Col. Wilman D. Barnes, [redacted], Army of the United States (lieutenant colonl, U.S. Army).

Col. Emmett W. Bowers, [redacted], Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).

Col. William H. Fitts, [redacted], Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).

Col. William J. Livsey, Jr., [redacted] Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).

Col. Floyd C. Adams, [redacted], Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).

Col. Alfred J. Cade, [redacted], Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).

Col. David E. Watts, [redacted], Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).

Col. James F. Cochran III, [redacted] Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).

Col. Joseph N. Jaggers, Jr., [redacted] Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).

Col. Thomas D. Ayers, [redacted], Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).

Col. William C. Rousse, [redacted], Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).

Col. Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., [redacted] Army of the United States (lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army).

Col. Glenn K. Otis, [redacted], Army of the United States (major, U.S. Army).

IN THE NAVY

Vice Adm. Harold E. Shear, U.S. Navy, having been designated for commands and other duties of great importance and responsibility determined by the President to be commensurate with the grade of admiral within the contemplation of title 10, United States Code, section 5231, for appointment to the grade of admiral while so serving.

Vice Adm. Jerome H. King, Jr., U.S. Navy, for appointment to the grade of vice admiral, when retired, pursuant to the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 5233.

IN THE AIR FORCE

Air Force nominations beginning John R. Chasteen, to be colonel, and ending Paul R. Day, to be lieutenant colonel, which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the Congressional Record on April 29, 1974.

Air Force nominations beginning Herbert E. Adams, to be lieutenant colonel, and ending Henry O. Wick, Jr., to be lieutenant colonel, which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the Congressional Record on May 2, 1974.

IN THE ARMY

Army nominations beginning Michael K. Abdo, to be second lieutenant, and ending Ancil L. Hicks, to be second lieutenant, which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the Congressional Record on April 29, 1974.

IN THE NAVY

Navy nominations beginning Clifford G. Barnes, Jr., to be ensign, and ending Richard R. Brown, to be a permanent commander and a temporary captain, which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the Congressional Record on May 6, 1974.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—*Monday, May 20, 1974*

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

Msgr. James P. Cassidy, director of Catholic Charities, archdiocese of New York, offered the following prayer:

Almighty and Eternal God, Lord of all nations, and Father of all men, we ask Your blessings for all who rule over us that they may exercise their office with wisdom and justice.

Bless them Lord with the courage to ignore their own selves and to be sensitive to the needs of the people they have been elected to serve.

Grant that all people may be aware of their devine vocation and strive to fulfill it with the help of Your Holy Spirit.

Today, on Cuban Independence Day, we pray for the liberty and freedom of all nations and for especially the people of the Cuban nation.

Lord, You make all things new and tell us to wait for Your Kingdom. Grant that the more longingly we look forward to the life of Heaven, the more carefully we carry out our present duties. Grant that we may all be together again with You for ever and ever. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER. The Chair has examined the Journal of the last day's proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof.

Without objection, the Journal stands approved.

There was no objection.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. Arrington, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed without amendment a bill of the House of the following title:

H.R. 10942. An act to amend the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of July 3, 1918 (40 Stat. 755), as amended, to extend and adapt its provisions to the Convention between the United States and the Government of Japan for the protection of migratory birds and birds in danger of extinction, and their environment, concluded at the city of Tokyo, March 4, 1972.

The message also announced that the Senate agrees to the amendment of the House to a bill of the Senate of the following title:

S. 775. An act to amend the Public Health Service Act to provide for the establishment of a National Institute on Aging.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed with an amendment in which the concurrence of the House is requested, a bill of the House of the following title:

H.R. 13999. An act to authorize appropriations for activities of the National Science Foundation, and for other purposes.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed a joint resolution of the following title, in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S.J. Res. 202. Joint resolution designating the premises occupied by the Chief of Naval Operations as the official residence of the Vice President, effective upon the termination of service of the incumbent Chief of Naval Operations.

The message also announced that Mr. STAFFORD was appointed in place of Mr. BUCKLEY as a conferee on H.R. 14368, Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act.

PERMISSION FOR MANAGERS TO FILE CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 14013, MAKING FURTHER SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1974

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the managers may have until midnight tonight to file a conference report on the bill (H.R. 14013) making further supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, and for other purposes.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

COMMITTEE REFORM AMENDMENTS OF 1974

(Mr. MARTIN of Nebraska asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MARTIN of Nebraska. Mr. Speaker, what should Members of the House tell their constituents in reporting to them on the status of the Committee Reform Amendments of 1974, House Resolution 988?

Dare we tell our constituents that this resolution, adopted unanimously by an official, bipartisan House committee after some 15 months of intensive hearings, studies, and discussion, has not been scheduled for debate but has been packed off to a group made up of just Democrats to see if it is to their particular liking?

The action by the Democratic Caucus in holding up action on House Resolution 988 and sending the resolution to a Democratic Caucus committee for study and recommendation has stripped this effort of its bipartisan foundation and turned it into a political circus.

Democrats in the House can, and ought to, feel an acute sense of embarrassment about this type of partisan maneuvering; Republicans can, and ought to, feel an acute sense of outrage. The public can, and ought to, feel a deep sense of embarrassment and outrage.

I call on the leadership to make every effort to terminate this inequitable, one-sided political arrangement and bring this legislation back into the official channels of House procedures so that the entire membership of the House can consider it and exercise its judgment on House Resolution 988.

When that happens we will all have something praiseworthy to tell our constituents.

AUTHENTICATED U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GPO

SPENDTHRIFT POSTAL SERVICE

(Mr. GROSS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, with appropriations to the U.S. Postal Service approaching $2 billion for this fiscal year, it seems important to me to find out just how the public's money is spent.

The pattern of wasteful stop-and-go decisionmaking by Postal Service managers is not reflective of the efficient operation we were promised under the Postal Reorganization Act.

In Pittsburgh the Postal Service incurred $881,000 in expenses for general design and specifications which, according to a 1971 General Accounting Office report, were not utilized. Subsequently, $889,000 was authorized for the architectural-engineering design on a second facility.

In Stamford, Conn., the Postal Service paid $400,000 for design plans which were canceled. It then paid $331,826 for the second design plans which were also canceled when the entire project was terminated, for a total loss of $731,826.

In Chicago, $593,917 was paid for design plans for the facility at North Suburban Chicago. The plans were canceled and a 20-year lease taken on a food company warehouse for $499,200 rent per year. The Postal Service then spent $317,000 for design plans to renovate the warehouse. The net result being that over one-half million dollars were lost in canceling the first proposed facility, and an additional $317,000 was spent on the second.

Mr. Speaker, with this sort of decisionmaking going on at L'Enfant Plaza, it is no wonder the Postal Service has to increase postal rates and request "transitional appropriations" in order to break even.

ADJOURNMENT TO 11 A.M. TUESDAY, MAY 21, 1974

Mr. O'NEILL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns today it adjourn to meet at 11 a.m., on tomorrow.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

CONSENT CALENDAR

The SPEAKER. This is Consent Calendar Day. The Clerk will call the first bill on the Consent Calendar.

AMENDING THE MILLER ACT

The Cerk called the bill (H.R. 11691) to amend the act of August 24, 1935 (commonly referred to as the "Miller Act") to provide for the inclusion of interest and legal fees in judgments granted on suits by subcontractors based upon payment bonds, and for other purposes.

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows:

H.R. 11691

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That subsection (a) of section 2 of the Act of August 24, 1935 (49 Stat. 794), as amended (40 U.S.C. 270b(a)), is amended by adding at the end thereof two new sentences reading: "Any judgment entered against a contractor and his surety, or either of them, and in favor of a person who has furnished labor and material in the prosecution of such work shall include interest on the sum or sums due him at the rate of 6 per centum per annum from the date on which payment thereof was due, together with such reasonable attorneys' fees as may be fixed in the discretion of the court. No promise or agreement to waive any right under this Act shall be valid if made or entered into prior to the date of accrual of the right to sue on the payment bond as provided for in this subsection, and payment for all labor and materials furnished in the prosecution of such work shall be conclusively presumed to be due on such date unless an earlier date has been agreed upon."

SEC. 2. The amendment made by this Act shall not be applicable with respect to any contract entered into prior to the date of the enactment of this Act.

Miss JORDAN. Mr. Speaker, the bill H.R. 11691 would amend the Miller Act to provide that interest and reasonable attorneys' fees are to be included in judgments in favor of subcontractors who bring actions to enforce their rights under payment bonds required by the act. The new language added by the bill would also render invalid any promise or agreement to waive any right under the Miller Act unless the waiver was made after the subcontractor's rights under the act had fully matured. Two new sentences would be added to subsection (a) of section 2 of the Miller Act to accomplish these purposes, and they would state:

Any judgment entered against a contractor and his surety, or either of them, and in favor of a person who has furnshed labor and material in the prosecution of such work shall include interest on the sum or sums due him at the rate of 6 per centum per annum from the date on which payment thereof was due, together with such reasonable attorneys' fees as may be fixed in the discretion of the court. No promise or agreement to waive any right under this Act shall be valid if made or entered into prior to the date of accrual of the right to sue on the payment bond as provided for in this subsection and payment for all labor and materials furnished in the prosecution of such work shall be conclusively presumed to be due on such date unless an earlier date has been agreed upon.

The bill H.R. 11691 was introduced in accordance with the recommendations of an executive communication from the General Services Administration which urged its enactment. The executive communication pointed out that its recommendation was based upon experience of the General Services Administration in handling complaints of subcontractors in connection with construction activities of the Government.

Section 2 of the Miller Act, found in the United States Code as section 270b of title 40, now provides that every person who has furnished labor material under a contract in which a payment bond is furnished under the act—that is, any contract exceeding $4,000 for the construction, alteration, or repair of any public building or public work of the United States—and who has not been paid in full therefor before the expiration of 90 days after the date the claim matured, shall have the right to sue on the bond for amounts unpaid. Under section 2(b) of the Miller Act, the suit must be brought in the U.S. District Court having jurisdiction where the contract was performed, within 1 year after the labor was completed or the materials supplied.

The bill would provide for interest at 6 percent per annum if a judgment is entered, and reasonable attorneys' fees, in the event of a successful suit by a subcontractor.

The executive communication states that subcontractors have complained to the GSA and other Federal agencies engaged in construction that they must litigate the claims for payment because the surety on Miller Act payment bonds, disclaim liability or fail to respond to their claims. In some cases the cost of legal proceedings is such that the subcontractor cannot afford to litigate. In this connection, the executive communication stated:

Many complaints received from subcontractors by GSA and other Federal agencies engaged in construction activities demonstrate that, because of a surety's disclaimer or failure to respond, their claims cannot be satisfied without litigation. It is clear that in many cases litigation costs would be so high in proportion to the amount which might be recovered as to constitute an effective economic barrier to the very protection which Congress has statutorily provided.

By including language which would, in effect, bar any promise or agreement to waive any right under the Miller Act unless entered into after a subcontractor's rights have fully matured, the amendments would implement the act's basic purpose of protecting the rights of subcontractors. In the words of the communication, this would give protection to a supplier or subcontractor who "inadvertently or from lack of legal assistance enters into an agreement whereby he waives all rights that would be available under the payment bond furnished by the contractor." By providing that any such waiver provision is invalid unless it was made after the subcontractor's rights under the act had fully matured, the bill would permit settlement of claims after performance had been completed.

Similar protection would be afforded by the bill to a subcontractor who enters into an agreement under which final payment becomes due and payable more than 90 days after completion of his performance under the subcontract. The Miller Act now provides for suit on the bond only if the subcontractor has not been paid within 90 days after the last of labor was performed or the material supplied. The bill would permit suit to be brought within the statutory period notwithstanding the contract provision for payment at a later date.

The General Accounting Office commented upon these provisions of the bill, noting that the second sentence added to the subsection by the amendment pro-

vides for the preservation of the right to pursue the remedy under the payment bond notwithstanding any agreements to the contrary. The General Accounting Office referred to situations in which subcontractors have been precluded from enforcing their rights under the Miller Act because they have filed suit after expiration of the limitation requiring suit to be brought within 1 year after the day on which the last of the labor was performed or material was supplied by the subcontractor as a result of reliance upon agreements with prime contractors that payment will not be due until the Government has paid the prime contractors. The General Accounting Office stated that it assumes that the amendment is intended to preclude the use of arbitration for the resolution of prime-subcontractor differences that might otherwise be settled by the courts under the Miller Act.

In this regard, the General Accounting Office observed in 37 Comp. Gen. 115, 116–117 (1957), that the courts have held that agreements that payments by prime contractors to subcontractors will not be due until the prime contractors are paid by the Government are void as contrary to the public policy expressed in the Miller Act so that suits filed within the Miller Act limitation would not be premature even though the prime contractors have not been paid by the Government. See *United States* v. *Holloway Company*, 126 F. Supp. 347 (1954), and *United States* v. *United Pacific Ins. Co.*, 122 F. Supp 48 (1954).

Under the existing law, the committee has been informed there is a lack of uniformity with regard to attorney's fees and interest in Miller cases in the various States. A U.S. district court must look to the State law to determine whether a successful litigant is entitled to attorney's fees and interest as a part of a judgment. As a result in certain States a subcontractor suing under the Miller Act may receive attorney's fees and interest but in another jurisdiction he would not. This bill would provide a desirable uniformity as to this subject.

The bill concerns matters and actions involving subcontractors. The Government is not directly involved in a contractual sense. That is, the Government is not a party to the subcontract. The executive communication points out that the proposed amendments would afford protection to those subcontractors, especially when they are small businessmen who might otherwise suffer from unnecessary financial losses when performing as subcontractors and material suppliers on Government contracts. The General Services Administration also stated that it does not believe that the bill would result in any increased cost to the Government. The only possible cost would be an indirect one based on the possibility that private surety companies would increase their bond premiums to reflect the added exposure to the payment of interest and attorneys' fees in the event a subcontractor enforced his right by suit. It can be assumed that the prime contractor's bid would reflect the increased premiums, if any.

The amendments are consistent with the policy of protecting subcontractors as embodied in the Miller Act. It is recommended that the bill be considered favorably.

Mr. MOORHEAD of California. Mr. Speaker, when Congress first passed the Miller Act in 1935, its primary objective was to safeguard the rights of subcontractors and suppliers in connection with Federal construction contracts. Normally, a mechanic's lien serves as an adequate security for payment for work done by subcontractors or suppliers in the construction industry. However, since a mechanic's lien does not attach to Federal property, some other mechanism was needed to protect them. Consequently, Congress provided a vehicle in Federal law so that subcontractors or suppliers could recover overdue payments from prime contractors on Government-financed projects.

The Miller Act requires the prime contractor to provide a payment bond, where the value of the contract exceeds $2,000. The payment bond is required as a security for the protection of those supplying labor and/or materials in the performance of such public contracts. Then, if a subcontractor or supplier is not paid within 90 days after full performance, he is given a right to bring an action in the U.S. district court against either the prime or the surety on the payment bond. The suit must be brought where the contract was performed, within 1 year after the labor was performed or the materials supplied. In enacting this law, the Congress embraced a public policy of protecting subcontractors working on Government construction contracts.

But, while the intent of the original Miller Act is clear, as a practical matter the remedy provided has all too often been illusory. Frequently, the cost of litigation is prohibitively high, when compared with the amount which may be recovered. So, in many instances, there exists a basic economic disincentive for bringing such suits. Also, either through a lack of legal advice or pressure from the prime contractor, a subcontractor often enters into an arrangement whereby he waives his rights under the Miller Act, in return for getting the job.

The amendments to the Miller Act, contained in the legislation (H.R. 11691) we consider today, seek to make that statute the genuine remedy it was intended to be. First, it authorizes the payment of attorney's fees and interest—6 percent per annum—to a successful plaintiff. Since the existing provisions of the Miller Act do not specifically authorize attorney's fees and interest, a Federal court applies the law of the State where the contract was performed. This has resulted in an unfortunate and unjust lack of uniformity with respect to the recovery of attorney's fees and interest.

So, for example, a subcontractor suing under the Miller Act in California or Kansas would recover both interest and legal fees while one suing in Mississippi or South Carolina would not. This is true irrespective of how comparatively meritorious their cases may be. Under Alaska law the allowance of attorney's fees to the prevailing party is left to the discretion of the trial court and, in Miller Act suits, the district court has gone both ways. *United States* v. *F. D. Rich Co.*, 434 F.2d. 855 (1970); *United States* v. *Peter Kiewit & Sons, Inc.*, 235 F. Supp. 500 (1964); and *Macri* v. *United States*, 353 F.2d 804 (1965).

Similar confusion clouds Miller Act suits in Texas, where the recovery of attorney's fees in some instances seemingly depends upon whether you sue the prime contractor or the surety. *Boyd Callan, Inc.* v. *United States*, 328 F.2d 505 (1964); *Transamerica Insurance Co.* v. *Red Top Metal, Inc.*, 384 F.2d 752 (1967)

H.R. 11691 would also render unenforceable any provision in a contract between the prime contractor, whereby the subcontractor purports to waive his rights under the Miller Act, including arbitration clauses. This provision aims at protecting the unknowing subcontractor or the one who falls victim to the inequality of bargaining power.

Mr. Speaker, this bill is fully supported by the General Services Administration, the Federal agency that deals most closely with these matters. It is legislation that protects a subcontractor on a Federal contract from being the victim of economic inequality or coercion. It is a proposal that seeks to make the remedies available under a Federal statute uniform throughout the several States.

This measure is fully consistent with the original intent of the Miller Act. In fact, it is an attempt to insure that its original intent is realized. I strongly urge my colleagues to support the adoption of this needed remedial measure.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

RENAMING CIVILIAN CONSERVATION CORPS CENTER IN FRANKLIN, N.C., IN HONOR OF FORMER PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 13685) to rename the first Civilian Conservation Corps Center located near Franklin, N.C., and the Cross Timbers National Grasslands in Texas in honor of former President Lyndon B. Johnson.

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows:

H.R. 13685

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the first Civilian Conservation Corps Center, known as the Arrowood Civilian Conservation Corps Center, located near Franklin, North Carolina, is redesignated as the "Lyndon B. Johnson Civilian Conservation Corps Center", and the Cross Timbers National Grasslands, located in Wise and Montague Counties, Texas, is redesignated as the "Lyndon B. Johnson National Grassland".

SEC. 2. Any law, regulation, document, map, or record of the United States in which reference is made to the Arrowood Civilian Conservation Corps Center or to the Cross Timbers National Grasslands shall be held and considered to be a reference to the Lyndon B. Johnson Civilian Conservation Corps Center and the Lyndon B. Johnson National Grasslands, respectively.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Mr. POAGE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Agriculture be discharged from further consideration of the Senate bill (S. 2835) to rename the first Civilian Conservation Corps Center located near Franklin, N.C., and the Cross Timbers National Grasslands in Texas in honor of former President Lyndon B. Johnson, a bill identical to H.R. 13685 just passed by the House, and I ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the title of the Senate bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, this is an identical bill; I mean, a verbatim bill?

Mr. POAGE. Yes, it is.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the Senate bill as follows:

S. 2835

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the first Civilian Conservation Corps Center, known as the Arrowood Civilian Conservation Corps Center, located near Franklin, North Carolina, is redesignated as the Lyndon B. Johnson Civilian Conservation Corps Center, and the Cross Timbers National Grasslands, located in Wise and Montague Counties, Texas, is redesignated as the Lyndon B. Johnson National Grasslands.

SEC. 2. Any law, regulation, document, map, or record of the United States in which reference is made to the Arrowood Civilian Conservation Corps Center or to the Cross Timbers National Grasslands shall be held and considered to be a reference to the Lyndon B. Johnson Civilian Conservation Corps Center and the Lyndon B. Johnson National Grasslands, respectively.

The Senate bill was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

A similar House bill (H.R. 13685) was laid on the table.

CALL OF THE HOUSE

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.

Without objection, a call of the House was ordered.

There was no objection.

The call was taken by electronic device, and the following Members failed to respond:

[Roll No. 229]

Anderson, Calif.	Brasco	Clausen, Don H.
Andrews, N.C.	Broomfield	Clawson, Del
Ashbrook	Brotzman	Clay
Badillo	Buchanan	Conyers
Bafalis	Burke, Calif.	Corman
Barrett	Burke, Fla.	Cotter
Bell	Butler	Culver
Biaggi	Byron	Daniels, Dominick V.
Biester	Carey, N.Y.	Danielson
Blatnik	Carney, Ohio	Davis, Ga.
Boland	Chisholm	Davis, S.C.
Bolling	Clancy	
Brademas	Clark	
Delaney	Hunt	Rangel
Dennis	Ichord	Reid
Dent	Jarman	Rinaldo
Diggs	Johnson, Pa.	Roncalio, Wyo.
Dingell	Jones, Okla.	Rooney, N.Y.
Donohue	Kluczynski	Rooney, Pa.
Dorn	Kyros	Roy
Dulski	Landgrebe	Ruppe
Eckhardt	Landrum	Satterfield
Eilberg	Lehman	Scherle
Eshleman	Litton	Schneebeli
Findley	Long, La.	Schroeder
Fish	Long, Md.	Sebelius
Fisher	Luken	Shipley
Flood	McCloskey	Shoup
Flowers	McCormack	Shuster
Ford, William D.	McKinney	Skubitz
	McSpadden	Smith, Iowa
Fountain	Macdonald	Staggers
Gaydos	Madigan	Stanton, J. William
Gettys	Mann	Steed
Giaimo	Maraziti	Steele
Gibbons	Matsunaga	Steiger, Wis.
Goldwater	Mayne	Stubblefield
Goodling	Milford	Teague
Grasso	Mink	Udall
Gray	Mitchell, Md.	Vander Jagt
Green, Oreg.	Mollohan	Veysey
Green, Pa.	Moorhead, Calif.	Vigorito
Griffiths	Moorhead, Pa.	Waldie
Gunter	Morgan	Ware
Hanna	Moss	Widnall
Hansen, Idaho	Murphy, Ill.	Williams
Harrington	Murphy, N.Y.	Wyatt
Hays	Nedzi	Wydler
Heckler, Mass.	Nelsen	Wyman
Heinz	Nix	Yatron
Helstoski	Parris	Young, Ga.
Hogan	Peyser	Young, S.C.
Holifield	Podell	
Huber	Pritchard	
Hudnut	Quie	

The SPEAKER. On this rollcall 274 Members have recorded their presence by electronic device, a quorum.

By unanimous consent, further proceedings under the call were dispensed with.

USDA DELAYS FLEMING KEY ANIMAL IMPORT CENTER PLANNING

(Mr. MELCHER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MELCHER. Mr. Speaker, although directed by action of the 92d Congress to build an import quarantine center to import European breeds of cattle and other livestock at Fleming Key off the coast of Florida, the Department of Agriculture has failed to start the plans and design of the facilities.

Congress appropriated $300,000 for design and planning in fiscal year 1973. The Department advises me:

The design criteria have been completed. Architectural-engineering firms have been evaluated and ranked in order of preference by a review board.

But—the Department then equivocates by saying that they do not intend to expand the $300,000 appropriation for design and planning until construction funds are available.

For the current fiscal year appropriations the conference committee of the Agriculture Appropriations Committee asked that the request for funds for the Fleming Key Animal Import Center be made in the routine way through the President's budget rather than asking for the funds outside the normal budgetary process. That was not done. Now the Department position is that this quarantine center should be financed through private sources.

Whether it is private or Government funds that pay the bill for this needed facility I would strongly urge the Department to get right on the job of design and planning the installation, which usually takes a year, so that when the funds are available construction can start. Further delay only stalls what is an obvious need for the U.S. livestock industry. Also the stall defies the will of Congress in directing that the $300,000 appropriated be used for the purpose of planning and it's obvious that the Department has wasted a year or more in defiance of the directive of Congress.

MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION, 1975

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 1112 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution as follows:

H. RES. 1112

Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 14592) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1975 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces and of civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, and to authorize the military training student loads and for other purposes. After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and shall continue not to exceed four hours, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services, the bill shall be read for amendment under the five-minute rule by titles instead of by sections. At the conclusion of the consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill, and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Indiana (Mr. MADDEN) is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. MARTIN) pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, last week the House Rules Committee held hearings on the 1975 military authorization legislation and reported out an open rule with 4 hours of general debate—House Resolution 1112.

Chairman HÉBERT and other members of the Armed Services Committee testified at length regarding the important features of this legislation, after months of extended hearings of recorded testimony from the heads of the various armed services, Members of Congress, et cetera.

This legislation reported by the Armed Services Committee provided for appropriation authorization of $22,642,963,000. The total authorization includes $13,641,000 for procurement of aircraft, mis-

siles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons. The sum of $9,001,663,000 is authorized for research, development testing, and evaluation.

After the hearings were completed the Armed Services Committee reduced the total amount of this authorization by $487 million. The total amount of the authorization is $1.2 billion above the 1974 authorization.

The total authorization also includes $1,400,000,000 for the military assistance service funded program, providing for military assistance to South Vietnam.

The Armed Services Committee reduced the requested airborne warning and control system authorization from $515.4 million to $257.7 million. This reduction included authorizing 6 instead of 12 aircraft.

The committee denied the request of $50 million for the stretched version of the C–141 aircraft.

The request of $132.9 million for the civilian reserve air fleet program was reduced to $25 million.

The procurement authorization request for $14.3 million for two patrol gunboats to be furnished the South Vietnamese Navy was denied.

The Defense Department's request for $9.2 million for 45 naval craft to be furnished to the South Vietnamese Navy was denied also.

The $106.3 million request for procurement of the Dragon missile for the Army was reduced to $86.5 million, in which the Army Department concurred.

The request for $25.3 million for 35 armored reconnaissance scout vehicles was denied.

Further changes were made which resulted in a reduction of $8.4 million in Army procurement authorizations, which met with the concurrence of the Army.

Mr. Speaker, I fully realize that some of these items in this military procurement bill are controversial. The open rule will permit the Members to have an opportunity to offer amendments, and I urge the adoption of this rule in order that we may discuss and debate H.R. 14592 this 1975 armed services authorization bill.

Mr. MARTIN of Nebraska. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, as the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. MADDEN) has explained, House Resolution 1112 provides for an open rule and 4 hours of debate on the bill H.R. 14592, the military procurement authorization for fiscal year 1975. As I say, this is an open rule which provides that the bill shall be read for amendment under the 5-minute rule by titles instead of by sections. There are no waivers of points of order. It is a completely open rule. I know of no obligation to the rule itself, and I urge, Mr. Speaker, the adoption of the rule.

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, I have no requests for time.

Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the resolution.

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the resolution.

The question was taken.

Mr. SNYDER. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 298, nays 0, not voting 135, as follows:

[Roll No. 230]

YEAS—298

Abdnor	Frenzel	Miller
Abzug	Frey	Mills
Adams	Froehlich	Minish
Addabbo	Fulton	Minshall, Ohio
Anderson, Ill.	Fuqua	Mitchell, Md.
Andrews, N. Dak.	Gettys	Mitchell, N.Y.
Annunzio	Gibbons	Mizell
Archer	Gilman	Moakley
Arends	Ginn	Mollohan
Armstrong	Gonzalez	Montgomery
Ashley	Green, Oreg.	Moorhead, Calif.
Aspin	Gross	Mosher
Baker	Grover	Murtha
Bauman	Gubser	Myers
Beard	Gude	Natcher
Bennett	Guyer	Nedzi
Bergland	Haley	Nelsen
Bevill	Hamilton	Nichols
Biester	Hammer-schmidt	Obey
Bingham	Hanley	O'Brien
Blackburn	Hanrahan	O'Hara
Boggs	Hansen, Wash.	O'Neill
Boland	Harsha	Owens
Bowen	Hastings	Passman
Bray	Hawkins	Patman
Breaux	Hébert	Patten
Breckinridge	Hechler, W. Va.	Pepper
Brinkley	Henderson	Perkins
Brooks	Hicks	Pettis
Brown, Calif.	Hillis	Pickle
Brown, Mich.	Hinshaw	Pike
Brown, Ohio	Hogan	Poage
Broyhill, N.C.	Holifield	Powell, Ohio
Broyhill, Va.	Holt	Preyer
Burgener	Holtzman	Price, Ill.
Burke, Calif.	Horton	Price, Tex.
Burke, Mass.	Hosmer	Quillen
Burleson, Tex.	Howard	Railsback
Burlison, Mo.	Hungate	Randall
Burton	Hunt	Rarick
Byron	Hutchinson	Rees
Camp	Ichord	Regula
Carney, Ohio	Johnson, Calif.	Reuss
Casey, Tex.	Johnson, Colo.	Rhodes
Cederberg	Jones, Ala.	Riegle
Chamberlain	Jones, N.C.	Roberts
Chappell	Jones, Tenn.	Robinson, Va.
Cleveland	Jordan	Robison, N.Y.
Cochran	Karth	Rodino
Cohen	Kastenmeier	Roe
Collier	Kazen	Rogers
Collins, Ill.	Kemp	Roncallo, N.Y.
Collins, Tex.	Ketchum	Rose
Conable	King	Rosenthal
Conte	Koch	Rostenkowski
Conyers	Kuykendall	Roush
Coughlin	Lagomarsino	Rousselot
Crane	Landgrebe	Roybal
Cronin	Latta	Runnels
Daniel, Dan	Leggett	Ruth
Daniel, Robert W., Jr.	Lent	Ryan
Davis, Wis.	Long, Md.	St Germain
de la Garza	Lott	Sandman
Dellenback	Lujan	Sarasin
Dellums	Luken	Sarbanes
Denholm	McClory	Satterfield
Derwinski	McCollister	Seiberling
Devine	McDade	Shriver
Dickinson	McEwen	Sikes
Dingell	McFall	Sisk
Downing	McKay	Slack
Drinan	Macdonald	Smith, N.Y.
Duncan	Madden	Snyder
du Pont	Mahon	Spence
Edwards, Ala.	Mallary	Stanton, James V.
Edwards, Calif.	Martin, Nebr.	Stark
Erlenborn	Martin, N.C.	Steelman
Esch	Mathias, Calif.	Steiger, Ariz.
Evans, Colo.	Mathis, Ga.	Stephens
Evins, Tenn.	Mayne	Stokes
Fascell	Mazzoli	Stratton
Fish	Meeds	Stuckey
Flynt	Melcher	Studds
Foley	Metcalfe	Sullivan
Forsythe	Mezvinsky	Symington
Symms	Michel	Wilson, Charles, Tex.
Talcott	Vander Veen	Winn
Taylor, Mo.	Vanik	Wolff
Taylor, N.C.	Veysey	Wright
Thompson, N.J.	Waggonner	Wylie
Thomson, Wis.	Walsh	Yates
Thone	Wampler	Young, Alaska
Thornton	Whalen	Young, Fla.
Tiernan	White	Young, Ill.
Towell, Nev.	Whitehurst	Young, Tex.
Traxler	Whitten	Zablocki
Treen	Widnall	Zion
Ullman	Wiggins	Zwach
Van Deerlin	Wilson, Bob	
Vander Jagt	Wilson, Charles H., Calif.	

NAYS—0

NOT VOTING—135

Alexander	Findley	Moss
Anderson, Calif.	Fisher	Murphy, Ill.
Andrews, N.C.	Flood	Murphy, N.Y.
Ashbrook	Flowers	Nix
Badillo	Ford	Parris
Bafalis	Fountain	Peyser
Barrett	Fraser	Podell
Bell	Frelinghuysen	Pritchard
Biaggi	Gaydos	Quie
Blatnik	Giaimo	Rangel
Bolling	Goldwater	Reid
Brademas	Goodling	Rinaldo
Brasco	Grasso	Roncalio, Wyo.
Broomfield	Gray	Rooney, N.Y.
Brotzman	Green, Pa.	Rooney, Pa.
Buchanan	Griffiths	Roy
Burke, Fla.	Gunter	Ruppe
Butler	Hanna	Scherle
Carey, N.Y.	Hansen, Idaho	Schneebeli
Carter	Harrington	Schroeder
Chisholm	Hays	Sebelius
Clancy	Heckler, Mass.	Shipley
Clark	Heinz	Shoup
Clausen, Don H.	Helstoski	Shuster
Clawson, Del	Huber	Skubitz
Clay	Hudnut	Smith, Iowa
Conlan	Jarman	Staggers
Corman	Johnson, Pa.	Stanton, J. William
Cotter	Jones, Okla.	Steed
Culver	Kluczynski	Steele
Daniels, Dominick V.	Kyros	Steiger, Wis.
Danielson	Landrum	Stubblefield
Davis, Ga.	Lehman	Teague
Davis, S.C.	Litton	Udall
Delaney	Long, La.	Vigorito
Dennis	McCloskey	Waldie
Dent	McCormack	Ware
Diggs	McKinney	Williams
Donohue	McSpadden	Wyatt
Dorn	Madigan	Wydler
Dulski	Maraziti	Wyman
Eckhardt	Matsunaga	Yatron
Eilberg	Milford	Young, Ga.
Eshleman	Mink	Young, S.C.
	Moorhead, Pa.	
	Morgan	

So the resolution was agreed to.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

Mr. Dominick V. Daniels with Mr. Kyros.
Mr. Rooney of New York with Mr. Milford.
Mr. Teague with Mrs. Mink.
Mr. Steed with Mr. Davis of Georgia.
Mr. Brasco with Mr. Hanna.
Mr. Corman with Mr. Butler.
Mr. Helstoski with Mr. Findley.
Mr. Biaggi with Mr. Carter.
Mr. Rooney of Pennsylvania with Mr. Dennis.
Mr. Delaney with Mr. Ashbrook.
Mr. Eilberg with Mr. Conlan.
Mr. Donohue with Mr. Clancy.
Mr. Shipley with Mr. Bafalis.
Mr. Stubblefield with Mr. Eshleman.
Mr. Yatron with Mr. Don H. Clausen.
Mr. Young of Georgia with Mrs. Schroeder.
Mr. Moorhead of Pennsylvania with Mr. Bell.
Mr. Murphy of New York with Mr. Del Clawson.
Mrs. Chisholm with Mr. Culver.
Mr. Morgan with Mr. Broomfield.
Mr. Gunter with Mr. Badillo.
Mr. Diggs with Mr. Eckhardt.
Mr. Harrington with Mr. Clay.
Mr. Rangel with Mr. Fraser.
Mr. Barrett with Mr. Frelinghuysen.

Mr. Green of Pennsylvania with Mr. Brotzman.
Mrs. Grasso with Mr. Goldwater.
Mr. Podell with Mr. Heinz.
Mr. Nix with Mr. Blatnik.
Mr. Murphy of Illinois with Mr. Huber.
Mr. Flood with Mr. Buchanan.
Mr. Ford with Mr. Hudnut.
Mr. Gaydos with Mr. Burke of Florida.
Mr. Giaimo with Mr. Goodling.
Mr. Hays with Mrs. Heckler of Massachusetts.
Mr. Kluczynski with Mr. Hansen of Idaho.
Mr. Dent with Mr. Jarman.
Mr. Flowers with Mr. Johnson of Pennsylvania.
Mr. Carey of New York with Mr. Fisher.
Mr. Alexander with Mr. Landrum.
Mr. Fountain with Mr. Madigan.
Mr. Jones of Oklahoma with Mr. Litton.
Mr. Dulski with Mr. Parris.
Mr. Lehman with Mr. Maraziti.
Mr. Anderson of California with Mr. Andrews of North Carolina.
Mr. Long of Louisiana with Mr. Peyser.
Mr. Mann with Mr. Moss.
Mr. Cotter with Mr. Quie.
Mr. Matsunaga with Mr. McCloskey.
Mr. Brademas with Mr. Rinaldo.
Mr. Clark with Mr. McKinney.
Mr. Dorn with Mr. Roncallo of New York.
Mr. Gray with Mr. McSpadden.
Mr. J. William Stanton with Mr. Ruppe.
Mr. Reed with Mr. Scherle.
Mr. Danielson with Mr. Shoup.
Mr. Roy with Mr. Skubitz.
Mr. Smith of Iowa with Mr. Schneebeli.
Mr. Staggers with Mrs. Griffiths.
Mr. Steiger of Wisconsin with Mr. Sebelius.
Mr. Steele with Mr. Williams.
Mr. Davis of South Carolina with Mr. Shuster.
Mr. Udall with Mr. Vigorito.
Mr. Waldie with Mr. Young of South Carolina.
Mr. Wyatt with Mr. Ware.
Mr. Wydler with Mr. Wyman.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded. A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 14592) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1975 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces and of civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, and to authorize the military training student loads and for other purposes.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. HÉBERT).

The motion was agreed to.

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 14592) with Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

By unanimous consent, the first reading of the bill was dispensed with.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. HÉBERT) will be recognized for 2 hours, and the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. BRAY) will be recognized for 2 hours.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. HÉBERT).

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Any Member of the House who has anything to say on this very complex subject will be allowed the time he desires today.

I hope that consideration will be given during the amendment period and that it will not be abused by some individuals. We ran into a difficult situation last year, as the Members will recall. I refused to ask that debate be cut off, but other Members insisted that it be cut and did make the motion.

Mr. Chairman, let me first inform Members that it is our intention to complete general debate today and that on completion of general debate the committee will rise. We can then begin reading for amendments when the committee meets tomorrow.

It has been my custom since becoming chairman of the Armed Services Committee to assure the House at the beginning of the annual consideration of this important bill that I would make no move to cut off debate. As I said, I renew that promise again today.

WHAT THE BILL DOES

H.R. 14592 authorizes appropriations for all major military procurement and for research, development, test, and evaluation; authorizes the active duty and Reserve strengths of the Armed Forces; and authorizes the military training student load.

This year for the first time the bill authorizes the annual civilian personnel strength for the Department of Defense.

The action on the civilian personnel strength was accomplished with the splendid cooperation of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service; and I wish to express my deepest appreciation to the gentleman from New York (Mr. DULSKI) and the members of his committee. The Manpower Subcommittee of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee met jointly with our own Manpower Subcommittee during the consideration of this title of the bill, and the separate statement by the Post Office and Civil Service Subcommittee will be found in our report beginning on page 79. This is, I believe, a unique example of outstanding cooperation between two committees on a matter that affects the prerogatives of more than one committee.

It is necessary for this authorization to pass before appropriations can be voted for the military departments.

Therefore, the legislation is absolutely necessary for continued operation of our military establishment.

DOLLAR TOTALS

Let me briefly list the significant dollar totals in the bill:

Authorization requested: $23,130,139,000.

Recommended by the committee: $22,642,963,000.

Reduction from Defense Department request: $487,176,000.

The net reduction does not tell the whole story, however. The committee actually made reductions totaling more than $800 million and made additions totaling over $300 million.

PERSONNEL IMPACT

In addition to the dollar impact of decisions on procurement and R.D.T. & E., the committee action on personnel will have a significant impact on budgetary requirements. Personnel costs now take 55 percent of our Defense budget.

Our committee has made a slight reduction of 2,810 in the active duty strength of the Armed Forces and has increased the Selected Reserve strengths by approximately 54,000. But it has reduced the Defense Department's civilian personnel strength request by 15,000. While not reflected in the dollar totals of the bill, the net effect of the committee's personnel revisions, when implemented, will be a reduction of approximately $121 million from the administration's Defense budget request.

NUCLEAR POLICY

In addition to the money authorizations and strength levels, the committee has made important policy decisions in two other areas:

The committee has added to the bill a new title, title VIII, which would establish as the policy of the United States the requirement that construction of future major combat ships for the U.S. Navy be nuclear powered. I particularly recommend that Members read the section of our report beginning on page 6 on the "Nuclear Navy." It was the Congress which dragged the Navy and the Department of Defense into the nuclear age and, sadly the Congress is still required to take the lead in this vital area.

The committee continued the military assistance service funded—MASF—program authority to aid South Vietnam. But we provided a limitation of $1.4 billion for fiscal year 1975, a reduction of $200 million below the amount requested by the Department. The committee also rewrote the language of this section of the bill, section 701, to require the establishment of a single fund. This will improve the administration and accounting of the funds used for this purpose and make the use of such funds more responsive to congressional intent.

The committee language provides that unobligated balances previously authorized for the program are repealed as of June 30, 1974.

COMMITTEE PROCEDURE

The bill I bring before the committee today is the product of 67 days of hearings in the Committee on Armed Services. In addition to 14 days of hearings by the full committee, there were:

Twenty days of hearings by subcommittee No. 1, chaired by Mr. PRICE of Illinois, with Mr. GUBSER as ranking minority member. Subcommittee No. 1 considered title II, the research and development portion of the bill.

Twenty-one days of hearings by subcommittee No. 2, chaired by Mr. FISHER, with Mr. DICKINSON as ranking minority member. Subcommittee No. 2 considered titles III, IV, V, and VI, the personnel sections of the bill.

Twelve days of hearings by subcommittee No. 3, chaired by Mr. BENNETT, with Mr. BOB WILSON as ranking minority member. Subcommittee No. 3 consid-

ered the naval ship construction portion of title I of the bill and also the new title VIII on nuclear ship construction policy. Title VIII results from legislation developed separately by Mr. BENNETT and Mr. WILSON.

Following my remarks, I am going to yield to Mr. PRICE to explain the R. & D. authorizations, Mr. FISHER to explain the manpower decisions, and Mr. BENNETT to discuss ship construction programs.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to express my appreciation, not only to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the subcommittees, but also to all members of the committee for their work on this bill. The bill involves literally thousands of separate items. The hearings fill four volumes. It would be simply impossible to complete the committee's required work without the splendid cooperation and diligent attendance that we have had by members of the committee.

MAJOR ADDITIONS

The committee's report is available to all Members of the House. It is 132 pages, and it explains the actions taken by the committee. Let me just highlight some of the major changes.

A–7

The committee added $104.9 million for the procurement of 24 A–7D aircraft and specified in the bill that these A–7's shall be for the use of the Air National Guard.

F–111

The committee added $205.5 million for the procurement of 12 F–111 aircraft.

In providing funds for the F–111, the committee continues the procurement of one of the outstanding aircraft in the world, the only tactical aircraft in our inventory capable of performing a strategic nuclear mission. This action keeps open the only active aircraft production line in the free world capable of producing a strategic bomber. I want to emphasize, however, that the committee considers even the bomber version of the F–111 as an interim aircraft until the B–1 comes along. We do not consider the bomber version of the F–111 a long-term replacement for the B–52. In title II of the bill the committee has provided the development money for the B–1, which we must have the option to produce to assure the continuation of the manned element of our strategic triad.

MAJOR REDUCTIONS

The R. & D. request was reduced $323.3 million. The reductions affect a great variety of programs. They are explained in the report and will be discussed more fully by Mr. PRICE in the course of this debate.

The committee denied $50 million requested for the stretched version of the C–141. The committee determined that authorization should not be provided until prototypes have been developed and engineering and flight-testing completed.

The procurement request for modification of the Civil Air Reserve Fleet (CRAF) was reduced from $132.9 million to $25 million, a reduction of $107.9 million. Because of the failure to provide funding in the fiscal year 1974 supplemental appropriation bill, the committee believes the authorization should be limited to $25 million for fiscal year 1975. This will provide for basic engineering, design, and tooling. The committee does not oppose the concept of the program.

The request for the E–3A (AWACS) was reduced by $257.7 million, a 50-percent reduction. The committee believes this program should be slowed down until completion of the complex system integration testing.

The committee turned down the request for $14.3 million for patrol gunboats and $9.2 million for 45 naval craft, all of which would have been furnished to the South Vietnamese Navy. The committee believes these vessels for South Vietnam should be provided through the military assistance program.

COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT

In some cases the committee has imposed requirements to make sure that authorizations are prudently used. In providing $436.5 million for the patrol frigate program, the committee has provided in the bill that the contract for construction of these ships shall not be entered into until the Secretary of the Navy has notified the committee that the fire control system for the ship has been satisfactorily tested.

In providing funds for the procurement of the A–10 close-support aircraft for the Air Force, the committee has made clear in its report that the authorization is available subject to a favorable decision in the flyoff competition between the A–10 and the A–7.

SPECIAL CONCERNS

In addition to its actions on the specific weapons program requests of the military departments, the committee has, in its report, expressed special concern in a number of areas.

Beginning on page 37 of the report, the committee expresses its concern for the management of R. & D. programs in the Department of Defense. The discussion will be useful to Members of the House, and I caution those in the R. & D. business in the military departments to read it also. The mounting cost of defense is going to require improved procedures in managing weapons programs. And it is going to require our committee to look more closely at expensive programs.

We have not fully absorbed, as yet, the lessons of the October war in the Middle East for our Armed Forces.

But that war has made us aware of the awesome capacity of the Soviets to produce and supply conventional arms to countries with which it seeks influence. On page 8 of the report the committee expresses its particular concern with the limitations on the capacity in our own country to produce tanks and with the considerable numerical advantage the Soviets have in tank inventories. At present, there is only one producer in the United States; and the rate of production is 360 a year. The Soviets have provided more than that number to one Arab country in a matter of weeks.

Last year the House, via the Peyser amendment, directed our committee to make a study of our commitments in Europe. The report resulting from that study, which our committee approved by a vote of 32 to 5, was transmitted to the House on April 8. On page 5 of the report the committee discusses the essential points of that study which Members of the House should keep in mind in considering any proposals to change our NATO deployment. Briefly, we are in the middle of a process that was begun as a result of U.S. urging. Negotiations began in Vienna last October which will affect not only the level of troops in Europe, but the whole spectrum of détente. The Jackson-Nunn amendment requiring the NATO allies to offset our balance-of-payments deficit due to troops in Europe was enacted as part of last year's bill, and efforts are underway to meet the requirements of that amendment. The prospects for success look very good.

To reduce forces in Europe now would undercut the mutual and balanced force reductions negotiations, would throw away the beneficial economic effect of Jackson-Nunn, and would make the United States look capricious and irresponsible on the world's stage.

CONCLUSION

Since the authorization bill was brought to the floor last year, the free world has had a frightening lesson in the necessity for military preparedness.

I hope the lesson was not lost on Members of the House. The October war in the Middle East gave renewed evidence not only of the willingness of the Soviets to sponsor aggressive action, but of their capacity to supply arms at an incredible rate.

All of the evidence available to us also indicates that the Soviets continue to develop strategic missile capability at an undiminished pace and continue the feverish expansion of their worldwide naval forces. We all want peace. But surely the last 55 sad years of history, if it has taught us anything, teaches us that we do not get peace by reducing the capabilities for defense. In our world it is absolutely necessary to keep our Armed Forces in a high state of readiness. That means keeping them supplied with adequate weapons systems of today. But it also means keeping the technological vigor to make sure our forces will be ready for any eventuality in the decade ahead. The bill I present to you today is necessary to carry out the Congress part of that awesome responsibility.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Chairman, will the distinguished gentleman yield?

Mr. HÉBERT. I am happy to yield to the distinguished gentleman from Texas (Mr. GONZALEZ).

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Chairman, first I am sure that I express the sentiments of most if not all Members of the House in wishing to compliment the distinguished gentleman from Louisiana for the monumental task that the gentleman handles for us. I rise only to compliment the gentleman and his committee, and to ask the gentleman a question in connection with a matter that I believe is of great importance to the country, and especially in view of those who believe that you have provided too much in this authorization bill.

The question that I have is: In view of the recommended strength and the pro-

jected strength of the Army of less than 800,000 men, and also reductions in some of the other services, does the gentleman believe that this is adequate, and have we not reached the danger point?

Mr. HÉBERT. We have reached a point of necessity in an area where we must recognize that we need the maximum of muscle. We have 800,000 provided for in the Army, and I might say that they are having some difficulty in recruiting in some areas. But I am sure the gentleman has noticed that we have increased the reserve forces by some 58,000 men.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Yes.

Mr. HÉBERT. And as we move down the lane further in the future, we have to realize that the area of personnel now demands 55 percent of the budget.

So if we make a strong regular cadre out of the active military, and have a strong reserve force that can be called up quickly, and functions properly, then we can save a great amount of money, and still have the capability and the ability to rally these forces.

I believe that the committee has taken that into consideration, and is following in line with what not only the Army has recommended, but also the Air Force and Navy.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Chairman, may I say that that makes sense, and I thank the gentleman for his reply. I trust that the gentleman through his leadership will help us avoid at this point in our national history the same sad and tragic errors that we have made twice before, when we stripped ourselves of our defense capabilities only to find ourselves in an emergency, and then having to do everything we could so as to procure the equipment that was needed.

In other words, if the gentleman will recall, after World War I and after World War II and after Korea, we did disengage, and we did reduce, but history has shown that we reduced a little bit too fast, and too foolishly.

I hope we do not do the same thing this time. I am very hopeful that under the gentleman's leadership it will not happen this time.

Mr. HÉBERT. I will say to the gentleman from Texas it is certainly refreshing and reassuring for me to hear his remarks. I only wish that the spirit of those remarks and their logic and their full impact would spread more widely, not only in the Congress here, and in the House in which we serve, but throughout the country.

The situation has not changed at all. The Russians know only one language—only one language and no other. That language is strength. We must maintain our strength. We cannot go to the table to negotiate unless we have the backup strength.

This bill gives us the opportunity of holding that strength, although I personally would like to go even beyond the bill in some areas. Consider that our Navy has dropped in the number of ships by hundreds the ships in our Navy are, on the average, far older than the ships in the Russian navy. This is a horrible situation in which we find ourselves, and it is very annoying—which is about the only word I can use—to hear people strongly cry out for a reduction in our forces when we are doing the best we can to maintain this Nation. Some cry out that too much money is being spent on defense but 55 percent is spent on manpower. Take away the 55 percent and we have comparatively little with which to buy new weapons.

I think the gentleman from Texas has expressed a sentiment which I only hope will be more widespread in this House and in this country.

Mr. GONZALEZ. I thank the chairman.

Mr. KAZEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HÉBERT. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. KAZEN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for the work he has done on this bill and for his attitude as far as our national defense is concerned. I, for one, think that we should not lower our guard. I fully agree with what the gentleman has said.

If we are to maintain our relationship in this world, we must remain strong, and I would hate to see anything cut from this bill that would weaken us in the face of possible adversaries in the future, because we cannot just turn the switch on at that time for that which we need and have everything that we need immediately. We have got to provide for it.

Let me ask the gentleman one question. What has happened to our flight training program under this bill here? Are we cutting off any of the flight training?

Mr. HÉBERT. No; we are not cutting off any of the flight training, we are also expanding the capability of the Reserve Air Forces by providing additional A-7D's which must go to the National Guard.

We also had to be very sensitive about another area. There are some individuals and some very fine people who believe in national defense as much as the gentleman from Texas and I do. There is a movement to sort of combine the training of the National Guard and the Air Reserve which, would destroy the Guard. We have to be very alert to that. We have to understand these things. They are well-meaning, well-intentioned people.

We hear voices raised on the floor against the bill, in offering amendments, but the same voices seem to cry out against every military item. I recognize that the voices are often the same; the forces are often the same, and the arguments are always the same. I have not seen a new one come over the horizon yet.

Mr. KAZEN. I thank the gentleman from Louisiana, and I intend to stand by him.

Ms. ABZUG. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HÉBERT. I yield to the gentlewoman from New York.

Ms. ABZUG. Do you recognize the face, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. HÉBERT. I certainly recognize the voice.

Ms. ABZUG. I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that obviously some of the voices that were raised did create some change in policies and attitudes with respect to the war in Vietnam and in Cambodia. Would the gentleman not agree?

Mr. HÉBERT. The gentlewoman did what?

Ms. ABZUG. Not I. People have changed their minds. Voices do change and faces do change.

What I would like to know is what is the purpose of the research and development proposals for the new maneuverable reentry vehicles popularly known, I believe, as MARV.

Mr. HÉBERT. Does the gentlewoman mean MIRV's?

Ms. ABZUG. No, MARV.

Mr. HÉBERT. In the area of research and development? I would be very happy to answer the gentlewoman's question, but as I have indicated I am going to leave that part of the program in the hands of the expert on our committee, the gentleman from Illinois (MELVIN PRICE), and I suggest to the gentlewoman when he rises that she address any question on research and development to him. The gentlewoman must keep in mind that the Armed Services Committee has a job to do and he does it well. The man in this area of responsibility is the gentleman from Illinois (MELVIN PRICE) and he will talk to the gentlewoman on this subject.

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HÉBERT. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, naturally this is an advancement of art in the weapons system. I think unless we do continue to advance and always have a secondary weapon we will be out of commission. The Soviet Union is pressing us pretty far in the area of the reentry vehicles. I think this indicates an advancement in the art.

Ms. ABZUG. If the gentleman will yield further, it was my understanding that kind of advancement in the art—and correct me if I am wrong—would seem to indicate a new strategy with respect to our program and policy. I understood always it was a deterrent policy, and development of these other kinds of weapons actually represent a new strategy of a first strike capability rather than a deterrent strategy.

I would suggest we ought to keep ourselves strong in order to keep the peace, as the chairman of the committee indicated before, and that kind of strategy would seem to indicate we would be incorrect in increasing our strength and therefore also the probability of war and not of peace. When we first started manufacturing, after we did the research and development on the MIRV, the Soviet Union did not have these weapons. But once we started producing MIRV's, the Soviet Union started to develop MIRV's. We still have an enormous advantage over the Soviets in the development of these weapons—an advance of 5 years or so. But if we are to start a new program of weapons with increased counterforce capabilities, we will only be encouraging the Soviet Union to keep up with us, thereby accelerating the nuclear

arms race. There is no reason in the world for increasing our counterforce capabilities except to achieve a first-strike capability. And if that is our goal and we are, in fact, reversing our policy of nuclear deterrence, should we adopt such a radical departure in policy in an authorization bill, without giving the Members of Congress an opportunity to focus on this and to discuss it more fully? Will the gentleman explain that?

Mr. HÉBERT. I will explain it. This is an authorization, not an appropriation. It is a proper place for Congress to make policy. That goes not to research and development, but to the logic of the situation. Are we going to stand by and just twiddle our thumbs and let the Russians advance? We know they are making a great deal of progress in research and development, at a greater rate than we have ever made in our history; we know they are not hampered nor contained by the restrictions and by the attacks which restrain us and by the money values which restrict us.

We never thought the Russians had the MIRV, except those of us who make this our business, and the individuals who are on the side of the gentlewoman often told us the Russians did not have the MIRV and would not have them. Immediately after the SALT agreement, we found the Russians did have the MIRV. We know the Russians are advancing so fast we have to make the most of our progress and prevent them trying to do anything to us. This is policy; and it is something the House decides and properly so, and something which is in the full area of the authorization Committee on Armed Services and we accept that responsibility and we will do everything we can to help the House carry out its grave duties to national defense.

We will leave no stone unturned. We will not falter. We will not hesitate to keep America the first nation in the world.

Ms. ABZUG. But is it not true that our policy has been one of utilizing nuclear power as a deterrent, and not as an offensive or first-strike weapon?

Mr. HÉBERT. I can say that is true and that is the reason we have not had a nuclear war, because nuclear power is a deterrent. The Russians have nuclear weapons and we have them. If they throw first or we throw first, either nation will be destroyed.

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HÉBERT. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. That is exactly true. The weapon the gentlewoman from New York referred to is a deterrent weapon, not a first-strike weapon. It is being developed to meet the capability that we now know the Soviets have.

Ms. ABZUG. I think the gentleman is in error. Even Secretary Schlesinger has concluded—and stated in his testimony—that we now have greater operational counterforce capability than the Soviets have. And the Secretary has indicated that this and other items in the research and development budget are really intended to be used to increase further the accuracy and yield of these weapons in order to enable us to target on Soviet missile silos and other hardened military installments and not merely on cities and soft military targets. These new weapons are aimed at enabling us to destroy the Soviet retaliatory force. Is this not why the authorization for these new missiles is requested?

Mr. Chairman, my chief objection to this military procurement bill is that it moves the country away from peace and toward war. It increases not just our expenditures for war, but also the likelihood that war will occur.

The new direction of the Department of Defense can only be viewed by the rest of the world as conversion to a Department of Offense. The preparations contemplated in the Pentagon budget are difficult to interpret as defensive.

At the outset, the Pentagon proposes to spend an alltime high of some $94 billion, of which today's $22 billion is only a small part. After other wars, the military budget has been drastically reduced; this time, with the Asian war supposedly ended, we are asked to increase the expenditures by some $8 billion, or 9.4 percent. Why? When even the Secretary of Defense concedes that this is "the first budget in a decade or more that does not include support of U.S. forces in combat." It is also a budget that would gobble up 44 percent of all Federal spending.

The Secretary and Chairman MAHON have quite frankly justified the inclusion of $5 to $6 billion simply to stimulate our sinking economy. Yet a Department of Labor study in 1972 shows that in reality, more jobs could be derived from transferring military funds to education, health, and other social service programs at the State and local level. Further, these jobs would become available not just to highly skilled persons but to the low-income, low-skilled workers who are hardest hit by unemployment. Military jobs on the contrary usually demand high technical skills.

We must remember, too, that the end product of jobs produced by the military is pure waste. The planes and tanks and bombs and missiles produced by the thousands of workers are far beyond our legitimate defense needs. Either they are used in war—which has now become unthinkable—or they soon become obsolete and are scrapped. In either case, what a waste of resources, both human and inanimate, particularly when these resources could be invested, instead, in fulfilling so many socially desirable needs.

The very concept of investing more of our national resources, rather than less, into military machinery at this time is indefensible. It cannot be justified on any grounds—military, economic, or social. There is, moreover, more than a touch of irony in the present Pentagon request, coming, as it does, from the administration that promised us prosperity with peace.

Even so conservative an institution as the First National City Bank of New York warns that increased military spending—

> Could be an inflationary stimulus to an economy that has already started on the road to recovery . . . historically, it has seldom proved good economics to give an economy a fiscal shot in the arm by upping defense outlays.

But there are even more serious implications to this budget. The very manufacture and storage of nuclear and nerve weaponry—which it contemplates—endangers us all. If the general public were aware of the dangers we all live with daily, there would be a hue and cry that would drown out even the Pentagon lobby. The leakage of radiation and deadly gases in our air and water, and the danger of massive accidents or malicious theft of materials, will accelerate as we continue to manufacture and test new and more lethal weapons. We talk about those programs as if we were discussing the construction of a new building: Is this or that weapon functional, does it fill a need? What need? We should rise up and declare an end to this dangerous waste.

We also are asked, in this bill, to increase the risk of confrontation. Negotiation is viewed as another form of combat. We are told we must develop even more lethal weapons as "bargaining chips." We must make the American presence ever more visible. I thought we had renounced the role of world policeman—but here we are asked to authorize a "stabilizing military presence" in the Indian Ocean, which has traditionally been a zone of peaceful commerce among nations.

We are asked to approve new land forces with new equipment; to expend our airlift capability; to continue supporting a dictatorship that allows oil interests a toe-hold in Asia. We are asked to approve more accurate nuclear warheads so that we can pinpoint our destructiveness not only on cities and missile silos but also upon a long list of other important assets.

There is reflected in this budget a completely new nuclear targeting strategy by providing funds for research and development of new missiles for fixed deployment and for terminally guided MARV's in order to give this country a first-strike capability. We are, in effect, reversing our long-standing policy of nuclear deterrence. This is a radical and dangerous move and one which will, I fear, provide a strong impetus to the nuclear arms race. The implications of this change in policy are earth-shattering. Yet we are asked to approve this about-face in foreign policy through a military authorization bill with many hidden items and without any real opportunity for the Members of Congress to discuss—or even to focus on—this issue. I, for one, am completely opposed to this new policy. Therefore, I plan to introduce an amendment which would delete all funds for research and development of counterforce weapons.

Another new philosophy reflected in the bill before us is the requirement in title VIII that all new major combatant vessels be nuclear powered—the provision for a nuclear Navy. The committee's proposal to retire prematurely our existing naval surface ships and to build all future major vessels with nuclear propulsion can only be characterized as a make-work welfare program for private shipyards.

Nuclear propulsion does, I concede, pay off in substantial added capability for our submarine fleet, but will add nothing to our surface fleet—nothing except substantial costs. By greatly increasing the costs of destroyers, frigates, and other fighting ships we will, in effect, reduce our naval capability as we can afford to build fewer of these surface vessels. I view this new policy as economically wasteful and self-defeating.

I cannot emphasize too strongly that, despite all our rhetoric about arms limitations agreements, we are accelerating the nuclear arms race. This is a confrontation budget. How can we be pretending to be seriously negotiating for peace or for new SALT agreements when we are pouring more and more funds into more and newer weapons? Secretary Schlesinger claims that the development of new weaponry—and particularly new counterforce programs—are essential to a strong bargaining position at the SALT talks. But we are now years ahead of the Soviet Union in nuclear weaponry.

Make no mistake: the new counterforce strategy is a belligerent stance. We are asked—in title VIII of the bill—"to modernize the strike forces of the U.S. Navy by the construction of nuclear powered major combatant vessels * * *." Whom do we expect to strike? to combat? In such phrases is reflected the entire mentality of the new counterforce strategy.

According to a group of former Defense officials headed by former Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul C. Warnke:

> We are today the strongest military power in history . . . the U.S. has been about five years ahead of the Soviets in the development of MIRV's, multiple warheads which can be aimed at separate targets, and will continue to lead them in the number of missile warheads well into the 1980's no matter what the Russians do. Nevertheless, we are moving on to the next generation of nuclear warheads without waiting to see whether this dangerous and expensive race can be halted.
>
> . . . Our true national security is neither measured nor insured by tanks, planes, missiles, warships and armed men but by the fundamental strength, unity and confidence of our people in our institutions; our economy and our society. We do not protect but endanger that real security by excessive military spending.

I agree.

Mr. HÉBERT. I will answer that. Every effort we make in this field, any research and development, any construction, any production, is aimed at one objective and that is to keep America No. 1. As far as the Committee on Armed Services is concerned, it will do everything it can to keep this Nation first and to assure the Soviets do not achieve an unacceptable technological advantage over us.

Mr. Chairman, I have yielded long enough.

Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HÉBERT. I yield to the gentleman from Tennessee.

Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. I wonder if the very able chairman can tell me what the possibility is for the Navy Fighting Fleet to be nuclear powered, in view of the great requirement in the consumption of oil by the Navy; what is the possibility of our Navy having complete nuclear power?

Mr. HÉBERT. If this bill is passed and signed by the President, there is not just the possibility, but it is there. Keep in mind, it has been the Congress, and particularly the House Committee on Armed Services that has compelled the nuclearization of the Navy, from the Polaris on.

Now again we find evidence of slippage whereby nuclear power is being shoved aside. Under the new title VIII we have in the bill, every major Navy combat vessel in the future must have nuclear power. Major combat vessel means, according to the bill, all submarines, all ships that run with a carrier navy, including the carrier and all of its escorts, and all of strike forces where independent, high-speed operations will be of military significance.

We certainly cannot have a Cadillac running down the street with all its guns, followed by horses carrying bows and arrows. The Navy will follow along with nuclear construction.

Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. I thank the gentleman and I think his policy should be followed by the Congress.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HÉBERT. I yield to the gentleman from Colorado.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. During the Korean conflict, I flew jets in the Marine Corps. I flew an old type of plane that was not very compatible with the time. It did not have the safety devices that it should have. I have always been resentful of the fact that several of my friends were killed because these planes did not have the proper equipment that planes of that time should have had.

I felt that the Congress was derelict in its duties.

I have a question on the F–111. When the Air Force itself does not want the F–111, it is very hard for me to understand why Congress insists that it should have it. I do not know whether the safety provisions of this aircraft have been perfected; but for several years it was not safe to fly it. This is the second year the committee has insisted that the production lines be kept open, when the Air Force says it did not want it.

I would like to have that explained from the report.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, the language describes it. The fact the Air Force did not ask for it was because they were constrained by the budgetary limitations and they had to put priorities on what they could get.

Now, as far as the F–111 is concerned, any flyer that has flown the F–111 will tell anyone that it is one of the greatest planes we ever had. It is a plane that has been developed out of the very odious beginnings of the TFX. The FB–111 version is only an interim manned bomber. That is why we have to keep the lines open. For years I fought Secretary McNamara to put a new manned bomber in the air.

He insisted that he did not want any. As a result, there has not been a B–52 constructed in over 15 years. We cannot have this happen, that the B–52 should wear out before the B–1 comes along. Then, we would have nothing.

All the F–111 does is keep that spread open until the B–1 becomes a part of the inventory. It cannot come into the inventory until 1981. There are three prototypes in the B–1 now. We will give them another prototype B–1 this year and give them a fifth prototype before a decision on production will be made. I hope it will be made.

Referring back again to the gentleman's observation about the Marines and the lack of safety, this is what we are trying to correct. We realize these shortcomings. This is why we are trying to put into the hands of our forces the proper instruments of war and the most advanced airplanes.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, if the chairman will yield further, the committee report says:

> The committee was advised that current plans contemplate that a substantial number of the earlier F–111s be converted to electronic warfare configuration.

I was wondering why we need to do that.

Mr. HÉBERT. Keep in mind that we cannot go in and take an airplane off the shelf. We do not keep them in stock like shoes or things like that. It takes us a minimum of 5 years from the drawing board to the air. We are going to have a fight again on the B–1 on the floor before this bill is over. I hope its opponents do not prevail. There are so many things we have seen prevail. The antimilitaristic spirit is so up; the antidefense spirit is so up, that I am not amazed at anything that happens in this body.

I am trying to warn this body and tell this body exactly what we need.

Mr. McCLORY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. McCLORY. Mr. Chairman, I have in my district, as the gentleman knows, the Naval Training Center at Great Lakes. I am particularly interested in authorization for the Navy.

It has been my view that funds for the Trident submarine can really, in the long run, provide economies for the country. In other words, it can in the long run enable us to eliminate some of our overseas military bases and return a number of our men from overseas.

Would the gentleman confirm that concept?

Mr. HÉBERT. Yes, and there is another area in which an attack will be made on this floor before this bill is passed, to cut down Trident. Another attack will be made in the Senate on the same subject. That is why I tried to point out again that all these attacks will be made by the same individuals who attack everything.

Mr. McCLORY. The Trident, then, will not only enhance our military strength, but at the same time, in the long run provide economies in our defense posture which can provide savings in the future?

Mr. HÉBERT. There is the advantage. It is the advanced submarine weapon. But keep in mind, as regards the troops overseas, that the Trident is a strategic weapon. It is needed independent of the need for forward deployed conventional forces.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, will the distinguished chairman of the committee yield?

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, responding to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. JOHNSON) who raised the question with regard to the F–111, I would like to say that I was the member of the committee who offered the amendment to add the F–111 to the bill.

I would like to simply say that I concur with what the chairman has said about this airplane. There is no question about the fact that the Air Force wanted it, but the restraints that exist in the Pentagon made it impossible for the Air Force to come out and include it in their request.

We have three basic reasons for it, as the chairman has indicated. First of all, it is one of the very few planes, I think—as far as the Air Force is concerned, the only aircraft—this country has developed in the last 15 to 20 years, which can perform a strategic mission, while the Russians have developed some three or four. All the bugs have been worked out and the F–111 is flying spectacularly. It would be shameful to turn off the production line.

The several electronic aircraft that are now being developed have been taking out of the basic four wings of the F–111 for the Air Force because it is such a terrific plane and performs well in the electronic role. The Air Force schedule itself included no planes to replace those taken out for electronic purposes.

And by continuing the production line for another year we provide both planes, so they will fill out the men required for four wings of F–111's.

Mr. Chairman, the second point, as the chairman has already indicated very eloquently, is that this is the only kind of aircraft that can qualify as an interim manned bomber. The B–1 has been delayed for years. The cost is estimated very conservatively; and if for some reason the B–1 should not be approved by Congress as a bomber, the FB–111 can perform almost all of the jobs that the B–1 can do. Therefore, we ought to keep it going, at least until we make a decision about the B–1.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HÉBERT. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I would just like to add one factor that was not mentioned by the distinguished gentleman from New York on the other side, to put the shoe on the other foot. Those of us who have some skepticism, some doubts as to whether or not we will buy the B–1 when that time comes, if we, in fact, allow the line to be closed down on the FB–111, then we will have no option; and it does not make any difference what the B–1 costs. If it is $100 million per copy, we will have absolutely no option, because if this one is closed down, we can never again crank it up to get it back on the job. So this allows us an option when we come to decide whether or not to buy the B–1 and then does not put us in a position where we have absolutely no choice at all.

Mr. WHITEHURST. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HÉBERT. I will be happy to yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. WHITEHURST. Mr. Chairman, I just want to make a comment on the F–111. If anyone in this body or in this country thinks the airplane is deficient in what it will do, it is significant to me that 2 years ago when SALT I negotiations were going on, this is the one airplane in our inventory that the Russians wanted to include in the SALT agreement, so we know what they think of it.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman has indicated in the discussion, in the colloquy and exchange of thoughts, again how important it is to have the essential weaponry to go to the table and talk about reduction in arms. This we must have. Indeed, this is one of the reasons we cannot reduce our troops in Europe at this time. We want to reduce the troops; of course, we do, but we cannot tell the Russians that we are going to reduce them and have the Russians say, "So you are going to reduce the troops. What can we talk about?"

Mr. Chairman, this is one of the things I tried to point out the other day. These things were fought in this body and fought bitterly; and if we had to survive on one of those counts, we would not have had any SALT talks at all.

I repeat and reemphasize again that the only language the Russians know and understand is strength. That is the only thing they know, strength, and we must have that strength and that muscle if we want to survive.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, the bill that the committee brings to the floor of the House today is necessary to provide the weapons systems, the research and development and the personnel strengths of the Armed Forces. The Committee on Armed Services has worked its will on this legislation, making reductions of more than $800 million and additions of more than $300 million and making substantial changes in the Reserve and civilian personnel strengths requested by the military departments.

The chairman of the committee has explained the highlights of the bill. And the leaders of our subcommittees will explain in more detail some of the specific actions on research and development, manpower levels, and ship construction.

Rather than repeating the details of the bill that will be covered by others, I would like to depart from tradition and use my time to discuss some of the major aspects of world conditions which make such legislation necessary. One thing that I am deeply concerned about is the basis on which Members determine their vote on this bill and particularly on some amendments which will be offered.

We Americans are people who like to feel that we control our destiny. It is, therefore, not surprising that some Members, with the best of motives, make their judgment on the Defense budget on the basis of things we can control.

References are made to domestic needs and to the desire to give domestic programs priority. One of our "Dear Colleague" letters tells us that we should treat military authorizations "in the same manner as other Government programs." Attempts are made to set the level of authorization according to some amounts that were spent in the past plus an allowance for inflation.

But the simple fact is that our defense needs, and therefore our authorization requirements, are driven by factors that we cannot control.

It is nice to say that Defense spending should be treated "in the same manner" as other Government programs. But it is essentially a meaningless statement. The fact that you could, in a given year, reduce spending on the Commerce Department because of developments in the business community does not mean that you can reduce spending on Defense in a similar period. Defense spending is governed by needs relating to the world situation and the actions of potential adversaries and simply cannot be based on happenings on the domestic scene.

One of the letters that has been sent to Members of Congress in connection with this bill says that defense expenditures can be held down because of the improvement in international relations. It is a great mystery to me how anyone can look at events of the past year and conclude that international developments have been so favorable as to allow us to reduce our commitments to national defense. There has been, in the past year:

The October war in the Middle East where the Soviets showed how much respect they have for détente;

The Soviet testing of MIRV missiles;

The political instability of Western European governments.

Among the major democracies of Western Europe, there is virtually no government left that has been in office more than 6 months. This demands, more than ever, steadfastness on the part of the United States.

SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS

The Soviets have been engaged in an unprecedented drive to achieve clear superiority in strategic weapons.

SALT I was based upon a balancing of technological advantages of the United States and the quantitative advantages possessed by the Soviet Union. SALT I limited the number of missiles in an attempt to stop the pace of Soviet deployments. In so doing, SALT I institutionalized the numerical advantage of the Soviets. We were able to accept this numerical advantage because we had a clear technological advantage through having the MIRV capability and greater accuracy.

SALT I, however, while it limited the number of missiles on each side, did not place any limit on research and development. The Soviets thus have had the option to try to catch up with us tech-

nologically, though we are prevented from matching them numerically.

If the Soviets truly look upon SALT I as a stabilizing development and if they truly wish to lessen world tension and slow down the arms race, they should curtail their strategic developments.

The opposite, however, has been true. Soviet development of strategic systems has been going forward at a frightening rate. Four new ICBM designs of varying sizes and characteristics are currently being flight-tested by the Soviets. Of the four, three have now been tested with MIRV's. These new systems incorporate improved guidance and reentry techniques.

One of the characteristics of the Soviet missile flight tests last summer was that they made use of onboard computers for the first time. This means that they will be able to achieve greater accuracy in their MIRV'd warheads.

The Soviets thus are successfully developing the capabilities which will allow them to match the technological advantages of the United States. If they marry these technological capabilities with the considerable advantage in the number and throw weight of their missiles, a serious strategic imbalance will occur.

Unless we are prepared to offset these gains, the Soviets could, by the decade of the 1980's be in a position to have an overwhelming strategic advantage, an advantage which could upset the nature of the world we live in. It is important to remember the psychological effect of such an advantage. Just by having such power, they could greatly increase their influence in the world.

What SALT II negotiations are all about, really, is to prevent the marrying of these newly acquired Soviet techniques to the existing Soviet nuclear advantage. But if the Soviets do not see that we are prepared to continue developments to offset their technological advancements, there will be no incentive to them to negotiate at SALT II. It is, therefore, simply absolutely necessary that we continue a vigorous research and development program and continue to maintain the ability to improve our weapons systems so that we do not lose ground to the Soviets.

SLBM'S AND MOBILE MISSILES

The Soviets have also continued the rapid modernization of their submarine-launched ballistic missile force. The SS–N–8 missile aboard the Delta-class submarine has a range of 4,200 nautical miles. The SS–N–6 missile deployed aboard the Yankee-class submarine has been improved, and a version of the missile with a multiple-reentry vehicle appears to be ready for deployment.

One of the four new missiles being developed by the Soviets, the SS–X–16, which has a range of over 5,000 nautical miles, is being developed in such a manner as to indicate the Soviets are considering deploying it as a land-based mobile ICBM. The United States in the SALT agreements stated unilaterally that deployment of a land-mobile ICBM would be inconsistent with strategic arms limitation objectives. But the U.S.S.R. did not agree on any objectives concerning mobile ICBM's. And the treaty does not prohibit development and testing of a mobile system. The SS–X–16 could be deployed in 1975.

THE CHANGING BALANCE

Ten years ago the United States had an advantage in delivery vehicles—ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and bombers—of over 2,000. The U.S.S.R. has now totally eliminated our lead and has surpassed us in delivery vehicles.

Ten years ago the United States had five times the available megatonnage as the U.S.S.R. The Soviets have long since taken a substantial lead.

The only remaining quantitative lead of the United States is in strategic offensive warheads and bombers. The United States is expected to maintain this lead through the decade of the 1970's; but as the U.S.S.R. develops its new family of ICBM's, with their larger throw weight and MIRV's, it will give the Soviets the potential to overcome the last remaining quantitative missile lead of the United States.

NO NEW U.S. SYSTEMS

Members of the House should be reminded that the bill before you provides for no new major weapons systems. The strategic systems developments that are carried forward by this bill—the Trident and the B–1—are systems that have been in development for several years. In the case of the B–1 it has been many years. We are not building new strategic missiles, or increasing the number of our missiles, or digging new silos. We are simply continuing a comparatively modest R. & D. effort on the systems to make sure of their continued capabilities in the years ahead.

One of our problems is that we spend more time studying and talking about weapons systems than building them. The Soviets do not talk about weapons development much—they just build weapons.

We have been debating about a new manned bomber for over 10 years. And the B–1 will still not be ready for several years. The Soviets, meanwhile, have built a new bomber, the Backfire, which is expected to be deployed this year. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told our committee that when deployed with refueling tankers, the Backfire "constitutes a potential threat to the continental United States."

The B–1 is expected to be superior to the Backfire. But the B–1 is still in development. The Backfire is ready for deployment.

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

Surely it is axiomatic that in a time of nuclear parity conventional capability increases in importance.

Since there is no way that we could match the Soviets or other potential adversaries in manpower, it is important, if our forces are going to be a deterrent to conventional conflict, that we have weapons of the quantity and quality necessary to deter aggressive action.

But do not get the impression that this bill allows us to develop conventional weapons at anywhere near the pace of the Soviets.

Last fall I was privileged to be the ranking minority member on a subcommittee that toured the battlefields of the Middle East. Probably never before in history has a congressional subcommittee visited a battlefield so soon after the conflict. The litter of war was still visible in the Sinai. Egypt was still in a state of readiness that included blackouts at night in Cairo.

On one stretch of desert we saw more destroyed tanks within a half-mile than the United States can produce in a year. The Arab nations lost thousands of tanks in that war. But in a few months after the cease-fire, the Russians had resupplied the Arabs to the extent of virtually all of their losses.

The numbers and speed with which the Soviets poured missiles, tanks and other weapons into the Middle East was a development unmatched in history.

We know we can produce as good or better weapons than the Soviets. But we cannot produce them in the quantities the Soviets turn out. We have only one producer of tanks in the United States. We have only one producer of tank turrets.

We must, therefore, keep our forces supplied with modern weapons. We must keep the quality of our weapons on a par with those of the Soviets.

So do not be lulled by statistics about economic considerations. Whether you like it or not, it is what happens in the rest of the world—what happens in Russia—that dictates how much defense you must provide for the United States.

The bill before you today is designed to provide the defense our country needs. It does no more. I urge all Members to support it.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE).

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, the fiscal year 1975 authorization request for $9,325,039,000 is the largest amount, in actual dollars, ever requested by the Department of Defense for research, development, test, and evaluation. Some people—without probing any further—would contend that this spending level is excessive for Defense research. There are many demands being placed upon our economy and this level of Defense spending is of grave concern.

However, there is even a greater concern that must be addressed, that of delineating the kind of R. & D. program that is essential for our national defense.

Mr. Chairman, having served as a member of the Armed Services Committee since its organization in 1947, and as chairman of the Research and Development Subcommittee for over 10 years, I can realize and appreciate the importance of research and development to our military strength and national security.

Unpleasant as a memory can be, many of us here today can remember those tragic days in the history of mankind on August 6 and August 9, 1945, when the awesome power of technology and its relationship to military strength was demonstrated. Since then, technological advances have taken even greater strides. Developments such as the high-energy laser, among others, will make tomorrow's national security even more dependent upon technology.

I am not a believer in legislating or spending through fear. However, we must face up to the current world situation and gear out policymaking accordingly. The Governments of Italy, Britain, France, Canada, and West Germany have all been subjected to varying degrees of turbulence

The status of our naval fleet has fallen very nearly to the cross-over point—that point where the technology balance is changed to our disadvantage. The Middle East conflict, the limited progress of SALT II and other factors lead me to believe that while a $9 billion research budget may be very high—it is a relative bargain—a cheap price to pay—for freedom.

Mr. Chairman, this belief does not preclude the vigilance required by our committee to insure the authorization of an effective R.D.T. & E. program at the lowest possible cost. As the architects of our research program, the Department of Defense has done a credible job. They are not, and can not, be expected to be perfect. They have the same internal management weaknesses that are characteristic of any body of this size. For this, among other reasons, the Research and Development Subcommittee examined over 3,000 individual programs and projects in the fiscal year 1975 authorization request.

The programs were discussed at varying lengths with Defense witnesses during the 30 hearings that were held by the subcommittee. During the hearings the committee assessed the requirement or need for each weapon system development program, program progress, the Department of Defense course of action and the possibility of using lower cost alternatives.

The arguments concerning the continued use of the B–52 or developing a stretched version of the FB–111 in lieu of the costly B–1 were again thoroughly assessed. The committee considered the results of studies conducted by the General Accounting Office and others, and used these and other input in the overall decisionmaking process. The committee concluded that new Soviet advances and developments preclude the use of less expensive, less capable alternatives in lieu of the B–1, Trident, and several major strategic tactical systems presently being developed.

The result of the extensive hearings was a 3.5-percent reduction in the request—a reduction of $323,376,000 from the $9,325,039,000 request. The amount approved for authorization by the Armed Services Committee for R.D.T. & E. is $9,001,663,000.

I wish to emphasize, Mr. Chairman, that the reduction was the result, and not the prescribed goal. A meaningful R.D.T. & E. program necessary to insure our national defense was the committee's objective.

During the committee's markup of this bill, several amendments were offered which would have a significant, long-term impact upon the ability of this Nation to underwrite its strategy of deterrence. The authors of these amendments have indicated that they would offer the same amendments on the House floor.

One of the amendments offered would be to delete the entire amount included in the bill for the development of the B–1 bomber. The rationale for this amendment as described in the committee report certainly has substance: The B–1 program has experienced cost overruns, schedule slippage, and some performance degradation. What we must ask ourselves, however, is—does this Nation need a manned strategic bomber?

Today—right now—the Soviets have a manned strategic bomber with performance characteristics that are not widely apart from those of our planned B–1. Yes, there are two other legs of the triad, but are we content to be second best on the third?

Beyond the thought of a nuclear confrontation, have we forgotten the effectiveness of the bomber during the Southeast Asia conflict?

As a nation we are committed to a policy of non-first aggression; however, inevitably and unavoidably, in the absence of clairvoyance, this Nation must be prepared to fight almost every kind of war that could be thrust upon us. Unpalatable as it may be, Mr. Chairman, we are compelled to keep up with the Joneses—as long as our potential enemies have a strategic bomber, so must we.

In the committee report, my distinguished and dedicated colleague from New York has called the B–1 a "sick program"—and that it has been. But will the financial euthanasia that puts it out of its misery make us, as a nation, any healthier? I think not.

We must admonish the Air Force and take the necessary action to insure against subsequent ineffective management. Killing the B–1 may be an answer to the problem, but it certainly is not the solution.

I urge the Members of the House to think hard and long before adopting any proposed amendment. The question that must be resolved in every instance is—will the proposed amendment, if adopted, compromise in any way our ability to deter? This is not a rhetorical question, but is the gut issue which underlies every amendment.

I also urge the Members to exercise caution in arriving at decisions that are based solely on cost or program slippage.

In my many years with the Research and Development Subcommittee, I have come to realize that research and development never has and never will be perfect. Failure is inherent in the process. It is part of the learning process that leads to success. I would like to paraphrase a distinguished member of the Armed Services Committee in the other body, who described the research and development request as the "most difficult part to understand and examine."

We authorize the expenditure of millions—and in some cases—billions of dollars with the expectation that the technology will culminate in an operational, deployable, effective system. Then, only in a time of crisis do we tend to appreciate it.

Mr. Chairman, and Members of the House, I urge you to consider:

Whether deletion of funds for binary chemical munitions will help or hinder the arms control and disarmament negotiation talks; can one bargain in the absence of bargaining chips?

Whether deferral or stretchout of the Trident program will be the final step that permits the Soviets to change the balance of our technology to our disadvantage;

Whether in light of the current state of world affairs, coupled with the strength of the Warsaw Pact nations and the weaknesses of our NATO allies, we can call to a halt our air defense programs, such as SAM-D;

Whether in light of the limited progress of SALT II, we can reduce the present lead we now hold in ballistic missile defense; and

Whether this Nation is content with a 20-year-old bomber for the 1980 time frame.

Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to dwell on how hard our committee worked on the Defense request. We are expected to work hard. The point I wish to make is that many hours of pondering, assessment, and discussion went into the decisionmaking process.

I stated earlier that the Department of Defense was not perfect. Neither is the Congress. We, too, are capable of capricious and irresponsible action. With this awareness, we strive to avoid such action and I urge the Members to share this awareness here today.

I ask you further to recall the words of President Kennedy in his inaugural address. He said:

> We dare not tempt them with weakness. For only when our arms are beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be deployed.

Mr. Chairman, I ask the Members of the House to support the R.D.T. & E. portion of this bill as reported by the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. HÉBERT. I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. FISHER).

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, I want to address myself generally to titles III, IV, V, and VI of the bill. This is the portion relating to manpower and training. It was my pleasure to chair the subcommittee which considered these sections of the bill. We spent 6 weeks in intensive hearings on this subject alone. For 1 week of the hearings we had the pleasure of holding joint hearings with the Manpower Subcommittee of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee when we reviewed the Department of Defense request for civilian personnel. Various members of the subcommittee will tell our actions on the four titles of the bill; however, I want to present just a brief overview.

At the outset let me tell you what our overall recommendations are: For the active forces, we are recommending the numbers which were requested except for the Air Force where we recommend reducing the strength by 2,810 and ending up with a total active force end strength of 2,149,313. This is a reduction from that authorized for fiscal year 1974 of 40,589.

For the Reserve forces, we made numerous changes from the request and

authorized an average Selected Reserve strength of 946,019. This is 22,026 more than authorized for fiscal year 1974. For civilian manpower, we reduced the total requested by 15,000, the reduction to be allocated by the Secretary of Defense. In the training load title, we changed it in two instances to reflect the change we made in the Reserve strengths.

Thus, we end up with a total military force consisting of active forces and Selected Reserve forces of approximately 15,737 less than were authorized for fiscal year 1974. In the civilian personnel area, we are recommending authorization for approximately 1,012,000 as contrasted that budgeted for in the fiscal year 1974 budget and supplemental of 1,029,000. The total reduction then is in the nature of 32,753 in these three categories.

For the active duty forces this represents an end strength of 2,149,313. This is 40,589 fewer personnel than were authorized for fiscal year 1974. To put these figures in perspective the recommended end strength is 538,000 lower than the strength at the end of fiscal year 1964, a pre-Vietnam year; 1,399,000 lower than fiscal year 1968, the peak of the Vietnam war; and 84,000 lower than the fiscal year 1974 strength requested in the President's budget submitted to the Congress in January 1973.

It is my understanding that later on this afternoon when the bill is open for amendments there will be an amendment to reduce the size of our Active Forces by approximately 200,000. Frankly, I can find no connection between these arbitrary reductions and any alternative strategy for the protection of this Nation. I do know, however, that any reductions would seriously jeopardize our national security. It is clear that a strength reduction of this magnitude would require reductions in combat units. As a preliminary estimate, actions of the following order would have to be taken:

For the Army you would have to reduce the number of active divisions programed for fiscal year 1975 by 2⅓ divisions.

For the Navy we would have to reduce the number of active combatant ships by the equivalent of two carrier task groups.

For the Marine Corps we would have to inactivate five infantry battalions and supporting arms.

For the Air Force this would require elimination of additional strategic defensive squadrons and many tactical fighter and airlift units.

We are already short of both airlift and tactical units to meet many of the war contingency plans as determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I am firmly convinced that the services have responded to the will of the Congress and are making substantial progress in reducing the fat and increasing the muscle. Headquarters are being reduced and eliminated and personnel are being transferred to combat units.

We will have at the end of fiscal year 1975, 105 fewer general officers than we had in 1969—or 63 fewer than we had in fiscal year 1964. We plan to have 13.8 percent fewer colonels and Navy captains; 23.5 percent fewer lieutenant colonels and commanders; 24.7 percent fewer majors and lieutenant commanders, and 32.1 percent fewer captains or Navy lieutenants at the end of fiscal year 1975 than we had at the end of fiscal year 1969.

By the end of fiscal year 1975 the officer force will have been reduced by almost one-third, or about 124,000 officers, from the Vietnam peak. The changes between fiscal year 1973 and 1975 positions show their efforts to control the officer content. One out of every four military spaces eliminated during fiscal years 1974 and 1975 will be an officer space. In fiscal year 1975, almost half of the eliminated spaces will be officer spaces. The effect is shown in the trend of the number of enlisted personnel per officer, which rises from 6 in fiscal year 1973 to 6.3 in fiscal year 1975.

They are moving in the right direction. For instance, within the framework of the 785,000 manpower authorized for the Army, they are working for a 16 division force by 1980. This compares with the 13 division force at the end of this fiscal year and the planned goal of 14 divisions by the end of fiscal year 1975.

For the Navy, the end strength is the lowest in 29 years and I will add that this reduction occurs over a time frame in which the total number of ships has increased by four, including one aircraft carrier.

The strength we are recommending for the Marine Corps is 384 more people than were authorized for fiscal year 1974. This represents a requirement for increased guards at our overseas embassies.

We recommend an authorization for the Air Force of a total of 627,121. This is 2,810 personnel less than were originally requested. It represents a decrease of 17,885 less than were authorized for fiscal year 1974. In our opinion, this additional decrease is warranted because testimony presented during our hearings indicate certain roles in the strategic airlift mission could be withdrawn from the Active Forces and given to the Air Force Reserve, with the resultant decrease in active personnel and an annual overall cost savings of approximately $31 million.

In the area of our Reserve forces, I am extremely concerned about what is happening in the Pentagon at the present time. For example, the Secretary of Defense ordered a structure cut of 48,000 in the Army Reserve and National Guard while simultaneously ordering a study of roles and missions of the Reserve forces in the total force concept. It is our opinion that this structure cut at this time is like putting the cart before the horse. The roles and missions study should be completed and a Reserve force built to supplement the wartime requirements of the Active Forces—rather than taking arbitrary cuts before the study is completed.

We are extremely concerned too that equipment diversions to our Allies have left a severe shortage in the Reserves of tanks, tactical and airlift aircraft. If we are to be a prime supplier of equipment to our allies, we must arrange for direct procurement of this equipment to our Reserves so the implementation of the total force policy can become a reality.

We rejected the request for a lessened Reserve Force at the time our active Forces are being reduced and added approximately 54,000 to the Reserve forces. It must be pointed out, however, that the Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs in a second appearance before our committee adjusted the figures upward by approximately 40,000, claiming the Department of Defense had grossly underestimated recruiting capability in the Reserves.

Frankly, we do not want one more person in the Reserve structure than is required for mission accomplishment, but we strongly urge a Selected Reserve Force of sufficient strength to meet the requirements imposed upon them by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The cuts proposed will not allow this.

In my opinion, with friendly Allied governments falling from public favor, this is no time for us to weaken our defense structure.

Insofar as civilian personnel is concerned, it was a real pleasure working with my good friend and colleague, DAVE HENDERSON, who is chairman of the Manpower Subcommittee of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, and the members and staff of that subcommittee. As I said earlier, we reduced the DOD request for civilian personnel by 15,000 from that which was requested. By this action alone, we are effecting a cost savings of approximately $185,000,000. We are firmly convinced that these reductions will not affect readiness or curtail the ongoing civilianization program. A more detailed statement will be presented later.

The training loads in this bill have been increased slightly to provide for nonprior accessions in the Marine Corps Reserves and the Army Reserves where we added to the requested strengths.

Frankly, both in the areas of civilian personnel and training loads, I personally am not convinced that they could not be better controlled by budgetary processes rather than establishing ceilings. However, by establishing such strengths through legislation we are able to have the legislative vehicle on which to annually review the total DOD request for manpower and training requirements.

Mr. Chairman, this completes my general overview of titles III, IV, V, and VI of this bill.

I urge the support of every Member of this House.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas has expired.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 additional minutes to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FISHER. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I certainly want to commend the gentleman for the excellent manner in which he has carried on the review of manpower personnel levels, both during the current session and previous sessions of Congress.

I think you did a very, very good job for the Air National Guard and for the reserve forces all over the United States. I think the actions of your subcommittee are going to result in economies in military manpower costs, and on behalf of those of us in the West, I thank the gentleman very much for his service.

Of course, obviously the gentleman will be retiring at the end of this term, and we want to thank him for the good work that he has done on the House Armed Services Committee. I think it has inured to the benefit of our defense posture.

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman very much. He favored us with his presence a time or two and contributed to our hearings. We appreciated that. He was very knowledgeable and very helpful.

Mr. GRAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. DICKINSON).

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to be able to rise in support of H.R. 14592, the bill under discussion.

As the ranking member of our Subcommittee on Manpower, I want to echo the statements made by the distinguished chairman of the subcommittee, the Honorable O. C. FISHER, of Texas, who preceded me here in the well.

At this point I would also like to pay tribute to his excellent leadership during the years he headed this subcommittee. I am sure all of the Members know that this will be the last time he will bring the manpower portion of the yearly Defense Department authorization request to the floor, as he is retiring at the end of this Congress. The gentleman has been a real stalwart for the defense of this Nation; one whom we can lean on; one whom we can depend on. And I know that as he retires he retires with the thanks of all of us who are interested in a strong America.

I do not want to repeat what he has said about the bill or what others will say; therefore, I am going to confine my remarks to certain ancillary suggestions which directly relate to manpower in the armed services and anticipated amendments.

First, let me say we will commence holding hearings on the bill to admit women to the academies on May 29. I call this to your attention because that is the time to raise this issue, not during the discussion of this particular bill. This is a matter that is of vital interest to many of you but it is also a complex issue and one which should be thoroughly explored. I am hopeful that the House will not take precipitous action on the bill in this area when we vote tomorrow.

The second area relates to the numbers of colonels and lieutenant colonels or their Navy equivalents in the armed services. We have a bill proposed by the Department of Defense which would permit selective elimination from the armed services of certain colonels and lieutenant colonels who have been passed over for promotion but have a right under the current tenure laws to remain in the service for 28 to 30 years. Plans are being made to hold hearings on this subject prior to the completion of this Congress. This bill is H.R. 1113 which would amend title 10, United States Code, to authorize the selective continuation of certain regular commissioned officers on the Active list of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force upon the recommendation of a selection board and for other purposes.

Third, in order to eliminate certain junior regular officers in the services, we also plan to hold hearings on H.R. 11745 which would amend title 10, United States Code, to provide the commissioned officer of the Army in regular grades below major may be involuntarily discharged to coincide with a reduction in force. This would help the Department of Defense to eliminate one officer for every enlisted man during fiscal year 1975. I think we would have accomplished these actions prior to bringing this bill to the floor had time permitted but, frankly, the nearly 3 months of hearings held on this particular bill by both the full committee and subcommittees meeting simultaneously have precluded our acting on these bills prior to now.

The reason I mention our future plans is to alert you of the actions we are about to take, and I hope you will give us the consideration of letting full scale hearings be held on this matter rather than taking quick action on the floor tomorrow when the bill is open for amendments.

Mr. Chairman, in my opinion, the services are moving in the direction in which the Congress desires them to move, and with your cooperation by permitting hearings on these vital subjects, we may be able during the remainder of this session to bring you the bills after they have been given careful consideration by the House Armed Services Committee. Today, however, I urge you to support the thoughful committee action that has been taken by the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. MONTGOMERY).

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman of the committee for giving me this opportunity to talk to the Members briefly about one section of the bill.

I rise in support of H.R. 14592, and I wish to point out that I will limit my remarks to title IV, which deals with the reserve forces.

I would also like to commend my chairman of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. FISHER), for the time and the patience that he has shown the members of the subcommittee in working on this section. I think we have come up with a very, very strong section, as far as the Reserve Forces are concerned. We spent 21 full days in the subcommittee working on title IV. This is the longest time our subcommittee has ever spent working on the manpower section of the bill. Most of the time or at least a good deal of the time was put into the portions relating to the National Guard and the Reserve Forces.

I might say, Mr. Chairman, we have come up with a very, very strong section, as far as the National Guard and the Reserves is concerned. For the first time in my memory since I have been on this committee, we have raised the overall strengths of the Reserve Forces of this country not reduced them as recommended by the Defense Department.

Really this is a good "buy" for the taxpayers of this country. It was certainly proved in Israel that the Reserve Forces are a good buy. We can put a man with a rifle in the National Guard, and that man will cost us one-eighth, as far as cost to the taxpayer is concerned, of what it would cost to have a regular infantryman carrying a rifle in the Regular Forces. He might not be as good at first as the Regular, but time and equipment will bring him up to the standards of the Regulars.

So the Reserve and National Guard are good buys. As we move into a period of high expenses it will pay to rely more and more on these Reserve forces. We have done this and have increased the strengths despite what the Department of Defense wanted us to do. Thanks to our subcommittee chairman, Mr. FISHER, we have added new aircraft which will go to the Reserve and the Air National Guard. This aircraft consists of A–7's. This is the first time in a long, long time in a procurement bill that a reserve force has been given a new type of aircraft. We believe it is a step in the right direction.

If we want to get efficiency out of the Guard and the Reserves, we will have to give them good equipment, and, as I said, this is a step forward. The Army Guard and the Reserve need new tanks and modern tanks so that they can also update Army training as we improve the Air Guard and the Air Reserve.

As far as the Air Guard were concerned, we were requested by the Department of Defense to cut 14 Air Guard squadrons out of the T.O. and E. of the Air Guard. We found out that these units were efficient and could be put on active duty in 24 hours. They had better skilled mechanics than some of the regular Air Force had—4,500 trained Guardsmen would have to find other units to train with, so we locked them in with it so the regulars could not do away with these 14 air squadrons. Therefore there will now be be 91 squadrons in the bill. This is a good move, our subcommittee thought.

Mr. LEGGETT. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LEGGETT. I would like to say at this point the gentleman in the well has been a real sparkplug on the committee in achieving the goal he just described of the new revitalized A–7 mission for the Air Guard and, of course, maintaining at least 91 units around the country. This is a real economy, and it also saves the existing capability.

I wonder if there has been any indication on the part of the Air Force that they will carry through and if the recom-

mendations of the committee are approved on the House floor and in conference, will the Air Force carry through and cooperate and give this new mission to the Air Guard?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I certainly hope so. It is in the law. It is in the report and in the debate today. If they obey the law and have any respect for the Congress of the United States and the laws of the land, they will have to carry out this mandate.

Also the Air Reserve squadrons will be moved onto certain Air Force bases and participate with the regulars in flying the 141 transport plane. It will share the plane with the regular Air Force. This is another step forward in getting the Reserves into the total concept picture.

Mr. LEGGETT. The committee also recommended that the Guard give additional 130 capability. Is that correct?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. That is correct. My time is running out, but I would like to include the following remarks which emphasize my very strong support of the Reserve components.

I am extremely delighted with the actions taken by the Armed Services Committee in connection with the Reserves this year. On the other hand, I am totally dismayed by actions currently on-going in the Pentagon which would result in reducing the Reserve structure and lessening the effectiveness of our Reserve forces. This, to me, is appalling.

Let me illustrate the inconsistency within the Department of Defense in the area of the Reserve program. Earlier this year the Secretary of Defense proposed an arbitrary strength cut of 48,000 structure spaces in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, with no clear conception of what units, or types of units, were to be eliminated. Simultaneously, with ordering this structure cut, he ordered a study of the roles and missions which should be assigned to the Guard and Reserve within the total force concept. Others have spoken to you about this apparent inconsistency, so I will not dwell on it.

But a second inconsistency exists. For the Active Forces, manpower requests are based on requirements. In the Reserves, however, the requests were built upon projections of recruiting capability—and, as admitted by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, these projections now prove to be completely erroneous. So, he revised the figures upward by some 30,000. In most instances we accepted his revised figures, and I will discuss our deviations from those figures in a moment. It appears to us, however, that manpower requests for both Active and Reserve Forces should be based on the same premise—and by that I mean requirements to fulfill mission responsibilities.

Still, an equally important inconsistency exists in Pentagon statements and Pentagon action on the Reserves and that is in the area of equipping the Guard and Reserve Forces. If the Reserve Forces are to become an important segment of our total force policy, they must be provided equipment equal to that of the Active Forces or the concept of the total force policy is a mere deception.

I refer specifically to two areas of equipment—tanks and planes particularly. While the information on the adequacy of tanks in our Reserve Force is a classified matter, I can assure you that less than one-fourth of our tanks are in a usable condition. We must find ways to correct that condition. The airplanes assigned to our Reserve and National Guard Forces are becoming so obsolete that the Secretary of Defense is looking into the possibility of phasing out some flying units merely because of the obsolescence of the equipment. As you know, we have included in this bill 24 A7–D for direct entry into the Air National Guard. This should be an indication of congressional intention that actions must be undertaken to make the Guard and Reserve Forces a realistic portion of our defense forces.

In the Army Reserve we had testimony that the structure strength for the Army Reserves is presently established at 276,000. Using the 93 percent manning figure, a figure which has been used over the past several years, this would result in a desired strength of 260,000. On-going studies within the Army indicate that revised missions which will be assigned will increase the structure by 25,000 spaces. While we did not want to authorize a figure that would be unattainable, we did feel that we should maintain the Army Reserve strength at a 225,000 level, and to use that figure to build up to a required strength of 260,000 as required.

In the Naval Reserve, where the request was made for 108,000, we increased the strength to 117,000. We did so because the reductions requested were made solely for budgetary purposes and not because of lessened military missions.

We rejected the idea, too, that we should do away with all of the civil affairs units in category A status; that is, 48 drills per year and a 2-week summer training program. The Secretary of Defense would have transferred the 7,000 persons in civil affairs units to category D status which would provide only 2 weeks of summer training. We agree with the Secretary of Defense that 53 civil affairs units are probably excessive to our present-day requirements. But to eliminate all such units would, in our opinion, be wrong because many people believe that, if we ever have another war, it will be a short one, and there will not be time to assemble and train people to run the governments which we would have to run in case of victory. We recommend retention of at least half of the units and half of the personnel in category A status.

Another concern that I have with the present-day policy of the Secretary of Defense is to transfer certain aviators in the Naval Reserve from category A to category B status, thus reducing the number of drills from 48 to 24 yearly. When we have done this in the past, experience has shown us that we lose approximately half of these highly skilled personnel which are so expensive to train.

Now, let me come to the hardest part of our decision insofar as it pertains to the Reserves this year. I refer specifically to the Air National Guard of the United States. The Secretary of Defense made a decision to phase out 15 of the 92 flying units in the Air National Guard in fiscal year 1974, 1975, and 1976. These Guard units had as their principal mission the air defense of the United States. The Secretary of Defense reasons that the United States cannot afford to maintain significant air defense forces to defend against strategic bombers when the thrust is dominated by large numbers of strategic missiles. During extensive testimony we could find no evidence that the Russian bomber threat had been reduced. And thus, it was not a change in the threat; it was just a change in the decision as to how to respond to the threat. We were given assurances that, by the deactivation of these flying units, the United States would not have the ability to insure that foreign bombers could fly over U.S. airspace unimpeded.

We are recommending a provision in this bill which puts a floor on the number of flying units in the Air National Guard at 91. Currently, there are 92 such units, 2 of which are collocated at Van Nuys, Calif., which will be consolidated before June 30 of this year. This will cause no reduction in the number of aircraft but will eliminate a headquarters.

We agree with the Under Secretary of the Air Force when he stated:

> We are concerned over the loss of the affected Air Guard Units. We are concerned over the abrupt loss of 11,726 highly-skilled, well-trained Guardsmen which will affect the morale in other units and have a severe impact on recruiting potential. . . .
>
> A significant delay in Reserve Force modernization has been created by a slowdown in F–15 and A–10 procurement for the active force. This slowdown causes the retention of F–4 and A–7 aircraft in the active force longer than previously programmed, thereby slowing down the transfer of these assets to the Reserve Forces causing retention of F–100 aircraft. Requirements to provide C–130 and A–37 aircraft to the Republic of South Vietnam have also contributed to the slowdown of re-equipping Reserve Force units.
>
> The Air Force has substantial shortage of tactical units including Reserve units to satisfy requirements established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet wartime requirements, for example, fighter attack and airlift. In finalizing the fiscal year 1975 Program and Budget we were unable to find the necessary funds to meet all of the foregoing as well as other priority force requirements.
>
> The Air Force can retain the 14 Air National Guard units and provide interim equipment for them largely by redistribution of aircraft from other Air National Guard units not deactivating. In other words, spread what we have a little thinner. We have not budgeted the military personnel, operations and maintenance and other funds required for the retention of these units.
>
> The best solution to the equipable needs of these units can be found in a combination of additional A–7 and C–130 procurement and an acceleration in the procurement of the F–15 and A–10 so that F–4 and A–7 aircraft can be released earlier from the active force.

Frankly, the Reserve Forces are our Nation's best defense bargain in terms of cost. This does not mean we want to transfer all missions to the Reserves. But where they have adequate capability

to perform at a cheaper cost than the Active Forces, then serious consideration must be given to letting the Reserve Forces perform the mission.

We are not attempting to design the roles and missions of the Active or the Reserve Forces. Obviously that is the job of the Department of Defense but what we are trying to do is at least preserve the status quo until they have made that determination. And, we are attempting to try and find the most effective means of protecting our Nation at the cheapest possible cost.

Mr. Chairman and Members, a completed study on the roles and missions of the Reserve and National Guard will be ready in August of this year. And, I think it would be self-destructive at this time to provide only that which was originally requested in the bill. I would call your attention to the fact that the bill we authorized last year was for 66,000 less reservists than was authorized in fiscal year 1973. And the bill that is before you today still represents 20,000 less than were authorized for fiscal year 1973. With a reduction in both our Active and Reserve Forces during this time frame, I feel we have reached the bare minimum to insure the defense of the United States.

I urge your support of this bill.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. May I have 1 additional minute?

Mr. HÉBERT. I am sorry. The time has been allocated.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I thought I could get more than 5 minutes to talk about a very important subject in the bill.

Mr. HÉBERT. I am sorry, but the gentleman from California used up your time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT).

Mr. BENNETT. If the gentleman from Mississippi had some line of thought he wanted to complete at this point, I will be glad to yield to him.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I appreciate the gentleman yielding to me.

I wanted to point out something which is very important in the report, namely, that there has been a letter circulated by the Secretary of Defense ordering the Army Guard and the Army Reserve to give a report back to the Secretary of Defense on a structural cut of 48,000 personnel in the Army Guard and in the Army Reserve.

In effect, the Secretary of Defense would be getting around the strength levels that we set up, and would be reducing the National Guard units in small towns, and the Army Reserve units in small towns across the country.

In our report—if the gentleman from Florida will permit me to conclude, and I appreciate the gentleman giving me this additional time—in the report it instructs the Secretary of Defense—and this is not in the bill, but it is in the report—that before he makes any structural cuts in the Army National Guard, or Reserve, that he would come back to the House Committee on Armed Services and would tell us what he was going to do, and then we could take a look at it and decide whether we would accept it or not. We are not telling him what units we need to have a strong National Guard and a strong Reserve, but we are saying that if he wants to make a cut, then he should come back to the House and tell us.

Again I appreciate the gentleman yielding me this time.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 14592.

The Seapower Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee has held extensive hearings in connection with the Navy shipbuilding and conversion program, both last year and this year. We are gravely concerned about the state of our Navy.

A decision was made some years ago to use the operating funds saved by the retirement of over-aged ships to buy new ships. Since 1970 our fleet has been reduced by 47 percent down to a mere 508 ships. This means that the United States has fewer total ships of all kinds in its fleet than the Soviet has major combatant ships. The Soviets, on the other hand, have continued building a new, modern, surface and submarine fleet. Their momentum has not slackened. The result is that this year has been described to our committee, by both the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations, as the year of our greatest jeopardy and peril.

This is the year in which we will begin to build the numbers of ships claimed by the Navy to be needed to provide a top notch fleet. The situation is so drastic that the Chief of Naval Operations, in a recent press interview, publicly said for the first time that—

> The United States has lost to the Soviet Union its ability to control the world's sea lanes.

It was primarily for this reason that our committee has recommended almost the entire shipbuilding program requested this year by the President. The Armed Services Committee, over 12 years ago, was in the fore telling the Navy and the country that we urgently needed to build new ships because the large number of ships constructed during World War II—and still relied upon—presented us with a monumental tragedy through block obsolescence. We need new ships and we need them now desperately.

The only ships which we removed from the administration's budget were 2 patrol gunboats and 45 craft which are planned for transfer to South Vietnam. We believed that the proper way to provide for these ships was through the military assistance program—not through the Navy's shipbuilding and conversion program. Even with this cut, the Navy's shipbuilding program is about $3.5 billion this year.

This must be considered along with the testimony we have received in earlier years, from both Admiral Moorer—as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs—and Admiral Zumwalt—as Chief of Navy Operations, that the Navy really needs an annual $4 to $5 billion shipbuilding budget for several years in succession in order to build up over the block obsolescence hump.

There is one main addition to this year's authorization bill which I wish to emphasize: The new provisions in this bill for a Nuclear Navy.

The Armed Services Committee added to this bill a new title, title VIII, which would require that all new frontline combatant ships be nuclear powered. It defines those ships as all submarines—both missile and attack submarines—and all the major combatant ships in an attack carrier task group—which includes the carrier and its escorts and any other ships running with the group—and, last, all ships with independent missions dependent on unlimited high-speed endurance for military value.

You will notice that there is no arbitrary weight limit set forth in this definition like there used to be in Navy statements. This is because there are some ships which may be larger than the limit which should not be included for they do not have the main strike characteristic. Nuclear propulsion is not needed for them. I am referring to the sea control ships and the amphibious attack ships. They are not part of the naval strike force, but are there to keep the sea lanes open.

On the other hand, there may be ships which might be less in weight than an arbitrary limit which should be included for nuclear propulsion, such as the new guided missile destroyer which is presently being discussed and which will carry the main naval armament for the future, the Aegis missile system. It will be the main surface escort for the carriers. It must be nuclear in order to keep up with the nuclear task group.

You might ask why this new title VIII is necessary at this time—after all, Congress last year fully funded the *Carl Vinson*, CVN–70, the third of the Nimitz class aircraft carriers. This year we are recommending the funding of two nuclear-powered Trident ballistic missile submarines, three nuclear-powered attack submarines of the SSN 688 class, and one nuclear frigate, the DLGN 41—and we are providing long leadtime funds for DLGN 42. In this year's program, the nuclear powered program is doing very well.

However, we found that the Department of Defense has ordered the Navy to study a carrier costing $550 million for the fiscal year 1978 budget; we also find no more nuclear frigates in the years planned ahead; we hear authoritative talk about studies for a diesel-powered submarine class; and we have heard definitely about the guided missile destroyer plans—most of which will be conventionally powered.

The Armed Services Committee cannot believe that the Department of Defense is still trying to turn the clock back and to avoid nuclear power. It took the Congress to include the reactors for the first nuclear-powered submarines in the Atomic Energy Commission budget—to start the nuclear navy. The *Nautilus*

and the *Sea Wolf* would have been diesel unless the Congress acted. Even after that, it took continuous congressional pressure to keep the attack submarine program going. At one point the systems analysts in the Department of Defense said that they wanted to stop the attack submarine fleet at 69—but the Armed Services Committee was able to override that decision and had the new fast submarine programs—the SSN 688's—started.

The Congress had to exert pressure to get the new quiet submarine built when the systems analysts tried to stop it. It took congressional decision to start the ballistic missile submarine fleet—and that was a crash program in which the first ships were actual attack submarines under construction on the days which were cut in half, lengthened and had the missile silos installed.

After the *Enterprise* was commissioned, the Department of Defense had the following two carriers conventionally powered, over strong congressional objection. One of these, the *John F. Kennedy*, had to sail at reduced speed during the 1968 Middle East crisis to go from the east coast to the Eastern Mediterranean and had to have planned refuelings along the way. If the *Kennedy* had been nuclear powered it would have saved up to 2 days in the crisis. Further congressional insistence made the *Nimitz* class nuclear.

Then we come to the carrier escorts. The Congress changed a conventionally power frigate to nuclear power in the fiscal year 1976 program to create the *Truxtun*. With this, the Navy had two destroyers and one cruiser with which to escort the *Enterprise*. The Navy has said that there should be at least four nuclear powered escorts to run with each nuclear powered carrier. The cruiser was best used on independent missions so there were really only two escorts.

The Congress then put a nuclear powered escort into the fiscal year 1966 budget. When there was a refusal to build this, the Congress mandated its construction in fiscal year 1967. The frigates became the DLGN 36—the *California*. The next year Congress mandated the construction of DLGN 37, the *South Carolina*. It took further congressional mandate to get the DLGN 38 class started and this year we are only fully funding the DLGN 41 with more long lead time money for the DLGN 42. We are going to have four nuclear powered carriers by the time the *Vinson* is commissioned. We need at least 16 nuclear powered escorts for these carriers. We must continue to have them constructed to get the kind of fast independent strike force we need in our Navy.

There is no need to repeat here the superiority that exists for nuclear powered naval ships. They have unlimited steaming endurance—they do not need to be tied to a black oil logistics train—they can run around bad weather without regard to fuel consumption—they need not come off the line in any mission to get refueled—they have no corrosive stack gases which attack the ship or its planes. Indeed, the nuclear forces are so superior that no mission of any of our over 100 nuclear ships has ever had to be aborted because of the failure of its nuclear propulsion plant.

Because of the repeated failure of the Department of Defense to read the lessons of nuclear operations, we have found it necessary to mandate that all first line strike combatant ships of the Navy shall be nuclear powered.

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENNETT. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. RANDALL. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman for the excellent analysis he has made this morning. Also we are indebted to him for his good work as the chairman of the Sea Power Subcommittee. As the ranking member of the Sea Power subcommittee, I have noted at times we have had to disregard some of the advice of the Navy—particularly when they declined to recommend nuclear powered ships.

I am sure that our conclusion to go nuclear was the best one for this country. The gentleman made a very excellent statement providing the reasoning for use of nuclear power. There was one other reason not mentioned for going nuclear. It is energy problems meaning a shortage of petroleum products. There is a huge great consumption of petroleum products by the Navy. This is an additional reason to use nuclear power in our Navy.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENNETT. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I commend the gentleman from Florida for the job he has done in overseeing and pioneering in the Seapower Subcommittee. I think his recommendations have been very salutary throughout the years. While I do not agree with each and every thing done in the current bill I think overall my objections are rather minor.

I would like to ask this question. We keep observing that our numbers of ships in our Navy are continuously dwindling, and they have gone from 980 ships down to 500-some-odd ships. So we talk about the numbers and we want to build up the numbers of ships. On the other hand the committee has wisely come out with this program to go to nuclear power wherever we can. I think it is pretty well conceded that when we talk about going to nuclear power today we understand it is going to be a $400 million investment in each ship. How can we rationalize in your mind how we can build up the number of ships in our Navy and simultaneously spend as much as the committee amendment and the subcommittee amendment contemplates in this new nuclear Navy?

Mr. BENNETT. I had some difficulty with that originally but Admiral Zumwalt helped with his high and low concept. He convinced me, against my original critical interrogation, that it would be wise to build some of these lower cost ships; which, although not very cheap, are much lower in cost than others because they have principally to do with keeping the sea lanes open rather than with a strike capacity in a Navy combatant function. Of course they have nothing to do with strategic operations.

Mr. LEGGETT. I would like to ask another question. I remember former Chairman Mendel Rivers asked the Navy for a 10-year projection as to where we were going with the Navy from 1966, say, to 1976—and certainly we are not there. We have kind of missed our target rather substantially. I wonder if the committee has a 10-year projection currently for the Navy or if they are contemplating getting something like that from the Navy?

Mr. BENNETT. We had a recommendation last year for a $5 billion-a-year program in shipbuilding for the Navy, and obviously we are not living up to that because this bill this year is for only $3.5 billion. The Navy thinks it must have a $5 billion-a-year program and we have revised it down to $3.5 billion because of fiscal constraints.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. BOB WILSON).

Mr. BOB WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I join my colleagues in commending the chairman of the Sea Power Subcommittee, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT), who has just spoken on the subject of sea power. It is my privilege to be the ranking minority member of that Sea Power Subcommittee. I think under the leadership of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT) we have studied the situation as to the Navy's strength and the comparative strength of our Navy vis-a-vis Russia sufficiently to start taking some action.

This bill does contain some significant action, in my opinion for rebuilding our Navy. There is no question it is the Congress that has been responsible for modernizing the Navy with nuclear power. Twenty years ago we insisted that the Nautilus submarine be built. We insisted on the Polaris submarine and we are relying today on the Polaris as our most important, in my opinion, strategic defensive system. Yet we find ourselves needing to continue to build and to rebuild in order to maintain the traditional freedom of the seas which has kept this country alive over its history.

The gentleman from Florida took our subcommittee down to Norfolk, Va., earlier this year. We studied every type of ship that was in port.

We made a trip up to New London, Conn. and saw the mock-up of the Trident. Incidentally, my colleague, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. ROBERT W. DANIEL, JR). will be speaking about the Trident. I just want to say one word to give a concept of just what a weapons system this is from a size standpoint alone. Imagine a submarine 42 feet in diameter. That is about as far as from here to the back wall and half again, one and a half times the length of a football

field. That is the size of the Trident submarine, which carries 20 powerful missiles. When it is built it will be the most important strategic defensive system ever designed by man. I think it is a vital thing that it be included in this bill.

Most importantly, the title VIII that the gentleman referred to added to this bill and setting a nuclear policy for this Navy, is the most important step taken by this committee in 20 years, because we have had the planners in the Pentagon insisting over and over again, as they have in the past 20 years, that know better than anyone else whether we should have nuclear-powered ships. We have overridden their plans and have built over 100 nuclear-powered submarines. We have very successful nuclear-powered surface ships to the envy of the world.

It seems to me it is time that Congress gave a message to the planners in the Pentagon that for major combatant ships, there is no other way to go than nuclear power.

It is true, the first cost because it includes 10 years of fuel is more than buying a nonnuclear powered vessel; but with the rapidly escalating cost of black oil, there is no doubt that it is an economical thing for us to build nuclear powered combatant vessels, the larger ones, and to use them for the most important duties, which are strike duties, in wartime. It would be absolute folly for us to allow the planners to go ahead, as they are now doing, talking about a nonnuclear powered aircraft carrier or nonnuclear powered submarine, despite the fact that the Vietnam war has proved that nuclear power far exceeds in efficiency the black oil powered vessels that are common to navies around the world.

So I would hope this Congress would not even question the inclusion of title VIII in this bill. We will probably have trouble selling it to the Senate, because the Senate has some other ideas.

I think in this case the House position should prevail and we should plan to work our problems out in conference to maintain an all nuclear Navy.

It seems to me this is an excellent bill from the Navy point of view. I commend the subcommittee for the great work they did. They worked long and hard on the bill. They are ready to go with new programs for shipbuilding potential. We find that the shipyards are filled and we must have hearings on shipyard capacity.

Mr. KING. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BOB WILSON. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. KING. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 14592. I want to compliment the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee for the excellent bill which he has brought to the House floor. The bill before you is a result of the most extensive study by the Committee on Armed Services, extending over 3 months. I also want to congratulate the distinguished chairman of the Research and Development Subcommittee, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE), and the distinguished chairman of the Manpower Subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. FISHER), and the distinguished chairman of the Seapower Subcommittee, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT).

Every member of the committee worked hard on this bill, and we believe it should receive the support of every Member who seeks to keep America strong.

I want to talk for a few minutes about the E–3A aircraft, the airborne warning and command system. The Armed Services Committee deleted 6 aircraft of the requested 12, not because the committee does not see the need for the system, because it is needed, but rather they objected to the degree of concurrent development and production which the Air Force contracted for. In other words, the committee felt the R. & D. program should be further along and the complex system integration testing should be completed before going to a 12-aircraft buy.

The AWACS would make a number of unique contributions to deterrence, and would provide an important capability in the event of high intensity conflict—such as in NATO Europe—and in more limited contingencies in other parts of the world.

Of major importance to the effective functioning of general purpose forces—and therefore of major importance to the credibility of our deterrent—is the assured survivability of our command and control systems. The AWACS will sustain deterrence by denying to a potential aggressor confidence of being able to delay, disrupt, or otherwise negate a timely, controlled, and effective response by United States and allied forces through attack on those less survivable elements of our surveillance, warning, and control systems which are located at fixed, ground-based sites. This ability of AWACS to deny an enemy the option to attack a command and control "Achilles' heel" is fundamental to deterrence and is important at all times, particularly during periods of heightened tensions when deterrence is subject to its most severe test.

The AWACS would also contribute to deterrence by providing deep-look surveillance into enemy territory. In addition to providing important information on the location and movement of enemy air and surface forces, AWACS surveillance would deter attacks that depend on surprise for success. Warning of an attack may well prevent the aggressor from achieving his objective. Thus, AWACS would provide an element in crisis management that does not exist today. Moreover, the contribution of AWACS to the quality and timeliness of surveillance may, in itself, be sufficient justification for deployment of AWACS.

An imminent theater conflict would feature a mobilization period, including dispersal of aircraft to forward operating locations and movement of ground units and their organic air vehicles, on both sides. The AWACS would provide invaluable information to the NCA and to military commanders on enemy movements and intentions during a mobilization period. Such data would be used to determine the approximate number of enemy aircraft available at forward locations, the most lucrative airfields for attack by friendly forces, likely avenues of attack by the enemy, and the most urgent ground targets for initial close air support operations. This capability to support operational planning is not currently available and could well be the dominant influence in subsequent resolution of the conflict.

Should deterrence fail and conflict occur, the improved capabilities of the AWACS would better enable the combined, joint, and component commanders to select and allocate, in an informed deliberate manner, the appropriate forces to counter hostile strategies in massing and thrusts by hostile forces. These improved capabilities would insure maximum practical effectiveness in the application of our forces.

The AWACS also provides, for the first time in the history of tactical air warfare, the capability to observe and to direct simultaneously the forces engaged in the range of tactical air missions—air superiority, theater air defense, and search and rescue. This capability provides an entirely new dimension in both resource allocation and assessment of mission effectiveness.

AWACS, by eliminating the low level detection deficiency, would perform the surveillance and interceptor control functions of the theater air defense system more effectively. Fighters employed under radar control are more effective in the air-to-air battle, and overall air-to-air effectiveness has become critically important to overcome the numerical advantage enjoyed by Warsaw Pact forces.

The ability of the AWACS to extend radar coverage beyond that possible with ground-based radar would also provide significant benefits during interdiction and reconnaissance operations in a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict. For example, strike or reconnaissance aircraft would receive adequate warning of potential attackers to take appropriate defensive maneuvers. Additionally, friendly escort fighters could be vectored to intercept the enemy's attacking aircraft.

The flexibility programed for the AWACS will offer unique and valuable capabilities in more limited contingencies in other parts of the world where facilities for the control of tactical air operations are marginal or non-existent. The clean need for such facilities was demonstrated in the Vietnam conflict, particularly during the period when U.S. forces were attacking targets in North Vietnam.

For example, after August 1967, the Mig–21 aircraft effectively employed new, radar controlled, low altitude intercept tactics to achieve surprise and position advantage on U.S. strike flights. Without adequate radar warning and control, an increased number of our strike aircraft were forced to jettison their bomb loads to counter an attack, and the previous U.S. exchange ratio of 4 kills to 1 over the Mig–21 decreased to

1.2 to 1. This lack of adequate warning and control also forced the United States to increase the size of the force defending against air attacks with a resultant decrease in the number of tactical aircraft available to perform the interdiction mission.

Moreover, recent combat experience has shown that combat aircraft under centralized surveillance from command and control centers were able to achieve much higher rates of success in air battles, with much lower losses than those sustained by aircraft without that kind of assistance.

AWACS could also serve as a command and control center; managing the immediate air battle; coordinating area air traffic; and relaying combat reports or other messages. AWACS would not necessarily perform all these missions simultaneously and continuously. Many would be taken over by other facilities as soon as ground-based equipment could assume these tasks. But AWACS' capability to perform in each of these roles would insure that the most important control tasks could be accomplished without interruption.

With regard to friendly ground force elements, current communications systems do not permit senior commanders to maintain a constant update on the location and status of their maneuver units in a fluid combat situation. However, efficient management of these forces is based in part on such information. Moreover, the efficient application of tactical airpower in support of these forces also relies on precise knowledge of their location and status. AWACS has demonstrated a potential to display returns from radar beacons or IFF—identification, friend or foe—transponders which have been deployed with ground force elements, and to provide in real time, the location and status of friendly ground forces, airfields, and other resources.

AWACS has also demonstrated a capability to detect and track surface ships and to provide real time information to aid senior commanders in making timely decisions concerning force deployment and employment. Through use of IFF, AWACS can monitor the location and status of friendly ships. Non-IFF targets would easily be identified as unknown or hostile. This information could be made available to senior commanders, thereby enhancing the capability to vector friendly naval and air forces for reconnaissance, and for attack enemy vessels.

In short, the inherent mobility and flexibility of the AWACS would offer the capability to perform a number of important functions in any future contingency, and, thereby, could greatly enhance the overall effectiveness of U.S. forces in future conflicts—not only in air battles but also in combined arms battles. This increase in effectiveness would help to offset expected future growth in the capabilities of enemy general purpose forces. Moreover, AWACS could function in support of friendly indigenous forces. This could enable friendly nations to make greater contributions to their own defense by increasing the effectiveness of their aid and surface forces.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT).

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I intend to offer amendments tomorrow in a number of subject areas. First, perhaps, I should point out that a large part of this bill, as in previous years, I concur with. A large number of the cuts that were made by the committee I likewise concur with, particularly the reductions that were recommended by the committee on the AWAC system on the order of $250 million. I think that was well thought out. I think that program can well afford to be slowed down and we should know where we are going with it. Obviously, it is a tactical program, as the committee report wisely points out, that particular aspect of AWACS should be better thought out.

The C–141 stretch out program and the CRAF program likewise have been either abated or slowed down. It is a little difficult to figure out exactly where we are in these programs, since they were also included in the authorization supplemental and the supplemental appropriation bills. We do not have the results of either of those conferences to date, but hopefully we can take considerable testimony on both of these two subject matters.

On the CRAF program modification we are talking about making a nose loader out of the Boeing 747's and the Lockheed 1011's and the DC–10's; ripping out all of the interiors and putting in a new hinge in the front section, giving them a tank ramp.

Obviously, spending $7 million per vehicle and perhaps $800 million or $1 billion on these programs requires considerable thought and should not come up in a supplemental. It requires more testimony than we have before our committee, so I think we were wise in slowing that program down.

The other program that I will talk about in the couple of minutes I have remaining is the MASF program, the military assistance service funded program for Vietnam. I do intend, with a number of my colleagues from a number of committees, to offer an amendment tomorrow to reduce that program from the $1.6 billion recommended by the Pentagon, the $1.4 billion recommended by the House committee, down to a $900 million level. The $900 million level, I think, is reasonable. It does not pull the rug out from under the allies that we have in Southeast Asia. It is $900 million for military assistance and will be combined with about $900 million of economic assistance and will provide a total program of about $1.8 billion for the 1975 fiscal year, which compares to about $1.8 billion for the current fiscal year.

So, we are not escalating that program at all. It allows for a one-half billion dollar reduction in the Vietnam program for the 1975 fiscal year. We will have some reasons in addition to those I have outlined.

Mr. Chairman, I also intend to offer an amendment with regard to the Trident submarine system. I have already complimented my colleague from Florida, Mr. BENNETT, on the method by which the Sea Power Subcommittee has made its recommendations. However, the last time we had appropriations approved by conference on the Trident program, we agreed to a one ship program for fiscal year 1975, and we should keep with that schedule.

Mr. Chairman, today we begin consideration of the military procurement authorization bill for fiscal 1975. As the action on the fiscal 1974 supplemental bill indicates, not all committees dealing with the defense budget view it in the same light:

COMPARATIVE ACTION ON FISCAL YEAR 1974 DEFENSE SUPPLEMENTAL AND APPROPRIATIONS BILLS

	Defense request	House A.S.	Senate A.S.	House appropriations	Senate appropriations
I. Procurement:					
Army ACFT	22.0	22.0	15.0	16.0	16.0
Navy, Marine ACFT	219.2	219.2	101.1	153.7	113.0
AF ACFT	445.0	445.0	154.8	294.0	244.4
Army missiles	84.4	76.6	66.3	76.6	76.6
Navy missiles	28.6	28.6	17.0	0	0
Marine Corps missiles	22.3	22.3	22.3	22.3	22.3
Air Force missiles	39.0	39.0	22.9	39.0	27.0
NAVY SCN	24.8	24.8	0	0	24.8
Army TCV	113.6	113.6	50.9	63.1	50.6
Army other	8.2	8.2	8.2	8.0	8.0
Total	1,007.1	999.3	[1] 458.5	658.0	582.7
II. R. & D.:					
Raises	108.9	108.9	108.9	54.4	108.7
R. & D.	108.6	.975	0	0	0
III. MILCON	29.0	29.0	0	29.0	0
IV. MASF	[2] 0	0	[2] 0	0	[2] 0
Total	1,253.6	1,138.175	712.8	741.7	681.6

[1] $155,800,000 to be transferred from $2,200,000,000 for Israel.
[2] MASF request required no appropriation.
[3] Approved bookkeeping switch freeing $266,000,000.

If the country had unlimited money, no agency would need to be limited in spending. Since we don't have the money, we have therefore restricted poverty, education, health, housing and manpower training funds. Defense expenditures should be no exception.

The following chart shows the escalation of the U.S. national debt over the past 7 years, the annual service charge on the debt that must be paid, administrative income and the percentage of administrative income allocated to this item:

[Dollar amounts in billions]

Year	National debt	Service charge	U.S. administrative income	Percentage service charge
1969	$367	$15.8	$143	11.0
1970	382	18.3	143	12.7
1971	410	19.6	134	14.6
1972	437	20.6	149	13.8
1973	468	22.8	161	14.1
1974	486	27.8	185	15.0
1975	508	29.1	202	14.4

Obviously, our escalating debt, escalating service charge, and escalating service charge as a percentage of income dictates and demands moderation.

Since we spend 95 percent of all military funds spent in this hemisphere, and 60 percent of all military funds expended in the world, we need constantly to review our posture in this regard.

The short chart that follows, prepared by committee counsel, shows the action of our House Armed Services Committee in various subject areas of the pending bill:

H.R. 12564

[In thousands of dollars]

	Requested by DOD	Recommended by committee
Procurement:		
Aircraft:		
Army	339,500	335,000
Navy and Marine Corps	2,960,600	2,964,100
Air Force	3,496,600	3,391,400
Missiles:		
Army	459,200	439,400
Navy	620,600	620,600
Marine Corps	76,000	76,000
Air Force	1,610,800	1,610,800
Naval vessels: Navy	3,562,600	3,539,100
Tracked combat vehicles:		
Army	331,900	321,200
Marine Corps	80,100	74,200
Torpedoes: Navy	187,700	187,700
Other weapons:		
Army	53,400	55,700
Navy	25,600	25,600
Marine Corps	500	500
Total procurement	13,805,100	13,641,300
Research, development, test and evaluation:		
Army	1,985,976	1,878,397
Navy	[1] 3,264,503	[1] 3,153,006
Air Force	3,518,860	3,459,760
Defense agencies	555,700	510,500
Total R.D.T. & E	9,325,039	9,001,663
Grand total	23,130,129	22,642,963
SUMMARY		
Net change in procurement (title I)		−163,800
Net change in R.D.T. & E. (title II)		−323,376
Total reduction		−487,176

[1] Includes foreign currency program $2,570,000.

Lest we believe that every cent in the defense budget is vital to national security, we should consider this testimony given by the Secretary of Defense to the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee on February 17, 1974, in response to allegations that the budget contained $5 billion worth of padding:

It was recognized late in calendar year 1974 that there may be an easing of the economy and some growth in unemployment and that as a consequence of that, the total figure for the budget outlays would be relaxed. . . . If there had not been this perception of an easing economic environment I believe our outlays might have been a billion dollars or a billion and a half dollars less in 1975.

In short, the Secretary had admitted to a billion or a billion and a half WPA dollars intermixed with the national security budget.

We had further evidence of Pentagon padding in the fiscal year 1974 supplemental request, which included $108.6 million for research and development. The committee decided the request was not sufficiently urgent to warrant supplemental action, and suggested the Defense Department make a strong appeal for these funds in the fiscal year 1975 regular budget if it so desired. Now we find not one word about these programs in the 1975 request; the previously vital programs are no longer vital. To me it seems the DOD sometimes means what it says and sometimes does not.

TITLE I. PROCUREMENT

A. TRIDENT SUBMARINE

The submarine-launched ballistic missile system is probably as important as the rest of the military establishment combined. It is secure from detection and is expected to remain so in the foreseeable future. Of all our weapons systems, it makes the greatest contribution to national security, and at the same time is not provocative. By increasing the range of the missile, the Trident I and Trident II systems will provide a prudent hedge against the possibility of unforeseen breakthroughs in Soviet antisubmarine technique.

In short, I favor the Trident concept. However, the very high rate at which the Navy plans to build the 10 ships is, in my view, unwise.

It is not sufficient for a system to be sound in concept; it must be reliable in operation. The Polaris submarine-launched missile system, which had the benefit of a thorough and careful R. and D. program, was perhaps the most reliable missile system ever built. The Poseidon, which was not developed as carefully, has been somewhat less reliable but still creditable. It would be disastrous if this trend were to continue and we were to find our underwater security dependent upon an aquatic C–5A.

The surest way to induce unreliability, as well as cost overruns, is to rush the program. The worst aspect of a rushed program is what is called "concurrency": placing the system full into production while a substantial amount of R.D.T. & E. remains to be done.

The arguments for accelerated development are not persuasive.

First. There is no need to rush Trident into the water to meet a Soviet threat to Polaris-Poseidon ships, since the threat does not exist. On the contrary, at this point we cannot even speculate on the nature of the threat which might develop. Thus, the sooner we construct the ships the more we increase the possibility that they may be inappropriate to the threat they may eventually face. I believe the House Appropriations Committee was entirely correct in its rejection of the Trident acceleration in the fiscal year 1974 supplemental. Its report stated:

The Committee recommends that the $24,800,000 requested to accelerate Trident submarine construction from one per year, as recommended by the Congress in fiscal year 1974, to two per year not be appropriated.

It is the considered judgment of the Committee that with new Navy initiatives, such as the strategic cruise submarine-launched missile, the available options to backfit the Trident I missile into our 10 Polaris, and 31 Poseidon submarines, and the proposed NARWHAL submarine as a low cost option to the Trident submarine, an acceleration of the Trident submarine construction effort cannot be justified. The Committee is also mindful of the backlog of new construction and conversion of ships and submarines at the two large nuclear-capable shipyards which are involved in the Trident submarine program, and the problems they and many shipyards are having in obtaining skilled labor.

All of these factors seem to mandate a prudent and cautious, but deliberate course in the construction of Trident submarines. There must be a reasonable limit or plateau that should be achieved in spending merely for the sake of "bargaining chips." The Trident submarine construction rate of one per year as directed by Congress appears to be a sufficient demonstration that this country has the national resolve to modernize and maintain our sea-based missile deterrent and a current status technologically, without risking an escalation or renewal of the arms race.

Second. While submarines do wear out, there is no indication that a 1-per-year Trident program will leave Polaris boats in operation longer than would be justified by safety considerations. On the other hand, it is undeniable that the sooner we launch the Tridents the sooner thay will wear out and the sooner we will need the next generation SSBN. Moreover, if we buy Tridents in rapid succession they will wear out in rapid succession, thus forcing us into excessive concurrency on the next generation and more block obsolescence.

It is claimed that faster procurement is cheaper. This is only true if the acceleration does not produce difficulties. In my views, it is probable that problems, and therefore increased costs, will arise from the accelerated schedule proposed by the Navy.

Therefore, I will propose an amendment to reduce the procurement schedule to one ship per year from the Navy's proposed two.

I propose to reduce the $1,166.8 million two-ship program to $700 million, which would consist of last year's $627.8 million one-step program plus a reasonable inflation allowance.

I do not propose to reduce research and development. Neither do I propose to

reduce procurement of the Trident I missile, which can and should be retrofitted into the existing Poseidon submarines.

In additional views appended to the fiscal year 1974 report, I described the landing heavy assault—LHA—program as "one of the worst disasters in the history of American military procurement." While this rhetoric may have been somewhat overdramatic, subsequent events have not impugned the accuracy of the assertion. At the time of last year's report, these five ships were 2 years behind schedule. Today they are 2½ years behind; the cost is sitting on the contract ceiling and we can expect, before we have the ships in hand, to find the contractor rewarded for his delays by payments well above the ceiling.

The same contractor in the same shipyard—Litton Industries in Pascagoula, Miss.—is building another series of ships: the 30 large antisubmarine destroyers of the DD–963 class. This program is clearly headed for similar or worse problems.

The new "assembly-line" method used in this shipyard has received much publicity, but it is not the source of the problem.

The difficulty stems from the inability of the contractor to attract sufficient quantity and quality of labor to the site of the shipyard. Total labor force on the DD–963 program is presently 23 percent below program. The problem is increasing rather than decreasing, with 10.6 percent attrition but only 9.9 percent accession between September 1972, and September 1973. The shipyard today is 4,000 men short and is unable to accelerate employment.

The quality of the work force, according to the General Accounting Office, is as substandard as the quantity. The journeymen/apprentice ratio has been about 1.4–1, where 2–1 is considered desirable. While this ratio has remained relatively stable, the quality of the apprentice force has declined markedly, with the percentage having less than 1 year's experience soaring from 18 percent in October 1972, to 41 percent in August 1973. The contractor sees no prospects for improvement.

These are the results:

First. Scheduling: The first two ships, DD–963 and DD–964, have been launched on schedule. However, this has been a mere public relations gesture, accomplished by launching them in an incomplete state. Ship 963 was launched 50 percent complete, in contrast to the original plan calling for 75 to 85 percent completion at launch.

Whereas the original plan calls for 9½ months in which to complete 20 percent of the work after launch, the contractor will now have to perform 50 percent of the work in the same time period to achieve on-time delivery. This would require working at 2½ times the originally expected pace. If we generously assume work at the planned pace, we must project a 24-month scheduled slippage. If we more realistically assume work at two-thirds of the planned pace, we find ourselves facing a 3-year slippage. And this is only the first of the 30 ships.

Second. Cost: Program unit cost has so far kept reasonably consistent with the general inflation. However—

Delays inevitably require the contract to be performed in an inflated economy, which increases the cost to the contractor.

Litton is now asking for an additional $7 million per ship.

With only 2 of the 30 ships in the water, the Navy has already told us it expects the cost to go to ceiling—130 percent of target price.

A number of expensive subsystems—totaling perhaps 20 percent of the cost of the ship—are to be installed after delivery. Thus, they are not included in the systems acquisition costs. Instead, they are funded by the other procurement, Navy—OPN—and operations and maintenance—O. & M.—budgets, which receive relatively light scrutiny and are therefore prime breeding grounds for what is known in the trade as "contract nourishment."

Third. Performance: We are not yet capable of judging the performance of the system. However, our experience has been that late delivery and cost overruns do not usually go hand in hand with satisfactory performance.

I believe it to be a real mistake to authorize the last of the 30 ships, thus effectively giving up the Armed Services Committee's control over this program. A similar mistake was made on the LHA program, in which we finished authorizing the last of the five ships last year, yet the Navy has still to see its first LHA.

I do not propose to reduce or cancel the program. At this point, I merely emphasize that the reasons for the difficulty—difficult location and inadequate management—were entirely subject to the control of the contractor at the time he made his bid. It is he, and not the taxpayers, who should bear the burden of his inability to live up to the contract.

According to the recent report to the Congress by the General Accounting Office, the Navy and its contracting officer have made sincere and vigorous efforts to adhere to the terms of the contract. I commend them for it. It would be my intention to see that the full 30 ships will be delivered with satisfactory performance at not one cent above the contract ceiling, and we wish to make the contractor aware that, from all indications, the 94th Congress will be more receptive to this position than has any Congress in the recent past.

TITLE II. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

A. SITE DEFENSE ABM

The pros and cons of antiballistic missile systems have been discussed at length in previous reports. Very briefly, I regard the Safeguard as ludicrously inadequate from its basic concept onward, and I regard it as now self-evident that the $8 billion this system has and will siphon out of the taxpayers' pocket is so much money down the drain. In contrast, site defense appears to be intelligently designed and technically capable of increasing the survivability of our fixed base Minuteman ICBM's against a reasonable vigorous threat.

However, site defense operates under two handicaps:

The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty—SALT—sets a limit of 100 interceptors whereas many hundreds would be required before Site Defense could add significantly to our deterrent.

Site defense is incompatible with the administration's headlong rush for maximum ICBM accuracy. As I point out under "Dangerous Nuclear Programs" later in these additional views, if we fund the development of high accuracy, there will be no way to negotiate the Soviets out of also deploying high accuracy warheads. They will thus be able to use very small yields as silo-killers which means they will be able to use large numbers of warheads on each ICBM at low cost. Thus, they will be able to exhaust site defense far more cheaply than we could expand it. It is important to note that the same unlikely and tragic circumstances that would permit deployment of site defense abrogation of SALT I—would almost certainly be accompanied by the failure of SALT II and the consequent technological developments that would neutralize any ABM.

Therefore, we shall move to amend the site defense authorization, reducing the $160 million prototype demonstration program to a $110 million technology program.

B. SAM–D

Secretary of Defense Schlesinger has has wisely pointed out that, since the United States has no technological choice but to remain vulnerable to Soviet missiles, there is no sense spending money to defend against bombers.

Thus, the only function of the SAM–D anti-aircraft system will be to defend our allies. This $6 billion program makes a very expensive charity item in these days of precarious economic security.

Therefore, it would be desirable for the Secretary of Defense to seek commitments from our allies to pay in cash a minimum of one-half the total program cost of the system, and to include the result of his efforts in his annual report for fiscal year 1976. If these commitments are not in hand at the time of the report, it is my view that the program should be abandoned.

C. DANGEROUS NUCLEAR PROGRAMS

It is natural to assume that any technological development which offers increased military capability at relatively modest cost is a good thing. Unfortunately, this is not always true. The present bill contains four nuclear weapons programs which, while increasing our nominal military effectiveness, give us no useful ability we would not have already. Moreover, they would decrease national security by increasing the probability of nuclear war.

First. Three of the programs in question are strategic: $25 million for engineering development to increase the yield of Minuteman warheads; $32 million for maneuvering reentry vehicles—MaRV—to improve the accuracy of Minuteman; and $20 million for advanced research on terminal guidance of warheads.

The purpose of all three programs is to increase our ability to destroy hard targets. These programs are sometimes presented as offering a more humane way of fighting nuclear war, allowing us to attack military and industrial targets rather than cities.

This characterization is not entirely accurate. A steel mill is an impressive and imposing structure if you plan to strike it with your fist, but in nuclear terms it is a very soft target; we can easily destroy it with the accuracy-yield combination found in our present Minuteman warheads. The same is true of all Soviet factories, refineries, troop concentrations, tank parks, et cetera. The only hard targets of any significance are missile silos.

If we wish to destroy a small number of Soviet silos as a show of force, we can do so with our present warheads; higher accuracy and yield are not needed.

If we wish to develop the capability to destroy all Soviet silos, we have to use terminal guidance. The problem is that such a capability would force the Soviets to adopt a launch-on-warning policy, emptying their silos on radar warning of a U.S. attack rather than riding out the attack. This would neutralize our capability—even highly accurate warheads cannot destroy a missile that isn't there—and it would greatly increase the probability of accidental war. Even if the Soviets for some reason did not launch on warning, our hard-target capability would still be suicidal in that it would bring retaliation from the Soviet missile submarine fleet.

Thus, there are no benefits and considerable losses in this program. The Senate Research and Development Subcommittee recognized this in killing these programs, pointing out that our goal should be to enhance the survivability of our deterrent, not to chase the ill-defined mirage of counterforce capability.

Several years ago, Congress unwisely approved the development of MIRV. Since MIRV deployment cannot be verified without on-site inspection, once we had tested MIRV the Soviets had no choice but to assume we had deployed it, and we lost the opportunity to negotiate a MIRV ban. Now the Soviets have their own MIRV, there is no way to negotiate them out of deploying it, and there is great—although in my view unwarranted—concern about its significance. The United States could have avoided the entire issue by going slow on testing and fast on negotiations; it does no one credit that we did the opposite.

The proposed warhead-improvement programs present a similar but more serious problem; there is a danger that we will deal with it in a similarly unfortunate manner. I note with regret that the full Senate Armed Services Committee has overruled its Research and Development Subcommittee and approved funds for these programs. The rationale given by the chairman of the Senate committee was that we need the warhead improvement programs as bargaining chips for SALT II.

Mr. Speaker, these items are categorically incapable of being used as bargaining chips. Once we approve the money, the system can no longer be bargained away. Just as MIRV deployment cannot be verified, so deployment of high-accuracy warheads cannot be verified. Worse, testing of high-accuracy warheads cannot be verified. If we do not prohibit the development of high accuracy, the Soviets will have to assume we have achieved the ability to destroy all their silos. They will then either abandon their fixed-base ICBM's or place them on launch-on-warning status. Given their present truculent mood, it seems more likely that they will choose the latter course; we will thus have increased the probability of nuclear war and gained nothing by doing so.

The Pentagon has proposed that we deploy smaller, cleaner tactical nuclear weapons for use in Europe. The rationale is that our present large, dirty weapons would cause so much collateral damage to the surrounding friendly countryside that we would be afraid to use them, whereas the smaller weapons would cause less collateral damage, and we could therefore resort to them more easily.

This argument rests on two assumptions:

The Soviets, having only old-fashioned large dirty nuclear weapons, will refrain from using them in retaliation because they share our concern for collateral damage to the soil of our allies and their enemies.

Even if the Soviet also develop small nukes, if we cross the nuclear firebreak first, the Soviets will not feel compelled to respond by attacking us with weapons slightly larger, whereupon we will counter-respond with weapons still larger, and we will very shortly find ourselves in an all-out nuclear war.

The evidence for either of these propositions is distinguished by its total nonexistence. It would be the height of folly to take any steps that would make crossing the nuclear firebreak easier. Among all the military failures and foreign policy failures of the past twenty years, our one shining success has been the avoidance of nuclear war. To deliberately set out to violate this record is to take unconscionable risks with the national security.

Title VII of this bill, which deals with military aid to Vietnam, does three things, two of which have my wholehearted support. The committee's recommendation of a $1.4 billion ceiling on military aid to Vietnam, however, serves the best interests of neither the United States nor the Vietnamese people, and I and others shall propose an amendment to reduce that figure to $900 million. The bill as recommended by the committee:

Tightens up the language by which we require the Department of Defense to report its expenditures of the MASF program. Henceforth, DOD will be required to report actual obligations instead of estimated obligations, giving us for the first time real figures to work with in evaluating our military aid to Vietnam.

It repeals the authorization for any unobligated balances remaining in the MASF account at the end of this fiscal year. This will end the guessing game we have had to play each year as to how much money is left in the MASF account.

It authorizes a ceiling on this year's MASF program of $1.4 billion. This is $100 million, or 8 percent more than the committee recommended for South Vietnam and Laos last year; almost $400 million, or 39 percent more than the $1,009.5 million that the Congress finally approved for Vietnam last year; $570.5 million, or 31 percent more than the $829.5 million in new money we made available for military aid to Vietnam last year; and $656.5 million, or 88 percent more than the Defense Department had available in controllable expenditures last year. As was explained in the letter I and several of my colleagues sent to your offices today, of the $1,009.5 million available for Vietnam military assistance last year, $266 million had to be used to replenish U.S. stocks for ammunition provided to the ARVN in prior years. When this amount was subtracted from the available funds, only $743.5 million was available for obligation for military aid to Vietnam in fiscal year 1974.

As these facts clearly show, there is absolutely no way that the $1.4 billion ceiling can be viewed as anything but a substantial escalation of our military aid to Vietnam; yet, the facts of that conflict are that there has been no escalation of the war. The casualty figures provided to my office show, if anything, a slight decrease in military activity this year.

CASUALTY FIGURES

These figures show another interesting trend; VC/NVA casualties continue to bear about the same relationship to ARVN casualties as they have in the past with the VC/NVA losing three to four men for every ARVN soldier killed. You do not have to be a military genius to conclude from this that the ARVN is still mounting a substantial number of offensive operations. If there was ever any doubt about this, it was dispelled by the testimony of Maj. Gen. William B. Caldwell III. In his testimony before the committee, General Caldwell told us, in language which is repeated virtually verbatim in the committee report, that—

Territorial and population control have changed little over the last year—*what change has been made has been in favor of the Government forces;* (italic added).

Since the only land changing hands is coming under Saigon's control, it is impossible to believe that the ARVN has not been on the offensive. U.S. military aid is intended to help Vietnam defend itself, not to continue the war as though nothing had happened. Expert testimony shows that the ARVN has been able to mount offensives with the amount of aid they have; therefore, it is obvious that no increase is required for purely defensive purposes.

It should be understood that this is not all the military assistance that the Saigon government can count on from the United States this year. The President's foreign aid request contains $183 million in funds for the commodity import program. The dollars generated by this program in the past have been used by Saigon for uniforms and construction

programs; in other words, to supplement their defense budget. If that $183 million is added to the $1.4 billion recommended by the committee, it will boost our Vietnam military assistance program to $1.583 billion, or very nearly the $1.6 billion requested by the Pentagon. Thus, this bill represents an even larger escalation than appears on its face.

It has been argued that we must provide aid at this level because "the Russians and Chinese are supplying Hanoi." True enough, Hanoi's aid does come from the major Communist countries; but how extensive is that aid? Hoang Duc Nha, Minister for Information and Open Arms for South Vietnam, wrote in the May 1 edition of the Vietnam Bulletin that—

> Hanoi has now begun to realize that . . . neither Russia nor China will be willing to help it on a large scale.

Such figures as we possess on aid to Hanoi are classified, but if GVN officials are willing to describe that aid as being not on a large scale, it certainly cannot be very much.

Inevitably, we must ask ourselves exactly what our aid accomplishes. I have cited several times the report we received last year that the amount of gunfire in Vietnam on both sides was directly attributable to the amount of ammunition we supplied to the ARVN. That report was buttressed by acknowledgment by our embassy in Saigon of a need to "restrain" ARVN ammunition consumption, especially artillery ammunition. Yesterday, confirmation of the relationship between the level of our aid and the level of violence in Vietnam was received from yet another source. In a front-page story in the Washington Post, Phillip McCombs tells of discovering the "strange accommodation" between the VC and the ARVN; if the ARVN does not shoot too much, the VC do not attack. The logical extension of this accommodation is that if we were not giving the ARVN ammunition in excess of their self-defense needs, far fewer VC attacks would be provoked. With a lowered level of activity on the battlefield thus obtained, perhaps a higher level of activity at the conference table might ensue.

In the final analysis, it is not our military aid to Vietnam that will make the difference of their ability to or not to survive. Our former colleague, Melvin Laird, recently said:

> The South Vietnamese can handle them. They have enough pilots. It is their foot soldiers who are important. If there is no will, it's their own tough luck. We have done everything that we told them we were going to do. That's what Vietnamization is all about. The fighting will continue for 20 years.

Mr. Laird and I have had our differences in the past, but that makes our agreement on this point all the more significant. Dollars do not buy victory—only the Vietnamese will can do that. If we continue as we have, dumping $2.5 to $3 billion into Vietnam every year, we can look forward to doing so at least for the next 20 years. Is this a fitting memorial to the Americans who were sent to die in Southeast Asia? I think that if those men could come back to talk to us, they would tell us that we have far better things to do with our money than that. The administration has told us that we do not have $250 million this year for programs to serve our own veterans; others will propose to reduce our military aid to Vietnam by twice that amount, and I hope that the House will agree with us that we have other, more pressing needs for that money.

Our amendment does not signal an abrogation of our responsibilities to the Vietnamese; rather, it is an acknowledgement of our responsibilities to the American taxpayers. The $900 million ceiling I propose will not leave Vietnam high and dry. It makes available more money than either the $743.5 million in controllable money we allowed last year or the $829.5 million in new money we appropriated for military aid to Vietnam in fiscal year 1974. A $900 million ceiling was unanimously agreed to by the Senate Armed Services Committee just last week; and no one would suggest that such men as Senator THURMOND or Senator TOWER would countenance an abrogation of our responsibility to Vietnam. They and I agree that $1.4 billion is simply too much money for this program.

Our fiscal year 1975, Southeast Asia costs are $584 million greater than our total MAP budget. In other words, military aid to Vietnam will cost us 46 percent more than military aid to the rest of the world combined. If our amendment is adopted, Vietnam costs will still be $84 million more than the rest of our military assistance budget; but we will at least have brought these expenditures into some kind of reasonable relationship with the rest of the budget.

Mr. Chairman, it is a reasonable program that we seek. The United States is at peace; its citizens should not be called on to pay indefinitely for someone else's war. If we intend to participate in a meaningful peace, we must serve notice that the U.S. Treasury is not a bottomless grab bag for another 20 years of carnage in Vietnam. This reasonable reduction will represent a continuation of the policy of fiscal disengagement from Vietnam that the Congress initiated last year. It is a policy Americans will thank us for pursuing, because they know better than anyone what a drain Vietnam has been on financial resources already ravaged by the worst inflation we have experienced in over two decades. In the name of the American taxpayer, I urge the House to consider our amendment favorably when we propose it tomorrow.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. ROBERT W. DANIEL, JR.)

Mr. ROBERT W. DANIEL, JR. Mr. Chairman, the Polaris/Poseidon strategic ballistic missile systems have gained recognition as a major cornerstone of the U.S. triad of forces to deter nuclear war largely on the basis of the survivability and reliability of the submarine platforms. The Trident system, now under development, will further exploit the survivability and reliability inherent in the application of submarine technology.

As this country has indeed come to recognize in recent months, all wheels grind to a halt without suitable energy sources. This was very true of our early submarines, dependent on gasoline or diesel engines and chemical batteries. However, with the application of nuclear fission-generated power to submarine propulsion, the submarine became virtually unlimited in its operations.

The marriage of the ballistic missile to the nuclear submarines in our first Polaris systems is a success story that has long been told. It is a fact that our Polaris/Poseidon fleet has been a most valuable member of our deterrent forces almost 15 years. During that period five different classes of submarines and four different missile systems have evolved. Over 1,000 deterrent patrols have been successfully completed with the crews having spent almost 2 million hours underway in the 41 submarines of this force.

In developing Trident the Navy is following this same normal evolutionary process but with widespread application of new technology that has become available in the years since the Polaris/Poseidon systems were designed and built.

The major objectives of this report are to provide a strategic submarine-based ballistic missile weapon system that will: Be highly survivable in a sophisticated ASW environment; be a cost effective replacement for Polaris/Poseidon systems; carry a missile capable of delivering full payload to a much greater range than the Polaris/Poseidon systems.

In achieving the Trident objectives the Navy is, for the first time, developing a new submarine platform and a new strategic weapon system at the same time. In addition, with the longer-range missile available, the Trident system will be based and operate out of a base in the United States. The location for that base has been selected at the naval torpedo station, Keyport, Bangor Annex on the Hood Canal across Puget Sound from Seattle, Wash. Construction on phase 1 of the base is planned to start late this fall.

Development of submarine components has been ongoing since 1971. The single most important development is perhaps the nuclear propulsion plant designed to allow Trident to operate more quietly than any prior class of submarine. The reactor is a new design first developed and tried out on an attack submarine, the *Narwhal*. Under normal Trident patrol conditions this reactor has virtually no moving parts. The propulsion plant used on Trident makes maximum use of machinery and hydraulic quieting techniques developed, tested, and proven on the *Narwhal* and the Navy's very latest attack submarines. The design is such that the systems will be capable of continuing deterrent patrol operations between regular shipyard overhauls for about 10 years.

Command and control of the Trident system is a second major area of improvement. Here the Navy is making maximum use of the significant progress made in the last few years in computer technology and computer driven displays.

By bringing information from multiple sources to a single control station, they have been able to reduce the number of so-called "watch stations" and thus crew manning. This has a significant input in reducing the continuing operational costs of this so important system.

The Trident strategic weapon system is designed to handle a new family of missiles capable of much greater ranges than today's Poseidons. The missile under current development is intentionally designed to be compatible with backfit into the 31 SSBN's being converted for Poseidon. Although the missiles externally look very much alike, internally Trident is all new. It is the Navy's first three-stage submarine launched ballistic missile and utilizes much new propulsion technology developed in very recent years. All the experience gleaned from Polaris/Poseidon programs is being utilized to make Trident ever more reliable. The Trident system will also provide the room for future growth which was so prudently provided in Polaris and Poseidon, but which is now used up.

There are, of course, many other areas where Trident is taking advantage of new technology, such as the automatic and built-in test equipment utilized to increase overall system reliability by decreasing system downtime. Even when the system is in port, it is intended that a rotatable pool of replacement components and equipments be utilized rather than try to repair equipments on board.

Trident system acquisition is expensive, but today, what is not, however, when built and operating, the system will keep missiles at sea in an "alert" status for about one-third the cost of acquiring and operating a system similar to our earlier systems. All agree, even those who oppose Trident, that the system will be highly survivable against all projected threats that we can foresee. As a new element of the U.S. Strategic Forces, Trident provides some measure of maintaining nuclear parity with the Soviet Union and continues the criteria of a credible deterrence of nuclear war. As such, it provides additional safeguards to our Nation as we continue to work for an equitable armament limitations agreement. Under such circumstances, Trident must be considered a bargain.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. DAN DANIEL).

Mr. DAN DANIEL. Mr. Chairman, we consider our military procurement bill today in a climate of turmoil among the Western nations which is unprecedented. To borrow the words of Charles Dickens, written in an earlier period of unrest, if these are not the worst of times, they are certainly not the best.

West Germany has not recovered from the shock of Chancellor Brandt's resignation and the events which led to it. France barely saved her constitutional form of government from a Communist-Socialist takeover in the national election yesterday. Britain's new Government, having come into office in a period of the most serious economic and political upheaval in two decades, appears at times to be hostage to manipulators, at least one of whom is a self-proclaimed Marxist. In Italy, where political stability has been virtually unknown since World War II, the Christian Democratic Party is in grave trouble, and serious cracks in the European Economic Community are beginning to widen. Belgium's Premier has recently put together a coalition government, after 3 months of effort, and in the Netherlands, a coalition was 6 months being assembled. Our neighbor to the north, Canada, faces new elections in July, and half a world away, in Australia, another cliffhanger election has been held, with the voters split down the middle. In Israel, nearly 4 months after that nation's elections, a new Cabinet still has not been assembled.

The entire portion of Scandinavia outside the Russian sphere is in turmoil. In Denmark, the minority Liberal government escaped defeat last week by a hair. Norway's Premier, elected 8 months ago, functions with an uneasy coalition. Sweden's legislature is tied equally between opposing parties. It would come as no surprise if any of the three nations soon faced new elections.

Even Iceland is feeling the pangs of political upheaval, and its Parliament has been dissolved, with new elections set for June.

Portugal, under the rule of a military dictatorship, has in its cabinet two Communists, and the people of that land may very well find that a devil has been swapped for a witch.

There is a drought of decision leadership in the Western World today.

On the other hand, there is no disruption in Russia. There is no change. The dictatorship holds firm, and holds firm as well to its goals. There is no change in that respect, either.

None of the Western nations has, of course, been immune to governmental upheaval, although some have historically been more stable than others. But there has never been a period when the political fabric of the Western World was so torn at the seams, when nations were so buffeted about by political dissent and at times by political opportunism.

Just now, trauma in government may be the least of the world's worries. Having seen the successes achieved by those who control Arab oil, other nations enjoying monopoly or near-monopoly status in certain other basic commodities have begun talking in terms of embargo, of doubled and quadrupled prices, with little or no thought given the rest of the world—developed, developing, or undeveloped.

Inflation—bad as it is here at home—is considerably worse in the rest of the world. And balance-of-payments deficits loom large on the horizons of Japan, West Germany, and other nations which have not known them in the past few years.

At the moment, there is no really stable currency, and people in ever-growing numbers are exchanging currency for tangible resources—for things—where it is possible.

Just this weekend, we learned that India—with all her other problems—has become the sixth nation to joint the nuclear club.

And what else has happened, worldwide, as far as our Nation is concerned? Plenty.

Russia has recently acknowledged what many of us knew, but have not been able to say: At the time of the October war in the Mideast, she had available and ready to go into that troubled area some seven divisions, while we could have fielded only slightly more than one.

At that time, if I may add an aside, a great cry went up that the Department of Defense had manufactured a crisis, that the worldwide alert had been called solely for domestic political reasons; that no real danger existed.

Russia has told us in no uncertain terms that the danger was very real.

As he leaves his current assignment, the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, has acknowledged the conviction that we have lost our ability to control the world's sea lanes. He said:

> The Soviet Union's capability to deny us the sea lanes—is greater than our capability to keep the sea lanes open.

While it is being argued that we must not establish a presence in the Indian Ocean, lest we provoke a buildup of Russian opposition seapower, the Russians have moved ahead full tilt to establish their own presence, and this will be expanded when the Suez Canal is opened. Right now, our naval forces are outnumbered by Russia's in that part of the seas, and you can depend on this—it will grow even larger.

All this is bad enough—but the situation gets worse.

Peace in the Mideast remains elusive. While we are all prayerful for success, reasonable men must agree that the outcome of current negotiations will be based in large measure on goodwill of all parties—a trait which has been absent from that area for many, many years.

The conference on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe proceeds. Proceeds? That is a miserable choice of wording. Right now, it stagnates.

And why should this not be so? Why in the name of all that is good and holy should the Soviet Union withdraw one man—one tank—one airplane from Eastern Europe? By simply waiting, enough Members of Congress will apparently succumb to pressure from the antimilitary, and our adversaries will accomplish their goals; it will cost them absolutely nothing. All they must do is stall—and wait.

Those who espouse unilateral withdrawal adopt the following logic. One: MBFR talks are stalled. Two: they are stalled because the Soviet Union has no interest in expediting them, since the longer they wait—and I am quoting here

> The more intolerable will be our irrational commitment in domestic terms, and the more damaging to European unity will be unilateral cuts when they come.

Three: Since the Eastern nations, and Russia, have done nothing, we may as will accede to their wishes .

This is like saying: One. We live on the brink of a precipice. Two. Some day we may stumble over it, or the edge might erode away. Three. We therefore may as well throw ourselves over, since we are likely to go by accident, anyway.

Last year, the Jackson-Nunn amendment to mandate burden-sharing was appended to the military procurement bill. Its provisions have been substantially met. This was not an unreasonable requirement on our part, and the fact that it has been met indicates that our NATO partners recognize the reasonableness of it, also. It belabors the obvious to say that no one—and no nation—is going to pay for what can be had free. It is equally obivous that people are not going to pay for that which has no value. The requirement—and the meeting of it—represent a mutual acknowledgement of the necessity for our presence in Europe.

In the past 25 years, we have spent untold sums on military endeavors, to aid friendly nations in the maintenance of stability—and the Russians have helped those who shared their beliefs. In the same quarter-century, we have invested additional unnumbered dollars in economic assistance to friendly nations—as have the Russians. But there has been, in addition to these similarities, one difference. We have helped nations whose beliefs, whose ideologies, differed vastly from our own—India is a prime example—and we have occupied no nation to enforce our will.

By loans, grants, gifts, by provisions of grains and the material for self-sufficiency, by the construction of industries, of hospitals, of roads, we have done more than the world has ever seen before to help those who could or would not help themselves.

The people of the United States—unwillingly, through individual and group endeavors—have assumed an obligation to the rest of the world. And no one held a gun to our heads. No one extracted our money at bayonet-point. We have done it largely out of our own free will.

Some of us have acted altruistically; others from a sense of practicality, in the belief that a peaceful and stable world would help to insure an equally peaceful and stable environment for ourselves and our children. I do not believe it is the will of the American people to write off this investment in the future.

Has it cost us? You can bet your life it has. But before you bet other people's lives, consider this: In a time when government, and the Congress in particular, are at a very low point in public esteem—garbagemen are more highly regarded—the military in our land lead the list of most-admired. In essence, the people of America believe the military is meeting its commitment, at a time when they believe the politician is shirking his.

And consider this as well—two-thirds of the people of America have faith in their country—have faith that things, bad as they are, not intolerable, and that they will be better. Should we not share this feeling?

We cannot ignore the effect of our actions here in this Hall on other nations of the world—our potential enemies, as well as our friends. The leaders in both categories can read—and they can read English as it is written in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

I do not believe it is the intent of this body or of the American people to send them a message of surrender. We have invested too much—too much of our blood, of the best of two generations of men. We have invested our money—that money which might well have been invested in other things, I concede. We cannot walk away now. We cannot say, "It was not worth it. We will throw away our friends, our lives, our children's future."

The pessimists say that we are watching the decline of the West, that capitalism and its attendant freedoms are gasping their last. I do not believe this. And the evidence is that the American people do not believe it, either.

The urge is strong at times like this to quote from an earlier period, to reassure ourselves, perhaps, that no matter how bad things are, they have been worse—or at least as bad—before. Yet nothing quite fits. The times are indeed unique. Still and all, there is a quotation, a statement which applies to our times. It is 33 years old, and it was said, not by a politician, not by a man of the military. It was said by an author—an intellectual, some say. It was said by Somerset Maugham:

If a nation values anything more than freedom, and the irony of it is, if it is comfort or money that it values more, it will lose that, too.

I cannot add to this.

Mr. Chairman, last week a member of the board of a Methodist Church in the Fifth District of Virginia, forwarded me a two page "justification" for reduction in military spending. This material was compiled by Coalition on National Priorities and Military Policy.

The Department of Defense, through a Deputy Assistant Secretary who was formerly an Armed Services Committee staff member, was asked to respond. The material is admittedly lengthy, but it is exceptionally pertinent to the bill we discuss today. I, therefore, include the statement and responses for printing in the RECORD so that we may all give it full consideration as we debate the military procurement bill:

REDUCE DEFENSE SPENDING—CONTACT YOUR CONGRESSMAN NOW

This year military spending increased significantly even though the U.S. has concluded direct participation in the Vietnam War and entered into a "peacetime economy". With the Defense Department requesting $92.9 billion for FY75 and $6.2 billion as a supplemental for FY74 (total of $99.1 billion)—"the largest ever requested in one year except for 1942"—it is imperative that the defense budget be substantially reduced.

When communicating with your Congressman please urge him to support the following forthcoming legislative actions to reduce military spending:

1. A major worldwide overseas troop cut of at least 100,000.

2. Elimination or development slowdown of unnecessary weapons such as the SAM-D Air Defense System, B-1 Bomber, Trident Submarine, AWACS, Binary Gases and Tactical Mini-Nukes.

3. Support of a ceiling amendment which will limit further increases in defense spending. An amendment will be offered by Congressman Les Aspin (D-Wis) to hold spending to last year's levels; this would mean a reduction of approximately $1.1 billion in the FY75 defense budget.

If these legislative actions are to succeed, your Congressman must hear from you immediately. The Military Authorization Bill which authorizes programs for funding will be on the floor of the House by mid May.

Consituent pressure is the most effective way to encourage congressional opposition to increased defense spending.

If you want your Representative and Senator to vote against FY 1975 military spending write, call or see them now.

STATEMENT

In FY 1974 approximately 68% of the 2,100,000 active duty personnel are serving as commissioned, warrant officers and non-commissioned officer/specialists (E-4 through E-9). There is an average of 2 officers or non-commissioned officer/specialists on active duty to command, supervise or assist each private.

DOD POSITION

To classify all officers and non-commissioned officers as executive or supervisory is an erroneous assumption. Many officers and senior enlistment personnel are specialists and technicians whose grades are more reflective of their technical skills, training, education and experience than it is a reflection of their supervisory responsibilities. To illustrate the magnitude of this, the Army officer corps at the end of FY 1974 will contain 92,500 commissioned officers. Of this number, approximately 28,000 (30%) will be a technically oriented officer of the Chemical Corps, Engineer Corps, Finance Corps, Judge Advocate General, Chaplains Corps, Medical Corps, Dental Corps, Veterinary Corps, Medical Service Corps, Nurse Corps and Medical Specialist Corps. Many of the personnel in the combat oriented groups are also performing technical duties. This group contains officers working in communications and electronics; transportation; ordnance (including nuclear devices); police, intelligency and logistical support.

On the enlisted side there are nine different pay grades. Technically, the top five of these grades (E-5 through E-9) are "sergeants", varying in title from "buck sergeant" to sergeant major. Many are NCO's, but many others are skilled technicians and specialists who operate and maintain complex equipment but do not supervise. The bottom four grades include recruits, privates, privates first class and corporals or corporal-equivalents. Although the corporals are technically NCO's, the majority of them are first-term personnel experienced only to a journeyman level of skill. A more meaningful comparison would be to combine the strengths of the bottom four grades, since together these constitute the group of first-term enlisted men, and compare that with the top five grades which constitute the second-termers and careerists. On this basis, there are 1.5 times as many in the bottom enlisted group as in the top. If officers are included, the officer NCO level would be 48% of the total force vice the 68% cited.

STATEMENT 2

In FY 1974 only 17% of the 2,100,000 active duty military personnel are assigned

to combat skills jobs that fire on an enemy. In FY 1975, the Department of Defense estimates that there will be no improvement and this percentage will remain at 17%.

DOD POSITION

This 17% of military personnel only considers those personnel assigned to such activities as the infantry and armor, artillery and aircraft crews. No recognition is given to the total number of personnel assigned to within those manpower categories which constitute our combat forces, i.e., the Strategic and General Purpose Forces categories. Since these are our fighting forces, it is certainly more meaningful to examine how many military personnel are assigned to these categories and what actions have been taken to increase that number.

At the end of FY 1973, there were 46% of our military personnel assigned within the Strategic and General Purpose Forces categories. In 1975, this will increase to 49%. That is, of the 2,152,000 personnel requested for FY 1975, 1,044,000 will be assigned to these combat categories. Certainly, not all these personnel will be in skills which require direct confrontation with an enemy. It is a principle of the Department of Defense to take full advantage of technology to obtain equal or increased combat effectiveness rather than use the gross application of the American combat soldier. This technology dramatically increases combat capability of our forces, but the complex weapons systems obviously have increased the requirements for supply, maintenance and transportation personnel. For example, an Air Force fighter squadron has 27 aircrew personnel, but there "combat skill" personnel certainly cannot function within that specialty without the support of approximately 262 maintenance and 151 munitions support personnel. In this light, the mix of resources required to constitute and support our combat forces structure is designed to provide the required capability at minimum cost. No "support" or "overhead" resources are applied which are not essential, directly or indirectly, to the accomplishment of the combat mission.

STATEMENT

In FY 1975 the Army and Marine Corps are requesting a total authorized end-strength of 981 (thousand) active duty personnel at a total cost of approximately $10 billion. Yet only 260,000 of those personnel will be assigned to the 16⅔ divisions the Army and Marine Corps will field to fight in defense of the US National security.

DOD POSITION

The allegation is correct. It was planned that way deliberately in order to obtain maximum combat power from limited resources.

This common allegation ignores the fact that modern land warfare is a complex, highly mechanized business, which demands a complex and highly mechanized Army and Marine Corps. It is simply no longer true—and has not been true since the turn of the century—that "divisions" contain all of the combat power, or that the vast bulk of an army should consist of private soldiers carrying rifles. If DoD were to design its forces to satisfy these kinds of critics, we would have more divisions, a high proportion of private soldiers with rifles, few supporting troops—and we would not be able to win a battle. The facts are that:

1. About one-third of combat power is not included in divisions.

2. Support is needed to operate and maintain the vehicles and weapons (tanks, helicopters, jet fighters) used by the Army and Marine Corps.

3. Weapons are useless unless they can be brought to bear on an enemy in a coordinated fashion, and this takes intelligence, command, control, and communications.

The following combat forces are not included in divisions:

Three Marine Air Wings (30,000 men) with fighters, bombers, and helicopters.

Four active Army separate brigades (20,000 men) with organic infantry, tank, and artillery battalions.

Three Armored Cavalry Regiments (9,000 men).

Forty-seven separate Aviation Units (10,000 men).

Marine Force Troop Tank, Artillery, Amtrack Battalions (5,000 men).

Seventy-five separate Artillery Battalions (45,000 men).

Special Forces and Ranger Units (6,000 men).

Fifteen Surface-to-Surface Missile Units (10,000 men).

Seventy-four Air Defense Units (12,000 men)

Thus an additional 147,000 soldiers and Marines are in combat units. The total for both Services is about 407,000 personnel in combat units.

Proper support of these combat units is essential to success in battle. Guns without ammunition are useless. Tanks without fuel are useless. Soldiers without food are useless. There is no point in providing combat units which cannot be sustained in combat at their design levels of combat power. The support forces of the Army and Marine Corps are designed primarily to provide the sinews of war: ammunition, POL, food, personnel replacements, maintenance, and new parts and equipment to replace combat losses. Other support, such as pay, mail, medical service, and police service, are provided to assure proper administration of the forces. Support which does not contribute in one way or the other to combat effectiveness is not provided.

Similarly, an effective command and control system is an essential ingredient of success in battle. It would not make sense to line up thousands of riflemen and order them just to "fire in the direction of the enemy". The object of the exercise is to bring fires to bear on the enemy. This involves finding the enemy, determining his relative position, providing aiming and firing instructions to the weapons, and pointing the weapons in the right direction with the proper firing attitude. The process is incredibly complex. This is true because the stand-off distances from our forces to those of the enemy have increased from 300 yards for rifles to 300 miles for missiles and aircraft. Our desire is to minimize our losses by hitting the enemy before he has the opportunity to close with our units. We want to fire at him from a distance. This is the cheapest way to fight. But it does involve having people for intelligence (to find the enemy), communications (to transmit the information), and control at various levels (headquarters). War is a confusing business; errors persist. The side that prevails is often the one that makes the fewest errors. We invest a lot of men in our intelligence, command, control, and communications systems in order to minimize error and make best use of our weapons.

Modern land forces are designed to provide maximum combat power. Critics who use simplistic ratios to discredit this design make about as much sense as those who would complain that there is something wrong with a football team because only four of the eleven players are in the backfield.

STATEMENT

Within each of the 15,000 to 17,000 man divisions only 28% of the manpower will be assigned to the combat battalions that do the actual fighting. Each division contains approximately 11,000 officers and noncommissioned officer/specialists—and about 5,000 privates.

DOD POSITION

This allegation is incorrect. A "type" division of about 16,000 men includes about 50% in the combat maneuver battalions, and an overall total of 72% in combat modules. The remainder of the typical division includes 16% combat support and only 12% combat service support. The division is a balanced combined arms organization designed to apply effective combat power on the enemy. The combination of infantry, armor, artillery, and aviation, in which each arm complements and reinforces the others, allows a synergism which produces a maximum of combat power.

The approximate composition of the "average" or "type" division is as shown below:

	Men	Percent
Combat:		
10–11 Combat maneuver battalions: (infantry or tank)	8,000	50
4 field artillery battalions	2,400	15
1 cavalry squadron	800	5
1 aviation battalion (less general support company)	320	2
Total combat	11,520	72
Combat support:		
1 combat engineer battalion	1,000	6
1 signal battalion	500	3
1 military police company	200	1+
1 general support aviation company	220	1+
Headquarters (division, division artillery, and 3 brigades)	600	4
Total combat support	2,520	16
Combat service support:		
1 maintenance battalion	600	4
1 medical battalion	320	2
1 supply and transportation battalion	600	4
1 personnel services company	240	1+
1 support command headquarters and band	200	1+
Total combat service support	1,960	12
Total division	16,000	100

The allegation with respect to grade structure is also incorrect. The basic journeyman grade for an infantry rifleman is Specialist 4th Class (E–4). The lower grades, entitled recruits, privates, and privates first class, are apprentice grades. Recruit and private grades are actually used in the initial training period for a new soldier or are the result of disciplinary or other administrative reduction action. The typical good and well-trained soldier in today's army is a Specialist E–4.

When a "type" division is broken out into officers, NCOs, and workers, both specialist ratings and privates, the approximate mix is:

Officers (including warrant officers):	1,200
Noncomissioned Officers:	4,800
Specialists and Privates:	10,000
Total:	16,000

Statement: The 2.1 million FY 1974 military force will contain more 4- and 3-star generals and admirals and colonels and Navy captains than were required on active duty in 1945 to command 12.1 million military personnel. Approximately 80% of all U.S. general and field grade officers serve in non-combatant assignments.

DoD Position: The Department of Defense shares the concern of those who want the grade distribution of officers to be at the minimum necessary to meet the needs of Defense. However, comparisons made to World War II structures can be misleading because the situation in World War II differed in many respects from the situation today.

First, in 1945 forces were fully mobilized. The quantum buildup from a total officer force of only 31,000 in 1940 to an officer force of 1.2 million in 1945 resulted in an officer corps consisting largely of very young men in uniform for the *duration of the war*. The grade structure produced under such circumstances is not a valid basis of comparison for the current peacetime force three decades later.

Second, the organization for Defense has changed. In 1945 there was neither a Department of Defense nor a separate Air Force. The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 created new unified commands and Defense Agencies and strengthened the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Both NATO and SEATO were established after 1945. All of these developments have increased the requirements for senior officers.

Third, Defense management is functionally more complex today than in 1945. The procurement and distribution of material and equipment is more technically demanding and requires a much higher degree of economic control. Command and control systems are more sophisticated. The management of human resources, too, is far more complex and challenging. These developments significantly increase the requirements for senior officers. It should be noted that the proportion of top management positions has grown elsewhere in government and the private sector for many of these reasons.

The Department is unable to readily verify the statement concerning the proportion of flag and field grade officers in non-combatant assignments because such summary information is not maintained nor required for effective management. It would be expected that the majority of senior officers would not be in direct contact with enemy forces.

Statement: In FY 1974 there were 42,000 U.S. military personnel (including 20 generals and admirals) and an undisclosed number of nuclear weapons stored in South Korea to "assist" the 600,000 man armed forces of the Republic of South Korea to defend themselves from the unlikely possibility of attack by the 360,000 man North Korean forces. Last year this force cost the U.S. taxpayers over $600 million in direct costs—no change is proposed in this deployment in the FY 1975 Defense budget.

DOD Comment: The annual operating costs of maintaining U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea (ROK) currently are estimated at $525 million in FY 1973 and $560 million in FY 1974. Maintaining U.S. troops in Korea at this time costs less than supporting the same troops in the U.S. if factors such as the cost of providing in the U.S. modern housing and other support facilities and higher costs for food, civilian support, and other operations are considered.

Secretary Schlesinger in his Annual Report described the function of U.S. forces in Korea as follows:

"At the moment, the principal role of our forces in Korea is to provide a hedge against the uncertainties and deficiencies in South Korea's defense posture, and to provide an inducement to caution on the part of North Korea against the precipitation of new hostilities."

In addition, the presence of our forces serves as a manifestation of our support of the Republic of Korea in its effort to resolve the Korean problem. Our support encourages the South to take constructive initiatives with greater self-confidence such as the opening of contacts with the North (which resulted in the July 4, 1972 Joint Communique), the June 23, 1973 proclamation of a policy of free and open competition with the North, and the proposal of a non-aggression agreement by President Park on January 18, 1974.

It is policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons at any particular location.

Statement: There is no article of the NATO Treaty that requires the commitment of any level of U.S. military forces in Europe. Yet in FY 1974 there are 320,000 U.S. military personnel stationed in Western Europe at a cost to the taxpayer of $7.7 billion.

DOD Comment: It is true that there is no article of the NATO Treaty which, per se, requires U.S. military personnel to be stationed in Europe. U.S. forces in Europe are an integral part of the NATO military posture designed to implement NATO strategy and operational plans as approved by the Supreme Allied Commander after consultation and agreement with National Authorities concerned.

Statement: There is no article in the SEATO Treaty that requires the commitment of any U.S. forces in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia. Yet in FY 1974 there are 188,000 U.S. military personnel stationed or afloat in those world areas at a cost to the taxpayer of nearly $3 billion.

DOD Comment: Listed below is the disposition of U.S. military personnel in the Pacific area as of 31 December 1973. (Areas where military personnel number under 1,000 are not shown.)

Japan (including Ryukyus)	55,000
Philippines	16,000
South Korea	38,000
Thailand	36,000
Taiwan	6,000
Afloat	21,000

These troops are present in the area for a variety of reasons: because the U.S. is a Pacific power, to implement our forward defense strategy, and to support various treaty commitments.

Secretary Schlesinger in his *Annual Report* summed up the reasons for our continued presence in Asia. After noting that our military presence in Asia had been considerably reduced he pointed out:

"Nevertheless, we consider the possibility of conflict in Asia in deciding upon the characteristics and forward deployment of United States forces, because the continuing instabilities in Asia could involve the United States, and because having the visible capability to act can help to avoid, through deterrence, the necessity for action. A further large-scale or rapid reduction of United States forces in the Western Pacific would have unsettling effects in the region. Therefore, we continue to deploy one Army division to South Korea; a Marine Amphibious Force in Japan, including Okinawa, three tactical fighter wings at various bases in the Pacific, tactical fighter squadrons in Thailand, and B–52 aircraft on Guam and in Thailand; and naval deployments, including three carrier task forces, in the Western Pacific and, on occasion, in the Indian Ocean."

In speaking of our future posture Secretary Schlesinger emphasized:

"As we look forward, we see the most useful role for United States forces in the Pacific as providing a strong measure of visible support for our Allies, a credible deterrent to those who might risk new hostilities, and a general umbrella under which our Allies can pursue negotiations and internal development in an environment that encourages cooperation and discourages hostilities. Therefore, our present plans call for maintaining our forward deployments in the Pacific."

(It is planned that approximately 10,000 troops will be withdrawn from Thailand by the end of this year. Our deployments are under constant review and will be adjusted downward when the situation in Southeast Asia permits.)

Statement: On February 5, 1974, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger said, "It is a well-worn truism that our forces exist to support our foreign policy." Yet at a time when current U.S. foreign policy is supposedly directed toward detente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with China, the United States is maintaining almost the same troop levels in Europe and Asia as during the depth of U.S. 1950–1960 Cold War foreign policy.

DoD Comment: It is false to assert that we maintain as many troops overseas as in the 1950's and 1960's. On the contrary, we are now at the lowest point in our overseas troop deployments since before the Korean War.

The attached table shows U.S. strength overseas by year since 1955, i.e., since we had passed our 1952 Korean War peak. (Prior to 1955, different regional aggregations were used for strength data; these aggregations are not comparable to those in use since 1955, hence regional time-series cannot be constructed in such a way as to extend back beyond that year.) The table shows, first, that at the end of 1973, both our total strength overseas and our strength in Asia and the Western Pacific was at an all-time low for that period, while our strength in Western Europe and Related Areas was within 4,000 of the low registered in 1969, and substantially below the levels reached in the mid-1950's.

ASSIGNED U.S. TROOP STRENGTH OVERSEAS (ASHORE AND AFLOAT)[1]

[In thousands]

Year (as of June 30)	Total	Asia and W. Pacific	W. Europe and related areas
1955	867	320	[2] 412
1956	813	284	[2] 407
1957	799	262	[2] 401
1958	734	214	[2] 401
1959	699	185	[2] 375
1960	698	179	[2] 362
1961	703	197	[2] 371
1962	770	214	455
1963	762	224	424
1964	719	242	403
1965	744	297	401
1966	977	534	360
1967	1,208	744	364
1968	1,200	860	319
1969	1,155	842	296
1970	1,034	683	304
1971	804	453	314
1972	595	275	298
1973	542	199	319
Dec. 31, 1973	438	172	300

[1] Source: OASD/comptroller.
[2] Does not include troops afloat, for which 6th Fleet breakout is unavailable prior to 1955.

Statement: In FY 1974 the Defense Department operates over 200 training installations and has about two training personnel assigned for each trainee.

DOD Position: The statement does not agree with the facts. First, DOD does not "operate over 200 training installations." Of the 491 principal bases (that is, those which house a battalion-sized unit or its equivalent in manpower) which the four Services will operate in FY 1975, only 68 have the primary mission of training. Some training activities, such as technical schools, are tenants on other bases which have other primary missions, but these bases are not training installations.

The statement that DOD "has about two training personnel assigned for each trainee" is also incorrect. The average number of trainees in individual training during FY 1975 will be about 276,000. The total number of instructors and support personnel for this training will be about 255,000 (162,000 military, 93,000 civilians). It should be noted that this figure is not just instructors, as might be inferred from the statement. It includes the full array of support personnel, such as the mechanics who service the aircraft used for flight training and the engineers who maintain the roads and operate the utilities on training installations. Nevertheless, using the full figure for training support manpower, the ratio of training personnel to trainees is only about nine-tenths to one, not two to one.

Statement: In FY 1974 and FY 1975, the Armed Forces programmed 2.1 million costly, permanent change of station moves among a yearly total force of 2.1 million military members.

DOD Position: In planning for proposed Permanent Change of Station (PCS) movements, each of the Military Services recognizes the delicate balance between the needs of the Service in mission accomplishments, objectives of Service attractiveness and limited monetary resources. At the same time, every effort is being made to provide more stability in the lives of service members by assuring less frequent PCS moves.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to gauge the PCS problem by dividing the number of programmed moves by the total military force figure. The two are related, of course, but are not necessarily inter-dependent. Certain categories of PCS moves cannot be controlled. For example, accession of personnel (which includes moves attendant to entry into service) accounts for over ¼ of the total number of PCS moves. Similarly, separation of personnel (approximately the same percentage as accession) cannot be reduced. The other types of PCS, however, are controllable to an extent. These include training (for schooling purposes), operational (generally resulting from unit or activity activations or inactivations, relocation of units or reduction in size of activities), rotational (reassignment of an individual to a new billet—the category which usually comes to mind when discussing PCS movements) and organized units (movements of entire units with all assigned personnel).

The following table summarizes the distribution of types of moves in the FY 74 PCS program for each Service.

PCS MOVES BY TYPE OF MOVE FOR FISCAL YEAR 1974

[In percent]

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
Accession	25	27	42	13
Training	3	10	1	19
Operational	9	18	9	10
Rotational	36	15	26	40
Separation	27	28	22	16
Organized unit	(1)	2		2
Total	100	100	100	100

[1] Less than 0.5 percent.

In recognition of the problems involved, not only from a fiscal standpoint, but with a realization that morale of military personnel and their dependents is adversely affected by too-frequent PCS moves, the Services have been actively pursuing methods to reduce PCS moves since 1970.

As a result, in the Navy alone, which has an additional factor that does not apply to the other Services, the rotation of personnel between the fleet and shore billets, the number of PCS moves were reduced almost 50% from FY 70 to FY 73. Costs were reduced approximately 16% which represented a savings of $26.8 million. The difference in percentages between moves and costs can be attributed to the inflationary impacts on cost factors.

The other Services have reduced PCS moves and attendant costs by a continuous examination of all policies which influence PCS moves. Wherever practicable, all factors being taken into consideration, unnecessary PCS moves have been eliminated.

Attached are illustrations of the PCS moves made by each Service from FY 72 to FY 74.

[PCS moves in thousands]

	Fiscal year—		
	1972	1973	1974
ARMY			
Total PCS moves [1]	1,486.7	1,018.6	849.4
PCS moves not related to transient requirement:			
Accession	187.1	252.8	184.4
Organized unit	16.8	14.1	3.0
Separation	533.4	254.5	228.5
Total	737.3	521.4	415.9
PCS moves related to transient requirement:			
Accession	27.0	25.4	23.9
Training	21.7	23.3	22.3
Operational	89.9	79.7	73.9
Rotational	610.8	368.8	313.4
Total	749.4	497.2	433.5
NAVY			
Total PCS moves [2]	435.6	437.3	419.3
PCS moves not related to transient requirement:			
Organized unit	.8	3.0	9.3
Separation	151.9	150.0	117.3
Total	152.7	153.0	126.6
PCS moves related to transient requirement: [3]			
Accession	121.7	140.6	111.3
Training	37.8	39.8	44.0
Operational	71.8	62.8	74.7
Rotational	51.6	41.1	62.6
Total	282.9	284.3	292.6
Ship/shore "no cost" rotations	32.4	29.5	33.9
Total	315.3	313.8	326.5
MARINE CORPS			
Total PCS moves	288.3	272.6	264.4
PCS moves not related to transient requirement:			
Accession	49.8	47.8	47.1
Separation	74.0	62.0	58.5
Total	123.8	109.8	105.6
PCS moves related to transient requirement:			
Accession	59.1	62.9	63.4
Training	3.9	2.7	2.7
Operational	22.4	24.6	23.6
Rotational	79.1	72.6	69.1
Total	164.5	162.8	158.8
AIR FORCE			
Total PCS moves [4]	731.4	773.4	736.4
PCS moves not related to transient requirement:			
Accession	107.9	118.3	94.1
Organized unit	4.0	9.2	12.5
Separation	135.3	149.6	118.6
Total	247.2	277.1	225.2
PCS moves related to transient requirement:			
Training	170.0	175.6	142.8
Operational	61.9	61.5	72.9
Rotational	252.3	259.2	295.5
Total	484.2	496.3	511.2

[1] Excludes Military Academy cadet accession and separation moves.

[2] Excludes Naval Academy midshipman accession and separation moves.

[3] The substantial decrease in transient requirements from fiscal year 1972 to fiscal year 1973 is the result of Navy managerial action to reduce the time personnel spend awaiting assignment or transfer.

[4] Excludes Air Force Academy cadet accession and separation moves.

Statement: "In FY 1975 U.S. military personnel will be serving as military advisors in 43 foreign countries."

DOD Comment: The DOD personnel referred to will be assigned to Military Assistance Advisory Groups, Military Missions and Military Groups in foreign countries, commonly referred to as MAAG's which are key elements in the system through which military assistance and Foreign Military Sales requirements are identified and the resulting grant aid programs and sales arrangements are developed and implemented in a manner ensuring their maximum contribution to U.S. security objectives. These organizations are not only responsible for efficient planning, administration and management of Military Assistance Program (MAP) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs, but also perform other functions of equal importance to U.S. interests by:

Providing knowledgeable Department of Defense representation in country to advise and assist the host country prior to and during major sales and delivery transactions involving a wide variety of complex military equipment produced by U.S. manufacturers.

Advising and assisting the host country in the development of military self-reliance and a realistic force level which meets the country's security needs, is within its capability to maintain, and is also consistent with U.S. collective security interests.

Establishing and maintaining rapport with the military of the host country to provide channels of communication, dialogue and influence which are valuable to the U.S. Government for diplomatic and commercial, as well as military, reasons.

Monitoring the movement and delivery of MAP end items and continuous observation and review of their use by recipient countries to ensure proper utilization and disposal—a residual function which continues after termination of grant aid programs.

The Department of Defense is dedicated to the principle that the basic purposes and missions of the MAAG's are consistent with the national interest in maintaining a minimum military presence in selected foreign countries. Thus, the need for MAAG's, their size and the skills of personnel assigned are kept under constant review within the Department of Defense. As the situation in a particular foreign country changes, all of these elements of the MAAG's structure are adjusted so that the objectives of minimum presence and maximum efficiency are kept in balance.

These security assistance organizations, by type and location, are shown on the attached sheet.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS

COUNTRY: MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS—19

Bellux, Denmark, China (Taiwan), Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Greece, Iran, Italy, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Thailand, Turkey.

MILITARY MISSIONS—10

Cambodia, Military Equipment Delivery Team; Indonesia, Defense Liaison Group; India, Office of Defense Representative; Japan, Mutual Defense Assistance Office; Liberia, U.S. Military Mission; Morocco, U.S. Liaison Office; Pakistan, Office of Defense Representative; Saudi Arabia, U.S. Military Training Mission; Tunisia, U.S. Military Liaison Office; Zaire, U.S. Military Mission.

MILITARY GROUPS (14)

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. WHITEHURST).

Mr. WHITEHURST. Mr. Chairman, in these times of inflation, increased technical complexity, and rising cost of weapon systems, the Navy's patrol frigate program stands out as an excellent example of a program to meet an urgent military requirement in the most economical manner.

It is widely appreciated that the

United States is growing more and more dependent on the use of sea lines of communication for the necessary conduct of world trade, for the import of needed raw materials, and to sustain our friends overseas in both peace and war.

At the same time the Soviet Navy is expanding rapidly in the numbers of modern combatant ships and in its ability to deploy these ships in the critical ocean areas of the world. In contrast, the U.S. Navy has diminished markedly in size for over the last 10 years. The World War II ships, destroyers in particular, that were the mainstay of our Navy for so many years have reached the end of their useful life. To replace them with large, multipurpose, "able to fight anywhere" destroyers in the numbers required to adequately cover the thousands upon thousands of miles of vital sealanes in time of war would be prohibitively expensive.

The Navy has taken cognizance of the fact that, when combined with the newer escort ships that we now have or will have during the next 10 to 25 years, relatively small, less expensive ships could be designed and constructed to adequately defend our sealanes in all but the most hostile of the world's potential war zones where our carrier task forces and other highly sophisticated ships are designed to fight. And most importantly, the Patrol Frigate can be constructed in the numbers that we require at an affordable price.

The Navy has devoted almost 3 years of concentrated study, analysis, and design effort to determine exactly the right combination of weapons and sensors to provide the required force effectiveness at a minimum cost. Taking advantage of modern computers they evaluated ever 300 combinations of hull, propulsion, weapons, and sensors before deciding on the patrol frigate as the most effective in meeting our needs. It is an austere ship design to provide maximum required capability at least cost. It is a ship which will fill a major portion of the void brought about by the retirement of our World War II destroyers.

It should be noted, also, that the Navy has been equally diligent in developing a shipbuilding program designed to prevent gross cost overruns. The ship is "designed to cost" and the "design to cost" principles will be adhered to in its planned production.

In summary, the patrol frigate is a well conceived program, carefully tailored to provide capabilities vital to the protection of the sea lanes of the world essential to the United States in peace and in war. It is a "no nonsense" ship, designed to provide maximum effectiveness at least cost. It is a ship we can build in the numbers that we need. It is a ship we connot afford not to build.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. ARMSTRONG).

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I rise to congratulate the chairman of the Seapower Subcommittee and the ranking member for their leadership in bringing before the committee and before the House the important new provision in this legislation relating to the nuclear Navy.

It seems to me all too often Congress is preoccupied with day-to-day crises and all too seldom looks ahead to plan wisely for the future.

In presenting this proposal the gentleman from Florida and the gentleman from California have done so in a most responsible manner. I think historians will look back on the action they have recommended as an important turning point in the naval history of the United States.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE).

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 14592, but I do not want to give the impression that I rise in support of everything contained within H.R. 14592.

I think we have done some very useful things in this bill. I am particularly impressed with the work of the Subcommittee on Manpower. Any time we can increase the proportion of enlisted men to officers, that is real progress toward a more effective fighting military. Any time we can decrease the proportion of generals and admirals to combat troops, that, too, is real progress.

I would like to say at this time I think among the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that General Abrams in particular is committed to the goal of making a fighting Army rather than a parade Army. I think he is doing everything he can in this regard and should be commended and encouraged.

Tomorrow I will offer an amendment to cut out the B–1 program. I will not go into that in detail at the present time. The minority views on this subject are on page 97 of the committee report. I was encouraged to hear the chairman of the Research and Development Subcommittee, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE) did concede in his own remarks today that it is in fact a sick program.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to address myself briefly today to the larger problem of getting facts out of the Pentagon.

I have not brought my lunch here today in this package, but I have brought an altimeter. This particular altimeter costs $1,000, and that is not a bad buy for an altimeter, except that this particular altimeter does not work. It not only does not work, but it cannot be repaired.

It has on it a red tag which says, "Warning, for Ground Use Only. Not To Be Installed on Aircraft."

I would submit that an altimeter which cannot be installed on an aircraft is not much of a bargain. Not only did it cost $1,000, but there are thousands of them sitting on the shelves at an Air Force facility, and they just cannot be installed on aircraft, because they do not work.

The Air Force investigated this procurement. What did they find? They found that the manufacturer was sneaking into the factory at night during the testing process and adjusting the altimeters while they were being tested. Did they cancel the contract? Oh, no, they did not cancel the contract. The Government inspector found that in the testing facility there was a tube running off from the vacuum and pressure testing mechanism, right into the wall of the facility, so that no matter whether the altimeter really worked or not, it would indicate that the altimeter worked.

So, did they cancel the procurement? No, they did not cancel the procurement.

There was just unadulterated fraud in this procurement of these altimeters, and finally the Air Force, because they did not work, canceled it for nondelivery. But they continue to buy other altimeters from the same corporation.

Now, can we get those investigation reports? No. We cannot, because, for instance, I have tried to get the OSI report. They have let me look at it, but I could not keep it. I pointed out to them the Freedom of Information Act which we passed, and the Freedom of Information Act says that when an investigation is completed we can get the facts.

Well, what do they say? Although the investigations say on the face of them that they are completed, the case is closed, they say, "We have not completed the investigation."

I say, "Why have you not completed the investigation?" They say, "We have not completed the investigation because you, Congressman PIKE, asked a question about it."

If I had not asked for the information, in other words, I could have it. But, in view of the fact that I have asked for the information, they are still investigating it, and, accordingly, we cannot get it.

Now, this is true throughout this whole procurement business.

The B–1 program increased in cost by $300 million a month every month in the last year—increased. And we cannot get the up-to-date selected acquisition reports not only on the B–1 program, but on any program. We have not gotten a selected acquisition report in the subcommittee dated more recently than last December 31. We do not know what the B–1 costs today. They know over in the Pentagon. They are not telling us the truth. They know that they are accelerating the price at an estimated inflation rate of only 3.3 percent a year.

This is fantasy, and we ought to at least insist on the truth from the Pentagon.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. WHITEHURST. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. RANDALL).

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, tomorrow this committee will be faced with some amendments that will be every bit as important as those we faced at this time last year. Last year we had what we called the Peyser amendment. It was added to an amendment which made an attempt to reduce our commitments to NATO. The Peyser amendment called for a study of our forces in Europe, and with

the mandate that the Committee on Armed Services make a report effective April 1 on its study. But there have been some important intervening events. I wish there were more Members on the floor who were not members of the Committee on Armed Services who could listen to this brief discussion.

Following the Peyser amendment came the Jackson-Nunn amendment. That said that in the period ending in 18 months—12 months from last November and an additional 6 months, which would expire next May—that if there is a deficit in our balance of payments because of deployment of air troops and our allies do not make up that deficit, then there should be a withdrawal of forces by the percentage which fell short of full offset by air allies. Thus Jackson-Nunn is one difference this year. As one who was privileged to serve as chairman of the ad hoc committee, that we have a very excellent chance of meeting Jackson-Nunn on time. There is no indication that we will fail.

There has been another event which has already been alluded to. That is the MBFR. The subcommittee visited Vienna, and we found there something that we had never seen before. There was complete unity among our allies in agreeing on what forces we should reduce and, on the contrary there was no footdragging and no delays at all by the Russians.

The committee reports to you here today that there is a good chance that that conference can succeed. We are not certain of the reasons for it. Maybe it is because the Russians are anxious to have our credits and our technology. Maybe they think more of the concept of détente than we realize, but they have indicated a willingness to move forward.

How does this apply to the debate and the amendments which will be offered tomorrow? There will be two amendments offered tomorrow, and maybe more. One will be simply to the effect that there are going to be 200,000 troops brought home from overseas. We do not know yet whether they are to be brought home or discharged. The other one would be a little bit different. It will say about 100,000 troops phased out, apparently brought home.

Of course, at the appropriate time the Armed Services Committee will attempt to show there will really be no saving. There might be some saving for those who are brought home if they were discharged. But for those who are brought home and try to find a place to house them, there will be no saving. In fact, it will cost more to keep them in this country than if they remain in the NATO area in the Federal Republic of Germany.

But let me get back on the track in the limited time I have remaining and say to the Members that the real seriousness of this whole thing is that if we approve any amendment to call home our troops then our Nation can very well become a spectacle in the eyes of the world for acting capriciously. We will allow ourselves to be held up to the justified criticism of all the world. In effect we will have said yes, we passed the Jackson-Nunn amendment. Our allies are meeting Jackson-Nunn but we are bringing our troops home anyhow. The Federal Republic of Germany made the best offset agreement that has ever been made in all of the years there has been an agreement. At the moment just about everything is going our way.

In spite of their problems this year, the oil crisis, and all of the other problems, our allies have, nevertheless, come up with the best offset agreement of any year. So if we do a turnaround here tomorrow and happen to adopt one of these amendments for withdrawal, or any variation of them, then we are saying to our allies and to the world in effect: We did not mean what we said by Jackson-Nunn, and we do not mean anything we are saying or doing in Vienna at MBFR.

We have Secretary Resor, former Secretary of the Army, heading the negotiations over at Vienna. He came over here to make a report 2 or 3 weeks ago. We had a chance to visit with him. There was no diminution in his optimism.

It is unexpected and unanticipated the cooperation we are getting from the Warsaw Pact at this time in Vienna. Sure, we have a long, tedious time ahead at MBFR. It is going to be a lot of work yet, but the prize or the objective is the important thing, and that is to get a reduction—a balanced reduction of forces without diminishing our security.

For the first time we appear to have a breakthrough. Think how foolhardy, how almost stupid it would be if we approve any of these amendments tomorrow. It simply would mean we will have pulled the rug out from under our people. We might as well say to them: "Just pack your bags and come on home."

So I suggest to the Members they should think long and hard before they support either of these amendments which will be offered tomorrow.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. DELLUMS).

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, obviously this is one of the most important bills considered by Congress. The size of the military bureaucracy and the amount of money needed to supply it with hardware far exceeds the wildest dream of any nondefense agency administrator. Only the military budget is significant enough itself to set limits to what the whole Government can do or hope to do. In fact, the size of the military budget is the central issue determing domestic reform.

As Secretary Schlesinger has clearly told us, this first completely post-Indochina budget shows what to expect for the indefinite future unless some basic assumptions are changed.

It is the first indication of what can be expected from a supposedly peacetime Government. Unfortunately, the answer is: "Not much." Whatever else "peace" means for this administration, it does not mean any commitment to creativity in any other field besides military hardware or to any renewed dedication to working out real problems.

At home, we see this in the fact that while every other Government agency and program is scraped to the bone, especially the human needs programs, and forced to show "efficiency dividends" at the expense of significant accomplishment only the military maintains its rate of growth without any substantial savings, in fact with a growth rate that outstrips the overall rate of inflation.

We must realize this: In an era of tightened resources and hard choices, we must choose either tax reform and defense cuts on the one hand, or a helpless Government facing multiplying social problems on the other. If the Defense budget is untouchable, the rest of the Government must wither away.

Abroad, we see this when we notice that détente does not mean an end, first, to our worldwide military presence; second, to our ability to fight any way at any time; third, to our dedication to keeping dictators in power through any means necessary; and fourth, to the same perception of political and strategic realities that dominated foreign policy thinking 20 years ago.

So we are forced to ask ourselves, "Is détente any different from the cold war? Does it make any difference at all? What is the use of it then?"

OVERSEA TROOP LEVELS

Manpower costs comprise 55 percent of the military budget. This figure does not include the increasingly heavy burden of veterans' benefits, which the administration never includes in its military spending figures, but which this year will be $13.6 billion. We will undoubtedly save some money if we end some of the unneeded and costly weapons systems such as the atomic aircraft carrier, the B–1 bomber, the Trident submarine or the destabilizing land-based missiles—but we will never touch the bulk of the huge military budget until we revise our assumptions about the use of manpower. It is here that the Pentagon's refusal to come up with any real "efficiency dividend" is most flagrant.

For these reasons, I shall offer an amendment that will substantially cut end-strength, and mandate that the cuts be taken overseas. Exact location of the oversea cuts will be left to the Pentagon.

We now have 492,000 troops scattered all over the world. My amendment will cut 198,100 from this total. This decrease could easily be accommodated without a reduction in real commitment, because of the inefficient structure of the oversea troops as reflected in crowded headquarters, wasteful support-to-combat ratios, and disruptive rotation policies.

These are the key questions we want to ask:

Is it possible to have a real peacetime budget? Can the Government get its job done without raising taxes?

Do we need to maintain a worldwide military manpower presence?

Can we really end the arms race by the method proposed by the Pentagon, that is, new technological leaps in weaponry?

Finally, does this budget really serve the interests and the security of the American people?

The answer to the final question is "no." In simple terms, this bill continues the disastrous trend of blind faith militarism and adventurism which has dominated policymaking in this Nation and which, over the past decade, has destroyed and distorted the American economy, shattered the political and social framework upon which our democracy was created, and killed and maimed hundreds of thousands of persons. There is a massive difference between what funds should be required to provide for the common defense of our Nation, and the money required by this bill. For this reason, I am strongly opposed to the bill in its present form.

MILITARY AID TO SAIGON

This Nation is a signatory to the Paris agreements and yet we are in serious violation of that truce. Our client, General Thieu, has made a mockery of the Paris agreements; there is probably not an article that Thieu has not flagrantly violated.

Nevertheless, American taxpayers are virtually the sole financial support for Thieu. Estimates indicate that our tax dollars account for 85 percent of Thieu's national budget, and I would like to call attention once again to the figures noted by our colleague from New York (Mr. PIKE) in the floor debate on the supplemental aid to Vietnam, when he pointed out that the South Vietnamese defense budget dropped from $1.3 billion in 1971 to only $474 million budgeted for this year.

American dollars allow Thieu to continue a war that took approximately 60 thousand lives last year; American dollars pay for a police state in which thousands of Vietnamese are held political prisoner without benefit of trial; American dollars pay for the security of a petty dictator who refuses to allow distribution of the Paris agreements in his areas, who holds illegal elections, forbids neutralism, and employs systematic torture.

It is a sham to say there is peace in Vietnam, and a lie to claim there is "honor" in American policy toward that tragic nation. What honor for us can there be when Thieu's biggest friend also happens to be the American Ambassador? I do not think this is the forum to deal with all of Ambassador Martin's follies, but I would like to bring attention to the fact that Martin himself has admitted that he is permitting outright American violation of the Paris agreement. Despite legislative mandate and terms of the Paris agreement, in a memorandum printed in the April 4, 1974, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on page 9916, Ambassador Martin notes that—

A certain number of people in the Defense Attaché Office were retained, engaged solely on logistics assistance to the military forces of South Vietnam.

To me, that appears to be a flagrant violation of both congressional intent and the Paris agreement.

Finally, let me indicate what I see occurring if huge flows of American military assistance continue to Thieu—as the general and the administration desire. As long as America picks up the tab for his military operations and for his repeated violations of the Paris agreements, Thieu will continue the war. I do not think the Provisional Revolutionary Government will allow that to happen for any prolonged period—and up to now, the PRG has concentrated on achieving a political settlement based upon the Paris agreements and has undertaken only limited military operations. But I do not think it realistic for us to assume that the PRG and its allies would remain so passive, if it becomes apparent that Thieu will never agree to any of the political components of the Paris accords and that America will continuously fund Thieu's aggression. Whenever that point is reached, I think that massive fighting will break out again, and we will be back to the situation of a decade ago.

Given that chance, it is conceivable that, based upon the implicit commitment Secretary Kissinger has made, large-scale American forces could be reintroduced in Vietnam.

Have we not learned from the past decade in Vietnam? How long is this tragedy to continue? As long as Congress allows Thieu to mock the Paris agreements by his repeated offensives, by his refusing basic human rights guaranteed by the agreements, and by gestapo tactics which pervert the legal system in Vietnam, it is we who must take the responsibility for war in Vietnam.

I do not oppose the concept of humanitarian assistance to the people of Vietnam. But this bill provides nothing of that sort. Instead, the American taxpayer once again assumes the burden of Thieu's military budget. As long as we do so—and no matter what level ceiling we may impose—tthere will be continuing war in Vietnam.

If instead, our Nation is to abide by the Paris agreements—something we have not done up to now—Congress must insist that Thieu live up to the terms set in Paris. I intend to offer an amendment on the floor proposing that all military aid be suspended until we are assured that Thieu is in accord with the Paris agreements and I urge my colleagues to support that motion.

This is a serious issue, but not one apparently critical enough though for the Armed Services Committee to devote major analysis and attention. Proper legislative oversight of Executive activities is, of course, the very key to our system of government—particularly now in an era of gross Executive misuse of power. It is thus with considerable dismay that I found that the committee report's language justifying military aid to Saigon contains outright plagiarism of unsubstantiated and thoroughly inaccurate Executive testimony.

I have discovered that the committee's justification is not only misleading, loaded with inaccuracies, and in many cases totally untrue, but it is, in fact, copied almost word-for-word from testimony given by a Pentagon spokesman to the committee on March 26, 1974. The following comparison of testimony given by Maj. Gen. William B. Caldwell, Director, Security Assistance Plans and Policy Formulation, to the committee on pages 893–895 of its hearings with the language of the committee report shows that the committee has simply copied the prepared statement of General Caldwell and then presented it as a summary of committee findings:

A COMPARISON BETWEEN HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE REPORT ON FISCAL YEAR 1975 MASF PROPOSAL AND TESTIMONY BY PENTAGON SPOKESMAN

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE REPORT ON MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1975 MASF FOR SOUTH VIETNAM, MAY 10, 1974, PAGES 85–90	TESTIMONT BY MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM CALDWELL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DIRECTOR, SECURITY ASSISTANCE PLANS POLICY, MARCH 26, 1974, PAGES 893–895	COMMENTS
The objectives of our military assistance to South Vietnam are limited, but absolutely **essential. [The Government of the United States wishes] to help the Government of South Vietnam to maintain an effective military deterrent in the face of the considerable threat posed by the North Vietnamese forces within the Republic of Vietnam. Attainment of this limited objective is the key to the maintenance of stable balanced conditions necessary to ensure peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia. However, attainment of this objective has a vital and strategic importance far beyond Indochina. Involved are the fundamental goals of our nation's foreign policy.**	General CALDWELL. Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of this committee: **The objectives of our military assistance to South Vietnam are limited but absolutely essential. We seek to help the GVN to maintain an effective military deterrent in the face of the considerable threat posed by the North Vietnamese forces within the Republic of Vietnam. Attainment of this limited objective is key to the maintenance of stable, balanced conditions necessary to insure peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia. However, attainment of this objective has a vital and strategic importance far beyond Indochina. Involved are the fundamental goals of our foreign policy.**	Paragraphs 1–2—**The available evidence does not indicate that our military assistance is helping to "ensure peace". There were well over 1,000,000 war victims in South Vietnam alone last year—perhaps more than in the rest of the world combined for 1973. (50,152 military dead and over 100,000 military wounded, according to GVN official statistics; 15,000 civilian dead, 70,000 civilian wounded, and 818,000 refugees, according to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Refugees.)** **Not only does our military assistance fuel this continuing war, but it shows no hope of stabilizing. Thus last year $1.009 billion in MASF funds was allocated to the GVN; In FY 75, however, the Administration request was set at $1.6 billion, an increase of 42%.**

A COMPARISON BETWEEN HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE REPORT ON FISCAL YEAR 1975 MASF PROPOSAL AND TESTIMONY BY PENTAGON SPOKESMAN—Continued

Events in Vietnam over the past year have taught us that a lasting peace is possible only if there is a stable balance of power between the opposing sides. It is the view of the Committee on Armed Services that a military equilibrium in that area of the world will deter new offensives and gradually induce a (general) shift in priorities (by the contending forces) away from war.	Events in Vietnam over the past year have taught us that a lasting peace is possible only if there is a stable balance of power between the opposing sides. A military equilibrium will, we believe, deter new offensives and gradually induce a shift in priorities away from war.	Nor does it offer any hope of deterring possible offensives by the other side, which was neither deterred from a 1968 offensive by 550,000 U.S. ground troops or a 1972 offensive by a massive U.S. bombing campaign. Clearly, the only way of achieving our objective of "lasting peace" is implementation of the Paris Agreement; there are numerous indications, however, that the GVN still refuses to recognize the PRG (See the *N.Y. Times*, Feb. 10, 1973; *The Economist*, Feb. 16, 1974) and test its offer to engage in political settlement. Under these circumstances, the Administration's present MASF program offers little hope of encouraging peace and seems only to be leading to more war.
"The post agreement period in Vietnam has recorded substantial progress toward this goal. (Although) some fighting has continued, on the basis of testimony received by the Committee, it is the conviction of the Committee that the cease fire has indeed served to significantly dampen combat activity. Thus, the hopes of the Executive Branch, which are shared by the members of the Committee on Armed Services, for a stable peace in South Vietnam, are largely dependent upon the continued ability of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves.	The post-agreement period in Vietnam has recorded substantial progress toward this goal. While fighting has continued, we believe that the cease-fire has served to dampen combat activity. Our hopes for a more stable peace are dependent on the continued ability of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves.	Paragraph 3—All evidence indicates that it is not our arming the GVN that has served to "dampen combat activity", but rather a Communist decision in 1973 that it is in their interests to try for a political solution to the conflict and emphasize reconstruction. (See U.S. Embassy analysis of Document No. 113, Vietnam—Documents and Research Notes; N.Y. Times, January 23, 1973; "Hanoi Puts Rebuilding Ahead of Victory"; Baltimore Sun, April 16, 1974.)
The cease fire already has witnessed the following: "A rough but tenuous balance of forces thus far prevails in Vietnam; Territorial and population control have changed little over the past year (what change has been made has been in favor of the Government forces); In the area of military operations, Hanoi's land grab offensive on the eve of the Paris agreement set a pattern of NVA attacks and Government reactions which still characterizes the cease-fire. Major Communist initiatives in the past year have included: Another land grab attack prior to the June communique; The capture of strategic posts (e.g., Le Minh border Camp) in the western highlands last fall; An offensive in Quang Duc province which seized a district capital; The shelling of Bien Hoa airbase; The destruction of a major civilian fuel depot near Saigon; Continuing attacks against all forms of transportation and; Terrorism against civilians.	The cease-fire already has witnessed the following: A rough but tenuous balance of forces thus far prevails in Vietnam; Territorial and population control have changed little over the past year—what change has been made has been in favor of the Government forces; In the area of military operations, Hanoi's land grab offensive on the eve of the Paris agreement set a pattern of NVA attacks and government reactions which still characterizes the cease-fire. Major Communist initiatives in the past year have included: another land grab attack prior to the June communique; the capture of strategic posts, for example, Le Minh Border Camp in the western Highlands last fall; an offensive in Quang Duc Province which seized a district capital; the shelling of Bien Hoa Airbase; the destruction of a major civilian fuel depot near Saigon; continuing attacks against all forms of transportation; and terrorism against civilians.	Paragraph 4—This shocking admission that "what change has been made has been in favor of Government forces" indicates that the GVN may well be using our military assistance to take land from the other side. This has been also suggested by numerous newspaper reports, for example one which reported that "In the past month, military officials say, almost 20 square miles of formerly Communist-held territory have been seized by South Vietnamese troops driving westward from Highway 1. . . ." (Wash. Post, September 30, 1973.) This fact indicates that while the communist attacks listed did occur, the GVN is not entirely blameless. Indeed, the consensus of opinion indicates that at the very least both sides have engaged in violations of the military ceasefire, thus making it difficult to attribute primary blame to either side for a specific military incident. Senate Foreign Relations Committee investigators, for example, have reported that Saigon forces "have encroached on territory considered predominately under Communist control, and in MR III they have been even more aggressive in military operations. ("Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam," April 1923, p. 35) And, until the GVN at least tests the other side's offer to compete for power politically by recognizing the PRG and allowing democratic liberties guaranteed by Article 11 of the Paris Agreement, the GVN may have to take the political responsibility for the military breakdown.
A new North Vietnamese full-scale offensive, however, is not inevitable, Hanoi is keeping its option open but, is encountering serious problems both at home and in the south. These problems, together with a strong GVN deterrent and the international context of détente give us hope that an offensive can be avoided. A shift in Hanoi's priorities would then make possible a serious accommodation within the spirit of the Vietnam agreement.	A new North Vietnamese full-scale offensive, however, is not inevitable. Hanoi is keeping its option open but, is encountering serious problems both at home and in the South. These problems, together with a strong GVN deterrent and the international context of détente give us hope that an offensive can be avoided. A shift in Hanoi's priorities would then make possible a serious accommodation within the spirit of the Vietnam agreement.	Paragraph 5—As long as the PRG is outlawed from the political arena, another offensive is unlikely in the short-term but inevitable in the long-term. The notion that the Communists are encountering more problems now than five years ago when facing 550,000 American ground troops or 1½ years ago when facing hundreds of U.S. bombing raids daily does not make sense. "International détente" did not stop an offensive in 1972, nor is likely to preclude a future one. There is every reason to believe that build up the GVN's army can only increase its capacity to provoke attacks, while doing nothing to prevent defeat. The GVN is offering the other side no choice at this point but surrender, and the experience of the past 25 years indicates that this simply will not happen.

While the North Vietnamese have increased the conventional capability of the main forces, the cost has been great, and the Government of Vietnam has thus far managed to turn back all their challenges in the past year.

Combat deaths, while substantial on both sides, have declined to the lowest level since 1965 and are down 75% compared with the rate in 1972. Some 500,000 refugees have been resettled. Virtually all pre-cease-fire civilian detainees and POW's—at least on the GVN side—have been released.

The balance of power which underlies the chances for peace is under heavy pressure from North Vietnam. Hanoi is conducting a massive military buildup in the south and repeatedly violates the cease-fire. These activities threaten the equilibrium and consequently the whole framework of the peace we so laboriously negotiated in Paris, for example: In total violation of the Paris Agreement, since the cease-fire, Hanoi has infiltrated over 70,000 replacement troops, some 400 tanks, 150 long-range heavy artillery pieces, 1,000 AAA guns and 150,000–200,000 tons of ammunition and supplies. Since the cease-fire, North Vietnamese capabilities have increased 20% in combat manpower, 200% in tanks, 75% in heavy artillery and 75% in AAA. Some of this additional equipment includes new items such as SAM–2 missiles with 16 to 20 launchers of which most, if not all, were introduced into the south after the cease-fire. The Communists are also working on 12 airfields in the south and are completing a massive new logistics system of all-weather three lane roads and pol pipelines.

The record of GVN's and North Vietnam's cease-fire implementation simply does not support the argument that our assistance will only facilitate new "violations" by the GVN and thus undermine the cease-fire. Throughout the cease-fire period, Saigon has exercised restraint compared with the Communists' excesses. It has observed the agreement to the extent of any prudent state faced with North Vietnam's current policy and activities in the South. Despite Hanoi's record of violations, the GVN has limited itself to justifiable acts of self-defense. With few exceptions, Saigon has limited its military operations to responding to communist land grab

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For example: In total violation of the Paris agreement, since the cease-fire, Hanoi has infiltrated over 70,000 replacement troops, some 400-plus tanks, 150-plus long-range heavy artillery pieces, 1,000 AAA guns, and 150,000–200,000 tons of ammunition and supplies. Since the cease-fire, North Vietnamese capabilities have increased 20 percent in combat manpower, 200 percent in combat manpower, 200 percent in tanks, 75 percent in heavy artillery, and 75 percent in AAA. Some of this additional equipment includes new items such as SAM–2 missiles with 16 or 20 launchers of which most, if not all, were introduced into the South after the cease-fire. The Communists are also working on 12 airfields in the South and are completing a massive new logistics system of all-weather, two lane roads and POL pipelines.

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Paragraph 6—Since the "enemy offensives" long predicted by U.S. and GVN officials have simply not materialized since the ceasefire, it is fundamentally inaccurate to claim that the GVN has "turned back all their challenges."

Paragraph 7—The Pentagon neglects to note that the 818,000 new refugees reported by the U.S. Senate Refugee Subcommittee are more than in any year of the war except 1966 (906,000) and 1972 (1,320,000). The Refugee Subcommittee also notes that many of those "resettled" have actually been simply shifted to economically unviable land so the GVN can claim new territory, in violation of Article 11 of the Paris Agreement which permits "freedom of movement". The Senate Appropriations Committee reported on December 19, 1973, that "reliable and objective sources suggest that there are between 40,000 and 60,000 political prisoners being held." Since the ceasefire, however, the GVN has only released, by its own official count, 5,081 "civilian detainees" to the other side, leaving tens of thousands still in jail. The U.S. Embassy in Saigon, moreover, has admitted not visiting the prisons since the ceasefire. (Cong. Record, April 29, 1974, S6421.) Thus American officials do not have sufficient evidence to make the sweeping generalization that the GVN has released all pre-ceasefire civilian detainees.

Paragraph 8—The evidence suggests that there has been no shift in the military balance of power in South Vietnam since the Paris Agreement in favor of Hanoi. Although there is no way of knowing the real figure of replacement troops, the 70,000 figure is more than offset by the 40–50,000 troops reported to have left South Vietnam to return North during this period. (Los Angeles Times, February 13, 1974), and the 50,000 or more "NVN/PRG" reported killed.

Moreover, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff reported the CIA estimate to be 142,000 North Veitnamese troops in South Vietnam as of April 15, 1973. (See "Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam: April 1973", p. 36.) Since then there has been virtually no change. Official U.S. sources put the figure at 138,000 in December, 1973. U.S. News and World Report. December 17, 1973; Chicago Daily News, December 19, 1973.) More recently the estimate was put at between 140,000 and 150,000 (N.Y. Times, May 6, 1974).

Moreover, USSAG headquarters reported that nearly all 400 tanks referred to actually came into South Vietnam before the ceasefire deadline. (See "Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam," pp. 36–37.) The argument can also be made that the relatively small number since South since then may well fit the "one for one" provision of the Agreement, as may also be true for the artillery pieces. [As for AAA and SAMS, the buildup since the ceasefire could well be a response to the heavy bombing of PRG zones which has been going on since the beginning of the ceasefire. Such defensive measures, in any event, hardly "threaten the equilibrium" as much as the refusal of the GVN to compete for power politically with its adversaries.]

Paragraph 9—The record shows precisely the contrary. An American official has been quoted as saying that "after we cut down the ammo supply, we found that the South Vietnamese were still outshooting the enemy by 20 to 1, but the overall total was that much lower." (*Washington Post*, June 4, 1973). Virtually every western newsman to have visited PRG zones since the ceasefire has reported random shelling of villages by ARVIN forces (See, for example, *New York Times*, Feb. 18 and 19, 1974; *CBS News*, Nov. 14, and 16, 1973). Returning staff aides from a GVN-sponsored trip in April, 1974, have reported that American officials say the GVN is wast-

A COMPARISON BETWEEN HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE REPORT ON FISCAL YEAR 1975 MASF PROPOSAL AND TESTIMONY BY PENTAGON SPOKESMAN—Continued

activities and to consolidating where its forces were present at the time of the cease-fire.	to Communist land grabs activities and to consolidating where its forces were present at the time of the cease-fire.	ing considerable ammunition and could get by on far less of what they are now consuming. U.S. Ambassador Graham Martin recently reported in a cable that it was only after "U.S. imposed constraints" that the use of American-supplied ammunition dropped at a rate of 20 to 50 percent. The most striking indication of lavish ARVN use of ammunition is the fact that despite the Congressional refusal of $474 million in a supplemental ammunition request, the Pentagon recently reported that the ARVN has survived and is not in the "dire straits" that Assistant Secretary Clements predicted it would be if the supplemental ammunition request was refused.
The foregoing suggests that far from exciting GVN violation of the cease-fire, our military assistance is tailored to enable Saigon to defend itself against Communist pressure while deterring a major offensive. South Vietnam's need for substantial U.S. assistance, both military and economic, is not open-ended. The next 18–24 months is an especially critical period which will determine whether Saigon becomes economically viable and whether a North Vietnamese attack can be deterred. Provided the requisite amount of U.S. assistance is forthcoming in the near term, the executive branch foresees a signficant economic revival in the South and the chance that Hanoi will shift its energies to more peaceful pursuits. Hopefully, these developments will reduce the need in subsequent years for heavy American assistance.	The foregoing suggests that far from existing new GVN "violations" of the cease-fire, our military assistance is tailored to enable Saigon to defend itself against Communist pressure while deterring a major offensive. South Vietnam's need for substantial U.S. assistance, both military and economic, is not open ended. The next 18–24 months is an especially critical period which will determine whether Saigon becomes economically viable and and whether a North Vietnamese attack can be deterred. Provided the requisite amount of U.S. assistance is forthcoming in the near term, we forsee a significant economic revival in the South and the chance that Hanoi will shift its energies to more peaceful pursuits. Hopefully, these developments will reduce the need in subsequent years for heavy American assistance.	Paragraphs 10–11—All available evidence directly contradicts the notion that there is the slightest possibility that Saigon can become either economically or military viable in the next 18–24 months. An official World Bank Study Mission recently reported that ". . . net aid required in 1980 will still be on the order of $770 million a year. . . . it seems probable that Vietnam is at least a medium 'long haul' case as far as foreign aid is concerned. . . . as a purely arithmetical exercise . . . by 1990 the external resources gap would close by about $300 million to about $450 million." (Current Economic Position and Prospects of the Republic of Vietnam", January 28, 1974, p. 34.) As long as the GVN continues to refuse to allow refugees to return to their villages, even if in PRG zones—thus maintaining unproductive islands of millions of people, as long as it does not reduce its 1.1 million man army, 120,000 man police force, and 350,000 civil servants, moreover, there is little reason to believe that the GVN can become economically viable. In 1973, for example, the GVN exported only $56 million, while importing $795 million. There is no foreseeable way this huge balance of payments deficit can be altered until there is peace. Indeed, the reverse is likely to be true, as the cost of maintaining the GVN's war machine rises for the U.S. taxpayer due to inflation. Thus, although ARVN casualities were down from 39,587 in 1972 to 11,093 in 1973, the costs of maintaining the ARVN for the U.S. taxpayer did not decrease at all. According to official AID statistics supplied Congresswoman Bella Abzug on February 20, 1974, U.S. Military aid in CY 1972 was $2.382 billion and in CY 1973 was $2.270 billion. Secretary Kissinger himself as much as acknowledged that our commitment to the GVN is open-ended, when he stated in a March 25 letter to Senator Kennedy that "we believe it is important that we continue our support as long as it is needed."
The Departmental budget for military assistance to South Vietnam in fiscal year 1975 contemplates a program involving $1.45 billion. Departmental representatives have assured the Committee on Armed Services that the proposed program in no way violates the cease fire agreement. The printed Committee hearings on both the Department's fiscal year 1974 Supplemental Request and for the Department's fiscal year 1975 Authorization Request contain extensive data on the administration of the MASF program. The Committee urges that these hearings be read by all Members of Congress since such a reading will eliminate much of the confusion and misinformation which often occurs during debate on the justification for the continuation of this military assistance program to South Vietnam. For example, one of the more pertinent questions which is continually raised concerning the military assistance program to South Vietnam is the possible alleged conflict with Article VII of the Cease Fire Agreement, which provides for a one-for-one replace-	It is an honor and privilege to appear before you today in support of the request for a $1.6 billion overall authorization and related program of $1.45 million in fiscal year 1975 for the military forces of South Vietnam. The proposed program in no way violates the cease-fire agreement.	Paragraphs 12–14—If Committee members actually do read the hearings for the FY 74 supplemental and FY 75 authorization, they will discover that the DOD not only provides no evidence for any of its major assertions, but even admits this on page 900: "The determination of a ceasefire violation is exceedingly difficult. . . . As a result, we do not have truly independent sources for information of this kind." Indeed, this fact makes the numerous newspaper reports of GVN ceasefire violations by western correspondents all the more credible. The question of whether the Administration is violating the "one for one" clause is not at all answered by the insertion from page 51 of the hearings, which in fact states that *no one*, not even the ICCS, is aware of what the Administration has channeled into South Vietnam. Given the fact that the Administration has admitted replacing the F5A with the F5E, an entirely different aircraft, the weight of the evidence would seem to indicate that the Administration is not honoring the "one

ment of weapons of the same characteristics and properties. The answer to this question appears on page 51 of HASC Document 93–40, and because of its pertinency, is set out below in its entirety:

Question. Is the International Control Commission in Vietnam supervising the delivery of weapons and ammunition for either side under article 7 of the cease-fire agreement which provides for a one-for-one replacement of weapons of the same characteristics and properties?

Answer. Article 7 of the ICCS Protocol specifies that the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) and the Two Party Joint Military Commission jointly inspect the entry into South Vietnam of replacements of war materiel permitted under Article 7 of the Paris Agreement. The Viet Cong has refused to permit the TPJMC to carry out this function, and the ICCS has taken the position that inspections by it alone would not be official. The United States and the RVN have kept records of replacement shipments to South Vietnam and have stated their readiness to provide a full accounting to the ICCS and to the TPJMC whenever those bodies begin to carry out their duties with respect to inspection and replacement materiels for the two sides. Hanoi on the other hand has introduced illegally into South Vietnam vast quantities of armaments. No offer to allow ICCS inspection of this materiel has ever been made.

for one" portion of the Agreement. The committee report, moreover, also fails to note that the Administration is now proposing an even more blatant violation of the Paris Agreement for FY 75: introduction of 28 new *F5Fs*.

Most importantly, however, is the failure of the Pentagon to provide a rationale for its provision of $521.6 million in FY 74 and $574 million in FY 75 for Operations and Maintenance, and $42.4 million in FY 74 and $24 million in FY 75 for personnel.

It seems clear that neither of these categories fit the provision of Article VII of the Paris Agreement permitting only "one for one" replacement, and Article IV by which the U.S. agreed not to "continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam."

Most shockingly, the Committee also fails to note that the DOD's *own* definition of what is allowed under Article VII also precludes Operation and Maintenance and Personnel. "The Executive branch would be limited to furnishing only armaments, munitions, and war materials. . . . Those words (were) defined by the DOD for the purpose of complying with the peace agreement," DOD lawyer Forman has testified. (Senate Armed Services Committee, FY 74 Authorization hearings, Part 8, p. 5906).

Given such massive violations of the Agreement, the Administration would be better-advised to observe Article VII rather than making empty offers to allow inspection of records, particularly when responsibility for the failure of the Two-Party JMC may lie as much with the GVN as its opponent.

That the committee would just copy word for word Executive testimony and present it as the recommendations of Congress is shocking enough, in and of itself. It also represents a surprising degree of slovenliness and shoddiness. And it raises the question of the very need for a staff. Why should taxpayers fund hearings, hire a staff, pay for the printing of public reports if the committee is going to merely mindlessly and slavishly reproduce Executive testimony?

The real issues raised by the report, however, go far deeper.

Is our only function to rubber stamp Executive actions? Are we to avoid taking public witnesses more seriously, doing some of our own investigative work, integrating testimony by executive officials with that of other observers in an attempt to come up with the truth? What do we need the Congress for, if it is simply to endorse Executive pronouncements, no matter how untrue or tendentious.

The fact that the committee would plagiarize Executive testimony, falsely presenting it as independent conclusions based on an impartial and thorough analysis of the subject goes to the very heart of our democratic system. It represents an unconstitutional erosion of congressional powers, and is symbolic of our headlong progress toward an executive dictatorship in this country.

For, at the heart of the matter, there is not only plagiarism, but more importantly, indifference to the truth and to our responsibility. The Caldwell testimony is replete with factual errors, and is indeed little more than blatant propaganda misrepresented as serious analysis.

I believe that there are few more critical matters facing our Nation than exposing the kind of congressional indifference to responsibility represented by this report. I further believe that the House has an obligation to reject entirely both the suggestion of giving $1.4 billion to the Thieu regime this year and the half-baked rationale presented for it.

Despite what the Pentagon and its friends in Saigon would want us to hear and to read, there is quite another side of the situation in Vietnam. Because the committee has not allowed us a full range of material before we vote on this critical issue, I would now like to insert in the RECORD important testimony given to the committee and other materials available to it which present a broad perspective on the existing situation.

The materials follow:

TOWARD PERPETUAL WAR OR A POSSIBLE PEACE

(Testimony of Guy Gran)

The Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) program is the principal overt and legislated channel through which the United States sends military aid to the Republic of South Vietnam (RVN) and to the Royal Laotian government. For FY 74 this program now has a ceiling of $1.126 billion of which $1.022.1 billion for the RVN. In the supplemental bill under consideration the Nixon Administration wishes to raise the MASF ceiling by $474 million, using pipeline funds, to restore precisely the amount cut by Congress from the original request.

It would be well at the onset to consider that the MASF monies are only a part of the direct and indirect military aid to the government in Saigon. Additional military support results from all of the piasters generated by $295 million of commodities under the Food for Peace program and some if not most of the piasters from the c.$200m. Commodity Import Program. Additional aid is being channeled through excess defense articles, piaster purchases, and military service money.[1] There is no reason to believe that three decades of covert CIA activities in Indochina, squandering both their own and DOD resources, with and without legal authority or Congressional knowledge, has come to a halt in FY 74. Finally, the RVN benefits from the American military presence elsewhere in Southeast Asia. An early FY 74 estimate of such costs was $1.1 billion. A recent UPI report contained a DOD estimate that the sum of DOD activities in Southeast Asia would cost $3.4 billion this fiscal year.[2]

The investment of another $474 million requires judgments about political, military and legal realities in Indochina. It also necessitates judgments about the integrity of information concerning such issues released by the Executive branch. I shall argue that the basic political and military arguments advanced on behalf of this level of aid are not supported by empirical evidence. A major portion of the MASF program is not in keeping with the legal provisions of the Paris Agreement. The relevant information released by the Executive is deliberately distorted and incomplete. In sum, our policies are still designed to seek the impossible, the buying of total and permanent political victory with lavish bribery and military force.

INFORMATION IS POWER

These are harsh conclusions. To reach them one must examine both evidence and the manner it comes to light. Most obviously neither the Congress nor the public has much information that should be available. It is monumentally absurd that the justification for this request, for example, should be classified. Classification implies that knowledge by the enemy would imperil national security. All parties in Indochina have a rather clear idea of how much and what kind of American aid enters Vietnam every year. The enemy this Administration is afraid of is the Congress and the taxpayer who pays the bill. That in itself is a damning commentary on the Administration's estimate of the value

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Footnotes at end of article.

and persuasiveness of its policies in Indochina. By accepting such a system Congress further weakens its potential for critical examination and effective control. For any critic can thus be dismissed because he "doesn't have all the facts."

One concrete example is quite relevant. DOD would prefer that most of Congress and all independent researchers like myself not know how much MASF money goes to the RVN each quarter. The required quarterly report to Congress is thus kept secret. Woe if the left hand knew what the right were doing. New USAID statistics show that we supplied the RVN with at least $1.5 billion in MASF aid in the seven months prior to the Paris Agreement.[3] By a modest extrapolation, it is apparent that every quarter we perpetuate the present war would cost the taxpayer at least $400 million in direct military aid through the MASF program. The first quarter of FY 74, however, saw $613.3 million spent, a fact which says much about the Pentagon's attitude toward the role of Congress.

Classification depends upon never having to define in an intellectually rigorous fashion the idea of national security. Should that day ever come, the result would provoke a series of legal actions that would make Watergate look like shoplifting from a dime store. In the meantime the Executive cannot, at least, reduce the issue entirely to a series of pontifications that "I have all the facts and you will have to trust me". Instead selected information, supportive of official policy, is released through testimony, news conferences and briefings, and leaks to sympathetic journalists. To put it crudely the intellectual environment is manipulated by propaganda.

Testimony before Congressional committees is a very effective weapon for the Executive. The parade of Cabinet officials and bemedaled military officers has a considerable effect on the viewers. It is hard not to link respect for the position with the incumbent and his ideas. Critical reflection is not the result. DOD Vietnam testimony on the FY 1974 budget can be reduced to an endless series of unproved and unchallenged assertions about what the PRG and DRV could and would do and what is legal under the Paris Agreement.

Occasionally a DOD witness was indeed pressed for evidence. The replies came "according to intelligence reports," "our best estimates show", or "DOD lawyers have concluded." I'm not privy to closed sessions; doubtless you have been shown classified pictures and documents. One tank does not 600 make. More importantly, the intellectual value of such reports is limited. Anyone who watched former CIA Cambodian specialist Samuel Adams testify last summer on the size of the Khmer Rouge force, or who has read news accounts carefully, or studied the literature on the U.S. intelligence community, knows that such estimates are often made on extremely flimsy evidence, must travel through often hostile bureaucracies, and are used by witnesses for political rather than intellectual purposes. This is not to argue that DOD estimates are inherently or invariably wrong. It is, however, to suggest that they cannot stand alone as definitive proof of any thesis.

The other favorite forum through which the Administration manipulates Congress and the public is the media. Far too many stories in the most reputable newspapers are based on backgrounds or leaks of material just declassified which journalists accept in abysmally uncritical fashion.

Footnotes at end of article.

For the last year, and doubtless before, the consideration of Vietnam money bills in Congress has coincided with stories of threatened offensives by Hanoi.[4] This bill has provoked a new round begun by a recent story of Drew Middleton in the *New York Times*.[5]

Middleton, citing "qualified sources", provides a long list of precise quantities of weapons and supplies supposedly moving from the North Vietnam to the PRG areas. Careful reading indicates, however, that this build-up has been going on since January, 1973; if the Pentagon had a historian, he would suggest that the build-up began many years prior. The Pentagon report showed that more than 90% of the air defense weaponry and much of the rest are in Quang Tri, a PRG stronghold. That the PRG might be contemplating defending themselves against Thieu's endless encroachments did not occur to the writer or his sources. In another exercise in double standards Middleton lists new and improved roads and bridges in PRG areas in a manner that the reader thinks of them as offensive weapons. Why, then, are the roads and bridges we build in RVN areas always considered as economic development and humanitarian assistance?

In 1974 techniques of selective classification, manipulation, and dissembling are not likely to be sufficient. The Administration and its supporters have also begun mudslinging. If the empirical evidence doesn't support your position, then try to destroy the credibility of the critic. Thus in Ambassador Martin's recent tirade, *New York Times* writer David Shipler is a propagandist, using "deliberate and gross distortions" as part of a Hanoi based plot "to bring influence to bear on selective, susceptible but influential elements of American communications media".[6] The American Ambassador in 1964 didn't like David Halberstam, either.

One trusts that Congress is sophisticated enough to notice that the Administration provides no evidence to support its slander and that if its Vietnam policies were sensible it would not be vulnerable to substantive criticism. As I shall argue, the choices for Congress are greater and more complex than the two in Ambassador Martin's simplistic universe wherein the United States endlessly subsidizes the Thieu government or delivers it into the hands of Hanoi.

THE ADMINISTRATION POSITION

In the course of numerous Congressional appearances and public statements since the Paris Agreement, Administration spokesmen have formulated and reformulated a small number of basic arguments which serve to justify the MASF program and the present level of military aid to the RVN. All of these themes are designed to paper over two unspoken and unproven presumptions, that without such aid the government of Nguyen van Thieu would collapse, a result that is not in the national interest of the United States. By not verbalizing such assumptions, the Administration does not have to defend them.

Instead, the following arguments are trotted out on each occasion. The PRG, more or less directed by Hanoi, is endlessly and flagrantly violating the Paris Agreement; our military aid to Thieu is designed to insure the stability of the ceasefire agreement. We must continue to beware of communist plans for aggression; witness the steady infiltration of men, tanks, and other weapons along an improving infra-structure. Any drastic cut in MASF spending would signal Hanoi, unbalance the situation and invite attack.

The equipment, supplies, services, and training provided by the MASF program are indispensable to the final stage of Vietnamization which will soon permit the RVN forces to stand entirely on their own. Finally, any reduction in military aid and resultant political transformation would be contrary to the basic United States objectives of worldwide equilibrium and orderly change.

I submit that none of these arguments rests on a sound conceptual or empirical base. Each is designed as part of an edifice that serves to protect a series of myths deemed necessary to the political and psychological health of the current Administration and the nation. This is not the time to explore the costs this government and its citizens pay for such myths. It is, however, apropos to explore the fallacies of the preceding paragraph.

That the PRG violates the Paris Agreement far more than the RVN and is primarily (or exclusively) responsible for its failure has been the core argument carefully nurtured by Saigon and Washington spokesmen since January 27, 1973. Such spokesmen have successfully manipulated most uncritical journalists and headline writers and doubtless a majority of the public as well. Few journalists travel out into the rural areas and interview participants to determine the precise circumstances of each incident. Thus more stories than not begin "Saigon spokesmen reported". Restrictions placed on journalists, classification of embarrassing material, and intimidation of potential witnesses by U.S. and RVN authorities also work against an objective record.

Not all Saigon correspondents and American editors can be easily seduced. A careful examination of the last year's press reports show a consistent pattern. Those stories based on investigative journalism rather than official hand-outs almost always revealed some evidence that the provocateur of the ceasefire violation was not the PRG but rather the RVN. Excerpts from more than one hundred articles were assembled recently in a compendium by the Indochina Resource Center.[7] The reader can examine the primary evidence and draw his own conclusions.

This is not to argue that the issue is black and white, that the PRG never violates the Agreement. The PRG does respond with violence to RVN nibbling operations, does move against RVN outposts which intrude in basically PRG areas and does occasionally carry out punitive raids in response to extreme provocations like the RVNAF terror bombing of Loc Ninh, the PRG capitol in late November, 1973. In addition local PRG units do respond to pressure with pressure and do take initiatives with sometimes irresponsible and tragic results; the mortar shell in the school yard at Cai Lay comes recently to mind.[8]

But the sum of these military actions is not the coherent plan of aggression Saigon and Washington paint. It is instead the RVN for whom one can document a steady stream of military operations to gain rice, people, and territory.[9] One can also document some remarkably candid comments by Thieu and other RVN leaders outlining their general policies and attitudes toward the Paris Agreement.[10] The clearest indication of the absurdity of the Administration position is, however, this simple reality. In PRG areas the Paris Agreement is disseminated and discussed everywhere; in RVN areas it is forbidden to be printed or distributed.

If it is demonstrably the RVN which pursues the consistent policy of aggression, our aid to Thieu cannot logically be said to be insuring the stability of the ceasefire. Since January 27, 1973 there have been 120,000 to 150,000 Vietnamese casualties. To use a word like stability at all is nothing less than Orwellian newspeak. What U.S. military goods and services do accomplish was summarized very clearly in a *New York Times* review arti-

cle recently, an article of such value that I add it as Appendix A to this testimony.

"These valuable military goods and services have a sharp political impact. They are indispensable to the South Vietnamese Government's policy of resistance to any accommodation with the Communists. Militarily, the extensive aid has enabled President Nguyen Van Thieu to take the offensive at times, launching intensive attacks with artillery and jet fighters against Vietcong-held territory.

"Furthermore, the American financed military shield has provided Mr. Thieu with the muscle to forestall a political settlement. He has rejected the Paris Agreements provision for general elections, in which the communists would be given access to the press, permission to run candidates and freedom to rally support openly and without interference from the police."

Mr. Thieu has offered elections, but without the freedoms.[11]

It is this basic stalemate which has forced the PRG to military measures, to maintain at least modest pressure while waiting to see if Thieu's own internal economic contradictions destroy him.

The Administration's third and most ancient argument is that we must guard against incipient aggression by Hanoi. The evidence isn't there. Captured COSVN documents on 1974 PRG strategy, a portion of which were leaked to the press in early January, speak at most of limited military pressure and maintaining unhindered supply routes.[12] The *Baltimore Sun* article adds a typical fabrication—"A further goal intensified attacks on selected areas in government-controlled territory." Given the political values of all those who work with the material between their capture of the documents in Vietnam and the publication of selected ideas therefrom in this country especially the absymal track records of longtime partisans in the intelligence community like William Colby and George Carver, this kind of presentation is not at all credible. If the Administration wants to make a really believable case, let it collect *all* of the *original* documents that are relevant in one place and permit independent scholars to make separate studies. Let the Administration also lay bare the precise methodology it uses at each step. That neither of these things happen is a considerable commentary on both bureaucratic will to power and the intellectual vulnerability of the Administration position.

Even if the Administration now produces damning new evidence, as Ambassador Martin threatened to do, it still must deal with physical realities and the conclusions of the North Vietnamese National Assembly. Both the PRG and the DRV are simply too poor in resources to sustain a major attack over any period. The DRV has just made a basic decision in favor of economic reconstruction and social renewal. In this effort they are apparently quite dependent on outside help. Thus military plans for the South have been limited to enough support to maintain the status quo. In sum, unless conditions change drastically, there will be no major offensive.[13]

If there is not an imminent offensive, what is one to make the infiltration of men and material the Administration is constantly pointing to?[14] Troops have been going from DRV to PRG areas, perhaps as many as 70,000 in the last year if one gives credence to undocumented Administration claims. At the same time it was recently revealed that 40 to 50,000—mostly sick and wounded—have been allowed to return North.[15] Given the meager reliability of such figures, one can only conclude that the infiltration rate is far below the rate which presaged the 1968 and 1972 offensives. If there is a surplus going South, it violates the intent of the Paris Agreement. However, by RVN's own recent figures, its soldiers have killed 46,668 communists in the last year.[16] The Agreement permits one-for-one replacement. The Administration's position is thus valid only for those who cannot add and those who insist that the PRG alone must abide by a ceasefire that does not exist.

I will agree that the current public evidence would indicate that the number of tanks, anti-aircraft installations, and pieces of road-building equipment in PRG areas has increased in a year. Tanks are normally an offensive weapon. One wonders how the Administration could document each of the 600 it claims have infiltrated since the Agreement. How many of these tanks belong to the PRG pre-ceasefire buildup comparable to the billion dollar war chest we lavished on the RVN in late 1972? It does take longer for a PRG tank to arrive than an RVN F5A. Some of the subsequent tanks are surely replacements for destroyed vehicles. The rest are indeed violative of the Agreement and designed to provide the PRG with a credible threat, certainly far less than what its opponents are up to.

Given the beleaguered condition of the PRG territory anti-aircraft weapons are predictable. Does the Administration expect the PRG to suffer daily raids by RVN Skyraiders and A–37's in silence? Given the fractionated nature of PRG territories would not any normal government begin to consolidate its territories by building roads? Especially given the presence of an aggressively hostile million man army chewing away at one's territory? In any case, where in the Paris Agreement does it forbid the building of roads? Physical evidence does not, in sum, have to be viewed solely through the political perspective of the Administration.

A fourth Administration argument, that a drastic cut to Thieu would signal Hanoi and unbalance the situation, is a masterpiece of sophistry. Any level of aid to Thieu sends a plethora of signals to all concerned. The preeminent signal to Hanoi now is that the United States is willing to subsidize infinite aggression by Thieu. A cut in military aid that ended such behaviour would be taken by Hanoi as a gesture that the United States was really interested in the peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese conflict envisaged by the Paris Agreement. The deletion of the present $474 million supplemental would be at most an augur of that policy. In the meantime one cannot speak of and the the Agreement did not intend, the present as stability. Such a stability may be acceptable to the Administration, but 120 to 150,000 Vietnamese dead or wounded in a year is not a form of stability the Congress should wish to share responsibility for.

The Administration raises two further arguments. One is that the MASF program is imperative to the final stage of Vietnamization. The program is imperative, but it is imperative only to the scale and type of war we have insisted that the RVN pursue. This was a function of our technological choices and political goals. Total Vietnamization is a myth. It is very clear from the recent *New York Times* article, my Appendix A, or from any close examination of the RVN budget figures, that the United States will pay $1.5 to $2 billion a year for military aid to the RVN for many years to come if it persists in present policies. RVN personnel will not soon, if ever given their lack of motivation, be able to take over the highly technical military jobs now held by DOD contract personnel. The RVN cannot ever conceivably generate sufficient domestic resources to finance the ammunition and ordnance intensive style of warfare it was accustomed to by the United States. After thirty years we are still trying to make up for lack of political persuasion by military force.

The final and most general Administration argument revolves around the notions of worldwide stability and orderly change. As Elliot Richardson put it last year, the United States must honor its obligations because of the "essentially psychological" "structure of international stability".[17] Such a world view subsumes too many faulty and self-serving perceptions of modern history to be fully dealt with here, but a few comments are in order. This refurbished domino theory presumes incorrectly that Secretary Kissinger's idea of world stability is good for the United States and its allies. What is good about it for the penniless slum dweller in Saigon or New York? In a world of finite resources and environment the tiny population of the United States enjoys a vastly disproportionate share of the world's wealth and struggles to maintain its position. At the same time the MNC's are busy teaching the have-nots the pleasures of having. It is quite apparent that the interests of the MNC's, the United States, and the Third World are in many ways mutually antipathetic. If the Administration wishes America to become something other than an ever more beleaguered bastion of wealth, it had better put far more resources and effort into the institutionalization of the substances of change rather than the rhetoric of stability.

THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL SITUATION

If the MASF program can only be justified by such suspect documentation and uncompelling rhetoric, one can well imagine how and to what ends the program operates in the field. As presently constituted the MASF program is broken down into three budgetary categories. Under procurement we provide weapons, vehicles, ammunition, air ordnance, and aircraft. Of the aircraft 116 F5A's are really for MAP countries from which the F5A's were borrowed in late 1972, and the rest are 71 new F5E's for the RVNAF. Under operations and maintenance we provide diverse supplies, contract operations, training, shipping, and a variety of small programs including police support. These two giant categories are each about half of the MASF program; some $40 million in personnel support, uniforms and rations apparently, forms a third category.

The United States is, of course, quite successful in the physical process of delivering equipment. One Pentagon official recently admitted "we shipped so much stuff to South Vietnam in the two months prior to the cease-fire, plus what went since, that a large new resupply of tanks, artillery pieces, and planes would only sit around the docks in crates."[18] The problems develop once the material reaches the shores of Vietnam. From there on are the ubiquitous and endless signs of futility, waste, stupidity, and tragedy which indicate as clearly as ever that the present political goals are still perpetuating an impossible task for the American and RVN armed forces.

Ammunition is by far the largest component of the MASF program, almost $300 million of the $554.8 million spent on the RVN forces during the first quarter of FY 74. The high expenditure rate is partly political; if much ammunition wasn't used, it would be much harder to convince the American Congress that there was a war on that still needed support. The high rate is, however, primarily a function of the tactics of Vietnamese commanders who need to look busy without losing men. An illuminating report of the results appeared last summer.

"The South Vietnamese were reportedly expending vast quantities of artillery ammunition in what is known here as "H and I fire" (for harassment and interdiction),

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Footnotes at end of article.

This is a form of artillery firing in which there is no specific target. But shells are pumped into a general area in an attempt to reduce enemy activity there. . . .

"American sources say they have learned that in Indochina, the more guns and ammunition are available, the more the armies in the field will use them.

" 'After we cut down the ammo supply,' one well informed officer said, 'we found out that the South Vietnamese were still outshooting the enemy by 20 to 1, but the overall total was that much lower.' "[19]

The Pentagon has not, however, imposed any meaningful limits, for it is confident that it can ignore authorized levels and return to Congress later for supplemental requests. The situation has not changed since last summer. James Markham toured PRG areas in mid-February and found random harassment shelling of civilian areas everywhere he went.[20]

About half of the MASF program thus goes to a wasteful and essentially meaningless exercise attempting to terrorize Vietnamese who choose to live in PRG areas. Little territory is won, and the RVN knows that it is incapable of military victory. Instead a vast million man bureaucracy rolls on, filling its institutional imperatives in its most culturally acceptable way—violence. That violence is a cultural norm, that children and even young adults have never known peace, is perhaps even more tragic than the incredible waste of resources and labor.

Another enormous portion of the MASF program is occupied by the supply and maintenance of aircraft and other complex technological hardware. Leaving aside for the moment the legal implications of operation and maintenance, consider the future potential of this operation.

The U.S. has never Vietnamized logistics; about 1,150 DOD contract personnel still run the basic logistics effort for the RVN forces. It is conceivable that over a decade Vietnamese could handle most of tasks, given the pay incentive and motivation necessary. But these are unlikely, and, the potential for corruption would be so enlarged that the system itself would be severely jeopardized.

It is in the maintenance of aircraft that the basic contradiction of the MASF program are most clearly illuminated. We are supposed to be teaching the Vietnamese how to take care of the extremely complex aircraft engines we have given the RVNAF. A Vietnamese is intellectually as capable as anyone, but the culture of war destroys both ability and interest in learning. *New York Times* correspondent David Shipler pinpointed two factors: profound war weariness wherein the pressure for peace blankets any other desire, and resentment over wage differentials where Vietnamese get $10 to $35 a month and Americans up to $1,000 a week, working in the same plant.[21] These are impossible conditions to overcome, and even under unreachable ideal circumstances many of these jobs take at least five to ten years to develop sufficient expertise. The American military aid program is thus a potentially *permanent* operation.

The MASF program entails a number of other less expensive activities most of which are cloaked in considerable secrecy. One that is both morally reprehensible and politically counterproductive in the extreme deserves brief attention here. That is the ongoing American support of the police and prison system of the RVN. At this point in time the dollar amount of direct support may not be great; AID general counsel says that AID is no longer channeling police commodities funded by the MASF program (c $9 million in FY 74). Little, however, prevents DOD from direct grants, or from using the CIA. Little also prevents the budgetary subsidies provided by the PL 480 and CIP programs to end up as police support.

Neither the explicit prohibition of the Paris Agreement nor the even more precise language of SEC 112 of the FY 74 Foreign Aid Appropriation Act (PL 93-240, January 2, 1974) seem to be deterring the Administration from this most profound intrusion in internal Vietnamese affairs. The January study mission of the conservative American Security Council wrote "a handful of U.S. civilian technicians continue to provide advice in the operation of a newly installed computer system which keeps tabs on more than 10 million South Vietnamese."[22] David Shipler's research uncovered these current practices:

". . . South Vietnamese National Police continue to receive regular advice from Americans . . . two high-ranking officers said they and their staffs met frequently with the Saigon station Chief of the C.I.A. and his staff. Sometimes, he said, the C.I.A. Chief asks the police to gather intelligence for him, and often they meet to help each other analyze the data collected.

"A police official confirmed that in some provinces 'American liaison men' who work with the police remain on the job. . . . Local policemen still refer to 'American police advisers.' "[23]

This is not an academic issue, for the police are not an apolitical force. They are an essential part of the political and military apparatus which Thieu uses to suppress all opposition, not simply the communists. It is not merely that this represents total abrogation of the Paris Agreement. It is not merely the gross inhumanity of arresting and abusing tens of thousands of political prisoners.[24] It is the political result. With no opportunity for peaceful political resolution of conflicts as the Paris Agreement called for, opponents of Thieu are forced to return to methods of violence.

The war in Vietnam, and the enormous MASF program which fuels it, are not proceeding on the present tragic and expensive path without guidance. Both President Nixon and President Thieu have equated their personal honor and their national security with the survival of the latter. If there were peace, Thieu would have to demobilize much of his military manpower. This is a dire economic necessity for any real future as an economically independent state. But in so doing, Thieu would lose the tight socio-political control he now enjoys over all government employees. If his policies represented the needs of the majority, he could stay in power. But Thieu represents the interests of a wealthy minority; to abandon the economic interests of his closest supporters would end his career abruptly. The only solution is enough war ("no peace, no war") to avoid the dilemma.

The deletion of this $474 million in supplemental aid would not seriously deprive Thieu. It would leave him a little short-handed at worst. More importantly, it would communicate a message from the United States Congress that the American people are not going to pay $2 to $3 billion a year forever so that Thieu does not have to come to terms with the political and economic needs of his own people. Such a message at this point in the year would give Thieu several months and considerable incentive to prepare for peace. The Administration, by its FY 75 request of $1.6 billion, is quite willing to pay the price; 120,000 Vietnamese casualties a year is not too great a moral burden for the Executive branch. I do not think that the American people have the same set of formal standards and fiscal priorities.

THE LEGAL SITUATION

Thirteen months after the signing of the Paris Agreement, the Administration and a majority of Congress, the media, and the public consider it a dead letter. This is a considerable tribute to the Administration's propaganda campaign. In operation before the ink was dry, the Administration plan proceeded simultaneously along two paths. Secretary Kissinger and other spokesmen created a fundamentally novel interpretation of various key phrases and passages which in sum came to mean that the United States could continue any kind of aid or interference it wished that was not explicitly proscribed. At the same time the Administration and the RVN orchestrated the charge (previously addressed) that the PRG was continuously violating the Agreement: then, when caught in blatant violation, the Administration was in a position to and did argue that the Agreement was thus essentially inoperative and the United States was not bound to abide by it.

This successfully disposed of the Paris Agreement in the United States, but not in Indochina. The PRG and its supporters knew that the United States was legally bound not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Vietnamese. How such words applied to the anomalous situation wherein one state is essentially an economic parasite of another was unhappily not spelled out in the Agreement. The only area of precision was in military aid. Article 7 permits piece-for-piece replacement "of armaments, munitions, and war material". It is to this phrase and its application to the MASF program under consideration here that I shall limit my legal argument.

Certain international commissions were designated by the Agreement to define the permissable military items and supervise their arrival. This did not happen so in the early spring of 1973, DOD created its own list. This list defined 13 categories of "armaments", 8 categories of "munitions", and 8 categories of "war material." Taken together these 29 categories correspond almost precisely to those items which appear under the DOD category of procurement. The Paris Agreement, by DOD's own interpretation, limited American aid to procurement items.

This list was picked up in Saigon by Senate staff members and was incorporated into the Committee Report of S. 1443 (The Foreign Military Sales and Assistance Act). This bill was passed by the Senate but the Vietnam provisions died in conference. It would not be inappropriate to attempt this legislation again for the situation has not changed. Indeed, after endless denials in many FY 74 hearings, one DOD lawyer was finally pressed to discuss precisely what the Paris Agreement did and did not allow.

His response was a marvel of the bureaucratic mind in an impossible legal dilemma.

"Mr. Forman . . . under the bill passed yesterday (S. 1443), the executive branch would be limited to furnishing only armaments, munitions, and war material. Now that is a category of equipment and supplies far more narrow than the terminology in the statute which applies to other countries, namely defense articles and defense services. The words, "armaments, munitions, and war materials" were taken from the peace agreement signed in January. Those words, as defined by the Department of Defense for the purpose of complying with the peace agreement—the definitions are set forth in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report, pages 26 to 27—do not include . . . the contract services which we are providing to the Vietnamese with civilian personnel. It does not include spare parts on consumables. It does not include subsistence. It does not include petroleum products . . . we couldn't provide overhaul and repair services."[25]

Footnotes at end of article.

DOD has developed here an essentially schizoid position. In one universe was the Paris Agreement with DOD dutifully supplying a law abiding definition of the parameters of its activity. In another quite separate universe is the actual operation of the MASF program continuing quite as though the Paris Agreement had never happened. Such a clever semantic voyage, linking the bureaucratic imperative of survival and the political goals of the Administration, should not, however, succeed in drawing attention away from the main point.

More than half of the MASF program is not in keeping with the Paris Agreement. Neither are the activities of the CIA or the indirect military subsidies provided by the Food for Peace and Commodity Import Programs. The elimination and/or restructuring of these programs cannot be done without political changes Thieu and the Administration are most unwilling to make.

The way out of the legal dilemma, the financial drain, the moral vacuum, and the politics of repression are all to be found in the accommodations envisaged in the Paris Agreements. There is no other path to peace.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Administration approaches the issue of military aid to the RVN with an air of inevitability entirely unjustified by the realities in Vietnam. Secretary Schlesinger describes a cease-fire that has not worked as well as he had hoped, as though this process happens in some remote world we have no control over. He speaks of inflation as though the American taxpayer could care less about taking up the further burden. He describes needed program readjustments as though these were justifications for the program. He hopes that Congress will simply push the funds through to get the issue out of the way. I hope that this Committee will accept Secretary Schlesinger's initial challenge early this year to examine critically all of the assumptions and programs in the enormous defense bills now before you. The MASF program would be an ideal place to start.

I would like to close with these formal recommendations.

(1) that the language and the additional spending authority for the MASF program be deleted from the supplemental bill.

(2) that in lieu thereof the following language be inserted

"None of the funds appropriated herein, none of the funds heretofore appropriated, and none of the local currencies generated as a result of any legislated program may be used by any department, agency, or employee for the support of military or civil police in South Vietnam, for the support of Vietnamese court and prison systems of any kind, and for the support of surveillance, identification, and computer training activities in South Vietnam related to police, criminal, or prison matters."

(3) that the appropriate Committee(s) of Congress undertake a serious review and field investigation of the aspects of the MASF program raised herein before a decision on FY 75 funding levels is taken.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Military service money is a mysterious, so far inexplicable, category giving the RVN $100 million in FY 74. See Senate Committee on Armed Services, *FY 74 Authorization for Military Procurement*, Part 2, p. 1270–71.

[2] *Washington Post*, February 16, 1974.

[3] These numbers were part of USAID testimony before a House Government Operations Subcommittee during November, 1973.

[4] For a detailed study of the nature and timing of these reports, see D. Gareth Porter, "Vietnam—the Strategy of Misinformation," available from IRC and soon to be published.

[5] *New York Times*, March 4, 1974.

[6] *Washington Post* and *New York Times*, March 9, 1974.

[7] "Breakdown of the Vietnam Ceasefire: The need for Balanced View," January, 1974 available (for 75¢) from IRC.

[8] *New York Times* and *Washington Post*, March 10, 1974.

[9] Take November, 1973 for example: see *New York Times* 11/1 (p. 3), *Chicago Tribune* 11/4 (p. 15), *Boston Globe* 11/4, *London Times* 11/4, *New York Times* 11/5 (p. 1), same 11/6 (p. 3), *Washington Star News* 11/8, *Washington Post* 11/8 (p. A–27), *London Times* 11/9, *Philadelphia Inquirer* 11/9, et cetera.

[10] See especially *Washington Post*, January 5, 1974 and *Washington Star News*, January 6, 1974.

[11] *New York Times*, February 25, 1974.

[12] *Baltimore Sun*, January 3, 1974 and *New York Times*, January 14, 1974.

[13] *The Washington Post*, February 18, 1974.

[14] *The New York Times*, January 8, 1974, for example.

[15] *Los Angeles Times*, February 13, 1974.

[16] *Washington Star News*, February 10, 1974.

[17] House Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1974*, Part 1, p. 150.

[18] *New York Times*, January 6, 1974.

[19] *Washington Post*, June 4, 1973.

[20] *New York Times*, February 18 and 19, 1974.

[21] *New York Times*, February 25, 1974.

[22] American Security Council, "Vietnam Report: 'Not in Vain' ", February 26, 1974.

[23] *New York Times*, February 25, 1974.

[24] The quibble over whether there are 40,000 or 200,000 or some other number misses the point that there are more than none. The denials by RVN and American embassy authorities do not account for the malformed remnants of the lucky Vietnamese who crawl out (American POW's walked) of RVN prisons. An introduction to this topic is *Hostages of War*, available from the Indochina Mobile Education Project in Washington. Of course, not all prisoners are tortured, not all prisons are tiger cages, physical conditions have improved over the years, and public attention diminishes abuses. But the political nature and human results of the RVN judicial system are too well documented and too appalling to ignore, as the Senate Appropriations Committee report noted last December.

[25] Senate Committee on Armed Services, *FY 74 Authorization for Military Procurement*, Part 8, p. 5906.

APPENDIX A

[From the New York Times, Feb. 25, 1974]

VAST AID FROM UNITED STATES BACKS SAIGON IN CONTINUING WAR

(By David K. Shipler)

SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, Feb. 16—Ray Harris of Ponca City, Okla, has come back to Vietnam. This time he is not behind the machine gun of an Army helicopter but behind a workbench at the Bien Hoa air base, sitting next to South Vietnamese Air Force men and repairing jet fighter engines.

Mr. Harris is a civilian now, safer and better paid. But his changed role in the continuing Vietnam war has scarcely diminished his importance, for as a 27-year-old jet engine mechanic he remains as vital to the South Vietnamese military as he was in 1966 as a 19-year-old helicopter gunner.

He is among 2,800 American civilians without whose skills South Vietnam's most sophisticated weapons would fall into disrepair. Employed by private companies under contract to the United States Defense Department, these men constitute one facet of a vast program of American military aid that continues to set the course of the war more than a year after the signing of the Paris peace agreements and the final withdrawal of American troops.

Whether the United States is breaking the letter of the agreements could probably be argued either way. But certainly the aid directly supports South Vietnamese violations and so breaks the spirit of the accords.

The United States, far from phasing out its military involvement in South Vietnam, has descended from a peak of warfare to a high plateau of substantial support, dispatching not only huge quantities of weapons and ammunition but also large numbers of American citizens who have become integral parts of the South Vietnamese supply, transport and intelligence systems.

These include not just the Vietnam-based mechanics and technicians but also the Pentagon-based generals who tour airfields to ascertain the needs of the South Vietnamese Air Force, the "liaison men" who reportedly give military advice from time to time, the civilian Defense Department employees who make two-to-three-week visits to provide highly specialized technical help, and the Central Intelligence Agency officials who continue to advise South Vietnam's national police on intelligence matters.

The total budgeted cost of military aid to South Vietnam is $813-million in this fiscal year, and the Pentagon has asked Congress for $1.45-billion next year, with most of the increase probably going for ammunition, which the South Vietnamese forces have expended at a high rate.

TRUE COST EVEN HIGHER

The true costs of the military support probably rise considerably above the official figures. Some of the aid for example, comes in through economic programs that dump millions in cash into the Saigon Government's defense budget. And other costs—salaries of Pentagon technicians who make special visits, for example—are hidden in the vast budgets of the United States Air Force, Army and Navy and are not labeled "Vietnam."

These valuable military goods and services have a sharp political impact. They are indispensable to the South Vietnamese Government's policy of resistance to any accommodation with the Communists, militarily. The extensive aid has enabled President Nguyen Van Thieu to take the offensive at times, launching intensive attacks with artillery and jet fighters against Vietcong-held territory.

Furthermore, the American-financed military shield has provided Mr. Thieu with the muscle to forestall a political settlement. He has rejected the Paris agreements' provision for general elections, in which the Communists would be given access to the press, permission to run candidates and freedom to rally support openly and without interference from the police.

VIETCONG MAINTAIN PRESSURE

Mr. Thieu has offered elections, but without the freedoms. The Vietcong, refusing to participate unless the freedoms are guaranteed, have maintained military pressure throughout the country, mostly with artillery and rocket attacks on Government outposts and, from time to time, with devastating ground assaults against Government-held positions.

United States intelligence officials contend that continuing American aerial reconnaissance, as well as prisoner interrogation and radio monitoring, shows that the North Vietnamese have sent thousands of troops and hundreds of tanks and artillery pieces south in violation of the Paris agreements. They have also refurbished a dozen captured airfields and built a large network of roads that threatened to cut South Vietnam in two.

Yet in battle the Communists appear more

frugal with ammunition than the Government troops, who have been seen recently by Western correspondents spraying artillery across wide areas under Vietcong control as if there was no end to the supply of shells. This difference has bolstered the view of some diplomats that China and the Soviet Union, unwilling to support an all-out offensive now, have placed limits on the rate of resupply to Hanoi.

Amid the political stalemate then, the inconclusive war continues.

KEEPING JETS IN THE AIR

Ray Harris is at his workbench in the huge engine shop at the Bien Hoa air base just north of Saigon. He works for General Electric, which manufactures the jet engine that drives the Northrop F-5 fighter, the mainstay of Saigon's airforce.

He hunches over a circular fuser assembly, the last part of the engine before the afterburner. The assembly is invisibly cracked, and Mr. Harris is using a machine about the size of a dentist's drill to grind down the metal so the crack can be welded.

There are Americans everywhere in the shop, which is devoted to repairing and overhauling fighter and helicopter engines. There is virtually no workroom or machine or assembly line where Americans are anything less than essential parts of the process. Although a few are training Vietnamese to take over the work eventually, most are simply doing the work, especially the highly technical jobs, themselves.

The line where rebuilt jet engines are finally assembled, for example, looks more like a factory somewhere in the United States than a shop belonging to the Vietnamese Air Force. Eight of 10 Americans work on several engines, and not a Vietnamese is in sight.

There are 25 Vietnamese assigned here, a technician says with a shrug, but he adds, "I never see them."

OUTPUT IS KEPT HIGH

Ken Martin of G.E. is crouching with another American beside a jet engine that he has just assembled himself in four 12-hour days. Without the American technicians, he says, the shop could produce not more than 40 per cent of what it does. Another American asked what would happen if he and his colleagues pulled out, replied, "This would turn into a big Honda repair shop."

As self-serving and exaggerated as these assessments seem, they underscore the long-term military role that American civilians will have to play if the South Vietnamese are to have continued use of their complex weapons.

Without long training, mechanics in any modern air force probably could not match the skills of the American technicians, most of whom are not young Vietnam war veterans like Mr. Harris but seasoned experts who have been building and rebuilding engines for years on bases here and in the United States.

"Most of our people—this is the only work they've ever done," said Glenn Miller, the 47-year-old G.E. supervisor at the shop. Mr. Miller has 22 years' experience with the company, all on jet engines.

His men are so vital that they—and those working on helicopters for Lycoming Aircraft—were all placed on 12-hour shifts last month during the week before Tet, the Lunar New Year holiday. Their objective was to get as many aircraft flying as possible, Mr. Miller explained, to be ready for a Communist offensive.

$1,000 IN A LONG WEEK

Mr. Miller figures that with overtime and other bonuses, some of the men made $1,000 apiece that week.

High pay is cited by many of the civilians as the main reason for their choice of Vietnam as a place of work. After a year on the job G.E. employes get double their base salaries, bringing the average pay to $20,000 or more, plus $16 a day for food and lodging—an annual total in excess of $25,000.

Since living costs are low by American standards, and since the employees do not have to pay any Federal income tax on $20,000 a year if they are off American soil for at least 18 months, many say they save a good deal of money. Some add that the money has become a silent source of resentment among the Vietnamese Air Force men, who earn only $10 to $35 a month.

This, plus profound war-weariness, has made many Vietnamese men difficult to teach, the contractors say. "They are only kids, all of them—they don't want to be in the military to begin with," said Elmer Adams, a former United States Air Force man who works for Lycoming supervising helicopter repairs.

"It's a lack of desire," said a technician for Cessna Aircraft working at the Da Nang air base. "They've been under so much pressure for so long they just want peace. They're peace-minded."

CRITICISM OF AMERICANS

It was said sympathetically, and the Cessna man went on: "All they know is that Americans came over here and tore up their country, uprooted their villages and now they're looking for food."

Gilbert Walker, another technician, who asked that his company not be identified, observed: "The people I talk to in town care very little about the form of government they have. I guess I don't feel much difference. I don't feel too much admiration for the present Government."

In that case, he was asked, why is he helping the South Vietnamese carry on the war? "I work for my company and I try to keep the aircraft flying," he replied. "I'm working on helicopters, that's all I know. Sometimes I sit back and think, What's it all for, what's the good of it all? It seems like an exercise in futility, what I'm doing."

Futile or not, the Americans' work has carried some of them to positions of considerable authority in the South Vietnamese military supply system. The South Vietnamese still call many of them "co van," which means "advisers," and the American office at the Da Nang base has a big sign over the door that reads "Co Van."

The Americans often come to identify closely with their jobs, perhaps taking more responsibility than their contracts call for. In a revealing slip of the tongue, Mr. Adams of Lycoming looked around the Bien Hoa engine shop and remarked, "We're in the process, rather—of reorganizing the shop."

MANY STILL ON PAYROLL

The fact is that supply and transportation have remained an American operation. "We Vietnamized the fighting, but we never Vietnamized logistics," said a Defense Department official based in Saigon.

That is reportedly the principal reason the United States Defense Attache's Office—originally scheduled to be dismantled early this year—still contains about 1,150 people, of whom 50 are military men, according to official figures.

In addition, the reduction in the number of Americans working for private defense contractors has halted, allowing the figure to level off at approximately 2,800, down 2,200 since July, according to a spokesman for the Defense Attaché's office.

The logistics effort—provision of maintenance, ammunition, weapons, trucks, fuel, electronics parts and the like—is now the basis for the Americans' most pervasive and intimate contacts with the South Vietnamese military. Depending on how such terms as "military" and "advisers" are defined, there is evidence that the contacts occasionally cross into areas of relationship prohibited by the Paris agreements.

"The United States will not continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam," Article 4 of the cease-fire agreement declares.

TOTAL WITHDRAWAL

Article 5 says: "Within 60 days of the signing of this agreement, there will be a total withdrawal from South Vietnam of troops, military advisers and military personnel, including technical military personnel and military personnel associated with the pacification program, armaments, munitions and war material of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a). Advisers from the above-mentioned countries to all para-military organizations and the police force will also be withdrawn within the same period of time."

According to both American and South Vietnamese officials, the American civilians—both employes of private companies and those of the Defense Department—who help with supply activities not only see that the South Vietnamese get the equipment and ammunition they ask for but also advise them on what to ask for.

Some of these activities came to light as a result of the capture by the Chinese last month of a former United States Army Special Forces captain, Gerald E. Kosh, who was aboard a South Vietnamese naval vessel during a two-day battle with Chinese forces in the Paracel Islands, in the South China Sea.

Mr. Kosh, who was taken prisoner and later released, was described by a spokesman for the United States Embassy as a "liaison officer" with the South Vietnamese military whose job was to observe the efficiency of various army, navy and air force units and report to the Pentagon.

American officials steadfastly refused to provide further details of Mr. Kosh's job. They would not say exactly what he was supposed to observe or whether his reports were ultimately shared with the South Vietnamese. They did say that there were 12 such liaison men based in various parts of Vietnam.

EXTENT OF ROLE UNCLEAR

What is not clear is whether they confine their observations to such matters as the condition of equipment and the rate of ammunition expenditure, or whether they evaluate military tactics and strategies and go so far as to suggest alternatives.

What is fairly certain is that their reports end up in the hands of the South Vietnamese, perhaps providing indirect advice of one sort or another.

A South Vietnaese officer in a position to know said recently that normal procedure called for an American and a South Vietnamese to make an inspection or auditing tour of a military unit together. Then they write up their reports, sometimes separately, sometimes together. The reports, he said, are forwarded up the chain of command in the United States Defense Attache's Office, which then relays copies of them to Lieut. Gen. Dong Van Khuyen, head of the Logistic Command for the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff.

More direct overt advice is sometimes given by zealous Americans who are still stationed in every province. An embassy official reported recently that an American based in one province boasted to him about a successful military operation: "I told them to clear the Communists out of there."

Actually, South Vietnamese military men do not seem anxious for such guidance noting with some pain that their country has suffered for years under American advice. What they want from the United States is military aid.

SIX GENERALS PAY A VISIT

Clearly, the Pentagon continues to attach high priority to the success of the South Vietnamese military. Last fall a group of six Air Force generals based in the Pentagon visited the Da Nang air base to find out what

equipment and aid were needed, according to the base commander, Lieut. Col. Nguyen Tan Dingh. He said they were scheduled to come again this month.

A few weeks ago two civilian employes of the Air Force—one based in Hawaii and the other in Texas—were flown to Vietnam for a short stay so they could give advice on the repair and upkeep of plants that manufacture oxygen for jet fighters. One said he had been in and out of Vietnam frequently on similar missions since 1964, the other since 1968.

Although the Paris agreements explicitly rule out advisers to the police force, the South Vietnamese National Police continue to receive regular advice from Americans.

In a recent conversation with this correspondent, two high-ranking officers said they and their staffs met frequently with the Saigon station chief of the C.I.A. and his staff. Sometimes, they said, the C.I.A. chief asks the police to gather intelligence for him, and often they meet to help each other analyze the data collected.

A police official confirmed that in some provinces "American liaison men" who work with the police remain on the job. "There are still some, but not so many," he said.

EPISODE IN POLICE STATION

Local policemen still refer to "American police advisers," according to James M. Markham, Saigon bureau chief of The New York Times, who was detained by the police late in January after a visit to a Vietcong-held area.

Mr. Markham said that in both Qui Nhon, where he was held overnight, and Phan Thiet, where he was detained briefly while being transferred to Saigon, policemen, talking among themselves, referred to the "police adviser." In Phan Thiet, he reported, a policeman was overheard saying, "Let's get the American police adviser over here."

In the last six weeks The New York Times has made repeated attempts to interview officials in the United States Agency for International Development who are responsible for American aid to the police. Although the officials appeared ready to discuss the subject, they were ordered by the United States Ambassador, Graham A. Martin, to say nothing.

In the absence of official United States figures, the best information on police aid came from Senator Edward M. Kennedy, who calculated that as of last June 30 the Agency for International Development and the Defense Department had spent $131.7-million over the years for police and prisons in South Vietnam. Despite a Congressional ban on such assistance enacted last December, such support has continued, according to American officials, but they say that no decision has yet been made on how to phase out the programs.

Section 112 of the new foreign aid bill reads: "None of the funds appropriated or made available pursuant to this act and no local currencies generated as a result of assistance furnished under this act may be used for the support of police or prison construction and administration within South Vietnam, for training, including computer training, of South Vietnamese with respect to police, criminal or prison matters, or for computers, or computer parts for use for South Vietnam with respect to police, criminal or prison matters."

TRAINING IN WASHINGTON

South Vietnamese policemen are reportedly still being trained at the International Police Academy in Washington, and technical contracts with private companies that provide computer services and communication equipment have not been terminated.

Senator Kennedy reported that the Nixon Administration had requested $869,000 for the current fiscal year for police computer training, $256,000 for direct training of policemen, $1.5-million for police communications and $8.8-million for police equipment, presumably weapons and ammunition, from the Defense Department.

Although these figures are not normally included in the totals for military aid, the police here have military functions, and engage in infiltration, arrest, interrogation and torture of Communists and political dissidents.

This activity violates the cease-fire agreement, which states in Article 11: "Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties will . . . prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination against individuals or organizations that have collaborated with one side or the other, insure . . . that freedom of organization, freedom of political activities, freedom of belief."

INTERVIEWS ARE REFUSED

Not only has Ambassador Martin ordered American officials to remain silent on the subjects of military and police aid; both he and the Defense Attaché, Maj. Gen. John E. Murray, refused requests by The New York Times for interviews. Furthermore, the embassy told at least two private companies—Lear-Siegler, which employs a large force of aircraft mechanics here, and Computer Science Corporation, which works on military and police computer systems—to say nothing publicly about their work, according to company executives.

The official nervousness is attributed by an embassy employe to the Nixon Administration's apprehension about the inclination of Congress to cut aid to South Vietnam. The Ambassador has reportedly told several non-Government visitors recently that South Vietnam is in a crucial period and that he sees his role as unyielding support to build up and preserve a non-Communist regime.

He is reported to have pressed Washington to provide new weapons for Saigon to counteract the infiltration of troops, tanks and artillery from North Vietnam since the ceasefire. For example, plans have been made for the delivery of F–5E fighter planes to replace the slower, less maneuverable and less heavily armed F–5's, many of which were rushed to South Vietnam in the weeks before the cease-fire.

VIOLATION IS CHARGED

Privately, officers in the International Commission of Control and Supervision scoff at the American contention that supply of the planes does not violate the Paris agreements, which permit only one-for-one replacement of weapons "of the same characteristics and properties." A high-ranking official of one of the non-Communist delegations, asked recently if he thought the United States was faithfully observing the one-for-one rule, replied, "Of course not."

There is nothing the commission can do about it without permission from both the South Vietnamese Government and the Vietcong to investigate, and permission is unlikely to be forthcoming from the Saigon side. Similarly, the commission has been unable to audit other incoming weapons and ammunition for both sides. During the first year after the cease-fire, the United States provided South Vietnam with $5.4-million worth of ammunition a week, apparently unaccompanied by pressure to restrain military activities.

Several weeks ago Elbridge Durbrow, who was Ambassador to South Vietnam from 1957 to 1961, came to Saigon and met with Ambassador Martin and General Murray. Mr. Durbrow, who denounced the Paris agreements and who declares, "I am a domino-theory man," was asked by newsmen whether the American officials had indicated that they were trying to keep South Vietnam from violating the cease-fire.

"Not from anybody did we hear that," he replied. Then, referring to General Murray, he said: "He's not that kind of man at all—just the opposite. If you are not going to defend yourself you might as well give up and let Hanoi take over."

THE NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION FOR PEACE IN INDOCHINA

(Statement of Fred Branfman, Co-director of the Indochina Resource Center, before the Asia and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, House of Representatives, May 1, 1974)

KEY POINTS

1. The Administration has quietly violated congressional intent to cut economic aid to Indochina in FY 1974. The original Administration request was for $827.8 million. Congress cut this back to under $700 million. By the end of FY 74, however, the Administration has wound up allocating $1.1 billion in economic aid to Indochina. (See Table 1.)

2. The Administration allocated a total of $3.2 billion in FY 74 for Indochina, almost as much money as was allocated for specific countries in the rest of the Third World combined. This figure, for example, is 6 times what went to Africa and Latin America combined for economic aid. This was part of the Administration's continuing commitment to combatting local insurgencies, despite a clear public and congressional mandate for non-interventionism in such insurgencies.

3. This Administration commitment to counter-insurgency is inflicting unacceptable costs on the people of Indochina—more war victims in 1973 than the rest of the world put together; and it is a disturbing sign of the lack of Administration concern for its own citizens, as well as others in serious need. Food For Peace shipments to Indochina were increased by $300 million in FY 74, for example, while hundreds of thousands starved in Sahel. (See Parts III and IV)

4. Congress must "Pause for Peace" by suspending aid pending progress towards political solutions, or at least substantially reduce what are greatly increased Administration requests for FY 1975. Military and "Indochina Postwar Reconstruction" requests have jumped 45%. (p. 19). FY 74 total spending saw only .03% actually going toward "humanitarian", "reconstruction", or "development" projects. The FY 74 budget, therefore, was a war budget—caused by the structural unviability of the GVN and Lon Nol regimes. Administration claims that U.S. aid will allow them to "stand on their own" are myths.

I. INTRODUCTION—CONGRESS AND THE LESSONS OF VIETNAM

As Congress considers this year's giant $3.7 billion Administration request for U.S. expenditures in Indochina, (see table 1), it will be deciding far more than simply the nature of our Indochina involvement. During the 1960s, millions of Americans turned against the war—in the streets, at the ballot box, in the army. Congress, however belatedly, finally responded to this mandate for peace from the American people.

Powerful congressional opposition to the B52 carpet bombing of urban centers in Christmas 1972 helped force the Administration to sign the Paris Agreement. Congress halted the bombing of Cambodia on August 15, 1973, and passed legislation aimed at ending U.S. support for South Vietnamese police and prisons on December 19, 1973. And last month, it took the historic step of rejecting an Administration proposal for $474 million in supplemental military aid for Indochina.

These congressional actions have saved countless Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian lives; made billions of dollars available for urgent domestic and humanitarian international needs; reversed what seemed like lock-step progress toward Presidential Dictatorship; and, in a subtle and not yet fully understood way, these congressional actions

have begun to restore the spiritual health of a nation torn apart by our Indochina involvement.

By so doing, Congress clearly embarked on new path, away from Global Policemanship, away from silent and willing partnership in a Presidential Dictatorship, away from war and towards peace. If this process is to be continued during the 1970s, Congress cannot continue to assent this FY1975 to the same kind of covert Executive involvement that got us involved in Indochina in the first place.

The Nixon Administration has in the past year, however, quietly been subverting this public and congressional mandate for peace in Indochina. Intervening covertly as in the early 1960s, the Administration has initiated a spiral which will bring ever-increasing U.S. escalation unless Congress acts.

During FY 1974, the Administration expended $2.53 billion in Indochina, only 7% of which was designated for "humanitarian", or "reconstruction"+"development" programs. The remaining 93% went to prop up military regimes which are unwilling to bring peace to their countries. The Thieu government in South Vietnam, for example, has refused all offers by the other side to negotiate a standstill ceasefire, allow democratic liberties, and form a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concern to help plan elections. As a result, over 75,000 were killed in Indochina last year, 125,000 were wounded, and 1 million made homeless—more war victims than in the rest of the world put together, including the Middle East (see table 2).

The Administration's FY 1975 program, moreover, offers even more of the same. Its proposed FY '75 military and economic aid requests, total $3.28 billion—or 27% more than what was allocated last year.

Once more, over 90% of this aid is destined neither for reconstruction nor humanitarian needs, but for the maintenance of the war machines in Cambodia and South Vietnam.

And, the Administration's FY 75 program offers even more disturbing visions for FY 76 and beyond. If General Thieu continues to refuse to allow his opponents to participate in the political process outlined by the Paris Agreement, for example, there is every reason to believe that they will feel no choice but to launch an offensive. And what then? Are we to give even more billions to Mr. Thieu in an attempt to repel such an offensive? Is the 200th anniversary of this country to find us convulsed in a national debate over a Presidential attempt to renew U.S. bombing to save Thieu? And even if U.S. bombing is renewed, what reason is there to believe that it will "succeed" next time?

Clearly, this fiscal year 1975 provides Congress with a historic opportunity to ensure that our aid is no longer used for war in Indochina, that the hesitant progress made towards halting our global interventionism be continued.

Congress can achieve these goals by only appropriating aid for Indochina in the letter and spirit of the Paris Agreement. Two means offer progress toward these goals:

(1) *A pause for Peace:* Congress could suspend all non-humanitarian and non-developmental aid to either side in Indochina until governing bodies emerge which reflect the political realities of the situation. In South Vietnam, this would mean waiting until the political machinery outlined by the Paris Agreement was set into motion, and a newly-formed National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord had gotten off the ground. In Cambodia, this would mean withdrawing from what overwhelming evidence indicates is now a war only among Cambodians, and allowing the Cambodian parties to evolve whatever form of government they will. In Laos, it means absolutely halting all U.S. economic and military inputs which are not approved by all of the parties which have just entered a fragile coalition.

This alternative, we believe, would lead to a major change for peace on the part of all parties concerned within a matter of weeks and would, in the end, result in far less suffering and disruption than any other alternative.

(2) *A substantial reduction in non-humanitarian aid:* although less likely to bring peace quickly to Indochina, this alternative would also reduce the level of violence and generate pressures on all sides for peace.

It has been contended that such a suspension in aid—or even the more moderate step of a substantial reduction—would deliver South Vietnam "bound hand and foot to the Communists".

It is our contention, however, that present Administration policies can do nothing to prevent such an outcome—and, indeed, are quite likely to produce victory for the guerrillas in any event. All that present Administration programs mean is that there will be millions more war victims, billions more dollars denied people in need, before Indochinese guerrillas eventually seize power militarily because they were outlawed from competing politically.

A suspension or substantial reduction in American aid, such as we are proposing, offers the only hope of moving the conflict away from the military and toward the political arena. The present GVN administration—or a successor—should have no trouble competing politically, if it enjoys the popular support its advocates claim. Nor would it necessarily be precluded from picking up the gun once again, if it turned out that its opponents were not willing to compete politically. Under the Paris Agreement, moreover, Third Force elements would be accorded an important "balancing" role in the political play of forces between right and left.

Under the circumstances, then, Congressional aid designed in accordance with the Paris Agreement offers far less chance of a complete PRG takeover than present Administration policy. And, in Cambodia, a serious American attempt to move the conflict into the political arena offers the only possibility that moderate elements in the Lon Nol cabinet can avoid the complete eclipse an all-out Khmer Rouge military victory could bring.

Congress clearly has a public mandate for such policies. The Administration can point to no substantial group of Americans which supports an admitted expenditure of $3.7 billion and hidden expenditures totalling many billions more—to continue our futile attempts to impose unpopular military regimes on the people of Indochina. Millions of Americans, however, support the notion that the people of Indochina should be allowed to determine their own affairs; the Paris Agreement provides just such a vehicle for this occurring.

This year could be remembered as the year that Congress finally regained its rightful say in making foreign policy; a year which future Americans would remember as the one in which the Presidential Dictatorship over our country's destinies was significantly altered; in which this country began the slow, painful, and long process of turning to peace and healing throughout the world.

If 1976 is to be a year of rebirth, however, Congress must re-cast any U.S. aid requests to Indochina into a form that will bring peace. It can happen . . . this year. It is up to Congress to act.

II. U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN INDOCHINA—THE GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT

Before turning to the specifics of U.S. expenditures for Indochina this fiscal year, it is important to remember the overall context in which the Administration is presenting them.

The key issue which Vietnam has symbolized for many is whether the U.S. should intervene to put down wars of national liberation in the Third World. Most Americans have by now decided we should not—for moral or practical reasons, or a combination of both.

The Administration, however, has reached just the opposite conclusion. It is as committed to U.S. intervention to put down local insurgencies in 1974 as was the U.S. presidential branch 30 years ago—and particularly in the East Asia and Pacific region that we are discussing today.

This is why the Administration has stationed more U.S. troops in the East Asia and Pacific region today than in 1964. We have today 173,000 troops stationed from Guam to Thailand, compared to 156,000 in 1964. (Another 33,000 naval troops are afloat in the Pacific.)

This is why 7 disguised and admitted military dictatorships in the East Asia and Pacific regions receive more Administration aid than the rest of the world put together. In its original FY 1974 budget presentation to Congress, for example, the Administration specifically allocated $3.863 billion for South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and South Korea. By contrast $2.13 billion was specifically allocated for military and economy aid to 97 other countries in the Third World. Put another way, two-thirds of the Administration's aid world-wide was destined for 7 nations having a population comprising but 10% of the Third World's population.

And this is why the Administration has in FY 1974 allocated so much money to South Vietnam and Cambodia's military regimes, while millions went hungry around the globe:

In FY 1974, for example, the Thieu government received $878 million in economic inputs (see table 2). This money that went into the tiny land of South Vietnam, a nation of 18 million, was 50% more than what the U.S. gave to all of Africa and Latin America combined, two continents with 534 million people ($500 million).

Also in FY 1974, tens of millions starved and many died from hunger, in the Sahel and Ethiopia. AID contributed some $130 million in food and non-food emergency assistance, as of February 4, 1974. The Administration, however, has targeted nearly 30 times as much money for Indochina, money which is designed to fight a counter-insurgency.

Particularly reprehensible was an extra $300 million in Food for Peace money which the Administration added to its original requests for Cambodia and South Vietnam—to compensate for cuts made in economic aid by Congress. The Administration clearly had a choice between using that $300 million worth of food to shore up military dictatorships in Indochina or to feed starving millions in the Sahel. It chose the former.

This commitment to Global Policing, finally, is why the Administration transferred economic aid money from nations all over the world to Indochina, where such money is designed to help in the counter-insurgent effort. A recent chart supplied to Congress by AID administrator Parker, for example, shows the differences between AID original proposals for economic aid for FY 1974, and their final allocations, in 18 selected countries plus the continent of Africa. The Administration has reduced aid to nations where millions go hungry precipitously—aid to Bangladesh was down 41%, to India down 56%, to Pakistan down 40%, to Africa down 6%. Aid to Vietnam was listed as increasing 10% (our estimate is 34%, see Table 1); however, aid to Cambodia was listed as increasing 273% and aid to Thailand was up 16%. (Source: Hearings

Before House Approp. Comm., Part II, on Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1974, pp. 877–880)

It has been argued that detente has made such counter-insurgency efforts obsolete. There is little evidence to support this point of view, however. The only Third World "success" the Administration has been able to point to as a result of detente has been its ability to carpet-bomb Hanoi and blockade Haiphong Harbor wihout the Soviet Union or China intervening in response. Besides noting that not initiating World War III due to saturation bombing of a tiny far-off land is a curious measure of success, we should point out that there is no reason to believe that things would have worked out any differently without detente.

More to the point, however, the importance of support from the Soviet Union or China during the early stages of insurgency has always been highly exaggerated. As the Pentagon Papers make clear, such support was almost nonexistent in the very beginning in South Vietnam. And even at the height of the war, only 3% of the military expenditures by all three super-powers in Indochina were those of the Soviet bloc and the Chinese (see Table 3). Furthermore, of course, there have been no signs whatsoever that the Soviet Union and China have decided to eliminate the relatively minor aid they give local insurgencies—or why they should or would.

The Administration's massive and continuing commitment to counter-insurgency in the 1970's was particularly brought home to me during a visit to Thailand in the spring and summer of last year.

While in Thailand, I interviewed a large number of American officials, including a member of the U.S. counter-insurgency board, a member of the U.S. Embassy political-military sections and members of private U.S.-supported counter-insurgent think-tanks.

I discovered that these officials also feel that Vietnam was a "mistake", that to a man they deride publicly the President's notion that we have extricated ourselves through "Peace with Honor".

But I also discovered, to my dismay, that our failure in Vietnam has not led them to draw the conclusions drawn by most Americans: that we should get out. The only lesson they seem to have drawn is quite the opposite: that we should have gotten in sooner. Time and again I was told that while our cause was just in Vietnam, our means appropriate, we had intervened too late. It was absolutely essential to "get them before they build up", I was told.

Which is precisely what the Nixon Administration is trying to do in Thailand. Unknown to most Senators and Representatives, not to mention the American people, the U.S. Mission in Thailand has recently embarked on an ambitious new counter-insurgency program in Thailand. I was told by an official in the "Pol-Mil" section that it would be modeled after the "Regional Forces" and "Popular Forces" concept in South Vietnam, and involved deploying district and province-level "reaction" forces throughout Northeast Thailand. It would be much smaller than in South Vietnam, this official told me, involving only several million dollars and several thousand men. Other Americans told me, however, that this program was not at all modeled after the RF–RF program, but rather the infamous Phoenix program. Assassination of civilians thought to be working for the other side, selective terror, programs for issuing ID cards to all adults linked to computerized bio-dossiers, and mass arrests—based on quotas—had already been tried out on an experimental basis, I was told.

At this point, I have no way of knowing which source was correct, i.e. whether U.S. officials in Thailand have launched new counter-insurgency programs modeled after the RF or Phoenix programs.

I do know, however, that they are committed to such counter-insurgency efforts—as are their counterparts from Indonesia to Indochina to the Philippines.

What we are seeing today in the East Asia and Pacific region is an Orwellian vision come true, as the leaders of our Executive branch engage in the deadly serious business of mass assassination, mass incarceration, and mass labelling of human beings in a Pacific basin region inhabited by several hundred million people.

There is no more reason to believe it will succeed than did similar visions of totalitarian control held by American leaders in Vietnam during the early 1960's.

And I know that, just as in the 1960's, Administration commitment to counter-insurgency in the East Asia and Pacific region is inflicting unacceptable costs on Asians and Americans alike.

III. COSTS TO THE INDOCHINESE

At the end of his request for Indochina funds during his Foreign Aid message last week, the President of the United States said that "the investment I am now seeking (is) an investment to sustain the peace, to overcome the human suffering resulting from the war."

This statement is beyond comprehension.

We have already pointed out that official figures reveal that more than 1.5 million war victims were created this past year.

To this number of newly killed, newly wounded and newly refugeed last year, moreover, must be added:

Several million refugees living in marginal, undeveloped areas to whom the GVN has denied the right to return to the villages of their birth.

Tens of thousands of political prisoners who remain in prison despite the Paris Agreement, and the thousands more who have been arrested, tortured, imprisoned without trial since the ceasefire was signed.

Thousands of people who are suffering and dying from lack of medicine or an adequate diet—in the cities, in the refugee camps, in the villages.

If Congress does not substantially alter the Administration's aid request, one can assume that casualty figures will be at least as high one year from today as during the past year.

That is, Congressional acquiescence to the President's aid request will guarantee at least 50,000 corpses among people who are now alive, in the coming year. At least twice as many will be wounded. And hundreds of thousands—in Cambodia, in South Vietnam—will lose their homes.

For President Nixon to claim that his aid bill is designed to "overcome human suffering" goes beyond mere duplicity, and enters into a realm of Orwellian doublespeak beyond my understanding.

I know that to accept this statement, however, is to acquiesce in a monstrous lie; one which continues to threaten the lives of all Vietnamese and Cambodians, not merely the war victims enumerated above.

IV. COSTS FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

The costs to the American people of continuing Executive involvement in Indochina are no less real, though perhaps less evident.

I need not tell U.S. Representatives what $3.7 billion could do this fiscal year for millions of the ill, aged, infirm, young and deprived in this society. The following examples, however, may make clearer a larger point:

The chairman of this committee, for example, has noted the distressing plight of hospital workers around the country, earning woefully inadequate salaries. Ten thousand workers could have their annual wages raised by over 25% for the $10 million the Administration is proposing to spend each day in the coming fiscal year.

During fiscal year 1975, the Nixon Administration has reduced federal funding of medical research into diabetes, kidney disease, aging, sudden infant death, glaucoma and cystic fibrosis from $82.4 million allocated in FY 74 to a proposed $74.8 million in FY 1975. These diseases affect the lives of well over 15 million Americans, with the U.S. ranking today 16th in infant mortality. The Administration's proposed saving of $7.6 million will be expended before the next 24 hours are up in Vietnam.

Another serious example is "Public Service Employment", a program which allows tens of thousands of Americans to engage in useful constructive work during periods of temporary unemployment. In FY 1974, approximately $1.25 billion was allocated to these programs. This year, however, while the Nixon Administration is proposing spending $3.7 billion in Indochina, it has reduced its FY 1975 Public Service Employment Program by 1 billion to a mere $250 million.

And, although the Nixon Administration sent well over a million men off to fight in Vietnam, it has not yet been able to provide them with adequate living benefits on their return. Recently, the Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs proposed raising GI benefits from $220 a month to $270 a month, a move which would affect the lives of 1,630,000 veterans in the first year alone. The Nixon Administration is opposing this program. Its cost? In FY 1975, it would come to $554 million, about the cost of 1½ months fighting in Indochina. The total cost of the program, over a five year period, comes to about $2.272 billion—about 60% of what the Administration proposes spending in the next year alone in Indochina.

And, we may remember the dismemberment of programs reaching tens of millions of Americans carried out by the Nixon Administration on January 29, 1973 when it unveiled its FY 1974 budget. Proposed savings by abolishing the Office of Economic Opportunity—an agency which had helped millions of poor people in its decade of existence—were $62 million in FY 1973, $328 million in FY 1974, and $390 million in FY 1975. In other words, in order to save $780 million over a three year period, the Administration chose to abolish OEO. Meanwhile, however, it spent four times that sum last year alone for war in Indochina.

Finally, indeed, we may note the fact that virtually all of the programs abolished by the Administration in the fields of social welfare, job opportunities, health and education, resulted in a saving of far less than the $3.7 billion proposed by the Administration for this year's FY 1975 budget. For example, last year's $3.2 billion of Indochina spending was $600 million more than the $2.6 billion the Administration expected to save in FY 1974 by terminating OEO ($328 million), phasing out the Economic Development Administration ($35 million), eliminating soil and water programs ($258 million), terminating rural water systems and waste disposal grants ($100 million), suspending new housing program ($305 million), phasing down of the Emergency Employment Assistance Program ($670 million), cutting back Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance ($310 million), manpower training programs ($354 million), federal student loans ($264 million) and student subsidies ($119 million).

I bring up these examples not because I think that foreign policy objectives can always be weighed against domestic needs so directly. There are indeed cases where it may make more sense to send money abroad.

than to use it to help our own citizens at home. This year, for example, when there are millions starving in the Sahel and India, flood and storm victims from Pakistan to Nicaragua, a cogent case can be made that such cases deserve urgent priority. And there is also, to be sure, a very strong case for reconstruction and rehabilitation in Indochina.

I bring up these examples of what our Indochina experience is costing the American people, however, because the Administration is doing none of these things. Not only is it not aiding the starving and sick of the earth anything like it might; not only is it not meeting humanitarian and development needs in Indochina; but it even denies its own citizens badly-needed billions, only to take this money for use in killing, maiming and torturing abroad.

I have already in testimony before this committee attempted to describe the kind of mentality, shared by the highest Executive leaders in this land, which I saw in Indochina: a mentality which reduced human beings to numbers, numbers to be tracked, jailed and broken if deemed necessary.

My testimony today reveals the other side of the coin. Not only has this mentality created one of the most sophisticated police-states in the world today abroad, but to achieve this the Administration has begun the process of reducing its own citizens to mere objects, to be manipulated and deprived as well.

I do not think it is necessary for me here to elaborate on the indecency, inhumanity and wretchedness of the present occupants of the Executive branch in following such a policy.

But I feel I must stress again that this question of U.S. aid to Indochina goes beyond mere outrage or shock. It is an issue which directly threatens every man, woman and child in this country, an issue that will in the end determine whether this is a country to be ruled by its people, and, however imperfect, their representatives in Congress; or whether policy will continue to be made by a tiny group of war-makers who turn ever-more to deception, as their foreign policy runs ever-more counter to American ideals and values.

The cost of our continuing involvement in Indochina to the people of this country, in a word, is not to be measured merely in financial terms.

What is at stake is no more or less than the spiritual and moral health of this nation.

To understand this point, we may now turn to a consideration in detail of the Administration's FY 1975 aid request.

For only through a microscopic look at this gigantic demand can we see how duplicitous, how indifferent to human needs, and how war-like our Executive branch has become.

I daresay there is no other administration in the world today which would dare to present a budget over 90% of which is designed for war, and call it a budget for "reconstruction". I know there has never been a time in the history of this country when the American Executive has been so contemptuous of its people and Congress: unilaterally allotting money in direct violation of congressional intent, advancing the crudest sort of propaganda to support its position. The Administration has resorted to the most transparent subterfuge simply to mulct their FY 1975 appropriation out of Congress.

"A nation divided among itself cannot stand," said the President during America's first civil war. The cost to Americans of our continued involvement in Indochina will be continued division during this present, rather quiescent phase, of what has become our second civil war.

V. THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROGRAM FOR UNENDING WAR—PRESENTED AS A PLAN FOR PEACE

Realizing public and congressional sentiment for peace and against U.S. involvement, the Administration has sought to present its program to Congress as one designed to heal, rebuild, and bring peace. In fact, however, U.S. aid programs are doing precisely the opposite.

What is more important, moreover, is that there is no end in sight. Henry Kissinger implicitly admitted this recently, when he wrote to Senator Kennedy on March 25, 1974, that "we believe it is important that we continue our support as long as it is needed."

This shockingly open-ended commitment to involvement in Indochina, one year after Mr. Kissinger had negotiated an agreement committing the U.S. to ending its involvement, is sufficient cause for alarm.

When it is realized however, that there is no possibility that pro-U.S. military regimes will ever be able to stand alone, Mr. Kissinger's statement is revealed as nothing less than a commitment to American involvement for decades to come—with the cost of this involvement, moreover, steadily rising.

1. The fiscal year 1974 presentation: War presented as "rehabilitation" and "reconstruction"

One year ago today, for example, the President of the United States went before Congress to present his FY 1974 foreign aid proposals, and stated:

"The signing of the ceasefire agreements . . . will permit us to turn our attention to the considerable post-war needs of Southeast Asia . . . The legislation I am presenting today . . . would provide a sound beginning of the process of reconstruction and rehabilitation there."

In fact, however, only 4% of the Indochina Aid that President Nixon proposed for FY 1974 was actually designated for "reconstruction and rehabilitation" or "development" ($121.4 million out of $2.9 billion—See Table 3). And only another 4% was even termed "humanitarian" ($107.4 million out of $2.9 billion).

Ninety-two percent of the Administration-requested funds for FY 1974 were meant to continue the war—both military funds, which were 72% of the total, and "economic" and "Food for Peace" funds, which were indirectly war-related.

Even more importantly, the Administration's aid programs went to feed our narrow-based war machines in South Vietnam and Cambodia, which offered no hopes of peace.

In South Vietnam, President Nixon had announced on January 23, 1973—even befor he had signed the Agreement—that his Administration would continue to recognize the Thieu Administration as the "sole" and "legitimate" government of the Republic of Vietnam. In elaborating on this, Henry Kissinger explained that the U.S. would continue to recognize the GVN "with its constitutional structure intact".

This not only directly violates the Paris Agreement—which establishes that there are "two parties" exercising sovereignty only over their respective zones of control, and that neither held sovereignty over the Republic of Vietnam until both—together with a "third segment"—met together in a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord to hold elections.

But the Nixon-Kissinger announcement of their recognition of the GVN as the "sole, legitimate" government of the Republic of Vietnam, also ruled out any serious chance for peace. For the Thieu government's constitution, left structurally "intact", outlaws the PRG from peaceful political competition. By committing itself solely to the Thieu regime, the Administration also ensured no hope for a political settlement because of the nature of that regime. The GVN would hardly favor allowing the refugees to return to PRG-controlled villages, emptying its prisons of its tens of thousands of political prisoners, or allowing popular Third Force leaders to have the freedoms guaranteed them by the Paris Agreement, as long as it could count on an Administration lavishly supplying aid with no conditions.

And the situation in Cambodia is even less amenable to a political solution. In throwing its weight behind the Lon Nol regime, the Administration has managed to produce one of the most unpopular, ineffectual, corrupt, and comic-operaish regimes in modern history.

Visiting Cambodia last year after the ceasefire, I not only failed to find any Cambodians supporting the Lon Nol regime. I was also told by high-ranking officials in the American embassy in Phnom Penh that Lon Nol had lost even the support of the few groups—students and intellectuals—who had supported him at the time of the 1970 takeover.

More moderate elements within the Phnom Penh regime have made no secret of their distaste for Lon Nol—and he in turn has systematically excluded them from power. The latest casualty was Premier In Tam, who had spoken vaguely of negotiations.

The result is that the Administration has found itself in a no-win situation in Cambodia, spending hundreds of millions annually to prosecute a war which cannot be won.

2. Fiscal year 1974 implementation: Administration covertly increases economic aid 34 per cent

Last year, Congress clearly showed its desire to *reduce* our involvement in Indochina by cutting the Administration's request for Indochina Postwar Reconstruction from $632 million to $450 million.

Through a variety of subterfuges, however, the Administration succeeded not only in restoring the cuts, but in actually spending nearly twice as much for economic aid to Indochina as the Congress had originally intended.

The main means the Administration used for this subversion of Congress was taking money from world-wide Food for Peace allocations and channeling it into Indochina. Since Congress has until now only set world-wide levels, such Administration subterfuge was possible.

Food for Peace for South Vietnam shot up from an original request of $176.4 million to $309 million, and for Cambodia from $30.9 million to $194.2 million.

In addition, the Administration pushed through two "loans" to South Vietnam totalling $110 million, and "supplemental" economic aid of $49 million.

The result is that the Administration proposed a total of $840.8 million in economic aid to Indochina as of the spring of 1973; Congress reduced this figure to about $700 million ($450 for "postwar reconstruction", $50 million "development loan", $208.8 "Food for Peace") by Christmas 1973.

The Administration then proceeded to restore all cuts—and then go beyond even its original request, winding up at $1.1 billion.

This $1.1 billion, moreover, is used almost entirely for war-related programs and has no impact whatsoever on the reconstruction or human needs of Indochina. Almost half of this money, for example, is for "Food for Peace". "Food for Peace" is imported in South Vietnam and Cambodia by local importers, who pay local currency to the GVN and Lon Nol governments. The Administration has used 100% of these funds in South Vietnam, and 80% in Cambodia, for "common defense" needs, i.e. war.

Most of the remaining money—for the

commodity import programs, "technical support" programs, etc.—is similarly used to support the war. They are designed to provide the minimal economic backing necessary for the Thieu and Lon Nol regimes to survive, with much of the local currency generated by the CIP and other programs also finding its way into the budgets of the army, airforce and police.

3, Fiscal year 1974 implementation: Humanitarian and reconstruction funds reduced

Despite the fact that the "economic" aid has risen, moreover, the actual FY 1974 funds devoted to humanitarian or reconstruction needs has actually fallen. Total funds requested for "humanitarian, reconstruction and development" programs in the FY 1974 original presentation amounted to $228.8 million. At this writing, however, we have found that the Administration has allocated only $172 million for what is termed "development", "humanitarian", and "reconstruction".

And even this minuscule amount of aid contains a massive deception of Congress. Of the $96.4 allocated for "humanitarian" needs, some $75 million went to "refugee relief." Much of this money pays for "refugee resettlement" which, as former U.S. AID officials Edward Blook and Leon Van Wagoner, as well as the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Refugees, have recently pointed out, is not humanitarian at all. Rather U.S. and GVN officials have denied refugees the "freedom of movement" guaranteed them under Article 11 of the Paris Agreement, by refusing to allow them to return to the villages of their birth and instead resettling them in marginal areas, often without water and decent farming land, so as to claim this land for "strategic reasons."

Of a total of $3.2 billion appropriated by Congress in FY 1974 for Indochina-related expenses, then, only $96 million, or .03% has actually gone to meet the humanitarian and reconstruction needs of the people. The rest has gone—directly or indirectly—for more war.

4. Requests for increased fiscal year 1975 aid: Four administration myths

Since FY 1974 aid was not designed either to meet the human needs of the people of Vietnam, nor to lead to a political solution, it is not surprising that the Administration's FY 1975 aid requests far exceed FY 1974 allocations.

Just one week ago, on April 24, the President unveiled his FY 1975 budget proposal for Indochina. This year, this section of the President's Foreign Aid speech was entitled "Toward Reconstruction of Indochina". In it, the President requested $939.8 million for "Postwar Reconstruction", more than double last year's $450 million allocation.

Other Administration documents reveal, moreover, that the President intends to ask for $2.1 billion in military aid for FY 1975, an increase of 42% over last year's military appropriations.

The only major category which did not jump up spectacularly for FY 1975 was the Administration's "Food for Peace" request, which was only $260 million, about half of the FY 1974 allocation. Last year at this time, however, the Administration only requested $208.8 million for "Food for Peace." Since it eventually grew to $507 million, there is no doubt that this year's request could grow similarly over the next 12 months.

Depending on one's measure, therefore, the FY 1975 Administration request represents an increase over FY 1974 allocations of varying degrees:

1. Overall, the jump is from $3.2 billion in FY 1974 to a requested $3.7 billion in FY 1975—an increase of 16%.

2. Total economic and military inputs into the three countries of Indochina have increased 30%, from $2.5 billion to a requested $3.2 billion.

3. The most real measure of the increase, however, comes from ignoring the preliminary "Food for Peace" estimates for FY 1975. Comparing "Indochina Postwar Reconstruction Aid" funds, with "Military Assistance Service Fund" and "Military Assistance Program" funds, we find an increase from $2.08 billion to $3.02 billion, a jump of 45%.

This large increase in requested FY 1975 aid has resulted entirely from the weakness of the Administration position in Indochina. Unable to triumph militarily, but unwilling to try and compete politically for fear of losing, the Administration is doing little more right now than simply more of the same.

Unable to admit this to the American people and Congress—and perhaps to themselves—however, Administration officials have instead attempted to present this year's aid requests in the best possible light. The essence of their position is that if these aid requests are passed, they will both give the GVN and Lon Nol government a "fair chance" against the weapons supplied the other side by the Soviet Union and China, and also make them economically and militarily viable so that they will not demand American aid 3 or 4 years from now.

Unfortunately, such arguments by the Administration are little but myths.

Myth (1). Administration Programs are made necessary by our "commitments" under the Paris Agreements. On March 25, 1974, Henry Kissinger wrote to Senator Kennedy that "as a signator of the Paris Agreement . . . the United States committed itself to strengthening the conditions which made the ceasefire possible . . . with these commitments in mind, we continue to provide the Republic of Vietnam with the means necessary for its self-defense and its economic viability."

The American people have been given many reasons in public for our involvement in Vietnam over the years: there was the domino theory, the Gulf of Tonkin, the SEATO treaty, the "Yellow Peril" scare, and the ever-popular "commitment to allowing the Vietnamese people the right of self-determination."

In fact, as the Pentagon Papers reveal, all of these public rationales were mere sugar-coating for what former Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton described as 70 per cent of our goal: "To avoid a humiliating defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor)." McNaughton also stated that only "10%" of our "aims" were to "permit the people of SVN to enjoy a better, freer way of life."

Of all the previous untruths, however, none is more absurd than Mr. Kissinger's. The notion that the Paris Agreement serves as a rationale for our continued intervention is plainly untrue.

Article 1 of the Paris Agreement states that 'The United States . . . respect(s) the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam." By signing this, the Administration conceded on the crucial point of debate over the years: Vietnam is one country, by definition wrought by a civil war. Continuing U.S. involvement in Vietnam, therefore, constitutes blatant intervention in a civil war, one recognized by international law and common sense to be illegal.

If there was any doubt on this question, moreover, Article 4 of the Paris Agreement removes it. Article 4 states that "The United States will not continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam." In signing the Agreement, therefore, the Administration was making a solemn commitment to end our involvement—military, political and economic—in South Vietnam, i.e., the zones controlled by President Thieu, as well as by the PRG.

For Mr. Kissinger to now claim that this Paris Agreement in fact "commits" the U.S. to further and massive involvement represents one of the most grotesque and twisted myths ever put forward to the American public as a reason for intervention abroad.

Myth (2): This substantial amount of aid will suffice to launch the GVN on the road to economic recovery, allowing us to reduce our aid substantially in the next 2–3 years.

Recently, for example, the U.S. Ambassador to Saigon Mr. Graham Martin stated that, "If . . . the Congress approves the 850 million dollars I have recommended for fiscal year 1975, plus approximately 700 million dollars for the following year, I am convinced further economic aid from the United States could be drastically reduced or even eliminated altogether by fiscal year 1977." (*U.S. News and World Report*, April 29, 1974).

All available evidence suggests precisely the opposite, however. The World Bank, for example, recently completed a survey for South Vietnam's economy. In its report, dated January 28, 1974, World Bank experts concluded that ". . . net aid required in 1980 will be on the order of $770 million a year or about $100 million higher than seems probable for 1974. In short, it seems probable that Vietnam is at least a medium 'long haul' case as far as foreign aid is concerned. For what it is worth, as a purely arithmetical exercise but with about the same parameters we have mentioned above, by 1990 the external resource gap would close by about $300 million a year to about $450 million." (Source: "Current Economic Position and Prospects of the Republic of Vietnam," a World Bank Study Mission, January 28, 1974, page 34).

Mr. Martin is also rather disingenuous about the total amount of funds necessary to get the Thieu economy back on its feet again. For example, he states in the same interview that "We were able to give only 300 million dollars" in economic aid to the Thieu government in FY 1974.

In actual fact, however, AID provided a chart to the House Government Operations Subcommittee on March 20, 1974, indicating that the U.S. had actually provided $708.5 million in "economic and humanitarian assistance to Vietnam, fiscal year 1974." (House Government Operations Subcommittee, "Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1974, part II, page 860). This figure, moreover, does not include a $60 million "loan" and $49 million supplemental appropriation expected to pass Congress for FY 1974, and an extra $50 million "Food for Peace" money.

Thus the U.S. is supplying $878 million to Thieu's economy this year, not only the $300 million that Martin suggests.

Mr. Martin's $850 and $700 million figures, moreover are based on the assumption that the fighting does not drastically increase in the next year or two. In fact, however, escalation is not only possible but probable, given the refusal of the GVN to even test the other side's offer for a ceasefire and political settlement.

Myth (3): Our aid is "defensive", designed to off-set weapons given the other side by the Soviet Union and China.

The only official figures of Soviet and Chinese military aid to North Vietnam of which I am aware are for the years 1965–68, and 1970 and 1971. For these 6 years, during which hundreds of thousands of U.S. ground troops were fighting in Indochina, and the U.S. Air Force dropped well over 5 million tons of bombs, U.S. military expenditures were estimated to total roughly $90 billion. During these same 6 years, source Soviet and

Chinese military aid combined was estimated to total roughly $2.245—or roughly about $380 million a year, or roughly 1/30 the amount of armament, we funnelled in.

Since the ceasefire, moreover, Soviet and Chinese aid has reportedly been substantially reduced. Mr. Martin himself, for example, stated on January 16, 1974, that the Soviet and Chinese "are not resupplying them (Hanoi) with massive weapons of war as they have continuously over the past years." (*Congressional Record*, 9921, April 4, 1974.)

Given this fact, it is fair to assume the Soviet and Chinese military aid to its allies may be on the order of $1–200 million, or less for the coming fiscal year. At the same time, however, we find the Administration proposing $2.08 billion or 10–20 times as much military aid to the Thieu and Lon Nol regimes, as well as $463 million more for U.S. forces in the area.

Indeed, the Soviet and Chinese could turn this equation around and argue that they are in fact only supplying their allies to protect them against the vastly greater quantity of arms given the Thieu and Lon Nol governments. This case can be made even more strongly, moreover, by noting that many of the most expensive items in the other side's inventory, e.g. SAM missiles, are quite clearly defensive weapons; or—as in the case of Soviet-supplied MIGs for the North Vietnamese air force—they are weapons which have historically been used defensively.

Many of the most expensive items we supply our allies in Indochina however, e.g. airplanes, spare parts of bombs, are often used offensively. Numerous western journalists visiting PRG zones since the ceasefire, for example, have reported GVN bombing deep inside numerous PRG zones, where no PRG military activity was taking place.

The thesis that our military aid is not at all geared to the threat from the other side, moreover, is strengthened by a comparison of our military aid to the GVN in calendar years 1972 and 1973.

In CY 1972, we supplied $2.383 billion in military aid to the Thieu regime. In that year 39,587 ARVN soldiers were killed. In CY 1973, ARVN casualties declined by two-thirds, to 13,822. This substantial decline in casualties helps to substantiate the universal opinion that fighting was substantially lower in 1973 than it was in 1972. And yet U.S. military aid to the Thieu regime totalled $2.271 billion in 1973 precisely as much as it had been in 1972 when the fighting had been much higher. (Source: AID figures supplied to Cong. Abzug, Feb. 20, 1974.)

All evidence indicates, therefore, that the amount of U.S. military aid given to the Thieu government is determined more by the constant size of the GVN army—1.1 million men—than by the amount of aid supplied by the Soviet Union and China to their allies.

Myth (4): Administration FY 75 aid requests will allow pro-U.S. regimes "stand on their own feet", thereby allowing the U.S. to walk away in a matter of years.

At the end of his request for economic aid funds for Indochina last week, the President stated that "the investment I am now seeking (is) . . . to give the people of Indochina a chance to stand on their own feet."

Graham Martin, in the interview referred to above, was even more explicit about the time required for the "to stand on their own feet": "How do we end our involvement? . . . I have said our objective should be to end it leaving a Vietnam economically viable, militarily capable of defending itself with its own manpower, and free to choose its own government and its own leaders. I believe this can be done within the next three years."

These optimistic and idealistic pronouncements are reminiscent of former predictions of a "light at the end of the tunnel". And, as in 1961, as in 1964, these predictions cannot and are not substantiated. All available evidence, indeed indicates exactly the opposite.

Thieu's opponents are, if anything, stronger since the ceasefire. Numerous reports from western journalists indicate that the PRG has begun building up its economy, reconstructing its bomb-leveled communities in the zones under its control. The relative prosperity, cleanliness, and lower prices in its rural villages, moreover, have astonished numerous outside observers who have visited its zones.

The PRG has, moreover, seized the *political* initiative. On my recent trip to Saigon, for example, one friend explained it this way: before the ceasefire, both sides meant war. You might be for the PRG, but to join it meant to opt for a difficult and dangerous way of life. Since the ceasefire, however, Thieu has continued to call for war, while the PRG have come to represent peace. It is common knowledge, for example, that everyone in PRG zones is encouraged to learn the Paris Agreement, and the PRG has convinced many Vietnamese that it sincerely wants to implement it. In GVN zones, on the other hand, the Paris Agreement is not publicized and Thieu does little but talk of more war.

During my visit to South Vietnam, moreover, I found that most experts believe that the military balance is also shifting away from Thieu. U.S. technicians trying to keep the GVN air force together, for example, told me that VNAF mechanics have little interest in maintaining their own planes. The desertion rate is reportedly high since the ceasefire, and local accommodations between PRG and ARVN units have skyrocketed since the ceasefire. This has allowed the PRG to move more freely than ever throughout South Vietnam, extending its influence into many villages and hamlets it formerly could not reach.

The motion, moreover, that by providing well over 90% of the GVN's resources, the U.S. is leaving Vietnam "free to choose its own government" makes no more sense today than it did 20 years ago. The basic fact is that the Thieu government is the only administration in the world which derives 90% of its resources from a foreign government. And, as such, it is not responsible to its own people but to the U.S. This basic structural fact means that the GVN will never be able to "stand on its own"—for it has no base in its own country. (See Table 4)

The principal economic problem of the GVN, for example, is the tremendous cost of maintaining its 1.1 million-man army, 350,000 civil servants, and 120,000 policemen. This huge parasitic class not only devours our aid, but can only survive through an ever-increasing amount of aid and war material from the outside.

The Thieu government, unwilling to compete politically, unable to allow a relaxation of tensions which might see its army desert en masse, unable to relax police control of its population, is therefore structurally committed to maintaining this huge bureaucracy indefinitely.

Thus it is, for example, that despite the decline in the real value of U.S. transfers of resources to South Vietnam's economy since the 1969 peak, the per capita level of imports into South Vietnam in constant U.S. dollar values remains today at about $25—still higher than the $21 per capita a decade ago. Despite this tremendous influx of funds from the outside, however, the Thieu government has been unable to use this capital for development. It has all been eaten up by an ever-burgeoning bureaucracy which has seen GVN per capita spending increased from about $25 to $50 during the same period.

Another example of the structural inability of the GVN to stand on its own is the artificial nature of its urban economy. By refusing to allow millions of refugees to return to the villages of their birth—because such villages are in zones controlled by the PRG—the GVN has ensured that millions of its citizens will remain unproductive, and often in need of doles just to survive. This has in turn, led to over-crowding and filth in and around South Vietnam's major cities—and increased the probability that the GVN will need aid indefinitely.

Fundamentally, however, the most basic structural inability of the GVN is its military orientation and disinclination to shift towards a peace-time economy and political mode of competition. In part, it is a question of sheer momentum. For over a decade now, General Thieu and other top officials have remained in power due to American largesse in return for ordering troops into battle. Like any government anywhere, it finds it easier to do what it knows best, than shift to what appears to be a more high-risk arena of political competition. In part, however, it may also be a realization or fear on the part of the GVN's part that it simply cannot compete politically with the PRG—that the GVN's well-known corruption, its police-state tactics, and its decade-long commitment to war, will place it at a disadvantage against its adversaries.

Whatever the case, it is clear that as long as the war in Indochina continues—at whatever foreseeable level—the GVN will simply not be able to "stand on its own" no matter how much aid is given it. (1) Agricultural production will still be limited, with war victims, refugees and often, urban dwellers, demanding American food imports indefinitely. (2) Domestic and foreign investors will not put money into long-term investments. (3) Mobilization of manpower and resources for the war machine will continue to constitute a powerful inflationary force; world prices will remain high, and the major items required for capital intensive agriculture we have introduced to compensate for lost production due to war, will continue to be too expensive for most farmers.

And if all the above is true for South Vietnam, of course, the situation is even less hopeful for the Administration in Cambodia.

One need do little here but repeat the obvious: the Lon Nol regime is composed entirely today of hard-line extremists, with such moderates as In Tam having left the cabinet in disgust. The Lon Nol government's military position is hopeless, with the Khmer Rouge controlling 70–80% of Cambodia, and remaining on the offensive in the rest. Politically, the Lon Nol government has virtually no support at all—it has even lost the support it originally enjoyed from a numerically tiny group of intellectuals.

For the Administration to suggest that it is in either the American or Cambodian interest for Congress to appropriate more than $600 million in FY 1975 for war in Cambodia is beneath comment. Even more so than in South Vietnam, the only solution for everyone is for us to stop intervening in Cambodia and to allow what all admit is a civil war among Cambodians to take its course.

This fiscal year 1975 budget request for Indochina aid, then, represents a fundamental attempt by the Administration to deceive Congress and the American people. It will not allow the GVN or Lon Nol governments to become economically viable, it is not a measured response to Soviet and Chinese aid to their allies, and it offers no hope of ever ending.

TABLE 1.—FISCAL YEAR 1974 AND 1975 U.S. EXPENDITURES FOR INDOCHINA

	Original fiscal year 1974 request	Fiscal year 1974 allocation	Original fiscal year 1975 request
Economic aid:			
1. Indochina postwar reconstruction	[1] $619,000,000	[1] $435,000,000	[2] $939,800,000
2. Food for peace	[1] 208,800,000	[1] [3] 507,300,000	[3] [4] 260,000,000
3. Loans		[3] 110,000,000	
4. Supplemental		[3] 49,000,000	
Subtotal, economic aid	827,800,000	1,100,000,000	1,200,000,000
Military aid:			
5. Masf	[5] 1,900,000,000	[3] 1,126,000,000	[7] 1,600,000,000
6. Map	[6] 181,000,000	[8] 342,000,000	[9] 480,000,000
Subtotal, economic and military aid	2,909,000,000	2,530,000,000	[9] 3,280,005,000
Indochina-related U.S. forces	[10] 1,000,000,000	[11] 691,000,000	[12] 463,000,000
Grand total	3,909,000,000	3,221,000,000	3,743,000,000

[1] "Current Programing Levels Compared with Fiscal Year 1974 Congressional Presentation," hearings before House Operations Subcommittee, Mar. 20, 1974, pp. 877–879.
[2] President's foreign aid message, Congressional Record, p. 11665, Apr. 24, 1974.
[3] "GAO Reports on U.S. Aid to South Vietnam," Hon. Lee H. Hamilton, Congressional Record p. 8825, Mar. 28, 1974
Of this, $183,000,000 for South Vietnam (source—footnote 3 above), $77,000,000—Cambodia (source—telephone conversation with the Department of Agriculture).
[4] $54,000,000 supplemental expected, though not yet appropriated at this writing.
[5] Hearings before the Senate Appropriations Committee, pt. II, 1973, p. 1363.
[6] Letter from Secretary of State Kissinger to Senator Kennedy, Congressional Record, p. 9033, Apr. 1, 1974.
[7] "American Aid to Indochina", Hon. Ronald Dellums, Congressional Record, Apr. 3, 1974
[8] 27 percent up.
[9] This $1,000,000,000 was the figure advanced by Robert Moot, DOD Comptroller, on Jan. 29, 1973, when he stated that $1,000,000,000 was for "support of U.S. forces involved in the Southeast Asia situation, both naval and air."
[10] This figure was supplied the Indochina Resource Center from the DOD Comptroller's office on Apr. 29, 1974, and defined as "incremental Southeast Asia costs for the support of U.S. forces related to the phasedown of the Indochina conflict."
[11] Annual Defense Department budget, Mar. 24, 1974, p. 24—"Included in the $1,900,000,000 for Southeast Asia costs in fiscal year 1975 is $463,000,000 for U.S. forces—largely the airbases in Thailand.

TABLE 2.—HUMAN TOLL OF WAR

	Refugees [1]	Civilian hospital entries—annual [2]	Civilian hospital entries—monthly average [2]	Civilian killed [3]	Civilian wounded [3]	ARVN killed [4]	ARVN wounded [4]	"Enemy" killed [4]	Total killed and wounded
1965	*772,000	50,000	4,166	25,000	75,000	11,234	23,118	35,436	169,788
1966	*906,000	50,000	4,166	50,000	100,000	11,953	20,975	55,524	238,452
1967	*463,000	49,707	4,142	60,000	115,000	12,176	29,448	88,104	304,728
1968	*494,000	86,993	7,249	100,000	200,000	27,915	70,696	181,149	579,760
1969	*590,000	66,002	5,500	60,000	140,000	21,833	65,276	156,954	444,063
1970	**410,000	59,663	4,971	30,000	95,000	23,346	71,582	103,638	323,566
1971	*136,000	50,737	4,228	25,000	75,000	22,069	59,823	98,094	279,986
1972	*1,320,000	53,901	4,491	65,000	135,000	39,587	109,962	131,949	481,498
1973	*818,700	43,166	3,597	15,000	70,000	13,822	60,005	48,237	207,064
Expelled from Cambodia	210,000								
PRG zones	700,000								
Estimated nonregistered	2,000,000								
Total	8,819,700	510,169	4,723	430,000	1,005,000	183,935	510,885	899,085	3,028,90

[1] Refugees—Figures marked by (*) are newly generated refugees as reported yearly by the U.S. Agency For International Development. The 1970 figure, marked by (**), includes 281,000 persons who registered in 1970, but were generated as refugees from 1965–69.
[2] Hospital entries—These figures are official, supplied by the U.S. Agency For International Development.
[3] Civilian killed and wounded—These figures are estimates made by the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Refugees.
[4] Soldiers killed and wounded—Figures for 1965–Jan. 27, 1973, supplied by Pentagon Information Office (202) OX 7–2873. Jan. 27–Dec. 31, 1973, figures are those supplied by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.
Note: Civilian figures below prepared by the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Refugees.

TABLE 3.—A COMPARISON OF U.S., SOVIET, AND CHINESE EXPENDITURES IN INDOCHINA

[In of U.S. dollars]

Year	Soviet		Chinese		United States		Military aid		
	Military	Economic	Military	Economic	Military	Economic	Soviet-Chinese total	Soviet-Chinese percent of total	United States percent of total
1966	210,000,000	85,000,000	60,000,000	50,000,000	5,263,500,000	736,500,000	270,000,000	5.0	95.0
1967	505,000,000	200,000,000	145,000,000	80,000,000	17,431,900,000	568,100,000	650,000,000	4.0	96.0
1968	440,000,000	240,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000	22,463,300,000	536,700,000	540,000,000	2.0	98.0
1970	70,000,000	345,000,000	85,000,000	60,000,000	16,523,300,000	476,700,000	155,000,000	1.0	99.0
1971	100,000,000	315,000,000	75,000,000	100,000,000	11,424,300,000	575,700,000	175,000,000	1.5	98.5
Total	1,300,000,000	1,200,000,000	465,000,000	390,000,000	73,100,000,000	2,900,000,000	1,800,000,000	2.0	98.0

SOURCES

1. Soviet and Chinese expenditures for 1966–68 were drawn from National Security Study Memorandum No. 1, as reprinted in the "Congressional Record," May 10, 1972. They are included in the section prepared by the State Department, in response to question 28, in a chart captioned "In Million U.S. Dollars at Soviet Foreign Trade Prices," on p. 16773.
2. Soviet and Chinese expenditures for 1970–71 are taken from an Associated Press dispatch published in the "New York Times" on Apr. 13, 1972. The dispatch cites "U.S. government sources, not allowing use of their agency name." It is entitled "Soviet Arms Aid to Hanoi Is Down."
3. U.S. expenditures for 1966–68, and 1970, are taken from "Impact of the Vietnam War," prepared by the Library of Congress, June 30, 1971, p. 2. Costs are given in fiscal years, and are incremental, i.e., costs that would not have been incurred was the U.S. not involved in Indochina. The 1971 figure is an estimate reported by "The Air War in Indochina," by a Cornell University study team, Beacon Press, p. 100. We have divided U.S. costs into military and economic by subtracting from the total figure given in the sources just listed, the figures for U.S. economic aid listed in the "Fiscal Year 1974 Program Presentation to the Congress," prepared by the U.S. Agency for International Development, p. 10.

Note: The 5 selected years chosen above are the only ones for which it is possible to compare United States, Soviet and Chinese expenditures for Indochina.

TABLE 4.—UNITED STATES NOW SUPPLIES 86.3 PERCENT OF THIEU'S TOTAL RESOURCES

1973 INCOME INTO SOUTH VIETNAM

[In millions of dollars]

	U.S.-supplied income (86.3 percent)			GVN-generated income (13 percent)	
	Amount	Percent		Amount	Percent
U.S. military aid	2,270.5	66.8	Direct taxes	58.6	1.7
U.S. commodity import program	300.0	8.8	Indirect taxes	283.2	8.3
U.S. Food for Peace	143.0	4.2	Import revenues	10.16	.2
U.S. project aid	86.1	2.5	Currency additions	30.7	.9
U.S. loan	50.0	1.4	Bond sales	30.3	.8
Import revenues due to U.S. presence (minimum)	91.44	2.6	3d country aid	40.0	1.1

Note: Th e above table shows how the 86.3 percent of the Thieu Government's resources supplied by the United States is divided.

Key to chart on other side of this page: line (1) The GVN did accomplish a model gain in direct taxes during 1973. For a population of 20 million, however, the $3 per capita raised in taxes is a telling indictment of the GVN's political appeal. Line (2) Although we have counted all $283.2 million in "indirect taxes" as internally-generated, in fact 30% of indirect taxes during the war were generated by the U.S. presence, and a substantial portion of such "indirect taxes" are still derived directly from the U.S. presence. Line (3) Virtually *all* import revenues are derived from U.S.-subsidized imports. Nonetheless, we have estimated the GVN's internally-generated import revenues at 10% of the total, a rather high estimate. Line (4). This simply means that the GVN printed up new currency, thus stimulating inflation. Line (5). The GVN borrowed on the future here, presumably from the national bank. Line (6) The 1973 "loan" was from the U.S., those in 1974 will come from a variety of countries and institutions like the World Bank. Lines (7)–(10) These are 4 *overt* and *admitted* categories of U.S. funding. Inflation has meant that they amount to a declining amount of real aid and thus declining living standards. The 1974 "military aid" figure of $1.026 billion is not taken seriously by the Indochina Resource Center, since it cannot be correlated with the requests of $1.6 billion for FY 1974 and $1.6 billion for FY 1975. Line (12) This indicates that portion of American aid which enters GVN budget accounting. The budget is quite obviously a small portion of what it takes to keep the GVN in existence.

TABLE 4 (CONTINUED).—SOUTH VIETNAM: GOVERNMENT BUDGETS BY CALENDAR YEARS 1964–74
[In millions of dollars]

	Calendar year—										
										Estimated	
	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
1. Direct taxes	12.3	12.7	11.7	19.4	24.4	28.1	35.4	34.0	39.6	58.6	65.6
2. Indirect and other domestic taxes	87.7	124.1	128.3	135.6	138.1	158.9	190.3	199.0	201.5	283.2	301.6
3. Import revenues	63.0	70.9	215.8	177.5	158.9	275.5	328.8	379.6	114.3	101.6	96.9
4. Addition to currency supply	63.0	255.7	131.7	117.5	249.4	86.5	98.2	154.8	47.1	30.7	93.8
5. Bond sales	15.2	27.1	17.7	11.6	40.0	28.6	13.1	75.7	121.4	30.3	N.A.
6. Loans from foreign countries										50.0	100.0
7. U.S. AID project asst	46.3	65.7	184.1	324.8	224.1	153.0	115.9	95.7	72.2	86.1	201.7
8. U.S. C.I.P	104.8	157.5	259.9	165.2	104.4	176.1	182.3	239.4	225.6	300.0	240.0
9. U.S. Food for Peace	33.9	48.2	76.3	153.3	138.3	94.1	121.0	81.8	118.1	143.0	160.0
10. U.S. military aid	181.8	268.9	862.0	1,203.5	1,054.5	1,608.2	1,692.6	1,882.5	2,382.6	2,270.5	1,026.0
11. Third country grant aid	19.9	19.9	19.9	20.0	20.0	26.0	20.6	28.3	34.2	40.0	60.0
Grand total	627.9	1,050.7	1,907.4	2,328.4	2,152.1	2,632.3	2,798.2	3,170.8	3,356.6	3,394.0	2,345.6
12. Counterpart contribution to the budget	129.5	174.5	301.2	277.7	177.4	190.6	239.5	267.4	305.0	400.2	390.2
Total GVN budget	292.5	382.2	657.0	610.2	498.8	653.1	794.0	880.0	675.4	855.6	854.3
(Conversion rate Vietnam dollars/U.S. dollars)	(81/1)	(79/1)	(120/1)	(160/1)	(168/1)	(192/1)	(226/1)	(294/1)	(412/1)	(512/1)	(604/1)

Note: The above table was recently supplied by the U.S. Agency for International Development. For the first time in the war it officially outlines in the clearest way possible the fact that the United States is responsible for over 85 percent of the Thieu government's total resources. It is important to note, moreover, that during 1973 the United States was forbidden by the Paris Agreement from interfering in the internal affairs of Vietnam.

Source: "Table 1", Letter to Congresswoman Bella Abzug, from House Foreign Operations Committee, Feb. 20, 1974, from AID.

UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AID TO INDOCHINA FOR FISCAL YEAR 1974

	SVN		Cambodia		Laos		Total	
	Original	Actual	Original	Actual	Original	Actual	Original	Actual
"Humanitarian"	85.0	70.0	4.0	13.4	18.4	13.0	107.4	96.4
"Reconstruction"	50.0	2.0	5.0	0	5.9	10.9	60.9	25.9
"Development"	48.0	13.0	×	×	12.5		60.5	
"Comm. Imp. Prog."	275.0	200.0	46.7	62.1	×	×	321.7	262.1
"Stabiliz. Fund"	×	×	18.3	18.3	18.2	16.1	36.5	34.4
Technical Support	17.0	15.0	1.0	1.2	×	×	18.0	16.2
Ind. "Post-War" Rec	475.0	300.0	75.0	95.0	55.0	39.8	605.0	435.0
Food for Peace	176.4	309.0	30.9	194.2	1.5	3.6	208.8	506.8
Dod Moneys	105.0	105.0	?	?	?	×	?	?
Supplemental—Cip	×	49.0	×	×	×	×	×	49.0
Loan—Cip	×	60.0	×	×	×	×	×	60.0
Development Loan	×	50.0	×	×	×	×	×	50.0
Grand total	756.4	873.0	105.9	289.2	56.5	43.4	813.8	1,100.0

Notes: (1) Figures represent "Millions of dollars—United States." (2) "Original stands for original administration requests for fiscal year 1974, present in spring 1973; "Actual" stands for final administration appropriations.

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS SAIGON-STYLE

Nine out of 18 dailies in Vietnamese language were confiscated on Wed., April 3, 1974 by the Minister of Interior, according to AFP in Saigon. The order of confiscations was made because these papers carried an article on the massive withdrawal of money from the banks to buy gold while the piaster is devaluating continuously. The Saigon Minister of Finance had demanded the National Bank to take urgent measures to stop this public panic. The piaster has devaluated eight times in '73 and four times since the beginning of this year.

This is the first time in 20 months after the decree-law 007–TT/SLU went into effect, there is such a great number of dailies at one time.

One may recall the statement of Marshall Nguyen Cao Ky in his visit to the U.S. in '70 that the Press in South VN enjoys the most freedom in the world. Or one may recall the less positive statement that freedom of the press that has not been entirely extinguished in South VN; that journalists have even less elbow room in South Korea, the Philippines and Taiwan, and that Viet Nam is still at war, so we must maintain necessary restrictions. And the reason usually given is that in South VN, the Saigon administration allows opposition voices to be heard, that's the proof of its democracy.

We have no illusion, of course, about demanding the Saigon regime to allow freedom of the press as demandad by the Paris Peace Agreement (Art. 11). But here could skim over some principal aspects of what-is-called the freedom of the press, Saigon style.

Officially, Art. 12 of the Saigon Constitution states clearly that freedom of the press is a "fundamental right" and that "censorship is prohibited." The law 019 of Dec. 31, 69 on the status of the press was to the same effect. But of course, that is on paper. According to Tran Tan Quoc who wrote about the DoiDien (Face to Face) case in early 71, there were over 200 cases of seizure of the Saigon dailies within 13 months after the law 19 came into effect. "A record breaking number . . . of the world!" said he. "And press-conditions have never been lived through in a century-life of the Vietnamese press," even under the French colonialist regime, the Japanese fascist regime, feudalism, the Bao Dai puppet regime, and the First Republic, i.e., Ngo Dinh Diem regime.

This is not record-breaking any more, since the law is "too liberal" in comparison to the decree law 007 which was promulgated on August 4, 72. The repression of the press has now become the law and freedom of the press is eliminated totally. The birth of this decree-law is a death sentence passed upon the Press Council which was elected by the entire South Vietnamese press.

The most striking provision of the decree-law is the deposit. The daily has to deposit 20 million piasters (about U.S. $40,000) the daily of a legal party has to deposit 10 million, and the weekly 10 million, to guarantee the payment of fines and court costs.

The daily or magazine which violates this law will be seized and brought to court. The press-court has only one level. The sentenced paper can only appeal to the Supreme Court, and cannot declare mistrial at the same level. And if it wants to appeal to the Supreme Court, it has to pay the fines first.

The decree-law gave enormous powers to the Minister of Interior, who can order the seizure and even temporary suspension of papers that violate "national security" or "sow dissention." Military courts are empowered to try National Security cases and can impose sentences of up to 3 years and fines of up to 5 million piasters (U.S. $10,000). For the most part, the government relies on fines to subdue the press.

Finally, the press must submit copies to the Ministries of Information and Interior

four hours before publication. As a result, almost all Vietnamese papers reach the stands late in the afternoon—often after discreet "unofficial" calls have produced blank spaces containing the words "tu y duc bo" (Voluntarily censored).

On the day this decree-law went into effect, a total of 92 Vietnamese publications (counting weekly and monthly magazines) were shut down, according to L.A. Times, Sept. 16 1972.

Until the beginning of this year, that is within 15 months after the decree-law went into effect, from about 40 dailies in Vietnamese language with half a million readers the press of SVN had only 15 left. The monthly salary of people working for the papers decreased visibly over 60%.

According to all publishers, all South Vietnamese dailies today have a total of 100,000 readers and the number of readers who rent the newspapers (because they can not afford to buy them) are not accountable.

Fourteen out of 16 newspapers, in 15 months under the decree-law, were confiscated 145 times. Ninety-eight seizures of these 145 violated article 28A which states something like "release distorted news," confuse public opinion." Thirty-five seizures violated Art. 29, "voluntarily or involuntarily benefit the communists." And seventeen seizures violated Art. 35 which concerns pornography.

Another means the Saigon administration uses to subdue the press is the regulation of paper. In order to get paper at official price in this time of crisis, the publishers have to apply for paper bonds from the government. The black market price is much higher and the publishers cannot afford it. Therefore, they have to go along with the government if they want to keep their newspapers running. According to Dien Tin (Telegraph), starting from April 11, the paper price increased from 25 to 30%. Starting from early this year, the South Vietnamese press went into another bitter turn. About 50% of journalists, reporters, writers, advertisers, workers . . . became jobless at the end of last year. When a newspaper reduces from 8 pages to 4, i.e. reduces in half, half of the people who work for the newspaper turned jobless is a matter of course.

Usually after a confiscation, a Saigon newspaper is almost at the brink of dissolvency.

"Freedom of the Press does not exist in Viet Nam," declared Vo Long Trieu, a member of Parliament who publishes Dai Dan Toc (The Great People), one of the anti-government newspapers in Saigon. Systematically, by combining confiscation, censorship, deposit and paper bond, the Saigon regime eliminates all opposition, that is, combining law and economic means to silence their voices. To say these measures are but necessary restrictions during the war is sophistic, because the war already ended, and the one who causes war now is the Saigon regime. And to say that opposition voices heard are the proof of Saigon's democracy is another lie. It is impossible to silence people's voice when the government rules by jungle laws, when it does not represent the people and does not adhere to their interests and aspirations.

Who Is Responsible for the Cai Lay Massacre?

On March 9, 74, a rocket fell in Cai Lay primary school (My Tho province, on Highway 4) killed 23 children wounded a woman teacher and 40 others. The Saigon administration immediately claimed the school of Cai Lay was shelled by "Viet Cong". It quickly organized demonstrations and considered March 9 as the "National Day of Mourning".

The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam denounced Saigons "odious trick" and "slanders" in the statement on Cai Lay at the International Conference for the Implementation of the Paris Agreement held in Stockholm, Sweden, March 29–31, 1974. Representatives of the PRG at the Two Party Joint Military Commission requested the ICCS to investigate this massacre and the Saigon administration "to reach an agreement on and to guarantee the conditions necessary for the investigation."

Public opinion in Saigon has shown their doubt about the charge of the Saigon administration.

WHAT IS THE TRUTH?

Cai Lay is situated in a contested area on Highway 4 (on the way from Saigon to the Mekong Delta). The Saigon administration has continuously opened many "pacification" operations in the area. On March 9, an explosion occurred at Cai Lay primary school as school children of two classes were lining up outside their classrooms. No sooner had the explosion taken place than the Saigon troops in the nearby district chief's office rushed to the scene and barricaded the school gate with barbed wire. They carried all the injured school children to the military hospital of the Saigon 7th division. They ordered the victim's relatives to stay outside the school gate and did not allow the latter to see and inquire about their injured sons and younger brothers or to search for their dead loved ones.

SAIGON DEMONSTRATION FARCE

On March 15, 1974, the Saigon administration at Vinh Long forced 3,000 students and 300 teachers in the provincial capital to take part in a demonstration farce in which Nguyen Van Thieu's message was read. "The shelling of the Cai Lay primary school is a concrete proof of the violation destruction of peace and war waging of the Communists in our country. I order all the high schools and primary schools all over the country to spare a minute to commemorate the death of 32 pupils."

The massacre has caused deep pain and anger in the hearts of the people in the Mekong Delta and at CaiLay. Many women, who were forced to take part in the "demonstration," refuse to go, instead, they exposed the Saigon's charges.

EVERYTHING IS CLEARED BY SAIGON POLICE

On March 30, 1974, as the ICCS started its investigation of the massacre, it had to stop because the members of the commission were attacked by the Saigon gangs. Two members from Iran were injured. At the same time, the spokesman of the Saigon administration blatantly declared that "the investigation will not bring any success."

This "prediction" of Saigon was not said without cause. According to AFP, the same day, when the ICCS arrived at Cai Lay primary school in the morning of March 30, 1974, "the only evidence was bullet holes on the walls" because "fragments caused by bullets and shells were immediately cleared under the supervision of the (Saigon) police after the explosion occurred."

WHY DOES SAIGON PROHIBIT THE PRESS?

According to Hoa Binh Daily (Peace), March 14, 1974, "Many reporters, having learned of the news, arrived at Cai Lay primary school when the heart-rending scene of death was still there, but they were banned from taking photos. They were bullied and threatened with film roll confiscation. And when they got permission to carry out their work, Thieu's agents had cleared away all evidence and there was nothing there to be photographed."

Dai Dan Toc (The Great People) March 13, 1974, wrote that a Pultizer winner photographer was threatened to be arrested by the Saigon police when he was about to take pictures of the massacre right after he heard the explosion. "He was told that unless he got permission from the Commander General of the 4th Region Nguyen Vinh Nghi, he could not take pictures."

On the same issue, Song Than, another daily newspaper in Saigon, March 17, 74, asked a series of questions, among those were "Why did the authorities in Cai Lay district and DinhTuong province cover up their war crimes committed at Cai Lay primary school? It must be due to the fact that they want to easily whitewash the responsibility they themselves must ebar. They have taken advantage of their power and their position to bully the press circuits from carrying out their work."

When the need to investigate the massacre was in high demand, the Saigon regime intentionally and hastily slandered the PRG with committing the act. This is not a unique case in which Saigon tries to cover up the truth by soundly condemning the other side.

Why should they prohibit the press from taking pictures right after the massacre if they did not commit the act? Why should they clear all evidence and cause a lot of trouble to the ICCS when the latter was investigating the case if Saigon was not the author of the cruelty?

This act only shows the true intention of the Saigon regime that is to use any means—even the death of innocent children—to fulfill its aim, to cover up the truth and to condemn the other side when proof has not yet been exposed.

However, the people in the area could not be fooled by the Saigon propaganda. On March 19, '74, at Cai Lay, Mrs. Vo Thi Nhuong, a villager, asked the young South Vietnamese soldier: "'Why does the South Vietnamese army—Saigon—shell my village? All the members of one family were killed the other day,' she challenged.

"'If the army keeps using artillery like that, innocent people will continue to be killed.'

"She fixed him with a defiant there-I've-said-it-look and the embarrassed soldier, blurted. 'I don't know if people suffer, well, that's war.'" (Washington Post, Mar. 21).

Actions to Support the Political Prisoners

DEMONSTRATION AT BEN THANH MARKET

Saigon (AFP, UPI): A group of about four students demonstrated at Ben Thanh Market, Saigon at 9:15 am, March 16, 74. Two among the four students threw a Molotov cocktail and a bunch of leaflets at the west gate of the market. Then, they disappeared in the crowd. Others set a fire with black smoke and also threw a bunch of leaflets and disappeared immediately.

According to the CBS News, the content of the leaflet is as followed:

1. To demand the government of the Republic of Viet Nam to release immediately and unconditionally student Huynh Tan Mam and the third political force prisoners.
2. To demand the government of the Republic of VietNam to immediately stop all acts of terrorism against the 3rd political force.
3. The people and the youth, students and pupils determine to shatter the Saigon conspiracy to sabotage the Paris Agreement.

THE THIRD POLITICAL SEGMENT

The Committee to Demand and Receive Prisoners of the 3rd Political Segment was formed in Saigon, March 28, 74. The declaration, signed by 43 people, including professors, religious people, representatives, lawyers, journalists asserted that the "Third Political Segment is a political reality which has the right and the responsibility to contribute to the task of national reconciliation and concord," with a political stand and position "independent of the two South Vietnamese parties." Its work is for "peace and independence, for the right of national self determination and democratic liberty."

According to the declaration, facts have shown that a "large number of prisoners belonging to the 3rd political Segment" are still being detained by the Saigon regime. Regarding the release of the third political force prisoners to the PRG side by the Saigon regime, the declaration said that it is a "shame," a "useless shame because it brought no honor" to the Saigon regime. And "this coercion is also contrary to the spirit of national reconciliation and concord."

Among the signatures are the names of Mrs. Ngo Ba Thanh, Father Chan Tin, Mrs. Nguyen Long, Venerable Thich PhapLan, Representative Ho Ngoc Nhuan, Prof. Tuan Nham (just being released) . . .

THIRD FORCE DEMANDS THE RETURN OF POLITICAL PRISONERS

A group of the third political force composed mostly of Buddhist monks marched from An Quang pagoda to the Lower House on April 1, to demand the return to Saigon of the third political force prisoners who are temporarily staying in the liberated area of Loc Ninh.

A number of the delegates, headed by Mrs. Ngo Ba Thanh, presented their resolution to the Lower House.

Before starting the march, Venerable Thich Lieu Minh told the press that South Viet Nam "has not yet been free, because the foreigners are still present." The Venerable demanded that the U.S. government withdraw all its present advisors from South Viet Nam.

The demonstration was organized by the Buddhist Committee to Free Political Prisoners and the Committee to Demand the Release of the Third Political Force Prisoners. (AFP, April 1, 74)

The third political force prisoners should have been released to their hometown. Despite their request and the provision of the Paris Agreement, the Saigon administration released them to the PRG and labeled them pro-PRG, work in favor of Communists. In a statement to the ICCS, the third political force prisoners strongly re-affirmed that they are part of the third political force in South Viet Nam as granted by the Paris Agreement.

ASUC PROTESTS JAILING OF HUYNH TAN MAM

Associated Students of University of California Senate (ASUC) at Berkeley passed a resolution demanding the immediate and unconditional release of student Huynh Tan Mam and all political prisoners in South Viet Nam, on April 10, 74.

In the resolution, the ASUC Senate also demanded the Saigon administration to realize all democratic liberties of the South Vietnamese; the U.S. government to withdraw all military advisors in civilian clothes in South VN, to cut off all aid to the Saigon regime and to demand the full implementation of the Paris Agreement.

The school newspaper Daily Californian, editorial on April 12, acknowledges that American tax money continues to help build the prisons in South VN. "American dollars continue to subsidize the clandestine persecution of Mam and others like him in Saigon." The editorial called upon all who feel "responsible to do everything they can to bring an end to American aid to Saigon."

HuynhTam Mam, a 20-year old medical student, was arrested in 1970 for demanding Peace for Viet Nam. The Saigon administration promised to release him last month in Saigon where his family is. But afterward they brought him to Loc Ninh and then put him in solitary confinement. Nobody knows his, whereabout. The Saigon administration called him a "defector". From prison, he strongly denied the charge. Mam and other political prisoners are still on a hunger strike.

THE EUROPEAN CATHOLIC MOVEMENT FOR PEACE

On March 20, the European Catholic Movement for Peace raised their voices against the imprisonment of 300 Buddhists at Chi Hoa prison by the Saigon regime and demanded their immediate release.

THE CATHOLIC COUNCIL FOR PEACE

On March 11, the Catholic Council for Peace sent a telegram to the Association of Patriotic Catholic in South Viet Nam to express their support for the struggle of the Vietnamese people and to demand the Saigon regime to respect the Paris Agreement.

WORLD PEACE COUNCIL IN SUPPORT OF INDOCHINA

At its session held in Sofia from 16th to 19th Feb., 74 the World Peace Council passed a resolution demanding the U.S. government to stop its intervention in the Indochinese countries, to respect the fundamental rights of these peoples and to abide by the Vientiane Agreement and Protocol on Laos and the Paris Peace Agreement on Viet Nam.

The WPC also called upon all organizations and individuals from all strata in all societies to "give their support for the establishment of genuine peace in Indochina."

THE GENEVA DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE: FACTS AND IRREGULARITIES!

The International diplomatic Conference on the reaffirmation and development of international humanitarian laws, reported *New York Times* on March 30th, "convened by Switzerland to modernize the rules of war completed the two sessions this week with the US delegation expressing regret that little progress has been achieved." The conference, which lasted nearly six weeks starting from Feb. 20th, 74, was attended by 125 nations.

Based on the simple facts that laws—either national or international—are all originated from the evolution of human society. In order to place laws at the same pace with history, the old laws have to be reformed or changed and new laws have to be initiated. Therefore, the International Red Cross convened the International Diplomatic Conference in Geneva to develop the 1949 Geneva Conventions. These conventions dealt with the treatment of the war wounded, the sick, war prisoners and the participation of the civilian population in war time. Until 1974, there are 135 governments adhering to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, among them are the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (1957) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (1973).

The 1974 conference began slowly because of time spent to debate the participation of the PRG and of African liberation movements, including Guinea-Bissau. Guinea-Bissau was admitted with full voting rights, while other liberation movements were accorded observer status.

The PRG was rejected by one vote margin, on February 28, 74 with 38 against 37 and 33 abstained or blank votes.

According to *Le Journal* (Geneva), March 1st, 74, here and there in the hall, it was visible that many delegates laid down in order to be considered absent. And it is known that during these days, Washington had pressured many delegations.

On March 2, the Foreign Ministry of the PRG issued a statement on Geneva Conference which says: "As they are afraid of being exposed and condemned at the said diplomatic conference", the US government "had resorted to all ways and means to prevent the voice of just cause and justice of the PRG RSVN, the most eloquent witness of their crimes . . . for example, to delay the work of the conference, to threaten and make pressure on other countries."

And the reasons the PRG gave for its "normal and desirable" participation are:

1. The US government has led an atrocious war in South Vietnam, where all modernest weapons are used against human being. It is still pursuing policy of intervention. This poses many new problems to be solved by international humanitarian laws, and the PRG is a victim of this war.

2. The PRG is recognized by the Paris Peace Agreement as one of the two governments in South Vietnam. If Saigon is invited, so must be the PRG.

3. International Humanitarian Law is a problem of common interest for peoples all over the world, and closely relating to life and conscience of mankind.

The DRV did not attend the conference in protest of the actions against the PRG. However, the DRV and the PRG suggested the amendments of the Geneva Conventions which were greatly supported since they both are qualified in contributing experiences gained during the war in Vietnam.

The US government created the Saigon's Republic of Vietnam, led a war of aggression against South Vietnam and a war of destruction against North Vietnam. Therefore, these wars have special aspects which pose different problems in terms of humanitarian international law—for example, the use of the latest means of destructions by the imperialist countries, the protection of civilians and soldiers . . .

It was to this effect that the US government could not lead the conference to another direction, far from solving the present humanitarian laws.

ELECTIONS IN WHAT CONDITIONS?

At the January 18, 1974 Consultative Conference in Paris between the Saigon administration and the Provisional Revolutionary Government to settle the internal affairs of South Viet Nam, Vice Premier Nguyen Luu Vien, head of the Saigon delegation, presented a new proposal demanding that the general elections for the entire South Vietnamese people be held on July 20, 1974.

The Saigon administration has repeatedly made a lot of noise about general elections lately; "Let us vote," they say, "and the sooner the better—in four months' time! What's the point of seeking to bring about an effective ceasefire at all costs, setting prisoners free, allowing people free movement and letting this third force surface? Let people vote first. Isn't the ballot democracy's sacred symbol? Once elections are held, there will be peace forever!"

To reinforce the idea, President Nguyen Van Thieu reportedly declared: "Let the communists make it clear on which day they want elections to take place, then there will immediately be the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord and as many democratic freedoms as they like . . ."

In fact, in the Saigon 6 chapter-proposal for the preliminary agreements between the two South Vietnamese parties, there are provisions which say:

"The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord mentioned in article 12 of the January 27, 1974 Paris Agreement consists of three equal segments. Each South Vietnamese party shall decide its own segment. The third segment will be a compromise of the two parties."

The National Council "has to complete the regulations deciding the procedures and modalities of the general elections provided in articles 9c and 12c of the Paris Agreement no later than 30 days after its formation . . ."

At first glance, Saigon seems to be very eager and serious about the general elections in South Viet Nam; however, if we look more closely into the matter, their actions prove the contrary.

One day after its proposition, on January 19, 1974, a Special Joint Session of the Saigon National Assembly was set up to amend the Saigon Constitution. The amendments allow Thieu to run for a third term in 1975 which is extended from four to five years, and to take control of the Supreme Court.

Let us see how the Saigon Proposal for elections compares with the Paris Agreement.

The Paris Agreement writes:

"The South Vietnamese people shall decide themselves the political future of South Viet Nam through genuinely free and democratic general elections under international supervision." (Article 9b) and

"The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord shall have the task of promoting the two South Vietnamese parties' implementation of this Agreement, achievment of national reconciliation and concord and insurance of democratic liberties. The National Council of Reconciliation and Concord will organize the free and democratic general elections provided for in article 9b and decide the procedures and modalities of these general elections. The institutions for which the general elections are to be held will be agreed upon through consultations between the two South Vietnamese parties . . ."

First of all, article 9b states very clearly the nature of the general elections, which is free and democratic—as a rational and realistic requirement for any type of elections. And as we have discussed article 11 in the last issue—Newsletter no. 7, all democratic liberties for the South Vietnamese people are to be realized unconditionally and immediately after the ceasefire. Not only that the ceasefire has not been observed by the Saigon administration, not only that the 200,000 political prisoners have not been released by the Saigon administration, but the personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of political organization, freedom of residence, freedom of movement . . . have not been realized in the Saigon zone of control.

Instead, the Thieu administration is considering the democratic liberties as an exchanging condition for an agreement on election with the PRG.

Without a complete observation of the ceasefire, the normal life of the people cannot be restored; without the realization of the democratic liberties, there can never be a true representative voice of the people expressed and heard; in such conditions, then, the organizations of general elections are just another cheating game.

Secondly, the Saigon administration intentionally plays down the role and functions of the National Council. Its most important functions such as "promoting" the implementation of the agreement, the "achievement" of the national reconciliation and concord and the "insurance" of democratic liberties have been totally erased. Moreover, according to the Saigon proposal, the National Council does not organize the general elections, but only "controls them," "decides the procedures and modalities of these elections." Therefore the important organization designed to settle the internal affairs of South Viet Nam is reduced to a simple election committee.

Thirdly, the role of the third political force is totally denied by the Saigon administration. This force, according to the Saigon proposal, is simply chosen by a compromise between Saigon and the P.R.G.; despite the fact that the leaders of the third political force and the P.R.G., demand the full recognition of this force. In June, 1973, the PRG presented a proposal for the settlement of the Vietnamese internal affair, in which the P.R.G. said:

"The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord will have three equal components placed on an equal footing. Each South Vietnamese will designate the members of its own components to the Council. The third component will be composed of persons belonging to the political and religious tendencies who do not side with any party and who approve the Paris Agreement. The designation of the third component must be made in such a way as to ensure that these political voices be heard, that this component be really representative and play an independent and equal role within the Council."

Fourthly, in very vague wordings, the Saigon administration has expressed its aim to eliminate the vital voices of the majority of the population of South Viet Nam to organize the general elections under the Saigon control and regime. Furthermore it wants to abolish all provisions of the Paris Peace Agreement, and continue to maintain dictatorial rule. Elections and re-elections repeatedly took place under the Saigon regime, from the Ngo Dinh Diem administration to the Thieu administration, where free voting was just a hoax, where all opponents were intimidated, jailed, maimed, liquidated, or banned from elections by fascist laws and decrees.

It is not a coincidence that the Paris Agreement puts the observation of the ceasefire, the realization of the democratic liberties, and the release of all political prisoners and civilian personnel before the formation of the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, to be followed by free and democratic general elections.

Only under these conditions can the general elections be held in which the representation of the South Vietnamese people's wishes and aspirations will be accurate, and which will fully express the true meaning of self-determination.

Huynh Tan Mam Does Not 'Defect'!

Included in the recent civilian prisoner exchange between the PRG and Saigon from Feb. 8 to March 6 in Loc Ninh was Huynh Tan Mam, who was supposed to be released on Feb. 21. Mam protested to the ICCS that he wanted to be freed in Saigon where his family and school are. Mam was brought back to Saigon.

After taking Mam back to a place at confinement on Feb. 22, General Pham Hoa Hiep, head of the Saigon delegation to the Joint Military Commission, told the press that Mam "had rallied to the National [Saigon] cause" and that currently Mam is being processed through a "returnee center." This distortion was picked up by the U.S. press. The Los Angeles Times issued on Feb. 22 described Mam as "defector."

What is the truth?

In a letter dated Feb. 25, 74, smuggled out of prison, Mam has this to say:

". . . At Loc Ninh, in front the ICCS and the JMC, I demanded to be released in Saigon. Representatives of the [Saigon delegation to the] JMC agreed to free me in Saigon without going through any procedure. However, when getting to Saigon, I was kept in a dark room, isolated, prohibited from receiving visitors and was told to wait for orders. I warn you for their action against me. I urge you to contact the outside to intervene for me. The government [Saigon] press printed a completely distorted story when it said that I 'defected'."

Mam is on a hunger strike

Since Feb. 22, 74, Mam has been on a hunger strike to demand that the Saigon administration stick to its words in Loc Ninh—that it unconditionally release Mam in Saigon. His health has been declining and is approaching the critical stage. Still Saigon keeps him in isolation. On Feb. 27, a delegation from the People's Committee Demanding the Implementation of the Paris Agreement including Father Chan Tin, Deputy Ho Ngoc Nhuan, Mrs. Ngo Ba Thanh . . . went to Chi Hoa prison, trying to determine his whereabouts. But they were unsuccessful. The next day, Mam's mother tried in vain to find her son.

Who is Huynh Tan Mam?

A 29-year-old medical student at Saigon University, Mam has been active in student organizations and in the peace movement in Saigon. Mam is one of the popular figures among students in South Viet Nam. In his eight years of activity in the student movement, Mam was the President of Viet Nam Student Union and Saigon Student Union. In 1966, Mam was arrested for the first time for participating in the movement demanding peace and an end to Buddhist repression. Since then he has been arrested five times for activities against the regime of Nguyen Van Thieu. In 1971, he led the protest against Thieu's one-man-presidential election. Also in 1971, Mam signed a People's Treaty with the delegation from the National Student Association—an organization which represents student bodies from throughout the US—and delegation of other countries. The Treaty calls for the withdrawal of US troops, the return of all prisoners and asserts the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination. On Jan. 5, 72, Mam was arrested again, and is still being detained. Many times, in prison, Mam was tortured and was pressured to sign a "confession" admitting "adherence to the communist organization" (so that he could be prosecuted). However, all attempts by Saigon police to force Mam to sign this false statement failed.

Why does Saigon want to release Mam to the PRG?

The Paris Agreement recognizes the third political force, of which Mam is a member, as one of the three equal political segments in South Viet Nam which struggles for Peace, the implementation of the Paris Agreement, for the release of all political prisoners, the achievements of democratic liberties and national concord. Members of this third political force oppose all kinds of US intervention in the internal affairs of South Viet Nam, and the Saigon regime.

The third political force was born and grown up by the indescribable destruction of the country by the US war of genocide and ecocide and the unprecedented facism of the Saigon administration. They do not side with any South Vietnamese party, that is the fact.

Therefore, in a systematic attempt to return the third force political prisoners to the PRG, to brand them "communists" or "common criminals", the Saigon administration is in fact destroying politically and in the world public opinion the ipsofacto existence of the third political force—thereby, denies that Saigon is a dictatorial, unpopular, and undemocratic regime.

How does public opinion react to this?

A statement dated Feb. 26, 74, signed by 21 students and intellectuals in Chi Hoa prison and another statement dated March 10, 74, signed by 20 students and intellectuals in Loc Ninh exposed Mam's case. They affirm the existence of the third force of which they are members. They demand that their release and the immediate and unconditional release of Mam take place in Saigon. Many other individuals and groups have raised their voice specifically for the release of Mam. It is worth noticing here that the release of Mrs. Ngo Ba Thanh last year was due to the strong pressure from the people in South Viet Nam as well as in the world. Public opinion now should be alerted about Mam's case. The Saigon administration must release immediately and without any condition Huynh Tan Mam and all other political prisoners.

News From Vietnam Brief

Lawyer Nguyen Long asks the PRG for political asylum

Lawyer Nguyen Long, 65, an attorney in Saigon Higher Court, is also a member of the Third Force being returned to the PRG in the previously mentioned civilian prisoner exchange rather than in Saigon as was his wish. Long has been the leader of many peace organizations, and was the defense attorney for many students and peace activists including Mrs. Ngo Ba Thanh. He was arrested on July 27, 72.

In a letter to the ICCS, Long wrote:

". . . I was imprisoned because my political standpoint is the opposite of the [Saigon] administration's. I demand the people's right to self-determination and peace while the administration continues to let the U.S. direct its policies and continue the war.

"My aspiration is the full implementation of the Paris Agreement and its protocol concerning the release of civilian prisoners . . . and my immediate release so that I can be reunited with my family in Saigon and continue to make a living by practicing law in my office in Saigon.

"However, experience has shown clearly that the authorities of the Republic of Viet Nam [Saigon] has arrested and detained me at any time, without any charge. Moreover, it could put me away so nobody would know my whereabouts. A concrete proof is the case of the student Huynh tan Mam . . .

"Therefore, . . . I request political asylum in the areas controlled by the PRG and, according to the Paris Agreement and its protocols, the safety of my return to Saigon should be guaranteed at any time . . ."

GENERAL MINH ISSUES OPEN LETTER

(Dien Tin Newspaper, Mar. 10, 1974)

In an open letter dated Sept. 4, 1973, general Minh called on the responsible authorities of the two South Vietnamese parties to:

"—Solve the issue of returning prisoners, belonging to the two sides on a priority basis;

"—Release immediately and unconditionally the prisoners belonging to neither side at any places they want;

"—Humanely treat all the prisoners mentioned above and allow their relatives to visit and care for them, and so forth.

Recently, there have been official [Saigon] voices confirming that there is no third segment, even though the Paris Agreement which you [Saigon] signed explicitly recognizes this segment, whose members include the prisoners mentioned above."

General Minh is a member of the third force in South Vietnam.

340 MONKS ARE ON A HUNGER STRIKE

340 imprisoned monks of different religions: Buddhist, Cao Dai, Hao Hao, Dao Dua, Buu Son Ky Huong, are on a hunger strike on indefinite length inside Chi Hoa prison to demand their freedom. They are detained for refusing to be forced into the Saigon army (letter to the ICCS dated Feb. 20, 1974).

Though it is one year after the Paris Agreement, Saigon is still conscripting young men into its army to be used in Thieu's war plans. Even religious conscientious objectors share the same fate. This again shows that Thieu has no intention to restore peace in Viet Nam.

ECOCIDE IN VIET NAM

A recent report by a Committee of Scientists from different countries on the impact of US defoliants on Viet Nam revealed that herbicides caused "serious and extensive damage" to the inland tropical forests and destroyed 36% of the mangrove forests along the coast (*New York Times*, Feb. 23, 74). "Under present conditions of use and natural regrowth, it may take well over 100 years for the mangrove to be reforested" (*Washington Post*, Feb. 23, 74). In the past, many studies revealed that defoliants can cause liver damage, genetic changes and cancer. According to the new study, herbicides "apparently caused death among montagnard children". Affected victims would show symtoms such as abdominal pains, intense coughing . . . , adults recovered, but after some attacks children died. In one village, witnesses told Dr. Hickey 38 children died. It is worse in the mountains since mothers carry their babies on their backs when going to the fields—where the defoliant was sprayed. The committee's report will be submitted to the US Congress.

SUPPLEMENT: 6-POINT PROPOSAL OF THE PRG

In response to that overwhelming aspiration of all strata of our people,

In conformity with the spirit and letter of the Paris Agreement on Viet Nam and the June 13, 1973 Joint communique,

On the basis of the six-point proposal made on April 25, 1973 and further clarified on June 28, 1973,

The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam solemnly makes the following declaration on the achievement of peace and national concord in South Viet Nam.

1. AN IMMEDIATE END TO THE SHOOTING AND A STRICT CEASEFIRE THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIET NAM

To immediately stop the shooting and to implement a strict ceasefire throughout South Viet Nam is the legitimate demand and the most earnest aspiration of all strata of the South Vietnamese people.

Over the past year, the high commands of the two South Vietnamese parties had on two occasions issued ceasefire orders, but so far the guns have not been silenced, and, as a result, no basic problem concerning the internal affairs of South Viet Nam has been solved. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam firmly demands that the Saigon administration immediately observe a strict ceasefire throughout South Viet Nam.

The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam proposes as follows:

The Government of each of the two South Vietnamese parties will immediately issue an appeal to ceasefire in the same terms, reaffirming its commitment to observe the ceasefire and to preserve peace in South Viet Nam, to settle matters of contention through negotiations, and to avoid all armed conflict as provided for by Article 10 of the Paris Agreement and calling on all levels of Government, all units of the armed forces and the police under control to strictly respect the ceasefire and to preserve peace.

The High Command of each of the two South Vietnamese parties will issue orders of ceasefire in the terms to all regular and irregular armed forces and the armed police under its authority to completely end hostilities all over South Viet Nam at an agreed date and time and to scrupulously implement the ceasefire provision mentioned in the Paris Agreement, the Protocol concerning the ceasefire and the Joint Military Commissions and the June 13, 1973 Joint communique.

The two South Vietnamese parties will make public, in time and widely, through the radio, newspaper news agencies, and other information media, the full texts of the abovementioned appeals and orders of ceasefire.

The two South Vietnamese parties will intimate to the International Commission for Control and Supervision the agreement on the ceasefire and give the Commission all necessary assistance and cooperation so that it may effectively carry out its tasks of controlling and supervising the observance of the ceasefire.

The two parties, through joint or separate actions, will so inform the signatories of the Act of the International Conference on Viet Nam and the United Nations Secretary General of the above-mentioned ceasefire agreement.

2. RETURN ALL CAPTURED AND DETAINED VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL

Over two hundred thousand civilian personnel comprising personnel of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and people belonging to the third political force, and more than fifteen thousand military personnel of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam captured before January 28, 1973, are still being detained and subjected to barbarous treatment in the prisons of the Saigon administration.

In conformity with Article 8 of the Agreement and Paragraph 8 of the June 13, 1973 Joint Communique, the Saigon administration must carry out without delay the return of all detained Vietnamese civilian and military personnel, return all members of political forces siding with neither party, ensure their safety, and allow them to return freely to their families and organizations in areas under the control of whichever party they choose.

The two parties will return to each other all military and civilian personnel captured and detained after January 28, 1973.

The return of all captured and detained civilian and military personnel must be completed within three months, and not later than June 30, 1974.

In accordance with Article 8 of the Protocol on the return of captured personnel, the Saigon administration will immediately stop all tortures, murder, and inhuman treatment of persons still under detention, and improve its present extremely cruel prison regime. It must allow national Red Cross societies agreed upon by the two parties to visit all places of detention and immediately give its concurrence to inspections of those places.

3. FULL DEMOCRATIC LIBERTIES TO RE ENSURED IMMEDIATELY TO THE PEOPLE

In the areas under the Saigon administration's control, all strata of people live under a repressive regime which stiffles all democratic liberties.

The Saigon administration must immediately do away with the concentration camps, put an end to all forms of coercion or forced residence, and abrogate all anti-democratic laws and war-time measures, which are at variance with the letter and spirit of the Agreement.

Pursuant to Article 11 of the Agreement and Paragraph 9 of the Joint Communique, the two South Vietnamese parties will:

—Achieve national reconciliation and concord, end hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisals and discrimination against individuals or organizations that have collaborated with one side or the other.

—Ensure the democratic liberties of the people: personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of meeting, freedom of organization, freedom of political activities, freedom of belief, freedom of movement, freedom of residence, freedom of work, right to property ownership, and right to free enterprise.

Only by achieving national reconciliation and concord and fully ensuring the people's democratic liberties, will it be possible to establish rapidly the national council for national reconciliation and concord and ensure its effective functioning, to hold truly free and democratic general elections and to allow all citizens, all political and religious tendencies, and social organizations . . . in South Viet Nam to devote, in a true spirit of national reconciliation and concord, all their strength and energies to the peaceful reconstruction of the country.

4. PROMPT ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD

All the successive administrations in Saigon have so far been fabricated by the United States, these administrations are characterized by their dictatorial, warlike and fascist policies, their independence on the United States and their actions which run counter to the supreme interest of the nation's interests and the legitimate aspirations of the people's. Under the Paris Agreement on Viet Nam, the United States has undertaken to respect the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, not to

impose any existence of two administrations, two armies, two zones of control, and three political forces in South Viet Nam. The third political force, including organizations and persons of all political and religious tendencies, now in South Viet Nam or abroad, who do not side with either party and who stand for the Agreement, is an existing entity which exists and is constantly growing. Over the past year the Saigon administration has left no stone unturned in its attempts to negate the existence of the third political force and to increase coercion and repression against it. The Saigon administration has not only continued to detain many persons, but has also made fresh arrests of many of the third-force people. Yet, the third political force has remained active and has contributed to the struggle of the entire people for peace, independence, democracy, national reconciliation and concord. This force must have its proper place in the political life of South Viet Nam at present and in the future.

The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam proposes that the national council of national reconciliation and concord comprising three equal segments be promptly set up, no later than three months after the aforesaid appeals and orders for the ceasefire come into effect.

Each South Vietnamese party will designate the representatives of its segment in the council. The representatives of the third segment will be appointed on the principle that this force has its voices and its independent and equal position in the council. In keeping with this principle, the two South Vietnamese parties will issue joint or separate statements in the same terms expressing their willingness to enter into consultations with the organizations or personalities of the third political force, in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, equality and mutual respect, with a view to speeding up the establishment of the council as soon as it is set up, the national council of national reconciliation and concord will concentrate all its efforts in the task of promoting the two South Vietnamese parties' implementation of the Agreement, achieving national reconciliation and concord, guaranteeing democratic liberties, organizing general elections and working out the modalities and procedures of the general and local elections, in accordance with Article 12(b) of the Agreement.

5. THE ORGANIZATION OF TRULY FREE AND DEMOCRATIC GENERAL ELECTIONS

All elections held so far under the Saigon regime have been stage managed by the United States. They have been farcical, fraudulent, elections, "one-man" comedies, having no value at all. Under the Paris Agreement on Viet Nam, the South Vietnamese people will determine the political future of South Viet Nam through truly free and democratic general elections under the international supervision.

Truly free and democratic general elections can be held only in a context of peace, national reconciliation and concord, when the people are guaranteed the exercise of democratic liberties. The date of general elections will be decided by the national council of national reconciliation and concord. For its part, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam proposes that the general elections be held not later than one year after the establishment of the council.

In the general elections, the South Vietnamese will elect a constituent assembly, which will work out a constitution meeting the people's aspirations, with a view to the formation of the government of South Viet Nam.

6. SETTLEMENT OF THE QUESTION OF ARMED FORCES

To serve the U.S. neo-colonialist desire and its own selfish interests, the Saigon administration has been using its armed forces in its violation of the Agreement and its sabotage of peace. It has made every effort to pressgang the youth and to push them into the path of crimes against the people whereas the majority of Saigon troops desire peace and want to return to their homes and earn their living.

The Saigon administration must give up this warlike policy and ensure that its armed forces correctly implement the Agreement, observe the ceasefire and put an end to all offences against the people's lives and property.

Under the Agreement, the two South Vietnamese parties will solve the question of armed forces in a spirit of national reconcilitation and concord, equality and mutual respect, without foreign interference, and in accordance with the post-war situation. They will agree upon the appropriate reduction of military effectives and the demobilization of the troops being reduced so as to lessen the cost to the people and to devote human and material resources to the peaceful reconstruction of the country.

After the general elections and the formation of the government, a unified army will be built up in South Viet Nam for the defense of peace, independence and sovereignty of South Viet Nam, and for the sake of the people's interests.

In order to allow the South Vietnamese people to achieve peace and national concord, the United States must put a complete end to its military involvement and its intervention in the internal affairs of South Viet Nam, stop using the Saigon administration as an instrument to impose neo-colonialism on South Viet Nam and to perpetuate the partition of Viet Nam. For its part, the Saigon administration must abandon the path of war, violation of the Agreement and sabotage of peace. It must seriously respond to the above stated constructive proposals put forward by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam. If the United States and the Saigon administration persist in violating the Agreement and sabotaging peace, they must bear full responsibility for the consequences of their actions . . . South Viet Nam March 22, 1974.

PATH TO RECONCILIATION

Democratic liberties must be restored by the Thieu regime so that potential "third force" people can come forward and operate freely. Only then will the creation of the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord be possible.

Article 12 of the Paris Agreements stipulates that a "National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord" will be created which will consist of "three equal segments." This Council "shall have the task of promoting the implementation of this Agreement by the two South Vietnamese parties, achieving national reconciliation and concord, and ensuring democratic liberties. The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord will also decide the procedures and modalities of such local elections as the two South Vietnamese parties agree upon."

The article cited above recognizes three political forces which are supposed to have equal representation in the Council. It is clear to everyone what two of these three political forces, or segments, are. However, few really understand what the third segment, or "third force", is. Some veteran Vietnam-watchers have called the "third force" "neutralists" or "non-aligned representatives" selected by both Saigon and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG). But by definition, this is a contradiction in terms. For how can people selected by Saigon and the PRG be neutralists or non-aligned representatives? If these neutralists were chosen in this manner, the possibility of national reconciliation and concord as envisioned by the Paris Agreements would never come about. For as long as President Thieu is in control of the Saigon government, he will see to it that no compromise with the "Communists" on any issue will be possible. And the creation of a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord composed of the PRG, the Saigon regime, and the "neutralists" chosen by the two former parties would thus necessarily, by Thieu's definition, include only the representatives of the two antagonistic forces. In a July 9, 1973 interview granted exclusively to *Dan Chu*, the official organ of Thieu's recently organized Democratic Party, Thieu said as much. In the July 15, 1973 issue of *Viet-Nam Report*, an English-language publication of the Vietnam Council on Foreign Relations,* Thieu stated:

". . . we have proposed a solution to do away with the third force. We have essentially told the Communists that (since that third segment has failed to materialize) the matter might be solved with the two South Vietnamese sides suggesting each one half of that segment."

There is no need to go into detail here as to why "that third segment failed to materialize" as General Thieu claimed. In its declaration issued in Saigon on August 2, 1973, the Movement of Young People and High School and University Students for the Right to Life for the People, strongly condemned the Thieu regime for having PRG in order to liquidate them. The background and conditions of the 200,000 political prisoners in Thieu's jails, documented in detail elsewhere, upholds this fact.

What should be stressed here is that if the National Council is to function properly as called for by the Agreements, the third segment has to be truly independent. Only this would help make the Council authoritative enough to bring both the PRG and the Thieu regime to implement the agreements. Otherwise, the members of the Council would be equally split, with each half under the direction of the two respective parties, and each representing the position of its own side. Such a situation would create stagnation and frustration and would eventually lead to the resumption of full-scale hostilities. If this were to occur, not only would it be impossible to achieve national reconcilitation and concord, but it would also be difficult to carry out the task of rebuilding the country, especially the devastated areas of the countryside. Thieu knows this full well, but he also knows that the United States is still supplying 80 percent of the income of his regime and he wants to maintain his flow of support by maintaining a state of war. This is an easier task than to have to go to the Vietnamese people for support and to rely on them for survival.

The PRG, on the other hand, does not rely on massive foreign assistance but on popular support for its survival and success and therefore it is in its interest to see to it that the population is saved from further destruction, suffering and death, and that national reconciliation is achieved as soon as possible. Also, since they are going to inherit the country along with others, the less destroyed it is, the better it will be for them in the future. PRG leaders are fond of citing a Vietnamese proverb: "If you hurl rocks at the rats, you will destroy the antique vases in your home." It is because of these considerations that the PRG has reiterated demands for the creation of the Council as soon as possible, stressing that the third component should be strictly equal and independent in relation to the other two parties.

To ensure that the third component be truly independent, democratic freedoms have to be restored to create conditions favorable for people to form this segment and to come forward and operate freely. The PRG's pro-

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*A semi-official organization composed of high Saigon officials and their American friends.

posal on these two points was first detailed by Minister Nguyen Van Hieu at the La Celle-St. Cloud Conference on June 28, 1973. [An unofficial translation of the PRG proposal on these points is provided at the end of this article.]

The Thieu regime, however, has consistently and adamantly rejected such implementations of the accords. For example, in the interview translated in the *Viet-Nam Report* already quoted, Thieu said that the PRG "has been trying to take advantage of the Paris agreements by turning the Reconciliation Council into super coalition-government. They have also been trying to take advantage of the democratic liberties mentioned in the Paris accords to subvert our society from within." Later, on August 6, 1973, in a speech to the self-Defense Forces on the commemoration of their creation, Thieu ordered all of his forces and cadres to "be resolute in chopping up all the tricky Communists," to "chop, chop, chop," because the Communists are demanding negotiations, democratic freedoms, freedom of the press, and freedom of speech in order to propagandize Communist ideology among the ranks [of the government] of the Republic of Vietnam.

But as pointed out by Deputy Ho Ngoc Nhuan, a Catholic leader in the Saigon Lower House, in a study entitled "Violations of the Peace Agreements" [made public on November 1, 1973]—

The thing that must be clearly emphasized here is that whatever the other side has demanded and President Thieu has rejected, are precisely the things that the population of South Vietnam has also demanded. Especially during the last 10 years of Mr. Thieu's rule, the people of South Vietnam have continually struggled for their democratic freedoms. These are inalienable rights that guns and bullets cannot suppress.

Given this fact, it is difficult to see how Thieu's adamant position won't generate strong reactions which would in turn would produce grave consequences. Nevertheless, as quoted by Deputy Nhuan in the above study, General Thieu has ordered his troops to chop to pieces "any person who dares to speak in the Communist language."

It is clear that in order to ensure a peaceful solution to the political problems in South Vietnam as spelled out in the agreements, it is absolutely necessary that the United States stop providing the Thieu regime with the means of carrying out repression against existing and potential third force elements. The United States, as a signatory and a guarantor of the agreements, should also stop encouraging the Thieu regime on its bellicose path by continuing to send into South Vietnam military advisors and illegal arms supplies in clear violation of the terms of the agreements.

BUDDHISTS AND THE THIRD FORCE

A related question to "what is the third force" is "who is the third force?" Many people consider the third force to be synonymous with the Buddhist Church in South Vietnam. They go on to identify the third force with the Buddhist hierarchy. While it is not possible to give a definite answer to the question of who the third force is for the simple reason that Thieu's barbaric repression has kept most neutralists in the background, the next article will briefly trace historical and political developments in recent years in the attempt to suggest who the third force might be. In this article, and through the documents presented in this newsletter, we will attempt to explain the mistaken impression that the third force is the Buddhist Church or the Buddhist hierarchy.

Perhaps the identification of the Buddhist Church with the third force in South Vietnam was formed when Buddhist monks and leaders led the demonstrations against the Diem regime in 1963. After that date, however, the United States government and the Saigon regimes supported by it, forcefully and skillfully applied the "carrot and the stick" tactics and eventually created severe cleavages in the Buddhist hierarchy and between the majority of the hierarchy and the masses of Buddhist believers. In the words of Thai Phien, a Saigon columnist, as printed in the December 17, 1971 issue of Dan Chu Moi, an influential Buddhist daily—

The Viet Nam Quoc Tu Buddhist Church has been propped up by the government and the Americans from behind and therefor has taken the wrong road, has rendered itself useless, has become degraded and corrupt, and its members claw at each other for personal gain.

The An Quang Church, precisely because its constitution was taken away and because the regime and the Americans hated it, survived and remained strong for a while. . . .

However, just like every other religious organization that enters the real world in these troubled times, these times of much temptation, the leadership of this truly Buddhist organization has become corrupted and imbued with worldliness.

The young and the old leaders in the many Buddhist dioceses and establishments are competing for luxuries and fighting for authority much in the same way that it is being done over at the Catholic Church. All the mistakes and abuses of religious power committed by the Catholic Church are now being repeated by the Buddhist leadership in many areas. Political and economic interests have created severe cleavages between the leadership in the central organization and those in the local dioceses. Many still look toward the Church with hope, but severe dissension has torn the ranks of the informed Buddhists.

The regime, other opposing religious and political organizations and especially the United States, have not let the opportunity of subverting the Church slip by.

The wicked plans of the Americans and the furtive hope of the regime is to cause the city inhabitants to lose hope in a last nationalist force that still remains in the cities and towns.

The cleavages between the Buddhist leadership and their followers became especially severe during and after the National Buddhist Convention in 1971. During this convention the Buddhist Student Association in Saigon was disbanded by the Church leadership for having "served outside political organizations and exerted political pressure at the convention on its first day of meeting." After getting rid of the opposition, the entire corrupt Central Steering Committee of the Church which had come under strong criticism from many Buddhists, had itself re-elected (Dan Chu Moi, December 23, 1971). Henceforth, students and young people were banned from the convention. The Buddhist Student Center in Saigon was closed down. And in spite of statements from the four Buddhist Student Associations in Hue, Saigon, Van Hanh and Can Tho Universities pleading with the Church to allow them to carry on their activities as usual and to call for a national referendum of Buddhist students, Venerable Thich Thien Minh, the Commissar of Youth, held firmly to his decision (Dan Chu Moi, January 17, 1972). Then on December 22, the Deputy Director of Student Activities at the Buddhist University of Van Hanh called the police in to attack the Student Center there in the middle of the night. Leaflets and posters were pasted all over the university saying that the Student Union was nourished by the Communists and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency" (Dan Chu Moi, January 24–25, 1972). An active duty soldier serving at the Presidential Palace was subsequently appointed director of Buddhist Student Affairs, a post with power over all the Buddhist Student Associations in South Vietnam. Members of the Secret Police were installed as presidents of the DaLat, Can Tho and Hue Buddhist Student Associations; and the Venerable Thich Thien Minh also collaborated with the Americans and the Saigon regime in the search and arrest of members of the Buddhist Student Association in Saigon (see Thoi Bao Ga, No. 25, June, 1972 for details).

By 1970, the attitude of the An Quang Church had caused much dissension within the Church itself. This can be seen in the reaction of the young people who gathered in DaLat from December 26 to December 29, 1970, for the Fourth National Congress of Buddhist Students in South Vietnam. The following excerpt was printed in the special New Year's edition of Tin Tuong (Faith), a magazine published by the DaLat Buddhist Student Association:

"EXCERPT FROM A REPORT ABOUT THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF BUDDHIST STUDENTS

"What has the Buddhist Church done over the past several years to help the Buddhist Student Association? Not only has it failed to encourage and help the Buddhist students, but it has hindered the students in many of their righteous activities. The Church has not come to the students in understanding, compassion, and enlightenment. Those Superiors who bear responsibilities towards the students have been very aloof and conservative. Many Superiors show that they are more hot-tempered and rash than the students themselves. They say things without thinking them over first and behave in a most irresponsible and careless way—at the Fourth Congress, for example. This has made many Buddhist students extremely uneasy. Many monks who graduated from foreign universities could not resist being haughty and aloof. Buddhist Superiors cannot lead the Buddhist Students Associations located abroad. For example, the Joint Overseas Buddhist Student Association has refused to accept the Venerable Thich Nhat Hanh as the representative of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam."

The cleavages within the Buddhist Church, a result of manipulation by the U.S.-backed Thieu regime, became most critical during the Fifth National Buddhist Congress held in Saigon in December, 1973. Uniformed police surrounded the An Quang Pagoda and plain-clothes police milled around in the crowd. Inside the pagoda, hundreds of secret police, calling themselves "New Monks", occupied the pagodas, searched all the believers who came into the meeting, and turned away many people. These "New Monks" are paid an extra bonus of 12,000 piasters each per month by the Venable Thien Minh himself. The Venerable Thien Minh and Huyen Quang, who are in control by the grace of the Thieu regime, went against the order of the Patriarch of the Church and insisted on maintaining themselves in their positions, along with another pro-Thieu superior named Tu Nhon.

They impounded all the Church funds, including the 150 million piasters that the Independent Swedish Church had given to Buddhist victims of the war. Venerable Huyen Quang himself, disregarding the agenda of the meeting and the intervention of the chairman of the convention, took over the platform to express his own opinion on the Paris Agreements. He said that the Paris Agreements did not contribute to peace in any way and that the Buddhist Church did not belong to any segments mentioned in the agreement. The chairman of the meeting, Venerable Duc Nhuan, had to disassociate himself from the speech, saying that it was designed to destroy the Paris Agreements and that it served to ignite the resumption of a full-scale war. However, in spite of oppo-

sition and public criticism, the three monks, aided by Thieu's police and money, carried out what many Buddhist superiors and newspapers in Saigon described as a "coup d'etat." Finally, scores of Buddhist superiors resigned from their posts in tears and hundreds of followers cried with them (*Dien Tin* and *Dai Dan Toc*, December 14, 1973).

The example of the Buddhist Church serves to point out the U.S.-Thieu tactics in regard to potential third force elements. This policy is carried out against other groups as well. At the present time many "private" American organizations such as the Asia Foundation and the Ford Foundation are most active in carrying out such divisive schemes. New American operatives have been sent to Vietnam. But what they and all those concerned with Vietnam must realize is that this kind of activity will only serve to create an explosive situation and will only compromise U.S. positions in the future. The Vietnamese people should at last be left completely to themselves as called for in the peace agreements. All aid to the Thieu regime should be cut off—if not immediately, then in stages—until the Thieu regime stops repressing elements that may form the third force and until the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord is created. After that, all foreign aid coming to South Vietnam ought to be channeled through this Council to guarantee fair treatment for all segments of South Vietnamese society. Until then, any aid to the Thieu regime on the part of the United States government clearly violates Article 4 of the agreements, which says that the United States will not "intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam", and Article 9 which guarantees the exercise of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination and states that foreign countries "shall not impose any political tendency or personality on the South Vietnamese people."

THE THIRD FORCE—HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT

A decade ago, South Vietnam's first U.S.-bucked regime was brought to an end by a junta of senior ARVN generals. At the time, the Ngo Dinh Diem regime's brutal repression of Buddhist elements and of youth and student groups, generated mounting opposition within governmental and military ranks, thus weakening its administrative structure in the countryside and accelerating the already obvious deterioration of its position vis-a-vis the NLF forces. As a result of this struggle against Diem, the Unified Buddhist Church, under the leadership of Venerable Tri Quang, and sympathetic students groups, became a significant influence in the coming to power and eventual undoing of success Saigon governments. As the Pentagon Papers later revealed, the Buddhists' success and rise was "facilitated" by the U.S. through the C.I.A.'s assistance to the generals in their coup execution. Despite the Buddhists' importance as a political force, Vulnerable Tri Quang and his followers were unable to prevent American maneuvers from changing ruling groups in Saigon which did not totally acquiesce to U.S. war efforts or to prevent the massive influx of American troops into Vietnam.

In early 1966, the Buddhists again threw their political strength into a confrontation with the Nguyen Cao Ky government in order to check its military rule and war policies. For the first time since 1963, U.S. officials then came out publicly against the Buddhists, expressing the fear that Buddhist antigovernment activities and demonstrations might bring about the disintegration of the Saigon regime and slowdown military efforts against the NLF (*New York Times*, April 9, 1966). In late May, 1966, the Buddhists' rise to national prominence and influence as a political force was bloodily buried under the avalanche of Premier Ky's marines in the Buddhist stronghold of Central Vietnam. Many Buddhist students went underground and later joined the NLF. Since then, the Unified Buddhist Church leadership has been unable to regain much of its political vitality.

BUDDHIST VISION ON A THIRD WAY

During these years, counties articles and remarks inside Vietnam and in the United States were written on an emerging "third force" led by the Buddhists. This group was perceived as more nationalistic and less anti-communist, that is, situated somewhere between the Diem regime's right-wing Catholic supporters and the NLF. Many Buddhists and students who actively participated in the 1963 struggle and in the 1966 struggle in Central Vietnam. spoke out for some type of neutralist political solution. It was the implied desire of these people to negotiate with the NLF although the Buddhist Church as a whole never officially advocated such a view. Buddhist leaders in those years tended to link their vision of the third force to a third way to end the war. Through their program for peace in South Vietnam, they hoped to rally the majority of the South Vietnamese. They could then negotiate with the NLF for a neutralist settlement from such a "legitimate" position that the political struggle would be free from armed conflict. They also believed that the U.S. would once again "facilitate" the replacement of Saigon's military junta with a civilian-dominated government more to their liking (National Security Staff Memorandum, No. 1. *Congressional Record*, May 10, 1972). Such a settlement in their eyes would permit the United States to withdraw without unleashing further destruction on South Vietnam and would spare Americans the humiliation of not having attained their objective of a pro-U.S. regime in South Vietnam.

CONDITIONS FOR THIRD COMPONENT

What is the third force? Foreign observers often refer to it without being able to define it, while others in peace groups associate it with the Buddhists. Why then does the January, 1973 Peace Agreement recognize this "third component" as playing an important role in the realization of the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord? Does the third component have real political strength?

To understand how the third component came into being, we must look first at the profound social and economic disruptions caused by the massive American occupation. The U.S. military with its logistical base has generated by its military and political activities more than 9 million refugees, several hundred thousand prostitutes, almost one million disabled civilians [since 1965], almost one million homeless orphans (*U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees*, Hearings, August 1 1973), and some 3.9 million unemployed Vietnamese (see *Thoi Bao Ga*, No. 41). Above all, this U.S. presence has installed in the eyes of most Vietnamese an artifical ruling group in Saigon whose total devotion to war policies, whose cruelty, corruption, and exploitation of the people are unmatched in modern Vietnamese history (see *Thoi Bao Ga*, Nos. 41, 42, and 43). These characteristics of the Saigon regime stand wholly against Vietnamese traditions and values, aspirations for national independence and desire for a human and just social order.

Striving for the economic survival of his regime [then threatened by the loss of revenue from the departure of U.S. troops under the Vietnamization program], Thieu launched on November 15, 1971, his new economic reform plan—a plan which amounted to a series of tax collection and extortion measures. He declared on that day: "We will do everything possible before we beg for foreign aid." (*New York Times*, November 15, 1971). Economic conditions had since steadily worsened for Vietnamese in urban areas and in particular in refugees camps (see *Thoi Bao Ga*, Nos. 38–43).

In cities among the regime's exploited social groups, one finds the disabled veteran who is totally disregarded by the regime after years of fighting against NLF forces. Such veterans are paid an occasional monthly pension of eleven dollars and no housing is provided (*New York Times*, September 8, 1971). These veterans began to demonstrate in late 1971 in front of Thieu's palace for their right to better living conditions and treatment. The regime reacted by deploying more than 1,000 shock troops to neutralize the veterans (*New York Times*, September 17, 1971). Veterans' leaders and organizers were jailed subsequent to General Thieu's successful one-man race on October 3, 1971. Veterans were joined by university and high school students who always bore the burden of the urban opposition in times of U.S. escalation of the war. Deeply affected by the sapping of Vietnamese culture and society around them as a result of U.S. intervention and Saigon policies, several student organizations [since 1963] along with intellectuals, Buddhists, Catholics, and even civil servants—often parents of politically active students—have engaged themselves in organized activities against the Thieu regime (see *Thoi Bao Ga*, No. 18, "The Urban Opposition," and No. 25, "New Wave of Terror"). This struggle extended itself to the 2 million Buddhists of Cambodian descent whom the regime tried to draft by force (*New York Times*, September 20, 1971), and in 1972 to other religious groups like the Cao Dai in smaller cities throughout the Mekong Delta.

These urban and religious elements from various social backgrounds have struggled on their own without joining the NLF forces; they comprise the third force or "third component" in South Vietnam. Although not an administration, these groups are a political force which has been fighting under varying forms and intensities for the realization of a peace settlement and for national independence.

The third component gained more urban support in the wake of the great PRG military campaigns of 1968 and 1972. It was these campaigns which burst the bubble of American invincibility and of the "Vietnamized" Saigon regime that sheltered most of South Vietnam's cities. In the face of the enormous firepower unleashed indiscriminately by the U.S. to stop the NLF, the essential demand for national independence came into clear focus in the lives of those discontented and oppressed by the policies of the Saigon regime.

As a small reflection of the groundswell favoring third component groups, almost all successful opposition deputies for Saigon's National Assembly seats in the October, 1971 election were selected from urban districts despite gigantic efforts of Saigon authorities to repress and harass them. On December 27, 1972, General Thieu signed Decree-Law No. 60, eliminating participation by opposition candidates in any future election.

Under these conditions, it is not surprising to witness the transition of staunch supporters of the late Diem and U.S. policies at the time to members of the opposition to the Thieu regime and continuing U.S. intervention in Vietnam. For instance, the imprisoned Deputy Tran Nagoc Chau, former head of Saigon's Open Arms Program for NLF defectors and a protege of U.S. embassy officials, advocated direct negotiations with the PRG and an early U.S. exist from the South. Another, Father Hoang Quynh the once hawkish, anti-communist refugee

from North Vietnam, a man of great influence among Catholics, has been pushing for an inter-religious front for the reconciliation between pro-Thieu elements and the PRG. Among the Vietnamese in exile, Colonel Nguyen Van Chau, former head of Diem's Psychological Warfare Department, is now active in Paris with the third component group which has called for respect by both sides of the 1973 Peace Agreement. These personalities and others who now stand with the third component, testify to the strong trend toward national reconciliation and concord among all Vietnamese, including many former Diemist elements who officially support General Thieu.

In the spring of 1972, the Thieu regime suffered a tremendous loss of confidence within its own ranks due to the impact of the PRG campaign. In some areas, like Binh Dinh province and Kontum, Saigon's administrative structure simply crumbled, while in the Mekong Delta many officials supposedly working for Saigon revealed themselves as pro-PRG administrators. At the same time, third component groups in the cities denounced U.S. escalatory moves against the northern half of their country and agitated against Thieu's economic measures.

THIEU IMPRISONS THIRD COMPONENT

Sensing his growing isolation, General Thieu embarked on a massive campaign of arrest and repression in mid-1972. By the time of Paris Agreement was signed in January, 1973, the regime's prisons were filled to utmost capacity. A letter dated May 26, 1972, from the Buddhist Student Association in Saigon stated that the entire leadership of most student associations and several civil rights groups were in prison (see *Thoi Bao Ga*, No. 25). Documents from opposition sources and the Committee to Reform the Prison System in Saigon, quoted later in American and European newspapers, and sources of political prisoners released after January 27, 1973, indicate the extent of Thieu's attempts to stop the movement for national reconciliation. Having steadily lost real administrative control in most of the countryside to the PRG since the fall of 1972, General Thieu set about eliminating the urban opposition which threatened his position in the cities, a position already much weakened by the disappearance of the protective U.S. military shield and by the dwindling U.S. economic assistance.

Under General Thieu's police state tactics and past U.S.-directed public safety projects designed to strengthen Saigon's police forces and reduce the potential of any opposition to the Thieu regime—NLF or non-NLF—the Third Component has suffered some severe blows. A great number of its most effective organizers and leaders are in jail, some of them crippled like Huynh Tan Mam, chairman of the Vietnamese Student Union. Hundreds of monks are in a similar situation (*New York Times*, January 29, 1971). However, it is also in General Thieu's prisons that one discovers the most well-organized segment of the Third Component. According to *Le Monde Diplomatique* (December, 1973), these political prisoners have quite often neutralized their prison guards in their struggle for democratic liberties. The more General Thieu arrests and imprisons discontented elements in the urban areas, the more Third Component followers his prisons will produce. A June 6, 1973 "White Paper on Political Prisoners" by Deputy Ho Ngoc Nhuan—a Catholic opposition leader—shows that torture and repression in Saigon's prisons is indeed intense but has failed to break the will of the prisoners.

On January 27, 1973 the U.S. and the Thieu regime signed the peace agreement in Paris. Its provisions gave Third Component groups a legal and official basis for existence despite General Thieu's intentions to terminate their life as a political force. Such provisions include:

Article 12, which recognizes the existence of the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord which "shall have the task of promoting the two South Vietnamese parties' implementation of this agreement."

Article 11 guarantees all "the democratic liberties of the people," and prohibits "all acts of reprisal and discrimination."

Articles 2 and 3 of the Protocol on the Ceasefire reinforced the preceding provisions by forbidding all acts, armed attacks, or any other restrictions on civilian freedom of movement and communication by either party (the PRG and Saigon).

This fact alone has given new impetus to the urban opposition and the political prisoners in their struggle for implementation by Thieu of their democratic liberties. On June 22, 1973 the leading Third Component group abroad, the Paris-based Committee for Peace and Democratic Liberties in South Vietnam, stated, "It is only when these demands are statisfied, can the Third Component effectively operate in an official capacity." Prominent members of the opposition in Saigon such as Deputy Nhuan and Father Chan Tin repeatedly emphasized the close connection between Third Component prisoners and these clauses of the peace agreement, especially in their detailed White Papers on political prisoners released in June, 1973.

If the essential guarantees of democratic liberties as called for by Article 11 and Articles 2 and 3 or the Protocol were respected by both the Thieu regime and the PRG, most "Third Component" elements would be released and free to organize activities. This would thus mark a major step towards legalization of the urban opposition. In the push for full implementation of these guarantees Third Component elements would be able to shape their organizations closer to the needs and realities of their struggle, and to strengthen their unity on a common program for a national reconciliation and concord.

EMERGENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES

The application of Article 11 would facilitate the emergence of real Third Component representatives in the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord who would be capable of furthering the demands and aspirations of their constituencies. In his June 7, 1973 letter to the Committee for Peace and Democratic Liberties in South Vietnam, Venerable Tri Quang had this to say:

"In my opinion the Third Component of the National Council must be put forward in a serious way, independently of the two other parties. It must be more than merely appointed by the other two parties. . . . Thus those who want to be chosen thanks to foreign approaches beside Americans will not be the representatives of the people. . . . The existence of a third independent segment within the National Council constitutes an essential element in mobilizing the population, in harmonizing the activities and resolving conflicts between the two other parties."

A case in point is the Unified Buddhist Church. Active Buddhist elements have seen their struggle undermined by the church leadership in the persons of Venerable Thien Minh, Huyen Quang and a few others who now side with the Thieu regime. Even among the ten Buddhist senators elected in 1970 with Buddhist support, seven are now publicly or quietly supporting the regime. The church leadership, totally decredited, has simply been unable to keep pace with the aspirations of Buddhist followers, and no longer can be considered as part of the Third Component. The Venerable Phap Lan and several other monks along with progressive Catholics have carried on the struggle for the release of jailed Buddhist students and monks.

Discrediting Buddhists and other Third Force elements is part of the American and Saigon regime effort to undermine all trends toward national reconciliation and concord among Vietnamese of different political tendencies. More than a year has passed since the signing of the peace agreement with no significant release of Third Component political prisoners, General Thieu even intensified arrests of Third Component Vietnamese once he was prevented from repressing elements supporting the PRG after the signing of the peace agreement last year. As the major funding source for General Thieu's police force and prisons, the US bears a heavy responsibility for Saigon's frantic efforts against the Third Component. It is a known fact that US opposition to any Third Component role goes back at least to 1972 when Henry Kissinger bitterly opposed it in the Paris negotiations with Le Duc Tho (*New York Times*, October 27, 1972).

With the release of political prisoners, the development of a widespread urban movement for national reconciliation on the basis of the peace agreement would be more than a possibility. The strength of such a movement would steadily neutralize General Thieu's war policies if the US decides to strictly respect the political provisions of the peace agreement. Recent Congressional prohibitions against US funding of General Thieu's police force and prisons under the rubric of foreign aid represents a positive step toward realization of peace in Vietnam through national reconciliation.

In the face of unabated government repression, the Third Component has nevertheless grown substantially in comparison to its position in 1963 or 1966. At present, it is in a stage of great development. The Third Component's real leaders will emerge and make themselves known in due time. Because the PRG advocates a similar policy of reconciliation and concord, PRG officials have refrained from interference in Third Component affairs and have not demanded the right to name members or leaders of the Third Component. General Thieu's continued liquidation and subversion of the Third Component undermines the resolution of the political situation by peaceful means and the PRG's policy of reconciliation. His desperate attempts to reverse his regime's increasing isolation invite a PRG response in the effort to defend and guarantee the continuance of such a policy of national reconciliation. The existence of an independent Third Component with democratic liberties respected by both parties, in particular by General Thieu, would be the shortest route toward reconciliation and real peace in Vietnam.

DOCUMENTS

STATEMENT BY MINISTER NGUYEN VAN HIEU

(Nguyen Van Hieu was head of the PRG delegation to the 14th session of the Consultative Conference between the two South Vietnamese parties held June 28, 1973—ed.)

Guaranteeing the democratic liberties of the people

The Joint Communique stipulates that the South Vietnamese parties shall strictly implement Article 11 of the Paris Agreement. This stipulation satisfactorily meets Point 3 of the six-point proposal put forward by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam.

In conformity with the Joint Communique and Article 11 of the Paris Agreement on Vietnam, all the democratic liberties of the people must be immediately implemented:

1.) Immediately abolish all forms of coercion, concentration camps forced regrouping, forced residence; stop immediately all "pacification programs," police operations, terrorism, repression, "purges," and all acts endangering the lives and property of the people.

Abolish all anti-democratic laws and wartime measures contrary to the spirit and letter of the Paris Agreement and in violation of the spirit of national reconciliation and concord.

2.) Guarantee the South Vietnamese people's freedom of residence, movement and correspondence between the two areas controlled by the two South Vietnamese parties so that the population can carry on business and work, visit relatives, look after rice fields and houses and tend family graves.

Guarantee freedom of belief and worship; fully respect pagodas, churches, temples, shrines. . . . All religions in South Vietnam must enjoy equality and freedom to practice their respective beliefs.

Vietnamese residing overseas and persons who, for political reasons, had to live abroad, must be given freedom to return to South Vietnam to visit their families, work, participate in political activities and take part in the reconstruction of the country.

3.) Fully ensure freedom of speech, freedom of the press; abolish any limitation on the freedom of the press, including censorship, confiscation, fines, etc.

4.) The two South Vietnamese parties shall agree simultaneously to let all persons of different political and religious beliefs carry on political activity freely in the areas controlled by the two South Vietnamese parties, and to allow the free circulation of newspapers of different trends in the two areas.

Establishing the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord

The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord must be set up as soon as possible.

1.) In conformity with Article 12(b) of the Paris Agreement on Vietnam, the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord has the task of promoting the two South Vietnamese parties' implementation of this Agreement, achieving national reconciliation and concord, ensuring democratic liberties, organizing general elections and deciding procedures and modalities of the general and local elections:

a.) The Council shall assume its function of promoting the implementation of the Agreement's provision concerning the ceasefire through close contact with the two South Vietnamese parties. The Council shall be fully reported to by the two South Vietnamese parties on the implementation of these provisions of the Agreement.

b.) With regard to the achievement of national rconciliation and concord and the ensurance of democratic liberties, the Council shall:

Control and supervise the implementation of the Agreement by the two parties;

Prevent, uncover and investigate violations and propose to the parties measures for a solution;

Speed up activity by both parties to abolish policies, laws, regulations, and measures contrary to the provisions of the Agreement.

c.) The Council shall organize general and local elections and decide the procedures and modalities of these general and local elections.

d.) The parties shall scrupulosuly implement the agreements to be reached by the Council. The press and news agencies of the two parties shall widely publish the Council's decisions and motions.

2.) The National Council shall consist of three equal segments having the same footing. Each of the two South Vietnamese parties shall nominate its delegates to its segment of the Council. The third segment shall include those persons of different political and religious trends who belong to neither side but who approve the Paris Agreement. It must be ensured that the above-mentioned political and religious trends be heard, that this segment by truly representative and that it have an independent role and enjoy and equal status in the Council.

The Council shall consist of 36 members, each segment providing 12 members. The Presidium of the Council shall consist of 6 persons, each segment providing 2 persons. Three representatives of the three segments shall in turn preside over the Council.

3.) The two parties shall agree upon the Council's working regulations and conditions of activity. The Council must be given the ensurance of safety and the possibility of working easily and efficiently. This implies freedom of movement, freedom of contact with the people, the press, the parties and the organizations concerned. The Council must be granted guarantees of full privileges and immunities in order to accomplish its task and to be worthy of its important responsibilities.

4.) After the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord has been set up as mentioned in points 2 and 3 above, it shall immediately begin its activities.

5.) The Councils at lower levels shall consist of three equal segments on the same footing and shall be set up on province, city, district, village, and ward administrative units. The timing for setting up the councils at lower levels shall be decided by the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord.

The next document concerns the Buddhist Church in South Vietnam and the extent of the influence over it exercised by the Asia Foundation. The document was written by Frank E. Dines, an Asia Foundation representative in Saigon in 1965.

THE ASIA FOUNDATION, VIETNAM

No. V–SX 416.
Date: October 25, 1965.
To: The President.
Attn: Director, Southeast Asia Division.
Subject: Buddhist Program in Vietnam.

The purpose of this memorandum is to pull together the various aspects of the Foundation's Buddhist program and to discuss the basic assumptions and the objectives for further development.

The Vietnam program does not have a Buddhist category as such; projects with Buddhists have been grouped in categories such as education and rural development and have been justified in terms of Level III objectives of those categories. This practice, which may be sound from an administrative point of view, should not obscure the broader implications of Buddhism in Vietnam. Buddhism has assumed a social and political role which could make it the dominant force in society within a few short years. It is the total significance of Vietnamese Buddhism which must shape the individual projects undertaken by the Foundation. Van Hanh University, for example, is not particularly important in the overall educational picture of Vietnam nor would it seem to qualify for major Foundation assistance under existing Level III objectives. In the broader context, the University is vitally important because its purpose is to train future Buddhist leadership.

Buddhism in Vietnam is significant not only because of its numbers—eighty to ninety percent of the population is Buddhist or Buddhist-influenced—but also because of its special nature. Many Buddhists believe that their religion projected into the social, economic, and political spheres can supply a solution to the chaos and misery which have beset Vietnam for decades. What is more, they are actively building toward a position of predominance. Since monks, the traditionalists, are disturbed by the winds of change and advocate the return to ancient pursuits. Others—led by the visionary intellectual Nhat Hanh—preach social revolution and the rehabilitation of society through action programs based on love, non-violence and the voluntary spirit. Militant monks advocate, albeit still quietly, direct involvement in politics. It is doubtful that a plot as such exists to take over the government. In any case, the schisms within the Unified Buddhist Church would make concerted action difficult for the present. The immediate goals seem to be development of leadership, ideology and organizational strength.

An unusual characteristic of present-day Vietnamese Buddhism is the concentration not only of religious but also of secular authority in the hands of monks; the Institute for the Execution of the Dharma is controlled by the clergy. There is considerable irony in the fact that the lay leaders of the Buddhist Associations which formed the basis for unification of the Buddhists in early 1964 now find themselves outside the mainstream. The history of the past twenty or thirty years has yet to be written, but it would appear that the laymen, not the clergy, were initially responsible for the resurgence of Buddism through encouraging higher education for monks and development of social services. Today these laymen can do little more than contemplate the Pandora's box they opened. Mr. Mai Tho Truyen has commented that some elements in the IED would like to see the IED charter rewritten to return control to the laymen. He, of course, supports this point of view, but prospects for such a revision seem rather slim.

Buddhism must also be looked at in the context of the war as the Buddhists are unquestionably an unstable and unpredictable element. The limited and traditional education of monks makes them vulnerable to manipulation by those whose worldly wisdom is greater. Although clear evidence of Communist influence in the Sangha itself is lacking, V.C. infiltration into lay organizations, particularly in Central Vietnam, is a threat. Traditional religious education, if weak in practical matters, is strong in history and culture. It contributes to the prideful and nationalistic attitude of many monk leaders which finds not only anti-foreign expression but also anti-government. Certainly the most explosive issue involving the Buddhists is the war itself. Although Buddhists seem generally to have few illusions about what life would be ike under a communist regime, the moral issues raised by the killing and destruction now taking place are enormous and cannot be rationalized. There is no easy way of predicting how this dilemma will be resolved. Probably the best that can be hoped for is that the Buddhists will continue to talk of and pray for peace and to maintain silence on the war. The worst would be a peace movement which would bring them into open conflict with the government and which would at the same time be strongly anti-American.

In working with the Buddhists under these circumstances, the Foundation is running a risk; we could conceivably come under criticism in Vietnam and the United States if the Buddhists were to move against the government and the war effort. However, Buddhism cannot be wished away, and it is certainly desirable to bring to bear all possible constructive influence while there is time and while the opportunity exists. The ability of the Foundation to work with the Buddhists when other American groups cannot or do not would seem to justify taking a calculated risk so long as we have our objectives clearly in mind. We have associations with Buddhist groups which go back to the late 1950's, and we now have wide access to and excellent working relations with the top Buddhist leadership. Equally important, the Buddhists are willing to accept assistance from the Foundation while they are suspicious of and usually antagonistic toward official groups, both Vietnamese and American.

The Foundation's Buddhist projects are

all directed ultimately at two specific goals: (1) training an educated leadership with particular emphasis on programs such as scholarships to the United States which enable the Foundation to regulate the experiences and environment of individuals, and (2) encouraging the growth of Buddhist social service and community activities along professionally sound lines. Certain grants may at times seem wide of this mark, but it should be recognized that it is occasionally necessary to undertake peripheral projects in order to establish our *bona fides* and to cement personal relations. For example, the grant of a small printing press to Van Hanh University last spring—the first assistance given by any foreign group—was designed to help win the confidence of Minh Chau[1] who after ten years in Ceylon and India was uncertain of the nature of the Foundation's interest in Buddhism.

From the Buddhist point of view, an educated leadership is neecssary to consolidate the gains made in the revolution against Diem. Many monks were slow to recognize the importance of trained cadres, but experience has taught them that traditional religious education is inadequate for their growing involvement in secular affairs.

From the Foundation's point of view, the new interest of the Sangha in education and its willingness to turn over to the Foundation its best young monks and nuns for training abroad provide an extremely unusual opportunity to help mold future leadership. Our flexibility of operation and our acceptability to the Buddhists equip us particularly well to work with elites. Limitations of finance and personnel make it more difficult for the Foundation to undertake programs designed to affect the masses, and other U.S. agencies may have better capabilities here.

Both the Buddhists and the Foundation have moved slowly in developing a scholarship program for study abroad and for different reasons. On their side, interest after the revolution against Diem lay chiefly in sending more monks and nuns to Japan and India for advanced religious studies. Recognizing that funds for this purpose have been fairly readily forthcoming from Buddhist sources, the Foundation early indicated to the Institute for the Execution of the Dharma its interest in assisting the training of personnel in fields related to Buddhist social and educational activities provided that a long-range plan was developed to utilize the monks and nuns thus trained. The slowness of the Buddhists to follow through seems to have been due to the disturbances of the Khanh-Huong period are also doubts about the appropriateness of the United States and American education. The latter were effectively wiped away by the trips of Thien An and Minh Chau. On our side, we have had to move cautiously in an effort to regulate the number and caliber of grantees and also to avoid involvement in the personal and regional factionalism within the IED. Our primary interest is in leadership potential. We have emphasized non-religious studies in the United States because this is the surest way of obtaining candidates who are already university graduates and who can be prepared and returned in two or three years. Japan and India, on the other hand, attract monks with Buddhist institute educations which are not even equivalent to the baccalaureate, and a training period of five to eight years is often called for.

In addition to Le Manh That who is studying Sanskrit and Tibetan at Wisconsin, the Foundation has three other monks and two nuns as firm candidates for scholarships. San Francisco has already approved the training program for Quang Minh, the Director-designate of the Buddhist Youth Socio-Cultural Center. Proposals have been submitted to San Francisco for a two-year scholarship in sociology for Le Van Hoa and a two-year scholarship for nun Tinh Anh. Two others will be proposed shortly. Two or three additional possibilities exist but have yet to be fully explored.

It is important to understand that this group represents the best young talent of the Buddhists. At a time when every person of ability is needed here in Vietnam, the Sangha has made the difficult decision to forego immediate needs and build for the future. These monks and nuns are not run of the mill scholarship applicants. They have been handpicked and referred to the Foundation by the topmost leadership of the United Buddhist Church. They include the only nun university graduate in Vietnam who is presently the headmistress of a high school, the head of the Young Monks and Nuns' League of the IED, and others who have in various ways shown themselves to be outstanding. Of the 20,000 monks and nuns in Vietnam, there are less than twenty who have foreign educations (including twelve now abroad of whom four are in the United States) and no more than thirty who have qualified for undergraduate degrees within Vietnam. Quite apart from the individual qualifications of the Foundation grantees, our scholarship group will represent in several years a considerable proportion of the total trained leadership of the Buddhists.

The raw material we have here is probably the best that could be found. We know that these monks and nuns are destined for leadership positions. Their training and experience in the United States will to some extent influence, positively or negatively, the type of leaders they will be. Within a relatively short period of time, they will return to positions of prominence in the IED. Van Hanh University and various pagodas. They will become the chief interpreters of the United States and U.S. policy of the Buddhists. It is therefore recommended that San Francisco undertake a study drawing on outside advice and experience if necessary—of measures which would be instituted to direct the experiences of Vietnamese Buddhist grantees along desirable lines. Simple exposure to the American way of life and education is not enough. Quang Lien's two years to Yale appear to have done little more than to develop his taste for Cadillacs. Nhat Hank grew as an intellectual and was influenced by warm relationships with two or three professors who recognized his brilliance, but he also made at least one close friend who is active in leftist causes.[2] The Foundation's present practice of keeping in touch with grantees by letter and one or two annual visits is undoubtedly suitable for the objectives of most scholarship grants. However, it uses only a small part of the potential the Foundation has to turn the grantee's presence in the United States into a decisive experience which is the primary goal with Vietnamese Buddhists.

We are by no means experts, but some of the following might be considered in the suggested study. Vacation travel to various parts of the country and participation in seminars, conferences or other programs which give insight into American life could be planned. If necessary, the Foundation itself might sponsor and organize such activities. One entirely new approach might be considered, that of taking appropriate professors or others close to the grantees into our confidence. This would make possible close and constant monitoring and specialized attention. Working through persons in whom the grantees already have confidence is essential; potentially it would seem to be the most effective method of controlling the experiences of grantees. In developing these and other approaches, thought might be given by San Francisco to using consultants such as Holmes Welch.[3] Costs of these special programs would be gladly met from the Vietnam budget.

Implementation of this scholarship program will require considerable work and the forebearance of the San Francisco staff. Of the six monks and nuns mentioned above, only four have the *license* which is equivalent to the American bachelor's degree. One has a baccalaureat and will require a specially tailored program. The other is a product of Buddhist studies institutes and the equivalence of this education has yet to be established. English ability varies from good to weak; in some cases initial language work will have to be arranged at Michigan's ELI, American University or elsewhere. Placement will also be a problem. Unfortunately, the Buddhists did not time this surge of interest in American education with the academic year. We are not expecting the impossible, but we do ask that San Francisco give special attention to early admission. A change in the political climate could reduce our list of candidates or, manpower shortages among the Buddhists being what they are, a good prospect could be lost to other more pressing duties because of long delays.

Other Foundation projects with Van Hanh University—its Faculty of Buddhist Studies, Faculty of Letters and Human Sciences, and School of Youth for Social Service—have precisely the same goal as the foreign scholarships: at assist the formation of leadership. Van Hanh brings together much of the Buddhist intelligentsia, both lay and religious. Leadership of the University is in the hands of monks trained abroad who are oriented toward Buddhism's social significance and role; they are mainly from Central Vietnam and are associated with activists such as Tri Quang and Thien Minh. The University put emphasis on training monks and laymen to serve society and, ultimately, Buddhism. Translations of several of Nhat Hanh's works have been completed and will be forwarded to San Francisco within the next few days. These throw light on Vietnamese Buddhist social thinking which the University is an extension of, and they also reveal something of the mind of the leading monk intellectual.

In addition to foreign scholarships (three or four of the grants under consideration are for future Van Hanh faculty members), the Foundation foresees assistance to the University for library development, research and the School of Youth for Social Service. The library program in its initial stages would provide for the training of a monk or nun in library science in the United States. Depending on developments over the coming months, it might also include major assistance to acquire a collection of modern works in the social sciences. Such materials are rare in Vietnam where what little that exists in French and Vienamese is usually decades old and as often as not Marxist oriented. Research undertaken by Van Hanh will be focused on Vietnamese history and will fit the University's nationalistic orientation. There may be areas in which the

[1] Thich Minh Chau, now rector of Van Hanh, has long been won over to the American side. In the fall of 1973, he visited the U.S. under American sponsorship; one of his stops was the so-called "Vietnamese Studies Center", a creation of U.S. AID, at Southern Illinois University.—Ed.

[2] Thich Nhat Hanh's close friend in the American left is Alfred Hassler, for many years executive director of the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR).

[3] Holmes Welch, a good friend of Dennis Duncanson and Patrick J. Honey, two internationally-known British colonists and super-hawks on Vietnam, is author of two books on Buddhism: The Practice of Buddhism in China and The Buddhist Revival in China, published by Harvard University Press in 1967 and 1968 respectively.

Foundation can guide and facilitate the efforts of scholars to interpret Vietnamese culture. The School of Youth for Social Service is important because of its function of preparing cadres to work in the countryside, but its program is still being evolved and specific needs which the Foundation might meet are still not clear. At present it appears that our most useful contribution would be to help train permanent staff members in rural and community development in other Asian countries.

It is evident that the travels of Venerables Minh Chau, Thien An and Nhat Hanh earlier this year strongly influenced their thinking about university education. The Foundation will actively seek opportunities to provide additional experience in depth. Minh Chau in particular would benefit from intensive study and observation of university administration in the United States, and such a program is under consideration for next summer.

In the Buddhist youth field, the Foundation intends to continue its programs with the IED General Commission for Youth and with individual youth groups such as the Buddhist Student Association (for university students), the Buddhist Youth Families organization and others. Most of all of the Buddhist youth apparatus will move to the Socio-Cultural Center now under construction. The Foundation has agreed to train the program director of the center in the United States and will also furnish the library and provide a sound system for the 200-seat auditorium.

The Foundation's program with Buddhist service groups is not as clearly defined as in other areas, mainly because the Buddhists' efforts are still disorganized. It is no longer a question of whether or not the Buddhists should or are able to expand their social services; the decision has been made and the number of schools, orphanages, dispensaries, etc. are being increased. The Foundation's role has been to encourage growth and professionalization. One of the foreign scholarships under consideration is to provide training for a nun who will eventually have responsibility for setting up a school to train other nuns in social welfare. The IED has periodically talked of taking measures to organize social services, including training, but constantly changing personnel and the political motivation of some of these moves make the IED itself an unstable base for the training function.

We believe that the Buddhist program outlined above utilizes the Foundation's special capabilities to the maximum extent. Individual projects may have to be amended as circumstances change and as we increase our knowledge and experience, but the broad outline of the program in our opinion is significant and appropriate.

A breakdown of Foundation Buddhist projects since the November 1963 revolution and the establishment of the Unified Buddhist Church is attached for reference.

San Francisco's comments, as always, will be welcomed.

For the representative:

FRANK E. DINES,
Assistant Representative.

SELECTED TRANSLATIONS FROM SAIGON NEWSPAPERS

(The following are editorials from Dan Chu Moi, the most influential Buddhist paper in Saigon, which closed in 1972.)

[From *Dan Chu Moi*, Dec. 13, 1971]

NOW'S NOT THE TIME FOR PRAYERS ALONE

Every year the Buddhist Church holds a convention and at every convention a statement is issued which calls for . . . prayers for peace! And every time there are prayers for peace, the war becomes more intense, more widespread, and the Vietnamese people have to suffer even more in terms of life and property.

This year the representative of the Buddhist Church has another opportunity to issue another statement containing words of peace. And the sounds of their gongs and drums will vibrate resounding in prayer ceremonies just like they do every year!

But the sounds of gunfire are louder, drowning out the words of prayer and even the toll of the Bells of Repentance which [in themselves] will never enlighten warmongering and murderous souls.

At the present convention, according to many papers, the Buddhist Church will again issue a statement which will include four key points:

The withdrawal of foreign forces from Vietnam;

A ceasefire;

And the creation of a peace settlement based on self-determination, Vietnamese affairs to be ironed out by Vietnamese without foreign intervention.

What could be better?

These are also the aspirations of the entire people after several decades of having to shoulder a war against their own will, a war in which shady (*vo minh*, a Buddhist term which means literally "not bright, nuclear, unreal") interests benefit while people from every stratum of the society must sacrifice blood, sweat and tears.

Even though the foreigners are trying their best to force their devious schemes on the sacred aspirations of the people, the struggle of the Vietnamese people is progressing steadily toward victory.

This progress is based on concrete events in every field of activity and not on the empty statements by the leaders—statements made and then shelved—or on prayers which only disappear into space.

The concrete struggles of the soldiers and the people, the quickening developments—both internal and external—and the entrance of the Vietnam war into a decisive stage, [all these] demand more concrete and positive action [from the Buddhist Church].

This is a heart-felt suggestion from the people to the representatives of the Buddhist Church who are about to convene to decide on matters of life or death for the Vietnamese people and for Buddhism.

Buddhist leaders have said that Buddhism will persist only if the people do. Therefore, concrete struggle for the people means struggle for the survival of the religion. And this should be done through a positive, firm declaration of peace to be accepted by the convention.

No more empty rhetoric or prayers!

[From *Dan Chu Moi*, Dec. 16, 1971]

In every struggle, if there is no participation and support from the masses, there is no hope for success no matter how well-trained the soldiers, how powerful the generals, or how modern the weapons. If some success is achieved, it can only be temporary.

On the other hand, if a movement has the support of the people but is wanting in political direction and proper conduct on the part of the leadership, it will also be difficult to gain full success.

Almost all of the political leaders in this southern part of Vietnam at the present time have encountered these two situations: lack of popular support or, if there is support, inability to lead the masses.

A number of religious leaders had some support from the people because of an opportune political stance during the struggle against injustice, dictatorship, and prejudice. They have now lost their positions as leaders precisely because they lack the proper conduct required of leaders. They forget that it was precisely because of the righteous stance in the name of the masses and for democratic freedoms—not because of any individual leader—that a great number of people and Buddhist rose up. This success raised Vietnamese Buddhism much higher in the estimation of the people. No matter how famous a certain religious or political leader might be, if he does not follow the righteous path of struggle or if his programs are unjust or misdirected, none will follow him except for a small blinded minority who worship him as leader.

After a few unsuccessful [political] ventures which serves to weaken their power, the leaders among Buddhists today have become negative, passive and complacent. This in turn has served to lessen their prestige even more.

Even so, a number of leaders do not seem to be able to understand this, and instead they display an attitude of self-aggrandizement, self-fulfillment, conceit and complacency. Either publicly or secretly they bourgeoisie-ize (*truong gia hoa*) their way of life. Their homes are air-conditioned, they ride in shiny limousines, they love to be praised and toadied to, and they consider themselves idols and gods.

The way of life and the kind of attitude mentioned above could easily render them useless and could lead them to become the type of official who removes himself increasingly from the people and from Buddhist believers and isolates himself from the waves of national and international struggle. Political, religious and labor leaders of the type mentioned above will never be able to catch up with the speedy progress of the people. They will become reactionary, opposing and hindering the progress of the people.

At the present time, many religious leaders have fallen victims to the case mentioned above and they cannot walk with the people anymore. They do not think of the common interests of the people but only of their own interests, their own position, and their own ambition. There have been many squabbles over positions and interests both in private and in public, causing a loss of prestige to the entire religious community. Hiding in the shadow of the compassionate and forgiving Buddha, they have done many vile things in complete disregard of the criticisms of the population and of the believers. The greater part of the blame [of course] falls on their superiors and the Buddhist community as a whole for having been lenient and protective toward them.

A century of repression and oppression pushed them into the shadows and caused them to lead a very hard life. Then the sudden glow of success and glory blinded them to such a degree that by their unrestrained activities they have let themselves sink into a quagmire of depravity. They no longer qualify as true spiritual leaders or true spiritual soldiers who are supposed to make sacrifices and lead a life of hardship.

No one asks them to lead a life of abstinence in the shadow of lonely pagodas, forces them to eat meatless meals and sleep on the floor, or makes them beat the wooden gongs while chanting the sutras and embracing the Buddha day and night. On the contrary, the suffering masses all wish that the religious leaders knew how to lead a real life. They all hope that these leaders step out [of their pagodas] and pitch in to relieve the sufferings of humanity. . . . Buddha left his golden and jade throne, engaged in a life of suffering for humanity, incessantly struggled against injustice and tyranny on the side of the people until his last breath.

You must practice your religion (*Tu thi phai hanh*). In practicing your religion, you must do good things for the people and for the religion and not evade social responsibilities by living off the people and becoming a social parasite. . . .

In order that the common aspirations of the people in this critical and decisive period

be attained, it is urgent that true spiritual leaders and righteous believers sweep away all the obstacles, clear the road, and advance in a direction which is compatible with the ideals of peace, independence, and democracy.

These are the important tasks facing the hundreds of Buddhist representatives at the present convention in the capital city of Saigon.

Theirs is the responsibility of discussing these points and quickly implementing them. The leaders cannot continue with their negative attitude forever. Time is running out for you! Hesitancy, timorousness, and feet-dragging will not help you catch up with events for time waits for no one. Every success to you.

AUSTERITY, FRUGALITY, INTEGRITY

Saigon's latest austerity drive is on. Everyone will have to learn to do without—everyone, that is, except Thieu's corrupt corps of officials, many of them sporting degrees from top American universities.

While there is widespread hunger and starvation due to Saigon's rice collection policy and to the destruction of crops by the recurrent floods and the continued use of anti-crop chemicals by the Thieu regime; while tens of thousands of people are homeless because of the floods, caused in part by the defoliation program and the continued bombings and shellings of the countryside by the Thieu regime; and while there are thousands of hungry and homeless children digging in garbage dumps for food and sleeping on the streets, Thieu's high officials are treating themselves royally with public funds and are making merry on the money they exact from an already impoverished population.

Most of these high officials are young men in their 20's and 30's, the products of the best American universities and of over a decade of American grooming. To give an idea of how much these men have learned, let us take a brief look at a few typical cases.

The first person is Tran Khanh Van, the present Minister of Housing Development. Tran Khanh Van is a graduate of the University of California at Berkeley in mining engineering, although he claims to have a Ph. D. in international relations from Johns Hopkins University, and, without fail, introduces himself as "Dr. Van."

Before he returned to Vietnam last year to take his present job, Van was an officer at the Saigon consulate in New York. His job was basically public relations, and he was willing to take assignments such as going to college campuses to explain Thieu's policies. These are tasks that his colleagues at the embassy in Washington and at the consulate in New York usually shrank from. For this reason, he earned the title of "political plumber." Van usually fared better than his colleagues with American university audiences because his line of argument, which was always the same, went this way: True, the Saigon government was fairly corrupt and ineffective. But everybody knew that communists almost everywhere were known to be bloodthirsty and totalitarian. In Vietnam, they blew up bridges that Americans had so kindly built for the Vietnamese people with American tax money and they rocketed cities and killed innocent civilians.

Therefore, although the Saigon government was corrupt and ineffective, it was the lesser of two evils. Precisely because it was ineffective, it needed help, especially from the United States. The difference between a democratic and a totalitarian state Van would then state, was that a democracy was conducive to change and would welcome the help of talented people, while the reverse was true in a totalitarian country. At this point Van would usually tell his audiences that as a Ph.D. he could earn more than the meagre salary he was receiving by working for American corporations or teaching at American universities.

However, since he was thinking not of himself alone, he took up the challenge of working for the Thieu regime. "If you want to change things," he would say, "prove yourselves by working and not just sitting there criticizing." Van frequently added to his well-rehearsed speech at this point that although his current pay was already too low, he had decided to give it up and go back to Vietnam to take up a job that would pay him only 50 to 60 dollars a month—at least 10 to 15 times less than his current salary. The reason for this, he said, was because he wanted to help improve the situation.

What Van has done since he returned to Vietnam is well documented in the December 17, 1973 issue of *Dien Tin*, a Saigon daily. As soon as he took his job, he set for himself a basic monthly salary of 300,000 piasters—over ten times the monthly pay of a full professor at the Saigon university. This is about $600 at the present rate of exchange. But obviously Van did not think that this was enough, for he increased his salary by an average of over 600,000 piasters each month. In addition, he has also taken over ten million piasters from the ministry's fund to pay for parties and feasts that he and his friends have had at the most expensive hotels and restaurants in Cholon, Saigon's twin city. He has also used public funds to pay for his housing and other expenses such as the gas bill for his private car, although he already has an official limousine for his own use. His aides and staff has enjoyed the same luxuries. Each of his three aides receives 200,000 piasters a month as base pay and an additional amount of over 100,000 piasters for monthly bonuses and extra pay. These bonuses have recently become increasing larger as the result of the fact that Van's underlings caught him in the act of fooling around with girls in the middle of the night in his own office at the ministry. Now Van's underlings do whatever they want without fear of being reprimanded.

The total amount of money that Van and his aides have siphoned off from the ministry's fund is reported to have reached at least several hundred million piasters. The money comes mostly from the profit made by selling the so-called "National Reconstruction" lottery tickets, which nets a profit of several billion piasters a year. [Anyone familiar with the government lottery knows that the tickets are not sold to willing buyers alone but also are also forced on civil servants, soldiers, traffic violators, and so on.] Money is also stolen outright from downpayments made by people who want to buy houses from the government on an installment basis. These downpayments are very sizable and hundreds of people have been victimized by this blatant robbery.

In spite of all this, Van is still the minister of Housing Development under the protection of Hoang Duc Nha, Thieu's most trusted advisor and Van's high school classmate. In fact, according to the November 1, 1973 issue of *Dai Dan Toc*, there has been much discussion within official circles that Tran Khanh Van would be appointed as the chief of a merged ministry composed of the present Ministries of Labor and Social Affairs.

PHAN QUANG DAN: WEALTH FROM REFUGEES

The second case concerns Phan Quang Dan who is chairman of the "Interministerial Committee for Relief, Resettlement, and Return to Villages of War Victims" and Commissioner of the "Develop Virgin Land and Construct Hamlets Program." Dan, a Harvard-trained physician, has had a long career in politics which began in 1958 when he became secretary general of a small group known as the Caravelle group.* After the attemped coup in 1961 by a group of officers (with whom Dan had some connection) against the late President Ngo Dinh Diem, Dan was jailed. When he was taken to court for trial by the Diem regime, Dan cried in public and begged for mercy. After the successful coup against Diem in 1963, Dan was released and carried through the streets of Saigon by his supporters as a national hero. Since then Dan has held one important post after another in the various regimes that followed Diem's.

The longest job that he has held has been in connection with the refugee problem. In this capacity, Dan has carried out persistent and systematic relocation and transfer of the rural population and of refugees in an attempt to deny peasant support to the NLF and also to provide buffer zones for the Saigon-controlled areas. Since after the signing of the Paris agreements, the transfer of refugees has been especially active.

Following are but a few examples: According to the March 22, 1973 *New York Times*, the Saigon regime disclosed that it has begun to move 100,000 of a planned 660,000 persons from the central provinces (which are considered areas where an NLF offensive against Saigon would have to go through.) On July 5, 1973, the *New York Times* again reported that more than 160,000 Vietnamese were to be resettled in the month of July alone, or at least 30,000 persons more than the total number of people resettled during the first six months of 1972.

In an attempt to grab more land, most of these people have been sent to devastated and unsettled areas that had been conceded to the PRG for years. All this his been done under the guise of the "Program to Improve the Life of Anti-Communist Refugees" and the "Develop Virgin Land and Construct Hamlets Program." Not only do all these activities violate the terms of the Paris agreements, but they have also exposed the peasants to all kinds of danger and suffering.

First of all, the countryside is infested with unexploded mines and other munitions. According to the *Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary* (August 1, 1973. p. 42), there are "over 400 to 600 million tons of live ammunition in the fields" in South Vietnam. This is an equivalent of 80,000 pounds for each South Vietnamese man, woman and child. Although Norman Firnstahl, former USAID Associate Director for Relief and Rehabilitation, testified at the above hearing that in 1973 "probably about 300 resettlement village sites" were planned to be cleared by the South Vietnamese military, this has not been the case.

On the contrary, Wells Klein, member of the Subcommittee Study Mission to South Vietnam, testified that ammunition was still being dumped on the countryside at a very high rate: "When we were in Da Nang in mid-March, the South Vietnamese admitted to firing 10,000 rounds of artillery daily, most of which was not to counter operations from the other side, by primarily H & R [harassment and interdiction] fire." (p. 33.)

Secondly, refugees who have been transferred or resettled are often left to hunger and starve on the new sites. Often they do not have a roof over their heads. This is because Dan's committee and his staff in the field steal all the aid—food, money and building materials—that are supposed to go to these victims. Even peasants who have been transferred to the geographically favorable province of Tay Ninh are so hungry that they have had to go up to the mountains to dig roots; and when there is not enough of this food to go around, they starve. This situation has been documented in detail in an investigation serialized in the November 1

* The name comes from the most expensive hotel in Saigon where the group met to draft its statement criticizing the Diem regime.

to 20, 1973 issues of Dai Tan Toc. The situation confronting refugees of minority background has been even worse.

For example, as reported in the October 25, 1973 issue of Dien Tin, the Hre highlanders who had been resettled in Quang Ngai province were so hungry that many of them had to eat dirt. Many of them died and the newspaper warned that unless the government helped these people immediately, they would all die of starvation.

THEFT OF REFUGEE FUNDS

But as Dien Tin stated in its November 20, 1973 issue, the Saigon regime must have refugees in order to obtain aid money from the United States. The newspaper reported that about 90% of the aid to refugees, amounting to "several tens of billion of piasters each year," has been siphoned off. Phan Quang Dan, as the chief of the whole "Relief, Resettlement and Return to Village Program," and as Commissioner of the "Develop Virgin Land and Construct Hamlets Program," has been accused hundreds of times in Saigon papers of taking part in the stealing of funds earmarked for the refugees and of sharing the spoils on all kinds of shady undertakings. The accusations are usually very specific, and Dan's answers to them are usually ludicrous.

One of the latest examples of this is the accusation by Deputy Nguyen Minh Dang and Deputy Ho Van Xuan at a hearing in the Saigon Lower House, as reported in the November 1, 1973 issue of *Dai Dan Toc*. The generals and colonels appointed by Dan connived with local authorities to steal money from the programs. All the good land granted by Dan's office in Long Khanh province has been parceled out to powerful friends. Only worthless land is left for the poor people. As far as clearing virgin land is concerned, although the unemployed inhabitants of Long Khanh province bid to clear the land for 35,000 piasters per hectare, Dan instead granted monopoly rights to the Vecco Company which charged 90,000 piasters for clearing each hectare.

As far as the timber and other things taken from the land during clearing is concerned, Dan had allowed trucks to come and take everything away for sale. The local inhabitants were not allowed to use anything. The money from the sale of these commodities had not been put into the official fund but went into the pockets of the officials connected with the program. The chief of the office of social welfare of the province for example, got nine million piasters in this manner.

A second case involved a certain Catholic priest in Khanh Hoa province who used 120 million piasters to buy 1,200 hectares of land (which turned out to be usurped land in the first place) to give it to Dan's office on the condition that the priest would be given monopoly rights for all the work contracts given out by Dan's office for the province. The priest could then lease his rights out to sub-contractors.

Money for the "Develop Virgin Land and Construct Hamlets Program" had been used to furnish Dan's own home and offices and also offices of his underlings in the provinces. For example, Dan's own house on Phung Khac Khoan Street alone, 10 million to furnish his office on Hai Ba Trung Street in Saigon, and 60 million piasters on the offices at ten provincial locations. On a recent trip to Hue city, Dan observed that the office of his friend the provincial chief was run-down, so he gave him 4 million piasters from the funds that are supposed to go to construct hamlets for the refugees.

Dan never attempted to answer all the charges but his answers to some of them are quite interesting. For example, he said that the repair of the provincial chief's office fell into the flood relief category. Besides, since the money came from the U.S. embassy and American clubs such as the Lions Club anyway, why should his critics care one way or another. As for the granting of monopoly rights to the Vecco Company, according to Dan that was in order to get this company to put to use the equipment it had been sold by the American construction company RMK/BRJ so that the equipment would not get rusty. As far as the high payment to the company was concerned, that was for helping to get operators for the company's equipment. In the case of the timber, Dan said that the contractor had no use for it anyway. Finally, in answering the charge that he had used public funds for furnishing his own home, Dan said that he also used his home as an office (Probably a leaf from Nixon's book!).

Perhaps one of the most unforgettable statements of Dan's is the one he made recently after a tour of the central provinces to assess the flood damage there. Deputy Kieu Mong Thu reported in her article published in the November 19, 1973 issue of *Dai Dan Toc* that Hurricane Sarah swept through the ten central provinces, "immersing the central provinces under a sea of water, killing thousands of people, destroying and washing away tens of thousands of homes, wiping out unknown quantities of crops, and leaving close to half of the population homeless, hungry, suffering under the cold winds and rain."

As reported in the November 29 and 30 issues of *Dien Tin*, even the office of the commander of Military Region I had to admit that tens of thousands of hectares of riceland had been destroyed, that tens of thousands of homes had been razed, hundreds of people had been killed and over 70,000 persons had evacuated. In fact, the flood waters rose to about 7 yards in some places and at least 3 yards on the average in many areas. In spite of this, after a short tour of the central provinces as the chairman of the national relief committee, Dan announced matter-of-factly, "The damage is very light, very insignificant" (quoted in *Dien Tin*, November 29, 1973). But there is a reason behind this statement. For, as reported by Deputy Kieu Mong Thu, in the article quoted above, "Most of the money for the flood victims has been used to buy carpets, beds, furniture, new cars, and office furnishings for the officials involved."

Our third and last example has to do with Pham Kim Ngoc, a Yale man and a graduate of the London School of Economics. Ngoc held the post of Economics Minister for five years until the end of last month when his participation in the various rice scandals and rice collection policy generated so much public indignation against him that Thieu was forced to kick him upstairs as High Commissioner of Planning and National Development, a post comparable to John Ehrlichman's former job at the White House. Pham Kim Ngoc's "achievements" over the years have been considerable, and it is quite impossible to list them all.

Ngoc first came to national prominence in 1971, when, as Economics Minister he announced the so-called "Autumn Revolution" to "save the country" (*Dan Chu Moi*, November 17, 1971). In fact, after he had announced the issuing of the new bill, Pham Kim Ngoc held a press conference entirely in English to explain the decision. This led a Saigon newspaper to conclude that apparently it was not worth the trouble to explain it in Vietnamese—why waste words trying to explain things to the Vietnamese? (*Duoc Nha Nam*, November 18, 1971).

According to the November 17, 1971 issue of the Saigon daily *Dan Chu Moi*, the "revolution" devalued the Vietnamese piaster by 45 per cent, lowered import taxes on luxury goods by at least 50 per cent, and increased internal consumption taxes on about 650 items such as rice, fish, vegetables and cloth by 45 to 50 per cent. When Pham Kim Ngoc announced the tax increase and devaluation, he also announced that by the end of November of 1971 some 17 billion piasters in 1000-piaster notes—the highest denomination thus far—would be issued. Most people in Saigon saw this as yet another spur to inflation, but Ngoc and the Thieu regime ignored them and maintained that this was part of the "Autumn Revolution." *Dan Chu Moi* was so angry that on November 18, 1971 it carried an editorial asking, "How can a series of financial tricks designed to squeeze out more money be called an 'Economic and Financial Revolution?'" The paper was subsequently closed down.

RICE COLLECTION

Since then, Ngoc has used many devices for exacting money from the Vietnamese population, each more ingenious than the last. Let us name only the latest example of these, which is the rice collection policy, otherwise referred to by Thieu as the "rice war." According to two Saigon newspapers, the Thieu regime has forbidden the rural population to store more than 3 *gia* (40 liters) of paddy rice, or the equivalent of about 40 liters of milled rice, at any time. All excess rice has to be sold to the Thieu regime (*Dien Tin* and *Dai Dan Toc*, September 25, 1973). The Thieu regime has ordered the high command of the Saigon Armed Forces, the Department of Commerce and Industry, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Economy to join forces in the collection of rice (*Dien Tin*, November 2, 1973).

Often the rice collected is simply confiscated from the population without compensation or only with a promise that compensation is to be made some time in the distant and uncertain future (*Dai Dan Toc*, October 1, 1973). The fixed official price for each *gia* of paddy rice to be paid the peasants is from 1300 to 1400 piasters depending on the variety; but in cases where Saigon officials have actually paid for the rice, the payment has been only 800 to 900 piasters a *gia* (*Dien Tin* and *Dai Dan Toc*, September 25, 1973).

Meanwhile, the price for 100 kilos of rice in Saigon has ranged from 20,000 to 27,000 piasters (*Dien Tin*, October 19, 1973) and the price of the same amount of rice in the central provinces has been 40,000 piasters in many areas (*Dien Tin*, November 20, 1973 and December 7, 1973). Official Saigon statistics quoted in the November 16, 1973 issue of *Dien Tin* show that for the months of November and December alone, Military Region IV had to deliver 215,000 tons of milled rice to Saigon alone. This means that even if Saigon sells the rice at 20,000 piasters per 100 kilos and buys it at the official price of 1300 to 1400 piasters per *gia* of paddy rice, then Saigon would make over 30 *billion* piasters, or about $60 million, during the two months alone. Of course this is not to mention the large amount of rice that never reaches Saigon through the official route.

For example, according to the October 31, 1973 issue of *Dien Tin*, Major Ngo Van Thi, the district chief of Ben Tranh, sold 49,000 100-kilo sacks of rice to Saigon and Cholon through illegal routes. All this happens when there is a decree that no one is supposed to bring rice from one village to another, one town to another or one district to another for sale, milling or any other purpose without the written consent of the authorities.

According to the December 7, 1973 issue of *Dien Tin*, the provincial and district authorities had orders to arrest anyone who carried three kilos of rice, for such an act was considered an attempt to aid the Communists. Only merchants close to the Saigon

regime are allowed to transport rice for any distance. There is no knowing what percentage of the spoils Pham Kim Ngoc has gotten from all these. However, he himself had admitted his part in one famous case in which he sold 20,762 tons of government rice to a number of friendly merchants at the low rate of 8500 piasters per one hundred kilos. In his official statement, Ngoc admitted that if those merchants sold the rice back at the rate of only 15,000 piasters per 100 kilos, they would have made about 1.5 billion piasters. In the same statement, Ngoc also admitted carrying out the dubious practice of subsidizing rice merchants who were transporting rice to the central provinces for sale. For each billion piasters worth of rice transported, the Economics Minister granted a one billion piaster subsidy! (*Dai Dan Toc*, October 21, 1973).

Meanwhile, in the central provinces, even though the price of rice is 400 piasters a kilo as already cited above, it is extremely difficult to obtain rice anywhere. In Da Nang city, there are 40,000 tons of rice kept in the government granaries, but the province authorities refuse to sell it to the hungry population (*Dien Tin*, December 6, 1973). When about 1000 inhabitants of the third district of Da Nang gathered to protest against the Saigon government for not selling rice to the population when thousands were in critical states of hunger, Major Le Khac Kha, the district chief, personally directed an attack against the protesters, leaving many wounded (*Song Than*, November 26 and 27, 1973).

In an attempt to pacify the population of Da Nang as well as to explain his economic policies to them, Pham Kim Ngoc flew to Da Nang where he made a truly "revolutionary" statement: "If there is no rice, eat gruel. If there is no gruel, eat roots. What's wrong with that?" (quoted by *Doan Ket*, December 22, 1973). According to the December 7, 1973 *Dien Tin*, even in the town of Tam Ky (about 20 miles south of Da Nang) where food is generally more available than elsewhere, a piece of root the size of two fingers and about 10 centimeters (about 4 inches) long costs 50 piasters, or a fourth of the daily salary of a full-time worker. Yes, what is wrong with that? What is wrong with the whole economic policy of the Thieu regime? What is wrong with Thieu's slogan of "austerity, frugality and integrity" when his officials from top to bottom are robbing the people blind?

Father Nguyen The Thiep, in charge of the cultural and social affairs for the Redemptorists in the southeastern areas of Quang Ngai, said with bitter irony, "No one should bring relief for the people around here anymore. No matter how much people give, they all take the credit for it and all they do is spoil the population here."

According to Reverend Thiep, the people are "spoiled" because of the way the various organizations and private associations give out their relief.

"All of a sudden they come and herd people out and give them a few cans of concentrated milk, a dozen or so kilos of rice, a few blankets, a few pots. One group after another comes to distribute relief under the direction of the authorities, and they all concentrate on a few areas . . ."

According to Reverend Thiep, "people"—especially those important figures from Saigon—only carry out the distribution for show, for satisfying their own egos, and after some photographs and movies have been taken they just leave and ask the local authorities to continue with the distribution for them. Two seconds after they've gone the distribution is stopped. The relief goods are then taken to the homes of the authorities with the words, "The distribution will be continued tomorrow, we are busy today." But tomorrow never comes, and the victims just have to sit there waiting for another relief delegation.

"We would be lucky if we could get even that," said Mr. Tran Chieu, a flood victim in Quang Ngai. "They give it to you in the morning, then the village, district and provincial authorities come in the afternoon and take most of it back. They say, 'Give back some of the relief goods so that we can share them with the inhabitants of District A or District B who have not been given anything.' When the authorities address us in this way, who would dare to disobey?"

For this reason, the people have to give back the shirts, rice, cans of milk, although they know very well that the population of District A or District B will never see them.

"In my area," Mr. Chieu continued, "the authorities come and say, 'You people should not store so much rice in your houses. Give it to the government and we'll keep it for you. If you keep it in your houses the Viet Cong will come and steal everything."

The phrase "the Viet Cong will steal everything" or "do you guys want to supply the Viet Cong, huh?" is repeated over and over again in the provinces of Quang Ngai and Quang Nam.—Dien Tin, December 1, 1973

PEACE—OUT-OF-HAND

The situation in South Vietnam becomes more desperate every day as Thieu continues his "rice war" and forced resettlement of refugees. And U.S. aid makes it all possible.

Recently, when Secretary of State Kissinger was discussing the Middle East War with a friendly foreign minister, the Vietnam settlement was mentioned. The conversation, as told by the foreign minister and related by the *New York Times* in its December 26, 1973 issue, went this way:

"But Vietnam wasn't much of a cease-fire."

"I know," said Kissinger, "but it could have been. I wanted to bomb the daylights out of Hanoi, but Congress wouldn't let me. That would have made it stick."

The fact of the matter is that Kissinger and Nixon did try their best to bomb the daylights out of Hanoi and other populated areas of North Vietnam for two weeks at the end of 1972. During this period several hundred fighter-bombers and over 100 B-52's carried out massive round-the-clock assaults on the cities, dams and dikes of North Vietnam. During the first two days of bombing, 20,000 tons of bombs—the equivalent of the atomic bomb used on Hiroshima—were dropped. By December 24, about 40,000 tons of munitions had been dropped on that country. But this unprecedented intensity does not tell the whole story. For what was especially wicked about this "Christmas bombing" was the use of B-52's to carpet-bomb. Two hundred B-52's were used on a rotation basis; each mission was composed of 80 to over 100 planes. Each B-52 typically carried about 108 500-pound bombs and dropped them from an altitude of about 35,000 feet. The bombs from each B-52 covered "a rectangle a mile and a half long and a half mile wide with flames and flying steel fragments." (*New York Times*, December 26, 1972.) If there were no overlap, each mission of 100 planes could destroy an area about 34 square miles, or 32,000 acres. The bombing during this season of "peace on earth," therefore, was not just a fireworks demonstration. Whole cities, such as Bac Giang, were totally destroyed.

Nor was it true that the American Congress tried to tie Kissinger's hands in any way. To be sure, a few Congressmen and Senators did voice concern from their vacation retreats, with the strongest denunciation coming from Senator William Saxbe, who said that Nixon was "out of his mind." But Congress was in recess for a month and when it reconvened, the most significant legislation that had the remotest connection with the Indochina war was a bill which said Congress could be recalled during recess. Kissinger could not bomb the daylights out of Hanoi because those creatures on the ground there, those human beings called Vietnamese, just refused to give in to the American technology of death.

Instead they shot down over 15% of the B-52's and scores of the fighter-bombers. Meanwhile, the United States had seriously depleted its bomb stockpiles and world opinion rose to such a level of opposition that even its former Vietnam war allies, Australia and New Zealand, boycotted American goods and refused to unload American ships. Faced with such military and diplomatic pressure, Kissinger was forced to go back to the Paris Peace talks in January, 1973, to sign a virtually unchanged version of the nine-point draft agreement proposed by North Vietnam in October of the previous year.

The intention here, however, is not simply to set the record straight, nor to show how little Nixon's chief advisor on international affairs learned after four years of dropping more than 13 million tons of high explosives on the societies of Indochina. The Indochinese had proven throughout the course of the war the strength of the human spirit and the triumph of men over machines. What should be carefully examined is Kissinger's implication that Hanoi is the principal, if not the sole, violator of the peace agreements and that the use of force beyond the level of the "Christmas bombing" is required against North Vietnam in order to make the agreements "stick."

NIXON'S TACTICS

It should be remembered that it was the United States which had to grudgingly sign the Paris agreements after all its military and diplomatic maneuvers had failed miserably, therefore placing it in the best of all possible positions: In the attempt to destroy McGovern's main campaign issue, Kissinger and Nixon accepted the October, 1972, draft agreement as proposed by North Vietnam with the hope that they could renege on it after Nixon was elected. And this they attempted to do in the most blatant way. By using the pretext that "minor linguistic problems" had to be ironed out in order to reopen negotiation on an agreement that had already been accepted in its totality, Kissinger and Nixon soon brought back the demands that there should be two Vietnams, that the demilitarized zone should be a political border betwen the two parts, and that Thieu should have authority over all of South Vietnam.

In other words, they wanted to gain every possible objective over which the war had been fought for close to a decade. As reported in the December 22, 1972 issue of the *New York Times*, the spokesman for the DRV delegation in Paris disclosed at a press conference that at every one of the 15 meetings held in November and December of that year the American side threatened to break off the private talks if the above demands were not met. At one of the last meetings the threats were repeated six times, and on the last day of the secret talks personal threats were addressed to Mr. Tho and Ambassador Xuan Thuy.[1] The North Vietnamese refused to be intimidated by the threats as well as by the subsequent air blitz.

In the end, there was nothing the United States could do except to drop all its demands and sign the agreements on January

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[1] The Nixon administration, usually quick to deny any charges brought against it, has yet to comment on this disclosure of threats made during the secret talks.

27, 1973, in Paris, an occasion hailed by both the North Vietnamese and the PRG as "a very big victory for the Vietnamese people." This is not just rhetoric for developments during the past eleven months have shown that while the DRV and the PRG have insisted on strict implementation and observation of the agreements the United States and the Thieu regime persistently violated the agreements both in word and in deed.

The intention of the Nixon administration was first made clear on the very evening that Nixon announced the signing of the agreements when he declared that his administration continued to recognize the Thieu regime as the sole legitimate government of South Vietnam. This is in direct contradiction to the terms of the agreements which say that there are two parties, two administrations, two armies, three political forces, and so on, in South Vietnam. Having thus stated its intention, the Nixon administration proceeded to supply the Thieu regime with so many arms that, as testified by Major-General Peter Olenchuk before the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 8, ". . . we short changed ourselves within our overall inventories. We short changed also the Reserve units in terms of prime assets. We also, in certain instances, diverted equipment that would have gone to Europe."

U.S. AID TO THIEU

According to U.S. military sources quoted in the October 3, 1973 issue of the *New York Times*, during the first six months after the signing of the Paris agreements, the U.S. provided the Saigon Air Force alone with 142,000 bombs, rockets and flares and 13.8 million of small-arms ammunition. In clear violation of Article 7 of the Paris agreements, the Pentagon announced plans to replace Saigon's F–5A fighters with more advanced F–5E's, which as one Defense Department official explained, "are not to replace attrition per se, or losses, they are to modernize the Vietnamese Air Force."

Of course, the Saigon Air Force requires training in the use of these new fighters, and to this end, the Pentagon hinted that South Vietnamese pilots are being trained at Williams Air Base in Arizona as well as in Vietnam (*Hearings of the Committee on Armed Services*, Part 8, August, 1973.) Even the most recent Defense Department appropriations include substantial allocations for "offshore training of ARVN personnel," "funds for the operational support of the field advisors from all services assigned to Military Assistance Command-Vietnam," appropriations for a "psychological warfare campaign conducted by the United States Information Service and Military Assistance Command-Vietnam," and a host of other appropriations. The number of MAC–V field advisors is given as 6,326 persons (*Hearings of the Committee on Appropriations*, Part 5, July, 1973.)

In addition, the Pentagon's own figures indicate that there are now 12,000 Marine and Air Force personnel in South Vietnam (*Hearings of the Committee on Armed Services*, Part 8, August, 1973). Then there are several thousand civilian advisors under Defense Department contract and "public safety officers" (i.e., prison and police advisors, intelligence advisors, and advisors for the pacification and the Phoenix programs) attached to the U.S. embassy in Saigon and to the various consulates in other parts of the country.[2] The total number of Americans listed openly as military advisors is over 24,000, or close to the total number of American advisors during the late months of the Kennedy administration, when, according to the Nixon administration, the Vietnam war was really precipitated.

Besides the maintenance of such a large force, the United States has also organized its command structure in Vietnam to better carry out Washington's intentions. The Defense Attache Office, headed by General John Murray and attached to the command headquarters of General John Vogt in Thailand, now takes over MAC–V responsibilities for commanding the Saigon army and police forces. The office of the Special Assistant to the Ambassador for Field Operations (SAAFO) is now directing the pacification and the Phoenix programs. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) still continues to train, equip and advise the Saigon police. And the four American consulates in Da Nang, Nhatrang, Bien Hoa and Can Tho are in effect the new American military command headquarters for the Saigon army in military regions numbers I, II, III, and IV respectively.

THIEU'S VIOLATIONS OF PEACE AGREEMENTS

All the American activities mentioned above represent serious and blatant violations of Articles 1, 4, 5, 7, and 9 of the Paris agreements. Thus encouraged and supported the Thieu regime has done everything it can to wreck the agreements. This fact is well-documented in a study entitled "Violations of the Peace Agreements" prepared by Deputy Ho Ngoc Nhuan, a well-known Catholic leader in the Saigon Lower House, and made public by him on November 1, 1973. Just like the Nixon administration, the Thieu regime has been quite frank about its intentions. Deputy Nhuan's study reprints quite a number of Thieu's official orders to his forces to "blow the brains out," "chop to pieces," and "annihilate" any communist or "any person who dares to speak in the communist language."

An example of this is Thieu's speech on August 6, 1973, during the military parade commemorating the anniversary of the creation of the so-called Self-Defense Forces in which he ordered the Self-Defense Forces and all other of its forces and cadres to "be resolute in chopping up all the tricky Communists" to "chop, chop, chop," because "The Communists are trying their best to create a second administration in South Vietnam and to demand democratic freedoms and the freedom of movement from one zone to another so that they can carry out trade and therefore destroy the economy of the Republic of Vietnam [Thieu's regime—ed.]. The Communists are demanding negotiations, democratic freedoms, freedom of the press, and freedom of speech in order to propagandize Communist ideology among the ranks [of the government] of the Republic of Vietnam."

ATTACKS ON PRG AREAS

To make it difficult for the PRG to "create a second administration," the Thieu regime has repeatedly attacked PRG-controlled areas. It is impossible to list all these military violations here, for by all accounts the Saigon Air Force has flown around 15,000 bombing and reconnaisance missions, the army has conducted about 35,000 military operations in the attempt to gain territories, and the police and para-military forces have carried out over 200,000 "pacification" operations during the past eleven months. And more often than not, the Saigon regime unabashedly brags of its achievement.

For example, on June 19, 1973, Thieu declared that "the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam has regained all the territories lost during 1972." On October 8, 1973, Reuters quoted an official Saigon press release as saying that over 100 of its own jets had bombed many areas under PRG control along the Vietnam-Cambodia border for four successive days. These turned out to be populated areas in the province of Tay Ninh and and result was the death of many civilians and the destruction of many homes, plus a school and a hospital (*Agence France Press*, October 9, 1973).

In recent days, the Thieu regime has become increasingly aggressive and provocative. For example, according to Agence France Press, between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. on November 23, 1973, several hundred Saigon jets dumped thousands of bombs in the populated areas of Tan Bien district in Tay Ninh province and killed scores of people, destroyed hundreds of homes and many paddy-fields and farms. From November 17 to 22, close to 100 planes dropped 600 bombs, fired rockets, and strafed villages in the Hong Tam area of Binh province, causing untold death and destruction. On December 3, 100 homes and a Catholic church in Ninh Phu, Loc Ninh province, were destroyed and many of the inhabitants were killed.

On December 10, 1973, at 8:30 a.m., 15 minutes before the airplane operated by the International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS) was to reach Loc Ninh airport from Saigon, two Saigon AD–6 planes dropped 10 bombs on the airport in an attempt to kill PRG leaders who had come to welcome their representatives back from the Joint Military Commission meetings. These are what Thieu referred to as "pre-emptive actions" in a recent speech. The speech is summarized in the January 5, 1974 issue of the *Washington Post* as follows:

"President Nguyen Can Thieu today [January 4] called on his troops to attack the Viet Cong in their own territory because he said, the Vietnam war has begun again. He said pre-emptive actions of the South Vietnamese army had forestalled a Communist offensive, but the fight now had to be carried to zones occupied by the Viet Cong under the cease-fire agreement, because the threat of an offensive still remained."

In an attempt to restrict the movement of the population so that the "Communists" cannot "carry out trade and therefore destroy the economy of the Republic of Vietnam," the Thieu regime has ordered its forces to shoot to kill any refugee attempting to go home to PRG-controlled areas and has also ordered an "economic blockade", known as the "rice war." The refugee situation was discussed in some detail in Nos. 38 and 39 of this newsletter and the "rice war" was treated in issue No. 40. Since then the situation has become increasingly worse.

THIEU'S "MODEL" REFUGEE CAMPS

As far as the refugees are concerned, even those who had been transferred to the southern provinces so as to be able to "take advantage of new economic opportunities" are living in abject misery. The heart-rending conditions of those "lucky" refugees who had been transferred from the central provinces of Binh Dinh, Quang Ngai and Quang Nam to the districts of Ninh Tho and Long Hai in Tay Ninh province is described in a detailed study which was serialized in *Dai Dan Toc*, a Saigon daily, from November 1 to 20, 1973. This study is highly censored by the Thieu regime; there are big blank spaces on the printed pages indicating last minute "chiseling out" (*duc bo*) by the authorities.

However, what remains of the study is that more than half of the refugees transferred had escaped to go back to their former provinces in spite of the threat to their lives, the danger along the road, the lack of money for transportation, and the knowledge that their original villages had been completely razed and their former lands destroyed. Those refugees who are left behind said that they too would brave death to escape the two settlements in Tay Ninh.

The reasons are many and we can only briefly summarize some of them here. First of all, the Saigon regime is still conducting military operations in the areas, and the refugees are frequently killed and wounded. Then the camps are built in the middle of

[2] The names and functions of these advisors are listed outright in the most recent Foreign Service List, for example.

bodies of stagnant water where mosquitoes thrive. The houses in the camps are "just like cows' pens," with "tattered coconut-frond walls" and "low corrugated iron roofs which bake the occupants" during the daytime. Each house, only large enough to "contain 5 beds, serves as living quarters for 5 families," each "family is given a rectangular space similar to a stall for a horse or buffalo." To be able to get a piece of virgin land outside the camp to build a house on, each family has to pay at least 10,000 piasters.

While this amount of money represents about two months salary for a Saigon soldier, it is a huge sum for most refugee families. The refugees also claim that the government gives them no food and no help in seeking employment. The local Cao Dai churches only help them with some food during the first 9 or 10 days, in return for their labor. Eighty per cent of the refugees in Long Hai have no employment at all. Those who could find work such as reaping and thrashing rice for landlords earn next to nothing while being abused in many ways.

In order to survive almost all of the refugees have to go to the mountains to dig up roots. This has been the chief means of livelihood for the refugees. The mountains are distant from the camps, and in order to get there one has to have a bicycle. Only those with savings can afford this luxury, since an old second-hand bicycle costs over 10,000 piasters. Even so, there are just too many refugees and roots are getting extremely hard to find, and some families have to go for days without even this food, even though the roots are somewhat toxic, causing the eyes to become yellow and the eyesight to blur. Nor are greens anywhere to be found, for everything has been eaten.

Because of the lack of food, some mothers do not have any milk for their babies and so even some two month old babies have to suck on the roots. A mother became so desperate that she borrowed a bicycle from a neighbor and went and stole some manioc roots from the land of a certain landlord. The landlord caught her and beat her with the trunk of a bamboo until the bamboo broke. That night the woman was allowed to crawl home to her two children (for her legs had been completely broken and she could no longer walk) but the landlord kept her borrowed bicycle, saying that he would give it back only after she brought him a head of a pig. Her neighbors chipped in to buy the landlord a pig's head, but they could not buy her life back for her. She died soon thereafter, leaving her orphaned children behind.

At Long Hoa marketplace in Long Hai, there are people who sell their children and wives. There are others who have just quietly taken the lives of everyone in their families to escape the suffering. Such are only a few brief sketches of the lives of the refugees in these two "model" camps.

The situation concerning the refugees of Phu Tai in Binh Dinh province, as documented in the November 18 and 20 issues of the Saigon daily, *Dien Tin*, is even worse. According to the accusation of 5 deputies of the Saigon Lower House from Binh Dinh and Qui Nhon provinces, Thieu's own lieutenants have burnt 2,700 houses in Phu Tai camp, depriving 14,000 refugees of their shelters. The purpose of the burning is to drive the refugees to the An Tuc camp in the mountain area, where no planting is possible and to cover up the fact that the aid in terms of rice, money and corrugated iron roofing that was supposed to go to the refugees (amounting to some 2.5 billion piasters) had been all stolen by the officials. But as reported in the December 1, 1973 issue of *Dien Tin*, instead of doing anything about this situation, the Thieu regime arrested the whole staff of Deputy Nguyen Huu Thoi, one of the deputies who accused the Thieu regime of the crime. They have been jailed since November 29.

According to Deputy Huyn Van Tru, in the same issue of *Dien Tin*, not only does this violate the constitutional rights of Deputy Thoi but it also runs against the fact that one of the persons accused had admitted his crime. The Saigon regime accused the Deputy of "working for the Communists" for accusing the Saigon authorities of burning the Phu Tai camp and threatened that if the Deputy persisted in his accusation, he would be eliminated.

The "Rice War"

The refugees are not the only ones who are suffering. According to Deputy Vu Cong Minh, "the inhabitants of the Western provinces are now caught in a dying situation because of the government's policy of economic blockade." The Deputy said that he raised his voice asking for help because the lives of the inhabitants of the areas are being seriously threatened. One of the reasons for the sorry state of affairs is the confiscation of rice from the rural population by the Saigon authorities. But even if the authorities did not confiscate rice from the population so indiscriminately, the official demands for rice from these provinces are enough to cause serious hunger. According to the November 16, 1973 issue of *Dien Tin*, the IV Corps commanders have promised to send Saigon 75,000 tons of rice in November and 165,000 tons of rice in December, 1973. This is about equal to the total amount of rice delivered to Saigon during the first 6 months of 1973, according to the April-June, 1973 USAID *Vietnam Economic Data* bulletin.

Here is one of the widespread cases caused by this policy of collection of rice from the rural areas as reported in the December 17, 1973 issue of *Dien Tin:* In Hong Vang, a woman whose soldier husband had died, received no death benefits from the Saigon government. For a long period she tried her best to find any kind of job to feed her six children, the oldest being only eleven years old. But because the rice collection had created critical shortages in the countryside and consequently pushed the price of rice way up, there was nothing the woman could do. On December 12, 1973, after going three days without food, the woman crawled into a fellow villager's house and stole a basketful of manioc roots. By the time she got some of the roots cooked, she died. The children gorged themselves on the roots, but because they had gone without food for quite some time, and perhaps because the roots were too hot for their already weakened stomachs, they all became unconscious. The next to the youngest child died.

Neither is the situation facing the city population much rosier. Most of the rice collected is sold by the officials at horrendous blackmarket prices. According to the November 20, 1973 issue of *Dien Tin*, the price of a kilogram of rice in the district of Hoai Nhon in Binh Dinh province is 400 piasters, or 4 times the official price! According to the November 26 and 27 issues of *Song Than*, a very conservative Saigon daily, on November 11, 1,000 city inhabitants of the third district of Danang, the second largest city in South Vietnam, congregated to protest the fact that the Saigon regime refused to sell rice to the population, causing thousands to be seriously hungry. Major Le Khac Kha the chief of the third district, ordered his troops to fire into the crowd to disperse the protestors, causing serious wounds to many people.

A Danang city councilman who was supporting the protest was critically wounded. This angered the inhabitants of Danang even more, and coupled with their demand for hunger relief is the demand that the local despots be punished. So far to no avail. Perhaps the critical economic situation facing the urban population of South Vietnam could be demonstrated by the case of this Saigon family as reported in the December 22, 1973 issue of *Dien Tin*: This is a small family of four, husband, wife, and two children. The husband is a disabled officer who receives no benefits and has no work; the two children are still too young to go to school; and the wife works at a Saigon bank and receives 20,000 piasters, or about 4 times the monthly salary of an average worker.

At the beginning of this year, this was barely enough for rent and food. Because of Thieu's "economic blockade" policy, prices jumped from 109% to 198%. The woman began selling her jewelry and other belongings to make up for the increase in prices. Beginning in August, 1973, she had to buy rotten rice, the rice that at other times is fed to pigs, to feed her family. In October, however, they could not even afford two meals of cooked rice a day but had to be content with one meal of steamed rice and one meal of rice gruel. The husband and wife consider themselves lucky that they are still alive, but with soaring prices the husband finds himself faced with two choices: one is to enter a monastery so that his children and wife will have enough to eat, and the other is to give up the two children to an orphanage.

The above violations of the terms of the peace agreements and the rampant corruption of the Thieu regime have created so much suffering for the people of South Vietnam, from both the rural and urban areas, that, in spite of the possible consequences, a writer in the November 20, 1973 issue of *Dien Tin*, called for a "total revolution." No wonder, as quoted earlier, Thieu ordered his troops to chop to pieces "any person who dared to speak in the communist language." But as pointed out by Deputy Ho Ngoc Nhuan in the study quoted earlier:

"The thing that must be clearly emphasized here is that whatever the other side has demanded and President Thieu has rejected, are precisely the things that the population of South Vietnam has also demanded. Especially during the last 10 years of Mr. Thieu's rule, the people of South Vietnam have continually struggled for their democratic freedoms. These are inalienable rights that no guns and bullets can suppress."

It is difficult, therefore, to see how Thieu's policies won't generate strong reactions on the part of the population. These reactions may come in many forms and may include violent demonstrations in the cities and armed rebellions in the countryside. After all, as testified by Interior Minister Le Cong Chat before the joint session of the Budget and Finance Committee and the Interior Committee of the Saigon Lower House on October 30, 1973, by this year the local Popular Defense Forces are to be increased to 4 million persons (*Dien Tin*, November 1, 1973). This is one-fourth of the total population of South Vietnam, and many of these people are armed with the latest weapons. The present conditions created by Thieu must have affected them too.

Perhaps Thieu realizes the full meaning of his doings (or undoings), because for the past few months he has issued warnings of an imminent attack by "Communist forces." This is used as an excuse for brutally squashing any organized protests on the part of the population as well as for getting more military and economic support from the U.S. government.

To get American support, Thieu has used tactics ranging from commandeering the peasants of Binh Duong province to dig anti-tank trenches to protect against an alleged impending attack (*New York Times*, December 11, 1973), to declaring that Hanoi has about 400,000 troops in the South and is planning a large-scale offensive (Reuters, January 1, 1974). What is so ominous is that instead of rebuking Thieu for his obvious

lies[3] and his blatant provocations,[4] it is reported in the January 6, 1974 issue of the *New York Times* that President Nixon, Secretary of State Kissinger, and Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger have approved plans asking Congress for increased arms aid to the Thieu regime. They want "to provide Saigon with modern sophisticated weapons in a total aid package of about $1 billion." This is after Congress had already voted over $1 billion worth of military aid, with $813 million through the military aid program and $200 million through the "Food For Peace" program. This should be measured against the statement by Defense Secretary Schlesinger on November 30, 1973, that the United States was prepared to resume bombing Vietnam because "the North Vietnamese are preparing for an offensive," the implication of Kissinger's statement about bombing the daylights out of Hanoi to make sure that the agreements stick, and the charge by the PRG of frequent reconnaissance flights by U.S. planes over PRG territories. Who knows an American president on the brink of impeachment may find a way out by resuming the war. For who would have the guts to carry through with impeachment of an American president who is carrying out a war to stop "Communist aggression?" And once such a war started, who would stop it? The lessons of the Vietnam war—and later of the Indochina war—ought to be perfectly clear.—*Vietnam Resource Center staff*

U.S. "Aid": Prelude to War

The more money the U.S. gives Thieu, the more Thieu can avoid coming to terms with his own people. More aid will not "reform" Thieu but only ruin the chances for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

Previous to the signing of the Paris agreements the United States channeled a very large amount of unauthorized funds to the Thieu regime and its armed forces through the U.S. army and other agencies. According to Colonel Hoa of the ARVN Department of Logistics, the Saigon military budget averaged about $5 billion a year at the official exchange rate instead of about $1 billion as the public has been led to believe (quoted in the Saigon daily Duoc Nha Nam, December 11, 1971.) The presence of American troops also brought various fringe benefits in the form of G.I. spending and work contracts for the Thieu regime and its supporters. After the signing of the accords, however, the withdrawal of American troops deprived the Thieu regime of the much needed money pump and hence all the attached fringe benefits. Of course American military and economic aid still remains at the very high ceiling of about $2.5 billion a year. Yet even this is not enough for Thieu because the Thieu regime has absolutely refused to demobilize any part of its armed forces. On September 14, 1973, Thieu himself declared that ARVN had to be maintained "to beat the Communists." (Le Monde, September 16–17, 1973). In fact, as his Interior Minister, Le Cong Chat, testified before the joint session of the Budget and Finance Committee and the Interior Committee at the Saigon Lower House on October 30, 1973, Saigon's national police force are to be increased to 122,000 men and the local Popular Defense Forces to 4 million persons by 1974. The minister stated that the salaries for the national police alone amounted to 29.5 billion piasters this year and is to be increased to 35.8 billion piasters by 1974. Also, the proposed expansion of the prison system in South Vietnam will incur a further expense of 5.7 billion piasters. Of this amount 1.6 billion piasters will go to the Department of Correction and the rest will be shared by the Con Son Prison Administration and the central office at the Department of the Interior (*Dien Tin*, November 1, 1973). According to the official statistics given by the Thieu regime, in 1971 its national budget was 235 billion piasters, in 1972 this was increased to 328.5 billion piasters, in 1973 the amount is 467.2 billion piasters, and during FY 1974 it will be increased to 630.7 billion piasters, an increase of 275 per cent over 1971, 195 per cent over 1972 and 130 per cent over 1973 (*Dien Tin*, November 6, 1973).

Thieu and Taxes

Where will Thieu get all this money? One way is through increased taxation. The main part of the tax package for 1974 is 226.5 billion piasters, or an increase of 85 per cent over the total tax package of 126.5 billion for FY 1973 (Dien Tin, October 25, 1973). The amount of 226.5 billion piasters of tax money for 1974 also represents an increase of 182 per cent over the total for FY 1972, a deputy at the Saigon Lower House recently stated. However, according to the same deputy, the 226 billion piasters will only pay about 65 per cent of the salaries of the military and civilian personnel. This amounts to over 330 billion piasters alone (Dien Tin, November 6, 1973). While this is the case, the 226 billion piasters in tax is a large chunk of the gross national product of South Vietnam, which is given as 453.9 billion piasters for 1974 (Dien Tin, October 25, 1973). Robert H. Nooter, Assistant Administrator for Supporting Assistance of the State Department, testified on July 13, 1973 before the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Operations that Saigon's GNP in 1972 was 124.6 billion piasters at constant (1960) prices. Since the foreign exchange rate was 102 piasters per US dollar in 1960 and around 430 piasters per dollar in 1972 (Vietnam Economic Data, April–June, 1973, AID Bureau for Supporting Assistance), it seems that South Vietnam's GNP has been declining.

This development is reflected in the critically high and steadily increasing rate of unemployment recently announced by the Saigon Department of Labor. Among the unemployed are the 3.9 million who fled into the towns and cities for safety, 600,000 officially listed refugees who are still living in the camps, 160,000 former employees for American and other foreign companies and firms, 250,000 young people of working age joining the labor force every year, several hundred thousand former barmaids and prostitutes for the foreign troops, and tens of thousands of disabled veterans, widows, and discharged soldiers. The total population of the country is given as 18.7 million. (Dai Dan Toc, October 28, 1973)

As for those who are still employed, they have received little or no increase in salary since 1971. The minimum monthly salary of a male employee is still 6,375 piasters (Dai Dan Toc, November 4, 1973), while a 100-kilo sack of rice now costs over 27,000 piasters in Saigon (Dien Tin, October 19, 1973). This means that a worker can buy only about 25 kilos of rice a month, which is only enough for his own consumption. Nevertheless, the Thieu regime has ordered that taxes must be "collected to the utmost" (tan thu) for the sake of the national budget (Dien Tin, November 1, 1973). And in the countryside a person has to pay from eight to 14 kinds of taxes, depending on his occupation or lack of occupation (Dien Tin, October 19, 1973).

"Collection to the Utmost"

"Collection to the utmost" does not simply mean collecting all the taxes in full. It also means official sanction to use all possible means of extortion to get those taxes. In the October 1973 issue of this newsletter we documented in some detail the rice collection policy, which involved massive military forays into the countryside, causing death and suffering and threatening a full-scale resumption of the war. We have now learned that this policy is being pushed with unprecedented cruelty and that, not content with leaving it to the regional commanders, the province and district chiefs and other local authorities, the Thieu regime has ordered the high command of the Saigon Armed Forces, the Department of Commerce and Industry, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Economy to join forces in the collection of rice (Dien Tin, November 2, 1973).

We also described a gigantic land grab being carried out by Thieu's officials. Using their bureaucratic power these officials employ the army to evict the peasants from their land even though they have legal proof of ownership. The timber and produce from the peasants' land are then taken away for export to bring in the much-needed foreign currency. In the past five years Saigon has had to import on the average over $800 million in foreign goods each year. The only year it imported less than $800 million was 1970. The total imports planned for 1974 amount to $870 million, while South Vietnam only has a foreign reserve of $27 million this year (Dien Tin, October 25, 1973). Even Robert H. Nooter of the State Department testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Operations on July 13, 1973 that the State Department's own planning for Saigon's import will amount to $800 million in 1974. Foreign currency is not only for imports but also for transfer of funds abroad, to Swiss and other foreign bank accounts. The land grab by Thieu's officials continues with increasing cruelty despite the fact that several million people are unemployed and starving. More than one million hectares of the once cultivated land has been laid barren by the war and recent floods (caused in part by the American defoliation program) destroyed additional crops in some central and southwestern provinces during the past few months. To maintain the loyalty of its officials and the flow of taxes and supplies to Saigon, the Thieu regime sanctions a system of unbridled corruption, extortion and terror in the countryside far worse than in any other period since the Diem regime first came to power.

The Western press, impressed as it is by the destructiveness of modern war-making gadgets and spectacular military offensives, has failed to notice the suffering and death caused by Thieu's officials by quieter and simpler means. A measure of the seriousness of the situation has been the response of the Saigon newspapers. In spite of extremely heavy fines, strict censorship, the constant threat of confiscation of the papers and closing down of their presses, these papers have been carrying hundreds of articles fully documenting and detailing the corruption and extortion, the murders and liquidations carried out every day by Thieu's officials. In what follows we briefly summarize some of the typical cases as reported in several Saigon newspapers.

Assassination Squads

The first typical case is described in detail in the October 24–31, 1973, issues of Dien Tin. It involves Major Ngo Van Thi, district chief of Ben Tranh in Dinh Tuong province. Like many of his colleagues, this district chief has all kinds of ingenious ways of making money. He organizes gangs of thugs (many of them his own soldiers) disguised as NLF troops, armed with captured NLF weapons, and sends them out to rob people at gunpoint. These gangs are called the "assassination squads." During village and hamlet elections, anybody who wants to run for office has to pay him 50,000 piasters and anybody who wants to "win" has to pay him 100,000 to 300,000 piasters. Almost all of the seats

[3] The *New York Times* (January 6, 1974) reported U.S. claims of 30,000 new NVA troops in the South—an unsupported figure but significantly smaller than Thieu's.

[4] The attack on Loc Ninh airport, the order to his troops of January 4 to attack PRG-controlled areas.

in the hamlets and villages under his jurisdiction have been sold in this manner. The sum of 300,000 piasters is equal to the annual salary of a colonel or a Saigon university professor. Although this may appear to be a huge sum of money to pay for a village seat, "the successful candidate" can easily get back his investment with interest in a short time, simply by using his bureaucratic power to exact as much money from the people as he wants. Many of the village chiefs in the district will in turn recruit gangs of their own and send them out disguised as NLF soldiers to rob the people. On one occasion, May 31, 1973, the national police of Tan Hoa Thanh learned of this and brought it to the attention of the district chief. Within hours, the commander of the robbery, Le Van Man, took his M-16 rifle in search of the police who dared to bring the matter up.

The district chief's henchmen also arrest people, branding them as "Viet Cong" or deserters, in order to exact money from them. Meanwhile, the real deserters are holding many of the official positions in the villages and hamlets after paying the district chiefs huge sums of money. The district chief also forces the peasants to sell rice to rice merchants working with him and then pockets half the profit made. Any person who wants to bring rice to Saigon for sale has to pay him 150,000 piasters for permission. At the beginning of this year the district chief had group photos taken of the 10,000 households in his district to make it easier for him to control them. In the process he made at least 1.5 million piasters by shaking down the photographers. He also forced the households to hang out Saigon flags and made more than 300,000 piasters from that. The district chief confiscates identity papers from the population and returns them to their holders only after a certain amount of money has been paid. He sends his henchmen out to collect and destroy the certificates of land ownership from landholders and then usurps their lands. Following his example landlords go on a rampage stealing lands from the peasants. Any peasants who attempt to go back to their land have been either beaten or brought to court. The whole thing is so rampant and callous that the Director of the Office of Paddyfields and Land in Dinh Tuong province has had to protest in a report. As for those owners who have not had their certificates of ownership taken away from them, they have to pay 30 gia (about 900 kilos) of rice per hectare. This amounts to about 30 per cent of the yield. In addition to this they have to pay taxes of course to the central authority.

There are many other ways of making money, notably demanding 20 to 70 thousand piasters from regional forces who do not want to be transfered to dangerous areas in the district. Many of these forces are in turn used by the district chief to run his various businesses, such as raising pigs, repairing motor-cycles and cars, and providing personal services for him and his various wives.

Many people have dared to bring the matter to the attention of the Thieu regime. People with documented proof of the corruption of the district chief have had the papers confiscated and have been beaten, in some cases killed, by his hired thugs. The latest victim of such a murder was Mr. Le Van Duyen, a fairly well-off inhabitant of Ben Tranh. Mr. Duyen had supplied the government with impressive documentation of the district chief's crimes. As a result, in the middle of the night of October 25, 1973, the district chief sent two of his henchmen and executed Mr. Duyen in front of his wife and daughter by shooting him through the temple with a revolver. After that District Chief Ngo Van Thi forced Mr. Duyen's family to bury him immediately and would not allow an autopsy.

According to Dien Tin, the case of the district chief of Ben Tranh has been brought to the attention of the Thieu regime many times with full documentation. Many times, because of public pressure, investigative teams have been sent out, but nothing ever came of such investigations and not a word has been uttered about the case officially. The October 30 issue of Dien Tin formally charged the Thieu regime with protecting the district chief, detailing some of the reasons. This issue was immediately confiscated. Dien Tin then concluded that the district chief of Ben Tranh was "covered by a hugh umbrella as large as the sky." The entire population of Ben Tranh is of less consequence than the district chief who is absolutely indispensible in "herding the people."

MORE EXTORTION CASES

The second typical cases involves Major Nguyen Van Hac, district chief of Giao Duc, Dinh Tuong province. His case has been discussed in some detail by many Saigon papers for months, and it was again mentioned in the October 27-29 issues of *Dien Tin*. Basically, Nguyen Van Hac has been guilty of the same crimes as Major Ngo Van Thi, only more openly. He has no need to disguise his people as NLF troops when they go out to rob the people. He simply sends Captain Tuong or Sergeant No out with a group of soldiers to knock on people's doors and demand money. When a public outcry unavoidably brought the case of Nguyen Van Hac to the attention of the Thieu regime, an official investigative delegation was sent out which was merely a whitewash. Nguyen Van Hac wined and dined the delegation and nothing came of it. In fact, Mrs. Nguyen Van Hac even declared publicly that she had bought off the entire delegation and that her husband would shortly be made deputy provincial chief of Dinh Tuong. Nguyen Van Hac also personally bragged to the inhabitants of his district, "I am still district chief of Giao Duc. All those local people and reporters who accused me have been thrown in jail. You'll see, whenever I get tired of this place I'll go to Dinh Tuong to take up the post of deputy regional commander."

The third typical case is that of Major Vu Cong Khanh, district chief of Thang Binh, Quang Tin province. He has been accused by the village councils in all the villages under his jurisdiction of cruelty, extortion, and wanton destruction of private and church properties. Even the Province Council of Quang Tin was forced to send an official report to Thieu himself, summarizing the crimes committed by the district Chief and asking Thieu to transfer the district chief to another place while his crimes were under investigation. The letter was dated September 25, 1972, but so far Thieu has not responded to it in any way. For this reason, a verbatim transcript of the letter was printed in the November 3-5 issues of *Dien Tin*. Major Khanh's activities are similar to those of his two colleagues just mentioned. The only difference is that he is even more brazen in his approach. (This is perhaps due to the fact that northern provinces are usually regarded by the Thieu regime as "unfriendly" requiring harsher measures.) Any village official who does not go along with the district chief's activities is personally beaten up by him. The victims of this kind of physical abuse have been the village chiefs and other village officials of Binh Lam, Binh Lanh, Binh Tri, and Binh Phu.

Although the district chief received money in April for rehabilitating 11 villages, he officially allowed the inhabitants of only 6 villages to come home. The inhabitants of the other villages were ordered to go south and that as far as he was concerned their villages ceased to exist. As well as pocketing the entire amount of money allotted to the five villages and a very large chunk of the money of the other six, he also sent Company 3 of the Army Corps of Engineers to the villages of Binh Lam and Binh Lanh with bulldozers and power saws and razed them to the ground. Churches and pagodas, houses, orchards, and even graveyards were completely flattened. Then the district chief ordered army trucks to carry back to his district headquarters anything of value. Of particular interest to the district chief was the timber from jackfruit trees, a valuable article. It took 10 trucks working continuously for two weeks to transport all these trees.

"THE LITTLE MONARCH"

The fourth typical case involves Major Le Van Sy, district chief as well as military commander-in-chief of Phuoc Long, the province of Bac Lieu. As described in the November 3-5, 1973, issues of *Dien Tin*, by holding these positions Major Sy makes a huge sum of money by replacing and transferring village officials, soldiers, outpost commanders and so on. The Major has an impressive force of retainers who specialize in extortion, protection of gambling, rapes and torture. They beat people whenever they feel like it, for no reason at al. Rapes are committed both impulsively and systematically. Two of the Major's most effective henchmen in the village of Phong Tay, for example, order families with beautiful girls to their village headquarters to sleep at night under the pretense that these families are considered "Viet Cong suspects." Then the women are taken to their private quarters and raped. Those families who refuse to go to the village headquarters to sleep are branded as Viet Cong and punished accordingly. The Major sends his henchmen out daily to find out which peasant households have some rice and which have relatives with the NLF. Sometimes disguised as NLF soldiers, his men will ask the inhabitants for help. The people who fall into this trap are immediately arrested and tortured to extort money from them. Many of the major retainers are draft-dodgers and deserters. At one point the national police made a sweep in the area and arrested eight of Major Sy's retainers because these people did not have the necessary papers. The Major forced the national police to release them at once.

To make extra money, the Major also makes his soldiers raise pigs, chickens and ducks for him. All the local rice milling stations have to supply feeds free of charge. Soldiers are also used as servants for his three wives. At one point, owing to public pressure the IV Corps Headquarters was forced to investigate but without result. Major Sy's protector was so powerful that the authorities of the IV Corps were obliged to announce that "Major Sy is a meritorious and effective administrator and has never done anything wrong." Since that day, the Major has behaved even more heavy-handedly and the inhabitants in his district are even more fearful of him. And for this reason, he has earned the nickname "the little monarch" of Phuoc Long.

The list of local despots protected by the Thieu regime might be extended but enough has been given to show how much the Vietnamese people have to go through. And the despots are not limited only to officialdom. Landlords and even some Catholic priests have been especially active in robbing and bullying the people. Catholic priests who are involved in such activities are usually more subtle than the officials, but not always so, as in the case of the parish priest of Cai San, a Catholic community of several hundred thousand Catholics who originally had come from North Vietnam. The case of this priest, who is the spiritual father in charge of the whole community of Cai San, is described in the October 25, 1973, issue of Dien Tin. The father stops at nothing to get an income for himself. Even the officials in Cai San are scared of him and "have to shake their heads and stick out their tongues because the Fa-

ther's activities would even make the devil cry and the gods frown in sadness." In Cai San community there is a 75-year-old man, who is a descendant of a five-generation Catholic family and advisor to the parish's Catholic Council. This man, Tran Van Huan, advised the father to refrain from his unpopular activities. But the father went on with his business and so Mr. Huan had to oppose him publicly. The father subsequently sent a disciple to destroy Mr. Huan's house and beat his daughter almost to death. As a result of this, Mr. Huan prepared a document to be presented to the Saigon regime describing the crimes of the father. A policeman was then dispatched to Mr. Huan's house armed with a rifle. Everybody in the house was shot and a woman in the neighborhood who was visiting at Mr. Huan's house was killed on the spot. Only Mr. Huan and his wife escaped death with severe injuries and had to leave the community. All of Mr. Huan's land was then seized by the father. And even though Mr. Huan again sent a letter to the Saigon regime on October 7, 1973, asking for help and intervention, nothing has been done.

But this kind of abuse of power is not limited to the districts and provinces alone. It happens right in Saigon under the very noses of foreign observers and the foreign press. For example, as reported in the October 27, 1973 issue of *Dien Tin*, on the previous day Saigon representatives held a conference at which they reported the widespread confiscation of properties on the pretext of not having paid the full amounts of taxes. Often the properties confiscated are worth more than 100 times the amount of taxed owed. These would in turn be sold off cheaply and the money gained would be pocketed by the tax collectors and their protectors. An example of this tactic is given by Representative Ruyet: A bread bakery on Hai Ba Trung Street, a few blocks from Thieu's Independence Palace, was taxed at 200,000 piasters. But the collector made the owner pay 2 million piasters. After the owner paid this, an additional 5 million piasters was demanded. The owner said he had no more money and in two days this bakery worth "several tens of millions of piasters," was confiscated and sold for a few million piasters. Money is also being made in the name of "urban beautification." Thieu's latest program for attracting foreign tourists. One of the ways of exacting money from the Saigon population under this program is the widespread confiscation of motor bikes on the pretext of "traffic law violations" as described by Deputy Do Sinh Tu in the November 1, 1973 issue of *Dien Tin*.

Again, one can simply go on and on citing cases of extortion right in the city of Saigon itself. What can be done about it? The Thieu regime says it needs more money from the United States and other countries. The Nixon administration agrees, and has been forcing Congress to vote generous sums to the Thieu regime. The assumption of the Nixon administration and a majority in Congress is that the Thieu regime will behave better if given more money. They assume that it is the lack of money that has made the Thieu regime embark on its course of corruption, extortion, and terror. But this is an erroneous assumption, for several reasons. American aid given to Thieu at the present rate asked by the Nixon administration will meet only a third of Thieu's budget (*Dien Tin*, October 25, 1973). Thieu will still have to "collect to the utmost" from the Vietnamese people to meet his expenditures. This aid will not make Thieu's officials any less despotic but instead it will give them added strength and ammunition in carrying out their activities. Not only will they have more means at their disposal, but the foreign currencies supplied through the aid will enable them to transfer the wealth they exact from the Vietnamese people abroad. Perhaps the most serious of all is the fact that as long as the Thieu regime thinks it can depend on U.S. aid, it will never make peace with the Vietnamese people. As a Saigon newspaper recently stated, "The more critical the situation the Saigon government creates for itself, the more reason there is for the Nixon administration to continue military aid." (*Dien Tin*, October 3, 1973) If such is the expectation, then the Thieu regime will never make peace with any segment of the society, including the Third Force. Thieu has declared that all Third Force groups are "traitors" with their "strings pulled by the Communists." (*Dien Tin*, October 3, 1973) And Deputy Nguyen Ba Can, chairman of the Saigon Lower House and one of Thieu's most effective supporters, said "there is no such thing as national reconciliation and national concord" with other political forces. (*Dien Tin*, October 3, 1973)

But the importance of a Third Force for national reconciliation and national concord is real and is not just a "Communist ploy" to outmaneuver Thieu politically by using it as a focus for the vast popular opposition to the Thieu regime.

Even if the PRG should become a dominant force in the future, with or without a coalition government, a Third Force can at least provide a channel through which Thieu's present henchmen and local despots can reform and give them an opportunity to prove that they are willing to change and work for the benefit of the national community. It also makes it possible for the PRG to cooperate with them and use them in the future without risking strong criticism from the population who have been their victims and perhaps from the PRG soldiers and rank-and-file who have sacrificed so much for the national community. There is no doubt that many of the present despots are talented people and could be of good service to their country if given the opportunity to change their ways.

This opportunity is thrown away as long as U.S. aid flows indiscriminately to the Thieu regime. There should be a complete or at least a very substantial aid cut. The Thieu regime must be made to realize that it needs the Vietnamese people and not be allowed to rely on continued U.S. aid to oppress the people. As long as the Thieu regime still has the illusion that it can beat large segments of the Vietnamese people into submission with continued aid, it will continue with its present policies and its officials will continue heaping suffering and death upon the Vietnamese people. Under such circumstances, there is no guarantee that the PRG won't lose its patience and be pressured by public opinion to take military measures to curb the Thieu regime or even attempt to get rid of it. When this occurs, not only will there certainly be ramifications beyond the wishes of most Vietnamese but there will be little the United States can do to save Thieu. Besides the obvious loss of lives and destruction of property in the course of the fighting, the prospect for national reconciliation and concord as envisioned in the Paris agreements will become more difficult. To cite but one possible example, the present despots have to be punished if a sense of justice is to be felt and if social order is to be promoted. It will be too late for them to repent all of a sudden and it will also be too late to let them go scot-free even if the future government wanted to do this badly enough. On the other hand, if the despots were appropriately punished for their crimes the cry of "bloodbath" will resound in the Western world and especially in the United States. Even sympathetic people will call the Vietnamese authoritarian and will explain any punishment in terms of Vietnamese culture as in *Fire in the Lake*. Even if these despots were to be sent to "correctional facilities", to use an American term, for a short period to allow them to think things through, the cry of "thought reform," "brain washing," and "kiem thao"—again as in *Fire in the Lake*—will be loud and clear. Many Americans on both sides of the political fence would feel especially self-righteous either about their correct idea of the nature of a socialist or communist society or their correct idea of the nature of Vietnamese society. Either way, in the eyes of these people, the Vietnamese can't win. At best, they will be victims of Communism or their own culture!

The tragedy of continued aid to the Thieu regime, therefore, does not stop at the continued death and suffering for the Vietnamese people but it includes as well the danger that the most significant social experiences in the history of the world will never be fully understood by people in the West even after the expensive price they have had to pay for it.

SELECTED TRANSLATIONS FROM SAIGON NEWSPAPERS

The following translation from the November 1 and 2 issues of Dien Tin is not a piece of fiction but a real story written in the "documentary fiction" style (phong su tieu thuyet). For a demonstration of the importance of this kind of writing as well as the "essays in realist literature" (van chuong ta chan) in describing Vietnamese life, please read Ngo Vinh Long's Before the Revolution: The Vietnamese Peasants under the French (MIT Press, 1973).

PIGS AND PEOPLE

(By Soc Ha)

Mrs. Hai put her head on her husband's chest. Her son Chot, whom she was holding in her arms, smiled at the glittering sunlight in the front yard. Mrs. Hai wiped Chot's nose with her plaid scarf as she said to her husband:

"Darling, look! She's getting well-rounded. Perhaps next month we will have a litter of . . . 'grandchildren.' "

Mr. Hai smiled and patted his wife on the back.

"When do you think she will deliver?"

Mrs. Hai muttered to herself as she calculated:

"At the latest, by the end of the month."

Out in the yard the sow was sunning herself. Her large bulging stomach spread out over the packed earth.

Mrs. Hai looked at her husband and smiled cheerfully.

"When she delivers her litter, it will be quite a sight to see the piglets running around the house!"

Sounds of gunfire cracked in the distance. The smile on Mrs. Hai's face disappeared.

"What misery! I thought that by moving here we'd at last be safe. But who'd ever think that guns and bullets would follow us around like this all the time?"

Mrs. Hai sighed as she carried Chot into the kitchen.

She mixed two bowls of bran and a handful of greens and brought it out to the sow.

That night there was gunfire close by. Mr. and Mrs. Hai quickly grabbed their son and jumped into the shelter. Startled from his sound sleep, Chot burst out crying. But the sound of his crying was drowned out by the gunfire. Mrs. Hai clutched her son tightly. Suddenly she heard loud grunts and she turned to her husband:

"My God! The sow is still up there!"

She quickly handed Chot to her husband and started out of the shelter.

"No, darling, no!" said Mr. Hai, clutching his son with one hand and trying to pull his wife back with the other. "Look, the gunfire is too close!"

But the screeching of the sow made Mrs. Hai determined.* Amidst loud explosions she pulled herself out of the shelter. She brought the sow to the edge of the shelter and pushed it in. Mr. Hai pulled himself in deeper, making room for the pig. But a moment passed and Mrs. Hai still had not followed the pig down into the shelter. Mr. Hai quickly crawled out of the tunnel and there he felt his wife's hair spread out over the wet? earthen floor. She lay face-down, motionless. A bullet had pierced her forehead.

Mr. Hai lit the joss-sticks on his wife's altar. Under the altar a litter of piglets was contentedly sucking at their mother. The grunting of the sow brought tears to his eyes.

"Lua, darling," he prayed, "you should be alive to see your litter of 'grandchildren'! Why did you have to die? Why?"

Chot could crawl now and moved from under the bed toward the altar. He hugged and kissed his father's leg. When Mr. Hai bent to pick up his son and saw his dirty face, his tears streamed out. He carried Chot over to the bamboo bed and measured out rice gruel to feed the child. For over a month now, Chot had not had any milk. He cried continually for three days after his mother's death, but after that he slowly learned to eat the gruel.

After feeding his son, Mr. Hai walked to the back of the house, pulled out some coconut fibers, and knitted a rope the thickness of a finger. He then tied one end of the rope to Chot's ankle and the other end to the house post. Sobbing, he pleaded with his son:

"There is nothing I can do; I have to tie you up like this. I have to go to the fields to thrash rice for people to get some food to eat. I'm afraid that if I let you loose you'll crawl into a pond. Please don't be angry with me, son,"

Mr. Hai kissed Chot and walked out quickly. Chot screamed and crawled after his father. When the rope kept him from going any further, he hugged the earthern floor with his face and cried.

That afternoon Mr. Hai came home with a bunch of ripe bananas. As he stepped into the house, he peeled one of the bananas and scanned the house for Chot. But Chot was not there. All that remained was a twisted piece of broken rope. Mr. Hai was scared and cried out:

"Chot, Oooh! Chot, Oooh!"

He ran out of the house and around to the back. Then he stopped suddenly, stupefied. Chot was playing, crawling after the piglets who were led by the mother pig. Piglets and child, both covered with mud, making the rounds of the wet yard! Mr. Hai picked up his son and softly patted his behind.

"What a naughty boy you are, Chot! Who would ever play with pigs! Did they bite you loose?"

Chot smiled broadly, not knowing what his father was saying. Mr. Hai handed the banana to his son, put him down on the floor, and walked into the kitchen to wash rice for the evening meal. As he was measuring out the rice, he heard the mother pig lead her noisy litter into the house. Hr. Hai muttered:

"My, my! They really seem to love each other!"

The sow sprawled by the side of the bamboo bed and her litter gathered at her bulging udders. When Mr. Hai came back he saw that Chot was nestled among the piglets, hugging a teat and sucking contentedly. Mr. Hai reached down to pull his son up from the litter but for some reason he stopped and stood by quietly.

A gunshot echoed in the distance and Mr. Hai lifted his hands to stop the tears rolling down his cheeks.

DIEN TIN, *November 3, 1973.*

One lovely day, the emperor of a certain country didn't have anything to do so he went to visit the biggest jail in the capital of his kingdom. When he got to the jail, he asked one prisoner:

"Why are you here? What is your crime?"

"Your Majesty, I have not committed any crime."

"And how about you?" inquired his Majesty of another prisoner.

"I haven't done anything wrong. I am completely innocent."

The emperor went through the jail and everyone, except an old man, told the emperor that he was completely innocent of any crime. The old man did not answer the emperor; he only bowed his head in silence. But the emperor insisted: "How about you?"

"Your Majesty, Sir," replied the old man, "I deserve my punishment for all the corruption and extortion during my official life. I have no complaint."

"Guards," the Emperor shouted as the old man finished, "Release this prisoner immediately! He shouldn't be allowed to stay around here for his presence will corrupt the innocence of all the other prisoners."

NOW AVAILABLE AT THE VIETNAM RESOURCE CENTER:

Before the Revolution: The Vietnamese Peasants under the French, by Ngo Vinh Long.

Although the United States has been involved in Vietnam for over twenty years, there has been no book in English that provides both a historical perspective on the Vietnamese peasants, who are more than 80 percent of the population, and a firsthand account of their living conditions under colonial rule during the first half of this century.

The subject of this study is the impact of French colonial administrative policies on Vietnamese peasant society between the 1880s and 1945—a period that is crucial for an understanding of the nature of the peasants' determined struggle not only against the French colonizers but also against their American successors. In his Foreword to the book, Professor Alexander Woodside (East Asian Research Center, Harvard) remarks that "for English-speaking readers, this book is likely to serve as a foreceful, unpleasantly chilling introduction to some very representative Vietnamese views about what Vietnamese relations with the industrial West have meant to Vietnamese society over the past century."

The book is divided into two nicely complementary parts. In the first, Mr. Long presents a brief but detailed history of the effects that the French policy of land expropriation and free land concession had upon the peasant; the resulting problems of tenant farming and sharecropping; and the roles of taxes, tax collection, usury, government agrarian credit programs, and industry and commerce in determining the peasants' living standards.

This history provides an objective background for the second part of the book, which introduces moving personal Vietnamese accounts in translation of life in the twenties and thirties. "The Peasants," by Phi Van; "When the Light's Put Out," by Ngo Tat To; "Dead End," by Nguyen Cong Hoan; "Mud and Stagnant Water," by Hoang Dao; and "Who Committed This Crime?" by Tran Van Mai are only samples from the rich legacy of Vietnamese writings on social change that were produced during this period and that because of stringent censorship took the form of the short story and the novel. "Some of the best documentation of the conditions of peasant life appeared in fictional disguise," writes Mr. Long—and the prolific outpouring of these tormented and often short-lived writers became a most sophisticated means of indirect opposition to French rule.

Ngo Vinh Long was born in Vinh Long province in the Mekong Delta and spent his boyhood in rural South Vietnam. He came to the United States in 1964 and was educated at Harvard University; he has been serving as Director of the Vietnam Resource Center in Cambridge.

September—6 x 9—352 pp., $12.95Ta—£5.85, November—U.K. and Europe, The MIT Press.

The struggle in Vietnam is far from over, American interference in the country is far from ended, the movement here and now to bring an end to the U.S. role must continue. To this end, Americans need access to information not normally available from the American mass media. The Vietnam Resource Center for years has published up-to-date and well-researched material about Vietnam. But we're in the midst of a financial crisis. To help us continue our work, please subscribe to our monthly newsletter, Thoi Bao Ga, or send us your contributions.

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PEACE PRIZE: WHERE'S THE PEACE?

As the palace in Oslo is readied for the festivities, Thieu continues to rain shells on the Vietnamese countryside as fast as American factories can make them. This issue of Thoi-Bao Ga takes a hard look at the sort of "peace" that has been achieved in Vietnam in the wake of the Paris agreements.

Special advisor Le Duc Tho and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger have just been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for bringing peace to Vietnam.

But ever since the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements the Thieu regime has done everything possible to destroy the peace and provoke a full-scale resumption of the war. Not long after the signing of the agreements, the New York Times reported in its February 28, 1973 issue that ". . . major causes [of violations] have included the fact that the South Vietnam Government has continued to fight to regain all positions it had lost just before the ceasefire and that it has continued to seek and attack Communist units whenever it could find them." In fact, two weeks before his visit to the United States Thieu bragged to the American press that his forces had retaken over 400 villages since the signing of the accords. This amounts to about one-fifth of all the villages in South Vietnam. Again, on June 19, 1973 Thieu declared that "the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam have regained all the territories lost during 1972."

While Thieu's claim of having taken back so much territory may be questioned, all reports from Vietnam indicate that the war is indeed raging on. For example, the French newspaper Le Monde reported on August 30, 1973 that the Saigon high command stated some 41,000 of its troops had been killed, 44,000 had been wounded and 4,000 were missing since the signing of the agreements. Saigon has never been known for inflating its own casualty statistics. Another indication of the seriousness of the situation is given in the June 11, 1973 report of the US Senate Subcommittee on US Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad. The report quoted the Defense Attache Office as saying that in the post-ceasefire period Saigon's "firings of 105 mm. howitzers were continuing [in the northern provinces alone] at a rate which exceeded 31,000 rounds, the average daily production of this ammunition in the United States." At the

*In Vietnam a family usually puts its entire savings in its pig. Often several families join together and raise a common pig. If the pig dies or is stolen, plans for paying debts, taxes, and for buying clothes and medicine go down the drain.—*ed.*

September 20, 1973 meeting of the La Celle-Saint-Cloud Conference Minister Nguyen Van Hieu of the PRG produced evidence to the effect that the Saigon regime had conducted 52,000 operations into the countryside since the middle of June. The minister also documented in some detail Saigon's air and artillery strikes and their effects on the civilian population.

THIEU AGGRESSION

There are many reasons for Thieu's aggressive military posture. One is the need for rice from the countryside. After the PRG spring offensive last year, rice deliveries from the Mekong Delta to Saigon plummeted. According to the April-June 1973 USAID "Vietnam Economic Data" bulletin, rice deliveries to Saigon during the first six months of last year averaged around 65,000 metric tons a month. During the second half of the year, however, rice deliveries from the delta decreased to only 23,000 metric tons a month. Thieu attributed this to the PRG control over the countryside, and hence the control over the flow of rice into the Saigon-controlled cities. Since Thieu has to feed an army and bureaucracy of over two and a half million persons, he ordered this military push into the countryside. This is why Thieu's forces have received very high casualties in the Mekong Delta, the rice basket of South Vietnam. The September 8, 1973 *New York Times* reported the shooting has continued unabated, Vietnamese officers say, with an average of 100 South Vietnamese soldiers killed or wounded every day this year in the delta alone. That is a rate equal to the number of casualties during the big Communist offensive last year, and higher in many previous periods during the interminable war.

Even with the military push into the countryside, according to the USAID report just quoted, the average deliveries of rice to Saigon during the first five months of this year averaged only around 40,000 metric tons a month. Meanwhile, rice imports from the United States under the Food For Peace Program (PL 480) have fallen from 59,000 metric tons in January to only 7,000 tons in May. The United States is selling two million metric tons of rice to the Philippines this year. Thailand has announced that it will not sell any more rice to any foreign country.

RICE WAR

Faced with this problem, Thieu personally ordered a "rice war with the Communists." To carry out this "rice war" his district and province chiefs are to force the peasants to sell rice to the government. Each district and village has to sell rice to the government under a certain quota and at a fixed price. But, as documented in some detail by two Saigon daily newspapers, while the fixed official price for each gia (40 liters) of paddy rice is from 1,300 to 1,400 piasters depending on the variety, Saigon officials in the local areas have been forcing the peasants to sell paddy rice to them at only 800 to 900 piasters a gia (Dien Tin and Dai Dan Toc, September 25, 1973). While this was going on, according to a pro-Thieu Saigon daily, the PRG paid the peasants two to three times higher than Saigon's official price for their rice and then resold that rice to people, who needed it for much less than Saigon's official price. Much of the time, although they have given the peasants money for the rice they ask the peasants to keep the rice for them, saying that they would only ask for it when they needed it (Song Than, September 9, 1973). As a result of this PRG action, even Saigon officials have been selling the rice they collected from the peasants to the NLF. For example, a Saigon Congressional bulletin issued by a group of Saigon senators and deputies (Ban Tin, No. 10, October 15, 1973) reports that General Hoang Duc Ninh, President Thieu's cousin, had made 80 million piasters by selling rice to the PRG over the Vietnam-Cambodian border. Song Than, in the issue just quoted, stated that in Quang Ngai province many officials are participating in the sale of government rice to the PRG. The New York Times reported on September 18, 1973 that the province chief of Long Khanh province, northeast of Saigon, is under investigation on charges of stealing rice and transporting it in army trucks for sale in the PRG.

Faced with this situation, Thieu personally declared on September 14 that the purpose of the "rice war with the Communists" now should be to block rice from going to them (*Dien Tin*, September 15, 1973). How does Thieu propose to do this when his own officials are selling rice to the PRG? According to two Saigon daily newspapers, the Thieu regime has forbidden the rural population to store more than 3 gia of paddy rice, or the equivalent of about 40 liters of milled rice, at any time. The excess rice has to be sold to the government. No more than 3 gia of paddy rice could be transported from one place to another at any time without written permission of the district chiefs or the village chiefs. Rice transported from one place to another without such permission would be confiscated by the authorities and the transporter is automatically accused of "supplying the Communists." Also, no milling of paddy rice is allowed without the written permission of the local authorities, which usually takes from three to four days (Dien Tin and Dai Dan Toc, September 25, 1973). This policy is even more severe in Mekong Delta provinces. According to the October 9, 1973 issue of Dien Tin, General Nguyen Van Nghi, commander of the IV Corps area, had ordered that every household in the provinces under his control has to hang a sign on the front door stating the exact amount of rice left in the house. The peasants must also list the amount of rice gathered in the last harvest. Any discrepancy will meet with severe penalties. According to the October 11, 1973 issue of the same newspaper, in the IV Corps area every household is allowed to keep only 30 liters of rice in the house at any time. All excess rice has to be taken to predetermined government rice stations, to be sold to the government or for deposit. Any person who is caught with any amount of rice above the quantity permitted is automatically considered a "supply cadre for the Communists." Col. Nguyen Dan Phuong, province chief of Chau Doc, has marked off a large area in his province as a "controlled area." And, as quoted in the same issue of the newspaper, the province chief has said, "For each liter of rice sold to the controlled area a person will be shot to death." He said further he would "use every cruel measure" against persons who secretly buy rice for their own lawful profit.

This policy met with resistance from the rural population. As a result, according to the September 26, 1973 issue of Dai Dan Toc only 200 metric tons of rice get to Saigon every day, or only 6,000 tons a month. Saigon remained optimistic that its armed forces would solve the problem. A pro-Saigon daily newspaper, But Thep, had reported on September 10, 1973, that the 16 province chiefs in the delta had met with some success in collecting rice from the peasants by using the armed forces. Deputy Kieu Mong Thu reported in the October 1, 1973 issue of Dai Dan Toc that in most areas in the countryside, the police, village chiefs, hamlet chiefs and district chiefs have been going to the peasants' homes to take all their rice away. All that the peasants are given is receipts for the rice taken. Presumably the government might pay them sometime in the future. In the same report Mrs. Thu stated that when people bring rice to the milling stations for husking, even with permission of the authorities, they are not allowed to bring the milled rice home. All they get are receipts stating that the rice has been sold to the government. This, according to Mrs. Thu, has produced adverse effects all over the countryside. The rural population does not have enough rice for consumption, for feeding their pigs, chickens, and ducks, and for seeds for the next crop.

But, as reported by the Saigon press, the rice collected from the rural population is not used to feed the urban population either. Much of this rice has been exported by the Thieu regime to Cambodia and elsewhere to get foreign exchange. As a result, rice is now rationed in most cities in South Vietnam. In Saigon each family is allowed to buy only 25 liters of milled rice a month (Dai Dan Toc, September 22, 1973; September 26, 1973; and Dien Tin, September 22, 1973). Twenty-five liters is enough for the consumption of only one adult a month. And according to the papers just quoted, hunger is widespread among the poor people since there is no black market rice to be purchased either.

"FORCED URBANIZATION"

Another reason for Thieu's attack on the countryside is to make it difficult for the refugees to go back home. Thanks to the American "forced urbanization" program, the majority of the population of South Vietnam has been moved into the so-called "refugee camps" and the shacks in and around the cities. By maintaining these people where they are, the Thieu regime hopes that it can force them to deliver votes in an election. This is the reason why Thieu's delegates at the La Celle-Saint-Cloud have consistently refused to discuss any issue concerning the carrying out of the provisions of the Paris Agreements unless the PRG agreed unconditionally to an election first. For the time being, at least, the Thieu regime is confident of its control over the urban population.

Trial runs to test the regime's control over elections were conducted in May, 1973, in the form of elections for rural councils. As pointed out in a Saigon newspaper, to be "elected" to a Village Council seat a "candidate" had to pay from 300,000 to 500,000 piasters to Thieu's district chiefs (Dien Tin, October 4, 1973). A more detailed exposition of Thieu's manipulation of the votes is given in the August 15, 1973 issue of Ban Tin, the news bulletin published by a group of Saigon senators and deputies. Another example of this is the Senate election of August 26, 1973 when the entire Thieu slate was "elected" by 92.2 percent of the votes. Of course, elections of this type mean nothing to the Vietnamese people since they clearly will have no freedom to vote; but Thieu hopes to deceive the American public about his "increasing popularity" which would, hopefully, persuade the American people to continue financial and military support to his regime. According to the accusation of Minister Nguyen Van Hieu of the PRG at the September 20, 1973 La Celle-Saint-Cloud meeting, 900,000 more refugees had been generated by Thieu since June of this year. This is probably true, since official AID statistics revealed that 213,400 refugees were created during the period from January 28 to February 16, 1973 alone. This statistic was itself scaled down by at least 70,000 persons (New York Times, Senate Subcommittee on Refugees report, February 28, 1973).

LAND USURPATION

Related to the maintenance of the refugees in the camps and the urban areas is the new and fantastically fierce surge of land usurpation by Saigon officials. These officials follow the footsteps of the Saigon armies into any newly secured area and take over any land they can find even when the peasant owners are occupying it and cultivating it and even when the peasants can produce legal Saigon documents to prove their ownership. There

is nothing the peasants can do. If any of them want the land back for cultivation, they have to pay from 600,000 to several million piasters per hectare. (See the September 29, October 2–5 and October 8 issues of Dai Dan Toc for details.) All the crops and timber on the peasants' land are razed by bulldozers and in their place banana and other fruit trees are planted. The timber and fruits are export commodities to Japan. This brings in the much needed foreign currencies. A Saigon deputy recently brought to public attention that the Saigon Ministry of the Economy has budgeted $21 million for the import of cosmetics, ladies' panties and bras for 1973 (Dai Dan Toc, October 1, 1973). The Saigon regime has also budgeted 90 million dollars for importing gas, $100 million for imported rice and $60 million for imported sugar (Dai Dan Toc, September 8, 1973).

The third and most important reason for Thieu's aggressive military posture is the need for continued US military and economic aid. By continually exhibiting such an aggressive attitude the Thieu regime hopes to hoodwink the American public into thinking that not only have its forces shaped up but that they can indeed lick the PRG. Therefore, the American people should continue to support his regime. Thieu thinks that the Americans will not let all their investment in money and blood go down the drain if they think that he has a chance to stand on his own. Thieu knows that the American people are not in the position to realize that Thieu is only weakening himself in expending so much ammunition, in getting so many of his troops killed, and in antagonizing an increasing number of the Vietnamese people. The American government of course realizes that Thieu is getting himself into a critical situation. But, as a Saigon newspaper recently stated, "The more critical the situation the Saigon government creates for itself, the more reason there is for the Nixon administration to continue military aid." (Dien Tin, October 3, 1973) Thieu is a puppet who pulls on his strings, and to a certain extent he has been successful. According to US military sources, during the first six months after the signing of the Paris peace agreements the United States provided the Saigon air force alone with 142,000 bombs, rockets and flares and 13.8 million rounds of small-arms ammunition (New York Times, October 3, 1973). The American "Pentagon East" in Saigon is still maintained in fact, if not in name. Through the new Defense Attache Office (DAO) 20,000 American military advisers and military personnel are directing much of Thieu's military and other activities. This office is headed by General John Murray.

The Thieu regime knows that if peace were really established according to the provisions of the Paris agreements, his survival would be short. For this reason, Saigon has shown little regard for the Paris agreements. Prime Minister Tran Thien Khiem announced in Saigon on September 11 that "the Paris agreements are even worse than marriage certificates." (Dien Tin, September 13, 1973) Deputy Nguyen Ba Can, chairman of the Saigon Lower House, stated recently that "there is no such thing as national reconciliation and national concord" with the other side (Dien Tin, October 3, 1973). And Thieu declared on September 14 that there would be no demobilization and that ARVN had to be maintained "to beat the Communists." (Le Monde, September 16–17, 1973).

If the Thieu regime continues with its present belligerent policy, it is difficult to see how the present military situation would not escalate into a full-scale war, especially when popular outrages pressures the PRG to take a firmer stance. So far the PRG has been bending backward in many ways in the hope that the Thieu regime would eventually carry out the provisions of the Paris agreements, however grudgingly. Perhaps William Sullivan, Kissinger's top aide to the Paris negotiations, noted the serious developments toward this tragic outcome when he said recently that an outbreak of armed conflict in Indochina "by miscalculation of Hanoi" still possible (*Boston Globe*, September 25, 1973. The White House also announced on October 5, 1973 that it had changed its plan for withdrawing US troops from overseas "because of the North Vietnamese build-up." These, of course, are but attempts by the Nixon administration to cover up the reality in South Vietnam and also to prepare public opinion for possible US intervention on Thieu's behalf should be full-scale outbreak of war referred to by Sullivan become a reality. It is these kinds of statements that encourage Thieu to go on the warpath. And who knows whether Dr. Kissinger might not receive a war prize from the people of the whole world very soon? The American people, of course, will have to pay for it.

—*Vietnam Resource Center staff.*

SELECTED TRANSLATIONS FROM SAIGON NEWSPAPERS: LAND USURPATION

(By Doan Van)

On March 26 of each year the Saigon regime and its embassies abroad celebrate the so-called "Land to the Tiller" day as if it were a national holiday. This day commemorates a land reform law passed on March 26, 1970, the result of much pressure from the United States and after three years of study by a group of "specialists" from the Stanford Research Institute. Even on paper, the law was not for true land reform. The landless peasants were put at the bottom of the list of priorities for land distribution with military men, civil service personnel, and city dwellers preceding them. Under the program, the United States was supposed to pay some $1.2 billion for the purchase of 900,000 hectares of land from Vietnamese landlords, presumably for distribution to the "tillers." As fully documented by a Vietnamese researcher in the August 1970 issue of *Tu Quyet* (a Saigon magazine), the land sold by Vietnamese landlords was worthless, long ago abandoned by them because of the insecure situation. In effect the law amounted to forcing the peasants to put into cultivation land that they did not want themselves.

Many peasants had to brave land mines, bombs and artillery shells as well as put up much capital and expend much labor to get the abandoned land back into production. Now we learn from the following article that Saigon officials and local despots are using every conceivable means to evict the peasants from their land in a maddening surge of official usurpation of peasant lands. The article is here translated in its entirety, except for the first paragraph which says that unemployment in South Vietnam is now at its peak, that there are some 160,000 former employees of American companies, 3 million city dwellers, hundreds of thousands of refugees, and an additional 250,000 young people of working age joining the labor force every year who are unemployed.

The reader should remember that Saigon newspapers are highly censored and are subject to severe fines as well as constant threats of being closed down by the Thieu regime. Therefore, the fact that articles such as the following are allowed to be published at all reflects either a rampant situation that is known by almost everybody in the country and therefore is regarded by the regime as of little consequence, or is only a small part of a really serious situation. —*ed.*

At the present time the majority of the city population wants to work at putting virgin land into cultivation in order to make a living for their families and to contribute to the reconstruction of the country. But the problem is that while there are many unemployed people, there is no land available.

This is not because our country is so poor that it does not have enough land for its people. It is only because in areas where there is relative security, the high officials and their wives have vied with each other in usurping all the land. The end result is that the poor people who need land for cultivation and who are dedicated to producing food have no land at all. The filthy rich are freely usurping all the land. Many of these rich and powerful people have taken thousands of hectares of public land each, all in the name of "development of virgin land." Along the highway from Saigon to Vung Tau of about 100 kilometers, and for tens of kilometers on either side, there is not a single piece which is still public land. The forest is all cut down, and scattered here and there are signs bearing the names of the owners. Along the national highways where security has returned, the same situation has occurred. Public land is being usurped at a very quick pace.

If one looks closer at the situation one will see that the majority of the usurpers are powerful people. After taking the land, they rent it out to less well-off people who hire someone to plow some land and plant some manioc roots to make it resemble a farm, then rent it out to a third person.

Selling public land is now a big business. Each hectare of land usurped is priced at a few million piasters.* Therefore, how can poor people who really need the land for cultivation afford to buy it?

The usurpation of land leads to furious contests. Usually the usurpers make use of the name of a high official or the name of the wife of a high official. Sometimes they do not hesitate to use the names of charitable organizations and orphanages in an attempt to usurp land. Usually the contests are very heated and often lead to bloodshed. Whenever this happens, it is the poor people who have to bear all sacrifices while the rich and powerful cliques float above the realm of the law.

As soon as peace returned, in all the areas under the control of the national armed forces [i.e., Thieu's armies—ed.] fierce contests for land began. The situation is especially serious in areas where security has just been established and the people have just returned to their homes.

A typical example is the situation in Long Khanh, Phuoc Tuy province. One of the most dramatic contests for land occurred at Nga Ba Ong Do. At the beginning of 1969, about 135 families came to this area determined to put virgin land under cultivation and to establish a livelihood for themselves. The security situation was still very tenuous. One might say that these people put up their huts and tents between two fires. Each family had its own bomb tunnel. At night artillery shells exploded around their houses.

At that time, in an attempt to protect the security of the highway, the local government ordered the people to come to the area to put up huts and cut down the forest to put the land under cultivation. The people had to struggle with death in order to go on living. But their right of ownership of the land was not yet legalized. These people used all their strength and their savings to put into cultivation a piece of land which previously was a desolated forest on which no human being had set foot and which was full of unexploded artillery shells. With hard work, they planted mangoes, jack fruits and bananas. Life appeared. These people thus asked the government to legalize their ownership status according to the "Land to the Tiller" law. But the authorities used many excuses and turned them down many times.

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* A million piasters is equal to US $2,000. However, in Vietnam the amount is equal to about 35 times the monthly salary of a full university professor. Even the lifetime savings of a Saigon professor cannot approach that amount.–ed.

As soon as peace returned many powerful people came in the name of this or that high official and forced the cultivators to move somewhere else, saying that these peasants occupied the land illegally.

Who are these "bogeymen"? [A Vietnamese term depicting regional and local despots. –ed.]

"BOGEYMEN"

They are either high local officials or high Saigon officials who capitalize on the fact that the peasants have not had their ownership rights legalized. They do not hesitate to use crude force, such as bulldozers, to flatten the houses, orchards and other crop areas of the peasants. They also erect barbed wire fences around all the areas cultivated by the peasants, forbidding anybody to enter. This is not to mention such shady tactics as branding the good and honest peasants as Communists.

This situation at Nga Ba Ong Do is typical of countless similar cases happening every day in the whole country. The reality is that, since the return of peace, the contests for land have become increasingly fierce. And everywhere it is the peasants who are losing. The rich and powrful get richer. Social injustices are increasing every day.

After the signing of the Paris Agreements the problem of the usurpation of peasants' land is spreading quickly into many areas. People use their wealth, their positions and their connections to forcibly appropriate peasants' land, driving the peasants off the farms into which they have sunk all their energy.

Another typical example occurred in Con Tron in Dinh Tuong province. This is a small island in the middle of the Mekong River, between Ngu Hiep Island and Ba Lai Island. This is the reason why it is also known as Con Giua [Middle Island—ed.]

When the ceasefire went into effect, the peasants came back to their old farms. But they were confronted by powerful persons. Mrs. Do Thi Xa, a peasant in Con Tron, said that she had been tilling the land on this island as long as she could remember. At the beginning of 1973, the Dinh Tuong Department of Paddy and Land gave her a certificate of ownership for the land she had been cultivating. All in all there were only four persons on the island who got certificates of ownership. But this was only on paper; in reality the land had already been usurped by some high officials.

These people took over the whole island of Con Tron and had their henchmen throw up water breakers around the island and turn the whole island into an orchard. An old man moaned as he looked at other people plant trees on his own land, "I have a hectare of land on Con Tron and had a certificate of ownership from the Department of Agriculture. But all that I have now is a piece of paper. Other people have taken my land away."

The people who usurped the land did so not to cultivate it themselves but to sell it to others. The price for a hectare of land on this small island is 600,000 piastrs. There are 90 hectares of cultivated land on the island. This means that the usurpers are collecting some 50 million piasters. As far as the former peasant owners are concerned, the only thing they can do now is to call out to the heavens!

The usurpation of land in Con Tron represents a very widespread "stake planting" [ownership claiming—*ed.*] campaign. The regional "bogeymen" use any violent means to evict the peasants from the land they are cultivating. Caught in the middle of this fierce scramble for land by the high officials who are the overlords in the various regions, there is nothing that the peasants can do.

In reality, the land in the countryside is being parceled into many domains. Over each domain a modern feudal overlord reigns, paying no attention whatever to the national laws. In each of these domains, the peasants hold as important a position as the serfs did in feudal times. Peasants who show "understanding" are spared by the overlords. Those who do not, must "watch out for their souls." It is naturally accepted that the laws of the king must yield to the habits of these feudal lords.

Under these conditions, there is no hope that working people from the cities can put virgin land into cultivation. An untold number of dedicated and hard-working people have left the cities to look for land to cultivate, only to return in disappointment to the shacks around the cities to drag their feet around the city streets looking for work. But at the present time we face a gigantic paradox: on the one hand, the number of unemployed people is too large and is increasing every day; on the other, although there is still a lot of land in the secured areas of the countryside, it has all been usurped by the rich and powerful. Dedicated people who want to cultivate the land and return to the countryside have but one alternative, and that is to purchase the usurped land. But where can they get the money? It costs a million piasters a dectare. This is a price no poor person can afford.

For these reasons, the slogan "return to the land" sung every hour on the government radio station is a sham and a ploy to soothe the dreams of millions of people who have no way out.

Return to the land? Agreed! Much applause! But there is no land to return to.

Meanwhile, in the contested areas, the peasants are always having to leave their hamlets and villages. Even if the peasants wrestling with bombs and artillery shells there manage to produce food, they cannot enjoy the fruits of their labor. Their orchards and crops are razed [by Thieu's forces—*ed.*] to clear the countryside for military activities.

"Return to the land" is only a slogan to put a good face on the thing. The program, called "virgin land development," only brings huge incomes from land sales into the pockets of high officials and their wives. As for the unemployed masses, no matter how hardworking and conscientious they are there is nothing they can do for one simple reason—there is no land!

"Return to the land? Agreed! Much applause! But there is no land to return to."

There are numerous unemployed and the number increases every day. The most urgent task [for the government—*ed.*] is to create jobs for the people and end the injustices in the countryside. Robbery, prostitution and other social ills are spreading, largely because of the abject living conditions of the people. The people are waiting for early government action to improve the situation.

According to the government plan which has been reported in the press recently, first priority in development goes to the agricultural sector and the yearly average increase in production is supposed to be 9.7 per cent a year. But it is now seven months since the ceasefire came into effect and the plan is still lying untouched in air conditioned offices. The plan cannot be carried out. This shows the unreality of the planners. Their plans are only wishful thinking and are not based on any real economic facts.

How can there be any increase in agricultural production when the countryside is still an arena for fierce and bloody contest for land, when the peasants in many areas have to abandon their lands and flee to the cities to escape sure disaster?

—*Dai Dan Toc*, September 29, and October 2–5, 1973.

MILITARY MISCONDUCT IN PHUOC TUY PROVINCE

(By Representative Nguyen Quoc Hung)

A certain major, commanding officer of the battalion stationed in Dat Do district, Phuoc Tuy province, habitually abuses his military power and causes great popular resentment. The people complained numerous times to the regime but it has paid no attention to them and shows no sign of trying to bring about a solution and win the local people's favor.

A few examples typical of the military misconduct of Major N.X.T. are as follows:

The district chief ordered a curfew from 19:00 hours to 6:00 hours the next day. But the battalion commander imposed a curfew from 18:30 hours until 6:30 hours the next day.

The district chief ordered a curfew from 19:00 hours to 6:00 hours the next day. But the battalion commander imposed a curfew from 18:30 hours until 6:30 hours the next day.

The district chief allowed a troupe to perform in the district town. The battalion commander arrived and said they could not perform because of security problems and that he had told the district chief so many times.

A lieutenant colonel who is a disabled veteran currently living in Vung Tau has a son serving in this battalion. One Sunday the colonel and his family traveled 40 kilometers to pay a visit to his son. The battalion commander and his wife happened to pass by the shop where Lt. Colonel Tho and his son were drinking tea. Major N.X.T. charged into the shop and ordered a lieutenant, "So this fellow is the son of a lieutenant colonel. Shut him up in a box!" Even the commander's wife felt compelled to say, "Darling, that's not right!"

At around 19:00 hours on September 8, 1973, the commander ordered one of his soldiers to arrest and hold three girls named Nguyen thi H., Thiem thi L., and Tran thi X. for the whole night on the Phuoc Hai beach. The matter was not reported to the district or regimental headquarters. The next day various civilian authorities in the area asked for intervention from the district chief. He then told the commander to transfer the three girls to his headquarters. After finding out that the three girls were not guilty of anything, the district chief released them.

The battalion commander had his soldiers place mines around people's houses at night. In the morning, when the soldiers left they did not remove the mines and this caused the death of a 14-year-old girl named Mai thi Lieu. On September 3, 1973 the same thing happened. The mines placed around a house in Hoi Cuu hamlet seriously wounded a woman named Ngo thi Kiem. This is not to mention the death of two buffaloes belonging to an inhabitant of Hoi My hamlet. In addition, chickens belonging to the inhabitants in the area under the authority of the commander have been taken and sold by his soldiers.

On August 4, 1973, while on patrol in the hamlets of Loc An and Hai Lac, the commander had two young men named Dinh Van H. and Pham Van H. arrested and exacted 3,00 piasters each from them . . .

In its August, 1973 Provincial Council meeting the province of Phuoc Tuy decided that the lieutenant colonel provincial chief, who is also commander-in-chief of the regiment in the area, should talk to Major N.X.T. about his misconduct . . . What does the lieutenant colonel provincial chief think about this?

—Dai Dan Toc, October 5–6, 1973.

LAND USURPATION IN KIEN LUONG DISTRICT

Kien Giang, October 8, 1973. An as yet unidentified group of people has suddenly appeared and openly seized the lands of several hundred families in areas of Kien Luong district, Kieng Giang Province, in spite of the fact that the peasant families had certificates of ownership.

This is a report from the area appearing in Tfn Som [another Saigon newspaper—ed.]. According to the report, all the land

on both sides of the Rach Gia-Ha Tien highway (12 kilometers in length) in the area of Kien Luong district has been usurped. The usurpers destroyed all the crops and fruit trees planted by the inhabitants of the area and built shacks here and there. When the inhabitants produced documents showing they were the legal owners, this group of usurpers ignored them and went ahead with their operation.

According to the newspaper, the situation has been brought to the attention of the regional authorities, but so far nothing has been done. The local people in adjoining areas meanwhile live in fear that their lands may also be taken over any time.

The report also points out that the land usurpers in Kien Luong district seized land in Tan Hiep and Kien Tan districts. Obviously they are taking advantage of the situation to renew their old "operations."

—Dai Dan Toc, October 8, 1973.

SHOOT RICE TRAFFICKERS! SHOOT TO KILL!

A representative from Kien Phong province has just arrived in Saigon to bring to public attention the fact that during this last increase in the price of rice, Mr. Hoang Duc Ninh, commander-in-chief of the special military region No. 44, made over 80 million piasters in selling rice.

When asked how this was possible, the representative answered that it was done by selling rice from the western provinces over the border [into Cambodia—ed.]

Yet the government itself has ordered its forces to shoot to death rice traffickers who allow any rice to slip over to the other side . . . We suggest that the above representative bring the situation concerning Mr. Hoang Duc Ninh to the attention of the President because Mr. Ninh is a cousin of the President! But we must warn the representative to watch out for his life!*

—Ban Tin, October 15, 1973, a bulletin published by Saigon senators and deputies

THE DESPOT OF GIAO DUC

If you should have occasion to stop anywhere near Giao Duc district in Dinh Tuong province, you will hear people complain about the despot Nguyen Van Hac, the district chief of Giao Duc. He is a man who is always "doing his best" to exploit and oppress the people. For a long time the national press has talked about the shady activities of Nguyen Van Hac, but only recently did the regime begin any investigation into the situation, finally prompted by a flood of letters from the people in the IV Corps region. To clarify the case of Nguyen Van Hac, here are some of his typical activities:

Extortion by branding people as Communists. In villages such as An Huu, Thai Trung and Thai Dong, any household with any property at all has been slandered by Nguyen Van Hac. He drew up anonymous letters branding those unlucky villagers who have some money as having pro-Communist activities or sympathies. Then in the middle of the night he ordered his soldiers to arrest and imprison these people. His most effective accomplice in this business is Sergeant No. Sergeant No runs loose in the villages and hamlets collecting money for Nguyen Van Hac.

Selling village chief seats for 300,000 to 500,000 piasters each. During the last elections for village council, the district chief collected a huge sum of money by selling off village chief positions for 300,000 to 500,000 piasters apiece. The more money a certain candidate had, the better the position he got. Faced with this blatant sale of elective posts by the district chief, nobody, no matter how much he cared for the people and how dedicated he was to their welfare, dared to run in the elections. Only those people with the same corrupt goal as His Excellency spent money to buy their posts. As soon as they arrived at their posts they recovered their capital within interest. Robbed of their rights as citizens, the people are in despair.

His mistress first, the national business second. In front of An Thai Trung a building is being erected. The workers are soldiers of His Excellency's who have been sent on a special mission here to build a house for his darling and precious mistress, a schoolteacher by the name of Thanh. The building materials were lifted by His Excellency from the materials used for building strategic hamlets. Besides, His Excellency ordered the Commissioner of Agriculture in the district to do everything to get back the land that Miss Thanh's grandfather had to sell to the government under the "Land to the Tiller" program. Because the Commissioner of Agriculture said that he could not go against the law decreed by the President and therefore could not satisfy the demand of the district chief's mistress. His Excellency ordered the Commissioner jailed for a whole day. Truly, first comes the mistress, then the nation.

Making soldiers and Popular Defense Forces pay. His Excellency ordered a shakedown of all the soldiers in the district. If a soldier wanted to be stationed in a certain place, he had to pay the district chief from 20,000 to 38,000 piasters. [Each soldier receives from 5,000 to 7,000 piasters as monthly pay.—ed.] The person responsible for carrying out His Excellency's order is Captain Tuong, the officer in charge of personnel. This business of exploiting the sweat and blood of the soldiers whose living conditions are extremely harsh is an unforgivable activity on the part of His Excellency. Besides, any Popular Defense Force member who wanted exemption from guard duty had to pay the district chief 10,000 piasters. Even people who fulfilled all the legal requirements for exemption from guard duty had to pay the same amount of money.

Extortion of merchants. All the stores in Giao Duc district are subject to severe inspections from His Excellency. His Excellency also ordered a complete inventory taken in all the stores. Using various pretexts he got the store owners to come in for a meeting at his district headquarters; there they had to answer his queries about their goods. Whoever "showed understanding" [paid him off—ed.] were allowed to go home to carry on their business. Those who did not had their shops closed down indefinitely. The pharmacies selling Western medicine are His Excellency's special target. He inspected every medical item in them and used every possible pretext to extort money from them.

Connivance in gambling. Everyone in the district knows that Mrs. Thot, who lives close to the An Huu marketplace, sells lottery tickets. In fact, she hangs out her sign, "Lottery tickets for sale." Although the sale of lottery tickets is illegal, she can be so open about it because she is protected by the district chief. This is because she deposits the monthly "money association" (hui) installments with His Excellency. Besides all this, in the last Village Council elections her son, Tiet, became a village councillor after having given a large sum of money to His Excellency.

Having committed these and other crimes, Nguyen Van Hac clearly lacks the moral qualities appropriate to the administrative position with which the regime has entrusted him.

When the official investigative delegation came down to look over the situation, Mrs. Nguyen Van Hac declared publicly that she had bought off the entire delegation and that shortly her husband would be made deputy provincial chief of Dinh Tuong.

We earnestly hope that the Vice-President and the Censorate are watching the activities of the despot Nguyen Van Huc, a person who is destroying the policies of the government, corrupting the national machinery, and weakening the spiritual bonds between the people and the government.*

—*Dien Tin*, October 4–5, 1973.

REFUGEES THIEU'S OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS

Over half the population of South Vietnam has been herded into miserable refugee camps where they can be kept under the guns of Thieu's army. Formerly independent farmers, these people want only to return to their ancestral lands to begin life anew. The forcible detention of refugees, a constant feature of US policy for Vietnam since the 1950's and now a violation of the Paris Agreements, is certain to reignite full-scale war in Vietnam unless the US Congress finds the courage to cut off funds for these programs.

An area of less than 18 million people, South Vietnam has a total of more than 10 million refugees.[1] Most of these people have been made refugees many times over through the deliberate American policy of "emptying the countryside." This policy, officially referred to in the American government's literature as the "pacification program," did not begin with the massive invasion of the American armed forces during the Johnson administration. It began under Eisenhower in the late 1950s.

When the Eisenhower administration decided to install Ngo Dinh Diem as president of "South Vietnam" in direct contravention of the 1954 Geneva Agreements it realized that Diem was unwanted by the majority of the Vietnamese people. All the experts advised Eisenhower that if the General elections stipulated by the agreements were actually to be held in July, 1956, more than 80 per cent of the Vietnamese people would vote for the Viet Minh and their leader, Ho Chi Minh.[2] Columnist Joseph Alsop writing in the August 31, 1954 New York Herald Tribune said after a trip to Vietnam, "In the area I visited, the Communists have scored a whole series of political, organizational, military—and one has to say it—moral triumphs. . . . What impressed me most, alas, was the moral fervor they had inspired among the non-Communist cadres and the strong support they had obtained from the peasantry." Leo Cherne, one of the original promoters of the Diem "alternative," wrote in the January 29, 1955 issue of *Look* magazine: "If elections were held today, the overwhelming majority of Vietnamese would vote Communist. . . . What can we do?"

FIRST PACIFICATION PROGRAM

The only thing to do was to try to "pacify" the Vietnamese people. The nationwide "Communist Denunciation Campaign" (Phong Trao To Cong) started in 1955. Various military campaigns against local opposition started in the same year. These campaigns having failed, the United States advised and assisted Diem in carrying out wholesale forced relocation of the resident population in the countryside. People were thrown off of their plots of ground, on which their houses, their rice fields, their ancestral tombs were located. They were moved to totally unsuitable relocation sites then called qui-khu and qui-ap, renamed "agroviles" and

*Hoang Duc Ninh is older brother of Hoang Duc Nha, Thieu's most trusted advisor on national and international affairs. According to the September 7, 1973 issue of Dien Tin, a Saigon daily, Hoang Duc Nha now holds the portfolios of the Ministry of Information, the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Chieu-Hoi Ministry, and the Ministry of Youth. The same newspaper also reports that Nha will soon be Prime Minister.—ed.

*The Army Investigation Department of IV Corps has found the man guilty of these crimes, but he is still in office. It turns out that he is useful to Thieu in some way.—ed.

Footnotes at end of article.

"agro-hamets" in early 1959, and again renamed "strategic hamlets" in 1961.[3] Stockades, barbed-wire fences and spiked moats were thrown up around these sites and new shelters constructed within them by forced labor. Houses and rice fields too distant from the newly constructed camps were burnt down to deny their use to the "Viet Cong" and to prevent the relocated population from going back to their native villages.[4] Beginning in November, 1961, chemical defoliants were used to kill the crops outside of the Diem-controlled areas to drive people more quickly into the strategic hamlets.[5] By November 1963 the Diem regime claimed that it had constructed 8,544 strategic hamlets and regrouped 85 per cent of the total population.

In spite of these impressive statistics, the Diem regime and its American supporters failed to "pacify" the rural population in the southern part of Vietnam. As John McDermott observed in the August-September, 1965 Viet Report:

The regroupment schemes had convinced the peasantry that Vietcong propaganda was accurate. Diem was a puppet. . . . Because he was under the control of the American he was willing to raze the houses of the people, destroy the shrines of their ancestors, tear up sacred burial grounds, and force a helpless people into what a Wall Street Journal reporter called "concentration camps."

More than this, the massive relocation and the wholesale destruction of crops created untold suffering and hardship for the people, as well as widespread hunger and starvation.[7] These and other factors finally led to the downfall of the Diem regime. A senior AID advisor for the pacification program, William A. Nighswonger, writes: "The fall of the Ngo regime was accompanied by a complete collapse of the pacification efforts in many areas, and vast regions that had been under government control quickly came under the influence of the Viet-Cong." [8] In September 1963, Rufus Phillips, special advisor to the President of the United States on Vietnam, reported to him estimates of the USOM (U.S. Operations Mission to Vietnam) Rural Affairs section that the Mekong Delta was falling under "Viet Cong" control in areas where pacification was supposedly complete.[9]

Yet American policy-makers as well as official historians consistently refused to acknowledge the real reasons for the failure of their pacification campaign. They blamed Diem for having been "concerned more with control measures" while they, the Americans, "focused on security measures."[10] They failed to realize that when you herd people into concentration camps surrounded by stockades, spiked moats, and barbed-wire fences, guarded by soldiers, it made little difference whether you intended to control the people or provide them with security. In any case, having drawn such a useless distinction, the United States again re-emphasized pacification by sending the Marines onto the shores of South Vietnam in 1965. From 1965 to 1967, the Americans attached first priority to the program and they ran the show themselves.[11] American Marines were sent out to "secure villages" and to root out "Viet Cong infra-structures" which, in effect, meant rounding the people up while they freely destroyed certain parts of the villages.[12] The new emphasis of pacification, as summarized by Nighswonger, was:

(1) Elimination of Viet-Cong by search-and-destroy operations, (2) protection and control of the population and its resources by police and military forces, and (3) preparing and arming the peasants to defend their own communities.[13]

This new effort made the American officials so optimistic that they called the pacification program "the other war: the war to win the hearts and minds of the people." On May 13, 1967, Ambassador Bunker declared in a long report that he regarded the pacification program as "close to the heart of the matter in Vietnam." [14]

But Bunker's announcements and catchy slogans aside, the new program had created so much resentment, and consequently resistance, from the Vietnamese people that to bring them under their "protection" the Americans had to send out American troops with bulldozers and bombers to raze the villages to the ground, then transport the inhabitants to the so-called "campus for refugees fleeing from Communism" and the "New Life hamlets." An example of this is the pacification of the village of Ben Suc which has been described most graphically by Jonathan Schell in his book.[15] After the village was taken over by the Americans, the surrounding area bombed, some people indiscriminately killed, some systematically interrogated, some kept prisioner, and the rest taken away to the camps, the village of Ben Suc was destroyed in the following manner:

G.I.'s moved down the narrow lanes and into the sunny, quiet yards of the empty village, pouring gasoline on the grass roofs of the houses and setting them afire. . . . Before the flames had died out in the spindly black frames of the houses, bulldozers came rolling through the corpses of palms, uprooting the trees as they proceeded and lowered their scoops to scrape the packed-mud foundations bare. . . . The bulldozers cut their own path across the backyard fences, small graveyards, and ridged fields of the village, ignoring the roads and lanes. When the demolition teams withdrew, they had flattened the village, but the original plan for the demolition had not yet run its course. Faithful to the initial design, Air Force jets sent their bombs down on the deserted ruins, scorching again the burned foundations of the houses and pulverizing for a second time the heaps of rubble, in the hope of collapsing tunnels too deep and well hidden for the bulldozers to crush.

Another way of "securing" the people, and one that required less time and energy, was the use of chemicals to destroy their crops. It was hoped that hunger would force the rural population to stop supporting the NLF and move over to the US-Saigon-controlled areas. A high-ranking US field commander reportedly said in 1966, "If the people are to the guerrillas as the oceans are to the fish, then . . . we are going to dry up that ocean." [16] By the end of 1966 more than half of the chemicals sprayed were admittedly directed at crops.[17] In February 1967 Donal Hornig, President Johnson's chief advisor, explained to a group of scientists that "the anticrop program was aimed chiefly at moving the people." [18] In 1967 the United States used 12 million gallons of defoliants and herbicides, enough to cover "nearly half of the arable land in South Vietnam." [19] In a study of American anticrop and defoliation methods, Yoichi Fukushima, head of the Argonomy Section of the Japan Science Council, testified that by 1967 American chemical attacks had ruined 3.8 million acres (or one-half) of the arable land in South Vietnam. This is not to mention other effects such as death to both humans and livestock, birth defects, and disease.[20]

In spite of all this, the Americans failed to win the hearts and minds of the people. The New York Times, citing official United States data on the loyalties of the hamlets, reported on August 7, 1967 that out of 12,537 hamlets, the number of hamlets under total Saigon control was a mere 168. The number of those totally controlled by the NLF was 3,978. The rest of the hamlets were listed as "contested" or partially controlled by both sides. There were many reasons for this obvious failure.

TRADITIONAL VIETNAMESE CUSTOMS

To begin with, the tactics used in pacification ran counter to traditional Vietnamese customs and beliefs. It is in the tradition of the country that the people should never forgive those who "bring elephants home to stamp out the graveyards of their ancestors" (dem voi ve day ma to)—bring foreigners in to destroy the fatherland. "Fatherland" in Vietnamese is dat to—literally, "land of ancestors." This is indeed one of the reasons why the Vietnamese have been willing to sacrifice so much to throw the invaders out of their country. More importantly, since most Vietnamese consider reverence for their ancestors as a religious obligation, they take this belief quite literally. In Vietnam they say that people "live on the graveyards, and no one lives on rice alone." (Song ve mo ma, ai song ve ca bat com.) The Vietnamese believe that tombs are houses for the dead. In fact, they believe that no one is ever "dead" as such. When a person passes away, his soul lives on and is never destroyed. The dead and the living are believed to exist in the same world, only in different forms, and in communication with each other. Therefore, the ancestors are able to participate in the daily activities of their descendants. They will usually protect the latter and sometimes warn them in dreams or through certain signs of possible dangers so that those dangers may be avoided. Since the souls of the ancestors are so important for the destiny and welfare of the descendants, filial behavior requires that the descendants provide for them. They must see to it that their ancestors lack nothing. Since in life one's parents are one's foremost benefactors, it is everyony's duty to provide for his parents when they grow old. When one's parents have passed away, one must give offerings and perform rituals to one's ancestors (usually not more than three generations back), on the anniversaries of their marriages and deaths as well as on many other holy days. This is considered a family reunion of sorts.

Those who shirk their duties are the most unfilial of all because by not observing those days they turn the souls of their ancestors into hungry, wandering, forsaken spirits. The result of such ill behavior would be misfortune not only for themselves but also for their descendants. Thus it is of the utmost importance that Vietnamese behave correctly towards their ancestors. And the first requirement is the upkeed of tombs and graveyards.

Should the graveyards of the ancestors be destroyed, the Vietnamese feel they must "avenge the souls of the dead" (tra hon cho nhung linh hon noi chin suoi). Otherwise, they and all their children will succeed in nothing throughout their entire lives. Even verbal slighting of parents or ancestors is not tolerated in Vietnam. If in the course of a heated argument one of the disputants should run out of words and pronounce the simple phrase bo me may or to cha may—"your father and your mother" or "your father and your ancestors"—his opponent is left with no choice but to avenge the violated honor of his parents and ancestors by force. Since this is so, it is all the more difficult for the Vietnamese to tolerate the desecration of their ancestors' graveyards.

Next in importance to the graveyards is the Vietnamees house. In his book, Village in Vietnam, Gerald Hickey noted the special significance of the house in the Vietnamese mind:

To the villagers, nha (house) is not simply a physical structure; it is a symbol of family and hearth. The ancestral house is the cen- namese tradition and culture described cestors. . . . Villagers express their feelings about house and tomb in the oft-quoted proverb, "When alive, one must live in a house, when dead, one must have a tomb." [21]

To a Vietnamese, the construction of a

Footnotes at end of article.

house is one of the most important activities of his life, and is the last in a series of difficulties that he should overcome. As a Vietnamees saying has it, "To buy a buffalo, take a wife, and build a house—these are the three most difficult tasks in life." (Tau trau, lay vo, lam nha. Ca ba viec ay thay la kho thay.) Moreover, "the construction of a house is an important act which could greatly influence the future of the family for good or bad. There is a favorable day; there are favorable dimensons; there is a favorable location; there are rites which should be observed in the course of construction that the proprietor may enjoy fortune, honor and longevity." [22] For this reason, he must wait until he reaches a certain age and must choose a good orientation that assures great advantages (coi huong dai loi) before he starts out building his house. The geomancer (thay dia ly) is thus needed to "search among the mountains and rivers for a propitious location" (tim noi son thuy huu tinh). Since the location of duong co (for houses) is as important as the location for am phan (for burials), it is of the utmost importance that people should meet the requirements of a basic set of taboos and sanctions. For instance, a house should face south according to the proverb, "A man should take a gentle woman for a wife and build his house facing south" (lay vo hien hoa lam nha huong ram).[23] Other directions permitted are facing "east, northeast, or southeast. Two directions to avoid are west and northwest. . . . A house should never face another house, nor should it be sited where three roads meet." [23]

In planning the kitchen, however, the western and the northwestern sides of a room are the most favorable locations for the hearth because the fire will bar entrance to the five demons associated with these directions. Villagers consider it wise to hire a geomancer to plan the kitchen, since the Spirit of the Hearth (Ong Tao or Tao Quan) is likely to be upset if the position of the hearth is inauspicious and so might cause endless difficulties for the family.

Apart from all its religious significance, in Vietnam as house is also a place of emotional attachment. Husbands and wives refer to each other as nha toi, or literally, "my house." Also, since houses are frequently handed down from one generation to the next, they usually carry with them all the characteristics associated with the ancestors, especially in a society where ancestor worship is widespread.

UNPARDONABLE CRIME

The destruction of a Vietnamese house is thus regarded as an unpardonable crime. In fact, the mere desecration of a single house in a village may be regarded as having an impact on the village as a whole. An example of this is related by Hickey in his book:

During the Indochina War, French troops had commandeered one of the village chief's houses in Ap Dinh-B and converted it into a temporary slaughterhouse. This shocked the villagers, who believed that such desecration of a house would surely drive the good spirit from the vicinity. Subsequent misfortunes in the hamlet were attributed to this.[24]

The land itself is considered precious in the extreme, as a Vietnamese saying suggests: "An inch of land is an inch of gold." (*Bao nhiue tav dat tac vang bay nhieu*). Since the livelihood of the whole people depends on rice cultivation, this feeling may be readily understood. The Vietnamese peasants also worship the land. Separate offerings are usually made to the Spirit of the Soil (*Tho Than*) on the anniversaries of ancestors, on the day of marriage, of funerals and many other occasions and holy days. On the day of marriage, an American anthropologist observes, before entering the groom's house, the bride and groom pause by the altar honoring the Spirit of Soil, and with burning joss clasped in their hands, they kowtow, asking permission to enter the house.[25]

When people go to repair the family tombs they also have to request "the Spirit of the Soil for permission to disturb the earth." [24] Moreover, since many Vietnamese live on the same piece of land that their father, grandfather and great-grandfather before them had tilled, it becomes an emotional attachment. Even those who in the course of their lives move away from the place of birth (*noi chon nhau cat ron*, or literally, "the place where [their mother's] placenta was buried and their umbilical cord cut") feel that, as a matter of principle, they should return there, if at all possible, when the time of their death is near.

Vietnamese call their native area *que cha, que me*, or *dat to* (birthplace of the father, the mother or the land of the ancestors, respectively). These terms also have a wider meaning analogous to the term fatherland in English. Also, since the tombs of their forefathers are on the same piece of land occupied by their houses and fields, there is no possible way to describe the significance of the land to the Vietnamese.

Thus the scorched-earth tactic applied during the pacification of the villages in Vietnam is even more serious than the desecration of a church in the Western sense.

The second reason for the apparent failure in "winning the hearts and minds" was the horrible living conditions in the refugee camps and the humiliation the refugees had to face there as well as the "New Life hamlets" and the urban centers. The conditions of the refugees were so bad that Saigon newspapers, in spite of the harsh government censorship and the continual government practice of confiscating newspapers and closing their offices, felt compelled to run long articles on the misery endured by these people.

Song was a Saigon daily specifically created to justify the pacification program, whose editors and staff were members and leaders of the Rural Development Cadre Teams sponsored and trained by the joint cooperation of the CIA and the USOM. Even *Song* had this to say on December 10, 1967 in a long article entitled "Looking at the Face of the two Quang Provinces in War, Hunger, Misery, and Corruption":

This is a free area—free for depravity, corruption, irresponsibility, cowardice, obsequiousness, and loss of human dignity. What the devil is dignity when people sit there waiting to be thrown a few hundred piasters and allotted a few dozen kilos of rice a month? . . . I believe that even if a certain Communist had in his pocket a few dozen "open-arms" passes, after witnessing the humiliation of life in a refugee camp he would be so shocked that he would run away without a single look back.

The same article hastens to point out, however, that the money thrown out and all the rice allotted seldom reached the refugees. Out of the 170 million piasters (or about $1 million at the time) of redemption money which was supposed to go to the people in the province of Quang Ngai in 1967, less than 70 million actually reached the people. The number of refugees who had to suffer and stay hungry reached two million in the central provinces, and in the province of Quang Tin, for example, "60 per cent are children from two to fourteen" years of age. The remaining 40 per cent were old men and women. The able-bodied men presumably either got killed off or went to fight with the NLF.

REFUGEE LIVING CONDITIONS

The horrible living conditions of the refugees have also been generally corroborated by American GIs and Congressional investigators. Here is a description by David Tuck, an infantryman in the US Army:

From what I could see from these people they looked just like they were starving . . . shortly after we got there [to the refugee camp] I was on a work detail to dump some garbage . . . as soon as we dumped this these refugees—a whole lot, a horde of children, it seemed—literally jumped into this sump [hole full of garbage] and fought like animals for the garbage. They also had to be in their refugee camps at a certain time because if they showed up outside our perimeter or outside the South Vietnamese perimeter they were liable to be shot as VC.[27]

The reason for this sorry state of affairs was not far to seek. All the means of livelihood of the refugees had been destroyed, official relief was minimal (about 5 cents a day per person), and 75 per cent of the money intended for the resettlement allowances was siphoned off in graft.[28] In fact, according to the December 13, 1967 of *Song Moi*, a conservative Saigon newspaper, fewer than 6 million piasters out of the 71 million allocated for refugees in Quang Nam ever found their way to these people. The same newspaper writes:

In order to get a place to stay in the government "camps for refugees fleeing from Communism" people have to go to the authorities at least five to seven times with bribes. When they have found a place where they might be sheltered from the sun and rain, a few weeks later a "decree" would arrive from the district chief or the police director ordering them to come in for an investigation. They would be interrogated about their activities while they were still living in the countryside: whether they had contact with the Viet Cong or whether they had paid their rice tax or their annual tax—all must be told. If the peasant is naive and does not understand what the authorities want [i.e, bribes]—in other words if he does not let them sniff and smell a few 500-piaster bills—he is in deep trouble, including imprisonment. That is to say, being detained for further investigation! The only thing the peasant can do now is to call to heaven for the relief of his hunger and he is further distressed because he cannot earn a living [for his family]! . . . But a peasant who knows the situation knows that he has to give at least 10,000 to 15,000 piasters to get a place to stay.

At that time, 10,000 to 15,000 piasters was about the same as the monthly salary of a colonel in the Army or of a university professor. On the other hand, it would amount to the lifetime savings of a peasant.

Meanwhile, the situation of those peasants who escaped being taken to the "camps for refugees fleeing from Communism" but who instead flocked into the urban centers was not any brighter. Old men and women became beggars. Young boys shined shoes, washed cars, picked pockets, and pimped for their sisters or mothers. Girls and young women became barmaids and prostitutes. Older women did laundry and their husbands drove pedicabs or worked as day laborers—all in the service of the Americans who had destroyed their homes and villages. To be sure, the Americans were able to "empty out" parts of the countryside, but they were not able to dry up the ocean. They only moved parts of it into the urban centers and it was in these urban seas that the revolutionary fish could swim freely. There was ample evidence pointing to this fact. Here are a few examples. A *New York Times* article on May 24, 1967 reported that

Enemy forces overran Quang Tri city, the province capital, freed 250 guerrillas from jail and successfully attacked two regimental headquarters of the South Vietnamese First Infantry Division . . .

A few days later, in a series of events that were not fully reported at that time, *they moved virtually unmolested in Hue, while*

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the army and the national police fled. [emphasis added—*ed.*]

A second example is given by *Song*, the CIA-supported Saigon daily, on December 10, 1967:

The enemy forces did not exceed 100 men while in the province capital [of Quang Ngai] there were thousands of riflemen, many field officers, and all kinds of brave-looking outfits. The police in white and striped clothes alone outnumbered the enemy forces by four to one and *could easily have repulsed the enemy if they had wanted to or had cared to shoot.* [Emphasis added]

But the American authorities refused to grasp the significance of these reports and went ahead with their policy of "emptying the countryside" until the events of the Tet offensive of 1968 slapped them coldly in the face. Although the city population knew of the planned attacks beforehand and many of them had actually moved away from the target areas, none of them reported it to the Americans and the Saigon authorities! The population in South Vietnam's urban centers clearly supported the other side. Learning of this, the Americans, instead of trying to take back the towns and cities with ground troops (which they realized would be a near impossibility), made the decision to bomb them until the NLF forces withdrew. Some cities were 90 per cent destroyed.

POWER OF DENIAL

In any event, the Americans learned a precious lesson from the Tet offensive. They learned that they had the power of denial. NLF forces could not take over cities again without risking their destruction. The more people you "urbanized" the more difficult it would be for the NLF to mobilize their support. American academics advising the US government began to rehash pacification theories and cloaked them in new terms. Samuel Huntington of Harvard University, for example, wrote in July 1968 that the United States might have "stumbled upon" a solution to popular wars of national liberation through "forced-draft urbanization." He argued optimistically that because of forced urbanization, "Time in South Vietnam is increasingly on the side of the Government." [29] And American officials in Vietnam concentrated their efforts on carrying out the new "Accelerated Pacification Program." There was no more talk about "winning hearts and minds." Nor was there any more talk of gaining or regaining more territory. Henry Kissinger, for example, wrote in his famous article which appeared in the January 1969 issue of *Foreign Affairs* that the crux of the pacification program was to get more people and not to gain more territory.

The concern now was how to deprive the "revoluntionary fish" (the guerrillas) of the water (the rural population) as quickly as possible. "Accelerated Pacification" thus meant increased punishment of the rural areas through bombing, artillery shelling, chemical spraying, and "mop-up" operations. During the first three years of the Nixon administration 7 million tons of high explosives, or the equivalent of about three times the tonnage of bombs dropped on all fronts during the Second World War, were expended on South Vietnam alone. Out of this about 3 million tons were delivered by artillery strikes. The most noticeable result of these air and artillery strikes, according to the * * *

CRATERIZATION

April 6, 1971 issue of Look magazine, was the destruction of dams, dikes and canals and mile upon mile of "rice fields pockmarked with millions of large craters filled with water in which malarial mosquitoes have been breeding in epidemic numbers."

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During the same period 60,000 "mop-up" operations involving more than a battalion of "allied" troops—most of them Vietnamese—were directed against inhabited areas of South Vietnam. The Saigon regime claimed in early 1972 that it carried out an average of 300 mop-up operations every day. The end result of all these operations was more than 3,000 hamlets destroyed, about 26 per cent of the total, during the first three years of the Nixon administration. Their inhabitants were, of course, "urbanized."

CHEMICAL SPRAYING

As for the chemical spraying, the Pentagon informed a US congressman in 1969 that the only limit was "our ability to produce it." [30] According to a report in the November 12, 1970 issue of Tin Sang, a Saigon daily published by a group of Catholic Deputies in the Lower House, Deputy Tran Van Qua, chairman of the Committee on Agriculture, declared that American chemical defoliants alone had destroyed approximately 60 per cent of all crops in South Vietnam. Deputy Kieu Mong Thu also reported in the December 8, 1970 issue of the same newspaper disastrous floods in the central parts of the country caused by chemical defoliants stripping off most of the trees and destroying the vegetation, leaving nothing to stop the monsoon rain water. The effect of this was further crop destruction.

South Vietnam consequently had to import an average of 1 million metric tons of rice annually, according to Deputy Tran Van Qua in the article just quoted, although before the US invasion it was one of the largest rice exporters in the world. This fantastic importation of rice was enough to feed 5 million persons, or close to one-third of the total population of the country, with 440 pounds of rice each a year. In spite of this, hunger and starvation was widespread, especially in the central provinces, during the course of the "Accelerated Pacification Program." The following are a few examples taken from Saigon newspapers:

In the November 17, 1970 issue of *Tin Sang*, Deputy Kieu Mong Thu reported that in normal times the population of the whole central region of South Vietnam had been so hungry that they had had to eat roots because of a lack of rice. In the November 20, 1970 issue of the same newspaper Deputy Thu again reported that in the district of Nam Hoa in the province of Thua Thien a number of people had died of hunger. Meanwhile many families were so hungry that they dug for food in the garbage dumps left by the Americans and Koreans on both sides of the highway and some of them were poisoned by the rotten food. Finally, in the November 23 issue of the same newspaper Deputy Thu described in some detail how the population in some districts in the central area had to eat banana roots, leaves, and even cactus because they were so hungry. Another newspaper, *Xay Dung*, the most pro-Thieu Catholic daily in Saigon, reported in its December 2, 1970 issue that even in Tam Ky, a once prosperous district south of Da Nang, each inhabitant could purchase only from 5 to 6 kilograms of rice a month, less than a week's supply. From February 1 to February 2, 1972 *Tin Sang* ran a long report entitled "Hunger is Rampant in the Central Region" (*Nan Doi Dang Hoanh Hanh o Mien Trung*) which documented in some detail the causes of the hunger and described the heart-rending situation of the population in the area. Following is an excerpt from the article describing the situation facing a "resettlement area," which means an area people were herded into after their former villages had been destroyed:

At present in the resettlement area of Gia Dang, where the population of the villages of Trieu Phong and Hai Mang districts is now living, starvation is widespread and is threatening the lives of the entire population living in this resettlement area. In the coastal areas of Thua Thien province it is the same: people have to eat banana roots and leaves after days of having no rice and greens. Let us witness these scenes: mothers have no more milk for their babies to suck at; fathers stare helplessly at their children lying about in hunger. Will the fathers die before the children or will the children die before them? Death appears before them . . . In early January, 1972, dozens of people left the resettlement area to beg for food. Since January 15, every morning about a hundred persons from villages such as Co Luy, Da Nghi, Phuong Land and Ba Du go up to the district town of Hai Long or the town of Quang Tin to beg. . . . From the resettlement area of Gia Dang to the plain region one must cross five miles of sand dunes and hills. Now it is winter in the province of Quang Tri. A bone-chilling wind blows in from the north. The sky is covered with dark clouds, but it does not rain. In the cold the people try to drive away the shadow of death dancing before them as they walk . . . Getting up on an empty stomach each morning, they walk across the hills and dunes to beg for food. Unable to lift their feet anymore, they lie down here to die. Each day brings new corpses. Logically, the elderly die before the young, because there is no more shooting around here. But here children also die before their parents, and many youths without anything in their stomach and without any strength left try to cover up the corpses of their loved ones under a thin layer of earth without having even a worn out mat to throw over the dead bodies. Every day countless emaciated bodies fall on the way out to beg and on the road home.

The areas around the Gia Dang resettlement site are now running out of rice. If the number of beggars increases, the people in the plains will also have no more rice in a few weeks. Therefore not only has hunger already killed hundreds of people from Gia Dang, it is seriously threatening the lives of half a million people in the areas surrounding it . . .

Mr. Nguyen Dao Tan, the village chief of Hai Khe, which lies in the resettlement area, realizing that the people in the village are terribly hungry already and that the number of hunger victims increases by the hour, went to the district and province chiefs and asked for relief, but so far to no avail . . .

Since the situation is so tragic, why doesn't the government pay any attention? The answer is very simple. The government has just put through the fantastic "Autumn Economic Revolution." Yet despite this revolution the people are dying of hunger. How could the government admit such a tragic situation exists? . . .

The American government and the South Vietnamese governments must bear full responsibility for this starvation which is reaching historic proportions.

The government keeps quiet about the hunger running rampant in the central provinces because it is conniving with the Americans to unleash death and desolation on the Vietnamese people.

Such was the situation before the NLF's 1972 spring offensive. The situation during and after the offensive was even more tragic. During a period of less than four months, a million new refugees were generated, mostly in the central provinces alone as the result of American firepower and military activities.[31] There was supposed to be some relief for some of these people, but according to a Reuters dispatch of May 4, 1972, only a small number of those who were supposed to receive relief ever got anything at all.

The Thieu regime and its American advisors may claim that due to the disruptions caused by the offensive they were not able to establish effective channels for aiding the refugees. But months afterwards, the situation worsened instead of improving. On October 23, 1972, *Song Than*, an ultracon-

servative Saigon daily, reported that since September 9, each person in the camps in Binh Dinh province received only three kilograms of rice. Since that time they had not been given anything else to eat, not even salt. Yves Henry, a French economist, in his book entitled *Economic Agricole de l'Indochine*, writes that the average necessary consumption of milled rice per capital should be 225 kilograms a year, or about 20 kilograms a month. The three kilograms of rice given to the refugee population in Binh Dinh province over a month and a half would only last for a week at most.

PLASTIC RICE

This was not all. There were many other ways of skimming off the rice from the refugees. According to the October 12, 1972 Dai Dan Toc, another Saigon daily, more than 25 per cent of the rice given to the 250,000 "detainees in the concentration camps" in Da Nang was composed of plastic grains. The newspaper goes on to say that most of the detainees had lost a lot of weight, and that the rice given them was almost inedible. In a series of articles published in the second half of October, 1972, Dien Tin, a Saigon daily, accused Thieu's henchmen of making a profit for themselves by substituting cheap plastic grains for the more expensive rice. The same newspaper described in some detail the impending starvation in many areas, especially in the camps in Binh Long, just north of Saigon, where 8,000 persons were being kept and where there were extremely critical food shortages.

With the signing of the January 27 Paris Peace Agreements one would expect the refugee situation to improve. First of all, the "Accelerated Pacification" was supposed to be ended with the departure of the Americans. Second, the Agreements specifically guarantee freedom of movement, residence and work.[32] Refugees are supposed to be allowed to return to the countryside to put up their residences and to begin the long and hard process of resurrecting their devastated paddyfields and farms.

Exactly the reverse has occurred. Five days before the actual signing of the Agreements, the Saigon regime issued a series of edicts in the January 22, 1973 issue of Tin Song, its semi-official newspaper, threatening arrests and on-the-spot executions for "persons who incite the people . . . to leave areas controlled by the government to go into the communist-controlled zones." And, according to American journalists, Thieu's field commanders and local authorities have been doing everything possible to carry out these edicts. According to a report by Daniel Southerland in the January 29, 1973 Christian Science Monitor, people were even "being prohibited from working in outlying fields" of their own villages, apparently for fear they might fall under Communist control. Another report filed by Southerland on March 16, 1973 said the Saigon regime was doing everything it could to stop the refugees from returning to their former lands to farm and to rebuild their destroyed homes. Among other things, individuals and whole families were being forced to be photographed under anti-PRG banners to discourage them from going back. "The soldiers beat us up if we go to our fields. But if we don't work the fields, we won't have enough to eat," Southerland was told. Even if the refugees could make it back to their lands, their lives would be in constant danger from Saigon artillery practice. According to Southerland, Saigon forces made a habit of shelling the countryside surrounding their outposts regularly, although there was no evidence of any NLF activities.

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Frances FitzGerald's report in the May 4, 1973 New York Times was to the same effect:

In many provinces officials have taken away these people's identity cards—forcing them to check in at the police station every few days—and threatened arrest or violence against those who move from the wartime settlements.

Where refugees have disobeyed orders, the Government has carried out those threats. In many provinces it has made it a practice to bomb or shell all the newly-built houses in the PRG areas. In areas undefended by the PRG main forces, it has sent in ground troops to burn the new houses, strip the new fields, and, perhaps incidentally, to loot the farmers' belongings. The police and territorial forces that patrol the borders of Government zones have arrested farmers going to market and charged them with "supplying the VC." As was always the case during the war, these arrests are often followed by the confiscation of the farmers belongings and sessions of interrogation and torture.

Other methods ranged from "subtle psychological warfare activities" like falsely telling the people that the Paris Peace Agreements prescribe a cease-fire in place, and therefore all civilians have to stay where they are, to continual air and artillery strikes to make it difficult for the refugees to return home. In late February the Saigon regime itself claimed it flew 250 sorties against "enemy"-controlled areas. In its June 11, 1973 report, the US Senate Subcommittee on US Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad quoted the Defense Attache Office as saying that in the post-ceasefire period Saigon's "firings of 105 mm. howitzers were continuing [in the northern provinces alone] at a rate which exceeded 31,000 rounds, the average daily production of this ammunition in the United States."[33] The *Washington Post* (March 1, 1973) gave a figure of 35,000 rounds daily.

Of course, the Saigon regime has not been content with merely preventing the refugees from going home. It has also generated more refugees. Official AID statistics reveal that 213,400 refugees were created during the period from January 28 to February 16 alone. This statistic was itself scaled down by at least 70,000 persons. All this in a period of only 17 days after the agreements had been signed and in a country of fewer than 18 million people.[34]

The making of new refugees has been the result of indiscriminate air and artillery strikes and continued ground attacks into URG-controlled areas, which means any area in the countryside. In the words of a *New York Time*" report on February 28, 1973, " . . . the South Vietnamese Government has continued to fight to regain all positions it had lost just before the ceasefire and that it has continued to seek and attack communist units wherever it could find them." By the end of February, the Saigon regime bragged to the American press that its forces had retaken over 400 villages since the signing of the accords. If Thieu's claim were true, this means that one-fifth of all the villages in South Vietnam had been attacked by Thieu's forces in clear violation of the ceasefire by that time. Since that time, the September 8, 1973 *New York Times* reported, the shooting has continued unabated, Vietnamese officers say, with an average of 100 South Vietnamese soldiers killed or wounded every day this year in the delta alone. That is a rate equal to the number of casualties during the big Communist offensive last year, and higher than in many previous periods during the interminable war.

TRANSFER REFUGEES

Besides generating new refugees, the Thieu regime has also been transferring refugees from one province to another. According to the March 22 New York Times, the Saigon regime disclosed that it had begun moving 100,000 of a planned number of 660,000 persons to be transferred from the central provinces into areas directly north of Saigon. On July 5, 1973 the New York Times again reported that more than 160,000 Vietnamese were to be resettled for the month of July alone, or at least 30,000 persons more than the total number of people resettled during the first six months of 1972. In an attempt to grab more land, most of these people were to be sent to unsettled areas that had been conceded to the PRG for years.

All this is done under the guise of the "Program to Improve the Life of Anti-Communist Refugees" and the "Develop Virgin Land and Construct Hamlets Program." These programs are part of Saigon's four-year Community Defense and Local Development Plan (1972–1975), developed in 1971 with the assistance of high-ranking American CORDS (Civil Operations and Rural Development Support) officials. Saigon officials distinguish between forced relocation and voluntary resettlement, the former being removal of civilians from their native villages, the latter, improvement of refugees' lives by resettlement on new lands. According to the 1972 GAO (General Accounting Office) Report on Indochina, local US officials considered both to be forced resettlement and protested against it, only to be overruled by their superiors. In any event, at the present rate of relocation, Saigon officials claim that there will be no more refugee camps by December 1973!

There are many reasons for the transfer of refugees out of the central provinces. These provinces have always been considered more pro-PRG than other areas. This move would enable Thieu both to deprive the PRG of their support and to call in air strikes on those provinces more freely. It would also presumably provide Thieu with buffer zones if and when the PRG is provoked into taking the offensive against him. Moreover, in thus resettling the refugees Thieu hopes to dislocate any PRG "infrastructures" among the refugees and make control of them easier. Such control is important in manipulating votes in an election. Electoral trial runs to test the regime's control were conducted in May, 1973, in Go Cong, Quang Tin and other places in the form of elections for rural councils. On August 26, 1973, elections took place on a wider scale and 31 pro-Thieu faithfuls were "elected" to the Saigon Senate by 92.2 per cent of the votes, indicating an even greater degree of ballot box stuffing than during Thieu's one-man race in 1971.[35] Such use of refugee bloc votes, in addition to electoral support by right-wing groups, would allow Thieu either to run again for a third presidential term, according to sources close to Thieu himself, in the event of a stalemate in the political talks in France between his regime and the PRG, or to help Thieu win a majority of the seats in a future assembly in case general elections are carried out. Of course such an election would mean nothing to the Vietnamese people since they clearly will have no freedom to vote, but Thieu hopes to deceive the American public about the "increasing popularity" of his regime which will in turn guarantee continued financial and military support for him.

Hence, the wholesale transfer of refugees. It is meant neither to "improve the life of anti-Communist refugees" nor to "develop virgin land." According to the GAO report cited above, the planned assistance to refugees for 1973 covers only 600,000 refugees and, even on paper, amounts to a meager US $14 per refugee. Corruption and graft reduce refugee relief to almost nothing. Ac-

cording to the June 6, 1973 issue of Hoa Binh, a Saigon daily, close to half a million US dollars of relief funds for a camp in Binh Dinh province had been siphoned off in graft. Earlier, in its March 8, 1973 issue, the New York Times also reported that corruption in the 34 refugee camps in the Da Nang area (where 300,000 refugees are kept) was so rampant that camp chiefs had to be replaced more than once within a period of five months.

All this graft and corruption at a time of critical rice shortages in the central and highland provinces (Washington Post, July 25, 1973; New York Times, August 4, 1973) has only meant increased suffering and hunger for the refugees. Demanding their freedom, refugees demonstrated last month in Quang Tri, Thua Thien and Quang Nam provinces. In September hungry refugees rioted in Long Khanh province.[35] Meanwhile AID has asked Congress for further resettlement appropriations in FY 1974: $45 million for the so-called "return-to-village" plans and facilities, $20 million for resettlement plans on new lands and $25 million for relief of refugees waiting to "resettle." None of these requested appropriations as parts of the AID bill for Indochina has been finally passed by Congress. For this reason, AID funding for refugee relief continues at a lower level as authorized by the overall Continuing Resolution of the Senate.

There is still time for concerned Americans to influence Congress in cutting of all these so-called "relief funds" and other "humanitarian" aid to the Saigon regime. Such aid has clearly not been used for relief or humanitarian purposes. It has only been used to prolong the suffering of millions of Vietnamese and to destroy the hard-earned Paris Peace Agreements. Americans owe it to humanity as well as to themselves to cut off further aid of any kind, "humanitarian" or otherwise, from the Thieu regime. Such aid would only bring more suffering and death and consequently a full-scale resumption of the war. It is unlikely that after the suffering inflicted upon the Vietnamese people and the onslaught on Vietnamese tradition and culture described above, the refugees will remain "pacified" under Thieu. So far they have been extremely patient in the hope that things might work out peacefully as stipulated by the peace agreements. There has been too much death and suffering already and the Vietnamese people are putting their most earnest hopes in a peaceful solution.

But there is no guarantee that, supported by American "humanitarian" aid, Thieu might not push his luck a little too far. One only has to read the heart-rending accounts in the May 18 and 29, and June 1 and 6, 1973 issues of Dai Dan Toc, a Saigon daily, on the new and widespread horror of mothers having to sell their babies for food and medicine to understand the meaning of continued American aid and support for the Thieu regime. American responsibility does not end with the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam. It will only end when the Vietnamese people are left alone to carry out the provisions of the Paris Agreements, free from any US intervention in support of the Thieu regime.

FOOTNOTES

[1] *Senate Subcommitee on Refugees*, February 28, 1973.

[2] *Pentagon Papers*, Senator Gravel Edition, Beacon Press, Vol. I, pp. 45–50; Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, Garden City, N.Y., 1963, p. 372.

[3] W. A. Nighswonger, *Rural Pacification in Vietnam*, Praeger, New York, 1966, p. 46; M. E. Osborne, *Strategic Hamlets in South Vietnam*, Cornell University, 1965, p. 22. Nguyen Khac Nhan, "Policy of Key Rural Agrovilles," in *Asian Culture*, Vol. 3, July-December, 1961, No. 3–4, p. 32.

[4] See Ngo Vinh Long's articles in *Ecocide in Indochina*, Harper and Row, 1970, and *The Capitalist System*, Prentice Hall, 1972.

[5] Ibid. Also: *New York Review of Books*, April 25, 1968.

[6] Nighswonger, p. 63.

[7] Ngo Vinh Long in *Ecocide in Indochina*.

[8] Nighswonger, p. 62.

[9] Ibid., p. 64.

[10] *Pentagon Papers*, Vol. II, p. 130.

[11] Ibid., pp. 515–623.

[12] Nighswonger, p. 115.

[13] Ibid., p. 130. See subsequent pages for description of the varied systems for controlling the rural population.

[14] *Pentagon Papers*, Vol. II, p. 616.

[15] Jonathan Schell, *The Village of Ben Suc*, New York: Vintage 1967.

[16] UPI dispatch quoted in *New Statesman*, March 11, 1966.

[17] *New York Review of Books*, April 25, 1966.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Barry Weisberg, ed., *Ecocide in Indochina: The Ecology of War*, New York: Harper & Row, 1970.

[21] Gerald Hickey, *Village in Vietnam*, Yale University, 1964, pp. 88–89.

[22] Luong Du Thiep, *–a Hoi Viet Nam* (Vietnamese Society), Hanoi: Han Thuyen, 1944, p. 239.

[23] Hickory, p. 41.

[24] Ibid., p. 104.

[25] Ibid., p. 104.

[26] Ibid.

[27] *Against the Crime of Silence*, proceedings of the Russell International War Crimes Tribunal, O'Hare, 1968, p. 479.

[28] *New York Times*, June 23, 1968. This is a report of the findings of the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees.

[29] *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1968.

[30] Richard McCarthy, *The Ultimate Folly*, Alfred A. Knopf, 1969, 49–50.

[31] See the reports by Associated Press, April 28 and May 1, 1972. *Le Monde*, May 3, 1972; *Le Figaro*, May 3, 1973.

[32] Both Article 11 an Article 3 of the Ceasefire Protocol explicitly guarantee the rights of "freedom of movement" and "freedom of residence" to all civilians in all parts of South Vietnam. Article 5 further paves the way for such rights by calling for a total removal or deactivation of "all demolition objects, minefields, traps, obstacles or other dangerous objects placed previously, so as not to hamper the population's movement and work." However, stockades, barbed-wire fences, spiked moats and minefields still surround the majority of the Sagon defugee camps.

[33] Subcommittee on US Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad. *Staff Report*, June 11, 1973, p. 33.

[34] *New York Times*, Senate Subcommittee on Refugees report, February 28, 1973.

[35] See *Thoi-Bao Ga*. No. 17, for a detailed description of the 1971 National Assembly and Presidential election.

[36] *Washington Post*, September 11, 1973.

WAR EXPENDITURES 88 PERCENT OF TOTAL BY ADMINISTRATION'S OWN ADMISSION—ONLY 5 PERCENT FOR "HUMANITARIAN" GOALS

FISCAL YEAR 1975 INDOCHINA AID PROPOSED: $3-668 BILLION TOTAL

[Programs in quotation marks below as given by administration]

	Amount	Percent
I. Military expenditures	$2.513 billion	69
1. South Vietnam: "Military Assistance Service Funded"	$1.6 billion	
2. Cambodia: "Military Assistance Program"	$363.75 million	
3. Laos: "Military Assistance Program"	$86.1 million	
4. "Incremental cost of U.S. Forces"	$463 million	
II. War-related "Economic Assistance"	$714.9 million	19
1. South Vietnam:		
(a) "Food For Peace"	$160.6 million	
(b) "Food and Nutrition"	$185 million	
(c) "Industrial Production"	$155 million	
(d) "Transportation and Misc."	$47.3 million	
2. Cambodia:		
(a) "Food for Peace"	$77 million	
(b) "Commodity Import Program"	$71 million	
(c) "Multilateral Stabilization"	$17.5 million	
(d) "Technical Support"	$1.5 million	
III. Reconstruction and development	$267.6 million	7
1. South Vietnam—"Reconstruction and Development"	$227.2 million	
2. Cambodia—"Reconstruction and Development"	$0	
Laos:		
(a) "Reconstruction and Development"	$22.4 million	
(b) "Stabilization"	$17.5 million	
IV. Humanitarian	$172.4 million	5
1. South Vietnam—"Humanitarian Assistance"	$136 million	
2. Cambodia—"Humanitarian Aid"	$20 million	
Laos:		
(a) "Humanitarian Aid"	$16.2 million	
(b) "Food for Peace"	$253,000	

Note: In reality only 2 percent of administration's proposal for "humanitarian" or "reconstruction" needs. (1) "Reconstruction and Development"—Covertly war-related: Since fierce war rages in South Vietnam, the Indochina Resource Center does not believe that any of the funds designated as "reconstruction and development" for South Vietnam will actually go for that purpose. We would only consider the $39.9 million designated for Laos as fitting this description. (2) "Humanitarian"—Covertly War-related: Most of the "humanitarian" funds designated for South Vietnam and Laos are meant to aid in a war-related program designed to keep refugees away from the other side. This includes $116.5 million out of $135 million in South Vietnam ($30 m. for "City to Farm," $86.5 for "Refugee Relief," and all $20 million in Cambodia. Therefore, the only truly humanitarian aid we consider is $33.8 million, ($15.3 million for Laos, $10.3 million for Health Care in South Vietnam, and $8.2 million for Child Care in South Vietnam).

Sources: All program titles in quotation marks are taken from the official Agency for International Development Fiscal Year 1975 submission to Congress for Indochina, see p. 5 (Vietnam), 51 (Cambodia), and 59 (Laos) for program breakdown. Military Assistance and Food For Peace figures taken from the Agency for International Development Fiscal Year 1975 submission to Congress—Summary—April 1974, pp. 7, 8, and 9.

MORE AID FOR INDOCHINA THAN THE REST OF THE WORLD COMBINED

ADMINISTRATION-PROPOSED FISCAL YEAR 1975 EXPENDITURES, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Indochina—$3.7 billion

1. Ind. postwar reconst., $917 million.[1]
2. Food for Peace, $237.8 million.[1]
3. Mil. asst. serv. fded., $1.6 billion.[2]
4. Mil. asst. prog. and credit sales, $449.8 million.[1]
4. Ind.-related U.S. forces, $463 million.[3]

Total, $3.668 billion.

Rest of the world—$3.542 billion

1. Asia (except Indichina), $1.67 billion.[1]
2. Middle East, $969 million.[1]
3. Latin America, $592.3 million.[1]
4. Africa, $293.8 million.[1]
5. Europe, $15 million.[1]

Total, $3.542 billion.

The official Administration chart for FY 75 world-wide military and economic aid expenditures, referred to in Source 1 above, shows Indochina as consuming 46.6% of the Administration's proposed expenditures as designated per region. This is because the $3,090,819,000 figure for Indochina does not include the $463 in incremental costs for U.S. forces, and only gives $1.45 billion—the new obligational authority—as the cost for MASF, instead of the proposed $1.6 billion ceiling. Using this particular chart, we may make the following breakdown:

[1] Agency for International Development—fiscal year 1975 submission to the Congress—Summary—April, 1974. Chart entitled "Bilateral U.S. Economic Assistance, Military Assistance and Credit Sales—Program Proposed for FY 1975", pp. 7, 8, 9.

[2] Letter from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to Senator Kennedy, *Congressional Record*, S. 4884, April 1, 1974. Of this $1.6 billion, $1.45 billion is in new obligational authority, $150 million in pipeline.

[3] This figure was supplied to the Indochina Resource Center from the DOD comptroller's office on April 29, 1974, and defined as "incremental Southeast Asia costs for the support of U.S. forces related to the phase down of the Indochina conflict."

Note—Administration Chart shows: Indochina: 46.6% of Total U.S. Aid. Only 0.8% of World Population.

	(Indochina)	Asia	Middle East	Latin America	Africa	Europe	Total	World—Total
Thousands of dollars	(3,090,819)	4,762,069	969,050	592,360	293,753	15,053	$6,632,231	[1]$7,459,599
Percent of total	(46.6)	71.8	14.6	8.9	4.4	0.2	100	
Population [2]	[3] (28,700,000)	2,000,000,000	102,100,000	195,000,000	354,000,000	466,000,000	3,120,000,000	3,706,000,000
Percent of World	(0.8)	54	2.8	5.3	10	13	85.1	

[1] This $7,459,599,000 figure for total proposed economic and military aid includes $827,368,000 for "other" worldwide expenses, including AID and State Department administrative costs, ocean freight, etc.

[2] Source for these population figures is the "Information Please Almanac," 1974, pp. 319-320, 371.

[3] "Indochina" population figures include only South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, the only areas in Indochina to which the administration proposes giving aid.

[From Internews, Mar. 11–24, 1974]

WORLD BANK PROJECTS AID THROUGH 1990: HOW THE UNITED STATES PLANS TO KEEP THIEU AFLOAT

The Nixon Administration is quietly working through the World Bank to organize mutilateral aid to subsidize the collapsing Saigon economy through 1990. On October 14, 1973 the World Bank, headed by the architect of Johnson's Vietnam war build-up Robert McNamara, convened a secret meeting in Paris to discuss aid for the Nguyen Van Thieu regime. The meeting was attended by Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, ten West European countries and the United States, which sent representatives from the State Department, Treasury Department and the National Security Council.[1]

"As you know," World Bank representative I. P. M. Cargill explained at the opening session, "President Thieu called on Mr. McNamara last April to inquire whether the World Bank would help in forming an aid group for the Republic of Vietnam [Saigon]." Cargill warned that without the necessary foreign aid, the stability of the Saigon regime would be "endangered." Reconstruction and economic development programs in South Vietnam may be postponed indefinitely because of the "continuing security problem," he said. What is needed immediately is aid to alleviate Saigon's balance-of-payments crisis.

Shortly after the Paris meeting, a World Bank mission was dispatched to Saigon to assess the economic prospects and specific foreign aid needs of the Thieu regime. The mission's secret report, obtained by internews, was filed on January 18, 1974.

The mission's report assumes that the Paris Peace Agreement will not be applied and is therefore "irrelevant" for future economic plans. The report describes a very grim economic situation in the Saigon-controlled areas of South Vietnam:

Economic growth in the last two years has been "very small, if not negative."

Per capita income has remained stable at $140 per year since 1960.

Manufacturing industry has declined from 12.8 percent of the Gross Domestic Product since 1960 to 10.0 percent at present.

South Vietnam still needs to import 300,000 tons of rice per year (it exported over a million tons in 1939).

Inflation last year was 60 percent, and living standards have fallen "considerably" in the past two years "particularly among soldiers and government officials."

Nearly 50 percent of those gainfully employed are in services rather than production, and 25 percent of the potential work force is unemployed.

Refugees are not being resettled in areas where they can resume agricultural production because Thieu is "finding it difficult to locate secure areas."

About 50 percent of the Saigon budget goes for the military and police (this does not count direct U.S. military aid).

The percentage of the Saigon budget obtained from external sources (the United States) is steadily growing and will be about 56 percent in 1974.

The World Bank mission concludes that the most serious problem facing the Saigon regime is its chronic balance of payments deficit. Last year, it says, Saigon exported only $56 million in goods while importing $794 million, for a deficit of $738 million. For 1974, the Bank mission projects a deficit of $829 million, and the outlook for the next decade and a half promises only slow improvement.

The mission holds out little hope for postwar reconstruction, and even less for economic development. It simply calls for balance of payments support to prevent economic collapse while the war continues. Saigon will need at least $700 million this coming year, the mission says, $770 million in 1980, and $450 million in 1990—for a total of $11 billion in foreign aid subsidy over the next sixteen years. In 1974 only $100 million of these funds will come from non-U.S. sources, but Saigon officials hope to eventually get as much as $500 million a year.

The report emphasizes that Saigon has a very weak tax base and cannot be expected to repay the foreign aid subsidy except on the easiest of terms: 70 percent of the aid should be an outright gift, and the remaining 30 percent should be repayable over 30 years at 3 percent interest with a ten-year grace period.

According to the World Bank report, the number one priority for South Vietnam is keeping the Saigon regime afloat. The Bank does not suggest that the war-orientation of the economy be changed by demobilizing even part of the 1.1 million men in the army who are kept out of the work force, that the government budget be re-allocated from military to economic reconstruction and development expenditures, or that the hundreds of thousands of peasants in the cities be allowed to return to cultivate their rice fields. In effect, the World Bank is rewarding Thieu for refusing to implement the Paris Accords.

The Bank could play a role in forcing implementation of the peace agreement by offering aid only to the new government to be created by the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord called for under the terms of the Accords. The Council—to be composed of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, Saigon, and the neutralist forces—is to organize free elections to form a new government for all of South Vietnam. Thieu has rejected this part of the agreement. He calls instead for elections to posts in the Saigon administration under the present constitution which outlaws the PRG and the neutralists.

Given this posture on the part of Thieu, even members of the third force or neutralists have called for an end to aid to Saigon. Former Saigon deputy, Ngo Cong Duc, for example, told the French paper Le Monde: "Aid for reconstruction will be precious for South Vietnam. But in the present circumstances, assistance to the Saigon regime is a source of unhappiness for us. To aid Nguyen Van Thieu at this moment is to work against the spirit of the Accords."

WORLD BANK BACKS AWAY FROM SAIGON IN REPLY TO BREAD FOR THE WORLD

The World Bank has gone on record for the first time against considering capital development funds for South Vietnam as long as the war continues, despite pressure from the Administration for the Bank to make such funds available.

An announcement to that effect came in a letter dated April 18 from Peter Cargill, Vice President of the World Bank, to Eugene Carson Blake, President of Bread for the World, in response to testimony recently pre-

[1] The meeting was attended by representatives of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, the International Monetary Fund, the Asia Development Bank, the United Nations, and the World Bank.

sented by the latter organization before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Bread for the World is a new, ecumenically-based "Christian citizens' lobby" on hunger and poverty, and Blake, its President, is the former General Secretary of the World Council of Churches.

Cargill's letter put a clear distance between the Bank's position and that of the Administration.

Cargill wrote that any participation by the International Development Association—a division of the World Bank that lends development capital to the poorest countries at no interest—"would depend on the Bank Group's assessment of the possibility of such an assistance program being directed solely towards the reconstruction and development of these economies and restoring them to a peacetime basis as foreseen in the Paris Accords." He said that informal discussions among various aid-giving countries indicated that "most of them believed that conditions were not yet ripe in South Viet Nam for any formal action to be taken to set up an aid group."

Blake had urged Senate approval of a measure (defeated in the House) that would provide U.S. funding for IDA. But in his testimony Blake said, "Bread for the World would take quite a different position if the IDA program became a major conduit for funds to support, for example, the Thieu regime." He added that "because rumors and reports to that effect persist, we are asking Mr. [Robert S.] McNamara to lay them to rest in the clearest possible terms." McNamara is President of the World Bank.

Reports of possible Bank assistance to Saigon stemmed from a chain of events that began a year ago.

In April 1973, shortly after the Paris agreements, President Thieu asked the World Bank to help form a consultative group of donor nations to consider aiding the Republic of Viet Nam, a member country. The Bank agreed, and in May and November sent study missions to South Viet Nam, each of which resulted in private reports. The reports were leaked and rumors began to circulate. Although the reports painted a bleak picture of Saigon's economic prospects, some observers interpreted them as a case for Bank assistance.

During the same period, as Saigon's financial difficulties mounted, the Administration began pressing the World Bank to help through IDA, its "soft loan window." On March 25 Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote to Senator Edward Kennedy expressing the hope that "a reversal of the negative Congressional action on IDA replenishment would clearly enhance the possibility of success" with regard to arranging reconstruction assistance for the Republic of South Viet Nam. The Administration's interest served to reinforce rumors prompted by the reports of the study missions, and vice-versa.

Privately the Bank's information office denied the rumors and insisted that no decision to fund projects in South Viet Nam had been made. But it did not rule out the possibility of a later decision favorable to Saigon, and Bank officers maintained official silence.

In breaking that silence, Vice President Cargill clearly attached further consideration of assisting South Viet Nam to compliance with the Paris Accords.

An initial meeting of 16 major donor nations (the consultative group) took place last October in Paris to consider the first report and the Saigon request for aid, but a subsequent meeting has been indefinitely postponed. In his letter to Senator Kennedy, Kissinger said that the reactions of participating countries to the energy crisis and to the Congressional decision on IDA replenishment led the Bank to postpone the meeting."

Cargill's letter, however, says that conditions "in South Viet Nam" led most of the 16 nations to postpone further consideration.

At least one of the 16 nations, Sweden, insists that after the war ends assistance should go to both North and South Viet Nam.

Cargill's statement apparently means that the donor nations are not prepared to act as a group even outside the Bank structure until a reasonable settlement, consistent with the Paris peace agreements, takes place.

INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT,
Washington, D.C., April 18, 1974.

Dr. EUGENE CARSON BLAKE,
President, Bread for the World,
New York, N.Y.

DEAR DR. BLAKE: Thank you for your letter to Mr. McNamara enclosing the text of your statement on the IDA Fourth Replenishment before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We greatly appreciate your eloquent testimony in support of the Fourth Replenishment and its goal of helping the poorest countries in the world. Mr. McNamara has asked me to respond to your specific questions regarding Bank operations in Indochina, for which I have been principally responsible.

You probably know that for the past 15 years, at the request of our member countries, the Bank Group has taken the lead with other international organizations in organizing aid groups for countries wherever a significant number of aid giving countries have shown an interest in some form of consultation. At present there are 18 such groups. The Bank and IDA services these groups by providing economic analysis, estimates of the aid needs of a particular country, etc., and in general takes the chair at meetings which they convene. This procedure has proved extremely useful to the aid giving countries—including, I believe, to the U.S.A.—and has provided opportunities for consultation amongst donor countries—and coordination of the aid efforts. It was taken as a matter of course, therefore, when about a year ago several donor countries made inquiries of the Bank Group whether we could help in forming such a group for Indochina.

Mr. McNamara in reply said that the Bank Group would be prepared to form such a group on the basis of various understandings of which the most important from the point of view of the issues you have raised were: (a) that the group deal with the problems of the three countries of Indochina that are members of the Bank and IDA, namely, Laos, Khmer Republic and South Viet Nam; (b) that any initiative in forming such a group or any participation by IDA would depend on the Bank Group's assessment of the possibility of such an assistance program being directed solely towards the reconstruction and development of these economies and restoring them to a peacetime basis as foreseen in the Paris Accords; and (c) that the Bank Group would undertake only those operations that received the broad support of its membership.

With the progress reported from the Paris peace talks in the spring of last year, we decided to send a mission to South Viet Nam to begin inquiries about the possibility of forming an aid group of the kind described above. Subsequently, we approached the Governments of Laos and the Khmer Republic. At the time neither of these governments felt that they were ready to receive such a mission from IDA. The mission accordingly visited South Viet Nam in June, and its report was circulated to interested countries towards the end of September last year.

In October I had the opportunity of meeting in Paris with representatives of the various aid giving countries concerned. From these informal discussions I gained the clear impression that most of them believed that conditions were not yet ripe in South Viet Nam for any formal action to be taken to set up an aid group. Accordingly, I suggested that we postpone further discussions for some months to give us an opportunity to watch developments in Indochina and to form a clearer judgment whether an aid program could be worked out in accordance with the understanding I have described above.

I recognized that one of your particular concerns is that IDA would become a major source of financial assistance to the Government of South Viet Nam. Even under peaceful conditions the resources gap which would have to be filled annually would be far beyond the relatively small amount of funds likely to be available to South Viet Nam out of the Fourth Replenishment of IDA. Taking into account the scarcity of concessional assistance funds such as IDA provides, as well as the urgent needs of hundreds of millions of poor people in other parts of the world, it is clear that IDA could hardly become a major source of funds for this purpose.

Sincerely,

PETER CARGILL,
Vice President.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON).

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York is recognized for 6 minutes.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the opportunity to wind up this debate today on behalf of the Committee on Armed Services. I must say, though, that I never really have been convinced that many souls are saved during general debate. That is borne out, I think, by the tremendous and enthusiastic turnout of the membership here during this debate; but, nevertheless, perhaps we can get a few remarks into the RECORD and perhaps some day in the distant future people may even read what we have said.

I want to say just a few words about this bill. I think it does a number of very important things. For example, this bill continues the job that we began in the supplemental appropriation bill of trying desperately to remedy some of the errors in our own defense readiness posture that were recognized as a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict of last October.

We are increasing very rapidly the production of tanks. We are increasing very rapidly the production of the TOW antitank missiles, which are the tactical counterpart of the Soviet Sagger, but which are vastly outnumbered by the cheaper Soviet product.

We are also adding, as the gentleman from Colorado pointed out a moment ago, the F–111, the only supersonic new aircraft that we have developed in the past 15 years in the Air Force and the one which, without the active participation of the Congress and the Committee on Armed Services, would already have been consigned to oblivion. We are keeping it alive, not only to fill out the ranks of the tactical Air Force, but also as a possible supersonic bomber hedge if we should need it.

Finally, we have stopped the dramatic decline of the U.S. Navy—if this bill goes through intact tomorrow, as I hope it will—which has steadily been going down year after year while the Soviet Navy has steadily been going up. If this bill is passed, for the first time we will be building ships in this fiscal year than we are putting into mothballs.

Many of the Members who have included their dissenting views in the committee report, and some of whom have spoken on the floor today, talk about the terrible expenditures involved in this particular legislation. Well, the figures in this bill are somewhat high. They are higher than the figures last year; but let us not forget that percentagewise, we are doing less in the field of defense today than we have done at any time since 1950. That was the year, the Members will recall, when Louie Johnson, after the Korean war broke out, was castigated from one end of the city of Washington to the other for his failure to have provided this Nation with the means to defend itself.

So, what we are presenting here is really a modest defense budget, and one that is taking only 27 percent of the budget and only 5.9 percent of the gross national product, compared with some 47 percent of the budget when President Kennedy first took office, and 8.3 percent of the gross national product.

Mr. Chairman, I think the most important thing of all, for those who traditionally in knee-jerk fashion oppose anything or everything that comes out of the Committee on Armed Services, is to realize that the purpose of this bill is not to fight a war; it is to prevent war. The money that we are putting into this budget is to try to maintain the peace. Let us remember that. It is intended to provide peace forces in Europe where we are confronting the mass of the Soviet threat; and where else would one have us put our forces except in the area where the threat exists?

Second, it will provide assistance and provide the forces capable of influencing stability in the troubled Middle Eastern area where, thank God, Secretary Kissinger is today on the verge of another fantastic and magical peace arrangement, backed up by the determination and the power of the 6th Fleet and of American military forces.

Finally—and I hope this will continue to be the case when the votes are counted tomorrow—this budget will put money in to deter war and to preserve the fragile peace in Southeast Asia. We have gotten our troops out of there; all this bill will do is provide a little ammunition to let the South Vietnamese continue to defend themselves in fiscal 1975.

If Members have bothered to read the paper, they know that a massive North Vietnamese offensive is already under way today in Vietnam in complete and total violation of the Paris Accords. Let us not tell the South Vietnamese people that they have got to go out there with only sticks and stones to fight off those Russian tanks moving against them. Let us at least tell them tomorrow that they can have some real ammunition, so long as they promise to shoot it themselves.

So, this is what this defense authorization bill is all about. We are trying to correct the serious and dangerous situation where American power has been going down while Soviet power is going up. We are trying to deter a new war breaking out in Southeast Asia. And we are trying to maintain peace and stability in a world where self-proclaimed "peace loving" Indians yesterday exploded an atomic bomb.

Mr. Chairman, let me add a word of further explanation with regard to the F–111 aircraft.

I am presently a supporter of the B–1 although I must admit that I am deeply concerned about the problems the B–1 has encountered, the slippage in its production schedule, and the fantastic escalation in its cost. We must face up realistically now to the possibility that Congress may never approve such a costly program. In that event we need to have an option available when the time for decision comes.

As for the B–52's, however they may be modified, there is I believe considerable room for doubt as just how much longer they will constitute a credible threat to the Soviet Union.

However, we do have readily available to us in the interim the FB–111, which can be produced at any time that the Department of Defense and the Congress decide that this should be done, and which can in its EB–111 version, can be an interim supersonic bomber.

But let it be understood we are not merely buying insurance here. The primary purpose of this addition of the F–111 is the need for additional F–111 tactical aircraft. The report points out, for example, that a very substantial number of the early F–111's are now being diverted by the Air Force for reconfiguration into reconnaissance aircraft. When this is done these F–111's will be lost to the tactical strike force because they will be used with other aircraft in our inventory to provide the unique capability that is found in the F–111.

The committee is to be congratulated for the action they have taken to preserve this essential production line both for the aircraft that will be produced for our forces today and, very importantly, as a hedge for a most uncertain future in the manned bomber field.

Mr. WHITEHURST. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. JOHNSON).

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, not being a member of the committee, I have some questions I would like to raise, and I agreed to ask them of the gentleman from New York during his time, but his time was limited so I got some time of my own to ask some of these questions now.

Mr. Chairman, this is the second time I have listened to the position of the committee, and I am impressed with the committee's sincerity and their desire to maintain strong American defense. I agree, of course, that this is what has to be done, but there are certain questions which come to my mind.

For example, in the area of the F–111, I have been satisfied by the gentleman's statements and the chairman's statements, and by some of the others, that the F–111 is a good piece of equipment now.

Mr. Chairman, I had doubts about that. Evidently those have been satisfied in the gentlemen's minds and I am satisfied by their statements.

When we start examining the various numbers of delivery systems to the Soviet Union, the methods by which we can deliver atomic weapons, we have the Trident—I am all in favor of the Trident—we have the missile systems, the ballistic missiles; we have F–111's now; we have a lot of other aircraft. It is my understanding that we have F–4's; we have the F–14 and we have the F–15 which can deliver atomic weapons.

Admittedly, they have to come from the periphery of the Soviet Union. But years ago we had the F–100. My brother used to sit on the end of a runway in Turkey. He would sit there for hours at a time, and they would have targets assigned inland.

How many of these delivery systems do we have to pile up one on top of the other to maintain the deterrent force that we are talking about? When we talk about the F–111 versus the B–1, I would like to have somebody discuss these problems.

I have understood that we have many thousands of bombs that can be delivered to any one target or any series of targets in the Soviet Union. How many do we have to pile, one on top of the other, before we regard ourselves as safe? I wish the gentleman would respond.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, let me just say that, first of all, it is my understanding that the only nuclear carrier aircraft we have around the periphery of the Soviet Union, primarily, is the F–111. The other aircraft which the gentleman referred to no longer perform that mission.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Let me ask the gentleman this specific question: Do we no longer have Air Force fighters stationed on the runways around the periphery of the Soviet Union, such as in Turkey and any other places, that have targets assigned inland?

Mr. STRATTON. To answer the gentleman, we have Air Force fighters, but the gentleman is talking about nuclear-attack aircraft. My understanding is that the only ones that are carrying out this mission now are the F–111's that are stationed in Europe.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Is the gentleman saying that we do not have F–100's or F–4's that have the capability of delivering bombs, those that are operating off aircraft carriers or runways in Turkey and other areas?

Mr. STRATTON. There may be some on aircraft carriers. I am not sure just how many we have there, but the gentleman refers to those that were stationed in Europe.

This is a complicated matter, but the gentleman refers to all these myriad weapons systems. There has been reference to the Triad in terms of our nuclear defense. We have believed—I think properly—that we should not put all our eggs in one basket. So we have missiles. None of those missiles has ever been fired in anger, as the gentleman well knows, and some people are not even sure that they are going to work. God forbid that it should ever occur.

We also have the nuclear bombers, the Strategic Air Command, which now depends on the B–52's. It seems to me that we have what is probably our most

invulnerable deterrent, the Polaris/Poseidon submarine.

Mr. Chairman, the feeling is that it is conceivable that the missiles might not work. It is conceivable that the aircraft on the ground might be sabotaged, and that is why we have the Polaris submarines. It is also conceivable that perhaps one of these days the Soviets, with their satellites, might be able to track our submarines, so we have felt that the best security is to have all three of these systems. They are expensive; there is no question about that, but if they deter nuclear warfare, which they have done to date for over a quarter century, I think they are worth the money that we put into them. This is the reason we have these three types of systems.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, we all agree with what the gentleman has said about the necessity for a deterrent. What I am asking is this: If we need the B–1 bomber when we have the F–111, I would like to hear the gentleman's analysis of that, because I have not heard anything that says the B–1 bomber is necessary. We have the F–111 and know its capability.

I am not challenging the gentleman on that.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, let me address myself to that question.

The nub of our Strategic Air Command has been the B–52 bomber. I am sure the chairman of our committee is the real expert on this, and he might want to answer this; I am sure that he could do a better job than I can.

The B–52 bomber was last constructed, I think, almost 20 years ago, and I think we all know that it is getting outmoded. It did the job in the conventional bombing assignments in Vietnam.

So the question has been: What will be the follow-on to the B–52? The B–1 is the plane that the Air Force is in the process of developing. It is a supersonic aircraft, an aircraft that can come in low, an aircraft with a standoff capability which will take the place of the B–52 in the 1980's and the 1990's.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. What about the F–111?

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, the F–111 is primarily a tactical fighter plane, but it has the capability of carrying bombs. It also happens to be a supersonic plane. It is larger than most of our fighters, and it has a bomber version.

So the feeling on our committee is that if the B–1 should become so expensive, as the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE) has pointed out, that Congress is not going to go for it, we will have another option available to us; namely, the FB–111, which may not be able to do all the things which the B–1 can do, although it can do a number of them.

So that is why we are keeping the production line of the F–111 alive for another year, until we come to that point where Congress has to decide whether we will go into production of the B–1 or not, considering the specified cost. If we do not keep the F–111 line open, there will not be any option open; we will have to go to the other plane regardless of what the cost might be.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, let me ask the gentleman this question:

Does the gentleman have any reports as to how many of these tactical fighter planes we have available in Europe for the purpose of striking into the middle of the continent, into the Soviet Union? Does the gentleman know how many fighter planes there are?

Perhaps that is secret information, I do not know.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I would hope that that would be classified in any event.

However, the gentleman is probably aware of the fact that this has been one of the stumbling blocks in our discussions with the Soviets. The Soviets have all kinds of medium-range nuclear missiles which are aimed at Paris, at London, at Berlin, and at points in all of these other countries in Western Europe, and they do not count these missiles in their nuclear force. Yet they are demanding that the nuclear carrying planes in our tactical Air Force should be counted.

This is one of the reasons we are having difficulty in the Salt II, as I understand it.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman.

If we could get this kind of information, it would help some of the Members like myself who are not on the committee to make a determination with respect to the B–1 bomber. I would appreciate it if the committee would try to think of the situation in those terms, so we can make our decisions based on that information.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I think the committee has tried very hard to provide information. I think the report is a very carefully reasoned discussion of this very issue, if the gentleman has had time to read it. We are trying to protect the gentleman's options so that he will know which way to go.

Mr. Chairman, I might call the gentleman's attention to page 3514 of the hearings, part 4 of the hearings of our committee, which go into this matter in further detail.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, let me ask the gentleman from New York this question:

What is the range of the Russian intermediate missile?

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, the range of the medium-range missile of the Russians, I would imagine, would probably be on the order of 1,000 or 1,500 miles. It could be programed to be less or more.

Mr. GROSS. Do we have a comparable missile?

Mr. STRATTON. No, I do not think they are in the active force any more.

We took the Thors and the Jupiters out some time ago, following the confrontation with Cuba in 1962.

Mr. GROSS. We did not have an intermediate missile in Vietnam, did we?

Mr. STRATTON. The gentleman is correct. We did not have one in Vietnam, and, of course, the policy of our Government was not to get into a nuclear attack in Vietnam.

Mr. GROSS. I did not know they would have to carry a nuclear warhead. In fact I have been told they could carry conventional warheads.

Mrs. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, the subcommittee action to increase the programed average strength for the majority of the Guard and Reserve Forces is an outstanding example of congressional determination to fully support the total force policy. It has been a very satisfying experience to work under the able chairman (Mr. FISHER) in implementing this effort.

The committee has properly recognized that full and complete support for strong and operationally ready Guard and Reserve Forces is in the best interest of the United States. These increased strength authorizations will allow significant improvement in the manning percentages of required units. At the same time, the committee action recognizes the long-standing efforts of Congress to support and enhance the Guard and Reserve strength postures.

This action recognizes the past difficulties with underestimating the appropriate levels of strengths to be authorized for the Reserve components.

The strength figures that the committee recommends are derived from the skilled judgment of the Guard and Reserve leaders who are most aware of the needs and capabilities of their respective components. These same skilled judgments are essential factors in all determinations of what Guard and Reserve Forces can and should be used and the extent to which they require fiscal and other support.

I am particularly pleased by the visible demonstration of leadership in the grassroots of our country as evidenced by the outstanding recruiting and retention efforts and successes of the Reserve components in the face of great adversity. This is an example of what small unit commanders throughout the country can accomplish when motivated and given some assistance.

I am firmly convinced that these units are continuing to exert the same driving energy toward improving their readiness that they have shown in manning improvement. Congress must continue our strong support of full implementation to the total force policy and move toward achieving the fiscal benefits of these lower cost forces.

Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 14592, the military procurement authorization for fiscal 1975. This bill authorizes a total amount of $22.6 billion for military weapons procurement and research and development. The total authorization is a reduction of $500 million from the Department of Defense's budget requests, and is an increase of only 8.1 percent over last year's request—barely enough to keep pace with inflation.

Yet there are those who will offer amendments tomorrow to cut the authorizations by additional millions and even billions. There are those who will seek to reduce our troop levels by up to 200,000 men. We will hear the annual and expectable outcries that the defense

budget is too large, too filled with waste and fat, and too unnecessary.

The Constitution charges the U.S. Congress "to provide for the common Defence" as a top priority. The budget proposals of the Department of Defense are aimed at maintaining U.S. military superiority at the minimal necessary cost to the American taxpayer, and I believe it is incumbent upon the Congress to fulfill its constitutional mandate for the national defense and to dispel some of the myths which have grown up about defense spending in recent years.

Opponents of defense spending continually complain about the billions which go for defense in the face of competing human priorities in the Federal budget. But the truth is, since President Nixon took office in 1969 and began to wind down the Vietnam war, defense spending has declined from 44 percent of the budget, to 29 percent for fiscal 1975. As defense spending has declined, spending for human resources has jumped to almost 50 percent of the budget in its place.

Defense outlays for fiscal 1974 thus far total $79.7 billion; adjusted for inflation, this is the lowest Pentagon spending since the Korean war began. Put another way, defense spending is only 5.9 percent of our gross national product, its lowest point since the end of the Korean war. Thus, either way it is viewed, defense spending has been constantly declining since the mid-1950's—in the face of a war in Southeast Asia, in the face of inflation, and in the face of an ever-expanding Communist threat to global peace.

There is substantial evidence that the fiscal 1975 defense budget is a minimum beyond which we dare not go if we are to fulfill our constitutional duty to provide for the common defense:

We spend less than 6 percent of our GNP on defense—Russia spends almost half;

We spend some $8 billion a year for military research and development—Russia spends at least double that figure;

We have 2.2 million men in the uniformed services—Russia has 3.4 million;

Russia has 500 more ICBM's than the United States, 14 more nuclear submarines, and 240 more missiles to launch from these submarines;

Russia has been outbuilding the United States in naval vessels by a ratio of 8 to 1, and Russian ships are an average 10 years younger and more modern than ours;

In the past decade, the Russians have developed and built eight new fighter planes, while the United States turned out one;

The Russians are much better prepared for the type of limited brush-fire war that is more likely today: 600 more tactical and fighter aircraft; 468 more strategic airlift carriers; and 628 more medium-range bombers.

In the face of these dismaying statistics, we encounter "slash and trim" advocates who want to chop billions from defense spending. In response to these attacks, Secretary Schlesinger has said:

It is an enchanting illusion that you can simply take large amounts of money out of the defense budget and cut only fat, and not muscle, and it is an illusion that we can ill-afford today.

Where do we cut?

Do we cut our research and development program which has not even expanded in recent years, while the Russians have overtaken us on all fronts? The United States does not have a single weapon system that the Russians do not now also have, in one form or another.

Shall we cut military procurement?

After all, we are bombarded daily with allegations of cost overruns and military waste. Yet the fine print in the 1975 budget clearly states that over the past 10 years, defense spending for purchases of goods and services has risen by 61 percent, while Federal civilian spending for the same purposes has risen 170 percent—almost triple the DOD rate.

What about military pay and benefits? Almost one-third of the entire defense budget in 1975 will go for military and retired pay—some $32 billion. Yet in constant dollars, the average serviceman's basic pay today is only $500 more than it was 20 years ago—$8,100 as compared with $7,600. The total in constant dollars of all benefits received by a serviceman—education, housing, pay, and other allowances—has risen from $9,600 in 1954 to $11,000 in 1974. Most of this increase has come in the past 4 years, as Congress has sought to assist the growth of the all-volunteer Armed Forces.

In 1974, it cost the taxpayer $11,000 for each man in our uniform. During this same fiscal year, however, it cost the American taxpayer $12,900 for each civilian employee of the Federal Government. It appears that our men in uniform are a pretty good personnel bargain—for $1,900 less a year than a civilian employee, they put their lives on the line for their fellow Americans.

The lesson is clear. The myths of excessive defense spending do not hold up in the light of harsh numerical reality. In constant—1974—dollars, we are spending $20 billion less than we did 20 years ago and less than we have any year since.

Mr. Chairman, we are now in an era of hard-won global peace and stability. But this is a precarious peace, one which was achieved and maintained through the strength and deterrent force of our military. Russia's efforts to force the United States into a confrontation in the Middle East demonstrate the need for us to maintain our ability to bargain from strength. Therefore, I urge my colleagues to approve H.R. 14592 as reported by the House Armed Services Committee, and to vote down amendments which would cripple our national defense.

Mr. SEIBERLING. Mr. Chairman, of all the weapons systems programs included in this year's military procurement bill, certainly the one that is potentially the costliest and buys the least for the money is the B–1 bomber.

In the research paper that Senator McGOVERN and I prepared for Members of Congress for peace through truce. I think one of the most significant points that is made is that the B–1 bomber, and the concept of strategic nuclear bombardment by manned aircraft, plays only an extremely marginal role in the U.S. deterrent posture.

In the so-called strategic Triad, it represents the third string team in the role of a back-up after the ICBM's and SLBM's have been used. If nuclear war occurred, and any restraint was exercised by the Chiefs of State, there could be eight successive nuclear missile salvos—four on each side and each answering the one before—before the B–1 would be in a position to do any damage. The war would be over before it could get into action.

In 1971, after Senator McGOVERN and I issued a critical analysis of the B–1 bomber program, which spokesmen for the Air Force criticized as inaccurate, I offered publicly to retract any part of that report if the Air Force could prove to me that it was in error. I was invited to Strategic Air Command Headquarters at Omaha where I spent a day receiving briefings and discussing the B–1 with several general officers. I was shocked to learn that they did not regard the B–1 as a replacement for the B–52's and FB–111's but, in fact, regard it as an additional weapons system and would retain, by 1984, 255 B–52 G and H models, 66 FB–111's, and 244 B–1's. This, in effect, would increase the overall maximum payload capability of U.S. strategic bomber forces by 2½ times—from about 21 million to nearly 52 million pounds of bombs. Such compounding of our nuclear overkill is both tragic and ludicrous.

After having to concede that the manned bomber represents the weakest leg of the Triad, the generals at SAC said that it was still justified if it forces the Soviet Union to spend more on air defense systems than they would if the threat did not exist. This argument also collapses when you examine the facts. The low-altitude SA–3 missile would be at least as effective against the B–1 as the SA–2 was against the B–52 during Operation Linebacker. The SA–3's cost between $40,000 and $50,000. The current estimated B–1 cost is $61.5 million, 1,230 times as much as the SA–3, even counting site costs and assuming relatively low-kill ratios. The economics come down hard on the side of defense.

SAC's final argument was that the U.S.S.R. was developing a supersonic bomber—the Backfire—that they were test flying in the prototype stage and that it was to be in serial production within months. As for now, nearly 3 years later, I have yet to see any hard evidence that the Backfire is being deployed. Actually the whole concept of building a bomber to defend against a bomber is fallacious. To defend against a bomber we would deploy surface-to-air missiles. Yet most such installations are, in fact, scheduled to be phased out of our air defense system.

Last, there is former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's "bargain chip" theory. He stated that we should continue to acquire the B–1 bomber so it could be used at SALT II and beyond as

a bargain chip. With a cost, including avionics, armaments, a new compatible tanker and operations and maintenance, of $35.5 million and a current cost overrun of $5.6 billion, the B–1 represents the most expensive weapons systems in history and by no stretch of the taxpayers' imagination can such a cost be justified as a bargain chip.

I would hasten to point out that with the crying domestic needs that are unmet in this country today, the funds requested for the B–1 in fiscal year 1975 invested entirely in payroll could produce 50,000 jobs at an annual average salary of $10,000 per year. This is twice as many jobs as the B–1 program is producing in the aerospace industry.

To take a cynical view, it would seem that the real reasons that the B–1 bomber program is being pushed are other than strategic military requirements. The B–1 serves to perpetuate a powerful segment of the military-industrial complex. Without the B–1 to feed on, this segment of the military-industrial complex would die on the vine or be forced to develop other programs for which some rational need exists.

The devotion of the Air Force generals to strategic bombers is reminiscent of the devotion of the diehard admirals to the battleship. To build a new generation of manned strategic bombers in the missile age makes little more sense than to build a new fleet of battleships. This country can no longer afford the luxury of expensive, outmoded weapons systems either in the name of military security or job security.

The manned strategic bomber is going to go the way of the battleship. Let us do it now and use that money where it will do some good.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 14592. I think this is a good bill, and one this body should support wholeheartedly.

I want to take the opportunity to address myself to the F–15 program and to point out how the F–15 program is progressing very satisfactorily and urge your continued support for this great fighter now coming into the inventory of the Air Force.

The aircraft in the flight test program have been proving the capabilities of the overall weapon system with great success. Over 1,700 hours of flight tests have been acrued in more than 1,700 separate flights. The test force has flown the design level flight envelope of the aircraft, and in fact has exceeded the combat altitude and maximum mach number for which it was designed. These two points are well in excess of 60,000 feet altitude and twice the speed of sound. Pilots flying the aircraft attest to its superior handling qualities and its remarkable agility and acceleration. These latter qualities are a direct byproduct of, among other things, the technological advances contained in the F–100 engine.

In addition to the exceptional success enjoyed by the airframe early in its development program, the weapon subsystem is also proving to be worthy of high confidence. The pulse doppler radar system has demonstrated search and track ranges in excess of that required by the development specifications. The ability of the pulse doppler concept to distinguish radar targets from background clutter, in combination with the extensive computer processing of the radar information, enables the pilot to easily detect and track aircraft. In conjunction with the head-up display of critical flight and weapons information, this feature allows the single crew member of the F–15 to use effectively the full capabilities of this aircraft. Successful tests of the various weapons subsystems include airborne firings of the M–61 20-millimeter cannon, and the AIM–7 and AIM–9 air-to-air missiles.

Contractor and Air Force flight testing of the Tactical Electronic Warfare System (TEWS) began in February 1974 at Eglin AFB, Fla. Provisions have been made for growth of the TEWS as technology becomes available for system enhancement or is necessitated by future electronic warfare threats. The Air Force is conducting two engineering developments for eventual addition to the TEWS. These are: First, an internally mounted chaff and flare countermeasures dispenser set (CDS); and second, a tail warning set (TWS) to detect airborne interceptors and air-to-air missiles in the rear hemisphere of the F–15.

The reliability and maintainability of the F–15 during the extensive flight testing have been excellent. For example, there have been numerous instances when an F–15 has made three flights in one day. The F–15 program is on schedule, within cost and is meeting technical performance goals.

Mr. RHODES. Mr. Chairman, I want the RECORD to show that I fully support the inclusion of title VIII, "Nuclear Navy" in the defense procurement authorization bill, H.R. 14592, now before us. I congratulate the distinguished chairman and his Armed Services Committee for the outstanding leadership and foreight they have demonstrated by incorporating this much needed legislation in this year's procurement authorization.

I also congratulate my distinguished colleagues BOB WILSON, the ranking minority member of the Seapower Subcommittee, and CHARLES BENNETT, the chairman of that subcommittee, who initiated this action with their bill H.R. 14364.

Title VIII of this bill establishes the policy that all future major combatant vessels for the strike forces of the U.S. Navy shall be nuclear powered. This includes all combatant submarines, aircraft carriers, and carrier escorts.

I became intimately familiar with the nuclear Navy issue through my many years on the Appropriations Committee where I participated in the annual review of the shipbuilding program by the Defense Subcommittee and the annual review of the Atomic Energy program by the Public Works Subcommittee. The annual reports of the Appropriations Committee clearly document the long-standing support of that committee for nuclear powered warships. In fact, last year's report dated November 26, 1973, on the Department of Defense appropriation bill states:

> The House Appropriations Committee has always been in the forefront in advocating a nuclear-powered fleet whenever that is feasible.

I am proud of my record in supporting the initiative taken by Congress to bring about a nuclear Navy both for submarines and major surface warships.

But, despite all the actions taken by Congress in the past to bring about a nuclear Navy much more needs to be done and I believe title VIII in this bill is necessary to achieve it. It may surprise some of my colleagues to learn that even though this Congress has authorized only nuclear submarines for almost 20 years, in the Pentagon today there are those who advocate studying a reversion to diesel-powered submarines. In the early 1960's the Congress held extensive hearings and debates concerning the need for nuclear power for the aircraft carrier *John F. Kennedy*. Secretary McNamara insisted in going ahead with conventional propulsion. Many of us vowed that we would never again authorize a conventional aircraft carrier. We believed that the Pentagon had finally gotten the message and today we are building three nuclear-powered carriers, the *Nimitz* (CVAN–68), the *Eisenhower* (CVAN–69), and the *Carl Vinson* (CVN–70). But do you realize that right today in the Pentagon millions of dollars are being spent on the design of a new class of conventional aircraft carriers? Do you realize that millions more are being spent on the design of conventional escorts to accompany these carriers? I think these studies are a waste of time.

If there is any lesson to be learned from last year's oil embargo it is that our striking force naval warships of the future must have nuclear propulsion. Many of us have urged for years that the Navy and the Defense Department face up to this issue. They have refused to do so. Therefore, it is time that we in Congress establish a clear-cut policy on this issue. Title VIII does this. I recommend that this Body give unanimous support to the inclusion of title VIII in the defense procurement authorization bill as recommended by our Armed Services Committee.

Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Chairman, once again we are presented with a military procurement bill which contains an inordinate number of expensive programs and military hardware of questionable value, which carries forward grossly distorted and misdirected priorities and which represents the largest peacetime military budget in this country's history while doing serious damage to a number of pressing domestic problems. Few seriously debate the fact that this country must maintain an adequate defense and that we must have the military capability to protect our basic national interests and to properly meet our various treaty obligations. However, since the end of the Second World War—for almost 30 long years—the United States has main-

tained the largest, strongest, and, beyond any question, the most expensive military position in the world. During these three decades education, health, employment, housing, community service, job training, and many similar programs have been grossly underfunded—and unfunded in some instances. At the same time the military budget remains a sacred cow and whatever cuts have been made are of little consequence and often are more for appearance than substance.

The legislation before us this week is certainly no exception. For fiscal year 1975 the administration sought an unprecedented expansion in military spending of some $13.7 billion—a 16.4 percent increase over the amount we approved last year or a net rise of 9.3 percent once the inflationary rise has been taken into account. The $22.64 billion authorization for new weapons systems alone surpasses the total appropriated by the Congress for the current fiscal year by $2.47 billion or a net increase of some $1.5 billion, again taking into consideration the inflationary factor of about 7.4 percent.

While some allowance must be made for the soaring inflation which has been generated by an inept economic policy, the amounts sought in H.R. 14592 are simply not justified and affirmative steps must be taken to place controls or ceilings on these increases. The need for such restrictions is driven home when you take into account the fact that many nondefense Federal agencies are limiting their expenditures in line with congressional mandates to reduce spending. The Defense Department and its constituencies are no exception and cannot be considered to be sacrosanct. It has been reported that H.R. 14592 would allow DOD spending to rise 12.6 percent over last year's appropriation level and this is clearly unacceptable. Thus I urge our colleagues to support the amendment which will impose a ceiling of $21.9 billion on authorizations in this bill.

One of the tragic and telling aspects of this measure is revealed in the report that Secretary Schlesinger has testified that over $6 billion was added in an ill-conceived attempt to "stimulate the economy." I strongly believe that these funds could more effectively achieve their supposed objective by being used to carry out urgently needed public service employment programs, to release impounded funds for a number of highly desirable domestic programs, and to significantly expand a number of efforts which seek to resolve problems confronting urban America. It must also be recognized that military spending is usually slow and whatever stimulative effects it may have will not be felt for some time.

In reviewing this legislation I find it hard to understand how the Defense Department in good conscience can support the continuation of a procurement program such as the B–1 bomber which, in just 4 years, has seen a cost overrun of $5.6 billion before even the first prototype has been flown and whose strategic military worth has been subject to serious question. This must certainly be one of the most wasteful and unnecessary weapons programs we have seen for some time and I am hopeful that the amendment to be offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE)—deleting the $499 million for the plane's continued development—will be overwhelmingly passed.

Mr. Chairman, through one device or another the military is attempting to subvert the Congressional mandate that we totally extricate ourselves from further involvement in Southeast Asia, particularly South Vietnam. As our colleague, Mr. DELLUMS, so aptly noted in his dissenting views, "General Thieu has made a mockery of the Paris agreements," to which we are also a party, and ". . . American taxpayers are virtually the sole financial support for Thieu." I believe that the reduction sought in the amendment to be offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT) will go a long way toward encouraging the Saigon regime to pursue nonmilitary avenues toward a final cessation of hostilities and that it will aid in reducing the continued level of violence in South Vietnam and the numerous violations of the Paris agreements perpetrated by General Thieu.

It would be possible to comment on many other aspects of this measure which are not only questionable but needlessly expensive and which warrant reductions. Suffice it to say, Mr. Chairman, that in the absence of any executive leadership, it becomes incumbent upon the Congress to take affirmative and meaningful steps to redirect the Nation's priorities and to achieve economies in the defense budget. The Congress must reassert its authority and control over this country's overseas military posture and the overall defense budget. We must move to restore some balance and reason in authorizing and appropriating moneys for the defense establishment, particularly in light of the many serious domestic economic and social problems with which we are faced and which are not being fully met. Economies can be achieved and disputable military policies can be redefined without detracting from our basic national security or from our ability to ably fulfill our international commitments. In the process I believe the American taxpayer will receive more for the hard-earned dollar through greater economies and efficiency not to mention a more responsible and responsive national security structure.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to urge my colleagues to take a hard, critical look at H.R. 14592, the fiscal year 1975 military procurement authorization. I am disappointed that we again are presented with a military budget request that is grossly inflated. In this fiscal year 1975 budget, I fear that our true national security is being sacrificed to a mindless drive for more weapons of unneeded complexity and inordinate expense and for the maintenance overseas of excessive military forces, often designed for contingencies in which our military involvement would disserve our national interest. It is a budget that can and must be cut.

I can see no justification for the increase of $2.47 billion over the amount actually appropriated for fiscal year 1974 that this bill requests. This is the first U.S. military budget in history to be increased after a war. By 1948, the defense budget was less than 10 percent of its World War II high. Two years after the end of the Korean war, defense spending fell to 45 percent of its 1952 peak. Yet, today, when we are no longer fighting in Vietnam, and when we are engaged in negotiating arms limitations, the fiscal year 1975 request is up a whopping 12.2 percent over the amount actually appropriated for fiscal year 1974.

The magnitude of this increase cannot be justified by the fear of a growing Soviet nuclear capability. As was documented recently by the Center for Defense Information the United States has three times as many strategic nuclear warheads as the Soviet Union—7,940 versus 2,600. We are also producing new strategic nuclear warheads at a rate of about four per day while the Soviets are producing them at a rate of probably less than one per day. Comparing United States and Soviet war capabilities, Senator MCINTYRE, the distinguished chairman of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Research and Development commented:

> I for one get weary and skeptical of the uncritical littany which somehow judges our technology in the worst possible light and theirs in the best. . . . Let's not forget or discount the quality of our own military technology, a technology that has been richly funded and represents the premier product of American engineering, scientific, and industrial talent. Their subs are *not* as quiet; Their missiles *not* as accurate; Their warheads *not* as efficient; Their computers *not* as advanced; Their ASW *not* as effective; Their sub-launched missiles are *not* MIRVed; Their bombers are *not* truly intercontinental.

Why, then, are we faced with such a large DOD request?

Perhaps a partial answer was provided by Secretary Schlesinger when he appeared before the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee in February of this year. At that time he stated that over $6 billion had been added to the fiscal year 1975 defense budget in order to stimulate the economy. However, in its April 1974 monthly economic letter, the First National City Bank of New York pointed out that:

> Historically, it has seldom proved good economics to give an economy a fiscal shot in the arm by upping defense outlays.

Most outrageous about this $6 billion injection into the military budget for nonmilitary reasons is the critical need for such funds in other Federal programs. Six billion dollars is nearly as much as is spent on education—$7.5 billion—or community development and housing—$6.4 billion; and is much more than the $750 million spent on drug abuse enforcement and prevention, the $3.3 billion spent on manpower, or the $2.1 billion spent on energy research. We are told that we cannot afford to spend so little on these critical domestic programs while we blithely add $6 billion to the defense budget for economic reasons.

The administration has impounded nearly twice that $6 billion from programs in such vital areas as housing, health, education, water treatment, and

mass transportation. It is outrageous to pump money into an already bloated defense budget to help stimulate the economy while refusing to spend funds authorized by the Congress for essential and worthwhile domestic programs.

The budget before us can be cut in many places. If we give it the careful scrutiny the Congress gives budget requests for domestic programs, we can both redirect badly needed funds and insure a healthy and powerful defense. The goal of those of us who are trying to cut parts of this budget is not to weaken our Armed Forces. Our goal is to get the best defense possible for the dollar, to eliminate gold-plating, and to end ill-conceived programs that bring us cost-overruns for hardware that will not perform to specifications.

There are several parts of the bill that can and should be cut. At a minimum, the Congress must support the bipartisan amendment, chiefly sponsored by our colleague from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN), that would hold military procurement to fiscal year 1974 levels, plus a 7.4 percent increase for inflation. This would amount to a savings of $733.1 million. Even the most hawkish Members of this body should be able to support this reasonable proposal, which would merely hold military spending at current levels. With the United States no longer fighting in Vietnam, and in fact not engaged militarily anywhere in the world, and with the ongoing arms limitations negotiations, there is no justification for an increase in defense spending.

The bill also includes funding for the construction of two Trident submarines, a program which I have actively opposed in the past. Trident is a monumentally expensive weapons system, costing nearly $1.2 billion per year, and one whose need is highly questionable. We are now developing a new type of steel, called H–130 which will greatly extend the life and maximum depth of submarine hulls. The faster we rush ahead with submarine procurement, the fewer ships will be built with these superior hulls. A recent study by the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation in the Defense Department has concluded that the Soviet Navy is quickly aging, and does not pose the severe threat to our control of the seas which many alarmists would have us believe. The study also predicted "a noticeable decline" in the number of major Soviet warships by the end of the decade. When these facts are added to the widely accepted view that Soviet ASW capabilities lag behind our own and pose no significant threat to our existing Polaris SLBM fleet, I can see no need for us to rush into this program. I urge my colleagues to support the amendment of the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT) to reduce the rate of construction in the Trident program from two subs per year to one per year.

Another amendment that deserves support is that of my colleague from New York (Mr. PIKE) to eliminate funding for the B–1 bomber. The B–1 is of questionable design and its increasing costs and decreasing capabilities make its continuation a waste. In just 1 year, its anticipated costs have risen $3.7 billion. While its price has been soaring, its capabilities have been slipping. Originally, the B–1 was designed to be supersonic at both high and low altitudes, but today, it is supersonic only at high altitudes. It now is estimated that it will require an extra 1,000 feet of runway to take off and, once it is up, its range has been diminished. The U.S.S.R. has no long-range bomber capabilities and thus the B–1 is not needed as a deterrent. With the massive U.S. nuclear arsenal, and our nuclear missile system, I cannot accept the need for a follow-on bomber to the B–52. The money which we continue to pour into this unnecessary and ill-managed program is making no contribution to our defense, and is badly needed elsewhere.

There is also a highly sensible amendment, to be offered by the majority leader and supported by a broad coalition including our colleagues from Michigan (Mr. ESCH), and from Hawaii (Mr. MATSUNAGA) to reduce the number of U.S. troops stationed overseas by 100,000. The United States still maintains more than 500,000 troops overseas. Even after the end of direct U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia and 24 years after the Korean war, we still station 181,000 troops in the Western Pacific and Asia. This troop cut amendment makes only a modest reduction in our troop levels, avoiding the wholesale cutback and demobilization of overseas forces which many of us favor. It also allows the Pentagon the flexibility to determine from which parts of the world the cuts should be made, and it allows 18 months for these troop reductions to be made. It is about time to bring some of our troops home and I urge support for this amendment.

I am also hopeful that the House will cut the assistance provided in this bill for South Vietnam. The amendment, chiefly sponsored by the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT) reduces the ceiling on aid to Vietnam from $1.4 billion to $900 million. The $1.4 billion ceiling requested in the bill constitutes an increase of nearly $660 million over the actual level of aid sent to Vietnam last year. How much longer can we be expected to pour billions of dollars into Vietnam in support of a government that denies to its citizens the basic rights and freedoms of a democracy? How much longer will we continue to entangle ourselves in Indochina? I feel that the $900 million figure serves notice that the United States does not plan to provide a billion dollars a year indefinitely in military aid to Vietnam. It is high time that we begin to cut back U.S. aid to Indochina and I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.

In attempting to reduce the military budget, time and time again we are met with the same dreary and fallacious argument; namely, that we are compromising U.S. security, that we are playing Russian roulette with American lives. Nothing could be further from the truth. Reducing the defense budget to realistic levels is not an effort to weaken our military posture; rather, it is an effort to strengthen the United States by eliminating pockets of fat and flabbiness and by seeing to it that all aspects of national security, including a healthy economy and a prosperous public, are guaranteed for the future. It is an attempt to direct Federal funds to programs which will most benefit the people of our great country.

The time has long since come when we must turn from expensive, ill-planned, and unnecessary programs for defense to the true needs of the American people. We must guarantee to every American not only a strong military, but also a decent life. To fail in this attempt is to deny to people throughout America their rightful place in the prosperity and freedom which make America great.

I urge my colleagues to join with me in removing the flab from the defense budget and redirecting the money to help bring the American dream to all Americans.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, President Eisenhower once said:

> Every addition to defense expenditure does not automatically increase military security. Because security is based upon moral and economic, as well as purely military strength, a point can be reached at which additional funds for arms, far from bolstering security, weaken it.

During debate on the fiscal year 1975 defense procurement authorization, it is our responsibility to determine that point where strength becomes weakness.

Despite budgetary legerdemain which ascribes funds that belong in the fiscal year 1975 accounts to a fiscal year 1974 supplemental, we have now been presented with the largest peacetime military budget in our history. Weapons systems procurement and R.D.T. & E. for the basic fiscal year 1975 and fiscal year 1974 supplemental requests show over $5 billion in increased budget authority. The bill before us increases spending in these areas by 12.6 percent over last year's appropriation. Thus, Congress is asked to provide funds not just to meet the costs of inflation in relatively uncontrollable accounts such as personnel and retired pay, but also to provide authority and funding for basic alterations in our force structure. Furthermore, the administration has admitted, through testimony by Secretary Schlesinger, that it has included some $6 billion for "pump-priming" purposes in coming years—certainly a non-military reason for additional spending and largely of no effect on areas of real economic deprivation.

The arms race not only goes on but is accelerating. A prime example is the committee approved requests for funding for major strategic weapons systems which embodies the development of a counterforce option—a result more of the inexorable press of new technologies and flexible response options rather than any bargaining-chip theory of arms control.

In an analysis made for the Project on Budget Priorities, headed by former Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul C. Warnke, it was recommended that $11 billion could be cut, without risk—and perhaps of benefit—to our national

security. Areas suggested by the Warnke group for defense savings include $5.9 billion in general purpose forces, $4 billion in military efficiency, and $2.5 billion in strategic forces, plus reductions in various military assistance programs.

Amendment will be offered to this bill which will seek to check inordinate and wasteful expense and which could lead toward coherent economic planning for a peace economy. Our true national security depends on our ability to control the irrational drive for weapons and defense policies which contribute little to our military strength and add fuel to our economic problems.

The B–1 bomber has been subject to rapid cost overruns while its performance projections have slipped considerably. Our bloated troop levels overseas have no foothold in rational military planning for various contingencies. Massive spending in South Vietnam—46.6 percent of total U.S. aid to only 0.8 percent of the world population —is out of balance with the foreign policy proclamations accompanying the cease-fire agreement. According to the Defense Department and Ambassador in South Vietnam, official U.S. attitudes toward that war-torn area have not changed since the highly touted and much abused "peace with honor." Despite GAO warnings that "study after study has demonstrated that the telescoping of development and production has often resulted in slippages and overruns rather than shorter timespans between concept and inventory," the Pentagon seeks to rush Trident to completion even without a real Soviet threat to our current Polaris-Poseidon submarines. This listing of defense anomalies is by no means comprehensive, but it is representative.

Whether through reform of committee procedures and Pentagon budgetary practices, or through floor amendments on specific weapons systems, defense policies and, as a last resort, spending ceilings; Congress must reassert its fundamental responsibility in defense planning. To do otherwise will not bolster our security, but weaken it.

Mr. WON PAT. Mr. Chairman, after careful consideration I rise to support H.R. 14592, the 1975 fiscal year military appropriate bill.

In this year of rampant inflation, throughout all phases of our lives, the House Armed Services Committee has produced, after much labor, a remarkable legislative work which at once preserves the integrity of our Nation's Armed Forces and resists the pressure to further burden the taxpayer beyond a reasonable limit.

As it is presently written, H.R. 14592, authorizes Congress to appropriate $22,642,963,000 during the fiscal 1975 for the procurement of aircrafts, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons and for vital research development, test, and evaluation of new weapon systems for the Armed Forces. The bill additionally establishes the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component of the Armed Forces and for the total civil work force of the Department of Defense.

Although no one would argue that the $22.6 billion asked for in H.R. 1459, is a vast sum, it represents only 20 percent of $90.9 billion in military funds requested by the President. This amount is the sum total our country will expend on new armaments to insure that our Armed Forces will have the most modern weapon systems possible.

I can appreciate that some of my colleagues in Congress are distressed to learn that the Pentagon is planning to spend $22 billion for research and procurement. Especially at a time when our domestic programs are slashed to the bone and when inflation is eating away at the buying power of the taxpayers' dollar.

As a lifelong advocate of fiscal integrity, I am always opposed to needless spending. In this instance, however, I do not believe that the $22 billion asked for in H.R. 14592 is needless. This amount is desperately needed, especially if this country is to preserve our ability to respond to global threats of aggression against us and our friends.

The recent war in the Middle East is one example why America should be ready to allocate the amount we are seeking today. During the altercation, it quickly became obvious that one of the major reasons behind the Arab successes in the battlefield was their almost unlimited supply of highly advanced weapon systems. Weapons which were supplied by our new partner in international détente—the Soviet Union. Israel, on the other hand, has been cut off from their sources of armaments from almost everyone except the United States.

President Nixon responded to the urging of many Members of Congress, including myself, to provide Israel with new arms. Thankfully, that action proved successful. But, in the process we severely depleted our own sources and found that the Russians have not been idling their time away. The weapons they supplied were far more sophisticated than we had previously thought. And equally important, their weapons worked.

The war in the Middle East also provided another object lesson for the United States, which I believe H.R. 14592 responds to. After the cease-fire had been called, the Arab oil producing states gathered together to cast an embargo on oil shipments to nations friendly to Israel. As a consequence we on Guam, and our fellow Americans in the States and other territories, along with our allies in Europe, found ourselves in a mad scramble for what little petroleum there was and taking a hard look at alternative fuel sources.

It was with great interest that I have noted, therefore, that this bill calls for the establishment of a modern nuclear Navy, including new submarines, and attack and escort vessels, along with the industrial ability to develop and produce such vessels.

Ever since Congress took the initiative 20 years ago to order the construction of nuclear powered vessels, the success of this venture has proven itself many times over. With the threat of a renewed oil embargo continually hanging over our heads, what better time to go ahead with a nuclear Navy that is capable of meeting the challenge of tomorrow.

Undoubtedly, there are many who would argue with the points I have made. There are those who say that America spends far too much on its military and not enough on its other needs. There is some truth to those statements. We do spend too much on defense and not enough on human resources. But in this time of international strife, America cannot afford to let our ability to defend our shores and that of our allies decrease when our enemies are increasing their strike capabilities.

For this reason, I wholeheartedly support the allocation of funds as called for in H.R. 14582. In doing so, however, I urge my colleagues in Congress to require that the Department of Defense fully account for every penny they spend. The public has been treated to all too many instances of massive overruns by defense contractors who have failed to keep their words. It is one thing to spend sums such as this on equipment and research that will prove useful. It is another thing to allow the taxpayers' hard earned dollar to be thrown down the drain.

I also urge that House Armed Services Committee to carefully consider pulling back American forces from our bases in Europe. It is time our allies in NATO learned to carry the brunt of defending themselves. The funds we save here could be well spent in our own country making the lives of our people better.

Speaking as one who has personally witnessed and experienced the horrors of occupation of American soil by the enemy in World War II, I can testify that a strong, well equipped military, under the control of the people, is and will be a strong deterrent to future aggressors against this great Nation of ours.

Chairman HÉBERT and his colleagues on the House Armed Services Committee are to be congratulated for their efforts in producing H.R. 14592, and I urge that it be passed.

Mr. WHITEHURST. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the Clerk will now read the bill by title.

The Clerk read as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

TITLE I—PROCUREMENT

SEC. 101. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal year 1975 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons as authorized by law, in amounts as follows:

Aircraft

For aircraft: for the Army, $335,000,000; for the Navy and the Marine Corps, $2,964,100,000; for the Air Force, $3,391,400,000, of which $104,900,000 shall be used only for the procurement of A–7D aircraft for the Air National Guard of the United States.

Missiles

For missiles: for the Army, $439,400,000; for the Navy, $620,600,000; for the Marine Corps, $76,000,000; for the Air Force, $1,610,800,000.

Naval Vessels

For Naval vessels: for the Navy, $3,539,100,000, of which sum $1,166,800,000 shall be

used only for the Trident program; $502,500,000 shall be used only for the SSN–688 nuclear attack submarine; $244,300,000 shall be used only for the DLGN nuclear powered guided missile frigate program; $457,100,000 shall be used only for the DD–963 program; $142,900,000 shall be used only for the sea control ship program; $92,300,000 shall be used only for the patrol hydrofoil missile program; $436,500,000 shall be used only for the patrol frigate program: *Provided, however,* That, except for necessary loan leadtime items, no contract for the construction of these ships shall be entered into until after the Secretary of the Navy has notified the Chairman of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees that the fire control system has been satisfactorily tested; $81,400,000 shall be used only for the fleet oiler; $116,700,000 shall be used only for a destroyer tender; $10,800,000 shall be used only for a fleet ocean tug; $104,600,000 shall be used only for the Poseidon conversion of fleet ballistic-missile submarines; $18,300,000 shall be used only for conversion of a submarine tender; $22,000,000 shall be used only for craft; $10,400,000 shall be used only for pollution abatement craft; $30,200,000 shall be used only for outfitting material; $30,400,000 shall be used only for post delivery; $71,900,000 shall be used only for escalation on prior year programs.

Tracked Combat Vehicles

For tracked combat vehicles: for the Army, $321,200,000; for the Marine Corps, $74,200,000.

Torpedoes

For torpedoes and related support equipment: for the Navy, $187,700,000.

Other Weapons

For other weapons: for the Army, $55,700,000; for the Navy, $25,600,000; for the Marine Corps, $500,000.

Mr. HÉBERT (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of the title be considered as read, printed in the Record, and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Louisiana?

There was no objection.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I move that the committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 14592) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1975 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces and of civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, and to authorize the military training student loads and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous matter on the bill H.R. 14592.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Louisiana?

There was no objection.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 230 which was taken on the rule on the military procurement authorization bill for fiscal year 1975, I was on official business attending the dedication of a new mental health center in my district. Had I been present, I would have voted "yea."

FURTHER LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

(Mr. O'NEILL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. O'NEILL. Mr. Speaker, I take this time to announce that we are adding a bill to the Suspension Calendar for tomorrow, H.R. 13221, saline water program authorization.

PERMISSION FOR COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS TO FILE A REPORT

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Government Operations may have until midnight tonight to file a report.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. PIKE). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

CUBAN INDEPENDENCE DAY

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. FASCELL) is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, today, May 20th, marks the 72d anniversary the independence of Cuba. We pause briefly today to commemorate that achievement and to express, on behalf of all the people of the United States, our hope that one day soon the Cuban people will again live in the freedom for which they struggled so many centuries.

May 20, 1902, marked the beginning of a new form of government for Cuba—a government free of Spanish control and dedicated to the high ideals of political freedom and respect for the rights of the individual. But May 20 is not just the anniversary of the achievement of independence but of the epic struggle for freedom and independence under the leadership of such heroic figures as Maximo Gomez, Antonio Gomez, and Jose Marti.

The first May 20 was a day for rejoicing and despite the tyranny which grips Cuba today it still is a day of happiness; for more than anything else today is the anniversary of a spirit—an attitude toward other persons—that no amount of repression can stifle or crush.

Mr. Speaker, in recent months there has been increased speculation about renewed relations between the United States and Cuba. Many, including a number of Congressmen and Senators, have called our present policy inadequate and have urged either a reassessment or have gone even further, urging outright that our relationship be "normalized." I want to take this opportunity to reiterate my own views that such a course would not be the proper one for the United States to follow. In saying this, I want to make clear that I do not disagree with Secretary Kissinger's recent commitment to discuss with other Hemisphere foreign ministers their views toward Cuba in order to determine whether there is a consensus that Cuba should be invited as an observer to the meeting of foreign ministers schedule for next year. The United States cannot and should not insist on a joint policy that other OAS nations do not want. But if some of the OAS restrictions on Cuba are lifted we need feel no compulsion to rush headlong toward an embrace of Castro. In my judgment, if OAS sanctions are lifted, the United States should continue its present policy until such time as Castro is prepared to respect minimum standards of international law and decency toward other nations and his own people.

Mr. Speaker, many in this Chamber are prepared today to vote restrictions of one kind or another against this government or that government who today's paper accuses of repression or torture. Time tends to dull the memory of us all but just because we do not read about it let us not be led to the conclusion that Castro has suddenly become a kind and generous hero. He was and is a cruel dictator who murdered hundreds of his opponents as well as hundreds of his supporters who learned too late he was not the man he pretended to be. His policies have driven 10 percent of his country's population into exile since he came to power. Thousands of political prisoners continue to rot in his jails—prisoners whose conditions are not subject to even cursory review by the human rights commissions of either the United Nations or the Organization of American States or by any of the many respected private international groups. Moreover, his own citizens are not the only ones who suffer. Hundreds of U.S. citizens remain on the island and are not permitted to leave. This is a fact little recognized in this country but is a matter of grave concern. Only recently, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, I received a detailed report on this subject from the Department of State which I include to be incorporated at the end of my remarks as a part of my statement.

In addition to systematic political repression Castro has brought to Cuba a new kind of economic theory which has enabled him to convert one of Latin America's more prosperous nation's to a poor satellite of the Soviet Union. Not only have the last 10 years upsurge in economic activity in the Hemisphere passed Cuba by, but Cuba has actually suffered a real decline in per capita GNP.

While Castro has built a brutally efficient system of political repression the only thing he has succeeded in making systematic about Cuba's economy are waiting lines, chronic shortages of almost everything, and a growing dependency

on Soviet handouts to prevent total collapse.

Castro's economic policies have had their impact here, too. Those who wish to renew relations should consider the $1.85 billion worth of property stolen from U.S. citizens and which has been certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. And whether the property was that of a stockholder in a large corporation or that of an average citizen, there has been no compensation—and the lives of thousands of our citizens have been adversely affected.

Mr. Speaker, the most serious concern of our Government with respect to our posture toward Cuba has been and must continue to be security. Although the nature of strategic weapons has changed and diminished to a certain extent, the advantage to the Soviets of a Cuban base, the use of Cuban territory by the Soviets remains a matter of serious concern. Moreover, we have no assurance that future weapons developments will not again make proximity a significant military advantage. Castro's continued willingness to allow Cuba to be used as a base from which to exert Soviet military power in this hemisphere is counter to the basic precepts of the inter-American system and is representative of the basically hostile attitude Castro shows toward this country at every opportunity. In addition to establishing a Soviet base in Cuba, Castro has systematically attempted to subvert virtually every government in Latin America. He has supplied arms, training, money and sometimes even his own troops to aid terrorist groups. Over the years such activities have diminished but in my view, this has not been because of any change in attitude but because of the realization that guerrilla activities have failed everywhere except Cuba. We need look back less than a year to see evidence of Castro's involvement in Chile where his public support for President Allende apparently was only the small visible portion of an extensive program of support for a secret and illegal armed force.

Mr. Speaker, those who suggest that we change our policy toward Cuba should remember the steps which produced it. We did not adopt a hostile attitude toward Castro. Far from it. President Eisenhower worked hard to avoid conflict, but Fidel Castro wanted hostility. He systematically set out to make this country his enemy for his own purposes. At the height of the cold war he helped the Soviet Union in an attempt to upset the nuclear balance of power. His actions to overthrow its government prompted Venezuela to ask for and get OAS sanctions adopted against Cuba. These and myriad other actions are what produced the current relationship between this country and Cuba. Perhaps the day may come when it will suit Castro's policies to abandon his hostility toward the United States, but if that time should come we should think long and hard about whether our purposes and ideals can be served by serving those of Fidel Castro.

The detailed report follows:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., May 13, 1974.

Hon. DANTE B. FASCELL,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I refer to your letter of April 15, 1974 addressed to Assistant Secretary Kubisch, concerning U.S. citizens presently residing in Cuba, and your wish to have a report on the subject for the Subcommittee's use.

Our latest available information shows that there are 785 American citizens distributed among 618 families in Cuba who are registered for repatriation with the Swiss Embassy in Havana. A total of 1,187 Cuban citizen members of their families also have registered their desire to accompany the U.S. citizens.

A special problem exists with regard to dual nationals—American citizens whom the Cuban authorities consider also to be Cuban citizens because of their birth in Cuba or the Cuban nationality of one of their parents. Since the Cubans consider these persons to be Cuban, the authorities have been reluctant in many instances to allow their departure. This is a matter on which the Department continues to focus its attention.

The following is a breakdown of the various categories of registrants in Cuba for repatriation to the U.S.:

I. FAMILIES INCLUDING ONLY AMERICAN CITIZENS

Birth to age 21	0
Age 21 to 60	13
Age 61 and over	21
Total families	34
Including: Total American citizens (one family includes two American citizens)	35
Total Cubans	0

II. FAMILIES INCLUDING AMERICAN CITIZENS WITH CUBANS

Birth to age 21	0
Age 21 to 60	14
Age 61 and over	33
Total families	47
Including: Total American citizens	47
Total Cubans	116

III. FAMILIES HEADED BY AMERICAN CITIZENS WITH DUAL NATIONAL AMERICAN CITIZENS AND CUBANS

Birth to age 21	0
Age 21 to 60	9
Age 61 and over	8
Total families	17
Including: Total American citizens	18
Total dual national American citizens	32
Total Cubans	16

IV. FAMILIES HEADED BY DUAL NATIONAL AMERICAN CITIZENS

1. Dual national American citizens alone (without family members)

Birth to age 21	10
Age 21 to 60	25
Age 61 and over	35
Total families	70

2. Dual national American citizens with other dual national American citizens

Birth to age 21	1
Age 21 to 60	15
Age 61 and over	8
Total families	24

3. Dual national American citizens with other dual national American citizens and Cubans

Birth to age 21	39
Age 21 to 60	19
Age 61 and over	7
Total families	65

4. Dual national American citizens with Cubans

Birth to age 21	170
Age 21 to 60	146
Age 61 and over	45
Total families	361

RECAPITULATION OF CATEGORY IV

Total families	520
Compost of	
Dual national American citizens	653
Cubans	1,055
Total	1,708

Reasons for which American citizens (and families) under Categories I, II, and III have not yet departed:

Reason:	Number of Families
1. For personal reasons do not wish to leave the country (for the moment)	11
2. Address unknown or do not reply to letters from the Embassy	21
3. Do not have a *carnet de extranjeros*.—C.E. (alien registration card)	24
4. C.E. application being processed	4
5. C.E. in order, application for departure authorization pending at Foreign Ministry	16
6. Departure authorized but postponed for personal reasons	3
7. Do not wish to leave Cuba without other relatives not included in the family	5
8. Ill	3
9. Applications for departure authorization submitted to Foreign Ministry but rejected (dual national: Cuban son of military age, members of Cuban families)	8
10. Other personal reasons	3
Total number of families	98
Composed of: 100 American citizens	
Dual national American citizens	32
Cubans	132
Total individuals	264

We do not have available a similar breakdown of Category IV showing reasons why families of dual U.S.-Cuban nationals and Cubans have not yet departed.

Since the termination of special flights from Cuba, the return of American citizens to the United States has continued at only a trickle and on the basis of internal criteria established by the Cuban authorities. Nevertheless, the Department continues to work through the good offices of the Swiss Embassy in Havana to assist in every way it can those American citizens and their families wishing to return to the United States. The Department has been successful in some instances. We cannot anticipate, however, that without some change in attitude on the part of the Cuban Authorities, many Americans will obtain permission to leave Cuba in the near future.

I hope the above information will be of use to the Subcommittee. If I can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Sincerely yours,

LINWOOD HOLTON,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

VETERANS' BENEFITS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hogan) is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. HOGAN. Mr. Speaker, there are 29 million living American veterans today—men and women who have given military service to their country. Nearly 7 million of them are Vietnam era veterans. These dedicated men have served a portion of their lives in the Armed Services and have blessed the people of this country with peace and freedom. We owe these men and women our best effort in providing them with the benefits that their service has earned them.

I was pleased to support H.R. 14117, which will increase the rates of disability compensation for disabled veterans and the rates of dependency and indemnity compensation for their survivors.

The disability compensation program for veterans, throughout its modern history, has been designed to provide relief for the impaired earning capacity of veterans disabled as a result of military service. The "account payable" varies according to the degree of disability which, in turn, is required by the law (38 U.S.C. 355) to represent, to the extent practicable, the average impairment in earning capacity resulting from such disability or combination of disabilities in civil occupations.

In the past several years the Congress has recognized the greater need for monetary assistance in the cases of more seriously disabled veterans and at the same time beer. aware of the fact that the vast majority of those veterans having minor disability ratings are able to supplement their compensation with outside income. Consistent with this policy, the bill we passed today provides increases for service-disabled veterans rated 10 to 20 percent in amounts ranging from 10.7 to 12 percent. Cases rated 40 and 50 percent disabled are granted increases in the amount of 15 percent. Finally, all cases rated 60 percent or more are increased 18 percent.

Disabled veterans who are in receipt of compensation benefits based on service-connected disability last received a benefits increase on August 1, 1972. Since that time, the Consumer Price Index has increased by 10 percent. The time has long been overdue to provide the necessary adjustment in compensation rates in order to keep pace with the enormous increase in the cost of living.

While this in no way can make up for the economic difficulties suffered by veterans and their dependents during the period in which inflation eroded their benefits, I do feel it is an effort to try to restore the intended value of the benefit dollar.

Mr. Speaker, a gross inequity was perpetrated on all veterans when, as a result of the 20-percent increase in social security benefits, the veterans and widows of veterans had their benefits decreased to offset the increase in social security.

The method for calculating benefits has always been unfair to veterans because it effectively denies the increase in social security benefits granted to all other social security recipients. While other incomes rise, veterans' incomes remain stationary.

I have cosponsored legislation, H.R. 13582, which would insure that recipients of veterans' pension and compensation will not have the amount of such pension or compensation reduced or discontinued because of increases in monthly security benefits. The men and women who are the concern of this legislation are poor, elderly, and unable to provide extra income for themselves. In many cases they are disabled. The increases which have been made in social security payments were meant to combat the terrible effects of inflation on our elderly citizens. Certainly if any group is deserving of our consideration these impoverished former servicemen and their widows make up such a group. They should not be penalized because their voice is small and their numbers are few. We must not let them think we have forgotten them. I wish to insert the text of my bill at this point.

Mr. Speaker, May 31 of this year marks the expiration date for education training benefits for veterans of the post Korean conflict and Vietnam era, and for servicemen on active duty.

The current GI education program for veterans and certain wives, widows, and children of veterans was instituted in 1966 for veterans of the Vietnam era and others who served after January 31, 1955. The educational allowances thereunder are payable directly to the veteran or other beneficiary concerned.

I am pleased to see that the House has acted on extending this program. On February 19, we passed H.R. 12628, which contains three major provisions as well as a number of additional minor liberalizations. The bill called for a 13.6-percent increase in all educational allowances. This means that the basic rate for a single veteran is increased from $220 a month to $250 a month and proportionate increases are provided for those with dependents. Although some differences exist between the House and Senate version of the bill, I am hopeful that both bodies will reach an agreement before the May 31 expiration date.

Another major provision of the bill extends relief in an area which I am sure that all Members have received voluminous communications and complaints from constituents. Under the present law all training must be completed before the expiration of 8 years from the date of discharge. With regard to veterans who served between 1955 and 1966, when the new GI bill was enacted, they have a period of 8 years from the date of the bills enactment. The bill, as passed by the House has extended the expiration date for an additional 2 years, that is, to 10 years. This is a reasonable additional time to enable all veterans to utilize their entitlement, which is a maximum of 36 months of educational training.

The third major provision of the bill would relax the present strict eligibility criteria for vocational rehabilitation in the case of Vietnam era veterans.

Mr. Speaker, I was pleased to support H.R. 12628. I believe it is a reasonable and sound piece of legislation which should serve to relieve in considerable measure the financial burden facing veterans in their pursuit of education and training. I understand that this bill will be before the Senate within the next few days and I hope they concur with the sentiment expressed on the floor of the House when this bill was before us.

Mr. Speaker, the cost of living is expected to rise at a minimum monthly rate of 0.6 percent. In an effort to hedge against inflation, I am today introducing legislation to provide for cost of living increases in compensation, dependency, indemnity compensation, and pension payments for veterans. My bill would authorize the Administrator of the Veterans' Administration, as a result of an increase of 3 percent or more in the Consumer Price Index, to increase those pensions for the veteran.

Mr. Speaker, I have tried to point out our commitment and our need to grant financial assistance to veterans. The necessity of my bill is evident. I urge the Congress to continue to respond to the needs of the veteran in an effort to compensate for the commitment and dedication these men and women have made to their country.

H.R. 13582

A bill to insure that recipients of veterans' pension and compensation will not have the amount of such pension or compensation reduced, or entitlement thereto discontinued, because of increases in monthly social security benefits

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) subsection (g) of section 415 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:

"(4) In determining the annual income of any individual who is entitled to monthly benefits under the insurance program established under title II of the Social Security Act, the Administrator, before applying paragraph (1)(G) of this subsection, shall disregard any part of such benefits which results from (and would not be payable but for) the general increase in benefits under such program provided by section 201 of Public Law 93-66, sections 1 and 2 of Public Law 93-233, or any subsequent cost-of-living increase in such benefits occurring pursuant to section 215(1) of the Social Security Act."

(b) Section 503 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"(d) In determining the annual income of any individual who is entitled to monthly benefits under the insurance program established under title II of the Social Security Act, the Administrator, before applying subsection (a)(6) of this section, shall disregard any part of such benefits which result from (and would not be payable but for) increases in benefits as provided by section 201 of Public Law 93-66 and sections 1 and 2 of Public Law 93-233, or any subsequent cost-of-living increase in such benefits occurring pursuant to section 215(1) of the Social Security Act."

(c) In determining the annual income of any person for purposes of determining the continued eligibility of that person for, and the amount of, pension payable under the first sentence of section 9(b) of the Veterans' Pension Act of 1959, the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs shall disregard, if that person is entitled to monthly benefits under the insurance program established under title II of the Social Security Act, any part of such benefits which results from (and

would not be payable but for) the increase in benefits as provided by section 201 of Public Law 93-66 and sections 1 and 2 of Public Law 93-233, or any subsequent cost-of-living increase in benefits occurring pursuant to section 215(i) of the Social Security Act.

SEC. 2. (a) The amendments made by this Act shall apply with respect to annual income determinations made pursuant to sections 415(g) and 503 (as in effect both on and after June 30, 1960) of title 38, United States Code, for calendar years after 1972.

(b) The Administrator of Veterans' Affairs shall (1) restore the entitlement of any person to dependency and indemnity compensation under section 415 of title 38, United States Code, pension under chapter 15 of such title, or pension under the first sentence of section 9(b) of the Veterans' Pension Act of 1959, as the case may be, who ceases to be entitled solely by reason of increases in the monthly social security benefits as provided by section 201 of Public Law 93-66 and sections 1 and 2 of Public Law 93-233; and (2) pay in lump sum to any such person any such compensation or pension that would have been payable to him but for such loss of entitlement.

GI EDUCATION BENEFITS JEOPARDIZED

HON. LESTER L. WOLFF

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 20, 1974

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Speaker, the House and Senate are presently locked in a battle that is jeopardizing the rights and future of over 300,000 Vietnam era veterans. The GI education benefits of these veterans are due to expire on May 31. The House and Senate are caught up in a dispute that is blocking enactment of a 2-year extension of the eligibility time period which would enable these vets to finish their education.

Over 3 months ago, the House passed legislation to extend the eligibility period for using GI benefits from 8 to 10 years. This bill also contained a 13.6 percent increase in education benefits. For 3 months, the Senate has dragged its feet on this bill, trying to gain time to gather support for a direct tuition payment provision, in addition to the increase in benefits. In the meantime, those thousands of veterans whose benefits are due to run out on May 31 have been placed in the terrible quandary of deciding whether to register for school or not; will they have the assurance that GI benefits will be forthcoming?

Finally, last week the Senate passed a bill containing only the 2-year extension of the eligibility period and sent this bill back to the House. The House, insisting on its original position, substituted for the Senate-passed bill its own bill which contained both the 2-year extension and the increase in benefits. So here we are still embroiled in the same dispute while thousands of veterans await the assurance from us that assistance will be forthcoming.

Mr. Speaker, it is unconscionable for this situation to develop as it has. I strongly support the increase in benefits; in fact, in committee I asked for a 25 percent increase, but was voted down. I also strongly support the direct tuition plan and was indeed one of the originators of this provision in the House. However, while the House continues to hold out for the increase, and the Senate holds out for the direct tuition plan, the future of 300,000 veterans whose benefits are running out is jeopardized. The struggle between the two Houses should go on, but after we get the 2-year extension out of the way. If we sacrifice the future of these veterans now in school in the interests of getting a complete package through at this time, we will have found ourselves winning a battle but losing the war.

Mr. Speaker, I am deeply concerned that the entire stalemate between the House and Senate on this issue has been manufactured by the administration in concert with others in an attempt to defeat meaningful improvements in the GI bill using the excuse that upgraded benefits would be inflationary. I think there is a power play going on here in an attempt to kill chances for enactment of the direct tuition plan. The administration's argument rings pretty hollow since this same administration will spend billions on South Vietnam. It is unconscionable that anyone would be willing to sacrifice the future and lives of those veterans, who have already served their country well, by refusing to support or fund upgraded tuition benefits.

Mr. Speaker, tomorrow is the last day in the House for suspension of the rules to get the 2-year extension passed. When the Senate bill providing for the 2-year extension came before the House last week under unanimous consent, I withdrew my objection to the House insisting on its original position because I was assured that, in the event of no agreement between the two Houses, we would put through the 2-year extension under suspension of the rules. I was assured by the Speaker, the majority leader, the chairman of the House Veterans' Affairs Committee, and the ranking minority member of the committee that they would support my request to bring only the 2-year extension up under suspensions so that the future educational opportunities of thousands of Vietnam vets would not be sacrificed.

Mr. Speaker, I will not sit idly by and let the current dispute between the House and Senate hold up benefits for 300,000 veterans. Tomorrow is the last day for bringing the 2-year extension up under suspensions, and there cannot be any more delay.

ENERGY

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Utah (Mr. OWENS) is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. OWENS. Mr. Speaker, for the past 2 years our country has been faced with both chronic and spot fuel shortages. The problem was seriously aggravated by the Arab oil embargo last fall. Surprisingly, our Federal Government had no contingency plan and very little authority to deal with the situation.

The embargo intensified the disparity between domestic supply and demand and thrust the energy crisis, which has been developing openly for years, into the daily lives of all Americans.

The embargo has now been conditionally lifted; the lines of automobiles at gasoline stations have disappeared, and it now appears that the short-run energy crisis has abated. According to the President, "The crisis is over." The American people have predictably reacted to those words of encouragement by again consuming at preembargo rates.

But the energy crisis is not over. We remain an energy-short nation, and the long run trends are most disturbing. As recently as 1948, we produced two-thirds of the world's crude oil and owned or controlled almost one-third of the world's proven reserves. A short 10 years later we produced only one-third of the crude and owned or controlled a modest one-ninth of the reserves.

Petroleum production has diminished annually since 1970. Consumption, however, has rapidly increased. Until last year we consumed oil at a rate which doubled almost every 10 years. And, since 1970 virtually all of the increase has been imported oil, mostly from the Middle East. In slightly more than two decades, our country has reversed its traditional role of exports and has been forced into the role of an importer of 15 percent of our energy, including 35 percent of our oil.

SHORT-RUN PROPOSALS

Congress attempted to cope with the energy crisis and its attendant impact by enacting the Emergency Energy Act. It provided emergency authority to the President to fight the crisis. Although urgently needed and supported by the administration, the President vetoed the bill because of his opposition to the crude oil price rollback provision. This bill also authorized the creation of the Federal Energy Administration, implementation of energy conservation measures, power to audit oil company reserves, and unemployment assistance for people displaced by the energy crisis.

Congress also passed the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act over administration opposition. That bill required the President to establish a mandatory fuel allocation program which is now being administered by the FEO to assure equitable distributions of available energy supplies.

IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY

The energy shortage has dealt a heavy body blow to the economy.

A study by the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee reports that price increases for petroleum products since January of 1973 are costing consumers a conservatively estimated $35.5 billion extra a year. And that high price of gasoline has transferred billions of dollars from the consuming public to the oil industry.

Unemployment caused by the energy shortage has not touched most Americans, but some areas have been hit hard. The automobile industry, for example,

has been forced to lay off hundreds of thousands of workers. To assist people in that situation, I have cosponsored legislation to provide assistance and full-time employment to persons who are unemployed or underemployed as a result of the energy crisis.

Energy policy to manage the shortages must be formulated so that no single industry or group bears a disproportionate burden of the energy crisis. For example, the recreation industry throughout the country, which depends on tourism, is in serious trouble. Unemployment is sure to follow. Utah shares a common concern with several other States which are largely dependent upon tourism for economic survival. In this regard, I have cosponsored a bill to provide low-interest loans to small businesses which are directly and seriously hurt by the energy shortage. I have also introduced a resolution with over 30 cosponsors calling for equitable consideration of the tourist sector in energy policy decisions.

We recognize, of course, that the economic nightmare of the energy shortage has very broad implications. The skyrocketing oil prices are reflected not only in gasoline and heating oil increases, but also in most goods U.S. industry produces—particularly food. More than half of the explosive increase in the consumer price index can be attributed to rising fuel and food costs. Since oil provides more than half the energy needs of our country, public and Government attention has focused on this industry's role in contributing to and solving the energy crisis.

THE OIL INDUSTRY

A distinguishing element of this industry is that it is highly concentrated. Over 1,000 companies operate in this business, but the top 20 control 70 percent of the crude oil produced domestically. They also account for 86 percent of the Nation's refinery capacity and 79 percent of its gas sales. Their economic power is greater since the largest 20 companies control 94 percent of domestic crude proven reserves—the best indicator of production concentration trends. Interfuel diversification by petroleum-based firms is increasing concentration levels for the energy industry as a whole and is raising concern over reduced interfuel competition and retarded technological advance.

Due to the price increases for petroleum products since January of 1973, the transfer of income from the American consumer to the oil industry in 1974 will be the equivalent of a 15-percent surtax on all Federal income taxes paid by all the people in the country—an incredible $16 billion increase in profits in 1 year. There has been no such overnight windfall for an American industry in the history of the country, and uniquely, no additional investment of capital, risk, and hard work was involved. The benefits flowed simply from the catastrophe that has hit the oil consumer with the oil shortage.

The following table lists the profit increases for major oil companies for the first quarter of 1974:

1974 1st quarter profit increases over 1st quarter 1973 in percentages

Exxon	39
Texaco	123
Gulf	76
Mobil	66
Shell	52
Standard (Ind.)	81
Standard (Cal.)	92
Continental	130
Occidental Petroleum	718

(Source: Time magazine.)

Defenders of the oil industry demand that market forces work out the problems. However, a complex of industry-supported government policies including State prorationing systems tied to market demand, oil import quotas to keep inexpensive foreign crude out, and tax subsidies such as the oil depletion allowance, the intangible drilling expense, and the foreign tax credit, have subverted free market forces and have made American oil the most richly subsidized industry in the world.

Many major oil companies have argued for an end to price controls claiming that this alone would constitute a free market. Although prices will have to rise in a transition to a free market, this must not be allowed to happen without concurrently phasing out the subsidies. It is imperative that the Government act to insure that the consumer does not bear the full burden of the energy crisis.

I voted to rollback the price of new crude oil to $7.09 per barrel. There is no evidence that exploration will be greater at the current price of $10 per barrel. Even former energy chief, now Treasury Secretary William Simon has said that $7 per barrel will bring forth as much new production as we can reasonably expect to get.

After years of subsidizing the oil industry to protect our national security, we now find ourselves with fuel prices soaring, demand outstripping supply, people losing their jobs, the economy suffering, and the NATO alliance crumbling in a frantic scramble for oil. It is time to reintroduce the dynamics of normal market forces into this industry through vigorous antitrust enforcement and policy proposals which insure the most efficient technological and organizational means to deliver the product.

ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

We have as a national goal the development of a capabilty for energy self-sufficiency. This does not mean an end to fuel imports—it means simply limiting our dependency to levels which will permit us to maintain essential public services, economic growth, and a satisfactory standard of living in the event these imports should not be available. In the short run we must accelerate development of oil and natural gas in Alaska and on the Outer Continental Shelf. We must boost coal production and bring on line coal gasification and liquefaction.

In the long run I support a national energy research program to provide the overall energy sources we will need to meet the energy demands of the future. I am currently involved in drafting the national energy research and development bill by virtue of my assignment to the House Interior Committee. The costs of research into some of these areas will require the kind of capital that only the Federal Government is capable of providing, particularly with the tremendous risk involved. We must continue Federal research with maximum private industry input. Harnessing energy from the Sun, geothermal steam, tides, and wind is not as remote and impracticable as it may seem. The Sun, especially, will be a great source of energy, if we develop our ability to use it. I have introduced in separate legislation an energy research and development bill to develop Utah's vast oil shale reserves.

ENERGY CONSERVATION

Even with implementation of a massive energy R. & D. effort, there is no way we can meet the self-sufficiency goals of "Project Independence" by the President's 1980 deadline. Dependence on foreign oil will be a fact of life for at least a decade. Unless oil imports can be increased at an acceptable economic and political price, the only way to reduce the gap between domestic production and consumption is through more effective use of physical capital already in place and through shortrun conservation measures. How individual and industrial energy consumers respond to energy shortages will in large part determine their severity. Business and industry consume 70 percent of our energy, and they will have to develop the bulk of energy saving techniques.

We cannot sustain the growth rates in energy consumption of recent years. Even under the best of circumstances, energy conservation is going to be mandatory. We are going to have to adapt our transportation systems—indeed our whole system of generating and using energy, to an age of energy scarcity.

Currently the biggest job this Government faces is convincing Americans that energy shortages are real and will continue despite the lifting of the Arab oil embargo last March and optimistic statements on the energy situation emanating from the White House. The consumption side of the energy equation is not receiving adequate attention. Unfortunately, except for a few exhortations, the President's messages look only at supply. The administration appears to have accepted the premise that public demand will grow exponentially. This approach means inevitable conflict with other world powers competing for scarce petroleum resources and could mean mortgaging our future national security for Mideast oil.

The average American consumes more energy than his British counterpart. We waste as much energy each year as the Japanese consume. We use as much energy for air conditioning annually as 800 million Chinese use for everything. It is clear that there are areas we can cut back without reverting to a spartan life style. The narcotic effect of ending the embargo has brought a premature relaxation of voluntary conservation measures encouraged by Federal, State, and local governments. We must accept an energy diet as a permanent fact of life.

CONCLUSION

Oil industry officials and the FEO both agree that resumption of Arab oil imports will not end the U.S. oil shortage and that we can expect higher prices at the retail level. My concern is that the President's desire to report good news to the country causes him to make light of the long-term energy shortages. We must bear in mind that the Arabs clearly indicated their intention to continue to use resource diplomacy as a means to influence our actions and policies in the Middle East.

The 5-month oil embargo is now behind us, but we are still faced with the challenge and legacy of an energy crisis. America has run out of easy energy sources. We must now grapple with the tough choices. Our options will be much broader if we take steps now to lay the necessary groundwork. For the decisions we make today will significantly affect our energy alternatives for a long time to come.

A RATIONAL APPROACH TO THE WORLD SUGAR PROBLEM

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. REUSS) is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Speaker, Congress is being asked, in H.R. 14747, to extend the life of the Sugar Act for 5 more years. This would be a serious mistake.

The current act, designed for the low prices and large surpluses of the depression, no longer serves any valid purpose. Instead, it adds only to inflation, to the drain on the U.S. Treasury, and to waste in the use of our agricultural resources. It is an inflationary, extravagant, and wasteful bonanza for a few high-cost farmers and for foreign quota holders, wholly unsuited to the growing worldwide need for low-cost sugar. It should be dropped, and the Congress should adopt a forward-looking program in its place, one which recognizes that in a growing world food crisis, America can and must act to insure adequate food for all.

For sugar, as for other commodities, the United States must adopt policies which move us toward a more productive and rational use of our resources. The present Sugar Act does not do this. Instead, it moves us in the opposite direction and at great cost to ourselves and to the world at large.

The current Sugar Act has four major failings:

First, it costs the American taxpayer and consumer far more—$500 million a year in normal times—than it delivers in benefits to American sugar producers—only $100 million a year.

I

For every 1 dollar of benefits which the program provides and pays for, 4 dollars are lost.

The costs, which include higher prices, the actual direct payments to producers, and a regressive transfer payment of excise taxes and tariffs, fall most heavily on low- and middle-income families—those who spend a greater fraction of their income on food. The benefits go not only to our own producers, but also to foreign quota-holders who benefit from a capricious and arbitrary allotment of shares in the lucrative U.S. sugar market.

The remainder of the discrepancy between costs and benefits results from two factors: First, America is a high-cost producer of sugar, so that even with high, supported prices, the profits of our producers are low, and second, much of the land and other resources employed in sugar production here could earn virtually as much if employed in producing other commodities.

Surely, any program which costs so much and delivers so little ought to be discarded out of hand. In normal times, the sugar program cuts one-half billion dollars from our real national income every year. Indeed, $400 million would be added to our national income every year if we simply abandoned the program, and reimbursed producers directly for the $100 million they would have received net under the existing program. Yet this financial argument is but one of several compelling reasons for changing our policy on sugar.

II

A second failing of the Sugar Act is that it encourages production in the wrong places—where the costs are high and where other crops could better be grown. In Louisiana, for instance, farmers are growing high-cost, low-yield sugarcane on land which is ideally suited for soybeans. In California, beet sugar is produced on irrigated land that could be better used for vegetables. In Washington and Colorado, feed grains and wheat would be the more rational crops. Even now, farmers generally rotate sugar acreage with alternate products. Clearly, it is only the distorted incentives of the current Sugar Act which keeps them in the sugar business at all.

Because of our policy and that of other nations in temperate climates, some 40 percent of the world's sugar is being grown on land that would be better used for soybeans, grain or other scarce commodities which cannot easily be grown elsewhere. Protection of sugar production in Europe dates from the Middle Ages. Although the United States did not follow suit until the depression, our program is no more justified for being a mere 30 years out of date.

A rational U.S. and world sugar policy would result in more sugar being produced in the tropical areas of the world. These areas have no good alternative use for their land, Sun, and rainfall.

In large parts of the United States, Western Europe, and the U.S.S.R., some of the acreage which is—or in the future might be—devoted to sugar beets could be better utilized for other products with little or no financial loss to the producers.

The world has a food problem of massive proportions. We can see it in the faces of the starving inhabitants of north central Africa and India. World production of cereals has not kept pace with world demand since 1969, and current reserves are now at their lowest level in 20 years. We know that 1 million new mouths are added to the world's population every week. Under these conditions, we must make certain that the world's agricultural resources are used in the most productive possible way. To do less is to invite disaster.

III

A third major failing of U.S. sugar policy is that it adds to the evergrowing curse of inflation—by supporting high prices, by controlling production, and by denying the land for alternate, scarce and high-priced crops. If the United States were opened to unrestricted low-cost imports, the price of sugar to U.S. producers, with the help of government consumers would go down. American aid where necessary, could then shift to other high-priced goods, such as grains and soybeans. The increased supplies of these goods would, in turn, drive their prices down.

IV

The fourth failing of the U.S. sugar program is that it distributes its benefits among foreign countries capriciously, and provides an opportunity for unsavory manipulation of quotas among countries.

A U.S. sugar import quota is a valuable asset. Lobbyists are paid huge sums to secure increased quotas. Great pressure is put on Government officials and Congressmen. The American political system can ill afford still more examples of political favors that are for sale, especially not in our foreign relations.

To be sure, the program benefits some foreign sugar producers. But the benefits are not distributed on any rational basis—not even as rational a basis as U.S. foreign aid. Moreover, there is no reason why two rich, importing countries, Japan and Canada, should be able to buy cheap sugar on world markets because of the U.S. program, at the expense of the developing countries of Latin America and elsewhere.

Finally, the benefits to sugar producers in developing countries are less than would accrue to them if they were able to expand output to supply the large and growing markets in the United States and Europe. The developing countries should provide more of the sugar needs of the rich countries. We are becoming increasingly aware of the abject poverty in which two-thirds of mankind lives, and the difficulty of providing adequate and effective amounts of foreign aid to meet their needs. Letting these people use their lands and hands to produce sugar for our markets would be an effective way of providing them both employment and foreign exchange. Latin America would benefit. So would India. And so would we.

These four basic reasons compel me to oppose strongly the extension of the Sugar Act of 1948 for 5 more years that will come before the House in the next few days.

Moreover, this is a good time to make a change. At the moment U.S. sugar

prices are above world prices. While abnormal, this occurs at fairly regular intervals. It occurred before in 1963 and 1951 and is the result of a world sugar production cycle. The cycle, which normally runs from 6 to 9 years, results from the time it takes for sugar production to respond to changes in price, and the time needed to plan and construct the huge and very expensive mills and refineries.

Some observers use the current abnormal situation to argue that we should keep the Sugar Act since the United States benefits from it today—foreign producers sell us their sugar at less than they sell sugar on the world market. They do so because they want to keep their U.S. sugar quota, in normal times a very valuable commodity.

But this situation cannot last, for these reasons:

First, if it were to continue, as some suggest, foreign producers would soon cease to sell us their sugar. Why should they do so at a substantial discount from what they could get elsewhere?

Second, if the prices of alternate crops on sugar land also remained high, farmers would shift to those crops rather than continue to produce sugar at an artificially low U.S. price. This is already happening to some extent. If our sugar price remained low, we might then be faced with a potentially serious shortage of sugar.

Third, and most important, a higher world price would eventually draw out greater production of sugar from the less developed nations into the world market. This would cause the world price of sugar to fall, thereby reestablishing the exorbitant cost-benefit relationship which pertains in normal times under the current Sugar Act.

We should take advantage of the present temporary situation. With the world price of sugar likely to remain above the domestic price for at least a time, a shift to free trade in sugar—such as exists for most of the rest of agriculture—could be accomplished with a minimum of disruption to domestic producers. In fact, domestic production could be expected to expand in the short run. Deficiency payments should be made to help farmers over the rough spots when the price again falls.

I propose, therefore, that the current Sugar Act be allowed to expire, and that the following steps be taken to rationalize international sugar production:

On the domestic front, we should:

First. Eliminate quotas on the importation of sugar.

Second. Eliminate the excise tax on sugar—as the current amendments suggest—and retain only a small tariff on imported refined sugar, to be reduced gradually in multilateral negotiation.

Third. Encourage the transition of our domestic high-cost beet and cane producers to other crops with deficiency payments up to—but only up to—90 percent of what they could have gotten for the best alternate crop on the same land, whenever sugar prices fall below that 90-percent level. This would insure that high-cost producers do not bear the whole burden of transition, while providing them a solid economic incentive to change to more desirable and economical products.

Fourth. Retain current protection of the pay and rights of sugarfield workers.

Fifth. Finally, we should eliminate all restrictions on the amount of acreage that can be devoted to sugar when the price is high enough to justify domestic production.

In the international arena, we should take the initiative in pressing for a new International Sugar Agreement, in which industrial nations would agree to reduce their protection of high-cost domestic sugar production, and to rely instead on the cheap, efficient nations of the developing world. In return, the developing nations might agree to continue supplying raw sugar to established refineries in the industrial nations, so that this sector would not be adversely affected by reduced domestic production.

A revitalized international agreement on sugar is not possible unless there is strong leadership. We cannot expect leadership from the European Common Market, which is sharply divided on this issue. Clearly, only the United States has the cohesion and strength to lead. What we lack—so far—is the imagination and the will. Unless world restrictions on sugar trade are relaxed, the evils discussed earlier will persist and world sugar trade, which is a residual market, will continue to be subject to violent price swings.

An international agreement on sugar should aim for free trade in sugar in the long run. Immediately, it should set its sights lower—at reducing the level of uneconomic production which takes place in the temperate, developed countries of the world—principally the United States, continental Western Europe and, if possible, the U.S.S.R. The United States, the European Common Market and, if possible, the Soviet Union ought to agree to reduce gradually their degree of self-sufficiency in sugar. The United States is now some 55 percent self-sufficient; continental Western Europe—the original six Common Market countries—has a self-sufficiency ratio of 105 percent. It cannot be repeated too often that a good part of the agricultural land and other agricultural resources of these areas could be put to use better in the production of other crops, particularly grains, which are sorely needed by the world.

This is not a radical proposal. It is a pragmatic attempt to reduce the useless costs to American consumers and taxpayers, to meet the world's growing food needs, to fight inflation, and to assist economic growth in poor countries. Eventually the program would result in free trade in sugar.

For our own sugar economy, I do not think we should tie much-needed progress to an uncertain set of international negotiations. I urge that we let the Sugar Act lapse and adopt an approach similar to that used for other agricultural products. The plan which I propose—elimination of excise taxes and quotas, reduction of tariffs, deficiency payments which encourage substitution of more economical crops, and an end to production restraints—is very similar in most respects to the plans now in effect for other agricultural goods. It will help insure adequate supplies of sugar for the U.S. market. Under present legislation, as I noted earlier, there is a real danger that foreign producers will begin to avoid the U.S. market, at least in the short run. Further, my plan would encourage production in the efficient areas of the world, especially the poor tropical countries—with the eventual result of lower prices of sugar and greater economic well-being for both us and them.

Finally, the plan would put a floor under the income of established U.S. sugar producers. They will not be forced to go through the wringer for the benefit of the rest of the country. In any reasonable set of circumstances the cost of deficiency payments to the American taxpayer will be considerably less than the cost of high domestic prices supported by import quotas. And even this cost will decline as farmers respond to the market and shift to more economical products.

The benefits from such a plan are clear. Now, who would be hurt by it?

Not the farmers. The current high domestic sugar price—substantially above the price objective of the Sugar Act—is not high enough to encourage producers to meet their present quotas for production of sugar beets at home. American farmers are switching to other crops even with the present sugar program.

The sugar mills and refineries would be adversely affected, but the exact degree of the impact is difficult to determine. U.S. consumption of sugar would continue to rise and the mills could work on domestic as well as imported sugar cane and beets. Transportation costs are cheaper for bulk crops than refined sugar so that as more of U.S. sugar needs are imported, they could still be processed in the United States.

However, we should recognize that the mills and refineries will probably have some economic problems. The investments involved are large. The plant and equipment are not transferable to other uses. We must mitigate the economic losses which this sector of the U.S. economy may suffer. One way, as I noted before, would be to take as much of our increasing imports from the Third World as possible in the form of raw sugar—perhaps by negotiated agreement, or by retaining a temporary tariff on imports of refined sugar. Possibly, the adjustment assistance provisions of the trade bill now before Congress might be expanded to provide more adequate protection. What is clear is that the current Sugar Act offers no viable alternative for the sugar refiners either. It merely postpones the day of judgment. Under the current act, more expensive and wasteful refineries will be built—and the result will be an even greater crash when economic reali-

ties finally catch up with our profligate and wasteful habits.

This proposal for dropping the present Sugar Act in favor of a rational, market-oriented program has the support of most disinterested observers and, until they waffled recently for some unknown reason, of the major branches of the administration as well. Specifically:

Secretary of Agriculture Butz endorsed a similar program in testimony on February 19, 1974, when he recommended the eliminations of both payments and controls in sugar production, and said:

I have confidence that the sugar industry will grow and prosper if the market place is permitted to guide its future.

In late 1973, Kenneth Firck, administrator of the Agriculture Stabilization and Conservation Service of the Department of Agriculture, floated a trial balloon, which the Congressional Quarterly described as calling for:

Elimination of quotas, excise taxes, processor marketing allotments, wage regulations, farm acreage allotments for the purpose of controlling production and loans or purchases to support sugar prices. The quota system would have been replaced by a target-price approach whereby farmers would be paid the difference when the market price fell below a target price set by law. Congress approved a similar plan for wheat, feed grains, and cotton in 1973 in the omnibus farm bill.

In November and December of 1973, Arthur Calcagnini, Director of the Sugar Division in the Department of Agriculture, made two speeches in which he said:

The Sugar Act is based on a false assumption of a relatively constant sugar surplus in the world. Now no surplus exists, scarcity is looming, and as a result the Sugar Act will one day fail us. . . . We must change the system while we still have time.

Now, while I disagree with a few of the suggestions made by both Mr. Butz and Mr. Calcagnini, I think that their ideas are basically sound. I should like to quote at some length from the statements of each, beginning with Mr. Butz:

The Congress last year had the foresight to move farther and farther away from the set rules and built-in restrictions that have been the mark of Federal farm legislation since the 1930's. Aimed at restoring the market place and producers as the decision makers for U.S. crop acreage and production, the bipartisan effort set the stage for a revitalizing of the U.S. farm plant in major crop areas. If this shift in Federal farm policy had not been made, U.S. farmers today would have been hampered in their efforts to meet the needs of U.S. and world consumers in the important grain and cotton sectors.

The fast-paced shifts taking place in the pattern of U.S. farm production foreclose on our past custom of legislation on a commodity-by-commodity basis. As we look to the market place and away from artificial pricing structures, the price relationships among all commodities takes (sic) on added significance in determining what kind and how much of the different crops are planted and grown. . . .

Whether we like it or not, this inter-relationship dictates a long, hard look at cotton, wheat and feed grain legislation as we consider new sugar legislation.

The Act of 1970 introduced set-aside programs for cotton, feed grains and wheat. It moved agriculture away from tight acreage allotment and marketing quota programs that had restricted production for more than 30 years. It looked outward instead of inward and enabled producers to reach competitively toward the growing world markets. Most importantly, it fostered the reestablishment of peaceful trade relationships with the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China, and brought world recognition to the U.S. as the greatest and most reliable source of food and fiber. . . .

As we look to the future growth of the sugar industry, we must deal forthrightly with the question of artificial production and marketing controls. As other commodities have been freed from restraints, U.S. farmers have prospered. They have been free to shift and use their resources in the most efficient and profitable manner. Under the sugar control system . . . domestic quota, farm proportionate shares and processor marketing allotments . . . there is little incentive for growth and expansion. While controls are not a major factor at the moment, their ever present threat as a device of the future inhibit the investment of production and processing capital. I have confidence that the sugar industry will grow and prosper if the market place is permitted to guide its future.

Another sensitive question in any farm legislation is that of payments . . . and the specter of payment limitations. There has been a rapid trend away from payments as an income supplement for other commodities. It is now time to consider the elimination of all farm payments. Wheat producers accepted the termination of 'wheat certificate' payments and are finding the market place a much more satisfactory answer to their growing income needs. We must be willing to accept a similar solution for sugar. With the end of sugar payments, there will be no further need for the domestic sugar excise tax (which is a burden to consumers).

In short, despite a reported administration decision not to oppose the extension of the Sugar Act of 1948, Mr. Butz' speech provides only criticisms of the present sugar program and suggests only major changes.

Now let me quote from Mr. Calcagnini:

The world market today is demanding sugar—and paying for it. And the U.S. is limping along with legislation based on the assumption that too much sugar is being produced!

What are we going to do about it? Who's going to see that sugar production expands to meet demand? You, or the government?

Is it reasonable to suggest that the government stop the use of quotas and instead try to help the industry by providing a program that allows more expansion and more competition?

I'm sure most of you here have made it a point to find out the details of sugar policy now being discussed by the Department of Agriculture with all segments of the industry. Therefore, I will list them only briefly and then go on to examine some of them in more depth.

We are thinking of:

No quotas on imports of raw sugar;

No processor marketing allotments;

No regulations relating to wages paid sugar workers;

Target prices for payment;

Payments to be made if average market prices received by farmers are below the target price;

Farm acreage allotments, to be used only for payment purposes and not to control production;

National acreage allotment or pay base to be established on history. New factory areas such as North Dakota and Minnesota would form a new base;

Substitution authority between crops, as is given in the cotton, feed grains, and wheat programs;

No set-aside authority (this differs from the cotton, feed grains, and wheat programs); and

No support of sugar through loans or purchases. However, farm income from sugar would be maintained by target price payments if needed.

Now let me answer some questions that keep popping up when this proposed policy is outlined. First—only farms with a history of sugar production will be protected by target prices. Anyone would be free to get into sugarbeet or cane production—providing they had the land and finances and processing plant available—but new farms would not receive the target price guarantee.

Second, farm payment yields would be based on the average yield per harvested acre during the 3 preceding years, adjusted or natural disaster and other conditions beyond control of the producer.

Third, producers need to understand that payments would be made only if the average market price received by farmers in the first 5 months was below the established target price. It would not be whether the price you, as an individual producer, received was above or below target that would determine whether or not you received payment. The determining factor would be the average market price.

Finally, the duty and excise taxes would be eliminated.

After you have given some thought to this approach to sugar industry-government relationship, I believe you will find it a more reasonable means of attaining all of our objectives than the present Sugar Act, which as you know, expires at the end of 1974.

The Sugar Act is based on a false assumption of a relatively constant sugar surplus in the world. Now no surplus exists, scarcity is looming, and as a result the Sugar Act will one day fail us. . . .

We must change the system while we still have time.

Government payments would be on a kind of "standby" basis, and farmers would look to the market to expand their income, rather than to the Government.

We do not yet see anything but higher prices ahead for some time. At some point, rising prices will bring demand into line with available supply. But so far the evidence indicates that world demand for sugar is so strong that it will take higher market prices than we have yet seen for this to happen.

I do not know why the administration lost courage to present the Congress with a sensible alternative to a piece of special legislation designed for conditions of the 1930's. Perhaps, as the Washington Farmletter of April 26, 1974 reports:

The Sugar Act extension is being written by lobbyists, not Congressmen.

Nevertheless, we must have a modernized domestic sugar program modeled along the lines of the Agriculture Act of 1973. It has many advantages. It would be market oriented. It would avoid rigid government controls. It would have target price and deficiency payment systems, as now exist for cotton, feed grains and wheat. And, it would make a healthy contribution to a more efficient use of the world's agricultural resources, to fighting inflation, to helping impoverished countries and would, at the same time, protect the legitimate interests of American farmers.

CAN WE STOP INFLATION?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Speaker, there follows the text of remarks by our colleague from Wisconsin, HENRY S. REUSS, before the California Bankers' Association at San Diego, Calif., on Saturday, May 18, 1974:

Can we stop inflation? There's no question about it. We have got to stop inflation—it is ruining the economy, virtually eliminating growth, throwing thousands out of work, distorting business decisions, undermining our balance of payments position, penalizing poor and middle-income families and old people, destroying the social cohesion of the Nation.

But how do we stop it?

Price-wage controls are no more. With management and labor dancing on the coffin, they expired on April 30. Though the administration ran these controls ineptly, Congress and the administration made a mistake in allowing them to lapse.

But that is all water over the dam now. Controls are gone, and I do not see much likelihood that they will be re-enacted in the near future.

This leaves us with fiscal and monetary policy as the basic economic tools. But how apply them to the present "stagflation," where double-digit inflation is accompanied by retarded production and increased unemployment?

If we tighten spending and money to fight inflation, we court greater recession and greater unemployment. If we run huge deficits and print vast quantities of new money to fight stagnation, we add to the inflationary spiral.

The way out of the dilemma, I suggest, is to adopt an essentially neutral fiscal and monetary policy, and to fight inflation and recession by how we spend our money rather than by how much we spend.

What of the budget? The fiscal 1975 budget projects outlays of $305.4 billion, receipts of $294 billion, and a deficit of $11.4 billion. The full employment budget shows a more restrictive picture—a $9 billion surplus.

Of course, I should like to rearrange Mr. Nixon's spending priorities, trimming the defense budget and boosting public service employment, transportation, and housing, for example. But speaking in macro-economic terms, the fiscal impact of the proposal budget is not too far from right—certainly not too stimulative, perhaps a little too restrictive. Maintaining its general proportions for now is probably sensible advice.

As for the monetary policy, we need a period of moderate monetary growth. In the latest 3 months for which figures are available, the Federal Reserve has let the money supply, narrowly defined, increase at the rate of 8.9 percent, a rapid expansion given existing economic conditions. It is time for the Fed to bring money growth to no higher than the 6-percent band, and to keep it there for the immediate future. Chairman Burns has announced his intention of doing so. Let us hope that he has more success in the future than in the recent past.

Even with the money supply increasing rapidly, money is "tight" relative to demand, and interest rates are outrageous. The bulge in demand is largely from business borrowing for inventory and supplies and for stockpiled credit.

To create excessive new money to accommodate this demand could simply add to price inflation across the board. Indeed, it would not even help those interest-sensitive sectors of the economy, such as housing, for whose benefit easy money is frequently urged. The overall inflation induced by excessive new money only causes disintermediation, illiquidity, and the consequent disappearance of mortgage money.

But housing and the thrift institutions must be protected, by measures other than excessive money creation.

With respect to thrift institutions and disintermediation, the increases announced by the administration last week in the amounts to be made available to savings and loans are a first step in the right direction. Standing back of the Home Loan Bank Board, the Fed itself should start rolling open its discount window to thrift institutions, meanwhile making compensating open market sales, if necessary, to keep money growth within the 4- to 6-percent yearly band.

With respects to housing, there is likewise an arsenal of available actions to cushion the hardship that accompanies the Fed's tighter money policy. For example, the Fed and other regulatory agencies could impose on the various financial institutions special asset reserve requirements which give the lender an incentive to favor desirable loans, like residential mortgages, and disfavor less desirable loans, such as for conglomerate takeovers or to buy excessive inventories.

If price-wage controls are out, and fiscal-monetary policies are merely neutral, what should be the main ingredients in an anti-inflationary campaign?

I suggest two: increase supply, and work out a social contract which will enable wage earners to modify their wage demands by repairing their pocketbooks in other ways.

Advance planning and sensible import, export, subsidy, and market policies are the best way to increase the supply of scarce materials and forestall future shortages. Ironically, the administration frequently does just the opposite.

Some examples from the recent past:

For months and months, in 1972 and 1973, the Department of Agriculture, despite the growing beef shortage, refused to let cattlemen graze their livestock on the 60 million acres met aside from production under the farm price-support program. As a result, fewer beef cattle came to market, and the price of meat jumped.

Again, in early 1973, the Secretary of Agriculture sent a bulletin out to the turkey growers of this country, advising them to keep turkey production down in order to keep the price up. And up indeed it went—so much so that last Thanksgiving and Christmas, a turkey cost per pound almost double what it had cost a year before.

And do not forget the milk price scandal: an agreement by the administration to raise the price support for milk, the money paid, the support price raised. One day a jury will determine whether this was bribery. We do not need to wait to know that it was a giant rip off for the milk consumer.

Or take oil. We cannot blame the energy crisis entirely on the sheiks. It has been obvious for years that the United States, with its energy demand growing exponentially, faced eventual shortages of crude and refined oil. The President's own Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control warned him of this in 1970, and advised, as did other experts, that the oil import quotas be abolished. But faithful to the oil interests who financed his election, the President refused to take this obvious step, and thus subject domestic producers to the competition of cheaper foreign oil. Had he done so, we would today have a stockpile of oil to help cushion the fuel shortages exacerbated by the Arab oil embargo.

I wish I could report that the administration has repented.

But no—like so many rogue elephants crashing through the canebrake, various Government agencies are today siphoning off scarce goods and credit from the U.S. economy, and thus worsening inflation. It is misguided to give perverse incentives to export scarce goods like wheat, cotton, scrap, and lumber, and equally scarce credit that is vitally needed for housing, small business, and capital investment generally. Yet that is precisely what the Government is now doing. Some examples:

First. The Commodity Credit Corp., unabashed by the Russian wheat fiasco of 1972, continues to lend to foreign countries, some of them rolling in wealth, so that they can buy American wheat, soybeans and other scarce commodities at discount prices. In the current fiscal year, ending in June 30, 1974, CCC will have issued $286 million in new credits. Even more astounding, the Department of Agriculture is now preparing a big promotion campaign for the fiscal year starting July 1 for $415 million in new credits.

Who gets these allocations of credit?

Oil-rich Iran, for one. Last year Iran got a CCC-administered $45 million 15-year loan for American wheat. While the Iranians gouge the Americans on oil, the CCC gouges the Americans on wheat! With our wheat dissipated, of course bread prices here rise. With our credit diverted to Iran, of course housing here languishes. With our grain reserves gone, hope of helping the starving millions of the Sahara margin and of the Indian subcontinent dwindles.

And, of course, the taxpayers pay for the program.

Nor is this all. The local currency counterpart of these easy-money loans is supposed to be used to expand future U.S. exports. But instead of building a promised port facility, the Iranian Government, with the help of the Department of Agriculture, has used these funds to subsidize model kitchens for middle-class Iranian housewives. The DA wanly hopes that one day modern kitchens in the suburbs of Tehran will have a U.S. chicken in every pot

Second. Or take the Export-Import Bank. Ex-Im recently guaranteed a $48 million 7- to 10-year loan at 6 percent interest to German Lufthansa to purchase wide-bodied U.S. commercial planes, of which we have a near-monopoly. Since West Germany is choking with reserves, and the mark is dangerously high, Germany should obviously have bought them for cash.

These wasted credit dollars could have been spent on housing here in America. Furthermore, why should the American taxpayer make loans to Germany at subsidized interest rates?

Ex-Im is also making cut-rate taxpayer-subsidized loans to Japan for commerical aircraft, for nuclear powerplant fuel, and for cotton. How does Ex-Im justify this subsidizing cotton exports at a time when shortages are causing the cost of cotton goods in this country to soar?

Ex-Im is also smothering oil-rich and reserve-choked Iran with goodies at the American taxpayers' expense—6 percent subsidized loans for $400 million for military equipment in the last 2 years, $53 million for commercial jets, $17 million at interest rates as low as 5 percent for the purchase of U.S. oil well drilling rigs, at a time when American oil is not being produced because of the shortage of drilling rigs in this country.

Third. AID's housing guarantee program is another needless drain both on our taxpayers and on our scarce domestic supply of credit. While the housing is supposed to be for low-income people, AID's latest report discloses that:

> The average house guaranteed under the program in Latin America costs about $7,500, requiring a family income of about $3,000 per year, which is more than 50 percent of the population can afford in almost any Latin American country.

Helping Latin American slum dwellers is a worthy project. But housing for the South American middle class? Why not put the scores of millions a year in abstracted credit into housing for the North American middle class?

Fourth. Or take the Internal Revenue Service's DISC program, created back in 1971 when we were still laboring under fixed exchange rates. DISC gives a tax deferment to American companies to induce them to export more. But frequently the exports induced are scarce items like lumber, plywood, or scrap, thus adding to domestic inflation. And the taxpayer, as always, has to pay for the ride.

The final irony is that the Federal Reserve is now so worried about excessive exports of scarce U.S. goods, and the inflationary consequences to us, that it wants to intervene in the market so as to raise the dollar's exchange rate, and thus cut down on these excessive exports. Would it not be more sensible to cut down on the excessive exports in the first place by curtailing the agencies that are using taxpayers' dollars to bring them about?

Government, in a nutshell, must reverse its restrictive outlook on supply.

The second major new anti-inflationary attack takes the form of a social contract with working Americans to moderate wage demands, and hence avoid a wage-price spiral.

While inflationary pressure from food and fuel prices seems to be abating somewhat, new upward pressure on prices due to higher labor costs must be expected. Wage contracts across the country are being renegotiated, with increases of 8–10 percent in store.

The average worker has taken a financial shellacking in the last few years. Prices rose more than 9 percent in 1973, while wages stayed close to the 5.5-percent guideline. But although labor deserves and must have compensation, excessive wage increases will eventually erode the purchasing power of workers themselves.

How can wage earners be given grounds to be temperate in their wage requests?

By a social contract, I suggest, designed to cushion average Americans from the worst effects of the recession-cum-inflation we are now enjoying. Low- and modest-income families—the two-thirds of a nation earning up to $15,000 a year—have been hit disproportionately hard by rising prices—largely food and fuel—by rising payroll taxes, and by rising unemployment. Since 1968, their share of national income has declined, and roughly $10 billion has been shifted from them to the highest income families. A proper social contract should see to it that the income shares and purchasing power of these families do not fall below 1968 levels, and should move toward even greater income equity.

Such a social contract, or incomes policy, should contain the following elements:

a. Unemployment must not be allowed to rise. Public service jobs—in health, public safety, the environment, education, inner city problems—are the least costly, least inflationary, and least energy-consuming jobs. Creating 500,000 such jobs, for example, would cost approximately $3.5 billion a year, to be recouped through cutting equivalent waste in the Nixon budget.

b. Tax reform must redress special hardships suffered by low- and middle-income families.

Beyond the question of equity, consumer purchasing power faces a fall-off of around $7 to $10 billion this year from higher oil prices alone—$10 to $15 billion reduced to a net $7 to $10 billion by additional U.S. exports to oil-producing countries, some drawdown of savings by U.S. consumers, and some wage increases. Already, the dollar volume of retail sales, adjusting for inflation, is lagging behind last year's figures. An incomes policy to maintain adequate consumer purchasing power is necessary to prevent recessionary forces from accelerating.

Tax relief aimed specifically at low- and modest-income families will both help them recover from the financial beating they've been taking and spur production. Such relief—accompanied by a thorough-going welfare reform for those too poor for the tax rolls—could take several forms, such as: First, reducing the employee's payroll tax; second, increasing the income tax standard deduction and the low-income allowance; or third, changing the personal income tax deduction to a credit.

The proceeds which such a tax cut—and associated welfare reform—would put in consumers' pockets would not be inflationary. If present trends are followed, the extra money would be spent by low- and moderate-income families on commodities and services which are generally in adequate supply. Even more significant, many of these expenditures would serve an energy-conserving purpose—storm windows, insulation, garden equipment, canning and freezing equipment, tools, and outdoor gear.

Furthermore, to avoid excessive fiscal stimulus, the cost of tax relief should be offset—partly, of course, through increased Federal revenues due to increased economic activity, but mainly through closing tax loopholes. Loophole-plugging with a microeconomic eye will not only raise needed revenues but remove distortions. Some leading candidates:

First, failure to tax capital gains at death, which discourages inter vivos gifts and tends to lock in investment capital; second, foreign oil bonanzas, which discourage domestic exploration and production—the Ways and Means Committee is already moving in this direction; third, hobby farm tax deductions, which bid up the price of agricultural land; fourth, DISC's which encourage export of commodities regardless of whether they are in short supply domestically; fifth, tax-exempt interest on State and local bonds, which results in a loss of revenue to the Federal Treasury far outweighing the benefit to State and local governments and restricts the market in municipal bonds to the very rich—they should be supplemented by interest-subsidized non-tax-exempt bonds as an additional option for the State or local government.

c. For whatever it is worth, an appeal must be made to business and banking to "get right" with St. Thomas Aquinas by not pressing their prices and interest rates to the point of avarice, John Dunlop and the Cost of Living Council should be kept in business by Executive order, to focus the spotlight of public scrutiny on exorbitant price increases.

If the Government will make a good faith effort to carry out such a program—keep unemployment down, keep supplies up and prices down, provide tax relief and reform, channel credit where it is needed—wage-earners will have a valid reason to moderate their requests for pay increases.

For both labor and government, keeping in mind that the "just price" of Thomas Aquinas may be the best assurance that Government will not respond to a deteriorating situation in the months ahead by reimposing wage-price controls, moderation is the answer.

Prudent economics and social justice, thus, are the elements of a program designed to control inflation.

Finally, where do the banks fit in to all this? The theme of this conference is "getting involved". In your allocations of lending power, you have always had your own criteria to guide you, beyond fixing the interest rate at the highest level which will dispose of your merchandise. Among these criteria have been the riskiness of the loan, its administrative cost, the long-term value of the customer.

In this day and age, when a fair social contract demands that the share of wealth and income going to profits and executive compensation should not be gaining at the expense of the share going to the wage-earner, why not "get involved" by cranking social purpose into your lending calculus? Why cannot the banks make credit available to a business bent on new investment in high-technology, energy-conserving, environment-preserving plant and equipment at a lower rate than to a conglomerate giant bent on overstocking its warehouse or on devouring yet another small business? Or to a moderate-income new town housing project rather than to another resort project that is going to outrun the energy-ecology parameters in a few years?

If it is said that to admit social purpose to the calculus may be to diminish profits from what they would otherwise be, I reply that profits based solely on what the traffic will bear, without regard to fairness and income shares, are likely to be excessive profits. If business and banking are going to ask labor to exercise income moderation, they should start by exercising income moderation themselves.

California bankers, particularly, should not find it difficult to crank social purpose into their lending practices. If I remember right, you were the bankers who a half century ago decided that there was nothing wrong with making lots of scarce credit available to the outlandish moviemakers of Hollywood or winegrowers of the northern valleys. Both borrowers and lenders prospered.

Why do not you California bankers take the lead again? Why not allocate substantial portions of your lending power on the basis of social purpose, 1974 style? Who knows? The idea might spread through the banking community of the Nation, and on to business generally.

I hope you will give it a try. And if you do, as a member of the House Banking and Currency Committee, I will see that you get a hearty welcome and the best seats at the witness table.

FACTSHEET ON VANIK AMENDMENT TO H.R. 14462, OIL AND GAS ENERGY TAX ACT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. VANIK) is recognized for 5 minutes.

WHAT DOES THE VANIK AMENDMENT DO?

Mr. VANIK. Mr. Speaker, the amendment eliminates two tax preferences presently available to the petroleum industry on their foreign operations. First, it would repeal the option to expense intangible drilling costs on foreign wells, and second, it would change the foreign tax credits which are now available on foreign oil production income to business deductions. The amendment provides, however, that the tax credit on foreign oil and gas extraction income may be reinstituted through international tax agreements between the United States and the oil producing countries.

In the discussion of U.S. tax treatment of foreign income it is important to distinguish between a tax deduction—which is allowable, for example, for a royalty payment—and a tax credit, such as the foreign tax credit. A deduction has a smaller effect in reducing taxes than a tax credit. For example, a deduction of $100 from gross income—assuming a taxpayer's tax bracket of 48 percent—reduces the tax on that income by $48. However, a tax credit of $100 offsets completely $100 of the taxpayer's tax bill on his other income.

WHAT IS THE REVENUE IMPACT OF THE VANIK AMENDMENT?

Repeal of the intangible drilling expense on foreign wells will result in a revenue gain of $100 million per year. However, the committee bill provides for a complex tax formula which has roughly the same revenue impact.

Changing the foreign tax credit on foreign oil production to a business deduction will raise an additional $2 billion per year over the committee bill.

WHAT IS THE INTANGIBLE DRILLING EXPENSE?

Certain expenses in putting a well into production—such as labor, equipment rentals, repairs, fuel costs and the like—are considered intangible costs. Ordinarily, intangible drilling costs account for 75 percent of the total investment in a well. Under present oil tax law, these costs can be deducted for tax purposes as soon as they are incurred. The intangible drilling expense provision is an extraordinary benefit, because it allows the immediate tax-free recovery of investment capital. Most other taxpayers and industries must recover their investments through depreciation—bit by bit and year by year over the useful life of the capital asset. By allowing the intangible drilling expense on foreign wells, we are subsidizing foreign oil exploration—and the development of oil for the benefit of other Nations.

WHAT IS THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT?

The United States allows a credit against U.S. tax for taxes paid to foreign governments on income earned abroad. Only income taxes may be credited; other charges, such as royalties and excise taxes, are considered a cost of doing business which will be passed on to the consumer. No credit is permitted for these other forms of taxes.

There are two ways of calculating a taxpayer's foreign tax credits. First, there is the per country limitation under which a separate computation is made of the U.S. tax liability and the available tax credits for each separate foreign country where income is earned. Second, there is the overall limitation. Here, U.S. taxable income—and losses—from all foreign sources are pooled together along with all foreign income taxes. One aggregate computation of U.S. tax liability—and available foreign tax credits—is made on the taxpayer's total foreign operations.

Each method of computation has its benefits. Under the overall limitation, a taxpayer may shift excess credits from one high tax rate foreign country to a second low tax rate foreign country so as to avoid U.S. tax on worldwide operations. The per country limitation allows a taxpayer with a loss in a particular foreign country to deduct that loss against his U.S. domestic income for tax purposes.

The foreign tax credit can only be used to offset a U.S. tax liability on foreign source income. If a taxpayer accumulates foreign tax credits in 1 year which he cannot use, he may carry these credits forward for 5 years and back for 2 years.

HOW HAVE THE OIL COMPANIES ABUSED THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT?

There are two major abuses of the foreign tax credit provision by the oil companies.

First, using the per-country method of computing the foreign tax credit—which allows deductions against U.S. income of foreign losses—the oil companies have taken losses in their foreign exploration activities and deducted those losses against their U.S. income. Therefore, the American taxpayer is subsidizing 48 cents of every dollar spent to explore for oil abroad. The primary reason the oil companies can have so large a foreign loss to deduct is the intangible drilling expense we allow on foreign properties. This provision exaggerates losses in the early years of exploration before commercial production begins.

The second major abuse stems from a secret Treasury tax ruling in 1951 which provided that increased oil company pay-

ments to the producing countries would qualify as income taxes, fully creditable against U.S. taxes. This decision set in cement the present cooperative relationship between the oil companies and the producing countries. The foreign tax credit mechanism provides the conduit by which increased revenues flow from the pocket of the American consumer, through the oil companies and to the oil producing countries.

WHAT HAS WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE DONE?

To meet the abuse of per country loss deductions, the committee constructed a very complex formula—which includes elimination of the per country limitation and establishment of a recapture procedure—in an attempt to erase the foreign loss problem. Just from the standpoint of tax simplicity—which is a major necessity for tax reform—this proposal is a disaster. It spreads another layer of complexity over an already too complex area of our tax law.

To deal with the second abuse, the committee devised another formula limiting eligible credits for foreign taxes to 52.8 percent of income from oil and gas production. This device does little to solve the problems of existing law. It results in $300 million a year in added Treasury revenues—less than one-half of the revenue projected from the windfall profits tax provision on domestic profits in 1974.

IS VANIK AMENDMENT ELIMINATION OF THE INTANGIBLE DRILLING EXPENSE ON FOREIGN PROPERTIES JUSTIFIED?

Purely from the standpoint of tax simplicity, elimination of this provision would be justified. Elimination of foreign intangibles would have essentially the same tax impact as the committee bill, but would substitute a half a page of statutory language for 10 pages of the committee bill.

Beyond this fact, there is absolutely no reason to extend taxpayer subsidies to explore for additional reserves of foreign oil.

IS VANIK AMENDMENT ELIMINATION OF THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT ON OIL PRODUCTION INCOME JUSTIFIED?

Termination of the credit provision on foreign production income is justifiable for the following reasons:

1st. The Vanik amendment will not result in double taxation of the oil companies. The companies have encouraged the foreign countries to call what are really royalty payments—treated as tax deductions—foreign income taxes (treated as a credit against U.S. taxes). The companies have attempted to call these charges taxes—but that does not make them taxes. They must be considered as royalties and a cost of doing business abroad.

But the essential question in the controversy over the taxation of the foreign profits of the oil companies is not the academic debate between what is a tax and what is a royalty. In plain fact, no precise line will ever be drawn. The major issue is whether we should even be extending the privileges of the foreign tax credit to the oil companies.

The goal of tax neutrality—and its instrument, the foreign tax credit—is to eliminate tax considerations from international investment decisions. Given our goal of energy independence—and the unprecedented capital investment required to develop necessary domestic energy sources—it is a justifiable question to ask whether or not a foreign tax credit for oil production is in the national interest. Why should we not use our tax system to limit the attractiveness of foreign investment and increase the level of domestic investment?

Second. The oil companies have abused a privilege extended to them by the American taxpayer. By perverting the foreign tax credit provision, the oil companies have accumulated in every year since at least 1962, enough tax credits to eliminate U.S. tax liability on their foreign income. By the end of 1974, the companies will have accumulated $20 billion in excess, unusable foreign tax credits.

Third. Elimination of the foreign tax credit on extraction income would eliminate an outstanding taxpayer abuse, but would not jeopardize the principle of tax neutrality embodied in the foreign tax credit. The oil companies would still be eligible for credits on taxes paid on their income unrelated to the production of oil and natural gas:

Fourth. There is no evidence that this change would jeopardize our national interest, undermine the oil companies' competitive position, or reduce the flow of oil worldwide. The most significant results will be that the oil companies will pay more taxes and the revenues of the producing countries will decline. In addition, domestic investment will become more attractive relative to foreign investment.

SHOULD THE ISSUE OF FOREIGN TAX CREDITS FOR FOREIGN OIL PRODUCTION BE THE SUBJECT OF AN INTERNATIONAL TAX AGREEMENT?

Congress has the responsibility to declare a clear position on eliminating taxpayer subsidies to foreign oil production. At the same time, we must recognize that our domestic tax policies have become an important part of the cartel-controlled pricing system for world oil. The United States could encourage the establishment of an equitable international tax system for oil through the negotiation of a multinational tax agreement between the consuming and the producing countries. The United States has already negotiated over 20 international tax agreements dealing with important economic issues. The appeal of this approach is that these decisions are made in the open with full public debate and scrutiny—not—as presently—through a series of private administrative rulings.

I include the following:

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May 16, 15258—Analysis of Oil's Foreign Tax Preferences by Professor Glenn Jenkins, Harvard University.

RENEGOTIATION ACT OF 1951

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. GONZALEZ) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, the time has come for Congress to again consider the extension of the Renegotiaion Board. I am very much in favor of extending the Board and have perhaps been the most persistent supporter of the too often ignored agency. Its continued existence is tremendouly important because it remains an effective safeguard against the misuse of public funds, and fulfills the trust placed in Congress by the American people.

The Renegotiation Act has been around since the early fifties, but over the course of the years the Congress almost dismantled the Renegotiation Board completely. It was at this juncture in the late sixties when I became extremely interested because I thought to do away with the Board would be a serious error. At that time I appeared before the House Ways and Means Committee and presented extensive testimony in favor of continuing the Board. I have since appeared before the committee on several occasions to emphasize the need for its existence and for strengthening its power in the renegotiation process. At this point I am taking the liberty of inserting my remarks before the House Ways and Means Committee on Tuesday, May 14, in support of not only continuing the Board but recommending changes that would make it more effective.

EXTENSION OF THE RENEGOTIATION ACT OF 1951

(Testimony of Congressman Henry B. Gonzalez)

Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee:

I appreciate your giving me this opportunity to comment on the Renegotiation Act. I am cognizant of the enormous responsibilities of the Committee, and will not take a great deal of time.

I am sure that you know I have for several years supported the Renegotiation Act, and have twice appeared here to urge that the Act be extended. In 1969, and again last May—and today as well, I ask you to support extension of the Renegotiation Act. I believe that properly used, the Act affords the government real protection against potential abuses by its suppliers. The Renegotiation Act has worked well in the past, and it has been relatively effective even in recent years,

when the scope of the law has been considerably reduced. Today, I believe that the Act should be extended, not just for one year, but for five. And I believe that the Renegotiation Act should be strengthened so that the Renegotiation Board will be properly equipped to carry out its enormous task. What I am asking for is not a mere extension of the law, but a revitalization of the whole concept of renegotiation. It is a concept that has worked well, even in adverse circumstances. It will work very well if the Renegotiation Act is extended for a suitable length of time and its powers revitalized.

Public attention may be focused on great issues of the day, and the crisis of the moment. That is appropriate, and has always been the case. But the strength and vitality of any government depends on how well it carries out the small, daily tasks that confront it. Napoleon is said to have commented that an army moves on its stomach, and he was right. He knew that a great battle could never be joined, let alone won, if the generals did not have the efficient and effective management that alone makes it possible to move the army. The same is true today: our responsibility is not only to resolve fundamental issues, but to see that our government performs its routine essential functions as well as possible. So while there may be no great drama to the business of improving the procurement process, we should be aware that it is vitally important; it is a task upon which much depends.

General Washington was plagued by supply problems, and the business of providing for the revolutionary army and navy was one of the great problems of the Continental Congress. The Congress established a Commissary General in 1775.

From then until now the principles that guided procurement have remained the same: maximize competition, obtain reasonable prices, and assure that public officials are accountable for their actions. Today of course, the problems are enormously more complex. Our government is vastly expanded in size and scope. Government purchases today can have immense impact on local economies, and even on the national economy. Defense procurement is by far the biggest of all government buying, and the impact of a major military spending decision has substantial economic and political importance.

In military procurement there has always been the problem of assuring that suppliers provide what they promise, and that they do not take advantage of the government. Preventing excess profits has been a concern of Congress from the beginning. That is why we insisted on forcing revolutionary commissary officers from taking a percentage on the goods they bought—which was a common practice in those days. Congress correctly recognized that it was better to have a quartermaster who was responsible for supplying his troops rather than preoccupied with lining his pockets. And that is why we have insisted on competitive bidding. As far as 1934, in the Vinson-Trammell Act and 1936, in the Merchant Marine Act, Congress has attempted to prevent excessive profits in defense procurement.

In 1942, when the military establishment was being expanded at a fantastic rate, we enacted the Renegotiation Act as a means of recapturing excess profits. In the atmosphere of the day—with frantic buying of every conceivable kind of military goods, Congress understood that windfall profits ought to be recaptured whenever possible, and the Renegotiation Act was the means devised for this.

The Renegotiation Act expired in 1945, but Congress found it necessary to revive the law in 1948. The basic law covering renegotiation today was enacted in 1951, and we have extended it eleven times.

I believe that if we allow the Act to expire this year, history will repeat itself, and we will have to come back later to write a new Renegotiation Act, just as happened in 1948. Military procurement is so vast that windfall profits are going to happen, regardless of how careful the procurement officers are, or how complicated the regulations may become. And windfall profits in defense procurements may become. And windfall profits in defense procurement are no more desirable today than they were in 1942 or 1951.

The Commission on Government Procurement recognized this, and recommended that the Renegotiation Act be continued. I think that we ought to accept the judgment of this outstanding Commission, which performed the most thorough study of government procurement ever conducted. The Commission found the concept of renegotiation necessary and valid. That should be sufficient reason for us to extend this law, and strengthen it as necessary.

The Renegotiation Board has been very effective over the years. Altogether, it has made almost 4,500 determinations of excess profits, totalling $1,163 billion. In fiscal 1973 the Board found excessive profits of $28 million— and almost 91 per cent of that was reached through negotiation. The Board found it necessary to issue its excessive profit findings in only nine cases. Only three cases out of the 86 considered wound up in court appeals last year.

The Renegotiation Board has only 201 employees, and its expenses amount to only one-seventh of what the Board returned to the government last year.

The Board is doing what it should: it negotiates most of its cases, reaches an agreed settlement in the vast majority, and more than pays it own way. All of this shows that the Board is working as best it can under the circumstances. It deserves our support and its work ought to go on.

The nature of defense contracting makes an instrument like the Renegotiation Board absolutely necessary. Major contracts are frequently let by negotiation rather than bid. Even though both parties have the best intentions and make the best efforts, these contracts may result in windfall profits. The government undertakes generally to see that contractors don't go broke, and good sense requires that the government should be protected from excessive profits. Contractors ought to get a reasonable return, but excessive profits do not strengthen our defense nor in any way benefit the nation as a whole. If contractors have a right to be bailed out of trouble by the government, as many have, the taxpayer has a right to be protected from gouging, even innocent.

The work of the Renegotiation Board is not finished, nor will it ever be as long as military procurement remains a major function of our government's responsibilities. There is every reason to believe that the Renegotiation Act should be extended, and I recommend that it be extended for five years. A one year extension leaves the government and contractors alike in the dark about the intentions of Congress. A five year extension would give everyone clear notice of Congressional intent, and would strengthen the hand of the Board by giving it ample time to develop and implement policies. Under a short extension, no one would ever know what policies would or would not actually be carried into effect.

Presently, the Board, as the Committee has said, may be too subjective in its work. I believe that a five year extension would make possible for the Renegotiation Board to develop and carry out objective guidelines—which is impossible under existing conditions.

The business of determining excessive profits is enormously complicated. There is room for argument about the standards that should be applied. Many contracts involve unique products, or advances in technology; they may involve large amounts of government property and supplies; and they may involve differing accounting standards. But these are matters that can be resolved, given a Renegotiation Board with a clear mandate and unequivocal support of the Congress.

For example, contractors and the government alike are beginning to have the benefit of uniform cost accounting standards, thanks to the development of uniform standards that are being developed as a result of amendments to the 1968 Defense Production Act. I offered the amendment to create uniform cost accounting standards, following a recommendation advanced by Admiral Hyman Rickover. At the time many contractors said that this would be impossible. But the General Accounting Office said otherwise, and the Cost Accounting Standards Board is now developing sound accounting guidelines.

With this tool in hand, the Renegotiation Board will be equipped to render objective judgments. This is what the Committee wants, and now that this invaluable tool is available for the protection of the government and contractors, Congress should assure that it will be properly used—and that requires the continued existence of the Renegotiation Board.

In addition to the uncertainty of its continued existence, the Renegotiation Board is hampered by a growing backlog of cases that have been appealed to the courts. The number of cases resulting in litigation is small—less than ten per cent, but unless these appeals are disposed of expeditiously, the Board functions in an uncertain legal atmosphere; it does not know which of its actions may be overruled. I believe that speedy disposition of these appeals can be obtained by returning the appeals jurisdiction to the Tax Court. Further, I believe that the Tax Court should have judges assigned to the specific task of dealing with renegotiation appeals. In this way, the government and contractors alike can have the advantage of quick settlement of any dispute. The board and contractors both would benefit considerably from having the shortest possible backlog of litigation. As matters now stand, the growing uncertainty of what the courts might rule forces the Renegotiation Board to operate in more subjective ways, which is unfair to it and to contractors alike—and contrary to the intent of Congress. I believe that the work of the Board could be greatly enhanced by again giving the Tax Court jurisdiction over appeals.

Mr. Chairman, the concept of renegotiation has stood the test of time. Congress found it necessary to restore the Renegotiation Act the one time it was allowed to lapse; I believe we would again find it necessary if the Act expires this year.

I believe that a five year extension would allow the Renegotiation Board to become much more effective, by giving it a clear mandate, and time to develop and implement effective policies. The new availability of uniform cost accounting will make it possible for the Board to function much more objectively than is now possible, even though it already is able to resolve the vast majority of its cases without resorting to issuing unilateral findings, and seldom is confronted with court appeals. Further, the uncertainty posed by court appeals backlogs can be removed by returning jurisdiction over these appeals to the Tax Court.

Most of what I have said underscores one

vital thing: that the responsibility of Congress it to remove the uncertainties that now surround the Renegotiation Act. By making it certain that the Act is going to be around for five years, Congress can make it clear to the contractors that windall profits are going to be discouraged. By that same act, the Board should begin to make effective use of new tools like uniform cost accounting, and develop the sound guidelines that everyone recognizes are needed. And we can help the Board and contractors alike by insuring that appeals do not build up into lengthy backlogs which are unfair to everyone concerned; all parties need to be more certain of their legal ground than they are now—and this is a problem that the Board is helpless to solve, since it is a matter of court operations over which it has no control whatever.

I urge the Committee to extend the Renegotiation Act, revitalize the work of the Renegotiation Board, and act to remove whatever uncertainties that now exist about this unique and essential tool of government. It may seem a small thing, but history will show that the strongest government is one that excels in carrying out the small, daily, vital tasks of management. If it fails in this, no government can be prepared to meet the great challenges when they arise. Strength comes from daily discipline. Weakness comes from inattention to details—little things like this necessary task of insuring that the government is protected from windfall profits at the hands of its suppliers.

HEARINGS SCHEDULED ON EXTENSION OF RECORD PIRACY LAW

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. KASTENMEIER) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary has scheduled a public hearing to begin at 10 a.m. on Friday, June 7, 1974, in room 2226, Rayburn House Office Building, on my bill H.R. 13364, a bill to amend title 17 of the United States Code to remove the expiration date provided in Public Law 92–140 which authorized the creation of a limited copyright in sound recordings for the purpose of protecting against unauthorized duplication and piracy of sound recordings; to increase the criminal penalties for piracy and counterfeiting of sound recordings; and for other purposes, and related measures.

Enactment of H.R. 13364 will prevent the limited copyright in sound recordings, that was newly created by Public Law 92–140, from lapsing automatically on December 31, 1974.

The purpose of inserting the automatic expiration clause in that public law was to provide a period for further consideration of alternative solutions to problems in this area, before resorting to permanent legislative enactment. This was done in the hope that by January 1, 1975, the protection of sound recordings would be part of an overall copyright law revision.

It now appears questionable whether copyright revision can be enacted by both Houses of Congress during the present year. Enactment of H.R. 13364 is needed to prevent the automatic lapse of the protection of sound recordings accorded by Public Law 92–140.

H.R. 13364 also contains provisions increasing the penalty for infringing sound recordings willfully and for profit, and for knowingly and fraudulently transporting records carrying counterfeit labels. Whether the amount of these increases in penalties is justified and, if not, what changes should be made, will be developed at the hearing.

Government witnesses are expected to express the views of the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce and the Librarian of Congress on the legislation.

PRESIDENTIAL LANGUAGE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. WAGGONNER) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr. Speaker, I believe a recent editorial from the Shreveport Journal for May 13 speaks for itself on the need for sensible consideration of the facts contained in the Watergate transcripts.

In the light of the recent accusations against the President, it seems appropriate to reevaluate the moral indignation aroused in some circles and put it into perspective with the real issue at hand, that of impeachable crimes.

The article, while brief, echoes my feelings on the subject:

PRESIDENTIAL LANGUAGE

Many anti-Nixon writers and broadcasters have taken offense at the barracks-room language used by President Nixon on the taped conversations in the White House. Assuming that the expletives deleted are what we think they are, the President is using language in the presence of grown men which is almost as bad as your teenage daughter might hear in a movie or read in a magazine.

Of course the President knew such words a long time before they began to be used in the motion picture theatres or in the widely-circulated magazines. Your teen-age daughter might not have.

We regret that bad language was used in the White House. We don't think that four-letter words add anything to the grace, beauty and utility of the language no matter where they are used. But it's a lot worse to use such language on the screen and in popular magazines than it is to speak it in the privacy of one's office.

HOUSING

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. METCALFE) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. METCALFE. Mr. Speaker, the inability of low- and moderate-income homeowners to maintain their homes is often due to a lack of financial resources and to the discriminatory loan practices of many financial institutions. This has been one of the major problems confronting those who are attempting to halt deterioration of our communities. Another major problem is the poor administration of Federal housing programs, as most recently evidenced by the Federal Housing Administration scandals.

On April 30, I introduced a housing bill, H.R. 14475, which is designed to correct these two problems. I am today reintroducing this bill with 25 cosponsors. Title I of this bill would establish within the Department of Housing and Urban Development a direct, low-interest loan program to assist low- and moderate-income homeowners in the maintenance and improvement of their homes. Title II would provide for an annual General Accounting Office review of the Department's housing program. This bill would provide some of the funds needed to arrest the deterioration of our communities, especially in inner-city and rural areas, and also would provide an additional tool for the Congress in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the Federal Government's housing programs. A detailed outline of the provisions of H.R. 14475 appears in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for April 30, on page 12437.

Two recent articles illustrate the great need for this type of legislation. The first article appeared in a publication prepared by the National Urban Coalition entitled "The Urban Agenda: An Action Plan for the 1970's." It details the process of disinvestment in inner-city areas which leads to a deterioration of these areas. The second article appears in the May 20, 1974, issue of Newsweek and concerns the recently disclosed Federal Housing Administration scandals. H.R. 14475 is intended to help correct the situations described in these articles. I am sure that my colleagues will find them to be informative and enlightening and I include these articles at this point in the RECORD:

THE URBAN AGENDA: AN ACTION PLAN FOR THE 1970'S

REMEDIES FOR RED-LINING

Absentee landlords, withdrawal of municipal services, high numbers of tenant-occupied housing, deteriorating residential structures, failing businesses—are all elements of the picture of a declining neighborhood. Each one is the harbinger of the abandoned or near abandoned neighborhood—common forces which determine the future viability of a neighborhood.

The unseen enemy is the practice commonly known as red-lining adopted by most financial institutions in the nation's metropolitan areas. The practice is one of the first steps in disinvestment in central city neighborhoods. Red-lined neighborhoods are ones viewed by financial institutions as high risk areas which will not give them a return on their investment. Homeowners and businessmen in these areas find it difficult or impossible to obtain loans, or face high interest rates, high down payment requirements and short term loans.

Reasons for red-lining range from blatant racial discrimination to anticipation of the saturation of a market with no opportunity for future growth. Red-lining has never been an open policy by banks—rather it has been covert, difficult to pin down. The result of this policy is that home mortgages are not refinanced for rehabilitation work, people don't want to move in because they can't get financing, the basic confidence in the neighborhood becomes undermined and businesses move elsewhere.

In a short time, red-lining because of potential "high risk" becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. And so the neighborhood begins its decline. Block busting practices take over as hungry profiteers seek to gain by buying cheap and selling dear. As money changes hands, realtors, mortgage bankers, savings and loan associations and other lenders make money. Money is made through commissions, broker's fees, "points" and servicing fees. Poor people pay for inferior housing at inflated rates and then find they cannot obtain financing or afford to rehabilitate the property.

Gail Cincotta, director of the Housing Training and Information Center in Chicago has been working in the area of disinvestment for a number of years. Ms. Cincotta, a member of the National Urban Coalition's Task Force on Housing, Urban Growth and Transportation, describes the ultimate results of red-lining:

"The neighborhood is turned over in a few years. Since homes with FHA mortgages are insured, the institutions holding them have no incentive to get the owner to keep up the property. Unable to refinance and improve their properties, owners of large apartment buildings maneuver for a short term, last minute return on their investments by overcrowding the properties, decreasing maintenance and increasing rents and sale prices. Real estate then reaches a state where it can no longer be sold or refinanced. Deterioration spirals as maintenance declines. As businesses and the socially mobile move out of the neighborhood, only the severely deprived remain. City services decline, housing code enforcement is dropped; building abandonment increases, as does crime. Home and property insurance become nearly impossible to get."

In the end, the entire area is "renewed" for upper middle and more affluent people and the poor and working class are shunted off to yet another neighborhood on its way down.

HOUSING: THE FHA SCANDALS

The scandal has gone nearly unnoticed because of Watergate, but it is considerable in its own right. It has tarnished the image of a government agency—the Federal Housing Administration—that has helped finance millions of U.S. home buyers in the last four decades by insuring their mortgages. Since the troubles started to surface, the former top FHA official in Philadelphia has been jailed and 26 persons have been sentenced to prison in Detroit. In Chicago, two former officials of Kaufman & Broad, a large U.S. home builder, have pleaded "no contest" to charges of bribing FHA inspectors with cash and cases of liquor. The FHA finally had to close a scandal-rocked office in Hempstead, N.Y.—and the man sent to clean up the mess later admitted to being on the take himself.

Nearly everyone, it seems, has been cheating the old FHA, mostly in connection with the sale of ghetto housing to the poor. Federal investigations throughout the country have turned up hundreds of similar but unconnected cases of conniving among FHA employees, builders, real-estate speculators and mortgage bankers to defraud the housing agency. So far, 239 defendants have been convicted and 227 others are under indictment. Meanwhile, the FHA has been stuck with thousands of homes, many of which it may never be able to sell in the marketplace.

COSMETICS

Most of the schemes worked much the same way. Typically, a builder buys a run-down inner-city dwelling for $10,000 and spends $2,000 on cosmetic repairs. He then finds a low-income buyer who qualifies for the FHA's $200-down-payment terms, and he bribes an FHA appraiser to to put an inflated value of $18,000 on the home. The FHA then insures a $17,800 mortgage on the dwelling. So the builder ends up being paid $18,000 for a dwelling that cost him only $12,000. He pockets the difference—less the bribes he paid—as profit.

The unwary buyer soon finds that he has purchased a lemon. His furnace breaks down, or faulty plumbing that had been "repaired" with tape begins leaking. Few buyers have the money to make proper repairs. Some simply move out. Others stop paying their mortgages, and the houses then become the nearly worthless property of the FHA.

Experts say that the FHA became an easy prey for the con men when Congress ordered it to subsidize housing for the poor after the inner-city riots of 1967 and 1968. Up to that time, its experience had been in middle-income housing, where most prospective buyers were sophisticated enough to know a dilapidated house when they saw one. Operations had been so trouble-free, in fact, that the agency had a poor system for policing its appraisers and inspectors.

Even without fraud, the low-income program was headed for problems, claims Assistant Secretary H. R. Crawford of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, who now labels the whole scheme a "terrible mistake." "It makes no sense to sell houses to welfare families," he told NEWSWEEK's Tom Joyce. "They don't have the means to take care of them." In addition to the buyers who abandoned homes that had been sold fraudulently, many more moved simply because they couldn't afford to keep up the dwellings or because the neighborhood began to deteriorate. FHA says that the great majority of the 77,000 homes it has had to take over in the last five years weren't connected with any fraud.

The government's low-income-housing efforts now have all but ended—last week's Federal infusion of more than $10 billion into the sagging mortgage market, for instance, was clearly aimed at the middle-income area—but there remains the problem of the thousands of foreclosed properties on the FHA's books. These homes cost the agency $432,740 each day in such expenses as taxes and vandalism repairs. In Detroit alone, the cost of repairing, reselling or razing 15,000 dwellings is expected to run as high as $400 million. An FHA official in that city points out that the FHA typically has to pay off a $15,000 mortgage whenever it takes over a home. If it is to be resold, the house needs about $8,000 in repairs. The cost of taxes, security, vandalism and other expenses totals nearly $7,000 more. There is no way these costs can be recovered in the resale market.

SKIMMING

If that weren't enough, the FHA has its share of other problems. Private companies increasingly are skimming off the low-risk mortgage-guarantee business. Many builders and real-estate dealers avoid FHA-backed loans because of the increasing amount of bureaucratic paperwork involved. And of maximum allowable interest rate on FHA loans consistently lags behind other interest rates, discouraging institutions that might lend money under FHA guarantees. But there's hope that these problems will be alleviated by the $10.3 billion the Administration plans to pump into the mortgage market through loans to savings and loan associations, stepped-up buying of existing mortgages and an increase in subsidized mortgages.

Officials at the FHA and at the Department of Housing and Urban Development, its parent agency, also hope that the worst of the scandals are behind them. HUD Assistant Secretary Sheldon Lubar last week even tried to make light of what has already happened. "There has been only 40 indictments [of FHA employees]," he said at a news conference. As reporters guffawed, he added quickly that "any amount is unacceptable." While the worst shocks may indeed be past, the unacceptable numbers are certain to keep mounting. Investigations are still going strong in 21 cities. What's more, 139,000 more houses with FHA insurance are now in default, and it is estimated that about 70 per cent of these will be added to FHA's inventory of distressed merchandise.

MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH PROGRAMS

(Mr. KOCH asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Speaker, last year we fought the successful fight to keep in existence the children and youth and maternal and infant care programs which are funded under title V of the Social Security Act. That fight will be lost through an administrative device if we do not provide full funding for these programs. HEW has not requested the appropriate funds for these programs.

Dr. Fred Seligman, director of the Association of Children and Youth Directors, testified last Friday before the Labor/HEW Appropriations Subcommittee on fiscal year 1975 appropriations for title V. I would like to submit for the information of our colleagues his very excellent testimony:

TESTIMONY OF FRED SELIGMAN, M.D.

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee on Labor, Health, Education and Welfare. My name is Fred Seligman, M.D., M.P.H., Director, Division of Comprehensive Health Care, Associate Professor of Pediatrics and Assistant Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Miami School of Medicine, Miami, Florida. I am Chairman of the Association of Children and Youth Project Directors. In this capacity, I represent the staffs of the sixty-eight Children and Youth Projects throughout the United States and the more than ½ million children and youth served by these programs. I am also representing the Maternity and Infant Care Project Directors. My remarks are also on behalf of the Ambulatory Pediatric Association, a national association of more than 700 professionals primarily from the discipline of Pediatrics. This Association is the major organization that is concerned with medical education and health services to children in the outpatient setting.

My remarks are additionally on behalf of the American Public Health Association, the nation's major national public health organization which has over 25,000 active members from all health disciplines.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to present our views concerning fiscal year 1975 HEW appropriations for Maternal and Child Health Programs, and to present to you testimony concerning the status of the extraordinarily successful special project grants under Title V of the Social Security Act. We will limit our comments primarily to the appropriations relating to Secs. 503 and 516 of Title V. The wisdom of the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee in developing the special project grants of Title V, and the subsequent fiscal support of both this Subcommittee and the Senate Subcommittee on

HEW Appropriations have had meaningful impact on the delivery of needed health services to more than one million pregnant women, infants, children and teenagers.

SUCCESS OF SPECIAL PROJECTS

The accomplishments of the special projects have been extensive and have been well documented. Infant mortality rates in geographical areas served by Maternity and Infant Care Projects have been significantly reduced. These Projects have been so successful in this regard, that it is easy to forget that in the not too distant past, there were target areas, especially urban, with inordinately high infant mortality rates. Children and Youth Projects have developed an extraordinarily successful reporting system that has documented decreasing costs of care per patient and significant reduction in rates of hospitalization.

BASIC TO A NATIONAL HEALTH PLAN

The special projects have emphasized comprehensiveness, quality control and evaluation. Cost benefits, community involvement and educational spin-offs have been great. The special projects have laid a framework on which a National Health Plan can be built. Indeed, many of the prominent legislative proposals for National Health Insurance now being considered by Congress build upon the existing Title V programs.

LINKAGES TO OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

As much as local options and funds have been available the special projects have attempted to develop linkages to other health organizations. Special projects such as the Children and Youth Project at Brooklyn Jewish Hospital have developed services for adults utilizing neighborhood health center funding. The University of Miami program has a contractual arrangement to provide health services to Head Start children. The Greensboro, North Carolina Children and Youth Project is one of many special projects that has received funds from the Department of Agriculture to operate a supplemental feeding program. Some special projects are linked to University Affiliated Centers that specialize in mental retardation and handicapping conditions. Most projects have linkages to Crippled Children's Programs that receive funds through Sec. 509 of Title V. Others relate closely to drug rehabilitation programs, community mental health centers and other specialized programs.

TRANSITION TO STATE AUTHORITY

This past year has been and continues to be a difficult year for the special projects, especially those projects which exist in highly urban states such as Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylvania, because of the transition of special project grants from federal to state authority.

VIEWPOINT OF THE PRESIDENT'S HEALTH ADVISOR

In spite of the fact that the Administration's intent has been to transfer funding for the special projects from direct to formula grants, even the Administration has acknowledged the success and value of the special projects. One year ago I had the privilege to discuss the status of these programs with Dr. James Cavanaugh, the President's Special Advisor for Health. At that time, it was Dr. Cavanaugh's opinion that the special projects of Title V have been "the most successful of all health programs in this Administration."

INCREASE IN NUMBER OF PROJECTS

Because of the transition of special projects to formula grants, the number of Children and Youth and Maternity and Infant Care Projects will commencing July 1, 1974 actually increase in number. All states will now be required to operate at least one of these projects, along with the three other special projects—namely, Dental Projects for Children, Intensive Neonatal Projects and Family Planning Projects. In fact, beginning July 1, 1974 one hundred and sixty-two new special projects will be initiated. The number of new projects will actually be greater than the some 150 special projects now in existence.

HOLD HARMLESS PROVISIONS

On June 30, 1973, mindful of the problems of transition of authority, Congress passed PL 93–53 amending Title V by adding a new Section 516. I need not remind this subcommittee of the hold-harmless legislation of PL 93–53. Section 516 (a) (1) (A) authorizes hold harmless legislation for the population groups being served by special projects and Section 516 (b) (1) (A) authorizes the appropriations to implement this, commencing in fiscal year 1975.

HEW FISCAL ESTIMATES

This Subcommittee is well aware of HEW estimates indicating that approximately $30 million of additional funds were necessary to implement the hold harmless clause in fiscal year 1974 and that in fiscal year 1975, this would be $36 million.

We appreciate the difficult decision that this Subcommittee faced last November in considering the $30 million suggested by this Subcommittee's Senate counterpart for HEW Maternal and Child Health 1974 supplemental appropriations. Even though the need for $30 million had been projected at the time this Subcommittee considered this request, a significant portion of the current fiscal year had elapsed. Further, the States held harmless in 1974 had a lag period while developing plans and staff for new projects.

As we approach July 1, the situation is entirely different. Firstly, a different group of states in fiscal year 1975 come under the hold harmless provision.

Secondly, all states are now ready and able to start the additional special projects required by law. A minimum of 250 special projects are required by PL 93–53. New monies are needed to start these projects.

Mr. Chairman, special projects already in existence in urban states face a dismal picture unless your Subcommittee sees the wisdom of increasing the Maternal and Child Health appropriations. HEW has attempted to juggle its distribution formula so that the impact on any particular state would be minimal. However, HEW cannot alter this dismal picture without additional funds.

Allow me to cite some specific examples of insufficient funding. Our own Children and Youth Program at the University of Miami School of Medicine serves 7,200 patients. In fiscal year 1974, we received $765,000 from HEW. We have made as much use of third-party monies as possible. Because of the restrictive nature of Title XIX payments in providing limited reimbursement for preventive services, we are only able to collect about $30,000 yearly from third party payments. To maintain our present operational level in fiscal year 1975, we will require a budget appropriation from HEW of approximately $840,000. Our staff currently consists of approximately 75 full time staff equivalents. Yet our project allotment of HEW funds from the State of Florida will be $571,000 and this amount is already based on a shift of $18 million from Sec. 503 (formula funds) to Sec. 516 (supplemental funds) as recommended in the President's budget. This is a budget reduction of more than 25% in spite of a significant increase in operating costs. Unless we can receive additional funds very soon, we will have to release more than ⅓ of our staff—dedicated and expert professionals—and discharge some 2,500–3,000 child patients from our program. Special projects in New York State will be even more severely affected by the budgetary reduction of 40% planned for July 1.

An exodus of qualified professionals, who do not have the confidence of program continuity, has already started to occur in special projects. Many projects do not have Project Directors. Some professionals are transferring to those states that will be developing special projects. Sponsoring institutions do not have the necessary financing to subsidize these programs. Our own institution, the University of Miami, receives no indirect costs for project operation.

All this is occurring amidst the discussion and probable passage in the foreseeable future of a National Health Insurance Plan. Many of the proposals currently under consideration not only leave Title V intact but build on it. Certain of the proposals will actually expand existing Title V Programs.

OUR POSITION CONCERNING SECTION 516

The Administration has recommended $7 million be appropriated for the 1975 supplemental provisions of Sec. 516. Another $10.4 million of released impounded funds should also become available solely, of course, for 1975. This leaves a shortfall of approximately $19 million. We disagree with the Administration's proposal to alleviate the shortfall of the hold-harmless provision by transferring $18 million from Sec. 503 to 516.

We strongly believe this is not within the spirit and intent of PL 93–53. We do not advocate compromising the needed formula funds required for Sec. 503. We do not ask you to rob Peter to pay Paul. We ask you to appropriate a minimum of $19 million for the special projects under Sec. 516.

This additional appropriation is absolutely needed. It is a minimum. It means that special projects in many states will still receive less funds than they have received in 1974. The requirement of beginning 162 new special projects will cut into the ongoing operating budgets of both formula fund and supplemental fund programs. For example, in my State, three new special projects must be started in order for Florida to have acceptable comprehensive State plan as required by legislation. Florida plans to expend an addition $900,000 to begin these three special projects. These funds will have to come from already reduced allocations to the State. Thus the special projects already in existence will receive reduced funding even with full supplemental appropriations.

NEEDS OF NEW PROJECTS

Additionally, we urge this Subcommittee to reconsider the formula grant level of Sec. 503. Based on an estimate of $½ million per new special project, $81 million will ultimately be required to develop the 162 projects as the legislation requires. We propose phased funding over the next three years, and accordingly urge this Subcommittee to appropriate one third of this amount in fiscal year 1975. Therefore, we propose that this Subcommittee increase the current appropriation level of Sec. 503 by $27 million.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, I have appeared before this Subcommittee previously. The Association of Children and Youth Project Directors have fought continuously year by year for the survival of these programs. Many of us have spent inordinate efforts in maintaining financial solvency rather than spending our time developing even stronger program operations. We seek and need your support. We ask you to appropriate the necessary $19 million required to hold harmless the special projects already in existence. Further, this should be accomplished without taking monies from other needed Maternal and Child Health Programs. All of us at the

operational level wish to once again move forward in our mission of providing quality health services to low income mothers and children. We ask you to appropriate sufficient funds to allow all Maternal and Child Health Programs, general and special, in all states, urban and rural, large and small, to maintain the delivery framework that has been developed, so that we can ultimately merge into a Comprehensive National Health Plan.

We are in great desire of this Subcommittee's continued commitment to maternal and child health. This is needed immediately before professional staffs and patients become further disillusioned. This can be accomplished by immediate affirmative action by your Subcommittee as we have recommended.

AN IRONY IN MARINE RECRUITMENT POLICY

(Mr. KOCH asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Speaker, on February 21, 1974, in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, I discussed the case of Igor Bobrowsky in his fight for admission to the Marine Corps Officer Candidate School. I will not restate all of the facts concerning his matter since they are set forth at length in my prior CONGRESSIONAL RECORD statement. The crux of his case is that in answering a questionnaire after his conditional acceptance, he did not lie when undoubtedly many others responding to the question lied and were accepted. The question asked of him when applying to the MCOCS was, "Have you ever used LSD, marihuana, opiates, and so forth?" to be answered "yes" or "no." Igor Bobrowsky, a combat soldier in Vietnam, had used marihuana on approximately six occasions in Vietnam and no other drugs. For this reason and this reason alone he was denied admission to the MCOCS. Last week there appeared in two separate papers—the Washington Post and the New York Post—articles which bear upon this matter. The Washington Post article of May 16 reports that the Marine Corps is having trouble recruiting for its ranks in the policy goal of an all-volunteer service. It reports:

The latest monthly recruitment statistics released by the Pentagon yesterday show that in April the Marines were only able to get 45 percent of the 3,750 new recruits they sought.

The New York Post in its editorial of May 17 commented on the same subject and mentions the Igor Bobrowsky case.

The additional correspondence which I have had with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the White House is appended along with the two newspaper articles, including my letter of today's date asking for reconsideration of this matter. While it appears hopeless, perhaps reasonableness will prevail and Secretary of Defense, Schlesinger or the White House or both will reconsider this matter.

The articles follow:

[From the Washington Post, May 16, 1974]

MARINES HAVE TROUBLE GETTING ENOUGH RECRUITS TO FILL QUOTA

(By Michael Getler)

The Marine Corps is having trouble finding those "few good men" the recruitment posters and bumper stickers say are needed to fill the ranks in the era of the draft-free military.

The latest monthly recruitment statistics released by the Pentagon yesterday show that in April the Marines were only able to get 45 per cent of the 3,750 new recruits they sought.

While attention over the 16 months since the last man was drafted has focused on the Army, Pentagon statistics now reveal that the Marine Corps—with a much smaller force—is virtually certain to have a shortage about the same size as the Army's in terms of manpower and several times larger in terms of the percentage of its total force.

The April shortage pushes the Marines some 3,000 men below their goal for the fiscal year 1974, which ends June 30. Pentagon officials now say their best estimate is that the Marines will wind up the fiscal year with 6,000 to 10,000 fewer men in the ranks than planned. That represents a shortage of between 3.1 and 5.1 per cent in the goal of a 196,000-man corps.

The Army is estimated to be heading for about a 7,000-man shortage by June 30, only about 0.9 per cent short of the authorized 782,000-man level.

What is causing problems for the Marines, as Corps and Pentagon officials see it, is last year's congressionally mandated requirement that all the services take no fewer than 55 per cent of their recruits from the ranks of high school graduates. The idea was to insure that a draft-free military still maintained a reasonably high standard of formalized education within the ranks, and that it did not become a "poor man's" army.

The restriction has proved little problem for the Air Force and Navy. The Army has managed, through April, to reach the 54 per cent level, but the Marines are still only at the 50 per cent level.

The reason for the sharp April drop is that 99 per cent of the 1,670 men who signed up were high school graduates as the corps struggled to meet the requirement. The Marines essentially were unable to accept anyone else.

The legislation was originated last year within the House Appropriations Committee. This year, the Pentagon—with considerable support from the House Armed Services Committee and some others in Congress who feel that the restrictions discriminate against minority groups that may have less opportunity to make it through high school—are trying to get it changed.

Thus far, however, efforts led in the House by Chairman F. Edward Hebert (D-La.) of the Armed Services Committee have been stymied on legistiative technicalities by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.).

Kennedy, and many others, feel strongly that the military will indeed become an outfit with too high a portion of poor and less privileged young men.

If these efforts remain stalled, the first chance for new legislation would not come until the new fiscal 1975 budget is ready for final action by Congress. With no relief from the legislation this fiscal year, the Pentagon estimates that the Marine Corps shortage could run to between 8,000 and 12,000 men. With some relief during the final two months of fiscal 1974, it could drop to a shortage of 4,000 to 8,000.

Despite problems with the high school requirements, senior Defense Department officials say they are not alarmed about eventually reaching the authorized manpower levels.

The same legislation that places restrictions on high school graduates also requires that the services do not take more than 18 per cent of their recruits, from the lowest mental category as measured in service acceptance tests.

The Marines, however, chose to impose a 10 per cent limit of their own. Thus, if the Corps can satisfy the 55 per cent figure, it can probably fill up the ranks by taking more of the so-called category-four recruits.

[From the New York Post, May 17, 1974]

UNWANTED MARINE?

According to the recruiting literature available around town, the U.S. Marines "are looking for a few good men." Unfortunately, a few seem to be what they're getting; enlistments are substantially off.

There are apparently a number of reasons for the shortage of boots—interservice competition for manpower is a prime factor—and no doubt many a staff conference will be held on the subject. One of them should take up the case of Igor Bobrowsky.

Bobrowsky, as readers of this newspaper may remember from several articles about him, is a Marine veteran of Vietnam decorated for his service, who has patiently sought a commission in the Corps. His academic record is as impressive as the one he made in the enlisted ranks. He would doubtless be commanding men today if he had not, in answer to an enlistment questionnaire, admitted to having smoked marijuana several times while in Vietnam.

For this "offense," he was rejected for officer training. Although Rep. Koch (D-N.Y.) has taken the case to both Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and the White House, Bobrowsky's pleas have been so far spurned.

He is ready, willing and unusually able to serve as a Marine officer. The Corps obviously needs that kind of man. What possible excuse can there be for holding things up?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., March 27, 1974.

HON. EDWARD I. KOCH,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. KOCH: The Secretary of Defense has asked me to reply to your inquiries regarding Mr. Bobrowsky. He has taken a personal interest in this matter and has directed that a thorough review be made of the handling of Mr. Bobrowsky's case.

In reviewing Mr. Bobrowsky's appeal, we examined his individual situation in the total context of the Department's manpower needs and the Services' standards on drug use. I believe the following comments are appropriate.

The U.S. Marine Corps for years has had a firmly established regulation against active duty personnel using marijuana. Mr. Bobrowsky was aware of that regulation while he was on active duty in Vietnam. He admits to breaking the regulation by using marijuana on several occasions in Vietnam. Moreover, Mr. Bobrowsky is near the maximum age limit for candidates to Officer Candidate School and, in addition, he would require a dependency waiver for admission to the school.

It was the judgment of the U.S. Marine Corps that the above factors resulted in a situation in which Mr. Bobrowsky was considered to be less qualified than other applicants for Officer Candidate School. My personal review of the record indicated no persuasive reason to recommend that the Secretary overrule the U.S. Marine Corps decision in this particular case, and he has concurred in that judgment.

However, the Secretary is concerned over the issue raised by this case. He recognizes that some significant fraction of potential enlistees and officer candidates has had some exposure to marijuana. We should not automatically deny these men and women the opportunity to serve nor should we deny ourselves the opportunity to avail ourselves of the qualifications of these individuals.

Here it is essential to draw a clear distinction between the treatment of those who have used marijuana in a limited or experimental fashion *prior* to their application for Service and those who have used marijuana while on active duty in disregard of Service regulations.

The Secretary also believes that this distinction must be balanced against the danger that an easing of enlistment criteria by the Services might encourage the widespread use of marijuana among those serving on active duty.

As a result of his interest in a just application of Service regulations, the Secretary has instructed me to conduct a review of Service regulations regarding the prior use of marijuana in evaluating volunteers for the Services.

Thank you for your personal interest in this matter.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM K. BREHM.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., April 17, 1974.

President RICHARD M. NIXON
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Enclosed is the letter from Mr. Igor Bobrowsky. I support his application and I am bringing it to your attention because we have exhausted all other sources of help. The facts are stated in his letter and the enclosures so I shall not repeat them. The *Congressional Record* statement contains the pertinent correspondence. The latest letter from Assistant Secretary William Brehm has turned down his application but appears to recognize the problem and procedures may be worked-out in the future for others but that doesn't help Igor.

I know of your concern for Viet Nam veterans and Igor deserves whatever you and I can do.

Sincerely,

EDWARD I. KOCH.

NEW YORK, N.Y., *April 9, 1974.*

President RICHARD M. NIXON,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I believe that the enclosed material will adequately explain my predicament as of September 1973. Having initially turned to, and exhausted, all available Marine Corps channels, I turned to my Congressman and Senators—initially for advice and ultimately in the hope of receiving a fair hearing and a redress of my case. Subsequently the matter was brought to the attention of the Marine Commandant, the Secretary of the Navy, and most recently the Secretary of Defense. As you can see from the enclosed material, all of these efforts have proved to be equally futile. Ironically, in the last letter from the Secretary of Defense, even the recognition of the basic inequity of this policy and a commitment to re-examine this policy with a view to modifying it has not been found to be sufficient justification for changing the ruling in my case. In a situation generally not lacking in ironies, perhaps the final one is that the rejection from the Secretary of Defense arrived on the day established by your office for honoring the Vietnam Veteran, and only a day before you spoke to the nation about the need for offering the veterans more than just words.

Mr. President, the fact that the Secretary of Defense has shown enough interest in this matter to commit himself to review and modify existing policy is most gratifying to me. Indeed, one of the major reasons for my persistence in this matter has been the knowledge that this policy, if unchanged, would continue to deprive men of their goals and our country of a wealth of human resources in the future as it has done in the past. However, I found it interesting to note that, even in conceding the need for changing existing policy, the Secretary of Defense draws a distinction between attitudes to be adapted to those with prior in-service experience as opposed to those with non-service-connected marijuana experience: granting the benefit of doubt and a chance for proving themselves to the latter while denying the same opportunity to men who, despite a momentary lapse, have already proven themselves—having served adequately, well, or even exceptionally. I would think, sir, that if anyone deserved the benefit of a doubt, it would be the men who had already shown their capabilities and earned the right to be judged by more than the incidental and insulting criterion of past marijuana use. To seemingly prejudice policy against the veteran in this way appears to me an inversion of reason. It is a concession of particular bitterness to one who has long regarded the military profession as the most meaningful way to developing oneself to the fullest, and thus, ultimately, contributing one's best to society.

I have always believed that personal knowledge and personal growth are the keys to potential worth, and have read and studied with that potential worth in mind. In addition to readings in geography, political science, classical history, current events, etc., I have chosen my formal studies with the view to making me a more fully educated human being, and consequently, a finer officer in a complex, crucial time, needful of educated leadership. Thus, I have studied literature to give me some depth as a human being, read history in the hope that it would help me to see outlines of the future through knowledge of the past, and I have studied Russia because I firmly believe that like no other nation on earth, she shares with us the responsibility for the future of our collective civilization—and not to know and understand her as well as we know and understand ourselves is to invite our mutual destruction by our individual ignorance.

On the less theoretical side, you have my SRB and the recommendations of my former officers and friends. In examining the former you will find that I went from responsibility for a fire team of four men to that of a Combined Action Platoon (with direct responsibility for the lives of some fifty-sixty Marines and Vietnamese) in a matter of weeks. It has been strange for me to discover that the same Marine Corps that gave me responsibility for hamlets full of people and trusted me with the lives of a platoon of men directly, and some hundreds of lives indirectly, will not trust me now because I erred in having frankly stumbled on to an uncomfortable truth—and will not grant me the opportunity of developing the potential it recognized in me previously.

I will not trouble you longer, sir. There have been too many words and too much time spent on this matter. You, as the Commander-in-Chief, are the last recourse available and as such, I ask that you examine this case for whatever merits you may find in it, and as a man who once must have set himself an ideal to strive for, make your decision.

Respectfully yours,

IGOR BOBROWSKY.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, D.C., May 2, 1974.

Hon. EDWARD I. KOCH,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. KOCH: This is in further reply to your letter of April 18 regarding your efforts on behalf of Mr. Igor Bobrowsky.

We have reviewed this entire matter with the Department of Defense and its position remains as stated in Mr. Brehm's letter of March 27.

As you noted, over a long term, procedures may be adjusted to accommodate changing social and legal perceptions concerning the use of drugs. However, the key issue here appears to be the availability of more highly qualified applicants for Marine Corps OCS rather than the Corps' drug policy.

I regret that we cannot be of assistance to Mr. Bobrowsky but the matter of enlistment standards for our Armed Services should properly remain the province of the Defense Department.

Sincerely,

MAX L. FRIEDERSDORF,
Deputy Assistant to the President.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., May 20, 1974.

JAMES R. SCHLESINGER,
Secretary, Department of Defense,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In view of the report in the Washington Post of May 16 that the Marine Corps in April was "only able to get 45% of the 3,750 new recruits they sought.", may I suggest that you reconsider Igor Bobrowsky. He really would be a fine addition to the Marine Corps.

Sincerely,

EDWARD I. KOCH.

SALUTE TO THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE

(Mr. KOCH asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Speaker, it was gratifying for me to read in today's New York Times that Communist Party leaders have admitted that Ukrainian nationalism remains strong despite a 2-year crackdown directed by the Ukrainian Communist Party Secretary. At a meeting of the party's Central Committee 2 weeks ago, officials were particularly critical of the Ukrainian press and radio, citing the low "ideological level of certain republican television and radio programs." In addition, some artists and writers were charged with losing sight of "class landmarks" in their works or "falling under the influence of various fashionable trends of foreign art." The Central Committee has asked that ideological indoctrination be increased throughout the Ukraine.

Every admission from Soviet authorities that their Ukrainian problem still exists is a monument to the resilient courage of the Ukrainian people. Since its political absorption into the Soviet Union in 1922, the Ukraine has faced both violent and subtle assaults on its cultural identity. The most recent wave of oppression begna early in 1972 with the arrest of some 200 Ukrainian intellectuals. Since that time, virtually any

demonstration of independent thought has been met with intense resistance from the Soviet Government. However, as recent reports indicate, the toughening Soviet policy has failed to discourage the expression of the Ukrainian national consciousness. What we are seeing instead is an amazing display of national will arrayed against the intimidation of superior strength. In this struggle, the Ukraine has the hopes and prayers of freedom-loving people the world over. I salute the Ukrainian people.

FREEDOM FOR GREECE

(Mr. MADDEN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include a newspaper article.)

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, George Anastaplo, who is one of Chicago's outstanding educators at the University of Chicago and Rosary College, is also an authority on Greek politics and government. I wish to include with my remarks excerpts from a commentary on Greek freedom, which was carried in the columns of some of our country's leading newspapers, including the Baltimore Sun.

Mr. Anastaplo is a brother of John Anastaplos, the celebrated news broadcaster for the WJOB radio station in Hammond, Ind. George Anastaplo continues to be persona non grata to the Greek Government because of articles he has published in the United States criticizing the present monarchical regime that controls the Greek people denying them a free and democratic government.

BLOODIED GREECE: NO WAY OUT?

(By George Anastaplo)

I

It has now been seven years since a clique of colonels seized the government of Greece. That usurpation culminated last November in the shooting in Athens of a number of students, a massacre in which the Greek government acknowledges a dozen dead and in which unofficial sources count dozens if not even hundreds of dead. One result of the massacre was a military coup on November 25 which removed from office the demoralized dictator who had been in charge since April 21, 1967.

The student demonstrations which were suppressed so bloodily in November had been prompted by the general deterioration of the colonels' rule, a deterioration reflected both in a runaway inflation and in a general fatigue. The bitter discontent students were expressing was, it now turns out, shared by much of the Greek nation as well.

The crisis which toppled the bloody dictatorship in Athens cannot be resolved, or even smothered, by recourse to still another military strongman. That crisis is rooted in the incompetence and arrogance of colonels who cannot be expected to handle intelligently the complex social and economic problems of Greece. Such usurpers simply cannot enlist the necessary services and good will of the better professionals, politicians and military officers of that country for the great work of reconciliation and austerity which Greece so desperately needs.

It has now been five months since the army moved. It was not clear at that time just who would be ruling the country thereafter: another clique of ideological colonels who would try to maintain the dictatorship, or non-political regular army officers who would turn over the government to civilian rule. Non-political officers would by this time probably have surrendered power if they had been in control. Instead, one hears more and more reports from Greece of widespread torture and stifling repression—this suggests that ideological officers have remained dominant in Athens.

II

The shortsighted role played by the American government since the colonels first took over in 1967 has already (perhaps even permanently) compromised, in the eyes of the resentful Greek people, our legitimate interests in that country and hence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Among our mistakes have been that of publicly backing the wrong man in Greece, and in such a way as to make us seem either foolish or unfeeling.

One constructive role the United States can play is to provide the considerable money Greece will need to bail itself out of the unnatural economic mess into which the colonels have inflicted on that country. But no American Congress will provide such aid so long as the colonels remain in power. And no aid would be worth giving without a genuinely political government in Athens to use it, a government which can provide a disciplined, intelligent leadership and behind which a united country can breathe freely as it dedicates itself to an austere program of reconstruction.

The observer of Greek affairs gets an impression of helplessness, drift and malaise, with the new government going through the forms of moral regeneration and reform. But those forms have been made a mockery by revelations of the corruption around the recently deposed dictator who had also preached moral regeneration when he first came to power. It must be difficult for anyone in Greece today to take seriously anything a military government says these days.

III

And yet, what way out is there? As economic conditions worsen, partly as a result of the shortsighted measures adopted by the colonels since 1967 in order to stay in power, acts of desperation (including exploitation of crises with Turkey) will be provoked on the part both of government officials and of their opponents. An explosion can be expected next fall or early winter, when students return to their universities from summer vacations.

Thus, even more bloodshed can be expected upon the next "encounter" as well as a pronounced radicalization both of the opposition to the colonels and of the political life following the colonels—unless the present rulers of Greece can be persuaded to return to their barracks.

We Americans should, before still another ruthless dictator becomes consolidated in Athens or before a massive explosion radically disrupts the life of that country, try to redeem somewhat our good name by using our remaining influence in Greece and NATO, as well as our economic power, to help the Greek people recover control of their own affairs. This can best be done by vigorously encouraging the colonels to step aside for Constantine Karamanlis, the man whose prestige as a former conservative prime minister still recommends him to the Greek people (including elements as diverse as responsible Army officers and articulate Leftist intellectuals) as the best way to avoid the even bloodier crises which now threaten their country.

Greece may be the only country in the world today where the genuine popular alternative to domestic tyranny is so moderate and so experienced a politician as Mr. Karamanlis. What more can the Greeks or the United States hope for? Dare we or they risk further deterioration in Greece and in American-Greek relations?

If the changes begun so bloodily last November are not properly followed up during the next six months by responsible men in Greece and the United States, the political map of the Balkans is likely to be radically and hence dangerously altered during the next decade.

B–1 MANNED BOMBER

(Mr. SEIBERLING asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SEIBERLING. Mr. Speaker, today, Senator GEORGE MCGOVERN of South Dakota and I issued a report on the supersonic bomber, the B–1. This report is the first in a series critically analyzing military weapons systems and policies to be issued by the bipartisan group, Members of Congress for Peace through Law. The report concludes that strategic nuclear bombardment by manned aircraft now plays only a marginal role in the U.S. deterrent, that the B–1 represents an addition to the existing U.S. bomber fleet, rather than a replacement and, as such, increases the present payload of U.S. strategic bombers from 21 million to 52 million pounds. The report further concludes that between 1970 and 1974 the B–1 program's price has increased from $9.4 billion to $15 billion and when such costs as armaments, avionics, decoy missiles, a compatible fleet of new tankers and operations and maintenance are added, this will push this figure to a minimum of $35.5 billion to make this purely marginal weapons system the most costly in our history.

I urge my colleagues to give this report their careful attention, and at this point I insert it in the RECORD:

REPORT ON THE B–1 BOMBER PROGRAM

(By Senator GEORGE S. MCGOVERN and Congressman JOHN F. SEIBERLING)

CONCLUSIONS

1. Strategic nuclear bombardment by aircraft now plays only a marginal role in U.S. deterrent or war-fighting posture. Bombers protect only against a massive failure or destruction of thousands of nuclear warheads which are based in hardened silos or under the oceans, and which can be delivered on target in about one-twelfth the time required for a manned aircraft to travel the same distance.

2. Both the nature and the size of the planned strategic bomber force are based on preparations for a counterforce role which is wholly implausible—the premise that bombers would be useful in striking Soviet ICBMs on the ground after a nuclear war is already underway.

3. Bombers do have utility in complicating still further the enormous defensive or counterforce problems which any adversary would have to solve to attain a first strike posture. But a force designed expressly for this purpose would be much smaller and less complex than the B–1.

4. The B–1 has only slight advantages over the later model B–52s, and almost none that are likely to be relevant to its mission. The high altitude supersonic capability has no real relevance and could actually detract

from the ability to penetrate at low altitudes. If Soviet defenses were massively upgraded, the most important countermeasures for U.S. bombers would lie in electronic countermeasures, decoys, stand-off missiles, and other technology which can be applied to the B–52 as well as to the B–1.

5. There is no time urgency for a production decision on the B–1 by late 1976. The existing force B–52Gs and Hs and FB–111s can be operational through the 1990s. In fact, the B–1 is planned as an addition to, not as a replacement of, those forces. As such, it would represent in the 1980s an unnecessary increase from the present 21 million pound payload of U.S. strategic bombers to nearly 52 million pounds.

6. Because of costs and risks, manned strategic bombers can have no sustained role in conventional wars except against targets—such as those in South Vietnam—which are almost entirely undefended. The U.S. lost 15 B–52s to Soviet SA–2s in 11 days of bombing North Vietnam in 1972. 90 days of bombing at the same loss rate would have wiped out the entire B–52 force assigned to Southeast Asia. If B–1s, which are vulnerable to SA–3s, had been used, the loss of 15 would have represented nearly $1 billion worth of airplanes shot down—by missiles costing about $50,000 apiece.

7. Between 1970 and 1974 the cost of the B–1 program has gone from $9.4 billion to $15 billion—an overrun of $5.6 billion, before the first prototype has even flown. The projected cost of each aircraft has doubled. And the $15 billion figure excludes such added costs as a new tanker, armaments, decoy missiles, and operation and maintenance, which will push the total up to a minimum of $35.5 billion and possibly up to $70 billion if costs continue to rise proportionately. And as costs have been going up, performance characteristics have been going down.

8. The last complete cost-effectiveness study of the B–1 was made in 1966. Rising costs and declining performance make the results of those earlier studies almost meaningless.

9. With the B–58 in mothballs, the B–70 in a museum, and the B–1 in trouble, the history of strategic bomber development programs gives scant reason for confidence in the ability of the Air Force to evaluate independently the various strategic bomber options.

10. In the current economic context, the B–1 program makes inflationary pressures still more severe and, because it is intensive in costly materials and technology, it is an extremely inefficient method of providing jobs. The B–1 now employs 25,650 people directly; the fiscal 1975 B–1 request, if devoted exclusively to payroll, could produce 50,000 jobs at $10,000 a year. Almost any kind of public investment would create more jobs for the same money. For long term job stability, B–1 workers would be better served through conversion programs which could shift skills and facilities now devoted to the B–1 to such civilian needs as transportation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I. The B–1 development program should be scaled down and rescheduled to a timetable which would set the production decision no sooner than 1980.

II. Programs should be developed to assist in the conversion to such priorities as public transportation, housing, and new energy sources, of workers and facilities who would be displaced by a decision to reschedule the B–1 program.

III. A new and comprehensive cost-effectiveness study of various strategic bomber options should be undertaken immediately, under the following conditions:

A. As recommended by the General Accounting Office, assumptions and methodology should be reviewed in advance by the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of both the House and the Senate.

B. The study should include not only a comparison of various options, but an assessment of the strategic practicality and plausibility of the nuclear mission profiles planned for strategic bombers in the 1980s and beyond.

C. To assure an independent assessment, personnel who have worked for the Department of Defense or on military contracts in private industry in the prior three years should make up no more than one-half of the expert manpower employed on the cost-effectiveness study. The special capabilities lodged in the Office of Technology Assessment should be given consideration in preparing the study.

D. The study should include cost-effectiveness comparisons for:

a. The B–1 bomber,

b. A redesigned version of the B–1 bomber with the supersonic capability excluded,

c. The existing B–52G and H/FB–111 combination,

d. The FB–111G,

e. The B52–I,

f. Various designs of a strategic aircraft/missile combination designed exclusively for launching missiles from beyond the reach of the adversary's defensive systems, and

g. The option of excluding manned strategic aircraft entirely, and relying on improvements in SLBM and ICBM systems as necessary as insurance against failure or degradation of those systems.

SECTION I—INTRODUCTION TO THE B–1

(A) CHARACTERISTICS

The B–1 is a proposed new intercontinental strategic bomber designed to be phased into the U.S. Air Force in the early 1980's, to replace a portion of the existing force of B–52's as they are retired.

With a length of 143.3 feet and a gross weight slightly under 400,000 pounds, the B–1 is comparable in size to the Boeing 707 commercial aircraft—relatively small for an intercontinental strategic bomber. Yet it is designed to carry a maximum payload of 75,000 pounds internally, plus another 40,000 pounds externally, for a total approaching two and one-half times the payload of the B–52. However, because of payload for fuel tradeoffs, the B–1 is not expected to carry substantially more than the B–52 on typical missions—10 to 12 nuclear weapons.

In addition to gravity bombs, the B–1 will be designed to carry nuclear-tipped standoff missiles (SRAM) with a range of 70 to 100 miles, so it can attack from outside terminal defenses. The Air Force is studying whether it should also carry armed decoy missiles such as the subsonic cruise armed decoy (SCAD). But that system, designed for the B–52, would require major modifications if it were to be included in the B–1 arsenal.

The new bomber will have a variable geometry, or swing wing design, so the wings can be swept back for supersonic flight at high altitudes and swept forward for takeoff and landing and for flying at reduced speeds at low altitudes. It will be manned by a crew of four, and will have an unrefueled range of approximately 6,000 miles, boosted to 10,000 miles with one refueling.

The Air Force claims two major advantages for the B–1 over the B–52. First, it will have a better survivability before and during launch. It will be a "harder target" on the ground, which means that an explosion would have to strike closer in order to destroy it prior to takeoff. It will also take off much more rapidly—in as little as four minutes according to ambitious estimates, compared to roughly fifteen minutes for B–52's on ground alert. It will be able to take off from shorter and narrower runways, permitting wider dispersal on bases in the United States. It will be painted white to reflect thermal energy from nuclear blasts.

Second, the B–1 is expected to have an improved ability to penetrate Soviet defenses. It will have a smaller radar cross-section and infra-red signature, which will make detection more difficult. At low altitudes, between 200 and 1,000 feet off the surface, it will travel at slightly higher speeds than the B–52, although still less than the speed of sound. Aside from SCAD, it will carry the full range of penetration aids, including electronic countermeasures which are now being incorporated into the later series B–52's.

(B) DEVELOPMENT HISTORY

The concept of a new manned bomber has been under active consideration since well before the last of 744 B–52's rolled off the production lines in 1961. In that year recommendations were received for a Subsonic Low Altitude Bomber (SLAB), followed by the Extended Range Strike Aircraft (ERSA), the Low Altitude Manned Penetrator (LAMP), the Advanced Manned Precision Strike System (AMPSS), and the Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA) in 1962 through 1965.

With the advent of high speed, high altitude surface to air missiles, these studies generally recognized low-level flight to avoid radar detection as the one feasible method of penetrating hostile airspace. The major exception was a costly failure. The XB–70 "Valkyrie" was terminated in 1966 after two flying prototypes had been built and $1.4 billion had been spent. The B–70 was designed for high altitude supersonic penetration. And the essential lesson was that aircraft flying even at twice the speed of sound or more cannot outrun SAM's flying at up to 11,000 knots.

By the same token, the most advanced bomber in the present force, the FB–111, was designed and built to penertate at low altitudes. The FB–111 is the bomber version of the TFX built by General Dynamics, and it is the one aircraft in that multipurpose program that is fully operational. It is swing wing aircraft which flies at 2.2 times the speed of sound at high altitudes and slightly over the speed of sound at sea level. It entered the Strategic Air Command inventory in October of 1969, but because its range and payload are limited (the range is 3,300 nautical miles without refueling; that can be extended with external tanks, but at the expense of payload), the Air Force does not regard the FB–111 as the answer to strategic bomber requirement.

The B–1 itself is the outgrowth of the AMSA studies of the mid-1960's, and it, too, is designed for low altitude penetration. Like the FB–111, however, it also incorporates the high altitude, supersonic features of the B–70. Originally it was expected to be supersonic at low altitudes as well, but that feature was deemed infeasible and excessively costly before the advanced research and development program was underway.

The development program for the B–1 was approved in June of 1970. It has proceeded on the basis of three flying prototypes and 27 test engines, with the first flight originally scheduled for April of 1974 and the production decision for July of 1975. The prime research and development contract was awarded to Rockwell International (formerly North American Rockwell). General Electric is building the engines, and Boeing is designing the integration system for the avionics. Smaller but nonetheless sizeable B–1 subcontracts are held by nearly 70 divisions

of these companies or separate companies in seventeen states.

As recently modified, the total research and development program for the B–1 will cost $3.5 billion in "then year" dollars. Counting earlier ASMA studies, roughly $1.6 billion in current dollars had been approved through fiscal 1974.

By mid-1973 the B–1 development program had encountered serious schedule slippages and management problems. In August of that year, in response to congressional concern, Secretary of the Air Force John McLucas appointed a task force headed by Dr. Raymond Bisplinghoff, Deputy Director of the National Science Foundation, to review the program. Based on the task force's conclusions, the B–1 development effort now includes a "pre-production" phase involving funding a fourth and possibly a fifth aircraft out of development funds and postponing the production decision until November of 1976. The task force also projected increased costs and possible deviations from performance standards, based primarily on an increase in the B–1's gross takeoff weight from 360,000 pounds to 395,000 pounds.

(C) FORCE LEVELS

If the B–1 is produced, it would enter the force in the early 1980's, replacing initially the 80 B–53D's which are now being modified to extend their operational life into that period. These are the oldest B–52's presently in service.

While the general impression may be to the contrary, the B–1 would not initially replace the latest model B–52's, the G and H models, which are presently organized into 17 squadrons with 255 assigned aircraft, nor will it replace the four squadrons of FB–111 bombers with 66 assigned aircraft. Both can remain operational at least through the 1980's.

Hence, based on the projected buy of 244 B–1's organized into 14 squadrons, the B–1 is an additive rather than a follow-on and represents a dramatic increase in the payload of the U.S. strategic bomber force. The following table compares maximum payloads for the existing force with those of the force of the mid-1980's.

STRATEGIC BOMBER PAYLOAD

Aircraft	Payload per aircraft (internal/external)	Total payload
397 [1] B–52D, F, G, H	31,000/20,000 lbs	20,247,000
66 FB–111	4,400/4,200 lbs	567,600
1974		20,814,600
255 B–52G, H	31,000/20,000 lbs	13,005,000
66 FB–111	4,400/4,200 lbs	567,600
244 B–1	75,000/40,000 lbs	38,060,000
1984		51,632,600

[1] 120 B–52D's and 22 B–52F's are included even though these aircraft have been operational almost entirely in conventional roles or in training They are not capable of low altitude penetration, and their nuclear role would be limited to targets other than the Soviet Union. The payload of present strategic aircraft oriented toward the Soviet Union is about 13,500,000 pounds

The table demonstrates that under current plans, with the B–1 entering the force well before the B–52G's and H's and the FB–111's are phased out, the B–1 represents far more than a replacement of existing capability. It would increase the overall maximum payload capacity of U.S. strategic bomber forces by two and one-half times, from about 21 million to nearly 52 million pounds of bombs.

SECTION II—NUCLEAR STRATEGY

(A) Forces for deterrence

It is impossible to make a valid assessment of the strategic bomber program without considering the country's overall strategic posture. Bombers share a purpose with other offensive systems—sea-launched and intercontinental ballistic missiles. And the need and the timing of massive expenditures on a new strategic aircraft obviously depends on the reliability of those other systems in meeting the overall objective of deterring nuclear war.

It is also important to note that for all practical purposes the exclusive function of nuclear weapons and delivery systems is deterrence. Within the constraints of both arms control agreements and technology, it is impossible for either the United States or the Soviet Union to prevent their own destruction if nuclear war does occur. A small proportion of the weapons already in the Soviet arsenal could wipe out most of American population and industry within a matter of minutes, and the reverse is also true. A full scale nuclear exchange would render both countries and much of the rest of the world uninhabitable.

Hence, the mission of U.S. nuclear forces is not so much to fight a nuclear war as to prevent one. And prevention means demonstrating to any potential attacker that we could—and would—absorb a first strike and deliver a society-destroying blow in return. It is a matter of convincing the leaders of the Soviet Union, in particular, that they can never hope to win or even gain the slightest advantage through a nuclear strike against the United States or its allies.

Since deterrence is as much a mental as a physical process, it is impossible to calculate with any degree of precision the size and nature of the nuclear force necessary to accomplish the mission. Just twenty-six warheads could, for example, strike every city in the United States with 500,000 or more people. Some 160 individual missiles could strike every community of 50,000 or more. It is hard to imagine a provocation which would cause a rational American President to accept damage of that kind, and it is similarly hard to imagine a Soviet leader accepting the assured destruction of that country's ten, twenty, or 100 largest cities.

But there is one practical measurement of how much is enough, and that is the number of targets big enough to be worth attacking. Once the adversary's major center of population and industry have been accounted for, it probably does not add much, if anything, to deterrence to be able to strike rural communities or agricultural regions. In the case of the Soviet Union, some 34 percent of the population and 62 percent of the industrial capacity is concentrated in 200 cities, all of which could be destroyed by a slightly larger number of weapons equivalent to a one megaton blast. Doubling the number of warheads would destroy only another six percent of the Soviet population and another ten percent of industrial capacity.

But a Soviet leader who would not be deterred by our ability to destroy more than a third of his population and two thirds of his industry would probably not be much impressed by the incremental ability to destroy a few percentage points more. Therefore, 300 to 400 missiles or bombs or their equivalent would seem to provide all that it is possible to accomplish in fulfilling the strategy of deterrence. Beyond that figure additional warheads must be counted as redundant or as insurance. In all likelihood even fewer would suffice.

On this basis it is clear that both the United States and the Soviet Union have built massive overkill into their nuclear forces. In mid-1974, the United States operational force will include 7,940 force loadings—bombs and separately targetable missile warheads. Through the continuing deployment of multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV's) on both land and sea based missiles, we are building toward a total of 10,000 force loadings by 1976. The Soviet Union will have 2,600 force loadings in mid-1974, and they have also begun testing MIRV's. The following table compares existing forces for both sides.

UNITED STATES AND U.S.S.R. STRATEGIC FORCE LEVELS (MID–1974)

ICBM launchers	United States	U.S.S.R
ICBM launchers	1,054	1,575
SLBM launchers	656	660
Intercontinental bombers	496	140
Total force loading [1]	7,940	2,600

[1] The force loadings total includes independently-targetable warheads and bombs; as opposed to the number of launchers, it is a measure of how many separate targets the force can strike.

(B) Assured destruction, the Triad, and SALT

But deterrence requires more than numbers. The potential adversary must also be convinced that the warheads could actually be delivered on target—that adequate numbers could survive a surprise first strike, and that the warheads would penetrate defenses and inflict unacceptable damage.

To make this guarantee the United States has not only considerable numerical overkill, but three different delivery systems—1054 intercontinental ballistic missile launchers, 656 sea-launched ballistic missiles, and 496 intercontinental bombers (comparable figures for the Soviet Union are 1575 ICBM's, 660 SLBM's, and 140 bombers). Each of the three systems—each leg of the "triad"—has more warheads than there are major Soviet targets. Each creates its own challenge to counterforce or defensive technology. ("Counterforce" means generally destroying a weapon before it can be launched or fired—hitting ICBM's in their silos, for example, or destroying bombers on the ground. Defensive systems are those, such as surface to air missiles or ABM's, designed to intercept weapons on their way to target.) Therefore, each leg of the triad insures against any failure or degradation of the other two.

While it was limited in scope, the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement with the Soviet Union marked an important step in determining how much of this insurance will be necessary in the future. Whether or not the concern has been justified by the state of ABM technology, the possibility that the Soviet Union might build an antiballistic missile shield to intercept our ICBM's and SLBM's has been a major rationale for additions to the U.S. nuclear force. Our own development and deployment of MIRV's was, for example, justified primarily by the system's ability to overwhelm ABM defenses. And the threat of a Soviet ABM has also been used to strengthen the case for a new bomber. While SLBM's have a somewhat flatter trajectory and would thus be more difficult to intercept, both they and ICBM's involve warheads following ballistic trajectories into the atmosphere; similar ABM technology would apply against both. A low-flying aircraft armed with gravity bombs and short-range missiles creates an entirely different set of problems for the defense.

But through the SALT I agreement, both the United States and the Soviet Union have foresworn active ABM defenses. Both have agreed, in essence, to remain vulnerable at least to ballistic missiles which cannot be countered prior to launch. And if the threat of a Soviet ABM made the unique flight characteristics of bombers more urgent,

the SALT I agreement makes them much less so.

(c) *The precise bomber role*

It is undisputed that with the development first of intercontinental ballistic missiles in the 1950's and then of sea-launched ballistic missiles in the 1960's, the long-range bomber has been displaced as the leading edge of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. It is, in fact, the least equal of the three legs of the triad, if for but one reason: while even an advanced aircraft such as the B–1 would take four hours to fly 6,000 miles, at supersonic speeds all the way, ICBM's and SLBM's have flight times of 30 minutes or less. If nuclear war did occur, there could be eight successive nuclear missile salvos—four on each side and each answering the one before—before the B–1 could be in a position to do any damage. The war would be over before it could get into the action.

The position of the strategic aircraft has been further eroded by comparative costs. Delivery of nuclear warheads by ballistic missiles costs far less than their delivery by manned aircraft.

Defenders of the B–1 program have attempted to sustain a primary nuclear war mission for bombers with the contention that it would have an important counterforce role. The thesis is that in initiating nuclear war the Soviet Union may fire some of its missiles at military targets—including ICBM and SLBM launchers—and that others would be held back for a possible later attack against American population and industrial centers. American bombers, it is argued, would be uniquely capable of flying over the Soviet Union before the attack on population comes, to spot and strike ICBM's which have not yet been fired. This scenario is central to the case for bombers, and even more so to the case for a bomber force of the size contemplated. It means that payload requirements are set not according to the number of soft population and industrial targets we need to cover for deterrence, but the number of hardened military targets—ICBM silos—to be covered for damage limitation.

But for several reasons, the counterforce scenario is wholly unrealistic. While flying at altitudes of under 1,000 feet to escape detection, and at high subsonic speeds, the crews would simply not be able to see enough to distinguish between loaded and empty missile silos. Further, if the Soviet Union did adopt such a scenario, they would likely fire their most accurate missiles—their ICBM's—in the first round against hardened military targets, and hold back SLBM's which, because they are less accurate, are better suited for striking population and industry. The B–1 would not be useful against SLBM's. Finally, and most decisive, there is hardly any reason to believe that Soviet commanders—knowing that the B–1's were on their way to attack retained ICBM's—would continue to retain them for the necessary four to six hours. Indeed, any professed capability to degrade their weapons in less than total war is probably the best way to guarantee that nuclear war, if it comes, will in fact be total.

It seems clear, therefore, that aside from political steps such as placing them on airborne alert as shows of force, the mission of manned aircraft in the nuclear context is secondary. They are maintained to complicate enemy defensive problems, and to discourage defensive efforts against missiles because the costs of defending against all systems would be too high. And they would be counted upon to deter attack—to be in a position to actually strike Soviet targets—only in the exceedingly unlikely event that the adversary discovered a way to (a) destroy all or nearly all ICBM's and SLBM's simultaneously before they could be launched, or (b) intercept thousands of incoming ballistic missile warheads from both ICBM's and submarines.

The latter would, of course, involve a violation of the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement, and even then the better—and less expensive—response might be to simply add more ballistic missiles to overwhelm interceptors. The former—prelaunch destruction of both ICBM's and SLBM's—would involve solving enormous and seemingly insoluble problems of coordination, of tracking and attacking 41 nearly silent submarines hidden in a minimum of three million square miles of ocean, and of hitting more than 1,000 hardened missile silos with pinpoint accuracy. Even then the Soviet Union could never be sure that we would not adopt a "launch on warning" strategy, under which our missiles would be fired as soon as theirs were sighted.

All of this does not lead to a hard conclusion that bombers do not have an important role to play in U.S. nuclear strategy. Their presence can and does insure against the unknown—against, for example, any breakthrough in antiballistic missile or counterforce technology, possibly in the laser field, which could disarm ICBM's and SLBM's. In one sense they help to insure compliance with the SALT I agreement on ABM's, by nullifying the strategic worth to the Soviet Union of any violation. For what it's worth, they can be launched and recalled in times of crisis, such as the 1973 crisis in the Middle East, in order to actively demonstrate national will.

Perhaps the most significant contribution of the manned bomber lies in its protection of ICBM forces against a counterforce attack. In effect, it is physically impossible for any adversary to attack both bombers and missiles on the ground at the same time.

Our ICBM's cannot be attacked by Soviet submarine launched missiles because those forces are not accurate enough to score direct hits on hardened missile silos. However, bombers on the ground are much softer targets, and Soviet SLBM's could, in theory, destroy them there in a surprise attack, if they were fired from close enough to the U.S. coast and on sufficiently flat trajectories to avoid detection before it was too late to scramble the bomber force. That is why U.S. bombers are stationed inland, and why the faster launch time and satellite basing planned for the B–1 are deemed useful.

So if the Soviet Union found a way to neutralize our nuclear-armed submarines and wanted to launch a first strike, they would have to strike U.S. ICBM's with their own ICBM's and U.S. bombers with their SLBM's. But there is no way to coordinate such an attack. Once fired, their ICBM's would be detected about 20 minutes before striking their targets—ample time to put the bombers in the air. If, on the other hand, they struck our bombers first, the nuclear detonations on SAC bases would give us enough assured notice that a nuclear war was underway to warrant launching our ICBM's.

In effect, through this "box phenomenon" we know that under any first strike strategy the other side would adopt, the prelaunch survival of either our strategic bombers or our ICBM's would be fairly well assured. The bomber gives us the assurance that our ICBM's will be available without any need to place them in a destablizing and dangerous launch on warning posture. In the absence of Soviet ABM's and a Soviet ability to track and attack submarines, the concept of a Soviet first strike is beyond the realm of possibility anyway, unless a suicidal madman were in charge. But the presence of bombers does serve to solidify the impossibility.

So the strategic bomber is not completely without utility in today's nuclear context. In an age of overkill capacity on both land based and sea based missiles, any reliance on bombers to play a primary deterrent or nuclear war fighting role is exceedingly remote. But given the options presented to the Congress, that fact bears less on whether bombers should be retained than on whether and when enormous sums should be invested to expand and upgrade bomber forces.

(*D*) *The bomber operating environment*

Both proponents and opponents of a new U.S. intercontinental bomber have cited Soviet bomber programs in support of their respective positions. Opponents of the B–1 have noted that the Soviet Union has a small and aging intercontinental bomber fleet made up of 100 turboprop Bear aircraft and 45 jet powered Bisons, both of which are older and substantially less advanced than our B–52's. Proponents of the B–1 point to the Soviet development of a newer bomber, designated Backfire, which is expected to have swing wings and a supersonic capability. However, despite regular annual assertions that the Backfire was nearly operational, it is still not deployed. And in any case the Backfire would require two refuelings to attack the United States. It is far more likely directed elsewhere.

Attempts to relate U.S. bomber programs to Soviet bomber programs are nothing new. Indeed, there is some evidence that the original production of B–52's was increased by half because U.S. analysts in 1955 miscounted the number of bombers in the Soviet fleet, when the bombers were being flown in circles as a defensive tactic. Like the "missile gap" of the 1960's, there were alarms sounded about a "bomber gap" in a decade before.

But whether they help to either make or break the case for a new U.S. bomber, such comparisons are largely irrelevant. We do not send our bombers into battle against their bombers; we send our bombers against their bomber defenses. And the critical question is whether a substantial proportion of the U.S. intercontinental bomber force would be able to survive a counterforce attack, overcome defenses, and actually deliver warheads on target.

As of mid-1974 the Soviet Union had approximately 2,600 fighter-interceptor aircraft of varying capabilities, down from 2,800 the year before. They have also retained a relatively constant force of about 9,800 surface to air missiles, although in that case in particular the numbers are deceptive. During the brief period after World War II when the United States enjoyed a nuclear monopoly, the Soviet Union had an overwhelming incentive to build defenses, concentrating on the one method of delivering nuclear weapons—high flying bombers—which then existed. The great majority of the Soviet SAM's inspired during that period and in the force today would have no capability against modern strategic aircraft and tactics.

As noted previously, the key to penetrating these defenses is to fly at low altitudes to escape detection. A strategic bomber cannot outfly a SAM or air to air missiles, nor can it outmaneuver a fighter-interceptor built for high maneuverability and high speed over short distances. But all of those defenses are nullified if the attacking bomber cannot be detected. And ground-based radars such as those in the Soviet Union, while they can detect high-flying aircraft from hundreds of miles away, cannot spot low altitude bombers unless or until they come within 25 to 35 miles of the station.

And interception between the time of detection and the time over target is still an

extremely difficult matter, even after the planes are spotted. Only about 40 percent of today's Soviet fighter-interceptors are modern versions, and even they could not separate the bomber from radar ground echoes; they would have to get below and behind the bomber to lock on. Under such conditions their range would be sharply limited and their maneuverability would be greatly reduced because of the denser air and reduced room at low altitudes. Meanwhile, the 1,200 to 1,500 Soviet SAM's which have some low altitude capability, principally SA-3's, are also subject to range limitations because they depend on ground radars to identify targets. Even at subsonic speeds, a low flying bomber would pass through the effective range of these missiles within about three minutes, which is probably far too little time for launch.

Further, both manned and missile interceptors can be countered by a series of measures, ranging from course variations to chaff and highly sophisticated electronic countermeasures (ECM) that would jam enemy radar. Standoff missiles such as the short range attack missile (SRAM) and Hound Dog can also be used to blind the defense by knocking out radars. The Quail decoy presently in the U.S. force is equipped to look like the B-52 to Soviet radars, and another program now in development, the subsonic cruise armed decoy (SCAD), would combine the same features with a longer range and a small nuclear warhead.

In sum, the Air Force today has justifiably high confidence that our bombers can penetrate Soviet air defenses.

Those defenses could, of course, be strengthened over a period of several years, if the Soviet Union chose to apply a great deal of money and time to the project. Specifically, we know from U.S. developments that an over-the-horizon radar can be constructed, and the U.S. is developing an airborne warning and control system which, according to the Air Force, would be capable of spotting our own B-1 flying at low altitudes. In combination with these systems, it is theoretically possible to construct an effective "look down—shoot down" capability using advanced interceptor aircraft and air to air missiles.

However, there is no indication that the Soviet Union is working on such a capability. Given their agreement in SALT I to remain vulnerable to U.S. ballistic missiles, it seems highly improbable that they would undertake a massive and costly effort to defend against U.S. bombers. And even if they did, countermeasures already in force or in the development stage would probably still assure a sizeable number of bombers would get through.

SECTION III—CONVENTIONAL ROLES

(A) Prior experience

The one obvious attribute strategic bombers have that missiles do not is the fact that they can be employed in conventional wars. At least publicly, no one has suggested replacing nuclear warheads on ICBM's or SLBM's with conventional bombs and launching them against, say, insurgents operating in Cambodia or in the Philippines. For one thing, it would be outlandishly expensive. But B-52's armed with conventional bombs were used throughout the Vietnam conflict, and they inflicted massive damage. Hundreds of conventional bombs were used to literally demolish target boxes the size of several football fields. In their one planned penetration of North Vietnamese airspace in late 1972, "Operation Linebacker," B-52's flew some 730 sorties and were credited with knocking out four-fifths of North Vietnam's electric power capacity and one-fourth of its petroleum supplies in a space of just eleven days.

The strategic bomber is unquestionably a formidable conventional weapon. But the discussion cannot end there. With specific reference to the B-1, the real question is, if the B-1 program cannot stand on its primary nuclear mission, is its incremental value in possible non-nuclear conflicts sufficient to warrant its enormous costs?

First, it must be noted that since World War II the United States has only once used heavy strategic bombers over defended targets in a conventional war. In Korea, the high altitude tactical bombing environment was so hostile due to Soviet-manufactured anti-aircraft weapons and MIG fighters that neither our first-line strategic bomber of that era, the B-47, nor its predecessor, the B-36, were used. The aging B-50 was employed, but it was restricted to night missions because daylight losses became prohibitive. Throughout Vietnam, up until "Operation Linebacker," B-52 missions were restricted to undefended areas in South Vietnam, in this case because North Vietnam was defended with Soviet SA-2 surface to air missiles. And when B-52's were finally ordered north, 15 were shot down and many more were disabled in only 11 days of bombing.

(B) Economics and risks

The experience of "Operation Linebacker" does not suggest that strategic bombers cannot perform their nuclear mission. The SA-2 is by no means a primitive missile; on the contrary, it is most effective against high flying aircraft, and the B-52's attacking North Vietnam were coming in at high altitudes, using few or none of the countermeasures which would be employed in nuclear war. Further, although 15 bombers were shot down, the loss rate was only about three percent. In a nuclear war there would be just one mission, not repeated sorties in which our aircraft would be repeatedly exposed to attack. Considering the incredible destructive power in every aircraft, a 97 percent penetration rate in a nuclear war would be very high indeed.

But the experience does suggest that if for economic reasons alone, it makes little sense to rely in conventional wars upon bombers that are designed for long range nuclear missions. Because they are built for long range, high payload operations, they will inevitably be less maneuverable and more vulnerable than their contemporaries in the fighter bomber class. So if the B-1 will be highly capable compared to today's strategic bombers, it will nonetheless be cumbersome compared to even today's fighters and fighter bombers, let alone more advanced tactical aircraft that will be in the force in the same time frame as the B-1.

Further, in conventional war, the prudent strategy is to increase the number of aircraft the defense must intercept, not to concentrate more and more offensive power in a single extremely expensive aircraft which can be knocked out by a single surface to air missile. The wise strategist wants to increase the number of targets, not cut them down.

The economic and vulnerability arguments can both be best made through some comparison.

Had B-52's flown continuously over North Vietnam at the same loss rate experienced in "Operation Linebacker," we would have lost the entire B-52 force assigned to Southeast Asia in about 90 days time.

Alternatively, had 15 B-1's been shot down over North Vietnam, we would have lost nearly $1 billion worth of airplanes in eleven days.

A SA-2 Guideline missile site such as those used in North Vietnam represents an initial investment of around $6 million, including six missiles and launchers plus the radar complex. But the launchers can be reloaded indefinitely, with missiles costing $70 to $80,000. In Vietnam those missiles were knocking out B-52's that cost $8 to $10 million apiece—more than 100 times as much.

The B-1 could have avoided the SA-2 missiles, since they are designed to intercept at high altitudes. But the low altitude SA-3 could be at least as effective against the B-1 as the SA-2 was against the B-52. And SA-3's cost less—$40 to $50,000. The current estimated B-1 cost, $61.5 million—1,230 times as much as the SA-3. Even counting site costs and assuming relatively low kill ratios, the economics come down hard on the side of the defense.

Further, by the time the B-1 is operational, it is possible to envision a small, cheap surface to air missile that could be fired by hand and still be very effective against low flying bombers.

So it is clear that when posed against probable conventional defense, and when compared to other aircraft which are being designed and built exclusively for tactical missions, the long range strategic bomber is at an overwhelming disadvantage in a conventional war environment—except in rare cases when it would be sent against undefended targets. If these strategic bombers are deemed essential to the deterrence of a nuclear war which could completely destroy America in a matter of minutes—and that, after all, is their main justification—that surely no responsible commander would suggest risking them in a conventional conflict such as Vietnam.

(C) What wars?

If B-1 advocates still base their case on its conventional utility, it is also pertinent to ask what specific conventional wars they have in mind.

As noted previously, the B-1 represents a dramatic increase, from 21 million pounds to nearly 52 million pounds, in the payload of the U.S. strategic bomber force in the 1980's. It is in the conventional war context that this figure becomes especially relevant because conventional missions are usually not intercontinental, so fuel for payload tradeoffs do not apply. To the extent that B-1's would be assigned to conventional wars, nearly all of the added payload capacity—two and one-half times that of the B-52—could be devoted to weaponry.

The magnitude of that payload capacity is indicated by the fact that flying just one mission a day, the U.S. strategic bomber force programmed for the mid-1980's could drop in just one week as many pounds of conventional bombs as we dropped on Japan throughout World War II. It would take about four months, again with just one mission a day, to drop as many pounds as we dropped in all theaters in World War II and Korea combined. Just one mission by the entire force could unload, in conventional bombs, an explosive force two and one-half times as great as the atomic bombs which destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Combined with fixed wing tactical aircraft and helicopter gunships, the force of some 120 B-52's operating in Vietnam provided massive damage to the undefended areas over which it could be used in that country. It churned up vast areas which may never be truly restored to their original condition. Even if we are planning future Vietnam-type conflicts—and policymakers of all shades of opinion profess that we are not—there should be no need for such a vast escalation in bomber payload capacity for use against primitive targets. At the very least it is not so compelling a need as to justify the cost of the B-1.

SECTION IV—COSTS AND PRIORITIES

(A) Rising costs

Even at original cost estimates the B–1 bomber promised to be the most expensive weapons system ever built.

In mid-1970, when B–1 engineering development began, the total program cost was estimated at $9.4 billion, broken down at $2 billion for research and development and $7.4 billion for production. That was doubtless too low because inflation was not included. But it was the official estimate upon which Congress based its decision to proceed. In 1969 the Defense Department had calculated the cost for each aircraft at $25 to $30 million, and the mid-1970 estimate was on the high end of that range—at $29.2 million.

Since then costs have risen astronomically. As of April, 1974, the research and development estimate was $3.5 billion, up 75 percent over 1970, and the production figure was $11.5 billion, up 55.4 percent. Since 1970 *the total research and development and procurement figure has risen by $5.6 billion*—and that with the system still only about halfway through the research and development stage.

For the sake of rough comparison, just the $5.6 billion cost overrun to date on the B–1 would have been nearly enough to fund the entire Poseidon conversion program for 31 nuclear submarines. It is more than the total estimated program cost for the F–14A carrier-based aircraft. It would buy 560 highly sophisticated F–15 supersonic fighters—more than twice as many F–15's as the planned buy of B–1's, just for the B–1 cost overrun. It would buy 1,860 A–10A close air support aircraft, or it would buy five nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.

On a per unit basis, the B–1 costs have more than doubled since 1970. The current figure is $61.5 million. By comparison, the first U.S. nuclear bomber—the B–29 which dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945—cost about $700,000. Each B–1 will cost about 88 times as much. The latest model B–52's cost about $10 million, or less than one-sixth as much as the B–1.

But the B–1 program cost is deceptive because it does not include armaments, support, or operation and maintenance costs. Some of these will, of course, be incurred whether or not the B–1 is built, so long as the United States retains a strategic bomber fleet of any kind. But they will be substantially higher for the B–1. For example, existing KC–135 tankers could probably service the B–52 force through the 1980's and beyond; the B–1 will require a new tanker that can offload more fuel and—if they are to mean anything—that can match both the B–1's quick takeoff capabilities and hardened airframe for survival. As a supersonic aircraft, the B–1 will carry and consume a great deal more fuel than the B–52. A new tanker fleet could cost as much as $8.5 billion.

In addition, a SCAD designed for the B–52 would not work on the B–1, and a B–1 SCAD would be more difficult to build because it would have to match the smaller B–1 configuration. A new SCAD would likely cost in the range of $2 billion, over and above the cost of the B–52 model. Based on a 20 year operational life span, operations and maintenance would probably add at least another $10 billion. Although it is admittedly a rough figure, these additions, which leave out the basic armaments such as SRAM and gravity bombs and which do not account for new armaments such as the Long Range Attack Missile, nonetheless push the total system cost to $35.5 billion. And that accepts today's estimates of procurement costs, assuming no more overruns.

The likely costs can also be calculated in another way. In mid-1970 there was an attempt to arrive at a total strategic bomber systems cost by adding up the official Air Force estimates for the B–1 and all related systems and operating costs for a twenty year period. That analysis produced a total of $43.9 billion. If the other costs included in that analysis have escalated at the same rate as B–1 research and development and production costs, the comparable figure today would be close to $70 billion.

It must also be noted that there are currently some unusual conditions with respect to materials which could cause B–1 costs to soar still more. In particular, higher fuel prices have brought great inflation in the cost of producing aluminum and titanium. Each B–1 bomber contains 27,000 pounds of titanium and 54,000 pounds of aluminum, or 6.1 million pounds and 13.2 million pounds respectively for the entire fleet. It takes eight kilowatt hours to produce a pound of aluminum, and 20 kilowatt hours for a pound of titanium. These metals are both in short supply, and prices are rising rapidly due to higher energy costs.

(B) Contract problems

Rising B–1 costs have been accompanied by delays in the development process and also by declining expectations on performance.

The Air Force originally projected the initial operating capability for the B–1 at mid-1976. That was when the first production models would have entered the force. Although the program was fully funded by the Congress, that date had slipped by two full years by 1970. Now it has been put off nearly three years more, to March of 1981—almost five years later than originally projected, even though the Congress has been funding the program at the maximum levels that could be used by the contractors.

As to capabilities, it was apparent even in 1970 that capability was being traded in to keep the price down. Between 1969 and 1970 there was a cutback of 25 percent of the B–1's internal capacity for SRAM and SCAD missiles, and the low altitude supersonic capability was dropped completly. Further, the size of the avionic package had been greatly reduced, by an amount that should have produced a savings of $5 to $6 million for each aircraft. Yet even then the estimated price per aircraft was $29.2 million, at the very top of the $25 to $30 million range which was the official 1969 estimate.

The study of the B–1 begun last August and headed by Deputy Director Bisplinghoff of the National Science Foundation, while its recommendations were directed principally to the program's management, also had some significant findings on the aircraft's probable performance. The most serious potential difficulties come from a projected increase in gross takeoff weight, from the original estimate of 360,000 pounds up to at least 395,000 pounds. The weight increase in turn affects such other performance characteristics as the distances required for takeoff and landing, the range and rate of fuel consumption at various speeds and altitudes, the maximum altitude, and potential payload.

The Bisplinghoff report specifically:

"Did not attempt to comment on the acceptabilities of the reduced performance values since this judgment must rest with the Air Force."

And the Department of Defense is expressing confidence that the B–1 would be operationally effective against the full target spectrum.

This does not, however, square with the calculations supplied by Major General Douglas Nelson, the former B–1 System Program Director, to the Senate Armed Services Committee in April of 1973. He said in part:

"Based on analyses, the B–1 design has the flexibility to accept a weight increase up to the point that takeoff gross weight reaches 395,000 lbs. Beyond this point, additional fuel could not be added to offset the range degradation caused by the increased aircraft weight. We can achieve our full maximum distance of (deleted) miles of which (deleted) miles are at low altitude with a gross take off weight of 389,772 pounds."

So the gross takeoff weight of the B–1 is already projected at more than the level calculated for maximum range. It is, in fact, at the very top of the acceptable limits. Obviously there are real grounds for doubt about the ability of the B–1 to perform its mission as advertised.

Nor should the Bisplinghoff report be taken as the ultimate in critical technical analysis of the B–1 program. As noted, its scope was limited, and there is also cause for concern about its perspective. Of the 31 members of the task force besides the chairman, 25 were officials of private defense contractors such as General Dynamics, Boeing, Grumman, and McDonnell, including at least two companies which have sizeable B–1 research and development contracts. Five more were officials of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Only one came from the private sector—James A. McDivitt, a senior vice president of the Consumers Power Company (and Brigadier General, United States Air Force, Retired). And the primary task force recommendation in terms of management was that two more prototypes be included in the research and development part of the program, bringing the total back up to the five that the Air Force originally wanted. This does not suggest that the study was not an honest evaluation, but simply that its limitation must be recognized.

The B–1 program has also been reviewed recently by the General Accounting Office. The April 17, 1974, report of that agency noted that no comprehensive cost-effectiveness study for an advanced bomber has been made since 1966. It is clear that since that time, and since 1968 when the basic design decisions for the B–1 were made, B–1 costs have gone up sharply and B–1 effectiveness has gone significantly down. It seems likely that a current cost-effectiveness study comparing the B–1 to possible alternative designs would lead to conclusions at variance with the studies of eight years ago.

(C) Time urgency

The B–1 program as presented to the Congress is more than a plan to buy a given number of aircraft at a certain price. It is a plan to buy them over a relatively certain period of time—specifically, so they can enter the force at the beginning of the 1980's.

Survival is obviously the first of all national priorities. If it is possible to perceive a risk to national survival which (a) will be posed in that certain time frame of the 1980's, (b) could not be countered by existing nuclear forces, and (c) could be countered by the B–1, then no one would question the wisdom of going ahead with all due speed, regardless of the cost.

Complex systems such as the B–1 do have long lead times, and production decisions must be made well in advance of the time when the new system is required in the active forces.

But in the case of the B–1 program, the overriding question to be asked is whether there is any risk that the U.S. deterrent—counting not only bombers but SLBM's and ICBM's, and accounting for any improvements in those other systems scheduled in the interim—will fail or be seriously degraded by the early 1980's. And while it is not ordinarily wise to make categorical statements about defense policy, this is a case

where a categorical statement can probably be made in complete confidence. There is no such risk. On the contrary, we should be able to proceed on the assurance that both bombers and missiles will be able to reach and destroy their targets through the mid-1980's and beyond.

As noted, active missile defenses are ruled out on both sides by the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement. The United States is nonetheless already compensating for active missile defenses by deploying MIRV's. And long lead times apply to the Soviet Union as well as to the United States—any violation of the SALT agreement would necessarily be detected well in advance, giving the United States ample time to take whatever additional countermeasures might be necessary.

Where counterforce attacks on SLBM's are concerned, our Polaris/Poseidon submarines cannot be detected, let alone destroyed, and they are expected to remain invulnerable well beyond the 1980's. The U.S. is substantially ahead of the Soviet Union in anti-submarine warfare technology; according to the Trident program coordinator Read Admiral R. Y. Kaufman, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee in June of 1973.:

"Right now we don't think we have a big problem. The Soviet aren't a match for us in ASW. However, if you ask us what will happen in 30 years, our foresight isn't too good."

And the U.S. is nonetheless moving ahead with the Trident submarine program, including, as the first step, placing Trident missiles in existing submarines and thereby extending their area of deployment from three million to fourteen million square miles.

Neither is a counterforce attack on U.S. ICBM's a significant risk for the 1980's, the Soviet MIRV testing program notwithstanding. Assuming the Soviet MIRV's were sufficiently accurate to destroy hardened U.S. Minuteman silos, they would still have to be fired in phases in order to avoid the problem of having the blast from one warhead disarm, destroy or disrupt the flight path of the one adjacent to it. Under such an attack, the Soviets can be assured that most of our ICBM's would still get off.

More important to the prelaunch survivability of Minuteman, we can be quite certain that the "box phenomenon" described in Section II of this report will continue to be effective in protecting both our missiles and our bombers because bombers and missiles cannot both be attacked before launch and we know that existing strategic bombers will be able to penetrate in the 1980's time frame. On Soviet air defenses, Major General William Evans, assistant deputy Air Force Chief of Staff for Research and Development, supplied the following information to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1973:

"The most likely solution to the Soviets (deleted). There is no indication that they are developing a 'look down-shoot down' capability. It is estimated, however, that they desire such a capability and could achieve it in the late 1970's . . .

"This would pose a threat to bombers penetrating at low level. However, high penetration speeds, countermeasures, and counter tactics would decrease the significance of this threat."

Read closely, this does not suggest that Soviet Union is building or even planning to build a defense capability that could intercept existing B–52 and FB–111 bombers. On the contrary, the only evidence given is speculation about Soviet desires—hardly a strong justification for a multibillion dollar military program. And it speculates a foolish Soviet desire since, having agreed to remain vulnerable to SLBM's and ICBM's, it would not make much sense for them to spend billions of rubles to defend against bombers.

Finally, it is worth noting that the bomber force the U.S. will have assigned to nuclear roles without the B–1 into and through the 1980's will be no smaller than the bomber force we have now. The 22 B–52F's are used mostly for training, and they have a limited nuclear delivery capability because they are not equipped to fly at low altitudes. The 120 B–52D's have nearly all been assigned to Southwest Asia, and their capabilities are similar to those of the B–52F. So we have been operating with 255 B–52G's and H's and 66 FB–111's—all of which can be operational through the 1980's—without sending any fundamental weakness in our overall deterrent.

In sum, there is no real time urgency for having a new bomber in the force early in the 1980's. On the contrary, the outlook underscores one very significant benefit of the "triad" which is too often neglected. By supplying the assurance that the entire deterrent will not fail if one or even two legs are temporarily degraded, it should be seen allowing a more deliberate approach to the development of new nuclear weaponry—an opportunity to wait somewhat longer, and to see more, on the developing threat, and to fully evaluate all possible alternatives for meeting it. In light of the rising costs and doubtful performance of the B–1, it is a case where a moderate approach of that kind is obviously warranted.

(D) *Economic context*

If the B–1 is not a time urgent project, then it is fair to place it in an economic context and to compare it with other public needs which are competing for finite national resources during the proposed development period. The Congress and the American people may not want to explore all of the technical details of a complex and controversial military program. But they certainly can make judgments about what they want government to accomplish, and on whether they want the B–1 more than other results the same money could buy.

One primary alternative to the B–1 would be to lessen, rather than worsen, the highest and most persistent peacetime inflation in American history.

Military procurement spending is inherently inflationary in times of chronic deficits because it creates demand in the marketplace without creating any offsetting supply. For an admittedly oversimplified example, if a worker makes $200 a week building refrigerators, his salary amounts to $200 more in demand in the economy each week. But the economy gets around $200 worth of refrigerators as well, to make up for the added buying power. The salary of a worker on the B–1 contract also creates more demand, but the product obviously does not go on the public market. So the B–1 worker's salary simply bids up the price of the other consumer goods—like refrigerators—that can be bought and sold in the marketplace.

Since much of the current inflation is a consequence of rising energy prices, the B–1 adds to inflation in another way. It uses specialized materials—titanium, magnesium, aluminum, and others—which take vast amounts of energy to produce. So it contributes in particular to the energy shortage and to rising prices for fuels.

Hence, one option would be to minimize the B–1 program and reduce the deficit. The overall impact on the economy would not be great, but it would at least be in the right direction—toward less inflation rather than more.

With reference again to the energy crisis, the Administration has recommended a five year, $10 billion program to develop new sources of energy and to achieve independence from foreign fuel supplies by 1980. Savings from the B–1 program alone in the same period could pay for that energy program. Or they could be used to double it.

Gasoline shortages have focused new attention on mass transit and rail transportation as energy-efficient methods of moving both people and goods. But large public investments are required The annual savings brought by a decision to forego production of the B–1 would, under the likely production schedule, be enough to make up the entire $2 billion yearly investment deficit of the nation's railroads. The $61.5 million cost of each B–1 bomber could buy 2,460 boxcars—or 1,662 modern air-conditioned buses. The fiscal 1975 B–1 request of $499 million could pay for 1,660 mass transit rail cars, enough to supply about four medium-sized cities. Or part of it could be used to free the $375 million for urban transit that has been impounded. Over time, all of these investments would help to conserve fuels, rather than increase fuel consumption. They would help stem rather than stimulate inflationary pressures.

The question is whether national needs such as these are as compelling and as time urgent as the need to have the B–1 bomber operating in the early 1980's.

Inflation is not the only economic concern. In recent years we have had the unique experience of suffering record inflation and rising unemployment at the same time. And the B–1 project does provide jobs. Some jobs would be lost if the program were ended or curtailed.

Of course the job impact of a decision to reduce the program now would be far less than it would be if the program were cut once the contractor and subcontractors had geared up for full production. By that time many more workers will have become dependent on the B–1, and the economic pressures to continue will be that much greater.

But beyond that, military procurement, particularly on sophisticated programs such as the B–1, is a very inefficient method of providing employment. Compared to other kinds of enterprise, a greater proportion of the military procurement investment goes for such items as costly materials and fuels, and less goes directly for payroll. Using the prime contractor's own estimates, for example, the B–1 research and development program is employing 25,650 people directly. But if the funds requested for the B–1 in fiscal 1975 were invested entirely in payroll it could produce 50,000 jobs at an average annual salary of $10,000 a year—nearly twice as many. Or it could create more than 100,000 public service jobs at the minimum wage. Any kind of more job-intensive public investment—including housing, transit construction, and others—would produce some net increase in employment for the same amount of money.

Any threat to the workers who have already grown dependent on the B–1 contract should be taken as a matter of concern to the national policymakers who created the dependence. To the maximum extent possible, any decision to reduce the program should be accompanied by steps to counteract the adverse local economic impact and the loss of jobs. In this context it is significant that three of the States most heavily dependent on the B–1 program—California, Washington and Ohio—all have urgent needs in the public transit field. It is possible that both workers and facilities now devoted to the B–1 could be productively employed to help meet those pressing requirements in a

civilian sector. Over the long term this is a far more promising course for workers who are now or may become dependent on the B–1 contract only to have it canceled because it is deemed not worth the enormous investment.

In summary, considering its impact on inflation and on the employment outlook, the B–1 compares poorly with alternative high priority uses of the same funds.

SECTION V—THE B–1 AND ALTERNATIVES

(A) Strategic air options

Various alternative approaches to the manned strategic aircraft role were considered in the course of arriving at the basic B–1 design. However, a number of additional options have surfaced since the B–1 development decision was made in 1968. There has also been additional time to evaluate the developing threat. Further, the dramatic changes in cost and performance expectations should stimulate a reevaluation of the B–1 even in comparison to alternatives which were considered and rejected six years ago.

The following are brief descriptions of various strategic air options:

(1) No Manned Strategic Aircraft:

Clearly the lowest cost option would be to conclude that the development of advanced intercontinental and sea based missile systems has rendered the entire concept of a strategic bomber obsolete. This would involve deactivating all of the existing 27 squadrons of strategic bombers, and would save in the range of $700 to $800 million annually in operations, maintenance and personnel costs.

While this could also be the highest risk option, the rationale for such an approach has been strengthened substantially by the SALT I agreement. The strongest element of the case for retaining strategic bombers has been the fact that as compared to ballistic missiles they post on entirely different set of problems for the defense—if it were possible for the Soviet Union to design an anti-ballistic missile that would be wholly effective against both ICBM's and SLBM's, it still would not work against bombers and the U.S. deterrent would therefore still be assured. The force of this argument falls considerably if we can be assured that there will be no Soviet ABM.

Assuming compliance with the SALT I agreement, the major risk of this "diad" posture would be in the realm of counterforce—the risk that the Soviet Union could find a way to threaten the prelaunch survivability of both Polaris/Poseidon submarines and ICBM's. Bombers help assure that this could not be done.

(2) The B–52/FB–111 Combination:

Even against greatly improved Soviet defenses, the existing combination of B–52G and H models and FB–111's will remain a highly potent force through the 1980's. It is not true that these latest model B–52's represent the technology of the 1950's; in reality it would have been logical to give them a new numerical designation because they differ so sharply from the earlier members of the B–52 series. For example, their low level flight capabilities are not the result of later modifications, but were designed into the original production aircraft. Other substantial improvements have been made since. And a $3 billion program for further modernization is now underway, including the same electro-optical viewing system (EVS) that will go into the B–1, using television and infra-red sensors to allow sustained flight at an altitude of 300 feet or less. Most important, these models, based on the Air Force's average annual flight times, will not exceed the 12,000 to 13,000 range of flying hours until 1990. Their operational lifetime should extend at least that long.

The newer FB–111, meanwhile, although it is limited in range and payload, can still strike at least 75 percent of the strategic targets in the Soviet Union if it is refueled just prior to its descent to low altitude. It can fly slightly faster than the B–1. The models currently in the force can carry six SRAM missiles so the payload limitation is significant only to the extent that the FB–111 cannot fly around and hit as many separate targets as the B–1 or B–52—and it is questionable whether in a nuclear war context any strategic bomber would want to remain exposed to defenses long enough to strike more than a few targets.

In addition, far too much is made of the special penetrating characteristics of the B–1 aircraft, as opposed to the penetration aids which the B–52 can also carry. There are basically three special B–1 aircraft features—a slightly higher speed at low altitudes, a smaller radar cross-section, and a smaller infra-red signature. But if the aircraft is detected and defensive systems can be looked on, the higher speed of the B–1 will still not help it outrun a surface to air or air to air missile that can fly up to 20 times as fast, or even a manned interceptor that could fly twice as fast at low altitudes. Nor are the radar cross-section and infra-red signatures likely to be decisive improvements. It may be somewhat more difficult, but if the Soviets can build warning and control systems and a look down-shoot down capability that would operate effectively against the B–52 it would probably work just as well against the B–1. They can be made smaller, but neither the radar or infra-red signature can be made to disappear. It is admitted that our own proposed AWACS system could spot the B–1, and it is claimed, under what has now become the major rationale for that system as a means for conventional battlefield control, that it could even pick out smaller tactical aircraft or troop movements on the ground. And no technological monopoly last very long.

If the Soviet Union should greatly upgrade its air defenses, therefore, by far the most important steps to assure that we can continue to penetrate lies not in the characteristics of the airframe but in such devices as SRAM, SCAD, decoys, chaff, and other electronic countermeasures which can avoid, confuse or suppress defenses. All of those same devices can be applied to the B–52; many can also be used on the FB–111.

As to prelaunch survivability, the takeoff characteristics for the FB–111 are similar to those contemplated for the B–1, and the reaction time of B–52's and KC–135 tankers is also being improved through quick-starting devices, satellite warning and communications systems, rebasing, and alert-dedicated runways. With these changes, there should not be a significant difference between the B–1 and B–52 in terms of capability to survive an SLBM attack. In fact, the quick reaction time of the B–1 is not necessarily required for protection against SLBM's on inland bases, but would rather permit it to be based closer to the U.S. coastline.

Various mixes of weapons could be employed. But the B–52G and H and FB–111 combination could carry, for example, a total of 2,826 SRAM missiles with nuclear warheads in the medium kiloton range, plus 2,430 SCAD decoys on the B–52's—certainly an ample force for a bomber deterrent.

(3) Stretched FB–111:

The builders of the FB–111, General Dynamics, has suggested that this aircraft could be redesigned to make it a true intercontinental bomber. The proposal, the FB–111G, would have somewhat more range and payload, and it could still retain the FB–111A's speed advantages over the B–1—the limited supersonic capability at low altitudes. The contractor has estimated the cost for 210 FB–111G's at about $3 billion, or $15 million for each aircraft. The Air Force set it higher, at $17.8 million per aircraft or $3.7 billion for the program.

Despite obvious cost advantages, the Air Force has studied and rejected this option, on the principal grounds that the FB–111G would be less cost effective than the B–1 on the basis of weapons spaces, the cost per target destroyed and the cost to the adversary of countering the system. However, the validity of those ground rules is highly dependent on the extremely implausible counterforce scenario described earlier in this report, under which the role of bombers would be to attack retained ICBM's after one or more counterforce exchanges have already occurred. If the bomber is considered more realistically as insurance against failure or degradation of ICBM's or SLBM's—as a means of sustaining assured destruction against soft targets—then the total payload of the force could be much less than is contemplated for the B–1 and the comparative cost-effectiveness of the FB–111G should rise accordingly.

(4) The B–52I:

The builder of the B–52, Boeing, has come up with another alternative—fitting the B–52G's and H's with the newer and larger engine which is now used on the C–5. The aircraft would be redesignated the B–52I. The change would reduce the B–52's dependence on tanker support, shorten its takeoff time and distance, and slightly improve performance in some other respects. It would not significantly extend the lifetime of the airframe, but neither, according to Boeing's engineers, would it shorten the period over which the B–52 can be expected to perform satisfactorily. Costs for this modification have been estimated at between $2 and $3.3 billion, including the cost of the new engines. The major benefit would be greater prelaunch survivability plus—as compared to the stretched FB–111 option—retention of the much higher B–52 range and payload, including room for more penetration devices in the event that Soviet defenses are upgraded.

(5) Redesign of the B–1:

It would also be possible to make cost-saving changes in the design of the B–1, and a primary candidate for exclusion would be the feature of supersonic flight at high altitude.

Since any strategic aircraft must penetrate at low altitudes, where the B–1 is subsonic, the high altitude supersonic capability is not relevant anyway to the problem of penetrating Soviet defenses. In fact, the supersonic capability is the reason for having a swing wing on the aircraft, and that, as opposed to a fixed wing, could actually detract from stability at low altitudes, at the same time limiting the payload that can be carried externally. Further, there is some indication that an aircraft shifting from high altitude supersonic flight to low altitude subsonic would leave an infra-red afterglow that would almost guarantee its detection.

Dropping the supersonic capability would, of course, increase the time required for the aircraft to complete its mission, since it is now contemplated that a portion flown outside of the range of Soviet radars would be supersonic. But supersonic flight requires drastically more fuel, which detracts from payload. Further, when missiles can cover the distance in 30 minutes, the difference between the flight time of ten hours at high subsonic speeds and eight hours with some supersonic flight hardly seems likely to have

a serious bearing on the bomber's role in nuclear war.

Eliminating the supersonic flight capability could, therefore, cut several billions of dollars from the cost of the program, without any serious reduction in the B–1's important performance characteristics.

(6) Standoff Aircraft:

Another option recommended by the authors of this report several years ago would be to forego the gravity bombing approach and initiate work on an aircraft/missile system capable of attacking targets in the interior of the Soviet Union without having to penetrate defenses.

The SRAM is a step in this direction, since it can be launched from 70 to 100 miles away from the target and eliminates the need to penetrate terminal defenses. The Hound Dog missile now operational on the B–52 has a longer range and a larger warhead than SRAM, but it is a relatively slow cruise missile which could be intercepted by advanced defenses, and it must still be launched from within Soviet airspace. The optimum concept would be a high speed ballistic missile which could be launched from outside the range of Soviet radars, thereby eliminating the need for the entire range of costly flight characteristics needed if the aircraft itself is required to penetrate.

Under the general designation M–X, the Air Force does have conceptual studies of a long range air launched missile underway, although it has not as yet been described as an alternative to a penetrating bomber. Several approaches are possible, using either the commercial Boeing 747 or Lockheed's C–5 as the launch platform and arming it with existing Minuteman missiles, a smaller missile weighing about 47,000 pounds and with a range of around 6,000 miles, or a still smaller missile designed to penetrate from just beyond the range of Soviet radars. The latter approach would mean, of course, that each aircraft could carry more effective payload because it would reduce the amount of fuel required to propel each warhead toward its target. Depending on missile development costs, such a system could probably be acquired for around $10 million, for targeting flexibility and payload similar to that of the strategic bomber fleet the Air Force now plans for the 1980's.

The need for such a system in the 1980's would depend almost entirely on whether the adversary greatly upgrades bomber defenses. If they do not, then the B–52/FB–111 combination should serve through the 1980's; if they do upgrade defenses, then the cost-effectiveness of the standoff system should compare very favorably with the B–1 or any other aircraft built to penetrate defenses. In either case, the standoff approach seems most promising for the longer range future, when the B–52's and FB–111's ultimately do have to be retired.

(B) *Weighing alternatives*

The most recent General Accounting Office review of strategic manned bomber programs concludes that there is time to undertake a thorough new cost-effectiveness study of the B–1 bomber before the currently scheduled production decision in late 1976. The Air Force has agreed. However, the Air Force rejected the agency's recommendation that the assumptions and methodology of the study be reviewed by the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of the House and the Senate.

In fact, the assumptions and methodology will likely dictate the outcome of the study. It is possible to assume precise ranges of Soviet defenses, or to establish specific mission profiles, which would exactly fit the B–1 and no other option.

A good example is the most recent internal comparison between the B–1 and the FB–'11G. It was based primarily on the target coverage required for a counterforce scenario in which the bomber would be used against Soviet ICBM's. Under those ground rules the FB–111G came off a poor second. But the opertaing assumption itself was not and has not been evaluated on a realistic basis. As this study suggests, it has little to recommend it. Yet it is a decisive factor in weighing both the nature and the size of an American strategic bomber force.

Since the B–52, we have had the B–70 in an air museum, the B–58 in mothballs, and the B–1 experiencing both unprecedented cost overruns and performance underruns. That history does not inspire great confidence in the ability of the Air Force to provide an objective analysis. At the very least it reflects an entrenched desire to have a certain aircraft—the B–1—and a disturbing tendency to shape all the studies accordingly.

The Bipslinghoff study was not an exception to this tendency, first of all because its scope was sharply limited and also because the task force was dominated by experts who should not be expected to take a contentious point of view on the program itself.

Considering both the economic and the strategic stakes involved, therefore, the approach to date does not provide a sound basis for congressional decisions. Based on costly experience, there is ample reason for Congress to insist on a role in defining the assumptions used in any further cost-effectiveness studies, and on assurances that all options are fully, and fairly, and independently considered. Otherwise the country could well spend billions of dollars for the wrong system, with resulting losses not only in funds but in the added security the right system could buy.

HEALTH HAZARDS OF OCCUPATIONAL CHEMICALS REQUIRE DRASTICALLY INCREASED GOVERNMENT RESEACH EFFORT

(Mr. OBEY asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, the inadequacy of Government research efforts to determine the dangers to human health by the casual and indiscriminate use of potentially dangerous chemicals should be obvious to all of us. In my own district, a number of communities have recently found high levels of asbestos fibers in their drinking water—a result of massive dumping of taconite tailings into Lake Superior by Reserve Mining Co.

Asbestos is already known to cause cancer when inhaled into the lungs and studies are now being conducted to determine whether it causes cancer when ingested.

This past weekend, the New York Academy of Science held an International Conference in New York City on a new tragedy rising from our ignorance of the affect on human health of another chemical, vinyl chloride. This is the second meeting on this subject which a member of my staff has attended since it was revealed in January that vinyl chloride, a gas from which polyvinyl chloride and, in turn, most plastic is made, is a highly toxic substance, causing a fatal form of liver cancer among vinyl chloride workers.

Papers read at the New York conference—which was attended by scientists from eight countries as well as representatives of business, labor, and government—indicated that in addition to causing the fatal liver cancer angiosarcoma, vinyl chloride has caused workers to suffer from enlarged livers and spleens, deliterious blood changes, skin eruptions, pathology of the bones of the fingers, restricted blood circulation and lung function and even sexual impotence that disappeared when workers left the vinyl chloride plant.

The most significant revelation at the conference, however, was that at least six workers at a German plant which manufactures floor tile from polyvinyl chloride are suffering from a liver disorder which may be a precursor of the cancer. This could mean that not only are the more than 6,500 workers directly involved in the manufacturing of vinyl chloride into polyvinyl chloride in the United States subject to the cancer, but also the nearly three-fourths of a million American workers who manufacture polyvinyl chloride into various plastic products ranging from phonograph records to baby bottles.

Dr. Irving Selikoff, a leading researcher in the field of occupational health, and chairman of the conference, has estimated that as many as 12 percent, or one out of every eight workers who have been exposed to vinyl chloride, may die of the disease.

Mr. Speaker, every day workers are exposed to 15,000 chemicals and agents. Two thousand new chemicals are compounded each year. One thousand chemicals have been found to have cancer-causing potential. Vinyl chloride is simply the most famous.

It is high time that we start looking at the possible health effects those chemicals can have on the workers who handle them, and the consumers who buy products made of them. Our past record in this regard is dismal at best.

Although the United States has been first in the production of vinyl chloride and first in the number of deaths which have already occurred from vinyl chloride-related diseases, we have not been nearly so preeminent in researching the risks posed by this chemical. The first major clinical study which established a definite link between angiosarcoma and vinyl chloride was performed in Italy. The West Germans have made enormous strides in uncovering nonmalignant ailments caused by vinyl chloride and a number of other nations have contributed significant discoveries in this area as well. In the United States, it is only now, after clear proof of the dangers of this chemical is already available that the Federal Government has begun to direct a significant effort toward learning about it and much of that effort has been made at the expense of our already inadequate efforts to study other occupational health risks.

The failure of the Federal Government

to make a major commitment toward researching vinyl chloride and other such health hazards has also meant that the very industries which are adversely affected by the imposition of new standards that result from the discovery of a new hazard are dominating what research is being done on those hazards. They employ most of the scientists and finance most of the experiments and to a great degree, therefore, control both the kind of data that is being developed and the access to that data.

The vinyl chloride episode has revealed much about the inadequacy of our efforts to uncover occupational hazards and I think it will be inexcusible if this Congress does not begin with the 1975 budget to make available the kind of money needed to carry out this research.

That does not mean a token increase. It means a large one. Working men and women in America are becoming more and more aware that they rather than white rats, are being used to test the health hazards of such chemicals and already some are asking their Congressmen why something hasn't been done. I hope that in the future we will not have to answer that the Congress thought it would cost too much money.

Among the many distinguished speakers at the New York conference was Mr. Jacob Clayman, secretary-treasurer of the International Union Department of the AFL–CIO who describes the vinyl chloride tragedy in human terms from the perspective of the workers whose jobs demand that they be exposed to heavy concentrations of untested chemicals in their dairy work assignments. His remarks follow. Also following are several newspaper articles on the New York conference:

REMARKS OF JACOB CLAYMAN, SECRETARY-TREASURER, INDUSTRIAL UNION DEPARTMENT, AFL–CIO

When philosophers and scientists speculate on the future, no one really expects a surge of interest to be generated, certainly not a call for action. In our problem-oriented society, the short-term has priority over the long. In government, in our institutions, in industry and in the family of organized labor, we move from crisis to crisis, never stopping long enough to change the conditions and circumstances from which these crises arise.

Health and environment, in the workplace or in the community, pose no exceptions. We have been told of the dangers of our increasingly synthetic world for over a half century—and of some of the traditional hazards of the workplace since the beginnings of the industrial revolution. And, to be honest, we have done very little about either. When an episode occurs, of the kind focused upon here, we tend to treat it as if it were one of a kind, as if similar episodes could not occur again.

Fortunately for our children—but unfortunately for those of us who will die of an environmental disease—the difference between the short and the long term is collapsing under the weight of predictions-come-true. The crisis we are now faced with is forcing us to radically alter the conditions for change in our society. We no longer can merely solve the problem of vinyl chloride. We must halt the parade of new environmental diseases, whether they are dread angiosarcomas and mesiotheliomas or as yet unnamed behavioral and neurological syndromes. With my own lifetime cancer has changed from being one of the least frequent to one of the most frequent causes of death. This is not human progress. It is not a legacy willingly left for my grandchildren to challenge.

Vinyl chloride may pose, as Dr. Lloyd points out in this week's issue of TIME magazine, "the occupational disease of the century" but it also presents us with a case history of why these diseases occur.

Dr. Selikoff reminds us that the toxicity of vinyl chloride was established in the European scientific literature more than a quarter century ago. Even in this country corporate scientists developed information which was not widely or effectively acted upon, 10 . . . 15 years ago, by either management or government. Only in very recent years has there been serious investigation of vinyl chloride as a carcinogen. And if it were not for the uniqueness of the tumors produced, as Dr. Epstein noted some months ago, this chemical scourge might still not have broad acceptance as a *human* carcinogen.

Now at this point I will not make an attack on the callous multinational corporations who ignored and kept secret even the voices of their own indentured scientists. (I'll save that for later.)

To be fair, we ought to ask: Where was labor? What were we doing?

This is really the question asked by the *Louisville Times* in their editorial of February 28. It deserves an answer.

I cannot speak for the labor movement abroad. But I know what we are doing.

As long as a hundred years ago we were fighting in the courts for the right to a safe workplace. Fifty years ago we were struggling to secure Workmen's Compensation laws and arguing with the employers that "safety would pay" because it would cut down on Workmen's Compensation awards. Twenty-five years ago we were still struggling with the medical profession and compensation boards in many states to have silicosis declared a compensable disease. Fifteen years ago we accepted the invitation to collaborate with management in the voluntary safety movement. Five years ago we were still struggling to make our system of state enforcement programs work, although the industrial and business power over state legislation foredoomed these efforts.

During that century we brought hundreds of millions of dollars worth of seals and raffle tickets in the march on polio, rheumatism, tuberculosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, sickle cell anemia, kidney disease, MD, MS, mental health, etc., etc. We built hundreds of hospitals, sanatoria, and clinics. Like this occasion, gastronomics became a weapon as we organized thousands of luncheons, breakfasts, dinners, brunches, cocktail parties and coffee klatches to plan the stuffing of envelopes, the rolling of bandages and the ringing of doorbells.

In this city, only blocks from here, we passed the hat in filthy, airless sweatshops to collect pennies, nickels, and an occasional dime to fight the Great White Plague. Ironically, some of the funds left over from those days are being donated to the federal government, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, to help finance the study of the new hazards faced by the modern clothing worker. Times haven't really changed.

While some small gains were made, on balance I must tell you that our efforts were much short of great success. But we tried.

As I try to pinpoint the reasons for the failure, I inevitably focus on one fact. We were once an immigrant society with relatively simple and undemanding expectations. The worker in particular accepted a rather subordinate role in the decision-making process. He assumed that someone else would have to do the thinking, the evaluation and choose the course of action. He looked around at the safety posters, he attended committee meetings and rallies for the glory of the hard hat and the fire extinguisher. He accepted designation as the "accident prone" employee who needed psychological reconditioning.

While his lungs were being destroyed, while the valves of his heart were being torn, he tried to believe that someone was really doing something to protect him.

But four years ago our Department had a rank-and-file meeting in Washington where we vowed to end the consequences of society's failures. That meeting lead to the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, which went into effect barely three years ago.

Laws don't solve problems. But they set forth the rules we must all follow in the fight to find solutions.

The key set of rules implied and spelled out in the Act are those that clearly spell out the equal role of the worker or his representative at every stage of the decision-making process. The meaning of those rules for you as medical scientists is that there can be *no* more secret studies, *no* more decision-making meetings with government in the absence of worker representatives, *no* more government-management secrecy pacts on data collection.

When we initiated our campaign to clean up the asbestos industry, despite these new rules, there was an attempt to play the game as if the Act had never passed. I thought we had settled that question but our experience in the current vinyl chloride episode leads me to believe that on this point there are still some untutored minds in government and industry.

Multi-corporate studies of cancer from vinyl chloride were initiated secretly in this country and in Europe. They were discussed with the government in secret and their results would probably still be a secret without the presence of mass media and if the law did not require the reporting of occupational disease.

Even after the Louisville cases were announced, the government attempted to conduct key meetings without the presence of our representatives. In at least one case, in the Union Carbide plant in South Charleston, West Virginia, the government sought to substitute a medical survey of employees by an independent researcher, initiated by the Machinists union, with a study of their own to be conducted—by secret pre-arrangement—in collaboration with the company.

Seemingly, to slow down the development of new information, NIOSH is being ordered to request no increases in staff and funds to cope with the additional burden of their vinyl chloride investigation. Because of resources already stretched to the breaking point, in effect, NIOSH is being asked to diminish its total effort. No serious reprogramming is taking place at the National Cancer Institute and there are no funds available to the National Institute for Environmental Health Sciences to support the work of her sister agency.

Dr. Wagoner—for example—is being forced to delay other equally important investigations.

I am convinced that this effort is unrelated to a tight budget. The funds required are a pittance in terms of the total HEW budget; a few million dollars are required. Research means information and information means regulation. Regulation means corporate expenditures. The equation is rather simple.

The unstinting personal sacrifice of scores of civil servants and commissioned corps officers of the Public Health Service is frustrat-

ing this design. It isn't going to work. These men and women are making great personal sacrifices for our members. Our people will take every necessary step to protect and support the civil servants who are trying to do an honest job. They are also being advised about who in the private sector is providing them with necessary professional skills: Selikoff, Nicholson, Lillis, Anderson, Daum, Fishbein, Mancuso, Epstein, Kay, Holaday and dozens of others.

We've come a long way in this country in at least our formal commitment to the preservation of life and health on the job. The passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act was a magnificent episode in our struggle. It is essentially a good law. But it needs implementation.

It needs much more financial support.

It needs many more dedicated public officials.

It needs the continuing support of people of good will, in and out of the labor movement.

And finally it needs the precious skills which you possess.

We appreciate—more than we can express—the great contributions of some of you sitting here.

VINYL CHLORIDE PARLEY TOLD OF DANGER TO WORKERS

(By Jane E. Brody)

Workers exposed to vinyl chloride, a widely used chemical in the plastics industry, face an increased risk of developing blood, liver and respiratory abnormalities as well as dying from a variety of cancers, the first international meeting on the chemical was told yesterday.

The hastily called conference, held under auspices of the New York Academy of Sciences, was organized in response to the discovery in January of four cases of a rate liver cancer among vinyl chloride workers at a B. F. Goodrich plant in Louisville.

Today, as a result of industrywide searches of records and examinations of workers, 19 cases of this cancer—angiosarcoma of the liver—are known to have occurred among vinyl chloride workers, 13 of them in the United States.

PLASTICS WORKERS INVOLVED

The finding of this unusual cancer was assumed to represent just the tip of an iceberg of an illness that may be occurring unnoticed among the nation's 6,500 workers who make vinyl chloride or polyvinyl chloride, and the reports presented to the 300 scientists gathered here from eight countries confirm this suspicion.

The reports also indicate that the risk of disease may extend to the tens of thousands of workers who fashion polyvinyl chloride into thousands of commonly used plastics products, ranging from floor tiles to clothing to pharmaceutical products.

As yet, there is no hint of any danger to consumers who use the products. But the Food and Drug Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency recently recalled several dozen aerosol products in which vinyl chloride was used as a propellant.

In reports to the conference, physicians from the University of Bonn in West Germany said that they had identified a syndrome they call vinyl chloride disease. Among the symptoms commonly found are abnormally low numbers of blood cells called platelets, which are crucial to clotting, slowed liver function, enlarged liver and spleen, and excessive production of immature red blood cells.

A report from Romania indicated that nearly half of the vinyl chloride workers may have spasms in their blood vessels, and 10 per cent of the Romanian workers had temporary hormonal disturbances that in some cases were manifested as sexual impotence that disappeared during vacations.

The results of an intensive examination of nearly 400 workers at a Goodyear plant in Niagara Falls, N.Y., tends to support the European findings, according to data presented by Dr. Ruth Lilis of Mount Sinai Medical Center here.

Of 348 Niagara Falls workers whose lung function was studied, 58 per cent showed significant obstruction of the airways, Dr. Albert Miller of the Mount Sinai team reported. He added that this obstruction was found in a large percentage of nonsmokers as well as smokers, "suggesting that occupational exposure is a factor."

MEASURES SUGGESTED

A study of deaths that occurred among the Niagara Falls workers hinted at an increased risk of dying of cancer of the lymph and blood-forming organs and the brain, as well as the liver cancer. An industry-sponsored study of 352 deaths among vinyl chloride workers at plants around the country pointed to an increased risk of developing cancer of the respiratory and digestive systems, the lymph glands, the liver and the brain.

Although the legacy of previous vinyl chloride exposure is expected to last many years—possibly decades—to prevent further risk to workers the United States Department of Labor yesterday published a proposed new occupational standard that would outlaw workers' exposure to detectable levels of vinyl chloride. The standard would require the wearing of respirators by any workers who might inhale measurable levels of the chemical and would require the company to provide annual medical examinations for all its employes.

The industry is expected to ask for a hearing on the proposal. Among the crucial issues are whether present technology permits such a lowering of the vinyl chloride level inside a plant and whether workers could feasibly wear respirator equipment. Currently, the industry is trying to conform to the emergency standard of 50 parts of vinyl chloride per million parts of air, a level at which the liver cancer has been produced in experimental animals.

To define further the ill effects of vinyl chloride and how it may interact with other agents, Dr. E. Cuyler Hammond, a vice president of the American Cancer Society, a cosponsor of the meeting, said that a large group of workers would be studied, going back 10 or 15 years.

[From the Wall Street Journal, May 13, 1974]

SCIENTISTS HEAR REPORTS VINYL CHORIDE MAY BE MORE DANGEROUS THAN REALIZED

(By Barry Kramer)

NEW YORK.—Scientists from around the world at a hastily organized meeting on the health hazards of vinyl chloride heard disturbing indications that the danger to workers in the plastics industry may be more widespread than first realized, and that the chemical may also pose environmental and public-health problems.

Vinyl chloride, a gas used since World War II to make polyvinyl chloride, or PVC a solid plastic with ubiquitous industrial and consumer applications, has been linked recently with 20 cases world-wide of a rare and usually fatal form of liver cancer, angiosarcoma, in workers at plants where vinyl-chloride gas is produced or where it is polymerized into the plastic. Thirteen of the angiosarcoma cases, only two of whom are still alive, are in the U.S.

At the two-day conference, sponsored by the New York Academy of Sciences, the American Cancer Society, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and other groups, scientists reported a growing list of health problems they have labeled collectively "vinyl chloride disease." From West Germany, Rumania, Japan and the U.S., scientists reported that the symptoms, found in a significant number of vinyl-chloride workers, include enlarged livers and spleens, deleterious blood changes, skin eruptions, pathology of the bones of the fingers, restricted blood circulation and lung function and even, in Rumania, sexual impotence that disappeared when the afflicted workers left the vinyl-chloride plant.

MOST UNSETTLING REPORT

But the most unsettling report came from scientists at Bonn University, who reported finding serious liver disease in six workers at a plant that turns PVC plastic into floor tiles. Until now, it had been thought the danger was limited to workers in direct contact with the vinyl-chloride monomer, who number about 6,500 in the U.S. But if the hazard extends to workers down the line who melt, mold, form, extrude, shape and otherwise fabricate PVC into pipes, packaging film and bottles, flooring, apparel, automotive parts, home furnishings, wire coatings and myriad other products, a much larger number of workers—some estimates say as many as 700,000—could be exposed to the danger.

The Bonn scientists didn't find liver cancer in the floor-tile workers, but they described the liver disease as possible precursors to angiosarcoma. Similar liver changes were reported among U.S. vinyl-chloridemonomer workers.

The largest effort to seek out present and former vinyl-chloride workers who may have been sickened by working with the chemical has gone on in the U.S., which produces about 25% of the world's PVC, with sales of over $12 billion. Since an alert company physician, Dr. John L. Creech, discovered in January that two vinyl-chloride workers at the B. F. Goodrich Co. facility in Louisville, Ky., had died of angiosarcoma, a total of seven cases of angiosarcoma have been found at the Louisville plant, two of whom are alive, three cases at the Niagara Falls, N.Y., plant of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., two cases at the South Charleston, W. Va., plant of Union Carbide Corp., and one at the Pottstown, Pa., facility of Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. Seven other cases have been found abroad.

OTHER FORMS OF CANCER

Reports at the conference also hinted at the possibility that vinyl-chloride workers may have contracted other forms of cancer beside the rare liver form. A survey of 8,384 present and former vinyl-chloride workers done for the Manufacturing Chemists Association found that overall death rates compared favorably with the general population, but that vinyl-chloride workers, especially those with longer exposure to the substance, showed increased risk of cancers of the liver, lung, lymphatic system, brain and urinary organs.

Another study, of workers at Goodyear's Niagara Falls plant, found that while four deaths from all types of cancer could have been expected statistically among the 257 workers studied, there had been nine cases.

While several studies showed that the danger of vinyl chloride increased the longer the exposure to it, it isn't known whether low levels of exposure are safe. The Italian scientist, Dr. Cesare Maltoni, whose studies showed as early as 1972 that vinyl chloride at high levels in the air caused angiosarcoma in mice, but whose studies were ignored until the human cases were uncovered, has since reported that mice exposed to as little as 50 parts per million in the air also got the cancer. Fifty parts per million is the current

emergency standard in vinyl-chloride plants set recently by the Labor Department, although the agency proposed last week tougher permanent standards that would limit air levels of vinyl chloride in plants to under one part per million.

"ZERO TOLERANCE" STANDARD

The Society of the Plastics Industry has already condemned the proposed "zero tolerance" standard as "excessively and unrealistically restrictive," claiming that the standard would make it "virtually impossible for plants to operate." In a separate statement, B. F. Goodrich called the proposed limits impractical and unjustified by the situation. The temporary 50-parts-per-million standard, which replaced a long-time standard of 500 parts per million, is expected to stay in effect for up to six months.

While the Food and Drug Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency have ordered recalls of hairsprays and pesticide sprays whose propellent is vinyl chloride, there isn't any evidence that consumers have been exposed to dangerous amounts of the substance.

But an EPA study, based on the theoretical use of vinyl-chloride-containing sprays, indicated that some consumers may have been exposed to air concentrations of the chemical above that currently allowed in industry.

"The risk may be smaller in the general population, but we're dealing with a much larger group of people than the industrial vinyl-chloride workers," said Dr. Kenneth Bridbord of the EPA's Human Studies Laboratory.

The EPA is currently surveying emissions of vinyl-chloride gas into the atmosphere and water found around factories nationwide to help determine if the health of people living around the plants may be endangered. Glenn E. Schweitzer, director of the EPA's Office of Toxic Substances, told the conference an estimated 200 million pounds of vinyl chloride are discharged into the atmosphere from U.S. vinyl-chloride-polymerization plants each year.

He called on industry to help support studies of populations around such plants who may have been exposed to low levels of vinyl-chloride for long periods of time.

CONGRESSMAN MELCHER STRIKES A GREAT BLOW FOR CHEYENNES

(Mr. HECHLER of West Virginia asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HECHLER of West Virginia. Mr. Speaker, our colleague from Montana (Mr. MELCHER) has won the richly deserved praise of the Northern Cheyenne Indians for the great news that the Department of the Interior is about to cancel leases for strip mining on 260,000 acres of Indian lands in Montana. I was in eastern Montana and Wyoming over the weekend, and the news of Congressman MELCHER's successful effort, strongly supported by Montana's able Senators, spread like wildfire through the Indian reservation and brought great joy to those dedicated to the protection of the land and people in this Nation.

I am pleased to include with my remarks the text of the front-page article which appeared in The New York Times on Sunday, May 19:

U.S. MAY CANCEL TRIBAL MINE DEAL—CHEYENNE CHARGE THE INDIAN BUREAU CHEATED THEM IN COAL NEGOTIATIONS

(By Ben A. Franklin)

WASHINGTON, May 18.—The Interior Department was reported to have decided to cancel leases for strip-mining for coal on 260,000 acres of the Northern Cheyenne Indians' reservation in Montana.

Indians have charged that the Bureau of Indian Affairs cheated them in negotiations for coal-mining rights to their lands.

The leases, dating to 1969, are potentially worth billions of dollars to four major energy corporations and two groups of land speculators.

The Interior Department's reported decision surprised many observers because it was considered both radically "pro-Indian" and a blow to the Nixon Administration's plans for rapid coal development in the Great Plains States.

Representative John Melcher, a Montana Democrat, whose district embraces the largely barren, 415,000-acre reservation east of Billings, reported the decision in a statement released by his Billings office that became known here today.

Officials of the department, who had expected Interior Secretary Rogers C. B. Morton to announce a decision momentarily after separate meetings here last Wednesday with representatives of the tribe and the leaseholders, challenged Mr. Melcher's version of the department's action. But officials did not deny that Mr. Morton was likely to favor the Indians' petition for a lease cancellation.

One top official here called the announcement "premature," saying, "An outright lease cancellation is a strong option, but there is no definite decision."

But by telephone Mr. Melcher insisted he had been "privately advised that the leases will be declared invalid." He said he had "given congratulations" to tribal leaders.

One Interior spokesman said that Mr. Melcher was "trying to get into the act."

ONCE A WARLIKE TRIBE

The 4,000 impoverished Northern Cheyenne, once one of the most warlike Plains tribes, own at least two billion tons of the low-sulphur Fort Union formation in eastern Montana, the largest single block of coal in the United States. The leases involved cover the choicest half of the Indians' coal reserves.

The leasing companies, with a $2.7-million investment there to date, are the Peabody Coal Company of St. Louis, the nation's largest coal producer; the Consolidation Coal Company of Pittsburgh, the second largest; American Metal Climax, Inc., with headquarters in New York; the Chevron Oil Company of San Francisco, a subsidiary of Standard Oil of California, and two smaller Montana-based leaseholders.

Spokesmen for the companies could not be reached today, but one Interior Department aide said that company executives learned last week that a decision for the Indians was likely and were "seething."

JOINT VENTURE PLANNED

Peabody coal announced a year ago its intention to start, as a joint venture, a major coal conversion complex on its 16,000-acre Northern Cheyenne leasehold. The company's plan was to strip-mine 500 million tons of the Indian coal for conversion into pipeline gas for the Northern Natural Gas and the Cities Service Gas Companies, utilizing at least four huge coal gasification plants around the edge of the excavated area.

Consolidation Coal, American Metal Climax, Chevron and the other leasing interests so far hold only exploration or coal prospecting permits. But the negotiations by the Bureau of Indian Affairs on these permits have led to one of the tribe's major grievances.

Exploration permits that are proved by the companies' drilling samples to be profitable for strip-mining are to "ripen" automatically into 10-year, renewable coal leases.

TWO ROYALTY RATES

The royalty rates payable to the tribe for coal removed from the reservation is 17.5 cents a ton under terms negotiated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. If the coal is used "on the reservation," the royalty falls to 15 cents a ton.

The language on the lower rate was intended to cover fuel sold cheaply to the Indians as "house coal," but it would also encompass the vast consumption of the coal gasification plants on the reservation.

The Northern Cheyenne objections were the first concerted Indian resistance to the corporate acquisition of the strip-minable, low-sulphur coal underlying half a dozen Western reservations. It began to take shape two years ago after Consolidation Coal, a mining subsidiary of the Continental Oil Company, sought to sidestep the Indian bureau's procedure requiring competitive bids on leases and to gain for itself a billion-ton corner of the reservation's coal resources.

In the summer of 1972, the company presented the tribal council a no-bid offer of 25 cents a ton in royalty payments, plus $35 an acre in land rent, plus a "bonus" of sorely needed, $1.5 million medical center at Lamedeer, the reservations' tribal center.

"OPENED INDIANS' EYES"

Tribal spokesmen said that the offer "opened the Indians' eyes." The no-bid proposition was rejected, and other coal lease and prospecting terms already negotiated by the bureau were given new scrutiny with the aid of lawyers from the Native American Rights Fund in Denver.

The tribal council early this year retained the Seattle law firm of Ziontz, Pirtle, & Morisset to press for abrogation of all leases negotiated by the bureau.

Avin J. Ziontz, the tribe's chief counsel in the dispute, said the Indians' petition contended that the bureau had "simply ignored" an array of departmental requirements in making the leases as the Northern Cheyenne trustee.

I'M BULLISH ON AMERICA

(Mr. BURLESON of Texas asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BURLESON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, a few days ago, on May 10, my able colleague, JERRY PETTIS, of California, with whom I serve on the Ways and Means Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, spoke to the Securities Industry Association, meeting in White Sulphur Springs, W. Va.

Congressman PETTIS' subject was "I'm Bullish on America." He based his remarks on H.R. 14645, which he recently introduced and which I cosponsored.

This proposed legislation is designed to promote, encourage, and stimulate an orderly and efficient market system for the U.S. economy. More specifically, this measure would establish a graduated tax on capital gains to provide incentives for new capital formation.

Mr. Speaker, this bill is basic to our capitalistic system.

It is needed now, not only for practical incentives to put dormant money into active and productive investments, but to greatly complement justice in our taxing methods.

I call this speech by Congressman PETTIS to the attention of my colleagues with the hope it finds a favorable response among you.

I'M BULLISH ON AMERICA

(By Congressman JERRY L. PETTIS)

WHITE SULPHUR SPRINGS, W. VA.

I don't have to tell any of you here today that our national economic picture is far from rosy. For the first time in history, the prime lending rate is hovering around 11-percent. While one of the more obvious implications of this unprecedented rate is a marked decline in the securities markets, this is only a reflection of many of the even deeper ills affecting U.S. economy; among them inflation, unemployment, productivity, growth.

For example, many economists are now saying that until inflation is controlled, prospects are dim for a sustained decline in interest rates back down to more historic levels. However, few have suggested a way to end two-digit inflation without suffering two-digit unemployment.

It is obvious a critical problem faces both government and industry. Also obvious is the fact that there are no short-term solutions. It's going to take a long time to effectively deal with the problem and put this nation back on a more even economic keel.

In the meantime, maintenance of a healthy market place for American capital should be a continuing object of both the private and public sectors in this country. While I cannot promise that the government alone will immediately turn the economic situation around and thus return both America and your industry to prosperity, I believe my bill, H.R. 14645, can produce some important and positive effects for the securities industry and the American market system in the years ahead.

Since this legislation was introduced, there has been some speculation that it is a special interest bill. Nothing could be farther from the truth. In my view, any measure designed to promote an orderly and efficient market system in the American economy benefits everyone and can in no way be considered special interest.

Someone asked me early this week—"Pettis, just why *did* you drop this bill?" What can I say, but—with all due respect to Merrill-Lynch—"I, too, am Bullish on America."

The main thrust of my bill is to establish a graduated tax rate on capital gains and thus provide incentives for new capital formations.

This "recycled" capital would enable the private sector to purchase new plants and equipment which, in turn, would provide more jobs for U.S. workers AND a good part of the capital expenditures needed to meet the challenges we face in areas like energy resource development, environmental clean-up, and mass transit system development.

I've made up a little scenario that I think offers a pretty good illustration of the problems involved in new capital formations today that H.R. 14645 is designed to overcome. I'd like to advance it to you now.

Back in the early forties, John Smith saved up a little money and invested in an innovative electronics firm. Today, that firm has grown into one of the biggest and most successful computer businesses in the world and the value of John's original investment has grown tremendously.

But, it's 1974, the energy crunch is upon us and new energy development is the coming thing. There's another innovative company now, one that's developed an advanced solar energy converter which has been successfully used in heating and cooling private dwellings. The company's gone public and needs new capital to adapt its product for large structures. The theory is feasible and the market for their product is certainly there if they can go ahead with the adaptation.

John Smith believes in this new company. He believes in the product and he'd like to sell his long-held stock and invest in solar energy. But if he does, he's going to have to pay an enormous capital gains tax.

So, what happens?

Mr. Smith keeps his computer stock. The Solar Development Company doesn't get the capital it needs. And the Federal Government doesn't get anything either because John's no dummy and knows if he holds onto his stock and passes it on to his children when he dies, the stock will be liable only for estate taxes which carry one of the lowest rates assessed.

Now, you tell me . . . who wins in a situation like this? The answer is nobody.

One of the great strengths of the American economy has always been its ability to provide capital where it's needed in order to create jobs. But, recently, the movement of capital has been retarded significantly by the "lock-in" effect caused by high taxes combined with inflation, and the fact that there is no significant tax assessment if capital assets are held until death.

Present laws make no provision for inflation at all. And although assets may have appreciated in value over a long period of time, in many cases this appreciation represents little more than the effect of inflation. This so-called "lock-in" prevents everyone from large corporations to small farmers and ranchers from converting their present assets to other investments.

When I went home to California over the recent Easter recess, I talked to a number of small independent businessmen, farmers, and ranchers in my own Congressional District who told me that after laboring for years, they can't afford to sell their holdings and retire because the combination of capital gains taxes they'd have to pay, plus today's spiraling inflation factor wouldn't leave them with sufficient funds to make ends meet.

The locked-in capital being held by these would-be retirees and the John Smiths throughout this nation has been estimated to run as high as $1-trillion and up. The result of this amount of capital being essentially locked out of new capital formations is that private investment has hit rock bottom. And I don't have to tell you that private investment is one of the most important factors in making our economy grow. With out investment capital, there is no growth. The economy stagnates and we're all worse off.

The problem many people have in coming to grips with economic reality is that when you throw around figures like $1-trillion, it's easy to be lulled into thinking that the supply of U.S. capital is virtually inexhaustible. That's just not so. Capital is a finite resource. There is just so much of it to go around and if you take a trillion dollars worth of capital and set it on a shelf, making it unavailable for new investment, our economic growth is going to suffer tremendously.

Another factor which must be faced is that while the present economic slow-down is not unexpected, I don't think we have to slow down to such a rate that we go backwards, which is what we are doing now. And, it is our current system of taxing capital transactions that is to a great extent to blame for this situation.

The graduated capital gains tax I am proposing would unlock much of the existing capital that's been tied up over the years and provide the necessary incentives for new essential venture capital investments.

I don't have to ask you who would benefit from this new approach.

First, it would benefit the economy by increasing capital flows and encouraging growth.

Second, it would benefit Government finances. The tax gained on this recycled capital would more than offset the losses caused by reducing rates on long-term holdings. In fact, it has been estimated that for every billion dollars of capital gains unlocked, we would realize as much as $200-million in new tax revenues.

Third, it would benefit individual taxpayers.

And, Fourth, and probably of most importance to your interests, it would improve the liquidity of our markets.

My bill contains two additional changes in the tax laws which will benefit individual taxpayers who suffer long- and short-term capital losses.

Today, if a person incurs long-term capital losses that exceed his capital gains, he is only allowed to deduct up to $1,000 of these losses against his ordinary income. I have proposed an increase in this deduction limitation to $4,000, which I believe is an equitable raise to recognize the effect of inflation that's occurred since the initial adoption of the $1,000 limitation. I have also proposed that an individual be able to carryback these losses and apply them against gains over a three preceding year period. This is the same type of carryback corporations enjoy.

And, finally, my bill proposes that short-term capital losses be fully deductible against ordinary income. It is interesting to note that professional gamblers already enjoy this privilege. They can deduct full gambling losses from gambling income when they make their peace with Uncle Sam. [In fact, one of the hundred or so individuals the press wrote about last year who made more than $200-thousand and paid no taxes at all was a gambler who declared $300-thousand in winnings and $300-thousand in losses. I don't think this particular return has been audited, but there's a funny story about another true case where a gambler was taken to tax court to prove his losses. This guy walked in with a bushel basketful of track tickets to back up his story. After careful deliberation, some $30-thousand worth of deductions were disallowed when the court threw out all the tickets with footprints on them.]

Ordinary citizens, on the other hand, must include 100-percent of their short-term *gains* in figuring their income tax liability, but are only allowed to deduct $1,000 in short-term losses. To me, short-term gains and losses should be treated alike for tax purposes. If the gains are to be fully included as ordinary income, the losses should be fully deductible.

This, then is a pretty brief synopsis of my bill and what I hope it will accomplish.

The question now is, what are the prospects for getting it passed.

When our Committee on Ways and Means decided to write an omnibus tax reform bill and try to get it passed in this Congress, we had a list of 31 possible areas to be considered.

The Chairman then took another look at this list and the time limitation we'd be working under and put a priority on the topics to be considered. The list was cut to 26, and seven items were chosen for immediate consideration because they were not expected to require extensive deliberation. And, the Committee definitely wants to enact some reforms this year.

As of this morning, we have pretty well completed mark-up on these relatively minor items. And now we are moving into the consideration of major areas.

Capital gains of course is very high on that list—and, if you will allow me to play prophet for a moment, I predict that the Committee will report a bill and it will pass the House. The only stumbling block I see to a general tax reform bill being enacted into law this year could be Senate preoccupation with other matters.

But, I assure you I will do all in my power to see that H.R. 14645 is included in the tax reform bill that passes the House.

REGULATION OF LOBBYING ACT

In compliance with Public Law 601, 79th Congress, title III, Regulation of Lobbying Act, section 308(b), which provides as follows:

(b) All information required to be filed under the provisions of this section with the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate shall be compiled by said Clerk and Secretary, acting jointly, as soon as practicable after the close of the calendar quarter with respect to which such information is filed and shall be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

The Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate jointly submit their report of the compilation required by said law and have included all registrations and quarterly reports received.

REGISTRATIONS*

*All alphanumeric characters and monetary amounts refer to receipts and expenditures on page 2, paragraphs D and E of the Quarterly Report Form.

The following registrations were submitted for the second calendar quarter 1974:

(NOTE.—The form used for report is reproduced below. In the interest of economy in the RECORD, questions are not repeated, only the essential answers are printed, and are indicated by their respective letter and number.)

FILE ONE COPY WITH THE SECRETARY OF THE SENATE AND FILE TWO COPIES WITH THE CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

This page (page 1) is designed to supply identifying data; and page 2 (on the back of this page) deals with financial data.

PLACE AN "X" BELOW THE APPROPRIATE LETTER OR FIGURE IN THE BOX AT THE RIGHT OF THE "REPORT" HEADING BELOW:

"PRELIMINARY" REPORT ("Registration"): To "register," place an "X" below the letter "P" and fill out page 1 only.

"QUARTERLY" REPORT: To indicate which one of the four calendar quarters is covered by this Report, place an "X" below the appropriate figure. Fill out both page 1 and page 2 and as many additional pages as may be required. The first additional page should be numbered as page "3," and the rest of such pages should be "4," "5," "6," etc. Preparation and filing in accordance with instructions will accomplish compliance with all quarterly reporting requirements of the Act.

Year: 19_____ ◀

REPORT

PURSUANT TO FEDERAL REGULATION OF LOBBYING ACT

P	QUARTER			
	1st	2d	3d	4th
(Mark one square only)				

NOTE ON ITEM "A".—(a) IN GENERAL. This "Report" form may be used by either an organization or an individual, as follows:

(i) "Employee".—To file as an "employee", state (in Item "B") the name, address, and nature of business of the "employer". (If the "employee" is a firm [such as a law firm or public relations firm], partners and salaried staff members of such firm may join in filing a Report as an "employee".)

(ii) "Employer".—To file as an "employer", write "None" in answer to Item "B".

(b) SEPARATE REPORTS. An agent or employee should not attempt to combine his Report with the employer's Report:

(i) Employers subject to the Act must file separate Reports and are not relieved of this requirement merely because Reports are filed by their agents or employees.

(ii) Employees subject to the Act must file separate Reports and are not relieved of this requirement merely because Reports are filed by their employers.

A. ORGANIZATION OR INDIVIDUAL FILING:

1. State name, address, and nature of business.

2. If this Report is for an Employer, list names of agents or employees who will file Reports for this Quarter.

NOTE ON ITEM "B".—*Reports by Agents or Employees.* An employee is to file, each quarter, as many Reports as he has employers, except that: (a) If a particular undertaking is jointly financed by a group of employers, the group is to be considered as one employer, but all members of the group are to be named, and the contribution of each member is to be specified; (b) if the work is done in the interest of one person but payment therefor is made by another, a single Report—naming both persons as "employers"—is to be filed each quarter.

B. EMPLOYER.—State name, address, and nature of business. If there is no employer, write "None."

NOTE ON ITEM "C".—(a) The expression "in connection with legislative interests," as used in this Report, means "in connection with attempting, directly or indirectly, to influence the passage or defeat of legislation." "The term 'legislation' means bills, resolutions, amendments, nominations, and other matters pending or proposed in either House of Congress, and includes any other matter which may be the subject of action by either House"—§ 302(e).

(b) Before undertaking any activities in connection with legislative interests, organizations and individuals subject to the Lobbying Act are required to file a "Preliminary" Report (Registration).

(c) After beginning such activities, they must file a "Quarterly" Report at the end of each calendar quarter in which they have either received or expended anything of value in connection with legislative interests.

C. LEGISLATIVE INTERESTS, AND PUBLICATIONS in connection therewith:

1. State approximately how long legislative interests are to continue. If receipts and expenditures in connection with legislative interests have terminated, place an "X" in the box at the left, so that this Office will no longer expect to receive Reports. ☐

2. State the general legislative interests of the person filing and set forth the *specific* legislative interests by reciting: (a) Short titles of statutes and bills; (b) House and Senate numbers of bills, where known; (c) citations of statutes, where known; (d) whether for or against such statutes and bills.

3. In the case of those publications which the person filing has caused to be issued or distributed in connection with legislative interests, set forth: (a) Description, (b) quantity distributed; (c) date of distribution, (d) name of printer or publisher (if publications were paid for by person filing) or name of donor (if publications were received as a gift).

(Answer items 1, 2, and 3 in the space below. Attach additional pages if more space is needed)

4. If this is a "Preliminary" Report (Registration) rather than a "Quarterly" Report, state below what the nature and amount of anticipated expenses will be; and if for an agent or employee, state also what the daily, monthly, or annual rate of compensation is to be. If this is a "Quarterly" Report, disregard this item "C4" and fill out item "D" and "E" on the back of this page. Do not attempt to combine a "Preliminary" Report (Registration) with a "Quarterly" Report.◀

AFFIDAVIT

[Omitted in printing]

PAGE 1◀

A. Action for Community Economic Development, 1126 16th Street, NW., Washington, D.C.

A. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, 15 Union Square, New York, N.Y. 10003.

A. American Association of University Women, 2401 Virginia Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.

A. Robert E. Ansheles, 1028 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Thrift Assembly, 1028 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 718, Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, 1815 H Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Soft Drink Association, 1101 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, 1815 H Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. New York State Health Facilities Association, 302 Loew Building, Syracuse, N.Y. 13202.

A. Carl F. Arnold, 1100 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Family Corp., 1902 Wynnton Road, Columbus, Ga. 31906.

A. Carl F. Arnold, 1100 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 1300 EDS Center, Exchange Park, Dallas, Tex. 75235.

A. Robert C. Barnard, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Joseph Baroody, 1100 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Credit Union National Association, Inc., 1617 Sherman Avenue, Madison, Wis.

A. Fraser Barron, 1054 Potomac Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20007.
B. Hauasupai Tribal Council, Supai, Ariz. 86435.

A. Kenneth C. Bass III, 800 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Alaska Federation of Natives, Inc., 1675 C Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501.

A. Kenneth E. BeLieu, 1725 DeSales Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Gas Supply Committee.

A. E. M. Benson, Jr., 515 South Flower Street, Los Angeles, Calif. 90017.
B. Atlantic Richfield Co., 515 South Flower Street, Los Angeles, Calif. 90017.

A. Berry & Gipson, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington D.C. 20006.
B. OEHEG, A-6020 Innsbruck, Sudtiroler Platz 8, Austria, OEMOLK, 1010 Wien, Wedertorgasse 5, Austria.

A. Mark Borinsky, 4114 Davis Place NW., Washington, D.C. 20007.
B. National Council to Control Handguns, 4114 Davis Place NW., Washington, D.C. 20007.

A. Tracy Bird, Suite 801, 1629 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Motorsports Committee of ACCUS, Suite 801, 1629 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Theodore H. Bornstein, 2028 37th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20007.

B. World Federalists, U.S.A., 2029 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Charles Bosley, 100 Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C. 20002.
B. Council for a Livable World.

A. Kenneth J. Bousquet, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. General Atomic Co., San Diego, Calif.

A. Robert M. Brandon, 133 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Tax Reform Research Group, 133 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.

A. Michael F. Brown.
B. American Frozen Food Institute, 919 18th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. G. Nicholas Buffington, 1101 17th Street NW., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 1101 17th Street NW., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Richard M. Bush, Suite 501, Barr Building, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Pacific Northwest Power Co., P.O. Box 3727, Spokane, Wash. 99220.

A. John W. Byrnes, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Foley & Lardner, 815 Connecticut Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. John W. Byrnes, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Foley & Lardner, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Camp, Carmouche, Palmer, Carwile & Barsh, Pioneer Building, Fourth Floor, Lake Charles, La. 70601.
B. State of Louisiana, Department of Conservation, P.O. Box 44275, Baton Rouge, La. 70804.

A. Caplin & Drysdale, 1101 17th Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., 2727 Allen Parkway, P.O. Box 3206, Houston, Tex. 77001.

A. Norval E. Carey, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. General Atomic Co., San Diego, Calif.

A. Robert J. Casey, 330 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.
B. Santa Fe Natural Resources, Inc., 80 East Jackson Boulevard, Chicago, Ill. 60604; Champlin Petroleum Co., P.O. Box 9365, Fort Worth, Tex.

A. Rita L. Castle, 1100 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Organization of Plastics Processors, 1100 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. V.A. Clark, 1660 L Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Outdoor Advertising Association of America, Inc., 1660 L Street NW., Washington, D.C.

A. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. CSR, Ltd., 1–7 O'Connell Street, Sydney, Australia.

A. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Natomas Co., 601 California Street, San Francisco, Calif. 94108.

A. Clifford, Warnke, Glass, McIlwain & Finney, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

B. Owens-Illinois, Inc., Madison Avenue and St. Clair Street, Box 1035, Toledo, Ohio 43601.

A. Coca-Cola Co., P.O. Drawer 1734, Atlanta, Ga. 30301.

A. Cohen and Uretz, 1730 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. PHM & Co., Exchange National Bank Building, Dallas, Tex. 75235.

A. John M. Collier, 4436 Perrier Street, New Orleans, La. 70115.
B. Southern Forest Products Association, P.O. Box 52468, New Orleans, La. 70152.

A. Collier, Shannon, Rill & Edwards, 1666 K Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Department of Information, Private Bag X152, Pretoria, 0001, Republic of South Africa.

A. Jerry C. Connors, 8111 Gatehouse Road, Falls Church, Va. 22042.
B. American Automobile Association, 8111 Gatehouse Road, Falls Curch, Va. 22042.

A. James A. Cook, 2311 West El Segundo Boulevard, Hawthorne, Calif. 90250.
B. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., 2311 West El Segundo Boulevard, Hawthorne, Calif. 90250.

A. John P. Cosgrove, 927 National Press Building, Washington, D.C. 20004.
B. National Committee for Research in Neurological Disorders, 927 National Press Building, Washington, D.C. 20004.

A. Covington & Burling, 888 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Business Men's Assurance Co. of America, BMA Tower, One Penn Valley Park, Kansas City, Mo. 64141.

A. Covington & Burling, 888 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Federation of Independent Business, Inc., 921 Washington Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.

A. Cramer, Haber & Becker, 485 L'Enfant Plaze SW., Suite 4100, Washington, D.C. 20024.
B. Action Committee for Community Services, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Corbin Crews, Hogan & Hartson, 815 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Prince George's County Bar Association, Upper Marlboro, Md.

A. Daniels & Houlihan, 1819 H Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Indian Sugar Industry Export Corp., Ltd., New Delhi, India.

A. Danzansky, Dickey, Tydings, Quint & Gordon, Suite 1010 Bender Building, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Potomac Electric Power Co., 1900 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Stephen I. Danzansky, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Potomac Electric Power Co., 1900 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Charles W. Davis, One First National Plaza, No. 5200, Chicago, Ill. 60670.
B. National Association of Independent Insurers, 2600 River Road, Des Plaines, Ill. 60018.

A. Ovid R. Davis, P.O. Drawer 1734, Atlanta, Ga. 30301.
B. Coca-Cola Co., P.O. Drawer 1734, Atlanta, Ga. 30301.

A. Donald A. Duffy, 900 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Kaiser Industries Corp., 900 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C.

A. R. Michael Duncan, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Douglas G. Dunn, 1133 15th Street NW., Suite 503, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Northern Natural Gas Co., 2223 Dodge Street, Omaha, Nebr. 68102.

A. Donnie R. Duplissey, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Lone Star Gas Co., 301 South Harwood, Dallas, Texas 75201.

A. Robert E. Ebel, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 1206, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Lone Star Gas Co., 301 South Harwood, Dallas, Tex. 75201.

A. William R. Edgar, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 1215, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. General Aviation Manufacturers Association, Inc., 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 1215, Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. M. Dale Ensign, 1625 I Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Husky Oil Co., Box 380, Cody, Wyo.

A. Frederick C. Fellingham, 1725 DeSales Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Gas Supply Committee.

A. Maurice W. Fillius, 5040 Lowell Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20016.
B. Bacardi Corp., San Juan, Puerto, Rico.

A. Fiori and Burgeson, 3204 Auburn Way North, Auburn, Wash.
B. Alaska Federation of Natives, International, 133 Queen Anne Avenue North, Seattle, Wash. 98109.

A. Susan G. Flack, 1616 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Retail Federation, 1616 H Street NW., Washington, D.C.

A. David M. Fleming, 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. M.C.I., Ltd., 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.

A. Foley & Lardner, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006
B. Natomas Co., 601 California Street, San Francisco, Calif. 94103.

A. Foley & Lardner, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.
B. United States Steel Corp., 71 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10006; Bethlehem Steel Corp., Bethlehem, Pa. 18016; Inland Steel Co., 30 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Ill. 60603.

A. Carol Tucker Foreman, 1012 14th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Consumer Federation of America, 1012 14th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.

A. Walter L. Frankland, Jr., 1717 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Silver Users Association, Inc., 1717 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Mark H. Freeman, 910 17th Street NW., Room 728, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. League of New Community Developers, 910 17th Street NW., Room 728, Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman, 600 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. Associated Independent Producers, 600 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.

A. Charles H. Fritzel, 1625 I Street NW., No. 812, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Association of Independent Insurers, 2600 River Road, Des Plaines, Ill. 60018.

A. Gailor, Burns & Elias, 700 E Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. National Association of State Savings & Loan Supervisors, 500 12th Street SW., Suite 810, Washington, D.C. 20024.

A. Geothermal Resources International, Inc., 4676 Admiralty Way, Suite 503, Marina del Rey, Calif. 90291.

A. Mary Condon Gereau, 1730 K Street NW., Suite 1101, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Treasury Employees Union, 1730 K Street NW., Suite 1101, Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Donald Gerrish.
B. American Bakers Association, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Martin D. Ginsburg, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, 767 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.
B. Association of American Publishers, One Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016.

A. Joan Goldman
B. National Women's Political Caucus, 1921 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Gore, Cladouhos & Brashares, 1750 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Tool, Die & Precision Machining Association, 9300 Livingston Road, Washington, D.C. 20022.

A. Gore, Cladouhos & Brashares, 1750 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 2055 West 190th Street, Torrance, Calif. 90504.

A. Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Collingsworth & Nelson, Harker Stanton & John Coffey, 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Williams Cos., National Bank of Tulsa, Tulsa, Okla.

A. Patricia L. Hanahan, 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Bristol-Myers Co., 345 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.

A. Henry G. Harper, P.O. Box 190, Aurora, Ill.
B. Northern Illinois Gas Co., P.O. Box 190, Aurora, Ill. 60507.

A. Stephanie Gerbi Harris, 2000 P Street NW., Suite 708, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Health Research Group, 2000 P Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Hercules Inc., 910 Market Street, Wilmington, Del. 19899.

A. Richard Hinds, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. John S. Hoff, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Protestant-Catholic Hospital Action Committee, 840 North Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, Ill.

A. John F. Horty, 4614 Fifth Avenue, Suite 921, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15213.
B. National Protestant-Catholic Hospital Action Committee, 840 North Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60611.

A. Houger, Garvey, Schubert & Barnes, Suite 810, 1019 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Lloyd M. Howard Jr., 10445 SW. 27th Street, Miami, Fla. 33165.

A. John Edward Hurley, 1101 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.

A. Lester S. Hyman, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Mazda Motors of America, Inc., 3040 East Ana Street, Compton, Calif. 90221.

A. Lester S. Hyman, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Toyo Kogyo Co., Ltd., 6047 Fuchu-Machi, Aki-Gun, Hiroshima, Japan.

A. Ivins, Phillips & Barker, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Rochester Tax Council, 1100 Midtown Tower, Rochester, N.Y. 14604.

A. Jim Jaffe.
B. American Bakers Association, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. James N. Juliana Associates, Inc., 1812 K. Street NW., Suite 301, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Consejo Estatal del Azucar, Apartados Nums. 1256 y 1258, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.

A. Sheldon Z. Kaplan, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Centro Azucarero Paraguayo, 541 Independencia Nacional, Asuncion, Paraguay.

A. T. Michael Kerr, 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.

A. David S. King, 1620 I Street, Suite 800, Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Richard D. Kisling, 9803 Cone Court, Upper Marlboro, Md. 20870.
B. Air Force Sergeants Association, 6101 28th Avenue, Marlow Heights, Md. 20031.

A. Ann Kolker, 1921 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Women's Political Caucus, 1921 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Land Improvement Contractors of America, 435 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Ill.

A. Karl S. Landstrom, 510 North Edison Street, Arlington, Va. 22203.
B. Geothermal Resources International, Inc., 4676 Admiralty Way, Suite 503, Marina del Rey, Calif. 90291.

A. League of New Community Developers, 910 17th Street NW., Room 728, Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Robert E. Lee, 1725 DeSales Street NW., Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20036.

B. National AeroSpace Services Association, 1725 DeSales Street NW., Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Robert K. Lee, Movers' Committee for Emergency Fuel Resources, P.O. Box 272, Wichita, Kans. 67201.

A. Earl T. Leonard, Jr., P.O. Drawer 1734, Atlanta, Ga. 30301.
B. Coca-Cola Co., P.O. Drawer 1734, Atlanta, Ga. 30301.

A. Leva, Hawes, Symington, Martin & Oppenheimer, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Mazda Motors of America, Inc., 3040 East Ana Street, Compton, Calif. 90221.

A. Leva, Hawes, Symington, Martin & Oppenheimer, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Protestant-Catholic Hospital Action Committee, 840 North Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60611.

A. Leva, Hawes, Symington, Martin & Oppenheimer, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Toyo Kogyo Co., Ltd., 6047 Fuchu-Machi, Aki-Gun, Hiroshima, Japan.

A. Harrison Lewis, 1660 L Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Outdoor Advertising Association of America, Inc., 1660 L Street NW., Washington, D.C.

A. Gerald M. Lowrie, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Bankers Association, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Pamela Lowry, 61 Centre Street, Brookline, Mass.
B. Massachusetts Organization to Repeal Abortions Laws, Inc., 3 Joy Street, Boston, Mass.

A. Donald C. Lubick, 1800 One M & T Plaza, Buffalo, N.Y. 14203.
B. Xerox Profit Sharing Retirement Plan, % Philip J. Canfield, Xerox Corporation, Xerox Square, Rochester, N.Y. 14603.

A. Lund Levin & O'Brien, 1625 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Shanghai Power Co., 100 West 10th Street, Wilmington, Del. 19801.

A. Christian J. Lund.
B. American Bakers Association, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Clement G. Maloney, Crystal Plaza, Apt. 405–S, 2111 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, Va. 22202.

A. ManExec, Inc., 231 East Vermijo Avenue, Box 572, Colorado Springs, Colo. 80901.
B. Red River Valley Cooperative, Inc., Box 43, Hillsboro, N. Dak. 58045.

A. J. Eugene Marans, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Clarence E. Martin, Jr., 119 South College Street, Martinsburg, W. Va. 25401.
B. Gas Supply Committee, 1725 DeSales Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Massachusetts Organization to Repeal Abortion Laws, Inc., 3 Joy Street, Boston, Mass. 02108.

A. Jon G. Massey, Suite III, 125 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Oil Investment Institute.

A. Ellen M. McCartney, 2401 Virginia Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. American Association of University Women, 2401 Virginia Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.

A. Robert A. McConnell, Jr., 4234 Winfield Scott Plaza, Scottsdale, Ariz. 85251.
B. Amerco, International, 2727 North Central Avenue, Phoenix, Ariz. 85004.

A. Joseph E. McMahon, 255 West 18th Street, New York City, N.Y.
B. Action for Community Economic Development, 1126 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C.

A. Nanine Meiklejohn, 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.

A. T. H. Meredith, 6030 Warwick Court, New Orleans, La. 70114.
B. Southern Forest Products Association, P.O. Box 52468, New Orleans, La. 70152.

A. Lawrence C. Merthan, 1015 18th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The Carpet and Rug Institute, Dalton, Ga. 30720.

A. Ernest S. Meyers, 1 East 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022.
B. Recording Industry Association of America, Inc., 1 East 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022.

A. Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin, 1320 19th Street, NW., Suite 500, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Motors Corp., 14250 Plymouth Road, Detroit, Mich. 48232.

A. Miller & Chevalier, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Hercules Inc., 910 Market Street, Wilmington, Del. 19899.

A. Miller & Chevalier, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Investors Diversified Services, Inc., IDS Tower, Minneapolis, Minn. 55402.

A. Miller & Chevalier, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Burbank, Calif.

A. Miller & Chevalier, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Santa Fe International Corp., Union Bank Square, South Tower, P.O. Box 1401, Orange, Calif. 94104.

A. Miller & Chevalier, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Sperry and Hutchinson Co., 330 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.

A. Frank A. Morgan, Suite 820, 1800 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Sun Oil Co., 240 Radnor Chester Road, St. Davids, Pa. 19087.

A. Karen Mulhauser, 705 G Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. National Abortion Rights Action League, 250 West 57th Street., New York, N.Y. 10019.

A. Daniel J. Mundy, 815 16th Street NW., Suite 603, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Building and Construction Trades Department, 815 16th Street NW., Suite 603, Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. National Association of Federally Licensed Firearms Dealers, 7001 North Clark Street, Chicago, Ill. 60626.

A. National Association of OTC Cos., Box 110, Jenkintown, Pa. 19046.

A. National Association of Real Estate, Investment Trusts, 1101 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. National Beer Wholesalers' Assn., of America, Inc., 6310 North Cicero Avenue, Chicago, Ill. 60646.

A. National Congress of Parents and Teachers, 700 North Rush Street, Chicago, Ill. 60611.

A. National Council to Control Handguns, 4114 Davis Place NW., Washington, D.C. 20007.

A. National Motorsports Committee of ACCUS, Suite 801, 1629 K Street NW., Washington, D.C.

A. National Security Traders Association, Inc., 55 Broad Street, New York, N.Y.

A. A. S. Nemir Associates, 1230 Pennsylvania Building, Washington, D.C. 20004.
B. Brazilian Sugar & Alcohol Institute, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

A. Nancy Nord, 1615 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A., 1615 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Julia J. Norrell, 1620 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Association of Trial Lawyers of America.

A. Rebekah L. Norton, 105 Sixth Street NE., No. 2, Washington, D.C. 20002.
B. American Conservative Union, 422 First Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.

A. O'Connor & Hannan, 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Federation of Independent Business, 150 West 20th Avenue, San Mateo, Calif. 94403.

A. Oil Investment Institute, Suite III, 125 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.

A. The Organization of Plastics Processors, 1100 17th Street NW., Suite 1000, Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Edward R. Osann, 2147 O Street NW., No. 201, Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. Save the Dunes Council, Inc., P.O. Box 303, Chesterton, Ind. 46304.

A. Outdoor Advertising Association of America, Inc., 1660 L Street, NW., Washington, D.C.

A. Patton, Boggs & Blow, 1200 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Association of Oil Pipe Lines, 1725 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Patton, Boggs & Blow, 1200 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Central American Sugar Council, 1200 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Patton, Boggs & Blow, 1200 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Council of State Chambers of Commerce, 1028 Connecticut Avenue, Suite 1018, Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Patton, Boggs & Blow, 1200 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

B. Outboard Marine Corp., 1401 Cushman Drive, P.O. Box 82409, Lincoln, Nebr. 68501.

A. Patton, Boggs & Blow, 1200 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. State of Louisiana, Department of Conservation, P.O. Box 44275, Baton Rouge, La. 70804.

A. Jack Pearce, Suite 808, 910 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Computer Industry Assn., 16255 Ventura Boulevard, Encino, Calif. 91316.

A. Daphne Philos, 3150 Spring Street, Fairfax, Va. 22030.
B. National Audio-Visual Association, 3150 Spring Street, Fairfax, Va. 22030.

A. Kenneth B. Pomeroy, 10404 Conover Drive, Silver Spring, Md. 20902.
B. National Association of State Foresters, 10404 Conover Drive, Silver Spring, Md. 20902.

A. Potomac Electric Power Co., 1900 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, DC. 20006.

A. Prather Levenberg Seeger Doolittle Farmer & Ewing, 1101 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Central of Sugar Producing Cooperatives of Peru, Av. Guzman Blanco 240, Lima, Peru.

A. Dan Prescott, 1800 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Mid-Continent Oil & Gas Association, 1111 Thompson Building, Tulsa, Okla. 74103.

A. Joseph H. Price, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Mazda Motors of America, Inc., 3040 East Ana Street, Compton, Calif. 90221.

A. Joseph H. Price, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Toyo Kogyo Co., Ltd., 6047 Fuchu-Machi, Aki-Gun, Hiroshima, Japan.

A. Graham Purcell, 1819 H Street NW., Suite 230, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Chicago, Ill.

A. Arthur L. Quinn, 723 Washington Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Belize Sugar Industries, Belize City, Belize.

A. Arthur L. Quinn, 723 Washington Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
G. Government of Republic of Panama, Compania Azucarera La Estrella, S.A., Azucarera Nacional, S.A., Panama City, Panama.

A. Arthur L. Quinn, 723 Washington Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Sociedad Agricola e Industrial San Carlos, S.A., Compania Azucarera Valdez, Azucarera Tropical Americana, S.A., Tababuela Industrial Azucarera, S.A., Ecuador.

A. Arthur L. Quinn, 723 Washington Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. West Indies Sugar Association, Bridgetown, Barbados.

A. Donald A. Randall, Suite 303, 910 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Automotive Service Councils, Inc., 4001 Warren Boulevard, Hillside, Ill. 60162.

A. Merrill S. Randol.
B. National Women's Political Caucus, 1921 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. William A. Raftery, 222 Cedar Lane, Teaneck, N.J. 07666.
B. The Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association, 222 Cedar Lane, Teaneck, N.J. 07666.

A. D. Michael Rappoport, P.O. Box 1980, Phoenix, Ariz. 85001.
B. Salt River Project, P.O. Box 1980, Phoenix, Ariz. 85001.

A. Reavis and McGrath, One Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10005.
B. The Pulitzer Publishing Co., 1133 Franklin Avenue, St. Louis, Mo. 53101.

A. Austin T. Rhoads, 1105 Barr Building, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. International Association of Ice Cream Manufacturers & Milk Industry Foundation, 1105 Barr Building, Washington, D.C. 10006.

A. Rice Genocide Research, P.O. Box 7307, Washington, D.C. 20044.

A. Warren S. Richardson, 1957 E Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Associated General Contractors of America, 1957 E Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Robert R. Rickett, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. James C. Roberts.
B. American Conservative Union, 422 First Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.

A. Kenneth A. Roberts, 888 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Movers Committee for Emergency Fuel Resources, c/o Robert K. Lee, P.O. Box 272, Nationwide Trailers Rental Systems, Wichita, Kans.

A. Diana Rock, 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.

A. Rogers & Wells, 1666 K Street NW., Suite 900, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Prime Land Bank, 1828 L Street NW., Suite 505, Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Francis P. Rooney, 1909 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, 320 New Center Building, Detroit, Mich. 48202.

A. Gail Rosenberg, 705 G Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. National Abortion Rights Action League, 250 West 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10019.

A. Stuart Philip Ross, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Prince George's County Bar Association, Upper Marlboro, Md.

A. Larry W. Rubin, 1319 F Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20004.
B. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America, 11 East 51st Street, New York, N.Y.

A. Perry A. Russ, 901 North Washington Street, Alexandria, Va. 22314.
B. Society of American Florists, 901 North Washington Street, Alexandria, Va. 22314.

A. G. K. Sandweg, 705 Olive Street, St. Louis, Mo. 63101.
B. Clayton Brokerage Co. of St. Louis, Inc., 7701 Forsyth Boulevard, St. Louis, Mo. 63105.

A. Santa Fe International Corp., Union Bank Square, South Tower, P.O. Box 1401, Orange, Calif., 94104.

A. Kenneth I. Schaner, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

B. National Protestant-Catholic Hospital Action Committee, 840 North Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60611.

A. Carolyn Schneider, 116 Church Street, Newton, Mass.
B. Massachusetts Organization To Repeal Abortion Laws, Inc., 3 Joy Street, Boston, Mass.

A. Patricia S. Senger, 133 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Tax Reform Research Group, 133 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.

A. J. Richard Sewell, 1701 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Florida Power & Light Co., P.O. Box 013100, Miami, Fla. 33101.

A. Larry E. Shapiro, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Blue Bell, Inc., 335 Church Street, Greensboro, N.C. 27402.

A. Sharon, Pierson, Semmes, Crolius & Finley, 1054 31st Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20007.
B. Cattle Feeders Tax Committee, P.O. Box 16086, Denver Colo.

A. Sharon, Pierson, Semmes, Crolius & Finley, 1054 31st Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20007.
B. Mauritius Sugar Syndicate, Mauritius Chamber of Agriculture, Plantation House, Port Louis, Mauritius.

A. Jowanda Shelton, 910 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Committee for Humane Legislation, Inc., 11 West 60th Street, New York, N.Y. 10023.

A. James K. Shiver, 1629 K Street NW., Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co., Cleveland, Ohio.

A. Silver Users Association, Inc., 1717 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Jean Head Sisco, 1616 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Retail Federation, 1616 H Street NW., Washington, D.C.

A. Barney J. Skladany, Jr., 1100 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Mobil Oil Corp., 150 East 42d Street, New York, N.Y. 10017.

A. Smathers, Merrigan & Herlong, 888 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Chicago Board of Trade, LaSalle at Jackson, Chicago, Ill., 60604.

A. Smathers, Merrigan & Herlong, 888 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Pennzoil Co., 900 Southwest Tower, Houston, Tex. 77002.

A. Kern Smith, 1001 3d Street SW., Washington, D.C. 20024.
B. American Society of Bariatric Physicians, Englewood, Colo.

A. Kern Smith, 1001 3d Street SW., Washington, D.C. 20024.
B. Health Industries Institute, Washington, D.C.

A. Diane Somerford, 50513 South Frederick Avenue, No. 5, Gaithersburg, Md. 20760.
B. Women's Lobby Inc., 1345 G Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.

A. Joe P. Sparks, 4234 Winfield Plaza, Scottsdale, Ariz. 85251.
B. Havasupai Tribe of Indians, Supai, Ariz.

A. Lynn E. Stalbaum, 30 F Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.

B. National Milk Producers Federation, 30 F Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.

A. Michael E. Strother, 1435 Fourth Street SW., No. B512, Washington, D.C. 20024.
B. Land Improvement Contractors of America, 435 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Ill.

A. Susan Renolds Sullivan, 72 Fox Lane, Winnetka, Ill. 60093.

A. Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, 1666 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Central States Health & Life Co. of Omaha, Howard at 18th Street, Omaha, Nebr. 68102.

A. Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, 1666 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Association of Life Companies, 1365 Peachtree Street NE., Atlanta, Ga. 30309.

A. Lloyd Symington, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Mazda Motors of America, Inc., 3040 East Ana Street, Compton, Calif. 90221.

A. Lloyd Symington, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Toyo Kogyo Co., Ltd., 6047 Fuchu-Machi, Aki-Gun, Hiroshima, Japan.

A. TADCO Enterprises, Inc., 1625 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Government of Bolivia, U.S. Embassy, 1145 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C.

A. Jerry P. Thompson, 1300 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 1300 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Francis J. Tucker, Wynnewood Plaza, Wynnewood, Pa. 19096.
B. Penn Central Co., No. 3 Penn Center Plaza, Room 823, Philadelphia, Pa. 19102.

A. C. Roger Turner, 1106 Paper Mill Road, Wyndmoor, Pa. 19118.
B. Penn Central Co., No. 3 Penn Center Plaza, Room 823, Philadelphia, Pa. 19102.

A. Richard F. Turney, 1725 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Courtney & McCamant, 1725 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Joseph D. Tydings, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Potomac Electric Power Co., 1900 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Robert J. Wager.
B. American Bakers Association, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Charls E. Walker Associates, Inc., 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Cigar Manufacturers Association of America Inc., 575 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.

A. Weisman, Celler, Spett, Modlin & Wertheimer, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 910, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, ASCAP Building, One Lincoln Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10023.

A. Morton N. Weiss, 55 Broad Street, New York, N.Y.
B. National Security Traders Association, Inc., 55 Broad Street, New York, N.Y.

A. Edward O. Welles, 5186 Watson Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20016.
B. National Council to Control Handguns, 4114 Davis Place NW., Washington, D.C. 20007.

A. Thomas F. Wenning, 1625 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Gerald M. Wieczorek, 321 East Potter, Lansing, Mich. 48910.
B. Counselors Advocate, Inc., 3132 South Pennsylvania Avenue, Lansing, Mich. 48910.

A. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Cabot Corporation, 125 High Street, Boston, Mass. 02110.

A. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Special Industry Council on Energy Conservation, c/o Discover America Travel Organization, 1100 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Williams & Jensen, 1130 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Estee Lauder, Inc., 767 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.

A. Williams & Jensen, 1130 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C., 20036.
B. James G. Freeman & Associates, 1825 Magnolia Avenue, Burlingame, Calif. 94010.

A. Williams & Jensen, 1130 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Association of School Bus Contract Operators, P.O. Box 324, Fairfax, Va. 22030.

A. Williams & King, 1620 I Street NW., Suite 800, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Noranda Mines Ltd., P.O. Box 45, Commerce Court West, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.

A. Robert G. Williams, 6521 Arlington Boulevard, Falls Church, Va. 22042.
B. The Trane Co., 3600 Pammel Creek Road, La Crosse, Wis. 54601.

A. John C. Williamson, 1730 Rhode Island Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Mobilehome Dealers National Association, 14650 Lee Road, Chantilly, Va. 22021.

A. John C. Williamson, 1730 Rhode Island Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Mortgage Insurance Cos. of America, 1730 Rhode Island Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. John C. Williamson, 1730 Rhode Island Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Apartment Association, 1825 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. James E. Wolf, 6521 Arlington Boulevard, Falls Church, Va., 22042.
B. The Trane Co., 3600 Pammel Creek Road, La Crosse, Wis. 54601.

A. Merle E. Wood, 10236 Bunker Ridge Road, Kansas City, Mo. 64137.
B.. Ewing M. Kauffman, 10236 Bunker Ridge Road, Kansas City, Mo. 64137.

A. Merle E. Wood, 10236 Bunker Ridge Road, Kansas City, Mo. 64137.
B. Marion Laboratories, Inc., 10236 Bunker Ridge Road, Kansas City, Mo. 64137.

A. Carol R. Wyrick, 5607 Greentree Road, Bethesda, Md. 20034.
B. Women's Lobby, Inc., 1345 G Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.

A. Xerox Profit Sharing Retirement Plan, % Philip Canfield, Xerox Corp., Xerox Square, Rochester, N.Y. 14603.

A. John S. Zapp, 1776 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Medical Association, 535 North Dearborn Street, Chicago, Ill. 60610.

A. Marlene Zendell, 12522 Windover Turn, Bowie, Md. 20715.
B. Women's Lobby, Inc., 1345 G Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.

A. Paul G. Zurkowski, 4720 Montgomery Lane, Bethesda, Md. 20014.
B. Information Industry Association, 4720 Montgomery Lane, Bethesda, Md. 20014.

QUARTERLY REPORTS*

*All alphanumeric characters and monetary amounts refer to receipts and expenditures on page 2, paragraphs D and E of the Quarterly Report Form.

The following quarterly reports were submitted for the first calendar quarter 1974:

(NOTE.—The form used for report is reproduced below. In the interest of economy in the RECORD, questions are not repeated, only the essential answers are printed, and are indicated by their respective letter and number.)

FILE ONE COPY WITH THE SECRETARY OF THE SENATE AND FILE TWO COPIES WITH THE CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

This page (page 1) is designed to supply identifying data; and page 2 (on the back of this page) deals with financial data.

PLACE AN "X" BELOW THE APPROPRIATE LETTER OR FIGURE IN THE BOX AT THE RIGHT OF THE "REPORT" HEADING BELOW:

"PRELIMINARY" REPORT ("Registration"): To "register," place an "X" below the letter "P" and fill out page 1 only.

"QUARTERLY" REPORT: To indicate which one of the four calendar quarters is covered by this Report, place an "X" below the appropriate figure. Fill out both page 1 and page 2 and as many additional pages as may be required. The first additional page should be numbered as page "3," and the rest of such pages should be "4," "5," "6," etc. Preparation and filing in accordance with instructions will accomplish compliance with all quarterly reporting requirements of the Act.

Year: 19_____ ◀

REPORT

PURSUANT TO FEDERAL REGULATION OF LOBBYING ACT

P	QUARTER			
	1st	2d	3d	4th
(Mark one square only)				

NOTE ON ITEM "A".—(a) IN GENERAL. This "Report" form may be used by either an organization or an individual, as follows:
(i) "Employee".—To file as an "employee", state (in Item "B") the name, address, and nature of business of the "employer". (If the "employee" is a firm [such as a law firm or public relations firm], partners and salaried staff members of such firm may join in filing a Report as an "employee".)
(ii) "Employer".—To file as an "employer", write "None" in answer to Item "B".
(b) SEPARATE REPORTS. An agent or employee should not attempt to combine his Report with the employer's Report:
(i) Employers subject to the Act must file separate Reports and are not relieved of this requirement merely because Reports are filed by their agents or employees.
(ii) Employees subject to the Act must file separate Reports and are not relieved of this requirement merely because Reports are filed by their employers.

A. ORGANIZATION OR INDIVIDUAL FILING:
1. State name, address, and nature of business.

2. If this Report is for an Employer, list names of agents or employees who will file Reports for this Quarter.

NOTE ON ITEM "B".—*Reports by Agents or Employees.* An employee is to file, each quarter, as many Reports as he has employers, except that: (a) If a particular undertaking is jointly financed by a group of employers, the group is to be considered as one employer, but all members of the group are to be named, and the contribution of each member is to be specified; (b) if the work is done in the interest of one person but payment therefor is made by another, a single Report—naming both persons as "employers"—is to be filed each quarter.

B. EMPLOYER.—State name, address, and nature of business. If there is no employer, write "None."

NOTE ON ITEM "C".—(a) The expression "in connection with legislative interests," as used in this Report, means "in connection with attempting, directly or indirectly, to influence the passage or defeat of legislation." "The term 'legislation' means bills, resolutions, amendments, nominations, and other matters pending or proposed in either House of Congress, and includes any other matter which may be the subject of action by either House"—§ 302(e).
(b) Before undertaking any activities in connection with legislative interests, organizations and individuals subject to the Lobbying Act are required to file a "Preliminary" Report (Registration).
(c) After beginning such activities, they must file a "Quarterly" Report at the end of each calendar quarter in which they have either received or expended anything of value in connection with legislative interests.

C. LEGISLATIVE INTERESTS, AND PUBLICATIONS in connection therewith:

1. State approximately how long legislative interests are to continue. If receipts and expenditures in connection with legislative interests have terminated, ☐ place an "X" in the box at the left, so that this Office will no longer expect to receive Reports.

2. State the general legislative interests of the person filing and set forth the *specific* legislative interests by reciting: (a) Short titles of statutes and bills; (b) House and Senate numbers of bills, where known; (c) citations of statutes, where known; (d) whether for or against such statutes and bills.

3. In the case of those publications which the person filing has caused to be issued or distributed in connection with legislative interests, set forth: (a) Description, (b) quantity distributed; (c) date of distribution, (d) name of printer or publisher (if publications were paid for by person filing) or name of donor (if publications were received as a gift).

(Answer items 1, 2, and 3 in the space below. Attach additional pages if more space is needed)

4. If this is a "Preliminary" Report (Registration) rather than a "Quarterly" Report, state below what the nature and amount of anticipated expenses will be; and if for an agent or employee, state also what the daily, monthly, or annual rate of compensation is to be. If this is a "Quarterly" Report, disregard this item "C4" and fill out item "D" and "E" on the back of this page. Do not attempt to combine a "Preliminary" Report (Registration) with a "Quarterly" Report.◀

AFFIDAVIT

[Omitted in printing]

PAGE 1◀

NOTE ON ITEM "D."—(a) *In General.* The term "contribution" includes *anything of value.* When an organization or individual uses printed or duplicated matter in a campaign attempting to influence legislation, money received by such organization or individual—for such printed or duplicated matter—is a "contribution." "The term 'contribution' includes a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money, or anything of value, and includes a contract, promise, or agreement, whether or not legally enforceable, to make a contribution"—Section 302(a) of the Lobbying Act.

(b) IF THIS REPORT IS FOR AN EMPLOYER.—(i) *In General.* Item "D" is designed for the reporting of all receipts from which expenditures are made, or will be made, in accordance with legislative interests.

(ii) *Receipts of Business Firms and Individuals.*—A business firm (or individual) which is subject to the Lobbying Act by reason of expenditures which it makes in attempting to influence legislation—but which has no funds to expend except those which are available in the ordinary course of operating a business not connected in any way with the influencing of legislation—will have no receipts to report, even though it does have expenditures to report.

(iii) *Receipts of Multipurpose Organizations.*—Some organizations do not receive any funds which are to be expended solely for the purpose of attempting to influence legislation. Such organizations make such expenditures out of a general fund raised by dues, assessments, or other contributions. The percentage of the general fund which is used for such expenditures indicates the percentage of dues, assessments, or other contributions which may be considered to have been paid for that purpose. Therefore, in reporting receipts, such organizations may specify what that percentage is, and report their dues, assessments, and other contributions on that basis. However, each contributor of $500 or more is to be listed, regardless of whether the contribution was made solely for legislative purposes.

(c) IF THIS REPORT IS FOR AN AGENT OR EMPLOYEE.—(i) *In General.* In the case of many employees, all receipts will come under Items "D 5" (received for services) and "D 12" (expense money and reimbursements). In the absence of a clear statement to the contrary, it will be presumed that your employer is to reimburse you for all expenditures which you make in connection with legislative interests.

(ii) *Employer as Contributor of $500 or More.*—When your contribution from your employer (in the form of salary, fee, etc.) amounts to $500 or more, it is not necessary to report such contribution under "D 13" and "D 14," since the amount has already been reported under "D 5," and the name of the "employer" has been given under Item "B" on page 1 of this report.

D. RECEIPTS (INCLUDING CONTRIBUTIONS AND LOANS):

Fill in every blank. If the answer to any numbered item is "None," write "None" in the space following the number.

Receipts (other than loans)

1. $_____Dues and assessments
2. $_____Gifts of money or anything of value
3. $_____Printed or duplicated matter received as a gift
4. $_____Receipts from sale of printed or duplicated matter
5. $_____Received for services (e.g., salary, fee, etc.)

6. $_____TOTAL for this Quarter (Add items "1" through "5")
7. $_____Received during previous Quarters of calendar year

8. $_____TOTAL from Jan. 1 through this Quarter (Add "6" and "7")

Loans Received

"The term 'contribution' includes a . . . *loan* . . ."—Sec. 302(a).

9. $_____TOTAL now owed to others on account of loans
10. $_____Borrowed from others during this Quarter
11. $_____Repaid to others during this Quarter

12. $_____"Expense money" and Reimbursements received this Quarter

Contributors of $500 or more (from Jan. 1 through this Quarter)

13. Have there been such contributors?

Please answer "yes" or "no": _____

14. In the case of each contributor whose contributions (including loans) during the "period" from January 1 through the last days of this Quarter total $500 or more:

Attach hereto plain sheets of paper, approximately the size of this page, tabulate data under the headings "Amount" and "Name and Address of Contributor"; and indicate whether the last day of the period is March 31, June 30, September 30, or December 31. Prepare such tabulation in accordance with the following example:

Amount	*Name and Address of Contributor*
	(*"Period"* from Jan. 1 through _____, 19____)
$1,500.00	John Doe, 1621 Blank Bldg., New York, N.Y.
$1,785.00	The Roe Corporation, 2511 Doe Bldg., Chicago, Ill.
$3,285.00	TOTAL

NOTE ON ITEM "E".—(a) *In General.* "The term 'expenditure' includes a payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, and includes a contract, promise, or agreement, whether or not legally enforceable, to make an expenditure"—Section 302(b) of the Lobbying Act.

(b) IF THIS REPORT IS FOR AN AGENT OR EMPLOYEE. In the case of many employees, all expenditures will come under telephone and telegraph (Item "E 6") and travel, food, lodging, and entertainment (Item "E 7").

E. EXPENDITURES (INCLUDING LOANS) in connection with legislative interests:

Fill in every blank. If the answer to any numbered item is "None," write "None" in the spaces following the number.

Expenditures (other than loans)

1. $_____Public relations and advertising services
2. $_____Wages, salaries, fees, commissions (other than item "1")
3. $_____Gifts or contributions made during Quarter
4. $_____Printed or duplicated matter, including distribution cost
5. $_____Office overhead (rent, supplies, utilities, etc.)
6. $_____Telephone and telegraph
7. $_____Travel, food, lodging, and entertainment
8. $_____All other expenditures

9. $_____TOTAL for this Quarter (Add "1" through "8")
10. $_____Expended during previous Quarters of calendar year

11. $_____TOTAL from January 1 through this Quarter (Add "9" and "10")

Loans Made to Others

"The term 'expenditure' includes a . . . *loan* . . ."—Sec. 302(b).

12. $_____TOTAL now owed to person filing
13. $_____Lent to others during this Quarter
14. $_____Repayment received during this Quarter

15. Recipients of Expenditures of $10 or More

In the case of expenditures made during this Quarter by, or on behalf of the person filing: Attach plain sheets of paper approximately the size of this page and tabulate data as to expenditures under the following heading: "Amount," "Date or Dates," "Name and Address of Recipient," "Purpose." Prepare such tabulation in accordance with the following example:

Amount	*Date or Dates—Name and Address of Recipient—Purpose*
$1,750.00	7–11: Roe Printing Co., 3214 Blank Ave., St. Louis, Mo.—Printing and mailing circulars on the "Marshbanks Bill."
$2,400.00	7–15, 8–15, 9–15: Britten & Blaten, 3127 Gremlin Bldg., Washington, D.C.—Public relations service at $800.00 per month.
$4,150.00	TOTAL

A. Aberg, Bell, Blake & Metzner, 222 West Washington Avenue, Madison, Wis. 53703.
B. Credit Union National Association, Inc., ICU Services Corp., 1617 Sherman Avenue, Madison, Wis. 53704.
D. (6) $5,107.50. E. (9) $6,305.56.

A. Robert K. Aberg, 222 West Washington Avenue, Madison, Wis. 53703.
B. Aberg, Bell, Blake & Metzner, 222 West Washington Avenue, Madison, Wis. 53703.
D. (6) $2,809.12. E. (9) $662.67.

A. John J. Adams, Suite 1060, 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Ethyl Corp., 330 South Fourth Street, Richmond, Va.
D. (6) $250.

A. John J. Adams, Suite 1060, 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Vepco, Seventh and Franklin Streets, Richmond, Va.
D. (6) $200.

A. Clarence G. Adamy, 1725 I Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. National Association of Food Chains, 1725 I Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $300.

A. Ad Hoc Committee of Shipbuilders, 1200 18th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $19,558.

A. Aerospace Industries Association of America, Inc., 1725 De Sales Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $9,062.40. E. (9) $9,062.40.

A. AFL–CIO Maritime Committee, 100 Indiana Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
D. (6) $2,000. E. (9) $2,306.35.

A. Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Institute, 1815 North Fort Myer Drive, Arlington, Va. 22209.
E. (9) $624.

A. Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association, P.O. Box 5800, Washington, D.C. 20014.

A. Air Traffic Control Association, Inc., Suite 409, ARBA Building, 525 School Street SW., Washington, D.C. 20024.

A. Alderson, Catherwood, Ondov & Leonard, 105 East Oakland Avenue, Austin, Minn. 55912.
B. The Hormel Foundation, Austin, Minn. 55912.

A. Willis W. Alexander, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The American Bankers Association, 1120 Connecticut Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $1,500. E. (9) $8,507.34.

A. Nicholas E. Allen, 444 Shoreham Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Music Operators of America, Inc., 228 North LaSalle Street, Chicago, Ill. 60601.
D. (6) $2,070. E. (9) $107.98.

A. Altman, Kurlander & Weiss, 125 South Clark Street, Chicago, Ill. 60603.
D. (6) $99.26. E. (9) $3,502.

A. Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL–CIO, 5025 Wisconsin Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20016.

A. Amalgamated Transit Union, National Capital Local Division 689, 100 Indiana Avenue NW., No. 403, Washington, D.C. 20001.

A. American Academy of Family Physicians, 1740 West 92d Street, Kansas City, Mo. 64114.
D. (6) $7,646.07. E. (9) $7,646.07.

A. American Association of Meat Processors, 224 East High Street, Elizabethtown, Pa. 17022.
D. (6) $348.92. E. (9) $71.27.

A. American Automobile Association, 8111 Gatehouse Road, Falls Church, Va. 22042.

A. The American College of Radiology, 20 North Wacker Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60606.
D. (6) $1,701.76. E. (9) $1,701.76.

A. American Conservative Union, 422 1st Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $25,344.79. E. (9) $24,214.15.

A. American Consulting Engineers Council, 1155 15th Street NW., Suite 713, Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $7,500. E. (9) $7,500.

A. American Dental Association, 211 East Chicago Avenue, Chicago, Ill. 60611.
D. (6) $5,103.39. E. (9) $5,103.39.

A. American Farm Bureau Federation, 225 Touhy Avenue, Park Ridge, Ill. 60068.
D. (6) $41,044. E. (9) $41,044.

A. American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, 815 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $62,504.85.

A. American Feed Manufacturers Association, Inc., 1701 North Fort Myer Drive, Arlington, Va. 22209.
D. (6) $300. E. (9) $300.

A. American Frozen Food Institute, 919 18th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $226,338.20. E. (9) $2.195.72.

A. American Hotel & Motel Association, 888 Seventh Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10019.
D. (6) $3,227.85. E (9) $3,743.85.

A. The American Humane Association, 5351 South Roslyn Street, Englewood, Colo.
E. (9) $1,800.

A. American Insurance Association, 85 John Street, New York, N.Y. 10038.
D. (6) $36,537.38. E. (9) $36,537.38.

A. American Israel Public Affairs Committee, 1341 G Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $30,346.90. E. (9) $21,362.42.

A. American Land Title Association, Suite 303, 1828 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $896.10.

A. American Life Insurance Association, Inc., 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $1,613.21.

A. American Maritime Association, 17 Battery Place North, New York, N.Y. 10004.
E. (9) $842.22.

A. American Medical Association, 535 North Dearborn Street, Chicago, Ill. 60610.
E. (9) $28,166.28.

A. American Mutual Insurance Alliance, 20 North Wacker Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60606.
E. (9) $4,580.

A. American National Cattlemen's Association, 1001 Lincoln, Denver, Colo. 80202.
E. (9) $3,246.90.

A. American Paper Institute, Inc., 260 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016.
E. (9) $1,188.57.

A. American Petroleum Institute, 1801 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $61,836. E. (9) $48,953.

A. American Physical Therapy Association, 1156 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $8,010.34. E. (9) $8,010.34.

A. American Podiatry Association, 20 Chevy Chase Circle NW., Washington, D.C. 20015.
E. (9) $14,046.27.

A. American Postal Workers Union, AFL–CIO, 817 14th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $1,309,126.53. E. (9) $87,909.57.

A. American Pulpwood Association, 605 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.

A. American Short Line Railroad Association, 2000 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $854.34. E. (9) $854.34.

A. The American Society of Radiologic Technologists, 500 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 836, Chicago, Ill. 60611.
D. (6) $3,766.83. E. (9) $4,203.35.

A. American Surveys, Embassy Square, Suite 901, 2000 N Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Customs Brokers & Forwarders Association of America, Inc., 1 World Trade Center, Suite 1109, New York, N.Y. 10048.
D. (6) $150. E. (9) $61.88.

A. American Textile Machinery Association, 1730 M Street NW., Washington, D.C., 20036.
D. (6) $519.45.

A. American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc., 1501 Johnston Building, Charlotte, N.C. 28281.
D. (6) $18,114.68. E. (9) $18,114.68.

A. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 1616 P Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $10,290.06. E. (9) $57,907.62.

A. American Veterinary Medical Association, 1522 K Street NW., Suite 828, Washington, D.C. 20005.
E. (9) $640.

A. The American Waterways Operators, Inc., 1250 Connecticut Avenue, Suite 502, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $157,028. E. (9) $2,787.20.

A. Donald E. Anderson.
B. National Cable Television Association, 918 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $8,750. E. (9) $75.

A. J. Lem Anderson, 400 First Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. Eastex Inc., 219 North Bowie Street, Jasper, Tex.
D. (6) $800. E. (9) $459.14.

A. Scott P. Anger, 1725 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Superior Oil Co., P.O. Box 1521, Houston, Tex. 77001.

A. Leonard Appel.
B. Everett Terminal Co., Inc., Hewitt Avenue Marine Terminal, P.O. Box 1478, Everett, Wash. 98206.
D. (6) $7,758.90. E. (9) $219.93.

A. Clarence A. Arata, Metropolitan Washington Board of Trade, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $16,250.

A. John C. Archer, 1515 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. 22209.
B. American Gas Association, 1515 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. 22209.
D. (6) $550. E. (9) $300.

A. Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, 1815 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Soft Drink Association, 1101 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $75. E. (9) $1.

A. Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, 1815 H Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. New York State Health Facilities Association, 302 Loew Building, Syracuse, N.Y. 13202.
E. (9) $62.91.

A. Carl F. Arnold, 1100 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Petroleum Institute, 1801 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $7,500.

A. Carl F. Arnold, 1100 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Realty Committee, 230 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.
D. (6) $1,250. E. (9) $52.65.

A. Carl F. Arnold, 1100 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Securities Industry Association, 20 Broad Street, New York, N.Y. 10005.
D. (6) $791.60. E. (9) $66.05.

A. Arnold & Porter, 1229 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Bottled Water Association, 1411 West Olympic Boulevard, Los Angeles, Calif. 90015.

A. Arnold & Porter, 1225 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 464 Ellis Street, Mountain View, Calif. 94040.

A. Arnold & Porter, 1229 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., Nutley, N.J. 07110.
D. (6) $650. E. (9) $4.

A. Arnold & Porter, 1229 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 1125 15th Street N.W., Washington, D.C.
E. (9) 47.63.

A. Arnold & Porter, 1229 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Realty Committee, Inc., 230 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.
D. (6) $102.42. E. (9) $235.69.

A. Judith A. Assmus, 1763 R Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
B. Washington Research Project Action Council, 1763 R Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
D. (6) $1,500.

A. The Associated General Contractors of America, 1957 E Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Association for the Advancement of Invention & Innovation, Suite 301, Crystal Mall 1, 1911 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, Va. 22202.
D. (6) $4,275. E. (9) $2,869.29.

A. Association of American Railroads, American Railroads Building, Room 211, 1920 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $4,246.13, E. (9) $4,246.13.

A. Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc., 1735 DeSales Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $13.57.

A. Association of Oil Pipe Lines, 1725 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Association on Japanese Textile Imports, Inc., 551 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.
E. (9) $500.

A. Atlantic Richfield Co., 515 South Flower Street, Los Angeles, Calif. 90071.
D. (6) $1,200. E. (9) $300.

A. Robert L. Augenblick, 1775 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Investment Co. Institute, 1775 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) 50. E. (9) $3.50.

A. Richard W. Averill, 1730 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Optometric Association, c/o Jack A. Potter, 820 First National Bank Building, Peoria, Ill. 61602.
D. (6) $800. E. (9) $301.

A. Kenneth L. Bachman, Jr., 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Kenneth L. Bachman, Jr., 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Donald L. Badders, 2030 M Street NW., Suite 800, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. TRW Credit Data, One Space Park, Redondo Beach, Calif. 90278.
D. (6) $352. E. (9) $129.70.

A. Carl E. Bagge, Coal Building, Washington D.C. 20036.
B. National Coal Association, Coal Building, Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $529.68.

A. John C. Bagwell, 723 Investment Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, Honolulu, Hawaii.

A. George F. Bailey, Jr., P.O. Box 21, Montgomery, Ala. 36101.
B. Alabama Railroad Association, P.O. Box 21, Montgomery, Ala. 36101.

A. James F. Bailey, 101 Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 101 Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
D. (6) $6,175. E. (9) $595.

A. Grace C. Baisinger, 2870 Arizona Terrace NW., Washington, D.C. 20016.
B. National Congress of Parents and Teachers, 700 North Rush Street, Chicago, Ill., 60611.
E. (9) $453.14.

A. Emil F. Baker, 1303 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Fleet Reserve Association, 1303 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Thomas F. Baker, 1101 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Soft Drink Association.
D. (6) $66.72. E. (9) $5..

A. Donald Baldwin, Suite 906, 1625 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. PEPCO, 1900 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,000. E. (9) $300.

A. Donald F. Bale, 955 L'Enfant Plaza North, SW., Washington, D.C. 20024.
B. The Boeing Co., P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Wash. 98124.
D. (6) $575. E. (9) $175.

A. Thomas H. Barksdale, 1801 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Petroleum Institute, 1801 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $8,250. E. (9) $210.

A. Robert C. Barnard, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Robert C. Barnard, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Robert C. Barnard, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Irvin L. Barney, 400 First Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. Brotherhood Railway Carmen of the United States and Canada, 4929 Main Street, Kansas City, Mo. 64112.
D. (6) $5,166.65.

A. James C. Barr, 1156 15th Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. National Association of Federal Credit Unions, 1156 15th Street NW., Suite 315, Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $300. E. (9) $117.50.

A. Robert W. Barrie, 777 14th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. General Electric Co., 570 Lexington Avenue, New York, N.Y.
D. (6) $216.

A. David S. Barrows, 214 Century Building, Portland, Oreg. 97205.
B. Association of Oregon and California Land Grant Counties, Douglas County Courthouse, Roseburg, Oreg. 97470.
D. (6) $1,200.

A. T. Michael Barry, 1771 N Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Association of Broadcasters, 1771 N Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $500. E. (9) $126.56.

A. Weldon Barton.
B. The Farmers' Educational and Co-Operative Union of America, P.O. Box 2251, Denver, Colo.
D. (6) $4,907.74. E. (9) $132.30.

A. Kenneth C. Bass, III, 800 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Alaska Federation of Natives, Inc., 1675 C Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501.
D. (6) $800. E. (9) $6.30.

A. William M. Bates, 2016 Peachtree Center Building, Atlanta, Ga. 30303.
B. Georgia Farm Bureau Federation.
D. (6) $9,000. E. (9) $2,483.05.

A. Batzell & Nunn, 1523 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Independent Gasoline Marketers Council, 1523 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $2,500.

A. Batzell & Nunn, 1523 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Independent Terminal Operators Association, 1523 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $500.

A. Donald S. Beattie, 400 First Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 2001.
B. Congress of Railway Unions.
E. (9) $1,609.70.

A. Daniel S. Bedell, 1125 15th Street, NW., No. 600, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 8000 East Jefferson Avenue, Detroit, Mich. 48214.
D. (6) $5,353.28. E. (9) $355.24.

A. John H. Beidler, 1125 15th Street, NW., No. 600, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 8000 East Jefferson Avenue, Detroit, Mich. 48214.
D. (6) $7,545.80. E. (9) $375. 80.

A. Page Belcher, 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Suite 404, Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $82.

A. Thomas S. Belford, 2030 M Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Common Cause, 2030 M Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $225.

A. E. M. Benson, Jr., 515 South Flower Street, Los Angeles, Calif. 90071.
B. Atlantic Richfield Co., 515 South Flower Street, Los Angeles, Calif. 90071.
D. (6) $900.

A. Berl Bernhard, 1660 L Street, NW., Suite 1101, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The Common Fund, 635 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.
D. (6) $2,500. E. (9) $226.59.

A. Berry & Gipson, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Atlanta Corp., 17 Varick Street, New York, N.Y. 10013.
D. (6) $8,000. E. (9) $905.05.

A. Berry & Gipson, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. East-West Trade Council, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Max N. Berry, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Meat Products Group, American Importers Association, 420 Lexington Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.

A. Robert L. Bevan, 1120 Connecticut Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The American Bankers Association, 1120 Connecticut Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $4,000. E. (9) $362.

A. Andrew J. Biemiller, 815 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, 815 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $10,153. E. (9) $226.55.

A. Walter J. Bierwagen, 5025 Wisconsin Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20016.
B. Amalgamated Transit Union, 5025 Wisconsin Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20016.

A. Lydia Bitter, 1801 K Street NW., Suite 1201, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. United States Independent Telephone Association, 1801 K Street NW., Suite 1201, Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $80. E. (9) $80.

A. Neal R. Bjornson, 30 F Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. National Milk Producers Federation, 30 F Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
D. (6) $1,250. E. (9) $78.66.

A. John W. Black, 1800 K Street, NW., Suite 920, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Bank of America N.T. and S.A., Bank of America Plaza, San Francisco, Calif. 94137.

A. Jerald Blizin, 1425 K Street, NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Hill and Knowlton, 633 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.

A. Nancy Blum, 215 10th Street, SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Women's Lobby, Inc., 1345 G Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $942. E. (9) $483.65.

A. Blumberg, Singer, Ross, Gottesman & Gordon, 245 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.
B. Cigar Manufacturers Association of America, Inc., 575 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.
D. (6) $12,000.

A. Becky Bogard, 2600 Virginia Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. American Public Power Association, 2600 Virginia Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
D. (6) $360.

A. Theodore H. Bornstein, 2028 37th Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20007.
B. World Federalists, U.S.A., 2029 K Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $2,302.66. E. (9) $70.21.

A. Charles E. Bosley, 100 Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C.
B. Council for a Livable World.
D. (6) $3,600. E. (9) $31.80.

A. G. Stewart Boswell, Suite 1001, 1150 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Textile Manufacturers Institute, 1501 Johnston Building, Charlotte, N.C. 28281.
D. (6) $937.50. E. (9) $54.46.

A. Charles G. Botsford, 1730 M Street NW., Suite 609, Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. A. D. Bourland, 1660 L Street NW., Suite 804, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. General Motors Corp., 3044 West Grand Boulevard, Detroit, Mich.
D. (6) $3,000. E. (9) $2,519.74.

A. Kenneth J. Bousquet, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. General Atomic Co., San Diego, Calif.
D. (6) $1,600. E. (9) $350.

A. Rodney A. Bower, 1126 16th Street NW., Room 200, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. International Federation of Professional & Technical Engineers, AFL–CIO, 1126 16th Street NW., Room 200, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $240. E. (9) $20.

A. J. Wiley Bowers, 415 Pioneer Building, Chattanooga, Tenn. 37402.
B. Tennessee Valley Public Power Association, 415 Pioneer Building, Chattanooga, Tenn. 37402.

A. Edward L. Bowley, 817 14th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. American Postal Workers Union, AFL–CIO, 817 14th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $7,890.55. E. (9) $1,366.32.

A. Melvin J. Boyle, 1125 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL–CIO–CLC, 1125 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $6,333.

A. George E. Bradley, 1341 G Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Organization of Professional Employees of USDA, 1341 G Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $900. E. (9) $25.

A. Wayne W. Bradley, 1776 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Medical Association, 535 North Dearborn Street, Chicago, Ill. 60610.
D. (6) $1,250. E. (9) $720.

A. Charles N. Brady, 8111 Gatehouse Road, Falls Church, Va. 22042.
B. American Automobile Association, 8111 Gatehouse Road, Falls Church, Va. 22042.

A. Joseph E. Brady, Room 122, Sheraton Gibson Hotel, Cincinnati, Ohio.
B. National Coordinating Committee of the Beverage Industry.

A. Charles G. Bragg, P.O. Box 12285, Memphis, Tenn. 38112.
B. National Cotton Council of America, P.O. Box 12285, Memphis, Tenn. 38112.

A. Edward J. Brenner, Suite 301, Crystal Mall 1, 1911 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, Va. 22202.
B. Association for the Advancement of Invention and Innovation, Suite 301, Crystal Mall 1, 1911 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, Va. 22202.

A. Bill Brier, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $1,687.49. E. (9) $140.43.

A. Parke C. Brinkley, the Madison Building, 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. National Agricultural Chemicals Association.

A. Wally Briscoe.
B. National Cable Television Association, Inc., 918 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $135. E. (9) $16.50.

A. John Broadbent, 161 East 42d Street, New York, N.Y. 10017.
B. Recycled Paperboard Division of the American Paper Institute, 260 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016.

A. David A. Brody, 1640 Rhode Island Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, 315 Lexington Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016.
D. (6) $450

A. Michael D. Bromberg, 1101 17th Street, NW., Suite 810, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Federation of American Hospitals, 1101 17th Street NW., Suite 810, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $4,500.

A. W. S. Bromley, 605 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.
B. American Pulpwood Association, 605 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.

A. George Bronz, 888 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $5,000. E. (9) $6.36.

A. J. Colvin Brown, Jr., 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
B. National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
D. (6) $100.

A. J. D. Brown, 2600 Virginia Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. American Public Power Association, 2600 Virginia Avenue NW.
D. (6) $500.

A. Michael F. Brown.
B. American Frozen Food Institute, 919 18th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $100. E. (9) $25.

A. Travis Taylor Brown, 2525 49th Street NW., Washington, D.C.

A. Brownstein Zeidman Schomer & Chase, Suite 900, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Council of Housing Producers, Suite 308, 10920 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, Calif. 90024.

A. Brownstein Zeidman Schomer & Chase, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. International Franchise Association, 7315 Wisconsin Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20014.

A. Brownstein Zeidman Schomer & Chase, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 900, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Massachusetts Bankers Association, Inc., 125 High Street, Boston, Mass. 02110.
E. (9) $66.

A. Brownstein Zeidman Schomer & Chase, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 900, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Mobile Home Manufacturers Association, 14650 Lee Road, Chantilly, Va. 22021.

A. Brownstein Zeidman Schomer & Chase, Suite 900, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, DC. 20036.
B. Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corp., MGIC Plaza, Milwaukee, Wis. 53201.

A. Lawrence E. Bruce, Jr., 1125 15th Street NW., Washington, DC. 20005.
B. Mortgage Bankers Association of America, 1125 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $2,438. E. (9) $4,883.

A. Marguerite E. Bryan, 400 First Street NW., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. District No. 1—Pacific Coast District, Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association, AFL–CIO, 17 Battery Place, New York, N.Y 10004.
D. (6) $900. E. (9) $89.20.

A. George S. Buck, Jr., P.O. Box 12285, Memphis, Tenn. 38112.
B. National Cotton Council of America, P.O. Box 12285, Memphis, Tenn. 38112.

A. Philip N. Buckminster, 1100 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Chrysler Corp., 12000 Oakland Avenue, Highland Park, Mich. 48231.
D. (6) $2,000. E. (9) $347.65.

A. Robert D. Buehler, 1800 K Street NW., Suite 929, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. B. F. Goodrich Co., Akron, Ohio 44318.
D. (6) $350.

A. Norman D. Burch, 1175 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. College of American Pathologists, 230 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Ill. 60601.
D. (6) $3,375. E. (9) $211.34.

A. J. J. Burke, Jr., 40 East Broadway, Butte, Mont. 59701.
B. Montana Power Co., Butte, Mont. 59701.
E. (9) $308.04.

A. Burley & Dark Leaf Tobaccos Expansion Association, P.O. Box 860, Lexington, Ky. 40501.
D. (6) $10,000. E. (9) $1,083.88.

A. Phil Burnett, 1030 15th Street NW., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. National Cotton Council of America, P.O. Box 12285, Memphis, Tenn. 38112.
D. (6) $363.28.

A. George Burnham IV, 1625 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. United States Steel Corp., 600 Grant Street, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15230.
D. (6) $365. E. (9) $395.

A. Charles S. Burns, 1620 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Phelps Dodge Corp., 300 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.
D. (6) $1,200. E. (9) $330.10.

A. David Burpee, Fordhook Farms, Doylestown, Pa. 18901.
E. (9) $21.

A. Richard M. Bush, Suite 501, Barr Building, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Pacific Northwest Power Co., P.O. Box 3727, Spokane, Wash. 99220.
E. (9) $250.

A. Business Executives Move for New National Priorities, 901 North Howard Street, Baltimore, Md. 21201.
D. (6) $16,591.18. E. (9) $1,409.98.

A. Harry W. Buzzerd, Jr., 1030 15th Street NW., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. National Cotton Council of America, P.O. Box 12285, Memphis, Tenn. 38112.
D. (6) $312.50. E. (9) $8.72.

A. John W. Byrnes, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Foley & Lardner, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. John W. Byrnes, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Foley & Lardner, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Charles S. Caldwell, 900 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. United Mine Workers of America, 900 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $5,375.04.

A. Charles Argyll Campbell, 1615 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Chamber of Commerce of the USA, 1615 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $256.80.

A. Carl C. Campbell, 1050 15th Street NW., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. National Cotton Council of America, P.O. Box 12285, Memphis, Tenn. 38112.
D. (6) $175.78.

A. Charles O. Campbell, 8111 Gatehouse Road, Falls Church, Va. 22042.
B. American Automobile Association, 8111 Gatehouse Road, Falls Church, Va. 22042.

A. Sharyn G. Campbell, 1620 I Street NW., Suite 603, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National BankAmericard, Inc., 555 California Street, San Francisco, Calif. 94126.
D. (6) $2,500. E. (9) $2,747.18.

A. W. Dean Cannon, Jr., 1444 Wentworth Ave., P.O. Box R, Pasadena, Calif, 91109.
B. California Savings & Loan League, 1444 Wentworth Avenue, P.O. Box R, Pasadena, Calif. 91109.
D. (6) $1,500.

A. Capital Holding Corp., Commonwealth Building, Louisville, Ky.
E. (9) $1,000.

A. Marvin Caplan.
B. Industrial Union Department, AFL–CIO, 815 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $3,249.40. E. (9) $105.15.

A. Caplin & Drysdale, 1101 17th Street NW., Suite 1100, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., Hartford, Conn. 06115; Fidelity Mutual Life Insurance Co., P.O. Box 7318; Philadelphia, Pa. 19101; John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., One Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010.

A. Norval E. Carey, 1025 Connecticut Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. General Atomic Co., San Diego, Calif.
D. (6) $1,000. E. (9) $375.

A. Philip Carlip, 675 Fourth Avenue, Brooklyn, N.Y. 11232.
B. Seafarers International Union.
D. (6) $2,500. E. (9) $1,972.46.

A. Elizabeth Carpenter, 1425 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Hill and Knowlton, Inc., 633 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.
D. (6) $270. E. (9) $15.

A. L. C. Carpenter, 201 South Seventh Street, Columbia, Mo.
B. Midcontinent Farmers Association.
D. (6) $5,299.32. E. (9) $898.30.

A. Henry A. Carrington, 1200 17th Street NW., Suite 500, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Savings & Loan League, 1200 17th Street NW., Suite 500, Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. John R. Carson, 20 Chevy Chase Circle NW., Washington, D.C. 20015.
B. American Podiatry Association, 20 Chevy Chase Circle NW., Washington, D.C., 20015.
D. (6) $6,250.

A. David C. Carter, 1156 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. United States Beet Sugar Association, 1156 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.

A. John L. Casey, 127 East 59th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022.
B. Investment Counsel Association of America, Inc., 127 East 59th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022.

A. Casey, Lane & Mittendorf, 26 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10004.
B. South African Sugar Association, P.O. Box 507, Durban, South Africa.
E. (9) $3,376.42.

A. Robert J. Casey, 330 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.
B. Santa Fe Natural Resources, Inc., 80 East Jackson Boulevard, Chicago, Ill.; Champlin Petroleum Co., P.O. Box 9365, Fort Worth, Tex.
E. (9) $3,152.80.

A. James B. Cash, Jr., 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

B. The American Bankers Association, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $3,000. E. (9) $147.35.

A. James Cassese, Sr., 400 First Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes, 400 First Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
D. (6) $3,600.

A. Frank R. Cawley, 511 Wilson Plaza Building, 2425 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. 22201.
B. Agricultural Publishers Association, 511 Wilson Plaza Building, 2425 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. 22201.
D. (6) $76. E. (9) $60.27.

A. Frank R. Cawley, 1625 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1625 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Frank R. Cawley, Room 511, Wilson Plaza Building, 2425 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. 22201.
B. Media General, Inc., 333 East Grace Street, Richmond, Va. 23219.
D. (6) $150. E. (9) $80.95.

A. Center for Public Financing of Elections, 201 Massachusetts Avenue NE., Washington, D.C. 20002.
D. (6) $13,632.51. E. (9) $21,862.38.

A. Central America Cooperative Federation, Inc., 918 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $665.72.

A. J. M. Chambers & Co., Inc., 2300 Calvert Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20008.
B. Cordage Institute, 2300 Calvert Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20008.
D. (6) $1,062.50.

A. J. M. Chambers & Co., Inc., 2300 Calvert Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20008.
B. Satra Corp., 475 Park Avenue South, New York, N.Y. 10016.
D. (6) $1,500.

A. Justice M. Chambers, 2300 Calvert Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20000.
B. Swaziland Sugar Association, P.O. Box 445, Mbabane, Swaziland.
D. (6) $7,500. E. (9) $902.20.

A. Donald E. Channell, 1705 DeSales Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Bar Association, 1705 DeSales Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $500. E. (9) $20.

A. James W. Chapman, 1625 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Retired Officers Association, 1625 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,590.

A. William C. Chapman, 1660 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. General Motors Corp., 3044 West Grand Boulevard, Detroit, Mich. 48202.
D. (6) $3,000. E. (9) $4,222.35.

A. Nancy H. Chasen, 133 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Congress Watch, 133 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $500.

A. Hal M. Christensen, 1101 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Dental Association, 1101 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $3,000.

A. Albert T. Church, Jr., 1625 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Institute of Merchant Shipping, 1625 K Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Cigar Manufacturers Association of America, Inc., 575 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.
D. (6) $43,592.25.

A. Citizens for Control of Federal Spending, 1629 K Street NW., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $46,501. E. (9) $34,953.01.

A. Earl W. Clark, 100 Indiana Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. Labor-Management Maritime Committee.
D. (6) $1,650. E. (9) $33.15.

A. Kimball Clark, 40 Ivy Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Association of American Railroads, 1920 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $162.76. E. (9) $183.97.

A. Richard W. Clark, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Common Cause, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $4,749.99.

A. Robert M. Clark, 1100 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 80 East Jackson Boulevard, Chicago, Ill. 60604.

A. Clay Pipe Industry Depletion Committee, P.O. Box 6, Pittsburgh, Kans. 66762.

A. Joan Claybrook, 133 C Street SE, Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Congress Watch, 133 C Street SE, Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $800.

A. Jacob Clayman, 815 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Industrial Union Department, AFL–CIO, 815 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $875.

A. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The Charter Oil Co., P.O. Box 4726, Jacksonville, Fla. 32202.
D. (6) $500.

A. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. CSR, Ltd., 1–7 O'Connell Street, Sydney, Australia.
E. $18.20.

A. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Interbank Card Association, Suite 3600, 110 East 59th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022.

A. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Marion Corp., 316 Bel-Air Boulevard, Mobile, Ala. 36606.
D. (6) $750.

A. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Natomas Co., 601 California Street, San Francisco, Calif. 94108.
E. (9) $77.50.

A. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The Oil Shale Corp., 680 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10019.

A. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Peugeot, Inc., 300 Kuller Road, Clifton, N.J. 07015.

A. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association, 1075 Central Park Avenue, Scarsdale, N.Y. 10533.
E. (9) $197.20.

A. Earle C. Clements, 1776 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Brands, Inc., 245 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.
E. (9) $90.

A. Earle C. Clements, 1776 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., Louisville, Ky. 40201.
E. (9) $90.

A. Earle C. Clements, 1776 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Liggett & Myers Inc., 4100 Roxboro Road, Durham, N.C. 27702.
E. (9) $90.

A. Earle C. Clements, 1776 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Lorillard, Division of Loews Theatres, Inc., 200 East 42d Street, New York, N.Y. 10017.
E. (9) $90.

A. Earle C. Clements, 1776 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Philip Morris Inc., 100 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.
E. (9) $90.

A. Earle C. Clements, 1776 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc., Winston-Salem, N.C. 27102.
E. (9) $90.

A. Earle C. Clements, 1776 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Tobacco Institute, Inc., 1776 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Ronald D. Clements, 1016 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Association of Plumbing-Heating-Cooling Contractors, 1016 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $90.

A. Clifford, Warnke, Glass, McIlwain & Finney, 815 Connecticut Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20007.
B. Avco Corp., 750 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.
D. (6) $270. E. (9) $68.25.

A. Clifford, Warnke, Glass, McIlwain & Finney, 815 Connecticut Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Bessemer and Lake Erie Railroad Co., 600 Grant Street, P.O. Box 536, Pittsburg, Pa. 15230.

A. Clifford, Warnke, Glass, McIlwain & Finney, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 955 L'Enfant Plaza North SW., Washington, D.C. 20024.

A. Clifford, Warnke, Glass, McIlwain & Finney, 815 Connecticut Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. New York Cocoa Exchange, Inc., 127 John Street, New York, N.Y.; New York Coffee & Sugar Exchange, Inc., 79 Pine Street, New York, N.Y.; Commodity Exchange, Inc., 81 Broad Street, New York, N.Y.
E. (9) $221.

A. Clifford, Warnke, Glass, McIlwain & Finney, 815 Connecticut Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Owens-Illinois, Inc., Madison Avenue and St. Clair Street, Box 1035, Toledo, Ohio 43601.
D. (6) $250. E. (9) $60.80.

A. Larry D. Cline, 1315 16th Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Limestone Institute, Inc., 1315 16th Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $30.50.

A. Coalition to End Grand Jury Abuse, 412 Fifth Street, NW., Room 708, Washington, D.C.

A. Grover B. Cobb, 1200 Travis, Houston, Tex.
B. Houston Natural Gas Corp., P.O. Box 1188, Houston, Tex. 77002.
D. (6) $375. E. (9) $1,444.35.

A. Grover C. Cobb, 1771 N Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Association of Broadcasters, 1771 N Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $3,000. E. (9) $400.

A. The Coca-Cola Bottlers' Association, 166 16th Street, NW., Atlanta, Ga. 30328.
E. (9) $3,135.41.

A. Jeffery Cohelan, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Group Health Association of America, Inc., 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $999.99.

A. David Cohen, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Common Cause, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $6,562.44.

A. Cohen and Uretz, 1730 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, % Jose A. Cabranes, 1625 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Cohen and Uretz, 1730 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. McDonnell Douglas Finance Corp., 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, Calif. 90801.

A. Timothy A. Colcord, 1620 I Street NW., Suite 603, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National BankAmericard, Inc., 555 California Street, San Francisco, Calif. 94126.
D. (6) $6,875. E. (9) $7,855.54.

A. Eleanor Cole, 720 Hotel Washington, Washington, D.C. 20004.
B. UBA, Inc.
D. (6) $1,000. E. (9) $1,000.

A. R. Michael Cole, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Common Cause, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $4,749.99. E. (9) $31.

A. Robert E. Cole, 320 New Center Building, Detroit, Mich. 48202.
B. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S., Inc., 1909 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Robert T. Cole, 1200 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. H. H. Robertson Co., Two Gateway Center, Pittsburgh, Pa.
D. (6) $1,795. E. (9) $71.09.

A. Robert T. Cole, 1200 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. PPG Industries, Inc., One Gateway Center, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15222.

A Coles & Goertner, 1000 Connecticut Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Committee of American Tanker Owners, Inc., One Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10005.

A. Coles & Goertner, 1000 Connecticut Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Committee, 1612 K Street NW., Suite 510, Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. William J. Colley, 1776 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Medical Association, 535 North Dearborn Street, Chicago, Ill. 60610.
D. (6) $2,400. E. (9) $810.

A. Collier, Shannon, Rill & Edwards, 1666 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Cylinder Manufacturers Committee, 1666 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $35.

A. Collier, Shannon, Rill & Edwards, 1666 K Street NW., Suite 701, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Footwear Industries Association, Inc., 1611 North Kent Street, Arlington, Va. 22209.
D. (6) $500. E. (9) $475.

A. Collier, Shannon, Rill & Edwards, 1666 K Street NW., Suite 701, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Bicycle Manufacturers Association of America, Inc., 122 East 42d Street, New York, N.Y. 10017.
D. (6) $500. E. (9) $100.

A. Collier, Shannon, Rill & Edwards, 1666 K Street NW., Suite 701, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Department of Information, Private Bag X152, Pretoria, 0001, Republic of South Africa.
D. (6) $3,000. E. (9) $3,700.

A. Collier, Shannon, Rill & Edwards, 1666 K Street NW., Suite 701, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Association of Food Chains, 1725 I Street NW., Washington, D.C.
E. (9) $300.

A. Collier, Shannon, Rill & Edwards, 1666 K Street NW., Suite 701, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Broiler Council, 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $300.

A. Collier, Shannon, Rill & Edwards, 1666 K Street NW., Suite 701, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Tool & Stainless Steel Industry Committee, 1666 K Street NW., Suite 701, Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,250. E. (9) $75.

A. James F. Collins, 1000 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Iron & Steel Institute, 150 East 42d Street, New York, N.Y.
D. (6) $500. E. (9) $125.

A. Robert B. Collyer, 720 Hotel Washington, Washington, D.C. 20004.
B. UBA, Inc.
D. (6) $1,000. E. (9) $1,000.

A. Colorado Railroad Association, 702 Majestic Building, Denver, Colo. 80202.
B. Colorado Railroad Association, 702 Majestic Building, Denver, Colo.

A. Committee for Modern, Efficient Transportation, Suite 818, 910 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $16,500. E. (9) $16,550.40.

A. Committee for Study of Revenue Bond Financing, 1000 Ring Building, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $62,525. E. (9) $8,422.35.

A. Committee of Copyright Owners, 1600 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,555.29. E. (9) $9,720.56.

A. Committee on Strikes in Transportation, 1101 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Common Cause, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $1,789,707.23. E. (9) $395,466.90.

A. The Common Fund, 635 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.
E. (9) $5,453.20.

A. Computer Industry Association, Inc., 16255 Ventura Boulevard, Encino, Calif. 91316.
D. (6) $60,457. E. (9) $6,941.

A. Harold B. Confer, 245 Second Street NE., Washington, D.C.
B. Friends Committee on National Legislation, 245 Second Street NE., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $1,541.

A. Richard J. Congleton, 734 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Academy of Actuaries, 208 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, Ill. 60604.
D. (6) $900. E. (9) $73.40.

A. Richard J. Congleton, 734 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 1285 Avenue of the Americas, New York, N.Y. 10019.
D. (6) $1,500. E. (9) $200.

A. Congress of Railway Unions, 400 First Street NW., Room 800, Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. Congress of Railway Unions.
D. (6) $8,539.39. E. (9) $8,538.99.

A. Congress Watch, 133 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $3,321.22. E. (9) $3,321,22.

A. Raymond F. Conkling, 1001 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Texaco, Inc., 135 East 42d Street, New York, N.Y. 10017.
D. (6) $200. E. (9) $62.45.

A. Connecticut Bankers Association, 100 Constitution Plaza, Hartford, Conn. 06103.
D. (6) $2,629.21. E. (9) $2,629.21.

A. Robert J. Conner, Jr., 1100 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Chrysler Corp., 12000 Oakland Avenue, Highland Park, Mich. 48231.
D. (6) $500. E. (9) $305.

A. Jerry C. Connors, 8111 Gatehouse Road, Falls Church, Va., 22042.
B. American Automobile Association, 8111 Gatehouse Road, Falls Church, Va. 22042.

A. Consolidated Natural Gas Service Co., Inc., Four Gateway Center, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15222.
E. (9) $4.

A. Bernard J. Conway, 211 East Chicago Avenue, Chicago, Ill. 60611.
B. American Dental Association, 211 East Chicago Avenue, Chicago, Ill. 60611.
D. (6) $2,600.

A. Jack T. Conway, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Common Cause, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $2,812.50.

A. Cook & Franke, 660 East Mason Street, Milwaukee, Wis. 53202.
B. M&I Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 770 North Water Street, Milwaukee, Wis. 53202.
D. (6) $500. E. (9) $170.01.

A. Harry N. Cook, Suite 200, 1130 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The National Waterways Conference, Inc.

A. Howard Lee Cook, Jr., 1776 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Medical Association, 535 North Dearborn Street, Chicago, Ill. 60610.
D. (6) $2,000. E. (9) $1,170.

A. Eileen D. Cooke, 110 Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C. 20002.
B. American Library Association, 50 East Huron Street, Chicago, Ill. 60611.
D. (6) $627.60.

A. John R. Cooper, Suite 801, 1629 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Motorsports Committee of ACCUS. Suite 801, 1629 K Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,500. E. (9) $1,114.21.

A. Joshua W. Cooper, 626 South Lee Street, Alexandria, Va. 22314.
B. Portsmouth, Kittery Armed Services Committee, Inc., Box 1123, Portsmouth, N.H. 03801.
D. (6) $2,500. E. (9) $301.36.

A. Mitchell J. Cooper, 1001 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Council of Forest Industries, 1055 West Hastings Street, Vancouver 1, Canada.
D. (6) $3,000. E. (9) $23.85.

A. Mitchell J. Cooper, 1001 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Footwear Division, Rubber Manufacturers Association, 444 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y.
D. (6) $10,000. E. (9) $67.66.

A. Cooperative League of the U.S.A., 1828 L Street NW., Suite 1100, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $2,500. E. (9) $825.

A. Darrell Coover, 1625 Eye Street NW., No. 812, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Association of Independent Insurers, 2600 River Road, Des Plaines, Ill. 60018.
(D. (6) $2,000. E. (9) $268.

A. James T. Corcoran, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Association of Motor Bus Owners, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $975. E. (9) $87.50.

A. Allan D. Cors, 1800 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Corning Glass Works, Corning, N.Y. 14830.

A. Bertram Robert Cottine, 2000 P Street NW., Suite 708, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Health Research Group, 2000 P Street NW., Suite 708, Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Robert M. Coultas, 1612 K Street NW., Suite 508, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Institute for Rapid Transit, 1612 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Council for a Livable World, 100 Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $4,439.44. E. (6) $4,439.44.

A. Council for the Advancement of the Psychological Professions & Sciences, 1725 I Street NW., Suite 606, Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $37,530.65. E. (9) $5942.02.

A. Council of State Chambers of Commerce, 1028 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C.
D. (6). $1,592.50. E. (9) $1,595.30.

A. Counihan, Casey & Loomis. 1000 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Adhesive & Sealant Council, 1410 Higgins Road, Park Ridge, Ill. 60068.

A. Counihan, Casey & Loomis, 1000 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Corn Millers Federation, 1030 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.

A. Counihan, Casey & Loomis, 1000 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Association of Bituminous Contractors, 1000 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Counihan, Casey & Loomis, 1000 Connecticut Avenue, Washington D.C. 20036.
B. Classroom Periodical Publishers Association, 1000 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Counihan, Casey & Loomis, 1000 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Industrial Diamond Association of America, 59 East Main Street, Moorestown, N.J. 08057.

A. Counihan, Casey & Loomis, 1000 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Kohler Co., Kohler, Wis. 53004.

A. Counihan, Casey & Loomis, 1000 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Linen Supply Association of America, 975 Arthur Godfrey Road, Miami Beach, Fla. 33140.

A. Counihan, Casey & Loomis, 1000 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Association of Casualty & Surety Agents, 5225 Wisconsin Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20015.

A. Counihan, Casey & Loomis, 1000 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Association of Printing Ink Manufacturers, 101 Executive Blvd., Elmsford, N.Y. 10523.

A. Counihan, Casey & Loomis, 1000 Connecticut Avenue, Washington D.C. 20036.
B. National Erectors Association, 1800 North Kent Street, Arlington, Va.

A. Counihan, Casey & Loomis, 1000 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Glass Dealers Association, 1000 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Counihan, Casey & Loomis, 1000 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Optical Manufacturers Association, 1730 North Lynn Street, Arlington, Va. 22209.

A. Paul L. Courtney, 1725 K. Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $300.

A. Roger C. Courtney, 1730 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

B. American Optometric Association, c/o Jack A. Potter, 820 First National Bank Building, Peoria, Ill. 61602
D. (6) $264.96. E. (9) $258.55.

A. Covington & Burling, 888 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Machine Tool Distributors Association, 1500 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.

A. Covington & Burling, 888 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Business Men's Assurance Co. of America, BMA Tower, 1 Penn Valley Park, Kanass City, Mo. 64141.

A. Covington & Burling, 888 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Investment Company Institute, 1775 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $3,750. E. (9) $12.15.

A. Covington & Burling, 888 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Irving Trust Co., 1 Wall Street, New York, N.Y. 10015.
D. (6) $5,000. E. (9) $21.01.

A. Covington & Burling, 888 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. MGIC Investment Corp., 600 Marine Plaza, Milwaukee, Wis. 43201.
D. (6) $1,000.

A. Covington & Burling, 888 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Machine Tool Builders Association, 7901 Westpark Drive, McLean, Va. 22101.

A. Eugene S. Cowen, 9024 Willow Valley Drive, Potomac, Md. 20854.
B. American Broadcasting Co., 1150 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $56. E. (9) $56.

A. Cox, Langford & Brown, 21 Dupont Circle NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Association of Research Libraries, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $2.

A. Cox, Langford & Brown, 21 Dupont Circle NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The National Collegiate Athletic Association, U.S. Highway 50 and Nall Avenue, P.O. Box 1906, Shawnee Mission, Kans. 66222.
D. (6) $680. E. (9) $10.80.

A. Robert W. Crawford, 1625 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Association of General Merchandise Chains, Inc., 1625 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $9,999.99. E. (9) $1,180.35.

A. Hubert M. Crean, 1801 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Petroleum Institute, 1801 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Richard C. Creighton, 1957 E Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Associated General Contractors of America, 1957 E Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,000.

A. P. H. Croft, 2000 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Short Line Railroad Association, 2000 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $832.50.

A. H. C. Crotty, Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 12050 Woodward Avenue, Detroit, Mich. 48203.

A. Jack A. Crowder, Suite 1001, 1150 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Textile Manufacturers Institute, 1501 Johnston Building, Charlotte, N.C. 28281.
D. (6) $1,500. E. (9) $55.34.

A. William Cudlip, 320 New Center Building, Detroit, Mich. 48202.
B. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S., Inc., 320 New Center Building, Detroit, Mich. 48202.

A. William E. Cumberland, 1125 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Mortgage Bankers Association of America, 1125 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $581. E. (9) $3,716.

A. Frank Cummings, 1250 Connecticut Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 345 East 47th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017.
D. (6) $4,000.

A. John T. Curran, 905 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL–CIO, 905 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $8,250. E. (9) $3,689.56.

A. William Kay Daines, 1616 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Retail Federation, 1616 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,100. E. (9) $274.90.

A. Thomas A. Daly, 1101 16th Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Soft Drink Association.

A. Daniels & Houlihan, 1819 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Importers Association, 420 Lexington Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.
D. (6) $6,000. E. (9) $412.91.

A. Daniels & Houlihan, 1819 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Indian Sugar Industry Export Corp., Ltd., New Delhi, India.
E. (9) $239.10.

A. Daniels & Houlihan, 1819 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Japan Lumber Importers Association, Tokyo, Japan.

A. Daniels & Houlihan, 1819 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Office Machine Dealers Association, 1510 Jarvis Avenue, Elkgrove, Ill. 60007.
D. (6) $4,000. E. (9) $585.59.

A. Fred E. Darling, 110 Maryland Avenue NE., Suite 510, Washington, D.C. 20002.
B. Non-Commissioned Officers Association of USA, P.O. Box 2268, San Antonio, Tex. 78298.
D. (6) $435.

A. Philip J. Daugherty.
B. Industrial Union Department, AFL–CIO, 815 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $3,165. E. (9) $153.56.

A. John B. Davenport, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
B. National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
D. (6) $155.

A. Aled P. Davies, 59 East Van Buren Street, Chicago, Ill. 60605.
B. American Meat Institute, 59 East Van Buren Street, Chicago, Ill. 60605.
D. (6) $100. E. (9) $118.55.

A. Charles W. Davis, One First National Plaza, No. 5200, Chicago, Ill. 60670.
B. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 4444 Lawrence Avenue, Chicago, Ill. 60630.

A. Charles W. Davis, One First National Plaza, 5200, Chicago, Ill. 60670.
B. The First National Bank of Chicago, One First National Plaza, Chicago, Ill. 60670.
D. (6) $1,137. E. (9) $720.37.

A. Charles W. Davis, One First National Plaza, No. 5200, Chicago, Ill. 60670.
B. Inland Steel Co., 30 West Monroe Street, Chicago, Ill. 60603.
D. (6) $400.

A. Charles W. Davis, One First National Plaza, No. 5200, Chicago, Ill. 60670.
B. The Myron Stratton Home, P.O. Box 1178, Colorado Springs, Colo. 80901.

A. Charles W. Davis, One First National Plaza, No. 5200, Chicago, Ill. 60670.
B. Northwest Industries, Inc., 400 West Madison Street, Chicago, Ill 60606.

A. Charles W. Davis, One First National Plaza, No. 5200, Chicago, Ill. 60670.
B. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Sears Tower, Chicago, Ill. 60684
D. (6) $29,510. E. (9) $598.33

A. Charles W. Davis, One First National Plaza, No. 5200, Chicago, Ill. 60670.
B. Trans Union Corp., 111 West Jackson Blvd., Chicago, Ill. 60604.

A. Charles W. Davis, One First National Plaza, No. 5200, Chicago, Ill. 60670.
B. United Insurance Co. of America, One East Wacker Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60601.

A. Claire Davis, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
B. National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
D. (6) $150.

A. R. Hilton Davis, 1615 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A., 1615 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Walter L. Davis, 1775 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Retail Clerks International Association, AFL–CIO, 1775 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $750.

A. P. M. Davison, Jr., 418 East Rosser Avenue, P.O. Box 938, Bismarck, N. Dak. 58501.
B. North Dakota Railway Lines.
E. (9) $4.21.

A. Dawson, Quinn, Riddell, Taylor & Davis, 723 Washington Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. National Cystic Fibrosis Research Foundation, 3379 Peachtree Road NE., Atlanta, Ga. 30326.
D. (6) $3,750. E. (9) $270.32.

A. Dawson, Quinn, Riddell, Taylor & Davis, 723 Washington Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. National Wool Grower Association, 600 Crandall Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101.
D. (6) $4,500. E. (9) $929.93.

A. Charles W. Day, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Ford Motor Co., Dearborn, Mich. 48121.
D. (6) $325. E. (9) $265.

A. J. Edward Day, 21 Dupont Circle NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Associated Third Class Mail Users, 1725 K. Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. J. Edward Day, 21 Dupont Circle, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Electronic Industries Association, 2001 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Ronald B. Dear, 422 First Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. American Conservative Union, 422 First Street, SE., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $2,500.03.

A. Tony T. Dechant.
B. The Farmers' Educational and Co-Operative Union of America, P.O. Box 2251, Denver, Colo.
D. (6) $4,000. E. (9) $161.91.

A. DeHart and Broide, Inc., 1505 22d Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. Clairol, Inc., 345 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.
D. (6) $410. E. (9) $86.

A. DeHart and Broide, Inc., 1505 22d Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. Recording Industry Association of America, Inc., 1 East 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022.
D. (6) $210. E. (9) $10.

A. John L. Delano, P.O. Box 1172, Helena, Mont. 59601.
B. Montana Railroad Association, P.O. Box 1172, Helena, Mont. 59601.

A. Richard A. Dell, 2000 Florida Avenue N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009.
B. National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
D. (6) $150.

A. Vincent A. Demo, 25 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10004.
B. New York Committee of International Committee of Passenger Lines, 25 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10004.
D. (6) $7,500. E. (9) $2,600.

A. Ray Denison, 815 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, 815 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $6,942. E. (9) $389.70.

A. Claude J. Desautels, Suite 811, 1725 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, One Lincoln Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10023.

A. Claude J. Desautels, Suite 811, 1725 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Emergency Committee for American Trade, 1211 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Claude J. Desautels, Suite 811, 1725 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., One Liberty Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10006.

A. R. Daniel Devlin, 1000 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 605 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016.
E. (9) $210.

A. Ralph B. Dewey, 1150 17 Street NW., Suite 1109, Washington, D.C. 20036.

B. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 77 Beale Street, San Francisco, Calif. 94106.
D. (6) $1,760. E. (9) $984.24.

A. John M. Dickerman, 1730 Rhode Island Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Lumber & Building Material Dealers Association, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $6,029.28. E. (9) $126.20.

A. Timothy V. A. Dillon, 1730 Rhode Island Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Committee for Marysville Dam, P.O. Drawer B, Marysville, Calif. 95902.
D. (6) $1,023. E. (9) $23.

A. Timothy V. A. Dillon, 1730 Rhode Island Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Department of Water Resources, State of California, P.O. Box 388, Sacramento, Calif. 95802.
D. (6) $2,315.85. E. (9) $155.85.

A. Timothy V. A. Dillon, 1730 Rhode Island Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Sacramento Yolo Port District, Sacramento, Calif.
D. (6) $766.30. E. (9) $26.30.

A. Disabled American Veterans, 3725 Alexandria Pike, Cold Spring, Ky. 41076.
D. (6) $43,244.55. E. (9) $43,244.55.

A. William H. Dodds, 1125 15th Street NW., Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 8000 East Jefferson Avenue, Detroit, Mich. 48214.
D. (6) $6,449.94. E. (9) $860.40.

A. James F. Doherty, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Group Health Association of America, Inc., 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $4,304.99.

A. Robert C. Dolan, 1140 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 1010, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Association of Electric Cos., 1140 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 1010, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $387.50. E. (9) $87.28.

A. Edward V. Donahue, 1900 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Graphic Arts International Union, 1900 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $2,280. E. (9) $2,362.

A. Jack Donahue, 1725 I Street NW., Suite 606, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Council for the Advancement of the Psychological Professions & Sciences, 1725 I Street NW., Suite 606, Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,089. E. (9) $267.66.

A. Leo J. Donahue, 230 Southern Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Association of Nurserymen, 230 Southern Building, Washington, D.C. 20003.

A. Gary W. Donnelly, 1315 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Limestone Institute, Inc., 1315 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $35.60.

A. James A. Dorsch, 1701 K Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Health Insurance Association of America, 1701 K Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $379.25. E. (9) $96.89.

A. C. L. Dorson, Suite 529, Munsey Building, Washington, D.C. 20004.
B. Retirement Federation of Civil Service Employees of the U.S. Government, Suite 529, Munsey Building, Washington, D.C. 20004.
D. (6) $2,943.60. E. (9) $225.

A. Carol Ann Douglas, 3100 Connecticut Avenue NW., No. 204, Washington, D.C. 20008.
B. Women's Lobby, Inc., 1345 G Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.

A. Dow, Lohnes & Albertson, 1225 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Advance Schools, Inc., 5900 Northwest Highway, Chicago, Ill. 60631.

A. Richard Morgan Downey, 133 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Congress Watch, 133 C Street, Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $200.

A. F. Raymond Downs, 1801 K Street NW., Suite 1104, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Procter & Gamble Manufacturers Co., 301 East Sixth Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202.

A. Harry J. Doyle, 1730 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Optometric Association, % Jack A. Potter, 820 First National Bank Building, Peoria, Ill. 61602.
D. (6) $735.30. E. (9) $490.95.

A. Robert H. Doyle, 2029 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Society of Professional Engineers, 2029 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $4,031.25.

A. Andrew Drance, Room 511, Wilson Plaza Building, 2425 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. 22201.
B. Media General, Inc., 333 East Grace Street, Richmond, Va. 23219.
D. (6) $241.50. E. (9) $61.39.

A. Dean W. Drulias, 1730 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Optometric Association, % Jack A. Potter, 820 First National Bank Building, Peoria, Ill. 61602.
D. (6) $226.16. E. (9) $301.64.

A. Franklin B. Dryden.
B. The Tobacco Institute, Inc., 1776 K Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $120. E. (9) $120.

A. Evelyn Dubrow, 1710 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10019.
B. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 1710 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10019.
D. (6) $4,329. E. (9) $3,051.50.

A. Donald A. Duffy, 900 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Kaiser Industries Corp., 900 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C.

A. William E. Duke, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Atlantic Richfield Co., 515 South Flower Street, Los Angeles, Calif. 90071.
D. (6) $600. E. (9) $300.

A. M. L. DuMars, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
B. National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
D. (6) $60.

A. Norman Duncan, 1156 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. J. C. Penney Co., Inc., 1301 Avenue of the Americas, New York, N.Y. 10019.
D. (6) $350. E. (9) $120.20.

A. R. Michael Duncan, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. R. Michael Duncan, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Douglas G. Dunn, 1133 15th Street NW., Suite 503, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Northern Natural Gas Co., 2223 Dodge Street, Omaha, Nebr. 68102.
D. (6) $1,500.

A. J. D. Durand, 1725 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Association of Oil Pipe Lines, 1725 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. J. Frederick Durr, R.R. 2, Sheridan, Ind. 46069.
B. National Association of Farmer Elected Committeemen, R.R. 2, Sheridan, Ind. 46069.
E. (9) $88.70.

A. Roy W. Easley, 1735 DeSales Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc., 1735 De Sales Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. East-West Trade Council, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $564.16.

A. N. Boyd Ecker, 1100 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Mobil Oil Corp., 150 East 42d Street, New York, N.Y. 10017.
D. (6) $1,500. E. (9) $42.75.

A. Arthur B. Edgeworth, Jr., 1709 New York Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. United States League of Savings Associations, 111 East Wacker Drive, Chicago, Ill.
D. (6) $587.50.

A. Hallett D. Edson, 956 North Monroe Street, Arlington, Va. 22201.
B. National Association for Uniformed Services, 956 North Monroe Street, Arlington, Va. 22201.
D. (6) $1,883.40.

A. E. Neel Edwards, Jr.
B. National Federal of Independent Business, 921 Washington Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $2,500. E. (9) $298.26.

A. J. Rodney Edwards, 260 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016.
B. American Paper Institute, 260 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016.
E. (9) $373.78.

A. Macon T. Edwards, 1030 15th Street NW., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. National Cotton Council of America, P.O. Box 12285, Memphis, Tenn. 38112.
D. (6) $375. E. (9) $30.13.

A. J. C. B. Ehringhaus, Jr., 1600 South Eads Street, Arlington, Va. 22202.
B. Tobacco Institute, Inc., 1776 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Harmon L. Elder, 2000 L Street NW., Suite 520, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Wilson E. Hamilton & Associates, Inc., 2000 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $250. E. (9) $82.76.

A. John Doyle Elliott, 5500 Quincy Street, Hyattsville, Md. 20784.

A. Ruth Bowdey Elliott, 5500 Quincy Street, Hyattsville, Md. 20784.
D. (6) $3,703. E. (9) $2,664.26.

A. Frank Ellis Associates, Inc., Suite 400, 1730 North Lynn Street, Arlington, Va. 22209.
E. (9) $195.10.

A. John C. Ellis, 1957 E Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Associated General Contractors of America, 1957 E Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,000.

A. Emergency Committee for American Trade, 1211 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $8,868.32. E. (9) $18,328.63.

A. Richard W. Emory, 1800 Mercantile Bank & Trust Building, 2 Hopkins Plaza, Baltimore, Md. 21201.
B. Maryland State Fair and Agricultural Society, Inc., Timonium State Fair Grounds, Timonium, Md. 21093.
E. (9) $51.91.

A. Employers Insurance of Wausau, 2000 Westwood Drive, Wausau, Wis. 54401.
E. (9) $1,092.67.

A. Lowell J. Endahl, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
B. National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
D. (6) $235.

A. Gertrude Engel, 2450 Virginia Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. Bob Hoffman, York Barbell Co., York, Pa., 27405.
D. (6) $1,750. E. (9) $261.01.

A. Grover W. Ensley, 200 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.
B. National Association of Mutual Savings Banks, 200 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.
D. (6) $1,863.

A. Glenn R. Erickson, 1616 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Retail Federation, 1616 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,400. E. (9) $225.

A. Russell G. Ernest, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., 1014, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Exxon Corp., 1251 Avenue of the Americas, New York, N.Y. 10020.

A. John D. Fagan, 200 Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C. 20002.
B. Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S.
D. (6) $3,364. E. (9) $22.

A. Robert R. Fahs, 1030 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Cargill, Inc., 1200 Cargill Building, Minneapolis, Minn. 55402.
D. (6) $2,500. E. (9) $25.25.

A. Mrs. Joseph S. Fair, 1900 Lamont Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20010.
B. Calling Concerned Christian Countrymen, P.O. Box 2866, Washington, D.C. 20013.
D. (6) $364.

A. Farmers' Educational and Cooperative Union of America, P.O. Box 2251, Denver, Colo.
D. (6) $109,468.10. E. (9) $31,976.49.

A. Federation of American Controlled Shipping, 17 Battery Place North, New York, N.Y. 10004.
D. (6) $700. E. (9) $700.

A. Federation of American Hospitals, 1101 17th Street NW., Suite 810, Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $4,500.

A. Fruzsina H. Fedlam, 1730 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. League of Women Voters of the United States, 1730 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $550.

A. Herbert A. Fierst, 607 Ring Building, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Council of Forest Industries of British Columbia, 1500/1055 West Hastings Street, Vancouver 1, British Columbia, Canada.
D. (6) $8,875.02. E. (9) $235.

A. Herbert A. Fierst, 607 Ring Building, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Joint Committee of Printing and Publishing Industries of Canada, 321 Bloor Street, East, Toronto 5, Ontario, Canada.
D. (6) $999.99. E. (9) $155.

A. Francis S. Filbey, 817 14th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 817 14th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $5,514.21.

A. Mathew P. Fink, 1775 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Investment Co. Institute, 1775 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $51. E. (9) $6.

A. Thomas W. Fink, 1030 15th Street NW., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. National Cotton Council of America, P.O. Box 12285, Memphis, Tenn. 38112.
D. (6) $210. E. (9) $10.

A. James W. Finley, 1660 L Street NW., Suite 915, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Crown Zellerbach Corp., One Bush Street, San Francisco, Calif. 94119.

A. Firearms Lobby of America, 325 Pennsylvania Avenue SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $8,893.80. E. $8,237.59.

A. Susan G. Flack, 1616 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Retail Federation, 1616 H Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $1,300. E. (9) $450.

A. William J. Flaherty, 1221 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Disabled American Veterans, 3725 Alexandria Pike, Cold Springs, Ky.
D. (6) $7,250.

A. Carl J. Fleps, 1000 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The Greyhound Corp., Greyhound Towers, Phoenix, Ariz. 85077.
D. (6) $315. E. (9) $45.

A. John F. Fochtman, 1776 K Street Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Medical Association, 535 North Dearborn Street, Chicago, Ill. 60610.
D. (6) $2,000. E. (9) $660.

A. Foley & Lardner, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Cabot Corp. and Subsidiaries, 125 High Street, Boston, Mass. 02110.

A. Foley & Lardner, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Natomas Co., 601 California Street, San Francisco, Calif. 94108.
A. Gordon Forbes, 203 Hanover Building, 480 Cedar Street, St. Paul, Minn. 55101.
B. Minnesota Railroads Association.
D. (6) $500. E. (9) $387.45.

A. Tim C. Ford, 1800 K Street, Washington, D.C.
B. Glass Container Manufacturers Institute.
E. (9) $368.15.

A. Carol Tucker Foreman, 10 2 14th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Consumer Federation of America, 1012 14th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $612. E. (9) $60.

A. James W. Foristel, 1776 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Medical Association, 535 North Dearborn Street, Chicago, Ill. 60610.
D. (6) $2,300. E. (9) $480.

A. John S. Forsythe, 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Life Insurance Association, Inc., 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $90. E. (9) $23.35.

A. David H. Foster.
B. National Cable Television Association Inc., 918 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $2,500. E. (9) $237.50.

A. The Four C's, P.O. Box 2866, Washington, D.C. 20013.
D. (6) $955.07. E. (9) $926.73.

A. John G. Fox, 2000 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 195 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10007.

A. Joe H. Foy, 1200 Travis, Houston, Tex.
B. Houston Natural Gas Corp., P.O. Box 1188, Houston, Tex. 77002.
D. (6) $1,000. E. (9) $1,412.11.

A. Walter L. Frankland, Jr., 1717 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Silver Users Association, Inc., 1717 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $750. E. (9) $89.61.

A. Donald A. Frederick, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, 1129 20th Street, NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $465.83. E. (9) $25.93.

A. James O. Freeman, 1709 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. United States League of Savings Associations, 111 East Wacker Drive, Chicago, Ill.
D. (6) $2,375. E. (9) $21.50.

A. Mark H. Freeman, 910 17th Street NW., Suite 728, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. League of New Community Developers, 910 17th Street NW., Suite 728, Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $3,000. E. (9) $65.63.

A. Benjamin W. Fridge, 1900 South Eads Street, Arlington, Va. 22202.
B. National Rifle Association of America, 1600 Rhode Island Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $3,750. E. (9) $1,179.91.

A. Susan Fridy, 30 F Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. National Milk Producers Federation, 30 F Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $500. E. (9) $99.35.

A. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman, 600 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.

B. The Hualapai Tribe of the Hualapai Reservation, Peach Springs, Ariz.
D. (6) $78.25. E. (9) $34.45.

A. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman, 600 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. The Navajo Tribe, Window Rock, Ariz.
E. (9) $1,356.14.

A. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman, 600 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. Salt River Pima-Maricopa Community, Box 120, Route 1, Scottsdale, Ariz.
D. (6) $238. E. (9) $4.50.

A. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman, 600 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. The Seneca Nation of Indians, Box 268–A, Saylor Building, Irving, N.Y. 10481.

A. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman, 600 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. The Tuscarora Indian Nation, Lewiston, N.Y.
D. (6) $73.

A. Philip P. Friedlander, Jr., 1343 L Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. National Tire Dealers & Retreaders Association, 1343 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $375. E. (9) $6.

A. Gay H. Friedmann, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Lone Star Gas Co., 301 South Harwood, Dallas, Tex. 75201.
D. (6) $1,000. E. (9) $273.52.

A. Friends Committee on National Legislation, 245 Second Street NE., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $77,618. E. (9) $12,689.

A. Owen V. Frisby, 900 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. The Chase Manhattan Bank, 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York, N.Y.
D. (6) $393.75. E. (9) $1,590.67.

A. Frank W. Frisk, Jr., 2600 Virginiia Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. American Public Power Association, 2600 Virginia Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
D. (6) $650.

A. Charles H. Fritzel, 1625 I Street NW., No. 812, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Association of Independent Insurers, 2600 River Road, Des Plaines, Ill. 60018.
D. (6) $1,500. E. (9) $63.

A. Gadsby & Hannah, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Council of Independent Laboratories, Inc., 1725 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. James E. Gaffigan, 777 14th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Hotel & Motel Association, 888 Seventh Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10019.
D. (6) $242.30. E. (9) $47.90.

A. Robert E. Gallamore, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Common Cause, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $1,656.24.

A. Peter N. Gammelgard, 1801 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Petroleum Institute, 1801 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. William B. Gardiner, 1221 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Disabled American Veterans, 3725 Alexandria Pike, Cold Springs, Ky.
D. (6) $6,375.

A. John W. Gardner, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Common Cause, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $1,875. E. (9) $1,279.47.

A. Gas Appliance Manufacturers Association, 1901 North Fort Myer Drive, Arlington, Va. 22209.
E. (9) $870.

A. Geothermal Resources International, Inc., 4676 Admiralty Way, Suite 503, Marina del Rey, Calif. 90291.

A. Mary Condon Gereau, 1730 K Street NW., Suite 1101, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Treasury Employees Union, 1730 K Street NW., Suite 1101, Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $4,710.50. E. (9) $267.75.

A. Lesley Chapman Gerould, 1730 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. League of Women Voters of the United States, 1730 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6.) $1,000. E. (9.) $4,080.

A. William T. Gibb III, 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Life Insurance Association, Inc., 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6.) $200. E. (9.) $50.

A. Wayne Gibbens, 1800 K Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Mid-Continent Oil & Gas Association, 1111 Thompson Building, Tulsa, Okla. 74103.
D. (6.) $832.50. E. (9.) $266.10.

A. Joseph L. Gibson, 1660 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., P.O. Box 8339, Chicago, Ill.
D. (6.) $80. E. (9.) $150.

A. Joseph S. Gill, 16 East Broad Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215.
B. The Ohio Railroad Association, 16 East Broad Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215.

A. Caesar A. Giolito, 1700 18th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
B. American Psychiatric Association, 1700 18th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
E. (9.) $2,020.

A. Dave Givens, Tennessee Railroad Association, 916 Nashville Trust Building, Nashville, Tenn. 37201.
B. Class I Railroads in Tennessee.

A. Glassie, Pewett, Beebe & Shanks, 1819 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Eastern Meat Packers Association, Inc., 734 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.

A. Glassie, Pewett, Beebe & Shanks, 1819 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The National Independent Meat Packers Association, 734 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.

A. Glassie, Pewett, Beebe & Shanks, 1819 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Music Publishers' Association, Inc., 110 East 59th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022.

A. Glidden-Durkee Division, SCM Corp., 5601 Eastern Avenue, Baltimore, Md. 21224.
E. (9.) $50.

A. Don A. Goodall, 1625 I Street NW., Suite 614, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Cyanamid Co., Wayne, N.J. 07470.
D. (6.) $200. (9.) $74.76.

A. Vance V. Goodfellow, 307 Fourth Avenue South, P.O. Box 15111, Minneapolis, Minn. 55415.
B. Crop Quality Council, 307 Fourth Avenue South, P.O. Box 15111, Minneapolis, Minn. 55415.
D. (6) $6,600.

A. Edward Gottlieb & Associates, 485 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.
B. Florists' Transworld Delivery Association, 900 West Lafayette Boulevard, Detroit, Mich. 48226.

A. Government Employes Council, AFL–CIO, 100 Indiana Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
D. (6) $15,553.41. E. (9) $5,650.82.

A. David B. Graham, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.
B. National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
D. (6) $115.

A. Donald E. Graham, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, 129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $1,711.66. E. (9) $53.33.

A. Graphic Arts International Union, 1900 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $2,280. E. (9) $2,362.

A. James A. Gray, 7901 Westpark Drive, McLean, Va. 22101.
B. National Machine Tool Builders Association, 7901 Westpark Drive, McLean, Va. 22101.
D. (6) $657.84. E. (9) $31.24.

A. Robert K. Gray, 1425 K Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Hill and Knowlton, Inc., 633 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.
D. (6) $1,384.40. E. (9) $229.94.

A. Virginia M. Gray, 3501 Williamsburg Lane NW., Washington, D.C. 20008.
B. Citizens Committee for UNICEF, 110 Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C. 20002.
D. (6) $1,451. E. (9) $110.88.

A. Samuel A. Grayson, 611 Idaho Building, Boise, Idaho 83702.
B. Union Pacific Railroad, 1416 Dodge Street, Omaha, Nebr. 68102.

A. Richard Greenspan, 133 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Congress Watch, 133 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $120.

A. Chellis O'Neal Gregory, Jr., 151 North Carolina Avenue SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Center for Public Financing of Elections, 201 Massachusetts Avenue NE., Washington. D.C. 20002.
D. (6) $5,538.42.

A. William G. Grief, 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Bristol-Myers Co., 345 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.
D. (6) $500.

A. Group Health Association of America, Inc., 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $8,292.13. E. (9) $8,292.13.

A. James J. Gudinas, 8111 Gatehouse Road, Falls Church, Va. 22042.
B. American Automobile Association, 8111 Gatehouse Road, Falls Church, Va. 22042.

A. Kenneth J. Guido, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Common Cause, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $662.49.

A. Jerome R. Gulan, 1225 19th Street, Washington, D.C. 20035.
B. National Small Business Association, 1225 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $4,500. E. (9) $1,200.

A. Matthew Hale, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The American Bankers Association, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $1,000. E. (9) $300.

A. Harold T. Halfpenny, 111 West Washington Street, Chicago, Ill. 60602.

A. Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Collingsworth & Nelson, Harker Stanton & John Coffey, 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Williams Co., National Bank of Tulsa, Tulsa, Okla.
E. (9) $7.65.

A. J. G. Hall, 1660 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. General Motors Corp., 3044 West Grand Boulevard, Detroit, Mich., 48202.
D. (6) $4,500. E. (9) $2,587.29.

A. Hamel, Park, McCabe & Saunders, 1776 F Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Business Roundtable, 888 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Hamel, Park, McCabe & Saunders, 1776 F Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Hardaway Co., 11th Street and Third Avenue, Columbus, Ga. 39102.
E. (9) $25.

A. Hamel, Park, McCabe & Saunders, 1776 F Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National School Supply & Equipment Association, 1500 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. 22209.

A. Hamel, Park, McCabe & Saunders, 1776 F Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 845 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.

A. Robert N. Hampton, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, 1129 20th Street, NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $1,193.75. E. (9) $20.36.

A. Donald K. Hanes, 1129 20th Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Council of Farmer Cooperatives 1129 20th Street, NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $317.08. E. (9) $9.96.

A. James E. Hanson, 121 Second Street, NE., Washington, D.C. 20002.
B. Puget Sound Tug & Barge Co., 1102 Southwest Massachusetts Street, Seattle, Wash. 98134.
D. (6) $120.

A. Robert B. Harding, 1801 K Street NW., No. 1041, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Southern California Edison Co., P.O. Box 800, Rosemead, Calif. 91770.
D. (6) $300. E. (9) $61.21.

A. William E. Hardman, 9300 Livingston Road, Washington, D.C. 20022.
B. National Tool, Die and Precision Machining Association, 9300 Livingston Road, Washington, D.C. 20022.

A. Eugene J. Hardy, 1776 F Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Association of Manufacturers, 1776 F Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $2,500.

A. William B. Harman, Jr., 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Life Insurance Association, Inc., 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $180. E. (9) $73.20.

A. John H. Harper, 1140 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 1010, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Association of Electric Cos., 1140 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 1010, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $68.40. E. (9) $11.70.

A. A. J. Harris, II, 425 13th Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20004.
B. Securities Industry Association, 425 13th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20004.
D. (6) $345.29. E. (9) $49.70.

A. Stephanie G. Harris, 2000 F Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Health Research Group, 2000 F Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $14. E. (9) $2.

A. William C. Hart, 1625 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Columbia Gas System Service Corp., 20 Montchanin Road, Wilmington, Del. 19807.
D. (6) $4,389. E. (9) $7,205.51.

A. Rita M. Hartz, 1737 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Federation of Federal Employees, 1737 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $6,153.60.

A. Walter A. Hasty, Jr., 1616 P Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 1616 P Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $7,500. E. (9) $86.18.

A. Sidney G. Hawkes, 1000 Connecticut Avenue, Suite 715, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The Mead Corp., 118 West First Street, Dayton, Ohio 45402.
D. (6) $825. E. (9) $495.

A. Paul M. Hawkins, 1701 K Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Health Insurance Association of America, 1701 K Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $23.25. E. (9) $3.99.

A. Robert T. Hayden, 815 16th Street NW., Suite, 706, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. United Steelworkers of America, Five Gateway Center, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15222.
D. (6) $4,067.25. E. (9) $1,571.73.

A. Patrick J. Head, 1660 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Montgomery Ward & Co., 619 West Chicago Avenue, Chicago, Ill. 60670.
D. (6) $528. E. (9) $150.

A. Health Insurance Association of America, 1701 K Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $6,783.16. E. (9) $6,783.16.

A. Health Research Group, 2000 P Street NW., Suite 708, Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $21.52.

A. Patrick B. Healy, 30 F Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. National Milk Producers Federation, 30 F Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
D. (6) $300. E. (9) $69.10.

A. John F. Heilman, 1221 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Disabled American Veterans, 3725 Alexandria Pike, Cold Springs, Ky.
D. (6) $4,375.

A. William F. Heimlich, 1725 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Association of National Advertisers, 155 East 44th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017.

A. Spencer H. Heine, 1660 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., P.O. Box 8339, Chicago, Ill. 60680.
D. (6) $102.57. E. (9) $150.

A. Robert B. Heiney, 1133 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Canners Association, 1133 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $875. E. (9) $634.27.

A. Phil D. Helmig, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Atlantic Richfield Co., 515 South Flower Street, Los Angeles, Calif. 90071.
D. (6) $300. E. (9) $300.

A. Leslie P. Hemry, 1701 K Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Health Insurance Association of America, 1701 K Street NW., Washington, D.C.

A. Edmund P. Hennelly, 150 East 42d Street New York, N.Y.
B. Mobil Oil Corp., 150 East 42d Street, New York, N.Y.
D. (6) $1,500. E. (9) $71.78.

A. Andrew I. Hickey, Jr., 1133 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Federal National Mortgage Association, 1133 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $10,125. E. (9) $702.85.

A. M. F. Hicklin, 720 Bankers Trust Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50309.
B. Iowa Railway Association, 720 Bankers Trust Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50309.

A. J. Thomas Higginbotham, Mellon Bank, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15230.
B. Mellon Bank, N. A. & Mellon National Corp., Mellon Square, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15230.
D. (6) $2,000. E. (9) $605.25.

A. J. Eldred Hill, Jr., 720 Hotel Washington, Washington, D.C. 20004.
B. USA, Inc.
D. (6) $2,000. E. (9) $2,000.

A. James J. Hill, 5025 Wisconsin Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20016.
B. Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL–CIO, 5025 Wisconsin Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20016.

A. Richard Hinds, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Richard Hinds, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Harry R. Hinton, 1776 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Medical Association, 535 North Dearborn Street, Chicago, Ill. 60610.
D. (6) $1,250. E. (9) $960.

A. Lawrence S. Hobart, 2600 Virginia Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. American Public Power Association, 2600 Virginia Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
D. (6) $510.

A. Claude E. Hobbs, 1801 K Street NW., Ninth Floor, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Westinghouse Electric Corp., Westinghouse Building, Gateway Center, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15222.
D. (6) $900. E. (9) $195.

A. Philip R. Hochberg, 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Hockey League, Two Pennsylvania Plaza, Suite 2480, New York, N.Y. 10001.
D. (6) $4,000. E. (9) $200.

A. Ralph D. Hodges, Jr., 1619 Massachusetts Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C.
B. National Forest Products Association.

A. Glen D. Hofer, 1030 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $444.58. E. (9) $30.16.

A. John S. Hoff, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Protestant-Catholic Hospital Action Committee, 840 North Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60611.
E. (9) $25.

A. Dale Curtis Hogue, 1100 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Specialty Equipment Manufacturers Association, 11001 East Valey Mall, Suite 204, El Monte, Calif. 91734.
E. (9) $300.

A. Thomas W. Holland, Suite 370, One Dupont Circle NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Association of American Law Schools, Suite 370, One Dupont Circle NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Henry W. Holling, 100 Northeast Adams Street, Peoria, Ill. 61602.
B. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 100 Northeast Adams Street, Peoria, Ill. 61602.
D. (6) $828. E. (9) $357.

A. Lee B. Holmes, 1125 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Mortgage Bankers Association of America, 1125 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $5,100. E. (9) $24,507.

A. John W. Holton, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The American Bankers Association, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $1,750. E. (9) $32.

A. Miles B. Hopkins, 5601 Eastern Avenue, Baltimore, Md. 21224.
B. Glidden-Durkee Division, SCM Corp., 5601 Eastern Avenue, Baltimore, Md. 21224.

A. W. Dean Hopkins, 1105 East Ohio Building, Cleveland, Ohio 44114.
B. McDonald, Hopkins & Hardy Co., L.P.A., 1105 East Ohio Building, Cleveland, Ohio 44114.
D. (6) $104.22. E. (9) $77.10.

A. The Hormel Foundation, Austin, Minn. 55912.

A. John F. Horty, 4614 Fifth Avenue, Suite 921, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15213.
B. National Protestant-Catholic Hospital Action Committee, 840 North Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60611.
E. (9) $25.

A. Houston Natural Gas Corp., 1200 Travis, Houston, Tex. 77002.
E. (9) $8,045.78.

A. C. T. Hoversten, 209 West 53d Street, Western Springs, Ill. 60558.
B. National Advertising Co., 6850 South Harlem Avenue, Bedford Park, Argo, Ill. 60501.
D. (6) $345.

A. Thomas Howarth, 1801 K Street NW., Suite 1201, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. United States Independent Telephone Association, 1801 K Street NW., Suite 1201, Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $330. E. (9) $330.

A. Joe L. Howell, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Suite 750, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Allstate Enterprises, Inc., Allstate Plaza, Northbrook, Ill. 60062.

A. Joe L. Howell, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Suite 750, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Allstate Insurance Cos., Allstate Plaza, Northbrook, Ill. 60062.

A. Howrey, Simon, Baker & Murchison, 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.
E. (9) $130.88.

A. Charles L. Huber, 1221 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Disabled American Veterans, 3725 Alexandria Pike, Cold Springs, Ky.
D. (6) $9,375. E. (9) $53.35.

A. William J. Hull, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., No. 505, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Ashland Oil, Inc., 1409 Winchester Avenue, Ashland, Ky.

A. William J. Hull, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., No. 505, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Ohio Valley Improvement Association, Inc.

A. The Human Life Amendment, the Bellevue Hotel, 15 E Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $485. E. (9) $779.32.

A. Gregory A. Humphrey, 1012 14th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Federation of Teachers, AFL–CIO, 1012 14th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
E. (9) $202.06.

A. David J. Humphreys, 1140 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Recreation Vehicle Institute, Inc., 2720 Des Plaines Avenue, Des Plaines, Ill. 60018.
D. (6) $19,000. E. (9) $86.25.

A. Richard M. Hunt, 490 L'Enfant Plaza East SW., Washington, D.C. 20024.
B. NL Industries, Inc., 111 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10006.
D. (6) $562.

A. James L. Huntley, 1775 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Retail Clerks International Association, AFL–CIO, 1775 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $6,819.23. E. (9) $1,315.55.

A. John Edward Hurley, 1101 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
E. (9) $25.

A. Elmer P. Hutter, P.O. Box 2255, Washington, D.C. 20013.
B. Arnold L. House et al.
D. (6) $1. E. (9) 192.

A. Elmer P. Hutter, P.O. Box 2255, Washington, D.C. 20013.
D. (6) $1.

A. Frank N. Ikard, 1801 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Petroleum Institute, 1801 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Industrial Union Department, AFL–CIO, 815 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $8,303.11. E. (9) $8,303.11.

A. Institute for Rapid Transit, 1612 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 1300 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $11,632.77.

A. International Brotherhood of Painters & Allied Trades, 1750 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $4,973.61.

A. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 25 Louisiana Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
E. (9) $15,846.80.

A. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 8000 East Jefferson, Detroit, Mich. 48214.
D. (6) $116,859. E. (9) $116,859.

A. Investment Co. Institute, 1775 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $1,632.80.

A. Investment Counsel Association of America, Inc., 127 East 59th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022.
E. (9) $1,722.30.

A. Iron Ore Lessors Association, Inc., 1500 First National Bank Building, St. Paul, Minn. 55101.
D. (6) $15,716.18. E. (9) $3,169.32.

A. Joseph S. Ives, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.
B. National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
D. (6) $120.

A. Ronald A. Jacks, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Reinsurance Association of America, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $1,500. E. (9) $100.

A. Robert C. Jackson, 1150 17th Street NW., Suite 1001, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc., 1501 Johnston Building, Charlotte, N.C.
D. (6) $2,750. E. (9) $44.90.

A. Robert L. James, 1800 K Street NW., Suite 920, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Bank of America N.T. and S.A., Bank of America Plaza, San Francisco, Calif. 94137.

A. Japanese American Citizens League, 22 Peace Plaza, Suite 203, San Francisco, Calif. 94115.
D. (6) $3,130. E. (9) $3,130.

A. Phillip F. Jehle, 300 National Press Building, Washington, D.C. 20004.
B. Smith Kline Corp., 1500 Spring Garden Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 19101.
E. (9) $975.75.

A. David M. Jenkins II, 1800 K Street NW., Suite 622, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Akron, Ohio 44316.

A. Anita Johnson, 2000 P Street NW., Suite 708, Washington, D.C. 20036.

B. Health Research Group, 2000 P Street NW., Suite 708, Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Jess Johnson, Jr., 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Shell Oil Co., One Shell Plaza, P.O. Box 2463, Houston, Tex. 77001.
D. (6) $500.

A. John H. Johnson, Jr., 1176 F Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Association of Manufacturers, 1776 F Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $2,250. E. (9) $32.

A. Rady A. Johnson, 1000 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), 200 East Randolph Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60601.
D. (6) $1,820.62. E. (9) $7.88.

A. Reuben L. Johnson.
B. The Farmers' Educational and Co-Operative Union of America, P.O. Box 2251, Denver, Colo.
D. (6) $5,637.11. E. (9) $145.64.

A. Stuart H. Johnson, Jr., 910 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. New York Dock Railway, 334 Furman Street, Brooklyn, N.Y.
D. (6) $3,295. E. (9) $310.98.

A. Charles N. Jolly, 1775 K Street NW., Suite 315, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Miles Laboratories, Inc., 1127 Myrtle Street, Elkhart, Ind. 46514.
E. (9) $710.26.

A. Allan R. Jones, 1616 P Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 1616 P Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $6,000. E. (9) $448.87.

A. Charlie W. Jones, 1150 17th Street NW., Suite 310, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Man-Made Fiber Producers Association, Inc., 1150 17th Street NW., Suite 310, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $300. E. (9) $98.

A. L. Dan Jones, 1101 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Independent Petroleum Association of America, 1101 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $49.15.

A. Oliver H. Jones, 1125 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Mortgage Bankers Association of America, 1125 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $3,250. E. (9) $13,199.

A. Phillip E. Jones, 1156 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. United States Beet Sugar Association, 1156 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.

A. Richard J. Jones, 1110 Davidson Street, Champaign, Ill. 60631.
B. Independent Grocers' Alliance, 5725 River Road, Chicago, Ill. 60606.

A. Robert S. Jones, 900 Union Commerce Building, Cleveland, Ohio 44115.
B. Glidden-Durkee Division, SCM Corp., 900 Union Commerce Building, Cleveland, Ohio 44115.
E. (9) $50.

A. Ronald K. Jones, 8209 Carrleigh Parkway, Springfield, Va. 22152.
B. Mobile Homes Manufacturers Association, P.O. Box 201, Chantilly, Va. 22021.
D. (6) $5,530. E. (9) $128.10.

A. Carl D. Jordan, 408 East Maple Street, Fremont, Mich. 49412.
B. Gerber Products Co., 445 State Street, Fremont, Mich. 49412.
D. (6) $400. E. (9) $70.

A. Mrs. Fritz R. Kahn, 9202 Ponce Place, Fairfax, Va. 22030.
B. National Congress of Parents and Teachers, 700 North Rush Street, Chicago, Ill. 60611.
E. (9) $6.75.

A. Gerald M. Katz, 1800 Mercantile Bank & Trust Building, 2 Hopkins Plaza, Baltimore, Md. 21201.
B. Maryland State Fair and Agricultural Society, Inc., Timonium State Fair Grounds, Timonium, Md. 21093.
E. (9) $51.91.

A. Carleton R. Kear, Jr., 1625 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Retired Officers Association, 1625 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $189.

A. William J. Keating, 500 Folger Building, 725 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. National Grain and Feed Association, 725 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.

A. Howard B. Keck, 555 South Flower Street, Los Angeles, Calif. 90071.
B. The Superior Oil Co., 555 South Flower Street, Los Angeles, Calif. 90071.
E. (9) $300.

A. W. M. Keck, Jr., 1801 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1110, Los Angeles, Calif. 90067.
B. The Superior Oil Co., 555 South Flower Street, Los Angeles, Calif. 90071.
E. (9) $275.

A. Patricia Keefer, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Common Cause, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $4,749.99. E. (9) $ 40.

A. Eugene A. Keeney, 1616 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Retail Federation, 1616 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $3,000. E. (9) $2,000.

A. John G. Keller, Suite 1014, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Exxon Co., U.S.A., P.O. Box 2180, Houston, Tex.

A. George J. Kelley, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Blue Cross Association, 840 North Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60611.
D. (6) $2,000. E. (9) $800.

A. James C. Kelley, 1500 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Machine Tool Distributors Association, 1500 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.

A. John T. Kelly, 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association.

A. George Kelm, One First National Plaza, No. 5200, Chicago, Ill. 60670.
B. Myron Stratton Home, P.O. Box 1178, Colorado Springs, Colo. 80901.

A. R. G. Kendall, Jr., P.O. Box 21, Montgomery, Ala. 36101.
B. Alabama Railroad Association, P.O. Box 21, Montgomery, Ala. 36101.

A. I. L. Kenen, 1341 G Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Israel Public Affairs Committee, 1341 G Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $833.32.

A. Harold L. Kennedy, 420 Cafritz Building, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Marathon Oil Co., Findlay, Ohio 45840.
E. (9) $510.60.

A. Jeremiah J. Kenney, Jr., 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Union Carbide Corp., 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $35.30.

A. William J. Kenney, 1515 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. 22209.
B. American Gas Association, 1515 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. 22209.
D. (6) $220. E. (9) $150.

A. Thomas P. Kerester, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Gulf Oil Corp., Pittsburgh, Pa. 15230.

A. Kenneth L. Kimble, 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Life Insurance Association, Inc., 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $200. E. (9) $50.

A. Charles L. King, 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Life Insurance Association, Inc., 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $52.

A. Susan B. King, 421 Fourth Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Center for Public Financing of Elections, 201 Massachusetts Avenue, NE., Washington, D.C. 20002.
D. (6) $5,772.

A. Gibson Kingren, 900 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.
D. (6) $1,125. E. (9) $1,068.75.

A. John M. Kinnaird, 1616 P Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 1616 P Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $7,500. E. (9) $1,194.41.

A. Kirkland, Ellis & Rowe, 1776 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Grocery Manufacturers of America, Inc., 1425 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.

A. Walter A. Kischefsky, 1201 South Scott Street, No. 535, Arlington, Va. 22204.
B. National Association for Uniformed Services, 956 North Monroe Street, Arlington, Va. 22201.
D. (6) $2,448.

A. Ernest A. Kistler, Two North Ninth Street, Allentown, Pa. 18101.
B. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., Two North Ninth Street, Allentown, Pa. 18101.
D. (6) $1,250. E. (9) $852.43.

A. James D. Kittelton, 7901 Westpark Drive, McLean, Va. 22101.
B. National Machine Tool Builders Association, 7901 Westpark Drive, McLean, Va. 22101.
D. (6) $551.27. E. (9) $6.81.

A. Ralph W. Kittle.
B. International Paper Co., Room 700, 1620 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $750. E. (9) $900.

A. Douglas E. Kliever, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

B. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. John S. Knox, Jr., 166 16th Street NW., Atlanta, Ga. 30318.
B. The Coca-Cola Bottlers' Association, 166 16th Street NW., Atlanta, Ga.
D. (6) $575. E. (9) $164.56.

A. Philip M. Knox, Jr., 1211 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 802, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Sears, Roebuck and Co., Sears Tower, Chicago, Ill. 60684.
D. (6) $1,000. E. (9) $200.

A. Joseph L. Koach, 2000 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Wilson E. Hamilton & Associates, Inc., 2000 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Joseph L. Koach, 2000 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Wilson E. Hamilton & Associates, Inc., 2000 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Bradley R. Koch, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
B. National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
D. (6) $125.

A. Robert M. Koch, 1315 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Limestone Institute, Inc., 1315 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $48.50.

A. Horace R. Kornegay, 1776 K Street NW., Suite 1200, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Tobacco Institute, Inc., 1776 K Street NW., Suite 1200, Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,000. E. (9) $250.

A. Paul A. Korody, Jr., 1725 I Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. National Association of Food Chains, 1725 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $500.

A. Kenneth S. Kovack, 815 16th Street NW., Suite 706, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. United Steelworkers of America, Five Gateway Center, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15222.
D. (6) $4,665.99. E. (9) $1,058.78.

A. June K. Kraeft, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
B. National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
D. (6) $132.

A. Robert D. Krause, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Cleary, Gottlieg, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Lawrence E. Kreider, 1015 18th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Conference of State Bank Supervisors, 1015 18th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. James S. Krzyminski, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $1,533.33 E. (9) $82.86.

A. Philip Kugler, 1012 14th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Federation of Teachers, AFL–CIO, 1012 14th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
E. (9) $265.50

A. William J. Kuhfuss, 225 Touhy Avenue, Park Ridge, Ill. 60068.
B. American Farm Bureau Federation, 225 Touhy Avenue, Park Ridge, Ill. 60068.
D. (6) $1,150.

A. Lloyd R. Kuhn, 1725 DeSales Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Aerospace Industries Association of America, Inc., 1725 DeSales Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $7,668. E. (9) $1,315.95.

A. Norman G. Kurland, 2027 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $4,617.64. E. (9) $3,800.69

A. Labor Bureau of Middle West, 1200 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.

A. Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL–CIO, 905 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $14,335.94.

A. Labor-Management Maritime Committee, 100 Indiana Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
D. (6) $9,273. E. (9) $9,863.

A. Nick L. Laird, Suite 200, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Shell Oil Co., One Shell Plaza, P.O. Box 2463, Houston, Tex. 77001.
D. (6) $500.

A. Lake Carriers' Association, 1411 Rockefeller Building, Cleveland, Ohio 44113.

A. A. M. Lampley, 400 First Street NW., Suite 704, Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. United Transportation Union, 400 First Street NW., Suite 704, Washington, D.C. 20001.
E. (9) $175.

A. Karl S. Landstrom, 510 North Edison Street, Arlington, Va. 22203.
B. Geothermal Resources International, Inc., 4676 Admiralty Way, Marina del Rey, Calif. 90291.
E. (9) $30.

A. Karl S. Landstrom, 510 North Edison Street, Arlington, Va. 22203.
B. Sportsman's Paradise Homeowners Association, 10612 Dalerose Avenue, Inglewood, Calif. 90304.
D. (6) $678. E. (9) $120.50.

A. Asger F. Langlykke, 1913 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Society for Microbiology, 1913 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $200.

A. James J. LaPenta, Jr., 905 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL–CIO, 905 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $521.38.

A. Clifford C. LaPlante, 955 L'Enfant Plaza North SW., Washington, D.C. 20024.
B. The Boeing Co., P.O. 3707, Seattle, Wash., 98124.
D. (6) $1,600. E. (9) $259.66.

A. Glenn T. Lashley, 8111 Gatehouse Road, Falls Church, Va. 22042.
B. D. C. Division, American Automobile Association, 8111 Gatehouse Road, Falls Church, Va. 22042.

A. Robert B. Laurents, 7205 Reservoir Road, Springfield, Va. 22150.
B. National Association for Uniformed Services, 956 North Monroe Street, Arlington, Va. 22201.
D. (6) $3,300.

A. George H. Lawrence, 1515 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. 22209.
B. American Gas Association, 1515 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. 22209.
D. (6) $550. E. (9) $135.

A. Lawyers Committee to End the War, One Wall Street, 25th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10005.
E. (9) $11.36.

A. Lawyers to Preserve the Constitution, 36 West 44th Street, Room 500, New York, N.Y. 10036.
D. (6) $30. E. (9) $19.40.

A. Monte Lazarus, 1825 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. United Air Lines, P.O. Box 66100, Chicago, Ill. 60666.
D. (6) $500. E. (9) $415.

A. William Lazarus, 1616 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Retail Federation, 1616 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,200. E. (9) $150.

A. League of New Community Developers, 910 17th Street NW., Suite 728, Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $6,608. E. (9) $7,362.52.

A. Robert F. Lederer, 230 Southern Building, Washington, D.C.
B. American Association of Nurserymen, Inc., 230 Southern Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.

A. Robert E. Lee, 1725 DeSales Street NW., Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Robert K. Lee, P.O. Box 272, Wichita, Kans. 67201.
D. (6) $8,554.10. E. (9) $8,304.10.

B. National AeroSpace Services Association, 1725 DeSales Street NW., Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $312.

A. Robert W. Lee, 1028 Connecticut Avenue NW., No. 1004, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The John Birch Society, 395 Concord Avenue, Belmont, Mass. 02178.

A. Legislative Committee of the Committee for a National Trade Policy, Inc., 1028 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $991. E. (9) $3,149.47.

A. Gilbert LeKander, 910 17th Street NW., Suite 501, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Montana Power Co., 40 East Broadway, Butte, Mont. 59701; Washington Water Power Co., P.O. Box 3727, Spokane, Wash. 99220.
D. (6) $450.

A. Nils A. Lennartson, 801 North Fairfax Street, Alexandria, Va. 22314.
B. Railway Progress Institute, 801 North Fairfax Street, Alexandria, Va. 22314.
D. (6) $667.32.

A. Leva, Hawes, Symington, Martin & Oppenheimer, 815 Connecticut Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Protestant-Catholic Hospital Action Committee, 840 North Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60611.
E. (9) $25.

A. Harry LeVine, Jr., 777 14th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. General Electric Co., 570 Lexington Avenue, New York, N.Y.
D. (6) $260.

A. J. M. B. Lewis, Jr., 315 Shenandoah Building, P.O. Box 2887, Roanoke, Va., 24001.
B. National Council of Coal Lessors, 317 Southern Building, Washington, D.C. 20005;

Iron Ore Lessors Association, 1500 First National Bank Building, St. Paul, Minn.
D. (6) $3,500.

A. J. Stanly Lewis, 100 Indiana Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. National Association of Letter Carriers, 100 Indiana Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
D. (6) $3,215.21.

A. Robert G. Lewis.
B. The Farmers' Educational and Co-Operative Union of America, P.O. Box 2251, Denver, Colo.
D. (6) $1,615.38.

A. Herbert Liebenson, 1225 19th Street, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Small Business Association, 1225 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $4,500. E. (9) $1,200.

A. Russell B. Light, 955 L'Enfant Plaza North SW., Washington, D.C. 20004.
B. The Boeing Co., P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Wash. 98124.
D. (6) $360. E. (9) $235.

A. Lester W. Lindow, 1735 DeSales Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc., 1735 DeSales Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $11.57. E. (9) $2.

A. Lindsay, Nahstoll, Hart, Duncan, Dafoe & Krause, 1331 Southwest Broadway, Portland, Oreg. 97201.
B. Master Contracting Stevedore Association of the Pacific Coast, Inc., San Francisco, Calif.
D. (6) $200.

A. John E. Linster, 2000 Westwood Drive, Wausau, Wis. 54401.
B. Employers Insurance of Wausau, 2000 Westwood Drive, Wausau, Wis. 54401.
D. (6) $500.

A. Joseph Lippman, 133 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Congress Watch, 133 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $150.

A. Charles B. Lipsen.
B. National Cable Television Association, 918 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $11,442.34. E. (9) $400.

A. Robert G. Litschert, 1140 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 1010, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Association of Electric Cos., 1140 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 1010, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $332.25. E. (9) $105.58.

A. Sheldon I. London, 1025 Vermont Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. National Home Furnishings Association, 1150 Merchandise Mart, Chicago, Ill. 60654.
D. (6) $400. E. (9) $455.

A. Philip J. Loree, 17 Battery Place North, New York, N.Y. 10004.
B. Federation of American Controlled Shipping, 17 Battery Place North, New York, N.Y. 10004.
D. (6) $500.

A. James F. Lovett, 1801 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Westinghouse Electric Corp., Westinghouse Building, Gateway Center, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15222.
D. (6) $600. E. (9) $250.

A. James P. Low, 1101 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Society of Association Executives, 1101 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. James Rowland Lowe, Jr., 1730 Pennsylvania Ave. NW., Suite 230, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Alaskan Arctic Gas Study Co., P.O. Box 979, Alaska Mutual Bank Building, Anchorage, Alaska 99510.
E. (9) $1,410.

A. Otto Lowe, 888 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. National Canners Association, 1133 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $1,050.

A. Freddie H. Lucas, 1156 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. J. C. Penney Co., Inc., 1301 Avenue of the Americas, New York, N.Y. 10019.
D. (6) $300. E. (9) $150.

A. Milton F. Lunch, 2029 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Society of Professional Engineers, 2029 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,000.

A. Lund Levin & O'Brien, 1625 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Pacific Northwest Power Co., Public Service Building, Portland, Oreg. 97204.
D. (6) $193.20.

A. Lund Levin & O'Brien, 1625 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Shanghai Power Co., 100 West 10th Street, Wilmington, Del. 19801.
D. (6) $283.34.

A. Lusk-Evans Ltd., 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 940, Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $2.

A. James H. Lynch, Jr., 1325 Massachusetts Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Federation of Government Employees, 1325 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $6,311.20. E. (9) $532.03.

A. Mark H. Lynch, 133 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Congress Watch, 133 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $500.

A. Shane MacCarthy, 1730 North Lynn Street, Arlington, Va. 22209.
B. Printing Industries of America, Inc., 1730 North Lynn Street, Arlington, Va. 22209.
D. (6) $1,125. E. (9) $1,820.74.

A. James E. Mack, 1225 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Confectioners Association, 36 South Wabash Avenue, Chicago, Ill. 60603.
D. (6) $11,250. E. (9) $2,577..64.

A. James E. Mack, 1225 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Peanut Butter Manufacturers and Nut Salters Association, 1225 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $7,500. E. (9) $945.27.

A. Thomas J. Mader, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Common Cause, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $4,500.

A. Ronald E. Madsen, 962 Wayne Avenue, Suite 802, Silver Spring, Md. 20910.
B. Park Mobile, Inc., 61 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10006.
D. (6) $6,000. E. (9) $119.22.

A. John F. Magnotti, Jr., 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C.
B. The National Council of Professional Services Firms, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $520.84. E. (9) $10.

A. W. Terry Maguire, 491 National Press Building, Washington, D.C. 20004.
B. National Newspaper Association, 491 National Press Building, Washington, D.C. 20004.
E. (9) $27.

A. Robert L. Maier, 900 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Kaiser Industries Corp, 900 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C.

A. Andre Maisonpierre, 666 11th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. American Mutual Insurance Alliance, 220 North Wacker Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60606.
E. (9) $650.

A. Thomas M. Malone, Suite 1014, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Exxon Co., U.S.A., P.O. Box 2180, Houston, Tex.

A. Ben J. Man, 400 First Street NW., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association, AFL–CIO, District No. 1, Pacific Coast District, 17 Battery Place, New York, N.Y. 10004.
D. (6) $1638. E. (9) $238.93.

A. Management Communications, Inc., 1505 22d Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. Council on Foundations, 888 Seventh Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10019.
D. (6) $560.

A. Management Communications, Inc., 1505 22d Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. Recycled Paperboard Division of the American Paper Institute, 260 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016.
D. (6) $595. E. (9) $219.79.

A. Carter Manasco, 5932 Chesterbrook Road, McLean, Va. 22101.
B. National Coal Association, Coal Building, 1130 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $7,374.99. E. (9) $103.35.

A. Mike Manatos, 1801 K Street NW., Suite 1104, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Procter & Gamble Manufacturing Co., 301 East Sixth Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202.

A. ManExec, Inc., 231 East Vermijo Avenue, Box 572, Colorado Springs, Colo. 80901.
B. Red River Valley Coeperative, Inc., Box 43, Hillsboro, N. Dak. 58045.
E. (9) $460.98.

A. Man-Made Fiber Producers Association, Inc., 1150 17th Street NW., Suite 310, Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $398.

A. H. Warren Mann, 1200 Travis, Houston, Tex.
B. Houston Natural Gas Corp., P.O. Box 1188, Houston, Tex.
D. (6) $250. E. (9) $1,876.32.

A. Manufacuring Chemists Association, Inc., 1825 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
D. (6) $5,000. E. (9) $3,000.

A. Dallace E. Marable, 1776 F Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Association of Manufacturers, 1776 F Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $345.

A. J. Eugene Marens, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association, AFL–CIO, District No. 1, Pacific Coast District, 17 Battery Place, New York, N.Y. 10004.
E. (9) $5,975.60.

A. Rodney W. Markley, Jr., 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Ford Motor Co., Dearborn, Mich. 48121.

A. Ralph J. Marlatt, 640 Investment Building., 1511 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. National Association of Mutual Insurance Agents, 640 Investment Building, 1511 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
E. (9) $1,300.

A. Dan V. Maroney, Jr., 5025 Wisconsin Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20016.
B. Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL–CIO, 5025 Wisconsin Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20016.

A. William J. Marschalk, 1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Forest Products Association, 1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $2,860. E. (9) $210.

A. Edwin E. Marsh, 200 C Street SE., No. 401, Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. National Wool Growers Association, 600 Crandall Building, Salt Lake City, Utah. 84101.
D. (6) $4,802.84. E. (9) $1,271.77.

A. Winston W. Marsh, 1343 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. National Tire Dealers & Retreaders Association, 1343 L Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $120. E. (9) $19.40.

A. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 770 North Water Street, Milwaukee, Wis. 53202.
D. (6) $1,050. E. (9) $371.12.

A. J. Paull Marshall, 40 Ivy Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Association of American Railroads, 1920 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $250.89. E. (9) $136.

A. Guy R. Martin, 655 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. State of Alaska.
D. (6) $7,875. E. (9) $6,332.03.

A. Thomas A. Martin, 1801 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Petroleum Institute, 1801 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Steven A. Martindale, 1425 K Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Hill and Knowlton, Inc., 633 Third Avenue NW., New York, N.Y. 10017
D. (6) $650. E. (9) $117.65.

A. Richard E. Martinez, 1730 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036
B. American Optometric Association, 820 First National Bank Building, Peoria, Ill. 61602
D. (6) $389.34. E. (9) $407.50.

A. Maryland State Fair and Agricultural Society, Inc., Timonium, Md. 21093
E. (9) $51.91.

A. Mike M. Masaoka, 2021 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Japanese Trade Committee, 2021 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Mike M. Masaoka, 2021 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Association on Japanese Textile Imports, Inc., 551 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.W. 10017.
D. (6) $500.

A. Mike M. Masaoka, 2021 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Nisei Lobby, 2021 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Mike M. Masaoka, 2021 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. West Mexico Vegetable Distributors Association, P.O. Box 848, Nogales, Ariz. 85621.
D. (6) $500.

A. Paul J. Mason, 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Life Insurance Association, Inc., 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Jon G. Massey, Suite III, 125 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Oil Investment Institute.

A. P. H. Mathews, 40 Ivy Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Association of American Railroads, 1920 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $572.41. E. (9) $352.64.

A. Barry D. Matsumoto, 1730 Rhode Island Avenue NW., Suite 204, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Japanese American Citizens League, 22 Peace Plaza, Suite 203, San Francisco, Calif. 94115.
D. (6) $1,009.

A. Charles D. Matthews, 100 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Ocean Industries Association, 1100 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $337.50. E. (9) $205.24.

A. Robert A. Matthews, 801 North Fairfax Street, Alexandria, Va. 22314.
B. Railway Progress Institute, 801 North Fairfax Street, Alexandria, Va. 22314.
D. (6) $333.66.

A. Charles E. Mattingly, 1608 K Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. The American Legion, 700 North Pennsylvania Street, Indianapolis, Ind.
D. (6) $4,368. E. (9) $109.59.

A. C. V. and R. V. Maudlin, 1111 E Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20004.
B. Georgia Power Co., 270 Peachtree Street, Atlanta, Ga.

A. C. V. and R. V. Maudlin, 1111 E Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20004.
B. Joint Government Liaison Committee, 1 North La Salle Street, Chicago, Ill.

A. Arnold Mayer, 100 Indiana Avenue NW., Room 410, Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America (AFL–CIO), 2800 North Sheridan Road, Chicago, Ill. 60657.
D. (6) $6,604. E. (9) $815.

A. Mayer, Brown & Platt, Suite 1955, 231 South La Salle Street, Chicago, Ill. 60604.
B. Brunswick Corp., One Brunswick Plaza, Skokie, Ill. 60076.
D. (6) $800. E. (9) $13.40.

A. Mayer, Brown & Platt, 231 South La Salle Street, Chicago, Ill. 60604.
B. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 425 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Ill. 60611.
D. (6) $2,130.

A. Mayer, Brown & Platt, 231 South La Salle Street, Chicago, Ill. 60604.
B. L. M. Williams & Clayton Burch families, Trustees, c/o Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co., 231 South La Salle Street, Chicago, Ill. 60693.

A. William J. McAuliffe, Jr., 1828 L Street NW., Suite 303, Washington, D.C.
B. American Land Title Association, 1828 L Street NW., Suite 303, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $560. E. (9) $18.90.

A. Michael J. McCabe, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Suite 750, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Allstate Enterprises, Inc., Allstate Plaza, Northbrook, Ill. 60062.

A. Michael J. McCabe, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Suite 750, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Allstate Insurance Cos., Allstate Plaza, Northbrook, Ill. 60062.

A. Carlos R. McCalla Jr., Route 2, Box 72F, New Windsor, Md. 21776.
B. U.S. Tobacco Co., 100 West Putnam Avenue, Greenwich, Conn. 06830.

A. William C. McCamant, 1725 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $300.

A. Robert C. McCandless, 1725 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Committee for Humane Legislation, 11 West 60th Street, New York, N.Y.
D. (6) $80. E. (9) $2.20.

A. Robert C. McCandless, 1725 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 1101 17th Street NW., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $765. E. (9) $18.85.

A. John A. McCart, 100 Indiana Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. Government Employes Council, AFL–CIO, 100 Indiana Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
D. (6) $3,068.58.

A. McClure & Trotter, 1100 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The Coca-Cola Co., P. O. Drawer 1734, Atlanta, Ga. 30301.
D. (6) $615. E. (9) $37.91.

A. McClure & Trotter, 1100 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Gulf and Western Industries, Inc., One Gulf and Western Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10023.
D. (6) $2,476.95. E. (9) $107.54.

A. McClure & Trotter, 1100 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The Magnavox Corp., 1700 Magnavox Way, Fort Wayne, Ind. 46804.

A. McClure & Trotter, 1100 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Mobil Oil Corp., 150 East 42d Street, New York, N.Y. 10017.
D. (6) $5,542.34. E. (9) $236.58.

A. McClure & Trotter, 1100 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20036.

B. Montgomery Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc., North Perry and Jefferson Streets, Montgomery, Ala. 35102.

A. McClure & Trotter, 1100 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., Oil City, Pa. 16302.

A. McClure & Trotter, 1100 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Alfred P. Slaner, 640 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10019.

A. McClure & Trotter, 1100 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. United Artists Corp., 729 Seventh Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10019.

A. Harry G. McComas, 1016 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Association of Plumbing Heating Cooling Contractors, 1016 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $637.50. E. (9) $89.75.

A. E. L. McCulloch, 819 Railway Labor Building, 400 First Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, Engineers Building, Cleveland, Ohio 44114.
D. (6) $284.60. E. (9) $81.50.

A. Albert L. McDermott, 777 14th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Hotel & Motel Association, 888 Seventh Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10019.
D. (6) $506.80. E. (9) $120.10.

A. Francis O. McDermott, 1750 K Street NW., Suite 1110, Washington, D.C.
B. The First National Bank of Chicago, 1 First National Plaza, Chicago, Ill. 60670.
D. (6) $1,137. E. (9) $720.37.

A. Francis O. McDermott, 1750 K Street NW., Suite 1110, Washington, D.C.
B. Sears, Roebuck and Co., Sears Tower, Chicago, Ill. 60684.
D. (6) $29,510. E. (9) $598.33.

A. Joseph A. McElwain, 40 East Broadway, Butte, Mont. 59701.
B. The Montana Power Co., Butte, Mont. 59701.
E. (9) $77.75.

A. Robert M. McElwaine, 1129 20th Street, Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $760.

A. Robert E. McGarrah, Jr., 2000 P Street NW., Suite 708, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Health Research Group, 2000 P Street NW., Suite 708, Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. J. Raymond McGlaughlin, 400 First Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. Brotherhood Maintenance of Way Employes.
D. (6) $7,080.

A. Marshall C. McGrath.
B. International Paper Co., 1620 I Street NW., No. 700, Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $723.33. E. (9) $152.33.

A. F. Howard McGuigan, 815 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, 815 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $6,413.50. E. (9) $652.14.

A. Clarence M. McIntosh, Jr., 400 First Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Railway Labor Executives' Association, 400 First Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
D. (6) $853.26.

A. William F. McKenna, 1200 17th Street NW., Suite 500, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Savings & Loan League, 1200 17th Street NW., Suite 500, Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. C. A. (Mack) McKinney, 110 Maryland Avenue NE., Suite 510, Washington, D.C. 20002.
B. Marine Corps League, National Headquarters, 933 North Kenmore Street , Arlington, Va. 22201.

A. C. A. (Mack) McKinney, 110 Maryland Avenue NE., Suite 510, Washington, D.C. 20002.
B. Non Commissioned Officers Association of USA, P.O. Box 2268, San Antonio, Tex. 78298.
D. (6) $2,700. E. (9) $3,527.91.

A. John S. McLees, 1615 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, 1615 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $200.

A. William F. McManus, 777 14th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. General Electric Co., 570 Lexington Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.
D. (6) $265.50. E. (9) $215.

A. C. W. McMillan, Suite 1015, National Press Building, 14th and F Streets, Washington, D.C. 20004.
B. American National Cattlemen's Association, 1001 Lincoln Street, Denver, Colo. 80202.
D. (6) $1,500.

A. Ralph J. McNair, 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Life Insurance Association, Inc., 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $200.

A. Charles R. McNeill, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The American Bankers Association, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $2,000. E. (9) $1,927.84.

A. McNutt, Dudley, Easterwood & Losch, 910 17th Street NW., Suite 301, Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $7,000. E. (9) $3,307.58.

A. Harry McPherson, Suite 1101, 1660 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The Common Fund, 635 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.
D. (6) $2,500. E. (9) $226.61.
A. Harry McPherson, Suite 1100, 1660 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Montgomery Ward, Inc., 619 West Chicago Avenue, Chicago, Ill. 60607.
D. (6) $650. E. (9) $25.

A. George G. Mead, 1616 P Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 1616 P Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $6,000. E. (9) $243.16.

A. William H. Megonnell, 140 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Association of Electric Cos., 1140 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $188.75. E. (9) $12.88.

A. Louis L. Meier, Jr., 1625 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Society of Civil Engineers, United Engineering Center, 345 East 47th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017.
D. (6) $430. E. (9) $480.

A. Kenneth A. Meiklejohn, 815 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, 815 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $6,942.

A. R. Otto Meletzke, 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Life Insurance Association, Inc., 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $40. E. (9) $5.

A. Lawrence C. Merthan, 1015 18th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The Carpet and Rug Institute, Dalton, Ga. 30720.

A. Lawrence C. Merthan, 1425 K Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Hill and Knowlton, Inc., 633 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y.
D. (6) $375. E. (9) $86.

A. Metropolitan Washington Board of Trade, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. George F. Meyer, Jr., 1625 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Retired Officers Association, 1625 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $449.

A. James G. Michaux, 1801 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Federated Department Stores, Inc., 222 West Seventh Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202.
D. (6) $500.

A. Ronald Michieli, Suite 1015, National Press Building, 14th and F Streets, Washington, D.C. 20004.
B. American National Cattlemen's Association, 1001 Lincoln Street, Denver, Colo. 80202.
D. (6) $1,000.

A. Mid-Continent Oil & Gas Association, 1111 Thompson Building, Tulsa, Okla., 74103.
D. (6) $157.18. E. (9) $1,186.07.

A. A Stanley Miller, 910 16th Street NW., Room 302, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Federation of American Controlled Shipping, 17 Battery Place North, New York, N.Y. 10004.
D. (6) $100.

A. Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin, 1320 19th Street NW., Suite 500, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Motors Corp., 14250 Plymouth Road, Detroit, Mich. 48232.

A. Miller & Chevalier, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Capital Holding Corp., Commonwealth Building, Louisville, Ky. 40201.
E. (9) $500.

A. Miller & Chevalier, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Pacific Lighting Corp., 810 South Flower Street, Los Angeles, Calif. 90017.
D. (6) $5,443.75.

A. Dale Miller, 377 Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Dallas, Tex., Chamber of Commerce.
D (6) $195. E. (9) $338.65.

A. Dale Miller, 377 Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Gulf Intracoastal Canal Association, Houston, Tex.
D. (6) $262.50. E. (9) $40.88.

A. Dale Miller, 377 Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Texasgulf, Inc., New York, N.Y.
D. (6) $300. E. (9) $338.65.

A. Edwin Reid Miller, Union Pacific Building, 1416 Dodge Street, Omaha, Nebr. 68179.
B. Nebraska Railroad Association, Union Pacific Building, 1416 Dodge Street, Omaha, Nebr. 68179.
D. (6) $6,550.22. E. (9) $42.08.

A. Joe D. Miller, 535 North Dearborn Street, Chicago, Ill. 60610.
B. American Medical Association, 535 North Dearborn Street, Chicago, Ill. 60610.
D. (6) $875.

A. Luman G. Miller, 620 Southwest Fifth
A. Luman G. Miller, 620 Southwest Fifth Avenue Building, Suite 912, Portland. Oreg. 97204.
B. Oregon Railroad Association, 620 Southwest Fifth Avenue Building, Suite 912, Portland, Oreg. 97204.
E. (9) $312.89.

A. Jack Mills, 1776 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Tobacco Institute, Inc., 1776 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,000. E. (9) $250.

A. Thomas F. Mitchell, 1735 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 900 Southwest Fifth Avenue, Portland, Oreg. 97204.
E. (9) $350.

A. Mobile Homes Manufacturers Association, Post Office Box 201, 14650 Lee Road, Chantilly, Va. 22021.
D. (6) $1,728.10. E. (9) $1,728.10.

A. John S. Monagan, 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Connecticut Bankers Association, 100 Constitution Plaza, Hartford, Conn. 06103.
D. (6) $2,500. E. (9) $129.21.

A. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 1660 L Street NW., Suite 1001, Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $2,288.07.

A. G. Merrill Moody, 40 Ivy Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Association of American Railroads, 1920 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $84. E. (9) $164.43.

A. O. William Moody, Jr., 815 16th Street NW., Room 510, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Maritime Trades Department, AFL–CIO, 815 16th Street NW., Room 510, Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $2,500. E. (9) $952.11.

A. Donald L. Morgan, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Cleary Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Donald L. Morgan, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Frank A. Morgan, Suite 820, 1800 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Sun Oil Co., 240 Radnor Chester Road, St. Davids, Pa. 19087.

A. Jo V. Morgan, Jr., 815 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. The American Humane Association, P.O. Box 1266, Denver, Colo. 80201.
D. (6) $1,800.

A. Morison, Murphy, Abrams & Haddock, 1776 K Street NW., Suite 900, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 330 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y.

A. Gene P. Morrell, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 1206, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Lone Star Gas Co., 301 South Harwood, Dallas, Tex. 75201.
D. (6) $1,500. E. (9) $957.

A. Jack Moskowitz, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Common Cause, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $7,500. E. (9) $89.50.

A. Lynn E. Mote, 1133 15th Street NW., Suite 503, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Northern Natural Gas Co., 2223 Dodge Street, Omaha, Nebr. 68102.
D. (6) $2,000.

A. Karen Mulhsuser, 705 G Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. National Abortion Rights Action League, 250 West 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10018.
D. (6) $1,875. E. (9) $2,229.94.

A. William G. Mullen, 491 National Press Building, Washington, D.C. 20004.
B. National Newspaper Association, 491 National Press Building, Washington, D.C. 20004.
E. (9) $170.

A. Robert M. Mulligan, 1105 Barr Building, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. International Association of Ice Cream Manufacturers and Milk Industry Foundation, 1105 Barr Building, Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. John J. Murphy, 416 Shoreham Building, 806 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. National Customs Service Association.

A. Richard E. Murphy, 900 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Service Employees International Union, AFL–CIO, 900 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,000. E. (9) $100.

A. Richard W. Murphy, 1200 18th Street NW., Suite 1109, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Merck & Co., Inc., Rahway, N.J. 07065.
D. (6) $500.

A. Tom O. Murphy, 1156 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. United States Beet Sugar Association, 1156 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.

A. D. Michael Murray, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 842, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co., 516 West Jackson Boulevard, Chicago, Ill. 60606.
D. (6) $95. E. (9) $157.

A. D. Michael Murray, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 842, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 1460 Union Commerce Building, Cleveland, Ohio 44115.
D. (6) $75. E. (9) $107.

A. D. Michael Murray, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 842, Washigton, D.C. 20036.
B. National Association of Industrial Parks, 1800 North Kent Street, Arlington, Va. 22209.
D. (6) $100. E. (9) $171.

A. D. Michael Murray, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 842, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Council of Coal Lessors, Inc., 1425 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $75. E. (9) $75.

A. William E. Murray, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
B. National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
D. (6) $185.

A. Thomas H. Mutchler.
B. International Paper Co., 1620 I Street NW., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $300. E. (9) $92.50.

A. Kenneth D. Naden, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C.

A. John J. Nangle, 1625 I Street NW., Suite 812, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Association of Independent Insurers, 2600 River Road, Des Plaines, Ill. 60018.
D. (6) $2,000. E. (9) $400.

A. National Agricultural Chemicals Association, 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.

A. National Association for Humane Legislation, Inc., 675 Pinellas Point Drive South, St. Petersburg, Fla. 33705.
D. (6) $472. E. (9) $2.12.

A. National Association for Uniformed Services, 956 North Monroe Street, Arlington, Va. 22201.
D. (6) $38,596. E. (9) $10,200.65.

A. National Association of Electric Cos., 1140 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 1010, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $50,618.75. E. (9) $6,770.30.

A. National Association of Farmer Elected Committeemen, c/o J. Frederick Durr, R. R. No. 2, Sheridan, Ind. 46069.
D. (1) $2,136.98. E. (9) $2,136.98.

A. National Association of Food Chains, 1725 I Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $300. E. (9) $300.

A. National Association of Furniture Manufacturers, 8401 Connecticut Avenue, Suite 911, Washington, D.C. 20015.
D. (6) $1,750. E. (9) $1,230.

A. National Association of Insurance Agents, Inc., 85 John Street, New York, N.Y., 10038.
E. (9) $12,201.01.

A. National Association of Letter Carriers, 100 Indiana Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
D. (6) $931,837.64. E. (9) $37,722.77.

A. National Association of Mutual Insurance Cos., 2511 East 46th Street, Suite H, Indianapolis, Ind. 46205.

A. National Association of Mutual Savings Banks, 200 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.
D. (6) $4,701.54. E. (9) $4,701.54.

A. National Association of Plumbing, Heating Cooling Contractors, 1016 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $4,330.10. E. (9) $4,330.10.

A. National Association of Realtors, 155 East Superior Street, Chicago, Ill. 60611.
E. (9) $15,514.70.

A. National Audio-Visual Association, Inc., 3150 Spring Street, Fairfax, Va. 22030.
D. (6) $227,780.65. E. (9) $7,572.65.

A. National Broiler Council, 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $300. E. (9) $300.

A. National Building Granite Quarries Association, Inc., 202 South Second Street, Cold Spring, Minn.
E. (9) $1,410.23.

A. National Canners Association, 1133 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $428,954.52. E. (9) $4,615.92.

A. National Coal Association, Coal Building, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $528,291.91. E. (9) $3,478.96.

A. National Committee Against Repressive Legislation, 555 North Western Avenue, Los Angeles, Calif. 90004.
D. (6) $1,944.97. E. (9) $1,944.97.

A. The National Committee on the Presidency, Inc., 63 East 82d Street, New York, N.Y. 10028.
D. (6) $44,221.12. E. (9) $23,518.87.

A. National Cotton Council of America, P.O. Box 12285, Memphis, Tenn. 38112.
D. (6) $8,466.32. E. (9) $8,466.32.

A. National Council for a Responsible Firearms Policy, 1028 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $915.22. E. (9) $30.

A. National Council of Agricultural Employers, 337 Southern Building, 15th and H Streets NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $42,000. E. (9) $1,650.

A. National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $42,774. E. (9) $43,090.

A. National Counsel Associates, 421 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, D.C.
B. American Blood Resources Association, 308 State Street, Albany, N.Y.
D. (6) $1,125. E. (9) $74.24.

A. National Counsel Associates, 421 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, D.C.
B. Cenco Inc., 2600 South Kostner Avenue, Chicago, Ill.
D. (6) $2,475. E. (9) $148.70.

A. National Counsel Associates, 421 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Committee for the Study of Revenue Bond Financing, 1000 Ring Building, Washington D.C.
D. (6) $833.33. E. (9) $136.17.

A. National Cystic Fibrosis Research Foundation, 3379 Peachtree Road NE., Atlanta, Ga. 30326.
E. (9) $12,530.33.

A. National Electrical Contractors Association, Inc., 7315 Wisconsin Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20014.

A. National Electrical Manufacturers Association, 155 East 44th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017.

A. National Federation of Federal Employees, 1737 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $370,418.80. E. (9) $20,111.14.

A. National Federation of Independent Business, 920-922 Washington Building, Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $11,297.44. E. (9) $11,297.44.

A. National Grain and Feed Association, 725 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.

A. National Home Furnishings Association, 1150 Merchandise Mart, Chicago, Ill. 60654.
D. (6) $400. E. (9) $455.

A. National Limestone Institute, Inc., 1315 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $21,377.01. E. (9) $21,377.01.

A. National Livestock Feeders Association, Inc., 309 Livestock Exchange Building, Omaha, Nebr. 68107.
D. (6) $9,251.72. E. (9) $9,251.72.

A. National Milk Producers Federation, 30 F Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
D. (6) $3,877.06. E. (9) $3,877.06.

A. National Motorsports Committee of ACCUS, Suite 801, 1629 K Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $7,983.25. E. (9) $5,645.13.

A. National Parking Association, 1101 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
E. (9) $825.

A. National Patent Council, 1225 19th Street NW., Suite 409, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $1,875. E. (9) $800.

A. National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
E. (9) $3,547.88.

A. National Savings & Loan League, 1200 17th Street NW., Suite 500, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $208,883.71. E. (9) $3,750.

A. National Small Business Association, 1225 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $5,000. E. (9) $2,562.52.

A. National Society of Professional Engineers, 2029 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $12,500. E. (9) $14,542.90.

A. National Soft Drink Association, 1101 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $1,524.84.

A. National Tire Dealers & Retreaders Association, 1343 L Street NW. Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $1,156.40. E. (9) $1,156.40.

A. Nation-Wide Committee on Import-Export Policy, 815 15th Street NW., Suite 711, Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $3,925. E. (9) $4,964.07.

A. National Wool Growers Association, 600 Crandall Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.
D. (6) $33,383. E. (9) $6,878.68.

A. Alexander W. Neale, Jr., 1015 18th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Conference of State Bank Supervisors, 1015 18th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $1,495.

A. Alan M. Nedry, 1801 K Street NW., No. 1041, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Southern California Edison Co., P.O. Box 800, Rosemead, Calif. 91770.
D. (6) $350. E. (9) $85.91.

A. Allen Neece, Jr., 512 Washington Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.

B. National Association of Small Business Investment Cos., 512 Washington Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $300.

A. Frances E. Neely, 245 Second Street NE., Washington, D.C.
B. Friends Commitee on National Legislation, 245 Second Street NE., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $1,850.

A. Stanley Nehmer, Suite 800, 1101 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Footwear Industries Association, 1611 North Kent Street, Arlington, Va. 22209.
D. (6) $750. E. (9) $500.

A. George R. Nelson, 1300 Conecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 1300 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $4,000. E. (9) $472.54.

A. Robert W. Nelson, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
B. National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
D. (6) $160.

A. Ivan A. Nestingen, Suite 700, 1010 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Nursing Home Association, 1200 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $1,200. E. (9) $174.60.

A. E. John Neumann, 1515 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. 22209.
B. American Gas Association, 1515 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. 22209.
D. (6) $400. E. (9) $300.

A. Robert B. Neville, 1155 15th Street, NW., Suite 505, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. National Restaurant Association, 1155 15th Street, NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $2,187.50. E. (9) $18.75.

A. Louis H. Nevins, 1709 New York Avenue, NW., Suite 200, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Association of Mutual Savings Banks, 200 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.
D. (6) $2,000. E. (9) $519.54.

A. E. J. Newbould, 1130 17th Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Clay Pipe Institute, 350 West Terra Cotta Avenue, Crystal Lake, Ill. 60014.
D. (6) $150.

A. New York Committee of, International Committee of Passenger Lines, 25 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10004.
D. (6) $32,000. E. (9) $21,778.

A. Richard Ney, Watergate South, 700 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. American Academy of Family Physicians, 1740 West 92d Street, Kansas City, Mo. 64114.
D. (6) $675. E. (9) $373.05.

A. Charles E. Nichols, 101 Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 101 Constitution Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20001.
D. (6) $675. E. (9) $373.05.

A. F. Clayton Nicholson, Box 15, Route 1, Henryville, Pa. 18332.
B. Northern Helex Co., 2223 Dodge Street, Omaha, Nebr. 68102.

A. Patrick J. Nilan, 817 14th Street, NW., Washington, D.C.
B. American Postal Workers Union, AFL–CIO, 817 14th Street, NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $8,515.91. E. (9) $1,098.13.

A. NL Industries, Inc., 111 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10006.
E. (9) $562.

A. Robert W. Nolan, 1303 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Fleet Reserve Association, 1303 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $100.

A. Charles M. Noone, 1225 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Association of Small Business Investment Cos., 512 Washington Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $1,500. E. (9) $187.82.

A. Robert H. North, 1105 Barr Building, Washington, D.C.
B. International Association of Ice Cream Manufacturers and Mil.. Industry Foundation, 1105 Barr Building, Washington, D.C.

A. Seward P. Nyman, 20 Chevy Chase Circle NW., Washington, D.C. 20015.
B. American Podiatry Association, 20 Chevy Chase Circle NW., Washington, D.C. 20015
D. (6) $650.

A. O'Connor & Hannan, 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Transit Association, 465 L'Enfant Plaza West SW., Suite 2900, Washington, D.C. 20024.
D. (6) $2,250. E. (9) $136.50.

A. O'Connor & Hannan, 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Northwestern Steel & Wire Co., Sterling, Ill. 61081.
D. (6) $2,700.

A. O'Connor & Hannan, 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Pasco, Inc., 530 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10036.
D. (6) $16,500.

A. O'Connor & Hannan, 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Upper Mississippi Towing Corp., 7703 Normandale Road, Room 110, Minneapolis, Minn. 55435.
D. (6) $2,500. E. (9) $477.64.

A. L. L. O'Connor, 20 North Wacker Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60606.
B. Profit Sharing Council of America, 20 North Wacker Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60606.

A. James L. O'Dea, 1341 G Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. National Association of Government Employees, Inc., 285 Dorchester Avenue, Boston, Mass. 02127.
D. (6) $2,000. E. (9) $80.

A. John A. O'Donnell, 1001 Connecticut Avenue NW., No. 716, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Trucking Associations Inc., 1616 P Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $1,500.

A. John A. O'Donnell, 1001 Connecticut Avenue NW., No. 716, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Philippine Sugar Institute.
D. (6) $3,000. E. (9) $378.09.

A. Jane O'Grady, 815 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

B. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL–CIO, 15 Union Square, New York, N.Y. 10003.
D. (6) $4,529.98. E. (9) $3,757.22.

A. Bartley O'Hara, 25 Louisiana Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 25 Louisiana Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
D. (6) $4,999.98.

A. Richard C. O'Hare, 1120 Investment Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Harness Tracks of America, 333 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Ill. 60601.

A. The Ohio Railroad Association, 16 East Broad Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215.

A. Oil Investment Institute, Suite III, 125 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.

A. Alvin E. Oliver, 725 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. National Grain and Feed Association, 725 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.

A. Edward W. Oliver, 5025 Wisconsin Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20016.
B. Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL–CIO, 5025 Wisconsin Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20016.

A. Michael S. Olson, P.O. Box 2776, Raleigh, N.C. 27602.
B. Carolinas Association of Mutual Insurance Agents, Inc., P.O. Box 2776, Raleigh, N.C. 27602.

A. Roy E. Olson, 260 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016.
B. American Paper Institute, 260 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016.

A. Samuel Omasta, 1315 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Limestone Institute, Inc., 1315 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $52.25.

A. Organization of Professional Employees of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1341 G Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $2,730.26. E. (9) $1,944.99.

A. Edward R. Osann, 2147 O Street NW., No. 201, Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. Save the Dunes Council, Inc., P.O. Box 303, Chesterton, Ind. 46304.
D. (6) $1,696. E. (9) $433.68.

A. John L. Oshinski, 815 16th Street NW., Suite 706, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. United Steelworkers of America, Five Gateway Center, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15222.
D. (6) $4,728.99. E. (9) $753.31.

A. David A. Oxford, 314 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Mobile Homes Manufacturers Association, P.O. Box 201, Chantilly, Va. 22021.
D. (6) $5,000. E. (9) $100.

A. Juris Padegs, 127 East 59th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022.
B. Investment Counsel Association of America, Inc., 127 East 59th Street, New York N.Y. 10022.

A. Raymond S. Page, Jr., Mill Creek Terrace, Gladwyne, Pa. 19035.
B. Campbell Soup Co., Campbell Place, Camden, N.J. 08101.

A. Norman Paige, 538 Pennsylvania Building, Washington, D.C. 20004.
B. Distilled Spirits Council of the United States, 538 Pennsylvania Building, Washington, D.C. 20004.

A. Edward J. Panarello, 1775 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Retail Clerks International Association, AFL–CIO, 1775 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $6,819.23. E. (9) $1,639.20.

A. Frederick Panzer, 1776 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Tobacco Institute, Inc., 1776 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,000. E. (9) $250.

A. Robert D. Partridge, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
B. National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
D. (6) $198.40.

A. Kenton Pattie, 3150 Spring Street, Fairfax, Va. 22030.
B. National Audio-Visual Association, Inc., 3150 Spring Street, Fairfax, Va. 22030.
D. (6) $1,424.38.

A. Patton, Boggs & Blow, 1200 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Alyeska Pipeline Service Corp., P.O. Box 576, Bellevue, Wash. 98004.
D. (6) $5,640.

A. Patton, Boggs & Blow, 1200 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Imported Automobile Dealers Association, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $760. E. (9) $135.

A. Patton, Boggs & Blow, 1200 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Maritime Association, 17 Battery Place, New York., N.Y. 10004.
D. (6) $960. E. (9) $20.

A. Patton, Boggs & Blow, 1200 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Boating Industry Association, 401 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Ill. 60601; National Association of Engine & Boat Manufacturers, 537 Steamboat Road., Greenwich, Conn. 06830.
D. (6) $2,310. E. (9) $500.

A. Patton, Boggs & Blow, 1200 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Central American Sugar Council, 1200 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $4,500. E. (9) $3,000.

A. Patton, Boggs & Blow, 1200 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Chippewa-Cree Tribe, Rocky Boy Route, Box Elder, Mont. 59521.
D. (6) $80.

A. Patton, Boggs & Blow, 1200 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Council of State Chambers of Commerce, 1028 Connecticut Avenue, Suite 1018, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $625. E. (9) $70.

A. Patton, Boggs & Blow, 1200 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 140 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10005.
D. (6) $1,680. E. (9) $240.

A. Patton, Boggs & Blow, 1200 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Institute of Scrap Iron and Steel, Inc., 1729 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,200. E. (9) $329.

A. Patton, Boggs & Blow, 1200 17th Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. International Snowmobile Industry Association, 5100 Edina Industrial Boulevard, Minneapolis, Minn. 55435.

A. Patton, Boggs & Blow, 1200 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Machinery Dealers National Association, 1400 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $160.

A. Patton, Boggs & Blow, 1200 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Marcor, Incorporated, 619 West Chicago Avenue, Chicago, Ill. 60607.
D. (6) $780. E. (9) $47.25.

A. Patton, Boggs & Blow, 1200 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Moody's Investors Service, Inc., 99 Church Street, New York, N.Y. 10008.

A. Patton, Boggs & Blow, 1200 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The Nestle Co., 100 Bloomingdale Road, White Plains, N.Y. 10605.

A. Patton, Boggs & Blow, 1200 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. New Process Co., 220 Hickory Street, Warren, Pa. 16365.
D. (6) $2,000.

A. Patton, Boggs & Blow, 1200 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Ralston Purina Co., Checkerboard Square, St. Louis, Mo. 63188.
D. (6) $508.

A. Patton, Boggs & Blow, 1200 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Reader's Digest Association, Inc., Pleasantville, N.Y. 10570.
D. (6) $2,500.

A. Patton, Boggs & Blow, 1200 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. State of Louisiana, Department of Conservation, P.O. Box 44275, Baton Rouge, La. 70804.
D. (6) $880. E. (9) $250.

A. Patton, Boggs & Blow, 1200 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Tax Corporation of America, 2441 Honolulu Avenue, Montrose, Calif. 91020.

A. Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, 345 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.
B. Warner Bros. Inc., 4000 Warner Boulevard, Burbank, Calif. 91505.

A. Jack Pearce, Suite 808, 910 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Committee on Modern, Efficient Transportation, Suite 818, 910 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $9,800. E. (9) $3,250.40.

A. Jack Pearce, Suite 808, 910 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Computer Industry Association, 16255 Ventura Boulevard, Encino, Calif., 91316.
D. (6) $9,000. E. (9) $2,883.23.

A. John J. Pecoraro, 1750 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. International Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades, 1750 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $2,686.53.

A. Pennzoil Co., 900 Southwest Tower, Houston, Tex. 77002.
E. (9) $12,345.39.

A. D. V. Pensabene, Suite 1204, 1700 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Standard Oil Co. of California, Suite 1204, 1700 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $50. E. (9) $25.

A. J. Carter Perkins, Suite 200, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Shell Oil Co., One Shell Plaza, P.O. Box 2463, Houston, Tex. 77001.
D. (6) $1,000.

A. Kenneth Peterson, 815 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, 815 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $6,714.50. E. (9) $645.56.

A. Richard W. Peterson, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The American Bankers Association, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $600.

A. Walter T. Phair, 900 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Kaiser Industries Corp., 900 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $375. E. (9) $350.

A. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.

A. John P. Philbin, 1100 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Mobil Oil Corp., 150 East 42d Street., New York, N.Y. 10017.
D. (6) $1,500. E. (9) $41.21.

A. Howard Phillips, 4220 Linden Street, Fairfax, Va. 22030.
B. American Conservative Union, 422 First Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $4,500.

A. Pierson, Ball & Dowd, 1000 Ring Building, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Committee for Study of Revenue Bond Financing, 1000 Ring Building, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $4,444.44. E. (9) $203.

A. Pierson, Ball & Dowd, 1000 Ring Building, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), 910 South Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Ill. 60605.
D. (6) $1,000.

A. Plains Cotton Growers, Inc., P.O. Box 10425, Lubbock, Tex. 79408.
D. (6) $176,954.42. E. (9) $1,350.

A. Kenneth B. Pomeroy, 10404 Conover Drive, Silver Spring, Md. 20902.
B. National Association of State Foresters, 10404 Conover Drive, Silver Spring, Md. 20902.
D. (6) $3,000. E. (9) $650.62.

A. Ramsey D. Potts, 910 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Investment Company Institute, 1775 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,500. E. (9) $22.30.

A. Ramsay D. Potts, 910 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Investment Counsel Associaton of America, Inc., 127 East 59th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022.
D. (6) $1,697. E. (9) $25.30.

A. Richard M. Powell, 7315 Wisconsin Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20014.
B. International Association of Refrigerated Warehouses, 7315 Wisconsin Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20014.

A. Carlton H. Power, 1918 N. Parkway, Memphis, Tenn.
B. National Cotton Council of America, P.O. Box 12285, Memphis, Tenn. 38112.
D. (6) $352.50. E. (9) $48.40.

A. John J. Power, 101 Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 101 Constitution Avenue NW., Washington D.C. 20001.
D. (6) $2,080. E. (9) $60.

A. William C. Prather, 111 East Wacker Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60601.
B. United States League of Savings Associations, 111 East Wacker Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60601.
D. (6) $600. E. (9) $100.

A. Forrest J. Prettyman, 730 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Association of Registered Bank Holding Cos., 730 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $437.50.

A. PROD, Inc., 2000 P Street NW., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $54.80.

A. Profit Sharing Council of America, 20 North Wacker Drive, Room 722, Chicago, Ill. 60606.

A. The Proprietary Association, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $290.71. E. (9) $290.71.

A. Earle W. Putnam, 5025 Wisconsin Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20016.
B. Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL–CIO, 5025 Wisconsin Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20016.

A. Howard Pyle, 1000 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), 200 East Randolph Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60601
D. (6) $1,346. E. (9) $17.61.

A. William A. Quinlan, Route 8, Box 238, Annapolis, Md. 21401.
D. (6) $2,921. E. (9) $817.88.

A. Arthur L. Quinn, Arthur Lee Quinn, 723 Washington Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Belize Sugar Industries, Belize City, Belize.
D. (6) $3,750. E. (9) $340.42.

A. Arthur L. Quinn, Arthur Lee Quinn, 723 Washington Building, Washington, D.C. 20005
B. Government of Republic of Panama, Compania Azucarera La Estrella, South America and Azucarera Naciconal, South America, Panama City, Panama.
D. (6) $4,500. E. (9) $356.81.

A. Arthur L. Quinn, Arthur Lee Quinn, 723 Washington Building, Washington, D.C. 20005
B. Sociedad Agricola e Industrial San Carlos, South America, Compania Azucarera Valdez, Azucarera Tropical Americana, South America, Tababuela Industrial Azucarera, Ceneral America, Ecuador.
D. (6) $6,250. E. (9) $592.71.

A. Arthur L. Quinn, Arthur Lee Quinn, 723 Washington Building, Washington, D.C. 20005
B. West Indies Sugar Association, Bridgetown, Barbados.
D. (6) $8,750. E. (9) $890.91.

A. Thomas H. Quinn, 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Committee for Study of Revenue Bond Financing, 1200 18th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $1,666.50. E. (9) $305.57.

A. James H. Rademacher, 100 Indiana Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. National Association of Letter Carriers, 100 Indiana Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
D. (6) $2,204.72.

A. Alex Radin, 2600 Virginia Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. American Public Power Association, 2600 Virginia Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
D. (6) $346.95.

A. Raymond Raedy, 1701 K Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Health Insurance Association of America, 1701 K Street NW., Washington, D.C.

A. Railway Labor Executives' Association, 400 First Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $10,692. E. (9) $10,692.

A. Railway Progress Institute, 801 North Fairfax Street, Alexandria, Va. 22314.
D. (6) $1,500. E. (9) $1,500.

A. Donald A. Randall, Suite 303, 910 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Automotive Service Councils, Inc., 4001 Warren Boulevard, Hillside, Ill. 60162.
D. (6) $3,300. E. (9) $524.50

A. D. Michael Rappoport, P.O. Box 1980, Phoenix, Ariz. 85001.
B. Salt River Project, P.O. Box 1980, Phoenix, Ariz. 85001.
D. (6) $644.88. E. (9) $361.06.

A. G. J. Rauschenbach.
B. Communications Satellite Corp., 950 L'Enfant Plaza South SW., Washington, D.C. 20024.
D. (6) $1,500. E. (9) $1,060.

A. Sydney C. Reagan, 6815 Prestonshire, Dallas, Tex. 75225.
B. Southwestern Peanut Shellers Association, 6815 Prestonshire, Dallas, Tex. 75225.
D. (6) $150.

A. Carl L. Rechin, 900 Union Commerce Building, Cleveland, Ohio 44115.
B. Glidden-Durkee Division, SCM Corp., 900 Union Commerce Building, Cleveland, Ohio 44115.

A. Timothy J. Redmon, 1730 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Optometric Association, c/o Jack A. Potter, 820 First National Bank Building, Peoria, Ill. 61602.
D. (6) $101. E. (9) $101.95.

A. Dwight C. Reed, 1101 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Soft Drink Association.

A. David J. Reedy, 6S430 Huntington Circle, Naperville, Ill. 60540.
B. National Advertising Co., 6850 South Harlem Avenue, Bedford Park, Argo, Ill. 60501.
D. (6) $2,200.

A. John A. Reggitts, Jr., R.D. 2, Boonton Avenue, Boonton, N.J. 07005.

A. John A. Reilly, 59 Maiden Lane, New York, N.Y. 10038.
B. Estate of Bert N. Adams, 1461 West 16th Place, Yuma, Ariz. 85364; Emma Giambald, 1461 West 16th Place, Yuma, Ariz. 85364; George Hallingby, 4104 Chestnut Drive East, Forest Hills, Holiday, Fla. 33589.
E. (9) $25.

A. W. W. Renfroe, 69 Fountain Place, Capital Plaza, Frankfort, Ky. 40601.
B. Kentucky Railroad Association, 69 Fountain Place, Capital Plaza, Frankfort, Ky. 40601.

A. The Retired Officers Association, 1625 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $2,228.

A. Retirement Federation of Civil Service Employees of the U.S. Government, Suite 529, Munsey Building, Washington, D.C. 20004.
D. (6) $4,633.75. E. (9) $7,360.25.

A. James J. Reynolds, 1625 K Street NW., Suite 1000, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Institute of Merchant Shipping, 1625 K Street NW., Suite 1000, Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,875. E. (9) $189.51.

A. William L. Reynolds, 1200 17th Street NW., Suite 500, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Savings & Loan League, 1200 17th Street NW., Suite 500, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $3,210. E. (9) $510.

A. Rice Genocide Research, P.O. Box 7307, Washington, D.C. 20044.
E. (9) $332.

A. Theron J. Rice, 1130 17th Street NW., No. 400, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Continental Oil Co., High Ridge Park, Stamford, Conn. 06904.

A. Maxwell E. Rich, 1600 Rhode Island Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Rifle Association of America, 1600 Rhode Island Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $625.

A. Mark Richardson, 1611 North Kent Street, Arlington, Va. 22209.
B. American Footwear Industries Association, Inc., 1611 North Kent Street, Arlington, Va. 22209.
D. (6) $270. E. (9) $250.

A. Warren S. Richardson, 1957 E Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Associated General Contractors of America, 1957 E Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $2,060.

A. Robert R. Rickett, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Robert R. Rickett, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Robert R. Rickett, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Paul M. Riley, 1730 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Optometric Association, c/o Jack A. Potter, 820 First National Bank Building, Peoria, Ill. 61602.
D. (6) $110.60. E. (9) $133.

A. Stark Ritchie, 1801 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Petroleum Institute, 1801 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Geo. W. Ritter, 3914 King Arthur Road, Annandale, Va. 22003.
B. Alton Box Board Co., Alton, Ill. 62002.
D. (6) $3,000. E. (9) $1,483.

A. William Neale Roach, 1616 P Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 1616 P Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $6,000.

A. Paul H. Robbins, 2029 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Society of Professional Engineers, 2029 K Street NW., Washington D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,000.

A. Clyde F. Roberts, Jr., 1776 F Street NW., Washington D.C. 20006.
B. National Association of Manufacturers, 1776 F Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $450.

A. Kenneth A. Roberts, 888 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Movers Committee for Emergency Fuel Resources, c/o Robert K. Lee, P.O. Box 272, Wichita, Kans. 67201.

A. William S. Roberts, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
B. National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
D. (6) $60.

A. Charles A. Robinson, Jr., 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
B. National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
D. (6) $233.28.

A. John P. Roche, 150 East 42d Street, New York, N.Y.
B. American Iron & Steel Institute, 150 East 42d Street, New York, N.Y.
D. (6) $500. E. (9) $210.

A. Thomas G. Roderick, 1101 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Consolidated Natural Gas Service Co., Inc., Four Gateway Center, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15222.
E. (9) $4.

A. W. L. Rodich, 5601 Eastern Avenue, Baltimore, Md. 21224.
B. Glidden-Durkee Division SCM Corp., 5601 Eastern Avenue, Baltimore, Md.

A. Byron G. Rogers, 918 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Denver Board of Water Commissioners, 144 West Colfax Avenue, Denver, Colo. 80202.
D. (6) $2,825.50.

A. Donald L. Rogers, 730 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Association of Registered Bank Holding Cos., 730 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $937.50.

A. Frank W. Rogers, Suite 793, 1801 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Western Oil and Gas Association, 609 South Grand Avenue, Los Angeles, Calif. 90017.
D. (6) $750.

A. Walter E. Rogers, 1660 L Street NW., Suite 601, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, 1660 L Street NW., Suite 601, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $1,000.

A. Rogers & Wells, 1666 K Street NW., Suite 900, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Deltona Corp., 3250 Southwest Third Avenue, Miami, Fla. 33129.

A. Rogers & Wells, 1666 K Street NW., Suite 900, Washington, D.C. 20006.

B. Prime Land Bank, 1828 L Street NW., Suite 505, Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $4.40.

A. Rogers & Wells, 1666 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association/College Retirement Equities Fund, 730 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.
D. (6) $1,000. E. (9) $20.

A. John F. Rolph III, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Bankers Association, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $750.

A. Gail S. Rosenberg, 705 G Street SE., Washington, D.C.
B. National Abortion Rights Action League, 250 West 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10019.
D. (6) $1,250.

A. Larry M. Rosenstein, 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Life Insurance Association, Inc., 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Rouss & O'Rourke, Lawyers Building, 231 East Vermijo Avenue, Colorado Springs, Colo. 80903.
B. Union Nacional de Productores de Azucar, S. A. de C. V., Balderas 36, Mexico, D. F. Mexico.
D. (6) $5,493. E. (9) $2,074.75.

A. John Forney Rudy, 1800 K Street NW., Suite 622, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Akron, Ohio 44316.

A. Perry A. Russ, 901 North Washington Street, Alexandria, Va. 22314.
B. Society of American Florists, 901 North Washington Street, Alexandria, Va. 22314.

A. Albert R. Russell, P.O. Box 12285, Memphis, Tenn. 38112.
B. National Cotton Council of America, P.O. Box 12285, Memphis, Tenn. 38112.
D. (6) $3,046.88. E. (9) $210.85.

A. Wally Rustad, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
B. National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
D. (6) $150.

A. J. T. Rutherford & Associates, Inc., 1660 L Street NW., Suite 514, Washington, D.C.
B. The Am College of Radiology, 20 North Wacker Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60606.
D. (6) $750. E. (9) $951.76.

A. J. T. Rutherford & Associates, Inc., 1660 L Street, Suite 514, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Optometric Association, 1730 M Street, Suite 206, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $400. E. (9) $840.62.

A. J. T. Rutherford & Associates, Inc., 1660 L Street NW., Suite 514, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Am. Trucking Association, Inc., 1616 P Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $500. E. (9) $651.25.

A. Millard H. Ruud, Suite 370, One Dupont Circle NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Association of American Law Schools, Suite 370, One Dupont Circle NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Ella Marice Ryan, 1156 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. J. C. Penney Co., Inc., 1301 Avenue of the Americas, New York, N.Y. 10019.
D. (6) $150. E. (9) $14.33.

A. William Ryan, 1300 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 1300 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $3,500. E. (9) $135.04.

A. Carl K. Sadler, 1325 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Federation of Government Employees, 1325 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $7,491.40. E. (9) $8,388.38.

A. G. K. Sandweg, Thompson & Mitchell, 705 Olive Street, St. Louis, Mo. 63101.
B. Clayton Brokerage Co. of St. Louis, Inc., 7701 Forsyth Boulevard, St. Louis, Mo. 63105.
D. (6) $250. E. (9) $1,609.70.

A. Irene Saunders, 2827 28th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20008.
B. Center for Public Financing of Elections, 201 Massachusetts Avenue NE., Washington, D.C. 20002.
D. (6) $2,634.

A. Thomas H. Saunders, 1825 K Street NW., Suite 501, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Dow Chemical Co., Midland, Mich. 48640.

A. Ruth M. Saxe, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Common Cause, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $300.

A. Kenneth I. Schaner, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Protestant-Catholic Hospital Action Committee, 840 North Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60611.
E. (9) $25.

A. Kenneth D. Schanzer, 1771 N Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Association of Broadcasters, 1771 N Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $1,249.98. E. (9) $268.47.

A. Eric P. Schellin, 1225 19th Street NW., Suite 409, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Patent Council, 1225 19th Street NW., Suite 409, Washington, D.C. 20036. 20036.
D. (6) $800.

A. Jacques T. Schlenger, 1800 Mercantile Bank & Trust Building, 2 Hopkins Plaza, Baltimore, Md. 21201.
B. Maryland State Fair and Agricultural Society, Inc., Timonium State Fair Grounds, Timonium, Md. 21093.
E. (9) $51.91.

A. Stephen I. Schlossberg, 1125 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 8000 East Jefferson Avenue, Detroit, Mich. 48214.
D. (6) $8,730.68. E. (9) $1,198.50.

A. Allan D. Schlosser, 1000 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. United States-Japan Trade Council, 1000 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $300.

A. Hilliard Schulberg, Suite B-3, 5010 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20016.
B. National Liquor Stores Association, Inc., Suite B-3, 5010 Wisconsin Avenue NW., Washintgon, D.C. 20016.
D. (6) $225. E. (9) $20.

A. Hilliard Schulberg, Suite B-3, 5010 Wisconsin Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20016.
B. Washington D.C. Retail Liquor Dealers Association, Inc., Suite B-3, 5010 Wisconsin Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20016.
D. (6) $555. E. (9) $65.

A. Donald H. Schwab, 200 Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C. 20002.
B. Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States.
D. (6) $2,014.05.

A. Sydnee M. Schwartz, 900 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. United Mine Workers of America, 900 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $843.75. E. (9) $10.

A. Scribner, Hall, Thornburg & Thompson, 1200 18th Street NW., Suite 502, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Jefferson Pilot Corp., Post Office Box 21008, Greensboro, N.C. 27402.
D. (6) $1,000.

A. Scribner, Hall, Thornburg & Thompson, 1200 18th Street NW., Suite 502, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co., Chattanooga, Tenn. 37402.

A. Earl W. Sears, P.O. Box 12285, Memphis, Tenn. 38112.
B. National Cotton Council of America, P.O. Box 12285, Memphis, Tenn. 38112.
D. (6) $270. E. (9) $29.08.

A. Ronald C. Seeley, 1357 Nicolet Place, Detroit, Mich. 48207.
B. Estate of Bert N. Adams, 1461 West 16th Place, Yuma, Ariz. 85364; Emma (Adams) Giambaldi, 1461 West 16th Place, Yuma, Ariz. 85364; George Hallingby, 4104 Chestnut Drive East, Forest Hills, Holiday, Fla. 33589.

A. William M. Segall, 1015 18th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The Carpet and Rug Institute, P.O. Box 2048, Dalton, Ga. 30720.

A. Stanton P. Sender, 1211 Connecticut Avenue NW., No. 802, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Sears Towers, Chicago, Ill. 60684.
D. (6) $125. E. (9) $25.

A. W. O. Senter, 1725 DeSales Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Gas Supply Committee, 1725 DeSales Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $355. E. (9) $83.

A. Theodore A. Serrill, 491 National Press Building, Washington, D.C. 20004.
B. National Newspaper Association, 491 National Press Building, Washington, D.C. 20004.
E. (9) $227.70.

A. J. Richard Sewell, 1701 K Street NW., suite 503, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Florida Power & Light Co., P.O. Box 3100, Miami, Fla. 33101.
D. (6) $600. E. (9) $100.

A. Robert L. Shafer, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Pfizer Inc., 235 East 42d Street, New York, N.Y. 10017.
D. (6) $650. E. (9) $305.

A. Sharman Associates, Inc., Suite 1000, 1100 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Movers Committee for Emergency Fuel Resources, c/o Robert K. Lee, P.O. Box 272, Wichita, Kans. 67201.
D. (6) $4,100.

A. Sharon, Pierson, Semmes, Crolius & Finley, 1054 31st Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20007.

B. Albright Title & Trust Co., 100 North Main Street, Newkirk, Okla. 74647; American Title Insurance Co., 150 Southeast Third Avenue, Miami, Fla. 33131; Chelsea Title & Guaranty Co., 1300 Bacharach Boulevard, Atlantic City, N.J. 08401.
D. (6) $10,250. E. (9) $1,394.86.

A. Sharon, Pierson, Semmes, Crolius & Finley, 1054 31st Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20007.
B. Estate of Howard Allington; Estate of Robert P. Anninger; Henry Arnhold.
E. (9) $220.

A. Sharon, Pierson, Semmes, Crolius & Finley, 1054–31st Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20007.
B. American National Cattlemen's Association, Denver, Colo.
D. (6) $2,000. E. (9) $38.57.

A. Sharon, Pierson, Semmes, Crolius & Finley, 1054 31st Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20007.
B. General Electric Co., 570 Lexington Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.
D. (6) $6,966. E. (9) $942.02.

A. Sharon, Pierson, Semmes, Crolius & Finley, 1054 31st Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20007.
B. Independent Grocers' Alliance, 300 West Adams Street, Chicago, Ill. 60606; Topco Associates, Inc., 7711 Gross Point Road, Skokie, Ill. 60076; Alpena Wholesale Grocer Co., P.O. Box 475, Alpena, Mich. 49707.
D. (6) $1,315.19. E. (9) $188.60.

A. Sharon, Pierson, Semmes, Crolius & Finley, 1054 31st Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20007.
B. The Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co., 528 North New Street, Bethlehem, Pa. 18018.
D. (6) $800.

A. Sharon, Pierson, Semmes, Crolius & Finley, 1054 31st Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20007.
B. Mauritius Sugar Syndicate, Mauritius Chamber of Agriculture, Plantation House, Port Louis, Mauritius.
D. (6) $17,500. E. (9) $1,159.37.

A. Sharon, Pierson, Semmes, Crolius & Finley, 1054 31st Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20007.
B. Rubber Manufacturers Association, 1901 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $5,775. E. (9) $119.05.

A. James R. Sharp, 1108 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Fur Merchants Association, 224 West 30th Street, New York, N.Y.; Fur Conservation Council of America, Inc.
D. (6) $500. E. (9) $208.10.

A. James R. Sharp, 1108 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Ametalco, Inc., 530 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y.

A. Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, Barr Building, 910 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Doubleday & Co., Inc., 277 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.

A. John J. Sheehan, 815 16th Street NW., Suite 706, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. United Steelworkers of America, Five Gateway Center, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15222.
D. (6) $6,261.75. E. (9) $3,997.78.

A. W. Lee Shield, 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Life Insurance Association, Inc., 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $317.66.

A. Edward L. Shields, 666 11th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. American Mutual Insurance Alliance, 20 North Wacker Drive, Chicago, Ill.
E. (9) $1,320.

A. Charles W. Shipley, 1140 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 1010, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Association of Electric Cos., 1140 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 1010, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $287.82. E. (9) $301.12.

A. Harvey A. Shipman, 1725 K Street NW., Suite 1103, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Penn Central Transportation Co., Six Penn Center Plaza, Philadelphia, Pa. 19104.

A. James K. Shiver, 1629 K Street NW., Suite 600, Washington, D.C.
B. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co., Cleveland, Ohio.
D. (6) $200. E. (9) $100.

A. L. J. Sichel, 1730 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Abbott Laboratories, North Chicago, Ill. 60064.

A. David Silver, 1775 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Investment Company Institute, 1775 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Silver Users Association, Inc., 1717 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $4,716.80. E. (9) $2,629.53.

A. Gilbert Simonetti, Jr., 1620 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Institute of CPAs, 666 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10019.
E. (9) $500.

A. Frederick Simpich, 910 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Peugeot, Inc., 300 Kuller Road, Clifton, N.J. 07015.

A. Talmage E. Simpkins, 100 Indiana Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. AFL–CIO Maritime Committee, 100 Indiana Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
E. (9) $373.66.

A. Talmage E. Simpkins, 100 Indian Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. Labor-Management Maritime Committee.
D. (6) $1,650. E. (9) 105.42.

A. Julian H. Singman, 815 16th Street NW., Room 310, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. International Longshoremen's Association, AFL–CIO, 17 Battery Place, Suite 1530, New York, N.Y. 10004.
D. (6) $5,000.

A. Barney J. Skladany, Jr., 1100 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Mobil Oil Corp., 150 East 42d Street, New York, N.Y. 10017.
D. (6) $1,500.

A. Carstens Slack, 1825 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Phillips Petroleum Co., Bartlesville, Okla. 74004.
D. (6) $3,500. E (9) $188.

A. Smathers, Merrigan & Herlong, 888 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Horse Council, Inc., 1776 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $6,250. E. (9) $1,064.63.

A. Smathers, Merrigan & Herlong, 888 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Association of American Railroads, 1920 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $6,250. E. (9) $164.04.

A. Smathers, Merrigan & Herlong, 888 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Chicago Board of Trade, LaSalle at Jackson, Chicago, Ill. 60604.
D. (6) $8,500. E. (9) $222.63.

A. Smathers, Merrigan & Herlong, 888 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Hockey League, 2 Pennsylvania Plaza, Suite 2480, New York, N.Y. 10001.
D. (6) $8,500. E. (9) $3.28.

A. Smathers, Merrigan & Herlong, 888 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Pennzoil Co., 900 Southeast Tower, Houston, Tex. 77002.
D. (6) $6,000. E. (9) $7.50.

A. Donald E. Smiley, Suite 1014, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Exxon Co., U.S.A., P.O. Box 2180, Houston, Tex.
E. (9) $432.54.

A. Arthur J. Smith, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 200, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Shell Oil Co., P.O. Box 2463, Houston, Tex 77001.
D. (6) $500.

A. Gordon L. Smith, 1145 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Edward Gottlieb & Associates, 485 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.

A. J. Kenneth Smith, Suite 820, 1800 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Sun Oil Co., 240 Radnor Chester Road, St Davids, Pa. 19087.
D. (6) $4,000. E. (9) $335.

A. James R. Smith, 1250 Connecticut Avenue, Suite 502, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The American Waterways Operators, Inc., 1250 Connecticut Avenue, Suite 502, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $2,250.

A. Kern L. Smith, 1001 Third Street SW, Washington, D.C. 20024.
B. American Society of Bariatric Physicians, Englewood, Colo.

A. Robert Wm. Smith, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Ford Motor Co., Dearborn, Mich. 48121.
D. (6) $569. E. (9) $379.

A. Wallace M. Smith, 425 13th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20004.
B. National Association of Mutual Insurance Cos., 2611 East 46th Street, Suite H, Indianapolis, Ind. 46205.
D. (6) $600. E. (9) $97.

A. Wayne H. Smithey, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Ford Motor Co., Dearborn, Mich.
D. (6) $1,848.75. E. (9) $1,080.30.

A. Arthur V. Smyth, 1625 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Weyerhaeuser Co., Tacoma, Wash. 98401.
D. (6) $500. E. (9) $100.

A. Frank B. Snodgrass, 1100 17th Street NW., Suite 306, Washington, D.C. 20036.

B. Burley and Dark Leaf Tobacco Export Association, P.O. Box 860, Lexington, Ky. 40501.
D. (6) $640.75. E. (9) $443.13.

A. John M. Snow, 8401 Connecticut Avenue, Suite 911, Washington, D.C. 20015.
B. National Association of Furniture Manufacturers, 8401 Connecticut Avenue, Suite 911, Washington, D.C. 20015.
D. (6) $500. E. (9) $30.

A. Edward F. Snyder, 245 Second Street NE., Washington, D.C.
B. Friends Committee on National Legislation, 245 Second Street NE., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $2,004.

A. J. R. Snyder, 400 First Street NW., Suite 704, Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. United Transportation Union, 400 First Street NW., Suite 704, Washington, D.C. 20001.
E. (9) $300.

A. Society for Animal Protective Legislation, P.O. Box 3719, Georgetown Station, Washington, D.C. 20007.
D. (6) $5,549.18. E. (9) $4,442.13.

A. Carl A. Soderblom, 1 East First Street, Room 803, Reno, Nev. 89501.
B. Nevada Railroad Association, 1 East First Street, Room 803, Reno, Nev.; Southern Pacific Transportation Co., Western Pacific Railroad Co.

A. Charles B. Sonneborn, 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Association of Blue Shield Plans, 211 East Chicago Avenue, Chicago, Ill. 60611.

A. Shelby Southard, 1828 L Street NW., Suite 1100, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Cooperative League of the U.S.A., 1828 L Street NW., Suite 1100, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $2,000. E. (9) $725.

A. Southwestern Peanut Shellers Association, 6815 Prestonshire, Dallas, Tex. 75225.
D. (6) $150. E. (9) $150.

A. Joe P. Sparks, 4234 Winfield Scott Plaza, Scottsdale, Ariz. 85251.
B. Havasupai Tribe of Indians, Supai, Ariz.
E. (9) $1,444.25.

A. Wilbur D. Sparks, 1815 North Fort Myer Drive, Arlington, Va. 22209.
B. Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Institute, 1815 North Fort Myer Drive, Arlington, Va. 22209.

A. William W. Spear, 1000 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), 200 East Randolph Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60601.
D. (6) $733. E. (9) $3.06.

A. Frank J. Specht, 1725 DeSales Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Schenley Industries, Inc., 888 Seventh Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10019.

A. John F. Speer, Jr., 1105 Barr Building, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. International Association of Ice Cream Manufacturers and Milk Industry Foundation, 1105 Barr Building, Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Larry N. Spiller, 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Consulting Engineers Council, 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $1,850. E. (9) $75.

A. Joseph L. Spilman, Jr., 1801 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Petroleum Institute, 1801 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Sportsman's Paradise Homeowners Association, 10612 Dalerose Avenue, Inglewood, Calif. 90304.
E. (9) $678.

A. James M. Sprouse, 1957 E Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Associated General Contractors of America, 1957 E Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,000.

A. Squibb Corp., 40 West 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10019.
E. (9) $122.

A. John M. Stackhouse, The Madison Building, 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. National Agricultural Chemicals Assotion.

A. Lynn Stalbaum, Room 400, 918 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Central America Cooperative Federation, Inc., 918 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $363.34. E. (9) $170.25.

A. Lynn E. Stalbaum, 30 F Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. National Milk Producers Federation, 30 F Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
D. (6) $416.66. E. (9) $130.84.

A. Melvin L. Stark, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 211, Blake Building, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Insurance Association, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 211, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $3,000. E. (9) $350.

A. David J. Steinberg, 1028 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Legislative Committee of the Committee for a National Trade Policy, Inc., 1028 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $1,000.

A. David J. Steinberg, 1028 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Council for a Responsible Firearms Policy, 1028 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C., 20036.

A. William M. Stephens, 1616 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Retail Federation, 1616 H Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $1,200. E. (9) $460.

A. Steptoe & Johnson, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Atlantic Richfield Co., 515 South Flower Street, Los Angeles, Calif. 90071.

A. Steptoe & Johnson, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Robert College of Istanbul, Turkey, 305 East 45th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017.
D. (6) $80. E. (9) $2.

A. Steptoe & Johnson, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Rule of Law Committee, 1250 Connnecticut Avenue NW., Suite 800, Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. B. H. Steuerwald, 400 First Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen, 601 West Golf Road, Mt. Prospect, Ill. 60056.

A. Wynne A. Stevens, Jr., 1901 North Fort Myer Drive, Arlington, Va. 22209.
B. Gas Appliance Manufacturers Association, 1901 North Fort Myer Drive, Arlington, Va., 22209.
D. (6) $870.

A. Travis B. Stewart, 1775 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 340 Kingsland Street, Nutley, N.J. 07110.
D. (6) $650. E. (9) $150.

A. Nelson A. Stitt, 1000 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. United States-Japan Trade Council, 1000 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $100.

A. Francis W. Stover, 200 Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C. 20002.
B. Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, 200 Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C. 20002.
D. (6) $6,039.35. E. (9) $451.33.

A. William M. Stover, 1825 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
B. Manufacturing Chemists Association, Inc., 1825 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
D. (6) $1,000. E. (9) $100.

A. Herald E. Stringer, National Legislative Commission, 1608 K Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. The American Legion, 700 North Pennsylvania Street, Indianapolis, Ind. 46206.
D. (6) $6,150. E. (9) $955.24.

A. John D. Stringer, 666 11th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. American Mutual Insurance Alliance, 20 North Wacker Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60606.
E. (9) $1,745.

A. Norman Strunk, 111 East Wacker Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60601.
B. United States League of Savings Associations, 111 East Wacker Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60601.
D. (6) $2,750. E. (9) $695.88.

A. Walter B. Stults, 512 Washington Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. National Association of Small Business Investment Cos., 512 Washington Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $600.

A. Barry Sullivan, 536 Washington Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. National Association of River and Harbor Contractors, 536 Washington Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $600. E. (9) $488.80.

A. Sullivan, Beauregard, Meyers & Clarkson, 1200 18th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $1,318.77.

A. Frank L. Sundstrom, 1776 K Street NW., Suite 1200, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Tobacco Institute, Inc., 1776 K Street NW., Suite 1200, Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $475. E. (9) $360.

A. Glenn A. Swanson, 1725 DeSales Street NW., Suite 905, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Independent Bankers Association of America, Sauk Centre, Minn. 56378.
D. (6) $15,987.46. E. (9) $3,903.86.

A. Irving W. Swanson, 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association.

A. Noble J. Swearingen, Suite 61, 128 C Street NE., Washington, D.C. 20002.
B. American Lung Association, 1740 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10019.
D. (6) $1,000.

A. David A. Sweeney, 25 Louisiana Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 25 Louisiana Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
D. (6) $7,500.

A. John R. Sweeney, Solar Building, 1000 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 701 East Third Street, Bethlehem, Pa. 18016.
D. (6) $350. E. (9) $296.15.

A. Ronald E. Sweet, 1126 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. International Federal Professional and Technical Engineers, AFL–CIO, 1126 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $350. E. (9) $20.

A. Charles P. Taft, 1028 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Committee for a National Trade Policy, Inc., 1028 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Charles C. Talley, 100 Angus Court, Charlottesville, Va. 22901.
B. National Congress of Parents and Teachers, 700 North Rush Street, Chicago, Ill.

A. David Tarr, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Common Cause, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $225.

A. Tax Reform Research Group, 133 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $1091.50. E. (9) $1,091.50.

A. Richard M. Tempero, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Common Cause, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. L. D. Tharp, Jr., 1660 L Street NW., Suite 601, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, 1660 L Street NW., Suite 601, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $300.

A. Jerry P. Thompson, 1300 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 1300 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $3,432. E. (9) $93.19.

A. William D. Thompson, 1660 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. General Motors Corp., 3044 West Grand Boulevard, Detroit, Mich. 48202.
D. (6) $3,000. E. (9) $3,515.64.

A. Samuel Thurm, 1725 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Association of National Advertisers, 155 East 44 Street New York, N.Y. 10017.

A. Cyrus C. Tichenor III, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 1007, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. A. H. Robins Co., Inc., 1407 Cummings Drive, Richmond, Va. 23220.
D. (6) $5,250. E. (9) $3,525.85.

A. Paul J. Tierney, 1101 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Transportation Association of America.
D. (6) $36. E. (9) $26.

A. J. R. Timmins & Co., 37 Wall Street, New York, N.Y. 10005.

A. E. Linwood Tipton, 1105 Barr Building, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. International Association of Ice Cream Manufacturers & Milk Industry Foundation, 1105 Barr Building, Washington, D.C.
E. (9) $163.66.

A. Tobacco Associates Inc., 1101 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $1,232.

A. H. Willis Tobler, 30 F Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. National Milk Producers Federation, 30 F Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
D. (6) $1,000. E. (9) $32.45.

A. David R. Toll, 1140 Connecticut Avenue, Suite 1010, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Association of Electric Cos., 1140 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $354.63. E. (9) $215.52.

A. Christine Topping, Suite 614, 1800 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Bipartisan Committee on Absentee Voting, Inc., Suite 614, 1800 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $400.

A. John P. Tracey.
B. American Bar Association, 1705 DeSales Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $400. E. (9) $50.

A. Transportation Association of America, 1101 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Paul E. Trimble, 1411 Rockefeller Building, Cleveland, Ohio 44113.
B. Lake Carriers' Association, 1411 Rockefeller Building, Cleveland, Ohio 44113.

A. Glenwood S. Troop, Jr., 1709 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. United States League of Savings Associations, 111 East Wacker Drive, Chicago, Ill.
D. (6) $6,500. E. (9) $96.10.

A. St. Clair J. Tweedie, Suite 1001, 1150 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Texile Manufacturers Institute, Inc., 1501 Johnston Building, Charlotte, N.C. 28281.
D. (6) $1,074.30. E. (9) $165.74.

A. John D. Tyson.
B. International Paper Co., Room 700, 1620 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $350. E. (9) $197.46.

A. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 101 Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
E. (9) $11,569.30.

A. United Mine Workers of America, 900 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
E. (9) $6,921.19.

A. United States Cane Sugar Refiners' Association, 1001 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $310.21.

A. United States-Japan Trade Council, 1000 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $716.42. E. (9) $716.42.

A. United States League of Savings Associations, 111 East Wacker Drive, Chicago, Ill.
E. (9) $66,056.66.

A. Universal Development Consultants, Inc., 425 13th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20004.
B. Mortgage Bankers Association of America.
D. (6) $625. E. (9) $11.

A. Jack J. Valenti, 1600 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., 1600 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. John A. Vance, 1150 17th Street NW., Suite 1109, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 77 Beale Street, San Francisco, Calif. 94106.
D. (6) $591.25. E. (9) $773.83.

A. Ted Van Dyk Associates, Inc., 1156 15th Street NW., Suite 912, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. United Air Lines, P.O. Box 66100, Chicago, Ill. 60666.
E. (9) $1,478.73.

A. Lois W. Van Valkenburgh, 1673 Preston Road, Alexandria, Va. 22302.
B. Citizens Committee for UNICEF, 110 Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C. 20002.

A. Robert V. Vaughn, 17 Battery Place North, New York, N.Y. 10004.
B. Federation of American Controlled Shipping, 17 Battery Place North, New York, N.Y. 10004.
D. (6) $100.

A. Richard E. Vernor, 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Life Insurance Association, Inc., 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $114. E. (9) $18.

A. L. T. Vice, Suite 1204, 1700 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Standard Oil Co. of California, Suite 1204, 1700 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $175.

A. Elizabeth Alderman Vinson, 1730 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. League of Women Voters of the U.S., 1730 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $650.

A. Robert E. Vinson, 1101 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Independent Petroleum Association of America, 1101 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $16.15.

A. Bruce E. Vogelsinger, 1155 15th Street NW., Suite 713, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Consulting Engineers Council, 1155 15th Street NW., Suite 713, Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $1,700. E. (9) $75.

A. Donn L. Waage, 730 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Association of Registered Bank Holding Cos., 730 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $187.50. E. (9) $28.

A. Paul A. Wagner, 1125 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Solidarity House, 8000 East Jefferson Avenue, Detroit, Mich. 48214.
D. (6) $4,943.66. E. (9) $194.

A. Wald, Harkrader & Ross, 1320 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Spring Mills, Inc., Fort Mill, S.C. 29715.
D. (6) $229.50.

A. E. F. Waldrop, Jr., 40 Ivy Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Association of American Railroads, 1920 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $71.50.

A. Anne Walker, Apt. 501, Potomac Plaza, 2475 Virginia Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. Committee for Ethical Medical Standards in Psychiatric Practice & Research.

A. Charls E. Walker Associates, Inc., 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Aluminum Co. of America, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $238.10.

A. Charls E. Walker Associates, Inc., 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Cigar Manufacturers Association of America, Inc., 575 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.
D. (6) $1,500.

A. Charls E. Walker Associates, Inc., 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Ford Motor Co., The American Road, Dearborn, Mich. 48121.
D. (6) $238.10.

A. Charls E. Walker Associates, Inc., 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. General Electric Corp., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $4,613.10.

A. Charls E. Walker Associates, Inc., 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Gulf Oil Corp., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $238.10.

A. Charls E. Walker Associates, Inc., 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Laredo National Bank, Laredo, Tex.; Alamo National Bank, San Antonio, Tex.; National Bank of Commerce, San Antonio, Tex.
D. (6) $958.33.

A. Charls E. Walker Associates, Inc., 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Procter & Gamble, Cincinnati, Ohio 45201.
D. (6) $238.10.

A. George R. Walker, 3901 Hawkins Point Road, Baltimore, Md. 21226.
B. Glidden-Durkee Division SCM Corp., 3901 Hawkins Point Road, Baltimore, Md. 21226.

A. John S. Walker, 1100 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Glidden-Durkee Division of SCM Corp., 5601 Eastern Avenue, Baltimore, Md. 21224.

A. Lionel L. Wallenrod, 260 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016.
B. American Paper Institute, Inc., 260 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016.

A. Jack A. Waller, 1750 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. International Association of Fire Fighters, 1750 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $6,435.84.

A. Franklin Wallick, 1125 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Solidarity House, 8000 East Jefferson Avenue, Detroit, Mich. 48214.
D. (6) $5,638.60. E. (9) $616.03.

A. Charles S. Walsh.
B. National Cable TV Association, Inc., 918 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $127.50. E. (9) $15.

A. William A. Walton, 800 Merchants National Bank Building, Eighth & Jackson Streets, Topeka, Kans. 66612.
B. Kansas Railroad Committee, 800 Merchants National Bank Building, Eighth & Jackson Streets, Topeka, Kans. 66612.

A. Richard D. Warden, 1125 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 8000 East Jefferson Avenue, Detroit, Mich. 48214.
D. (6) $5,807.94. E. (9) $586.52.

A. Jack Ware, 1801 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Petroleum Institute, 1801 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $9,000. E. (9) $122.

A. James A. Warren, 5500 Friendship Boulevard, Chevy Chase, Md. 20015.
B. REA Express Inc., 219 East 42d Street, New York, N.Y. 10017.
D. (6) $450. E. (9) $75.

A. Washington Research Project, Action Council, 1763 R Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
D. (6) $5,500. E. (9) $4,878.82.

A. George B. Watts, 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. National Broiler Council, 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $300.

A. Ray Wax, c/o J. Frederick Durr, R.R. 2, Sheridan, Ind. 46069.
B. National Association of Farmer Elected Committeemen, c/o J. Frederick Durr, R.R. 2, Sheridan, Ind. 46069.
E. (9) $78.53.

A. Clyde M. Webber, 1325 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Federation of Government Employees, 1325 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $13,617.10. E. (9) $1,629.49.

A. Weisman, Celler, Spett, Modlin & Wertheimer, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 910, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Beneficial Management Corp., 200 South Street, Morristown, N.J.
D. (6) $2,000.

A. Weisman, Celler, Spett, Modlin & Wertheimer, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 910, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Football League Players Association, 1300 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $2,000.

A. Bernard J. Welch, 1800 K Street NW., Suite 900, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Pan American World Airways, 1800 K Street NW., Suite 900, Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $127.34.

A. Frank J. Welch, 3724 Manor Road, Chevy Chase, Md. 20015.
B. Tobacco Institute, Inc., 1776 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Paul S. Weller, Jr., 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $2,110. E. (9) $94.88.

A. Thomas F. Wenning, 1625 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $17.15.

A. Fred M. Wertheimer, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Common Cause, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $7,500. E. (9) $360.

A. West Mexico Vegetable Distributors Association, Post Office Box 848, Nogales, Ariz. 85621.
E. (9) $500.

A. Clyde A. Wheeler, Jr., 1800 K Street NW., Suite 820, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Sun Oil Co., 240 Radnor-Chester Road, St. Davids, Pa. 19087.
D. (6) $7,000. E. (9) $1,810.

A. Robert Y. Wheeler, Box 185, Tilden, Tex. 78072.
B. E. G. Herman, 9538 Brighton Way, Beverley Hills, Calif. 90010.

A. Wheeler, Van Sickle, Day & Anderson, 25 West Main Street, Madison, Wis. 53703.
B. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 770 North Water Street, Milwaukee, Wis. 53202.
D. (6) $550. E. (9) $201.11.

A. Donald F. White, 1616 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Retail Federation, 1616 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,700. E. (9) $175.

A. John C. White, Room 1008, 1101 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Private Truck Council of America, Inc., Room 1008, 1101 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C.

A. John S. White, 420 Cafritz Building, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Marathon Oil Co., Findlay, Ohio 45840.
E. (9) $493.50.

A. Robert L. White, 7315 Wisconsin Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20014.
B. National Electrical Contractors Association, 7315 Wisconsin Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20014.

A. Douglas Whitlock II, 1660 L Street NW., Suite 1005, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Zale Corp., 1660 L Street NW., Suite 1005, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $500. E. (9) $150.

A. Alan J. Whitney, 1341 G Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. National Association of Government Employees, Inc., 285 Dorchester Avenue, Boston, Mass. 02127.
D. (6) $5,000. E. (9) $750.

A. William E. Wickens, 1520 33d Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Howrey, Simon, Baker & Murchison, 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.

A. Richard J. Wiechmann, 260 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016.
B. American Paper Institute, 260 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016.

A. Claude C. Wild, Jr., 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Gulf Oil Corp., Pittsburgh, Pa. 15230.

A. David Wilken, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Common Cause, 2030 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $120.

A. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Society of Travel Agents, Inc., 360 Lexington Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.
E. (9) $378.86.

A. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Arapahoe Tribe of Indians, Fort Washakie, Wyo.
E. (9) $42.57.

A. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Donneville International Corp., 135 East South Temple Street, Salt Lake City, Utah.
E. (9) $55.05.

A. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
E. (9) $12.82.

A. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Cabot Corp., 125 High Street, Boston, Mass. 02110.
E. (9) $2.

A. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. College Placement Council Inc., 65 East Elizabeth Street, Bethlehem, Pa.
E. (9) $9.30.

A. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, Mont.
E. (9) $124.10.

A. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Estate of Albert W. Small, c/o Mrs. Albert W. Small, 5803 Green Tree Road, Bethesda, Md.
E. (9) $13.05.

A. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Hoopa Valley Tribe, P.O. Box 817, Hoopa, Calif.
E. (9) $36.28.

A. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Association of Insurance Agents, Inc., 85 John Street, New York, N.Y. 10038.

A. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Quinaielt Tribe of Indians, Taholah, Wash.
E. (9) $49.01.

A. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Special Industry Council on Energy Conservation, c/o Discover America Travel Organization, 1100 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $304.09.

A. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, New Town, N. Dak.
E. (9) $49.39.

A. Francis G. Williams.
B. American Frozen Food Institute, 919 18th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Harry D. Williams, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 505, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Ashland Oil, Inc., P.O. Box 391, Ashland, Ky. 41101.
D. (6) $250.

A. Williams & King, 1620 I Street NW., Suite 800, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Nutritional Foods Association, 7727 South Painter Avenue, Whittier, Calif. 90602.
E. (9) $407.42.

A. Robert E. Williams, 1825 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. United Air Lines, P.O. Box 66100, Chicago, Ill. 60666.
D. (6) $1,250. E. (9) $677.64.

A. Robert G. Williams, 6521 Arlington Boulevard, Falls Church, Va. 22042.
B. The Trane Co., 3600 Pammel Creek Road, La Crosse, Wis. 54601.
E. (9) $614.

A. Samuel M. Williams, 1515 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. 22209.
B. American Gas Association, 1515 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. 22209.
D. (6) $400. E. (9) $300.

A. Kenneth Williamson, 2130 LeRoy Place NW., Washington, D.C. 20008.
B. Seventh-day Adventists Hospital Association, 6840 Eastern Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20021.
D. (6) $1,500. E. (9) $153.52.

A. Frederick L. Williford, 10010 Green Forest Drive, Adelphi, Md.
B. National Federation of Independent Business, 921 Washington Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $4,000.

A. Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, 1666 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Basketball Association, 1700 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10019.

A. Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, 1666 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Council for Responsible Nutrition, 1776 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $2.

A. Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, 1666 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Marianas Political Status Commission, P.O. Box 977, Saipan, Mariana Islands 96950.

A. Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, 1666 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Oil Investment Institute, 2500 Dunstan, Houston, Tex. 77005.

A. W. E. Wilson, 623 Ockley Drive, Shreveport, La. 71106.
B. Pennzoil Co., 900 Southwest Tower, Houston, Tex. 77002.
D. (6) $3,133. E. (9) $1,292,39.

A. R. J. Winchester, 900 Southwest Tower, Houston, Tex. 77002.
B. Pennzoil Co., 900 Southwest Tower, Houston, Tex. 77002.
D. (6) $5,000. E. (9) $2,920.

A. Richard F. Witherall, 702 Majestic Building, Denver, Colo. 80202.
B. Colorado RR Association, 702 Majestic Building, Denver, Colo.

A. Barry M. Wolf, 631 North Carolina Avenue SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, 2317 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
D. (6) $360.

A. James E. Wolf, 6521 Arlington Boulevard, Falls Church, Va. 22042.
B. The Trane Co., 3600 Pammel Creek Road, La Crosse, Wis. 54601.
E. (9) $350.

A. Sidney M. Wolfe, 2000 P Street NW., Suite 708, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Health Research Group, 2000 P Street NW., Suite 708, Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Nathan T. Wolkomir, 1737 H Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. National Federation of Federal Employees, 1737 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $8,308.80. E. (9) $1,417.29.

A. Kenneth D. Wollack, 1341 G Street NW., Suite No. 908, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Israel Public Affairs Committee, 1341 G Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $1,500.

A. Merle E. Wood, 10236 Bunker Ridge Road, Kansas City, Mo. 64137.
B. Ewing M. Kauffman, Marion Laboratories, Inc., 10236 Bunker Ridge Road, Kansas City, Mo. 64137.
D. (6) $2,062.50. E. (9) $540.

A. Merle E. Wood, 10236 Bunker Ridge Road, Kansas City, Mo. 64137.
B. Marion Laboratories, Inc., 10236 Bunker Ridge Road, Kansas City, Mo. 64137.
D. (6) $2,062.50 E. (9) $540.

A. Albert Young Woodward, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.
B. The Signal Cos., Inc., 9665 Wilshire Boulevard, Beverly Hills, Calif. 90212.

A. Albert Young Woodward, 815 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D. C.
B. The Flying Tiger Line Inc., Los Angeles International Airport, Los Angeles, Calif.

A. Perry W. Woofter, 1801 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Petroleum Institute, 1801 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $9,000. E. (9) $322.

A. George M. Worden, 1425 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Hill and Knowlton, Inc., 633 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.

A. Wyatt, Saltzstein, Minton & Howard, 1300 Wyatt Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Business Press, Inc., 205 East 42d Street, New York, N.Y. 10017.
D. (6) $2,250. E. (9) $53.66.

A. Gerald L. Wykoff, 7315 Wisconsin Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20014.
B. National Electrical Contractors Association, 7315 Wisconsin Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20014.

A. Wyman, Bautzer, Rothman & Kuchel, Suite 1000, The Watergate 600, 600 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. Airbus Industrie, 160, Avenue de Versailles, Paris 16e, France.

A. Wyman, Bautzer, Rothman & Kuchel, Suite 1000, The Watergate 600, 600 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. Alaska Federation of Natives, Inc., 1675 C Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501.

A. Wyman, Bautzer, Rothman & Kuchel, Suite 1000, The Watergate 600, 600 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. California Canners and Growers, 3100 Ferry Building, San Francisco, Calif. 94106.
D. (6) $200.

A. Wyman, Bautzer, Rothman & Kuchel, Suite 1000, The Watergate 600, 600 New

Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. City of Palm Springs, 3200 Tahquitz-McCallum Way, Palm Springs, Calif. 92262.
D. (6) $100. E. (9) $3.

A. Wyman, Bautzer, Rothman & Kuchel, Suite 1000, The Watergate 600, 600 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. Copyright Owners Negotiating Committee, c/o Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim and Ballon, 477 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.

A. Wyman, Bautzer, Rothman & Kuchel, Suite 1000, The Watergate 600, 600 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. Petersen Publishing Co., 8490 Sunset Boulevard, Los Angeles, Calif. 90069.
D. (6) $650.

A. Dennis M. Yamamoto, 1730 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Optometric Association, c/o, Jack A. Potter, 820 First National Bank Building, Peoria, Ill. 61602.
D. (6) $230.70. E. (9) $184.05.

A. Jack Yelverton, 1303 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Fleet Reserve Association, 1303 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. John H. Yingling, 1156 15th Street NW., Suite 701, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. First National City Bank, 399 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.
D. (6) $200. E. (9) $140.77.

A. Kenneth Young, 815 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, 815 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $7,202. E. (9) $252.03.

A. John S. Zapp, 1776 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Medical Association, 535 North Dearborn Street, Chicago, Ill. 60610.
D. (6) $2,400. E. (9) $800.

A. Thomas K. Zaucha, 1725 I Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. National Association of Food Chains, 1725 I Street NW., Washington, D.C.
E. (9) $500.

A. Donald P. Zeifang, 1771 N Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Association of Broadcasters, 1771 N Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $3,000. E. (9) $142.08.

A. Ziontz, Pirtle, Morisset & Ernstoff, 3101 Seattle-First National Bank Building, Seattle, Wash. 98154.
B. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, P.O. Box 150, Nespelem, Wash. 99155.
D. (6) $388.50. E. (9) $462.04.

A. Ziontz, Pirtle, Morisset & Ernstoff, 3101 Seattle-First National Bank Building, Seattle, Wash. 98154.
B. Lummi Tribe of Indians, P.O. Box 309, Marietta, Wash. 98268.
D. (6) $420. E. (9) $92.09.

A. Ziontz, Pirtle, Morisset & Ernstoff, 3101 Seattle-First National Bank Building, Seattle, Wash. 98154.
B. Makah Indian Tribe, P.O. Box 115, Neah Bay, Wash. 98357.
D. (6) $420. E. (9) $169.68.

A. Ziontz, Pirtle, Morisset & Ernstoff, 3101 Seattle-First National Bank Building, Seattle, Wash. 98154.
B. Northern Cheyenne Tribe, Inc., P.O. Box 128, Lame Deer, Mont. 59043.
D. (6) $90. E. (9) $53.99.

A. Ziontz, Pirtle, Morisset & Ernstoff, 3101 Seattle-First National Bank Building, Seattle, Wash. 98154.
B. Suquamish Indian Tribe, P.O. Box 556, Suquamish, Wash. 98392.
D. (6) $248. E. (9) $153.37.

A. Paul G. Zurkowski, 4720 Montgomery Lane, Bethesda, Md. 20014.
B. Information Industry Association, 4720 Montgomery Lane, Bethesda, Md. 20014.
D. (6) $420. E. (9) $242.34.

*All alphanumeric characters and monetary amounts refer to receipts and expenditures on page 2, paragraphs D and E of the Quarterly Report Form.

The following reports for the fourth calendar quarter of 1973 were received too late to be included in the published reports for that quarter.

FILE ONE COPY WITH THE SECRETARY OF THE SENATE AND FILE TWO COPIES WITH THE CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

This page (page 1) is designed to supply identifying data; and page 2 (on the back of this page) deals with financial data.

PLACE AN "X" BELOW THE APPROPRIATE LETTER OR FIGURE IN THE BOX AT THE RIGHT OF THE "REPORT" HEADING BELOW:

"PRELIMINARY" REPORT ("Registration"): To "register," place an "X" below the letter "P" and fill out page 1 only.

"QUARTERLY" REPORT: To indicate which one of the four calendar quarters is covered by this Report, place an "X" below the appropriate figure. Fill out both page 1 and page 2 and as many additional pages as may be required. The first additional page should be numbered as page "3," and the rest of such pages should be "4," "5," "6," etc. Preparation and filing in accordance with instructions will accomplish compliance with all quarterly reporting requirements of the Act.

Year: 19_____ ◀

REPORT

PURSUANT TO FEDERAL REGULATION OF LOBBYING ACT

P	QUARTER			
	1st	2d	3d	4th
(Mark one square only)				

NOTE ON ITEM "A".—(a) IN GENERAL. This "Report" form may be used by either an organization or an individual, as follows:

(i) "Employee".—To file as an "employee", state (in Item "B") the name, address, and nature of business of the "employer". (If the "employee" is a firm [such as a law firm or public relations firm], partners and salaried staff members of such firm may join in filing a Report as an "employee".)

(ii) "Employer".—To file as an "employer", write "None" in answer to Item "B".

(b) SEPARATE REPORTS. An agent or employee should not attempt to combine his Report with the employer's Report:

(i) Employers subject to the Act must file separate Reports and are not relieved of this requirement merely because Reports are filed by their agents or employees.

(ii) Employees subject to the Act must file separate Reports and are not relieved of this requirement merely because Reports are filed by their employers.

A. ORGANIZATION OR INDIVIDUAL FILING:

1. State name, address, and nature of business.

2. If this Report is for an Employer, list names of agents or employees who will file Reports for this Quarter.

NOTE ON ITEM "B".—*Reports by Agents or Employees.* An employee is to file, each quarter, as many Reports as he has employers, except that: (a) If a particular undertaking is jointly financed by a group of employers, the group is to be considered as one employer, but all members of the group are to be named, and the contribution of each member is to be specified; (b) if the work is done in the interest of one person but payment therefor is made by another, a single Report—naming both persons as "employers"—is to be filed each quarter.

B. EMPLOYER.—State name, address, and nature of business. If there is no employer, write "None."

NOTE ON ITEM "C".—(a) The expression "in connection with legislative interests," as used in this Report, means "in connection with attempting, directly or indirectly, to influence the passage or defeat of legislation." "The term 'legislation' means bills, resolutions, amendments, nominations, and other matters pending or proposed in either House of Congress, and includes any other matter which may be the subject of action by either House"—§ 302(e).

(b) Before undertaking any activities in connection with legislative interests, organizations and individuals subject to the Lobbying Act are required to file a "Preliminary" Report (Registration).

(c) After beginning such activities, they must file a "Quarterly" Report at the end of each calendar quarter in which they have either received or expended anything of value in connection with legislative interests.

C. LEGISLATIVE INTERESTS, AND PUBLICATIONS in connection therewith:

1. State approximately how long legislative interests are to continue. If receipts and expenditures in connection with legislative interests have terminated, ☐ place an "X" in the box at the left, so that this Office will no longer expect to receive Reports.

2. State the general legislative interests of the person filing and set forth the *specific* legislative interests by reciting: (a) Short titles of statutes and bills; (b) House and Senate numbers of bills, where known; (c) citations of statutes, where known; (d) whether for or against such statutes and bills.

3. In the case of those publications which the person filing has caused to be issued or distributed in connection with legislative interests, set forth: (a) Description, (b) quantity distributed; (c) date of distribution, (d) name of printer or publisher (if publications were paid for by person filing) or name of donor (if publications were received as a gift).

(Answer items 1, 2, and 3 in the space below. Attach additional pages if more space is needed)

4. If this is a "Preliminary" Report (Registration) rather than a "Quarterly" Report, state below what the nature and amount of anticipated expenses will be; and if for an agent or employee, state also what the daily, monthly, or annual rate of compensation is to be. If this is a "Quarterly" Report, disregard this item "C4" and fill out item "D" and "E" on the back of this page. Do not attempt to combine a "Preliminary" Report (Registration) with a "Quarterly" Report. ◀

AFFIDAVIT

[Omitted in printing]

PAGE 1 ◀

A. Action for Legal Rights, 1346 Connecticut Avenue NW., Room 533, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $6,893.25. E. (9) $11,252.34.

A. Actors Equity Association, 165 West 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10036.
D. (6) $2,500. E. (9) $2,500.

A. AFL–CIO Maritime Committee, 100 Indiana Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
D. (6) $3,150. E. (9) $2,691.50.

A. Air-Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute, 1815 North Fort Myer Drive, Arlington, Va. 22209.
E. (9) $624.

A. Paul W. Airey, 4517 Sunset Drive, Panama City, Fla. 32401.
B. Air Force Sergeants Association, 6101 28th Avenue SE., Suite 713, Marlow Heights, Md. 20031.

A. George Alderson, 620 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Friends of the Earth, 620 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $1,500.

A. American Association of Meat Processors, 224 East High Street, Elizabethtown, Pa. 17022.
D. (6) $1,213.22. E. (9) $92.30.

A. American Conservative Union, 422 First Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $23,340.49. E. (9) $15,134.44.

A. American Dental Association, 211 East Chicago Avenue, Chicago, Ill. 60611.
D. (6) $4,838.45. E. (9) $4,838.45.

A. American Hospital Association, 840 North Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60611.
D. (6) $3,334.27. E. (9) $3,334.27.

A. American Institute for Housing Consultants, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $50. E. (9) $50.

A. American Institute of Merchant Shipping, 1625 K Street NW., Suite 1000, Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $2,431.30.

A. American Maritime Association, 17 Battery Place, New York, N.Y. 10004.
E. (9) $773.11.

A. American Nurses' Association, 2420 Pershing Road, Kansas City, Mo. 64108.
D. (6) $65,925.53. E. (9) $65,925.53.

A. American Optometric Association, c/o Jack A. Potter, 820 First National Bank Building, Peoria, Ill. 61602.
D. (6) $5,823.11. E. (9) $5,823.11.

A. American Pulpwood Association, 605 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.

A. American Veterinary Medical Association, 1522 K Street NW., Suite 828, Washington, D.C. 20005.
E. (9) $400.

A. American Vocational Association, 1510 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $1,665. E. (9) $1,610.

A. William C. Anderson, 425 13th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. American Farm Bureau Federation, 225 Touhy Avenue, Park Ridge, Ill.
D. (6) $2,354. E. (9) $59.75.

A. Scott P. Anger, 1725 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Superior Oil Co., P.O. Box 1521, Houston, Tex 77001.

A. Robert E. Ansheles, 1028 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Thrift Assembly, Suite 718, 1028 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $400. E. (9) $53.50.

A. Robert E. Ansheles, Suite 718, 1028 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. CITC Industries, Inc., 1 Park Avenue New York, N.Y. 10016.
D. (6) $400. E. (9) $98.95.

A. Arkansas Railroads, 1100 Boyle Building, Little Rock, Ark. 72201.

A. Arnold & Porter, 1229 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Franklin Life Ins. Co., Franklin Square, Springfield, Ill. 62705.

A. Arnold & Porter, 1229 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Maremont Corp., 163 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Ill. 60601.
D. (6) $250. E. (9) $10.

A. Arnold & Porter, 1229 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Powell Lumber Co., Lake Charles, La.

A. Arnold & Porter, 1229 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 112 East Washington Street, Bloomington, Ill. 61701.
E. (9) $53.

A. Associated Employers Inc., 8107 Broadway, Suite 202, San Antonio, Tex. 78209.
E. (9) $1,327.78.

A. The Associated General Contractors of America, 1957 E Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $5,060.

A. Charles W. Bailey, 1990 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Right to Work Committee, 1990 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. George F. Bailey, Jr., Montgomery, Ala.
B. Alabama Railroad Association, Montgomery, Ala.

A. Emil F. Baker, 1303 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Fleet Reserve Association, 1303 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Al J. Ballard, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
B. National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
D. (6) $150.

A. Irvin L. Barney, 400 First Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. Brotherhood Railway Carmen of the U.S. and Canada, 4929 Main Street, Kansas City, Mo.
D. (6) $5,022.

A. Davis M. Batson, 1155 15th Street NW., Suite 611, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Ethyl Corp., 1155 15th Street NW., Suite 611, Washington, D.C. 20005.
E. (9) $500.

A. C. Thomas Bendorf, 1620 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Association of Trial Lawyers of America.
D. (6) $1,500. E. (9) $300.

A. H. Michael Bennett, 1346 Connecticut Avenue NW., Room 533, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Action for Legal Rights, 1346 Connecticut Avenue NW., Room 533, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $6,125.

A. Billig, Sher & Jones, 1126 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Steamship Conferences.

A. Charles Binsted, National Congress of Petroleum Retailers, 2945 Banksville Road, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15216.

A. Robert J. Bird, Suite 412, 1140 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Ad Hoc Coalition for Cemetery Care, 6216 South Stanford Way, Whittier, Calif. 90601.

A. Robert J. Bird, Suite 412, 1140 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Occidental Life Insurance Co., 12th Street at Hill, Los Angeles, Calif. 90054.

A. Robert J. Bird, Suite 412, 1140 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The Paul Revere Corp., Worcester, Mass. 01608.

A. Eleanor Bissinger, 275 Central Park West, New York, N.Y. 10024.
B. Consumer Action Now, Inc., 30 East 68th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021.

A. Brent Blackwelder, 324 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Enviromnetal Policy Center, 324 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $365.

A. Richard W. Bliss, 1100 Ring Building, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Mining Congress, 1100 Ring Building, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $475.

A. Theodore H. Bornstein, 2028 37th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20007.
B. Washington Office on Africa, 110 Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C.

A. Rodney A. Bower, 1126 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. International Federation of Professional & Technical Engineers, AFL–CIO, 1126 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $240. E. (9) $20.

A. Helen Bremberg, 4515 South 31st Street, Apartment 202, Arlington, Va. 22206.
B. Women's Lobby Inc., 1345 G Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
E. (9) $154.13.

A. Cyril F. Brickfield, 1909 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Association of Retired Persons/National Retired Teachers Association, 1909 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Bill Brier, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $2,499.98. E. (9) $185.89.

A. W. S. Bromley, 605 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.
B. American Pulpwood Association, 605 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.

A. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, 6300 River Road, Rosemont, Ill. 60018.
D. (6) $21,012.85. E. (9) $21,012.85.

A. Joe B. Browder, 324 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Environmental Policy Center, 324 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $1,768.75. E. (9) $508.48.

A. Bryant Associates, Inc., Suite 907, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. St. Paul Title Insurance Corp., 1650 West Big Beaver Road, Troy, Mich. 48084.
D. (6) $50. E. (9) $33.13.

A. G. Nicholas Buffington, 1101 17th Street NW., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 1101 17th Street NW., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $1,000 E. (9) $17.

A. Bulgarian Claims Committee, % Oscar L. Casarella, 1901 Stratton Road, Silver Spring, Md. 20910.

A. David A. Bunn, 1211 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The Hearst Corp., 959 Eighth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10019.

A. David A. Bunn, 1211 Connecticut Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Magazine Publishers Association, 575 Lexington Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.

A. David A. Bunn, 1211 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Parcel Post Association, 1211 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Norman D. Burch, 1775 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. College of American Pathologists, 230 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Ill. 60601.
D. (6) $3,375. E. (9) $144.18.

A. George J. Burger, 250 West 57th Street, New York, N.Y.
B. Burger Tire Consultant Service, 250 West 57th Street, New York, N.Y.

A. George J. Burger, 30 Clinton Place, New Rochelle, N.Y. 10801.
B. National Federation of Independent Business, 30 Clinton Place, New Rochelle, N.Y. 10801.
D. (6) $4,249.98. E. (9) $365.12.

A. Lowell A. Burkett, 1510 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Vocational Association, 1510 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $1,011.

A. David Burpee, Fordhook Farms, Doylestown, Pa. 18901.

A. Carol Burris, 1345 G Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Women's Lobby Inc., 1345 G Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $1,300. E. (9) $678.56.

A. Burson-Marsteller, 1776 K Street NW., Suite 607, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Council for Responsible Nutrition, 1776 K Street NW., Suite 603, Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $4,500. E. (9) $1,955.06.

A. Busby, Rivkin, Sherman, Levy and Rehm, 900 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Automobile Importers of America, 900 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,100.

A. David W. Calfee III, 324 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Environmental Policy Center, 324 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $1,111.27. E. (9) $5.50.

A. Donald L. Calvin, 11 Wall Street, New York, N.Y. 10005.
B. New York Stock Exchange, 11 Wall Street, N.Y.

A. Donald E. Channell, 1705 DeSales Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Bar Association, 1705 DeSales Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $500. E. (9) $65.50.

A. Larry D. Cline, 1315 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Limestone Institute, Inc., 1315 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $16.50.

A. COALition Against Strip Mining, 324 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $1,759.37. E. (9) $2,173.92.

A. Coalition of Concerned Charities, c/o John G. Milliken, 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Suite 1102, Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $829.01.

A. Carl A. S. Coan, Jr., 1625 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Association of Home Builders of the United States, 1625 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $7,556.23. E. (9) $754.27.

A. Jerry S. Cohen, 1776 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Congress of Petroleum Retailers, 2945 Banksville Road, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15216.
D. (6) $2,000.

A. Jerry Cohen, 470 Totten Pond Road, Waltham, Mass. 02154.
B. Ruetgerswerke Aktiengesellschaft, Frankfurt am Main, West Germany.

A. Cohen and Uretz, 1730 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, c/o Jose A. Cabranes, 1725 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $2.40.

A. Cohen and Uretz, 1730 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. McDonnell Douglas Finance Corp., 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, Calif. 90801.
D. (6) $3,500. E. (9) $63.05.

A. Robert E. Cole, 1909 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S., Inc., 320 New Center Building, Detroit, Mich. 48202.
D. (6) $500.

A. Collier, Shannon, Rill & Edwards, 1666 K Street NW., Suite 701, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Footwear Industries Association, Inc., 1611 North Kent Street, Arlington, Va., 22209.
D. (6) $500. E. (9) $475.

A. James F. Collins, 1000 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Iron & Steel Institute, 50 East 42d Street, New York, N.Y.
D. (6) $500. E. (9) $125.

A. Colson & Shapiro, 1735 New York, Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Committee for the Martin Report, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C., 20006.
E. (9) $390.96.

A. Colson & Shapiro, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Vance Sanders & Co., Boston, Mass.; Federated Investors, Inc., Pittsburgh, Pa.; Fidelity Management & Research Co., Boston, Mass.

A. Committee for Humane Legislation, Inc., 11 West 60 Street, New York, N.Y. 10023.
D. (6) $9,279.19. E. (9) $17,244.48.

A. Committee for Modern, Efficient Transportation, Suite 808, 910 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $13,000. E. (9) $10,810.36.

A. Consumer Action Now, Inc., 30 East 68th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021.
D. (6) $2,260.55. E. (9) $3,593.23.

A. Bernard J. Conway, 211 East Chicago Avenue, Chicago, Ill. 60611.
B. American Dental Association, 211 East Chicago Avenue, Chicago, Ill. 60611.
D. (6) $2,600.

A. Charles F. Cook, Jr., 1100 Ring Building, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Mining Congress, 1100 Ring Building, Washington, DC. 20036.
D. (6) $1,075.

A. Harry N. Cook, Suite 200, 1130 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The National Waterways Conference, Inc.

A. Cooperative League of the U.S.A. 1828 L Street NW., Suite 1100, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $2,000. E. (9) $998.40.

A. Council for the Advancement of the Psychological Professions & Sciences, 1725 I Street NW., Suite 606, Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $36,791.73. E. (9) $3,401.58.

A. Council of AFL–CIO Unions for Scientific, Professional and Cultural Employees, 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $1,250. E. (9) $1,250.

A. Counihan, Casey & Loomis, 1000 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Association of Bituminous Contractors, 1000 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Paul L. Courtney, 1725 K. Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $300.

A. John A. Couture, 1625 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Association of Home Builders of the United States, 1625 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $4,828.14. E. (9) $334.50.

A. Covington & Burling, 888 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. MGIC Investment Corp., 600 Marine Plaza, Milwaukee, Wis. 43201.
D. (6) $3,900.

A. Elizabeth M. Cox, 1107 National Press Building, Washington, D.C. 20004.
B. National Organization for Women, Inc., 1107 National Press Building, Washington, D.C. 20004.
D. (6) $1,980. E. (9) $186.84.

A. Credit Union National Association, Inc., 1617 Sherman Avenue, Madison, Wis.
D. (6) $3,605.24. E. (9) $450.66.

A. Richard C. Creighton, 1957 E Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Associated General Contractors of America, 1957 E Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,000.

A. William J. Cudlip, 320 New Center Building, Detroit, Mich. 48202.
B. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S., Inc., 320 New Center Building, Detroit, Mich. 48202.
D. (6) $250.

A. William E. Cumberland, 1125 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Mortgage Bankers Association of America, 1125 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $581. E. (9) $2,355.

A. Danzansky, Dickey, Tydings, Quint & Gordon, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Potomac Electric Power Co., 1900 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $3,901.38.

A. Stephen I. Danzansky, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Potomac Electric Power Co., 1900 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Richard C. Darling, 1156 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. J. C. Penney Co., Inc., 1301 Avenue of the Americas, New York, N.Y. 10019.
D. (6) $960. E. (9) $185.12.

A. John C. Datt, 425 13th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. American Farm Bureau Federation, 225 Touhy Avenue, Park Ridge, Ill.
D. (6) $1,812. E. (9) $27.43.

A. P. M. Davison, Jr., 418 East Rosser Avenue, P.O. Box 938, Bismarck, N. Dak. 58501.
B. North Dakota Railway Lines.
E. (9) $1,024,68.

A. Donald S. Dawson, 723 Washington Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Opticians Association of America, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Dawson, Quinn, Riddell, Taylor & Davis, 723 Washington Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Air Transport Association, 1709 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.

A. Dawson, Quinn, Riddell, Taylor & Davis, 723 Washington Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Association of Plaintiffs Trial Attorneys for Metropolitan Washington, D.C., 910 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $2,000.

A. Dawson, Quinn, Riddell, Taylor & Davis, 723 Washington Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. C.I.T. Financial Corp., 650 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.

A. Dawson, Quinn, Riddell, Taylor & Davis, 723 Washington Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. U.S. Brewers Association, Inc., 1750 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. DeHart and Broide, Inc., 1505 22d Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. Clairol, Inc., 345 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.
D. (6) $525. E. (9) $30.

A. DeHart and Broide, Inc., 1505 22d Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 114 West 11th Street, Kansas City, Mo. 64105.
D. (6) $245. E. (9) $61.58.

A. DeHart and Broide, Inc., 1505 22d Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. Recording Industry Association of America, Inc., 1 East 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022.
D. (6) $2,170. E. (9) $440.81.

A. Vincent A. Demo, 25 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10004.
B. New York Committee of International Committee of Passenger Lines, 25 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10004.
D. (6) $7,500. E. (9) $3,465.

A. Leslie E. Dennis, 400 First Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, 6300 River Road, Rosemont, Ill. 60018.
D. (6) $925. E. (9) $148.

A. C. H. DeVaney, 425 13th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. American Farm Bureau Federation, 225 Touhy Avenue, Park Ridge, Ill.
D. (6) $2,354. E. (9) $85.50.

A. Timothy V. A. Dillon, 1730 Rhode Island Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Department of Water Resources, State of California, P.O. Box 388, Sacramento, Calif. 95802.
D. (6) $2,295.72. (E) (9) $135.72.

A. Timothy V. A. Dillon, 1730 Rhode Island Avenue NW., Washington D.C. 20036.
B. Marysville Dam Committee, P.O. Drawer B, Marysville, Calif. 95902.
E. (9) $31.35.

A. Timothy V. A. Dillon, 1730 Rhode Island Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Sacramento Yolo Port District, West Sacramento, Calif.
D. (6) $1,414.86. E. (9) $34.86.

A. Steven P. Doehler, 1625 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Association of Home Builders of the United States, 1625 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $3,749.98. E. (9) $326.85.

A. Jack Donahue, 1725 I Street NW., Suite 606, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Council for the Advancement of the Psychological Professions and Sciences, 1725 I Street NW., Suite 606, Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,002. E. (9) $200.59.

A. Leo J. Donahue, 230 Southern Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Association of Nurserymen, 230 Southern Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.

A. Gary W. Donnelly, 1315 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Limestone Institute, Inc., 1315 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $17.10.

A. Dow, Lohnes & Albertson, 1225 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Advanced Schools, Inc., 5900 Northwest Highway, Chicago, Ill. 60631.

A. Louise C. Dunlap, 324 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Environmental Policy Center, 324 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $2,850. E. (9) $143.20.

A. H. Stewart Dunn, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Rochester Tax Council, 1100 Midtown Tower, Rochester, N.Y.
D. (6) $22,000.

A. J. Frederick Durr, R.R. No. 2, Sheridan, Ind. 46069.
B. National Association of Farmer Elected Committeemen, c/o J. Frederick Durr, R.R. No. 2, Sheridan, Ind. 46069.
E. (9) $45.25.

A. Henry I. Dworshak, 1100 Ring Building, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Mining Congress, 1100 Ring Building, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $1,175.

A. Eastern Meat Packers Association, Inc., 734 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
E. (9) $32.09.

A. Charles E. Ehrhart, 1800 K Street NW., Suite 924, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Ralston Purina Co., Checkerboard Square, St. Louis, Mo. 63188.
D. (6) $400. E. (9) $124.

A. John Ellis, 1957 E Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Associated General Contractors of America, 1957 E Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,000.

A. D. A. Ellsworth, 400 First Street NW., D.C. 20001.
B. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, 6300 River Road, Rosemont,, Ill. 60018.
D. (6) $6,250. E. (9) $1,620.37.

A. Environmental Policy Center, 324 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $19,631.84. E. (9) $25,136.55.

A. Ethyl Corp., 1155 15th Street NW., Suite 611, Washington, D.C. 20005.
E. (9) $500.

A. Brock Evans, 324 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Sierra Club, 1050 Mills Tower, San Francisco, Calif. 94104.
D. (6) $6,500. E. (9) $142.

A. Penelope S. Farthing, 1616 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Retail Federation, 1616 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,500. E. (9) $305.

A. Frank C Fini, 2020 Brooks Drive, Apartment 506, Suitland, Md. 20028.
B. Air Force Sergeants Association, 6101 28th Avenue SE., Suite 713, Marlow Heights, Md.

A. Roger Fleming, 425 13th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. American Farm Bureau Federation, 225 Touhy Avenue, Park Ridge, Ill.
D. (6) $1,942. E. (9) $60.98.

A. Carl J. Fleps, 1000 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The Greyhound Corp., Greyhound Tower, Phoenix, Ariz. 85077.
D. (6) $300. E. (9) $34.

A. Tim C. Ford, 1800 K Street, Washington, D.C.
B. Glass Container Manufacturers Institute.
E. (9) $483.17.

A. Jean Fox, 88 Central Park West, New York, N.Y. 10023.
B. Consumer Action Now, Inc., 30 E. 68th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021.

A. Alice B. Frandsen, 10311 Folk Street, Silver Spring, Md. 20902.
B. Women's Lobby Inc., 1345 G Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
E. (9) $62.

A. Ronald C. Frankis, 1730 Rhode Island Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Credit Union National Association, Inc., 1617 Sherman Avenue, Madison, Wis.
D. (6) $1,096.56. E. (9) $79.46.

A. Donald A. Frederick, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $218.75 E. (9) $2.62.

A. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman, 600 New Hamphire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. The Hualapai Tribe of the Hualapai Reservation, Peach Springs, Ariz.
D. (6) $235. E. (9) $11.15.

A. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman, 600 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. The Navajo Tribe, Window Rock, Ariz.
D. (6) $18,000. E. (9) $563.95.

A. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman, 600 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. The Nez Perce Tribe, Lapwai, Idaho.
D. (6) $400.

A. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman, 600 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. Oglala Sioux Tribe, Pine Ridge, S. Dak. 57770.
D. (6) $4,000.

A. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman, 600 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. Pueblo of Laguna, Laguna, N. Mex.
D. (6) $45. E. (9) $4.80.

A. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman, 600 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community, Box 120, Route 1, Scottsdale, Ariz.
D. (6) $185. E. (9) $1.50.

A. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman, 600 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. Seneca Nation of Indians, Box 268–A, Irving, N.Y. 14081.
D. (6) $1,025. E. (9) $10.60.

A. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman, 600 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. Tuscarora Indian Nation, Lewiston, N.Y.

A. Frosh, Lane and Edson, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Institute for Government Assisted Housing, 1025 Connecticut Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $900.

A. Frosh, Lane and Edson, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Association of Building Manufacturers, 1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $900.

A. Frosh, Lane and Edson, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The Section 23 Leased Housing Association, Suite 707, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $450.

A. Gadsby & Hannah, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Council of Independent Laboratories, Inc., 1725 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Gadsby & Hannah, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Council of Professional Services Firms, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Tom Garrett, 620 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Friends of the Earth, 620 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $1,950.

A. Leo J. Gehrig, One Farragut Square South, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Hospital Association, 840 North Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60611.
D. (6) $949.35. E. (9) $205.68.

A. Louis Gerber, 1925 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Communications Workers of America, 1925 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $3,056.73.

A. Llewellyn H. Gerson.
B. National Federation of Independent Business, 921 Washington Building, 15th and New York Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $2,900. E. (9) $889.

A. John A. C. Gibson, 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $4,250. E. (9) $136.80.

A. Glassie, Pewett, Beebe & Shanks, 1819 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Eastern Meat Packers Association, Inc., 734 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.

A. Glassie, Pewett, Beebe & Shanks, 1819 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The National Independent Meat Packers Association, 734 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.

A. The Glenmede Trust Co., 1529 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, Pa.

A. Godfrey Associates, Inc., 918 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $53.80.

A. Horace D. Godfrey, 918 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Godfrey Associates, Inc., 918 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $375. E. (9) $53.80.

A. Ilene Goldman, 740 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10021.
B. Consumer Action Now, Inc., 30 East 68th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021.

A. Jack Golodner, 1990 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Actors Equity Association, 165 West 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10036.
D. (6) $2,500. E. (9) $310.

A. Jack Golodner.
B. Council of AFL–CIO Unions for Scientific, Professional and Cultural Employees, 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $1,000.

A. Gore, Cladouhos & Brashares, 1750 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Tool, Die & Precision Machining Association, 9300 Livingston Road, Washington, D.C. 20022.

A. Donald E. Graham, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $1,584.98. E.(9) $36.85.

A. Warren Graves, 324 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Environmental Policy Center, 324 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $4,500. E. (9) $200.

A. Harold H. Griffin, 925 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. National Association of Realtors, 155 East Superior Street, Chicago, Ill.
D. (6) $1,875. E. (9) $108.56.

A. James M. Hacking, 1909 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Association of Retired Persons/National Retired Teachers Association, 1909 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $45.

A. Hubert D. Hagen, Suite 1800, 500 North Broadway, St. Louis, Mo. 63102.
B. Arch Mineral Corp., Suite 1800, 500 North Broadway, St. Louis, Mo. 63102.

A. Matthew Hale, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The American Bankers Association, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $1,000. E. (9) $150.

A. Isabel Halliburton, 320 East 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022.
B. Consumer Action Now, Inc., 30 East 68th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021.

A. Robert N. Hampton, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $1,106.24. E. (9) $12.83.

A. Donald K. Hanes, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $587.50. E. (9) $65.64.

A. William E. Hardman, 9300 Livingston Road, Washington, D.C. 20022.
B. National Tool, Die & Precision Machining Association, 9300 Livingston Road, Washington, D.C. 20022.

A. Andrew E. Hare, 1990 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Right To Work Committee, 1990 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $460. E. (9) $91.

A. Donald L. Harlow.
B. Air Force Sergeants Association, Inc., 6101 28th Avenue SE., Marlow Heights, Md. 20031.

A. William C. Hart, 1625 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Columbia Gas System Service Corp., 20 Montchanin Road, Wilmington, Del. 19807.
D. (6) $3,248. E. (9) $5,389.95.

A. Clifford J. Harvison, 1616 P Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc., 1616 P Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Sidney G. Hawkes, 200 17th Street NW., Suite 501, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Mead Corp., 118 West First Street, Dayton, Ohio 45402.
D. (6) $650. E. (9) $380.

A. Bruce R. Hawley, 425 13th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. American Farm Bureau Federation, 225 Touhy Avenue, Park Ridge, Ill.
D. (6) $183. E. (9) $1.40.

A. Robert T. Hayden, 815 16th Street NW., Suite 706, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. United Steelworkers of America, Five Gateway Center, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15222.
D. (6) $3,976.33. E. (9) $1,119.12.

A. Kit H. Haynes, 425 13th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. American Farm Bureau Federation, 225 Touhy Avenue, Park Ridge, Ill.
D. (6) $2,354. E. (9) $69.93.

A. Robert B. Heiney, 1133 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Canners Association, 1133 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $875. E. (9) $513.14.

A. Barbara Heller, 324 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Environmental Policy Center, 324 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $627.50. E. (9) $130.28.

A. Lillie E. Herndon, 700 North Rush Street, Chicago, Ill. 60611.
B. National Congress of Parents and Teachers, 700 North Rush Street, Chicago, Ill. 60611.
D. (6) $207,400.13. E. (9) $497.48.

A. Donald E. Hirsch, 425 13th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. American Farm Bureau Federation, 225 Touhy Avenue, Park Ridge, Ill.
D. (6) $2,708. E. (9) $37.55.

A. Ralph D. Hodges, Jr., 1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.
B. National Forest Products Association.
E. (9) $6.96.

A. Glen D. Hofer, 1030 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $499.50. E. (9) $31.06.

A. Thomas P. Holley, 1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Paper Institute, 260 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016.

A. Peter W. Hughes, 1909 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Association of Retired Persons/National Retired Teachers Association, 1909 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $119.02.

A. The Human Life Amendment, The Bellevue Hotel, 15 E Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $159.50. E. (9) $579.01.

A. Gregory A. Humphrey, 1012 14th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Federation of Teachers, AFL–CIO, 1012 14th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
E. (9) $245.82.

A. David J. Humphreys, 1140 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Recreational Vehicle Institute, Inc., 2720 Des Plaines Avenue, Des Plaines, Ill. 60018.
D. (6) $10,000. E. (9) $16.90.

A. John Edward Hurley, 1101 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
E. (9) $25.

A. Bernard J. Imming, 1019 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. United Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Association, 1019 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $437.50. E. (9) $35.99.

A. INA Corp., 1600 Arch Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 19101.
E. (9) $100.

A. Institute for Government Assisted Housing, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $900. E. (9) $900.

A. Japanese American Citizens League, 22 Peace Plaza, Suite 203, San Francisco, Calif. 94115.
E. (9) $200.

A. H. Bradley Johnson, 1100 Ring Building, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Mining Congress, 1100 Ring Building, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $975.

A. Richard J. Jones, 1110 Davidson Street, Champaign, Ill. 60631.
B. Independent Grocers' Alliance, 5725 River Road, Chicago, Ill. 60606.
D. (6) $125.

A. Ardon B. Judd, Jr., 1100 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Dresser Industries, Inc., 1100 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C.

A. James J. Judge, 1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Association of Building Manufacturers, 1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $300.

A. Robert E. Juliano, 1666 K Street NW., Suite 304, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union, 120 East Fourth Street, 13th Floor, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202.
D. (6) $4,999.98. E. (9) $2,728.03.

A. Mrs. Fritz R. Kahn, 9202 Ponce Place, Fairfax, Va. 22030.
B. National Congress of Parents and Teachers, 700 North Rush Street, Chicago, Ill. 60611.
E. (9) $18.75.

A. Marvin Kamensky, 120 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, Ill. 60603.
E. (9) $355.

A. John G. Keller, Suite 1014, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Exxon Co., U.S.A., P.O. Box 2180, Houston, Tex.

A. R. G. Kendall, Jr., Montgomery, Ala.
B. Alabama Railroad Association, Montgomery, Ala.
D. (6) $52. E. (9) $191.38.

A. James J. Kennedy, Jr., 400 First Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. Brotherhod of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, 6300 River Road, Rosemont, Ill. 60018.
D. (6) $5,600. E. (9) $926.90.

A. Judith Kim, 1030 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Nurses' Association, Inc., 2420 Pershing Road, Kansas City, Mo. 64108.
D. (6) $6,441.03.

A. Kirkland, Ellis & Rowe, 1776 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Grocery Manufacturers of America, Inc., 1425 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.

A. Keith R. Knoblock, 1100 Ring Building, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Mining Congress, 1100 Ring Building, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $725.

A. John D. Knodell, Jr., 200 112th Avenue NE., Bellevue, Wash. 98004.
B. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.
E. (9) $1,906.10.

A. George W. Koch, 1425 K Street NW., Suite 900, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Grocery Manufacturers of America, Inc., 1425 K Street NW., Suite 900, Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $180.78.

A. Robert M. Koch, 1315 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Limestone Institute, Inc., 1315 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $24.50.

A. Charles B. Kornmann, P.O. Box 489, Aberdeen, S. Dak. 57401.
B. South Dakota Railroads Association.
D. (6) $375. E. (9) $502.55.

A. Kenneth S. Kovack, 815 16th Street NW., Suite 706, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. United Steelworkers of America, 5 Gateway Center, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15222.
D. (6) $4,665.99. E. (9) $1,358.27.

A. James S. Krzyminski, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $1,710. E. (9) $70.39.

A. Philip Kugler, 1012 14th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Federation of Teachers, AFL–CIO, 1012 14th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
E. (9) $273.21.

A. Laurence F. Lane, 1909 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Retired Teachers Association/American Association of Retired Persons, 1909 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $99.44.

A. Reed E. Larson, 1990 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Right to Work Committee, 1990 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $35.

A. Susannah Lawrence, 215 East 72d Street, New York, N.Y. 10021.
B. Consumer Action Now, Inc., 30 East 68th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021.

A. Robert F. Lederer, 230 Southern Building, Washington, D.C.
B. American Association of Nurserymen, Inc., 230 Southern Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.

A. Richard J. Leighton, 1701 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Grocery Manufacturers of America, Inc., 1425 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.

A. Morris J. Levin, 1620 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

B. Association of American Railroads, American Railroad Building, Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,000.

A. J. M. B. Lewis, Jr., 315 Shenandoah Building, P.O. Box 2887, Roanoke, Va. 24001.
B. National Council of Coal Lessors, 317 Southern Building, Washington, D.C. 20005; Iron Ore Lessors Association, 1500 First National Bank Building, St. Paul, Minn.
D. (6) $6,250.

A. Ronald L. Leymeister, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The American Bankers Association, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $500. E. (9) $162.14.

A. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 130 Third Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $17,979.74. E. (9) $21,623.43.

A. J. Patrick Logue, 1030 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Nurses' Association, Inc., 2420 Pershing Road, Kansas City, Mo. 64108.
D. (6) $5,476.04.

A. Gay Lord, 150 East 73d Street, New York, N.Y. 10021.
B. Consumer Action Now, Inc., 30 East 68th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021.

A. LeRoy E. Lyon, Jr., 11th and L Building, Sacramento, Calif. 95814.
B. California Railroad Association, 11th and L Building, Sacramento, Calif. 95814.
E. (9) $295.22.

A. Russell E. MacCleery, 1909 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc., 320 New Center Building, Detroit, Mich. 48202.
D. (6) $500.

A. Kenneth B. MacKenzie, 1660 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., P.O. Box 8339, Chicago, Ill. 60680.

A. Barbara Maltby, 600 West End Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10024.
B. Consumer Action Now, Inc., 30 East 68th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021.

A. Management Communications, Inc., 1505 22d Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. Council on Foundations, 888 Seventh Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10019.
D. (6) $420.

A. Management Comunications, Inc., 1505 22d Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. Recycled Paperboard Division of the American Paper Institute, 260 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016.
D. (6) $490. E. (9) $1.20.

A. John V. Maraney, 324 East Capitol Street, Washington, D.C.
B. National Star Route Mail Carriers' Association, 324 East Capitol Street, Washington, D.C. 20003.

A. Edwin E. Marsh, 200 C Street SE., Suite 401, Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. National Wool Growers Association, 600 Crandall Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.
D. (6) $4,638. E. (9) $500.90.

A. Carlin Masterson, 801 West End Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10025.
B. Consumer Action Now, Inc., 30 East 68th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021.

A. John J. L. Matson, 1909 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

B. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S., Inc., 320 New Center Building, Detroit, Mich. 48202.
D. (6) $400.

A. Charles E. Mattingly, 1608 K Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. The American Legion, 700 North Pennsylvania Street, Indianapolis, Ind.
D. (6) $4,368.

A. Frank W. Mayo, 1809 23d Street, Manhattan Beach, Calif. 90266.

A. Anthony Mazzocchi, 1126 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Oil Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union, 1636 Champa Street, Denver, Colo. 80201.
D. (6) $2,362.50. E. (9) $318.50.

A. Robert C. McCandless, 1725 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Committee for Humane Legislation, 11 West 60th Street, New York, N.Y.
D. (6) $300. E. (9) $25.

A. Robert C. McCandless, 1725 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 1101 17th Street NW., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $800. E. (9) $25.

A. John L. McConnell, 1800 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 11 Wall Street, New York, N.Y., 10005.
D. (6) $1,200. E. (9) $265.

A. John L. McCormick, 324 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Environmental Policy Center, 324 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $1,875. E. (9) $34.85.

A. Peter E. McGuire, 400 First Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. National Association of Retired & Veteran Railway Employees, Inc., P.O. Box 6069 Kansas City, Kans., 66106.
D. (6) $500. E. (9) $500.

A. Clifford G. McIntire, 425 13th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. American Farm Bureau Federation, 225 Touhy Avenue, Park Ridge, Ill.
D. (6) $1,833. E. (9) $18.48.

A. Medical-Surgical Manufacturers Association, 1666 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $3,017.75.

A. Marc Messing, 324 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Environmental Policy Center, 324 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $1,320.

A. Anne Miller, Suite 907, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Bryant Associates, Inc., Suite 907, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $75. E. (9) $45.91.

A. Lester F. Miller, 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.
B. National Rural Letter Carriers' Association, 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $182. E. (9) $6.

A. Clarence Mitchell, 422 First Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 1790 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10019.
D. (6) $4,000.

A. John G. Mohay, 734 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. The National Independent Meat Packers Association, 734 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $433.34.

A. John V. Moller, 1909 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc., 320 New Center Building, Detroit, Mich. 48202.
D. (6) $500.

A. John Morgan, 1925 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Communications Workers of America, 1925 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $627.90.

A. John J. Motley.
B. National Federation of Independent Business, 921 Washington Building, 15th and New York Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $2,900. E. (9) $889.

A. Richard E. Murphy, 900 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Service Employees International Union, AFL–CIO, 900 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,000. E. (9) $100.

A. George E. Myers, 1730 Rhode Island Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Credit Union National Association, Inc., 1617 Sherman Avenue, Madison, Wis.
D. (6) $832.78. E. (9) $85.85.

A. Kenneth D. Naden, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $3,037.50. E. (9) $46.25.

A. Maryann Napoli, 800 West End Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10025.
B. Consumer Action Now, Inc., 30 East 68th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021.

A. National Air Carrier Association, 1730 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $875. E. (9) $875.

A. National Associated Businessmen, Inc., 1000 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $393.30. E. (9) $592.06.

A. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 1790 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10019.
D. (6) $15,273.22. E. (9) $15,485.80.

A. National Association of Building Manufacturers, 1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $900. E. (9) $900.

A. National Association of Farmer Elected Committeemen, c/o J. Frederick Durr, R. R. No. 2, Sheridan, Ind. 46069.
D. (6) $255.90. E. (9) $255.90.

A. National Association of Home Builders of the United States, 1625 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $45,261.64. E. (9) $41,703.96.

A. National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 1101 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $2,400. E. (9) $2,322.

A. National Association of Realtors, 155 East Superior Street, Chicago, Ill. 60611.
E. (9) $18,586.47.

A. National Audio-Visual Association, Inc., 3150 Spring Street, Fairfax, Va. 22030.
D. (6) $7,370.65. E. (9) $5,130.96.

A. National Canners Association, 1133 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $686,194.32. E. (9) $3,684.87.

A. National Citizens Committee for Revenue Sharing, 707 National Press Building, Washington, D.C. 20004.

A. National Committee for Research in Neurological Disorders, 927 National Press Building, Washington, D.C. 20004.
D. (6) $1,060. E. (9) 8,216.14.

A. National Congress of Parents and Teachers, 700 North Rush Street, Chicago, Ill. 60611.
D. (6) $207,400.13. E. (9) $497.48.

A. National Council of Agricultural Employers, 337 Southern Building, 15th and H Streets NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $1,000. E. (9) $1,650.

A. National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $32,630. E.(9) $36,472.

A. National Counsel Associates, 421 New Jersey SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. American Blood Resources Association, 308 State Street, Albany, N.Y. 12210.
D. (6) $1,125. E. (9) $60.37.

A. National Counsel Associates, 421 New Jersey SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Cenco, Inc., 2600 South Kostner Avenue, Chicago, Ill.
D. (6) $2,475. E. (9) $95.52.

A. National Counsel Associates, 421 New Jersey SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Committee for the Study of Revenue Bond Financing, 1000 Ring Building, Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $833.33. E. (9) $58.81.

A. National Counsel Associates, 421 New Jersey SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Wheat Users Committee, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $6,000. E. (9) $187.46

A. National Federation of Independent Business, 920–922 Washington Building, Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $11,811.29. E. (9) $11,811.29.

A. National Housing Conference, Inc., 1126 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $24,444.18. E. (9) $30,699.62.

A. The National Independent Meat Packers Association, 734 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $540.02. E. (9) $2,234.56.

A. National Limestone Institute, Inc., 1315 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $10,481.70. E. (9) $10,481.70.

A. National Motorsports Committee of ACCUS, Suite 801, 1629 K Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $2,550. E. (9) $1,315.67.

A. National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, 2317 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
D. (6) $2,199.41. E. (9) $1,054.61.

A. National Organization for Women, Inc., 1107 National Press Building, Washington, D.C. 20004.
D. (6) $9,177.42. E. (9) $9,177.42.

A. National Parking Association, 1101 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
E. (9) $825.

A. National Patent Council, 1225 19th Street NW., Suite 409, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $2,647.50. E. (9) $800.

A. National Realty Committee, Inc., 230 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.
D. (6) $3,979.99. E. (9) $3,979.99.

A. National Rehabilitation Association, 1522 K Street NW., Suite 1120, Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $20,247. E. (9) $1,458.

A. National Right to Work Committee, 1990 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $1,901. E. (9) $1,901.

A. National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.
E. (9) $4,199.53.

A. National Rural Housing Coalition, 1346 Connecticut Avenue NW., No. 529, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $2,962.95. E. (9) $2,531.04.

A. National Rural Letter Carriers' Association, 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $4,076. E. (9) $2,917.

A. National Sharecroppers Fund, Inc., 1145 19th Street NW., Room 501, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $5,515.63. E. (9) $9,014.59.

A. National Student Lobby, 413 East Capitol Street, SE., Washington, D.C. 20002.
D. (6) $11,337.80. E. (9) $12,290.40.

A. National Tax Equality Association, 1000 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $2,051.48. E. (9) $2,051.32.

A. National Taxpayers Union, 625 East Capitol Street, Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $40,378.32. E. (9) $37,834.48.

A. National Wool Growers Association, 600 Crandall Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.
D. (6) $26,463. E. (9) $6,148.87.

A. Ivan A. Nestingen, 1000 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Credit Union National Association, Inc., 1617 Sherman Avenue, Madison, Wis.
D. (6) $900. E. (9) $225.

A. Neuro-Research Foundation, Inc., 35 Chestnut Place, Brookline, Mass.
E. (9) $1,500.

A. New York Committee of International Committee of Passenger Lines, 25 Broadway, New York, N.Y.
D. (6) $13,500. E. (9) $6,577.

A. Barbara Niles, 170 East 79th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021.
B. Consumer Action Now, Inc., 30 East 68th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021.

A. Robert W. Nolan, 1303 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Fleet Reserve Association, 1303 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $100.

A. W. Brice O'Brien, 1100 Ring Building, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Mining Congress, 1100 Ring Building, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $825.

A. Raymond D. O'Connell, 400 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.
B. National Cable Television Association, Inc., 1634 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $5,250. E. (9) $599.35.

A. Layton Olson, 413 East Capitol Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20002.
B. National Student Lobby, 413 East Capitol Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20002.
D. (6) $30.

A. Samuel Omasta, 1315 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Limestone Institute, Inc., 1315 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $15.10.

A. John L. Oshinski, 815 16th Street NW., Suite 706, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. United Steelworkers of America, Five Gateway Center, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15222.
D. (6) $4,728.99. (9) $850.98.

A. J. Allen Overton, Jr., 1100 Ring Building NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Mining Congress, 1100 Ring Building NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $1,475.

A. Lew M. Paramore, P.O. Box 1160, Kansas City, Kans. 66117.
B. Mo-Ark Basins Flood Control & Conservation, P.O. Box 1160, Kansas City, Kans. 66117.

A. Carol Ames Parker, 620 C Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
B. Friends of the Earth, 620 C Street SE., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $2,100.

A. Kenton Pattie, 3150 Spring Street, Fairfax, Va. 22030.
B. National Audio-Visual Association, Inc., 3150 Spring Street, Fairfax, Va. 22030.
D. (6) $1,418.18.

A. Ellen Pattin, 6907 Lyle Street, Lanham, Md. 20801.
B. Women's Lobby Inc., 1345 G Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
E. (9) $25.15.

A. Jack Pearce, Suite 808, 910 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Committee on Modern, Efficient Transportation, Suite 808, 910 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $8,400. E. (9) $2,410.36.

A. Jack Pearce, Suite 818, 910 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Computer Industry Association, 16255 Ventura Boulevard, Encino, Calif. 91316.
D. (6) $9,000. E. (9) $2,501.39.

A. Pepper, Hamilton & Sheetz, 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Coalition of Concerned Charities, 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Suite 1102, Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $829.01. E. (9) $69.01.

A. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 123 South Broad Street, Philadelphia, Pa.
B. The Glenmede Trust Co., 1529 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, Pa.
E. (9) $57.20.

A. Pepper, Hamilton & Sheetz, 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Johns-Manville Co., P.O. Box 17086, Denver, Colo. 80217.

A. Grant C. Pinney, Halsey Street, China Lake, Calif. 93555.

B. China Lake Elementary School District, Halsey Street, China Lake, Calif. 93555.

A. Frederick T. Poole, 425 13th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. American Farm Bureau Federation, 225 Touhy Avenue, Park Ridge, Ill.
D. (6) $488. E. (9) $21.21.

A. Potomac Electric Power Co., 1900 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $3,870.

A. William I. Powell, 1100 Ring Building, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Mining Congress, 1100 Ring Building, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $975. E. (9) $46.

A. Graham Purcell, 1819 H Street NW., Suite 230, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Board of Trade of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc., Kansas City, Mo.
D. (6) $1,200.

A. Graham Purcell, 1819 H Street NW., Suite 230, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Chicago, Ill.
D. (6) $1,200.

A. Graham Purcell, 1819 H Street NW., Suite 230, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Air Tankers Association, Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $350.

A. William A. Quinlan, Route 8, Box 238, Annapolis, Md. 21401.
B. Associated Retail Bakers of America, 735 West Sheridan Road, Chicago, Ill. 60613.
D. (6) $1,505. E. (9) $421.40.

A. Ragan & Mason, 900 17th Street NW., The Farragut Building, Washington, D.C.
B. The Department of Tourism, Hamilton, Bermuda.
D. (6) $1,666.

A. Ragan & Mason, 900 17th Street NW., The Farragut Building, Washingtin, D.C.
B. Gulf Oil Corp., P.O. Box 1166, Pittsburgh, Pa.
D. (6) $2,000.

A. Ragan & Mason, 900 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. National Ski Areas Association, Inc., 99 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y.
D. (6) $1,500. E. (9) $139.

A. Ragan & Mason, 900 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc., 401 North Main Street, Winston-Salem, N.C.
D. (6) $1,000.

A. Ragan & Mason, 900 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Sea-Land Service, Inc., P.O. Box 900, Edison, N.J.
D. (6) $900.

A. Ragan & Mason, 900 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Stimson Lumber Co., and Miller Redwood Co., 315 Pacific Building, Portland, Oreg.
D. (6) $125.

A. Rial M. Rainwater, 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.
B. National Rural Letter Carrier's Association, 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $182. E. (9) $7.

A. Gail Rakow, 77 Seventh Avenue, New York, N.Y.
B. Consumer Action Now, Inc., 30 East 68th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021.

A. Sydney C. Reagan, 6815 Prestonshire, Dallas, Tex. 75225.
B. Southwestern Peanut Shellers Association, 6815 Prestonshire, Dallas, Tex. 75225.
D. (6) $150.

A. Recording Industry Association of America, Inc., One East 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022.
E. (9) $37,800.53.

A. Recreational Vehicle Institute, Inc., 2720 Des Plaines Avenue, Des Plaines, Ill. 60018.
E. (9) $10,016.90.

A. Lola Redford, 1125 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10028.
B. Consumer Action Now, Inc., 30 East 68th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021.

A. Lawrence D. Reedy, 602 Ring Building, 1200 18th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Association of Advertising Agencies, 200 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.
D. (6) $1,250. E. (9) $600.

A. Robert S. Reese, Jr., 1616 P Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc., 1616 P Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. John T. Reggitts, Jr., 95 Boonton Avenue, R.D. 2 Boonton Avenue, Boonton, N.J. 07005.

A. Reserve Officers Association of U.S., One Constitution Avenue NE., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $1,268.33. E. (9) $460.50.

A. Harry H. Richardson, 335 Austin Street, Bogalusa, La. 70427.
B. Louisiana Railroads, 335 Austin Street, Bogalusa, La.

A. Warren S. Richardson, 1957 E Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Associated General Contractors of America, 1957 E Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $2,060.

A. James W. Riddell, 723 Washington Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. The Kellogg Co., Battle Creek, Mich.

A. James W. Riddell, 723 Washington Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. W. K. Kellogg Foundation, Battle Creek, Mich.

A. James W. Riddell, 723 Washington Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. Volume Footwear Retailers of America, 51 East 42d Street, New York, N.Y. 10017.

A. Rosalie Riechman, 120 Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C. 20002.
B. Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 1213 Race Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 19107.
D. (6) $1,575.

A. John Riley, 1625 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Association of Home Builders of the United States, 1625 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $750. E. (9) $3.72.

A. Kenneth Roberson, 2 Dubonnet Road, Valley Stream, N.Y. 11581.
B. Meat Importers Council of America, Inc., 708 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.

A. Nathaniel H. Rogg, 1625 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Association of Home Builders of the United States, 1625 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $2,587.50. E. (9) $104.12.

A. Jerome D. Schaller, 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co., 3M Center, St. Paul, Minn. 55101.
E. (9) $72.64.

A. Eric P. Schellin, 1225 19th Street NW., Suite 409, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Patent Council, 1225 19th Street NW., Suite 409, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $800.

A. Ann Scott, 1107 National Press Building, Washington, D.C. 20004.
B. National Organization for Women, Inc., 1107 National Press Building, Washington, D.C. 20004.
E. (9) $523.72.

A. Durward Seals, 1019 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. United Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Association, 1019 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $312.50. E. (9) $29.05.

A. The Section 23 Leased Housing Association, Suite 707, 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $450. E. (9) $450.

A. Sharon, Pierson, Semmes, Crolius & Finley, 1054 31st Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20007.
B. American National Cattlemen's Association, Denver, Colo.
D. (6) $1,000. E. (9) $376.50.

A. Sharon, Pierson, Semmes, Crolius & Finley, 1054 31st Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20007.
B. General Electric Co., 570 Lexington Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.
D. (6) $1,300. E. (9) $68.60.

A. Sharon, Pierson, Semmes, Crolius & Finley, 1054 31st Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20007.
B. Rubber Manufacturers Association, 444 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.
D. (6) $2,725. E. (9) $166.

A. John J. Sheehan, 815 16th Street NW., Suite 706, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. United Steelworkers of America, Five Gateway Center, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15222.
D. (6) $6,261.75. E. (9) $3,591.26.

A. Laurence P. Sherfy, 1100 Ring Building, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Mining Congress 1100 Ring Building, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $1,175.

A. A. Z. Shows, Suite 904, 2600 Virginia Avenue NW., Watergate Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20037
D. (6) $1,984. E. (9) $2,942.88.

A. Margaret A. Siegel, 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. $3,750. E. (9) $72.90.

A. Gilbert Simonetti, Jr., 1620 I Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Institute of CPA's, 666 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10019.
E. (9) $500.

A. Talmage E. Simpkins, 100 Indiana Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. AFL–CIO Maritime Committee, 100 Indiana Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
E. (9) $562.12.

A. Donald K. Simpson, 1100 Ring Building, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Mining Congress, 1100 Ring Building, Washington D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $475.

A. Hall Sisson, 1925 K Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Communications Workers of America, 1925 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $4,645.87.

A. Diane Somerford, 505 B South Frederick Avenue, Apt. 5, Gaithersburg, Md. 20760.
B. Women's Lobby Inc., 1345 G Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
E. (9) $15.

A. Shelby Southard, 1828 L Street NW., Suite 1100, Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Cooperative League of the USA, 1828 L Street NW., Suite 1100, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $2,000. E. (9) $835.75.

A. South Dakota Railroads Association, P.O. Box 489, Aberdeen, S. Dak. 57401.
E. (9) $877.55.

A. Southwestern Peanut Shellers Association, 6815 Prestonshire, Dallas, Tex. 75225.
D. (6) $150. E. (9) $150.

A. Wilbur D. Sparks, 1815 North Fort Myer Drive, Arlington, Va. 22209.
B. Air-Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute, 1815 North Fort Myer Drive, Arlington, Va. 22209.
D. (6) $624.

A. Larry N. Spiller, 1155 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Consulting Engineers Council, 1155 15th Street NW., Suite 713, Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $1,650. E. (9) $50.

A. Springs Mills, Inc., Fort Mill, S.C. 29715.

A. James M. Sprouse, 1957 E Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Associated General Contractors of America, 1957 E Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $1,000.

A. J. Gilbert Stallings, 1211 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. INA Corp., 1600 Arch Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 19101.
D. (6) $100. E. (9) $100.

A. Robert H. Starkey, 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.
B. National Rural Letter Carriers' Association, 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $182. E. (9) $6.

A. Cynthia Stein, 50 West 96th Street, New York, N.Y. 10025.
B. Consumer Action Now, Inc., 30 East 68th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021.

A. Steptoe & Johnson, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, P.O. Box 5439, St. Louis, Mo. 63160; Merck & Co., Inc., 126 East Lincoln Avenue, Rahway, N.J. 07065; S. B. Penick & Co., 100 Church Street, New York, N.Y. 10007.
D. (6) $1,500. E. (9) $450.

A. Herald E. Stringer, 1608 K Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. The American Legion, 700 North Pennsylvania Street, Indianapolis, Ind. 46206.
D. (6) $6,150. E. (9) $517.51.

A. Roger J. Stroh, 1019 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. United Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Association, 1019 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $218.75. E. (9) $13.93.

A. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, 1100 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. United States Banknote, 345 Hudson Street, New York, N.Y. 10014.
D. (6) $500.

A. Michael E. Strother, 1315 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Limestone Institute, Inc., 1315 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $8.50.

A. R. Keith Stroup, 2317 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
B. National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, 2317 M Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.
D. (6) $450.

A. G. Don Sullivan, 1100 Ring Building N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. American Mining Congress, 1100 Ring Building, Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $575.

A. Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, 1666 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Agway, Inc., P.O. Box 1333, Syracuse, N.Y. 13201.
E. (9) $30.

A. Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, 1666 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., 1295 State Street, Springfield, Mass. 01101.
E. (9) $30.

A. Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, 1666 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Retail Credit Co., P.O. Box 4081, Atlanta, Ga. 30302.
D. (6) $9,950. E. (9) $3,080.

A. Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, 1666 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Travelers Insurance Cos., One Tower Square, Hartford, Conn. 06115.
D. (6) $250. E. (9) $30.

A. Ronald E. Sweet, 1126 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. International Federal Professional and Technical Engineers, AFL–CIO, 1126 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $350. E. (9) $20.

A. J. Woodrow Thomas Associates, Inc., Suite 600, 734 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Hart Metals, Inc., Tamaqua, Pa. 18252.
D. (6) $2,250.

A. J. Woodrow Thomas Associates, Inc., Suite 600, 734 15th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. REA Express, Inc., 219 East 42d Street, New York, N.Y. 10017.
D. (6) $4,500.

A. Charles Richard Titus, 1909 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc., 320 New Center Building, Detroit, Mich. 48202.
D. (6) $400.

A. J. P. Trainor, 400 First Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20001.
B. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, 6300 River Road, Rosemont, Ill. 60018.
D. (6) $4,000. E. (9) $1,197.77.

A. W. M. Trevarrow, 601 National Press Building, Washington, D.C. 20004.
B. American Motors Corp., 14250 Plymouth Road, Detroit, Mich. 48232.
D. (6) $3,375. E. (9) $156.

A. Matt Triggs, 425 13th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. American Farm Bureau Federation, 225 Touhy Avenue, Park Ridge, Ill.
D. (6) $2,687. E. (9) $42.84.

A. Joseph D. Tydings, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Potomac Electric Power Co., 1900 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. United Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Association, 1019 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
D. (6) $2,231.88. E. (9) $2,231.88.

A. United States Banknote Corp., 345 Hudson Street, New York City, N.Y. 10014.
E. (9) $500.

A. John W. Vardaman, Jr., 839 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Veterans of World War I, U.S.A., Inc., 916 Prince Street, Alexandria, Va. 22314.
E. (9) $1,905.79.

A. Mary E. Vogel, 1107 National Press Building, Washington, D.C. 20004.
B. National Organization for Women, Inc., 1107 National Press Building, Washington D.C. 20004.
D. (6) $1,909.08. E. (9) $165.91.

A. Wald, Harkrader & Ross, 1320 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. INA Corp., 1600 Arch Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 19101.

A. Wald, Harkrader & Ross, 1320 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Springs Mills, Inc., Fort Mill, S.C. 29715.
E. (9) $4.50.

A. DeMelt E. Walker, 1730 Rhode Island Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.
B. Credit Union National Association, Inc., 1617 Sherman Avenue, Madison, Wis.
D. (6) $775.90. E. (9) $60.35.

A. George A. Watson, Suite 800, 1612 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Ferroalloys Association, Suite 800, 1612 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Ray Wax, care of J. Frederick Durr, R.R. 2, Sheridan, Ind. 46069.
B. National Association of Farmer Elected Committeemen, c/o J. Frederick Durr, R.R. 2, Sheridan, Ind. 46069.
E. (9) $49.60.

A. Fred Wegner, 1750 K Street NW., Suite 1190, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Retired Persons Services, Inc., 1750 K Street NW., Suite 1190, Washington, D.C. 20006.
E. (9) $7.80.

A. Janet H. Wegner, 1909 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Association of Retired Persons/National Retired Teachers Association, 1909 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.

A. Paul S. Weller, Jr., 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, 1129 20th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
D. (6) $1,625. E. (9) $94.18.

A. Arlene Weltman, 239 Central Park West, New York, N.Y. 10024.
B. Consumer Action Now., Inc., 30 E 68th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021.

A. Terrell M. Wertz, 1608 K Street NW., Washington, D.C.
B. The American Legion, 700 North Pennsylvania Street, Indianapolis, Ind.
D. (6) $3,850. E. (9) $84.50

A. Harry H. Westbay, III, 1625 I Street NW., Suite 805, Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. St. Regis Paper Co., 150 East 42d Street, New York, N.Y. 10017.
D. (6) $300. E. (9) $150.

A. Robert Y. Wheeler, P.O. Box 185, Tilden, Tex. 78072.
B. E. G. Herman, 9538 Briggtonway, Beverly Hills, Calif. 90210.

A. Leonard M. Wickliffe, Eleventh and L Building, Sacramento, Calif. 95814.
B. California Railroad Association, 11th and L Building, Sacramento, Calif. 95814.
D. (6) $3,125. E. (9) $6,724.

A. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. American Society of Travel Agents, Inc., 360 Lexington Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.
E. (9) $144.33.

A. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Arapahoe Tribe of Indians, Fort Washakie, Wyo.
E. (9) $40.03.

A. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Bonneville International Corp., 136 East South Temple Street, Salt Lake City, Utah.

A. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
E. (9) $5.50.

A. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Cabot Corp., 125 High Street Boston, Mass. 02110.
E. (9) $3.45.

A. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. College Placement Council, Inc., 65 East Elizabeth Street, Bethlehem, Pa.
E. (9) $11.90.

A. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, Montana.
E. (9) $137.18.

A. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Estate of Albert W. Small, c/o Mrs. Albert W. Small, 5803 Green Tree Road, Bethesda, Md.

A. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Hoopa Valley Tribe, P.O. Box 817, Hoopa, Calif.
E. (9) $25.04.

A. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, 1735 New York Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. National Association of Insurance Agents, Inc., 85 John Street, New York, N.Y. 10038.
E. (9) $92.20.

A. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Quinaielt Tribe of Indians, Taholah, Wash.
E. (9) $29.28.

A. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Special Industry Council on Energy Conservation, c/o Discover America Travel Organization, 1100 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
E. (9) $21.50.

A. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, 1735 New York Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. The Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, New Town, N. Dak.
E. (9) $15.56.

A. Williams, Connolly & Califano, 839 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas Highway Department.

A. Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, 1666 K Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20006.
B. Marianas Political Status Commission, P.O. Box 977, Saipan, Mariana Islands 96950.
D. (6) $250. E. (9) $20.

A. John A. Wilson, 1145 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Sharecroppers Fund, 1145 19th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $5,515.63. E. (9) $9,014.59.

A. Kenneth D. Wollack, 1341 G Street NW., Suite 908, Washington, D.C. 20005.
B. American Israel Public Affairs Committee, 1341 G Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.
D. (6) $3,000.

A. Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 1213 Race Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 19107.
D. (6) $41,812.37. E. (9) $9,159.59.

A. Women's Lobby Inc., 1345 G Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $8,019. E. (9) $7,191.99.

A. Burton C. Wood, 1625 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. National Association of Home Builders of the United States, 1625 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $5,507.82. E. (9) $690.58.

A. William E. Woods, 440 National Press Building, Washington, D.C. 20004.
B. National Association of Retail Druggists, One East Wacker Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60601.
D. (6) $750. E. (9) $150.

A. Carol R. Wyrick, 5607 Greentree Road, Bethesda, Md. 20034.
B. Women's Lobby Inc., 1345 G Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $1. E. (9) $61.60.

A. Leslie A. Yates, 1215 Lawrence Street NE., Washington, D.C. 20017.
B. Washington Office On Africa, 110 Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C. 20002.
D. (6) $1,844.

A. Jack Yelverton, 1303 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. Fleet Reserve Association, 1303 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A. Marlene Zendell, 12522 Windover Turn, Bowie, Md. 20715.
B. Women's Lobby Inc., 1345 G Street SE., Washington, D.C. 20003.
D. (6) $1. E. (9) $23.40.

A. Ziontz, Pirtle, Morisset & Ernstoff, 3101 Seattle First National Bank Building, Seattle, Wash. 98154.
B. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, P.O. Box 150, Nespelem, Wash. 99155.
D. (6) $374.50. E. (9) $90.34.

A. Ziontz, Pirtle, Morisset & Ernstoff, 3101 Seattle First National Bank Building, Seattle, Wash. 98154.
B. Lummi Tribe of Indians, P.O. Box 309, Marietta, Wash. 98268.
D. (6) $272. E. (9) $73.92.

A. Ziontz, Pirtle, Morisset & Ernstoff, 3101 Seattle First National Bank Building, Seattle, Wash. 98154.
B. Makah Indian Tribe, P.O. Box 115, Neah Bay, Wash. 98357.
D. (6) $260. E. (9) $73.93.

A. Ziontz, Pirtle, Morisset & Ernstoff, 3101 Seattle First National Bank Building, Seattle, Wash. 98154.
B. Northern Cheyenne Tribe, Inc., P.O. Box 128, Lame Deer, Mont. 59043.
D. (6) $103.50.

A. Ziontz, Pirtle, Morisset & Ernstoff, 3101 Seattle First National Bank Building, Seattle, Wash. 98154.
B. Suquamish Indian Tribe, P.O. Box 556, Suquamish, Wash. 98392.
D. (6) $40.

A. Charles O. Zuver, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
B. The American Bankers Association, 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036.
D. (6) $3,000. E. (9) $101.95.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Mr. BAFALIS (at the request of Mr. RHODES), for today, on account of official business.

Mr. CLAY (at the request of Mr. O'NEILL) for this week, on account of death in family.

Mr. CORMAN, for today, on account of official business.

Mr. FOUNTAIN (at the request of Mr. O'NEILL) until 2 p.m. today, on account of official business.

Mr. HELSTOSKI (at the request of Mr. RHODES), for today, on account of official business.

Mr. MANN (at the request of Mr. ROSENTHAL), for today, on account of official business.

Mr. PEYSER (at the request of Mr. O'NEILL) for today, on account of official business.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and and special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. HINSHAW) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous matter:)

Mr. RONCALLO of New York, for 1 hour, on May 21, 1974.

Mr. KEMP, for 15 minutes, today.
Mr. COLLINS of Texas, for 10 minutes, today.
Mr. HOGAN, for 15 minutes, today.
Mr. GROVER, for 15 minutes, today.
Mr. HORTON, for 60 minutes, on May 22, 1974.
(The following Members (at the request of Miss JORDAN) and to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous matter:)
Mr. OWENS, for 15 minutes, today.
Mr. REUSS, for 30 minutes, today.
Mr. ASPIN, for 10 minutes, today.
Mr. VANIK, for 5 minutes, today.
Mr. GONZALEZ, for 5 minutes, today.
Mr. KASTENMEIER, for 5 minutes, today.
Mr. WAGGONNER, for 5 minutes, today.
Mr. METCALFE, for 10 minutes, today.
Mrs. SCHROEDER, for 10 minutes, today.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

Mr. MADDEN and to include extraneous matter.
Mr. BURLESON of Texas and to include extraneous matter.
Mr. OBEY and to include extraneous matter notwithstanding the fact that it exceeds two pages of the RECORD and is estimated by the Public Printer to cost $552.50.
Mr. SEIBERLING and to include extraneous matter notwithstanding the fact that it exceeds two pages of the RECORD and is estimated by the Public Printer to cost $1,619.75.
Mr. LEGGETT to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter and tables used in general debate today at that point in the RECORD.
Mr. BROWN of Ohio, and to include extraneous material during general debate in the Committee of the Whole today.
(The following Members (at the request of Mr. HINSHAW) and to include extraneous material:)
Mr. ROBISON of New York.
Mr. HANRAHAN in two instances.
Mr. SARASIN.
Mr. DENNIS in 10 instances.
Mr. FINDLEY in two instances.
Mr. MARTIN of Nebraska.
Mr. ARCHER.
Mr. BELL.
Mr. DERWINSKI in two instances.
Mr. LENT in three instances.
Mr. KEMP in four instances.
Mr. BROWN of Ohio in two instances.
Mr. YOUNG of Florida in five instances.
Mr. MINSHALL of Ohio.
Mrs. HECKLER of Massachusetts.
Mr. ZWACH.
Mr. ESCH.
Mr. ROUSSELOT.
Mr. GROVER.
(The following Members (at the request of Miss JORDAN) and to include extraneous matter:)
Mr. ANNUNZIO in six instances.
Mr. GONZALEZ in three instances.
Mr. RARICK in three instances.
Mr. JONES of Oklahoma.
Mrs. GREEN of Oregon in 10 instances.
Mrs. BOGGS in two instances.
Mr. MCKAY.
Mr. VANIK in three instances.
Mr. VANDER VEEN.
Mr. MONTGOMERY.
Mr. HUNGATE in two instances.
Mr. HAWKINS.
Mr. STOKES.
Mr. TIERNAN.
Mr. MEZVINSKY.
Mr. WON PAT.
Mr. BROOKS.
Mr. PODELL.
Mr. ADAMS.
Mr. BENNETT.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION REFERRED

A joint resolution of the Senate of the following title was taken from the Speaker's table and, under the rule, referred as follows:

S.J. Res. 202. Joint resolution designating the premises occupied by the Chief of Naval Operations as the official residence of the Vice President, effective upon the termination of service of the incumbent Chief of Naval Operations; to the Committee on Armed Services.

SENATE ENROLLED BILL SIGNED

The SPEAKER announced his signature to an enrolled bill of the Senate of the following title:

S. 775. An act to amend the Public Health Service Act to provide for the establishment of a National Institute on Aging.

ADJOURNMENT

Miss JORDAN. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 3 o'clock and 55 minutes p.m.), under its previous order, the House adjourned until tomorrow, Tuesday, May 21, 1974, at 11 o'clock a.m.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

[Pursuant to the order of the House on May 16, 1974, the following reports were filed on May 17, 1974]

Mr. PERKINS: Committee on Education and Labor. H.R. 14225. A bill to amend and extend the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 for 1 additional year; with amendment (Rept. No. 93–1048). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. POAGE: Committee on Agriculture. H.R. 14747. A bill to amend the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended (Rept. No. 93–1049). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

[Pursuant to the order of the House on May 16, 1974, the following report was filed on May 18, 1974]

Mr. ULLMAN: Committee on Ways and Means. H.R. 14832. A bill to provide for a temporary increase in the public debt limit (Rept. No. 93–1050). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

2327. A letter from the Under Secretary of Agriculture, transmitting the annual report for calendar year 1973 on the administration of the Animal Welfare Act of 1970, pursuant to section 25 of the act [7 U.S.C. 2155]; to Committee on Agriculture.

2328. A letter from the Director of Selective Service, transmitting the semiannual report of the Selective Service System, covering the period ended December 31, 1973, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. App. 460(g); to the Committee on Armed Service.

2329. A letter from the Assistant Administrator for Legislative Affairs, Agency for International Development, Department of State, transmitting a quarterly report for the period ended March 31, 1974, on the programing and obligation of contingency funds, pursuant to section 451(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended [22 U.S.C. 2261(b)]; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

2330. A letter from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior, transmitting a copy of a proposed amendment to a concession contract authorizing the continued operation of a motion picture, lecture, and photographic studio for the public on the South Rim of Grand Canyon National Park, Ariz., for a term ending December 31, 1974, pursuant; to 16 U.S.C. 17b–1; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

2331. A letter from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior, transmitting a copy of a proposed contract with Batelle Memorial Institute, Columbus Laboratories, Long Beach, Calif., for a research project entitled "Development of Guidelines for Hoist Inspection and Safety in Underground Mines," pursuant to section 1(d) of Public Law 89–672 [42 U.S.C. 1900(d)]; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

2332. A letter from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior, transmitting a copy of a proposed contract with Bolt, Beranek, and Newman, Inc., Cambridge, Mass., for a research project entitled "Study of Noise Control of Underground Diesel-Powered Mining Equipment," pursuant to section 1(d) of Public Law 89–672 [42 U.S.C. 1900(d)]; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

2333. A letter from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior, transmitting a copy of a proposed contract with Factory Mutual Research Corp., Norwood, Mass., for a research project entitled "Improved Fire Protection for Stationary Underground Equipment," pursuant to section 1(d) of Public Law 89–672 [42 U.S.C. 1900(d)]; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

2334. A letter from the Chairman, Indian Claims Commission, transmitting the final determination of the Commission in docket No. 124–H, Ira Sylvester Godfroy, William Allola Godfroy, John A. Owens, on relation of the Miami Indian Tribe and Miami Tribe of Indiana and each on behalf of others similarly situated and on behalf of the Miami Indian Tribe and various bands and groups of them comprising the *Miami Tribe and Nation*, plaintiffs, v. *the United States of America*, defendant, pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 70t; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

2335. A letter from the Secretary of Transportation, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968, as amended, to authorize additional appropriations, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

2336. A letter from the Acting Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, transmitting re-

ports concerning visa petitions approved according certain beneficiaries third and sixth preference classification, pursuant to section 204(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended [8 U.S.C. 1154(d)]; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

RECEIVED FROM THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL

2337. A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting a report on the emphasis needed on the Government's efforts to standardize data elements and codes for computer systems; to the Committee on Government Operations.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. THOMPSON of New Jersey: Committee on Education and Labor. H.R. 13678. A bill to amend the National Labor Relations Act to extend its coverage and protection to employees of nonprofit hospitals, and for other purposes; with amendment (Rept. No. 93–1051). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. HOLIFIELD: Committee on Government Operations. Report on expenditures of Federal funds in support of Presidential properties (Rept No. 93–1052).

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. BLATNIK (for himself, Mr. JONES of Alabama, Mr. HARSHA, Mr. KLUCZYNSKI, Mr. GROVER, Mr. WRIGHT, Mr. CLEVELAND, Mr. GRAY, Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN, Mr. CLARK, Mr. ZION, Mr. JOHNSON of California, Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT, Mr. DORN, Mr. MIZELL, Mr. HENDERSON, Mr. BAKER, Mr. SHUSTER, Mr. HOWARD, Mr. WALSH, Mr. ANDERSON of California, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. ROE, and Mr. ABDNOR):

H.R. 14883. A bill to amend the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965 to extend the authorizations for a 2-year period, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. BLATNIK (for himself, Mr. RONCALIO of Wyoming, Mr. HANRAHAN, Mr. MCCORMACK, Mr. TAYLOR of Missouri, Mr. JAMES V. STANTON, Ms. ABZUG, Mr. BREAUX, Mr. STUDDS, Mrs. BURKE of California, Mr. GINN, and Mr. VANDER VEEN):

H.R. 14884. A bill to amend the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965 to extend the authorizations for a 2-year period, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. BRINKLEY:

H.R. 14885. A bill to amend title 23 of the United States Code to permit States whose highway trust fund apportionments have been withheld through impoundment to construct certain highways in advance of receipt of the impounded funds; to the Committee on Public Works.

H.R. 14886. A bill to amend title 23 of the United States Code to further reinforce the original and continuing intent of Congress that no highway trust fund moneys be impounded; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. BROOKS (for himself and Mr. YOUNG of Texas):

H.R. 14887. A bill to authorize the operation of foreign-built dredges in the United States; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. CAREY of New York:

H.R. 14888. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to allow a tax credit for part of the increase in residential heating and electricity expenses attributable to price increases; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. HASTINGS (for himself, Mr. ROBINSON of Virginia, Mr. SHOUP, and Mr. GROSS):

H.R. 14889. A bill to amend the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. HICKS (for himself, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. DICKINSON, Mr. NICHOLS, Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California, and Mrs. HOLT):

H.R. 14890. A bill to amend title 10 of the United States Code in order to eliminate or reduce certain deductible payments by patients for treatment under the uniformed services health benefits program; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. HOGAN:

H.R. 14891. A bill to amend title 38 of the United States Code to provide for cost-of-living increases in compensation, dependency, and indemnity compensation, and pension payments; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. HOSMER (for himself, Mr. STEIGER of Arizona and Mr. YOUNG of Alaska):

H.R. 14892. A bill to establish a national program for research and development in energy sources; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. HOWARD:

H.R. 14893. A bill to establish a congressional award program for the purpose of recognizing excellence and leadership among young people; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. KARTH:

H.R. 14894. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide that the gross income of an employee shall not include amounts directly or indirectly received as payment or reimbursement for legal services under group legal service plans, the value of legal services rendered under such plans, or contributions by employers to such plans; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. KEMP:

H.R. 14895. A bill to amend the Truth in Lending Act to protect consumers against inaccurate and unfair billing practices, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. LEHMAN:

H.R. 14896. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide for the administrative and judicial review of claims (involving the amount of benefits payable) which arise under the supplementary medical insurance program; to the Committee on Way and Means.

By Mr. MEEDS (for himself, Mr. DOMINICK V. DANIELS, Mr. PERKINS, Mr. ESCH, Mr. QUIE, Mr. THOMPSON of New Jersey, Mr. DENT, Mr. BRADEMAS, Mr. HAWKINS, Mr. FORD, Mrs. MINK, Mr. BURTON, Mr. GAYDOS, Mr. CLAY, Mrs. CHISHOLM, Mr. BIAGGI, Mrs. GRASSO, Mr. BADILLO, Mr. LEHMAN, Mr. BELL, Mr. DELLENBACK, Mr. ESHELMAN, Mr. HANSEN of Idaho, Mr. FORSYTHE, and Mr. KEMP):

H.R. 14897. A bill to amend the Youth Conservation Corps Act of 1972 (Public Law 92–597, 86 Stat. 1319) to expand and make permanent the Youth Conservation Corps and for other purposes; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. MEEDS (for himself, Mr. PEYSER, Mr. TOWELL of Nevada, Mr. SARASIN, Mr. ASPIN, Mr. BROWN of California, Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts, Mr. BYRON, Mr. CARNEY of Ohio, Mr. CORMAN, Mr. DANIELSON, Mr. DE LUGO, and Mr. DULSKI):

H.R. 14898. A bill to amend the Youth Conservation Corps Act of 1972 (Public Law 92–597, 86 Stat. 1319) to expand and make permanent the Youth Conservation Corps and for other purposes; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. METCALFE (for himself and Ms. HOLTZMAN):

H.R. 14899. A bill to establish in the Department of Housing and Urban Development a direct low-interest loan program to assist low- and middle-income homeowners in the maintenance and improvement of their homes, and to provide for an annual General Accounting Office audit of the housing programs of such Department to promote their more efficient administration; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. METCALFE (for himself, Mr. STARK, Mr. DE LUGO, Mr. MADDEN, Mr. MURPHY of Illinois, Mr. MAZZOLI, Mr. EDWARDS of California, Mr. CORMAN, Mr. WON PAT, Mr. BADILLO, Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois, Mr. ROYBAL, Mr. HAWKINS, Mr. HECHLER of West Virginia, Mr. MITCHELL of Maryland, Mr. DIGGS, Mr. DELLUMS, Ms. JORDAN, Mrs. CHISHOLM, Mrs. BURKE of California, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. STOKES, Mr. HARRINGTON, Mr. YOUNG of Georgia, and Mr. BROWN of California):

H.R. 14900. A bill to establish in the Department of Housing and Urban Development a direct low-interest loan program to assist low- and middle-income homeowners in the maintenance and improvement of their homes, and to provide for an annual General Accounting Office audit of the housing programs of such Department to promote their more efficient administration; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. PRICE of Illinois (by request):

H.R. 14901. A bill to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Atomic Weapons Rewards Act of 1955, and for other purposes; to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

By Mr. REGULA:

H.R. 14902. A bill to amend the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 to authorize the payment of subsidies to public and private urban mass transportation systems to enable them to provide services to the elderly at reduced rates; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. ST GERMAIN:

H.R. 14903. A bill to increase the availability of urgently needed mortgage credit for the financing of housing, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. SEIBERLING:

H.R. 14904. A bill to amend the National Science Foundation Act of 1950 in order to establish a framework of national science policy and to focus the Nation's scientific talent and resources on its priority problems, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Science and Astronautics.

By Mr. ULLMAN (for himself, Mr. YATRON, Mr. BADILLO, Mrs. BOGGS, Mr. BROWN of Michigan, Mr. ROBERT W. DANIEL, JR., Mr. DAVIS of Georgia, Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN, Mr. FRENZEL, Mr. FULTON, Mr. GOLDWATER, Mrs. GRASSO, Mr. HAMILTON, Mr. HARRINGTON, and Mr. ICHORD):

H.R. 14905. A bill to amend the provisions of the Social Security Act to consolidate the reporting of wages by employers for income

tax withholding and old-age, survivors, and disability insurance purposes, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. ULLMAN (for himself, Mr. YATRON, Mr. LONG of Maryland, Mr. MCCOLLISTER, Mr. MCEWEN, Mr. MONTGOMERY, Mr. MOSHER, Mr. O'BRIEN, Mr. OWENS, Mr. PRICE of Texas, Mr. RINALDO, Mr. SARASIN, Mr. CHARLES WILSON of Texas, Mr. WYDLER, Mr. WYMAN, and Mr. CASEY of Texas):

H.R. 14906. A bill to amend the provisions of the Social Security Act to consolidate the reporting of wages by employers for income tax withholding and old-age, survivors, and disability insurance purposes, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. PEPPER:

H.J. Res. 1021. Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating to the power of the President to make treaties; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

MEMORIALS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII,

481. The SPEAKER presented a memorial of the Legislature of the State of California, relative to the proposed closure of Fort MacArthur; to the Committee on Armed Services.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII,

437. The SPEAKER presented a petition of Richard B. and Shirley A. Jarrett, Redding, Calif., relative to the Silver King Mine, which was referred; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

EAGLE SCOUT AWARD DINNER

HON. JOSEPH M. GAYDOS

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 20, 1974

Mr. GAYDOS. Mr. Speaker, the rank of Eagle Scout in the Boy Scouts of America is not easily attained. Those who accomplish this goal are justifiably proud of their achievement for they represent the best in an organization long dedicated to molding the character of America's future leaders.

It is, therefore, with great pleasure I acquaint my colleagues with 173 young adults from southwestern Pennsylvania who have attained the Eagle Scout rank during the past year. These young Americans belong to the East Valley Area Scout Council. Led by Mr. Howard N. Hubbard, president, the council represents more than 40 communities and 12,000 scouts.

The new Eagle Scouts, and their sponsors at a recent recognition dinner, are as follows:

EAGLE SCOUTS AND SPONSORS

David Amore (Robert Amore of Amore Construction Co.); Ted Baldwin (John Seelke of Westinghouse Electric Corp.); Jeffrey Balogh (Frank Dlugonski of Westinghouse Electric Corp.); Scott Barbour (Charles Turner of Turner Dairies); Timothy Bertoty (Victor A. Bertoty of Mellon Bank & Trust Co.); Thomas Blandford (Robert Ashworth of U.S. Steel Corp.); Steve Bober (Thomas L. Nied Funeral Home); Michael Borza (Anthony Joseph, U.S. Steel Corp.); Michael Castagnaro (F. W. Keeley, retired, Bell Telephone Co.).

Patrick Castagnaro (James Malandra, retired); William Cenk, Jr. (Dr. Raymond Masters of Westinghouse Electric Corp.); William Combs (Dr. Lester Rosenbloom, dentist); Andrew Comtois (Col. Donald Mueller, University of Pittsburgh); Philip Craig (Dr. Gordon H. Stillson, Gulf Oil Corp.); Thomas Costelnick (George Bogler, Port Authority Transit); Mark Crooks (Fred Kingsbury, Westinghouse Electric Corp.); Eugene Csider (James Zafris, U.S. Steel Corp.); Mark Cubakovic (Sylvester Miller); Timothy Dawes (Rev. John F. Doherty); John DeBaldo (S/Sgt. Terry Curtin, U.S. Army).

Joseph DePaolo (Eugene Costel, Steel Valley Schools); Patrick Dolan (Thomas Feldman, WEDO Radio); William H. Donnelly (Ralph Whitney, Farmers Pride Inc.); James Dorney Jr. (Thomas Capp, Steel Valley Schools); Robert Dunkle (John Ziegler, River School District); James Dvorsky (Joseph Balawajder, electrical draftsman); Thomas Dzurko (Merwin Weed, Penn State University); George Eckert (Lee Verca, Penn State University); Stephen Eckert (Russell C. Eadie, retired, U.S. Steel Corp.).

Harry Fails (Larry Janci, U.S. Steel Corp.); Robert Fescemeyer (Michael Fedor, U.S. Steel Corp.); Thomas H. Fetsick (Dale Liken, Liken Employment Service); William Ford (Dr. Paul N. Cooper, McKeesport Hospital); Christopher Fuhs (Dr. Viken Sassouni, dentist); Robert Furlong (Dr. Philip P. Ripepi, general surgeon); William Fustos (Robert Frazier, U.S. Steel Corp.); Ronald Gala (Walter F. Baczkowski, attorney); David Gartner (Richard Helmstadter, Halmstadter's Department Store); Kenneth Germ, Richard Obermyer (Penn State University); Daniel Gibas (Theodore R. Barker, laboratory technician).

Steven Glaze (Luke Haney, U.S. Steel Corp.); John Greenwade (Robert Johnson); David Gretz (James M. Fisher, Pittsburgh Institute of Aeronautics); John Hall (Merle D. Chilcott, U.S. Steel Corp.); Robert Harney (Robert C. Harney, Westinghouse Electric Corp.); John Hartley (Virgil Yoder, Magee Women's Hospital); Scott Heckman (Bernard England, U.S. Steel Corp.); David Hoffman (Dr. T. J. Ferguson, physician); Jack N. Huckestein (J. H. Brandon, Airways Cleaning & Fireproofing); Howard Irwin (Edward Romig, retired, Pittsburgh National Bank).

Paul N. Jacobs (Willam Seller, Allegheny County Agriculture Agent); Stephen James, (Police Chief George Brkovich, Elizabeth Twp.); Jeff Janci (Samuel R. Porter, Westinghouse Electric Corp.); John E. Johnston (Robert Johnson, Johnson's Dairy); Jeffrey W. Jobes (Dr. Herbert McGibbeny); Grego Jordan (Dr. Douglas Peacock, Westinghouse Electric Corp.); Roy Joseph (Lee Lacey, physical therapist); Jonathan Judkins (Thomas Jackson, Butler Golf Course); Pat Kerner (Theodore McConnel, architect).

Tommy Kinch (Clifford Skelton, mortician); Thomas Kingsbury (Joseph Sabol Jr.); William Kiser (Dr. Oliver Steen, McKeesport Hospital); Mark Kraitchman (Dr. Hendry); Douglas Kushner (Philip DeIvenois, Westinghouse Airbrake Co.); Bernard Labuskes Jr. (Geoorge Keubler, U.S. Steel Corp.); Jeffrey M. Lazer (Dr. Jay Yarnell, Gateway Schools); Joseph Lia (Joseph Smith); Robert Lieberium (Harry B. Hunter, Westinghouse Electric Corp.); Robert Linzer (Gene Graziano, Westinghouse Electric Corp.); Jeff Logan (Robert Logan); Troy Lucas (Steve Menzell, U.S. Steel Corp.).

Richard Mader (Allen McElhinny, computer engineer); Edward Matwij (Michael Hrjick, Devereaux Chevrolet); James J. Mayer (Sgt. Rick Williams, U.S. Air Force); Jeff J. Mayer (Bill Allen, U.S. Steel Corp.); Kevin McGreevy (John P. McCune, Potter-McCune Co.); Gregg McMillan (Fred Calderellis, retired builder); Mark Milchak (Donald Milchak, Westinghouse Electric Corp.); Robert Monyok (Monsignor Joseph Altany); Daniel Nelson (David Nelson, Bacharach Inst. Co.); Glenn W. Nelson (William Wepfer, Westinghouse Electric Corp.); Donald J. Nist (Donald Walukas, Westinghouse Electric Corp.); Thomas Novack (Donald G. Sweeney, East Valley Area Scout Council).

Paul Oakes (James Weldon, pharmacist); David O'Gurkis (Dr. Clifford Bryce, McKeesport Hospital); Joseph O'Gurkis (Mrs. Irene Rudd, McKeesport Hospital); Thomas Palchak (Joseph Lewis, U.S. Steel Corp.); Mark Palmer (Robert Disney, retired, Bell Telephone Co.); James Peppler (Jeff Madden, G. C. Murphy Co.); Brad Peterson (Thomas Womer, PPG Industries); Kevin W. Pingor (Kenneth Gleason, General Motors Corp.); Daniel Pinneri (Bob Roschenthaler, U.S. Steel Corp.); Joseph Pinneri (Steve De'Augustino (West Mifflin Area Schools); David Pocastko (Edward J. Kreh, Westinghouse Electric Corp.).

Chet Polesko (Max E. Bills, U.S. Steel Corp.); David Posipanka (Michael Hrizo, Allegheny County Parks Dept.); Thomas Poston (Lorie Poston, Port Authority Transit); Gene Richardson (William Hacker, retired, McKeesport Hospital); Thomas Riley (Charles Kabel, U.S. Navy); Robert Ritenour (Sgt. Nevin Kasparak, U.S. Army); David Ritter (David Ritter, Ritter Funeral Home).

Gary Robas (Lawrence Guidish, U.S. Steel Corp.); Richard C. Rouleau (William D. Rogers, Continential Sales & Engineers); John R. Rudd (Dr. Elmer W. Erickson, McKeesport Hospital); Mark Rylatt (Ron Porter, U.S. Navy); Mark Sambuco (Richard A. Mauro, Gateway Schools); Jack Sanford (R. M. Colteryahn Jr., Edgewood Schools); Michael Schmitt (Dr. Stephen Kondis, dentist); Leon Schlabech (James Richards, tax collector); George Seese (Howard Hubbard, retired, U.S. Steel Corp.); Keith Senkou (Ray Schuler); Stephen Siviy (Dr. Joseph J. Glorioso, surgeon).

Brad Smith (Cmdr. William J. Doyle, U.S. Navy Reserve); Matthew Smith, (Donald Cole, U.S. Steel Corp.); David Smudski (Dr. James Smudski, University of Pittsburgh); David Stein (William Hall, Westinghouse Electric Corp.); Deryl Steinert (W. T. Doorley, John F. Scott Co.); Richard A. Stevens (Dr. Raymond C. Forbes, McKeesport Hospital); Joseph Stock Jr. (Milan Spanovich, Engineering Mechanics Inc.); Lee Wagner (David Montgomery, U.S. Steel Corp.); Ronald Weisser (Robert Furlong); Jay Whitney (J. S. Kirby, Westinghouse Electric Corp.).

David Wingert (Charles Thomas, U.S. Steel Corp.); Kurt Wilkinson (Mayor Jack Patterson, White Oak Borough); Mark Worrell