SENATE—*Friday, August 11, 1972*

The Senate met at 10 a.m. and was called to order by Hon. LAWTON CHILES, a Senator from the State of Florida.

PRAYER

Dr. D. Elton Trueblood, professor at large, Earlham College, Richmond, Ind., offered the following prayer:

O Thou who art the Supreme Ruler of the world, enable us to be Thy instruments in achieving those purposes for which this Nation has been brought into being. Help us to love our country much, because we love Thee more. May our leaders be marked not by pride, but by a sense of unworthiness for their heavy responsibilities. Give wisdom, we pray Thee, to our President as he makes decisions which affect not only our own citizens but the entire family of man. Guide our lawmakers that they may be both courageous and wise, knowing that their calling is a sacred one because they are Thy ministers.

Enlighten both government and people in order that all may know and do Thy will. May we not meanly lose the last best hope of earth. All this we ask with humility of heart. Amen.

APPOINTMENT OF ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will please read a communication to the Senate from the President pro tempore (Mr. EASTLAND).

The assistant legislative clerk read the following letter:

U.S. SENATE,
PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE,
Washington, D.C., August 11, 1972.

To the Senate:

Being temporarily absent from the Senate on official duties, I appoint Hon. LAWTON CHILES, a Senator from the State of Florida, to perform the duties of the Chair during my absence.

JAMES O. EASTLAND,
President pro tempore.

Mr. CHILES thereupon took the chair as Acting President pro tempore.

THE JOURNAL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Thursday, August 10, 1972, be dispensed with.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Commerce, the Committee on Finance, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Public Works may be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate go into executive session to consider nominations on the Executive Calendar.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to the consideration of executive business.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The nominations on the Executive Calendar will be stated.

THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LIBRARIES AND INFORMATION SCIENCE

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to read sundry nominations in the National Commission on Libraries and Information Science.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the nominations be considered en bloc.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nominations are considered and confirmed en bloc.

NOMINATIONS PLACED ON THE SECRETARY'S DESK

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to read sundry nominations in the Public Health Service, which had been placed on the Secretary's desk.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nominations are considered and confirmed en bloc.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President be immediately notified of the confirmation of these nominations.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate resume the consideration of legislative business.

The motion was agreed to, and the Senate resumed the consideration of legislative business.

INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.S.R.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, around noon today, the Senate will take up the unfinished business, the question of the interim agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

I anticipate that there will be a good deal of discussion. Certainly there is a great deal of confusion about it.

I ask unanimous consent that an article published in the Baltimore Sun today, entitled "Sugaring SALT" be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SUGARING SALT

In its effort to mollify hardline critics of the strategic arms limitation agreements signed by President Nixon in Moscow, the administration is operating oddly. On Capitol Hill, it has thrown its weight behind a proposal by Senator Henry M. Jackson that would establish equality in numbers of missile launchers as a goal in the next round of SALT. Very well. Mr. Jackson, a close student of military affairs, has consistently voiced his concern that the President had settled for a SALT formula giving the Soviet Union a 2,130-to-1,710 edge in the number of offensive missile launchers over the next five years. The senator was unimpressed by administration arguments before Congressional committees that the United States is well protected by its lead in other areas—multiple warheads, long-range bombers, overseas bases and over-all technological superiority. "You cannot freeze technology," Mr. Jackson contended at one point, saying that in a future permanent treaty "technology cannot substitute for numbers." The administration gave no hint it would swing around to this rationale until after the Senate Foreign Relations committee had approved and sent the SALT agreements to the floor without reservations. But after Senator Jackson dropped another proposal threatening abrogation of the pending agreement if the Soviet Union pursued a huge weapons buildup, the administration accepted numerical equality.

Or did it? As the Senate controversy developed, the Pentagon began leaking information about a decision to go ahead with the development of new multiple warheads that could strike hardened targets—nuclear command centers, nuclear bomb stockpiles and missile-launching silos—on enemy territory. Wednesday a Pentagon spokesman insisted that the United States is not seeking a first-strike force capable of knocking out the Soviet deterrent. But the SALT agreements, he explained, would preclude the United States from enjoying superiority in numbers of missiles. Therefore, he said, "we are recommending technological superiority."

So there we have it. In the Senate, the administration has opted for numerical equality for the next round of SALT. Over at the Pentagon, the emphasis is on "technological superiority." It is confusing, perhaps deliberately so, but the House Foreign Affairs Committee may clarify the situation. It has approved the SALT agreements, without reservations, and sent them to the floor where passage intact is expected.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I yield back my time under the standing order.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE) is now recognized for 15 minutes.

AN INDEPENDENT, BIPARTISAN, TWO-MAN COMMISSION SHOULD BE APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE THE WATERGATE BUGGING SCANDAL

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, because of the overwhelming conflict of interest of White House and Nixon administration officials, today I call for the appointment of an independent, high

level, bipartisan, two-man commission to investigate all the facts in connection with the Watergate incident and to report to the public on this matter within 30 days.

I propose for appointment to the commission former Republican Senator John J. Williams of Delaware and former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg. These men are scrupulously honest, have a rugged independence of mind, and wear no man's collar. They can serve the public interest and bring a measure of confidence to the American people about this matter which is now entirely lacking.

All the facts now known by the investigating officials should be turned over to these men to make certain that the administration, which has an overwhelming conflict of interest, does not sweep this matter under the rug or delay it until after the November elections.

ADMINISTRATION CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

What we have now is a situation in which former key administration officials, particularly former Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans, a number of former White House aides and consultants, as well as a number of people connected with the Nixon campaign committee, are directly involved in key aspects of the break-in at the Watergate headquarters of the Democratic National Committee or are involved with the large money transactions involving $5,300 in $100 bills found on those involved in the break-in.

Yet this matter is being investigated by the Justice Department whose head, Mr. Richard Kleindienst, is one of the President's most partisan and loyal lieutenants—for whom I voted and in whom I have great faith as to his ability—and whose predecessor and former boss, John Mitchell, headed the Nixon campaign committee; by Mr. L. Patrick Gray III who has just been appointed by the President as Acting Director of the FBI; and by a U.S. attorney who is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the President.

NO CONFIDENCE NOW

In these circumstances, it is impossible for the public to have the slightest confidence that this matter will be dealt with fairly or expeditiously.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I am delighted to yield to the Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. SCOTT. I am just asking for purposes of clarification as to when such a commission would report.

Mr. PROXMIRE. In 30 days.

Mr. SCOTT. Would the Senator consider taking the issue right out of the possible field of political consideration on either side and have the report made by the end of the year?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I feel, frankly, that——

Mr. SCOTT. I think that this is a very shabby business——

Mr. PROXMIRE. I understand that.

Mr. SCOTT. It is a very shabby business. I am not defending anything that happened. I do not believe anyone has been found guilty. I do not defend it. I just want to see if we can move it out of politics.

Mr. PROXMIRE. What concerns me is that the purpose is not for disclosure or for revelation until after the election. I think that 30 days is ample time for people like former Senator John Williams of Delaware and Arthur Goldberg to make a finding which would win our confidence and that of the public as to what the facts actually are, before the election.

Mr. SCOTT. They are eminent men but I have not the remotest idea who is responsible. Whoever is responsible should be fired if they had any connection with any political organization and if they are guilty they should be tried, convicted and punished. I have no sympathy for that. I am simply raising the question for purposes of clarification, as whatever was done seems to have been done for some mysterious purpose. The Senator from Wisconsin knows that I was national chairman of my party once and I assure him that I did not have anything worth stealing.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I am sure the Senator from Pennsylvania is too intelligent to have permitted that to happen while he was chairman of the Republican Party.

Mr. SCOTT. If anyone had done that while I was there, they would have been fired, probably including me.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Watergate incident is getting "curiouser and curiouser" with the passage of time. Does the Senator have any idea as to what they were after?

Mr. PROXMIRE. It is difficult to know what kind of documents they would have wanted, or what kind of other attractive things they could have found. Apparently, what was behind this was an attempt at bugging, to find out what was going on at the headquarters, so that they could be listening in to campaign strategy, know who the contacts were with the various people around the country, so that it could be monitored and the other side could take advantage of it. A real "big brother" effort.

Mr. MANSFIELD. According to what I have read in the newspapers, this fits in with what the distinguished Republican leader has indicated. There have been a number of firings already of individuals who were tied to this caper.

Has the Senator introduced a resolution or made a suggestion relative to who should look into this matter?

Mr. PROXMIRE. Exactly. I propose the distinguished former Senator John Williams of Delaware and the distinguished former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg. This is not unprecedented. This is exactly what was done in the Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. case by President Wilson and in the Teapot Dome scandal by President Coolidge.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, would the Senator consider just one man, the distinguished former Senator John Williams and have him undertake the responsibility for the key proposal which the Senator is suggesting?

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, perhaps one man would be sufficient. However, I prefer a two-man commission. This commission is so important that it might be better received if we had a two-man commission. This is not a new precedent. This was done before with a Republican and a Democratic President, as I have indicated.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, because of the time element, I want to make it clear that I did not rise in support of the Senator's suggestion, unless we can keep it out of the political arena. However, if anyone considers that this is a serious matter and considers that there are political implications, whoever he is, he ought to stand up and make it known and clean up a cloudy situation.

I personally do not want to be any part of it. However, as an individual citizen, and not as a U.S. Senator, I would like to see the thing clarified.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I want to commend the Senator for the suggestion he has made. I also want to reinforce the position he has taken that the American people are entitled to know the facts as quickly as they can be ascertained.

I do not follow the argument that the question should be taken out of the political arena. Its resolution is highly pertinent to the decision the American people must make in November. Nobody can forecast, at this time, the outcome of such an investigation. However, I think that an inquiry made by men of unquestionable integrity, no matter what revelations it may lead to, is something that the American people are entitled to have now. They have a right to the facts, in order to pass judgment on the moral caliber of this administration, on its fitness to remain in office.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I could not agree more with the Senator.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, this is an issue of tremendous significance. It raises the question of whether any ethical standards are being observed at the highest levels of government. And that is something we need to find out about. If, in fact, the Committee for the Reelection of the President has used large sums of money to hire thugs to bug the Democratic National Committee Headquarters, contrary to the laws of the country, then why, in the name of good government should not the people know about it before the election?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I could not agree with the Senator more. The only way that the people can react is if they know this before the election.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I think even a better suggestion would be a three-man commission. It is well known that former Senator Williams is a man of tremendous integrity. However, he did run as a Republican. It is also well known that former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg is a man of tremendous integrity. However, he ran as a Democrat.

I propose that we ought to have a three-man commission, former Senator

Williams, former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, and a third party chosen by the two, which would keep it outside of the realm of politics, and then we would have a troika. We would have the third party put on the stool.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President. I only have a few minutes more time remaining. I will proceed as rapidly as I can.

Mr. President, even now key facts have been suppressed, high officials including Mr. Stans have failed to make any public statement or explanation, and the matter has been locked up and declared sub judice by the investigating officials who owe their position and power to the President, the White House staff, and the Republican party.

By appointing former Senator John Williams and former Justice Arthur Goldberg to an investigating commission, we can be certain that facts will not be suppressed, that public information will be made public, that the Justice Department will be goaded to prosecute those who are involved in wrong doing, and that justice will be served.

The two men should have access to every piece of information now held by the investigating authorities. They should make a report on those facts within 30 days. They should recommend what actions should be taken including whether or not a special prosecutor should be appointed to handle the matter and whether any information is being hidden until the campaign is over.

This is the best way for justice to be served in what appears to involve scandalous action by those at the very highest levels of government who should not be allowed merely to judge themselves and their colleagues.

There is ample precedent for the action which I am proposing.

WORLD WAR I PLANE SCANDAL

In 1918 during the Wilson administration there was a scandal involving hundreds of millions of dollars in the aircraft industry and particularly the Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. in which the Talbot family was involved. The scandal involved planes which routinely crashed after being built. The young Talbot later became Secretary of the Air Force during the Eisenhower administration but had to resign under fire for serious indiscretions.

Woodrow Wilson considered that it was improper for one agency of his administration, namely the Justice Department, to investigate another agency of the Government, namely the War Department.

As a consequence he appointed Charles Evans Hughes who had resigned from the Supreme Court to run against Wilson and whom Wilson had defeated for President in 1916, as a Special Assistant to the Attorney General. President Wilson gave Hughes an entirely free rein in the case. That was how Wilson overcame an apparent conflict of interest in his administration.

TEAPOT DOME EXAMPLE

Calvin Coolidge performed a similar act in his administration. Under a resolution offered by Robert LaFollette, Sr., the Senate Public Lands Committee, under the chairmanship of Senator Thomas J. Walsh, the great Senator from Montana, was pursuing an investigation of the Teapot Dome scandal. Harry Daugherty, who was then Attorney General, was deeply involved in the Teapot Dome scandal and obviously had a conflict of interest in investigating and prosecuting the case.

BIPARTISAN SPECIAL COUNSELS

As a result, President Coolidge appointed one Democrat and one Republican to serve as special counsel in the Teapot Dome case. Those two men, Owen Roberts, who later—1930—was appointed to the Supreme Court, and Atlee Pomerene, a former Democratic Senator from Ohio, were also confirmed by the Senate in their investigative jobs.

In the end Daugherty resigned and Harlan F. Stone was appointed Attorney General by President Coolidge.

In these two previous incidents, two of the men who were appointed by Presidents to investigate scandals in their administrations in which there was a conflict of interest, served on the Supreme Court of the United States. A third was a former U.S. Senator.

There is, therefore, ample historical precedent for my proposal in two key respects. First, in the fact that former Presidents went outside their administrations to seek men when there was a scandal involving a conflict of interest. Second, in the fact that the men selected to run the investigations were of such caliber that they either had served or would serve on the Supreme Court, or had served as a Senator of the United States.

I therefore commend to the President of the United States my proposal that former Senator John Williams and former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg be selected to perform a similar investigation in his administration where there is a clear and major conflict of interest among the existing investigative authorities.

President Nixon, if he is to gain the confidence of the country over the way the Watergate incident is handled, should do in 1972 what President Wilson did in 1918 in the Dayton-Wright scandal and what President Coolidge did in 1924 when high officials of his administration were involved in the Teapot Dome scandal. He should appoint a bipartisan investigative commission now.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a series of articles and editorials on the bugging affair be printed at this point in the RECORD. They include an article from the August 10, 1972, issue of the Washington-Star News by Patrick Collins; an article by James J. Kilpatrick from the August 8 Star-News, an August 8 editorial from the Star-News entitled "The Watergate Silence"; and an August 9, 1972, article from the Washington Post by Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein entitled "Stans Denies GOP Money Funded Watergate Break-In."

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Star-News, Aug. 10,] 1972]

GOP CONTRIBUTIONS: MORE MONEY TIED TO BARKER

(By Patrick Collins)

Additional campaign contributions totaling $89,000 passed through the Committee to Re-elect the President and into the bank account of Bernard Barker, a suspect in the break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquarters in June, sources close to the investigation have revealed.

The new disclosure raised to at least $114,000 the amount deposited in Barker's account through the national committee. Last week a $25,000 campaign check was traced to the suspect's account.

Federal agents probing the June 17 break-in at the Watergate complex also have determined that the Republicans had established a special "security fund" to thwart demonstrations at their convention this summer.

Sources said the fund—including money to possibly purchase information about planned disruptions—was set up before the GOP decided to switch its convention site from San Diego to Miami Beach.

It is not known whether the money which found its way to Barker's bank account came via this fund.

But, sources say, the investigation suggests the most possibility that money given as legitimate campaign contributions was used to finance the break-in—apparently without the knowledge or authorization of top officials of the Committee to Reelect the President or other GOP leaders.

Federal agents are now trying to pinpoint the origins of the $89,000 and determine what transactions brought the money to the account of Barker, a Miami real estate man and one of five men arrested inside the Democratic offices with copying cameras and electronic gear.

Shortly after the arrests, D.C. police confiscated 53 consecutively numbered $100 bills from the suspects which were later traced to a large withdrawal Barker had made from his account at The Republic National Bank of Miami.

A further investigation revealed that, before that withdrawal, $89,000 had been transferred to Barker's account in the name of a prominent Mexican business lawyer.

The lawyer, Mannuel Daguerre Ogarrio, has denied any knowledge of the transaction which was accomplished in four separate installments. But sources have confirmed that the money did not pass through the President's campaign committee.

Last week, a $25,000 campaign check was also traced to Barker's account. The source of that money was Nixon's chief Midwest fundraiser, Kenneth H. Dahlberg. He has said that on April 10 he converted $25,000 in cash contributions into a cashier's check. The next day, Dahlberg said, he gave the check to Maurice Stans, former Secretary of Commerce and head of Nixon's campaign funds.

Ten days later, bank records show, Barker deposited the $25,000 check in his account.

Stans, according to reports published yesterday, has denied that the check had been used to fund the alleged break-in at the Democratic offices.

He has reportedly told investigators that he gave Dahlberg's check to the committee treasurer, Hugh W. Sloan, who in turn gave it to finance committee lawyer G. Gordon Liddy.

Stans is reported to have told investigators that Liddy exchanged the check for $25,000 cash and then deposited the money in the campaign fund.

Neither Stans, Liddy or a committee spokesman would comment on that report.

Sloan, reached at his McLean home, described the account of the exchange as "inaccurate" but refused to discuss any details.

Liddy was fired from the re-election committee last month after refusing to cooperate with FBI agents working on the investigation. Sloan resigned from his post in June for what he termed "personal reasons unrelated to the incident."

In a related action yesterday, a federal judge ruled that the Justice Department could not represent a Secret Service agent expected to testify in the $1 million civil suit the Democrats have brought against the Republicans in connection with the break-in.

U.S. District Court Judge Charles Richey ruled that there would be a conflict of interest if the Justice Department defended agent Alfred Wong, since the department is involved in the criminal investigation of the incident.

Wong reportedly recommended James McCord, one of the suspects arrested in the Democratic headquarters, for the job as chief security adviser to the Republicans, a job McCord held until his arrest.

The judge gave Wong 10 days to find a lawyer and ordered that all depositions to be filed be suspended until his new counsel acquaints himself with the case.

In response to the disclosure today, Lawrence F. O'Brien, national campaign chairman for presidential candidate George McGovern, again called for the appointment of a "politically disinterested" special prosecutor to investigate this "outrageous case."

O'Brien said that the connection between the President's re-election committee and the attempted political espionage, becomes "clearer" with every new development. "The continued silence on the part of the White House and Republican officials can only be viewed as an admission that they have something to hide," he said.

McGovern said the revelations today "were shocking but not surprising. Since Richard Nixon has refused to tell us where his contributions of $10 million have come from, it is not surprising that the allocation is just as secret." He challenged Nixon to make public all his financial records, and "to trust the American people."

[From the Washington Star-News, Aug. 8, 1972]

THE WATERGATE CAPER IS NO LONGER JUST FUNNY

(By James J. Kilpatrick)

Until this past week, when the Washington Post broke the story of a wandering $25,000 check, no solid evidence had surfaced to link top-level Republicans with the bizarre affair known locally as the Watergate Caper. The evidence, to this point, was at best circumstantial and tenuous, and the caper had its funny aspects.

It isn't funny any more. It now appears that Maurice Stans, former Secretary of Commerce and now treasurer of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President, on April 11 had in his hands a $25,000 check intended as a campaign contribution. Nine days later, on April 20, that same check was deposited to the Florida account of Bernard L. Barker. On the following day, Barker made a $25,000 withdrawal.

This is the same Bernard L. Barker, 55, alias Frank Carter, who was arrested at 2:30 a.m. June 17, caught *in flagrante* in the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee at the Watergate. Barker and four others have been charged with second-degree burglary. A local grand jury is expected to return indictments soon.

At the time of their arrest, the five suspects had in their possession $5,300 in $100 bills, serially numbered. Most or all of these bills have been traced to the same bank in Miami, where Barker is in the real estate business. The thing is beginning to smell to high heaven. Clark MacGregor, chairman of the Nixon Re-election committee, and the President himself have to do more than they have done so far. The affair has to be exposed promptly.

The story first broke into public view on June 17, when a guard at the Watergate noticed the fire doors in the apartment building had been taped in an open position. He summoned police, who found a door to the Democratic headquarters jimmied open. There they discovered the five suspects, red-faced and unarmed, but well-equipped with electronic bugging equipment, cameras, and walkie-talkies. Viewed professionally, the burglary was a comically bungled job.

Twenty-four hours later, after various aliases had been penetrated, the suspects, in addition to Barker, were identified as Frank A. Sturgis, 48, an anti-Castro soldier of fortune; Eugenio Martinez, 49, a salesman for Barker's real estate firm; Virgilio R. Gonzales, 46, a Miami locksmith; and James W. McCord, Jr., 53, a retired security consultant in Washington.

Of these, the most interesting was McCord. He retired from the Central Intelligence Agency in 1970 after 19 years in security work there. In January of this year he was retained by the Committee for the Re-Election of the President, and also by the Republican National Committee, to supervise internal security for them. In this capacity, he had obtained FCC licenses for certain walkie-talkie equipment.

A search of the suspects turned up an address book. It contained the name of E. Howard Hunt, Jr., 53, with the notation: "White House." Hunt also retired from the CIA in 1970, after 21 years in intelligence work. He was closely identified with the Bay of Pigs operation of 1961. So was Barker. After leaving the CIA, Hunt also became a private consultant. At the time of the Watergate Caper, he had a part-time desk in the office of Charles W. Colson, special counsel to Nixon. Hunt has dropped out of sight, and reportedly is in Spain.

The story, as it first developed, had other Republican connections. Douglas Caddy, Barker's lawyer, is a founder of Young Americans for Freedom and an active Republican worker. Barker had Republican associations in Miami. None of this directly touched the Committee for the Re-Election of the President and John Mitchell, of course, who was then committee chairman, indignantly denied everything.

More than indignant denials are now required. The check for $25,000, representing cash contributions raised by Kenneth H. Dahlberg of Minnesota, cries out for explanation. Dahlberg gave the check to Stans, who presumably gave it to some subordinate for routine deposit. Then it turned up in Barker's account. How did it get there? And Why? Nixon himself, above all others, must demand swift and public disclosure.

[From the Washington Star-News, Aug. 8, 1972]

THE WATERGATE SILENCE

A couple of years from now it may be possible to read, between hard covers, coherent accounts of what led up to and what were the results of the Watergate caper. The incident involved the June 17 arrests of five men in an alleged break-in and bugging attempt at the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee.

Authors gathering material for the forthcoming books will have the knowledge of events still to unfold, including the presentation of testimony and other evidence in court, the developing reaction to the affair and the results of the 1972 presidential election campaign. There will be room for scholarly placement of the happening in the American political experience. If written with any competence, the narrative should be fascinating.

At this moment in the political year we don't have the literary luxury of time. The Watergate mystery is seven weeks old and getting more rather than less disturbing. The presidential campaign is upon us and the time for giving the American people some answers is now. Public confidence in the political process is very much at stake.

A major new element entered the plot last week. This was the revelation that a $25,000 check representing contributions to the Nixon campaign had turned up in the bank account of one of the defendants in the Watergate office break-in, allegedly after going through the hands of Mr. Nixon's chief fundraiser, former Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans. In line with the general uncommunicativeness of Republican and administration officials about all that relates to the incident, Stans has been unavailable for comment.

This comes atop many other circumstances that demand explanation. Another $89,000 of mysterious origin reached the same defendant's account by way of a Mexican bank. One of the other defendants was the security chief of the Committee for the Re-election of the President. Other links were reported between the Watergate intruders and a White House consultant, who dropped from sight. The Democrats are suing the Nixon camp for $1 million, and lawyers for the latter seek to postpone the case for fear of "incalculable" harm to the campaign.

The mess is being investigated, of course. But it is somewhat unsatisfying to have Mr. Nixon's Justice Department probing among others some of Mr. Nixon's political operatives. Especially since the re-election committee was headed until recently by former Attorney General Mitchell, a close Nixon friend.

The Democratic proposal for a special prosecutor to direct the investigation has merit. Publicity about the $25,000 check at least brought the congressionally directed General Accounting Office into the picture on the strength of its responsibility for policing campaign financing. And a federal judge has barred the Justice Department from representing a White House aide in the Democrats' lawsuit.

The whole affair could mean only that the Nixon campaign apparatus was afflicted, perhaps at a fairly low level, by some faithless servants with weird ideals about using campaign money and raving at the political opposition. But without any cogent explanation from the President and other top officials about what's going on, many people suspect the worst, and the Democrats could have a high caliber campaign weapon.

The most important damage from the continued silence could be to the faith Americans need to have in their political system. That is the cement required to keep the republic operating with some unity of purpose, even in election years.

[From the Washington Post, Aug. 9, 1972]

STANS DENIES GOP MONEY FUNDED WATERGATE BREAK-IN

(By Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein)

Maurice Stans, the finance chief of President Nixon's reelection campaign, has denied to federal investigators that $25,000 in campaign contributions helped to finance the break-in and alleged bugging attempt at Democratic National Committee headquarters.

Stans was interviewed by federal agents after it was learned that he had received a $25,000 cashier's check that eventually was deposited in the Miami bank account of one of the five men arrested in the break-in.

The check, drawn on a bank in Boca Raton, Fla., was made out to Kenneth W. Dahlberg, Midwest finance chairman of President Nixon's re-election drive. Dahlberg has said the check represented campaign contributions he collected and that he personally turned the check over to Stans.

Stans, formerly Secretary of Commerce,

was described by an associate as "angered and frustrated" by reports linking his office to the bugging case. He has repeatedly refused to discuss the matter with reporters.

However, sources close to the investigation reported yesterday that Stans provided federal agents with the following explanation of what happened to the $25,000 check:

After receiving the check from Dahlberg on April 11, Stans is reported to have said, he turned it over to campaign treasurer Hugh W. Sloan, Jr. Sloan then reportedly gave the check to G. Gordon Liddy, finance counsel of the campaign. Liddy is said by Stans to have exchanged the check with someone else for $25,000 in cash, which was deposited in the Nixon campaign treasury.

Stans, according to federal sources, provided no explanation of why the check would be exchanged for cash, instead of being deposited directly in the campaign account.

Only Liddy or Sloan would know the identity of the person with whom such a transaction was made, Stans reportedly told the investigators.

The former Cabinet member also reportedly told the agents that his only involvement in the case was the initial receipt of the check and that any further inquiries should be directed to Liddy or Sloan—both former White House aides who left their jobs at the executive mansion to join the Nixon re-election campaign.

Sloan abruptly quit as campaign treasurer last month for what he said were "personal reasons." Liddy was fired in June for refusing to answer FBI questions about the alleged bugging attempt.

If Stans' version of events is correct, it would mean that the Nixon re-election committee received the $25,000 in cash and thus did not lose any campaign contributions in the transaction.

Following disclosure that the $25,000 check was deposited in the bank account of one of the suspects in the break-in, the General Accounting Office announced it would undertake a full audit of the Nixon campaign organization's books.

Thus far, it was learned, GAO investigators have found no evidence that the $25,000 was reported as contributions by the Nixon campaign organization. Nor have investigators found any evidence that the $25,000 was expended for campaign purposes. Failure to report either contributions or expenditures after April 7 is a violation of the new federal elections law.

Republican sources said yesterday that Stans is expected to make a public statement this week about the $25,000 check and deny any involvement in the alleged bugging attempt. However, the same sources said they were dismayed at Stans' silence since his name was linked to the $25,000 check more than a week ago.

"Stans has been angered and frustrated about the entire thing," said one associate. "In effect there will be a perfectly logical explanation."

Meanwhile, many Republicans are acknowledging that the links between the Nixon campaign committee and the break-in incident are a growing source of embarrassment and should be cleared up as soon as possible—if they can be.

Since the arrest of five men inside the Democratic National Committee's headquarters at the Watergate building on June 17, there have been these developments:

One of the suspects, former CIA official James W. McCord, was identified as the security coordinator of the Nixon re-election committee.

A second of those arrested in the break-in, Bernard L. Barker, had placed numerous phone calls from his Miami home and office to E. Howard Hunt, Jr., a former CIA operative who was a White House consultant at the time of the break-in.

It was Barker who ended up with the $25,000 check that went through Stans.

Hunt, who like Barker was associated with the Bay of Pigs invasion, disappeared shortly after his name was linked to the suspects. He was hired at the White House on the recommendation of Charles W. Colson, special counsel to President Nixon.

Meanwhile, Colson has refused to testify by deposition in the $1 million civil suit filed by the Democrats against the suspects in the break-in and the President's re-election committee.

Barker also placed numerous phone calls to Liddy's office at the re-election committee.

Liddy, who worked with Hunt and Sloan at the White House on federal narcotics enforcement problems, was Stans' chief legal adviser in establishing campaign committees that collected more than $10 million for the President's re-election without revealing the names of contributors. That money was raised before the new disclosure laws came into effect in April.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. At this time in accordance with the previous order, the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) is recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

THE WAFFLING PERFORMANCE OF PRESIDENT NIXON

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, it was Mark Twain who remarked:

It is easier to stay out than to get out.

The United States and the Soviet Union—nations which have never been at war with each other—have been in an armaments race, and now a nuclear armaments race, for more than 25 years.

We never quite managed to stay out of that race.

First, we were ahead with the atom bomb; then the Russians caught up.

Then we were ahead with the hydrogen bomb; the Russians caught up.

Then the Russians orbited sputnik and seemed to be headed toward a superior technology in space; the United States caught up.

Then came Polaris, and it was said the United States had surged ahead again in the arms race. Then FOBS—fractional orbital system—and alarm that the Russians might gain the advantage.

Then MRVS, MIRV's, Poseidon, and now Trident and the B–1 bomber—and what is next?

It is easier to stay out than get out.

We and the Russians were not smart enough to stay out of this race which diverts our energies and our resources away from what makes life worth living, and devotes them instead to stockpiling ever higher nuclear weapons neither side dares use.

Not having been smart enough to stay out of this race, one wonders if we and the Russians are smart enough to get out.

Perhaps we now have a chance.

I thought we had a chance in late May when in Moscow President Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist Party leader, agreed for their respective countries that, and I quote,

They will proceed from the common determination that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence. Differences in ideology and in the social systems of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. are not obstacles to the bilateral development of normal relations based on the principles of sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual advantage.

President Nixon brought back from Moscow the two agreements before the Senate—the treaty which we approved last week which limits ABM sites in each nation to two—and the 5-year, interim agreement, to limit the deployment of certain offensive weapons—the agreement which is now before us.

With respect to these two agreements the President told congressional leaders on June 15:

I have noted a great deal of speculation about who won and who lost in these negotiations. I have said that neither side won and neither side lost. As a matter of fact, if we were to look at it very, very fairly, both sides won, and the whole world won.

He added:

There are advantages in (the agreement) for both sides. For that reason, each side has a vested interest, we believe, in keeping the agreement rather than breaking it.

But even before the President told congressional leaders of his hopes, one of the highest ranking members of his own official family began the saber rattling.

On June 6, 1972, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird stated:

I could not support the agreements if the Congress fails to act on the movement forward of the Trident system, on the B–1 bomber, and on the other programs that we have outlined to improve our strategic offensive systems during this five year period while the interim agreement is in effect.

Congress has—with the exception thus far of authorizing an ABM site at Washington—authorized the movement toward the new systems recommended by Secretary Laird. Call these new systems what one will—essential to the defense of the United States, or bargaining chips to be used in the next phase of negotiations—the fact is that they represent another costly step toward keeping the nuclear competition going, not toward limiting the race.

It is not easy to "get out."

I find myself in agreement with the distinguished director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center at Stanford University, Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky. He testified that—

The "Moscow Agreements can constitute the largest advance in the control of arms which the world has yet seen."

But to have that effect, Dr. Panofsky stated—

It is essential that actions subsequent to the treaty and its ratification shall make fullest use of the unique opportunities these agreements could bring to reverse the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. (Hearings, page 357).

I am beginning to doubt whether this administration is capable of grasping the unique opportunities which these agreements offer for slowing the arms race. In

its efforts to be all things to all people, one day the President joins with Mr. Brezhnev to promise that we will do our "utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war" and that we "will always exercise restraint in—our—mutual relations."

And shortly thereafter we find the White House covertly endorsing the explicit threat—contained in the first Jackson amendment—that if the Russians do as we are doing and develop threats to our deterrent forces—as we propose to do to theirs—we will denounce the agreement.

This is evidence, as Dr. George W. Rathjens told the committee, of the profoundly disturbing nature of—

> The pressure to go ahead with all of these programs. . . . There is an enormous waste of resources; there is the likelihood that such moves will strengthen the hands of those in the U.S.S.R. who are disposed to use SALT as a basis for greater weapon programs; there is the disillusioning effect on our own people; and, finally, in such pressures there is evidence of a lack of balance, if not of something approaching morbidity, in our view of the role of strategic nuclear arms in world affairs. (Hearings, page 299.)

George Kennan recently wrote in the magazine Foreign Affairs that military rivalry—or systems—must not ride along on their own momentum "like an object in space."

> The military rivalry—

Mr. Kennan wrote—

> has no foundation in real interests—no foundation, in fact, but in fear, and in an essentially irrational fear at that. It is carried on not by any reason to believe that the other side would, but only by a hypnotic fascination with the fact that it could. It is simply an institutionalized force of habit. If someone could suddenly make the two sides realize that it has no purpose and if they were then to desist, the world would presumably go on, in all important respects, just as it is going on today.

Mr. Kennan continued:

> We stand like two men who find themselves confronting each other with guns in their hands, neither with any real reason to believe that the other has murderous intentions towards him, but both hypnotized by the uncertainty and the unreasoning fear of the fact that the other is armed. The two armament efforts feed and justify each other.

Mr. President, I have intentionally avoided a detailed discussion of the existing strategic weapons balance between the United States and the Soviet Union—not because numbers are not important in some contexts, but because, in the context of a nuclear confrontation between the two super powers, whether the balance in certain of these weapons is 9 to 8 or 10 to 7 does not make any real difference. As someone remarked in a recent elaboration of the point, it does not make much difference whether a giant SS–9 could blow you from here to Chicago, or whether a smaller weapon would only blow you to Pittsburgh. The effect is still the same.

If there is one message that comes loudly and clearly through all the testimony of the experts, it is that both we and the Russians have a nuclear overkill capacity that defies reason.

In view of his vacillation in recent weeks, I wonder if President Nixon is willing any longer to acknowledge that fact, or whether he is sufficiently in charge of his administration that he has been able to give clear guidance to officials who presumably speak for the administration. The American people find themselves surfeited with the words of art tossed up by experts at obfuscation. "Sufficiency," "parity," "equality," "strategic balance," "quantitative superiority," "qualitative superiority." But in the final analysis, decisions as to which nation is ahead in what, and what possible difference a presumed advantage could make, depends upon judgment—the commonsense of a nation expressed through its leaders.

In recent days we have had opportunity to measure the commonsense of our leaders as the administration has sought approval of the agreements which the President concluded at Moscow.

To say that the administration has "waffled" in its positions is to put the best light possible on the twists and turns the White House has taken.

In order to placate the leading hardliners on the subject of defense policy, the administration appears to have joined in condemning its own agreement. By approving the revised Jackson amendment to the resolution authorizing the President to accept the interim offensive agreement, the White House leaves an impression that it prefers not to take issue with Senator Jackson, when he says:

> We have, in the few brief years since the Kennedy Administration, gone from strategic superiority to parity to sufficiency—whatever that means—to *interim subparity*. (Cong. Record, 8/7/72).

How the President can endorse language which interprets his interim offensive agreement as one which has fixed upon the United States a situation of "interim subparity" is beyond me. Maybe the President or his aides did not read the fine print of the Jackson amendment.

But that is not all. The Jackson amendment calls for a research, development and modernization program, and I quote, "leading to a prudent strategic posture."

If that is not an implied slap at President Nixon, I do not know what is. Yet we have the President endorsing a statement by the Senate—for we will surely adopt this amendment—implying that somehow the President in his negotiations with Moscow has gotten this Nation into a posture where we must now go full speed ahead if we are at some future time to acquire a "prudent strategic posture."

Finally, the crowning ignominy is the White House endorsement of language which contrasts the "equality' achieved by the ABM Treaty, with the "subparity" which was achieved by the President in his agreement for a 5-year limitation on offensive strategic weapons. In the words of the distinguished Senator from Washington, "in the interim agreement before the Senate we have subparity." The President has endorsed language in the Jackson amendment which is based on the assumption that the Interim Agreement gives the United States subparity and so instructs the President to do better next time and to make sure that we do not remain "inferior" to the Soviet Union.

Well, if we are "inferior," who let us get that way? And if the agreements keep us inferior, why is the President asking for the approval?

I suggest that this administration, wittingly or unwittingly, is beginning the slow process of scuttling its own nuclear agreements with Moscow. It may be that the President fears the charge that he was outwitted by the Russians in Moscow, and seeks a way to go back on his statement that in these negotiations "both sides won, and the whole world won."

I for one, hope this is not the case. I stand with those young and old people in our society who say: "give peace a chance."

I say, let us give life on this planet a chance by beginning to bring the arms race under control.

A generation has grown up since the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union was described as a situation comparable to two scorpions in a bottle.

I had thought this administration was ready to begin the long, hard process of extrication—that we might free ourselves, at last, from our entrapment.

Now, I am not so sure.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHURCH. I yield to the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished senior Senator from Idaho for the forthright and candid statement he has just made relative to a most serious issue which confronts this Nation, and which will confront the Senate today. He used the words "superiority, sufficiency, equality, and subparity."

On June 15, about 15 or 20 Members of this body were called to the White House to hear a discussion of the results of the Nixon-Brezhnev Treaty and the interim agreement. At that time the President made some introductory remarks and then turned the meeting over to Dr. Kissinger, who was speaking for the President, and the President remained in attendance. At that time the following question was asked:

> Does the agreement perpetuate a U.S. strategic disadvantage?

The reply:

> We reject the premise of that question on two grounds. First, the present situation is on balance advantageous to the United States. Second, the Interim Agreement perpetuates nothing which did not already exist in fact and which could only have gotten worse without an agreement.
>
> Our present strategic military situation is sound. Much of the criticism has focused on the imbalance in number of missiles between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. But, this only examines one aspect of the problem. To assess the overall balance——

And I stress the word "overall"—

> it is necessary to consider those forces not in the agreement; our bomber force which is substantially larger and more effective than the Soviet bomber force, and our forward base systems.

The quality of the weapons must also be weighed. We are confident we have a major advantage in nuclear weapons technology and in warhead accuracy. Also, with our MIRV's we have a two-to-one lead today in numbers of warheads and this lead will be maintained during the period of the agreement, even if the Soviets develop and deploy MIRV's of their own.

Then there are such factors as deployment characteristics. For example, because of the difference in geography and basing, it has been estimated that the Soviet Union requires three submarines for two of ours to be able to keep an equal number on station.

When the total picture is viewed, our strategic forces are seen to be completely sufficient.

May I say that no question in opposition to that statement by Dr. Kissinger and he, speaking for the President who was in attendance, was raised at that time. If my memory serves me correctly, the distinguished Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) was one of those in attendance. I think the record ought to be made clear, and I again commend the distinguished Senator from Idaho for the statement which he has made this morning.

Mr. CHURCH. I thank the majority leader very much. I want to add that the Foreign Relations Committee yesterday voted unanimously to support the agreement without amendatory language.

If this agreement is a worthy one, and we believe it to be one which is probably based on an overall balance in the nuclear position of the United States and the Soviet Union, then it should be passed. It should not be undermined by language subject to interpretation that could seriously impair the President's negotiating ability in the future.

If this is to be a first step, then let us ratify the agreement without adding language that could foreclose the possibility of further steps in the future.

TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. There will now be a period for the transaction of morning business for not to exceed 30 minutes, with statements therein limited to 3 minutes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 257—ESTABLISHMENT OF A CEILING ON SOCIAL SERVICES

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. CHILES). The Chair now lays before the Senate Joint Resolution 257 which was introduced yesterday and read the first time; objection having been heard at that time to the second reading, the joint resolution will now be read the second time.

The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 257) was read the second time, as follows:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That of the funds available for Social and Rehabilitation Service grants to States for public assistance for making payments to States for services under title I, IV (Part A), X, XIV, and XVI of the Social Security Act not to exceed $2,500,000,000 shall be available for obligation during fiscal year 1973.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I object to any further proceedings on this joint resolution at this time.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Objection to further proceedings is heard. Under rule XIV, paragraph 4, the joint resolution will be placed on the calendar.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, may I say that I have done this on behalf of the distinguished Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY). I have done it with his knowledge and approval, and at his request so as to get the joint resolution placed directly on the calendar.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE CONVENTION ON OWNERSHIP OF CULTURAL PROPERTY (EXECUTIVE B, 92D CONG., SECOND SESS.); THE TAX CONVENTION WITH NORWAY (EXECUTIVE D, 92D CONG., SECOND SESS.); THE CONVENTION ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF LEGAL METROLOGY (EXECUTIVE I, 92D CONG., SECOND SESS.)—ORDER FOR THE YEAS AND NAYS

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, as in executive session, I ask unanimous consent that it be in order to order, with one show of seconds, the yeas and nays on each of the three treaties scheduled for a vote today.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from West Virginia? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I ask for the yeas and nays on the question of agreeing to the resolution of ratification on each of the three treaties.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. As in executive session, there being a sufficient second, the yeas and nays are ordered on the question of agreeing to the resolution of ratification on each of the three treaties.

THE CALENDAR

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate turn to the consideration of items on the Calendar beginning with Calendar order No. 983 and ending with Calendar order No. 992.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AUTHORIZATION FOR ADDITIONAL EXPENDITURES BY THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The resolution (S. Res. 340) authorizing additional expenditures by the Committee on Armed Services for routine purposes, was considered and agreed to, as follows:

Resolved, That the Committee on Armed Services is authorized to expend from the contingent fund of the Senate, during the Ninety-second Congress, $15,000 in addition to the amount, and for the same purposes specified in section 134(a) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, and Senate Resolution 252, Ninety-second Congress, agreed to March 6, 1972.

AUTHORIZATION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL EXPENDITURES BY THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

The resolution (S. Res. 349) authorizing supplemental expenditures by the Committee on Government Operations for inquiries and investigations, was considered and agreed to, as follows:

Resolved, That Senate Resolution 258, ninety-second Congress, agreed to March 17, 1972, is amended as follows:

(1) In section 3, strike out "$1,585,300" and insert in lieu thereof "$1,706,300".

(2) In section 4, strike out "$830,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$929,000".

(3) In section 7, strike out "$285,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$307,000".

(4) In section 9, strike out "$1,595,300" and insert in lieu thereof "$1,716,300".

AUTHORIZATION FOR PRINTING THE 74TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL SOCIETY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

The resolution (S. Res. 350) authorizing the printing of the 74th annual report of the National Society of the Daughters of the American Revolution as a Senate document, was considered and agreed to, as follows:

Resolved, That the Seventy-fourth Annual Report of the National Society of the Daughters of the American Revolution for the year ending March 1, 1971, be printed, with an illustration, as a Senate document.

MICHAEL M. O'CONNOR AND KATHLEEN M. O'CONNOR

The resolution (S. Res. 351) to pay a gratuity to Michael M. O'Connor and Kathleen M. O'Connor, was considered and agreed to, as follows:

Resolved, That the Secretary hereby is authorized and directed to pay, from the contingency fund of the Senate, to Michael M. O'Connor, son, and Kathleen M. O'Connor, daughter, of Molly M. O'Connor, an employee of the Senate at the time of her death, a sum to each equal to one-half of six and one-half month's compensation at the rate she was receiving by law at the time of her death, said sum to be considered in-

clusive of funeral expenses, and all other allowances.

FRANCES M. FELL

The resolution (S. Res. 352) to pay a gratuity to Frances M. Fell, was considered and agreed to, as follows:

Resolved, That the Secretary of the Senate hereby is authorized and directed to pay, from the contingent fund of the Senate, to Frances M. Fell, mother of Thomas F. Fell, an employee of the Senate at the time of his death, a sum equal to eleven months' compensation at the rate he was receiving by law at the time of his death, said sum to be considered inclusive of funeral expenses and all other allowances.

AUTHORIZATION FOR CERTAIN PRINTING FOR THE COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS

The concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 553) authorizing certain printing for the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, was considered and agreed to.

Mr. MANSFIELD subsequently said: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the action of the Senate in agreeing to Calendar No. 988, House Concurrent Resolution 553, be vacated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROVISION FOR PRINTING "HOUSING AND THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE THREE STUDY PANELS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOUSING"

The concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 560) providing for the printing of the report entitled "Housing and the Urban Environment, Report and Recommendations of Three Study Panels of the Subcommittee on Housing," was considered and agreed to.

AUTHORIZATION FOR PRINTING "OUR FLAG"

The concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 605) authorizing the printing as a House document the pamphlet entitled "Our Flag," and to provide for additional copies, was considered and agreed to.

AUTHORIZATION FOR THE COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS TO EXPEND ADDITIONAL FUNDS FROM THE SENATE CONTINGENT FUND

The Senate proceeded to consider the resolution (S. Res. 330) authorizing the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to expend additional funds from the contingent fund of the Senate, which had been reported from the Committee on Rules and Administration with amendments in line 4, after the word "the", where it appears the first time, to strike out "amount" and insert "amounts"; at the beginning of line 5, strike out "purpose" and insert "purposes"; in line 6, after the word "Act", strike out "approved August 2, 1946, as amended" and insert "of 1946, and in Senate Resolution 138, agreed to November 20, 1971"; so as to make the resolution read:

Resolved, That the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs is hereby authorized to expend from the contingent fund of the Senate, during the Ninety-second Congress, $15,000 in addition to the amounts, and for the same purposes, specified in section 134 (a) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, and in Senate Resolution 138, agreed to November 20, 1971.

The amendments were agreed to.

The resolution, as amended, was agreed to.

The title was amended, so as to read: "Resolution authorizing additional expenditures by the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs for routine purposes."

SECURITY APPARATUS FOR PROTECTION OF THE CAPITOL

The Senate proceeded to consider the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 550) providing for the installation of security apparatus for the protection of the Capitol complex, which had been reported from the Committee on Rules and Administration with amendments, on page 1, line 5, after the word "and" ", to strike out "directed" and insert "directed, without regard to section 3709 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, as amended (41 U.S.C. 5),"; and, on page 2, line 3, after the word "from", strike out "the contingent fund of the House of Representatives" and insert "funds hereafter provided to the Architect of the Capitol under the appropriation "Capitol Buildings, for that purpose."

The amendments were agreed to.

The concurrent resolution, as amended, was agreed to.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE GREAT SOCIAL SERVICES FUND RAID

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I regret that last night the Senate did not see fit to impose a limitation on the amount of money that could be spent for social services. During the discussion of my motion, much of the controversy was centered on the question of whether or not time was of the essence. I think that a front-page article in today's Washington Post clearly demonstrates why it is so necessary that Congress act, and act immediately, if it is going to protect U.S. Treasury funds. I make reference to the article entitled "Maryland Joins Raid on U.S. Fund—Boosts $23 Million HEW Request to $417 Million," written by Herbert H. Denton and published in today's Washington Post.

I would just like to read a part of the article, because I think it shows more clearly than anything else why time is of the essence to impose such a ceiling. The article says:

The State of Maryland stands to get a windfall of about $417 million federal dollars for social welfare programs this year, but has not yet figured out how it would spend the money.

Maryland officials worked feverishly this summer to get huge chunks of money out of a newly opened federal pool after originally counting on receiving only $22.9 million in federal social services money. In the late spring, after they learned about a change in interpretation of what the federal money could be used for, Maryland officials hired a team of consultants and came up with the new request for $417 million.

"Oh, we were very conservative, very conservative," Rita C. Davidson, Maryland's secretary of Employment and Social Services, said in an interview in which she discussed the sudden increased request.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks the article on Maryland to which I have referred.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1.)

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, as I said last night, every day we delay action is going to mean a greater raid on the Federal Treasury, when the national deficit is already of such dimensions that we cannot afford to take that risk.

I particularly regret that we failed to act because there is no question now, in my opinion, that the Labor-HEW appropriation will not be enacted into law before the school year. It is not fair to thousands of school administrators in schools throughout this country. Going back in history, when we were engaged in a similar exercise, it ended up with the HEW appropriation not being adopted finally until mid-winter, long after the school year was already under way. I am certain that this type of delay can only mean great waste of funds so far as our schools are concerned.

Mr. President, the distinguished junior Senator from Minnesota has offered a resolution, and I wish that I believed that it could be expeditiously adopted both by the Senate and the House. Frankly, it is most unlikely that even if we do take any immediate action in the Senate, any such action will be taken in the House prior to the recess, if at any time during the current year. So I think that if this resolution is called up for action and we adopt it, we should not fool ourselves as to thinking we have solved this most critical problem.

Mr. President, I should like to make it clear that I intend to keep my options open; and, if it appears feasible, I shall offer an appropriate amendment, possibly to an appropriation bill to be considered next week. I believe it absolutely essential that Congress act promptly to close the door to this ballooning raid on the Federal Treasury.

EXHIBIT 1

[From the Washington Post, Aug. 9, 1972]

MARYLAND JOINS "RAID" ON U.S. FUND—BOOSTS $23 MILLION HEW REQUEST TO $417 MILLION

(By Herbert H. Denton)

The State of Maryland stands to get a windfall of about $417 million federal dollars for social welfare programs this year, but has not yet figured out how it would spend the money.

Maryland officials worked feverishly this

summer to get huge chunks of money out of a newly opened federal pool after originally counting on receiving only $22.9 million in federal social services money. In the late spring, after they learned about a change in interpretation of what the federal money could be used for, Maryland officials hired a team of consultants and came up with the new request for $417 million.

"Oh, we were very conservative, very conservative," Rita C. Davidson, Maryland's secretary of Employment and Social Services, said in an interview in which she discussed the sudden increased request.

Maryland's request for federal funds is based on programs ranging from state aid to alcoholics and ex-convicts to a private social center for the elderly run by the Baltimore graduate chapter of a college sorority.

In the last fiscal year, Maryland received $20.5 million from the federal social services program. The jump in its request this year to $417 million is the largest increase sought by any state except Mississippi.

The $417 million in federal funds for Maryland would be an amount equal to 20 per cent of the entire current state budget and more than the state is currently spending for education, public safety or any other single state service.

In addition, the $417 million Maryland hopes to get under the social services program would far exceed the amount the state would get under proposals to help states through revenue sharing with the federal government. The most Maryland would get under the Senate Finance Committee's version of a federal revenue sharing bill would be $117.5 million.

The windfall that Maryland and other states expect is federal money provided under the Social Security Act. Health, Education and Welfare Secretary Elliot L. Richardson, whose agency distributes money to states under the act, has called the increases that Maryland and other states have requested "a virtual open-ended raid on the federal treasury."

The federal social services program, which threatens to double itself every year, requires HEW to pay $75 for every $25 that states spend to help present, former and potential welfare recipients. There is no limit on the total amount states can request in federal matching money.

None of the money goes for welfare payments as such. It is intended for services to keep people off welfare, such as day care centers for mothers who have young children and want to work.

A Senate-passed ceiling of $2.5 billion on the social services program was knocked out of the HEW spending bill in a joint conference committee last week, increasing the likelihood of a major cost overrun in the HEW budget this year. Without a ceiling, the conference compromise passed the House Wednesday, 239 to 166, and passed the Senate last night, 67 to 22.

Richardson indicated Wednesday that President Nixon might veto the bill if it passes without a ceiling on social services spending. In that event, the windfall that Maryland is looking for might not materialize.

Until this year, Maryland has not been one of the big beneficiaries of the federal social services program—a situation that seemed to rankle Mrs. Davidson, who referred frequently to the federal largesse for social services bestowed on California.

Maryland takes its marching orders on eligibility for federal social welfare funds from the regional office of HEW in Philadelphia, where the act was interpreted strictly.

Mrs. Davidson said the federal regional officials told her that Maryland was eligible for federal matching money only for those state programs that helped Maryland's 260,000 welfare recipients.

For some years, she noted, the interpretation by the HEW regional officials for California has been significantly more liberal. In fact, California in 1969 was getting 40 per cent of all the federal social services money distributed in the nation.

Mrs. Davidson pressed for a change by the Philadelphia office of HEW, she said, and, other states across the country did the same.

By late spring, she said, the Philadelphia office—like others—began to change.

Mrs. Davidson's staff and a group of hired consultants then closely read through the state budget, picking out every program that they could argue helped get people off welfare, helped them from getting back on or helped keep them from ever having to go on the welfare rolls.

Maryland's list included state-run programs for alcoholics and programs for mental retardates, ex-convicts, and drug addicts.

They did not stop with the state budget. They went around to private agencies that run social services-related programs.

Epsilon Omega, the Baltimore graduate chapter of a college sorority, which runs a social center for elderly people, was included in the Maryland request. So were three private groups that run summer camps for needy children. So was the consumer law center of the state Legal Aid Bureau.

For each state dollar spent on the programs that they were able to locate, they requested $3 from the federal government under the Act. When they finished the application in time for the June 30 deadline, it all totaled up to $394 million more than the original request for Maryland.

Mrs. Davidson said the Philadelphia HEW officials have given her the "generalized opinion" that the request is acceptable.

After all the work to get the federal money by locating the state social service program, Mrs. Davidson's office has not produced any specific plans for how the federal money would be used.

Mrs. Davidson and her staff said in an interview this week that the money would permit them to expand existing programs and add new ones. They could not say what new programs would be created or by how much the old ones would grow.

They said the new federal money would permit the state to extend social services to groups other than welfare mothers. It could enable them to help blue collar families who, for example now cannot afford private day-care centers for their children but make too much money to be eligible to use state-run centers.

Mrs. Davidson and her staff said they could not now give even the roughest idea of how many new people will benefit from expansion of the social services programs.

All of this will be worked out in the next six months during a period of "program design" by Maryland's state agencies, local governments and the privately run social welfare agencies, Mrs. Davidson said.

Saying Maryland has never before had enough programs to aid all the people who need some form of public social service, she said the federal money would be used and was needed.

"The needs are just so crying, just so crying," Mrs. Davidson said.

QUORUM CALL

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there further morning business?

Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMUNICATIONS FROM EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, ETC.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. CHILES) laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

PROPOSED DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER MEMORIAL BICENTENNIAL CIVIC CENTER ACT

A letter from the Commissioner, Government of the District of Columbia, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the Public Buildings Act of 1959, as amended, to provide for the construction of a civic center in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

REPORTS OF COMPTROLLER GENERAL

A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report entitled "Audit of Payments From Special Bank Account to Lockheed Aircraft Corporation for the C–5 Aircraft Program During the Quarter Ended June 30, 1972," Department of Defense, dated August 11, 1972 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Government Operations.

A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report entitled "Drug Abuse Control Activities Affecting Military Personnel," Department of Defense, dated August 11, 1972 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Government Operations.

A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report entitled "Military Drug Abuse Control Program Activities in Continental United States," Department of Defense, dated August 11, 1972 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Government Operations.

A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report entitled "Drug Abuse Control Program Activities in Vietnam", Department of Defense, dated August 11, 1972 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Government Operations.

A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report entitled "Drug Abuse Control Program Activities in The Philippines", Department of Defense, dated August 11, 1972 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Government Operations.

A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report entitled "Drug Abuse Control Program Activities in Okinawa", Department of Defense, dated August 11, 1972 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Government Operations.

A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report entitled "Drug Abuse Control Program Activities in Europe", Department of Defense, dated August 11, 1972 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Government Operations.

A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to to law, a report entitled "Legislation Needed to Revise the Interest Rate Criteria For Determining the Financing Costs of Water Resource Projects", Department of the Interior, Department of the Army, dated August 11, 1972 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Government Operations.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following reports of committees were submitted:

By Mr. BIBLE, from the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, with an amendment:

S. 3811. A bill to amend the Act entitled "An Act to provide for the establishment of the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore, and for other purposes", approved November 5, 1966 (Rept. No. 92–1042).

INTRODUCTION OF BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

The following bills and joint resolutions were introduced, read the first time and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as indicated:

By Mr. MOSS (for himself, Mr. BURDICK, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. McGOVERN, Mr. MONTOYA, and Mr. PASTORE):

S. 3908. A bill to stabilize interstate commerce by mitigating the adverse economic effects of shifting patterns of Federal expenditure, to provide for national planning for economic diversification, and for other purposes. Referred to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mr. MONDALE (for himself, Mr. RANDOLPH, Mr. TUNNEY, Mr. MOSS, Mr. McINTYRE, and Mr. HARTKE):

S. 3909. A bill to provide youth services grants, and for other purposes.

By Mr. COOPER:

S. 3910. A bill to reduce sedimentation from land-disturbing activities consistent with the applicable water quality standards. Referred to the Committee on Public Works.

STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

By Mr. Moss (for himself, Mr. BURDICK, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. McGOVERN, Mr. MONTOYA, and Mr. PASTORE):

S. 3908. A bill to stabilize interstate commerce by mitigating the adverse economic effects of shifting patterns of Federal expenditure, to provide for national planning for economic diversification, and for other purposes. Referred to the Committee on Government Operations.

ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION ACT OF 1972

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I introduce a bill to diversify the economies of those areas of the country which have come to depend almost entirely on major Federal programs, such as those in defense and aerospace, for their stability.

The purpose of the measure is to encourage these highly impacted communities to develop alternative industrial and commercial opportunities thereby strengthening their ability to adjust, with the minimum dislocation and human hardship, to a shift in national priorities.

The Economic Diversification Act of 1972 calls for a national policy to prepare for the adverse effects of Federal defense and aerospace cutbacks on those areas which rely heavily, in some cases solely, on these programs. To achieve this goal, the bill provides for Federal action to help these localities to plan their economic futures in light of changing Federal spending patterns. Assistance would include:

A national effort to monitor, and hopefully, forecast the economic impact of reduced Federal spending on various localities;

Planning and technical grants to highly impacted communities;

Establishment of local development corporations to provide the "risk capital" facilities vital to an expanding commerce and industry;

And incentives for industries in these areas to broaden their operations to non-Federal markets.

Economic diversification would benefit the entire Nation. By ending the reliance of these communities and industries on existing Federal programs, the American people would gain a new flexibility to direct the Nation's resources toward its highest priorities.

The need to plan and provide for the local economic impact of massive Federal spending, especially in defense and aerospace, has become well established in recent years.

Today, Government purchases of goods and services amounts to almost one-quarter of the gross national product. By way of contrast, in 1929, the Federal share in the American economy was only about 8 percent. This growing Federal role in the Nation's economy has had its heaviest impact on those communities serving defense and aerospace installations. This has also been true in those industrial centers which have come to do the great bulk of their business with the Federal Government.

Consider the case just in my own State. Over the past 10 years, the Federal work force has increased at an annual rate of 6.1 percent, while the rest of the State's nonagricultural work force grew by only 3.6 percent. Today the Federal payroll amounts to $415 million a year. One out of every six workers is employed by the Government. This figure, moreover, does not include those employees working for firms operating on Federal contracts.

In some areas of the State, the Federal impact is proportionally much higher. In the three counties of Davis, Weber, and Morgan which supply manpower for Hill Air Force Base, almost 20,000 of the 73,600 wage and salaried work force are employed either at Hill Air Force Base or at Defense Depot, Ogden.

In Tooele County which contains Tooele Army Depot and the Dugway Proving Grounds, 6,777 out of the 9,322 work force are employed by the Government. Most are Federal employees. Obviously this enormous influence on the local economies carries with it an equally immense potential for harm should the Government activity be terminated or substantially reduced. We have all seen the impact in those parts of the country which relied on Federal defense and aerospace programs when these programs were cut back. Businesses closed, supporting industries were forced to lay off workers. The revenues of local governments were hit by reduced property values and even more sharply, reduced personal incomes. Economic depression spreads widely to all those who had depended on Federal jobs and wage income, either directly or indirectly, for their livelihoods.

In recent months Utah experienced a substantial reduction-in-force at Hill Air Force Base. It was part of the administration's program to cut Federal payrolls 5 percent by the end of fiscal 1972. Over 1,500 employees were affected; 239 career and career-conditional employees lost their jobs. Another 83 temporary employees were separated. Many other positions were eliminated through the process of attrition, thus eliminating jobs which would never be replaced.

The economic impact of this relatively small manpower cutback at Hill gives only an indication of the disastrous consequences which would attend a truly massive RIF.

Now another RIF is projected for Defense Depot, Ogden—in the same city.

There is an obvious need to bring new industries, new economic activities, to parts of the country such as Ogden. This is our best way to help prepare these communities for inevitable shifts in Federal requirements, which are themselves dependent on changing national and international conditions. This stabilizing bill would benefit the entire Nation.

One of the great strengths of the American economy has been its phenomenal ability to adjust to new conditions, to respond to new national challenges by enlisting vast amounts of capital and technological know-how in a short period of time.

This remarkable flexibility, demonstrated so boldly during the early days of World War II and again during the race to the moon, is now threatened by a growing dependence in many parts of the country on the continuation of existing Federal programs. Many communities today see any shift in national priorities as a threat, not only to local job markets, but to their overall economic stability.

Though certainly understandable, our concern for the short-run welfare of these communities has crippled the Nation's ability to shift rapidly to meet its urgent new demands.

I believe that it is time for our Nation to deal quickly with local economic impact of Federal decisionmaking. Failure to do so will mean even more dislocation, and, as far as national priorities are concerned, continued pressure to maintain the status quo at all costs.

To meet this need, the bill I propose today would establish an Office of Economic Diversification, which would be primarily responsible for determining the impact of Federal spending, particularly in defense and aerospace, on capital and labor markets throughout the country. This office would also act to isolate those areas of the Nation which are vulnerable to a shift in Government spending and to coordinate Federal, State and local efforts to prepare for their economic adjustments.

The office would be authorized to assist these highly impacted areas to assess their resources and make plans for more diversified industrial and commercial activities.

These areas would be eligible to create economic diversification corporations which would receive Federal assistance to: develop plans for local economic diversification; participate in financing research and development projects which would contribute to a more broadly based local economy; guarantee or make loans

which would create new industries and job opportunities.

This bill would also permit special Small Business Administration loan guarantees to firms located in these areas which are attempting to diversify their operations into non-Federal markets. As an added incentive to industrial diversity, the bill also provides that all Federal contractors would be required, whenever practical, to develop plans for the use of their facilities and manpower skills in efforts to enlarge the economic base of the locality.

I ask that the full text of the bill be printed in the RECORD at this time.

There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 3908

A bill to stabilize interstate commerce by mitigating the adverse economic effects of shifting patterns of Federal expenditure, to provide for national planning for economic diversification, and for other purposes

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Economic Diversification Act of 1972".

STATEMENT OF FINDINGS AND DECLARATIONS OF POLICY

SEC. 2. (a) The Congress finds that—

(1) the Federal Government, through its expenditures for goods and services, exerts a significant impact on the direction, as well as the strength of the entire national economy;

(2) many industries and localities are substantially dependent upon the existing patterns of national expenditures;

(3) shifts in patterns of Federal expenditures for goods and services of which the Federal Government is the largest and often the sole purchaser creates large-scale dislocations in capital and labor markets;

(4) these resulting dislocations adversely affect interstate commerce and have particular impact upon the localities wherein the supplies of the Federal Government are located, and their labor markets; and

(5) failure to provide effective mechanisms for mitigating these dislocations tend to reduce the flexibility of the National Government and reduces its ability to insure our national security with a responsive and resilient National Government.

(b) Accordingly, the Congress declares that it is the national policy to promote a sound economy by promoting economic diversification and by undertaking positive programs to maintain interstate and foreign commerce by mitigating the effects of shifts in national expenditure patterns.

(c) It is the purpose of this Act—

(1) to initiate a continuous system of monitoring and forecasting of the impact of Federal expenditures on labor and capital markets, and to disseminate the results of this program of monitoring and forecasting to all interested Federal, State, and local officials, and to the public generally;

(2) to encourage coordination of the programs of all levels of government, which are designated to provide assistance to localities and labor groups in their efforts to plan and provide for shifts in Federal spending patterns;

(3) to provide for the development of more adequate programs of Federal assistance to adversely affected localities, firms, and their employees; and

(4) to provide immediate technical and financial assistance to promote the stabilization of interstate commerce by encouraging economic diversification, with special provisions for areas presently suffering substantial economic dislocation.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OFFICE OF ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION

SEC. 3. (a) There is established in the Executive Office of the President the Office of Economic Diversification (hereinafter referred to as the "Office").

(b) The Office shall be headed by a Director, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

(c) There shall be in the Office a Deputy Director who shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Deputy Director shall perform such functions as the Director may prescribe and shall be Acting Director during the absence or disability of the Director or in the event of a vacancy in the position of the Director.

(d) There is established in the Office a Council on Economic Diversification consisting of—

(1) the Director of the Office, who shall be the Chairman of the Council;

(2) the Secretary of Commerce;

(3) the Secretary of Labor;

(4) three members of the public chosen from among the leaders of organized labor; and

(5) three members of the public chosen from the business community.

The public members shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall serve at the pleasure of the President.

(e) The Director shall head and direct the staff of the Office, and shall assist the Council in carrying out such activities as it may request.

FUNCTIONS

SEC. 4. (a) The Director of the Office is authorized to—

(1) collect data relating to the impact of Federal expenditures on interstate commerce, and upon particular industries, professions, segments of the labor market, and localities; and to project future impacts resulting from possible shifts in Federal expenditures;

(2) disseminate this information as broadly as possible to promote advance planning by all sectors of the economy and thereby to permit mitigation of the hardships which might arise from shifts in Federal expenditures by diversification and decreased reliance upon Federal expenditures;

(3) select, appoint, employ, and fix the compensation of such officers and employees as are necessary to carry out his duties under this Act, subject to the civil service and classification laws;

(4) direct and supervise all personnel so selected, appointed, or employed;

(5) employ experts and consultants in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, and compensate individuals so employed for each day (including traveltime) at rates not in excess of the maximum rate of pay for grade GS–18 as provided in section 5332 of title 5, United States Code, and, while such experts and consultants are so serving away from their homes or regular place of business, to pay such employees travel expenses and per diem in lieu of subsistence at rates authorized by section 5703 of title 5, United States Code, for persons in Government service employed intermittently;

(6) utilize, with their consent, the services, personnel, and facilities of other Federal agencies and of State and private agencies and instrumentalities with or without reimbursement therefor;

(7) enter into and perform such contracts, leases, cooperative agreements, or other transactions as may be necessary in the conduct of the work of the Office and on such terms as the Director may deem appropriate, with any agency or instrumentality of the United States, or with any State, territory, or possession, or any political subdivision thereof, or with any public or private person, firm, association, corporation, or institution;

(8) accept gifts and voluntary and uncompensated services, notwithstanding the provisions of section 665(b) of title 31, United States Code;

(9) designate representatives to serve or assist on such committees as the Director may determine to be necessary to maintain effective liaison with Federal agencies, and with State and local agencies involved in the problems of economic development.

(10) perform such other activities, not delegated to the Council, as are necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

(b) The Council is authorized to—

(1) authorize and direct studies of economic effects of Federal expenditure patterns,

(2) identify those localities, industries, job skills, and firms which are substantially dependent upon Federal expenditures,

(3) approve or disapprove all applications for grants or other assistance authorized by this Act,

(4) promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the duties of the Office under this Act.

(c) The Office, acting through the Director or the Council is authorized to—

(1) consult with the Governors of the several States and the officials of any unit of government within the United States and its territories to encourage appropriate studies and planning at the regional, State, and local level;

(2) encourage the establishment of Economic Diversification Corporations referred to in section 6 of this Act;

(3) consult with trade and industry associations, labor unions, and professional societies to encourage and enlist their support for a coordinated effort to increase the economic diversification of each locality;

(4) serve as a clearinghouse for information on existing Federal, State, and local programs which provide for the development of economic plans, and provide for means to mitigate the adverse impacts of shifting Federal expenditure patterns; and

(5) enter into agreements with other Federal departments, with agencies of State and local governments, and with private groups and individuals to carry out the purposes and provisions of this Act;

(6) prepare and transmit the following reports to the Congress and the President:

(a) annually, in January, a report on the activities of the Office during the past fiscal year, with particular attention to data indicating the extent to which the economy of the various localities assisted have become more diversified during the year;

(b) annually, at such time is appropriate, a report on the extent to which the Federal Government has affected the diversification of the national economy during the preceding year, together with recommendations for future Federal activity to accomplish the goals of this Act;

(c) periodically, such reports and recommendations as the Council feels should be made available to the Congress and the President; and

(d) when requested, such special reports as may be requested by the President, or the Congress, or any committee thereof;

(7) the Council shall approve or disapprove of the chartering of any Economic Diversification Corporation as provided for in section 6 of this Act. Such action shall be taken pursuant to procedures established under the authority of this Act, however, in no case shall an application properly submitted not receive a decision within ninety days of the receipt thereof;

(8) appoint advisory committees composed of such private citizens and officials of the

Federal, State, and local governments as is deemed desirable to advise the Office with respect to its duties under this Act, and to pay such members (other than those regularly employed by the Federal Government) without regard to any conflict-of-interest statutes while attending meetings of such committees, or otherwise serving at the request of the Director or Council, compensation and travel expenses at the rate provided for in paragraph (5) of subsection 4(a) of this Act with respect to experts and consultants;

(9) obtain by subpena, where necessary, such information as the Office acting through either the Director or the Council is authorized to acquire under this Act;

(10) conduct public hearings anywhere in the United States to consider means to accomplish the purposes of this Act.

GRANTS TO LOCALITIES FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

SEC. 5. (a) From funds available pursuant to section 10 of this Act, the Office is authorized to make grants to eligible localities to assist them in assessing their economic condition and determining their resources; and establishing, if conditions warrant, an Economic Diversification Corporation.

(b) In determining whether or not to approve a planning grant under this section the Council shall consider the extent to which the planning proposal is supported by the various segments of the local community, the extent to which the local economy is dependent upon federally financed programs, and the existing or likely unemployment in the area.

(c) "Eligible locality" means any political entity, or combination of entities, which at the time of the application is experiencing or is expected to experience within the ensuing six months an unemployment rate in excess of 8 per centum of the work force, if any significant portion of such unemployment is directly or indirectly related to shifts in Federal expenditure patterns. The Council shall determine whether or not the applicant has authority to act on behalf of the entities to be encompassed and shall not approve any planning grant request for any entity within the geographic area of an existing applicant.

(d) In the event that funds made available pursuant to section 10 of this Act are insufficient to provide adequate funding to all applicants, the Council shall give priority to those communities suffering from the most severe economic dislocation, and shall report to the President and the Congress the applicants which have been denied due to the insufficiency of funds.

ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION CORPORATIONS

SEC. 6. (a) In order to promote development planning and financing in localities through locally controlled institutions the Council is authorized, under such regulations as it may prescribe, to provide for the organization, incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation of associations to be known as Economic Diversification Corporations, and to issue charters therefor.

(b) The Council shall not issue a charter unless it is satisfied (1) that the governing body of the applicant will consist of a broad cross section of the political and economic interests in the locality to be serviced, (2) that to the extent allowed by local law the governing body of the applicant will include adequate representation from the governmental officials elected or appointed having general responsibility for the overall development of the locality, and (3) that the applicant will not include within its service area territory now served by any other corporation established under this Act: *Provided, however,* That in the event that Council shall determine that the interests of the localities affected would be better served it may redefine the service territory of the applicant and the prior existing corporation to meet the requirements of this subsection.

(c) In addition to such other powers as may be conferred upon such Economic Development Corporation by the Council each such Corporation, when chartered and authorized to commence operations, shall be authorized to—

(1) analyze existing economic data, conduct additional studies of the local economy to develop plans for economic diversification with the cooperation of local, State, regional, and Federal officials, and the citizens in the affected locality;

(2) participate in financing research and development projects which would contribute to the goal of diversification of the local economy;

(3) guaranty or make loans, whether or not secured, in the form and manner approved by the Council or in accordance with its regulations which will both promote diversification of the local economy and afford new job opportunities for the members of the labor force of the community: *Provided, however,* That the Corporation shall not provide capital assistance under this section unless the capital market of the community is unable to provide the necessary capital on terms and conditions which will permit the enterprise to be undertaken; and

(4) guaranty or make loans, to individuals or to organizations to finance the establishment of or the enrollment in courses of study designed to permit individuals now in the labor force to engage in new forms of employment in the locality: *Provided, however,* That no assistance under this section shall be granted unless the applicant has received the approval of the proposed course of employment from an official of the State employment service.

(d) From the funds available pursuant to section 10 of this Act, the Council is authorized to make an initial capitalization grant of not more than $500,000 to each Economic Diversification Corporation upon approval of its application for a charter. Such grant shall constitute a preferred capital contribution of the United States, and in the event of the dissolution of the Corporation or upon the occurrence of such other event as the Council may proscribe in the terms of the grant such contribution shall be repaid to the Treasury of the United States.

(e) The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized on behalf of the United States to subscribe for preferred shares in such associations which shall be preferred as to the assets of the association and which shall be entitled to a dividend, if earned, after payment of expenses and provision for reasonable reserves, to the same extent as other shareholders. It shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to subscribe for such preferred shares upon request of the Council; but the subscription by him shall not exceed $1,000,000 in any one such association, and no such subscription shall be called for unless the Council is satisfied that the funds are necessary for the accomplishment of well-developed plans for economic diversification in the community served by the association. To enable the Secretary of the Treasury to make such subscriptions when called there is authorized to be appropriated the sum of $100,000,000 to be immediately available and to remain available until expended. The terms and conditions associated with such subscriptions shall be set by regulation of the Council.

(f) No State, county, municipal, or local taxing authority shall impose any tax on such associations not expressly authorized by Congress.

(g) The Economic Diversification Corporation is authorized to borrow funds at such rates as may be appropriate from individuals, associations, corporations, political entities of the United States, or any agency thereof otherwise authorized to loan money for such development purposes.

(h) From funds made available pursuant to section 10(d) the Council may authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to make loans to specific economic diversification corporations on such terms and conditions as are appropriate: *Provided, however,* That no individual economic diversification corporation shall ever be indebted to the United States under the provisions of this Act in excess of $50,000,000.

LOAN GUARANTEE AND INTEREST PAYMENT PROGRAM

SEC. 7. Title IV of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 is amended—

(1) by striking out the title heading and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

"TITLE IV—GUARANTEES

"PART A—LEASE GUARANTEES

(2) by striking out "this title", wherever it appears in sections 402 and 403, and inserting in lieu thereof "this part"; and

(3) by adding at the end thereof the following:

"PART B—DIVERSIFICATION PROJECT GUARANTEES

"DEFINITIONS

"SEC. 410. As used in this part—

"(1) The term 'eligible lender' means an eligible institution, an agency, or instrumentality of a State, or a financial or credit institution (including an insurance company) which is subject to examination and supervision by an agency of the United States or of any State (including an Economic Diversification Corporation) or a pension fund approved by the Administration for this purpose.

"(2) The term 'diversification project' means the planning and carrying out of any project by a business concern which is designated to facilitate that business concern's diversification by allowing it to enter into different markets and which will also assist the locality in which the concern is located to diversify its local economy.

"AUTHORIZATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION

"SEC. 411. (a) The Administration may, upon such terms and conditions as it may prescribe, enter into a contract and guarantee any loan for a diversification project made by an eligible lender against loss as a result of the failure of any person to meet the terms of such loan, subject to the following conditions:

"(1) The person to whom the loan is made is a small business concern.

"(2) The loan is required in order for such a person to carry out a diversification project.

"(3) Such person is not able to obtain such loan on reasonable terms and conditions without a guarantee under this section.

"(4) The loan bears interest at a rate not in excess of 8 per centum a year.

"(5) The Administration determines that there is reasonable assurance that such person will repay the loan.

"(6) The application therefore bears the approval of the Board of Directors of the Economic Diversification Corporation serving the locality of the applicant, whether or not the funds are to be loaned by it.

"(7) The diversification project for which the loan is made meets requirements established by the Administration for feasibility and reasonableness of costs.

"(b) When entering into a contract to guarantee a loan for a diversification project which meets the six conditions specified in section 411(a) above, the Administration will—

"(1) give preference to small business concerns which have suffered severe direct or indirect financial difficulties resulting from the diminution or termination of any Federal contracts; and

"(2) give preference to diversification projects aimed at aiding in the resolution of the Nation's pressing domestic problems.

"(c) Any contract of guarantee under this

section shall obligate the Administration to pay upon default to an eligible lender the unpaid balance of the principal amount of the loan, other than interest added to principal.

"(d) The Administration shall fix a uniform fee for any guarantee under this section which shall be payable at such time as may be determined by the Administration. To the extent practicable, having due regard for the purpose of this section, the amount of any such fee shall be determined in accordance with sound actuarial practices and procedures. Any fee so established shall be subject to periodic review in order that the lowest fee that experience under the program shows to be justified will be placed into effect. The Administration may also fix such uniform fees for the procesing of applications for guarantees under this section as it determines are reasonable and necessary to pay administrative expenses incurred in connection therewith.

"(e) The provisions of section 402 shall apply in the administration of this section.

"FUND

"SEC. 412. (a) There is established a revolving fund for use by the Administration in carrying out this part, except section 413 thereof. Initial capital for such fund shall consist of not to exceed $50,000,000 transferred from the fund established under section 4(c)(1)(B) of the Small Business Act, but paragraph (6) of such section shall not apply to any amounts so transferred.

"(b) There shall be deposited into the fund established by this section all receipts from the guarantee program authorized by this part. Money in such fund not needed for the payment of current operating expenses or for the payment of claims arising under such programs shall be invested in bonds or other obligations of, or guaranteed by, the United States; except that money provided as initial capital for such fund shall be returned to the fund established by section 4(c)(1)(B) of the Small Business Act, in such amounts and at such times as the Administration determines to be appropriate, whenever the level of the fund established by this section permits the return of such money without endangering the solvency of the program under this part.

"INTEREST ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS

"SEC. 413. (a) In addition to any contract of guarantee entered into pursuant to section 411 of this title, the Administration is authorized to make, and to contract to make, interest assistance payments to any eligible lender which has made a loan subject to the provisions of such section 411, on behalf of any person to whom such loan is made. Such payments shall be made at such times and under such conditions as the Administration may by regulation provide. Interest assistance payments to any such lender shall be made only for the period equal to the repayment period as provided in the agreement evidencing such loan, but in no event for a period longer than five years.

"(b) No interest assistance payments made under this section for any loan for any year shall exceed the difference between 3 per centum and the interest such person would be required to pay under the agreement evidencing such loan.

"(c)(1) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Administration such sums as may be necessary for the payment of interest assistance grants to eligible leaders in accordance with this section.

"(2) Contracts for interest assistance grants under this section shall not be entered into in an aggregate amount greater than is authorized in appropriation Acts, and in any event the total amount of interest assistance grants which may be paid to eligible lenders in any year pursuant to contracts entered into under this section shall not exceed $15,000,000."

DEVELOPMENT AND DIVERSIFICATION PROVISIONS IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS

SEC. 8. (a) Under such regulations as the Office shall prescribe, each Government contract or grant, entered into twelve or more months after the date of enactment of this Act, any agency of the Federal Government shall contain provisions effective to—

(1) require a general contractor, whenever appropriate to survey the economic impact upon the locality or localities in which the major portion of such contract or grant is to be carried out of (A) the completion of work under such contract or grant, or (B) a substantial reduction in the use of a facility operated under such contract or grant;

(2) require each contractor to estimate the degree of dependency, currently and prospectively, of such contractor under defense contracts or grants; and

(3) require a general contractor, whenever practicable, to develop plans for the use of any facility, operated under, or personnel skills or other benefit derived from such a contract or grant, to supplement community and private efforts to foster economic diversification in such locality upon the completion of such contract or grant or substantial reduction of the use of a facility operated under such contract or grant.

(b) The Office shall encourage trade and industry associations, labor unions, and professional organizations to make appropriate studies and plans to further the purposes of this section.

(c) The Office may by regulation exempt entire agencies and types of materials or services from the application of this section.

SEC. 9. (a) Pursuant to the provisions of section 4(a)(5)(d) of this Act the Council is requested to report to the President and the Congress on the feasibility of a nationwide program of salary continuation insurance for employees of contractors and subcontractors whose job security is threatened by shifts or possible shifts in national expenditure patterns. The Council shall consider whether or not a compulsory insurance plan, the premiums for which could be paid in all or in part by the Federal Government, would provide a stabilizing influence on the economy while at the same time facilitating the necessary changes in national expenditures necessary to make the Government responsive to national needs.

(b) This report shall be prepared in cooperation with the Department of Labor, the Department of Commerce, and other interested Federal, State, local, and nongovernmental organizations interested.

(c) The Council shall make its initial report on this study within twelve months of the enactment of this Act, and the final report shall be forwarded to the Congress not later than January 1, 1974.

SEC. 10. (a) There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out the provisions of this Act for each fiscal year such sums as the Congress deems necessary not to exceed—

(1) $50,000,000 for planning grants under section 5 of this Act;

(2) $50,000,000 for initial capitalization grants under section 6(d) of this Act;

(3) $50,000,000 for long-term loans to Economic Diversification Corporations under section 6(e) of this Act;

(4) $200,000 for all purposes of this Act.

(b) There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out the study directed by section 9 of this Act, $200,000 to remain available until expended.

By Mr. MONDALE (for himself, Mr. RANDOLPH, Mr. TUNNEY, Mr. MOSS, Mr. MCINTYRE, and Mr. HARTKE):

S. 3909. A bill to provide youth services grants, and for other purposes.

YOUTH PROGRAMS ACT

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I am very pleased today to announce the introduction of the "Youth Programs Act of 1972."

This legislation has two main purposes. One is to provide small grants to be used for the operation of youth services including hotlines, runaway houses, walk-in centers, and medical services.

The second is to try to attack the problem of alienation of young people from Government and the political process by providing for them in a meaningful role in administering this grant program.

As chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Children and Youth, I have been both impressed and fascinated to observe in the last year or two the burgeoning of services actually started and operated by young people for other young people. For example, throughout the country, we know that there are at least 600 hotlines or telephone emergency services. In addition, we know of untold hundreds more drop-in centers, medical services, runaway houses—the names are not important. What is important is that young people do turn to these services for help.

These services have undoubtedly sprung up because the young people are subject to perhaps greater stresses than any comparable group in history.

One tragic indicator of the need for this service is the alarming increase in the suicide rates of young people. For males between the ages of 10 and 19, the suicide rate has tripled between 1960 and 1970. For females in the same age group, the increase has been from a statistically insignificant 0.04 suicides per 100,000 to 8.0 per 100,000, a 200-fold increase. For women from age 20 to 29, the increase in the suicide rate has been the same.

In addition, we hear one story after another that speaks to the alienation of young Americans, not only from their families—but from the schools, church, the political process—from society as a whole.

We cannot, in good conscience, ignore their pleas for help. Young persons—between the age of 14 and 24—make up fully 20 percent of our population. As many as 1 million of these young Americans run away from home every year, often becoming the victims of an unhealthy and even criminal "street" environment. Six percent of youth of high school age, under 18, have tragically experimented with heroin.

Many young people who run away or take hard drugs, or who get drawn into a street life they do not really want and cannot seem to escape from, literally do not know a soul they feel they can turn to for help.

And so, Youth Emergency Service, a hotline in Minneapolis, receives 5,000 calls each month, and a similar service in Cincinnati receives 6,000.

And in a 2-year period, 2,500 young runaways showed up on the doorstep of one San Francisco runaway shelter, Huckleberry House, for assistance.

Youth crisis centers have helped many young people with problems such as these.

Crisis centers have proven that they can play a crucial role in bringing runaways and their families back together, in referring young addicts to needed medical services, in aiding young people in trouble with the law.

Virtually all of these accomplishments have been achieved without the assistance of the Federal Government. Occasionally, such as in the case of the Youth Emergency Services hotline in Northfield, Minn., some funds have trickled into the crisis service through programs whose basic purpose was not the support of crisis services. But the interest of the Federal Government in any kind of youth programs has at best been sporadic—and its financial commitment, minimal. Programs that service youth are scattered throughout Government agencies and lack coordination.

It is now over a year since the White House Conference on Youth convened in Estes Park, Colo. In that year we have seen a proliferation of sleekly packaged, voluminous documents, task force reports, recommendations, answers to recommendations. Yet in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, which has prime responsibility for dealing with the problems of young people, less than 12 percent of members of advisory committees are under 30 years old. Only some 2 percent are under 25 years old. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this time, statistics on the youth membership of HEW advisory boards as provided to me by Secretary Richardson.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

YOUTH MEMBERS OF PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEES

There were a total of 3,570 public members on HEW public advisory committees on May 1, 1972.

There were 22 persons 25 and under serving on such committees as of May 1.

There were 107 people 30 and under serving on such committees as of May 1. This figure includes the 22 who are 25 and under.

There were a total of 922 members serving on committees on which there were one or more youth members. (See chart below for agency by agency compilation.)

Agency	25 and under	30 and under	Total	Percentage
OS	6	15	149	10.0
OE	5	16	140	11.4
HSMHA	5	35	255	13.7
SSA	0	1	19	5.3
SRS	2	9	92	9.8
FDA	0	8	47	17.0
NIH	4	23	220	10.5
Total	22	107	922	11.6

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, on June 25, the Subcommittee on Children and Youth held a hearing in Minneapolis for the purpose of learning about the new forms of youth crisis services—how they operate, who they serve, what they do, and the problems they face.

I was particularly impressed by the thoughtful statements of the young people who operate crisis services for Minnesota youth—who have thought deeply about what they are trying to do and who feel strongly the responsibility they hold for the future of so many young people.

I scheduled that hearing, among other reasons, because I heard that some 85 hotlines have actually closed down in the last year. And I heard that many of them closed because they could not plug into a source of money that would support a staff member and pay the phone bill.

The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has indicated some interest in youth programs in recent years. Perhaps the most sophisticated thinking about how to support such programs and make them effective have come out of the National Institute of Mental Health, a component of HEW. For several years NIMH has been discussing the means of developing an effective mechanism for supporting youth programs and providing input by young people into administration of the programs. In fact, some small grants have already been awarded to youth-sponsored youth services by NIMH. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this time a memorandum dated March 1972, which outlines a proposal for a permanent NIMH youth grant program.

There being no objection, the memorandum was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION OF NIMH YOUTH GRANT PROGRAM

At the present time funding sources for youth-initiated activities within the National Institute of Mental Health and other government agencies are not readily accessible. Youth today have developed innovative projects many of which are meeting the needs of youth and families where many of our abundantly funded traditional programs have proven unresponsive and/or inept. This present proposal is an attempt to develop a funding mechanism which is responsive to the needs of youth, as well as a youth grant program, which is an integral part of the Institute's on-going program.

FUNDING PROGRAM FOR YOUTH-INITIATED PROJECTS

I. Plan I—A youth office and youth review committee composed of youth consultants

A. Description: Youth Office Staff/Youth Coordinator

1. The Youth office would be staffed by a Youth Coordinator who would be an NIMH staff member who could work effectively with NIMH staff across Divisions, with the NIMH Intramural Committee on Youth Initiated Activities, and with youth reviewers and youth groups.

2. Three or four youth would work with the Coordinator as hired NIMH staff to develop and maintain an NIMH youth program.

B. Roles of Youth Office Staff and Youth Coordinator

1. Coordinate and consult on youth projects within the Institute

2. Stimulate grants in the area of Youth.

3. Feedback and monitoring of Youth-Initiated Projects

4. Make recommendations concerning whether applications are appropriate for review by the Youth Review Committee

5. Refer (when appropriate) large scale youth-initiated grant applications to Division for review and funding.

C. Description: Youth Review Committee (Ad Hoc)

1. There are six youth reviewers from the Pilot program who would be available for further development of the program. These youth reviewers did an excellent job and have been praised by many NIMH staff members.

2. A year's stability would be provided for the six Youth reviewers to "maintain the direct and continuing involvement of youth in the planning process" (HSMHA Agency Youth Plan—Philosophy of Youth Involvement).

D. Roles of Youth Review Committee (Ad Hoc)

1. The Youth Reviewers would be available as consultants to NIMH staff on any projects involving youth which are being processed through the standing research committees.

2. The Youth Reviewers might review grant applications relating to youth and present a critique to the Review Committee which was assigned the grant application. (See Review Procedure used in the Division of Mental Health Services.)

3. The Youth Reviewers would be available to meet, when appropriate, with Division Directors and Branch Chiefs.

4. The Youth Review Committee members and the NIMH Youth Office would have the criteria for grant applications clearly spelled out. They want each applicant to know that youth will be reviewing the grants and what measuring sticks are used in determining whether a grant is approved or disapproved. By keeping this "transparency" they hope to encourage straight-forward applications with a minimum of rhetoric.

E. Review of Applications: 2 Options

1. Ad Hoc Youth Review Committee:

a. Would review small scale (up to $10,000) grant applications from youth-initiated projects which have components of either of research, service, and training or all three.

b. Would provide speed in processing and funding of youth applications: 90 days from date of submission of a grant application an applicant would receive payment of funds if application was approved.

c. Would provide a simplified grant application.

2. Standing NIMH Review Committees (research, service, and training):

a. Would review large scale grant applications ($10,000–$100,000) from youth-initiated projects which were appropriate for a specific committee to review.

b. Would review applications from youth-initiated projects which have further developed their program through the small scale funding mechanism—the (Ad Hoc) Youth Review Committee.

c. Small scale funding via the contract mechanism has been used successfully by the Section on Youth and Student Affairs to enable Youth Projects to develop their projects further before applying for large scale funding (see Runaway House Contract and Training Grant. As a result of a contract provided to Runaway House, a grant to this organization is now in the process of being awarded.)

d. Would review small scale grant applications which are in a specific program area, i.e., Metro Center may prefer to have some specific grants reviewed by its own standing committee (some program areas may have developed some youth-initiated small scale grant applications to educate their Review Committees).

F. Regional Offices

The HSMHA Youth Agency Plan involves youth staff in working out of the Regional Offices. These youth staff (YPAC) have indicated a willingness to provide regional consultation to youth initiated projects to enable youth groups to apply to the NIMH for grant applications either to the Youth Review Committee or to other Standing Review Committees.

G. Funding

1. The Youth Reviewers (and the operational costs of the Youth Review Committee) could be supported from funds from various Divisions. Chairman grants of Review Committee might be an effective mechanism.

2. The funds to support the youth initiated projects could come from funds earmarked by various Divisions or from a special funding source, i.e., the Director's fund.

3. The funds for those grants reviewed by (Ad Hoc) Youth Review Committee could be administered similar to the Small Grants Programs, i.e., projects may be paid and administered by appropriate program area; other grants paid by funds from (Ad Hoc) Youth Review Committee.

H. Benefits

1. These projects are low cost-high gain.

2. Youth have developed effective service, research and training projects for less than ¼ the price it would cost to have professional services (see contracts—Section on Youth & Student Affairs).

3. Youth initiated projects reach a population that is inadequately served by traditional services.

4. These projects place emphasis on prevention, which is often more beneficial and less costly than focusing strictly on treatment.

FIRST YEAR PLANS OR ALTERNATIVE PLANS

(These plans are based on feedback from different Divisions)

Plan II—Each division could develop its own panel of youth reviewers. These youth reviewers could present and critique youth initiated projects to the Review Committees of the Divisions as was the Procedure in the pilot program of the Division of Mental Health Services.

The Panels of youth interviewers from each Division could work together to coordinate a youth program. The SMHF Section on Youth and Student Affairs could aid this coordinating function and could serve as a resource for competent youth for reviewers and on youth initiated projects.

Plan III—The Youth Reviewers could be based out of one Division and relate to the entire NIMH. The Division of Special Mental Health Programs would be the most appropriate Division for this Program and the Center for Studies of Child and Family Mental Health (SMHF) the most appropriate unit to base the program.

The SMHF is only "coordinating center" in the Institute which has its on-going mandate "to relate to the entire NIMH on matters relating to the development of the Institute's Program for children and families." The Center's Section on Youth and Student Affairs is the only section within NIMH focusing primarily on youth and has been serving a coordinating and youth advocacy role within the Institute for the past three years. (See SMHF Annual Report 1969 and 1970).

Grants Management and Legislative Branch have reviewed the Intramural Committee proposal and have informed the committee that an authority to create a youth grant program already exists in previous legislation. When the operational plan for the youth program proposal is devised, the Intramural Committee would continue its ongoing contact with Grants Management in developing review procedures.

(Dr. Plaut might find it helpful to receive a separate report from Mr. Desmond McLearen, Assistant Chief, Grants and Contracts Management Branch who is an active member of the Intramural Committee.)

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, and so today, I am introducing in the Senate the Youth Programs Act of 1972. This bill is designed specially not to create a huge, unwieldy, expensive, and eternal bureaucracy. It will provide small grants—a maximum of $10,000 a year—to be used by crisis services to train employees, monitor the effectiveness of their services, compile and distribute lists of youth-serving agencies in the community, and to pay operating expenses. In other words, the grants will enable services that have proven their value to continue to serve their communities.

The bill provides for operation of the program from a new Office of Youth Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of HEW. Fifty percent of members of the staff of that office must be under 25, and at least half of those must be under 21. It is my hope that this measure will encourage the bureaucracy to listen to and consult young people not only on issues that directly affect them, but on all of the great issues which confront our political system.

Under the legislation I intend to introduce, there would be an incentive to search for even more effective, long-range approaches. The bill would require a study of what elements of the existing services could and should be preserved—and also a thorough consideration of what the approach of the Federal Government should be toward youth services. This study would include recommendations for new legislation and for administrative changes that would make the Government more sensitive to the needs of young people.

I would just like to say that the time limit on funds and the proposed research are not an attempt to dilute the effectiveness of this grant program. Several witnesses at the hearing emphasized that crisis services are delicate institutions that could wither away from the excessive influence of the Federal Government—both by losing their credibility with young people and by becoming lax about maintaining community support.

In closing, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the bill be printed in the RECORD together with the following background materials: two articles on hotlines and how they operate, one by Gus Potter, youth services coordinator of the town of North Hempstead, Long Island, N.Y.; and the other by Dale C. Garell of the hotline at Children's Hospital in Los Angeles; excerpts from a recent follow-up study of runaway youth served by "The Bridge" in Minneapolis; and some of the testimony presented at the Subcommittee on Children and Youth's hearing on youth crisis services.

There being no objection, the bill and material were ordered to be printed in the RECORD as follows:

S. 3909

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the:

"YOUTH PROGRAMS ACT"

STATEMENT OF FINDINGS

SEC. 2. (a) The Congress hereby finds that—

(1) nearly 1,000,000 young Americans run away from home each year and often become the victims of an unhealthy and criminal environment;

(2) an increasingly large number of young Americans have experimented with drugs and subsequently suffered damaging physical and psychological effects from the use of such drugs;

(3) within the last 10 years the suicide rate for young American males between 10 and 19 years of age has tripled, and within the last 5 years the suicide rate for young American females between 10 and 19 years of age has increased 200 percent; and

(4) an increasing social and cultural change together with geographical and social mobility has contributed to the alienation of many young Americans from society and established institutions, leading them to create their own institutions.

(b) It is therefore the purpose of this Act to provide youth services grants and to establish in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare an Office of Youth Programs.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 3. In order to carry out the provisions of this Act, there are authorized to be appropriated $10,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973, and for each of the two succeeding fiscal years.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OFFICE OF YOUTH PROGRAMS

SEC. 4. (a) There is established in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare the Office of Youth Programs. The Office shall be headed by a Director who shall be appointed by the Secretary within 90 days of enactment of this Act; and shall perform such duties as are delegated to him by the Secretary.

(b) To the extent practicable, the Secretary shall employ personnel in the Office so that at least 50 percent of such personnel are individuals who have not attained 25 years of age and at least one-half of such per centum are individuals who have not attained 21 years of age.

(c) The Secretary shall carry out the provisions of this Act through the Office of Youth Programs.

GRANTS AUTHORIZED

SEC. 5. (a) The Secretary is authorized to make grants to pay the Federal share of the cost of youth service projects conducted by nonprofit private organizations, particularly organizations engaged in furnishing emergency telephone counseling, general counseling, medical service, and services for runaways.

(b) Grants under this section may be used for—

(1) training volunteers and for providing compensation for workers in such projects;

(2) monitoring the effectiveness of the services provided by such organizations;

(3) compiling, improving, and distributing lists of youth organizations within appropriate geographic areas, and

(4) operating expenses for such organizations.

(c) (1) No grant may be made under this section except upon application made therefor in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary.

(2) No grant may be made under this section to any individual organization or project in an amount in excess of $10,000 in any fiscal year.

(d) (1) The Secretary shall pay to each applicant which has an application approved under section 5 an amount equal to the Federal share of the cost of the application. The Federal share for each fiscal year shall not exceed 75 percent of the cost of such application, except that for applications from organziations located in areas of high concentration of poor people, pursuant to regulations established by the Secretary, the Federal share may be increased to an amount not to exceed 90 percent of the cost of such application.

(2) Payments under this section to any nonprofit organization may be made in installments, and in advance, or by way of reimbursement, and with necessary adjustments on account of underpayments or overpayments.

(e) The Secretary is authorized to establish whatever procedures he determines necessary to assure that whenever possible, applications under this section will be processed to completion within a period not to exceed 90 days from the date on which any such application is received.

THE NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE ON YOUTH SERVICES

SEC. 6 (a) The Secretary is authorized to establish and operate a National Clearinghouse on Youth Services which call—

(1) collect, analyze, and disseminate research materials relating to the services assisted under the provisions of this Act with particular emphasis upon such materials as are developed by nonprofit organizations receiving financial assistance under this Act;

(2) conduct a thorough evaluation of the programs assisted pursuant to section 5 of this Act; and

(3) develop recommendations for a long-term approach, by the Federal Government, to the problems of young Americans.

(b) The Secretary, through the National Clearinghouse on Youth Services, may carry out the functions under this section directly, or by way of contract, grant, or other arrangement.

YOUTH ADVISORY BOARD

SEC. 7. (a) There shall be established a Youth Advisory Board within 90 days of enactment of this Act. The Board shall consist of fifteen members, at least fifty percent of whom are individuals who have not attained twenty-five years of age and at least one-half of such percentum who have not attained twenty-one years of age. The Board shall be appointed by the director of the Office of Youth Programs after consultation with youth who have experience in youth programs, either as providers or as recipients of such services. The Board shall—

(A) Assist in the establishment of priorities for the award of grants under this Act.

(B) Recommend general policies for, and review the conduct of, the Office.

(C) Advise the Director of the Office on development of programs to be carried out by the Office.

(D) Conduct such studies as may be necessary to fulfill its functions under this Section.

(E) Prepare an annual report to the Secretary on the current status and needs of youth programs in the United States.

(F) Submit an annual report to the Congress on the activities of the Office, and on youth programs in the United States.

(G) Meet at the call of the chairman, except that it shall meet (i) at least four times during each fiscal year, or (i) whenever one-third of the members request in writing that a meeting be held.

REPORT

SEC. 8. The Secretary is authorized and directed to prepare and furnish to the President and the Congress not later than July 1, 1975, a report on his activities under this Act, together with an evaluation of financial assistance provided under this Act and recommendations, for long-term solutions to the problems of young Americans.

DEFINITIONS

SEC. 9. As used in this Act, the term—

(1) "nonprofit private organization" means any organization, including unincorporated associations of individuals which the Secretary determines is capable of carrying out a program to be assisted under this Act;

(2) "Secretary" means the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare; and

(3) "young American" means any individual who has attained 10 years of age but not 26 years of age.

[From the Federal Probation, December 1971]

"HOTLINE" FOR TROUBLED YOUTH

(By Gus Potter)

Hotlines started so that human beings of all ages could find each other in the darkness of loneliness and despair. A widening emotional communication gap between adults and youth and each other is strangling traditional services that adults have historically and sociologically delivered to young people. Though youth are more beset by increasingly complex challenges, no longer do the troubled youth openly seek the traditional advice and guidance of their parents, ministers, teachers, or the corner policeman as the "wise elders."

"Hotline" is a magic word, ranging from the high level diplomatic circuits between Washington and Moscow to anything that smacks of "instant solution," such as the 1970–1971 ABC–TV series called "Matt Lincoln," starring Vince Edwards. Hotlines have sprung from many sources that have met together in the past few years at the confluence of the youthful counter-culture, the alienation between generations, and the "mod" psychological notion that phones are "cure-alls." The grandfather of all Hotlines is the suicide prevention service, and much of Hotline's technique stems from suicide phones technique. As the drug crisis spread across the country in the mid-1960's, the same urgency for nonthreatening phone response to drug emergencies arose to share the spotlight with suicide services.

The Hotline approach to general youth and drug problems was popularized across the Nation as a result of the original 10-week pilot project sponsored at the Los Angeles Children's Hospital where psychologist Jerry Bissiri and Dr. Dale C. Garrell, director of the hospital's adolescent medicine division, teamed in April 1968. Some 10,000 calls-a-year later, the service operates solely for youth counseling on a seven-night-a-week basis, from 6 p.m. to 12 midnight and 2 a.m. on weekend nights. Their service spread the word locally with wallet-size announcement cards distributed in four area high schools, and the news of Hotline spread quickly by word of mouth. Originally funded by a foundation grant, the project was later funded by Los Angeles County. Serving as the basic model of a Hotline service for youth, the Los Angeles staff has hosted the first two international gatherings, starting in 1970, of Hotline gatherings, starting in 1970, of Hotline workers, and has helped countless hundreds of similar services to organize.

Many similar services exist in religious and charitable organizations, such as "telephone ministries" and "FISH" groups, where help is arranged for a broad spectrum of needs through contact with phone and action volunteer staffs. One of the largest such services is "HELPLINE" sponsored originally by Dr. Norman Vincent Peale's Marble Collegiate Church in New York City and now run by the Religion and Psychiatry Association. The service works with all age and ethnic groups and gets 1,300 to 1,500 calls a week. Some 750 services are now listed in the National Hotline Directory, with new ones springing up in every community in the United States and Canada, as well as all the major foreign metropolises where London, especially, has been a pioneering leader.

THE NORTH HEMPSTEAD HOTLINE

In late February of 1970, four clergymen and youth workers on the now-mellowed Gold Coast of Nassau County, out on Long Island, New York, formed a telephone counseling service for youth, known as "Hotline," centered in the Manhasset area. It would become an emergency service resource for youth in time of a personal crisis by bringing an understanding, objective, and informed listener as close as the nearest telephone.

On Long Island, the first "broad scope" Hotline started with one phone and received three calls on its first night. The phones are located in the Sunday School office of the local Episcopal Church whose rector, the Reverend Frank Johnston, was one of the Hotline founders. By the end of 1970, after 133 nights on the phones, 2,144 calls had been answered, of which 1607 were "substantive." The year ended with four phones, some 25 listeners—mostly youth—and a corps of concerned professional adults and youth as referral consultants.

The Long Island service in Manhasset, now sponsored by the youth services program of the Town of North Hempstead and its young, active Town Supervisor Michael J. Tully, Jr., is only one of 25 similar Hotlines on the Island ranging from the L.S.D. Rescue Service in Brooklyn to the Hotline in Riverhead, way out in Suffolk County at the Headquarters of beautiful Peconic Bay.

DIFFERENCES ABOUND IN SERVICES

All across the United States and Canada "street people" and "straight people" have opened nontraditional facilities and services such as walk-in clinics, free clinics, crisis intervention centers, runaway houses, switchboards, and many more. A Hotline service, strictly speaking, is usually only a phone operation, and many Hotlines around the country consist of phones located in semisecret spots. Many of the other services include a Hotline phone as an integral part of a total operation. Between all these different types, a loose network of information coordination has formed, based on the similarity of phone operations.

Each Hotline is different in philosophy, schedule, operation, staff interests, needs of the local area, and the kinds of problems dealt with. Most Hotlines deal solely with youth, but some specialize in youth talking to adults, such as in Fairfield, California, or for parent-to-parent lines, such as in Broomall, Pennsylvania. Some Hotlines operate 24 hours a day, usually in the urban centers or where Hotlines are part of a large hospital or mental health center, or in the nontraditional and even antiestablishment centers. Many services operate only at night time, some only on the weekend "peak activity" periods, and a few only in the daytime hours.

Some Hotlines have a central office, but many are located in individual homes where a "call diverter" automatically switches calls to a selected home each night, such as in Northport, Long Island, where the Narcotics Guidance Council has served key experienced drug workers manning phones 24 hours a day. Many of the Hotlines use telephone answering services to receive messages when the Hotline is "off-duty," but many others use a message-giving tape announcer listing other 24-hour-a-day services to call instead.

Many of the Hotlines are run by street people, such as "HELP" in Philadelphia, where peer staff members receive a thousand calls a week from youth too alienated to take their problems to professional agencies. On the other hand, one quarter of the 200 Narcotics Guidance Councils run by municipalities in New York State have "drug Hotlines" and another 50 percent are planning them. In between both extremes are the Hotlines similar to Los Angeles, run by a large hospital, or by the Manhasset line, run out of a small church in rich suburbia.

OPERATIONS AND FINANCES

Every conceivable kind of Hotline exists, and many have already folded because of

lack of money, commmunity apathy, or failure of youth to appreciate or respond. Many such services should have folded, many not. Some still operating have severe money problems and scrape along on donations for phone bills. Some have grants and tax support. Some operate on widely varying schedules, as described above, partly because of limited funds or limited staff, or both. Most Hotlines are community sponsored without government ties, either by civic or religious associations and some simply a private group of people. Many appear to be located in churches or storefront centers, some in private homes or in business complexes. In many urban areas or where large numbers of "street people" congregate, the Hotline is usually located in an old frame house or storefront clinic. Many of these street operations receive little funding and staff operation is run like a commune and living coop.

A Hotline service usually consists of two or more phones and a reserved outgoing line. Most Hotline numbers have catchy numbers, such as Los Angeles' 666–1015, or Manhasset, 627–5005; many translate their number into catchy words, like H-O-T-L-I-N-E (468–5463) or partly, like 482–HELP.

All Hotlines have special resource lists of community people particularly noteworthy or available to alienated youth seeking immediate help. Such empathetic resources receive referred troubled callers. Some Hotline services are little more than referral stations, while many (such as Los Angeles and Manhasset) do few referrals, concentrating on direct over-the-phone counseling for the vast majority of their calls. Referral is usually an automatic procedure for certain calls, such as abortion references or a means of last resort when the caller so obviously needs specialized reference or help from a particular consultant.

CRISIS PHILOSOPHY

In a special article in the November 1970 issue of *Delinquency Prevention Report* (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare), Los Angeles Hotline pioneer Dr. Gerald R. Bissiri describes some of the psychological factors affecting the Hotline Approach.

"The major crisis intervention model used in Hotline follows closely the precepts of General Systems Theory in the style of Gerald Caplan in his considerations of preventive psychiatry. Within his framework, a crisis is viewed as an upset or disequilibrium in an individual's efforts to organize experience so that it is reasonably predictable and need-fulfilling.

"A crisis is experienced when one is faced with a problematic situation which, for the moment at least, appears both insolvable and inescapable; insolvable in the light of perceived limitations in coping resources; inescapable insofar as important needs are at stake. The usual situation is one in which needs conflict—the satisfaction of one precluding the satisfaction of the other.

"Inevitably crisis will be resolved in one way or another, if only to eliminate the unpleasant accompaniments of being off-balance: tension, anxiety, cognitive disorientation increase the longer the resolution is delayed. The manner in which a crisis is resolved is considered crucial for ongoing adjustment. It can represent a significant gain in adaptability—in mental health—by virtue of an enhancement of the individual's problem-solving resources. In this case, the person emerges from the crisis a more effective human being.

"On the other hand, the outcome of a crisis resolution could mean the addition of maladaptive coping styles, i.e., patterns of response which, in effect, represent a lesser capacity to deal with novel experiences and thus an increased vulnerability to breakdown in the future. This would be the case, for example, if one has chosen to avoid the problem or to manipulate reality in fantasy or to escape reality pressures through alienation or drugs.

"The forces brought to bear on the decision-making processes determining the choice of strategy for crisis-resolution include a variety of predispositions which the individual brings to the event. These include his background of coping experiences, his current ego strength, special meanings associated with the current problem situation and previous experience. In fact it is assumed that as the crisis intensifies, the crisis-bearer will be increasingly prone to turn to others for assistance. It is further assumed that to the extent the intervention (outside assistant) is well-timed—that is, geared to the individual's reaching-out—optimal benefit is approached and effort minimized.

"It is assumed that through the very act of clarifying such a crisis, the Hotline listener and the crisis caller, working together, can "work through the problem" to achievement. Coping strategies become apparent as one approaches a total understanding of the problem situations. Such understanding obviously requires an atmosphere of honest self-disclosure and a mutuality of intent on the part of the parties involved that carries no signs of prejudgment.

"Major aspects of the Hotline philosophy include the following concepts:

"1. Immediate availability so that assistance is timed to the "reaching-out."

"2. An open door policy meant to serve people with problems rather than problems with people attached.

"3. The recognition of the need for help rests with the adolescent himself rather than being the inspiration of others, the latter often the fuel for resistance.

"4. Respect for the anonymity of the caller so that he's free to test out doubts about himself with immunity as well as the trustworthiness of the listener, and

"5. An approach reinforcing notions of strength in the individual rather than weakness of dependency, by mobilizing the caller's resources toward effective problem solving."

Much Hotline philosophy derives from the empathetic nonjudgmental approach championed by Dr. Carl Rogers, author of *On Becoming a Person* and *Encounter Groups*, who addressed the 1971 Hotline conference in Monterey, California. Dr. Rogers said, "Listening rightly done, is the most significant thing you can do for a person. To the caller, the empathetic nondirective therapy means you, the listener, really care. This is something you can't fake. It's a willingness to stand in his shoes, to understand deeply what he means, without a trace of judgment. This is very rare for a young person to experience. A caring relationship is formed and the caller's self-respect is increased.

HOTLINE IS A SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

As a loosely strung network of wholly autonomous services, the various Hotlines rarely see themselves as a new social force in their communities. Hotlines have been urged at their areawide gatherings to exert pressure on the traditional social agencies to "de-bureaucratize" themselves or Hotlines would refer their callers only to those persons or services that do. Many Hotlines select only sources on criteria bordering on radical or "freak" standards, where waiting lists are shunned, where traditional approaches are avoided, and where availability was immediate, even in the dead of a winter's weekend night.

Because of the thoroughly nonjudgmental and nondirective psychological approach, many Hotlines avoid judgmental associations such as with police, government agencies, public hospitals, or mental health clinics. The moralizing is minimal and the need for response to emotional needs at the moment is paramount.

Many Hotlines exist for drug education, drug emergencies, or even, as on the upper west side of Manhattan in New York, for locating drug pushers. Such lines are aware of their limited appeal in advance due to their very nature. Hotline should not be a "straight world's" bridge to alienated youth, because the news will spread by word-of-mouth if unfeeling or judgmental adults are manning the phones.

One of the more controversial philosophical aspects of Hotline has been the manning of such services by "amateurs" and paraprofessionals in the counseling sphere, where professionals naturally (and rightly) see many limitations and pitfalls. Hotline staff veterans say this is the risk necessary to reach youth and the street scene today, that such alienation and lack of constructive identity-development cannot be helped by the vast professional network and that such youth are driven even further away by professional approaches. The recent AMA convention in Atlantic City in June 1971 erupted over charges that doctors today have generally contributed to youthful rejection of medical services.

A Hotline can guarantee one protection that no other face-to-face service can offer. The telephone itself is a surrogate "confessional booth," leading paranoid and scared youth to its use, instead of the more threatening frontal approach for help. Such frontal approaches conjure up instant prejudgment, unless carefully prepared in advance.

SOME OPERATING POLICIES

Policies of operations vary widely, but some underlying principles exist in most phone services where no other side operations are involved. These include:

(1) Identity of the phone location is secret, keeping potentially disturbed persons from coming to the scene.

(2) No tracing, taping of calls, or no attempts at identification are possible or permitted. No taping even for training and evaluation purposes is allowed.

(3) No medical or legal advice from nonprofessionals.

(4) No arrangement or referral for illegal or immoral purposes, though laws in such grey zones as abortion and drug emergencies are untested in legal challenges.

(5) No face-to-face contact later between caller and listener.

(6) No telling the caller what to do. They won't learn to resolve their own crises; and if the instructions are wrong, they might do more psychological harm than good.

(7) At least two staff members on duty, able to back up each other, with one older staff member mature and cool under pressure.

(8) No drug involvement while on duty; no advocacy of drugs or drug techniques while talking on the phone; no description of the listener's personal drug involvement just to win the caller's trust or confidence. Exceptions in case of tripping or crashing emergencies.

(9) Staff may give only their first names, real or concocted, if they feel it necessary; but no other personal data.

STAFFING, SELECTION, AND TRAINING

The greatest problem is in selecting appropriate staff to man the lines. Manhasset's Hotline does not seek or accept volunteers, but instead selects only personally known candidates. Unknown volunteers are politely thanked for their interest and told firmly that no volunteers are accepted. As a result, staff selection is a very personalized procedure between the coordinator, or certain veteran staff members, and a wide circle of acquaintances through previous youth groups or activities. The required team of 25 staff volunteers is usually full, even for the heavy summer months. In general, parents and adults with no "street experience" are categorically avoided because of the near im-

possibility of untraining them from their preformed judgmental attitudes toward youth. Many other Hotlines must rely on the volunteer selection process since their immediate circle of concerned friends is too limited, or the task too broad, or the area to cover quite immense. These Hotlines must then add an initial psychological screening scheme, like the suicide line in Nassau County, "LIFELINE," where an advance psychological training course of 10 weeks tries to weed out undesirable candidates.

Staffs usually range from midteens to the sixties, depending on the local philosophy of whether callers, youth and/or adults, want to talk to youth or adults. Staff selection includes both sexes, since many callers choose to make the distinction to whom they wish to speak. Manhasset's four listeners each night usually consist of three males and one female. Membership involvement on the Hotline staff is not publicly announced and staff may not disclose their involvement, since many of them are from high schools which provide the most callers, such as Schreiber High School in Port Washington. Of the four on duty, three are youth or college age, and one, called the team supporter, is a professional, usually a clergyman, social worker, youth director, nurse, graduate student, *New York Times* reporter, or personnel director, all of whom qualify as knowledgeable of the "street scene" and whose credentials of trust with alienated youth have been proved before coming on the lines.

Many institutionalized Hotlines, sponsored by hospitals or mental health clinics, must use paid staffs made up largely of nonjudgmental graduate students, in order to man a round-the-clock operation. The pay at Los Angeles Hotline, for example, is $2.50 an hour. Salaries for staff listeners are usually based on such needs as the requirement for professional standards and full-time schedule where volunteer variables are not acceptable.

Many Hotlines use a 3- or 4-hour shift. The nighttime-only Hotline might keep the same staff for the whole shift (from, say, 6 p.m. to 2 a.m.) or split the shift in half.

The first question in public meetings about Hotlines is "what training do Hotline listeners have," as if training was a panacea for dealing with the caller's problems. This is a misleading question that requires the retort that Hotline listeners must have inherent capabilities that no amount of training could provide or inspire. The training process for such staff is then really orientation toward phone techniques, phone referrals, phone psychology, and other procedural matters. The real "training" must be done with preoriented people. After the initial orientation phases, the bulk of ongoing training usually deals in staff awareness through role-playing, demonstration, case analysis, problem call evaluation, and staff encounter or awareness training. Here is where an experienced and knowledgeable psychologist can be a major service as a consultant during this orientation and ongoing training program for the staff.

The Manhasset staff and training procedure includes several steps:

(1) Evaluate selection of candidates.

(2) Two 2-hour orientation meetings to discuss phone techniques, staff responsibilities, philosophy, phone procedures, call records, referrals and emergency procedures.

(3) Short "encounter" (5 to 10 minutes) at the monthly staff meeting between the candidate and the assembled staff.

(4) A 3-month probation period working on the phones with "buddies" and a team supervisor, mutually evaluating the progress.

(5) A final short "encounter" after the 3 months at the next staff meeting, with a final acceptance determined then.

(6) Monthly 2-hour staff meetings with outside consultants analyzing call handling, problem calls, situations, and referred techniques.

(7) When a listener starts to slip, either a repeat probation period, or a firm release from the lines.

Staff supervision rests with the coordinator who must combine the needs for a mutual cooperative spirit among the staff with a firm and gentle authoritarianism in dealing with the vibrant and unique personalities that each listener presents. This is hard to do in a Hotline owned and operated by a Town Government, and is especially difficult in a real mutual cooperative where personalities and power struggles are natural partners.

A rapidly growing feature of the services is the "burnt-out" staff phenomenon noticed at the recent Monterey conference in May 1971. Some staff have been working (for little or no pay to afford vacations) for months or years without respite, losing their original dedication for the pressing onslaught of tragedy, dilemma, and confusion constantly approaching them on the phones. Hotline staff planners must be awake to the trend of listeners getting bored or stale after a few months or a couple of years.

REFERRALS AND CONSULTANTS

Behind the phone listener is a group of selected referral consultants, such as doctors, lawyers, or psychologists, who have agreed to accept referred calls dealing with specialized problems such as pregnancy inquiries, legal aid needs, and many more. These consultants have usually proved themselves socially aware of the needs of alienated youth, and are available at the Hotline and may give reduced or free services to such callers. Otherwise, agency or institution referrals are just "routine referrals," where Hotline may give out the agency phone number without followup or where Hotline can actually arrange an appointment or followthrough with confirmations.

ALL TYPES OF CALLERS

Each Hotline has its own statistical record and no attempt is now planned to correlate these nationally or locally. According to mutual understanding at various conferences, girl callers predominate over boys between 2 to 1 and 5 to 1. This may reflect the greater ability of girls to relate their emotional needs, albeit less specifically than boys, and are thus more likely to use a phone counseling service. On the other hand, the specificity of a boy's problem may be dealt with openly between friends, or repressed without any desire to relate.

Not every Hotline call is "real" or "substantive." Gag or goof callers range from 5 percent to 25 percent in some areas, with a large number of "hangups" when the phone is answered. The Manhasset line finds that 75 percent of its calls are "substantive," with girl callers at 70 percent. The average caller's age, based on a 60 percent sampling, is 16.2 years; and the average length of the call ranges about 20.5 minutes. Many of the callers, mostly girls, are "repeaters" or "chronic callers," seeking consistent companionship through periods of depression or loneliness.

A smaller percentage of calls than most people realize come from drug problems, though many calls dealing with other prime subjects have peripheral involvement with drugs. Usually 10 to 20 percent of the Hotline calls deal directly with drug use and drug emergencies, such as tripping, crashing, or overdosing. Drug Hotlines, of course, have a higher percentage because of their special image and service nature.

Call frequency varies in cycles. In 1970, in Manhasset, the heaviest night was Saturday (24.3 calls night) over Friday (20.4 calls), but the trend is reversing with Friday leading the way. The single busiest hour is between 10 and 11 p.m. on Saturday nights.

The vast majority of calls deal with social peer-level problems, family disputes or hangups, drug emergencies, drug involvement, psychological problems, loneliness, pregnancy or abortion questions, drinking alcohol, smoking tobacco, runaway counseling, school and community problems, draft and political matters, V.D. tests, inter-Hotline referrals, and a rising degree of suicidal callers. Many other types of Hotlines, especially in urban centers, deal with runaways, need or intercity travel and rides, places to house overnight, and urgent medical attention. Many neophyte Hotlines find their original glamorous predictions of "action on the phones" melting under the feet when the phones don't ring for a couple hours, or when gag callers from a party somewhere "bug" our listeners, or several "hangups" come in a row. Many Hotline listeners find such "action," and the danger of being judgmental to weak callers two of their most frustrating staff problems.

On the basis of limited sampling, the most important methods of advertising for Hotline is "word-of-mouth" through friends, posters, wallet-sized cards distributed through schools, or AM/FM rock music station announcements. The telephone operator, or a listing in the phone book, is important for travellers. But adult-oriented news stories and other traditional approaches have little effect with the youth.

FORMING NEW SERVICES

Communities forming new Hotlines or crisis centers have many pitfalls to avoid before undertaking their service. The most serious danger is that the service is being planned by "do-gooders" who have no street experience or relationship with alienated youth. Organizations planning to open up drug Hotlines whose staff of planners have seldom been emotionally involved with heavy drug-users, may find their Hotline expenditures a colossal white elephant and a sad target of sick humor from drug-abusers. The second most serious pitfall is the selection of a capable and empathetic staff, described above. Most of the remaining decisions must be based on real, not imaginary, needs of the alienated potential clientele, though very few community adult groups seem to understand what those needs are these days. Hiring an experienced and successful group from another area to come into the local community to consult may be the wisest, in the long run.

COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION NETWORKS

After the 1970 Los Angeles conference, delegates asked the crisis center in Minneapolis to undertake a limited international information network. Since then, additional regional networks have sprung up, sometimes overlapping, sometimes in fits and starts.

The national information network is headed by Ken Beitler, director of the Youth Emergency Service, 1423 Washington Avenue South, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55404. They publish a national Hotline directory (contribution of $2) and a periodical information newsletter, the *Exchange* (contribution $3). They have limited ability to advise on setting up new services and publish a small outline on starting new Hotlines.

In addition, the Los Angeles Hotline under former administrator Myldred Jones, now coordinating the Western Hotline region, has hosted the first two international conferences in 1970 and 1971 at Los Angeles and Monterey, California. In addition, the Western Hotline region has held two regional workshops. The busiest activity east of the Rockies comes from the East Coast, where simultaneous conferences were held on April 3, 1971, in Amherst, Massachusetts, and port, Connecticut. Since then, the Amherst planning meeting resulted in a conference at College Park, Maryland, in June 1971. Coordinating Northeastern United States and Eastern Canada information is the Manhas-

set Hotline, 1355 Northern Boulevard, Manhasset, New York 11030. Coordinating New England efforts and crisis services is "Project Place," 37 Rutland Street, Boston, Massachusetts. Both the Manhasset and Boston services publish newsletters.

NATIONAL STANDARDIZATION TRY

Efforts of groups at the recent Monterey conference to form a set of nationwide standards and certification committees were vigorously turned down, mainly because of the autonomous nature of individual Hotlines which outweigh the natural tendency to make the Hotline network a national bureaucracy despite the many rampant local divergencies of philosophy and procedure. Also, the conference participants felt the most urgent need was expansion of the limited information network so that the work of success and other activities could be spread further. There was also no hope of many to adequately control such bureaucracy, and a desire to avoid a national office as long as possible.

Because of the many attempts at groundswell coordination, and partly to avoid the "empire-building" attempts of some Hotline "freaks" and power-playing fanatics, individual Hotlines have been cautioned to avoid universal entanglements, political or financial, that jeopardize the primary import of phone listening, though a nationwide mutual coordinating network, for runaway counseling and cross-country travelling clientele is a very useful service.

The Hotline technique is diffused into so many other overlapping systems such as free clinics, runaway houses, drug centers, and crisis services, many of which have their own nationwide coordinating system. In the foreseeable future those Hotline and crisis staff members who want to maintain an even keel, until a suitable nonthreatening nationwide service structure can be built with or without federal funds, should avoid the natural tendency to create regional, area, or national groups in multiplicity or duplication, which may be largely fronts for egotrips or mutual staff sensitization, relishing the new found power in the "street community" that Hotline or crisis center participation gives to its staff members.

THE SAN FRANCISCO PROJECT: A CRITIQUE

(By William P. Adams, Paul M. Chandler, and M. G. Neithercutt, D. Crim)

It has not been established that the rise in reported crime reflects basic changes in American people. It is apparent, however, that seldom in the history of our country has such a majority of law-abiding citizens been so acutely aware of crime and so concerned with its remediation. It is a concern that embraces our political system, increasing our interest in the effectiveness of crime control approaches. In view of heightened public concern, research in probation and parole can no longer be regarded as a luxury; it is essential to improve program effectiveness and to increase public confidence in these processes.

Research is costly and funds for research in probation and parole have been limited. It is important, therefore, that we make our research investments wisely. In 1964 a major research effort, the *San Francisco Project*[1] was undertaken. Because the final project reporter revealed methodological uncertainties and equivocal results, a critique might reveal some valuable lessons for guidance in future research investments.

On June 1, 1964, the National Institute of Mental Health awarded a $275,000 grant to the School of Criminology, University of California, Berkeley, for research in probation and parole. Funded for four years, the project began September 1, 1964. As then conceived, the main goals of the project were:

1. Develop discriminating criteria for the classification of federal offenders.

2. Study the effects of varied intensities and types of supervision and caseload sizes.

[From Children, September–October 1969]

A HOTLINE TELEPHONE SERVICE FOR YOUNG PEOPLE IN CRISIS

(By Dale C. Garell)

One of the major reasons that young people today find themselves alienated from what they call the "establishment" of the "system" may be the increasingly wide gap between them and the helping agencies. Long waiting periods, unavailability of service when needed, the categorizing of persons by their complaints, and the fragmentation of services make it difficult for many adolescents to use the services that do exist for them. Added to these deterrents to the use of service are young people's characteristic reluctance to regard themselves as problems, their unwillingness to wait for help if it is not immediately available when crises arise, and their general lack of knowledge about existing services.

In an effort to help young people break through these obstacles to securing help when they need it, the Childrens Hospital at Los Angeles is providing an emergency telepone service for adolescents and young adults under 25. Called the Hotline, the service was established in April 1968 as a resource for helping young people in a time or crisis by making an understanding, objective, and informed listener as close as the nearest telephone. Over 7,000 telephone calls were received from young people during the service's first year.

When the Hotline was first proposed, several questions arose. Would young people use the service? What types of problems would they present? Could all the phone calls be answered? Who should answer the phones? How would the telephone answerer be trained for the task? What about followup, community resources, and funding? Through a series of meetings with representatives of other services in the community, the hospital established an advisory board to consider these questions. This committee still meets monthly to discuss policy issues and program needs.

Support for the program was obtained from the California Department of Health, the Rosenberg Foundation, and private donations. To man the telephones, persons were sought who could communicate easily with young people in an open and sensitive way, who were not easily put on the defensive, and who were not authoritarian or judgmental in their responses. Each applicant was interviewed independently by two professional members of the advisory board.

When the staff was selected and the service was ready for operation, four young people, with approval of the school authorities, distributed 10,000 cards calling attention to the Hotline to young people on the campuses of four local high schools. A local newspaper also carried a notice of the program.

The service operates every night of the week, including Sunday. The usual hours are from 6 p.m. to 12 midnight, but on Friday and Saturday nights the hours are extended until 2 a.m. At all times during the service hours, three staff members are on duty to answer calls on four incoming lines, which are linked to a rotary mechanism. The switchboard is also equipped to permit an incoming call to be transferred to consultants available in mental health, medicine, probation, religion, community resources, or law. In this way, a three-way conversation (or "patch-in") is possible when indicated by either an emergency situation or a staff member's wish to consult a specialist. The telephone numbers of several consultants in various fields of service are kept in the Hotline office, as well as the numbers of community agencies that serve as resources.

In addition, the clinic employs an answering service that takes messages from young people when they call outside regular hours. These calls are referred to members of the clinic staff during the day or members of the Hotline staff when they come on duty, and, if the situation seems urgent, a worker contacts the caller. Thus, 24-hour coverage is achieved.

The staff consists of 30 young persons, most of them in their 20's, who have various types of background. A number of them are graduate students in medicine, social work, or psychology. Working in teams of three persons per shift, they are paid $15 each for 6 hours of work. All staff members receive some preliminary training as well as training on the job. Before beginning work, each staff member attends two formal 3-hour sessions. Subjects discussed in these sessions include the youth culture, the drug and hippie scene, venereal disease, laws relating to juveniles, and community resources for providing help. The new staff members are helped to understand general principles of interviewing and of crisis intervention through role-playing and answering simulated telephone calls.

Training is a continuous process. All staff members attend regular meetings with the program's supervisors to learn techniques of dealing with callers, review the principles of the service, and discuss actual calls that raise questions or that exemplify problems for the staff. In addition, the training supervisors make periodic visits to staff members on duty to provide individual consultation.

At all times the caller's desire for anonymity is respected. He is not asked to give any information about himself. However, callers frequently describe themselves voluntarily in presenting their problems. The staff's approach to assisting callers is based upon a number of assumptions:

1. Those who call the service do so because they face some conflict or uncertainty that they have not yet been able to resolve on their own.

2. Effective resolutions of problems can only evolve out of the context of the individual's own experience.

3. Persons with problems benefit little, if at all, from direct advice, readymade solutions, or any kind of action that displaces responsibility.

4. Unconditional concern and respect for the caller, effectively communicated to him, are prerequisites for constructive interaction between the staff member and the caller.

A directory of community agencies—hospital, police, public health, and mental health—is kept on hand in the Hotline room at the hospital to help the staff refer the caller to the best place for securing the kind of help he needs. A catalogue of resource material, including information about frequent problems among teenagers and current fads in teenage language, is also kept there. Information on every call is recorded; all completed data forms are kept on file in sequence, and a separate file is kept for frequent callers.

CALLERS AND PROBLEMS

The data obtained from each call are coded and fed to a computer through the facilities of the Youth Study Center of the University of Southern California. We have recognized from the start that our attempts at evaluation will be limited by the anonymity of the callers, the program's emphasis on service rather than research, and the problems encountered in getting such a program under-

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[1] Joseph V. Lohman, G. Albert Wahl and Robert M. Carter. *The San Francisco Project*. Berkeley: University of California, April 1965.

way. Therefore, in analyzing the results of our first 3 months of operation, we addressed ourselves to two basic questions: Would adolescents use an emergency telephone service? What kinds of problems would they present?

The answer to the first question was a decided "yes." During its first 3 months of operation, the service received 1,071 calls from 872 persons—an average of 19 calls a day. The busiest times were on weekends when the average was 25 calls a day. The calls lasted from 1 minute to 3½ hours. The average duration was 20 minutes, but the most frequent duration was about 10 minutes.

No information is routinely requested during the Hotline calls. However, a great deal of data is frequently volunteered. Of the first 872 callers, 516 gave their age. They ranged in age from 13 to 35 years, but most of them were between the ages of 13 and 20. The average age was slightly over 17. It was 16.8 for females and 17.7 for males. There were nearly twice as many females as males—a ratio of 1.7 to 1.

In regard to our second question, the analysis showed that the callers had presented 31 different kinds of problems or requests. The most frequent by far were problems related to boy-girl relations (nearly 21 percent of the problems mentioned) and problems related to parental conflict (nearly 19 percent of all). Other problems frequently brought up by the callers related to drug use (nearly 7 percent of all), school (nearly 5 percent), social isolation (over 3 percent), social inhibition (3 percent), and pregnancy (3 percent). A scattering of miscellaneous problems comprised 27 percent of the problems or requests recorded.

Many of the calls were concerned with information only—about the Hotline itself (nearly 6 percent of the "problems" recorded) and with other types of information (over 3 percent). Some of the problems brought up by the callers were "put-ons" (3 percent).

The following brief illustrations show some of the specific problems that prompted young people to use the Hotline:

A 17-year-old youngster who had shot heroin and missed a vein was in a panic as to what to do. Through the "patch-in" service, he was able to talk directly to a physician, who assured him that he was not in immediate danger.

A 14-year-old girl who had run away from home wanted to know the legal implications of her action. Through the "patch-in," she was put in contact with a juvenile public defender who gave her the information she sought and discussed various alternatives with her.

A 19-year-old girl called in a panic because she thought she might be pregnant. Frantic at the prospect, she was alternately contemplating marriage, suicide, or abortion. She was referred to a local public health agency for a medical examination and pregnancy test. Later she called back to say that the examination had revealed that she was not pregnant.

A 14-year-old boy and his mother called in together on extension phones asking the Hotline operator to mediate a heated argument. After some discussion, they saw how ineffective it was for them to be talking to each other by phone from separate rooms when they could be talking out their differences face to face.

In instances of acute medical emergencies when the life of the caller may be at stake, as in contemplated or attempted suicide, efforts are made to find out the location of the called and to intercede.

CONCLUSIONS AND QUESTIONS

On the basis of our first year's operation of the Hotline, two facts stand out clearly:

1. Adolescents will use the emergency telephone service to discuss their personal problems in detail. We suspect that the main reasons why they do so is because of the anonymity it allows them and because the service is available to them immediately when a crisis occurs in their lives. The fact that the service is located in a hospital may also appeal to young people in trouble because of the objectivity, neutrality, and confidentiality traditionally associated with medical services. Another reason for the frequent use of the service may be that most social agencies that help people with interpersonal and social problems do not provide service in the evening or on weekends.

2. The types of problems for which adolescents use an emergency telephone service primarily relate to interpersonal relations, especially boy-girl problems and family conflicts.

Our experience to date has raised several questions that we are planning to explore:

Does the emergency telephone service reach young people who would not ordinarily seek help from existing community agencies?

Our impressions are that in some instances the Hotline may serve as young people's treatment for problems that are subclinical in nature, such as early predelinquent behavior or situational crises of adolescence that, if unresolved, might require professional therapeutic intervention. In other instances, the Hotline may help the young person identify his own needs and then direct him to the appropriate community resource for dealing with them.

Can an emergency telephone service to teenagers also serve as a listening post for learning about pressing problems in the teenage world?

Since the population served may include many persons not likely to use the resources of social agencies, the data generated by Hotline callers may provide more valid information on the kinds of problems that teenagers face today in large metropolitan communities than such agencies can provide. If so, such information would be of value in community planning for meeting the needs of teenagers.

How effective are our methods of dealing with the troubled teenagers who use the Hotline?

Impressions we have received from repeat calls (20 percent of the callers are repeaters) and unsolicited letters from callers suggest that the service may prove to be a valuable adjunct to other community resources for adolescents. We realize, however, that more precise information is needed to evaluate the effectiveness of our staff members' methods of helping teenagers cope with their problems and the utilization of the service by young people. Therefore, we are exploring several research techniques that promise to yield a more definitive answer to this question. We are now developing methods to analyze the interaction that takes place during calls and to relate the types of interaction noted to the results of the service as measured by follow-up reports requested of the caller and information received from the caller's school, family, and friends. Because the caller's anonymity and confidence must be respected, these approaches to evaluation cannot be made without the permission of the caller.

Is the emergency telephone service an effective training vehicle for professional persons in the health field?

Our use of graduate students to answer the incoming calls may indicate whether such experience is useful to students in developing skill in working with adolescents facing crises.

The Hotline Emergency Telephone Service represents an experiment in communicating with young people. The fact that so many people still in their teens have used the Hotline points to the need for services that reach out to adolescents who have problems without labeling them as problem adolescents. This response also suggests that the development of multipurpose youth centers patterned on the Hotline approach to the young might merit careful consideration. We know that the fragmentation of services often keeps people from using them. If our communities would provide centers where young people, merely by walking in, could get health supervision, personal counseling, job placement, legal aid, or recreation, according to their needs, many more young people might seek help for their problems before serious complications developed. Moreover, the communities might find that they had built effective two-way channels of communication between the "establishment" and the young.

A HOTLINE CONVERSATION

LISTENER. Hello, this is Hotline. My name is Linda. Can I help you?

CALLER. Well, I've been thinking lately that I'd like to try some "pot" (marijuana). Do you think I should?

LISTENER. I take it you're not so sure whether you want to or not?

CALLER. Well, I don't see what's wrong with it. All the other guys are; they've been taking it a long time.

LISTENER. How's it happened you've gone along this far without having tried it yet?

CALLER. I've thought about it a lot.

LISTENER. What are some things you've considered that make you hesitate?

CALLER. I read somewhere that you can get hooked or it could change my brain. What do you think?

LISTENER. Well, right now I'm wondering about other things you may have thought of that make you uneasy about trying it.

CALLER. Well, it seems like everybody's doing it and I want to be an individual.

LISTENER. Do you think it's real important to be an individual?

CALLER. Yea, like it's really hard not to do what everyone is doing. Do you know what I mean?

LISTENER. Yes, I think I do—like drugs, for example, seems like a lot of people are taking them and that this would be particularly difficult to stay away from—there could be a lot of pressure.

CALLER. What would you think if I told you I've already taken drugs?

LISTENER. Well, then I might wonder if this has been bothering you.

CALLER. Well, actually that's really why I called. Can you help me?

LISTENER. Do you mean you'd like to stop?

CALLER. Yea.

At this point, the listener asked the caller if he had tried to stop, and, if so, how. The reasons these attempts had failed were explored and other possible approaches were considered by the two of them together in an extended discussion between them.

FOLLOWUP STUDY OF RUNAWAY YOUTH SERVED BY THE BRIDGE

(By the Research Department, Community Health and Welfare Council of Hennepin County, Inc., February 1972)

PREFACE

The following report on runaway youth served by The Bridge constitutes the final evaluation of the experimental phase of the program by the Community Health and Welfare Council's research department and Runaway Youth Committee. Conclusions concerning effectiveness of the program's policies and evidence for continuance of The Bridge have been made with the approval of the Family and Child Welfare Committee; and thus, completes the Runaway Youth Committee's established planning objectives as designated in the original mandate.

Between the writing of this report and acceptance of the report by the Board of Directors of the Community Health and Welfare Council, The Bridge was incorporated as an agency independent of Catholic Welfare Services. The conclusions as drawn in this report only relate to the organizational structure of The Bridge, staff and characteristics of runaways admitted between February 1

and August 31, 1971; the report does not include information upon which to base an endorsement of the present auspices.

* * * * *

The bridge's functions

For many, the running is to protest the situation they were living in and hopefully bring to the attention of someone the necessity of resolving the problem either with their parents, themselves or society. The Bridge is especially designed for these youth who are running for help because of personal or family problems. Its primary therapy is "crisis counseling" which is designed to help redirect the runaway rather than necessarily resolving all of the detailed portions of his or her problem. Staff social workers serve as a liaison in this function. The following five functions have been established for The Bridge:

1. A temporary emergency shelter for those youth who want to quit running.

2. To provide an accepting, sensitive, stable environment or neutral ground at the fringe of society which gives the youth time to "cool off" and "put the brakes on" before making any commitment to leave their present residence.

3. Crisis counseling to help the youth perceive problems more clearly, phone or contact his or her parents, and involve the parents in the process of the youth returning home; thereby using the runaway crisis to help families evaluate the reasons for running and to suggest treatment plans and/or make referrals to appropriate social agencies.

4. To provide services to the youth who are already under the jurisdiction of an official agency in the community.

5. To find other appropriate shelter if the youth is not able or ready to return home.

The bridge's program

The Bridge has both a house management staff and a qualified family counselor. House staff consists of three day and two night house managers who serve on a twenty-four hour basis. The family counselor must: 1) process each youth admitted, 2) keep the resident staff aware of the youth's problems and 3) inform the youth that the staff must contact his or her parents within twenty-four hours. Volunteers are used to complement the fulltime staff.

To be served, the runaway youth must follow The Bridge's policies and cooperate in a prescribed treatment program. No force of any kind is used to keep the youth at the runaway house. If the youth gives the runaway counselor his or her parent's names the parents will be notified regardless of whether the youth decides to stay or not because the parents are probably anxious and concerned about their son or daughter's whereabouts.

The intake policy requires that there be two steps accomplished with each youth. First, that as much data as possible be gathered concerning the youth and family, especially the name and address of the parents so that they can be contacted. Secondly, the youth must be willing to be counseled with his or her parents and cooperate with the persons at The Bridge by abiding by all of the rules and regulations such as helping to prepare meals.

The crisis counseling includes the identification of the problem, a review of this problem with both youth and parents and a suggestion for treatment and possibly a referral to an appropriate social agency. The treatment program also includes small group counseling and a few recreational activities provided in the runaway house. When a youth is admitted, he is given any medical attention and care necessary.

Information about the youth comes from both the case records and the daily progress materials on the operation of the house. Within the records, both background materials and progress of the case at the house are available. In addition, there is a group log, a morning report and changes of shift conferences which allow communication among staff members about the individual youth. All of these serve as a means of coordinating information among the staff.

Purpose of the case records and follow-up

The Research Department of the Community Health and Welfare Council was asked by the Committee on Runaways to assist them in evaluating The Bridge during its experimental stage. Two means were employed to collect the necessary data for the evaluation—creation of case records and a follow-up study. The case record system was established at the opening of The Bridge in December of 1970 with three functions in mind: (1) to aid the staff in rendering effective and efficient services to the youth, (2) to collect administrative data for periodic progress reports, and (3) to develop a resource for obtaining more detailed descriptions of runaways as a whole than was previously possible.

Secondly, after sufficient time had elapsed, a follow-up study was conducted in order to acquire information on the status of the youth and the attitudes of the youth and parents towards the services received from The Bridge. This, together with selected variables from the case records, form a basis for determining the usefulness and importance of such a runaway house.

* * * * *

CHAPTER IV. CONCLUSIONS

The role of the bridge

It was concluded from the findings that The Bridge can be an important link in the provision of health and welfare services in the community. The information supports the need for a temporary emergency shelter for runaway youth who want to quit running. Most of the clients generally supported the counseling service but differed in their feelings about whether the youths or the parents should receive the benefit of the doubt. The information emphasized that only qualified counselors should counsel the youth and volunteers should remain in the less sensitive functions of the house's operation.

The bridge's effectiveness

In summary, a majority of the youth and their parents thought the operation of the house, the manner in which they were treated, the individual and group counseling, and the staff's referral of the family to other social agencies were services for which they thought The Bridge should be commended.

From the information gathered in the records and through the follow-up study, it is concluded that The Bridge has generally been correct in its assumptions about the type of person they want to serve and are prepared to serve coming to the house. This is particularly true for first-time runners. The staff's assumption that many of these first runners are acting out their need for help and desiring a solution to their difficulties with their parents has been largely proven correct. Consequently, it appears that The Bridge is more successful if the youth wants to stop running, and if the parents or other significant adults are able and willing to work out the problems. On the other hand, The Bridge is much less successful with youth who have little interest in returning to their family of origin, have committed criminal acts, or are already under the jurisdiction of an official agency. The Bridge is also unable to force parents to listen to the youth, discuss each other's feelings and to change enough to bring about constructive factors which will afford a positive relationship between the youth and adults. The Bridge also has no power to force a youth or family to receive help from the social service agencies or health services to whom they are referred by The Bridge. Thus, long-term resolution of the problem is greatly reduced.

* * * * *

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Description of runaways

1. Three-fifths of those admitted between February 1 and August 31, 1971 were females.

2. Fourteen and fifteen years olds were the most frequent guests in the house.

3. Most of the youths were white.

4. Over three-fifths of the youths came from homes in Hennepin County and approximately 95% came from Minnesota.

5. About 77% of the persons who came to The Bridge had been living with both parents and some brothers and sisters.

6. About 80% were first runners who had been running alone.

7. Over two-thirds of the youth expressed their problem in terms of parent-child relationships.

8. Over three-fourths of the youth admitted to The Bridge remained three days or less.

9. Almost 50% of the persons admitted to The Bridge were recorded as eventually going home. Of the approximately 23% who went back out on the streets, most of the girls responded to the questionnaire from home.

10. Over 71% of the youth who responded were living at home. Of the average it had been six or more months since they had left The Bridge.

11. The youths' recall of the problem which precipitated the run matched closely with The Bridge's case records.

12. Over 60% of the youth and parents combined stated that their primary problem had improved and approximately 15% said it was resolved. Most of the other youths and parents said there was no improvement.

13. All of the cases of alcoholic parents, the youth's emotional instability and/or use of drugs were improved; 75% of the communication and cooperation problems were improved or resolved; all of the youth with school or racial problems felt their problem had remained the same, and two-thirds of the youth whose behavior was disapproved of by the parents thought the problem had remained the same or gotten worse.

14. Approximately 54% of those families which could be contacted by mail have been referred to a health or welfare service by The Bridge. About 71% actually contacted the agency after leaving The Bridge.

B. Youths' opinions of services received from The Bridge

1. In general, those youths who returned the questionnaire were more positive and better informed about The Bridge than the parents.

2. Most of the youth who returned the questionnaire saw almost no realistic alternative to The Bridge except returning home or receiving help to acquire some other stable living arrangement under adult supervision.

3. About 86% of the youth rated The Bridge as "excellent" or "good" and 93% felt The Bridge had given them some kind of help.

4. The youths were most complimentary with regard to the *manner* in which The Bridge helped with the problem and treated the youth.

5. About 83% of the youths rated The Bridge more highly than the services they received later from other health and welfare programs.

6. Over half of the youths' suggestions related to new services at The Bridge and improving operational procedures. The other suggestions fall into the areas of recommending new facilities or additional specialized staff.

C. Parents' opinions of services received from the bridge

1. The services at The Bridge which seemed the most important to the parents were: counseling, sheltering, informing parents and referral to the other agencies.

2. In general, the parents rated The Bridge's service slightly lower than the youths. They also tended to report receiving services in more structured social service settings which a few parents rated higher than The Bridge's services.

3. Most of the parents' comments when asked for suggestions concerning new services at The Bridge were general compliments or criticisms of the current services. Of those who made specific suggestions, they were primarily concerned with improvements in counseling and referrals.

D. Conclusions

1. From the information available, The Bridge seems to have been a successful demonstration project and should be continued on a permanent basis.

2. There seems to be a sufficient number of runaways coming to The Bridge to warrant the operation to continue at this address.

3. The primary functions and program have generally remained close to the original design and appear to be what many runaway youth need as a link back to a stable living arrangement.

4. The intake policy and house rules seem to have been functional to the program and especially effective with youth who want to quit running.

TESTIMONY OF DONALD F. MUHICH, M.D.

This testimony will speak to the following topics:

(1) The history of the Hotline development;

(2) The theoretical background of the Hotline approach;

(3) The directions Hotlines are taking;

(4) The relationship to other service delivery systems;

(5) Current and future needs of Hotlines.

Hotlines—by which I mean crisis counseling by telephone—had their origin with the opening of a telephone service at Childrens Hospital of Los Angeles on April 1, 1968. However, for the beginning one must go back one year prior to that date. The service actually began with the formation of a multidisciplinary advisory group with the precise intent of developing a crisis counseling service available to youth under 25 years of age using the telephone as the exclusive contact instrument. This service was conceived as a crisis intervention resource wherein an understanding, sympathetic, yet objective listener would be as immediately available as the nearest telephone.

The idea of such a service grew out of an awareness by the staff of the Adolescent Unit at Childrens Hospital of Los Angeles that an increasing number of youth seemed alienated from the society and that they seemed to lack adequate avenues of communication to helping resources during stress. Dr. Dale Garell specifically was instrumental to this recognition and to the assembling of the advisory group which developed the first Hotline.

The causative elements which lead to the large number of alienated youth will not be commented upon extensively here. The major forces, however, are thought to be:

(1) Increasing social and cultural change rate;

(2) Increasing geographic and social mobility;

(3) Prolongation of adolescence with attendant absence of a valued social role;

(4) Further deterioration of the nuclear family;

(5) Increasing urban complexity.

In response to the perceived alienation, the advisory group designed a program and called it Hotline. Perhaps the most unique and crucial features of the resource are its immediate availability and respect for the anonymity of the caller. The approach utilized is not one which presumes traditional professional training in psychotherapy or counseling on the part of those who answer the calls. Rather, it is based on the concept of "creative listening" and underpinned by a warm and human regard for others and a special awareness of and sensitivity to the world of young people.

The service at Childrens Hospital has been averaging over 15,000 calls a year and while the precise impact of the program remains unclear, the continually increasing use of the service would seem of some significance.

DEFINITION OF HOTLINE

In review then, the major provisions of the Hotline concept are as follows:

(1) Immediate availability so that assistance is timed to the "reaching out";

(2) An open door policy meant to serve people with problems rather than problems with people attached:

(3) The recognition of the need for help rests with the adolescent himself rather than being the inspiration of others, the latter often fuel for resistance;

(4) Respect for the anonymity of the caller so that he's free to test our doubts about himself with immunity as well as the trustworthiness of the listener; and

(5) An approach reinforcing notions of strength in the individual rather than weakness or dependency, by mobilizing the caller's resources toward effective problem solving.

The Hotline at Childrens Hospital after its inception had a rapid growth spurt and as it became known spawned an unknown number of other telephone services. It is thought that there are more than 500 Hotlines currently operating in the United States. These services cover a broad and varied spectrum of specialty, generalized, youth and adult programs. Services vary from program to program, some just referral services but most following the crisis intervention model which I will describe later.

The problems which appear at the Hotline interface are equally broad and varied. A majority, however, are from youth in crisis. Most frequently are crises concerning peers, parents, and drugs. These three categories comprise about half of all calls. The remainder are problems with various subsystems; work, housing, isolation, loss of psychological control, suicide, etc. In this regard may I remind you that serious increases in suicide rate are a current American phenomenon. The suicide rate in males age 10–19 has tripled between 1960 and 1970. In females 10–19, an even more pronounced increase has occurred during this period (from .04 to 8.0/100,000). Similar multiplication of suicide rates has occurred in the 20-29 year age group. Our society clearly has a problem in this area—a problem which is by no means currently solved.

The approach of Hotlines to the problems presented rests soundly on crisis intervention theory which is dealt with next.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE

A focal aspect of the Hotline service is the approach followed in assisting the young people who call. This approach rests on a number of key assumptions related to the nature of crisis, to their resolution and to adolescence in general. There is nothing new here—simply the choice of one particular set of biases over others that might be followed in trying to assist young people as they grapple with difficult problems.

The crisis model adopted follows closely the precepts of General Systems Theory in a fashion similiar to that of Caplan in his considerations of preventive psychiatry. Within this framework, a crisis is viewed as an upset or disequilibrium in an individual's efforts to organize experience such that it's reasonably predictable and need-fulfilling. A crisis is experienced when one is faced with a problematic situation which, for the moment at least, appears both insolvable and inescapable. Insolvable in the light of perceived limitations in coping resources; inescapable insofar as important needs are at stake. The usual situation is one in which needs conflict—the satisfaction of one precluding the satisfaction of the other.

Inevitably, crisis will be resolved in one way or another if only to eliminate the unpleasant accompaniments of being "off-balance": tension, anxiety, cognitive disorientation increase the longer a resolution is delayed. The manner in which a crisis is resolved is considered crucial for on-going adjustment. It can represent a significant gain in adaptability—in mental health—by virtue of an enhancement of the individual's problem solving resources. In this case, the person emerges from the crisis a more effective human being than he was beforehand. He is prepared to face adaptively a wider range of experience and thereby allow himself the opportunity for further growth and enrichment.

On the other hand, the outcome of a crisis resolution could mean the addition of maladaptive coping styles, i.e., patterns of response which, in effect, represent a lessened capacity to deal with novel experiences and thus an increased vulnerability to breakdown in the future. This would be the case, for example, if one has chosen to avoid the problem or to manipulate reality in fantasy or to escape reality pressures through alienation or through the use of drugs.

Thus, the crisis represents a rather important fork in the road—moments of truth, as it were. On the one hand, an opportunity to move further along towards self-mastery and fulfillment; on the other, the chance of a significant setback that, at the very least, will require the retracing of steps. The issue, then, is two-fold: how to capitalize on the crisis experience recognizing its potential for growth; and secondly, how to avoid panicking into a dead-end. These two components are clearly not independent. However, it would seem we most often overlook the opportunity implicit in the crisis while attending primarily to the preventive aspect. This is, perhaps, no more conspicuously evident than in the manner in which we customarily approach the "problem" of drug abuse. Hotline is intent on exploring ways that enable at least as much as underlining ways that do not.

The forces brought to bear on the decision making processes determining the choice of strategy for crisis resolution include a variety of predispositions which the individual brings to the event. These include his background of coping experiences, his current ego strength, special meanings associated with the present problematic situation as derived from previous experience, and so on. An additional source of significant influence can be that which is forthcoming from the interaction of the individual with "significant others" in his psychosocial environment. In fact, it is assumed that as the crisis intensifies (i.e., continues without resolution) the crisis-bearer will be increasingly prone to turn to others for assistance. This is regarded as no less true of the adolescent than of an adult or young child. It is further assumed that to the extent the intervention (outside assistance) is well-timed—that is, geared to the individual's "reaching out"—optimal benefit is approached and effort minimized.

In setting up the Hotline service one of the primary considerations was that of providing the means whereby the need for the immediate availability of an outside assistant could be met. Such provision is considered particularly important for the adolescent because of the characteristic instability of forces—the rather delicate balance that prevails generally, let alone during crisis pe-

riods, that tends to force impulsive action. Underlying the notion that a Hotline was needed was, in part, the observation that the condition of immediate availability was not being met for many young people by the "significant others" within their own world, not to mention the traditional care-giving agencies with waiting lists, eligibility mazes and limited hours.

In addition to "timing" there are other conditions assumed prerequisite to the opportunity for intervention, particularly with the adolescent. There is the question of whether or not the individual will avail himself of the outside help even if the latter is available when needed. There seem to be any number of factors that could stop the process short. For example, certain pre-conceived notions as to how the outsider will interact once disclosures are made. Fears of rejection, of ridicule, of pre-judgment are mixed in with the images that a youngster may have of the "significant others" in his world and these kinds of expectations obviously interfere with his seeking their assistance.

One is reminded here of how important a role the business of imagery plays in the adolescent faced with the prospect of seeing a psychiatrist or psychologist. It is rare that adolescents greet this news with enthusiasm and it seems to have to do with the connotations that come to mind. To be sure, one doesn't have to be crazy to see a psychiatrist but this kind of objectivity may not come easily to the adolescent fighting his fears of insanity, a fairly typical preoccupation it would seem.

This argument can be extended beyond the psychiatrist to the traditionally conceived caregiving agencies that most communities provide. The question again is how available, in effect, are these resources when their services are defined in terms of a specific problem as opposed to simply seeing people who are troubled by this or that. One suspects that many adolescents at least are "turned off" by the connotations of the label, even assuming they are somehow able to so pinpoint the problem that they are clear on what line to stand in.

The most troublesome connotation of being labeled a problem, particularly for the adolescent who is struggling to prove to himself, let alone to others, that he shows promise of becoming an adult, is probably that which to him at least implies weakness, inadequacy, inferiority and the like. All of this amounts, in effect, to saying that the individual is incapable of being responsible for his own life and, thus, that it must be taken out of his hands. Hopefully this is not necessarily what happens once the helping process gets started. However, it appears to be a frequent expectation on the part of adolescents and as such to promote considerable resistance to "reaching out" at all.

Added, then, to the list of conditions essential of effective intervention can be possible is a kind of "no strings" message. Assistance is standing by when the need is felt to reach out and there are no strings attached to the assistant's participation in one's struggles and concerns. The assistant is here to listen, to hear one out and to collaborate in problem solving. Anonymity is respected so that doubts may be tested with immunity.

A final key assumption underlying Hotline's approach relates to what constitutes help once a person has reached out and made contact. If the conditions of timing and unconditional regard have been met, the major thrust of the helping relationship is that of mobilizing the individual's resources toward effective problem solving rather than rendering advice or in other ways taking over. If the crisis experience is to yield dividends in terms of growth, the individual must be afforded the opportunity of continued involvement in working through the problem. The task of the outside assistant then is not prescriptive but rather one of provoking inquiry; of setting up an atmospsere in which the individual is prompted to examine what he's experiencing, to reconsider his opinions about himself and his relationships and to become aware of alternative pathways in meeting the challenge he faces. The outcome of this kind of experience is two-fold: (1) the individual's ego strength is enhanced because he discovers a capacity to be responsibly involved in matters of personal significance; and (2) emergent strategies or solutions are most likely to be implemented because they have meaningful anchorage in the individual's own perceptual world. In short, the goal is to counter the tendency to rely on external agents of change and through the very process of interaction itself allow for an experience in self-direction. It is assumed that this kind of opportunity will have significance beyond the resolution of the immediate crisis.

The tasks of the outside assistant, as conceived above requires considerable discipline, skill and effort. To collaborate in the sense intended here implies understanding as fully as possible how the crisis-bearer views his situation. To gain this kind of understanding requires listening in the true sense: Being completely engrossed in what is being said without imposing value judgments, without comparing, without translating what is being said into the terms of one's own experience. Hotline's monthly training sessions are devoted in large part to "listening workshops"; a continual effort is necessary to overcome old patterns of not listening.

It is assumed that through the very act of clarifying the crisis (on the part of both the assistant and crisis-bearer) much of the "working through" is achieved. Such understanding obviously requires an atmosphere of honest self-disclosure and a mutuality of intent on the part of the parties involved that carries no vestige of prejudgement.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Telephone counseling services in addition to expanding in number have also participated in the development experienced by any new service system. In recent years Hotlines have begun to develop quality control standards and a system of ethics necessary for such a system. This process has not been an easy one because the anonymity of the listener and caller has made the evaluation of phone services difficult. In spite of this lack of clear evaluative feedback, Hotlines like similarly non-feedback systems, have tried to separate highly effective systems from others. This standardization of program has produced some internal conflicts as all quality control programs in the humanitarian service systems seem to do. The conscientious management of most Hotlines has persevered in this endeavor. Therefore, this evaluation must be anecdotal or testimonial in character. The evaluation effort has met considerable resistance and needs to be pursued.

Along with the search for quality control, Hotlines have expanded the services that they render to include walk-in, referral, out-reach, residential, and advocate services in some areas. All of these services seem to be needs of the Hotline constituency. The development of individual Hotlines has varied with the institutional base, the clearness of mission, and the organizational integrity of the program.

In the expansion to other program services, it became apparent that Hotline had a coordination role which was not currently being fulfilled among not only established agencies but also among alternate culture delivery systems such as free clinics, runaway houses, and switchboards. These other programs which grew up concomitantly in relationship to the same alienated youth groups have gradually become integrated with telephone services with the latter being the coordinating agent.

The estimated one million yearly teenage runaways, the millions of alternative culture youth, and a variety of other youth subcultures all look to this service delivery system as the major force in solving the human crises that their members experience. The future will see expansion of all these programs with Hotlines as the leading and coordinating agency.

NEEDS

Most Hotline programs as other alternate culture service systems have and will continue to have severe operational problems. These problems are characterized by lacks in the areas of institutional connectedness, organizational longevity, adequate funding, technical ability and managerial competence. One sees a variegated vista if one examines programs around the country. If there is a single most crucial need in the programs being discussed, it is the need to get adequate human and capital resources to provide stability in the areas already mentioned. The instability of purely volunteer programs, the lack of technical assistance and the absence of competent full-time management have conspired to destroy basically sound initial programs repeatedly.

We at Childrens Hospital of Los Angeles have had the blessing and support of a sound institution with a multiplicity of technical, managerial, and capital resources. We would urge the development of such resources at the federal level to give adequate and continuing support to less advantageously positioned efforts. The need for not only expansion but for continuing staff and program support is crucial to maintain and further develop this non-duplicated service resource. The problems of youth in our society are legion and will not be dealt with by less than our best effort.

SENATE HEARINGS ON HOTLINES, JUNE 17, 1972

I. BACKGROUND ON KENNETH BEITLER, DIRECTOR OF THE EXCHANGE

Local:

Founder and former Director of Youth Emergency Service (YES).

Member of the Advisory Board of the Community Information and Referral Service of Hennepin County.

National:

Keynote speaker for the Second International Hotline Conference in May 1971, at Pacific Grove, California.

Resource person for the National United Way Study Committee on Information and Referral Service, held in Alexandria, Virginia in March 1972.

Director of Midwest Hotline Conference held in Minneapolis on March 17–19, 1972.

Conference Director, Third International Hotline Conference, Northfield, Minnesota, June 22–25, 1972.

II. BACKGROUND ON THE NATIONAL HOTLINE AND SWITCHBOARD EXCHANGE, INC.

The National Hotline and Switchboard Exchange is the central clearinghouse for information on hotlines, switchboards, and other youth oriented crisis centers. Among the materials published by the Exchange are:

1. "The Exchange," a monthly newsletter, is mailed to over 1,500 hotlines, switchboards, and interested individuals. Each issue of "The Exchange" lists conferences seminars, whom to write to for training manuals, general interest items, and guest editorials and articles. The subscription fee for one year is $6.00.

2. The *National Directory of Hotlines, Switchboard, and Related Services* is published twice each year. The next edition will be published on July 1st, 1971. Copies are available for $2.00 each.

III. NATIONAL OVERVIEW OF HOTLINES, SWITCHBOARDS, AND RELATED YOUTH CRISIS CENTERS

A History:

1. Beginning with the first suicide prevention center in Los Angeles in the early 1960's using carefully trained volunteers to perform

"crisis intervention by telephone" has spread across the country.

2. The first *hotline* telephone center was started in Los Angeles in 1968. Operated as a project of the Division of Adolescent Medicine of Children's Hospital, this model uses highly trained "listeners," with professional back-up and referral help available to the caller.

3. *Switchboards* first started in San Francisco in the Summer of 1967 as a response to the massive influx of youth into the Haight-Ashbury area. The switchboard model is that of a loosely structured telephone service, offering information and some referrals for the community in which it is located. Its staff may have little formal training, and will probably be from the community being served.

B. Growth of Programs:

1. By August of 1970 there were at least 73 hotlines and other telephone crisis services for youth, not including suicide prevention centers.

2. By April of 1971, the number had grown to at least 378, with at least one hotline in every state in the country.

3. By June, 1972, this number *had grown to 656*, despite the fact that last year nearly 85 hotlines closed due to lack of funds, volunteers, community support, or other factors.

C. Related Youth Crisis Centers:

1. Many communities have other types of youth crisis centers that include crisis lines as a small part of their operation. Drop-in centers, drug help centers, free clinics, and other youth oriented programs may offer a crisis line to the community.

2. In addition nationally, there are over 62 Runaway programs which crisis intervention counseling to young people and their families.

3. In many communities the United Fund sponsors an Information and Referral Service, which although serving the entire community, does offer help to young people. There are more than 85 Information and Referral Centers in the country.

D. Staff and Management:

1. The *sponsor* varies from state to state, program to program. In New York state, the sponsor is many times the local Narcotic Guidance Council, while in Maryland some programs are sponsored by local mental health centers. In a few cases the Red Cross, or YMCA sponsors such a program. However, the majority of hotlines are set up as private non-profit corporations, with an independent Board of Directors.

2. The volunteer *staff* of each program is as varied as the community it serves.

3. The *training* for each program also varies, for in some programs there is as much as 60–80 hours of formal training, while in other programs the training is minimal. This difference is due to the fact that the goals or purpose of each program are different, and that the types of calls, and their seriousness varies from center to center.

4. All hotlines make use of extensive lists of *referral resources* who serve as volunteer back-up help as needed. Clergymen, lawyers, school counselors, and doctors serve as referral resources.

5. The *annual budget* will include phone, rent (usually donated), publicity and administrative salaries, such salaries being necessary for all centers.

IV. SUMMARY OF HOTLINES IN MINNESOTA

A. The first hotline in Minnesota was Youth Emergency Service, YES, which was started in Minneapolis in May of 1969. (Both the Suicide prevention center, and the Community Information and Referral Center are older than YES, but do not exclusively serve youth.)

B. At present there are 19 services in Minnesota, primarily located in towns which have either a college or junior college. Although a couple of programs are actually sponsored by a college, most are sponsored and funded privately in each community. At present, there is no state wide network or other attempt at co-ordination.

V. DOCUMENTATION OF NEEDS—SEE ATTACHED SHEET

VI. POSSIBLE FEDERAL ROLE

A. Help In Building Credibility:

Many services, especially those in small town and rural areas, have a hard time winning community support, more so with adults than with the young people to be served. Yet adult support for funding, for professional resources, etc. is very important to the long term success of a program.

Credibility building can be in the form of speeches, press releases, research grants, or articles in various federal journals, possible within H.E.W., NIMH, ACTION, etc.

B. Funding:

Because hotlines are new, respond to many needs, and not just drug problems, they don't fit into existing funding patterns. Yet, financial stability is important if a program is to deliver quality care.

Hopefully a temporary funding mechanism could be established within H.E.W., or some similar agency. Such a funding mechanism would provide small amounts ($5,000–$10,000) of matching funds through a simplified grant proceeds. Young people should be involved in this process.

C. Utilization of Data:

Hotlines and similar programs both provide service and gather data on unmet community needs. This information should be included in any comprehensive health care planning that goes on at the federal, state, or local level. H.E.W. guidelines and planning should utilize data collected from non-traditional sources, such as hotlines.

VII. CONCLUSION

Hotlines and other crisis centers, are at best a temporary response to a deeper problem. It is as if the entire country was experiencing a "nervous breakdown" and taking all of us with it.

It is as if each local hotline is up against tremendous odds. Everyday there are the constant reminders: the war in Vietnam goes on, pollution, politicians that play to the fears and prejudices of many, unemployment that takes its worst toll upon the young, the returned veteran, and on and on.

It is no wonder then that so many young people find our present educational system meaningless, old life styles irrelevant, and the future bleak.

So maybe, just maybe, more than hotlines and crisis centers, we need to take a look at the major institutions, and ask that they change to meet the needs of the people, and not vice-versa.

HOTLINES—AVERAGE NUMBER OF CALLS PER MONTH

Name of program, city, State	Number calls per month
National:	
Community Crisis Center, Atlanta, Ga	1,000
The Connection, Denver, Colo	1,000
The Help Center, College Park, Md	3,100
Switchboard of Miami, Miami, Fla	3,200
621-CARE, Cincinnati, Ohio	6,000
Contact Little Rock, Little Rock, Ark	600
Hotline for Youth, Kansas City, Kans	1,475
HEAD and NOSE, New Orleans, La	2,000
Portland Hotline, Portland, Oreg	2,291
Local:	
Youth Emergency Service, Austin, Minn	224
People's Center, Duluth, Minn	75
Campus Assistance Center, Minneapolis, Minn	1,600
Community Information and Referral, Minneapolis, Minn	1,3
Emergency Social Service, Minneapolis, Minn	990
Youth Emergency Service, Minneapolis, Minn	5,000
Hotline, Moorhead, Minn	120
Mountain, St. Cloud, Minn	600
Pooneil Corner, St. Paul, Minn	1,000

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH

(NOTE.—Delivered Saturday, June 17, 1972, Library, Metropolitan State Junior College, 1419 Harmon Place, Minneapolis, Minnesota. From: David Hvistendahl, General Coordinator, Youth Emergency Service for Rice County, Inc., 402 Division Street, Northfield, Minnesota 55057.)

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to impart to you my thoughts on "hotline" programs.

Youth Emergency Service (Y.E.S.) has been in operation in Rice County, a predominantly rural county with a population of 41,500, for the past year and a half. Y.E.S. has helped over 3,000 callers with problems ranging from suicidal thoughts to lacking a babysitter on Friday night.

Faribault is the largest city in the county with a population of 16,500. Our office is located in Northfield, a college town with a population of 10,000. Y.E.S. reaches out to the whole county by accepting collect calls from anywhere in the county.

We were fortunate while setting up the Y.E.S. program to receive "seed" funding from the Office of Economic Opportunity's Youth Development Program. The federal funding, received through the Goodhue, Rice, Wabasha Citizens' Action Council, is responsible for the program's longevity. (Most hotlines, I understand, fail to survive more than a year due to chronic funding shortages.) The initial goals of the program were to provide anonymous, non-directive counseling for drug problems, relationship problems, and unwanted pregnancies among teenagers and referrals to professional people and agencies for low-cost medical, legal, and counseling aid.

The Y.E.S. program has expanded and changed rapidly as the needs of the communities we serve have changed. We now handle more employment problems than drug problems, offer family counseling and assistance with housing problems.

Most of the work we do on the hotline and in the walk-in center consists of applying "band-aids"; the real hope for alleviating the social and personal problems we deal with lies in education. Two of our three full-time staff members spend much of their time during the school year putting on educational programs in the junior highs and high schools in the county on drug abuse, venereal disease, and other social problems.

The Y.E.S. annual budget, including salaries for three full-time staff members (two of whom have degrees in counseling), is about $15,000. One-third of the budget is donated by the communities served. The success of the program, however, is due to the dedication of college students and other young people who have volunteered thousands of hours of their time to keep the switchboard open 17 hours a day, seven days a week.

Hotlines have four major advantages as a model for community service programs. First, hotlines can be flexible in the types of services offered to meet the changing needs of the community. Most hotlines have ongoing training programs, so the staff can receive training to cope with new problems as they arise. The information and referral files in most hotline offices are also set up to accommodate frequent changes in content.

Second, low-cost hotline programs improve the efficiency of other existing agencies and programs by helping the individual go to the right place with a particular problem. In that regard, hotlines serve as a clearinghouse for human resources for the community.

Third, by relying upon volunteer help it is feasible for hotlines to offer crisis intervention and other services during more hours than professionally-staffed programs. Some people also find it emotionally easier to

anonymously contact a nonprofessional hotline counselor that a professional counselor with impressive degrees and fees.

Finally, hotlines can overcome transportation problems endemic to community service programs in small-town and rural areas. Hotlines can efficiently serve a large area with a low population base by relying upon telephone contacts.

The future of Y.E.S. is uncertain. Our federal funding terminates January 1, 1973. However, we are fairly confident that we will be able to raise enough funds from the communities to keep part or all of our program in operation. Had we never received federal funding, we would never have had the opportunity to build the public confidence in the Y.E.S. program, and become a community-funded project.

SENATE HEARING ON HOTLINES, JUNE 17, 1972

(NOTE.—Pooneil Corner, 359 Oneida Street, Saint Paul, Minnesota 55102. Frank Capriotti, Former Director of Pooneil Corner: B.A. in Psychology, Macalester College, St. Paul, Minnesota; One of the founders and former Director of Pooneil Corner; Consultant and training workshop leader for various Hotline programs including HOPE, Face to Face Crisis Center, Sunrise Hotline; Assistant Conference Director, Third International Hotline Conference, Northfield, Minnesota June 22–25, 1972; and Seminar Leader for the Midwest Hotline Conference in Minneapolis, March 17–19, 1972.)

WHAT IS POONEIL CORNER?

Pooneil Corner is a Telephone crisis intervention, information and referral service, commonly referred to as a "Hotline". At present Pooneil receives approximately 1,000–1,200 calls per month. The concept of Pooneil Corner is that of a closely knit community of phone volunteers reaching out to a greater community, that being the greater St. Paul community. Each volunteer attempts to help the caller out in whatever way he/she can. This may be by talking to the caller, attempting to aid the caller in identifing and sorting out his/her feelings and accepting these feelings as being O.K. feelings to have. Then the volunteer will attempt to work with the caller in looking at all of the alternatives the caller has to the crisis situation. A crisis situation is defined as any time in a person's life in which he/she is having difficulty dealing with a situation, decision or anything else.) In looking at the alternatives to the problem the volunteer may inform the caller of one or more of Pooneil's over 400 professional resources.

WHY A POONEIL CORNER?

A group of Macalester College students, several of whom were majoring in Psychology, began meeting in late 1969 to try to see if something could be done to aid the Macalester College Student Community in dealing with it's problems. It was felt that some form of Helpline may give temporary help to the students and then perhaps the causes of some of these stressful or crisis situations could be better understood and dealt with. After looking at several existing Hotlines, including Youth Emergency Service in Minneapolis, it was decided that The Listening Ear in East Lansing, Michigan would be asked to help set up this line. The name Pooneil Corner was taken from a song by the Jefferson Airplane, a popular rock group, and the telephone lines were opened on March 13, 1970. After several months, knowledge of Poonell's existence had reached many people in St. Paul. It was then decided that there was a need for a phone service that included more people in the St. Paul area, and Pooneil expanded it's service to all of St. Paul.

WHAT IS HOLDING POONEIL CORNER BACK?

It seems to be an inherent problem of a phone service that you have to expend almost as much energy proving that you are worthwhile to obtain funding, as you spend actually helping the people that call in. Another problem is staffing the phones, a telephone volunteer seems to be a very transient person. Approximately 80–100 hours over one and one-half months are spent training the volunteer to work on the telephones at Pooneil. The volunteer usually stays for two to three months longer, this means that a lot of time and energy has to be spent constantly attempting to maintain a trained staff. The third area which seems to be holding Pooneil back is the constant up-dating required to maintain an accurate file of resources, all 400 must be checked each month to see if the hours, address, etc. are accurate.

HOW CAN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HELP POONEIL CORNER AND OTHER HOTLINES?

By providing access to funding. This could be either by making funds easily available or providing funding consultation services to aid the Hotline in obtaining funds.

By aiding Hotlines in building credibility. The Hotlines have a good amount of credibility wth the people that they serve, but credibility building is needed with the more established sectors of the population. This could be done perhaps through grants, legislation, subcommittee hearings such as this, or other such things.

IN CONCLUSION

I feel that Hotlines are a very necessary and much needed safety valve for our society. But care must be taken to remember that they are only providing temporary help for problems which are caused by greater stresses than hassles at home with one's parents. There seems to be a connection with these problems and many of the social issues of the day. Hotlines are only the first step, the step which identifies the fact that something is wrong. I feel that Hotlines should be looked at in this broader spectrum.

ALTERNATIVES TO EXISTING YOUTH SERVICES PROGRAMS, SUBMITTED TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH, BY SUSAN L. KREMER, YOUTH EMERGENCY SERVICE, MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., JUNE 17, 1972

As an introduction to my statement, I will briefly outline my background and present involvement in youth services programs. I graduated from Mankato State College last Spring with B.S. degree in Social Work and Corrections. While in Mankato, I was very active in setting up and administering alternative youth services programs. I worked with many other people in organizing Mankato's Youth Emergency Service (YES). I became director of this program. Because Mankato did not have adequate facilities to deal with people using and abusing drugs, I worked with some people to set up a drug drop-in center. Along with this I was doing abortion-pregnancy counseling with women who were having hassles because they were pregnant at a time in which they did not want to be pregnant. I was also active on a variety of community based boards and committees in an attempt to bridge misinformation and misunderstanding between the community, parents, and young people.

After graduating from Mankato State College, I decided to go to graduate school in Social Work at the University of Minnesota. I will graduate next spring with a M.S.W. degree. Last fall I was elected President of the Student Association of Social Workers. This organization is designed to act as a vehicle for change within the School of Social Work. I am currently working with the Youth Emergency Services (YES) in Minneapolis as a board of Directors member, a shift supervisor and a phone volunteer. This summer I will be working as a street worker in the West Bank and Dinkytown areas surrounding the University of Minnesota campuses.

Throughout my experiences in traditional and non-traditional social agencies, I have become increasingly aware of the gaps between the needs of the people and the services available to respond to the wide range of needs that people have. I have had experience working with a wde range of "straight" agencies and it is my opinion that the policies and structures that operate in these agencies often inhibit and defeat the goals of the agencies in terms of adequately responding to the needs of the people. Because of my disillusionment & impotence in radically changing these systems, I became involved with "alternative" agencies. It is my opinion that alternative street agencies can fill many of the gaps that exist in social services. The use of volunteer staffs, flexible hours, and alternatives to traditional treatment models have had an impact in terms of filling some of the gaps that presently exist.

However, even alternative agencies must become bureaucratized and structured. As problems of funding, staffing, etc. arise, street agencies must become "established" in their own way in an attempt to deal with the hassles inherent in their programs. And again, there are gaps in the service provided and the needs that people have. Perhaps before I explain my recommendations for possible ways this situation can be changed, I will share some of the insights I have gained concerning youth services from the people I talk with on the street as a street worker.

Many of the people I talk with on the street are looking for alternative ways to live. Generally, they are disillusioned with "middle America" and the inherent gaps between the idealist goals of our society and the reality of this society. In reaction to this, they have committed themselves to alternative ways of life on a philosophical level. In many cases, the kids are incredibly idealistic, angry, and sometimes lost. Although they seem to have made philosophical commitment to a way of life, they are often not equipped with the basics of how to survive in the lifestyle they have chosen. Often they seem to be caught in the middle of two lifestyles; the middle class lifestyle of their parents on one end, and the idealistic "peace-love" hip style on the other end. One lifestyle they have rejected, the other lifestyle is too idealistic to be easily realized.

Apart from the inherent value conflicts one must deal with in this situation, the kids must also deal with situations involving drugs, sex, communal living, etc. Trying to develop a new lifestyle presents many problems and concerns for the kids. Because a person splits to the West Bank and becomes a "hippie" does not mean that 15–18 years of being influenced and conditioned by "middle America" can easily be ignored.

There are a variety of social agencies on the West Bank that are designed to be available if the kids choose to use them to work out some of their hassles. These agencies have flexible hours, volunteers, long haired staffs, and are generally free for the asking. It is difficult to exactly determine the reasons but I am finding out that many people are not using these services. It is my opinion that regardless of the nature of the services offered, they are still offered within the context of an agency and one must still present one's self to the agency, thereby admitting one is having hassles. Somehow, for the kids in this situation to admit that part of the "counter culture" is creating a problem for them is to break norms of the "counter-culure." Somehow, it is to admit that part of one's "middle America" background is in conflict with one's hip, new lifestyle. When a person, even on a philosophical level, has rejected this value system, it is difficult to get in touch with hassles that may indicate to the person that he/she may not be as well integrated into the hip, West Bank "culture" as they would like to be.

This apparent situation concerns me, and

although I personally am very committed to alternative youth services and the variety of services that are provided, I am reaching a point where I see a great need for alternatives to the alternative street agencies. The following are my recommendations which may help to decrease the gaps between the young people and the services which are provided:

1. Governmental funding with less rigid "strings attached" which may encourage a broader base of programs which do not have to be so totally concerned with basic survival, thus freeing the program up to try out creative, innovative approaches in delivery of services.

2. Encouragement of non-crisis oriented programs designed to direct the talents and creativity of people looking for viable alternative lifestyles.

3. Development of youth advocacy centers and/or clearinghouses in Washington, D.C. that will act as a place where people can find out about key people funding in the government.

4. Additional funding to programs that are into training people that want to work with young people (free schools, medical programs, etc.)

By Mr. COOPER:

S. 3910. A bill to reduce sedimentation from land-disturbing activities consistent with applicable water quality standards. Referred to the Committee on Public Works.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I introduce for appropriate reference an administration bill entitled the Sediment Control Act. The bill was proposed by the administration through the Environmental Protection Agency. It represents another good initiative by the administration in the environmental field.

We have considered that the problems of sediment relating to water pollution would be adequately reached through the Federal Water Pollution Control Act amendments. However, as the bill is still in conference, I thought it appropriate to introduce the bill. It will assist the conferees in determining if the House and Senate have adequately provided for sediment control in the water pollution control bill now before the conference.

I ask unanimous consent that an explanation of the bill be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the explanation was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE SEDIMENT CONTROL ACT

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

Section 201 states the purpose of the Title, to reduce sedimentation from land-disturbing activities consistent with water quality standards.

Section 202 provides applicable definitions.

Section 203 provides for the Administrator of EPA (hereinafter, the Administrator) to issue within a year of the Title's enactment guidelines for effective control of sedimentation from land-disturbing activities, such as road and building construction, and excluding agricultural and silvicultural activities and mining activities that would be required under the President's proposed Mined Area Protection Act.

Subsection (b) provides that the guidelines shall include information on effects of uncontrolled sediment and on the techniques for control, including their costs and effectiveness. The guidelines must also specify procedures to be followed by States in establishing control programs and designate categories of land-disturbing activities for which, within program areas, permits, general regulations, or no controls, respectively, are appropriate.

Subsection (c) prescribes that the Administrator will consult with appropriate Federal, State and local agencies in developing and revising the guidelines.

Section 204 provides the requirements for State programs. The first is a survey to be conducted, within a year of the Title's enactment to subsequently as appropriate, to determine on the basis of water quality standards critical areas of sedimentation resulting in substantial part from activities regulated under this Title in which the standards may be substantially achieved either under this Title alone or in conjunction with controls over other sedimentation sources such as agricultural runoff.

Within a year after initial Federal guidelines are issued (during which time the survey is to have been completed), States are expected to submit control programs, consistent with the guidelines, for the problem areas identified in the survey.

Further provisions for such programs, specified in subsection (b), include encouragement of the use of State or local agencies that already issue permits for land-disturbing activities, provided their programs are acceptable to the State water quality agency. A technically qualified agency must review to evaluate permits prior to issuance, a requirement applicable only where the permit-issuing agency itself lacks sufficient expertise. Adequate monitoring of regulated activities and enforcement authority must be provided.

Subsection (c) provides for Federal agencies to regulate activities on lands within their jurisdiction.

Section 205 provides for several aspects of Federal enforcement of requirements under Title II. First, Federal agencies that provide financial assistance for activities regulated under this Title will require possession of any requisite permit under Title II as a condition of assistance.

Second, section 21(b) of the FWPCA, which requires a State certification of reasonable assurance of compliance with water quality standards with respect to proposed activities for which a Federal license or permit is sought, would be modified with respect to activities regulated under Title II to require a certificate of compliance with the specific requirements imposed under Title II.

Third, the Administrator would be authorized to enforce the requirements of State programs established under Title II in the same manner as he may enforce standards established under Title I, i.e., the present Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Here the bill is drafted in anticipation of pending amendments of the FWPCA that would basically authorize Federal administrative or judicial enforcement of federally-approved State standards when a State fails to do so.

Finally, Section 205 provides for Federal establishment of and enforcement of regulations in order to abate violations of water quality standards if a State had failed to adopt an acceptable sedimentation control program within six months after the time specified for submission of such a program to the Administrator for approval.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Washington, D.C., February 8, 1972.

Hon. SPIRO T. AGNEW,
President of the Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In accordance with the President's 1972 Message to the Congress on the Environment, there is transmitted herewith a proposed bill containing The Sediment Control Act and The Toxic Waste Disposal Control Act, to be added as Title II and III of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. They are being submitted together as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. The proposed new Titles II and III are intended to strengthen the Act in areas we believe are inadequately covered under both the existing legislation and the extensive amendments of that legislation now pending before the Congress.

The proposed Title II, The Sediment Control Act, would supplement both the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, which does not deal specifically with sedimentation as a water quality problem although sediment is the major pollutant of waters by volume, and various authorities of the Department of Agriculture for technical and financial assistance to control sedimentation. The Act would provide for controls over non-agricultural land-disturbing activities, primarily building and road construction activities. The concentration of such activities in urban-suburban areas and their substantial per-acre yield of sediment often lead to particularly severe water quality problems.

The Act calls upon States to implement a regulatory program, including permits where appropriate, with respect to sedimentation arising from such land-disturbing activities in areas where they significantly affect water quality. Mining activities, sedimentation from which would be regulated under the President's proposed Mined Area Protection Act of 1971, are excluded from the Act, along with agricultural and silvicultural activities. Federal guidelines for State programs would be promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency in consultation with the Secretaries of Housing & Urban Development, Agriculture, and Transportation, with other appropriate Federal agencies and with representatives of State and local governments. States would be given flexibility in assigning, presumably to counties or other local governmental units in most cases, the responsibility for administering the permit and general regulatory program. The bill encourages the use of existing regulatory mechanisms, such as building and grading permits, for providing the required sedimentation controls. Local components of the State's program would be subject to approval by the State water quality agency. Relevant Federal permit and assistance programs would be used to assist States in achieving compliance with approved programs. The Environmental Protection Agency would be authorized to promulgate appropriate regulations for application in States failing to implement approved programs and would be empowered to enforce State regulations where a State fails to do so.

The proposed Title III, The Toxic Waste Disposal Control Act, would provide for a nationwide program to regulate land and underground disposal of wastes toxic to human health.

As controls over disposal of toxic subtances directly into surface waters are strengthened, the use of land or underground strata for such disposal can be expected to increase significantly, particularly with the enactment of needed controls over ocean disposal, which the President has proposed.

The program would be administered by the States except in cases of State failure to meet guidelines of the Environmental Protection Agency, in which event the Agency would issue necessary regulations. The proposed propram would substitute for the present inadequate system of State regulation a more orderly, nationwide system that would retain the best in ongoing State programs under Federal guidelines.

Both the sediment and toxic waste disposal control provisions would substantially enhance the effectiveness of the Federal-State water pollution control program by providing a structured approach to two significant

types of pollution. In addition, the toxic waste disposal control provisions would help to provide the controls over ground water contamination which the President recommended a year ago.

Although the proposed "Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972" are being recommended as amendments to the present law, we are of course aware of the extensive amendments to the law already pending in the Congress. Indeed, references in our bill to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act anticipate such widely agreed-upon and expected reforms of the Act as provision for effluent limitations, special standards for toxic pollutants, and strengthened Federal enforcement authority that is not limited to interstate pollution.

I would point out that S. 2770, which has passed the Senate, contains some general provisions for controls over construction-related sources of water pollution and for disposal of pollutants on or under the land. However, we believe that the more specific provisions contained in our proposed amendments would establish a more effective framework for action.

A similar letter is being sent to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that enactment of this proposed legislation would be in accord with the program of the President.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM D. RUCKELSHAUS,
Administrator.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS

S. 1032

At the request of Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD (for Mr. HART), the Senator from Montana (Mr. METCALF) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1032, a bill to promote and protect the free flow of interstate commerce without unreasonable damage to the environment.

S. 3881

At the request of Mr. CHILES, the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE), the Senator from Vermont (Mr. STAFFORD), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART), and the Senator from California (Mr. TUNNEY) were added as cosponsors of S. 3881, a bill to provide that meetings of Government agencies and of congressional committees shall be open to the public.

SENATE RESOLUTION 353—SUBMISSION OF A RESOLUTION TO ESTABLISH A COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE WATERGATE INCIDENT

(Referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.)

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, earlier today I urged that a two-man bipartisan commission composed of former Senator John Williams and former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg be appointed to investigate the Watergate incident and the events surrounding it, especially in connection with the possible misuse of campaign funds.

I suggested that the President of the United States appoint these two men to go into the matter. I sincerely hope that he does so.

But in the event the President fails to act, and to act within the next day or two, I am introducing a Senate resolution establishing a Senate investigative commission composed of these two men acting for and on behalf of the Senate of the United States.

I send the resolution to the desk and ask that it be appropriately referred.

The resolution reads as follows:

SENATE RESOLUTION 353

Whereas funds donated to a Federal election campaign may have been used for the purpose of engaging in surveillance at the Democratic National Committee offices at the Watergate;

Whereas investigating authorities of the executive branch of the United States Government have a conflict of interest in investigating this incident and making information relating to this incident available to the public; and

Whereas the public should have confidence in the investigation and determinations made with respect to such incident: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That (a) there is established a commission of the Senate to examine, investigate, and make a complete study of any and all matters relating to the use of Federal election campaign funds to conduct electronic surveillance at the Democratic National Committee offices at the Watergate Buildings in Washington, District of Columbia. Former Senator John J. Williams of Delaware and former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg are appointed as the members of the commission. Each of the members shall receive $100 for each day (including travel time) he is performing his duties as a member of the commission.

(b) In carrying out its functions under this resolution, the commission shall consider and review all information in the possession of the investigating authorities of the executive branch of the United States Government.

SEC. 2. For the purposes of this resolution, the members of the commission, acting jointly, are authorized in their discretion (1) to make expenditures from the contingent fund of the Senate, (2) to employ personnel, (3) to hold hearings, (4) to sit and act at any time or place during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Senate, (5) to require, by subpena or otherwise the attendance of witnesses and the production of correspondence, books, papers, and documents, (6) to take depositions and other testimony, (7) to procure the service of individual consultants or organizations thereof, in accordance with the provisions of section 202 (i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, and (8) with the prior consent of the Government department or agency concerned and the Committee on Rules and Administration, to use on a reimbursable basis the services of personnel of any such department or agency.

SEC. 3. The expenses of the commission under this resolution shall not exceed $15,000, of which amount not to exceed $5,000 shall be available for the procurement of the services of individual consultants, or organizations thereof as authorized by such section 202 (i).

SEC. 4. The commission shall report its findings, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but not later than 30 days after this resolution is agreed to or October 31, 1972, whichever occurs first. Upon filing its report, the commission shall cease to exist.

SEC. 5. Expenses of the commission under this resolution shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved jointly by the members of the commission.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 89

At the request of Mr. THURMOND, the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BROCK), the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PASTORE), the Senator from Delaware (Mr. BOGGS), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. FANNIN), the Senator from Florida (Mr. CHILES), the Senator from Alaska (Mr. STEVENS), the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE), the Senator from Alabama (Mr. ALLEN), the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. CURTIS), the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON), the Senator from Utah (Mr. BENNETT), the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. EASTLAND), and the Senator from Georgia (Mr. TALMADGE) were added as cosponsors of Senate Concurrent Resolution 89, in behalf of prisoners of war and missing in action.

NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH ACT—AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 1433

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I submit an amendment to H.R. 14896 on vending machines to strike in section 7 all language beginning with the phrase "The first sentence" on line 6, page 16, and continuing through to the word "institutions" on line 13. On line 14, strike the word "SEC." and the number "8." The effect of this amendment will be to continue the Secretary of Agriculture's authority to regulate vending machines in school cafeterias.

My amendment is cosponsored by Senators AIKEN, BENNETT, TUNNEY, BURDICK, MOSS, MAGNUSON, MCGOVERN, JACKSON, MUSKIE, and HART.

This amendment will strike the language reported in the Senate version of H.R. 14896. At the present time vending machines are permitted in school cafeterias if they are a part of the school lunch program, but vending machines are not permitted for the distribution of other food items. However, vending machines are permitted outside the cafeteria for distribution of items such as soft drinks, if the school so permits.

The amendment I introduce is strongly supported by the American Dental Association, the National Dental Association, and the American School Food Service Association.

I ask unanimous consent that a letter I received from the American Dental Association and the National Dental Association be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION,
Washington, D.C., August 8, 1972.

Hon. CLIFFORD P. CASE,
Old Senate Office Building,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR CASE: We are writing you on behalf of the American Dental Association and the National Dental Association with

respect to H.R. 14896, the National School Lunch Act amendments.

Section 7 of H.R. 14896, as passed by the House of Representatives, would amend the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 to permit the sale of food through vending machines in participating schools and service organizations. The Senate version of the bill, as we understand it, would amend existing law rescinding the statutory authority of the U.S. Department of Agriculture to regulate the sale of food items in competition with programs authorized under the Child Nutrition Act and the National School Lunch Program.

Our Associations oppose the changes contemplated by either version because they would not help guarantee, as does the present Act, the maintenance of adequate and desirable nutritional standards for children in school lunch programs.

The concern of our Associations is twofold. We share, first of all, the desire of all Americans that children be afforded diets that are high in nutritional value. The present school lunch program plays a valuable role in helping to assure this. It would be imprudent and, we think, unfair to the child to tempt him to ignore the well-balanced lunch available to him in favor of purchasing foods from vending machines that would be far less valuable in terms of his over-all growth and development.

Secondly, we are concerned about the deleterious effect on the oral health of children that is the consequence of undue consumption of sugar-rich foods, many of which are commonly sold in vending machines.

Conclusive evidence has long been available concerning the hazards to dental health resulting from the undue consumption of sugars. The hazards are especially great among school-age children. The sale of sugar-containing drinks and other confections in schools through vending machines encourages the between-meal consumption of sugar-rich products.

Dentists have been bringing this evidence to the attention of their patients and the general public for decades. Sound oral health care involves disincentives against indulgence in sugar-rich snacks between meals, much less in place of well-balanced meals. Uncontrolled placement of food and drink vending machines purveying such products militates against the efforts being made by dentists, parents and schools to teach good oral hygiene habits to children.

We understand that the School Food Service Directors Association—the people ultimately responsible for the nutritional levels of the foods children eat at school—is also opposed to the placement of food-dispensing devices as contemplated by provisions of H.R. 14896.

The American Dental Association and the National Dental Association strongly urge the retention of statutory authority by the U.S. Department of Agriculture to regulate the sale of food items in competition with programs authorized under the Child Nutrition Act and the National School Lunch Act.

We are most grateful to you for the leadership you have shown on this issue.

Sincerely,

CARL A. LAUGHLIN, D.D.S.,
President, American Dental Association.
EDDIE G. SMITH, D.D.S.,
President, National Dental Association.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, under current law, the Secretary of Agriculture has authority to regulate competitive food services. The Senate version of H.R. 14896 would remove this authority from the Secretary and, in effect, leave the question of competitive food service up to the States and local school districts. School lunch directors are fearful they would be forced to allow vending machines in school cafeterias. Certainly this would weaken their effort to provide balanced and nutritious meals for all children.

The House version of H.R. 14896 would allow competitive food services to offer the sale of "nutritious food through vending machines—where the proceeds of such sales will inure to the benefit of the schools or of organizations of students or parents approved by the schools and (where) such sales will not substantially interfere with the (school lunch) programs so authorized." Unfortunately, there is no workable definition of "nutritious foods" which could well mean "empty calories" and there would be substantial pressure not only to install such machines but, also, to use them to the "advantage" of fund raising organizations.

In my view we should retain the existing system while continuing to improve the quality of meals offered in the National School Lunch program.

Returning to the original language of the School Lunch Act does not foreclose the option in the hands of the Secretary to allow certain exceptions. For example, senior high school students may desire soft drink machines in school cafeterias and if, in the Secretary's opinion, there is no sound reason to prohibit soft drink machines, the authority exists for him to take action.

Now, however, I think it is best to proceed as we have in the past and safeguard as well as we can the school lunch program.

INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.S.R.

AMENDMENT NO. 1435

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. BROOKE (for himself and Mr. HUGHES) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment No. 1434, proposed to the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 241) authorizing the President to approve an interim agreement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF AN AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 1431

At the request of Mr. JAVITS (for Mr. CASE) the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PASTORE), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE), the Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE), the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT), the Senator from Maryland (Mr. BEALL), and the Senator from Utah (Mr. Moss) were added as cosponsors of amendment No. 1431, intended to be proposed to the bill (H.R. 14896), to amend the National School Lunch Act, as amended, and for other purposes.

NOTICE OF HEARINGS BY THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMITTEE

Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, I announce hearings by the Subcommittee on Business, Commerce, and Judiciary of the Senate District of Columbia Committee on the following bills:

S. 2715, to provide that any person operating a motor vehicle within the District of Columbia shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical test of his blood, breath, or urine, for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood.

H.R. 6968, to amend the Uniform Commercial Code of the District of Columbia to make a warehouseman's lien for charges and expenses in relation to household goods stored with him effective against all persons if the depositor of the goods was the legal possessor.

H.R. 13533, to amend the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945 to provide for the reimbursement of public utilities in the District of Columbia for certain costs resulting from urban renewal; to provide for reimbursement of public utilities in the District of Columbia for certain costs resulting from Federal-aid system programs; and to amend section 5 of the act approved June 11, 1878—providing a permanent government of the District of Columbia—and for other purposes.

The hearings on August 15, 1972, will begin at 9:30 a.m. in room 6226, New Senate Office Building.

Persons interested in testifying on these bills should contact Mr. Robert B. Washington, legal counsel, in room 6222, New Senate Office Building.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

AGRICULTURE APPROPRIATIONS PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR POLLUTION CONTROL

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, Wednesday the Senate approved and sent to the White House the agricultural appropriations bill for fiscal 1973. The bill is particularly constructive this year for the increase in funds for pollution control and environmental protection in rural areas.

All too often, soil erosion clogs our streams and kills our wildlife. Feeding yards and processing of raw agricultural products can create serious waste disposal and water pollution problems on which farm operators need technical and financial help. Heavy rains, unchecked by adequate watershed treatment, result in floods with loss of valuable soil and stream pollution.

Such conditions not only damage our natural resources and impede crop and livestock production, but they also inhibit the economic development of our rural areas.

Federal assistance has been effective in protecting our rural environment through such programs as the Farmers Home Administration water and waste disposal projects, the rural environmental assistance program, and the resource conservation and development and watershed projects of the Soil Conservation Service. There are still, however, many rural counties and small towns awaiting help through these programs; and it is important that a greater Federal effort be made to reach them.

Last April, I urged the Senate Appropriations Committee to increase the fis-

cal 1973 budget for agricultural pollution control at least to the level of funding for fiscal 1972. By its action this year Congress has not only restored the amount cut by the administration but also appropriated an additional $50 million for these important programs.

In my own State of Missouri, the increases will permit a much-needed expansion of nonmetropolitan pollution control efforts.

For water and sewer grants to small towns and rural areas, Congress has approved $150 million, including a $58 million carryover of funds from fiscal 1972. This level would permit significant progress on the backlog of 90 applications in Missouri now awaiting Farmers Home Administration approval.

With the Federal support provided by the Rural Environmental Assistance program, Missouri farmers have been able to initiate projects to prevent soil erosion and flooding on their land and thereby increase its productivity. Under the administration proposed budget cut of $55.5 million for REAP, Missourians would have lost $2.3 million in Federal funds for these important projects. The farmers in Missouri will welcome the congressional action to restore the funds to the fiscal 1972 level.

Unfortunately, for the Soil Conservation Service the final version of the bill included a $10 million reduction in the $340 million previously approved by the Senate for SCS programs; but the congressional action does provide increases over both the 1972 budget and the administration request for this year.

These increases will also be welcome in Missouri where we have more counties not served by Soil Conservation Districts than in all the rest of the Nation combined.

Missouri's increased share of the $328 million appropriated by Congress for the Soil Conservation Service should permit the establishment of as many as five new soil and water conservation districts. Resource Conservation and Development projects in Missouri also should be accelerated and planning applications for others could receive approval. Finally, with the SCS appropriation approved by the Congress, construction contracts for several very important watershed projects could be granted and planning for other watersheds could be completed.

We of Missouri are pleased that the House and Senate have recognized the importance of these programs to protect and preserve our rural environment.

It is hoped that the full amount appropriated will be made available by the administration promptly, so that these programs can move ahead now.

THE FIGHT AGAINST MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. President, we in the Senate are very much concerned with man's fight against disease. In the past we have repeatedly demonstrated our sincere desire to step up America's fight against the many diseases which attack her people. For this reason, it seems to me that we should be anxious to act upon H.R. 15475, a bill which has already passed the House and which is currently pending in the Health Subcommittee of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

The purpose of the bill is to create a nine-member national commission to study ways to escalate our fight against multiple sclerosis. Multiple sclerosis, which is often called the crippler of young adults, is a disease of the nervous system. It can strike any person at any time without even the hint of a warning. More than 250,000 Americans must struggle with the crippling effects of this disease every day of their lives. And every year thousands of healthy Americans come to the bleak realization that they too are now among the victims of MS.

I have with me today, Mr. President, an article written by Mrs. Linda Turner Nickel, a young woman from Delaware who is an MS victim. The article describes her first year of living with multiple sclerosis. It would behoove all of us to read the article and to witness the patience, faith, and courage with which a person can meet the terrors and the pains of an experience like multiple sclerosis. I think the article will demonstrate to each of us that we must do everything in our power to escalate the fight against this tragic disease.

I ask unanimous consent that the article, published in the Delaware State News, of Dover, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From Delaware State News, May 18, 1972]

MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS WEEK—MY FIRST YEAR OF LIVING WITH MS

(By Linda Turner Nickel)

Fifteen years ago my Dover High School commencement speech began with Shakespeare's words from "Hamlet":

"This above all: to thine own self be true,
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man."

Little did I know the real impact these words would have on my life this past year. Perhaps today the phrase would be updated and reworded, "Do your own thing," and this is what I've been doing for exactly one year today, March 22, 1972: living with, coping with, and constantly readjusting to my life with multiple sclerosis.

It has been a year of frustrations, annoyances, fear of the unknown, and inability to function normally. It also has been a year of awareness, real communication, and true realization and appreciation of life's blessings. I've been affected by many of the symptoms of M.S.: numbness in parts of the body, pins and needles feelings, extreme fatigue, loss of bladder and bowel control, double and blurred vision, slurred speech, hand tremors with loss of coordination, imbalance and staggering, and dragging of one leg and foot.

Fortunately these symptoms have come and gone and usually have flared up with emotional upsets and pressures. We've had our share of those during the year. My symptoms began when we discovered a lump on the back of the knee of our youngest son, Kenny, age three at the time. It was diagnosed as a Baker's cyst, not malignant; but mothers will worry!

At this same time, my grandmother was failing, and the realization suddenly came that she wouldn't be with us much longer. The numb feeling that started on my left side eased during the next few weeks, but came back on the right side when Kenny was hospitalized and the cyst was removed. During this time, I was tested thoroughly by a very capable and dedicated family doctor and team of neurologists. An EEG and skull X-rays were normal, but I knew I wasn't my normal self.

When we found a lovely old larger home we had always dreamed of and put our outgrown house up for sale, new eye symptoms in the form of double vision and involuntary eyeball movement appeared. A spinal tap was taken with the doctor's suspicion to me of "an inflammation of the central nervous system," but to Paul the words were "something serious." Paul suffered so much more than I those few agonizing days of waiting, and we shared our feelings very deeply.

The day of the spinal tap, my closest great aunt died, and my parents drove upstate to tell me, but the doctor advised against any further emotional strain. Paul and two neighbors scrutinized the newspaper obituary section, but I always read the small downstate "Peninsula Shorts" section and read of it.

Then on May 14 we faced the diagnosis we had suspected: multiple sclerosis. Looking back on the total shock, it was terribly frightening. But we had each other, three normal sons, a loving family, strong faith and courage, wonderful relatives, friends, and neighbors, and a church family truly giving of its God-given talents.

Somehow having the fear of the unknown removed, we were able to face the reality of an illness in a previously normal active teacher, wife, and mother. After reading data about M.S., we found much of the information ominous. A call to the local chapter of the M.S. Society presented a totally new outlook of hope and encouragement. One of my friends from college also has M.S. and has been a big help. Her view has become mine: it could be something so much worse. When I see her functioning normally, I know I can, too.

During the rest of the year, there have been other flareups (technically they are called exacerbations; I call them exasperations!). The major one came in June the week before we moved. All the extra work in renovating an over 30-year-old home was quite a challenge, and the stress left me fatigued. One night my legs began to spasm uncontrollably, and after that the right leg began to drag. To climb stairs, Doug, then seven, and Tommy, then five, got behind me and lifted my right leg up each step. That's quite a responsibility for little boys, but they could and wanted to help.

The day after we moved, the neurologist put me in the hospital for 10 days of intravenous feedings with ACTH and physical therapy. This treatment effected a real miracle: within three days my right leg worked again!

Homecoming in early July was one of the most fulfilling experiences of my life. We picked up the boys from a neighbor's home, and they held onto me so securely. Getting out of the car, they waited and watched me carefully. Little Kenny stood in front with outstretched arms and clapped encouragingly as we did to our babies taking their first exciting steps. He said, "Come on, Mommy. Walk to me!" We all were thrilled and relieved that I was beginning to walk normally again.

At home I improved with rest, extra help, very limited activity, and follow-up therapy at the Delaware Curative Workshop, which is a remarkable place where courageous people work hard to help themselves and each other.

By August, our lives were settling into a fair amount of normalcy. I had to depend on Paul to help with some cooking, laundry, weekly shopping, and caring for the boys. He has, in the words of one of my college roommates, been "an extra sensitive help-

mate who can be your arms and legs when you need him."

Luckily, I have help from many wonderful friends who have visited, shopped, brought meals, driven, watched the boys and mothered them while I've been hospitalized, and have sincerely cared about our entire family. People have been truly good to us. I guess it takes adversity to make one realize that we all need to spend our priceless gifts of time and energy in ways that count by helping others, especially helping them to see the good in themselves as so many have done for me.

Events in normal lives don't always go smoothly, and late in the summer Kenny fell and needed stitches; in September grandmom died; and Doug fell out of a tree fort and was hospitalized with a mild concussion. Many people recognized us when we arrived at the hospital. Is that good? Thank goodness for such a helpful place! I emerged from each of these stresses with a slight increase in numbness. An immediate crisis can be faced, but several weeks later the effects show up. In November extreme fatigue began again and didn't ease, which required another 10-day hospitalization with i.v. ACTH. So far, this medication has worked well for me.

As I write this story, I've been on the medication once more for blurred central vision in my right eye. This time the ACTH was given by injection requiring daily visits to the doctor's office a block away instead of hospitalization, thank goodness. Last night I could read the newspaper again with the affected eye. What encouragement for the upcoming day of a one-year anniversary of living with M.S.!

During the year, I've learned to readjust to my strengths and limitations. At present I walk normally; can carry a daily light load of laundry up and down stairs; iron a little if sitting; do small shopping; am driving with automatic transmission after trading our dear 11-year-old gearshift car; have young playmates in occasionally for the boys; can cook all meals, although the boys like to help and are very capable when supervised; and when Paul has evening meetings, the boys are good about getting themselves ready for bed. They are learning real responsibility. You know, if you can raise your children to be dependable, industrious, honest, and considerate of others, you need not do everything to make them happy. They will make themselves happy.

My day includes almost an hour of basic stretching exercises each morning, and the boys have learned to help me with these from their observations at the Workshop; resting for at least two hours each afternoon with a short nap; and getting ready for bed when the children do so I can relax with Paul in the evenings. During the day, any accomplishment in addition to caring for the boys, meals, and laundry is a real victory.

I try to continue to design and make some of my clothes and derive much personal satisfaction from this creativity. Also, I've learned to do macrame at the Workshop and am again doing some oil painting.

Spending time writing, phoning, and occasionally visiting keeps me in touch with dear friends. We try to go out to dinner at least once a month with family or friends and have enjoyed attending some early dinner-dances, providing I take a long nap that day and rest more the following days.

One of the most difficult readjustments has been to make myself rest and not overdo when I'm feeling energetic. The other big readjustment has been to stop being such a stubbornly independent perfectionist and to ask for help when I need it. By accepting the help of others gratefully and thankfully, I can in my own small way help people by really needing them.

I don't know what the future holds, but I do know that my life has been changed for the better, because I've developed many new philosophies about what is really important to self-fulfillment.

The following words of Reinhold Niebuhr, the theologian, have become most meaningful: "Grant me serenity to accept the things I cannot change; courage to change the things I can; and wisdom to know the difference."

But that familiar beginning, "To thine own self be true," still holds a dear place in my life, for if I am honest with myself, I will be what I can be within my own capabilities.

AVID POLITICAL OVERKILL

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I have more than once seen the statement that 20,000 Americans have been killed fighting in Vietnam since President Nixon took over. To set the record straight, I would like to say categorically that this statement is false. It is in my view a terrible sad commentary on the way in which some people will twist facts to further their own purposes.

Here are the correct figures, compiled from the Defense Department release of August 3, 1972:

Killed by hostile action:	
1961 through 1964	267
1965 through 1968	30,347
January 1, 1969 through July 29, 1972	15,222
Total	45,836

It is worth noting that in 1968 alone, American servicemen killed totaled 14,592. The total of 15,222 since, is bad. Any casualties are bad, but it is not the 20,000 figure so casually bruited about.

Mr. President, the 20,000 figure charged to President Nixon is obviously inflated. Its avid currency can only be ascribed to a political motivation which cares nothing for truth, even when dealing with the tragic matter of Americans killed fighting in Vietnam.

JOB OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. DEPENDENTS OVERSEAS

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, as one who has been concerned for some time about the discriminatory hiring policies with respect to American dependents overseas, particularly in Europe, I am glad to note that, according to an article published in the Army Times of July 26, 1972, under a newly approved policy—

Dependents living overseas with their sponsors will receive preference for employment in all jobs at Defense installations.

As long as U.S. policy supports the stationing of thousands of its citizens at installations around the globe, there is no alternative but to provide them decent working and living conditions according to the particular circumstances of their assignment. The idea of U.S. military families living overseas under poverty conditions because hiring policies give preference to foreign nationals is totally unacceptable, and a change in those policies, although long-overdue, is welcome indeed.

I ask unanimous consent that the article entitled, "Kin To Win Overseas Jobs," be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Army Times, July 26, 1972]

KIN TO WIN OVERSEA JOBS

(By Randall Shoemaker)

WASHINGTON.—Dependents living overseas with their sponsors will receive preference for employment in all jobs at Defense installations, under a newly approved policy.

Both appropriated and nonappropriated fund positions are included in the policy which was given a green light by the Civil Service Commission. The preferential consideration applies to dependents of both the military and civilian employees.

No distinction is to be made as to whether those to be hired are command-sponsored or not, under provisions of the new policy.

Service authorities this week expressed great pleasure over the development which they think will go far toward solving a thorny problem: military poverty in the lower ranks.

Because of the low-cost fares available for flights overseas, many wives and other dependents spend all their ready cash to join the servicemen on a foreign tour without command sponsorship, officials explain. Many families then find themselves "almost destitute," living in high-cost areas without military housing privileges or extra jobs needed to provide the necessary income.

U.S. employment overseas of American citizens totals 188,000, most military-related. In addition, some 135,000 foreign nationals are on the U.S. payroll, not counting nearly 100,000 more provided under contracts and other arrangements by the Defense Department.

Since 1961 it has been official Defense policy to give military and civilian dependents stationed in an area preference for jobs in nonappropriated fund activities—exchanges, commissaries, officers' or NCO clubs. In practice, though, foreign nationals were usually given the inside track because there was less turnover and they asked less pay.

Two countries, Panama and the Philippines, have treaty agreements that give citizens of those countries priority for certain jobs. Those provisions will remain in force under the new policy.

A controversy arose last year over hiring rules for exchange jobs in Europe. The charges of discrimination against dependents were resolved by a directive granting U.S. citizens equal footing with foreign nationals in competition for the jobs.

An anti-discrimination provision was attached subsequently to the military pay legislation last year. This in turn prompted development of the new preferential policy.

REMARKS OF MR. THOMAS B. CUNNINGHAM ON RURAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM BEFORE APPROPRIATIONS

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, one of my constituents, Mr. Thomas B. Cunningham, a farmer from Darlington County, S.C., recently testified before

the Senate Appropriations Committee on the rural environmental assistance program.

This program helps farmers to improve the lands they farm. It helps insure that the land will be as fruitful for future generations as it is for us.

As Mr. Cunningham has pointed out, farmers today are caught in a financial squeeze between rising equipment and labor costs and the public demand for lower food prices. Without Federal assistance, they cannot afford to care properly for their lands and put back into the soil vital nutrients that are used up. I believe all Senators should be aware of the importance of REAP to the Nation's farmers.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Cunningham's testimony be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the testimony was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TESTIMONY OF MR. THOMAS B. CUNNINGHAM BEFORE THE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, AGRICULTURE, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am Thomas B. Cunningham of Darlington County, South Carolina. I am first of all a farmer interested in soil conservation, next I am a County Committeeman with ASCS and finally I am President of the South Carolina Association of Farmer Elected Committeemen.

I am most appreciative of the opportunity to appear before this distinguished Committee to express my views and the views of many of my fellow farmers in South Carolina, and I feel, also, throughout the nation, regarding the appropriating of funds for our Rural Environmental Assistance Program.

Gentlemen, I am becoming increasingly concerned about recent decreases in the appropriations of funds for this all important program. In addition to the appropriations decreasing, the Administration has seen fit during recent years, to impound some of the funds you have appropriated. In these days, we are hearing more and more about the ecology and our environment. This one program, the Rural Environmental Assistance Program, or in recent years known as the ACP—(Agricultural Conservation Program)—has been at work and is still doing a tremendous job in the areas of pollution abatement and, needless to say, good conservation. Instead of reducing funds for this program each year, all of us wonder why funds for this program have not been increased.

This program has been operating some 35 years and as you know is the program where farm people are standing ready to match government funds in combating pollution and in cleaning up the environment.

During the past five (5) years, 1967–1971, the Rural Environmental Assistance Programs and the Agricultural Conservation Programs have contributed fourteen million nine hundred and eight thousand dollars—($14,908,000)—in my state of South Carolina. These funds were allocated to 91,919 farms within the state. As you can readily determine, with simple arithmetic, this amounts to only a little more than $162.00 per farm in my state for pollution abatement and conservation practices. Farmers generally are discouraged from filing requests for this assistance due to the lack of funds. Of the near fifteen million dollars—($15,000,000)—allocated during the past five years more than twenty eight million ($28,000,000) in assistance was requested. County Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Committees, therefore, had to drastically reduce requests for assistance and/or deny the assistance requested.

Now, Gentlemen, let me mention some of our problems. The number one pollutant of our streams is silt that comes from land controlled by the farmers of this nation. We, of course, want to keep the soil on our farms and prevent it from washing into streams, reservoirs, and harbors where it ruins the fishing, provides mosquito marshes and fills in our reservoirs and harbors. It is not that the farmer is negligent or careless in protecting his soil from erosion. Building terraces, strip cropping, planting trees and carrying out other measures to prevent erosion and keep our streams cost lots of money. We farmers can do only what we are able to do as we are caught in a cost-price squeeze so severe that we absolutely can not do the job.

Dust that fills the air in the farmer's field does not stop at his property line, it blows across highways, causing hazardous conditions, and into urban areas where it is inhaled by city people as well as farmers. The farmer can stand some wind erosion and still get by. However, he certainly does not like to see his soil blowing away, but it takes wind breaks a long time to grow. Generally in our state this would require twenty (20) to fifty (50) years and future generations would obtain more benefit than the farmers who plant them today.

Strip cropping and other measures to control wind erosion also costs a lot of money. We, as farmers, will certainly do all we can to protect our soil but if we are to continue to sell our products on a competitive market at about the same price every year while the things we have to buy, such as labor, chemicals, machinery, etc., are going up every year, we certainly need some incentive to bear the extra cost of protecting this land of ours for future generations.

Another good practice the program provides is the building of water storage reservoirs. These storage facilities not only provide water for our livestock, to irrigate our fields, but they also help to prevent flooding the land and to maintain the ground water level.

Some of the other practice of benefit to all Americans and provided by this program are:

Fishing, boating and swimming provided by farm ponds helps to keep the young people off the highways and city streets.

Planting forest trees prevent erosion and improve the farm woodland that helps to hold down the cost of woodland products. However, it takes trees 30 to 50 years to reach maturity in our state and the man who plants them seldom sees the final harvest.

Drainage of cultivated land in my section of South Carolina is an important factor in farming. Without it most of us would have to go out of business. If we are going to keep the price of food and fiber down for consumers in this country and grow crops that can compete in the world market for foreign trade, we are going to have to get the wet spots and small ditches out of our fields. We can't grow farm products to help maintain a balance of foreign trade with our farm tractors bogged down in wet spots in the fields. We are going to have to establish drainage systems that will permit the efficient use of modern machinery. This means installing more underground tile drains. These tile drains should last for hundreds of years but are costly to install. Yet, this fiscal year the cost of tile installation went up and the REAP incentive payment went down.

Mr. Chairman, I point out these things as just a few of the items that this program has done in the past and will continue to do at a more adequate level, if the Congress can see fit to allocate more funds for the program. The small payments provided to the farmers of this nation by this program promote and encourage the conservation of our soils, water, grassland, woodland and wildlife for the benefit of all our people and also for our unborn generations of Americans which, of course, is essential to our survival. The main problem is that these cost-share payments have been too small and the total allocated most inadequate. Comparing the amount of funds this program provides to the acreage of privately owned land, about 14¢ per acre was spent to save our national resources. This is too small an amount to do the job that must be done.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I strongly urge this Committee to give careful thought to this program and to the funding thereof. As you know, this program has been operating very successfully for about 35 years, and in recent years funds have been cut substantially and, of course, the need for such funds has been increasing. I would suggest, as a minimum, that the level of funding be the maximum as authorized by law—five hundred million dollars, I believe.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the other members of your fine Committee for the opportunity to present my views.

OBLIGATIONS UNDER CONTINUING RESOLUTION FOR MILITARY FOREIGN AID

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of June 29, 1972. page 23323, will reflect my concern regarding the excessive rate at which Treasury warrants were drawn down and obligations incurred in past years for certain programs—particularly foreign assistance—under authority of continuing resolutions.

The Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of which I am chairman reported a foreign assistance and related activities appropriation bill to the full Senate Appropriations Committee on June 26. The House, however, has not acted, and we are unhappily faced with the necessity of an extension of the current continuing resolution—without question a most unsatisfactory and cumbersome substitute for responsible and timely congressional action.

Because of my stated concerns, I promised to keep the Congress apprised of action taken pursuant to the continuing resolution authority, as enacted, and my first report is contained in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of July 19, 1972, page 24344.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a schedule prepared by the General Accounting Office showing Treasury warrants drawn for foreign assistance activities through August 4, 1972.

There being no objection, the schedule was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1973 UNDER THE CONTINUING RESOLUTION

[In thousands of dollars]

Appropriation	Annual rate under 1973 continuing resolution	Warrants approved by Comptroller General through Aug. 4, 1972
TITLE I—FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES		
Economic assistance:		
Worldwide, development loans	$200,000	$50,000
Alliance for Progress, development loans	150,000	37,500
Worldwide, technical assistance	160,000	40,000
Alliance for Progress, technical assistance	80,000	20,000
American schools and hospitals abroad	15,575	3,893
Programs relating to population growth	125,000	31,250
International organizations and programs	124,835	31,208
Indus Basin Development Fund, loans	12,000	5,562
Indus Basin Development Fund, grants	10,000	6,010
Contingency fund	30,000	7,500
International narcotics control	0	
Refugee relief assistance (Bangladesh)	100,000	25,000
Administrative expenses:		
AID	50,000	7,500
State	4,221	633
Subtotal, economic assistance	1,061,631	266,056
Other:		
Overseas Private Investment Corporation: (OPIC) (reserves)		
Subtotal, other		
Military and supporting assistance:		
Military assistance (grants)	500,600	124,000
Supporting assistance	550,000	137,500
Subtotal, military and supporting assistance	1,050,600	261,500
Total, Title I, Foreign Assistance Act	2,112,231	527,556
TITLE II—FOREIGN MILITARY CAPS		
Credit sales	$400,000	$100,000
Total, foreign military	400,000	100,000
TITLE III—OTHER		
Peace Corps	72,500	12,329
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY—CIVIL FUNCTIONS		
Ryukyu Islands, Army: Administration	0	
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE		
Assistance to refugees in the United States (Cuban program)	139,000	
DEPARTMENT OF STATE		
Migration and refugee assistance	1,087	90
Resettlement of Soviet Jewish refugees	0	
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS [1]		
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	0	
International Development Association	0	
Inter-American Development Bank	0	
Asian Development Bank	0	
Total, Title III, Foreign Assistance (other)	212,587	12,419
TITLE IV—EXPORT-IMPORT BANK		
Limitation on program activity	0	
Grand total, all titles	2,724,818	639,975

[1] No amounts are shown because funds appropriated for these activities are not necessarily recurring type appropriations and it is not clear whether the continuing resolution would apply.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH WATERSHED PROGRAMS

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I invite the attention of the Senate to the text of an address by Mr. Kenneth E. Grant, Administrator of the Soil Conservation Service, to the 27th annual meeting of the Soil Conservation Society of America. The subject of the address is self-explanatory: "Environmental Improvement Through Watershed Programs."

Throughout the text of this address, excellent examples are cited regarding the multipurpose benefits from the small watershed program—recreation benefits, water storage for municipal and industrial use, the economic and physical growth of small rural communities, flood prevention benefits, and so forth. He estimates that "watershed projects already have prevented flood damages in the order of $300 million, and they almost certainly have saved human lives as well."

I draw attention to the address because the opportunities for these types of public benefits are broadened through title II and title III of the Rural Development Act of 1972, now pending final passage by the Senate.

These broadened authorities in title II and title III of the Rural Development Act of 1972 will offer new ways and means to help local conservation districts in building rural America. This is a good reason why the Rural Development Act of 1972 should become the law of the land promptly.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of Mr. Grant's address be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH WATERSHED PROGRAMS

Perhaps it goes without saying that the subject assigned to me today, while I played no role in selecting it, is one that I find very satisfactory.

Some people might argue that I am not the proper person to present an objective and scholarly view of the environmental improvement brought about through Public Law 566 projects, since I am responsible for administering the law. I will admit that I think very highly of the small watershed program, both from the standpoint of what already has been accomplished and what remains to be done to help those upstream communities still without adequate flood protection. But I am also in a position to offer you a great deal of first-hand information about a program which has suffered from more than its share of misrepresentation and one-sided criticism during the past three years.

The Soil Conservation Service has published a 14-page pamphlet to explain the P.L. 566 program to the public. The pamphlet begins with the following words:

"Experience in hundreds of localities demonstrates that multiple-purpose small watershed projects are an effective means of dealing with land use and water resource problems, of improving the quality of life in both rural and urban America, and of balancing our future national growth."

I would like to take a few minutes to document this statement for you.

At the same time, I hope to demonstrate that the effects of small watershed projects are consistent with the declaration of environmental policy as expressed by the Congress in Title I of the National Environmental Policy Act. NEPA charges the Federal Government with assuring for all Americans "safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings." It also calls for "a balance between population and resource use which will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities" and enhancement of the "quality of renewable resources." The worthy aims expressed in this Act, which is less than three years old, have a familiar ring to members of this 30-year-old organization. SCSA accepted these challenges many years ago.

What is the impact of the small watershed program on the environment?

First, it reduces frequency and depth of flooding in farm, urban, and residential areas. We estimate that the watershed projects already prevented flood damages in the order of 300 million dollars, and they almost certainly have saved human lives as well.

During June, when the heavy rainfall accompanying Hurricane Agnes caused serious flooding in the Middle Atlantic states, all or part of 75 small watershed projects lay in the path of the hurricane. *All* of the dams and other structures associated with those projects did the job they were designed to do. None of the small watershed dams failed, or even came close to failure. Each helped to prevent a regional catastrophe from becoming a series of even greater local disasters.

Lake Needwood and Lake Frank, for example, in the Upper Rock Creek watershed project north of Washington, D.C., kept floodwaters out of hundreds of homes and apartments in the densely settled suburb of the capital. Even after the hurricane dumped from 7 to 9 inches of rain in the watershed in 24 hours, the level of water in the lake was still more than two feet below the elevation of the emergency spillway and more than 14 feet below the top of the dam.

"Pity the area below if the dam hadn't been there," editorialized one local newspaper.

In Wellsboro, Pennsylvania, where 10 inches of rain fell in 36 hours, Mayor William Hall reported that the Marsh Creek watershed project prevented millions of dollars in damages.

In the town of Jim Thorpe, Pennsylvania, local officials estimate that the Mauch Chunk watershed project prevented a quarter of a million dollars in flood damages.

In Virginia, the Mountain Run watershed project held back 1.8 billion gallons of water during Agnes and without question protected the town of Culpeper from serious flooding. The nearby towns of Rapidan and Remington, which so far do not yet have protection, were inundated by the same storm.

The list of successes could go on and on. In 1967, a nursing home in Randolph, New York, was evacuated when 4.7 inches of rain fell. This year, during hurricane Agnes, the rain totalled 6 inches, but the home and its patients were never threatened. The difference was a new dam constructed as part of a small watershed project for the area.

Anyone who has tried to clean up after a flood knows well that flood protection is one form of environmental improvement.

Another contribution to environmental improvement in the P.L. 566 program accrues from the conservation treatment of farms in the watershed. Sound land treatment is essential to reduce water run-off and sedimentation. Once again, our recent experience with Hurricane Agnes reminded us of the far-reaching impact on the environment of land treatment. It also reminded us that the job is far from finished.

In Virginia, David Grimwood, the SCS state conservationist, toured flooded areas by helicopter soon after the disaster. He said: "One of the things that really sickened me was to see the damage done to unprotected farm lands above the dam. Fields without strip-cropping and waterways were badly rilled and gullied, and you could spot the sediment run-off patterns. I don't think most people realize how much everyday soil conservation work pays off during and after floods."

You people here realize it. Small watershed projects have prevented nearly 15 million tons of sediment from accumulating in streams or lakes, or from becoming unwelcome deposits on land downstream, since the program began.

SCS requires that at least 75 percent of the critical sediment sources above a P.L. 566 dam either be treated or be under treatment at the time the dam is constructed. We also require that at least half of the land above a dam be included in a conservation plan before work on the dam begins.

The havoc wrought by Hurricane Agnes on eastern farmland taught us that these minimum goals are just that, and that we must keep our basic missions in mind and redouble efforts to put more farmland under conservation agreement.

The hurricane also reminded us of still another lesson that has too often been forgotten in recent years: a decision to do nothing to alleviate watershed problems is, in itself, a major decision about the environment.

A lot of people have been worried of late about man's ability to accurately depict the fourth or fifth order of consequence of his actions upon the environment. And if you can't project with absolute certainty the consequences of your actions, they say, mankind and the environment would be better off if you did nothing at all.

Now I would be the first to admit that we frequently do not have all the information we need to predict every consequence of every action that man takes in his environment. But I do not believe that is sufficient reason to suspend all action. The first and second order consequences of inaction are much too disastrous for that: wrecked homes and businesses, eroded farms, ruined crops, human lives lost.

More vivid to me than any statistics about damages was a television interview with a young Virginia man whose first home, his furniture, his wife's piano, all had been lost to the flood.

"How much has this cost you?" asked the interviewer.

The young man looked shocked. "I guess $25,000," he said. "But our things meant a lot more to us than the money involved. It was part of our lives that washed away."

The floods suffered this year in South Dakota and the Mid-Atlantic States are the type of disasters against which small watershed projects can provide a measure of protection. These obvious and predictable consequences are the reason we should get on with our work and develop needed projects. The price of inaction is frequently too high a price for the Nation to pay.

Flood protection is not the only way in which the small watershed program benefits the environment, by any means. In many projects, we also improve water quality and assure greater water supply through the watershed program. In keeping with the multiple-purposes of P.L. 566, local sponsors are encouraged to provide water supply storage in available reservoirs for both present and anticipated demands.

Since 1958, 200 multiple-purpose reservoirs incorporating water storage for municipal and industrial use have been planned in small watershed projects. When completed, these reservoirs will provide water to 206 communities and more than 1.2 million people.

Like flood statistics, these figures only hint at the human story that lies behind them. Water supply can mean life or death to a community. Not long ago, for instance, the city of Winfield, Kansas, faced a serious water quality problem. Its supply, drawn from wells, was subject to salt water pollution. Winfield, a town of more than 11,000, includes the patients and staff of a Kansas state hospital for the handicapped. A dependable supply of quality water was essential to the continuance of that institution.

Planners of the Timber Creek Watershed Project helped solve the town's problem. They increased the capacity of a flood-prevention reservoir to include storage for municipal water supply. The city developed a new water treatment plant and a 1.5 million gallon ground storage supply facility. To provide adequate pressure, it also constructed a 1 million gallon elevated storage tower. These supply and treatment facilities will provide Winfield and surrounding areas with quality water supply that should prove sufficient until the year 2020. And recently, Winfield City Lake has been developed to meet the recreation needs of the area. Local residents began fishing there in summer. This development has significantly improved the human environment and quality of life of this community.

The economic and physical growth of scores of small rural communities like Winfield, Kansas, is limited absolutely by inadequate supply of water. It will avail us little to talk about reversing the tide of migration from country to city and attracting more business and industry to rural America if the water supply in these country towns is inadequate even to meet the needs of present residents. That is why I attach so much importance to this benefit of the small watershed program, a benefit in keeping with that charge to the government in the National Environmental Policy Act about enhancing "the quality of renewable resources."

There are many examples, of course, of the new business and industry that have followed in the wake of multi-purpose watershed projects. Near Crozet, Virginia, the structure known as Beaver Creek Lake covers 104 acres and contains 750 million gallons of water. Because water is available, two major industries have settled in Crozet. One of them, a frozen food company, uses a million gallons of water a day. The new firms provide jobs for nearly 2,500 workers and have brought $15 million in annual payrolls to the area. Men and women who formerly were underemployed farm workers now have decent homes and new cars and television sets, like their relatives in larger communities, and the benefits to the community continue to multiply.

Another benefit of P.L. 566 projects, one perhaps unfamiliar to project sponsors in eastern states, is the creation of a regular and dependable supply of irrigation water.

An outstanding example is the American Fork-Dry Creek project in Utah. This project serves a watershed that had too much water in spring following rapid snowmelts and too little water in summer. Sediment damage caused by spring floods also plagued the local landowners.

The plan called for four debris basins strategically placed to hold the surging waters from the mountains and to permit the sediment to settle. Also included in the plans was the Silver Lake Flat Irrigation Reservoir. Local irrigation users bear the additional cost of this reservoir to provide water for irrigation when other supplies are exhausted.

As is typical with watershed projects, sponsors also found ways to conserve water supplies, to stretch them, and to avoid waste. They report that lining the irrigation ditches with concrete saves nearly a third of the watershed's supply of irrigation water, and they are continuing to line about 80,000 feet of canals and ditches annually.

In Wyoming, a different solution to a similar problem was applied by sponsors of the Star Valley Dry Creek Project. Like their neighbors in Utah, they were running out of irrigation water in August. The people of Star Valley eliminated the old irrigation canals that fed their sprinklers, and replaced them with a pipeline that intercepts water at a point high in the mountains. The weight of the water confined in the pipe provides the needed pressure; the same principle is used in municipal water towers.

Working in cooperation with the Star Valley farmers, the Forest Service built level terraces in the mountains to catch and hold water and snow. They also stabilized nearly 29,000 feet of gullies to help control flash flooding and assure a continuing and steady supply of water.

Another benefit of watershed projects is one which is particularly close to my heart. It is a benefit consistent with the aim expressed in the National Environmental Policy Act of achieving "a wide sharing of life's amenities." I refer to recreation.

I am not one of those people who consider recreation in any way a frivolous benefit. In my opinion, to be cut off from such simple pleasures as swimming and boating, fishing and camping, picnicking and hiking, is to be psychologically crippled.

I was deeply moved on a recent visit to a lake constructed as part of the Duncan Creek Watershed Project in South Carolina. That lake has brought the pleasures of fishing to many people, including the mentally and physically handicapped children of Whitten Village, a state training school. The Village built access ramps for wheelchairs and a fishing pier for the children. The Fish and Wildlife Service was asked to stock the lake with bass, bream, and channel catfish. But whether they catch a fish or not, one can see by the faces of these children that the simple act of dropping a line in the water provides them with more enjoyment than perhaps

they are able to experience in any other way. In the mathematics of computing cost-benefit ratios, I am not sure what dollar value you could put on such an experience for 2,800 people, but in my own private scale of values, I would rate it very high indeed. The benefits to the human beings involved transcend any inventory of physical facilities.

Another watershed lake, this one in Georgia, offers special recreational opportunities to more than 16,000 physically handicapped people every year. At Fort Yargo Lake, a multi-purpose flood prevention and recreation structure was built as part of the Marbury Creek Watershed Project. The Georgia Department of Natural Resources provided paths for wheelchairs and installed ramps for rolling specially built chairs into the water. There are nature trails and piers where people confined to wheelchairs can fish. Plant identification markers and other signs in the park area are in writing and in Braille. Here blind and crippled adults and children can swim, fish, play and enjoy nature despite their handicaps. Like the lake in South Carolina, Fort Yargo demonstrates the enormous potential of small watershed projects for extending the amenities of the natural environment to all people.

A growing number of small watershed projects also include planned improvements in fish and wildlife habitat. One example is Trafton Lake, in Maine, one of three sites planned as part of the Limestone Stream Watershed Project.

Several months after Trafton Lake was filled in April 1969, fisheries biologists made a census of the game fish population and found that it contained so many brook trout that supplemental stocking was unnecessary. One reason is that the nursery area above the lake was carefully preserved during construction. Also, water temperatures and food supply in the lake are optimum for a trout fishery.

Besides providing more fishing, both flood prevention and multiple purpose reservoirs can be modified to permit controlled management of the level of the water surface. This permits planned water fluctuations for the management of the fishery habitat. It also permits seeding of desirable food plants in the upper reaches of the reservoir, which can be flooded in the fall to provide food for migratory waterfowl.

We in SCS are convinced that much more can be done to improve fish and wildlife habitat in P.L. 566 projects, on a case by case basis, particularly if fish and wildlife experts participate in the planning from the very beginning.

An excellent example of the kind of cooperation I have in mind is taking place in Tennessee. During the past 10 years, an interagency group of biologists from the Tennessee Game and Fish Commission, the U.S. Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, and SCS, has helped plan and evaluate 44 watershed projects in the State.

In each case, the group makes an inventory of fish and wildlife resources in the watershed and determines the actual and potential fish and wildlife values in the area. These values can then be considered by the local sponsors and the watershed planning party as they develop the work plan.

After the watershed application is approved for planning, the biologists study the flood prevention measures to determine their impact, if any, on fish and wildlife. From this study additional measures may be recommended for improving wildlife resources or for mitigating damage to them.

This cooperative approach, which extends even into the construction phase has worked very well in Tennessee, and I see no reason why it shouldn't work in other States as well. Certainly this is a far better approach than boycotting the planning process entirely, only to superimpose an overview of a project after the basic work is done.

If you want first-hand knowledge of a project, there is no substitute for personal participation in planning that project. This was brought home to me with some force recently, when I visited India to study some of that nation's resource problems. Before my trip, I had done a good deal of advance reading—enough to run across many conflicting reports which I was unable to resolve in my own mind. While traveling in India, however, I was able to make some positive judgments by using my own eyes and ears and by talking with people whose experience I respected.

It is much the same with a man who tries to judge the pros and cons of a P.L. 566 watershed project from a distance. It is impossible to get the project into perspective unless you examine the site, wrestle personally with the problems, and immerse yourself in the conflicts. That is why I welcome the Tennessee approach. That is why I distrust the efforts of some to set themselves up as judge and jury while remaining hundreds of miles from the watershed site. This simplistic approach is not going to help resolve the conflicts we are experiencing today.

I have grown wary of engaging in generalized discussions of channel improvement work. The fact is that you can't isolate channel work in a watershed project from other aspects of the project. You have to look at all facets of each watershed project to come to any sensible conclusion about its value to the community and its impact on the environment

I also have learned first-hand that it is risky to generalize about the motives of local people who are personally involved in watershed planning. Some critics of the program try to tell me that farmers are motivated by crass economic considerations and that only scientists are concerned about the state of the environment. We all live in this environment together; farmer and biologist; bureaucrat and businessman. All share a concern about what kind of world we bequeath to our children and grandchildren. Certainly the long history of participation of thousands of farmers in such movements as soil stewardship and wildlife preservation provides ample evidence that the farmer is motivated by far more than the dollar sign. As one farmer told me not long ago, "If I were in this business just for the profit, I believe I'd get out of it."

All of us who appreciate the virtues of the small watershed program should be willing to speak up more forcefully in its behalf. The P.L. 566 program is not coming to an end; it is just beginning. We estimate that only about 10 percent of the job that needs to be done is already under way; the bulk of the work lies ahead of us. I do not know of any other local-state-Federal program which has any more potential for contributing to better urban and rural life and the environment than the small watershed program.

We have made some mistakes, to be sure but in far more instances, we have joined with sponsors in helping bring untold environmental as well as economic benefits to local people. And with new legislation proposed by Congress this year, there is a chance that the small watershed program may become an even more useful vehicle for serving rural communities in the future.

But it is going to take the full participation of knowledgeable people who are committed to participate in local planning—people from all manner of background and disciplines, like those assembled at this great meeting of the Soil Conservation Society of America. This is a program for the people—not for one kind of people or one segment of society or one point of view—but for all the people. That is why I am proud of the record of the small watershed program; that is why I am so confident about its future.

GENOCIDE AND REFUGEES

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, we are all aware of the great suffering that occurred because of acts of genocide during the Second World War. The events so shocked us that our Nation became a leader in the United Nations, urging and participating in the formulation of the Genocide Convention. I have been compelled to speak before the Senate daily for the last 5 years to promote ratification of that treaty, because genocide still exists in the world today.

One side effect of genocide which has been overlooked during much of the debate is the impact of genocide on the living members of a persecuted group.

For many people the best alternative available to them is to flee to another country, upsetting the peace between nations. The suffering which these refugees experience is often beyond belief. They may live for months or years in a foreign territory whose economy is unable to accommodate them. Often, they suffer from malnutrition. Adequate housing may not be available. The fear and despair which they face can be unbearable.

At the present time, many refugees are now suffering from this side effect of genocide. In Bangladesh, the repatriation of the homeless and hungry people is possible only because of a great spirit of unity among the people. Yet their pain has been and continues to be severe.

During the 17-year war in Sudan, nearly 200,000 refugees fled the country and still face much misery before they are repatriated.

Many citizens of Burundi are now fleeing their country as the killing continues.

The crime of genocide is creating international havoc and immense suffering. I urge ratification of the genocide treaty not only to declare our opposition to the crime of genocide, but also to give these refugees the hope that they need if they are to rebuild their broken lives. And we cannot forget the many people who will become refugees if genocide is allowed to occur in the future.

GRAIN SALES TO RUSSIA

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, farmers are reaping the benefits of President Nixon's wise and far-seeing policies as reflected in the approximately $1 billion in agricultural commodity export sales recently completed.

These recent sales of wheat, feed grains, and soybeans follow the 3 million tons of feed grain—about $150 million worth—exported to the U.S.S.R. in the fall of 1971. These commercial sales resulted from the Nixon policies which have brought the level of farmers' income to the highest on record.

PRESIDENT CHANGED POLICIES

President Nixon revised the trading rules imposed by President Kennedy and continued by President Johnson, which adversely affected sales to Soviet-bloc nations and our efforts to solve the balance-of-payments problem. Moreover, there was no indication that these burdensome regulations prevented the Soviet-bloc nations from obtaining the needed grain supplies. The restrictive programs of past administrations, of imposing certain shipping limitations and licensing exports, increased costs to importers and was deemed by President Nixon to be of doubtful utility. He eliminated these burdensome regulations.

RECORDSETTING AGREEMENT

He decided to offer the Soviet bloc the same competitive conditions available to other nations. Such a policy enables our export firms to be in the position of offering agricultural commodities every hour of every day. Moreover, on July 8, 1972, President Nixon announced the successful negotiation of the largest 3-year grain agreement in history between the United States and the U.S.S.R.—$750 million. As a part of that agreement, the United States is making available regular Commodity Credit Corporation credit terms. Trade reports have indicated very substantial cash purchases of grain and soybeans in addition to the credit purchases.

LABOR BENEFITS

The Presidential mission to the Soviet Union is resulting in a basic change in that the U.S.S.R. will now become the largest single importer of our farm output. Labor will benefit to the tune of 35,000 to 50,000 man-years of additional work. Our balance-of-payments situation will be much improved. All of this is tangible proof of the wisdom of President Nixon's bold efforts for peaceful trade.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an article entitled, "Another Fiscal Year Record for U.S. Agricultural Exports," from the August 7, 1972, issue of Foreign Agriculture, a publication of the Foreign Agriculture Service, be printed in the RECORD.

The article outlines the progress in agricultural export sales during the past recordbreaking fiscal year. It is well that this story receive the extensive distribution provided by the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ANOTHER FISCAL YEAR RECORD FOR U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS

(By Dewain H. Rahe)

In 1971-72, U.S. agricultural exports again advanced to an all-time high, reaching $8 billion. The increase of 4 percent, or $200 million, was all in commercial sales for dollars. Shipments of animals and animal products jumped to more than $1 billion, a record for that export category; and shipments of soybeans and products passed $2 billion, a first for any category.

Higher prices were responsible for nearly all the increase: export value increases for soybeans, cotton, dairy products, cattle hides, fruits, nuts, vegetables, and feedgrains more than offset reductions in shipments of wheat, flaxseed, alfalfa meal, and animal fats. Volume, however, about equaled the record level of the previous year.

Fiscal 1972 had most of its agricultural trade misfortunes during its first half. First, the longshoremen's strike at east coast, west coast, and gulf ports severely hampered exports, although stepped-up shipments before and after the strike somewhat reduced the impact on the east coast and the gulf, and the St. Lawrence Seaway remained open for shifts from gulf ports. Second, the international monetary crisis created uncertainty in the foreign market, delaying the purchase of many U.S. products. Third, foreign production of grains, especially wheat, showed a substantial increase in 1971 which damped the demand for U.S. grains in July-December.

During the second half of the fiscal year, several improvements occurred. First, the period was relatively free of strikes (except on the west coast, Jan. 17-Feb. 21). Second, the bulk of the grain sold to the USSR last fall moved out. Third, economic growth picked up in most foreign countries. Fourth, reports of reductions in foreign grain production began to appear, stimulating U.S. sales. Fifth, the devaluation of the dollar and the revaluation of some major foreign currencies increased the competitiveness of many U.S. farm products. However, flexible duties on variable-levy items, plus other European restrictions, offset much of this competitive edge. Nonetheless, January-June exports rose to a record $4.2 billion, from $3.9 billion the year before—enough to more than balance off the July-December slump.

Shipments to developed countries totaled $5.0 billion, or about the same as the previous year; but the composition of the trade changed considerably. For example, exports to Japan, the top market, declined by about 4 percent because of a sharp reduction in wheat and feedgrains. Exports to the European Community, on the other hand, rose about 7 percent to a record of $1.9 billion. Exports of items not subject to variable levies accounted for the increase. This outweighted a decline in exports of variable-levy commodities caused by the sharp increase in EC wheat production that reduced import requirements.

Developing countries accounted for $2.7 billion of the year's total, up from $2.5 billion a year earlier. Shipments to South Vietnam, India, Brazil, and Morocco declined, while those to South Korea, the Philippines, Iran, Pakistan, Egypt, Afghanistan, Colombia, and Peru gained.

Sales to COMECON countries rose over $280 million, from about $170 million in 1970–71. The largest part of this increase came from feedgrain sales of $135 million to the USSR. Exports to other COMECON countries showed mixed trends, with increases for Poland and East Germany and decreases for Romania, Bulgaria, Czechslovakia, and Hungary.

Exports of soybeans and products jumped 6 percent to a new record of over $2 billion—the first commodity group ever to exceed that figure. Both prices and volume were up from last year's record.

Soybean exports rose to over 430 million bushels, from 424 million a year earlier. Top markets again were the EC, Japan, Spain, Canada (includes transshipments), Taiwan, Denmark, and Israel. Increased foreign demand for meal was the princial reason for the rise. The expending livestock industries of many countries, especially those in Western Europe, are emphasizing improved feeding practices, which require greater use of high-protein feed. The high price of grains in the EC has also encouraged feeding of soybean meal.

U.S. stocks were smaller in 1971–72 and prices higher, pushing export value up about 9 percent. Average unit value was $3.22 per bushel compared with $3.00 in 1970–71. For many foreign buyers, these higher prices were offset by the realinement of the U.S. dollar with other currencies. In Japan, the elimination of import tariffs on soybeans also helped maintain stable prices to Japanese buyers.

Combined exports of soybean oil and cottonseed oil were down slightly from last year's record level of 2.1 billion pounds. Still, the 1971–72 figure of 2.0 billion pounds was the second highest on record. Foreign consumption of vegetable oils continued to gain in both developed and developing countries, and strong demand for U.S. soybean oil contributed to the near-record export total; but foreign production of copra, palm and palm kernel oils, peanuts, and rapeseed rose sharply, somewhat reducing U.S. vegetable oil sales.

Protein meal exports totaled 4.5 million tons, down somewhat from a year earlier. However, value was about the same because of higher prices. Soybean meal accounted for over 90 percent of the total. U.S. meal exports, including the equivalent of oilseeds, accounted for about one-half of the world export total.

Exports of grains and preparations fell about 4 percent. Wheat accounted for the decline, totaling around 632 million bushels compared with 738 million a year earlier as increased grain production, especially of wheat, in the Northern Hemisphere reduced the demand for U.S. wheat.

A considerable part of the drop in wheat exports can be traced to losses during the longshoremen's strikes. For example, wheat exports through the west coast ports declined to 176 million bushels, from 214 million a year earlier. Down sharply were exports to India, Pakistan, Brazil, Japan, the EC, and the United Kingdom. Exports to Japan alone plunged from 106 million bushels to 80 million. Advancing somewhat, however, were exports to Iran, Mexico, Peru, Afghanistan, Syria, and Pakistan.

The average export value of wheat rose to $1.68 per bushel, from $1.65 per bushel in 1970–71 when feed wheat accounted for a large part of the total. This year, with the sharp drop in feedgrain prices, feed wheat exports fell.

Rice exports totaled 37.4 million bags, slightly more than a year earlier. Exports to the EC, Korea, and South Vietnam were smaller; those to India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, larger. Heavy exports to developing countries in the last quarter of the year helped maintain the total. With increasing population and somewhat smaller production in a number of these countries, demand for U.S. rice rose sharply.

Exports of feedgrains rose about 1.7 million tons, to a total of 20.8 million. All the increase occurred in the latter months of the year. The continued growth of demand for livestock products throughout the developed and developing countries has created more demand for U.S. feedgrains. The current world meat shortage, in particular, has encouraged many livestock producers around the world to feed animals to heavier weights.

Purchase of 2.5 million tons of feedgrains by the USSR last fall—most of which moved in the second half of fiscal 1972—contributed to the overall gains; and exports to the EC were over one-half million tons larger than a year earlier. Also, reduced coarse grain production in some countries caused many foreign purchasers to turn to the United States for their feedgrain supplies. Corn production in Argentina, for example, fell by 4 million tons, and grain sorghum production, by 2.3 million. Corn production in South Africa rose to record levels, but South African exports are somewhat limited by handling and transportation facilities.

The rise in U.S. feedgrain exports might

have been even larger had not shipments to Japan declined by over 2 million tons, as Japan made more coarse grain purchases elsewhere—especially in Australia, Brazil, South Africa, and Thailand. In addition, Japan reduced its feedgrain import requirements by using 1.5 million tons of surplus rice for feed.

Cotton exports rose 8 percent in value, all of the increase stemming from higher prices. In quantity, cotton exports totaled 3.3 million bales, down slightly from the 3.7 million of a year earlier. Export value jumped to nearly $160 per bale from $132 the previous year.

Strong world demand for cotton has helped U.S. exports despite tight supplies and relatively high prices. Foreign non-Communist production in 1970–71 was down sharply, while consumption was up in both Communist and non-Communist countries, thereby pulling world stocks down to a 20-year low. U.S. exports have fallen sharply since March, when reports indicated that world production in 1971–72 would be substantially larger; and because of the big U.S. cotton crop expected in 1972–73, many foreign buyers have been delaying their purchases. Principal cotton markets this year included Japan, Canada, the EC, Indonesia, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, Korea, and the Philippines.

Tobacco exports, including bulk tobacco, totaled about the same in value as a year earlier. Quantity, however, fell to about 557 million pounds from 584 million. The decline was in exports of flue-cured tobacco to the United Kingdom the EC, primarily West Germany. Other tobacco exports increased, including those of burley, Maryland, and dark fire-cured. Exports of bulk smoking tobacco also increased, to 33 million pounds compared with 29 million a year ago.

U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS: VALUE BY COMMODITY
FISCAL YEARS 1971 AND 1972

[Dollars in millions]

Commodity	1970–71	[1] 1971–72	Change (percent)
Animals and animal products:			
Dairy products	$131	$195	+49
Fats, oils, and greases	273	229	−16
Hides and skins	186	237	+27
Meats and meat products	143	178	+25
Poultry products	55	57	+4
Other	115	115	0
Total	903	1,011	+12
Grains and preparations:			
Feedgrains, excluding products	1,096	1,118	+2
Rice	289	305	+6
Wheat and flour	1,201	1,047	−13
Other	119	133	+12
Total	2,705	2,603	−4
Oilseeds and products:			
Cottonseed and soybean oils	290	293	+1
Soybeans	1,273	1,391	+9
Protein meal	398	398	0
Other	110	140	+27
Total	2,071	2,222	+7
Other products and preparations:			
Cotton, excluding linters	492	530	+8
Tobacco, unmanufactured	570	570	0
Fruits and preparations	341	381	+12
Nuts and preparations	66	83	+27
Vegetables and preparations	208	230	+10
Other	400	420	+5
Total	2,077	2,214	+7
Total exports	7,756	8,050	+4

[1] Estimated.

Tobacco exports to Japan rose to 63 million pounds from 54 million the year before. Most importing countries, however, have been maintaining tobacco stocks at relatively low levels during the past year. Uncertainty about Rhodesia's future as an exporter has caused many foreign buyers to purchase only for current needs.

Exports of animals and animal products exceeded $1 billion for the first time. This new record was achieved primarily by increases for dairy products (primarily butter) and hides and skins, though meats—particularly beef and pork—also gained.

Dairy product exports rose in value by nearly one-half from a year earlier. All the increase was accounted for by butter exports, which leaped to $63 million for $3 million in 1971. The United Kingdom took nearly all of this gain. The substantial reduction in New Zealand's dairy production caused by 2 years of drought created a very tight world butter situation; in addition, the huge EC surplus of a few years back has disappeared. Thus the United States was the only major supplier that had enough to meet the U.K. demand.

Exports of hides and skins gained in value by over one-fourth from those of 1970–71. Foreign demand has been gaining slowly in recent years; but this year, supplies from other exporters were limited—particularly from Argentina, which reduced its cattle slaughter and used a larger portion of its hide production domestically.

Meat and meat product exports rose by about a fourth. Beef accounted for much of the difference, with sharp increases in exports of high-quality cuts to Canada and to tourist areas of the Caribbean, Asia, and Europe. Pork and variety meats also gained—pork, mostly in May and June, with Japan taking the increase. Although meat production around the world has been rising steadily in recent years, it has failed to meet the rise in world demand from rapid growth in income.

Exports of animal fats and oils fell by about 16 percent from those of 1970–71. Increased lard production and availability in Western Europe resulted in a substantial decline of U.S. exports to the United Kingdom, the most important market. Inedible tallow exports rose by about 100 million pounds to more than 3 billion; but value fell by about $14 million because of lower prices.

Poultry and poultry product exports rose 3 percent with most of the increase occurring in poultry meat, especially exports of chickens to Japan and Canada. The total for turkeys declined slightly because of higher EC supplemental levies, which effectively curtailed shipments to that area. Other poultry products showed relatively little change. Combined exports of baby chicks, breeding chicks, and other chicks totaled about $20 million, about the same as a year ago. As more countries have developed a foundation of breeding stock, export growth in these items has slowed somewhat.

Combined exports of fruits, nuts, and vegetables achieved a new record value in 1971–72. Exports of fruits rose to $381 million, 12 percent more than a year earlier. Most of the gain was due to fresh products. Demand for U.S. citrus has shown a sharp gain, particularly for grapefruit in Japan, where there continues to be a strong market for lemons. In addition, exports have been helped this year by the realinement of the U.S. dollar with other currencies, which has made U.S. products more competitive. At the same time, promotion of high-quality U.S. products has helped capture more markets and a larger share of some existing markets. Exports of grapefruits jumped to $34 million from $15 million. Lemons and limes were also up, as were most other fresh items.

Exports of canned fruits, however, were down because of smaller production and higher prices, especially for canned peaches and fruit cocktail; but exports of fruit juices rose by about $3 million to around $63 million, primarily because of advances for orange juice. Dried fruits, principally raisins, also gained slightly; higher prices accounted for the increase. Raisin prices rose sharply after the freeze in California.

Exports of nuts and preparations rose to a third successive record, reaching $83 million from $66 million a year earlier. Most of the increase was due to almonds, which account for over two-thirds of the total. However, other items have also gained, especially walnuts. New methods of production that enable mechanical harvesting have greatly increased the competitive position of U.S. nuts in the world market.

Exports of vegetables and preparations totaled $230 million, 10 percent greater than a year earlier. Again, fresh products—mainly lettuce—accounted for most of the increase except for hops, exports of which jumped to $20 million from about $12 million after production slumped in Western Europe because of unfavorable weather.

BRITISH GOVERNMENT NOTES HEALTH RISKS OF SMOKING CIGARETTES

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I invite attention to the fact that the British Government is taking steps parallel with those of our own Government in attempting to educate its people on the health risks of smoking cigarettes. Indeed, all the industrialized countries of the world are endeavoring through their health departments to warn their people of the consequences of cigarette smoking.

I ask unanimous consent that a small news item published in the Washington Post be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

BRITISH TO STIFFEN CIGARETTE CURBS

LONDON, August 8.—The British government today announced new moves to highlight health risks to cigarette smokers.

British cigarette makers, who are banned from advertising on television, already must publish official health warnings on the packs they sell in this country. Now the government intends, starting next year, to publish lists of brands in order of their tar contents to run an anti-smoking campaign in schools and to cut down exposure of cigarette advertisements at televised sporting events.

THE NIGHT OF THE MURDERED POETS

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, 20 years ago, on the night of August 12, 1952, the Soviet Union executed 24 leading Russian Jewish poets, writers, and intellectual public figures. This blood-stained night reflected the Soviet Union's compulsive drive to eradicate all the values and traces of a great religious faith—Judaism—from the face of Russia.

Mr. President, it is a tribute to the human spirit and the spirit of a great people that the Jews of Russia today, more than ever, are united in their goal to retain their identity and solidarity

with their brothers throughout the world. They can achieve this goal because they remember "The Night of the Murdered Poets" 20 years ago. We all should.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a brief description of these events prepared by the American Conference on Soviet Jewry.

There being no objection, the description was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE NIGHT OF THE MURDERED POETS

On the night of August 12, 1952, twenty-four leading Jewish poets, writers and intellectual public figures were executed in the basement of Moscow's notorious Lubianka Prison. These were not random executions, but the culmination of a calculated campaign to eradicate Jewish life in the Soviet Union.

The paradox of the August 12th massacre is clear: Poetry is, by its very nature, immortal. Once a poet has committed his words to paper, or whispered them to another, he has secured a place for his ideas, his beliefs and his convictions. A bullet cannot kill a poem, any more than it can murder a philosophy.

In his despair for the murdered poets, Chaim Grade, their wartime comrade, wrote "The young have forgotten you and me and the hour of our grief . . . your darkly murdered tongue, silenced by a hangman's noose is no longer heard. . . ." That poetic prophecy, written after the execution of the 24 writers, must not be allowed to be fulfilled. The repercussions of August 12th, and of the entire 1948–1953 period, when the Soviet Government effectively demolished the remnants of the Jewish community, provoked Soviet Jews to fight to retain their Jewish identity. In the void created by the destruction of Jewish life, the Soviet Government did not take into account the determined and obdurate nature of the Jewish people.

When the war was over, two million Soviet Jews had perished. The Nazis had found in the Soviet Jews the synthesis of all they despised and feared. The "Jewish Bolshevik" became a prime target of the full force of Nazi propaganda and war machinery. The three million surviving Jews were physically and psychologically depleted. With their relatives dead and their towns destroyed, Jews returned home to encounter more anti-Semitism.

This resurgence of popular anti-Semitism left Russian Jews with little more than their inherent will to survive. It was in this atmosphere that Soviet Jews began to rebuild their lives. But they had hardly any time before the Cold War, with its attendant suspicions and tensions, evolved.

The Cold War engendered in the Soviet Union a fear of anything Western and a concomitant attempt to prove that things Soviet and Russian were best. The Soviet campaign against rootless cosmopolitanism" was a natural outgrowth of this new perspective. At first, the campaign was directed at all those whose outlook and preferences were for Western and international ideas. However, as the propaganda became more extensive, anti-Jewish sentiments emerged. Soviet authorities saw the trait of "cosmopolitanism" as a contemptible Jewish attribute. The scene was set for the period that came to be known as the "Black Years"—1948–1953, with the purges and repressions which would follow.

Jewish communal and religious institutions had been destroyed long before the War. In 1942, the Soviet Government organized the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee to enlist wartime support from Jews in the West. The Yiddish writers and artists selected by Stalin to lead the Committee became victims of the terror of the black years. Solomon Mikhoels, director of the Moscow Yiddish State Theater and an actor whose characterizations of King Lear and Tevye were legendary, had been named chairman of the Committee.

The writers who joined with Mikhoels in the work of the Committee had from the early days of the Soviet State joined wholeheartedly in the seemingly messianic work of building a new social order.

Several had left in the wake of the programs and upheavals of the revolutionary period, but returned voluntarily as the new Soviet Government restored order. Many Soviet Yiddish writers communicated the Communist message to the hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews whose mother tongue was Yiddish.

In time, due to the absence of other Jewish institutions during the traumatic wartime period, Soviet Jews came to look upon the Committee as the symbol of Jewish consciousness in the U.S.S.R. Under the impact of shattering wartime experience, the writers began to employ Jewish historical and religious themes.

The struggle of Soviet Jews against the Nazis was portrayed in terms of the tradition of the Jewish will to survive against powerful oppressors. The public meetings of the Committee and the pages, as well as the very title of its Journal, *Eynikayt* (Unity), provided a forum for expression of Jewish sentiments, emphasizing the unity of Soviet Jews with world Jewry, which would have been considered unthinkable before the war.

Mikhoels addressed "Brother Jews" throughout the world. Peretz Markish said, "We are one people, and now we are becoming one army." Colonel Itzik Feffer recalled Ezekiel's vision of a mighty nation arising from the valley of dry bones. A Committee manifesto was addressed to "our Jewish brethren the world over." Mikhoels and Feffer were dispatched on an official mission to the United States. They were heard in many different cities by about half a million Jews, urging and receiving moral and financial support for the Soviet war effort, and promising that "firm brotherly relations" would persist among Jews throughout the world after the war.

More than three million dollars was collected in the United States. At a postwar memorial ceremony in honor of Polish Jews, Markish corrected Feffer—who had spoken of "the friendship of the Jewish peoples"—with these words:

"There are not two Jewish peoples. The Jewish nation is one. Just as a heart cannot be cut up and divided, similarly one cannot split up the Jewish people into Polish Jews and Russian Jews. Everywhere, we are and shall remain one entity."

Soviet Jews, hearing such expressions from Committee members, turned to the Committee for assistance with many kinds of problems, particularly those of refugees and evacuees. Ilya Ehrenberg, the assimilated Jewish writer who wrote in Russian and frequently served, in the postwar period, as a spokesman for Stalin's strictures against Jewish nationalism, recalled in his memoirs: "After the victory thousands of people went to Mikhoels for help because they saw him as the wise rabbi the defender of the oppressed."

Mikhoels as one of the leading creative Jewish personalities of the era was among the first to sound the anguished alarm of "solidarity." He called for the united front of all Jews in the face of total annihilation in the battle against fascism and as part of the freedom-loving people of the world. But by 1948 Jewish solidarity which had been so important in the Soviet struggle against fascism was no longer needed or desirable. It was viewed as divisive to a regime characterized by Russian chauvinism.

The solution to this "Jewish problem" was to be the suppression and obliteration of all traces of Jewish culture. The reign of destruction began with Solomon Mikhoels.

Mikhoels had been sent to Minsk on an official mission as a member of the Stalin Prize committee. Late at night on January 13, 1948, he was summoned from his hotel room by a Communist Party official. The next morning, his bruised and bloody corpse was found near the railroad station. The reported "accidental death" was eventually discovered; the Soviet secret police had killed Mikhoels by running him over with a truck. A Jewish theater critic who had accompanied him, Golubov-Potapov, suffered the same fate.

The murdered Mikhoels was given a magnificent funeral in Moscow by the government. His body lay in state at the Jewish State Theatre, and tens of thousands of Jews came to pay their last respects in death. The dishonesty of the official report of "death by accident" swiftly became apparent. A Jewish detective who began his own investigation of the "accident" disappeared and was never seen again. Peretz Markish had the courage to challenge the official version of Mikhoels death in his memorial poem, "To Solomon Mikhoels—an Eternal Lamp at his Coffin." Despite Stalin's assigning Professor Zbarsky, the expert mortician who had embalmed Lenin's body, to disguise the bruises on Mikhoels' face Markish wrote:

"The wounds on your face are covered by the snow,
So that the black Satan shall not touch you.
But your dead eyes blaze with anger,
And your heart they trampled on cries out against the murderous crew . . .
Somewhere in heaven, between the wandering shine,
A star lights up in honor of your brilliant name.
Don't feel ashamed of the holes in you, and your pain!
Let eternity feel the same."

The Soviet Government provided a splendid funeral while seeking, at the same time, to conceal the actual cause of death. Nevertheless, many Soviet Jews quickly perceived the ominous meaning of Mikhoel's death. For them, the tragic murder of Mikhoels was an alarming and frightening sign of the increasing militancy of the anti-Jewish campaign.

On September 21, 1948, Ehrenberg writing in *Pravda* delivered the opening blows of the new campaign. He warned Soviet Jews that their identifying with Jews in other countries would prove their disloyalty to the Soviet Union. The last issue of *Eynikayt* appeared on November 20, 1948 and then the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was disbanded. There followed the liquidation of the Yiddish *Emes* publishing house, the bimonthly *Heymland*, a Yiddish newspaper in Kiev, Jewish libraries, the last two Yiddish schools, professional theaters and amateur artistic groups. Jewish books disappeared into "restricted collections" in libraries.

What was left to the authorities was now the removal of key Jewish personalities. In the winter of 1948–49, the Soviet secret police arrested hundreds of writers, poets, artists, musicians, and government and party officials.

The first of the Yiddish writers to be arrested was Feffer, who had been the most enthusiastic Communist among the Jewish writers. At intervals which allowed time for the spread of uncertainty, dread and despair, the secret police came in turn for the prominent Yiddish writers and poets. Pinkhas Kahanovich, who wrote under the mystical

nom de plume, Der Nister ("The Hidden One"), reportedly said to the secret policemen who came to arrest him: "At last!"

While the exact toll is not known, one account (Cang) offers the figure of 431 outstanding Soviet Jewish artists arrested this period—217 writers and poets, 108 actors, 87 painters and sculptors, and 19 musicians. The families of the prisoners—wives, small children, fathers and sisters, in-laws, aged parents—were exiled to Siberia or left as social outcasts without means of support. Most of the prisoners died in Soviet labor camps. Der Nister, for example, died in a camp on June 4, 1950, when he was past 65 years of age.

Somehow the remainder of the most prominent writers and poets survived in the camps until the cataclysmic summer of 1952. They included Peretz Markish, Itzik Feffer, David Bergelson, Leyb Kvitko, Shmuel Persov, David Hofshteyn and Itzik Nusinov.

On July 11, 1952, these writers were among the 25 Jews brought to trial in Moscow. The other known defendants were:

Solomon Lozovsky, age 74, member of the Central Committee elected by the 18th Party Congress (1939), served for a time as deputy foreign minister.

Binyamin Zuskin, distinguished actor, successor to Mikhoels as the last director of the Moscow Yiddish State Theater.

Eliahu Spivak, head of the Department of Jewish Culture of the Ukranian Academy of Sciences until its liquidation in 1949.

Lina Shtern, 74, the only woman defendant, a biochemist and member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences.

Considering the positions of those involved, the charges brought against them are ironic and tragic. All 25 were charged with being "enemies of the USSR, agents of American Imperialism, bourgeois nationalist Zionists and rebels who sought by armed rebellion to separate the Crimea from the Soviet Union and to establish their own Jewish bourgeois nationalist Zionist republic there."

The trial ended on July 18, 1952. The defendants refused to plead guilty. According to some accounts, Markish and the aged Lozovsky showed particular valor in forcefully defending themselves, claiming that the prosecutors were the real criminals. All 25 male defendants were sentenced to death; Lina Shtern was sentenced to life imprisonment. She was subsequently released and died in 1968 at the age of 90 without ever revealing the circumstances of the 1952 trial.

On August 12, 1952, the 24 defendants were executed in the basement of Moscow's Lubianka Prison, on Dzerzhinsky Square. Reportedly, the last words of David Bergelson, who was 68 at the time of his murder, were:

"Earth, oh earth, do not cover my blood!"

The Soviet policy which culminated on August 12, 1952 left three million Soviet Jews bereft of poets, writers, actors, teachers, leaders, theaters, artists and communal institutions of any kind. Even the Yiddish linotype machines had been smashed. There was no one left to give voice to simple grief. The next generation might still be Jews, but they would be dumb and mute Jews, without poets, without songs. So it seemed.

The crimes committed against the Jewish writers have never been publicly acknowledged by any official Soviet source. Even during the period following Stalins death, when many of his other crimes were denounced, the night of August 21 was not recognized. While this absence of official Soviet recognition may be a function of the involvement of post-war Soviet leadership in crime, it also represents a commitment on the part of the present Soviet leadership to a perpetuation of anti-Jewish polices: Jewish culture remains under sentence of death.

In November, 1955, the widows of the murdered writers were issued documents of "rehabilitation for their dead husbands by a Soviet court. This "rehabilitation has never been made public. The Soviet Government continues to suppress identification of even the graves of the writers.

The Jewish generation which grew to maturity in the Soviet Union after 1952 was the crucible in which the success of the Soviet Jewish policy was tested. We now know this generation of Soviet Jews had not been found wanting in its dedication to Jewish survival. Because they have been found deprived of the tools of survival which most other Soviet minorities enjoy—schools, publications, seminaries, poets, writers, artists, two languages—Soviet Jews today insistently proclaim what Itzik Feffer proudly declared in one of his last poems "I Am a Jew."

There are other signs from within the U.S.S.R. that the echoes of August 12 will not be stilled. Raiza Palatnik, an Odessa librarian who insists on addressing the courts in Yiddish, was sentenced to three years in prison in 1971. The charges against her included possession of an old book by David Bergelson, published before 1948. And Esther and David Markish, the widow and 33 year old son of Peretz Markish, sent from Moscow an endless stream of letters, telegrams, telephone calls, and petitions demanding their right to be repatriated to Israel.

David Markish does not confine his demands to prose. He writes forceful poetry which demands of Brezhnev, "Pharaoh, Let My People Go." There is perhaps no better illustration of the futility of the bullets of August 12 than the fierce determination to leave the U.S.S.R. which the son of Peretz Markish expresses in "Caravans of Jewish Cemeteries."

Our land, my land without end
Towards you I do not age when I stride,
Because I need you in my youth.
Only a bullet will subdue me,
But, if on the way I shall be killed,
I shall fall with my head forward,
And you then my heart will be nearer,
Though it be merely one step—
Israel!

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is concluded.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the unanimous-consent agreement, following conclusion of routine morning business, the Senate will now go into executive session and proceed to the consideration of treaties, Executive Calendar Nos. 27, 28, and 29.

CONVENTION ON OWNERSHIP OF CULTURAL PROPERTY

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The resolutions of ratification of all three treaties having been read, the Senate will proceed to vote on the first treaty, Calendar No. 27, Executive B (92d Cong., 2d sess.), the Convention on Ownership of Cultural Property.

The first question is on agreeing to the reservations and understandings to the resolution of ratification.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, while the first vote will take 15 minutes, the two succeeding votes, as long as they are in sequence, take 10 minutes.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I would hope that the secretaries of the respective parties will notify all Senators to that effect.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will report the reservation and understandings.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The United States reserved the right to determine whether or not to impose export controls over cultural property.

The United States understands the provisions of the Convention to be neither self-executing nor retroactive.

The United States understands Article 3 not to modify property interests in cultural property under the laws of the states parties.

The United States understands Article 7(a) to apply to institutions whose acquisition policy is subject to national control under existing domestic legislation and not to require the enactment of new legislation to establish national control over other institutions.

The United States understands that Article 7(b) is without prejudice to other remedies, civil or penal, available under the laws of the states parties for the recovery of stolen cultural property to the rightful owner without payment of compensation. The United States is further prepared to take the additional steps contemplated by Article 7(b)(ii) for the return of covered stolen cultural property without payment of compensation, except to the extent required by the Constitution of the United States, for those states parties that agree to do the same for the United States institutions.

The United States understands the words "as appropriate for each country" in Article 10(a) as permitting each state party to determine the extent of regulation, if any, of antique dealers and declares that in the United States that determination would be made by the appropriate authorities of state and municipal governments.

The United States understands Article 13 (d) as applying to objects removed from the country of origin after the entry into force of this Convention for the states concerned, and, as stated by the Chairman of the Special Committee of Governmental Experts that prepared the text, and reported in paragraph 28 of the Report of that Committee, the means of recovery of cultural property under subparagraph (d) are the judicial actions referred to in subparagraph (c) of Article 13, and that such actions are controlled by the law of the requested State, the requesting State having to submit necessary proofs.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the reservation and understandings are agreed to en bloc.

The question now is, Will the Senate advise and consent to the resolution of ratification with the reservation and understandings of Executive B (92d Cong., second sess.), the Convention of Ownership of Cultural Property?

The resolution of ratification, with the reservations and understandings, reads as follows:

Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, adopted on November 14, 1970 at the Sixteenth General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Executive B, 92d Congress, 2d Session), Subject to the following reservation and understandings:

The United States reserves the right to determine whether or not to impose export controls over cultural property.

The United States understands the provisions of the Convention to be neither self-executing nor retroactive.

The United States understands Article 3, not to modify property interests in cultural property under the laws of the states parties.

The United States understands Article 7(a) to apply to institutions whose acquisition policy is subject to national control under existing domestic legislation and not to require the enactment of new legislation to establish national control over other institutions.

The United States understands that Article 7(b) is without prejudice to other remedies, civil or penal, available under the laws of the states parties for the recovery of stolen cultural property to the rightful owner without payment of compensation. The United States is further prepared to take the additional steps contemplated by Article 7(b)(ii) for the return of covered stolen cultural property without payment of compensation, except to the extent required by the Constitution of the United States, for those states parties that agree to do the same for the United States institutions.

The United States understands the words "as appropriate for each country" in Article 10(a) as permitting each state party to determine the extent of regulation, if any, of antique dealers and declares that in the United States that determination would be made by the appropriate authorities of state and municipal governments.

The United States understands Article 13 (d) as applying to objects removed from the country of origin after the entry into force of this Convention for the states concerned, and, as stated by the Chairman of the Special Committee of Governmental Experts that prepared the text, and reported in paragraph 28 of the Report of that Committee, the means of recovery of cultural property under subparagraph (d) are the judicial actions referred to in subparagraph (c) of Article 13, and that such actions are controlled by the law of the requested State, the requesting State having to submit necessary proofs.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Virginia (Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR.), the Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON), the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. EASTLAND), the Senator from Georgia (Mr. GAMBRELL), the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. HARRIS), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUYE), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN), the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL), and the Senator from Virginia (Mr. SPONG) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that the Senator from Louisiana (Mrs. EDWARDS) is absent on official business.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Georgia (Mr. GAMBRELL), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), the Senator from Virginia (Mr. SPONG), and the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL) would each vote "yea."

Mr. SCOTT. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. GRIFFIN), the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. MILLER), the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY), and the Senator from Ohio (Mr. SAXBE) are necessarily absent.

The Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) is absent because of illness.

The Senator from Nebraska (Mr. CURTIS) is detained on official business.

If present and voting, the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. CURTIS), the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. MILLER), and the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) would each vote "yea."

The yeas and nays resulted—yeas 79, nays 0, as follows:

[No. 374 Leg.]

YEAS—79

Aiken	Fannin	Nelson
Allen	Fong	Packwood
Allott	Fulbright	Pastore
Anderson	Gravel	Pearson
Bayh	Gurney	Proxmire
Beall	Hansen	Randolph
Bellmon	Hart	Ribicoff
Bennett	Hartke	Roth
Bentsen	Hollings	Schweiker
Bible	Hruska	Scott
Boggs	Humphrey	Smith
Brock	Jackson	Sparkman
Brooke	Javits	Stafford
Buckley	Jordan, N.C.	Stennis
Burdick	Jordan, Idaho	Stevens
Byrd, Robert C.	Kennedy	Stevenson
Cannon	Long	Symington
Case	Magnuson	Taft
Chiles	Mansfield	Talmadge
Church	Mathias	Thurmond
Cook	McClellan	Tower
Cooper	McIntyre	Tunney
Cotton	Metcalf	Weicker
Cranston	Mondale	Williams
Dole	Montoya	Young
Dominick	Moss	
Ervin	Muskie	

NAYS—0

NOT VOTING—21

Baker	Goldwater	Miller
Byrd, Harry F., Jr.	Griffin	Mundt
Curtis	Harris	Pell
Eagleton	Hatfield	Percy
Eastland	Hughes	Saxbe
Edwards	Inouye	Spong
Gambrell	McGee	
	McGovern	

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HUMPHREY). On this vote the yeas are 79 and the nays are 0. Two-thirds of the Senators present and voting having voted in the affirmative, the resolution of ratification is agreed to.

CONVENTION ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF LEGAL METROLOGY

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now occurs on the adoption of the resolution of ratification on executive I, 92d Congress, second session, the convention establishing an international organization of legal metrology.

The question is, Will the Senate advise and consent to the resolution of ratification? On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Virginia (Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR.), the Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON), the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. EASTLAND), the Senator from Georgia (Mr. GAMBRELL), the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. HARRIS), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUYE), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN), the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL), and the Senator from Virginia (Mr. SPONG), are necessarily absent.

I further announce that the Senator from Louisiana (Mrs. EDWARDS) is absent on official business.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Georgia (Mr. GAMBRELL), the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL), the Senator from Virginia (Mr. SPONG), and the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES) would each vote "yea."

Mr. SCOTT. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. GRIFFIN), the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. MILLER), the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY), and the Senator from Ohio (Mr. SAXBE) are necessarily absent.

The Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) is absent because of illness.

The Senator from Nebraska (Mr. CURTIS) is detained on official business.

If present and voting, the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. CURTIS), the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. MILLER), and the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) would each vote "yea."

The yeas and nays resulted—yeas 79, nays 0, as follows:

[No. 375 Ex.]

YEAS—79

Aiken	Fannin	Nelson
Allen	Fong	Packwood
Allott	Fulbright	Pastore
Anderson	Gravel	Pearson
Bayh	Gurney	Proxmire
Beall	Hansen	Randolph
Bellmon	Hart	Ribicoff
Bennett	Hartke	Roth
Bentsen	Hollings	Schweiker
Bible	Hruska	Scott
Boggs	Humphrey	Smith
Brock	Jackson	Sparkman
Brooke	Javits	Stafford
Buckley	Jordan, N.C.	Stennis
Burdick	Jordan, Idaho	Stevens
Byrd, Robert C.	Kennedy	Stevenson
Cannon	Long	Symington
Case	Magnuson	Taft
Chiles	Mansfield	Talmadge
Church	Mathias	Thurmond
Cook	McClellan	Tower
Cooper	McIntyre	Tunney
Cotton	Metcalf	Weicker
Cranston	Mondale	Williams
Dole	Montoya	Young
Dominick	Moss	
Ervin	Muskie	

NAYS—0

NOT VOTING—21

Baker	Goldwater	Miller
Byrd, Harry F., Jr.	Griffin	Mundt
Curtis	Harris	Pell
Eagleton	Hatfield	Percy
Eastland	Hughes	Saxbe
Edwards	Inouye	Spong
Gambrell	McGee	
	McGovern	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote the yeas are 79, and the nays are 0. Two-thirds of the Senators present and voting having voted in the affirmative, the resolution of ratification is agreed to.

TAX CONVENTION WITH NORWAY

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now is on the adoption of the resolution of ratification on Executive D, 92d Congress, second session, the Tax Convention with Norway.

The question is, Will the Senate advise and consent to the resolution of ratification? On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Virginia (Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR.), the Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON), the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. EASTLAND), the Senator from Georgia (Mr. GAMBRELL), the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. HARRIS), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUYE), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN), the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL), and the Senator from Virginia (Mr. SPONG), are necessarily absent.

I further announce that the Senator from Louisiana (Mrs. EDWARDS) is absent on official business.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Georgia (Mr. GAMBRELL), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL), and the Senator from Virginia (Mr. SPONG), would each vote "yea."

Mr. SCOTT. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. GRIFFIN), the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. MILLER), the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY), and the Senator from Ohio (Mr. SAXBE) are necessarily absent.

The Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) is absent because of illness.

The Senator from Nebraska (Mr. CURTIS) is detained on official business.

If present and voting, the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. CURTIS), the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. MILLER), and the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) would each vote "yea."

The yeas and nays resulted—yeas 79, nays 0, as follows:

[No. 376 Ex.]

YEAS—79

Aiken	Allott	Bayh
Allen	Anderson	Beall
Bellmon	Gurney	Pastore
Bennett	Hansen	Pearson
Bentsen	Hart	Proxmire
Bible	Hartke	Randolph
Boggs	Hollings	Ribicoff
Brock	Hruska	Roth
Brooke	Humphrey	Schweiker
Buckley	Jackson	Scott
Burdick	Javits	Smith
Byrd, Robert C.	Jordan, N.C.	Sparkman
Cannon	Jordan, Idaho	Stafford
Case	Kennedy	Stennis
Chiles	Long	Stevens
Church	Magnuson	Stevenson
Cook	Mansfield	Symington
Cooper	Mathias	Taft
Cotton	McClellan	Talmadge
Cranston	McIntyre	Thurmond
Dole	Metcalf	Tower
Dominick	Mondale	Tunney
Ervin	Montoya	Weicker
Fannin	Moss	Williams
Fong	Muskie	Young
Fulbright	Nelson	
Gravel	Packwood	

NAYS—0

NOT VOTING—21

Baker	Goldwater	Miller
Byrd, Harry F., Jr.	Griffin	Mundt
Curtis	Harris	Pell
Eagleton	Hatfield	Percy
Eastland	Hughes	Saxbe
Edwards	Inouye	Spong
Gambrell	McGee	
	McGovern	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote the yeas are 79, and the nays are 0. Two thirds of the Senators present and voting having voted in the affirmative, the resolution of ratification is agreed to.

THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I am very proud that the chairman of the National Conference on Weights and Measures—the Honorable George L. Johnson—is a Kentuckian and director of weights and measures, Kentucky Department of Agriculture. On August 3, he testified before the Foreign Relations Committee, urging that it approve U.S. membership in the National Conference on Weights and Measures.

The National Conference on Weights and Measures provides a national forum for the discussion and evaluation of questions relating to weights and measures administration carried on by regulatory officials of State and political subdivisions. The conference develops technical, legal, and general recommendations in the field of weights and measures administration to encourage and promote uniformity of requirements by weights and measures jurisdictions. This is of great importance, nationally and internationally, as uniform standards would result in the promotion of trade. Its membership includes Federal, State, and local governments officials as well as representatives of industry, business, and consumer organizations.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Johnson's testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks. His succinct statement was very influential in persuading the Foreign Relations Committee to recommend to the Senate that the United States participate in the convention establishing an International Organization of Legal Metrology. Today the Senate has approved a convention to this effect by a unanimous vote. We can congratulate Mr. Johnson and his colleagues, as well as the Senate, on this initiative.

There being no objection, the testimony was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

(Statement of George L. Johnson)

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: My name is George L. Johnson. I am the Director, Division of Weights and Measures, Department of Agriculture, State of Kentucky. I am also serving this year as Chairman of the National Conference on Weights and Measures.

The National Conference on Weights and Measures is an assembly of weights and measures regulatory officers, other officials of federal, state, and local governments, and representatives of manufacturers, industry, business, and consumer organizations. The Conference develops many technical, legal, and general recommendations in the field of weights and measures administration. Its programs encompass and explore the entire area of this economically important segment of governmental regulatory service. The Conference provides a national forum for the discussion and evaluation of questions relating to weights and measures administration carried on by regulatory officers of the states and political subdivisions. The Conference develops model weights and measures laws and regulations to encourage and promote uniformity of requirements among the weights and measures jurisdictions.

The National Conference on Weights and Measures recognizes the necessity for uniformity of laws and regulations and further recognizes the need of harmonization of weights and measures laws of this country and other countries of the world. Weights and measures officials are aware of the need for uniformity due to the ever-increasing amounts of import and export goods, which makes it more demanding that these commodities be represented accurately, honestly, and informatively at the point of manufacture, packaging, or sale.

It is our belief that cooperation with foreign weights and measures officials, through membership in OIML, will yield dividends of mutual benefit and satisfaction. The 57th National Conference on Weights and Measures meeting in Washington, D.C., July 14, 1972, adopted the following resolution:

RESOLUTION ON U.S. MEMBERSHIP IN THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF LEGAL METROLOGY AS ADOPTED BY THE 57TH NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WEIGHTS AND MEASURES, JULY 14, 1972

The National Conference on Weights and Measures, on behalf of its state, county and local member officials, and associated representatives of business, industry, consumer organizations and the Federal government, urgently recommends that the United States become a member of the Organization of International Legal Metrology (OIML).

In the view of the Conference, U.S. participation and leadership can greatly assist in two specific areas. First, harmonization of weights and measures legislation and technology will assist the private sector in competing internationally without encountering non-tariff restraints to trade, based on national quantity regulations. Second, and equally important, our citizens may be assured that ever-increasing amounts of imported goods are represented accurately and honestly at the point of foreign manufacture or packaging.

It is our belief that cooperation with for-

eign weights and measures officials, through membership in OIML, will yield positive results similar in effectiveness to those we attribute to our own organization, the National Conference on Weights and Measures.

For these reasons, we solicit the Senate of the United States of America to favor the treaty authorizing U.S. membership in the International Organization of Legal Metrology.

Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the National Conference on Weights and Measures, I respectfully urge favorable action on this resolution. I also want to thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify on this important matter.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate resume the consideration of legislative business.

The motion was agreed to.

APPOINTMENT BY THE VICE PRESIDENT

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HUMPHREY). The Chair, on behalf of the Vice President, pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 77–250, appoints the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) to the Joint Committee on Reduction of Federal Expenditures vice Senator Ellender, deceased.

INTERIM AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HUMPHREY). Under the previous order, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which the clerk will state.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A joint resolution (S.J. Res. 241) authorizing the President to approve an interim agreement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senate will proceed to its consideration.

PROGRAM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, before I yield to the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE) to present a conference report, which will not take much time, I would like to take this occasion to urge Senators to be present on the floor of the Senate this afternoon, to be aware of the possibility that there may be rollcall votes, and, if possible, to give the serious consideration and attention which the interim agreement on arms limitation deserves of all Members, regardless of their position.

May I say that I have heard rumors to the effect that there will be no votes this afternoon. I would like to disabuse Senators of that notion. There will be at least a vote this afternoon, and I am hopeful that there will be no stalling and no delay, and again, regardless of our personal feelings on this matter, that we will face up to it and dispose of it today, if possible, or tomorrow, if possible, and if not, by Monday at the latest; but that will, of course, be up to individual Senators and the Senate as a whole to decide.

DISASTER RELIEF LOANS—CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I submit a report of the committee of conference on H.R. 15692, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HUMPHREY). The report will be stated by title.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 15692) to amend the Small Business Act to reduce the interest rate on Small Business Administration disaster loans, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses this report, signed by all the conferees.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the consideration of the conference report?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the report.

(The conference report is printed in the House proceedings of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of August 10, 1972, at pages 27673–27675.)

Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, the conference report that the committee submits to the Senate reflects what I am sure the record will show an excellent job done by the Senate conferees regarding the bill, H.R. 15692.

This disaster relief bill is of extreme importance at this time to thousands of victims of recent disasters occurring along the eastern seaboard and in South Dakota and to other victims of prior disasters occurring after January 1, 1971.

The Senate conferees were successful in obtaining concurrence with the House conferees on almost every section of the Senate-passed bill.

The only changes made by the conferees to the bill passed by the Senate are the following:

First. The Senate receded to the House with an amendment concerning the retroactivity, forgiveness, and interest rate features contained in H.R. 15692. The provisions agreed to in conference provide for the following:

For Presidentially declared and Small Business Administration declared disasters occurring during calendar year 1971 disaster loans would have a forgiveness feature not to exceed $2,500, and the remaining balance of the loan would carry an interest rate of 3 percent.

For the period January 1, 1972, to July 1, 1973, the two categories of disaster loans referred to in the paragraph above would be made with a forgiveness feature not to exceed $5,000, and the remaining balance of the loan would carry an interest rate of 1 percent.

Where the interest rate is higher under existing law than that agreed to by the conference committee, the loans will be refinanced at the new lower rate. The new rate will apply only to the balance on the loan outstanding at the date of enactment of this act.

In addition, the requirement in the Disaster Relief Act of 1970 that the borrower must pay the first $500 of a loan before he can receive any forgiveness has been removed retroactively to January 1, 1971.

This represents a compromise between the Senate- and House-passed bills and incorporates features of both.

Second. The Senate amendment to the House bill contained a provision requiring all borrowers to obtain Federal flood insurance, if available, during the life of the disaster loan. The House-passed bill contained no provision. The Senate receded to the House position.

Third. The Senate amendment contained a provision which would allow the Small Business Administration to make loans to small businesses which incur certain expenses as a result of the need to comply with new Federal or State law. Such loans would be made at interest rates based on the cost of money to the Federal Government and there would be no limitation on the amount of the principal of the loan. The House had no similar provision, and the Senate receded to the House position.

The Senate conferees while unable to convince our counterparts in the House to accept this provision did, however, receive a strong commitment from both the chairman of the House Banking Committee, Mr. PATMAN, and the chairman of the Small Business Subcommittee, Mr. STEPHENS, that hearings would be held on this proposal before Congress adjourns for this session.

Fourth. The Senate amendment contained a provision which would allow the President to make grants to nonprofit private educational institutions in areas declared a major disaster by the President in connection with hurricane and tropical storm Agnes. The House language contained no similar provision. The House receded to the Senate position.

In addition, the Senate amendment contained a provision which provided that funds appropriated to the President for "disaster relief" were to be made available for carrying out the program of assistance to schools. The House had no similar provision. The Senate receded to the House position.

The House conferees indicated that unless we receded on this section of the legislation that a point of order could be raised concerning the manner in which the bill provided for appropriations.

Mr. President, on all other provisions contained in the bill passed by the Senate, the conferees were successful in retaining those provisions in the bill agreed on in the conference.

I now yield to the distinguished ranking minority member of the conference committee, the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER).

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, the conference report on disaster assistance which we are submitting to the Senate for approval today represents a substantial improvement in the present level of

assistance available to the victims of natural disasters. The present disaster assistance program administered by the Small Business Administration consists essentially of a loan program to disaster victims at the Treasury interest rate, with $2,500 of the loan being forgiven. Under this legislation, the interest rate on the remaining balance of loans issued as a result of disasters declared in 1971 will be lowered to 3 percent; the forgiveness of $2,500 is not changed in amount for that period, but will now apply to the first $2,500 of the loan rather than the $2,500 above the first $500 of the loan. For disasters declared in 1972, the forgiveness figure was raised to $5,000 and the interest rate lowered to 1 percent.

The Senate provisions on suspension of payments of principal for the retired and disabled—the Javits amendment; on refinancing residential mortgages—the Buckley amendment; on loans for working capital, the Schweiker amendment; and on aid for private educational institutions, the Scott amendment; among others, were agreed to by the House.

Obviously, no form of financial assistance can fully make up for the property, health, and inconvenience loss of a victim of a flood, a hurricane, a tornado, or other such disaster.

Where lives are lost, certainly government aid cannot console the survivors for this irreplaceable loss. But we do feel the definite obligation to try to do something to help the disaster victims whose houses, households, and businesses are destroyed or damaged in the wake of these phenomena that we are powerless to prevent. This legislation can at least help these unfortunate victims to get on their feet financially and to try to return their lives to a normal state once again. The main ingredient of recovery is a strong spirit in the community and among the individuals hit by disasters, but we can at least do our part to help out somewhat on the financial end.

The administration will be working on a new comprehensive package of improved disaster assistance legislation for the next few months, in order to bring a more coordinated governmental approach to the problem of aiding the victims of disasters. Presently, disaster relief programs are scattered throughout 31 agencies and are administered under a number of laws. The conferees are agreed that a new, coordinated program is needed to administer assistance more effectively and to make the most efficient use of the taxpayer's dollar, and we look forward to receiving and working on this legislation early next year.

Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I move the adoption of the conference report.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point?

Mr. McINTYRE. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, let me thank the conferees for the fine thing they did in making special provision for retirees in this measure, who might otherwise have been in trouble in obtaining some of these loans. It was a splendid thing they did, and I am sure I speak for all the retired persons who are affected in thanking them.

Mr. McINTYRE. I thank the Senator from New York, and wish to say that the House conferees were very willing to concur in that amendment.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I thank our friend from New York for having offered the amendment, which I think was a substantial improvement on the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the conference report.

The report was agreed to.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the conference report was agreed to.

Mr. JAVITS. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the majority leader yield to me?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the Senator from New York.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, if it would be convenient for the leadership, while the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON) is on his way to the floor, we would like to take about 2 minutes, or a very short time, to call up the conference report on the economic opportunity amendments, that is, the antipoverty bill.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Of course.

Mr. JAVITS. Solely for the purpose of having it rereferred to the conference.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. MANSFIELD. On the basis that I do not lose my right to the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

CONTINUATION OF PROGRAMS AUTHORIZED UNDER THE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY ACT—CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, it is my purpose now, with the permission of the Senator from Wisconsin, who heads the subcommittee on poverty, and chaired the Senate conferees, to call up for consideration the conference report on H.R. 12350, with the intention of moving to recommit the conference report to the conference committee.

Mr. President, the Senator from Wisconsin is here, and I ask that the conference report on H.R. 12350 be called up, and I ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 12350) to provide for the continuation of programs authorized under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, and for other purposes, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses this report, signed by all the conferees.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the consideration of the conference report?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the report.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I shall make a short explanation, and I hope very much that the Senator from Wisconsin may be moved to join in this explanation, as well as the Senator from Ohio, who is the ranking member of the Poverty Subcommittee of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare that handled this matter; perhaps also Senator DOMINICK, who is second to me in seniority in that committee will wish to comment.

Mr. President, our purpose in referring back this conference report to the conferees is as follows:

First. The conference remains in being so long as we are the first House to act, and we have not yet acted.

Second. The fact that the conference report has been pending here for almost a month without being called up must be a clear indication to Senators—especially when we consider that Senator NELSON and I and every other member of the conference has burning interest in getting action on these antipoverty amendments—that there must have been some good reason for it, and there was.

We feel a deep policy and humanitarian drive to do our utmost to produce a bill which will be signed at the White House. Of course, perhaps a veto could be overridden. We have no idea. In any case our first duties are to do everything we can to develop and propose a bill which, in the deepest conscience to the poor and with the most understanding consideration of the point of view of the President and the budget authorities, and so forth, is entitled to be signed.

I might say, Mr. President, that the burden of compromise has been carried throughout consideration of this bill most heavily by the conferees. I cannot pay enough tribute to the patience, the skill, and the patriotism of Senator NELSON, who headed the Senate conferees, and to Representative PERKINS, who headed the House conferees, and the work and devotion of Senators KENNEDY, MONDALE, CRANSTON, HUGHES, STEVENSON, RANDOLPH, TAFT, SCHWEIKER, BEALL, and DOMINICK. We have all consulted together, and Senator NELSON and I are satisfied that this is the thing to do, that it has the best hope for producing what all friends of the bill and the program would like to see accomplished.

For those reasons, and because Senator NELSON felt that, inasmuch as this was a Presidential matter, it was more logical that the ranking minority member should make this motion rather than he, I move to recommit the conference report to the committee on conference.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield.

Mr. ALLEN. What are the areas that the Senator has in mind would be changed at subsequent meetings of the conference committee?

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, my answer is that I cannot tell the Senator. The Senator knows the personalities involved. They are men of great independence. They will simply go over the conference report again, with a view toward examining every phase of it—the Legal Services Corporation, the authorizations for appropriation, the other conditions and terms of the bill and have one other look as to whether this is really the best product we should present to the House and the Senate and try to send to the White House.

Mr. ALLEN. Surely, some areas, as pointed out, are in need of adjustment.

Mr. JAVITS. Many areas have been pointed out. I do not think there is a part of the bill that has not been the subject of some comment, scrutiny, or consideration. But I have emphasized those that have come in for the most discussion as being the authorization, the Legal Services Corporation, and general conditions with respect to the poverty programs in the communities. There are various phases of the bill which relate to authorization add-ons. There are provisions respecting a new approach—or at least a more modern approach—to Headstart.

All these things have come in for more detailed discussion since the conferees agreed.

Senator Nelson has continued to talk with the House conferees, and it is a common judgment that we should try again. But I think I would be arrogating to myself an authority which I do not possess to delimit for the Senator specific areas of the bill that will undergo change and others that will not. The bill will be wide open in every section to all the conferees. As I have said, they are very independent and very gifted men.

Mr. ALLEN. There is no hope that the legal services program will be dropped from the bill, is there?

Mr. JAVITS. I would not say that at all. I just say that every part of the bill, including that, will be considered in the conference.

Mr. ALLEN. I thank the Senator for his clear and full explanation.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield.

Mr. DOMINICK. I want to add, for the benefit of the Senator from Alabama, that it is my understanding that when the Senate conferees would go back—assuming that this motion is successful—the effort would be designed toward at least cutting down the size of some of the authorizations and strengthening the method of appointment of particular people who will be organizing the Legal Services Corporation.

I believe that this is the intent; although, as the Senator very aptly said, all issues will be open. But I strongly suspect that, if this motion is successful, the conference report will not come back with any additional amounts.

Mr. JAVITS. I certainly assure the Senator of that.

Mr. ALLEN. Would the Senator from New York hazard the guess that the bill as reported by the conference would result in a Presidential veto? Is that his judgment?

Mr. JAVITS. No; it is not. I have no idea what the President would or would not veto, and he is not in the habit of issuing that information in advance. I simply believe that all of us, having consulted together, who have a personal interest in this measure have decided that we should try again, and this will give us that chance.

Mr. NELSON. First, let me say that I endorse the remarks of the distinguished Senator from New York concerning the cooperation we have had with the House, with the chairman of the committee in the House, as well as with the conferees in our own House, both Republicans and Democrats. The Senator from New York is correct in saying that he did not know, and neither do I know what proposals will be made, once the bill goes back to the conference. We reached agreement after a good conference. I would say to the Senator from Alabama that my objective in agreeing to sending it back to conference is to attempt to make some modifications that would be more acceptable to the administration.

I cannot speak for the conferees on my side, but for myself I will say that I am perfectly prepared to modify the Legal Services Corporation in such a way that it would be totally acceptable to the administration.

No. 2, I am personally prepared to propose a substantial reduction in the authorizations.

Those are the two points that I would support in conference. I repeat, of course, that I cannot speak for anyone else on either side of the conference, but that is the objective.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield?

Mr. NELSON. I yield.

Mr. CRANSTON. What is meant by "substantial reduction"? What sort of compromise will have to be made in order to get the President to go along? How much less will it be?

Mr. NELSON. I think I would prefer to argue that question of a substantial reduction at the conference. My judgment is that there is no reason to authorize a whole lot more money than we will get in the appropriations. I cannot speak for the conferees, but I will support a substantial reduction in the authorization which will be still more than what is currently appropriated. The distinguished Senator from California may not agree with me. I want to make it clear to the Senate and for the RECORD as well as to the distinguished Senator from Alabama in particular, who raised the question, that I was interested in two things; namely, the Legal Services Corporation and the size of the authorization.

Mr. CRANSTON. Then the Senator has no clear conception at the moment as to what a substantial reduction would mean?

Mr. NELSON. I do.

Mr. CRANSTON. That is something he wants to reserve until he gets to the conference?

Mr. NELSON. No. I am perfectly prepared to say that I would support a substantial reduction in the authorization from the $900 million increase down somewhere around a $200 million increase. In other words, I would support a reduction in the authorization of about $600 to $800 million.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield?

Mr. NELSON. I yield.

Mr. KENNEDY. I was a member of that conference and I join the distinguished Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) in commending the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON) for the work that he has done in the conference. As in so many other matters, many of us are not able, because of other Senate business, to spend all the time we would like to in the conference, and he has assumed that responsibility. I am fully in agreement with the leadership and the work the Senator from Wisconsin has performed in this area.

I am distressed by the motion to turn it back to the conference. I would want the RECORD to show that I am opposed to that move.

I felt that in that conference, we had tried to make an adjustment and an accommodation in the legal services program to the administration's objections. I understood, in the final hours of the conference, that at least we had worked something out, considering the frequent communication with the White House, and that while at least we are not guaranteed this would be veto-proof, they understood we had gone what I considered to be a good deal further than half way on this matter.

Now, I hear, we are going back to the conference, or at least the resolution so proposes, to talk about further compromise on this matter. I, for one, am increasingly concerned, as I listen to this colloquy, about what we really intend to do in the conference and how intimidated we will be by the threat of a veto.

I would, therefore, be very much interested in what the Senator from Wisconsin has planned. He mentioned his figures on cutting back on the authorization, but could the Senator tell me if there are any further amendments or compromises intended in the area of legal services?

Mr. NELSON. May I say to the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts that I have no real way to tell him as I cannot understand the opposition on the White House side. I do not know who it is down there that is opposing the Legal Services Corporation as it is now constituted. There simply is no question whatsoever that the President controls every single appointment subject only to confirmation by the Senate. There is language that permits the national legal organizations to recommend to the President but he is not bound by any recom-

mendation. He does not have to appoint from any list. He is free to appoint anyone he wishes. So I cannot explain to the Senator from Massachusetts what the White House is complaining about. It is quite irrational That is the reason I cannot explain it. All I am trying to say is that, so far as I am concerned, the President has all the appointments. They are all his. There is no doubt about that. But they are being irresponsible in every way down there about it. I am willing to accommodate them in their foolishness. The President has all the appointments. The American Bar Association, in the language of the bill, can make a recommendation but they are only recommendations, nothing more. I would suggest that this administration is more interested in form than in substance. As they seem to be rather more interested in form than in substance, I am prepared to give them form.

That is fine. I am prepared to support their proposal in this unimportant matter. It seems to me they are just looking for an excuse to veto the bill. They did it the last time with a veto message that would not stand serious analysis in any grade school. If I were the President, I would fire whoever wrote that message. It did not make any sense at all and it was not honest though I am sure the President did not realize that. Obviously they are looking for a way to defeat the bill. I want the bill to be signed. We have accommodated their objections which did not have much substance, anyway. In any event, every single objection made by the White House in the veto message has been met. So I want to send them the bill that clearly meets every objection made in the veto message.

If they can then find a Philadelphia lawyer to justify the veto I want that lawyer to be my lawyer, because he can make the most subtle and refined distinctions of any mind anywhere on earth. What I am trying to do is to send a bill up there that will save the program that someone in the White House is obviously trying to kill. I do not want to give them any excuse to kill the bill. If they do veto it, then we can go to the country with the issue and show how irresponsible they are.

The veto message last time was a phony. They are seeking new ways to confuse the whole country by saying, "Oh, they took away legal services control from the President or some such thing." No one will understand that it is not so. I do not want to give them the opportunity to mislead the public.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I feel that I have to raise an objection to this continual delay, because when I yielded the floor it was with the proviso that I would get back the floor and it was with the understanding that they would take no more than 2 minutes. We have now been discussing this matter for about 25 minutes. It seems to be getting stronger and stronger. I would most respectfully express the hope that this matter would be brought to an end at this time so that we could go ahead with the business before the Senate, the interim agreement.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the debate close on this matter at the present time. I would like to get the floor.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I object.

Mr. MANSFIELD. It is then going to call for individual action on the part of the parties concerned.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, if the majority leader will yield to me, I want to say that I had no idea we would engage in any extensive debate on this subject or that it would be a controversial matter.

I represented to the majority leader and to the majority whip that it would take only a few minutes. Therefore, if the majority leader wishes to take it down at this time, I have no objection. I think the majority leader is absolutely right. I had no notion that we would get into such an extensive debate.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I appreciate that statement. I make that unanimous-consent request at this time.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, what is the request?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I made the unanimous-consent request that the matter be taken down at this time.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, could the majority leader give us an indication of when this matter will be taken care of? I do not think that any of us are interested in delaying this unnecessarily. I think we all want to get back to the business before the Senate. I, for one, do not want to delay it. However, I wonder when this matter might be brought before the Senate. I want to indicate my views on the matter.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in view of the situation which has developed, I ask unanimous consent that we turn to the pending business until the hour of 12:20, at which time we return to the conference report. It is my understanding that the Senator from Alabama intends to offer an amendment and that a vote on that occur at 12:30.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, that is satisfactory to me. I merely want to offer an amendment to the motion of the Senator from New York. I would not debate it over 2 or 3 minutes. And I would not call for a rollcall vote.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Montana? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, what is the pending matter?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to recommit the conference report.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President——

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama is recognized.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, what is the pending business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is on agreeing to the motion to recommit the conference report.

Mr. MANSFIELD. No. I asked unanimous consent that that matter be taken down and that we return to it at 12:20.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Montana to set aside the conference report?

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I did not understand the majority leader.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I made the unanimous-consent request that the matter of the conference report be set aside and that we come back to it at 12:20 and then consider, and vote on the Allen amendment.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, may we understand what the amendment of the Senator from Alabama is?

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I merely wish to offer an amendment to the motion of the distinguished Senator from New York to give some instructions to the conferees. They have come back and asked that they be permitted to go back into conference. I merely wish to ask that the Senate give them instructions during their deliberations.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the reason I made the request is that I think we have been had on the basis of the implicit promise given to us when we laid aside the pending business. We will get back to the matter of the conference report at 12:20. There is a little business to be done in the meantime, if Senators do not mind.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I have no objection. I have no objection to withdrawing the whole matter from consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Montana? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time be equally divided between 12:20 and 12:30 p.m.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

INTERIM AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Pursuant to the agreement, the Senate will proceed to the consideration of the unfinished business which the clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

Calendar Order No. 929 (S.J. Res. 241) a joint resolution authorizing the President to approve an interim agreement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Social Republics.

The Senate continued with the consideration of the joint resolution.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

Insert after the resolving clause (which reads: "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,") the following:

"That the Congress hereby endorses those portions of the Declaration of Basic Principles of Mutual Relations Between the United

States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed by President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev at Moscow on May 29, 1972, which relate to the dangers of military confrontation and which read as follows:

" 'The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. attach major importance to preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations . . .' and 'will do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war' and 'will always exercise restraint in their mutual relations,' and 'on outstanding issues will conduct' their discussions and negotiations 'in a spirit of reciprocity, mutual accommodation and mutual benefit,' and

" 'Both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives,' and

" 'The prerequisites for maintaining and strengthening peaceful relations between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. are the recognition of the security interests of the parties based on the principle of equality and the renunciation of the use or threat of force.'."

On page 1, line 3 strike out "That the" and insert in lieu thereof "Sec. 2, The"

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, may we have order in the Senate? The majority leader is entitled to the courtesy of having order so that he can be heard.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order. This matter is of great importance, and most of us want to hear what the majority leader has to say. The Senate will be in order. Attachés will take their seats and cease their conversations.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I have in my hand the text of the Nixon-Brezhnev declaration. It applies directly to the amendment which is now the pending business. This is the agreement. The declaration is entitled: "Basic Principles of Mutual Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" signed by President Nixon and Leonard I. Brezhnev.

This is part of the joint communique:

The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. attach major importance to preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations. Therefore, they will do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. They will always exercise restraint in their mutual relations, and will be prepared to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means. Discussions and negotiations on outstanding issues will be conducted in a spirit of reciprocity, mutual accommodation and mutual benefit.

Both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives.

The prerequisites for maintaining and strengthening peaceful relations between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. are the recognition of the security interests of the parties based on the principle of equality and the renunciation of the use or threat of force.

Mr. President, may I say that the reason for offering this amendment at this time is to try to bring this matter to a head and to do so without delay, and at the same time to give to the Senate a choice as to what course they wish to pursue.

I have heard rumors going around that certain Members have been told there would be no votes this afternoon, that there would be no votes tomorrow. I think that is a question which at least the leadership should have been brought in on, if such rumors have any foundation in fact. I wish to assure the Senate that there will be at least a vote this afternoon, and I am hopeful there will be other votes today and tomorrow, because this is a Presidential request; this is something worked out between the chiefs of state of two nations. It should be faced up to, and Senators know their minds at this time and how they are going to vote.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the names of the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) and the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) be added as cosponsors.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

CONTINUATION OF PROGRAMS AUTHORIZED UNDER THE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY ACT—CONFERENCE REPORT

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. RIBICOFF). The hour of 12:20 p.m. having arrived, the Senate will return to the consideration of the conference report on the Economic Opportunity Act of 1972.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, what is the pending business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending question is on the motion to recommit the conference report.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, the Senate has before it the conference report.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Chair state how the time is divided?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time is divided 5 minutes to a side, the vote to occur at 12:30 p.m.

Mr. TAFT. I thank the Chair.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I call the attention of the Chair to the fact that we did not start until 12:21 p.m.

Mr. President, I yield myself 3 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama is recognized.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, the Senate has before it the OEO conference report. The distinguished Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) in calling up the report has asked and has moved that the report be referred back to the conferees inasmuch as the conferees have not yet been discharged, and he states there are a number of areas in the bill which the conferees wish to take another look at.

The junior Senator from Alabama asked what areas he planned to seek to make revisions in and the Senator responded it was the whole bill itself, all the sections of the bill should be reviewed.

So it was the thought of the junior Senator from Alabama, with the whole bill being reviewed, with no definite information being given to the Senate as to what areas revisions would be sought in, it would be only proper for the Senate to give the conferees instructions in a particular area.

With that thought in mind, I offer an amendment to the pending motion to recommit, that our conferees be instructed to seek the elimination from the bill of title IX, which is the Legal Services Corporation.

I feel that this is a bad provision, setting up a separate corporation to carry out the functions of this department, functions that already are being carried on. But to set up a special, separate corporation without any control by any other agency of Government, letting it be a self-contained entity, carrying on this work, would be inimical to the best interests of the country.

For that reason I offer this amendment that the conferees be instructed to seek the elimination of title IX from the bill.

Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the reason for my reply to the Senator from Alabama as to what the conferees would do is that in the presence of my colleagues, the chairman of the conference committee, the chairman of the subcommittee, the chairman of the Senate conferees, the ranking members of the subcommittee on the Republican side, and the Republican member next to me on the whole committee, it would have been improper and highly offensive, I think, for me to delimit the conferees. This was a free and open conference; it will be a free and open conference. The chairman of the Senate conferees has indicated his personal view that the main things dealt with will be the Legal Services Corporation and the authorization for appropriation. That is very authoritative because he will be the chairman of the Senate conferees.

Second, we will do our utmost to develop another bill, taking another crack at it. We have done this in conference, with Members from the House, to get a laudable bill.

But to throw restrictions upon the conference at this time would only prejudice the matter and not do anyone any good, and it will not serve the hope of fashioning a bill which will be good for the situation we are trying to deal with.

Finally, the Legal Services Corporation was requested by the President himself. We have never differed in principle; it is only a question of how it is to be worked out. But the President himself asked for the Legal Services Corporation.

I believe all of the Senate conferees did their utmost to fashion it in such a way that he would approve it, but the basic proposition is irrefutable.

For all those reasons—because I think the conference has been free and open, that the conference should be free and open again—it will be my purpose, when the time comes, to move to table the motion of the Senator from Alabama.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Ohio.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio is recognized.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for yielding. I back his position with respect to the motion of the Senator from Alabama. It seems to me this has been resolved by the Senate in a separate vote. The same issue also came before the House.

In voting on the instructions here to eliminate title IX from the bill we should understand the purpose of going back to the conference, a step with which I am in strong agreement. It is to simplify and work out a strong agreement on provisions which it is feared are in conflict with other legislation. I would like to point out the interrelationship of this matter with child development. The two are interrelated so it is important to get on with trying to find a solution. I believe we can make provision for this matter, consistent with child development. Problems have arisen on that bill and also there is a question of whether we can provide more consistently with provisions of H.R. 1, should that bill come to the floor and be enacted into law.

For all these reasons I believe we should support the motion, without the amendment of the Senator from Alabama.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, how much time is remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York has 1 minute remaining.

Mr. JAVITS. I yield to the Senator from Wisconsin.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin is recognized.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I wish to endorse the remarks of the Senator from Ohio and the Senator from New York.

From my viewpoint I am trying to give the President what they say they desire in terms of the Legal Services Corporation. They did ask for it. We are trying to give them that kind of corporation. I try to support the administration whenever I can. I would have to vote against the pending amendment of the Senator from Alabama.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama has 2 minutes remaining.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, is there any time remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama has 2 minutes remaining.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the Senator from California.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his generosity in yielding to me. I would like to ask one question. Is the purpose of this amendment to end all legal services, or just to end the proposed independent corporation?

Mr. ALLEN. No. As the Senator knows, even with the Legal Services Corporation killed, the OEO would carry on the work of the Legal Services Division, but there would be some supervision and control over the activities of the Legal Services Corporation, and would not repose those powers and duties in a separate corporation, free wheeling, and without control by any other agency of the Government, or the President of the United States, or, for that matter, the Congress.

Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the Senator.

I want to say I oppose the amendment because I feel we have tried to meet the President's objections about legal services.

I want to express solidarity with the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) on four points:

First, praise for the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON), on the magnificent work he has done.

Second, I question the wisdom of recommitting at the present time.

Third, I am not eager to set slashing cuts in the important authorizations for vital programs.

Fourth, I am gravely concerned about compromising still further on legal services——

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I move to table the motion.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the motion to table the motion to instruct (putting the question).

The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it.

The motion to table is agreed to.

The question now is on the motion to recommit (putting the question). The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it. The motion carries.

INTERIM AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which will be stated by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 241) by title, as follows:

A joint resolution (S.J. Res. 241) authorizing the President to approve an interim agreement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Montana.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I wish to make a few comments, and I know other Senators will want to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator suspend until we have order? This is a most important matter before the Senate. The Senator is entitled to be heard. The Senate will be in order.

The Senator will proceed.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I completely concur in what the Chair has said—that I consider this one of the most important issues that has come before this body, certainly since the Gulf of Tonkin resolution 8 years ago. As a matter of fact, yesterday, or the day before yesterday, makes it 8 years old. We made a disastrous mistake in the Senate not only in the decision itself, but also in the procedure we followed. I should like to do what I can at this time to avoid a similar mistake.

The pending business is the joint resolution giving our consent to the President to approve the interim agreement which has been before us.

The Foreign Relations Committee, which has the responsibility, as the agent of the Senate, to understand and to advise on treaties and agreements such as the one before us, has reported this agreement unanimously, without any whereases, qualifications, or amendments. The House of Representatives on yesterday took similar action.

When the committee voted unanimously in favor of the interim agreement, we did so upon the assurance that it was a prudent and wise agreement, providing adequately for the security of the United States.

I wish to quote from a verbatim statement of the President of the United States, made to a large group of Members of Congress on June 15 in the State dining room at 9:18 a.m. I shall not read it all. I am quoting the President of the United States. The President is speaking:

I have studied this situation of arms control over the past 3½ years. I am totally convinced that both of these agreements are in the interest of the security of the United States and in the interest of arms control and world peace.

He continues:

I have noted a great deal of speculation about who won and who lost in these negotiations. I have said that neither side won and neither side lost. As a matter of fact, if we were to really look at it very, very fairly, both sides won, and the whole world won.

Let me tell you why I think that is important. Where negotiations between great powers are involved, if one side wins, and the other loses clearly, then you have a built-in tendency or incentive for the side that loses to break the agreement and to do everything that it can to regain the advantage.

This is an agreement which was very toughly negotiated on both sides. There are advantages in it for both sides. For that reason, each side has a vested interest, we believe, in keeping the agreement rather than breaking it.

I completely endorse that statement—that both sides have a very important interest in keeping this agreement and not in breaking it.

Now, in the face of that, in the face of the unanimous action of the Committee on Foreign Relations, we are told by the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) that this amendment to the resolution of ratification is desired. The clear implication of the Jackson amendment is that the interim agreement is defective in that it does not provide adequately for our security and in that the statements of the President about the effect of the agreement were inaccurate.

The Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) himself has stated that this agreement provides for interim "subparity" in his statement of last Monday on the Senate floor.

If it is a fact that the interim agreement overall provides for "subparity"—

or, as he suggests in one of his statements, "inferiority"—then the agreement should be rejected as not in the national interest. It should not be amended in the way that the Senator has stated he wishes to amend it.

Actually, he does not amend this agreement. The effect of his amendment is to set down guidelines for the future. But those guidelines are based upon the assumption, on any fair reading of the amendment, that the present agreement is not adequate and does not properly provide for the security of this country.

If this agreement is prudent, then it ought to be approved as written. If it is not prudent, if it actually does provide for "subparity" overall, if it does not adequately provide for our security, then it ought to be rejected.

If the Jackson amendment is agreed to, I certainly will vote against this resolution; for the resolution would then mean that the interim agreement is defective, that it does not adequately protect the security of the United States.

I for one do not intend to be a party to another Tonkin Gulf resolution. I have spent 8 years apologizing for my small part in that. I was a Member of the Senate and I was the manager of that measure, which was brought here by the President, or his emissaries, and was described to us as being a necessary and important element in preventing the spread of war. We were told that if we showed ourselves to be standing behind the President, it would prevent the spreading of the war in Vietnam.

We did not give it serious consideration. We did not understand all the implications. We spent only a few hours in debating it on the floor, because at that time there was a political campaign on. President Johnson was the peace candidate. He was saying, in public speeches, that he would not be responsible for sending our young men to Vietnam, and it was said in the papers that his opponent was a hawk, and was for using nuclear bombs, and all sorts of things representing a radical approach to the war in Vietnam.

In contrast, President Johnson said he would restrict the war and prevent our participation. All we had to do was support the Tonkin Gulf resolution. Unfortunately, I think none of us considered it carefully enough. And that should not happen again. Now, this interim agreement before us is very important.

The ABM treaty was important. They are, in fact, the most significant measures, in my opinion, for this country since the Tonkin Gulf resolution. That measure, of course, was a disaster. But in this case, we have the opportunity to render approval to what represents a great step forward.

The kind of amendment which the Senator from Montana, the majority leader, has offered was considered by the committee as a fall-back position. But the committee did not really think any amendment was necessary. In fact, when it voted the joint resolution out unanimously, it struck out all statements of a qualifying or hortatory nature: we wanted to insure that there was nothing in the resolution that would raise questions about the meaning of the agreement itself.

This amendment offered by the Senator from Montana is not really an essential amendment, because all it is is a recitation of the precise language that the President of the United States and Mr. Brezhnev agreed upon. It is taken verbatim from the statement of principles which both Governments agreed upon at the time they agreed upon the interim agreement. So it in no way varies or could possibly vary or change in any respect the meaning of the agreement itself, nor would it in any way confine or restrict future negotiations.

I think any effort to restrict future negotiations, if it is to be done at all, should be done as a separate resolution or an amendment to some other bill, perhaps one dealing with the armed services. But that restriction should not be attached to this measure, because to do so would raise doubts about the efficacy and the adequacy of the agreement already signed, as to whether it protects our national interest.

So I shall vote for this amendment, although in truth it is not really an amendment; it is simply a restatement of the principles, with which I agree, and that is the only reason I would support it.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield to the Senator from Idaho.

Mr. CHURCH. Is it not true that the amendment which has been offered by the distinguished majority leader confines itself entirely to language contained in the declaration of principles to which the President and Mr. Brezhnev signed their names on May 29 in Moscow? That is to say, is not the amendment cast in the language that the two Governments agreed upon at that time?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct.

Mr. CHURCH. So there is no hazard, in the adoption of this amendment, that we would be placing any different interpretation upon the agreement, or new limits upon the negotiating positions of the two Governments in the future, than the Governments themselves agreed upon at the time of the summit meeting?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is correct.

Mr. CHURCH. The Senator would also agree, would he not, that the mischief in adopting new language is that it could give rise to any number of interpretations; indeed, it already has caused considerable confusion in that some Senators have interpreted the proposed new language one way, while others interpret it another way; the administration, on the one hand, endorses the Jackson amendment, as revised, and, on the other hand, disassociates itself from the interpretation placed upon the amendment by its very author.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct.

Mr. CHURCH. So we have created a confusion that can only raise questions, now and in the future, as to what we meant by this agreement and as to our future intentions.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is quite correct. I think it raises very serious questions about our sincerity and good faith in accepting the interim agreement.

Mr. CHURCH. This is a hazard, and a serious one.

Moreover, suppose a future administration, following the election, were to take the view that the language of the so-called Jackson amendment must be construed literally, and that it constituted a mandate by Congress to confine any future negotiations with the Soviet Union within the principle of numerical equality for each particular weapon system. If a future administration were to interpret the language in this way, would that not jeopardize the chances for further progress in broadening these agreements to cover other weapons systems, or indeed for reducing their numbers in the future?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. If the President took it seriously, I think it would be an inducement to a renewal of the arms race, the old tit-for-tat. Each one then would undertake to equal the other one, and there is always some imbalance; there is no way to have absolute equality. There is such great disparity now between the natures of our forces that, under this interpretation, I suppose the Russians would have to look about for some shore bases; they would have to implore either Canada or Mexico to give them a base similar to ours on their borders.

Mr. CHURCH. I surely agree. The literal interpretation of this language, if we adopt it and if it is adhered to by a future administration, could only lead, logically to the construction of two identical nuclear weapons systems by the Soviets and the United States, and this, instead of meaning limitation or control of the nuclear arms race, could instead accelerate the nuclear arms race in the future; is that not correct?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think that is exactly what it would do. In fact, I think that is one of its purposes. Obviously the supporters of this amendment are not satisfied with the slowdown in the arms race.

Mr. CHURCH. As I have reviewed the debate thus far, and looked for some argument that might have some plausible appeal for adopting the Jackson amendment, it seemed always to come down to the proposition that we did not want the Soviet Union to secure some unilateral advantage during the 5-year period that might prove adverse to the security interests of the United States.

Now, of course, we are all agreed on that proposition; but the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to that proposition as well. And here, plainly stated in the language of the governments themselves, forming part of the amendment now offered by the distinguished majority leader, is the following:

> Both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objections.

Now, if there is any reason at all relating to the security interests of the United States to adopt the language of-

fered by the distinguished Senator from Washington, it would be to warn against the Russians taking unilateral advantage of us, during the 5-year interim period.

Yet, here in the language of the two governments, the very point is already covered. Why, then, should we jeopardize this unique opportunity to take a first step toward ending this mad nuclear arms race, by adopting different language that could give rise to every sort of confusing implication and, indeed, could prove a serious handicap to future negotiations, when the language already adopted by the two governments covers the very point, the only real point, that can be made on behalf of the Jackson amendment? It is already there. It is already agreed to, and agreed to in the language that both President Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev, themselves, drafted and approved as part of the statement to which they appended their signatures.

So I would argue very strongly that we accomplish nothing by abandoning the language of the two governments, covering the concern that one or the other might use the 5-year period to secure some unilateral advantage, and substitute in its place new and different language fraught with every sort of problem. There is no reason to do it at all, except to restrict the President's options in the future, when he seeks to take a second step toward controlling the ongoing nuclear arms race.

So I hope we will adopt the amendment offered jointly by the distinguished majority leader and the dean of the Republicans of the Senate (Mr. AIKEN), and that we will reject any substitute offered by the Senator from Washington.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield the floor, Mr. President.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

CALL OF THE ROLL

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

[No. 377 Leg.]

Aiken	Hollings	Proxmire
Allen	Hruska	Ribicoff
Buckley	Jackson	Roth
Byrd, Robert C.	Javits	Stennis
Cooper	Jordan, Idaho	Stevens
Cranston	Magnuson	Stevenson
Fulbright	Mansfield	Taft
Gurney	Mathias	Williams
Hansen	Pastore	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is not present.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Sergeant at Arms be directed to request the attendance of absent Senators.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Montana.

The motion was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sergeant at Arms will execute the order of the Senate.

After some delay, the following Senators entered the Chamber and answered to their names:

Allott	Dole	Muskie
Anderson	Dominick	Nelson
Bayh	Ervin	Packwood
Beall	Fannin	Pearson
Bellmon	Fong	Schweiker
Bennett	Gravel	Scott
Bentsen	Hart	Smith
Bible	Hartke	Sparkman
Boggs	Humphrey	Stafford
Brock	Jordan, N.C.	Symington
Brooke	Kennedy	Talmadge
Burdick	Long	Thurmond
Cannon	McClellan	Tower
Case	McIntyre	Tunney
Chiles	Metcalf	Weicker
Church	Mondale	Young
Cook	Montoya	
Curtis	Moss	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is present.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the distinguished Senator from Georgia (Mr. TALMADGE) be permitted to bring up a conference report at this time for a period of time not to exceed 5 minutes, and that upon acceptance of the report the distinguished Senator from Washington be recognized.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ACCELERATED REFORESTATION OF NATIONAL FORESTS—CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I submit a report of the committee of conference on H.R. 13089, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STEVENS). The report will be stated by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment to the bill (H.R. 13089) to provide for acceleration of programs for the planting of trees on national forest lands in need of reforestation, and for other purposes, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses this report, signed by all the conferees.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the consideration of the conference report?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the report, as follows:

CONFERENCE REPORT

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 13089) to provide for acceleration of programs for the planting of trees on national forest lands in need of reforestation, and for other purposes, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate and agree to the same.

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the printing of the report as a Senate report be waived.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, this measure establishes a fund for reforestation of national forest lands.

The House bill would have authorized annual use of section 32 funds in the amount of duties collected on imports of wood and wood products. Last year such duties amounted to $72.2 million.

The Senate authorized a direct appropriation annually of $65 million.

The House accepted the Senate version.

Mr. President, I move the adoption of the conference report.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Georgia.

The motion was agreed to.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished majority whip.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia is recognized.

TIME LIMITATION AGREEMENT ON CONSIDERATION OF NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH ACT

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, this matter has been cleared on both sides of the aisle.

I ask unanimous consent that there be a time limitation in the usual form with respect to H.R. 14896, the National School Lunch Act; that at such time as it is called up and made the pending business before the Senate, which will not be this week, there be 3 hours on the bill, 1 hour on amendments, and one-half hour on amendments to amendments, debatable motions, and appeals.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

INTERIM AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

The Senate resumed the consideration of the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 241) authorizing the President to approve an interim agreement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, the Senate fully appreciates that it has before it an arms limitation measure of very great importance. Equally important, in my view, is how we in the Congress come to judge that agreement and how we convey our judgment to the Soviet Union, to our allies, to the executive branch and to the American people.

International agreements, this one included, have always had a dimension deeper than their words—a dimension that embodies hopes and expectations and reservations, all unwritten, and all of which reflect the blend of risks, doubts and assurances of which treaties are made. The present agreement, which rests to so remarkable a degree on statements with which the other party did not concur, has all of these in full measure.

SOME AMBIGUITIES RESOLVED

In an agreement that goes to the heart of America's security—our capacity to

deter nuclear war—nothing is more important than a precise understanding of what the parties have agreed to. Precision can never weaken an arms control agreement; ambiguity can be a source of future tension.

From the moment the agreements were signed in Moscow, there were vague and conflicting reports about the contents of the accords. The press relied on confusing background briefings held in Moscow. Various statements and attachments, integral parts of the agreements, were not made public for weeks. Public figures issued statements of support before the terms of the accords were revealed or analyzed. High administration spokesmen offered contradictory interpretations.

Thus, when the President finally submitted these agreements to the Congress, I was concerned that the Senate and the American people understand what we and the Russians could and could not do within their terms. The Senate Armed Services Committee, under the distinguished chairmanship of my able friend the Senator from Mississippi, held extensive hearings on the military implications of the SALT accords during which we tried very hard to bring before the American people the terms, and the meaning of the terms, of the interim agreement and the ABM treaty. We endeavored to obtain a clear and consistent administration position on key provisions—which was not always easy.

Let me illustrate the kinds of problems the committee hearings had to address. Article I of the interim agreement obligates the parties not to build ICBM launchers after July 1, 1972. But nowhere in the agreement does there appear the number of ICBM's the Soviets are thereby permitted to have. Article II contains a prohibition against substituting "heavy" ICBM launchers for "light" ICBM launchers. But nowhere is there an agreed-upon bilateral definition of what a "heavy" ICBM is. Terms like "modernization" and "significant increase" were used in the agreement, but precise definitions of these terms are not provided.

Mr. President, although the texts of the treaty and the executive agreement contain few numbers, many more numbers have been discussed in connection with the SALT accords. In the last several weeks we have heard these: 1,054; 1,618; 313; 41; 42; 62; 84; 710; 740; 656; 950; and zero. The crucial question for the Nation and for the cause of world peace is whether these numbers add up to stable parity or unstable inferiority. It may clear the air to discuss some of them.

First, 1,054—this is the maximum number of land-based ICBM's that the United States is permitted to retain under the agreement.

Second, 1,618—this is the maximum number of land-based ICBM's that the Soviet Union is permitted to retain given our understanding of the agreement. I emphasize "our understanding" because the figure 1,618 is a U.S. intelligence estimate and not a Soviet supplied number. This vagueness on the Soviet part is most unfortunate and can only lead to uncertainty and possible tensions. The agreement would be much improved by the use of specific numbers on both sides.

Third, 710—this is the maximum number of submarine launched ballistic missiles that the United States is permitted to deploy under the agreement. It is arrived at by adding our present 656 Polaris/Poseiden missiles to our potential under the agreement, to replace 54 of our Titan missiles with new submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Fourth, 950—this is the maximum number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles that the Soviet Union is permitted to deploy under the agreement. To achieve this total the Soviets would retire their obsolete SS–7 and SS–8 ICBM's and replace them with new submarine-based missiles. This would give the Soviets a total of 62 modern nuclear—Y-class—submarines.

Fifth, 84—the total permissible number of Soviet missile-firing submarines that can be deployed under the agreement. This is derived by adding 22 Soviet G-class submarines to the 62 Y-class submarines that they are permitted to construct.

Sixth, 44—the total permissible number of American missile-firing submarines that can be deployed under the agreement. However, only 41 in actual fact are part of the U.S. deterrent in this period.

Seventh, 313—this is the maximum number of "heavy" ICBM's that the Soviet Union is permitted to deploy under the agreement. This again is a U.S. intelligence estimate, not a confirmed Soviet figure. Each of these missiles can carry at least a 25-megaton warhead and perhaps, eventually, as much as 50 megatons. Of course the Soviets are free to replace single large warheads with many MIRV warheads per missile when they are able to do so.

Eighth, 0—this is the maximum number of "heavy" ICBM's that the United States is permitted to deploy under the agreement.

These numbers, Mr. President, are merely representative of the thrust of the agreements—which is to confer on the Soviet Union the authority to retain or deploy a number of weapons based on land and at sea that exceeds our own in every category, and by a 50 percent margin.

Now there will be some who argue that "numbers do not matter"—that both sides have "sufficiency" and that therefore the strategic balance is stable. How curious it is that the people who hold to the "numbers do not matter" doctrine are the same ones who believe that without an immediate arms control agreement the world is in danger of a great nuclear war. Either numbers matter or agreements do not—you cannot have it both ways.

I have never seen an international agreement that depends so greatly on the attachment of unilateral statements. Clearly each of these unilateral statements reflects, not U.S.-Soviet agreement but, on the contrary, a failure to reach agreement. In my view the interim agreement is substantially weakened as a result of the failures indicated by the resort to unilateral assertions with no legal standing. No long-term treaty covering these vital matters would be acceptable to me and, I suspect, to a majority of my colleagues, if it depended to the extent of the present agreement on unilateral statements. The fact that the present agreement runs for only 5 years mitigates a situation that would be intolerable in a future treaty. I believe that in expressing this view I am joined by Ambassador Smith who informed the Armed Services Committee that he expected provisions that could not be agreed upon in SALT I to be resolved on a bilateral basis in SALT II.

In seeking to establish clearly what the parties were permitted to do over the next 5 years and what they would be prohibited from doing—not all of which was self-evident—two points were of particular interest, and illustrate the complications that arise from vague language in the agreement and from negotiating not only against one's adversary but against self-imposed deadlines as well:

First, under the terms of the agreement, the Soviets are permitted to have operational, by July 1, 1977, 62 Polaris-type Y-class submarines. The agreement is very explicit on this. Owing to a provision that could have constituted a serious loophole, the issue arose as to whether the Soviets might have additional such submarines under construction, but not yet operational, on July 1, 1977. Some witnesses, including Ambassador Smith and Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Zumwalt, indicated that, technically, this was permissible. Were that the case, the Soviets could continue to turn out Y-class submarines like sausages, eight per year, with absolutely no perturbation of their deployment momentum.

Therefore, on July 24, I raised this problem with Secretary Laird in order to get the administration position as understood at the highest levels. Secretary Laird said:

> The protocol to the interim agreement specifies that the Soviet Union may have 950 SLBM launchers and not more than 62 modern ballistic missile submarines.

Then Secretary Laird, speaking for the administration, said:

> In the event that during the period of the interim agreement they were to initiate construction of additional modern ballistic missile submarines beyond the number necessary to reach the total of 62, this could be done only as replacements [for older Y-class submarines] and this would be under the procedures as specified under article 3 of the interim agreement. We would consider any new construction starts which were merely for the purpose of maintaining the momentum of the Soviet Union construction program to be contrary to the intent of the agreement.

This point is made equally clear in a colloquy between the Secretary and me. In order to understand the administration view, I asked:

> I take it that it is your judgment and the view of the President and the Administration that any attempt to use this ambiguity to build up—especially toward the end of this 5-year period—a pipeline of advanced Y-class boats under construction—as a tech-

nical means of getting around the limit of 62 operational submarines, would be in clear violation of what we understand to be the agreement.

Secretary Laird answered:

I would, and that would also apply to the United States.

Second, another area of potential misunderstanding relates to the modernization of missile silos under the agreement. The agreement allows for the modernization of existing silo-launchers, but stipulates that, in the process of modernization, the dimensions of those silos cannot be significantly increased. In a further attachment to the agreement, a significant increase is defined as not greater than 15 percent.

Testimony from administration witnesses on the meaning of these provisions was conflicting. Therefore, on July 24, I asked Secretary Laird for the definitive administration position. He replied:

I would not go along with the interpretation that some Members of the Senate and House have given to that provision in which they read that the 10 to 15 percent increase in dimensions could allow an increase in both dimensions.

I then asked:

Diameter and length?

Mr. Laird said:

Yes.

He went on to say:

The major increase that would be possible under the agreement would be in any one silo dimension.

In order that there be no misunderstanding on this point, I want to cite the colloquy which followed this official policy declaration by Mr. Laird:

Senator JACKSON. Do you reject the interpretation that an increase in both dimensions is allowable?

Secretary LAIRD. I have always rejected that from the first day that the treaty and the agreement became public—the idea that both diameter and depth could be increased by as much as 15 percent.

Senator JACKSON. It is the Administration's position that only one dimension of a silo can be increased?

Secretary LAIRD. That is correct. That is the Administration's position.

Senator JACKSON. It cannot be both dimensions?

Secretary LAIRD. It cannot be both diameter and depth.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question on that particular matter?

Mr. JACKSON. I am very pleased to yield.

Mr. ALLOTT. I think the Senator put his finger on one of the most important facets of this matter. I recall raising this question with the Secretary of Defense myself in a Defense Appropriation subcommittee hearing. The significance of it may escape some people.

Is it not a fact that if you are permitted, or were permitted, for example, to increase a missile of 10 feet in diameter and 100 feet in length, by 15 percent in diameter and 15 percent in length, that you would actually increase the volume of the missile by 50 percent?

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator is correct. It would be a little over 50 percent.

This gives me an opportunity to emphasize my disappointment that so few Senators are involved in one of the most important arms limitation agreements in the history of this country—in the history of the world. It is regrettable that not enough Senators are involved in what is at issue here and that is why I am deeply concerned, and other Senators who have followed this matter are deeply concerned. This issue of silo dimensions is but one example of the sort of ambiguity that we have in this agreement.

Mr. ALLOTT. It does run slightly over 50 percent if the 15-percent increase is applied to both diameter and length.

Mr. JACKSON. That is right.

Mr. ALLOTT. Where there is ambiguity the Senate should speak out loudly, making its intentions and understanding of this interim agreement very plain and clear, not only as a guide for the President, but also as a guide to the Soviet Union.

An increase of slightly over 50 percent volume, in the size of a missile silo is a very significant increase in the size of the missile that goes in that silo.

While the agreement does say silos shall not be significantly increased, it also says the dimensions may be increased by up to 15 percent.

I thank the Senator for yielding. This is a very important matter and I like he, am sorry that on a matter such as this we do not have the great majority of the Senate here to listen to this description and the argument which is going to affect the future security of the United States so deeply.

Mr. JACKSON. I believe that the Committee on Foreign Relations that reported this resolution has a responsibility of spelling out in detail, which they have not done yet, what is in this interim agreement, and what is meant by the unilateral understandings.

I think Senators have the idea—and I have tried to spend some time going into detail—that we have a precise agreement when, in fact, we have an agreement that is often vague. We have a limited agreement with a long series of unilateral statements and understandings; but it is my view that for an agreement to have validity, it needs, of course, to have a bilateral basis reflecting a bilateral understanding. There is nothing, in my judgment, that is more destabilizing than to purport to represent something as an agreement on a bilateral basis when in truth and fact it involves a lot of unilateral understandings which the party on the other side has not concurred in.

We want an agreement that will stabilize, and not destabilize. That is why I am going into great detail here, because no one from the Foreign Relations Committee has done so up to date, to explain to the Senate what is involved.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, I am happy to yield.

Mr. COOPER. I will ask the Senator if he is familiar—I know he has a deep understanding of these issues—with both the understanding and statements that the United States has made upon various parts of the agreement. Did the United States make a statement upon this particular issue?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes. There is a whole series of unilateral statements. Some were made in Moscow, and some were drafted after the delegation came back from Moscow.

Mr. COOPER. I know, and I am sure the Senator knows, that a statement by the Secretary of State on behalf of the President was made on this issue. Would the Senator care to read that statement?

Mr. JACKSON. Give me a moment to find the proper passage in the attachments to the agreement.

Mr. COOPER. I believe the Senator used the term "dimensions," but does he imply that failure to reach an agreement upon the exact size of the launcher makes this agreement a very dangerous one to the United States? I quote the relevant portion from the Secretary of State's letter of submittal of June 10, 1972.

I ask unanimous consent that the relevant portion of Secretary Rogers' statement be placed in the RECORD at this point. In addition, I ask the relevant portion of Ambassador Smith's answer to Senator JACKSON'S question and Secretary Laird's answer on this matter also be placed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

XVI

B. HEAVY ICBM LAUNCHERS

Article II provides that the Parties shall not convert land-based launchers for light, or older heavy, ICBMs into land-based launchers for modern heavy ICBMs, such as the Soviet SS–9. All currently operational ICBMs other than the SS–9 are either "light" (the United States Minuteman and the Soviet SS–11 and SS–13) or "older" ICBM launchers of types first deployed prior to 1964 (the United States Titan and the Soviet SS–7 and SS–8).

Article II would thus prohibit the conversion of a launcher for an SS–7, SS–8, SS–11 or SS–13 ICBM into a launcher for an SS–9 or any new modern heavy ICBM, and would similarly prohibit the conversion of a launcher for a Minuteman or Titan into a launcher for a modern heavy ICBM. The Parties agree that in the process of modernization and replacement the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers will not be significantly increased, and that this means that any increase will not be greater than 10–15 percent of the present dimensions. The United States has also made clear that it would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side (which is the Soviet SS–11) to be a heavy ICBM.

In Helsinki an ad referendum agreement was reached that there would be no significant increase in silo dimensions. It was clear from the record that dimensions meant internal diameter and depth. In Moscow, this agreement was discussed and confirmed and a further agreement was reached that "significant increase" means an increase greater than 10 to 15 percent. This understanding was read into the record in Helsinki on May 26. The Moscow discussions support the interpretation that either diameter or depth could be increased up to 15 percent but not both.

SOVIET SS-11 RETROFIT PROGRAM

SENATOR JACKSON. Thank you. Again, I want to raise another very important point that should be clarified for the record.

The largest part of the Soviet land-based ICBM deployment is in the SS-11 silos. If the Soviets were to retrofit their SS-11 silos with a new missile, how much could they (a) increase the volume of those silos and (b) increase the volume of the missiles that go in those silos?

Are you prepared to answer that?

Secretary LAIRD. I am prepared to address that particular question. I believe, like I testified, that I would not go along with the interpretation that some Members of the Senate and House have given to that provision in which they read that the 10 to 15 percent increase in dimensions could allow an increase in both dimensions.

Senator JACKSON. Diameter and length?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes.

I would consider that a violation of the agreement. In no case would it be possible for the Soviet Union to retrofit their SS-11 silos with a new significantly larger missile or would it permit them to install in the SS-11 silos the SS-9's or the follow-on missile system to the SS-9.

The major increase that would be possible under the agreement would be in any one silo dimension and, of course, that would limit the total volume increase to no more than 30 percent. With such a limitation it would not be possible to install an SS-9 class missile in an SS-11 silo.

Senator JACKSON. I would have thought that what the parties had intended was actually a maximum of 15 percent increase in the total volume, but when you read it——

Secretary LAIRD. I believe that up to a 30-percent volume increase in one dimension would be possible and I believe that anything over and above that would be a violation under the most liberal interpretations of the agreement.

Senator JACKSON. I would think that running through all of this, Mr. Secretary——

Secretary LAIRD. It is no more than one dimension.

Senator JACKSON. I understand. If you increase the diameter by 15 percent, that amounts to about a 30 percent increase in volume. You are saying that this is the absolute maximum allowed. If both the diameter and the length are increased by 15 percent, the volume would be increased by about 50 percent. I want to be clear about this. Do you reject the interpretation that an increase in both dimensions is allowable?

Secretary LAIRD. I have always rejected that from the first day that the treaty and the agreement became public the idea that both diameter and depth could be increased by as much as 15 percent.

Senator JACKSON. It is the administration's position that only one dimension of a silo can be increased?

Secretary LAIRD. That is correct. That is the administration's position.

Senator JACKSON. It cannot be both dimensions?

Secretary LAIRD. It cannot be both diameter and depth.

Mr. JACKSON. In response to your earlier question it makes it a very ambiguous one.

Mr. COOPER. Does he believe that threatens the supreme national interest of the United States?

Mr. JACKSON. That will depend on what the Soviets do in the 5-year interim period.

The statement the Senator had in mind, I think, is the statement made by Ambassador Smith. This is what he said on May 26, 1972:

The Parties agree that the term "significantly increased" means that an increase will not be greater than 10–15 percent of the present dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers.

Mr. Semenov replied that this statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding.

Now, what is meant by "dimensions"?

Mr. COOPER. Is the Senator contending that this ambiguity in the agreement, as the Senator terms it, is so far-reaching, so dangerous, that it threatens the supreme national interest of the United States?

Mr. JACKSON. Well, I will put it this way to the Senator: If it were to mean 50 percent, it would give the Soviets the right to practically double their throw-weight. Perhaps the Senator can tell me what "dimensions" means as used in that statement. We went into that in great detail. I do not think the Foreign Relations Committee did, but we went into it in great detail, because it makes a lot of difference whether we are talking about a 10 to 15 percent increase in one dimension or in both. The Senator understands that?

Mr. COOPER. Yes, I do. We did go into that, and we asked various expert witnesses in the administration and outside if they considered it one which would be dangerous to the supreme national interest. If it were so dangerous and serious, would it not justify those who plead that to vote against the agreement, if it is one which is going to threaten the supreme national interest of the United States?

I will ask another question: Is it not a fact that the United States could also increase the size of its launchers by the same relative dimensions if it chose to evade the spirit of the agreement?

Mr. JACKSON. I believe the Senator had an opportunity—perhaps he did not—to follow the statement that I made on this point, where we pinned down the administration on our understanding of what it means.

Does the Senator have a copy of my speech?

Mr. COOPER. Yes.

Mr. JACKSON. I think the Senator will find I asked this question of Secretary Laird, and he said that it was his judgment, and it was the judgment of the administration, that the 10 to 15 percent provision would apply to one dimension only.

Well, we did not have that on the record until I developed it in our hearings. I just point it out to show why it is important to go into this matter in detail, because, as the Senator knows, we have a situation here in which we have a limited bilateral understanding with a long series of unilateral statements. Secretary Laird did respond to my questions in that regard, and was most helpful.

Mr. COOPER. I ask the Senator if the United States could also increase the size of its launchers under this agreement in the same way that he is describing the way the Soviet Union could do it?

Mr. JACKSON. As the Senator knows, we are bound by our interpretation of "dimensions," and the Soviet Union has not given an interpretation on this matter. So we have bound ourselves by our interpretation. The Soviet Union, I may say to the Senator, has not indicated its understanding.

Am I not correct?

Mr. COOPER. I did not hear the Senator.

Mr. JACKSON. I say, the Soviet Union has not given its interpretation of "dimensions." We have.

Mr. COOPER. The Senator is correct, but the United States has made its interpretation, and I would assume—I think we are agreed on this—that when these interpretations are made, if they were breached by the Soviet Union, if they went beyond the 10 to 15 percent permitted that the United States could then determine, if it threatened the supreme national interest of the United States, and could then abrogate the agreement. Would the Senator agree to that?

Mr. JACKSON. Would the Senator repeat the question? I am sorry. I did not hear it.

Mr. COOPER. There are a number of understandings agreed to by both the Soviet Union and the United States. In addition, the United States has made statements as to its interpretation of certain sections of this agreement. Would the Senator agree that the United States having made an interpretation, if a situation arose which threatened its supreme national interest, it could so determine and abrogate the agreement?

Mr. JACKSON. Well, certainly. That is a finding that our Government would have to make. But I am just trying to point out the ambiguity surrounding some of these issues.

The Senator knows, for example, that we have stipulated in the agreement the number of nuclear strategic submarines that are permitted. That is spelled out. It is 62, is that not correct, for the Soviet Union, and 44 for the United States?

Mr. COOPER. Yes.

Mr. JACKSON. Now, where in the agreement, in the same document, can the Senator find the number of land-based missiles stipulated for the United States and for the Soviet Union?

Mr. COOPER. Well, it is not in there, I know that.

Mr. JACKSON. Now, is that the way to do business?

Mr. COOPER. No.

What the Senator from Washington is really arguing, I believe, is that this agreement is one which places the United States at a disadvantage insofar as its national interest is concerned. I say with all deference, because I have great regard for the Senator, both for his knowledge in this field and for his convictions, that I really believe if I felt that way, I would vote against this agreement. I would say it is disadvantageous to the United States of America. I would say that President Nixon was wrong in signing it. I would say that Dr. Kissinger's interpretations on behalf of the President were wrong, and I would vote against it. I would beg the Senate to vote against it, if I believed it was going to place our

country at a disadvantage. The Senator mentioned——

Mr. JACKSON. Could I make a comment right there?

Mr. COOPER. Yes.

Mr. JACKSON. I have nothing but admiration for the conscientious way in which the Senator from Kentucky proceeds on these matters, and I completely respect him.

This agreement is acceptable only because it is for 5 years, with the understanding that we are going to achieve, hopefully, in SALT II, equality with the Soviet Union. That is a basis on which we could proceed, and I think it is most important that the amendment I have proposed be adopted, so that we do not have any misunderstanding. I do not think the American people fully understand—and I do not think many Members of the Senate fully understand—the arrangement we have entered into here.

The Senator has followed this matter very closely, and I commend him.

But I want to point out to the Senator that the present agreement is acceptable only on the basis, as far as I am concerned, that it is 5-year agreement. It is only a 5-year agreement, and I want to see, in SALT II, an agreement which will at least bring about equality. In the past all of our Presidents, of both political parties, and our Secretaries of Defense, talked about superiority. The amendment that I am proposing will simply call for parity—instead of subparity, which we have agreed to as an interim matter for a 5-year period.

I can support the interim 5-year agreement if the Senate lays down the policy—a policy for the future—and surely the Senate should give some advice in these matters. Members of this body have said that foreign policy is made exclusively by the executive branch. I do not know why the Senate should not be able to say, "We will, in SALT II, seek to achieve equality." That is what we are talking about.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes.

Mr. COOPER. The Senator mentioned a few minutes ago the number of intercontinental ballistic land-based missiles. It is true that the Soviets have more ICBM launchers than we do. That is known and agreed. Also, it is not said specifically in the agreement what the limits on the Soviets ICBM's will be, except it will be the number in being and under construction as of July 1, 1972. In answer to our questions on that subject, we were told:

> We know what they have not through our verification satellites, and they cannot build any more. If they build any more, it will be a breach of the treaty.

I ask the Senator this, then: He is talking about parity or equality and he relates it to a specific weapons system, when in fact there are several weapons systems. There are land-based missiles. Submarine-based missiles, bombers, and other forces of which the Senator is well aware, such as forward based forces, and any parity as far as the resulting deterrent is concerned is the overall power of all of those systems and other factors such as qualitative differences, deliverable warheads, and other factors. I do not think we can discuss parity by picking out one system in which we seem on the surface to be numerically inferior, without taking into account a lot of other factors which the Senator is well acquainted with, particularly in connection with the submarine-based missile forces.

I have to say, after reading the Senator's speech today and listening to his other speeches, that he is saying implicitly and has said specifically that we have entered into an agreement which has placed us in a position of subparity.

I do not know of anyone who is saying that in the administration. Perhaps other Senators are saying it, but I am talking about those who have given information and testimony to the committee.

On that basis of the Senator's belief that we are in a position of subparity, he has drafted an amendment by which, as the first interpretation read, he would want us to be equal in numbers and throw weight of intercontinental systems.

As someone has explained so well, and I think the Senator from Washington would agree, there is no way under heaven whereby the United States and the Soviet Union could be equal in numbers and megatonnage, unless we had identical nuclear systems.

Is not the question one of having parity taking into account the quality, quantity. and assured destructural power of all our strategic forces? Is that not correct?

Mr. JACKSON. May I respond?

Mr. COOPER. Surely.

Mr. JACKSON. When we talk about equality, we must talk in terms of equality in numbers of launchers, taking account of throw-weight. This is the basic principle of the ABM Agreement where our two countries were permitted two ABM sites each.

Frankly, I think it was a poor agreement, for the obvious reason that we should have retained the opportunity to defend our Minuteman silos. Now, I am opposed to the construction of an ABM site in Washington, D.C., to defend the NCA, because it is just not workable. No one argued more vigorously than I did that it is not workable: And it will not be in the defense authorization bill for that reason.

But the point raised by the Senator's question, is that you cannot freeze technology; and we are not doing it here in the interim agreement. The advantage we have currently is in our technology, as the Senator knows; but surely the Senator is not going to argue that the Russians are unable to move forward very rapidly, as they have demonstrated in the past, in the scientific and technological area, especially MIRVing.

I remember the argument over the H-bomb. Some argued that it would take the Russians a decade to get the H-bomb after we did. We finally got it, as I recall, only 7 months ahead of the Russians.

I just do not want the numbers in the interim agreement with the throw-weight advantage a permanent arrangement in a treaty at SALT II. That would destabilize the strategic balance rather than stabilize it.

Mr. COOPER. Let me ask the Senator a question. I do not wish to interrupt his speech further, but in speaking of numbers, will he state the number of deliverable warheads that the Soviet Union is estimated to possess, and the number that the United States possesses?

Mr. JACKSON. At the present time?

Mr. COOPER. Yes.

Mr. JACKSON. I readily agree that we have an obvious advantage in numbers of warheads at this moment, but I submit that under the interim agreement the Soviets are authorized and permitted to have an unlimited number of warheads; and they have the throw weight to go on building more and more warheads.

Mr. COOPER. Is it not correct that today the United States has approximately 5,900 warheads and the Soviet Union has 2,200 or 2,300?

Mr. JACKSON. I said the United States has more. But that does not answer the question as to what is permitted under the agreement.

Mr. COOPER. Under the agreement, also, could the United States, if it desired, continue to MIRV and probably have 10,000 deliverable warheads by the end of the 5 years of the Interim Agreement?

Mr. JACKSON. Let me point this out to the Senator: Under this Interim agreement, they get 4 times our throw weight. That is the key. They get four times the throw weight of our forces. As the Senator knows, they are permitted 50 percent more launchers. So they will have the ability to have more warheads with greater megatonnage if we do not reverse this trend in SALT II. It is that simple. I think that is an undisputed fact. If the Senator has facts to contradict it, I will be glad to hear them.

Mr. COOPER. I think the Senator will agree with me that the Soviet Union could add additional warheads to a total of about 4,000 if it gets MIRV, which it can do under the agreement, and the United States could do the same, and we could probably have 10,000 warheads, according to the Department of Defense. Is it not correct, also, that 250 or 300 of the warheads could destroy the Soviet Union and a similar number could destroy the United States?

Mr. JACKSON. First of all, let me say this: Would it not be better to get a lid on all these things on both sides, on a basis of equality? The Senator talks about the number of warheads that would be available to do this or to do that. Of course, that presupposes that our retaliatory force will survive. That is one of the major inquiries we made in our hearing. I think there is a real threat to our retaliatory forces unless we get a sound agreement in SALT II. We can tolerate this interim agreement for 5 years if we get a good agreement in SALT II that will make it possible for us to have a survivable and therefore a credible deterrent force. But I do not want one side to have the advantage.

I point out that if this interim agreement is approved without some advice from the Senate that we want to achieve equality. I say that we have real problems ahead. That is what I am seeking to do.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am very familiar with the word "parity," and so forth, in farm prices. I do not quite know what the Senator means by "subparity" in nuclear weapons. Would he define it? He has criticized the agreement for being imprecise. Would he be precise about what "subparity" means?

Mr. JACKSON. The answer is that, under the terms of the agreement, they have the authority and the right, unless we can get a treaty before the end of 5 years, to obtain a very much larger force than they have currently. That is the answer.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does it mean that presently they have greater strength now or that projected figures indicate that is what they will have?

Mr. JACKSON. We know what they have now.

I will restate it: They can have—and Mr. Brezhnev has made it clear that they are going to implement their rights under the agreement—50 percent more intercontinental launchers——

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Only intercontinental weapons.

Mr. JACKSON. That is correct.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. When the Senator says "subparity," he is referring only to intercontinental launchers. The Senator excludes, for example, the forward based weapons that we have. He excludes the fact that we have forward bases for our submarines which enable them to stay on station. We have the testimony that because of our forward bases in various places—as the Senator knows, it is not classified—in Spain and in Guam and in Scotland, it takes 3 Russian submarines to equal 2 of ours. The Senator excludes that from his computation of "parity"?

Mr. JACKSON. First of all, we do not have a "forward base" in Spain. I think the Senator has in mind a support facility for the Polaris.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct.

Mr. JACKSON. It is not a delivery base.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is a base for submarines.

Mr. JACKSON. That is correct. But bear in mind first, on that point, that the Soviets have developed and have operational a 3,000-mile missile, and they do not need forward bases. If the Senator wants to go down this route, keep in mind—and I am sure the Senator knows this—how many cruise missiles they have. Is the Senator aware of that?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes. They are surface-to-surface.

Mr. JACKSON. Let me explain. The Soviets have more than 400 cruise missiles. They are subsonic. They can be fired into the population centers of the United States. We do not have any. However, our capability in Europe is very limited so far as reaching the Soviet Union is concerned. We have approximately 40 airbases over there.

Mr. McNamara made public years ago—and this is where much confusion originates—that we have 7,000 warheads in Europe. Well, warheads do not mean anything unless you can deliver them. There are only 40 bases. The Soviets have some 600 intermediate range ballistic missiles. One hundred of those missiles could reach every one of our bases.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does that include bases in Greece and Turkey?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. And Korea?

Mr. JACKSON. No. I said Europe.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. All around Russia?

Mr. JACKSON. No. As the Senator knows, we are out of Okinawa. We are not going to have nuclear weapons in Okinawa.

Those forward bases are being pushed back. Our bases in France are gone.

The Senator knows that the situation is that the planes in Europe have a very limited range. They are just fighter bombers. But the Russians have 600 intermediate-range ballistic missiles. All they need is 100 to knock out our means of delivering warheads. And how many IRBM's do we have in Europe or any other place? Zero.

So when we talk about warheads, it is like talking about the United States having the greatest Navy in the world on December 6, 1941. On December 7, we did not have a Navy.

I am addressing myself here to the fundamental question we must resolve—what kind of negotiating posture we are going to go forward with in SALT II so far as the intercontinental delivery systems are concerned?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Only that.

Mr. JACKSON. That is what is involved.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is the Senator's opinions. When the Senator says we are behind, he is talking about intercontinental ballistic missiles, land based missiles, is he not?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, in terms of what the agreement authorizes and permits. I would include sea-based missiles as well—SLBM's—in terms of what is permitted under the Interim Agreement.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. On the question of the throw-weight, is the Senator saying that the number of megatonnage which the Russians have is greater in just the intercontinental missiles or all missiles.

Mr. JACKSON. No, the Soviet throw-weight greatly exceeds that of all our intercontinental and noncontinental missiles. The Soviet Union passed us some time ago in terms of megatonnage.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does that include the calculation which I have seen, on which we have testimony, that four 1-megaton weapons equal one 16-megaton weapon? Does the Senator accept that as a valid calculation and, in view of that, does he still say they have more effective megatonnage?

Mr. JACKSON. I know what the Senator is talking about. It is the advantage that may or may not accrue when we divide up the megatonnage. But it does not change the basic point that I have propounded and tried to emphasize here, that with respect to throw-weight, they are given a 4-to-1 advantage. Now, the concept of "effective megatons" is a highly specialized one that is not relevant to what we are discussing.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It seems to me the throw-weight is of some significance.

Mr. JACKSON. They can use it any way they want.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The agreement does not guarantee and say specifically that the Russians shall have so many megatons and the United States shall have so many megatons. We ourselves have chosen not to put ours in the large 16- to 20-megaton weapons. What I am talking about is the effective throw-weight I have in my hand a recent publication from the Department of State, dated August 1, which states that, in terms of destructive area, four 1-megaton weapons equal approximately one 16-megaton weapon. It seems to me that is significant.

It seems to me that is significant.

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator, of course, is referring to a situation that would pertain to an attack on a city, not a hardened silo. The point I am making is, that under this agreement—and if the Senate wants to contradict it, fine, but I want to reemphasize it—they are granted, not only the throw-weight advantage of 4-to-1 but also a wide numerical advantage in launchers.

I can buy this agreement on an interim basis provided that, in the negotiating process, the administration and the President through his representatives will work to attain numerical equality in a follow-on treaty. What is wrong with that?

The Senator talks about forward bases. Those are of very limited value. They are for theater purposes. The Senator knows that we cannot talk about our forward bases in Western Europe, without bringing in all our NATO allies.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. They are in it, of course.

Mr. JACKSON. They are not in the SALT negotiations, as the Senator knows. They are not involved in these negotiations and never have been.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. But, there they are, the weapons, the armies, the navies, and so forth—the overall military strength.

Mr. JACKSON. Does the Senator think we should negotiate on matters that relate to our allies without involving them? Is that what the Senator is advocating?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. No. Let us return to the point. I think the negotiation is quite proper, and I am very much sold on the idea of making some progress. It would cut down on the arms race. And I think that what the Senator says is directly contrary to what the President of the United States has said and what Dr. Kissinger, his delegate and spokesman, has said and what others have said. The Senator is complaining about the imprecision of the agreement. I submit that the Senator's own amendment is very imprecise, too, as in the language on "subparity" that he has used.

Mr. JACKSON. Where is the term "subparity" in my amendment?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is in the Senator's own statement that he used in describing the agreement. In the amendment, he uses the word "inferiority," the implication being that we are moving toward an inferior position, which is contrary to the President's statement. I do not understand how the Senator can

take the position that only the ICBM's should be considered as the criteria for judging this agreement. The administration and all the spokesmen say it should be judged overall, that all our strategic weapons should be considered—the whole mix. As to whether it is in our interest or not, the Senator well knows that the President has stated his opinion that it is in our interest and that there is no danger whatever of our being in an "inferior" or "subparity" position. The Senator is aware of that, is he not?

Mr. JACKSON. Well, the administration, I think, has spoken clearly on this——

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The President has. Has not the President?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes. They have made it very, very clear that they do not want the interim agreement made permanent. Now, what is wrong with getting the Russians to cut back to a basis of numerical equality with us? Since when is that wrong? Since when is it wrong that we have equality of forces? I remember in the ABM debate, some Senators, in the closed session we had, argued that the Soviets would not build more than 1,200 missiles. Now the Soviets have over 1,600 on land and another 740 on the way at sea.

I point out to the Senator that it seems to me what we want here is a treaty that will really give us parity. That is the basis on which to end the arms race.

The Russians argue that you have got to count all the forward bases, all the warheads, against our total. That is what the Russians have been arguing in Helsinki and Vienna. That is what they have been arguing all the way through. I submit that we should start here, now, by laying down a policy statement in which the Senate—what is wrong with the Senate, by the way, giving its advice—is on record for avoiding U.S. inferiority, and supporting equality in round two. That is what we are talking about.

Let us not confuse a policy for the future with the interim agreement. We are talking about reaching a permanent treaty. I want to see such an agreement and I want to see that that agreement is on the basis of equality.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator knows that neither Dr. Kissinger nor the President will, as they have already stated, accept the specific interpretation of the Senators' amendment.

The President said:

I have studied this situation of arms control—

This is relative to the interim agreement——

Mr. JACKSON. What is the Senator reading from?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. From the President's statement of June 15. I think the Senator was there. I certainly was there, and I think most of the Senate and most of the House Members—a great many of us—were there.

On June 15, 1972, the President said:

I have studied this situation of arms control over the past three and a half years. I am totally convinced that both of these agreements—

I will read the whole of it, but he is talking about ABM and the Interim Agreement—

He said:

I am totally convinced that both of these agreements are in the interest of the security of the United States and in the interest of arms control and world peace.

Later on he said:

I have noted a great deal of speculation about who won and who lost in these negotiations. I have said that neither side won and neither side lost. As a matter of fact, if we were to really look at it very, very fairly, both sides won, and the whole world won.

Let me tell you why I think that it is important. Where negotiations between great powers are involved, if one side wins, and the other loses clearly, then you have a built-in tendency or incentive for the side that loses to break the agreement and to do everything that it can to regain the advantage.

This is an agreement which was very toughly negotiated on both sides. There are advantages in it for both sides. For that reason, each side has a vested interest, we believe, in keeping the agreement rather than breaking it.

I think that is a sound statement. And I agree with it. I think that what the Senator is suggesting is that this agreement is not a sound one and that he does not agree with the President that both sides should have some advantages so that they both will have an interest in keeping it.

If we follow the Senator's advice on this agreement, we will remove, I think, the incentive that the President talks of. The Senator's purpose apparently is to prevent any agreement with the Russians.

The Senator's views about the Russians are well known: He has described the Soviet Union as a burglar going down a hotel corridor looking for an open door. He has made such statement for many years.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, is the Senator aware——

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I want to finish my statement.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, just a minute. I have the floor. If the Senator will not complete his statement, I will not yield further. He may complete his statement and I will respond. The Senator is making all sorts of wild statements.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Go ahead.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, is the Senator aware of the fact that I have supported all the agreements we have with the Soviet Union? I am proud of the fact that I supported them and that we now have a program of Safeguards in connection with the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. I voted for the ABM Treaty the other day. What treaty is the Senator referring to with the Soviet Union that I did not support?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I am referring to the statements I have heard the Senator make on the floor time and time again as to how untrustworthy the Russians are. The Senator is the only one I know of who took exception to it from the beginning.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, the Senator will recall that in the ABM debate he was quoting, in support of an argument he was advancing, a certain man named Gromyko. I asked the Senator from Arkansas a question—and some of the Senators are still here who were present during that debate—I asked the Senator from Arkansas: "Is that the same man who on October 6, 1962, walked into John F. Kennedy's office and told President Kennedy to his face that the Russians did not have any missiles in Cuba?"

I remember that Mr. McCone, the head of the CIA, had that very morning given photographs to the President that showed Soviet missiles there.

If the Senator wants to trust them on that basis, that is all right.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is right. I do not hold it against him that he has not trusted the Russians. There are plenty of reasons not to.

Mr. JACKSON. But the Senator from Arkansas does?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I think the only way to build up trust is the way the President of the United States is doing it. I think that our negotiations with the Soviet Union for the last 25 years have been lamentable and have been most disappointing.

I had a report from the State Department to the effect that we have spent $1.3 trillion in arms over this period. And there is no one whom I know of who has contributed to that more than the Senator from Washington. He has done more than any other Senator to destroy the fiscal responsibility of our country.

He was the principal person who prevented us from stopping the ABM years ago when we had a 50–50 vote in this body.

I give credit to the Senator for being the principal reason why we were not able to stop the ABM at that time.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I want to say that I am very proud of my support of those programs, without any partisanship, that I think are essential to our security.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I realize that.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I want to say that the Senator from Arkansas for many years came on the floor of the Senate advocating foreign aid expenditures involving billions of dollars. Why does not the Senator talk about that a little bit. The Senator felt that it was in the interest of our security. I supported a lot of that. If the Senator has some qualms about that——

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, it has been years since I supported the program. In the Marshall days I supported it and for a few years after.

Mr. JACKSON. When did the Senator stop supporting it?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. About 6 years ago.

Mr. JACKSON. When was the Marshall plan in effect?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, that was in the late 1940's. I am not here to go through a history examination. The Senator knows that it was about at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin joint resolution that the President did to my committee and to this country what Mr. Gromyko did. He lied to us. Since that time I have been very much disillusioned with respect to both military aid and foreign aid. I think that we have wasted a lot of our resources.

The Senator has in mind the possibility of stopping any forward movement in the next SALT talks. That is what he is doing, as he concedes in his amendment.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, the Senator from Arkansas has been a leader in saying that the Senate should give its advice and not just consent—that policy statements should be made here and not wholly within the executive branch.

All I am suggesting in this particular amendment, which I will offer at an appropriate time, is a policy statement that says that we insist upon equality.

It is a pretty sad day for America if we are not going to fight for parity or equality in a strategic arms agreement.

That is all I am asking for. If the Senator wants to take his present position, all I can say is that every Member of the Senate will have an opportunity to vote on it. But it will be a pretty sad day for America when we will not stand up in this Senate to indicate our views by insisting upon equality with the Russians on strategic arms. Contrary to what the Senator says, I am in favor of forward movement at SALT II. We simply disagree on how to achieve that.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Will the Senator yield further?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, is it not a fact that the Senator's amendment in no way affects the terms of the interim agreement?

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator is correct.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. In other words, he is supporting the policy. Why does the Senator wish to encumber an agreement which he does not wish to change, which in his exchange with the Senator from Kentucky, he said he does not want to vote against. Why does he not offer it in a resolution? Why does he encumber the RECORD with a policy that does not affect it?

Mr. JACKSON. Because the pending agreement that is before us for approval is not a permanent agreement. The President and all of his advisers have made it very clear that it is an interim agreement.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is for 5 years.

Mr. JACKSON. That is right. And as the Senator knows, our talks are expected to start in October on SALT II. And the Senator has been the leading advocate in this body that Congress ought to give its advice when it gives consent in these matters. That is what I am suggesting here.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is quite right.

Mr. JACKSON. They are related, because we are going into SALT II trying to reach a permanent agreement.

Now I am suggesting that the Senate do what the Senator has been talking about so much for the past year or two, that we state our position. Just as the administration issued a number of unilateral statements in connection with the interim agreement, we ought to indicate our basic position as far as SALT II is concerned.

This will help strengthen the hand of the President of the United States, and I think it would help speed the possibility, which I hope we can realize, of an agreement that will result in a stabilization of forces, so that we can have equality.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator realizes——

Mr. JACKSON. What is wrong with that?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Let me answer. The Senator realizes that the Committee on Foreign Relations is, after all, as the agent of the Senate, charged with the responsibility of advising the Senate. The Committee on Foreign Relations includes in its membership both the majority leader and the minority leader of this body, as the Senator knows, and some of the leading members of the Republican Party. The Committee on Foreign Relations unanimously reported this resolution without any whereases; it struck them all out.

It is also significant that the House Committee on Foreign Affairs did the same thing yesterday. Both of those committees have taken the position that this interim agreement should not be encumbered by extraneous controversial language.

The Senator wishes to have a policy statement for a guide 5 years from now, or even 3 years from now, for the benefit of Mr. Smith and his colleagues.

Why does the Senator not prepare a resolution for that purpose alone and not encumber this measure, because this is very dangerous at the very beginning of our first agreement with the Russians, to begin tampering with it and to create the impression that we do not agree with the President's assessment that it is a fair agreement.

I submit that, overall, this agreement does provide parity, not in any single weapon, but overall. That is the position of the President.

Mr. JACKSON. May I respond?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. JACKSON. First, the Senator seems to imply that because it came from the Committee on Foreign Relations unanimously, maybe we should not offer amendments. I simply suggested an amendment and it stopped the bill for a whole week. I am astonished. The Senator knows a lot about unanimous recommendations from that committee. Did not the Gulf of Tonkin resolution come out of the Foreign Relations unanimously?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. No; I think Senator Morse was against it.

Mr. JACKSON. Well, only two, and they were Senators Morse and Gruening.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. JACKSON. But the fact that it came out unanimously—what does that prove? Do we not have a right to dissent from that judgment and offer amendments?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I have been apologizing for that, as others have, for the last 8 years. That was one of the most disastrous measures, not only of that committee, but of the Senate. Except for those two Senators, the Senate also voted unanimously.

Mr. JACKSON. I want to make sure the Senate does not someday apologize for failing to have insisted on equality.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I suggest it will apologize for this if this amendment is adopted. It is not an amendment to this agreement. If it were an amendment to this agreement, it would be much more easy to deal with. It is a subtle expression of policy that seeks to bind the negotiators in the future, although it is presented as an amendment on a resolution regarding the present agreement. It is not really an amendment at all.

Mr. JACKSON. Why is the Senator concerned with it, then? If it were a reservation to the Interim Agreement the Senator would say that the reservation disrupts the agreement entered into and, therefore——

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It would not——

Mr. JACKSON. Let me finish, please. The Senator would say it would change the agreement and we would have to go back to Russia to renegotiate.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. If the Senator wished to do so, he could offer a reservation: That it is not effective unless the Russians let us build 1,634—whatever that number is—ICBM's so that we would have parity in ICBM's. Of course, our own people do not want that. They refused to do it. Their own judgment tells them that is not desirable.

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator has gone on and on. My amendment affects the future; it does not affect the agreement. Far from "building up" I would like to see a follow-on agreement that would require the Russians to "build down."

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is a policy statement, a guide.

Mr. JACKSON. But it is relevant because I do not want the impression created, and the administration made this point over and over again, that because we approve the interim agreement in which the Soviets get definite superiority in the areas I earlier referred to, that that is going to be the basis on which we are going to move toward an agreement in SALT II. The Russians should understand the feelings of the Senate on this subject.

I believe it fulfills the Senator's objective of the Senate being involved more in policy matters. The Senator from Arkansas has been complaining for the last 2 or 3 years, that we are not brought in on these matters. I want the Senate to have the opportunity to implement the Fulbright doctrine.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The "Fulbright doctrine" has never been to perpetrate the arms race or to inhibit an improvement in our relations with Russia or China. I think the policy of this country for the last 25 years is the most dismal thing in our history. We have wasted more opportunities than any other country ever had, by spending our money and time on futile wars abroad and in building weapons which will never be used.

Mr. JACKSON. I hope they will never be used. If they are, God help us.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. These agreements are to create a climate in which they will not be used. What is dangerous about the Senator adding his policy guidelines to this agreement is that it is bound to create doubts among the Russians as to our good faith. He does not have respect for the Russians.

Mr. JACKSON. I did not say I did not have respect for them. I am a realist. I want to ask the Senator: Would he rely on the statements of Mr. Gromyko?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I rely on this agreement.

Mr. JACKSON. That is not my question.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. You can ask me: Would you rely on the statements of Mr. Dean Rusk when he said to the committee that we had been attacked in the Tonkin Gulf without provocation?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, I would.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. All right. We have all lied. I do not know anybody in that position who would not misrepresent the Office. We have had witnesses before the committee that have. They have been under instructions and dodged the questions. The Senator knows that.

I hope the Senator is not saying that no American ever lied. Is he?

Mr. JACKSON. I would not say that.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not think he would.

Mr. JACKSON. Is the Senator suggesting we should make critical agreements on the basis of trust?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The basis is the same as the President outlined in his statement: The agreements are of mutual interest to both countries. This is exactly the basis on which to put it, and you are out to destroy that basis. If we accept the Senator's view on this, as interpreted in his statement Monday, I predict there will be great difficulty making further agreements with Russians.

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator had dire predictions about what would happen if we went ahead with the ABM. I debated him on that. I argued that the ABM would play an important part in the SALT bargaining—that it would facilitate an agreement. The Senator had a different idea.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. You are wasting $10 billion.

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator can make all the wild statements he wants, but the fact is the appropriation for the ABM did play a major role in reaching an agreement. We know the Russians were most anxious to halt our ABM deployment and their desire to do this formed the basis of both the ABM treaty and the interim agreement.

But let me conclude on this point. After all, the White House should know if this is bad, and this is what the White House statement included. It said the Jackson amendment—

> Is consistent with the undertakings in Moscow. It reflects what we believe to be broad Senate support for statements made by the Administration in connection with the understanding accompanying the agreements and previously transmitted to Congress.

It does not constitute a reservation or interpretation to the agreement in any legal sense.

And I will stand on that.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, certainly.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, during the course of the colloquy the Senator indicated he had been waiting for a week to vote, that there had been a delay in the consideration of the interim agreement, and the Senator is correct.

Now, is the Senator prepared to consider this afternoon a time certain to vote on the Senator's amendment?

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator is aware that my position on a unanimous agreement has been clear from the very beginning. It was made clear to the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD) last week. What really surprised me was that when the Senator from Washington offered an amendment, the pending business was laid aside. I made no objection to the unanimous-consent request. I made it clear that I would enter into a fair and equitable unanimous-consent agreement. I will be glad, when I complete my statement, to discuss that with the majority leader.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Well, I think we ought to discuss a few things publicly before we get to that, because we have discussed this privately, and we have reached a tentative agreement—very, very tentative—but would the Senator consider the possibility of voting at a time certain, say on Monday, on his amendment, with a time limitation of 1 hour on all other amendments after that, and with 4 hours on the bill?

Mr. JACKSON. Well, I do have to talk to some of my colleagues. I have not been able to do that with one Senator who is away and will not be back until Monday night. I can say this much: I will certainly make every effort to try to reach a unanimous consent agreement to vote some time in the afternoon or early evening on Monday, in any event not any later than Tuesday, and I hope it will be Monday; but I do want to have a chance to do that. I have been holding the floor most of the afternoon, and I want to talk to my colleagues in that regard. But I want to cooperate with the majority leader.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I appreciate the Senator's cooperation. I would be prepared to give the Senator to whom the Senator from Washington refers a live pair if the one vote did not make a difference in the result of the tally.

Could the Senator meet with his colleagues sometime this afternoon and, for the benefit of the Senate, perhaps make a proposal which would be agreeable to both sides?

Mr. JACKSON. I will certainly try, and I will do everything I can. I told the Senator right along I would, and I told the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD), as the majority leader knows, at the very beginning. I was the one who agreed immediately to a unanimous-consent agreement on the ABM treaty that we worked out. I indicated that as soon as I had some idea when the Interim Agreement was going to come up—and I, of course, had no way of knowing when it was going to come up, after it had been set aside each day—that I would agree to a fair unanimous-consent arrangement after consultation with other Senators who might or might not be out of town.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator.

Mr. JACKSON. Again I want to reiterate that I shall do everything I can to achieve that objective.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. ALLOTT. While the distinguished majority leader has the floor, as one of the cosponsors of this amendment, I want to assure the majority leader that, on my own part, I am perfectly willing to cooperate and do the very best I can to get a speedy, agreeable time to vote on it. I thought, personally, that this matter was going to be brought up from day to day and that I would be here whenever it was voted on, although, as the Senator knows, I have other commitments I have to attend to next week. But I think if we had some time, and we could investigate and find time to do it, I would certainly be agreeable to it.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I appreciate the statements which have been made by the distinguished Senator from Colorado.

Will the Senator from Washington yield to me briefly?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I understand the situation in which he and others of his colleagues find themselves, but I would point out that what the leadership is ryng to do—and I speak of the joint leadership—is push along the President's legislative program in the period ahead. We have but 1 week more before the Republican Convention opens. During that 1 week, even, a number of our colleagues on the other side will necessarily have to be away from the Chamber because of preparatory work in connection with the convention.

Then we decided, in view of certain proposals which were made, that we would not come back after the Republican Convention had ended until the day after Labor Day, although, speaking personally, that went contrary to what I had been considering all along.

But the way things look now, we have not much time to take up the President's proposals and the appropriation bills, and achieve a sine die adjournment for this Congress by September 30.

May I say that not only is that true of the interim agreement, which I fully support, in accordance with what the President said on the basis of the Nixon-Brezhnev communique, and on the basis of what Dr. Kissinger said to about 30 Senators and Representatives the day after the President returned from Moscow, and which he said with the full authority of the President, because the President, as I recall, spent about 40 minutes stating his views and then telling us Dr. Kissinger would speak for him; but in addition to the interim agreement which we are now considering, we have the revenue sharing proposal, which is in serious dispute, and I doubt very much if we could complete action on it before the Republican Convention. Then we have H.R. 1 and four or five appropriation bills, the land use bill, and all kinds of legislation which will have to be considered. It will call for cooperation.

I am very happy with the statements made by the distinguished Senator from Colorado and the distinguished Senator from Washington that there may be a possibility of working something out on this measure.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I wanted to suggest the absence of a quorum, on the stipulation—and I am not going

to ask for a live quorum—that I not lose my rights to the floor.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to do so.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, reserving the right to object—and I shall not object—prior to the unanimous consent agreement, would the Senator from Washington yield for a question to the majority leader on a procedural matter?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, I am glad to yield.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, if I may have the attention of the majority leader, I have two amendments at the desk, one amendment to the Jackson amendment and one amendment to the resolution, both of which amendments I intend to press. I would hope the majority leader and the Senator from Washington, prior to entering into any unanimous-consent agreement, would consider those two amendments, on which I expect to have rollcall votes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is fine. May I say that if we do not reach some sort of agreement on some of these very important measures in which the President is interested—and I should not be the one out here saying this—it is quite possible that the interim agreement could take us through this week and into September, and the effect which the President desires would be lost, because, if I recall correctly, he wanted to start phase II next month.

What will happen to revenue sharing on that basis I do not know. It looks to me as though H.R. 1 stands a good chance of going down the drain. It is not even reported out of committee. So we are faced with a situation which I think calls for some sort of accommodation better than has been the case heretofore, though I think it has been splendid up to this time.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I am glad to yield to my friend the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank my friend from Washington.

I have followed this discussion of the SALT I agreement to the best of my ability in the Armed Services Committee, the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, and the Foreign Relations Committee. I was impressed with the intelligent questioning the able Senator from Washington has undertaken in this matter, and there are many aspects of his amendment that impress me.

However, a particular word—"intercontinental," and I have taken the liberty of discussing this with the Senator from Washington—if this proposed tabling motion is defeated, and that word is not eliminated from his amendment, based on my knowledge of the subject, this would mean he would be stipulating that in the future the negotiators for the United States would have to demand superiority, not equality, as a sine qua non of any SALT II agreement.

I would have to oppose that, and would do my best in open discussion to show why.

With great respect to the majority leader, I would oppose any unanimous-consent agreement when it came to amendments, if this tabling motion were defeated.

Mr. JACKSON. I do not know what tabling motion the Senator is talking about.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, may I respectfully say I hope the Senator would keep an open mind.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I have great respect for the majority leader, I have appreciated my long association with him, and challenge him to show me when, because of his wise influence, I have not kept an open mind. This is the first time in my many years here I have objected to a unanimous-consent agreement; but this matter would appear so important it should be dealt with carefully. We all got a short message from the Soviet Embassy the other day as to what they are thinking about in this matter——

Mr. JACKSON. What message from the Soviet Union? What is the massage from the Soviet Union the Senator is talking about?

Mr. SYMINGTON. We received a statement from the Soviet Embassy, hand delivered into my office, that they did not acquiesce to your resolution.

Mr. JACKSON. It was not delivered to my office. They do not contact me, I guess.

Mr. MANSFIELD. It was not signed.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I am curious about who sent the statement, and where it was sent to. I have heard of the Soviet tendency to keep in touch with a lot of people on Capitol Hill.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The statement was an implication that the Soviet Embassy did not agree, that they were not consulted.

Mr. JACKSON. Is this a statement from the Russian Embassy?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I do not know. It just came to my office. Several other Senators said it came to theirs.

Mr. JACKSON. I am not on the right mailing list, I guess.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I am not attempting to justify or criticize any statement, but believe if this word is left in the Senator's amendment as proposed, it would make very difficult any really meaningful negotiating position in the SALT II talks. That is the thrust of what I am trying to say. Therefore, I would ask some questions about our relative strength, all around the world nuclear-wise as well as intercontinental strength; and until this matter was thoroughly explored, I would not want to agree to any time limitation agreement.

Mr. JACKSON. I must say I am still a little curious. I have heard of these statements floating around that the Soviet Union, through their embassy here, is expressing concern about the Jackson amendment. That is a rather unusual activity, would not the Senator agree?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I received the notice stating they had not been consulted about it, after the press said they had.

I would hope we would not do anything in this body that would prevent, in the future, a meaningful arms control agreement. "Arms control" must also be two important words in the Soviet Union, because the Senator knows as well as I that a full nuclear exchange could well destroy civilization.

I was impressed with what the President said after the SALT I agreements. We are in this discussion as to whether the agreement made in Moscow by this administration is a wise agreement for the United States to pursue. I believe it is. I think it is a good agreement. What the Senator from Arkansas has quoted two or three times in this discussion, the President's statement or Mr. Kissinger's—which, as we know, is essentially the same thing—impressed me.

So if a tabling motion does not go through, I would pursue——

Mr. JACKSON What tabling motion? That is what I wanted to ask

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is my purpose to make a motion to table the Senator's amendment. I thought that was understood.

Mr. JACKSON. No, the Senator has not mentioned it to me.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Then I apologize for being remiss. I assumed the Senator would judge from the circumstances. But in any case, I now say that is my purpose.

Mr. JACKSON. Your tabling motion is just like the interim agreement; there is a lot of it that is not explicit.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I support the position of the Senator from Missouri. I have said to the majority leader that if the amendment is not tabled, and it is there and we have to deal with it, then there will be a number of amendments, and a while ago I tentatively said perhaps everyone could be contacted. There are other Senators; the Senator from California has an amendment, but especially amendments going to this subject, as the Senator has mentioned, and the word "intercontinental." This bears directly on the exchange I just had with the Senator that this subparity and parity relates only to the ICBM.

Mr. SYMINGTON. That is right. That is the thrust of what I was getting at.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, could we have that statement from the Russians put in the RECORD?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I will read it now. This is a copy; I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD. It is very short, and reads as follows:

In connection with the reports published in the American press to the effect that Soviet diplomats were consulted on Senator Jackson's resolution and allegedly gave "their acquiescence" to it the Embassy of the Soviet Union would like to state that there is no truth in these reports.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY

In connection with the reports published in the American press to the effect that Soviet diplomats were consulted on Senator Jackson's resolution and allegedly gave "their acquiescence" to it the Embassy of the Soviet Union would like to state that there is no truth in these reports.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is all there is to it. That came to my office, and I assume to most Senators' offices. It may be that they thought a communication from them to the Senator's office would not be welcome. I can understand why they might feel that way. Therefore, he may have been the only one not to receive it. I think all the rest of the Senators did.

Mr. JACKSON. Let me just say, as the Senator knows, the Russian attachés are all over the Hill. They are here daily. They come into my office and get my statements. As soon as my amendment was offered, we gave it to them. They get our publications. They were in my office within an hour after the amendment was in the press gallery.

We all know they are very active on Capitol Hill. They are talking to Senate aides all over the place. They have that right. I just wish we had the opportunity to send some of our attachés from our Embassy, especially with all the persecutions going on, to visit some of the people in the Supreme Soviet, the Presidium, and the Politburo. The Soviets have total access here, and they are taking full advantage of it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I would agree with the Senator that they are extremely concerned about the significance of the Senator's amendment. I think the Russians have great interest in moving forward with arms control, and I think they would deeply regret our having this progress mutilated and nullified by the Senator's amendment.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield very briefly?

Mr. JACKSON. First of all, let me just say, in response to the statement that the Senator read into the RECORD from the Soviet Union, of course, I never said at any time what is in this statement. This is what the Embassy statement says:

> In connection with the reports published in the American press to the effect that Soviet diplomats were consulted on Senator Jackson's resolution and allegedly gave "their acquiesence" to it the Embassy of the Soviet Union would like to state that there is no truth in these reports.

I would like to say I know nothing about this, and I never indicated that the Soviet Union had been consulted.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That was in the paper, that is all.

Mr. JACKSON. But, as I say, that is a news report.

I just want to make the record clear that I never, at any time, made any statement such as that referred to in their release. They can refer to third-party statements that are nothing but hearsay; but I want to make the record clear, so long as this statement has been brought into the debate.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. I understand that the Senator wishes to finish his statement. I have no desire to interfere with the consecutive quality of his presentation, but I think there are some detailed questions on his own amendment which the Senate and the country would benefit from having asked. Senator SYMINGTON has already opened up one of them. I have some others.

Would the Senator, as he is going to get consent to resume the floor, allow us, at a seasonal moment—perhaps in a little while but within some reasonably proximate time—to go over the actual text of his amendment with him, in the hope of helping him and him helping us, to explain precisely what is the meaning of the actual text?

Mr. JACKSON. I say to the Senator that I will do that when I offer my amendment. As the Senator knows, I have not offered the amendment. The pending amendment is the amendment of the Senator from Montana. So we do not need to confuse the situation at this point. At a proper time, I will offer my amendment.

In the meantime, I am trying to make what I think is the only detailed explanation of what is involved in the interim agreement. The Committee on Foreign Relations has not offered a careful and full explanation. The chairman of the committee just got up and took about 3 minutes and did not give a detailed statement. I am engaged in giving a detailed statement of what is involved in this matter. I think that for the sake of history and the record, that should be done. I am surprised that it has not been done by the Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I spoke the other day, when the matter first came in. Today, I did not repeat what I had said.

Mr. JACKSON. I think there has not been, to my knowledge—and I may be wrong—a detailed explanation of what is involved in this interim agreement. I am doing it, and I am just giving my views. I would like to have a detailed explanation from the Foreign Relations Committee as a result of the testimony. That is all I am saying.

Mr. JAVITS. Are we to understand, therefore, that the Senator may submit some different version of his amendment than the one upon which the administration commented?

Mr. JACKSON. Which the administration approved; No.

Mr. JAVITS. They have not approved his interpretation.

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator knows what I am talking about. I am talking about the amendment. They have approved the amendment.

Mr. JAVITS. That is why I said what I have said. We have a right to assume that the amendment the Senator has widely distributed is the amendment he will present.

Mr. JACKSON. It has been printed.

Mr. JAVITS. That is correct. Nonetheless, the Senator makes a point of the fact that he does not want to discuss the detail of it because he has not submitted it.

Mr. JACKSON. I have not called it up. It has been submitted; it is printed; it is at the desk. What is the question?

Mr. JAVITS. We would like to assume that that is the text.

Mr. JACKSON. That is the text.

Mr. JAVITS. So the Senator would be prepared to answer questions relating to the text?

Mr. JACKSON. Certainly. When I call it up.

Mr. JAVITS. Why, then, if the Senator is not going to change it?

Mr. JACKSON. Because I think that, in the interest of orderly procedure, the pending amendment is the amendment by the majority leader.

Mr. JAVITS. But the Senator's argument is not going to the majority leader's amendment. It is going to his own affirmative position.

Mr. JACKSON. I am on page 5 of a 14-page detailed statement on this agreement. I do not know how long the Senator wants to stay here, but I am willing to stay as long as necessary. I will then be glad to go into it. I think other Senators want to be heard, and I will go into it in detail at the proper time.

I thought we wanted to discuss it, and I was going to ask unanimous consent for a quorum call which would make it possible to have some discussions on the issue and question which I think is central at the moment, raised by the majority leader.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be a quorum call—and I will not ask for a live quorum; that I not lose my right to the floor; and that I resume holding the floor to the starting of the quorum call.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages in writing from the President of the United States, submitting nominations, were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Geisler, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session, the Presiding Officer (Mr. STEVENSON) laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(The nominations received today are printed at the end of Senate proceedings.)

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed a bill (H.R. 16029) to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and for other purposes, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

HOUSE BILL REFERRED

The bill (H.R. 16029) to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and for other purposes, was read twice by its

title and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

INTERIM AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

The Senate resumed the consideration of the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 241) authorizing the President to approve an interim agreement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

THE MOMENTUM ARGUMENT OR HOW TO GO FORWARD WHILE STANDING IN PLACE

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, the present agreement is intended to slow the momentum of the buildup of Soviet offensive forces, a buildup that has taken the Soviets far beyond the force levels required for implementing a deterrent posture based on a simple notion of assured destruction. My own examination and assessment of the appropriate intelligence data coupled with an analysis of the latitude granted under the terms of the agreement has brought me to the conclusion that, as a means of halting the Soviet momentum it is a failure and as a means of slowing Soviet momentum it accomplishes far less than has been claimed.

Mr. President, it is instructive to examine the comments made by the President and by his national security adviser, Dr. Kissinger, on the effect of the interim agreement. They add up to what I would call the "headache theory of treaty-making," according to which one signs an agreement, not because it is good, but because nonagreement is worse. That is about as close as public policy can come to beating your head against the wall, because it feels so good when you stop. Listen to Dr. Kissinger:

I do not deny that the initial reaction of some people will be to look at the gap in numbers. But once they understand . . . what the gap would be without this agreement . . . I believe that many of those who express some hesitation will come around.

Now, what I understand Dr. Kissinger to be saying is that those of us who are concerned at the gap in numbers in the interim agreement will be persuaded that a balance even more adverse to the United States would have resulted from a failure to reach the interim agreement. The President himself made this argument in his press conference of June 29, 1972, when he said:

Had there been no arms control agreement, the Soviet Union had a program underway in the field of submarines which would have brought them up to over 90. The agreement limits them to 62.

Had there been no arms control agreement—and this is the most important point—in the terms of offensive strategic weapons, the Soviet Union that has now passed us in offensive strategic weapons—they have 1,600; we have roughly 1,000—they would have built 1,000 more over the next 5 years. Now, under those circumstances, any President of the United States could see that in 5 years the United States would be hopelessly behind; our security would be threatened, our allies would be terrified, particularly in those areas, and our friends, like the Mideast, where the possibility of Soviet adventurism is considered to be rather great.

Therefore, the arms control agreement at least put a brake on new weapons.

So we have before us an agreement designed to see us through the next few years, the chief virtue of which is that life under it will be less dangerous, hopefully, than life without it. This may be a sufficient argument for the Senate giving approval to the interim agreement. It is not, in my view, a sufficient argument for allowing our approval to go unqualified, either by our recognition of the risks or the assertion of our own view of the future.

Understanding what the agreement does is of such importance that I raised the question of the extent to which it slows Soviet momentum on a number of occasions. For example, on July 19 I had the following exchange with General Ryan, Chief of Staff of the Air Force:

Senator JACKSON. One method of assessing the impact of the SALT accords on Soviet programs would be to compare what they are free to do under the agreement with what we have projected that they might have done in the absence of the agreement. Speaking generally, and without getting into precise estimates, how does the lower end of the spectrum of official estimates of the Soviet strategic offensive force for mid-1977 compare with the permitted Soviet force under the SALT accords?

General RYAN. Roughly equivalent, Senator, lower end of the spectrum.

Again, on July 21, I put the same question to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Zumwalt, who, like General Ryan, is fully apprised of our intelligence projections. The admiral answered:

The lower end of the spectrum of the official estimates is lower than the force permitted under the SALT records.

Mr. President, I ought to make clear for the record that I put the same question to both Ambassador Smith and General Allison of the SALT delegation when they appeared before the Armed Services Committee on June 28. Both gentlemen declined to answer stating that security considerations precluded comment. Now, the figures in question are readily available to any Senator who wishes to judge for himself the extent to which the forward momentum of the Soviet buildup has been slowed by the interim agreement.

The Director of Defense Research and Engineering commented on this question of the impact of the interim agreement on Soviet deployment programs when he appeared before the Armed Services Committee in executive session on June 22, 1972. At that time Dr. Foster engaged in an important exchange with my good friend the Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON):

Senator CANNON. I want to turn for a moment to the discussion of momentum that Senator Jackson was talking about that both sides have in building strategic weapons and how that will change our relative strategic posture as a result of SALT. I think this is a subject which is relevant to a meaningful discussion of the role of the ABM in the NCA defense.

The Interim Offensive Agreement limits both the United States and the Soviets to their present ICBM force, with allowances made for the Soviets to complete 90-odd silos now under construction. Therefore, the Soviets have slightly more than a 1.5 to 1 ratio of ICBM launchers and their numerical advantage is about 600.

The interim agreement also allows the Soviets to build up to a 62-submarine force, an increase of about 40 or so from their present level of about 22 Yankee class.

On the other hand, we are essentially frozen at a maximum of 44 submarines, only three more than our present level, and therefore, the agreement grants the Soviets the advantage of completing their current momentum in submarine building.

Is that not basically correct?

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, that is correct.

Senator CANNON. Concerning the quid pro quo of the treaty and agreement, is it not true that the Soviets will not have to exercise restraint in their momentum, that is, they will not have to curtail their current building rate of production on submarines for at least 3 years and perhaps more?

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator CANNON. In other words, they will not be giving up anything in terms of momentum until at least 3 years from now and possibly 4 to 5.

On the other hand, the United States has agreed to give up something this year, and that is work on three ABM sites at the Minuteman missile installations. In fact, we will actually be dismantling work already started at Malmstrom Air Force Base. Thus we are giving up something now whereas they might give up something 3 years from now, or then again they might not.

Is that a correct assessment?

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. President, I have tried to put in perspective the claim that the interim agreement halts the momentum of the Soviet build-up not to reflect adversely on the interim agreement, but to help the Senate form a judgment that bears directly on our policy with respect to SALT II. It is essential, in my view, that we enter the second phase of the SALT deliberations with a clear view of the emerging strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union and with the conviction that SALT II, whatever else it does, must assure equality between the parties on offensive intercontinental strategic arms. To insist on such equality with respect to offensive weapons is to require no more than was done, at Soviet insistence, with defensive weapons in the ABM treaty.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ALLEN). Does the Senator from Washington yield to the Senator from California?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. CRANSTON. I want to say, first, I have great respect for the Senator's courage and determination and for his very deep knowledge of nuclear and other weapons. Therefore, it is with some trepidation that I would like to ask a few questions of the Senator.

First, he has spoken a number of times this afternoon about those who have raised questions about his amendment and has said, "What is wrong with parity, and what is wrong with equality?"

I want to make it plain that I think we should be on a par and that we should have equal strength with the Soviet Union. I would like to ask him if he knows of any Senator who suggests that we should be weaker than the Soviet Union.

Mr. JACKSON. I am not going to judge what other Senators may believe. I am offering an amendment whereby

the Senate and individual Senators will have an opportunity to state as a matter of policy, in connection with SALT II, where they think the United States should stand vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in intercontinental strategic arms. I am calling for equality. If a Senator does not want it, he can vote against it. That is the issue.

Mr. CRANSTON. The Senator from California certainly wants equality in overall strategic weaponry and military strength with the Soviet Union. What we are getting down to, or where the difference seems to lie, is in the definition of "parity" or "equality." The Senator from Washington places seemingly total emphasis on the number of missiles and the throw-weight involved. Other people who I think have some expertise in this field feel that there are other factors which should be taken into account, such as the accuracy with which a country can throw its missiles, the distances the Soviet Union has to contend with, and the overall qualitative and sophisticated performance of our weapons.

Mr. JACKSON. As the Senator knows—and I know he has gone into this—the factors to which he refers are not frozen under this agreement.

Mr. CRANSTON. But are not those factors that should be taken into account in determining overall strength?

Mr. JACKSON. We are talking about equality here. Now, you cannot assume that we will, in a long term treaty, maintain our present advantage in technology. Technology may change, but the numbers do not. That is why equality in numbers is so important.

As the Senator knows, we have 7,000 warheads in Europe, according to former Secretary McNamara. I would point out to the Senator that the Soviets have about 600 intermediate range ballistic missiles. One hundred of them are all they need to eliminate the 7,000 warheads. But in any event, behind their 600 IRBM's they have, as the Senator knows, a very large number, far more than we have, of fighter bombers—that could follow up those IRBM missile attacks.

So forward bases are a small part—a very, very small part— of any strategic consideration, and very limited at best.

Obviously, they involve our NATO allies. And forward bases, I would also point out to the Senator, are a very uncertain thing. We had a forward base in Okinawa, as the Senator knows, but we no longer can have nuclear weapons in Okinawa. The Senator knows that we had nuclear weapons in France, but we no longer can have nuclear weapons in France. We no longer have bases in France, even though they were once a part of NATO.

If we are going to count warheads that cannot be delivered in the event the worst should happen, should we be attacked, what good are the warheads in a storage facility that are not delivered? This is the point.

As I said earlier this afternoon, we had a great Navy, the largest in the world, on December 6, 1941. On December 7, we had no Navy at all. This is what we are talking about. I listened over the years to the debate on the ABM. We were told, "Look, the Russians really are not going for more than 1,200 ICBM's, and they are not going to go for Polaris-type submarines." We went through that in 1969 and 1970 and 1971. Now, look at the figures. Senators argued: "All they want is parity with the United States. They want an equal number of submarines and an equal number of ICBM's."

What did the Soviets do. They have gone ahead and have 50 percent more intercontinental ICBM launchers, and they have a 4-to-1 throw-weight advantage. Under the interim agreement they will have 62 submarines to our theoretical 44. In actuality, it will be 41.

I am just a country boy, but I think I know what is equality and what is not, and the interim agreement is not equality. The President recognizes it, and the President, who has the job of directing the negotiations, has indicated that the interim agreement is not the basis for the SALT II talks.

We do not want to leave the impression, I think, that the interim agreement here is going to be the foundation on which the SALT negotiators will try to draft a treaty that is going to be of an extended duration. If that is the case, we will never reach an agreement, because I do not think any President, Republican or Democrat, who has the responsibility of protecting the freedom of our people, and indeed the security of the western world, would ever do such a thing.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for an informational inquiry?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes.

Mr. CHURCH. Because the Senator has control of the time, it is difficult to get an exchange on equal terms.

Mr. JACKSON. I will try to answer—as a matter of fact, so far I have spent more time answering questions than delivering my speech. The amazing thing is——

Mr. CHURCH. May I ask a question?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, but may I make a comment?

Mr. CHURCH. Yes.

Mr. JACKSON. It is really amazing: Here is a most important question involving an historic agreement on strategic weapons, but the Committee on Foreign Relations has not made a detailed presentation of the matter. I am doing it here; I am going into detail, and I am amazed, because normally the committee which has the responsibility makes a full explanation, and here I am, not a member of the committee, going into the basic issues. But let me say I am delighted to respond to any questions, and I will stay as long as the Senator likes.

Mr. CHURCH. Very well. In the language of your amendment, I would like a more precise definition of what you mean by "intercontinental strategic forces."

I concur with the Senator from California; I would not favor any future agreement, following on the termination of the SALT II negotiations, which placed the United States in an inferior position to the Soviet Union in terms of our strategic nuclear capacity. There is no Member of the Senate who would favor an agreement consummated on those terms. What we really are considering here is the definition of "equality" or "parity." We cannot evaluate the Senator's definition unless we understand just what he includes in the term "intercontinental strategic forces."

For example, is a B–52 bomber, with the capability of departing from the United States, refueling in the air, and then penetrating the Soviet Union to deliver nuclear bombs over a Russian target an intercontinental strategic weapon?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes.

Mr. CHURCH. Would a B–1 bomber with that capability be an intercontinental strategic weapon?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes.

Mr. CHURCH. Good; now we are getting somewhere.

Mr. JACKSON. Is the Senator going to talk about the Russian delivery systems, too?

Mr. CHURCH. I just want to get this straight. I am not trying to look into one corner but not the others. I have read everything the Senator has said here with great interest, and I commend him on the thorough presentation he is making.

Let me ask the Senator this hypothetical question: Suppose, in the course of the SALT II talks, we were to decide that we wanted to secure an agreement which would allow us to build 100 B–1 bombers. This is all hypothetical, because I do not want in any way to reveal classified information.

Mr. JACKSON. Well, there is nothing classified about that.

Mr. CHURCH. Let us assume that these B–1 bombers each had a capability of delivering 5 megatons in nuclear bombs. Suppose we were to say, "We want the right to build 100 B–1 bombers that would give us 500 megatons of throw-weight capability, that is the capability to deliver over the Soviet Union 500 megatons of nuclear bombs," and the Russians were to say, "If you want that, we want the equivalent, but we are not interested in building bombers; we happen to have a different opinion of bombers than you do, so we want instead the right to build 100 more launching sites, silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles, of a character and dimension that would permit us to have the equivalent capability—namely, to deliver by means of these additional missiles, 500 megatons of warheads upon the United States."

With that hypothetical, is there anything in the Senator's language here that would preclude our negotiators from reaching that understanding if they were willing to do so? In other words, would that example constitute "parity" or "equality" in the Senator's mind?

Mr. JACKSON. It could. It is a part of the aggregate that you would consider, and the answer is that it could constitute equality.

Mr. CHURCH. Then, I would ask the Senator if he would have any objection, at an appropriate time, to inserting the term "overall," just to make clear that we are not talking about the necessity of numerical equality for each particular weapon?

What I am talking about is this: We have our mix of strategic weapons, they have their mix, and the important thing

is, so far as the future is concerned, that any future agreement place us in balance, so far as the two mixes go, and that is why "overall" would make it clear that this is the Senator's objective. The difficulty with the Senator's present language, if I may say so, is the sequence of two clauses. I want the Senator to understand the problem, so let me read from the Senator's language——

Mr. JACKSON. What line?

Mr. CHURCH. On page 2, line 9:

The Congress recognizes the principle of United States-Soviet Union equality reflected in the antiballistic missile treaty, and urges and requests the President to seek a future treaty that, inter alia, would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union.

When we take those two clauses together—and they are not even separated by a period—we have language susceptible to the interpretation that the equality the Senator seeks is the kind represented by the ABM Treaty, where each side is allowed to build an equal number of antiballistic missiles. Equality, then, appears to mean numerical equality for the particular weapon that is the subject of the agreement.

Mr. JACKSON. It is not numerical alone, I want to point out to the Senator, because, obviously, we have to consider the dimensions or size. Throw-weight is the key index.

Mr. CHURCH. Yes.

Mr. JACKSON. I mean numbers alone are not the whole picture—throw weight is also important.

Mr. CHURCH. I agree with that. My point is that, judging from the Senator's answer to my earlier question, which I gladly accept—I wonder why he would have any objection to the insertion of "overall?"

Mr. JACKSON. Overall what?

Mr. CHURCH. Overall intercontinental strategic forces. To make it clear that what we are talking about is the mix and that we do not have to build an identical system to that of the Soviet Union and they do not have to build an identical system to ours in order to meet the standard of equality intended by this policy statement.

Mr. JACKSON. The intercontinental strategic forces are the aggregate intercontinental strategic forces. When you talk about "overall," we run into the problem of possible misinterpretation—of including what the Russians are trying to include, and that is the warheads and aircraft—because we do not have missiles—at forward bases, which have but a minor role in the strategic balance. What we are really talking about, basically—and it has to be that way—are the ICBM's, the SLBM's—the submarine launched ballistic missiles—and the intercontinental bombers.

Mr. CHURCH. Would the Senator have any objection to the insertion of the word "aggregate"?

Mr. JACKSON. Intercontinental strategic forces are the land- and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and intercontinental bombers. When "aggregate" is added to it, I think it confuses the picture.

Mr. CHURCH. It does not confuse it for me. It helps to clarify it.

Mr. JACKSON. I have no objection to intercontinental strategic forces involving ICBM's, SLBM's and intercontinental bombers. I have no objection to that.

Mr. CHURCH. Any term such as "overall" or "aggregate" which will make it plain that we are talking about two equivalent systems would be helpful.

Mr. JACKSON. We can talk as lawyers at the moment. I can give the Senator a bill of particulars, and I am giving him a bill of particulars. I am giving him intercontinental strategic forces, which are ICBM's, SLBM's, and intercontinental bombers. That is it.

Mr. CHURCH. The senior Senator from Idaho wants to make certain——

Mr. JACKSON. This bill of particulars is a part of the legislative history.

Mr. CHURCH. That any final version of this text makes it self-evident in the language of the text itself. Legislative history often means 50 different Senatorial viewpoints. I want the text itself to make absolutely clear what the Senator is striving for, equality in terms of the two strategic systems.

Mr. JACKSON. The three, ICBM's, SLBM's, and intercontinental bombers.

Mr. CHURCH. I mean the two—the American and the Russian strategic systems.

"Aggregate" or "overall" or such a term would make that self-evident. I suggest it would do no damage to the Senator's proposition, but it would help to reassure some of us who feel that otherwise the language would be subject to a different interpretation.

Mr. JACKSON. I know that the Senator, who is a very good lawyer and a very good draftsman, would agree that when I defined "intercontinental strategic forces" as being specifically ICBM's, SLBM's, and intercontinental bombers, that is unequivocal; there is nothing ambiguous about it. On the other hand, if we say "aggregate," we will have another debate as to what is meant by "aggregate."

Mr. CHURCH. But this was the term the Senator, himself, suggested first—"aggregate." It seems to me to be a very precise term.

Mr. JACKSON. What is more precise than listing specifically the strategic systems?

Mr. CHURCH. I am afraid that the countersuggestion of the Senator might compound the same ambiguity. It could then be said that what is meant is that any future agreement must give us and the Russians an equivalent right to build the same number of bombers, the same number of ICBM's, the same number of submarine-launched missiles.

Mr. JACKSON. No; that is not true.

Mr. CHURCH. But I am afraid that it could be subject to that interpretation; whereas, "aggregate" could not.

Mr. JACKSON. No; that is not true.

Mr. CHURCH. We are talking as lawyers.

Mr. JACKSON. I am being specific. The facts are as I have indicated them. I am talking about the delivery systems. I said it means equality, and equality is not numbers alone, but obviously it includes the throw-weight.

I want to conclude on this point by saying that the President of the United States understands it. The White House has agreed to this language. It seems to me it is a sensible guideline for the President of the United States to follow as an expression of Congress.

Mr. CHURCH. Let me ask the Senator a second question. Does he regard a submarine carrying missiles, whether these be Polaris or Poseidon missiles, to constitute a part of an intercontinental strategic force——

Mr. JACKSON. Yes. And so, too, should we include——

Mr. CHURCH. I have not finished.

Mr. JACKSON. You also have to include shorter range ballistic missiles that the Soviets have which give them a unique advantage, because our coasts are exposed and a large part of our population and industry are in coastal areas.

Mr. CHURCH. I certainly do include them. The Russian submarine, whether it is armed with a Polaris-type missile or whether it is armed with a shorter range missile, since it can come close to our coasts and reach us with its missiles, clearly falls within the definition of an intercontinental strategic weapon.

Mr. JACKSON. The same could be said of a cruise missile of which they have some 400 that are not limited in the interim agreement.

Mr. CHURCH. Would you include a Russian cruiser that could come within missile-firing range of our shores?

Mr. JACKSON. I would not say that, because Soviet surface ships do not have ballistic missiles aboard. In any case, we are talking about central strategic systems that are solely devised for the purpose of delivering intercontinental payloads.

Mr. CHURCH. Would it include aircraft carriers that could reach, with jets carrying nuclear bombs, the shores of the Soviet Union or even penetrate into the interior of the Soviet Union?

Mr. JACKSON. Aircraft carriers are multipurpose, as the Senator knows. They are not exclusively strategic forces. They have a very minor strategic role—almost negligible.

Mr. CHURCH. But they do have that strategic capability.

Mr. JACKSON. They are fundamentally nonstrategic. They have an essentially conventional role.

Mr. CHURCH. If you were looking at it from the Russian viewpoint, would you not feel that our aircraft carriers, equipped with planes having a nuclear capability, would constitute the same kind of hazard, and could not be excluded in the makeup of the American strategic force?

Mr. JACKSON. When you talk about a strategic system that is exclusively designed for a strategic delivery role, that is vastly different from talking about a carrier which, as in the Mediterranean, has a limited and multipurpose role. It is not a strategic weapons system comparable to a submarine or an ICBM clearly deployed for strategic purposes. When one looks at the United States-Soviet strategic balance I think it is clear

that our carriers are insignificant except in their conventional role. And that, of course, is what the Russians are really after.

Mr. CHURCH. I find the Senator's argument in this respect most unconvincing, and I will express myself on that in a moment, but first I would like to yield to the distinguished Senator from Vermont——

Mr. JACKSON. I have the floor. I will be glad to yield to him on my time.

Mr. AIKEN. I should like to ask a question that will take only 10 seconds. I feel sure the Senator from Washington will be able to answer it in 2 seconds.

Does the Senator from Washington believe our country would have been better off had the President never signed any agreement at all?

Mr. JACKSON. I can say that I can support this interim agreement on an interim basis only—a 5-year basis—provided we get an agreement, a treaty, that will give us numerical equality and not the inferior position that exists in connection with the 5-year interim agreement, that, I believe is the position of the administration.

I want to emphasize that in this interim agreement on a temporary basis the Soviets have a 50-percent advantage in terms of numbers of delivery systems and a 4-to-1 advantage in throw-weight. This is obviously something that we do not want to perpetuate. I can accept it as an interim, but an interim arrangement only, on the stipulation that we go forward with a negotiation to obtain equality. Hopefully, this would involve a reduction in Soviet strategic weapons to equal U.S. levels.

Mr. AIKEN. In other words, the Senator from Washington can accept this agreement provided his interpretation is accepted along with it?

Mr. JACKSON. Provided that we can get the statement of policy that I have offered in the form of an amendment and which the White House has approved.

Mr. CHURCH. The Senator says that the White House has approved his amendment, but the Senator knows that the White House has not approved, or associated itself with the particular interpretation that the Senator gives the amendment——

Mr. JACKSON. I am talking about the administration's approval of the amendment which is clear on its face. It is certainly clear enough for the Senator to oppose it.

Mr. CHURCH. But the interpretation is what is so critical here. We were talking about equality. Everyone is for equality. I am for equality. I do not know of any Member of the Senate who is against equality.

Mr. JACKSON. You will have a chance——

Mr. CHURCH. The question is, How is equality defined? You would not have a chance, by voting for this proposal, to endorse "equality" unless we go to the heart of the term. The particular "heart" we were talking about was aircraft carriers.

Mr. JACKSON. It is clear on its face what is provided in my amendment. I stand on that. The President of the United States has the responsibility and he accepts it. Obviously, you can go on forever but we all know what is meant by equality as opposed to inferiority. I will stand on that. Reference in the amendment, as the Senator himself observed, to the ABM Treaty is the key to what is meant by the term "equality."

Mr. CHURCH. I do not want to make my own argument on the Senator's time. But I would appreciate it if he would let me make a rebuttal to his remarks about the aircraft carrier.

Terms, such as "equality" or "parity," are meaningless. They mean nothing unless we know precisely to what weapons they refer. The Senator says he would exclude U.S. aircraft carriers from the balance, even though they have a large nuclear capability. They patrol the oceans, just as the submarines do, and they can advance to within striking distance of the coasts of the Soviet Union, and, with their planes, penetrate the Soviet Union and deliver onto Soviet targets many nuclear warheads. Yet, the Senator from Washington would exclude aircraft carriers. He says they are not exclusively designed for this purpose. What difference does that make? Put yourself in the other fellow's position. Is the other fellow going to say, simply because aircraft carriers also possess other capabilities, that therefore, they are not intercontinental strategic weapons? Is that really reasonable? I do not think so. It is very hard to make a distinction between a Russian submarine that can approach our coasts, come to the surface, and launch a low-flying missile which is quite like an airplane and call that a strategic weapon for which we insist upon equality; but then to turn around and say that an aircraft carrier, which can approach a Russian coast and, not launch one missile but 50 planes, all of them with nuclear bombs, and claim it is not a strategic weapon. I cannot follow the logic.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, does the Senator assume that every time an American carrier moves into the Mediterranean the strategic balance would shift? What carriers is the Senator counting?

Mr. CHURCH. That is precisely the point. The carrier, by definition, could form a part of that mix on which a subsequent agreement in the SALT talks might turn. And I do not want to limit our negotiators in such a way that they are restricted within guidelines that could undermine whatever opportunity there may be to reach some subsequent agreement. That is what the Senator does when he says: "I define strategic force to include intercontinental bombers, intercontinental missiles, and submarine missiles. But I do not include aircraft carriers with nuclear capability."

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I have stated the American position. The Russians want to include every warhead, wherever it might be. And I do not think that in terms of providing for equality we can accept the concept that warheads, per se, regardless of purpose, even nuclear forces aboard carriers are to be included.

Mr. CHURCH. If I ever heard one, that is a distinction without a difference.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I am very much interested in the Senator's argument. In effect, he seems to agree with the position the Russians are taking, which is to count carriers and forward bases.

Mr. CHURCH. Did the Senator from Idaho say that?

Mr. JACKSON. Pardon me?

Mr. CHURCH. Did the Senator from Idaho say that?

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator from Idaho knows what position the Russians take.

Mr. CHURCH. Did the Senator from Idaho propose that?

Mr. JACKSON. No.

Mr. CHURCH. Then why does the Senator say that I did?

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator follows the arms control talks?

Mr. CHURCH. Surely.

Mr. JACKSON. Am I not correct in saying that the Russians have taken the position that we have to count aircraft carriers and forward bases?

Mr. CHURCH. The Senator is correct in saying that is the position of the Russians. However, he is incorrect in saying it is my position.

My position is that I disagree with the Senator when he says that aircraft carriers ought not to be counted as strategic weapons and ought not to figure in any future negotiations with the Soviet Union. I have not said I agree with the Russians. The Senator frequently says that we should stick to the facts. Let us stick to the facts.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I am asking the Senator what his position is in connection with the arms control talks that will be coming up. Should we go along with the concept that we are going to include, in arriving at a U.S.-Soviet bilateral balance of equality, our aircraft carriers, and forward bases? Is that what the Senator wants interpreted here under the term "equality"?

Mr. CHURCH. What this Senator wants is the negotiators to be free to move ahead under conditions that will best enable them to consummate an agreement. I do not know what the quid pro quo might be for any particular proposal. I would reserve the right, as a Senator, to look at any agreement that came back, and to vote for or against it, depending on how I felt it affected the security of the United States.

But, I do object to putting our negotiators in a straitjacket, before the negotiations begin, by defining strategic weapons in ways that I obviously cannot accept.

As an American and as a U.S. Senator, I would have difficulty in arguing that an aircraft carrier is not a strategic weapon. If I were charged by my Government to argue that case, I would be hard put to make a convincing argument.

If we include aircraft carriers in any future parity, I would want a quid pro quo from the Russians. It would be in our national interest to do so. However, I cannot possibly accept the language the Senator offers here, which undertakes to restrict in advance the scope of the negotiations.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, may I say to my good friend, as I have said earlier today, that there has been a lot of discussion on the floor of the Senate about the executive branch usurping the foreign policy field. I have great respect for the Senator and for his ability. We have served together for a long time. And he has spent a lot of time on arms control. He has served for a long time on the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee and has followed this very closely. As I recall, he made a trip, or several trips, to Geneva and followed very closely the question of stopping atmospheric nuclear testing. The Senator has long experience, and I respect him.

I want to point out that in all of this discussion about a policy position, it seems to me that a Senator ought to be willing to indicate what his position is as far as the negotiations are concerned and the guidelines they ought to follow.

All I am trying to do is to provide a basic policy directive from the Congress. It is for SALT II. It is nothing more than that. It is not mandatory. It is an expression of policy. If the Senator wants to disagree with that, that is his right. I indicated my position and what I thought we ought to do in SALT II, reach an agreement on the basis of equality.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I certainly have no argument whatever with the Senator when it comes to the right of the Senate, whenever it feels it to be in the national interest, to offer policy guidelines to the Executive. It is not the fact that the Senator wishes to do this. It is the policy the Senator proposes that troubles me. And it is, in this regard, that I have tried to make some suggestions to him which, it seems to me, would improve the amendment and make it less objectionable. I take no exception at all to the Senator offering his amendment. And it is certainly in line with the responsibility of the Senate to consider his and other suggestions.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I appreciate that. However, as the Senator knows, when this amendment was proposed, we had a statement by one Senator that it was a bombshell. The bill was set aside for a whole week. I respect the right of anyone to do that. However, I think it is the right of a Senator to offer amendments. There is nothing unusual about that.

In fact, I was rather surprised that, because I offered an amendment, it stopped the bill for a whole week. I did not know that one Senator could do that just by proposing an amendment. I did not even formally offer it.

Mr. CHURCH. I know. The Senator from Washington opened his mouth and the President crawled right in. The Senator should not underestimate his power.

Mr. JACKSON. I am glad if that is true. However, I am a little confused when the Foreign Relations Committee put the bill in limbo for a whole week just because I proposed an amendment without even formally offering it.

I have been hearing so much from the members of the Foreign Relations Committee, and the chairman in particular, about how Congress is not being brought into these things and is not able to participate and that maybe we ought to do something about it.

So I have offered an amendment on policy. As a matter of fact the statement that I am making today is the first detailed statement made on this matter. The Committee on Foreign Relations has not made one. This is a rather historic agreement we are called upon to take action on. I feel very strongly we should discuss it and debate it in detail.

Mr. CHURCH. I agree with the Senator. I promise to do my part.

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator has done very well. I commend the Senator. We have set forth a bill of particulars.

Mr. President, I look forward to completing my remarks when the Senate returns to the interim agreement.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we are discussing today an interim agreement which will freeze the quantitative levels of our strategic offensive weapons. As we all know, it is an interim agreement; that is to say, it is the agreed-upon basis for the negotiation of a follow-on agreement which hopefully will reduce the levels of strategic armaments on a balanced basis on both sides. The interim agreement does not reduce the weapons levels; in fact it allows the Soviets to continue to build certain systems up to certain levels set in the agreement.

Nevertheless the case has been made that the Soviet quantitative advantages are outweighed by U.S. technical achievements. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made such arguments persuasively before the Armed Services Committee. However, we expect the picture to change. The President has stated:

> Mr. Brezhnev and his colleagues made it absolutely clear that they are going forward with defense programs in the offensive area which are not limited by these agreements.

By the time that the SALT II negotiations are concluded, the strategic picture will be considerably different than it now appears, even with both sides adhering strictly to the terms of the agreement.

For this reason, the resolution offered by the Senator from Washington, and cosponsored by the Republican leader and the senior Senator from Colorado is of critical importance. This merely expresses the resolution of Congress that the present agreement shall not become the springboard for a distorted relationship with the Soviet Union in the future. It is a very mild statement. The present agreement itself goes far beyond these implications. Article VIII, paragraph 3 says that:

> Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Interim Agreement if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Interim Agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests.

Thus even the present agreement could be scrapped, if it resulted in a situation where the survivability of our retaliatory forces were endangered.

We know that the Soviets will expand their forces outside the terms of the agreement; we are doing the same thing, as indicated by the votes taken here last week. These actions will result in a strategic balance, or perhaps imbalance, which cannot be calculated today. If our strategic forces are jeopardized by that calculation, then surely it is within the spirit of these agreements that the withdrawal clause would be triggered.

At the same time that our strategic systems are changing, under the influence of the constraints in this agreement, our negotiators will be arriving at a second formula, a new agreement which will possibly result in the dismantling of some systems. It is my hope, and, I am sure, the hope of this body that the negotiators do not get carried away with the euphoria of circumstances, and initial an agreement that results in a permanent disparity in our forces. We must not forget that at the same time the Soviets are talking, they are building, they are developing.

They are considering not only the major strategic situation between the United States and the U.S.S.R., but also the Soviet role in world leadership. They will be playing off the SALT agreements against more limited aims in geopolitics. That is why this resolution wisely confines the negotiating limits to intercontinental strategic forces.

Even with the best intentions, our negotiators will have difficulty coping with the rapidly shifting situation. We have only to go back over the history of the present negotiations.

Although the SALT talks properly began in November of 1969, we ought to go back to July 1968, when the talks were first scheduled. We had 1,054 ICBM's; the Soviets had over 850. The talks were postponed until September, but meanwhile the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia. On September 1, 1968, according to the posture statement of the Secretary of Defense, the Soviets had 900 ICBM's. We had 1,054. In this same period, the Soviets began to conduct tests on their SS–9 MOD 4, or MRV.

When the SALT conference finally opened in November, 1969, the United States and the Soviets went to the table with a rough parity. The prestigious Institute for Strategic Studies set the Soviets at 1,050 and us, of course, at 1,054. When the conference finished on December 22, both the Soviet and U.S. Ambassadors issued expressions of hope and progress. More specific details appeared in the Washington Post in an article which gave the flavor of having the benefit of inside briefings. The Post said that it appeared that the problem at hand was to devise a method of maintaining the balance of power which resulted from this "rough parity." In the meantime, the negotiators were said to have agreed that neither side should do anything to upset the roughly equal standing of the two countries. Whether or not such an agreement actually took place, a bona fide negotiating stance would have required it.

We know what the Soviets actually did. While we talked, the Soviets built. The second SALT meeting took place in Vienna between April 16 to August 14, 1970. By that time the Soviets had about 1,250 ICBM's and we still had 1,054.

The third SALT meeting took place in Helsinki, between November 2 and December 18, 1970. By that time the Secretary of Defense had said that the Soviets had approximately 1,300 to our 1,054.

The fourth SALT meeting took place in Vienna, March 15 to May 28. The Soviets were estimated to have approximately 1,400 ICBM's to our 1,054.

The fifth SALT meeting took place in Helsinki, July 8 to September 24, 1971. By that time the Soviets had approximately 1,440 ICBM's to our 1,054.

The sixth SALT meeting took place in Vienna, November 16, 1971, to February 4, 1972. By that time the Soviets had approximately 1,520 ICBM's to our 1,054.

The seventh SALT meeting began in Helsinki on March 28, 1972, and ended in Moscow on May 26. At the conclusion the President announced that the Soviets had 1,618 and we had the original 1,054.

It was no secret that this was happening. I merely point it out to illustrate the Soviet drive for advancement of their weapons system. The same point was made by Dr. Kissinger in his June 15 White House conference with congressional leaders. He said then:

For various reasons during the 1960's the United States had, as you know, made the strategic decision to terminate its building programs in major offensive systems and to rely instead on qualitative improvements. By 1969, therefore, we had no active or planned programs for deploying additional ICBM's, submarine-launched ballistic missiles or bombers. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had dynamic and accelerated deployment programs in both land-based and sea-based missiles.

This is precisely the difference. The Soviet defense strategy is an active one, while ours is passive. The Soviets had a complex mix of strategic systems that can be directed at Europe as well as the United States. They have an aggressive development program, not only with current strategic systems, but in creating new ones. They have gone into many programs which some of our planners derided as not "cost effective." They went into a counterforce program against our ICBM's. We, meanwhile, relied on a passive strategy of "maximum assured destruction," saying that if we were hit first, we would hit back.

Dr. Kissinger stated it succinctly when he said:

We are in the position with respect to various categories of weapons that the Soviet Union has an accelerated program, and we have none.

Fortunately, we are moving into an accelerated program with the Trident; we have the B–1 underway, and we are stepping up R. & D. What we have to recognize, however, is that the Soviets will shift their habits of active defense from numbers to quality. Having built a formidable foundation in numbers, and in payload capacity, they are now ready to erect a structure of quality which potentially can surpass our own efforts.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Moorer, said, in the Armed Services Committee hearings:

The USSR was already far superior to us in total intercontinental strategic offensive megatonnage. Only in the numbers of strategic offensive warheads was the United States projected to maintain a lead over the Soviet Union during the next five years. Even here, the USSR has the potential to overtake us. Given the technology which we have every reason to believe the Soviet Union either has or is acquiring, it is anticipated that they will move vigorously into MIRV's, both in their ICBM's and SLBM's. The considerably greater "throw weight" or payload capacity of the Soviet missile force, particularly the SS–9 type missile, is especially adaptable to this task. It is still anticipated that they will considerably narrow our lead in terms of warheads by the late 1970's.

Admiral Moorer further said:

We thus reduced the growth of the Soviet lead through negotiations rather than by adding to our force structure.

We have not provided strict parity, we have only reduced the growth of the Soviet lead. As the admiral put it, the agreements provide only "a degree of strategic equality and balance."

For these reasons, SALT II is even more important than SALT I. The Soviet basic line of strategy has always revolved, and still revolves around dynamic ideas of preemptive military action, when the situation calls for it, while U.S. strategies in recent years have been retaliatory in character. Our negotiators will have to take into consideration the fact that this agreement, along with the ABM treaty, effectively restricts defensive systems, and assures an expanded base for offensive systems. The Soviet dynamic strategies are maximized, while the effectiveness of U.S. retaliatory concepts are downgraded. All of this must be taken into consideration in judging "parity"—that is to say, the capability of the United States to deter nuclear war.

Moreover, there is more at stake in SALT II than the nuclear balance alone. Geopolitical strategies with regard to Europe will be decisively affected.

Phase II of SALT will extend the arrangements of phase I in both the offensive and defensive strategic arms areas. The Soviet purpose in the next phase of SALT will probably be directed primarily into disarming and neutralizing Western Europe.

The major Soviet drive in the current political offensive is to extend Soviet influences and "protective" arm over the entire continent of Europe. This is being attempted by the Soviet Union in two different levels: First, by vigorous promotion of the European Security Conference; and second, by the phase II of SALT.

The ESC and phase II of SALT are actually two mutually interrelated programs of the long-range Soviet "coexistence" plan aimed at the gradual imposition of dominant position for the Soviet Union of the European continent.

The most important point of the Soviet plan in this respect is the problem of effective neutralization of Europe. To achieve this goal the U.S.S.R. will maneuver in the SALT for denuclearization of NATO in exchange for a similar "clearing" of the Eastern European zone of countries.

This will affect the offensive capabilities of the so-called forward based systems—FBS. For all practical purposes FBS was never clearly defined and there will be a serious disagreement of what should be included or excluded from this definition. Basically, however, it can be assumed that the Soviets will attempt to cover all U.S. nuclear weapons stationed in Europe which can reach the territory of the U.S.S.R. All weapons of this type even if under allied and not exclusive U.S. command are now politically under U.S. control. The complete removal of these weapons would not only expose our Western European allies to the direct assault of the Soviet ICBM's located in the U.S.S.R., but would keep the U.S. forces stationed in Europe dependent entirely on the cover of "external" forces or weapon systems not located on the European continent.

The FBS concept definitely includes the 80 Polaris missiles on five submarines assigned currently to the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean and some aircraft of the Turkish Air Force suitable for use as a launcher of nuclear weapons. The Soviets will obviously insist on the removal of these submarines and planes from the above areas in exchange for the Soviet withdrawal of similar submarines from the same area—which can hardly be considered an equivalent concession on their part.

Generally speaking, it will be rather difficult to move forward in a meaningful way on the FBS problem in phase II of SALT without jeopardizing the American interests and without exposing our allies to subsequent direct pressures from the Soviet Union as the result of a reduced U.S. security umbrella over the European continent. For this reason I am glad that this resolution limits the negotiators to intercontinental strategic systems.

Mr. President, I support the Interim Agreement. As a result of his predecessors' misjudgments, the President today is faced with narrow options. I repeat, with narrow options. As I have said on another occasion, these pacts are based upon close calculations. As a result of last week's action on the military procurement bill, it appears that Congress is going along with the necessary upgrading of our strategic forces within the confines of the agreements. Moreover, I think we can assume that the Soviets, having built their numerical base, would have aggressively gone into qualitative improvements anyway. The pact does little more than ratify the projected situation over the next few years.

However, the resolution of the Senator from Washington goes to the heart of the matter. We must indicate that our will to survive is greater than the quazy dreams of disarmament planners. If the Interim Agreement aids the cause of peace, and supports the future security of the Nation, then we must be in favor of it without hesitation. The same is true of SALT II. But the moment that these noble purposes fail, then our security lies elsewhere, and we must abandon such agreements as misplaced aspirations. Such safeguards are built into the present agreement; we must have no one miscalculate that we will fail to use them. Similarly, SALT II can only be productive of peace if our secu-

rity is not endangered. The criteria set down in the resolution are reasonable enough indeed, and I believe they should be approved.

Mr. President, the strategic arms limitation pacts signed by President Nixon in Moscow must be considered in every aspect against the situation of the present and the realistic probabilities of the future.

The basic decisions limiting the numbers of our missiles were made in previous administrations despite the warnings of informed observers. Former Secretary of Defense McNamara thought that the Soviets were disturbed by our superiority, and that they would seek parity, or balance, stopping their arms construction when both sides reached the magic number of 1,000 ICBM's. Since it takes 5 to 10 years to develop a major defense system, our inventory has remained frozen ever since at 1,000 Minuteman missiles, plus 54 of the obsolescent Titan missiles.

When President Nixon took office in 1969, it was obvious that the Soviets were not going to stop at the magic number of 1,000. They already had more than 850 and were constructing at the rate of 250 per year. Recognizing the adverse political pressures generated by the disarmament lobby, the President took three steps.

First, he set forth vigorously on a program of qualitative improvements, such as the rapid implementation of the multiple-warhead Minuteman III, the construction of the B–1 and stepped-up planning for the long-range undersea launched missile now known as the Trident system.

Second, he took the leadership in the political battle to construct the Safeguard ABM. The U.S. nuclear strategy is based upon the concept of having sufficient forces left after an enemy attack to launch a devastating retaliatory strike. The ABM was designed to protect our retaliatory capability, thus lessening the chance that an enemy would dare attack.

Third, he inaugurated the SALT talks. By the time that the SALT talks were finished, the Soviets had 1,618 ICBM's deployed or under construction. The agreements, if accepted by the Senate, will put a halt to this Soviet construction. The agreements accept a basic 3:2 numerical superiority over us, but they shift the competition from quantity to quality, where we have the edge. They prohibit expansion in areas which have been blocked in the United States by irresponsible political pressures.

However, the apparent stalemate created between Soviet numbers and U.S. quality is only temporary. The Soviet "throw-weight," or payload capacity is five times greater than ours. The Soviets are already testing MIRV, which, in combination with their 5:1 payload advantage could ultimately give them the ability to surpass us in number of warheads.

These agreements were negotiated upon the assumption that Congress would take a responsible attitude toward the continuing development and deployment of current defense programs. A highly dangerous situation would have been created if Congress slashed defense efforts, particularly in such areas as the B–1 bomber, and the Trident long-range missile system.

The nations that had been prostrate in 1945 had regained their economic strength and their political vitality. The Communist bloc was divided into contending factions, and nationalistic forces and social and economic pressures were reasserting themselves within the individual Communist states.

Perhaps most important for the United States, our undisputed strategic predominance was declining just at a time when there was rising domestic resistance to military programs, and impatience for redistribution of resources from national defense to social demands.

Mr. President, Dr. Kissinger said that Soviet rivalry will continue. Amidst all of this profound change, there was one important constant—the continuing dependence of most of the world's hopes for stability and peace upon the ability to reduce the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The factors which perpetuated that rivalry remain real and deep.

We are ideological adversaries, and we will in all likelihood remain so for the foreseeable future.

We are political and military competitors, and neither can be indifferent to advances by the other in either of these fields.

We each have allies whose association we value and whose interests and activities of each impinge on those of the other at numerous points.

We each possess an awesome nuclear force created and designed to meet the threat implicit in the other's strength and aims.

Therefore, as we approve this ICBM agreement, we need to keep the Soviets on notice, as the distinguished Senator from Washington is attempting to do in these proposals.

Mr. President, I commend the able and distinguished Senator from Washington for offering these proposals. It is my hope that the Senate will most carefully consider them and give their approval to them.

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I am pleased to cosponsor the amendment of the Senator from Washington to Senate Joint Resolution 241 authorizing the President to sign the interim agreement on offsensive weapons.

This interim agreement and the ABM treaty on defensive weapons comprise the Moscow accords which were concluded by the President during his recent trip to the Soviet Union. They go to the very heart of our national security—the capacity to deter nuclear war. Therefore, since our continued survival as a nation hangs in the balance, we must jealously guard that capacity against erosion which could result from an agreement concluded in an election year before a battery of television cameras.

Last week by a vote of 88 yeas to 2 nays the U.S. Senate ratified the ABM treaty dealing with defensive weapons. We are told that that treaty was what the United States had to give up to obtain the 5-year agreement on offensive weapons. I submit that in return we got little which places effective restraints on the Soviet offense which is the very reason that our Nation has defensive weapons in the first place.

Under the terms of the interim agreement, the Soviets will have a three to two advantage in numbers of land-based ICBM's—1,618 to our 1,054. Their ICBM's are larger and include 300 giant SS–9's. There is no American counterpart for the SS–9. However, the agreement neither permits us to develop similar missiles nor prevents the Soviets from continuing to deploy theirs. Altogether, the payload capacity of the Soviet missile force is about four times greater than ours.

Furthermore, even though the Soviets have not as yet developed sophisticated MIRV warheads, the agreement gives them carte blanche authority to accelerate their development of such multiple warheads, and in 5 years they should easily be able to match us in this area of technology. Recent statements of Secretary of Defense Laird credit the United States with only a 2-year lead now.

Put simply, since the Soviets will be allowed to have more missiles and to have missiles many times more powerful than ours, they could end up overtaking us in numbers of warheads, numbers of missiles, and missile size.

This is even more alarming in light of the fact that the interim offensive agreement further permits the Soviets to have 950 nuclear missiles on 62 modern submarines while allowing us only 710 such weapons on 44 submarines.

All of this underscores the need for amendment of the Senator from Washington which has two objectives: First, that the United Statcs will insist on at least equal limits on the offensive forces of both countries in the future and, second, that string research and development and force modernization programs are absolutely essential to strengthen the American negotiating position in the future.

Mr. President, I do not want my country to be inferior militarily to any in the world. I do not want the leaders of my country to willingly accept an inferior position. I am afraid, however, that this is the direction in which the interim offensive agreement will lead us. Without this amendment, the SALT agreements are a bad deal today for which the United States will pay a prohibitive price tomorrow.

I support the proposal of the Senator from Washington and I urge my colleagues in this body to approve it.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I rise to speak in opposition to the amendment proposed by the distinguished Senator from Washington and in favor of the simple resolution of approval reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

I also want to endorse the amendment proposed by the distinguished majority leader. It clearly endorses the interim agreement and does not contain the fatal flaws of the Jackson amendment.

I believe the amendment is both unnecessary to the security interests of the United States. First, it unnecessarily established a set of conditions which could trigger the withdrawal clause of the agreement. Second, it restricts our ne-

gotiating posture establishing a different and somewhat questionable principle upon which to base our strategic force structure planning; and, third, it seeks to lock this Nation into further costly deployment of offensive strategic weapons systems.

First, the Jackson amendment asserts that endangering our strategic forces could jeopardize our supreme national interests. Article VIII of the interim agreement, as does article XV of the SALT treaty, provides the right to either signatory to withdraw from the treaty if it finds its supreme interests to be jeopardized. Clearly that right is available without the Senate adding additional language to indicate once again that the right to withdraw is available. And it seems of little additional import to specify that the endangering of our strategic forces "could jeopardize the supreme national interests of the United States."

Second, the Jackson amendment appears to assert as the only basis of negotiating SALT II agreements, the principle of numerical equivalents. The implication of that assertion goes far beyond the mere desire that a rough equality between the strategic forces of the two nations be part of the negotiating process.

For in the past several administrations, the policy underlying our strategic force structure has been the policy of deterrence, the ability to deliver a retaliatory blow which assures the destruction of the aggressor, even after absorbing a nuclear first strike.

We sought, and have succeeded, in acquiring a strategic force which not only is capable of meeting the requirements of deterrence, but which contains an overkill capacity as well.

The Polaris-Poseidon force alone contains that capability with a single Poseidon able to destroy 25 percent of the industrial capacity of the Soviet Union. We now have 10 Polaris already converted to Poseidon with another 10 in the conversicn process. In addition, we have an intercontinental bomber force of 457, nearly four times that of the Soviet Union, and 1,054 land-based ICBM's.

Our ongoing MIRV process plus our forward submarine bases and our superiority in warhead technology all play a part in providing us with a secure deterrent.

And it is on that basis that we should be negotiating with the Soviet Union, seeking to achieve limitations and reductions of both qualitative and quantitative nuclear arms that will rest on the principle of mutual deterrence, not on a formula approach for numerical equivalents that seemingly is being asserted in the resolution now before us.

It is our overall deterrent that is of critical importance not the numbers of launchers of any single system.

Finally, there is the provision in the resolution which species that the success of future negotiations is dependent upon, not only research and development, but modernization of nuclear weapons systems.

Instead of the Interim Agreement yielding limitations on arms, the Senator is proposing that we affirm our intent to go right ahead and base the success of this agreement and future agreements on continued research and development and modernization—of nuclear arms—in other words, this agreement would then depend on fostering the continued escalation of the arms race. The success of these agreements should be linked only to the maintenance of our deterrent, yet I see nothing in the present range of strategic threats that would place in doubt the security of our deterrent, even if we reject further modernization of existing offensive systems.

And what is perhaps equally disconcerting, the Senator from Washington is opening the door, knowingly or unknowingly, to a basic alteration now being considered by this administration in its strategic force planning. That alteration was reported on the front page of the New York Times last Saturday, although the administration has been noticeably reticent in discussing it with the Congress.

The clear indications are, however, that the administration request for $20 million for improved reentry vehicles represents a nuclear gamble of immense proportions.

And it is a step which the Senator from Washington's amendment would encourage.

Instead of our traditional design and deployment of small warheads whose goal would be the destruction of enemy cities and industry in a retaliatory strike—a design intended to prevent our ever having to use those weapons—the administration is now suggesting a fundamental alteration, an alteration that accepts the plausibility of a limited nuclear strike, an alteration that surely could be interpreted by the Soviet Union as the development of a first strike potential by this nation.

For the intent of the SALT add-on request, a matter that this body has not yet had an opportunity to debate, is to develop large, accurate nuclear warheads with a capability of destroying the Soviet missiles in their silos. While the administration undoubtedly will argue that this will provide greater flexibility in the unlikely event of a limited nuclear attack by the Soviet Union by permitting us to strike back at "military" targets, Soviet planners could not be faulted for a different interpretation.

For they will be aware of our current superiority in warheads, some 5,888 to their 2,200, and the decision to add to the size and accuracy of those warheads, could be viewed as a fundamental change in our planning, perhaps even a step toward a first-strike capability.

I believe such actions would be both unwise and dangerous and I would urge the rejection of this resolution which seems to argue that these and other modernizations of our strategic forces are prior requirements for successful conclusion of SALT II.

The reason for ratifying this agreement as it stands is that it does provide, for the first time, some limitations on the number of strategic offensive weapons systems. And what is particularly important, the limitations come on those weapons which the Soviet Union stressed in its weapons buildup. The agreement limits any additional land-based ICBM's, particularly the SS–9's, and places a ceilings on Y-class nuclear submarines.

The only relevant question to be asked appears to be the one posed by Dr. Kissinger in Moscow on May 26. He said:

> The question in assessing the freeze is not what situation it perpetuates, but what situation it prevents. The question is where we would be without the freeze.

And in that analysis, we have the most recent statistics provided to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by the executive branch.

They project that if the Soviet Union had not been limited by the SALT agreement, it could have built up to over 2,200 land-based ICBM's by 1977 without the limitations, it could have developed over 1,050 submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

The result is that in 1977 at the conclusion of this interim agreement, the Soviet Union will have approximately 1,000 fewer offensive launchers than they would have had in the absence of the agreement.

Similarly, Defense Department statistics now anticipate that the Soviet Union will have some 2,800 fewer warheads in 1977 than they would have possessed without SALT.

Thus, the impact of the Executive agreement is to curb the Soviet momentum in those areas where it has been engaged in rapid buildups. And the impact on on-going U.S. offensive weapons programs is practically nonexistent.

Our program to continue placing multiple warheads on our submarines and on half of our land-based ICBM's is unaffected. In addition, our lead in strategic bombers is not touched by the agreement.

Therefore, I would not only strongly disagree with the Senator from Washington's assertion that the agreement places us on a "subparity" level; but I would argue that the agreement affords additional assurance that the sufficiency of our forces to meet the requirements of difference will continue.

Therefore, I would urge approval of the agreement.

However, I also would repeat that the agreement must be followed by urgent efforts to achieve subsequent nuclear arms limitations agreements. This agreement represents a bare beginning.

In that effort to turn the nations of the world away from the absurdity of the arms race, I would urge once again that the President act now to propel all nations in the direction of mutual disarmament.

I would urge that he declare a moratorium on underground nuclear testing by this Nation, to remain in effect so long as the Soviet Union abstains, and that he present a new initiative at Geneva, unencumbered by the demands of the past for seven on-site inspections, for a permanent treaty to ban all nuclear testing. Such action would mark a breakthrough in placing a ceiling on the qualitative arms race and could well lend the future negotiations at SALT an added impetus.

SALT marks the first time since the 1963 test ban that we really have attempted to slow the nuclear merry-go-round. Now it is time for us to join with

other nations to halt its mad momentum. In the end, the merry-go-round will either stop or it will spin faster and faster and finally explode. For, in the end, it is a merry-go-round of death, and we continue riding at our own risk and the risk of mankind.

THE CALENDAR

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar Nos. 974, 979, and 980.

SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

The resolution (S. Res. 299) to establish a select committee to study questions related to secret and confidential Government documents, was considered and agreed to, as follows:

Resolved, That there is hereby established a special ad hoc committee of the Senate to be composed of ten members, five from the majority and five from the minority. The majority leader shall be the chairman and the minority leader the co-chairman. Of the remaining eight members, four will be appointed by the majority leader and four by the minority leader. Any member appointed under the provisions of this resolution shall be exempt from the provisions of the Reorganization Act relating to limitations on committee service.

The committee shall conduct a study and report its findings and recommendations to the Senate within sixty days of its establishment, on all questions relating to the secrecy, confidentiality, and classification of Government documents committed to the Senate, or any Member thereof, and propose guidelines with respect thereto; and, the laws and rules relating to secrecy, confidentiality, and classification, of Government documents, and the authority therefor.

Mr. MANSFIELD subsequently said: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent on the action of the Senate earlier today by which Calendar No. 974, Senate Resolution 299, was agreed to be vacated.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I shall not object, this measure, which has been before the Senate for debate, was referred to the Committee on Government Operations, of which I am honored to be a member, with a limited time for return and which has now been returned to the Senate, reported and placed on the Senate calendar with instructions, with an amendment by the committee, without a dissenting vote, to conform it to the view of the committee by extending the time for reporting by the ad hoc committee of 10, set up under the resolution, to February 15, 1973.

The committee actually said to report to the new Congress, but the chairman and the ranking minority member interpreted that to mean some reasonable date after the new Congress came back, which we decided should be February 15.

Thereupon, I introduced such an amendment, and was joined in that amendment by the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. ERVIN), chairman, and the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY), ranking minority member.

The Senator from Nebraska (Mr. HRUSKA) has taken an interest in this matter and was very gracious in saying he would not object to that being done, but wished to place a statement in the RECORD.

I was not present on the floor, when there was a sweep of the calendar. I am grateful to the Senator from Montana for having the order vacated. I am sure the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. HRUSKA), when he has an opportunity, will prepare a statement and that the resolution will be adopted. I would feel embarrassed if its passage would stand.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the vote is reconsidered, the action of the Senate is vacated and resolution is returned to the calendar.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I must apologize to the Senate.

COMMERCIAL FISHERIES RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1964

The bill (S. 3524) to extend the provisions of the Commercial Fisheries Research and Development Act of 1964, as amended, was considered, ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed, as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 4(a) of the Commercial Fisheries Research and Development Act of 1964 (16 U.S.C. 779b (a)), as amended, is further amended by changing the words "for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1969, and for the three" to "for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1973, and for the four."

SEC. 2. Section 4(c) of the Commercial Fisheries Research and Development Act of 1964, as amended, is further amended by changing the words "for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1969," to "for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1973,".

SEC. 3. Section 4(b) of the Commercial Fisheries Research and Development Act of 1964, as amended, is further amended by changing the words "for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1969, and for the three succeeding fiscal years, $650,000 in each such year," to "for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1973, and for the four succeeding fiscal years, $650,000 in each such year,".

SEC. 4. The provisions of this Act shall be effective July 1, 1973.

DEVELOPMENT OF TUNA AND OTHER LATENT FISHERIES RESOURCES

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill (H.R. 12207) to authorize a program for the development of tuna and other latent fisheries resources in the Central and Western Pacific Ocean, which had been reported from the Committee on Commerce with amendments on page 1, line 3, after word "Central", strike out "and"; at the beginning of line 4, insert "and South"; in line 9, after the word "Central", strike out "and"; in the same line, after the word "Western", insert "and South"; on page 2, line 13, after "June 30", strike out "1975" and insert "1976"; line 23, after the word "Central", strike out "and"; in line 24, after the word "Western", insert "and South"; on page 3, line 1, after the word "to", strike out "140" and insert "130"; in line 4, after "July 1", strike out "1972" and insert "1973"; and at the beginning of line 5, strike out "1975" and insert "1976".

The amendments were agreed to.

The amendments were ordered to be engrossed and the bill to be read a third time.

The bill was read the third time, and passed.

The title was amended, so as to read: "An Act to authorize a program for the development of tuna and other latent fisheries resources in the Central, Western, and South Pacific Ocean."

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate go into executive session to consider Executive G, 92d Congress, second session.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION

The Senate, as in committee of the whole, proceeded to consider Executive G (92d Congress), 2d session, the Universal Copyright Convention, as revised, with protocols, which was read the second time as follows:

UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION AS REVISED AT PARIS JULY 24, 1971

The Contracting States.

Moved by the desire to ensure in all countries copyright protection of literary, scientific and artistic works,

Convinced that a system of copyright protection appropriate to all nations of the world and expressed in a universal convention, additional to, and without impairing international systems already in force, will ensure respect for the rights of the individual and encourage and development of literature, the sciences and the arts,

Persuaded that such a universal copyright system will facilitate a wider dissemination of works of the human mind and increase international understanding,

Have resolved to revise the Universal Copyright Convention as signed at Geneva on 6 September 1952 (hereinafter called "the 1952 Convention"), and consequently,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each Contracting State undertakes to provide for the adequate and effective protection of the rights of authors and other copyright proprietors in literary, scientific and artistic works, including writings, musical, dramatic and cinematographic works, and paintings, engravings and sculpture.

ARTICLE II

1. Published works of nationals of any Contracting State and works first published in that State shall enjoy in each other Contracting State the same protection as the other State accords to works of its nationals first published in its own territory, as well as the protection specially granted by this Convention.

2. Unpublished works of nationals of each Contracting State shall enjoy in each other Contracting State the same protection as works of its own nationals, as well as the protection specially granted by this Convention.

3. For the purpose of this Convention any Contracting State may, by domestic legislation, assimilate to its own nationals any person domiciled in that State.

ARTICLE III

1. Any Contracting State which, under its domestic law, requires as a condition of copy-

right, compliance with formalities such as deposit, registration, notice, notarial certificates, payment of fees or manufacture or publication in that Contracting State, shall regard these requirements as satisfied with respect to all works protected in accordance with this Convention and first published outside its territory and the author of which is not one of its nationals, if from the time of the first publication all the copies of the work published with the authority of the author or other copyright proprietor bear the symbol © accompanied by the name of the copyright proprietor and the year of first publication placed in such manner and location as to give reasonable notice of claim of copyright.

2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not preclude any Contracting State from requiring formalities or other conditions for the acquisition and enjoyment of copyright in respect of works first published in its territory or works of its nationals wherever published.

3. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not preclude any Contracting State from providing that a person seeking judicial relief must, in bringing the action, comply with procedural requirements, such as that the complainant must appear through domestic counsel or that the complainant must deposit with the court or an administrative office, or both, a copy of the work involved in the litigation; provided that failure to comply with such requirements shall not affect the validity of the copyright, nor shall any such requirement be imposed upon a national of another Contracting State if such requirement is not imposed on nationals of the State in which protection is claimed.

4. In each Contracting State there shall be legal means of protecting without formalities the unpublished works of nationals of other Contracting States.

5. If a Contracting State grants protection for more than one term of copyright and the first term is for a period longer than one of the minimum periods prescribed in Article IV, such State shall not be required to comply with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article in respect of the second or any subsequent term of copyright.

ARTICLE IV

1. The duration of protection of a work shall be governed, in accordance with the provisions of Article II and this Article, by the law of the Contracting State in which protection is claimed.

2. (a) The term of protection for works protected under this Convention shall not be less than the life of the author and twenty-five years after his death. However, any Contracting State which, on the effective date of this Convention in that State, has limited this term for certain classes of works to a period computed from the first publication of the work, shall be entitled to maintain these exceptions and to extend them to other classes of works. For all these classes the term of protection shall not be less than twenty-five years from the date of first publication.

(b) Any Contracting State which, upon the effective date of this Convention in that State, does not compute the term of protection upon the basis of the life of the author, shall be entitled to compute the term of protection from the date of the first publication of the work or from its registration prior to publication, as the case may be, provided the term of protection shall not be less than twenty-five years from the date of first publication or from its registration prior to publication, as the case may be.

(c) If the legislation of a Contracting State grants two or more successive terms of protection, the duration of the first term shall not be less than one of the minimum periods specified in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b).

3. The provisions of paragraph 2 shall not apply to photographic works or to works of applied art; provided, however, that the term of protection in those Contracting States which protect photographic works, or works of applied art in so far as they are protected as artistic works, shall not be less than ten years for each of said classes of works.

4. (a) No Contracting State shall be obliged to grant protection to a work for a period longer than that fixed for the class of works to which the work in question belongs, in the case of unpublished works by the law of the Contracting State of which the author is a national, and in the case of published works by the law of the Contracting State in which the work has been first published.

(b) For the purposes of the application of sub-paragraph (a), if the law of any Contracting State grants two or more successive terms of protection, the period of protection of that State shall be considered to be the aggregate of those terms. However, if a specified work is not protected by such State during the second or any subsequent term for any reason, the other Contracting States shall not be obliged to protect it during the second or any subsequent term.

5. For the purposes of the application of paragraph 4, the work of a national of a Contracting State, first published in a non-Contracting State, shall be treated as though first published in the Contracting State of which the author is a national.

6. For the purposes of the application of paragraph 4, in case of simultaneous publication in two or more Contracting States, the work shall be treated as though first published in the State which affords the shortest term; any work published in two or more Contracting States within thirty days of its first publication shall be considered as having been published simultaneously in said Contracting States.

ARTICLE IV*bis*

1. The rights referred to in Article I shall include the basic rights ensuring the author's economic interests, including the exclusive right to authorize reproduction by any means, public performance and broadcasting. The provisions of this Article shall extend to works protected under this Convention either in their original form or in any form recognizably derived from the original.

2. However, any Contracting State may, by its domestic legislation, make exceptions that do not conflict with the spirit and provisions of this Convention, to the rights mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article. Any State whose legislation so provides, shall nevertheless accord a reasonable degree of effective protection to each of the rights to which exception has been made.

ARTICLE V

1. The rights referred to in Article I shall include the exclusive right of the author to make, publish and authorize the making and publication of translations of works protected under this Convention.

2. However, any Contracting State may, by its domestic legislation, restrict the right of translation of writings, but only subject to the following provisions:

(a) If, after the expiration of a period of seven years from the date of the first publication of a writing, a translation of such writing has not been published in a language in general use in the Contracting State, by the owner of the right of translation or with his authorization, any national of such Contracting State may obtain a non-exclusive licence from the competent authority thereof to translate the work into that language and publish the work so translated.

(b) Such national shall in accordance with the procedure of the State concerned, establish either that he has requested, and been denied, authorization by the proprietor of the right to make and publish the translation, or that, after due diligence on his part, he was unable to find the owner of the right. A license may also be granted on the same conditions if all previous editions of a translation in a language in general use in the Contracting State are out of print.

(c) If the owner of the right of translation cannot be found, then the applicant for a license shall send copies of his application to the publisher whose name appears on the work and, if the nationality of the owner of the right of translation is known, to the diplomatic or consular representative of the State of which such owner is a national, or to the organization which may have been designated by the government of that State. The license shall not be granted before the expiration of a period of two months from the date of the dispatch of the copies of the application.

(d) Due provision shall be made by domestic legislation to ensure to the owner of the right of translation a compensation which is just and conforms to international standards, to ensure payment and transmittal of such compensation, and to ensure a correct translation of the work.

(e) The original title and the name of the author of the work shall be printed on all copies of the published translation. The license shall be valid only for publication of the translation in the territory of the Contracting State where it has been applied for. Copies so published may be imported and sold in another Contracting State if a language in general use in such other State is the same language as that into which the work has been so translated, and if the domestic law in such other State makes provision for such licenses and does not prohibit such importation and sale. Where the foregoing conditions do not exist, the importation and sale of such copies in a Contracting State shall be governed by its domestic law and its agreements. The license shall not be transferred by the licensee.

(f) The license shall not be granted when the author has withdrawn from circulation all copies of the work.

ARTICLE V*bis*

1. Any Contracting State regarded as a developing country in conformity with the established practice of the General Assembly of the United Nations many, by a notification deposited with the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (hereinafter called "the Director-General") at the time of its ratification, acceptance or accession or thereafter, avail itself of any or all of the exceptions provided for in Articles V*ter* and V*quater*.

2. Any such notification shall be effective for ten years from the date of coming into force of this Convention, or for such part of that ten-year period as remains at the date of deposit of the notification, and may be renewed in whole or in part for further periods of ten years each if, not more than fifteen or less than three months before the expiration of the relevant ten-year period, the contracting State deposits a further notification with the Director-General. Initial notifications may also be made during these further periods of ten years in accordance with the provisions of this Article.

3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2, a Contracting State that has ceased to be regarded as a developing country as referred to in paragraph 1 shall no longer be entitled to renew its notification made under the provisions of paragraph 1 or 2, whether or not it formally withdraws the notification such State shall be precluded from availing itself of the exceptions provided for in Article V*ter* and V*quater* at the end of the current ten-year period, or at the end of three years after it has ceased to be regarded as a developing country, whichever period expires later.

4. Any copies of a work already made under the exceptions provided for in Articles V*ter* and V*quater* may continue to be distributed after the expiration of the period for which notifications under this Article were effective until their stock is exhausted.

5. Any Contracting State that has deposited a notification in accordance with Article XIII with respect to the application of this Convention to a particular country or territory, the situation of which can be regarded as analogous to that of the States referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, may also deposit notifications and renew them in accordance with the provisions of this Article with respect to any such country or territory. During the effective period of such notifications, the provisions of Articles V*ter* and V*quater* may be applied with respect to such country or territory. The sending of copies from the country or territory to the Contracting State shall be considered as export within the meaning of Articles V*ter* and V*quater*.

ARTICLE V*ter*

1. (a) Any Contracting State to which Article V*bis* (1) applies may substitute for the period of seven years provided for in Article V (2) a period of three years or any longer period prescribed by its legislation. However, in the case of a translation into a language not in general use in one or more developed countries that are party to this Convention or only the 1952 Convention, the period shall be one year instead of three.

(b) A Contracting State to which Article V*bis* (1) applies may, with the unanimous agreement of the developed countries party to this Convention or only the 1952 Convention and in which the same language is in general use, substitute, in the case of translation into that language, for the period of three years provided for in sub-paragraph (a) another period as determined by such agreement but not shorter than one year. However, this sub-paragraph shall not apply where the language in question is English, French or Spanish. Notification of any such agreement shall be made to the Director-General.

(c) The license may only be granted if the applicant, in accordance with the procedure of the State concerned, establishes either that he has requested, and been denied, authorization by the owner of the right of translation, or that, after due diligence on his part, he was unable to find the owner of the right. At the same time as he makes his request he shall inform either the International Copyright Information Centre established by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization or any national or regional information centre which may have been designated in a notification to that effect deposited with the Director-General by the government of the State in which the publisher is believed to have his principal place of business.

(d) If the owner of the right of translation cannot be found, the applicant for a license shall send, by registered airmail, copies of his application to the publisher whose name appears on the work and to any national or regional information centre as mentioned in subparagraph (c). If no such centre is notified he shall also send a copy to the international copyright information centre established by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

2. (a) Licenses obtainable after three years shall not be granted under this Article until a further period of six months has elapsed and licenses obtainable after one year until a further period of nine months has elapsed. The further period shall begin either from the date of the request for permission to translate mentioned in paragraph 1(c) or, if the identity or address of the owner of the right of translation is not known, from the date of dispatch of the copies of the application for a license mentioned in paragraph 1(d).

(b) Licenses shall not be granted if a translation has been published by the owner of the right of translation or with his authorization during the said period of six or nine months.

3. Any license under this Article shall be granted only for the purpose of teaching, scholarship or research.

4. Any license granted under this Article shall not extend to the export of copies and shall be valid only for publication in the territory of the Contracting State where it has been applied for.

(b) Any copy published in accordance with a license granted under this Article shall bear a notice in the appropriate language stating that the copy is available for distribution only in the Contracting State granting the license. If the writing bears the notice specified in Article III (1) the copies shall bear the same notice.

(c) The prohibition of export provided for in sub-paragraph (a) shall not apply where a governmental or other public entity of a State which has granted a license under this Article to translate a work into a language other than English, French or Spanish sends copies of a translation prepared under such license to another country if:

(i) the recipients are individuals who are nationals of the Contracting State granting the license, or organizations grouping such individuals;

(ii) the copies are to be used only for the purpose of teaching, scholarship or research;

(iii) the sending of the copies and their subsequent distribution to recipients is without the object of commercial purpose; and

(iv) the country to which the copies have been sent has agreed with the Contracting State to allow the receipt, distribution or both and the Director-General has been notified of such agreement by any one of the governments which have concluded it.

5. Due provision shall be made at the national level to ensure:

(a) that the licence provides for just compensation that is consistent with standards of royalties normally operating in the case of licences freely negotiated between persons in the two countries concerned; and

(b) payment and transmittal of the compensation; however, should national currency regulations intervene, the competent authority shall make all efforts, by the use of international machinery, to ensure transmittal in internationally convertible currency or its equivalent.

6. Any licence granted by a Contracting State under this Article shall terminate if a translation of the work in the same language with substantially the same content as the edition in respect of which the licence was granted is published in the said State by the owner of the right of translation or with his authorization, at a price reasonably related to that normally charged in the same State for comparable works. Any copies already made before the licence is terminated may continue to be distributed until their stock is exhausted.

7. For works which are composed mainly of illustrations a licence to translate the text and to reproduce the illustrations may be granted only if the conditions of Article V*quater* are also fulfilled.

8. (a) A licence to translate a work protected under this Convention, published in printed or analogous forms of reproduction, may also be granted to a broadcasting organization having its headquarters in a Contracting State to which Article V*bis* (1) applies, upon an application made in that State by the said organization under the following conditions:

(i) the translation is made from a copy made and acquired in accordance with the laws of the Contracting State;

(ii) the translation is for use only in broadcasts intended exclusively for teaching or for the dissemination of the results of specialized technical or scientific research to experts in a particular profession;

(iii) the translation is used exclusively for the purposes set out in condition (ii), through broadcasts lawfully made which are intended for recipients on the territory of the Contracting State, including broadcasts made through the medium of sound or visual recordings lawfully and exclusively made for the purpose of such broadcasts;

(iv) sound or visual recordings of the translation may be exchanged only between broadcasting organizations having their headquarters in the Contracting State granting the licence; and

(v) all uses made of the translation are without any commercial purpose.

(b) Provided all of the criteria and conditions set out in subparagraph (a) are met, a licence may also be granted to a broadcasting organization to translate any text incorporated in an audio-visual fixation which was itself prepared and published for the sole purpose of being used in connexion with systematic instructional activities.

(c) Subject to sub-paragraph (a) and (b), the other provisions of this Article shall apply to the grant and exercise of the licence.

9. Subject to the provisions of this Article, any licence granted under this Article shall be governed by the provisions of Article V, and shall continue to be governed by the provisions of Article V and of this Article, even after the seven-year period provided for in Article V(2) has expired. However, after the said period has expired, the licencee shall be free to request that the said licence be replaced by a new licence governed exclusively by the provisions of Article V.

ARTICLE V*quater*

1. Any Contracting State to which Article V*bis* (1) applies may adopt the following provisions:

(a) If, after the expiration of (i) the relevant period specified in sub-paragraph (c) commencing from the date of first publication of a particular edition of a literary, scientific or artistic work referred to in paragraph 3, or (ii) any longer period determined by national legislation of the State, copies of such edition have not been distributed in that State to the general public or in connexion with systematic instructional activities at a price reasonably related to that normally charged in the State for comparable works, by the owner of the right of reproduction or with his authorization, any national of such State may obtain a non-exclusive licence from the competent authority to publish such edition at that or a lower price for use in connexion with systematic instructional activities. The licence may only be granted if such national, in accordance with the procedure of the State concerned, establishes either that he has requested, and been denied, authorization by the proprietor of the right to publish such work, or that, after due diligence on his part, he was unable to find the owner of the right. At the same time as he makes his request he shall inform either the international copyright information centre established by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization or any national or regional information centre referred to in sub-paragraph (d).

(b) A license may also be granted on the same conditions if, for a period of six months, no authorized copies of the edition in question have been on sale in the State concerned to the general public or in connection with systematic instructional activities at a price reasonably related to that normally charged in the State for comparable works.

(c) The period referred to in sub-paragraph (a) shall be five years except that:

(i) for works of the natural and physical sciences, including mathematics, and of technology, the period shall be three years;

(ii) for works of fiction, poetry, drama and music, and for art books, the period shall be seven years.

(d) If the owner of the right of reproduction cannot be found, the applicant for a licence shall send, by registered air mail, copies of his application to the publisher whose name appears on the work and to any national or regional information centre identified as such in a notification deposited

with the Director-General by the State in which the publisher is believed to have his principal place of business. In the absence of any such notification, he shall also send a copy of the international copyright information centre established by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. The licence shall not be granted before the expiration of a period of three months from the date of dispatch of the copies of the application.

(e) Licenses obtainable after three years shall not be granted under this Article:

(i) until a period of six months has elapsed from the date of the request for permission referred to in sub-paragraph (a) or, if the identity or address of the owner of the right of reproduction is unknown, from the date of the dispatch of the copies of the application for a licence referred to in sub-paragraph (d);

(ii) if any such distribution of copies of the edition as is mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) has taken place during that period.

(f) The name of the author and the title of the particular edition of the work shall be printed on all copies of the published reproduction. The licence shall not extend to the export of copies and shall be valid only for publication in the territory of the Contracting State where it has been applied for. The licence shall not be transferable by the licensee.

(g) Due provision shall be made by domestic legislation to ensure an accurate reproduction of the particular edition in question.

(h) A licence to reproduce and publish a translation of a work shall not be granted under this Article in the following cases:

(i) where the translation was not published by the owner of the right of translation or with his authorization;

(ii) where the translation is not in a language in general use in the State with power to grant the licence.

2. The exceptions provided for in paragraph 1 are subject to the following additional provisions:

(a) Any copy published in accordance with a licence granted under this Article shall bear a notice in the appropriate language stating that the copy is available for distribution only in the Contracting State to which the said licence applies. If the edition bears the notice specified in Article III(1), the copies shall bear the same notice.

(b) Due provision shall be made at the national level to ensure:

(i) that the licence provides for just compensation that is consistent with standards of royalties normally operating in the case of licences freely negotiated between persons in the two countries concerned; and

(ii) payment and transmittal of the compensation; however, should national currency regulations intervene, the competent authority shall make all efforts, by the use of international machinery, to ensure transmittal in internationally convertible currency or its equivalent.

(c) Whenever copies of an edition of a work are distributed in the Contracting State to the general public or in connexion with systematic instructional activities, by the owner of the right of reproduction or with his authorization, at a price reasonably related to that normally charged in the State for comparable works, any licence granted under this Article shall terminate if such edition is in the same language and is substantially the same in content as the edition published under the licence. Any copies already made before the licence is terminated may continue to be distributed until their stock is exhausted.

(d) No licence shall be granted when the author has withdrawn from circulation all copies of the edition in question.

3. (a) Subject to sub-paragraph (b), the literary, scientific or artistic works to which this Article applies shall be limited to works published in printed or analogous forms of reproduction.

(b) The provisions of this Article shall also apply to reproduction in audio-visual form of lawfully made audio-visual fixations including any protected works incorporated therein and to the translation of any incorporated text into a language in general use in the State with power to grant the licence; always provided that the audio-visual fixations in question were prepared and published for the sole purpose of being used in connection with systematic instructional activities.

ARTICLE VI

"Publication", as used in this Convention, means the reproduction in tangible form and the general distribution to the public of copies of a work from which it can be read or otherwise visually perceived.

ARTICLE VII

This Convention shall not apply to works or rights in works which, at the effective date of this Convention in a Contracting State where protection is claimed, are permanently in the public domain in the said Contracting State.

ARTICLE VIII

1. This Convention, which shall bear the date of 24 July 1971, shall be deposited with the Director-General and shall remain open for signature by all States party to the 1952 Convention for a period of 120 days after the date of this Convention. It shall be subject to ratification or acceptance by the signatory States.

2. Any State which has not signed this Convention may accede thereto.

3. Ratification, acceptance or accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument to that effect with the Director-General.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Convention shall come into force three months after the deposit of twelve instruments of ratification, acceptance or accession.

2. Subsequently, this Convention shall come into force in respect of each State three months after that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance or accession.

3. Accession to this Convention by a State not party to the 1952 Convention shall also constitute accession to that Convention; however, if its instrument of accession is deposited before this Convention comes into force, such State may make its accession to the 1952 Convention conditional upon the coming into force of this Convention. After the coming into force of this Convention, no State may accede solely to the 1952 Convention.

4. Relations between States party to this Convention and States that are party only to the 1952 Convention, shall be governed by the 1952 Convention. However, any State party only to the 1952 Convention may, by a notification deposited with the Director-General, declare that it will admit the application of the 1971 Convention to works of its nationals or works first published in its territory by all States party to this Convention.

ARTICLE X

1. Each Contracting State undertakes to adopt, in accordance with its Constitution, such measures as are necessary to ensure the application of this Convention.

2. It is understood that at the date this Convention comes into force in respect of any State, that State must be in a position under its domestic law to give effect to the terms of this Convention.

ARTICLE XI

1. An Intergovernmental Committee is hereby established with the following duties:

(a) to study the problems concerning the application and operation of the Universal Copyright Convention;

(b) to make preparation for periodic revisions of this Convention;

(c) to study any other problems concerning the international protection of copyright, in co-operation with the various interested international organizations, such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and the Organization of American States;

(d) to inform States party to the Universal Copyright Convention as to its activities.

2. The Committee shall consist of the representatives of eighteen States party to the Convention or only to the 1952 Convention.

3. The Committee shall be selected with due consideration to a fair balance of national interests on the basis of geographical location, population, languages and stage of development.

4. The Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Director-General of the World Intellectual Property Organization and the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, or their representatives, may attend meetings of the Committee in an advisory capacity.

ARTICLE XII

The Intergovernmental Committee shall convene a conference for revision whenever it deems necessary, or at the request of at least ten States party to this Convention.

ARTICLE XIII

1. Any Contracting State may, at the time of deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance or accession, or at any time thereafter, declare by notification addressed to the District-General that this Convention shall apply to all or any of the countries or territories for the international relations of which it is responsible and this Convention shall thereupon apply to the countries or territories named in such notification after the expiration of the term of three months provided for in Article IX. In the absence of such notification, this Convention shall not apply to any such country or territory.

2. However, nothing in this Article shall be understood as implying the recognition or tacit acceptance by a Contracting State of the factual situation concerning a country or territory to which this Convention is made applicable by another Contracting State in accordance with the provisions of this Article.

ARTICLE XIV

1. Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention in its own name or on behalf of all or any of the countries or territories with respect to which a notification has been given under Article XIII. The denunciation shall be made by notification addressed to the Director-General. Such denunciation shall also constitute denunciation of the 1952 Convention.

2. Such denunciation shall operate only in respect of the State or of the country or territory on whose behalf it was made and shall not take effect until twelve months after the date of receipt of the notification.

ARTICLE XV

A dispute between two or more Contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention, not settled by negotiation, shall, unless the State concerned agree on some other method of settlement, be brought before the International Court of Justice for determination by it.

ARTICLE XVI

1. This Convention shall be established in English, French, and Spanish. The three texts shall be signed and shall be equally authoritative.

2. Official texts of this Convention shall be established by the Director-General, after consultation with the governments concerned, in Arabic, German, Italian and Portuguese.

3. Any Contracting State or group of Contracting States shall be entitled to have established by the Director-General other texts in the language of its choice by arrangement with the Director-General.

4. All such texts shall be annexed to the signed texts of this Convention.

ARTICLE XVII

1. This Convention shall not in any way affect the provisions of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works or membership in the Union created by that Convention.

2. In application of the foregoing paragraph, a declaration has been annexed to the present Article. This declaration is an integral part of this Convention for the States bound by the Berne Convention on 1 January 1951, or which have or may become bound to it at a later date. The signature of this Convention by such States shall also constitute signature of the said declaration, and ratification, acceptance or accession by such States shall include the declaration, as well as this Convention.

ARTICLE XVIII

This Convention shall not abrogate multilateral or bilateral copyright conventions or arrangements that are or may be in effect exclusively between two or more American Republics. In the event of any difference either between the provisions of such existing conventions or arrangements and the provisions of this Convention, or between the provisions of this Convention and those of any new convention or arrangement which may be formulated between two or more American Republics after this Convention comes into force the convention or arrangement most recently formulated shall prevail between the parties thereto. Rights in works acquired in any Contracting State under existing conventions or arrangements before the date this Convention comes into force in such State shall not be affected.

ARTICLE XIX

This Convention shall not abrogate multilateral or bilateral conventions or arrangements in effect between two or more Contracting States. In the event of any difference between the provisions of such existing conventions or arrangements and the provisions of this Convention, the provisions of this Convention shall prevail. Rights in works acquired in any Contracting State under existing conventions or arrangements before the date on which this Convention comes into force in such State shall not be affected. Nothing in this Article shall affect the provisions of Articles XVII and XVIII.

ARTICLE XX

Reservations to this Convention shall not be permitted.

ARTICLE XXI

1. The Director-General shall send duly certified copies of this Convention to the States interested and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for registration by him.

2. He shall also inform all interested States of the ratifications, acceptances and accessions which have been deposited, the date on which this Convention comes into force, the notifications under this Convention and denunciations under Article XIV.

APPENDIX DECLARATION RELATING TO ARTICLE XVII

The States which are members of the International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (hereinafter called "the Berne Union") and which are signatories to this Convention.

Desiring to reinforce their mutual relations on the basis of the said Union and to avoid any conflict which might result from the coexistence of the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention,

Recognizing the temporary need for some States to adjust their level of copyright protection in accordance with their stage of cultural, social and economic development,

Have, by common agreement, accepted the terms of the following declaration:

(a) Except as provided by paragraph (b), works which, according to the Berne Convention, have as their country of origin a country which has withdrawn from the Berne Union after 1 January 1951, shall not be protected by the Universal Copyright Convention in the countries of the Berne Union;

(b) Where a Contracting State is regarded as a developing country in conformity with the established practice of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and has deposited with the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, at the time of its withdrawal from the Berne Union, a notification to the effect that it regards itself as a developing country, the provisions of paragraph (a) shall not be applicable as long as such State may avail itself of the exceptions provided for by this Convention in accordance with Article V*bis*;

(c) The Universal Copyright Convention shall not be applicable to the relationships among countries of the Berne Union in so far as it relates to the protection of works having as their country of origin, within the meaning of the Berne Convention, a country of the Berne Union.

RESOLUTION CONCERNING ARTICLE XI

The Conference for Revision of the Universal Copyright Convention,

Having considered the problems relating to the Intergovernmental Committee provided for in Article XI of this Convention, to which this resolution is annexed,

Resolves that:

1. At its inception, the Committee shall include representatives of the twelve States members of the Intergovernmental Committee established under Article XI of the 1952 Convention and the resolution annexed to it, and, in addition, representatives of the following States: Algeria, Australia, Japan, Mexico, Senegal and Yugoslavia.

2. Any States that are not party to the 1952 Convention and have not acceded to this Convention before the first ordinary session of the Committee following the entry into force of this Convention shall be replaced by other States to be selected by the Committee at its first ordinary session in conformity with the provisions of Article XI (2) and (3).

3. As soon as this Convention comes into force the Committee as provided for in paragraph 1 shall be deemed to be constituted in accordance with Article XI of this Convention.

4. A session of the Committee shall take place within one year after the coming into force of this Convention; thereafter the Committee shall meet in ordinary session at intervals of not more than two years.

5. The Committee shall elect its Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen. It shall establish its Rules of Procedure having regard to the following principles:

(a) The normal duration of the term of office of the members represented on the Committee shall be six years with one-third retiring every two years, it being however understood that, of the original terms of office, one-third shall expire at the end of the Committee's second ordinary session which will follow the entry into force of this Convention, a further third at the end of its third ordinary session, and the remaining third at the end of its fourth ordinary session.

(b) The rules governing the procedure whereby the Committee shall fill vacancies, the order in which terms of membership expire, eligibility for re-election, and election procedures, shall be based upon a balancing of the needs for continuity of membership and rotation of representation, as well as the considerations set out in Article XI(3).

Expresses the wish that the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization provide its Secretariat.

In faith whereof the undersigned, having deposited their respective full powers, have signed this Convention.

DONE at Paris, this twenty-fourth day of July 1971, in a single copy.

For the Federal Republic of Germany: Rupprecht von Keller, Eugen Ulmer.
For Andorra:
For the Argentine Republic:
For the Comonwealth of Australia:
For the Republic of Austria:
For the Kingdom of Belgium:
Baron Papeians de Morchoven 28 juillet 1971.
For the Federative Republic of Brazil: Everaldo Dayrell de Lima
For Canada:
For the Republic of Chile:
For the Republic of Costa Rica:
Carlos Corrales.
For the Republic of Cuba:
For the Kingdom of Denmark:
W. Weincke.
For the Republic of Ecuador:
For the Spanish State:
Emilio Garrigues.
For the United States of America: Bruce C. Ladd, Jr., Abraham L. Kaminstein.
For the Republic of Finland: R. R. Seppälä, November 12th, 1971.
For the French Republic: Pierre Charpentier, A. Saint-Mleux.
For the Republic of Ghana:
For the Kingdom of Greece:
For the Republic of Guatemala: *ad referendum*.
Francisco Linares Aranda.
For the Republic of Haiti:
For the Hungarian People's Republic: Timár István.
For the Republic of India: *ad referendum*: Kanti Chaudhuri, S. Balakrishnan.
For Ireland:
For the Republic of Iceland:
For the State of Israel: Mayer Gabay.
For the Italian Republic: P. Archi.
For Japan: Yoshihiro Nakayama, K. Adachi, 22 octobre 1971.
For the Republic of Kenya: D. J. Coward.
For the Khmer Republic:
For the Kingdom of Laos:
For the Lebanese Republic: Salah Stétié.
For the Republic of Liberia: Augustine D. Jallah.
For the Principality of Liechtenstein: Gerliczy-Burian.
For the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg:
For the Republic of Malawi:
For Malta:
For Mauritius: R. Chasle.
For the United Mexican States: F. Cuevas Cancino.
For the Principality of Monaco: Falaize.
For the Republic of Nicaragua:
For the Federal Republic of Nigeria:
For the Kingdom of Norway: Hersleb Vogt, 20 novembre 1971.
For New Zealand:
For Pakistan:
For the Republic of Panama:
For the Republic of Paraguay:
For the Kingdom of the Netherlands:
W. L. Haardt and J. Verhoeve.

For the Republic of Peru:
For the Republic of the Philippines:
For the Portuguese Republic:
For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
E. Armitage and William Wallace.
For the Holy See E. Rovida.
For the Kingdom of Sweden: Hans Danelius.
For the Swiss Confederation: Pedrazzini.
For the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic:
For the Republic of Tunisia:
Rafik Saïd.
For the Republic of Venezuela:
For the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia:
A. Jelić.
For the Republic of Zambia:

PROTOCOL 1

Annexed to the Universal Copyright Convention as revised at Paris on 24, 1971 concerning the application of that Convention to works of Stateless persons and refugees.

The States party hereto, being also party to the Universal Copyright Convention as revised at Paris on 24 July 1971 (hereinafter called "the 1971 Convention"),

Have accepted the following provisions:

(1) Stateless persons and refugees who have their habitual residence in a State party to this Protocol shall, for the purposes of the 1971 Convention, be assimilated to the nationals of that State.

(2) (*a*) This Protocol shall be signed and shall be subject to ratification or acceptance, or may be acceded to, as if the provisions of Article VIII of the 1971 Convention applied hereto.

(*b*) This Protocol shall enter into force in respect of each State, on the date of deposit of the instrument of ratification, acceptance or accession of the State concerned or on the date of entry into force of the 1971 Convention with respect to such State, whichever is the later.

(*c*) On the entry into force of this Protocol in respect of a State not party to Protocol 1 annexed to the 1952 Convention, the latter Protocol shall be deemed to enter into force in respect of such State.

In faith whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have signed this Protocol.

Done at Paris this twenty-fourth day of July 1971, in the English, French and Spanish languages, the three texts being equally authoritative, in a single copy which shall be deposited with the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. The Director-General shall send certified copies to the signatory States, and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for registration.

For the Federal Republic of Germany: Rupprecht von Keller and Eugen Ulmer.
For Andorra:
For the Argentine Republic:
For the Commonwealth of Australia:
For the Republic of Austria:
For the Kingdom of Belgium:
Baron Papeians de Morchoven 28 juillet 1971.

For the Federative Republic of Brazil: Everaldo Dayrell de Lima.
For Canada:
For the Republic of Chile:
For the Republic of Costa Rica:
Carlos Corrales.
For the Republic of Cuba:
For the Kingdom of Denmark:
W. Weincke.
For the Republic of Ecuador:
For the Spanish State:
Emilio Garrigues.
For the United States of America: Bruce C. Ladd, Jr., and Abraham L. Kaminstein.
For the Republic of Finland: R. R. Seppälä, November 20th, 1971.
For the French Republic: Pierre Charpentier and A. Saint-Mleux.
For the Republic of Ghana:
For the Kingdom of Greece:
For the Republic of Guatemala: *ad referendum:*
Francisco Linares Aranda.
For the Republic of Haiti:
For the Hungarian People's Republic:
For the Republic of India: *ad referendum:*
Kanti Chaudhuri and S. Balakrishnan.
For Ireland:
For the Republic of Iceland:
For the State of Israel:
Mayer Gabay.
For the Italian Republic:
P. Archi.
For Japan: Yoshihiro Nakayama and K. Adachi 22 octobre 1971.
For the Republic of Kenya: D. J. Coward.
For the Khmer Republic:
For the Kingdom of Laos:
For the Lebanese Republic:
Salah Stétié.
For the Republic of Liberia: Augustine D. Jallah.
For the Principality of Liechtenstein: Gerliczy-Burian.
For the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg:
For the Republic of Malawi:
For Malta:
For Mauritius:
For the United Mexican States:
F. Cuevas Cancino.
For the Principality of Monaco: Falaize.
For the Republic of Nicaragua:
For the Federal Republic of Nigeria:
For the Kingdom of Norway:
Hersleb Vog.
20 novembre 1971.
For New Zealand:
For Pakistan:
For the Republic of Panama:
For the Republic of Paraguay:
For the Kingdom of the Netherlands:
W. L. Haardt and J. Verhoeve.
For the Republic of Peru:
For the Republic of the Philippines:
For the Portuguese Republic:
For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
E. Armitage and William Wallace.
For the Holy See: E. Rovida.
For the Kingdom of Sweden: Hans Danelius.
For the Swiss Confederation: Pedrazzini.
For the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic:
For the Republic of Tunisia: Rafik Saïd.
For the Republic of Venezuela:
For the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: A Jelić.
For the Republic of Zambia:

PROTOCOL 2

Annexed to the Universal Copyright Convention as revised at Paris on 24 July 1971 concerning the application of that Convention to the works of certain international organizations

The States party hereto, being also party to the Universal Copyright Convention as revised at Paris on 24 July 1971 (hereinafter called "the 1971 Convention"),

Have accepted the following provisions:

(1) (*a*) The protection provided for in Article II (1) of the 1971 Convention shall apply to works published for the first time by the United Nations, by the Specialized Agencies in relationship therewith, or by the Organization of American States.

(*b*) Similarly, Article II (2) of the 1971 Convention shall apply to the said organization or agencies.

(2) (*a*) This Protocol shall be signed and shall be subject to ratification or acceptance, or may be acceded to, as if the provisions of Article VIII of the 1971 Convention applied hereto.

(*b*) This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of deposit of the instrument of ratification, acceptance or accession of the State concerned or on the date of entry into force of the 1971 Convention with respect to such State, whichever is the later.

In faith whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have signed this Protocol.

Done at Paris, this twenty-fourth day of July 1971, in the English, French and Spanish languages, the three texts being equally authoritative, in a single copy which shall be deposited with the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. The Director-General shall send certified copies to the signatory States, and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for registration.

For the Federal Republic of Germany: Rupprecht von Keller and Eugen Ulmer.
For Andorra:
For the Argentine Republic:
For the Commonwealth of Australia:
For the Republic of Austria:
For the Kingdom of Belgium:
Baron Papeians de Morchoven 28 juillet 1971.
For the Federative Republic of Brazil:
Everaldo Dayrell de Lima.
For Canada:
For the Republic of Chile:
For the Republic of Costa Rica:
Carlos Corrales.
For the Republic of Cuba:
For the Kingdom of Denmark:
W. Weincke.
For the Republic of Ecuador:
For the Spanish State:
Emilio Garrigues.
For the United States of America:
Bruce C. Ladd, Jr.
Abraham L. Kaminstein.
For the Republic of Finland:
R. R. Seppälä.
November 20th 1971.
For the French Republic:
Pierre Charpentier.
A. Saint-Mleux.
For the Republic of Ghana:
For the Kingdom of Greece:
For the Republic of Guatemala:
ad referendum
Francisco Linares Aranda
For the Republic of Haiti:
For the Hungarian People's Republic:
Timár István.
For the Republic of India:
ad referendum
Kanti Chaudhuri.
S. Balakrishnan.
For Ireland:
For the Republic of Iceland:
For the State of Israel:
Mayer Gabay.
For the Italian Republic:
P. Archi.
For Japan:
Yoshihiro Nakayama
K. Adachi.
2 octobre 1971.
For the Republic of Kenya:
D. J. Coward.
For the Khmer Republic:
For the Kingdom of Laos:
For the Lebanese Republic:
Salah Stétié.
For the Republic of Liberia:
Augustine D. Jallah.
For the Principality of Liechtenstein:
Gerliczy-Burian.
For the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg:

For the Republic of Malawi:
For Malta:
For Mauritius:
R. Chasle.
For the United Mexican States: F. Cuevas Cancino.
For the Principality of Monaco: Falaize.
For the Republic of Nicaragua:
For the Federal Republic of Nigeria:
For the Kingdom of Norway:
Hersleb Vogt 20 novembre 1971.
For New Zealand:
For Pakistan:
For the Republic of Panama:
For the Republic of Paraguay:
For the Kingdom of the Netherlands:
W. L. Haardt.
J. Verhoeve.
For the Republic of Peru:
For the Republic of the Philippines:
For the Portuguese Republic:
For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
E. Armitage.
William Wallace.
For the Holy See:
E. Rovida.
For the Kingdom of Sweden:
Hans Danelius.
For the Swiss Confederation:
Pedrazzini.
For the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic:
For the Republic of Tunisia:
Rafik Saïd.
For the Republic of Venezuela:
For the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia:
A. Jelić.
For the Republic of Zambia:

Certified a true and complete copy of the original of the Universal Copyright Convention as revised at Paris on 24 July 1971, of the Protocol 1 annexed to the Universal Copyright Convention as revised at Paris on 24 July 1971 concerning the application of that Convention to works of Stateless persons and refugees and of the Protocol 2 annexed to the Universal Copyright Convention as revised at Paris on 24 July 1971 concerning the application of that Convention to the works of certain international organizations.

Paris, 25. 12. 1971 Claude Lussier.

Director, Office of International Standards and Legal Affairs, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the Revised Universal Copyright Convention was approved unanimously by the Committee on Foreign Relations on August 8, 1972, and ordered reported to the Senate with the recommendation that this body give its advice and consent to ratification of the convention. The full text of the committee's report will be available to Members of the Senate prior to the vote on the convention. In the meantime, however, I ask unanimous consent that excerpts from a statement submitted by Mr. George Cary, the Register of Copyrights, Library of Congress, be printed in the RECORD. I believe Members of the Senate will find Mr. Cary's explanation of the provisions of the Copyright Convention helpful in understanding precisely what the convention is designed to accomplish.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SALIENT PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED U.C.C.

The revised Universal Copyright Convention represents the culmination of several years of careful, patient negotiation and hard work by representatives of developed and developing countries. In this country, the private sector was consulted and informed at each step of the way toward revision of the Convention. In the context of the past five years in international copyright, the revised U.C.C. must be viewed as beneficial to the interests of authors generally. From the perspective of the Stockholm Protocol, it should be clear that the Paris Diplomatic Conferences of 1971 reversed an apparent "anti-copyright" trend at the international level and turned the thoughts of the international copyright community toward protection of authors' rights, notwithstanding the concessions to developing countries. The excesses of the Stockholm Protocol have been eliminated. The concessions are reasonable and will permit compulsory licensing with respect to the translation and reproduction rights only with appropriate safeguards and restrictions regarding the purpose of the use.

SPECIFICATION OF MINIMUM RIGHTS

The revised U.C.C. for the first time specifically includes the minimum rights of reproduction, public performance, and broadcasting. These rights are mentioned in a new Article IV*bis*. Previously in the U.C.C. there was only the general obligation to provide "adequate and effective protection of the rights of authors," and a seven year period of exclusive translation rights. Specific mention of the rights of reproduction, public performance, and broadcasting is not limitative, nor is it necessary for any present number of the U.C.C., including the United States, to amend its copyright law as a condition of adhering to the revised Convention. We do have the obligation, under the revised Convention, of according a "reasonable degree of effective protection to each of the rights" specifically mentioned and, although exceptions are permitted, the exceptions should not "conflict with the spirit and provisions" of the revised text. We are fully confident that our present copyright law enables us to fulfill the obligations of the new Article IV*bis*. We believe that the specification of additional minimum rights can only benefit authors.

ABROGATION OF THE "SAFEGUARD CLAUSE"

The present "safeguard clause" in the 1952 U.C.C. text makes the Berne Convention predominant over the Universal Copyright Convention in the case of relations between two countries that are members of both conventions. The clause also carries the penalty mentioned previously for denunciation of the Berne Convention: loss of U.C.C. protection in Berne-U.C.C. countries. Article XVII and the Appendix Declaration are amended in the revised text to remove the penalty for denunciation of the Berne Convention, in the case of developing countries. This amendment would have no effect on the United States because we are not a member of the Berne Convention. The "safeguard clause" is of significance only to Berne members.

SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The revised text includes new Articles V*ter* and V*quater*, permitting compulsory licensing by nationals of developing countries under certain conditions with respect to the rights of translation and reproduction.

Article V of the present text already permits translations under compulsory licenses seven years after publication, unless the author has published a translation in a particular language for which a compulsory license might be requested. In the more than fifteen years of experience with these provisions, the compulsory license has been resorted to rarely, if ever.

Experience under this provision suggests that the detailed compulsory licensing mechanism established under the revised text may be resorted to only in the event that voluntary licensing agreements fail.

Authors and copyright proprietors can foreclose the issuance of any compulsory licenses by effecting publication of the work within specified periods from first publication during which they enjoy exclusive rights. In the case of the translation exception, under Article *Vter* the author can stop compulsory licenses by publication of a translation in the particular language within three years of first publication in the case of translation into a "world language," or within one year in the case of all other languages. Under the reproduction exception, the exclusive right periods are longer, giving the authors more time to decide upon publication in developing countries. The periods are: seven years for works of fiction, poetry, music, and drama; three years for works of the natural and physical sciences and mathematics; and five years for all other works. The work must be published in a given developing country within the exclusive right period at the usual price for comparable works in that country.

Even after compulsory licenses have been issued, the exclusive right can be recaptured by effecting publication in the developing country at any time in the case of reproductions. The comparable provision for translations is complicated by the existing compulsory licensing mechanism of Article V, but the exclusive right can be recaptured by publication of the translation within seven years of first publication and even beyond that time if the prospective licensee does not utilize the present Article V system.

In order to grant compulsory licenses to their nationals, the developing countries must establish specific procedural mechanisms. Compulsory licenses may be granted only for limited purposes. Translation licenses are permitted only for purposes of "teaching, scholarship or research." Reproduction licenses are permitted only for "systematic instructional activities." Compulsory licenses can be issued only after the national of the developing country has contacted or attempted to contact the author or proprietor to negotiate voluntary licenses. The proprietor therefore will have notice and can arrange for a publication in the developing country which would forestall any compulsory license, or he may of course agree to a voluntary license.

In addition to the procedural safeguards spelled out in the revised text, the Report of the General Rapporteur by former Register of Copyrights, Abraham L. Kaminstein, contains many authoritative interpretations that further limit the circumstances under which compulsory licenses may be issued. For example, if the copyright owner makes a reasonable offer to grant a voluntary license, the prospective licensee's refusal to accept the terms cannot be used as a basis for granting a compulsory license. Also, if the copyright owner files a list of the works he owns with the competent authority in the developing country, an applicant for a compulsory license must first contact the owner to negotiate a voluntary license; he cannot claim that he is unable to contact the owner.

If the procedural barriers are hurdled and compulsory licenses are issued, the author is entitled to a "just compensation that is consistent with standards of royalties normally operating on licenses freely negotiated between persons in the two countries con-

cerned." Further, developing countries are obligated to assure transmittal of payment, or, if national currency regulations intervene, the competent authority shall make all efforts by the use of international machinery to insure payment in world convertible currency.

If compulsory licenses are issued, they operate essentially only within the territory of the granting authority. Export of copies produced under compulsory licenses will not be permitted, subject to very limited circumstances. One exception permits export, under severe restrictions, to nationals of the developing country who are living abroad. A more important "exception" does not appear in the text. It appears as an interpretation in the Report of the General Rapporteur. The interpretation would permit a developing country that lacks printing or reproducing the work in question to grant a license allowing the licensee to have the editorial and reproduction processes done abroad. All copies must be returned in bulk for distribution only within the given developing country. The Report emphasizes that in all other cases the editorial preparation and reproduction must be done in the licensing country.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I believe Senators will find Mr. Cary's explanation of the provisions of the copyright convention helpful in understanding precisely what the convention is designed to accomplish.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the convention now pending be taken to final reading.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no objection, the convention will be considered as having passed through its various parliamentary stages up to and including the presentation of the resolution of ratification, which will be read.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of the Universal Copyright Convention as Revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, Together with Two Related Protocols (Ex. G, 92–2).

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate return to legislative session.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL MONDAY, AUGUST 14, 1972, AT 10 A.M.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I must apologize to the Senate for stating that there would be a session on tomorrow, Saturday. It had been anticipated that the revenue-sharing bill would be reported out of the committee, would be pending, and would be the subject of debate this weekend. Because of the fact that that did not happen, I ask unanimous consent that the order for convening on Saturday, tomorrow, at 9 o'clock, be vacated, and that when the Senate adjourns tonight, it stand in adjournment until the hour of 10 o'clock Monday morning next.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, again my apologies to the Senate. I hope no Senator has been inconvenienced very much by his change in plans at the last minute but, more important, I hope all Senators will understand the situation that developed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair feels each Senator will be glad to get a day of respite.

ORDER FOR VOTE ON EXECUTIVE G (92D CONG., SECOND SESS.) UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION AT 11:45 A.M. MONDAY, AUGUST 14, 1972

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, as in executive session, I ask unanimous consent that the vote on Executive G (92d Congress, second session) Universal Copyright Convention, as revised, with protocols, occur at the hour of 11:45 a.m. Monday next.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

REQUEST OF SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE STATE AND LOCAL FISCAL ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1972

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, it is my understanding that the Senate Appropriations Committee has requested that the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972—H.R. 14370—upon being reported by the Finance Committee be rereferred to the Senate Appropriations Committee. It is my impression that this request is made because the Senate Appropriations Committee views this bill as containing an appropriation which comes within its jurisdiction.

The Senate Finance Committee which is still considering this bill believes that this measure is essentially a revenue measure and that as such the Committee on Finance should be viewed as having exclusive jurisdiction over this bill. The fact that the measure was initially referred to the Finance Committee without any question by the Parliamentarian indicates quite clearly its nature as a revenue measure. Title II of the bill in its entirety is an amendment to the revenue code and title I contains Internal Revenue Code amendments.

There, of course, is nothing to prevent the Senate Appropriations Committee from informally considering the bill and offering an amendment to it when it reaches the floor. It is quite another thing, however, to claim jurisdiction over the bill by requesting the referral of the bill to that committee. This has serious implications not only with respect to this bill but also with respect to other revenue measures which come before the Finance Committee. It is the effect of a precedent for referral of bills within the jurisdiction of the Finance Committee to the Appropriations Committee to which I find cause for concern.

There are several points that I wish to make with respect to this request of the Appropriations Committee.

First, the Standing Rules of the Senate refer to the jurisdiction of the Committee on Appropriations as follows:

* * * proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials, and other matters relating to appropriations of the revenue for the support of *the* Government.

Let me emphasize the words, "the Government." I believe that means the Federal Government and not State and local governments.

Second, I would like to note that many times Federal funds are made available for expenditure without the matter being referred to the Senate Appropriations Committee. There are good reasons for these exceptions, just as there are good reasons why this bill should not go to the Appropriations Committee.

One major expenditure program not run through the Appropriations Committee is the social security program. These benefits are paid out of the old age and survivors insurance trust fund. In this case, the statute provides for permanent appropriations of the revenue obtained from certain taxes for the payment of these benefits. This permanent appropriations, which has been unchanged in the statute since 1941, was provided for in legislation referred to, and acted upon, by the Senate Finance Committee and not the Appropriations Committee. Substantially, the same situation exists in the case of the health insurance fund, the disability insurance fund, and the unemployment compensation fund, as well as others.

Still another example of an appropriation which did not go through the Appropriations Committee is the permanent appropriation for interest on the public debt. As Senators know, this accounts for $22 billion of expenditures in the current year. This has been a permanent appropriation on the statute books since before 1847, and this predates even the existence of the Senate Appropriations Committee.

Another tried and true method for making funds available for expenditure without requiring action by the Appropriations Committee is the grant of authority to expend public debt receipts. This practice came into use in 1932 to finance activities of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and has since been used numerous times to finance various Government programs. I ask unanimous consent at this time to insert in the RECORD a table prepared by the Fiscal Service Bureau of Accounts of the Treasury Department which sets forth the various programs for which this has been provided for the period 1932 through 1967.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AUTHORIZATIONS TO EXPEND FROM DEBT RECEIPTS

TABLE 7.—ACTS OF CONGRESS AUTHORIZING EXPENDITURES FROM PUBLIC DEBT RECEIPTS JAN. 22, 1932 THROUGH JUNE 30, 1967

[In millions of dollars]

Agency and program	Date of act	Citation				Authorizations [1]	
		Statute		U.S. Code		Through appropriation committees	Through other congressional committees
		Volume	Page	Title	Section		
FUNDS APPROPRIATED TO THE PRESIDENT							
Expansion of defense production (Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended)	Sept. 8, 1950	64	802	50 App	2094 note		$600.0
	June 2, 1951	65	61	do	do	$1,000.0	
	July 31, 1951	65	134	do	do		500.0
Total, Expansion of defense production						1,000.0	1,100.0
Agency for International Development:							
Mutual defense program—economic assistance	Apr. 3, 1948	62	146	22	1509(c)(2)		972.3
							[2] —.3
	Oct. 6, 1949	63	710			150.0	
						[2] —.2	
Assistance to Spain	Sept. 6, 1950	64	758			62.5	
India emergency food aid	June 15, 1951	65	70	50 App	2312		27.3
Foreign investment guarantee fund	Apr. 3, 1948	62	146	22	1509(c)(2)		27.7
	do	62	146	22	1509(b)(3)		—12.9
	Apr. 19, 1949	63	52	22	1509(c)(2)		122.3
	June 5, 1950	64	199	22	do		50.0
	July 18, 1956	70	559	22	1933(b)(4)(F)		37.5
	do	70	563	22	1442(b)		—28.0
	do	70	564	22	1442(d)		2.5
Total, Agency for International Development						212.3	1,198.3
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE							
Commodity Credit Corporation	Mar. 8, 1938	52	108	15	713a-4		500.0
	Mar. 4, 1939	53	511	15	do		400.0
	Aug. 9, 1940	54	782	15	do		500.0
	July 1, 1941	55	498	15	do		1,250.0
	July 16, 1943	57	566	15	do		350.0
	Apr. 12, 1945	59	50	15	do		1,750.0
	June 28, 1950	64	261	15	do		2,000.0
	Mar. 20, 1954	68	30	15	do		1,750.0
	Aug. 31, 1954	68	1047	15	do		1,500.0
	Aug. 11, 1955	69	634	15	do		2,000.0
	Aug. 1, 1956	70	783	15	do		2,500.0
Total, Commodity Credit Corporation							14,500.0
Rural Electrification Administration	July 30, 1947	61	546	7	903	[3] 840.1	
	do	61	546			225.0	
	May 10, 1948	62	218			175.0	
	June 19, 1948	62	529			400.0	
	June 29, 1949	[4] 63	345			500.0	
						—30.0	
	Oct. 14, 1949	63	874			25.0	
	Sept. 6, 1950	64	673			382.5	
	Aug. 31, 1951	65	239			[4] 125.2	
	Nov. 1, 1951	65	755			—85.5	
	July 5, 1952	66	349			[4] 85.0	
	June 15, 1953	67	60			7.5	
	July 28, 1953	67	218			[4] 240.5	
	June 29, 1954	68	314			245.0	
	May 23, 1955	69	58			[4] 235.0	
	June 4, 1956	70	236			314.0	
	Apr. 16, 1957	71	12			[4] 180.0	
	Aug. 2, 1957	71	333			[4] 219.0	
	June 13, 1958	72	195			[4] 409.5	
	July 8, 1959	73	175			265.0	
						—25.0	
	June 29, 1960	74	239			310.0	
	July 26, 1961	75	235			[4] 377.5	
	Oct. 24, 1962	76	1,212			[4] 405.0	
	Dec. 30, 1963	77	830			495.0	
						—150.0	
	Sept. 2, 1964	78	873			435.0	
	Nov. 2, 1965	79	1,176			453.5	
	Sept. 7, 1966	80	700			462.0	
Total, Rural Electrification Administration						7,520.9	
Farmers Home Administration:							
Rural housing direct loan account	Oct. 14, 1949	63	874			25.0	
	May 19, 1956	70	161			5.0	
	Aug. 7, 1956	70	1,114	42	1481		450.0
	June 30, 1961	75	186	42	do		200.0
	Sept. 28, 1962	76	672	42	do		50.0
	Sept. 2, 1964	78	796	42	do		150.0
	Aug. 10, 1965	79	500	42	1488(c)		[5]
Total, rural housing direct loan account						30.0	850.0
Direct loan account	July 30, 1947	61	545	7	1032	[3] 94.8	
						—41.7	
	June 29, 1949	63	345			103.0	
	Sept. 6, 1950	54	673			154.0	
	Sept. 27, 1950	64	1052			18.0	
	Aug. 31, 1951	65	240			153.0	
	Nov. 1, 1951	65	755			—24.5	
	July 5, 1952	66	349			164.0	
	July 28, 1953	67	219			162.0	
	July 31, 1953	67	297			20.0	
	June 29, 1954	68	315			148.0	
	Aug. 26, 1954	68	812			5.0	
						—5.0	
	May 23, 1955	69	59			153.0	
	Aug. 4, 1955	69	450			15.0	

See footnotes at end of table.

AUTHORIZATIONS TO EXPEND FROM DEBT RECEIPTS—Continued

TABLE 7.—ACTS OF CONGRESS AUTHORIZING EXPENDITURES FROM PUBLIC DEBT RECEIPTS JAN. 22, 1932 THROUGH JUNE 30, 1967—Continued

[In millions of dollars]

Agency and program	Date of act	Citation: Statute Volume	Citation: Statute Page	Citation: U.S. Code Title	Citation: U.S. Code Section	Authorizations [1]: Through appropriation committees	Authorizations [1]: Through other congressional committees
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE—Continued							
Farmers Home Administration—Continued							
Direct loan account—Continued							
	June 4, 1956	70	236			$209.5	
	June 21, 1957	71	177			26.0	
						−10.0	
	Aug. 2, 1957	71	333			209.5	
	June 13, 1958	72	196			[4] 221.5	
	July 8, 1959	73	176			226.0	
	June 29, 1960	74	240			267.0	
	July 26, 1961	75	236			318.0	
	Aug. 8, 1961	75	316	7	1988(b)		[5]
	Sept. 30, 1961	75	733			8.0	
Total, direct loan account						2,594.1	
Agricultural credit insurance fund	Aug. 14, 1946	60	1078	7	1005c		$5.0
	do	60	1078	7	do		7.6
	do	60	1078	7	do		26.7
	do	60	1078	7	do		6.2
	Aug. 8, 1961	75	309	7	1929(c)		60.5
	do	75	309	7	do		178.7
Total, agricultural credit insurance fund							[6] 284.8
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE							
Area Redevelopment Administration:							
Area redevelopment fund	May 1, 1961	75	54	42	2508(a)		300.0
	June 30, 1965	79	195	42	2525		−300.0
Maritime Administration:							
Federal ship mortgage insurance fund	July 15, 1958	72	358	46	1275(b)		[7] 7.6
	do	72	358	46	do		−6.0
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE							
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY							
Natural fibers revolving fund	June 29, 1948	62	1098	5	234		150.0
(liquidated)	Mar. 23, 1955	69	13	5	do		−150.0
Panama Canal Company	Aug. 25, 1959	73	428				10.0
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT							
Office of the Secretary:							
College housing loans	Apr. 20, 1950	64	78	12	1749(d)(e)		300.0
	Aug. 11, 1955	69	645	12	do		200.0
	Aug. 7, 1956	70	1,113	12	do		250.0
	July 12, 1957	71	303	12	do		175.0
	Sept. 23, 1959	73	681	12	do		250.0
	Sept. 14, 1960	74	1,028	12	do		500.0
	June 30, 1961	75	172	12	do		300.0
	do	75	172	12	do		300.0
	do	75	172	12	do		300.0
	do	75	172	12	do		300.0
	Aug. 10, 1965	79	489	12	do		300.0
Total, college housing loans							3,175.0
Federal flood insurance	Aug. 7, 1956	70	1,084	42	2414(e)		500.0
Prefabricated housing loans	Reorg. Plan No. 23 of 1950	64	1279	12	1701g note		47.7
	Sept. 1, 1951	65	311	12	1701g–1		15.0
	June 24, 1954	68	295	12	1701g–5	−49.9	
Total, prefabricated housing loans						−49.9	62.7
Public facility loans	Aug. 11, 1955	69	643	42	1493(a)		[8] 0.0
	Sept. 14, 1960	74	1028	42	do		50.0
	June 30, 1961	75	175	42	do		[9] 450.0
Total, public facility loans							600.0
Urban mass transportation fund	July 9, 1964	78	303	42	1493(a)		50.0
Urban renewal fund	July 15, 1949	63	415	42	1452(e)(f)		1,000.0
Federal National Mortgage Association	Reorg. Plan No. 22 of 1950	64	1277	12	1717 note		1,559.9
	do	64	1277	12	do		−10.9
	do	64	1277	12	do		1,201.0
	do	64	1277	12	do		−67.9
	July 14, 1952	66	602	12	do		900.0
Liability transferred from Reconstruction Finance Corporation	Reorg. Plan No. 2 of 1954	68	1281	15	609 note		91.8
Total, prior to separate accountability							3,673.8
Management and liquidating functions	Aug. 2, 1954	68	614	12	1718(d)		−21.0
	do	68	618	12	1721(a)		−196.1
	do	68	618	12	do		−500.0
	do	68	618	12	do		−300.0
	do	68	618	12	1721(c)		−370.2
	do	68	619	12	1721(d)		−1,567.8
	do	68	619	12	do		721.7
	June 30, 1961	75	176	12	1721(f)		−170.5
	do	75	176	12	1721(d)(f)		47.5
	do	75	176	12	do		−176.9
	do	75	176	12	do		−368.9
	do	75	176	12	do		[10] 30.1
Total, management and liquidating functions							801.9

Agency and program	Date of act	Citation: Statute Volume	Statute Page	U.S. Code Title	U.S. Code Section	Authorizations [1]: Through appropriation committees	Through other congressional committees
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT—Continued							
Secondary market operations:							
Notes to the Secretary of the Treasury	Aug. 2, 1954	68	616	12	1719(c)		$1,000.0
	Mar. 27, 1957	71	7	12	do		350.0
	July 12, 1957	71	298	12	do		900.0
Preferred capital stock	Aug. 2, 1954	68	614	12	1718(d)(e)		92.8
	Mar. 27, 1957	71	7	12	do		50.0
	July 12, 1957	71	298	12	do		65.0
	Sept. 10, 1966	80	738	12	do		110.0
Total, secondary market operations							2,567.8
Special assistance functions	Aug. 2, 1954	68	617	12	1720(c)		200.0
	do	68	617	12	do		100.0
	Aug. 11, 1955	69	636	12	1720(e)		50.0
	do	69	651	12	1720(f)		200.0
	Mar. 27, 1957	71	7	12	1720(e)		50.0
	July 12, 1957	71	299	12	1720(c)		150.0
	do	71	299	12	1720(e)		100.0
	do	71	299	12	1720(f)		250.0
	Apr. 1, 1958	72	73	12	1720(c)		500.0
	do	72	73	12	1720(f)		50.0
	do	72	74	12	1720(g)		1,000.0
	Sept. 23, 1959	73	669	12	1720(e)		25.0
	June 30, 1961	75	175	12	1720(c)		750.0
	do	75	176	12	1721(f)		139.4
	do	75	176	12	1720(h) note		−348.1
	do	75	176	12	do		[10] 3.4
	Aug. 10, 1965	79	493	12	1720(c)		100.0
	Sept. 10, 1966	80	738	12	1720(g)		500.0
Total, special assistance functions							3,819.7
Federal Housing Administration:							
General insurance fund	Aug. 10, 1965	79	472	12	1735d		[11] 25.0
Public Housing Programs	Sept. 1, 1937	50	898	42	1420		100.0
	June 21, 1938	52	820	42	do		700.0
	Oct. 30, 1941	55	759	42	do		−75.8
	July 15, 1949	63	427	42	do		775.8
Total, Public Housing Programs							1,500.0
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR							
Bureau of Commercial Fisheries:							
Federal ship mortgage insurance fund, fishing vessels	July 5, 1960	74	314	46	1275 note		([12])
Bureau of Mines:	Sept. 13, 1960	74	923	50	167j		([9])
Helium fund	Aug. 3, 1961	75	253			$10.0	
	Aug. 9, 1962	76	342			6.0	
	July 26, 1963	77	104			6.0	
	July 7, 1964	78	281			14.0	
	June 28, 1965	79	182			16.0	
	May 31, 1966	80	177			26.0	
Total, Bureau of Mines						78.0	
Virgin Islands Corporation	Sept. 2, 1958	72	1760	48	1407c (p)		([9])
	May 20, 1959	73	45			.1	
	May 13, 1960	74	119			1.1	
	Aug. 9, 1962	76	352			.2	
Total, Virgin Islands Corporation						1.4	
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION [13]							
Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation	May 13, 1954	68	94–5	33	985		105.0
	July 17, 1957	71	307	33	do		35.0
Total, Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation							140.0
TREASURY DEPARTMENT							
Office of the Secretary:							
Civil defense program fund	Jan. 12, 1951	64	1257	50 App	2261 note		250.0
							[3] −249.9
VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION							
Direct loans to veterans and reserves	Apr. 20, 1950	64	76–7	38	694m		150.0
	do	64	76–7	38	do		−42.9
	Sept. 1, 1951	65	317	38	do		45.9
	Apr. 18, 1952	66	64	38	694m		117.1
	July 1, 1953	67	136	38	do		96.7
	June 29, 1954	68	320	38	do		4.6
	Aug. 21, 1954	68	757	38	do		119.8
	June 21, 1955	69	168	38	do		242.3
	Apr. 1, 1958	72	77	38	do		349.6
	June 30, 1959	73	156	38	1823		100.0
	July 14, 1960	74	532	38	do		150.0
	July 6, 1961	75	202	38	do		500.0
	do	75	202	38	do		200.0
	do	75	202	38	do		150.0
	do	75	202	38	do		[14] 141.2
	do	75	202	38	do		[15] −394.7
Total, Veterans' Administration							1,929.6

See footnotes at end of table.

AUTHORIZATIONS TO EXPEND FROM DEBT RECEIPTS—Continued

TABLE 7.—ACTS OF CONGRESS AUTHORIZING EXPENDITURES FROM PUBLIC DEBT RECEIPTS JAN. 22, 1932 THROUGH JUNE 30, 1967—Continued

[In millions of dollars]

Agency and program	Date of act	Citation				Authorizations [1]	
		Statute		U.S. Code		Through appropriation committees	Through other congressional committees
		Volume	Page	Title	Section		
OTHER INDEPENDENT AGENCIES							
Export-Import Bank of Washington:							
Regular activities:							
Notes to the Secretary of the Treasury	July 31, 1945	59	538	12	635d		$2,500.0
	Oct. 3, 1951	65	367	12	do		1,000.0
	Aug. 9, 1954	68	678	12	do		500.0
	May 22, 1958	72	133	12	do		2,000.0
Capital stock	July 31, 1945	59	528	12	635b		174.0
	do	59	528	12	do		825.0
Liability transferred from Reconstruction Finance Corporation	Reorg. Plan No. 2 of 1954	68	1281	15	609 note		42.0
Total, Export-Import Bank of Washington							7,041.0
Farm Credit Administration:							
Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation (in liquidation) [16]	Jan. 31, 1934	48	345	12	1020c		2,000.0
	June 30, 1948	62	1191	12	1020-1	−$1,500.0	
	Aug. 2, 1957	71	339			−499.8	
Total, Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation						−1,999.8	2,000.0
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation	Aug. 23, 1935	49	699	12	264(o)(2)		250.0
	Aug. 5, 1947	61	773	12	264(o)		2,750.0
Total, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation							3,000.0
Federal Home Loan Bank Board:							
Federal home loan banks	June 27, 1950	64	258	12	1431(i)		1,000.0
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation	June 27, 1950	64	258	12	1725(i)		750.0
Home Owners' Loan Corporation (liquidated)	Apr. 27, 1934	48	643	12	1463(c)		2,000.0
	June 27, 1934	48	1263	12	do		1,000.0
	May 28, 1935	49	296	12	do		1,750.0
	June 30, 1953	67	126	12	1463 note		−4,217.0
Total, Home Owners' Loan Corporation							533.0
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (liquidated) [17]	Jan. 22, 1932	47	9	15	609		1,500.0
	July 21, 1932	47	714	15	609a		1,800.0
	July 22, 1932	47	728	15	602		125.0
	Mar. 9, 1933	48	6	12	51d		[18] 1,152.5
	do	48	6	12	51d		−983.9
	May 12, 1933	48	33	7	605		([18])
	do	48	50	15	609c		300.0
	do	48	46	12	823 note		−97.4
	do	48	56	15	609c-1		500.0
	June 10, 1933	48	120	15	605e		50.0
	June 13, 1933	48	129	12	1463(b)		200.0
	June 16, 1933	48	210	15	609b		−400.0
	Jan. 20, 1934	48	319	15	609-1		850.0
	June 16, 1934	48	971	15	606a		250.0
	June 19, 1934	48	1056	15	609d	250.0	
	June 27, 1934	48	1247	12	1705		[18] 92.9
	June 31, 1935	49	3	15	606i		100.0
	do	49	4	15	6053		25.0
	June 25, 1940	54	564	15	609g	50.0	
	do	54	566	15	609h	100.0	
	do	54	572	15	602		300.0
	June 26, 1940	54	614	15	609i	125.0	
	Sept. 26, 1940	54	962	15	609j		1,500.0
	Mar. 28, 1941	55	55	15	609k		10.0
	June 10, 1941	55	250	15	609o		1,500.0
	July 1, 1941	55	439	15	6091	50.0	
	do	55	440	15	609m	120.0	
	do	55	442	15	609n	100.0	
	Oct. 23, 1941	55	744	15	609p		1,500.0
	Mar. 27, 1942	56	175	15	606b-2		1,000.0
	do	56	176	15	609q		2,500.0
	June 5, 1942	56	326	15	609r		5,000.0
	July 22, 1942	56	695	15	609s	32.5	
	do	56	696	15	609t	97.5	
	do	56	698	15	609u	10.0	
	July 12, 1943	57	426			60.0	
	do	57	427			30.0	
	Dec. 23, 1943	57	619			7.5	
	June 28, 1944	58	456			67.5	
	do	58	457	15	609w	15.0	
	do	58	458	15	609x	25.0	
	May 5, 1945	59	160			67.5	
	do	59	162	15	609y	50.0	
	do	59	162			80.0	
	July 5, 1945	59	422			120.0	
	Mar. 22, 1946	60	58			100.0	
	Mar. 28, 1946	60	82			15.0	
	June 22, 1946	60	*293	15	609z	70.0	
	do	60	294	15	609a-1	50.0	
	do	60	295			250.0	
						[2] −7.7	
	do	60	294	7	1001 note	−174.1	
						−621.1	
	June 30, 1947	61	204	15	606		4,042.3
	do	61	204	15	606		−18,892.2
	July 30, 1947	61	545	7	1032	−94.8	
	do	61	547	7	903	−840.1	
	June 29, 1954	68	320	15	609		−1,189.1
	Reorg. Plan No. 2 of 1954	68	1281	15	609 note		−147.3
Total, Reconstruction Finance Corporation						204.7	2,587.8

Agency and program	Date of act	Citation: Statute Volume	Statute Page	U.S. Code Title	U.S. Code Section	Authorizations [1]: Through appropriation committees	Through other congressional committees
OTHER INDEPENDENT AGENCIES—Continued							
Small Business Administration:							
Liability transferred from Reconstruction Finance Corporation	Reorg. Plan No. 2 of 1954	68	1281	15	609 note		$13.6
Smithsonian Institution:							
John F. Kennedy Center Parking Facilities	Jan. 23, 1964	78	5				15.4
Tennessee Valley Authority	Aug. 31, 1935	49	1078	16	831 n–1		50.0
	July 26, 1939	53	1083	16	831 n–2		—49.7
	do	53	1083	16	831–3		61.5
	July 30, 1947	61	576			—$5.0	
	Aug. 6, 1959	73	280	16	831 n–4(c)		150.0
Total, Tennessee Valley Authority						—5.0	211.8
U.S. Information Agency	July 18, 1956	70	563	22	1442(b)		28.0
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA							
District of Columbia Commissioners:							
Stadium sinking fund, Armory Board, District of Columbia	July 28, 1958	72	423				[19] 3.8
PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND FOREIGN LOANS							
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	July 31, 1945	59	514	22	286e		3,175.0
	June 17, 1959	73	80	22	do		3,175.0
Total, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development							6,350.0
International Monetary Fund	July 31, 1945	59	514	22	286e		950.0
	June 17, 1959	73	80	22	do		1,375.0
Total, International Monetary Fund							2,325.0
International Finance Corporation	Aug. 11, 1955	69	670	22	282e		35.2
Loan to the United Kingdom	July 15, 1946	60	535	22	286m		3,750.0
Total increases in authorizations						13,751.2	95,086.4
Total decreases in authorizations						—4,164.5	[21] —31,325.4

SUMMARY

Increases as above:	
Through appropriation committees	$13,751.2
Through other congressional committees	95,086.4
Total	108,837.6
Decreases as above:	
Through appropriation committees	4,164.5
Through other congressional committees	31,325.4
Total	35,489.9

[1] Includes amounts for establishment of original authority as well as increases and decreases (—) in this authority. Where authorizations are indefinite in amount, the figures used generally represent the net amounts of actual borrowings.

[2] Represents administrative cancellation of borrowing authority.

[3] Represents transfers to Treasury consisting of notes held by Reconstruction Finance Corporation and unadvanced balances which the Corporation has been authorized and directed to lend to this Agency.

[4] Reductions have been netted against the authorizations.

[5] Authorized to borrow such amounts from the Treasury as may be authorized in appropriation acts.

[6] Authorization to borrow is indefinite. This amount includes $22,200,000 which had previously been withdrawn.

[7] Authorization to borrow is indefinite. This amount represents borrowings of $12,700,000 from the Treasury less repayments of $5,100,000 made during the fiscal year 1967.

[8] Has been reduced by $50,100,000 which was transferred to the urban mass transportation fund pursuant to an act approved July 9, 1964 (78 Stat. 303).

[9] Represents the portion of increase in working capital not financed by earnings and purchase discounts on the mortgage portfolio.

[10] Represents portion of the increase in working capital not financed by earnings and purchase discounts on the mortgage portfolio amounting to $8,400,000 less net reduction of $5,000,000 in the mortgage portfolio during the fiscal year 1967 under its low and moderately priced housing program, established by an act approved Apr. 1, 1958 (72 Stat. 74), and terminated by an act approved June 30, 1961 (75 Stat. 176).

[11] Authorization to borrow is indefinite. Represents amount transferred from unused authorizations to borrow from the public.

[12] Authorization to borrow is indefinite. This fund has borrowed $400,000 from the Treasury which has been repaid.

[13] This Department was established by an act approved Oct. 15, 1966 (80 Stat. 931). The St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, which was formerly an independent agency, was transferred to this Department.

[14] Represents authorization of $150,000,000 less proceeds from sales of loans amounting to $8,800,000 returned to the fund during the fiscal year 1966. (See footnote 15.)

[15] Represents proceeds from sales of loans during fiscal years 1962 through 1965. Amount authorized to be advanced in any fiscal year after June 30, 1962, shall be reduced by the amount returned to the fund from loan sales during the previous fiscal year.

[16] This Corporation was abolished and its assets transferred to the Secretary of the Treasury for liquidation pursuant to an act approved Oct. 3, 1961 (75 Sat. 773). All borrowings were made while it was under the Farm Credit Administration.

[17] Sections of the code cited for this Corporation refer to 1946 and prior editions. The 1947 act superseded all prior legislation.

[18] Authorization to borrow is indefinite. This amount represents amount used to carry out the provisions of the act.

[19] Authorized to borrow from the Treasury for payment of interest on or retirement of principal on stadium bonds issued to the public in accordance with an act approved July 28, 1958 (72 Stat. 423).

[20] Includes $10,000,000 transferred from unused authorizations to borrow from the public.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, if my count is accurate, this table shows that funds have been expended without the appropriation going through the Appropriations Committee under this technique some 183 times in the period from 1932 to 1967. These include such programs as financing of the Defense Production Act of 1950, many programs under the Agency for International Development, the Commodity Credit Corporation, Rural Housing Direct Loan Account of the Farmers Home Administration, Agricultural Credit Insurance Fund, Federal Ship Mortgage Insurance of the Maritime Administration, Area Redevelopment Administration, Panama Canal Company, college housing loans, Federal flood insurance, and urban mass transportation fund, just to mention a few of the items listed.

I might also say that the Campaign Fund Financing Act in the form passed by the Senate in 1971 also contained a permanent appropriation. In connection with that provision, the junior Senator from Kansas (Mr. DOLE) raised a point of order on the Senate provision for campaign fund financing on the grounds that it contained an appropriation. However, the Senate, on a rollcall vote, specifically overruled this point of order with the Senator who is now the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, as well as the other members of that committee on this side of the aisle, voting against the point of order.

Still another way in which funds can initially be expended without their being considered by the Appropriations Committee is through authorization contracts to spend. In this case, although an appropriation is later required to fund the obligation incurred, nevertheless the incurring of the obligation takes place without an appropriation.

Examples of where this contract authority is used are the Highway Trust Fund as well as the Airport and Airways Users Trust Fund and the Urban Mass Transit grant program.

The procedure for making funds available to the State and local governments under the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 is a matter which is currently being considered by the Finance Committee. As I indicated earlier, no one challenges our jurisdiction over the matter of providing social security benefit payments without the provision for the funds going through the Appropriations Committee. In this case, the funds, equaling a percentage of certain specified taxes, are on a permanent appropriation basis turned over to a trust fund. The provision for funding in the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act as passed by the House closely parallels this procedure. The Finance Committee is

examining the language in the social security provision, and I expect to offer an amendment in committee which will place the provision for the funding of revenue sharing on an exact parallel with the social security program, hoping that that will be more satisfactory to the Senate Appropriations Committee as a method of procedure. When this is done I see no possible grounds for questioning the Finance Committee's exclusive jurisdiction with respect to this bill.

One of the principal needs urged on us by the States and local governments is their need for the certainty which a permanent appropriation provides; they need to know that the funds promised them will actually be available as of a given time.

One of the major difficulties with our categorical aid programs for local governments is the uncertainty of when the funds will actually be made available for use to the local governments. They find it difficult if not impossible to plan in their budgets for funds when they cannot be sure whether the funds will, or will not, be available. Advanced planning on their part is necessary if there is to be an opportunity for the funds to be spent economically, an objective which I am sure all of us share. Much of the advantage of providing fiscal assistance funds, rather than categorical aid is lost to the States and local governments if they cannot plan on the funds in advance.

I understand that some have thought that this could be provided for by the appropriation technique known as advanced funding. On close examination of this technique, however, it seems that this would first of all require the Appropriations Committee this very year to act on the funding for the 1972 and 1973 amounts. With the time schedule we are operating under, it seems to me highly unlikely that funds actually would be made available by the Appropriations Committees this year if they are required to act in addition to our action on this bill. In other words, this is just another way of saying "no" to the revenue-sharing proposal.

I might also say that those who believe advanced funding will solve this problem point to its use in the field of education. However, advanced funding in education in practice has not worked very well. After the first year advanced funding for education, although theoretically possible, in fact was not provided by the Appropriations Committee. This indicates the uncertainty which would arise from any attempt to use advance funding as an answer to the present fiscal needs of States and local governments.

I think it should be clear that a referral of the revenue-sharing bill to the Senate Appropriations Committee is wrong in principle because it establishes a bad precedent. It is also wrong in practice because it really means that revenue-sharing funds will not be made available on any certain basis for State and local governments in the current year and in the years ahead.

Mr. President, it is possible that the bill does deserve further consideration, and implicit in a motion to recommit usually is the thought that the bill should be considered further, in order to take other factors into account.

It is true, Mr. President, that we on the Finance Committee have rushed ahead in the consideration of the revenue-sharing bill with what amounts to virtually breakneck speed, to bring the bill to the Senate, because we felt that the Senate was anxious to consider the bill, and proceed to give an answer to the States and local governments and to the administration with regard to their requests and their pleas.

If more time is to be taken on this measure by committees, the Finance Committee needs that time to provide additional information to the Senate which we would certainly like to make available—detailed information, for example, showing what every city with a population over 2,500, every county, and every State government in the United States could expect from the revenue-sharing bill.

We also may want to reconsider one or two of our own decisions, which we think might possibly be improved upon if we had more time to give them further consideration. It was only because we felt that the Senate was anxious to proceed with this measure that we proceeded as fast as we have to try to complete action on the bill and make it available to the Senate.

Mr. President, my position on this matter is not by any means frozen in concrete. I shall be happy to meet with the Appropriations Committee. In fact, on a matter of this significance, I think it might be appropriate that all members of the Finance Committee sit down with the members of the Appropriations Committee and discuss the problem as men of good will.

I have always tried to talk with the very able and competent men who serve on that committee in years gone by, and I think the record will indicate that this Senator has been very circumspect in trying to protect their jurisdiction. I can recall, some years ago, when we had a conference between the Senate and the House of Representatives on a major revenue bill, the Revenue and Expenditures Control Act of 1968, that when that bill emerged from conference, on my own motion and before agreeing to the conference report, I requested to be heard before the Appropriations Committee and explained just exactly what was being suggested, and what the probable result of the conference would be. It was only when the Appropriations Committee indicated to me that they were satisfied that they should make no objection to it that I proceeded to sign the conference report and bring back to the Senate an expenditure limitation, which may have been within the jurisdiction of the Appropriations Committee rather than the Committee on Finance.

I do think, Mr. President, that it is very important that each committee respect the jurisdiction of the others, and as a member of the Finance Committee I shall scrupulously attempt to avoid trespassing upon the jurisdiction of others. I would invite members of the Appropriations Committee to visit with us and discuss the matter currently under consideration any time they might feel disposed to do so. We certainly want to cooperate with them and will work with them. We realize their concern about this important revenue measure, and the fact that its language does use the word "appropriations."

We at the same time would like to urge them to consider our problem, and the general purpose and theory of the revenue-sharing bill. This theory and purpose is that this should be a long-term measure, it should not be subject to annual appropriations, for the reason that communities should be privileged to make their plans for years in advance, and further, that it should be a measure that would not be subject to having additional strings or conditions attached to it every time the Senate meets.

I know it can be argued that as a matter of fiscal responsibility someone should keep a close look upon all moneys that are raised by Federal taxes, and I would agree. However, I would point out that the Treasury itself, which shares that same concern, feels that the Appropriations Committee type procedure is not in accord with the theory of this bill. This bill is based on the theory that the Federal Government should help the communities and the States to raise money, and that the responsibility for spending that money should be at the local level, and that in the event the money is not spent wisely, the accounting should be not so much with the Treasury of the United States and the Congress of the United States as with the people of those communities.

Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS ON MONDAY

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on Monday, following the recognition of the two leaders under the standing order, there be a period for the transaction of routine morning business, for not to exceed 45 minutes, with statements therein limited to 3 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of the routine morning business on Monday, the Senate go into executive session for the consideration of Executive G (92d cong., second sess.), Calendar No. 30 on the Executive Calendar.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. LONG). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent—and I do this with the approval of the distinguished majority leader—that the vote, which will be a yea-and-nay vote, occur on Executive G, 92d Congress, second session, at 11 a.m. on Monday.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that upon the disposition of the treaty, Executive G, on Monday and the return to legislative session, the Senate resume its consideration of the unfinished business, Senate Joint Resolution 241.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROGRAM

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, the program for Monday is as follows:

May I say, parenthetically, it had been hoped that the revenue sharing bill would be reported to the Senate for action by today. It was on that basis that the leadership had indicated to the Members that there would be a session on Saturday. But for reasons which are explainable, it was not possible for the Finance Committee to report that bill.

Moreover, the leadership sought throughout the afternoon, until a very late hour, to reach an agreement for votes on the interim agreement on Monday. That, too, did not prove to be possible. So, with regret, the leadership decided not to have a Saturday session. I think it is clear, under the circumstances, that to have had one would not have brought about enough progress to amount to anything. For these reasons, the leadership canceled the Saturday session. There will be votes on Monday, however.

The program for Monday is as follows:

The Senate will convene at 10 a.m.

After the two leaders have been recognized under the standing order, there will be a period for the transaction of routine morning business, for not to exceed 45 minutes, with statements therein limited to 3 minutes.

At the conclusion of routine morning business, the Senate will go into executive session for the purpose of considering Executive G, 92d Congress, second session—the Universal Copyright Convention, as revised by protocols. There will be a yea-and-nay vote on that convention at 11 a.m.

Upon the disposition of the convention and upon the return to legislative session, the Senate will resume its consideration of the unfinished business, Senate Joint Resolution 241, authorizing an interim agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Rollcall votes are hoped for, expected, and anticipated—and I suppose I can say likely—at some time Monday afternoon, on amendments thereto. The amendment by Mr. MANSFIELD, amendment No. 1434, will be pending when the Senate resumes its consideration of the unfinished business on Monday.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10 A.M. MONDAY, AUGUST 14, 1972

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, if there be no further business to come before the Senate, I move, in accordance with the previous order, that the Senate stand in adjournment until 10 a.m. on Monday next.

The motion was agreed to; and at 6:55 p.m. the Senate adjourned until Monday, August 14, 1972, at 10 a.m.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate August 11, 1972:

DIPLOMATIC AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Hermann F. Eilts, of Pennsylvania, a Foreign Service Officer of the Class of Career Minister, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the People's Republic of Bangladesh.

Viron P. Vaky, of Texas, a Foreign Service Officer of Class one, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Costa Rica.

Frederick Irving, of Rhode Island, a Foreign Service Officer of Class one, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Iceland.

George W. Landau, of Maryland, a Foreign Service Officer of Class one, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Paraguay.

Adm. Horacio Rivero, U.S. Navy, retired, of California, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Spain.

U.S. TAX COURT

Cynthia Holcomb Hall, of California, to be a judge of the U.S. Tax Court for a term expiring 15 years after she takes office, vice Craig S. Atkins, retired.

U.S. NAVY

Vice Adm. Walter L. Curtis, Jr., U.S. Navy, for appointment to the grade of vice admiral, when retired, pursuant to the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 5233.

CONFIRMATIONS

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate August 11, 1972:

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LIBERATION AND INFORMATION SCIENCE

The following-named persons to be members of the National Commission on Libraries and Information Science for terms expiring July 19, 1977: (Reappointments)

Harold C. Crotty, of Michigan.
Martin Goland, of Texas.
Louis A. Lerner, of Illinois.

PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE

Nominations beginning Henry V. Belcher, to be medical director, and ending Peter K. Vaslow, to be senior assistant health services officer, which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on July 24, 1972.

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

CITIZENS WORK FOR YOUTH

HON. BILL CHAPPELL, JR.

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, August 10, 1972

Mr. CHAPPELL. Mr. Speaker, I take great pride in sharing with the Members of the House the work of a group of 30 dedicated individuals in my district who serve on my Youth Advisory Committee. Together we have engaged in a driving effort to improve the lot of our young people and the result is a package of four bills which I have introduced here.

The Youth Advisory Committee has spent some 20 months studying many aspects of the problems relating to youth. They have delved into drug control, juvenile delinquency, work incentives, vocational training, violence on television, the influence of communism, and many other areas. They have spent many long hours in committee and subcommittee work.

From their efforts I have introduced their bills and I look forward to their favorable consideration.

H.R. 16122, which I have termed the "Internatitonal Opium Control Act," authorizes the President to negotiate a proposed treaty with foreign countries providing for a systematic and uniform international system of enforcement standards and penalties for illegal opium producers and traffickers. It permits the President to discontinue all military, economic, and other assistance to any country continuing to permit the production and processing of opium which illegally enters the United States. One of the most effective ways to eradicate drugs from our society is to dry up their sources. It is absolutely imperative that we get nations to agree on regulations and enforcement against drug traffic.

The act further establishes an Executive Committee on International Opium Control to be composed of the Secretary of State as chairman, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, one member from each of the majority and minority parties of the Senate and House, and two persons representing the general public. The committee shall review measures taken by countries and international organizations in eliminating the production and processing of opium, improving the enforcement of national laws, and expediting the extradition of persons charged with criminal offenses relating to opium.

The committee's vocational education bill would require that at least one-third of Federal moneys be spent at the junior high school level.

One of my deepest concerns is the number of high school age students who are not adequately trained for a job. One-half either drops out of high school