

Brigadier General Marion L. Boswell, xxx-xx-x...
 FR, Regular Air Force.
 Brig. Gen. Kenneth L. Tallman, xxx-xx-xxxx
 FR, Regular Air Force.
 Brig. Gen. Otis C. Moore, xxx-xx-xxxx
 FR, Regular Air Force.
 Brig. Gen. Frederick C. Blesse, xxx-xx-xx...
 FR, Regular Air Force.
 Brig. Gen. James V. Hartinger, xxx-xx-xxxx
 FR, Regular Air Force.

U.S. ARMY

The following-named officer under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 3066, to be assigned to a position of importance and responsibility designated by the President under subsection (a) of section 3066, in grade as follows:

To be lieutenant general

Maj. Gen. Howard Wilson Penney, xxx-xx-x...
 U.S. Army.

CONFIRMATIONS

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate February 14, 1972:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Willis C. Armstrong, of New Jersey, to be an Assistant Secretary of State.

Kenneth Franzheim II, of Texas, now Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to New Zealand and to Western Samoa, to serve concurrently and without additional compensation as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Fiji.

John I. Getz, of Illinois, a Foreign Service officer of class 1, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Malta.

Albert W. Sherer, Jr., of Illinois, a Foreign Service officer of class 1, to be Ambassador

Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

Matthew J. Loomam, Jr., of the District of Columbia, a Foreign Service officer of class 1, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Somali Democratic Republic.

Robert Anderson, of the District of Columbia, a Foreign Service officer of class 1, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of Dahomey.

Anthony D. Marshall, of New York, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Trinidad and Tobago.

Robert Strausz-Hupé, of Pennsylvania, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Belgium.

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

YOUTH WITH A PURPOSE

HON. WILLIAM H. NATCHER

OF KENTUCKY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 9, 1972

Mr. NATCHER. Mr. Speaker, during the week of February 19 through 26, the Future Farmers of America will celebrate their 44th birthday. It is not accidental that this fine organization has picked this particular time to celebrate its anniversary. The birthday of one of our Nation's greatest leaders, George Washington, falls on February 22 and it is in honor of him that this splendid group annually designates the Saturday before his birthday through the Saturday after his birthday as FFA Week. George Washington's love for America was matched by his love for farming and we can be thankful for his many significant contributions to agriculture. It is almost impossible to separate the man from the land he loves and George Washington was no exception.

Boys and girls, aged 14 through 21, residing in 49 States, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico actively participate in the many worthwhile activities of the FFA. It has a membership of 430,000 students studying vocational agriculture in 8,200 public schools. The strength of the FFA lies in its local chapters. The members are taught agricultural skills by their chapter adviser in an effort to better prepare them for tomorrow when many people will rely on the skills they are learning today.

The mass exodus to the cities over the past few decades has left many rural areas weak and stagnant while the urban centers have become overpopulated, impoverished, and plagued with crime. These trends must be reversed in order to establish a better distribution of population and economic activity so vital to the future of America. The destiny of our great country lies in the hands of its youth and the FFA is successfully pointing its members in the right direction.

FFA's Building Our American Communities—BOAC—program, now in its

third year, is designed to improve communities across the Nation. One aspect of this program deals with actual physical improvements such as building parks and ecological centers, renovating old storefronts, landscaping football fields, constructing outdoor recreational centers, and a general overall clean-up of the communities and their surrounding areas. Another facet of the program deals with social problems such as unemployment. Job placement services have been set up to assist students in finding summer and part-time employment. Career counseling is also available to those planning for future occupations. The FFA has been extremely successful in obtaining the cooperation of non-members who wish to improve their surroundings and better their communities.

The theme of FFA Week this year is "Youth With a Purpose." The plans of these fine young people do not begin and end with the environment. Agriculture exceeds the boundaries of the farm. In their vocational agriculture classes the students learn the technology of production, supply, processing, and distribution; they learn the science of farming and how to preserve the soil; they learn the practical application of farming techniques with a minimum of supervision and are thus prepared for the time when they will be on their own. They are given the opportunity to work together and develop leadership skills which will be so important to them in later life. As farmers, these industrious citizens are concerned with the future of agriculture and the role they will play in improving the industry and providing the people with enough materials to feed and clothe an overpopulated Nation.

Many people have felt the impact of FFA's valuable contributions to America and I am happy to note that its membership is soaring. The Second Congressional District has benefited from its activities and the program continues to be a success.

Mr. Speaker, I am proud to have this opportunity to congratulate the Future Farmers of America for its many outstanding achievements and I wish them every success in performing even greater accomplishments.

COUNTERBRIEFING ON U.S. POLICY IN INDOCHINA

HON. DONALD M. FRASER

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 9, 1972

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, on Friday, January 28, 1972, a group of House Members sponsored a "Counterbriefing on U.S. Policy and the Indochina War." This effort was cosponsored by the Indochina Education Council, an independently funded resource and research center on the Indochina war located here in Washington. Carl Kukkonen of the education council served as the coordinator.

Our counterbriefing was aimed primarily at the editors and broadcasters brought to Washington to attend a State Department briefing on U.S. foreign policy. We received some attention from Washington and New York newspapers and I include with my remarks newspaper accounts of the meeting.

The participants, in addition to myself, were:

Dr. Raphael Littauer, professor of physics at Cornell University; coordinator of the Cornell research project that produced the report: "The Air War in Indochina," which was released in October of 1971.

Fred Branfman, director of Project Air War, a nonprofit educational organization aimed at raising public consciousness about the air war in Indochina.

Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT, Democrat, Arkansas, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Senator GAYLORD NELSON, Democrat, Wisconsin, sponsor of S. 3084, a bill to provide for a study and investigation to assess the extent of damage done to the environment of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as the result of the operations of the Armed Forces of the United States.

Earl C. Ravenal, former director, Asian Division, Systems Analysis, Office of the Secretary of Defense; now associate fellow, Institute for Policy Studies.

Profs. Arthur H. Westing, Windham College, Putney, Vt., and Egbert W.

Pfeiffer, University of Montana, leading experts on the ecological effects of modern weapons technology as applied in Indochina.

The congressional sponsors were Representatives: JAMES S. ABOUREZK, South Dakota; BELLA ABZUG, New York; HERMAN BADILLO, New York; PHILLIP BURTON, California; JOHN CONYERS, Michigan; RONALD DELLUMS, California; JOHN DOW, New York; ROBERT DRINAN, Massachusetts; BOB ECKHARDT, Texas; DON EDWARDS, California; MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Massachusetts; HENRY HELSTOSKI, New Jersey; ROBERT KASTENMEIER, Wisconsin; EDWARD KOCH, New York; ABNER MIKVA, Illinois; PARREN MITCHELL, Maryland; CHARLES RANGEL, New York; BENJAMIN ROSENTHAL, New York; and WILLIAM RYAN, New York.

Mr. Speaker, under the President's Vietnamization policy, U.S. forces are slowly being withdrawn from Indochina. This is movement in the right direction. But as U.S. manpower levels recede, the air war continues and in some areas it has been accelerated. The nature of the air war means the American public only will be kept informed of this U.S. involvement if the news media make a special effort. That this special effort should be made to describe the air war our Government is conducting in Indochina is the point made by all participants in the counterbriefing. A transcript of a tape recording of the counterbriefing follows:

[From the Washington Post, Jan. 29, 1972]

EDITORS BRIEFED AND COUNTERBRIEFED

(By Richard L. Lyons)

After hearing administration briefings on Indochina, visiting editors were told by war opponents yesterday that the press bears a difficult responsibility of keeping the spotlight on the continuing but changed war.

Congressmen and outside specialists gave a "counter-briefing" on Capitol Hill for a few dozen of the 400 editors and broadcasters who had come to Washington for a two-day briefing by high administration officials.

The editors were told that the war has not ended, but has shifted from a ground war to a bombing war which reporters cannot see and so cannot report to the public.

Few Americans are now being killed, lessening antiwar pressure at home, but American policy to maintain an anti-Communist government in Saigon remains unchanged the editors were told.

Fred Branfman, director of a private organization trying to mobilize public sentiment against the air war in Indochina, said a third Indochina war is now being waged. The first was by the French until 1954 and the second by American ground troops until recently.

The third, he said, is a war waged from the air by bombers that destroy everything below them. At least half the bombs dropped are designed to kill people, not to destroy structures, Branfman said. He heads a group called Project Air War.

Unlike the ground war, the bombing war cannot be covered by reporters and cameras, Branfman said, and the American people are not getting the facts to form judgments for pressuring Congress to end the war. The war will go on indefinitely, he said, unless the press reports that it is not ending.

Rep. Donald Fraser (D-Minn.) said the recent change in House sentiment toward an antiwar stand was caused by public pressures. This will be less as ground troops are withdrawn, he said. He called on the press to keep the spotlight on the war.

Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and one of the most outspoken congressional critics of the war, said that if he were President he would do what the French did in 1954 after long, costly fighting—decide it is not in our national interest to continue, and get out.

Fulbright said President Nixon's forthcoming trip to Peking indicates that he wants to end the Cold War. "Why is he so hesitant about getting out of Indochina?" asked Fulbright. He said the President's latest proposals vary little from those rejected by North Vietnam in the past.

Slides were shown of how American bulldozers in South Vietnam have scraped bare an area the size of Rhode Island, how spraying with poisonous herbicides have destroyed forests equal in size to Massachusetts, and how bombers have created 23 million craters 25 feet deep and 40 feet in diameter.

Sen. Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.) gave these statistics and said he introduced a bill yesterday calling for a presidential report to Congress in six months on the ecological damage done in Southeast Asia by these activities.

The editors were in town for an annual State Department briefing.

[From the Washington Star, Jan. 29, 1972]

U.S. BOMBINGS IN ASIAN WAR SCORED

(By James Doyle)

Editors who came to Washington for briefings at the State Department were offered a "counter-briefing" on Capitol Hill that included a slide show by a botanist and a zoologist depicting the devastation of Southeast Asia's forests by U.S. bombs.

About 150 persons showed up for the briefing, which came at the conclusion of two days of talks by administration officials at the State Department to editors invited here from across the country.

But most of those in the Capitol Hill hearing room were young men and women and, from appearances, only about 20 editors showed up to ask questions.

The "counter-briefers" included two senators and a congressman; three college professors, a former Defense Department systems analyst and a former field worker from Laos who is now researching the American air war in Indochina.

Most of the session was spent explaining the extent of the American air war and the lack of coverage of it in the U.S. press because reporters are banned from the bombing areas.

A botanist from Windham College in Putney, Vt., and a zoologist from the University of Montana showed slides depicting 30-foot-wide bomb craters which, they said, have made much of the Indochina countryside unusable.

There are an estimated 10 million bomb craters in South Vietnam alone, the scientists said, and they have "permanently rearranged the landscape."

The craters, along with shrapnel in the trees and the loss of vegetation to defoliation, have created a land devastation that will not be repaired for 500 or 1,000 years, according to Sen. Gaylord Nelson, D-Wis., one of the panelists.

The two scientists showed the effects of a single B52 bombing raid by superimposing a bombed swath on a map of Washington showing the area between the Capitol and the Lincoln Memorial, from Pennsylvania Avenue to Independence Avenue. In an area that size, 108 bombs of the 500-pound size are dropped by each B52 sortie, the panelists said, and each bomb creates a crater 20 to 50 feet wide and 5 to 20 feet deep.

Nelson submitted legislation calling for a U.S. investigation of the extent of ecological

damage done in Southeast Asia by U.S. military forces.

In a speech on the Senate floor, Nelson called American tactical operations in the land of its ally, South Vietnam, "a scorched earth policy." He said, "this an impersonal, automated and mechanistic warfare brought to its illogical conclusion—utter permanent total destruction."

Other points made by the participants included the following:

The "third Indochina war" is underway, substituting widespread and indiscriminate bombing for the use of ground troops which were part of the "second Indochina war."

The bombing attacks have been militarily ineffective, but the administration appears ready to increase their scope in the next few weeks as the Communists seek military victories on the ground.

NOT WINDING DOWN

The war is not winding down. The bombing is increasing and having a devastating effect on the civilian population.

Newsmen have been excluded from reporting on the effects of the air war because they no longer go along on bombing raids under a new Defense Department policy.

The President's newly revealed peace proposal should be seen as a warning that the United States will remain in South Asia indefinitely.

The counter briefing was sponsored by an anti-war organization called the Indochina Education Council.

Panel participants were Dr. Raphael Littauer, physics professor at Cornell University; Earl C. Ravenal, former Asian division systems analyst with the Defense Department; Fred Branfman, a former field worker in Laos and now director of a nonprofit organization aimed at publicizing the air war; Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright of Arkansas; Nelson; Rep. Don Fraser, D-Minn.; Prof. Arthur H. Westing of Windham College in Vermont and Prof. Egbert W. Pfeiffer of the University of Montana.

[From the New York Times, Jan. 29, 1972]

GOP PRESSES CAMPAIGN FOR NIXON'S PEACE PLAN

(By Terence Smith)

WASHINGTON, January 28.—More than 123 members of Congress signed letters circulated by the Republican leadership today expressing support for President Nixon's eight-point peace proposal for Vietnam.

In circulating the letters, the Senate Republican leader, Hugh Scott, and the House Republican leader, Gerald R. Ford, said they were seeking to demonstrate the widest possible backing of the President's new initiative among the 100 Senators and 432 Representatives.

Neither the text of the letters, nor the names of the signers will be released, sponsors said, until the letters are sent to the President.

Mr. Scott and Mr. Ford have stopped short, however, of proposing a formal resolution, apparently for fear that it would produce a major debate on the Administration's war policies and provide a forum for the President's critics.

The letters, which will be sent to the White House after more signatures are gathered next week, appear to be the last phase of a full-scale Administration effort to rally support behind the President's offer.

The campaign has included daily news conferences and speeches by senior Administration officials, including Henry A. Kissinger and Secretary of State William P. Rogers, and well-publicized leaks about the aspects of the new proposal that can be portrayed as generous.

Yesterday, for example, Administration sources volunteered to reporters that the President had offered North Vietnam \$2.5-billion as part of a \$7.5-billion program for Indochina reconstruction. The details of this offer were confirmed today by the White House press secretary, Ronald L. Ziegler.

The Administration appears to have a twofold purpose in its efforts to sustain the momentum behind the new initiative: first, to persuade Hanoi that the majority of Congress and the country support the President and, second, to deflate the domestic critics of Mr. Nixon's policy.

Senator Scott has been in the forefront of the second effort, accusing the critics of advocating "abject surrender" to the North Vietnamese.

He repeated those charges to reporters today and added the observation that former Senator Eugene J. McCarthy was being "fatuous and disingenuous" in his continuing criticism of the President's handling of the war.

Also today, a group of opponents of the President's policies staged a "counterbriefing" in which they sought to refute some of the arguments the Administration's spokesmen have put forward during the week.

A series of speakers, including Senators J. W. Fulbright and Gaylord Nelson, addressed an audience of nearly 200 crowded into a committee hearing room in the Rayburn House Office Building.

AUTOMATED WAR ASSAILED

Other speakers included Prof. Raphael Littauer of Cornell University, the coordinator of a recent study on the impact of the air war in Indochina; Earl C. Ravenal, a former Defense Department official now with the Institute for Policy Studies, and Fred Branfman, director of Project Air War, a nonprofit organization aimed at raising public consciousness about the air war in Indochina.

The speakers called for an immediate end to what Mr. Branfman described as "an automated war of total destruction" in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

Senator Fulbright, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, argued that the President's new proposal was "hardly distinguishable from the previous offers we have made."

"It may contain some new details," he said, "but it still lacks the critical ingredient: a frank statement of our willingness to withdraw our forces and leave the political future of Vietnam up to the Vietnamese."

HANOI SEEKS CLARIFICATION

HANOI, VIETNAM, January 28.—The Communist party newspaper Nhan Dan said today that North Vietnam would respond officially to President Nixon's proposals only after further clarification.

Quoting the Paris correspondent of the North Vietnamese press agency, it said Hanoi would await the answers to precise questions asked yesterday at the Paris talks.

The agency correspondent summarized the questions as follows:

"Will the United States withdraw all its troops, weapons and equipment, dismantle their bases, cease using planes against North Vietnam and South Vietnam?"

"When will agreement be made fixing the precise manner and date of the withdrawal?"

The army newspaper, Quan Doi Nhan Dan, gave a much shorter report, but it published at length the Jan. 26 communiques by North Vietnamese and Vietcong spokesmen in Paris and said they had "rejected the eight points." This paper is intended for military personnel.

SOVIET COMMENT SKEPTICAL

Moscow, January 28.—The first Soviet commentaries on President Nixon's peace

proposals today were highly skeptical but avoided outright rejection.

Vikentii Matveyev, a leading political commentator in the Government newspaper, Izvestia, made it clear that there were important questions to be answered, such as whether American aircraft would continue to operate in Indochina.

[From the New York Times, Jan. 29, 1972]

ECOLOGICAL DAMAGE IN VIETNAM ASSAYED

WASHINGTON, January 28.—Two scientists who recently returned from Indochina say American bombs, herbicides and tree-clearing operations have done more damage to South Vietnam than any military action the United States has taken against North Vietnam.

When the war ends, Dr. Egbert Pfeiffer said, North Vietnam "is going to be better off than South Vietnam."

Dr. Pfeiffer, a zoologist from the University of Montana, and Dr. Arthur H. Westing, a biologist, have been studying the ecological impact of the war since 1968 under the auspices of the Fund for Investigative Journalism and Environment magazine.

Dr. Westing says the United States has dropped 20 times as many bombs on South Vietnam as on North Vietnam. One of the effects of that, he said, is the destruction of 10 per cent of the ricefields of the South.

He said that frequently a farmer who returned to restore a water-filled rice paddy was killed by one of the estimated 250,000 undetonated bombs beneath the surface of the water.

Dr. Westing and Dr. Pfeiffer recently said that the Air Force was using a new 7.5-ton bomb with explosive power enough to kill nearly every kind of animal life within 3,000 feet of where it detonates.

TRANSCRIPT OF TAPE RECORDING OF COUNTER-BRIEFINGS

KUKKONEN.—This briefing is sponsored by 20 Members of the House of Representatives and was organized by the Indochina Education Council to present information and analyses on Indochina from sources independent and outside the executive branch of government.

Today's meeting is a counter-briefing to the State Department's conference on U.S. policy that was being held for editors and broadcasters. All statements today are on the record.

The war in Indochina has begun its second decade. The fighting has spread to Cambodia and to Laos. The character of the U.S. role in Indochina has changed from a ground war to an air war. Our briefers today will speak on various aspects of the continuing war and the possibilities for ending it.

We encourage questions from the editors and broadcasters and other people in the audience and in order to facilitate that our format is chosen to promote such an interchange of ideas. Each speaker will give a brief seven-minute presentation followed immediately by 5 minutes of questions from the audience. If we can stick to our schedule we'll be done in an hour and 15 minutes. At that time we will throw the meeting open to a larger group of questions. At present we're missing two of our people; Mr. Ravenal is having plane trouble from Providence, Rhode Island, and Sen. Nelson is on his way.

Our first breifer is Professor Raphael Littauer from Cornell University. He's a professor of physics who coordinated the research project which produced the report on the air war in Indochina. And with that introduction I give you Professor Littauer.

LITTAUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ladies and gentlemen, it's rather difficult to summarize such a big subject in such a short time. I'll just try to outline for you a few of our findings.

Air power, of course, is an extremely powerful tool and we know that it's played an important role in Indochina and will continue to play an almost exclusive role in the future or in the near future.

In what ways can air power help to win a war? I think one can break that down into four categories. It can give close support to troops engaged with the enemy on the ground. You have a good example of that, for example, from the Middle East war in 1967 where air power played a decisive role. But you have to have ground forces that are effective that you are trying to support. And of course you are circumscribed by the nature of the terrain and by the type of fighting. And if you look at the Vietnam scene and Indochina scene, you find the terrain is unfavorable as a whole—the jungle. And the style of fighting is flexible and diffuse, again unfavorable to air force which is an indiscriminate type of weapon in that kind of circumstance.

The second role is interdiction of supplies. That is a very important role. Again it is meant to support ground forces, to deprive their opponents of the supplies, and again it is a function of the terrain and of the style of transportation. It is relatively easy to interdict a four-lane highway; much harder to do so against a network of very diffused jungle trails.

Then you have the third category, strategic bombing. This assumes you have strategic targets such as power stations, factories, marshaling yards, airfields. When those targets are few as they were in fact in Indochina, that being a rather rural society rather than heavily industrialized, strategic bombing is limited. You can direct strategic bombing also against the predominant resource of the style of fighting we've encountered in Indochina, which is the population itself. Particularly when it's guerrilla warfare the population provides resources, cover, food, shelter, everything you wish to name and is consequently to be regarded as one of the major strategic resources of a guerrilla enemy.

Last is deterrence. This is not a direct effect of bombing; it is a psychological or political effect but it does play an important part. I think there is no question that the bombing of North Vietnam in the years 1965 to 1968 had a very strong deterrent motive. It was supposed to teach the opponents that it did not pay to pursue their course. And we will see that deterrence continues to be an important element in the air war as waged by the United States at this time.

Now just to give you a quick thumb nail sketch of the historical survey, I'd like to project a slide (I think we can do that with the lights on) which shows the tonnages by the year which were delivered by air—by the U.S. and its allies but mainly by the United States—to the various theaters of war. And you will see quickly that the main tonnage was of course developed on South Vietnam itself—up to a million tons a year. That is because that was the focus of fighting. On the other hand, that has also been dramatically de-escalated. So when people quote figures on South Vietnam, as you will see from the other graphs, these are not typical of the air war in Indochina as a whole.

The air war, as a whole, has not come down to half even; it's still more than half of what it was at its great dramatic peak in 1968. North Vietnam stopped as a concerted effort in 1968 as the graph shows there. But immediately after it ceased, the bombing of northern Laos began and you can see from the graph that that was at roughly the same intensity as the amount of bombing removed from North Vietnam due to the bombing halt of 1968. The bombing of north Laos continues. Its effects have been quite extensively documented so I won't go into that.

Bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which is a specific interdiction function of course,

is the major advertised effort of United States air force and as you can see from the graph, it has received increasing emphasis.

Finally we see that Cambodia, since the invasion of 1970, has also participated in receiving a fair share of United States' bombing and that seems to be continuing.

The political impact of such heavy bombing is of course very large. You must not think that the military impact is negligible. It is not. Without it I'm sure the military situation, as it now exists, would not have been achievable without deploying three times as many American troops, general mobilization and so on.

However, concomitant with some military effects, there is a political impact which I think takes a little imagination to understand but it must be indubitably a strong one.

I'd also like to point out that in all this fighting less than 10 percent of the fixed-wing sorties were devoted to close air support. The rest of them, in fact, went to interdiction, to strategic bombing and to deterrence. So that there is a far greater volume of air power shown on that chart than would actually have been needed for the direct military objectives of supporting troops in action. It's important to remember that because air power is a very wide-ranging instrument and the kind of things you do with it of course can be over a wide spectrum of purposes. Thank you for the slide.

Now, for the present trends as we see them is that the direct support function continues to be vital. Reports from both Cambodia and Laos show that without direct American air support the casualties incurred and the defeats taken by both the Laotians and the Cambodian government forces would have been far more severe. Interdiction continues to be very important and of course it is improving. Technological developments, the electronic battlefield, are highly advertised as making interdiction a remote control efficient technological weapon.

However, one should observe that the fighting continues at extreme intensity at the moment and that we have reports of supply build-ups of historic proportions taking place in South Vietnam itself. These reports, I think, indicate that at least the interdiction is not throttling the flow of supplies beyond the point at which the opponents can continue the fight.

Moreover it is difficult to think of interdiction activity as a specific surgical thing you direct against the enemy's lines of supply. When you do that you have to contend with his reactions—anti-aircraft guns, MIG fighters, interference. And the result of that is that your own actions not only drop bombs on the trails themselves but on the airfields, on the anti-aircraft installations and in the general vicinity. The result is that the interdiction activity which by itself seems like a surgical, precise tool becomes diffused through the technology of air power and commits you to doing a lot of things that you're not really intending to do, for example, escalating the war against North Vietnam itself.

I conclude from this that the United States remains deeply involved in the military balance in Indochina, despite the theorem that we are withdrawing. And that that involvement carries with it some implications which in the last minute I would quickly like to outline for you.

The policy aims seem to me to be basically unchanged. We have switched, however, to enforcing that policy with a tool, air power, which is basically a mismatch to the objectives it is trying to achieve.

Air power is not a precise match to the requirements of Indochina. We are now relying on it exclusively and the question you have to ask yourself is: In undertaking a commitment to enforce a policy by air power,

what will it mean when your bluff is called? That is, when the deterrent effects and when the direct interdiction effects and the close support effects of the air power fail to deter the enemy from his actions, what do you do for encores? That is a question I think that we should all ask ourselves because we are standing on the threshold of such a decision, I believe, in the very next few weeks.

The style of warfare has changed dramatically. We're able to wage that war without bases in South Vietnam. We're able to wage it from Thailand and from carriers afloat in the Gulf of Tonkin. However, the intent is the same; the involvement of U.S. policies is the same; and if we should be pushed, the question we have to ask ourselves (is) how can we respond?

I think the important point is that the cessation of bombing which is not mentioned in many places explicitly is a bargaining token which may contribute to the settlement of the conflict. But it will do so only while it has a meaning. Once it is defeated, once its impotence against the ultimate progress of the other side should become demonstrated it will, of course, be a devalued token and we will have missed the opportunity for playing it.

I think the impression I would like to leave therefore is that it may not be too late to play that token to negotiate on the basis of a full bombing halt all over Indochina, but that opportunity may not present itself indefinitely.

Thank you.

KUKKONEN. We have five minutes of questions from the audience for Professor Littauer.

QUESTION. Professor Littauer, what did you mean when you said that the decision was going to be made very shortly to re-escalate the ground war? Is that what you were implying?

LITTAUER. The decision I referred to is that it seems from both the very precarious military situation in Laos and Cambodia and from all reports in South Vietnam that a major military confrontation is in the making. Would you not agree?

At that point the amount of air power we deploy and the style in which we use it comes up for questioning. We will want it to have a maximum effect in holding off this military thrust. And it's difficult to visualize how exactly that can be done without a change in the style and objectives of that air power. What I'm saying is that the kind of raids which we saw over the Christmas period against North Vietnam—obviously meant for political pressure—may be escalated dramatically and the hope may then be to achieve an objective that way which we cannot achieve directly on the battlefield.

QUESTION. Professor, some of us point to the 14th or 15th of February as to the date when the enemy offensive will begin. Do you agree?

LITTAUER. I have no information, I'm afraid. (Laughter) If I had, I would peddle it. (Laughter)

QUESTION. Sir, what are the alternatives? What do you do for an encore?

LITTAUER. You consider the situation in a realistic light, I believe . . .

QUESTION. Let me add one element. If you were in the administration, what would you do?

LITTAUER. That's a very difficult question indeed. You put me on the spot. I'm not the administration, fortunately. That's a very hard seat to be in evidently. But the point is, you have to, I believe, realize the type of mismatch of air power versus determined ground power that we are fighting here. And it seems from indications (now obviously I'm a layman in this field), it seems from indications that the ground power is in serious trouble and may con-

tinue to be in such trouble. And from the historical element and from our studies that we've made it does not seem likely that air power applied directly will be able to change that balance greatly. So that is an impasse at which point you ask what can you do.

It's a dangerous impasse, I believe. I mean these questions were questions that were considered in 1968 also.

QUESTION. Professor, you spoke of the bombing halt as a bargaining token. Do you not see President Nixon playing this right now with his withdrawal and his peace proposition being sent to Paris?

LITTAUER. That may be. I don't see an explicit statement of a bombing halt in his proposal. One cannot expect the initial terms of a proposal to Hanoi to be explicit that leaves no room for bargaining. I'm not naive enough to think it ought to be all explicit. One's hope is that it will form such a token. However, there is the other element which is that the proposal seemed to require a withdrawal by the other side, which is something that I think was offered in 1965 by President Johnson and has been met with total rejection ever since.

KUKKONEN. We have time for one last question.

QUESTION. Professor, do you have any reason to believe that (next few words are imperceptible) the possibility of a dramatic escalation of the air war that new strategic targets will be considered in North Vietnam? Is that what you're suggesting?

LITTAUER. I'm not suggesting anything, believe me; nothing I can wish more is that nothing of this will come to pass. However, there are reports that the air sorties in Indochina are to be increased by 50 percent. In other words, that the slow downward trend we've seen will be reversed. And it has been hinted many times that the President will not consider placing any restraints on his use of American air power in Indochina. That leaves the field wide open.

KUKKONEN. Our next briefer is Fred Branfman who spent four years in Laos and is presently working as the director of Project Air War here in Washington.

Mr. Branfman.

BRANFMAN. The events of the last few weeks—of the last week in particular—have shown that there's a basic irreconcilable difference between our government's position and the position of the governments of North Vietnam and the other guerrilla forces. That is, the United States is still insisting it has a right to have a say as to who is going to rule in Indochina and the other side says it doesn't. Now whether or not one believes that's right—that we do have the right to make that kind of decision—it's worth pointing out that this is what got us involved in the first place 20 years ago. It's what's led to all the fighting for the last 20 years and there's no reason to believe it's not going to lead to an indefinite war.

However, there is a difference, of course. The ground troops have come home. And what I'd like to stress is that we're involved now in a new war, a war we like to call the Third Indochina War, an air war.

What's important here is not simply the tonnages being dropped, whether they've (been) raised, whether they've fallen, other than the fact that it remains at a quite high level—50 thousand tons of bombs a month. What's important here is not whether the tonnages are rising, falling as long as it remains at a high level.

I'd like to stress three basic points about the Third Indochina War. The first is that it's a total war by machine from the air which levels everything below. No matter what kinds of restrictions we try to place on this kind of bombing, when we're bombing in rural theaters like North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, South Vietnam we're going to wind up bombing civilian targets; we're going

to wind up bombing people's homes; we're going to wind up killing people.

We've interviewed several thousand refugees in Laos—all of whom have lost their homes—and our interviews indicate, almost to a man, that the vast majority of the casualties are civilians and not the military. Of course if we could hit the soldiers the war would have been over 20 years ago. So, first point—total devastation from the air.

The second point is that—and this is really the key—is that bombing is no longer supporting the ground troops. This was the case during the Second Indochina War—our ground intervention in South Vietnam. It has been the case historically. What's new today is that the bombing is the key. We send our bombers out; they level everything; then the ground troops come in—Snuol, Kratie, Cambodia, the Plain of Jars. Asian ground troops come in afterward and take out the survivors and search for supplies, whatever. They're supplementing the bombing. That's really the key.

And then there's the third factor—the one I want to speak most about because we are talking with the press today and that is, this kind of a war depends largely on secrecy, on news management, on muffling the kind of domestic dissent which ended the Second Indochina War. Most of the bombing in the last two years has gone on in Laos and Cambodia. The Cornell air war study shows that two-thirds of the bombs have fallen in Laos and Cambodia. Actually for the percentage of American sorties it's even higher; I'd estimate anywhere from 80 to 90 percent of the American sorties are falling in Laos, Cambodia and the southern part of North Vietnam.

Now in those arenas newsmen are not allowed out on bombing strikes. There's only one that I know of. One exception to that occurred a few weeks ago when a reporter was allowed to go out at night on a gunship over the Ho Chi Minh Trail. But other than that, thousands of sorties have been flown in these countries and reporters are not allowed to go out on those bombing strikes. It doesn't seem to be for reasons of military security.

Reporters have always been allowed to go out on bombing strikes over South Vietnam. It seems to be an attempt at news management, to keep the war off the TV screens, off the front pages. Reporters are not flown to the scenes of battle in Laos and Cambodia. The kinds of scenes that we had from Khe Sanh back in 1968—reporters flown into Khe Sanh, the war is on the TV screens, on the front pages—no longer exists. Tremendous fighting at Long Cheng—reporters are only brought in on a prepackaged tour for a few hours for the first time in 10 years.

And what we have therefore is that the press can't cover this kind of a scene. We have to ask ourselves, it was after all the domestic dissent in this country which did a lot to end the Second Indochina War. Suppose the American people could see scenes like this (holds up drawing) on their TV screens or scenes like this (holds up drawing). These are drawings done by refugees who live under the bombing.

By now the American people kind of know what M-16s and mortar shells look like. Suppose they knew that most of the bombs that we were dropping yesterday and today and tomorrow were anti-personnel bombs, bombs which are only meant for people. Suppose they knew that when this kind of pineapple bomb falls, it has 250 steel pellets in it; one sortie—and we're flying 3 or 4 hundred a day—one sortie has a thousand of these bombs. One sortie sends 250 thousand steel pellets which are only meant for human flesh spewing horizontally over an area half a mile long and a quarter of a mile wide.

But suppose they knew that even these were obsolete because they explode hori-

zontally and we figured out by now that the people are hiding in their holes. So we've gone on from that to the guavas, half a million pellets in a single sortie—they explode up in the air, they go down diagonally into the holes where the people are hiding. Suppose they knew that even this wasn't good enough, that we'd gone on from this to flechettes, flechette pellets which are little tiny steel arrows with fins on one end that as they enter the body enlarge the wound and are designed to shred the internal organs.

But suppose they not only knew that but could see it and could see that most of these bombs—whether by design or by accident—were falling on civilians right now. What this does is to raise a very basic issue.

Our democracy is founded on the principle of separation of powers. And, of course, the press plays the key role in this in terms of informing the people about what their government is doing. Now the press can't go out on the bombing raids, can't be under the bombs, they can't go out to the front lines and see the fighting. At the same time the government meanwhile creates its own version of reality with these new speak kind of terms, protective reaction strikes against missile sites and all the rest of it. How can the people make any informed decisions about whether or not they want the war to go on? How can Congress act if there's no public pressure about the war? This is the kind of situation we find ourselves in today.

And just to close, I'd like to point out that this has two very important implications for me. The first is that this kind of war is an automated war, the kind of automated war predicted by George Orwell, when super powers wage war by machine halfway across the globe and their own citizens don't know anything about it and can't do anything about it if they did. It's the kind of war which is lying like a shadow over the Third World, over millions of people in the decade to come. Unless we can somehow solve this problem, unless we can somehow at least let the American people know what's going on so that they can react, I personally feel that an awful lot of people are going to fall under just this kind of war.

But finally there is the most immediate implication. There are hundreds of thousands of Indochinese right now living in caves and holes and tunnels and shelters. Before we wake tomorrow, dozens of these people are going to be burned alive by napalm and riddled by these anti-personnel bombs and cut to pieces by these fragmentation bombs. This thing is going to go on indefinitely until somehow—and I think the press has this key role to play—we can at least begin informing the American people that the war isn't ending and that it's continuing but continuing by air.

QUESTION. Give us the factual background for your knowledge of the use of these weapons.

BRANFMAN. Well, in terms of the weapons themselves, it's simply from interviewing pilots and interviewing refugees. I can perhaps show you a kind of factual basis that perhaps you're looking for.

We'd be happy to show anyone who's interested. We have dozens of photographs—this is a little girl. If you came a little closer, you could probably see the pellets still in her. When we interviewed, the father held her out and we felt her leg and felt the little steel pellet in it. This was taken in Laos in July of 1970.

These are refugees from the Plain of Jars. There are thousands of them around Vientiane—people from the Plain of Jars. We don't have photographs of the people from southern Laos that we've interviewed. We've interviewed lots of them also.

Every reporter who goes out sees these kinds of things but unfortunately it's just

reported once perhaps or perhaps it's not even reported—it's not news.

I might have mentioned there that as the ability of reporters to see things firsthand goes down, the percentage of the news that they report based on official statements goes up, of course. If you can't see the war, you're much more likely to report what you have no choice but to report what you see from the briefing and this is how this kind of information is kept from the press. We only got it, as I say, by interviewing the people and by interviewing the pilots who described how these things were meant to work.

QUESTION. Did the gentleman find pilots cooperative? Do you feel you got an accurate cross-section of the pilots who were operating over there?

BRANFMAN. Well, I went to Danang Air Force Base in November of 1970. I spent about ten days interviewing pilots. I was taken around by the information officer who went from squadron to squadron and interviewed pilots. And then there are other people that I have just met informally. And I think we have a fairly good cross-section. I didn't make any comments about their attitudes. But I don't think there's any question about these kinds of bombs and how they work. I mean it's sort of common knowledge—everyone knows how they work. Everyone knows about the flechette. Here's a photograph of it. This is a North Vietnamese photograph but it's a flechette.

If you go up to CBS, the guy has a flechette right on his bulletin board that he got somewhere. It's no big question. There's no question that these are the kinds of bombs that are dropping now.

QUESTION. Is this the major proportion of the bombs being dropped?

BRANFMAN. This is something I can't prove. Of course, this information is not released by the Air Force. I wish someone would ask the Air Force and I wish they'd tell us just what percentage. All I can say is I've talked to people who are in charge of stockpiling ordnance at Udorn Air Force Base in particular and then just pilots in general and it's my impression that it's at least 50 percent if not higher. This, by the way, stands to reason. After all, we have destroyed most of the structures in Laos and Cambodia a long time ago. It stands to reason that we would go on from that to these kinds of anti-personnel bombs. But I wish the press would find out. I wish the press would demand the answers to these questions. I wish the press would report the fact that when we went to Laos and asked Ambassador Godley to go out on a bombing raid he wouldn't let us. But we could when we were in South Vietnam. I wish they'd report that about Cambodia. Until they do, we can't document this.

KUKKONEN. There will be opportunity for further questions as we get on in the program.

Our next briefer is Senator J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

FULBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I wasn't quite aware of the format for this meeting. I'm not sure that I'm qualified to brief anyone on the conduct of the war in Vietnam. The basic facts, it seems to me, have been so overwhelmingly discussed and exposed on television time after time that it hadn't occurred to me that that was the matter in question.

Someone a moment ago asked what I would do or asked one of the previous speakers what he would do if he were in the President's position. I might undertake a discussion of this character.

If I were in the President's position I would do about the same as the French. I would attempt to do what the French did in 1954 when they were confronted with a somewhat similar situation. They had been in control of Vietnam for about 75 years and they de-

cided it was against their interests to continue the war. It had been going on for approximately 8 or 9 years. It began about 1946 and this was in the spring of 1954. And it was costing them a great deal.

Of course, we were paying a large part of the costs ourselves.

But even so, the French decided it was against the interests of their country to continue the war so within the course of about 6 weeks they went to Geneva and arrived at a conclusion of the war by agreement which is generally called the Geneva Accords. I think most of you are aware of the provisions of that. If not, you can ask about it later.

But the pattern is a rather classic one for a situation in which there's a stalemate, neither side being willing or able to win the war in a military way, that is, a decisive victory. We could have if we had chosen to use all of our power but for reasons which previous presidents thought were good and sufficient didn't wish to use. For example, they didn't wish to use nuclear weapons which they could have used and would have certainly demolished all of Vietnam.

To get a perspective of this you do have to, I think, refer to the history of it, the nature of that war that we intervened in. It was a civil war. First it was a colonial war and then later, after the Geneva Accords, I would say it turned into a civil war between factions within Vietnam.

As I was saying, if I were in a position to do anything about the war, I would follow the example of the French. The French were by no means defeated—they had 400,000 plus soldiers there—they could have continued it for a number of years had they thought it was in their interest.

I feel it's not in the interest of this country to continue the war. We can continue it. We can sacrifice all of our domestic affairs and so on if we wish to. It's a question of what is in the interest of this country.

I would follow the example of the French. There are many aspects of that. They had provisions about elections and about withdrawal in two years and so on. Those details, if they're interesting to you, we can discuss.

Neutralization has been discussed. I've advocated that. Many different smaller details. The main thing is a decision to get out, to stop the war because it is against the interests of this country to continue it. It's against our interests because we have no vital interest in being there and because the interest in reforming and revitalizing our own domestic economy comes uppermost in my view. It's because of such things as you've been reading recently—the extent of our deficit, the disillusionment of so many of our people with our government, the general loss of confidence in the capacity of our political system to meet the challenges today.

The urban problem, the ecological or pollution problem, mass transportation, etc., a great many neglected areas of our national life. I think they are now so critical that this war, which was a mistake in judgment in my opinion, to ever become involved in should be liquidated simply as a balance of what is in the interests of our country: the preservation and improvement of our own economy and our own country. That's all. To me the basic principle is rather simple. You have to make up your mind if that's more important than continuing a base in Southeast Asia for the containment of Communism.

Now some believe that is important. That is traditional, this has been our policy since the beginning of the Truman Doctrine, that there is this ideological contest in being. Well, the President is moving in other areas to try to liquidate, at least ameliorate, this ideological warfare that has been in process since after World War II. And that again, I think, only emphasizes the fact that it is in

our interests to liquidate this physical warfare.

These terrible things that you've told us about are extremely embarrassing. It's always been, it seems to me, a shameful thing that a country the size of ours should wreak the kind of destruction upon a small backward peasant community which has never done anything to this country because of its ideological obsession. But that's another aspect of it.

There are all kinds of reasons you can bring into it. I simply think we should finish this war and the pattern for doing so is very much like the French.

I regret that the President's recent offer is hardly distinguishable from the former offers made by President Johnson and others. You may find in the fine print a few little differences, but basically it doesn't exhibit a resolution or a determination that we no longer have a vital interest for remaining in control of Southeast Asia or of South Vietnam, if you like; that we're willing to give up our physical presence there and allow those people to determine their own future, with or without the assistance of the North Vietnamese. That would be the basic decision. I do not think that is quite clear in the President's offer. That's why I think it will not be accepted.

Now, are there any questions?

QUESTION. Secretary Rogers told us on the record that for all of the noise Hanoi has made about the President's proposal, it has not been rejected outright. As a result, hope springs eternal.

FULBRIGHT. Well, they have rejected similar ones often before. This offer of \$2.5 billion may be tempting to them but I doubt that it is. It's possible that they could for reasons of their own—this has been a long war and it's been hard on them. I've often thought they should have accepted former offers. I thought in the days of the San Antonio formula that they would have been wise to have accepted our offer. I think they've been very foolish, but not as foolish as we have. The trouble is we've got so much involved and it's a big country and I personally feel it's so much more important that this country be made to operate satisfactorily not only for the welfare of my constituents and all of us in this room, but we have been looked to as a kind of example of democracy that can be made to work on a large scale.

It's a great disappointment, not only to us, but to much of the world and especially our best friends, to see us stumble into this very unwise policy threatening really confidence in the very idea of a workable democracy. It's a great blow to all of those who have been dedicated in the world to the principle of self-government and more liberal life for human beings. So it's much more involved than just this one contest in Vietnam. I don't know. Maybe they'll accept it. I wish they would. I'm only trying to deal with what I think of the probability. They have rejected similar ones before.

I think they have an attitude which is hard for us to realize. They live there. They're Vietnamese. They don't accept the assumptions that we make that there are two Vietnams, they've always said that there's one.

We get ourselves in most peculiar positions. We've done the same in China. We have treated them as two Chinas, Taiwan and China, but both Chang Kai-shek and Mao have always insisted there's only one China. It's only a question of which one's the head of it. But we find ourselves in this peculiar position of saying there are two.

Now we say there are two Vietnams. They've never accepted there are two. The Geneva Accords didn't accept there were two. There was a temporary dividing line.

There are certain assumptions they don't

agree with. They think they're quite able to get self-determination themselves. So they look at it differently. When the President says this is a reasonable proposal, well, to our eyes it may be reasonable. I don't think it is to the Vietnamese a reasonable proposal. They think that we're asking them to surrender everything they've been fighting for. I think in time, regardless of what we do, they are going to be independent of us. We can't rely on the colonial system to maintain a colony there indefinitely. It's a question of time.

I'm only saying I'd like for us to recognize the inevitable now and to proceed to revitalize our own country. Now you can call it neo-isolationism if you like. I simply think that America's in such desperate straits that we need to do a lot here at home. The President and his advisers obviously give 90 percent of their attention to this and other foreign affairs. Obviously, no one's paying much attention—no one who matters—to our domestic and local affairs because look at their neglect. So this is the way I come up to that conclusion. It is in our interests to liquidate the war.

QUESTION. Senator, going back to the original question, what you would do were you in the President's position. Specifically, how would you disengage from Vietnam?

FULBRIGHT. Well, that's the best pattern. If you don't want to revive the Geneva conference and it has been suggested they would never be willing to do it because none of them ever had any confidence we were willing to do anything that would likely bring about a solution; if you don't want to find that out, I would make a suggestion or the offer, I would say, in Paris, if you like, that is comparable to the Geneva Accords, that what actually was agreed to at that time by everyone except the United States including China and Russia and the Vietnamese and the French and everyone—I think there were some 10 or 12 countries that signed it except for us. We refused to and you must remember this was at the height of the McCarthy obsession in this country—1954—and Mr. Dulles just couldn't bring himself to agree to it. He left there and immediately organized the SEATO Treaty and began to try to undo and undermine the decisions of Geneva. And that's a matter of history. But I would make (a few words here are imperceptible) which didn't allow the Vietnamese to decide it. They provided elections because at that time the Vietnamese were willing to have elections. I don't think we should insist upon our concept of elections. I'm not particularly interested in how they decide it. And I don't think it makes very much difference as to what happens to it, that is, to the long term.

I have my preferences. I wish that South Vietnam and all of Vietnam would love to have a nice parliamentary system in which everyone treated everyone with great consideration, sort of like Sweden or Denmark or Holland. But if they don't want that, it's their business and it's not, I don't think, our business and we're very presumptuous to think we can go to them, there or anywhere else. We have a lot to do here at home. And I'm not so sure I can with great enthusiasm say to everybody, go do what we do. Have a system like ours.

I like our system. We've got it anyway. I've got no choice. But it is foolish of us to think, to presume, that we should try to translate this system over to a little country in Vietnam or in Africa or Latin America. They've got to work out their own system. That is my basic approach to it and I think it's a matter of detail as to how they will work the details of self-determination. Now I know everyone is repelled. Are you saying that you don't care whether it's Communist or not? Well, I care in the sense of a pref-

erence. I do not care in the sense I'm willing to sacrifice the United States for the preference. That's about the way it is. We all have our preferences.

We have Cuba down there. Cuba's Communist. It's much closer than Vietnam. Why do we tolerate Cuba? Why don't we go in and invade them and kick them out and put in our system? Well, of course, that would be foolish to do. I do advocate that we review our policy and stop acting so obnoxious to Cuba. But the State Department doesn't agree with that either.

I would like to liquidate the cold war. It seems to me the President—if there's any significance to going to Moscow or Peking—leads me to believe that I think the country, too, that he is willing to begin to liquidate the cold war, to begin to try to re-establish normal relations. I favor that. I don't quite understand why he's so hesitant in the case of Vietnam which is the major one. The idea of Vietnamization—that's true these words like protective reaction strikes are very difficult to tie down—seems to me to be an evasion of the real question. Are you or are you not going to liquidate our presence, our physical presence, in Southeast Asia? Do you or do you not think it is in our interest to maintain control of a base there, a base whether it consists of Cam Ranh Bay or all of South Vietnam or only Cambodia or what have you? If he thinks it is, it ought to be very clear and then he could be right. I just don't agree, that's all.

QUESTION. Senator, you're not the President, you're chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Is there any new initiative you might institute as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee?

FULBRIGHT. None that I could think of that would be effective. I've tried everyone I thought of. I've tried persuasion. We've had hearings. I made speeches. So have my colleagues, Senator Nelson's here. He has, too. I don't want to take any more time because he is a very perceptive man and much more persuasive than I am. He usually gets his way in most of the things he tries. But I don't know anything the committee can do. If you've got a good suggestion as to what the committee can do that's designed to bring about a change I'd welcome it. Our country, of course, that's another matter. We're very conscious of the fact that due to various developments, particularly television and its capacity and the development of the National Security Council with a man like Mr. Kissinger, that we have very limited resources with which to influence the course of events. I think the press also is conscious of that sometimes and of their access to the source of the news, too.

Well, thank you very much.

NELSON. I'm not here as a briefer. I just want to thank Congressman Fraser and the others who deferred just long enough for me to take two minutes before I leave because I'm late on my schedule. I particularly didn't wish to leave without commending Professor Westing and Professor Pfeiffer for the exceptional contribution that they have made in going to Vietnam and collecting the slides and the footage that you will see here today.

The story that their pictures tell describes the war against the land itself with much greater eloquence than any words I or anyone else could summon to describe the situation.

I didn't want to leave either without reminding those of you who do not know that it was Professor Westing and Professor Pfeiffer who went to Vietnam and came back with some very useful studies of the environmental implications of the massive dosages of the landscape by herbicides for purposes of defoliation. These studies, along with the studies that others made too, made it possible for us in the Senate and in the House to have at our command some important

facts with which to debate the issue. And I think their efforts made a very substantial contribution towards alerting the public and the Congress as to the problem being created by defoliation. And I think their studies were significant in causing the Department of Defense to terminate the defoliation program.

So those of us who are not only worried about the war and the disaster of it all and the human suffering by all sides, those of us who are also concerned about the environmental implications of this massive medication of the whole country thought that the environmental problems were over with. When you see these films today, you will realize that the military has been carrying on without the knowledge of the Congress or more than a handful, if any. The films demonstrate a massive interference into the environment in a way that no other country has ever done before in the history of warfare because they didn't have the instrumentality to do it.

I made a statement on the floor of the Senate today in which I said that a scorched earth policy has been a tactic of war throughout the history of man; but never before in any warfare has any scorched earth policy as massively intruded, destroyed permanently the soil in the land as we have done here. I think substantial amounts of it are beyond recovery in a hundred years or 500 years or longer. And it's a disastrous situation which I think if the Congress understood, it wouldn't appropriate the funds to support it. The President, if he could see these pictures and understood the implications, would demand its halt in 30 minutes. The public, if they could identify who was responsible, would throw them out of office. But they'll never identify who's responsible because nobody knows. It is, as somebody suggested here a few moments ago, an automated mechanistic war run from long distances away; in which the people who are making decisions never see the consequences of the decisions they've made and never see the face of the peasant who sees his land permanently destroyed in one 30-second B-52 bombing that destroys all of the land he owns and that of all his friends around him.

So I just wish to commend the two professors for the remarkable contribution they have made and I would hope that everybody in the Congress could see these films. If 51 percent of either House or both Houses could see the films, that would be the end of this program. If the President could see the films, that would be the end of this program. But nobody knows what has happened there and these films tell the story.

I have introduced legislation today for an environmental study of the nature and character and dimension of the damage done there and I would hope we can get hearings on both sides—in the House and in the Senate. And that we can move to get this evaluation under way.

Thank you very much.

KUKKONEN. Our next briefer is Earl Ravenal, former director of the Asian Division, Systems Analysis, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Mr. Ravenal.

RAVENAL. I'd like to talk for a few moments today about the relation between the Nixon Doctrine and our current overall foreign policies and the situation in Southeast Asia. And particularly about the prospects for a continuation of conflict and confrontation in Asia.

Of course, it's fair to say that this is an inherited war of this administration. But it's also fair to say that this is the same war, the same intervention, though it's conducted under a very different set of policies. In fact, this war has been conducted in various guises under a succession of policies from the Truman-Acheson administration to the present day. The rationales have changed and the war remains.

Truman and Acheson commenced military assistance to France and this was even before Korea. This was related, however, primarily to the containment of Soviet Communism in Europe and the desire to help out France.

Eisenhower and Dulles acceded to their various offices. We had the near intervention, a nuclear intervention at Dien Bien Phu. This policy under Eisenhower and Dulles in Indochina was conducted under the rubric of a rollback, a rollback of Communism in Asia, not simply containment. A rollback at least of the expectations of the various parties to the Geneva Convention. And, of course, it was also conducted under an extreme ideological cover.

With the accession of Kennedy and then the Johnson administration, we had an acceleration to a dramatic global confrontation with Communist power. And this became the rationale for the war in Indochina.

The war continued, it escalated, American intervention was intensified. It took different forms. The rationale changed. It became a bi-lateral, global confrontation with Communist power that was conceived to be monolithic throughout the world.

Now under the Nixon administration we have the same war, but we have a new rationale. And it's very important, I think, for us to realize that there has been a very profound change not only in the international system where we have an advent of several strong independent centers of world power. But there's been an equally profound change in the orientation of the United States under this administration towards the international system.

President Nixon and particularly his very academic and erudite adviser Henry Kissinger very clearly perceive the advent of this multipolar distribution of power. The ideology has vanished. They not just in fact acquiesce in this situation and accommodate it, but they're actively cooperating, as we see, in bringing this new international system into being. In short, these men in this administration are the architects of the new balance of power in the world. They're very clear about this. They see this in terms of a new global balance of power and they see this in terms of the advent of new regional balances of power—in East Asia, South Asia as we've seen over the last 6 to 8 months, in the Middle East, certainly, and eventually perhaps even in Central Europe.

Now, true to the rules of the balance of power game, one might parody this administration's approach in terms of a parody of President Kennedy's inaugural. This administration will deal with any enemy, subvert any friend, use and play off any government, et cetera, in order to accomplish its purposes. Obviously, this is a sophisticated and delicate and somehow obscure game that's being played.

It might be exhilarating for those few at the pinnacle of government to play the game, but it is incomprehensible to the Congress. It is incomprehensible even to foreign policy experts. And it's certainly incomprehensible to the people. And I would maintain it is an unsafe and unwise policy for this country. And it's ultimately untenable as a foreign policy for a popular democracy because it does not invite nor deserve the support or the participation of the people or for that matter of the press.

Now the question is, under this new policy and this new set of assumptions about the world, what can one expect to see in Southeast Asia. Well, certainly not disengagement. However one once might have interpreted the Nixon Doctrine during its first few years, since Guam in 1969, it is now clear that whatever it might have meant, it does not mean disengagement. At best it means a selective intervention. And it means a new

rationale for old involvements under the watchword of stability.

Now stability has always in some sense been a motive of post-World War II foreign policy. In fact, even before that the United States has intervened, has been willing to fight, it seems, in the twentieth century to make the world safe for something.

Safe for democracy under Woodrow Wilson. Under the Caribbean policy of Teddy Roosevelt and his successors, safe for the United Fruit Company or the City Bank of New York. Under Kennedy, safe for pluralism and free choice. Now under the balance of power dispensation of the Nixon-Kissinger administration, the United States appears to be willing to fight anywhere in the world just for the sake of stability, to preserve a precarious equilibrium.

Now, this is indeed a very conservative principle and yet it is a principle that keeps the United States intimately involved in the vicissitudes of various regions of the world. Now in fact the world is not going to be stable despite the efforts of the United States, despite our intervention, and in particular, East Asia and Southeast Asia and South Asia are not going to be stable. And this will be despite any intervention in force or any tilt that this United States Government wants to administer in favor of one or the other of the various contestants for power in these areas of the world. So what the balance of power philosophy under this administration implies is not stability in the world but a perpetual stabilization operation.

Now if we're lucky, and just lucky, this could be brought about by a diplomatic talk or a mere threat of force. But if we're not lucky, it will take the commitment of armed force to create and carry out this stabilization policy.

In the light of this administration's conduct of the balance of power, how should we consider its objectives in Southeast Asia and how should we regard its latest negotiating ploy that was revealed several days ago by the President?

In purely objective terms, even without any particular animus that one might have towards Mr. Nixon, it is unlikely that this administration was really offering anything substantial, that is, anything that would be likely to upset the balance of power in Southeast Asia. If the true motive of this administration, for instance, was to secure the return of our prisoners, then it has engaged in an elaborate evasion of the obvious, the obvious point that is that if the war were ended, it would be perfectly normal to get back our prisoners of war.

In fact, the President is still attaching too many conditions to his negotiating program, conditions such as the stabilization of all of Southeast Asia which is an expansive condition, one that we haven't even heard before, through the mechanism of a cease-fire throughout that region. Conditions such as the continuing presence of U.S. air and naval power in the region and certainly conditions such as the election, however fair it might seem in western terms, which would only cause the NLF to surface and expose itself to annihilation. The program, in short, is too little and too late and the negotiating program has the major flaw of not being acceptable to the other side.

Of course, the administration knows this in proposing this current negotiating program. And so one must conclude that the administration is offering this negotiating proposal not so much as an opportunity but perhaps to be read as a threat; a threat that the United States is going to hang in there in Southeast Asia indefinitely in one form or another until the other side agrees on a stabilization of the region or a balance or an equilibrium for this area, Southeast Asia. Therefore, if this policy is not deliberately, that is politically, changed to allow the scope

of politics at even force to take its course in Southeast Asia, then we might well see the next three-quarters of a hundred years war in Southeast Asia.

KUKKONEN. I think we have time for about two questions.

QUESTION. I heard you state that you do not expect the proposal sent by the administration to Paris to be accepted on the major flaw that it's not acceptable to the other side.

At the open briefing given by Dr. Kissinger he stated that the only difference of significance between the proposal being sent and the nine-point proposal given us was that we would not withdraw all economic aid, all military aid, all U.S. equipment and all U.S. manpower; in his words, turn over to them and help them defeat the current government. Now do you think that the U.S. ought to include this in their proposal?

RAVENAL. In my own personal opinion, I think that we certainly should include a complete unconditional withdrawal in our proposal. Now the next statement that must be made is that certainly the President and Henry Kissinger extremely exaggerated and misconceived the nature of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese proposals. They did not ask us to connive at the overthrow, the active overthrow, of the government of Saigon. They simply have been asking us to cease our active support of that government. I think that this ought to be realized. I think that the propagandistic nature of the briefing of Henry Kissinger and the President's address comes through very clearly when one differentiates the substance from some of the rhetoric attached to their presentation of this so-called demand.

But, I would also say that if this is as Kissinger said the only thing that keeps the parties apart at Paris, he certainly is minimizing this because this is not a small matter. In fact, this is the crux of the entire war. This is what the North Vietnamese and the NLF have been fighting for for the last 20, 30 and indeed fighting for since the 1920s when their party was organized, the Indochinese Communist Party. So I think that to say this is the only thing that keeps the parties apart is seriously to understate the issue.

KUKKONEN. We'll have time for more questions after Mr. Fraser and Professors Westing and Pfeiffer.

Our next briefer is Congressman Don Fraser, House Foreign Affairs Committee.

FRASER. I'm going to make my remarks very brief because I think you've heard from people who are far more expert on Vietnam than I. But I would like to touch on one aspect of the debate on the war which I think should be of special concern to the press of the United States.

What I'd like to just comment on is the inter-action between the war and the House of Representatives. Now what has been evident, I think, to observers and reported in the press is that there has been a shift in sentiment in the House of Representatives over the past two or three years. For example, over the past year, the margin of votes needed to turn the House into an anti-war body shifted from something like 140 votes down to 12; that is, in the most recent clear vote on the Mansfield amendment, a shift of 12 votes would have put the House on record in favor of the Mansfield amendment and that occurred last fall. The freshmen Democrats who came into this session of Congress—of them thirty voted for the Mansfield amendment and only 3 against.

The point that I want to make here is that the shift in sentiment in the House has not been due to any internal processes of the House itself.

It was last year when the House Foreign Affairs Committee first held hearings on the Vietnam war, in which critics from the outside with some qualifications were given the

opportunity to testify against the war. Floor debates, as any of the press who've watched them know, have not been productive of changes in sentiment.

And if you look at the committee structure, you find that, for example, the House Foreign Affairs Committee has had among its senior members those who have generally supported the administration. This has been the reason there have not been hearings. And when you look at the House Armed Service Committee, which has had the most direct control over the pursestrings for the war in Southeast Asia, and test their basic alignment, you find, for example, using a caucus vote of a year ago which split the Democrats down the middle—about 50/50—that on the Armed Services Committee the Democrats split 5 in favor of fixing a date to end the war and 16 against.

I'm making this point about the lack of effective internal processes in the House to stress the role of the press in carrying on the debate over the war. The fact is that any change, any significant change in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, has been externally generated. It has been generated by the activities of students, by protest marches, by demonstrations, by publicized hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and all of this reported through the press. This has been abetted by the concern of parents about the drafting of their children to be sent to Vietnam. This point is important in the context of what is now evolving in Southeastern Asia. That is the fact, of course, that there has been and apparently will continue to be a withdrawal of troops so the casualty rates will go down. And this will mean a lessening of expressed concern on the part of families who are worried about their children being drafted and sent there.

But the air war—and this is a point already made—is of a nature that the press will be unable without special effort to continue to report what in fact is being done on behalf of the people of the United States in the conduct of the war by their government. So I make these observations to stress the special responsibility that I think now falls on the press in the coming months as this war continues and perhaps intensifies in certain respects.

I'd like to finally just comment, give you my own view about the peace negotiations, the so-called secret negotiations in Paris. I think that beyond the admission of failure of the negotiations, that what is suggested by the position of the administration is that there's been no lessening of the ultimate objective of securing South Vietnam in a fashion which will be compatible with or friendly to United States' concerns. This is the history of negotiations in this war.

It seems to me that it might have been possible that this kind of an approach might have worked three or four years ago when we had a half million troops in Vietnam. But the posture of every administration since we become directly involved has always been to place the settlement objectives somewhat in advance of the realities of the situation and thereby precluding the likelihood of settlement. And what seems to me, as one observer now, is that we have lost virtually all of our bargaining power. The air power may represent a small bargaining chip but I think it's very small indeed in view of the history of bombing over these past five years.

My view is that the United States should disengage from the war. My view is that we should take our troops out, close our air bases and desist from any active involvement in the war. I have difficulty today believing that it is in anyone's interest for the United States to negotiate the future of South Vietnam. We lack the power to do so and in fact, I think we lack the wisdom to arrive at a settlement that would have any meaning over the long run.

So I would hope that the administration or perhaps the next administration will reach the conclusion that realism should dictate our policies from this point forward. And realism suggests that we've lost the capacity to substantially influence events in South Vietnam without a prolonged involvement which I think is no longer acceptable to the American people.

KUKKONEN. We have a few moments for questions.

QUESTION. Congressman, both the President and Henry Kissinger suggested during the past week that the United States had already offered the other side a straight withdrawal in exchange for a POW swap on May 31, and that this current proposal that he made public is somehow an improvement over that. Do you accept that we've ever done that, offered them a straight swap?

FRASER. A straight withdrawal to get our prisoners of war back? I'm reasonably convinced that no such offer has ever been made. And neither in public or in private sessions has it ever been intimated that we've made such an offer.

KUKKONEN. Our last briefers have already been introduced by Sen. Nelson and they have some very interesting slides to show you on the environmental impact of the air war in Indochina. I give you together Professor Arthur Westing, Windham College, and Professor Egbert Pfeiffer, University of Montana.

PFEIFFER. I want to say we're very honored at the very kind remarks made about our work by Sen. Nelson and we're very excited about the bill that he introduced this morning. It's the sort of thing we've been hoping would happen for several years now. Like many biologists in this country and throughout the world, Dr. Westing and I have been very concerned about the effects of certain U.S. weapons systems on the environment in Indochina.

Our concern began with our involvement in the herbicide question. As Sen. Nelson pointed out, the program has been ended, having been found to have been very damaging to the Indochina—particularly the Vietnamese—environment. But this doesn't mean that ecocide is stopping in Indochina.

We were last there in August and found that several very devastating weapons systems are still being employed, some even being escalated. And we want now to move right into the slide show and show you what some of these weapons systems are doing to the ecology of Indochina, undermining the natural base of that country, that is, its ability to recover and produce the food and fiber that it did before we went into that area. And Dr. Westing will take over now.

WESTING. Thank you. If we could have the lights we have about 3 dozen slides or so we'll go through rather quickly.

You see before you perhaps a hundred or so craters made by B-52 bombers. Each of those was made by a 500 pound bomb. This is from about 4500 or 4000 feet up. Each of those holes—and there are 23 million of them by our estimate in Southeast Asia—each of those holes is perhaps 30 to 40 feet across and perhaps 20 to 25 feet deep. The amount of land displacement of environmental destruction by the bombing has impressed us enormously.

This is a somewhat closer view of B-52 bomb craters.

Again a view, and here I hope you notice the type of target. This is the harassing and interdiction fire, 90 percent strategic bombing. The targets are the forests and the fields, the natural resource base of an agrarian, rural subsistence economy.

Here is one B-52 strike. You see in front of you perhaps 700 holes. This was done in 30 seconds. We have this repeated over again five times a day, day in and day out, at least since 1965—1000 sorties a month by official

estimates and this is the result: a half a mile wide and three miles long in 30 seconds.

The next picture indicates what that looks like in terms of Washington, D.C. I have to admit I got the idea from Professor Littauer who has such a picture in a publication of his. Starting at the Lincoln Memorial and going as far as the Capitol, you see what a half of mile by 3 miles looks like, having this as one pattern in a pattern bombing by the B-52s. This occurs four or five times over each day.

You see here on the left rice paddies in operation and functioning. On the other side of the river you see abandoned rice paddies that were once a free-fire zone, have now been pacified, but are still not in use. Over and over again we ran across this. Once an area has been bombed, peasants are hesitant to return to their land in order to reclaim it and farm it. There are perhaps 300,000 unexploded bombs just beneath the surface of Indochina. Again, there's a one or two percent unexploded dud rate that the Air Force explains exists. This turns out to be more than a quarter of a million bombs. There isn't a farm family in Southeast Asia that hasn't lost someone by having the water buffalo or the plow hit such an unexploded dud and then blow up.

Another aspect of the air war. Professor Littauer described it very graphically. These are the side effects. He described the main military reasons for the main military objectives. This is the outwash. Four logs out of five in Vietnam are now riddled with metal and have become useless as timber.

What this picture represents is the now ended herbicide program. These are C-123 aircraft on their way to spraying War Zone C. You see there four planes—there were over 20,000 such flights before the program ended.

This is the result of one such spraying. You see partial damage. This picture was taken a year or two after the spraying. You see perhaps a quarter of the timber trees destroyed and now slowly rotting in place. This is the result of perhaps two sprayings; in an open forest every tree is killed. The area has been taken over by elephant grass, a useless weed which now dominates several millions of acres in South Vietnam.

This is the result of multiple sprayings. This is Tay Ninh Province near the Parrot's Beak. There are over a million acres of South Vietnam that look like this, that have been sprayed multiple times and the result, of course, is that every last tree or essentially every last tree has been killed. This is northern Tay Ninh.

We turn now to something else. This is healthy mangrove, the coastal forests that start at Vung Tau and go on around. We've sprayed about 40 to 50 percent of all the mangrove forests.

Here's a border region between unsprayed and sprayed. The result is utter devastation with no hope of recovery on those 400,000 acres. Of course you also see some of the 500 pound bomb craters.

This is looking at the mangrove forest slightly closer, with the hills of Vung Tau in the background. Four hundred thousand acres will look like this for at least the next quarter of a century.

Still closer. And here you can see in the very foreground that there's been some salvage logging for firewood and charcoal, something that frightens us in as much as we have found out through the French National Laboratories just recently that if you burn wood that has been sprayed with Asian Orange the result is perhaps a material called dioxin which is a very potent poison which causes birth defects.

Here is nipa palm commonly used throughout the coastal regions for thatching

houses—the walls and the roofs. That's healthy nipa palm.

This is what it looks like after spraying.

This is a picture of a rubber plantation. As a matter of fact, this is not Vietnam, but in Cambodia, this is Mimot in the Fish Hook region. Clandestine spraying operation in 1969 which in a few days wiped out 173,000 acres of rubber and essentially destroyed the Cambodian economy.

This is healthy rubber. That's how it looks as it should.

And here it is—you see in the foreground destroyed rubber trees, again taken over by this elephant grass and in the background the end of the spray area—healthy rubber.

This is just a picture to show you another aspect of the spraying programs. This is in the central highlands and this represents one crop destruction mission using Asian Blue. Using Asian Blue, the arsenical, we have destroyed enough upland rice in the central highlands to feed approximately 800,000 Montagnard their entire diet. This is an intentional crop destruction program which also ended.

This is looking down on that strip from about 4000 feet. You can see the terraced rice fields that were destroyed here.

This is papaya that is just about to die. This is to demonstrate inadvertent food crop destruction. This is a side effect of forest defoliation. It drifted over on to a man's property, onto a peasant's property, and it is destroying his fruit crop.

Again, a similar situation. Drift has caused the death of that jack fruit next to the house and another jack fruit partially off the picture. Jack fruit in this region of Southeast Asia is the favorite fruit. In that particular province 45,000 jack fruit were killed over a period of three days, all of it unintentionally.

This is a picture showing dead poultry. I only show this because over and over again in our peasant interviews we were told by farmers, by peasants, that after a crop spraying or an herbicide spraying that their poultry died. We were never able to track this down in any rigorous way but we heard dozens and dozens of such reports and were given pictures like this.

Another program. Once the herbicide defoliation program was phased out, the bulldozing program was phased in. This is a 45 ton tractor of which there are 150 in Vietnam working seven days a week, 15 hours a day and clearing enormous areas of forestland. In fact, the program started as a roadside clearing program to prevent ambushes.

This is the roadside again filled in with this elephant grass—this was three years ago—from the edge of the road to the forest and it fills in with this useless elephant grass that water buffaloes won't even eat. Once the roadsides were done, we went to area bulldozing.

Here again you can see craters and the last remnants of the Ho Bo Woods. Nine thousand acres were cleared here in a period of 26 days by 30 such bulldozers working en masse. This goes on all of the time.

Here you see an area of about 6000 acres in Northern Tay Ninh from 4000 feet also scraped clean of former forest.

This is a little closer. Again, the B-52 holes and here is a company of bulldozers of that sort that you saw a moment ago going off to work.

This is a little closer. And here you can get a feeling for the D-7 tractor which has a blade 11 feet wide and the size of a crater. That's quite an old crater, by the way. That crater is probably three years old and you can see a little bit has washed in the bottom—two or three feet—and there's a little patch of grass in the middle and that's the extent of three years of natural recovery in one crater.

Here it is on the ground in the Boi Loi woods along what was considered an infiltration route. This area had been pattern bombed, had been herbicide sprayed, and now was being given the coup de grace with bulldozers.

Finally, a few quick pictures on this so-called Commando Vault or super bomb, the 15,000 pound concussion bomb which is used for clearing, for making instant helicopter paths and also as an anti-personnel weapon.

Here it is inside the C-130. You can see the three-foot probe at the front which hits the ground first and insures an explosion about 2 or 3 feet above the ground.

There it is. This is a film clip out of an Air Force film and you can see it is being dropped by parachute and is about to hit.

There it is. It has just detonated. And here's a cloud which will in a moment be 6,000 feet high.

And there's a two acre opening that has resulted in a mature triple canopy forest. Those trees are 150 feet tall. You can see the size of it by seeing the helicopter which is just hovering over the hole. Two assault helicopters can land in one of these moments after the blast.

Here's a closeup. This is one that we flew over west of Danang. This was dropped on to an enemy rocket position.

A little bit closer and I think here it is looking straight down at it from a few thousand feet. And you can also see a few places the conventional bomb crater size.

And almost finally, here is a picture that shows what would happen if it were dropped on the Washington Monument. You would see that people could get killed as far as the White House and of course, anywhere in that inner circle. They could be wounded somewhat further.

And I think this is now the last picture. Professor Pfeiffer took this slide and he wants to say something.

PFEIFFER. I want to first thank Fred Branfman who is with us. He was the one who made this picture possible. He took us to this refugee village. This is the way many people—over a third of the population of Indochina—are now living in refugee camps as a result of the destruction of the countryside which makes it impossible for them to carry out their mainly subsistence farming activities.

You see one of the pineapple bombs that Mr. Branfman has brought with him. This had been converted into a lamp. It was a dud which they had defused and put to some useful purpose.

We end up with this picture because we think it graphically illustrates the effect of this ecocide upon the subsistence farming population of Indochina.

WESTING. I might mention one more thing, a question that was asked Fred Branfman: What is the proportion of this type of bomb to the big crater producing bomb? I tried to get this information through official sources and it's unavailable. However, my information coincides with Mr. Branfman's that approximately 50 percent of the ordnance dropped is crater-producing and approximately 50 percent by weight is of the anti-personnel type.

PFEIFFER. I might say we have a few black and white prints of some of these slides which if any of you gentlemen from the press are interested in them, we'll be happy to give them to you at the conclusion of the program.

KUKKONEN. I think at this point, it's getting along and people are getting tired. But if you wish, we still have a number of us here and Mr. Ravenal is still in the audience so we will be happy to respond to questions for a while. But people can feel free to leave also.

QUESTION. Were the American authorities

and the Vietnamese authorities aware of your presence there and what you were doing and did they attempt to interfere with what you were doing?

PFEIFFER. We could not have gotten these pictures and this information without the very good cooperation of the Department of Defense. We were helped by the Army, Navy and Air Force and Transportation, Logistics, Spy Information. They were very cooperative.

WESTING. The embassy was cooperative as well. In fact, for one full week we had the full disposal of Ambassador Bunker's private helicopter.

QUESTION. If a reparations program would be undertaken, is \$2.5 billion enough for the recovery of Southeast Asia?

WESTING. I'm sorry, I couldn't answer that question. On the other hand, I would like to again say that this is precisely the question that Sen. Nelson hopes to be able to answer with that bill he introduced this morning. It has the purpose of looking into just exactly that question.

THE DANGER OF CANDOR

HON. OLIN E. TEAGUE

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 9, 1972

Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, Col. William C. Moore, vice commander of Headquarters Command, USAF, Bolling Field, Washington, D.C., has written a number of articles in which he has analyzed our situation in Southeast Asia, and they have been carried in leading newspapers and magazines throughout the country. The following article is Colonel Moore's views with respect to the conduct of our foreign affairs in light of the demands of many that they be open to the light of day.

[From the New York Times, Feb. 7, 1972]

THE DANGER OF CANDOR

(By William C. Moore)

WASHINGTON.—Some Americans are convinced that the United States Government should conduct its foreign affairs with far less secrecy than is now the case. A nation, they say, should lay its cards on the table, announce its intentions, reveal its aims, its strengths. If this is done, neither side will miscalculate—crisis through ignorance will be avoided.

The people who hold this conviction cite Government actions as disclosed in the Pentagon and Anderson papers as one example where lack of candor with the American public and the rest of the world got the United States into trouble. They cite as another example the failure to set a date for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam.

As a result of the Pentagon and Anderson papers, the case for more candor has been discussed at great length. The arguments are impressive. But there is another side which is equally as impressive; its underlying theme is this: There is a value in fostering uncertainty. There is, in fact, a "strategy of uncertainty."

This strategy is based on the premise that the less the enemy can calculate, the less positive he becomes, the less bold he becomes, the more certain he is likely to delay decisions until more facts are available.

Supporters of the strategy contend that political scientists, war planners, intelligence analysts, national security advisers—call them what you wish—all can be relied on to

be precise, cautious men because war is a grave undertaking requiring exacting analysis and utmost caution.

They will strive, therefore, for precise, scientific evaluation, giving due regard to the unknown as well as the known. Instinct warns them that unknown factors often carry more weight than known factors. Unknowns do not cause them to miscalculate; unknowns have precise values. Unknowns makes them uncertain, and uncertainty provokes them to seek more facts, to calculate other options. Uncertainty forces them to become less inflexible, less daring, more cautious. Unknown factors are positive, not negative factors; they are part and parcel of a war planner's calculations, not his miscalculations.

The strategy of uncertainty forces enemy leaders to sift the pros and cons; to weigh the psychological, political and military factors; to make the final hard decision themselves; unassisted by pronouncements from the free world about intentions, strengths, or weaknesses.

Uncertainty must not cause the enemy to become nervous, perhaps irrational, as opposed to uncertain and cautious. Here success depends on how judiciously the signals which are sent to the enemy are selected and how wisely they are conveyed. In all cases, these signals should reflect strength and resolution of will, never weakness. For example, the strategy of uncertainty dictates against suggesting (as allegedly was the case in 1950) that U.S. commitments did not include Korea. It dictates against the U.S. announcing a policy of flexible response as was the case in 1961. The sudden shift from a policy of massive retaliation to one of flexible response was an open invitation to calculate more accurately U.S. intentions and determination. To the enemy, the sudden shift could only mean that the U.S. was concerned with finding an acceptable strategy to fight a war once it began rather than a strategy to deter war.

After the announcement of the policy of flexible response, Communist probes became bolder and more aggressive. Witness the Berlin Wall, the subsequent Berlin crisis, the Cuban crisis, the Dominican affair, the Vietnam war, the Pueblo incident, and the intrusion of the Soviet Union into the Middle East and Mediterranean.

The strategy of uncertainty, therefore, is particularly useful to temper action, be they diplomatic or military. Uncertainty creates doubt, induces caution, curbs daring, deters decisions—all of which are essential to deterrence.

WORKERS FORCED INTO PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT

HON. HENRY S. REUSS

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 9, 1972

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Speaker, on December 2, 1971, I introduced legislation, H.R. 12011, that would create 500,000 federally financed public service jobs by amending and expanding the Emergency Employment Act of 1971—CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, volume 117, part 34, page 44359. This legislation is cosponsored by 60 Democratic Congressmen, and was introduced in the Senate on January 31, 1972 by Senator WALTER MONDALE and 20 other Democratic Senators. A list of the 60 House cosponsors follows:

LIST OF COSPONSORS

James Abourezk (S. Dak.), Brock Adams (Wash.), Les Aspin (Wis.), Herman Badillo (N.Y.), Nick Begich (Alaska), Jonathan B. Bingham (N.Y.), Edward P. Boland (Mass.), Frank J. Brasco (N.Y.), Phillip Burton (Calif.), Hugh L. Carey (N.Y.), Charles J. Carney (Ohio).

Frank M. Clark (Pa.), George W. Collins (Ill.), William R. Cotter (Conn.), George E. Danielson (Calif.), Ronald V. Dellums (Calif.), Robert F. Drinan (Mass.), Thaddeus J. Dulski (N.Y.), Don Edwards (Calif.), Joshua Ellberg (Pa.), Walter E. Fauntroy (D.C.).

William D. Ford (Mich.), Donald M. Fraser (Minn.), Sam Gibbons (Fla.), Ella T. Grasso (Conn.), William J. Green (Pa.), Richard T. Hanna (Calif.), Michael Harrington (Mass.), William D. Hathaway (Maine), Ken Hechler (W. Va.), Henry Helstoski (N.J.).

Joseph E. Karth (Minn.), Peter N. Kyros (Maine), Robert L. Leggett (Calif.), Romano L. Mazzoli (Ky.), Lloyd Meeds (Wash.), Ralph H. Metcalfe (Ill.), Abner J. Mikva (Ill.), Parren J. Mitchell (Md.), Morgan F. Murphy (Ill.), David R. Obey (Wis.).

Edward J. Patten (N.J.), Claude Pepper (Fla.), Bertram L. Podell (N.Y.), Melvin Price (Ill.), Charles B. Rangel (N.Y.), Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (N.J.), Robert A. Roe (N.J.), Benjamin S. Rosenthal (N.Y.), Edward R. Roybal (Calif.), William F. Ryan (N.Y.).

Fernand J. St Germain (R.I.), Paul S. Sarbanes (Md.), John F. Seiberling (Ohio), B. F. Sisk (Calif.), Louis Stokes (Ohio), Frank Thompson, Jr. (N.J.), Robert O. Tierman (R.I.), Charles A. Vanik (Ohio), Jerome R. Waldie (Calif.), Lester L. Wolff (N.Y.).

SENATE COSPONSORS

Mr. Mondale, Mr. Cranston, Mr. Bayh, Mr. Burdick, Mr. Harris, Mr. Hart, Mr. Hartke, Mr. Hughes, Mr. Humphrey, Mr. Jackson, Mr. Kennedy, Mr. McGovern, Mr. Metcalf, Mr. Moss, Mr. Muskie, Mr. Nelson, Mr. Pell, Mr. Randolph, Mr. Stevenson, Mr. Tunney, and Mr. Williams.

The jobs-now program will fill vital unmet needs in such areas as public safety, environmental control, and health. It will make jobs, lots of them. It will also mean additional hours of work for those forced to accept part-time employment because full-time jobs are unavailable.

Figures released by the Bureau of Labor Statistics—BLS—in the January 1972, issue of "Employment and Earnings" show a disturbing increase since 1969 in the number of workers forced by a sluggish economy into part-time employment, and an equally disturbing cut-back in the amount of overtime work available for those fortunate enough to be working 40 hours a week. Analysis by the BLS of overall work experience during the year 1970 suggests that the problem of inadequate full-time work opportunity has hit hardest at white, male, and skilled craftsmen rather than at blacks, females and laborers where the highest concentrations of unemployment exist.

According to the BLS, the number of workers forced to accept part-time employment because full-time work was unavailable increased 30 percent—from 2.0 to 2.7 million—from 1969 to 1971. Such workers constituted 2.5 percent of the civilian labor force in 1969 and 3.2 percent in 1971.

In 1969, 4 million workers, or 5.5 percent of the civilian labor force, worked

less than 15 hours per week, and 677,000, or 0.9 percent, worked less than 5 hours per week. The corresponding figures for 1971 are 4.3 million workers, or 5.8 percent, working less than 15 hours per week and 740,000, or 1 percent, working less than 5 hours per week.

In addition, the number of persons who worked 41 hours per week or more fell over 7 percent from 1969 to 1971, from 22,458,000 to 20,781,000. This occurred while the civilian labor force itself was growing from 80,734,000 to 84,113,000 and while civilian employment was increasing from 77,902,000 to 79,120,000.

These figures represent a great deal of hidden unemployment. A man who was working overtime in 1969 suddenly may find himself working only a straight 40 today. Or he may be cut back to 30 hours per week, or 20, or 15, or even 1, without ever appearing in our unemployment statistics. But he feels the bite of economic hardship almost as much as the worker who is completely unemployed for a period of weeks or months and then returns to full-time employment.

These statistics further show that economic hardships brought about by a sluggish economy are more widely shared than many have to date suggested. While detailed analysis by the BLS of overall work experience during 1971 will not be available until midsummer of this year, the figures for 1970 indicate that, while blacks, women, and laborers had high rates of unemployment, the skilled, white, male craftsman had little to cheer about either. In 1970, 52 million people worked all year round at full time jobs, 800,000 fewer than in 1969, the first time since 1958 that the number of year-round full-time workers decreased significantly. Furthermore, this decline was comprised entirely of men. Also during 1970, 14.6 million persons were unemployed at some time during the year, a rise of 2.8 million over 1969. The increases of proportions of workers with some unemployment during the year were greater for men than for women, for whites than for blacks, and for craftsmen rather than laborers.

I would suggest that these statistics document the need for prompt action on the jobs-now legislation. The question is not whether we can afford to put people back to productive full-time work, but how much longer we can afford not to.

VOICE OF DEMOCRACY CONTEST WINNER

HON. LAWRENCE J. HOGAN

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 9, 1972

Mr. HOGAN. Mr. Speaker, freedom is the most treasured benefit of American life, and yet I am sure we would all find it extremely difficult to explain what freedom really is.

That is why I am particularly pleased to be able to bring to the attention of the House an eloquent speech describing that most elusive term which was writ-

ten by Teresa Anderson for the 33d annual Voice of Democracy Contest sponsored by the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

Teresa, a student at DuVal Senior High School in Lanham, Md., wrote the speech on freedom for the contest and won at both the post and district levels.

Mr. Speaker, I insert Teresa's speech, "My Responsibility to Freedom," in the Record at this point:

MY RESPONSIBILITY TO FREEDOM

Freedom. That's a golden word for a possession we all should treasure. Most of us don't know what it's like to live without freedom. Yet realize that without protecting it, you can lose it. Democracy depends on the love of freedom and the ability to carry out the responsibilities of that freedom. Thus my responsibilities to freedom aren't unique, and neither is my love of it. My responsibilities mirror yours.

Any man's main responsibility to freedom is the protection of the rights of all. To protect and enjoy freedom, you have to understand what it is, and what it encompasses. True freedom exists where individual and human rights balance and mesh with moral and judicial law.

This freedom is like an orchestra playing a perfect symphony. The piece is controlled by the time signature and beat—in life this might represent judicial law. All instruments must play—moral law states this. There are minorities of some instruments, each as important as any other. This represents a primary human right—equality. Occasionally an instrument might play notes not written, but these don't violently disturb the music. Thus the individual has the right to choose—the right to be an individual. Freedom to play different notes doesn't mean freedom from the consequences if the notes are sour.

We see this in societies when freedoms are abused, and punished. The results of all the instruments is a rare changing symphony. It has liberal harps, staunch tubas, Ralph Nader trumpets, Martha Mitchell piccolos, and a Nixon percussion—that with one note can change the entire piece—often for the better.

With the understanding of freedom, there grows a respect of it. Freedom is powerful enough to change the primitive American colonies, made up of religious dissenters, some profit seekers, adventure lovers and pioneers, the downtrodden, and even English jail rabble, into an industrialized society advanced enough to save thousands of lives by predicting crushing hurricanes, and eradicating polio.

We've increased the average life span by thirty years, achieved the world's highest standard of living, and put man on the moon.

The main right of man is to know the truth and speak the truth. The main responsibilities are to keep well informed, and seek the facts. Listen to others, and respect their opinions.

NORTHERN IRELAND

HON. ROBERT N. GIAIMO

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 9, 1972

Mr. GIAIMO. Mr. Speaker, if we travel the recent past we can ride into bloodshed that could have been prevented by timely international intervention of crises in the smaller nations. The head-

lines of 1969 reported the horrors of the Nigerian conflict. Later on, we read about useless killings in Greece. All last year and even today, we have been made aware of the deaths of innocent victims of the Pakistan situation.

On January 30 in Northern Ireland, 13 Irish citizens lost their lives as the result of a conflict in that country that appears to be reaching its most dangerous boiling point. It seems that in 1972 Northern Ireland may be more inundated with civil and religious strife than in 1971 unless immediate action is taken.

The conflict in Northern Ireland is not just stimulated by intellectual differences. It is kindled also by terrifying and sometimes enduring religious and social hatreds that father the worst kind of violence, an indifference to the killing of women and children. Only quick, international intervention can cool the smoldering hotbed that exists in Northern Ireland today, a format that should be provided by the United Nations.

To aid in controlling this matter, I have cosponsored House Concurrent Resolution 523, calling for the United Nations to meet the problems in Northern Ireland head on with some viable peace-keeping measures.

I would not advocate intervention independent of the United Nations, for the urgency of the problem is one that should be troubling the conscience of the entire world. To date, hundreds of innocent victims have lost their lives due to a conflict that cannot be tolerated by silence.

The proposals offered by the resolution are as follows:

First. Immediate termination of the current internment policy and the simultaneous release of all persons detained thereunder.

Second. Arrangements for consultation among all the parties involved, including the Irish Republican Army, to bring about a cessation of the conflict.

Third. The replacement of British troops in Northern Ireland with a peace-keeping force of the United Nations.

Fourth. An international inquiry into the tragic events of Sunday, January 30, 1972.

To end a storm of further violence and bloodshed, the United States can urge the United Nations to accept the proposals stated in the resolution. If America does this, as a nation, we will be able to take pride in having helped to bring order to an area of the world that has given to almost every continent on earth great riches of the mind and heart.

SOARING COSTS OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES AND FACILITIES— RARICK REPORTS TO HIS PEOPLE

HON. JOHN R. RARICK

OF LOUISIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 9, 1972

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, I recently reported to my people on the increased

costs of health care services and facilities. I insert my report in the RECORD at this point:

RARICK REPORTS TO HIS PEOPLE ON THE SOARING COSTS OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES AND FACILITIES

Inflation—our dollars continuing to buy less as prices continue to soar—remains the number one issue in our nation and a threat to all people, young and old, workers and retired. Many of our people are conscientiously observing the wage and price controls in a concerted effort to bring the inflation problem under control.

I frequently receive mail from persons concerned about the high cost of hospital and medical care and inquiring as to what can be done to alleviate the situation. I thought today we'd explore the methods for delivery of health care and hospitalization, the causes for soaring costs of hospital and medical care, how these price spirals got started, and then attempt to arrive at recommendation for solution to this problem.

We in Louisiana have long provided excellent hospital facilities for those who can pay; and for those who are indigent or impoverished, the taxpayers have provided a system of charity hospitals which in treatment and facilities is second to none in the nation.

Now we learn that there has been a concerted effort to convince the charity patient that he is not receiving the caliber of medical service in the charity hospital system that he might through the private or non-profit hospital. We thus find suits being filed and high-level political maneuvering to compel private hospital facilities to be made available to indigent or charity patients.

One of the latest steps in this direction is the anticipated directive by HEW that all private medical hospitals will be required to give a percentage of their facilities and services to charity non-paying patients. The percentage of the gross receipts of the institution.

Of course, it only makes sense that our private hospitals must operate on a fixed budget or else they can go broke. If these health care facilities are forced to give no-charge treatment to some, then they can only stay in business by increasing their charges to those patients who pay their bills or carry insurance to cover such expenditures.

Presently, 52% of a hospital's income comes from private paying patients who also already subsidize various government assistance programs such as Medicare, and the trend seems to be to encourage more charity patients to receive what they believe is "equal treatment" with paying patients. In some instances, there is a reported lack of full utilization of the existing charity facilities.

And so, when this latest federal plan takes effect and you or a member of your family is forced to use health care facilities, you will find all of the charges increased, because you will be paying not only full treatment costs but a percentage of the charity patients' treatment which has been tacked on to your bill so that the hospital can remain open. It will be a sort of a hidden tax.

As the free patients become a reality in the private health care facility, fewer and fewer patients will seek out private physicians. More physicians will be forced to submit to being political doctors to take care of new government patients. Those doctors who desire to remain independent can be expected to increase their fees for private care.

All of this will take place while you are continuing with your taxes to support a first rate hospital for our indigent and charity patients!

In addition to this threat to the pocket-books of the health care recipient, the Labor

Committee in the House has reported out a bill which would increase the minimum wage to \$2.00 an hour.

While the hospital administrators and boards in our area report that they do not oppose the \$2.00 minimum wage, they do advise that it will be necessary for them to correspondingly increase all of their hospital charges if the minimum wage rate is increased. It is estimated that, as to the hospitals' continued operation alone, an increase in minimum wage from \$1.60 an hour to \$2.00 an hour would require a hospital room rate to be increased by \$12 a day.

I have given two classic examples of action under way right at this time which will benefit some at the expense of others, but in the long run will affect all of us in a continuing inflationary spiral.

Perhaps the tragic thing about medical services is the fact that many letters I receive are from people who have suffered a catastrophic illness or disease in which their entire savings have been wiped out by medical costs.

I can advise that Congress is at this time attempting to establish a catastrophic medical expense program to ease such burdens. Again, the catastrophic fund would mainly go to pay the costs of hospitals. I also hear from many who are irate because the ever increasing medical expenses exceed the coverage given by their insurance policies or are much higher than they had found them to be several years previously.

I think the most serious threat to all of us who know that we must maintain medical facilities in our communities is that many of our citizens who are in the grey borderline area of wanting to have the pride in paying their own way and meeting their own obligations will, if medical costs continue to soar, throw up their hands in despair and adopt the ever-growing feeling of some that the Federal government should take over all of the hospitals and that the taxpayers should give everybody "free" medical attention. In other words, as we wish better things for the poor and higher earnings for the unskilled, we are but passing these extra costs to those who can pay or his insurer. Those taxpayers who can bear the cost will become an ever-decreasing percentage of our population.

We are seeing the movement mount that will use our free enterprise, locally controlled and managed medical facilities to bring about their own destruction by forcing their costs of operations up to the point where they are prohibitive for the average American. This will force more and more people to seek charitable aid, and the number will continue to increase.

All of this is being done to the average citizen promising him existing health care services and facilities, yet these services will not remain the hospitals nor the health care to which we are accustomed if socialized or taken over by the Federal government.

And so, what is now underway in the name of human dignity to provide for charitable free treatment will eventually destroy these private institutions and make all of the nation's hospitals charity, impersonal, conveyor-belt type institutions.

When the people lose control of their own community, they will find political doctors, political hospitals, and political health care services that fail to attain the promises or the standards of those institutions as we know them and at a price far exceeding what could have been provided under the free enterprise system.

Americans are now being barraged with misleading and even false propaganda from the press, radio, and TV that the American private enterprise system of providing health care has broken down—it has failed. The only solution to this predicament, according

to much of the communication media, is public medicine—as if only the federal government can adequately supply the needed medical and hospital care and services.

Americans are being urged to destroy a free choice, private individual responsibility system in order to improve the situation.

Through an organized political scare tactics campaign of misleading and even false charges and information as to the nature and scope of the problem of the nation's health, the American people have been led to believe that a national health program is mandatory. We are told we must change, even if for the worst—just to change from our present system.

To look at the quality of health care in countries which have undertaken equal medical care—socialized medicine—should raise serious questions as to abandoning our present workable system for an inferior program in the U.S. Socialized health care has been a failure in England, France, Canada, Sweden, and all other countries which have abandoned private for public health care.

The experience of other nations with socialized medicine should serve as a stark warning to the U.S. against embarking on such a course for political promises to get the votes of the poor and disgruntled.

The reason for the increased costs of medical and hospitalization services is to be found in the general inflationary trend which has resulted in price rises in other fields as well. Inflation—a substantial and continuing rise in the general price level—is caused primarily by an increase in the volume of money and credit available relative to goods available. This disproportionate expansion of money and credit results from an unbalanced budget and deficit spending.

Other causes of high costs of medical care and hospitalization, as well as other items, are restrictive federal legislation and bureaucratic intermeddling in the private free enterprise sector of the economy.

We must realize that to stay in business, hospitals must pass any increase in wages on to private patients and insurance companies.

The result of further intermeddling and compulsory wage increases, of course, would be soaring costs of medical expenses, hospitalization, and insurance costs which will not cover all medical expenses.

Continued intervention by government in the private sector of the economy is like throwing gasoline on the fire of already exorbitant prices. It will fan the flame of the inflationary spiral, destroy private medicine, and result in complete nationalization of medicine in the United States. Many people, in despair, will abandon our present health care system and actually demand a federal takeover or full socialization.

The answer to this problem, as to many others, is to retain the private enterprise method which has proven to be far superior not only in reduced costs and improved service, but also in increased freedom and individual responsibility to that provided by a socialistic or government managed method of providing so-called "free" health service. Nothing is really free—not even freedom itself.

The answer is to repeal a whole series of laws which hamper the natural operation of the free enterprise system.

We must begin an assault on the ever increasing size and scope of a centralized government in Washington. In this way we will make progress toward balancing the federal budget, stopping inflation, and restoring our freedom.

I am reminded at this point of a story pertinent to this discussion. It is about Frogs and Freedom.

There's an old story that says you can't kill a frog by dropping him in boiling wa-

ter. He reacts so quickly to the sudden heat that he jumps out before he's hurt; but if you put him in cold water and then warm it up gradually, he never decides to jump till it's too late. By then, he's cooked!

Men are just as foolish. Take away their freedom overnight, and you've got a violent revolution. But steal it from them gradually (under the guise of "security", "peace", or "progress"), and you can paralyze an entire generation. Look at the income tax. It started out at a harmless sounding 1%. It would have been easy to jump out of water as tepid as this, but like the frog, we waited while it climbed ever higher. Try jumping now!

Worst of all, we never learn. Even today we cannot believe that Medicare is the same warm water that will one day boil us in Socialized Medicine. We see no connection between farm price supports and Nationalized Agriculture; and if we draw a parallel between subsidized teachers' pay and federal control of education, we are called "extremist".

The tragedies of history are always repeated by those who refuse to learn them. To seek guidance from the past is not "turning the clock back," as we are so often told. It is merely a good way to keep out of hot water.

MORE ON THE NIXON "PEACE" PROPOSAL

HON. BELLA S. ABZUG

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 9, 1972

Mrs. ABZUG. Mr. Speaker, as I have previously stated, Mr. Nixon's so-called peace proposal does not take or offer a single step toward peace in Indochina.

It does not set a date for our total and complete withdrawal.

It conditions our withdrawal upon assurances of the continued existence of the puppet dictatorship of President Thieu.

It fails to stop or even to lessen the indiscriminate bombing of targets in North Vietnam.

Richard Falk, of the Center of International Studies at Princeton University, is a recognized authority on American foreign policy. He has prepared an analysis of the Nixon proposals which clearly demonstrates their lack of viability. I think that his comments are well worth reading, and include them at the conclusion of my remarks:

THE NIXON PROPOSALS: MATTERS OF ILLUSION AND REALITY

(By Richard A. Falk)

Once again an American President has gone on national television to report on the search for peace in Vietnam. And once again there is no indication that the policy-makers in Washington have renounced their war plans to sustain the Thieu regime for the indefinite future. And once again, also, the liberal community in America, the mainstream opposition to the war in this country, has been taken in by the President, assumed his good will, and called on the other side to respond positively. The dreary situation interacts with heightened American bombing throughout Indochina (and especially in North Vietnam), with the initiation of an historic anti-war trial in Harrisburg, and with the sharpening focus on voter politics in a Presidential election year.

The first necessity, however, is to understand why Mr. Nixon's proposals are not, despite Senator Mansfield's unseemly lunge to embrace them, "a long step forward." Indeed, Nixon's proposals hearken back to 1966 at Manila where Lyndon Johnson joined in a Communique offering to withdraw all American forces from Vietnam within six months in exchange for an agreement by the other side to do the same. What was wrong with Johnson's proposals of 1966, remains wrong with Nixon's proposals of 1972. There is no way to compromise a civil war without coordinating the sharing of political power with the cessation of hostilities. To seek a cease-fire as a prelude to withdrawal, solidifies the position of the existing government, allows it to be the sole guardian of "law and order," and obtain mobility and access for its police and militia forces. In Vietnam where the war has raged so bitterly for so long, where the government leader is such a proven cutthroat repressor, and where the liberation forces have suffered such ravage, an insistence on no cease-fire without power-sharing is especially understandable.

It is on this issue—the crux of the matter—that the Nixon Administration has been deliberately misleading the public. Henry Kissinger has pointed to the willingness of the other side to enter a partial cease-fire with American forces during a withdrawal period as demonstrating that "cease-fire is not itself an issue in the negotiations." But Vietnamese willingness to negotiate a partial cease-fire seeks to arrange an American disengagement from an active combat role in the war, but it does not envision an end to fighting or a settlement of the war. The war for control goes on between Saigon and the NLF, but without American participation. In such circumstances, the North Vietnamese and the NLF do not renounce their military advantage or render themselves vulnerable to the good faith of the other side. Such an all-Vietnamese civil war would go on until victory was achieved by one side or a compromise was negotiated whereby the sharing of political power would be coupled with the total cease-fire, that is, the problem of settlement would remain the same after American disengagement, but the parties would be different. Most analysts agree that the Saigon regime would quickly fall in the event of a genuine American disengagement from the war. As the North Vietnamese have made clear in their public proposals they would be prepared to release all American prisoners in exchange for a pledge to end all American combat activities within a time certain. In this sense, the disengagement action remain available to Nixon as a way to obtain the release of American prisoners and assure the end of American casualties.

The Nixon Proposals cover up the failure to offer a power-sharing compromise by window-dressing and deceptive rhetoric. There is no power-sharing as the administrative, military, and police functions would be left entirely under the control of the Thieu regime after the cease-fire goes into effect and during the six-months period in which elections are being organized. The offer to have Thieu (and his Vice President Tran Van Huong) resign one month before the elections take place seems meaningless for several reasons. First of all, the apparatus of power would continue intact, and there is no assurance that Thieu would not continue to run things from off-stage. Secondly, Thieu's replacement by the chairman of the Senate, a weak bureaucrat allied with Thieu, reinforces the impression that the Saigon regime would retain full control over the country. Thirdly, in the face of persistence of the repressive Thieu regime there is no prospect that a mixed electoral commission, even with the participation of the Na-

tional Liberation Front, could organize free elections, or even that elections are the best way to select an interim government to supervise the transition from war to peace. On this basis, it hardly seems reasonable or likely to expect North Vietnam or the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam to consider seriously this type of political settlement. It is not an offer of genuine compromise. It is, indeed, a demand that the insurgent forces lay down their arms and allow the Thieu government to dominate South Vietnam during the period in which elections of a permanent government are taking place. If Mr. Nixon really believes that this line of proposal represents having "gone the extra mile in offering a settlement that is fair," then he fails to grasp neither the de facto military situation throughout Indochina which is increasingly tilting against those elements that we support nor the political conditions that must be satisfied to achieve a genuine negotiated settlement. More likely Nixon does understand, is putting forth proposals that are drawn to quell and bewilder domestic opposition to the war without any hope or expectation that the other side will accept them, or even negotiate from such a baseline. This interpretation is reinforced by the disclosure of the 9-point North Vietnam proposals of June 26, 1971, made in the secret talks.

In such circumstances, it is incredible that the lead editorial in the *New York Times* on January 26, 1972, the day after Nixon's speech, should hail the proposals and declare that "they merit support from all shades of American opinion and a positive response from the other side." Such an editorial position, given the ceaseless reiteration of the conditions for peace in Vietnam by the other side and by anti-war groups in this country, suggests the bankruptcy of the liberal dove opposition to the war, a bankruptcy based partly on subservience to Presidential authority and good faith and partly on a continued insistence on regarding the other side as "the enemy." After so many revelations of criminality and deceit on the part of our leaders in connection with the war these past years and after so many indications that the goals of the other side are the inevitable and natural goals of any political movement fighting for national independence, it is vital that the American people no longer view North Vietnam and the PRG as its enemy. North Vietnam and the PRG are the enemies of our government, but not of ourselves as citizens, and to parrot Washington's propaganda about regarding the other side as the enemy at this point in the conflict is to falsify and invert the nature of the moral and political issues and to distract attention from the horrifying sacrifice of lives still being made in furtherance of a lost and base cause—helping a repressive government fight mercilessly against its own population.

There are two positive courses of action that an American government could take to get the war over:

(1) American disengagement from the war by ending combat activity over a six-month period during which American POWs would be returned; North Vietnam and the PRG would not attack withdrawing American forces and so a partial cease-fire would be operative assuring no further American casualties; the United States on its part would agree to the immediate end of all air activity, including strikes originating from Thailand and carriers; during this period the contending Vietnamese factions would have the options of continuing the conflict or negotiating a settlement; some difficulty might arise over the definition of what "disengagement" or "withdrawal" entailed, that

is, whether the United States remained free to give economic and military aid to the Saigon regime during the period set for prisoner release and troop withdrawals.

(2) American acceptance of the notion that the administrative, military, and police functions in South Vietnam would have to be supervised by a provisional coalition government during the period set for the withdrawal of American forces and the organization of elections to select a new permanent government; this kind of power-sharing formula could be accompanied by immediate arrangements for cease-fire, thereby bringing the war to an end, assuring the return of American POWs, and the end of all casualties; the negotiations would have to define the character and functions of the provisional revolutionary government and the degree to which the approach taken in Vietnam could be extended to Cambodia and Laos; an Indochina Peace Conference should also be scheduled to give formal status to the arrangements for political power-sharing and cease-fire agreed upon for the two Vietnams, Cambodia, and Laos.

In concluding, it is important to ask why it is unlikely that the Nixon Administration will choose either of the alternatives outlined above, both of which have been explicitly and openly offered by the other side. For Nixon and Kissinger to say that the North Vietnamese insist on the United States acting to overthrow the present Saigon regime (Nixon's words: "The only thing this plan does not do is to join our enemy to overthrow our ally, which the United States of America will never do.") is, on its face, absurd and misleading. If the real meaning of this Kissinger-Nixon charge is that any power-sharing political formula is tantamount to the overthrow of the Thieu regime, then this may be an accurate prediction of the probability of Thieu's collapse shortly after American military props are taken away.

But this is only to acknowledge that the war is lost and that no compromise is possible because Thieu can't stay in power unless he is helped by the United States to repress the opposition, including the many thousands of non-Communist political prisoners who continue to be locked up in jails throughout South Vietnam.

But why shouldn't Nixon be prepared to risk this collapse? What is the reason for putting forward proposals that are *prima facie* unacceptable when there are clear lines of alternative action that would get American POWs back and earn Nixon political credit as a peace-maker? The best answer seems to be that Nixon is unwilling to risk appearing before the American public (and the record of history) as a loser. The worst of all possible outcomes for Washington continues to be the appearance of defeat, not the reality which is already evident to any close student of the war. And all of the continuing carnage in Indochina under Nixon, as it was under Johnson, is inflicted for the sole purpose of delaying the day of reckoning. And so Nixon, like Johnson before him, is holding on in Indochina by bombardment and threats in Indochina and by tranquilizing and misleading talk at home, with the hope of postponing this day of reckoning at least past next November.

There is a small chance that this line of analysis is wrong, that Nixon will yet opt for a genuine way out or that the other side, weary of war, frightened by the remaining escalation options, or confident that a resumed post-withdrawal struggle would lead to rapid victory, might negotiate something responsive to the Nixon proposals. In my view this is only a slim possibility, and its reality depends on how much doubt and empathy exists in Washington's policy-makers and whether the terms of proposals, ambiguous

on their contours, could be substantially reshaped in the course of negotiations. As a rule of thumb, it is highly unlikely that any "peace" initiative put forward at Paris with Thieu's endorsement is negotiable, but it may be that Thieu has been coerced or fooled, although this seems unlikely. One area of flexibility involves the possibility of converting the mixed election commission in Nixon's proposal into the real locus of power by making it into the effective government during the six-month interim period. Another area of flexibility involves a definition of what is meant by withdrawal. Mr. Kissinger has stressed the Administration's flexibility. It remains to be seen and during the interim, extreme skepticism is the only reasonable attitude.

With an election coming along in the United States and with the end of the war still not in sight, it seems very important that the Democratic Party go clearly on record as advocating an end to the war in the only realistic terms now imaginable—by acknowledging the U.S. defeat and by supporting a power-sharing formula as coincident with withdrawal and cease-fire. Without such clarity from the Democratic Party, in its Platform and by its Presidential candidate the people will once again be denied a choice on the war.

A REVIEW OF TIMBER CUTTING IN THE BOUNDARY WATERS CANOE AREA.

HON. DONALD M. FRASER

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 9, 1972

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, in only one of the 87 designated and 49 proposed units of the national wilderness preservation system is logging permitted. This exception to the wilderness rule is the Boundary Waters Canoe Area, a unique region of prime canoe country and virgin forests, extending for 100 miles along the Canadian border of Minnesota. Six Minnesota conservation organizations have asked that all cutting in the area be halted until an environmental impact statement as required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 can be prepared. In the following article in the January 8, 1972, issue of the *Minneapolis Tribune*, the arguments against continued timber cutting are advanced, and a plea is made for a moratorium on logging until the points at issue and alternatives can be fully studied.

WHY TIMBER CUTTING IN BWCA IS OPPOSED
(By Herbert Wright, Director, Limnological Research Center, University of Minnesota)

The U.S. Forest Service has refused to move appreciably from its plan to decimate tens of thousands of acres of virgin timber in the portal (cuttable) zone of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area. A major gravel road already under construction leads north from Echo Trail to service timber sales in the Oyster Lake-Hustler Lake country, some 25 miles northwest of Ely.

The canoe area contains by far the largest virgin forest east of the Rocky Mountains. With its interconnected lakes and forested hills, it is a region of incomparable scenic beauty, easily accessible to the canoeist and hiker who seeks peace, serenity and adven-

ture in the wild. It is the most heavily visited area in the U.S. wilderness system, and use is growing so fast that restrictions must soon be placed on permits, length of stay, allowable routes and other logistical arrangements.

Simple foresight should dictate that the wilderness area should be increased in size rather than decreased, and that visitors be encouraged to disperse from main canoe routes by means of hiking trails to less accessible lakes. Timber-cutting now is prohibited within 400 feet of lakes, but what kind of wilderness experience can one expect when he ventures away from his canoe to come upon a vast, clear-cut wasteland?

The virgin forest of the BWCA is unique not only in its recreational potential, but in its scientific value. It is the only major natural remnant of the vast conifer forest that once extended eastward to the coast of Maine. Nearly all the rest has been cut over. The forest regrown from cut-over areas has little value for the scientific study of a natural forest ecosystem.

For that matter, such a disturbed forest has little aesthetic appeal to the discerning layman. Does the Minneapolis Institute of Art feature copies of great paintings when it has the originals at hand? The public can support the preservation of some of the great works of man. Minnesota is fortunate to have this unique resource convenient for its citizens. But it has a responsibility to be an enlightened custodian of a great treasure.

In these days of search for ecological understanding, a major natural ecosystem is a prime natural resource. A natural forest ecosystem must be large to remain viable so natural plant succession is not diluted by introductions from outside the forest and a sizable natural population of big mammals such as moose, wolf and bear is maintained.

An example of research that required a large area of undisturbed forest is the recent study of fire history in the BWCA. During the last 10 years it has been demonstrated that practically all the virgin forest of the BWCA can be traced to specific fires of the past 300 years and that fire plays a major role in the periodic renewal of the natural forest.

This research raises basic questions about management of natural forests. It would not have been possible without the existence of the extensive natural forest in which the distribution of major past fires could be plotted. Who knows what similarly unexpected insights into natural forest ecosystems might result from future studies? If the natural forest is destroyed or reduced in size, the value of such research may be diminished.

The Forest Service seems insensitive to arguments based on scientific as well as aesthetic grounds. The Little Sioux fire of last May, for example, affected a large area of virgin forest in the margin of the BWCA. It provides a superb opportunity to study the process of plant and animal succession as well as the effects of fire on water quality in lakes. The fire also provided the chance to educate the public on the role of fire in natural ecosystems.

But the Forest Service not only refused to support a significant research effort or to publicize the educational aspects. It now proposes to cut the surrounding unburned virgin forest that might supply much of the seed for regeneration of the burned area. This is a valid reason for a moratorium on cutting, so the effects of timber-cutting can be assessed in an environmental-impact statement.

The Forest Service also is insensitive to the economic argument. The particular timber sale in question next to the Little Sioux fire will bring \$61,000 to the government—about 10 cents per tree. The Forest Service has spent many thousands of dollars to cruise the timber and prepare the contract, and will spend an additional \$120,000 to replant after cutting—and the virgin forest will be lost in the process. About 90 percent of the timber will go to paper-pulp mills. Very little will be used for poles and boards. And this at a time when pulpwood is in surplus in Minnesota.

This financial arrangement would be a poor investment even if the wilderness were not involved.

The public is not well informed on the alternatives to management in the BWCA. Environmental-impact statements are supposed to provide this information, not only for new projects, but for projects already under way. Contracts can be reviewed and terminated under changed conditions of public attitudes.

As a minimum, a moratorium on cutting in the BWCA is necessary to permit discussion of alternatives before an informed public. If a new course of action is found advisable, it can then be provided by appropriate legislation. To refuse to recognize an environmental and economic problem is a mark of blindness and not a responsible reaction by a federal agency.

The validity of the conservationist case for cessation of all logging in the area is open to question, but the need for a thorough review of the environmental impact of timber cutting seems clear. These issues are further explored in the following editorial in the Minneapolis Tribune, also of January 8, 1972:

BOUNDARY WATERS AREA ISSUES

The Minnesota Public Interest Research Group (MPIRG), in concert with a half-dozen state conservation organizations, has initiated what could grow into a national controversy over the use of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area, the nation's oldest wilderness area.

MPIRG has asked the U.S. Forest Service to stop logging by Northwest Paper Co. in the 4,650-acre "Sunnydale" tract northeast of Ely, adjacent to 15,000 acres burned in a fire last spring. Further, MPIRG wants all logging suspended within the BWCA until the service prepares a statement on the environmental impact of cutting timber there. The Forest Service and the secretary of agriculture (the service is part of the U.S. Department of Agriculture) this week refused the requests.

The issues raised are complex and suscep-

tible to few easy answers. They involve widely divergent value judgments and philosophies about the best use of natural resources. But MPIRG makes a convincing case for at least some of its immediate requests.

The validity of its long-range goal, which is to end all cutting in the BWCA (the article below by Prof. Herbert Wright makes a case for this), seems to us open to considerably greater doubt.

The fire last spring, in an area never logged, provides a unique opportunity for valuable research. Cutting in the adjacent Sunnydale tract will reduce or destroy the validity of five separate studies being conducted by the University of Minnesota and the Forest Service itself. (The service has altered the terms of its cutting contract with Northwest to eliminate interference with one other research project.) The company needs species such as jackpine and spruce to balance its use of aspen in producing paper, but it doesn't need the pine and spruce in the Sunnydale tract. Northwest holds long-term contracts to cut more than 300,000 cords of such species elsewhere in the Superior National Forest, including the canoe area, but depends on the forest for only about 50,000 cords annually. The potential value of the research outweighs the difficulties involved in postponing or cancelling the Sunnydale cut, it seems to us.

MPIRG also has a sound basis for requesting an environmental-impact statement on the effects of continued logging in the BWCA. The Forest Service has a number of sincere, logical arguments why this is unnecessary. But such statements were required by a federal law now two years old; since then, federal courts repeatedly have ruled out just such arguments.

The underlying issue, however, is whether all logging in the BWCA should cease, and the entire area be reserved for recreation. The BWCA no-cut zone was expanded to 530,000 acres in 1965. When another 100,000 acres are added in 1975, logging will be prohibited in about 67 percent of the BWCA and 20 percent of the 3-million-acre Superior National Forest. The wood-products industry views continuing withdrawal of timber as a distinct threat to its survival—and to jobs that are badly needed in northeastern Minnesota.

The Forest Service points out that before the no-cut zone was extended in 1965, the recreation-vs.-timbering issue was reviewed (battled, in fact) publicly at some length, and that the service now is managing the area as federal law provides. Conservationists argue there are new circumstances today—chiefly a heavy increase in recreational use of the BWCA, and a shift in public sentiment toward environmental concerns. Both sides are correct.

An environmental-impact statement—not just a management plan, which the Forest Service is preparing—would help resolve such issues. A thorough statement would involve consideration, for instance, of the effects of cutting part of the largest remaining undisturbed coniferous forest east of the Rockies; the negative economic effects of not doing so, and sources of timber outside the BWCA.