

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. PERKINS: Committee of conference. Conference report on S. 795 (Rept. No. 93-529). Ordered to be printed.

Mr. HOLFIELD: Committee on Government Operations. Report on stream channelization: what federally financed draglines and bulldozers do to our Nation's streams (Rept. No. 93-530). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. DINGELL (for himself, Mr. MOAKLEY, and Mr. SEIBERLING):

H.R. 10580. A bill to regulate commerce by assuring adequate supplies of energy resource products will be available at the lowest possible cost to the consumer, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. WIDNALL:

H.R. 10581. A bill to assist States and local governments to improve their capabilities for responsive and effective governmental action; to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mr. BROYHILL of Virginia:

H.R. 10582. A bill to bring certain employees of the Department of Defense within the purview of the competitive civil service, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

H.R. 10583. A bill to amend title 5, United States Code, to include as creditable service for the purposes of the civil service retirement system certain periods of service of civilian employees of nonappropriated fund positions in special services recreation and morale programs of the Armed Forces; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. DE LUGO (for himself, Mr. WON PAT, Mrs. BURKE of California, Mr. BURTON, Mrs. CHISHOLM, Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois, Mr. CONVERS, Mr. CRONIN, Mr. DELLUMS, Mr. DIGGS, Mr. HAWKINS, Miss JORDAN, Mr. JOHN-

SON of California, Mr. JONES of Oklahoma, Mr. KETCHUM, Mr. MATSUNAGA, Mr. MEEDS, Mr. MELCHER, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. RONCALIO of Wyoming, Mr. SAYLOR, Mr. SEIBERLING, Mr. SKUBITZ, Mr. STEPHENS, and Mr. STOKES):

H.R. 10584. A bill to amend the public assistance provisions of the Social Security Act to provide that benefits thereunder (including supplemental security income benefits) shall be made available and financed in the case of Guam and the Virgin Islands on the same basis as in the case of other States; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. DE LUGO (for himself, Mr. VIGORRO, and Mr. FAUNTRY):

H.R. 10585. A bill to amend the public assistance provisions of the Social Security Act to provide that benefits thereunder (including supplemental security income benefits) shall be made available and financed in the case of Guam and the Virgin Islands on the same basis as in the case of other States; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. FISHER (for himself, Mr. NEDZI, Mr. RANDALL, Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California, Mr. LEGGETT, Mr. GUESER, and Mr. VAN DEERLIN):

H.R. 10586. A bill to amend title 10, United States Code, to authorize the use of health maintenance organizations in providing health care; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. HUTCHINSON:

H.R. 10587. A bill to amend the Export Trade Act, as amended, to provide for clarification of law, for prior Federal Trade Commission clearance of export trade associations, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MATSUNAGA (for himself, Ms. ABZUG, Mr. ANDERSON of California, Mr. BADILLO, Mr. BLATNIK, Mr. BRASCO, Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts, Mrs. CHISHOLM, Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois, Mr. CORMAN, Mr. DELLUMS, Mr. DRINAN, Mr. EDWARDS of California, Mr. EILBERG, Mr. FINDLEY, and Mrs. GRASSO):

H.R. 10588. A bill to promote the peaceful resolution of international conflict, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mr. MATSUNAGA (for himself, Mr. HARRINGTON, Mr. HAWKINS, Mr. HELSTOSKI, Mr. LEGGETT, Mr. LONG of

Maryland, Mr. METCALFE, Mr. MOLLOHAN, Mr. MOSS, Mr. NIX, Mr. PEPPER, Mr. REES, Mr. REUSS, Mr. RODINO, Mr. ROE, Mr. ROSENTHAL, Mr. ROYBAL, Mr. SEIBERLING, Mr. WALDIE, Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California, and Mr. WON PAT):

H.R. 10589. A bill to promote the peaceful resolution of international conflict, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mr. MILLER:

H.R. 10590. A bill to provide effective relief from disruptive imports of nonrubber footwear in a manner that will be fair to producers, workers, and consumers; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. MURPHY of New York (for himself, Mr. CLARK, Mr. STUBBLEFIELD, Mr. JONES of North Carolina, Mr. LEGGETT, Mr. BIAGGI, Mr. BOWEN, Mr. SNYDER, and Mr. YOUNG of South Carolina):

H.R. 10591. A bill to amend the act of June 13, 1933 (Public Law 73-40), concerning safety standards for boilers and pressure vessels, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. PEYSER (for himself and Mr. YATRON):

H.R. 10592. A bill to amend the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to provide a program of grants to States for the development of child abuse and neglect prevention programs in the areas of treatment, training, case reporting, public education, and information gathering and referral; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI (for himself, Mr. KLUCZYNSKI, Mr. METCALFE, Mr. MURPHY of Illinois, and Mrs. COLLENS of Illinois):

H.R. 10593. A bill to amend the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45) to provide that under certain circumstances exclusive territorial arrangements shall not be deemed unlawful; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. HUTCHINSON (for himself, Mr. McCLOY, Mr. RAILSBY, Mr. WIGGINS, Mr. DENNIS, Mr. FISH, Mr. MAYNE, Mr. HOGAN, Mr. KEATING, Mr. BUTLER, Mr. COHEN, Mr. LOTT, Mr. FROELICH, and Mr. MARAZITI):

H. Res. 570. Resolution directing the Committee on the Judiciary to conduct an investigation into certain charges against Spiro T. AGNEW; to the Committee on Rules.

SENATE—Thursday, September 27, 1973

The Senate met at 9 a.m. and was called to order by the President pro tempore (Mr. EASTLAND).

PRAYER

The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward L. R. Elson, D.D., offered the following prayer:

O Lord who hast been our dwelling place in all generations, keep us ever under the canopy of Thy care. We ask not to be separated from the stresses and strains of life, nor kept from problems and pain, but to be kept by Thy grace amid all sunshine and shadow. Shelter us in our coming in, in our going out, and in our daily work that we may be used to advance Thy kingdom.

In Thy holy name, we pray. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of

Wednesday, September 26, 1973, be dispensed with.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all committees may be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RELEASE OF RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF CERTAIN PROPERTY CONVEYED TO CITY OF ALGONA, IOWA, FOR AIRPORT PURPOSES

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 384, S. 1116.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there

objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the bill (S. 1116) to authorize the Secretary of Transportation to release restrictions on the use of certain property conveyed to the city of Algona, Iowa, for airport purposes was considered, ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed, as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, notwithstanding section 16 of the Federal Airport Act (as in effect on March 20, 1947), the Secretary of Transportation is authorized, subject to the provisions of section 4 of the Act of October 1, 1949 (50 App. U.S.C. 1622c), to grant releases from any of the terms, conditions, reservations, and restrictions contained in the deed of conveyance dated March 20, 1947, under which the United States conveyed certain property to the city of Algona, Iowa, for airport purposes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask

unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from the report (No. 93-408), explaining the purposes of the measure.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SUMMARY AND PURPOSE

S. 1116 would remove the restrictive conditions imposed by section 16 of the Federal Airport Act of 1946 as they appear in the Quitclaim Deed dated March 20, 1947, pursuant to which the War Assets Administration (WAA) transferred to the City of Algona approximately 221.3 acres to be used as a public airport. Such a release would allow part of the airport property to be used for industrial or non-airport purposes.

BACKGROUND AND NEED

At the time of the above-mentioned conveyance, the WAA was unable to convey non-airport surplus property (such as the prisoner of war camp conveyed by the Algona Deed) for airport purposes without a reverter clause because of the conveyance authority contained in section 16 of the Federal Airport Act. Section 16 of the Federal Airport Act states, in part, "each such conveyance shall be on the condition that the property interest conveyed shall automatically be reverted to the United States in the event that the lands in question are not developed, or cease to be used, for airport purposes."

Section 52(a) of the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-258), repealed the Federal Airport Act as of the close of June 30, 1970. However section 52(c) contained a saving provision concerning such conveyances under the Federal Airport Act, giving rise to the need for S. 1116.

The purpose of this bill is to authorize the Secretary of Transportation to grant a release from this reversionary clause so that the city of Algona may use a portion of the property for industrial development. The bill contains a safeguard against abuse in that the Secretary's authority is made subject to the provisions of Section 4 of the Act of October 1, 1949 (50 App. U.S.C. 1622c).

This section in effect requires that before property is released for non-airport purposes it must be determined that the property is no longer necessary to accomplish the purpose for which it was originally transferred and is not necessary to protect or advance U.S. civil aviation. It further provides that the Secretary may impose such conditions on the conveyance as he deems necessary so as to insure that any proceeds arising from non-airport use of the property will be used for the development and maintenance of the airport.

Similar legislation was approved by the Congress in connection with airport property in Clarinda, Iowa, in 1966 (Public Law 89-649), approved October 13, 1966.

The Department of Transportation has recommended passage of this legislation saying:

"It is the Department's position that such a release to permit use of a part of the airport for industrial or non-airport purposes is not inconsistent with the needs of the Department of Transportation and would, in fact, benefit the airport's overall operation."

The Committee believes passage of this legislation is in the public interest as it will enable a small rural community to promote a new economic development and job opportunities with land that is not needed for civil aviation purposes.

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

This bill does not change existing law.

ESTIMATED COSTS

Enactment of S. 1116 will not result in any costs to the United States.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Does the acting minority leader desire recognition?

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. President, the acting minority leader would like to reserve his time temporarily.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senator from Delaware (Mr. Roth) is recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

BUDGET REFORM

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I speak this morning to urge Senators to put the force of their interest and participation behind the budget reform legislation now in the Government Operations Committee.

Congress is still foundering without the aid of these key reforms. We continue to take a piecemeal approach to spending the public's money, and have generally abdicated our responsibility to set the Nation's overall priorities. Members from both Houses and on both sides of the aisle have decried the fact that Congress has created a vacuum for itself by failing to adopt these modern management tools. Without them we are often at the mercy of the Executive to decide how authorized funds shall be spent.

We have a good head of steam up on this issue. Congress is aware of its shortcomings. The public has asked for reform. The administration has encouraged a new congressional approach.

As the author of several spending reforms in the past, I have persistently called on Congress to bring this issue to the floor. The time, I urge, is now.

We cannot wait any longer. If this critical legislation is postponed until next year, we will have perpetuated our own inefficiencies for yet another budget cycle. Congress will be in the middle of an election push—a time, as we all know, when deliberations often become embroiled in purely partisan viewpoints.

Mr. President, this is not a partisan issue. Budget reform affects every Member and every American. Programs that deserve funding will be assured their place in congressionally set priorities. Those that do not have the majority's support will no longer eat up our valuable tax dollars.

But we cannot hope to make these choices without the assistance of a well-disciplined mechanism for budget consideration. I say Congress should determine the Nation's goals—but Congress must first equip itself with the means for expressing those intentions.

This is "must" legislation, and we should all get behind it to guarantee passage in this session. Our counterparts in the House should likewise strive to bring this effort to fruition before we return home for Christmas.

Let me recount a debate on this floor almost a year ago. At that time, the question of the statutory debt ceiling was before us and I, like many, felt that the

legislation had to have a stronger, more permanent set of teeth.

Consequently, I lead the fight for a spending ceiling to apply to fiscal year 1973, in the hopes that such a measure would focus congressional attention on the desperate plight of our domestic economy and the damage done to it by persistent Federal deficits.

The record at that time was appalling—in the preceding 4 years, Congress had authorized and the Executive had spent some \$100 billion more than the Federal tax system had provided for the Treasury. The result of this profligate behavior persists today as an inflation which has eroded the purchasing power of our dollar 14 percent since 1970. Long treasured savings have been eaten up, and we have twice reduced the trading value of our currency in order to stay afloat in the international markets.

Faced with these serious and embarrassing results, the Congress last fall debated the most appropriate medicine for our ailing dollar. Though both bodies agreed that Federal outlays should not exceed \$250 billion, we came to a stalemate with the House of Representatives over the specific means of implementing that constraint. I thought that failure was a great tragedy. Two separate conferences were unable to fashion a compromise acceptable to the majority, and in the closing hours of the session, the spending limitation was dropped from the bill.

However, supporters and opponents of the language agreed that Congress could simply not continue to spend its way into further economic chaos. It was clearly felt that a joint panel of House and Senate should devote complete attention to the issue of budget control reform, and report to the Congress with at least tentative findings by February 1973. In a sense, we agreed to accept the short-term responsibility for no immediate action, with the clear understanding that a more deliberate approach could, and should, produce sound legislative recommendations.

Mr. President, I was privileged to serve on the Joint Study Committee and to have an opportunity to present my points of view to a most distinguished panel of senior Senators and Representatives.

As the author of several previous spending limitations, I argued strongly for a mechanism which would force the Congress to make its overall spending decisions early in the year, before the appropriations process begins. To act late in the year, after many bills have already been enacted, is a bit like locking the barn door after the horses have been stolen. Further, I am convinced that unless we set firm ceilings, which cannot be easily breached, we will have perpetrated a charade. We will only be creating a paper tiger.

Rather, we should accept our constitutional responsibility seriously, and schedule a debate on spending priorities that is structured with full knowledge of our available resources. Every company, every household, every State or local

government must do this—why should not we?

The Joint Study Committee agreed with my argument and wrote a series of strong recommendations in its final report to the Congress. The bill that emerged, S. 1641, called for a new budget mechanism, with a timetable and specific legislative goals to insure that spending actions would not begin until Congress had resolved the macro budget issues.

Let me dwell for a minute on what I feel to be the significance of that proposal. The Joint Committee reviewed several volumes of historical evidence which showed that even the most conservative Congresses had exceeded their anticipated spending rates. This has been reflected in the numerous times the ceiling on the national debt has been raised, an action signaling an accelerated outflow of Treasury dollars in relation to previous plans.

It was once thought that such a ceiling, set by Congress, would act as a natural brake on future appropriations. But we have only to look at fiscal year 1973 to realize that Congress acted with aplomb in the face of a congressionally determined debt limit. While we had established a debt ceiling last fall of \$465 billion, we simultaneously approved spending bills that would have pierced that debt limitation. How can the American public place trust and confidence in an organization whose right hand completely ignores the actions of its left?

I feel that our individual and collective experiences will remind us that Congress is not easily subject to disciplined action. Each of us represents a constituency that may have very different goals and objectives than that from a neighboring State or district. We are here in Washington to fight for those interests, and we do not take naturally to external constraints. But, if we do not accept the necessity of new budget constraints, we are doing poor service to all of our constituents whose dollars suffer at our direction.

Consequently, I was delighted that our new Budgeting Subcommittee voted in favor of a "tough" bill, which would establish an overall ceiling early in the year, and divide, by major program areas, the pieces of the Federal budget. This process would become the focus for the congressional decisions over program priorities, and most important, it would be a clear expression of legislative objectives. We would not be locked in irons—a budget resolution could be changed at any time, but it would be an explicit statement of intentions, rather than the incremental method we currently use.

However, if this becomes law, it would be the first time that Members could sit down and seriously study their own budgetary goals in the context of a unified plan.

Mr. President, I want to express my great thanks to our distinguished committee chairman, Mr. ERVIN, for scheduling markup sessions on the bill beginning October 1. I know how dedicated he is to a prompt report to the Senate

on the Watergate affair, but he is the essence of an excellent legislator. I know he will devote equal energy to our budget bill, and will bring to it the same wisdom of experience and clarity of thought that he has always shown.

I would urge my colleagues on the Government Operations Committee to work toward fashioning a strong, but realistic bill—one that can be used to help Congress regain its legitimate power over the purse. I hope that committee deliberations will be concluded in time to bring this bill to the Senate floor before the end of this first session. It would be irresponsible for us to adjourn without a vote on this most critical piece of legislation. Let us not lose the important momentum that has built this into such prominence as a pressing national issue.

Our people back home have come to appreciate the significance of huge deficits. We have suffered institutional rebuffs from an administration eager to hold down spending, even if we are not. I am convinced we can regain our fiscal controls if we create for ourselves these necessary budget tools.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. WEICKER) is recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

THE TRIDENT SUBMARINE

Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, the Senate will vote shortly on an important investment in national defense. This is truly an investment, for the Trident submarine program is no budget-bloating boondoggle, but rather represents a carefully designed modernization of our essential strategic deterrent force.

Critics of the Trident funding schedule, as recommended by the Senate Armed Services Committee, generally agree that the present Polaris-Poseidon fleet will need to be upgraded and eventually replaced by a new and more effective ballistic missile launching system. The committee authorization of \$1.5 billion for fiscal year 1974 will assure that the first Trident can be deployed in 1978, when some Polaris subs will be approaching their 20th year of service.

Stretching out the Trident schedule would not only inflate the overall project cost but also threaten the viability of the deterrent power. On this score, in light of the increasing maintenance problems and decreasing cost effectiveness of the Polaris-Poseidon fleet, the Navy must move forward with long lead research and development and initial procurement now.

I will not presume to reiterate the arguments relative to Trident that have been thoroughly debated by my distinguished colleagues over the course of the last few days. It is my sincere conviction that this Nation cannot afford not to pay the basic price for the essential submarine-based missile system represented by Trident. I am one Senator who believes we must be cost effective and ef-

fective in our allocation of scarce national resources. That is why I voted for the "accelerated" Trident program last year and that is why I will do so again today.

The full funding schedule for Trident reflects a reasoned analysis of this Nation's priorities, and I urge my colleagues to uphold the committee recommendation in the upcoming vote this morning on the Senate floor.

Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, on the time of the Senator from Connecticut.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Virginia is recognized.

RHODESIA

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. President, I note from the RECORD of September 25, in a statement made by the distinguished senior Senator from Wyoming (Mr. McGEE), that it is anticipated the Senate will soon consider a repeal of legislation which Congress enacted 2 years ago permitting the importation of chrome from Rhodesia.

Of course, I shall oppose the repeal of that previous act.

But I might say that the introduction of the repeal of legislation is not an unmixed matter in my mind. I think it has some benefits in that I feel now would be a good time for a full discussion of the many ramifications of the action taken by the Security Council of the United Nations in 1966 and implemented unilaterally by President Johnson in 1967.

I point out that the legislation, which some in the Senate will seek to repeal, legislation enacted 2 years ago to permit the importation of chrome from Rhodesia, was approved by Congress with Representatives from 46 of the 50 States voting in favor of permitting the importation of chrome. Now, when an effort is made to repeal what was done with such broad support as to have the approval and the affirmative vote of Representatives from 46 of the 50 States, I think that very careful consideration must be given before any such repealer is approved.

Mr. President, there are other aspects of this matter that need to be debated.

For example, in 1976, it will be 200 years since the United States declared its independence from Great Britain. That is an historic date in our country.

Congress almost 10 years ago created a Bicentennial Commission for a celebration of the 200th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence. That is

what our country did 200 years ago. We sought our independence from Great Britain and we did it unilaterally. That is what Rhodesia is seeking to do and has been seeking to do for nearly 10 years—to achieve her independence of Great Britain.

Personally, I do not argue if she should or should not be independent of Great Britain. That is a matter to be determined by Great Britain and Rhodesia.

What I object to is our country taking sides in this matter and unilaterally, by action of the President of the United States, without consultation of Congress, putting an embargo on trade to prevent Rhodesia from obtaining her independence.

I guess I have a natural sympathy for the underdog. Here is a small nation which in no conceivable way can be considered a threat to world peace. Yet, the United Nations and the United States have declared an embargo on trade against her. Why? Because she seeks to do what the United States did 200 years ago. She seeks to obtain her independence from Great Britain.

I happen to be pro-British. I think the British are among our most trustworthy friends. We have stood side by side in many battles for over 100 years.

But I do not believe that the United States should involve itself in a purely internal matter in Rhodesia; namely, whether she shall be independent of Great Britain or whether she shall be a colony of Great Britain.

I have the same sympathy for Rhodesia as an underdog as I have for Israel. I have great sympathy for Israel, a small nation determined to maintain her independence.

Mr. President, there is another reason I am unhappy that this matter of economic sanctions against Rhodesia should be brought to the floor of the Senate. I think now is a good time for a full-scale debate on the United Nations itself. The American people would like to see the Senate debate this matter. The United Nations has changed over the years that have passed since it was first organized in 1945. At that time there were 51 member nations; now there are 135. The whole attitude has changed.

I returned from the Pacific in World War II in 1945. I came back to San Francisco at the time the United Nations was formed. So through the years I felt a rapport with that organization. I have supported it. I think it is desirable to have a world organization.

But I think that a full-scale Senate debate as to what it has accomplished, what it can accomplish, and what the cost has been to the U.S. taxpayers, and what the cost has been in other aspects of this world organization need to be debated.

It has been many years since the United Nations Participation Act was enacted by the Congress of the United States, and the world has changed since then and the world organization has changed since then. What changes, if any, should be in the original act, approved by the Congress many years ago?

So while I shall oppose the legislation

which the Senator from Wyoming says will shortly be coming to the floor to overturn what the Congress did 2 years ago, it is not an unmixed blessing. I think it will present the vehicle for a full discussion of many problems worrying the American people.

I say again, the only times that the Senate and the House of Representatives have voted in regard to economic sanctions against Rhodesia have been to take off sanctions, not to impose them. There has never been a vote in the Congress to impose sanctions. Sanctions were imposed by a President of the United States acting unilaterally.

Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator has 4 minutes remaining.

SEATO

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. President, I note that the senior Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) has introduced Senate Resolution 174, dealing with the U.S. commitment to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty Organization, commonly known as SEATO. The purport of the resolution, as I understand it, is to give consideration to repealing that agreement.

I think the resolution of the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) has much merit. The purpose of SEATO was to bring force to bear in that area by the signatories, which are France, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, and the Philippines, as well as the United States.

When the United States got into trouble in Vietnam, where were these other signatories? France did not participate. As a matter of fact, France was opposed to what the United States was doing in Vietnam.

Great Britain did not participate. As a matter of fact, she permitted ships flying her flag to take cargo to North Vietnam, at whose hands the American people suffered so many losses. Pakistan did not participate.

The Philippines participated to the extent of 1,900 noncombatant engineers, and then the United States paid the Philippine Government for that participation.

Australia and New Zealand did participate, and I think, for small countries, they participated to as great a degree as they possibly could. That is two partners to the agreement out of seven.

We have a separate treaty with Australia and New Zealand which would not be affected by the Church proposal.

I was not in the Senate in 1954 when the legislation relating to the SEATO agreement was enacted. But as a newspaper editor, I editorially opposed it. I thought it was not a desirable thing, from the standpoint of the United States, to attempt to guarantee the freedom of all Southeast Asia. I did not think we could do it.

Secretary Rusk, time after time after time, told the Senate committees and the American people that it was because of SEATO that the United States was

obligated to put ground troops into Vietnam.

I think the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) has presented a proposal that deserves full consideration, and I hope the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to which it has been sent, will give it consideration at an early time. We have commitments to 44 different nations—and that is too many.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, there will now be a period for the transaction of routine morning business, not to extend beyond the hour of 10 o'clock, with statements therein limited to 3 minutes.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE \$676 BILLION QUAGMIRE

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I have run across a very interesting article in the Progressive magazine for August 1973. The subhead is, "The Bills for the War in Indochina Will Be Coming in for the Next Century."

The main headline is "The \$676 Billion Quagmire."

I have never seen a figure that high before. However, on the basis of the Statistical Abstract of the United States, issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce for the year 1972, it is indicated that the total cost of the war in Indochina will be something in the order of \$352 billion and will continue into the middle of the next century.

Mr. President, this is an official publication of the Government of the United States and was issued by the Department of Commerce for 1972.

Mr. President, in reading this article by Mr. Tom Riddell, I note that it states:

In the course of the Indochina War, American forces exploded more than fifteen million tons of air, sea, and ground munitions throughout North and South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. They also saturated South Vietnam with more than 100 million pounds of chemical herbicides. More than 8,000 American aircraft were lost in the war (about 4,600 helicopters and about 3,600 planes).

Of the three million who served Uncle Sam in the military, 56,241 were killed in hostile

and non-hostile action. Another 303,616 were injured. The total casualties of this war give it the dubious distinction of being the third most costly war in American history, surpassed only by the Civil War and World War II. Among the injured Americans there are almost 23,000 double amputees and more than 2,500 quadriplegics and paraplegics. About 260,700 Vietnam veterans receive disability payments from the Veterans Administration. More than 1,300 Americans are classified as missing in action and, most likely, they too will be added to the list of those killed in action. The statistics are abundant and grim. America's longest war has exacted a heavy price.

All of these statistics demonstrate the magnitude of the U.S. effort in Vietnam to "secure self-determination for the South Vietnamese and to halt the spread of international Communism and the aggression of the North Vietnamese"—or whatever it is we accomplished in ten years of war and more than twenty-five years of American "interest" in Southeast Asia. However, there is one further measure of the high cost of this war that all Americans can easily understand: the vast amount of money that we have spent, and will spend, as a result of our Southeast Asian adventure. We can only estimate the total final cost, since there are future costs such as veterans' benefits, aid to Indochina, and interest payments on the national debt which have not been incurred yet, but which will have to be paid in the decades to come.

As we shall see, the future costs of wars are usually larger than the original costs of the wars themselves. For the war in Vietnam, when all of the past, present, and future costs are calculated, the ultimate expense will amount to about \$676 billion. That is more than two-and-a-half times the amount of money that the Federal Government will spend this year for all purposes, and amounts to about one-half of the current total annual output of the entire American economy.

Mr. President, if I still have enough time remaining, I would like to skip to the end of the article and would like to sum up Mr. Riddell's final conclusions. He states:

In reflecting on this massive amount of money, all Americans should ask themselves if this cost of our Southeast Asian adventure was worth it. Did it serve American interests? What interests? Did we achieve peace with honor? Although each of us has his or her own answer to those questions, ultimately history will decide.

Finally, perhaps every one of the fifty-five million American families should ask whether it was worth the more than \$12,000 each of them will ultimately pay for the war in economic terms. Was it worth one year's income to finance a civil war that raged 10,000 miles away? Is it what you would have done with \$12,000?

What else could we have done with the tax money that we have spent and will spend on the war?

The \$676 billion could have been allocated to other public purposes, towards the neglected priorities of the United States itself. For example, the \$141.3 billion spent on direct costs of the war for the past decade could have paid for 5,652,000 single-family homes at \$25,000 each.

The remaining \$27 billion in miscellaneous expenses already incurred would just about cover the costs of the abatement of air pollution in the United States during the period from 1970 to 1975 (as estimated by the Council on Environmental Quality).

The approximately \$30 billion in interest charges on war-caused increases in the national debt would pay most of the \$38 bil-

lion estimated cost of abating water pollution for the same period.

The \$40 billion in U.S. aid that will probably continue to flow to the governments of Southeast Asia for the next twenty years could be used instead to achieve adequate solid waste treatment programs here at home.

The \$282.6 billion that will go to Vietnam veterans and their dependents, probably for the next 100 years, could have been used toward the elimination of hunger in the United States for the next fifty years.

The article goes on and on. I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that the depressing article by Mr. Riddell be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE \$676 BILLION QUAGMIRE

(By Tom Riddell)

(NOTE.—Tom Riddell teaches economics at Bucknell University and is writing his doctoral dissertation on the economic effects of the Indochina war. He is co-author of the Council on Economic Priorities' publication, "Efficiency in Death: The Manufacturers of Anti-Personnel Weapons," and formerly was education director of SANE.)

In the course of the Indochina War, American forces exploded more than fifteen million tons of air, sea, and ground munitions throughout North and South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. They also saturated South Vietnam with more than 100 million pounds of chemical herbicides. More than 8,000 American aircraft were lost in the war (about 4,600 helicopters and about 3,600 planes).

Of the three million who served Uncle Sam in the military, 56,241 were killed in hostile and non-hostile action. Another 303,616 were injured. The total casualties of this war give it the dubious distinction of being the third most costly war in American history, surpassed only by the Civil War and World War II. Among the injured Americans there are almost 23,000 double amputees and more than 2,500 quadriplegics and paraplegics. About 260,700 Vietnam veterans receive disability payments from the Veterans Administration. More than 1,300 Americans are classified as missing in action and, most likely, they too will be added to the list of those killed in action. The statistics are abundant and grim. America's longest war has exacted a heavy price.

All of these statistics demonstrate the magnitude of the U.S. effort in Vietnam to "secure self-determination for the South Vietnamese and to halt the spread of international Communism and the aggression of the North Vietnamese"—or whatever it is we accomplished in ten years of war and more than twenty-five years of American "interest" in Southeast Asia. However, there is one further measure of the high cost of this war that all Americans can easily understand: the vast amount of money that we have spent, and will spend, as a result of our Southeast Asian adventure. We can only estimate the total final cost, since there are future costs such as veterans' benefits, aid to Indochina, and interest payments on the national debt which have not been incurred yet, but which will have to be paid in the decades to come.

As we shall see, the future costs of wars are usually larger than the original costs of the wars themselves. For the war in Vietnam, when all the past, present, and future costs are calculated, the ultimate expense will amount to about \$676 billion. This is more than two-and-a-half times the amount of money that the Federal Government will spend this year for all purposes, and amounts to about one-half of the current total annual output of the entire American economy.

The \$676 billion figure has been derived by adding together all of the costs to the Federal Government and to the American economy occasioned by American involvement in Indochina. It includes the money that was spent to buy the planes and bombs used in the air war. It includes the money used to provide shelter, clothing, food, and entertainment for American troops. It includes aid to the separate states of Indochina going back to the post-World War II years. It includes the aid that the United States decided in 1950 to grant France for its efforts in Indochina until the French withdrawal in 1954. The future costs of aid to Indochina, veterans' benefits, and interest payments on the national debt have also been included. Estimates of the amount of income that has been lost to the American economy as a result of death and disability of servicemen and exile of young men avoiding the draft have been included. I have also attempted to estimate the costs involved in U.S. efforts, official and unofficial, to end the war. Finally, there is also an estimate of the cost of the American economy, and some of its components, resulting from the de-escalation of the war.

PAST AND PRESENT BUDGETARY COSTS

Let us look first at the direct costs of the war itself. According to official Department of Defense figures, the cost from fiscal year 1965 through fiscal year 1974 adds up to \$141.3 billion. The following table breaks down this total on a year-by-year basis:

Fiscal year:	[In billions]
1965	\$0.1
1966	5.8
1967	20.1
1968	26.5
1969	28.8
1970	23.1
1971	14.7
1972	9.3
1973	7.9
1974	5.0
Total	141.3

This estimate of war costs covers the "full costs" of the war, that is, all of the costs for the forces, equipment, and material used in the war effort. The Pentagon, however, is fond of using what it calls "incremental costs" for estimating war costs. Incremental costs cover the added costs of fighting the war over and above the normal costs of operating the peacetime military forces. In other words, some Pentagon employees, both military and civilian, who were involved in the war effort would have been engaged in the defense effort even if there had been no war in Vietnam. Conveniently, this method also happens to provide a lower total cost for the war—\$112.3 billion.

The Pentagon, though, does provide both sets of figures on war costs. I have used the full cost estimate because these figures represent the total amount of resources and manpower that were devoted to the war effort from 1965 to 1974. It is also possible that even the full cost estimates of the Pentagon understate the true cost of the war. These estimates contain no attempt to assign a value to the time spent on the war by the President or by the top brass in the Pentagon or the State Department. Antiwar groups have consistently charged that the cost figures of the Pentagon were purposely underestimated to curtail domestic opposition to the war.

The figure of \$141.3 billion, then, is probably a good compromise estimate of the actual cost of the American war in Indochina. This is the money that was used in direct support of the U.S. war effort. It went to pay for the men and women in the armed services who fought in the war or provided support for those who did. It bought the planes

and helicopters, the bombs and mines, the electronic sensors and napalm. It built the runways and ports, the barracks and recreational facilities for the troops. Since 1966, the estimates also include the amounts of military assistance to South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand (in that year the Department of Defense was given authority over those funds in conjunction with the war effort). The war itself, by the end of fiscal 1974, will have cost American taxpayers more than \$141 billion. That comes to about \$2,570 per American family—or approximately the present cost of a Volkswagen bug.

The direct costs of American involvement in Indochina can be expanded somewhat by including the amounts of money invested in support of U.S. policy prior to the actual entrance of American forces into the war. The United States began supporting the French effort in Southeast Asia in 1950 by awarding military and economic aid to France and the Associated States of Indochina. Between the time of the agreement to provide aid in May, 1950, and the fall of Dien Bien Phu in May, 1954, the United States provided more than \$4.4 billion. Following the Geneva Conference and the end of the first Indochina war, the United States, in essence, took over the role of the French. Military advisers were sent and military and economic aid continued to flow from Washington to Saigon. From the signing of the Geneva Accords to the American entrance into the war, this military and economic assistance amounted to \$6 billion. Consequently, even before the United States became heavily involved in the day-to-day fighting, we had already spent about \$10.4 billion in furthering U.S. policies in Indochina.

In addition to Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand have all been involved in the war and in U.S. efforts in Southeast Asia. Each of these countries has received American money throughout the entire post-World War II period. The following totals have been gleaned from official Government statistics on aid to these countries:

Military assistance to Laos and Thailand from 1950 to 1966 (after which such funds were included in war cost estimates) amounted to \$1.1 billion.

Military assistance to Cambodia from 1950 to 1974 will total \$1 billion.

Economic assistance for Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand from 1946 through 1974 and for South Vietnam from 1965 to 1974 comes to more than \$7.5 billion.

There are two more categories of direct costs. The first involves the use of "Third Country Military Forces" in the war. This "more flags" policy of involving the troops of South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, New Zealand, and Australia in the fighting in Vietnam cost the United States an additional \$1 billion of special aid as compensation for the services rendered. The second involves the transfer of \$5.9 billion of U.S. Government property in the form of military facilities and equipment to the governments of South Vietnam and Thailand.

Summing up all of these costs, we find that American involvement in Indochina and our efforts against "International Communism" there have cost us \$168.2 billion since the end of World War II.

FUTURE BUDGETARY COSTS

Unfortunately, however, this \$168.2 billion is not the end of the line for the budgetary outlays resulting from U.S. involvement in Indochina. There will be veterans' benefits to be paid to the Vietnam veterans. If history is any guide, these payments to the war veterans and their dependents will continue for at least 100 years. There will be interest payments on the national debt, which was increased substantially to finance the war. And, because there are still U.S. Air Force bases in Thailand, and the Seventh Fleet is still operating in Southeast Asian seas, the direct U.S. military effort in Southeast Asia

will require still more funds in the near future.

There is also the matter of continued military and economic aid to the countries of the area, as well as U.S. funds for the reconstruction of Indochina as promised in Article 21 of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring the Peace in Vietnam. (Future economic and reconstruction aid, of course, may prove constructive, but these sums must be listed in any accounting of the total costs of U.S. war policy in Indochina.)

These future costs can only be roughly estimated. But experience from past American wars provides us with enough information to derive some reasonable estimates on these costs over future years. As historian James L. Clayton of the University of Utah has pointed out, "Most of the costs of wars in American history have come after the fighting stopped."

On the basis of estimates from the Veterans Administration and the studies of General Omar Bradley's Presidential Commission on Veterans' Pensions in the mid-1950s, Professor Clayton has concluded that veterans' benefits range from 100 per cent to 300 per cent of the original costs of war. If this pattern applies to the Vietnam War, the future benefits for Vietnam veterans and their dependents will range from \$141.3 billion to \$423.9 billion. If we take the mid-range estimate of 200 per cent of the original cost of the war, we can expect veterans' benefits from the war in Indochina to total \$282.6 billion.

Clayton has also estimated that the interest payments on the national debt incurred by past wars have ranged from ten per cent to forty per cent of their original costs. In light of recent experience, it is reasonable to assume that the interest payments on the national debt incurred from the war in Indochina will amount to about twenty per cent of its original cost, or about \$28.2 billion.

In addition to these future costs, there will be budgetary costs associated with continuing U.S. interests in Indochina in conjunction with emerging America's foreign policy. In 1969, Pentagon Comptroller Robert Moot estimated in Congressional testimony that the continuing support to the South Vietnamese government alone would probably amount to about \$2 billion annually into the indefinite future. If one considers the estimates for military and economic assistance to South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia for fiscal 1974, the total comes to more than \$3 billion. If one goes a step further, as I. F. Stone has done, and considers the total cost of U.S. military presence in the area and the aid, the total is closer to \$10 billion annually. If we take the example of Korea and the fact that our interest there has continued for almost twenty years after the fighting stopped, then, using the most conservative estimate of a \$2 billion annual expense in the area, the U.S. Government is likely to pour another \$40 billion into Indochina by the 1990s. To this \$40 billion we must also add the \$7.5 billion that has been promised by the Nixon Administration for postwar reconstruction making a total future cost estimate of \$358.3 billion.

Ultimately, then, the war in Vietnam will cost the Federal Government in excess of \$526 billion, including direct costs of the war and future budgetary costs. (If the lower and higher estimates of veterans' benefits and interest payments are used the totals are \$371.1 billion and \$696.1 billion, respectively.) Only World War II, with an estimated price tag of more than \$660 billion, has cost American taxpayers more.

HUMAN RESOURCE COSTS

Beyond the \$526.5 billion that has been and will be spent by the U.S. Government to pay for its war, there are the "human resource costs" that can be measured in monetary

terms. They represent the lost opportunities that have resulted from participation in the war by American men and women, from the deaths and disabilities, from the non-participation in American life of draft evaders and deserters, and from the losses associated with Vietnam veterans who have become drug addicts.

In each of these cases, an "opportunity cost" is involved. The men and women who served in Vietnam could have been engaged in other activities within the American economy. Those killed or disabled can not fulfill their productive capabilities—their potential economic output has been lost. Nor will the draft evaders and deserters participate in the American economy. The drug addicts will not contribute to their full potential; in fact, the crime to which some will resort to support their habit will serve as a drag on the economy. These human resource liabilities are very real costs of the war. They cannot be ignored and must be included in any reckoning of the total dollar costs.

Conscripts in America's armed forces and those who volunteer to avoid the draft have traditionally been paid at less than market wages. That is, while in the service, these men earn less than they would earn in civilian employment. This penalty paid by draftees and reluctant volunteers is known as a "conscription tax." It measures the difference between military pay and civilian pay for those affected. In addition, it reflects the amount of civilian output foregone by society as a result of having them in the military. Economist Robert Eisner of Northwestern University, working from data of President Johnson's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, has estimated that the economic costs of Vietnam conscription from 1966 to 1972 amounted to about \$65 billion.

In the same manner, the real and substantial human losses of the war—the dead, the disabled and injured, the missing in action, and even the exiled—also represent a significant cost to society in the form of future income (and productive activity) lost. Based on the average earning capability and span of American men, Eisner and other economists have calculated that the U.S. economy has lost approximately \$35.3 billion in future production from Indochina war deaths, injuries, and men missing in action. If the approximately 70,000 draft evaders and deserters are never granted amnesty and do not return voluntarily to the United States, their production potential is also lost. Using Eisner's analysis, this loss may be estimated at about \$16.3 billion.

A final human resource cost of the war is represented by the men who returned from Vietnam addicted to heroin. The Senate Veterans' Affairs subcommittee has estimated that there are about 100,000 drug-addicted Vietnam veterans. These men, as long as they are addicts, are not likely to assume a fully productive role in the economy and, in fact, are likely to turn to crime to support their habit. The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs has estimated that the cost of a heroin habit is \$30 a day in the States. In addition, to support his habit at an annual cost of about \$11,000, the House Select Committee on Crime has estimated that an addict who relies on crime must steal goods worth about \$55,000. If we assume that about one-half of the veteran addicts will turn to crime, and if we accept the estimate of the House Committee, these addicts will probably engage in crime costing about \$2.7 billion a year (50,000 times \$55,000). If we assume that this \$2.7 billion cost will have about a ten-year "life," since the addict will either eventually be cured of his habit or become a victim of it, an educated guessimate, then, of the human resource cost of the drug addiction of Vietnam veterans comes to about \$27 billion.

Thus we arrive at a total of \$143.6 billion for the real costs to society of the draft, of

the war dead and disabled, of the exiles, and of veteran drug addicts. This exceeds the original direct budgetary costs of the war (\$141.3 billion).

OTHER COSTS

There have been other costs, too. For years, private individuals and organizations have devoted large amounts of time, energy, and money to efforts to end the war. The Nixon Administration assigned a major portion of Henry Kissinger's National Security Council staff to attempting to end the war. I have estimated that the total costs of these efforts to end the war approximate \$220 million.

This total includes an estimate of \$10 million from the budgets of the National Security Council for the last five years and a nominal sum for the wanderings of Henry Kissinger. It includes about \$90 million spent by the more than fifty national organizations that devoted either their entire energies or a major proportion of them to ending the war over a period of nine years from 1964 through 1972. And, finally, it contains an estimate of about \$120 million as a value for the private efforts—from marching, to lobbying, to letterwriting—of the American people to end the war.

This \$220 million total is a considerable underestimate since it does not include all the costs of governmental efforts to end the war (e.g., the U.S. mission at the Paris Peace Talks), or any of the time and campaign money devoted by politicians to articulating the desire to end the war (e.g., no part of the \$5 million spent on Senator McCarthy's campaign in 1968 or of the \$25 million for Senator McGovern's in 1971-1972).

An additional cost has resulted from the Nixon Administration's winding down the war over the last four years. Associated with the conclusion of any war is a period of economic demobilization—of conversion from military employment and war production to a civilian economy. This conversion process can have two types of costs: (1) the costs of developing the proper mix of programs which provide a smooth conversion, and (2) the costs to the economy of the disruption that can occur if the conversion is not adequately planned.

Planning for conversion from the Vietnam war began in President Johnson's Administration with the Cabinet Coordinating Committee on Economic Planning for the End of Vietnam Hostilities. Under President Nixon, the responsibility for this task was given to a Cabinet-level Interagency Economic Adjustments Committee. This committee, headed by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, was to assist in the adjustment process of communities adversely affected by the Vietnam cutbacks. During the cutback, more than two million military and civilian jobs were lost. Unfortunately, the conversion was not smooth and total U.S. unemployment increased by two million.

Based on preliminary estimates of the governmental programs to deal with conversion made by Johnson's committee, and a description of the programs instituted by the Nixon Administration upon the actual beginning of the Vietnam cutbacks, the cost of Federal conversion efforts can be estimated at about \$800 million for the 1969 to 1971 period. There is the further cost of the recession engendered by the Nixon Administration in 1970 as a consequence of efforts to control inflation stimulated by the war. The result was that people thrown out of work because of defense cutbacks could not find employment elsewhere in the economy. The average period of unemployment for most of these workers was about one-fourth of the year. Consequently, if we assume the annual economic contribution of an American worker to be about \$10,000, then the total loss to the economy of two million unemployed was about \$5 billion (one-fourth of \$10,000 times two million). The total cost of conversion from the Vietnam war, therefore, comes to approximately \$5.8 billion.

THE GRAND TOTAL

If we add up all of the costs discussed so far, we get the estimate of \$676.1 billion for the total dollar cost of the war to the American people:

Cost:	Amount (billions)
Budgetary Expenditures, 1950 to	
1974 -----	\$168.2
Future Budgetary Expenditures-----	358.3
Costs of Efforts to End the War-----	.2
Costs of Conversion-----	5.8
Human Resource Costs-----	143.6
Total -----	676.1

If the high and low estimates of interest payments and veterans' benefits are used instead, the total costs range from \$520.7 billion to \$845.7 billion.

In reflecting on this massive amount of money, all Americans should ask themselves if this cost of our Southeast Asian adventure was worth it. Did it serve American interests? What interests? Did we achieve peace with honor? Although each of us has his or her own answer to those questions, ultimately history will decide.

Finally, perhaps every one of the fifty-five million American families should ask whether it was worth the more than \$12,000 each of them will ultimately pay for the war in economic terms. Was it worth one year's income to finance a civil war that raged 10,000 miles away? Is it what you would have done with \$12,000?

What else could we have done with the tax money that we have spent and will spend on the war?

The \$676 billion could have been allocated to other public purposes, towards the neglected priorities of the United States itself. For example, the \$141.3 billion spent on direct costs of the war for the past decade could have paid for 5,652,000 single-family homes at \$25,000 each.

The remaining \$27 billion in miscellaneous expenses already incurred would just about cover the costs of the abatement of air pollution in the United States during the period from 1970 to 1975 (as estimated by the Council on Environmental Quality).

The approximately \$30 billion in interest charges on war-caused increases in the national debt would pay most of the \$38 billion estimated cost of abating water pollution for the same period.

The \$40 billion in U.S. aid that will probably continue to flow to the governments of Southeast Asia for the next twenty years could be used instead to achieve adequate solid waste treatment programs here at home.

The \$28.6 billion that will go to Vietnam veterans and their dependents, probably for the next 100 years, could have been used towards the elimination of hunger in the United States for the next fifty years.

The \$143 billion in human resource costs represents the value of human labor, and loss of productive potential, that could have been devoted to more peaceful and constructive activities by Americans, such as the construction and maintenance of urban transportation systems, day care centers, hospitals, and schools throughout the nation.

The \$6 billion in costs associated with efforts to end the war and with the economic disruption caused by the manner in which the war was wound down could have provided \$2,000 college scholarships to one million students for three years.

Pick your favorite neglected priority in the United States: every form of public spending in the country, at the Federal, state, and local level, has suffered as a result of the Federal Government's obsessive pursuit of the war in Indochina.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I have listened with great interest to the words of the distinguished majority leader. I would like to support what the distin-

guished Senator has said with respect to the cost of war.

I have been working with the Government Operations Committee together with the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. ERVIN) on the recommendations for improved congressional control over budgetary outlays. We will go into mark up on a bill for a new procedure for budgetary control on October 1, 5, and 8.

The reason we feel our procedures are in need of revision is brought out by a situation that seems to be completely out of control. We are faced with the fact that in the 53 years since 1920, the budget of the United States has shown a deficit 37 times. In large part the deficits that we have undergone have been because of war.

We must recognize that of the \$268 billion budget we are dealing with for fiscal year 1974, virtually 75 percent of it is beyond the direct control of the Congress. We are only dealing with about 25 percent of that budget that we can say with assurance actually can control. This has been caused largely because of the cost of past wars which have consumed so much of our resources.

I certainly commend the distinguished majority leader once again for bringing out this very sobering thought. I trust that in dealing with the military bill pending before the Senate that we will take that into account. And that is one of the reasons that I will vote decisively against the speedup accelerated program for the Trident today.

Mr. President, in my closing moment, I would like to turn to the majority leader not just as a statesman but also as a fellow grandfather, and indicate to him that when the senior Senator from Illinois leaves the Chamber at 4 o'clock today for 24 hours, it will not be because it is his own birthday—which it is—but because his infant grandson, by the name of Charles Percy Rockefeller, is going to be christened tonight in the great State of West Virginia, and also his son-in-law will be sworn in tomorrow as the new president of West Virginia Wesleyan College.

I shall indicate myself in every vote that I may miss and do not presume that my absence will cause the downfall of the Republic. I think the distinguished majority leader will agree that even a Senator cannot perform his family functions by proxy, and I hope I shall have the understanding of the majority and minority leadership when I leave the Capital for 24 hours at 4 p.m. today.

Mr. MANSFIELD. As Gabriel Heatter used to say:

There's good news today.

This is a most pleasant and auspicious occasion. I wish we would hear more about things of this nature instead of wars, installations, bases, and expenses everywhere in the world except at home. Congratulations.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. President, the minority would like to join in offering congratulations to the Senator from Illinois. We will certainly understand his absence.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (MR. MATHIAS). Is there further morning business?

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ENROLLED BILLS PRESENTED

The Secretary of the Senate reported that on today, September 27, 1973, he presented to the President of the United States the following enrolled bills:

S. 464. An act for the relief of Guido Belalance; and

S. 2075. An act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to engage in feasibility investigation of certain potential water resource developments.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following reports of committees were submitted:

By Mr. JACKSON, from the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, with an amendment:

S. 2176. A bill to provide for a national fuels and energy conservation policy, to establish an Office of Energy Conservation in the Department of the Interior, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 93-409). Referred to the Committee on Commerce.

INTRODUCTION OF BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

The following bills and joint resolutions were introduced, read the first time and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as indicated:

By Mr. MAGNUSON:

S. 2492. A bill for the relief of Sara Shepard and Maribel Shepard. Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. NUNN (for himself and Mr. TALMADGE):

S. 2493. A bill to authorize the disposal of silicon carbide from the national stockpile and the supplemental stockpile. Referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. HARTKE (by request):

S. 2494. A bill to amend chapter 15 of title 38, United States Code, to provide for the payment of a pension to World War I veterans. Referred to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. MAGNUSON (for himself, Mr. Moss, and Mr. TUNNEY):

S. 2495. A bill to amend the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 to apply the scientific and technological expertise of NASA to the solution of domestic problems, and for other purposes. Referred jointly to the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences and the Committee on Commerce, by unanimous consent.

By Mr. CHURCH (for himself and Mr. Moss):

S. 2496. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to provide for training programs which will train nurse practitioners to serve as physicians' assistants in extended care facilities. Referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

By MR. BAKER:

S. 2497. A bill to require the Librarian of Congress to establish and maintain a library of television and radio programs, and for other purposes. Referred jointly to the Committee on Commerce and the Committee on Rules and Administration, by unanimous consent.

STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

By Mr. MAGNUSON (for himself, Mr. Moss, and Mr. TUNNEY):

S. 2495. A bill to amend the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 to apply the scientific and technological expertise of NASA to the solution of domestic problems, and for other purposes. Referred jointly to the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences and the Committee on Commerce, by unanimous consent.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, on January 31, 1958, the United States took its first tentative step into the vast reaches of space with the successful launching of the tiny 30-pound Explorer satellite. Now, 15 short years later, the Skylab II astronauts have just completed their 59 days of far-reaching and invaluable scientific exploration of space. The progress that has been made in space is indeed tremendous, but the promise it holds for progress here on Earth is far more incredible and far more important. It is to that promise of solutions to the challenges of life right here on our own planet in our own country that the Technology Resources Survey and Application Act is addressed.

Our achievements in space have demonstrated, beyond any doubt, the Nation's capability for marshalling its scientists, its technicians, its managers, its private industry, and its Government into a single technological problem-solving team. The legislation I am introducing today would build upon that model and the knowledge our space program has produced to attack the technological problems we face in our everyday lives—the problems of illness, transportation, safety, housing, pollution, the energy crisis and many others.

Mr. President, this is no idle dream. In testimony earlier this year before the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NASA's Deputy Assistant Administrator for Technology Utilization described a wide variety of cases where space-age science is already being applied to the age-old problems of man on Earth. Let me cite just a few examples from that testimony:

Equipment developed for NASA's Manned Spacecraft Center has been adopted for use as a highly refined medical instrument to better diagnose eye tumors.

NASA's Marshall Flight Center and Vanderbilt University have adopted other space equipment and technology to aid doctors in examining children with heart defects and deciding whether surgery is required.

Aerospace technology originally developed for use on the Viking mission to Mars has gone into the development of devices now being clinically tested which detect the presence of bacteria in human body fluids and also measure the patient's response to various medications.

Paralyzed patients and amputees are now using special switches developed originally by NASA for use by astronauts immobilized by high gravitational forces, to control the various support devices the handicapped must have to move around.

NASA technology in life-support sys-

tems has made possible the development of new breathing apparatus to protect fire fighters from smoke inhalation.

The NASA Ames Research Center, which has been involved in the development of materials for fire protection aboard spacecraft, is now working in conjunction with the Federal Railroad Administration and the Association of American Railroads to develop materials to protect tanker cars from fire in accidental derailments.

Working together with other Federal agencies as well as with private industry, NASA is developing new smoke detection devices to greatly decrease fire hazards in large housing developments.

The Bureau of Mines and NASA are jointly engaged in adopting the Lunar Rover used by moon explorers to serve as a vehicle to rescue trapped coal miners.

In conjunction with the Environmental Protection Agency, NASA is developing special new sensors to detect and measure air pollutants.

Railroad safety stands to be improved as a result of NASA-developed technology that is now being tested for use in detecting potential rail safety hazards.

Mr. President, science and our scientists, technology and our technicians have passed the critical test of outer space. The developments I have just cited demonstrate that manpower and that knowledge can be successfully applied to the technological problems in our daily lives. Now it is up to us to insure that they will be applied. That is the purpose of the Technology Resources Survey and Applications Act.

This act would create a three-element system for utilizing available technical manpower and other resources in the solution of critical domestic problems.

First, it would create a long-range survey of technological resources. This survey would draw on both Government and private sources to identify the actual scientific research being done by private enterprise, the academic community, government at all levels, and other sources. This survey would also note areas of research critical to the solution of important domestic problems that are being neglected. The survey should also describe to what degree unemployment among technically oriented workers exists. This survey would be updated yearly. It is long overdue and is an approach recommended by the National Academy of Engineering.

Second, the act would provide an inventory of critical domestic problems which are susceptible to resolution by the application of science and technology. It would provide for the selection from among these of such programs as will utilize unemployed technological resources and contribute to the resolution of critical domestic problems.

Third, the act would provide an organization within NASA to carry out programs thus identified to resolve critical national programs. This would expand an activity already underway within NASA and enable us to better utilize a capability which has already exhibited an impressive record of success.

The survey of technological resources and the identification of critical national problems would be under the direction of a National Technology Resource

Council composed of Cabinet Members and agency heads most involved with high technology problems. This Council would not be obligated to assign all problems which it identifies to NASA for solution, but could do so where they felt it to be in the best interests of the country. The Council, procedurally, would make its recommendations to the President who, in turn, would make the ultimate decision as to assignment.

The Technology Resources Survey and Applications Act provides for the systematic application of unemployed technological resources to the Nation's technology oriented problems. Our country has both the technological momentum and resources to overcome the most serious of our technology oriented problems. What we lack is a strategy. The Technology Resources Survey and Applications Act fills an urgent need.

Finally, in light of the proposed change in mission for NASA outlined in this bill, I am suggesting changing the name of the agency to the National Applications of Science Administration (NASA). However, I have not included this name change in the bill. Changing the name is an issue which must be thoroughly considered by the committees with jurisdiction over this bill. I do believe the name I have suggested would accurately reflect the new role which my bill attempts to create for NASA.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be jointly referred to the Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee and to the Commerce Committee. I also ask unanimous consent to have the bill printed in full at his point in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

S. 2495

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Technology Resources Survey and Applications Act".

STATEMENT OF FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF POLICY

Sec. 2(a) The Congress hereby finds and declares that—

(1) The scientific and technological resources of the United States can and should be used more effectively and efficiently to solve critical domestic problems.

(2) Such scientific and technological resources, if properly applied and directed, could effectively meet many major public needs.

(3) It is the responsibility of the Federal Government to insure the full and efficient use of such scientific and technological resources.

(4) A more systematic approach to analyzing and planning for the resolution of critical domestic problems is essential to achieving such full and efficient use of the Nation's scientific and technological resources.

(5) A comprehensive long-range technological resources survey is a prerequisite to the more effective utilization of scientific and technological resources in the resolution of critical domestic problems.

(b) Therefore, it is hereby declared by the Congress to be the policy of the United States that the Federal Government shall henceforth be responsible for applying the technological resources of the United States to the resolution of critical domestic problems, and shall prepare and maintain a comprehensive national technological survey.

Sec. 3(a) Section 102(d) of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (42 U.S.C.

2451(d)) is hereby amended to read as follows:

"(d) The Congress declares that the capability demonstrated by the aeronautical and space activities of the United States and the expertise developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in research and in the development of new and advanced technology to solve complex problems shall be made available and be used in the resolution of critical domestic problems of the United States to the extent not inconsistent with such aeronautical and space activity functions."

(b) Section 102 of such Act is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"(e) It is the purpose of this Act to carry out and effectuate the policies declared in subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) of this section."

Sec. 4. The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new title:

"TITLE IV—NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY RESOURCES PLANNING AND COORDINATION"

"THE NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY RESOURCE COUNCIL"

Sec. 401. (a) There is established in the Executive Office of the President the National Technology Resources Council (hereinafter in this title referred to as the "Council") which shall be composed of the—

"(1) Vice President;
"(2) Secretary of Commerce;
"(3) Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare;

"(4) Secretary of Housing and Urban Development;

"(5) Secretary of Transportation;
"(6) Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration;

"(7) Director of the National Science Foundation;

"(8) Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission;

"(9) Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality;

"(10) Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency; and

"(11) Secretary of the Interior.

"(b) The Vice President shall be the Chairman of the Council. The President shall from time to time designate one of the other members of the Council to serve as Acting Chairman during the absence, disability, or unavailability of the Chairman.

"(c) Each member of the Council may duly designate in writing a qualified officer or employee of his office, department, or agency to serve as his representative on the Council in his absence.

"(d) Each person designated under subsection (c) of this section as the representative of a member of the Council shall be designated to serve as such by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and shall appear before appropriate committees of the Congress upon request relevant to the activities of the Council.

"FUNCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL"

Sec. 402. (a) It shall be the function of the Council to prepare a technology resources survey in accordance with section 403 of this title and to advise and assist the President with respect to other technology resource matters.

"(b) The Council shall—

"(1) develop and supervise a technology resources survey, in accordance with section 403 of this title;

"(2) develop a comprehensive program to identify in advance scientific and technological resources, including manpower, which are available for the resolution of critical domestic problems but which are not being fully utilized for such purposes;

"(3) review and evaluate the activities of Federal departments and agencies engaged in programs which are recommended by the

technology resource survey and similar activities of State and local public agencies;

"(4) make recommendations to the President who may assign any critical domestic problem which is identified by the technology resource survey to the Office of Technology Applications of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any more appropriate Federal agency.

"(5) review and evaluate the progress in solving problems assigned by the Council to the Office of Technology Application of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and to other Federal agencies; and

"(6) prepare and submit a report to the Congress at least once in each fiscal year on the activities of the Council during the preceding fiscal year.

"TECHNOLOGY RESOURCES SURVEY"

Sec. 403. (a) The Council shall prepare and transmit to the President and to the Congress at the earliest practicable date a technology resources survey. Such survey shall identify the existing scientific engineering and technological activities, capabilities, programs and resources and the means by which each might be applied and used to practical advantage in the resolution of the nation's critical domestic problems. The survey shall include, but is not limited to, making—

"(1) an inventory of the Nation's scientific and technological resources;

"(2) an inventory of critical domestic problems which may be susceptible of resolution by the application of science and technology; and

"(3) recommendations for programs which will strengthen the economy and contribute to the resolution of such critical domestic problems.

"(b) Such technology resources survey shall be reviewed and revised annually by the Council. The survey and each such annual revision shall contain a full explanation of the determinations, and recommendations of the Council together with reasons therefore. The survey and each such annual revision shall be printed and made available as a public document and published in the Federal Register.

"ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS"

Sec. 404. (a) The Council is authorized to employ a staff which shall be headed by an executive director. The executive director with the approval of the Council is authorized to the extent necessary to—

"(1) appoint, assign the duties and fix the compensation of personnel without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title, relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, at rates not in excess of the maximum rate for GS-18 of the General Schedule under section 5332 of such title; and

"(2) procure temporary and intermittent services to the same extent as is authorized by section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, but at rates not to exceed \$100 a day for individuals.

"(b) The Council shall, to the fullest extent possible, use the services, facilities, and information, including statistical information, of other governmental agencies as well as private research agencies. Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive branch of the Government, including any independent agency, is authorized and directed to furnish the Council, upon request made by the executive director with the approval of the Council, such information as the Council deems necessary to carry out its functions under this title.

"(c) The Council is authorized to establish advisory committees and may consult with such representatives of state and local governments and with such groups, organizations, and individuals as it may deem advisable.

September 27, 1973

"THE OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY APPLICATION"

"SEC. 405. (a) The Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration shall establish within the Administration an Office of Technology Application to be composed of the Office of Applications and the Office of Technology Utilization in the Administration, and other such offices and agencies as the Administrator determines have functions which primarily relate to the duties assigned by this section.

"(b) In order to carry out the purpose of this Act, the Administrator, through the Office of Technology Application shall—

"(1) upon request, furnish technical assistance to the Council in the preparation of the technology resources survey;

"(2) upon request, furnish technical assistance to the Council in deciding what critical domestic problem may be resolved by applying scientific and technological resources;

"(3) upon direction of the Council, accept responsibility for specific domestic problems which may be susceptible of resolution by the application of scientific and technological resources; and

"(4) utilize aerospace firms and other scientific organizations in the private sector on a contract basis to assist in developing scientific strategies for the resolution of critical domestic problems.

"(c) Except as otherwise provided in this title, the Administrator shall, in carrying out its functions under this title, have the same powers and authority it has under title II of this Act."

SEC. 5. Section 5316 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraphs:

"(132) Executive Director, the National Technology Resources Council

"(133) Assistant Administrator for the Office of Technology Application, National Aeronautics and Space Administration."

SEC. 6. (a) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated to the National Technology Resources Council \$10,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974 and the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975 to carry out its functions under title IV of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958.

(b) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration \$200,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975 to carry out its functions under title IV of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958.

By Mr. CHURCH (for himself and Mr. Moss):

S. 2496. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to provide for training programs which will train nurse practitioners to serve as physicians' assistants in extended care facilities. Referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF CARE IN NURSING HOMES

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I introduce for appropriate reference a bill to help improve the quality of life for the nearly 1 million residents of our 23,000 nursing homes.

My bill would provide funds to schools of nursing to establish programs to train nurse practitioners in geriatrics and the needs of nursing home patients.

The bill is in response to one of the most serious problems in the nursing home field and that is the absence of the physician from the nursing home setting. Almost all students of long-term care will agree that doctors have neglected the care of patients in nursing homes. Even President Nixon, in his speech in Chicago last year, said that

physicians do not view the nursing home as part of the medical continuum; that they get too "depressed" and feel their time is better spent tending to the younger members of society.

This tendency has been documented by the Subcommittee on Long-Term Care under the chairmanship of the distinguished Senator from Utah, Senator FRANK E. MOSS. In numerous hearings, including investigations of the Baltimore salmonella epidemic where 25 nursing home patients died of food poisoning, the subcommittee has learned that doctors do not view bodies of patients who have died in nursing homes before signing death certificates and that in some nursing homes the telephone is becoming a more important medical instrument than the stethoscope.

The General Accounting Office confirmed these facts in its May 28, 1971 audit of 90 nursing homes in 3 States. The GAO sample revealed that over 50 percent of the nursing homes surveyed did not meet the Federal requirement that Medicaid patients be seen by physicians at least once every 30 days.

When the physician is absent from the nursing home, an intolerable burden falls on the nursing staff. The registered nurse must spend more and more of her time with administration and supervisory responsibility, and untrained aides must provide much of the medical care. Certainly this is not true in every State, but the incidence is wide enough to be truly alarming.

To my mind these problems demand immediate action. I am aware of the recent contract between HEW and the American Medical Association to develop seminars to inform doctors of the needs of nursing home patients and I know of the legislation introduced by Senator MOSS to help create departments of geriatrics in schools of medicine, but I feel that nursing home patients need immediate and more far-reaching protection. It is for this reason that I am offering my bill for the consideration of the Senate.

Since the most reasonable explanation for the failure of physicians to visit nursing homes is simply that they are already overworked and in short supply, the answer suggested in my bill is to substitute nurse practitioners trained in geriatrics. Nurse practitioners would assume the responsibility for the care of nursing home patients subject to the continuous and overall responsibility of a physician who has agreed to be on call and to assume the duties and title of medical director as defined by the forthcoming skilled nursing facility regulations.

The suitability of the nurse practitioner concept to the care of nursing home patients has been pointed out to me by many experts in the field of long-term care, including Dr. Alfred Popma from my home State. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point a copy of his October 19, 1971 letter to me.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MOUNTAIN STATES REGIONAL MEDICAL PROGRAM,

Boise, Idaho, October 19, 1971.

Hon. FRANK CHURCH,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR FRANK: With the concern of you and your Committee for the aged who are in nursing homes, I am impelled to write you briefly my views as they relate to enhancing and improving patient care in these institutions.

Generally speaking, the vast majority of patients in nursing homes are there because of cardiovascular disease, cancer, stroke or one of the neurological diseases. Too often the nursing homes become a "dumping ground" for these people.

There are many nursing homes in the United States where hypertensive patients do not have blood pressures taken; diabetics who do not have blood sugar determinations made; cancer patients who do not have available to them the palliative benefits of modern chemotherapy;—and the list could be expanded. I do not imply that these conditions exist in all nursing homes—there are many in which the care is excellent.

To improve nursing home care to all patients seems to be primarily one of lack of adequate manpower.

As a device to assist in the remedy of this situation, I proposed several years ago, the development of an "intermediary physician"—a nurse specially trained in many of the minor medical skills, who, working under supervision of a physician, could and would make regularly scheduled visits to patients in nursing homes, perform physical examinations, order laboratory procedures, maintain the medical records and report to and consult with the physician regarding her findings and recommendations.

Such a nurse physician assistant would provide a tremendous resource to the very busy doctor. Patient care would be improved and medical care costs could be reduced.

For several reasons, my original proposal met with a number of obstacles which could not be surmounted at that time. Today it would seem that the climate would be more favorable.

I am quite sure that the establishment of such programs, with the necessary changes in the Medicare legislation to provide payment for such services would greatly enhance the delivery of health care services in this area of great need.

If you see fit to present these thoughts to your Committee, I will be grateful to you.

With kindest of regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,

ALFRED M. POPMA, M.D.

Mr. CHURCH. By the term nurse practitioner, I mean a registered nurse who is licensed as such under State law and has completed a program of study to become competent as a registered nurse in an expanded role. A nurse practitioner is an individual who is qualified to be responsible for any or all of the following:

First, obtaining a health history;
Second, assessing health-illness status;
Third, entering an individual into the health care system;

Fourth, sustaining and supporting individuals who are impaired, infirm, ill, and undergoing programs of diagnosis and therapy;

Fifth, managing a medical care regimen for acute and chronically ill patients within established standing orders;

Sixth, assisting individuals in regaining their health;

Seventh, teaching and counseling individuals about health and illness;
Eighth, counseling and supporting in-

dividuals with respect to the aging and dying processes; and

Ninth, supervising nursing assistants.

This bill has the enthusiastic support of the American Nurses Association, which has informed me that there are thousands of registered nurses who would consider coming out of retirement if they could have the freedom, the responsibility and the salary commensurate with the nurse practitioner's role. I have every reason to expect support from the medical community and from the American Nursing Home Association.

For the sake of the infirm elderly I hope that this legislation can be promptly implemented.

By Mr. BAKER:

S. 2497. A bill to require the Librarian of Congress to establish and maintain a library of television and radio programs, and for other purposes. Referred jointly to the Committee on Commerce and the Committee on Rules and Administration, by unanimous consent.

RADIO AND TELEVISION REPOSITORY

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I send to the desk a bill to establish a repository for recordings or films of radio or television programs of historic importance, and ask unanimous consent that it be jointly referred to the Committee on Commerce and the Committee on Rules and Administration. I also ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in full at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, this legislation is similar to bills I introduced in the 91st and 92d Congresses. It would direct the Librarian of Congress to obtain, preserve, and index nationally distributed radio and television programs that he determines to be of historical significance or general public interest. In addition, it provides for a study of: First, the guidelines to be used in determining the type of programing not of a journalistic nature that it would be in the public interest to preserve, and the cost thereof; and second, the recordings and film prints that are available that it will be necessary to acquire in order to have as complete a collection as possible of radio and television programs that have been broadcast and are of historical significance, and the cost of such acquisition.

For many years historians and other scholars have relied extensively on contemporary news accounts in their research into the American past. Universities, libraries, and other institutions have long realized the value of preserving newspapers, periodicals, and other printed matter. The advent of microfilm techniques has made this reproduction and storage far more practical.

However, today radio and television are major news forces. Although the print media continue to exert great influence and are capable of providing the kind of in-depth coverage often beyond the capacity of broadcast journalism, radio and television are documenting the mainstream of the continuing evolution of civilization. Historic events of thousand-year importance are being

recorded in a most professional and marvelous way. Certainly a thorough account of the Vietnam war and the response of the American people to it would not be complete without reviewing the network news reports and the numerous television documentaries produced during that period of our history.

Mr. President, today radio and television are also an influential entertainment medium. Americans watch television on an average of more than 6 hours a day, and millions of Americans make the radio a part of their daily lives. The social, cultural, and even behavioral impact of this phenomenon on our society is difficult to measure; but we know it is formidable. Some have said, and I believe it to be essentially true, that America for the first time in her history, has become a nation-state—that we are in fact one people free from regionalism or colloquialism. The language idiom—the soft-rounded e's of Southern speech patterns and the cryptic directness of New England are gradually merging into an American language, attributable, I believe, almost entirely to the effect of national communications with national emphasis and interests. The future development of media technology promises to have an even greater impact on us as a people and a nation. Unless we can study the product of our electronic communications media, we cannot expect to understand that phenomenon.

Yet, if one attempts to obtain a news report or an entertainment program that has been broadcast, he would find it to be a difficult, if not impossible, task. This often comes as a surprise to those seeking recordings or films of particular broadcasts. But, the fact is that the material being produced by the electronic media is not being retained for posterity on an organized basis; and, if it is retained, the tapes or films are scattered across the country in various private collections.

At the present time, Vanderbilt University is the only nonprofit institution making an effort to obtain and preserve the nightly news broadcast by the three networks. Most importantly, after indexing the broadcasts, Vanderbilt makes them available for a reasonable rental charge for research purposes. In 1968, at the recommendation of Vanderbilt alumnus Paul C. Simpson, the Vanderbilt Television News Archive was established with the financial assistance of interested Nashvillians and several foundations. Since that time it has expanded its operations as additional grants became available. Vanderbilt is to be commended for the pioneering efforts it has made in this field. However, because these efforts have been financed solely by private contributions, there is a degree of instability that should not be present in a project of such importance to our Nation.

And it is largely for that reason and because we need the guarantee of a national commitment by the Federal Government to preserve the news and entertainment programs that will make it possible to better understand the evolution of our society as recorded by the electronic media, that I introduce this bill today.

I have discussed this legislation with

the distinguished chairman of the Commerce Committee, Senator MAGNUSON, as well as the chairman of the Committee on Rules and Administration, Senator CANNON, and I have been assured they will schedule hearings and act on this bill.

EXHIBIT 1 S. 2497

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That Congress finds that the United States Government presently preserves newspapers, periodicals, and other written materials that have been a major source of knowledge of our history, but there is no permanent repository for recordings or films of radio or television programs of historic importance. Therefore, it is the purpose of this Act, in order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the continuing evolution of our civilization, to establish a means of preserving the product of our electronic media.

SEC. 2. As used in this Act, the phrase "recordings and film prints" includes all forms of recordings of radio and television programs by any means now known or hereafter developed.

SEC. 3. The Librarian of Congress shall establish and maintain a library containing recordings and film prints of television and radio programs, distributed nationally, which the Librarian determines to be of substantial public interest, including, but not limited to, television and radio news programs, public affairs programs, and other programs of historical significance or general public interest.

SEC. 4. (a) The Librarian of Congress shall—

(1) obtain such recordings and film prints through copyright deposit, or as gifts, or by other means at government expense, from the owners of those programs referred to in section 3;

(2) establish and maintain appropriate indices of such recordings and film prints; and

(3) preserve such recordings and film prints and make them available for study and research in the Library of Congress, or elsewhere, under guidelines which he shall prescribe.

(b) If, in seeking to obtain a copy of any such recording or film print of a program, the owner of the program charges a fee for such copy, the Librarian shall offer to pay an amount for the copy that he considers reasonable. If the owner rejects the offer, the fee for the copy shall be determined by arbitrators selected as provided by the rules of the American Arbitration Association.

(c) The guidelines established by the Librarian under subsection (a) (3) of this section shall be compatible with practices of general research libraries and shall include procedures to insure that any copy of a recording or film print obtained, which is under a copyright or other restriction against reproduction, publication, or public use, is secure against infringement of such copyright or restriction. However, the Librarian of Congress shall not be liable for any act of infringement committed by any other person unless the Librarian has knowingly and willfully consented to or authorized such act.

SEC. 5. Under such conditions or guidelines as he may prescribe, the Librarian of Congress may contract or otherwise arrange with such libraries, agencies, or organizations as he may deem appropriate to assist in carrying out this Act.

SEC. 6. The Librarian of Congress, after consultation with appropriate individuals and organizations, shall conduct a study of (1) the type of guidelines to be used in determining what programs, not of the type referred to in section 3, that it would be in the public interest to preserve, and the cost

thereof, and (2) the recordings and film prints that are available and that it will be necessary to acquire in order to have as complete a collection as possible of radio and television programs that have been broadcast and are of historical significance, and the cost of such acquisition. The Librarian shall submit a comprehensive report to Congress with respect to such study within 18 months of enactment of this Act.

SEC. 7. There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this Act.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

S. 1401

At the request of Mr. HRUSKA, the Senator from Alabama (Mr. ALLEN), the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. CURTIS), the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. EASTLAND), the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. ERVIN), the Senator from Florida (Mr. GURNEY), the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. HUGH SCOTT), and the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. THURMOND) were added as cosponsors of S. 1401, to establish rational criteria for the mandatory imposition of the sentence of death, and for other purposes.

S. 1801

At the request of Mr. BIBLE, the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. DOMENICI) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1801, to authorize certain Indian hospital facilities to be made available to non-Indians under certain conditions.

S. 2200

At the request of Mr. CRANSTON, the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. DOMENICI) was added as a cosponsor of S. 2200, to govern the disclosure of certain financial information by financial institutions to governmental agencies, to protect the constitutional rights of citizens of the United States and to prevent unwarranted invasions of privacy by prescribing procedures and standards governing disclosure of such information, and for other purposes.

S. 2275

At the request of Mr. MCINTYRE, the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. JOHNSTON), the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS), the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON), and Senator from Georgia (Mr. TALMADGE) were added as cosponsors of S. 2275, to provide for an extension of certain laws relating to the payment of interest on time and savings deposits, and for other purposes.

S. 2303

At the request of Mr. HUGH SCOTT, the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCHWEIKER) was added as a cosponsor of S. 2303, to authorize the establishment of the Fort Mifflin National Historic Site in the State of Pennsylvania, and for other purposes.

S. 2442

At the request of Mr. MCINTYRE, the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) was added as a cosponsor of S. 2442 to amend the Export Administration Act of 1969 to prohibit the export of crude oil and petroleum products during any period when prices in the petroleum industry are subject to economic controls.

S. 2453

At the request of Mr. STEVENSON, the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. MONDALE) and the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. LONG) were added as cosponsors of S. 2453, to amend section 203 of the Economic Stabilization Act in regard to authority conferred by that section with respect to petroleum products.

S. 2465

At the request of Mr. BIBLE, the Senator from Florida (Mr. GURNEY), the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON), and the Senator from Alaska (Mr. STEVENS) were added as cosponsors of S. 2465, to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to guarantee loans for the financing of commercial ventures in geothermal energy; to coordinate Federal activities in geothermal energy exploration, research, and development; and for other purposes.

S. 2466

At the request of Mr. MAGNUSON, the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON), the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON), and the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) were added as cosponsors to S. 2466, a bill providing for the continued operation of the Public Health Service hospitals.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 158

At the request of Mr. RANDOLPH, the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. ERVIN), the Senator from Florida (Mr. GURNEY), the Senators from Georgia (Mr. TALMADGE and Mr. NUNN), the Senator from Colorado (Mr. HASKELL), and the Senator from Utah (Mr. BENNETT) were added as cosponsors of Senate Joint Resolution 158, to set aside regulations of the Environmental Protection Agency under section 206 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended.

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 47—SUBMISSION OF A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO AUTHORIZE PRINTING OF ADDITIONAL COPIES OF A REPORT

(Referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.)

Mr. CHURCH (for himself and Mr. MATHIAS) submitted the following concurrent resolution:

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 47

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That there be printed for the use of the Senate Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency five thousand additional copies of its report to the Senate entitled "Emergency Powers Statutes: Provisions of Federal Law Now in Effect Delegating to the Executive Extraordinary Authority in Time of National Emergency."

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET AND NATIONAL PRIORITIES ACT OF 1973—AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 550

Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to add the following language to Amendment No. 550 of S. 1451, which was inadvertently left out when we submitted the amendment yesterday and on which I wish to make the appropriate correction in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

BUDGET COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEC. 102. (a) Clause 1 of Rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives is amended by redesignating paragraphs (e) through (u), inclusive, as paragraphs (f) through (v), respectively, and by inserting after paragraph (d) the following new paragraph:

"(e) Committee on the Budget, to consist of _____ members."

(b) Rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives is amended by redesignating clauses 5 through 33, inclusive, as clauses 6 through 34, respectively, and by inserting after clause 4 the following new clause:

"5. Committee on the Budget

"(a) Establishment of limitations on budget outlays and on new budget authority of the United States Government.

"(b) Determination of the amount, if any, by which budget outlays should exceed revenues, or revenues should exceed budget outlays, considering economic conditions and such other factors as may be relevant to such determination.

"(c) Determination of the appropriate level of Federal revenues, and the appropriate level of the public debt of the United States.

"(d) The exercise of new advance budget authority within the meaning of section 403 of the Congressional Budget and National Priorities Act of 1973.

"(e) The exercise of new tax expenditure authority within the meaning of Section 403 of the Congressional Budget and National Priorities Act of 1973.

"(f) The control of impoundment in accordance with provisions of Title VI of the Congressional Budget and National Priorities Act of 1973.

"(g) Such committee shall have the additional duty to—

"(1) Study on a continuing basis the operation of the congressional budget process and recommend to the House improvements in such process with a view toward strengthening Congress and enabling it better to meet its responsibilities under the Constitution of the United States.

"(2) Study on a continuing basis the effect of existing and proposed legislation on budget outlays and report the results of such studies to the House, and

"(3) Review on a continuing basis the functions and operation of the Congressional Office of the Budget."

PATENT REFORM ACT OF 1973—AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 551

(Ordered to be printed and referred to Committee on Finance.)

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, yesterday I submitted an amendment to S. 2397, a bill to provide for a 7-percent increase in social security benefits beginning with benefits payable for the month of January 1974. At that time, the amendment was ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that amendment No. 551 be referred to the Committee on Finance.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

FALSE STATEMENTS TO OR DEFRAUDING PATENT OFFICE—AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 533

(Ordered to be printed and referred to Committee on the Judiciary.)

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I am submitting an amendment to S. 1321, for the general reform and revision of the Patent

Laws, title 35 of the United States Code, and for other purposes.

Mr. President, the problem of fraud on the Patent Office is of grave and increasing concern for all friends of the free enterprise system. The published decisions of the Federal courts every month reveal new instances of patent monopolies that have been procured from the Government by fraudulent means, with resultant gouging of the public and injury to business competitors. In one major case, still pending in the courts, the State and Federal Governments have sued to recover overcharges on the price of a leading antibiotic drug, which were due to a fraudulent patent monopoly. A witness has recently advised a Senate subcommittee that the public was milked of over a billion dollars by this fraud. I believe that the Congress must take steps now to discourage and punish this outrageous mockery of our system.

Senator HART has recently introduced an omnibus bill to reform and update the patent system. Today, I propose an amendment to Senator HART's bill, which will make it a crime to defraud and deceive the Government in patent application proceedings.

The introduction of such legislation at this time appears particularly appropriate and necessary for several reasons. First, Senator HART's patent reform legislation has focused interest on improvement of the patent system and the protection of its integrity. Protection of the public against fraud is one of the stated aims of this reform legislation, and my amendment would complement and supplement such efforts.

Second, despite the existence of provisions in the Criminal Code which forbid the making of false statements to Government agencies (18 U.S.C. 1001) and forbid conspiracies to defraud the United States (18 U.S.C. 371), it would appear that little law enforcement action has been taken against such fraudulent conduct. As far as I am aware, the Department of Justice has not brought a single criminal prosecution in recent years against such frauds. Either existing law is inadequate, and I assume that it must be, or the Department of Justice needs to be reminded that law enforcement in this important area of our economy is highly necessary. The monopoly which our patent laws grant to those who develop new ideas is justified in order to encourage invention, but it is a monopoly which must be strictly controlled. Fraud in obtaining such monopoly rights which can involve, as in the drug cases, millions of dollars, must be severely punished. I believe that specific legislation directed against patent frauds is essential and should be included in the general patent reform legislation we will act on in this Congress.

I ask unanimous consent that this amendment to the Patent Reform Act of 1973 be printed in the RECORD at this point, along with a supplementary memorandum on section 34.

There being no objection, the amendment and memorandum were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AMENDMENT NO. 553

On page 12 line 37 insert the following new section:

“§ 34. FALSE STATEMENTS TO OR DEFRAUDING THE PATENT OFFICE.

“(a) Any person is guilty of a misdemeanor who, in connection with any patent examination proceeding or other matter involving a function of the Patent Office—

“(1) intentionally makes a statement in respect to a matter which is a significant factor in the proceeding or function—

“(a) which is a false statement, and he knows that the statement is false or he makes it in reckless disregard to its truth or falsity; or

“(B) in which he knowingly fails to disclose any facts or other matters—

“(i) the disclosure of the same therein he knows or should know is necessary to prevent the statement, or a prior statement relating thereto, from being misleading when considered as a whole; or

“(ii) a duty to disclose the same therein has expressly been imposed by any provision of this title, regulation prescribed by the Commissioner pursuant to this title, or other law relating to this title; or

“(2) intentionally submits or invites reliance on any writing he knows is false, altered, mutilated, edited, or otherwise lacking in authenticity in any respect which is relevant to the proceeding or function; or

“(3) intentionally uses a fraudulent, deceptive, misleading or false trick, scheme, or device, or intentionally conceals or covers up relevant facts or other matters; or

“(4) causes the issuance of a patent to himself or another, or obstructs, impairs, hinders, or perverts such proceeding or function, by fraud, deceit, craft, trickery, or conduct proscribed by paragraphs (1), (2), or (3) of this subsection; or

“(5) conspires or attempts to do any of the foregoing; aids, abets, commands, procures, causes, or induces another to do so; or assists another to conceal his having done so.

“(b) Any natural person who commits an offense proscribed by paragraphs (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a) of this section shall, upon conviction thereof, be imprisoned for not more than six months, or fined not more than \$10,000, or both. Any corporation or other entity not a natural person which commits an offense proscribed by paragraphs (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a) of this section shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than \$50,000. Any natural person who commits an offense proscribed by paragraph 4 of subsection (a) of this section shall, upon conviction thereof, be imprisoned for not more than one year, or fined not more than \$50,000, or both. Any corporation or other entity not a natural person which commits any offense proscribed by paragraphs (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a) of this section shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than \$250,000. The punishment for offenses proscribed by paragraph 5 of subsection (a) of this section shall be that for the corresponding substantive offenses proscribed by paragraphs (1) through (4) of such subsection.

“(c) Each offense proscribed by subsection (a) of this section shall be deemed an offense that continues until the issuance of the patent or other termination of the fraudulent concealment of the offense, the statute of limitations shall not begin to run so long as the fraud remains concealed.

“(d) In any proceeding before any court of the United States in which facts come to the attention of the court, indicating that an offense proscribed by this section may have been committed, the court shall direct the clerk thereof to communicate such facts to the Attorney General and to the Public Counsel. If such facts come to the attention of any person admitted to practice before the Patent Office, he shall have the duty to communicate them to the Public Counsel. If such facts come to the attention of the Public Counsel, he shall communicate them to the Attorney General. If such facts come to the attention of the Attorney General,

he shall communicate them to the Public Counsel.

“(e) If any corporation or other entity not a natural person engages in conduct proscribed by paragraph (4) of subsection (a) of this section, and derives pecuniary gain therefrom, it shall forfeit to the United States a civil penalty of three times such pecuniary gain, or ten percent of its net sales of products covered by the patent or affected by the proceeding or function, whichever is greater. Any civil action instituted pursuant to this subsection must be filed within two years of the government's discovery of the defendant's conduct, or else it shall be barred.

“(f) The United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any civil or criminal action, or other proceeding, instituted pursuant to this section. To that end its process shall run throughout the jurisdiction of the United States.”

MEMORANDUM ON SECTION 34

Draft Section 34 is a proposed amendment to S. 1321, Senator HART's patent reform bill completely revising Title 35 of U.S. Code.¹ It would provide criminal penalties for making false statements to the Patent Office or defrauding it. Much of this draft section tracks the language of present 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1001.² The language used here, however, is more specific and is specifically directed to patent fraud. Moreover, the Title 18 provisions define felonies, while proposed section 34 defines a series of misdemeanors. It should be noted that the new Criminal Code proposed by the Administration would substantially modify the present Title 18 provisions, and their applicability to Patent Office proceedings might well be severely limited.³

Subsection (a) of section 34 defines five misdemeanors. First, it is made unlawful to make an intentional false statement or to make a statement in which material information is withheld which is necessary to prevent the statement from being misleading when considered as a whole. This provision is based on the second clause of present § 1001, although the language is more specific. Second, it is made unlawful to submit forged or falsified documents to the Patent Office. This provision corresponds to the third clause of present § 1001. Third, it is made unlawful to use a fraudulent trick, scheme, or device, or to conceal or cover up facts in a Patent Office proceeding. This provision corresponds to the first clause of present § 1001. The fourth paragraph of subsection (a) prohibits defrauding the Patent Office (procuring a patent from it by fraud). This provision differs from the previous provisions in that success in defrauding the Patent Office, over and beyond deception, is an element of the violation. Finally, the fifth paragraph of subsection (a) prohibits conspiring, attempting, aiding, and abetting the violation of one of the four preceding paragraphs of the subsection.

Subsection (b) makes violations of the first three paragraphs of subsection (a) punishable by a fine of \$10,000 and/or six months imprisonment (for natural persons) or a \$50,000 fine for corporations. The penalty for violation of the fourth paragraph (which covers successfully obtaining a patent by means of the kinds of misconduct prohibited by the first three paragraphs) is imprisonment for up to one year and/or a fine approximately five times as high as that provided for violation of the other paragraphs.⁴ Conspiracies, attempts, etc. have the same punishment as the corresponding substantive offenses.

Subsection (c) provides that the offenses involved here are continuing and they are not deemed completed until the end of the Patent Office proceeding. The statute of limitations, therefore, begins to run only then. Also, fraudulent concealment of the offense tolls the running of the statute of limitations. These provisions are consistent with

present law in other fields of fraud, although not necessarily present 18 U.S.C. § 1001.⁵ Thus, in treble damage antitrust cases, the statute of limitations is tolled while the conspiracy remains undiscovered.⁶

Subsection (d) provides that courts and patent practitioners who discover that fraud has been committed on the Patent Office should report this to the Public Counsel and the Attorney General. This comports with Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B) of the ABA Code for Professional Responsibility.⁷ Moreover, the courts have also recognized the duty to report fraud to regulatory agencies.⁸

Subsection (e) creates a governmental civil penalty action against corporations who procure patents by fraud and then derive pecuniary gain from the offense. The penalty is three times the gain or ten per cent of net sales, whichever is higher. The purpose of the civil penalty is to provide a punishment more likely to fit the crime than will an ordinary criminal fine.

Finally, subsection (f) provides that the District of Columbia, which is the official place of business of the Department of Commerce, will be the forum for cases brought under this section.

FOOTNOTES

¹ H.R. 7111 (Owens and Mezvinsky) is the House bill corresponding to S. 1321.

² 18 U.S.C. § 371 provides:

If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.

18 U.S.C. § 1001 provides:

Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

The statute prohibiting obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C. § 1505) is generally inapplicable to this type of fraud. It provides, in pertinent part:

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness in any proceeding pending before any department or agency of the United States, or in connection with any inquiry or investigation being had by either House, or any committee of either House, or any joint committee of the Congress;

Shall be fined not more than \$5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

This provision appears to be inapplicable unless force or bribery or similar "corrupt" means are involved.

³ S. 1400, § 1343, corresponds to present 18 U.S.C. § 1001. It punishes any person who "in fact, in a government matter . . . knowingly makes a material false statement; . . . knowingly omits or conceals a material fact in a written application for a pecuniary or other benefit; . . . or knowingly uses a trick, scheme, or device which is misleading in a material respect. . . ." § 1301 of the bill corresponds to present 18 U.S.C. § 371. It punishes any person who "intentionally obstructs, impairs, or perverts a government

function by defrauding the government." S. 1, § 2-6D2 (McClellan), is similar to S. 1400, § 1343. All of these provisions define felonies and none is specifically geared to the problem of fraudulent procurement of patents.

⁴ These penalties are proposed on a tentative basis. The present Sherman Act penalties are a fine of no more than \$50,000 and/or imprisonment of not more than one year. The present 18 U.S.C. § 371 and § 1001 penalties are \$10,000 fine and/or five years.

⁵ In *Bramblett v. United States*, 231 F. 2d 489 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (Fahy, J.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 503 (1956), however, the court found that a trick, scheme, or device to cover up a material fact was a continuing offense, analogous to a conspiracy.

⁶ See, e.g., *General Electric Co. v. City of San Antonio*, 334 F. 2d 480, 483-485 (5th Cir. 1964) (collecting cases).

⁷ DR 7-102(B) provides:

A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:

(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal.

(2) A person other than his client has perpetrated a fraud upon a tribunal shall promptly reveal the fraud to the tribunal.

⁸ See, e.g., *Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co.*, 417 F. 2d 147, 154-155 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970) (duty of issuer to report broker's fraud to SEC).

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATION AUTHORIZATION ACT, 1974—AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 554

(Ordered to be printed, and to lie on the table.)

Mr. BUCKLEY submitted an amendment, intended to be proposed by him to the bill (S. 9286) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1974 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each Active Duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and the military training student loads, and for other purposes.

AMENDMENT NO. 552 (MODIFIED VERSION)

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. GOLDWATER, by unanimous consent, submitted a modified version of amendment No. 552, intended to be proposed by him to House bill 9286, supra.

The amendment is as follows:

AMENDMENT NO. 552 (MODIFIED VERSION)

SEC. . . (a) Title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding the following new section at the end of chapter 101:

"§ 2004. Detail of commissioned officers of the military departments as students at law schools

"(a) The Secretary of each military department may, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, detail commissioned officers of the armed forces as students at accredited law schools, located in the United States, for a period of training leading to the degree of bachelor of laws or juris doctor. No more than twenty-five officers from each military department may commence such training in any single fiscal year.

"(b) To be eligible for detail under sub-

section (a), an officer must be a citizen of the United States and must—

"(1) have served on active duty for a period of not less than two years nor more than six years and be in the pay grade O-3 or below as of the time the training is to begin; and

"(2) sign an agreement that unless sooner separated he will—

"(A) complete the educational course of legal training;

"(B) accept transfer or detail as a judge advocate or law specialist within the department concerned when his legal training is completed; and

"(C) agree to serve on active duty following completion or other termination of training for a period of two years for each year or part thereof of his legal training under subsection (a).

"(c) Officers detailed for legal training under subsection (a) shall be selected on a competitive basis by the Secretary of the military department concerned, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. Any service obligation incurred by an officer under an agreement entered into under subsection (b) shall be in addition to any service obligation incurred by any such officer under any other provision of law or agreement.

"(d) Expenses incident to the detail of officers under this section shall be paid from any funds appropriated for the military department concerned.

"(e) An officer who, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, is dropped from the program of legal training authorized by subsection (a) for deficiency in conduct or studies, or for other reasons, may be required to perform active duty in an appropriate military capacity in accordance with the active duty obligation imposed by regulations issued by the Secretary of Defense, except that in no case shall any such member be required to serve on active duty for any period in excess of one year for each year or part thereof he participated in the program.

"(f) No agreement detailing any officer of the Armed Forces to an accredited law school may be entered into during any period that the President is authorized by law to induct persons into the Armed Forces involuntarily. Nothing in this subsection shall affect any agreement entered into during any period when the President is not authorized by law to so induct persons into the Armed Forces."

"(b) The table of contents of chapter 101 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding the following new item at the end thereof:

"2004. Detail of commissioned officers of the military departments as students at law schools."

AMENDMENT OF SMALL BUSINESS ACT—AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENT NOS. 555 AND 556

(Ordered to be printed, and to lie on the table.)

Mr. STEVENSON submitted amendments intended to be proposed by him to S. 2482, to amend the Small Business Act.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENT NO. 524

At the request of Mr. FULBRIGHT, the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY) was added as a cosponsor of amendment No. 524 to the bill (H.R. 9286) the Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1974.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

THE VICE PRESIDENT

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, with the commencement of presentation of evidence to the grand jury in Baltimore today, the controversy surrounding the Vice President enters a new phase. It would be improper for me, as a member of the bar, to comment on that evidence which is now an element of a judicial proceeding.

It would be equally inappropriate for me, as a Member of the Senate, to make any statement that might imply the slightest degree of pre-judgment on an issue that may come to the Senate for final disposition.

At the same time, it is incumbent on me to say that the Vice President, like every American in a similar situation, is entitled to a presumption of innocence. If the Constitution is to guarantee the rights of the humblest American, it must safeguard the rights of every American without any exception.

CHILE

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the situation in Chile, and its relationship to the foreign policy of the United States, deserve the most careful and sober attention of the Senate, of the policy-making officials of the executive branch, and of the American people generally.

There is much to be learned from this tragedy, but we are likely to draw the wrong conclusions unless we put the recent events in their proper context.

Chile has long been justly regarded as one of the most democratic, civilized, and advanced countries of Latin America and, indeed, of the world. It suffered from few of the surface appearances of underdevelopment as these are generally measured by economic statistics. It had one of Latin America's highest per capita gross national products and one of the highest literacy rates. It had a well-developed infrastructure and flourishing, stable political institutions, all within a climate of freedom. It was essentially a middle class country, a nation of shopkeepers and petit bourgeoisie.

It also had a rigid social structure and serious maldistribution of wealth and income. Most of the time since World War II, it has suffered from chronic inflation which, even under conservative governments in the 1950's, reached 80 percent a year. Its principal source of foreign exchange, copper, was largely owned by foreigners. Its economic growth rate during the 1950's and 1960's rarely exceeded 2 percent and in some years was negative.

For at least 12 years, the most notable political fact in Chile has been the general movement to the left all across the political spectrum except for the right, which remained anchored somewhere in the 18th century. In 1964, with a good deal of covert help from the United States, the Christian Democratic Party came to power under the leadership of Eduardo Frei. Frei promised a "revolution in freedom," which was seized on in the Washington of that era as the hope of the Alliance for Progress.

American aid poured into the country,

reaching a high point of \$242 million in a single year and amounting to well over a billion during the decade of the 1960's.

Frei introduced some reforms, but nothing fundamental in the country changed. In the 1970 presidential election, Salvador Allende won a three-way race with 36 percent of the vote as the head of a leftist coalition composed principally of the Socialist and Communist Parties in uneasy alliance. Allende himself was a Socialist and an avowed Marxist. U.S. covert involvement in the 1970 election campaign appears to have been minimal, certainly in comparison with 1964. However, the Allende victory sent shockwaves through at least a part of the Government and the business community. The frantic efforts of the International Telephone & Telegraph Co. to keep Allende from taking office have been well documented in the hearings of the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations under the chairmanship of the distinguished Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH).

The final scheme presented to ITT by the CIA was essentially a plan for economic warfare. The principal instrument would be a cutoff of credit which would result in a deteriorating economic situation which, in turn, would result in the fall or overthrow of Allende. The plan was rejected by ITT 3 years ago as unworkable, and it was never adopted by the CIA. But, in effect, it is what happened.

The reasons it happened, however, are a good deal more complicated. Allende's election indicated a polarization of Chilean politics; his policies after taking office increased that polarization. There was also a fragmentation of the poles, especially on the left. The Socialists in Allende's coalition pressed for ever more radical policies and in many instances took things into their own hands, leading workers in occupying factories and peasants in occupying farms. The Communists preached moderation. In the opposition, the Christian Democrats split and vacillated between compromise and opposition. The right-wing National Party remained obstinate.

Allende began by decreeing substantial wage increases. This had the immediate effect of increasing demand and of absorbing unused industrial capacity. It also resulted in better living standards for the lower class. But it was not accompanied by capital investment and when industrial capacity was fully utilized, there was no further expansion of production. Hence, inflation which had been bad to begin with, got worse and shortages of almost everything appeared. The situation was aggravated by a chaotic condition in both industry and agriculture, brought on by a flight of managers and technicians from the country, by government intervention of plants and factories or their seizure by workers with consequent disorganization of management, and by a drastic upset of the agricultural sector.

The situation was further aggravated by the drying up of foreign credits. U.S. economic assistance, which had already been reduced to \$26 million in 1970, the last year of the Frei administration, was further cut to \$9 million in 1971, and

most of this was food for peace distributed through voluntary agencies.

More economic problems came in late 1972 when small businessmen, led by truckowners, went on a prolonged strike. This was settled when Allende brought Gen. Carlos Prats, then the Army Chief of Staff, into the government as Minister of the Interior. Congressional elections were held peacefully in March 1973, and the Allende coalition got 43 percent of the vote, a significant increase from its percentage in 1970 but still leaving it with a minority position in Congress. Inflation got worse, rising from 200 percent in 1972 to a rate of 300 percent in mid-1973. Businessmen struck again.

The armed forces were brought back into the government, but to no avail. However, it is significant that in the weeks before the coup d'état of September 11, the top commanders of the army and air force were replaced. In both cases, they resigned in frustration. In the case of the army in particular, there was also pressure from the officer corps. Their successors were appointed by Allende and were the next ranking officers, but were also more strongly opposed to the government. Allende was also under great pressure from the navy to replace its commander with a more conservative officer, and it may have been his failure to do so which triggered the coup.

In any event, the picture of Chile which emerges over the last year or two is of a society falling apart and of an economy which almost literally ceased to function. Extremists on both left and right made it impossible for moderates to survive, and in Chilean terms, both Allende and General Prats were moderates.

The lessons in all this for the United States are two:

First, if you are caught in enough lies, nobody is going to believe you even when you are telling the truth.

Second, a good many things which we really should not have been doing but which seemed relatively harmless are coming back to haunt us.

The U.S. Government has flatly denied any involvement in the coup. I have not seen any credible evidence to the contrary, at least so far as direct involvement is concerned. But I have been surprised by the number of letters and telegrams I have received which assume that there was U.S. involvement. In this connection, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks an article by Chalmers M. Roberts entitled "The U.S. Integrity Gap" in the Washington Post of September 19, and an article by Carl T. Rowan entitled "Chile Is Our Tragedy as Well" in the Washington Star-News of the same date.

The second lesson is related to the first. While refusing to give Chile credits for economic purposes, we have nonetheless continued to extend credits for purchases of military equipment. True, these were not very large—\$10 million in 1972—but now we find that equipment being used to overthrow a freely elected government which we did not like. Further, there is the matter of U.S. naval vessels being

near Chile at the time of the coup. They were there in connection with Operation Unitas, an annual series of inter-American naval exercises in which the United States carries out maneuvers with a number of Latin American navies. This year, the maneuvers with Peru had just been completed and the American ships were en route to join Chilean ships. When the coup occurred, the American ships were diverted and never, as I understand it, came closer than 150 miles to the Chilean coast. Their presence in the area, however, and the scheduled joint maneuvers provided a pretext for the Chilean Navy to put to sea shortly before the coup and thereby not to have its ships in a Chilean port if the coup failed.

But whatever may be the real explanation of what happened in Chile September 11, we are now faced with the question of the future. The present commanders of the Chilean Armed Forces are taking a much harder line toward supporters of the Allende regime than was anticipated by many observers of the Chilean scene. Although reports of mass executions have not been confirmed, there have been mass arrests and I have reason to believe the casualties, both military and civilian, are much higher than the junta has so far admitted. Most un-Chilean of all, we have seen news photographs of bonfires of books unhappily reminiscent of the pictures from Nazi Germany 40 years ago. This is no doubt a reflection of the polarization which I mentioned earlier and which seems to have been more pronounced even than it appeared.

Two specific factors are also probably involved. One is the series of changes in command of the armed forces. In fact, what we have seen in Chile may not be one coup, but two—the first within the armed forces themselves when moderates were replaced by hard liners, and the second when the hard liners overthrew the civilian government.

In addition, the military probably encountered—perhaps is still encountering—more opposition than it bargained for.

Allende could not govern Chile because he had the support of only 40 percent of the people. Even with guns, the military may have trouble governing Chile with 40 percent of the people against them. It is reasonable to assume that the continued economic deterioration of the last 6 months brought some falling off in Allende's support from the high point of 43 percent in the elections last March, but even allowing for this, the military will still have to deal with a substantial and incorrigible minority, many of whom are armed and even more of whom may feel that the gains they have made in recent years in both living standards and self-respect are now threatened.

A continued policy of repression and brutality in Chile will alienate even further large and vocal segments of public opinion in the United States, and in other countries as well. This is especially the case with respect to treatment of the thousands of political exiles from other Latin American countries who are now in Chile. At a minimum, they should not be sent back to their countries of origin from which they fled, and I am glad to note reports from Chile that the junta has

indicated this will not be done. At a maximum, if they are no longer welcome or comfortable in Chile, efforts should be made to help them migrate to some other country where they would be welcome.

The question of U.S. recognition of the military government has already been settled. Many people will take recognition as a gesture of approval when in fact it is not, or should not be. In this connection, I call attention to Senate Resolution 205, agreed to September 25, 1969, which expresses the sense of the Senate—

that when the United States recognizes a foreign government and exchanges diplomatic representatives with it, this does not of itself imply that the United States approves of the form, ideology, or policy of that foreign government.

I do think the administration should be congratulated on avoiding the mistake of its predecessor with respect to a somewhat analogous coup d'état in Brazil in 1964 when the White House embraced the new government with unseemly haste and the Secretary of State publicly offered to reinstitute an aid program.

We still face the question of U.S. policy toward Chile generally. I hope there will be no resumption of the aid program, though I anticipate that there will be growing pressure for it. Taking past administration statements at face value, Chile would again become eligible for aid if the new government settles, or begins negotiating in good faith to settle, disputes with American investors. We do not yet know what the attitude of the new government will be on this issue. There have been indications that it would welcome foreign investments, though probably not undo the expropriatory actions of its predecessor, particularly as these relate to copper.

We do know, however, that the Chilean economy is in a desperate condition, and it is reasonable to expect that voices will soon be raised urging a bail-out operation. I can hear them now: The new government saved Chile from chaos and communism; American aid is all that stands between the new government and unspeakable horrors. That is an argument which I trust will be rejected.

I commented earlier on the administration's lack of credibility. Nothing would be more calculated to impair this credibility still further than a policy of treating the new government of Chile better than its predecessor.

I am not, of course, laying down a prescription for eternity. One of the sources of difficulty in our foreign policy has been our failure to adapt to change in the world—in China, in Cuba, and elsewhere. Indeed, one of the reasons for the widespread skepticism, to use the mild word, of the administration's protestations of innocence in the Chilean coup is precisely our past failure to adapt to change in that unhappy country.

All I am saying today is that we should keep our policy open and flexible until we see what kind of government this new one in Chile turns out to be, or whether it even survives.

Finally, Mr. President, it is worth noting the public reaction in the United

States evidenced by the telegrams, letters, and even long-distance phone calls received by the Foreign Relations Committee. These number in the thousands—a large, but by no means unprecedented, volume. What is unprecedented is their unanimity. Not one expresses approval, or even acceptance, of the coup. On the contrary, they express dismay, strong suspicions of U.S. involvement, and deep concern over the fate of Chilean supporters of the Allende regime and of the foreign exile community in Chile. They indicate a depth of public feeling which should be taken into account, both in Washington and Santiago.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE U.S. INTEGRITY GAP

(By Chalmers M. Roberts)

The take-over in Chile by a military junta has demonstrated that the U.S. government in general and the Nixon administration in particular is suffering from a credibility gap. Allegations that the coup was engineered, or at least encouraged, by Washington through the Central Intelligence Agency are being made around the world. The administration, while conceding that it did have some advance tips that the take-over was coming, denies that it had any part in the affair and, specifically, that the President had heard the reports in time to do anything about them, even if he had wished to do so.

The CIA starts out with several strikes against it. After all it is well known that the agency did engineer a coup against the leftist government of Guatemala in 1954; that it had a hand in saving the Shah of Iran's throne in 1952; that it tried unsuccessfully to topple Sukarno's government in Indonesia; that it was central to the fiasco at the Bay of Pigs; that it has been involved in intrusions into Communist China; and that it conducted for years a secret war in Laos. President Nixon himself recently referred to the Iranian affair without mentioning the CIA role. He finally conceded, last year, that two Americans long held by China were, in fact, CIA operatives. And so on.

As to Chile, the CIA says its hands are clean. But it is on the public record that John McCone, the former head of the CIA, offered a big chunk of money to the agency on behalf of his new employer, International Telephone and Telegraph, to help prevent Salvador Allende from coming to power. So it is not likely that those who want to believe the CIA is involved in the anti-Allende coup will give the CIA a clean bill of health. As for those who hope, or even believe, that the CIA has learned some lessons or been reined in, it is not very easy to accept, on their face, the current CIA denials. Maybe they are true; but just maybe they are not.

But it isn't just a matter of the CIA; it's President Nixon himself. When you consider his record for dissembling, it makes you wonder about Chile.

During the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon campaign, candidate Kennedy proposed strengthening the anti-Castro forces. But candidate Nixon, who then was the Vice President, knew about the secret Bay of Pigs plan and, to protect the prospects of that invasion, he had to "go to the other extreme" and attack the Kennedy proposal as "dangerously irresponsible," as he himself has written. In short, he lied to cover the operation. More recently, as President, Mr. Nixon secretly authorized the undisclosed bombing of Cambodia while telling the public that the United States was not violating that country's neutrality. As to Laos, he admitted American involvement only when forced to do so by a Senate in-

vestigation. In time we shall probably hear of other similar cases now still hidden.

In short, Mr. Nixon's record of credibility hardly encourages one to accept protestations of innocence in Chile. It reminds me of Thurston the Magician who used to show you how empty his sleeves were; he then proceeded to pull from them an amazing assortment of cards, scarves and other paraphernalia of his trade.

In the case of the Bay of Pigs Mr. Nixon, writing in his "Six Crises," never questioned the propriety or legality of the operation against Castro. "The covert operation had to be protected at all costs," he wrote. There is nothing in the Nixon record to indicate that he has in any way altered that point of view. Indeed, the justification in the Watergate case for trying to head off an FBI investigation of the Mexican money transactions was essentially the same. In short, the end justifies the means whenever the end is a matter affecting "national security."

President Nixon's aversion, to put it mildly, to the Allende regime was well known. His administration kept on supplying military aid while withholding economic help; international organizations were encouraged not to help Allende. The American ambassador had just made a quick trip back to Washington and had returned to Chile prior to the takeover. Put it all together and the only conclusion one can come to, given the record, is no clear conclusion—and a reasonable doubt about any official conclusion offered by the government.

Perhaps not directly related to Chile but part of the Nixon backdrop to his foreign policy methods is his penchant for surprises, for the quick switch, and for secrecy. Dollar devaluation, the change in China policy, the "Nixon shocks" to Japan, the mining of Haiphong harbor—even the switch to Phase I economic controls here at home—all testify to this style of doing business. Who can guess what he may have in mind for Latin America, where Henry Kissinger says he wants to institute new policies?

Integrity is perhaps the most precious asset that a government can have. The sad fact is that in the post-World War II decades successive administrations have eaten away at governmental integrity. One has only to recall President Roosevelt and the secret Yalta agreements, President Eisenhower's handling of the U-2 affair, President Kennedy's initial covert operations in Indochina and the panoply evasions by President Johnson as documented in the Pentagon Papers. By the time Mr. Nixon got into the White House, government integrity had indeed suffered.

Somewhere along the line Mr. Nixon became entranced with General Charles de Gaulle's idea of the "mystique" of high office, of holding aloof from the public, of treating the public like school children in a "papa knows best" manner. He is not the first President to act this way; it seems to be a failing of those chief executives in particular who have been quickest to wrap themselves in the "national security" blanket. But as President, Mr. Nixon has carried it to hitherto unknown extremes.

Perhaps the United States had no direct role in the Chilean affair; there certainly was reason enough, in internal Chilean terms, for the take-over, without judging the right or wrong of it. But this administration's credibility is so low, who can believe its denials?

CHILE IS OUR TRAGEDY AS WELL

(By Carl T. Rowan)

It is conceivable that U.S. military attaches and CIA operatives in Santiago had nothing to do with the military coup in Chile, or the death of Marxist President Salvador Allende. But all the propaganda resources the United States can muster will not convince many Latin Americans.

"I can't prove it, but I firmly believe it," the old Argentine leader Juan Peron said

when asked if the United States had overthrown Allende. "I know all about this process. I believe it could not have been otherwise," he added.

That pretty well sums up the suspicions of the overwhelming majority of Latin Americans, whatever their ideology. There has simply been too much testimony in the U.S. Senate, too much media publicity about CIA and ITT schemes to crush Allende, for such suspicions not to exist.

Another reason why U.S. denials of involvement evoke skepticism in Latin America and even here: The maze of lies and cover-ups revealed in the Watergate hearings has created a climate in which the tendency everywhere is to expect the worst of this government and believe none of its denials.

That is why this first Chilean coup since 1931 could become almost as big a tragedy for the United States as for Chile itself. Somewhere in the U.S. government there may be gleeful handshaking over the demise of Allende, who was, in fact, a demagogue who brazenly ordered Cinderella and Sleeping Beauty rewritten so as to give children Marxist indoctrination. He was a constant headache for U.S. leaders. Some Americans surely are proud that arms we poured into Chile made it possible for the military to topple him.

But only a fool will overlook the fact that Allende was not the creator of the basic problems the United States faces; he was just a symbol of new awakenings in Latin America with which this country has been loath to deal.

It was not just a litany of the leftists when Allende shouted to the United Nations that Latin America remains poor and underdeveloped because it is exploited by huge U.S. corporations which make phony pretenses of "investing" in Latin American countries.

On a recent trip to Latin America I heard that same charge, spoken with angry passion, from the lips of presidents and foreign ministers who are Christians and capitalists and in no way inclined to communism.

Contempt for the multinational corporations already was at unprecedented levels in many countries, and a lot of these firms will suffer in the wave of resentment over the Chilean coup.

No matter how innocent and uninvolved U.S. officials may have been, it will be clear to almost everyone that the coup-makers can retain power only with U.S. arms. Every intelligent Latino will look to see how much the junta relies on the loans and grants that the United States denied Allende.

Whatever the short-term advantages of "ridding" Latin America of its first elected Marxist ruler, we cannot ignore the fact that the Chilean coup pumped a lot of new anti-U.S. venom into the hemisphere.

As a long-range matter it is sad to ponder—except for those who believe that there is nothing to worry about because, whenever U.S. interests are seriously threatened, there will always be a few armed friends ready to stage another coup.

TRIBUTE TO SENATOR GOLDWATER

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, the current issue of *Newsweek*, October 1, 1973, contains a tribute to the junior Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) that I commend to all our colleagues. Once again, his principled stands, his "tough, long-viewed and carefully balanced judgments" are receiving the broad recognition and respect they have always so richly deserved. I ask unanimous consent that the *Newsweek* article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

IN HIS HEART, HE KNOWS HE'S RIGHT

For all its Pogo-esque complement of villains, white knights, fools and folk heroes, the Nixonian crisis that now ranges from Agnew to Watergate has yet to produce its first statesman, its first detached but responsible overseer. Congressional Democrats by definition have too great a partisan interest to fill the role, and GOP liberals have not been able to figure out what stance to take. But in the vacuum, the tough, long-viewed and carefully balanced judgments of conservative Sen. Barry Goldwater have taken on increasing weight through the long months—and an increasingly outspoken series of recent interviews and newspaper articles have only augmented Goldwater's reputation as perhaps Capitol Hill's most conscientious voice in the whole wretched affair.

Goldwater professes to believe that Mr. Nixon did not know of the break-in ahead of time, nor of the massive coverup afterward—though in private the senator has conceded that the precise truth may never come out. In either case, Goldwater argues that the enormous pileup of national problems has made Watergate an indulgence and a preoccupation that the country can no longer afford. On these grounds, he has urged that the Senate Watergate committee move its remaining hearings behind closed doors—at the same time stressing that the Administration cannot move ahead without "a complete clearing of the air," including release of "selected portions of the Watergate tapes."

Goldwater has taken an equally uncompromising stand on the Vice President problems—and since he is one of the potential stand-ins for Spiro Agnew in Washington's current fever of rumors, his plain speaking may not seem quite so disinterested. If Agnew is indicted, Goldwater said last week, "then I think he would consider resigning"—a statement that those close to Goldwater take to mean that the senator will surely suggest that Agnew resign if the Vice President does not do so voluntarily. If Agnew goes, however, it is problematic whether Mr. Nixon would name Goldwater to succeed him; the senator's hard-line position on the Presidential tapes has hardly endeared him to Mr. Nixon. "Don't rule out the possibility of Goldwater reacting very, very harshly [toward Nixon]," said an intimate, "if the Supreme Court indicates that Nixon must turn over his private tapes to Federal prosecutors."

Goldwater's position springs partly from loyalty; he is plainly worried about the GOP's fate in next year's Congressional elections, with not only the White House scandals but massive economic problems to answer for. As the man who began his Presidential campaign in 1964 with the now-regretted slogan that "extremism in defense of liberty is a vice," Goldwater was horrified that the storm-trooper tactics of Mr. Nixon's palace guard should have been branded "Goldwaterism." "Barry's speaking out was a severe jolt to those who don't understand the difference between principled conservatism and the kind of government by reprisal the White House was giving us," said one liberal GOP senator recently. By his judiciousness in the case of Agnew—whom Goldwater has supported for the GOP nomination in '76—the once-debated Arizona conservative is emerging as the most respected man in his party.

STATEMENT BY DR. WERNHER VON BRAUN TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCE

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, in an inspiring 30 minutes before the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences' second day of hearings on the state of aerospace industry, our faith in the accomplish-

ments of man for the benefit of mankind was forcefully affirmed by the testimony of Dr. Wernher von Braun. Our country needs to dream and accomplish great things without fear of acting and with hope for the future.

I ask unanimous consent that the testimony of Dr. Wernher von Braun be printed in the RECORD for the benefit of Senators.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY DR. WERNHER VON BRAUN

Mr. Chairman—Gentlemen—I am Wernher von Braun, Vice President, Engineering and Development, Fairchild Industries, Inc. It is a pleasure and an honor to be here. I was associated with all of the other gentlemen who are appearing before this committee throughout our manned spaceflight program and consider it a privilege to be among them.

I have not had the opportunity to hear all of their testimony, but I am sure there will be some repetition in what I have to say. However, if you will bear with such redundancy, there are a few points that I feel are significant.

World leadership and technological leadership are inseparable. A third-rate technological nation is a third-rate power; politically, economically and socially. That is the reason that I have always felt that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, which has rightfully been called the "cutting edge of our technological progress", bears a grave responsibility for the future of our nation. Whether we like it or not, ours is a technological civilization. If we lose our national resolve to keep our position on the pinnacle of technology, the historical role of the United States can only go downhill.

NASA and thousands of others in the U.S. industry and in our universities have placed man on the moon. In December of this year, Pioneer 10, following a trip of half a billion miles will pass within 87,000 miles of the planet Jupiter to transmit back the most detailed picture man has ever seen of that giant planet. Once the spacecraft has completed that mission, it will not return to earth. With Jupiter's powerful gravity acting as a sling-shot, Pioneer 10 will be hurled right out of our solar system. It may coast through the emptiness of interstellar space for maybe 100 million years before it gets close to one of the nearest fixed stars.

While Pioneer 10 and its successor Pioneer 11, which is also on its way to Jupiter, are expressions of man's indomitable spirit to explore the unknowns that surround us, NASA is doing a great deal of pioneering work of more direct significance to our life here on earth. In aviation, for instance, NASA is conducting much R&D with a view to protecting the environment and relieving air traffic congestion. This work encompasses study of jet engines for cleaner and quieter operations, environmental impact of high altitude and supersonic flight, wing and fuselage shapes suitable for cruise flight close to the speed of sound, and ways to reduce airport noise levels. In addition, NASA has also entered the much neglected field of research in support of general aviation.

The NASA programs that have taken man into space are now legend: Mercury, Gemini, Apollo. A sizable fleet of satellites is circling the earth, helping man with his earthly chores in numerous ways. In addition to communications and weather satellites, the concept of versatile earth observation satellites is now being demonstrated by ERTS-I and by the earth resources experiments in Skylab. Speaking of Skylab, our astronauts Alan Bean, Owen Garriott and Jack Lousma, as you all know, returned to earth the day before yesterday after successfully completing a 59-day mission in a space station.

They have brought the extensive Skylab research and observation program completely

back on schedule. For a while, as you gentlemen will remember, this elaborate program was in serious jeopardy when Skylab's micrometeoroid shield was ripped off, and the station became overheated and deprived of most of its electrical power. Speaking of the second Skylab crew's happy return, let me add that I just learned that *Arabella*, the space spider that quickly learned spinning webs in zero gravity, returned with them.

The reusable Space Shuttle is, of course, NASA's major space project of this decade. It will establish a new way of utilizing our new foothold in outer space. The same can be said of the Applications Technology Satellite No. 6 (ATS-F) slated for launch in the spring of 1974.

It is to these two programs that I would like to address the substance of my remarks this morning, for the Space Shuttle and the communications satellite programs are, in my view, the most promising space programs for the "here and now".

It is sad to say, but there are some who even now would scuttle the Shuttle. In my opinion, this would be a disastrous mistake because it would deprive this country of many of the economical and social space benefits now becoming available to us as a result of our previous national multi-billion dollar space investment. Antagonists of the Shuttle say that we should not spend hard-earned tax money on such a costly new technology program as long as we are still surrounded by so many crying social needs. But, we should never forget that it is in the nature of all social programs that they are wealth consuming.

The Space Shuttle, with all it can do for man down here on earth, is a good example of a wealth producing program. And we will continue to need promising wealth producing programs to support our direly needed social programs. There is an old Chinese proverb that illustrates the situation quite well: "Give a boy a fish and you feed him a meal. Teach a boy to fish and you feed him for a lifetime." I also cannot emphasize too strongly how unfortunate I feel it is that budget limitations seem to be forcing NASA to abandon its fifteen-year involvement in the further development of advanced technology for communications satellites. Caught in a budget pinch, even inside NASA the argument has been made occasionally that communications satellites have developed into such an industrial success story that private enterprise should be able to raise enough R. & D. money to experiment with more advanced but still unproven communications technologies.

From my new vantage point in a private corporation which is deeply involved with advanced communications satellites, let me assure you, gentlemen, that this is wishful thinking. Customers, whether domestic or international, want satellite communications channels with a guaranteed revenue-producing life of seven years or more, and they don't care a hoot what technology you use, as long as it is well-proven. On the other hand, the potential of technological advancement in this new field, whose surface we have hardly scratched, is almost unlimited. There is great potential in the use of higher frequencies, in laser beams communication, in switching satellite beams by ground signal from one ground target to another, in increasing satellite transmitting power so the cost of ground stations can be drastically reduced, to name just a few. In the fiercely competitive environment of the rapidly expanding communications satellite market, no private company can take the gamble of offering unproven technologies to its customers.

The few commercial giants in the communications fields may indeed be the only ones who can afford to sink a few million dollars here and there in a little experimentation with new-fangled ideas, but their overall record in advancing the field of communications satellites has been so disappointing that the Federal Communications

Commission wisely decided to open up the field to a pack of lively, smaller and less sated competitors. If NASA were to discontinue permanently its pioneering technology work in the communications satellite area, it would virtually reverse that FCC policy and give the game back to the established monopolies who, in view of their vast investments in old-fashioned wire communications, never had much of an incentive to explore the satellite potential in the first place.

The space program has done a lot of wonderful things for the human spirit, for the advancement of science and for the direct benefits of man. Only history can properly assess the lasting significance of these contributions to the human spirit and to science. When it comes to the direct benefits, however, we can make some judgment now, and I would give the highest rating to the communications satellite.

I have spent most of my life, particularly the past fifteen years, working toward putting man in space. Eighteen months ago, I left the space agency filled with a feeling of deep gratitude for the unprecedented opportunities NASA had offered me to make a contribution in that fascinating program. Looking for a suitable spot in industry, I wanted to be helpful in expanding the tremendous potential of communications satellites, in particular their use for audio-visual education. It was for this reason that I joined Fairchild Industries which has long been a leader in this field.

There is no field in which the goals of space applications are expanding at a faster rate than in the field of communications. Ever since NASA demonstrated that radio signals bounced off passive reflection satellites such as the Echo balloon or rebroadcast by active repeater spacecraft such as Early Bird, worldwide communications by satellite have been growing by leaps and bounds. Satellites, by providing international telephone and television service, are an important force in overcoming regional and national barriers. It is difficult to maintain hostility and isolation in the presence of free communications.

I would like to review with you, briefly, where we are now, what our plans are for the immediate future, and share my speculations about satellite communications, both domestic and international, toward the end of the century.

Yesterday, I was due to make an address in San Diego, California. Unfortunately, my doctors' advice prevented my making the trip. Therefore my remarks were transmitted via a specially rigged television hookup over a domestic communications satellite. I told my audience in San Diego at the Eleventh Annual Conference of the Tele-Communications Association, "I am speaking to you from my offices at Fairchild Industries near Washington, D.C. My voice is being transmitted by land line to the nearby facilities of the American Satellite Corporation. From there the signal is transmitted to Canada's domestic satellite ANIK II. In San Diego, a transportable ground station has been set up by TelePrompTer Corporation to receive the satellite signal. And a control center in a mobile van processes the signal into the picture you see on the screen."

This method of conveying a talk, or of linking a whole conference of widely scattered participants together via ad hoc television hookups, will soon be commonplace in our country. But let us not get complacent. Though the United States may be a leader in technological know-how, other nations are presently ahead of us in the pragmatic development of domestic communications satellite systems.

Earlier this year, Rudy Pudluk, an Eskimo at Resolute on a Canadian island far above the Arctic Circle, picked up a telephone and called General Peletier, the Canadian Minister of Communications in Ottawa. Pudluk's call began commercial operations of North

America's first domestic satellite communications systems, Telesat Canada. Called ANIK (which means "brother" in Eskimo), it is the world's first satellite for domestic use to be put into synchronous orbit like those of the trans-ocean Intelsat satellites.

ANIK I, launched in November 1972, has been joined by ANIK II, both stationary with respect to the earth, 22,300 miles high over the equator and the eastern Pacific where they view Canada from coast to coast. Since one satellite is sufficient to cover Canada, the second merely gives additional channels and serves as standby.

The Soviet Union has a satellite system linking the vast stretches from Kiev to Vladivostok. The vast overland distance of Brazil, once an overwhelming obstacle to communications, will soon be no more than an inconvenience of the past. That South American nation, larger than the United States, plans by 1975 to have its own Domestic Communications Satellite System. In addition to carrying telephone calls and television programs to the largely undeveloped Brazilian hinterland, it will serve thousands of small jungle schools with audio-visual TV education.

International satellite systems are now in their fourth generation serving 88 member nations of the Intelsat community. Until recently, the technical requirement was to keep the space element as light and simple as possible and to absorb whatever complexity and cost this required in the ground station. As a result, the spacecraft have only relatively modest radiated power while the ground stations are highly sophisticated multi-million dollar installations. Today, that philosophy is changing.

With the capability of putting larger and larger payloads into orbit, and with the advent of the reusable Space Shuttle to service and repair larger satellites, even nations with limited fiscal resources can put in a network of smaller, far less expensive ground stations. Intelsat's successes have caused many countries to begin investigation of satellites as a means of solving their domestic communications problems. It must be remembered that while there are only 88 members in the Intelsat system, the consumers or users are beginning to number into the millions.

Most of these nations are looking at next generation equipment which will put radiated power into orbit and permit acquisition of a number of relatively inexpensive earth stations priced at a fraction of today's costs. These systems contemplate a total communications operations supplementing the existing ground communications network and serving a variety of users, including educators, law enforcement agencies, health care agencies, the scientific community, military services and business organizations.

Brazil is one of these nations. At the moment it has only one Intelsat satellite ground station near Rio de Janeiro. I recently visited that station and was told it was far more difficult to get a telephone call from one of the smaller cities in Brazil's back country to that ground station than from there to Los Angeles or Paris. In some of the developing countries in Africa, it is even worse. While they are proud owners of a single Intelsat ground station, the local hookup to their widespread users is still by tom-tom.

At this moment, thanks to NASA programs initiated a few years ago, the United States is still quite active in that area of pioneering new technology for communications satellites.

Next spring, NASA's ATS-F (for which my own company, Fairchild, is prime contractor) will be orbited. It will be the first of a new generation of advanced spacecraft. As only one of its many functions, it will be the first satellite to provide "direct TV broadcast." This means the satellite is powerful enough to beam its TV signal directly to small, inexpensive roof-top antennas and on into a normal TV receiver.

Like its Canadian brothers ANIK I and

II, ATS-F will be operating from a synchronous orbit position 22,300 miles above the equator. But ATS-F will be relaying back voice and video classroom instruction to small dish antennas mounted atop some 500 school houses in the Rocky Mountains, Appalachia and Alaska. Tying together the existing ground based communications systems into a regional network, it will broadcast an hitherto impossible range and variety of user-designed curriculums in childhood education and career development.

Many educators feel the ultimate impact on learning of this novel system could prove the most important advance since movable type as a method of reaching people now separated by vast geographical, economic and cultural barriers.

In 1975 the ATS-F will be literally "walked" from its Western Hemisphere meridian to a position over the Indian Ocean. With ATS-F on a one-year loan, India, under international agreement, will start a test program where education programs will be beamed into 5,000 receivers located in 5,000 remote Indian villages. As the program progresses, India plans to acquire its own educational satellites and use them as the main tool to carry elementary as well as adult education to its 500,000 villages, in a resolute attempt to break the back of illiteracy which for centuries has impaired its economic growth. I recently spent several weeks in India and I was told that for India, just as important as these educational programs—the three R's in the morning for the kids, and agricultural education in the afternoon for the grownups—may be suitable entertainment programs in the evening. Nothing, I was told, would be more effective in fighting India's most troublesome problem, the population explosion.

But let me return to the domestic scene. Just three weeks ago, following several years of debate, the Federal Communications Commission announced a decision which will allow at least six companies to proceed with the development of a domestic satellite system that will serve the entire United States.

I see a tremendous future for this venture. These satellites will not just support the television networks and carry telephone calls. The venture will offer a wide range of services for both civilian and military uses. The system will connect computers for nationwide operations. Hotel reservations and airline ticketing may well be accomplished through the system, as will be distributor support and inventory controls. By reducing the necessity for much business travel and a resultant reduction in air pollution and conservation of petroleum resources, it will even have a long-term beneficial effect on our environment and energy crises.

Visualize the world after the communications explosion—where disaster warning is a universal reality. I refer not just to storm or hurricane watching, but also forecasting of drought and famine; to be able to know where and when emergency action will be needed to combat national disasters.

Think of the finest library being available (via satellite facsimile) to the remotest outpost. A world where telemedicine brings the benefits of expert consultation to the rural doctor—where Nobel Prize lecturers speak to high school classes—where ships at sea and aircraft in flight have quality telephone service.

During the balance of this decade and through the 1980s, we will see the wholesale introduction of domestic satellite systems with capabilities tailored for each nation's needs.

Human language evolved because man felt the need to communicate information and abstract ideas. Communications satellites will enable man to carry education and enlightenment to the remotest hamlets. Thus, space development—once derided as a luxury which only the richest nations can afford—is beginning to provide the only solutions to one of the most difficult problems facing all

nations—rich and poor alike—effective communications.

Mr. Chairman, Gentlemen—May I suggest that you give these matters your most earnest consideration. . . . I thank you for allowing me to meet with you today and make these remarks.

CHARLOTTE OBSERVER EDITOR APOLOGIZES TO SENATOR HELMS

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, this morning I received a very comforting letter from an obviously responsible member of the staff of the Charlotte Observer, published in the largest city of my State.

The author of the letter, Mr. James K. Batten, is, in fact, executive editor of the Charlotte Observer. That newspaper did not support my candidacy last year; it has rather constantly been critical of my activities and positions in the Senate. There have been times, Mr. President, when—to be frank about it—many of my friends have wondered if there might not be some deliberate attempt on the part of this newspaper to misrepresent my various positions.

Be that as it may, Mr. President, the letter I received today from Mr. Batten demonstrates that he has a definite sense of fairness and decency. I did not solicit this letter. I have never mentioned the headline in question. I have always felt that there is great wisdom in that old axiom to the effect that "if you cannot stand the heat, you ought to stay out of the kitchen."

So I am comforted by Mr. Batten's obviously high personal standards and journalistic ethics. I commend him, and thank him.

I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that Mr. Batten's letter be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE CHARLOTTE OBSERVER,
Charlotte, N.C., September 25, 1973.
Hon. JESSE HELMS,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR HELMS: We were appalled, as you undoubtedly were, at the tone and total inaccuracy of the page one headline on the story about your proposed compromise in the Joyce Kilmer Memorial Forest dispute. The story appeared in The Observer of Monday, September 24.

I believe all the editors involved now understand the gravity of such an error. It was an inexcusable departure from the standards we try hard to uphold.

We apologize to you and redouble our own determination to avoid such mistakes in the future.

Sincerely,

JAMES K. BATTEN,
Executive Editor.

NEVER FOUND A CONVINCING ARGUMENT FOR FAILURE TO RATIFY GENOCIDE CONVENTION

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, said former Justice Arthur J. Goldberg, testifying before a Senate subcommittee in March 1971:

When I was United States ambassador to the United Nations, I was often asked to explain our failure to ratify the genocide convention. Frankly, I never found a convincing answer. I doubt that anyone can.

The fact is, Mr. President, there is no convincing argument. The United States was a major proponent of the Genocide Treaty at its negotiation almost 25 years ago.

The U.N. General Assembly voted unanimously to approve the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide at Paris' Palais de Chaillot on December 9, 1948.

The treaty, which formally outlaws "acts committed with an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group," has subsequently been signed by 75 nations. We, who should have been the first to sign the treaty, may well be among the last.

Indeed, the United States led the way in formulating the original treaty. It was the United States that insisted that a specific intent to commit genocide must be proven before an offender could be punished.

Not only must we admit that we were wrong not to sign this treaty 25 years ago. We must right that wrong. I ask that we ratify the Genocide Treaty in this session of Congress.

JOHN HAMILTON

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, yesterday's Washington Star-News carried a report of the death of a distinguished Kansan.

John Hamilton was born in Fort Madison, Kans., and went on to establish a noted career as a lawyer and State legislator before coming to Washington in 1935. As Republican national committeeman from Kansas, general counsel, and eventually as national chairman, Mr. Hamilton was a leading figure in the Republican Party for many years. His assumption of the party chairmanship came at the urging of his fellow Kansan, Gov. Alf M. Landon, who was the Republican 1936 Presidential candidate.

Mr. Hamilton established a tradition of professional leadership for the party by being the first chairman to receive a salary in the period between Presidential campaigns. He was also the first Kansan to serve as national chairman, and I know I speak for Wes Roberts—the other Kansan in addition to myself to fill this post—in expressing a sincere tribute to Mr. Hamilton's contributions to our party and to the American political system.

I am sure many of the senior Members of the House and Senate recall Mr. Hamilton and his work for the Republican Party, and I ask unanimous consent that the Star-News article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JOHN HAMILTON IS DEAD, WAS CHAIRMAN OF GOP

John D. M. Hamilton, 81, a former Kansas state legislator who was chairman of the Republican National Committee from 1936 to 1940, died Monday in a Clearwater, Fla., hospital. He lived in Clearwater Beach.

Mr. Hamilton, a lawyer, was a senior partner in the Philadelphia firm of Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz and also a director of Glenmede Trust Co. in Kansas.

When Mr. Hamilton was voted a salary of \$25,000 by the Republican National Committee's executive committee in 1936 it was the first time the committee chairman had been put on a full-time salary basis in the interim between presidential campaigns.

Mr. Hamilton was widely known in political circles as a talented speaker and enthusiastic campaigner.

He was born in Fort Madison, Kans. At one time Mr. Hamilton was a probate judge. During his four years in the Kansas House of Representatives he was speaker of the house. He was defeated in 1928.

Mr. Hamilton stepped into the national political picture in 1932 after the death of the then-Kansas national committeeman. He was chosen by presidential candidate Alf Landon to become committeeman, and was nominated in 1934 for the chairmanship at the first national committee meeting he attended. He was defeated, but was chosen general counsel for the committee and became attached to the Washington headquarters in 1935.

He helped organize the Midwestern grassroots Republican convention in Springfield, Ill., in 1935.

Mr. Hamilton leaves his wife, Rosamond K.; a daughter, Mrs. Laura H. Trott of Menlo Park, Calif., six grandchildren and five great-grandchildren.

Graveside services will be held tomorrow in Lancaster, Pa. The family requests that expressions of sympathy be in the form of contributions to the Morton Plant Hospital, Clearwater, Fla.

THE HOPE AWARD TO DR. KISSINGER

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, on Tuesday, September 25, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger was accorded an honor which is not only prestigious, but highly appropriate for our new Secretary of State. Secretary Kissinger received the Hope Award for International Understanding. This award is given in memory of President Eisenhower and is sponsored by Project Hope, which operates the hospital ship, the U.S.S. *Hope*.

The Hope Award salutes Secretary Kissinger for his great efforts in the cause of peace over these recent years. Moreover, it reminds us that President Eisenhower was pledged to the same goals that marked Secretary Kissinger's breakthroughs in international understanding through the negotiations in Paris, Hanoi, Peking, and around the world. As President Eisenhower once said:

There is no place on this earth to which I would not travel, there is no chore I would not undertake if I had any faintest hope that, by so doing, I would promote the general cause of world peace.

Finally, this award is a testament to the mercy ship U.S.S. *Hope*, a ship of peace that calls no port alien where there are people to be helped.

Mr. President, I am certain my colleagues join me in congratulating Dr. Kissinger for the great honor he has brought to America's striving for peace among all nations.

OFFICE FOR SPANISH-SPEAKING AMERICAN AFFAIRS

Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, today I am joining 15 Senators in cosigning a letter to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Mr. Caspar Wein-

berger, urging him to reconsider his decision to eliminate the Office of Spanish-Speaking Affairs within the Office of Education.

This Office was created in 1966, originally as the Office of Mexican-American Affairs. Later its name was changed, and its duties were expanded to meet the needs of all of the Nation's Spanish-speaking people.

Since its inception the Office has helped guide Spanish-speaking educators through Washington's bureaucratic maze. Within the Federal Government the Office has also served as a vigorous advocate of programs designed to meet the needs of the Spanish-speaking community. I recently received a letter from Dr. Salomon Flores, the director of programs for the Spanish-speaking at Chicago State University, detailing the constructive assistance which he has received from the Office. Dr. Flores noted that—

This Office has been one of the few offices serving Mexican Americans that has come in contact with decisionmakers in Washington.

Despite the proven effectiveness of the Office, the Nixon administration now proposes to eliminate it. It has already cut the Office's staff from seven to three, and the present budget for the Office is only \$50,000.

This action is another example of the administration's indifference to our Spanish-American citizens. Last year I advocated increased Federal funding for bilingual education programs under title VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. In testimony before an Appropriations Subcommittee, I pointed out the many inequities in the funding of education programs for Spanish-speaking children, particularly in my own State of Illinois. Despite the Office of Education's assurances of more equitable administration of the bilingual programs, it now appears that Illinois has received less funds under this program for fiscal year 1974 than it did in fiscal 1973. Not only are new funds not available, but existing programs—such as the one we are concerned with today—are being cut back.

I do not consider maintaining the amount that we spend in our efforts to assure equality of opportunity for Spanish-speaking Americans an example of "excessive spending." Unless programs such as this are continued, the Spanish-speaking people of Illinois and the Nation will be unable to overcome the language and cultural barriers that deprive them of full participation in American life. I want to see this rich country do better by all of its foreign-language-speaking residents. We can afford it. We cannot afford to fail them.

Mr. President, I strongly urge the Secretary to reconsider his ill-conceived decision.

I ask unanimous consent that the letter from Dr. Flores, dated August 21, 1973, addressed to me, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AUGUST 21, 1973.

Hon. ADLAI E. STEVENSON III,
U.S. Senate,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR STEVENSON: It has come to my attention that the Office for Spanish Speaking American Affairs, in the U.S. Office of Education of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, is soon to be terminated. This Office has been one of the few offices serving Mexican Americans that has come in contact with decision makers in Washington. This office has provided Mexican American educators throughout the nation with invaluable services. It has played a constructive advocacy role, and presented the urgent need for federal support for educational programs that will improve the socio-economic status of Spanish-speaking people in this country.

The role this office has played in helping direct and guide Spanish-speaking educators to the appropriate bureaus and divisions to present proposals has proved invaluable. Keeping us informed on current legislation and guidelines concerning federal resources available for education projects that will help us attain our educational objectives has been another of its many services.

I urge you to contact Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare; Sidney Marland, Under Secretary for Education; and John Ottina, Commissioner of Education, concerning their plans, and request your support in our efforts to keep the Office in question in operation.

Cordially,

DR. SALMON FLORES.

THE GRAND INQUEST OF THE NATION

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, one of the most distinguished legal and constitutional authorities in this Nation is Prof. Raoul Berger of the Harvard Law School. Professor Berger has written a thoughtful article for the current issue of Harper's magazine entitled "The Inquest of the Nation."

This article is drawn from Professor Berger's forthcoming new book "Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth." I found the article, as I have other statements by Professor Berger, to be a wise and highly informed discussion of the current constitutional crisis facing our Nation. I strongly urge my colleagues in the Senate to read it.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Professor Berger's article be printed in the RECORD:

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE GRAND INQUEST OF THE NATION (By Raoul Berger)

"Although remarks made by others in conversations with the President may arguably be part of a criminal plan on their part, the President's participation in these conversations was in accordance with his constitutional duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed. It is the President, not those who may be subject to indictments by this grand jury, who is claiming executive privilege. He is doing so, not to protect those others, but to protect the right of himself and his successors to preserve the confidentiality of discussions in which they participate in the course of their constitutional duties, and thus ultimately to protect the right of the American people to informed and vigorous leadership from their President

of a sort for which confidentiality is an essential prerequisite. . . .

"The President has concluded that it would be detrimental to the public interest to make available to the special prosecutor and the grand jury the recordings sought as Item 1 of the subpoena. That decision by the President is in itself sufficient cause for this court to proceed no further to seek to compel production of those records."

—from a brief filed August 7, 1973 by attorneys for President Nixon in support of the President's refusal to obey a subpoena from Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox.

Executive privilege is the shorthand for the Presidential claim of constitutional authority to withhold information from Congress. Richard Nixon's deployment of this claim to protect his documents and aides against inquiry by Congress and the courts poses an issue that transcends a jurisdictional squabble among the branches of government—it goes to the heart of our democratic system. He who controls the flow of information controls our destinies.

The fact is that executive privilege—root and branch—is a myth, without constitutional basis and the best evidence that can be mustered for it is a series of self-serving Presidential assertions of a power to withhold information. On this issue, in fact, we have the testimony of Mr. Nixon himself. When Congressman Nixon was riding to glory on the trail of "fellow travelers," the FBI, on instructions from President Truman, refused to deliver an FBI report to a Congressional investigating committee. On the House floor, Mr. Nixon rejected the proposition that "the Congress has no right to question the judgment of the President. I say that the proposition cannot stand from a constitutional standpoint, or on the basis of the merits." History demonstrates that Congressman Nixon was right and President Nixon is wrong.

Since the Supreme Court has traditionally looked to English history for the meaning of common-law terms and practices embodied in the Constitution, in particular for the inquisitorial function as an "inherent attribute" of the "legislative power" given to Congress, it is quite relevant to note that the power of parliamentary inquiry begins as an auxiliary not to the power to legislate, but to the power to impeach—on the common sense ground that one does not first indict and then inquire whether there was just cause. In a random sampling of parliamentary debates at different periods, stretching from 1621 to 1742, I found that legislative oversight of administration had been exercised across the board: inquiries into corruption, the basis for legislation, the conduct of war, execution of the laws, disbursement of appropriations—in short, into every aspect of executive conduct. Foreign affairs, about which American presidents have traditionally drawn a curtain of secrecy, were not excepted.

It is striking that no member of the Nixon and Eisenhower administrations, when executive privilege reached its most extravagant proportions, has advanced a single pre-1787 precedent in English history for executive refusal to turn over information to the legislature. I found none. Thus, whereas Congress's power of inquiry is solidly based on the precedents of Parliament, there is no pre-Convention historical basis for the claim that the power to withhold information from the legislature was an attribute of the Executive. All inferences are to the contrary.

That the Founding Fathers were aware of this inquisitorial attribute or "legislative power" is demonstrated by four or five references in the Constitutional Convention and the several ratifying conventions to the function of the House as the "grand inquest of the nation." There is not the slightest intimation that the Founding Fathers intended to

curb the functions of the grand inquest in any way. We need to recall that Madison stated: "In a republican government the legislative necessarily predominates. This minimally carries overtones of the traditional parliamentary oversight about which James Wilson, second only to Madison as an architect of the Constitution, rejoiced in 1774: "The proudest ministers of the proudest monarchs have trembled at their [the legislators'] censure; and have appeared at the bar of the house, to give an account of their conduct and ask pardon for their faults."

Taking no notice of this history, the thirty-seventh President of the United States has chosen to build his right to withhold information from Congress on the doctrine of separation of powers. But resort to the separation of powers assumes that the Executive was given a withholding power upon which legislative inquiry encroaches. The separation of powers does not grant power; it merely protects power elsewhere conferred. And since the Convention did not confer on the Executive the power to refuse information to the legislature, a Congressional requirement of information from the Executive does not encroach on powers confided to the Executive; it does not violate the separation of powers.

The Act of 1789 confirms that the separation of powers was not designed to reduce the grand inquest function. The Act made it:

"The duty of the Secretary of the Treasury . . . to make report, and give information to either branch of the legislature in person or in writing (as he may be required), respecting all matters referred to him by the Senate or the House of Representatives, or which shall appertain to his office."

The Act contains no provision for executive discretion to withhold information, and there is no reference whatsoever to such discretion in the legislative history of the Act. It was drafted by Alexander Hamilton, who, as a member of the Convention and co-author of *The Federalist*, knew well enough whether an unqualified duty could be imposed on the executive branch to furnish information to Congress. Adopted by the First Congress, in which sat some twenty Framers and Ratifiers of the Constitution, and signed by President Washington, who had presided over the Convention, this Act can hardly be deemed in violation of the separation of powers. It constitutes a vitally important legislative-executive recognition that, under the Constitution, the separation of powers had no application to Congressional inquiry.

Let me now return to the right and duty of Congressional inquiry as a prelude to impeachment, bearing in mind that the Constitution makes express provision for impeachment of "The President, Vice-President and all civil officers." The President, we should remember, was not looked at with awe in 1787 but with apprehension. As if cognizant of parliamentary history, Congressman Lyman stated in the house in 1796 that the "power of impeachment . . . certainly implied the right to inspect every paper and transaction in any department, otherwise the power of impeachment could never be exercised with any effect." And in 1843, a committee of the House stated:

"The President himself, in the discharge of his most independent functions, is subject to the exercise of this power—a power which implies the right of inquiry on the part of the House to the fullest and most unlimited extent."

Given that, historically, inquiry could precede impeachment, and that the Constitution expressly provides for impeachment of the President, this statement seems to be incontrovertible. It was confirmed by President Polk in 1846:

"If the House of Representatives, as the grand inquest of the nation, should at any time have reason to believe that there has

been malversation in office by an improper use of application of public money by a public officer, and should think it proper to institute an inquiry into the matter, all the archives and papers of the Executive Department, public or private, would be subject to inspection and control of a committee of their body and every facility in the power of the Executive be afforded to enable them to prosecute the investigation [my emphases].

This corresponded to parliamentary history and the incorporation of that history by the Founding Fathers. Clearly, the claim of an implied power to withhold information cannot be allowed to defeat the express power to impeach, or to take such measures as will make impeachment effective.

Consequently, President Nixon errs in asserting that "the manner in which the President exercises his assigned executive powers is not subject to questioning by another branch of the Government." Mr. Nixon needs to be reminded that Chief Justice Marshall rejected the notion that the President was immune from subpoena in the trial of Aaron Burr and held that President Jefferson could be required to deliver to Burr a letter written to Jefferson by Gen. James Wilkinson, who was implicated in the Burr conspiracy. In consequence, there is no Presidential immunity that can be shared with the Nixon aides. Furthermore, since "all civil officers" are impeachable by the terms of the Constitution, they are subject to inquiry without the leave of the President. Impeachment, said Elias Boudinot in the First Congress, enables the House "to pull down an improper officer, although he should be supported by all the power of the Executive." The point was made again and again by, among others, Abraham Baldwin, who had been a member of the Convention.

My search of the several Convention records, let me repeat, turned up not a shred of evidence that the President was empowered to withhold any information from Congress. Nor was such a power secreted in the intricacies of the "Executive power," which the Framers conceived largely as a power to execute the laws. The lawmaking body, as Parliament showed and Montesquieu recognized, has a legitimate interest in examining how its laws are being executed. Since the Framers were at pains *expressly* to authorize the President to "require the opinions in writing of the principal officers in each of the executive Departments," they were hardly likely *sub silentio* to give him carte blanche to cripple the recognized functions of the grand inquest.

The Commander-in-Chief power, described by Hamilton merely as that of a "first General," at best authorizes severely limited withholding from Congress; for example, the time and place of an attack on, say, Normandy Beach. And it was on Congress, we must recall, that the vast bulk of the power to initiate and wage war was conferred. In the treaty-making provision, the President was joined to the Senate; and discussion of this provision in the several Conventions shows that the Senate was meant to participate in the *making* of treaties at every stage. Withholding of information in these areas attests arrogant usurpation rather than constitutional authorization.

On this score, finally, there is a notable constitutional provision, the force of which has not been sufficiently appreciated—the Framers authorized secrecy in only one case, and then by Congress, not the President. Article I, Section 5(3) requires Congress to keep and publish journals except "such part as may in their judgment require secrecy." This provision encountered rough going, being harshly criticized by Wilson, George Mason, Elbridge Gerry, Patrick Henry, and also by Jefferson. To allay the fear of this secrecy provision, its proponents explained that it had very restricted scope. John Marshall stated in the Virginia Convention that the debates "on the propriety of declaring war" and the like could not be conducted

"in the open fields," and said, "In this plan, secrecy is only to be used when it would be fatal and pernicious to publish the schemes of government."

In light of the denial to Congress of a limitless power to conceal, how can one derive an implied grant of such a power to the Executive? On the contrary, as the Supreme Court held in analogous circumstances, the express authorization for limited discretionary secrecy by Congress and the omission of a similar provision for the President indicates an intention to withhold such authority from him. What might momentarily be concealed from the public by Congress had to be divulged by the President to Congress if the senior partner in government was to participate in making those momentous decisions which were temporarily to be kept secret.

In sum, parliamentary practice (which the Supreme Court has held lies at the root of the legislative power of inquiry) and the intention of the Framers establish a comprehensive power of inquiry, an anti-secrecy tradition, which leaves no room for an "uncontrolled" Presidential discretion to withhold information from Congress.

President Nixon tells us that "executive privilege" was first invoked by Washington. There were two incidents which can be briefly recounted. First, there was the 1792 House inquiry into the disastrous St. Clair expedition against the Indians. Washington turned over all the documents; "not even the ugliest line," stated his biographer Douglas Freeman, "on the flight of the beaten troops was eliminated."

Mr. Nixon's reliance on St. Clair is based, not on *refusal* of the documents, but on Jefferson's notes of a Cabinet meeting at which it was agreed that the "House was a grand inquest, therefore might institute inquiries," but that the President had discretion to refuse papers "the disclosure of which would injure the public." These notes, however, are hardly reconcilable with the 1789 Act that Washington had signed earlier, and that permitted unqualified inquiry. What little value as precedent may attach to the notes vanishes when it is considered that only four years later Washington himself did not think to invoke the St. Clair "precedent" in the Jay Treaty episode—the precedent upon which Mr. Nixon next relies—and instead stated his readiness to supply information to which either House had a "right," such as the Senate had to treaty documents.

Jefferson's notes did not find their way into the government files, and there is no evidence that the meditations of the Cabinet were ever disclosed to Congress. The notes were found among Jefferson's papers after his death and published many years later, among his *ana*, which he described as "loose scraps" and "unofficial notes." There this "precedent" slumbered until it was exhumed by Deputy Attorney General William P. Rogers in 1957! It is a dispiriting testimonial to the effectiveness of executive propaganda that *Time* magazine could say of this incident, "Washington released the documents but he warned that never again would he turn over papers that might reveal secrets or otherwise would be 'injurious' to the public."

The first authentic assertion of power to withhold information from Congress was made by Andrew Jackson in 1835. Jackson refused a request by the Senate, which wanted to investigate frauds in the sale of public lands, that he turn over the charges that had led to his removal of Gordon Fitz his Surveyor General. He acted on the ground that the inquiry "would be applied in secret session" and therefore deprive a citizen of a "basic right," that of a "public investigation." Measured against historical precedents, Jackson was plainly wrong. The Supreme Court has held in *Watkins v. United States* (1957) that the "inherent power of Congress to conduct investigations [compre-

hends] probes into the departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste." It would be insufferable if the President were able to shield documents revealing the corruption by removing the official.

Jackson's strictures failed to sway his successors, Buchanan and Polk, for both expressly recognized the plenary power of Congress to investigate suspected executive misconduct. Polk's unqualified recognition of a Congressional power that could "penetrate into the most secret recesses of the Executive Departments" is a far cry from President Nixon's "sanctity" of the FBI files, and from his attempt to immunize members of his staff from an investigation into their knowledge of a criminal conspiracy. It would be stale and unprofitable to rehearse subsequent Presidential assertions of a right to withhold information from Congress, for the last assertion stands no better than the first—repetition does not legitimate usurpation. In the words of the Supreme Court in the 1952 "Steel Seizure Case": "That an unconstitutional action has been taken before surely does not render that same action any less unconstitutional at a later date."

Let us focus, rather, on that branch of executive privilege which, according to President Nixon, was "designed to protect communications within the executive branch" and is allegedly "rooted in the Constitution." What the President conceives to be "rooted in the Constitution" was in fact first born in 1954, to fend off Senator McCarthy's savage assaults on Army personnel by a directive that communications between employees of the Executive Branch must be withheld from Congress so that they may "be completely candid in advising with each other." Overnight, this "doctrine" was expanded to shelter mismanagement, conflicts of interest such as led the Supreme Court to set aside the Dixon-Yates contract, the inexplicable selection of high bidders, and so forth.

It is novel doctrine that the acknowledged power to probe "corruption, inefficiency or waste" does not extend to "candid communications" which are often at the core of such misconduct. Had that doctrine prevailed, many an investigation of corruption and maladministration—Teapot Dome, for example—would have been stopped in its tracks. Indeed, this was precisely the objection made by Congressman Nixon in criticizing President Truman's withholding of an FBI report: "That would mean that the President could have arbitrarily issued an executive order in the . . . Teapot Dome case . . . denying the Congress . . . information it needed to conduct an investigation of the executive department." Congress, declared the Supreme Court in *McGrain v. Daugherty* (1927), may investigate "the administration of the Department of Justice . . . and particularly whether the Attorney General and his assistants were performing or neglecting their duties . . . To shield communications between suspected malefactors would go far to abort investigation.

Eisenhower's claim that "candid interchange" among subordinates in an indispensable precondition of good government is an unproven assumption. Indeed, it is disproved by the fact that government functioned well enough from 1789 to 1954 without the benefit of this doctrine, and by the further fact that Eisenhower's withholding (under the umbrella of "candid interchange") of information respecting alleged maladministration of foreign aid in Peru was immediately countermanded by President Kennedy, with the salutary result that exposure lead to correction, not to the toppling of administration. In England, "candid interchange" was laughed out of court by the House of Lords in *Conway v. Rimmer* (1968). Against the debatable assumption that fear of disclosure may inhibit "candid interchange," there is the proven fact that such interchanges have time and again served as a vehicle of cor-

ruption and malversation—the latest example being the "interchanges" about Watergate within the White House—so that, to borrow from Lord Morris, "a greater measure of prejudices to the public interest would result from their non-production."

Even if there were an "established" doctrine of executive privilege, it is hard to imagine a sorrier occasion for its invocation than as a shield for White House aides, files, and recorded tapes of White House conversations from inquiry into the Watergate affair. Here is a criminal conspiracy to corrupt the election process that has already resulted in the conviction of two former White House aides, C. Gordon Liddy and E. Howard Hunt, and has ever-widening ramifications. Following the break-in was a massive cover-up designed to obstruct justice—in which former White House counsel John Dean confessedly participated and by his testimony implicated his superiors. These charges have been denied, and justice requires that the conflicting testimony be resolved by resort to documentary evidence contained in the White House files or in recorded conversations with the President. The invocation of executive privilege to shield these records thwarts justice and feeds suspicion that the President himself is implicated.

Were executive privilege, even though without constitutional roots, deemed a necessity of government, it should at most shield official action, not unofficial acts of a candidate campaigning for reelection, and certainly not criminal acts. It is a perversion of the separation of powers to convert it into a shield for crimes that would subvert the Constitution. George Washington, upon whose precedent Mr. Nixon heavily relies, took a quite different view. Upon hearing rumors of an inquiry into the conduct of Alexander Hamilton, his Secretary of the Treasury, Washington said, "No one . . . wishes more devoutly than I do that [the allegations] may be probed to the bottom, be the result what it will." He would have welcomed, not blocked, public exposure of "executive" tapes and papers.

"Executive privilege won't kill you," reassuringly states Roger Cramton, recently Assistant Attorney General. Those who insist that Congress needs more information, he says, labor under a "staggering misconception. The practical fact is that Congress gets most of the information that it wants from the executive branch. Except," says Cramton, "possibly in the foreign and military area, Congress is not hindered in making legislative judgments by the failure of the Executive to provide relevant information." That is a tremendous "except." The supply of information about imports of nuts and bolts does not compensate for the suppression of the Pentagon Papers, or the deliberate falsification of bombing raids over a neutral Cambodia. It does not make up for ten years of agonized escalation in Vietnam while Congress and the people were kept in the dark as to dismal expert evaluations and our shifting goals; for secret executive agreements with foreign powers for bases, troop commitments, and projected military aid running into the hundreds of millions. Nor does the supply of innocuous information in bulk balance the shrouding of evidence respecting White House participation in an unparalleled conspiracy. At the heart of "executive privilege" and the "can-dor" theory of immunity is the view that Congress and the people are the enemy, whereas the truth is that every officer is, or should be, more truly a servant of the people than of the President. Overriding loyalty to the President as Watergate shows, produces its own chamber of horrors.

"Executive privilege" is not therefore "rooted in the Constitution," but owes its being to the reluctance of Congress to assert its right and duty, in no small part because the President, through patronage, with-

holding of fat defense contracts, and other means of retaliation exercises great leverage on Congress. Even though executive refusals of information have often met with stinging protests by Congress, more often that body has shrank from confrontation. Nevertheless, if Congress was given a plenary power of inquiry—and it was—it cannot abdicate that power; it cannot divest itself of powers conferred upon it by the Constitution. If powers, said Justice Jackson, "are granted, they are not lost by being allowed to lie dormant." Congressional tolerance of Presidential infringement does not transform it into a constitutional right.

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF AERONAUTICS AND ASTRONAUTICS

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, in the brief period of my chairmanship of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences I have had the opportunity to come into contact with many fine organizations in the aerospace field. One of them, the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics—AIAA—has been singled out for special commendation in an editorial by Robert B. Hotz, editor in chief of the prestigious *Aviation Week & Space Technology* magazine. It is a pleasure to ask unanimous consent to print this editorial in the RECORD so that my colleagues in Congress can become better acquainted with this enterprising professional society.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FILLING THE VACUUM

(By Robert Hotz)

As the aerospace industry stalled out of its zoom climb to prosperity in the late 1960s and entered its worst period of adversity since the late 1940s, it became apparent that a great vacuum was developing in industry leadership. As it faced a succession of new problems in a changing and largely hostile environment, the industry drifted aimlessly and, except for a few outspoken individuals, without a voice to state its case and confront its critics. For the most part, industry leaders and the organizations that should have shouldered the new responsibilities of leadership were content to roll along as if the glamour world of the 1950s and 1960s still existed. Even the few who recognized that both the industry and its customers had lost much of their former public esteem counseled a low profile in the hopes that the good old days would automatically recycle.

Now it appears this leadership vacuum is being filled by an unlikely and surprisingly effective organization—the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. The AIAA was formed in 1963 by a merger of the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences and the American Rocket Society as the technologies to which these two professional societies were dedicated melded into the single enterprise of aerospace. Perhaps because its technology was slower to flower and when it finally happened the technological explosion propelled mankind into outer space, the Rocket Society was always livelier and more public-relations conscious than the staid high priests of the IAS representing a more established and then more prosperous segment of technology. Thus it was not surprising that in the merger the vitality of the Rocket Society staff, led by Jim Harford, naturally dominated the new organization and the good gray men of the IAS staff faded gently into obscurity. But their already out-of-date philosophy unfortunately lingered on behind them.

It took the shock of massive and sudden

unemployment among the engineers and scientists of its membership in 1970 to knock AIAA out of its ivory tower of professional detachment down into the hurly-burly of the real world where aerospace was getting battered in a critical crossfire. Since then AIAA has been remarkably agile and effective in responding to the real problems of aerospace and exercising perceptive leadership. These efforts have spread into the following areas:

EMPLOYMENT

Responding in early 1970 with its first experimental employment workshop in Los Angeles, AIAA has spearheaded an expanded and intensified engineering employment campaign aided by funds from the Dept. of Labor and support from other professional engineering societies. More than 25,000 unemployed engineers and scientists have gone through the AIAA employment workshops and another 15,000 through the Voluntary Engineers, Scientists and Technicians (VEST) program. More than 12,000 have found jobs through programs. Geoffrey Potter, AIAA administrator of member services, was a key man in organizing these programs, but AIAA's members working in their local environments are making them effective.

TECHNO-POLITICS

For years, the professional engineer disdained any interest in politics and deluded himself into the myth that they did not affect his livelihood. The AIAA leadership stepped into this vital area, moving its main 1972 meeting to Washington in an effort to stimulate greater awareness of what aerospace technology could offer among the legislators who determine national policies and funding priorities. After a shaky start in the right direction in 1972, the next year's meeting last January under the leadership of Edgar Cortright of NASA and USAF Lt. Gen. James Stewart, Aeronautical Systems Div. commander, was a smashing success in producing an effective blend of industry and government dialogue on technology. AIAA also conducted a detailed study on the technology and utility of new space transportation systems and broke the ice on Capitol Hill last spring by presenting its data to four congressional committees. When Preston Layton of Princeton, director of the study, Jim Harford and Jerry Grey, AIAA director of technical studies, finished this presentation, Sen. Barry Goldwater (R.-Ariz.) asked: "Where the hell have you guys been before?" Obviously, more of this type input is required.

URBAN TECHNOLOGY

The application of aerospace technology and techniques to other problems of society presents an obvious goal preceded by a thorny path. AIAA has jumped into this area where others have already given up and is sponsoring its third urban technology conference this week in Boston, again bringing its technical membership into contact with the politicians and civic groups whose problems so acutely require solutions.

YOUTH

Aerospace technology's future is seriously clouded by the current and understandable lack of the youth enthusiasm that attracted bright young people into this field for decades. AIAA is using its university-based chapters to operate with educational television stations to carry debates and discussions of current aerospace problems and progress into the academic atmosphere.

EXPORTS

But perhaps the most important area into which AIAA has moved is the leadership vacuum in the vital field of exports. There are several other organizations, including the Aerospace Industries Assn., which should take the lead in this area but just don't. Expanded exports have become vital to both the U.S. aerospace industry and the national economy's fight against a trade deficit. While some companies have been making fine indi-

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vidual efforts to expand into such new markets as China, the USSR and the eastern European countries, AIAA has emerged as a dynamic catalyst to broaden and strengthen these efforts in the peculiar manner required by the political systems of these countries. All of them would rather deal through a single, official-looking organization than with the western tradition of commercial competition. AIAA's tremendous success is building an aerospace trade bridge to the USSR with its Moscow exhibition last July was a spectacular demonstration of what can and must be done. In fact, the U.S. industry is already well behind the British and French on similar exhibitions in China. With the lack of any other organization willing or capable of blending U.S. government and industry efforts under a single tent, AIAA should push its advantage hard.

During the past three years AIAA has changed from a detached, professionally introverted organization into a vital force of leadership for the aerospace industry both domestically and on the international scene. Under the leadership of Ray Bisplinghoff, Allen Puckett and Holt Ashley, it is on the right track and merits strong support both from within its professional membership and externally from everybody with a stake in aerospace.

WILLIAM T. COLEMAN, JR., MEMBER OF THE BOARD

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, Peter H. Binzen in Thursday's Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, has painted a fascinating picture of an extraordinary man—William T. Coleman, Jr. Coleman, recently named by Black Enterprise magazine as one of 69 Philadelphia blacks who serve on white-controlled boards of directors, has a healthy, if unusual, view of the role of the black director.

Coleman asserts:

Blacks should not be picked because they're black—And whether a director is a black or Jewish or whatever, he should function as a board member, period, and not try to represent a particular constituency.

This is an interesting article about an interesting man.

I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE HUMAN SIDE OF BUSINESS: HE BRINGS ADDED DIMENSION TO THE BOARD

(By Peter H. Binzen)

Black Enterprise magazine published this month a list of all the American black men and women it could find serving as directors of white-controlled corporations and financial institutions. A Philadelphia lawyer named William T. Coleman Jr. was unimpressed.

"A lot of them are there just because they're black," said Coleman of the 69 men and three women listed in the national survey. "That's not the way to run a company. Maybe 10 or 15 are well qualified corporate directors. The rest were chosen for the wrong reasons."

Coleman himself made Black Enterprise's list. Made it in a big way. In fact, with one exception—educator and former U.S. Ambassador to Sweden Jerome Holland—no other American black serves on as many

boards of directors as does the 53-year-old Coleman.

PICKED FOR AMEX

Ten years ago not a single black sat on the board of a major U.S. corporation. Coleman joined his first board, Western Savings Bank, in 1968. Earlier this year he was elected to Philadelphia Electric Co.'s board.

Between these two directorships, he was picked for the boards of Pan American World Airways, First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Co., First Pennsylvania Corp., Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co., and the board of governors of the American Stock Exchange.

These boards meet monthly, and Coleman figures he attends 85 to 100 percent of their meetings. He also finds time to serve as president of the NAACP's Legal Defense Fund, special counsel and chief negotiator for SEPTA, Fairmount Park commissioner, vice president of the Philadelphia Art Museum, trustee for Rand Corp. and Brookings Institution, among many other activities and a busy law practice.

With his vest, his watch chain, his soft-spoken manner that masks a tough, razor-sharp intelligence, "Bill" Coleman, a social worker's son, fits easily into the polished elegance of corporate board rooms.

He was first in his 1946 class at Harvard Law School—a class that included Elliot Richardson, now U.S. Attorney General and godfather to Coleman's daughter, Lovida. Later he clerked for the legendary U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Felix Frankfurter.

FIGURE AT GIRARD

In 1952, he joined the big Philadelphia law firm that is now called Dilworth, Paxson, Kalish, Levy and Coleman. He's a senior partner, and senior partners in the most successful law firms here often make upwards of \$200,000 a year.

In civil-rights struggles, Coleman has worked effectively for social change without being militant. In the 1950s, he quietly persuaded a prominent builder to sell houses to Negroes. In the 1960s, he helped upset Girard College's whites-only enrollment rule.

He is currently arguing in Washington a key school desegregation case involving Richmond, Va., and its suburbs.

But in viewing his role as a corporate director, Coleman parts company with some other black directors.

For example, the Rev. Leon H. Sullivan says he accepted a General Motors directorship to "help my people." Henry G. Parks, the Baltimore sausage maker, told Black Enterprise he was put on First Pennsylvania Bank's board to be "a burr in the britches" on minority hiring.

Coleman, however, doesn't see himself as a representative of blacks or any other special constituency.

"I'm dead against that," he said. "Obviously, corporate boards of directors, in looking for good people, should not exclude blacks. But blacks should not be picked because they're black."

"And whether a director is black or Jewish or whatever, he should function as a board member, period, and not try to represent a particular constituency," he added.

DOES HOMEWORK

Robert Townsend, in his book, "Up the Organization," charged that the typical company director is "someone who barely knows the name of your company, your product or your problems. He ought to pay you to sit on the board."

Coleman, disputing this, says most of the directors he knows are alert, interested, effective. Certainly, he gets high marks from them as a man who does his homework and knows his business.

Cyrus R. Vance, former deputy Defense secretary at the Pentagon, sits on Pan Am's board with Coleman and recommended him for the Amex post. Of Coleman, Vance says:

"He's one of the ablest men I know—extraordinary versatile. Penetrating in his analysis. He follows up and makes sure he gets straightforward answers. A great board member."

With his close ties to Establishment figures, Coleman has a heavy stake in American free enterprise. With all of its imperfections, he thinks it works better than any other economic system.

"When government owns and operates the major means of production," he says, "you can't have the freedoms that are important to civilized people. The American capitalist system is the only system we can function under. It needs changes but, basically, it works fairly well."

PHILADELPHIA BLACKS ON BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Name: Wm. T. Coleman, Jr., position, lawyer; directorships: American Stock Exchange, First Penna. Banking & Trust Co., First Penna. Corp., Pan American World Airways, Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., Phila. Electric Co., Western Savings Bank.

Robert Evans, position, personnel director; directorship: Gino's Inc.

Ragan A. Henry, position, lawyer; directorship: Continental Bank.

Rev. Thomas J. Ritter, executive director, Opportunities Industrialization Center; directorship: Philadelphia National Bank.

Rev. Leon H. Sullivan, pastor, Zion Baptist Church; directorships: General Motors, Girard Bank, Philadelphia Saving Fund Society.

FEDERAL PAY RAISE DELAY

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I would like to announce my support of Senate Resolution 171, recently reported by the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service with a favorable recommendation, which disapproves of the alternate plan proposed by the administration to delay Federal salary increases scheduled for October 1. Based upon a study by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Federal Employees Pay Council has determined that Federal employees should receive a salary increase averaging 5.5 percent. I believe that it is a fair figure and it is incumbent on the Government to grant this increase to its employees immediately.

The committee report states that collective bargaining settlements in private industry have been on the order of 5 or 6 percent. Therefore, from the time the previous comparability study was made until July of this year, the cost of living had increased 6.6 percent. It seems to me that in view of these figures, a 5.5-percent salary increase is a modest one. Unfortunately, however, this increase will not even allow Federal employees' salaries to keep up with increases in the cost of living, and yet the President has proposed postponing it.

The Federal Pay Comparability Act give the President authority to set Federal pay rates comparable to private industry. Based on the BLS study, the Federal Employees Pay Council and the President's agent, which is the Civil

Service Commission and the Office of Management and Budget, each made a recommendation. The Employees Council has recommended a 5.5-percent increase and the agent a 4.7-percent increase. The President, who makes the decision with the further advice of a Federal Pay Advisory Committee, has not yet determined a rate, but has decided to postpone whatever increase will be granted.

As provided in the Comparability Act, either House of Congress can, by resolution, override the President's decision to postpone the increase. I hope that my colleagues will support the resolution so that the increase will become effective on October 1.

October 1 is the date that Congress selected for making such increases, but it was provided that the President could propose an alternative plan stipulating a later date when he deemed it advisable. This is the third time in the 3 years since the law was enacted that the President has proposed delaying the increase. Every year the President has found a reason to delay Federal comparability raises, but it certainly was not congressional intent to allow the President to do this on a regular basis. It is extremely unfair to regularly postpone salary increases and to thus "tax" Federal employees every time there is a budgetary problem, which has been happening quite often in recent years and may continue. Federal salaries should not be one of the first places to cut the budget, but one of the last.

We expect a fair day's work from Government employees, and we should be prepared to pay, in fact, committed to pay, a fair day's wages. This commitment must not be taken lightly as we must not toy with a person's income, particularly in these inflationary times. The President has justified the delay because of inflation, but this is precisely the reason this adjustment should not be put off.

The President has called upon Federal employees to make a sacrifice to hold down inflation. I, too, am strongly committed to fighting inflation. However, with personal income over the trillion-dollar mark this year, the inflationary impact of the \$358 million increase in income that would result from not postponing the pay increase will be minimal.

Furthermore, Federal employees have already made their sacrifice. It has been almost a year and a half since the last survey was made to set Government salaries comparable to those in the private sector. During that time, salaries in private industry have been going up and inflation has been rampant. Federal employees have not shared in the benefits of increased salaries, but have paid the costs of inflation. I would call this a sacrifice, one greater than most others have had to bear.

In his message to Congress, the President praised the private sector, stating—

Labor and management in the private sector have done their share by acting with commendable restraint in agreeing upon new wage increases.

Federal employees have not even shared in these increases negotiated with "commendable restraint." Now, without further delay, they should be given comparability, comparability with the past, modest increases in private sector salaries which the President has praised.

billion of future appropriations to complete them. The future outlays will then be attributable to the Administration rather than to the Congress because they would be included in the President's budget.

II. Congress directly changes the budget in many ways other than through its action on appropriations.

a. Some legislation provides obligational authority directly (backdoor authority) and avoids the need for appropriations committee approval prior to the obligation of funds. A case in point is the Environmental Protection Agency grant program for waste treatment works.

b. Some legislation makes spending mandatory. When such mandated spending requires higher appropriations, as it does for veterans benefits, the President has no choice but to include a request for the higher amount in his budget. The first-year effect of such legislation is generally attributed to the Congress in the Joint Committee report referred to above, but all the later-year effects are attributed to the President. In addition, some mandated spending, like increases in social security benefits, requires no appropriations action at all. Again, while the first-year effect of Congressionally-initiated increases in such spending is attributable to the Congress, the effect on all later years is part of the President's budget.

c. The budget can be increased—as well as decreased—by Congress' failure to enact proposed legislation. The 1974 budget proposes enactment of legislation that would result in nearly \$1½ billion of savings. If the Congress fails to enact these proposals, and so far no action has been taken on them, 1974 spending for the affected programs will be about \$1½ billion higher.

III. Congress changes the budget by its indirect action on authorizations for appropriation. Comprehensive summaries of the effect of Congressional action like the Joint Committee report normally exclude authorizations with discretionary funding levels because those levels will be determined later in appropriation acts. However, these authorizations create expectations that programs will be started or expanded. Both the Congress and the Executive Branch are sometimes unable to resist the greater pressure for higher appropriations once the authorizations have been enacted.

One measure of the "gap" between amounts authorized for appropriation and amounts appropriated is cited in the April report of the Joint Study Commission on Budget Control. The Study Commission referred to a 1970 analysis of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) which showed that the "gap" for certain grant appropriation authorizations (health, education, highways, mass transit, et al.) had increased as follows:

	[In millions]	Fiscal year 1966	Fiscal year 1970
Authorized	\$14,246	\$24,381	
Appropriated	\$11,561	\$15,928	
Gap: Amount	\$2,685	\$8,453	
Percent of au- thorization	18.8	34.7	

Clearly, since 1970, further increases in this "gap" have occurred. Further, the ACIR analysis does not include authorizations for direct Federal programs. The "gap" for public works projects alone is now over \$25 billion more than appropriation levels.

The growing "gap" caused the Study Commission to note that "Pressure to increase spending has come as a result of the annual authorization process."

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON THE BUDGET

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, recently there has been a great deal of discussion regarding the President's budget and congressional action on it.

I have asked Mr. Roy Ash, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, to prepare a document setting out the record of congressional action on the budget as they view it.

I ask unanimous consent that the response from Mr. Ash with accompanying tables be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the document was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON THE BUDGET

The record of Congressional action on the budgets submitted by President Nixon has become a subject of public debate. Administration spokesmen state, with reports of the Congressional Joint Committee on Reduction of Federal Expenditures supporting them, that the Congress has increased the President's budget over the past four years. Some members of the Congress assert that the Congress has cut each of the budgets submitted by the Nixon Administration.

The facts are that the Congress has added to the budgets during the first four years of the Nixon Administration and is adding to the one currently before it.

Those who assert that the Congress has reduced the budget focus on only one measure of Congressional action—appropriations—and consider only the first-year effect of these actions. This measure does show reductions. The more comprehensive and correct measure prepared by the Congressional Joint Committee on Reduction of Federal Expenditures tells the opposite story, even though it, too, shows only the first-year effect and, therefore, understates the magnitude of the Congressional add-ons.

The attached Table 1 summarizes the first-year effect of Congressional action on budget authority and outlays for fiscal years 1970 through 1974 to date. Clearly, Congressional reductions in appropriations bills and, as a result of inaction on Administration proposals, are more than offset by increases that result from Congressional action on other legislation.

Table 2 summarizes the first-year effect of Congressional action to date on the fiscal year 1974 budget.

The following propositions explain how Congress is adding to the budget and why even the attached tables understate the increase.

I. The reduction shown in overall appropriations can be misleading. Included in those overall reductions are small additions to appropriations that may require the President to make subsequent requests for large appropriations. For example, the Congress added \$11 million for 38 unbudgeted planning and construction starts to the fiscal year 1974 Public Works Appropriation Act. Thus, \$11 million is reported as the first-year effect. If these starts are initiated, the Administration will have to request \$1.2

TABLE 1.—CONGRESSIONAL CHANGES TO THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET REQUEST¹
[In billions of dollars]

	Budget authority			Outlays				
	Appropriations	Other legislation ²	Inaction on legislation	Total	Appropriations	Other legislation ²	Inaction on legislation	Total
1970	—5.4	5.7	1.5	1.7	—2.9	1.5	1.4	(1)
1971	—2.6	8.4	—4.6	1.1	—1.7	4.2	—2	3.3
1972	—3.0	—7	—5.5	—7.8	—1.1	3.7	—3.3	—7
1973	—4.9	15.6	—4.7	6.0	—1.6	7.9	—1	6.1
Subtotal	—15.9	30.4	—13.3	1.1	—6.3	17.3	—2.2	8.7
1974 to date	.3	5.2	.5	6.1	.5	1.3	1.4	3.2
Total	—15.6	35.6	—12.8	7.1	—5.7	18.5	—.9	11.9

¹ Based on the Budget Scorekeeping Report (Staff Report No. 6) to the Joint Committee on Reduction of Federal Expenditures.

² Includes: backdoor authority (authority to obligate funds outside appropriation acts); mandatory authority (bills requiring subsequent appropriation action, adjustments and other changes, e.g., REA loans put off budget); and shifts of fiscal year 1973 requests to fiscal year 1974.

³ Less than \$50,000,000.

Note: Details may not add to total because of rounding.

TABLE 2.—CONGRESSIONAL CHANGES TO DATE TO THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 1974 BUDGET REQUEST¹

[In millions of dollars]

Items	Budget authority	Outlays
Appropriation bills	+303	+519
Legislation other than appropriation bills:		
Backdoor (authority to obligate funds outside appropriation acts)	+1,588	+20
Mandatory (bills requiring subsequent appropriation action)	+350	² +1,458
Adjustments and other changes	—579	³ —146
Shifts of fiscal year 1973 requests to fiscal year 1974	+3,890	
Subtotal, legislative bills	5,249	1,332
Inaction on proposed legislation	4 512	⁴ +1,362
Total	6,064	3,213

¹ Based on the Budget Scorekeeping Report (Staff Report No. 6) to the Joint Committee on Reduction of Federal Expenditures.

² Modified to include effect of bread tax repeal.

³ REA loans off-budget adjusted from \$157,000,000 to reflect best estimate.

⁴ Adjusted to exclude duplicate burial benefits and Federal Crop Insurance Corporation listings.

ADDRESS BY ROBERT S. McNAMARA TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE WORLD BANK GROUP

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, in his recent address in Nairobi, Mr. Robert McNamara, President of the World Bank, set the same goals for the assistance policy of the World Bank group that the new foreign assistance legislation, S. 2335, sets for the assistance policy of the United States. Mr. McNamara expressed concern over the growing gap between the rich and the poor—both between nations and within the developing countries themselves—and over the “absolute poverty” that “denies its victims basic human necessities.” He announced the World Bank’s commitment to helping relieve absolute poverty and bringing the poorest people in the world into the development process.

The dimensions of poverty in the less developed countries are overwhelming. As Mr. McNamara pointed out:

One-third to one-half of the two billion human beings in those countries suffer from hunger or malnutrition.

20% to 25% of their children die before their fifth birthdays. And millions of those who do not die lead impeded lives because their brains have been damaged, their bodies stunted, and their vitality sapped by nutritional deficiencies.

The life expectancy of the average person is 20 years less than in the affluent world.

They are denied 30% of the lives those of us from the developed nations enjoy. In effect, they are condemned at birth to an early death.

800 million of them are illiterate and, despite the continuing expansion of education in the years ahead, even more of their children are likely to be so.

This is absolute poverty: a condition of life so limited as to prevent realization of the potential of the genes with which one is born; and a condition of life so common as to be the lot of some 40% of the peoples of the developing countries. And are not we who tolerate such poverty, when it is within our power to reduce the number afflicted by it, failing to fulfill the fundamental obligations accepted by civilized men since the beginning of time?

As Mr. McNamara pointed out, it will take a major revision of the development policies of many of the less-developed countries themselves as well as of the assistance policies of the developed countries to deal with the problem of absolute poverty. Too often landed elites have concentrated on increasing their own wealth rather than bringing the poorest elements of their populations into the development process. But both the World Bank and the donor nations realize that their past development assistance policies have often contributed to the income disparities in the developing countries rather than reducing them.

Having learned that simply giving money to the less-developed countries does not necessarily contribute to the alleviation of poverty, the donor nations must now commit their technology, their research skills, and their capital to directly improving the standard of living of the millions who are poor.

Mr. McNamara announced several ways the World Bank intends in the next 5 years to contribute to the “eradication of absolute poverty by the end of the century.” Since 70 percent of the population of developing countries, and the same percentage of the poor, live in the countryside, the World Bank will concentrate on increasing production and improving living standards in the rural areas. The major kinds of projects the Bank will sponsor are:

Land and tenancy reform—financing land redistribution and providing logistical support for the small farmer;

Providing credit to the small farmer; Making sure irrigation reaches the small landholder;

Livestock production, particularly

small-scale dairy farming in milk-deficient areas;

Expansion of training facilities for extension agents who can help raise the productivity of the rural poor;

Rural works programs; for example, building feeder roads to markets;

Agricultural research institutions, particularly in the development of appropriate technologies for semiarid agriculture; and

Cooperative and similar institutions by which the small farmers can organize to gain better access to markets, credit, and agricultural inputs.

The goals expressed by Mr. McNamara deserve the full support of the United States. We must not only continue to provide financing for the World Bank and IDA. We must also focus our bilateral assistance on alleviating absolute poverty. The United States can make a unique contribution to this effort. Our experience in semiarid agriculture, our agricultural technology and research skills, and our experience in developing vast networks of farmers’ cooperatives and extension services can all be applied to the effort to bring small farmers into the development process around the world.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of Robert McNamara’s address before the Board of Governors of the World Bank Group be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ADDRESS BY ROBERT S. McNAMARA TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE WORLD BANK GROUP, NAIROBI, KENYA, SEPTEMBER 24, 1973

I. INTRODUCTION

Last year I began a discussion with you of the critical relationship of social equity to economic growth. I emphasized the need to design development strategies that would bring greater benefits to the poorest groups in the developing countries—particularly to the approximately 40% of their populations who are neither contributing significantly to economic growth nor sharing equitably in economic progress.

In the twelve months since our last meeting, we in the Bank have given high priority to further analysis of the problems of poverty in the developing countries and to an evaluation of the policies available for dealing with them. On the basis of these studies, I should like this morning to:

Discuss the nature of the poverty problem, particularly as it affects the rural areas.

Suggest some of the essential elements of a strategy for dealing with it.

And outline a plan for World Bank operations in support of this new strategy.

But before turning to these matters, I want to report to you on the results of the Bank's Five-Year Program for the fiscal years 1969-73—a program that concluded on June 30th of this year; and then to suggest the financial objectives for a second five-year plan for the years 1974-78.

II. THE BANK'S 5-YEAR PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEARS 1969-73

It was in September of 1968 that I first met with you in this forum and outlined the goals of a Five-Year Program for the World Bank Group. You will recall what our objectives were. We stated that we were "formulating a 'development plan' for each developing country to see what the Bank Group could invest if there were no shortage of funds, and if the only limit on our activities were the capacity of our member countries to use our assistance effectively and to repay our loans on the terms on which they were lent."

Based on these analyses, we proposed to double the Bank's operations in the fiscal period 1969-73 as compared with the previous five-year period 1964-1968. That objective has been met: total financial commitments of the IBRD, IDA, and IFC, in current prices, in the 1964-68 period, were \$5.8 billion; in the 1969-73 period, \$13.4 billion. In real terms, the increase was 100%.

As indicated in the table below, in the five years we achieved a level of operations that exceeded the total of all the operations that the Bank had undertaken in the developing world in the 23 years from 1946 through 1968.

BANK GROUP FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BY REGION

[Dollars in millions]

Region	Numbers of projects		Amount of commitments (current prices)	
	1946-68	1969-73	1946-68	1969-73
East Africa	78	104	\$834	\$1,099
West Africa	35	102	522	891
Europe, Middle East				
North Africa	113	168	1,785	3,198
Latin America and Caribbean	281	176	3,554	3,734
Asia	201	210	3,927	4,496
Total	798	760	10,622	13,418

But it was not just quantity that we were seeking. We did not simply want to do more than had been done in the past, but to do more of what was best suited to the rapidly changing needs of the developing countries. That meant that within our overall objective we had to shift our emphasis both geographically and sectorally.

While continuing to serve the regions where we had been particularly active, we decided to expand substantially in other areas.

In Africa, for example, we set out to triple our lending—and we have done so.

We undertook operations, for the first time, in Indochina—and in the five years have committed \$523 million there.

For the poorest and least developed of our member countries, those with average per capita incomes of \$120 or less, we have nearly tripled our lending. During the Five-Year Program period we have initiated 217 separate projects in these countries. The comparable figure for the whole of the previous 23 years of the Bank's operations is 167.

Geographically, then, our planned shifts in emphasis have been carried out, and carried out concomitantly with an increased level of lending in our more traditional regions.

But it was clear to us in 1968 that the Five-Year Program must shift emphasis sectorally as well. Accordingly, we proposed to triple lending in education and quadruple lending in agriculture. We have done so.

Perhaps the most significant shift was into

a sector in which the Bank had previously had no operations at all: the sensitive and difficult, but clearly critical, sector of population.

We established a Population Projects Department, and from the very beginning received more requests for technical and financial assistance from our member countries than we could immediately provide. We deliberately began our project work in a number of smaller countries in order to work effectively within our limited staff resources. But by the end of the Five-Year Program period agreements had been signed for projects in seven countries, including two of the largest and most heavily populated nations: India and Indonesia.

In addition to the Population Projects Department—to which has now been added the responsibility for nutritional projects—we launched other initiatives within the Bank. Among them are new departments for Industrial Projects, Urban Projects, and Tourism Projects; an Office of Environmental Affairs; an Operations Evaluation Unit; and a new program of comprehensive country economic reporting.

To achieve the doubled level of our operations, it was necessary, of course, to strengthen the Bank both organizationally and financially. Worldwide recruitment was increased and the staff was expanded by 120% during the period. We were determined in this effort to broaden its international character to the maximum degree feasible. In 1968 the staff represented 25 nationalities. It now represents 92. In 1968 the proportion of staff from our developing member countries was 19%. The proportion is now 29%, and continues to grow.

Lending more has of course meant borrowing more, and that in turn has depended on governments granting us access to their capital markets. This they have continued to do, despite unsettled conditions and monetary fluctuations. It is a mark of confidence in the Bank's financial structure that we have been able to borrow not only in our more traditional markets, but in altogether new ones, and to utilize new borrowing instruments and new channels of distribution.

Net borrowing for the five-year period has been approximately four times that of the earlier period, and our liquid reserves have risen to \$3.8 billion, an increase of 170%.

Neither the increase in operations, nor the shift in emphasis toward more socially oriented sectors, has adversely affected net income. On the contrary, total net income for the five-year period was \$965 million, 28% more than in the previous period, and this despite the fact that the Bank's lending rate was held down to levels resulting in a substantially greater subsidy to the developing countries than in earlier years.

We have completed the Five-Year Program, then, by meeting the quantitative goals we had set for ourselves in 1968, and by making a sustained effort to improve the overall quality of our work.

But our task now is to move forward with a second Five-Year Program. Like the first, its goals and shifts in emphasis must be shaped by the evolving development situation itself.

I should like to give you my assessment of that situation.

III. THE BANK'S SECOND 5-YEAR PROGRAM: FISCAL YEAR 1974-78

Most of our developing member countries are faced with three interrelated difficulties:

An insufficiency of foreign exchange earnings from trade.

An inadequate flow of Official Development Assistance.

And an increasingly severe burden of external debt.

Each of these problems is serious in itself. But together they threaten the outcome of the entire development effort.

Let me examine each of them briefly.

The trade problem

The core of the trade problem for the bulk of the developing countries is that they cannot expand their exports rapidly enough to pay for their essential imports. These imports are themselves often the key to greater export capability—and higher foreign exchange earnings—and thus the dilemma of trade imbalances in these countries tends to become self-perpetuating.

The problem is compounded by the delay of the wealthy nations in dismantling discriminatory trade barriers against the poor countries. Our studies indicate, for example, that if the affluent nations were gradually to reduce their present protectionist trade restrictions against agricultural imports from the developing world, the poorer nations could, by 1980, increase their annual export earnings by at least \$4 billion.

An acute shortage of development assistance

Secondly, the current flow of Official Development Assistance (ODA)—financial aid on concessionary terms—is acutely inadequate. Not only is it far below what the developing nations need and what the affluent nations can readily afford, but, as the attached table indicates, it is only half the modest target prescribed by the internationally accepted United Nations Strategy for the Second Development Decade.

That target called for reaching ODA levels of .7% of gross national product (GNP) by 1975. In fact, by 1975 ODA will not exceed .35%. And yet achievement of the target neither requires the people of the developed nations to reduce their already high standards of living, nor to neglect their domestic priorities. It asks them only to dedicate a tiny fraction of the incremental income—income over and above that which they already enjoy—that will accrue to them in the decade of the 70s.

During the decade, the annual GNP of these affluent nations will grow, in constant prices, from \$2 trillion in 1970 to approximately \$3.5 trillion in 1980: an increase in output virtually beyond one's capacity to comprehend.

In order to double the ODA flows, and thereby raise them to the targeted .7%, the developed countries would need to devote to that end less than 2% of the amount by which they themselves will grow richer during the period. The remaining 98% of their incremental income would provide them with more than sufficient funds to meet their domestic priorities.

I have heard it said in the developed countries—in the United States and elsewhere—that their domestic problems are so pressing that they require an exclusive claim on the immense incremental wealth which will accrue to their societies in future years, and that not even the 2% of this additional income, which we suggest should be diverted to the developing countries, can be spared. But I believe that such critics of additional assistance to the poorer nations, when citing the needs of their own cities and countryside, fail to distinguish between two kinds of poverty: what might be termed relative poverty and absolute poverty.

Relative poverty means simply that some countries are less affluent than other countries, or that some citizens of a given country have less personal abundance than their neighbors. That has always been the case, and granted the realities of differences between regions and between individuals, will continue to be the case for decades to come.

But absolute poverty is a condition of life so degraded by disease, illiteracy, malnutrition, and squalor as to deny its victims basic human necessities.

It is a condition of life suffered by relatively few in the developed nations but by hundreds of millions of the citizens of the developing countries represented in this room. Many of you have cause to know far better than I that:

One-third to one-half of the two billion

human beings in those countries suffer from hunger or malnutrition.

20% to 25% of their children die before their fifth birthdays. And millions of those who do not die lead impeded lives because their brains have been damaged, their bodies stunted, and their vitality sapped by nutritional deficiencies.

The life expectancy of the average person is 20 years less than in the affluent world. They are denied 30% of the lives those of us from the developed nations enjoy. In effect, they are condemned at birth to an early death.

800 million of them are illiterate and, despite the continuing expansion of education in the years ahead, even more of their children are likely to be so.

This is absolute poverty: a condition of life so limited as to prevent realization of the potential of the genes with which one is born; a condition of life so degrading as to insult human dignity—and yet a condition of life so common as to be the lot of some 40% of the peoples of the developing countries. And are not we who tolerate such poverty, when it is within our power to reduce the number afflicted by it, failing to fulfill the fundamental obligations accepted by civilized men since the beginning of time?

I do not wish you to interpret my remarks as those of a zealot. But you have hired me to examine the problems of the developing world and to report to you the facts. These are the facts.

It is true that some citizens of the developed countries protest against increasing their assistance to the developing countries because of poverty in their own societies. They do so either because they are unacquainted with these facts; or because they fail to distinguish between relative absolute poverty; or perhaps because they are obscuring the truth even from themselves—unwilling to admit that the principal pressure on the incremental incomes of their economies comes not from a legitimate concern for the less fortunate in their societies, but from the endless spiral of their own demands for additional consumer goods.

There are, of course, many grounds for development assistance: among others, the expansion of trade, the strengthening of international stability, and the reduction of social tensions.

But in my view the fundamental case for development assistance is the moral one. The whole of human history has recognized the principle—at least in the abstract—that the rich and powerful have a moral obligation to assist the poor and the weak. That is what the sense of community is all about—any community: the community of the family, the community of the village, the community of the nation, the community of nations itself.

I, for one, cannot believe that once the gross deficiency in the flow of Official Development Assistance is better understood; that once the degree of deprivation in the development nations is more fully grasped; that once the true dimensions of poverty in the less privileged world are more realistically compared with the vast abundance in the affluent world (that once the people of the United States, for example, understand that they, with 6% of the world's population, consume about 35% of the world's total resources and yet, in terms of economic assistance as a percent of GNP, rank fourteenth among the sixteen developed nations)—I cannot believe that in the face of all this the people and governments of the rich nations will turn away in cynicism and indifference.

The growing burden of debt

Finally, there is the growing burden of external debt in the developing world. Publicly guaranteed debt currently stands at about \$80 billion, with annual debt service of approximately \$7 billion.

It is important to understand what the essence of the debt problem is. It is not the fact that there is debt, nor even the size of the debt. It is, rather, the composition and dynamics of the debt; the fact that debt, and debt payments, are growing faster than the revenues required to service them.

Restricted trading opportunities, exacerbated by inadequate flows of ODA, tend to drive developing countries to over-reliance on export credits and other short-term, high-cost loans. It is these factors that threaten to increase the debt burden beyond reasonable limits. Already, since 1970, the situation in several countries—Ghana, Chile, Pakistan, India, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka among others—has led either to debt rescheduling or to unilateral defaults.

The Bank's program for fiscal years 1974-78

Given the nature of this interrelated set of problems in our developing member countries—an insufficiency in foreign exchange due to trade difficulties, the inadequate flow of ODA, and the growing debt burden—the Bank, far from relaxing the momentum of our operations over the next five years, must increase it. And that is what we intend to do.

We plan to expand both our IBRD and IDA lending at a cumulative annual rate, in real terms, of 8%.*

For the five-year period FY 1974-78, our lending—in 1973 dollars—should total \$22 billion for almost 1,000 projects.

The total cost of these projects will approach \$55 billion.

Our \$22 billion in new commitments will constitute, in real terms, a 40% increase over the 1969-1973 period, and a 175% increase over the 1964-1968 period.

This, then, in financial terms is our plan for the Second Five-Year Program. It will represent the largest program of technical and financial assistance to developing countries ever undertaken by a single agency.

But the qualitative changes in the program will be of even greater significance than the increase in its size. We plan to place far greater emphasis on policies and projects which will begin to attack the problems of absolute poverty to which I referred earlier—far greater emphasis on assistance designed to increase the productivity of that approximately 40% of the population of our developing member countries who have neither been able to contribute significantly to national economic growth, nor to share equitably in economic progress.

In the remaining sections of this statement I would like to discuss the nature of this poverty problem, consider what means are at hand to alleviate it, and indicate what part the Bank can play.

IV. POVERTY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

Poverty and growth

The basic problem of poverty and growth in the developing world can be stated very simply. The growth is not equitably reaching the poor. And the poor are not significantly contributing to growth.

Despite a decade of unprecedented increase in the gross national product of the developing countries, the poorest segments of their population have received relatively little benefit. Nearly 800 million individuals—40% out of a total of two billion—survive on in-

* In last year's address, I stated that our plan, in terms of current prices, was to increase financial commitments 11% per year. The "real terms" equivalent was 8%. Today, because of changes in exchange rates and accelerated price increase, a growth rate of 8% per annum in real terms, for the period FY74-78 vs. FY69-73, will probably require an increase in financial commitments of approximately 14% per year in current prices.

comes estimated (in U.S. purchasing power) at 30 cents per day in conditions of malnutrition, illiteracy, and squalor. They are suffering poverty in the absolute sense.

Although the collection of statistics on income distribution in the developing world is a relatively recent effort, and is still quite incomplete, the data point to what is happening. Among 40 developing countries for which data are available, the upper 20% of the population receives 55% of national income in the typical country, while the lowest 20% of the population receives 5%. That is a very severe degree of inequality—considerably greater than in most of the advanced countries.

The data suggest that the decade of rapid growth has been accomplished by greater maldistribution of income in many developing countries, and that the problem is most severe in the countryside. There has been an increase in the output of mining, industry, and government—and in the incomes of the people dependent on these sectors—but the productivity and income of the small farmer have stagnated.

One can conclude that policies aimed primarily at accelerating economic growth, in most developing countries, have benefitted mainly the upper 40% of the population and the allocation of public services and investment funds has tended to strengthen rather than to offset this trend.

Reorienting development policy

The need to reorient development policies in order to provide a more equitable distribution of the benefits of economic growth is beginning to be widely discussed. But very few countries have actually made serious moves in this direction. And I should stress that unless national governments redirect their policies toward better distribution, there is very little that international agencies such as the World Bank can do to accomplish this objective.

Without intruding into matters that are the proper concern of individual governments, I would like to discuss an important first step that could lead to a more rapid acceptance of the required policy changes. This step would be to redefine the objectives and measurement of development in more operational terms. While most countries have broadened the statements of their development goals to include references to reducing unemployment and increasing the income of the poor—as well as emphasizing traditional growth in output—they still measure progress toward these complex objectives with a single measuring rod: the growth of GNP.

But the fact is that we can no more measure the achievement of multiple development objectives by the GNP alone than we can describe the quality of life in a city exclusively by its size. The Gross National Product is an index of the total value of goods and services produced by an economy; it was never intended to be a measure of their distribution.

It is important to remember that indices of the increase in gross national product implicitly weight the growth of each income group according to its existing share of total national income. Since in the developing countries the upper 40% of the population typically receive 75% of all income, the growth of GNP is essentially an index of the welfare of these upper income groups. It is quite insensitive to what happens to the poorest 40%, who collectively receive only 10-15% of the total national income.

Were we to fashion a new index which gave at least the same weight to a 1% increase in the incomes of the poorest groups in society as it gave to a 1% increase in the incomes of the well-to-do, we would get a much different picture of development in the past decade. The growth of total income in several of the largest countries in Latin America and Asia, for example, would be sig-

nificantly lower than the growth as measured by the GNP.

But, in a number of cases—including for instance, Sri Lanka and Colombia—the opposite would be true. In these countries, giving equal weight to the growth of income of each citizen, regardless of his income level, would result in a more accurate assessment of development performance than does GNP because it would give credit for some redistribution of the benefits of growth toward the lower income groups.

Adopting this kind of socially oriented measure of economic performance would be an important step in the redesign of development policies. It would require governments, and their planning and finance ministries, to look at the allocation of resources in a much more comprehensive way. For they would have to consider not only the total output of an investment but also how the benefits would be distributed. This would give practical, operational significance to the rhetorical statements of social objectives now embodied in most development plans. And it would insure that important questions of equity became an integral part of project evaluation procedures both within the developing countries and the lending agencies. We are, in fact, beginning to develop this approach in the World Bank.

Identifying the concentrations of poverty

This proposed reorientation of development strategy would require far greater precision in identifying the main concentrations of the poorest people in a given society and examining much more intensively the policies and investments through which they can be reached.

Clearly, the bulk of the poor today are in rural areas.² All of our analysis indicates that this is likely to continue to be the case during the next two or three decades:

At present, 70% of the population of our developing member countries and an equivalent percentage of the poor live in the countryside.

Although demographic projections indicate that 60% of the population increases in these countries (an increase of two billion people by the end of the century) is expected to take place in the urban areas—largely through internal migration—in the year 2000 more than half of the people in the developing world will still reside in the countryside.

Rapid urbanization is already creating very serious problems. Under present policies, per capita public expenditures in urban areas are typically three to four times as great as they are in rural areas. Thus, efforts to relieve rural poverty by still greater migration to the cities will result in an even more inequitable division of public expenditures and only exacerbate the existing inequalities of income.

Within the rural areas the poverty problem revolves primarily around the low productivity of the millions of small subsistence farms. The truth is that despite all the growth of the GNP, the increases in the productivity of these small family farms in the past decade has been so small as to be virtually imperceptible.

But despite the magnitude of the problem in the countryside, focusing on rural poverty raises a very fundamental question: is it a really sound strategy to devote a significant part of the world's resources to in-

creasing the productivity of small-scale subsistence agriculture? Would it not be wiser to concentrate on the modern sector in the hope that its high rate of growth would filter down to the rural poor?

The answer, I believe, is no.

Experience demonstrates that in the short run there is only a limited transfer of benefits from the modern to the traditional sector. Disparities in income will simply widen unless action is taken which will directly benefit the poorest. In my view, therefore, there is no viable alternative to increasing the productivity of small-scale agriculture if any significant advance is to be made in solving the problems of absolute poverty in the rural areas.

But that does not mean there need be an irreconcilable conflict between that objective and the growth of the rest of the economy. On the contrary, it is obvious that no attempt to increase the productivity of subsistence agriculture can succeed in an environment of overall economic stagnation. The small farmers cannot prosper unless there is significant growth in other sectors, both to provide the development resources they will require, and to create the demand for their additional output.

The point is that the reverse is also true—and it is time we recognized it. Without rapid progress in smallholder agriculture throughout the developing world, there is little hope either of achieving long-term stable economic growth or of significantly reducing the levels of absolute poverty.³

The fact is that very little has been done over the past two decades specifically designed to increase the productivity of subsistence agriculture. Neither political programs, nor economic plans, nor international assistance—bilateral or multilateral—have given the problem serious and sustained attention. The World Bank is no exception. In our more than a quarter century of operations, less than \$1 billion out of our \$25 billion of lending has been devoted directly to this problem.

It is time for all of us to confront this issue head-on.

V. A STRATEGY FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT

In presenting a strategy for rural development I should like: first, to analyze the scope of the problem; second, to set a feasible goal in order to deal with it; and third, to identify the measures required to meet that goal.

The scope of the problem

Let me begin by outlining the scope of the problem in the developing countries which are members of the Bank. It is immense:

There are well over 100 million families involved—more than 700 million individuals.

The size of the average holding is small and often fragmented: more than 100 million farms are less than 5 hectares; of these, more than 50 million are less than 1 hectare.

The possession of land, and hence of political and economic power in the rural areas, is concentrated in the hands of a small minority. According to a recent FAO survey, the wealthiest 20% of the landowners in most

² It is not my purpose today to discuss the food crisis presently affecting wide areas of the globe. However, any long-term solution of the food shortage, in a world in which population will increase for at least a century to come, clearly requires substantial increases in smallholder productivity. In addition, to provide insurance against the vagaries of the weather, some coordinated system of national food reserves must be established. I strongly support the efforts of the Director-General of the FAO to organize such a program, and I am fully prepared to recommend that the World Bank participate in its financing.

developing countries own between 50 and 60% of the cropland. In Venezuela they own 82%; in Colombia 56%; in Brazil 53%; in the Philippines, India, and Pakistan about 50%. Conversely, the 100 million holdings of less than 5 hectares are concentrated on only 20% of the cropland.

Even the use of the land which the small farmer does have is uncertain. Tenancy arrangements are generally insecure and often extortionate. In many countries tenants have to hand over to the landlord 50–60% of their crop as rent, and yet in spite of this are faced with the constant threat of eviction. The result is that their incentive to become more productive is severely eroded.

It has often been suggested that the productivity of small-scale holdings is inherently low. But that is simply not true. Not only do we have the overwhelming evidence of Japan to disprove that proposition, but a number of recent studies on developing countries also demonstrate that, given the proper conditions, small farms can be as productive as large farms. For example, output per hectare in Guatemala, the Republic of China, India, and Brazil was substantially greater on smaller farms than on larger ones. And it is, of course, output per hectare which is the relevant measure of agricultural productivity in land-scarce, labor-surplus economies: not output per worker.

There is ample evidence that modern agricultural technology is divisible, and that small-scale operations need be no barrier to raising agricultural yields.

The question, then, is what can the developing countries do to increase the productivity of the small farmer. How can they duplicate the conditions which have led to very rapid agricultural growth in a few experimental areas and in a few countries so as to stimulate agricultural growth and combat rural poverty on a broad scale?

The first step is to set a goal. A goal is necessary both so that we can better estimate the amount of financial resources required, and so that we can have a firm basis for measuring progress.

Setting the goal

I suggest that the goal be to increase production on small farms so that by 1985 their output will be growing at the rate of 5% per year. If the goal is met, and smallholders maintain that momentum, they can double their annual output between 1985 and the end of the century.

Clearly this is an ambitious objective. A 5% rate of growth has never been achieved on a sustained basis among smallholders in any extensive areas of the developing world. Smallholder production has risen on average only about 2.5% per year in the past decade.

But if Japan in 1970 could produce 6,720 kg. of grain per ha. on very small farms, then Africa with its 1,270 kg. per ha., Asia with 1,750 kg., and Latin America with 2,060 kg. have an enormous potential for expanding productivity.

Thus, I believe the goal is feasible. It recognizes that progress will be slow during the next five to ten years while new institutions evolve, new policies take hold, and new investments are implemented. But after this initial period, the average pace of growth in smallholder agricultural productivity can be more than double today's rate and thereby benefit the lives of hundreds of millions of people.

Now, what are the means necessary to accomplish this goal?

Neither we at the Bank, nor anyone else, have very clear answers on how to bring the improved technology and other inputs to over 100 million small farmers—especially to those in dry-land areas. Nor can we be fully precise about the costs.

But we do understand enough to get started. Admittedly, we will have to take some risks. We will have to improvise and experiment. And if some of the experiments fail, we will have to learn from them and start anew.

What, then, can we begin to do now?

Measures necessary to meet the goal

Though the strategy for increasing the productivity of smallholder agriculture is necessarily tentative, the following are essential elements of any comprehensive program:

Acceleration in the rate of land and tenancy reform.

Better access to credit.

Assured availability of water.

Expanded extension facilities backed by intensified agricultural research.

Greater access to public services.

And most critical of all: new forms of rural institutions and organizations that will give as much attention to promoting the inherent potential and productivity of the poor as is generally given to protecting the power of the privileged.

These elements are not new. The need for them has been recognized before. But they will continue to remain little more than pious hopes unless we develop a framework of implementation, and agree to a commitment of resources commensurate with their necessity. That is what I propose.

Organizational changes

The organizational structure for supporting smallholder agriculture is without doubt the most difficult problem. Let me examine this subject first and then turn to the others in sequence.

Obviously, it is not possible for governments to deal directly with over 100 million small farm families. What is required is the organization of local farm groups, which will service millions of farmers at low cost, and the creation of intermediate institutions through which governments and commercial institutions can provide the necessary technical assistance and financial resources for them.

Such institutions and organizations can take any number of forms: smallholder associations, county or district level cooperatives, various types of communes. There are, of course, many experiments already going on in different parts of the world. What is imperative is that at each organizational level financial discipline be rigorously required, and that the entire structure be oriented toward initiative and self-reliance. Experience shows that there is a greater chance of success if the institutions provide for popular participation, local leadership, and decentralization of authority.

The reorganization of government services and institutions is equally important. No program will help small farmers if it is designed by those who have no knowledge of their problems and operated by those who have no interest in their future.

The sad truth is that in most countries, the centralized administration of scarce resources—both money and skills—has usually resulted in most of them being allocated to a small group of the rich and powerful. This is not surprising since economic rationalizing, political pressure, and selfish interest often conspire to the detriment of the poor. It will clearly require courageous political leadership to make the bureaucracy more responsive to the needs of the subsistence farmers.

The ablest administrators, for example, should no longer be reserved exclusively for the urban sectors. Top engineering talent must be devoted to designing low-cost solutions to the problems of small-farm irrigation. Young graduates can be motivated to take on the problems of the rural poor, and be adequately rewarded for solving them. Educational institutions should recognize that the training in practical skills is as important as the accumulation of theoretical knowledge. In short, national managerial and intellectual resources must be redirected to serve the many instead of the few, the deprived instead of the privileged.

Acceleration of land and tenancy reform

But there are other structural changes necessary as well. And the most urgent among these is land and tenancy reform. Legislation dealing with such reform has been passed—or at least been promised—in virtually every developing country. But the rhetoric of these laws has far outdistanced their results. They have produced little redistribution of land, little improvement in the security of the tenant, and little consolidation of small holdings.

That is extremely regrettable. No one can pretend that genuine land and tenancy reform is easy. It is hardly surprising that members of the political power structure, who own large holdings, should resist reform. But the real issue is not whether land reform is politically easy. The real issue is whether indefinite procrastination is politically prudent. An increasingly inequitable situation will pose a growing threat to political stability.

But land and tenancy reform programs— involving reasonable land ceilings, just compensation, sensible tenancy security, and adequate incentives for land consolidation—are possible. What they require are sound policies, translated into strong laws which are neither enervated by exceptions nor riddled by loopholes. And most important of all, the laws have to incorporate effective sanctions, and be vigorously and impartially enforced.

What we must recognize is that land reform is not exclusively about land. It is about the uses—and abuses—of power, and the social structure through which it is exercised.

Better access to credit

But realistic land and tenancy reform—as essential as it is—is not enough. It is one thing to own land; it is another to make it productive. For the smallholder, operating with virtually no capital, access to credit is crucial. No matter how knowledgeable or well motivated he may be, without such credit he cannot buy improved seeds, apply the necessary fertilizer and pesticides, rent equipment, or develop his water resources. Small farmers, generally, spend less than 20% of what is required on such inputs because they simply do not have the resources.

In Asia, for example, the cost of fertilizer and pesticides required to make optimum use of the new high-yielding varieties of wheat and rice ranges from \$20 to \$80 per hectare. But the small farmer there is spending only \$6 per hectare because that's all he can finance. And most of that \$6 does not come from government or institutional sources, but from local landlords or village money lenders at usurious rates of interest.

The present institutions in the rural areas are simply not geared to meeting the needs of smallholder agriculture. In countries as disparate as Bangladesh and Iran, less than 10% of institutional credit is available to rural areas; in Thailand, the Philippines, and Mexico less than 15%; in India less than 25%. And only a fraction of this is available to the small farmer. Even then it is accompanied by stringent tests of creditworthiness, complicated application procedures, and lengthy waiting periods.

Existing commercial institutions are reluctant to make credit available to the small farmers because the administrative and supervisory costs of small loans are high. Further, the subsistence farmer is operating so close to the margin of survival that he is simply not as creditworthy as his more wealthy neighbors.

Nor do governmental credit policies always help the small farmer, even though the intention may have been to shape them for that purpose. The fact is that concern over the usurious rates the farmer pays the money lender has led to unrealistically low rates for institutional credit.

The smallholder does not need credit subsidized at an annual interest rate of 6% for projects which will yield 20% or more per

year. He would be much better off if he had to pay a realistic rate of interest but could actually get the money.

In reviewing their financial policies for agriculture, governments should take care that good intentions do not have self-defeating consequences. In many of our member countries, radical restructuring of interest rates is long overdue.

Assured availability of water

No less essential than credit—indeed even more so—is an assured supply of water for the smallholder. Without it, seeds, fertilizer, and pesticides are useless. This means continued research into the most productive uses of water, as well as substantial investment in irrigation and increased attention to on-farm irrigation methods.

It is estimated that the presently irrigated area in the developing world of 85 million hectares can be expanded by another 90 million hectares, but the additional cost would be high: over \$130 billion. And not only is expansion of irrigated land expensive, it is a slow process. No major irrigation dam which is not already in the active design stage is likely to yield significant on-farm benefits before the mid-1980s. Although investments in major irrigation projects will continue to be an important part of national investment plans, and of Bank financing, they must be supplemented by more quick-yielding programs designed to benefit the small farmer.

This calls for much greater emphasis in on-farm investment which can take advantage of existing large irrigation projects. There are too many cases—in our experience and that of others—in which it has taken ten years or more after the dam was completed for the water actually to reach the farmers. Major irrigation schemes often preempt necessary resources for on-farm improvement. The drama of harnessing a major river may be more exciting than the prosaic task of getting a steady trickle of water to a parched hectare, but to millions of small holders that is what is going to make the difference between success and failure. The allocation of scarce budgetary resources should reflect this reality.

Thus, development of major irrigation works, though necessary, is not enough. Too many small farmers would be left unaffected. These programs need to be supplemented by others which can bring water to farms outside major irrigation projects—and do so cheaply. Tubewells, low-lift pumps, and small dams can make major contributions to productivity. Moreover, these investments—while not always within the reach of individual poor farmers—can often be afforded by organized smallholders.

Expansion of extension services and applied research

The small farmer needs credit and water, but he needs technical information as well. And he is not getting nearly enough of it. The projected number of trained personnel who will graduate annually from existing agricultural educational institutions can at best satisfy less than half the total needs of the developing world. In the developed countries, the ratio of government agricultural agents to farm families is about 1 to 400. In developing countries, it is on average 1 to 8,000. And only a small fraction of even these limited services is available to the small farmer.

It is not primarily the deficiency of funds that is delaying the necessary expansion of extension services. It is the deficiency of resolve to do more for the small farmer who desperately requires them. There is scarcely a single developing country which does not produce too many lawyers, but there is no developing country which produces enough extension agents. Governments cannot control personal career objectives, but they can offer appropriate incentives, and promote

vocational choices which will contribute more directly to economic development and social modernization.

Thus the annual cost of training the required extension personnel would be modest as a percentage of GNP or budgetary resources. The net cost—after deducting savings from changed allocations—would be even less. As long as the supply of extension workers is grossly inadequate, only the large farmers will benefit and the needs of the poor will be ignored.

Behind extension services, of course, lies applied research. In a sample of five major developed countries, the governments are allocating annually from \$20 to \$50 per farm family for such research. The comparable figures for five major developing countries are only 50 cents to \$2 per farm family.

The international network of agricultural research has grown impressively. The Bank, for example, chairs the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, and contributes to the financing of the research institutes including the financing of the new institute for the semi-arid tropics. But very much more needs to be done at the national level to explore the special-equipment needs of the small operator, to develop new technologies for the non-cereal crops, and to help the farmer in non-irrigated areas.

General expenditures on research and development in the developing countries are notoriously low and must be increased substantially. In doing this, governments should give very high priority to strengthening that type of research which will benefit the small farmer—research to produce low-risk, inexpensive technology that he can put to immediate use.

Greater access to public services

In other areas too, public services are grossly inadequate. The income of the small farmer could be substantially increased if he were supported by better physical infrastructure. Because of the costs involved, it is not within the power of the developing countries to provide all of this infrastructure quickly to the millions who need it. But governments can provide much of it by organizing rural works programs to construct small feeder roads, small-scale irrigation and drainage systems, storage and market facilities, community schools and health centers, and other facilities which make extensive use of local labor and relatively simple skills.

There is no mystery about designing these programs. They have worked successfully at various times in experimental projects in Bangladesh, Tunisia, Indonesia, and other countries. The major handicap has been their limited scale and inadequate management. The task for governments is gradually to extend these projects to a national scale.

Basic changes are also necessary in the distribution of other public services. In the rural areas these services are not only deplorably deficient, they are often not geared to the needs of the people they are supposed to serve.

Educational systems should stress practical information in agriculture, nutrition, and family planning for those both within and outside of the formal school program. Health services should be developed which can assist in eradicating the common enervating diseases that afflict the rural poor. Electricity for rural areas should not be considered a luxury, nor should its purpose be merely to place a lightbulb in every dwelling. One of its most important uses is to supply power for production appliances, such as water pumps. Power is admittedly almost always in short supply but urban lighting and air conditioning should no longer be given such a disproportionate priority in the national systems.

Every country must examine why it can afford to invest in higher education, but fails

to offer incentives to attract teachers to rural areas; why it can staff urban medical centers and export its doctors abroad, but fails to provide doctors for the countryside; why it can build urban roads for the private automobile, but cannot build feeder roads to bring produce to market.

Resources are scarce in the developing countries, and their redistribution cannot provide enough for everyone's needs. But a major redistribution of public services is required if the small farmer is to have at least the necessary minimum of economic and social infrastructure.

The programs I have discussed above can all be initiated quickly by governments, and will make a major contribution to the goal of a 5% growth rate in the output of small-scale agriculture by 1985. And all of these programs deserve, and will have, the full support of the Bank Group.

But the fact remains that the measures I have outlined are primarily the responsibility of the developing countries. It would be a great disservice if the aid agencies were to try to convince either these countries or themselves that policies for alleviating rural poverty can be fashioned and delivered from abroad. The problem must be perceived and dealt with by the countries themselves.

But the international community can, and must, help. The resources required to achieve a 5% growth rate in the yields on small farms by 1985 are very large. One estimate would place the annual cost of on-farm investment, land and water resource development, additional training facilities, and minimum working capital requirements for smallholder agriculture at \$20-25 billion by 1985. This would be about 3.5% of the combined annual GNP of the developing countries.

Part of these resources must come from additional savings generated by the farmers themselves, and part must come from redirecting resources from other sectors in the developing countries.

But some of these resources must come from the international community—in the form of services and financing which the small farmer needs.

An action program in the Bank

What can the Bank do to assist in this effort?

First of all, we expect to lend \$4.4 billion in agriculture during our next five-year program (1974-78), as compared to \$3.1 billion in the first five-year program (1969-73), and \$9.2 million in the 1964-68 period.*

This in itself is a formidable target, but more importantly we intend to direct an increasing share of our lending to programs which directly assist the small farmer to become more productive. In the next five years we expect that about 70% of our agricultural loans will contain a component for the smallholder. We are now preparing these programs in consultation with member governments.

But we recognize that at best our lending can finance only a small portion of the total credit and investment needs of smallholder agriculture. That is why we intend to give particular attention in our economic advice to governments to those sectoral and financial policies which most affect the rural poor so that the resources to be invested by governments will have a maximum impact.

And though experimentation and innovation will remain essential, the broad policies governing the Bank's program are clear:

We are prepared to do much more to assist governments in the reform of their agricultural financial structure, and to support institutions designed to bring credit to the small farmer.

We intend to continue to invest in large irrigation projects and in the recovery of

saline lands, but we will emphasize on-farm development incorporating a maximum of self-financing so that the benefits of irrigation can reach small farmers more quickly.

We will support non-irrigated agriculture, including the financing of livestock production, and in particular small-scale dairy farming in milk-deficient areas.

We are prepared to finance the expansion of training facilities for extension agents who can help raise the productivity of the rural poor.

We are prepared to finance rural works programs as well as multi-purpose rural development projects.

We are ready to assist land and tendency reform programs by providing the follow-up logistical support required by the small farmer, and to help in the technical and financial aspects of land purchase and consolidation.

We have financed agricultural research institutions in the past and are fully prepared to do more in the future, particularly in the development of an appropriate technology for semi-arid agriculture. We propose to support investigation into the most effective uses of water at the farm level, especially in water-deficient areas. We are already assisting one such investigation in Mexico.

We will, in our lending for infrastructure, strongly urge that account be taken of the pressing needs of the rural areas.

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Let me now summarize and conclude the central points I have made this morning.

If we look objectively at the world today, we must agree that it is characterized by a massive degree of inequality.

The difference in living standards between the rich nations and the poor nations is a gap of gigantic proportions.

The industrial base of the wealthy nations is so great, their technological capacity so advanced, and their consequent advantages so immense that it is unrealistic to expect that the gap will narrow by the end of the century. Every indication is that it will continue to grow.

Nothing we can do is likely to prevent this. But what we can do is to begin to move now to insure that absolute poverty—utter degradation—is ended.

We can contribute to this by expanding the wholly inadequate flow of Official Development Assistance.

The flow of ODA can be increased, by 1980, to the target of 7% of GNP—a target originally accepted within the United Nations for completion by 1975.

This is feasible, but it will require renewed efforts by many nations, particularly the very richest.

Further, we must recognize that a high degree of inequality exists not only between developed and developing nations but within the developing nations themselves. Studies in the Bank during this past year reinforce the preliminary conclusions I indicated to you last year: income distribution patterns are severely skewed within developing countries—more so than within developed countries—and the problem requires accelerated action by the governments of virtually all developing nations.

A minimum objective should be that the distortion in income distribution within these nations should at least stop increasing by 1975, and begin to narrow within the last half of the decade.

A major part of the program to accomplish this objective must be designed to attack the absolute poverty which exists to a totally unacceptable degree in almost all of our developing member countries: a poverty so extreme that it degrades the lives of individuals below the minimal norms of human decency. The absolute poor are not merely a tiny minority of unfortunate—*a miscellaneous collection of the losers in life—a regrettable but insignificant exception to the rule.*

* Figures for all three periods are in 1973 dollars.

On the contrary, they constitute roughly 40% of the nearly two billion individuals living in the developing nations.

Some of the absolute poor are in urban slums, but the vast bulk of them are in the rural areas. And it is there—in the countryside—that we must confront their poverty.

We should strive to eradicate absolute poverty by the end of this century. That means in practice the elimination of malnutrition and illiteracy, the reduction of infant mortality, and the raising of life-expectancy standards to those of the developed nations.

Essential to the accomplishment of this objective is an increase in the productivity of small-scale agriculture.

Is it a realistic goal?

The answer is yes, if governments in the developing countries are prepared to exercise the requisite political will to make it realistic.

It is they who must decide.

As for the Bank, increased productivity of the small, subsistence farmer will be a

major goal of our program of expanded activity in the FY 1974-78 period.

But no amount of outside assistance can substitute for the developing member governments' resolve to take on the task.

It will call for immense courage, for political risk is involved. The politically privileged among the landed elite are rarely enthusiastic over the steps necessary to advance rural development. This is shortsighted, of course, for in the long term they, as well as the poor, can benefit.

But if the governments of the developing world—who must measure the risks of reform against the risks of revolution—are prepared to exercise the requisite political will to assault the problem of poverty in the countryside, then the governments of the wealthy nations must display equal courage. They must be prepared to help them by removing discriminatory trade barriers and by substantially expanding Official Development Assistance.

What is at stake in these decisions is the

fundamental decency of the lives of 40% of the people in the 100 developing nations which are members of this institution.

We must hope that the decisions will be the courageous ones.

If they are not, the outlook is dark.

But if the courageous decisions are made, then the pace of development can accelerate.

I believe it will. I believe it will because I believe that during the remainder of this century people everywhere will become increasingly intolerant of the inhuman inequalities which exist today.

All of the great religions teach the value of each human life. In a way that was never true in the past, we now have the power to create a decent life for all men and women. Should we not make the moral precept our guide to action? The extremes of privilege and deprivation are simply no longer acceptable.

It is development's task to deal with them.

You and I—and all of us in the international community—share that responsibility.

PROJECTED FLOW OF OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE MEASURED AS A PERCENT OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT¹

	1960	1965	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976		1960	1965	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Australia	0.38	0.53	0.59	0.53	0.61	0.58	0.59	0.60	0.62	Netherlands	0.31	0.36	0.61	0.58	0.67	0.66	0.70	0.72	0.76
Austria	.11	.07	.07	.09	.19	.22	.25	.26	.26	Norway	.11	.16	.32	.33	.41	.56	.67	.75	.82
Belgium	.88	.60	.46	.50	.55	.58	.65	.70	.70	Portugal	1.45	.59	.67	1.42	1.51	.45	.45	.45	.45
Canada	.19	.19	.42	.42	.47	.49	.50	.52	.53	Sweden	.05	.19	.38	.44	.48	.56	.65	.71	.75
Denmark	.09	.13	.38	.43	.45	.52	.56	.61	.63	Switzerland	.04	.09	.15	.11	.21	.26	.30	.32	.34
France	1.38	.76	.66	.66	.67	.65	.65	.65	.65	United Kingdom	.56	.47	.37	.41	.40	.37	.40	.40	.40
Germany	.31	.40	.32	.34	.31	.32	.34	.36	.38	United States ²	.53	.49	.31	.32	.29	.25	.22	.22	.21
Italy	.22	.10	.16	.18	.09	.16	.16	.16	.17	Total	.52	.44	.34	.35	.34	.34	.34	.35	.36
Japan	.24	.27	.23	.23	.21	.28	.34	.40	.40										

¹ Countries included are members of OECD Development Assistance Committee, accounting for more than 95 percent of total official development assistance. Figures for 1972 and earlier years are actual data. The projections for later years are based on World Bank estimates of growth of GNP, on information on budget appropriations for aid, and on aid policy statements made by governments. Because of the relatively long period of time required to translate legislative author-

izations first into commitments and later into disbursements, it is possible to project today, with reasonable accuracy, ODA flows (which by definition represent disbursements) through 1976.

² In 1949, at the beginning of the Marshall Plan, U.S. official development assistance amounted to 2.79 percent of GNP.

JUDGE SUPPORTS CONTROLS FOR METHAQUALONE

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, during my 3 years as chairman of the Juvenile Delinquency Subcommittee, I have conducted an intensive investigation into the diversion and abuse of legitimately produced narcotic and nonnarcotic dangerous drugs.

During the course of our barbiturate hearings, increasing reference was made to the growing incidence of methaqualone abuse. The drug is known as the "love drug," "heroin for lovers," and "the Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde drug." Many law enforcement and drug program staffers claim that it is the "hottest drug on the street" and that its abuse is rising in "geometric proportions."

In my own State of Indiana the abuse of methaqualone has increased substantially in the last year, particularly among youths 13 to 20. Directors of drug crisis centers, personnel operating drug hotlines and law enforcement officers in many Indiana communities, including Evansville, South Bend, Bloomington, Terre Haute, Muncie, Indianapolis, Fort Wayne, Lafayette, Anderson, Peru, and Kokomo, report that methaqualone abuse is increasingly common. They express deep concern because abusers believe the drug to be a safe nonaddicting downer.

Methaqualone is a nonbarbiturate sedative-hypnotic. It is pharmacologically equivalent to the short and intermediate acting barbiturates. Since abusers are primarily interested in pharmacological effects rather than the chemical classification, it is not surprising that this nonbarbiturate is being widely

abused. Best known on the streets as "sopors" and "quaaludes," this drug rates attention because of its newly recognized abuse potential and harmful effects.

In many ways the drug has become more attractive to potential abusers because of its nonbarbiturate characterization. The abuser who is "luding out," mistakenly thinks that he or she is using a less dangerous, nonaddictive barbiturate substitute. In fact, recent reports indicate that methaqualone is not only the rage in the addict community and on college and high school campuses, but it is so fashionable in some cities that bowls of "sopors" have replaced peanuts as a cocktail party staple. Individuals who would not abuse amphetamines or barbiturates are abusing "sopors" in ever-increasing numbers.

Most alarming is the fact that methaqualone is often combined with alcohol, wine and beer. As with barbiturates, this is a deadly mixture. There is a potentiation, so that one multiplies the effects of the other. If these practices continue we can expect growing numbers of tragedies associated with methaqualone abuse. As with barbiturates, abuse of methaqualone is risky business, but combining it with alcohol is suicidal.

Methaqualone because of the casual consideration it receives may have an even greater potential for abuse than the barbiturates. Methaqualone, is indeed, the "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde drug"—seemingly safe while actually deadly.

Although widespread abuse of methaqualone is a relatively recent phenomenon in this country, the problems associated with it are no mystery to students of its abuse. Epidemic outbreaks of metha-

qualone abuse have occurred in Japan and European nations during the 1960's. A study of 411 drug addicts treated in mental hospitals from 1963 to 1966 in Japan, found that 176—or 42.8 percent—abused methaqualone. When withdrawn from the drug, 9 percent of these methaqualone abusers experienced convulsions and delirium symptoms. The chief reason for these hospital admissions was violent antisocial behavior associated with methaqualone abuse. Apparently the serious methaqualone abuser develops the same disoriented mean drunk temper as the barbiturate abuser.

In this country, methaqualone has not been subject to as much scrutiny as the more traditional sedative-hypnotics. Several studies, however, have concluded that chronic abuse of methaqualone does lead to tolerance and, when the drug is discontinued, to withdrawal symptoms.

The American Medical Association's Council on Drugs says of methaqualone that "long-term use of larger than usual therapeutic doses may result in physical and psychic dependence." The Medical Letter on Drugs and Therapeutics, a non-profit publication providing unbiased critical evaluation of drugs by a board of eminent physicians, states:

Despite manufacturer's claims that "even after wide use physical dependence has not been established" . . . we believe it should be classified as a physical dependence producing drug.

In fact, physical addiction to methaqualone was demonstrated by a number of clinical studies in England as early as 1966.

On May 5, 1972, representatives of the Food and Drug Administration assured

the subcommittee that their recommendation on stricter controls for sedative-hypnotic drugs, including methaqualone, would be submitted to the subcommittee within approximately 2 months.

Nearly a year after the FDA made such assurance no action had been taken. Unfortunately, this type of administrative delay is not atypical.

It was only after a 3-year struggle that the proponents of stricter controls on the production and distribution of amphetamines could claim a victory of sorts, at least for the many youngsters and others who because of the recently imposed production quotas will perhaps not be exposed to an overabundance of "speed" in the family medicine chest, at school, or on the street.

In spite of conclusive documentation of epidemic Ritalin and Preludin abuse and dependence in Sweden and Japan, as well as evidence of increasing abuse and diversion in this country, a spokesperson for the Attorney General told the members of the subcommittee, in July 1971, that they did not have sufficient evidence of abuse potential to justify tighter controls. The FDA spokespeople expressed the hope that these drugs would be more strictly controlled.

I took strong exception to this wait-and-see approach then, and I reiterated this position most emphatically with regard to methaqualone, when in March 1973, I introduced the Methaqualone Control Act of 1973, S. 1252.

The Methaqualone Control Act, co-sponsored by 16 Members of the Senate would place the drug on schedule II of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970. Methaqualone is a prescription drug, but is not controlled under the 1970 act. Under schedule II, methaqualone would be subject to production quotas, stricter distribution controls, and more stringent import and export regulations.

Subcommittee hearings held in March and April on the Methaqualone Control Act documented even further the need for strict controls.

Diversion from legitimate channels occurs at all levels of distribution. This includes thefts, employee pilferage, unauthorized sales and in some instances excessive and unlawful prescribing and dispensing.

Methaqualone is readily available. In Indiana, the 150 mg. tablets sell on the street for 50 cents to \$1. Our preliminary surveys indicate that this price range is fairly typical of the street market in other regions of the country. The legitimate wholesale price for 500 tablets of 150 mg. each is approximately \$18.25 or 3.7 cents a tablet. When methaqualone is diverted at the wholesale level the profits are enormous.

Reports indicate that there have been instances of significant diversion. The subcommittee recently learned of the diversion of 600,000 methaqualone tablets from a Parke, Davis & Co. warehouse in Detroit, Mich. These tablets were reportedly diverted over a 10-day period in November 1972. These methaqualone tablets would bring from \$300,000 to \$600,000 on the street. The methaqualone diverted in this one case could provide each of the 24,000 students at Wayne State University in Detroit with 25 "sopors."

The DEA reported 2 additional cases involving diversion of substantial amounts of methaqualone:

1. The case of a defendant pharmacist in the Rocky Mountain area who reported to an undercover agent that methaqualone was readily available, and that he had 250,000 tablets for sale. In addition, he admitted that he diverted 300,000 tablets. A DEA agent reports that this pharmacist had revealed that, for the past year and half, he shipped large quantities (25,000 to 200,000 units) to customers in Boston, New York and Columbus, Ohio;

2. A case in which an audit performed by the state pharmacy board revealed a shortage of between 300,000 and 400,000 methaqualone tablets while in the possession of a wholesaler, and disclosed that the firm had made several shipments to non-existent firms.

Physicians and pharmacists are also sources of substantial amounts of the methaqualone which reaches the street. Drug samples and supplies are stolen from doctors' offices and pharmacies. Prescription pads are also sought. One common practice involves a single abuser who visits numerous physicians and complains of the same ailment. From each doctor, the abuser requests and receives a prescription for methaqualone. These prescriptions will be filled and refilled at numerous pharmacies. Thus the abuser or dealer is often able to obtain large quantities of methaqualone without being detected.

In a few instances, physicians themselves are actively engaged in illicit methaqualone traffic. Richard Oliver, investigative reporter for the New York Daily News, working with the Manhattan district attorney, brought such a case to the attention of the subcommittee members. Mr. Oliver commented as follows:

We sent another youth to the doctor, after determining the visiting hours. He found the cars double-parked outside of the office. He found half a dozen youngsters inside. He introduced himself to the nurse on duty.

When his turn came, during which time the room filled up with other students, when he was called, he was told to say two things: He had trouble sleeping; and his studies were bothering him. The physician did not look up from the prescription pad.

He prescribed 100 tablets of Quaalude, a sedative, asked for \$10, and our agent left. He never examined the patient, he never—he barely looked at him.

Unscrupulous pharmacists contribute to the blackmarket traffic. A journalist recently reported that "one pharmacist in the Washington Metropolitan Area does a brisk blackmarket business in methaqualone, taking a percentage of the street profits—much higher than he would get on a doctor's order."

According to the DEA, distribution of methaqualone in the hypnotic dosage form—150-400 mg.—has increased 1,500 percent in the past 5 years. One manufacturer's production has increased from 8 million pills in 1968 to over 100 million pills in 1972. DEA feels "unquestionably, the vast quantities manufactured are a major factor in the growing abuse."

Obviously these tablets, whether diverted from a manufacturer, a wholesaler, a retailer, or a practitioner, are not meeting legitimate research, industrial, or medical needs.

I believe that widespread abuse of this substance can be significantly curtailed by limiting the supply of the drug to recognized legitimate needs, and by simultaneously placing tighter controls on the distribution and prescription, and recordkeeping procedures required for methaqualone.

Following 3 days of highly publicized hearings the FDA finally announced their support of schedule II controls for methaqualone. William H. Rorer, Inc., Fort Washington, Pa., however, formally objected to the administrative proposal to strictly control production and distribution of their methaqualone whose trade name has been adopted as street jargon for the drug. Administrative hearings were completed in early August. The decision by Judge Theodor von Brand is a welcome one. It echoes my contention that methaqualone is a drug with a high potential for abuse and that the abuse may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence within the meaning of schedule II of the Controlled Substances Act. I urge the Drug Enforcement Administration to take quick action to implement this decision.

Our earlier success on the amphetamines and this decision on methaqualone are important steps in limiting the diversion of legitimately manufactured drugs to illicit purposes. But the circle will not be complete until the frequently abused barbiturates are also placed on schedule II.

The Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency began its investigation of the adequacy of Federal controls on the widely abused barbiturates 2 years ago. The extent of barbiturate abuse, the high incidence of barbiturate diversion, and the clear potential for even greater abuse have been documented in the subcommittee report, "Barbiturate Abuse in the United States—1972," and the many hundreds of pages of testimony and supplemental materials in our recently published volume "Barbiturate Abuse 1971-1972."

It has been almost a year since BNDD (DEA) concurred in my recommendation on the barbiturates. Five months later, after what some observers have characterized as "a heated but productive subcommittee hearing," the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare announced its support for my long standing proposal, cosponsored by 29 Senators, to reschedule these barbiturates. I hope that the expeditious manner in which DEA handled the methaqualone hearings, reflects a similar commitment with regard to the placement of the widely abused barbiturates on schedule II.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for the full text of Judge Theodor von Brand's decision to be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the decision was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[Before the United States Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration—Docket No. 73-11]

IN THE MATTER OF SCHEDULING METHAQUALONE AND ITS SALTS

RECOMMENDED DECISION

Theodore P. von Brand, Administrative Law Judge.

Robert J. Rosthal, Esq., Harold Murry, Esq., and Richard Ira Lebovitz, Esq., Counsel for the Drug Enforcement Administration.

Covington and Burling, Washington, D.C., by Eugene I. Lambert, Esq., and Christopher M. Little, Esq.

Thomas E. Quay, Esq., Fort Washington, Pennsylvania, Counsel for William H. Rorer, Inc.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This is a rulemaking proceeding pursuant to the provisions of the Controlled Substances Act, Public Law 9-1518 (1970), 21 U.S.C. [801 et seq.]. By notice dated April 6, 1973, as amended on April 17, 1973,¹ the director of the then Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD)² found that methaqualone and its salts:

1. Have a high potential for abuse;
2. Have a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States; and
3. May, when abused, lead to severe physical and psychological dependence.

On the basis of those findings, the director proposed an amendment of 21 CFR § 308.12, by listing the drug methaqualone in Schedule II pursuant to the provisions of the Act.

On May 14, 1973, William H. Rorer, Inc. (Rorer)³ requested a hearing concerning the proposed amendment of the list of drugs contained in Schedule II of the Bureau's regulations (ALJ Exhibit 4). In its comments on the Bureau's proposal, Rorer contended essentially that the Bureau had failed to meet one of the statutory prerequisites to the listing of the drug under Schedule II because of a failure to show that abuse of the drug "may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence" (ALJ Exhibit 7).

Subsequent to Rorer's request for a hearing, prehearing conferences were held on June 15 and June 29, 1973. The evidentiary hearings were held on July 17 and 18 and August 1 and 2, 1973. The record was closed on the last day of hearings and proposed findings and replies were filed by the parties on August 31 and September 14, 1973.

Rorer does not contest the Drug Enforcement Administration's findings that methaqualone and its salts:

1. Have a high potential for abuse; and
2. Have a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States.

The sole issue to be decided is whether the abuse of methaqualone "may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence."

This matter is now before the undersigned for final consideration of DEA's notice of proposed rulemaking. Rorer's comments and requests for hearings, the evidence, the proposed findings of fact, conclusions and briefs filed by counsel for the Government and for Rorer. Consideration has been given to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions and briefs filed by the parties and all proposed findings of fact and conclusions not herein specifically found or concluded are rejected; the undersigned, having considered the entire record herein, makes the following recommended findings of fact and conclusions drawn therefrom:

RECOMMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Methaqualone is a depressant drug of the sedative hypnotic group (Fort 54).

2. A drug is any biologically active substance that alters the physiology or chemistry of the body whether used in the treatment of illness or used for non-medical social purposes (Fort 53).

3. The psychoactive or mind-altering category of drugs comprises those drugs whose primary effect is on the mind or consciousness of the individual (Fort 53).

4. The central nervous system depressants are drugs that relieve anxiety (sedatives) or induce sleep (hypnotics) (Rorer Exhibit 2, p. 10).

The depressant drugs are one of the major

subtypes of the psychoactive or mind-altering drugs. They decrease or dampen the electrical and chemical activity of the brain beginning with the frontal areas and then with progressive dosages, spread to involve the lower centers of the brain on to and including control of respiration and heart action (Fort 53-54).

The depressant drugs are comprised of the sedative hypnotic group which includes the barbiturates, methaqualone, and a variety of other drugs. The narcotics such as heroin, morphine, codeine, and methadone are also included among the depressant drugs (Fort 54).

5. The sedative hypnotic drugs which work on the central nervous system, tend to produce drowsiness, diminish alertness and decrease inhibitions. They impair muscular coordination and to some extent vision, as well as judgment, reasoning, and memory. These results vary with the dosage consumed (Fort 54-55).

The short-term effect of a large dose of a depressant drug or of a sedative hypnotic drug may progress into stupor and coma. If the dose is sufficient in a concentrated time period, it may lead to death with the terminal stages of the individual's comatose state sometimes involving convulsions or chronic movements of the body and a variety of other symptoms (Fort 55).

6. The standard drug in the sedative hypnotic class are the barbiturates (Fort 56).

In the strict sense, methaqualone is a non-barbiturate hypnotic (Brown 210). Nevertheless, there is a substantial element of resemblance between methaqualone and the barbiturate hypnotics in terms of the chemical and pharmacological properties of this drug (Brown 210): As far as methaqualone's pharmacology and biochemistry is concerned, it is almost indistinguishable from the short-acting barbiturates (Brown 218, 227).⁴

The accepted medical use for the barbiturate drugs is to relieve tension, anxiety, stress or to induce sleep. Another common use is as an adjunct in the treatment of certain forms of epilepsy and as a preanesthetic medication (Fort 57).

Methaqualone, like the barbiturate, is medically prescribed for sedation or for the induction of sleep. It is also, used non-medically for the same reasons as other sedative hypnotics, viz., a user would use it in terms of turning on, feeling good, getting high, escaping, or relaxing (Fort 64-65).

Methaqualone would be closest to the short-acting barbiturates such as pentobarbital and secobarbital. By shortacting, it is meant that the drug has a quick onset of action somewhere between two and six hours (Fort 67).

7. The therapeutic dose of methaqualone for sedation would be 75 to 150 milligrams. There is an increasing practice of using the larger tablet, namely, 150 milligrams although 75 milligrams was previously indicated as satisfactory. A therapeutic dose for hypnosis, namely, sleep induction, would be 300 milligrams. The drug is also manufactured in tablets of 400 milligrams and 500 milligrams (Fort 68).

8. Use of a drug means that the person has consumed it. Abuse of a drug means that part of drug use where heavy use measurably impairs health, and/or social or vocational function. For example, drug abuse may impair the body organs such as the liver, impair faculties while driving, or lead to interpersonal conflict associated with heavy use of the drug (Fort 69-70).

9. Physical dependence means addiction and includes the elements of tolerance and withdrawal illness or abstinence syndrome (Fort 70-71, 74).

10. Tolerance is an adaptive process by the body's cells or the body as a whole to an alien compound such as a drug. It is measurable by pharmacological or biochemical tests (Brown 237).

The practical consequence of tolerance is

that an individual must take increasing amounts of a particular substance to obtain the same effect (Matthew 253).

Tolerance is part of the withdrawal syndrome since it is highly probable that an individual who has become tolerant to a drug will exhibit the withdrawal or abstinence syndrome when the drug is stopped (Matthew 253-54, Ford 74). In the case of the sedative hypnotics, tolerance and the withdrawal syndrome always go together (Matthew 254).

11. The abstinence syndrome is evidenced by symptoms such as restlessness, agitation, a fast pulse, and frequently, sweating. This may progress through various stages to toxic psychosis and epileptic fits (Matthew 257).

Toxic psychosis is characterized by hallucinations and delusions similar to delirium tremens from alcohol withdrawal (Matthew 257).

12. Severity of physical dependence is measured primarily in terms of the duration and danger of the withdrawal symptoms exhibited (Wieland 438).

13. The barbiturate-alcohol type dependence is the severest kind of physical or psychological dependence occurring with the mind-altering drugs (Fort 100-01, Deutsch 473-74). In the case of sedative-hypnotic dependence, there is central nervous system involvement and withdrawal with precipitate serious syndromes such as convulsions, delirium and organic psychoses which can be life threatening (Deutsch 473).

While withdrawal may be fatal in the case of the sedative hypnotic drugs, this does not occur in the case of narcotics (Fort 79).

14. A clinical study on 116 patients posseid with methaqualone correlating blood levels of the drug with degree of consciousness, objectively demonstrated the development of tolerance in the case of methaqualone with respect to 42 individuals (Brown 219-20, Matthew 256-57; Government Exhibit 20).

Tolerance to methaqualone on the part of seven patients was established by the administration of a sodium pentobarbital tolerance tests. Such patients were also given pentobarbital for the purpose of treatment, the average patient requiring more than 200 milligrams of pentobarbital, indicating a rather marked dependence on this type of drug (Deutsch 482). Detoxification of such individuals with gradually reduced doses of pentobarbital took approximately three weeks (482-83).

15. Proof that individuals may become tolerant to methaqualone demonstrates that abuse of this drug may lead to physical dependence. In the case of the sedative hypnotics, such as methaqualone, tolerance is one of the indicia of the withdrawal syndrome (Finding 10, *supra*).

16. The fact that sedative hypnotic drugs can be cross-substituted indicates they are of equal dependence liability (Fort 86-87).

17. In the case of withdrawal from methaqualone, a patient would be expected to go through the minor side effects appearing after eight hours or more. These symptoms would then continue over the next 24 to 28 hours. The patient would then have a significant chance of going on to the major withdrawal symptoms such as convulsions, organic psychosis, and delirium (Deutsch 484). A computer study of the symptoms of patients, who by history had taken methaqualone daily, when they could not get the drug, demonstrated that they had an abstinence syndrome indistinguishable from individuals taking tuinal or seconal (Deutsch 476).

Opinion testimony such as that of Dr. Matthew, Dr. Fort, and Dr. Deutsch based on an examination of and interviews with abusers of methaqualone, that abuse of this drug has severe physical dependence liability is persuasive (Fort 106, 113-14, 170-71, Deutsch 484, 473, Matthew 258).⁵ The record demonstrates their qualifications to make such a judgment based on their evaluation

Footnotes at end of article.

of withdrawal symptoms exhibited in the early stages or on their assessment of histories taken from methaqualone abusers. Such opinions need not be based on an examination of the entire clinical course of withdrawal. Correct medical procedure and ethical considerations require that treatment be instituted to prevent the dangerous or life-threatening symptoms of the later stages of withdrawal (Fort 88, Mathew 258, Deutsch 481).

18. The abuse of methaqualone may lead to severe physical dependence (Findings 9 to 17, *supra*).

19. "... In general, a person is considered as psychologically dependent upon drugs when the physical sensation or psychological state brought about through the use of the drug is of such a nature that he desires the repetition of the sensation or state, and feels more or less psychological disturbance or distress during periods of abstinence from the drug." Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970" (H. Rep. No. 91-1444 (Part 1) 91st Cong. 2nd Sess. 1970 at 7; See also Fort 106 and Deutsch 477-78).

20. Physical and psychological dependence overlap (Fort 108). Nevertheless, a person may have severe psychological dependence in the case of a particular drug without being physically dependent on it, and it is possible to be severely psychologically dependent on a drug without exhibition of withdrawal symptoms (Wieland 467).

21. The symptoms of psychological dependence range from mild symptoms such as feelings of uneasiness and restlessness through manifestations such as a compulsion or craving for the drug so that the individual cannot function without it (Fort 106-07).

22. Case histories taken by Dr. Lionel Deutsch, a New York physician in charge of the inpatient detoxification service at Queens Hospital, demonstrate that persons abusing methaqualone exhibited a craving for the drug lasting from two weeks to a month or more, relapsed after discontinuance, and persisted in use of the drug despite social pressure (Deutsch 477).

23. Abuse of methaqualone may lead to severe psychological dependence (Deutsch 477, Fort 114, 107-08; Findings 20-22, *supra*).

DISCUSSION

This is a case of first impression. It is evidently the first contested rulemaking proceeding under the Controlled Substances Act pertaining to the scheduling of a drug under Section 202 of the statute (21 U.S.C. § 812).

The Government and Rorer disagree both on the meaning of the applicable statutory standard, namely:

"Abuse of the drug or other substances may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence"

and the weight which should be accorded to the testimony of the witnesses and certain of the exhibits as well as the inferences which may be drawn therefrom.

It is Rorer's position that the term "may lead" should be construed as meaning "can be expected to lead in a significant percentage of cases" to severe psychological or physical dependence. DEA argues on the contrary, that the imposition of such a standard cannot be justified either from the legislative history or on the basis of this record. In this connection, the Government contends that the term should be equated with meaning "might lead to" to "could lead to" severe psychological or physical dependence. There is no precedent affording guidance on this subject. The Act does not define the term "may lead" nor does the legislative history in the form of the Senate and House reports give specific guidance on this issue. It is evident, however, from the text of the statute that the scheduling of drugs thereunder is intended to be a prophylactic measure before a drug becomes a public health problem in

the form of addiction, i.e., severe physical or psychological dependence. This is clear from the plain meaning of the word "may" which requires that the Government demonstrate that the drug has this potential. Moreover, the statute in this respect does not impose a quantitative standard. The dispute between the Government and Rorer as to the adequacy of the proof and the weight to be attributed to certain of the testimony should be evaluated in the light of those considerations.

The proposed findings and supporting argument principally raise the question of how much weight should be accorded to the expert testimony where there is a conflict between the witnesses or with other items of evidence. An administrative agency, however, is not precluded by conflicts in the evidence from passing on the weight to be accorded to the testimony and other portions of the evidentiary record and making findings thereon. See *Korber Hats Inc. v. FTC*, 311 F.2d 358, 362 (1st Cir. 1962); *Carter Products Inc. v. FTC*, 268 F.2d 461, 491 (9th Cir. 1959) cert. denied 361 U.S. 884 (1959); *NLRB v. Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp.*, 316 U.S. 105, 108 (1942).

The main thrust of Rorer's argument is that the testimony of the DEA witnesses is speculative since none had observed severe withdrawal or psychological symptoms resulting from methaqualone abuse. The testimony of Drs. Fort, Mathew and Deutsch, on the basis of their observations of abusers of methaqualone and their assessment of the histories of such individuals that abuse of the drug has severe physical dependence liability, however, cannot be dismissed as unfounded speculation. These experts clearly have the qualifications to make such a judgment based on their assessment of withdrawal symptoms exhibited in the early stages and on their evaluation of the histories taken from and interviews with methaqualone abusers. This evidence supports the finding that there is a probability that methaqualone abuse may lead to severe physical dependence. Neither the demeanor or the testimony of these witnesses gave any indication that they would engage in speculation on questions of this nature. Their testimony that the failure to treat patients prior to the onset of major withdrawal symptoms would be dangerous and contrary to sound medical practice is convincing. Under the circumstances, a prognosis by expert opinion of this nature as to the consequences of drug abuse is within the contemplation of the statute whose purpose is to prevent a public health problem before it arises.

There are additional reasons for not rejecting the opinion of DEA's experts for failure to meet a standard of hard medical evidence. Clinical observation by physicians involves not only what the physician sees with his eyes but also requires an exercise of judgment as to the significance of the patient's report of his subjective state.⁷ The opinion of the DEA witnesses, based on their observation of patients and evaluation of the histories of drug abusers constitutes such an exercise of judgment and should be regarded as reliable.⁸ Finally, the view of the DEA witnesses that the abstinence syndrome is best established through determining tolerance is evidently an accepted scientific concept which should not be rejected as speculative.⁹

Turning specifically to the issue of psychological dependence, the testimony of the DEA experts, and in particular, that of Dr. Deutsch, who carefully recorded the histories of methaqualone abusers is persuasive. Certainly, his findings based on detailed histories cannot be considered as conjectural. The opinion evidence of the DEA witnesses compels the finding that there is a probability that abuse of methaqualone will lead to severe psychological dependence. Consideration has been given to the testimony of Dr. Wieland that although there may be cases

of methaqualone abuse leading to severe psychological dependence, this is "not dealing in probabilities." (Tr. 467). To the extent that Dr. Wieland's views on this point conflict with those of Dr. Deutsch, the opinion of the latter appears entitled to more weight in the light of his empirical work on this point demonstrated by the record.

Since an individual may have severe psychological dependence without exhibiting symptoms of the withdrawal syndrome, a fortiori observation of the full clinical course of withdrawal cannot be prerequisite to a finding as to the existence of severe psychological dependence.

Although there are conflicts in the evidence between the testimony of DEA's experts and those of Rorer, the Government, by a clear preponderance of the evidence, has established that abuse of methaqualone and its salts may lead to severe psychological and physical dependence. There is no indication in the testimony of DEA's experts that severe psychological or physical dependence would be limited to an insignificant number of instances if abuse of the drug were unchecked.

RECOMMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Under the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.).

1. The Controlled Substances Act of 1970 was intended to protect the public health and safety by establishing a system of control procedures for drugs with a potential for abuse.

2. These controls include registration requirements, export and import restrictions, labeling and packaging requirements, production quotas, recordkeeping procedures and reports, order forms and prescription restrictions.

3. The controls are effected through a system of scheduling drugs or other substances according to criteria set forth in the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 relating to legitimate medical use and abuse potential.

4. Methaqualone is a drug, with a high potential for abuse and a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. 812 (b) (2) (A) and 21 U.S.C. 812(b) (2) (B), as Rorer has stipulated.

5. The Government has proved by substantial evidence of record that the abuse of the drug methaqualone may lead to severe psychological dependence within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. 812(b) (2) (C).

6. The Government has proved by substantial evidence of record that the abuse of the drug methaqualone may lead to severe physical dependence within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. 812(b) (2) (C).

THEODOR P. VON BRAND,
Administrative Law Judge.

SEPTEMBER 25, 1973.

FOOTNOTES

⁷ 38 F.R. 9170 (1973), 38 F.R. 10010 (1973).

⁸ BNDD is one of the predecessor agencies of the present Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

⁹ Rorer is a principal manufacturer and distributor of methaqualone under the brand name Quaalude (ALJ Exhibit 4).

¹⁰ The opinion of Dr. Brown, who is a clinical biochemist, is entitled to particular weight on this point.

¹¹ Pentobarbital is a short-acting barbiturate (Fort 67).

¹² Dr. Mathew of the Regional Poisoning Treatment Center in Royal Infirmary in Edinburgh, United Kingdom, has personally observed about 50 individuals severely addicted to methaqualone (258).

¹³ Dr. Deutsch, who treated seven abusers of methaqualone, testified that if treatment had not interrupted the withdrawal syndrome, these individuals would have been expected to develop the abstinence syndrome with a significant chance of going on to the major withdrawal symptoms such as convulsions

and toxic psychosis, which are life threatening (Deutsch 484, 473).

¹ See Wieland, Tr. 441.

² Consideration has been given to the contention of Rorer that Government Exhibit 20 demonstrates that methaqualone does not lead to severe psychological or physical dependence. This exhibit and Dr. Matthew's testimony at Tr. 254-57 and 272-76 are cited for the proposition that 42 persons proven tolerant to methaqualone were abruptly withdrawn from the drug and not a single case of severe physical or psychological withdrawal symptoms reported. However, the article is devoted to the treatment of methaqualone poisoning by conservative management such as avoidance of diuresis and does not appear to address itself to the withdrawal problem as such. Individuals tolerant to the drug are not necessarily poisoned (Tr. 260-61). As a result, the silence with respect to withdrawal of an article devoted to treatment of Mandrax poisoning affords an uncertain basis for drawing an inference conflicting with the testimony of Dr. Matthew. His express testimony that he treated persons considered dependent on methaqualone with barbiturates or a strong tranquilizer with a barbiturate and that persons tolerant to the drug, on withdrawal, could be expected to display the abstinence syndrome is persuasive and not vitiated by the possible conflicting inference drawn from the article in question. Moreover, as DEA states, Dr. Matthew did not testify with respect to the article except on the development of tolerance and the treatment of Mandrax poisoning.

³ See Dr. Deutsch's citation of Cecil and Loeb, a "classical textbook of medicine", on this point (Tr. 481).

ANOTHER ZERO-GROWTH POLICY FOR FOOD

Mr. MCCLURE. Mr. President, the continued policy of price controls on fertilizer, by the Cost of Living Council, is insuring that the administration policy for increased food production will fail. Once again two official Federal policies clash, with the American farmer and the American consumer as their victims. It should be obvious to the Cost of Living Council that when fertilizer is selling for \$110 a ton in foreign markets, a controlled price of \$75 a ton for U.S. buyers guarantees crippling domestic shortages.

I support Secretary Butz' request to the Council, in which he explicitly pointed out that if fertilizer price controls are not lifted promptly, he fears that "the crop yields and production will be reduced in 1974."

The American farmer cannot afford any further delays by the Cost of Living Council. In northern Idaho, for example, it is now raining heavily and a delay of 1 week could mean that fertilizer cannot be applied in time. One wheat grower has called me to explain if he cannot buy 250 tons of fertilizer within 1 week, then his plans for 1,100 acres of wheat next spring are jeopardized.

It is possible that one reason for administration confusion and delay in agricultural matters is lack of understanding of the true situation facing American farmers. A recent article in Farmland News graphically describes what faces them, whether it is a shortage of fertilizer, fuel, or baling wire. The report that old potbellied stoves are going for as much as \$150 illustrates the bleak picture that the farmers and other rural citizens see coming.

Mr. President, so that my urban colleagues, administration officials, and the national press may gain a better understanding of the problems in rural America today, I ask unanimous consent that the complete article be printed in the RECORD.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it so ordered.

[From Farmland News, Sept. 15, 1973]

SHORTAGES PUT DAMPER ON THE FARM BOOM

At a time when farmers are being enticed by fabulous prices to go all out in production, they are bucking a shortage syndrome that threatens to frustrate them at virtually every turn.

The delicacy of the gasoline situation for farmers has been well noted, but that is only one facet of the input, or supply, problem.

Whether you are talking about propane, fertilizer, or baling wire, the story is the same: Supplies are tight, perilously so in some cases.

Take propane, for example.

Farmland Industries considers this perhaps its most serious challenge in getting supplies to its member-owners. Dave Arthur, executive director of the fuels sales, says his biggest hope at this point is for a "dry harvest and a warm winter" which would help supplies go around.

Farmland's goal is to supply members as much propane overall as it did in the previous 12 months, but Arthur says this will take some doing.

"We've contracted for some foreign material," he said, "but it isn't expected to be available in time for the drying season. We are trying to buy, borrow or trade ahead for supplies wherever possible, but the propane we are able to get is going to be priced very high, and these costs will have to be passed on to local associations."

Indeed, propane could cost almost twice what it now is selling for. Higher corn prices can compensate for higher propane prices.

So far as the propane shortage is concerned, Arthur said it would be best for farmers to leave corn in their fields as long as possible to enable it to dry out more on its own. But after the experience some had last year in being kept out of their fields by inclement weather, he agrees they will get in as soon as they can.

In any event, whether the harvest is dry or wet, the need for propane will be up because of the anticipated increase in corn production, Arthur pointed out.

Propane for keeping rural homes warm will have top priority. And there are many in rural America who are taking steps to do without home heating fuels if it comes to that. An Oklahoma City newspaper recently reported a "sudden boom" in demand for wood-burning stoves by rural residents who don't want to be caught in winter with an empty butane or propane tank.

Hardware stores across rural Oklahoma were reporting that old potbellied stoves were going for as much as \$150. One might conclude a similar "run" was under way in other Farmland states.

Traditionally, homes have been put first in propane shortages. With big crops desperately needed, a wet harvest could make the priority issue even more ticklish. Governor John Love, the new federal energy czar, was expected to set up a mandatory allocations program on propane that could put Midwest farm needs first.

Propane users need to plan carefully to prevent overbuying. By harvesting crops at lower moisture content, farmers can cut the energy needed for drying. They can also save by reducing the drying temperature.

Research under way at Oklahoma State and other universities is aimed at drying crops with natural air. Low humidity air is used during harvest, fuel is conserved and grain quality is improved.

Farmers who are apprehensive about getting enough propane for grain drying can consider one chemical alternative available through Farmland—ChemStor. This is a combination of acetic and propionic acid that prevents mold and spoilage of high-moisture grain destined for feeding on the farm or for sale to feedlots.

In a year when both the profits and problems of farming seem to have reached unparalleled heights, it's little wonder that the biggest hay harvest in years is accompanied by a shortage of wire to bale it with.

If baling wire seemed a minor part of farming before, now it is no longer taken for granted by farmers, some of whom are paying as much as \$60 a box for it on the black market.

All steel is short, but wire is the primary product in the minds of everyone due to the excellent hay crop.

"With one of the largest hay harvests coming to an end, and many farmers experiencing shortages of baling wire and twine, we strongly suggest that they need to plan and order their wire and twine needs 6 to 8 months in advance," said Ross Denison, vice president of equipment and supplies, Farmland Industries.

In spite of the shortages, Farmland distributed 32% more boxes of baling wire and 36.5% more bales of twine this past fiscal year, but it still was not enough.

Farmland Industries is the largest baling wire distributor in America and one of the largest twine distributors also. It is expected that the supply of either will not improve materially in 1974 over 1973.

"The important thing to remember is that the producers of baling wire will no longer build inventories in the fall and winter as in the past," Denison said. "They will encourage shipments direct off of the production lines direct to our member associations in order for us to receive our fair allocation, which we feel will be a fair percentage over 1973."

"People wonder why there was a sudden shortage of steel. The reason is simple in that there is now very little foreign steel being shipped into the United States and this, with the increased demand, caused the shortage this past late spring and summer. If there is no change from present conditions, we estimate it will be three or four years before our domestic mills will be able to catch up."

"We're running our machines around the clock to fill orders," said Dick Yates, director of public relations at C&F Steel Corporation in Pueblo, Colo. "We exhausted our warehouse supply in June and our order book is filled into 1974. We aren't taking on any new customers. We can only produce so much."

Northwestern Steel, in Sterling, Ill., isn't taking on any new customers either. "We don't have any inventory," said Bob Tousley, sales manager. "The wire goes right from the machines to the trucks. We're sold out for the balance of the year. We could take enough orders in a week to keep us busy for six months."

"We have no inventory except the little that builds up overnight," said W. O. Buffe, manager of merchant wire sales at Armco Steel Corporation. "The trucks line up at 6 a.m. and take it away. Most of our output never hits the warehouse floor."

Two years of drought in Africa, Mexico and Brazil, sisal producing countries, have exhausted most of the reserve stocks of sisal inventories from which baling twine is made. Farmland Industries is exploring all sources to have an adequate twine supply available for next season. Farmers placing orders for their twine needs in November and December are likely to receive their needs in time for the haying season. Twine is an imported product and is exempted from price controls.

Never has there been a "run" on fertilizer supplies to match this one.

With farmers planting almost up to their doorways and present grain prices suggesting fabulous returns on fertilizer investment, there is little wonder that Farmland Industries is so hard-pressed to meet demand.

As the major fertilizer supplier in the grain-rich Midwest, Farmland is moving product out to member associations as fast as it makes it. But the demand is so great that Farmland plants have been unable to build up inventories.

Indeed, inventories of all types of fertilizer are virtually nonexistent, according to Warren E. Dewlen, vice-president of fertilizer for Farmland and chairman of the board of The Fertilizer Institute.

"All we've got to ship is the product we make each day," Dewlen said. This is a seller's market, all right, but there is a definite nightmarish aspect to it so far as Dewlen is concerned.

In late August the big demand was for anhydrous ammonia in the wheat belt. Farmland storage facilities at Fort Dodge, Ia., Hastings, Neb., Sergeant Bluff, Neb., Dodge City, Kan., and Lawrence, Kan., can hold a total of 273,000 tons. Normally at this time of the year, a tenth of that capacity is on hand. There's nowhere near that much available now.

"It's not a healthy situation," said Dewlen in noting that member cooperatives are on allocations for all types of fertilizers. In some cases, clients have had to be directed to alternate sources of supply.

Dewlen pointed out that because of the tremendous demands for fertilizers this last spring Farmland had little chance to build up inventories for the fall rush. "By the time corn side dressing was completed," he said, "we were on a day-to-day basis in keeping up with demand."

Farmland facilities are going at full capacity and even if the Enid fertilizer plant, now under construction, was on stream the situation would still be touch-and-go, Dewlen said. It's not a matter of having insufficient supplies of natural gas to make ammonia. It's simply a case of a tremendous demand for fertilizers of all kinds.

"You come back to two key reasons for this situation," Dewlen said. "First, the lid is off on production controls and, second, domestic price freezes have driven a lot of fertilizer into export channels. Export fertilizers bring as much as \$30 a ton more than the domestic price."

Then, too, a lot of land being put back into production is of a marginal quality and needs a lot of fertilizer.

Farmland, of course, has spurned the lucrative export field to try to meet the needs of its member-owners, but other companies are shipping great quantities out of the country. In the last year, Dewlen said, 1.6 million tons of diammonium phosphate and 900,000 tons of triple superphosphate were exported.

So acute is the situation that recently a California cooperative that manufactures fertilizer turned to overseas sources for phosphate rock. The Valley Nitrogen Producers received 30,000 tons from the Spanish Sahara on Africa's west coast. Valley Nitrogen said similar shipments are planned to enable it to triple production of phosphate fertilizer to meet a surging demand for it in southwestern agriculture.

Farmland is studying an expansion program for its phosphate production in Florida and at this point Dewlen can see little likelihood of Farmland becoming importer of rock.

Fertilizer always has represented the farmer's best return on investment, Dewlen noted, and this year the situation is especially tempting to get the required materials.

"When corn was selling at \$1 a bushel and wheat at \$1.50, the farmer could figure a return of from \$2 to \$3 for each dollar he spent on fertilizer," Dewlen said. "Now, with wheat and corn selling at twice and three times those figures, he can expect as much as \$5 back for each dollar spent on fertilizer."

In potash, too, the situation is ticklish. A Canadian rail strike has tied up shipments to the U.S. and, even when the strike ends, there will still be a transportation crunch to deal with, Dewlen observed.

Dewlen shies from recommending clamps on fertilizer exports. He sees complications for farmers resulting from such a policy. Rather, Dewlen would prefer to see an end to price controls on domestic supplies. Domestic prices likely would rise but the increased availability of product would more than compensate for the higher costs, he believes.

CAMPAIGN REFORM

Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, on August 21, 1973, the Arizona Republic carried an editorial which suggests current efforts to attain campaign reform are attacking the problem from the wrong end.

I ask unanimous consent to have this editorial printed in the RECORD so that we can give some thought to another approach to reform:

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

POOR CAMPAIGN REFORM

Election reform is in the air. Congress is striving to curb the practice of political candidates accepting large campaign contributions from corporations, influential lobbies and individuals.

Most of these attempts appear doomed to fail.

They are unlikely to have an effect because they consist chiefly of reporting requirements which are easily circumvented, and limits on the amounts of the contributions.

One campaign reform already in force is the income tax checkoff which invites the taxpayer to kick in toward the campaign expenses of national candidates. This money is administered by the government rather than being given directly to the candidate cited by a contributor.

It is the germ of tax-paid campaigns much sought after by liberal spokesmen and legislators which would have the effect of breaking the link between a candidate's appeal to the people and his ability to raise funds.

What is missing from these various schemes is the recognition that the real cause of excessive campaign contributions is the excessive power government holds over the contributors.

If the price of milk, for example, were not established by government fiat there would be no reason for the milk industry to contribute so heavily to both parties.

If the power of OSHA and the Environmental Protection Agency to interfere with the operations of business were less awesome businesses would not feel impelled to placate the government with generous donations to officeholders.

If the complaint is that large corporations and powerful lobbies are attempting to purchase favors from the government, the most beneficial solution would be to remove the government from the position of being able to bestow favors.

This would not only help to reform campaign practices, it would go a long way toward restoring productivity to the economy and freedom to the people.

ECONOMIC AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF PUBLIC WORKS

Mr. MONTOYA. Mr. President, last week the Senate passed H.R. 8916, appropriations for the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce. Included in the bill were appropriations for the programs

administered by the Economic Development Administration and the Title V Regional Action Planning Commissions, both of the Department of Commerce. Included in this legislation was a stipulation that none of the funds appropriated under the act or otherwise available for expenditures by the Department of Commerce could be used to discontinue or phase out these economic development assistance programs. Although I consider the level of appropriations reflected in the legislation still too low, I am deeply gratified that these programs are included in this bill at all, since they had been designated for extinction under the President's original Federal budget for fiscal year 1974.

The provision disallowing a phase out of the Economic Development Administration and the seven Regional Commissions is not—I am certain my colleagues will agree—intended as a confrontation with the administration. Indeed, Congress wishes to cooperate with the administration in formulating regional and economic development policies that more adequately and more efficiently meet the needs of today. To this effect, the Senate, in passing the authorizing legislation, instructed the Office of Management and Budget and the Department of Commerce to examine current and past Federal efforts to secure "balanced economic development" and to submit by year's end a proposal for restructuring these programs. I am hopeful, therefore, that Congress and the administration can work together in this important area and provide the Nation with the best and most efficient program possible.

However, the administration has not yet offered a regional or economic development program which is ready to go into action. In the interim, the badly needed current programs must go on. Congress has acted responsibly by voting overwhelmingly to extend them, and the President apparently agreed when he signed the authorizing legislation. I am sure that the administration as well as the Congress realizes that the inflationary consequences of these particular programs are minimal, since they are not only modest in sum but are also designed to put idle resources to work.

In addition to other benefits, these programs are well suited to combat the adverse economic impacts that unavoidably accompany defense realignments. Budgetary and efficiency considerations, not to mention the ever changing international situation, suggest that further cuts to the defense budget are warranted, but of course we are not dealing exclusively with hardware in this matter. We are also dealing with human beings. We are dealing with our fellow Americans. These men and women were called when the Nation needed them and invested years of their lives in our support and defense. In our current efforts for efficiency in government, we must not simply turn our backs on them. We cannot assume that the private sector will readily absorb released personnel, when unemployment is already 4.8 percent and expected to go even higher. The Government must lend a helping hand as readjustment is made. Programs like those administered by the Economic De-

velopment Administration can be used in this effort, the effort of changing from a war-time to a peace-time economy—from an international policeman to an international provider.

In this regard, I applaud the Senate's action this week in authorizing \$50 million as part of the military procurement bill to be used by the Office of Economic Adjustment in the Department of Defense to help communities convert military installations to civilian industry. In extending the Public Works and Economic Development Act, the Senate requested a report from the Defense Department on its program of economic conversion for the communities affected by the defense facility and activity realignments announced in April of this year. This report "The Impact of Defense Cutbacks on American Communities" is now available for interested persons and may be obtained from the Committee on Public Works, U.S. Senate.

At the same time, we must continue to seek improvements in the way we do things. We must take into account new factors and new knowledge. In recent years, for example, we have attained a much greater awareness of the intricate interdependences that must be considered as we try to solve problems. Resource limitations and environmental degradation have forced themselves upon our consciousness placing new constraints upon our actions—constraints that demand greater care in our decisions.

Nowhere is the need for judicious action more necessary for us as a society than in the area of public investment: public works.

Investment that we make as a group can determine the course of events for years into the future; it can influence large groups of people and alter the composition of vast amounts of land; it is usually the necessary, if not the sufficient, prerequisite for economic activity.

As is true of all capital, public investment is a scarce commodity. There are competing demands for its use. Furthermore, investments, particularly investments for public goods, are usually bulky. That is, they cost a lot of money all at once, with costs concentrated at one point in the beginning and benefits extended over a long period of time. These benefits can represent increased national income to be distributed among us individually, or they can represent enhanced national wealth, to be consumed by us jointly.

These characteristics, joint supply, bulkiness, and scarcity, argue for the need to approach public investment decisions with the utmost of care and consideration. The Public Works and Economic Development Act, for example, tried to encourage reasoned investment decisions in order to optimize, given the limited funds allocated for this purpose, economic opportunity for persons living in the Nation's most distressed areas. One way it did this was by establishing and nurturing economic development districts at the substate level and regional action planning commissions at the interstate level. The utilization and emulation of these structures by other State and Federal agencies suggests that these experiments in regional development have not been totally unsuccessful.

More important, these experiments have provided us with invaluable experience in the area of public investment decisionmaking. These experiences must be considered as we attempt to formulate new or improved methods for achieving desired results from limited public investments. This hard-earned experience must not simply be wasted.

The administration's proposed alternatives are not completely acceptable. For example, revenue sharing taken alone may fragment both the decision-making process and available capital. Optimal public investment frequently requires just the reverse action, a pooling of knowledge and of resources—both horizontally among localities and vertically among governments. We have all heard of the community that recently returned its net sum of shared revenues, \$14, with a note telling Uncle Sam that on second thought why not forget the whole thing. This is fragmentation at its worst, of course; but how can communities provide needed public works with these small amounts? Some people argue that needed facilities might be obtained by utilizing shared revenues to pay interest on public facility loans, but how many communities are willing to take on a 20- to 30-year obligation based on a guaranteed income flow of 5 years?

Because I recognized the need for improvements in current economic and regional development programs, I have submitted legislation during both the 92d and 93d Congress that would establish a new regional development program. This legislation—S. 232—has generated great interest and provided the Committee on Public Works with additional information and suggestions that must be considered as we continue work on it. Mr. President, I sincerely hope that Congress and the administration will work together to formulate a new public works and development program by the time the 1-year extension on current programs expires. I hope that we can evolve a program that considers the unique characteristics of public investments, that builds from past experiences, that meets the need of our citizens equitably and efficiently, and that addresses the challenges of today's world.

DMSO REPORT COMPLETED

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, in recent weeks the National Academy of Sciences completed its study of the drug DMSO and submitted its report to the Food and Drug Administration.

In essence, the NAS finds that the benefits which may be found in the use of DMSO are negated by its potential to cause a number of adverse side effects, particularly with relationship to the skin. It is therefore the conclusion of the Academy that—

The nature of the evidence of effectiveness of DMSO is not such as to warrant the release of the drug for prescription in general medical practice at this time.

Personally, I know of many individuals who have been helped by DMSO, and I would be less than candid if I did not say that I hoped the NAS study would be more positive in its findings. Nevertheless, I am encouraged by the NAS recom-

mendation that applications for clinical investigation of the drug be more widely accepted by the FDA. These additional studies may indicate how DMSO may be safely prescribed for general public usage.

Mr. President, in light of the widespread interest in the Academy's report, I ask unanimous consent that a synopsis of its findings be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the synopsis was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SUMMARY

Dimethyl sulfoxide (DMSO) first became the subject of clinical investigation, with the approval of the Food and Drug Administration, in 1964. In 1965, after some 100,000 patients had received the drug, it was reported that DMSO had been linked with reversible changes in the lens of experimental animals. On the basis of that information, the Food and Drug Administration halted all clinical investigation of the drug. A year later investigations involving the cutaneous application of DMSO for some serious conditions—such as scleroderma, persistent herpes zoster, and rheumatoid arthritis—for which no satisfactory therapy existed were authorized. In September 1968, after special human toxicity studies, investigations in which DMSO might be applied cutaneously for not more than 14 days for less serious disabilities such as acute musculoskeletal conditions were authorized. The use of the drug under other than investigational circumstances has never been authorized and at the inception of this review was subject to the restrictions cited above.

The *ad hoc* Committee on Dimethyl Sulfoxide of the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council was established in 1972 at the request of the Food and Drug Administration. It was asked to review the scientific information on the toxicity and clinical effectiveness of DMSO and to determine whether that information supported the restrictions imposed by the Food and Drug Administration on the use of the drug.

The Committee screened, and studied the major part of, some 1,200 volumes of reports that had been submitted to the Food and Drug Administration by manufacturers and independent investigators. Generally speaking, the Committee found that only a minute portion of the reports reviewed were of a nature that permitted them to be used, with any degree of confidence, as the basis for a scientific conclusion with respect to the toxicity and efficacy of DMSO. The apparent inability to find a substance producing both the unique breath odor and the skin irritation of DMSO resulted in the absence of double-blind controlled studies in which the *placebo* could not be identified by the participants. Beyond that, however, a large number of reports contained insufficient evidence of the nature of the condition being treated, of the therapeutic results obtained, or of an attempt to eliminate or reduce the influence of subjective factors in the protocol. From reports that appeared to provide reliable evidence, the Committee arrived at the following conclusions:

1. The position of the Food and Drug Administration with respect to the clinical use of DMSO in man, as published in the *Federal Register* of September 10, 1968, is, in general, supported by the information reviewed. The minor reservation concerns the published criteria for acceptance of individual applications for clinical investigation which, in the view of the Committee, are overly restrictive.

2. DMSO produces side effects, particularly in the skin, in most persons treated and there have been sporadic cases in which DMSO has, with reasonable confidence, been linked to acute generalized urticaria in man. There is also evidence that in some species

of laboratory animals DMSO in doses somewhat higher than those contemplated for man produces a unique alteration of the lens. The nature of these side effects, the import of the animal data, and the incidence of adverse reactions alone would not warrant withholding the drug in clinical circumstances in which it gave promise of saving life or in which it would clearly be more effective than currently available treatment in arresting a disease process, reducing disability, or relieving pain.

3. The nature of the evidence of effectiveness of DMSO is not such as to warrant the release of the drug for prescription in general medical practice at this time. There is suggestive evidence that DMSO may be effective in the treatment of acute traumatic injury and nontraumatic painful shoulder and in relieving the pain of rheumatoid arthritis. Some investigators have claimed that DMSO may be superior to currently available forms of treatment in cutaneous scleroderma and in interstitial cystitis, but the evidence does not allow a conclusion to be drawn in that respect. As a vehicle, DMSO may enhance the effect of other therapeutic agents such as fungicides and antiviral agents.

4. In view of the toxicity and lack of demonstrated efficacy in prior studies, the use of the drug should be restricted to investigational circumstances until it can be clearly demonstrated in some clinical condition that its therapeutic effect warrants the attendant side effects.

5. More reliable data are needed on the toxicity of DMSO and on its mechanism of action.

TRIBUNE NOTES ITC MEASURE

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, the Senate will soon consider S. 1739, a bill to allow inclusive air tour charters to operate in the United States much as they do in Europe.

Although I have not yet determined how I will vote on the bill, I have noted many thoughtful comments in newspapers throughout the country. One of them appeared in the *Oakland, Calif., Tribune* of September 21.

For the benefit of Senators who must vote on this complex issue, I offer the Tribune commentary as a perceptive analysis of one side of the controversy.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the editorial to which I have referred be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CHARTER TOUR BAN UNJUSTIFIED

For 15 years Europeans have enjoyed low cost air and ground package vacations. They have proved so popular that Europeans sometimes take two or three long weekend trips a year. Moreover, they have stimulated scheduled air traffic.

Under regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board, these flights are not permitted in the United States and therein lies the controversy between the American scheduled air lines and the chartered companies. However, the CAB has repeatedly allowed the European airlines to operate these flights into the United States while denying the same right to U.S. carriers.

Soon the Senate will vote on legislation that would allow both scheduled and charter airlines to operate European-style inclusive tour charter holidays.

Under present CAB regulations, vacationers on tour charters must spend at least one night in three cities and, in addition, the trip must last at least one week and the cost must be more than 110 percent of the regular scheduled air fare.

This is not only expensive but unnec-

essary. Since the chartered air travel runs up the cost of the trip, the chartered air lines estimate one trip might cost \$295 but if the restrictions were removed, as in the proposed legislation, the same trip, including accommodations and all the extras, would cost about \$165.

But the scheduled airlines have started a widespread campaign, aimed at mayors and state officials, on the grounds that the change would force them to eliminate or reduce service to some cities.

The Senate Commerce Committee rejected this contention on the grounds it is the "big lie" technique designed to defeat consumer-oriented legislation. Moreover, the European experience has shown that these charter tours have increased regular travel.

In addition, the committee reported, the liberalized rules would be an economic boon to cities and industries catering to tourists and would encourage Europeans to travel here. This would help solve the balance of payments deficit, \$3.2 billion of which was run up in tourism alone.

The committee found no evidence to indicate that chartered services have or would impair scheduled services and that fears about a liberalization of the rules are unjustified.

The time has come for an equitable change that will benefit the consumers and the economy, and it is hoped the Congress will take this course.

ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF KANSAS CITY'S PROGRESSIVENESS

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, government at all levels is concerned about reform of the pervasive and regressive property tax. But despite all the concern we have not seen much action.

I would like to bring to the attention of the Senate a record of real progress in this area. I am referring to the record of Kansas City, Mo.

The property tax is still a major source of income for many of our country's large cities. But Kansas City depends on the property tax for only 20 percent of its revenue. According to a survey of a dozen major cities conducted by the Bureau of Census, Kansas City was the least dependent on the tax. The percentage of dependence for the other 11 cities in the study were: Minneapolis, 60.1; San Francisco, 55.3; Dallas, 50.9; New York, 50.8; Chicago, 49.5; Houston, 46.5; Detroit, 44.1; Los Angeles, 35.8; Atlanta, 33.2; Denver, 29.7; Washington, D.C., 26.9.

Kansas City's major source of income is its earnings tax, which is a proportional tax producing 31.6 percent of the operating funds. Only persons who earn money pay this tax.

The property tax is only the third ranking revenue producer for Kansas City. The city's property tax rate of 15 mills has remained the same over the past 40 years.

Mr. President, the decrease in Kansas City's dependence on the property tax began in 1963. I think much progress has been made. It is yet another example of the leadership and initiative shown by one of the most progressive cities in America.

DANGERS IN AMATEUR ATHLETIC ACT OF 1973

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, on August 3, 1973, the distinguished Senator from California (Mr. TUNNEY), on behalf of

the Senate Committee on Commerce, reported the "Amateur Athletic Act of 1973." At the same time he introduced an amendment in the nature of a substitute—amendment No. 459—which is intended to eliminate admitted confusion as to the purposes and the scope of the bill.

The bill is now on the Senate Calendar and may be called up in the near future. With this possibility in mind, and considering the confusion which still exists concerning the purposes and the scope of the bill and considering the far-reaching consequences of passage, I consider it extremely important to rebut some of the contentions which have been offered by way of explanation and in support of the proposal.

In the period since the bill was reported on August 3, 1973, educational institutions throughout the country have been assessing the implications of its provisions. Their reaction has overwhelmingly been that the bill goes too far, that it would effect broad Federal control of intercollegiate and interscholastic athletic programs and seriously undermine the autonomy of educational institutions. Collegiate conference commissioners, State high school associations, collegiate athletic directors, coaches, amateur sports organizations and sports writers and commentators have expressed similar concerns.

The nature of the reaction is exemplified by a recent resolution of the executive committee of the National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges calling for hearings on the bill. In this connection, it is well to bear in mind that the hearings heretofore held have been on four separate bills and not the combined omnibus bill which was reported.

The reason the educational community has reacted so strongly is not hard to find. The bill does in fact threaten pervasive Federal control of amateur athletics, including school-college programs. In many respects, the bill goes much further than may be commonly appreciated. More specifically, the bill establishes a Federal Amateur Sports Board, and we need only examine the separate provisions of the bill dealing with its powers, authority, and duties to see the very real threat of Federal control over amateur athletics.

Mr. President, the Board is vested not merely with authority to grant charters to national associations to control sports at the international level, but also with responsibilities regarding athletic facilities and athletic health and safety, authority to conduct inquiries into "any matter pertinent to athletic activity or physical fitness," authority to impose any requirement on chartered national sports associations, authority to define amateurism, authority to review rules of educational institutions regarding the eligibility of students to engage in athletic competitions, unlimited authority to take any action it considers appropriate "to advance amateur athletic competition in the United States" and the power to issue any regulation the Board considers necessary in pursuit of these broad authorities. This is Government regulation of amateur athletics.

In addition, the bill would give a government board the power to override rules and policies of high schools and colleges regarding the conduct of their athletic programs. It opens the door to outside promoters who, by setting up a competition—domestic or international—which meets the bill's definition of "unrestricted"—for example, a meet in which there are events open to both high school and college athletes—and obtaining a sanction for a chartered association, will gain virtually unrestricted access to high school or college student athletes.

Mr. President, I doubt that many members of the Senate realize that under provisions of this bill any high school or college wanting to enforce a policy or rule which would restrain participation by its students in such a competition, or in any way penalize them as a consequence of their participation, could do so only if the individual high school or college in each case applies to the Federal Board and demonstrates to the Board's satisfaction at a hearing that the school or college's rule: first, was previously adopted; second, reasonable; and third, based on the "academic interests" of the institution.

The result is that rules designed to protect student athletes from exploitation by promoters, to limit the demands which either outside promoters or the institutions themselves may make on student athletes in high-pressure sports, to protect an individual institution's own athletic programs or to regulate the recruiting of student athletes appear to be accorded no status under the bill's provisions. These, along with such basic requirements as attendance at practices and games, are rendered unenforceable.

Furthermore, high schools, colleges, and anyone else who may conduct a competition which is open to more than one "class" or "specific category" of amateur athletes—for example, such traditional events as the Drake Relays and the Penn Relays or municipal basketball or baseball leagues open to all comers—may be required to obtain the sanction of some federally charted association recognized by an international sports federation in order to conduct their competition. Yet, the high school-college programs, including unrestricted programs, have been superbly conducted without any need for Government approval.

Mr. President, it must be made clear that most of the provisions of this bill apply to all amateur sports which the Federal Board considers it appropriate to regulate. Government control may thus be extended over not only Olympic games sports, but any other amateur sport, from football to tennis and golf, as well.

Mr. President, let me now turn to a consideration of the bureaucracy to be established by this bill. Structurally it would consist of a five-member Federal Amateur Sports Board, a Division of Athletic Facilities and a Division of Safety and Health—each headed by a Director—with the Board, a 9-member U.S. Olympic Commission, and a National Sports Development Foundation governed by 16 appointed trustees.

In addition to these 30 appointed officials, the bill provides that the Board, each of the two Divisions, the Commission and the Foundation will each have its own staff, including directors, employees and consultants. This bloated Federal amateur sports establishment may not be "massive" as compared with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, but it is far in excess of any demonstrated need so far as amateur athletics in this country is concerned and it contains elements which are redundant both as between agencies created by the bill itself and with respect to functions performed by existing Federal Government or private agencies.

Mr. President, in conclusion let me say that the well-publicized problems associated with this country's Olympic effort and other amateur athletic competition at the international level have involved an extremely small number of competitions and athletes in comparison with the broad spectrum of domestic amateur competition which would be affected by the proposed "Amateur Athletic Act of 1973." The basic problem is to break up the monopoly in Olympic sports franchises in the United States which has been held for generations by the same small group. This can be accomplished without imposing broad Government controls and without interfering with our highly successful domestic competition.

I hope that all Senators will carefully evaluate all of the provisions of the proposed "Amateur Athletic Act of 1973," with particular attention given to the sweeping powers and responsibilities of the Board. I am convinced that such an evaluation will lead to a conclusion that this bill should not be passed.

THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR FREE ENTERPRISE SYSTEM

Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, the president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Edward B. Rust, made a speech recently in Chicago which should be called to the attention of every Member of this body and to all who cherish our free enterprise system. Speaking to the Public Service Award Luncheon of the National Association of Life Underwriters Convention, Mr. Rust called on his business colleagues "to look with fresh eyes at Ralph Nader and the kind of consumerism he represents." He points out in a most convincing manner that the consumer movement as represented by Ralph Nader and other like-minded leaders is dedicated "to making the free-enterprise system work as it is supposed to—to make marketplace realities of the very virtues that businessmen ascribe to the system."

Mr. Rust is the kind of corporate officer who practices what he preaches. He deeply believes that contact with the customer is an important part of his duties as president of the State Farm Insurance Companies. He states:

The day I refuse calls from customers is the day I should resign as head of the companies, because that is the day I will have begun to lose contact with the real world in which we operate.

Mr. President, I doubt whether Mr.

Rust and I would agree on all issues, but I want to associate myself with the sentiments expressed in this challenging speech and urge again all my colleagues to read it.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that his speech be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ADDRESS BY EDWARD B. RUST, PRESIDENT, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PRESIDENT, STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANIES, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LIFE UNDERWRITERS CONVENTION, PUBLIC SERVICE AWARD LUNCHEON, PALMER HOUSE, CHICAGO, ILL., SEPTEMBER 18, 1973

Someone asked me shortly after I was elected president of the U.S. Chamber, "Well, how does it feel to be the spokesman for American business?" I replied that if that's what they elected me to do, they have elected the wrong man.

I don't propose to speak for all of American business, which would be presumptuous, but I would like to share with my fellow American businessmen some of the things I have learned and believe in as the result of managing one business for some 27 years.

There is an aspect to this business of insurance that you and I are in that has always intrigued me—and I am talking especially about those personal lines of insurance that protect the individual's life and his most important personal possessions, his home and his car. This is a unique business, totally unlike any other I know of, because of the nature of the relationship we have with our customers. We don't sell our customer a product and we don't, at least initially, sell him a service. What we sell him, instead, is a promise to deliver a service at some future time when he needs it. That's all the insurance policy is—it's a contract, setting forth promises that the insurer will fulfill for the insured under certain specified conditions.

It's really asking quite a lot of somebody that he should give us a substantial sum of money in exchange for that list of promises.

You can see from the nature of the insurance company's relationship with its policyholders that the relationship depends upon credibility. The insurance buyer needs very much to believe that those promises will be kept. He, furthermore, needs to have a great deal of faith in his insurance company's financial strength, in the ability of its management to keep the enterprise alive and healthy, at least during the period of the insurance contract, so that the insurance company will be in shape to pay the claims that might arise under that policy in the months and years during which that contract is in force.

I think our democratic society is in a situation that is in some ways analogous to the insurance business. The society holds together because we make promises to each other, as individuals and as private and public institutions. To the extent that we keep those promises to each other, and to the extent that we have faith in the promises of others, the society functions rather well. When we begin to lose faith in each other and in our institutions, the social fabric begins to unravel.

We are all aware of the many problems that beset us today as a people—the energy crisis, environmental pollution, inflation, foreign trade deficits, and so on. It is not to dismiss these problems lightly that I say they are, to a degree, transient. They will pass in time, and others of equal urgency will arise to take their place. But there is another problem that, in my view, transcends all of these others. It is suggested by the phrase "credibility gap," which I suppose is just another way of saying we don't believe each other any more. We don't believe the busi-

nessman, we don't believe the political candidate or the office-holder or the government agency or the newspaper or the news broadcaster.

Why?

Why has this essential confidence that we need to have—must have—in our institutions eroded so much in the last few years? This is not supposition on my part. It is measurable erosion, and the measurement has been made by the Louis Harris polling organization. The Harris pollsters sought to gauge public confidence in various public institutions and organizations over a recent five-year period.

At the beginning of that period, of those queried, 55% said they had "a great deal" of respect for major companies. Five years later that figure had been halved to 27%. Moreover, three times as many respondents reported they had "hardly any" respect for major companies as said so five years earlier.

And it was not just because that suffered this damaging decline in the public's esteem. The survey also turned up a steep slide in the public's confidence in the military, scientists, educators, doctors and the press.

These are portentous findings, indeed. How can the society, we must ask, function if this decline continues? Can the trend be reversed?

I don't pretend to have the scientific background that would enable me to analyze for you the complex socio-psychological factors that underlie the declining confidence that more and more Americans seem to have in the many institutions that together make up our society. I can only offer the personal observations of an American businessman.

I would agree with Alexander Hamilton, who once said, "The vast majority of mankind is entirely biased by motives of self-interest." I don't know if Mr. Hamilton found that distressing. I do not. But the real problem arises in defining where our self-interests truly lie.

The answer to that question frequently depends upon how far into the future we are willing to look. If as businessmen we look only at tomorrow's profits, then self-interest will dictate that we act one way. But if our focus instead is on the long-range survival of the business enterprise, then we will act in quite another way.

There seems to be some confusion over the role of business in today's society. There is much talk these days about the social responsibilities of business and the need for involvement in social programs. And perhaps we should be doing more of this. But I personally feel that the first order of business is the competent management of business and that management's first priority should be the quality of the product or service it provides.

Please understand that I'm not suggesting we turn away from our obligations to the environment or from any of our social responsibilities. I am only reminding you that quality of product or service is itself a social responsibility with social implications far beyond profit and loss.

It seems appropriate to emphasize that point here today, at your Public Service luncheon. The public service program of the National Association of Life Underwriters has, over the years, contributed in countless ways to the well-being of America's communities, and it is vitally important that you continue this work in the future. But it is equally important to understand that the way we conduct our business also measures our sense of social responsibility. The professional life underwriter knows that, but elsewhere in the business community "social responsibility" and "public service" are sometimes discussed as if they were separate and remote from day-to-day business activities.

As businessmen, our focus must always be in the quality of the service or product we offer, simply because this is the first expecta-

tion people have of us. The manufacturer that landscapes the factory site but hedges the obligations in his product warranty has a misplaced sense of priorities. It's at this basic level that we must begin to rebuild faith in the institution of business. We need to regenerate a dedication to quality, to value and to service.

We need a commitment to excellence first of all in those things in which we are best equipped to excel. The business manager may need instruction in some of the new social roles that are being urged upon him—but he should need no instruction at all in bringing to the marketplace a product or service that meets whatever claims he is willing to make for it.

Above all else, he should know how to do that!

This, I believe, is what Ralph Nader and other consumerists are saying, and I find it hard to disagree with them on that point. You will notice that you rarely find consumerists criticizing a business for its failures to involve itself in social programs on the periphery of that business. Mr. Nader's focus is usually on the first business of business—its products and services. His primary insistence is on products that perform as they are supposed to, on warranties that protect the buyer at least as much as the seller, on services that genuinely serve.

In accepting the Chamber presidency, I expressed my belief that intelligent men of good will abound in all of our institutions, and that it doesn't make sense that we sit in our respective enclaves of business, labor or government and scream imprecations at one another across barriers of misunderstanding. I also said that most of us share a commitment to the welfare of our nation and of its people, and that we differ only in our perceptions of how to meet that commitment, and that as Chamber president I would focus on those things that bind us together rather than on our differences. It is in that spirit that I invite American business to look with fresh eyes at Ralph Nader and the kind of consumerism that he represents.

He has been described in some quarters as "an enemy of the system," but if we are willing to look objectively at his activities, I think we are forced to the conclusion that his commitment is to make the system work. I believe that it was inevitable that sooner or later someone like Ralph Nader would arise to focus and articulate the dissatisfactions and the frustrations that are widespread among American consumers. And so in him we see not an individual expressing his personal biases, but instead a man who is singularly sensitive to the mood of the public and who is unusually well-equipped to symbolize and express that mood.

Given the wide base of public appeal that Mr. Nader obviously has, I think it is unrealistic to come to any other conclusion. I think it is imperative that American business look calmly and realistically at what consumerism is and what it is not, as represented by Mr. Nader.

I hope you will understand that, as a businessman, I would hardly be siding with Mr. Nader against business. Rather, I simply insist that he is not on "the other side." If we look at the record, I think we will see a clear community of interest that Nader has with American business. The whole point of Nader—so obvious that it is often overlooked—is his single-minded dedication to making the free-enterprise system work as it's supposed to—to make marketplace realities of the very virtues that businessmen ascribe to the system.

It is not his style to mount street demonstrations, but it is his style to insist that products live up to their advertising and to buyers' reasonable expectation of them—and when they don't, to go to the regulatory authorities and say, "Look here. Now regulate."

That kind of activity suggests a considerable degree of faith in the system, and con-

trasts sharply with the revolutionary who would tear it down.

But if you would, say that he sometimes exaggerates, that he over dramatizes, that he is shrill, then I would have to agree—at the same time pointing out that this is the traditional way to gain attention in the clamorous and free American marketplace, as we who advertise our products and services should be well aware.

We in business sometimes complain that the public—and our young in particular—don't understand or appreciate the free enterprise system. But I must observe that when business sees consumerism and its spokesmen as enemies of that system, then business is demonstrating its own failure to understand the healthy tensions and competing pressures that must always be present in that system, if it is to survive.

The consumerist does not demand perfection of American business. I believe he perceives it as a human institution susceptible to error. But he understands the difference between honest mistakes and deliberate deception—a distinction Nader is able to make with considerable force.

This brings me to a matter that I think is part of this problem of credibility—our self-perceptions. We need always to be aware of our humanity, and that awareness should produce enough honest humility within us to admit that we will make mistakes.

It should be part of the manager's overview of his job to expect mistakes. When he has that view, then he will also have his organization geared to deal with them efficiently and equitably.

It's an exercise in corporate egotism to pretend—assume that mistakes aren't made—to attempt to present to the public an image of godlike perfection, which no one can rightly expect of himself or of the institution he manages. That kind of attitude shows a lack of faith in the American people's capacity to understand that mistakes will be made and their readiness to forgive those who move promptly to correct them.

I think that these attitudes come about as an indirect result of the "giantizing" of our business institutions, to borrow a term from the sociologists. The small businessman cannot isolate himself from his customers, no matter how much he might wish to. But it is possible for the managers of big business to remove themselves from the abrasions of the marketplace.

The tendency is to encapsulate oneself in corporate limousines and executive suites and paneled boardrooms—an environment that in the long run will distort management's view of reality. It's entirely human and understandable, I suspect, that most of us seek to make our lives more comfortable, to escape in some measure the harsh realities of human existence.

But I suggest to you that it is an incapable part of the businessman's job to maintain direct personal touch with the realities of the marketplace. Market research is fine and necessary—but those neat charts and graphs can never give you the feel of product and user that you get from a direct confrontation with an angry or happy customer.

I was in an office conference the other day in Bloomington, Illinois, when a customer of ours in Houston got me on the telephone. He had a problem that I was able to help him with. When our telephone conversation concluded, one of the people in my office commented that an efficiency expert would be appalled that I would interrupt an important meeting to involve myself in the problems of one of our 20 million policyholders. It would strike him as an inefficient use of executive time. My response was—and I deeply believe this—that the day I refuse calls from customers is the day I should resign as head of the companies, because that is the day I will have begun to lose contact with the real world in which we operate.

Share this little fantasy with me—Suppose every American product has a sticker on it, right up there where everyone could see it—smack in the middle of the car's dashboard, right on the side of the toaster, or in big letters by the dial of the TV set, and it read:

"If this thing doesn't work like we said it would, call our president," followed by his name and telephone number.

It's hard to imagine the impact this would have, but I can tell you a couple of things that would happen. Those consumer complaint statistics that come up in orderly columns from the computers would suddenly come very much alive, bristling with humanity, and in a very short span of time, the corporation president would acquire a very sure sense of reality—as well as an unlisted phone number.

You see, my name is on about 20 million insurance policies. If our service to our insured breaks down—as it sometimes does—or if misunderstandings arise that aren't cleared up elsewhere in the organization, the policyholder will sometimes look at the bottom line of the last page of his insurance contract, see my name and call me. And if he doesn't get me, he gets one of my assistants.

Quite often, he is irate and frustrated and has carefully marshaled the arguments he is sure he will need. But when I listen to his complaint, and if it's clear to me that he has not received what he has a right to expect from us, I apologize to our customer and tell him what I'm going to do to get things back on track for him. At that point, there is often stunned silence on the customer's end of the phone line, and I sometimes have to say "hello" two or three times to awaken him from shock.

Why should candor and a desire to correct error be such a startling experience for an American consumer to encounter in American business?

I have been told that these observations may make of me something of a pariah in the American business community, but I'll take that risk because I have great faith in the reason and good sense of most business leaders and managers.

But just a business must be willing to calmly assess what consumerism is really trying to achieve—must be willing to distinguish between honest criticism and unproductive enmity—so do I believe that it is fair to ask the American consumer to look at business realistically. It is no more sensible for the consumer to expect perfection in everything he buys than it is for business to expect consumer acquiescence to all its shortcomings.

I sense a kind of perfectionist mood in some quarters of the society, an irascible intolerance for error of any kind. This is probably a by-product of our technology and our advertising. Too often, the latter leads people to expect what no product or service can possibly deliver. (I've yet to see the marriage that was saved by changing brands of coffee.)

Our technology presents us with a more subtle problem. We've all heard the nostalgic comment, "They sure don't build them like they used to," and in some instances, this may be true.

But there's another side to that coin. Not too many years ago, the fairly affluent American home could count no more than a half-dozen electrical appliances. Today, an inventory of electrical devices in most American homes would total in the dozens—electric razors, his and hers; electric toothbrushes, mixers, blenders, fry pans and broilers; electric can openers; electric knives.

If the average appliance—when there were only six in the home—operated six years without needing repair, the customer was going to the serviceman on the average of once a year. But if you have three dozen appliances in your home—and many homes would have at least a dozen more—then you are getting something repaired on the average

of once every 60 days. In other words, even if the level of quality is the same, your service problems have increased six-fold, which is a pain in the budget and elsewhere.

Inflation, as well, heightens our expectations of products and services; the more you pay for something, the more you demand of it.

I think all of us—businessmen and their customers (and many of us are both)—need to abandon the clichés we too often use in talking and thinking about this thing we call "the system." The businessman sometimes behaves as if he were its sole proprietor, and the customer sometimes expects more of it than it can possibly deliver.

At best, perhaps the system can only be an uneasy partnership, out of which the consumer can expect reasonable satisfaction and out of which the businessman can expect reasonable profits.

I think most reasonable people would settle for that.

And I believe that reasonable people can make it happen just that way.

HOUSE COMMITTEE ACTION ON TRADE REFORM ACT

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I am extremely pleased that the Ways and Means Committee of the House has decided to incorporate in the Trade Reform Act a provision making most-favored-nation treatment conditional on the recipient country permitting free emigration. The action of the House committee is a most welcome affirmation of the commitment of this country to the cause of human rights, and the recognition of the Congress of the courageous struggle of men and women behind the Iron Curtain.

I am confident that the full House, in voting on the Trade Reform Act, will make credits, credit guarantees, and investment guarantees conditional on free emigration just as the Ways and Means Committee has made MFN conditional on free emigration. I understand that this humanitarian restriction on foreign credits, which is a vital part of the Jackson amendment, was not included in the bill as a result of a jurisdictional question. The full House will face no such jurisdictional question; and I am certain it will move to include the full Jackson amendment in the trade bill by adding the credit restrictions to those on MFN.

At a time when Americans are paying interest rates in the vicinity of 10 percent, I believe it would be financially foolish as well as morally mistaken to extend 6 percent credits to countries that close in their people behind barbed wire.

DOCTOR SHORTAGE

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, the Inter-Mountain, a daily newspaper in Elkins, W. Va., ran an editorial on a most important subject last Monday, September 17.

Under the headline "Doctor Shortage, But Students Turned Away," the editorial discusses a problem on which I have spoken a number of times over the past few years—namely, the severe shortage of physicians in the United States.

The Inter-Mountain points out that, when classes at the Nation's 114 medical colleges opened this month, only 13,570 freshmen were enrolled. This is far short of the number needed if we are to

overcome the doctor shortage, which is currently estimated at 69,000; and it represents only about one-third of the total number of college graduates who applied to enter medical school this year.

The sad fact is that many of those who applied and who were rejected were fully qualified. There simply was not enough room for them in the limited facilities America has for training doctors.

There is a possibility that this situation may be somewhat alleviated in the not-too-distant future. The 92d Congress passed authorizing legislation for the establishment, around the country, of up to eight new medical colleges to be established in conjunction with existing Veterans' Administration hospitals.

As a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee, I was able to secure \$20 million in the supplemental appropriations bill for fiscal year 1973, and another \$25 million in the fiscal year 1974 appropriations. These funds should be sufficient to get this vital program underway.

As the Inter-Mountain editorial points out, "many more medical schools are required to train the doctors of tomorrow."

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DOCTOR SHORTAGE BUT STUDENTS TURNED AWAY

Doctors, as nearly every patient knows, are a prosperous group. They are also in short supply. Why, then, aren't more young men and women enrolled in medical school, particularly at a time when so many liberal arts graduates are forced to pump gasoline or wait on tables until the job market opens up? Medicine, after all, offers its practitioners the opportunity to help other human beings and to earn an average annual salary of \$40,000 while doing so.

The problem is not that Americans are unwilling to undergo the long, arduous and expensive training that leads to an M.D. degree. It is simply that the supply of medical school openings does not begin to match the demand. In 1973 more than 37,000 persons sent 250,000 applications to the nation's 114 medical schools. But when classes begin this month only 13,570 or one-third of those who applied, will be enrolled. Many of the unsuccessful applicants were fully qualified. As the Los Angeles Times observed (June 10, 1973), "The medical school applicant pool has grown so large that substantial portions of those rejected are quite capable of handling the medical curriculum and would make excellent physicians."

That excellent physicians are needed is beyond dispute. Between 1900 and 1973, the number of graduates from American medical schools rose from 5,214 to 9,551 a year. But the population tripled in the same period. Moreover, Americans of 1973 are more concerned than those of 1900 about their aches and pains and are better able to afford treatment for them.

It hardly needs saying that many more medical schools are required to train the doctors of tomorrow. Around 300,000 physicians now practice in this country, but they are unevenly distributed. In the past decade, the number of counties without a single resident doctor increased from 98 to 133. Three-year M.D. programs and the training of physician's assistants have helped to expand the supply of medical personnel. All the same, most authorities agree that medical schools will have to double their present capacity if America's future health needs are to be adequately met.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 8:45 A.M.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until the hour of 8:45 a.m. tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR MATHIAS TOMORROW

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following the remarks of the two leaders or their designees under the standing order on tomorrow, the distinguished Senator from Maryland now presiding over the Senate (Mr. MATHIAS) be recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HATHAWAY). The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the Committee on Armed Services has taken some important steps toward reducing the requested authorization for military procurement, research, and development, and manpower.

I want to commend the committee for its recommended 7-percent reduction in military manpower, particularly since a substantial portion of this reduction will be in support personnel. There were other commendable cuts within the bill, as approved by the committee, including the reduced funding for the F-14, although the Senate has subsequently reversed the committee's good judgment. I also support the committee's denial of funds for the subsonic cruise armed decoy—SCAD—the strategic cruise missile and the Army light area defense program.

Important as the committee's proposed reductions are, they represent only a beginning for the bill is still replete with extravagant and exotic programs, the continuation of which is not in the best interests of the American public. The taxpayer is deserving of wiser and more constructive use of tax funds.

It is especially regrettable, for example, that the Committee on Armed Services reversed the decision of the Research and Development Subcommittee, and, by a one-vote margin, voted to proceed with accelerated funding for the Trident nuclear ballistic submarine.

The chairman of that subcommittee (Mr. McINTYRE) has made a highly persuasive case against the accelerated development of the Trident. As he points

out, the acceleration of Trident would concentrate the enormous burden of the program on the taxpayer within the next few years. A return to a more orderly development would reduce the \$1.527 billion requested this year by \$885.4 million and reduce next year's cost by a billion dollars.

I believe accelerated development of Trident to be unnecessary from a strategic standpoint and wasteful and imprudent from an economic standpoint. This would be perhaps the most expensive weapons system in our history. The Navy wants to build at least 10 of them, at a cost of \$13.5 billion. Under the accelerated program, all 10 submarines would be funded and under construction before the first one is completed, hardly consistent with good management practices.

Trident is billed as a replacement for the "aging" Polaris submarines, yet the oldest of the 41 Polaris subs is 13 years old, the newest 6. They will be seaworthy well into the 1990's. We are already in the midst of a submarine missile conversion program involving a tenfold multiplication of destructive power. Thirty-one of the Polaris subs are being converted to carry Poseidon missiles—16 Poseidons to a submarine. Each Poseidon missile contains 10 to 14 separate nuclear warheads—MIRV's—which could be directed to widely scattered targets. Thirteen of the conversions have already been completed and all 31 are expected to be completed by November, 1975, at which time the SLBM's will be capable of hitting 5,120 or more separate targets with nuclear warheads two to three times more powerful than the one that destroyed Hiroshima. Just two such submarines could destroy about 30 percent of the population and 50 percent of the industry of the Soviet Union. The Polaris-Poseidon force would have the capability to destroy the 219 Soviet cities of more than 100,000 population nine times over.

The Pentagon has consistently told us that the Polaris-Poseidon force is not vulnerable for the foreseeable future. At present, the nature of any antisubmarine warfare—ASW—threat to Polaris cannot even be predicted. Technology does not exist to even design, much less build, an ASW system which could destroy the Polaris-Poseidon deterrent. When and if such a threat ever arises, the Trident fleet could be more vulnerable than the present Polaris fleet because its greater unit size and its smaller number of ships could make it easier to destroy in a surprise attack, using some now unknown technology.

Mr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., formerly Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, states the case very well:

We will be placing our eggs in a smaller number of baskets and thus make easier the simultaneous destruction of all that are at sea. If a threat should develop, it may be better to have a larger number of smaller ships. In the meantime, we should save our billions and our resources for our sick and aged, for our poor and underprivileged and our environment.

The value of the Trident has been diminished even more by the decision to

place the \$500 million Trident base in Bangor, Wash., thus initially foreclosing its operation in the Atlantic, and flying in the face of almost every strategic consideration.

I would agree with the group of eminent authorities on military policy who issued a report for the project on budget priorities. This report concluded that virtually all the potential benefits of Trident, and none of its drawbacks, could be obtained by retrofitting the 4,000-nautical mile Trident I missile on Polaris. This would put our subs in range of Soviet targets, even while still in U.S. territorial waters.

Of course, when all else fails, and when the smokescreen of technical jargon which the Pentagon throws up around so many of its projects has been blown away by thoughtful outside analysis, the administration falls back on the old familiar "bargaining chip" argument, as the President did in his most recent state of the Union message.

As Senator SYMINGTON has pointed out, we do not add to our "bargaining chips" by pursuing a hurried and therefore premature schedule which ultimately would bring damage to the entire submarine replacement program.

Further, this whole business of "bargaining chips" has become absurd. In the past, both sides have approached the SALT talks in the belief that they must go to the bargaining table weighed down with chips. According to this self-defeating theory, you must arm to the teeth before entering an agreement to disarm, so as to have the greatest possible leverage in the negotiations. Since both sides engage in the practice, the very prospect of arms limitations has the effect of accelerating the arms race.

As the Center for Defense Information noted in a recent report, about the last thing the United States needs for "bargaining" or any other purpose is more nuclear weapons. The report stated:

The U.S. has at present 7,100 operational strategic nuclear weapons, of which about two-fifths, 3,088, are on board the nation's missile submarines. The number of U.S. submarine-launched nuclear weapons is thus far greater than all the nuclear weapons the Soviet Union possesses (2,300) without counting the 4,012 nuclear weapons the U.S. has on land-based missiles and on bombers.

The report further notes that within the next 3 years the total number of U.S. nuclear weapons will climb to 9,204.

We have all the bargaining strength we need. Rather than pouring billions of dollars into an accelerated program which would lock us into design and construction too quickly, the more orderly development of Trident offers us increased flexibility and would maximize our alternatives in the SALT talks and thereafter.

I am hopeful that the Senate will recognize the strong logic of this approach and vote to reduce the funding for Trident by \$885.4 million.

This administration speaks of the need for austerity and the importance of limiting Federal spending, yet insists on massive expenditures such as the \$1.7 billion—including military construction—for Trident; \$474 million for the B-1 bomber, which the committee pro-

poses to cut by \$100 million; \$657 million for the CVN-70 nuclear aircraft carrier; \$194.2 million for the \$4.5 billion SAM-D missile system; and the estimated \$30 billion overall cost for maintaining 1,900 military installations overseas, 321 of which are considered major, and more than 600,000 troops outside the United States.

For all the talk of changing priorities and despite the end of the war in Vietnam and improved relations with Russia and China, the administration wants to spend more for the military and to cut or terminate important domestic programs.

The administration tries to claim that in "constant" dollars, military spending has not really risen in recent years, which is as misleading as the claim that "human resources" rather than military-related spending constitutes the predominant portion of the budget.

Of course, what they do not say is that one of the major reasons the dollar has not been constant, and one of the major causes of inflation and the drastically weakened position of the dollar internationally, has been the excessive expenditure for military purposes.

The estimated cost of our NATO participation is about \$17 billion annually, which is more than the combined total the President has requested in his budget for all Federal programs in agriculture and rural development, natural resources and environment, community development and housing, and elementary and secondary education.

In previous statements, I have attempted to dispel the myth, fostered by the administration, that military spending is not the major component of Federal expenditures. This deceptive claim is largely based on the inclusion of the social insurance-medicare trust funds under human resources. Yet, the Government simply acts as a trustee for these funds, which constitute about one-third of the budget and which can only be used for specified purposes.

As Michael Getler of the Washington Post reported on August 31:

Federal statistics also show that in terms of outlays that can be controlled—as opposed to items such as Social Security and veterans payments that are set by law and cannot be cut back—defense accounts for about 69 per cent of the \$75.2 billion available for controllable expenditures.

Contrary to the haughty attitude of the administration that cuts in military programs are "unacceptable," I feel that we can and must make substantial reductions in military spending and that such cuts can be made without in any way jeopardizing our national security. In fact, I believe our real security lies in restoring our economy to a sound, healthy basis. To do this we must quit living beyond our means, which we have been doing through our overcommitment abroad and our waste and extravagance on weapons and military projects.

In the coming days we will consider a number of amendments which will offer reasonable means of trimming some of the fat from the \$85 billion military budget. I intend to support many of the amendments and am hopeful that we will avail ourselves of this opportunity

to bring about a more rational allocation of our resources.

I also want to mention some additional items in the pending legislation which deserve our serious attention, although they have received relatively little notice.

F-111

First I would cite the F-111 aircraft, for which the committee has recommended \$158.8 million and for which the House authorized \$172.7 million. This is one of the rare areas where the Pentagon has shown a willingness—if belatedly—to cut back. No funds for the F-111 were requested in this year's budget. It is particularly regrettable that Congress has, for the past 2 years, reversed the Pentagon's decision and provided F-111 funding.

I see absolutely no reason to keep the F-111 production line open and would hope that Congress would not be a part to such a misguided action again. Every day that this production line remains open the American people are being mis-served and every additional F-111 that is manufactured will be a monument to mismanagement.

The Washington Post reported on August 23:

Air Force officers . . . privately complain that their budget problems are being compounded by Congressional action, spurred by the Texas delegation, to keep producing the Texas-built F-111 fighter-bomber even after the Pentagon said it couldn't afford any more.

Mr. President, it seems incredible that after a decade of soaring cost overruns, forced design changes, mysterious crashes in test flights and in combat, and mass cancellations of earlier orders by other nations, that Congress could pour still more funds into this aircraft.

The Permanent Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, chaired at the time by my senior colleague from Arkansas (Mr. McCLELLAN) stated the case well in its final report on the TFX contract investigation, issued in December 1970. The report concluded:

The TFX program has been a failure. The Federal Government will spend more than \$7.8 billion to procure about 500 aircraft, although the original production schedule called for more than 1,700 aircraft to be purchased for less money. Of the 500 planes we will have, less than 100 (the F-111F's) come reasonably close to meeting the original standards. Spending so great a sum for so few aircraft represents a fiscal blunder of the greatest magnitude. It is clear that vital financial resources were squandered in the attempt to make the TFX program produce satisfactory results.

The report further stated:

The billion dollar savings in the TFX program, so grandiloquently promised by Secretary of Defense McNamara, became instead a directly accountable waste of more than one-half billion dollars spent on the F-111B, the F-111K and the RF-111 versions of the plane, all of which were unacceptable and had to be cancelled and abandoned before production. The total failure of the attempt to produce a satisfactory F-111B has caused a long and unnecessary delay in filling the Navy's requirement for a new carrier-based fighter. The lack of fighter maneuverability in the Air Force versions of the F-111 plane made it necessary to undertake the development of another fighter—the F-15—to fill this role

for the Air Force in the 1970's. The excessive costs of the Air Force versions forced drastic cutbacks in the numbers of aircraft which can be procured to fill the tactical and strategic inventory. The long delays in getting the F-111's into operational use certainly have had an adverse impact on our defense posture.

Aside from the serious impact which the TFX program has had upon our national security and aside from the obvious waste of scarce resources, the TFX case also has affected public confidence in our defense establishment. As this report makes clear, the primary cause of the TFX fiasco was mismanagement. A series of management blunders, made for various reasons, compounded errors with more errors and caused the failure of the program. The management blunders were made at the highest echelons of the Government. Top Presidential appointees in the Department of Defense during the McNamara era overrode expert advice to impose personal judgments on complex matters beyond their expertise. These same officials then made extraordinary efforts to conceal the results of their errors in the TFX case. These efforts included deliberate attempts to deceive the Congress, the press, and the American people. Understandably, this sorry record has done nothing to enhance public confidence in the integrity and competence of the people who are charged with preserving the national security. Nor has it improved the public image of the Department of Defense.

In view of the scandalous history of the F-111, it is difficult for me to believe that Congress could even consider buying 12 more of these planes. The irony is heightened by the fact that it was Congress which uncovered the waste and mismanagement in the F-111, yet now wants to buy still more of the problem-plagued planes.

ADVANCED AIRBORNE COMMAND POST (AABNCP)

A project which is redundant and of highly questionable value is the Airborne Command Post, for which \$83 million is requested for fiscal year 1974, following an expenditure of \$117 million last year. This bill contains \$32.3 million for procurement and \$33.1 million for R. & D., or a total of \$65.4 million. The House approved \$69.6 million. There is also \$14 million in the military construction budget for this aircraft, also referred to as the E-4A.

The AABNCP is even more likely than its underground analogs to be out of communications during the crises for which it is designed, assuming that it can get and remain airborne.

I believe this to have been an unnecessary project from the beginning, and it would seem that the three Boeing 747 aircraft already acquired are more than sufficient.

The Department of Defense already has a sizable fleet of airborne command posts, having spent nearly \$550 million and perhaps more for them. The Strategic Air Command alone has 29 EC-135 aircraft serving as airborne command posts, auxiliary command posts, communications relay aircraft and airborne launch control centers.

Of course, in addition to the AABNCP we are being asked to approve the AWACS or E-3A, which is the Boeing 707 aircraft, for which the committee recommends \$167.5 million this year. The AWACS is supposed to be an airborne surveillance, command, control, and

communications system for use by tactical and defensive forces.

There is every indication that acquisition of this large number of the gigantic 747 planes was budgeted with only minimal planning, but the cost of this total program is expected to be \$500 million or more.

The Defense Department has taken the largest aircraft available and developed lists of people to populate the aircraft as advisors. A relatively small portion of the aircraft's space would be used for equipment, the same equipment already aboard the EC-135's.

Between the existing command posts on EC-135's and the 747's already approved, I believe we have adequate aircraft and equipment for this purpose, assuming there is any possible role for such aircraft. Further funding for this costly project would be unnecessary and wasteful.

C-130

Little notice has been given to the fact that this bill includes \$180.6 million for 36 C-130 aircraft, built by Lockheed. These planes, according to the Pentagon, would "replace airlift aircraft transferred to South Vietnam."

I think it is appropriate to ask under what authority were these planes transferred? If we need such aircraft, then why were such a large number turned over to the Thieu government?

According to Pentagon figures, \$93 million was spent for C-130's in fiscal year 1973. The original 1973 budget request included no provision for C-130's. Subsequently, the House Armed Services Committee initiated a move to provide for 12 C-130's to keep the Lockheed production line open. Then President Nixon included a request for \$127.7 million for 30 C-130 aircraft in the fiscal year 1973 Southeast Asia amendment on June 30, 1972.

The Congress appropriated \$90 million for C-130's last year, and according to the reports of both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, this was for the procurement of 20 planes.

If 36 planes were transferred to South Vietnam, then it would appear that the President exceeded his authority. And since we are no longer engaged in Vietnam, is there any documented need for such a considerable number of new C-130's? Last year, prior to the transfer of planes to South Vietnam, the Air Force was reported to have 350 of these planes operating, with 12 more on order and 175 in the reserve fleet.

A further consideration here is that the committee proposes to authorize \$65.2 million this year for development of the advanced medium STOL—short take-off and landing—transport—AMST—which has been billed as a successor to the C-130. For example, the Appropriations Committee, in its report on the bill last year, referred to AMST as a replacement for the C-130. An examination of discussions on the AMST by Pentagon officials consistently turns up references to this aircraft as an improvement on the C-130.

Additionally, many of the C-130's capabilities are supposedly duplicated or exceeded by the gigantic \$4.5 billion C-5A's, which have had a cost overrun of \$1.1 billion or more.

I do not believe we should provide further funding for C-130's and see no reason that Congress should blithely ratify the President's giveaway after the fact.

The \$180.6 million which would be authorized this year for these C-130's is almost as much as the \$185 million would have been authorized for 3 years under the much-needed Emergency Medical Services Act, which the President vetoed as being too costly.

Mr. President, it is especially discouraging to see that despite the billions we are pouring into new projects and all the promises about the great advances which they represent, we are still producing the old planes or weapons systems which they were supposed to replace. Apparently when a military project gathers momentum it is almost impossible to bring it to a halt.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATION AUTHORIZATION ACT, 1974

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MATHIAS). Under the previous order, the hour of 10 o'clock having arrived, the Senate will resume the consideration of the amendment offered by the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE), No. 517, on which there shall be 1 hour of debate, with a vote thereon to occur at 11 o'clock.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 9286) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1974 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test and evaluation, for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each reserve component of the Armed Forces, and the military training student loads, and for other purposes.

Amendment No. 517 is as follows:

On page 18, line 15, strike out "\$650,700,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$645,700,000".

On page 18, line 18, strike out "\$3,628,700,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$2,800,900,000".

On page 19, line 12, strike out "\$2,656,200,000" and insert in lieu hereof "\$2,603,600,000".

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from New Hampshire.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, I should like to state in clear and unequivocal language what amendment No. 517 actually does.

The amendment offered by the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK) and myself, as members of the Armed Services Research and Development Subcommittee, has as its purpose the deceleration of the Trident submarine and missile program and a return to an orderly pace of development. Specifically, this amendment would reduce the total funds authorized for procurement in connection with the Trident submarine from the \$867,800,000 requested by the administration to \$40,000,000. No moneys would be authorized for procurement in connection with the Trident I missile, a reduction of \$5,000,000 from the request.

Finally, funds for R.D.T. & E. on the missile and the submarine would be reduced from the request of \$654,600,000 to \$602,000,000.

CALL OF THE ROLL

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, the time for the quorum call to be charged equally to both sides.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

[No. 424 Leg.]

Byrd, Robert C.	Jackson	Pastore
Church	Mansfield	Ribicoff
Cook	McIntyre	Talmadge
Dominick	Nelson	Thurmond
Hathaway	Nunn	Tower

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is not present.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Sergeant at Arms be directed to request the presence of absent Senators.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Montana.

The motion was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sergeant at Arms will execute the order of the Senate.

After some delay, the following Senators entered the Chamber and answered to their names:

Abourezk	Eastland	McGee
Aiken	Ervin	McGovern
Allen	Fannin	Metcalf
Baker	Fong	Mondale
Bartlett	Fulbright	Montoya
Bayh	Goldwater	Moss
Beall	Gravel	Muskie
Bellmon	Griffin	Packwood
Bennett	Gurney	Pell
Bentsen	Hansen	Percy
Bible	Hart	Proxmire
Bidwell	Hartke	Randolph
Brock	Haskell	Roth
Brooke	Hatfield	Saxbe
Buckley	Helms	Schweiker
Burdick	Hollings	Scott, Hugh
Byrd,	Hruska	Scott,
Harry F., Jr.	Huddleston	William L.
Cannon	Hughes	Sparkman
Case	Humphrey	Stafford
Chiles	Inouye	Stennis
Clark	Johnston	Stevens
Cotton	Kennedy	Stevenson
Cranston	Long	Symington
Curtis	Magnuson	Tunney
Dole	Mathias	Weicker
Domenick	McClellan	Williams
Eagleton	McClure	Young

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) is necessarily absent for religious observance.

I further announce that the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) is absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Kansas (Mr. PEARSON) is absent because of illness.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HATHAWAY). A quorum is present. Who yields time?

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield myself 4 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 4 minutes.

Mr. MCINTYRE. It is my understanding that the Senator from Wisconsin desires to ask me a few questions.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, my concern is over the distinction between the

September 27, 1973

amendment of the Senator from New Hampshire and the proposal as it came out of committee. It has been my feeling that there is not a very great distinction between the two positions; that in one of the first Trident would come off the line in 1978, and under the McIntyre amendment it would come off the line in 1980; but that in either event we are locked into a 10-submarine Trident program without adequate opportunity for Congress to continue to reevaluate that program.

If the McIntyre amendment really clearly is saying, "I am going to stretch this out further and we are going to have ample opportunity on more than one subsequent year to continue to evaluate this program and make a decision as to whether or not we intend to, must, or will go ahead with a 10-Trident program or whether we may decide, because of new technology, changes in the strategic situation, SALT talks, or what have you" if we are going to preserve the opportunity to change the program, slow down the program, stop the program if we decide that is in our best interest, then I am for that kind of proposal.

Just as an aside, I regret that we are locked into Trident. We did not have any serious debate around here about whether or not we ought to have more smaller submarines versus the 10 large ones. So I am concerned about being locked in, under the McIntyre amendment or the committee proposal, to a 10-Trident submarine program which we cannot get out from under even though we conclude there are sound reasons why we should get out from under next year or the year after or the year after that.

Will the Senator comment on that?

Mr. MCINTYRE. I want to be completely honest with my friend from Wisconsin and say that a heavy proportion of the Armed Services Committee, including this Senator from New Hampshire, desires to have an on-going submarine program such as the Trident, but I would point out to the Senator that, if the objective is to anticipate problems the 10 submarine program will be far easier to control under my amendment. If my amendment is adopted, it will be a great deal easier to reevaluate the program in fiscal 1975 and 1976, in the event something has occurred in the great wide world that demeans or derogates our submarine fleet. We will be in a much better position to reevaluate or amend our commitment on the new submarine than if we go on in a pell-mell rush to build the submarines as proposed under the bill.

Let me give the Senator a technical answer. The amendment the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK) and I offer would deny initial long-lead funds for ships 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10—six of the ships. It would also deny funds for the balance of the long-lead procurement for ships 2, 3, and 4. This would result in the use of \$311 million provided in fiscal 1973, to support continued work on ships 2, 3, and 4 at a more orderly pace through fiscal 1974.

The bill—the position of the distinguished Senator from Washington as reported here—provides some funds to support all 10 of the projected Trident submarine fleet.

Basically, then, the answer to the question of my friend, the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin is yes, under my amendment we would have a better opportunity to more accurately evaluate the progress and construction of these submarines.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator is expired.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute.

Mr. NELSON. Do I understand the Senator to say that under his amendment there would be no funds for procurement and construction of subs starting with what?

Mr. MCINTYRE. Five through ten.

Mr. NELSON. And that in the committee bill there would be funds for 5 through 10?

Mr. MCINTYRE. Some funds.

Mr. NELSON. I would be interested in the comments of the Senator from Washington on that.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Could they do that on their time?

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington is recognized for 1 minute.

Mr. JACKSON. The point being missed here is that you cannot have it both ways. You cannot say you are for the Trident and then say later you have decided not to be for it.

In order to do with Trident what the Senator from New Hampshire has in mind, he will have to face the fact that some of these items have a leadtime of 7 years. I would like to know how the leadtime is going to be changed as a result of later reevaluation. We are buying Trident now, even under the proposal of the Senator from New Hampshire. The point is this: even under his proposal, we will be buying the long leadtime items for the last 5 of the 10 Tridents. If the program is canceled in the future, we are going to have to pay the forfeiture costs on those long leadtime items. The only real and significant difference between us is whether initial operating capability is to be reached in 1978 or in 1980.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. PASTORE. I think we get ourselves mixed up in a lot of razzmatazz.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute.

Mr. PASTORE. I think this is a very relevant question. It has been decided here that we will build the Trident. If anybody is against building the Trident, the best thing is to vote for 1980; rather than sudden death, he will get a slow death.

Mr. JACKSON. And we will pay more for it.

Mr. PASTORE. If we really want to build the Trident and do it economically and according to schedule, there is not a man on the floor who has ever built a nuclear submarine.

So we have to go to people who have done it. We have the best expert in the whole country. We have Admiral Rick-

over, who has been in this program from the beginning, and is still in the program, and as long as he is in the Government, he will have direct supervision over it from now on. This is what he said.

Mr. NELSON. I read it.

Mr. PASTORE. The Senator read it. He makes it abundantly clear that we are proceeding according to schedule, that we know the technology, that we have had a full-sized markup. His argument is that anything we can build today will cost more tomorrow if we start building it tomorrow. The point he makes is this: If we are going to have it, we can do it comfortably by 1978, at which time we will know what we have, and the Congress can cancel any authorization and can cancel any appropriation any time it wants to. But if we are talking about dollars, it is fallacious to argue that anything we build by 1978 is going to cost more than if we complete it by 1980. It just does not make sense.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute.

Mr. NELSON. I wanted to ask a question or two.

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. NELSON. Is the Senator saying that if we will have the Trident we have to have 10, that we could not have 5?

Mr. PASTORE. No, I am not saying that at all. We are not authorizing 10 here. There is a tremendous lead time involved here. We have canceled program after program even while the program was going on, but what we want is the first Trident by 1978. That is the question here. Naturally, there may be some money that has to do with hardware that will go in the first one, but if we decide to go later on into the second, third, fourth, and fifth one, we can do it with that. It is going to take a long time before we build the 10. Any time we want to cancel it, we can.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PASTORE. I yield.

Mr. NELSON. That is not the way I understood it. The way I understood it, the first Trident will come in in 1978, then three in 1979, three in 1980, and three more in 1981. How do we stop the program if one came in in 1978—

Mr. PASTORE. We do not appropriate the money for the other three. We are not appropriating money for 10 Tridents.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PASTORE. I yield.

Mr. JACKSON. The Defense Department must come to Congress each year for an ongoing authorization and an ongoing appropriation.

Mr. NELSON. But we cannot build three subs, if one comes off the line in 1978 and the other ones are already under construction—

Mr. JACKSON. The leadtime is 7 years for most of these items.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. JACKSON. I yield myself 1 additional minute.

We have already made commitments on many of these long-lead-time items.

Mr. PASTORE. But is there any money in here for the three in 1979? The answer is there may be some money on the hardware, but there is no money for the building of the ships.

Mr. JACKSON. Just for a few long lead items, that is all. Most of the items we are authorizing here have leadtimes of 4 to 5 years. There are some which have a 7-year leadtime. That is why we authorized some long-lead time items last year. They are already being procured.

Mr. NELSON. I am for the longer stretchout. If that really stretches it out, I would be for the McIntyre amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. JACKSON. I yield myself 1 minute. If the Senator wants to stretch it out, there is no question it can be stretched out, but the Senator has to ask himself how much more we are going to pay for a stretchout. We have estimates that it will be perhaps \$1 billion or more. The argument is not whether we are going to have the Trident or not have it. It is over a stretchout of the Trident program.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute to make a point and will then yield to the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island stated that we must build the Trident soon and save money. We on the Armed Services Committee lived with the torture caused by the Cheyenne helicopter which never got off the ground, and the problems of the F-111, which cost the taxpayer billions of dollars. We know the problems caused by speeding up a weapons system. Another classic example was the C-5A. Excessive haste results in cost-overruns and incredible waste.

That is what we are talking about. That is what the conflict in the pending bill is about.

Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished senior Senator from Illinois.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I will try to make seven or eight points in the 3 minutes.

Mr. President, first I believe very strongly in a strong defense. I voted against every single across-the-board cut since I have been a Member of the Senate. We ought to be selective. We ought to take the responsibility and share that responsibility.

I do not believe that détente can be productive if it is not backed up with a strong effective military that can act as a deterrent and we can take the aggressive against any nation that acts against the interests of our allies.

Despite that, I supported yesterday the program for Trident. I believe in it. I spent several years in the U.S. Navy. I keep up as closely as I can with new developments that may occur, as most of us do in the services in which we have served.

Mr. President, I cannot for the life of me see the wisdom of an accelerated program. I support wholeheartedly the McIntyre-Dominick amendment.

First, simultaneous research, development, testing and construction would greatly increase the possibility of costly errors as we have seen in other systems.

If we have learned one thing it is that we ought not to try to do at the same time we are trying to research and make changes. It is utter madness to do that.

For 25 years I, along with my friend, the distinguished senior Senator from Missouri, learned that the way to speed up is to proceed in a careful manner and not cut corners to speed things up. It would cost us money and we would end up with a product that is never as good as it would otherwise be.

Militarily, there is no need for an accelerated program, since the Polaris/Poseidon force is an awesome sea-based deterrent for which there is no identifiable Soviet threat which could endanger even a small fraction of the force in the foreseeable future. Certainly our technology in this area is ahead of that of anyone else.

Prudent development and construction of the Trident system under the original system provides adequate bargaining power at SALT II.

We believe in SALT II. We want to see it work. However, the bargaining chip idea that we have to start accelerating a program at the same time we decelerate another program makes no sense. I believe that there is adequate bargaining power for SALT II.

Mr. President, Trident acceleration telescopes the financial burden of the program within the next few years, since acceleration envisions beginning construction of all 10 submarines within the next 4 years. Returning to the original schedule, we can save \$885.4 million in this year's budget and \$1 billion in next year's budget.

I feel absolutely certain that we will get our product in better shape and more error-free and just as soon, if not sooner, than if we were to try to go into an accelerated program. It makes no sense at all.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time for the vote originally scheduled at 11 a.m. today be at 11:15.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from New Hampshire?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, what was the request?

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time for the vote which was originally scheduled for 11 a.m. today be extended to 11:15 a.m.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, it was agreed that the vote would be at 11. I have a very important engagement and I relied upon the unanimous-consent agreement. It was understood that we would vote at 11 a.m. I do not know what else the Senators can say that has not already been said.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, in order to get some Senators on the floor to hear the closing arguments, we took 30 minutes of our time. They are now present, and that is the reason we are delayed.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, does the Senator really believe that anything can be said that has not already been said?

I would not object to 10 minutes.

Mr. MCINTYRE. The vote will occur then at 10 minutes after 11.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I did not hear the request.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire asks unanimous consent that the vote scheduled for 11 a.m. occur at 11:15 a.m.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I do not object to that.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I have no objection. I withdraw my reservation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, we have heard on the floor of the Senate time and time again about a crash program. The fact still remains that Admiral Rickover, the father of the nuclear navy, knows more about how to build a nuclear sub than any other man in the world. He has been in the program from the very beginning.

He said that we are going according to schedule and can do it comfortably. I do not know where we get the idea that this is a crash program.

Let me remind the Senate that when we built the *Nautilus* and put it in the water in 1954, it was the first one and the cost was \$58.2 million. When we put the *Cavalla* in the water in 1973, the cost was \$96 million. What does that prove? It proves that the longer we wait, the more it costs.

What I hear today is an echo of what we heard in the early fifties. I remember then about how we wanted to get into the hydrogen bomb. And Edward Teller said that we could build it. A lot of people then asked, "Why should we build it? We have the atomic bomb. We don't need a hydrogen bomb."

We went to see President Truman. He gave his consent and we got into it. It was exploded on the Nevada flats in November 1952. Does the Senator know when the Russians exploded theirs? They had a hydrogen bomb in August 1953, only 9 months after we exploded our hydrogen bomb.

That is what we are arguing today. Let us not lose what primacy we have in our underwater Navy.

The idea that we are on a crash program is ridiculous. Admiral Rickover said that we are not on a crash program. He said that we can do it and do it in less time than 1980.

That is the assurance from the most knowledgeable man in the United States.

I say to the Senators on the floor that none of us has ever built a nuclear submarine.

September 27, 1973

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, is the Trident not the key nuclear deterrent in the United States?

Mr. PASTORE. The Senator has put his finger on the crux of the matter. It is a platform, a launching platform, and that is exactly what we need. We can put this Trident 500 miles out of New York and hit Moscow, Peking, or any place in the world. That is the purpose of it.

The Russians cannot find it, and that is why they are frightened. Every land-based missile we have is targeted by a missile out of Russia. However, as far as a moving mobile launching pad is concerned, that is the best deterrent.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. WEICKER. I thank the distinguished Senator from Washington.

I would only point out that I would like to know what theory it is that can possibly explain that a piece of military hardware is going to be less expensive in 1980 than in 1978. No amount of economic gymnastics is going to be able to achieve that. It is a simple matter of commonsense that we are going to pay more and more the longer we drag it out.

The arguments are made that the Cheyenne, the C-5A, and some rather notable failures are equated to the Trident. That is not the issue here, as I understand it. This piece of hardware works.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. JACKSON. I yield the Senator an additional half minute.

Mr. WEICKER. It is not in the same category with those particular actions. So both on the cost basis and on the basis of giving us a good piece of defense hardware at the least cost, I throw my support behind the Senator from Washington, and I hope other Senators will look at it in a similar light.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, we are not arguing today as to whether or not we ought to have the Trident submarine. That has been decided, and I am for it. We are arguing today as to the time frame on which we will build the Trident submarine. We are not arguing as to whether or not we should have the Trident submarine missile system. That has been agreed to. The question now is, when is it to be put in place?

What we are really arguing about here today, Mr. President, is priorities. I am not going to take up the argument as to whether we save any money. I doubt whether we will. I think that is a valid point. But I ask Senators, who passed a budget ceiling of \$268 billion, since every Senator here has been voting for programs for the domestic scene which, if we do not cut this defense budget, will bust that budget ceiling, I put the question directly to Senators: Is it so essential that we put the date of 1978 for the Trident submarine and, therefore, spend, in this coming fiscal year, \$885

million more because of that date, or can we have it stretch out under the original program up to 1980, and have that \$885 million that we can put into health, education, manpower, housing, child care, school lunches, and the things we need? Because, make up your mind: We cannot have everything the Defense Department wants in this budget, and also the things we want. We are going to have to make up our minds.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time is expired.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I submit, Mr. President, we had better put some balance to it.

Give me 1 more minute.

Mr. MCINTYRE. I yield the Senator 30 seconds.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, are we weakening ourselves? Look at what we have in this budget: \$750 million for five new attack submarines; \$175 million for Poseidon missiles; \$235 million for conversion of Polaris to Poseidon; and \$445 million for 45 antisubmarine planes.

And a Trident missile, for which we have \$642 million.

We are not going to give the Soviet Union an easy way out. We are a strong country. This program makes it stronger, and the military power of our country is unquestioned.

Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, will the Senator from New Hampshire yield for a question?

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, at this time I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished acting chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON).

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I have here a telegram from the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Zumwalt, which in effect, denies that he used the term "Soviet agents" when discussing this matter on national television yesterday.

I shall read one part of it, and ask unanimous consent that the rest of the telegram be printed in the RECORD. The admiral did state:

The Soviets, in a host of ways, including the use of employees here, do make a concerted effort to impact upon U.S. policy.

I ask unanimous consent that the full text of his telegram be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the telegram was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Hon. STUART SYMINGTON,
Acting Chairman, Senate Armed Service Committee, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.:

Reference your telegram. I assure you I see no Soviet threat on Capitol Hill. I assume your telegram refers to NBC TV report 26 September. Following is transcript of my comment. Please note that therein I made no reference to Soviet "agents" nor, in point of fact, to Members of the Congress.

Quote: JOHN COCHRAN, NBC. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, campaigning for the Trident submarine, fears that Congress may not take the Soviet threat seriously enough. Zumwalt says Soviet agents have lobbied on Capitol Hill against the Trident.

Admiral ZUMWALT. The Soviets, in a host of ways, including the use of employees here, do make a concerted effort to impact upon U.S. policy. This is a courtesy that is af-

firmed in our democratic way and a courtesy that they don't afford us in the Soviet Union.

JOHN COCHRAN, NBC. But Zumwalt is more concerned about Senators McIntyre and Dominick than about Soviet agents. In the vote set for tomorrow, the two Senators have about a 50-50 chance of pushing through their amendment to slow construction of the Trident submarine. Unquote.

E. R. ZUMWALT, JR.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, the able Senator from Illinois, the former head of a great manufacturing concern, has expressed my position this morning better than could I. All this talk about the vital importance of such long lead-time is plain bunk. Everybody who has had anything to do with military procurement—and I have been connected with it for over 30 years, in private industry, and Government—knows that the trick is to get the camel's nose under the tent, then come back and say, "We have already invested \$1 billion, or \$2 billion; you do not want to scrap that, do you?"

After listening to this debate during the last several days perhaps we should give serious consideration to abandoning the Research and Development Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, possibly the committee itself. Let us simply call up Admiral Rickover, whose name time and time again has been and is brought up as the only person who really knows anything about manufacturing these submarines—

Admiral, we have read recently your derogatory remarks about the United States Naval Academy. We know you recently stated we could cut in half the present number of generals and admirals. We appreciate this consistent criticism of your own service. Now please tell us what we should do in this matter, because you are the only one in the world who really knows. Last year you were the only one whose opinion counted. Now this year, based on this debate, apparently you are the only one whose opinion counts. Therefore, please let us know, Admiral, what we in the Senate should do.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I yield 30 seconds to the distinguished junior Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, I would just comment on the remarks of the Senator from Minnesota, who said that everybody agrees the Trident should be built, that clearly the Senator from New Hampshire does not agree. He compares it to the C-5A and the Cheyenne. If that is the case, it should not be built. But it is not the same at all. This works; it is not in the same category, and, therefore, it should be built.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I think we should emphasize that the Trident program was officially exempted from the requirement of so-called fly before you buy because of the record—dating back to 1957—of the Polaris system. To equate Trident with less well managed weapons systems is like comparing apples with oranges.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me 15 seconds for one comment?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I did not say we should not build the Trident. I said we should, and so does the Senator from New Hampshire. It is only the question

of the time frame in which we build it. And I am not arguing about the price. I am simply saying to Senators, "You cannot have your cake and at the same time have a Trident submarine in 1978, while we fail here, time after time, to expand our budget to meet domestic needs."

Mr. JACKSON. I yield myself 30 seconds. The Senator says we cannot have our cake and eat it. I say the record is clear: To stretch out this program will cost us \$1 billion or more over the life of the program. Any Senator interested in saving money should know that stretching out the program costs more.

I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Georgia.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I raise this question: Are all these domestic programs so desirable and necessary as against a long-range program that relates to the security of our country? I, for one, must voice my dissent that the two can be weighed against each other. To me, national security must come first, and certainly those of us who believe that cannot so weigh it.

Mr. President, throughout the debate on the Trident program, I have been struck by the fact that so little attention has been paid to how this program affects our international position and our national security. Instead of these issues we keep hearing about how we are being misled or deceived by our own people, that our adversary, somehow, is not the Soviets, but the U.S. Navy or the Department of Defense.

I think, therefore, that it is important that we consider, in the concluding moments of this debate, the charges that have been raised against the case supporters in the Senate, and the officials of the Government in support of Trident.

We are told that the Navy is interested only in bigness for its own sake, that it is interested in ever-larger boats regardless of any other consideration. It is interesting that opponents of Trident, who already say the submarine is too expensive, want us to build even more, so-called smaller submarines. They tell us that 10 Tridents are too expensive, but what we really need is 20 or 25 of something else. I can imagine their reaction if the Navy said that it would be better to have 25 small submarines, rather than 10 Tridents. What would the opponents of Trident be saying?

I have also been dismayed to hear the argument that the Trident I missile is enough, that putting this missile into Poseidon boats would allow those boats to remain close to the United States, far away from Soviet antisubmarine warfare forces, and, therefore, make the extended operating area of the Trident submarine unnecessary. It is, of course, counter to all good sense and strategic planning to define the area for potential adversaries in advance, where our strategic submarine deterrent is going to be operating. It is foolish in the extreme to give up the vast operating expanse of ocean as a potential hiding space by restricting the operations of the submarine deterrent to only nearby waters. The Trident submarine, with the Trident

II missile, makes the whole ocean a safe sanctuary for our seaborne strategic deterrent. Should we announce to the Soviets that we are going to give up that sanctuary?

Another point raised by the proponents of delaying the Trident is that we ought to "fly before we buy."

All of us think that is a good concept, but, as the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) pointed out, the proponent of that concept, the originator, Mr. Packard, exempted the Trident program specifically in a conversation that the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) documented on the floor last year in the debate on the Trident program.

Moreover, the argument here is internally contradictory, since the opponents have taken great pains to point out that they wish to proceed with the Trident I missile, and to have the missile available by 1978. They want to proceed, therefore, with production of the first missiles even while developmental work is going on. Why this violation of their own principle?

The fact is that a certain amount of "concurrency" has been a part of the deployment of every U.S. strategic system. The only alternative to it is endless redesigning, and the construction of the Trident fleet on a prototype-by-prototype basis. But to deploy Trident on this basis would remove all the economies of production, and would be a case of mismanagement in the extreme.

I know the advocates of delay say they fear that we may be "locking ourselves in" and that we will not be able to respond to future breakthroughs in the technology of undersea warfare. They use this argument to refute the claim that Trident is needed precisely as a hedge against new developments in this area.

I believe this argument for delay misrepresents the situation. It is, in effect, an argument for doing nothing, while we wait to see what the Soviets come up with. But it conveniently ignores the fact that a seaborne missile system takes years to deploy, that the sensible thing to do is to move ahead with a submarine that will employ every feature of improved speed and quietness available, that can be equipped with a Trident missile, of intercontinental range, so that the area of ocean available for the submarine to operate in will increase geometrically, perhaps 10 times what it is at present. In fact, the company building the reactor for Trident has built all 104 nuclear ship propulsion plants. These ships have steamed over 23 million miles with 1,075 years of operating experience. They are not an untested entity.

These arguments, of course, are in the realm of the technical. The proponents of delay also have a host of arguments that might be termed political and strategic. They say, in effect, that whatever the technical considerations, it is simply bad policy to deploy the submarine in 1978.

I have heard it said, for example, that deploying Trident in 1978 would be a wrong "signal" to the Russians, that we ought to demonstrate our sincerity about arms control by postponing the Trident program. I believe, Mr. President, that

if anyone wishes to talk about sincerity in this regard, he ought to be talking to the Russians. The momentum of the Soviet arms program since the first SALT agreements were signed is a matter of record. The massive construction program in the Soviet Union of missile-firing submarines is also a matter of record. The only "signal" we will be sending the Russians if we postpone Trident is that we are prepared to sit still while they move ahead. And that, Mr. President, is precisely the wrong signal to send. It will destroy all hope for meaningful arms limitation agreements.

I want to emphasize, Mr. President, that in expressing our determination to preserve our security, there is no substitute for Trident. Proponents of delay may argue that the right "signal" has already been sent, because we have restored funding for a jet fighter, or because we passed an amendment to last year's SALT I interim agreement resolution saying that we want genuine equality in any permanent SALT II agreements. But voting for a tactical weapon, while postponing a strategic one, and issuing declarations about what we would like to see happen, are not substitutes for doing what must be done.

Finally, Mr. President, whatever else may be said on this subject, I want to stress once again that Trident in 1978 is a feasible and practical proposition. The program will be managed by an experienced, competent team, which has performed brilliantly in the past. It is a team with a proven track record. It has given us the successful Polaris/Poseidon program, when some said it was an impossibility.

I ask the Senate to consider not only the problems of acquiring Trident, but the more important question: Where will we be if we have to wait another 2 years for it? In 1980 the Russians will have had a 4,000-mile plus range missile at sea for 7 years, and we will still not have one. The Russians could have as many as 85 missile-firing submarines at sea, while we have the same 41 as we have today, indeed, the same 41 we have had since 1967. If the proponents of delay have their way, if Trident does not appear until 1980, we will have gone 13 years—from 1967 to 1980—without deploying a single new nuclear powered missile-firing submarine, while in that same period the Russians will have deployed more than 80. This is a risk we cannot afford to take.

Trident is a pressing concern, Mr. President, an urgent national priority which deserves the support of the Senate.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a letter dated today written to me, from Rear Adm. R. Y. Kaufman, the Trident program coordinator.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
Washington, D.C., September 27, 1973.
Hon. SAM NUNN,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR NUNN: The Secretary of the Navy has asked me to reply to your questions regarding the survivability aspects of back-

fitting the TRIDENT-I missile into existing POSEIDON submarines, and on the degree to which the "fly before buy" policy is not being followed in the TRIDENT program.

It is true that the TRIDENT-I missile can be placed in the POSEIDON submarines as early as 1978 in the event that this measure is required to give the existing ships, which are less survivable than the TRIDENT, additional range and patrol area to offset increased ASW threats. There are several very important deficiencies which are not alleviated by this measure alone, however. The POSEIDON submarine, built with technology of the 1950's, is noisier, less mobile, and much less capable in the area of sonar equipment than TRIDENT, and one might observe that a threat which might endanger the oldest of our POSEIDON submarines threatens the newest. There is no basic difference, no significant improvement, from one to another. The lack of very quiet mobility also is most important; the POSEIDON submarine in a normal patrol period can use only about one-quarter of the area, at quiet speeds, as can the TRIDENT with the same 4000 mile missile installed. Finally, the hedge measure of installing longer range missiles in POSEIDON submarines does nothing to remedy the aging problem to be faced by our entire 41 ship force as we reach the 1980 time frame. This entire force, built in a short, 7-year period, will commence reaching a 20 year life—as a block in 1979 and 1980—just shortly after the first TRIDENT can be available. As you know, the specifications to which these vital ships were built assumed a life expectancy of 20 years. The Navy considers these ships of such vital importance in the deterrent mission that they should not be degraded in performance or reliability.

The other point on which you requested amplification was that of concurrency, or the "fly before buy" policy enunciated by former Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard. I should first like to point out that the development time of our TRIDENT submarine and missile are both greater than that allocated to the previous very successful and respected POLARIS systems. The following table, which provides development periods of the past missile programs and the latest, most complex nuclear attack submarine may give a clear picture of this situation:

SUBMARINE

Interval: Start detail design to delivery in months

Latest SSBN class, 48.

Latest attack submarine, 56.

Trident, 62.

MISSILE

Interval: Start development to IOC in months

Polaris A-3, 48.

Poseidon C-3, 72.

Trident C-4, 82.

The TRIDENT program has been more thoroughly studied prior to completion of Preliminary and Contract design than perhaps any previous ship. The Navy and the AEC have been working hard for over 4 years on the TRIDENT design and development. The same approach to development, design, and deployment of this ship is being followed as has been used in every nuclear propelled ship commencing with NAUTILUS.

It is perhaps of interest to note that even those most severe critics of the TRIDENT program object only to what they view as early introduction of the ship, but not to as rapid development of the TRIDENT missile as is possible to accomplish. Yet, from a standpoint of risk and concurrency, the very fact that the missile development costs about five times that of the ship might raise a question as to the consistency in the views of the critics. It might also be observed that the "fly before buy" policy is not appropriate for complex, large ships which require a de-

velopment and construction period—a lead-time—of 5-7 years or more, and thus through sheer passage of time would have many obsolescent features built in were we not to overlap in the stages of construction and development.

I feel, Senator Nunn, that we should dwell on this last point for a moment. Our Navy ships do not represent merely a vehicle which performs a single, isolated job. In many cases, they individually perform or can accomplish a number of various roles or missions. They are not dependent upon the success of any one unit or weapon in their arsenals for success of their myriad missions. If one unit of equipment, or one weapon, fails—there is redundancy to permit accomplishment of that or other missions. Unlike missiles or aircraft, which required long R&D periods but short production periods, our ships require just the opposite.

For example, in TRIDENT, as measured by previously funded R&D, the submarine development is one-third complete, and as measured by R&D funding through Fiscal Year '74, will be three-fifths complete! Our ships, unlike a single purpose aircraft or missile, do not lend themselves to the mass production, assembly line techniques so familiar to the aerospace or electronics industries from which spring so many of our advisors in Defense, in the staffs of the Congress, and among the authors of writings on strategic systems most popularly quoted in debates today. Our ships, with large, heavy propulsion plant machinery, and with welded hulls which must withstand tremendous forces, are more representative of "piece work"—work which requires years and care. These ships are not single mission, short life vehicles—they are floating or submerged communities. Adoption of a pure "fly before buy" approach in their case would infer building a single ship, and waiting for the 5 to 7 years required to start the class. One might observe that with the changes technology could provide in that time, we would be led to a situation where we might build a one-ship class every five to seven years! Only where the driving force of the ship—the propulsion plant—or the operational concepts of the ship are completely revolutionary and unique might it be observed that the complete prototype or "fly before buy" concept is applicable to ships. The Navy has adopted that concept, as you know, by building land based propulsion plant prototypes for new reactor plants, or building prototype ships where appropriate. The TRIDENT propulsion plant, in smaller form, is at sea today; furthermore, a full scale, operating prototype is being constructed.

In examining the alternative proposed by the sponsors of the amendment being considered, there is very little difference in concurrency in building TRIDENT at a 1-3-3-3 rate, and at the alternative 1-2-2-, etc. rate. The ship construction periods are so long that in either case numbers of ships would be under construction or contracted before the first has been at sea and extensively operated. Furthermore, the slowed program, by the estimates of the Project Manager, could cost up to \$1 to \$1½ billion more, with almost \$600 million more being attributable to escalation alone.

During Senate action last year in an amendment to the Appropriations Bill, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator John Stennis, testified on information that he had been provided by the architect of the "fly before buy" policy, former Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, to the effect that the importance of TRIDENT was such that he felt the need, by 1978, was the overriding factor in his decision on TRIDENT.

The orderly program being followed by TRIDENT provides for meaningful steps of testing and evaluation to assure that de-

velopment problems are identified early in the program. Alternative measures are planned to offset failure of those areas adjudged of highest risk; on the other hand, virtually all of the ship technology, the area of objection by critics, is at hand, in many cases, in ships today in various stages of use or evaluation. The new propulsion plant represents merely an upgrading in size of a successful development in a ship in the fleet. The new sonar has been most successfully tested. The ship construction processes are not basically more complex than has been accomplished by our experienced submarine shipbuilders.

Finally, Senator Nunn, the same development and construction teams as were so successful in the POLARIS program are heading up TRIDENT. Vice Admiral Rickover, the driving genius in the Navy's nuclear propulsion program, and Rear Admiral Smith, whose technical expertise guided POLARIS and POSEIDON, are leading the TRIDENT technical development. Older, wiser, and with personnel who have, now, years of operational experience, our team has a record of past success which should be useful in predicting the results in the future.

I hope this will answer your points satisfactorily. I will be happy to amplify or provide additional information which you may desire.

Sincerely yours,

R. Y. KAUFMAN.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished colleague from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK).

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HATHAWAY). The Senator from Colorado is recognized for 2 minutes.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, obviously I will be, of necessity, brief. First of all, I want to comment on some of the remarks appearing in the RECORD today.

The Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PASTORE) says and I quote: "The longer you wait, the more it costs." He is referring to the relative costs of what the carriers were. In building a carrier, we have a set design and the cost goes up because of inflation. On Trident we do not have any kind of set design yet. The Navy has not even decided that they should have 24 missiles. They have not decided what they need in the way of insuring that it will be quieter than the others. They have not decided any of these items because we are not far enough along to make the decisions yet.

As the Senator from Illinois says, when we do not have a set design and then we try to crash it together doing everything at once, we have concurrency which has led us into problems before today.

The Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PASTORE) also said,

We can put these missiles on and take it 500 miles and hit anything in the world.

Well, we can take the missile that is being developed by 1978 and put it on a Poseidon and hit anything in the world 500 miles out of New York. Thus, it does not make any difference whether we build the submarine. The launching platform is simply a launching platform with which the R. & D. subcommittee, Senator MCINTYRE and I, are going along by 1980. We can backfit the missile into the Poseidon by 1978—

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the

Senator from Colorado yield, inasmuch as he mentioned my name?

Mr. DOMINICK. I have the floor and I do not have the time.

Mr. PASTORE. The Senator is mentioning my name—

Mr. DOMINICK. I am quoting what the Senator said—

Mr. PASTORE. I mean, the Senator is misquoting me. He is absolutely misquoting me.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, the next thing I should like to point out—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Colorado has expired.

Who yields time?

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. McCLELLAN).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas is recognized for 2 minutes.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I was undecided when this debate began whether I would support the amendment or oppose it. My concern has been as to what is the wise and prudent thing for us to do. I was not certain that a majority of the Senate, or any large majority of the Senate at least, favored the Trident program.

I am now convinced that it does. I had anticipated someone offering an amendment to strike all of the program from the bill, but no one has offered to do that. No one has offered such an amendment. So those who have remained silent and have not offered to strike it either favor the program or ultimately will do so, or concede that we are going to have such a program.

It will cost \$535 million just to cancel the program now—to stop it where it is.

Since the great majority of the Senate propose that we do have the program, that we carry out the project, then the issue resolves itself to this: That we are going to have the Trident, that we are going to have this program, and that we are going to complete it.

So, what is the practical, economical and sensible thing to do, under the circumstances?

I think it has been demonstrated beyond any doubt that if we stretch out this program as proposed by this amendment, ultimately we are going to pay for 11 and get only 10.

Is that the sensible thing to do?

In the meantime, I want to suggest this: That since this matter has to come before the Appropriations Committee, together with my colleagues on the committee, I am going to search every way in the world to see if there can be any practical reduction in the total amount requested for this year. But we are going to have it. We are going to have it. If we want to pay for it, we can get it quicker and cheaper by rejecting this amendment, or we can get it later and pay more by adopting this amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Arkansas has expired.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, no one on this floor is suggesting that the program be terminated. We will save \$900 million plus if we adopt my amendment

this year, a year when inflation runs rampant and balancing the budget should have top priority.

Mr. President, as I have warned time and time again, it is concurrency that gets us into trouble. I can think of no clearer example of such dangerous concurrency than what will occur under the accelerated Trident program. Before the first Trident submarine joins the fleet and becomes operational, we will have nine other submarines in various stages of production strung out behind it.

Further, I want to point out to my colleagues that this is the most massive spending program ever suggested or requested by the military.

In the next 3 years, they want us to spend \$7 billion on the Trident system.

Mr. President, the Research and Development Subcommittee which I am proud to chair, did not dream up this idea of excessive concurrency. We did not invent the delay factor. My committee has been warned, and the Appropriations Committee has been warned, time and time again, of the costs and dangers of proceeding at an accelerated pace.

Listen to the words of one of the finest men that President Nixon ever sent down here, David Packard, the former Deputy Secretary of Defense:

Almost without exception, the programs in trouble have been structured so that production had been started before development was complete. . . . Of all the major programs which we examined, there was hardly even one which kept to the original schedule. In every case, if more time had been taken to complete the development before production was started, the new weapon would in fact have been available to the forces just as soon but with fewer problems and at a lower cost.

So, Mr. President, do not buy this idea that if we do it fast we save a lot of dough. If we do it fast, we get ourselves in with a crocodile in the swamp.

Mr. President, I want to respond to the basic argument advanced by the proponents of an accelerated program of development for the Trident submarine. That argument holds that acceleration will strengthen the President's bargaining position at SALT II by putting the Soviets on notice that we will have a Trident fleet operational sooner than the original development schedule promised.

Implicit in that argument, Mr. President, are two assumptions I cannot leave unchallenged.

In the debate over Trident the point has been made again and again that a vast majority of this body favors producing this giant submarine. The argument, it is said, is over the pace of development.

That is true, Mr. President, but—left at that—the issue seemingly divides us into those who want a Trident fleet as soon as possible, and those who do not. Unfortunately, this simplification hints that opponents of acceleration are not as concerned over security and not as determined to support the President at SALT II.

This is not only unfortunate, Mr. President. It is wrong.

The Senators who support the McIntyre-Dominick amendment to restore or-

derly development of Trident are motivated not only by their desire to save taxpayers money, but by their determination to see Trident developed and operational without the undue cost and delay they believe is inherent in the kind of crash program advocated by the Navy and the administration.

Mr. President, if I have learned one thing in my 10 years on the Armed Services Committee and my experience on the Research and Development Subcommittee it is this: Rushing the development and production of any major weapons system is not only the surest way to waste time and money—it risks delay in the ultimate development of that system.

As to ultimate costs, I am fully aware that the advocates of acceleration argue that any stretch-out of development time will add substantially to the final cost total because skills, materials and components that cost one price today will cost an inflated price tomorrow.

Indeed, in my subcommittee hearings on Trident the Navy told us that because of the inflation factor the orderly development schedule Senator DOMINICK and I propose would cost a half-billion dollars more than the accelerated schedule.

I am willing to accept that figure, Mr. President, because inflation cannot be ignored in the cost consideration of any long-leadtime system.

But I must say in passing that I am intrigued—if not a little annoyed—by the way advocates of acceleration have “accelerated” that cost differential from the half a billion dollar figure we were given in testimony to the “billion dollars” now being bandied about by the hyperactive hotfooting between Senate offices.

I say “annoyed,” Mr. President, because I had hoped we could debate this issue with figures laying some claim to validity, and the critical question here is whether reducing the inflation factor by accelerating the Trident program is offset by a factor not even considered by the Navy when it costed out the two development schedules; namely, the heavy additional costs inherent in waste made by haste.

This is a critical question, and I would like to offer an answer based—not on figures which spring full-blown from the fevered imaginations of overzealous protagonists—but on figures contained in the Government Accounting Office’s report to the House Committee on Armed Services.

In analyzing the reasons why actual development costs for 45 acquisitions were consistently above development cost estimates, the GAO cited three causes: Cost estimating changes, the Agency said, accounted for about 25 percent in the cost growth; inflation accounted for 30 percent; and revisions to the specifications—time schedules, quantities, or engineering changes—accounted for 45 percent.

Of the last, GAO said, and I quote from Page 29:

Much of this type of cost growth results from unrealistic performance targets at the outset, including:

Trying to do too much—challenging the state-of-the-art frontier.

Trying to develop and produce the system too fast. One of the most prominent attempts had been concurrency; that is, beginning production before full-scale development and testing have been completed.

In other words, Mr. President, if we accept the GAO's analysis, then we are left to conclude that excessive concurrency—which translates to haste—can cost more in changes and corrections than it will save in reducing the impact of inflation.

In 1970, the President's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel which included in its membership the current Deputy Secretary of Defense, William P. Clements, specifically warned against concurrency between development and production of weapons systems, and on January 8 of this year, in his final Report to the Congress, retiring Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird told of how he and Deputy Secretary Packard had worked to eliminate this practice in weapons acquisition, declaring on page 7:

"Major, comprehensive changes have been made in the weapons system acquisition process of the Department. Under the guidance and no-nonsense pragmatic leadership of David Packard, my strong right arm as Deputy Secretary of Defense for three years, we replaced such bankrupt practices as total package procurement and an indiscriminate use of concurrency between development and production.

Mr. Laird continued:

Our common sense substitutes included "test before you fly" and "fly before you buy" procedures, more realistic cost-estimating techniques, and the widespread use of contract milestones and prototyping. It will take some years before the improvements in our procurement procedures will be fully validated. But I am confident that time will demonstrate the basic soundness of the new procedures.

And so, Mr. President, we have the word of the President's former Deputy Secretary of Defense, the word of the President's former Secretary of Defense, and the word of the President's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel that "excessive concurrency"—beginning production of a system before development is completed—is not only costly, not only wasteful, but can, indeed, delay deployment.

And make no mistake about it, Mr. President, when we talk about an accelerated Trident program that would begin construction of all 10 giant submarines in the next 4 years, we are talking about excessive concurrency.

And when we talk about excessive concurrency we must consider all that excessive concurrency portends: flaws, errors, mistakes; the high cost of corrections; the time costs of backtracking to incorporate new technology; and the very real possibility of deployment delayed not only beyond the target date of the accelerated schedule, but beyond the much more certain target date of a more orderly development schedule.

Let me repeat David Packard's wise observation:

In every case, if more time had been taken to complete the development before production was started, the new weapon would in fact have been available to the forces just

as soon but with fewer problems and at a lower cost.

I ask my colleagues to consider Mr. Packard's words, Mr. President.

I ask them to support the amendment offered by the senior Senator from Colorado and the junior Senator from New Hampshire to return the Trident to a carefully ordered schedule of development that will not only accommodate the technical advances certain to be made in the next few years, not only minimize the costly flaws and errors of headlong haste, not only insure completion and deployment by a date more certain, but will convince the Soviet bargainers at SALT II that we will build Trident—and build it right.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, how much time do we have left on each side?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington has until 10 minutes after 11, at which time the Senate will vote.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I believe that the distinguished Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. McCLELLAN) hit the nail right on the head. He said we cannot have it both ways, that we must decide whether we will go with the program or not.

My good friend from New Hampshire is trying to convince the Senate that if we cut \$800 million today we will have saved that money. We will not save it.

The Senator from New Hampshire is for the program, and I admire him for that. But the facts are that we are going to pay at least \$1 billion more, if we delay the program. That is the crucial point.

You and I know, Mr. President, that no matter how much we think it will cost today, the price will go up even more if we delay.

Moreover, we will be creating difficulties for our negotiators of SALT II. I want to see, in the next agreement, strategic arms cutbacks on both sides. I want the Russians to cut back on their land-based missiles and I want the Russians to cut back on their sea-based missiles. I want to see us do the same thing, so that we can have what the Senate agreed to by a very large vote, what was agreed to in the House by an overwhelming vote, and what was signed into law by the President—United States-Soviet equality in intercontinental strategic forces. That is the way to peace; that is the way to save money; that is the way to help poor people, both here and in the Soviet Union.

Now, let me emphasize the basic points: First, this debate is not over whether or not we should build the Trident submarine. The question is, should we continue the program at its present pace, as approved by Congress last year, or should we order that the program be delayed?

Second, delay will increase the costs. Every Senator who wishes to see the program delayed should understand that this will add to the overall costs. The Defense Department says that it will add a billion dollars to the cost of the program

to delay it even to the extent of the McIntyre amendment.

The reasoning here is simple. Building a submarine is a little like building a house—the longer it takes, the more it costs. Anyone who has ever built a home or an apartment house or a highway knows that delay costs money. In the construction business, working on the shortest possible schedule is the key to controlling costs. Stretchouts can turn profits into losses. The problem is that in building something like a submarine, roughly half the cost is overhead. Overhead means that every minute on the clock translates into dollars. The building sheds, the equipment, the machinery, the offices, the accountants and engineers and designers and management teams—all of these have to be maintained for the life of the project. The longer that takes, the more they cost. That is the simple fact: A vote to stretch out the Trident program is a vote to increase the final pricetag for our undersea deterrent.

At every crucial point in the recent history of American strategic programs there have been those who saw no threat and who saw immense technical obstacles. There were those who said that the capabilities of the Russians were being exaggerated, and that we were falling victim to mindless fear.

I have been in Congress long enough to remember every one of those historic debates. I remember, for example, that some said the Polaris program was unnecessary and hasty, but where would we be today without Polaris, the backbone of our nuclear deterrent? Where would we be today if we had listened to those who said that our security would always be with us, and that any further programs designed to safeguard it were a waste of money?

Mr. President, I urge the Senate to reject the amendment.

Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. President, this vote on the pace of the development of the Trident submarine and missile system is one of the most important of the year. It will have a significant effect on the ordering of our national priorities, as well as on the crucial question of our national defense.

I have listened, in the last few days, to a great deal of discussion and debate about this issue. For the most part, it has been very useful in clarifying and exposing the choices. But I have been extremely distressed that, injected into the debate, has been a suggestion that this vote is a reflection on the loyalty of Senators or others to the United States. It is absolutely insupportable to me for any rational debate in this Congress to be tainted with jingoism or with implications of disloyalty to our country. I wish to state that, having considered all the debate, I have decided to support the amendment of the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE), for the following reasons.

First, and most importantly, I believe the plan envisaged in the McIntyre amendment, to defer production of the Trident submarine for 2 years, while designs are completed and the Trident missile is perfected, will provide the United

States with a formidable deterrent force, at least the equivalent of the deterrent force we will have under the present Navy plan. We will be able to backfit the Trident missile into our present Poseidon submarines, starting in the late 1970's. This will give us about 10 years of useful life for these Poseidon submarines during which they will have a longer range Trident I missile, which gives them four or five times as much ocean room in which to maneuver. This added range is the single most important defensive factor for our submarines. Also, having the longer range missile in the Poseidon will allow us, at the earliest date, to withdraw our submarine forces from overseas bases.

I was very surprised to learn yesterday that the Navy did not plan to backfit the Poseidons with the Trident I missile if the present schedule for Trident submarine production was kept. This would mean that the Navy proposed to spend upwards of \$2 billion to develop a missile which, by their own testimony, is meant only as an interim weapon. Frankly, I think it might be wiser in that case, to start work right away on a 6,000 mile missile, which is the whole purpose of building the huge Trident submarine. Moreover, if the present Poseidon fleet is not backfitted with Trident I missiles, and the Soviets develop superior ASW capabilities in the next 5 or 7 years. I can foresee the Defense Department telling us, in 1976 or 1978, that there was a severe threat to our deterrent because of the vulnerability of the Poseidons, and asking for some expensive, new system—or more billion-dollar Tridents—when our Poseidons would still have a useful remaining life, as a very safe, invulnerable deterrent, had they been fitted with the Trident I missile.

I realize the growth of the Soviet strategic forces, and the potential threat which that means for our deterrent capability. But a plan to backfit our Poseidons will be at least as useful in making our submarine forces into a maximum invulnerable system, as would production of the Trident alone. The Trident will, after all, come off on station in the early 1980's. The Soviets can have no doubt of our resolve and our determination to have a powerful, lethal strategic force under the seas.

The second aspect of the debate on this program is the economic one. On this debate, I find the sides about even. The Navy has testified, without real contradiction, that there will be some added cost in stretching out production of the Trident submarines from the present schedule. The figure given is somewhere in the vicinity of a half billion dollars. This does not include the sure knowledge that, at the end of the program, the costs will be much higher than the presently projected \$13 billion, because of overruns and inflation factors. On the other hand, as good as Navy management of the submarine system has been in the past, I cannot overlook the logic of the argument that allowing more time for development of the lead, prototype submarine before committing design and production of the following

ships will have to save some money. Every one of our 31 Poseidon submarines was a little different from every other one; they averaged something like 10,000 design changes for each ship. And the Poseidon was a smaller ship, much faster to build than the Trident, without as great a degree of concurrency between prototype design and full production as is proposed for the Trident.

In any case, I feel there are other advantages of the stretchout. New technology will inevitably come along in the next 5 years, both in submarine design and in ASW techniques. Giving a little more time before committing the design of the later submarines will surely allow us, at minimum cost, to incorporate new developments into our Trident fleet, and make that fleet better and stronger. Also, the stretchout will help avoid the problem we have today, of excessive "bunching" of the lifespan of our submarine force. This will be very crucial to us in another 30 years—when few of us will be around to take the blame—when our Trident fleet reaches obsolescence or needs replacement.

What the economic argument, in the end, means to me, is saving money in the defense budget today. Slowing down the Trident will save \$3 billion in the fiscal years 1974-76. This is money which we desperately need to put into our domestic problems, and into more pressing defense problems, like modernizing the Navy's surface fleet. This program has been starved for funds because the Navy has placed so much of its procurement resources into some very expensive projects: the Trident, the CVN-70 nuclear carrier, and the F-14. America will benefit by having these funds available for other programs now. And America will also benefit by having a better-built, stronger Trident, and a more invulnerable submarine-based deterrent using a backfit of the Trident I missile.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, this is the second year that Congress has debated the question of whether or not to accelerate funding for the Trident submarine program. Last year I supported the amendment offered by the able junior Senator from Texas to continue an orderly and deliberate Trident program along the lines of the original Department of Defense schedule proposed in 1971. I have heard nothing this year to convince me that the hectic, costly accelerated program is either wise or needed. Instead, I continue to believe that the accelerated schedule is not only unnecessary and places an additional burden on the budget at a time we can ill-afford it, but also jeopardizes the effectiveness of the Trident program.

There is no question in my mind on the need for an American second strike capability that can withstand any Soviet attack and deliver a devastating blow in return. Such a deterrent is the surest guarantee that such an attack will never occur. Our missile-firing submarine force is an essential part of our deterrent, complementing our land-based ICBM's and our strategic bomber forces. Because our submarine forces are mobile, hard to detect, and therefore least vulnerable to surprise attack, it is important that they

be maintained and improved to meet any foreseeable threat to their destruction.

But the question we are facing today is not whether or not to continue and strengthen our sea-based deterrent by building the Trident, but how best to do so. The orderly Trident program which I favor, as proposed in the amendment proposed by the Junior Senator from New Hampshire, calls for the construction of the first Trident submarine in 1980, followed by two submarines a year through fiscal year 1985. The accelerated program proposed by the Navy requires a lead submarine in 1978 and additional submarines at the rate of three per year. Thus construction of all 10 Trident submarines under the accelerated program would begin within the next 4 years.

This high level of concurrence, that is, the extensive overlapping of research and development with production, has proved in past procurements to be a major cause of cost overruns, production slippages, mistakes, and waste. It violates sound principles of good defense management and would establish an unwise precedent. Concurrency, moreover, is not merely wasteful. It also reduces the credibility of the final product.

By adopting the amendment we will be saving \$885.4 million in this year's budget and \$1 billion next year at a time when Government spending and inflation continue at a rampant pace. The Trident program is surely one of the most expensive programs ever before Congress—costing an estimated \$13 billion to produce a total of 10 ships with missiles. Crowding the bulk of this expenditure into 4 years would make sense if there were sound strategic reasons for it, such as a credible threat to the survivability of our existing sea-based forces.

But no such threat has been demonstrated. To the contrary, the Department of Defense experts testified that our current Polaris/Poseidon submarine deterrent is invulnerable to detection and destruction now and until at least 1980. Its effectiveness is being enhanced by conversion from Polaris to the longer range Poseidon, a program for which this and past procurement bills have provided. Even greater survivability can be achieved, if necessary, by backfitting Trident I missiles, once they are available in 1978, to Poseidon submarines.

My colleagues on the Military and Research Development Subcommittee also report that the Defense Department experts testified not only that the United States leads the Soviet Union in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) technology, but that no Soviet ASW system can now be described. It seems only commonsense that the Trident program should proceed on a schedule that would permit adjustments to be incorporated to respond to ASW technology as it takes shape. It would be folly to have completed at breakneck speed 10 submarines that, however technically superb, were not designed to meet and counter the anti-submarine warfare technology of the future.

It should be emphasized that it is important to keep a close watch on developments in Soviet anti-submarine warfare capability. If, because of developments that cannot be foreseen today, it

becomes advisable to expedite the Trident program, Congress can provide accelerated funding in future years.

In conclusion, I want to reiterate my support for the development of an orderly, strong Trident program as envisaged in the amendment. I think it is a responsible amendment and provides the most sensible approach to enhancing the effectiveness and credibility of our sea-based deterrent. The Trident program is a case where the old adage of "haste makes waste" applies.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, we have under consideration one of the most expensive weapon systems yet devised or proposed for our defense arsenal, the Trident submarine and missile. This system is estimated to cost about \$13 billion for a fleet of 10 submarines, or \$1.3 billion each when armed with the Trident missiles. We are faced with making a decision on that system that will have a long-range effect on the quality of our deterrent capability in the 1980's. It will also have a significant effect on our military budget for the next dozen years or more.

There is, perhaps, never a "good" time—a comfortable time—for making a decision of such import and magnitude. But this decision we will make on this issue comes at a time when we are in an economic vise of soaring costs and shrinking dollars.

It comes at a time when we are under compelling necessity to cut Federal spending.

At a time when there are increasing domestic social demands on the Federal treasury.

And at a time when demands are being made for exorbitant slashes in the defense budget.

The Committee on Armed Services has reviewed this proposed weapons system in great detail. I understand the Armed Services Committee is unanimous in support of the Trident. They disagree only on the issue of how fast the program should be implemented. Moreover, a majority of the committee has recommended the full authorization requested for the Trident this year of \$1,527,400,000.

We have already invested \$960.3 million in this program. If we now approve the amount recommended by the committee, we will have committed \$2,487,700,000 to the procurement of the Trident system.

The pending amendment before us would stretch out the Trident program, delaying the initial ship operation from late 1978 to early 1980. The amendment would also cut the proposed authorized expenditure of \$1,527.4 million to \$642 million, a reduction of \$885.4 million in fiscal year 1974.

The Department of Defense takes the position that this reduction, with its imposed slow-down, will ultimately add from \$1 billion to \$1.5 billion to the overall cost of the 10 boats. We may well, however, recoup far more than that, it is contended, by reducing the high degree of concurrency with its potential for errors and slippages that is built into the existing timetable. That is the essence of what we will decide when we vote on the pending amendment.

This week's debate on the Trident, however, indicated that some Members may have reservations about the need for continuing this program in any form. Therefore, I asked the Department of the Navy to furnish me with its best available estimates of the costs that would be involved to terminate the Trident program in its entirety. Those estimates present the following picture:

Assuming a termination date of December 1, 1973, it would cost U.S. taxpayers \$535 million to now wind-down and terminate the total Trident program, both submarine and missiles. The cost involved in terminating the submarine program alone would be \$175 million, and another \$360 million would be required to terminate the missile development. This \$535 million termination cost, if added to the \$960 million we already have invested in the Trident, would result in an expenditure of \$1,495 million. And we would have spent that money—nearly \$1.5 billion—and have produced nothing by way of a tangible, viable weapon system.

Mr. President, I make these observations merely by way of information for the Senate. It is, I think, important that we know precisely where we stand by way of expenditures and investment as we consider our vote on the pending amendment.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, once more we are considering an amendment introduced by members of the Senate Armed Services Committee to reduce the level of authorization for the Trident weapon system. Once more we are asked to evaluate the claims of the Navy that failure to provide the full \$1.5 billion request will jeopardize our national security in an irreversible manner. Once more we must come to a decision on whether our strategic deterrent will be adequate this year and in the next several years even if we do not commit ourselves to supplying the Defense Department with every last dime it has requested.

Since virtually all of us have been visited by the highest officials and officers of the DOD and the Navy Department, I think it is appropriate to recognize at the outset what this amendment does not do.

This amendment does not say we should deny major improvements to our nuclear submarine fleet. I firmly believe that the nuclear submarine fleet is the critical element of our nuclear deterrent. I also believe that in the absence of major new arms control agreements, a follow-on nuclear submarine will be vitally necessary.

But this amendment does not halt the major rearming of the Poseidon fleet. This year alone we are authorizing \$200 million for the rearming of additional submarines with a tenfold addition in the number of nuclear warheads they carry. Clearly, this program, which is well underway, represents a major and continuing improvement in our submarine deterrent. No question now exists of our second strike capability.

This amendment does not even halt the plan to develop and be ready to deploy the Trident I missile by 1978. On

the contrary, the authors of the amendment are fully in support of the most expeditious completion of the testing and development of the Trident I missile, with its potential to add some 1,500 miles to the Poseidon missile range, effectively tripling the ocean area from which the submarine could strike at the heart of the Soviet Union.

This amendment does not even say that all development of the Trident submarine itself should be halted. In fact, it contains some \$104 million for continuing research and development on the submarine itself as well as \$40 million for the procurement of certain critical long-lead-time items.

As one who seriously questions the rationale for even this level of commitment to the design of the Trident submarine which, under the SALT I agreement, would mean a reduced number of ships carrying our undersea missiles, the amendment represents a substantial accommodation to the Navy's views already.

This amendment, which incorporates the unanimous view of the Members of the Senate Research and Development Subcommittee voting on the measure, as well as 7 of the 15 members of the full committee, merely does the following:

First, it would reduce the level of authorization by \$885 million this fiscal year, virtually all of that savings coming in the form of deleting the requirement that the first \$1.3 billion Trident submarine be deployed in fiscal year 1978 and three more in each of the following years. Instead of having the first submarine ready by 1978, it would plan for the first ship coming into the fleet in 1980.

In order that there be no doubt of the reasonableness of this time schedule, it is vital to recall that this is the time schedule approved by the Secretary of Defense and by the President only 2 years ago, prior to the SALT agreement. At that time, within the Defense Department, the argument raged over the appropriate deployment schedule. Even then, prior to the conclusion of the SALT agreement prohibiting an ABM system by the Soviet Union and limiting the number of offensive weapons, it was the judgment of the top civilian and military leaders of the Nation, that the security of the Nation would not be affected by the deployment of the first Trident in 1980.

In fact, Admiral Moorer testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee 2 years ago that only in the absence of an ABM treaty and a limitation on the Soviet offensive weapon buildup would it be necessary to accelerate the timing.

The ABM treaty was signed.

The interim agreement to limit offensive forces was signed.

The criteria established by Admiral Moorer were met.

Yet we are told today that the decision merely to hold the timing to the original plan recommended by the Department of Defense would be disastrous to our security needs. I find those arguments difficult to accept, particularly when one examines what our strategic

force structure is today and the potential for the future.

The nuclear Triad with its overwhelming redundancy contains 1,054 ICBM's, of which over 550 are being refitted to carry three warheads capable of hitting separate targets in the USSR. Our bomber force of 500 FB-111's and B-52's contain more than 2,000 nuclear weapons and our submarine deterrent with 26 of the Poseidon boats already carrying MIRV's now bristles with more than 3,000 nuclear weapons. A single submarine could destroy 160 Soviet cities at a distance of 2,500 miles.

The reality of the situation is that we now have 7,100 operational strategic nuclear weapons and, by the Department of State's calculations, by 1977 we will have 10,000 nuclear warheads capable of hitting the Soviet Union. Nor do these calculations even consider our forward based bombers which also have a capability of reaching the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons.

Under no circumstances are the arguments of fear and strategic illusion raised by the Department of Defense justifiable. Our strategic deterrent is secure and every witness testifying last year on the SALT agreements acknowledged that fact.

I would like briefly to discuss several of the arguments raised by opponents of this amendment.

First, they claim that the submarine fleet is aging so rapidly that they must be replaced at the earliest possible date. In fact, in 1978 when the Defense Department is asking for the first Trident submarine to be deployed, the average age of the 31 Poseidon boats will be only 14 years. Even by 1980 when this amendment would permit the first Trident to be on the seas, the average age of the vessels will be only 16 years. Even the oldest of the entire Polaris fleet will not be 20 years old until 1980. And despite the frequent claims that 20 years is the maximum lifespan of the nuclear powered submarine, a more accurate estimate would appear to be closer to 25 or 30 years.

In testimony before the House of Representatives appropriations subcommittee, Rear Adm. Harvey Lyon, the Trident project officer, admitted that the useful life of the Poseidon boats was 28 years.

Second, the argument is raised that on the grounds of vulnerability the Poseidon fleet is in danger. But once again, the hard facts seem otherwise. When pressed, no Defense Department witness could point to a single piece of evidence to indicate that the submarine fleet is vulnerable today. As to the future, the speculation of Soviet improved ASW capabilities remains speculation. Despite the massive effort of the past decades, the Navy admits that not once has a Soviet killer submarine ever tracked our submarines. Yet for our deterrent to be endangered, Soviet attack submarines would have to track simultaneously all 41 of our submarines and destroy them simultaneously.

If there is any hedge that appears needed, refitting the Poseidon with the Trident I missile will provide that hedge. It would triple the ocean space where

our submarines could hide, by extending the missile range to 4,000 miles. Even that range could be extended by reducing somewhat the number of warheads carried on each missile.

In addition, the issue of vulnerability is two-sided. For the Trident submarine proposed for breakneck development may be even more vulnerable than the existing smaller Poseidon vessel. The larger submarine may be a better target if antisubmarine warfare developments focus on sonar or any other device in which size is a factor. We may be placing more of our nuclear eggs in a smaller number of much larger and perhaps more vulnerable baskets. With the SALT I treaty in effect, we would be limited to fewer than our current 41 submarines if we continued the Trident production. Obviously, the degree of difficulty for an opposing antisubmarine fleet is multiplied when they have to track and kill simultaneously 41 submarines as they would today, compared to being able to concentrate their forces against a much smaller number.

But the basic point remains. No one knows what the developments in antisubmarine warfare are likely to be and there is no immediate national security rationale to justify committing ourselves 2 years earlier than necessary.

A third argument raised by the opponents of this amendment is that we must engage in this expensive process as a way of placing additional bargaining chips in the hands of our SALT II negotiators. Our experience with bargaining chips in the past should have convinced us that this posture means the expenditure of billions of dollars, the escalation of the arms race and the little positive effect on negotiations. It is not the Trident or any other single new weapons decision that affects our negotiating stance. It is the evidence of our will to provide for our own defense—evidence which is amply provided for in a budget of more than \$80 billion for defense, whether or not it includes an additional \$885 million for Trident. No one can doubt that we are maintaining a strong deterrent, and the Soviet Union is obviously aware of our continued willingness to do what is necessary to obtain a fully adequate defense.

The result of having ABM's as bargaining chips was to see that we spent billions of dollars on an ABM system that has never been proved, a system that is precluded by the ABM treaty. Yet the delay in negotiating an agreement while we pressed forward with an ABM system meant that instead of a single ABM site, the Soviet Union was permitted to build a second site.

The result of declining to agree to a ban on MIRV's or MIRV testing has meant that the Soviet Union finally has given enough time to develop a MIRV capability. For 4 years, the Pentagon cried "wolf" virtually whenever it suited their purpose of arousing fears of a rising Soviet threat so as to justify U.S. deployment of MIRV's.

Mr. President, now they have succeeded in merely adding to the pot another set of chips, chips which would have been better used had they never

moved from the research and development state to deployment.

Now once again we hear the Trident being put forward as a bargaining chip. If history is any guide, the commitment to deploy Trident will galvanize the Soviet Union to more rapidly achieving the MIRVing of their submarines. Once again, the bargaining chip will have been used with the only sad result being the Soviet's achievement of their own MIRV bargaining chips.

I believe that this amendment is thoroughly in keeping with a fully adequate nuclear deterrent now and in the near future. It avoids an unnecessary expense at this time and hopefully will avoid the excesses of overlapping research and development and production which was largely responsible for \$31 billion in overruns on 45 weapons systems in the recent past. It would not detract from immediate defense capabilities and it would avoid an unnecessary escalation in the arms race. I strongly urge its adoption.

Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, in the course of the Senate debate over the McIntyre/Dominick amendment, it has been alleged on several occasions that the Soviet Union already possesses a Trident submarine.

As my colleagues know, I do not believe this to be the case and have so argued during the debate.

Therefore, I was particularly interested to read an analysis of this question in the Washington Post this morning. Written by reporter Michael Getler, a well-informed expert on military matters, this news analysis offers us an unbiased, objective view of the controversy.

I believe his report makes it clear that despite escalating rhetoric on the Senate floor, the Soviet Union does not have a Trident and is not building submarines which would compare with such a vessel.

I hope my colleagues will have an opportunity to read the piece before our vote and will, therefore, ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TRIDENT DEBATE: DO THE RUSSIANS HAVE ITS EQUIVALENT
(By Michael Getler)

As the Senate nears a decisive vote on the Navy's proposed \$12.8 billion Trident missile-firing submarine project, defenders of the new weapon are picturing the Russians as "already having their equivalent of our Trident."

That is the way Adm. Hyman Rickover, the Navy's nuclear power chief described it in congressional testimony released last week. This week, Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), who is leading the fight for Trident in the Senate, also stressed that "the Russians already have a Trident" during an NBC-TV show appearance.

Actually, what the Soviet Union has is a missile-submarine program similar to a concept the U.S. Navy discarded two years ago.

In mid-1971, the U.S. Navy was considering a plan—known as Expo—to develop a new 4,000-mile-range missile for existing U.S. Poseidon submarines that now carry 16 missiles of 2,500-mile range.

But for a variety of reasons, the Navy decided instead to put all its money into a completely new missile-submarine combination now known as Trident.

The Russians, meanwhile, took a different tack. They developed a 4,000-mile range missile but decided to put it on what the Pentagon describes as a modified version of their existing Yankee class of submarines. The older Yankee class carries 16 missiles of relatively short, 1,500-mile range.

The submarines with the newer missiles are known as the Delta class.

Thus although much of the escalating rhetoric about Trident credits the Russians with having something equivalent to Trident, there are actually major differences in the U.S. and Russian approaches.

For one thing, the Russians are able to put only 12 missiles on each of their Delta subs. The Trident is meant to carry 24 each.

Further, while the Delta is basically the same as current Russian submarines, the Trident is a completely new vessel. It is to be twice the size of current U.S. vessels and will have the latest in nuclear propulsion and super-quieting devices to make it even harder to find beneath the seas.

Also, existing Poseidon missiles and the proposed Trident carry highly accurate MIRV-type multiple warheads, between 10 and 14 on each missile. The Russian Delta class carries missiles with single warheads.

Authoritative U.S. officials also say the new Soviet undersea missile—despite its longer range—appears to have only about half the weight-lifting power of the existing U.S. Poseidon missile. While the Russians may eventually be able to put MIRV warheads on their sea-based missiles, this weight-lifting factor could limit the size of such warheads to a point where they have limited effectiveness against well-protected U.S. targets.

For the Soviets to put still larger new missiles on submarines would seem to require that a new class of subs be built. Thus far at least, there has been no indication of that.

Aside from a new large submarine, the Trident program includes an initial 4,000-mile-plus range missile and eventually a 6,000-mile-range weapons. Both of these will carry at least as large a MIRV payload as the current Poseidon.

One of two major factors behind strong administration support of a speed-up Trident project, rather than the slower pace Senate critics favor, is the production line situation in each country.

The Russians have open and active production lines for their submarines. The United States is still producing some types of submarines, but no new missile subs have been built since 1967.

The administration wants the Russians to know that production lines would be in full swing as the 1977 deadline approaches when both countries have pledged to try to complete a permanent and more comprehensive limitation on offensive nuclear weapons.

This is linked to the theory that the Soviets recognize that the United States, if pushed, can out-produce the Russians. With no new agreement, the United States could quickly add Tridents to the existing fleet of 41 Polaris/Poseidon subs rather than using the new vessels to replace older ones.

Similarly, supporters of Trident argue that the Russians may attempt to put MIRVs on possibly more than 1,000 of their land-based ICBM force. Unless this is checked at SALT, it is argued that the 1,054 U.S. land-based missiles may eventually become vulnerable to attack. Thus Trident is also viewed as necessary if the United States is to quickly shift more of its nuclear retaliatory force to safer locations beneath the sea.

Critics argue, however, that even Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger has said that it would take the Russians until about 1980 to actually MIRV their land-based missiles. They note that bombers and submarines are still likely survivors of any attack and that

even at a slower pace, Trident would begin joining the fleet by 1980.

Also, aside from Trident, the Pentagon is moving to develop other hedges which should be included in the overall debate about Trident's relative importance.

The Air Force is studying mobile land-based missiles. A start is being requested for new cruise missiles that can be fired from planes or ships outside Soviet defense. Like small piloted jet planes, they would be hard to detect on enemy radars and could fly in very low under defenses.

The United States is also developing, a new B-1 bomber, is putting new missiles on existing B-52 bombers, and is still spending large sums to develop a new ABM system that can provide an anti-missile defense ring around Minuteman silos if the arms agreements break down.

Mr. BEALL. Mr. President, during the past 3 days the Senate has engaged in a rather spirited debate on the merits of continuing the accelerated development of the Trident Missile/Submarine program. Last year the Congress voted to accelerate the Trident program, especially the development of the submarine itself. If the program continues in its accelerated mode, it is anticipated that the Trident will be ready for deployment in 1978. The missile has the capability of being deployed onboard the Polaris/Poseidon Submarines which are currently in use. With its longer range, the Trident Missile offers a significant improvement in our sea-launched strategic capability. In addition, the longer ranged Trident missile will allow the submarines to cruise further off shore, thus significantly decreasing their vulnerability to enemy counter measures.

During the next few years, the Soviet Union may well develop a first strike capability that will allow them to destroy our land based missiles and bombers. Thus, our seabased strategic capability becomes paramount in our continuing effort to deter the Soviet Union from attacking the United States or our vital interest around the world.

Throughout this debate, there has appeared to be a high degree of unanimity on the basic need to develop the Trident Missile and its sophisticated submarine. The question before the Senate has been, do we continue to develop the missile and the submarine on an accelerated schedule? Proponents of the accelerated development argue that we need to begin deploying the Trident as soon as possible so as to insure our national security.

The question has also been raised as to how the Soviet Union's political leaders will view a Senate decision to slow down the development of the Trident. This decision coming just 1 year after the decision to accelerate the program might be interpreted by the Soviets as a sign of a flagging American commitment to our own security and that of its allies. I personally believe that such an interpretation would be a serious mistake and a serious miscalculation on the part of the Soviet planners. However, what I think is not important, what is important is how the Soviet Union perceives a deacceleration of the Trident program and how they respond to their perception. If they decide to continue or accelerate their own strategic and conventional buildup, then the approval of

the McIntyre-Dominick amendment would have served to destabilize United States/Soviet relations. They might also choose to be less willing to make concessions at the European Security Conference, the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations, and the second phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Their overall track record during the last 50 years makes it very difficult for me to conclude that they would respond to an American decision to slow the development of the Trident by slowing their own military buildup.

We must also keep in mind the points that were raised with regard to the Western Europeans. Yesterday the Senate delivered a "shock" to our allies even though we ultimately decided not to mandate a 40-percent cutback in U.S. military forces stationed overseas. I opposed this cutback because I do not believe that it is responsible for us as a Congress or as a Nation to undertake acts which would so clearly contribute to destabilizing the international scene and in doing so lessen the chances of world peace. If we follow that "shock" by slowing the development of the Trident, we could well begin the process of unraveling the NATO Alliance and other security arrangements which are designed to protect and promote our national interests. If our allies in Western Europe and elsewhere conclude that we no longer have the will to carry the burden which history has thrust upon us, they will almost assuredly respond by drawing away from the United States and seeking an acceptable modus operandi with the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China.

Arms control does not mean the same thing as disarmament. The objective of the SALT talks is to place a reasonable ceiling on strategic weapons, while allowing both the United States and the U.S.S.R. to meet their basic security needs. Since the SLBM will be our primary line of defense in the not too distant future, it is important for us to move ahead with all deliberate speed. The deployment of the Trident will certainly contribute to strengthening our position in future arms limitation talks, and I do not believe that this factor can be overlooked in our considerations.

A number of very effective arguments on behalf of these cutbacks. We are all aware of the potential dangers that exist when we move to full production concurrent with the feasibility testing. The \$800 million needed to accelerate the Trident program above its original timetable are funds that could probably have been utilized to increase the capability of our Navy. Thus, one program moves ahead of the general needs of the fleet. I have noted, however, that the committee cut \$94.6 million out of the Navy shipbuilding and conversion program request. In addition, the McIntyre-Dominick amendment No. 517 would delete \$885.4 million from the Trident authorization, with no assurance that these funds would be used for other defense needs.

It has also been argued that the deacceleration of the Trident program would save money. Amendment No. 517

would have reduced spending in fiscal year 1974, but it is projected that the long-range effects of slowing this program would be to add \$1 to \$1½ billion to the total cost. These projected increases result from the increases in construction costs and readjustments caused by the decision to decelerate development. The estimated total cost of the present program is \$12.8 billion which would have increased to at least \$13.8 billion under the extended development program.

Mr. President, my decision on this measure has been a very difficult one for me to reach. I have carefully weighed the merits of the arguments on both sides of this issue. I have decided to vote against the amendment No. 517 because I believe that, it is important to the long-range security of the United States, and, perhaps more importantly, I am convinced that the 1978 date will result in a lower total program cost than the schedule prepared in the McIntyre-Dominick amendment. From the cost standpoint, therefore, a "no" vote seems justified.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, I rise in support of provisions in the bill for the Trident program. They should be retained without amendment or modification.

Much study and consideration went into the preparation of these provisions by the committee. These studies and efforts go back a number of years. They form the foundation and the basis for the authorizations contained in the bill.

Throughout in the development of the 1974 Defense program there exists the imperative of maintaining a clearly and undoubtedly adequate defense posture. Not a marginal one. Not one which would admit of some conjecture or possibility. But a defense posture which will be of demonstrated and hard-core realization.

The Trident program is a substantial and vital portion of that desired defense posture. It is designed to provide a timely and orderly replacement of the present nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines.

This design calls for the lead ship starting operation in 1978. This date is important. It is vital.

To adhere to this timing will be to advantage in several respects, each of which is persuasive.

First, by the time the first Trident begins operations, the oldest Polaris submarines will be approaching 20 years of age, which is their designed life expectancy.

Second, to delay the contemplated schedule would result in substantial increase in cost. Admiral Rickover, who does not take his responsibility lightly in matters of this kind, stated in this regard:

If ten Trident submarines are bought on the delayed schedule contemplated by the amendment offered by Senators McIntyre and Dominick, the Navy estimates that the cost of the program will increase by more than one billion dollars.

Assigned as factors in this increased cost are breaks in the production lines, delay and disruption, and decreased annual quantity procurements, as well as

from inflation occurring during the delay period. Hence, deferral of authorization of funds this year will not save money. In the long run it will cost much more.

Third, there would be a severe, adverse impact on negotiations to limit arms and armament which are now in progress and which are soon to commence, if there is a change in the authorizations contained in the bill. SALT II—strategic arms limitations talks—are now in progress in Geneva. Next month mutual force reductions talks will commence in Vienna. We should call on a recent experience in this regard. The reason the United States was able to obtain an ABM Treaty at SALT I is that we, not the Soviets, were ahead in ABM technology, and were building a defense missile system the Russians could not match. If we are to achieve success at SALT II, it will be on the same principle. It will not be because the Soviets want to cooperate with us and reach parity. More likely it will be because they think we are ahead of them in strategic systems or that without an agreement we are going to get ahead.

In short, if SALT II is to stand a chance of success, the United States must have the military power to deal with the Soviets. By moving as scheduled into a new weapon system like Trident there is introduced a problem for the Soviets which may furnish the incentive in them to want to assume a reasonable bargaining position. It is through the timely delivery of Trident, together with other important weapons systems that the President will possess the necessary power to achieve meaningful limitations of armament agreements. The bearing of such treaties on the maintenance of peace would be tremendous. So would the reduced pace, volume, and cost of the arms building race which has been going on between the Soviets and ourselves.

Fourth, the establishment and operation of Trident would go far to assure continued free use of the seas. This is of increasing importance to America as our dependence on foreign sources for energy requirements increases. The expanded and growing Russian sea power is being employed by the Soviets globally as an important instrument of their foreign policy. It would be foolhardy indeed not to take steps to counter the probabilities flowing therefrom.

There are those who argue that we now have reached a condition of less tension and hostility internationally than has existed for the past quarter century. Détente among the major nations of the world is said to be the order of the day. Hence, it is said, we can moderate and reduce our national defense posture.

This "détente" condition could readily and speedily change. Should that occur we must remember that the industrial capacity of the United States cannot possibly mobilize rapidly enough to turn military inadequacy into adequacy in face of crisis as it did in previous major wars. The sophisticated technology of the day will prevent that.

While we can be heartened at the détente between our Nation and the U.S.S.R. which has resulted from our

foreign policy efforts, a détente is a fragile and often transient condition. Its continuation is dependent upon the intent and long-term ambitions of the U.S.S.R., as weighed against the apparent advantages of a détente situation.

In this regard, we must always keep in mind that today's Soviet leaders have never rejected their predecessors' statements on the inevitability of an eventual death struggle between the Communists and the capitalist-imperialists.

More significantly, despite the apparent détente, there has been no discernible slackening in the growth and modernization of Communist-bloc military strength and in the steady rise of the Soviet defense budget. In considering our own defense program, we must not ignore the latent threat which Soviet military forces pose to U.S. national security.

Mr. President, there are those who point to the heavy cost of the defense program. I certainly have had in mind in previous years as now, the necessity to carefully scan and judge the budget requests for defense as well as other programs. At another time I shall discuss this cost factor in greater detail. For the time being I wish to state that reductions in defense have been achieved in recent years and are reflected in the present request of \$79 billion for fiscal year 1974.

One item alone gives clear proof of this: In fiscal year 1968 defense outlays were \$78 billion. For this fiscal year, \$79 billion are being requested. This means an increase of only \$1 billion. However, during that same period of 1968 to 1974 fiscal years. Federal nondefense spending increased by \$93 billion. If there is threat of bankruptcy, and if there are swollen budgets, then we should consider and point to the nondefense spending areas, not to defense programs. This is added to by the inflation factor. The 1974 budget figure of \$79 billion, because of inflation and other factors, buys \$34 billion less than it would have in 1968.

Further, let it be noted that the total authorizations provided in the subject bill is almost 7 percent below the amount requested. The request was \$21,959,000,000—\$21.9 billion—while the amount recommended is \$20.5, which is over \$1.5 billion less. So we applied cuts in a suitable fashion and figure.

DESCRIPTION OF TRIDENT PROGRAM

For informational purposes and background, I now set out a general description of this Trident program.

Trident is the popular name used to identify all major components of this new strategic program—the submarine, the missiles, and the support complex. The present program is structured to build 10 submarines, each capable of carrying 24 long-range ballistic missiles and to develop two missiles—the Trident I and Trident II. The first of these submarines will become operational in the late 1970's with the Trident I missile. The Trident I missile will also be compatible with backfit into our existing Poseidon submarines if this should become necessary.

Trident represents recognition of the credibility of our sea-based strategic de-

terrent in future national planning. Our Polaris/Poseidon Forces have had, and continue to have, a magnificent record of performance. The Trident system is being developed to insure that this record continues, and that our Nation will have a modern, survivable strategic deterrent system in the 1980's and beyond.

The decision to proceed with Trident is not based on any single additional or recent threat, but on a continuing assessment of the entire Soviet military effort. Today there is an absence of a visible, powerful Soviet threat to our Polaris/Poseidon Force, and no major ASW breakthrough is anticipated in the remainder of this decade. Even so, the significant research and development efforts the Soviets are pursuing in both basic ASW and supporting oceanographic studies suggests that the Navy's strategic deterrent forces, so vital to our national interests, cannot afford to sit idle as other elements become increasingly vulnerable to advancing technology.

Our present Polaris/Poseidon Force consists of 41 nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines. The Trident submarine program is designed to provide an orderly replacement for these submarines. By the time the first Trident begins operations, the oldest Polaris submarines will be approaching 20 years of age, their designed life expectancy.

Trident will be even more survivable to antisubmarine warfare efforts than our present submarines, because of improved submarine technology—higher speed and quieter operation—as well as greater missile range—therefore, more useable ocean area to "hide" in. The backfitting of the Trident I missile into Poseidon submarines would also increase the useable operating area for these submarines, but would not provide the submarine improvements of quieting and speed nor provide an orderly replacement program.

The Trident program includes the development of two missiles—the Trident I missile which has an expected range of 4,000 nautical miles and the Trident II missile which has an expected range of 6,000 nautical miles.

For a strategic deterrent force, basing in continental U.S. ports is particularly desirable. This option becomes available with the longer range Trident missile and therefore we do not plan on using overseas basing for Trident submarines.

With U.S. basing, our submarines, with a missile of adequate range, can be on target upon leaving port. Transit times to a patrol area are avoided and logistics problems are simplified and less expensive. We eliminate the need to fly our crews and material support overseas and the ships' crews can be with their families during the refit periods—a factor which aids retention efforts.

Extensive studies have been conducted on the optimal choice for the support site. Virtually every potential site on both coasts, in the gulf area, and some few outside the continental United States were considered. The decision has been made to deploy the initial Trident force in the Pacific Ocean; the site selected is

near Bremerton, Wash., at an existing naval base.

Mr. President, it is my earnest hope this program will be followed through as scheduled. Its importance to our country and to the achievement of a stable and enduring peace is of the highest order and priority.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we have heard much argumentation and refutation on both sides of the Trident question. We have heard from the sponsors of the amendment that they favor the system, but question the "when" in the equation. Mr. President, I feel the "when" has been answered by the action of our adversaries. The information, the facts, that we have been presented in these past few days provide ample prodding. We must move, and move positively and aggressively, to assure that the most survivable element of our triad—the submarine (others being the bomber and the ICBM)—keeps well ahead of the "bow wave" of technology which can roll over a standing target.

Last year we heard much argument on the side of permitting the Soviets more submarines and more missiles than we were permitted. Not just a few more, incidentally, but a lot more. The rationale expressed was based on their shorter range missile, noisier submarines, lack of forward bases and greater distances to patrol areas, and their lack of MIRV. These were the reasons given, the excuses for permitting Soviet numerical superiority. Look at what the Delta class submarine, the new submarine SSN-8 missile—which can target Washington, St. Louis, Charleston—from the submarine construction yards in Russia—look at what these plus the new ICBMs and the MIRV do to that far-from-balanced equation.

Let me speak briefly to the criticisms spoken to on the Trident program:

Concurrency—or "fly before buy"—all one has to do is to examine the fact that Trident provides more development time—and with a top-notch, skilled, experienced development team—than previous Polaris or Poseidon programs. This is true in both the ship and the missile program.

Age of today's submarines—some argue that we can expect them to run until they're 30 years old. The Navy has no such firm expectations. The Navy is concerned as the submarines reach 20 years of age. The Navy sea-going experts like Adm. Rickover are the people we should consult regarding technical and operational considerations. Our oldest classes of nuclear submarines, not one of which is 20 years old, are not used by the Navy as "front-line" submarines now. The strategic submarines, the Polaris submarines, are even more important to us. Let's face the hard facts. With two crews, they are turned around rapidly and they are kept at sea. Let's make sure that our deterrent force can continue to maintain this pace.

"Acceleration" of Trident.—This is a misnomer. The term implies a "crash" program, similar to that of the first Polaris, when our Navy cut an attack submarine in half and thereby developed a

Polaris missile submarine. The present program had its genesis in 1966-67. The Secretary of Defense and his subordinates directed introduction of Trident—the ULMS—in 1976-78. The Navy was forced to slip it temporarily in 1971 because they were not provided enough funds to have Trident, Vietnam, and the usual destroyers, carriers, and submarines. This short period of slippage was "cured" by the Secretary of Defense in late 1971 when he ordered Trident restored to its former schedule. He put in enough money for the Navy to do the job at that time. We are talking about a "restored" program, not an accelerated one. The submarine development program, which critics are fretting about, as measured by previously funded R. & D. is one-third complete. As measured by R. & D. funding through fiscal year 1974, it will be three-fifths complete.

High risk of Trident.—The Navy and the AEC have been hard at work on this submarine for over 4 years. The propulsion plant—a smaller model of it—is at sea—successful. It works. The sonar equipment which will give it the "edge" against even quieter generations of Soviet subs is the sonar being installed in the new attack subs now building. It is tested. It works. Quieting techniques to be used have been largely proved in test installations or at sea. I do not see a "high risk" here, unless it lies in the higher cost—much higher—R. & D. effort of the missile. But then the critics do not oppose the missile. But let us not delude ourselves or our constituents with claims of high risk in the much more everyday production of a submarine.

Mr. President—my colleagues—the proposal to delay the Trident submarine in the manner proposed does little or nothing to reduce concurrency. We sorely need momentum in strategic forces. The amendment would have us building Tridents, already once delayed, at a rate of two, instead of three, per year. We are playing with semantics; there is little reduction of the so-called concurrency. Furthermore, the amendment calls for a program which would cost the taxpayer about \$1 billion in escalation alone. Not to mention whatever other costs come along because of slower, inefficient production lines, work stoppages, and the like.

Our position at SALT II will be much stronger if we lay the keel for the first Trident now.

The Soviets are building a new family of land-based missiles, which we are not doing. Thus it is more important that we move forward aggressively in building a new system which is lethal, invisible, and nearly invulnerable. It will help preserve the peace we all cherish.

Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from North Carolina (Mr. HELMS) prepared a very interesting and helpful chart that shows when the Trident would come on, as compared with the phase-out of Polaris/Poseidon. I ask unanimous consent that his chart and his letter concerning it appear at the conclusion of my address.

There being no objection, the letter and chart were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. SENATE,

Washington, D.C., September 21, 1973.

Hon. STROM THURMOND,

Dirksen Senate Office Building,

Washington, D.C.

DEAR STROM: In sorting out the arguments about the Trident submarine, I made up a little chart so that I could see when the Trident would come on, as compared with the phaseout of Polaris/Poseidon. The timing of this becomes crucial when the program authorization approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee is compared with the stretchout of the Trident program proposed by the McIntyre Amendment.

My conclusion is that the Committee bill prudently allows for a little leeway in the

time overlap of the new system coming on. The McIntyre Amendment, in effect, cancels that leeway. It is also noteworthy to visualize the time distance between the expiration of the Interim Agreement on Strategic Arms Limitation and the achievement of full operating capacity of Trident. The McIntyre Amendment would delay this even further. There is no guarantee that a permanent agreement acceptable to the United States can be signed before the Interim Agreement expires.

Further, at the present rate of R and D expenditures by the Soviet Union, it is possible that a breakthrough could be made in antisubmarine warfare that could result in

the obsolescence of the Polaris fleet. Therefore, I feel we should continue on the present schedule to preclude that possibility.

Being a mobile system the Polaris/Poseidon fleet is constantly subjected to greater wear and fatigue problems than a fixed system. After twenty such demanding years, its dependability is marginal and the cost of maintenance has reached the point of diminishing returns, not to mention the likelihood of strategic obsolescence. For these reasons, I believe we should not plan on operating the Polaris/Poseidon systems beyond the twenty year period.

Sincerely,

JESSE.

PHASEOUT OF POLARIS/POSEIDON SYSTEMS COMPARED WITH INITIAL OPERATING CAPABILITY OF TRIDENT UNDER COMMITTEE BILL
AND UNDER MCINTYRE AMENDMENT

41 Polaris/Poseidon submarines approximate operating capability (based on 20-year life span): Replacement schedule for 1st 15

10 Trident systems: X = Operational program approved by Armed Services Committee; — = Operational program proposed by McIntyre amendment

SAL I signed	SAL I ends	1972	73	74	75	76	1977	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	2000	01	02	03	04	05
			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
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Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, the Senate is presently debating and voting authorization legislation for the Department of Defense and while I am not a member of the committees that deal with foreign policy in Defense matters, I am very concerned about the trend which I see developing in the Congress and in the country. It is quite apparent that the frustration which has been pent up in the Congress during the past 10 years as a result of the Vietnam war has now been directed at the over-all military posture of the United States. I am fearful that a repetition of past history is now underway.

America has always wished to remain aloof from the problems of other countries. We tried desperately between 1914 and 1917 to do that. In the end we were still drawn into the war in Europe. But once that conflict was concluded, we again withdrew behind the shores of our oceans and ignored the problems and developments in Europe and Asia during the 1930's. The American people and the Congress as late as 1940 were still ignoring the threats from Europe and the Pacific, and when war came, we were totally unprepared for it.

However, time was on our side, and this factor coupled with the protection of two great oceans enabled us to develop a sufficient arsenal so that hand in hand with our allies we were able to defeat the Axis governments. Unfortunately those oceans no longer provide an adequate

measure of protection against today's sophisticated weaponry.

In retrospect America has done well since great power status was thrust upon her after World War II. No one would claim that we have not made mistakes, but Mr. President, I wonder if we are not now running the risk of making one of the great mistakes in American history. Under great pressure at home, facing a dollar crisis abroad, weary of a long and inconclusive war in Asia and fighting against serious inflation, there is now a strong tendency among the people and the Congress to again retreat into a dangerous state of isolationism—and unilateral, partial disarmament.

The temptation to do this is understandable. For almost a decade and a half we have had serious balance-of-payments problems. We, as a people, have had to maintain a large military establishment while at the same time facing serious demands upon our financial resources at home and rising inflation throughout the free world. Unfortunately, the Military Establishment offers a tempting target for all these problems and frustrations in America.

There is no question that we have experienced some waste and inefficiency in our Defense programs, but I remind the Senate that we have experienced waste and inefficiency in domestic programs as well. There are those who are concerned that our Defense budget has risen despite terminating our involvement in South-

east Asia. These same sources paint a picture of a growing military program entirely out of touch with the new realities. I think however that Congress must be honest with itself and accept the fact that the 1974 Defense budget represents the lowest Defense program in terms of real buying power since fiscal year 1951. Why is this so? Because we, along with past and present administrations, have voted large pay increases for military personnel—and I think no one would deny that they were necessary. We have experienced inflation sufficient to reduce the 1974 Defense buying power to a level 40 percent below that of 1968 and 15 percent below the prewar level of 1964.

With this sagging buying power we must remember that we have in the American arsenal a fleet of aging strategic bombers, a Navy that has been overworked and inadequately maintained as a result of our Southeast Asian involvement and a fleet of aging nuclear submarines whose 20-year estimated lifetime is rapidly drawing to a close.

As a partial answer to the present state of our defense systems the Senate is now asked to vote on the proposed Trident program. Trident is a long-term proposal for the modernization and orderly replacement of our present Polaris and Poseidon submarines which are a key element in our Nation's nuclear deterrent and defense system. The four-part program which includes a 4,000-mile-range sea-launched missile, a

September 27, 1973

6,000-mile-range sea-launched missile, a new third generation nuclear-powered submarine and a base to be constructed in Bangor, Wash., is essential to the effective modernization and efficiency of our national defenses.

The first phase of Trident is scheduled to be ready in 1978 when 10 Trident submarines will replace the 10 oldest units of the Polaris/Poseidon fleet, which will then be nearly 20 years old and ready for retirement under their original development plans. The advantages of these new Trident submarines and missiles to our national defenses are numerous. First, the submarines will be able to travel faster, run quieter, dive deeper and stay at sea longer than the present fleet thereby enabling the entire system to be less dependent on foreign bases and less vulnerable to detection. The submarines will carry an increased payload of missiles from the present 16 to 24 giving each ship substantially more firepower.

And since the missiles will have an increased range of from 4,000 to 6,000 miles as opposed to the present 2,500 the Trident will have millions of square miles of additional ocean within which to operate while still remaining within operative striking distance. This great range and versatility of Trident will provide the United States with virtually a global operational capability and will vastly reduce our submarines' vulnerability to any foreseeable antisubmarine measures.

Delaying procurement of the Trident system, which eventually must be a part of our defense posture, will only make its acquisition more costly as inflation increases development costs.

While it is true that our defense budget is not sacrosanct, there is a point at which we are no longer trimming fat but cutting vital muscle. We must avoid the temptation to reach this point especially in reaction to the emotional residue from past disappointments. I believe we are now at that stage where all the fat has been trimmed and the muscle is now being exposed to an emotional budget-cutting knife and I would urge my colleagues to avoid the temptation to leave our defense crippled in the future from lack of foresight.

I think no one is opposed to reductions if the end result is a mutual reduction in Soviet forces and arms or if the security of the United States is not jeopardized in the balance. However, this is not the case with many of the proposed reductions, especially Trident, whose opponents have found a convenient place to cut defense without sufficient consideration for the future consequences of failing to implement the program now as a means of replacing aging equipment, and the costs of implementing the same program in the future when costs will have risen significantly, and we are forced to appropriate even larger sums to replace submarines which by then will long have passed beyond their designated life.

A few weeks ago, Stewart Alsop wrote a column in the Washington Post describing the efforts of certain people to emasculate the Defense budget of the United States. I ask unanimous consent that this article be included in the

RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks. I quote from a paragraph of this farsighted piece of journalism.

It is curious reasoning that the way to deal with the threat of Soviet superiority in conventional and strategic power is to cut back on United States conventional and strategic power.

If this trend continues there will come a time when Soviet expansionism and adventurism, either diplomatic or military, will pose the greatest threat to America and the free world that we have ever known.

Peace is our goal, yet we cannot achieve it negotiating from weakness. Strength is our bargaining tool and from it will grow the generation of peace for which President Nixon has worked so hard.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE OPPOSITION BLUEPRINT FOR STRATEGIC DISASTER

(By Stewart Alsop)

This is going to be one of those old-fashioned, reactionary columns that will cause all right-thinking persons to label the writer a tired old toady of the military-industrial complex. But there are certain facts of our present situation that really do seem worth a bit of thinking about, and that are hardly being thought about, or argued about, or written about, at all. Here are four examples:

1. The way things are going, the U.S. Army will soon hardly be in shape to take on a determined girls' hockey team. The Army is now dependent on volunteers, and young men are not volunteering fast enough, despite a pay scale that makes our Army infinitely the most expensive per capita in world history. So the Army is headed down to 800,000 men, and could go down to 730,000 men.

Moreover, the Army bureaucracy, in its incredible way, has ruled that only 15 per cent of the men in Army uniform should be the fighting men of the three combat services, infantry, artillery and armor. That means an Army of around 120,000 combat soldiers—the rest are support troops or bureaucrats in uniform, rather less capable of harming an enemy than a determined girls' hockey team. An Army of 120,000 combat soldiers must seem some sort of joke to the Russians, who field a superbly equipped army of at least 80 combat-ready divisions.

2. Norman Polmar, U.S. editor of Jane's Fighting Ships, the traditionally accurate British guide to naval strength, believes that the Soviet Union, which hardly had a navy 15 years ago, "may already have become the dominant seapower."

3. U.S. intelligence satellites have spotted no fewer than three new Soviet missile types since the SALT I agreement was signed last year. All three are designed to carry very heavy warheads. One, for example, is a heavier version of the SS-9, which already carries a warhead about 20 times as heavy as the American Minuteman. Another uses a "pop-up" technique to enable the smaller SS-11 to carry a much heavier warhead than before.

Why all this emphasis on heavier warheads? The answer is obvious. MIRVing a warhead is like slicing a pie—the bigger the warhead to be MIRVed, the bigger, and the more numerous, the individually targeted warheads into which it can be divided. The SALT agreement represents a stable nuclear balance, simply because the Soviet missiles are not MIRVed and ours are. But all the experts are agreed that the Soviets will have fully mastered MIRV technology by 1980 at the latest.

Then, unless something is done in the

meantime, the nuclear balance will cease to be stable. For then, according to the experts in such matters, the Soviets will have the capacity to knock out our entire land-based nuclear deterrent in a first strike, with enough nuclear warheads to destroy every major city in this country in a second strike. We will lack an equivalent capacity. Thus the stable nuclear balance will cease to be stable.

4. The Canadian truce team in South Vietnam, just before it withdrew in frustration, issued a report. The Canadians, hardly toadies of the U.S. military-industrial complex, reported that the North Vietnamese had been cheating wholesale on the Paris agreement. North Vietnam, the Canadians charged, "without being deterred one scintilla by the Paris agreement, has been infiltrating massive armed North Vietnamese troop units into Cambodia and South Vietnam in order to conduct military operations against the Republic of South Vietnam . . ."

One thing that is interesting about these four assorted facts is the reaction to them of the Democratic opposition. The Democratic Party of John Kennedy and his predecessors would have been howling to high heaven that something had to be done to right the growing imbalance in both conventional and strategic power. The current reaction of the Democrats is summed up in a paper signed by almost the entire liberal Democratic defense establishment—Paul C. Warnke, Adrian Fisher, Morton Halperin, Roswell Gilpatrick, Herbert Scoville, Herbert York and so on. The booklet proposes to cut more than \$14 billion from the current defense budget.

This is to be done partly by sharp reductions in conventional strength. "At least" three divisions are to be cut from our enfeebled Army, and carriers, nuclear submarines, tactical air wings and so on are to be similarly cut back. It is to be done partly by eliminating virtually all new strategic-weapons procurement, even to the point of halting "the final installment for the MIRVing of the first 550 Minuteman missiles." And it is to be done partly by cutting off all logistic, economic or other support for the South Vietnamese.

All three proposals are fairly mind-boggling. The men who put their names to the report are intelligent men, but it is curious reasoning, surely, that the way to deal with an unquestioned threat of decisive Soviet superiority in conventional and strategic power is to cut back on U.S. conventional and strategic power.

The report points out that the "imbalance in the teeth-to-tail ratio" needs to be reversed. Indeed it does, and by the toughest kind of action, up to and including the mass firing of generals and admirals. But the way to do so is not to cut three divisions from our 13-division Army, for example, but to demand that the Army provide a lot more divisions—at least 20—from its 800,000 manpower level.

As for the proposal to cut off all logistic and other support to the South Vietnamese, this would of course insure the defeat of South Vietnam. The "massive" infiltration which the Canadians report is clearly in preparation for another North Vietnamese offensive, for which the Soviets and the Chinese are providing generous logistic support, including heavy tanks and long-range artillery. Cut off from all U.S. support, the South Vietnamese cannot possibly contain the offensive.

The betrayal of South Vietnam was the price demanded by the Communists for the return of our prisoners, before the Paris agreement. If this Democratic defense blueprint is approved, South Vietnam will be betrayed gratuitously, and the war lost retroactively. It is a curious atmosphere in which we find ourselves, in which moral men like those listed above can blandly propose the betrayal of a small dependent ally, amid

nods of approval from other moral men, who can claim to have been right all along, when the inevitable defeat of South Vietnam occurs.

In such an atmosphere, the Democratic defense blueprint seems likely to be adopted without much argument or much thought. For to dispute its wisdom is to invite the Pavlovian label of cold warrior or Pentagon toady and no sensible man, no politician especially, wishes to be so labeled.

Mr. CHILES. The Poseidon submarines with their missiles are today the most important weapons we have and insure us of the capability of bringing about virtually complete destruction of Russia or any other nation that might launch a nuclear attack against us. The Trident submarine with its Trident missiles is the next generation of weapons to take the place of our existing Poseidon and Polaris subs.

The question before us is whether the Trident should be accelerated to 1978—or held back to 1980. No one participating in the debate is against the Trident. The question is one of judgment of trying to weigh the pluses and minuses of 1978 versus 1980. This is the most expensive weapons system ever proposed to the Congress. It is a bipartisan question with proponents for a strong defense posture of the United States being on both sides of the question.

The Trident has posed for the Senate a very difficult issue. It seems to me that the Trident missiles and submarines provide the very best defense we can have at the highest level of strategic deterrence. The range of the missiles and the maneuverability of the submarines will be a very significant advance over what we and the Russians now have. So I am a strong supporter of the Trident program.

But it is also true that this program is the most expensive weapons system the United States has ever undertaken. It will cost the American public \$13 billion to complete the program. Today we faced the choice of whether to accelerate the building of the Trident submarines to be able to have some of them afloat by 1978 instead of 1980 or to stick to the original program as it was initially presented.

I voted to sustain the original program schedule for several reasons. Voting for the slower development of the submarines will have no effect on the production of Trident missiles which have a range of 4,000 miles. The missiles can be carried by our existing fleet of Polaris/Poseidon subs. So the increased deterrence and defense capability that we will get from the greater range and number of Trident missiles will be realized as rapidly as is feasible and would not have been slowed up if the original pace of the Trident program had been maintained.

But the accelerated production of the Trident submarines before the research and development stage has been properly completed would without question have raised the costs of the overall program considerably. The savings to the taxpayer this year alone as between the original and the accelerated program would have been \$680 million. I am now chairman of a new Ad Hoc Subcommittee

on Federal Procurement. Federal procurement experience shows that major cost overruns inevitably occur when production programs are rushed and pushed on top of research and development. This is compounded by the fact that the Trident submarine is a state of the art advance over what we have previously produced. This means there is more room for errors in the R. & D. stage. So by voting for the original production schedule we are following a more prudent and fiscally responsible procurement policy without sacrificing anything in military preparedness because the missiles will provide us with a good share of that security base given our current submarine capacity.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I support the McIntyre-Dominick amendment to put the Trident system on an orderly schedule of research, development, and production.

Throughout my years in Congress, I have consistently fought for and supported appropriations to assure that the United States maintained a strong defense posture. I continue to feel that survival must be our first priority and I have been impressed with the arguments on this amendment that, in my opinion, show conclusively that keeping the original production date of 1980 for the Trident will in no way weaken our defense.

In fact, production in 1980, as opposed to the accelerated date of 1978, could actually strengthen the United States by giving more assurances that the Trident, when finally put into operation, would be an effective deterrent.

Under the proposed accelerated program, production of the Trident would take place concurrently with its research and development. All 10 proposed Trident submarines would be built within the next 4 years; and, during the same period, the research and development program for the Trident would be trying to ascertain what kind of potential enemy challenge the submarine should be equipped to meet.

Seven members of the Armed Services Committee have said that "there is no surer way of inviting errors and adding excessive costs" than by building a weapons system at the same time it is in the research and development stage. We have only to look at the Poseidon program, where the first 10 of those submarines were obsolete by the time they were built. Fortunately, in the production of subsequent Poseidons, early errors were capable of being corrected. If, however, the entire fleet of Tridents were built before the research and development made any real progress, it is logical that production errors could not be corrected and both time and money would be wasted in costly overruns.

The McIntyre-Dominick amendment is a rational, reasoned alternative that not only offers savings of \$885 million in this fiscal year—when inflation is pushing prices sky-high—but the amendment also offers a better chance of developing a weapons system that will be unquestionably effective. Under the McIntyre amendment, the first submarine would join the fleet in 1980, rather than in 1978; and the remaining Trident sub-

marines, with any needed redesign and development adjustments incorporated, would be added at the orderly rate of two-a-year after that.

All available expert testimony reveals that our present submarine fleet will be more than adequate well into the 1980's, and no evidence has been presented of danger to our defense posture in the meantime that would necessitate a pell-mell rush at this time to accelerate the program while the research has not yet been completed. Let us remember, Mr. President, that we are not arguing about whether we will have the Trident submarine. That matter has already been settled. We are going to build the Trident. The 1980 production date for the Trident—called for in the McIntyre amendment—is still several years earlier than the date originally sought by the Navy in 1971.

I repeat that, during my years in public life, I have been a staunch supporter of military appropriations designed to make the United States second to none in defense, and I continue to feel that all the needed budget cuts cannot be taken from the Department of Defense.

However, I see in the Trident program an opportunity to save the taxpayers of America \$885 million this fiscal year, and, at the same time, strengthen the Trident program by assuring that its research and development is thorough before its production is begun. I think it is unwise to go for a program under which we would tool up and produce the Trident submarine even before the research has been completed. This could lead to costly overruns in the immediate years ahead. We should proceed in a systematic manner to conduct the research and build the Trident in the orderly way as is contemplated by the McIntyre amendment.

I shall vote for the McIntyre-Dominick amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TUNNEY). All time has expired.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from New Hampshire. On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, on this vote I have a pair with the senior Senator for New York (Mr. JAVITS). If he were present and voting, he would vote "yea." If I were permitted to vote, I would vote "nay." Therefore, I withhold my vote.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) is absent for religious observance, and his pair has been previously announced.

I further announce that the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) is absent on of-

ficial business, and, if present and voting, would vote "yea."

I also announce that the Senator from Kansas (Mr. PEARSON), is absent because of illness.

The result was announced—yeas 47, nays 49, as follows:

[No. 425 Leg.]

YEAS—47

Abourezk	Dominick	McGovern
Bayh	Eagleton	McIntyre
Bentsen	Fulbright	Mondale
Bible	Gravel	Moss
Biden	Hart	Muskie
Brooke	Hartke	Nelson
Burdick	Haskell	Packwood
Byrd,	Hatfield	Percy
Harry F., Jr.	Hathaway	Proxmire
Byrd, Robert C.	Huddleston	Roth
Cannon	Hughes	Saxbe
Case	Humphrey	Stafford
Chiles	Inouye	Stevenson
Church	Kennedy	Symington
Clark	Mansfield	Tunney
Cranston	Mathias	Williams

NAYS—49

Aiken	Fong	Pastore
Allen	Goldwater	Pell
Baker	Griffin	Randolph
Bartlett	Gurney	Ribicoff
Beall	Hansen	Schweiker
Bellmon	Helms	Scott, Hugh
Bennett	Hollings	Scott,
Brock	Hruska	William L.
Buckley	Jackson	Sparkman
Cook	Johnston	Stennis
Cotton	Long	Stevens
Curtis	Magnuson	Talmadge
Dole	McClellan	Thurmond
Domenici	McClure	Tower
Eastland	Metcalf	Weicker
Ervin	Montoya	Young
Fannin	Nunn	

PRESENT AND GIVING A LIVE PAIR, AS PREVIOUSLY RECORDED—1

McGee, against

NOT VOTING—3

Javits	Pearson	Taft
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So Mr. MCINTYRE's amendment was rejected.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was rejected.

Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay that motion on the table.

Mr. PASTORE. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to lay on the table the motion to reconsider.

Mr. ABOUREZK. Mr. President, I call for the yeas and nays on that vote.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second. The yeas and nays are ordered.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to lay on the table the motion to reconsider.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. PASTORE. Whose motion are we considering?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. We are voting on the motion to table the motion to reconsider.

Mr. PASTORE. But my question is, Whose motion is it?

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. PASTORE's.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senator JACKSON made the motion to reconsider.

Senator THURMOND made the motion to table.

Mr. THURMOND. To lay on the table.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senator THURMOND made the motion to table. Senator JACKSON made the motion to reconsider.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. THURMOND. As I understand now, those who favor the committee position would vote "aye"; those who are opposed would vote "no." Is that correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is an interpretation and the Chair does not make interpretations.

Mr. ABOUREZK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the request for the rollcall vote be withdrawn.

Mr. ERVIN. I object.

Mr. THURMOND. I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.

The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Iowa (Mr. CLARK), is absent because of a death in the family.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Iowa (Mr. CLARK), would vote "nay."

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), is absent for religious observance and if present and voting, would vote "nay."

I further announce that the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) is absent on official business, and if present and voting would vote "nay."

I also announce that the Senator from Kansas (Mr. PEARSON) is absent because of illness.

The result was announced—yeas 50, nays 46, as follows:

[No. 426 Leg.]

YEAS—50

Aiken	Fannin	Nunn
Allen	Fong	Pastore
Baker	Goldwater	Pell
Bartlett	Griffin	Randolph
Beall	Gurney	Ribicoff
Bellmon	Hansen	Schweiker
Bennett	Helms	Scott, Hugh
Brock	Hollings	Scott,
Buckley	Hruska	William L.
Byrd, Robert C.	Jackson	Sparkman
Cook	Johnston	Stennis
Cotton	Long	Stevens
Curtis	Magnuson	Talmadge
Dole	McClellan	Thurmond
Domenici	McClure	Tower
Eastland	McGee	Weicker
Ervin	Montoya	Young

NAYS—46

Abourezk	Fulbright	Metcalf
Bayh	Gravel	Mondale
Bentsen	Hart	Moss
Bible	Hartke	Muskie
Biden	Haskell	Nelson
Brooke	Hatfield	Packwood
Burdick	Hathaway	Percy
Byrd,	Huddleston	Proxmire
Harry F., Jr.	Hughes	Roth
Cannon	Humphrey	Saxbe
Case	Inouye	Stafford
Chiles	Kennedy	Stevenson
Church	Mansfield	Symington
Cranston	Mathias	Tunney
Dominick	McGovern	Williams
Eagleton	McIntyre	

NOT VOTING—4

Clark	Pearson	Taft
Javits		

So the motion to lay on the table the motion to reconsider was agreed to.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all yeas-and-nay votes today following the vote on the amendment by Mr. FULBRIGHT, which will be the next vote, be limited to 10 minutes, with the warning bell to sound after the first 2½ minutes.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object—and I shall not object—no Senators are on the floor who heard the request. I would say that there was some concern and objection to the shortening of votes to 10 minutes the other day. It applied to the morning hours when the committees were meeting. As the distinguished acting majority leader has put the request, it would be in the afternoon. As far as I know, no committees are meeting this afternoon. I will join him in doing everything possible to shorten the time consumed on the bill.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished assistant minority leader. We have a very busy schedule. And we need to do everything we can to shorten the time on this bill.

Mr. President, did the Presiding Officer present my request?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TUNNEY). Is there objection to the request of the Senator from West Virginia? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

AMENDMENT NO. 524

The Senate will now proceed to the consideration of the Fulbright amendment—No. 524—on which there shall be a limitation of 1 hour for debate.

The clerk will report the amendment.

The second assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

On page 28, beginning with line 24, strike out all down through line 5 on page 28, and insert in lieu thereof the following:

Sec. 701. Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the use of any funds appropriated pursuant to this Act, to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the name of the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY) be added as a cosponsor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator suspend until we get order in the Chamber? The Senate will be in order. Will Senators please take their seats or retire to the cloakroom.

The Senator from Arkansas is recognized.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, this amendment would delete the provision in the bill relating to funding of military assistance to South Vietnam and Laos. Thus, it would assure that aid to these countries is provided in accordance with the terms of S. 1443, which passed the Senate on June 26.

This amendment would be in accord with what I believe to be the understand-

ing with the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) last year with regard to the jurisdiction over the military assistance to Laos and South Vietnam being in the regular military assistance bill.

Since 1966 military assistance to Vietnam has been funded out of the Department of Defense budget instead of the regular foreign military assistance program authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act. Military aid to Laos and Thailand was switched to the Defense budget the next year. At the time this change took place, U.S. forces were carrying the brunt of the fighting in Indochina, and the executive branch officials pointed out that military aid to these countries could be provided more efficiently through the logistics system of our own Armed Forces. The 1966 Senate Armed Services Committee report, recommending the transfer, stated:

This limited merger of funding of support of allied forces for a combat area with that of U.S. forces engaged in the same objective is similar to the practice followed during the Korean war. It is desirable because parallel but separate financial and logistics systems for the U.S. forces and for military assistance are too cumbersome, time consuming, and inefficient in a combat zone.

Two years ago the Foreign Relations Committee approved a provision in the foreign aid bill which would have gone back to the traditional method of providing military aid to these countries. That provision was deleted on the Senate floor at the urging of the Senator from Mississippi, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, who told the Senate:

I am willing that, in the future, jurisdiction with respect to Southeast Asia be returned to the Committee on Foreign Relations. I think that while we are there and the activities are going on, we sought to keep it where it is, because they have to be considered together.

However, the Senator from Mississippi did approve the return of Thailand to the regular military aid program.

Last year the issue was raised again in connection with the military assistance authorization bill. And the Senator from Mississippi again urged the Senate to continue the existing system, stating:

My amendment is to strike that amendment in the bill (requiring funding of military aid to Vietnam and Laos under the Foreign Assistance Act) and await events, and just as soon as the hostilities stop over there, or even as soon as we have a cease-fire agreement carried out with evidence of permanence, I would be willing to let the matter go back to the Foreign Relations Committee, or let the Senate do that.

U.S. military forces are no longer involved in hostilities in Indochina. There are cease-fire agreements in South Vietnam and Laos. Other than in Cambodia, a tenuous peace exists throughout the region. And I point out that military aid for Cambodia is not involved here. Aid to Cambodia has been financed under the regular foreign military aid program ever since our involvement began in 1970.

The conditions cited by the Senator from Mississippi in 1971 and 1972 as justification for continued funding of military aid to Vietnam and Laos out of the

Defense budget no longer prevail. In view of this, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted again this year to end this aberration in the foreign aid program. Following the cease-fire agreements in Laos and South Vietnam, the committee approved a provision in S. 1443, the Foreign Military Sales and Assistance Act, authorizing aid to those countries. These provisions were not challenged in the Senate and the bill is now awaiting conference with the House.

Under that bill, the President was authorized to provide one-for-one replacement of arms, equipment and munitions to South Vietnam and Laos in accordance with the cease-fire agreements. Department of Defense stocks could be used for that purpose. If large-scale fighting broke out again in Vietnam, the one-for-one limit could be set aside if the President found and reported to the Congress that the cease-fire agreement was no longer in effect because of North Vietnamese military actions.

The bill recommended by the Armed Services Committee has the effect of reversing the Senate's earlier action and is contrary to past assurances that this program would be restored to regular foreign aid funding when U.S. forces were out and a cease-fire agreement achieved. If it is the executive branch's intention to keep this program in the Pentagon budget until no shots are being fired in anger in Indochina, there is not likely to be any change in the current arrangement in my lifetime.

The principal argument advanced in the Armed Services Committee in support of retaining this program in the Defense Department's budget is that the system now in effect gives the executive branch needed flexibility to respond to unforeseen developments in Vietnam and Laos. In reality, all this means is that the executive branch wants carte blanche authority to do what it chooses in Vietnam and Laos with the \$952 million recommended by the committee. If the concern is how to supply South Vietnam in the event of a North Vietnamese offensive, the bill approved by the Senate last June gives the President authority to provide all the arms and munitions he thinks the South Vietnamese need by drawing on Department of Defense stocks. The need is not for more flexibility for the executive branch, but for greater congressional control over the vast sums proposed to be poured into Indochina. But, under the present system, Senator SYMINGTON told the Appropriations Committee on September 13:

It . . . has never been possible for the Armed Services Committee to find out just what share of said funds are spent in each of these two countries for specific goods and services.

Congress has reasserted its control over the purse strings to force an end to the direct involvement of our forces in Southeast Asia. The logical next step is to impose tighter controls over the hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign aid going into these countries. The provisions of S. 1443, approved in the Senate without opposition last June, would do that. Adoption of my amendment

would reaffirm the Senate's earlier action.

The committee has recommended \$952 million in additional military aid to these countries for the current fiscal year. The House approved \$1.3 billion for this purpose. In addition, the committee report states that there is \$1.2 billion unexpended in the pipeline. There are already vast stockpiles of U.S.-furnished weapons and munitions in South Vietnam. So many, in fact, that the Department of Defense has a total of 4,708 direct-hire civilians and contract personnel in Vietnam to maintain the equipment and teach the Vietnamese how to use what we have given them. The Vietnamese will never learn to be independent and self reliant if Congress continues to be so extravagant with the American taxpayers' money as proposed in this bill.

Mr. President, in summary, I urge the Senate to adopt my amendment because:

The Senate has already acted in this field. Approval of H.R. 9286, as reported, would reverse the Senate's action of only 3 months ago.

The arguments used to justify the transfer of military aid to South Vietnam and Laos out of the Defense budget no longer apply. Proposals to give aid to these countries should be presented to Congress and considered on the same basis as aid to Cambodia, Korea, or Turkey, or the many other countries receiving arms under the Foreign Assistance Act.

Greater congressional control, and less executive branch discretion, over these vast sums of money is needed.

Congress has a responsibility to be prudent with the taxpayers' money. Savings of several hundred million dollars over the amounts recommended by the Armed Services Committee will be made under the authority approved by the Senate in S. 1443.

I hope that the Senate will approve the amendment.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD several articles relating to the situation, and particularly the corruption and waste of American money in South Vietnam, excerpts from the Committee report on S. 1443, and tables concerning total U.S. assistance to South Vietnam and Laos.

There being no objection, the articles and other materials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Star-News, Sept. 24, 1973]

WELL STUFFED TOY

PARIS.—Some \$170,000 in \$100 bills apparently belonging to Mrs. Lon Non, the sister-in-law of Marshal Lon Nol, Cambodia's president, was impounded at Orly Airport as she was about to leave Paris to join her husband in the United States.

The money was concealed in a toy dog that one of two children in the party of seven was carrying. It was reportedly discovered by a policewoman made suspicious by bulges in the stuffed animal.

Lon Non, the younger brother of the president, went to Washington several months ago, ostensibly on a visit. There were reports at the time that the United States had forced him to leave Phnom Penh, the Cam-

bodian capital, as part of an attempt to broaden support for the beleaguered government by bringing in former political rivals.

Mrs. Lon Non will stay in Paris for the time being, a source close to the family said. The source described Saturday's incident as "banal and without importance."

Efforts have been made to retrieve the money, but the chief customs agent at the airport told the family that it would take 10 days for a decision to be made.

French exchange-control regulations permit up to \$1,000 to be taken out of the country without special formalities. Above that figure, stamped customs documents must show that the money was brought into the country legally. Mrs. Lon Non and her party did not have such documents.

Family sources said: "It was all a misunderstanding. The travelers were ignorant of French foreign-exchange regulations, which are changing all the time. No fraud was intended."

The money was described as both for personal expenses and for use by the Cambodian Embassy in Washington.

[From the Washington Post, June 4, 1973]

UNITED STATES REPORTED CUTTING SAIGON AMMUNITION

(By Thomas W. Lippman)

SAIGON, June 2.—The United States has cut its supplies of artillery and heavy-weapons ammunition to Saigon's armed forces by a third in an attempt to reduce the overall level of violence in Vietnam, according to authoritative sources.

The reduction, carried out over a period of several months, was ordered after an analysis of field action by U.S. experts showed that the South Vietnamese army was firing sometimes twenty times as much ammunition as its Communist opponents.

The South Vietnamese were reportedly expending vast quantities of artillery ammunition in what is known here as "H and I fire" (for harassment and interdiction). This is a form of artillery firing in which there is no specific target. But shells are pumped into a general area in an attempt to reduce enemy activity there.

The United States has also reduced by 20 per cent the amount of petroleum it supplies to South Vietnam's armed forces, the same informed sources said, but the motivation for that decision was economic rather than military.

Military gasoline has a way of winding up on sale to the public in South Vietnam, and the cutback in supplies was largely an attempt to cut down on the black marketeering. American sources have reported that the move was followed by an almost exactly proportionate upturn in commercial gasoline sales.

As for the ammunition, South Vietnamese commanders began reporting some time ago that they had been instructed to cut down on the amount they expended, but the reason was not made clear.

American sources say they have learned that in Indochina, the more guns and ammunition are available, the more the armies in the field will use them.

"After we cut down the ammo supply," one well-informed officer said, "we found out that the South Vietnamese were still outshooting the enemy by 20 to 1, but the overall total was that much lower."

Most of the artillery firing has been in the country's northern military region, especially on the western defense perimeter of Hue, where South Vietnamese officials regularly report shelling attacks by the enemy. What they do not say is that South Vietnamese troops have been shelling, too, although it is no secret to anyone who has visited the area.

No figures on the total amount of artillery ammunition being supplied to the South Vietnamese were immediately available.

U.S. military officials here are watching the results of the search for clues about what would happen if Congress cut off the supply of military aid to the governments the United States is supporting in Indochina.

Some believe that the result would simply be an overall reduction in the level of violence by both sides—a view that is reportedly getting a sympathetic hearing among high-level American officials here.

In any case, the South Vietnamese have become almost casual in their use of artillery over the years, blasting away at targets of questionable military value, and can easily live with the reduced quantities of shells without weakening their overall position, military sources believe.

[From the New York Times, Sept. 18, 1973]
CORRUPTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM SEEMS WORSE

(By Fox Butterfield)

SAIGON, SOUTH VIENAM, September 17.—Lam is an epileptic and mentally retarded, but he was drafted into the South Vietnamese Army anyway because his family could not afford the bribe demanded by Government officials to certify him as unfit. Now, a year later, Lam has finally been discharged after his father went into debt to raise the million piasters (\$2,000) the officials wanted.

In Long Khanh Province, northeast of Saigon, the province chief is under investigation by the Government on charges of stealing rice from refugees and transporting it in army trucks for sale to the Communists. His predecessor as province chief was dismissed on similar charges earlier this year, only to be made an assistant army inspector.

These are merely two instances of an official corruption which has long permeated Vietnamese life but which many people now believe is becoming increasingly flagrant and destructive of the Government.

LESS FAT AROUND

"Corruption may not actually be any worse, but with the American withdrawal there is less fat around to live off," remarked a former colonel who is now in the National Assembly. "So corrupt officials these days have to turn for money to ordinary Vietnamese, not the Americans."

In the past few months corruption has become so blatant in fact that, it is said, President Nguyen Van Thieu, long accused by American officials of being too tolerant of erring subordinates, has declared it to be the Government's most serious problem.

According to a well-informed source in the Presidential Palace, Mr. Thieu recently issued strict warnings to his 44 province chiefs that while he will forgive the past he will not accept excessive corruption in the future. The President is also said to be determined to curb thievery by one or two of the four enormously powerful regional military commanders.

IT'S AN OLD STORY

Similar talk has often been heard at the palace, however, and most Vietnamese and Americans remain skeptical that Mr. Thieu will move against men that he seems to feel so heavily dependent on.

Given Saigon's vast bureaucratic, police and military apparatus, petty corruption has long been accepted as a part of life. Almost every daily action requires Vietnamese to deal with some arm of the Government, and therefore necessitates a bribe: 2,000 piasters (\$4) for a ride home with the police after curfew at night, \$25 to get a certificate of graduation needed for a job, \$100 a year for a family to obtain a safe desk job in Saigon for a son in the army.

At the upper end of the scale a province chief must buy his post from the regional commander and then turn over as much as 80 per cent of the monthly take to him. These amounts are often large by Vietnamese standards. In Kien Giang Province, in the Mekong Delta, according to an informed local official,

the province chief's job costs \$4,000 and the monthly take is \$100,000.

The low salary scale of most Vietnamese and the brutal inflation—prices have soared over 20 per cent so far this year—have contributed to the prevalence of corruption. With a Government clerk and an army lieutenant making only \$25 a month, and a month's supply of rice for an average family costing \$40, few can afford to be honest.

AVERAGE MAN HURT MORE

What has now disturbed American officials and reportedly upset President Thieu is evidence of increasingly virulent corruption that hurts the average Vietnamese more and undermines popular support for the Government.

In Quang Nam Province, on the central coast, for example, the province chief, a district chief and several officials of the Ministry of Social Welfare were recently ousted after being found guilty of misappropriating millions of piasters in rice and relief money intended for the refugees around Da Nang.

In nearby Quang Ngai Province, the province chief, Ngo Van Lol, was dismissed last month and 105 local officials, including the head of the Provincial Council, were arrested for selling hundreds of tons of scarce rice, gasoline, motorbikes and even army jeeps and trucks to the Communists. In exchange, the officials purchased cinnamon from the forest land controlled by the Vietcong and exported it at a profit estimated by well-informed officials in Saigon to be several hundred thousand dollars.

The commandant of the large army basic-training center near Saigon, Maj. Gen. Doan Van Quang, was dismissed last month after junior officers accused him of embezzling \$6,000 a month in money that should have been used for food for draftees. He was transferred to the Ministry of Defense and not punished.

ARBITRARY ARRESTS REPORTED

Some Vietnamese in Saigon have complained recently that the police are arbitrarily arresting people and demanding money to release them.

In one such case Mrs. Huu Thi Lan—that is not her real name—had to pay bribes to the local police station three times in 18 months to get her 22-year-old son out of jail. The son, a disabled air force veteran, was charged twice with robbery and once with rape; twice he was picked up while asleep at home.

What particularly discourages Vietnamese and Americans who want to stop such corruption is the apparent evidence that the Presidential Palace tolerates it in exchange for loyalty and that corrupt officers are seldom really punished.

For instance, in Military Region II, which embraces the vast, sparsely populated Central Highlands, the present commander, Lieut. Gen. Nguyen Van Toan, who was formerly head of a division, was found guilty of corruption as long ago as 1969 and recommended for dismissal and demotion. Instead he was promoted from colonel by President Thieu.

TWO MORE PROMOTIONS

Later he was widely accused in the Vietnamese press of raping a 15-year-old girl, but again he was promoted. Last spring, at the height of the Communist attack on Kontum, he was made corps commander.

Local officials in the highlands charge that he has not changed his ways. According to a knowledgeable official, the monthly take from illegal police "taxes" on lumber trucks in one district of Pleiku Province is \$20,000. The money is picked up by General Toan's chief logistics officer and carried to headquarters by helicopter, the informant reported.

To make matters worse, American officials note, General Toan took many of his own long-time subordinate officers with him to

the highlands and installed them in key posts. As commander of the 23d Division in Kontum he named his former deputy commander in the Second Division, Brig. Gen. Tran Van Cam, previously accused by many Vietnamese and Americans of helping General Toan loot the big former United States base at Chu Lai.

General Cam's predecessor as military commander in Kontum was Col. Le Duc Dat, who had been removed as province chief in Phuoc Tuy for "having committed mistakes while discharging his duties and having indulged in illegal activities." Colonel Dat disappeared last year when his forward headquarters at Tan Canh was ignominiously overrun in a few hours.

To combat the pattern of corruption there are three Government bodies, but they are widely regarded as ineffective if not totally moribund and corrupt themselves.

ANTIDOTE HELD INEFFECTIVE

The largest, the so-called General Censorate, has been headed by an uncle of President Thieu, Ngo Xuan Tich, since its inception in 1968. It is estimated that 90 per cent of its investigations are inconclusive, and in any case it has no power to impose punishment.

There is also an army inspectorate, which seldom carries out investigations and which, knowledgeable Vietnamese say, is usually staffed by officers considered unfit for regular command.

Third, there is a special anticorruption committee under Vice President Tran Van Huong, the aged and powerless senior statesman of the Government. It is regarded as merely a showcase.

Occasionally a Vietnamese journalist exposes or threatens to expose some major scandal, but that can be dangerous.

The publisher of a small newspaper was assassinated last year in Saigon by two men wearing paratroopers' uniforms after he had written articles on corruption in the army. Another editor was recently wounded in an ambush on the main road to the Mekong Delta, ordinarily one of the safest roads in the country.

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 2, 1973]

SAIGON MUST NOT CONTINUE TO RELY ON HEAVY U.S. AID

(By D. Gareth Porter)

Congress is now considering an economic aid program for South Vietnam which would continue to maintain for an indefinite time what one high U.S. official has called the "client relationship" with the Saigon government of Nguyen Van Thieu.

The main purpose of the proposed aid program, which the administration has called a "reconstruction and development" program, is neither reconstruction nor development but the subsidization of Thieu's military-police apparatus. By not only arming and equipping that apparatus but also by paying for most of South Vietnam's budget and artificially maintaining levels of consumption, the United States still refuses to allow the Saigon government to stand or fall on the strength of its support among the Vietnamese people themselves.

The Thieu government remains today essentially a creation of American military intervention in Vietnam. For it is kept in power by a military and a paramilitary control apparatus which the South Vietnamese people never desired and would have been unwilling to finance themselves.

It was in fact the U.S. mission, which imposed this political and economic monstrosity on South Vietnam. As the economic counselor to the U.S. embassy, Charles Cooper—the man credited with masterminding economic policy in Vietnam during the war—told me in a 1971 interview, "We've always

been in the position here of pushing their expenditures up. We pushed them on pacification, on increasing the army, etc. . . . We were actually satisfying our own ideas. . . ."

As a result the South Vietnamese ground and air forces increased from 216,000 men in 1964 to 1.1 million in 1972; the police force increased from 20,000 men in 1964 to 120,000 in 1972. The official government budget increased from \$219 million in 1964 to \$856 million in 1972.

INFLATION OR TAXES

In order to finance such a swollen apparatus of control, any independent state would have had to resort to runaway inflation or heavy taxes on the entire population, rich and poor. The taxes required to support this level of military spending only could be raised successfully if the government in question had had reasonable solid support for its anti-Communist war effort—something which the Saigon government has manifestly lacked.

But the Saigon government had an alternative to uncontrolled inflation or burdensome taxation—which was to rely on the U.S. to pay for most of its budget and to prevent any significant drop in living standards by providing massive quantities of imported goods.

The main instrument for preserving the Thieu government's military and paramilitary apparatus while minimizing economic hardship is still the Commodity Import Program, under which the government receives letters of credit which it then sells to the Vietnamese importers for plasters. It uses these aid-generated piasters to pay its budgetary expenditures, and when the goods arrive in Vietnam, the customs taxes collected on them add additional resources for the budget. Meanwhile, Vietnamese are able to purchase imported goods which South Vietnam could not possibly afford with its own minimal foreign exchange reserves: gasoline and parts for motor bikes, fertilizer, cement, sugar and other foodstuffs.

In fiscal year 1974, the Nixon administration has requested 275 million dollars for the Commodity Import Program and is adding a \$50 million "development loan" for imports which Thieu can also use to help pay for his military budget. This assistance is estimated by the Agency for International Development to represent roughly one-fourth the living standard of the average Vietnamese.

If the artificially maintained standard of living has neither made the Thieu regime popular nor silenced opposition to the war in the cities, it has nevertheless helped to keep urban discontent at a level which can be controlled through the massive use of police surveillance and terror. Millions of Vietnamese thus have been dissuaded from taking to the streets or to the jungles to overthrow the Saigon regime. There is no doubt in the minds of U.S. officials that Thieu's regime could not have survived the political turmoil which would have occurred without the U.S. subsidization of Saigon's state apparatus and economy.

GRADUAL REDUCTION

Despite administration statements paying lip service to the objective of Saigon's economic independence, the official rationale accompanying the 1974 aid program for Indochina makes clear its intention to continue the client relationship with Saigon indefinitely. Instead of offering a plan for the rapid elimination of American subsidization of the Thieu government the rationale suggests that the import subsidy can only be reduced "gradually" and that Saigon will "continue to require foreign assistance for the next few years to maintain the flow of goods needed for production, investment and consumption." It does not mention that this flow of goods is also necessary for Thieu to pay for his army and police force.

The army lives off foreign aid rather than relying on the support of its own people, and

any attempt to reorient it economically, socially and politically away from the present American style of organization and operation would almost certainly end in disaster. Moreover, for Thieu to demobilize most of his 1.1 million-man army would mean relinquishing a convenient means of political control over them and, indirectly, over their families.

Equally important, the Saigon regime has shown little interest in making domestic taxation its main financial basis. For nearly 20 years, American largesse has encouraged Saigon to avoid the taxation of domestic wealth in order to gain more fully the support of those comprising the taxable population. As a result, taxation in Vietnam has been feeble on the one hand and regressive on the other.

The Saigon government has shown an aversion to direct taxation, which must constitute the backbone of any healthy fiscal system, and has focused its efforts instead on the taxation of soft drinks, beer and tobacco products, which fall more heavily on the poor than on the rich and which do not draw on the primary sources of wealth in the country. For many years, well over half the domestic taxes collected by the government came from only nine foreign-owned companies in Saigon which produced beer, soft drinks and tobacco. In 1972, direct taxes brought in only \$37 million—4 per cent of total income, including U.S. aid.

There are two simple reasons for Saigon's persistent refusal to tax the real wealth available to it. On the one hand, officials have always feared that such taxation would increase its unpopularity or lose the cooperation of those whose acceptance or support was crucial for pacification and political stability. On the other hand, the readiness of the United States to provide whatever revenues were not obtained through taxation provides a lack of incentive for maximizing tax collections and an incentive for officials to exploit the most lucrative sources of wealth for their own benefit.

TAXING ISN'T POPULAR

The government, unable to appeal either to patriotic sentiment or a commonly shared vision of society, has implicitly admitted its own doubts about the legitimacy of the war effort in the eyes of the Vietnamese people in avoiding direct domestic taxation. When he was prime minister in 1969, Tran Van Huong declared, "If we levy more taxes, the government will be unpopular and the political situation here more unstable."

Willard Sharpe, chief of the economic analysis branch of AID in Saigon, explained fears of reduction in American Commodity Import funds in 1971 by saying, "I don't think the government feels it is strong enough to ask the people to pull in their belts. It's just not popular enough."

Between one-third and one-half of the private wealth of South Vietnam still lies in its agricultural production, primarily in the country's rice bowl, the Mekong Delta. American officials have been pointing to the new prosperity of commercialized farmers in the Delta, thanks to large inputs of fertilizer, new rice strains, and favorable rice prices. But Thieu's pacification strategy in the Delta has been based more or less implicitly on the idea that the government can give the farmers something for nothing, with the help of American generosity.

One of Saigon's bright young American-trained economists, who was then vice minister of agriculture, proudly asserted to me in 1971 that his government collected only a "very nominal tax" on land—less than 200 piasters, or 50 cents, on a hectare of land which brought an average of \$180 a year in income, or about one-third of 1 per cent of gross income.

"With our system," he pointed out, "the farmers themselves benefit from land reform.

With the Vietcong program, the result is more revenue for the Vietcong." This was precisely the difference between a regime dependent on popular support for its military operations and one dependent on foreign support. As the American tax adviser in Saigon, Paul Maginnis, explained two years ago, "The national government is subsidizing villages and hamlets in order to purchase their loyalty instead of demanding money from them to finance the war effort."

SUBSIDIES INCREASE

While the government collected a token 54 million plasters (\$242,000) in agricultural taxes in 1969, it was subsidizing the village budgets in the amount of 2.2 billion plasters (\$9.8 million), for both local government operations and village development projects. And while agricultural taxes rose to 3 billion plasters in 1972 (\$6.9 million), the subsidy increased even more, to 10.4 billion plasters (\$24 million). Whether or not the rural sector of the society will ever contribute more to the budget than it receives in subsidies is thus still open to question.

Political considerations also have kept Saigon from taxing fairly the unsalaried urban middle class which constitutes the most active segment of the U.S.-sponsored political system. The traditional policy toward this stratum has been summed up by one Vietnamese expert on taxation as, "Leave it alone as long as the circumstances permitted." The American budgetary subsidies thus far have provided just such circumstances: In February, 1971, President Thieu abruptly called off the work of special tax teams, which were trying to assess fairly the income of the professional and business class in Saigon, after it complained loudly through the press and its representatives in the national assembly. Later in 1971 the building containing Saigon's tax records was blown up. The teams were never revived.

The most important untapped source of wealth in Vietnam, however, are the profits which were generated by the war itself, which long has been the biggest industry by far in the country. Again, the U.S. subsidization of the budget not only encouraged Saigon to avoid taxing the war profiteers but gave officials an incentive to enter into collusion

with them at the expense of the government's fiscal health. And more important than the bars, nightclubs, brothels, laundries and other enterprises, which were officially untaxed but generated large incomes for district and province chiefs, was the import business.

From 1965 to 1971, Vietnamese importers were making enormous profits because of the officially overvalued plaster in exchange for the dollar and the rationing of import licenses. In 1970 a secret government report which was obtained by the House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations estimated that these "windfall profits" were running as high as \$150 million per year. (An even more detailed study of windfall profits done in 1970 by Dr. Douglas Dacey of the Institute for Defense Analyses on a contract with AID, which carefully estimated the amount of windfall profits each year on the basis of official economic data, was suppressed by the agency before it could be published. Congressional efforts to obtain a copy have been systematically refused.)

REVENUES AFFECTED

These unearned profits were all at the expense of revenues, since they would have remained in Saigon's treasury had the exchange rate kept up with the rate of inflation. Yet according to the Ministry of Finance, the government collected only 100 million plasters (\$250,000) in taxes on the 1969 incomes of those importers—an infinitesimal fraction of their illegitimate profits.

The failure of the government to get more tax revenues from war profiteers was caused by the same situation which produced the windfall profits in the first place. Relieved of the necessity to squeeze every bit of revenue possible from the South Vietnamese economy, powerful officials turned the rigged import licensing and foreign exchange system to their own advantage instead of reforming it.

The officials who had power over the distribution of import licenses used it to extract from the recipients a private "tax" in return for the favor. According to business and financial sources in Saigon, including a former high Economics Ministry official who now is in the import business and a Japa-

nese businessman with 7 years' experience in Vietnam as of 1971, importers had to pay 3 per cent of the total value of the license, or 10 plasters on every dollar of goods imported, to the minister of economics, Pham Kim Ngoc, who became known in Saigon circles as "Mister 3 Per Cent." Ngoc was assumed to have divided "taxes" with other top officials of the Thieu regime. The 3 per cent rakeoff, if applied to the total volume of imports, would have netted \$23 million in 1970, or 92 times the amount collected from them in the form of income taxes.

Although the threat of drastic reductions in U.S. subsidies to Vietnam finally moved the U.S. mission to insist on an end to the system of overvalued currency and tight controls over licenses, the system had already allowed importers to accumulate hundreds of millions of dollars, virtually none of which ever was used for the budget. The increased but still modest amounts in income tax collection in 1972 from nonsalaried individuals (\$7.5 million) and corporations (\$19 million) do not begin to scratch the surface of this wealth.

Ending the Commodity Import Program would have the effect of making the government dependent on the support of the South Vietnamese people for the first time in its history. It would then be up to the Vietnamese people themselves (as it should have been all along) to decide whether or how much they are willing to sacrifice in order to maintain the present military and paramilitary apparatus.

To the extent that the population, wealthy or poor, wishes to see the Saigon government survive, they can contribute their share through direct taxes, which Saigon unquestionably has the physical capability to collect. If the government cannot obtain the resources to support the present level of military spending through this means, it will have to reduce its expenditures to the level that it can support.

In any case, the United States no longer should be in the position of artificially maintaining a political and military structure through its assumption of the bulk of its budgetary expenditures and the subsidization of consumption levels.

TRANSFERS OF U.S. RESOURCES TO VIETNAM

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1972 actual	Fiscal year 1973 estimated	Fiscal year 1974 proposed		Fiscal year 1972 actual	Fiscal year 1973 estimated	Fiscal year 1974 proposed
Total of all U.S. resources transferred	3,790,128	3,061,173	1,837,000	Public Law 480 (sec. 104(c)) ¹	(50,600)	(137,280)	(137,360)
Security assistance (subtotal)	3,674,666	2,883,386	1,184,200	Purchasing of local currency	327,100	220,000	63,600
Military assistance advisory group, administration and training costs	41,583	41,500		Indochina postwar reconstruction (subtotal)			475,000
Military assistance service funded	2,159,500	2,257,700	1,085,000	Development assistance (subtotal)	115,462	177,787	178,426
Transfers of defense stock (excluding excess defense articles)	217,392	(1)	50,800	Agency for International Development population programs	1,108	1,256	1,500
Excess defense articles (legal value)	5,730		35,000	International narcotics control	500	500	182
Ship transfers (loans, leases)	538,132			Public Law 480 shipments (ccc value)	113,647	175,786	176,420
Real property transfers	385,229	313,386		Mutual education and cultural exchange	207	245	324
Security supporting assistance							

¹ Not included in MAP ceiling.

² Non add. Estimated at 80 percent of Public Law 480, title I agreements (export market value)

TRANSFERS OF U.S. RESOURCES TO LAOS

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1972 actual	Fiscal year 1973 estimated	Fiscal year 1974 proposed		Fiscal year 1972 actual	Fiscal year 1973 estimated	Fiscal year 1974 proposed
Total of all U.S. resources transferred	275,041	406,169	164,607	Indochina postwar reconstruction (subtotal)			55,000
Security assistance (subtotal)	271,892	401,700	105,500	Development assistance (subtotal)	3,149	4,469	4,107
Military assistance advisory group, administration and training costs	3,254	2,500	2,500	Agency for International Development population programs	500	780	912
Military assistance service funded	213,300	353,500	100,000	International narcotics control	1,100	2,079	1,500
Transfers of defense stock (excluding excess defense articles)	6,008			Public Law 480	1,337	1,421	1,505
Excess defense articles (legal value)	2,003	700	3,000	Mutual education and cultural exchange	212	189	109
Security supporting assistance	47,327	45,000					

EXCERPT FROM COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS REPORT ON S. 1443 (S. REPT. 93-189)
(Section 2109. Authorizations for South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia (see also section 3109))

Section 2109, coupled with section 3109, authorize a program of military assistance to South Vietnam and Laos to replace that now provided through annual Department of Defense authorization and appropriation bills. These sections would also authorize continuation of military aid to Cambodia.

Subsection 2109(a)(1) authorizes the appropriation to the Secretary of State of "such sums as may be necessary" to provide the armaments, munitions and war materials to South Vietnam and Laos allowed under section 3109.

Subsection (a)(2) authorizes the President to draw on the stocks of the Defense Department to provide the aid authorized, subject to reimbursement of the Department from subsequent appropriations.

Subsection (a)(3) authorizes \$150,000,000 for military aid to Cambodia in fiscal year 1974 subject to the provisions of section 3109.

Any military assistance to South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia shall be furnished with the objective of bringing about peace in Indochina and strict implementation of the cease-fire agreements in Vietnam and Laos and any agreement that may be reached in Cambodia in the future.

Military assistance to South Vietnam shall be furnished strictly in accordance with Article 7 of the "Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam," signed in Paris on January 27, 1973, which states:

"From the enforcement of the cease-fire to the formation of the government provided for in Article 9(b) and 14 of this Agreement, the two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of troops, military advisers, and military personnel including technical military personnel, armaments, munitions, and war material into South Vietnam.

"The two South Vietnamese parties shall be permitted to make periodic replacements of armaments, munitions and war material which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cease-fire, on the basis of piece-for-piece, of the same characteristics and properties, under the supervision of the Joint Military Commission of the two South Vietnamese parties and of the International Commission of Control and Supervision."

Any military assistance furnished to Laos shall be in accordance with Article 3(d) of the February 21, 1973, cease-fire agreement for Laos, which states:

"It is forbidden to bring into Laos all types of military personnel, regular troops and irregular troops of all kinds and all kinds of foreign-made weapons or war material, except for those specified in the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962. In case it is necessary to replace damaged or worn-out weapons, both sides will consult and arrive at an agreement.

Military assistance furnished to South Vietnam or Laos shall be limited to that necessary to replace armaments, munitions and war materials on a one-for-one basis that have been destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up. Replacement shall be based on lists previously furnished to the International Commission of Control and Supervision for Vietnam (ICCS) and, in the case of Laos, to the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos (ICSC).

The Committee expects that any armaments, munitions, or war materials shall be furnished South Vietnam only on a basis that is in full compliance with terms of the cease-fire agreement, and any pertinent regulations that either have been or may be established by the International Commission

of Control and Supervision and the Joint Military Commission (JMC). The aid is restricted to those materials as defined by the ICCS as "armaments, munitions, and war material" and shall not include general subsidization of the South Vietnamese armed forces. If the ICCS or the JMC do not establish standards for replacement the following lists, developed by the Department of Defense, shall apply to aid to Vietnam:

ARMAMENTS

Any device which is capable of launching a projectile or flammable liquid which is used for defensive or offensive military operations. Complete armaments systems configured in their entirety, which must be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece, of the same characteristics and properties are:

- (1) Aircraft gun armament systems.
- (2) Antiaircraft gun systems.
- (3) Artillery pieces.
- (4) Flame throwers.
- (5) Grenade launchers.
- (6) Guided missile systems.
- (7) Machine guns.
- (8) Mortars.
- (9) Pistols.
- (10) Recoilless rifles.
- (11) Rifles and shotguns.
- (12) Rocket launcher systems.
- (13) Shipboard gunmount systems.

MUNITIONS

Those items used with armaments as the projectile, dropped from an aircraft, such as bombs, or thrown by hand such as grenades. It also includes all explosives except those used for civil construction or for emergency/survival purposes operations. Munitions which must be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece, of the same characteristics and properties are:

- (1) Ammunition for armaments listed above.
- (2) Bombs.
- (3) Explosives, excluding commercial explosives used in civil construction operations or for emergency/survival operations.
- (4) Grenades.
- (5) Mines.
- (6) Missiles.
- (7) Napalm.
- (8) Rockets.

WAR MATERIEL

Those major end items whose principal use is for combat. Major end items are defined as a final combination of end products, component parts, and/or materiel which is ready for its intended use. War materiel which must be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece, of the same characteristics and properties are:

- (1) Tanks.
- (2) Military aircraft.
- (3) Military self-propelled ships and water craft and barges.
- (4) Armored tracked vehicles.
- (5) Military tactical wheeled vehicles and trailers.
- (6) Military tactical radios.
- (7) Landbased military tactical radars.
- (8) Military tactical telephones and teletypes.

Before replacement the United States shall take whatever action is necessary to insure that the South Vietnamese Government complies fully with the provision requiring notice to the ICCS of items eligible for replacement and shall comply with any other conditions the Commission may impose. The United States shall insure that the ICCS is provided in advance of delivery with lists of replacement items to be furnished to South Vietnam. Obligations can be made in advance of appropriations for replacement materials drawn from Department of Defense stocks with reimbursement to the Department from subsequent appropriations.

The provision authorizes \$150 million in military grant assistance to Cambodia but

requires that if a cease-fire comes about the aid be provided only in accordance with the terms of the cease-fire agreement.

Military training assistance could be provided to South Vietnam and Laos under chapter 23, if permitted under the respective cease-fire agreements as interpreted by the respective International Commission. After any future cease-fire agreement, military training for Cambodia would, of course, be subject to the conditions and terms of that agreement.

If there is a general outbreak of fighting in South Vietnam, the President can provide unlimited military aid if he finds and reports to the Congress that the Vietnam cease-fire agreement "is no longer in effect," in other words, that it is null and void insofar as the United States is concerned. Additional aid above the one-for-one replacement cannot be provided, for example, merely by a Presidential declaration that North Vietnam or the People's Revolutionary Government are violating one or more articles of the agreement. Experience to date has proven that such charges are likely to be a common occurrence on both sides. To go beyond the one-for-one replacement limit the President must assume full responsibility for scrapping U.S. support of the Vietnam cease-fire agreement.

In the absence of any replacement criteria being established by the ICSC for Laos or the parties to the cease-fire agreement for Laos, it is the Committee's intent that the list of eligible armaments, munitions, and war material established by the Department of Defense for Vietnam shall apply and replacement shall be only on a piece-for-piece basis. General subsidization of this Laotian armed forces is not authorized.

Finally, the President shall submit a quarterly report to the Congress on the aid furnished and the general status of the implementation of all cease-fire agreements involved in the area, including a full description of all types of assistance furnished to the three countries and the number and types of United States personnel involved who are paid directly or indirectly with U.S. funds.

There are, of course, no funds authorized anywhere in this bill for financing any U.S. military combat operations in Cambodia or anywhere else in Indochina. In this respect the bill is entirely consistent with the Senate's action on the Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill, H.R. 7447, and the Committee's action on the Case-Church amendment to the Department of State Authorization Bill, S. 1248.

(Section 3109. South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia)

(See the analysis of section 2109 for a more detailed explanation of the military aid program to be authorized for South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.)

Subsection (a) provides that after June 30, 1973, no sale, credit sale, or guaranty of any defense article or defense service shall be made, or any military assistance, including supporting assistance, furnished to South Vietnam or Laos directly or through any other foreign country unless that sale, credit sale, or guaranty is made, or such assistance is furnished, under this Act. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to funds obligated before July 1, 1973. However, any assistance furnished to South Vietnam or Laos that is in the pipeline before July 1, 1973, shall be consistent with the one-for-one replacement requirement.

Subsection (b) requires that any sale, credit sale, or guaranty made, or assistance provided under this Act to South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia shall be made or furnished with the objective of bringing about peace in Indochina and strict implementation of the cease-fire agreements in Vietnam

and Laos and any cease-fire agreement that may be reached in the future with respect to Cambodia.

Under subsection (c) armaments, munitions, and war materials may be provided to South Vietnam and Laos under any provision of this Act only for the purpose of replacing, on the basis of piece-for-piece and with armaments, munitions, and war materials of the same characteristics and properties, those armaments, munitions, and war materials destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up (1) in the case of South Vietnam after January 27, 1973, and which are included on lists previously furnished by the Government of South Vietnam to the International Commission of Control and Supervision for Vietnam, and (2) in the case of Laos, after February 21, 1973, and which are included on lists previously furnished by the Government of Laos to the International Commission for Supervision and Control for Laos.

Subsection (d) provides that if a cease-fire agreement is entered into with respect to Cambodia, then, commencing with the date such agreement becomes effective, armaments, munitions, and war materials shall be provided Cambodia under this Act only and strictly in accordance with the provisions of such agreement.

Subsection (e) permits armaments, munitions, and war materials to be provided to South Vietnam without regard to the provisions of subsection (c) if the President finds and reports to Congress that the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, signed in Paris on January 27, 1973, is no longer in effect insofar as the United States is concerned. No armaments, munitions, or war materials may be provided under this subsection, however, until the President has reported such finding to Congress.

Subsection (f) provides that the President shall submit to Congress within 30 days after the end of each quarter of each fiscal year, a report on (1) the nature and quantity of all types of foreign assistance provided by the United States Government to South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia under this or any other law, (2) the number and types of United States personnel present in, or who are involved in providing such assistance to, such countries and who are paid directly or indirectly with funds of the United States Government, and (3) the general status of the implementation of all cease-fire agreements with respect to Indochina. For purposes of this subsection, "foreign assistance" and "provided by the United States Government" have the same meaning given those terms under section 3301(d) of this Act.

AUTHORIZATIONS FOR SOUTH VIETNAM, LAOS, AND CAMBODIA

SEC. 2108. (a) (1) There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State such sums as may be necessary to provide armaments, munitions, and war materials for South Vietnam and Laos under this chapter.

(2) The President may order armaments, munitions, and war materials from the stocks of the Department of Defense to carry out this subsection, subject to subsequent reimbursement therefor from subsequent appropriations available under this subsection. The Department of Defense is authorized to incur, in applicable appropriations, obligations in anticipation of reimbursements in amounts equivalent to the value of such orders under this subsection.

SOUTH VIETNAM, LAOS, AND CAMBODIA

SEC. 3109. (a) After June 30, 1973, no sale, credit sale, or guaranty of any defense article or defense service shall be made, or any military assistance (including supporting assistance) furnished to South Vietnam or Laos directly or through any other foreign country unless that sale, credit sale, or guaranty is made, or such assistance is furnished, under this Act. The provisions of this subsection

shall not apply to funds obligated prior to July 1, 1973.

(b) Any sale, credit sale, or guaranty made, or assistance provided under this Act to South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia shall be made or furnished with the objective of bringing about peace in Indochina and strict implementation of the cease-fire agreements in Vietnam and Laos and any cease-fire agreement that may be reached in the future with respect to Cambodia.

(c) Armaments, munitions, and war materials may be provided to South Vietnam and Laos under any provision of this Act only for the purpose of replacing, on the basis of piece for piece and with armaments, munitions, and war materials of the same characteristics and properties, those armaments, munitions, and war materials destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up (1) in the case of South Vietnam, after January 27, 1973, and which are included on lists previously furnished by the Government of South Vietnam to the International Commission of Control and Supervision for Vietnam, and (2) in the case of Laos, after February 21, 1973, and which are included on lists previously furnished by the Government of Laos to the International Commission of Control and Supervision for Laos.

(d) If a cease-fire agreement is entered into with respect to Cambodia, then, commencing with the date such agreement becomes effective, armaments, munitions, and war materials shall be provided Cambodia under this Act only and strictly in accordance with the provisions of such agreement.

(e) Armaments, munitions, and war materials may be provided to South Vietnam without regard to the provisions of subsection (c) if the President finds and reports to Congress that the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, signed in Paris on January 27, 1973, is no longer in effect. No armaments, munitions, or war materials may be provided in accordance with this subsection, however, until the President has reported such findings to Congress.

(f) The President shall submit to Congress within 30 days after the end of each quarter of each fiscal year a report on (1) the nature and quantity of all types of foreign assistance provided by the United States Government to South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia under this or any other law, (2) the number and types of United States personnel present in, or who are involved in providing such assistance to, such countries and who are paid directly or indirectly with funds of the United States Government, and (3) the general status of the implementation of all cease-fire agreements with respect to Indochina. For purposes of this subsection, "foreign assistance" and "provided by the United States Government" have the same meaning given those terms under section 3301(d) of this Act.

bills to use for their personal purposes, or whatever they like.

The other articles simply emphasize the character and extent of the corruption which the vast amount of money we flood into Vietnam causes in that economy.

There are other programs which pump large amounts of U.S. aid into Vietnam.

Altogether, all the items in the President's aid program for Vietnam total \$1,837 million for 1974. It is an outrageous amount of money. It is spread around so heedlessly that it is inevitable that the kind of corruption which, as we have seen, results from this misuse of the American taxpayers' money is bound to result.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me 2 or 3 minutes?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield the Senator whatever time he likes.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I fully support the chairman of my committee, the Committee on Foreign Relations, in this action. I think it is appropriate and I think it is timely. Everything he has said about the history of our discussion of the return of the control of foreign aid to the jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Relations is, of course, accurate and correct, and I think the conditions which have been laid down by general consent for the return of that jurisdiction, or of that matter to our jurisdiction, have been met clearly, unless we are to assume that we are going to be indefinitely in a state of war in that part of the world.

I think it is clear that the people of the country and the Congress, certainly the Senate, do not want that to happen. I think it is clear also that so long as the matter of funding military assistance to these two countries is handled through the Defense appropriation bill and the Defense Department, we will never know exactly how much we are spending, even within the range of hundreds of millions of dollars a year; and that, in the interest of proper economy, proper supervision, and orderly handling of foreign relations, we ought to cease this schism, to end it, and bring back foreign aid, military as well as economic, to the single jurisdiction of one committee, so that it can exercise its proper role of oversight, authorization, and guidance for policy in this most important matter.

I fully support the amendment, and I hope it will receive unanimous support.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Jones and Mr. Dockery, of the Committee on Foreign Relations staff, be accorded the privilege of the floor during the consideration of amendments 524 and 493.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield the Senator from Missouri such time as he may require.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, as a member of both the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee, I have had a chance to look at this matter in both committees, and have reached the following conclusions.

With the termination of all direct U.S.

This is merely illustrative of the corrupting effect of so much money being heedlessly and carelessly spread around that people like Lon Nol's brother's wife would have \$170,000 in hundred dollar

military involvement in Indochina on August 15, it would seem reasonable for military assistance to Vietnam and Laos to be funded henceforth through normal military assistance channels.

The Foreign Military Sales and Assistance Act passed by the Senate on June 26 has, in fact, already provided for the return of the Vietnam and Laos programs to the military assistance program; and in order to "follow up" on that earlier action, I now support the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas to, in effect, delete MASF authority in the bill now before the Senate.

The Pentagon's two principal arguments for continuing the MASF program are: First, the need for "flexibility" in order to respond to "contingencies" which may arise as a result of uncertainties surrounding the cease-fire agreements; and second, the need for authorizations which are now available under MASF, but which might not be available if military assistance to Vietnam and Laos were to be governed by the new Foreign Relations Committee bill.

The "flexibility" argument is essentially an expression of preference that the Congress continue to delegate wide discretionary authority to the executive branch in matters relating to future military assistance to Vietnam and Laos. The previous justification, that it was more efficient to supply Vietnam and Laos from the same pipeline used to support U.S. ground force in Indochina is obviously no longer valid.

The Congress has just reasserted its control over the future involvement of U.S. forces in Indochina. In order to back up that regained authority, the Congress should also bring the military assistance programs in Vietnam and Laos under tighter rein.

If there should be substantial violations of the ceasefires, the President can always come back to the Congress and ask for more money and wider authorities. Under the Foreign Relations Committee bill, the President can, in the event of a major breakdown of the ceasefire, resume full-scale aid to South Vietnam without any restrictions on the type of aid provided.

The desirability of the broader authorities now available under MASF—and which presumably would be lacking under the Foreign Relations Committee bill—should be closely examined.

Why, for instance, should the U.S. taxpayer continue to provide subsistence for Lao and Vietnamese forces? With far less resources at their disposal, the North Vietnamese are able to provide for the subsistence of their own forces.

The same argument applies with regard to the practice of our paying the salaries and allowances of the Lao Army. The North Vietnamese don't pay their soldiers anything. Why should we pay the Lao—or as has been the case in past years, hire Thais—because the Lao won't fight?

The justification for the continued provision of contractual services which are permitted under the MASF program is directly related to the question of what force structures are necessary and appropriate in Laos and South Vietnam at this point in time.

Does South Vietnam need a 1.1-million man force equipped with highly sophisticated equipment which it cannot maintain and operate on its own?

Does South Vietnam need a 66-squadron air force—the third largest in the free world?

Let me repeat, Mr. President—the third largest in the free world.

Does South Vietnam really need F-5E's to replace F-5A's?

Do the Lao need the 171 aircraft now in their active inventory, plus the 14 T-28's still due to arrive, plus 92 planes in other miscellaneous categories?

Do the South Vietnamese really need a sophisticated electronics network and a computerized logistical system?

It should be possible to get a straight military assistance program—MAP—in Vietnam and for the Vietnamese to defend themselves with the material which such a program would provide. After all, the Cambodians are fighting a war under MAP, and no one in the administration has claimed that the MAP restrictions are the reason why the Lon Nol government is having grave problems, indeed.

When the MASF program was established in 1966, it was understood that said program would be terminated upon the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Indochina. Direct U.S. involvement in the war is now over, and I believe, with all our increasingly pressing problems at home, it is time to return the military assistance program in South Vietnam and Laos to the normal channels, to the same channel as Cambodia.

It has been impossible to get our hands on just what is happening to all those millions that continue to be sent by this Government to Vietnam—hundreds upon hundreds of millions of dollars. This is the purpose of the Fulbright amendment; therefore I will vote for it.

One cannot get away from the unbelievable waste and corruption characteristic of the way those people operate with our money.

The distinguished Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT) has brought out that the sister-in-law of the head of the Cambodian Government was caught in Paris with a toy dog in which she had \$170,000 in \$100 bills. This is but characteristic of the way our money is handled by these people.

As I see it, it is about time for us to call a halt and put this expenditure back on a normal basis.

I suppose it is not really important to some people, but it is to me, the distinguished senior Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PASTORE) placed in the Record an article about a fine elderly lady whose picture was published in his newspaper, which he showed me. She is 79 years old and receives \$145 a month to live on from the U.S. Government from her social security. She spends \$85 a month for rent. She said in the article:

I can get by and get enough to eat after the \$85 in rent, but some of my friends just can't. I watch them, my elderly friends, in the evening hitting the garbage cans in order to survive.

What a comparison, Mr. President, hitting the garbage cans in the United States and slipping \$170,000, as a mem-

ber of the ruling Cambodian family, in a toy dog you take out of France.

Some day, on some basis, we should stop this incredible outlay of our taxpayers' money in Indochina.

We have lost some \$150 billion in expenditures over there, and what is much more important, 50,000 dead and over 300,000 wounded of the finest of all Americans.

So I would hope we carry out the concept of normalcy and put this MASF program back with all the rest of the countries in the MAP program—not next year, not the year after—everything is "mañana," tomorrow, but now. We are told this war is over and we know what the needs are in this country, including high taxes, and the high prices which are so characteristic of America today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. NUNN). Who yields time?

MR. THURMOND. Mr. President, how much time do we have on each side?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina has 30 minutes remaining.

MR. THURMOND. How long for the opposition?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri has 10 minutes remaining.

MR. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 15 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS).

MR. STENNIS. Mr. President, I wish more Senators were in the Chamber, so that we could get the facts before them.

I believe that the main point involved here is that if anyone wants to vote this year for military aid to South Vietnam, this is the place to do it—the items in this bill. It has been carefully scrutinized by the Armed Services Committee. The committee took testimony on it and made a considerable reduction in the amount.

Leaving aside for the moment all the side issues, we have a bill in one small package, so that a person can vote yes or no as to the aid, settle that issue, and move on to something else. We are talking about an October adjournment, and the 1st of October is next Monday.

Mr. President, the matter of so-called jurisdiction—this is not a jurisdictional fight, as such—originated in this way, as best I am able to develop the facts. In 1965, when the late Senator from Georgia was chairman of the committee, he was approached by the then Johnson administration—the fighting was stepping up—with reference to how they would finance our military aid to the countries in Indochina that were engaged in the fighting. The proposal was: "Let us handle this the way we did in Korea"—in the Korean war of 1950—when the practice was to just authorize it and permit it to be paid by the U.S. military out of their funds, taking care of the expenses, the operations, the goods, the supplies—even the food, I take it—of the Korean army; and now, likewise, South Vietnam.

That was agreed to. I heard no objection to it. It was passed then as a part of this military bill.

I became chairman in 1969, and soon the matter of foreign aid became an

issue. I had no particular appetite for wanting to handle all the foreign military aid, not at all. I did not think it was primarily for our committee. But this agreement was in full force. It looks ridiculous to me to be fighting a war there with these people—almost each company had some of our men in it—and we would be paying for part of the war out of this MAP program, and then to have another way to try to pay another part of it. It could not be done, really. That is why the system was resorted to, and that is why I continued to defend it from year to year, with some complaining. I complained because it got to the stage that it gummed up the bill and interfered to a degree with the handling of the real hardware and the manpower—the primary functions of this authorization bill.

We have had colloquy here from year to year about this matter. Last year, we had a situation in which we thought we could let Thailand go back to the old system, which was agreed to. The 1974 budget was being prepared in late fall; and, as best I can recall, in December there was hope of a truce, but there was no truce, and the fighting was continuing. It was unknown when our men would be withdrawn. We were just hoping. It was unknown when the POW's would come home. We were just hoping.

The matter of putting it in the budget again this year, in this bill, was mentioned to me by the Defense Department. As best I recall, I put them off until January, when they came back and said, "We are putting the budget together now for the last part. What about this item? The war was still going on to a degree. The POW's were not home; there was no agreement; and overnight it looked to me as though the thing was all off.

I said, the war certainly is not over, and we do not know what kind of mess we will have thereafter. We do not know whether there will be a cease-fire agreement that will hold. So just go on and put it in the bill for this year.

That was around the middle of January, as best I recall—before I went to the hospital on January 30. That was the last I knew about it until something came up here around July.

But the committee, as I said earlier, went on and took jurisdiction of this matter. They took the testimony; they went into it; they examined it; they made a judgment on it. They reduced it from \$1.3 billion.

Incidentally, as things cleared up, the requests for these sums were reduced by the administration from what was at one time about \$2 billion. They finally asked for a \$1.6 billion authorization with an appropriation, as I am told now, as I get the facts, of \$1.3 billion. The committee then reduced it to \$952 million and put it in the bill, as I understand, without the issue being sharply raised. There was no vote on it, I am told—no record of any vote.

So the matter is here; and, so far as I am concerned, I am making no promise to try to keep this in the bill next year. If things go along as well as they are now, although they are still highly uncertain, I think that would be the time to let

this go back to the Committee on Foreign Relations. But I certainly do not think it ought to be done now.

It is unthinkable to me that we leave those people over there just like you pick a chicken and throw it out to the elements, with no assurance from Congress that there is going to be any kind of military aid. We are a long way from deciding on a conclusion such as that.

How can we look in the face of the relatives of those who died over there—more than 50,000 of them—and many, many more who are maimed or handicapped for life? How can we think of leaving those people over there to the elements and to the hazards?

For years and years, we talked about supporting the program that was going on, to train them and finance them and arm them and equip them, so that they could fight their own battle, and we were going to pull out gradually, to keep on making sacrifices in blood and lives, until that condition could be brought about.

Finally, we did get to that position, had an agreement of a sort, and we got our POW's back, thankfully. Now we are just going to turn around and say, "Do the best you can. You have our moral sympathy but you will not have our help." I do not believe it. I do not believe anything like a majority of this Senate wants anything like that done. There has been no opposition to this measure before the Committee on Armed Services.

I have no fuss with the Committee on Foreign Relations. I want to see them try to do something in this area of foreign policy. But with all deference, as I understand this bill, it has not been passed by the House, but it has been passed by the Senate. It does not really render the military aid to these people that is absolutely essential. It refers to providing a piece-for-piece replacement of hardware items. If tanks get blown up, we give them one in place thereof.

But they have to have some hard money, some hardware, and more than that they have to have some moral support from this great Nation that went over there and emptied its money, manpower, lives, and everything else. If we cut out this money, I think we would be doing a thing we do not want to do on a technical argument here about jurisdiction of committees.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I had 15 minutes. How much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 2 minutes remaining.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator out of courtesy. I know he will be brief.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I regret the Senator changed his mind. The record will show what he said last year. He had no objection to a return to the regular system when the war was over. I read exactly his words of about a year ago. In addition, the bill the Senator referred to that was passed gives wide discretion to the President if there is a recurrence of the fighting.

But this \$952 million is almost an assurance they will be given that amount of money if they need it or not. That has been the history. I do not see why the Senator insists on giving them that much in this appropriation.

The other bill provided for replacement of material and munitions and anything else they need for military purposes, but in addition the Senator mentioned hard money. In addition to this amount, the economic assistance measure has \$376 million for Indochina. Part of it is used as the Senator saw. The corruption is indescribable over there. They waste the money which we give them.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Mississippi has expired.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator from South Carolina yield 5 minutes to me?

Mr. THURMOND. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. STENNIS. I will take only a half-minute. Let me say this.

I assume the Senator from Arkansas quoted me correctly. I do not intend to go back on anything I said. Just as soon as the hostilities stop over there, I said, "and it is hard to say when hostilities stopped over there—or even as soon as we have a cease-fire agreement carried out with evidence of permanence, I would be willing to let the matter go back to the Foreign Relations Committee, or let the Senate do that."

However, budgets have to be made up and those conditions were not true in January and they are not true yet about permanence to the cease-fire. So I stand on solid ground.

I yield to the Senator from Washington.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I think it is quite obvious that the issue here is whether or not the Senate is going to pull out in connection with jurisdictional questions in the middle of a current fiscal year that is already underway. That is the issue. I believe the distinguished chairman of the committee, the able and outstanding Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) should be backed up in this regard.

He has lived up to his commitment, as he just read the words that were spoken at the time this matter was discussed. I think it would be a mistake to turn around in the middle of the current fiscal year, 1974, to make this change.

I hope the Senate will reject the amendment.

Mr. STENNIS. I think the Senator has stated more clearly than I could the point I tried to state in the beginning. That is exactly the picture here, and here is the package. If we want to aid those people, as we have said we would, we must go on and dispose of it now. If this amount is too much, let us cut it down. But let us move forward.

I yield back the rest of the time yielded to me by the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may require.

The issue is whether we wish to set aside years of progress toward peace in Southeast Asia through an action which would reduce or eliminate military assistance to Laos and South Vietnam. After many years, we have finally been able to negotiate an agreement which contains the basis for peace in Southeast Asia. We are all aware that these agreements have been openly and flagrantly violated by the other side. It is clear that the other side has not yet reached the conclusion that their best interests will be served by peace in Southeast Asia and are prepared to seize any opportunity to aggressively pursue their objectives throughout the area.

The American people must continue with their resolve to see beyond selfish national interest and to maintain the resolve to seek peace in this area. Peace in Southeast Asia requires the active and willing participation of all the countries involved in these conflicts. We must create a climate within which these nations find it within their interest to have peace. In the proposed legislation, we would restrict and even deny the use of one of the few things which still provides an incentive for the other side to seek peace—the strength of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces which are sustained by U.S. assistance provided on a timely and responsive basis through the MASF authority.

The Senate Armed Services Committee has developed a program of aid for South Vietnam. There is no alternative program. Thus, if we accept this amendment, assistance can be provided only as allowed under the previously passed bill, which does not offer a program of aid but merely replacement.

Some of the money in this bill is to pay for contractor support to help with maintenance and logistics for South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese are taking over these roles daily, but the degree to which they eventually manage these jobs depends upon continued training and transition.

Right or wrong, we have made heavy commitments in South Vietnam over the past years. It is only proper that our disengagement allow for a period of transition. Such a period of transition would be orderly under the military assistance funded program in this bill. To take it out, would cause such problems in South Vietnam that the whole country might be lost.

The American people have stood by four Presidents in their continuing efforts to bring peace to Southeast Asia. We now have a peace agreement in hand and through it a basis for lasting peace. We must all understand that should the funds for MASF be reduced or eliminated, the responsibility for reopening conflict in Southeast Asia might well be the result.

Mr. President, if this amendment carries it would mean there would be no funds for lifeline programs in South Vietnam, such as maintenance of all the equipment we have left, or to operate training programs, or to buy rations for the South Vietnamese forces. They need money to operate on, and they need moral support, as the Senator from Mississippi states.

Mr. President, this is a very important matter. I sincerely hope that the Senate will give it every consideration.

We have withdrawn from South Vietnam entirely. Our forces are out. When our forces were being withdrawn, I remember hearing some of those who were opposed to the war and to our troops being there saying, "Well, we do not mind helping them financially, but we do not want our men over there." Now our men are home, but those same people now seem inclined to withdraw assistance to those people.

We have spent billions and billions of dollars in the war in Vietnam. We have lost over 50,000 lives there and 300,000 have been maimed, blinded, or wounded. Is all of that going down the drain?

All we are doing here is giving them assistance so they can do their own fighting. President Nixon wound down the war. Our men are back home. All we want to do now is help the South Vietnamese to help themselves. If we do not do that, then all our fighting over there has been in vain.

I just want to say that the Armed Services Committee has already cut down the amount granted by the House. The original amount that was requested for this purpose was \$2.1 billion. That was reduced by the President to \$1.6 billion. The House approved \$1.3 billion. The Armed Services Committee has cut it down to a little over \$900 million. So we have already trimmed this program.

This amendment would take that out. It would deny these people the opportunity to maintain their equipment to fight for their survival? If South Vietnam goes down, if South Vietnam is lost, the whole of Southeast Asia may be lost. That could jeopardize our own national interest.

In summary, I want to say that the impact of any reduction here sets aside the years of progress toward peace in Southeast Asia. It will virtually eliminate support of South Vietnamese military operations, and cease-fire violations continue. It would be a clear signal to Hanoi of our reduced interest and concern; perhaps a clear invitation for a Communist takeover in South Vietnam.

The amount that we have provided here by the Senate Armed Services Committee has already been reduced. I hope the Senate will look carefully into the matter and think well before it adopts the amendment.

I have before me the testimony of Secretary Clements testifying before the Committee on Armed Services between June 11 and August 3. I want to read one excerpt from his testimony.

Military assistance program appropriations do not provide the necessary levels of financing nor the "surge" or flexible response capabilities so necessary to meet unexpected or sustained military operational needs.

And that is what they want to do here—

for South Vietnam and Laos would not be just a bookkeeping exercise. It would be a restrictive and inflexible procedure to impose at this time when it is so important to have available a responsive and flexible method to insure the stability of the cease-fire agreements which are still in a coalescing period.

Mr. Clements has not been with the Defense Department too long, but he has given this matter a great deal of attention. He is a student of this particular subject, and what he says is worth listening to by Members of the Senate.

I hope the Senate will see fit to kill this amendment, because we are confident it is in the public interest not only of the freedom of the people of South Vietnam but the people of America that we not adopt this amendment.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute.

I wish to put into the RECORD a letter of March 27, 1973, addressed to the Honorable Roy L. Ash, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, from Mr. J. Fred Buzhardt, who was at that time, general counsel for the Department of Defense. It is quite clear that the Defense Department wishes to take over all of the military assistance, this bill being a part of that effort. One of the purposes is section 7, as to which he says:

The probability is good that most of the existing MAP statutory restrictions could be eliminated.

In other words, they want no restrictions whatever upon the distribution of funds for military assistance anywhere.

This is simply a reversal of the attitude which was expressed by the distinguished Senator from Mississippi last year, in which he said there was no objection to its being concurrent, when the war was over, with the regular military assistance program.

I think it is quite clear from this letter what the intention of the Defense Department is, and what the reversal of the attitude of the committee is. I think the Senate ought to know about it.

I ask unanimous consent that the letter from Mr. Buzhardt be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., March 27, 1973.
Hon. Roy L. ASH,
Director, Office of Management and Budget,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. ASH: Reference is made to your request for the views of the Department of Defense on the proposed FY 1974 Foreign Assistance authorization bill submitted by the Department of State.

Insofar as the text of that bill is concerned, the Department of Defense recommends certain revisions to section 15 and 20 thereof and the addition of a new section 21. Enclosure 3 to this letter sets forth the texts of those sections as revised by the Department of Defense. Enclosure 4 sets forth the reasons for our recommended revisions.

Even as thus revised, however, the Department of Defense does not concur in the Department of State's proposal. The approach taken by the Department of State is to retain the status quo, namely, to keep military assistance for South Vietnam and Laos (MASF) in the Defense budget and military assistance for other countries and foreign military sales credits in the foreign aid budget. We recognize that this approach is consistent with the decision made by the President a few months ago during his consideration of the FY 1974 Budget Message, but that decision was made in the context of a shooting war in Indochina in which the United States was an active participant. In

our view, the current factual situation warrants reconsideration of that decision and a different approach to meet the new situation.

As we see it, the legislative option adopted by the Administration should be designed to meet the following goals:

1. Assure Congressional support for a Southeast Asia reconstruction program—including North Vietnam when that becomes timely—in FY 1974 at an adequate funding level without—

(a) Increasing the total federal budget;
(b) Cutting domestic programs to find savings for reconstruction;

(c) Increasing the NOA requested for foreign aid; and

(d) Diverting funds from other foreign aid requirements.

2. Retain the MASF or equivalent authority at least through FY 1974 in order to assure our ability to provide logistic support to the South Vietnamese armed forces (consumables, spare parts, contract support and one-for-one replacement of major items) and the added assistance which would be required if compliance with the cease fire accords collapses and active hostilities resume.

We do not believe that the State Department's proposal will achieve those goals.

Insofar as reconstruction is concerned, the State Department approach does not expressly address the issue of the sources of funds for reconstruction in North Vietnam when that becomes timely, and provides for the funding of reconstruction in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, at the expense of the supporting assistance requirements of those countries for military budget support and of supporting assistance requirements worldwide. (Assuming that Congress would as it has in the past, earmark \$50 million of supporting assistance for Israel, only \$40 million would remain for supporting assistance requirements worldwide inclusive of Indochina).

Although not articulated in its submission of the proposed bill, presumably the Department of State contemplates that funds for reconstruction in North Vietnam, when that becomes timely, would be made available through a budget amendment transferring funds from the MASF and/or military functions budget for Southeast Asia operations. Any such transfer, however, would mean an increase in the foreign aid budget, and an increase in that budget would not be politically palatable—particularly for reconstruction of North Vietnam—in the face of increasing pressures for reorienting the overall budget in favor of domestic programs. Moreover, those members of Congress who support the Defense budget are unlikely to look with favor on a cut in the Defense budget in order to fund reconstruction in North Vietnam. Finally, that approach takes for granted that Congress will continue MASF in the Defense budget at a reduced level. If, however, Congress rejects the status quo and directs the return of MASF to the foreign aid budget, the result would not only be an increase in the foreign aid budget for reconstruction in North Vietnam but an additional increase to cover military assistance for South Vietnam and Laos. We seriously doubt that the ultimate amount authorized and appropriated for foreign aid would in any way approximate the aggregate of the original NOA request for foreign aid and of the additional amounts which would be needed for reconstruction in North Vietnam and military assistance to South Vietnam and Laos. The consequent impact on the foreign aid program could well be disastrous.

That the Congress will not retain MASF in the Defense budget even at a reduced level is clearly more probable than not. It is certain that the Foreign Relations Committee, for one, will approve an amendment to the FY 1974 Foreign Aid authorization bill—comparable to the one it approved in February to the FY 1973 bill—prohibiting the

obligation of funds for military assistance to South Vietnam and Laos except as otherwise provided for in the foreign aid bill. Insofar as the Armed Services and Appropriations Committee are concerned, because the original rationale for the enactment of MASF no longer obtains after the withdrawal of our forces, we anticipate that they will not vigorously oppose such action by the Foreign Relations Committee; indeed we anticipate that they would favor the shift back to the foreign aid budget unless we can provide a new persuasive justification for keeping MASF in the Defense budget. (The original justification for MASF was that "parallel but separate financial and logistics systems for U.S. forces and for military assistance forces are too cumbersome, time consuming, and inefficient in a combat zone." See Sen. Rep. 92, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. p. 11)

In these circumstances, and in order to achieve the goals outlined above, we recommend an alternative approach to the FY 1974 foreign aid issue, namely:

Transfer MAP and FMS credits to the Defense budget.

Consolidate MAP and MASF.

Recast the authorization for the combined MAP/MASF in terms of a ceiling on deliveries rather than on the NOA program.

Absorb the NOA requirement for MAP/MASF and FMS credits within the NOA amount already budgeted for MASF.

The benefits to be gained from this approach are as follows:

1. Makes more money available for reconstruction in Southeast Asia than any other option, namely, the \$1.2 billion in the foreign aid budget for MAP and FMS as against what might be realized under State's proposal.

2. Does not increase the existing foreign aid budget NOA request, and enables the funds requested in the foreign aid budget to be used for reconstruction without a budget amendment shifting those funds from the DOD budget.

3. Affords a basis for new rationale to support continuation of military assistance to Southeast Asia in the Defense budget, namely:

(a) It would fully integrate the worldwide MAP (which would include what is now MASF) into the PPBS of DOD and facilitate trade-offs under the total force concept;

(b) It would enable Congress for the first time to make an informed judgment as to the validity of MAP since the same committees which handle the military functions items of the Defense budget would concurrently be reviewing the MAP request and hence would be in a position to assess the validity of our trade-offs under the total force concept;

(c) It would enable Congress for the first time to make an informed judgment as to the validity of MAP, since the same committees which handle the military functions items of the Defense budget would concurrently be reviewing the MAP request and hence would be in a position to assess the validity of our trade-offs under the total force concept;

(d) The redefined MAP could be presented to the Congress as a program of specifically limited future duration; e.g., five years, at the end of which time only FMS, training, and quid pro quo would continue as permanent provisions of Title 10 of the United States Code, and

(e) A significant management benefit of transferring MAP into the DOD budget would be to integrate the MAP and DOD supply systems and thereby facilitate cost savings and a meaningful application of supply priorities.

4. A delivery ceiling concept provides greater flexibility for reprogramming to meet emergencies within the ceiling because it can make fuller use of DOD assets than the exist-

ing MAP system which is accounted on an NOA basis.

5. A delivery ceiling concept would simplify our congressional relations problem since floor action would be required only during the authorization process and not twice as is the case now under MAP where we are annually faced with a floor debate and vote both on the authorization amount and the appropriation amount.

6. Within the context of the overall Defense budget, the delivery ceiling would be a relatively modest amount and the NOA required would be less visible since it would be spread through the various DOD accounts.

7. The probability is good that most of the existing MAP statutory restrictions could be eliminated.

8. The DOD budget would have to absorb the Enhance Plus cost and this option obviates the necessity of explaining and justifying an appropriation to DOD to reimburse the MAP account for Enhance Plus. (We are in dire danger now of losing these reimbursement funds.)

9. The Department of State would still play a significant role in the formulation of the MAP and FMS programs through the normal inter-agency procedures for foreign policy coordination.

10. It is less likely that Senators on the Foreign Relations Committee could make a hostage of the MAP and FMS programs by attaching riders, such as Senator Fulbright's impoundment amendment and the Case bills relating to executive agreements, since the proponents of those riders would have to initiate such action on the floor of the Senate rather than in committee markup.

11. It would obtain the votes of those members of the Congress who are in favor of MAP and FMS but who are unwilling to vote for a foreign aid bill containing economic assistance.

12. It would improve the management of MAP and FMS since historically the authorization and funds for DOD are passed earlier in the fiscal year than foreign aid.

Enclosure 1 to this letter is a draft bill which accords with the foregoing alternative approach, a bill cast in the form of an additional title to the Defense Appropriations Authorization for FY 1974 bill previously transmitted to the Congress. The section-by-section analysis of our draft bill is at enclosure 2.

We urge that our alternative proposal not be dismissed out of hand by OMB because of the prior Presidential decision made in the context of a significantly different factual situation, and that the pros and cons of State's proposal and our alternative be carefully assessed in the context of the goals which we believe the President desires to attain.

Sincerely yours,

J. FRED BUZHARDT.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield 8 minutes, if that is what I have, to the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, how much time is there remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota has 9 minutes.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, let us just take a few moments to see where we stand on the subject of military assistance. The Senate, as the chairman of the Relations Committee has reminded us, and as the acting chairman of the Armed Services Committee has reminded us, passed S. 1443 on June 26, and it passed it by a rollcall vote.

The chapter in this bill that relates to military assistance under which the areas of Vietnam, South Vietnam, and

Laos would be included, is known as part 3, chapter 21. There was no particular resistance made to the language of that chapter, but apparently the Department of Defense, after hearing what the Senate had done, comes rushing in now and says, "We have got to have this extra money of \$952 million," under what they call the flexibility that they need under the MASF program to aid South Vietnam and Laos.

I want to repeat that the Senate has already acted on this authorization. Are we going up the hill and down the hill? The Senate had a particulate debate on the whole subject of military assistance, and an appropriate committee of the Congress held hearings on military assistance. We marked up a bill, with long discussion in committee, on the military assistance program, and the Senate and the Congress of the United States acted affirmatively on the legislation known as S. 1443 to authorize the furnishing of defense articles to foreign countries and international organizations.

Now we come in and say we are going to change the rules.

It so happens that when the President's budget came down to Congress a particular item was hidden in the budget—I am a member of the Joint Economic Committee—wherein was a request for over \$2 billion for a special contingency fund for assistance to South Vietnam. I made quite a point of it. I went on radio and television. I spoke here in the Senate. I insisted that that item was over and beyond what was needed in this budget.

Later on I found that the counsel to the President had been advocating that the whole military assistance program be taken over by the Department of Defense, contrary to all understandings of the Congress of the United States.

I made a point of that. I wrote to the President. I spoke here on the Senate floor. I tried to make public notice of it.

They sort of backed away. Now they come around the barn once again and they need \$952 million.

May I say that we talk about \$952 million in the Defense appropriations like it is chickenfeed, but we debate for hours here a few dollars for the school lunch program or for the medical assistance program or for a rehabilitation program for the handicapped and disabled. May I say they are asking for more money here for South Vietnam and Laos—and I will speak to that as being absolutely not needed—than we had for the whole program for all the disabled people in the United States.

I was not quite so warmed up about the Defense debate until I got into it, until after I had seen the lobbying that was going on. I want to remind the Senate that if we are going to make up our minds that we are going to live within the \$268 billion budget, we should decide whether we are going to give most of it away in the Defense bill or take care of some of the needs at home. If anyone can show me that the \$952 million is vital to our national security, I will apologize. However, it has nothing to do with our security.

Let us take a look at how the poor South Vietnamese are getting along. By the way, I have supported that regime. I have supported our action there. I am not one of the most severe critics. However, I thought the war was over. I thought that we had entered an era of peace.

I know that the troops are home and am grateful for that. The prisoners of war are home, and I hope that those missing in action can be found and brought home.

There is \$200 million in the pipeline for flexible assistance that we can use in South Vietnam and Laos—\$1.2 billion. I thought that was a lot of money. That staggers the imagination of most of our citizens. There is \$1.2 billion for flexible spending already in the pipeline that they can spend as they want to. And the bill we passed in the Senate, S. 1443, provides for that.

We simply said, "When you get through with that, will you please, Mr. President, kindly come in with a program? Will you tell us what you really need?"

What else have we done? We provided under the cease-fire agreement—and that is provided for in legislation passed by the Senate—that there will be a replacement on a 1-for-1 basis. If they shoot a shell, and they certainly know how to shoot shells, they will get a shell back. If they lose a gun, they will get a gun back. If they lose a plane, they will get a plane back. If they lose a tank, they will get a tank back.

We did not leave them weak. Does the Senate remember the newspaper stories on how we were stepping up our shipments of war material to South Vietnam? There was page after page of it in every newspaper in America. The ships were loaded, and we were bringing in as much equipment as the docks could hold.

We loaded the South Vietnamese with everything they needed. We gave them a navy. They have the third largest navy in the free world. They have millions of men under arms. They have weapons. They have tanks. It is unbelievable. We have given them so much that, as a matter of fact, they might bankrupt themselves taking care of it. Yet we are being asked for more. Mr. President, I do not want to see the South Vietnamese go down the drain. I have been no supporter of North Vietnam. But, I read in the newspaper the other day that the brothers got together over at Laos. I do not know whether they are half brothers or full brothers. Anyway, they decided that they would have no more war. It is all part of the royal family. It is not a matter of whether one is a rightist or a leftist. It is all part of the family. They have a celebration and they stop the war to get together for family reunions. They have been doing this for years.

Why do we have special funding for this when there is not any war there?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, if we pass this bill, it will be the biggest waste of money. They do not need \$952 million more. Good God, they have everything in the world, and they have \$1,200 million that has not been touched.

[Applause in the galleries.]

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The galleries will be in order.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, how much time remains?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas has 1 minute remaining.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, how much time remains to the Senator from South Carolina?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina has 3 minutes remaining.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, since there is no one on the floor, there is no point in continuing with the debate.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield to me, I would like to say—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 1 minute of the Senator from Arkansas has expired.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I thought the Presiding Officer said the Senator from Arkansas had 1 minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Arkansas has now expired. The Senator from South Carolina has 3 minutes remaining.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I thought the Presiding Officer said I had 1 minute remaining.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. It took 1 minute to find out about the time.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, that should be charged to the Presiding Officer.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It should not come out of my time, I do not think.

Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has been yielded back or expired. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas. On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. LONG), and the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. MONDALE) are necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from Iowa (Mr. CLARK) is absent because of a death in the family.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Iowa (Mr. CLARK) would vote "yea."

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) is absent for religious observance.

I further announce that the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) is absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Kansas (Mr. PEARSON), is absent because of illness.

The result was announced—yeas 43, nays 51, as follows:

[No. 427 Leg.]
YEAS—43

Abourezk	Brooke	Church
Aiken	Burdick	Cranston
Bayh	Byrd, Robert C.	Eagleton
Biden	Case	Fulbright

Gravel	Mansfield	Proxmire
Hart	Mathias	Ribicoff
Hartke	McGovern	Saxbe
Haskell	Metcalfe	Schweikert
Hatfield	Montoya	Stevenson
Hathaway	Moss	Symington
Huddleston	Muskie	Tunney
Hughes	Nelson	Williams
Humphrey	Pastore	Young
Inouye	Pell	
Kennedy	Percy	

NAYS—51

Allen	Domenici	McGee
Baker	Dominick	McIntyre
Bartlett	Eastland	Nunn
Beall	Ervin	Packwood
Bellmon	Fannin	Randolph
Bennett	Fong	Roth
Bentsen	Goldwater	Scott, Hugh
Bible	Griffin	Scott,
Brock	Gurney	William L.
Buckley	Hansen	Sparkman
Byrd,	Helms	Stafford
Harry F., Jr.	Hollings	Stennis
Cannon	Hruska	Stevens
Chiles	Jackson	Talmadge
Cook	Johnston	Thurmond
Cotton	Magnuson	Tower
Curtis	McClellan	Weicker
Dole	McClure	

NOT VOTING—6

Clark	Long	Pearson
Javits	Mondale	Taft

So Mr. FULBRIGHT's amendment was rejected.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move that the vote by which the amendment was rejected be reconsidered.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages in writing from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Marks, one of his secretaries.

PATENT MODERNIZATION AND REFORM ACT OF 1973—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. NUNN) laid before the Senate a message from the President of the United States, which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. The message is as follows:

To the Congress of the United States:

America's dramatic progress from a small agrarian nation to a great technological and industrial leader has been due, in no small degree, to the inventive genius of its people. Names such as Benjamin Franklin, Eli Whitney, Cyrus McCormick, Thomas Edison, Alexander Graham Bell, Samuel Morse, the Wright Brothers and Henry Ford speak volumes about the character of our Nation.

Our creative history, however, has not been a matter of individual inspiration alone. Our Founding Fathers understood the need for innovative thinking and wrote into the Constitution a means of encouraging invention—the patent system—which has enormously stimulated our progress and prosperity.

The national patent system authorized by the Constitution took on form and substance with enactment of special patent acts in 1790, 1793 and 1836. The act of 1836 provided statutory criteria for the issuance of patents and required the Federal Patent Office to examine applications to determine whether they

conformed to those criteria. Although this 1836 law has since been amended, no basic change has been made in its general character and it now forms the basis for our present patent system.

While the patent system has changed only slightly since the nineteenth century, the social and economic structure of our Nation has, of course, undergone profound change. The individual inventor, often working alone and unaided, still makes an important contribution, but the lead role in exploring new frontiers of technology is now played by organized research—sophisticated and highly capable teams funded by our Government, industry and universities.

The changing nature of applied research has understandably raised questions about the adequacy of our patent system. Over the past 7 years, a number of searching studies have been made of that system, including a report by a special Presidential Commission in 1966. Those studies have shown that a successful patent system should meet at least four basic standards. It should:

- provide an incentive for new inventions by offering a meaningful reward to the inventor and to his supporters;
- promote early public disclosures of new discoveries, so that others may also benefit;
- encourage other researchers to explore alternative solutions to crucial technological problems; and
- through the process of discovery and disclosure, widen the opportunity for consumers to choose products of higher quality and lower price.

In recent years, it has become increasingly clear that our current patent system does not measure up to these standards. The United States Patent Office now examines patent applications in an *ex parte* fashion—a series of hearings involving only Patent Office personnel and the party applying for a new patent. The very nature of the examination process denies the Patent Office much information relevant to its decision about issuance of a new patent because that information is frequently held by those who may be in commercial competition with the patent applicant. Thus the Patent Office may grant a patent to one inventor without knowing that similar information already exists. As a consequence, legal disputes between a new patentee and his competitors have often arisen after the patent has been issued, and, because the courts can develop a more complete factual record, a large number of patents have been declared invalid. This litigation is often protracted and needlessly expensive, both for the patentees and their competitors. In addition, there have been increasing allegations of fraud and inequitable conduct in the procurement of patents. The net result is that public confidence in the reliability of our patent system has been eroded, and we have reached the point where reform is clearly desirable.

Accordingly, I am today proposing that the Congress enact the Patent Modernization and Reform Act of 1973. This legislation, which will today be transmitted to the Congress by the Commerce

and Justice Departments, is designed to rid the patent system of many of its existing problems without sacrificing the indispensable stimulus to invention now afforded by that system. Specifically, this bill has four major objectives:

1. Strengthening public confidence in the validity of issued patents;
2. Accelerating and improving the disclosure of new technology revealed by the patents;
3. Simplifying the procedures for obtaining patents; and
4. Enhancing the value of the patent grant.

STRENGTHENING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE

The single most important objective of reform must be the establishment of examination procedures which ensure that new patents are both sound and reliable. The best way to achieve this objective is to obtain as much information from all sources as is practicable.

To remedy the defects of the present system, I am recommending that we broaden public participation in the review of patent applications, that we strengthen the hand of the patent examiner, and that we require applicants to give greater assistance to the examiner in bringing information to light. If we take these steps, I believe we would not only insure a more orderly and complete patent examination but also greatly strengthen public confidence in the validity of our patents.

Under the proposed bill, the Patent Office would publish all patent applications that seem worthwhile and would then give the public six months to bring to its attention information relevant to the application. Members of the public would be permitted to present their views to the Patent Office in an adversary proceeding, and new procedures for discovery of information and opportunities for the opposing parties to appeal the decisions of the Patent Office through the courts would be established. The bill also provides for additional manpower for the Patent Office so that opposition proceedings can be conducted effectively.

The patent examiner, a critical figure in the application process, would also be given additional tools to perform his job. These would include, in appropriate cases, authorization to require an adversary examination proceeding and to obtain the assistance from a special patent officer in such a proceeding, as well as access to adequate discovery techniques under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

To further assist the examiner, patent applicants would be required to disclose all pertinent information at the outset of the examination proceeding along with a written memorandum describing why their inventions are patentable. In addition, this legislation spells out in considerable detail the duties of inventors, patent applicants and their attorneys to bring to the attention of the Patent Office all relevant information which comes to their attention during the examination process.

ACCELERATING AND IMPROVING DISCLOSURE

A basic premise of the patent system is that in exchange for commercial protection of his discovery, an applicant will

disclose the techniques of his invention so that others may build upon this knowledge. Some critics, however, have suggested that the current patent system is not bringing forth the full and rapid disclosure of technology that it should.

The legislation proposed by the Administration would encourage applicants to expedite the processing of their applications by granting a period of protection 20 years from the date the application is filed rather than the present 17-year period from the day a patent is granted. In addition, this legislation would require that patent claims be drafted with greater precision so that others would have a better understanding of how to use the invention.

SIMPLIFYING PROCEDURES

The Administration bill also sets forth several important steps to simplify the procedures for filing and obtaining patents. One reform would permit the owners of an invention, not just the inventor, to file the papers for, and directly obtain, a patent. This step should remove the present procedural hurdles to filing of applications by corporations, universities or other research organizations.

The bill would also simplify troublesome problems of amending applications and would give the Patent Office greater flexibility in examining applications containing more than one invention.

ENHANCING THE VALUE OF PATENTS

The legislation I am recommending would also enhance the value of the patent grant. The procedural reforms described above, which are designed to strengthen confidence in the examination process, would do much to achieve this goal. But other, more specific changes are also needed.

Current law leaves the owners of United States process patents unprotected against importers who sell foreign products that have been manufactured by utilizing processes developed in the United States. This law should be changed so that exclusive sales agents or affiliates of foreign competitors who handle such products will be considered patent infringers.

The proposed legislation would also permit the patent owner to settle disputes over the infringement and validity of his patent without resorting to expensive and time-consuming court litigation. Patent owners and those accused of infringing patents may instead, if mutually agreeable, turn to arbitration for resolution once a dispute arises between them. Where arbitration is not possible, improved disclosure and discovery techniques during the patent application process should reduce the expense and uncertainty of subsequent litigation.

In the event of a dispute over the validity of a patent, the legislation I am recommending would clarify the rights of the patentee or a person who might hold his patent, such as an assignee or licensee. Another provision would ensure that the patent laws not be construed to replace or preempt state laws concerning trade secrets so long as those state laws do not interfere with the free flow of ideas in the public domain. Decisions of

the Supreme Court in both of these areas would also be left undisturbed.

PRESERVING THE BEST OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM

The Patent Modernization and Reform Act of 1973 is more than a reform bill. It would preserve and extend some of the best and most important aspects of our current patent system. In preparing this legislation, the Administration considered and analyzed a great many proposals for changing the present law—but our decision was to adopt only those proposals for change that would significantly improve the system.

We were particularly anxious to maintain present standards for the awarding of patents, including the requirement that inventions serve a useful purpose. One of the virtues of the American patent system is its emphasis upon practicality—its demands that ideas be reduced to a tangible form having a known usefulness before the public should grant a monopoly on the concept to the applicant.

My proposal would also preserve the American concept of giving the patent to the person who is first to invent, because he is the individual most deserving of recognition and encouragement. In doing so, we would reject the approach of certain other countries that award the patent to the first applicant to file for a patent.

In addition, the existing state of case law on antitrust standards for patent licensing that have been determined by the courts would not be changed. Some have argued that this case-by-case approach to patent licensing has increasingly eroded the value and reliability of the patent grant. Earlier this year, I requested that various proposals addressed to this issue be carefully studied and reviewed by the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, and my chief advisers on economic policy. After much study, they concluded that there is no clearly demonstrated need or justification for introduction of any patent licensing proposals at this time. They also concluded that the legislation I recommend today will help counter the loss of public confidence by improving the reliability of patents that are issued.

CONCLUSION

Benjamin Franklin, a famous inventor as well as a statesman, reflected once that he wished it his destiny "to be born two or three centuries hence" so that he could not only enjoy the conveniences of modern life but also satisfy his curiosity. So long as the spirit of Franklin remains alive in America, we can be confident that our civilization will flourish.

Our patent system should always work to foster that spirit. Unfortunately, our current system does not always serve that end. With the changes I am recommending today, however, we can combine the best parts of our existing system with the most promising proposals for improving it. In that belief, I ask the Congress to give the proposals contained in the Patent Modernization and Reform Act of 1973 prompt and careful consideration.

RICHARD NIXON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, September 27, 1973.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session, the Presiding Officer (Mr. NUNN) laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(For nominations received today, see the end of Senate proceedings.)

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed the bill (H.R. 981) to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, and for other purposes, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

HOUSE BILL REFERRED

The bill (H.R. 981) to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, and for other purposes, was read twice by its title and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATION AUTHORIZATION ACT, 1974

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 9286) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1974 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test and evaluation, for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and of the selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and the military training student loads, and for other purposes.

AMENDMENT NO. 493

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. NUNN). The Senate will now proceed to the consideration of amendment No. 493 of the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES) on which there shall be 2 hours of debate.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I call up my amendment, No. 493, and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

On page 27, line 1, strike out "\$952,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$500,000,000".

On page 28, between lines 5 and 6, insert a new section as follows:

"Sec. 703. After June 30, 1974, no sale, credit sale, or guaranty of any defense article or defense service shall be made, or any military assistance (including supporting assistance) furnished to South Vietnam or Laos directly or through any other foreign country unless that sale, credit sale, or guaranty is made, or such assistance is furnished, under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Foreign Military Sales Act, or any subsequent, comparable provision of law. The provisions of this section shall not apply to funds obligated prior to July 1, 1974."

On page 28, line 6, strike out "Sec. 702" and insert in lieu thereof "Sec. 703".

On page 30, line 3, strike out "Sec. 703" and insert in lieu thereof "Sec. 704".

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, the Senate has a very busy schedule for the remainder of the day. It appears at this time that the Senate will be in session very late. I wonder whether the authors of the amendments scheduled for today—and the opponents likewise—would be willing to reduce the time on the amendments. Perhaps they would not. Perhaps this is not the time to ask. But I think I ought to venture the suggestion at this point.

May I ask the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), and the distinguished ranking member and the distinguished chairman of the committee, if it would be possible to reduce the time on the Hughes amendment. I see that Senators McGOVERN and BAYH are in the Chamber, and I would like to ask them if it would be possible to reduce the time on the McGovern amendment dealing with categorical ceilings, and the time on the SAM-D amendment.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time consumed in this colloquy not be charged against the time on the amendment of the Senator from Iowa.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I am fully appreciative and sympathetic with the efforts the distinguished Senator from West Virginia is making to move this bill through and I think that because of his efforts we are a lot further along than we normally would be. I salute him for that.

This SAM-D business is such a complicated matter that it will lead, ultimately, to an expenditure of \$4½ billion. So I want to make certain that we have a chance to make the record as to where we are going. When I look at the votes being cast today, I do not know how we are going to come out. Inasmuch as this is a project to be taken step by step, I want to make certain that we make a proper record so that the next time we want to spend money, we can compare where we are this year, because that is what it has been for the past few years, and I am concerned that we may be heading down the track of another cost overrun such as the weapons systems we have abandoned like the Cheyenne and the main battle tank. So I would like to know, before we crank in more dollars here, as to what the situation is.

I see the Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON) in the Chamber who will have some remarks to make in support of our position, as well as the Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON). We will not prolong the discussion but I think we need to make a good case and I would hate to foreclose doing that. I pledge, as the Senator knows, that I will not be dilatory in the use of our time.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. The Senator from Indiana is never dilatory and I thank him for his comments.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I think as the Senator from Indiana does on this matter, that I do not want to prolong debate needlessly, but several Senators have spoken to me about their desire to participate in this discussion. We are talking about a five-point proposal that would cut new obligational au-

thority over five major sections of the entire defense appropriation. So while I think at some point we will be able to yield back some of the time, I would rather not make that commitment right at this moment.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Very well. I thank the distinguished Senator from South Dakota for his comments.

Does the Senator from Iowa wish to comment?

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, my amendment enjoys so much support that no one has asked me for any time to speak in support of it. I do not intend to use more than 10 or 15 minutes. So if the majority whip would talk to the manager of the bill about whatever time we can save, that will be all right with me. I should be ready to vote any time after we have made our statements.

Mr. THURMOND. The Senator from Iowa is always generous. I should like to be helpful. Say, 1 hour, with 30 minutes to a side, if that is agreeable?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I thank both Senators. That will save at least 1 hour for the day.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, the Armed Services Committee has already reduced the administration's request for military aid to South Vietnam and Laos to \$952 million. My amendment No. 493 would go even further in two respects: It would cut funding to \$500 million and it would require the shifting of these programs back to the regular military assistance program (MAP) at the end of this fiscal year.

I might add at the outset, Mr. President, that there is a typographical error in the printed version of this amendment: Line 5 of page one should begin "Section 702" rather than "703." I ask unanimous consent that this correction be made.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator ask unanimous consent that his amendments be considered en bloc?

Mr. HUGHES. May I defer that request, Mr. President, in the parliamentary procedure?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Unless they are considered en bloc, the amendment is not in order, since it affects four places in the bill.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. HUGHES. Is it permissible to divide the amendment?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair is informed that this is not one amendment but four amendments, because it affects four separate places in the bill. Therefore, it must be considered en bloc, and the Senator would have to ask unanimous consent for that.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, that does not respond to the question I asked.

Is it permissible to divide the issue and still make an en bloc request for two different sections, so that there would be two votes rather than four?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator could ask unanimous consent for two votes in lieu of four.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, with the time taken from my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that amendment No. 493 be considered en bloc.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, section 701 should not even be in this bill. Military assistance to South Vietnam and Laos was covered in S. 1443, the Foreign Military Sales and Assistance Act, which passed the Senate on June 26, 1973. Section 2108 of that bill authorized sums for armaments, munitions, and war materiel; and section 3109 transferred the program back to MAP and out of the Department of Defense.

But I recognize that, given the typical obstacle course for these contentious measures, it may be very late in the year before these matters are settled in conference committees. If the military assistance service funded (MASF) program can be shifted sooner, I would welcome it.

In any event, I believe that Congress should put the executive branch on notice that this shift must take place no later than next July 1. Since the Defense Department claims that a changeover would require 6 months of planning, we should write the law now so that such planning can begin in earnest.

In my view, there is no need to continue MASF. This program was established in 1966 because, as the Armed Services Committee report said at the time, funding through the Defense Department "is desirable because parallel but separate financial and logistics systems for U.S. forces and for military assistance forces are too cumbersome, time consuming, and inefficient in a combat zone." Since those financial and logistics pipelines are no longer supporting U.S. forces in Laos and Vietnam, this justification no longer applies.

We may not have peace in these countries yet, but we surely have a greatly reduced level of conflict. If any change occurs in the military situation, of course, additional funds could be requested from Congress. What I want to avoid—and what I believe we all want to avoid—is a situation where unnecessary and unusable items are funneled into these countries simply because the funds are there now.

We have already given South Vietnam vast amounts of military aid—over \$13 billion in the past 8 years. Our accelerated delivery program last fall—between the "peace is at hand" statement and the December bombing—cost over three-quarters of a billion dollars, and we gave South Vietnam, among other things, more aircraft than they will be able to use for a substantial period of time.

All of these expenditures, in my view, reduce the need for huge additional amounts this fiscal year. Amazingly enough, we finished fiscal 1973 with between \$160 and \$200 million of MASF funds unobligated. In short, we have programmed more than we could spend, and we have still given more than the South Vietnamese could use.

It is particularly galling to me, and I believe to most Americans, to read news reports such as those recently showing that, because of U.S. aid, the South Vietnamese are having no trouble obtaining such items as gasoline and scrap steel which are in such short supply in our own country.

How much is enough? The administration wanted, and the House of Representatives approved, more money for MASF this year—a year of proclaimed peace—than we spent at the height of combat activity in 1968.

The Armed Services Committee took a major and commendable step by reducing that request to \$952 million. I believe that we can and should go further.

The present bill contains \$47.5 million to pay subsistence and other benefits to Lao and Vietnamese forces. Why should we be paying their salaries?

The largest single item still in this bill is \$690 million for operations and maintenance—meaning, base support, and maintenance, transportation of supplies, and consumable items such as petroleum, oil, and lubricants, and spare parts.

This amount is excessive and provocative. If we examine comparable O. & M. figures for Laos and South Vietnam in recent years, we see that this year's request for \$690 million is \$50 million more than we gave those countries in 1970, and is 90 percent of what we gave in 1971 and 82 percent of what we gave in 1972. Even compared with last year, we are still providing this kind of support at the 60 percent level. Yet the fighting has subsided, and I believe our financial support should also.

I say that such large sums are provocative because they involve several thousand American contractor personnel remaining in Vietnam, and we are providing far more than the piece for piece replacement of armaments, munitions, and war material authorized by the Paris cease-fire agreement. In fact, the \$952 million in this bill is far more than the total of \$705 million in both economic and military aid which North Vietnam received last year from its allies.

The road to reduced tensions requires mutual restraint. We can show such restraint on our part by reducing our levels of support for these nations' war machines.

One more point. Even if the entire amount requested were approved, the Pentagon admits that it will spend only \$800 million during fiscal 1974. I do not believe that American taxpayers should be squeezed for any more money than will even be spent.

For these many reasons, Mr. President, I believe that the level of military aid to South Vietnam and Laos can prudently

be reduced at \$500 million for the current fiscal year.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as may be required.

I rise in opposition to this amendment. As I understand this amendment, it would really do two things. It would not only transfer the jurisdiction on this program from the Committee on Armed Services to the Committee on Foreign Relations but also it would reduce the amount of funds allowed South Vietnam. I would like to inquire of the Senator if that is correct?

Mr. HUGHES. It does not make the transfer at this time, but at the end of fiscal year 1974, next July 1. It does reduce the amount of money to \$500 million.

Mr. THURMOND. \$500 million. And it makes the transfer.

Mr. HUGHES. At the end of the fiscal year.

Mr. THURMOND. At the end of the fiscal year.

Mr. HUGHES. The Senator is correct.

Mr. THURMOND. This is practically what we voted on before except that the amount previously was \$952 million. Now, the Senator wants to cut that to \$500 million. I would remind the Senate that the President originally requested \$2 billion, that was reduced to \$1.5 billion. The House made it \$1.3 billion. The Armed Services Committee cut that to \$952 million. So this amount already has been cut.

The administration feels it needs much more than the Committee on Armed Services approved. The Secretary of Defense, and I know because I heard him say today, feels exceedingly strongly about this matter. He feels that if South Vietnam is going to survive, the full amount provided by the House should be the minimum.

I oppose this amendment because it would signal the North Vietnamese to continue their protracted conflict with enhanced possibilities of success. MASF funding provides the flexibility necessary to oppose or deter further North Vietnamese violations of the cease-fire agreements. The military assistance program—MAP—is too restrictive to provide the assistance needed in a major active theater like SVN.

The administration has recently released intelligence information which plainly shows that the North Vietnamese have continued intensive infiltration of men and war materials to South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia since the January 27 Vietnam cease-fire agreement. In addition they have built and refurbished 12 air fields which adds a new and threatening element to the already shaky situation. All this activity is in gross violation of the peace agreements, and further demonstrates Hanoi's determination to achieve her objectives through military conquest.

If our allies in Southeast Asia are to have any chance at all in their efforts to force Hanoi to comply with the Paris agreements, they must have timely and

responsive military assistance that they need. A congressional restriction such as the one being proposed, could destroy the credibility of our current stance in Indochina. Some may seek this—but such a move would merely invite Hanoi to exacerbate the situation and to increase the level of tension and of fighting.

We all want to disengage from Indochina. But a precipitous act such as called for in this amendment could have tragic consequences for our allies and for peace.

Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

How much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina has 24 minutes remaining. The Senator from Iowa has 20 minutes remaining. Who yields time?

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, it is quite obvious that most Members of the Senate are not present to hear the debate. It is also equally obvious that the Senator from Iowa is not going to convince the distinguished Senator from South Carolina to change his position. Since no one is around that either of us can convince, I am prepared to yield back my time.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, before the Senator gives up—

Mr. HUGHES. I am not giving up. I want to inform the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. HUGHES. I yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I understand this is a followup of the Fulbright amendment. Is that correct?

Mr. HUGHES. The Senator is correct.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator is accepting the fact of the vote on the amendment and he is seeking to cut the amount.

Mr. HUGHES. That is correct.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator is so right.

Mr. HUGHES. I thank the distinguished Senator for his comment and his support.

Mr. President, if the distinguished Senator from South Carolina is prepared to yield back his time, I am prepared to yield back my time.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. HUGHES. I yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. There is \$1.7 billion in the pipeline of unexpended dollars for this type of fund. If the Senator were able to reduce that to \$500 million, that would be \$1.2 billion for the people of South Vietnam. We just turned out a disaster relief program for the United States with an \$800 million authorization. There are 212 million Americans and there are 15 million South Vietnamese. I think the people of South Vietnam will be able to get by.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, if the Senator from South Carolina is prepared to yield back the remainder of his time, I am prepared to yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is all time yielded back?

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Mississippi wanted to speak on this amendment. He has gone to lunch. He expects to be back in a moment. He feels very strongly about this amendment. He spoke on the last amendment, and he told me he wanted to speak on this amendment. We sent word to him.

In the meantime, I wish to read to the Senate a letter addressed to the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS). The letter states:

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., Sept. 27, 1973.
Hon. JOHN C. STENNIS,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The President is greatly concerned over moves currently pending before the Senate which would further reduce or eliminate Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) support of the forces of South Vietnam and Laos.

The Senate Armed Services Committee has recommended an authorization for MASF during FY 1974 of "not to exceed \$952,000,000" (Sec. 701, H.R. 9286). This \$952 million ceiling contrasts with the President's original ceiling request of \$2.1 billion (made in January 1973), which was further reduced by the President to \$1.6 billion in June 1973. The House has approved a \$1.3 billion MASF authorization for FY 1974.

Enormous cuts in our planned level of assistance to South Vietnam and Laos have already been accomplished. During FY 1973, the ceiling for MASF was \$2.735 billion. Further reduction to the FY 1974 request and elimination of MASF this year would be devastating. The 1.1 million man armed force of South Vietnam and the 80,000 man force of the Royal Lao Government are dependent upon us for "life-line" operations and maintenance support as well as for hardware replacements.

The pending Fulbright Amendment (No. 524) would strike the authorization for funding of South Vietnam and Laos. This amendment would shift authorized support from the Defense budget to the foreign aid budget. The Senate passed foreign aid bill, S-1443, does not provide any funding for operations and maintenance support of the armed forces of South Vietnam and Laos.

Support of South Vietnam and Laos under MASF during Fiscal Year 1974 must continue if we are to maintain stability in the area. If the President's initiatives for peace in Southeast Asia are to be successful, we must provide the means to restrict aggression.

I ask for your continued support of MASF for FY 1974.

Sincerely,

JAMES R. SCHLESINGER.

As I stated, Mr. President, this is a letter that was written to the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee (Mr. STENNIS) by Dr. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense. What he said in here concerning the Fulbright amendment No. 524 is equally applicable to the amendment of the distinguished Senator from Iowa, possibly more so, because he not only transfers the jurisdiction; he wants to cut the amount to \$500 million.

Mr. President, I now yield as much time as may be required to the distinguished Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS).

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, I would appreciate it if the Chair would let me know when 5 minutes are up.

I made a statement here on the floor about the preceding amendment, and I briefly repeat it, because it goes to the question of jurisdiction, as to why this military aid got over into the military authorization bill. This is not a fight, so far as I am concerned, with the Foreign Relations Committee. In fact, I welcome the time when we will not have to bring these matters up this way.

However, back in 1965, when the fighting stepped up in Vietnam, the then Secretary of Defense came to the late Senator Russell, then chairman of the committee—and I was not present at the conversation, but I was told about it and have refreshed my recollection about it and know it happened this way—and proposed that the military aid for South Vietnam in particular, in the fighting of the war that we were joining more and more every day, be financed like we did in the Korean war; that instead of going through the military assistance program that applied to the rest of the world, the money be paid by our military for their equipment, food, supplies, and everything else; that it be authorized under this bill and appropriated in the regular appropriation bill.

There was not any dissent from that. It was accepted. It passed with little attention.

But as the years came and went, the war was over; it had ended. It got to be an issue on the floor of the Senate as I became chairman, and we have had some rounds about it. I have said more than once that when the war was over and we had a cease-fire and when things were settling down, or words to that effect—I had the quotation here earlier, but I do not have the papers with me now—I would be through with it, and that our committee, as far as I was concerned, would not be handling this matter.

Then came the budget for fiscal year 1974 when they were putting the figures together in the Pentagon. The war was not stopped. We were pulling down rapidly, but we were still over there and were in the war to a degree. The POW's were not released. There was no cease-fire. So the Pentagon asked me about putting this item in the military bill again. I put them off. When we came back in session in January 1973 they said that they had to finalize the budget in 3 days, I believe it was. They were talking about military aid in the bill.

So I said, "We don't know whether there will be a cease-fire. We don't know whether we are going to get the POW's. We don't know what is going to happen." The thing was contradicting itself.

I said that so far as I was concerned, we would put the item in for this year, but that I was speaking only for the 1974 budget.

Just a few days thereafter, this thing happened to me. I went to the hospital, and I heard nothing more about the proposal, naturally, until sometime in the late summer. I remembered what had happened. The Armed Services Committee, as I understand, had fully passed on the matter. They went into it, took testimony, considered it, reduced the

amount, and no point was raised there by any member, as I am told, or by any other Senator, concerning the jurisdiction question.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. HUGHES. I thank the distinguished Chairman of the Armed Services Committee. I want to assure the distinguished chairman that the amendment does not become effective until the first of next July, at the beginning of the next fiscal year. It does not become effective during this fiscal year.

Mr. STENNIS. Perhaps something that I have said indicated that it did.

Mr. HUGHES. Will the Senator further yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. HUGHES. The Pentagon has stated in the committee hearings, that it needs 6 months' advance notice for planning to meet this transition.

By next fiscal year it is hoped that the shift could be accomplished, and we could hope to start it back in MAP at that time.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. If there was any inference contrary to what I was saying, I appreciate getting the matter straight.

Of course, we did not have hearings, anything of the kind. It seems to me that this situation is very demanding because we have got to go on and provide some military assistance, and do it now, for those people for whom we went to the rescue. We made sacrifices ourselves. We encouraged them by telling them we were standing by them, that we were going to Vietnamize this war, that we were going to put them in control, put them in the saddle. We did that by voting money. We stayed and stayed and stayed.

It is unthinkable to me that we would not put this money in Vietnam; and I think that we should put in enough, of course. According to the evidence, the \$952 million that the Senate committee agreed on represents the amount most probably needed.

So in the name of commonsense and humanity, let us not turn our backs or divert our course for this year. But here it is, and it is in a bill that is going to have to be signed into law and become law.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Mississippi an additional 5 minutes.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, appropriations can follow in an orderly way, and we will settle this matter in keeping with our promise. And I am not making any commitment for my part at all for next year. I do not want this to go on and on and on. I hope that this can move along as this committee has worked on it and that it can be resolved and that a firm recommendation may be made.

As a matter of fact, we had the whole thing in the preceding amendment, not altogether in the same fashion. However, the principle is largely the same. The Senate has spoken on the matter.

Mr. President, I appreciate the fine work that the Senator from Iowa has

done on many subject matters for our committee.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may need.

I would like to point out that this is a completely different issue from that contained in the prior amendment. We have already voted on that amendment. That would have wiped MASF out of this bill and made the transfer immediately to the Foreign Relations Committee. This amendment would transfer it in the beginning of fiscal year 1975.

The Pentagon told us that they needed 6 months for planning and preparation in order to do this. This is simply providing for an orderly procedure for doing what they told us years ago they intended to do. They said that when the war is over, this can be done. Unless my hearing is bad, we have been told time and time again that we are now at peace with honor and that there is no more war that this country is involved in. We have been told that the war is over.

Mr. President, if I am to believe what they said, now is the time for an orderly transition. They stated that they need 6 months to make an orderly transition.

This amendment allows them to make the transition at the beginning of the fiscal year 1975.

So in January next year, they can have 6 months and be ready to do it. And in the hearings everything can be orderly.

As far as the half a billion dollars that this amendment cuts it down to, the real question in the amendment is whether we should continue to spend such large amounts of money for South Vietnamese base support, for transportation, fuel, and so forth. And the \$690 million provided for these purposes is simply too high. The evidence in the committee and the evidence given this Senator did not support it. The need is not there for it.

In the opinion of this Senator, as the distinguished Senator from Minnesota said, with the \$1,200 million in the pipeline, in addition to the authorization, it is not a question of whether we are meeting our commitment. We are meeting it over and over again. This is simply to retain control in the Congress and make the transfer.

The amendment should be agreed to.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I think we ought to again place in the RECORD the fact that for every weapon that is lost to the Soviet Vietnamese, there will be a replacement. For every shell that is fired there, there will be a replacement.

We ought to know that the bill, S. 1443, does not deny the South Vietnamese weaponry. It says that if there is a need over and above the replacement that the President shall come to the Congress and make his proposal.

The amendment extends the program for the coming fiscal year and gives advance notice to the Department that there will be a cutoff. The amendment provides for \$500 million. That makes a total of \$1,700 million in the pipeline.

The South Vietnamese have their country loaded with weaponry that we gave them before the cease-fire. Everyone knows that, and they have one of

the largest navies in the world and one of the largest air forces in the world. We gave them that. They have millions of arms and millions of men in arms. They are not suffering from lack of munitions. They may suffer from lack of will, but not lack of munitions.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Minnesota for clarifying the matter.

Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. President, I would like to have a better understanding of what these contingency funds are to be used for. The word contingency suggests that they are to be held in reserve and not to be expended.

Can the Senator give me a better understanding of how these contingency funds will be used and whether they are going to be used and whether this amendment takes away from the Congress the opportunity to pass judgment on the use of these funds in the future as they affect our foreign policy?

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, this amendment does not provide for contingency funds. It is a yearly authorization. There is a backlog of funds that have not been expended. This is an authorization process we go through to keep these supplies and the salaries and so forth going to the South Vietnamese forces.

As the distinguished Senator from Minnesota has stated, there is \$1,200 million in the pipeline. This would authorize an additional \$500 million. There would be a total of \$1,700 million. Moreover, they plan to spend, as near as I can tell, only \$800 million, even if we give them all the money.

Mr. TUNNEY. That is the point I was trying to direct the Senator's attention to. What will become of the other money that is not spent, that we will have made available to the Department of Defense?

Mr. HUGHES. Hopefully, as the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island indicated earlier, if someone does not steal it, it will remain in the pipeline for the future.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, might I ask a further question.

Mr. HUGHES. I yield.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, is any part of that money that we are talking about to be used to pay the South Vietnamese soldier to fight for his own freedom?

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, \$47.5 million goes to pay the personnel costs of the forces of Laos and South Vietnam.

Mr. PASTORE. That means that we are paying the South Vietnamese soldier, the South Vietnamese general, and the South Vietnamese admiral with American dollars to fight for their own freedom.

Mr. HUGHES. We are paying \$47.5 million for the purpose of providing subsistence and other assistance to the Laos and South Vietnamese forces.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I have heard of mercenaries going into other countries. However, I have never heard of our making mercenaries out of people who are fighting for their own freedom.

Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. President, if I un-

derstood correctly what the Senator from Minnesota said, if any plane is lost by the South Vietnamese Government, if any tank is lost or any weapon destroyed, that automatically there will be a replacement of that plane, that tank, or that weapon.

Mr. HUGHES. The Senator is correct.

Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. President, that money to pay for those planes, those tanks, and those weapons is from the moneys we are putting in for this purpose.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, that comes out of the pipeline money, the Senator from Minnesota mentioned, the \$1,200 million, and this \$500 million is on top of that.

Mr. TUNNEY. It is anticipated that only \$800 million would be spent. It is not only paying for the salaries of the South Vietnamese troops, but it is also to pay for the replacement parts and equipment that has been lost or destroyed.

Mr. HUGHES. It is only \$800 million of the new obligation that is intended to be spent for those purposes.

Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. President, how many more hundreds of millions of dollars will be left in the pipeline?

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, if the figure of \$1,200 million is right, with the \$500 million provided here there would be a total of \$1,700 million. We are not sure how much money in that pipeline is already scheduled to be obligated. At any rate, there would be a substantial sum of money left in the pipeline.

Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I shall require.

The statement was made that there was no proof before the committee on this matter. I call the attention of the Senate to the fact that in part 8, pages 5890 and 5891, the Deputy Secretary of Defense testified. He made a strong statement in support of the position the committee took, except that the administration asked more than the committee gave. I will just read one sentence from that statement by way of conclusion:

The administration strongly opposes this measure because of the risks involved and because it would not be a practical move at this critical juncture.

I would also like to read one sentence from Dr. Schlesinger's letter:

Further reduction to the FY 1974 request and elimination of MASF this year would be devastating.

Mr. President, it is simply the question of whether or not we want to preserve the base which we have obtained in Vietnam. The people are willing to fight for themselves. We have turned it over to them. It is their responsibility, but they do not have the resources to do it. If we want everything we fought for there for 12 years to go down the drain, the way to do it is just not to help the South Vietnamese to obtain ammunition and weapons and things with which to fight themselves.

The administration feels very strongly about this amendment. It is very important to the peace of the world, in my opinion, because we do not know what a

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flare-up in any part of the world can bring.

I hope the Senate will reject the amendment.

If it is agreeable to the distinguished Senator from Iowa, I am willing to yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. President, I wish to indicate my support for the amendment offered by the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES). This amendment would do two very important things: It will reduce our commitment to provide arms for the Saigon Government by a half billion dollars, and second, it will place a firm deadline on the ending of the MASF program for funding military aid to South Vietnam and Laos through the military budget. My able colleague from Iowa has already stated many of the important reasons which compel adoption of his amendment. I will add only a few of my thoughts, and also bring to the attention of the Senators a document which sheds a great deal of light on this question.

Last April, Senator HUMPHREY released to the Congress and the American people a copy of an unclassified internal Defense Department document, from J. Fred Buzhardt, which described a plan by the DOD leadership to transfer the whole foreign military aid and sales budget to the DOD budget, merging all programs into MASF. In the interests of this discussion, I will insert into the RECORD of a portion of this memorandum, the full text of which, with Senator HUMPHREY's cogent remarks, appears at page 12477 of the RECORD of April 16, 1973.

This document shows that the Defense Department was trying to use every maneuver possible to keep its MASF program. Why the great fear that MASF might be returned to the foreign aid budget, where it now belongs? For one thing, Mr. Buzhardt's memo makes clear that MASF is a great slush fund to help pay for unexpected military contingencies in Southeast Asia. Buzhardt wrote:

That MASF provided funds to provide logistic support to the South Vietnamese armed forces . . . and the added assistance which would be required if compliance with the cease fire accords collapses and active hostilities resume.

This is a simple admission by the administration that MASF is not what it is stated to be. It is not just a program to replace South Vietnamese equipment; it is a program which allows them to expand fighting, to fundamentally alter the military situation in Southeast Asia. By having this cushion, the administration can support any South Vietnamese military program without having to go back to Congress.

I think this is an outrageous proposition.

We have given enormous amounts of military assistance to the South Vietnamese already, including a vast buildup of equipment just before the cease-fire. Much of this is just lying unused, because the South Vietnamese have not got the training to use or maintain it. Moreover, there is now a viable cease-fire in Laos and less fighting in South Vietnam, re-

ducing the need for these MASF funds. The South Vietnamese have more than enough equipment right now to meet any reasonable needs; we must not also provide them with a slush fund which would encourage them to upgrade the level of fighting.

If there is any serious increase in fighting in South Vietnam, the administration should come to us for a supplemental appropriation for military assistance. I have no doubt that it would be approved if a case can be made for its necessity. But I strongly believe that it is unwise to give all this money for aid which may not be needed, and which may then be misused by the South Vietnamese, outside our control.

The Buzhardt memo had a second, very interesting point which I want my colleagues to share. DOD had a very good reason why it wanted to put all the military assistance programs, worldwide, into its MASF program. Mr. Buzhardt pointed out that, if military assistance were spread out through the various Defense Department accounts, it would be "less visible." What this memo is telling us is that MASF is a good program from DOD's point of view, because it avoids the scrutiny which the Congress always places on its foreign aid programs. This rationale is very disturbing to me; I think it points out even more strongly the need to control and eliminate this MASF program. This is why the second portion of Senator HUGHES' amendment is so important: It puts the Defense Department and the administration on notice that the MASF goose will stop laying its golden eggs come next June. The argument has been made here, on the earlier amendment of Senator FULBRIGHT, that it is too late in the year to switch from MASF to foreign aid funding. Well, this amendment will make sure that this argument cannot be used on us next year.

We have great stringencies in our domestic economy. Inflation is rampant, our balance of payments are recovering, but in a serious situation. Of all the programs in our defense budget, this vast aid program to South Vietnam is one of the least justifiable. At a minimum, we must heed the call for fiscal restraint by cutting a half billion unnecessary dollars from this aid program.

And we must finally remember that a portion of the military assistance which we are voting in this bill is being used by the Thieu regime to keep thousands upon thousands of political prisoners in jail, and to turn South Vietnam ever more into a police state. I strongly urge my colleagues to adopt, next week, the Abourezk amendment to the foreign aid bill, which will prevent any of our assistance programs—MASF included—from being used to support police programs. In the meanwhile, we should cut this authorization to make sure that these excess funds will not find their way into the prisons of South Vietnam.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a portion of the memorandum by Mr. Buzhardt be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., March 27, 1973.

Hon. ROY L. ASH,
Director, Office of Management and Budget,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. ASH: Reference is made to your request for the views of the Department of Defense on the proposed FY 1974 Foreign Assistance authorization bill submitted by the Department of State.

Insofar as the text of that bill is concerned, the Department of Defense recommends certain revisions to section 15 and 20 thereof and the addition of a new section 21. Enclosure 3 to this letter sets forth the texts of those sections as revised by the Department of Defense. Enclosure 4 sets forth the reasons for our recommended revisions.

Even as thus revised, however, the Department of Defense does not concur in the Department of State's proposal. The approach taken by the Department of State is to retain the status quo, namely, to keep military assistance for South Vietnam and Laos (MASF) in the Defense budget and military assistance for other countries and foreign military sales credits in the foreign aid budget. We recognize that this approach is consistent with the decision made by the President a few months ago during his consideration of the FY 1974 Budget Message, but that decision was made in the context of a shooting war in Indochina in which the United States was an active participant. In our view, the current factual situation warrants reconsideration of that decision and a different approach to meet the new situation.

As we see it, the legislative option adopted by the Administration should be designed to meet the following goals:

1. Assure Congressional support for a Southeast Asia reconstruction program—including North Vietnam when that becomes timely—in FY 1974 at an adequate funding level without—

- (a) Increasing the total federal budget;
- (b) Cutting domestic programs to find savings for reconstruction;
- (c) Increasing the NOA requested for foreign aid; and
- (d) Diverting funds from other foreign aid requirements.

2. Retain the MASF or equivalent authority at least through FY 1974 in order to assure our ability to provide logistic support to the South Vietnamese armed forces (consumables, spare parts, contract support and one-for-one replacement of major items) and the added assistance which would be required if compliance with the cease fire accords collapses and active hostilities resume.

We do not believe that the State Department's proposal will achieve those goals.

Insofar as reconstruction is concerned, the State Department approach does not expressly address the issue of the sources of funds for reconstruction in North Vietnam when that becomes timely, and provides for the funding of reconstruction in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia at the expense of the supporting assistance requirements of those countries for military budget support and of supporting assistance requirements worldwide. (Assuming that Congress would, as it has in the past, earmark \$50 million of supporting assistance for Israel, only \$40 million would remain for supporting assistance requirements worldwide inclusive of Indochina).

Although not articulated in its submission of the proposed bill, presumably the Department of State contemplates that funds for reconstruction in North Vietnam, when that becomes, timely, would be made available through a budget amendment transferring funds from the MASF and/or military functions budget for Southeast Asia operations. Any such transfer, however, would mean an

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move that the vote by which the amendment was rejected be reconsidered.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 532

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DOMENICI). The Senate will now proceed to the consideration of the amendment by the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGOVERN) No. 532, on which there shall be 4 hours of debate.

The clerk will state the amendment.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

At the end of title I add a new section as follows:

“SEC. 102. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the sum which may be appropriated in the fiscal year 1974 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for procurement under this title shall not exceed a total amount of \$9,895,235,000.”

At the end of title II add a new section as follows:

“SEC. 202. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the sum which may be appropriated in the fiscal year 1974 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for research, development, test, and evaluation under this title shall not exceed a total amount of \$6,964,033,000.”

On page 20, in line five, strike the figure “156,100,” and insert in lieu thereof the figure “166,000.”

On page 20, after line 17, insert a new subsection as follows:

“(c) The end year strength for direct-hire civilian personnel employed by the Armed Forces of the United States or by agencies of the Department of Defense shall not exceed 911,700.”

On page 27, in line 1, strike out the words, “Not to exceed \$952,000,000,” and insert in lieu thereof the word, “None.”

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, with the Senator's permission, I should like to suggest the absence of a quorum and ask unanimous consent that the time not be taken out of the Senator's time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time on the pending amendment be reduced from 4 to 3 hours under the same regulations as before.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we have no objection.

Mr. MANSFIELD. And it will be not to exceed the 3 hours.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Does the Senator from South Dakota desire his amendments to be considered en bloc?

Mr. McGOVERN. I do desire that they be considered en bloc, Mr. President.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Who yields time?

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may require.

This amendment is basically a five-point proposal that deals with the broad categories in the Defense appropriation bill.

First, it sets a ceiling of \$9,895 million, approximately \$10 billion, on fiscal year 1974 appropriations for military procurement. That is, in round figures, about \$2½ billion below the total amount authorized in the committee bill for all armed services and for all kinds of weapons.

Mr. President, while there are still some Senators in the Chamber I ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I emphasize that this is not an expenditure ceiling for fiscal 1974. It does not substitute for action of that kind along the lines the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE) has proposed. I personally strongly back the expenditure ceiling set by the Senator from Wisconsin. I think it made good sense. But we should understand the difference between the kind of ceiling I am proposing here today and the one the Senator from Wisconsin proposed yesterday.

This is a ceiling on new obligational authority rather than a ceiling on the actual expenditures for fiscal 1974.

In fact, where procurement is concerned, only about 15 percent of the money authorized in the bill and appropriated later this session will be spent in fiscal 1974.

Since we typically appropriate ahead of the actual needs for spending outlays in this area, the remaining 85 percent of the 1974 spending comes out of money appropriated in previous years.

Second, the amendment sets an appropriation ceiling of approximately \$7 billion for military research and development. That is about \$1 billion below the amount authorized in the committee bill.

Again, this is not an outlay ceiling for fiscal 1974. As a rule, I am told, no more than 40 percent or 50 percent of the money appropriated for research and development in a given year is actually spent in that year. So the amendment is addressed primarily to research and development spending in fiscal 1975 and beyond, just as was the case with the first part of the amendment having to do with procurement.

Third, the amendment makes a further slight reduction in the authorized yearend personnel strength for active duty Armed Forces. The committee called for a cut of 156,000 personnel. My amendment would cut back an additional 9,900 in active duty manpower at the end of fiscal 1974, leaving a total end-year strength of 2,067,000 personnel.

While it is hard to estimate the total savings with any precision, this amendment, compared with the committee position, would permit a reduction in 1974 appropriations of approximately \$50 million, with savings of \$100 million a year in subsequent years.

Compared to the administration's proposed force level, total military manpower savings would be in the range of \$850 million this year and \$1.7 billion in subsequent years.

Mr. President, the fourth section of

this amendment calls for a 10-percent cut in the Pentagon civilian bureaucracy, leaving a yearend civilian manpower strength of 911,000. This would save approximately one-half billion dollars this year and about \$1 billion in each following year.

The fifth, and final, section of the amendment would delete all the remaining Pentagon funded aid to Indochina in this bill. This does not mean that all military aid to Indochina would be terminated, since, under other legislation—S. 1443, the Foreign Military Sales and Assistance Act, which was passed by the Senate last June—there is sufficient authority in that bill to cover military aid to Indochina in any amount being appropriated by Congress.

I stress these points because those who do not analyze it carefully may misconstrue this amendment as a much deeper cut than it actually is, by comparing it to the wrong figures in the President's proposed fiscal 1974 budget or in the Armed Services Committee report on H.R. 9286.

To further clarify this distinction, the administration has planned an increase of some \$4.2 billion in arms outlays in fiscal 1974—that is, in actual expenditures—moving up from \$74.8 billion to \$79 billion. That is money that will actually leave the Treasury in the course of this fiscal year.

As I said earlier, I think we could have safely limited those expenditures to last year's level, as Senator PROXMIRE proposed, particularly since the Pentagon is already limited to spending at last year's rate by the continuing resolution.

But the administration has also sought a dramatic increase in authority for new appropriations, money to be appropriated this year but to be spent largely in subsequent years. The administration has asked for a total of \$85.2 billion of new money for Department of Defense military programs and military assistance, the same items covered by the \$79 billion outlay figure cited earlier.

What concerns me most about this \$85 billion figure is that it clearly forecasts even greater demands in the years ahead. Whenever there is such a large gap between current actual expenditures and requested appropriations for the future, it signals us that we are in the early stages of a sharp escalation in military spending. I do not know how it can be read in any other way. The gap between outlays and requested new money in fiscal 1974 is more than \$6 billion.

The authors of the Brookings Institution report setting national priorities in the 1974 budget have given us some specific estimates on this matter; and in connection with the administration's recommended military budget, they state:

The cost in constant dollars of these forces is projected to rise steadily through the rest of the decade. In current dollars, the base line defense budget would increase from \$82 billion in fiscal 1974 to \$104 billion in 1978.

So, as we vote on these authorizations, Mr. President, I think Members of the Senate should be aware that we are moving along very rapidly toward a military

budget well in excess of \$100 billion just a few years hence.

That is a progression I think we have to turn around now. That is why I have proposed the appropriation ceilings in the pending amendment, No. 532. Those on procurement and research and development will not have much impact in the current fiscal year, since actual spending in those areas will come primarily out of the previous appropriations, in any event, but they will break this distressing trend toward a \$100 billion military budget just a few years down the road. I suggest, further, that if we are serious about bringing this huge Military Establishment under control, the time to do it is now.

Mr. President, I have participated in debates on military spending ever since I first came to the Senate, almost 11 years ago; and over the years, we have had the same arguments thrown out time after time after time, to the effect that that was a bad time to consider any reductions in the arms budget. There never has been a time in those 11 years when the defenders of an escalating military budget have said now is the time to make substantial reductions in military outlays.

When programs are in the research and development stage, before we really begin buying substantial military hardware, we are told that it is not wise to cut back on projects in the research and development stage, because all they represent, anyway, is the pursuit of a number of different options, that they are simply studies to explore the technology and to give us a chance to make the real production decisions later. Then, when the request for the production money does come before us, we are told that we cannot cut these systems because that would mean wasting hundreds of millions of dollars that have already been spent on research and development and on prototypes and all the rest. Then, if we try to get a handle on military spending by setting total ceilings on what the Pentagon can spend, we are told that that will throw the whole Pentagon game plan into disarray, since the vote always comes after the fiscal year has already begun, and that cutting overall outlays would mean cutting into money that has already been spent or is into the spending rates that already have been set.

But if we try to cut appropriations, someone usually points out that it is irresponsible to reach into expenditures planned for the future, when we cannot predict what the future will be. Mr. President, that is always going to be true.

We are never going to know what the future holds. All we can do is try to arrive at some reasonable estimate of what the most likely defense demands on the country are going to be. Meanwhile, other arguments are used against any kind of tampering with the defense budget. We are told there are delicate negotiations to be considered and if we seek to cut out anything before these negotiations are completed—and they seem to be endless—we are depriving our negotiators of bargaining chips. If we try to cut military spending after a treaty is negotiated, we are told we have to have a

hedge against a violation on the other side.

Senators will remember after we negotiated the first phase of the SALT agreement there were many requests for increases in military spending. It prompted some Senators to wonder if we could afford the arms reduction agreement, if it could be argued we are going to spend more money for arms to make sure we have the power to back up any possible snafu in the agreement.

We are told we cannot let the détente lower our guard. Let the other side think we are unwilling to spend less money. I suppose the theory is that if we negotiate some kind of better understanding of the Soviet Union, we want them to think we are as tough as we were the day before. They would have to spend more money after we have succeeded in negotiating some points with them, and presumably it works the same way on the other side.

It is said we must continue to build weapons not specifically prohibited by the agreement as bargaining chips for the next round of talks.

After listening to all of these arguments over the years, I have come to the conclusion that under the rules of those who always plead the Pentagon case there will never be a right time to look at this arms budget credibly or cut back on portions that seem unnecessary.

Whoever it was that came up with the imaginative idea of changing the name of the War Department to the Department of Defense was a public relations genius. If we had had the foresight to call the rest of these departments by a similar name, what a difference it would have made. For example, HEW; if we had called health a part of the defense of the Nation, or if we had called education a part of the defense of the Nation, perhaps we would have been more successful in heading off these things that affect the health of the Nation, but after all, are part of the defense of this country just as bombs and missiles are a part of the defense of this country.

But somehow as I have watched these votes in the last few days, we seem to evidence once again a kind of reverence and regard for anything which has a defense label, even though Senators have made a strong case that some of these expenditures contribute little or nothing to the defense of our country, and somehow weaken the Nation by depriving us of resources we need for other essential purposes.

That was the great and eloquent point the late President Eisenhower made so well in his farewell address when he said if the military spends too much, it actually weakens the Nation's strength rather than contributing to our overall stability.

I think that 1974 is the essential time, regardless of these arguments that we have heard for so many years, to make some modest reduction in military outlays. Let me suggest other considerations which should weigh more heavily. One reason is simply that this budget does contain the seeds of a vast growing military establishment that may soon overrun us.

I do not mean that in a literal sense,

but I do mean it in the sense that the late Senator ELLENDER, I think, had in mind when he once said that we are virtually in the hands of the military and it is so difficult to reverse these decisions once they have been made by Pentagon planners.

Just the major strategic systems, which is \$4.5 billion requested this year, will cost in the range of \$33 billion in years ahead. In other words, in this new obligatory authority, where we begin a new system, but what we authorize here today, as those systems move along that carry that \$4.5 billion in new authorizations this year the cost will go to some \$33 billion in the years immediately ahead. That includes nothing more than replacement, modernization, protection of our ICBM's, or SLBM's, bombers, and strategic air defense. It does not include costly new approaches that are still on the drawing board that few Members of Congress even know about.

Furthermore, we have selected new conventional weapons for which \$410 million has been requested in the budget before us, and which would actually involve outlays of more than \$11 billion in the next few years. I do not think that either Congress or the American people would actually accept those costs if they knew the seeds of escalating military costs that are contained in the bill before us.

We ought to begin paring down now before we start wasting more money on systems that I am convinced ultimately will be scrapped, cut back, or abandoned entirely.

Another reason for moving now is that we are in a time frame where the American people expect some reductions in arms spending. We have the phase I agreement on strategic arms. Congress has written and the administration has accepted a law which requires the end of our long and costly military involvement in Indochina. That was the real meaning of the August 15 cutoff putting an end to any further military operations anywhere in Indochina. Surely, that action in itself ought to produce the basis for some modest reduction in military expenditures. The President has been to Moscow and Peking and we have learned more about the intentions and the capabilities of these countries; and yet while the President hails a generation of peace, for which we all praise him, he offers a budget that prepares for a generation of war, of more and more elaborate new weapons, and American forces scattered all over the globe.

If détente is real, as we are told it is, if the SALT talks are succeeding, and if peace is cheaper than war, I think the American people have a right to expect that arms spending will go down and not up as this legislation now indicates, and that is what we should require.

The question of priorities is another reason why we should move this year to halt the upward spiral in military spending. This issue could not be more clearly drawn. The President maintains we are threatening to overspend the total budget ceiling he and Congress set by as much as \$7 billion. Every Senator knows that was leveled at the head of every Member

of this body by the President, that we are going to break his budget to the extent of \$7 billion. We have done no such thing, if for no other reason than that we have not acted on the whole program, and the military budget is the largest single component.

But we probably will exceed the budget limits, with some help from the impoundment rulings of the courts and the high interest policies of the Federal Reserve Board, unless we make some sizable changes in this program for arms.

The President, despite his professed concern about the overall size of the budget, declares flatly that he will accept no reductions in his military budget. He continues to veto any domestic bill that spends more than he wants, and now he combines that with a threat to veto any military bill that spends less than he wants.

You cannot draw the issue any more sharply than that.

The President has said, "Let us bring the total budget down, but do not touch the military budget. If you reduce that budget, I will veto the bill. On the other hand, if you increase the spending that I have requested for water and sewer grants, for pollution control programs, for education, for health, for assistance to the handicapped, I am going to veto that legislation." And that is exactly what has happened.

As the Congress, by substantial margins, votes these programs to strengthen the foundations of our society here, one after another is vetoed, and apparently we lack the two-thirds support to override those vetoes.

So, in effect, the President is running the country with one-third support in either the House or the Senate. That is all it takes to defeat what Congress considers to be the proper priorities.

I have no idea what will happen if we cut back what the President has requested for military spending, but at least we will have done our part in meeting the overall budget ceilings that both Congress and the President have suggested.

The simple choice that faces Congress is whether we are going to permit the President, as one man, to dictate national priorities or whether we are going to insist that the legislative branch carries out the function we have under the Constitution, and that is to determine what the legislative priorities of the Nation are. Put more bluntly, the question is whether all the discussions we have had about asserting congressional power over the purse is anything more than empty talk. That really is what is at stake here.

In March the President vetoed a bill authorizing funds to provide jobs and training for the handicapped. Who in the Senate is prepared to tell the 10 million handicapped adults in this country that they cannot have the help they need, because we want the money for a new airborne warning and control system to protect against a nonexistent Soviet bomber threat?

Who is going to explain to the 10 million handicapped that they cannot have the funds they need to be trained to do

something useful in life, because we have to have that money for a highly doubtful advance airborne warning and control system having to do with what I believe to be a nonexistent bombing threat?

Calling it inflationary budget-breaking legislation, the President vetoed in April a bill to reinstate rural water and sewer grants for small towns.

Calling it "inflationary budget-breaking legislation," the President vetoed in April a bill to reinstate rural water and sewer grants for small towns—that was the bill that the Senator from Vermont (Mr. ARKEN), the senior Republican in the Senate, introduced some years ago; as I recall, it had 96 cosponsors in the Senate—to provide grants and low-cost loans to small towns to improve their water systems and to improve their waste disposal systems.

That bill was vetoed on the ground that it was an "inflationary budget-breaking piece of legislation."

The President had previously impounded \$120 in funds for that program and had announced its cancellation by Executive decree.

Mr. President, which Senator is going to tell the people who are worried about pollution and about clean drinking water and about an adequate water supply in their town and about the adequate handling of waste that their concerns are going to have to wait, because General Thieu and his contemporaries in Indochina need another \$1 billion in Pentagon aid in order to stay in power?

In August the President vetoed an emergency medical services bill, even though he had earlier cited studies showing that better ambulance and emergency room services would save 60,000 lives a year.

Sixty thousand lives a year happen to be just a slightly greater number than the total amount of all the young men killed in 10 years of fighting in Indochina—and that emergency services bill provided assistance that is needed to improve the handling of patients over into hospitals under emergency conditions. The President's own people, his own experts, estimated it could save up to 60,000 lives in a year.

But that bill was vetoed on the ground that it was inflationary.

It is interesting that the emergency medical services bill authorized for the 3 fiscal years, 1974, 1975, and 1976 is just half the amount, or \$360 million, that this military bill contained for finishing the Safeguard antiballistic missile system in North Dakota.

Mr. President, does anyone really think that having one Safeguard antiballistic missile system in North Dakota is going to save a single life? And yet half the cost of completing that system would have paid for the emergency medical services bill that the best experts the administration has say would have saved 6,000 lives a year.

I find it unconscionable and irrational that that kind of scale of priorities exists, and I do not know how to explain that to the people of my State.

When I testified before the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee on this matter, one distinguished Senator, whom

I greatly admire for many of the positions he takes, suggested that it would be wasteful to stop building that Safeguard installation since it was almost completed. He pointed out that we have already spent more than \$5 billion out of the total of \$5.5 billion that the system will cost; so why not put a half billion more into it, even though common-sense would demonstrate to any of us that one defensive missile sitting up there in North Dakota is not going to defend this country against anyone. Whether or not that system is ever finished, it will not give 1 ounce of added security. It is not going to save anybody's life. We cannot have a nationwide defense missile system, because of the SALT agreement, and both the United States and the Soviet Union agreed not to build an antiballistic system. We were authorized to go ahead and complete this one installation, but that does not mean we have to do it.

Now, the \$360 million which is going to be programmed in this bill to complete the system, while it may seem like a drop in the bucket in terms of the \$80 billion military budget, is still twice as much as the President saved when he vetoed an emergency medical services program that would have saved thousands of lives.

The President has recently vetoed another bill, the proposed increase in the minimum wage to \$2.20 an hour by next July 1. Again he called it inflationary. Again, I simply cannot believe that very many people are going to buy that argument.

Why is it inflationary to increase the wages of workers who are at the very bottom of the economic heap and who feel the inflationary pinch more painfully than anything else? They are the ones who are the first to feel the cut-back in the grocery budget in the face of inflated food prices.

If it is inflationary to give a modest increase in wages to these people who are at the bottom, why is it not inflationary to increase by many billions of dollars our spending on military programs?

Why does it not occur to the President that there is inflation involved in a request to increase by billions of dollars a military budget that is already the largest single component in our Federal budget? As a matter of fact, Mr. President, the money spent for this purpose is more inflationary than anything else, because it creates purchasing power by paying wages to people who are working in these defense products without increasing corresponding goods and services that can be bought by the public in the marketplace. A housewife does not go out and buy a tank or buy a missile. And obviously, once that missile is shot or a bomb is dropped, they add nothing.

The same amount of money invested in a child's mind, in education, or in improving the health of our people will continue over the years to contribute something to help our country. The money we spend on military items is not only inflationary, but it is inflationary in the most effective sense since it is creating something that the American people cannot buy and use.

And if inflation is our concern, as it certainly ought to be, we ought to look first to this enormously swollen Pentagon budget for a solution and we ought to look last to these low-income workers who so desperately need a raise to keep up with the rising prices.

I am certainly not going to go back to the low-income workers in my State and tell them that we could not do anything about the workers who are at the bottom of the scale, most of whom are unorganized and do not belong to labor unions.

I am not going to tell them that there is nothing that we could do about raising income because that would be inflationary. And I am not going to tell them that we hope they can pay for this military budget which includes an excessive overkill capacity that goes away beyond anything that is really needed for the defense of the country.

These vetoes are past actions. Perhaps I have dwelt too long on them. However, the contrast is continuing in other areas. I frankly think that if our national security is in peril today, it is not because we have given the Pentagon too little. A lot of our difficulty is because we have offered too much for arms and too little for other sources of national strength.

Mr. President, I again plead with the Senate to try to come up with a more realistic definition of what constitutes national defense and national security.

One of the reasons we got into this tragic Watergate mess was because we made a god out of national security. We got to the point in our operations overseas where we were willing to short circuit the Constitution by secretly bombing neutral countries. We got into the habit of playing dirty tricks on other countries in the name of national security.

I think it is ineffective. The way we treat people at home is not right. Some of the people who are being investigated by the Watergate committee have said that everything they did was done by them in the name of national security.

We can carry that doctrine to the point where it destroys our security and undermines our real national strength.

I remember 33 years ago, as a high school freshman, that after the 1940 Presidential election Mr. Willkie, the defeated candidate, took a trip around the world at the request of President Roosevelt. He came back and reported to the President that one thing he found in every country visited was a reservoir of good will toward the United States. No one was suspicious of our motives.

We were not the strongest military power in the world; but he said the greatest reservoir of strength the United States had was that people everywhere he went trusted the decency, the honesty, and the integrity of the American Government. They believed in the essential goodness and decency of the American people, not because we had an Air Force as strong as some of the others around the world.

I recognize that we went too far in the 1930's and the early 1940's in being inadequately prepared militarily. But we should not forget that that fine, intelli-

gent man who traveled the world over 30 years ago said that the greatest power we had going for us around the world was that our allies trusted our integrity. So let us be careful, even in the name of national security, before we authorize everything that comes up here with that kind of label attached.

We are threatened by a fuel and energy crisis, while our best scientists and engineers are still absorbed in military overkill. The America that was once the world's breadbasket now finds cubboards that are bare and a policy that is barren of ways to assure that we and those in need have enough to eat.

At one time a couple of years ago—I do not think the condition has changed—three-fourths of the best scientific personnel were devoted to the military and space programs. We should have competent people in those areas; but should we have three-fourths of the best engineering, research, and scientific talent of the country tied down to military operations at a time when Germany, Japan, and other countries are beginning to outstrip us in the field of civilian production, taking away from us markets that once were ours, and making it difficult for us to sell to our own people because of their breakthroughs in concentrating their talent on domestic needs?

While our statesmen have concerned themselves with military muscle, our economic muscle has depleted to the point where both our allies and adversaries, some of them with no armed forces, have been able to exploit the economic programs of this country.

The President talked about our being a No. 1 power. The only trouble with that is that we are in real danger of becoming a second-rate economic power. Our dollar has become secondrate. We have become secondrate in the marketplaces of the world. On the basis of the President's vetoes over the past several years, most of us certainly recognize now that increasing arms budgets are at war with other priorities; that increased arms budgets can actually weaken the vital sources of national power. It is clear that if Congress does not cut this military request, it is going to mean cutting elsewhere in programs already approved by strong congressional majorities. That is exactly what is going to happen.

The President is winning the battle as to who shall control the purse strings of the country. Thomas Jefferson and James Madison would turn over in their graves if they could see the President of the United States—one man sitting in the White House—determining which programs are going to live and which are going to die; where the money in the budget is going to be allocated; with Congress sitting helplessly while programs are settled in the executive branch.

It is clear that that will mean an inadequate response to the difficult problems of energy, food, health, housing, transportation, the environment, and others, which the American people have been telling us in every way they can that they want solved.

So on the grounds of priorities in 1974 and beyond, we do have the strongest

possible incentive for examining this military request carefully, for determining, before we elect to "err on the side of strength," whether we must err at all.

A fourth reason for tightening up this year is that we should certainly realize by now that it is not enough to exhort the Pentagon about efficiency and about devising simpler and less expensive weapons which could do the job just as well at less cost.

Mr. President, I do not find it hard to understand why the Pentagon is made to fight for every dollar they get out of Congress. No general or admiral ever felt he was fully prepared for the battle ahead, and you and I would do the same thing: we would do everything we could to get every last dollar for preparedness by way of equipment.

It is our job to compare these requests with the other needs of the country, and then make a judgment as to how the resources of our country should be allocated.

I am disturbed to see one proposal after another going down to defeat, including the troop reduction proposal of the Senator from Montana, which passed here yesterday morning, and then, after intensive Pentagon lobbying, we backed away from it in the afternoon.

That is not the way for us to demonstrate our ability to control the allocation of money for our national priorities.

This is a problem that should concern us regardless of how large any one of us thinks the U.S. baseline military force should be. For example, Senator PROXIMIRE submitted a paper for the McGovern Panel on National Security which assisted in the campaign last year. He pointed out that our proposed F-14 fighter was expected to cost \$20 million apiece, whereas the Soviet Union was able to produce its Mig-21 fighter for approximately \$2 million each, calculated on the basis of U.S. dollars and U.S. labor costs. And he made this disturbing calculation:

For the same number of dollars, the Russians can put 10 planes in the air against one American aircraft.

Mr. President, where does it all end? We are up to a \$20 million fighter plane today. Where does this end?

I think we have that same problem across the board in military procurement. The F-15 is going to be an extremely expensive air superiority fighter for the Air Force because the Pentagon decided to build in more capabilities than it needs. The cost of each proposed B-1 bomber is now estimated in the range of \$45 million, or over \$56 million including research and development costs, compared to the original estimates of \$25 to \$30 million. Two years ago many people were startled when Congressman SEIBERLING and I projected cost escalation of almost precisely this size in a report on the B-1 prepared for Members of Congress for Peace Through Law.

We predicted at that time that the \$25 to \$30 million estimated cost of each B-1 bomber would double in the next couple of years. We were ridiculed for that prediction, but that is exactly what

has happened since in these 2 years' time, and it is happening principally because of this pressure to incorporate the most advanced technology and the most advanced imaginable capabilities, regardless of whether or not it is related to the threat we can project. Of course, a part of this is due to the inflationary spiral; but a part of it is due to the tremendously complicated nature of these weapons systems, that go beyond the real needs of the weapon.

Members of the Armed Services Committee have addressed this problem before. The report on the fiscal 1972 military procurement bill said that:

If the geometric cost increase for weapon systems is not sharply reversed, then even significant increases in the defense budget may not insure the force levels required for our national security.

Now, 2 years later, the Armed Services Committee report says much the same thing:

The Committee regrets that this dilemma is even sharper today than it was two years ago.

So we are still up against this appetite for elaborate and expensive arms. They are still offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, so that the choice is not between, say, the F-14 and a less complex system, but between the F-14 or no new Navy fighter at all. And I predict here today that we will not change that situation with words in committee reports. We will change it only if we exert some real fiscal discipline on the Pentagon, just as we do with other Departments, and put a lid on how much they can spend. And 1974 is the time to do it—we must surely have learned this lesson by now.

Mr. President, I have here a lengthy analysis and specific suggestions as to how the various categorical reductions could be made, but I do not think I shall go into those. They enumerate a number of areas where cuts could be made, for example in procurement or in research and development. I prefer simply to include that with my prepared remarks, and at this point of the debate simply to press on to the Senate the urgency of setting some kind of ceiling along the lines I have suggested here in each of the major categories.

SPECIFIC SAVINGS SUGGESTIONS

As I have indicated, amendment No. 532 addresses categories of money—procurement, research and development, military manpower, civilian manpower, and military aid—without specifying where cuts would have to be made to meet the ceilings in those areas. I regard it as a middle ground between two congressional strategies—between cutting specific systems on the one hand, or setting an overall spending or appropriations ceiling on the other.

But I do think it is useful to illustrate how the ceilings could be met. And it could be done without going beyond weapons systems and deployments which have already been widely questioned.

(1) PROCUREMENT

As I have noted, most of the procurement savings would be realized in future years because most of the money appropriated in the fiscal 1974 defense ap-

propriations bill will not be spent until fiscal 1975 or later.

I have recommended a ceiling on appropriations for military procurement of \$9,895,235,000, which is \$2,507,000 below the committee figure. It could be met by the following steps:

First. End construction of the third *Nimitz* class nuclear carrier, the CVAN-70, entailing a reduction to 11 carriers, instead of 12, by 1980. Procurement savings would be \$657 million.

Second. Terminate the F-14 program where it stands, and rely upon the F-4 for carrier based aircraft. Procurement savings would be \$197.6 million.

Third. Cut all Trident procurement funds. Savings would be \$872.8 million.

Fourth. End construction on the single Safeguard site in North Dakota. Procurement savings would be \$159.3 million.

Fifth. Postpone any further installations of MIRV warheads on Minuteman. Savings would be \$608.6 million.

Sixth. Cut long lead procurement for the Airborne Warning and Control System, saving \$11.7 million.

Cutting procurement funds would not, of course, result in an absolute cancellation of any of these programs. In the case of Trident, for example, the major dispute is over timing. Should we rush ahead now? Or should we regard it as an orderly program to replace the Polaris/Poseidon submarines when they begin reaching the end of their useful life in the mid-1980's? I favor the latter course.

(2) RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

As is the case with procurement money, the bulk of the funds appropriated this year will not be spent until fiscal 1975 or later. Here I have recommended an appropriations ceiling of \$6,964,033,000, which is \$1,095,700,000 below the figure contained in the bill as reported. Although the amendment does not require it, the reductions could be distributed as follows:

First. Stretch out the Trident research and development program, aiming for deployment in 1984 rather than by 1987: \$300 million could be left for research and development, concentrated on the Trident I missile which could, if necessary, be backfitted into existing submarines. Research and development savings would be \$354.6 million.

Second. Adopt an ABM research program aimed simply at staying on top of the technology rather than at preparing for deployment. Allocation of \$150 million for all areas of ABM research, including site defense, light area defense, and exploratory development, would permit a savings of \$211.3 million in R. & D. appropriations.

Third. Slow down the B-1 research and development program, and use some funds for exploring possible alternatives including a stretched version of the FB-111 or a standoff aircraft designed to fire ballistic missiles. A \$100 million strategic bomber research program would mean savings of \$273.5 million in appropriations in this category.

Fourth. Cancel the research program on the airborne warning and control system, to save \$155.8 million in R. & D. funds.

Of the four programs listed for possible cuts, AWACS is the only one which I would recommend canceling outright. In the nuclear war context, it suffers the same logical defect that is shared generally by the air defense concept—why attempt to defend against a strategic bomber attack, when we know that we cannot defend against an attack by nuclear missiles and when we have, in fact, agreed in SALT that we will not try? In the context of conventional war, on the other hand, the airborne command station would be extremely vulnerable to attack by the adversary's tactical air power and surface-to-air missiles. So while there are reasons for continuing work on a new strategic aircraft, on a replacement for Polaris/Poseidon, and on ballistic missile defense, I can see no merit in this very expensive and doubtful AWACS system.

(3) MILITARY MANPOWER

By calling for a reduction of 166,000 in active duty military manpower, the amendment in effect sets a year-end manpower ceiling of 2,066,902.

If the administration has any understanding of the message Congress has been trying to send through our discussions of manpower issues, then these cuts should come primarily from over 2,000 bases overseas, and from excessive manpower in the category of support forces. Despite the end of our involvement in Indochina, for example, we still have nearly 230,000 troops stationed in East Asia, on bases in Thailand, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan, or on ships stationed in the area. A distinguished group of Asian security experts, many of them former high-ranking officials of the government with special responsibilities in this area, have recently stated that:

...at least 100,000 of these can be returned and deactivated with no harm either to our national security or our important interests in the areas.

If that recommendation were followed, and if we brought home and deactivated just 66,000 of the U.S. forces now on the ground in Europe, then the entire reduction could be made out of troops presently stationed overseas.

The Senate has, of course, already taken an important step in this direction by adopting Senator Mansfield's amendment yesterday. It requires that 40 percent of our 500,000 troops stationed overseas be returned to the United States. That means the return of 200,000 people over a 3-year period.

The full savings on manpower cutbacks would not be realized until the first full year after the ceiling has been met. Beginning in fiscal 1975, the savings would be about \$1.7 billion compared to the cost of the administration's proposed force levels, or another \$100 million more than the savings that would result from the ceiling set by the committee. On the assumption that the administration would begin moving toward the ceiling immediately, however, it is safe to project a total reduction of about \$850 billion in the manpower appropriations required in fiscal 1974. And since current-year appropriations and actual outlays are nearly identical in this portion of

the Pentagon budget, unlike the case that prevails with procurement and research and development, those savings should show up as an actual cut in fiscal 1974 spending.

(4) CIVILIAN MANPOWER

Exclusive of the active duty cuts the committee has proposed or the additional reduction I have suggested, the administration has already reduced active duty military manpower by nearly 37 percent from the Vietnam war peak of more than 3.5 million men. Yet the Pentagon bureaucracy has been reduced by just a little over 21 percent, and there is actually a slight increase in civilian manpower planned in the fiscal 1974 program. I propose a further 10-percent reduction, to a ceiling of 911,700 direct-hire civilians. Savings in this fiscal year would be about \$500 million; in subsequent years the amendment would save about \$1 billion annually.

(5) AID TO INDOCHINA

The committee bill would authorize \$952 million for military aid to Indochina, funded through the Pentagon.

However, S. 1443, the Foreign Military Sales and Assistance Act, authorizes in section 2108:

... such sums as may be necessary to provide armaments, munitions, and war materials for South Vietnam and Laos under this chapter.

That section also provides \$150 million for the fiscal year for assistance to Cambodia.

The same bill provides in section 3109 that:

After June 30, 1973, no sale, credit sale, or guaranty of any defense article or defense service shall be made, or any military assistance (including supporting assistance) furnished to South Vietnam or Laos directly or through any foreign country unless that sale, credit sale, or guaranty is made, or such assistance is furnished, under this Act.

Those are the provisions of S. 1443 as it has already passed the Senate. So as I take it, it is the policy already adopted by the Senate that we will fund any further military aid to South Vietnam and Laos under the foreign military sales and assistance program, and that we specifically will not provide it through any other source.

It is my personal view that the administration's overall program for military and economic aid to Indochina goes far beyond anything we can reasonably justify. There are peace agreements in effect covering both South Vietnam and Laos. The agreement on Vietnam provides specifically that the Thieu government can receive arms only to replace, on a piece by piece basis, those which are lost or used up, and S. 1443 incorporates that language. At the same time we have declared an end to our involvement in Cambodia. Under those circumstances a program of more than \$2 billion in military aid alone should be completely out of the question.

But we need not resolve that issue in connection with my amendment. All I am saying is that we should not violate our own policy on the source of any military aid we do supply, and that we should therefore cut all of this \$952 mil-

lion out of the military budget. That would permit a corresponding reduction of \$952 million in DOD appropriations.

A MODEST TOTAL REDUCTION

While a significant portion of the savings in actual outlays would be realized in years following fiscal year 1974, amendment 532 would permit a reduction of \$5,891,200,000 from the figure recommended by the Armed Services Committee, and of \$7,402,322,000 from the figure recommended by the administration, for DOD appropriations in fiscal 1974. The administration originally requested \$85.2 billion for the Department's military and military assistance program. The comparable figure under my amendment would be \$77.8 billion.

This total figure is very much in line with the Pentagon budget levels discussed in the Brookings Institution report, "Setting National Priorities: The 1974 Budget." One of the medium range options they outlined would, according to their estimates, entail savings of \$7 billion in fiscal 1974.

Other analyses have called for more substantial reductions. A group of distinguished experts in defense, science and foreign policy, including former White House science advisers and former high officials of the Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the National Security Council, has suggested in a paper entitled "Military Policy and Budget Priorities" that—

Even a conservative analysis shows that some \$14 billion can be saved from the Nixon proposal while fully preserving our national security, and starting a return to a peacetime national budget.

I think that is sound advice. But what I am proposing here is more modest, I see this amendment as an interim step toward further reductions in the future, along the lines of the alternative military posture statement I had prepared early in 1972. But it also invites the support of Senators who simply want to prevent dramatic escalations in arms spending in the next several years—who think we must at least be prepared to hold the line in this area, so we can begin devoting more of our resources to pressing needs here at home. And if what we say is a fair reflection of what we believe, I think that is something nearly all Members of Congress would support.

As they evaluate this proposal, I hope Members of the Senate will break away from viewpoints that give a distorted picture of what is actually being proposed.

Because we deal with budgets sent up by the administration, we have a tendency to focus hardest on each proposed cut and how it would change the pre-established national security program. If a number of amendments are offered which would eliminate specific parts of the budget, it is fairly easy to create the impression that those who offer the amendments are trying to eliminate the very muscle, the bone, and possibly even the marrow of our Military Establishment.

But our focus should really be on what is left, not on what is being proposed

as a reduction. The rational way to proceed is to see what kind of a military program the remainder will buy. Then we should evaluate that, not according to what the administration wants, and not according to what we spent last year or in some prior year, but according to what we perceive as threats to the Nation's security.

For example, as I have noted, my amendment would leave total new military budget authority of \$77.8 billion.

The amendment would not touch any of vast nuclear deterrent forces present in the American arsenal—1,054 ICBM's, 656 SLBM's, and 500 strategic bombers, carrying at least 7,100 nuclear weapons. That compares to about 400 weapons needed to strike every significant target in the Soviet Union and China combined.

Nor would the amendment eliminate a single conventional weapon that is now in our arsenal. And if the administration manages the proposed manpower cuts prudently, it should not cut at all into the actual combat forces we have to operate those weapons; rather it should reduce an overblown support establishment. It would leave 13 active Army divisions, 3 Marine divisions, 21 tactical Air Force wings, 14 tactical Navy wings, 3 tactical Marine wings, 15 aircraft carriers, over 60 nuclear attack submarines, nearly 200 escort ships, 65 amphibious assault ships, 17 strategic airlift squadrons, and over 50 troop ships, cargo ships and tankers.

And rather than taking any weapons away, the amendment would authorize nearly \$10 billion, entirely for the purpose of building and buying new arms either in addition to those we already have or to replace those that are becoming old or obsolete. And beyond that, it would authorize another \$7 billion for research, development, test, and evaluation of weapons that may be purchased in subsequent years.

So rather than describe this amendment as a sizable reduction in money for the Pentagon, I would say that if it is adopted, we will have a very generous program, if not a lavish program, for that aspect of our national security which must be protected through arms.

At the same time, if this amendment is adopted, we can move to fulfill a more comprehensive definition of national security.

National security includes a strong economy as well as a strong defense. It includes protection against shortages of food and fuel, as well as protection against enemy guns. It includes schools for our children as well as silos for our missiles. It includes the health of our families as much as the size of our bombs, the safety of our streets and the condition of our cities, and not just the engines of war. And as much as the credibility of our deterrent in the eyes of the Communists, national security includes the credibility of our system in the eyes of our own people.

That is the kind of security the American people deserve. I hope we will act now to assure it.

Let the Department of Defense, within limits, decide how they are going to make

these reductions in research and development, and how they are going to apply the overall reduction in procurement, manpower levels, and so on. But I urge Senators to think very carefully about what we are doing with this bill before we obligate new money, away in excess of \$80 billion, that is bound to escalate to a budget in excess of \$100 billion in a very short time, if we do not begin turning the corner today in scaling down some of these new obligated funds.

Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 37 minutes remaining.

Mr. McGOVERN. I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, in the absence of the Senator from South Carolina, I shall assume the leadership on this side in behalf of the committee. I yield myself 20 minutes.

Mr. President, the amendment which is proposed, if put into effect, would jeopardize our national security posture in a number of ways.

Among other things the amendment would debilitate American strength in the immediate future by establishing unacceptably low ceilings on military procurement and manpower levels. The amendment would reduce the Defense Department request \$3.5 billion below that recommended by our committee.

Mr. President, I know that it is easy for some Members of this body to think that the Armed Services Committee spends all of its time genuflecting to those at the Pentagon and saying yes to everything that they want. I can assure the Senate that that is not the case. We spend most of our time trying to get the cost of weapons down. However, we have very little control over that because of inflation. Inflation is the major problem that we are faced with, as it is the major problem that the American housewife is faced with, and as it is with other programs in the Federal Government that it is faced with.

I suggest that to come on the floor of the Senate and suggest cuts totaling \$3.5 billion in a broad brush way is not the way to get at the problem. The way to do it is to come before the committee and make the arguments on specific line items.

If my memory serves me correctly, only one Member of this body who is not on the Armed Services Committee took the time to come before the committee and argue his case. I will say that he did a very good job. But to come to the floor of the Senate after we have spent months and months discussing this and then suggesting cuts the size of this one, is just the wrong way to go about it.

We do not know where the cuts should be made. We think we have done a job on this bill to the point the amount we are recommending is at the lowest level it could be. Maybe we are wrong, but I think that here on the floor of the Senate is not the place to prove it. The place to have proven it was before the committee by people appearing there with well reasoned arguments that could have convinced us that we were approaching it in the wrong way.

Mr. President, I think that we should understand the chain of procurement. This is not a simple thing. It was not dreamed up by any one person in the Pentagon. Possible expenditures are now being discussed for the next 5 years. Each of the different services projects its requirements for the coming years which must be approved by Secretary of Defense and eventually by the National Security Council.

Mr. President, in light of this amendment, a few remarks about the situation we are faced with in spending in this country today seem appropriate. I know that the defense budget is a large budget. However, it is not the largest budget by any means. It is probably the largest budget assigned to one specific title, but if we lump HEW together, that is the largest budget.

Now, Mr. President, many feel that the reason we have been unable to fund social and economic programs is because of the drain on our national resources caused by defense expenditures, when in fact the reverse is true. Social and economic programs have been growing at the rate of 10 percent per year, steadily, for more than a decade. The problem has been that when they started growing at the 10-percent rate they grew from a very small base. Now they are growing from a much larger base, and with increases in the Government of 7 percent each year, something has to give and has been giving. So that the defense budget is now down to a level of 18 percent, including State, and local governments, which is just about as low as we had at the time of Pearl Harbor.

Mr. President, I look at the trend in public spending, including Federal, State, and local governments, and note that national defense has declined from a point in 1945, when it occupied nearly 80 percent of all public spending, to this year, when it will be about 18 percent of all public spending. That is a significant decrease.

At the same time, social and economic problems, which along about 1945 were occupying about 15 percent of our total spending, have now increased to where they occupy almost 75 percent of our spending.

I point out that in the same period of time, national defense expenditures have decreased while social and economic programs have increased at a very, very fast rate.

Looking at the expenditures in another way, in constant 1974 prices—and these outlays exclude retired pay—in 1956, the defense budget was \$78.5 billion. Again, I stress that these figures are in constant 1974 prices. In 1964 it went to \$84.5 billion. In 1968, when the Vietnam war was at its height, it went to \$111.2 billion. This year it is down to \$73.7 billion.

Now, looking at the defense outlays in another way, its share in the gross national product—I might say that I do not have any particular faith in using the gross national product as an economic indicator but, since, most economists in Washington do, and since most of my colleagues on the floor put great faith in it, I am going to use it.

When we look at the outlays of defense

expenditures and compare them to the total gross national product, it shows that in terms of the resources provided to the Department, they are at their lowest levels since before the Korean war.

At the present time, Department of Defense research is about 6 percent of the gross national product, down from 13 percent during the 1960's. It will be noted that the Air Force alone in the early 1950's was receiving about 4½ percent of the gross national product.

We are moving in a direction where the entire Department of Defense's share of the gross national product will be similar to the Air Force's share at that time.

Back in the days of the Korean war, about 13 percent of the gross national product was related to defense spending. This year it is running at a rate a little over 6 percent. So it is at the lowest level it has been in the past 20 to 25 years.

When we look at the comparison between the Soviets and ourselves—and I do not like to keep trying to compare the Soviets with us—I do not honestly feel that we are ever going to engage in war with them even though their actions around the world are somewhat suspect. So, by 1978, if we show a tendency to weaken our military, we are going to be faced with some decisions that if we fail to meet them, we will automatically fall in the world power struggle and become a second or a third-class military and economic power.

So what we are doing today has a direct bearing on the problems that the President and the country will face in 1978.

I do not predict there will be any trouble before that, because we have a very strong man in the White House today, and other countries in the world know what will happen if he is forced into a decision relative to our security. But we have an election in 1976 and we might wind up with a man as President who would not be inclined or who would not be strong enough to take on the responsibilities that our President today has taken on.

So we have to look at the Soviets, and when we compare their expenditures in manpower with ours, we have to recognize not only the resources required but the capabilities and actions of our potential adversaries as well. The trend for both the United States and the Soviet Union in expenditures expressed as purchasing power and military manpower, the Soviet defense expenditures have been growing since 1964 at a rate of 3 to 4 percent per year.

It must be noted that this does not include the total defense effort by the Soviet Union. Some of this effort is hidden in other accounts, not easily separable or identifiable. As an example, on defense expenditures, a lot of their defense funds go into scientific research costs, so it is very difficult to separate them out. However, I believe it is correct to say that Soviet defense expenditures in dollar equivalents now exceed those of the United States.

It is clear that actions we have taken to substantially reduce our expenditures for the Department of Defense have

quite obviously not been matched by similar restraint by the Soviet Union. Once again, the United States force levels for fiscal year 1968 exceeded those of 1974 by more than 50 percent. However, despite this reduction, military manpower in the Soviet Union has grown from approximately 3 million in 1964 to 8 million at the present time. The Soviets now have 70 percent more manpower on active duty than we have in the United States.

Mr. President, the Soviet expenditures for defense—for weaponry, and so forth—have gone up at a constant rate, until it now is in the neighborhood of \$82 or \$83 billion; and, while ours peaked at close to \$100 billion back in 1968, it has now dropped to where it is today, around \$77 billion.

Mr. President I should now like to discuss what is referred to as "the peace dividend." There has been a great interest in the peace dividend that was expected following the Vietnam war. However, it did not materialize for several reasons.

First, in terms of purchasing power, it has already been paid. Second, in terms of the dollar levels made available to the Department, the peace dividend has been absorbed in terms of pay and price increases.

For example, military base pay in 1968 amounted to \$12 billion plus, but in 1974 that equates to \$18 billion. Military allowances have decreased a little. Civil Service pay has gone up approximately \$3 billion during the same time. Purchases for the military have decreased somewhat. With respect to the total, with retired pay included in 1968 we were spending \$78 billion, and now it is \$79 billion. So any peace dividend, as such, coming from the end of the Vietnam war, is just not there. It has been expended, or it has been absorbed by increased costs. In fact, to be a little more specific, of the \$5.5 billion increase in this year's budget, more than half goes to pay increases that we in Congress voted for the military people, and the other half does not quite meet the inflation factor.

If we could end inflation or even get it down to a reasonable level—say, 2 percent instead of over 5 percent—we could be making some headway in cutting not only military spending but all Government spending. We are actually buying fewer pieces of hardware. We will buy fewer aircraft this year than we bought in 1935. This is not because we are being a little short this year in money, but because we do not have anything ready to buy for production yet in the way of aircraft. This will probably come in next year. This, in itself, will cause next year's budget, in my opinion, to be higher than this year's. Whereas the Soviets build a new fighter aircraft every 3 years or so, it takes us a lot longer to get a new fighter into production.

While the sponsor of this amendment, the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGOVERN), said he saw no bomber threat from the Soviets, I can assure him that they have a bomber force. It is a bigger bomber force than we have. They

are not the same type or quality of aircraft, but they have the ability to bomb this country.

The B-52 is now 22 years old, and the B-1 will not be ready until 1978, or so. The B-1 has been over 4 years in the planning and designing and various stages, and just next week they will put the wings on this new plane. We hope to have it fly sometime in the next summer. So it should be noted that these things do not happen overnight.

Research and development funds are also significant. We have held hearings the last 2 days before the Subcommittee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences and have listened to manufacturers. Their criticism is that they have not received enough research and development money to provide the kind of advancement in weaponry, avionics, and so forth, that we would like to have in order to produce prototypes at a faster rate than we have been doing.

Now let us return to the amendment, and let us consider the facts of our national security situation.

First, the Soviet Union is not unilaterally reducing its forces because of its newly perceived interest in détente. Instead, the Soviets continue to improve and strengthen in numerous ways their already extraordinary military might. For example, we know they have a 3-to-2 advantage over us in numbers of ICBMs and a 4-to-1 advantage in ICBM payload capacity. There is evidence they are making an effort to improve the accuracy of their missiles, are developing new intercontinental missiles, and are conducting tests of MIRV systems. And China's military strength also continues to expand. To illustrate, China is strengthening its conventional forces; and its nuclear reach may soon extend to all of the Soviet Union and—before the end of this decade—to the United States as well.

Second, without the continuing capabilities of our forces to support our interests around the globe, we and our allies cannot insure our security nor continue negotiations with the basic confidence needed to develop new relationships. This, of course, is a critical factor in the negotiations for both strategic arms limitations and mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe.

Next, let us look at the proposed defense budget which has been submitted to us. In fiscal year 1974, the defense share of total Federal spending, total net public spending, the total labor force, and the gross national product would be the smallest in nearly a quarter of a century. Without a single cut in the proposed budget, we would obviously be—at best—in a "touch and go" situation relative to the power of our potential adversaries, and with respect to our negotiating position with the Soviets. How can the massive cuts in the proposed amendment possibly be justified? The answer is that they cannot be justified.

Again, the place to make these cuts is not on the floor of the Senate but before the Armed Services Committees of both Houses, where the witness can bring all the expertise to bear that he can gather and can discuss with the

members of the committee and with the staff—which is where the real expertise lies—how he feels cuts can be made.

While I mentioned earlier that I can recall only one Senator who did this, we did have a number of witnesses appear before the committee who outlined areas that they thought could be reduced. I do not say they went away empty-handed, because they have given us some things we can think about in the coming year; and possibly in the next presentation, we will be better equipped to attack this problem.

None of us likes the cost of the weaponry. I do not like the idea that we are paying more than \$14 million for a fighter plane. I can remember the fighter planes of World War II costing under \$50,000. I said the other day that I think the most expensive airplane I flew in World War II cost \$225,000—and, by golly, we are looking at one missile on the Phoenix system now that costs \$250,000, and the airplane takes off with six of those rascals strapped underneath it.

So we are spending money. I think there are some great areas we can attack, and we are attacking. We have the lightweight fighter. Two prototypes will fly next year. I feel that all the services can use these prototypes, and we can probably make them for under \$3 million each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 20 minutes have expired.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized 5 additional minutes.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, in terms of the broader implications of the proposed amendment with respect to reduced procurement and manpower levels, we should never forget that the world's hope for peace unequivocally depends on the strength of this Nation. And that means that the world's hope for peace unequivocally depends on our preventing our reduction to a second-rate power—or even to a first-rate power which is second best.

With respect to the severe restrictions which the amendment would place on research and development, a proposed \$1 billion cut, let us not close our eyes one moment to the dangers which would result. The Soviet policy to achieve technological superiority is clearly on the public record. In their development of engineers and scientists and in their development and provision of scientific and engineering facilities, they are steadily moving ahead of the United States. In budgetary resources, they are providing some 30 percent more of their annual defense budget than we are in investment and modernization.

Already we are seeing the results of their research and development efforts. We see their overall output in the form of new weapon systems. It is paying off in their increased rate of innovation and in the decreased time lag in fielding systems equivalent to our own. It is paying off in the technical capabilities of new weapon systems. And highly qualified observers suspect that it is paying off in new developments that are hidden under the

Soviets' roofs. How then can a major cut in our own research and developments efforts possibly be entertained?

Mr. President, in closing, we have already discussed the MASF issue in the two preceding amendments, and the Senate exercised its will in that area. The Senate does not see the wisdom in eliminating these funds. As regards military personnel, I suggest that the action taken by the committee in recommending a reduction of 156,000 men may be too much. We cannot afford the risk of another 10,000. Regarding civilian personnel, the committee next year intends to authorize the total number of DOD civilians. So that part of the amendment is, in my opinion, inappropriate at this time. The committee recognizes the problem and it tends to get to it next year.

Yesterday, in connection with an amendment that was accepted, in answer to a question I put with respect to a study of manpower problems in the Pentagon, they specifically said there would be included a study of the civilian problem.

Mr. President, there is hope that we are approaching the threshold of a new era of peace—but this emerging era is still in a highly tenuous state. We need a rational military posture to reinforce, to strengthen, and to stabilize the structure of peace. Let us maintain that rational posture by soundly defeating the proposed amendment which is before us.

Mr. President, it would be very dangerous for us to approve the amendment. I therefore urge that the Senate reject the amendment.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to thank the distinguished Senator from Arizona for his remarks. He is a military expert. He is a major general in the Air Force Reserve. He has had much service in the military and he is a very valuable member of the Committee on Armed Services. His statement today is a fair contribution to this debate.

I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Missouri, the acting chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I thank my able colleague from South Carolina, the ranking minority member of our committee.

It is my understanding the able Senator from New Hampshire is going to speak against this amendment. That is well, because I cannot support it. The reduction runs around 23.5 percent. I want the Senate to know that as manager of the bill that is my position, and I thank the Senator for yielding.

Mr. THURMOND. I thank the able Senator from Missouri. Ever since I have been in the Senate I have considered him a military expert and it has been a delightful experience to work with him on the committee.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator for his kind remarks. It has been an equal pleasure for me.

Mr. THURMOND. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from New Hampshire.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, although I am sympathetic with the underlying objectives of the distinguished Senator from South Dakota, in trying

to reduce defense spending, I must register strong objection to his method which contemplates the proverbial meat-axe approach.

The proposed amendment would cut the military procurement request by \$5.1 billion, or 23.2 percent. This is \$3.6 billion, or 16.3 percent, more than the \$1.5 billion reduction recommended by the committee. A cut of this size would literally gut or disembowel our military forces. In the past, large cuts in defense spending were criticized as cutting beyond the fat and into the muscle. The proposed reduction of 23.2 percent goes far beyond this and crushes the very bones in the patient's body. The question no longer becomes one of recovery from a critical blow, but survival from a fatal attack.

I am compelled to ask my good friend from South Dakota from where does he get these numbers? Does he fully appreciate the hard and trying work that the committee has done since last January to arrive at the most difficult decisions presented in the report on the bill? If the months of sweat and strain spent by the committee and its principal Research and Development and Tactical Air Power Subcommittees are not accepted by the Senator as constructive and fruitful reviews of the Defense budget, then I am afraid that much time has been wasted.

Let me address the area of research and development. As chairman of the Research and Development Subcommittee, I applied every ounce of my energies in a most thorough and soul searching review of the Defense Research and Development request. I am not an expert in this field, but with 5 years in this role I consider myself somewhat better educated than most Senators in the details of the Defense research and development program.

The subcommittee spent 82 hours in formal hearings on the fiscal year 1974 request for the research, development, test and evaluation appropriation. The major Defense witnesses responsible for research and development were cross examined at length and in great detail. They included the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, the Director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Assistant Secretaries for Research and Development, and the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Research and Development of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and program managers responsible for the major weapon systems under development.

I might say to my good friend from Colorado that I do not remember seeing Admiral Rickover.

These formal hearings were supplemented by extensive discussions and briefings to satisfy the critical questions asked by committee members. In addition, numerous briefings, discussions, and field trips were conducted by the committee staff. The important results of these activities are stated in the committee report on the bill and detailed in the printed volumes of committee hearings.

The actions of the Tactical Air Power Subcommittee, under the able chairmanship of my good friend from Nevada,

Senator CANNON, were just as thorough, detailed, and productive as that of the Research and Development Subcommittee.

Mr. President, in the research and development area, the committee cut \$498 million or 5.8 percent from the \$8.558 billion requested. The proposed amendment would cut an additional \$1.1 billion or 13.6 percent more than the committee recommended. This would bring the research and development amount down to \$6.964 billion, which is 18.6 percent less than the amount requested.

Such an action, if sustained by the Senate would make a mockery of the work done by the committee; but, more important, it would literally scuttle the Defense research and development program. But let me be more specific, Mr. President. Of the total of \$8.6 billion requested, only \$132.4 million was included to start new programs. Therefore, essentially all of the funds requested are required to continue contracts that are ongoing and to pay the civilian salaries and expenses involved in operating and maintaining the Department of Defense research, development and test facilities. What this means then, in simple terms, is that the additional cut of \$1.1 billion could be realized only by the wholesale termination of hundreds of contracts and subcontracts, the across-the-board reductions in force by indiscriminate firing of large numbers of civilian employees, closing down of vital research and development laboratories and facilities, or a combination of all of these. This would be tantamount to decimating the future capability of the United States to survive in a hostile world.

Also, I notice in this release by the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGovern), at the bottom of his first page he speaks of the cut that his amendment would be to research and development as a cut of some 8.7 percent.

Actually, I would have to take issue with that, because the way he arrives at it is as follows: He says that his cut would be \$1,095,700,000, and it would be taken from a figure of \$12,521,733,000.

That figure is \$12 billion that he has in the report here is a figure which includes the amount that R. & D. would get or \$8,059,733,000. Then he adds to that same \$4,462,000,000 and he points out that these are unexpended R.D.T. & E. funds.

Actually the funds he adds on there, to come up with this total of approximately \$12 billion, are mostly obligated, and all of those funds, which amount to \$4,462 million, are committed to R. & D. programs that are already approved and ongoing.

So when he says the cut to the R. & D. program is 8 percent, I feel he is misleading, because the cut is over 13 percent, which is much too much.

If the Senate should sustain the action as proposed by the Senator from South Dakota, it would make a mockery of the work done not only by the subcommittee but by the full committee. More than that, it would scuttle, it would sink, research and development. Of the total \$8 billion which is requested, which the administration and the Defense Department requested, only \$132.4 million was requested to start new programs. There-

fore, essentially all of the funds requested are required to continue contracts that are ongoing and to pay the civilian salaries and expenses required in operating and maintaining the Office of Research and Development and test facilities in defense.

What this means, then, in simple terms is that the additional cut proposed in the amendment by the Senator from South Dakota of \$1.1 billion could be realized only by the wholesale termination of hundreds of contracts and subcontracts, across-the-board reductions in force, by indiscriminate firings of large numbers of employees, closing down essential research and development laboratories and facilities, or a combination of these. This would be tantamount to decimating the future capability of the United States to survive in what is, unfortunately, a hostile world.

So, as I said, while I appreciate the objectives my friend from South Dakota is trying to attain, I do think this amendment is a meat ax, and I do hope my colleagues—and I urge them—will join me in voting against the amendment.

I thank my good friend from South Carolina for yielding to me.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me about 3 minutes?

Mr. THURMOND. First, Mr. President, I wish to compliment the Senator from New Hampshire for his fine statement.

I had promised to yield to the distinguished Senator from New Mexico.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Colorado.

Mr. THURMOND. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Colorado.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from South Carolina and I appreciate the Senator from New Mexico's yielding to me.

I want to express my agreement with what the distinguished chairman of my Subcommittee on R.D.T. & E. has just finished putting into the record. We have spent literally hundreds of hours of time going over the research and development programs which has been proposed. We have one category, I might say to the Senator from South Dakota, called "Other," which means that they are research and development programs which we simply have not had time to look at. I doubt very much whether the Senator from South Dakota could even give us an estimate of how much might be involved in those programs, but it is a lot of money.

What I am saying here is that, for the first time, over the last 3 or 4 years we have had subcommittees looking into these programs to try to determine which ones are not feasible or which ones are so expensive that, even though potentially feasible, are uneconomic. We have done an enormous amount of work therein. To come in at this time and suddenly say the work we have done is useless, is really cutting, I think, against the grain.

I remember very well Dr. Foster coming before us and saying we have intelligence sources which are pretty good and we can tell what other countries are doing once they get the development done and once they get them out into the open where we can see them, but no one can tell us what is going on in the labora-

tories, particularly in a closed society; and unless we keep our laboratories and experimental work going, we may wake up one morning to find a new system we have no knowledge of at all and no technical capability to try to approach it within the new thresholds of science.

I say that to cut back on R.D.T. & E. when we have a system which does not look economic or does not look feasible from the standpoint of performance is good, and we have been doing that in the committee, but to take out an arbitrary sum is inadmissible insofar as defending the country properly is concerned, and making sure our scientific and research and development capability are effective.

I thank the Senator, and yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to thank the distinguished Senator from Colorado.

I now yield to the distinguished Senator from New Mexico (Mr. DOMENICI).

Mr. DOMENICI. I thank my distinguished friend.

Mr. President, I want to say this at the outset. I did submit my detailed opinions to the subcommittee on this matter. I was pleased to have the opportunity, and I believe it was profitable to me, and hopefully to some few others, if not to the Members, at least to some members of the staff.

I wish to commend the Senator from Arizona for bringing to the Senate and the people the facts concerning relative costs of defense versus the costs of other items. It is easy to talk about billions for defense, but it is also very difficult to compare the billions we spend for defense with the billions we spend for health, education, welfare, and all kinds of new programs.

When the Senator talks in terms of our gross national product and says we are not spending any more on defense, in terms of gross national product, than we were 25 or 30 years ago, some people will say that is pre-Pearl Harbor in terms of comparison to gross national product. It is easy to talk about big figures and say that all this is wasted. I compliment the Senator and wish to associate myself with him on that score.

As far as the Senator from Colorado and his comments on research and developments are concerned, just this morning the distinguished Senator from Arizona and I heard Dr. von Braun speak about research and development. He said, very succinctly, a country that is first in applied technology is first in economics and first in the solution of its social problems. He said, just as conclusively, a country which is second in research and development and applied technology is second in the economy of the world and second in the solution of the social problems that confront the people. He also said you do not turn research on and off like a water faucet.

I commend the subcommittee for its deliberations. It is beginning now to give new strength to our Air Force in basic research and development.

Then in conclusion I wish to address just two remarks to the distinguished Senator from South Dakota with reference to the President of the United States and the one-third of the Congress that

are passing judgment upon the social expenditures of this country.

I think that I can do so because occasionally I am among the one-third—not all the time but part of the time. I do not think that the distinguished Senator from South Dakota meant what he said in the area of vocational rehabilitation. He said there are 10 million needy Americans and that the President of the United States vetoed a bill that would have provided help to them. I do not think he intends to tell the American people that we are not going to have any vocational rehabilitation this year because the facts are that the people who got help last year, and that was substantial, will get it this year. In fact, we have added two substantial new categories in addition to those covered under last year's vocational rehabilitation bill. We passed this new bill after the President vetoed the first one. The President has signed the new act for this year and we are operating under a vocational rehabilitation program substantially in excess of last year's.

I do not think the Senator from South Dakota meant what he said when he spoke of emergency medical services indicating that because of the President's act many Americans were being denied emergency medical services. In fact, there was no bill last year and even under the bill vetoed there will be some time before emergency medical services plans are forthcoming from the States. The Senator knows that the U.S. Senate, after the veto, passed an emergency medical services bill with all of the provisions of the State one and a similar amount of money. The only deletion in the bill was the deletion of certain public health service hospitals. There is every indication that the House will pass a similar bill and equally strong evidence that the President will sign it.

I do not think that the Senator meant that the one-third of the Congress running the country, according to his way of looking at it, are denying emergency medical services in toto or denying vocational rehabilitation to many millions who got it last year and will get it this year, and even more.

Mr. President, that era of harmony brings to my mind the proposition that détente was brought about because we are strong. Détente will continue as long as we are strong. Détente will permit us to prevail in negotiations for mutual reductions so long as we are strong.

If those with whom we have this new era of harmony ever suspect that, in fact, they are stronger than we are, there will be a quick cessation of détente and that approach which will bring about a quick cessation of détente and that approach which would bring about mutual reductions in arms expenditures and resource expenditures by the world will cease to be even a possibility.

Mr. President, I believe the Soviet Union decided it wanted détente. They want economic help from our country. And they will wait around and see if we are foolish enough to diminish ourselves in power so that they can call it off when they want to.

They want evidence that we are as strong or stronger than they are. And we may be able to fool them by making

the détente truly a long-term peace for the people of this world.

Mr. President, it is a distinct pleasure to present my views on the 1974 Department of Defense budget. This is an opportunity I greatly appreciate because I feel that there is no subject more important to the continuation of this great Nation than the treatment of the administration's defense budget by the Congress, particularly at this time when there are so many pressures to approve a budget much lower than the requested level.

One of those strong and attractive pressures, Mr. Chairman, is predicated on the air of détente which is said to exist between the United States and our principal potential adversaries, particularly the Soviet Union. I would like to address myself to what I consider to be the real danger of bending to the pressure.

Webster's dictionary defines détente as "a lessening of tension or hostility, especially between nations, as through treaties, trade agreements, and so forth." With that as its definition, I quite agree that détente does exist between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the United States and the People's Republic of China. That the tension and hostility which has existed between these two powerful nations and our own country has lessened in recent years.

However, in spite of the progress toward lessening of tensions achieved by the Nixon policy of negotiation, strength, and partnership with our allies, the fact of the matter is, Mr. President, that world tension and hostility have not been eliminated. No amount of wishful thinking can change that fact. So, it is against this background, under these circumstances, that I feel we must view our defense budget.

First, Mr. President, I think the true meaning of détente to our potential adversaries must be determined by the trend in their military capabilities during the period détente has become an acceptable—and in self-serving situations an even fashionable—relationship with us. Particularly, we must weigh the meaning and impact on détente of the measurable and quite visible trend toward clear-cut Soviet military supremacy.

I think it is particularly significant, Mr. President, that in 1968 the Soviets had about 800 ICBM's, but now it has twice that number. In 1968, the United States had 1,054 ICBM's—today we have that same number. In short, in the past 5 years, the U.S.S.R. has gone from a position of inferiority to a position of three-to-two advantage over the United States just in numbers of ICBM launchers and has, in addition, a considerable advantage over the United States in terms of ICBM "throw weight."

Again referring to 1968, the Soviets had less than 100 SLBM launchers while today it has more than five times that number. The United States has the same number of SLBM's that it had in 1968—656. At the present rate of construction, the Soviets will equal the United States in SLBM's by mid-1974.

Regarding today delivery vehicles of all types—ICBM's, SLBM's, and bomb-

ers—we had twice as many as the Soviet Union in 1968. Today, the Soviet Union has achieved a slight advantage in numbers of delivery vehicles. This Soviet quantitative advantage over the United States is expected to increase further over the next 5 years as we continue to phase out some of our older B-52's and they complete the buildup of their SLBM force to the level permitted by the interim agreement on strategic offensive arms.

Another critical factor to consider relative to the evolving international situation and our defense posture is military research and development. This is an area which unfortunately is not constrained by the agreements on arms limitation. Here, I feel, the pattern of Soviet goals continues to hold true. They give every appearance of having made a basic commitment to the objective of technological superiority. A number of studies have been made of the technological activities of various nations of the wording, including the U.S.S.R. and the United States, and it is very disturbing that no study I am aware of shows that we are even holding our own against the Soviet's concentrated efforts to overcome our technological superiority. In my opinion, it is one of the basic facts of modern life that it is research and development which will determine the character and quality of military forces—in the years ahead. I will speak at greater length on military research and development later in this statement.

There are many other indications of advancing Soviet military might which are totally inconsistent with other efforts to lessen world tension. As I have already observed, it is clear that recent activities have opened the way to more normal relations with the Communist States, and I applaud that trend, but, it is just as clear that the military power of the Soviet Union and mainland China continues to grow. The conclusion to be drawn from this situation is, to me, inescapable—we must maintain a perceptive, objective view of their current and future military capabilities—regardless of what we might hope their ultimate intentions might be. The military balance at this critical juncture is characterized by such extreme delicacy that to do otherwise would be utter foolishness in my opinion.

This is a view I share with the President and others whose judgment I respect. The President, in this year's report on foreign policy, after outlining alarming increases in Soviet military might, concluded that—

We have no responsible choice but to remain alert to the possibility that the Soviet Union and China may not prove durable.

I would sum up this point, Mr. President, by agreeing with Secretary Schlesinger's assessment of détente. In urging recently that the United States should not go too far, too fast with a détente policy in Europe, Dr. Schlesinger described détente as a velvet glove—a mailed fist in a velvet glove. "Should we," he asked, "be discussing the beauty and textures of the glove, or the import of the mailed fist? Mr. President, when that mailed fist becomes stronger every day, far beyond realistic defense needs, the

answer to Dr. Schlesinger's question is obvious.

Turning now to a more subtle connection between détente and the defense budget—I would offer for your consideration the proposition that "a strong U.S. military capability is an essential ingredient in pursuing détente and is critical to the ultimate success of détente."

I think it is beyond question that our military preparedness, combined with our partnership with our allies, provided the basis from which détente is developing. There are other factors, to be sure, such as the Soviet need and desire for economic expansion, but without a U.S. military response deserving of respect from the Soviets, the movement toward détente would have been much slower, if at all, and much more on their terms.

I want détente to continue. I fervently hope that world tension and hostility between nations will continue to be reduced. I am sure that is what all Americans want—we want peace and in good faith we are entering with high hopes into efforts which would lead in that direction.

But, what do the Soviets want, what is their ultimate purpose, and in question here today, what is the relation of that purpose to our defense budget? Perhaps to shed more light on that issue we should examine, in addition to their obvious military expansion, what they say when they think we are not listening very well.

In that regard, Mr. President, the extremely well respected Foreign Report of the Economist Newspaper Limited on July 18, 1973, had the following comments:

According to well-placed European sources, Brezhnev and his lieutenants went to great pains earlier this year to spell out to the east Europeans the basic principles of Soviet policy. In a series of separate, bilateral meetings, top Soviet officials explained to their opposite numbers in east European capitals that there had been a tactical switch in Soviet policy—but that it was basically a tactical switch.

Essentially, the east Europeans were told that the Soviet Union aimed in the next 12 to 15 years to devote all its resources (a) to pursuing détente with the west, and (b) to building up its own strength, militarily and economically. The Russians stressed that there was no contradiction in these objectives; one complemented the other.

At the end of this period—roughly in the middle or late 1980's—the total strength of the Soviet and east European block would have increased to such an extent that it would be able to gain the upper hand in its relationship with the west.

The foreign report went on to note that—

There has been debate within the Soviet leadership for more than a year over this policy, and in recent months signs of opposition within the hierarchy have surfaced. The changes in the politburo announced after the meeting of the Soviet Communist party's central committee in April to some extent reflected this disagreement—although at the moment Brezhnev is clearly on top. A curious feature is the way Leninist principles are being invoked at every turn; this is obviously to reassure doubtful party workers of the rectitude of the new Brezhnev doctrine. Some of the policies which are being invoked in his name must make Lenin turn in his grave.

In his television broadcast during his visit to the United States, Brezhnev said that "in politics, those who do not look ahead will

inevitably find themselves in the rear among the stragglers." This broadcast was relayed to the Soviet Union, unlike statements made by his American hosts during the visit, which were jammed. His remarks have been interpreted as a reminder to the more conservative elements in the Soviet Union that they should bear in mind the more long-term aims, and not take the new Soviet attitude at face value.

Our intelligence reports verify the facts contained in these statements. All of this means to me that we in the U.S. Congress must also bear in mind the Soviets' long-term attitude established by actions and words, some of which I have drawn to your attention, and not take the new Soviet attitude at face value any more than Brezhnev would have his own leaders do.

The important point here is often overlooked—if détente is desirable, as we all agree it is, and if it is to bear fruit, as we all hope it will—we must not remove the element most critical to its continued existence—a strong national defense. In other words, détente is one of the reasons to remain strong rather than a reason to disarm.

I am aware that there is also strong pressure to drastically reduce our defense spending to meet this Nation's domestic problems. There is a movement to reorder our priorities and devote a greater share of our resources to social needs. These domestic problems are urgent and there are social and human needs in this country which are not being met. I fully realize those facts and I am concerned, just as every one of you are.

However, I am also aware that there has already been a "reordering of priorities" so that social and human needs are receiving a greater proportion of our funds. My examination of budget figures confirms that in the last 4 years, the relative budgetary emphasis between defense and human resources has been exactly reversed.

I know that much more must be done to alleviate conditions of human misery that this great Nation in its abundance should not and cannot tolerate. And I pledge by constant attention and total effort to help overcome those problems, but I must agree with President Nixon's statement in his most recent message to Congress when he said:

We could have the finest array of domestic programs in the world, and they would mean nothing if we lost our freedom or if, because of our weakness, we were plunged into the abyss of nuclear war.

I would also draw from that Presidential message on the extreme importance of defense research and development activities. The President said and I agree that—

A vigorous research and development program is essential to provide vital insurance that no adversary will ever gain a decisive advantage through technological breakthrough and that massive deployment expenditures will therefore not become necessary.

Mr. President, I am convinced that we must have a vigorous research and development program to maintain force effectiveness and retain a necessary margin of technological superiority. There can be no doubt that the achievement of

technological superiority has been a primary instrument of Soviet national policy for more than 20 years—a policy unchanged by SALT.

I am not an advocate of technological superiority just to be "No. 1." My advocacy of this principle is based on the fact that this Nation will never be able to produce and maintain military force levels of the magnitude of our potential adversaries. In short, we are at a disadvantage in terms of quantity and we must have a quality advantage through technological superiority to offset this quantity disadvantage.

In these times of competing needs for limited resources, there is an understandable tendency to make the cuts where the effects are least visible. Unfortunately, the benefits of defense research and development programs fall into this category of great susceptibility. I hope the Congress will resist this easy route because I am convinced that a reduction in appropriations in this critical area will affect the prospect of peace in the next decade and perhaps into the next century.

In the final part of my statement I would like to mention several specific efforts toward significant budget reductions which I believe are unsound.

The Trident program is one of these issues. Trident will allow us to maintain an effective seabased strategic missile force in the future, provide a significant hedge against the possibility of Soviet technological breakthrough, and insure an orderly replacement for Polaris submarines. It is my opinion that this submarine is critical to our defensive posture as the Soviet numerical superiority becomes even greater. It is absolutely imperative for this country to have a submarine based strategic missile force that is relatively invulnerable to the wide range of potential future threats. The Trident, which will augment and replace the Polaris/Poseidon fleet, will give the range and protection from detection which is required to be invulnerable. The Senate Committee on Armed Services has approved the full amount requested for an accelerated Trident program and I hope it will pass and be fully funded.

I am not as encouraged regarding the Armed Services Committee action on the F-14, for which the committee recommended funding through December 1973, not to exceed \$197.6 million, well below the original request. I recognize that there are very substantial problems with the contractor and that these problems require time for proper solution, but the need for this aircraft is so critical in my view, that the Senate should restore the amounts cut.

There are two blanket cuts which concern me, the one in the House version of the procurement bill in terms of dollar limitations, and the one of the Senate Armed Services Committee in terms of military manpower.

The House authorization ceiling amendment, which was opposed by the leadership of the House Armed Services Committee, would limit weapons spending to 1973 levels with a 4.5-percent increase for inflation. It appears to me that such action sets a dangerous precedent and should be rejected to adhere to the traditional line item approach.

In my limited experience, it would seem that having two different approaches in the Houses of Congress will make final agreement on a conference report very difficult, perhaps causing such a problem as to prevent agreement. But, of even more concern to me is the blanket floor amendment as a means to deal with the military budget. It seems to relinquish the control of the Congress over the expenditure of military funds and refuses to recognize that the aggregate amount of very necessary and justified individual defense needs may, as in this case, exceed some arbitrary aggregate limitation.

The Senate Armed Services Committee's cut of 7 percent in our military manpower is another blanket approach to dealing with our defense posture which seems to me to be inappropriate. This specific action comes at a time when the Soviets are engaged in the buildup I have previously described, and in that context of the present delicate military balance represents a unilateral cut of such magnitude that I cannot endorse it. While it is possible that this cut could come from support elements, I think the dangers pointed out by Senator Tower in his individual views to the committee's report are very valid.

There are other proposals to require substantial unilateral U.S. troop reductions in Europe. It appears to me that, while I think there are accommodations that we should pursue with our allies on relative contributions to mutual security, withdrawals of the magnitude proposed would have disastrous consequences.

Certainly it must be obvious that such unilateral withdrawals would undermine the negotiations for mutual and balanced force reductions scheduled to begin on October 30th. Why would the Soviets need to bargain, why would they want to trade, when what they are interested in is being given away free? If we have any hope of these negotiations resulting in a reduction of forces that will be matched by the other side we must resist impulses of this kind.

What all of this means is that the euphoria expressed by some in our country concerning the current arms agreements and the military balance is at best premature. The facts are that détente is in its infancy, and that we are running second to the Soviet Union in force size, defense investments, and military research and development. That gap must not be allowed to widen, and therefore we cannot cut into our defense budget. Significant cuts in the defense budget now would undermine our strength, would seriously weaken the U.S. position in international negotiations, would require major unilateral force reductions, and would undercut our efforts to build a more stable balance of forces at lower long-term cost to both sides. And it is these efforts which, one way or another, will determine our success in building a lasting structure of peace.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may require. There are just a few additional points

I want to clarify in response to some of the things that have been said to the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. DOMENICI) and the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE).

Mr. President, first of all, I do not regard this as a massive meat ax approach. When we are talking about the new obligatory authority in the amount of \$85 billion which the administration has requested and a slightly lesser amount that came from the committee when it proposed that the larger figure, something in the amount of nearly \$85 billion, could be reduced by \$7 billion, particularly when the funds are not targeted at any special weapons systems. We are not killing any particular weapons systems. We are not telling the Secretary of Defense or the Department of Defense that if there is some particularly high priority system that they feel in their judgment they have to move ahead on without reductions, they cannot do it.

I am simply saying within these broad categories of research and development, procurement, manpower, and military foreign aid, that certain reductions should be made which come to a total of some \$7 billion in a total budget of \$85 billion.

It also needs to be kept in mind that these are not limitations on spending outlays for fiscal 1974. They are limitations on new obligatory authority which is being added to already unexpended billions in the hands of the Pentagon. For example, in procurement and research and development combined, the Defense Department will have over \$50 billion of prior year appropriations which, when added to this year's request for appropriations by the committee, is in excess of some \$50 billion.

This amendment, in research and development and procurement combined, would cut about \$3.5 billion. In other words, out of the total for procurement and research and development money that the Pentagon will have under this legislation, added to previously authorized money, we are cutting that \$50 billion by about 7 percent. The impact of that could be spread out over several years. Everyone knows that the total amount of money authorized in this bill is not going to be spent over fiscal year 1974.

What we are concerned about is a military budget that is rapidly escalating to over \$100 billion a year as projected by Brookings Institution in the study to which I referred earlier. That indicated that if this appropriation goes through in its present form, we are going to be at the \$104 billion level by 1978. What I am pleading for here is a modest reduction of about \$7 billion in that total amount so that we can begin to turn the corner on these forward obligations.

The proposal I have made is not a radical one. It is not particularly dramatic.

The July 19 issue of the Washington Post carries a summary of that study by the Brookings Institution. One of the principal authors of that was Charles Schultze, a former Director of the Bureau of the Budget, a very knowledgeable man.

The study shows military costs could

be cut by a range of from \$10 billion to \$15 billion a year before the end of this decade.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I want to join the Senator. There is nothing radical about the proposal. I think that it is a very reasonable proposal. Others have indicated that in our very stringent conditions, particularly with respect to our domestic economy, it is one of the best places to try to move toward a balanced budget. Certainly I think the Senator's proposal is a modest one.

The Senator referred to the B-1. No one yet has explained to me any reasonable mission for a B-1. I cannot imagine that we would send a bomber over Russia with its capacity for aircraft defense with missiles. I have seen nothing to indicate to me that bombers are at all useful against a sophisticated aircraft defense.

We have been worried about their ABM. That is, we used to be. Of course, we fortunately have gotten over it, I think, or partly over it, although there is some money in here. I believe, for continued research on ABMs. I am not quite sure what that research is, since we have made an agreement, unless we intend to abandon that agreement.

But I am bound to say that the appropriation of large amounts of money for obsolete weapons, just because we have the capacity to make them, does not appeal to me.

That is not the same as the case of the Trident. The argument there is different. No one feels the submarine, as such, as a weapon, is obsolete. The question is whether it should be accelerated.

But I cannot see what they are going to use a B-1 bomber for. Does the Senator believe that is a practical weapon to use against a country like Russia, with its capacity for ground-to-air missiles?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Well, I must say to the Senator I have serious questions about it. My questions go to the extent of at least feeling we ought to reduce the acceleration on the B-1. Even in the proposal I make here, while I do not require any cuts in the B-1 program—my cuts are in broad categories, and I leave it up to the Department of Defense to make them—I propose that one place where they might make a prudent cut would be to reduce the research program on that bomber to not more than \$100 million, which is still a lot of money. That would save about \$273 million.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Can the Senator tell me why that is any different in concept from the B-70, which we abandoned some years ago because I thought it was agreed, at least by the majority of the government, though I do not suppose the Air Force ever agreed, that it was not really a useful weapon?

What can the missile program do? We have put all this money in the Trident and in the Poseidon; why move it ahead without any visible target in sight? Where does the mission, as they call it, of the B-1 come in?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I think it has a very

dubious mission, for the reasons the Senator suggests. They are very vulnerable to surface-to-air missiles. We discovered that even in the hands of the North Vietnamese the missiles were devastating.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Well, of course, they had limited quantities, and I imagine very poorly trained crews for them, but that would be quite different, I think, than Russia.

I do not know what the mission is. If they would tell us what they intend to use them for that would make some sense, I might feel differently about it. But surely we are not going to have another Vietnam and use them against some undeveloped country. I suppose they would be useful if we were going to have a war, for example, with Guatemala or Honduras.

Mr. MCGOVERN. To whatever extent that is true, they have no particular advantage over the B-52, and those are not finished by any means. Their life can be extended for a number of years, I think.

We have the possibility of stretching out the FB-111 and other aircraft; people have been talking about a standoff model, that would not fly over the target area but would have the capacity to fly up to a safe zone and then fire a missile over the target area.

It would seem to me that before we plunge ahead with the construction of a very costly bomber system, which apparently will come out, now, to about \$50 million for each one of those planes, we ought to explore other alternatives.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I had understood that they slowed down the missile which could be used on a plane like the B-52 or even a 747, a plane that size, but they slowed it down for fear it might interfere with the B-1's appropriation.

Mr. MCGOVERN. That is my understanding; but I have never seen the logic to justify that.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not think there is any logic to it, either. What really bothers me about it is that usually there is some mission that they describe as an important one, that makes some sense, and then they try to design the missile or the airplane around it.

They seem to build the machines first and then try to figure out what to do with them. That seems to be the approach. That is the way we talk about the submarines. I can understand how anyone who is an expert and has devoted his life to submarines would want to build the biggest, finest submarines in the world. That was an ambition they had with the C-5A. I remember hearing the distinguished Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) bragging about the C-5A. It was the biggest airplane. He had just been on it, and it was the greatest thing that had come from creation. Of course, when the wheels started falling off and the wings came off, they downgraded its life from 10,000 to 5,000 hours. Nobody talked about it then; it was a plane without a mission.

I do not know what they expect to do about the B-1; nobody seems to talk about it. It is just such a great change. The challenge is the ingenuity of the engineer.

It is like the building of the pyramids.

There was no purpose in building them except that they were wonderful. People could go to see them, so they were built.

Mr. McGOVERN. They did not do much harm.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. They did not do any harm. They cost a lot of money and a lot of labor. Maybe it was just a make-work project. If the project for building the B-1 is to keep somebody at work, that is a good one, provided there is no blame to be put on it. But there is an awful lot of work to be done in the country to which skills could be applied.

Mr. McGOVERN. The Senator has been around a long time. Can he explain to me why a \$7 billion cut in a \$85 billion military bill is called a reckless, meat-ax approach, when cuts in the water development systems in all the towns, and all the waste disposal systems are called economizing?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is conservatism.

Mr. McGOVERN. Why is it called a meat-ax cut that will destroy the country and crush the whole life and bone out of our way of life if somebody wants to cut a few billion out of an enormous \$85 billion budget? I do not understand the difference in terminology.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator has asked a question that cannot be answered except in philosophical terms. The human race has been asking "Why?" for several thousand years. It is direct and simple: It does not need imagination to hit people over the head with a fist or a missile. It is just a weakness. That is why the human race is in such a difficult condition today. That is why we hear all the dire predictions. We have been bemused since the dawn of time by tyrants. It is characteristic that that has never been curbed. We keep thinking and working on it, but we have not done it. We can see the same thing in other activities concerning our major weaknesses. It has been demonstrated on the floor of the Senate, too. We came within two votes today of winning. We keep hoping we will. But we continue to demonstrate our capacity to keep up with a program.

I agree that the cut is very modest, but I am not sure that the Senator can get it. I applaud the Senator's energy in trying to give us a chance to vote for it. I shall certainly vote for it although I do not know how to explain what is happening. But we want to get as much support for it as we can.

Mr. McGOVERN. One of the reasons why I am interested in offering the amendment is in spite of the fact that I have not disagreed on substantive grounds.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think that is right.

Mr. McGOVERN. Is that Congress has said it is going to reduce the budget by \$7 billion.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is right.

Mr. McGOVERN. I voted for some of the domestic programs that he vetoed. I voted for the emergency medical services.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. So did I.

Mr. McGOVERN. The rural development of water, and so forth. All I am trying to do here is to comply with the President's wish that we save \$7 billion,

and that is what this amendment would do.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is right. Furthermore, this is more consistent with his announced purpose in going to Moscow and Peking last year than is the contrary. What we have been doing here raises serious questions about whether the announced policy of better relations between East and West is a genuine one. It is casting already very grave doubts about whether this administration, or certainly the country as a whole—but I cannot include the Senate in some of these matters because it seems to me the Senate goes further than the President, especially in this East-West trade question. But it does raise serious questions about that, whether, really, our country is seeking better relations with the other parts of the world or whether we want to use our military might to force our views on others.

The way the votes are going would indicate the latter. That is the only thing that I would add.

Mr. McGOVERN. I appreciate the Senator's comments.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, will the Senator from South Carolina yield me 3 minutes?

Mr. THURMOND. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from New Hampshire.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GOLDWATER). The Senator from New Hampshire is recognized for 3 minutes.

Mr. MCINTYRE. I want to say that I operate over there in that research and development area. It is an awfully important area, because that is where the new ideas are looked at. We progress through research, exploratory development, advanced development, engineering development. This year, the administration asked for \$8.6 billion. We gave it a hard look and cut it about \$500 million, back to \$8.1 billion.

What I was saying in this area, especially when I look at the Senator's overall suggested reduction, it would add \$1,100 million to the \$500 million already cut. This gets into a little difficulty, because when we analyze the overall programs in the research and development field, and the technology we need to have under our belts, or I should say, in our heads, we have only \$132 million for new starts and new ideas. The rest is for ongoing programs.

So if we absorb that \$1 billion cut, it would mean an awful lot of stops that would have to be administered for the various projects underway. I feel more or less as a speech writer would, who characterized this as a meat-ax approach. I hope that does not offend the Senator, but it does come down pretty hard.

Mr. McGOVERN. I appreciate the Senator's explanation. I know that he has worked very hard on this budget and has provided great leadership in the effort to cutback on the funds for Trident. Many people thought that was a meat-ax approach, too. I did not think so. I voted for the Senator's amendment. But I am sure he will be criticized in some quarters for applying the meat ax to the Trident.

Now, the proposal I have made here

with regard to research and development funds does not kill any single program. It leaves it up to the judgment of the Department of Defense to make another modest reduction beyond the commendable cut that was made by the committee. But I do not think it is at all that drastic a cut when we have careful studies such as the one made by experts in the Brookings Institution, including the former Director of our Bureau of the Budget, saying that we can effect a cut of \$10 to \$25 billion. I have proposed a total cut on everything of \$7 billion.

There is also the study—I do not know whether the Senator is familiar with it—put out by a group, entitled "Military Policy and Budget Priorities" which has some of the most respected former members of the Department of Defense, the CIA, and the National Security Council—men like Roswell L. Gilpatric, former Deputy Secretary of Defense; George Kistiakowsky, former Presidential Science Adviser to President Eisenhower; Paul Warnke, former Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Johnson administration, and many other people. They call for a \$14 billion cut in military outlays, which is double the amount I am pleading for in this amendment.

All I am saying to the Senator is, I thought his language was just a little bit more extravagant than it was yesterday and I hope that he will not see this as a drastic cut in military spending.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Let me say to the Senator that the way he interprets the cut he suggests for the research and development part of the budget, would amount to pretty close to 13.5 percent and that is too much to absorb. That would be tantamount to stopping the programs we need very much to go on.

I emphasize that one of the areas in this whole picture of the \$85 billion request, the most sensitive, and the most important, is just in the area of these incubator programs in research and development.

Mr. McGOVERN. With all respect to the Senator who is in the research and development field, where many of these boondoggles get started, once that head of steam starts to build and we get by the research and development stage, then the argument is made that we have already invested \$100 million in R. & D. and we have completed careful studies so we had better move on at least to the building of a prototype; then, that it would be better to build a model; and then, pretty soon, the investment is such that it is very difficult to back away from it.

We almost went for the RS-70, the Senator will remember, which is now a "white elephant" out in the museum at Wright-Patterson Air Force field. But so many of these projects were incubated right where the Senator says they were, in the research and development section of the budget. That is why I personally applaud the effort by Representative ASPIN in the other body, a former Defense Department official who took on that sector of the budget and got the House of Representatives to go along with a \$1 billion cut. It is in that area where we would best nip some of these

things that eventually run up into billions of dollars before they are finally abandoned.

But I appreciate the Senator's comments.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a summary of the Brookings Institution study which was published in the Washington Post on July 19, 1973; as well as a report to Congress called "Military Policy and Budget Priorities" prepared by Adrian Fisher, Alfred Fitt, William Foster, Roswell Gilpatrick, Morton Halperin, Townsend Hoopes, George Kistiakowsky, Vice Adm. John Lee, Herbert Scoville, Jr., Ivan Selin, Paul Warnke, Herbert York, and Walter Slocombe.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

BROOKINGS SUGGESTS POLICY SHIFT TO CUT DEFENSE BY \$25 BILLION

(By Murray Marder)

Major shifts in American defense strategy that could cut spiraling military costs by \$10 billion to \$25 billion a year in this decade were suggested yesterday in a study by the Brookings Institution.

One projected alternative would overturn existing strategy for the defense of Europe by reshaping U.S. forces "for a short, intense conflict in Europe rather than for a replay of World War II." In addition, "In Asia, the United States would limit its security interests to Japan and disengage from commitments to the defense of Southeast Asia."

These and other bold ideas for revising nuclear and conventional forces and strategies are likely to affect present congressional hearings on American force levels in Europe.

The proposals published by the independent research institution come at a time when the Nixon administration is mounting a major campaign in Congress to beat back drives to cut the numbers of U.S. troops based in Western Europe.

Although the administration prides itself on reductions it has made in numbers of U.S. forces around the world under the Nixon Doctrine, the Brookings report states:

Less attention has been paid to devising ways of using manpower more efficiently or simplifying the design of weapons systems. And for the most part, no changes have been made in the assessment of U.S. interests abroad, and of the forces necessary to protect them.

With the soaring costs of manpower and equipment, the study said, "the fact remains that a year of major progress in the President's quest for international peace has been followed by a substantial increase in the defense budget."

"In effect," the report noted, "this year's peace dividend is to be used for military rather than civilian purposes."

For 1974 the cost of the "baseline force" for U.S. defense is listed at \$82.1 billion with \$85 billion in total obligational authority. Projecting these costs the report said that "by 1978 the current dollar defense budget could reach \$104 billion, or almost 25 percent more than in Fiscal 1974."

Two types of alternatives were given special emphasis in the report.

One is a slowdown of the pace of modernizing nuclear strategic forces and economizing on spending generally, with projected savings of \$3 billion in Fiscal 1974, nearly \$6 billion in 1975, and \$10 billion in 1978.

A bolder option, given special emphasis for achieving savings of \$25 billion by 1978, would require the previously noted changes in U.S. doctrine in Europe and Asia.

This departure, based on fighting "a short war" rather than a protracted conflict in Europe, would include the following changes:

Strategic weapons: nuclear land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles would be gradually phased out. Instead of the nuclear "triad" of American land, sea and air power, there would be just two kinds of nuclear forces—"a dyad composed of bombers and submarine-launched missiles, on the assumption that two kinds of offensive forces would provide an invulnerable, flexible and powerful strategic retaliatory capacity indefinitely."

Conventional forces: Total conventional forces would be cut by roughly one-third. Army and Marine Corps divisions would be reduced from 16 to the equivalent of 11, carrier task forces from 15 to 9. Air Force tactical fighter wings would decline from 21 to 16.

Europe: The approximately 250,000 U.S. ground troops in Europe would be reduced about 50,000 by reorganizing the basis for retaining in the United States portions of units based in Europe. Troops would be rotated in relatively short tours in order to reduce numbers of U.S. dependents living abroad, with cutbacks of forces earmarked for protracted war missions.

Asia: A "lower military profile in Asia" would include the recall of about 50,000 U.S. men and four tactical fighter wings from Thailand; sharply reducing the American military presence in Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, and relying primarily on U.S. naval forces in the Pacific for the defense of Japan.

In examining the consequences of such fundamental shifts in U.S. strategy, the study acknowledged that a major question is whether the Soviet Union would interpret them as "a basic weakening of U.S. resolve."

For the Soviet leaders, the report noted, this would mean abandoning the opportunities they now perceive in economic and political cooperation with the United States.

"On the other hand," the report stated, "in the areas of major interest to the United States—Western Europe and Japan—the U.S.S.R. would see little evidence of a change in the U.S. security commitment."

A REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY POLICY AND BUDGET PRIORITIES FISCAL YEAR 1974

Presented by:

Adrian S. Fisher, former Deputy Director, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Alfred B. Fitt, former Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower).

William Foster, former Director, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Roswell L. Gilpatrick, former Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Morton Halperin, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense.

Townsend Hoopes, former Under Secretary of the Air Force.

George B. Kistiakowsky, former Presidential Science Advisor to President Eisenhower.

Vice Adm. John Lee, USN Ret., former Assistant Director, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Herbert Scoville, Jr., former Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency.

Ivan Selin, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense.

Paul C. Warnke, former Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs).

Herbert F. York, former Director of Defense Research and Engineering.

Walter Slocombe, Editor, former staff member, National Security Council.

Money bills in Congress—Distribution of the \$171.5 billion budget authority requested for fiscal 1974¹

National defense (57.2 percent)	\$98.1
DOD (including pay raises)	80.5
Veterans benefits	12.2
Military construction	2.9
Foreign military aid	1.3

AEC-military component	1.2
Physical resources (12.3 percent)	21.1
Agriculture, environment and consumer protection	9.5
Transportation	3.1
HUD	2.7
Department of Interior	2.4
Public Works, AEC-civilian component	3.4
Human resources (19.7 percent)	33.7
Labor, HEW	33.7
Other (10.8 percent)	18.6
State, Commerce, Justice, Judiciary	4.3
Foreign economic aid	3.1
Space, science	3.6
Treasury, general Government, etc.	7.6

Total 171.5

¹ Only \$171.5 billion is requested to be appropriated by Congress for Fiscal 1974; the rest of the proposed budget is composed of interest on the national debt, trust funds, and other funds obligated under permanent authorization legislation.

Source: U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee.

MILITARY POLICY AND BUDGET PRIORITIES

Our nation has been burdened in recent years with unprecedented military costs. The Vietnam War and the nuclear arms race have not only cost us dearly in lives and peace of mind; they have also distorted our national budget towards arms and war and away from those vital areas of our people's needs dependent on support from federal revenues. With the end of our Vietnam involvement and the negotiation of the Moscow arms agreements in 1972, we were entitled to expect a major reduction in the military budget for Fiscal Year 1974 similar to the massive reductions achieved upon termination of the Second World War and of the Korean War. But, instead of reductions, President Nixon has proposed a \$5.6 billion increase in national defense budget authority for Fiscal 1974 and simultaneously a vast cut-back on a great variety of federal domestic programs essential to our genuine national security.

A new international situation

Now is the time when the defense budget should decline, not increase, to reflect a changing world. The President, in his cordial exchanges with Chinese and Soviet leaders, has repeatedly stressed the need for a relaxing of international tensions. The Nixon doctrine states that foreign allies are primarily responsible for their own security. The SALT negotiations should have begun to curb a dangerous nuclear arms race. The U.S. and Russia have begun to develop economic ties, with large-scale business exchanges, which imply the existence of long-term, stable relationships.

As the President has repeatedly stated, we are indeed moving from an era of confrontation to one of negotiation. We still need a defense fully adequate to ensure our physical safety, but a general reduction in military funding would be consistent with that purpose in this new era. The Administration's proposal for increased military spending would, at best, mean a diversion of U.S. resources from urgent domestic needs. At worst it could re-ignite the arms race, bring about new international crises, and jeopardize our national security.

*Summary of feasible reductions in national defense budget authority fiscal year 1974**

[In billions]

Southeast Asia:	
Military aid to South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia	\$2.1
U.S. combat operations	1.0
Total	3.1

Summary of feasible reductions in national defense budget authority fiscal year 1974—Continued*

[In billions]

General purpose forces:	
Procurement reductions	\$2.0
Asia-committed forces	2.0
Total	4.0

Manpower efficiency:	
Reduce support personnel	1.2
Grade levels: restore to 1964 pattern	0.4
Cut civilian manpower 10%	0.8
No recomputation	0.4
Total	3.3

Strategic forces:	
Trident	1.3
Minuteman MIRV's	0.7
B-1 bomber	0.4
ABM	0.4
AWACS	0.2
Others (SLCM, ABRES, mobile ICBM, phased array warning)	0.1
Total	3.0

Military aid: Aid to foreign nations and U.S. military missions	0.6
Total	0.6

Total feasible reductions 14.0

*Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

The Nixon military budget could safely be reduced by more than 15 percent

We have analyzed the Nixon military budget proposal, which calls for the appropriation of \$87.3 billion in Fiscal 1974 for Pentagon programs, nuclear arms, and foreign military assistance, \$83.5 billion of which is requested for the Department of Defense. Even a conservative analysis shows that some \$14 billion can be saved from the Nixon proposal while fully preserving our national security, and starting a return to a peacetime national budget. Even making a generous allowance for transition and other "shut-down" costs, a substantial amount of the savings can be achieved in Fiscal 1974 budget authority, with the full saving in future years. Specifically, we project feasible savings of \$3.1 billion in U.S. military operations in and aid to Southeast Asia, \$4.0 billion in paring of our inflated general purpose forces and weapons systems, \$3.3 billion in military manpower efficiency improvements, \$3.0 billion in elimination or stretch-out of new strategic weapons procurements made unnecessary by the recent nuclear arms agreements with the Soviets, and \$556 million in discontinuance of unproductive and even counter-productive foreign military assistance.

We start with some basics:

About half of the current defense budget is enough to provide a more than adequate nuclear deterrent, as well as the land, sea, and air capacity to repel attack on U.S. territory.

The other half is spent to continue our alliance commitments and to maintain our overseas bases and troop deployments.

Many of these latter expenses are well justified; our national security interests at this time are advanced by a strong, stable network of international relationships. But recognition of the proportion of defense spending attributable to these commitments highlights the need for a close link between our international policy and our military spending.

In this report, we focus on that relationship and on wasteful expenses—those deployments and programs that do nothing to further our interests, either to defend the U.S. or to support our alliances. And we point

out some expenditures that actively threaten our national security by increasing the prospects of military confrontation.

An issue of priorities

We emphasize that savings from the Nixon military spending proposals must be made not merely because of the general desirability of eliminating wasteful spending. Making reductions on the military side has now become indispensable for adequate funding of many essential domestic programs. Programs now threatened by the Fiscal 1974 budget include: urban and rural housing assistance, water and sewer programs, various community development projects, health care and training programs, educational assistance for the disadvantaged. The cities, where many of these programs have been concentrated, are beginning to feel the effects of the Nixon reductions. The funds for manpower training and employment programs will be decreased nationwide by 13.5 per cent. Community development projects—those dealing with urban renewal, park construction, and sewer services—will be phased out abruptly. There is a promise in the budget of block grants to be available in 1975, but no new money is offered for 1974. Funds proposed for education special revenue sharing will decline by \$515 million from comparable program appropriations in 1972.

For all practical purposes, a maximum has been set on the total federal budget. President Nixon has defied Congress to exceed his proposed \$268.7 billion "fiscally responsible" federal outlay budget for 1974 and has threatened to impound domestic appropriations which would cause that limit to be exceeded. Congress has generally indicated its approval of such a spending ceiling, recognizing that the present inflation requires a limit on federal spending.

President Nixon, by increasing the military budget while announcing that we cannot afford to increase or even to maintain many of our vital domestic programs, has put before the Congress a fundamental issue of national priorities: It has become indispensable to the maintenance of our true national security that we find savings in the inflated defense budget to meet real human needs at home. We have concluded that at least \$14 billion can easily be eliminated from President Nixon's proposed \$87 billion military appropriations request.* Those billions saved can and should be applied to the needs of our people.

SOUTHEAST ASIA MILITARY COSTS—RECOMMENDED SAVINGS: \$3.1 BILLION

The new budget authority being requested by the Pentagon in Fiscal 1974 for Southeast Asia is \$2.9 billion. This figure includes \$1.9 billion for U.S. military aid to South Vietnam and Laos, about half of which is slated for ammunition and equipment procurement for those two countries, and half for support of "allied operations." The remaining \$1 billion is for the support of U.S. naval and air forces in Southeast Asia. In addition, \$180 million for military aid to Cambodia is sought in the military assistance request. All \$3.1 billion in new authorizations should be cut out. The arms assistance previously authorized is more than adequate for purposes of self defense.

The Congress and the American people are now united in the conviction that it is time to disengage militarily from Indochina. The January 27, 1973 peace agreement provided for an end to U.S. bombing in North and

* The figures in this report, except as otherwise stated, refer to "budget authority," i.e., proposed new appropriations. Because actual spending "outlays" includes amounts appropriated in prior years, reductions in appropriations, particularly for procurement, do not immediately produce equally large cuts in outlays. The full savings would be achieved in future years.

South Vietnam and the withdrawal of our ground forces there. However, the Administration has continued its heavy military involvement throughout Southeast Asia by conducting extensive bombing raids over Cambodia, sending in new advisers to South Vietnam, flying oil and other supplies to Phnom Penh, conducting two days of bombing raids over Laos, sending reconnaissance planes over North Vietnam, and maintaining high levels of "replacement" of equipment and supplies to South Vietnam.

The U.S. is becoming enmeshed in one part of Indochina—without any constitutional authority—just after disengaging militarily from another area. This can only lead to new military involvement, to new U.S. combat deaths in Indochina, to new prisoners of war, and to further Indochinese deaths.

It is time for the U.S. to end our use of military force in the entire area. This means the cessation of all U.S. bombing, the withdrawal of support for Thai mercenaries in Laos, the suspension of the shipments of enormous amounts of military equipment to the area, and the removal of our air forces in Thailand and our naval forces off the shores. In short, a true U.S. withdrawal can be achieved only by completely ending U.S. military participation in this tragic area, where such participation only serves to keep fighting going and to encourage new outbreaks.

The economic savings from the Fiscal 1974 military budget will be substantial; even more substantial will be the human savings resulting from an end to continued U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. It is time to leave the resolution of power struggles in Indochina to the Indochinese people.

GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES—RECOMMENDED SAVINGS: \$4 BILLION

General purpose forces—Army divisions, tactical air wings, both land- and sea-based, and most naval units—are the most expensive item in our defense budget. General purpose forces absorb 75 per cent of the defense dollar and are the driving element in the increasingly expensive defense manpower bill. Moreover, although they lack the terrible potential for ultimate destruction of strategic forces, the level and deployment of our general purpose forces may have more day-to-day political and diplomatic significance.

For the foreseeable future, the United States must maintain adequate conventional forces so that we do not have to rely entirely on strategic nuclear threats. However, in planning for these forces, we must keep two objectives in mind. First, we must achieve the most efficient possible use of funds spent for the manpower and equipment in our general purpose forces. Both because of budgetary considerations and because it is of profound importance to our national policy, we must clearly link the force levels and deployment patterns of our general purpose forces to our political and diplomatic objectives.

Procurement of new weapons

We must call a halt to the administration's seemingly incurable preference for extravagantly expensive, overly complicated weapons systems and for unjustifiably high force levels, sustained more by tradition than by need. The potential savings in this area are very large, at little or no cost in ability to meet genuine requirements. For example, by cancelling the fourth nuclear carrier and maintaining a reduced number of carriers in the future, we would save \$700 million on the new carrier in Fiscal 1974 and very large amounts in annual operating costs for aircraft, missiles, and escort vessels in the future.

Examples of other general purpose weapons systems which can and should be eliminated or cut back include: (Fiscal 1974 authorization requests in parentheses).

September 27, 1973

Cancel SAM-D Army anti-aircraft missile (\$194 million). This complicated system is of marginal utility, even for the NATO missions now chiefly proposed for it.

Eliminate F-14 program (\$633 million). This plane is financially and technically troubled and represents little, if any, advance on the proven F-4.

Stretch out SSN-688 nuclear attack submarine program (\$922 million), with two instead of five boats in Fiscal 1974 (\$550 million savings).

Cuts such as these—and a much more critical look at other proposed new tanks, missiles, planes, and ships—will save large amounts now. More important, if we insist on simpler, more workable systems in the future, the effectiveness of our forces will actually be enhanced. The cuts outlined above, and similar cuts in other smaller programs, could readily save \$2 billion in Fiscal 1974 authorization, even taking account of transition costs.

Manpower

Of particular importance in the general purpose forces area is reversing the continuing trend toward an imbalance in the teeth-to-tail ratio. The possible increases in military efficiency, detailed in the following section of this report, have greatest impact on the general purpose forces. Specifically, the 10 per cent cut in support personnel advocated there can be made with no harm to the capability of these forces.

We must review in the light of current conditions the reasons that we maintain our general purpose forces, i.e., the political and diplomatic objectives and policies they are designed to support. We must make these policies determine force levels and deployments and not, as so often has been the case in the past, the other way around. Reduced international tensions and acceptance of the hard-learned lessons of the limits on the usefulness of U.S. military power in foreign policy must be reflected in reduced forces and deployments.

The key practical areas here are deciding what forces we must maintain for Asia and what for European contingencies.

In recent years the level of forces actually deployed in Europe has been the most controversial issue as to general purpose forces. Clearly, the support for the NATO alliance must, in the United States' own self-interest, remain our highest conventional defense priority. However, it is neither militarily or diplomatically necessary, nor is it practically feasible permanently to maintain the present structure of United States forces in Europe. We must begin now, in consultation with our NATO allies, to plan a gradual but significant reduction in the number of United States forces in Europe. The place to begin the cuts is certainly in the overgrown support forces for the United States forces in Europe, as would be done by including European forces and bases in 10 per cent cut in support manpower, stressing greater efficiency and the preservation of combat capability. We cannot wait until the completion of negotiations on balanced force reductions to initiate this review, nor can we permanently delay actual reductions as "bargaining chips" in those negotiations.

With respect to Asia, the case is much clearer that there must be cuts in committed forces to bring our defense policies in line with an updated view of our military role in Asia. If we now understand as a nation the folly of any political commitments which could entail engaging in a major land war in Asia, we have no continuing need for the ground divisions and tactical air wings which are now committed to Asian contingencies.

Independent estimates allocate at least three of our 16 ground divisions and 6-8 of our 38 tactical air wings to readiness for Asian interventions. These forces should be eliminated, with an estimated savings of at

least \$2 billion. Specifically, there is no longer any justification for continuing to maintain an American division deployed in Korea, as the South Korean ground forces enjoy about a two-to-one advantage over those of North Korea.

MILITARY EFFICIENCY—RECOMMENDED SAVINGS: \$3.3 BILLION

In addition to the savings gained by a demobilization of combat units, other savings can be realized by cutting support personnel levels, improving military efficiency and reducing manpower-related waste. Total savings could amount to \$3.3 billion.

Reduce support personnel

At present only 15 per cent of military personnel are "combat" forces—the other 85 per cent provide engineering support, transport services, a logistic network, training facilities, and other non-hostile services. While the spending for combat troops has decreased, reflecting the reduction in troop levels following the end of U.S. ground combat in Vietnam, support spending has not decreased proportionately. We recommend a 10 per cent reduction in support personnel which could yield as much as \$1.2 billion.

Reduce officer levels—"Grade creep"

One significant source of increased costs is the steadily growing number of higher grade officers in a smaller total force. There are now more field grade and flag officers (lieutenant colonel or commander and above) to command a force of 2.2 million than there were in 1945 when the military numbered 12.1 million. Since 1970 total defense manpower has decreased by 15 per cent, while the number of general and flag rank officers and comparably paid civilians has remained the same. A similar problem exists with respect to non-commissioned officers.

If, by the end of Fiscal 1974, grade distribution were to be restored to the grade pattern of Fiscal 1964—the last "peacetime" year—an annual savings of over \$2 billion could be realized from this factor alone. Due to the costs of separation pay and retirement benefits, the first year savings from restoring grade patterns would be an estimated \$400 million.

Reduce civilian bureaucracy

The Department of Defense employs one million civilians, or ten times the number employed by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. President Nixon recognized in a recent interview that the Pentagon civilians were in need of a "thinning." Yet his proposed budget raises civilian employment by 31,000.

While DOD civilian personnel have been cut from their Vietnam War high, they have not been reduced in proportion to the cutback in military manpower. A 10 percent reduction in the DOD civilian workforce would save at least \$800 million.

No "recomputation"

The Administration proposes to tie military retirement benefits for certain retirees to the salary increases for active duty personnel, in addition to normal cost of living increases. While purportedly giving a fair shake to retired servicemen, this proposal, exceptionally costly over time, is inequitable for the civilian pensioner, the recipient of Social Security, and the taxpayer. Elimination of "recomputation" would save \$390 million in Fiscal 1974 and an estimated \$17 billion over the lives of the retirees affected.

Other savings

Vigorous implementation of simple operational efficiencies which even advocates of high levels of defense spending have repeatedly called for could easily achieve additional savings. Through a combination of increasing reliance on on-the-job training, reducing pilot training to operational needs, increasing average tours of duty, and improving

maintenance procedures, at least \$500 million could be saved.

PROCUREMENT OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS—RECOMMENDED SAVINGS: \$3 BILLION

Strategic context

Strategic weapons programs must be evaluated in 1973 in light of the Strategic Arms Limitations Agreements signed in Moscow in May 1972. The ABM Treaty, by limiting defensive missile systems to low levels, ensures the viability of our deterrent force. New offensive strategic weapons thus can no longer be justified as necessary to overcome potential Soviet ABM deployments. Furthermore, the capability to respond at appropriate levels in the event of limited Soviet nuclear aggression—the flexible response advocated by the Nixon Administration—has been materially enhanced and requires no new weapons developments. Our present strategic forces may now strike some military targets, including command posts and ICBM silos, without having first to overwhelm an ABM. Finally, the Interim Offensive Agreement freezes the number of large (SS-9 type) Soviet ICBMs at 313, significantly fewer than the number which Secretary Laird posed as a possible future threat to the Minuteman portion of our deterrent.

Despite this improved strategic climate, the Nixon Administration is planning to spend \$750 million (30 percent) more on procuring offensive strategic weapons in 1973 than was spent in 1972 and an additional \$670 million (20 percent) in 1974 over 1973. The Fiscal 1974 program also includes a number of new projects which, although costing relatively small amounts now, provide a foot in the door for very large expenditures in future years.

In the present strategic situation, we recommend the following minimum specific reductions:

Trident

The budget calls for more than \$1.8 billion (DOD and AEC combined) for the Trident submarine ballistic missile system. The missile part of this program, costing \$532 million, is divided into two phases: Trident I missile with a range of 4,000 nautical miles, which can also be retrofitted into the present Polaris-Poseidon system, and the Trident II missile with a range of 6,000 nautical miles. The ship part, costing about \$1.3 billion, would design and build huge new submarines to carry the Trident II missile.

Trident is rationalized in two ways: (1) as a replacement for the "aging" Polaris submarine, and (2) as a hedge against the future development by the USSR of an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability which could threaten Polaris-Poseidon. Neither rationale justifies the procurement of mammoth Trident submarines, more than twice the size of Polaris and each costing \$1.3 billion. The Polaris submarines will remain seaworthy until well into the 1990s, and at the present time the nature of any ASW threat to Polaris cannot even be predicted. When and if it arises, the Trident fleet could be more vulnerable than the present Polaris one because its greater unit size and its smaller number of ships could make it easier to destroy in a surprise attack, using some now unknown technology. The decision to place the \$500 million Trident base in Bangor, Washington, still further reduces the value of this new ship by initially foreclosing its operation in the Atlantic.

Virtually all the potential benefits of Trident, and none of its drawbacks, can be obtained by retrofitting the 4,000 nautical mile Trident I missile on Polaris; this would put our subs in range of Soviet targets, even while still in U.S. territorial waters. The Trident program should be cut back to the development of the Trident I missile and to research on alternative submarine configura-

tions including smaller vessels, with a saving of \$1.3 billion.

Procurement of Minuteman III with MIRVs

The Fiscal 1974 budget proposes \$768 million as the final installment for the MIRVing of the first 550 Minuteman missiles. Since no MIRVs are needed to overwhelm any Soviet ABA, further improvements to the Minuteman force should be deferred and the program halted after completing only those missile modifications now in process. Total savings would be about \$677 million.

B-1 bomber

The 1974 budget calls for \$474 million for the continued development of the new B-1 strategic bomber, a replacement for the present B-52s, which has less range and payload and is supersonic only at high altitudes. The envisaged eventual procurement of some 240 of these bombers could involve overall system expenditures of at least \$30 to \$40 billion. However, the later model B52Gs and Hs, of which we have more than 200, are now estimated to remain operational well through the 1980s. The B-52 replacement, if ever needed, could be a slower, longer endurance aircraft equipped with long-range missiles to avoid having to penetrate hostile air space. The program should be cut back to exploratory R&D on a variety of bomber system designs and the procurement of aircraft should be deferred, with a saving of \$374 million.

ABM

The budget calls for new authorization of \$672 million in Fiscal 1974 for ABMs, of which \$172 million would be authorized for weapons outlawed by the SALT treaty. Total outlays of \$1.74 billion in 1973 and 1974 are needed to complete the Safeguard deployment at the Grand Forks, North Dakota, site. The new program authority requested should be cut back to exploratory development on advanced ABM systems with no procurement of additional hardware, for a saving of \$372 million.

AWACS

The 1974 budget calls for \$210 million for continued development and production of Airborne Warning and Control Systems designed to provide highly sophisticated and invulnerable control systems for defense against Soviet bomber attack and for tactical air defense. The tactical system is too expensive and vulnerable to airplane attack to be worthwhile; the strategic system is unnecessary, as Soviet strategic strength is in missiles, not bombers. Since, by the ABM Treaty, the U.S. and the Soviet Union have recognized their inability to defend against missile attack, the expenditure of large sums of money for new defenses against bombers is very wasteful. The AWACS should be cancelled with a saving of \$200 million.

Development projects leading to large future expenditures

The Fiscal 1974 budget calls for the initial development of a Strategic Cruise Missile (\$15 million), a mobile ICBM (\$6 million), and the deployment of a phased array radar for warning against submarine launched missiles (\$31 million). None of these are justified. Cruise missiles are unnecessary when ballistic missiles have a free ride to targets in the Soviet Union; a mobile ICBM is unnecessary in view of the invulnerability of our submarine missile force with more than 5,000 warheads; and additional means of warning of submarine missiles is superfluous because of the recent successful deployment of a satellite-based missile warning system. In addition, the program calls for spending \$95 million for the development of advanced ballistic re-entry systems and technology. The project could be destabilizing and erode the agreed mutual deterrent balance, spurring the arms race. These four programs should be eliminated or reduced to very low levels with a saving of \$122 million.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM—RECOMMENDED SAVINGS: \$556 MILLION

The United States must adjust the military assistance program to the new era which has opened in international affairs. The detente among the superpowers has downgraded the significance of political/military developments in regions which were formerly the chief arenas of Big Power confrontation. Moreover, U.S. experience in Indochina in the past decade has shown the limits of military power, direct and by proxy, even when applied in huge amounts, to complex economic, political, and social conflicts within developing nations.

The American people recognize that the United States has neither the resources nor the need to be the world's policeman. It is equally wrong to continue to seek to be the world's chief distributor of subsidized arms and ammunition. Our arms aid and sale policies have led us to arm both sides in local conflicts. They increase the danger that the United States will align itself against the hopes and aspirations of the majority of the world's people by arming authoritarian governments representing a narrow political-military-economic elite.

In the current fiscal year the Executive Branch estimates that military and related assistance and arms sales programs total more than \$8.4 billion. Much of this assistance—some \$4 billion—is made available through programs which require no Congressional appropriations, for example, Department of Defense foreign military cash sales, excess defense articles, and ship loans.

Some parts of our military assistance and sales programs are clearly in our national interest, and should be continued. But major cuts can be made.

FEASIBLE REDUCTIONS IN THE FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

[In millions of dollars]

Program	Fiscal year 1974 budget request	Proposed	Savings
Military grant assistance (request includes \$180,000,000 for Cambodia)	652	270	\$202
Military education and training	33	25	\$8
Military credit sales	525	200	\$325
Credit sales ceiling	(760)	(700)	(60)
Security supporting assistance	100	95	\$59
Total	1,310	590	\$540

¹ Eliminating the \$180,000,000 request for military aid to Cambodia is included in our recommended Southeast Asia cuts, and not here.

Additional savings can be made by reducing Military Assistance Advisory Groups, missions, and military groups attached to U.S. embassies around the world. These groups, which promote U.S. military sales and services, and even the military aid program, too often play a role independent of the U.S. ambassador who is nominally in control. The Administration estimates MAAG Mission/Military Group costs for Fiscal 1974 as follows: \$15.8 million from the Military Assistance Program and \$50 million from Department of Defense Funds. We recommend a 25 per cent cut this year leading to a total phaseout of the program. Total savings for aid to foreign nations and U.S. military missions: \$556 million.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, this second report that I have just referred to outlines how a total of \$14 billion could be cut from the administration's requested \$35 billion military budget.

I emphasize again that that is double the size of the cut I am recommending in my amendment.

In a sense, my amendment is a conservative one when we compare it with the recommendations made by the Brookings Institution in its study, which was made by former Defense Department, CIA, and National Security Council experts.

I wish there were more time for Members of the Senate to read these two reports before we vote on this amendment today.

Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 17 minutes remaining.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I would be prepared to yield back my time at such time as the opponents of the amendment are willing to yield back their time.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the amendment by the distinguished Senator from South Dakota.

These provisions would limit the fiscal year 1974 authorizations to \$9.9 billion for procurement and \$7 billion for R.D. T. & E. In considering such a ceiling, let us review the financing of these programs. The fiscal year 1973 Appropriation Act provided \$20,445 million for items subject to authorization, including amounts that were provided by transfers from other accounts and spelled out in the appropriation act. For fiscal year 1974, the bill reported by the Committee on Armed Services would provide \$20,448 million—nearly identical to the amount provided by Congress in the fiscal year 1973 appropriations. It is necessary to recognize inflation, though. We are a year farther along, and the rate of inflation has been and continues to be very sharp; \$20.4 billion in fiscal year 1974 will not buy nearly as much as \$20.4 billion in fiscal year 1973. By not allowing any increase at all, the bill as reported by the Armed Services Committee would, in effect, require the Department to absorb all the inflation from fiscal year 1973 to fiscal year 1974 within a fixed dollar total. That inflation, at 6 percent, would amount to more than \$1.2 billion. We can say, then, that the fiscal year 1974 amounts in the bill as reported by the committee would involve a program reduction in real terms, that is, in terms of actual buying power, of \$1.2 billion, or 6 percent, from the levels appropriated by Congress for fiscal year 1973.

We begin then, with a committee bill that is down \$1.2 billion, or 6 percent, from the buying power that we provided for fiscal year 1973. The provisions we are now considering would reduce that committee bill by \$3.6 billion. These provisions, then, would produce a program for fiscal year 1974 that is about

\$4.8 billion—about 22 percent—below the fiscal year 1973 program.

One more point of perspective: For fiscal year 1964, Congress appropriated \$18.9 billion in areas that are now subject to authorization. At fiscal year 1974 prices—today's prices—that would be equivalent to \$27.7 billion. These provisions would limit the fiscal year 1974 program to \$16.9 billion—about 40 percent, in terms of buying power, below the levels of peacetime fiscal year 1964.

What these provisions would mean, then, is a reduction of \$3.6 billion from the amounts which the Armed Services Committee, after months of review, considered to be necessary to meet our national security needs. They would represent a cut, in real terms, of 22 percent below the levels financed in the fiscal year 1973 appropriation, and a 40-percent cut from the levels of peacetime fiscal year 1964. We are considering, then, massive reductions in defense programs which would have to involve a major strategic reorientation. We are considering a drastic slash in American defense capabilities, entirely out of line with the threat that faces us. Such proposals are simply unsupportable in today's world. Slashes such as these would place our security in the gravest peril.

I am disturbed, too, by another aspect of these provisions: Who would decide where these massive reductions are to be made? The provisions are silent on this point. We are dealing in this authorization with major weapon systems which will, to a very great extent, shape our national security efforts for years to come. We are dealing here with matters involving the fundamentals of national security policy. The appropriate committees have devoted months of study to these matters. Now, today, it is proposed that we reduce the recommendation of the Committee on Armed Services by \$3.6 billion—nearly one-fifth—in a blanket, unspecified cut. Who is to decide which weapons are to be eliminated, which forces curtailed, and so forth? The Secretary of Defense? Do we propose to give him blanket authority to make these massive adjustments without reference to Congress? This could only involve a serious weakening of the role of Congress in the national security field, an abandonment of our responsibilities to deliberate and to decide the major issues in this area.

But if Congress is to have a role in this area, what is it to be? Also important, when is it to be? Time is growing short. We are entering the second quarter of the fiscal year. We have been dealing with the fiscal year 1974 budget for more than 8 months, and the fiscal year 1975 budget must be submitted to us less than 4 months from now. Where is the time to make these massive decisions, which involve tearing to shreds a program for a fiscal year that is already well along? Where is the time for sufficient congressional consideration of such major changes in our national security posture? The schedule being what it is, and the date being what it is, I am afraid that the answer is obvious. We would have no choice, in practice, but to make a

huge delegation of authority to the Executive in this area.

These provisions must be rejected. They would involve a slash of nearly one-fourth from the levels approved by Congress for fiscal year 1973, and a 40-percent reduction from the levels of peacetime 1964. Cuts of this magnitude are grossly out of line with the national security needs of today's world. Moreover, a blanket cut of this nature would entail a massive delegation to the Executive of the powers and the responsibilities of the Congress in the national security field. We in Congress have the responsibility to provide an adequate defense, and a responsibility as well to deliberate and to decide in major areas of national security policy. By enacting this amendment we would be dodging these responsibilities, and I think this would be a great mistake.

As to the reduction of military manpower, this amendment would reduce the strength of the Armed Forces 166,000 below the level proposed by the President and the Secretary of Defense for fiscal year 1974. Not only would a strength reduction of this magnitude result in the elimination of ground combat units, ships and aircraft squadrons, but also, the resulting personnel turbulence would seriously weaken the remaining units of the Armed Forces.

I earnestly request my colleagues to consider the following facts:

First. The military strength proposed by the Department of Defense, as adjusted by the House, is 1,325,000 lower than at the height of the Vietnam war and 464,000 lower than in the pre-Vietnam year of 1964.

Second. In reducing military strength in the past several years, above-average reductions were made in such support functions as headquarters, base support, intelligence, and logistics.

Third. The military chiefs of each military service have testified that the major share of a reduction of this magnitude would have to be taken from combat "muscle"—ships, aircraft squadrons, and ground combat units.

Fourth. Congress enacted pay raises to provide a decent standard of living for members of the Armed Forces and to make it possible to achieve an all-volunteer force. Now many of my colleagues in the Senate use the cost of manpower as a reason for making an unwarranted and unwise reduction in military strength.

For these reasons I must oppose the reduction of military manpower provided in this amendment of 166,000.

This amendment, if enacted, would also require an arbitrary 10-percent reduction of civilian employment. The number of civilian positions required to be reduced by this amendment would be over 100,000 during the current fiscal year.

The statement that "The civilian bureaucracy of the arms establishment has continued to grow despite reductions in military forces from the Vietnam peak" is false. Defense full-time permanent civilian employment in military functions has decreased by 256,908 since the peak

of the Vietnam war. Present full-time permanent strength is about 200,000 below the prewar fiscal year 1964 level when fiscal year 1964 is adjusted to reflect civilian/military substitutions, contractor conversions, and the conversion of National Guard technicians from State to Federal status. On a comparable basis, the ratio of civilian to total positions in the Department of Defense has dropped since fiscal year 1964 from 33.3 percent civilian to 32.8 percent civilian.

The proposed amendment would require a massive reduction in civilian employment during the current fiscal year, nearly all of which would have to be accomplished in the short time frame of the latter half of fiscal year 1974. It would result in widespread layoffs and bumping that would be disruptive of efficiency, damaging to morale, and wholly unrelated to workload requirements.

Finally, this amendment would delete all MASF funds, an action the Senate rejected earlier today.

The issue very clearly before the Senate is whether we wish to set aside years of progress moving towards peace in Southeast Asia through an arbitrary and capricious action to deny the funds requested by the Department of Defense for support of our allies in Southeast Asia. Surely, we all recognize that peace comes only with strength. After a period of years, we have finally been able to negotiate a shaky cease-fire which contains the basis for real peace in Southeast Asia. We are all aware that these agreements have been only and flagrantly violated by the other side. It is clear that they have not yet reached the conclusion that their best interests will be served by peace in Southeast Asia. It is equally clear that there are those on the other side who are prepared to seize upon an opportunity to reinitiate open conflict in Southeast Asia and to pursue aggressive objectives throughout the area.

Elimination of the MASF funds recommended by the Senate Armed Services Committee would be an international signal easily read in Hanoi. It would tell them the United States was no longer going to stand behind our allies in Southeast Asia. It would tell Hanoi that the United States was no longer interested in preserving the tenuous balance we have achieved in Laos and Vietnam. It would open the door to another large-scale North Vietnamese offensive at a time when, in violation of the cease-fire agreement, they have refitted their forces in South Vietnam to a level where they are stronger than they were before the 1972 Easter invasion.

Let us choose the path of peace and responsibility and defeat this capricious amendment.

Mr. President, in summary, I point out that the committee bill provides that procurement would be \$12.3 billion. The McGovern amendment would cut this to \$9.8 billion, or a difference of \$2.5 billion.

The committee bill provides \$8.1 billion for research and development. The McGovern amendment would cut that to \$6.9 billion, a difference of \$1.2 billion.

The committee bill provides \$952 million for MASF. The McGovern amendment would provide nothing. That would be a difference of \$952 million.

The committee bill has already reduced manpower by 156,000. The McGovern amendment would reduce it by 166,000, a difference of 10,000.

The committee bill sets no ceiling on civilian manpower. The McGovern amendment sets a ceiling of 911,700. That takedown is more than 100,000.

Mr. President, the Committee on Armed Services spent 5 months studying this bill. We have turned out eight volumes of hearings such as the one I hold in my hand. Is all this going to be thrown to the wind? Is all this consideration and deliberation and testimony by experts on these matters to go unconsidered? In my judgment, this would be a great mistake.

It would be unfair for the committee's work to be handled in such a way. The committee has given careful consideration to this matter. It has made many recommendations, it has made many reductions, it has made many revisions, and we feel that to come along now and agree to an amendment such as the amendment of the distinguished Senator from South Dakota, whom I hold in great affection, would be a blunder and Congress would be handicapped in handling the important work of the Department of Defense.

Mr. President, for these reasons, I hope the amendment is rejected.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may require.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota is recognized.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I am not going to use a great deal of time. I wish to summarize the highlights of the amendment.

I hope that Senators will break away from viewpoints that give a distorted picture of what is actually being proposed.

Because we ordinarily deal with budgets sent up by the administration, we have a tendency to focus hardest on each proposed cut and how it would change the preestablished national security program. If a number of amendments are offered which would eliminate specific parts of the budget, it is fairly easy to create the impression that those who offer the amendments are trying to eliminate the very muscle, the bone, and possibly even the marrow of our military establishment.

But our focus really should be on what is left, not on what is being proposed as a reduction. The rational way to proceed is to see what kind of a military program the remainder will buy. Then we should evaluate that, not according to what the administration wants, and not according to what we spent last year or in some prior year, but according to what we perceive as threats to the Nation's security.

For example, as I have noted, my amendment would leave total new military budget authority of \$77.8 billion.

The amendment would not touch any of the vast nuclear deterrent forces presently in the American arsenal—1,054

ICBM's, 656 SLBM's, and 500 strategic bombers, carrying at least 7,100 nuclear weapons. That compares to about 400 weapons needed to strike every significant target in the Soviet Union and China combined.

Now would the amendment eliminate a single conventional weapon that is now in our arsenal. And if the administration manages the proposed manpower cuts prudently, it should not cut at all into the actual combat forces we have to operate those weapons; rather it should reduce an overblown support establishment. It would leave 13 active Army divisions, three Marine divisions, 21 tactical Air Force wings, 14 tactical Navy wings, 3 tactical Marine wings, 15 aircraft carriers, over 60 nuclear attack submarines, nearly 200 escort ships, 65 amphibious assault ships, 17 strategic airlift squadrons, and over 50 trooperships, cargoships and tankers.

There is no other country or combination of countries on the face of this earth that has military power comparable to that.

The amendment simply provides that so far as new spending is concerned, we are going to cut the \$85 billion which for new spending which the administration requested to approximately \$78 billion in new spending authority.

And rather than taking any weapons away, the amendment would authorize nearly \$10 billion entirely for the purpose of building and buying new arms, either in addition to those we already have or to replace those that are becoming old or obsolete.

One of the strange twists of logic that takes place here every time we talk about the military budget, is that if anyone proposes a cut of \$1 billion, it is talked about as cutting into our Military Establishment, instead of looking at what is left after the cut. In this amendment we are adding another \$78 billion to what we have in our defense forces. It just happens to be a little less than the addition the administration requested. Let us talk about \$78 billion and not the \$7 billion.

Beyond that, it would authorize another \$7 billion for research, development, test and evaluation of weapons that may be purchased in subsequent years.

At the same time, if this amendment is agreed to we can move to fulfill a more comprehensive definition of national security.

National security includes a strong economy as well as a strong defense. It includes protection against shortages of food and fuel, as well as protection against enemy guns. It includes schools for our children as well as silos for our missiles. It includes the health of our families as much as the size of our bombs, the safety of our streets and the condition of our cities, and not just the engines of war. I suggest there are more Americans nervous about their safety in the neighborhoods and streets of this country than who are nervous about the possibility of Soviet bombers overhead. As much as our deterrent in the eyes of the communities, national security also

includes the credibility and effectiveness of the system in the eyes of our own people.

I hope we will take that one prudent and, I believe, conservative step today by adopting this modest reduction in spending that has been requested for the Pentagon.

Mr. President, if the Senator from South Carolina is ready to yield back his time, I am ready to yield back my time.

Mr. THURMOND. We yield back our time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time is yielded back. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from South Dakota. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. McCLELLAN) is necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from Iowa (Mr. CLARK) is absent because of a death in the family.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Iowa (Mr. CLARK) would vote "yea."

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Oregon (Mr. PACKWOOD) is necessarily absent.

I further announce that the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) is absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Kansas (Mr. PEARSON) is absent because of illness.

I further announce that the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) is absent for religious observances.

I further announce that the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) is absent by leave of the Senate, and, if present and voting, would vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 12, nays 81, as follows:

[No. 429 Leg.]		
YEAS—12		
Abourezk	Hartke	Mansfield
Fulbright	Hatfield	McGovern
Gravel	Hathaway	Nelson
Hart	Hughes	Proxmire
NAYS—81		
Aiken	Dominick	Montoya
Allen	Eagleton	Moss
Baker	Eastland	Muskie
Bartlett	Ervin	Nunn
Bayh	Fannin	Pastore
Beall	Fong	Pell
Bellmon	Goldwater	Randolph
Bennett	Grimm	Ribicoff
Bentsen	Gurney	Roth
Bible	Hansen	Saxbe
Biden	Haskell	Schweiker
Brock	Helms	Scott, Hugh
Brooke	Hollings	Scott, William L.
Buckley	Hruska	Sparkman
Burdick	Huddleston	Stafford
Byrd,	Humphrey	Stennis
Harry F., Jr.	Inouye	Stevens
Byrd, Robert C.	Jackson	Stevenson
Cannon	Johnston	Symington
Case	Kennedy	Thalmadge
Chiles	Long	Tunney
Church	Magnuson	Weicker
Cook	Mathias	Williams
Cotton	McClure	Young
Cranston	McGee	
Curtis	McIntyre	
Dole	Metcalf	
Domenici	Mondale	
NOT VOTING—7		
Clark	Packwood	Taft
Javits	Pearson	
McClellan	Percy	

So Mr. McGOVERN's amendment was rejected.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will now proceed to the consideration of an amendment by the Senator from Indiana (Mr. BAYH), No. 487, on which there shall be 4 hours of debate. The clerk will report the amendment.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

On page 19, line 10, strike out "\$1,935,933,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$1,741,733,000".

On page 19, between lines 17 and 18, insert a new section as follows:

SEC. 202. None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be expended for any research, development, testing, or evaluation in connection with the SAM-D missile program."

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, would the Senator yield to me for a moment to move to reconsider the vote by which the McGovern amendment was rejected?

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I yield for that purpose.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the McGovern amendment was just rejected.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will have to ask unanimous consent.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for that purpose.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I now move to reconsider the vote by which the McGovern amendment was rejected.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I would like to address a question to my distinguished friend and colleague from New Hampshire, as well as any members of the leadership or others who may appear to address themselves to this question.

In my judgment, the SAM-D missile system debate is one of the most important matters to come before the Senate. I will not say it is the most important, because I suppose that all of us tend to become obsessed with the importance of their own particular efforts. I am talking about a new weapons system, a sizable cost overrun, and ultimately the expenditure of several billions of dollars to put into the field a system that we have never had before and some of us feel we never will have.

Mr. President, may we have order in the Senate?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will come to order.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, for that reason we have allotted 4 hours, which is a long time. It is a much longer time at quarter to 5 than it would be at a quarter to 12. I do not know how much time it will take. I hate to say that this 4 hours will put us here until a quarter to 9. However, I feel an obligation to see that all of the nuances of this matter are fully brought to the attention of the Senate and voted up or down.

I do not know how long we should spend on this tonight. Should we proceed

now or should we proceed at a time when it is a matter of more significance to the Senate?

I am willing to accept the leadership's opinion or the opinion of the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE) or the opinion of the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. THURMOND). If the Senators prefer to have this matter discussed tomorrow, I would be perfectly willing. I am not saying that we should do it now. However, I am dead set on discussing it.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we are prepared on our side to cut the time in half if the Senator is prepared to do so.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I am not prepared to say that. I do not say that in an arbitrary sense.

We are talking about a major expenditure by the Army and whether we ought to buy one kind of weapon or another. We have to go into it at length.

I do not know how long it will take. I hope that the presentation on our side will not take 2 hours.

I think the validity of the argument is enhanced when we realize that the distinguished Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) and the distinguished Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON), who have never seen eye to eye on all matters, have brought to our attention that in this bill they are in agreement that SAM-D is a bad system.

I think that lends a great deal more credibility to this matter than the fact that the Senator now speaking, right off a farm in Indiana, has a chance to talk about it. I want other Senators to talk about it.

I do not see the Senator from Ohio (Mr. SAXBE) on the floor. However, he is concerned about the matter. I just offer an opportunity to discuss this matter for the full time, if the Senate prefers.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I am prepared to say that on our side, the chairman of the subcommittee, the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE), will speak for probably 20 minutes. The Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOK) will speak for about 5 minutes. The Senator from South Carolina, now speaking, will speak for about 10 minutes. The Senator from Arizona will speak for about 5 minutes. We will perhaps not use half the time on our side.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BAYH. I will be glad to yield.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, speaking on behalf of the majority leader, I am constrained to say that we cannot put the amendment over until tomorrow or put the vote over until tomorrow.

We stated at least 24 hours in advance that the SAM-D missile would be scheduled for a vote today. We are hopeful that all amendments can be disposed of, and that we can reach final passage tomorrow. And if we are able to do that, there will not be any Saturday session.

Senators can see the predicament that we would find ourselves in if we would put this amendment over until tomorrow. The Humphrey amendment is

backed up behind this amendment, and we already have several amendments scheduled for tomorrow.

I would suggest that we proceed with this amendment and that the distinguished Senator from Indiana and his supporters present their viewpoints. We have heard the distinguished Senator from South Carolina state the time that each of his supporters would need. I would suggest that the opponents of the amendment cut their time to 1 hour and let the Senator from Indiana retain his 2 hours.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we would like to accommodate the distinguished Senator from Indiana in any way we can. We are willing to cut our time by the amount of time that the Senator from Indiana is willing to cut his time. If the Senator from Indiana wants to cut the time on the amendment from 4 hours to 2 hours, we are willing to do that.

If the Senator from Indiana wants to make some other reduction in time, we would be willing to do that. However, the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) might decide he is against the amendment or others may be against the amendment. The committee voted against the amendment.

We would not agree to a unilateral reduction of time, but would agree to a mutual reduction.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, would the Senator agree to 2 hours to be under the control of the distinguished Senator from Indiana and 1 hour to be under the control of the opponents with 1 additional hour to be under the control of the majority and minority leaders so that if other Senators come in and want additional time beyond the 3 hours, they may obtain it from the time allotted to the majority and minority leaders.

If I understand the Senator correctly, it is not likely that such time would ever be yielded.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I yield.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, and our distinguished majority whip, who has done an excellent job in expediting the various amendments before the Senate, I take this opportunity to congratulate him. Never before—

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, may we have order while the distinguished Senator is complimenting the majority whip?

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, the Senator knows that I love him so much I would even say it all over again.

I think we ought to keep going and see if we can finish the program tonight. We ought to stay here tonight and finish the program as laid out. As a matter of fact, I would like to see some items that have been designated for tomorrow acted upon tonight. If we are to go home at 9 o'clock, we might as well go home at midnight. Let us see how much we can accomplish and then get out of here.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

But since the beginning, I have said that I did not think we should have a time designated for a final passage vote tonight.

Mr. PASTORE. We are not discussing that now. I did not suggest that.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I am tempted to just sit down and rest my case, but perhaps that would not be the better part of wisdom. For the benefit of those who have already made up their minds on this issue, the Senator from Indiana plans to present a rather comprehensive statement summarizing the opposition to the SAM-D system, and then, of course, it is up to Senators to join in the debate and express themselves if they wish.

I see in the Chamber my friend from Ohio, who feels equally strongly about the lack of propriety and wisdom in this program. Several others wish to talk, and I think I would probably have been better off to start on my speech; but out of deference to the convenience of my colleagues, I thought I ought to offer to debate it tomorrow, or do anything that would meet their convenience. I share the feeling of the Senator from Rhode Island that if we are going to be here until 9 o'clock tonight, we might as well as here until midnight.

Mr. President, A few weeks ago, the United States finally brought to an end its involvement in the Indochina war—the longest and in many ways the most costly war in our history. The last year has also seen the signing of the historic SALT I agreements—the ABM Treaty and the interim agreement on strategic forces. These two events taken together seem to me to suggest that this is a particularly appropriate time for us to take a serious look at the level of resources we are devoting to national defense and to closely question whether these resources are being wisely spent. For too many years we have based our defense policy on the idea that the Nation has virtually unlimited resources to devote to this area. Today I believe that the people of the United States who are faced with the worst inflation in 20 years accompanied by continuing unemployment, by the highest interest rates in history, and by unprecedented devaluations of the dollar want their Representatives in Congress to take a long, hard look at defense priorities.

Let me make my position absolutely clear: Unchallengeable military strength is our goal, and in my judgment it will be maintained. But the resilience and vitality of our economic and social fabric is every bit as important as our weapons systems in achieving true "national security."

Today the distinguished Senator from Ohio (Mr. SAXBE) and I are asking the Senate to eliminate continued funding for one program which is as good an example as one can possibly find of runaway military costs—the Army's SAM-D missile system. The amount contained in this year's budget, \$194.2 million, is frankly not large compared with many other items. Yet by the time this missile is ready for operation, 7 years from now, it will have cost according to current estimates \$4.48 billion and thereafter will cost us more than \$400 million every year to maintain and operate.

Mr. President, that statement is pred-

icated upon a very important caveat: "According to current estimates." Unfortunately, military costs as well as the prices of shoes and bologna are escalating right now because of inflation.

As former Secretary Packard, one of the most respected experts in the defense field, noted in 1969:

The most certain way to waste resources is to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on a development and then conclude we will not need what we are developing.

Likewise, as the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator STENNIS noted in 1971:

If we can afford a permanent force structure of only one-fifth as many fighter aircraft or tanks as our potential adversaries—because our systems are five times more expensive than theirs—then a future crisis may find us at a sharp numerical disadvantage.

Although Chairman STENNIS was speaking in terms of aircraft and tanks, we clearly face a similar situation with regard to expenditures on air defense. The warnings of responsible defense officials as well as Members of the Congress, echoed again in this year's committee report, were again unheeded in the decision to proceed with the SAM-D. I would like to bring to the attention of the Senate today several aspects of the SAM-D which I considered important in reaching my decision to oppose the program. But before examining the details of the program, let me summarize where I think the crux of the argument really lies.

We could argue for many hours about the more technical aspects of this missile system and probably never reach a real resolution of these issues. Such arguments would seem to me, however, to miss the basic point. The SAM-D is an enormously expensive weapon system. It takes us down the road towards putting what resources we have available into a very few, highly complex, tremendously costly systems.

I am convinced that such a policy takes us in precisely the wrong direction. What we must do is to tell the Army that it is more important for us to direct what resources we in the Congress are able to provide toward less costly, less complex, and in all probability more diversified systems.

We in the Congress have made these hard decisions in other cases in recent years with highly successful results. Take the main battle tank for example. We agreed that the Army needed a new tank. There was no real argument about that. But when the schedule slipped technical failures multiplied and the cost went over a million dollars per copy, which was three times the previous tank, the Armed Services Committee in their wisdom said: "No. That is simply too expensive and too complicated. Go back and try again." The Army did, and they found they could build more reliable, simpler modern tanks for one-half the price. Similarly the committee wisely raised a similar stop sign for the Cheyenne helicopter when performance and schedule slipped and cost went beyond \$4 million, six times that of the previous armed helicopter. We cut the money. They tried again, and now we have the

advanced armed helicopter at \$1.6 million each with a better chance of proving useful. Thus, in that particular instance, we saved money and got a better helicopter.

I know that there are today a great many thoughtful Army men who are grateful to the Congress for making these hard decisions, for they improved the tank and the helicopter and they freed resources to beef-up conventional, everyday field Army hardware. Today we are considering a weapon of vastly greater complexity and risk than Cheyenne and MBT. The weapon under discussion has shown even worse schedule slippage and cost increases than the two cancelled programs.

It is not as if we are faced with an emergency where a crash program is needed, where money is no object. We are now just today beginning to pay for and field the improved Hawk, a system which the Army has acknowledged is fully adequate to deal with today's threat. We need the SAM-D, if at all, not for today's enemy capabilities, but for the advance aircraft we now speculate the Soviets might develop in the 1980's. We have the time, therefore, to go back and look for less costly solutions. The SAM-D system was designed and planned in the mid-1960's, when defense resources were relatively unlimited, when we never thought in terms of tradeoffs between costs and capabilities. We do not play by those rules any more. We all now, the committee and the Pentagon are agreed that we will follow a concept of "planning-to-cost." We forced these other weapons like the tank and the armed helicopter to conform to this concept, and we have found that the result improves our weapons and our Army's overall capabilities. I would urge the Senate to make the same wise decision with the SAM-D.

costs

The cost of development and procurement of SAM-D is now estimated at \$4.48 billion. This represents a unit cost growth of 350 percent—a cost overrun, if you please—since it was approved for initial development in 1967. The Army is fond of pointing out that the overall program costs have grown only about 9 percent from the 1967 estimates. What they usually fail to mention, however, is that they—although the total cost of the program has gone up only 11½ percent since 1967—limited overall program costs only by drastically decreasing the number of SAM-D fire sections and missiles to be purchased. The number of fire sections was reduced by 68 percent and the number of missiles by 52 percent. The committee report states that the SAM-D is "within cost estimates." I regard this statement as somewhat misleading, since costs increased again by more than \$104 million during the last year. In percentage terms, the present cost overruns on SAM-D exceed those of the C5-A, or any other Army program such as Cheyenne or MBT. In addition, this program is distinguished by the longest schedule slippage of any modern weapons systems ever—76 months or 6½ years, and 350 percent over the estimated cost. I suggest that with statistics like that before

us now, it would be folly not to stand back and heed the evidence.

One of the principal arguments made by the Army to support SAM-D is that it will save personnel costs. In point of fact, one SAM-D battery requires the same number of people to operate as do the Hawk and Hercules batteries it is supposed to replace.

The 7,500 man personnel savings that the Army postulates is possible only because the Army's present plans call for fewer SAM-D batteries and because they assume that as soon as SAM-D is operational we will immediately abandon the Hercules and the Hawks. Yet as the GAO report accurately points out, the cost-effectiveness study conducted by the Army's Air Defense Evaluation Board assumed that we would have to continue to deploy and operate the improved Hawk along with the SAM-D to "Provide adequate defense from 1980 to 1990." It seems to me that the Army ought to make up its mind before it asks us to approve continuing the funding of this program whether it needs just the SAM-D or both the Hawk and the SAM-D.

In any event, even if we accept the Army's argument—which I am unwilling to do—as to personnel savings, it nevertheless admits that over a 10-year period, it will cost \$2.2 billion more to operate and maintain the SAM-D than it would the alternative system. Every SAM-D battery would cost more than \$100 million to buy and operate over 10 years as compared with about \$43 million for an improved Hawk battery. Perhaps more important, the highly sophisticated radar and computer equipment of the SAM-D will require much more highly trained personnel to maintain. As a matter of fact, one of the specific objections that our NATO allies have made to the SAM-D is that it will require virtually Ph. D.-level personnel to operate and that they simply do not have these people available, or are unwilling to pay the price for them. This will, of course, be a problem for the United States as well, and it is one which the Army has not given sufficient consideration to, in the judgment of the Senator from Indiana.

Another technique used by weapons system planners to attempt to arrive at a rational judgment on cost-effectiveness is to attempt to measure the difference in costs for the side using the weapon and for the opponent seeking to destroy it. If all other things are equal, the theory then goes, a rational opponent will not persist in attacking a defensive weapon that costs him more to destroy than the weapon is worth. For example, an enemy will not continue to sacrifice a million dollars of investment in order to destroy an opponent's system which is worth, say, only \$100,000.

In considering alternative proposed weapon systems, the planner's choice should favor the one which inflicts the most unfavorable cost-ratio on the enemy. In that connection, I asked my staff to compute some rough comparisons of the costs to each side when the SAM-D is pitted against a known Soviet aircraft like the Mig-21, and to check them out with the General Accounting Office. The precise cost ratios in this regard will

vary, depending on the aircraft involved and the altitude of the attack. It is clear, however, that it will cost the United States many times more to protect the SAM-D than it would cost the Soviets to knock it out and furthermore that this cost-ratio is considerably more favorable to the Soviets in the case of SAM-D than it is with the improved Hawk, due to the much higher cost of SAM-D and its vulnerability.

In short, Mr. President, even if we ignore all the unresolved technical problems which, as I shall discuss in a moment, I believe exist, and assume that SAM-D will come through on time and at its present cost estimates, we still are talking about a gold-plated, multibillion-dollar weapons system with capabilities which were not designed for defense against manned aircraft. It is something I believe, if we are to talk in terms of economic realities, we just cannot afford.

THE IMPROVED HAWK—AN ALTERNATIVE TO SAM-D

In 1972, the Army began to deploy and pay for the first units of a new air defense system which it calls the improved Hawk. In spite of its name, however, this weapon is significantly different and more capable than is the earlier basic Hawk. The Army itself specifically acknowledged—and I quote from the Army's assessment—that:

Either the Improved Hawk or the SAM-D weapons is capable of providing an adequate defense.

But their cost-effectiveness study went on to conclude that it would be more expensive to purchase enough HAWK's to meet the threat levels they were postulating than it would be to proceed with development of the SAM-D.

Since this is the real heart of the matter—which system is most cost-effective—I think it is worth spending a few minutes examining the assumptions upon which the Army's supposedly objective cost comparison was based. Instead of comparing what the future costs would be to procure and operate the improved HAWK over, say a 10-year period with the costs of buying and operating the SAM-D over that same 10-year period, the Army started with assuming 23 years of operational costs for the HAWK vs. only 10 years for the SAM-D.

You do not have to be a Ph. D. in mathematics to know that if you prorate costs over 10 years, it is going to cost more per year than if you prorate the costs over 23 years. They did not use the same criteria in assessing costs. The Army now admits, in response to my inquiries, that this discrepancy exists, the effect of which, of course, is to severely bias the study against the Hawk and make SAM-D look better. Yet they blandly assert that it made no difference in their conclusions. I emphasize that. They prorated this over more than twice the period compared with the cost of the Hawk, which should have increased the cost more than twice. Yet, they said that a doubling of this cost estimate had no impact on their conclusion. They further assumed a 300-percent increase in the number of Warsaw pact aircraft that we could be faced with and that we would have an Army of 21½ divisions, with half of them in Europe.

I will not go into detail and compare

the numbers now of both divisions and aircraft. The percentage is accurate. In my judgment, I find that a totally unreliable threat to defend against. I should insert in the RECORD now that the Defense Intelligence Agency, the agency that is supposed to know more and be relied upon more than any other intelligence agency in the military, takes an entirely different perspective of what the ultimate threat is going to be than does the Army.

The improved Hawk is already in production and deployment has begun. Thus, the technical and cost risks associated with any new weapons system have now been minimized. The SAM-D, on the other hand, is just now entering engineering development and is 7 years from deployment. In addition, certain critical capabilities of the system have yet to be demonstrated. I am convinced that if the Army's cost-effectiveness study had in fact been fair and used identical criteria in simulation and costing for the SAM-D and the Improved Hawk, their conclusion would have been that the Improved Hawk was more cost-effective than SAM-D.

It stands to reason. If you try to compare the cost of a weapon that has not yet been developed with one that is now being put in the field, which has all the monkey wrenches out of the machinery, it is still not a fair comparison. The Hawk has been through the development, the mistake, the misjudgment costs, that any weapons system has. The SAM-D has not. Yet, the Army applies the different cost criteria to both weapons systems.

Perhaps the key variable in a cost-effectiveness analysis is the threat estimates with which our military forces will be faced. If we are to be able to make any rational judgment at all about how best to spend our defense dollar, it is crucial that we have the best possible estimates of our potential enemy's likely capabilities. Yet here, again, we find unexplained discrepancies in the data used by the Army to justify the need for SAM-D. I noted with interest the recent testimony of the distinguished manager of the overall bill, Mr. SYMINGTON, before the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, where he said that "instead of beginning with an accurate view of our potential enemy's capabilities, and deriving from that a requirement for America's defense needs, then buying what is needed with maximum efficiency." Current Pentagon practice is to "start with a need to spend money in order to show resolve, work backward to the need for a new and even more expensive weapon system, then concoct the threat to justify the always expensive, and often unnecessary, program in question." This is precisely what took place and is taking place, with the SAM-D.

Enemy threat assessments are the primary responsibility, as I mentioned a moment ago, of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and it is my understanding that all the branches of our Armed Forces are expected to base their planning on the estimates provided by DIA. DIA is supposed to have the answer. Yet, inexplicably, the threat estimates on which the Army bases its case for the SAM-D are

vastly different from those of DIA. Although the absolute figures are classified, it is possible to speak in terms of rough comparisons.

The documentation supporting the threat which SAM-D will be required to counter is based in estimates made by the Army in its 1970 study. When we compare these 1970 Army data with the Defense Intelligence Agency estimates for the same period, we find that as to aircraft models currently known to exist, the Army's estimates are approximately 44 percent higher than those of the DIA. As to aircraft models not now known to exist, but postulated for future development, the Army's estimates exceed those of DIA by about 270 percent. In addition, the Army assumed, arbitrarily, so far as I can tell, that these future enemy aircraft models would have two to six times more damage-inflicting capability than do presently known models. It was these figures that were used in the cost-effectiveness study which gave the green light to SAM-D in 1970.

I suggest that if you arbitrarily escalate the size of the threat and arbitrarily decrease the cost of the weapons system, you can make us spend money for anything, and that has exactly happened on both ends of this proposition so far as the SAM-D is concerned.

The Army now, in effect, admits the discrepancy in the 1970 study, but contends that the most recent DIA estimates are "converging" on the Army's figures. I asked my staff to verify this with the General Accounting Office personnel who have been studying SAM-D. They reported, that using the most recent figures available, although the estimates of the Army and DIA as to currently known aircraft are converging, a very significant discrepancy remains as to future models that are assumed to have much higher capabilities than known aircraft.

Furthermore, the Army assumes that Soviet long range strategic aircraft would be used for attacks against the 7th Army in central Europe. I am no expert in strategic theory; but I have talked to a number of people who are, and they and I would question whether either the Soviets or the United States, if, God forbid, we should ever become involved in a war with one another, would commit strategic bombers—theirs or ours—to tactical use against the field army rather than holding them in strategic reserve, particularly since we know that the Soviets have a very limited number of bombers.

Finally, the Army in its justification studies assumed that Army Air Defense would have to do the job of defending the field army against air attack all by itself. It ignored the contribution by our own Air Force now planned to attack their airfields or by the forces of our NATO allies. If we are going to give the Army enough hardware to do the whole job by itself, then we should perhaps reconsider authorizing the funds for maintaining our tactical air forces, as well as our purchases of new aircraft such as the F-15.

We had a tough vote the other day

on whether to go ahead with funds for a new sophisticated aircraft. I thought we needed it. I went along and voted for it. Now, the Army is not going to use this aircraft to defend its own army. That does not make any sense to me.

TECHNICAL UNCERTAINTIES

The SAM-D system was originally conceived as an ABM for defense against tactical or intermediate-range ballistic missiles. This ABM capability required the development of a new and very complex type of radar which combines the previously separated tasks of surveillance, target-tracking, and missile guidance. It also required a very high speed missile. The Army has now changed its mission to one of defense against manned tactical aircraft while retaining what they call a fallout capability which would allow its rapid conversion back to an ABM simply by adding a nuclear warhead. The budget contains several million dollars to, in the Army's words, "preserve the nuclear option." The trouble is that it is this "fall-out" capability which requires the SAM-D to continue to employ the highly sophisticated radar and computer equipment and the high-speed missile. There is good reason to believe that some of the SAM-D's characteristics which would be necessary if it were to be used against tactical ballistic missiles may actually be disadvantageous when directed against manned aircraft. For example, at low altitudes which are, incidentally, exactly where the most damage can be done to the field Army, the SAM-D's wingless missile is vulnerable to being out maneuvered by the attacking aircraft. Recent news reports suggested that officials within the Army and the Department of Defense believe that because of SAM-D's relative ineffectiveness at lower altitudes, we may need to buy another missile system, the French Crotale, to protect the SAM-D.

In making its case for the SAM-D, the Army emphasizes the SAM-D's supposed superior ability to withstand severe electronic countermeasures. These measures consist of devices carried onboard the enemy aircraft which attempt to confuse the air defense missile's radar or guidance equipment. Although it is true that the technical capabilities of the SAM-D would make it more effective against certain types of electronic threat, these same characteristics would be disadvantageous against other devices. For example, the greater power of the SAM-D radar would make it more effective against what is called "noise jamming." But the radar's power would at the same time make it more vulnerable to so-called "repeater" jammers which in effect turn the radar's signal back upon itself. Furthermore, the great power and specific characteristics of the SAM-D radar make it considerably more vulnerable to a radar-seeking missile. The SAM-D radar is so powerful that in theory the radar-seeking missile could be launched from the moon and be able to pick up the SAM-D signal. The Army has specifically acknowledged to me that it has yet to develop techniques to protect the SAM-D adequately against these weapons. In addition, as far as

the danger to the system is concerned, the power of the radar generates a substantial amount of heat, making it vulnerable to infrared or heat-seeking weapons.

The Army also makes much of the SAM-D's superior ability to engage multiple targets simultaneously. Again, let's look at the facts. One SAM-D battery consists of 40 missiles ready to fire on launchers. One Improved Hawk battery consists of 36 missiles or in its newer so-called TRIAD configuration, 54 missiles. The reloading time for the improved Hawk is 5 minutes. The reloading time for the SAM-D is 1 hour. Both U.S. and Soviet offensive strategy in conventional tactical air attack is to attack in waves, usually spaced several minutes apart.

I think that is important where we are talking about a weapons system needed to defend against incoming missiles. Where the button is pushed and everything comes in at once, that is one problem; but this system is designed to shoot down aircraft. No one tells us they are going to send them in all at once. They come in waves. The first come, and sometimes the second waves come. The first, and sometimes the second waves, consist of aircraft carrying anti-aircraft suppression devices rather than weaponry in order to attempt to neutralize air defense missiles. Because of the difference in reloading time, the SAM-D battery would be exhausted by the first wave, since it would be required to fire its missiles at the aircraft or their missiles in order to protect itself from being destroyed by the radar-seeking or heat-seeking weapons they would carry and the Army has specifically admitted this in testimony before the Armed Services Committee. The SAM-D has one radar with a limited span of coverage. The Improved Hawk has two acquisition radars, each with 360 degrees of coverage. The Hawk can continue to operate at some limited effectiveness if one of its acquisition radars is knocked out, while the loss of the single SAM-D radar destroys the entire system. The Hawk Triad can track six targets at the same time coming from opposite directions. The SAM-D can follow six targets simultaneously, but they both must be within the 90 degree sector of its radar. The Army tells us that it is working on the problem of the long reloading time for SAM-D but has not informed us as to any specific solutions. One hour to reload the SAM-D; 5 minutes to reload the Hawk.

WHO SHOULD PAY FOR DEFENDING EUROPE

For almost 25 years, the United States has borne the major burden of defending our European allies. Such expenditures were essential in the earlier post-World War II period. It is now time, however, for these nations to assume an increasing share of this burden. The Army's justification studies for the SAM-D are based on defending U.S. forces in Europe. This being the case, it would seem only reasonable that our NATO allies would pay for or at least share a major portion of the costs of SAM-D's development. I asked my staff to obtain the most recent figures as to what percentage of

gross national product our NATO friends spend on defense and how this compares with our commitment, part of which is contained in this budget.

The answers are revealing. In the 1973 fiscal year the United States spent 7.5 percent of its GNP on defense. This compares with the 4 percent of their GNP spent by the Germans and about 6.2 percent by NATO as a whole. If one looks at what percentage of our respective defense budgets are being spent on research and development, the United States allots 11.1 percent of its budget to research while the Germans spent only about 4.9 percent.

The Army contends that "discussions" are underway about SAM-D with NATO, but the fact remains, as the Tactical Airpower Subcommittee stated flatly in its report on the SAM-D last year, the Europeans have made it clear that they have "no" interest in SAM-D. They regard it as much too sophisticated and costly. They are, of course, quite willing to have the U.S. bear the entire cost of developing the SAM-D and then bring it over to Europe to protect them. Admiral Moorer, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, as much as acknowledged this when he testified earlier this year that the "NATO nations will exercise a posture of watchful waiting to see how SAM-D comes out"—watchful waiting while we are spending money on a system which, in my judgment, is not going to come about, in the final analysis, anyhow.

It seems to me that now is the time to say to our European friends, "Do you want this weapon system or not," by formally asking them to participate in SAM-D's development costs. But the Europeans believe that they cannot afford a system as costly and complex as SAM-D, then with so many demands on our limited resources, I would raise the question, can we?

SAM-D AND THE SALT TREATY

Finally, Mr. President, I would like to direct the attention of the Senate to the relationship between the SAM-D and the ABM Treaty with the Soviet Union. As I have suggested, the highly complex and sophisticated equipment of the SAM-D are necessary only if the system is required to retain its potential for use as the ABM and millions are being spent to preserve this "nuclear option." Yet in transmitting the ABM Treaty to the Senate, President Nixon hailed it as a "significant step into a new era of mutually agreed restraints." I read this to mean that we could save some money; that we could save money by this mutual restraint.

Yet here we are spending billions on a system the real justification for which is to have a short range ABM weapon ready-to-go if the ABM Treaty is ever abrogated. President Nixon, it seems to me, and we as a Nation, can't have it both ways. Either the permanent ABM Treaty was a "significant step" allowing us to eliminate, with the exception of the two ABM sites permitted under the treaty, the necessity of spending money on ABM systems or it was not. If it was not and we must continue to develop

our ABM capability then Congress and the American people should be told that this is the case.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes.

Mr. President, I want to say that I admire very much my distinguished friend from Indiana's taking a sharp and keen interest in the complicated area of research and development in the Armed Services Committee, and I would just like, before I get into very much detail, to talk a little about how I look at this weapon system.

There has been a great deal of criticism leveled at it, and I know that the Senator from Indiana has said something like this. The scenario goes this way: They started in the 1960's or early or late 1950's, and they had an idea they wanted to protect against incoming ballistic missiles. After some studies, they found it was very complicated and complex and expensive, so they rolled that up and looked around for another mission for this program. I think the Senator from Indiana referred to it as a weapon system without a mission.

Well, actually, way back in the early 1960's we were taking a look at what could be done in the way of defending against ballistic missiles. We had spent, in the span of a year or two, about \$7.5 million. We decided it was too complicated and beyond the state of the art to come up with an answer. So we went into what we knew to be a real threat.

If the Senator and others think conventional warfare is gone—and goodness knows, we all wish it would disappear—then they might consider this. We do not want to get into sophisticated weapons of defense such as this one is, but, unfortunately, conventional war still seems to be hanging around, and this system is put up to defend not only vital ports of embarkation, command centers, and so forth, but it seems well suited also to protect the field army. The "field army" is translated, as far as I am concerned, into foot soldiers.

We want to build these big, beautiful submarines, and I am all for it. We want to build a B-1 bomber. It is pretty close, but I am for it. Certainly, as we look to the threat of the future, to the threat to a field army, the infantry soldier, vital points of defense set up we have got to take the technology that is embraced in SAM-D to do the job.

This is a very sophisticated setup. We are using here a phased array radar that operates electronically, that has none of the clumsiness caught up in the radar of Hawk, the improved Hawk, and certainly the Hercules. This is a weapon system that can take on something in the vicinity of eight incoming aircraft simultaneously, and I am talking about supersonic aircraft.

Every time we get near this program, we find out there are things about it that are classified, but it is a tremendous system.

There are a lot of complaints that it has been going on too long. The Senator from Indiana is unhappy because it is on

to its 7th, 8th, or 9th year of development. But let me tell the Senate this: This program has not slipped to the extent asserted by the Senator from Indiana. This program is fully on time. It has made all of its schedule points or milestones. It has, under the compulsion of its high cost, been able to achieve some cost constraints and bring itself down as a weapons system in cost, which I certainly hoped other high-powered systems we have underway could have done; but, all in all, it has a lot of blue stars behind it. Certainly, as we look into the future, 1980 and 1981, we need it.

The committee recommends approval of the full \$194 million requested to permit the continued timely and orderly engineering development of SAM-D, which is one of the Army's top priority programs. I will cover several subjects to support the committee recommendation and to respond to the arguments made by my good friend, the distinguished Senator from Indiana, whose proposed amendment would deny this vital air defense system to the Army foot soldier and force them to fight with inferior weapons designed some 20 years ago. These subjects are:

First. Why SAM-D is needed.

Second. Agreement reached last year between Senator CRANSTON and Senator STENNIS to review the SAM-D program.

Third. Specific response to arguments made last year to support termination of SAM-D program.

Fourth. Rebuttal of arguments made by Senator BAYH to terminate SAM-D.

Let me first explain why SAM-D is needed.

SAM-D is needed in the 1980's and beyond to save the lives of our soldiers in the front lines of combat.

SAM-D is needed to protect our airfields, munitions dumps and command and communications centers so that we may counterattack and defeat the enemy.

SAM-D is needed to destroy the high performance aircraft of the future which will be equipped with advanced electronic jamming equipment and sophisticated air-to-ground missiles.

That is something I want to stress very hard. I said SAM-D is a highly sophisticated weapon. It is. The threat of the future involves not only supersonic aircraft, whether they are aimed to hit vital targets or to destroy men in entrenchments, bivouacs, barracks, and so forth. The whole use of the weapon is tied to electronic instrumentation and electronic countermeasures. The existing equipment we have today in the Hawk, the improved Hawk, the Nike-Hercules would fade away, but SAM-D, due to its high sophistication and phased array radar, can take on and defend against these aircraft.

SAM-D will provide essential improvements over present improved Hercules and Hawk systems which were built with technology of the 1950's and could not survive in the 1980's and beyond.

It would not survive in the 1980's. That is what we are looking at. We are not looking at 1971 or 1972; we are looking at the 1980's.

SAM-D will provide much higher fire-power, better survivability and greatly

reduced operating costs compared with existing systems.

The SAM-D can simultaneously detect, identify, and destroy large numbers of attack aircraft.

SAM-D can survive on the battlefield better than existing systems through mobility remote location of its small number of equipments.

SAM-D can be manned with substantially less troops than the improved Hercules and Hawk as they are replaced.

There is no other surface-to-air missile under development that can do the SAM-D job in the last two decades of this century.

If the Senator from Indiana was successful and this program was terminated, I would guarantee the Senator that we would have to go right into it again and put it back into effect, because this is the only place where we are working on this technology.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MCINTYRE. I yield.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I do not want to interrupt the Senator's speech. I have heard him make his presentation. I know how hard he has worked on this matter. And I know that in the development of the annual systems study, he has had some questions about this. He has spent a great deal of time on the matter and has come up on the positive side.

The Senator has rendered an excellent service in this matter and has saved the country a lot of money.

I can speak in a spirit of camaraderie and without any feeling against doing mild combat on this. However, one thing that concerns me is that I think what the Senator has said is absolutely correct. There is no other missile system around that can do what this is designed to do.

I do not know whether we want to do this job or not. If one reads what the Army says, the Army says that we can with Improved Hawk do about as well.

However, I want to ask the Senator concerning his statement that we would have to turn around and start all over again. We did that with the main battle tank and the Cheyenne. And we have saved the country a lot of money.

I would hope that we could have them go back to the drawing boards and get us something else that will do the job for not so much money.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, what the Senator from Indiana has said has not quite hit the nail on the head. We are pursuing successful technology. It has gone through the advanced development stage and is now one year and a half into engineering development.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 additional minutes.

If we were to terminate the program, we would have to go back. We would have to say that we cannot let this technology drop. We would promptly come back with the same thing. How are we going to defend against supersonic aircraft and attack aircraft coming in and knocking out installations and knocking out the man with a gun in the conventional type of war?

I do not want to digress or else we will be here much longer. I do not think we want to be here too long.

I do not envision that the SAM-D program is going to be all in Europe. I can foresee it as being part of every field army we have. It might be part of the TO, the table of organization. I would hate to see it, but we might need this in the Panama Canal Zone or Alaska or Florida or any place that is threatened with attack.

It is all very well for the Senator and me to say that we cannot see this threat. However, it is definitely there. It is over the horizon.

The Soviet Union has a lot of high type sophisticated aircraft. I could not mention all of these. However, I can probably enumerate some of them for the Record here.

Our friends in the Soviet Union have the Fishbed, the Fishpot, the Fiddler, the Flagon, the Fitter, the Foxbat, the Brewer, the Backfire, and the Flagger.

All of these aircraft if unleashed in a conventional type of warfare would make it very hard for the ground forces of the United States.

Mr. President, I believe I will suspend now and will yield to the Senator from Florida so that he may add his remarks to our debate at this time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida is recognized.

Mr. CHILES. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire for yielding. It seems to me that in listening to some of the arguments of the opposition to the SAM-D, they are some of the very reasons why I think we can allow this weapon system to continue in its engineering stages without having some of the qualms we have felt when voting for some of the other defense appropriations.

We had a lengthy debate that terminated with a vote today which was a very close vote. It concerned an accelerated system, and about going into production at a time when we had, in the minds of some of us, not completely finished all of the research and development and at a time when we do not really know exactly what is going to be the final make-up of the Trident submarine.

Yet, some criticize the SAM-D because it has taken longer to develop. It seems to me that here is one time when we ought to be saying to the Army and to the rest of the service that this is an example of at least keeping at the drawing boards and continuing on with the preliminary engineering and with the other preliminary stages until we do get all of the bugs out. And even if there is slippage in time and additional costs, this is the stage at which it would be much better, rather than going into production and saying this program will be all right and will accomplish its tasks.

If I felt the service was doing this with every weapons system, I would feel a great deal more comfortable, because I would feel that when we do go into production in the advanced stages, we will know what we are going to pay for it. And we will know that we will have something that will work.

I think that has been the path of the

SAM-D. This is as complicated as it can be, as many of these sophisticated weapons systems are. They are reaching into the future. However, as long as we can hold them to the drawing boards and as long as we can see that they do the research and the engineering, we will be much better off. I would rather pay the dollars for that than to go into production and have a tremendous cost overrun or have a turkey.

It seems to me that the dollars we have spent to date on the SAM-D have been good dollars as opposed to the dollars that have been spent on some of the weapons systems.

Mr. President, it is mentioned that the SAM-D will take less manpower than the Hawk or the Nike-Hercules and that we will be able to reduce the horsepower. I think that this is a tremendous plus and is an argument in favor of the SAM-D, because under the figures we are seeing today, over half of the cost for our military budget is going for manpower, and that figure is climbing all the time. Anything that we can do that is going to cause us to need less manpower is certainly the direction in which we should be going.

Many of us are concerned about the number of troops deployed overseas. We have had much debate on the floor about what we can do about our troop strength overseas.

We have an opportunity in the system we are developing to be able to man our overseas commitments, whatever those commitments are, with less troops. That will relieve the pressures we have on our balance of payments as well as being able to cut our manpower commitments.

Mr. President, it seems to me that this is when we want to reduce our overall manpower and hold the spending down. We have a weapons system that can do that for us. I think the fact that it will take less manpower is certainly a plus for the SAM-D and its development.

I think another thing is the argument that we are going forward and getting a better air defense system and a weapon much more capable of trying to keep the peace with the current military procurement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. MCINTYRE. I thank my friend from Florida for his support of our position in the R. & D. Subcommittee and in the committee on this amendment, which I know was presented with all good intentions.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum on our time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SAXBE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Who yields time?

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I yield the Senator from Ohio such time as he may require.

Mr. SAXBE. Mr. President, the

amendment that the Senator from Indiana has introduced, and of which I am a cosponsor, is an amendment that I feel recognizes a faulty approach to a serious problem.

The amendment would knock out the money that is going to the SAM-D missile. The SAM-D missile, to my mind, is not an effective missile for the purposes for which it is designed. It can be knocked out by a much cheaper weapon, it is cumbersome, and if it is planned for the time frame that is alleged, which is the 1980's, I think it will simply be out of date by that time.

I think that in the interim, the improved Hawk can do the job at a much cheaper cost, and I think that the first thing we have to recognize is that the radar controlled weapon that we are talking about has increased by such a tremendous amount of money since its concept, and many of the people now supporting it have questioned this increase over the years, that we should take a close look at it. I know it is customary to accept whatever the Armed Services Committee puts out, but I assure Senators that the Armed Services Committee was far from unanimous in its approach to the SAM-D missile.

I am somewhat distressed to think we would vote for the SAM-D missile, or retain it in the budget, for all the wrong reasons—in other words, for parochial reasons, because people who would otherwise be opposed to the SAM-D missile support it because they think it provides jobs and employment for their part of the country.

If we are going to attempt to cure the social ills of the country by use of defense money, as the previous administration's Secretary of Defense once suggested, perhaps we should build super carriers and then sink them, simply because it is so costly to keep them up. Perhaps we could build a super tank and bury it in the ground, because we would be providing jobs. We are using up the material, but it is not going to be effective for the purpose it is built for.

The SAM-D missile, I think, is the same type of gold-plated gimmick that provides substantial employment and makes the manufacturer very happy, but I think when it comes right down to what it is to be used for, it is of questionable value. The cost effectiveness of this weapon has gotten so out of balance that it requires, I believe, that this body take a very hard look at it. Moreover, once we buy it, the cost of maintaining it will be greater than for a comparable weapon. I believe in the speech my colleague the Senator from Indiana (Mr. BAYH) just made, he effectively pointed out the vulnerability of it.

We had an experience in Vietnam where the surface-to-air missiles—and they were the good surface-to-air missiles that the Russians sent in there—that were guarding strategic locations had to be knocked out, and they were knocked out by our planes before we ever proceeded into the missions.

We have sophisticated weapons ourselves, and I am sure we must presume that our supposed enemies must have

comparable weapons, that we can fire from substantial distances away—I am talking about 50 to 100 miles—that will home in on this radar, even if it is "blinded," as they refer to it in the trade, and knock it out. The aircraft this missile is supposed to knock out would never be within range of the missile; it would be knocked out by the first wave of weapons, and then, of course, it would simply lay the whole area open to any type of weapon attack. This is presuming, of course, that it is not a nuclear confrontation, which is a presumption I think we are pretty reckless in making.

Our evidence before the Armed Services Committee indicated that the SAM-D missile, like many of the weapons we have proposed over the years, is based on the last war, not on a confrontation sometime in the future that we hope will never happen, but rather on the experiences of the last war, and not even the recent unpleasantness in Vietnam.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield just a moment at that point? I hesitate to interrupt him, but I think he is making a very essential point when he talks about the experiences in the last war, and then points out that we are really not taking advantage of the lesson we should have learned after quite an expensive price tag.

Mr. SAXBE. I yield.

Mr. BAYH. I was amazed to look at some of the loss statistics on our aircraft.

About 89 percent of our lost aircraft were shot down, not by the SA-2's, but by fieldpieces. We lost only 5 or 6 percent to Migs and 5 or 6 percent to the SAM's and 89 percent were shot down by those traditional fieldpieces which we ought to be investing money in, instead of some of these sophisticated weapons systems that really just do not do the job.

Mr. SAXBE. I think that is essentially true; and I might suggest that we have even more hand-held, heat-seeking weapons now that are the real threat to aircraft, because we cannot afford to expend the weaponry that it takes to destroy them. As the Senator pointed out in connection with cost effectiveness on weaponry, you are not going to risk expending a \$5 million airplane to seek out a hand-held, heat-seeking weapon that can destroy it.

I think what we have to do is put more mobile field equipment with our tactical operations on the ground. I think we have to rely more and more on our missiles, not only air-to-air, but crew-type missiles. Of course, if we go to nuclear warheads, this is completely ineffective. It can be knocked out, for a whole area, by a low-yield weapon. I am distressed somewhat, and I know we kicked this about, but with a few people in the Chamber now, none of whom will be convinced one way or the other, what we say will be in the RECORD after the fact. In other words, the vote will come before the RECORD is printed and those who might be influenced by what the Senator from Indiana has said, or I, or the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. McINTYRE), will never hear it.

I know that the Senator from Indiana and the members of his staff, and the

members of my staff, have made a genuine attempt to get the information across to the various staffs of Senators on the SAM-D missile, but I am constantly confronted in discussing this with my colleagues with the idea, "Well, this is a good employer. It is a good operator."

That, to my mind, is questionable when we see the tremendous overruns in costs; but, nevertheless, it does provide jobs and it provides something for this area of the country where they need jobs.

If we are going to build war machines simply for the purpose of providing jobs, then I am going to put in a bill for a paddle-wheel carrier for the Ohio River because that would provide a lot of jobs and would provide something for our part of the country.

But, this, of course, brings to the extreme some of the arguments which are not stated on the floor but are stated in the cloakrooms about why we should support various weapons systems. We voted today on some that a marginal case could be made for, perhaps, if the weapons system should survive. On the SAM-D missile, I do not think we can even make a good marginal case for because of the cost overruns. The question of whether it is in tune with our times, the question of whether we can afford to put in this tremendously expensive missile system with a tactical unit, a missile system that can be knocked out with a \$12,000 missile, I just do not think it is cost effective.

I am distressed it has gotten this far, but I think if anyone would take the trouble to read the statement of the Senator from Indiana in the RECORD and the other speeches made, or just look at the performance and the production and the research and development of the weapon over the years, I recognize that we are dealing with an everchanging concept that locked it in at an extremely poor time in the history of this weapon and now that they have locked it in with a radar system, it has gotten so highly technical, requiring extremely well experienced men to run it, that they feel they have to go ahead and produce it.

I do not feel that way.

I hope that the Senate, in its wisdom, does not proceed that way.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, I should like to respond briefly to the remarks of the Senator from Ohio and the Senator from Indiana.

We cannot compare what happened in Vietnam, with the SAM missile over there and the SAM-D system we are talking about here. We are planning for a SAM-D system for the battlefields of the 1980's, and the radar that makes up a component part of the system, which is at the leading edge of the technology of radar. It is a thing of absolute sophistication and beauty, if one happens to be in love with radar.

I happen to be the kind of guy who thinks that we should have a Secretary of Radar because we have so much of it. This is radar that can detect eight targets simultaneously. We are not talking about defending troop trains tomorrow but in the 1980's. I think that this is a system which will first be deployed in

the early 1980's and the last deployment of the projected buy is in the late 1980's.

If we begin with engineering development, there has been no cost overrun, but if we go way, way back, I think that one could make some sort of case against the system for a cost overrun. But under the constraints of last year and the year before that, and Senators CRANSTON and BAYH with their objections, the whole full team of the Army was put to work along with the staff of the Armed Services Committee and, as a result, this program has been toned down and brought down in its overall costs.

It is a little bit ridiculous—I do not want to try to answer all these charges—but when I see statements made about the manpower needed to operate the system, and how it compares with the improved Hawk, taking an equivalent amount of the SAM-D surface-to-air defense missile development, we will find that the difference is 12,516 in favor of the SAM-D program as opposed to the improved Hawk.

So I think that this makes for a lot of fun, perhaps, in criticizing it, but I stress the high sophistication of the system.

When we talk about Vietnam, remember that in Vietnam, due to the skill we had in the battle between the electronic countermeasures and aircraft, we were able to overcome through the electronic countermeasures, the SAM missiles in Vietnam. This sophisticated SAM-D is able to look through and search through and take on anything in the way that comes along in jamming electronic countermeasures.

Let me now address the second subject and review what happened during the floor debate last year, when my good friend from California, Senator CRANSTON, introduced an amendment to delete all of the \$171.4 million requested for fiscal year 1973. However, he withdrew his amendment by agreement with Senator STENNIS with the understanding that the committee would conduct a thorough review of the program and hold separate hearings on the fiscal year 1974 request.

The subcommittee has been scrupulously painstaking in satisfying this commitment. The committee staff conducted a series of meetings throughout the year with the Army and the prime contractor, Raytheon. Visits were made to the contractor's plant by the committee staff and separately by members of Senator CRANSTON's staff. Formal hearings were held and attended by Senator CRANSTON as well as his staff members. An offer was made to Senator CRANSTON to hold open hearings to provide outside witnesses as well as the contractor an opportunity to testify, but he declined because he was satisfied with the steps already taken by the committee. And, finally, the General Accounting Office was requested to investigate certain aspects of the program.

I have looked into this program personally, and I have determined that the Army and Raytheon have performed in an outstanding manner during the past year. It is satisfying to be able to say

of at least this major development program that it is progressing satisfactorily, on schedule, within cost estimates, and with no major unresolved technical problems. Moreover, with the encouragement of the committee, the program has been reduced in total cost from last year by some \$759 million, from \$5.24 billion to \$4.48 billion.

Turning now to my third subject, the committee gave serious consideration to the arguments made last year to terminate SAM-D and was successful in setting each one of them aside. But let me examine and dispose of each of these arguments in turn.

First. Further schedule slippage may reasonably be anticipated. The SAM-D program has successfully completed its first 17 months of Engineering Development. The program is on schedule and within costs as specified by the Department of Defense in the Development Concept Paper approving SAM-D's entry into Engineering Development in March 1972. In fact, some work is ahead of schedule. Modification of the advanced development fire control group for use as the demonstration fire section at White Sands Missile Range is complete, and it is now being shipped 2 months earlier than scheduled.

Second. The cost growth in the SAM-D program has been drastic. The SAM-D program costs have not grown; in fact the program has been reduced by approximately \$759 million from the estimated cost of last year. The reduction in program costs is primarily due to a reduction in the quantity of ground support equipment and missiles; however, part of the reduction is due to the deletion of RDTE and procurement funds associated with the nuclear and anti-missile requirements and the reduced military construction requirement.

Third. SAM-D is vulnerable to anti-radiation missiles (ARM's). Antiradiation missiles—ARM's—require an electronic signature suitable for their guidance. An air defense system such as SAM-D must survive and be effective in the ARM environment. The SAM-D missile range and speed, reaction time, radar capabilities and system provides the potential capability to engage the ARM carrying aircraft or the ARM itself. If this should fail, the orderly programming of the radar by the computer could control the radar emission in one of a number of possible deceptive countermeasures.

Fourth. SAM-D's one radar per fire section makes it vulnerable to enemy attack. The single SAM-D radar provides increased system survivability since it is easier to camouflage than mechanically rotating radar antennas. The SAM-D radar is hardened to survive in a tactical nuclear environment. The inherent technology of the SAM-D electronically scanned, multifunction phased array radar permits use of operating techniques that can reduce the effectiveness of antiradiation missiles. In addition, SAM-D has only a minimum number of major equipment items which will be widely dispersed with a few interconnecting cables.

SAM-D has been designed from the start to survive on the battlefield. The

single radar is not a liability; instead it serves to reduce the vulnerability of the SAM-D system.

Fifth. Possible alternative systems, that is, Improved Hawk, improved low altitude missile, a tactical AWACS, the F-15, and the lightweight fighter. The threat for the 1980's will outstrip our current air defense capability. The threat aircraft will be much faster and more maneuverable than their predecessors, and they will operate in an intense electronic counter-measures environment. Both Nike Hercules and Improved Hawk have limited rates of fire and will not be able to cope with the aircraft maximum evasive maneuvers. In the electronic countermeasures environment of the 1980s, Nike Hercules will be virtually ineffective, and Improved Hawk will have only a limited capability.

SAM-D with its multifunction phased array radar, digital data processing, high rate of fire, and track-via-missile guidance will possess a greatly increased capability over the present systems against saturation attacks, electronic countermeasures and maneuvering target.

The air defense of the field army, including Air Force fighter aircraft, is a team effort with each element of the team contributing its share to the air defense battle.

Six. Lack of NATO interest. Development of the SAM-D air defense system has been unilateral. In fact, security classification on the SAM-D missile system precluded discussion with our NATO allies until December 1971. Since that time our NATO allies have attended a number of briefings and have continued to show interest in the SAM-D program.

A four-nation symposium—United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, France, and the United States—on air defense research and development was held March 12-14, 1973, at Garmisch, Germany, the purpose of which was to identify areas of mutual R. & D. interest for SAM's of the future. A U.S. representative briefed on medium/large surface-to-air missile system requirements and how the SAM-D system fulfills these requirements. All three European nations, France, Great Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany, agree there is a need for an advanced SAM due to the increased threat generated by ECM and longer range air-to-surface missiles. The European members regard the present SAM-D configuration as complex and expensive; however, they indicated that they will not undertake unilateral national development of a medium to large SAM and that it is clearly an important field for cooperation. It was further indicated that SAM-D technology may be relevant to their desired systems and that such possibilities should be explored.

Direct bilateral exchange of information on U.S. SAM-D and Federal Republic of Germany medium SAM requirements was conducted in Bonn just last month. This exchange of information included detailed U.S. briefings on SAM-D operational concepts in Europe. SAM-D requirements, technical description, cost and effectiveness analyses and the engi-

neering development and production program.

Mr. President, turning to my last subject, my distinguished colleague has made a number of additional arguments with which I do not agree, or which are factually in error. This may have happened because his staff does not have security clearances and therefore could not obtain any of the confidential and secret details contained in either the Army comprehensive 1970 Air Defense Evaluation Board study or in the classified version of the General Accounting Office report on SAM-D. Some of the conclusions stated obviously have been derived from bits and pieces of published and, in some cases, misleading information. This is comparable to an attorney making his arguments based on hearsay evidence but not on basic hard facts.

If the Senator's staff had the required clearances and then could devote the amount of time needed to examine the details of the Army Board study and the GAO study, each of which took about a year and numerous technical and military people to conduct, I would be surprised if the conclusions and recommendations made to the Senator would be the same. In fact, if the compounding of errors in the facts as stated by the Senator could be undone, and if the correct and complete facts could be presented to the Senator on a classified basis, I believe that he could be convinced that his amendment lacks merit and that it should be withdrawn.

I have a separate statement which addresses each of the major errors of fact and I request unanimous approval to have it inserted at this point in the RECORD.

Some of my colleagues will make separate statements covering several other major aspects of the SAM-D program, and based upon the specific facts obtained during the committee hearings.

Let me now briefly address the financial implication of the SAM-D research and development program. Through June 30, 1973, a total of \$558 million already has been spent, which has carried the program to about the halfway mark. The additional \$194 million requested increases this to \$752 million, or 62 percent of the total development cost. Contractor and major subcontractor employment has reached its peak of 3,603 employees, and the program has peaked out at its highest level of spending. Any reduction of funds in fiscal year 1974 would require the disruptive firing of people, termination or slowdown of many subcontracts and vendors, delay and stretchout of a program that is progressing smoothly and on schedule, and result in the inevitable increase of total program costs.

In conclusion, Mr. President, let me point out that last year the Armed Services Committee in recommending approval of the full \$171.4 million requested for fiscal year 1973, made the following observations in its report:

The committee considers approval of the \$171.4 million does not constitute a commitment to production. Technical progress and development costs will be closely monitored to insure that the expenditure of these funds in addition to the \$386.9 million pro-

vided previously clearly supports further development efforts. In this regard, the Army is encouraged to continue its efforts to manage this program in an austere and closely controlled manner.

The Army has complied with this direction to the letter and has managed this program with a high degree of competence. The contract team also deserves high marks for the accomplishment to date. Approval of the fiscal year 1974 request does not constitute a commitment to production but merely the next step in an orderly development program.

I have attempted to cover many of the major issues raised by the distinguished Senator from Indiana and by the General Accounting Office. I am satisfied that they either are without merit or are of little importance. I am convinced that we need SAM-D to provide our Army with a modern air defense system to meet the sophisticated enemy of the future. I urge that all of you join me in voting the full amount of \$194 million requested by the Army to continue this essential development program. The very lives of our soldiers are at stake.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ERRORS OF FACT IN STATEMENTS SUPPORTING PROPOSED AMENDMENT

Statement: "SAM-D is still 7 years from production" and "total production cost now estimated at 4.5B."

Rebuttal: The SAM-D, 31 March 1973, Selected Acquisition Report, submitted by the Army and approved by DOD, shows, on page 5, a programmed Limited Production Contract Award Decision scheduled for June 1977 and a full production decision for 1979—that to me says, SAM-D is less than 4 years from first production and 6 years from full production (not 7 years from production). That same SAR, on page 8 shows total procurement costs to be \$3.27B and not \$4.5B as quoted by proponents of the amendment now being considered. The difference of \$1.2B is actually the total development costs from 1965 to completion.

Statement: "Maintenance costs over 10 years—\$2.8B over Improved Hawk."

Rebuttal: The estimate referred to is that made by the Department of Defense on page 8 of Development Concept Paper No. 50—the number stated there is \$2.2B (\$600M different from the quoted figure) and it refers to a total ten-year life cycle cost which, as we all know, includes development, investment and operation costs of which maintenance is only a very small part. The "fact sheet" also states that the Army estimate of SAM-D maintenance costs was derived from assuming that maintenance time could be reduced to .01 hours per hour of operation. The requirement for SAM-D is .07 hours of maintenance per hour of operation and the Army's estimates are based on that figure which of course is 7 times as much as the .01 quoted by the opponents of this worthy system.

Statement: "Army estimates indicate that it would cost the U.S. 19-25 times as much to counter the projected enemy threat as it would cost the enemy to counter SAM-D."

Rebuttal: We know of no such Army estimate and the Army denies ever having indicated such an estimate.

Statement: "The Army's Air Defense Evaluation Board—ADEB—which found that the SAM-D was more cost effective than the Improved Hawk itself, specifically acknowledged that 'either system is adequate to meet the anticipated—ECM—threat.'

Rebuttal: Page 38 of the ADEB Report states: "Employed in sufficient numbers and in conjunction with improved short range air defense weapons, either Improved Hawk or the ADEB SAM-D weapon system is capable of providing an adequate defense against the non-nuclear air supported threat to the Army in the field. The key point here is the term 'sufficient numbers.' Although the numbers themselves are classified the required ratio of approximately 4 Improved Hawks to one SAM-D is not. The ADEB conclusion on page 62 of the same summary report states: 'The estimated life-cycle cost of ADEB SAM-D is 30 percent of the life-cycle cost of an equally effective deployment of Improved Hawk.'

Statement: "Yet the Air Defense Evaluation Board cost effectiveness study assumed that the Hawks and something they called Improved Hercules would be retained to complement the SAM-D."

Rebuttal: The ADEB did not assume that Hawk or Hercules, would be used to complement SAM-D, Hawk and Hercules would be phased out as soon as possible as SAM-D became available. SAM-D would be complemented by short range air defense systems such as improved versions of Redeye, Chaparral, and Vulcan.

Statement: "As for maintenance, the Army's own studies show that over a ten year period it will cost \$2.2 billion more to maintain and operate the SAM-D system than it would to operate the alternative system. . . ."

Rebuttal: The \$2.2 billion figure (apparently converted from the \$2.8B quoted in the first fact sheet) is a ten year life cycle cost estimate by OSD which includes development, investment and operational costs, not just the cost to maintain and operate. The \$2.2 billion does not take into consideration that it would be necessary to quadruple the number of currently planned Improved HAWK units to provide for adequate defense.

Statement: "For ten years it will cost \$102M to maintain one SAM-D battery as opposed to \$43M for the Improved HAWK."

Rebuttal: Again the figures used are total life cycle cost figures rather than maintenance cost figures and address currently planned quantities of Improved HAWK batteries rather than the quadrupled quantities required to provide adequate defense.

Statement: "Recently the contractor has reduced the maintenance free period to one-sixth of the previous requirements."

Rebuttal: The SAM-D missile is a certified round of ammunition and a requirement exists for a specified missile reliability at the end of two to three years of missile storage. In addition, the Missile reliability must not be degraded as a result of the missile round being deployed in the field for a minimum of six months. These requirements are valid.

RESPONSE TO SENATOR BIRCH BAYH'S LETTER ON SAM-D

GENERAL COMMENTS

1. "Already its cost is 350% higher than estimated."

This statement is a comparison of the estimated cost of a SAM-D tactical fire section computed in 1976 versus the current estimate. This comparison does not adequately portray the cost trail. The most significant reasons for the unit cost increase are economic escalation/inflation, a decrease in the quantity of equipment to be procured and a change in the method of estimating the costs. Economic escalation/inflation, not included in the 1967 estimate alone accounts for almost 42 percent of the cost increase. In addition, 27 percent of the increase results from reducing the number of fire sections to be procured, but the fire-power per section has increased. An additional 17 percent of the increase can be attributed to a change in the method of es-

timating the costs. A balance of about 14 percent could be charged as an increase due to engineering and schedule changes as a result of the development program between 1967 and 1972.

2. "SAM-D costs seven times more than the Improved HAWK."

The two most significant reasons why this cost comparison is not valid are:

(1) *System Capabilities*: One SAM-D battery provides a greater rate of firepower than the combined capabilities of seven Improved HAWK batteries. SAM-D's capabilities against saturation attacks and electronic and tactical countermeasures give it the ability to survive and be effective in situations where Improved HAWK could not be. A cost comparison of one SAM-D battery and seven Improved HAWK batteries turns out to be much in SAM-D's favor when operating and maintenance costs are considered.

(2) *Equipment Costed*: An Improved HAWK Battery, other than new missiles and a ground based computer, is merely a series of modification kits applied to Basic HAWK ground equipment (mod 5 to five Basic HAWK radars and the associated launchers). The quoted cost is for missiles, computer and modification kits only and does not include the cost of the large numbers of inherited Basic HAWK equipments. If additional Improved HAWK batteries were bought to make up in part for its lesser capability, the costs would of course be much higher.

3. "Drastic change in mission, none of the technical characteristics were altered."

In 1960, the Field Army Ballistic Missile Defense System (FABMDS) program was designed primarily for defense against ballistic missiles. The program was terminated in late 1962. The next program was Army Air Defense System—1970's (AADS-70). AADS-70 was to have a lesser capability than FAB MDS but still designed to defend against the ballistic missile threat and was to defend against the air supported aircraft. Again, this conceptual system was too complex and too costly for development. In 1964, the Secretary of Defense reoriented the program against specific class of air supported threat target and renamed it Surface-to-Air Missile Development (SAM-D). Any anti-tactical ballistic missile capability would be attained only as a fallout of optimizing against the air supported threat. In 1970, the Chief of Staff Army directed a SAM-D study for defense against the non-nuclear air supported threat to the Army in the field. The current program supports the results of that study and the system design is so optimized.

4. "Wingless missile is easy to outmaneuver."

The wingless SAM-D missile can outmaneuver and defeat any known or predicted enemy aircraft. The manifold requirements for SAM-D to successfully engage and detect targets at long ranges from low to high altitudes while these targets are employing sophisticated electronic and tactical countermeasures, dictated the decision to employ a wingless missile. Trade-off studies have repeatedly shown that the weight, space, cost and design penalties incurred by a winged missile have eliminated it from further consideration. The current missile configuration was designed, fabricated, and successfully flight tested during Advanced Development.

5. "SAM-D can be exhausted by decoys."

The computer control of SAM-D's electronically scanned radar beam allows many observations and comparisons of target data. The flexibility and potential provided by the computer program make the cost of effective decoys comparable to that of real weapons and therefore not an attractive option for attacking SAM-D.

6. "SAM-D can be destroyed by radar-seeking or infrared missiles."

Anti-radiation missiles (ARM's) require an electronic signature suitable for their

guidance. An air defense system such as SAM-D must survive and be effective in the ARM environment. The SAM-D missile range and speed, reaction time, radar capabilities and system provides the potential capability to engage the ARM carrying aircraft or the ARM itself. If this should fail, the orderly programming of the radar by the computer could control the radar emission in one of a number of possible deceptive countermeasures.

The SAM-D program includes study analyses on ARM countermeasures by both the prime contractor, Raytheon Company, and by a separate ARM analysis contractor, General Electric Company. These countermeasures will be tested and if adopted, will be included in the program in an orderly manner.

The application of built-in system capabilities, radar techniques and results of the test and evaluation program will provide SAM-D the most effective means of defeating the ARM attack.

The infrared signature characteristics of the SAM-D radar face have been investigated. Results show that at an ambient temperature of 77°F the operating SAM-D radar face reaches a temperature of approximately 154°F and is not detectable beyond 3,600 feet by an infrared seeker operating in the 3-5 micron region. Measurements have shown a tank to be detectable in the same micron region at a distance of 5,300 feet.

Current technology is concentrated in use of infrared Seekers in the 3-5 micron region, yet work is being done in R&D of seekers in the 8-14 micron region. There are many heat (hence infrared radiation) sources on the battlefield, such as trucks, generators, men, tanks, surface-to-air missile sites, etc. Each of these sources emit radiation in both the 3-5 and 8-14 micron region. Selection of seekers for a particular target must consider delivery means, characteristic of flight path, background heat sources, and contrast of target with the background. The threat of an antiradiation missile employing an infrared seeker exclusively is not considered significant due to short acquisition ranges. To effectively launch an infrared antiradiation missile, the delivery aircraft would have to penetrate to such an extent that engagement of the aircraft itself by SAM-D could preclude antiradiation launch altogether.

7. "Each fire section is, after all, a high value target. The question arises then, are we putting too many eggs in one basket?"

The SAM-D fire section with its single radar could be considered a high value target but this is true of any system that is a deterrent to the enemy. The system then becomes susceptible to attack and therefore must incorporate countermeasures to survive on the battlefield.

Actually the vulnerability of SAM-D is decreased rather than increased by the use of a single radar. The single SAM-D radar provides increased system survivability since it is easier to camouflage than mechanically rotating radar antennas. The SAM-D radar is hardened to survive in a tactical nuclear environment. The inherent technology of the SAM-D electronically scanned multifunction phased array radar permits use of operating techniques that can reduce the effectiveness of antiradiation missiles. These techniques are currently under intensive study. In addition SAM-D has only a minimum number of major equipment items which will be widely dispersed.

ISSUE: THREAT ASSESSMENT

Discussion

All Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) projections, as well as those of the Army's Air Defense Evaluation Board (ADEB), are based upon assumptions. The DIA projections are not a response to a war in Europe but plausible projections of aircraft inventories

assuming a relative status quo international environment. The numbers and types of aircraft employed in ADEB are a reasonable response if we went to war and had the two year build-up as the ADEB scenario indicated. ADEB considered families of weapon systems including SAM-D, short range air defense systems and Air Force interceptors to counter the threat.

Although these two estimates evolved from two completely different views of the international situation it is significant to note that the changes in the DIA estimate from 1970 to date lend credence to the original ADEB estimate. For instance:

(1) ADEB estimated a number of BACKFIRE aircraft in the threat and DIA estimated none. Today, DIA project a number of these aircraft in the SAM-D timeframe. ADEB estimated a number of future models, and DIA projected none. Again today, DIA indicates these future models in the threat. These future models are expected to carry increased ordnance and will have an increased degree of delivery sophistication so, therefore, they could have two to six times more damage capability than do present models.

(2) The ADEB utilization of Soviet long range aviation does not result in any overstatement of aircraft threat or threat capability. DIA confirms the role of these aircraft as utilized in ADEB.

The Acting Director of Defense Intelligence Agency on 16 Jul 73 in reference to the indicated disparity between the Army and DIA concerning the SAM-D threat stated:

"The General Accounting Agency analysis is based on an Army report written in November 1970. At that time, differences existing due primarily to the threat scenario selected. However, since 1971 the DOD, Army and DIA have been working very closely on the formulation of the threat. In November 1972 the Army, in preparation of an in-depth review of the SAM-D program prior to the FY 74 budget hearings, formally requested DIA to prepare a briefing that addressed the threat to the Army in the field. Such a briefing was prepared and presented by DIA to the Army, DOD and to Congressional Staffs during late 1972 and early 1973. To the best of my knowledge, this is the threat being used throughout DOD and no disparity exists today between the Army and DIA."

ISSUE: TECHNICAL UNCERTAINTIES

Discussion

The Army is not delaying the decision to test, in fact, the system is going through a whole series of ground tests. The question is the point at which to introduce the critical tests into the flight test program. The 1970 decision, to delay the Guided Test Vehicle (GTV) flights originally planned to conclude the advanced development program, is still considered to be a sound decision. The results of captive flight tests and simulations used to test the Track-via-Missile (TVM) guidance showed this area to be a low-to-medium risk. It was originally planned that GTV guidance equipment would conform closely to prototype requirements. As the program progressed it became apparent that the GTV equipment could not be identical to that required for a prototype system. Guidance section packaging had not been sufficiently miniaturized to permit installation in allocated space. Some guidance equipment was, therefore, contained within space allocated to armament components. This was possible because there was no intent to develop or test armament components such as the warhead and fuze during Advanced Development. Much production or packaging engineering remained to be accomplished during Engineering Development. This lack of close identity between the GTVs and the prototype guidance systems was viewed as a technical support

to the general agreement that the proposal to redirect the program should be implemented. Influenced by the technical, schedule, and cost environment, the GTV deletion is considered to be a desirable move from a total development program point of view since overall costs were reduced and possible.

SAM-D is required to fill the long-range Air Defense role now occupied by NIKE HERCULES and Improved HAWK. Although these existing systems provide 360° coverage with their mechanically rotating radars, the dimensions of their coverage circles are severely reduced when exposed to enemy electronic countermeasures expected in the 1980's. SAM-D has been designed to maintain its long-range engagement capabilities in the electronic countermeasures environment of the 1980's. The SAM-D radar has been designed to electronically scan a specific sector from radar horizon to its maximum altitude. The SAM-D radar is trainable and can rapidly adjust its assigned primary sector if necessary. When operating in an assigned sector, SAM-D's increased range capability actually provides more than twice the area coverage of Improved HAWK. This coverage ratio increases as the ECM threat increases. Thus SAM-D, as currently designed, has been selected by the Army as the most cost effective means of meeting the air threat to friendly forces in the 1980's and beyond.

ISSUE: HIGHER COST—FEWER UNITS
Discussion

The statement that the unit cost of one tactical fire section is now about three and one-half times (350%) the initial estimate is a gross oversimplification. This is a comparison of the current Program Unit Cost of a SAM-D Tactical Fire Section to the 1967 development estimate Program Unit Cost for a Tactical Fire Section. The point that is not explained is that the 1967 Fire Section contained only two launchers of 6 missiles each and one Fire Control vehicle containing a non-trainable radar, a computer and power source. These equipments were costed in constant FY 67 dollars to obtain the unit cost. In contrast, the current fire section contains five launchers of 4 missiles each (20 ready rounds versus 12 ready rounds of the 1967 configuration) and a Fire Control Group consisting of a trainable radar mounted on its own vehicle, a Weapons Control Computer and Prime Power Group each mounted on their own separate vehicles. These equipments are costed in FY 73 escalated dollars to determine a Program Unit Cost.

The statement that the currently estimated total program cost of SAM-D has increased only 9% since 1967. (\$4031 million vs \$4482 million) and that the planned procurement quantities of tactical fire sections and missiles have decreased approximately 68 and 52 percent respectively needs to be qualified. Although the number of missiles have decreased by approximately 52 percent, the number of ready missiles in the field army has reduced by less than 16 percent. The 1967 deployment concepts because of the non-trainable radar, required four fire sections per battery. Current planning, using the trainable radar requires only two fire sections per battery. The 1967 estimate for number of batteries in the field army is about the same as we are planning for today. The Continental United States (CONUS) deployments have decreased significantly from the number estimated in 1967 to the current number. The CONUS decrease in numbers of batteries is primarily the result of the major element of the threat shifting from large numbers of manned aircraft to ballistic missile and few aircraft.

ISSUE: SAM-D AND U.S. FORCE LEVELS
Discussion

SAM-D force requirements are based on meeting anticipated wartime requirements.

United States national and strategic objectives, and intelligence estimates have served as a basis for planning future force structure. The force planning figures are established by creating realistic scenarios of probable wartime conditions under this guidance. Recent Army studies have validated the worldwide SAM-D force levels. The number of SAM-D batteries programmed for Europe is based on a study of increasing tensions leading to a non-nuclear conflict in Europe, which included a buildup of US ground forces and a responding Warsaw Pact increase in the threat. The total number of divisions in Europe is a wartime figure based on current defense planning for such conditions. The worldwide force level was determined to support the total number of U.S. divisions, active and reserve, which would become all active following initiation of hostilities. Some SAM-D fire sections would be deployed around major port areas and aerial ports or logistical airfields which would be used for the input or movement of US supplies. The total number of SAM-D fire sections including a quantity for movement during hostilities in the combat zone to provide for survivability and to maintain adequate air defense coverage of forward combat elements during changing ground situations.

ISSUE: THE IMPROVED HAWK—AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE SAM-D
Discussion

Several criticisms of the SAM-D Program are based on the results of the 1970 Air Defense Evaluation Board's (ADEB) report on the cost effectiveness of the SAM-D system. Although this report formed the basis for the Army's request to enter Engineering Development, several additional studies have since been completed—all of which generally support the ADEB conclusions.

Because the ADEB was specifically interested in determining the most cost effective approach to air defense, they considered estimates of what it would cost to provide air defense for the Army in the field over the period 1972 to 1995, depending on the combination of weapon systems which are fielded for that defense. The two combinations considered were as follows:

Combination 1: Improved HAWK costed from 1972 until replaced by SAM-D and then SAM-D costed until 1995. SAM-D replaced Improved HAWK over a ten year period.

Combination 2: Improved HAWK costed from 1972 until 1995 with the number of units deployed increased so that by the early 1980's the requisite level had been achieved for an equally effective deployment.

Although the use of the inherited Improved HAWK system resulted in lower development costs than SAM-D, greater operations costs resulted in a higher total life cycle cost than SAM-D. The cost effectiveness comparison of SAM-D and Improved HAWK was based on common criteria; that is the total life cycle cost for each system was from 1972 to 1995, the period of interest. Because Improved HAWK began deployment in 1972 and SAM-D was not scheduled to start deployment until sometime later, the total years used to calculate operating costs differed substantially. By the same token, SAM-D's development costs are spread over a much greater period than Improved HAWK's since Improved HAWK RDTE funds ended in 1974 and SAM-D development continued through 1978.

The resulting conclusion was that the estimated life cycle cost of ADEB SAM-D was 30 percent of the life cycle cost, of an equally effective deployment (comparable firepower) of Improved HAWK.

The performance of SAM-D and the field army quantities as determined by that study have remained constant. CONUS quantities, which were not addressed in the ADEB study have since been determined by a separate study, and adjusted accordingly. No changes are contemplated to the SAM-D system con-

cept which would negate previous cost effectiveness comparisons.

A firepower capability that is at least matched to the potential size of an air raid is fundamental to avoid defeat by a saturation attack. A defense that is overrun or knocked out by the first raid is not enhanced by a rapid reload time. Whereas, a NIKE HERCULES battery can engage only one target at a time and a HAWK battery only two targets at a time, each SAM-D section, of which there are 2 in a battery, has a capability to simultaneously engage a significant number of targets. The number of missiles which can be fired by a SAM-D firing section over a prolonged period is limited only by the number of launchers which are assigned, and there is considerable flexibility in this assignment. In fact, with software changes, there is no real limit to the number of launchers that can be controlled by an individual SAM-D radar. Careful tactical distribution of launchers and planned shuttling of them for reloading will provide the flexibility to selectively reload and continue the battle. In addition a field procedure for minimizing reloading time for SAM-D is under study as part of the development program.

HISTORY OF SAM-D PROGRAM

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, SAM-D has come a long, long way. In fact, it had its inception more than 10 years ago when the Army terminated a 2-year concept formulation study of a field Army ballistic missile defense system (FABMDS) because it was too complex and too costly.

It is from that early study, back in 1960, that the requirement for a system to counter tactical ballistic missiles as well as supersonic aircraft carrying air-to-ground missiles was identified.

When my good friend from Indiana appeared before the Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations on September 12, 1973, he described SAM-D as a weapon system in search of a mission. A very catchy phrase indeed, Mr. President, but in no way a statement of fact. But rather than respond to that charge in generalities, I would like to guide my colleagues through the evolution of the weapon system which the Army has stated as essential to the mission of protecting the Army in the field. That is its mission.

In tracing the significant steps in this program, I ask unanimous approval to insert the complete details, which include the incremental costs incurred from inception through completion of the advanced development phase in February 1972 for a total cost of \$293.6 million. My description also will address the change that occurred from the initial primary requirement for a system to counter a ballistic missile threat to the system now under development whose primary mission is to defend against the modern air-borne supersonic threat.

There being no objection, the summary was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SAM-D—CHRONOLOGY OF R. & D. PROGRAM

1960—Field Army Ballistic Missile Defense System (FABMDS) concept formulation study, \$1.7 million.

Oct. 1962—The FABMDS study was terminated after two years because it was too complex and too costly.

Army completed study for Air Defense of Allied Command Europe (ADACE) which proposed replacement of Hercules & Hawk with an Improved Surface-to-Air Missile (ISAM). Less complex and costly than FABMDS, would be optimized against air supported threat of 1970s with inherent anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) capability.

Study was renamed Army Air Defense Systems—1970s (AADS-70s). AADS-70s was to provide defense against tactical ballistic missiles of shorter range than in FABMDS and to defend against supersonic aircraft, \$5.8 million.

Oct. 1964—Secretary of Defense directed reorientation of the program to optimize against the modern airborne supersonic threat. The name AADS-70s was dropped and renamed Surface-to-Air Missile Development (SAM-D). Sam-D was to be optimized against the modern supersonic threat. Any antitactical ballistic missile capability would be only as a fallout to this primary requirement.

Feb. 1965—The trade-off studies conducted from 1963-1965 were evaluated to complete the concept formulation phase of the program. A joint Army/Navy group studied the commonality between the Army Sam-D program and the Navy's Advanced Surface Missile System (ASMS), and concluded that there were only a few areas of potential commonality due to the peculiar differences in the system operation and deployment environments, \$18.5 million.

Mar. 1966—Office of Defense directed the Army to proceed with Advanced Development of SAM-D by Contract Definition (CD) to identify alternative technical options, system costs, patterns of funding and decision points relevant to a variety of program options from which a selection could be made of an integrated system for development. The Army also was directed to conduct a cost effectiveness study including Nike Hercules and Hawk.

Aug. 1966—Three 6-month CD contracts were awarded to Hughes, RCA, and Raytheon, \$16.2 million.

May 1967—The Secretary of Defense confirmed the decision of the Army selecting Raytheon to proceed with advanced development and a letter contract for a 28-months effort was awarded on 19 May 1967, \$136.8 million.

Aug. 1967—The study of cost and effectiveness of Sam-D compared with Nike Hercules and Hawk was completed and concluded that the Sam-D coupled with complementary air defense systems represents the most cost-effective Army air defense to counter the threat in the post 1975 time frame.

May 1969—Deputy Secretary of Defense decision continued Sam-D in advanced development. Army proposal to start engineering development was denied because of uncertainties in system cost and effectiveness.

Sept. 1969—The basic advanced development contract was modified by deletion of certain advanced development (AD) tasks and all engineering development (ED) long lead time items, minus \$20.8 million.

Feb. 1970—The AD contract was modified to complete AD program objectives including additional testing and checkout of fire control equipment, missile flight program (propulsion, control and test vehicles), captive flight tests and establishment of the guidance test and simulation facility, \$84.5 million.

March 1970—Army Air Defense Evaluation Board (ADEB) study to evaluate the Sam-D Qualitative Material Requirement (QMR) and to determine the program readiness to enter engineering development concluded that Sam-D should enter engineering development in FY 1972 based on the ADEB QMR as modified to maintain the option to add a nuclear warhead and antimissile capability. Army approved this on November 19, 1970.

June 1970—The AD contract was revised to delete the Guidance Test Vehicle flight tests. Engineering development definition (EDD) was added to define the total Sam-D system including subsystem specifications to establish a baseline to develop the total ED program plan. Contract extended to May 1972, \$17.2 million.

Aug. 1970—AD contract modified to include the first Supplementary Advance Development (SAD) effort to conduct selected critical study and hardware tasks necessary for reducing risk and lead-time during full scale ED, \$8.4 million.

Dec. 1970—Second and concluding portion of SAD effort added to complete SAD tasks previously initiated and approved, \$32.8 million.

Feb. 1972—The Sam-D advanced development program was completed. Objectives of the program to validate the system concept derived from the Sam-D contract definition and to functionally demonstrate experimental system hardware performance capabilities through a series of analyses, tests, and demonstrations. All objectives were satisfactorily accomplished.

Mar. 1972—The Deputy Secretary of Defense approved Sam-D engineering development. A contract for full engineering development was executed with Raytheon Company on March 31, 1972.

Dec. 1972—Recommendations of the Sam-D Nuclear and Antimissile Capability Study by the Army approved by the Chief of Staff (1) deleted research and development and procurement funds for the nuclear warhead but retained (with minimal cost) the nuclear ancillary equipment in the ground support equipment and in the missile; (2) reduced the quantity of Sam-D fire sections for CONUS air defense; and (3) initiated research and development on an improved non-nuclear warhead.

Total Sam-D, \$293.6 million.

Mr. MCINTYRE. In conclusion, Mr. President, it is clear that SAM-D has had a slow, but steady, gestation period. Despite this, it has matured successfully. The engineering development program started in March 1972 is making excellent progress. Contractor testing of engineering development models will begin at the White Sands Proving Ground in May 1974 with a series of guided prototype missile flights. Let me repeat that the program is on schedule and within cost estimates. This cannot be said about many other major weapon systems under development.

Let us keep this baby alive and give it the chance it has rightly earned to prove its success. I urge my colleagues to join me in defeating the proposed amendment.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I should like to ask for the yeas and nays on my amendment.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. MCINTYRE. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Arizona.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ABOUREZK). The Senator from Arizona is recognized for 10 minutes.

MISSION AND DESCRIPTION

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, SAM-D will replace Nike Hercules and improved Hawk in providing air defense of the Army in the field and the continental United States. In the field Army, SAM-D defenses will be complemented by short-range, low-altitude forward area air defense weapons and will be integrated with the U.S. Air Force in the overall air defense of the theater of operations. In the United States, SAM-D will provide air defense forces. The advanced features of SAM-D will provide an increased capability against saturation attacks, electronic countermeasures, and maneuvering targets. The replacement of Nike Hercules and Improved Hawk with

SAM-D will provide a significant reduction in manpower and maintenance requirements.

I would specifically refer to the remarks made by the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE) that this is a weapon of the future, a really long-range future, not getting into the act much before 1985. We are looking at the battlefield probabilities of 1990 and the 2000's.

COST

SAM-D has decreased in total program cost by almost \$800 million since its entry into full scale development in March 1972. Instead of the \$5.2 billion program addressed by Congress last year, SAM-D is now less than a \$4.5 billion program. This figure is based on procuring missiles and radars at the escalated prices predicted through the late 1980's and yet is only about 10 percent greater than the original \$4.1 billion development estimate made in 1967 using constant 1967 dollars. SAM-D is one of the few large defense projects which, if escalation/inflation had not driven up estimates, would have actually decreased in total cost since the time of its development inception and still met the originally intended requirement. It is true that the quantities planned for procurement have changed since 1967, but so has the individual fire section configuration. Although the individual fire section is considered more expensive in terms of total program cost estimates today than in 1967, the system is halfway through its development cost, is clearly defined with far less risk than the 1967 version and is tactically more effective due to its increased firepower. One SAM-D battery will provide greater rate of firepower than seven improved Hawk batteries while its capability against saturation attacks as well as electronic and tactical countermeasures provide for better survivability and versatility. The cost and manpower comparison of one SAM-D battery against seven improved Hawk batteries overwhelmingly favors SAM-D.

As of the end of fiscal year 1973, \$558 million of the total \$1,212.7 million total development costs had been spent. Approximately another \$50 million has been spent in fiscal year 1974 under continuing resolution. To halt the program now would conservatively cost another \$100 million to \$150 million leaving us with 75 percent of the total development cost spent and an undemonstrated system.

TECHNOLOGY

SAM-D applies the latest solid state microelectronic technology to the job of locating, identifying, threat ordering, and destroying enemy aircraft before they destroy our forces. Specifically designed to combat high speed, modern maneuverable aircraft in sophisticated electronic and tactical countermeasure environments, SAM-D is the only known air defense system which can survive and defeat the aircraft threat predicted for the 1980's and beyond. Improved Hawk, although significantly better than basic Hawk, was designed only as an interim measure to keep pace with the threat until SAM-D could be built and fielded. The limited simultaneous engagement capability of improved Hawk

eliminates it from consideration as a viable defense against saturation type attacks. Other considerations, such as missile speed and maneuverability and relative immunity to electronic countermeasures place improved Hawk well below SAM-D in effectiveness.

TESTING

The Army conducted a comprehensive 5-year advanced development program designed to minimize the possible risks associated with full scale engineering development. Presently, SAM-D is 1½ years into engineering development and ready to embark on extensive system demonstration tests. For these tests the Army is procuring 218 missiles and six sets of fire control equipment.

The test program has been designed with well defined goals which must be sequentially demonstrated prior to continuing. The most critical components will be tested early to reduce the risk of the overall program. A significant management effort has established techniques that assist in preventing cost growth and schedule slippage.

NATO INTEREST

Since World War II, our NATO allies have provided air defense of their forces with U.S. Army developed air defense systems. Now the possessors of Nike Hercules and basic Hawk, they are currently negotiating to purchase improved Hawk to maintain capabilities consistent with ours. We entered production on improved Hawk in 1969 and fielded the first battalion just about 1 year ago. This timing sequence—they decide after we test, produce and field—indicates NATO offers to buy SAM-D could not be expected until the 1980's. However, the NATO panels and their associated working groups have recognized a requirement for a medium to high altitude air defense system for the future and have shown considerable interest in SAM-D concepts and technology.

Sam-D is the only air-defense weapon that can offer our forces the protection necessary to maintain their combat effectiveness. The SAM-D concept and much of its hardware have been rigorously proved through an advanced development program to insure a minimum-risk effort. The reduced maintenance and manpower requirements and increased rate of firepower, even with fewer units, make SAM-D the cheapest solution to the Air-defense threat. The reduced manpower needs are particularly significant in view of the volunteer Army and the higher costs of personnel. SAM-D is a major part of the modernization program for equipping the Army. It is vital to our future success on the battlefield.

In closing, I point out one thing to my colleagues: In all the war games I have sat through involving possible attacks on bases in the European theater, it has been conceded that the Soviets, if they were the attacker, would use tactical nuclear weapons on their first strike. If we had no ability to stop this incoming strike from the ground, we probably would not be able to respond in time; because it should be remembered that the President has to authorize the use of tactical "nukes" anywhere, including Eu-

rope, even though the tactical "nukes" are there, ready for use.

So this type of weapon, which can be fired from the ground at any threat, does not require authority from the President; it is not nuclear; and it will be able to shoot down incoming enemy tactical aircraft which in all probability will be armed with tactical nuclear weapons.

While I realize that this is an expensive system, I also realize the great amount of time we have spent on it in committee and the arguments we have had. I still think that in the long run it is not only badly needed by the Army and the forces in the field, but that it will prove to be the cheapest. If we cancel it now and then tell the Army to develop a new system, we are going to be talking about a lot more money. I know it is expensive; nothing is cheap these days. I hope that this system can be purchased.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I do not pretend for a moment to be an expert on nuclear weapons, but I do know from my experience of having been in the Senate for 23 years and being a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and having been intimately and very closely associated with our development in nuclear weapons, that in the world of technology we live in today is an age of miracles. One never knows, from one day to the next, just what the human mind can achieve.

I realize that this is a very expensive program and that we are dealing with an instrument that is quite exotic when it comes to its technological aspects.

It is true that in my State of Rhode Island at the Raytheon Co. about 400 people are engaged in this program, and I may be influenced in my association with the program. Representatives of the company have been in my office to justify the program. I tell Senators frankly that I have been impressed with what they have had to say.

We all recall when the Russians shot up their first sputnik. No one ever dreamed that it was going to happen, but that miracle did happen. We ourselves became so excited that John Kennedy addressed a joint session of Congress and said that our first priority was to reach and to land a man on the moon within 10 years. We were able to do it.

So today, when it comes to technology, we have reached the point that almost anything is possible. As a matter of fact, the word "atom" means, in Greek, "in-divisible." The reason why the word "in-divisible" was used was that no one ever believed the atom could be split.

Yet under the Stagg Stadium, in Illinois, in 1942, Enrico Fermi split the atom, creating this tremendous power that led to the atomic bomb, that led to the hydrogen bomb, that led to the nuclear submarine and nuclear surface vessels. We would not have the nuclear powerplants we have today.

The point I am making is that this is a program that was started in March 1966. By the time we will have consumed the amount of money that is au-

thorized in this budget, we will have achieved about 62 percent of the ultimate program. I know that other people disagree with my point of view, and they do so sincerely. We have gone so far in this area, why stop now? Why throw down the drain all the money we have spent thus far, without knowing whether we can achieve our objective? As the Senator from Arizona has pointed out, there is a need for this weapon if we can achieve it. Whether or not we ever will, I do not know. How much it will cost ultimately, I do not know. But what if the Russians get it before we do?

What if we do not get it? What do we do if they get another so-called Sputnik? Will we get into another crash program and say, "Now, we have to get going and do it"?

I realize that most of the things we are doing in the defense budget may never be used. I pray that most of the things we are doing in the defense budget will never be used. I have said this publicly and privately and I repeat it now on the floor of the Senate. The only good purpose of the atomic weapon is to make sure none will ever be used by anyone because I tell Senators frankly there is much power in Russia today, in France, in Great Britain, in the United States, and Red China that they could burn this world to ashes. We could annihilate all civilization. To me, the purpose of the atomic weapon is not to fight and win a war, but to preventing war. Now how do we do that?

As I have said on this floor several times, John Kennedy was elected President of the United States on the ground that we had a missile gap. He told the people of this country that we had fallen behind after World War II, and that we needed to have conventional forces. Whether he was right or wrong is not the question to be debated here today. But when he met his crisis in 1962 it was the power behind him that averted a nuclear holocaust. It was the doom of Khrushchev. When history is recorded the best courage ever shown by Khrushchev will be that he needed the ultimatum of John Kennedy, who said—

If you come over with your atomic warheads I'll blow up your ships.

He turned back and the minute he turned back he was out because he had discredited the Soviet Union. That is the problem we have today. From that day on the Soviet Union has taken the position this will never happen to them again.

Their position is, "We will never be humiliated again."

That is the dilemma facing this Congress and which faces the free world today. How far do we go to make certain that such a confrontation does not happen again.

I would like to vote against every item in this defense budget and say, "Chuck it all." I would like to say, "Let us take the whole \$80 billion and put it in schools, put it in homes for the elderly and do things we need to do." My heart is just as big as the heart of anyone else on this floor. I have argued time and time again that this is an age of priority.

and I believe that sincerely. But can we let down our guard? How far can we go in that direction?

The Senator from Nevada made a tremendous pitch for the F-14.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield 2 additional minutes to the Senator from Rhode Island.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.

Mr. PASTORE. He was sustained by the Senate. He may be right and the rest of us that voted against him may be wrong. But all I am saying is we have gone so far we cannot put our finger on it and say this is it. In this day and age no one can make that assertion. Nobody knows what it is because we are living in a changing world where from day to day we wake up and find there is a new discovery, sometimes cataclysmically, but in truth it is so.

No one ever dreamed that the Russians would be able to shoot a rocket into space before we did. But we did the best we could and we met the challenge. I am saying on this SAM-D, give it another chance; give it a little more time to prove itself. Now is not the time to stop. We have come too far. Do not send the past investment down the drain.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PASTORE. This may be the answer. Let us try to find the answer.

I yield to the Senator from Indiana.

Mr. BAYH. I have the greatest respect for the logic and the dedication of my friend from Rhode Island, and I got a lump in my throat when he described—

I got a lump in my throat when I was reminded of the situation from which John Kennedy extricated us.

I want to point out to my friend from Rhode Island that the question is not the size of the heart, but the size of the military budget.

Also I wish to ask the Senator: Was this not the same argument used to go ahead with the Cheyenne helicopter and the main battle tank? Was it not argued then that, "We have \$500 million invested now, and we cannot afford to stop; let us go ahead and pour another \$200 million down the rathole."

Mr. PASTORE. When we get into similitudes, it is a matter of judgment.

With reference to having a big heart, I was talking about homes for the elderly, and no one has done more in that connection than the Senator from Rhode Island.

I do not think the Senator was listening too attentively because if the Senator was following my rationale I do not think he would have gotten as excited as he is.

Mr. BAYH. The Senator from Indiana is not excited.

Mr. PASTORE. It seemed to me the Senator was excited in a melodious sort of way, but the Senator is excited. This idea that every time someone rises to challenge the position of another, that for some reason he is being irrational or does not understand the subject, is going a little too far. I have been in public

life for 38 years and I have no apologies to make to anyone for any position I have taken during those 38 years.

Mr. BAYH. If my friend from Rhode Island—

Mr. PASTORE. If the Senator will let me continue, I know the impetuosity of youth. If the Senator will be patient, I will be patient, I will get around to him.

One thing the Senator from Rhode Island has never done that is to retreat from an argument.

All I am saying here is that the time has come for us to realize the potentiality. We talk about what the future has in store. Oh, of course, we rejoiced when Nixon went to Peking and tipped the champagne glasses with the leaders of China, and we all rejoiced when he then went to Moscow and tipped those glasses with the leaders there and got on the television network and told the Russian people how much we loved them. When he came back and threw out that nice red carpet for the prisoners of war, we all rejoiced in that.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, may I have a few more minutes?

Mr. MCINTYRE. I yield 2 minutes additional to the Senator from Rhode Island.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.

Mr. PASTORE. All I am saying here is to give this matter a healthy chance. We have supported the Senator from Indiana on many issues where we were in doubt, but we had confidence in his judgment and his integrity. The Senate is going to hear from the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts. The Senate has heard from the Senator from Rhode Island; the Senate has heard from the Senator from Arizona; the Senate has heard from the Senator from New Hampshire; and the Senate has heard from the Senator from Florida. We are reasonable people. All we are saying at this moment—to use a cliché one hears over at the Watergate hearings—at this point in time, it is about time we gave this thing a chance.

That is all I have to say. I hope the amendment is rejected. Now, if the Senator wishes me to, I am glad to yield.

Mr. BAYH. I learned a lesson. I will yield on my own time.

Mr. PASTORE. I hoped the Senator would because I do not have much left.

Mr. MCINTYRE. I thank my good friend from Rhode Island for his able remarks.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute. Somehow or other twice this afternoon I have tried to pay my friend from Rhode Island a compliment and somehow or other there is a screen between hither and yon and what I say turns out to be a dirty jab.

Mr. PASTORE. I never said that.

Mr. BAYH. I think the Senator from Rhode Island has the biggest heart in the Senate. I do not question his judgment or his motives, nor do I question the motives of anyone here. I do not think that is in good judgment.

I think we are trying to look at the place this weapon system has in our

overall arsenal. If I could be convinced that it has a good place in it, I would be on the side of the Senator from Rhode Island. If I thought we would get a dollar's worth of defense for a dollar's worth of taxes, I would be on the side of the Senator from Rhode Island.

I expect that that side has enough votes to beat us, but I will bet that within the next year or 2 years we will all be coming back here and we will be even more frustrated at the cost overrun and time lag. The argument will be made that, instead of the \$500 million, we will have to have \$700 million or \$1 billion, and then the perpetual system is going to go on, just like the Cheyenne helicopter and the main battle tank went on until Congress had its fill and said, "No more." I am glad to yield to the Senator from Nevada.

Mr. PASTORE. If I may have half a minute—

Mr. BAYH. I yield half a minute to the Senator.

Mr. PASTORE. If we get into overruns this next year, I will be the first one to get up and say we ought to call it quits, but the fact remains that as of the moment I think it would be a sad mistake for us to do that. That is all I am saying.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, I want to agree with the Senator from Rhode Island. I think that during the course of the earlier part of this week, Senators have heard me talk about overruns. If this program starts to show overruns or overcosts, I will be the first one to say "No."

I want to point out that there is a distinction in the comparison of the Cheyenne program and this program. The Cheyenne helicopter got itself into production at the same time they were trying to develop it. This is the concurrency we worry about. We do not have that in SAM-D.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I point out that the Army has already violated its own regulations. It has gone into engineering and development before it has tried it out. Its own manual says that should not be. It is doing that in spite of its own prohibition.

Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Nevada.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I am sorry we do not have more of our colleagues on the floor, because I have no illusions about being able to convince the minds of those who are here and listening and who admit that the company is in the State building the system. I say that in good humor, but I have no illusions about it.

Mr. President, I wish to support the amendment of Senator BAYH to the fiscal year 1974 Defense authorization bill to delete funding for SAM-D. My basic reason for being against SAM-D has not changed since last year, namely that it is too expensive to be bought in adequate quantities to be used as an area defense system. Therefore, the limited quantities of SAM-D fire units that could be purchased makes them a high value target potentially vulnerable to mass attacks.

I heard some strong words from the Senator from Rhode Island and the Senator from New Hampshire a few moments ago about the fact that they did not show cost overruns in this particular system, but I would like to point this out. I do not know what the difference between escalation of cost and overrun is, but the unit cost of this system has escalated 350 percent since this system was first approved. I repeat, 350 percent since it was first approved in 1967.

That may not be a cost overrun, but a 350-percent escalation in cost is something worth considering.

I would also point out that the cost to field a SAM-D fire unit will average \$1.3 million per missile.

I am sorry the Senator from Rhode Island is not here now, because he was talking about housing for the poor a few minutes ago. When we think in terms of \$1.3 million for each missile to field the unit, to put it out in the field ready to fire it, and every time it is fired to has just shot off \$1.3 million, I think that ought to be equated in terms of the cost of housing for the poor.

Another disturbing factor is that this system will be used by the 7th Army in Europe. Who is involved with our 7th Army and what is it there for? Our 7th Army is there to protect Central Europe, along with our NATO allies.

Where do our NATO allies stand on that issue? I will tell the Senator where they stand. They do not want the system because it is too expensive and they cannot afford it, and they are the countries that are interested in being defended.

What is SAM-D's history? The Senator from Rhode Island has said, let us give it a chance.

SAM-D began as an intermediate range antiballistic missile, but its mission now is for use against tactical aircraft. We have no mission for SAM-D in light of its original program. Its mission is against tactical aircraft. It is said that it has a great increase in altitude capability. It has. I am sorry the figures are classified and I cannot tell what the altitude capability is, but I will tell the Senate the improved Hawk can reach to an altitude that can attack any tactical aircraft in the Russian inventory today. Any tactical aircraft in the Russian inventory today can be reached by the improved Hawk.

Tactical aircraft do not fly at 80,000 or 90,000 feet. They fly down where they can be used in their air-to-ground role. Their normal activity is from 16,000 feet to sea level or to ground level. That is their basic operating altitude. So why are we talking about a weapon that can fire at some tremendously high altitude that has no opportunity to fire at anything up there?

In spite of this change, all of the sophisticated radar and computer equipment has been retained. I must agree that these capabilities are not necessary for a conventional air defense weapon and that the improved Hawk missile would be adequate to meet the threat.

Also a problem area exists in that SAM-D radar can only be aimed in one 90 degree quadrant at any given time. This makes it potentially vulnerable to a

coordinated attack from many quadrants, even though eight missiles can be guided simultaneously in any one quadrant.

Indications from our Southeast Asia experience shows the ARM missile a significant threat to SAM-D. Army studies show SAM-D has a 0.3 probability of surviving an ARM attack. Put another way, the ARM has a 0.7 probability of killing SAM-D. If the SAM-D is shot down, then the ARM kill probability drops to 0.001. Then the ARM has achieved suppression.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CANNON. I yield.

Mr. BAYH. There has been a discussion about the sophistication of the phased array radar, which is not more than the Hawk radar. Is not the Hawk radar more than sufficient to do the job with that weapon system?

Mr. CANNON. Absolutely.

Mr. BAYH. I have had to rely on others for expertise. The Senator has been there. Is it not accurate to point out that one of the factors in the phased array radar in combating tactical ballistic missiles is that that generates sufficiently more heat that even if it were shut off it would be more vulnerable to an infrared heat-seeking missile than the Hawk-type radar?

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, absolutely. The radar reports are much more powerful. They do use more power. They put out a greater signal, and they do have an opportunity for a suppression weapon approach on them.

Another very bad feature of the SAM-D is that if one is on a tactical mission, he would want a weapon that would reload fast. The SAM-D reloading time is estimated to take 1 hour. The missiles are stored in a box in units of four. They are very heavy and difficult to reload.

The Hawk takes 3 to 15 minutes to reload. This is a very important matter in front line activity.

When considered on a cost basis, a new Hawk battery's firepower consisting of 18 missiles is \$9 million, whereas the cost of a SAM-D fire section is about \$25 million which includes R. & D. not yet spent for 20 missiles.

I certainly agree with the Army that air defense protection for our field Army is a highly important mission.

However, I feel that to rely on the overly-sophisticated, high cost SAM-D to replace our Hercules and Hawk missiles, as the Army plans, will reduce, and not strengthen our Army's defenses against air attack.

The cost of the SAM-D surface-to-air missile program this year will be \$194.2 million, a further step toward what will ultimately be a multibillion dollar program.

Again, I am sorry that the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island who showed his concern and commented on his concern for housing for the poor is not present to listen to this. I think that this is a very important fact.

As was true of the now abandoned ABM system—abandoned at a cost to the taxpayers of \$5.1 billion dollars—SAM-D has been a system in search of a mission.

This system was conceived originally

to be, in part, a limited type of ABM, particularly for defense against tactical nuclear weapons. That explains some of its technical features, which are now less than desirable for its current mission, a field-deployed missile system designed to protect troops from attacking aircraft.

Strategic bomber defense by means of a sophisticated surface-to-air missile is difficult to justify, especially in that we have decided not to deploy an ABM system to defend the continental United States against strategic missiles.

I might say that my colleague, the Senator from Arizona, said that they could be used in the air defense role for the continental United States.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, would the Senator from Indiana yield me a few more minutes?

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Nevada.

Mr. CANNON. That is the most absurd contention that I think that I have ever heard, that this system could be used in an air defense role for the continental United States. We are through with almost all of those activities in this country because we regard the ability of air attack against this country to be very remote.

So to use this missile in that type of mission reaches the height of absurdity.

There is justification for maintaining limited air defenses to protect our air space from unauthorized intrusions, but modern manned fighter interceptors can handle such missions.

The SAM-D program is a good illustration of the problems of concurrency and misdirected technical capabilities that have been characteristic of some weapon system failures.

In this regard, a possible area of trouble are two important technical features of this system, the guidance and the fusing which are not scheduled for flight testing until late in its development program.

The capability to track and fire several missiles simultaneously, a hold-over from its early days as a partial ABM, is not as important in air defense as a rapid-reload capability; and the reload capability of the SAM-D, as previously pointed out, is considerably slower than that of the improved Hawk missile it is intended to replace.

I, accordingly, recommend the funding for this program be terminated.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Nevada who has considerably more expertise in this matter than does the Senator from Indiana. His expertise has convinced him that he should join with the Senator from Indiana on this amendment.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, would the Senator from Indiana yield me 1 minute?

Mr. BAYH. I yield.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I wish that the Senator from Rhode Island were able to listen to the Senator from Nevada present his statement. I think that the statement is quite compelling and in spite of his youth, it has compelled me to vote in favor of his amendment.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I appreciate the comments of the old Senator from Delaware.

I yield to the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I appreciate the courtesy of the Senator from Indiana. It is difficult as acting manager of the bill to oppose recommendations of the committee. Much, if not almost all, of what the distinguished Senator from Nevada, one of the true military experts in this body, embraces a statement I made recently before the Senate Appropriations Committee, at the request of the chairman. We are both opposed to this SAM-D.

This weapon, in effect, is designed for Europe. But they in Europe have no interest in it. They say that it is too complex and too expensive and that, therefore, if we want to build it for them, we can build it.

The statements made about the Hawk missile being at least as adequate as the SAM-D are correct. We are just beginning, as we did this morning, on another tremendously expensive system, a vote we narrowly lost. This is the camel's nose under the tent, and it will run into billions of dollars. It is really a part of the abandoned ABM system, a system now abandoned at a cost to the American taxpayers, already, of over \$5 billion.

Somewhere, sometime, we must achieve a true gage on the basis of true cost effectiveness, how much we actually spend on the military.

It might be of interest, inasmuch as we are building this SAM-D for Europe, to talk about something else that we are building and plan for Europe.

We have 8-inch guns in Europe that take conventional shells. The cost of a conventional 8-inch shell, in production, is some \$56 apiece. Many people believe in the possibility of tactical nuclear warfare. Tactical nuclear war to us, however, actually is strategic nuclear war to the people in the country in which the nuclear weapons are fired.

We are in production also on a nuclear shell for the same gun, the very same barrel, to be used in Europe. The cost is more than \$56 apiece in production. The cost of each of these shells is \$402,000 in production. And the same ratio of difference, in effect, is true also with respect to 155 millimeter shells. Over \$1 billion for a relatively very few shells.

We are told that we plan these shells for "use in Europe."

I asked, "Have you any agreement with, say, the Germans, as to whether they will allow us to use these shells on their territory?"

They said, "We have no disagreement." I said, "I did not ask you that. I asked if you have an agreement."

They said, "Well, we are working on it."

Later a respected friend came to visit the United States, Chancellor Brandt of Germany.

I asked, "What can I say to him to convince him that he should allow us to use these nuclear shells in this country?"

Now what do you think the answer was? The answer was, "Please do not dis-

cuss it with him at all. It is a very sensitive subject."

So here we are, spending billions more on something we do not know whether we can or cannot use them where planned.

I do not know a more conscientious Senator on military matters than the distinguished Senator from Nevada. I agree with everything he has just said. As we consider what is needed for our security and our defense, let us also consider the importance, from the standpoint of true security, of the position of the American taxpayer.

For such reasons, I support the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Indiana.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. BROOKE. I thank my colleague from New Hampshire.

Mr. President, I have listened to the debate with great interest. I am sure that foremost in the minds of all of the debaters, whether on the side of the proponents of this issue or in opposition to it, all are concerned primarily with the security of this Nation and secondarily with the taxpayer's dollar.

Mr. President, in times of peace it becomes very difficult for a democracy to give adequate consideration to national defense needs. Our thoughts naturally turn away from defense when we are not under attack, and toward what seems to be the more compelling social and economic needs of our citizens. Several times since World War II we have prematurely and unilaterally cut back on our defensive capabilities in the belief that an "era of peace" was at hand. In each case our country's actions were mistaken by some as a lack of resolve on the part of the United States to fulfill its obligations to others and to protect its core interests. A repeat of such an error on our part must be avoided as we seek now to make another so-called détente a reality. It is in this context that the discussion over the SAM-D air defense system should take place.

Last year we were reminded vividly of the destruction of over 3,800 Russian aircraft in 6 days by the German Air Force in Operation Barbarossa in 1941. A similar result occurred in the 6-day war of 1967. These two examples suffice to illustrate that the U.S. Army must have an air defense system which can handle concentrated surprise enemy attacks if our conventional deterrent and war-waging capabilities are to remain credible.

We already have air defense systems—the high-altitude Nike-Hercules and the medium-to-low altitude improved Hawk—and the obvious question is, why do we need a new system? There are four basic reasons why the older ones cannot do the job for much longer. First, their low firepower cannot survive saturation attacks even of the type that occurred in Russia in 1941 and in Sinai in 1967. Second, the 1950's designs of Nike-Hercules and Hawk will not be able to counter the maneuver and electronic countermeasure capabilities of future aircraft. Third, the existing equipment of Nike-Hercules and

Hawk will become more and more difficult to maintain. Moreover, the 1950's technology is not susceptible to further substantive improvement. Finally, the cost of supporting these older systems in manpower and dollars is too high. SAM-D will provide four times the fire-power of Nike-Hercules and Hawk systems while using only half the manpower and at less than 70 percent of the operating costs of these other systems it will replace.

Perhaps as important as these technical considerations is the relevancy of SAM-D to the European contingency. The next phase of East-West negotiations will entail, in part, an examination of the mutual and balanced force reduction issue. Of key concern here will be the determination of what is meant by the term "balanced." I believe we must begin thinking about this problem in terms of equality of firepower on both sides. It is in this light that SAM-D and its capabilities become relevant. SAM-D is one of those systems that will hopefully permit the Atlantic allies to maintain a credible force posture in terms of firepower vis-à-vis the East even though there may be some imbalances in troop levels in Europe between East and West.

In sum, we need an effective air defense system to protect our field armies. We need SAM-D to enhance the credibility of our conventional defense posture. We need SAM-D to provide a possible technological offset to manpower imbalances between East and West in Europe. Present systems must be replaced at the end of this decade. The SAM-D system will do a better job with fewer people and less money, and we have no other programs on the horizon to do this job. If we are to avoid repetition of past mistakes and if we are going to try to keep our defense manpower and dollars at as low a level as an adequate defense permits, we should proceed with the orderly development of systems such as SAM-D that are relevant to present needs and future contingencies.

Therefore, Mr. President, I urge the rejection by the Senate of the pending amendment.

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BROOKE. I am happy to yield to the Senator from New Hampshire.

Mr. COTTON. I would like to commend the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts on his logical, forceful, and able analysis. I think that, coming from him, this statement should be very persuasive to the Senate and to the country, because none of us, no one in this body and I dare say no one in the State of Massachusetts, does not know how deeply the Senator from Massachusetts feels for the needy and underprivileged in this country, and how hard he works on the subcommittee on which I serve with him for the Federal Government to try to use those resources where they are so badly needed.

This dispassionate, careful analysis in a field that we dare not allow ourselves to neglect, defense, coming from him, impresses me very much, and I want to

say to him it is one of the finest presentations I have heard in the Senate.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I am most grateful to my distinguished colleague, the senior Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. COTTON). I thank him for his most generous words. I am very privileged to serve on the Subcommittee on Labor, Health, Education, and Welfare and Related Agencies of the Appropriations Committee, of which he is the ranking minority member. We have worked together on important problems which require appropriations for the poor and needy in this country, but I certainly agree with him that our first obligation is the defense and security of this Nation, and if I did not feel so strongly that we needed this weapons system for our security and for the security of peace in the world, I assure him I would much rather have seen these funds allocated for the purposes of the needy and the poor. But we are cutting back on defense. We have done some of it in this defense bill already. We will do more. This is not the place to cut back. Our security cannot be compromised.

I am very grateful again for these words from a man whom I respect so much, the distinguished senior Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. COTTON).

I also thank the distinguished junior Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. McINTYRE) for yielding me more than my time to enable me to have this colloquy.

Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I want to compliment the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE) for his brief statement. I wish it could have been longer. I do appreciate his support for our position.

Mr. BROOKE. I thank the distinguished junior Senator from New Hampshire. Sometimes our colloquies are too lengthy. We could accomplish much more if we just related the facts. I have tried to do that in this statement. So I am very grateful to my colleague.

Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, there is no one in this body who has a higher respect for the distinguished Senator from Nevada than myself. He serves as chairman of the Tactical Air Subcommittee on the Armed Services Committee. During the course of his remarks, I noted that he said that each of these missiles would cost in the vicinity of \$1.3 million. That jolted me a little bit. His reference to the cost as being \$1.3 million comes about when we take all of the development costs, and the 10 years operating costs, and the production costs, and divide it by the number of missiles to be bought, which is about 6,000 plus, and we come up with the figure of \$1.3 million.

I would like the RECORD to show that the unit production cost of a SAM-D missile is less than one-tenth that figure as given by my good friend from Nevada.

Mr. BAYH. Which is how much?

Mr. McINTYRE. I want to remind Senators that what we are doing here is talking about a weapons system way downstream. We are talking about 10, 12 years ahead. We are developing a weapons system that will be able to handle the most sophisticated type of electronic countermeasures that are

creeping in—I hate to say it—but it is creeping warfare.

I believe the improved Hawk is not that good. If they cannot handle the electronic countermeasures and the jamming that would occur against them, if they are dead, silenced, defeated, it does not do any good to talk about them in 1980, 1981, or 1982. That is what we are looking to.

One other point. I have been critical of NATO and the fact that they have not exuded any great interest in this sophisticated and upcoming SAM-D missile system. One of the main reasons is that we have been holding it close to our vest. They are not in on it. Just recently, in the past year, the countries of NATO have begun to show some interest in talking with our officials and we do think there is every possibility in the future that they will undertake their own defense in 1980 and may be using the SAM-D to do it.

Members of the Armed Services Committee are acutely aware of what we have to do, because of lack of cooperation and lack of a share in the defense of Europe that we get from the NATO countries, but NATO has not had a chance to take a hard look at this highly developed weapons system.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I apologize to my good friend from New Hampshire for my impetuosity a few moments ago. If I might have just a couple of minutes to say that I appreciate the Senator's defining the difference between what he is discussing and what the Senator from Nevada was discussing. But I think we would all agree that we have to charge research and development to something. We cannot say we are marking up research and development to a good and better life.

Mr. McINTYRE. If we are going to do it fairly, do it as the Senator from New Hampshire does—the junior Senator from New Hampshire. He talks about the program unit cost and the production unit cost. The difference there is that when I talk about the program unit cost, I am throwing in all of the research and development that has to go into the whole system, before it can go into production.

Mr. BAYH. I say to my distinguished friend from New Hampshire that I think there is one argument and logic in equating the costs of SAM-D and another in equating the cost of the Trident, which I supported. We look at it differently. I think we have to figure out the total costs of this beast, this monster, this weapons system. Even if we take the logic which I am sure the Senator from New Hampshire feels deeply in his heart, and I would not impugn his motives at all, it costs only \$100,000 per missile to fire the SAM-D; but I would like to point out that we can throw in a Shrike and kill it for only \$10,000.

Mr. McINTYRE. I thank my good friend from Indiana.

At this time I yield to the distinguished ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. THURMOND), for 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.

ABOUREZK). The Senator from South Carolina is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the amendment of the Senator from Indiana.

I would remind the Senate that SAM-D is one of the top priority programs of the Army. The Army has five top priority programs this year. This is one of them.

I would also remind the Senate that the Armed Services Committee carefully studied it and heard both sides and approved it by a vote of 9 to 4. They recommended approval of the full \$194.2 million requested to continue the engineering development of this weapons system. In recommending approval of this amount, \$194.2 million, the committee emphasized that this does not constitute a commitment to production but merely the next step in an orderly development program.

The program is progressing satisfactorily. It is on schedule. It is within the cost estimates and no known major technical problems are unresolved.

Moreover, the program has been reduced in total estimated costs by some \$759 million, from five and a quarter billion dollars to a little less than four and a half billion dollars.

This has been brought about primarily by reducing the quantity of equipment required and by deleting certain unnecessary features.

Surely, we can get by just relying on the Hercules and the Hawk which we now have, but what are we going to do in the 1980's? The weapons provided for today will be the ones we will use in the 1980's.

Mr. President, this is a 1980 weapon. We cannot take the chance. We have got to be ready for the situation that we can anticipate that may arise at that time.

I would remind the Senate, as to the capabilities of this particular weapon, that SAM-D has the fire power, the multiple engagement capability, and the fast reaction to cope with increasing sophistication from any enemy air threat. No other system in the world has the capability of the SAM-D.

I would remind the Senate that the SAM-D has successfully completed its first year of engineering development. It has been completed on schedule and within the program costs, as I stated.

I would remind the Senate that the SAM-D is an integral part of the Army, for the Army must have an effective air defense wherever it goes, whether in this country, in NATO, or some other country. Thus, this is not being developed solely for the deployment of NATO in Europe although some of the NATO countries are emphasizing interest in the weapon. It is possible that they may wish to obtain this weapon later.

I remind the Senate that the concept cost effectiveness of this weapon is good. Over a decade of studies by the Defense Department, the Department has concluded that the most cost effective air defense is a single system such as the SAM-D, rather than our present two systems. Our present two systems are the Hercules, which provides for high altitude and long range, and the improved

Hawk D, which provides for a medium altitude and a medium range. The SAM-D will take the place of both, and the studies show that the single system is to be preferred over two systems.

I remind the Senate that the fire power in the SAM-D is four times greater than the current air defense systems—four to one over the present systems.

I remind the Senate that the SAM-D can survive on the battlefield better than existing systems. How can it do this? In 3 ways: First, because of its mobility. It can move from place to place. Second, because of the remote location of its small number of equipment elements. Third, the extraction of high attrition from the enemy. This is very important, because no system is of any value unless it can survive. The SAM-D is a system that the Defense Department says will be able to survive, if any can.

I remind the Senate that the personnel requirements with this system will be fewer than with the other systems. The SAM-D deployments will require several thousand fewer field army defense personnel than the current Nike-Hercules, and the improved Hawk.

I remind the Senate that the advanced technology used in designing the SAM-D inherently lends itself to a high order of combat-readiness. How does it do this? Because it has the highly reliable microelectronics imbedded in it. The present systems do not have that; therefore, they cannot be as combat-ready as the SAM-D will be.

I remind the Senate that the Soviets have demonstrated the value of good surface-to-air missiles—good SAM's. They did this in the Middle East, and they have done this by knocking down our aircraft in Vietnam.

I remind the Senate that the SAM-D is not scheduled for final procurement decision until 1979; and I repeat that this is not a production program. It is a development program, and this development must continue so that we may have the option to make the procurement decision if cost and conditions warrant.

Mr. President, in closing, I make this point: In every war we have fought, the Army has had to bear the brunt of the battle. I say that without any discredit to the Air Force or the Navy. We are proud of all of them. But if we look at the figures of those killed in the Vietnam War, they show about 1,500 in the Navy and about 1,000 in the Air Force. How many were lost in the Army? 46,000 to 47,000. And 300,000 were wounded, most of them in the Army. Again, I say it is no discredit. The Air Force did a wonderful job; the Navy did a wonderful job. But the fighting is on the ground. That is where it took place.

What is this weapon for? This weapon is to protect the man on the ground. As Senator STENNIS has said frequently, it is to protect the man who has mud on his boots, the man who is fighting on the ground. That is the purpose of SAM-D.

If we can save some lives by procuring SAM-D, if we can save the lives of the men fighting on the ground, this weapon certainly will be worthwhile.

I hope the amendment of the Senator from Indiana will be rejected.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

MR. BAYH. Mr. President, I should like to make a few summarizing remarks, and then I will be prepared to yield back the remainder of my time, unless others desire to speak.

As I said at the beginning of our discussion of our debate, the Senator from Indiana has no personal, built-in expertise in this area. Thus, I have had to rely on others.

I am amazed at the disparity between the figures that are cited by those who are in opposition and the figures that were cited by the experts on whom the Senator from Indiana relied. I trust that the Senator from Missouri, the Senator from Nevada, and others on this side of the argument are relying on the same arguments.

I point out that the Senator from Indiana relies heavily on the General Accounting Office experts, on an analysis and critique in their report to Congress. I think it is important for us to look at the fact that many people have different axes to grind around here, but the Comptroller General of the United States is responsible to us. He and his experts are responsible to Congress. They are not responsible to Raytheon or the Pentagon or the Army and all these well intentioned individuals who have built-in prejudices of which they are sometimes not even aware. The statistics we are relying on are the result of the study brought to Congress by the Comptroller General, and he is responsible only to us, nobody else.

I talked to a number of other experts, one of whom is one of the leading military test experts in the country. I said to him:

Can I bring some other Senators in? Can I use your name?

He said:

Well, I would like to, Senator, but I have a big house and a big mortgage, and they play awfully tough.

One of the experts the GAO brought in is someone whose name will not be mentioned now; I do not want to embarrass him. I see that he is seated in the gallery. He has been working on this kind of matter since the early 1940's. The Raytheon people came into my office and totally discredited the man.

I just get it up to the eyeballs with some of these people who have a vested interest in perpetuating a program that the taxpayers have to pay for, citing statistics that have no relevance to facts.

The distinguished Senator from South Carolina, who certainly is dedicated to a strong defense, talked about building to the 1980's. So did the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island and the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire, both of whom are very dedicated Senators. None of us really knows what is going to be present in the 1980's; but I think some rather basic facts are going to exist in the 1980's as they do now: that is, as that aircraft—and that is what the SAM-D is designed to destroy—is up there at 80,000 feet, 100,000 feet, or 200,000 feet, it is not going to hurt anything on the ground. No matter how fast that

aircraft goes, we know now, because of the aerodynamics we have learned from our missile programs and our space programs, that vehicle has to slow down before it can discharge any armament, particularly if it is going to come down into the lower altitudes. The heat of fast speed requires it to slow down.

That means before an enemy weapon capacity can hurt our troops on the ground it has to come down to within striking distance of existing weapons systems at a speed that can be dealt with by the existing system.

As far as survival is concerned, one of the most amazing things coming to my attention—and this is the first time I have been in a weapons system fight; if we lose it will not be the last—is to have a staff man of mine, who was sitting in a briefing session with a general, whose name I will not mention because I do not want to embarrass him, and he tells the general that he does not have security classification. Then, the general went ahead and enumerated all the facts and statistics on the SAM-D versus the Hawk, fully aware of my staff man sitting there and having been told this. When we pointed out we were going to make this information available to the Senate, and the case begins to tell, we are then told that the information is classified. That compounded my concern.

I have a document here that has been translated from Russian into English. It is a textbook containing a whole layout of the Hawk system. It contains the sensitive data, all the countermeasures necessary to destroy the SAM-D. This is not a hidden volume of technology but for some reason we still call it classified.

To summarize, we are talking about protecting ground troops. I share the concern of my colleagues on the other side that the fellows with mud on their boots are on the end of the limb and they deserve to be protected. The question is how they are to be protected.

The question is: Are we going to put in a SAM-D system that is \$58 million a battery, or are we going to be contented with an \$8.3 million system of the present improved Hawk?

We have had so many different figures quoted. I do not want to give Senators what the Senator from Indiana says about the systems. I want to give Senators what the Comptroller General of the United States says as to whether we need one or the other. We have been told we have to have the SAM-D, that it is the only thing available in the country, in the world. Here we have the Comptroller General, after looking at all these classified documents that are not available to us, saying:

The Army concludes that either the improved HAWK or the SAM-D system would be adequate to counter the anticipated threat.

Yet we are going to go out and build a system costing \$58 million a battery when we have one costing \$8.3 million. The cheapest system has 54 missiles, taking 5 minutes to reload, and the more expensive system has 40 missiles with 1 hour to reload.

I think we should learn from Vietnam. The distinguished Senator from South

Carolina talks about what happened to our troops in Vietnam. We have lost 89 percent of our pilots in Vietnam due to antiaircraft on the ground, not the SAM-D.

I wish we could shut the system off, convince the Army to go to the drawing board, and come up with a better antiaircraft weapon. We are the only country in NATO that does not have a better weapon going into an antiaircraft gun, the traditional kind of gun that shoots down our planes and that killed our men in Vietnam.

Mr. President, I wish to read into the record a letter in determining where the Army puts its own priorities. I shall read excerpts from the letter. If Senators would like to read the entire letter, it is available. It is from Malcolm Currie, Director of Defense Research and Engineering. He talks about the most critical deficiency in our air defense weapons, and a short-range missile system over a low level and low altitude capacity. I read:

A low-altitude air defense system with a capability during night and limited visibility conditions is needed as a complement to SAM-D in rear areas and also in corps and division areas to counter heliborne assault operations and fixed-wing aircraft attacks.

So we are talking not only about what is necessary to build the SAM-D, but now we come along and talk about building another system to protect the SAM-D. I do not know where this thing is going to end.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, will the Senator please put the entire letter in the RECORD?

Mr. BAYH. I shall do so. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the entire letter may be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE
RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING,
Washington, D.C., July 26, 1973.

Hon. STUART SYMINGTON,
Acting Chairman, Committee on Armed
Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: We have recently been informed that the Tactical Air Power Subcommittee has recommended deletion of the entire \$19.5M in R&D funds requested to procure a foreign-developed, U.S. manufactured, short range missile system for Army test and evaluation. This Subcommittee recommendation, if approved, would result in a serious setback in addressing the most critical deficiency in our Army air defense weapon mix.

In 1972, the Secretary of Defense approved the SAM-D development program with the understanding that the Army outyear budget would include sufficient funding to procure an improved low altitude air defense capability, which the Army Air Defense Evaluation Board recommended to provide a balanced air defense in conjunction with improved HAWK and SAM-D.

The Army decided in 1971 to conduct preliminary tests on CROTALE to determine its potential for Army use. In June 1972, in addressing the low altitude forward area air defense problem, the Secretary of Defense approved preliminary tests and evaluations of three foreign low altitude missile systems (CROTALE, RAPIER, and ROLAND) and a parallel improvement program for CHAPARRAL. The foreign systems are candidates to

either complement or replace our present inadequate low altitude air defense capability.

Even before the Army's decision to test these foreign systems, it had conducted design competitions in U.S. industry for technology and systems concepts that might provide improved capability in low altitude air defenses. The results of these and continuing investigations in this area show that any such program begun in the near future would be essentially a duplication of development already nearly completed by our European allies, and would not produce systems significantly more effective or less costly than those that would result from U.S. production of one of the foreign systems. All available evidence indicates this remains true both with regard to new system starts and to efforts that would convert the current CHAPARRAL to a radar-directed system equivalent to these foreign systems. The CHAPARRAL improvement program now underway is testing an upgraded infrared homing guidance system and includes a prototype feasibility program for an infrared target acquisition system. These improvements, if successful, will significantly increase CHAPARRAL's capability.

The FY74 funds would be used for starting a U.S. pilot production and the remaining required tests of a selected foreign system leading to a production decision if Army tests and evaluations prove a foreign system to be more desirable than improving CHAPARRAL. Total cost of this pre-production program will be contingent on the system selected and specifics of the testing to be performed. Estimates of the costs are in preparation at the present time and will be available in the late fall when the Army is prepared to address its system selection. The results of Army preliminary tests of the three foreign missile systems indicate that all of the systems essentially meet their published performance specifications. The FRG, UK, and France are planning to procure night and adverse weather low altitude missile systems to protect critical targets, such as airfields. FRG and the UK also plan to have these systems deployed in division forward areas. There is good reason to believe that U.S. selection of one of the systems will lead to its being standardized within the NATO Alliance, thereby making a strong, positive contribution to European participation in NATO force modernization.

A low altitude air defense system with a capability during night and limited visibility conditions is needed as a complement to SAM-D in rear areas and also in corps and division areas to counter heliborne assault operations and fixed-wing aircraft attacks. The candidate foreign systems all provide this capability and studies indicate that in most scenarios one of the foreign systems is more cost effective than Improved CHAPARRAL even during clear weather conditions. It is expected that the Army's ongoing study will validate (in the 1st Quarter of FY74) the need for a low altitude air defense system with a capability during night and limited visibility conditions.

As part of our international interdependency program—which is designed to make better use of NATO R&D funds by making use of each other's developments—we have assured our NATO allies that contingent on Army tests and evaluations we plan to produce (in the U.S.) one of the three foreign-developed air defense systems. This program is being closely watched by our NATO allies. In their view, it is a test case to demonstrate our seriousness to pursue interdependency for the conservation of R&D resources. Any unnecessary further delay in this program will be interpreted as a weakening of our resolve.

In summary, the three foreign systems all appear to be excellent candidates to improve

our low altitude air defense capability during clear daylight, night, and limited visibility conditions. Results of the Army's ongoing study to address requirement for a low altitude capability during night and limited visibility conditions will not be available until after the Senate Armed Services Committee action on the FY74 Authorization Bill. Delay of program initiation until FY75 would seriously disrupt a program to fulfill a critical requirement and adversely affect interdependency program efforts. Due to program delays, it is recommended that the requested FY74 budget of \$19.5M be reduced to \$7M and be retained to initiate this program.

Sincerely,

MALCOLM R. CURRIE.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I want to touch on other things. I want the Senate to know where the statistics that deal with this argument have been coming from. They have not been coming from the corporation that has an interest. They have not been coming from the Pentagon—God bless them—because they still have an interest. They have come from our aim—the Comptroller General.

Let us look at the time schedule. The GAO report specifies, on page 8, that we have had a 76-month delay. I do not know where the other side has found the argument that we are on schedule, but at least the Comptroller General, when he looked at all the facts, came to the conclusion that we are 76 months behind time. That is worse than the delay for any other weapon system we have ever had—76 months behind time.

So far as personnel costs have been concerned, we have had many discussions about them. I want to read not what BIRCH BAYH says, but what the General Accounting Office, our investigator, says:

The Army is planning for fewer personnel—

Then there is a blackout for security reasons.

for the SAM-D system than for the currently deployed force—

Another blank—
of the improved Hawk and the Nike-Hercules systems.

The DCP repeats the smaller manpower estimate but states:

Replenishment spares and maintenance and overhead costs of the SAM-D mission equipment will cost operating costs per battery to be greater than improved Hawk, offsetting the cost advantage of fewer personnel.

It then goes on to say that:

There would be an additional life-cycle cost increment of \$2.2 billion for the field army in spite of the fewer personnel programmed for . . .

It also goes on in the same report to say that in addition to the SAM-D "the improved Hawk deployment would have to be continued with an associated increase in cost and personnel to provide adequate defense from 1980 to 1990."

So far as the total costs are concerned, we have already given the GAO's analysis of the cost overrun. We have had an increase in the cost of this program this year of \$104 million, and we are buying 68 percent fewer fire sections and 52 percent fewer missiles. That is how

we get the figure of a 350 percent overrun. We are buying more to get less than half of what we initially contracted for.

I apologize to the Senate for taking this much time, but it seems to me we should ask ourselves whether we are not paying too much. Just as the Army came up with a better battle tank when we denied them funds for battle tanks; just as they came up with a better and less expensive helicopter when we did the same thing with respect to the Cheyenne; I am confident that if we cut off funds for the SAM-D missile, they are going to come up with a better missile and a cheaper missile and in the meantime, for the foreseeable future, we have, by their own admission, the Improved Hawk, which is fully capable to meet the threat.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes.

In approximately May 1972 the GAO had been making an investigation of Army defense. It filed a report in May 1973.

I ask unanimous consent to include in the RECORD excerpts from pages 3159 through 3163 of the hearings of the Armed Services Committee on S. 1236, which is an item-by-item reply by DOD to GAO criticism.

There being no objection, the excerpts were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Question. The following questions or statements are based upon the GAO report on SAM-D. Will you comment on each?

The Department of Defense did not adequately apply the criteria established in its own regulations in approving the SAM-D for engineering development in March 1972 because:

a. The Army's assessment of the threat in terms of quantity and quality was greater than that determined by the [deleted].

b. Definition of some performance capabilities was not well defined [deleted].

c. Critical subsystems were not tested in advanced development.

Answer. The Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) reviewed the SAM-D program prior to entry into engineering development. This included reviewing the postulated Soviet tactical aircraft threat for a target year of 1985. The quantity of this threat, displayed in DCP #50, is comparable [deleted] difference) to that postulated in the ADEB study. As a result of the performance capabilities established during previous studies and EDD, and in response to the ADEB QMR and the MN, the system is being designed to "maintain the option to add a nuclear warhead and the [deleted]. A risk analysis developed for the DSARC showed SAM-D to be a low-to-medium risk program due to the highly successful results of a 4½ year advanced development program. The 1970 decision to delay the Guided Test Vehicle (GTV) flights originally planned to conclude the advanced development program is still considered to be a sound decision. The results of captive flight tests and simulations used to test the TVM guidance showed this area to be a low-to-medium risk. The Army continues to feel that the proper decision was made in terms of program risk and cost. [Additional classified information was furnished to the committee separately.]

Question. The penalties in performance against the primary air-supported threat and the additional complexity and cost associated with the [deleted] capability were not identified.

Answer. [Deleted] capability is inherent in the present design. [Deleted.] The system has the capability to handle the velocities

and radar cross sections of the [deleted] threat, to incorporate the increased computer capacity needed, to allow interchange of warheads, and to accommodate necessary PAL devices. No other system requirements are driven by the [deleted] role as the performance obtained is derived from the requirements against aircraft.

[Additional classified information was furnished to the committee separately.]

Question. The Army's Air Defense Evaluation Board's (ADEB) study of tactical air defense requirements concluded that "either the Improved Hawk or the SAM-D weapon system is capable of providing an adequate defense" (setting aside considerations of cost).

Answer. The statement regarding the adequacy of SAM-D and Improved Hawk's capability is a statement of quality meaning that either system has the physical capability to counter the threat vehicles which were used in the ADEB study. However, the study further concluded that the [deleted] system would be required to provide a credible and adequate air defense. This latter factor led to the study conclusion that life-cycle cost of SAM-D is 30 percent of the life-cycle cost of an equally effective deployment of Improved Hawk.

Question. The ADEB reports state that it was determined that no reasonably-sized air defense force could adequately defend the surface-to-surface missile units. They were thus excluded from further consideration as a criteria.

Answer. The ADEB identified [deleted] critical field army asset categories for which a damage threshold was established. A 15 percent threshold was applied to [deleted]. Analysis of the computer results indicated that the [deleted]. Consequently, this target category was removed from the calculation of adequate air defense force levels. Since minimum acceptable damage criteria were met for all the other assets, increasing the SAM-D or Improved Hawk force level solely for [deleted] defense was not considered justified. Operational procedures and passive defensive measures were recommended by the ADEB to further decrease the vulnerability of SSM sites.

[Additional classified information was furnished to the committee separately.]

Question. On a force level basis, however, vulnerability should be measured by the fraction of force that survives. By this measure SAM-D is inferior to Hawk at low altitude, losing [deleted] percent of its forces to [deleted] percent for Hawk. At medium altitude, SAM-D's best operating regime, it loses [deleted] percent compared to [deleted] percent for Hawk. These loss rates were obtained during the first raid. Extended over a 30-day period the losses should be substantially greater.

Answer. Although SAM-D, or any other ground based air defense system, may be expected to lose a portion of its units during a severe saturation raid, SAM-D would be extremely costly to the enemy since he would have to commit a much larger force to compensate for the high attrition rate [deleted] during the raid. Each SAM-D fire section can engage [deleted] targets simultaneously and concurrently prepare for follow-on engagements. This high rate of fire extracts a severe toll from the attacking force. Attrition rates of this magnitude would provide a deterrence.

SAM-D has been designed from inception to survive on the battlefield. Its capability to counter suppression tactics combined with passive defensive measures such as, [deleted] will enhance its survivability.

Question. The Army concluded that the [deleted] percent attrition rate inflicted on the attacking aircraft was the overriding factor in determining air defense system force levels and the [deleted] percent damage

limiting criteria for AD units was not a driving factor.

Answer. The criterion established for air defense units was based on the air defense forces capability to limit damage to the other field army assets to an acceptable level. In adequately protecting the field army assets, if the air defense losses were somewhat greater than [deleted] percent this was considered acceptable in view of the very high (about [deleted] percent) attrition rate of enemy aircraft.

[Additional classified information was furnished to the committee separately.]

Question. Although major weapon systems are not to be moved into engineering development until technical uncertainties are resolved, the potentially problematic track-via-missile guidance system which has no operational precedent, was never flight tested and the critical warhead-fusing interface will not begin flight testing until 1974.

Answer. The 1970 decision, to delay the Guided Test Vehicle (GTV) flights originally planned to conclude the advanced development program, is still considered to be a sound decision. The results of captive flight tests and simulations used to test the TVM guidance showed this area to be a low-to-medium risk. It was originally planned that GTV guidance equipment would conform closely to prototype requirements. As the program progressed it became apparent that the GTV equipment could not be identical to that required for a prototype system. Guidance section packaging had not been sufficiently miniaturized to permit installation in allocated space. Some guidance equipment was, therefore, contained within space allocated to armament components. This was possible because there was no intent to develop or test armament components such as the warhead and fuze during ADDEV. Much production or packaging engineering remained to be accomplished during Engineering Development. This lack of close identity between the GTVs and the prototype guidance systems was viewed as a technical support to the general agreement that the proposal to redirect the program should be implemented.

Influenced by the technical, schedule, and cost environment, the GTV deletion is considered to be a desirable move from a total development program point of view since overall costs were reduced and a shorter overall development cycle was possible.

Question. Although testing of the guidance system through actual missile flight would have cost an estimated \$35 million, we believe such tests would have minimized associated risks during engineering development. Fuzing problems have plagued other missile programs and the much faster SAM-D missile will require much quicker fuze sensing.

Answer. The captive flight tests and simulations give confidence that the guidance components will function properly. There was no intent to develop or test armament components such as the warhead and fuze in the GTVs. There are no currently recognized technical problems which would have been discovered if the GTVs had been fired.

Question. Other uncertainties are yet to be resolved. Studies are continuing, for example, to determine how to provide the SAM-D with 360 degree radar coverage [deleted].

Answer. In the tactical deployment of SAM-D, there are three basic considerations which will be exploited to provide "blind side" defense. These are:

(1) Mutual Support: there will be many SAM-D fire sections in the defended area. These sections will be so arranged that each fire section is within the engagement sector of one or more other fire sections.

(2) Complementing Air Defense: the Army's Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) systems such as Vulcan, Chaparral, Stinger, etc., will be deployed in areas where masking by prominent terrain will not allow mutual support by another SAM-D.

(3) Trainability of the SAM-D Radar: The SAM-D radar will be capable of [deleted]. This allows quick reaction to targets approaching from the "Blind side" when these targets have been detected by either another SAM-D radar, a SHORAD unit or some other source.

By deploying the SAM-D Fire Sections with the above factors in mind, the possibility of a "blind side" attack can be practically eliminated. Field experience has shown with Hawk for example, that while the radar is normally limited to [deleted] coverage or less due to terrain limitations, deployment with these same above considerations can provide an all around defense capability.

[Additional classified information was furnished to the committee separately.]

Question. Both the Improved Hawk and the SAM-D are justified for their superior capability in an intense electronic countermeasure environment. In this severe ECM environment used by ADEB, the Army concluded that either the Improved Hawk or the SAM-D would be adequate to counter the anticipated threat when deployed in sufficient numbers.

Answer. It is true that ADEB concluded that Improved Hawk in sufficient numbers would be adequate to counter the anticipated threat of the 1980's. The ADEB also concluded that this would necessitate proliferation of Improved Hawk to [deleted] battalions as opposed to the presently planned [deleted] battalions of SAM-D.

Question. Because of the prolonged time required to reload the launchers, DOD officials have acknowledged the SAM-D will be vulnerable to follow-on enemy attack. The Army SAM-D project manager informed us that the Army is aware of this deficiency and studies are underway to determine the cost of either faster reloading or additional launchers.

Answer. The Army is in the process of conducting a stockpile-to-target sequence study to determine the optimum means of providing missile reload capabilities to the fire section in the field. A number of reload options are being evaluated in the study. In an option discussed previously, there could be a battery reload area a short distance from the firing position. Two A-frames, one for removal of the spent cannisters and one for the installations of ready missiles, can be set up. Once a launcher has fired its missile it moves to the reload area and can be reloaded in about [deleted]. Also in the area will be vehicles to transport the battery supply of missiles. The 5-ton wrecker option will be retained to accomplish reload of SAM-D launchers in the firing position since single round replacement is also a requirement.

Depletion of the basic load of missiles leaves the firing section vulnerable in the absence of an immediate resupply of missiles. However, the SAM-D system has two advantages. First, the near real time exchange of data and commands between the fire section and the battalion command and control group provides the battalion commander with means whereby he can distribute engagements between fire sections, thereby reserving some missiles for self-defense of the fire section when and as deemed necessary. Secondly, the SAM-D fire section can march order in [deleted] and, by vacating the firing position, protect itself from follow-on enemy attack.

[Additional classified information was furnished to the committee separately.]

Question. The Army expects the revised DCP to be finalized by March 1, 1973.

a. What significant facts are reflected which may affect the engineering development program as presently pursued, milestone schedules, quantities or costs?

b. If completed, will you provide a copy for Committee use?

Answer. The Army recommended to DOD that page 20 of the DCP be revised to reflect

the 7 December 1972, Army Chief of Staff decision regarding the SAM-D Nuclear and Antimissile Capability Study to include an update of procurement unit cost estimates due to decreases in planned procurements. All significant facts which affected the engineering development program were reflected in the 31 December 1972 Selected Acquisition Report. DDR&E has elected not to revise the DCP until after the next OSD Program Review to be held not later than 13 July 1973.

Question. In postulating the threat to the 7th Army, the ADEB assumed a buildup of U.S. ground forces in Europe by [deleted] to [deleted] divisions by [deleted] and a responding Warsaw Pact increase in the number of tactical aircraft by [deleted]. Is this consistent with the present strength under approved NATO contingency plans?

Answer. Yes. The buildup of U.S. and Warsaw Pact forces assumed by the ADEB was based on a scenario which depicted an increase in tension between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. One should not conclude that the U.S. perceives an increase in tension, but rather what would be the corresponding responses if there were an increase in tension. The probability of a conflict between the Warsaw Pact and NATO is hopefully minimal, but there are various situations which could lead to a change in the current detente. Our forces must be prepared for that eventuality. Under current plans to reinforce U.S. forces committed in NATO, total U.S. divisions are increased to [deleted] assuming mobilization. Plans call for the ultimate assignment of [deleted] to support NATO if a conflict occurs.

[Additional information is classified and was furnished to the committee separately.]

Question. The total number of Soviet aircraft postulated for ADEB was [deleted] more than the number estimated by [deleted] in 1970 for the comparable period.

Answer. All [deleted] projections, as well as those of the ADEB, are based upon assumptions. The [deleted] projections are not a response to a war in Europe but plausible projections of aircraft inventories assuming a relative status quo in international environment. The numbers and types of aircraft employed in ADEB are a reasonable response if we went to war and had the two year build-up as the scenario indicated. The numbers and the type characteristics were tempered by product amortizing.

The differences should be addressed by each category and/or type of aircraft. There is a difference of [deleted].

[Additional classified information was furnished to the committee separately.]

Question. The ADEB assumed [deleted] times more future models, (Foxbat, Advanced VGW fighter, advanced tactical fighter), than [deleted].

Answer. ADEB projections were predicated upon a two year political, economic and production response to a rise in international tension as depicted in the scenario utilized. The ADEB study group, in close coordination with the intelligence community, estimated that in response to the before mentioned parameters, Warsaw Pact production lines could be reasonably estimated to produce [deleted] under current status quo production with no increase in political or economic tension.

[Classified information was furnished to the committee separately.]

Question. Future models are assumed by the Army to have [deleted] times more damage capability than current models.

Answer. Damage capability and further damage effectiveness include the functions of the type ordnance, delivery angles/altitudes and quantity of ordnance. Each of the future model aircraft are [deleted]. The aircraft utilized for the ADEB study were loaded by type mission, directly from the [deleted] approved ordnance handbook and the dam-

age results computed using the Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual.

Question. In establishing the requirement for the SAM-D in the rear area, the ADEB considered also many more medium bombers with larger payloads than [deleted] estimated, to attack high priority targets such as U.S. airbases [deleted] lists Badger, Blinder and Backfire only in [deleted] units and assesses that these bombers would be held in [deleted] conflict. The preceding assumptions by ADEB appear to have resulted in an overstatement of the aircraft threat when compared to the [deleted] estimate at that time.

Answer. [Deleted] estimates that only about [deleted] would be retained as strategic withhold aircraft and that the remaining [deleted] excluding the Backfire, are expected to [deleted]. During the ADEB these aircraft were ordinance loaded and flight programmed utilizing approved [deleted] guidance. This [deleted] does not result in any overstatement of aircraft threat or threat capability.

Question. Your operational cost savings comparing SAM-D with Hercules and Improved Hawk are expressed in terms of a battery or fire section. How do these compare when SAM-D is fully deployed in Europe for a total SAM-D force? What is the total of the other missile forces?

Answer. The annual operating cost as shown is an average cost for the SAM-D fire section per year in a field army environment. The total annual operating cost would depend upon the number of SAM-D fire sections deployed to Europe. For example, comparing current Hercules and Hawk units in Europe to planned SAM-D peacetime deployment shows annual savings of approximately 40 million dollars. (The SAM-D force would be far more effective.) [Deleted.] Total field army missile force to include costs, show that SAM-D will save approximately 63 million dollars a year. [Deleted.]

[Additional classified information was furnished to the committee separately.]

Mr. MCINTYRE. I might say that this 1-year study by GAO, according to the final word we have at the staff level of GAO, resulted in their feeling today that SAM-D has promise and will be a significant improvement as long as it proves itself technically, and we are proceeding to prove it technically this year and next.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I do not know to whom my friend or his staff are talking at GAO. I have talked to a military testing expert who was afraid he would be fired if his name was made known. I have talked to a former expert in DOD systems analysis.

I do not know where these other experts are coming from, but I want to say the statistics which will be put in the RECORD were published on June 20, 1973, in an unclassified version, and that is from the experts of GAO that I have related to. They are still working there. They are still charged with that responsibility and they still stand by that report.

I yield back my time, if the Senator from New Hampshire will yield back his.

I want to compliment him for the dedication he has brought to the study of our defense budget. I disagree with him on this particular issue, but I want the record to show I really appreciate the effort he has made to try to make us more aware of the kind of money we are spending and where. Hopefully, this debate will lead in the same direction.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, I congratulate the Senator and urge him to join the Armed Services Committee. We need his talents there. It is a difficult and

tough job. We can certainly use his expertise.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. MCINTYRE. I yield.

Mr. HARTKE. Is this the pamphlet we are talking about on SAM-D?

Mr. MCINTYRE. Yes.

Mr. HARTKE. Who paid for the pamphlet?

Mr. MCINTYRE. The Army paid for the pamphlet.

Mr. HARTKE. I thank the Senator.

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, it seems to me the problem we are addressing here is a rather simple one—and that is, do we really need SAM-D and is it worth the dollars we are being asked to expend to get it?

It is my understanding that this system is to replace two existing systems, improved Hawk and Nike Hercules. A significant step forward—utilizing the latest technology to build a new system from the ground up rather than just continue to improve existing systems. In fact, Mr. President, we have reached the end of our rope in improving Hawk and Hercules.

Basic Hawk has provided air defense for the U.S. forces for 12 years and improved Hawk will have to be in service for about 16 years before it can be completely phased out—a total of 28 years for the Hawk system. Nike Hercules, having begun defending U.S. forces in 1958 and scheduled to remain until the mid-1980's, will have been in the inventory over 25 years—a tribute to the original technology and the ability of the men maintaining and operating such a system.

What we are offered now is a chance to have a new system with greatly increased potential for adjustment to future changes in the threat.

I am by no means a technician, but even I can understand the problems involved in replacing parts in old tube-type TV's and radios—even our automotive industry has gone to integrated circuitry in their ignition systems. The improved Hawk and Hercules are a mixture of old technologies—mostly tubes, some transistors and very few integrated circuits. A highly reliable missile, with predominately solid state circuitry, hardly helps when one cannot get replacement tubes to keep its target-finding ground-based radar operating.

SAM-D will provide us a system with consistency—the latest microelectronic technology—on the battlefield. Highly reliable, easy to maintain, and manned by fewer personnel, it offers significant savings in operating costs.

The key point about getting this technology into service for us is that we will have taken a giant step up the curve of flexibility and growth potential. No one knows for sure what the enemy air threat will be in 1985—12 years from now. We have those that believe the threat postulated for SAM-D is too severe and was more or less ginned up to support the program; however, there are others who claim SAM-D will be vulnerable to various threats they postulate for the 1980's.

The message here is that we had better have some flexibility to adjust to whatever that threat turns out to be.

The only flexibility we have left with Hawk and Hercules is to increase their numbers which is certainly not a cost effective approach. The only logical answer to me is to continue the development of SAM-D which we have already spent 10 years on and give ourselves the opportunity to field a system that can adjust to a changing threat for a good number of years. Therefore, Mr. President, I oppose the amendment and urge my colleagues to do the same.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, I am prepared to yield back the remainder of our time.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The question is on agreeing to the amendments, en bloc, of the Senator from Indiana. On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. McCLELLAN), the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. ERVIN), and the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) are necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from Iowa (Mr. CLARK) is absent because of a death in the family.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Iowa (Mr. CLARK) would vote "yea."

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. ERVIN) would vote "nay."

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Oregon (Mr. PACKWOOD) is necessarily absent.

I further announce that the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) is absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Kansas (Mr. PEARSON) is absent because of illness.

The Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BARTLETT) is detained on official business.

I further announce that the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) is absent for religious observance.

I further announce that the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) is absent by leave of the Senate.

On this vote, the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) is paired with the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY). If present and voting, the Senator from New York would vote "yea" and the Senator from Illinois would vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 34, nays 56, as follows:

[No. 430 Leg.]

YEAS—34

Abourezk	Hart	Moss
Bayh	Hartke	Muskie
Bible	Haskell	Nelson
Biden	Hathaway	Proxmire
Burdick	Hollings	Randolph
Cannon	Hughes	Saxbe
Case	Humphrey	Stevenson
Church	Mansfield	Symington
Cranston	Mathias	Tunney
Eagleton	McGovern	Williams
Fulbright	Metcalf	
Gravel	Mondale	

NAYS—56

Aiken	Eastland	Montoya
Allen	Fannin	Nunn
Baker	Fong	Pastore
Beall	Goldwater	Pell
Bellmon	Griffin	Ribicoff
Bennett	Gurney	Roth
Bentsen	Hansen	Schweiker
Brock	Hatfield	Scott, Hugh
Brooke	Helms	Scott,
Buckley	Hruska	William L.
Byrd,	Huddleston	Sparkman
	Inouye	Staford
Harry F., Jr.	Jackson	Stevens
Byrd, Robert C.	Johnston	Talmadge
Chiles	Kennedy	Thurmond
Cook	Long	Tower
Cotton	Magnuson	Weicker
Curtis	McClure	Young
Dole	McGee	
Domenici	McIntyre	
Dominick		

NOT VOTING—10

Bartlett	McClellan	Stennis
Clark	Packwood	Taft
Ervin	Pearson	
Javits	Percy	

So Mr. BAYH's amendment was rejected.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was rejected.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HOLLINGS). Under the previous order, the Senate will proceed to the consideration of Humphrey amendment No. 549.

The clerk will report the amendment.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

At the appropriate place in the bill insert a new section as follows:

"SEC. (a) The Secretary of Defense shall take such action as may be necessary to reduce, by not less than one hundred and twenty-five thousand, the number of military forces of the United States assigned to duty in foreign countries on March 1, 1973. Such reduction shall be completed not later than June 30, 1975. Not less than thirty thousand of such reduction shall be completed not later than June 30, 1974.

"(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds may be expended on or after July 1, 1975, to support or maintain military forces of the United States assigned to duty in foreign countries if the number of such forces so assigned to such duty on or after such date exceeds a number equal to the number of such forces assigned to such duty on March 1, 1973, reduced by such number as necessary to comply with the provisions of subsection (a) of this section."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There will be 2 hours on the amendment. Who yields time?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, if the Senator from Minnesota will yield, I have discussed this request with the distinguished author of the amendment, the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY). He is willing to cut down the

time on this amendment. As it now stands, 2 hours are allotted for the amendment.

I ask unanimous consent that there be 30 minutes on the amendment to be equally divided in accordance with the usual form, that there be 10 minutes on any amendment to the amendment to be divided in accordance with the usual form, and that there be 10 minutes on any debatable motion or appeal to be equally divided in accordance with the usual form.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we are willing to have an hour on the amendment and 20 minutes on any amendment.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, what was the suggestion made by the distinguished Senator from South Carolina?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, the Senator from South Carolina suggested 1 hour on the amendment and 20 minutes on any amendment to the amendment.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I want to accommodate Senators here. I think the issue has been pretty well debated. It is on troop levels. It will not take long to state the numbers. We have stated them a number of times. Everyone wants to get out. We can make our presentations briefly.

I hope that Senators would consider our request favorably, because it is an accommodation to all of us.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Would the Senator from West Virginia restate the request?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I restate my request as follows: That there be 40 minutes on the Humphrey amendment to be equally divided and controlled in accordance with the usual form, that there be 20 minutes on any amendment to the amendment to be equally divided in accordance with the usual form, and that there be 10 minutes on any debatable motion or appeal to be equally divided in accordance with the usual form.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from West Virginia? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on my amendment.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, it is my understanding that the distinguished Senator from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS) has an amendment which has been agreed to by both the manager of the bill and the minority leader on the bill, and it will take just a moment. I want to accommodate him if he can do it quickly. I believe this is an amendment that is noncontroversial. If so, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Maryland be recognized without my losing my right to the floor to call up his amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

AMENDMENT NO. 529

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I call up my amendment No. 529.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The legislative clerk proceeded to read the amendment.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, is this an amendment to the Humphrey amendment?

Mr. MATHIAS. No, this is an amendment which is being called up by unanimous consent at this time out of order. It is an amendment which the distinguished Senator from South Carolina has reviewed, and I believe he is agreeable to it.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I withdraw my reservation.

Mr. MATHIAS' amendment (No. 529) is as follows:

On page 26, between lines 22 and 23, insert new title as follows:

TITLE VII—NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE

CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS

Sec. 701. The Congress finds that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization continues to be vital to the security of the United States and reaffirms its support of that organization.

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW

Sec. 702. In order to carry out force reductions within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization without impairing the effectiveness of military forces of that organization, and in order to strengthen congressional and public support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Alliance, the President shall undertake a thorough and continuing review of the United States forces assigned to or earmarked for the defense of the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to assure that United States forces so assigned will be employed in the most effective manner to achieve the purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Alliance. This review shall be carried out with a view to achieving the following goals: (1) an increase in the ratio of combat to support troops; (2) an improvement of the defense capabilities of United States forces assigned to or earmarked for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, at existing and future reduced levels of manpower; (3) an improvement of the effectiveness of all forces deployed for the defense of the member states of the alliance through consultations with other member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The President shall report to the Congress at the end of each six-month period regarding the results of the continuing review conducted by him pursuant to this title.

CONSULTATIONS WITH NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ALLIES

Sec. 703. The President shall, within three months after the date of enactment of this Act, enter into continuing consultations with other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to (1) determine the level of United States forces required on the European continent for the defense of the alliance; (2) establish orderly procedures within the alliance for reductions of United States forces deployed in Europe; and (3) restructure the organization of North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces to take into account reductions made by the United States and other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in their armed forces.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE WARSAW PACT TREATY ORGANIZATION

Sec. 704. The President is requested to undertake negotiations with the Warsaw Treaty

Organization, in concert with other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to bring about a mutual and balanced reduction of forces deployed in Europe by both organizations.

EXPANSION OF NATO BASE

Sec. 705. The President, with other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is requested to make every effort to broaden the base of cooperation and understanding within the alliance, and to pursue accommodation and agreement with the nations of Western Europe on critical economic and political matters, including trade, monetary, and energy matters.

Mr. MATHIAS. The amendment was printed last week. I offer it on behalf of myself and the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY). I believe the distinguished Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) has also had a chance to look at it. Members of the Senate have had the weekend and this week to review it. I think the staffs are probably familiar with it. It deals with NATO processes, and unless there is further discussion, I move the adoption of the amendment.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, may we be told what the amendment does?

Mr. MATHIAS. The amendment, very briefly, provides for a series of processes by which the President and the Department of Defense may review the arrangements and deployment of troops under the NATO treaty, and, in concert with our allies, looking toward the most efficient, effective, economical deployment of our troops. It is a study of the process, and one which is entirely consistent with the MBR plan and with the administration policy in this area.

Mr. President, the overwhelming majority of the Congress supports the NATO Alliance. The NATO Alliance is a treaty commitment which is agreed by most in the Congress as vital to the security of the United States. Senator MANSFIELD, and I am sure, most of my colleagues who supported his amendment yesterday for troop reductions, continue to support the NATO Alliance and its purpose of common defense in the event of attack. But the Mansfield amendment is a clear and unmistakable message that many in the Congress now believe that past perceptions of the threat, and in particular military strategies and military deployments have not kept pace with present realities. We are, for the moment at least, in a period of détente. The Secretary of State and the President have negotiated the beginnings of what could be a period of understanding and peace between the great superpowers of the world. There is a lessening of tensions. There is lessening cause for fear of sudden attack. But it would be foolish to suggest that we can be certain that détente will continue or that dangers do not remain.

It is in this spirit, and with these thoughts in mind that we ask the Senate to support the amendment Senator KENNEDY and I have introduced. The purpose of this amendment is to direct the President to undertake continuing efforts to prepare for reductions and adjustments in the NATO military structure, as well as the entire North Atlantic

Treaty Organization, in the event that the present climate of détente continues and should the prospects for peace now evident be strengthened.

Specifically, the amendment directs the President to prepare for future NATO military reductions in concert with our allies, but at the same time to make adjustments in our military deployment posture which would remove present glaring inadequacies such as the maldeployments in the central German plain and an obviously too fat logistic tail. The amendment further directs the President to continue efforts to achieve mutual reductions with the Warsaw Pact and to undertake efforts to broaden the base of NATO in matters of trade, energy and other aspects of economic and social relations between the member nations.

Changes in military posture do take time. If we made a decision today to reduce troops, it would be several years before such reductions could be carried out in their entirety. While there are obvious difficulties in making reductions in our forces at this time, it is agreed by most, including the Pentagon, that reductions can be made now in U.S. forces that would not adversely affect MBFR negotiations; reductions could be made which would not undercut the principle that actions affecting NATO should be taken only in concert with our allies.

We have severe budgetary and balance-of-payments problems. The Jackson-Nunn-Percy amendment which the Senate supported 84 to 5 is recognition of a common awareness in the Senate of the necessity to share the cost burdens. But this amendment is a warning too, that present military arrangements are not satisfactory in the light of the existing conditions of détente, and most important, they are not satisfactory from a point of view of our military needs. For over 10 years the change in the nature of the threat to NATO, the weakening of common purpose, and certainly, the glaring reality of military maldeployments, have been evident to the world. This amendment, we believe, in an orderly and reasonable way, directs the President to take steps to remedy these shortcomings and weaknesses in the NATO Alliance and to meet the challenges that détente poses for NATO and the U.S. defense posture.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MATHIAS. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, the distinguished ranking minority member of the committee and I have looked at the amendment and discussed it with the authors, and we are prepared to accept it on this side.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the amendment is merely for a study, and we see no objection to it.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, for more than 20 years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has provided the underpinnings of security on the continent of Europe. Throughout these years, the United States has remained committed to this alliance, to the defense of Europe, and to the spirit of community and common purpose among free nations which NATO symbolizes. We have maintained strong military forces in the con-

tinent; and as a Nation we are prepared to retain forces there at the level needed for as long as needed.

Today, however, conditions in Europe are changing. There is mutual deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union; there is détente in a host of areas; and there are major efforts underway, involving every nation in Europe, to seize opportunities for moving beyond the postwar era of confrontation. Here in the United States, as well, there is growing concern to draw the conflicts of the past to a close, and to build new relations between East and West that can permit reductions in the level of military forces deployed for Europe's defense.

Many ideas have been advanced to bring about a reduction in American forces committed to NATO; some of these ideas have been debated here this week; and negotiations to bring about mutual and balanced force reductions on both sides of confrontation are scheduled to begin next month in Vienna. Yet one thing is clear; in the not-too-distant future there will be some reduction in U.S. forces stationed on the European Continent, and perhaps reductions in the forces of other nations, as well.

Mr. President, the amendment which Senator MATHIAS and I propose to the Senate today is not concerned with the timing of any force reductions, with their extent, or with the manner in which critical decisions will be reached—although it does endorse the talks on mutual and balanced force reductions. Instead, it is concerned with issues that may prove to be equally as important: namely, the preparations made within the American military services—and within NATO itself—to accommodate change in the most orderly fashion and with the least difficulty. In fact, it is my belief that following the approaches proposed in this amendment would make the entire process of reducing force levels in NATO much easier than it would be otherwise.

First, we propose that the President undertake a thorough and continuing review of all U.S. forces, at home and abroad, that are committed to the defense of the NATO alliance. This review would have three goals: First, to increase the ratio of combat to support troops; second, to improve the defense capabilities of all U.S. forces committed to NATO—whether at today's levels or at the levels that will obtain after troop reductions take place; and third, to work with our NATO allies in improving the effectiveness of all allied forces. And the results would not be circulated only within the administration, but would also be presented to Congress, where we could then better exercise our own judgment about these important matters.

I would like to be able to say that a review of this nature is not needed—that U.S. forces are now structured to provide the best defense possible in NATO. But this does not appear to be so. There is still room for reducing the level of support behind our combat soldiers, for streamlining our forces, and for improving their overall quality. This effort is important today; it will be even more important following any force reductions.

As vice chairman of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly, I have been impressed by the views of my colleagues from the parliaments of other NATO countries. They, too, are concerned that NATO forces—both now and following any force reductions—be armed and organized to provide the best defense possible. They, too, believe that there is room for improvement. I concur in the judgment reached by this committee at its last two meetings—and by the plenary sessions of the assembly itself—that individual NATO allies should undertake national reviews, along the lines of one proposed in this amendment.

Second—and more important—this amendment requires the President to enter into direct and continuing consultations with our NATO allies with regard to a wide spectrum of issues concerning the implementation of force reductions in Europe, however any decision on reductions is made. This, I believe, is a critical process, whether there are unilateral cuts in the forces of any NATO country, or East-West agreement on reductions in both halves of the continent. In either case—or any other—we in the alliance must prepare ourselves for the consequences of change.

To begin with, we need to engage our allies in discussions to determine precisely how many U.S. forces are really needed in Europe to provide for its defense and for a firm understanding and belief on the part of our allies concerning our commitment to them. This process can help all nations of the alliance to discuss and decide actual defense needs, and it can help reduce European anxieties that we will make critical decisions affecting their future without closely involving them. We may, indeed, find that some force reductions become possible by common agreement.

We also need to work with our allies well in advance of any force reductions, to establish orderly procedures for implementing the necessary adjustments in force composition, organization, and deployments.

These efforts may seem to be obvious ones that will be undertaken in the natural course of events. Yet all too often in NATO's history, critical decisions have been taken without adequate consultation or common agreement among governments. And all too often alliances find it difficult to cope with new circumstances, because they did not make adequate preparations in advance. It is easy to preach cooperation; but it is rarely easy to practice it, especially in an alliance of many nations, each with its own interests and concerns that go beyond the common objectives of alliance. We can aid the process of cooperation by undertaking now the efforts at mutual consultation set forth in this amendment.

Mr. President, I believe that working out orderly procedures now for force reductions in Europe can also facilitate those reductions without disrupting the NATO alliance or weakening its political and military strength by helping to reduce anxieties in Europe about our intentions toward NATO's defense. These anxieties are real; and they would be heightened by a haphazard process of

reducing troops. But provided that, today, the alliance can establish proper methods of carrying out any reductions, we in the United States can inspire new confidence in our allies concerning our steadfast commitment to their defense, to their efforts in détente, and to the future of their political and economic efforts.

We have precedent for these hopes. During the 1960's, the alliance was troubled over the issue of the control of American nuclear weapons pledged to deter attack on Western Europe. One proposal, the multilateral force, came to naught. In its place, the allies created the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group.

Neither of these two new organizations resolved what had been the fundamental issue; neither gave our allies a finger on the trigger of our nuclear weapons, or a thumb on the safety catch. Yet these two organizations helped to work a minor political miracle, in allaying the concerns of our allies. They did so, not by turning over to our allies the power of decision on nuclear war, but rather by taking them fully into our confidence and into our strategic planning. They had a new role to play in shaping fundamental decisions about their own future.

Today, as we in the United States are challenged to reaffirm our commitment to NATO, yet face the prospect of force reductions at some point, we owe it to ourselves and to our allies to begin a new effort to bring them fully into our confidence, into our planning and—this time—into joint decision on the best way of implementing any force reductions that may be made, by whatever means. We have nothing to lose, and much to gain in trust, confidence, and common action.

Finally, Mr. President, this amendment calls upon the President—and upon our allies in NATO—to make every effort to broaden the base of cooperation and understanding in the alliance. And it calls upon him to pursue accommodation and agreement with the nations of Western Europe on critical economic and political matters, particularly in trade, energy, and monetary relations.

This issue is critically germane to the problem of preparing for force reductions in Europe, and relates directly to the U.S. commitment to the defense of the alliance. It will profit us little to maintain a full complement of U.S. forces in Europe, if at the same time we fail to resolve other pressing problems of alliance relations that threaten to erode the basis of our common interests and understanding.

Yet if we can solve these problems—and make the adjustments that are necessary in a dynamic alliance of free nations—then we will be far better able to consider a reduction of forces. We will be advancing the cause of common effort in the alliance, and reasserting the mutual trust that is necessary if the whole issue of force reductions is not to raise tensions rather than help to lower them. Rather, we can strengthen the bonds among nations that lie at the heart of the security of all the allied states.

Mr. President, the Senate vote yesterday on the amendment offered by the

distinguished majority leader should be a warning to the administration. Although that result was reversed later in the day, it is clear that the Senate will not much longer tolerate failure by the executive branch to tailor U.S. force deployments abroad to real defense needs, and to pursue diligently negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe.

As I said yesterday in announcing my vote against the Mansfield amendment, I believe that the talks should be given a chance to succeed. But if they do not—particularly if the administration does not take steps to secure early agreement on troop cuts—then we should indeed take action here in the Congress.

Mr. President, I believe that the procedures set forth in the amendment offered today by Senator MATHIAS and myself offer the best hope of a successful resolution of this issue. It is all the more important in view of the vote yesterday on the Mansfield amendment. I commend the Mathias-Kennedy amendment to the Senate for its consideration and approval.

Mr. President, I want to emphasize that the need for this internal action by the United States is essential if we are going to achieve the basic restructuring of forces to meet the most likely contingent of a short war.

In November 1971, I proposed and the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly, followed by the Assembly itself, adopted a resolution I submitted on the need to reduce the size of our support tail.

That resolution, which I ask to be printed in the RECORD, recommended that NATO "undertake a review of the organizational structure of the member nation forces assigned to NATO, paying particular attention to the ratio of combat to support troops and to the numbers and roles of headquarters units in relation to the forces they command."

There was no comment from the NATO Secretary General on this recommendation.

As a result, last November, once more I introduced virtually an identical resolution, which I ask to be printed in the RECORD, again calling for an in-depth analysis of our force structure.

The response from the Secretary General clearly underlines the need for the amendment being put forward this afternoon.

For the Secretary General states in his comment to the Assembly:

I feel bound to point out, however, that the precise organizational structure of the forces contributed by member nations is decided by their governments in relation to the particular defence requirements of the country concerned and the financial and manpower resources available. These considerations also govern the character of the national command structure and the scale of logistic and other support provided.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the material will be printed in the RECORD.

[See exhibit 1.]

Mr. KENNEDY. Although the Senate Armed Services Committee has eloquently documented the need for this restructuring, there is nothing in the bill that

would impel the Army to undertake this review before reducing the size of forces as called for in the bill. In fact, we have received the specific comments of the Navy that rather than focus on support force reductions, they would first reduce our actual combat capabilities in response to the committee's reduction in the size of overall manpower.

The reason that I feel it is essential that a review of our forces be undertaken has been ably stated by Sir General Walter Walker, who retired last year from the British Army. He had been Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Northern Europe, prior to his retirement.

General Walker told the North Atlantic Assembly—

NATO should produce statistics to show what an overstuffed, and overstuffed military organization the nations now possess. The figures relating 1972 with, say, 1942, are quite fantastic.

What is wanted is more value for money, and less jobs for the boys. More sharp teeth in the mouth and less length in the tail.

More rationalization and interdependence, instead of independence. There is a great need for much more standardization.

So you see gentlemen, there are many, many ways of improving our conventional capability, without having to incur excessive additional expenditures on defense.

With regard to the United States, General Walker was referring to the following: Of the 313,000 spaces allotted to Europe, only 153,000 are allotted to the 4 1/3 divisions that form the conventional combat capability of the U.S. Army in Europe. Of those divisions, only 65,000 actually hold defined combat roles. The remaining men are in either initial support elements or sustaining support elements.

What has occurred is that each division contains a combat force of some 16,000 men including I might note, its own internal support elements of some 7,000 men. The 16,000-man combat division is backed up by an initial support element of some 16,000 men and then in half of the divisions there is an additional sustaining support element of another 16,000 men.

And so we have a situation where support troops support the support troops.

But that is not all. For in addition to the 153,000 men assigned to the division forces in Europe, there are another 50,000 men assigned to the Army. And more than 30,000 of those are in support and administrative roles.

The remaining 110,000 men in Europe, are assigned to the Air Force and to the U.S. 6th Fleet. They too have command support units of their own.

I would emphasize that these figures do not even take account of the specific imbalance in our command structure where we have 9,500 headquarters staff in Europe. In the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, there are 31 generals and admirals, 141 colonels, and Navy captains and 332 lieutenant colonels and Navy commanders. What this means is that we have one headquarters staff for every 32 men assigned to Europe. We have far more generals and admirals than we did at the time we were deeply engaged in the Second World War.

For all of these reasons, I think it is essential that we streamline our forces.

EXHIBIT 1

RECOMMENDATION 11
ON THE MOST EFFICIENT USE OF MILITARY
MANPOWER

Presented by the Military Committee

The Assembly, Considering that the most efficient use of the available manpower of NATO forces will promote the defense objectives of NATO and the security of Europe;

Considering that the most efficient use of the available manpower of NATO forces will promote the defense objectives of NATO and the security of Europe;

Considering that there are different organizational structures within the military forces of the different member nations;

Considering that it would be desirable for any changes in force by any member country of NATO to be made in conjunction with a reorganization of the remaining forces;

Recommends to the Defense Planning Committee of NATO that:

(a) it should undertake a review of the organizational structure of the member nation forces assigned to NATO, paying particular attention to the ratio of combat to support troops and to the numbers and roles of headquarter units in relation to the forces they command;

(b) it should recommend possible steps each nation might take to reorganize its forces in order to achieve an improved capability for the defence of Europe;

(c) it should report on the results of allocating NATO Headquarters and SHAPE in the Brussels area and, according to its findings, recommend next steps to improve their efficiency.

RECOMMENDATION 20

On the Efficiency of Armed Forces¹

The Assembly,

Recalling Recommendation 10 adopted at the Seventeenth Annual Session at Ottawa;

Recalling Recommendation 11 adopted at the Seventeenth Annual Session at Ottawa;

Considering that the North Atlantic Council's reaction to these recommendations has been disturbingly vague;

Considering that the urgency of these matters is even stronger than in 1971 as negotiations are soon to begin in Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations between members of the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact;

Reaffirms Recommendations 10 and 11 adopted at Ottawa in September 1971;

Recommends the Defense Planning Committee of NATO to investigate, as a matter of urgency, the possibility of reducing the number of separate fully-fledged national armed services, in order to make, through gradual integration and a new division of labour, North Atlantic defence more effective as well as to obtain better value for money;

Recommends that the Defence Planning Committee of NATO:

(a) should undertake a review of the organizational structure of the forces of member nations assigned to NATO, paying particular attention to the ratio of combat to support troops and to the numbers and roles of headquarter units in relation to the forces they command;

(b) should recommend possible steps each nation might take to reorganize its forces in order to achieve an improved capability for the defence of Europe;

(c) should report on the results of allocating NATO Headquarters and SHAPE in the Brussels area and, according to its findings, recommend steps which could according to its findings, recommend steps which could be taken, in the near future, to improve their efficiency.

¹ Presented by the Military Committee.

COMMENT ON RECOMMENDATION 20 OF THE
EFFICIENCY OF ARMED FORCES

1. Member countries of the Defence Planning Committee welcome the spirit which inspires this Recommendation and fully recognize the pressing need to make North Atlantic defence more effective as well as to obtain better value for money spent.

2. As to the first part of this Recommendation, it should be pointed out that measures designed to further integrate armed services and to arrive at a more balanced division of defence tasks among member countries would require careful analytical study in which a number of considerations would have to be taken into account. Thus, special weight should be given to the criterion of improved efficiency: it should be established whether important economies would result while maintaining an undiminished defence capability of the Alliance as a whole. At the same time, however, I may recall that I said on the subject last year, namely that a redistribution of defence task among member countries presupposes a degree of political harmonization not yet attained and unlikely to emerge in the near future.

3. As to the second part of this Recommendation, I feel bound to point out, however, that the precise organizational structure of the forces contributed by member nations is decided by their governments in relation to the particular defence requirements of the country concerned and the financial and manpower resources available. These considerations also govern the character of the national command structure and the scale of logistic and other support provided.

4. Nevertheless, it is one of the prime purposes of the annual NATO Defence Review to ensure that the force contributions of each country are regularly reviewed in relation to the needs of NATO as a whole, and that the available resources of the Alliance are as far as possible allocated in the optimum manner in support of the common defence. In addition, the original "AD 70 Study" and the subsequent follow-on reports have concentrated on the combat effectiveness of NATO forces, and have recommended a number of qualitative improvements, many of which are now being implemented.

5. The Military Committee and the Major NATO Commanders have also under constant review the military efficiency of the forces assigned or earmarked to NATO command and are in regular contact with national Ministries of Defence on the subject of measures for improving their capability. As to the particular problem of Military Headquarters, a special sub-committee of the Military Committee is now reviewing the manpower needs of all NATO Headquarters.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HOLINGS). The question is on agreeing to the amendment (No. 529) of the Senator from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 549

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, the amendment now before us is one cosponsored by a number of our colleagues: Mr. CRANSTON, Mr. MUSKIE, Mr. MATHIAS, Mr. STEVENSON, Mr. BENTSEN, Mr. EAGLETON, Mr. McGOVERN, Mr. METCALF, Mr. PROXIMIRE, Mr. NELSON, Mr. SCHWEIKER, Mr. CANNON, Mr. HASKELL, Mr. TUNNEY, Mr. ABOUREZK, Mr. CLARK, Mr. CHURCH, Mr. MONDALE, and Mr. FULBRIGHT.

The purpose is, No. 1, that the Secretary of Defense shall take such action as may be necessary to reduce by no less than 125,000 the number of military forces of the United States assigned to duty in foreign countries on March 1, 1973, and that such reduction shall be

completed not later than June 30, 1975. Not less than 30,000 of such reduction shall be completed not later than June 30, 1974.

That is the purpose. It is a 125,000-man force reduction, 30,000 of them by June 30, 1974, and the remainder by June 30, 1975. There is no other purpose.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order, so that we can hear the Senator.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. CANNON. Does that figure equate to approximately 22 percent, as distinguished from the 40 percent reduction that the Mansfield amendment would have entailed?

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct.

Mr. CANNON. I thank the Senator.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I do not think I need to make any further debate. This falls within the troop reduction limit of the committee bill, which is 156,000. This is not for additional reductions; it simply means that there shall be a reduction within the next 2-year period of 125,000 troops, which would come primarily from the Pacific areas and scattered places. This is not designed to weaken our NATO force or forces in Western Europe. I have fought consistently to prevent that, and the purpose of this amendment is surely not in any way to weaken our position in upcoming negotiations with the Soviet Union on mutual balanced force reduction.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Maine.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I am pleased to join my colleagues in cosponsoring this compromise amendment on U.S. troop reductions abroad.

Yesterday, the Senate passed—then defeated—Senator MANSFIELD's modified amendment which would have required an overall reduction of about 190,000 land-based forces abroad over a 3-year period. The compromise amendment which we are considering today would require a reduction of about 125,000 over a 2-year period. I am hopeful that a majority of the Senate will be able to support this provision.

Many Senators have expressed their concern that we not make substantial unilateral troop reductions in Europe at the very time that we are commencing negotiations with the Soviet Union on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR). I share that concern. While I am skeptical that these negotiations will ever achieve significant reductions, I do believe we should give our negotiators a reasonable chance to do what they can in this direction. So I am opposed to large-scale unilateral troop cuts in Europe.

The Mansfield amendment which we considered yesterday concerned U.S. troop reductions worldwide—not simply in Europe. The Defense Department would have been given flexibility in choosing where reductions should be made. If it were deemed advisable to avoid large cuts in Europe, that would

have been possible—and it would even have been possible to avoid any European cuts at all for the next 2 years.

So the Mansfield amendment did provide considerable flexibility in setting priorities for a U.S. force presence overseas. I was therefore able to support Senator MANSFIELD's amendment yesterday, even though I had voted against his amendments on European troop reductions in the past. I might add that I was privileged to have Senator MANSFIELD testify on this issue before my Arms Control Subcommittee last July 25. I think he has made an extraordinary contribution to the debate on U.S. force levels abroad—in the detailed, scholarly analysis which he presented to my subcommittee, as well as in his presentation to the full Senate yesterday.

Mr. President, the compromise amendment before us today is a more moderate approach designed to point us in the direction of significant overseas reductions without necessarily touching our force levels in Europe at all. It is well to recall that in Asia and the Pacific our forces number over 225,000 today. This amendment would have the effect of continuing to lower the U.S. profile in Asia—as we lessen our commitments in accordance with the Nixon doctrine. The amendment would not end the U.S. role in Asia, but simply cut back our military presence. For example, I believe that significant withdrawals could be made from Thailand, where we had 45,000 troops at the end of March 1973, South Korea, 42,000; Japan and the Ryukyu Islands, 58,000; without jeopardizing our existing commitments.

Mr. President, it may be helpful to review the worldwide U.S. commitment of forces abroad. The United States has about 600,000 troops abroad in 1,963 bases, installations and properties abroad. Former Defense Secretary Elliott Richardson termed 322 of these as significant bases. Accompanying these troops are 365,413 military and civilian dependents. In addition, the Defense Department employs over 160,000 direct hire and indirect hire foreign civilians plus 78,870 U.S. civilians outside the United States.

The cost of these overseas commitments is staggering. The distinguished majority leader estimates that the total cost of all U.S. troops committed to overseas missions is about \$30 billion with equipment, personnel costs and installation maintenance combined. At least one-third of our current serious balance-of-payments deficit results from military expenditures abroad. The economic report of the President earlier this year set the net negative U.S. balance-of-payments deficit for all fiscal year 1972 military transactions at \$3.6 billion.

Moreover, Mr. President, it should be pointed out that most of the deployments were made in a world situation very different from the one we find ourselves in today. The recent visit of Chairman Brezhnev to Washington only highlighted the changing world situation. The administration has moved significantly toward détente with both the Soviet Union and China. Last year the United

States and the U.S.S.R. signed the SALT accords limiting offensive and defensive weapons systems. Our trade with Russia and China has climbed dramatically in the last year, with more trade deals in the offing. And perhaps most significantly, the administration withdrew the last of our combat forces from Vietnam earlier this year and, as a result of congressional action, ended the U.S. bombing of Southeast Asia.

These changed circumstances should be accompanied by a changed level of U.S. troop deployment overseas. While the administration has made some tentative beginnings in this direction—particularly in Thailand and Taiwan—it seems to lack the determination to go far enough. I believe that it is up to Congress to encourage a new look at our overseas commitments by passing this amendment forcing a significant troop reduction overseas. There is a great tendency to stick with the status quo on overseas force levels without any consideration of the real military or political need for these troops.

A group of experts familiar with Asian affairs, almost all of whom were officials in past administrations, has spotlighted the new world situation in a statement placed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD by the distinguished Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY) on September 17. These 14 experts, who include such notables as Robert Barnett, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Roger Hilsman, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Far East Affairs, and Earl Ravelan, former Director of the Asian Division—System Analysis—in the office of the Secretary of Defense, have endorsed a call for the return and deactivation of 100,000 U.S. troops from Asia "with no harm either to our national security or our important interests in the area."

Their statement goes on further to say:

It is our sincere hope that Congress will take such firm and timely action as is necessary to bring our East Asian force level in line with present diplomatic realities.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this statement be included in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JULY 31, 1973.

STATEMENT ON ASIAN TROOP REDUCTIONS

The United States is completing a significant reduction in our involvement in East Asia. We have withdrawn from direct participation in the conflict in Vietnam, and are soon to refrain from all direct combat operation in Indochina. We have also begun to establish mutually beneficial relationships with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.

Because of these factors, we, the undersigned, believe that substantial reductions can be made in those military forces now deployed in East Asia and the Western Pacific. There are now 227,000 military personnel stationed in these areas, of whom 45,000 are in Thailand; 18,000 are in Japan; 15,000 are in the Philippines; 40,000 are in the Ryukyu Islands; 42,000 are in South Korea; 9,000 are in Taiwan; and 58,000 are afloat. We feel that at least 100,000 of these can be returned and

deactivated with no harm either to our national security or our important interests in the area.

It is our sincere hope that Congress will take such firm and timely action as is necessary to bring our East Asian force level in line with present diplomatic realities.

Endorsed by:

Robert Barnett, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Jerome A. Cohen, Professor, Harvard Law School (Chinese Law).

Chester L. Cooper, Special Assistant to Gov. Harriman for the Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam.

Alvin Friedman, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Morton Halperin, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense.

Roger Hilsman, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Far Eastern Affairs.

Townsend Hoopes, Former Under Secretary of the Air Force.

Anthony Lake, Former Staff Member, National Security Council.

Dwight Perkins, Associate Director, East Asian Research Center, Harvard University.

Earl Ravelan, Former Director, Asian Division (Systems Analysis), Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Gaddis Smith, Professor of History, Yale University. Speciality: 20th Century diplomacy. Author of recent biography, *Dean Acheson*.

Richard C. Steadman, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia Affairs.

James Thomson, Former Staff Member, National Security Council.

Paul C. Warnke, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, let us look at some specific cases where U.S. force reductions are both feasible and desirable. The changed world situation is perhaps best illustrated in South Korea. The last extensive fighting there occurred over 20 years ago. Since then, the South Koreans, with the generous support and aid of the United States, have built up their ground combat forces to 600,000—many of whom are Vietnam combat veterans—backed by a large trained reserve. In contrast, there are about 360,000 North Korean ground combat forces, most of whom have not fought for 20 years. An Institute of Strategic Studies report of 1969-70 concluded that even then the South Korean army was amply prepared to defeat any invasion from the North.

Since then, in 1971 the United States embarked on a large-scale modernization program of the military forces of the Republic of Korea. This program is scheduled to last for 5 years at a cost to the U.S. taxpayers of \$1.5 billion. In conjunction with this modernization, the United States has promised to withdraw our forces by the time the program is completed. The Senate Armed Services Committee reported that by the end of fiscal year 1973, 47 percent of the total funds for the 5-year plan had been spent with a scheduled completion time in fiscal year 1975.

Despite the South Koreans' proven combat ability and despite the modernization program, the United States still maintains 42,000 troops in Korea, the same level as fiscal year 1971. The pay,

upkeep and operating costs in fiscal year 1972 for these troops were \$584 million. In addition, the United States supplied South Korea with \$192 million in economic assistance and \$155 million in military assistance. All this is happening in the midst of preliminary détente negotiations between the two Koreas.

It is time for the United States to withdraw more of our troops from Korea. At a minimum, the Defense Department should follow through on its pledge to withdraw our forces by the end of the modernization program in fiscal year 1975. The Armed Services Committee report on H.R. 9286 quoted the Secretary of Defense as recently as the spring of 1973 as saying that—

Further withdrawal of U.S. forces in South Korea should be phased with the completion of the modernization program.

In light of this and other promises, it was dismaying to see Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clemente begin backtracking on that pledge in a recent news conference held in Tokyo. On September 17, Clements declared that the U.S. assessment of the threats in the area, rather than the modernization program, will become the determining factor concerning U.S. troops in Korea. The Pentagon should be held to its previous pledges.

Thailand is another area where a U.S. withdrawal should be carried out. The United States stationed 45,000 troops there as recently as March of this year. The purpose of the bulk of these troops was to carry out bombing operations in Indochina from several air bases in Thailand. The bombing has come to a long-delayed end, thanks to congressional action. Further legislation in this and other bills precludes U.S. air operations in the area without express congressional approval.

With the mission ended, the United States should take its troops out of the country. In this connection, it is worth noting that the administration has already begun limited withdrawals from Thailand, with about 3,650 troops having been withdrawn as of September 21.

Yet another reason for bringing home our forces in Thailand is the insurgency underway in northern Thailand. The fighting has not been heavy and the threat to the government remains uncertain, but the lessons of Vietnam should make the United States wary of intervening in new insurgencies. As a 1971 Members of Congress for Peace Through Law Military Manpower Report stated:

If Vietnam has taught us anything, it is that our foreign policy interests are not served by deployments of land troops in Asia.

Back in 1959 the United States had only 327 troops in Thailand. By 1964, that number was up to 9,000. The onslaught of the fighting in Vietnam brought a vast influx of U.S. forces to Thailand, a number which was not reduced until the 1970's. Then with the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, many of the U.S. troops in Vietnam shifted to Thailand to continue air operations. The trend should now be reversed. We should return to the 1959 level.

Japan is yet another country from which troops could be withdrawn. The United States has maintained close ties with this rising power since World War II, and has extended our nuclear umbrella for the protection of the Japanese. I believe that our close ties with Japan are an overriding interest of U.S. foreign policy. However, continuing close relations with our Japanese friends and providing nuclear protection does not require almost 60,000 U.S. troops in Japan and the Ryukyu Islands. The Japanese themselves have indicated they would welcome a reduction of at least half the U.S. forces; 30,000 troops will guarantee our commitment just as well as 58,000 and with fewer frictions.

There are two other Asian countries in which the United States maintains a significant number of troops. At the end of March, we still had 9,000 personnel in Taiwan and 15,000 in the Philippines. We should ask ourselves whether we should have any troops in Taiwan at a time when we are establishing ties with China and if the 15,000 troops in the Philippines are likely to get us involved with the insurgency and strife in that country.

Mr. President, the amendment before us will give the Pentagon the discretion and the flexibility to choose which 125,000 troops are in areas of lower priority, while at the same time forcing a cut that large by the end of fiscal year 1976. While I do not favor a withdrawal to any Fortress America, neither do I favor the deployment of over 225,000 troops in Asia and 600,000 worldwide. United States active involvement in world affairs can be maintained by many fewer troops.

I am sure that opponents of this amendment will cite U.S. commitments. In fact, most of those treaties are vaguely worded, discretionary documents which do not call for the standing commitment of any prescribed level of U.S. military manpower. Indeed, when the administration recently announced the withdrawal of a 5,200-man Air Transport wing from Taiwan over the next several months, it made sure to stress that there was "no relation whatsoever between this move and the mutual defense treaty" under which the United States pledges aid to Taiwan if attacked. Withdrawals elsewhere could be accompanied by similar pledges.

Mr. President, a move to reduce our overseas force level is long overdue. Congress can continue its effort to reassert its prerogatives by making its will known in this important policy area. The passage of this amendment will result in substantial savings in absolute costs and in balance-of-payments deficits. I urge its adoption.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, is there time in opposition to the amendment?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes. The distinguished chairman of the committee, the Senator from Missouri, has control of the time.

Mr. LONG. Will the Senator yield me some time in opposition?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I

do not oppose the amendment, but I shall be very glad to yield the opposition time.

Mr. LONG. May I have about 3 minutes in opposition?

Mr. THURMOND. I yield the distinguished Senator 3 minutes.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, I shall vote against this amendment. I voted for the reduction of troops in Europe, and I fully respect the rights of Senators to disagree with complete intellectual honesty. The fact is, however, that in my judgment this amendment would merely confuse the public, and make the public think that we have cut back on troops overseas, in areas where the administration would probably make a cut anyway.

There is nothing, in my opinion, that needs more to be trimmed back than these troops in Europe, and I think that care should be taken for the public to understand that Congress has not yet mustered the votes and the administration has not made the decision to reduce the American troop commitment in Europe.

This Nation is proceeding on the assumptions that if the Soviet Union should want to fight a European war, we will fight a European war with them; that if they want to come by land, we have more than 7,000 nuclear weapons in Europe to meet them; that if they prefer to come by sea, we will be superior on the sea, with nuclear weapons and all that; and in addition, that if we could persuade them to fight a war in Europe with cornstalks, we could whip them with cornstalks, with mostly American troops.

Now, it is all right with me to fight that kind of war in Europe if we can persuade them to fight that kind of war in Europe, but as a practical matter, they have the problem of fighting the same type of war, if they can persuade the Chinese Communists to fight an old-fashioned type of war in Asia. There is nothing to prevent them from shipping their troops in Siberia to the European side and fighting the war there with them.

I remind those in favor of committing our troops to fight an old-fashioned-type war in Europe that in my judgment, we cannot do everything. We cannot defend the whole wide world with ancient weapons. We might be able to do it with modern weapons, but not with so-called traditional weapons.

That is basically what this is all about. All we will do in agreeing to the Humphrey amendment will be to give people the impression that we did vote to cut back on the thing we cannot afford, that is, trying to maintain a capability in Europe to fight an old-fashion-type of war on the continent of Europe. It is a rather ridiculous thing. At some point I think it will be recognized it cannot be done.

If we do not do that, the result for which some of us have contended, that is, reducing forces, will in some way come about anyway, because the drain on our dollars will continue until the dollar will not be worth anything and we will not be able to afford keeping troops outside this Nation. Rather than give the American people the impression that we did some-

thing—when, in fact, we did virtually nothing—about a commitment made by the Executive, not by Congress, which we cannot afford to continue, I think the amendment is misleading and I will vote against it.

Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join the distinguished Senator from Minnesota as a cosponsor of his amendment on reducing U.S. forces abroad.

I want to say at the beginning that I continue to feel that the United States has a global role to play as the strongest Nation in the free world. I continue to believe that the surest guarantee of world peace is the continued deterrence of a powerful U.S. defense force. And I continue to believe that no deterrent can be effective unless those forces committed to the prevention of war are at full strength and are committed with a serious purpose.

I feel that these beliefs are not only fully consistent with this amendment but are also strengthened by it. The far-flung Defense Establishment of the United States is strong but the economic and trade position of the Nation they are committed to defend has rarely been worse. The impetus behind this amendment, therefore, is to convince our allies that we mean business when we say that they must assume a greater share of our common defense.

Those who share in this sentiment, for example, emphasize the point that after 25 years Europe is no longer a beleaguered, wartorn continent and after the same period of time the United States is no longer an economic colossus that can ignore the costs of its military commitments abroad. Those who call for a greater sharing of the NATO defense burden by Europeans point, with pleasure, to the economic growth of our European allies. They note the progress toward economic and political integration in Europe and welcome Europe as a strong new partner in what has too long been a largely bipolar world.

The question that is raised, of course, is how much stronger need our allies be before the cost of their own defense can become an item of their own expense. I know the familiar retort that Düsseldorf is not Detroit and that the United States is the strong arm of the Alliance but I also know that Düsseldorf symbolizes the healthy economies of Europe and reminds us of our allies' new prosperity and economic capabilities.

Europe is not alone in this regard. U.S. forces, for instance, are still stationed in Korea to the tune of 40,000 men and Taiwan at about 8,000 men, while both of these are recognized as having two of the strongest defense forces in their region of the world. In addition, they enjoy two of the fastest accelerating rates of economic growth in the world. It seems perfectly reasonable to me that they should be able to continue to provide for their own defense with a reduced U.S. presence.

Let me add here that this growing attitude of U.S. concern about our commitments does not represent a waning of our interest in Europe or other regions or a lack of concern for their security.

Rather it is born of a deterioration in the U.S. international economic position that jeopardizes our ability to provide for our own needs at home. Some of the danger signs that have raised U.S. apprehensions are well known to all of us.

In 1971 the United States experienced its worst trade deficit since 1887. In 1972 our balance-of-payments deficit reached its highest level ever and the figures so far for this year are equally disturbing. Devaluations have lessened the value of our currency and increased the cost of meeting our military commitments abroad.

To paraphrase Dickens these are neither the best nor the worst of times for the United States but they are a time for hard-nosed bargaining abroad and closely watched and austere expenditures at home.

In the fact of these developments, U.S. leaders both in the administration and the Congress have approached the question of U.S. foreign commitments with a greater sense of urgency and a stronger resolve to meet these commitments in a fashion that protects U.S. interests.

U.S. supporters of the NATO alliance, for example, will call upon our allies to examine the percentage of their GNP that is committed to defense expenditures and to increase their efforts. Let me cite some 1972 examples: Great Britain spends 5 percent, France 3.7 percent, West Germany 5½ percent, and Italy 2.8 percent. But the United States spent approximately 6¾ percent.

While Europe is the largest recipient of the defense dollar outflow, we have almost as many men stationed elsewhere around the globe as in Europe. Our naval forces put in appearances at nearly every port on earth that's deep enough to float a ship. We have also been increasing our presence in the Indian Ocean and around Australia. Our sizable troop commitments in South Korea, Thailand, and elsewhere in Asia are well known.

We have bases around the world, some of them set up long ago and which we continue to maintain although their reason for being may have become outmoded. A third of our total defense forces today are abroad—and a lot of dependents, a lot of bases, a lot of facilities, and a lot of dollars are flowing out to maintain them. I think it is time to determine whether the security benefits derived from maintaining these farflung bases justify the continued outflow of dollars and the resultant weakening of our dollar position at home and abroad.

This does not mean that we are being isolationist. It simply means we are waking up to the fact that some of these dollars flowing out are not bringing us a dollar's worth of security. I am sure our allies will welcome efforts to strengthen the dollar. Let us pare down unnecessary spending abroad, just as we are attempting to pare down unnecessary spending here at home.

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, the distinguished majority leader, Senator MANSFIELD, has again brought the issue of our military presence in the world to the floor of the Senate. The fact that his amendment was not, on the second

vote, supported by a majority of this body does not detract from the policy considerations he so eloquently expressed.

During debate on the Mansfield amendment, several questions were raised over the formula for reduction provided for in that amendment. Many of these objections centered on the extent to which our overseas forces would be reduced. Others argued that sensitive negotiations for mutual force reductions in Europe would be negatively affected by a total 40-percent reduction of all worldwide forces.

The amendment offered today by the Senator from Minnesota, myself, and others is designed to answer these objections. Our amendment would require a reduction of only 30,000 overseas forces by June 30, 1974, and a total of 125,000 by December 31, 1975.

The Humphrey amendment gives the President complete freedom to negotiate bilateral or multilateral reductions in Europe since no cuts would be specifically required from that area. The requirement for an orderly reduction is, therefore, more than met.

Mr. President, it is axiomatic that in a democracy any governmental policy that runs counter to the public will must be changed unless it is to eventually undermine the larger framework it is designed to support. Such is the case with the issue we discuss today.

It is no secret that we are overextended. Our tax dollars are being drained to maintain thousands of overseas support forces whose purpose is unrelated to our defense. It is time to act in our own best interests to relate the number of forces we keep overseas to national security, not to international politics.

Some months ago both Houses of Congress passed war powers legislation designed to revitalize the role of Congress in making the most potentially fateful decision our Nation can make. But the reality is that the pervasive presence of U.S. forces around the world comes close to rendering that bill moot.

It is generally conceded that the President has the inherent power to protect our forces when attacked. If this is so, he theoretically could engage the United States in 38 countries around the world, without congressional consent, on little more provocation than a street demonstration.

If Congress is to have a meaningful war-making role, we must control the instruments of our policy as well as the policy itself. As Senator MANSFIELD so forcefully asserted in his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee:

... the fundamental difficulty in discerning semblance to America's policy abroad is that the commitment and level of U.S. forces abroad has determined our policy rather than our policy determining the level of U.S. forces abroad.

Mr. President, the stubborn insistence of this administration to hold to the military option as the primary tool of diplomacy is an inconsistent aberration in this era of *détente*. To justify that aberration by attacking those who wish to reduce our military presence as "isolationists" can only serve to truly isolate

America in the economic and cultural spheres—spheres which are rapidly passing military strength as indicia of a nation's position in the world.

The debate we have engaged in for the past 2 days has centered on just that semantical misunderstanding. We seem to use the word "isolationism" as it was used in the post-World War I era. But that meaning should be discarded from the lexicon of modern internationalism. We should realize that the central question is not whether we participate in the world, but how we go about it.

The powerful forces of international economics and technology—forces that were in their infancy in the 1920's and 1930's—have revolutionized the previously predictable business of diplomacy. Power relationships have broken down to a complicated ferment of overlapping special interests.

My distinguished senior colleague from Missouri, Senator SYMINGTON, most eloquently described this complicated world scene yesterday when he quoted Lord Palmerston, who said:

No country has friends and no country has enemies; all a country has are interests.

Mr. President, as we emerge from one of the most difficult periods in our history, we must seek to define our interests objectively. We must realize that in today's world military allies may be economic competitors, and political foes may be trading partners. And most importantly, we must not fail to learn the lessons of overextending ourselves militarily, as we did in Korea and in Vietnam.

Those of us in this body who bear some considerable responsibility for the future involvement of our Nation in war cannot ignore the vision that hindsight gives us. If this amendment passes today and is enacted into law, we will still have some 385,000 American forces in the world on July 1, 1975. Prior to the Korean war in 1950, we had 330,000 forces around the world.

It is, therefore, my firm belief that we will remain overextended even if this amendment passes. But it is our responsibility to begin now to adjust to the realities of the modern world. I urge my colleagues to make that beginning by supporting this amendment.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, for several years the United States has been faced with an unfavorable balance-of-payments deficit. To correct this situation we have encouraged our citizens to "buy American" and to "see America first." But despite these entreaties, our balance-of-payments account has remained in the red, confidence in the dollar has declined, speculators have bet against the dollar in money markets, and the administration twice has been forced to devalue. They also have attempted to improve the trade balance by selling great quantities of basic commodities to foreign nations. The devaluations and the heavy export of commodities have resulted in increased prices to our consumers at home.

While we have been attempting to reverse the payments deficit through a myriad of ways, none of which have been fully adequate, we have failed to under-

take the step which will help immensely in solving this problem; namely, the reduction of the over 500,000 U.S. troops now stationed overseas. I believe that our trade position has been improving; but by itself, trade will not solve the payments problem. Because of our huge overseas commitment, exports must exceed imports by a considerable degree. In short, we are already in the red before we even start importing and exporting. We simply must reduce the amount of money we pay out as a result of our Military Establishment abroad.

We now have 300,000 men and women of our Armed Forces stationed in Europe with the resulting cost of about \$17 billion each year. It is clear that the real dollar is not due to a U.S. citizen taking a 2-week vacation in Europe—the real drain can be seen in these 300,000 members of our Armed Forces who are stationed in Europe 365 days a year. And believe me, for most of those 300,000—especially the enlisted personnel—it is anything but a vacation.

Our enlisted personnel in Europe are faced with both rising prices and a shrinking dollar which leaves them with more and more of less and less. Many of them are experiencing real hardships while trying to keep their families from being separated. In the end far too many men are having to send their wives state-side, because of the tremendous cost of keeping their families together in Europe.

Opponents to this amendment charge that we need to maintain these troops in foreign lands to assure us of peace. If we need to maintain over 500,000 troops overseas to "enforce the peace," I find it difficult to imagine the number it would take to fight a war. The European community as well as the other countries in which we have troops either have no need of those troops or are quite capable of taking care of their own military needs. The United States can no longer assume that all the world needs our troops and that we must send them helter-skelter to any country that would accept them.

If we can believe the statements which have come from both the White House and the State Department we are entering a generation of peace and an era of détente. But the administration also tells us that it would be improper to begin to reduce our troop levels in this "generation of peace." In short, the opponents of this amendment are telling us that we can reduce the number of troops stationed overseas, neither in times of peace, nor in times of war. One begins to wonder whether these troops have any purpose at all.

In fact, it is quite apparent that many of these overseas troops are maintained in their foreign posts not out of necessity, but out of habit. We currently maintain 32 Army bases and 38,000 troops in Korea. In Japan we still have 100 military bases. It is time that we realize that these countries are able to preserve their integrity without great numbers of our military personnel stationed on their soil. Indeed our military presence in many of these countries is the source of much anti-American sentiment among the

people, if not the government of these countries, and is looked upon as a form of colonialism.

I believe this amendment to reduce the numbers of forces overseas touches upon one of the profound truths concerning America's defense policy in the 1970's. We no longer can think of our defense merely in terms of troop levels or the size of our arsenal of weapons. The developing detente with China and the Soviet Union has shown that diplomacy is the handmaiden of a successful defense policy. Our extensive Defense Establishment abroad is mainly the reminder of an era when the crude show of force was a substitute for negotiation. In today's setting, however, international peace rests more on reducing fears than it does on the buildup of massive troop levels.

It is becoming apparent that the world role of the United States will be based in the future, to an increasing degree, on our economic strength and our trade relations with other countries of the world. We cannot afford to consider defense policy apart from such crucial matters as the problem of inflation or the balance-of-payments deficit. A defense policy that does not take into account the full economic ramifications of the policy, will, in the end, buy a policy of weakness rather than of strength.

Clearly now is the time to pass this amendment to begin to reduce our overseas troop levels which constitute an unreasonable drain on our manpower, morale, and economy.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield for a question or two?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. TOWER. What effect would this have on the ability of the President to deploy troops in the event of some kind of emergency? The Senator's amendment calls for withdrawal. Would this bar the President in the event of an emergency such as those we had with the Dominican Republic, the Lebanese crisis, the Jordanian crisis—something like that? How would this impact affect him?

Mr. HUMPHREY. It is within the limits of the troops available. This requires a reduction of overseas forces, 606,000 troops overseas. It simply says that within a 2-year period the figure should be down to 471,000 men. I gather, if there is any emergency, Senator, and that is not sufficient so that the President can make a substantial number of troops available, that he would be wise enough to come to Congress and discuss it with us and also seek our approval.

Mr. TOWER. Suppose Congress is not in session?

Mr. HUMPHREY. He still has half a million troops to move, and we could get back into session before he had moved one-half million troops.

Mr. TOWER. Now what if there is a crisis in the Middle East? What if there is a threat of war and an additional American naval presence might be required?

Mr. HUMPHREY. The American Navy's 6th Fleet is there.

Mr. TOWER. I know, but what if it

needed to be spread out, and under certain circumstances it would have to be?

Mr. HUMPHREY. No problem. He still has the Atlantic Fleet.

Mr. TOWER. Could you move the Atlantic Fleet in there? I say that just to make this legislative history.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes, indeed.

Mr. TOWER. What about another Jordanian or a Lebanese crisis—anything like that?

Mr. HUMPHREY. We do not put any restrictions on the President in terms of forces—our overseas people. Only that there should be 125,000 fewer men within a 2-year period.

Mr. TOWER. What if there is a crisis in the Mediterranean, or the Middle East again, and the President thought it would be necessary at least to bring troops in seaborne into position as an instrument of diplomacy, let us say. Would he have to bring them all the way from the United States?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Not at all. There are obviously naval forces available in the Atlantic Fleet.

Mr. TOWER. What about bringing in NATO forces?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I do not see why he cannot. It is up to him. I am not going to take in every contingency. If the Russians were coming into the battle, I believe the President might consult the Senator from Texas and the Senator from Washington. He might even get to the Senator from Minnesota. He might even consult the whole Congress. I cannot believe that he would.

Mr. TOWER. I think we are tying the hands of the President here. I think, really, that we are violating a fundamental principle which has existed for a long time in this country and that is that the President is solely responsible for the formulation and the implementation of foreign policy. If we tie his hands and render him inflexible in his use of military forces, I think it will seriously weaken the President in the eyes of the world and certainly in the eyes of the Soviets.

Mr. HUMPHREY. May I say most respectfully to the distinguished Senator from Texas, that this amendment applies only to overseas bases—as of March 31, 1973. There is no restriction against the President, as Commander in Chief, using the forces of this country if they are needed for the defense of this Republic. I do not think we should try to stretch this amendment to the point of absurdity. What this amendment requires is that of the forces presently stationed overseas, 125,000 shall be brought home in a period of years—in the first year, 30,000.

Again may I say that if circumstances which the Senator from Texas indicates were to prevail, any President worthy of the name would come to Congress.

Mr. TOWER. Does this include forces afloat?

Mr. HUMPHREY. This does not include forces afloat.

Mr. TOWER. Only land-based forces?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Only land-based forces, yes.

Mr. JACKSON. If the Senator will

yield for a point of clarification, in the discussion of the Mansfield amendment, the overseas forces—ground and air—were listed at 477,000. Now my colleague listed 606,000.

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct.

Mr. JACKSON. What does the Senator include in the 606,000? The Senator has a discrepancy here of over 150,000.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The U.S. military strength outside the United States, as of March 31, 1973, appendix A in the committee report—and here it is—adds up to 606,000, according to your own report.

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct. That was the figure I used.

Mr. JACKSON. 606,000?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I thought that was the figure the Senator from Montana used.

Mr. JACKSON. Does it include naval forces?

Mr. HUMPHREY. All forces.

Mr. JACKSON. All forces of every kind?

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct.

Mr. JACKSON. It includes—

Mr. HUMPHREY. It includes the Air Force, the Navy, the Marines—all forces abroad.

Mr. JACKSON. Our forces in the Trust Territory?

Mr. HUMPHREY. All forces. That is right. Guam—the Panama Canal—Puerto Rico—

Mr. JACKSON. Guam is part of the United States.

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is right.

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator does not want to say that—

Mr. HUMPHREY. It is part of the United States.

Mr. TOWER. We are going to leave Guam defenseless?

Mr. JACKSON. What about Puerto Rico?

Mr. HUMPHREY. It is included in the total appearing in the committee report.

Mr. JACKSON. You say—well, I think this is kind of misleading, Mr. President. A further point of clarification so that we know—the Senator talks about 606,000 units overseas. The inference there is that they are on foreign soil. I think it would be useful to have that broken down as to whether Puerto Rico, Guam, the Trust Territory, Samoa, which are part of the United States—

Mr. HUMPHREY. May I say, the Senator is stretching a nit into a gnat.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator just said “overseas.”

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct.

Mr. JACKSON. How would the Senator treat Alaska?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I treat Alaska as a State of the Union.

Mr. JACKSON. What about Hawaii? Is that not overseas? It is 2,500 miles—

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. May I say, I realize that some of my colleagues are having difficulty here, so I will try to answer them. Guam has 77,000 troops, the Panama Canal has 10,000, and Puerto Rico has 7,000—these are the only areas outside of foreign countries listed by the committee. They are in the 606,000.

Mr. JACKSON. What about our forces in Hawaii?

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is in the United States of America. I trust the Senator knows that.

Mr. JACKSON. What is Guam?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I excluded that. It is not a State.

Mr. JACKSON. What about Puerto Rico?

Mr. HUMPHREY. It is not a State.

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator does not want to leave the impression—

Mr. HUMPHREY. May I say to my delightful friend from Washington that I have been very fair with him. I have told him the number of forces in those areas.

Mr. SYMINGTON. We could solve this problem—perhaps there is some historical basis for it, perhaps it is just semantics—by following the advice of the late, great President Eisenhower and the also great Senator from Louisiana, and take all the troops out of Europe.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota has the floor.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. LONG. As I understand the Senator's amendment, they would have to bring home 30,000 troops in the first year. Is that correct?

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct.

Mr. LONG. Of that amount, they can take half the cut by just shifting them from Puerto Rico to Florida.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Fine. That is right.

Mr. LONG. So some can be taken from Puerto Rico—

Mr. HUMPHREY. United States military strength outside the United States on September 30, 1972: Foreign countries, 608,000; U.S. territories and possessions, 36,000. We are not talking about shifting from American territory. Foreign countries, I say to the Senator—for foreign bases. My amendment refers only to troops in foreign countries. Puerto Rico is not foreign; Guam is not foreign; the Panama Canal Zone, insofar as the law is concerned, is not foreign. Foreign bases—from Thailand to Florida, we are talking about; from Japan to Florida, we are talking about. We even can put some in Louisiana.

Mr. LONG. I am just trying to understand the Senator's explanation of his amendment. I have not read the amendment.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I imagined so.

Mr. LONG. If I understand the Senator's explanation, he just got through telling the Senator from Washington that he is including the troops in the American possessions.

Mr. HUMPHREY. No. I just told him a moment ago that that was excluded from the totals.

Mr. LONG. From the Senator's amendment?

Mr. HUMPHREY. From my amendment. Excluded.

Mr. LONG. Let us understand what the Senator is trying to bring home. He is going to bring home 30,000 troops.

Mr. HUMPHREY. From foreign bases, foreign territories—Americans in foreign countries.

Mr. LONG. That means they will be taken from some foreign nation, not an American possession.

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct. I do not consider any American possession a foreign nation.

Mr. LONG. So if 30,000 troops, say, are shifted from Thailand to Guam, that would meet the Senator's requirements?

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct. Or to Hawaii.

Mr. LONG. To any American possession?

Mr. HUMPHREY. To any American possession or territory.

Mr. LONG. Move them, say, from Taiwan or Vietnam or Japan to Guam?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Would the Senator like to use some of his time?

Mr. LONG. If I had time.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota has 3 minutes remaining. Who yields time?

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Michigan.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I wonder whether I could ask the Senator from Minnesota a question for clarification.

Mr. HUMPHREY. On the time of the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Yes.

If I understand the Senator correctly—and I want to be sure—the purpose of his amendment is that it shall not apply to troops in Europe, so that it will not affect our mutual balance of forces—

Mr. HUMPHREY. I am giving the President and the Secretary of Defense complete flexibility, which I am sure the distinguished Senator from Michigan would like.

It is my understanding that, in light of the administration's attitude, they will make these troop reductions in non-NATO areas.

Mr. GRIFFIN. The Senator does not intend that it shall apply to troops in Europe, unless a satisfactory treaty is arrived at?

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is my personal view, but I am not President. I tried to be, and I did not make it. [Laughter.] And I am not the Secretary of Defense. Because I do have respect for the Commander in Chief in his role as Commander in Chief, I leave the disposition of these troops up to him, with the exception that 125,000 of the troops stationed in foreign countries—which is what the language of the bill says—shall be brought home in a 2-year period.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Unfortunately, as I think the Senator realizes, this is going to be misinterpreted on the part of many people as a direction to the President to require a drawdown of troops in Europe without an agreement on the mutual balance of forces, which would be unfortunate.

Mr. HUMPHREY. There is not a line in this amendment that indicates that it is aimed at Europe. What is in this amendment is a very simple proposition: that the President is directed, within a 2-year period, to be able to remove from

foreign countries, not American possessions, up to 125,000 forces; and in the first year, 30,000. That is all there is to it.

It is not complicated. We do not need to have a Ph. D. thesis at Harvard. It is a very simple arithmetical proposition—125,000 brought home from foreign countries, thereby reducing our commitments overseas.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, how much time do we have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina has 14 minutes remaining.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I would just like to call to the attention of the Senate a few points with respect to this matter.

This is a very important matter. The President of the United States is the Commander in Chief. I do not know of any instance in history in which Congress has told the President where to position our troops. Are we not treading on dangerous ground when we tell the President how many troops he can have at home or have elsewhere? Is that not a decision for him?

Also, the world situation may be different next year or 2 years from now. The Senate meets every year; Congress meets every year. Why can we not legislate year by year on a matter such as this, rather than to tie the hands of the President and to tie the hands of the people of this country on an important matter of this kind?

Most important, our President is getting ready now to go into negotiations. I can tell the Senate—because he said it today—that the President of the United States and the Secretary of State are deeply concerned about any reductions in troops at this time. These negotiations will begin next month. It is a matter of principle, he says. If we make any reductions at this time, when he needs all the strength he can get, when he wants to go into these negotiations to achieve mutual reductions on both sides, are we not going to make a mistake if this amendment is adopted?

I hope the Senate will think well about this matter and not take precipitate action. We have taken action today that will strengthen the hands of the President. He will go into these negotiations with strength—troop strength, weapon strength, and other strength. Are we going to weaken his position at this time and say that Congress is going to mandate so much this year and so much next year with respect to reductions? Why not leave it to the President? He is the only President we have.

Certainly, Senators believe he is a man of peace. He has ended the Vietnam war. He has brought the soldiers home from Vietnam. He has brought the prisoners of war home from Vietnam. Can we not trust him now a little longer and give him a chance to go into these negotiations and use all the strength he has to achieve reductions on both sides, rather than to have a unilateral reduction at this time?

Mr. President, this is a very serious matter, and I hope the Senate will not adopt this amendment.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me 2 minutes?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time to the Senator from Louisiana?

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished Senator.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, I really cannot see that this amendment means a thing on earth, and I think we would be deceiving the American public to vote for it.

All the President has to do is to take some of the 40,000 troops he has on the Ryukyu Islands and move them to Guam, and he would have 10,000 left in the Ryukyus. That would not mean a thing on earth, and they would not be a bit closer to home.

As a practical matter, a vote for this amendment, in my opinion, will just mislead the American public into thinking that you did something when you did not do anything.

It is true that in the second year there would be a cutback of 125,000 men, but we will be here next year and can talk about it next year. What would be done this year? Move 30,000 troops from the Ryukyu Islands to Guam in order to comply with this amendment. If Senators want to vote for something, they should vote for it.

They could move or shift a few fellows from the Ryukyu Islands to Guam and be in compliance with this amendment. This situation will never be corrected in that way. The amendment would mislead the American people to think we had done something but all we did was to move 30,000 troops from the Ryukyu Islands to Guam. It is ridiculous and I refuse to vote for it.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I say to the Senator from South Carolina, if the Senator talks about weakening the President's hand, the committee has already cut the total number by 156,000 troops. This only takes them from foreign countries and brings them back to American possessions or the United States of America.

When the Senator from Louisiana talks about transferring them from the Ryukyu Islands to Guam, well, Guam is an American possession; Guam is a part of the United States.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, the Senator would tell someone from Louisiana he is home when he gets to Guam. [Laughter.]

Mr. HUMPHREY. It is a long ways closer to home than being in Thailand. Guam is an American possession. But that is not the purpose of this amendment. The purpose of the amendment is clear. It is to reduce the number of Americans based overseas increasing the possibility of potential involvement. We have had the other debate on the Mansfield amendment and we had the debate

on the Jackson amendment. This is a sensible, reasonable, moderate proposal.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, this is a most serious matter. I think there has been too much laughter and ridicule. I hope we will get back on the track.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I am prepared to yield back my time if the Senator from South Carolina is prepared to yield back his time.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Texas.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I would like to offer an amendment to the amendment of the Senator from Minnesota. I think it is a reasonable amendment. I think that the admonition of the distinguished majority leader to us was well taken. This is a serious matter.

I oppose this amendment on philosophical grounds, on the basis of principle, because I believe military force is a tool of diplomacy, and that the principal responsibility for the formulation and implementation of foreign policy resides in the hands of the President of the United States. When we deny him any flexibility in the use of that tool, we are undercutting and undermining the ability of the President to negotiate with foreign powers, specifically super powers, like the Soviet Union.

On that basis I oppose the amendment. I think, however, that that is not inconsistent with my desire to modify the amendment to make it what I consider to be less restrictive on the President, and at the same time perhaps accelerate some of what the Senator from Minnesota wants to do.

Therefore, when the time has expired or has been yielded back, I intend to offer an amendment which will provide that on page 2, line 5 we delete "such reduction shall be completed not later than June 30, 1975." In other words, leave the out years open rather than to foreclose the President in 2 years. I shall also offer an amendment to mandate, rather than a 30,000 troop reduction, a 40,000 troop reduction in the first year. So that would up the number required to be brought back in the first year but would leave the out years open ended. We could come back here and we have adequate time because the 40,000 reduction would have to be made not later than June 30 next year. Therefore, we could come back and mandate additional cuts.

Indeed, those cuts are mandated in my amendment, but the time is not prescribed.

So at such time as the time of the Senator from Minnesota has expired or yielded back, I shall offer that amendment.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, is the Senator from South Carolina prepared to yield back the remainder of his time?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, before he does that—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, how much time is remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina has 5 minutes remaining and the Senator from Minnesota has 2 minutes remaining.

Who yields time?

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we yield back our time, if the Senator from Minnesota will yield back his time.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I have a question for the Senator from Texas. Is the Senator leaving the figure at 125,000?

Mr. TOWER. The figure of 125,000 remains, but there is no prescription in the reduction in that amount. The time prescription is only on the amount of 40,000. In other words, it raises by 10,000 the number required by the Senator from Minnesota. He has 30,000 and I make it 40,000 in the first year. The rest is open-ended, but we have adequate opportunity to come back and mandate additional cuts.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is all time yielded back?

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we are ready to yield back our time if the Senator from Minnesota is prepared to yield back his time.

Mr. HUMPHREY. We yield back our time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time is yielded back.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

On page 2, line 3 strike 125,000 and insert in lieu thereof 110,000.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 20 minutes on this amendment, 10 minutes to a side. Who yields time?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute.

The argument for my amendment already has been made by the able Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY). The amendment is very simple. It cuts the figure from 125,000 to 110,000. There are some Senators who would like to bring all the troops home from overseas; other Senators do not want to go that far. I do not believe that we can go that far. I voted for the amendment proposed by the distinguished majority leader which would have required a reduction overseas of 190,000 troops over a 3-year period.

I do think there should be a significant reduction. I think my amendment is a reasonable compromise. The amendment speaks for itself. It would effect some savings to the overburdened taxpayers and would make a favorable impact on our imbalance of payments. The President and Secretary of State would retain discretion as to where the reductions overseas would be made. I hope the Senate will agree to this compromise figure of a 110,000 reduction of American troops in foreign countries.

I ask for the yeas and nays on my amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second. The yeas and nays are ordered.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I am ready to yield back my time.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I yield to the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I feel that this is a reasonable compromise. I would prefer 125,000 but I think we may very well be able to go along with this figure. I would be willing to accept it on our side.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the yeas and nays be vacated. We ought to discuss the amendment.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I have to object to the request of the distinguished Senator. I think we have to go to conference with a rollcall vote on this amendment. I am perfectly willing to have a 15-minute rollcall vote because I know that some Senators on both sides of the aisle are presently away from the building.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is any time yielded to the Senator from South Carolina?

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the rollcall vote be 15 minutes rather than 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears no objection, and it is so ordered. The rollcall vote will be 15 minutes.

The Senator from South Carolina controls time. The Senator from Minnesota is in favor of the amendment.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina has 10 minutes.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, do we control the time?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina controls the time.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I just want to say this: The President of the United States said today it was not the size of the reduction; he said it was the principle involved. He said:

I am going into these talks to try to bring about mutual reductions, to reduce troops, reduce weapons, and reduce everything, and I need all the power I can get.

Are we going to deny him that opportunity? Whether it is 125,000 or 110,000, is it not the prerogative of the President to position those troops? Are we going to say to him, "We are not going to give you a chance to see what you can do?"

President Nixon has gone to China. He has gone to Russia. He is doing all he can to bring about reductions. It would be a mistake, in my judgment—a serious mistake, and that is the President's opinion, and it is Dr. Kissinger's opinion. Are we going to trust him in that matter? This is a matter of foreign policy. Can we not give the President and the Secretary of State time enough to go into these talks and see what they can do?

Mr. President, we are making a great mistake here to make any reduction in troops, any reduction in weapons, any reduction in anything, just at the very moment when President Nixon is going into these talks. They are a short time off. Let us give him the strength to go

into those talks so that he can bring about mutual reductions.

He hopes to bring about reductions—not little reductions. He is hoping to get bigger reductions, amounting to billions of dollars, and thousands of troops, but he wants them cut on both sides. If Congress unilaterally mandates that he has to bring so many home now, we weaken his position; and will not the Soviets feel that if Congress cut them this year, next year Congress can cut them again, and will not the Soviet leaders feel they may have to deal with Congress rather than the President?

Mr. President, again I repeat, we have only one President. He is our spokesman. He is doing the best he can. Why not give him the authority and the flexibility to go into the mutual reduction talks with all the strength we can give him?

I hope the Senate will not adopt any amendment here that is going to take away that flexibility.

Again, we have the President saying it is a great mistake. The Secretary of State thinks it is a great mistake. Again I express the hope that the Senate will not make this mistaken judgment.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, if I were going to save the balance of payments for this country to protect the value of the American dollar and save the taxpayers billions, I would be willing to vote for the Mansfield amendment to bring 100,000 troops back from Europe, even if it did weaken the President's hand; but if all I am going to do is cause them to move 30,000 troops away from Okinawa down to Guam, I do not see any use in taking action that might weaken the President's hand. We would not save a dollar. All we might be doing is shifting 30,000 troops from one point overseas to another point even more distant from home.

As far as a Louisiana boy serving in the service is concerned, the only reason he would know he is on American soil might be that there is an American flag on the flagpole. So it is a distinction without a difference.

Why would Senators want to weaken the President's hand for that reason? If we were going to save billions of dollars, it would be a different matter, but for this kind of window dressing, I quite agree we should not do it.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield back my time.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield back my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time on the amendment having been yielded back, the question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD) to the amendment of the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY). On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative called the roll.

Mr. GOLDWATER. On this vote I have a pair with the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT). If he were present and voting, he would vote "yea." If I were allowed to vote, I would vote "nay." I withhold my vote.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. McCLELLAN), the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. ERVIN), the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), and the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE) are necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from Iowa (Mr. CLARK) is absent because of a death in the family.

I further announce that if present and voting, the Senator from Iowa (Mr. CLARK) would vote "yea."

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Oregon (Mr. PACKWOOD) and the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. WEICKER) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) is absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Kansas (Mr. PEARSON) is absent because of illness.

I further announce that the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) is absent for religious observations.

I further announce that the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) is absent by leave of the Senate.

The result was announced—yeas 73, nays 14, as follows:

[No. 431 Leg.]

YEAS—73

Abourezk	Griffin	Muskie
Aiken	Gurney	Nelson
Allen	Hart	Nunn
Bayh	Haskell	Pastore
Beall	Hathaway	Fell
Bennett	Helms	Proxmire
Bentsen	Hollings	Randolph
Bible	Hruska	Ribicoff
Biden	Huddleston	Roth
Burdick	Humphrey	Schweiker
Byrd, Robert C.	Inouye	Scott, Hugh
Cannon	Jackson	Scott
Chiles	Johnston	William L.
Church	Kennedy	Sparkman
Cook	Long	Stafford
Cotton	Magnuson	Stevens
Cranston	Mansfield	Stevenson
Curtis	Mathias	Symington
Dole	McClure	Talmadge
Domenici	McGee	Thurmond
Dominick	McGovern	Tower
Eagleton	McIntyre	Tunney
Eastland	Metcalf	Williams
Fong	Mondale	Young
Gravel	Montoya	

NAYS—14

Baker	Buckley	Hansen
Bartlett	Byrd	Hatfield
Bellmon	Harry F., Jr.	Hughes
Brock	Case	Moss
Brooke	Fannin	Saxbe

PRESENT AND GIVING A LIVE PAIR, AS PREVIOUSLY RECORDED—1

Goldwater, against.

NOT VOTING—12

Clark	Javits	Percy
Ervin	McClellan	Stennis
Fulbright	Packwood	Taft
Hartke	Pearson	Weicker

So Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD's amendment to Mr. HUMPHREY's amendment was agreed to.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment in the nature of a substitute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to read the amendment.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment must be stated.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be waived, because I can explain what the details are very quickly.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard. The clerk will state the amendment.

The second assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

On page 2, strike everything from line 1 through 17 and insert the following:

"Sec. (a) The Secretary of Defense shall take such action as may be necessary to reduce, by not less than one hundred ten thousand, the number of military forces of the United States assigned to duty in foreign countries on March 31, 1973. Such reduction shall be completed not later than December 31, 1975. Not less than forty thousand of such reduction shall be completed not later than June 30, 1974.

"(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds may be expended after December 31, 1975, to support or maintain military forces of the United States assigned to duty in foreign countries if the number of such forces so assigned to such duty on or after such date exceeds a number equal to the number of such forces assigned to such duty on March 31, 1973, reduced by such number as necessary to comply with the provisions of subsection (a) of this section.

"(c) As used in this section, the term 'military forces of the United States' shall not include personnel assigned to duty aboard naval vessels of the United States."

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield to the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in view of the fact that the hour is getting late, I ask unanimous consent that roll-calls from now on consume no more than 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, in this particular amendment in the nature of a substitute, we have incorporated the modification of the Byrd amendment of changing to 110,000 the number of forces subject to reduction. We have included the date of March 31, 1973, as the base line of forces of the United States assigned to duty in foreign countries, instead of a base line of March 1. Also, we have included the provision that such reductions shall be completed not later than December 31, 1975, instead of June 30, thereby providing a greater period of time for the early reduction of 40,000.

Furthermore, we have stated in the amendment that the reduction of 110,000

shall be completed by December 31, 1975, rather than June 30, 1975.

Why? It gives the President an extra half year to make the reductions.

The amendment incorporates the suggestion of the Senator from Texas of 40,000 instead of 30,000 for the first year, and it incorporates the modification that was just voted by the Senate, of a total of 110,000, in the amendment of the Senator from West Virginia.

It seems to me, Mr. President, that here we have an amendment, now, that will give us a reduction of American forces in foreign countries. It gives the President 2½ years. It provides, may I say, for the first year, in accordance with the suggestion made by the other side awhile ago, a reduction of 40,000.

Mr. President, I believe this is a reasonable, sensible, modest suggestion and proposal, and I urge my colleagues to support it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield such time as he may require to the Senator from Texas.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, the "Old Gray Fox" has done it again. I made a mistake in announcing that I was going to introduce my amendment; I should just have sprung up and introduced it. Now I cannot amend, being preempted. I have been around here long enough to know when I have been had.

However, I believe it is in order for me to offer a perfecting amendment to the amendment offered by the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I raise a point of order.

Mr. TOWER. I make a parliamentary inquiry to that effect.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas could offer a perfecting amendment to the original amendment. That would be in order when all time on the amendment has expired.

Mr. TOWER. In other words, I cannot offer a perfecting amendment to the amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by the Senator from Minnesota?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. It would be in the third degree. The amendment in the nature of a substitute is in the second degree.

Mr. TOWER. The substitute is in the second degree, so I am barred from offering an amendment in the third degree?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. TOWER. Let me see if I can bargain with my friend from Minnesota. I doubt if I can.

The amendment in the nature of a substitute of the Senator from Minnesota provides, on line 10, page 2, that the terminal date shall be December 31; is that correct?

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct, 1975.

Mr. TOWER. December 31, 1975. Now, of course, the Senate could repeal that subsequently, if it felt it necessary.

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct.

Mr. TOWER. Why not go ahead and do it open-ended, then, as suggested by the Senator from Texas? Because we

could come back and mandate an even greater reduction than the 110,000 advocated by the Senator from Minnesota. Why should we commit ourselves to that kind of reduction now? The Senator from Missouri made a great case that times change and situations change in debate on another matter, and it is true that times and situations will change. Why do we lock ourselves into that figure for that long a period of time? The Senator from Texas is willing to increase the number of people required to be withdrawn in the first year, but why should we commit ourselves to that kind of withdrawal when we do not know what the world situation will be a year from now?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, the Senator from Texas is always a reasonable and intelligent man. May I say he has made the argument I wanted to make in behalf of my amendment in the nature of a substitute: namely, that if Congress feels next year it is desirable, we can change it. But we ought to have some firm deadlines here, so we can have some idea of where we are going. As the Senator says, if we just leave it open-ended we can come in next year and change the numbers to whatever we wish. The Senator is absolutely correct.

So may I say most respectfully to the Senator from Texas, if he feels next year it should be changed, he can offer such a proposal. If he feels that the number of troops should be 90,000, or 200,000, he can propose legislation to that effect. I say most affectionately to my friend from Texas that we have an amendment before us now that everyone understands. It is reasonable, it is not going to cripple the country or injure the President—

Mr. TOWER. If the Senator will yield at that point, the President is not in agreement with that, since he is meeting with Mr. Gromyko tomorrow. He knows that Gromyko will probably giggle at it just a little bit, because the Senate has put it on him tonight.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yet, may I say most respectfully and with great respect, the weakening of our forces will not come about as a result of my amendment. The committee decided, I think wisely so, to reduce the total forces to 156,000. That is what Mr. Gromyko knows. All the Humphrey amendment says is that from Thailand, from Southeast Asia, the western Pacific, and all those places, we will bring home some of the American forces.

Mr. TOWER. Yes, but that amendment does not require that they be withdrawn from specific areas.

Mr. HUMPHREY. No, I know that.

Mr. TOWER. It does not require that they be withdrawn from Europe and Asia.

Mr. HUMPHREY. No, this makes no requirement except for withdrawal from foreign countries. We leave up to the Commander in Chief the deployment of forces. All we do is fix the level of forces.

Mr. TOWER. Would the Senator consider dropping that portion of his amendment which excludes the naval forces? Because, as the Senator knows, the deepest cut, if we do not cut naval forces, has to come out of the land-based troops.

Mr. HUMPHREY. May I say most re-

spectfully, the reason that section (c) was placed back in the amendment was that I thought it was helpful in terms of our defense situation, because the Navy is principally the instrument needed in our diplomacy, such as the 6th Fleet or the Atlantic Fleet; and I did not want to mandate withdrawal while the Navy was afloat.

Mr. TOWER. I say to the Senator, if you mandate troop withdrawal from Europe, you are diminishing our ability to deal with the crisis in the Middle East. Let us all understand, when voting for this amendment, the kind of hazard it represents to the security of Israel. Let us understand that very clearly, because we must draw down on NATO resources in the event of a crisis in the Middle East. So let us understand what situation we place Israel in here, and make no mistake about that.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I understand. That is why I want to preserve the 6th Fleet.

Mr. TOWER. But these are land-based naval forces in that area. What about Naples? What about Athens?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Would the Senator vote for this amendment if I removed section C?

Mr. TOWER. I do not think the Senator would want to modify his amendment, anyway, because nothing could compel me to vote for it.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I thank the Senator. I thought he was of that mind.

Mr. TOWER. We should modify it to the extent that we can give the President the flexibility he needs to deal with any crisis.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I thought the Senator said he wanted 6 months in there for the withdrawal of troops?

Mr. TOWER. That helps. I talked with the Senator about that. He is extremely cooperative and one of the most delightful people I know.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I thank the Senator from Texas for that.

SEVERAL SENATORS. Vote! Vote!

Mr. ALLEN. May I ask the Senator from Minnesota to explain the significance of the various date changes in the amendment. I do not believe he has explained the reason for the change from March 1 to March 31. There is a difference between the amendment on the troops for March 1 and for March 31.

Mr. HUMPHREY. That was a printing error in drawing it up. The "3" was left out. It is supposed to be March 31.

Mr. ALLEN. I thank the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I am prepared to yield back our time.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, will the Senator from South Carolina yield?

Mr. THURMOND. I yield to the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry. The Senator from Minnesota has offered a substitute for his amendment 549. While an amendment to the substitute would not be in order, would it not be true that a perfecting amendment to the original amendment would be in order?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HOLLINGS). That is correct and was so stated.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, a further parliamentary inquiry. If such a perfecting amendment were pending and the substitute were also pending, would it not be true that the vote would first occur on the perfecting amendment rather than on the substitute?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I thank the Chair.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, when all the time has expired, I should like to offer a perfecting amendment provided I can get recognized for that purpose. Maybe I should not make these announcements.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator can do so, no matter how many perfecting amendments are offered to the original language and presume when adopted and when the substitute is voted on it supersedes all the other amendments offered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

Mr. HUMPHREY. What we would be doing here would be to enter into an exercise of futility because the issue is, ultimately, on the substitute amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair would inform the Senator from Minnesota that he is not going to answer that. [Laughter.]

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield back his time, I will yield back my time.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, when the Senator from Minnesota yields back his time, we will yield back our time.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield back my time.

Mr. TOWER. I yield back my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has now been yielded back.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I send a perfecting amendment to the desk and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The perfecting amendment will be stated.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

On page 2 line 5; strike out all after the period.

On line 6 strike out all before the period, delete the word "thirty" and substitute the word "forty".

Delete subsection (B).

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I have already explained my perfecting amendment. It would mandate a 40,000 reduction the first year and leave open the time in which the additional 70,000 withdrawals shall occur. This gives us the opportunity to come back next year and make it an even bigger withdrawal if we choose to do so.

I am prepared to yield back my time and go ahead and vote.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I yield back my time.

Mr. TOWER. I yield back my time.

Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the perfecting amendment.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, which amendment are we voting on?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be voting on the perfecting

amendment of the Senator from Texas to the amendment No. 549 of the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. THURMOND. I thank the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time on this amendment has now been yielded back.

The question is on agreeing to the perfecting amendment of the Senator from Texas to the amendment No. 549 of the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY).

On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. ERVIN), the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. McCLELLAN), the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), and the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE) are necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from Iowa (Mr. CLARK), is absent because of a death in the family.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Iowa (Mr. CLARK), and the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE) would each vote "nay."

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Oregon (Mr. PACKWOOD), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER), and the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. WEICKER) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) is absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Kansas (Mr. PEARSON) is absent because of illness.

I further announce that the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) is absent for religious observance.

I further announce that the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) is absent by leave of the Senate.

The result was announced—yeas 36, nays 51, as follows:

[No. 432 Leg.]

YEAS—36

Aiken	Dole	McGee
Allen	Domenici	Nunn
Baker	Dominick	Roth
Bartlett	Eastland	Scott, Hugh
Beall	Fannin	Scott,
Bennett	Fong	William L.
Brock	Griffin	Sparkman
Buckley	Gurney	Stafford
Byrd,	Hansen	Stevens
Harry F., Jr.	Helms	Thurmond
Cook	Hruska	Tower
Cotton	Jackson	Young
Curtis	McClure	

NAYS—51

Abourezk	Haskell	Mondale
Bayh	Hatfield	Montoya
Bellmon	Hathaway	Moss
Bentsen	Hollings	Muskie
Bible	Huddleston	Pastore
Biden	Hughes	Pell
Brooke	Humphrey	Proxmire
Burdick	Inouye	Randolph
Byrd, Robert C.	Johnston	Ribicoff
Cannon	Kennedy	Saxbe
Case	Long	Schweiker
Chiles	Magnuson	Stevenson
Church	Mansfield	Symington
Cranston	Mathias	Talmadge
Eagleton	McGovern	Tunney
Gravel	McIntyre	Williams
Hart	Metcalf	

NOT VOTING—13

Clark	Javits	Stennis
Ervin	McClellan	Taft
Fulbright	Packwood	Weicker
Goldwater	Pearson	
Hartke	Percy	

So Mr. TOWER's perfecting amendment to Mr. HUMPHREY's amendment No. 549 was rejected.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was rejected.

Mr. PASTORE. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the yeas and nays on the substitute be rescinded, because I understand that if the substitute is adopted, we have to vote on the amendment as amended. Is that correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. HUMPHREY. In order to expedite our time, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the yeas and nays on the substitute be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

The question is on agreeing to the substitute amendment.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, this does not preclude a vote on the amendment?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. No.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, have the yeas and nays been ordered on final passage?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the substitute amendment.

The substitute amendment was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the substitute amendment, as amended.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, have the yeas and nays been ordered?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas and nays have been ordered on the amendment as amended.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I would hope that Senators would make sure that this is a sizable vote one way or the other before they leave the Chamber for the evening. The vote could be close enough that we would have a motion to reconsider, and then another vote.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. HUGH SCOTT (when his name was called). Mr. President, on this vote I have a pair with the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT). If he were present and voting he would vote "yea." If I were permitted to vote I would vote "nay." I withhold my vote.

Mr. YOUNG (after having voted in the negative). On this vote I have a pair with the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. WEICKER). If he were present and voting he would vote "yea." If I were permitted

to vote I would vote "nay." I withdraw my vote.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. EASTLAND), the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. ERVIN), the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE), the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. McCLELLAN), and the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) are necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from Iowa (Mr. CLARK) is absent because of a death in the family.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE) would vote "yea."

On this vote, the Senator from Iowa (Mr. CLARK) is paired with the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. ERVIN).

If present and voting, the Senator from Iowa would vote "yea" and the Senator from North Carolina would vote "nay."

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Oregon (Mr. PACKWOOD), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER), and the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. WEICKER) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) is absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Kansas (Mr. PEARSON) is absent because of illness.

I further announce that the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) is absent for religious observance.

I further announce that the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) is absent by leave of the Senate.

If present and voting, the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) and the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) would each vote "nay."

The pair of the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. WEICKER) has been previously announced.

The result was announced—yeas 48, nays 36, as follows:

[No. 433 Leg.]
YEAS—48

Abourezk	Hathaway	Muskie
Aiken	Hollings	Nelson
Bayh	Huddleston	Pastore
Bentsen	Hughes	Pell
Bible	Humphrey	Proxmire
Biden	Inouye	Randolph
Burdick	Johnston	Ribicoff
Byrd, Robert C.	Kennedy	Schweiker
Cannon	Magnuson	Scott,
Chiles	Mansfield	William L.
Church	Mathias	Stevenson
Cranston	McGovern	Symington
Eagleton	McIntyre	Talmadge
Gravel	Metcalf	Tunney
Hart	Mondale	Williams
Haskell	Montoya	
Hatfield	Moss	

NAYS—36

Allen	Cotton	Long
Baker	Curtis	McClure
Bartlett	Dole	McGee
Beall	Domenici	Nunn
Bellmon	Dominick	Roth
Bennett	Fannin	Saxbe
Brock	Fong	Sparkman
Brooke	Griffin	Stafford
Buckley	Gurney	Stevens
Byrd,	Hansen	Thurmond
Harry F., Jr.	Helms	Tower
Case	Hruska	
Cook	Jackson	

PRESENT AND GIVING A LIVE PAIR AS PREVIOUSLY RECORDED—1

Hugh Scott, against		
Young, against		
NOT VOTING—14		
Clark	Hartke	Percy
Eastland	Javits	Stennis
Ervin	McClellan	Taft
Fulbright	Packwood	Weicker
Goldwater	Pearson	

So Mr. HUMPHREY's amendment was agreed to.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, there will be no further rollcall votes tonight. I do not think anyone wants a yea-and-nay vote on a motion to adjourn.

I believe the senior Senator from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS) has an amendment.

Mr. THURMOND. That has been acted upon.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Is there any other amendment that could be acted upon by voice vote?

Mr. THURMOND. Not tonight.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES PAY ADJUSTMENT

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, it is necessary that I be absent from the Senate tomorrow morning when this body votes on Senate Resolution 171, which would disapprove the President's alternative plan to postpone from October 1, 1973, to December 1, 1973, a pay adjustment for Federal employees.

Under the procedure established by the 1970 Federal Pay Comparability Act, the President adjusts statutory pay rates of Federal employees in accordance with the comparability principle, on consideration of the report of the Civil Service Commission and the Office of Management and Budget, along with the findings and recommendations of a three-member Presidential appointed, nongovernment advisory committee. Adjustments recommended become effective on October 1.

Administrative pronouncements to the contrary notwithstanding, it is the expressed and demonstrated intent of the majority of this Congress to hold down unnecessary Government spending and to follow the course of economic stabilization. However, during the phases and half-phases and semi-phases of the administration's program, the salaried Federal employee has been called on to

be prepared to make sacrifices in the interest of cooling the fires of inflation.

For the third time in 3 years, the President has proposed that the pay adjustment due to become effective next Monday be postponed.

I believe this is beyond the call of duty to economic stability. For the family of the Federal employee, as for those in the private sector, the costs of food, health care, of housing and of fuel have continued to rise, insuring that the economic crunch is with us to stay. In the 2 months of the President's proposed postponement, we can continue to expect the familiar news of rises in the cost of living. The Federal employee is not immune to this hazard.

But while collective bargaining in private industry has brought about reasonable and timely increases, the Federal employees' economic fate rests in the President's hands.

Only a resolution of disapproval, such as the one offered by the distinguished Chairman of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, Mr. McGEE, and the ranking minority member, Mr. FONG, can nullify the President's decision.

Let me again emphasize, Mr. President, that I am committed to policies which will bring our Nation out of economic chaos. But our policies and guidelines must be equitable. We simply cannot expect one sector to carry more than its fair share of the burden.

ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR PROXMIRE ON MONDAY NEXT

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on Monday next, after the two leaders or their designees have been recognized under the standing order, the distinguished senior Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE) be recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, has there been morning business transacted today?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, there has.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I thank the Chair.

PROGRAM

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, the program for tomorrow is as follows:

The Senate will convene at the hour of 8:45 a.m. Immediately after the two leaders or their designees have been recognized under the standing order, the distinguished Senator from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS) will be recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes, after which the Senate will proceed to the consideration of Senate Resolution 171, which deals with the pay adjustment for Federal employees, on which there is a maximum time limit of 2 hours. No motions to amend, recommit, or reconsider are in order. There will be a yea-and-nay vote. I have the feeling that the managers on both sides will be in favor of cutting down

the time, but that will remain to be seen. Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I want to indicate that I have that feeling and impression on this side and that the vote may very well come after 1 hour of debate rather than 2 hours.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I thank the Senator.

May I also say there may be some desire on the part of the leadership on both sides of the aisle, depending on circumstances at the time, to delay that roll-call vote until a later hour, but that decision can be made in the morning.

Following the vote on Senate Resolution 171, the Senate will resume consideration of the unfinished business, the military procurement bill, and the Senate will take up the Stevens amendment to the bill, an amendment dealing with housing allowances, on which there is a time limitation of 1 hour. I have a feeling that that time can be reduced.

Following disposition of that amendment, the Senate will proceed to the consideration of the Clark amendment, No. 519, to reduce funds for aircraft carriers. There is a time limitation thereon of 4 hours, but there is every hope that the time limit can be considerably reduced.

Following that, the Humphrey amendment dealing with overall cuts, will be called up. There is a time limitation thereon of 2 hours. Hopefully, that time can be reduced, but I doubt it, judging from the nature of the amendment.

That is about as far as I can see it into tomorrow. Other amendments, of course, will be in order to the military procurement bill following disposition of the Humphrey amendment. There will be several yea-and-nay votes tomorrow, and the session could go late.

ADJOURNMENT TO 8:45 A.M.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, if there be no further business to come before the Senate, I move, in accordance with the previous order, that the Senate stand in adjournment until the hour of 8:45 a.m. tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to; and at 9:34 p.m. the Senate adjourned until tomorrow, Friday, September 28, 1973, at 8:45 a.m.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate September 27, 1973:

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

John J. Twomey, Jr., of Illinois, to be U.S. Marshal for the northern district of Illinois for the term of 4 years, vice John C. Meiszner.

IN THE NAVY

The following-named officers of the United States Navy for temporary promotion to the grade of chief warrant officer, W-3 subject to qualification therefor as provided by law:

Ackerman, John William

Adams, Lacy Malloy, Jr.

Adams, Raymond Harold

Akins, Olen Charles

Albright, William Charles

Alexander, Robert T., Jr.

Allen, Dale Joseph

Allen, Kenneth Wayne

Allen, Chester Lee, Jr.

Almy, Gideon Wilcox, III

Ames, Lloyd Monroe
 Andersen, Robert George
 Anderson, Douglas Warren
 Anderson, Howard Junior
 Anglea, James Carmack
 Anglehart, Gary Lee
 Archer, William Butler
 Arnold, Earl Delbert
 Ashcraft, Russel Glen
 Ashdown, Allen Stanley
 Askren, Virgil Robert, Jr.
 Aten, Billy Joe
 Austin, James Larry
 Award, David Paul
 Bailey, James Preston
 Baird, Anthony Lee
 Baker, Donald Douglas
 Ballas, Jim William
 Banks, Dwain Arnold
 Banks, Paul Elliott
 Barber, Richard Davis
 Barber, Theodore, Jr.
 Barger, James Beatty
 Barker, Troy Dean
 Barnes, Charles Edwin
 Barnhill, Arizona Wendell
 Baron, Gilbert Henry
 Bartyzal, Edward Thomas
 Bassett, William Thomas
 Baynes, Robert Thomas
 Beasley, Roy Wayne
 Beck, Wayne Arthur
 Becker, Martin Carl
 Beckum, Cecil Rufus, Jr.
 Beebe, Preston Lee
 Beer, Bill Eugene
 Beller, Merle Lee
 Beilinger, Richard Alan
 Bemenderfer, John Alan
 Berdeski, Phillip Ray
 Bethune, Gordon Mason
 Beutelspacher, James Richard
 Bewley, Norman Nelson
 Beyer, Richard Anthony
 Bilodeau, Ronald Lucien
 Bichard, Homer Raymond
 Binion, John Isaac, Jr.
 Bingham, Harold Eugene
 Bissette, Joseph Earl
 Bishop, Emory Lamar
 Blackstock, John Richard
 Blackshear, Arlie Ray
 Blocker, Gerald Clinton
 Bliven, Robert Paul
 Bollinger, George Edward
 Bock, Richard Dale
 Bone, Louie Cecil
 Bolton, Dwight Edward
 Borowski, Frank Marshall
 Bord, Robert Frederick
 Bougher, Chris Edward
 Boswell, William Stanley, Jr.
 Bowers, Michael Edward
 Bowen, Vernon Robert
 Bowser, Glenn Lee
 Bowman, Jerry Wayne
 Braswell, Wallace Edwin
 Boyar, John Anthony
 Brennan, Thomas Hay
 Braswell, Norvin Gilbert
 Brigman, William Milton
 Bridges, James Earl
 Brosh, Lawrence David
 Brooks, Guy Randolph
 Brown, Charles Anderson, Jr.
 Brouse, Robert Ammon
 Brown, Harold Miles
 Brown, Don Fletcher
 Brown, Joseph Morgan
 Brown, John Wilfred
 Bryant, William Joe
 Brown, Rex
 Bullis, Richard Alan
 Buck, Wayne Eugene
 Burbach, Donald Edward
 Bulmer, William Richard
 Burns, Benjamin Fred
 Burgess, Carl Huey
 Burrows, Hoyt Nathaniel
 Burns, Daniel Patrick
 Butler, Samuel Glen
 Busch, Danny George
 Butters, Joseph Kyle
 Butswinkas, Joseph Thomas
 Butz, John Erwin
 Cadora, Vincent Joseph
 Calhoun, Jimmy Royce
 Caldwell, Ralph Steven
 Canfield, Frank Louis
 Calveard, Samuel Richard
 Carlton, Curtis Wayne
 Caron, Louis Albert
 Carr, Patrick Michael
 Carr, David Paul
 Carramanzana, Rodolfo M.
 Cart, Harold Edward
 Casey, Daniel Patrick
 Castellano, Paul Michael
 Catlett, Howard Lee
 Chandler, Frank Lee
 Chapin, Ronald Clayton
 Choate, William Jackson
 Cleri, Harry Michael
 Clemens, Paul Daniel
 Cleven, Ronald Arthur
 Click, Robert Lawson
 Coard, Richard W., Sr.
 Cobb, Junior Lawrence
 Coen, Ronald Lee
 Coffman, Bert Uwe
 Coggins, Billy Ray
 Collard, Raymond Herbert, Jr.
 Collins, Richard Wayne
 Collins, James Edward
 Collins, Calfrey Wall, III
 Collins, Wyndolin Gray
 Combs, Carl Edward
 Comfort, Terrence Jay
 Coons, Joseph Dale
 Cooper, Gerald Oran
 Couillette, Roy Hinson
 Cowan, Jack William
 Cox, William Travis
 Craddock, Twiman Joe
 Crank, William Orson
 Crammer, John Michael
 Crawford, Robert Carl
 Crawford, William Daniel
 Cronin, Richard Barry
 Crooks, Dennis John
 Cross, James Edwin
 Crumley, James Jacob
 Culberson, Arthur Lee
 Culberson, Jerome Joseph
 Curry, Raymond Michael
 Curry, Dennis Samuel
 Curry, Ronald Kenneth
 Dahliam, Carl Eskil
 Dalton, John William
 Daniel, Jess Michael
 Daub, Nevin Earl
 Davis, Marvin Gary
 Davis, Jerrie William
 Davis, Raymond Oliver
 Dean, Charles Mitchel
 Dean, William Wayne
 Decker, Charles Edgar
 Devries, Harold Marvin
 Dickie, Robert William
 Dilick, Gregory Frank
 Dill, Walter Huey
 Dills, William Jay
 Dixon, James Allen
 Donahue, Charles Richard
 Donnellon, Earl Francis
 Dooley, John Patrick
 Doornbos, Robert Lee
 Dossey, Melvin Larry
 Doyle, Harlon Frank
 Dubose, Roy Harold
 Dudley, Roger Albert
 Dufford, Robert Howard
 Duncan, Robert Aubrey
 Dunn, Robert Kenneth
 Duryea, George Warner
 Earl, Robert Paul
 Earle, Douglas Stanley, Jr.
 Earnest, William Grover
 Easterling, James Thorpe, Jr.
 Eberle, Richard Raymond
 Eck, Richard Thomas
 Eckler, Burton Franklin, Jr.

Ekstrom, Russell Carl
 Elder, James Wayne
 Ellig, Jack Leroy
 Elzner, Jack Edward
 Emory, Charles Byron
 Engelhard, John Daniel
 Erven, Wayne Peter
 Esquibel, Umberto Castillo
 Evans, George Perry
 Evans, Roy Joseph
 Fagan, Joseph Thomas
 Farrell, James Thomas
 Farwell, Gary Lee
 Faulk, James Reginald
 Fehrs, Thomas Lee
 Fenton, Don Joseph
 Ferguson, Derrel Eugene
 Ferguson, John Lee
 Fike, Delmas Gene
 Fine, Leo Norman
 Finley, Charles Crothers
 Finniss, Richard Allen
 Fish, George Wayne
 Fishel, Walter Evander
 Fisher, Glen Andrew
 Flamboe, Edward Eugene
 Flaucher, Robert Harvey
 Fleming, Samuel Edward
 Fluker, James Andrew
 Foreback, Richard Fay
 Foreman, John Edward
 Forgays, Reginald Earl
 Fortier, Ormond Leo
 Foster, Timothy Walter
 Foster, Gilbert Lee
 Fox, Al E.
 Fox, James Henry, II
 Fox, Jerry William
 Frederick, David
 Free, Melvin Leon
 Freegard, Sidney Brookes, Jr.
 Freeman, Stanford Louis
 Freiberg, Roy Edward
 Froemel, Anthony Frank
 Fry, James Enlowe
 Fuller, Carroll Asbury
 Funkhouser, Guy Leonard
 Galen, Howard Eusibuis, Jr.
 Gallagher, James Theodore
 Gallagher, Terrence Michael
 Gann, James Wilson
 Garrett, Harold Lee
 Gaskins, Warren Carldon, Jr.
 Gault, Donald Richard
 Gaut, Leon Westley, Jr.
 Gavin, Donald Earl
 Gay, Donald Lee
 Gibbs, Ralph Walter
 Gilbert, John Berton
 Gilliland, Larry Daniel
 Gladding, Raymond Greene, Jr.
 Glynn, William Gardner
 Goard, Owen Douglass
 Godfrey, Thomas James
 Godwin, Jackie Eugene
 Goforth, George Thomas
 Goins, Donald Ross
 Goodwin, George Mackenzie
 Gorans, Larry Dean
 Gossett, William Dale
 Grace, Robert Michael
 Graf, Joseph Herbert
 Grafford, Elmer Lee
 Grampp, Gordon David
 Granthan, Richard James
 Greene, Montie Ray
 Greene, John David.
 Greene, Manson Moses
 Greksouk, John Gary
 Grosshel, Lyle Reynold
 Grossglass, Kenneth Alan
 Gudis, Richard Paul
 Gulbranson, Charles Richard
 Gurey, Charles James
 Gustafson, Oryville Leroy
 Gwiss, Thomas Edward
 Haack, Howard Ernest
 Hafner, Kenneth Duane
 Hager, Luther Hunt, III
 Hahn, Kurt Robert
 Hale, Nathaniel
 Halman, Charles Robert
 Halpin, Thomas Francis
 Hamblin, Gayle L.
 Hamilton, Robert Edward, Jr.
 Hammerle, Gerald Thomas
 Hanon, David Lee
 Hanson, Clark Richard
 Harden, Kenneth Dale
 Harker, Ralph Joseph
 Harmel, Robert Jerome
 Harold, Thomas Louis
 Harrison, Billy Bryan
 Harris, Leslie Alan
 Harter, Harold Warren
 Hartley, John Arthur
 Harwell, Michael Adaire
 Harwell, Eugene Alley
 Hawk, Bruce Leon
 Hawkins, Larry
 Hawkins, Robert Frederick
 Headrick, James Oliver
 Heberlein, Alexander Paul
 Heckhaus, Richard
 Heeger, George Franklin
 Hellie, Dennis Duane
 Helms, Wallace Junior
 Hembree, Buddy Russell
 Hendrix, Bobby Edward
 Henley, Ronald Wayne
 Hennessy, Raymond Michael
 Henry, James Perry
 Herrington, David William
 Hess, Harvey Leonard
 Hester, Roger Austin
 Hicks, Clayton Thayer
 Hicock, Harry Nelson
 High, Ellis Lynn
 Highlands, William Harry
 Hightower, Clyde Kenneth
 Hill, Donald Watson, Jr.
 Hill, Clark Gale
 Hillman, Cecil Martin
 Hinnant, Hobbie Lee
 Hinton, Herbert Ross
 Hite, Ralph Edward
 Hodge, William Frank, Jr.
 Hoff, Edward Adam
 Hoke, Carl Marvin
 Holcomb, William Kenneth
 Holden, John Palmer
 Hollendonner, Frederick R.
 Hollingsworth, Laban
 Holzworth, James Edward
 Hopkins, Michael Rodney
 Hoppe, Frederick David
 Hormuth, Thomas Patrick
 Horsfield, William Robert
 Houston, Cornell
 Howard, William Joseph
 Hoyt, William Henry
 Hudgens, Robert Thomas
 Hudson, Thomas George
 Huff, David George
 Huffman, Frank Alfred
 Huffman, Karl Howard
 Huggins, Harold Terry
 Hughes, Charles Evans
 Hughes, Jefferson Carroll
 Hull, Roger Leroy
 Hunley, Paul Dean
 Hunston, Larry Allan
 Hunt, Alan Arthur
 Hunt, Ted Lawrence
 Hurst, Ernest Wayne
 Husted, George Gerald
 Husted, Harry Robert
 Hutchings, Roger Arthur
 Hyatt, Jerry Owen
 Ingram, Walter Spencer
 Isaacson, Richard Daniel
 Isaacks, Carl Richard
 Jackson, Charles William
 Jackson, James Mack
 Jackson, Thomas Everett, Jr.
 James, Dempsey Dean
 James, Richard Holland
 James, William Bert
 James, William Cyrus
 Jecusco, Mark Alexander
 Jeffcoat, Alton Bruce
 Jeffrey, James Dillard
 Jensen, Charles Louis
 Jewah, Joseph Horton
 Johnson, Curtiss Leroy
 Johnson, David Paul
 Johnson, Gary Mel
 Johnson, Paul Nilan
 Jones, Douglas Wayne
 Jones, Stephen Ray
 Jones, Thomas Nelson
 Jones, Walter Lloyd
 Jopp, Rudolf Heinz
 Jordan, Edwin Moore
 Jordan, Theodore John
 Josey, Laverne
 Joyner, Thomas Frederick
 Kadlecik, Donald Michael
 Kamienski, Jerald Paul
 Kane, Roger William
 Kangas, Carl Duane
 Kaplan, Donavan Vern
 Katschke, William Roy
 Keller, Burlyn Lee
 Kelley, Thomas Francis
 Kellogg, James Lee
 Kelly, Tom Joseph
 Kennedy, Charley Houston
 Kiddie, Kenneth Eugene
 Kilby, William Gene
 Killingsworth, Henry Cairon
 Kilmer, Harold Bruce, Jr.
 Kimball, David Earl
 King, Earl Edward, Jr.
 King, Howard Nelson
 King, James Francis
 Kinney, Paul Charles
 Kirkey, Floyd Ronald
 Klissus, Anthony Joseph, III
 Knighton, Richard Benjamin
 Knupple, William Arnold
 Koenig, Bernard Joseph
 Kohn, Walter
 Kopanski, Edward
 Korbelik, Oakley Allen
 Kostich, Michael Edward
 Krauch, Charles Scott
 Kvederis, Bernard Joseph
 Lacava, Louis Robert, Jr.
 Lafleur, Francis Paul
 Lake, James Robert
 Lamont, Jerry Edgar
 Landick, Richard Earl, Jr.
 Lane, Dennis Lee
 Lang, James Elroy
 Langley, Bobby Gene
 Lankford, Roger Lee
 Larson, Duane Maurice
 Lasky, Ralph Carleton
 Latham, Buford Earl
 Lawson, James Thomas
 Lay, Robert Ernest
 Leach, Clifford Jo
 Leal, Pedro Guillermo
 Leavings, William Albert
 Leblanc, George Elsworth
 Lee, David Harrison
 Levangie, Richard Benjamin
 Lewis, Gordon Allen
 Lewis, Ira J.
 Lindsay, Howard Byron
 Little, David Elbert
 Little, Jackie Elzie
 Little, Larry Leroy
 Little, Thomas Richard
 Livingston, Thomas Edwin
 Logan, James Robinson
 Long, Raymond Michael
 Lose, Jay Donald, Sr.
 Loss, William Joseph
 Lott, Richard Alan
 Love, Odell Gregory
 Lovett, Harry Lee
 Lovitt, Roger Allen
 Lowell, Robert Owen
 Lucas, Ronald Eugene
 Lueck, Wallace Roy
 Lundby, Neil Warren
 Lutes, Jack
 Lutz, Philip Edward
 Lynch, Norman Wilson

Lynch, Daniel Sheldon
 Lyon, Scott Robert
 Lyon, John David
 Mabry, Eugene Patrick
 Macallister, Duane Edward
 Macdonald, Donald John
 Mackenn, John Fortune
 Malich, Thomas Carl
 Malloch, James Edward
 Mancini, Dante Russell
 Manjuck, George Edward
 Manley, Richard Walter
 Mares, Joe Nieto
 Marseglia, Vincent Richard
 Marshall, James Franklin
 Marshall, Rudy Frederick
 Marsh, Robert William, Jr.
 Martin, John Douglas
 Martin, Marion Lee
 Marttila, Elmer Edwin
 Massey, Don Ray
 Massengale, Thomas Irvin
 Masson, Donald George
 Masson, Frank Rogers
 Mathers, Ivan Gale
 Mathews, Hubert
 Matthews, Julian Thomas
 Mauldin, Robert Epethelle
 McAllister, Robert Atkin
 McAvinia, Thomas Francis
 McBryer, Gary David
 McCaleb, Jack Dodson
 McCarley, Theodore Kershaw
 McComas, Lucian Raymond
 McCoy, Charles Kenneth
 McCoy, Ernest Vincent
 McCulley, George Francis, Jr.
 McGinnis, Daniel Clyde
 McGuire, Robert Lee
 McInnis, Brady Dale
 McKinney, Terry Lee
 Mead, Willie Jack
 Mellon, Walter Edward
 Mercado, Daniel Metra
 Mergler, George Carl
 Meyers, Orville Luther
 Milam, Richard Bernard
 Miller, Dean Franklin
 Millette, James Edward
 Millsap, Dewey Jed
 Minor, Donald Arvine
 Mitchell, Kenneth Ray
 Mitchell, Roger Edward
 Mitzel, John Thomas
 Moatz, Charles Harvey
 Moloney, Rodger Timothy
 Mone, Frederick Patrick
 Moody, Bryan Deulin
 Moody, Paul Louis, Jr.
 Moore, Dwaine Raymond
 Moreau, James Frederick
 Moreland, David Ray
 Morin, John Earl
 Morrison, Thomas Alton
 Morris, Homer Walton
 Morrisett, Robert
 Morris, Leon
 Morrow, Robert Eugene
 Mott, Charles Wane
 Mumme, Ralph Phillip
 Munson, Bruce Roger
 Murner, William David
 Murphy, William Donald, Jr.
 Murray, William Henry
 Muse, Paul Robert, Jr.
 Mustin, James Ovid
 Nadeau, James Claude
 Nahill, Francis John
 Naron, Harold Franklin
 Neasham, Edwin Lowell
 Neddedog, Jose Terlaje
 Neidlinger, Gary John
 Nelson, Alfred Donald
 Nice, Dan Edwin, Jr.
 Nichols, Larry Dale
 Niles, Michael Edgar
 Nims, George Edwin, Jr.
 Nolan, Carl William
 Oakes, Delbert, Jr.
 Odonnell, Edward Joseph, Jr.

Ogle, James Ralph
 Ohlemacher, Richard Charles
 Oliver, Julian Dale
 Oneal, Loren Lee
 Oriley, William Thomas
 Orlekoski, Michael Gene
 Oropesa, John Reboton RA
 Orr, Tommy Daniel
 Osullivan, Patrick Leo
 Othmer, John Arthur
 Othus, Ross Bradley
 Overall, Gerald Wayne
 Overton, Herman Don
 Owens, Raymond Patrick
 Oxford, Russell David
 Ozehoski, Edward Mark
 Pallitto, Eugene Anthony
 Parker, Ronald Lee
 Parks, Clarence William
 Parks, James Forest
 Partridge, Arthur John
 Payden, Bryant Leverne
 Peach, Ellis Elbert
 Pearl, John Edward, Sr.
 Pease, Milton Lee
 Pedersen, Kurt Henry
 Pendrey, John Willis
 Pepper, Liston Duane
 Perez, Roy
 Perks, Thomas William
 Perry, Eugene Joseph
 Perry, James Frederick
 Peters, Kerry Alden
 Peterson, John Eugene
 Pettis, Roger William
 Petty, William Milton
 Pfeifer, Paul
 Phifer, Richard Lee
 Phillips, Kenneth Wayne
 Phillips, William Edmond
 Phillips, William Joseph, Jr.
 Richardo, Fortunato
 Pierce, John Williamson, Jr.
 Piercy, Kenneth Roy
 Placke, Chester Eugene
 Plimmer, Emmett Louis
 Poch, Henry William, Jr.
 Poffinbarger, James Clark, Jr.
 Porter, Robert Lee
 Potter, David Lawrence
 Poulin, Donald Robert
 Powell, Ronald Dewey
 Preckwinkle, Stanley England
 Prestidge, Ronald Otis
 Price, James Robert
 Prior, Melville Edwin, Jr.
 Pruter, Thomas John
 Ptacek, Russell George
 Pugliese, Ronald Francis
 Radke, Clifford Arvin
 Rand, Benjamin Wilfred
 Ratte, Richard Andrew
 Ray, Marcus Darrell
 Reagle, Robert Milo
 Redding, Hugh K.
 Reece, William Porter
 Reed, Charles Lloyd
 Reed, Jerry Lee
 Reed, Raymond Lee
 Reep, Earl Lee
 Reese, James Garnett
 Rehill, Peter John
 Reid, Gary Lloyd
 Reinke, Gerald Gene
 Rentner, Richard John
 Reynolds, Lyndel Leon
 Reynolds, Oscar Otha
 Reynolds, Robert Eugene
 Riddell, John Paul, Jr.
 Ridley, Raymond Charles
 Riley, Benjamin Pharo
 Ritchie, Freddie Wesson
 Roberson, Vernon Frank
 Roberts, Glenn Wesley D.
 Roberts, William Rhea, Jr.
 Robertson, Thomas Arden
 Robertson, William Reed
 Robinson, Warren Ellison
 Rogalsky, Laverne Henry
 Rogal, Joseph Walter
 Rogers, Frank Leonard
 Rogers, Michael Frederick
 Rogers, Samuel Earl III
 Rohrbacher, Charles Edward
 Rohrbacher, Richard Kenneth
 Romanek, Donald
 Rongey, Gerry Lee
 Roof, Carl Gerald, Sr.
 Roper, Thomas Wayne
 Rose, Joseph Patrick
 Rowe, Allan Lyle
 Royal, Robert Louis
 Rudden, Francis Arthur
 Rundberg, Edward Ernest
 Runyan, Charles Edwin
 Russell, Bobby Gene
 Ruth, Charles Mitchell, Jr.
 Rutkowski, Robert Bruce
 Rutledge, Gerald William
 Ryan, Patrick Lawrence
 Sablan, Francis Edward
 Safford, Russell Melvin
 Sanchez, Mariano James
 Sarkisian, Manoog
 Sauer, Daniel Martin
 Saunders, Richard Kevin
 Saye, William Andrew
 Sayles, Richard Norvelle
 Schaefer, Michael Reno
 Schick, Carroll George
 Schleichert, Kurt Michael
 Schlotterer, John Craig
 Schmidt, Allen James
 Schnell, Donald Duane
 Schroeder, Kenneth Leroy
 Sciuto, John Joseph
 Scott, Charles Richard
 Scott, Donald Gordon
 Scott, Leroy
 Scott, P. S.
 Selby, David Ellis
 Settje, Larry Allen
 Shamburger, William Arthur
 Shannon, Gerald Eli
 Shaw, James Arthur
 Sheehan, Leroy Edmund
 Shields, Gerald Thornton
 Shirley, Tommy Farrel
 Shriner, John Morgan
 Sidner, William Howard, Jr.
 Simoneaux, Ramon Joseph
 Simpson, Neal Leon
 Sinclair, Robert Grayson
 Singleton, Y. G.
 Sitar, John Joseph, Jr.
 Sloan, Alexander
 Smith, Albert Lawrence
 Smith, Billy Truman
 Smith, Chester Burton
 Smith, Dallas Thomas
 Smith, David Lawrence
 Smith, John Frederick
 Smith, John Joseph
 Smith, Kenton Leroy
 Smith, Lance Norman
 Smith, Robert Myron
 Smith, Wayne Owen
 Smith, William Sherry
 Snipes, Carl Landon
 Soper, Ronald Earl, Jr.
 Sorensen, John Christensen
 South, Michael Larry
 Spencer, Richard Allen
 Spriggs, Bernard Alen
 Staehler, James Paul
 Stafford, Jimmy Dale
 Stankoski, John Stephen
 Steinfort, Gilbert Henry
 Stephenson, Luther Guy, Jr.
 Steverson, Gerald Howard
 Stewart, James Harold
 Stewart, James Robert
 Stikeleather, Thomas Garner
 Stonecipher, William B.
 Stott, Michael
 Strackbein, Edward Mitchell
 Stralo, William Ellis
 Stroman, Joe Emmett
 Strusinski, John Richard
 Sullivan, Alan Bruce
 Sweeney, Robert Lee
 Szucs, John Howard

Talbot, Ronald Eugene
 Tarulli, Thomas
 Tate, Freddie Von
 Tavares, Michael **Humberto**
 Taylor, Howard Levon
 Teems, Billy Walter
 Tegethoff, Dennis Doyle
 Tennyson, Paul Dewayne
 Tew, Larry Allen
 Thiebaud, Robert Ray
 Thomas, David Storms
 Thomas, Edward William
 Thomas, Francis Farrell
 Thomas, Larry Robert
 Thomas, Richard Alvah
 Thompson, Billy Ray
 Thompson, Joseph Maurice
 Thomson, Francis Stoddard **J.**
 Thyfault, Marion Eugene
 Tibbets Joel Frederick
 Timms, Terry Wayne
 Tolson, Robert Anderson
 Tompkins, Robert Walden
 Toombs, Jon Loflin
 Toomey, Terrance Anthony
 Totten, Neil Ray
 Touchon, Andrew
 Townsend, James Lewis
 Trahan, Charles Ray
 Treptor, George Thomas
 Trimble, Richard Madison
 Truitt, William Gene
 Tschiltsch, Godfrey Joseph
 Tucker, William Thomas
 Turner, Howard Wayne
 Turriff, David James
 Udell, Stephen Marshall
 Ulin, Robert Richard
 Underwood, Herbert Hoover
 Ussery, Herman Ray
 Valade, Gerald Robert
 Valenta, David Michael
 Vandenburg, Richard Jay
 Vanvleet, Barry Lea
 Varley, John Charles
 Vassar, William Lee
 Vinson, Bobby Harold
 Vollbrecht, Melville W., Jr.
 Vonkapff, Achim
 Walker, Alvin Richard
 Walker, Charles Ray
 Wall, John
 Wallace, Howard Atkinson, Jr.
 Wallace, Robert Ellerslie
 Waithall, James Edward
 Warner, Charles Robert
 Warren, William Donald
 Watkins, Thomas Julian
 Watson, George Eugene
 Weaver, Lloyd Edsel
 Webber, Thomas Charles
 Wegiel, John Adam
 Weiss, Harlan Ellis
 Welch, George Douglas
 Welch, Gerald Francis
 Weller, Wayne Leroy
 Werther, Joseph Nicholas
 Westfall, Donald Leroy
 Whalen, Regis Emmett
 Wharton, Charles Eddy
 Wheeler, Edgar Allan
 Whipple, James Floyd
 Whitaker, Jesse Lowell
 Whitaker, Joe Daniel
 White, Frank Herman, Jr.
 Whitlow, John Norwood
 Wickliffe, Charles Donald
 Williams, Don Ralph
 Williamson, Kenny Dew
 Williams, Comer Lynn
 Williamson, William Leroy
 Willson, Harold Arthur
 Willson, Herman Theodore, Jr.
 Wilson, Francis George, Jr.
 Winifdale, Donald Albert
 Winkler, James Harry
 Witting, Glenn Douglas
 Wolfe, Larry Ray
 Wolam, Neil Robert
 Wollenburg, Alfred Edwin
 Wood, James Walton

Wood, Ray Beverly
 Woods, Thomas Ross
 Wooldridge, Donald Gene
 Worrell, Ira Gene
 Worsham, Allen Arthur
 Worwetz, Harry Joseph
 Wright, Randolph William
 Wright, Roger Gail
 Wright, Douglas Wesley
 Wylie, Jon Douglas
 Yarbrough, James Melton
 Yarmy, William Joseph, Jr.
 Young, David Hymans, Jr.
 Young, David William, Jr.
 Zahner, James Joseph
 Zell, Ronald John
 Zetsch, Kurt Johann, Jr.
 Zimmerman, James Harold
 Zingale, James Charles
 Zonkel, Joseph Page
 The following-named officers of the U.S. Navy for temporary promotion to the grade of lieutenant in the line and staff corps, as indicated subject to qualification therefor as provided by law:
 LINE
 Aasen, Roy Vernon
 Adams, Charles Robert
 Adams, Robert Ellison
 Adams, Roger Clinton
 Adams, Ronald Eugene
 Adamson, Robert Edward
 Adkins, Joseph Harold
 Adkins, William Kenneth, Jr.
 Agnew, William Mar
 Ahern, Lawrence Raphael
 Ahern, Thomas Joseph, Jr.
 Ahern, Timothy Michael
 Ahlers, Norbert Anthony
 Aichele, Stephen Sadler
 Akerson, Daniel Francis
 Akins, Olen Charles
 Albright, George Ernest, III
 Albright, James Clifford
 Albus, Johnny Patrick
 Alden, Robert Keith
 Alessi, Harry Peter
 Alexander, James Charles, Jr.
 Algiers, Michael Anthony
 Allen, Corson Lee
 Allen, James Stanford, Jr.
 Allen, Michael Anthony
 Allen, Phillip Kenneth, Jr.
 Allsopp, Ralph Stanley, Jr.
 Almony, Joseph Robert
 Altmann, Raphael Jerome, III
 Ambersley, Robert Thomas
 Ammons, Andrew Everett
 Anderson, Barton Paul
 Anderson, Craig Griffith
 Anderson, James Dorsey
 Anderson, James Douglas
 Anderson, Jay Wendel
 Anderson, Lyle Allen, III
 Anderson, Richard Earl
 Anderson, William R., Jr.
 Anton, William Max
 Archer, Dennis Lee
 Arcuri, Louis Edward
 Arfman, John Frederick, Jr.
 Arion, Ellsworth Eugene
 Armstrong, Andrew Adams, III
 Armstrong, David John
 Armstrong, Keith Stuart
 Arneson, Dennis Calvin
 Arnold, James Clyde
 Arnold, Raymond Dykes
 Arthur, William Charles
 Ashby, Donald Arthur
 Ashton, Richard Arthur
 Ashworth, Robert Arthur
 Atwell, Robert William
 Auckland, John Stacy
 Augustine, Sullivan
 Averill, Jeffrey Briggs
 Aversano, Anthony Joseph
 Avery, Robert Bruce
 Ayers, Richard Francis
 Baarson, Robert Fulton
 Babetz, Jeffrey Dale

Babyak, Edward Eugene, Jr.
 Bacitall, Charles Ray
 Backers, Douglas Allan
 Backlund, Bruce Edward
 Bacon, William Redding
 Baeder, Robert Arthur
 Bafus, Guy Raymond
 Bahr, Walter Elliot
 Bailey, Defort
 Bailey, Robert John
 Baker, Kenneth James
 Baker, Larry Alan
 Baker, Robert Donald
 Ball, Jeffrey St. John
 Banger, Michael Jon
 Bannat, Steven John
 Barber, Charles Harry, III
 Barbour, Richard Edelen, Jr.
 Barclay, Ray Franklin, Jr.
 Barker, Harvey Ward
 Barrett James Martin
 Barrows, Richard Douglas
 Barry, William Patrick
 Bartke, Harrold Lincoln
 Bartscher, John Keenan
 Bateman, Douglas Allen
 Baucom, Larry Clifford
 Bauer, Louis William
 Baumgartner, William Edward
 Baumgard, Richard Stuart
 Beason, Richard Edwards
 Beatrice, Albert Joseph, Jr.
 Beattie, Aaron Joseph, III
 Beatty, Larry Vernon
 Becker, Denny Richard
 Becker, Stephen Edward
 Beckley, Stephen Allen
 Beckman, Charles Barry
 Bell, Edison Lee
 Bell, Marvin Leon
 Bemis, Larry Ray
 Bender, Gene Paul
 Bender, John Frederick
 Bender, Thomas Joseph, Jr.
 Bengtson, Loren David
 Benjes, Christopher
 Benko, Michael Jay
 Benning, Vale Jean
 Berg, Jeffrey Michael
 Berger, Robert Floyd
 Bergstrom, Alan Lee
 Berke, Barry Lewis
 Berkheimer, Linden Lee
 Bermudes, Eulogio Conceptio
 Bernsen, Thomas Jerome, Jr.
 Bethke, Gary Walter
 Beuerlein, Alan Francis
 Beyatte, William Edward
 Bianco, Barron Bruce
 Bianco, Ralph Dominic
 Biola, John Alfred
 Bissell, Robert Edward
 Bisset, Andrew Everly
 Black, James Douglas
 Blake, Clifford Dale
 Blanchard, Gary Franklin
 Blank, David Alan
 Blankenship, Robert Merle
 Blankenstein, Glen Alan
 Bloom, Wade Douglas
 Blount, Wilburn Mac
 Bloxom, Richard Ralph
 Bobo, Billy Joe
 Bobo, Jerry Lyn
 Bodnar, John Williams
 Boerner, Michael Curtis
 Boger, Robert Michael
 Boley, Morris Victor, Jr.
 Bomkamp, Gary William
 Bond, Douglas Marsh
 Bonwit, Christopher Call
 Boon, John Edward
 Borer, Paul Joseph
 Borgmann, Frederick William
 Borns, Michael Oscar
 Borries, William Glenn
 Boutz, Allen Ray
 Bowen, Daniel John
 Bowland, Craig Charles
 Bowler, Daniel Richards
 Bowlin, James Franklin, Jr.
 Boyd, Garland Atkinson, Jr.

Boyle, David John
 Bozin, William George
 Brace, Timothy Barron
 Bramlett, William T., II
 Braswell, Wallace Edwin
 Brattain, Herbert Keith
 Brawn, Michael Duane
 Breede, Matthew John
 Breen, Dennis Francis
 Brehm, Dale Eugene
 Brennan, David Michael
 Brennan, Samuel Harley, Jr.
 Brenner, Robert Charles
 Brewer, Douglas Bacon, Jr.
 Bricken, Thomas Llewellyn
 Briggs, Bruce Kenneth
 Britt, James Frederick
 Broberg, Carl Ralph
 Brodsky, Larry Stephen
 Bronson, Robert William, II
 Brooks, Edgar Tearl
 Brooks, Wayne Guy
 Brotherton, Gene Michael
 Brown, Melvin Hugh
 Brown, Michael Corbett, Jr.
 Brown, Orville Kenneth, Jr.
 Brown, Richard Arnold
 Brown, Robert Edward
 Brown, Tommy Raymond
 Browning, Dural Wesley
 Bruerton, Charles Jan
 Bruninga, Robert Ervin
 Brydon, Wayne Robert
 Brzezinski, Walter Adam, Jr.
 Bucchi, Toney Michael
 Buce, Jack McKinley, III
 Buck Louis Eugene, Jr.
 Buff, Richard Cole
 Bulfinch, Scott Robert
 Bundschu, Lawrence Michael
 Burger, Jerome Paul
 Burgess, David Ross
 Burns, Gerald Thomas
 Burrows, David Reid
 Burtchell, Steven Gerard
 Burton, Robert Norman, Jr.
 Bush, William Frederick
 Bushore, Robin Paul
 Butler, Gregory Clinton
 Butler, Lonnie David
 Butler, Robert Edmund
 Butler, Thomas Alva
 Butler, William Robert
 Butorac, George Edward
 Butterfield, David Allan
 Butyn, Rene Francois
 Buzas, Michael Charles
 Byers, Bernarr Melton, Jr.
 Byrne, Neil Francis
 Cadden, Charles James
 Cahill, Edward Aloysius, III
 Cahill, Philip Thomas
 Cain, William Anderson
 Caldwell, Kenneth Wright
 Callahan, Daniel James
 Callaway, Michael Alan
 Cameron, John Stanley, III
 Cameron, Kerry Duane
 Campbell, Bruce Alan
 Campbell, Donald Leo
 Campbell, Phillip Wayne
 Campbell, Thomas John
 Cardoza, Rodney Wayne
 Carey, Charles Daniel, III
 Carey, John Dale
 Carley, Norman John
 Carlson, David Robert
 Carlson, James Robert
 Carlson, William Garrett
 Carney, James Mann
 Carr, Roger Wesley, Jr.
 Carroll, Joseph David
 Carson, Robert Lee, Jr.
 Carson, Steven Alma
 Carter, Frank Saulsbury, III
 Carter, James Butler, Jr.
 Carter, John Byrd, Jr.
 Carter, William Joseph
 Casey, Rodney Len
 Cash, Paul David
 Casko, John David

Cassidy, Richard Michael, Jr.
 Castell, Robert Blake, II
 Caster, Gary Don
 Castle, Kristopher Lee
 Cathcart, George Robert
 Caton, Robert Nelson
 Caudill, Gary Patrick
 Cauthen, George Barry
 Cavender, John Benjamin, III
 Chambers, Kenneth William, Jr.
 Chandler, Frank Lee
 Chandler, John Stephen
 Chaplin, Robert Charles
 Chapman, Steven Elliot
 Charley, Michael Bryan
 Chatham, Ralph Ernest
 Cheshire, Lehman Franklin I.
 Childers, Gary Neil
 Chitwood, Orvis Hugh, Jr.
 Chopp, Daniel Matthew
 Christenson, Larry Ray
 Christianson, Robert Neal
 Church, Larry Nathan
 Chwastyk, Thomas Frank
 Cloff, Gerald Alfred
 Clabaugh, Duane Lance
 Clabaugh, Ronald Stephen
 Clark, Gerald Wayne
 Clark, Richard Earl
 Clark, Robert Allen
 Clayton, Frederick W. III
 Clayton, William Todd
 Cleghorn, Larry Everett
 Clements, Frederick Roger
 Clemons, David Malcolm
 Click, Alan Richard
 Cloutier, Lawrence Paul, Jr.
 Cochran, Larry Lamont
 Cochran, Mark Dennis
 Cochran, Paul Reginald, III
 Cocozza, Timothy Robert
 Coffin, Robert Peter
 Cohen, Joseph Jeffrey
 Colcock, Marshall Gleason
 Coleman, Stephen Tredway
 Collins, David Oliver
 Collins, John George
 Collins, Robert Samuel
 Colombino, Ralph Frank, Jr.
 Colquhoun, Richard Bruce
 Colucci, Robert Joseph
 Connell, John Clay, Jr.
 Connell, Royal William, Jr.
 Connolly, Hubert Charles
 Conway, Patrick Michael
 Cook, Dennis Albert
 Coons, William Eric
 Coppins, Michael Frank
 Cornel Iussen Steven Thomas
 Cornwell, Joseph Henry
 Coronado, Tomas
 Cosgrove, Michael Alfred
 Cote, Joseph John, Jr.
 Counihan, Thomas
 Cox, Raymond Webster
 Crace, Jesse Allen
 Crain, Robert Levan, Jr.
 Crane, Allan Douglas
 Crane, Larry Stanley
 Cranney, Steven Joseph
 Creighton, Richard Alexandre
 Crisp, John Patrick
 Crisson, Phillip Mark Steve
 Crites, Don Michael
 Cronin, Timothy Gerard
 Crosby, Robert Carl
 Crosby, William Oscar, III
 Crossland, Roger Lee
 Crowder, James Dunn
 Crump, Mark Woodward
 Cruzan, Gary Lee Edward
 Crystal, Pete Atsushi
 Cudia, David Timothy
 Culp, Lowell Ronald
 Culwell, Clarence William J.
 Cumming, John Charles
 Cummings, Kevin Peter
 Cunningham, Curtis Brent
 Curran, Donald Joseph, Jr.
 Currier, James Whittet
 Currier, William Robert

Curtis, Keith Paul
 Curtis, Kendall William
 Cutcher, John McCormick
 Cyboron, Robert Edward
 Czech, Gregory Jacob
 Dailey, Eugene Terrence
 Daily, James Leon, II
 Dallara, Charles Harry
 Dampier, Craig Richard
 Daniel, Dale Franklin
 Darrow, Edward Eells, Jr.
 Davey, Douglas Harry
 Davies, Carl Robert
 Davis, Charles Carver
 Davis, David Lee
 Davis, Earl Ronald, Jr.
 Davis, John Charles
 Davis, Larry Thomas
 Davis, Norman Frederick
 Davis, Robert Lee
 Davolio, Joseph Francis
 Dawes, Larry Eugene
 Dawson, Howard Wesley, Jr.
 Dawson, James Cutler, Jr.
 Day, Jeffrey John
 Dean, Thomas Emanuel
 Deaver, William Nelson, Jr.
 Decker, Geoffrey Foster
 Deese, David Allen
 Defflese, Philip Leroy, Jr.
 Deinhardt, John Joseph
 DeJong, John Calvin
 Dekart, Donald Frank
 Delancey, James Douglas
 Delano, Kenneth Hatsil
 Delappa, John Edward
 Delorey, Michael Walter
 Delete, Clement Paul
 Demai, Nicholas Lee
 Demlein, John Joesph, Jr.
 Densley, Richard Lavern, Jr.
 Denson, Dwight Ellis
 Dent, Michael Wayne
 Denton, Larry Gene
 Denton, Walter Raymond
 Depoy, Lloyd Evan
 Dete, Leo Joseph, III
 Detweller, Jack Alan
 Deutsch, Joseph King
 Devane, John Murphy, III
 Devaney, James Francis
 Dewey, Roger Scott
 Diehl, George Francis, Jr.
 Dieter, Kenneth Albert
 Dietz, Douglas Warren
 Digiocomo, Raymond Vincent
 Dill, William Edward, Jr.
 Dillon, Neil Joel
 Dillon, Hall Stanton, II
 Dinger, John Parr
 Dobson, Wilbur Joel
 Dodd, Gerald Allan
 Dodd, Jack David
 Dodd, Richard Patrick
 Dodson, David Crockett
 Doehring, Robert Franklin
 Donahue, Edward Joseph
 Donnellan, David Francis
 Donohue, Philip Vincent, Jr.
 Dooley, Lawrence Joseph, Jr.
 Doolin, Robert Michael
 Doubleday, Michael Webb
 Doud, William Edward, Jr.
 Dougherty, Thomas James
 Douglas, Terry Scott
 Doyle, Martin Edward, Jr.
 Dozier, Thomas Cader, Jr.
 Drier, Melvin Franklin
 Driscoll, Richard Francis
 Driver, John Edward
 Duff, Vaughn Wayne
 Duffy, Eugene O'Donnell
 Duffy, Raymond Andrew
 Dumbauld, Jerry Ray
 Duncan, Lynwood Hart
 Dunlap, Thomas Rough
 Dunn, Franklin Thomas
 Dunn, Paul Owen
 Dunnington, Robert Alan
 Durazo, Manuel Ygnacio, Jr.
 Durham, James Leighton

Duval, David Alan
 Eadie, Lloyd Davis, Jr.
 Eason, William Ralph, Jr.
 Eckert, John Morris
 Eckert, Warren Raye
 Edwards, Bernard Darriel
 Edwards, Jesse Daniel
 Edwards, Raymond Lewis
 Ehret, Philip Harold
 Eick, Ira James
 Eisert, John Michael
 Eiel, Frederick John
 Ellingwood, Gerald Vincent
 Elliott, Charles Dewey, III
 Elliott, Thomas John, Jr.
 Ellis, Franklin William
 Ellis, James Manning
 Ellison, Curtis Joseph
 Ellison, Daniel A.
 Ellison, David Roy
 Emswiler, Robert Byers
 Enevoldsen, Jack
 Eney, Neilson Eugene, Jr.
 Erickson, Geoffrey Dell
 Ermentrout, Gerald George
 Ertel, Gregory William
 Erwin, Robert Ashley
 Eslinger, Philip David
 Estabrooks, Joseph Orlando
 Etten, Gary Albert
 Evans, Michael Allen
 Evans, Michael Frank
 Evans, Robert Bruce, Jr.
 Fahrenkrog, Steven Lock
 Fahy, Edward Joseph, Jr.
 Falstreau, Ronald Harold
 Falten, Paul J., Jr.
 Fargo, Thomas Boulton
 Farrell, Charles Stephen, Jr.
 Farrell, Gerard Michael
 Farrington, Robert Paul
 Farris, Marc
 Fatek, William Henry, Jr.
 Fedor, John Stephen
 Feichtinger, Mark Rudolph
 Felgate, George
 Felton, Bobby Joe
 Fenneman, Leigh Raymond
 Ferguson, Jeffrey Edward
 Ferry, John James, Jr.
 Fessenden, Richard Randall
 Fessenden, Steven Howard
 Fetter, Norman Leonard
 Fetzer, William Woodrow, Jr.
 Fidler, Walter Charles
 Fillmon, Louis Jason
 Fink, Jeffrey Jon
 Finn, Neil Charles
 Finnegan, Gerard Richard, Jr.
 Fiordaliso, Dennis Michael
 Fischer, William George
 Fish, David Allen Terry
 Fisher, Douglas Frank
 Fisher, Glen Andrew
 Fisher, Jack Alan
 Fiske, Richard Paul
 Fitch, Kevin Ferguson
 Fitchet, Charles Baxter
 Fitzgerald, Robert Lee
 Fitzgerald, William Robert
 Fitzgibbons, Paul Edwin
 Fitzpatrick, Richard Stephe
 Flaherty, James, Jr.
 Flaherty, Mark Ostrom
 Flaherty, Thomas John
 Fleischer, David Nathan
 Floyd, Stephen Donald
 Flynn, Peter Gregory
 Fogerty, Thomas Joseph
 Folga, Richard Michael
 Foote, Herbert Whittier
 Foote, Randall Edward
 Forbes, Ray Thomas
 Ford, Alexander Lawton, III
 Ford, Anthony Ellsworth
 Ford, Johnnie Edward
 Ford, Robert Enright
 Forrester, John Walter
 Fortik, Donald Floyd
 Foss, Harry Carson, Jr.
 Foster, Dave E.
 Foster, Michael Edward
 Foster, William Kim
 Fought, Earl Jay
 Fowler, Paul Lightle, Jr.
 Fowler, Thomas James
 Fox, John Williams, Jr.
 Fox, Mark
 Fox, William Leo, Jr.
 Fraley, Randall Martin
 Francis, John William
 Franklin, Gary Wayne
 Franklin, Marvin A., III
 Frasher, Steven John
 Freeburger, Thomas Oliver
 Freedman, Robert Norman
 Freeman, Harold Robert
 French, Ronny Wade
 Freybe, Harold
 Frick, Michael Glenn
 Fridell, Robert Allen
 Frieden, David Ralph
 Frith, Benjamin Newton, III
 Frydenlund, Douglas Timothy
 Fuller, Emil Andrew
 Fye, Robert Floyd
 Gaal, Gabriel
 Gable, Morrison Leslie
 Gaddie, Paul Ray
 Galdorisi, George Victor
 Gange, Dale Edward
 Gant, Virgil Fitzhugh
 Ganthner, Raymond William
 Gardner, Daniel Edward
 Garey, Alan William
 Garland, Gary William
 Garman, James Marshall
 Garman, Robert Bruce
 Garrison, Charles Figgins
 Garrison, Richard C.
 Gasink, Robert Ray
 Gates, Richard Wesley
 Gatewood, Joel Walter, Jr.
 Gautreaux, Terrence Michael
 Gavin, Joseph William
 Gaw, Richard Allan
 Geb, John Leonard
 Gelzer, Gary
 Gengler, Patrick Lee
 Gepford, Richard Donald
 Germany, Charles Joseph
 Getsinger, Clarence Layton
 Geyton, James Michael, Jr.
 Giambastiani, Edmund P., Jr.
 Gibbons, Peter Wickes
 Giffen, Robert Carlisle, III
 Gilchrist, Stanley Fredric
 Giles, Blaine Richard
 Gillcrist, John Anthony, Jr.
 Gillies, John Arthur
 Gimbel, Charles Robert
 Goen, Lewis Willis
 Goerg, Frederick Clarence
 Goforth, Michael Gerard
 Golle, Stephen Joseph
 Gonzales, Gilbert Manuel
 Goodman, Joe Anderson
 Goodrow, Everett Eugene, Jr.
 Gordon, Harold Leroy
 Gorman, Paul Richard
 Goss, Marlin Earl
 Gotha, William Francis
 Gould, Dexter Vernon
 Gradisnik, Gary Anthony
 Graef, Stephen Robert
 Graff, Clinton George, Jr.
 Graham, Bryce Lowell
 Graham, David Lee
 Graham, Richard Keagy
 Grasham, Michael Wayne
 Graul, Joseph Francis
 Graves, Edward Preston
 Greaves, Thomas William, Jr.
 Green, Albert Allen
 Green, Thomas James, Jr.
 Greene, Everett Lewis
 Gregor, Bruce John
 Gregory, Thomas
 Gresham, William Bacon, III
 Gretzinger, Larry Curtis
 Griffin, William Robert
 Griffith, Russell Lee
 Griffiths, Lee Edward
 Grimmer, George Kimbore
 Gronewold, David Allen
 Grossenbacher, John Joseph
 Grubb, Francis Bunyan, Jr.
 Grussendorf, Mark James
 Guardiano, Jerry John
 Guarneri, James Michael
 Guertin, Stanley Douglas
 Guest, Kenneth Wayne
 Guilford, Walter Byron
 Gunkelman, Ralph Frank, III
 Gunn, Robert Johnstone
 Gunter, Wallace Eugene, Jr.
 Guppy, Gerald Franklin
 Gurnon, Richard Gerard
 Guter, Donald Joseph
 Haas, Frank Armen
 Habermeyer, Kent Leigh
 Hackenburg, John Ray
 Hacker, John Michael
 Hackman, Rhodric Cina
 Haffner, Guy Allen
 Hagan, Charles Tilden, III
 Hagen, Paul Wendell
 Hagensick, John Richard
 Haggerty, Jerry Michael
 Hagood, James Timmons
 Haigis, John
 Halls, Alan Robert
 Haines, Frank David
 Hale, Douglas Alma
 Halgren, Robert Gustaf, Jr.
 Hall, Howard Robert
 Hall, Peter Dudley
 Hall, Richard Wendell
 Haller, Bernard Joseph
 Halvorson, George Henry
 Hambley, James Gilbert
 Hamlin, Kent Williams
 Hamm, Marvin Joseph, Jr.
 Hansell, William Richard, Jr.
 Hansen, Kisk Christian
 Hanson, Robert Thomas
 Haring, Peter Alan, Jr.
 Harmon, Robert Louis
 Harrell, John Peter, Jr.
 Harris, Clinton Page, II
 Harris, Dale Cooper
 Harris, John Kenneth
 Harrison, Bruce Rodney
 Harrison, Mark Morgan
 Harry, Robert Meade
 Harsch, Steven Merrill
 Hart, John Bernard
 Hart, Terry Curtis
 Hartje, Lynn Allen
 Hartle, Christopher Richard
 Harvey, Raymond Frank
 Hasbach, Robert Raymond
 Hash, Steven Peder
 Hauck, Russel Eric
 Haupt, Lloyd
 Havenstein, Gene Leon
 Havlik, Charles Earle
 Hawkins, Jeffrey Bert
 Hawkins, Stephen George
 Hawkins, Wayne Randolph
 Hayes, Jeffrey Thomas
 Hazelrigg, Steven Adolph
 Healy, Robert Jay
 Heaton, John Fredrick
 Heckmueller, John Howard
 Heinz, Stephen George
 Heitz, William Edward
 Held, Rene
 Helfen, William
 Helin, William Gary
 Helkey, John George
 Helmckamp, James Crum
 Henderson, Breck Wenger
 Henderson, Harold Allen
 Hendricks, Leon Alexander
 Henry, Dean
 Henry, Douglas Davies
 Henry, Joseph Gerard
 Henry, William David
 Herb, Robert Donald
 Herbert, Garry Lynn
 Herbert, Thomas George
 Herdrich, Harry Anthony, Jr.
 Hereford, Robert Butler
 Herman, Paul Irving

Herrman, Larry Virgil
 Hersh, Joel Randolph
 Hess, Nathan Martin
 Heuchert, Richard Herman
 Heyworth, Lawrence, III
 Hickman, Charles Ryan
 Higgins, James Raymond
 Hill, James Herbert
 Hill, Robert Wallace
 Hill, Roger Dale
 Hill, Ronald Maxwell
 Hillerman, Larry Alan
 Hinchliffe, Gregory Ward
 Hine, Jerry Gordon
 Hinson, Curtis Otho
 Hinson, Robert Henry, Jr.
 Hitchings, William Lee
 Hobbs, Hurshel Benton, Jr.
 Hobbs, Terry David
 Hodges, Dean Charles
 Hodges, James Edward
 Hogan, Daniel Timothy
 Hogan, John Edward
 Hogan, Patrick Michael
 Hoke, Mark Allan
 Holewa, John Gregory
 Hollenbach, Paul Douglas
 Hollimon, Geoffrey Lewis
 Hollinger, Wayne Melvin
 Hollon, Maurice Calvin
 Hollowell, Christopher W. L.
 Holm, Dwight Patrick
 Holt, Benjamin Lewis, Jr.
 Hopper, Geoffrey Victor
 Horner, Richard Lee
 Horsley, Russell Dewey
 Houck, Andrew William
 Houde, Paul Leo
 Houk, William Alvah
 Howard, Donald Reed
 Howard, James Elijah, Jr.
 Howard, John Finley
 Howard, Philip Graham
 Howard, Thomas Leslie, Jr.
 Hoyt, William Henry
 Hubbard, Van Richard
 Huddleston, Ronald Duane
 Hudgins, Thomas Eugene
 Huff, Terry Richard
 Huffman, Karl Howard
 Hughes, David Gerard
 Hughes, John George
 Hughes, Michael David
 Hunka, John Frank
 Hunter, David Tait
 Hunter, Edward Echerd
 Hurd, Paul Merrill
 Hurley, Douglas Edward
 Hussey, Anthony John, Jr.
 Husted, George Gerald
 Hutcherson, George Irvin
 Hutchins, Albert McConnell
 Hutchison, Guy Stuart
 Ice, Daniel Rawley
 Ide, Warren Harper, Jr.
 Ihrig, Clyde James
 Infinger, Jasper Milford
 Irby, Eldon Elmore
 Jackson, Charles Patrick
 Jackson, Gordon Campbell
 Jackson, Richard Kenneth
 Jackson, Robert Burns
 Jacobs, Roger Patrick
 Jacobson, John Frank
 Jacques, Harry Augustine, Jr.
 James, Bobby Campbell
 James, Roger Dean
 Jamison, Earl Joseph
 Jans, Jay Bennett
 Jeffcoat, John Phillip
 Jemison, Thomas Charles
 Jenkins, William Frost
 Jennings, Edward Payson, II
 Jensen, Gordon Mark
 Jensen, Jon Robert
 Jessen, Stanley Milton, Jr.
 Jewell, Glenn Albert
 Jinks, John Bradley
 Johanson, Donald William
 John, Paul Maret
 Johnson, Christopher Harry

Johnson, Dale Raleigh
 Johnson, Donald Howard
 Johnson, Gary Lee
 Johnson, Gary Quentin
 Johnson, Geoffrey Nicoll
 Johnson, Jack Arthur
 Johnson, Jon Robert
 Johnson, Richard Gray
 Johnson, Robert Alan
 Johnson, Thomas Everett, Jr.
 Johnson, Thomas Scott, Jr.
 Johnston, Darrell Edwin
 Johnston, James Edward
 Johnston, Michael McLeod
 Johnston, Wilford Paul
 Jones, Bobby Daniel
 Jones, Carlos
 Jones, Gordon Lee
 Jones, Steven Edward, Jr.
 Jordan, Boykin Bristow
 Jordan, James Abel, Jr.
 Justiss, Ronnie Lynn
 Kaahauul, Melvin
 Kaider, Donald Keith
 Kain, George Hay, III
 Kain, Michael Richard
 Kaiser, Charles Ellis
 Kaiser, Wayne Gordon
 Kampen, Roy William
 Kane, Jerry Allen
 Kane, John Edward, II
 Kane, Mark Anthony
 Kapololu, John Akahele
 Karch, George William
 Katz, Alan William
 Kaufman, Jack Emerson
 Kearney, James Phillip
 Keefer, Marc Martell
 Keefer, Thomas Brian
 Keen, James David
 Keesling, William Dale
 Kellas, John Calvin
 Keller, William Joseph, Jr.
 Kelley, Archie Parmelee, Jr.
 Kelley, John David
 Kellner, David Herman
 Kellum, William Clayton, Jr.
 Kemp, Bruce Raymond
 Kemp, William McIver
 Kendall, Charles Wilson
 Kenney, Daniel Francis, III
 Kenney, James Bradley
 Kenny, James Francis
 Kenyon, Larry Lee
 Keperling, Robert Edwin
 Kephart, John Gunnar
 Kern, Charles Michael
 Kerr, George Victor
 Kestly, Daniel Ralph
 Keymer, Kenneth Lee
 Keyser, Stephen Allen
 Kidd, Charles Davis
 Kidd, John Desta
 Kidder, John Lyndon
 Kidder, Paul Alfred
 Kidney, Jay Kimball
 Kincheloe, Everett Vernon
 King, Franklin Gary
 King, Peter Charles
 King, Robert Crippen
 King, William Anderson
 Kingseed, Jeb Bernard
 Kinne, Robert Thomas, Jr.
 Kipp, Terence Lynn
 Kirby, James Edward
 Kirner, Thomas Charles
 Kissinger, Robert John
 Klassen, Kenneth Wayne
 Kleehammer, Thomas
 Klein, William Carl
 Klementik, David Charles
 Kline, Bruce Gregory
 Klotz, Stephen Paul
 Klotz, Steven Irving
 Kluxen, David Stewart, Jr.
 Knieriem, Guy Robert
 Kniering, John Hoyell, Jr.
 Knock, Gary Lloyd
 Knoll, John Christian
 Knudsen, Michael Barry
 Knull, William Harlough, III

Knuth, Dean Leslie
 Koffend, Paul Francis, Jr.
 Kok, Timothy Alan
 Koller, Paul Stuart
 Komelasky, Michael Charles
 Kondrick, Harry Paul
 Koster, Thomas Wayne
 Kraemer, Thomas Edward
 Kraft, James Edwin
 Kramer, Kevin James
 Kraska, Kenneth Wayne
 Krstich, Jeffrey John
 Krupp, Thomas Michael
 Kuhne, Michael David
 Kunigonis, Michael Paul
 Kyle, William Carl
 Lachance, Norvel Wayne
 Lafleur, Timothy William
 Lagrone, James Marvin
 Lamartin, Douglass Hugh
 Lamb, Mark Edwin
 Lampert, Bruce Andrew
 Lampert, Jerry Jack
 Lancaster, Emmett John, II
 Landry, James Richard
 Langdon, Bruce Arnold
 Langell, James Floyd
 Langford, William Kent
 Laricks, James Richard
 Larson, David Allyn
 Larson, Larry Morris
 Larson, Marlin William
 Lashutka, Sergius
 Laska, Andrew John
 Latham, Rodney Guy, III
 Launey, Scott Riordan
 Lautenschlager, Jack Allen
 Lawless, Patrick Hubert
 Lawrence, James Ross
 Leary, John James, Jr.
 Leath, Dudley Wade
 Lechtenberg, Richard Clem
 Lee, Robert Edward
 Lehman, Jeffrey Allen
 Lentz, Joe Blane
 Letts, John Francis, Jr.
 Levy, James Malcolm
 Lewis, Barry Brooks
 Lewis, Charles Samuel
 Lewis, Robert Earl
 Lieurance, John Robert
 Lighthart, Lloyd William
 Ligon, Edward Campfield, IV
 Lingan, James Nickey
 Linger, Theodore Gerald
 Linkous, Harry Abraham, III
 Linquist, James Earl
 Linville, James Calder, Jr.
 Lipscomb, Jeffrey Ray
 Little, Robert Ernest
 Llewellyn, Jonathan Frame
 Locke, Gary Winfred, Jr.
 Locke, Stephen Allan
 Logan, William John
 Lohrmann, Walter Richard
 Long, Homer Richard
 Longa, William Christopher
 Loomis, Karl French
 Lopez, Clyde Cecil
 Loranger, Richard George
 Lord, Francis Buffum
 Lormor, Eugene Harold
 Losh, Dennis Michael
 Lovejoy, Jay Edward
 Lowe, Allan Ford
 Lowe, Walter Robert
 Loy, David Parker
 Lucero, Seferino
 Lundy, Robert Franklin
 Lunghofer, Dennis Michael
 Lunsford, Hollis Eugene
 Lupton, Stephen Charles
 Lynch, Robert Porter
 Lynch, Valentine Dillon, Jr.
 Lyon, Scott Roler
 MacBain, Richard Dennis
 Mace Frederick Earl, Jr.
 MacEvoy, John Anthony
 Machtley, Ronald Keith
 Mack, Lawrence John, Jr.
 Mackensen, Warren John

Mackenzie, Thomas Lyle
 Mackey, Robert Jemison
 Mackin, Patrick Charles
 Macpherson, Glenn Eldon
 Mader, Thomas Walter
 Madey, Stephen Laurance, Jr.
 Mady, Clemens James, Jr.
 Magaletti, Philip Joseph, Jr.
 Magnan, William James
 Magoun, Peter Robertson
 Magruder, Joseph Hull, Jr.
 Mahon, John Francis
 Mahoney, Dan Michael
 Mahoney, John Stanley
 Majchrowicz, Edward John
 Makl, Albert Stephen, Jr.
 Mallek, Robert Anthony, Jr.
 Malone, Laurence James
 Malone, Michael Dennis
 Malone, Robert Grant
 Maloney, Patrick James
 Mancini, Anthony Joseph
 Manes, Ezra Earl, Jr.
 Mangan, John Livingston
 Manis, John Jay
 Manning, Robert James
 Manson, Terrance Lynn
 Marcell, Frederick C., Jr.
 Marchi, John Albert
 Margo, Phillip Carmen
 Marino, John Theodore, Jr.
 Markle, Donald Franklin
 Marsh, Michael Thomas
 Marsh, Robert Dean
 Marshall, Leo Roy
 Marshall, Thomas George
 Martel, Reginald Timothy
 Martell, Jeffrey Robert
 Martella, Michael Baker
 Martin, Daniel Joseph
 Martin, David Alfred
 Martin, Robert Stanley
 Martino, Michael Fred
 Marvin, Gary Dillon
 Mason, James Thomas
 Mason, John Clyde
 Mason, Richard Edwin
 Massetti, Ennio
 Mast, Raymond Lee
 Mastrangelo, Robert Joseph
 Mathews, Carl Leon
 Matthews, Robert Brodnax, Jr.
 Mattison, Dennis Lee
 Mattox, Harvey
 Mauldin, Hugh Dubose, Jr.
 Maxey, James Robert, II
 Maxwell, Clarke Alvin
 May, Michael Dale
 Mayfield, Michael John
 Mazour, Thomas Joseph
 McAfee, John David
 McCampbell, David Perry
 McCauley, Alan Roger
 McClain, Tim Scott
 McClanahan, Joseph Edward
 McClane, James Lenus
 McCleer, James Lawrence
 McCleskey, Dale Leif
 McClure, David Gwin
 McComas, Jeffrey Clark
 McCombie, Ryan Joseph
 McCord, William Kirkland
 McCormick, Keith Joseph
 McCoy, James Glenn
 McCreary, Steven Alfred
 McCulley, Michael James
 McDougal, Willard Boyd
 McElroy, Fred Carl
 McElroy, Oliver Robert, Jr.
 McFalls, Tommy Ray
 McFarland, Stuart Edwin
 McGahan, Michael Patrick
 McGinnis, William Perry
 McGoey, Richard John
 McGrane, Myles Thomas
 McGrath, Francis Dennis
 McGugin, Leonard Fite, Jr.
 McGuire, David Nelson
 McGurk, Michael Edward
 McHale, James William
 McIntosh, Richard Cameron
 McIntyre, Lewis Frank

McKenny, Edward Russell, Jr.
 McKim, John Harvey, Jr.
 McMenamin, William Francis
 McMunn, Brock Allen
 McNamara, Brian John
 McNamee, John Robert, Jr.
 McPhail, Robert Bruce
 McPheeters, James Henry, Jr.
 McPherron, Charles Arthur
 McReynolds, Darwin James
 McReynolds, Michael Joseph
 McSorley, William Joseph, II
 Meacham, George Edward, II
 Meacham, John Monroe
 Meadowcroft, Robert Allen
 Mello, Gerald Charles
 Mellott, Paul Lloyd, Jr.
 Melson, Frank Baker, Jr.
 Merki, Richard Lewis
 Merritt, Thomas Brooke
 Messersmith, Ronald Edward
 Metter, Joel Jay
 Mettin, Verner, Edward, Jr.
 Meyer, Gary Charles
 Meyer, Glenn Warren
 Meyer, Jerry Lee
 Meyer, Robert Alan
 Meyertholen, Joseph A., Jr.
 Michaels, James Richard
 Michelsen, Gary Anthony
 Michelson, Dennis Clark
 Middle, James Leonard
 Midkiff, George Neil
 Mihalcik, Joseph Andrew
 Mikusi, Frank Charles
 Milano, Patrick Daniel
 Miles, Donald James
 Miles, Wilson Ashley, Jr.
 Milewski, Robert Francis
 Miller, David Damien
 Miller, Donald Dean
 Miller, Hubert John
 Miller, John Barrett
 Miller, Michael Luke
 Miller, Paul Howard
 Miller, Paul Lee
 Miller, Robert Peter, Jr.
 Miller, Roy Allen
 Miller, Stuart James
 Miller, William Garrett, Jr.
 Miller, William Harvey
 Milligan, Donald Ray
 Milner, Daniel Dewitt
 Mitchell, Elmer Ray
 Mitchell, Larry Joseph
 Mitchell, Tom Eugene
 Moe, George Lars
 Moffett, Edward Page
 Montgomery, John Bernard
 Moody, Jack Owen
 Moore, Edmund Eugene
 Moore, George, Elwick, III
 Moore, Larry Ichabod, III
 Moore, Richard Stewart, Jr.
 Moore, Thomas James, III
 Moran, Joseph John
 Moran, Matthew Francis, Jr.
 Morgan, Robert Wayne
 Morgan, William Randall
 Morgenfeld, Robert John
 Morris, Charles Robert
 Morris, Fredricke, McNeil
 Morris, Ralph Leslie
 Morrison, David Joseph
 Morse, John Prescott
 Mosby, David Cottrell
 Motten, Alexander Fewell
 Moulder, Edward Daniel
 Moulton, David Wales
 Moye, William Michael
 Mugg, William Allian
 Muhlhäuser, Steven
 Mulkeen, John Joseph, Jr.
 Mullen, Michael Charles
 Muller, David Gladning, Jr.
 Mulvey, Gerald Kevin
 Munson, Russell Grant
 Murphy, Charles Vincent
 Murphy, Daniel Joseph, Jr.
 Murphy, Dennis George
 Murphy, Michael James
 Murray, Michael Thomas
 Murray, Ronald Jay

Myers, Albert Clinton
 Myers, Terry Ray
 Nadeau, Walter Henry, Jr.
 Napior, Dennis Arthur
 Nassar, Albert Nicholas
 Nathan, Rodney Scott
 Nathman, John Bernard
 Neale, James Henry
 Nechvatal, Charles James
 Needman, Lester Dow
 Neel, Frederick Heard
 Nelms, Kenneth Lee
 Nelson, Christian Charles
 Nelson, Kenneth Lawrence
 Nelson, Neal James
 Nelson, Robert Terry
 Nemeth, Bradley William
 Ness, Robert William
 Neste, Carl Alfred
 Netzorg, Gregory Bertman
 Nevins, Michael Francis
 New, Melvin Roger
 Newberry, John Granville
 Newberry, Scott Fletcher
 Newton, Christopher Edward
 Nichols, Paul Malcolm
 Nickens, Donnell Jerome
 Nie, John Carlton
 Niedenthal, William Jeffrey
 Nintzel, Christopher Alan
 Nisbet, Peter Allen
 Nixon, Henry, Jr.
 Nolan, James Emmett, Jr.
 Noll, John Byard
 Noonan, Thomas Francis
 Norman, Richard Michael
 Norris, Rick Joseph
 Northrop, Thomas Wright, Jr.
 Nottingham, James H., Jr.
 Novak, Michael John
 Nunlist, Mark Moora
 Nurthen, William Augustine
 Nusom, Frank Allen, Jr.
 Nute, John Packard
 Nye, Geoffrey Robert
 Oakes, John Reid
 O'Bannon, Kenneth Leroy
 Oberholtzer, David Beardsle
 O'Brien, Leslie John, III
 O'Brien, William Patrick
 Ochs, John Lynn
 Ochsner, Steven Lewis
 O'Connell, Michael Alexander
 O'Dell, James Michael
 O'Dell, Paul, Jr.
 Oehler, James Christ
 Oehler, Michael William
 O'Hara, Charles Gabriel
 Olavessen, Leonard Robert
 Oldfield, Baird Dewes
 O'Leary, Thomas Joseph
 Oleson, Gary Yngve
 Oliver, Michael Patrick
 Olmstead, David Edward
 Olsen, Charles Clifford, Jr.
 Olsen, Fredrick, Lee
 Olson, Dennis Dean
 Olson, John Stephen
 Olson, John Theodore, Jr.
 Olson, Russell Clark
 O'Neil, Patrick Warren
 Otterbein, Thomas Gordon
 Otto, Sheldon Carter
 Overson, William Patrick
 Owen, Richard Lee
 Owen, Thomas Barron, Jr.
 Pacheck, Edward Richard, Jr.
 Paddock, Charles Guy
 Page, Alfred Leonard
 Paine, Maurice Terrell, III
 Paine, Stephen Robert
 Pairan, Craig Erik
 Palacheck, Daniel Lee
 Palla, Richard Warren
 Pallesen, David Conrad
 Palmer, Charles Frank
 Panico, John Russell
 Panowicz, Robert John
 Para, Alan Edward
 Pardee, William McKnight, Jr.
 Park, Patrick Joseph
 Parker, James Arren
 Parker, S. Dupree

Parker, Travis Wood, Jr.
 Parkin, Ernest Richard
 Parkin, Michael Cavenely
 Parks, Steven Greg
 Parks, William Hutchinson, Jr.
 Parsons, James Franklin
 Partesius, John Scott
 Paskewitz, Donald Peter
 Patch, Gregory Richard
 Pate, Michael Bence
 Patrick, Peter Devalangin
 Patterson, Donald Jay, Jr.
 Patterson, Philip Duane
 Patterson, Shonnie Jean
 Paulk, Ralph Caldwell
 Peacock, Frank Charles, Jr.
 Pearson, Robert Thomas
 Pedrotty, John Richard, Jr.
 Pelletier, Ronald Wilbrod
 Penhollow, Robert Henry
 Penn, Michael Gene
 Perch, Robert Leon
 Perin, Steven
 Perkins, Kevin Patrick
 Perkins, Thomas Arcade, III
 Perrault, Thomas James
 Perrin, Robert Warren
 Perry, James Elmer
 Perry, James Smith
 Perry, Oliver Hazard, III
 Peters, John Kenneth
 Peters, John Wesley
 Peterson, Elden Eugene
 Peterson, William Murray
 Pfahler, David Lee
 Philcox, John Ellis
 Phillips, David Shelby, III
 Phillips, Kenneth K.
 Phillips, William Joseph, Jr.
 Piech, Richard Frank
 Pierson, David Alexander
 Pike, Daniel Lee
 Plante, Kenneth Joseph
 Plunkett, John Cornelius
 Plyer, Bruce Arnold
 Poehlman, Philip James
 Pohl, John Sherman
 Pohl, Matthew John
 Pohl, William Charles
 Pola, Gary Lee
 Pollock, Richard Herbert
 Popikas, Charles Frederick
 Porter, David George
 Porzio, Raymond
 Potter, Charles Darrell
 Pounds, John William, Jr.
 Powell, George Alva
 Powrie, Stuart Robinson
 Pratt, James Wally
 Prell, Richard Edwin
 Preston, Noel Gary
 Prevette, Henry Slater, Jr.
 Priester, John Allison
 Prince, Robert Erskine
 Pritchard, Kenneth Wayne
 Prucha, Robert Stephen
 Puffer, David Brackett
 Purcell, Richard Lynn
 Purdue, Alexander William J.
 Purkrabek, David James
 Rackiewicz, David William
 Radeackar, Randy James
 Rakfeldt, Harry Ottomar
 Ralph, Russell Loomis
 Rand, Verl Allen
 Rankin, Randy Dale
 Ranney, Bruce William
 Rasmussen, Sam Eric
 Rawls, Robert Sherwood
 Raymond, Terry Alan
 Read, Thomas Sears
 Reager, William Reardon
 Reed, Frank Guy
 Reed, William Keeler
 Reed, William Scott, Jr.
 Regan, Francis Patrick
 Register, Stephen Thomas
 Regnier, Peter Allan
 Reich, Robert William
 Reichert, Timothy Martin
 Reid, Joseph Bagley
 Reifsnyder, Frank William J.

Reigner, Charles Buchanan
 Reinhardt, Charles Barnes J.
 Reinoehl, Phillip Wells
 Reynolds, Danny Wayne
 Rhedin, David Victor
 Rhodes, Harley Leroy
 Richardson, Billy Earl
 Richardson, Jack
 Rickabaugh, Frederick Lee
 Riddle, Andrew Spencer
 Riebe, Donald Elmer
 Riegel, Michael Glenn
 Ries, Robert Randall
 Rigg, Gary Lynn
 Riley, Benjamin Price, III
 Ringer, Charles Edward, Jr.
 Riolo, Robert Alan
 Rish, Robert David
 Riva, Robert Edmund
 Rivera, Jaime
 Roberson, William Henry, III
 Roberts, Crichton Carver
 Roberts, Michael Charles
 Roberts, Peter Garety
 Robertson, Andrew Coxe
 Robertson, Bernard Lee, III
 Robertson, Donald Joseph
 Robinson, Alan Russell
 Robinson, Frank Jeffrey
 Robinson, John Daniel, Jr.
 Robinson, John Gregory
 Roderick, Richard Michael
 Rodgers, Carl Todd
 Roed, Carl James
 Roeder, Paul Raymond
 Rogers, John Daniel
 Rogers, Mark Allen
 Rogers, Norman Lionel
 Rogge, John Arthur
 Rolek, Leo Stanley, Jr.
 Romano, Henry Schuberth, Jr.
 Root, Stephen Lloyd
 Rose, Stephen Anthony
 Rosemerry, James George
 Ross, Albert James, Jr.
 Ross, Michael Charles
 Rosselle, Michael Francis
 Rothrock, Ronald Lloyd
 Roundtree, Ronald Terrance
 Roy, Allan Harold
 Rudden, Francis Arthur
 Ruedisueli, Robert Louis
 Rugen, Sanford Longstreet
 Rugg, Daniel Maltby, III
 Rundall, David Glen
 Runnerstrom, Eric
 Rusch, Preston Godfred
 Ruszczyk, Richard Stanley
 Russack, John Alexander
 Ruth, Herbert Merton
 Rutter, Richard Way
 Ryan, Dennis Leo, III
 Ryan, Dennis Michael
 Ryan, Stephen Edward
 Sachon, Peter Anthony
 Saltenberger, William Mark
 Salter, Jesse Earl
 Samuel, Gary Bright
 Samuels, Arthur Michael
 Sanders, Doyne Hack
 Sanders, John Russell
 Sanders, Thomas William
 Sandin, Terry Lee
 Sansom, Byron Paul
 Santille, David Michael
 Sauer, George Emery, III
 Saur, Joseph Michael
 Savage, Carter Dow
 Savidge, Patrick John
 Sawyer, David Robert
 Scamihorn, Marvin Ross
 Scanlon, Charles Clark, II
 Schack, Robert Paul
 Schaffer, Lawrence Carl, Jr.
 Schear, Larry Robert
 Scheierman, Robert Leroy
 Scheine, Murray
 Scheiwe, David Arthur
 Schellhorn, Charles William
 Schempf, Peter William
 Schepman, Dennis Wayne
 Scherzer, James David
 Schilling, John Harding, Jr.
 Schmermund, William Henry
 Schmidt, Curtis John
 Schmidt, Donald Roger
 Schmidt, George Michael
 Schmidt, Hubert Francis
 Schmidt, Joseph Dunn, Jr.
 Schneider, James Eugene
 Schobert, Frederick George
 Schott, Jeffrey Michael
 Schrobo, Stephen Michael
 Schrot, John Robert
 Schwab, John Borden
 Schwartz, Harold Wayne
 Schwartz, Robert Wendell
 Scott, William Andrew
 Scruggs, Thomas Daniel, Jr.
 Seaman, Richard Curzon, Jr.
 Sedgwick, Gordon Lee
 Seeley, John Richard, Jr.
 Segur, Gregory Vincent
 Seitz, Thomas Alan
 Sellman, Robert Lee
 Semko, Paul Scott
 Serwicz, Thomas Gregory, II
 Seski, John Edward
 Sessler, Gregg Frederick
 Setzekorn, Robert Ray
 Seward, John Wesley, Jr.
 Sexton, James Stanley
 Shadday, Martin Andrew, Jr.
 Shaffer, John Nevin, Jr.
 Shannon, John Timothy
 Sharer, Kevin Woods
 Shaul, Michael C.
 Shaw, David Reginald
 Shaw, Robert Edward
 Sheehan, Timothy O'Grady
 Sheldon, Mark Nye
 Shepard, Scott Holman
 Shepherd, Richard Dewitt
 Shepherd, Wilbur French
 Sheppard, Dennis Dean
 Sher, Thomas Stewart
 Sherer, Charles Thaddeus, II
 Sherm, Gerald Frederick
 Shickle, David Lester
 Shields, John Thomas, III
 Shinn, Steven Craig
 Shonk, Merwyn Roop
 Shorts, Chester Arnold
 Shutt, Michael David
 Siegel, Dan Allen
 Silverthorne, Craig William
 Simmons, Michael Leroy
 Simpson, Gary Michael
 Sitz, William Wynn
 Skahan, Michael William
 Skerbec, Joseph Frank, Jr.,
 Skille, Alan James
 Skinner, Howard Arthur
 Skipper, John William
 Skolds, Charles Richard
 Slaght, Kenneth Duncan
 Slattery, Patrick John
 Slowik, Robert Louis
 Smith, Carl Chester, Jr.
 Smith, Carl Macon, Jr.
 Smith, Douglas Vaughn
 Smith, Earl Ramon
 Smith, Herbert Merrill
 Smith, John Walter
 Smith, Kenneth Flesco
 Smith, Kenton Leroy
 Smith, Robert Emmet
 Smith, Robert Emmett, Jr.
 Smith, Ronald Clark
 Smith, Stanley Harold
 Smith, Thomas Earl
 Smith, Thomas Holton, Jr.
 Smitherman, Robert Emerson
 Smoot, Arthur Eugene, Jr.
 Snapp, Paul Thornton
 Snell, Dean Allan
 Snell, Dennis Arthur
 Snelson, Jack Alvin
 Snowden, Ernest Maynard, II
 Snyder, Ralph Oscar
 Snyder, Ronald John
 Snyder, Thomas Frederick
 Songer, Steven Michael
 Spangler, Gary Gilbert
 Sparks, Howard Frank

Spear, Earl Jay
 Spears, Tommie Edward
 Specht, Robert David
 Speed, Claude Oscar, III
 Speh, Warren Glenn
 Spenser, Kenneth Vaughn
 Spong, Mark Edward
 Sponholz, Richard Otto
 Springer, Richard Samuel
 Sprinkles, Leonard Daniel
 Sproule, Robert Harvey
 Sponce, Frank Thomas
 Staehli, Christopher Paul
 Stahl, Dale Edward
 Standish, Leslie Clement
 Stanek, David Monroe
 Stanley, Jeffrey Dean
 Stanton, Richard Wayne
 Stasi, Frank Anthony, Jr.
 Stasiowski, James Michael
 Statuto, Mark Arthur
 Staudt, Gilbert Mark
 St. Clair, Kenneth Malcolm, Jr.
 Stearns, Richard A., III
 Stearns, Richard Charles
 Steelman, Barry Lee
 Stefkovich, Daniel Stephen
 Stenz, Robert Gall
 Stephens, Grant Schneider
 Steussy, William Howard
 Stevens, Robert Frederick
 Stevenson, Floyd Samuel, Jr.
 Stewart, Lowell Thomas
 Stewart, Michael McAlister
 Stiffler, James William
 Stiles, Gregory Allen
 Stillings, David Gordon
 Stockhaus, Daniel Quen
 Stockho, William Louis
 Stoddard, David Victor
 Storer, David Gene
 Stout, Charles Minor
 Strait, Chester Edwin
 Stratton, Larry Rodger
 Streeter, Bruce Allen
 Stribling, Ronald Anthony
 Strickland, Leroy Hickman
 Strong, David George
 Strong, Franklin Eugene
 Stroud, Charles Glayton
 Strzemieniski, Stephan Joseph
 Stuck, James Roland
 Suhr, James William
 Sullivan, John James, Jr.
 Sullivan, Paul Francis
 Sullivan, Timothy Finbar
 Sullivan, Walter Francis
 Sullivan, William Daniel
 Stutter, Ellis Dee, III
 Sutton, William Glenn
 Svoboda, John Michael
 Swah, Samuel Ryan
 Swanson, Raymond Peter
 Swigart, John Jacob, Jr.
 Swofford, Mark Dudley
 Swoope, James Paige
 Synowiez, Peter Mortimer
 Tabb, Henry Edmund, III
 Tabing, Mark Dana
 Talbot, Ronald Eugene
 Tallardy, Thomas John
 Tamburini, Robert
 Tanner, William Earl
 Tarter, Arlan Gilmore
 Taylor, Arch Edward
 Taylor, Eugene Warren
 Taylor, James Langdon
 Taylor, John McClellan
 Tempero, Thomas Lucas
 Terrible, Joseph Anthony
 Terry, Robert Joseph
 Tettelbach, Gary John
 Thaeler, Leigh MacQueen, Jr.
 Thayer, Paul Luke
 Thomas, David William
 Thomas, Mark Alan
 Thomas, Nauman Scott
 Thomas, Robert John, Jr.
 Thomason, William Rex
 Thompson, Benny Edward
 Thompson, Clayton Herbert J.
 Thompson, Douglas Scott
 Thompson, James Jay

Thompson, Richard Allen
 Thompson, Robert Bennett, Jr.
 Thompson, Robert Miller
 Thornhill, Daniel Bruce
 Tierney, Glenn Patrick
 Todorich, Charles Martin
 Townsend, Ronald David
 Treadway, Alton Glen
 Treichler, John Robert
 Tripp, Mark Steven
 Tsaggarris, Alexis
 Tucker, Benjamin William, Jr.
 Tucker, Malcom Richard
 Tudor, Tommy Neal
 Turbeville, Anthony Michael
 Turner, Prescott K., Jr.
 Turville, William Charles J.
 Tuttle, Donald Eugene
 Twyman, William Earl
 Tyler, Bobby Dale
 Tyler, Robert Jeffrey
 Updegrove, Edwin Wayne
 Utterback, Richard Lyn
 Uttich, Richard Michael
 Valeche, Hal Robert
 Vanamringe, Jon Eric
 Vanbrocklin, Stephen Ted
 Vance, Thomas Coates
 Vandenberg, George Edward
 Vanderbosch, Steven William
 Vandusen, Peter
 Vanhee, Richard Charles
 Vanhoose, Ronald D.
 Vantassel, Paul Franklin
 Vantine, Kirk Kelso
 Vantrease, Cameron Kent
 Vanwie, Steven Leroy
 Vaughn, David Joseph
 Vechinski, Gregory Joseph
 Vercher, John Buford
 Vettese, Anthony
 Vick, Don Allen
 Vine, Gary Lee
 Vines, Larry Paul, Sr.
 Viney, Robert Michael
 Visco, Dominick Wayne
 Vogel, Paul Heath
 Vonlintig, Richard David
 Vsetecka, Leonard John
 Waddell, James Barry
 Waddle, James Michael
 Wade, James Michael
 Wahl, Frank Bernard, Jr.
 Walker, Arthur Thomas
 Walker, David Russell
 Walky, Kenneth James
 Wallace, Harold Boyette
 Walmsley, Stephen Robert
 Walt, Douglas Orville
 Walters, Ronald Wayne
 Walton, Jerry Eugene
 Ward, Robert Earl Eugene
 Waterman, Marc Norris
 Watkins, John Bruce
 Watkins, William Allen
 Watson, Anthony John
 Watson, Donald Reed, Jr.
 Weaver, Lloyd Rollin
 Weaver, Sterrie Leon, Jr.
 Webb, Stephen Eugene
 Webb, William Francis
 Webb, William Jennings, Jr.
 Weber, William Lloyd III
 Weborg, Gene Marvin
 Webster, Edward Mullender J.
 Webster, Michael Thomas
 Weeks, Bill Frank
 Weeks, John Linton III
 Weeks, Stanley Bryon
 Weigel, Jay Ellis
 Well, Thomas Eliot, Jr.
 Weisopf, Carl Eugene
 Welch, Benjamin Harrison, II
 Wells, Carl Stanley
 Wells, John Timothy
 Wertz, Bruce Neal
 West, James Clyde, Jr.
 Westcott, Gerald Michael
 Westcott, Richard Elliott
 Westerfeld, Donovan Earle
 Whalen, Regis Emmett
 Wheeler, Harold Nelson

Whilden, Francis Covington
 Whitaker, Charles Henry, Jr.
 Whitaker, Clayton Edmund
 Whitaker, Dwight Vestal, III
 White, Bradley Thomas
 White, John Thomas
 White, Oakley Francis
 White, Richard Dehaven
 White, Stephen McConnell
 Whitman, David Robert
 Whitmire, Dewey Laland
 Whitt, Ervin Bishop, Jr.
 Whitten, George Brine, III
 Whitworth, John Burton, III
 Wick, Carl Eric
 Wildener, Lynn Harbour
 Wiedeman, David Blair
 Wiens, Leonard Arnold
 Wilder, Hubert Boone, III
 Wilder, Marc A.
 Wilkins, Thomas William
 Will, George Frederick
 Williams, Bruce Warren
 Williams, Charles Baxter
 Williams, Charles Leroy
 Williams, Douglas Henry
 Williams, Galbraith Denny J.
 Williams, James Howard
 Williams, Reginald Lewis, II
 Williams, Thomas Yeaman
 Williamson, Edward Hughes
 Willis, Thurman Lamar
 Wilson, Bryan Paul
 Wilson, Charles Howard
 Wilson, Dennis Alan
 Wilson, James Orville
 Wilson, Phillip Robinson
 Wilson, William Burton
 Winger, Philip Gray
 Winowicz, Stanley Joseph, Jr.
 Winslow, Robert Michael
 Winston, Bruce Howard
 Wirkkala, Richard Earl
 Witte, Thomas Michael
 Wittkamp, Thomas Michael
 Wittmann, William Warren
 Wlodarczyk, Edward
 Wolf, Peter Thomas
 Wolfe, Daniel Thomas
 Wolfe, Theodore Sheffer
 Wolfe, Wayne Leonard
 Wood, Don Alan
 Wood, Ronald Dewey
 Wood, Stephen Murray
 Woodall, Jonathan Hill
 Woodard, John Houghton
 Woods, Gerald Bishop
 Worms, Brent Leslie
 Wright, Brian Earle
 Wright, David Neil
 Wright, Gerrit Lee
 Wright, Herbert Rawson, III
 Wright, John Thomas
 Wright, Jon Robert
 Wurst, Frank Leonard
 Wurzel, David Lawrence
 Wyatt, Thomas Verden
 Wyld, Thomas Clinton
 Wylie, Pete
 Yash, Charles Joseph
 Yeates, Richard Morris
 Yerick, Martin Rudolph
 Young, Charles Bruce
 Young, William Fielding
 Zaborowski, James Joseph
 Zackary, Fort Arthur, Jr.
 Zambardi, Paul Anthony
 Zavadil, Stephen Wayne
 Zeola, John Patrick
 Zgolinski, Albert George
 Ziebell, Donald Robert
 Zielinski, Leon John
 Zimmerman, William Lee
 Zins, Michael James
 Zogmann, Paul Samuel
 Zysk, Thomas Stephen

MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS

Arnold, Anthony Ray
 Berkley, Roy Lee
 Criscitiello, Joseph John
 Donohue, Edwin Allen
 Dumais, Gary Wayne

Dunaway, Floyd James
 Ferda, Robert
 Hanrahan, James Edward
 Hardy, Frederick Charles
 Hora, Charles Donald
 Kraft, John Edward
 Lamar, Steven Richard
 Lobaugh, Larry Gene
 Marolf, Walter Keithley
 Mitchell, Michael Lenard
 Mumford, William Maxwell
 Surratt, Colonel Ogburn
 Swales, George Aloysius
 Terry, Lynn Marion
 Williams, Ralph Thomas

JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S CORPS

Harmon, Gerald Robert
 Regan, William Anthony

NURSE CORPS

Brown, Donald William
 Cox, Robert Leroy, Jr
 Cuddy, Susan Ann
 Guy, Bruce David
 Jung, James Wyland
 Lefort, David Michael
 McBurney, Richard Ellwood
 McPherson, Robert Carter
 Minzes, David Herman
 Peske, Lorelei Sue
 Pickens, Connie Lynn
 Zuber, Beverly Anne

SUPPLY CORPS

Anastasi, Richard
 Anunson, Merton Gregory
 Bishopp, Weller Stephen
 Bleier, Frederick Leo
 Blood, Roger John
 Bollman, Terry Lee
 Bothe, James John
 Brian, James Sanford
 Brooks, Ted Edward
 Burbridge, Robert Lee
 Burdett, James Randall
 Bush, Stephen Alan
 Cardinali Henry Albert, Jr
 Carter, David Maxon
 Casey, Michael Wayne
 Caskey, Carl Anthony
 Coats, Daniel Michael
 Compton, David Dean
 Conklin, Michael Douglas
 Cook, David Michael
 Cormier, Edward Norris, Jr.
 Cornelison, Gary Alan
 Cote, James Raymond
 Cubbedge, Carlon Eugene
 Davis, Thomas III
 Dickey, Thomas Edward
 Dickson, Robert Monroe
 Dowell, Billy Ray
 English, David Floyd
 Farlow, Roger Kent
 Faubell, Paul David
 Faucher, David Paul
 Felle, Robert Eugene
 Ferris, William Michael
 Fitzsimmons, Joseph James
 Flahiff, Daniel Edward
 Flanagan, John Edward, Jr
 Foerster, John Michael
 Frary, Charles Marmon
 Fulton, Daniel Stuart
 Gilbert, Dale Alton
 Gillette, Robert Corcoran
 Greene, Alan Robert
 Gronfein, Jerome Bruce
 Grove, Jerome Paul
 Hanson, Ryan Lewis
 Hassenplug, John Keith
 Hastings, Richard G., III
 Havey, Patrick Joseph
 Hawkins, Paul Russell
 Hinson, Kenneth Earl
 Hinton, James Reid
 Hodges, James Virgil
 Holbach, James Henry
 Huber, David Lee
 Jackson, William Andrew
 Johnson, Earl Winslow, Jr.
 Johnson, Jay Carter
 Johnson, Mark Scott

Johnson, Terrence Bateman
 Jones, Samuel Lynn
 Joyce, Robert Joseph
 Kawakami, Clarke Kiyoshi
 Keith, William Brett, Jr.
 Kimmel, Charles Bryan, Jr.
 Klase, Kenneth Allen
 Klingelberger, Carl Ervin
 Krey, Russell Warren
 Kwiatkowski, William Stanle
 Lafauci, Roger John
 Lawton, James Patrick
 Lombardi, John Ray
 Loney, James Eldredge
 Lowdermilk, Richard Francis
 Lyness, James Douglas
 Machado, Bruce Mervin
 Madaio, Paul Frank
 Marchetti, Ronald Andrew
 Martin, Walter Francis, Jr.
 McCulloch, John William
 McDermott, Thomas Ward
 McGown, James Hewitt
 McNaughton, Paul Thomas
 Meredith, Clarke Henry
 Merrell, Thomas Orin
 Moeller, William Griswold
 Morgan, David
 Morgan, Steven Robert
 Morrell, Dennis Lee
 Morton, George Henry E., III
 Mumma, Donald Charles
 Murphy, Robert Emmet
 Noble, Mark Raftrey
 Nyland, Stephen Carel
 Pearrell, Larry William
 Pendarvis, Daniel, III
 Phelps, Richard Patrick
 Pope, Michael Stanley
 Post, Stephen Edward
 Price, Samuel Russell Dow
 Purdy, Kenneth Coburn
 Ramsey, Phillip Grayson
 Randall, Thomas Edward
 Reese, James Mackintosh
 Rinaldo, John Charles
 Ritzel, Charles James
 Rodenbarger, Syd W.
 Ryan, Robert Joseph
 Schimpf, Barry John
 Scott, Douglas Thompson, Jr.
 Siemers, Uwe
 Simmers, Walter William
 Smith, Charles Sinclair
 Smith, Emmett Wilson
 Smith, Kerry Jon
 Smith, Robert Coleman
 Snyder, Michael John
 Stanger, Thomas Joseph
 Stephens, Jan Braven
 Stokes, David Vose
 Stolle, John Richard
 Suermeyer, Robert Storck
 Tarver, James Edward
 Thomas, Michael
 Thorpe, Grant William
 Tinker, William Marshall
 Tissier, Robert Joseph
 Turpie, James Alastair G.
 Walker, Allan Warren
 Walsh, Robert Arthur, II
 Walter, Frederick Sebastian
 Webb, James Arrington, III
 White, Charles Elbridge
 White, John Philip
 Wieczorek, Richard Joseph
 Wilhite, Bernard Lee
 Wilson, Paul Abernathy
 Wood, Stephen Joseph
 Woods, Charles Johnathan
 Young, Charles K.
 Young, Robert Wright

CIVIL ENGINEER CORPS

Becker, Raymond Herbert
 Bleakley, Robert Lockwood J.
 Borowski, Casimir Jan, Jr.
 Cahill, Patrick Joseph
 Cambron, George Keith
 Carpenter, Ronald Gary
 Casey, Michael Francis
 Dalton, Howard Griffin
 Deluca, John, Jr.

Delunas, Leonard James
 Ferguson, John Owens
 Hanley, John Timothy
 Headrick, Jay Clark
 Hisey, Howard Alan
 Johnson, Michael Ray
 Martin, Norman Richard
 Micheau, Terry Wayne
 Molineaux, Ian Joseph
 Mondoux, William Joseph, III
 Nettesheim, Richard David
 Newton, Willis Gerald
 Pilie, Joseph Maurice, Jr.
 Rockwood, Thomson Whitin

Rowett, Henry Matthew

Samuelson, Gene Roy

Schraud, Henry Frank, Jr.

Shepard, David Bruce

Smith, Earl Lee, Jr.

Spore, James Sutherland, III

Teater, Richard Michael

Thomas, Kenneth Wilson, Jr.

Thompson, Stephen Ray

Venable, Joseph Brown

Vogt, John Fredric

Wade, Richard Louis

Walley, James Marvin, Jr.

Walsh, David Frank

Wenck, Stanley Erlin

Williams, James Randolph

Wright, James Christopher

The following named women officers of the U.S. Navy for permanent promotion to the grade of lieutenant in the line, subject to qualification therefor as provided by law:

Barrett, Margaret Doris

Batchellor, Mary Pamela

Blackwood, Elizabeth Anne

Crounse, Carole Heath J.

Gifford, Mary Suzanne

Borst, Sharolyn Benfell

Groves, Linda Katherine

Hoag, Trudy Lynne

Humphreys, Mary Margaret

Johnson, Linda Kay

Kacer, Joanne Alice Camille

Long, Sandra Kay

Matarese, Marcia Dorothy

McCormick, Margaret Ellen

McCue, Sharon Elizabeth

McGann, Barbara Elizabeth

Melson, Leslie

Moll, Kathleen Margaret

Neuffer, Judith Ann

Patterson, Carol Anne

Reish, Margaret Ann

Roberts, Karyl Kaye

Rutherford, Louise Margot

Sanders, Penelope Lane

Schmidt, Dorothy Jean

Skaling, Kathleen Dell

Tracey, Patricia Ann

Vinson, Rebecca Gurley

Walker, Mary Anne

West, Linda Lou

Wheaton, Martha Jane

Zielinski, Margaret Mary

Zmich, Arlene Sharon

Lt. (junior grade) George B. Gilbert, U. S. Navy, for temporary promotion to the grade of lieutenant in the Supply Corps, subject to qualification therefor as provided by law.

Lt. Comdr. Gerald R. Sylvain, Medical Corps, U. S. Navy for temporary promotion to the grade of lieutenant commander in the Medical Corps, subject to qualification therefor as provided by law.

The following-named officers for temporary promotion to the grade of lieutenant in the line of the U. S. Navy, subject to qualification therefor as provided by law:

Milham, Russell O.

Goodnight, Lyman Evans, III

Ricksecker, William Grant

Comdr. Norman W. Busse, U. S. Naval Reserve for transfer to and appointment in the Judge Advocate General's Corps in the permanent grade of commander.

The following-named officers of the U. S. Naval Reserve for transfer to and appointment in the Supply Corps in the permanent

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

September 27, 1973

grade of lieutenant (junior grade) and the temporary grade of lieutenant:

Cole, Anthony L. McKenna, James L.
Culver, Kenneth D. Walters, Melville J., III
Gernertz, Thomas J.

Lt. William J. Anderson, Jr., U. S. Navy for transfer to and appointment in the Civil Engineer Corps in the permanent grade of lieutenant (junior grade) and the temporary grade of lieutenant.

The following-named officers of the U. S. Navy for transfer to and appointment in the Supply Corps in the permanent grade of lieutenant (junior grade):

Arcuri, Louis E. Heinen, Jerry J.
Bianco, Barron B. Smith, Barry L.
Gunter, Wallace E., Jr.

Lt. (junior grade) Guy R. Bafus, U.S. Navy for transfer to and appointment in the Civil Engineer Corps in the permanent grade of lieutenant (junior grade).

The following named officers of the U. S. Navy for transfer to and appointment in the Supply corps in the permanent grade of ensign:

Argue, Arthur C., III Perkins, George W., Jr.
Barrs, Jack C. Potampa, Whitton M.
Frazier, Robert B. Raymond, A. Ritchey
Hoffman, Lee D. Sims, Donald B., Jr.
Lottes, William R. Wright, Dennis L.

Ensign Michael W. Prasklevic for transfer to and appointment in the Civil Engineer Corps in the permanent grade of ensign.

The following named officers of the U. S. Navy for permanent promotion to the grade of lieutenant (junior grade) in the line and staff corps, as indicated, subject to qualification therefor as provided by law:

Adams, Michael R. Beuerlein, Alan F.
Ambersley, Robert T. Birkholz, Howard D.
Anderson, Barton F. Black, Richard A.
Barbour, Richard E., Jr. Bloomfield, Walter W., Jr.
Beckley, Stephen A. Borsh, Richard M., Jr.
Bell, Marvin L. Boyter, William T.
Benko, Michael J. Brennan, David M.
Bernard, Eugene P., Jr. Briggs, Bruce K.

Brooks, Wayne G. Gatewood, Joel W., Jr.
Brown, Jerry K. Getsinger, Clarence L.
Benko, Michael J. Gillies, John A.
Bernard, Eugene P., Jr. Gilmer, Franklin B.
Beuerlein, Alan F. Gorman, Paul R.
Birkholz, Howard D. Graham, Linda L.
Black, Richard A. Graybill, Jon Gilbert
Bloomfield, Walter W., Guliford, Walter B.
Jr. Hall, Peter D.
Borsh, Richard M., Jr. Harlow, Margaret A.
Boyter, William T. Hawkins, Wayne R.
Brennan, David M. Hayden, Robert L.
Briggs, Bruce K. Hendricks, Leon A.
Brooks, Wayne G. Hodges, Dean C.
Brown, Jerry K. Hollimon, Geoffrey L.
Brown, Stephen J. Hoople, Douglas D.
Browne, Joseph M. Howard, Philip G.
Cahill, Edward A., III Jessen, Stanley M., Jr.
Caldwell, Kenneth W. Kennish, James R.
Cameron, Kerry D. Keen, Wayne C.
Carlson, James R. Kidd, Charles D.
Chopp, Daniel M. Klassen, Kenneth W.
Clabaugh, Ronald S. Larson, Marlin W.
Clark, James R., Jr. Lashutka, Sergius
Clifton, Lowell D. Linger, Theodore G.
Cole, Anthony L. Lover, Kevin F.
Collignon, Michael J. Loy, David F.
Conner, Barbara A. Mahoney, Dan M.
Copper, Bruce D. Marchi, John A.
Cox, Patrick George Martin, Richard F.
Crane, Larry S. Mason, Roger E.
Crosby, Richard A. Mattox, Harvey
Crouch, Orren R. Maturi, Harold J.
Curtis, Kendall W. Mayon, Michael H.
Dargo, Ronald S. McCabe, Michael J.
Dawes, Larry E. McComas, Jeffrey C.
Doby, Brian K. McCoy, James G.
Doubleday, Michael W. McGrath, Thomas R.
Duncan, Lynwood H. McReynolds,
Dutra, Edward P., Jr. Darwin J.
Faine, Levarn L., Jr. Meyer, Jerry L.
Farrington, Robert P. Monteville, Arthur R.
Fatek, William H., Jr. Morgan, Robert W.
Fenoughty, Carolyn A. Motolenich,
Flynn, Peter G. Stephen E., Jr.
Forrest, William T. Munson, Russell G.
Foster, Dave E. Neims, Kenneth L.
Freeman, Harold R. Netzorg, Gregory B.
Gadzinski, Gary F. Nie, John C.

O'Brien, Leslie J., III Sponholz, Richard O.
Ochs, John L. Stanton, Richard W.
Oleson, Gary Y. Stiles, Joseph E.
Oliver, Larry L. Stillings, David G.
Overend, William J. Taylor, James E.
Parker, Travis W., Jr. Taylor, Samuel W.
Payne, Robert L., Jr. Thomas, Joseph W.
Phelps, Roy L. Thomas, Robert J., Jr.
Putman, Michael W. Utterback, Richard L.
Pyne, Joseph H. Vanbrocklin, Stephen
T.

Vandenberg, George E.
Rannells, David A. Vanwie, Steven L.
Ratner, William D. Waite, Robert C.
Reece, Stephen M. Weimerskirch, John P.
Roed, Carl J. Westendorf, William J.
Royall, Michael B. Williams, James H.
Russack, John A. Williams, Reginald L.,
Sandin, Terry L. III
Saur, Joseph M. Wilmot, James W.
Schilling, Ronald K. Woodring, Roger O.
Scruggs, Thomas Jr. Worms, Brent L.
Sharpe, Bruce E. Wylie, Pete
Simmons, William R. Yeates, Richard M.
Speed, Claude O., III Zuger, Margaret A.

MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS

Blome, Michael A. Hermann, Dean A.
Criscitiello, Joseph J. Leadbeater, Warrell F.

NURSE CORPS

Ahrens, William D. Hamachek, Susan M.
Bessent, William M. Minzes, David H.
Beveridge, Beverly A. Petersen, Patricia L.
Gookin, Jeannine K. Roberts, James W.

SUPPLY CORPS

Anunson, Merton G. Johnson, Darold L.
Beaty, Richard M. Pennington, Craig H.
Bender, Danny A. Richards, James C.
Compton, David D. Ridgley, Joe L.
Crandall, Stephen G. Ross, Charles A.
Featherstone, Harry Shirley, Richard H.
L., Jr. White, Charles E.
Gibbons, Lawrence B. Woods, Charles J.
Herrington, Michael C. Young, Charles K.
Jenkins, Gwilym H., Jr.

CIVIL ENGINEER CORPS

Casey, Michael F. Venable, Joseph B.

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

FULLER WARREN: 1905-73

HON. CHARLES E. BENNETT

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, September 25, 1973

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Speaker, I join with all thoughtful Americans in tribute to former Florida Governor, Fuller Warren, whose recent death so deeply distressed everyone in Florida.

Governor Warren came from a humble background of hard work on a farm near Blountstown, Fla., and perfected in himself the qualities of character and leadership which led ultimately to his being Governor of Florida and he accomplished many fine things as Governor and in other positions of public responsibility.

Along the way in his life he blessed the lives of all those who knew him with his friendship, kindness, and inspiration. Personally I remember his thoughtfulness when he suggested to former Congressman Lex Green that I run to succeed Congressman Green when he stepped out of the position of representing the Second Congressional District of Florida. This was in 1941. Congressman Green called me and made this suggestion that I run and I did run until World War II began and I dropped out of the

race to serve in a military service at that time. Immediately after coming back from the service I ran and was elected in 1948. Incidentally, in the meantime both Fuller Warren and Lex Green served in the armed services during that war. Fuller's thoughtfulness to me and that of Lex Green were typical of both of these fine men and I will forever be grateful.

Governor Warren never forgot those who elected him to office. For the people who shared with him a vision of better things for our State and our Nation, his successes were in turn their successes. This is the way that good politicians should always act. Governor Warren will always be an inspiration to me, not only because of his public life, but because of the warmth and human love that he expressed to all, including those who disagreed with him.

Mr. Speaker, I include at this point an editorial from the Florida Times-Union which speaks eloquently of this fine man's achievements for his fellow man:

FULLER WARREN: 1905-73

Tomorrow Fuller Warren will be returned to the Florida soil over which he toiled in his youth, as a cotton picker working for 75 cents a week and board, on a farm near Blountstown.

Although his career took him to the seats of the mighty, he never really left home in one sense. It was so much a part of him that he carried it along wherever he went.

Although his career took him to the seats of the mighty, he never really left home in one sense. It was so much a part of him that he carried it along wherever he went.

Gov. Fuller Warren, the mellifluous orator with the prematurely gray hair and the burden of weighty decisions, didn't let the pomp and circumstance with which he was surrounded warp his perspective.

He kept the wry Cracker humor that could not resist puncturing a pretension even when that pretension was his own. He kept the real reverence he felt for the state, its traditions and its government from getting pompous by periodically treating his own awe with a jocular irreverence.

During his very early years, he drove a cart in a sawmill, went to sea as a steward on a passenger ship, sold Bibles in the mountains of Alabama, worked in a livery stable, on a survey gang, farmed, dipped cattle, and did, as he is quoted by Allen Morris, "innumerable other kinds of dispiriting labor."

He suffered his first political disappointment at the age of 13 when he was an unsuccessful candidate for page in the Florida Legislature. But by the time he was 21, he had already been elected a member of the Florida House of Representatives from Calhoun County.

He later served as Jacksonville City Councilman for three terms, state representative