By Mr. HARRINGTON (for himself, Mr FRASER, and Mr. O'KONSKI):

H.R. 16185. A bill to require a study of the practices, policies, and procedures of all Government agencies relating to the availability of certain goods and services through Federal supply and service sources, to amend the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 to permit certain grantees and contractors of Government agencies to procure certain goods and services through Federal supply and service sources, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Government Operations.

H.R. 16186. A bill to amend the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 to provide for the use of excess property by certain grantees; to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mr. PREYER of North Carolina:

H.R. 16187. A bill to provide for disciplined and responsible action in the consideration and execution of the Federal budget; to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mr. RODINO (for himself, Mr. CELLER, Mr. EILBERG, Mr. FLOWERS, Mr. SEIBERLING, Mr. DENNIS, Mr. MAYNE, Mr. HOGAN, and Mr. MCKEVITT):

H.R. 16188. A bill to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ROUSH (for himself, Mr. MADDEN, Mr. JACOBS, Mr. BRADEMAS, and Mr. HAMILTON):

H.R. 16189. A bill to amend the act entitled "An act to provide for the establishment of the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore, and for other purposes," approved November 5, 1966; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. ST GERMAIN (for himself and Mr. KOCH):

H.R. 16190. A bill to amend Public Law 91–508 to limit the disclosure of bank records by financial institutions, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. STAGGERS:

H.R. 16191. A bill to amend sections 101 and 902 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, to implement the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft; to amend title XI of such act to authorize the President to suspend air service to any foreign nation which he determines is encouraging aircraft hijacking by acting in a manner inconsistent with the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft; and to authorize the Secretary of Transportation to suspend the operating authority of foreign air carriers under certain circumstances; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. WIGGINS:

H.R. 16192. A bill to permit an interested U.S. citizen to request a consular or immigration officer to review the presumed immigrant status determined for an alien by such officer; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ZWACH:

H.R. 16193. A bill to amend the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. DANIELSON:

H.R. 16194. A bill to encourage and support the dissemination of news, opinion, scientific, cultural, and educational matter through the mails; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. DELLUMS:

H.R. 16195. A bill to enforce the constitutional right of females to terminate pregnancies that they do not wish to continue; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 16196. A bill to protect confidential sources of the news media; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 16197. A bill to encourage and support the dissemination of news, opinion, scientific, cultural, and educational matter through the mails; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. DENHOLM:

H.R. 16198. A bill to establish an executive department to be known as the Department of Education, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mr. GRAY:

H.R. 16199. A bill to amend the Public Buildings Act of 1959, as amended, to provide for the construction of a civic center in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. KOCH:

H.R. 16200. A bill to provide for more equitable coverage under the emergency unemployment compensation program; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. MATSUNAGA (for himself, Mr. TEAGUE of Texas, Mr. UDALL, Mr. RHODES, Mr. STEIGER of Arizona, Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois, Mr. BYRNE of Pennsylvania, Mr. ASPIN, Mr. HUNT, Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON, Mr. NICHOLS, Mr. GUBSER, Mr. WHITEHURST, Mr. PRICE of Illinois, Mr. FISHER, Mr. STRATTON, Mr. PIKE, Mr. LEGGETT, Mr. PIRNIE, Mr. YOUNG of Florida, Mr. ANNUNZIO, Mr. BENNETT, Mrs. HANSEN of Washington, Mr. CASEY of Texas, and Mr. BURTON):

H.R. 16201. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Navy to construct and provide shoreside facilities for the education and convenience of visitors to the U.S. Ship *Arizona* Memorial at Pearl Harbor and to transfer responsibility for their operation and maintenance to the National Park Service; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. PERKINS (for himself and Mr. PUCINSKI):

H.R. 16202. A bill to authorize payments to State educational agencies for elementary and secondary education; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. ROE:

H.R. 16203. A bill to amend the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 to permit rescue squads to obtain surplus property; to the Committee on Government operations.

By Mr. SYMINGTON:

H.R. 16204. A bill to amend the Controlled Substances Act to provide for the registration of practitioners conducting narcotic treatment programs; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. THOMPSON of Georgia:

H.R. 16205. A bill to provide a limit on Federal Government expenditures and net lending; to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mr. FISH:

H.R. 16206. A bill to amend title 38 of the United States Code to prevent loss of veteran compensation and pension benefits as a result of increases in social security benefit payments under Public Law 92–336; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. EILBERG:

H.J. Res. 1273. Joint resolution authorizing the President to proclaim September 8 of each year as "National Cancer Day"; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ANDERSON of California:

H. Con. Res. 673. Concurrent resolution to collect overdue debts; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. WOLFF (for himself, Mr. SMITH of Iowa, Mr. J. WILLIAM STANTON, Mr. DIGGS, Mr. DELLUMS, and Mr. WYLIE):

H. Con. Res. 674. Concurrent resolution to collect overdue debts; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. WOLFF (for himself, Mr. ROUSSELOT, Mr. WYDLER, Mr. BROYHILL of North Carolina, Mr. KEITH, Mr. ROBISON of New York, Mr. SPENCE, Mr. STUBBLEFIELD, Mr. MCFALL, Mr. HALPERN, Mr. RODINO, Mr. NICHOLS, Mr. DENT, Mr. HARRINGTON, Mr. HATHAWAY, Mr. ROY, Mr. FLOOD, Mr. KEE, Mr. GRAY, Mr. DICKINSON, Mr. BURKE of Florida, Mr. THOMPSON of Georgia, Mr. HALEY, Mr. STEELE, and Mr. O'NEILL):

H. Con. Res. 675. Concurrent resolution to collect overdue debts; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. BROYHILL of Virginia (by request):

H.R. 16207. A bill for the relief of Albert Fleischhaker; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 16208. A bill for the relief of Richard B. Bradley; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HOSMER:

H.R. 16209. A bill for the relief of Winstone L. Rackerby; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

SENATE—*Thursday, August 3, 1972*

The Senate met at 10 a.m. and was called to order by the President pro tempore (Mr. EASTLAND).

PRAYER

The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward L. R. Elson, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Almighty God, Creator and Lord of Life, who hast made the heart of man a temple for Thy spirit, in this quiet pause open our hearts that we may be receptive to the divine entrance. May there come upon us the hush of solemn thoughts, a new awareness of Thy presence, a more fervent love of Thy ways, a more resolute determination to do Thy will. May the busy pace of daily duty never deprive us of the knowledge of Thy constant grace and goodness and Thy guiding light.

Preserve us from all that is base or mean or unworthy. May integrity of character and fidelity to high trusts be the cardinal and crowning glory of our lives. Nourished by Thy spirit and filled with Thy grace may we be good workmen for Thee, for this Nation, and for the world. And when evening comes breathe through the things that are seen the peace of the unseen and eternal.

We pray in the Redeemer's name. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Wednesday, August 2, 1972, be dispensed with.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, the Armed Services Committee, the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, and the Committee on Foreign Relations be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I yield back my time.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the distinguished Senator from Virginia (Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR.) is now recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

THE SALT AGREEMENTS

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. President, the Senate Armed Services Committee, of which I am a member, has concluded hearings concerning President Nixon's two agreements with the Soviet Union for the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons.

On July 20, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee completed deliberations on these same agreements and approved them without a dissenting vote.

Two separate documents were submitted to Congress by the President: a permanent treaty governing defensive—ABM—systems; and an interim agreement, governing offensive weapons.

The ABM Treaty restricts the Soviet Union and the United States to two defensive networks each. One would shield a major offensive weapons site, and a second would be placed near each country's capital.

The Senate will vote tomorrow on this treaty dealing with defensive weapons. A two-thirds vote is needed for approval.

In the case of the second agreement, a 5-year limitation on offensive weapons, a majority vote in each House of Congress is required.

This interim agreement covers only numbers of offensive missiles to be deployed by each country.

The United States will be restricted to 1,054 land-based missiles, while Russia will be permitted 1,618; the United States would be restricted to 41 Polaris-Poseidon submarines with 16 missiles each, while Russia would be permitted 62 Y-class submarines with 16 missiles each.

The agreement does not prevent modernization of missiles, nor does it limit numbers of warheads.

The signing of these two agreements in Moscow occasioned a considerable expression of optimism in the United States about the prospects for peace and an end, or a major reduction, of the arms race.

This was only natural, given the course of our history since the beginning of World War II.

The people of the United States have been praying for peace, fighting for peace, working for peace, and yearning for peace continually for over 30 years.

In May, when it was announced that President Nixon had signed strategic arms limitation agreements in Moscow, many optimists foresaw a stabilized world, with mutual trust and respect between the superpowers.

Many of these optimists felt that with these agreements, defense expenditures could immediately be reduced.

More than anything else, I want a world of peace; I also want to reduce governmental expenditures. But, my recollection of the Russian track record in world affairs made me skeptical of the first, and my many years of experience in the Government made me skeptical of the second.

As a result of this skepticism, I listened intently to the witnesses who appeared before our committee, and questioned them on the effect of the two separate documents submitted to the Congress by the President.

By the time the final testimony was completed, I had reached two conclusions: First, that these agreements are not as significant as some commentators and officials would have us believe; and second, they will not result in reduced military spending.

The agreements would be truly significant if we could be sure that they would lead the way to a more stable world, but we cannot be sure this will be the result. We can hope that the SALT agreements herald world peace, but hoping for peace is hardly new.

As regards savings in defense expenditures, the agreements will not of themselves result in a reduction in military spending. In fact, in some areas there will be increases in the defense budget.

For example, some of the defensive configurations being considered under the two-site ABM Treaty proposal will cost more than the four-site one planned before the agreement.

Incidentally, it should be noted that Russia gets the better of the bargain, in terms of protection, from the two-site ABM agreement. The system already installed around Moscow provides protection for Soviet missiles in that region, whereas a network of ABM's around Washington, even if approved, would not provide any defense for U.S. offensive missiles.

In addition to the ABM increase, other accelerations of weapons development have been linked to the SALT agreements.

One is the ULMS-Trident submarine and underwater-launched missile system, for which the 1973 budget request is $906.4 million. The program cost for 10 of these systems is now estimated at $13.5 billion.

Another is the B–1 bomber. Requested funds for this plane for fiscal 1973 are $444.5 million. A fleet of 244 B–1's would cost $11.1 billion.

The comments of President Nixon concerning the Moscow agreements, at his June 22 news conference, indicated that he feels approval of rapid development for new weapons systems is essential to preserve national security under the SALT pacts. The President said:

> The Secretary of Defense has a responsibility, as I have a responsibility, to recommend to the Congress action that will adequately protect the security of the United States. Moving on that responsibility, he has indicated that if the SALT agreement is approved, and then if the Congress rejects the programs for offensive weapons not controlled by the SALT agreement, that this would seriously jeopardize the security of the United States. On that point he is correct.

But then the President added these words:

> The arms limitation agreements should be approved on their merits. I would not have signed those agreements unless I had believed that, standing alone, they were in the interest of the United States.

His statements are, in my view, somewhat ambiguous. But I think it is clear that the President feels new offensive weapons are necessary if we are to maintain our security under the Moscow agreements.

It is important to bear in mind that many weapon systems are not covered by the Moscow agreements.

President Nixon, in his press conference, stressed that Mr. Brezhnev had told him unequivocally that in areas not controlled by the agreement on offensive weapons, the Russians will go ahead with their programs.

What are the areas not covered by the agreements?

The agreements do not limit land mobile ICBM's—which Russia has and we do not—surface ship-based missiles, land and sea-based cruise missiles, air-launched missiles, nor land-based ballistic missiles with less than strategic ranges—about 3,000 nautical miles. This last category includes intermediate range ballistic missiles—IRBM's—medium range ballistic missiles—MRBM's—and short range tactical ballistic missiles—SRBM's.

These facts underscore the point that we are not dealing with a budgetary issue—that is, an issue of savings on defense dollars—in considering the arms limitation agreements.

The real question before the Congress is whether these agreements are consistent with national security and strength.

I am not persuaded by arguments that military strength has brought about U.S. involvement in conflicts.

I am persuaded that the opposite is true, and that U.S. efforts to keep major conflict from happening over the past quarter century have been successful in direct proportion to that strength.

I am persuaded that a strong America is indispensable to peace and freedom.

If security and strength are the real questions, what is the position of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who have the responsibility for military preparedness?

Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee as follows:

I believe that the deterrent capability of the strategic forces will not be impaired by the agreement so long as we vigorously press forward with necessary programs which are permitted under its terms.

Gen. Bruce Palmer, Jr., Acting Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army testified:

Although the ABM Treaty has indeed limited our SAFEGUARD deployment, we must bear in mind that an unconstrained Soviet Union could have significantly increased its launchers in five years. Thus, viewed in this light, we believe that overall, we gain by the agreements.

Gen. John D. Ryan, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, when testifying stated:

. . . the Strategic Arms Limitations Agreements can give us a reasonable strategic posture if we take a few prudent steps to assure that we maintain our technological lead, make qualitative improvements in our strategic forces and maintain effective surveillance, warning and command and control capabilities.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Adm. Thomas Moorer, testified in like vein.

I noted earlier, as have many others, that under the agreements the Soviet Union will have superiority in sheer numbers of weapons.

But testimony also indicates that what the United States lacks in quantity, it makes up in quality. Its missiles are more sophisticated and probably more accurate than those of the Soviet Union.

In terms of the number of warheads that each missile can carry, the United States is ahead of the Soviet Union. This does not take into account new Russian development not covered by the agreements, but rather the present status.

On balance, our military experts are convinced that the U.S. combined strategic forces, under these agreements, would remain strong enough and diverse enough to withstand any preemptive first strike from Russia and to retaliate with a force capable of destroying most of the Soviet Union's population and industrial base.

This being the case, the agreements do not seem to compromise national security.

These new arms limitations may or may not represent a step toward a more peaceful and stable world. But because they appear not to weaken our national security, and because they also apply brakes to apparent Soviet ability and willingness to continue increasing their already formidable strategic power, I shall support the SALT agreements.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a letter from Lt. Gen. W. P. Leber, Systems Manager for the Safeguard ABM project, in which he cites the cost of the two-site ABM proposal as compared to the four-site proposal previously planned.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GRAVEL). Without objection, it is so ordered.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
Arlington, Va., June 21, 1972.

Hon. HARRY F. BYRD, JR.,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR BYRD: The Secretary of the Army has asked me to reply to your inquiry concerning SAFEGUARD cost estimates.

As you stated in your letter, the SAFEGUARD 4-site cost estimated in February 1972 was $8.0 billion. This is still the estimate for a 4-site deployment, but the $8.0 billion was then, as it is now, stated as a DOD acquisition cost; i.e., the RDTE, procurement and construction cost through completion of the last site. This DOD acquisition cost does not include the operating accounts, OMA and MPA, which would bring the total DOD direct cost to $8.9 billion.

In your letter, you asked for a justification of the difference between the 4-site cost estimate of $8.0 billion and an $8.5 billion cost estimate for a 2-site deployment (Grand Forks plus NCA). On 13 June 1972, in testimony before the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Secretary Laird estimated that the total DOD direct costs, including OMA and MPA, of the Grand Forks site plus the least costly of the NCA deployments under consideration, would be $8.7 billion. The DOD acquisition cost of this deployment would be $7.7 billion. Hence, the $8.0 billion 4-site acquisition cost estimate should be compared to the $7.7 billion acquisition estimate for two sites, not to the $8.7 billion total 2-site cost. Conversely, the $8.7 billion estimated total cost for the two sites can be compared to an estimated $8.9 billiion total cost for four sites. Either way, the current preliminary estimate for this particular 2-site deployment is slightly less, rather than somewhat greater, than the corresponding estimate for 4 sites. However, I must emphasize that there are a variety of NCA configurations under consideration and, if one of the more costly options is finally selected, the 2-site costs could in fact, exceed the estimated 4-site costs.

There are a number of reasons why even the least costly Grand Forks plus NCA deployment estimate closely approaches estimated 4-site costs. First, as you mention, our 2-site estimate reflects in construction and hardware costs, the lost effort expended for the 4-site deployment but not needed for the 2-site deployment. This includes contract termination costs as well as site restoration costs. Second, schedule differences also come into play. While one would ordinarily believe a 2-site deployment would be completed considerably earlier than a 4-site deployment, in this case the opposite is true because of the relatively late decision to change to NCA in favor of the MINUTEMAN defense sites that were scheduled for earlier completion. The stretchout of the program adds significantly to the 2-site costs. Third, because the threat to NCA varies considerably from that to the MINUTEMAN sites, particularly as it affects system software, significant additional development and testing is required. Last, this same consideration dictates increases in hardware requirements for an NCA deployment, for data processing equipment, for example, thus further increasing the cost. Taken collectively, the reasons cited above account for an increase of approximately $1.5 billion in DOD acquisition costs for the least costly Grand Forks plus NCA deployment as compared to a 2-site deployment consisting of Grand Forks plus Malmstrom.

I hope this information is of value to you.

Sincerely,

W. P. LEBER.

TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will now be a period for the transaction of routine morning business not to exceed 15 minutes with statements made therein limited to 3 minutes.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS, 1973—CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. BIBLE. Mr. President, I submit a report of the committee of conference on H.R. 15418, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GRAVEL). The report will be stated by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 15418) making appropriations for the Department of the Interior and related agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973, and for other purposes, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses this report, signed by a majority of the conferees.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the consideration of the conference report?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the report.

(The conference report is printed in the House proceedings of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of July 26, 1972, at pp. 25474–25475.)

Mr. BIBLE. Mr. President, as this bill passed the Senate it provided for appropriations totaling $2,773,482,800 in new obligational authority and appropriations to liquidate contract authority for the agencies and bureaus of the Department of the Interior, exclusive of the Bureau of Reclamation and the power marketing activities, and for various related agencies, including the U.S. Forest Service and the Indian Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

The conference committee bill provides appropriations totaling $2,763,495,300 for the programs and activities of these agencies. This total is over the budget estimates of $2,756,520,000 by $6,975,300; over the House bill of $2,744,468,200 by $19,027,100; and under the Senate bill of $2,773,482,800 by $9,987,500. The bill as passed by the Senate was greater than the House bill by $29,014,600. However, the Senate considered a budget estimate amounting to $6,814,000 which was not considered by the House. If this estimate is disregarded, the bill as it passed the Senate was $22,200,000 over the House bill.

I ask unanimous consent to have in-

cluded in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks a tabulation setting out the appropriation for fiscal year 1972. the fiscal year 1973 budget estimate, the House allowance, the Senate allowance, and the conference allowance for each appropriation in the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. BIBLE. Mr. President, the major changes from the Senate bill are a decrease of $769,000 for the Bureau of Indian Affairs—however, the conference figure is $1,489,000 over the House allowance and $10,046,000 over the budget estimate; a reduction of $750,000 in the amount allowed for the Geological Survey; an increase of $2,200,000 for the Bureau of Mines; a decrease of $3,500,000 for the Office of Coal Research; a reduction of $339,000 for the National Park Service; an increase of $2,393,000 for the Forest Service; a reduction of $650,000 for the Indian Health Service; and an increase of $200,000 for the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities. The amount for the National Foundation is almost 40-percent larger than the appropriation for last year. Although there is a $610,000 reduction below the Senate amount for the Smithsonian Institution, the appropriation for the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, which is included in this appropriation, is not affected.

Again, this year, the House and Senate conferees worked in a friendly and conscientious manner intent only in agreeing on a compromise bill that would provide as adequately as possible for needs which can be met through this particular legislation. Both the Senate and House positions were fairly maintained and joined together to succeed in this effort.

The chairman of the House conferees exhibited her usual charming cooperation which contributed greatly to the conference. I also want to give my special thanks to the Senate conferees, particularly to the Senator from Alaska who served for the first time as the ranking minority member of this subcommittee.

EXHIBIT 1

Agency and item	New budget (obligational) authority appropriated, 1972	Budget estimates of new (obligational) authority, 1973	Allowances: House	Allowances: Senate	Allowances: Conference	Conference allowance compared with: Budget estimates of new (obligational) authority, 1973	Conference allowance compared with: House allowance	Conference allowance compared with: Senate allowance
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
TITLE I—DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR								
PUBLIC LAND MANAGEMENT								
Bureau of Land Management								
Management of lands and resources	$88,654,000	$84,057,000	$77,980,000	$78,065,000	$78,065,000	−$5,992,000	+$85,000	
Construction and maintenance	4,827,000	7,965,000	7,965,000	7,965,000	7,965,000			
Public lands development roadas and trails (appropriation to liquidate contract authority)	(3,200,000)	(3,265,000)	(3,265,000)	(3,265,000)	(3,265,000)			
Oregon and California grant lands (indefinite, appropriation of receipts)	19,000,000	16,700,000	16,700,000	16,700,000	16,700,000			
Range improvements (indefinite, appropriation of receipts)	2,523,000	3,059,000	2,800,000	2,800,000	2,800,000	−259,000		
Total, Bureau of Land Management	115,004,000	111,781,000	105,445,000	105,530,000	105,530,000	−6,251,000	+85,000	
Bureau of Indian Affairs								
Education and welfare services	273,094,000	296,627,000	297,468,000	301,206,000	299,556,000	+2,929,000	+2,088,000	−$1,650,000
Education and welfare services (appropriation to liquidate contract authority)	(693,000)	(1,500,000)	(1,500,000)	(1,500,000)	(1,500,000)			
Resources management	75,764,000	83,734,000	84,316,000	82,645,000	83,141,000	−593,000	−1,175,000	+496,000
Construction	43,715,500	48,092,000	55,384,000	55,575,000	55,960,000	+7,868,000	+576,000	+385,000
Road construction (appropriation to liquidate contract authority)	(33,600,000)	(45,539,000)	(45,539,000)	(45,539,000)	(45,539,000)			
Alaska native fund	12,500,000	50,000,000	50,000,000	50,000,000	50,000,000			
General administrative expenses	6,161,000	6,358,000	6,200,000	6,200,000	6,200,000	−158,000		
Tribal funds (definite)	3,000,000	3,000,000	3,000,000	3,000,000	3,000,000			
Tribal funds (indefinite)	13,173,000	13,505,000	13,505,000	13,505,000	13,505,000			
Total, Bureau of Indian Affairs	427,407,500	501,316,000	509,873,000	512,131,000	511,362,000	−10,046,000	+1,489,000	−769,000
Bureau of Outdoor Recreation								
Salaries and expenses	$3,949,000	$4,203,000	$4,150,000	$4,150,000	$4,150,000	−$53,000		
Land and Water Conservation Fund								
Appropriation of receipts (indefinite)	361,500,000	300,000,000	300,000,000	300,000,000	300,000,000			
Territorial Affairs								
Administration of territories	21,699,000	22,375,000	22,375,000	22,375,000	22,375,000			
Permanent appropriation (special fund)	(367,000)	(469,000)	(469,000)	(469,000)	(469,000)			
Transferred from other accounts (special fund)	(458,360)	(470,000)	(470,000)	(470,000)	(470,000)			
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands	59,980,000	60,000,000	60,000,000	60,000,000	60,000,000			
Micronesian claims fund	5,000,000							
Total, Territorial Affairs	86,679,000	82,375,000	82,375,000	82,375,000	82,375,000			
Total, Public Land Management	994,539,500	999,675,000	1,001,843,000	1,004,186,000	1,003,417,000	+$3,742,000	+$1,574,000	−$769,000
MINERAL RESOURCES								
Geological Survey								
Surveys, investigations, and research	131,050,000	150,800,000	150,000,000	151,200,000	150,450,000	−350,000	+450,000	−750,000
Bureau of Mines								
Conservation and development of mineral resources	49,858,000	55,291,000	58,491,000	57,891,000	60,091,000	+4,800,000	+1,600,000	+2,200,000
Health and safety	81,851,000	95,374,000	95,374,000	95,374,000	95,374,000			
General administrative expenses	2,013,000	2,008,000	2,000,000	2,000,000	2,000,000	−8,000		
Helium fund (borrowing authority)	45,300,000							
Total, Bureau of Mines	179,022,000	152,673,000	155,865,000	155,265,000	157,465,000	+4,792,000	+1,600,000	+2,200,000
Office of Coal Research								
Salaries and expenses	30,650,000	45,330,000	42,330,000	46,990,000	43,490,000	−1,840,000	+1,160,000	−3,500,000

EXHIBIT 1—Continued

Agency and item	New budget (obligational) authority appropriated, 1972	Budget estimates of new (obligational) authority, 1973	Allowances			Conference allowance compared with		
			House	Senate	Conference	Budget estimates of new (obligational) authority, 1973	House allowance	Senate allowance
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
TITLE I—DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR—Con.								
Mineral Resources								
Office of Oil and Gas								
Salaries and expenses	$1,570,000	$1,558,000	$1,558,000	$1,558,000	$1,558,000			
Total, Mineral Resources	342,292,000	350,361,000	349,753,000	355,013,000	352,963,000	+$2,602,000	+$3,210,000	−$2,050,000
FISH AND WILDLIFE AND PARKS								
Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife								
Management and investigations of resources	66,883,000	74,552,000	73,529,500	73,477,000	73,489,500	−1,062,500	−40,000	+12,500
Construction	7,226,000	6,258,000				−6,258,000		
Migratory bird conservation account (definite, repayable advance)	7,500,000	7,100,000	7,100,000	7,100,000	7,100,000			
Anadromous and Great Lakes fisheries conservation	2,332,000	2,333,000	2,333,000	2,333,000	2,333,000			
General administrative expenses	2,240,000	2,332,000	2,250,000	2,250,000	2,250,000	−82,000		
Total, Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife	86,181,000	92,575,000	85,212,500	85,160,000	85,172,500	−7,402,500	−40,000	+12,500
National Park Service								
Management and protection	71,756,000	89,937,000	88,671,000	89,385,000	89,421,000	−516,000	+750,000	+36,000
Maintenance and rehabilitation of physical facilities	57,557,000	73,198,000	73,312,000	73,362,000	73,312,000	+114,000		−50,000
Construction	75,752,000	42,233,000	41,711,000	43,026,000	42,701,000	+468,000	+990,000	−325,500
Parkway and road construction (appropriation to liquidate contract authority)	(24,188,000)	(20,222,000)	(5,766,000)	(13,416,000)	(5,416,000)	(−14,806,000)	(−350,000)	(−8,000,000)
Preservation of historic properties	8,369,000	10,124,000	11,624,000	11,559,000	11,559,000	+1,435,000	−65,000	
General administrative expenses	4,052,000	4,175,000	4,140,000	4,140,000	4,140,000	−35,000		
Total, National Park Service	217,486,000	219,667,000	219,458,000	221,472,000	221,133,000	+1,466,000	+1,675,000	−339,000
Total, Fish and Wildlife and Parks	303,667,000	312,242,000	304,670,500	306,632,000	306,305,500	−5,936,500	+1,635,000	−326,500
OFFICE OF SALINE WATER								
Saline water conversion	27,025,000	27,021,000	26,871,000	26,871,000	26,871,000	−150,000		
OFFICE OF WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH								
Salaries and expenses	14,290,000	14,304,000	16,344,000	16,344,000	16,344,000	+2,040,000		
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR								
Salaries and expenses	6,967,000	7,031,000	7,000,000	7,000,000	7,000,000	−31,000		
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY								
Salaries and expenses	10,948,900	16,412,000	15,419,000	15,470,100	15,295,100	−1,116,900	−123,900	−175,000
Departmental operations	3,746,100	4,066,000	4,066,000	4,066,000	4,066,000			
Salaries and expenses (special foreign currency program)	500,000	1,000,000	750,000	500,000	500,000	−500,000	−250,000	
Total, Office of the Secretary	15,195,000	21,478,000	20,235,000	20,036,100	19,861,100	−1,616,900	−373,900	−175,000
Total, new budget (obligational) authority, Department of the Interior	1,703,975,500	1,732,112,000	1,726,716,500	1,736,082,100	1,732,761,600	+649,600	+6,045,100	−3,320,500
Consisting of—								
Appropriations	1,703,975,500	1,732,112,000	1,726,716,500	1,736,082,100	1,732,761,600	+649,600	+6,045,100	−3,320,500
Definite appropriations	(1,262,479,500)	(1,398,848,000)	(1,393,711,500)	(1,403,077,100)	(1,399,756,600)	(+908,600)	(+6,045,100)	(−3,320,500)
Indefinite appropriations	(396,196,000)	(333,264,000)	(333,005,000)	(333,005,000)	(333,005,000)	(−259,000)		
Authorization to spend from public debt receipts	(45,300,000)							
Memoranda—								
Appropriations to liquidate contract authority	(61,681,000)	(70,526,000)	(56,070,000)	(63,720,000)	(55,720,000)	(−14,806,000)	(−350,000)	(−8,000,000)
Total, new budget (obligational) authority and appropriations to liquidate contract authority	(1,765,656,500)	(1,802,638,000)	(1,782,786,500)	(1,799,802,100)	(1,788,481,600)	(−14,156,400)	(+5,695,100)	(−11,320,500)
TITLE II—RELATED AGENCIES								
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE								
Forest Service								
Forest protection and utilization:								
Forest land management	297,095,300	246,749,000	257,872,000	252,899,000	255,604,000	+8,855,000	−2,268,000	+2,705,000
Forest research	54,587,000	57,278,000	59,268,000	60,833,000	61,143,000	+3,865,000	+1,875,000	+310,000
State and private forestry cooperation	27,759,000	27,760,000	27,760,000	37,760,000	32,760,000	+5,000,000	+5,000,000	−5,000,000
Total, forest protection and utilization	379,441,300	331,787,000	344,900,000	351,492,000	349,507,000	+17,720,000	+4,607,000	−1,985,000
Construction and land acquisition	35,703,200	37,980,000	43,953,900	44,203,900	48,581,900	+10,601,900	+4,628,000	+4,378,000
Youth conservation corps	3,500,000	3,500,000	3,500,000	3,500,000	3,500,000			
Forest roads and trails (appropriation to liquidate contract authority)	(148,740,000)	(158,840,000)	(158,840,000)	(158,840,000)	(158,840,000)			
Acquisition of lands for national forests:								
Special acts (special fund, indefinite)	80,000	80,000	80,000	80,000	80,000			
Acquisition of lands to complete land exchanges	26,035							
Cooperative range improvements (special fund, indefinite)	700,000	700,000	700,000	700,000	700,000			
Assistance to States for tree planting	1,028,000	1,027,000	1,020,000	1,020,000	1,020,000	−7,000		
Total, new budget (obligational) authority, Forest Service	420,478,535	375,074,000	394,153,900	400,995,900	403,388,900	+28,314,900	+9,235,000	+2,393,000

Agency and item	New budget (obligational) authority appropriated, 1972	Budget estimates of new (obligational) authority, 1973	Allowances			Conference allowance compared with		
			House	Senate	Conference	Budget estimates of new (obligational) authority, 1973	House allowance	Senate allowance
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
TITLE II—RELATED AGENCIES—Continued								
COMMISSION OF FINE ARTS								
Salaries and expenses	$124,000	$135,000	$135,000	$135,000	$135,000			
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE								
HEALTH SERVICES AND MENTAL HEALTH ADMINISTRATION								
Indian health services	155,333,000	166,540,000	169,787,000	173,398,000	172,748,000	+$6,208,000	+$2,961,000	—$650,000
Indian health facilities	30,442,000	43,689,000	44,099,000	44,549,000	44,549,000	+860,000	+450,000	
Total, Health Services and Mental Health Administration	185,775,000	210,229,000	213,886,000	217,947,000	217,297,000	+7,068,000	+3,411,000	—650,000
INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION								
Salaries and expenses	1,045,000	1,090,000	1,090,000	1,075,000	1,075,000	—15,000	—15,000	
NATIONAL CAPITAL PLANNING COMMISSION								
Salaries and expenses	1,300,000	1,428,000	1,425,000	1,425,000	1,425,000	—3,000		
NATIONAL FOUNDATION ON THE ARTS AND THE HUMANITIES								
Salaries and Expenses								
Endowment for the arts	26,250,000	35,500,000	34,900,000	34,500,000	34,700,000	—800,000	—200,000	+200,000
Endowment for the humanities	24,500,000	35,500,000	34,500,000	34,500,000	34,500,000	—1,000,000		
Administrative expenses	3,536,000	5,314,000	5,314,000	5,314,000	5,314,000			
Subtotal, salaries and expenses	54,286,000	76,314,000	74,417,000	74,314,000	74,514,000	—1,800,000	—200,000	+200,000
Matching Grants								
Endowment for the arts	3,500,000	3,500,000	3,500,000	3,500,000	3,500,000			
Endowment for the humanities	3,500,000	3,500,000	3,500,000	3,500,000	3,500,000			
Subtotal, matching grants	7,000,000	7,000,000	7,000,000	7,000,000	7,000,000			
Total, National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities	61,286,000	83,314,000	81,714,000	81,314,000	81,514,000	—1,800,000	—200,000	+200,000
SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION								
Salaries and expenses	44,701,000	54,683,000	51,682,000	52,243,000	51,633,000	—3,050,000	—49,000	—610,000
Museum programs and related research (special foreign currency program)	3,500,000	6,000,000	4,000,000	3,500,000	3,500,000	—2,500,000	—500,000	
Science information exchange	1,600,000	1,650,000	1,600,000	1,600,000	1,600,000	—50,000		
Construction and improvements, National Zoological Park	200,000	675,000	675,000	675,000	675,000			
Restoration and renovation of buildings	550,000	5,409,000	5,064,000	5,014,000	5,014,000	—395,000	—50,000	
Construction	1,900,000	40,275,000	13,000,000	13,000,000	13,000,000	—27,275,000		
Construction (new contract authority)			27,000,000	27,000,000	27,000,000	+27,000,000		
Construction (appropriation to liquidate contract authority)	(3,697,000)							
Salaries and expenses, National Gallery of Art	4,841,000	5,420,000	5,420,000	5,420,000	5,420,000			
Salaries and expenses, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars	695,000	841,000	800,000	800,000	800,000	—41,000		
Operation and maintenance, John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts				1,500,000	1,500,000	+1,500,000	+1,500,000	
Total, Smithsonian Institution	57,987,000	114,953,000	109,241,000	110,752,000	110,142,000	—4,811,000	+901,000	—610,000
HISTORICAL AND MEMORIAL COMMISSIONS								
Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial Commission	37,000	38,000	38,000	38,000	38,000			
NATIONAL PARKS CENTENNIAL COMMISSION								
Salaries and expenses	250,000							
American Revolution Bicentennial Commission								
Salaries and expenses	3,834,000	6,814,000				—6,814,000		
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON INDIAN OPPORTUNITY								
Salaries and expenses	275,000	300,000	290,000	290,000	290,000	—10,000		
FEDERAL METAL AND NONMETALIC MINE SAFETY BOARD OF REVIEW								
Salaries and expenses	167,000	167,000	160,000	160,000	160,000	—7,000		
JOINT FEDERAL-STATE LAND USE PLANNING COMMISSION FOR ALASKA								
Salaries and expenses	125,000	1,500,000	708,800	708,800	708,800	—791,200		
Total, new budget (obligational) authority, related agencies	732,683,535	795,042,000	802,841,700	814,840,700	816,173,700	+21,131,700	+13,332,000	+1,333,000
Consisting of—								
Appropriations	732,683,535	795,042,000	775,841,700	787,840,700	789,173,700	—5,868,300	+13,332,000	+1,333,000
Definite appropriations	(731,903,535)	(794,362,000)	(775,061,700)	(787,060,700)	(788,393,700)	(—5,868,300)	(+13,332,000)	(+1,333,000)
Indefinite appropriations	(780,000)	(780,000)	(780,000)	(780,000)	(780,000)			
New contract authority			27,000,000	27,000,000	27,000,000	+27,000,000		

EXHIBIT 1—Continued

Agency and item	New budget (obligational) authority appropriated, 1972	Budget estimates of new (obligational) authority, 1973	Allowances: House	Allowances: Senate	Allowances: Conference	Conference allowance compared with: Budget estimates of new (obligational) authority, 1973	Conference allowance compared with: House allowance	Conference allowance compared with: Senate allowance
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
TITLE II—RELATED AGENCIES—Continued								
JOINT FEDERAL-STATE LAND USE PLANNING								
Memoranda—								
Appropriations to liquidate contract authority	($152,437,000)	($158,840,000)	($158,840,000)	($158,840,000)	($158,840,000)	----------	----------	----------
Total, new budget (obligational) authority and appropriations to liquidate contract authority	(885,120,535)	(953,882,000)	(961,681,700)	(973,680,700)	(975,013,700)	(+$21,131,700)	(+$13,332,000)	(+$1,333,000)
Recapitulation								
Grand total, new budget (obligational) authority, all titles	2,436,659,035	2,527,154,000	2,529,558,200	2,550,922,800	2,548,935,300	+21,781,300	+19,377,100	—1,987,500
Consisting of—								
Appropriations	2,436,659,035	2,527,154,000	2,502,558,200	2,523,922,800	2,521,935,300	—5,218,700	+19,377,100	—1,987,500
Definite appropriations	(1,994,383,035)	(2,193,110,000)	(2,168,773,200)	(2,190,137,800)	(2,188,150,300)	(—4,959,700)	(+19,377,100)	(—1,987,500)
Indefinite appropriations	(396,976,000)	(334,044,000)	(333,785,000)	(333,785,000)	(333,785,000)	(—259,000)	----------	----------
New contract authority	----------	----------	27,000,000	27,000,000	27,000,000	+27,000,000	----------	----------
Authorization to spend from public debt receipts	45,300,000	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------
Memoranda—								
Appropriations to liquidate contract authority	(214,118,000)	(229,366,000)	(214,910,000)	(222,560,000)	(214,560,000)	(—14,806,000)	(—350,000)	(—8,000,000)
Grand total, new budget (obligational) authority and appropriations to liquidate contract authority	(2,650,777,035)	(2,756,520,000)	(2,744,468,200)	(2,773,482,800)	(2,763,495,300)	(+6,975,300)	(+19,027,100)	(—9,987,500)

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I express my gratitude to the chairman of the subcommittee for his consideration and for the assistance he has given me in connection with this bill. It is the first time I have served with him on this bill as it has passed through the Senate. He has been wise in his counsel and generous in his consideration not only of the subject matter as a whole but in particular with respect to the items we sought for the State of Alaska. I am most pleased with the cooperation I have had and the assistance I have had from the Senator from Nevada.

Mr. President, I also would like to again thank the most distinguished Paul Eaton, who has assisted me in this regard, and who is now going out to his own pursuits after so many years in the service of the Interior Appropriations Subcommittee. I am grateful to him also for the education I have received this year.

Mr. BIBLE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Alaska for the views he has expressed. I also wish to echo one further sentiment, and that is appreciation for the great guidance, counsel, and help that have come from Paul R. Eaton, who is leaving us after 33 years of service on the Hill, first serving with Senator Hayden and then with the Committee on Appropriations. He will be terribly hard to replace. He has done a great job. We wish him well in the future.

Mr. President, I move that the conference report be agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the conference report.

The report was agreed to.

BENT'S OLD FORT

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, in reviewing the conference report making appropriations for the Department of the Interior, I am particularly pleased to note that the conference accepted the Senate position on appropriating $50,000 to commence reconstruction of Bent's Old Fort National Historic Site in Colorado. The national historic site, 7 miles east of La Junta, Colo., was authorized by an act of Congress in 1960. Its purpose is to commemorate the historic role played by Bent's Old Fort in the opening of the West.

After some 12 years of being authorized, very little, if any work has been done to reconstruct this important historic site. In appropriating the funds included in this bill today, Congress is putting in motion a development schedule which calls for completion of the reconstruction by 1976. This is particularly important in that that year is not only the national bicentennial, but is also the Colorado State centennial.

The development schedule as contemplated now by the National Park Service calls for a 4-year program. In order to meet this completion date, Congress must appropriate the $50,000 we are approving today; $300,000 in both the second and third years; and the remaining portion in the fourth year. I am pleased to see that we are taking the first step in reaching this goal by approving the funds today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the amendments in disagreement.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate numbered 7, 9, 10, 19, and 39 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein.

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 4 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment, insert: "$55,960,000".

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 12 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment, insert: "$60,091,000".

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 15 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment, insert: "$89,421,000".

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 21 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment, insert: "$5,416,000".

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 23 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment, insert: "$15,295,100".

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 26 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment, insert: "$61,143,000".

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 28 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment, insert: "$48,581,900".

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 35 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment, insert: "$51,633,000".

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The House recedes and concurs with House amendments to Senate amendments Nos. 4, 12, 15, 21, 23, 26, 28, and 35.

Mr. BIBLE. Mr. President, I move that the Senate concur in the amendments of the House to the amendments of the Senate Numbered 4, 12, 15, 21, 23, 26, 28, and 35.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Nevada.

The motion was agreed to.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR SCHWEIKER TOMORROW

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on tomorrow, following the remarks of the able Senator from Florida (Mr. CHILES), the able Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCHWEIKER) be recognized for not to exceed 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXTENSION OF PERIOD FOR TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the period for the transaction of routine morning business be extended for not to exceed 10 minutes, with statements limited therein to 3 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

INCREASED VOCATIONAL ALLOWANCES TO VETERANS—UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, with respect to S. 2161, to increase vocational rehabilitation and educational assistance allowances, at such time as that bill is called up and made the pending business before the Senate, I ask unanimous consent that there be a time limitation on the bill of 10 minutes, to be equally divided between the manager of the bill (Mr. HARTKE) and the distinguished Republican leader or his designee; that time on an amendment by Mr. MATHIAS be limited to 20 minutes, to be equally divided between the able Senator from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS) and the able Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE); that time on any other amendment, debatable motion, or appeal be limited to 10 minutes, to be equally divided between the mover of such and Mr. HARTKE, except in any instances in which Mr. HARTKE may favor such, in which case time in opposition thereto be under the control of the Republican leader or his designee.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

TREATY ON LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS—UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, as in executive session, I ask unanimous consent that the time which was to be under the control of the distinguished Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARKMAN), in accordance with the agreement of yesterday, be under the control of the distinguished Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, as in executive session, I ask unanimous consent that, with respect to any debatable motions or appeals, there be a time limitation, and division of time with respect thereto, in conformity with the agreement entered on yesterday with respect to amendments to reservations or understandings.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

TIME LIMITATION AGREEMENT ON S. 1729

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at such time as S. 1729, the Freight Car bill, is called up and made the pending business, there be a one half-hour limitation on the bill, the time to be equally divided between and controlled by the distinguished Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON), the manager of the bill, and the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. COTTON); provided, that time on any amendment, debatable motion, on appeal be limited to 20 minutes, to be equally divided between and controlled by the mover of such and the manager of the bill, except in any instance in which the manager of the bill supports such, in which case the time in opposition thereto be under the control of the distinguished majority leader or his designee.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMUNICATIONS FROM EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, ETC.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF TITLES 10, 18, AND 37, UNITED STATES CODE

A letter from the Acting Secretary of the Navy, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend titles 10, 18, and 37, United States Code, to revise the laws pertaining to conflicts of interest and related matters as they apply to members of the uniformed services, and for other purposes (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Armed Services.

REPORT ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT FROM SMALL AND OTHER BUSINESS FIRMS

A letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics), transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on Department of Defense procurement from small and other business firms, for the period July 1971-May 1972 (with accompanying report); to the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.

PROPOSED RATIFICATION OF CERTAIN PAYMENTS

A letter from the Secretary of Transportation, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to ratify certain payments made by the United States under the Federal Airport Act, as amended (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Commerce.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954

A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to permit charges for certain services (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Finance.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF TARIFF ACT OF 1930

A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the Tariff Act of 1930 to grant additional arrest authority to officers of the Customs Service (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Finance.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF TARIFF ACT OF 1930

A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the Tariff Act of 1930 to provide an exemption from the restrictions of the trade-mark laws, and for other purposes (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Finance.

PROPOSED MODERNIZATION OF CERTAIN PROCEDURES FOR LICENSING

A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to modernize the procedures for licensing and disciplining customs brokers, and for other purposes (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Finance.

REPORT ON PERSONAL PROPERTY DONATED TO PUBLIC HEALTH AND EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

A letter from the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on personal property donated to public health and educational institutions and civil defense organizations, for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1972 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Government Operations.

REPORTS OF COMPTROLLER GENERAL

A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report entitled "More Needs to be Done to Assure that Physicians' Services—Paid for by Medicare and Medicaid—Are Necessary", Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, dated August 2, 1972 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Government Operations.

A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States transmitting, pursuant to law, a report entitled "Need for Improved Coordination of Federally Assisted Student Aid Programs in Institutions of Higher Education", Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, dated

August 2, 1972 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Government Operations.

A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States transmitting, pursuant to law, a report entitled "Need for Improvements in the Management System to Assess Performance of AID-Financed Projects in India", Agency for International Development, Department of State, dated August 3, 1972 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Government Operations.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF SECTION 215, TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE

A letter from the Attorney General, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend Section 215, Title 18, United States Code, Receipt of Commissions or Gifts for Procuring Loans, to expand the institutions covered; to encompass indirect payments to bank officials; to make violation of the Section a felony; and to specifically include offerors and givers of the proscribed payments; and for other related purposes (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION OF CERTAIN ALIENS

Two letters from the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, copies of orders suspending deportation of certain aliens (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

THIRD PREFERENCE AND SIXTH PREFERENCE CLASSIFICATION FOR CERTAIN ALIENS

A letter from the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, transmitting, pursuant to law, reports according third preference and sixth preference classification to certain aliens (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION REPORT

A letter from the Secretary of Transportation, transmitting, pursuant to law, the 1972 National Transportation Report (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Public Works.

ENROLLED BILLS PRESENTED

The Secretary of the Senate reported that on today, August 3, 1972, he presented to the President of the United States the following enrolled bills:

S. 916. An act to include firefighters with the provisions of section 8336(c) of title 5, United States Code, relating to the retirement of Government employees engaged in certain hazardous occupations;

S. 2227. An act to amend title 44, United States Code, to authorize the Public Printer to designate the library of the highest appellate court in each State as a depositary library;

S. 2684. An act to amend section 509 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended; and

S. 3463. An act to amend section 906 of title 44, United States Code, to provide copies of the daily and semimonthly Congressional Record to libraries of certain United States courts.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following reports of committees were submitted:

By Mr. SYMINGTON, from the Committee on Armed Services, with an amendment:

H.R. 15641. An act to authorize certain construction at military installations, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 92-1010.)

By Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD (for Mr. HARTKE) from the Committee on Commerce:

S. 3879. An original bill to amend title 23, United States Code, sections 101 and 120 (Rept. No. 92-1011). Referred to the Committee on Public Works.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, on behalf of the distinguished Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE), from the Committee on Commerce, I report an original bill on rail-highway grade crossing safety.

I ask unanimous consent that the bill be referred to the Committee on Public Works.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, as in executive session, from the Committee on Armed Services I report favorably the nomination of Vice Adm. Maurice F. Weisner to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and his appointment to grade of admiral while serving. I also report favorably the nominations of 103 flag and general officers in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The reports will be received and the nominations will be placed on the Executive Calendar.

The nominations, ordered to be placed on the Executive Calendar, are as follows:

Rear Adm. William T. Rapp, U.S. Navy, for commands and other duties determined by the President, for appointment to the grade of vice admiral while so serving;

Brig. Gen. Herbert Eric Wolff, Army of the United States (colonel U.S. Army), and sundry other officers, for temporary appointment in the Army of the United States;

Brig. Gen. John Kirk Singlaub, Army of the United States (colonel U.S. Army), and sundry other officers, for appointment in the Regular Army of the United States;

Rear Adm. William J. Moran, U.S. Navy, for commands and other duties determined by the President, for appointment to the grade of vice admiral while so serving;

Brig. Gen. Robert Frank Cocklin, and sundry other U.S. Army Reserve officers, for promotion as Reserve commissioned officers of the Army;

Col. Joseph Earle Brown, Jr., and sundry other Army National Guard of the United States officers, for promotion as Reserve commissioned officers of the Army;

Lt. Gen. William K. Jones, U.S. Marine Corps, when retired, to be placed on the retired list in the grade of lieutenant general;

Maj. Gen. Louis H. Wilson, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps, for commands and other duties determined by the President, for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general while so serving;

Brig. Gen. O'Neil James Daigle, Jr., and sundry other Army National Guard officers, for appointment as Reserve commissioned officers of the Army;

Rear Adm. Frank H. Price, Jr., U.S. Navy, for commands and other duties determined by the President, for appointment to the grade of vice admiral while so serving;

Lt. Gen. Marvin L. McNickle (major general, Regular Air Force) U.S. Air Force, to be placed on the retired list in the grade of lieutenant general.

Maj. Gen. William G. Moore, Jr. (major general, Regular Air Force) U.S. Air Force, to be assigned to a position of importance and responsibility designated by the President, for appointment to lieutenant general while so serving;

Vice Adm. Maurice F. Weisner, U.S. Navy, for appointment as Vice Chief of Naval Operations;

Vice Adm. Maurice F. Weisner, U.S. Navy, for commands and other duties of great importance and responsibility determined by the President, for appointment to the grade of admiral while so serving; and

Rear Adm. William D. Houser, U.S. Navy, for commands and other duties determined by the President for appointment to the grade of vice admiral while so serving.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, in addition, I report favorably 423 nominations in the Army, 271 in the Marine Corps and 1,430 in the Air Force all in the grade of colonel or below. Since these names have already appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, in order to save the expense of printing on the Executive Calendar, I ask unanimous consent that they be ordered to lie on the Secretary's desk for the information of any Senator.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The nominations, ordered to lie on the desk, are as follows:

Donald L. Abbitt, and sundry other Marine Corps officers for promotion in the Marine Corps;

Capt. Jack T. Kline, U.S. Marine Corps, for appointment in the grade of major;

Katherine E. Hamlin, and sundry other officers, for promotion in the Air Force Reserve;

Charles L. Humphrey, and sundry other persons, for appointment in the Regular Army of the United States;

Carroll N. Anderson, and sundry other Air National Guard of the United States officers, for promotion in the Reserve of the Air Force;

Bruce L. Livingston, and sundry other persons, for appointment in the Regular Army of the United States; and

Francis W. Ahearn, and sundry other persons, for appointment in the Regular Air Force;

CHANGE OF REFERENCE—S. 3756

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, last month, this Senator introduced a private relief bill, S. 3756, designed to correct a situation relating to the retirement eligibility of the four photographers employed by the Republican and Democratic Senate Policy Committees.

At the time of the introduction it had been expected that the bill would be referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Rather the bill was sent to the Senate Post Office and Civil Service Committee.

In checking with the chairman, Mr. MCGEE, and the ranking minority member, Mr. FONG, of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, as well as the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Mr. EASTLAND, it was agreed that this bill should be considered by the Judiciary Committee.

Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the Post Office and Civil Service Committee be discharged from its consideration of S. 3756 and that the bill be referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.

HUMPHREY). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I want to emphasize that the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service reached the conclusion that this was not properly within its jurisdiction. I have urged that it be rereferred to the Committee on the Judiciary. We certainly support the request of the Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. HRUSKA. I thank the distinguished Senator from Wyoming.

INTRODUCTION OF BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

The following bills and joint resolutions were introduced, read the first time and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as indicated:

By Mr. BENNETT:

S. 3878. A bill to amend chapter 34 of title 38, United States Code, to consider as active duty service, for certain purposes and under certain circumstances, the initial period of active duty for training served by a veteran pursuant to section 511(d) of title 10, United States Code. Referred to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD (for Mr. HARTKE) from the Committee on Commerce:

S. 3879. An original bill to amend title 23, United States Code, sections 101 and 120. Referred to the Committee on Public Works.

STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

By Mr. BENNETT:

S. 3878. A bill to amend chapter 34 of title 38, United States Code, to consider as active duty service, for certain purposes and under certain circumstances, the initial period of active duty for training served by a veteran pursuant to section 511(d) of title 10, United States Code. Referred to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

GI BENEFITS TO RESERVISTS FOR INITIAL ACTIVE DUTY TRAINING

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, today I am introducing a bill to amend chapter 34 of title 38, United States Code, to consider as active duty service, for certain purposes and under certain circumstances, the initial period of active duty for training served by a veteran pursuant to section 511(d) of title 10, United States Code.

At this time, any serviceman, regardless of the branch of service or type of enlistment, must receive a minimum of 120 days of initial training before he can be sent to a hostile country. Servicemen in all branches who are drafted or enlisted are entitled to receive GI benefits for this training period, but reservists are prohibited from receiving any credit for this same training period, even though the skills taught are exactly the same.

The bill I have introduced would permit the counting, for GI benefit purposes, of initial active duty training by a reservist, where the reservist is subsequently called to active duty. This would erase the inequity which exists that allows one soldier to receive GI benefits for his initial active duty training, but not another soldier, because he is classified as a reservist. Both men receive the same training and both men participate in the same activities when called to active duty. Both men should receive the same benefits.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS

S. 32

At the request of Mr. KENNEDY, the Senator from Georgia (Mr. GAMBRELL) and the Senator from Kansas (Mr. PEARSON) were added as cosponsors of S. 32, the Conversion Research, Education, and Assistance Act.

S. 3771

At the request of Mr. GRIFFIN (for Mr. BROOKE) the Senator from Alaska (Mr. STEVENS) and the Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE) were added as cosponsors of S. 3771, to provide compensation to U.S. commercial fishing vessel owners for damages incurred by them as a result of an action of a vessel operated by a foreign government or citizen of a foreign government.

S. 2161

At the request of Mr. HARTKE, the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL) and the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY) were added as cosponsors of S. 2161, a bill to amend chapters 31, 34, and 35 of title 38, United States Code, to increase the vocational rehabilitation subsistence allowances the educational assistance allowances, and the special training allowances paid to eligible veterans and persons under such chapters.

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 91—SUBMISSION OF A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION DESIGNATING OCTOBER AS NATIONAL GOSPEL-RESCUE MISSION MONTH

(Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.)

Mr. SCOTT submitted the following concurrent resolution:

S. CON. RES. 91

Whereas in October 1872, Jerry McAuley in the city of New York opened the Water Street Mission as a haven for alcoholics and transient men, being the first religious institution to open its doors every night of the year to the homeless, and the above mission still serves the needy under the name Jerry McAuley Water Street Mission, and

Whereas the spirit and work of Jerry McAuley spread the length and breadth of North America, and to many parts of the world with Gospel-Rescue Missions springing up to meet the physical, spiritual, and material needs of thousands of persons in most cities over fifty thousand in population, and

Whereas three hundred and fifty Gospel-Rescue Missions in the United States of America, members of the International Union of Gospel Missions, served millions of meals to the hungry, housed over two million individuals, distributed over two and one-half million items of clothing last year, as well as offered a variety of youth services, alcoholic treatment programs, family care and services, parole placements, adoption counseling, and so forth, to the people of America, and have now for one hundred years shown willingness to serve mankind, and

Whereas Gospel-Rescue Missions have become a place of new beginning for thousands of individuals including many renowned leaders, and

Whereas the International Union of Gospel Missions will be celebrating October 1972 as its one hundredth anniversary and will be holding special programs in conjunction with a mission on October 7, 1972, and will be gathered in the city of New York on October 13 through 15, 1972, to join the McAuley Water Street Mission to celebrate one hundred years of preaching to and reaching the least, the last, and the lost: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States is hereby authorized and requested to issue a proclamation recognizing 1972 as the one hundredth anniversary of the Gospel-Rescue Mission movement and designating October as "National Gospel-Rescue Mission Month", and calling upon the people of the United States of America to observe such month with appropriate ceremonies and activities.

SENATE RESOLUTION 340—ORIGINAL RESOLUTION REPORTED AUTHORIZING ADDITIONAL EXPENDITURES BY THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

(Referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.)

Mr. STENNIS, from the Committee on Armed Services, reported the following resolution:

S. RES. 340

Resolved, That the Committee on Armed Services is authorized to expend from the contingent fund of the Senate, during the 92d Congress, $15,000 in addition to the amount, and for the same purposes specified in section 134(a) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, and Senate Resolution 252, 92d Congress, agreed to March 6, 1972.

SENATE RESOLUTION 341—SUBMISSION OF A RESOLUTION TO ESTABLISH A SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE TERMINATION OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY

(Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.)

Mr. MATHIAS submitted the following resolution:

S. RES. 341

Whereas the existence of the state of national emergency proclaimed by the President on December 16, 1950, is directly related to the conduct of United States foreign policy and our national security: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That (a) there is hereby established a special committee of the Senate to be known as the Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency (hereinafter referred to as the "special committee").

(b) The special committee shall be composed of eight Members of the Senate equally divided between the majority and minority parties to be appointed by the President of the Senate, four of whom shall be members of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

(c) The special committee shall select a chairman and vice chairman from among its members. A majority of the members of the special committee shall constitute a quorum thereof for the transaction of business, except that the special committee may fix a lesser number as a quorum for the purpose of taking testimony. Vacancies in the membership of the special committee shall not affect the authority of the remaining members to execute the functions of the special committee.

SEC. 2. It shall be the function of the special committee to conduct a study and investigation with respect to the matter of terminating the national emergency proclaimed by the President of the United States on December 16, 1950, and announced in Presidential Proclamation Numbered 2914, dated the same date. In carrying out such study and investigation the special committee shall—

(1) consult and confer with the President and his advisers;

(2) consider the problems which may arise as the result of terminating such national emergency; and

(3) consider what administrative or legislative actions might be necessary or desirable as the result of terminating such national emergency, including consideration of the desirability and consequences of terminating special legislative powers that were conferred on the President and other officers, boards, and commissions as the result of the President proclaiming a national emergency.

SEC. 3. For the purposes of this resolution the special committee is authorized from date of agreement to this resolution through January 2, 1973, in its discretion (1) to make expenditures from the contingent fund of the Senate, (2) to employ personnel, (3) to hold hearings, (4) to sit and act at any time or place during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Senate, (5) to require, by subpena or otherwise the attendance of witnesses and the production of correspondence, books, papers, and documents, (6) to take depositions and other testimony, (7) to procure the service of individual consultants or organizations thereof, in accordance with the provisions of section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended, and (8) with the prior consent of the Government department or agency concerned and the Committee on Rules and Administration, to use on a reimbursable basis the services of personnel of any such department or agency.

SEC. 4. The expenses of the special committee under this resolution shall not exceed $100,000, of which amount not to exceed $15,000 shall be available for the procurement of the services of individual consultants, or organizations thereof as authorized by section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended.

SEC. 5. The special committee shall report its findings, together with such recommendations for legislation as it deems advisable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but not later than January 2, 1973.

SEC. 6. Expenses of the special committee under this resolution shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the special committee.

SEC. 7. Senate Resolution 304, 92d Congress, agreed to June 23, 1972, is repealed.

DISASTER RELIEF—AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENT NO. 1392

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. BUCKLEY (for himself, Mr. JAVITS, and Mr. SCOTT) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by them jointly to the bill (H.R. 15692) to amend the Small Business Act to reduce the interest rate on Small Business Administration disaster loans.

AMENDMENT NO. 1393

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I am today submitting an amendment to H.R. 15692, a bill which amends the Small Business Act to reduce the interest rate on SBA disaster loans. This amendment is being offered pursuant to President Nixon's message to Congress yesterday urging flood relief funds for private nonprofit educational institutions.

During my tour of the flood ravaged areas of Pennsylvania, I was particularly struck by the magnitude of the damage sustained by some of our educational facilities. As the President pointed out in his message, Wilkes College in Wilkes-Barre sustained several million dollars in damages alone. The private facilities, those less reliant on direct public assistance, are having the hardest time, and they need the help now.

Under present law, public educational institutions are eligible for grant and loan assistance, but private facilities are only eligible for loans. The need is great enough, and the public interest and welfare is great enough, to warrant grants-in-aid as well.

The adoption of my amendment will mean the expenditure of at least $19 million in the flood stricken areas. I join the President in urging the swift adoption of this amendment and the whole package of disaster relief legislation which he has submitted to the Congress.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the amendment and certain supplementary material be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the amendment and material were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

At the end of the Act, add the following new section:

"SEC. 4(a) The Congress hereby finds and declares that there has been substantial damage to educational institutions as a result of Hurricane and Tropical Storm Agnes; that disaster relief for public educational institutions is adequately covered by legislation heretofore enacted; that nonprofit private educational institutions are not provided disaster relief benefits comparable to those provided to public educational institutions; that nonprofit private educational institutions have a secular educational mission; that students attending nonprofit private educational institutions that have been damaged, or destroyed will have to be provided for in public institutions if the former institutions are not restored; and, that these facts compel enactment of special measures designed to provide nonprofit private educational institutions which were victims of this catastrophe with disaster relief benefits comparable to those provided for public educational institutions.

"(b) To the extent such loss or damage or destruction is not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, the President may make grants to nonprofit private educational institutions in areas declared a major disaster by the President for the repair, restoration, reconstruction, or replacement of educational facilities, supplies, or equipment which have been lost, damaged, or destroyed as a result of Hurricane and Tropical Storm Agnes if such facilities, supplies, or equipment were owned on the date of such loss, damage, or destruction by an organization exempt from taxation under section 501 (c), (d), or (e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and the facilities, supplies or equipment were being used to carry out the exempt purposes of such organization; except that no grant may be made under this section for the repair, restoration, reconstruction, or replacement of any facility for which disaster relief assistance would not be authorized under Public Law 81-815, title VII of the Higher Educational Act of 1965, or the Disaster Relief Act of 1970 if such facility were a public facility.

"(c) The amount of a grant made under this section shall not—

"(1) exceed 100 per centum of the cost of:

(A) repairing, restoring, reconstructing, or replacing any facility on the basis of the design of such facility as it existed immediately prior to such disaster and in conformity with applicable codes, specifications, and standards; or

(B) repairing, restoring, or replacing equipment or supplies;

as they existed immediately prior to such disaster;

"(2) in the case of any facility which was under construction when so damaged or destroyed, exceed 50 per centum of the cost of restoring such facility substantially to its condition prior to such disaster, and of completing construction not performed prior to such disaster to the extent that the cost of completing construction is increased over the original construction cost due to changed conditions resulting from such disaster;

"(3) be used to pay any part of the cost of facilities, supplies, or equipment which are to be used primarily for sectarian purposes; and

"(4) be used to restore or rebuild any facility used or to be used primarily for religious worship; replace, restore, or repair any equipment or supplies used or to be used primarily for religious instruction, or restore or rebuild any facility or furnish any equipment or supplies which are used or to be used primarily in connection with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity.

"(d) For the purposes of this section,

"(1) the term educational institution means any elementary school (as defined by section 801(c) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965), any secondary school (as defined by Section 801(h) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965), and, any institution of higher education (as defined by section 1201 (a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965); and

"(2) the term school or department of divinity means a school or department of divinity as defined by section 1201 of the Higher Education Act of 1965.

"(e) Funds appropriated to the President in the appropriation "Disaster Relief" are hereby made available for carrying out the purposes of this section."

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
Washington, D.C., August 2, 1972.

HON. HUGH SCOTT,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR SCOTT: Today the President has issued a statement describing the destruction suffered by the private nonprofit educational institutions during hurricane and tropical storm Agnes. In that statement he stated his intention to send legislation to respond to the needs of those educational institutions in the devastated communities.

I am enclosing an amendment to the SBA legislation now before the Senate (H.R. 15692) which would carry out the President's intention with respect to private nonprofit schools This amendment should be offered in behalf of the Administration.

I submit this to the Senate because the House has already acted on H.R. 15692. I believe this approach to the Senate at this stage of the legislative process is the fastest way to provide the necessary legal authority to assist the victims of hurricane Agnes in their recovery efforts.

Sincerely,

FRANK C. CARLUCCI,
Deputy Director.

To the Congress of the United States:

Tropical Storm Agnes caused the most widespread destruction and devastation of any natural disaster in the history of the United States. On July 17, 1972, I sent to the Congress a proposal authorizing special disaster recovery measures which would aid victims of Agnes and also of the flood in Rapid City, South Dakota during June 1972.

As I stated in my transmittal message, the need for prompt enactment of these aid proposals, aimed at short and long-term recovery, is extreme and urgent. I asked the Congress then to consider and enact them within seven days. Sixteen days have passed without final Congressional action on the Disaster Recovery Act of 1972. I again urge the Congress to act immediately, because the victims of these disasters desperately need the help these measures would provide. And they need it now.

Today, I am transmitting an amendment which would make private, non-profit educational institutions eligible for disaster relief grants under the Act. I urge that the Congress consider and enact promptly this amendment, which would authorize reconstruction relief for these institutions comparable to the disaster reconstruction relief already available to public educational institutions.

The Office of Emergency Preparedness estimates that property loss and damage at private non-profit educational institutions in the storm affected areas has exceeded $19 million. Many of these institutions have undergone damage so extensive that they would be unable to rebuild facilities or reopen without extraordinary assistance. For example, at one alone, Wilkes College in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, which is not a large or wealthy institution, the storm caused havoc and destruction estimated at several millions of dollars.

The proposal I am transmitting today would provide financial assistance to restore, reconstruct or replace disaster-damaged education facilities, supplies and equipment used primarily for nonsectarian educational purposes. I believe this temporary authority is required if we are to meet our public responsibilities equitably and in a just manner.

Again, I cannot stress too strongly that it is essential that the Congress immediately enact the pending disaster relief legislation I have proposed. It is imperative that this massive recovery program begin at once. Millions of Americans—individual homeowners, farmers and city dwellers, small businessmen—are struggling to rebuild their lives in the wake of these natural disasters. They need their Government's help. And they need it now.

RICHARD NIXON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *August 2, 1972.*

AMENDMENT TO PROVIDE DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO PRIVATE NONPROFIIT EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

I. PRIOR PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVES

On July 12, 1972, the President announced that he would submit to the Congress when it reconvened, requests for new appropriations and authorizations of $1.77 billion to fund the Federal effort to recover from the devastation of Tropical Storm Agnes.

In the same message to the Congress, the President announced that he would also submit new legislation, the Disaster Recovery Act of 1972, which would make Small Business Administration and Farmers Home Administration loans to individuals and businessmen in the affected areas available at lower interest rates and with increased forgiveness of a portion of the sums borrowed. The foregoing legislative initiatives were submitted on the first day Congress reconvened for its present session on July 17, 1972. On July 18, 1972, an amendment was submitted to the Disaster Recovery Act which would extend its provisions to individuals affected by the flood in Rapid City, South Dakota, as well as victims of Tropical Storm Agnes.

II. NONPROFIT PRIVATE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AMENDMENT

The amendment proposed today would provide disaster relief for non-profit private institutions of elementary, secondary, and higher education in disaster areas damaged by Tropical Storm Agnes and by the South Dakota flood in June 1972. A number of those institutions were damaged so severely that they will not be able to recover without extraordinary relief. While these institutions are eligible for loans under existing legislation or the Disaster Recovery Act of 1972, this assistance will be inadequate in many cases.

Federal aid to public schools under existing law is through assistance provided directly to local school districts: to finance normal operation of elementary and secondary schools; to repair damaged facilities; to replace or repair equipment; and to provide temporary school facilities. This assistance has top priority for funding and amounts required have first claim on available appropriations. Public institutions of higher education are also eligible for grants for the cost of construction and equipment incident to restoration or replacement of damaged facilities. These programs are administered by the Office of Education in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Current estimates of Federal disaster assistance to public educational institutions as a result of Tropical Storm Agnes are between $50 and $60 million in over 100 school districts.

Administration officials who have inspected the devastated area at the President's direction have reported that continued operation of both public and non-profit private schools is essential to reconstruction of the devastated area.

The proposed amendment would provide grants for the rebuilding, repair, or replacement of facilities, equipment, and supplies used for primarily non-sectarian purposes which were lost, damaged, or destroyed by the storms. The relief to be provided would be limited to restoration of facilities as they were before the disaster. It is intended to provide reconstruction benefits for non-profit private educational instiutions comparable to the disaster relief now available to public educational institutions.

Preliminary estimates indicate that in the affected area, at least thirty-five non-profit private schools, with a total enrollment of over 17,000 students, were affected by the floods. Total damages to these institutions are estimated at approximately $19,000,000. The most critical area, the Wyoming Valley area of Pennsylvania suffered most of these damages. Wilkes College and Kings College sustained major damage. Public institutions were badly damaged also so that the ability of public facilities to absorb the large numbers of children attending private facilities is substantially lessened.

[From the Washington Post, Aug. 3, 1972]

PRIVATE SCHOOL DISASTER AID IS ASKED

(By Elsie Carper)

President Nixon sent an urgent appeal to Congress yesterday to extend disaster relief to private schools and colleges damaged by tropical storm Agnes and the Rapid City, N.D., flood.

The Office of Emergency Preparedness said it was the first time that emergency relief had been requested for private educational institutions.

Preliminary estimates show that about 40 private, non-profit schools and colleges sustained damage in excess of $19 million and "would not be reopened without extraordinary assistance," the President said.

Frank Carlucci, deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget, told a White House press briefing that about 27 of the schools are "church-related" Roman Catholic schools.

In the special message to Congress, Mr. Nixon emphasized that the funds would be used to restore, reconstruct or replace disaster-damaged education facilities, supplies and equipment used primarily for nonsectarian educational purposes.

Carlucci said the Justice Department has determined that no constitutional problem exists "as long as we are talking about a short-term emergency aid which fulfills a public need and is used primarily for nonsectarian purposes."

The aid could be financed, he said, without an increase in previously sought disaster funds totalling $475 million.

The President cited as an exemple of institutions needing assistance the non-sectarian Wilkes College in Wilkes-Barre, Pa. Describing the college as neither large nor wealthy, Mr. Nixon said that the storm "caused havoc and destruction estimated at several millions of dollars."

The proposed disaster relief is comparable with what is already available to public educational institutions, estimated at between $50 million and $60 million, the White House reported.

Mr. Nixon coupled his request for the private school assistance with a plea for Congress to act immediately on legislation sent earlier this month authorizing special disaster relief.

AMENDMENT NO. 1396

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. SCHWEIKER submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill (H.R. 15692), supra.

FEDERAL REVENUE SHARING—AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENTS NOS. 1394 AND 1395

(Ordered to be printed and referred to the Committee on Finance.)

Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, I am today submitting two amendments I intend to propose to H.R. 14370, the revenue-sharing legislation.

I ask unanimous consent that a description of the amendments be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the description was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AREAWIDE PROJECTS

H.R. 14370 provides that a state may require local governments to spend up to 10 percent of their revenue sharing entitlement for areawide projects "involving high priority expenditures in two or more contiguous counties in such state." The state must provide matching funds. According to the Ways and Means Committee Report, "the funds involved may be spent directly by the localities or by some agency (statewide, areawide, or by county agency) as the state may direct."

The Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, on which I serve, has consistently attempted to encourage areawide planning and cooperative projects. And I can only applaud the intent of H.R. 14370 in this regard.

However, the legislation provides for areawide projects only where localities in two counties are involved. This provision would effectively prevent areawide city-suburb projects in large metropolitan areas consisting mostly of one county encompassing both city and suburbs. My amendment would provide for areawide projects if two or more contiguous units of local government are involved, even if they are in the same county.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMUTER TAX

This amendment would eliminate the provision in H.R. 14370 which in effect would prevent the District of Columbia from levying a "commuter tax." The District would lose $1 in revenue sharing funds for every $1 raised by a commuter tax.

I cannot find the remotest justification for this provision. According to an April, 1970 report by the Advisory Commisison on Intergovernmental Relations, the vast majority of local governments which levy municipal income taxes also levy "commuter taxes"—that is, they extend their tax to non-residents earning income in the city. Cities levying commuter taxes include New York, Philadelphia, Detroit, Wilmington, Cincinnati, Louisville, Kansas City, Baltimore, and a host of other cities including many with small populations. The legislation would not penalize these cities for their choice of tax systems, and I cannot conceive of any sound reason for treating the District of Columbia differently. To do so would once again force second class citizenship upon the residents of the District of Columbia.

GUN CONTROL ACT—AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 1397

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. STEVENSON submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill (S. 2507) to amend the Gun Control Act of 1968.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF AN AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 1357

At the request of Mr. METCALF, the Senator from Oregon (Mr. PACKWOOD), the Senator from Alaska (Mr. STEVENS), and the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. MONDALE) were added as cosponsors of amendment No. 1357 intended to be proposed to the bill (H.R. 14370) to provide payments to localities for high-priority expenditures, to encourage the States to supplement their revenue sources, and to authorize Federal collection of State individual income taxes.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF HEARINGS ON S. 3762, MIGRANT HEALTH

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I would like to announce that the Senate Health Subcommittee, which I chair, will hold joint hearings with the Senate Subcommittee on Migratory Labor on S. 3762, a bill to extend the program for health services for domestic agricultural migrant workers in room 4200, New Senate Office Building.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

ENVIRONMENTAL HARMONY AT JONATHAN

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I invite the attention of the Senate to an excellent article regarding ecologically minded farming operations at Jonathan, Minn., and published recently in the Minneapolis Tribune.

The article, written by George Peterson, describes the ecological plan being implemented on the McKnight Angus Farm adjoining the new town of Jonathan. The plan includes farming techniques of the type recommended by the Soil Conservation Service. The plan emphasizes environmental preservation by utilizing rotation pastures, methods for barnyard pollution control, and soil protection practices like those used on many farms in Minnesota. A big wildlife marsh and tree planting are also part of the program.

But beyond the aspects of the plan specifically designed to minimize agricultural pollution, an even larger environmental concept is being tested at Jonathan. The McKnight Angus Farm is also designed to demonstrate that long range environmental harmony may depend upon promoting balanced communities with mixed agricultural and nonagricultural components.

The article notes that the district conservationist for Jonathan, Mr. Don Berg, believes that the standard conservation procedures designed for agriculture can be used with slight modification for urban development areas. After looking for himself, author George Peterson remarks:

> Those guidelines have worked very well at Jonathan where dwellings spring up in the midst of enhanced natural features.

People who work in large metropolitan centers too often cannot find natural areas within a short distance of their homes and especially their jobs. This is not the case in Jonathan, where farming will continue to play an essential part in the overall community scheme.

I think the work of Henry McKnight and the McKnight Angus Farm in piloting the Jonathan environmental plan deserves both attention and recognition by the Congress.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A FARM ON THE PRAIRIE

(By George Peterson)

Some day I'm going to get me a broad-brimmed Stetson and a pair of cowboy boots and pose as a knowledgeable cattleman. That's the garb of Dave Canning, but he doesn't have to pretend about his erudition in livestock lore. Henry McKnight calls him one of the world's outstanding authorities on Black Angus.

We met in the cool of the morning at Henry's farm adjoining the new town of Jonathan and hiked the lush pastures to meet a couple of hundred cows and their calves. Canning and Frank Hausam, the farm's Yorkshire-bred herdsman and manager, talked of the fine points of individual animals, though they looked pretty much alike to me. All beauties.

Canning, president of Colossal Cattle Co., raises Angus and feeds out 40,000 head of beef annually in the sand hills of western Nebraska. He has other ranches in Canada, New Zealand and Indonesia. Recently he sold 500 sons (artificial insemination) of his prize bull, Colossal, at one sale for an average price of more than $1,000.

He started life on a farm near Ada, Minn. During the Depression of the 1930s he decided the place couldn't earn a living for both himself and a brother so he headed east to become field man for the Virginia Angus Association at $50 a month. He promoted the breed, and the breed promoted him to wealth and influence.

McKnight, who yearns to develop the finest commercial Angus operation anywhere, cooperates with his old friend Canning on programs to test the progeny power of bulls. This involves interbreeding but no cross-breeding. To these fellows the pure Angus is ruler of the animal kingdom.

On our farm we turn the bull loose with a bunch of cows and let nature take its course. Canning relies on artificial insemination (AI), a more bothersome procedure. So does McKnight with about half his cows. Canning, of course, carefully registers his calves. Henry, with a setup aimed at the slaughter market, doesn't bother.

But Hausam knows the breeding of every critter in his care. He takes a look at each of them daily, no matter how far into the pasture they may have wandered. He was worried because some calves had come down with scours, curse of the cattle business. Canning told him it happened in the best of herds.

As a matter of fact, I visited the McKnight Angus Farm primarily to check on the ecological plan put into effect there rather than to envy Henry his sleek kine.

At Jonathan and in his farming operations he stressed environmental preservation from the start. He has been an enthusiastic cooperator with the Carver County Soil and Water Conservation District. Don Berg, district conservationist, drew up the plan, which includes half a dozen rotation pastures, a big wildlife marsh, waterway improvement, tree planting, barnyard pollution control, and all the usual soil-protection practices.

Bering pointed out that the standard conservation procedures designed for agriculture can be used, with slight modification, for urban development areas. Those guidelines have served very well at Jonathan, where dwellings spring up in the midst of enhanced natural features.

Despite his ambitious plans for an eventual five villages at Jonathan, McKnight promises that farming will continue indefinitely as part of the over-all scheme. Even with the most efficient Angus establishment, pastures on $1,500-an-acre land seem uneconomical. But the buffer a wellrun farm provides for Jonathan should be worth a lot. And obviously Henry doesn't have to squeeze nickels the way we do at our farm.

More than almost anyone I know, Henry McKnight realizes the seriousness of environmental deterioration, which in turn threatens the very existence of mankind. And he is doing his part to correct the situation.

He has a simple but effective precept for making the world more livable: "Everybody must do his bit to fight pollution, and keep doing it."

CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE ORDER OF AHEPA

Mr. COOK. Mr. President, on July 26, 1922, the Order of Ahepa was founded in Atlanta, Ga. This month the order is celebrating its golden anniversary.

The Order of Ahepa, which is composed of United States and Canadian citizens of Greek descent, has made many contributions to the betterment of American life. It has contributed financially to many worthy causes during the last 50 years. These include:

Relief of Florida hurricane victims.
Relief of Mississippi flood victims.
Relief of Corinth earthquake victims.
For the war orphans of Greece.
Relief of Dodecanese earthquake victims.

For the fatherless children of refugees, through the Near East Relief.

For the Hellenic Museum.

National scholarships to worthy students.

For the theological seminaries at Brookline and Pomfret.

Ahepa Franklin D. Roosevelt Memorial at Hyde Park.

Ypsilanti and Dilboy Memorials.

Sons of Pericles Memorial to the American Philhellenes of 1821, at Missolonghi, Greece.

Relief of Turkish earthquake victims.

For the Patriarchate of Jerusalem.

For the Patriachate of Constantinople.

Ecuadorean relief.

Kansas City flood relief.

Greek war relief.

Ahepa hospitals in Athens and Thessaloniki, and seven health centers in Greece.

Ahepa Agricultural College in Greece.

Ionian Islands earthquake relief.

Ahepa Preventorium in Volos.

Penelopian Shelter Home in Athens.

Ahepa Hall for Boys at St. Basil's Academy.

The Ahepa School at St. Basil's Academy, Garrison, N.Y.

Sale of $500 million in U.S. War Bonds during World War II as an official issuing agency of the U.S. Treasury.

Truman Library.

Dr. George Papanicolaou Cancer Research Institute at Miami.

The Ahepa Truman Memorial, Athens, Greece.

The New Smyrna Beach, Fla., monument commemorating the first landing of Hellenes in the New World in the year 1768.

The Ahepa educational journey to Greece student program.

I congratulate the fraternity for its worthy endeavors. We have two fine chapters in Kentucky, and I ask unanimous consent that the names of the officers of these chapters be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

KENTUCKY: LOCAL CHAPTER OFFICERS

Emmanuel G. Pappas, President, Louisville.
John Regas, Vice President, Louisville.
William Georgantas, Secretary, Louisville.
Arthur C. Commick, Treasurer, Louisville.
Nicholas C. Anggelis, President, Lexington.
Alvin B. Trigg, Vice President, Lexington.
Nicholas J. Pitanis, Secretary, Lexington.
Oakley Mullins, Treasurer, Lexington.

AN OVERSUPPLY OF SURGEONS

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a superb article from last week's Washington Star-Daily News by Judith Randal concerning this Nation's oversupply of surgeons. The United States is in the midst of a profound health care crisis which is in no small measure attributable to the difficulties regarding an adequate supply and geographical distribution of all types of health manpower. Miss Randal's article offers excellent insights into this vexing aspect of the health care crisis, and I commend it to my colleagues in the Senate.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TOO MANY SURGEONS SPOIL THE CARE

(By Judith Randal)

When Herbert S. Denenberg, Pennsylvania insurance commissioner, announced not long ago that he had prepared a "Shopper's Guide to Surgery," the language was somewhat razzmatazz, and some experts said that 2 million unnecessary operations a year—his estimate—overstated the case.

Nevertheless, Denenberg is essentially correct in his analysis. When one looks below the surface of many of the short-comings of health care, it quickly becomes evident that the dominance of surgery over the rest of the profession is a key weakness of our current system.

Consider, for example, the conventional wisdom that the availability of 50,000 more doctors would moderate costs and put care within everyone's reach.

Would it? When one recognizes that the present oversupply of surgeons has fueled the scarcity of supporting specialists like anesthesiologists, pathologists and diagnostic radiologists, it immediately becomes apparent that a sheer increase in the number of M.D.'s might have an opposite effect.

Indeed, surgeons and the specialists who work with them occupy the top rungs of the medical income ladder, so that failure to limit their number has discouraged young doctors from choosing other forms of practice and acted as a disincentive for controlling costs all across the board.

Thus, if we simply set training more doctors as the objective, without at the same time finding some way to slack off the percentage of them who become surgeons, we will not have solved anything.

Hospitals, too, need to be examined in this light. Originally conceived as places to sequester the contagions of the dying poor from the general public, their change in role can be traced in large measure to the advent of modern surgery and all that went with it.

With that change, surgeons gained more power than other physicians in laying down hospital policies. Although this trend has been somewhat moderated recently, it still, by and large, prevails.

What happened at a large hospital in New York City is a case in point. It had some money at its disposal, derived from the sale of property, which it had planned to use to develop a physical rehabilitation facility.

So powerful were the surgeons on the staff, however, that they persuaded the board to build an open-heart surgery suite instead—despite the fact that the community was short on rehabilitation services and already had more open-heart units than the metropolitan population warranted.

It is not only the highly specialized types of surgery that are subject to such pressures to the detriment of other community health needs. Just as serious and far more prevalent is the unnecessary performance of procedures like tonsillectomies, hemorrhoidectomies, hysterectomies and all bladder removals.

Besides the inevitable discomfort and expense, each of these operations poses a definite, if slight, risk of complications from the anesthesia and a potential additional requirement for blood, intensive care and nursing, all of which are expensive and in short supply.

Parkinson's law applies. While a certain number of these operations are desirable and to be expected, a turning point is reached when it becomes evident that the determining factor is less the health of individuals than the supply of surgeons and hospital facilities.

As Denenberg observes in advising patients to see their family doctors before seeking out a surgeon and then to get an independent, unbiased opinion before submitting to an operation: "There is a tendency of surgeons to do their thing—surgery."

The pre-eminence of the surgeon also has adversely affected the effectiveness of health insurance. Health insurance began as a hedge against the costs of surgery, and some policies to this day provide coverage only for operations.

But even those that offer broader protection are heavily loaded in favor of conditions that require hospitalization. In most of these cases, surgical procedures are involved whose necessity is never questioned when reimbursement is made

Since hospitalization is the most expensive form of health care, it follows that the costs of insurance continue to rise.

At bottom, it is a question of the suitability of care.

As long as there is a mismatch between the kind of care that people need and what the medical profession offers, and as long as payment mechanisms support the discrepancies, no amount of money will make quality health services available to all or even to the reasonably affluent.

A NEW COMMUNITY IN ILLINOIS: PARK FOREST SOUTH

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I invite the attention of Senators to an article entitled "'Main Street' Revived in Midwest New Town: Park Forest South Rises from the Illinois Cornfield," published in the July issue of the Journal of Housing.

I am pleased that the journal of the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials has taken note of this outstanding example of a modern planned city which is rapidly taking shape in my home State.

Already some 4,000 middle-income families live in this new community, which was originally conceived by Nathan and Lewis Manilow, the developers of the Chicago suburb of Park Forest, and is now in effect a venture in which a private developer, Lewis Manilow, has joined with private industry—the Illinois Central Railroad and the United States Gypsum Co.—and the public—the Department of Housing and Urban Development—to create, over the next 15 to 20 years, a total living environment for 100,000 people from all economic classes.

Park Forest South will have industry. It will have its own commercial, educational, and recreational facilities. It will have a modern mass transportation system. It will be linked with downtown Chicago via an express passenger train service. Development will take place in a planned, coordinated, and orderly manner.

The State of Illinois has shown its faith in the Park Forest South concept by locating one of two new universities, Governors State University, in the heart of the community.

Park Forest South is an exciting new venture in urban development. It stands as an example of what can be accomplished through enlightened public-private cooperation. Its success to date renews our hopes of putting a stop to endless suburban sprawl and at the same time providing decent housing in a decent environment for all our citizens.

I congratulate Jack Bryan, major feature writer of the Journal of Housing, for his fine article about Park Forest South.

I ask unanimous consent that that article and an accompanying article on Governors State University entitled "New Town University Tests New Methods," be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

"MAIN STREET" REVIVED IN MIDWEST NEW TOWN: PARK FOREST SOUTH RISES FROM THE ILLINOIS CORNFIELDS

(By Jack Bryan)

In a 14-square-mile section of gently rolling farmland 40 miles south of downtown Chicago, a new kind of crop is coming up this year. In place of wheat, corn, and alfalfa, the land is sprouting with townhouses, apartments, roads, industrial buildings—and people.

Bulldozers instead of farm tractors are plowing the earth, preparing it for new construction, and in the middle of a vast, otherwise untouched field is a huge, nearly completed, quonset-style structure of fiberglass. This structure—an ice rink—is the initial building in the town center of the new community of Park Forest South.

Although pastoral open spaces still stretch peacefully to the horizon, this broad, semi-wooded area of some 9000 acres is the site where, according to development plans, the modern planned city of Park Forest South, with a population of 100,000 or more, is to be built over the next 15 to 20 years.

Park Forest South is already well along in its initial development stages: 4000 people, all very active and involved in community affairs, occupy new apartments and homes; new industrial plants are in operation; and a brand new university is operating full blast.

Park Forest South—even in its early stages—is a vital, going, and growing town. town.

The town today: Initial development of the town, since groundbreaking late in 1969, has produced the following results:

1—The population has grown from 1000 to 4000; middle-income families of all age groups from the metropolitan area have bought or rented homes as fast as they were built;

2—A unique new state university (see page 289) has launched a revolutionary approach to higher education in urban areas and has just completed its first full year in temporary quarters provided by the developer;

3—A total of 1400 new units of housing, from apartments to single-family houses, have been completed and another 600 units are under construction;

4—In the 1200-acre area planned for industrial development, 250 acres have been bought or optioned by nine firms, three of which have their new plants completed and in operation;

5—A modern $800,000 open-classroom elementary school has been built and has been in operation for one school term;

6—Development and initial construction has begun on the town center and buildings are in construction on the 800-acre site of the campus of the new university;

7—A temporary convenience shopping center has been provided in modernized existing buildings, with grocery store, restaurant, beauty shop, lounge, drug store, and other shops, to augment major shopping facilities 20 minutes away in the town of Park Forest;

8—Most of all, the town has become a living community, with a high degree of citizen participation and activities, both in community affairs and in town government.

A developer's development: Park Forest South has a number of advantages going for it. One of the most important is that it has been conceived and is being carried out by a development firm that has already successfully completed one model suburban community, Park Forest, which lies just north of the present development. This is the firm of the Manilow family—the late Nathan Manilow, leading Chicago builder and developer, and his son, Lewis Manilow, president of New Communities Enterprises, which is developing Park Forest South. Since the death of Nathan Manilow last November, the responsibility for directing the new enterprise rests with the son.

The first of the Manilow ventures into community building was Park Forest. This new town was developed in the late 1940s and early 1950s by Nathan Manilow, in collaboration with Philip M. Klutznick, commissioner of the Public Housing Administration from 1944 to 1946, who returned to Chicago from Washington following his PHA service with the conviction that the government-built Greenbelt town idea was one that private developers could and should carry out. Park Forest resulted and is now a successful community of 33,000 people, with a major regional commercial center, and, most important of all, a model of open space suburban living not only for Chicago but for the nation.

In 1966, as the concept of complete new communities gained greater national attention, Nathan and Lewis Manilow, with their experience with Park Forest behind them, decided to undertake an even more ambitious venture in the undeveloped area immediately to the south of that community. Most of Chicago's earlier growth has been to the north and west, but with new highway systems, the area south of Chicago, as Park Forest demonstrated, was becoming a demand suburban market.

Some 225 houses had been built about 1960 in a section south of Park Forest, but in spite of attempts by three developers, the homes were left without the promised municipal services and commercial facilities and the development went bankrupt. The residents of that development—Wood Hill—more than welcomed the Manilow plan to bring community development into the area and, in 1967, joined with the developers to incorporate the new village of Park Forest South, with a master plan and appropriate zoning and building ordinances to carry out the initial comprehensive plan for the proposed new community. New Community Enterprises was formed, headed by Lewis Manilow, to acquire land and carry out the development.

Two partners join: One of the most important advantages of the development site is its strategic location for transportation to the surrounding area. The Illinois Central Railroad main line to Chicago transects the area. An interstate and other main highway flank the area, linking it to a network of north, east, and west freeways, as well as to the central city. The developers felt this was important to integrate the life and economy of the new town into the rest of the metropolitan area.

Illinois Central itself became interested in the potential of the new town and, in 1968, through its subsidiary, the Mid-American Community Improvement Corporation, became a partner in the enterprise, with a 25 percent interest. This partnership brought two advantages: (1) a new source of development capital and (2) IC's agreement to extend its commuter line service to Park Forest South, bringing the town's residents within 45 minutes express rail time of downtown Chicago.

The following year, one of the nation's largest building materials firms, the United States Gypsum Urban Development Company, also acquired a 25 percent interest, further expanding the source of development capital.

The final clincher to development financing came in 1970 when HUD approved a guarantee of 30 million dollars in capital financing for the new community under the urban growth and new community development legislation (Title VII of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970).

In some respects, Park Forest South is an extension and amplification of the predecessor community, Park Forest. It is predominantly planned as a middle-income town in a growing area of blue-collar and middle-income families and is culturally and economically linked with the surrounding metropolitan area.

In other ways, Park Forest South goes far beyond the earlier Park Forest concept. It will have three times the population and more than three times the acreage. Instead of being planned as an outlying satellite community, Park Forest South is to be developed as a largely self-contained city, with its own industrial, commercial, educational, and recreational base.

Park Forest South will also have a broader income mix in its population, with 12 to 15 percent of its housing planned for low-income families and elderly.

The town plan: Park Forest South is bringing Main Street back to the midwest. A three-mile linear "Main Drag", as it has been named, will be the east-west spine of the development plan, with a jog to the north in the center around the new university campus. The name applies to an elongated downtown, institutional, and civic center strip, with only access ways from the vehicular streets that adjoin it. The "town center", with the major commercial, recreational, and municipal development, is being built on the east leg of "Main Drag", with the university and a medical-health complex in the center. Later, a smaller residential area with a subcenter will be built on the upper west leg of the spine.

The town plan, now taking shape, provides for the major residential development to be concentrated in the southeast and south central section, and the 1200-acre industrial park is being developed in the southwest, between the IC tracks and the parallel Interstate 57. Nearly all the northeast section, reaching through and beyond the center of the area, is woodland, with ravines, open glades, streams, and a small wooded lake; it is to be preserved in its present state, so that the community will retain much of its natural character. In addition, greenways and recreational open space will be threaded throughout the developed sections.

The basic town plan was developed by Arcop Associates of Montreal and Carl Gardner & Associates of Chicago. Instead of dispersed local subcenters radiating from a central core, as is typical of some new community plans, the central linear concept was adopted for two reasons: (1) it will provide a concentrated center for commercial, recreational, and municipal facilities and create an action-oriented focus for community life and activity and (2) it will permit a more efficent basis for internal mass transit and mobility.

The initial phase of the town center now being built on the east leg of "Main Drag" will have 143,000 square feet of commercial space—later to be expanded to 190,000 square feet—in a covered mall. The primary market of this "downtown" will be the community itself, since Park Forest to the north already has a major regional shopping center. Parking areas and an internal transit roadway will flank the buildings. This section will later be expanded to provide an additional 162,000 square feet, principally for offices and municipal services.

The commercial center will be divided in half by a north-south greenway, leading from an entrance building on the south to two cylindrical-roofed fiberglass structures on the north; one, the ice rink already built, and the other for indoor tennis. At the south entrance will be a community exhibit building and information center, which will also house the developer's offices and a planned community cable-TV communication system.

Bordering this center greenway will be an outdoor sculpture gallery, financed in part by a $60,000 grant from the National Endowment for the Arts. Developer Lewis Manilow, also well-known for his art collection, has offered to contribute a monumental construction-type sculpture entitled "Yes," by Mark DiSuvero, for the gallery.

"That is," says Manilow, "if the people like it and want it. I'm going to impose my aesthetic tastes on the community."

Housing and open space: The town plan calls for construction of 35,000 housing units, most of them to be built in the southeastern segment. Seventy percent of the units are to be multi-family—mediumrise and lowrise apartments and condominiums. The other 30 percent will be single-family homes and townhouses.

About 1500 units have been or are being built and the rate of construction is increasing. Those built to date are for the middle-income market, with sales prices ranging from $19,000 for a one-bedroom condominium to more than $40,000 for a three-bedroom house. Rentals in garden and midrise apartments range from $190 to $280 a month for one to three bedrooms.

Under its commitment to HUD, from 12 to 15 percent of the total units—about 4500—will be subsidized housing for low-income families dispersed throughout the residential areas. Mr. Manilow expects to have the low-income housing construction under way before the end of the year.

Some of the new housing is being planned for higher-income levels as well. To date, nearly all of the housing has been built by the corporation for the middle-income market; this year, however, private builders are participating in housing development, bringing a wider variety of styles and design, including more expensive housing in prime locations. One of these is a special add-on section of the development area in the southeast, where an 18-hole golf course is soon to be created.

With a planned density of only a little more than 10 persons per acre, the community will have extensive open space areas. In addition to the greenways and recreational parks are the wooded Pine Lake section near the center of the area and nearly 500 acres in Thorn Creek Woods, which blankets a large part of the northeast section.

Preservation of the Thorn Creek Woods section is to be aided by a 70 percent open-space commitment to the town from HUD. The developer has contributed 140 acres of this land to the town to meet its share.

Thorn Creek Woods, however, goes far beyond the new community development area, extending northwards to join Cook County Forest, one of the nation's farsighted, historic forest preserves in an urban area. Mr. Manilow would like to see the entire woods protected and preserved and plans are underway between the developer, Park Forest to the north, the County of Will, and the state for combined acquisition and protection, with federal assistance both from HUD and the Department of the Interior.

The Thorn Creek Woods question, however, has also become a thorny controversy with some conservationists who criticize the developer for taking fringe sections of the area for community development, despite the fact that the development is designed to conserve the major wooded area. Mr. Manilow feels those critics fail to see the forest for the trees and show scant concern about pressures for destructive commercial development of the woods along the highway to the north.

Town and people: Rapid physical progress in the development of Park Forest South is matched by the formation of the human community, which has simultaneously been taking shape.

To date, it is a community of middle-income people, who have jobs or businesses in the surrounding area. The Park Forest South population is made up of persons of all ages, both black and white. A substantial number of elderly families have moved into the town, which they selected as a pleasant place for their less active years. Most of the residents, however, are middle-age families with children and very young couples. Black residents make up over 10 percent of the population.

The new citizenry is both vocal and active. Its involvement in community affairs and in town government resembles that of an established community; activities include a volunteer fire department, Little League teams with nearly 200 boys taking part, community festivals, welcoming parties, a drama club, a League of Women Voters chapter, a citizen-supported library, and school and recreation groups. The weekly newspaper, *Southwords*, has no trouble filling its pages with local goings-on.

But even more, the citizens are actively concerned in their town government and give readily of their time to carrying on its work. The town government is housed in a Victorian farmhouse on the main road, where parked cars have replaced cows in the barnyard, pending new quarters that are to be built in the town center. Six trustees, elected for staggered terms, serve without compensation as the governing body. Mrs. Joanne Vermilye, a young woman with 10 years professional training and experience in municipal management, administers the town's affairs.

The town's paid staff consists of eight employees—four times the number two years ago. It operates through a dozen or more citizen committees that deal with zoning; planning; streets; housing; services; schools; and similar key matters.

To meet citizen demands for democratic participation, an open discussion session on community matters is held every Saturday for explanations and debate. Monday evening meetings of the trustees are open to citizens—and this often results in some unanticipated items being added to the agenda.

Elections are hard fought, usually coming out with about a 52 to 48 decision and no one, one resident says, can predict which way the vote will go. In last year's annual election, 83 percent of the voters turned out and a similar participation is expected on July 22, when two vacancies for the board of trustees are to be filled. Two "political" groups have taken shape: (1) the "involved citizens", mostly older residents, who thus far have been in control, and (2) the "independents", speaking mostly for newcomers and dissenters. One "involved citizen" leader voiced the hope that one or two "independents" be elected, on the theory that "if they get some responsibility maybe they won't be so critical."

A recent issue that stirred up plenty of argument in the community was a proposal to change the town's name. Many residents feel that the town should have a name that carries its own identity and should not seem to be a "shadow" of another town, as one citizen put it. But getting the people to agree on an alternative name is something else. From more than a hundred alternative suggestions, a sizable group proposed that the new name be "Nathan, Illinois", in tribute to the founder and creator of the new community, the late Nathan Manilow. But at a citizens' meeting in June, this proposal brought considerable disagreement, both from those who thought other names should be considered and from those who felt the name should be expressive of the community, rather than in honor of the developer.

The result was no decision by the trustees, with none likely until after the July 22 election of the new trustees, if then. So it's still Park Forest South—for now.

While the town has plenty of local problems, one that it hasn't had is a race problem. More than 100 black families have bought or rented homes, dispersed through the community; they have encountered no white resistance.

Town and developer: All this community democracy poses problems for the developer. Although the overall plan and zoning were included in the town's incorporation, numerous actions, such as permits; street plans; locations; utilities, must run the gamut of review by the town trustees. Differences between developer and town are common, but thus far have not been serious. They usually have to do with such things as street widths; location of facilities; and services. These matters are worked out through constant consultation between developer, trustees, and the citizen committees. A small group, Mrs. Vermilye says, seems to oppose everything, but most of the people strongly support the new community concept, although they often have their individual views on specific questions.

Lewis Manilow, however, foresees a future day when the townspeople really decide to take over.

"We lived through this in Park Forest," he once said. "They love us now. But we're the only target in town. Sooner or later someone is going to say, 'Come on, let's throw the rascals out.' We will have to risk it. We really don't have much choice."

But the town is not likely to turn on the developer any time soon, since the entire development is being built virtually at his expense, including the basic infrastructure and the public areas and facilities. The developer has financed such improvements as a new school; the conversion of a big barn and farm area into a teenage center; and has improved the existing Pine Lake wooded area as a family recreation center and stocked the lake with fish. Large tracts of land for public and institutional use are being donated. In time the developer hopes that these investments will pay off in the values that the new community creates.

The town, moreover, has little current tax base or bond authority of its own and its principal revenues come from permit and other fees, primarily paid by the developer as the town builds, since most of the property tax revenues at present go to the school district.

The school problem, in fact, is a particularly vexing one. The community is part of the Crete-Monee school district, largest in the state and predominantly rural. The voters of the district are not inclined to approve large bond issues needed for a new city that never before existed.

To get the school system started, New Community Enterprises, under an agreement with the school district, has itself built an elementary school at a cost of $800,000 and is leasing it to the district to operate. More schools are needed, however, including a junior and senior high school, and the town hopes to persuade the state to create a new smaller school district that will be more responsive to the community's needs.

The new elementary school, Hickory School, which opened in January and has just completed its first semester, is an airy, colorful, well lighted one-story structure, designed on the open classroom plan. This plan is something of a reversion to the one-room schoolhouse of old, since related classes are grouped in one vast open room the size of a gymnasium, while teams of teachers rotate between the class areas, giving group and individual instruction.

Churches, except for one existing church, are yet to be built. An interfaith council was established early and has arranged Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish services in the new school building, with communitywide services held on special occasions. The town

library, housed in an attractive former sales office, already has over 10,000 volumes and a program of children's activities.

Industry moves in: One of the most encouraging responses to the new community's future is that of industry. On the southeast lies a vast tract for the Governors Gateway Industrial Park, with excellent rail and highway connections in the midst of a large blue-collar labor market.

Response to the site's advantages has already resulted in an expansion of the land area from its original 800 to 1200 acres, zoned for light and medium industry. Nine firms have bought or optioned land in the park, and three of these have now completed new plants and are in operation, the latest and largest being Wilson Pharmaceutical, a subsidiary of American Can Company. More recently, the firm of Johnson & Johnson bought 75 acres for a 400,000 square foot plant that will employ 300 people in the manufacture of disposable diapers. An additional 80 acres has been optioned for future growth, making Johnson & Johnson the largest of the industrial developers to date.

This industrial development is important not only for employment and tax revenues, but, in the view of Jack Shaffer, president of the development firm's Gateway Industrial Development Company, as a means of attracting professional and experienced citizens to help give the town a high quality of local leadership. To assure that such development will be an asset to the community, A. A. Epstein and Sons of Chicago has been engaged as the developer's engineering consultants on design and planning of industrial and institutional development, such as the university campus, and on pollution control and waste water treatment.

Only about 25 percent of the industrial land will be roofed over; the rest will be landscaped for parking and open space. New Community Enterprises owns its own sewer and water system and is providing tertiary sewage treatment and separate sewerage and storm run-off systems. The industries themselves, Mr. Shaffer says, are equally interested in installing the latest anti-pollution facilities.

What lies ahead: Although Park Forest South is well rooted, much that has started and more that will soon be under way is just taking physical shape. But plans for the coming year call for striking visible changes: (1) plans are near completion for a medical and health center, to include a hospital, paramedical training, and community health services that will be built on a 40-acre site north of the university; (2) the IC express commuter service to downtown Chicago is scheduled to begin this fall; (3) development will start on the 18-hole golf course in an adjoining southeast segment, which will be a residential-recreational area; (4) an internal mass transit system is being developed, with Barton-Aschman Associates, who also have helped plan the "Main Drag", as traffic consultants. The system, probably by bus, will connect all parts of "Main Drag" and the major areas of the community. A resident will be able to park his car in one of the parking areas along "Main Drag", and go to any part of the community, or to Chicago, by rapid transit.

With completion of the entrance building to the town center, a communitywide cable-TV system will be installed, similar to that planned for the town of Jonathan in Minnesota (see JOURNAL No. 3, page 125). Being developed by Cor-Plex International, the system will provide a local TV information-entertainment-education system for residents and town officials.

With the opening of the university campus and the commercial and recreational facilities in the town center and with an increasing rate of homebuilding and rapidly growing population, the physical anatomy of the city-to-be should become dramatically evident within another year.

NEW TOWN UNIVERSITY TESTS NEW METHODS

When the Manilows conceived their plan for Park Forest South, they agreed that one essential for a successful urban community is a strong institutional base. They wanted, in particular, to develop an institution of higher education as part of the town.

Fortuitously, as plans for the new community were being formulated, the state was seeking a site for a new type of university in Illinois. The excellent rail and freeway connections of the proposed community and the readiness of New Community Enterprises to make land available made Park Forest South an ideal location. The state accordingly, in 1969, approved the site for one of two new universities, to be experimental outposts in higher education, based on extensive studies conducted by the Illinois Board of Higher Education; 20 million dollars was approved for the phase one construction of the university campus.

In order to get the new university in operation without delay, New Community Enterprises built a large industrial structure in its industrial park to serve as temporary quarters for the university. Governors State University, as the new institution is named, in tribute to all of the state's governors, has just completed its first full year and expects to move into its new campus, now under construction in the heart of the community, by the fall of 1973.

Governors State University offers courses only at the junior, senior, and graduate level; it is designed to afford advanced education to the large numbers of students who now go to junior colleges. There are, at present, 20 junior colleges, with a total enrollment of more than 50,000 students, within a 30-mile radius of Park Forest South.

Anyone with a junior college degree or its equivalent with a C average can enter. Admission is on a first-come basis, not on a relative grade-level yardstick. Tuition for the full year is now $440 per year for state residents and triple that amount for out-of-staters.

Once in, no one can flunk out of this college. He may not get anywhere, but he can keep trying. There are no grades or set academic requirements. Instead, the students work out "learning modules" with their faculty advisers, based on interdisciplinary studies related to their educational goals. Failures are used for counseling, but are not recorded. Accomplishments, based on the learning goals, determine whether the student gets credit toward his degree. The university is entirely a commuter institution. The excellent transit connections make this possible.

Instead of semesters, the school year consists of six two-month "sessions" and students can attend continuously throughout the year or come in for one or two sessions and return later.

The university is now operating through four college units, each complete in its educational offerings, with a limit of 1500 students in each college. New college units will be opened when this number is exceeded.

The university will not have specialty schools, such as medicine or law, but its four colleges are designated as schools for (1) business and public service; (2) cultural studies; (3) environmental and applied science; and (4) human learning, approximating the conventional areas of commerce, liberal arts, science, and education.

During the first full year, enrollment has been about 700 and will increase in the coming year to 1250. With the opening of the new campus in the fall of 1973, enrollment is estimated at 3000. In another five years, it is expected to level off between 10,000 and 13,000 students.

The university is specifically mandated to provide advanced education for those of lower income. Twenty-five percent of its initial enrollment is black. As evidence of the deferred backlog of demand for higher education, the average age of the students is 28 and two-thirds of them are married. This level is expected to decline in the future.

All of the faculty, now numbering about 80, are "professors"—there are no academic rank distinctions, although 70 percent of them currently have Ph.D. degrees. All faculty, moreover, including the president, William E. Engbretson, are required to do some teaching, to keep them responsive to the students they are supposed to be educating.

The university has been launched for a five-year experimental period, after which the results will be reviewed and modifications made as experience dictates.

One aspect of this new educational approach offers prospect of dividends for the urban community beyond that of most such institutions. Except for those who have already had substantial outside work experience, all students, as part of their learning programs, will be expected to spend a certain amount of time off-campus in applied outside activity, which may be outside jobs or may be activity in connection with their home communities in helping to meet the needs of the people in an urban society; the faculty is also expected to contribute to the urban community it serves. The new town of Park Forest South is thus intended to be not only a place to live—but also a place to learn.

TRIBUTE TO SENATOR ALLEN J. ELLENDER

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, in the death of Senator Allen J. Ellender the Senate has lost its senior member in age and in length of service and experience. The depth of that loss is immeasurable.

A fine American is gone. A good and genial friend is with us no more. A hard-working, skilled, and dedicated colleague has left us, and we now have only the memory of his warm and generous nature, and the legacy of his vast accomplishments for his State and his Nation.

We can be thankful that his health and his stamina and his energy held up through his almost 82 years of life, and that he was ill for only a few hours before his death. He died in the middle of a good fight—and I know he would be proud of the fact that he fought to the very end.

Senator Ellender came to Washington when the New Deal was at its height, and he saw and participated in the economic and social reforms which turned America's feet down a new path. He leaves us now in a new time of great turmoil and change. What a rich experience he has had—the span of his political life has coincided with a span of great developments in his Nation's life.

Probably he will be most widely remembered for his impact on American agriculture. As chairman of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry for 18 years, and as a ranking and influential member for many more, he has left his mark on almost every major piece of legislation in this field since the thirties. Rural electrification, agriculture price supports, soil conservation, water resource development—he contributed to

all of them. He was the originator of the school lunch program, which has nourished a whole generation of schoolchildren—an innovative idea which was resisted by some when it was first proposed.

His most recent legislative accomplishment was as chairman of the powerful Senate Committee on Appropriations, where he speeded up its unwieldy machinery to bring to passage in the Senate all but three of the 13 appropriation bills by the middle of July—a record in recent years.

A man who had to see what was happening in the world for himself, he went to every corner of the globe, asking questions, probing into the management of our foreign aid, and the implementation of our foreign policy, and brought back extensive film and commentary for us all to see.

We shall miss him, our wise, gifted, tough-minded, and resolute colleague from Louisiana. My sympathy goes to his son and his seven grandchildren. They can be very proud of him—a strong man who has passed from the American scene.

EIGHTY-MEMBER DELAWARE BAND MAKES CONCERT TOUR OF EUROPE

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, recently a group of young men and women from my home State of Delaware returned from a 3-week concert tour of Europe, where their achievements and performance would serve as a worthy example to young musicians in Delaware and elsewhere.

The 80-member band, with members ranging in age from 11 to 18, left the United States in late June for a seven-country tour that included Greece, Yugoslavia, France, and the Soviet Union. Wherever they went, the members were treated graciously and cordially. In Athens, Istanbul, and Paris, they were greeted personally by the mayors, while in Paris, a component of the symphony, the 18-member jazz band, competed in the International Jazz Festival against two college bands and won "le Grand Prix" as well as three of the five individual awards. Victory was sweetened by an unprecedented invitation for the jazz band to perform at one of the four Paris squares set aside for the midnight celebration of Bastille Day; it was the first time such an honor had been extended to a foreign band.

Delawareans are justifiably proud of the accomplishments of these young men and women. I ask unanimous consent that a recent newspaper article describing their trip be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TOURING MUSICIANS RECALL THEIR STRAINS

(By Lloyd Teitsworth)

Victory in Paris was the big thing!

It will long be remembered by the 80 young musicians comprising the American Youth Junior Symphony and Studio Band, mostly from the Wilmington area, who went on the Black Sea Tour.

But also long remembered will be the little things—the waiting for planes and buses, the strange-sounding food, the friendliness of strangers in foreign lands, the inevitably lost or misplaced items.

The student musicians visited seven countries, including three under Communist rule. Concerts were presented in Athens, Istanbul, Paris and aboard the M.V. Romanza, the cruise ship of Greek registry that was their home for two weeks through July 15.

The final week they stayed in Paris, the scene of the Eiffel Tower Jazz Festival and of a resounding victory for the Studio Band under the direction of Hal Schiff, supervisor of music for the Alfred I. du Pont School District.

Ranging in age from 11 to 18, the youngsters roamed each port with confidence and consuming curiosity. The complexities of customs, money exchange and a new language every morning failed to dampen their spirit.

The Metro Subway System in Paris, unnerving to most visitors, was duck soup to these Americans. In two days they were using it like it was Concord Pike.

An international program, put together by Miss Audrey Murphy, and played by the Junior Symphonic group, paid tribute to the host nations in their own musical language. Featured piano soloist, Jim Trueblood of Hockessin, was warmly applauded after his shipboard presentation of Beethoven's "Seven Variations on God Save the King"—moving a group of English ladies to tears. The Marseillaise and the Greek National Anthem were played in their respective countries.

The Studio (or Jazz) Band's final performance as part of the tour was a competition sponsored by Performing Arts Abroad (an American organization) and the Selmer Corporation, a French manufacturer of musical instruments. The judges awarded the Grand Prix to the local group along with prizes for individual performance to Steve Koontz, trombone; Don Schiff, bass; and Bruce McCoy, flugelhorn.

In an unprecedented move, the American Youth Studio Band was asked to play at one of the four squares in Paris set aside to kick off the midnight celebration of Bastille Day. No other foreign band has ever enjoyed such an honor. The music was a little foreign at first to the French revellers, but as soon as the students started the "oldie," "In The Mood," the link was completed. Everyone joined in the fun.

When 80 youngsters, many away from home for the first time, are exposed to drastically different ways of life, the most memorable of situations can arise.

In spite of the travel brochures, the initial discomfort involves endless waiting at bus, air and rail depots. The AYSC group waited seven hours in Friendship Airport for the initial trans-Atlantic flight to begin. That was the first of a dozen major hold-ups.

Local laws and formalities affected some, notably Schiff, who strayed from his guide in Russia, and was instantly nabbed by the police who spoke no English. Frantic waving of his one-day visa got through to the authorities, and Schiff was shepherded back to the group. Hal's Russian vocabulary consists of "da" and "nyet", but he is not sure which means what.

Budgeting spending money in countries where exotic wares are offered in an unending array of shops becomes a problem. The $100 U.S. Customs allowance loomed very large in the minds of a few during the final hours of the trip. One student who had overspent his $100 limit was so broke at the end of the tour that he had to have his family meet him at Customs in Baltimore to pay his excess duty charge.

Baggage transfer was frequently frightening. A bag or trombone case set outside the hotel room door was spirited away to appear at the last moment beside the train or ship—the intervening hours being ones of some trepidation. Only one suitcase—that of Steve Sashihara of Surrey Park, a trumpeter with the symphonic group, was lost, and at last report was still missing.

A brand new baritone sax, just purchased during the Paris stay, was left forlornly on the field at Le Bourget Airport, due to lack of space on the airplane. Jim Andersen, owner of the instrument, was assured that it would show up somewhere on the East Coast in the near future.

Local travel, particularly along the canals in Venice, was confusing. A wrong choice of waterbus wiped out Jim Trueblood's tour of St. Mark's Square. He joined the group later, unabashed. He had his own personal tour of the Grand Canal.

In spite of many warnings to hang on to the passport for dear life, one student lost his in Paris. It wasn't brought to light until the last day, which was Bastille Day. The American Embassy was contacted and stood ready to process a new passport, but the worst part was finding a place to get instant passport photos. The job was miraculously accomplished and Bob Bunnell of Oak Lane Manor the student, Schiff and Glen Sanner, a chaperone, showed up at the airport about 10 minutes before the flight left for home.

GOV. GEORGE WALLACE OF ALABAMA

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, recently Dr. Raymond Coward of Arlington, Tex., wrote a fine editorial for the Fort Worth Star-Telegram regarding Governor Wallace, of Alabama. I think his letter makes a great deal of sense. Accordingly, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Fort Worth (Tex.) Star-Telegram, May 24, 1972]

WALLACE HAS LEVERAGE

(By Dr. Ray Coward)

George C. Wallace is probably the most underrated man on the national political scene today. He came from humble surroundings and as a boy he worked on a farm in Alabama. Through self-discipline, hard work and perseverance he graduated from the University of Alabama Law School and became a lawyer and then a judge. Later, as state senator, he sponsored legislation setting up trade schools in the state to train the uneducated and underprivileged in order that they might develop skills and obtain employment.

Here is a man of great dedication to the things in which he believes; he is a religious person; a teetotaler (when he became governor he ordered that no alcoholic beverages be served at the Mansion for any state functions); a man of self-discipline, who works hard, has an abundance of energy, and one who is a tireless campaigner. He loves people; communicates with them well; and they sense it and respond in kind. They look upon him as a man of principle.

If his health permits, he probably will go to the Democratic National Convention, possibly in a wheel chair, with a large bloc of delegates pledged to him, including 75 of the 81 delegates from Florida, and from other states. While lying in the hospital, the returns from the primaries in both Michigan and Maryland rewarded the governor with sizable victories over his opponents.

If not nominated for President, he may well be sought after by the nominee as a running mate for the vice presidency. The governor will certainly have a strong voice in writing the party platform and in the other proceedings at the convention. As a practical matter, no Democratic nominee for President has any substantial chance to win

in 1972 without the support of Governor Wallace.

It is evident that there exists in our society elements composed of anarchists, radicals and just plain thugs who would destroy our nation from within if allowed to do so. Freedom of speech, one of our most cherished rights, is protected by the First Amendment to our Constitution. It permits dissent, but not through violent or illegal means.

Even those who disagree with Governor Wallace's views should defend his right to freedom of expression. He speaks for millions of Americans. The strength of our democracy lies in the freedom of expression. Those who would silence another because they do not agree with him endanger their own freedom. We should be aware that where freedom ends, tyranny begins.

THE MOST EVIL FORCE OF ALL—IGNORANCE

Mr. BROCK. Mr. President, the Nashville Banner for July 22, 1972, contains an article, written by Grady Gallant, which points out that those who attempt to halt technological development are asking for enslavement by the most evil force of all—ignorance.

It is incumbent upon all of us to further technology rather than to fear it.

I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

"COME HOME, AMERICA"—WAR AGAINST TECHNOLOGY

(By Grady Gallant)

Dr. Edward Teller, the famed atomic scientist, has expressed the view that the United States is losing its preeminence in industry and is rapidly losing its strength to defend the free world because of the idea today that technology is somehow "evil," plus the lack of interest in many young persons in "progress."

The danger of the idea that the United States can somehow close out a world linked by instantaneous communication and high-speed transportation should be as self evident as the pressing need for rapid progress in technology should be.

This is not the world of 32 years ago, when Americans generally believed that they could decide whether Hitler or Tojo were worthy of consideration or not.

That attitude was shattered on Dec. 7, 1941 at Pearl Harbor. Since then, much has happened: The Atomic Age began, the space Age began, Computer Technology began, and the industrialization of the Orient began in earnest.

Yet, along comes Sen. George McGovern, a candidate for the Presidency on the Democratic ticket, who expresses the traditional midwest isolationism as a bright, new policy which will swaddle America from the ills of the world and bring "peace in our time," as the unfortunate Neville Chamberlain put it.

The "Come Home, America" slogan is typical midwestern, for they never wanted to leave.

McGovern speaks of drastic cuts in the military, rapidly withdrawing troops homeward without consideration of international consequences, and an economically destructive welfare plan which even he does not understand and will not allow some of his advisors to explain to him.

A nation cannot cut military resources on and off like a water tap. It requires years to build a submarine, for example. Modern weapons systems require deeply complex scientific research, tedious planning, extensive military training over many years.

Landing techniques used by the Marines to defeat the Japanese were conceived and tested in the 1930's—and when war came they were, even then, vastly improved in the following months.

Compared to modern weapons, the weapons of those days were as simple as bows and arrows.

Poverty is not eliminated by subsidizing it. It will not go away by providing everyone with minimal subsistence. Poverty is eliminated by training people for useful work by which they can earn a living wage. In this way, the economy is improved, rather than diminished by increasing taxation which reduces the general standard of living.

Schemes which rest on a foundation of heavy taxation impoverish the population—they do not make the economy healthy or expand it. Such schemes enslave the people in a snare of restrictions; they rob the wage earner before he sees his money. He is pre-robbed and kept in reduced circumstances, because he finds it impossible to earn enough to make his life better, happier or more productive of the finer things.

In addition, the poor are robbed, also. They are "kept people" and chained to semi-starvation, without incentive, without hope.

The person who fears expanding knowledge because such knowledge may be dangerous is of the same mentality as those who opposed teaching reading and writing to the masses.

Knowledge cannot increase too fast. There cannot be too much of it. Those who fear it, because new knowledge may undermine their power, require them to change their beliefs, or even to learn something new.

Those who attempt to halt technological development in a world of technology are asking for enslavement—whether it be by a foreign power, or by the most evil force of all—ignorance.

THE INVISIBLE MINORITY—ADDRESS BY SENATOR MONTOYA

Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. President, the following remarks on the "Invisible Minority: The Spanish-Speaking People in the United States," were directed by the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. MONTOYA) to representatives of the American GI Forum who held their annual convention in Washington from July 26 through July 29.

The 40,000 veterans and their families who make up the American G.I. Forum are dedicated to the proposition that justice and equitable participation in America can be gained by the Spanish speaking through peaceful action and lawful procedures.

I think that Senator MONTOYA's comments are noteworthy in that they encourage the diverse Spanish-speak-groups to unite and make use of their potential political power to make a hitherto unresponsive Government heedful of their needs.

I ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE INVISIBLE MINORITY

Of the scores of invitations I have received thus far this year to speak to auspicious gatherings such as yours today, I particularly enjoyed receiving this one. And further, I was delighted that I could accept it because YOU, sitting out there, are members of a great organization, the American G.I. Forum.

You are no "Johnnies-come-lately" to the civil rights scene. For almost a quarter of a century, through your words, through your actions, through your growth into an active, vital national organization of some 40,000 concerned individuals, you have opened the doors, the ears, and the consciences of many in the majority as to what is going on in the Spanish-speaking minority.

"Minority . . . minority" . . . an interesting word. What comes into focus when you see or hear "minority?" Think for a minute. I'll tell you what I see, and I see it now as I look out at you in front of me. I see the strength of your faces reflecting your heritage and the pride we have in it. What is so manifest to me, however, is not evident to the majority of this nation's citizens nor to our federal government.

We are the "invisible minority." While the black man has made the crying needs of his Ghetto children part of the nation's known history and collective conscious, we remain unseen. When the word "minority" is mentioned, the public mind sees black. And why not? Among minority groups are they not the largest? The front runners in the civil rights crusade? . . . The first to reap the fruits from seeds of minority unity planted across the country? But what dictionary defines "minority" as "black?"

All minorities have attended the same school on uncivil rights; sat through the same classes in unfair housing, unequal employment, and unfulfilled citizenship. But apparently some students have graduated from this school of real life faster than others. The diploma goes not to those with apathy, but those with determination—determination to prepare themselves to qualify; determination to prepare others to recognize them as people, not stereotypes; determination to go to the head of the class and join the American mainstream of opportunity and equality.

This the black have learned. But, how about us, the members of the second largest minority? Have we learned our lesson? Or, are we standing in apathy and paying the price of apathy—invisibility. We are invisible in middle and upper level GS positions, invisible in the officers' corps, invisible in the councils that make decisions on national priorities.

We are hidden. While a dozen agencies on the other side of Pennsylvania Avenue congratulate themselves on black gains, we are lumped statistically with half a dozen other minority groups. We are the "also rans."

Why are we the "also rans," when the Spanish surnamed comprise almost 7% of the population? Are we, like our national advertiser, only "second best?" I doubt it. But, unlike that same advertiser, I also doubt that we can say that "We try harder."

Our efforts are fragmented. Today a hundred, tomorrow a thousand interest groups. One becomes dizzy from trying to sort out the "Association of" from the "National Coalition of" and the "Council of."

And so in fragmented disorder we remain impotent; given hand-me-down programs; counted but not taken into account; seen with hindsight but not insight; asked but not listened to; a single brown face in a sea of black and white.

Look at the Department of Labor Manpower Programs. These programs were designed and are administered by Anglos and

blacks for the people they understand, Anglos and blacks. Twelve weeks of training and a hardhat will not make a skilled worker if he never understood what the instructor was saying. Our people need training, but we also need the tools of language and cultural preparation to succeed in an Anglo environment.

What chance do we have when many manpower training programs require an eighth grade education, when 20% of us have not completed the fifth grade? What chance does the monolingual Spanish speaker have when administrators choose trainees whose success is assured so that the record will look good?

And the record does not look good. A Labor report on Spanish participation in manpower training program was so embarrassing that the Department waited ten months to make it public. And to compound the insult, statistical data on the Spanish speaking was lumped in with the Anglos.

Yes, statistically, too, we are the invisible, undercounted minority. The 1970 Census upon which so many political and funding decisions will be made in the next decade grossly slighted us. Pressed to conduct a resurvey of the Chicano population in Santa Clara County, California, the Bureau of the Census found that a 16% error had been made. Will a new census be taken and will it be made available to government agencies? Or will it be slid under the rug and ignored while thousands of undercounted Spanish-speakers receive less than is their due in government programs.

We have been studied too much. We want action, not words and further delay. What we need are people in federal agencies who know what is in our minds, who know what it feels like to misunderstand the teacher, who know that chile has protein, who know what our family ties mean to us. And we cannot have that as long as minority programs are run by Anglos and Blacks.

Is it any wonder that almost 22% of the Health Service and Mental Health Administration employees are black and only 1.5% are Spanish surnamed when 24 of the 28 professionals in the Minority Employment Office are black and 1 is Mexican American?

Is it any wonder that there are 70 black cadets at the Coast Guard Academy while only six are Spanish surnamed?

Is it any wonder that the Coast Guard has or will have so few of our sons as officers when you consider that they had no Chicano recruiters for such programs, nor, from 1970–1972, did their other minority recruiters visit any of the colleges serving the Spanish speaking population? I doubt that we are equally as underrepresented among the seamen recruits.

And what assistance can we expect from the Office of Minority Business Enterprise when 131 of its staff is black and only 24 are Spanish surnamed?

Who is going to identify our needs if we are invisible within the government? Who is our ombudsman? Those who find themselves in minority program offices have no chance. They are outnumbered.

So what do we do? How do we gain visibility? To end these wrongs we must call for parity in federal employment and programs. Parity in Washington, parity at the regional level and parity in training. And most importantly, parity reflecting our needs. If a man must have language classes to compete for jobs with blacks and Anglos, those classes are part of the parity concept and must be had despite the added costs.

Agencies with programs affecting minority groups must set up separate centers to deal with the special and differing problems of the black and the Spanish-speaking. It is impossible to expect a single minority center to effectively serve two masters. Both minorities have legitimate needs. But as long as we are housed together, our story will be one of competition. While we have our sameness, we also have our differences. In terms of visibility, and in terms of numbers, we will lose when paired as the Odd Couple.

Our fragmentation is reflected by the fragmentation of federal programs for the Spanish speaking. Hand in hand with the need to set up specific centers for the Spanish speaking, is the need for this government to establish a national policy and plan of action related to our needs and problems.

So that the nation, the media and the government may hear our demands, we must shout as one. Let us not be divided by our special interests, let us not be divided by our egos, let us not be divided by the Administration. We are not fooled by the appointment of a few big names to semi-high posts. Let us compare the accomplishments of the Cabinet Committee with the promises at its inception.

Last fall we came together for the first time to speak with one voice. It was not easy. We learned that one shout did not make us visible. The national press did not raise its head. Even here in Washington, note was taken of the sensational while none was taken of the real work which was done.

Our diversity and our egos threatened to shatter our efforts at the Coalition Conference. We said "unite" and then looked around. We espoused unity and then walked out separate doors. We were different. We had come from all over the Hemisphere. We had been shaped by diverse environments and the non-Spanish-speaking people with whom we had rubbed shoulders.

And yet, we are all we have got. Let us recognize and cherish our diversity. But let us unite. For there is more in our common heritage that unites us and much more in our present situation which demands that we unite or fail and fade from sight.

I look at you, representatives of the 40,000 members of the American G.I. Forum, and see men and women from all walks of life, from all sections of the country, and I see that we can work together using non-violent and lawful methods. Let us look to you as an example.

Let us, too, look to Cesar Chavez. Here is a man whose nobility in the face of provocation has enobled us all. Here is a man and a movement who have shown that success can be gained through non-violent action.

Peaceful pressure and quiet lobbying bore fruit at the Democratic National Convention, as millions of Americans were made aware of the lettuce boycott. If an eastern state, far from the centers of Chicano population can declare itself in favor of the boycott, can we not make the whole nation aware of our needs?

"Visibility" need not be won by violence. "United We Stand, United in Violence We Fall." Let us not allow our youth to die in the streets. Let us not sow suspicion and fear among our fellow citizens. Those who are violent cast an ugly shadow upon those who struggle peacefully. We must take the initiative now, before discontent and frustrated aspirations erupt. Let us unite now in peaceful, constructive efforts.

We have a responsibility to work within the democratic process to encourage our youth toward accepting greater responsibility in citizenship and preparing themselves for the future. Check your school curriculum, check the teachers' performance, check whether your children are learning and demonstrating responsiveness to the challenges they face, check whether they are being encouraged properly by their home environment.

Constructive efforts go beyond our role in schools—look also to the political process. Meaningful political participation must be based upon the desire to acknowledge equality and be ready to reciprocate in kind.

Militancy for the sake of exhibitionism is not the ingredient of progress, but rather its enemy. Appeal to reason and constructive persuasion are the means of igniting understanding within America's conscience and are the only avenues that will enable us to reach our desired goals.

Had I suggested two years ago that the tools for peacefully attaining visibility and action were at hand, you would have scoffed. But there is a new light and a new maturity in this country and within ourselves which will enable us to seize the openness" of today and use it to our advantage.

"We can be the politicians." Today's politicians need not be remote, two-dimensional images. They can be you and me working in our precincts, participating in party caucuses and deciding who shall represent us. We saw it several weeks ago in Miami. If you were not there, it is because you failed to stand up to the challenge.

And we can vote. Not as if we were robots programmed to vote for one party or the other, not by pushing the lever and letting the party do the thinking for us, but by choosing and asking one basic question. "What has this man done for me, for my family, my neighbors and my people?" Did he do what he pledged, or did he court me at the polls and then slam the door in my face on the day of his inauguration. If he did, withold your vote.

We have the power to swing the presidential election in four states: California, Texas, Illinois and New Mexico. You the members of the American G.I. Forum, together with LULAC and the Mexican American Bar Association have shown us that we can control the destiny of 101 electoral votes. As black turnout at the polls have increased since 1960, Spanish-surnamed turnout decreased. Let us reverse this tragic trend. Your vote and our collective votes are power.

And so we ask, "How can I tell if this guy or this issue is helping me or my people? I don't have the time to read the Congressional Record." And that is where you, the members of the American G.I. Forum who collaborated so well with LULAC can provide a service to all Spanish speakers. Create a political arm of your organization, coordinate your efforts with LULAC and other groups, hire some Chicano experts to objectively rate the candidates and issues pro and con in light of our needs. Publish that information, let it out to your members.

Monitor the political process and speak in one voice to your administration, to your congressman. Tell me, tell the nation what you think. Send me one letter representing the interests of 40,000 people and I will hold that letter up high in Congress and say, "This is what my people think, I support them."

Let us turn to our courts. They are no longer the refuge of the elite. When federal programs do not respond to your needs, when those in power maim and misuse federal laws, band together. File a class action suit. The voice of one may be drowned, the voice of many united in legal action will get results. It is being done now. Utilize the legal aid societies in your locality.

Turn again to our courts when your schools are unresponsive. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not just apply to racial minorities. It is just as much a violation of the law to deny equal opportunity to a child because of his language or heritage as it is to segregate him by race. If your school does not have bilingual-bicultural education, if your child is placed in a class for the mentally retarded because a test is biased against his culture, if you are not being informed in

Spanish of what is going on in the school, you can take your school to court.

Remember, too, that money is power. That some businessman is waiting for that dollar in your pocket, he is depending on it. If you are unfairly treated, if the employees do not reflect the ethnic composition of the local population, you can deny him your dollar. If you tell your friend, he will be denied two dollars.

We Spanish-speaking members of Congress cannot be our watchdog alone. We, you and I and all of our 15 million brothers must unite in common cause. Only then will we attain "visibility" and action. Let us bid "Adios" to the "invisible minority."

Thank you.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CHINESE AMERICAN CITIZENS ALLIANCE AND THE INAUGURATION OF ITS WASHINGTON LODGE

Mr. FONG. Mr. President, the Chinese American Citizens Alliance—CACA— is an outstanding organization of U.S. born and naturalized American citizens of Chinese descent. For over 70 years it has rendered valuable service as a civic organization for the well-being and advancement of Chinese Americans. Nonpartisan in its policy and outlook, the CACA has made the promotion of better citizenship among Chinese Americans as one of its important activities. It has an exemplary record of community projects in the field of education, welfare, housing, and civic improvements.

On July 8, 1972, the CACA held a national planning conference in Washington, D.C. Over 200 Chinese American leaders participated in discussions of such questions as the importance of community involvement, social problems of Chinatowns, immigration and naturalization laws, and sources of economic development. Under the able direction of Grand President Albert Gee, of Houston; Past President Wilbur K. Woo, of Los Angeles; and Judge Harry W. Low, of San Francisco; the conference had free exchange of views and reached fruitful conclusions on many of the problems.

On the succeeding day, a banquet was held at the Statler Hilton Hotel to inaugurate the Washington lodge, whose first president is a member of my staff, T. L. Tsui. Over 300 members and friends, including many officials of the Government, attended the dinner. President Nixon and Vice President AGNEW sent messages of greetings. Several Senators and Congressmen were either present or sent messages. Mrs. Anna Chennault, vice president of the Flying Tiger Line, Inc., and cochairwoman of the National Republic Heritage Groups Council, delivered an inspiring address.

I am pleased to note the accomplishments of the CACA during its 70-year history, and I am delighted that the CACA has extended its activities to Washington by opening a new lodge here. I wish to take this occasion to extend my hearty congratulations to the officers of the grand lodge and of the Washington lodge and to wish them every success.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a list of the officers of the grand lodge and Washington lodge of the CACA and the complete text of Mrs. Anna Chennault's address.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GRAND LODGE, GRAND OFFICERS 1971–73

Grand President, Albert Gee.
Grand Vice President, Nowland C. Hong.
Grand Secretary, Harold Y. G. Fong.
Grand Assistant Secretary, Henry W. Fong.
Grand Treasurer, George H. Louie.
Grand Auditor, Lenard Louie.
Grand Auditor, Harvey Wong.
Grand Marshal, Howard H. Wong.
Grand Sentinel, Tom O. Wong.

GRAND EXECUTIVE

Thomas A. Wong, Samuel E. Yee, Frank Chin, Paul J. K. Hu, Park M. Louie, Hellmann Yee, George Leong Suey, Harry W. Low, William R. Choye, and William Jack Chow.

PAST GRAND PRESIDENTS

S. K. Lai, Y. C. Hong, Francis H. Louie, George Chew, and Wilbur K. Woo.

GRAND REPRESENTATIVES

Fred Huie, San Francisco Lodge.
George W. Tom, Los Angeles Lodge.
Bruce Quan, Oakland Lodge.
Edward G. Tom, Chicago Lodge.
Norman Locke, Portland Lodge.
York Gin, Salinas Lodge.
Johnnie Gor, Houston Lodge.
Sing Gun Ng, San Antonio Lodge.
Li Lee Louie, Albuquerque Lodge.
John Lee, New York Lodge.
Henry C. Wu, Sunnyvale Lodge.
Harry P. Lee, Washington, D.C. Lodge.

WASHINGTON, D.C. LODGE 1972 OFFICERS

Tawen Ling Tsui, President.
King S. Der, Vice President.
Jan Wah, Secretary.
Chung Ming Wong, Assistant Secretary.
Raymond D. E. Lee, Treasurer.
George G. Lee, Financial Secretary.
Kwong Ming Eng, Auditor.
George Cheung, Auditor.
Franklin D. Fong, Marshall.
Victor Wong, Sentinel.
Tai Leong Huie, Collector.
Harry P. Lee, Grand Representative.
Bill Yee, Advisor.

ASSOCIATES

Art Ping Lee, K. L. Lee, Walter Woo, Raymond Lee, G. N. Lee, D. P. Moy, K. M. Wu, William Lee, William C. Lee, and Hamilton H. Moy.

THE END IS THE BEGINNING

(Address by Mrs. Anna Chennault)

We meet this week in the Nation's Capital at a time for both triumphant recollection and re-dedication for the Chinese-American Citizens Alliance. It is fitting that our Convention be held in Washington, D.C., because this has been the site where many of the hopes and aspirations of other American minorities have realized dreams through the act of Congressional legislation and high level assistance. However, the Chinese-American's dreams and hopes seem far away from the horizon. It has been a lonely journey for all of us and I am sure each one of us who come from different parts of the United States share the frustrations and disappointments. Therefore, we particularly want to pay tribute to the unsung men and women who diligently and positively overcome the prejudice and problems placed before them with dignity, compassion, dedication and hard work. However, at the same time as Chinese-Americans, we must now seek to involve responsible people to build upon the solid base of membership and leadership to meet the ever-changing social environment we live in today. We salute and applaud our dedicated Chinese-Americans.

Every Chinese-American organization needs change, but more importantly than ever before, we need unity. For we are the minority of the minorities—and we can't afford the luxury of division.

In the 70's we are no longer content to sit back and let others arrange our affairs. The news media in America directs its image with white and black, or black and white and assumes that everyone will accept this image without challenge. But this is unacceptable, it is out-dated. To accept this without challenge is to accept defeat. It would be unfair to this great land of opportunity and certainly unfair to the thousands of American-Chinese who call this land their home.

The modern Chinese-American certainly will not be satisfied serving chop suey and egg rolls in restaurants and they are tired of taking care of other people's laundry. Today, the Chinese-Americans wants social justice not social charity. They want equal opportunity not second class citizenship. They have been patient, industrious and law-abiding. They have fought and died for their country in four wars. They have earned their right to first-class citizenship. And yet, in many cases are not considered a first-class citizen. Furthermore the Chinese-American wants better opportunities to serve his country. These talented people with their rich culture could increase their contributions once their ability is recognized and channels are provided.

The old system must end—and a new era be born. In the past, we had suffered from lack of direction, collective leadership. Perhaps it is time for us to review and update our commitment.

Where do we begin? The way to begin is through the political, economical, social and moral avenues. We must not be afraid to be involved. Yesterday is already too late.

Certainly, the events of the past year and the most recent chapter in tihs Asian drama are conclusive proof that Asia's rapid transformation and its pace of change is greater and faster than in any other part of the world. For this reason, and this reason alone, we as Chinese-Americans can do much to bring about some workable solutions between the two worlds—the West and the East. What a waste that many knowledgeable, highly educated and well-trained Asian-Americans have not been approached to deal with our many problems in Asia.

We are disappointed in both the Democratic and Republican Parties. They have totally ignored the Chinese-American's contributions and achievements. Not one Chinese-American has been given any appointment of significance in this Administration. The so-called experts dealing with Asian Affairs in all government departments have been white or black. It has been a real disappointment to the Chinese-Americans and certainly a great loss to this nation for the Federal Government having failed to utilize these great assets in top-level, policy setting and decision-making positions. Some have recommended that there be established in the Executive Office of the President, a Cabinet-level Office of Asian-American Affairs, to deal with the problems experienced by the Orientals in this country.

We must encourage more competent Chinese-Americans to enter government and policies on every level. We must agree that successful involvement is not through violence or protest to satisfy the minority few, but by positive action which benefit the majority many.

This evening we gather here to exchange

information and to talk about our common interests. Let us not be too critical of some of our failures or our disappointments and at the same time, not be overconfident of our accomplishments and our successes. We expect and encourage new direction and welcome new members with new ideas and we certainly shall not run away from new responsibilities.

We have moved a long way—and we have a long way to go. However, I believe with energetic maturity and more political wisdom we can make this new beginning and exciting challenge. Let us combine our strength and our efforts to build a new era.

We are proud to be Americans and we want to make certain that America is proud of us.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA POLICEMAN AND FIREMAN'S PAY BILL

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I wish to express my support for H.R. 15580, a bill which provides for a pay increase for two groups of indispensible public servants in the Nation's Capital—policemen and firemen.

Adequate compensation for the services these public servants render to our Capital City cannot be measured in salary alone. For, these are the employees who constantly jeopardize their personal safety and well being to combat lawlessness, to protect against the ravages of fire, and to rescue citizens during emergencies. But it is fitting that provisions of this bill, increase the starting salary for policemen and firemen to $10,000 per year. For, this is a tangible way to compensate these men and women for their services on a level that indicates how highly we value their usefulness as vital members of the public service corps of our Capital City.

I am pleased to see that the Committee on the District of Columbia has taken the bold initiative to prepare this legislation for action by the Senate. Under the direction of the distinguished chairman, the committee deserves full praise for its efforts to help resolve the problem of adequately compensating some of the most critical employees in our Capital City community.

It is my hope that this legislation will not only guarantee adequacy in pay for the guardians of safety in the Nation's capital—but, I look forward to this measure as an expression of the commitment to properly compensate all of Washington's essential public employees. Specifically, I would hope that by guaranteeing $10,000 annual starting salary to a freshman policeman—we can produce parity in the salaries offered to the teachers of the public schools in this city.

If the salary schedule for policemen and firemen approved by this Congress is any measure of their worth to the community, then I believe that this is a precedent that must lead to adequacy in pay for teachers, who also contribute a tremendously valuable service to our capital cities.

An adequate education is the surest guarantee that we will have a strong and safe community.

If we must pay $10,000 to attract and retain top quality firefighters and crime-stoppers—then surely we must pay at least that much to attract and retain top quality educators for the children in our schools.

Critics of conditions in Washington, D.C., continually emphasize that law and order will swiftly cure the decay and disorder that those same critics have helped to sustain.

Yet, it is inescapable that $10,000 for a rookie policeman reflects the misdirected concerns of those who have forced the starting teachers' salary to remain at only $7,800 per year.

Mr. President, I want Washington's policemen and firemen to receive the full measure of the salaries authorized in H.R. 15580. I believe these employees fully deserve that salary. But I am equally concerned about the need to properly compensate the enormously essential cadre of public school teachers in a manner that reflects our understanding of their community contribution.

I do not believe it is just or equitable to maintain a grossly disparate gap of $2,200 in the salaries for these valuable public employees.

For that reason I am pleased to take this opportunity to call upon Congress to take immediate steps to bring the teachers' salary at least in line with that paid to policemen and firemen.

IMPACT OF CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES ACT

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, during the last several years, we have heard praise for the "new politics" and many disparaging words for the "old politics." One of the occasions when these catch phrases drew attention was during the consideration of the Campaign Expenditures Act. It was constantly implied that those who opposed the bill's provisions and who attempted to amend them were somehow connected with the old order and wanted to hide their campaign activities from the people or had plenty of money for campaigning.

This week I received a letter from the owner of a small Wyoming radio station which reveals the impact, and I believe a somewhat unexpected impact which this act is having. Mr. Grover D. Allen of KYCN radio in Wheatland, Wyo., wrote to all political candidates informing them that he will provide each candidate with a specific amount of free time on his radio station. He has decided to sell no time to political candidates due to recordkeeping, filings, and other redtape required as a result of the act. He notes that his station operates with a total complement of 4½ people, including the owners, 16 hours per day, 6 days per week, and 14 hours on Sunday.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter from Mr. Grover D. Allen addressed to all political candidates in Wyoming be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

To all political candidates:

Federal agencies, aided by decisions of the courts, and the unthinking action of some Senators and Representatives have made a nightmare out of the operation of a small broadcast station.

This station operates with a total compliment of 4½ people, including the owners, 16 hours per day, 6 days per week, and 14 hours on Sundays for the convenience and necessity of most everyone but the people who have their life savings invested in it.

In order to avoid the time-consuming entanglement with further record keeping, filings, and other red tape that go with the setting up of a Paid Political Schedule under new regulations, this Station has elected to give free time to all candidates in the upcoming 1972 Primary and General Elections.

Each candidate . . . be he, she, or it running for a City, County, State, or National Office, will be allotted the following times . . . first in the primary election . . . then again in the General Election. No additional time will be sold, so please don't ask.

The candidates choice of: 25, 30-second announcements (or); 20, 60-second announcements (or); and 9, 5-minute programs.

In addition each candidate will be offered 1, 15-minute program for a drop-in interview and 1, 30-minute program which we would like to see used for a telephone question-and-answer program with our listeners.

The candidate has the option of refusing the Question-and-Answer program but, it seems to me, any candidate who is genuinely interested in what the voting public really wants should have no hesitancy in appearing for such a program.

To further insure an element of fairness, no more than 3 announcements, nor more than 2 programs will be run in any one day, so plan your schedule accordingly. Also no Political Announcements will be run on election day, nor will any new copy be accepted within the last 48 hours prior to midnight before the day of the election.

Each candidate will be responsible for seeing to it that proper copy, either typewritten in legible form for airing, or pre-recorded is put in the Station's hands 24 hours prior to start time. Free campaign counseling or copy writing by the Station does not come as a part of this package. It's "your baby".

Station will make announcer available for doing Station interview and for the half hour question-and-answer period. Appointment to be made 48 hours in advance.

It is my sincere hope that providing free time will enable candidates with some dedication to God and County to be elected to the office which they seek without becoming indebted to special interest groups, bent on wrecking our country and all it stands for.

If I sound like a crabby, cranky old man you're right. Everything is free but our free enterprise system and its so wrapped in red tape its strangling to death. God bless America for what it was . . . not what it is today.

Sincerely,

GROVER D. ALLEN,
Owner.

PROHIBITION OF IMPOUNDMENT OF HIGHWAY TRUST FUNDS

Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, I wish to extend my appreciation to the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON) for introducing S. 3877, a bill to prohibit the impoundment of funds from the highway trust funds which have been apportioned and appropriated. I hope the Committee on Finance can expedite handling of the bill so we may take early ac-

tion upon it. I was prepared to support the Senator from Oklahoma when he offered an amendment to the debt ceiling legislation to achieve the same purpose. I will support his bill when it is reported to the Senate, and if need be, I will support his amendment when the debt ceiling legislation is again under consideration. However, I fervently hope we may be able to act upon his bill long before the debt ceiling legislation is again before us.

My concern for early action is extensive unemployment in Montana as a direct consequence of Federal actions.

During the last 2 years, the highway construction program in Montana has been reduced about 35 percent. The immediate consequences of that employment reduction by the Office of Management and Budget were not immediately felt because simultaneously, additional employment was being created through construction of the ABM system.

However, this year both events came together to create an employment crisis in Montana. The steady reduction in the highway construction program is now painfully apparent in Montana because of the ABM construction cancellation, a result of the administration's SALT agreements with the Soviet Union.

Mr. President, in both of these situations, unemployment in Montana has been a direct consequence of Federal programs. When the orders to cease construction of the ABM system in Montana were received, over 1,000 workers were dumped into the labor market with only 1 day's severance pay. Those 1,000-plus workers were directly involved in construction of the ABM system, while at least another 1,000 indirectly involved lost their jobs in the wake of cancellation of ABM construction.

Employment statistics for one county alone tell the consequence. In May, Liberty County's unemployment rate was less than 4 percent; 1 month later the unemployment rate was 9 percent. That increase in unemployment has been similarly felt throughout the State of Montana.

Many efforts have been made to alleviate that unemployment crisis. One of the efforts undertaken is the result of superb cooperation by the Montana Highway Department and its very able director, Mr. H. J. Anderson. Working closely with the congressional delegation and the Governor's office, the Montana Highway Department has identified highway construction projects for letting this fiscal year which would entail the release of $21.7 million in Federal funds within the five-county area most directly affected by cancellation of ABM construction. Some of these projects were scheduled for 1976, but have been advanced to generate employment now for the hundreds of workers displaced by Federal action. It has done so with a considerable investment of manpower and time. In addition, the Montana Highway Department has advanced two projects within the affected area for a special letting this month and will fund those with available funds.

It is incumbent upon the Federal Government to take action to alleviate the unemployment crisis in Montana generated by Federal actions. The Office of Management and Budget has over $48 million impounded which has been apportioned and appropriated for Montana. Senator MANSFIELD, Congressman MELCHER, and I have asked for the release of $33.7 million, which we have been advised the State could match for immediate use this fiscal year.

The Office of Economic Adjustment in the Department of Defense has suggested the immediate release of $8.5 million for projects within the five-county area which can be let during the rest of the calendar year, with further reference to the release, after the first of next year, of an additional $13.2 million, for projects which can be let during the first half of calendar year 1973.

The apparent justification cited by the administration for impounding highway construction funds is that such impoundment serves as a curb to inflation. Regardless of the figure asked for release to Montana, that release could not be construed as inflationary. The ABM construction program would have entailed the expenditure of $210 million in Montana during the next 3 years. The immediate release of an additional $8.5 million for Montana would still leave our highway construction program with less funding than available during the fiscal year. Even the release of the entire $21.7 million for the five-county area would leave Montana's total highway construction program less than it was 2 fiscal years ago. Indeed, the release of the $33.7 million the congressional delegation has asked would leave the highway construction program roughly at the level of 2 years ago. The release of the entire $96 million alloted to Montana for highway construction is less than the total which would have been spent on the ABM construction and the highway construction programs as proposed by the Office of Management and Budget.

In view of these circumstances—an unemployment crisis generated by Federal action and the fact that the release of additional highway construction funds to Montana is noninflationary—I do not understand why the Office of Management and Budget hesitates to grant the request of the Montana congressional delegation.

If Senator BELLMON's bill were law today, many hundreds of Montanans would be engaged in productive work, work that is needed for the national interest. It clearly has been the congressional intent that these highway trust funds be committed and used. The failure of this administration to use funds duly apportioned and appropriated has caused economic chaos in Montana and elsewhere. The speedy passage of Senator BELLMON's bill will greatly reduce that economic chaos.

VIKTORS VIKSNINS OF CHICAGO

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I invite the attention of the Senate to the remarkable career of Viktors Viksnins, of Chicago. Just last May, Mr. Viksnins was elected to an unprecedented 20th term as president of the Chicago Latvian Association. Moreover he is executive chairman of both the Captive Nations Committee and the Captive Nations Friends Committee in Chicago.

Mr. Viksnins was born in Riga, Latvia, in 1923. At the end of the Second World War, Latvia was again occupied by Soviet troops, and Mr. Viksnins decided to leave his homeland. After walking hundreds of miles to the American lines and after 5 years in various displaced persons camps, Mr. Viksnins was finally able to come to the United States to start a new life in freedom.

Since his arrival in this country, Mr. Viksnins has dedicated his life to helping the people of all the captive nations. He has been honored for his leadership by many organizations, and he has received the Captive Nations-Eisenhower Proclamation Medal, joining the ranks of other distinguished Americans such as President Nixon and Vice President AGNEW Chicago and Illinois are proud of him.

SENATOR WALTER F. MONDALE, OF MINNESOTA

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, since he entered the Senate 8 years ago, Minnesota's senior Senator, Hon. WALTER F. MONDALE, has won the high esteem of his colleagues for the dedication and imagination with which he has served the people of his State and the Nation. For this reason, I was delighted to see his record of service proclaimed recently in an excellent article by Alan L. Otten, and published in the Wall Street Journal.

I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Wall Street Journal, May 25, 1972]

WALTER F. WHO?

(By Alan L. Otten)

WASHINGTON.—Two political paradoxes make Walter F. Mondale of Minnesota an unusually intriguing Senator this year.

—At a time when many liberals are finding it expedient to duck for cover, he remains outspokenly liberal—a leader, for instance, in the fight against legislative curbs on school busing—and yet is commonly rated a shoo-in for re-election this fall.

—Virtually unknown to the general public, he is so highly regarded by knowledgeable Democratic professionals that his name figures high on many lists of possible presidential nominees if there's a deadlock at the convention in July. And while a presidential nomination for 44-year-old Fritz Mondale this year must be reckoned the longest of long shots, odds are he'll figure more prominently in presidential speculation in future years.

"He's good-looking, articulate, liberal without being abrasive,"' says a party activist. "He'd be the perfect candidate this year

if only he weren't so far-out on busing, and didn't have to run for re-election."

Of his liberal credentials there can be no doubt. The son of a small-town Methodist minister, he says concern about poverty and inequality was drilled into him "over breakfast, lunch and dinner, and weekends to boot." Active from high-school days on in Minnesota's liberal, programmatic Democratic-Farmer Labor Party, he was named state attorney general at 32 by then Gov. Orville Freeman, and quickly built a reputation as a staunch fighter for consumer protection.

He was appointed to the Senate to replace Hubert Humphrey in 1964, and quickly zeroed in on urban and civil rights causes: open housing, legal services for the poor, conditions of migratory labor, hunger and malnutrition, Indian welfare. It was his child care bill—providing health, education, nutrition and other broad federal help for pre-schoolers—that President Nixon vetoed last year.

Along with most other liberal Democrats he strongly advocates lower military and space spending; he has led the fight, thus far very unsuccessfully, to block the space shuttle, even though one contractor, Honeywell, is a major Minnesota employer. With Sen. Mike Gravel of Alaska, he's sponsoring a move to cut off all Vietnam war funds within a month.

And as chairman of a special committee to study "equal educational opportunity," he has sought to build a record for far greater federal spending on education and for continued firm support of wider school integration. "It's much more complicated than I expected," he admits. "But I think we can now make a powerful case that a number of things are not being done, or done only half-heartedly, that offer great hope and promise." As examples, he cites pre-school programs, voluntary busing experiments, bilingual education, educational TV, metropolitan parks.

With so liberal a record, Mr. Mondale should be in at least a little re-election trouble, yet both Democrats and Republicans agree he's as close to being a cinch as any incumbent running this year. Well-known Minnesota Republicans ducked taking him on, and the party has just nominated a little-known minister, Rev. Philip Hansen, who'll have to fight a poorly financed, underdog campaign. "Why waste money trying to beat Fritz?" a GOP leader asks.

Minnesotans offer various explanations for this apparent anomaly: The state is more liberal than most, and traditionally gives its legislators considerable leeway; with a small black population, busing is not, except in the Twin Cities area, remotely the heated issue it is in many other large states.

But much of the answer clearly lies in Mr. Mondale himself. Though he often seems a trifle Boy-Scoutish on the surface, he is, in fact, a very tough and shrewd politician. He works extra-hard at keeping in touch with the folks back home—even in non-election years, for instance, he's back touring the state 20 to 25 weekends a year. He spends considerable time, too, on legislation of direct concern to the home-folks; trying to block railroad plans to abandon service, for example, or raise farm price supports, or expand federal efforts to combat Great Lakes pollution.

Fritz Mondale's strongest plus, however, may be the general air intelligence, solidity and fairness he projects. When unemployed scientists and engineers in Minneapolis criticized his space shuttle stand, he went back and met with them, listened to their arguments, gave his own. "They still don't love him, but maybe they at least respect his sincerity," an aide argues.

Concedes a Republican Congressman: "Voters seem to care less about his views on particular issue than the fact that he seems to them to be open-minded and honest and decent." Mr. Mondale himself agrees this may be crucial; "people are starved for the truth from politicians," he says.

The Mondale-for-President talk has a certain superficial logic. If there should indeed be a convention deadlock and Ted Kennedy still says no, why not a personable, telegenic Senator able to attract considerable center and liberal support? He has been a long-time associate of Mr. Humphrey and a close friend of Sen. Edmund Muskie, and his record certainly should make him more than acceptable to the issue-oriented McGovernites.

(Perhaps because of his leadership on school integration and other matters, liberals seem ready to forgive him for having long supported the Vietnam war. Though Mr. Mondale claims he began having doubts early in 1968 and argued for a dovish position within the Humphrey campaign organization that spring and summer, it wasn't until September, after the convention, that he publicly urged an end to the bombing. "The worst mistake of my entire career was to remain silent so long against the war," he now declares. "Some people in Minnesota still haven't forgiven me, and I can't say I blame them.")

Mr. Mondale pooh-poohs the dark-horse idea as far-fetched "Washington talk." Not only is it politically unrealistic, he believes, but "I don't have the stomach for a presidential race. I watched Hubert up close, and I don't like the way something like that tears you apart. I like some privacy, I like to see my family once in a while."

Anyhow, he says, "I love the job I have," and its potential for achieving the "decent society" he talks about. "There's a lot of power around here in Congress that's not being exercised for liberal ends," he declares. "Southerners and other conservatives don't let themselves get diverted, and it's time some of us liberals stayed around and tried to master and use the system, too."

NEW YORK TIMES CALLS FOR FEDERAL ACTION ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, earlier this week I commented on the report of the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws. I am pleased to note that the New York Times today editorially endorses the need for Federal action to implement the substantive recommendations of the Commission. As the Times editorial states:

It will be an outrage if, at this late stage, pressure to keep hands off still frustrates action on the sound reforms the Commission proposes.

The editorial further suggests that ultimately workmen's compensation should be "integrated" with other programs providing income maintenance for workers such as welfare, social security disability, and unemployment insurance. I do deem this to mean federalization of workmen's compensation; and ultimately that may be a desirable objective. But, as the Times editorial suggests, until we are ready to undertake that task, we ought promptly to get about the business of getting a floor under State workmen's compensation laws. I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PAYING FOR JOB INJURIES

For nearly a half-century critics have been finding the same things wrong with the crazyquilt of state workmen's compensation laws: They are inadequate and inequitable. That conclusion has just been reached all over again by a national commission appointed by President Nixon under the provisions of the Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.

The important distinction this time is that the commisison proposes that Congress set 1975 as a time limit for action by the states to meet Federal standards designed to guarantee that workers would be more fully protected against loss of wages and other costs resulting from industrial accidents and disabilities. The commission stops short of recommending an outright Federal takeover of the whole compensation system, but its call for national yardsticks reflects more courage than either the White House or Congress has shown in the fact of past pressure from lobbyists for state governments and industrial interests.

It will be an outrage if, at this late stage, pressure to keep hands off still frustrates action on the sound reforms the commission proposes. What would be even better would be comprehensive Congressional action to integrate workmen's compensation into an over-all system of income maintenance for workers and for those in need of public assistance.

There is little sense to treating sickness pay, pay for industrial accidents, disability payments under Social Security, minimum wage, unemployment insurance and welfare reform as if they were watertight compartments unrelated to a general governmental approach to the problems of what a family requires to live or even what constitutes an equitable tax system. But until Washington is ready to face up to that larger assignment it ought to insist on a floor under state workmen's compensation systems in line with the commission's report.

THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: TOO IDEALISTIC?

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, day after day I rise to implore the Senate to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

Critics might call those of us who call for approval of the Genocide Treaty idealists for believing that the Genocide Convention is necessary to prevent the destruction of a national ethnic, racial, or religious group. I would like to answer them by quoting the words of the late President Woodrow Wilson:

Sometimes people call me an idealist. Well, that is the way I know I am an American. America is the only idealistic nation in the world.

Since 1776 Americans have created ideals and striven to fulfill them. We can attribute the success of our country to the ideals which we have established for ourselves.

Idealism pervades our most cherished documents. Is not the Declaration of Independence the paragon of idealism? And yet opponents of the Genocide Convention argue that the convention is too idealistic.

How idealistic is the Genocide Convention? The Genocide Convention puts the lofty principles embodied in the Declaration of Independence into the framework of international law.

The Genocide Convention is a constructive attempt to diminish the threat of genocide. It is designed to prevent the destruction of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group by defining genocide, outlawing it, and establishing procedures for trying and punishing it.

The Senate cannot reject the Genocide Treaty on the grounds that it is too idealistic for idealism is a characteristic of any treaty. Therefore, I ask the Senate to reconsider the idealistic nature of the Genocide Treaty and ratify it without further delay.

FINANCIAL STATEMENT OF SENATOR MOSS

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, it has long been my conviction that Members of Congress should make public disclosure of their income and assets. I have made such disclosure a number of times in the past, and I do so again today.

The statement I file this year shows an increase in the equity of my homes both in Washington and in Salt Lake City, and also some equity in a home in Holladay, Utah. I have acquired an equity in a building lot in Stansbury, a new housing development west of Salt Lake City, and have increased my savings. But, on the whole, my holdings vary little from those I made public in the past.

I should mention that I have lecture fees of about $5,000 a year, and approximately $300 in royalties from my book entitled "The Water Crisis" and from stock dividends. These are my only earnings outside of my senatorial salary.

My assets are so modest that some Members of the Senate may wonder why I make this information public. I do so because I feel that all public officials owe it to their constituents to report to them at regular intervals their full income and assets.

I recognize that the Senate has adopted a disclosure-of-assets rule, and I follow this rule faithfully. However, as we all know, that "disclosure" is not made public, but is merely filed away somewhere in a sealed envelope. How can constituents hope to know about the income and economic assets of the men they send to Congress if such information is held in an envelope by an appointed custodian? I favor full public disclosure by every Member of the legislative branch of our Government. We demand disclosure of Executive appointees. Why should Members of Congress have any more privileged position?

Because I believe in public disclosure, I ask unanimous consent that my financial statement be printed in the RECORD. I should add that my wife has no separate income or earnings, so this statement applies to both of us.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Financial statement of Senator Moss
June 30, 1972

[All amounts approximate]

ASSETS

Equity:	
Home in Washington	$40,845
Home in Salt Lake City	14,060
Home in Holladay	7,000
Lot in Salt Lake City (unimproved)	8,000
Lot in Holladay (unimproved)	750
Equity: Lot in Stansbury (unimproved)	825
Average checking account	1,000
Savings account	2,440
Utah Employees Credit Union	395
1971 Dodge Dart	2,570
Personal note	7,000
5 shares Standard Oil of California	297
One share A.T. & T	42
Life insurance: Cash value	16,850
Total	102,074

LIABILITIES

Mortgage:	
Home in Washington	5,155
Home in Salt Lake City	17,027
Home in Holladay	27,016
Lot at Stansbury	6,176
Personal note	11,050
Loan on insurance policy	1,014
Total	67,438

NEW HORIZONS FOR HELIUM

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, helium is one of the most useful and intriguing of America's natural resources. Most of us know it best as the gas in circus balloons and blimps; but to industry and science it is a highly valuable and versatile substance with many properties which are unique among the elements. These unique properties—many of them known but little applied to industrial technology—hold great promise for the future well-being of our Nation's economy, environment and standard of living.

I believe it is highly important that we be aware of helium's present and potential value because it is a scarce material which, for all practical purposes, has but one source in nature. While it is the chief component of the sun and takes its name from the Greek word for sun, it is found in commercially recoverable quantities on earth only within certain natural gas deposits. And if the helium in these natural gas fields is not separated before the gas is used, the helium is lost into the atmosphere and can never be recaptured or replaced.

The Federal Government, through the Department of the Interior, sponsors a helium conservation program whereby helium is separated from natural gas and stored for future use. However, a proposal for discontinuation of the helium conservation program is presently under consideration.

To my view, termination of this program would be unwise and shortsighted. Helium's untapped qualities and unharnessed characteristics give it the potential for becoming perhaps one of the most important substances of the next century—perhaps even more important than uranium and other fissionable materials.

A short but enlightening article on one aspect of helium's promising future was published in the July 10, 1972, issue of Commerce Today. I believe it would make worthwhile reading for anyone who is concerned with the question of the helium program or who is interested in the likely course of technology and science in the coming decades. I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CRYOGENIC PROGRAM TO DEVELOP INDUSTRY

A Federal program to develop competitive new industry through the application of supercold cryogenic technology as a superconductor is expected to be undertaken under the leadership of the Commerce Department in the near future.

The President's FY 73 budget contains a request for $1 million for the first year's program planning and definition phase of an eventual $40 million program to help the electrical industry find better and cheaper means of generating electricity. The National Bureau of Standards will manage the program for the Commerce Department.

A Cryoelectronics Section was established within the Cryogenics Division of the National Bureau of Standards at its Boulder, Colo., laboratories in 1969 representing the fruition of a half-century of fundamental explorations in this field at the Bureau of Standards.

Specifically, this program, in cooperation with industry, recognized research institutes, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Science Foundation, would prove the feasibility of making a multi-million watt electrical generator and motor system which takes advantage of superconductors.

GREATER EFFICIENCY

Such an electrical generator is expected to operate with greater efficiency than present generators. A one percent increase in efficiency would mean that 20 million tons of coal per year could be saved. It would also mean a $4 million reduction in capital investment per generator.

Principal advantage, however, promises to be a marked reduction in weight and size which would permit the construction, assembly and practical operation of much larger capacity motors and generators than heretofore possible. Not only economies of scale would be achieved, perhaps a 15 to 20 percent reduction in the cost per kilowatt capacity, but also economies in use of materials.

Intent of the government's program would be to use Federal seed money in industry to stimulate industrial investment in applying this relatively new advanced technology in the well-established electric industry. Commerce Secretary Peterson, in his FY 1973 budget request to the Congress, supports a National Bureau of Standards proposal to promote and catalyze an industrial program for development of the next generation of multi-megawatt electric generators and motors.

A task force is to be formed by Commerce of representatives of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Departments of Defense, Transportation and Interior to coordinate the planning action. Similar steps are planned among the industrial, university and professional communities to assure an effective approach on a national scale.

The phenomenon of superconductivity is described by Bascom W. Birmingham, Deputy Director of the Institute for Basic Standards of Commerce's National Bureau

of Standards, "as the absence of electrical resistance in certain materials that are maintained below a characteristic temperature, electrical current, and magnetic field."

Cryogenics has long been under experimental development. But in recent years, industry throughout the world has been paying more attention to its possibilities. General Electric and Westinghouse have been two industrial leaders in this country experimenting with cryogenics as a means of employing its superconductivity characteristics in electric power generation.

Studies conducted at General Electric Research and Development Center at Schenectady, N.Y., indicate that electric utilities could realize a savings of several million dollars a year with the development of superconductive generators, transformers and transmission lines, while, at the same time, providing the expanding urban centers of the nation with all the electrical power needed.

A three-year, $1.05 million General Electric research project financed by the Edison Electric Institute, Tennessee Valley Authority, and the American Public Power Association, under the operation of the Electric Research Council, has been investigating the technical and economic feasibility of cryogenic underground cable.

Westinghouse Research Laboratories at Pittsburgh has built and is presently testing the world's largest superconducting turbogenerator which operates at —452 degrees F. Tests have been run to 5 million-volt-amperes (MVA) at 3,600 RPM. The company expects that this type of generator will be the answer for central city generators to meet the heavy electrical demands of the future.

Such utilization of cryogenics could:

Contribute toward solving the national energy crisis;

Develop radically new equipment and new products for export;

Stimulate industrial growth and perhaps whole new industries;

Utilize existing U.S. expertise and maintain technical leadership; and

Employ highly trained technical personnel.

Through its atomic energy and space program, this country leads the world in the basic scientific research that underlies cryogenic technology and in feasibility studies of various technological applications. In the development of actual prototype hardware, however, the U.S. faces the danger of being out-distanced by its principal economic competitors. The Japanese government is totally funding a three million watt generator for the electrolysis of copper. The British government has already built a 3,250 HP motor. The French government is providing two-thirds of the support for various superconducting motors and transmission lines. The German government is providing 50 percent of the support of a program to build a superconducting transmission line.

Total U.S. government effort for superconductivity this year is estimated at about $10 million, almost none of which is directed toward commercial applications.

LARGE BLOCKS

A Brookhaven National Laboratory study recently completed for the National Science Foundation on problems to be solved in applying the phenomenon of superconductivity to the design of systems for moving very large blocks of electrical power underground, foresees an indication of the growth in demand for electric power in the next two decades requiring underground transmission circuits to rise from the present average level of several hundred megawatts to about 2,000 MW. If interties between regional networks, for example, between TVA and the adjacent American Electric Power System, are placed underground, then capacities of more than 7,000 MW will be needed before the end of the century. By comparison, the present load of New York City is 10,000 MW.

While capable of carrying large amounts of power, superconducting cables cannot compete economically at lower power levels because of the fixed cost of refrigerators and dewars. At levels that are about the ceiling for conventional technologies, the costs become comparable. As this power level rises, the cost of each megawatt transmitted per mile drops dramatically. If superconducting cables become fairly common, a whole new industry will have to be established to produce the miles of vacuum-insulated containers to carry the cable.

Costs of such cable are considerably higher than overhead power lines of comparable power capability located in the open countryside. Near urban areas, however, the rapidly rising cost of right-of-way greatly reduces the differential. Thus, it is expected that superconducting cables will be used first in the large urban and metropolitan areas where the nation's energy crisis is most severe.

Environmental pressures against the use of overhead lines near well-traveled highways and in areas of scenic beauty are rising. Conventional cables have technical limitations of 10 to 30-mile links underground, thus making them incapable of supplanting the vast networks of existing overhead lines, even if the money were available. Superconducting cables could go a long way toward removing this barrier.

CHET HUNTLEY ON TAXES, THE ECONOMY, AND SOCIAL PROGRAMS

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, the rapid upward spiral in the cost of government, is bringing an increasing clamor for a thorough review of and adjustment in our national priorities.

The steepest rise in cost of government is in social service programs, many of which are being pushed with little or no regard to benefits derived or costs incurred.

Chet Huntley, the well-known, former television newscaster, presents a short radio program for American Airlines in which he discusses various issues. In his commentary for the week of July 31, 1972, Mr. Huntley addressed himself to the failure of Federal social programs, both in benefits arrived at and in costs. I commend Mr. Huntley's remarks to the reading of all, and I ask unanimous consent that a transcript of them be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CHET HUNTLEY ON VARIOUS ISSUES

This is Chet Huntley. There are only a little more than 90 days of this political struggle to go. Some might say to abide. While now and then the debate has touched upon some of our fundamental dilemmas, all of us can be assured that the candidates and the parties and the groups are NOT going to discuss the vital problem.

Where are we going to get the money to do the things promised, to do the things demanded, and to do the things already committed?

I have just read with interest . . . and with despair . . . the recently-published report of the Brookings Institution. In essence it repeats what Gov. Nelson Rockefeller said not long ago: "We are trying to help people, but are running out of money at all levels of government."

The Brookings study says that if the federal government should undertake not a single new program of any sort during the next two years, and if the economy should recover to one hundred per cent full employment, the federal budget would still be 17 billion dollars in the red. And the Brookings study adds that even if the additional 17 billion dollars were made available, probably by printing more dollar bills, the government still would not know how to spend it to cure or alleviate our social ills. Indeed, the study says that some of the past spending did more harm than good.

A glance at the apportionment of the federal budget tells us graphically how little choice we really have. About 70 per cent of the total budget goes for social programs which we initiated in the past: medicare, welfare, veterans benefits, aid to education, national health and so on. The remaining 30 per cent of the federal budget includes the giant defense spending and the temptation is almost uncontrollable to dig into that to pay for the other programs now proposed.

It is somewhat popular these days to sneer at the "New Frontier" and "The Great Society" of the '60's. Perhaps they are incredibly valuable. Despite the waste, they may have proved to us, at last, that federal social programs do not bring results. But in spite of that, much of the current political debate hinges on *how* we shall organize new federally-financed social undertakings. There have been suggestions that these programs can be financed by "closing tax loopholes" and "soak the rich" tax laws. That has had the sound of demagoguery, for a simple exercise in division demonstrates that if the entire gross national product were divided equally among the population it would produce only about 5 thousand dollars per person.

Looking back over the past 30 years or so, we may wonder whether both domestically and internationally we indulged in a program of reckless expansionism. In the same way we thought we might make Vietnam "safe for democracy," we talked of eliminating poverty at home. Both are noble concepts. But we are face to face with the question whether we can pay the bills for these projects. The debate this season would be more rewarding if it posed the question whether ending of poverty should be a fruit of the economy, rather than asking the economy to adjust to a program of ending poverty.

WAR VICTIMS IN VIETNAM

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, little more than a month ago, I reported to the Senate on the rising number of war victims in South Vietnam, and discussed the growing concern in many quarters over the impact of our shelling and bombing on the civilian population of North Vietnam. I wish to comment briefly on these issues again, today, especially in reporting to Senators the latest compilation of statistics on war victims in South Vietnam.

On June 29, as chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees, I reported that the flow of new refugees and civilian casualties was continuing at an alarming rate in South Vietnam. By official count, the numbers of new refugees, in government—held territory since April 1, stood at some 814,000—and

the number was increasing at a rate of nearly 3,000 per day. Unofficial estimates put the number of new refugees at well over 1,000,000.

Based on known hospital admissions, official estimates for civilian casualties put the number at nearly 8,700 for April and nearly 5,900 for May—for a total of some 14,600. A June 10 cable from Ambassador Bunker to the Department of State emphasized, however, that these figures were incomplete; for they did not include hospital admissions in areas such as Quang Tri and Kontum where heavy fighting was underway. The Bunker cable also said, that civilian casualties would be a "formidable challenge" for many months to come, and that the developing human tragedy in South Vietnam would probably exceed what occurred during and after the Tet experience in 1968.

I pointed out on June 29, that the full extent of civilian casualties could not be measured by hospital admissions alone—even if all the hospitals were reporting their admissions. For the record is clear that the bulk of civilian casualties never see a hospital. They are treated elsewhere, not treated at all, or they die.

And so, on June 29, I released the subcommittee's estimates on civilian casualties during April and May, which put the number at nearly 80,000—including as many as 25,000 deaths. The subcommittee's comparable figure for the Tet experience in February and March of 1968 was some 62,000 civilian casualties—including about 20,000 deaths.

The television and radio and press remind us every hour of the day that the intensity of the war continues. The bombing goes on. The shelling goes on. The violence spreads—from both sides. There are more military casualties. There are more prisoners of war—more missing in action. More civilians are injured or die. More children are maimed or orphaned. More refugees flee devastated villages and towns.

And despite what our military planners are claiming about victories on the battlefield—despite what they are claiming about having the other side on the run—and despite the President's new promises for peace—the fact remains that a war continues in Southeast Asia. The fact remains that the human cost of continuing this war to the people of Indochina is appalling, and our rising contribution to this cost should outrage the conscience of all Americans.

Since my report of June 29, the number of new refugees—by official count—has increased by more than 50,000—from some 814,000 to more than 866,000. Again, by official count, this is a daily average for the last few weeks of nearly 2,000. The Subcommittee on Refugees now estimates that the cumulative total of refugees since 1965, approaches nearly 8,000,000 men, women, and children—nearly one-half of South Vietnam's population.

Inevitably, the number of civilian casualties has also increased. In fact, Mr. President, the high numbers previously reported for April and May have continued. Based on known hospital admissions, the preliminary official estimate for June is 5,874. As a recent cable from Ambassador Bunker notes, however, this figure does not include civilian casualties treated in Quang Tri, Binh Long, Long An, and Phuoc Long Provinces—where the heaviest fighting has occurred. How many bodies lie in the rubble of Quang Tri City, An Loc and other devastated areas, is unknown. But accounts from all sources, including those within our Government, tell a very grim story of death—and more death.

Based on known hospital admissions, and estimates in all other categories, the Subcommittee on Refugees estimates that another 30,000 or more civilian casualties probably occurred in June—including as many as 10,000 deaths.

Since April 1, the subcommitte now estimates that more than 100,000 civilians have become casualties—including as many as 35,000 deaths. The cumulative total of civilian war casualties in South Vietnam since 1965 now stands at nearly 1,300,000 men, women, and children—including up to 400,000 deaths.

Mr. President, the comments I am making today sound a familiar theme. For they are only the latest chapter in the seemingly endless story of human suffering in South Vietnam. This latest chapter dramatically underscores again, that the war continues—not only in the Northern Provinces of South Vietnam just below the demilitarized zone—but all over the country. In fact nearly half of the reported civilian casualties are occurring in the delta below Saigon—an area the administration claims to have pacified long ago. And so the administration's peace slogans of the past have become the policy failures of the present. Vietnamization was not a plan for bringing peace, but a plan for continuing war.

Although the focus of human suffering in Indochina is currently in South Vietnam, the number of war victims is also rising in neighboring Laos and Cambodia. And for anyone to suggest that our bombing and shelling of North Vietnam is having little impact on civilians—on the creation of war victims—defies understanding and commonsense. Based in part on the pattern of death and destruction which our military practices have brought to other areas of Indochina, there can be little doubt that civilians have been caught in the crunch of the airwar. It is naive of the administration to suggest they can cover up the suffering and death of civilians in North Vietnam. Sooner or later the full truth will come out—as it did after the spokesmen for the administration denied that the forced relocation of villagers was among our military practices, that villages in Laos were being bombed, that a serious refugee problem existed in Cambodia, that bombing was an important cause in creating war victims throughout Indochina.

It is easy for the President to blame all the civilian suffering in Indochina on the other side—as he did again in his press conference just a week ago. But commonsense alone tells us that we are also part of the bloodbath. So does the record of our involvement in Indochina.

Mr. President, the people of this country are tired of the war. They are tired of hearing the stale arguments for the war and against it. They are tired of seeing our men withdraw from Vietnam, only to have others show up in Thailand or on the decks of our gunboats at sea or in the cockpits of our bombers. They are tired of hearing again and again the promises of peace met with plans for more war.

But most of all they are tired of seeing the pictures of refugees and maimed children flash across the television screen and the pages of our papers. And they ask today more than ever before how much longer will our country be part of the bloodbath in Indochina?

In the end, the answer to this question lies in the hands of the President. The Senate's vote yesterday on ending the war is a mandate to our national leadership from the people of America.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a chart summarizing civilian casualties in South Vietnam.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN WAR-RELATED CASUALTIES, 1965-72

Year	Official USAID hospital admissions	Subcommittee casualty estimates	Subcommittee estimates of death
1965	[1] 50,000	100,000	25,000
1966	[1] 50,000	150,000	50,000
1967	48,734	175,000	60,000
1968	84,492	300,000	100,000
1969	67,767	200,000	60,000
1970	50,882	125,000	30,000
1971	39,395	100,000	25,000
Total	391,300	1,150,000	350,000
1972 (6 month)	[1] 30,000	150,000	50,000
Total	421,300	1,300,000	400,000

[1] Estimate.

COSTS OF 45 SELECTED MAJOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS INCREASED BY $36.5 BILLION

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the costs of 45 selected major weapons systems have increased by $36.5 billion over the original planning estimates for those weapons.

This is the largest accumulative overrun reported so far.

Last November I reported a $35.2 billion cost overrun on the same 45 programs. The November figures were based on data compiled by the Department of Defense as of June 30, 1971. The figures I am making available today are based on data compiled by the Department of Defense as of March 31, 1972.

In the 9 months separating the two sets of figures, the costs of the same 45 programs increased by $1.3 billion.

Despite the countless congressional investigations, reports, exposes, and blue ribbon panel studies, the message that billions of dollars are being lost through mismanagement and waste in military

procurement has either gotten lost or been ignored.

The picture would have looked even worse except for the fact that seven of the 45 weapons programs were removed from the Pentagon's reporting system and figures for these programs can no longer be updated. Most of the programs in this category were dropped from the reporting system because they were either canceled or completed. Three are among the most mismanaged in recent years. They are the main battle tank, which was canceled after a dismal performance; the Gamma Goat, which received a scathing report from the House Armed Services Committee just a few days ago; and the FB–111, a program whose technical performance is as poor as its cost record.

Several other factors tend to understate the size of the cost overrun problem. Among these is the fact that the data supplied by the Pentagon is often seriously outdated and is sometimes inaccurate.

The Pentagon shows a cost overrun of $222.1 million on the F–14 aircraft program. The Navy has distorted the F–14 picture by supplying a current estimate of $5.3 billion to complete the program when in fact the Navy estimates that it will cost $6.5 billion to complete the program. Instead of a $222.1 million cost overrun, the Pentagon ought to be reporting a $1.5 billion cost overrun.

In the case of the LHA ship program, the Navy reports that it will cost $970 million to complete when, in fact, the Navy now estimates that it will cost $1.4 billion to complete. The LHA cost overrun has been understated by approximately $471 million.

The Air Force has managed to minimize the F–15 aircraft cost overrun by changing the cost base. The original planning estimate for this program was $5.1 billion, as shown in Development Concept Paper No. 19, dated September 28, 1968. But the Air Force now reports a planning estimate of $6 billion, thereby shrinking the difference between the planning estimate and what it will cost to finish the program. Instead of a $1.8 billion cost overrun in this program, there is really an overrun of $2.7 billion.

The omissions in the Pentagon's reporting system in these three programs alone understate the cumulative cost overrun by $2.6 billion.

Other programs showing extremely large increases include Safeguard ABM, $2.1 billion; the B–1 bomber, $2.2 billion; the C5–A aircraft, $1.8 billion; the F–111, aircraft, $4.9 billion; and the SRAM missile, $1 billion.

Another shortcoming in the Pentagon's reporting system is the practice of omitting the costs of large subsystems and associated costs of major weapons. The Safeguard ABM report, for example, ignores the costs of warheads, family housing construction and operation, missile test range support, hospitalization, training, and other Armywide support activities. The most recent estimate of these costs was in excess of $1 billion, and that estimate was made in 1970. The Army has refused to revise this figure.

A March 1972 GAO report on Safeguard strongly suggests that the Army is concealing the full costs of the program. The Army would not make available to GAO documentation showing the basis and source of its planning estimate for Safeguard. GAO concluded that the Safeguard estimate did not contain the provisions for certain known or anticipated costs and were significantly lower than estimates prepared by the weapon system contractor. In my experience, when the military estimate of the cost of a program is lower than the contractor's estimate for that program, the contractor almost always turns out to be right.

In the case of the DD–963 destroyer, all signs point to another large cost increase on top of the already large overrun that has been acknowledged. The DD–963 is supposed to be built in the same shipyard as the LHA and the delays on the LHA have already had a detrimental impact on the DD–963, although the Navy has so far refused to admit it.

Finally, the cumulative nature of the data on costs often obscures the reasons for the overruns. Admittedly, some overruns are excusable. When the cost of a weapon rises because more weapons are being purchased than was originally planned, the rise may be justified if the decision to buy more weapons was a wise one and was not concealed from Congress at the time the planning estimate was made. Changes in a weapon as it undergoes development and production may also increase costs, and this increase may be warranted. There are other factors, such as general economic inflation, which affect the costs of weapons.

In stating the overruns for the 45 selected weapons in this report, I have taken into account as much of the dollar costs of the quantity changes as is possible. Where the quantity to be purchased was increased, I have revised the planning estimate upward by the appropriate amount in order to arrive at the net overrun. Where the quantity was reduced, I have revised the planning estimates downwards.

Too often the causes of cost overruns are gross mismanagement on the part of the Pentagon and inefficiency on the part of the defense contractors. Most of the cost overruns I have studied fall into this category. Unnecessary cost overruns have contributed to general inflation.

Another problem is the intentional underestimate of the cost of a weapon program. A relatively low price tag combined with the rest of the Pentagon's sales pitch has succeeded in winning support for weapons which may otherwise have not been approved by Congress. A number of major weapons fall into this category.

The Pentagon has obviously been unable to cope with the cost overrun problem. The situation seems to me to be growing worse instead of improving. In addition, Congress and the public are still not being told the truth about cost overruns on major weapons.

I request unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a report of the costs of 45 selected weapons systems provided to me at my request by the General Accounting Office.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF
THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, D.C., July 24, 1972.

The Honorable WILLIAM PROXMIRE,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government, Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Enclosed is the updated summary of estimated cost data, on the status of 45 selected major weapon systems. Since our last report to you 7 of the 45 systems have been dropped from the Selected Acquisition Reporting System.

Attachments I and II presents the estimated cost data for 38 major weapon systems as presented in the March 31, 1972, Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) as released by the Department of Defense. Attachment III presents the estimated cost data on the 7 major weapon systems at the time they were dropped from Selected Acquisition Reporting. We have made no audit or verification of the reported data.

Sincerely yours,

ELMER B. STAATS,
Comptroller General of the United States.

ATTACHMENT 1

COMPARISON OF THE ESTIMATED COST DATA AS OF MAR. 31, 1972, WITH THE ESTIMATED COST DATA OF JUNE 30, 1971, FOR 38 WEAPON SYSTEMS

[Dollars in millions]

Number of systems	Planning estimate	Development estimate	Cost change		Current estimate
			Quantity	Other	
Army (8)	$10,892.7	$11,701.9	$1,234.6	$3,130.8	$16,067.3
Navy (20)	29,731.3	37,490.6	(576.2)	5,280.6	42,195.0
Air Force (10)	33,273.6	41,082.1	(3,762.5)	9,859.8	47,179.4
Total (38) as of Mar. 31, 1972	73,897.6	90,274.6	(3,104.1)	18,271.2	105,441.7
Total (38) as of June 30, 1971	73,897.6	89,083.5	(5,871.8)	18,124.6	101,336.3
Difference between June 30, 1971, and Mar. 31, 1972	0	1,191.1	2,767.7	146.6	4,105.4

Note: The amounts indicated above for current estimate show a net increase of $4,105,400,000 as compared to the similar total as of June 30, 1971. This net increase consists of an increase of $3,324,800,000 for the Army, a decrease of $301,300,000 for the Navy ($68,600,000 related to Navy actions and $232,700,000 due to elimination of the Air Force portion of Sparrow E from SAR), and an increase of $1,081,900,000 for the Air Force.

The systems accounting for the major changes are as follows:

ARMY

Safeguard: Increase—$1,791.0 million.

This increase includes $856 million for adding a fourth site to the program, $417 million due to stretchout of equipment readiness date of the third site, $225 million support change primarily for adding a Safeguard Missile Integrated Reliability Test (SMIRT) Plan, and $199 million for incorporation of OSD projected price indices.

SAM–D: Increase—$1,318.7 million.

This increase is due to $49 million for additional testing equipment, $54 million for anti-missile/nuclear option, $91 million for management reserve, $600 million for reconfiguration and quantity change, and $530 million for revised estimate and economic escalation.

TOW: Decrease—$62.7 million.

This decrease is attributable to $25 million for a reduction in quantity to reflect current inventory objectives and a $39 million decrease due to revising cost estimates based on existing multi-year missile contracts and changes in support requirements. These decreases were offset by about $1 million increase for economic escalation.

Dragon: Increase—$214.8 million.

This increase is attributable to $101 million quantity change as a result of a revision in combat and training consumption rates and forces to be equipped, $67 million due to change in learning curve computations, labor rates, overhead rates and estimating error, $12 million for stretchout of procurement, $24 million to update future economic escalation, and $11 million for support costs.

Cheyenne: Increase—$38.2 million.

This increase is primarily a result of the request for fiscal year 1973 funds for the fabrication of an additional prototype utilizing parts and tools available from the original production program, and for the renovation of two existing development prototypes.

NAVY

SSN–688: Increase—$250.2 million.

This increase is primarily due to an increase in the quantity of ships at a cost of about $182 million and $69 million for update of escalation.

Poseidon: Decrease—$303.6 million.

This decrease is primarily due to net reductions associated with lower negotiated missile and other equipment costs of about $245 million, and a decrease in the estimated cost for escalation of $14 million.

Mark 48: Decrease—$306.0 million.

The current SAR reflects the Mark 48 Mod 1 torpedo program for which a production contract was awarded in July 1971. The decrease shown above is primarily attributed to the elimination of $281 million in costs related to the Mark 48 Mod 0/2 programs which have been cancelled.

AIR FORCE

F–15: Increase—$493.0 million.

This increase reflects a $26 million increase in development program based on contractor cost data submitted for renegotiation of engine contract after deletion of engines for F–14B aircraft, $2 million for added program scope requirements for missile test hardware and a decrease of $4 million for deletion of test center service funding. In addition, the air vehicle price increased $412 million based on contractor data submitted for renegotiation of engine contract after deletion of F–14B aircraft which was offset by a decrease of $8 million for refinement of previous estimates. Initial spares estimates increased $94 million due to deletion of engines for the F–14B aircraft which was offset by $44 million as a result of computing spare engines on a modular support concept.

F–111: Increase $326.7 million.

This increase is attributable to $293 million for an increase in quantity of aircraft to be procured and $33 million for initial spares cost increase.

Minuteman II: Increase—$161.8 million.

This increase is primarily due to force modernization costs.

Minuteman III: Increase—$128.8 million.

This increase is primarily due to force modernization costs.

ATTACHMENT II

SCHEDULE OF PROGRAM COST DATA APPEARING ON THE MAR., 31, 1972 SARS

[In millions of dollars]

System	Planning estimate	Development estimate	Cost change: Quantity	Cost change: Other	Current estimate
Army (8):					
Cheyenne [1]	125.9	125.9	15.4	189.9	331.2
Safeguard [2]	4,185.0	4,185.0	1,686.0	2,104.0	7,975.0
Dragon	382.2	404.2	(131.9)	212.8	485.1
Sam-D [3]	4,916.8	5,240.5			5,240.5
Lance	586.7	652.9	5.9	115.4	774.2
Tow	410.4	727.3	(307.4)	232.0	651.9
M-60A2	162.1	205.6	(45.3)	243.2	403.5
Tacfire	123.6	160.5	11.9	33.5	205.9
Total	10,892.7	11,701.9	1,234.6	3,130.8	16,067.3
Navy (20):					
SSN–688	1,658.0	5,747.5	1,084.0	243.6	7,075.1
DLGN–38 [4]	769.2	820.4			820.4
S–3A	1,763.8	2,891.1		260.7	3,151.8
F–14	6,166.0	6,166.0	(1,116.5)	222.1	5,271.6
EA–6B	689.7	817.7	(50.8)	452.3	1,219.2
P–3C	1,294.2	1,294.2	949.0	46.3	2,289.5
A–7E	1,465.6	1,465.6	(70.5)	755.3	2,150.4
Vast 247	241.1	312.0	(180.7)	312.3	443.6
Phoenix	370.8	536.4	185.5	529.5	1,251.4
Condor	356.3	441.0	(146.0)	85.5	380.5
Poseidon [5]	4,568.7	4,568.7	(243.6)	425.9	4,751.0
Sparrow E [6]	1,215.8	740.7	(529.7)	120.6	331.6
Sparrow F [6]	151.5	707.7	28.0	490.6	1,226.3
Mark 48 [7]	720.5	1,753.8	(4.3)	183.5	1,933.0
LHA	1,380.3	1,380.3	(480.6)	70.3	970.0
CVAN–68/69	946.5	1,063.2		253.0	1,316.2
DE–1052	1,285.1	1,259.7		170.9	1,430.6
SSN–637 [5]	2,515.8	2,515.8		428.2	2,944.0
DD–963	1,784.4	2,581.2		173.3	2,754.5
Aegis	388.0	427.6		56.7	484.3
Total	29,731.3	37,490.6	(576.2)	5,280.6	42,195.0
Air Force (10):					
B–1	8,954.5	11,218.8	(33.8)	(72.4)	11,112.6
F–15	6,039.1	7,355.2		446.5	7,810.7
C–5A	3,423.0	3,413.2	(710.3)	1,823.5	4,526.4
F–111	4,686.6	5,505.5	(2,628.0)	4,117.1	6,994.6
A–7D	1,379.1	1,379.1	(282.6)	252.2	1,348.7
AWACS	2,656.7	2,661.6		(.3)	2,661.3
Maverick	257.9	383.4	(82.1	84.0	385.3
SRAM	167.1	236.6	125.6	969.7	1,331.9
Minuteman II	3,014.1	4,254.9	4.0	647.5	4,906.4
Minuteman III	2,695.5	4,673.8	(155.3)	1,592.0	6,110.5
Total	33,273.6	41,082.1	(3,762.5)	9,859.8	47,179.4

[1] The Cheyenne costs represent research and development costs only. These estimates do not include termination costs related to the cancelled production contract.

[2] For the programs where the SAR's have shown only a development or a planning estimate, we have made both estimates the same to prevent distortion between the totals of these columns.

[3] The development estimate of $4,031,000,000 formerly reported, dated March 1967, was changed to $5,240,500,000 in March 1972 to reflect the entry into engineering development.

[4] Although no development estimate was shown on the June 30, 1971, SAR, our last report included the same cost for the planning and development estimates in order to prevent distortion between the totals of these 2 estimates. With the award of the production contract, the Navy established a development estimate in the Dec. 31, 1971, SAR and is reflected in this schedule

[5] Cost estimates for the Air Force portion of this program were deleted from the SAR in December 1971.

[6] Cost estimates include Air Force estimates for its portion of the Sparrow F program.

[7] The development estimate was revised based on the award of the production contract in July 1971.

ATTACHMENT III

WEAPON SYSTEMS REMOVED FROM THE SAR

[Dollar amounts in millions]

System	Planning estimate	Development estimate	Cost change: Quantity	Cost change: Other	Current estimate	Date of final SAR
MBT–70 [1]	$2,126.5	$2,100.9	($602.4)	$721.2	$2,219.7	Sept. 30, 1971
Gama goat [2]	69.1	163.9	(5.5)	22.7	181.1	June 30, 1971
SQS–23 [2]	157.1	170.5	(82.7)	94.6	182.4	Do.
SSN–685 [3]	100.8	151.7		26.2	177.9	Do.
DLG Conv. [3]	698.8	698.8		307.8	1,006.6	Do.
Amtrac [3]	324.4	328.5	(126.9)	.4	202.0	Do.
FB–111 [3]	1,781.5	1,781.5	(1,043.3)	546.6	1,284.8	Sept. 30, 1971
Total	5,258.2	5,395.8	(1,860.8)	1,719.5	5,254.5	

[1] Dropped from the SAR because program was canceled.

[2] Dropped from the SAR because production was completed or substantially completed, or the program costs are below the revised OSD thresholds.

[3] Dropped from the SAR because visibility required by the SAR is no longer necessary and an internal monthly status report will be substituted in its place.

JIM PEARSON: A LEADER IN THE SENATE

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I was delighted to learn that the distinguished senior Senator from Kansas, Mr. PEARSON, has handily won the Republican primary in Kansas and will lead the Kansas Republican ticket in the fall. I have only the deepest personal and professional respect for this able Senator from our Nation's heartland. In his own quiet, steady way, JIM PEARSON is a moving force in this body.

Senator PEARSON is known in this Chamber and throughout the Nation as a man who votes according to his conscience rather than by the advice of pollsters and pundits.

Mr. President, I am especially aware of the role Senator PEARSON has played in the great movement to bring equality in the laws and dignity to the lives of racial and ethnic minorities in our Nation. JIM PEARSON has been in the forefront of the struggle for civil rights throughout his Senate career. Time after time, Senator PEARSON has provided a critical vote needed to secure passage of bills to end discrimination and promote equality of opportunity for all Americans.

His Senate career has spanned the period of greatest legislative action on civil rights since the Civil War. He voted for the historic Civil Rights Act of 1964 and has opposed attempts to weaken its substance. He was there when we needed his vote to insure that all persons in this Nation would have the right to vote. JIM PEARSON'S support helped pass equal employment opportunity legislation—and much more.

Mr. President, our struggle for civil rights is not yet ended. Black people, Indians, Spanish-speaking Americans, and other minority peoples have not yet achieved true equality in our Nation. For those legislative struggles yet to come and for constructive legislation in all fields, we need JIM PEARSON'S persistent support to make the American dream a reality for all of our people.

FAULTY APPROACH TO NO-FAULT

Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, we are told that the concept of no-fault insurance is an idea whose time has come.

This may be, and certainly I do not oppose the concept.

It is my belief, however, that S. 945 is the wrong approach to implement the concept of no-fault insurance.

I oppose the bill for these reasons:

First. This is a total no-fault concept which is unproven and even untested;

Second. This bill does not allow sufficient latitude for State governments to adjust the program to meet the different local conditions reflected in different parts of the Nation;

Third. It most likely will bring increases in insurance premiums across the Nation and especially in the more sparsely populated States such as Arizona;

Fourth. Motorists with good traffic records could be penalized while those with poor records would benefit.

Mr. President, what we are proposing is the imposition of a national program which will turn our philosophy of auto insurance a full 180 degrees. In most States motorists have been required to carry insurance to pay for any damage caused by their negligence. The no-fault approach dictates that each person buy insurance to protect himself, that the negligent motorist is no longer responsible for the damage, pain, and suffering he causes others—at least no longer responsible to the victims except in extreme cases.

UNTESTED CONCEPT

Now let me elaborate on what I mean by saying this is an untested plan. It is true that several States have enacted no-fault legislation in the last few years. But these all have been limited no-fault programs, not the total no-fault concept we are discussing here today. And, I must point out that the programs in the States which have no-fault systems have not yet been in operation long enough to give us concrete evidence as to how well they are operating.

Time and again in the past decade Congress has enacted programs based on high idealism without any experience as to how they will work out. These programs frequently have been disastrous.

If an idea appears to be good, we should not be afraid of testing it before trying to impose it on the entire Nation.

When we finally decide to impose a new concept or policy on our 50 States, I do not see why we cannot provide for an orderly transition rather than acting with undue haste.

And I do not see why we cannot allow States to have reasonable and meaningful options.

INSUFFICIENT LATITUDE

Sometimes I wish that we had this Capitol on wheels and could move it around from State to State during our sessions. Then all Members of Congress would learn that there are indeed great differences in the geography and living conditions in our States, and within our States

The bill we are considering, S. 945, will abrogate every existing motor vehicle State insurance program. It will impose Federal standards that will allow the States no flexibility in determining the program or benefits most appropriate for their various situations.

Any no-fault legislation should give consideration to the fact that there are considerable variations in average incomes, medical costs and facilities, and basic motor vehicle programs in the States.

INCREASED COST

No-fault insurance has been sold to the public as a concept which will lower the cost of insurance and make it easier to collect on claims.

It is obvious to me that, under the program we are considering in the Senate, the cost of insurance to Arizona motorists will jump significantly. One estimate, by Charles C. Hewitt, actuary of the Allstate Insurance Co., is that the insurance premiums for Arizonans would go up an estimated 35.8 percent as a result of the no-fault program we are discussing.

Rates would rise very little for the highly urbanized States, but would soar in the more rural and the sparsely settled States.

Indications are that there would be some advantages in the densely populated States such as those along the eastern seaboard, but why should the rest of the Nation be penalized in the process?

It has been pointed out that the bill would limit safe driver discounts, thus penalizing the middle-income, middle-aged, average driver. At the same time, drivers who have been considered high risks could benefit.

The new basis for rating policyholders will become the likelihood of their being involved in an accident rather than the likelihood of their causing an accident.

This, I believe, will work to the detriment of the average man.

Mr. President, this is one of those bills—we have had so many of them in recent years—which promises so much but which can deliver so little.

No one can say exactly what effects it will have, and that is perhaps the most powerful argument against it. The chance of its complicating the lives of our citizens is every bit as great as the chance that it will simplify things.

It will limit rather than expand the amount of legitimate damages that most victims of auto accidents can collect. It is very possible that this legislation will not reduce legal redtape as advertised by its proponents.

This bill is an unwise attempt to implement a reasonably sound idea. After all, we have had no-fault insurance for many years in the form of medical payment, collision, and comprehensive coverages.

This concept can be and should be expanded through prudent pilot programs.

To impose it upon the Nation in one fell swoop is irresponsible and foolhardy. We in Congress owe it to our constituents to do more than close our eyes and hope for the best.

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES WIN ANOTHER COURT CASE

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, the Nation's Federal employees have won yet another court battle in their fight for full protection of the laws.

On Tuesday, August 1, the U.S. district court directed a major health insurance company to pay thousands of Federal workers benefits which had previously been denied them. The court ruled that the insurance company could no longer avoid claims by simply reinterpreting contracts after they had been duly negotiated.

This decision was the second time this week that a Federal court has enforced a Government employee measure now before Congress.

On Monday, July 31, the U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia ruled that Federal workers can no longer be refused participation in political activities simply because they are employed by the Government. A central provision in the Hatch Act was ruled in violation of the first amendment to the Constitution. While the matter must still be decided in a higher court, the ramifications of Monday's decision could go well beyond reforms which have been contemplated before the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

On Tuesday, the district court ruled that Federal employees had a just claim to benefits being denied them by their insurance carriers. Recently the Senate approved a measure which I had introduced giving the Civil Service Commission authority to overrule an insurance company when the Commission believes the employee to have a just claim—even if the carrier interprets the contract otherwise.

Just as the earlier Hatch Act decision, Tuesday's action offers real hope to Federal employees that their longstanding complaints will be soon resolved.

Since many of my constituents have expressed concern over the dispute involving Federal employee health benefits, I ask unanimous consent that yesterday's Washington Star article, which gives a review of this issue, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FEDERAL UNION WINS CASE ON HOSPITALIZATION

(By John Cramer)

Federal employes have won a monumental victory in their fight to bring under control the costs of their government-sponsored group health insurance.

It came yesterday by way of a court settlement approved by U.S. District Judge Charles R. Richey in a suit brought by the National Association of Internal Revenue Employes.

In effect, it directed Blue Cross-Blue Shield to pay thousands of federal workers insurance benefits previously denied them by a cost-cutting order Blue Cross headquarters issued to member groups in mid-1971.

NONPAYMENT ORDER

This order directed non-payment of claims arising from the diagnostic services performed in-hospital which could have been done on an outpatient basis.

Blue Cross described it as mere stricter enforcement of the fine print of the contract.

But it was issued without notice to employes—or even to the Civil Service Commission, which negotiated the contract, and came to light through hearings conducted by Rep. Jerome Waldie, D-Calif.

The result was that thousands of employes found themselves facing large hospital bills they thought were covered by insurance.

It was shortly before the Waldie hearings that national Blue Cross officials sought to justify a 34.1 percent rise in premiums for Blue Cross subscribers by projecting a $146 million deficit by the end of 1972. In letters sent to all senators and representatives, Blue Cross vice president Joseph E. Harvey said losses during 1970 and 1971 totaled about $68 million.

"MILLIONS" IN BENEFITS

During those years, Harvey maintained, "federal employes have been using . . . benefits more often and in greater degree than was anticipated. (They) have received millions of dollars more in benefits than they have paid for."

Four months later, Blue Cross announced that there had been an error in computing past deficits. Losses through 1971 had been only $16 million.

In the meantime, the Price Commission had reduced Blue Cross' premium request from the original 34.1 percent to 22 percent.

The NAIRE suit was directed at Blue Cross, from which it sought $350,000 damages on behalf of Internal Revenue employes, and at the Civil Service Commission, which it charged with "negligence" for failing to inform employes of the benefit cutback.

The court-approved settlement, however, applies to all of the 1.6 million federal workers insured by Blue Cross. It was jointly worked out by NAIRE, the Blue Cross, and CSC.

By its terms:

Blue Cross agrees to pay all 1971–72 costs, subject only to a $100 deductible for employes hospitalized for diagnostic services which could have been performed outside a hospital. Under the cutback order, they paid for the diagnostic services, but not for the hospitalization.

CSC agrees to publicize to the employes the fact that the payments are available.

And employes whose claims for payment have been denied are given until Dec. 31, 1973, to file or refile them.

NAIRE estimated employes could win as much as $10 million in previously denied claims. A CSC official said the figure would be "much, much lower—but we don't underestimate the importance of the settlement to individual employes."

But let's not quibble about the dollars. Perhaps NAIRE over-estimated them. Perhaps CSC strained to minimize them. The important thing is that both Blue Cross and CSC, in agreeing to the settlement, publicly admitted error. Tighter management of insurance costs is on the way.

FOR THE LOVE OF POLITICS

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, one of the nicest things that has happened to me and my wife, Bethine, since we have come to Washington is getting acquainted with Frank and Holly Mankiewicz. It is a friendship that we have coveted and thoroughly enjoyed.

In the Washington Post of July 27, Myra MacPherson has written an unusually fine profile of Frank Mankiewicz, whose importance as a capital figure in the McGovern campaign for the President warrants its inclusion in the RECORD.

I ask unanimous consent that the article, entitled "For the Love of Politics," be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FOR THE LOVE OF POLITICS

(By Myra MacPherson)

Frank Mankiewicz and the man he is trying to get elected President are as dissimilar in style as their dissimilar childhoods might have foretold.

There was George McGovern, the son of a preacher, growing up in a South Dakota town that reminds him of the aimless small town-ness of "The Last Picture Show." And there was Mankiewicz, two years younger, growing up in Hollywood—the son of Herman Mankiewicz, the acerbic observer of the human scene who gave us "Citizen Kane" and the Marx Brothers' "Duck Soup."

While McGovern was sneaking off to his clandestine "flicks," and maybe an ice cream soda, Frank Mankiewicz knew mansions with swimming pools and saw his parents partying with people like Ben Hecht, Dorothy Parker, the Marx Brothers, Orson Welles and William Randolph Hearst.

Herman Mankiewicz—Hecht once called him the Central Park West Voltaire—was one of the leaders among the New York expatriate wits in the '20s and '30s who hated Hollywood, the town that made them rich. He left his son a legacy of wit, a dislike of Hollywood and a love of politics that drew Frank Mankiewicz to Washington, Robert Kennedy and ultimately—because of Kennedy—to McGovern.

Mankiewicz talks reluctantly and sparingly of his Hollywood youth. "My father convinced me Hollywood was not a real world. I don't remember a single dinner table conversation that involved his work. It was usually politics," said Mankiewicz the other day, wolfing down an egg salad sandwich and answering phone calls in his cramped office. "My father was a frustrated political columnist."

A heavy drinker and gambler, the elder Mankiewicz had an irreverence that rankled movie moguls. Once, being punished, he was told to write a Rin Tin Tin script. In Mankiewicz's version a house is on fire and the dog is carrying a baby *into* the flames. Mankiewicz may have been the originator of that famous caustic one-liner, when he said of Orson Welles (who claimed credit for the Kane script when it won an academy award), "There but for the grace of God, goes God."

Frank grew up in an atmosphere of urbanity and overachievement as well as one of strong family love, fostered by his Jewish mother. (His father, the son of a Jewish immigrant who became a professor, was an atheist.)

Frank's mother, now widowed, has on her mantle the Citizen Kane Oscar and the latest "Who's Who in America" marked at her sons' listings (Frank's brother Don wrote TV pilots for "Marcus Welby" and "Ironsides" as well as a novel).

Although Herman's fame was declining when he hit 40, his son Frank was not even nationally known until he was 44—four years ago. As Robert Kennedy's aide, he carried the news to the press, his face creased in sorrow, that Kennedy was dead.

Before that, Mankiewicz ran unsuccessfully for the California legislature, was a newspaperman, a Beverly Hills lawyer, a director of the Peace Corps in Peru, and Robert Kennedy's press secretary from 1966.

Mankiewicz uses his wit to hide his deep feelings and as a foil—successfully evading questions by the press, who clearly enjoy the humor, if not the lack of substantive information.

The other day he ducked a question about Philadelphia Mayor Frank L. Rizzo backing a Republican with the same crack he made about former Treasury Secretary John Connally—"his defection to the Republicans raised the intellectual level of both parties."

This week, he used characteristic understatement when McGovern's running mate, Sen. Thomas F. Eagleton, disclosed he had been hospitalized, under psychiatric care on three occasions.

While others were saying it was a disaster, Mankiewicz was saying, "It is not a plus."

Stung by a report in the paper that young McGovern aides wished Mankiewicz's power diluted because he had become "too Machiavellian," he nevertheless cracked, "As I recall, he ran a couple of successful campaigns. It's worth it all now, if three centuries from

now, they're saying somebody's too 'Mankiewiczian.'"

Mankiewicz is complex enough to have been called a variety of adjectives besides Machiavellian—cool, pragmatic, brilliant, arrogant, vain, charming, testy, condescending, aloof, petty.

There are those who praise him as a political maneuverer and others who feel that he, and other aides, are not as sharp as they should be in some instances. Some critics say Mankiewicz and other staff members made a disastrous goof in not checking out Eagleton, but Mankiewicz takes the position that they did all they could; that they checked out the only rumors they had heard—that Eagleton had a drinking problem. Mankiewicz said they were false.

Often considered "cold blooded" about politics, Mankiewicz felt McGovern's only chance in 1968, according to the book "McGovern" by Robert Anson, was to "provoke Humphrey into commiting a fatal gaffe, namely disowning the Johnson war policy." If that happened, Mankiewicz thought, "the ego of Lyndon Johnson would be so wounded that he would 'pull the rug out from under Hubert.'"

It was also Mankiewicz who suggested in 1968 that Sen. Abraham Ribicoff—who nominated McGovern that year and this year, too—throw away his cliches and "say something about what's going on in the streets."

Ribicoff brought the convention—and Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago—to a roar when he took that advice and said, "With George McGovern, we wouldn't have Gestapo tactics in the streets of Chicago."

When Mankiewicz is preoccupied, he brushes past friends without saying hello. Holly, his wife of 20 years, recalls "When I met him I didn't like him. I admired him but I thought he was Mr. Know It All. I knew he was very, very smart, but I didn't think he knew much about humility."

In addition to his wit, his wife found "great warmth," although she says he still thinks he's sometimes "vain." "He sure as hell can make me mad, but he never bores me," she says.

His rather homely face, with the deep circles under the eyes, the split in the front teeth, the jut-jawed smile, lights up with warmth when he wants to be charming. You can see the one-liners forming, as the eyes start to laugh before his face does.

As McGovern's national political director, Mankiewicz travels with him. He gives the candidate the benefit of his judgment—but not, as he did with Kennedy— his urbane one-liners. One aide said Mankiewicz tried that once and that it bombed because of McGovern's aw shucks delivery.

"His delivery with my words would be impossible," said Mankiewicz. "He's so genuine, so straight—just what the country wants," said Mankiewicz, who once kidded McGovern that the way to change his mild mannered image was to "get a rumor spread that someone at a cocktail party made a remark that you didn't like, and you gave him a quick karate chop that broke his arm."

While he avoids any introspective philosophizing about politics or why he's in it—"I've always just loved it"—Mankiewicz says, like other old Kennedy hands, he's working for the one man he thought could do the things Kennedy wanted done. Mankiewicz urged him to take over and run in 1968, only days after Kennedy was killed. He left a political column, a TV show and considerable money to go with McGovern last July, a time when his friends were laughing at McGovern's chances.

Mankiewicz can look injured and innocent when it is suggested that McGovern waffles on issues—"very little, very little"—or that Mankiewicz himself has told a political lie or two.

"He lied like hell about Bobby's condition when he was shot," said one newspaper friend of Mankiewicz, "but that was something he had to do."

Others thought Wednesday that Mankiewicz was fudging when he said that neither he nor McGovern knew the exact medical diagnosis of Eagleton's problem.

On the South Carolina credentials vote, Mankiewicz says McGovern aides "didn't sabotage the women. All we did was counter the tactical moves of Humphrey's 50 or so people who voted for it."

But Holly, who has an ingenuous quality of candor quite absent in most politician's wives, said, "I don't think Frank handled that very delicately. Instead of denying the tactics on television, I asked him, why didn't you just say 'we had to do it'? Frank said, 'Jesus Christ, we can't tell the women that. They're so damn mad—that would only make them madder.'" Although she says her husband has "fewer standard male notions about women than any man I ever met," she adds, "he's *not* a woman."

Holly says he's all for women's lib, but joked when the movement first started, "My god, this is tremendous—you get to go to work and I get to cry."

This year has been tough on the family. Although Josh, 16, sometimes travels with his father, Ben, 5, is too young to understand why his father is not home more often.

Holly has been a secretary to the constant phone calls—"I wouldn't mind, if they just gave me time to brush my teeth." She stopped waiting dinners for her husband, "when I found out I was hollering at him every night."

When Mankiewicz has time to relax, he reads, often re-reading old favorites like Orwell and James Joyce. A baseball freak, Mankiewicz uses his photographic memory ("it's been invaluable in my life") to stump friends with sports trivia: "In 1945, what major league pitcher had the name of his home town on his jersey? Bill Voiselle—number 96—came from Ninety Six, South Carolina."

As a boy, he dreamed of being a baseball player—"all my fantasies use to involve being a baseball player—the ones that didn't involve girls."

Mankiewicz says that he wants to write a "good book" about Washington, and that he "might go back to practicing law. I've got eight years to think about that," he says, adding with a confident grin, "I assume McGovern will be President eight years."

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time for morning business having expired, morning business is concluded.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Berry, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed the bill (S. 3507) to establish a national policy and develop a national program for the management, beneficial use, protection, and development of the land and water resources of the Nation's coastal zones, and for other purposes, with an amendment, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages in writing from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Geisler, one of his secretaries.

REPORT OF NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXTENSION AND CONTINUING EDUCATION—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. WILLIAMS) laid before the Senate the following message from the President of the United States, which, with the accompanying report, was referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare:

To the Congress of the United States:

The Sixth Annual Report of the National Advisory Council on Extension and Continuing Education is submitted herewith. The Council is authorized by Public Law 89–329.

I congratulate the Council on its comprehensive study of the Federal role in community service, extension and continuing education for adults through the resources of colleges and universities. The study points up the need for increased coordination of the support the Federal government lends to these efforts.

Several of the Council's proposals are receiving thorough consideration by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, including those relating to improved coordination of Federal assistance to extension, community service, and continuing education programs.

The Council also recommends that additional funds be provided for the program authorized by Title I of the Higher Education Act of 1965. I continue to hold as a basic principle that greater emphasis should be placed on broad funding approaches for Federal grant-in-aid programs, and that narrow categorical grant programs such as Title I should be relied on less as a means of channeling Federal funds to individual institutions.

RICHARD NIXON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *August 3, 1972.*

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session, the PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. WILLIAMS) laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(The nominations received today are printed at the end of Senate proceedings.)

EXECUTIVE SESSION

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now go into executive session to proceed to the consideration of the ABM Treaty.

TREATY ON LIMITATION OF ANTIBALLISTIC-MISSILE SYSTEMS, EXECJTIVE L, 92D CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

The Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, proceeded to consider Executive L, 92d Congress, second session, the treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, which was read the second time as follows:

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,

Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament,

Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States.

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.

2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.

ARTICLE II

1. For the purposes of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:

(*a*) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;

(*b*) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and

(*c*) ABM radars, which are radars, constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.

2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those which are:

(*a*) operational;

(*b*) under construction;

(*c*) undergoing testing;

(*d*) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or

(*e*) mothballed.

ARTICLE III

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:

(*a*) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and centered on the Party's national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular and have a diameter of no more than three kilometers; and

(*b*) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM radars.

ARTICLE IV

The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges.

ARTICLE V

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, nor to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, nor to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.

ARTICLE VI

To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by this Treaty, each Party undertakes:

(*a*) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; and

(*b*) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

ARTICLE VII

Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out.

ARTICLE VIII

ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time.

ARTICLE IX

To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty.

ARTICLE X

Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty.

ARTICLE XI

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms.

ARTICLE XII

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

ARTICLE XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will:

(*a*) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(*b*) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(*c*) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification;

(*d*) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty;

(*e*) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;

(*f*) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(*g*) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.

ARTICLE XIV

1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.

ARTICLE XV

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE XVI

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

DONE at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:
RICHARD NIXON,
President of the United States of America.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
L. I. BREZHNEV,
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous unanimous-consent agreement, debate on this treaty will be limited to 8 hours, to be equally divided between and controlled by the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT) and the Senator from Vermont (Mr. AIKEN); time on reservations and understandings to be limited to 2 hours, to be equally divided between and controlled by the mover and the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), with debate on any amendment thereto to be limited to 30 minutes, to be equally divided between and controlled by the mover and the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT).

Who yields time?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield myself 15 minutes.

Before I proceed to make my prepared presentation of this matter, I wish to call the attention of the Senate to a new development that was reported in the morning newspapers. I was very surprised indeed to read, on the front page of the New York Times this morning, an article by Mr. William Beecher which raised some serious questions about the attitude of the administration with regard to this treaty and the interim agreement. For the RECORD, I should like to read a part of it, just as a taking off place for a few comments.

The headline and the subject line are as follows:

SENATORS SEEK TO BOLSTER U.S. ARMS-PACT POSITION

RESOLUTION CONTAINS RESERVATIONS ABOUT ACCORDS WITH SOVIET INTENDED TO HELP STAND IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS

The article reads:

A group of Democratic and Republican senators, with Administration support, plans to introduce a resolution containing a number of reservations about the accords with the Soviet Union on offensive and defensive missiles.

Well-placed sources in the Pentagon, State Department and Congress say that the Administration agreed to lobby for the reservations—to be introduced as a resolution during the floor debate on the accords tomorrow or Friday—in hopes that they will strengthen its hand in the second round of talks on arms limitation expected this year or early next year.

The sources said that the Senate move was being lead by Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, who has raised persistent questions about some of the terms of the accords.

Co-sponsors include Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, the Senate minority leader, and Senator Gordon L. Allott of Colorado, chairman of the Republican Policy Committee in the Senate.

The reservations, according to Congressional and Administration sources, would do the following things:

I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of the article be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SENATORS SEEK TO BOLSTER U.S. ARMS-PACT POSITION

RESOLUTION CONTAINS RESERVATIONS ABOUT ACCORDS WITH SOVIET INTENDED TO HELP STAND IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS

(By William Beecher)

WASHINGTON, Aug. 2.—A group of Democratic and Republican senators with Administration support, plans to introduce a resolution containing a number of reservations about the accords with the Soviet Union on offensive and defensive missiles.

Well-placed sources in the Pentagon, State Department and Congress say that the Administration agreed to lobby for the reservations—to be introduced as a resolution during the floor debate on the accords tomorrow or Friday—in hopes that they will strengthen its hand in the second round of talks on arms limitation expected this year or early next year.

The sources said that the Senate move was being led by Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, who has raised persistent questions about some of the terms of the accords.

Co-sponsors include Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, the Senate minority leader, and Senator Gordon L. Allott of Colorado, chairman of the Republican Policy Committee in the Senate.

The reservations, according to Congressional and Administration sources, would do the following things:

Warn the Soviet Union not to take advantage of the period of negotiations for a comprehensive treaty covering missiles and bombers to deploy improved weapons that could threaten American land-based forces. The resolution makes clear that Congress would regard such action as dangerous enough to call for abrogation of the interim agreement and for American countermoves.

Urge the Administration to insist in the forthcoming talks on offensive weapons that the forces of each side be roughly equal. This is a reaction to the fact that of the two accords already reached and now before the Senate, one, a five-year agreement on offensive weapons, permits the Russians to have about 50 per cent more land-based missiles and 30 per cent more missile submarines. The other agreements, a treaty on defensive weapons, permits each side to deploy 200 interceptor missiles.

Explaining why the Administration is prepared to back such reservations, one senior official declared: "I would see them as reinforcing our negotiating position in the next round."

APPROVAL IN COMMITTEE

The Jackson resolution, Congressional sources said, will be taken up along with a resolution introduced by Senator J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. The committee unanimously approved his resolution, simply stating "approval" of the executive agreement without any reservations.

The interim agreement on offensive missiles requires a simple majority vote in each House of Congress. Passage of the antimissile treaty, by contrast, requires a two-thirds majority in the Senate, but does not require House action.

Supporters of the Jackson resolution, both in Congress and in the Administration, predicted easy passage. They say, however, that the reservations are advisory, and do not modify the substance of the negotiated agreement.

Administration officials pointed out that the Russians had informed President Nixon, as well as members of the American negotiating team, that they intended to pursue weapons movements not specifically prohibited by the accords.

LAND MISSILES AT SCENE

One point of concern relates to what the Russians may do about their very large land-based missiles. They are permitted to expand by 15 per cent the size of their silos for the very large SS-9 missiles. Some of these missiles carry three warheads of five megatons each. A megaton is equivalent in force to one million tons of TNT.

The Russians have built, but not yet tested, an advanced version of the SS-9 that intelligence sources say is large enough to carry 20 warheads of half a megaton to one megaton each.

The interim agreement would not forbid the Soviet Union to test such a multiple-warhead missile and place as many as 313 in existing silos, Pentagon sources note. Potentially, that would give the Russians more than 6,000 warheads in this one intercontinental ballistic missile system, which would be considered a major threat to America's 1,000 Minuteman missiles.

WARNING TO SOVIET

"One of the Senate reservations would put Moscow on notice that such a program, while not specifically forbidden, would be taken by the Congress as an aggressive act requiring some kind of response on our part," one defense official said. "It would also warn that the Congress will be watching for any moves of such a nature very closely."

The official said that four 1963 Senate reservations about the ban on most nuclear weapons tests are regarded by the Nixon Administration as valuable both in keeping up America's underground-test program and in inhibiting the Soviet Union from any temptation to cheat. This is so, he said, because the reservations also call for standby preparations to resume atmospheric testing should the Soviet Union suddenly do so.

In a statement accompanying the accords on limiting strategic arms, the United States said that the purpose of future negotiations should be to "constrain and reduce" threats to America's retaliatory forces. Should a comprehensive agreement on offensive weapons not be negotiated in five years, the statement warned, this "would constitute a basis for withdrawal" of the anti-ballistic-missile treaty.

MESSAGE REINFORCED

Administration officials say the Senate reservation on this point of jeopardizing the American ability to retaliate reinforces that warning, both by adding the Senate's voice to it, and by implicitly applying the warning to Soviet actions during the five years, not just at the end of the period.

The recommendation to the President to seek a treaty of more nearly balanced offensive forces, according to State and Defense Department officials, should improve the Administration's bargaining position because it raises doubt whether the Senate would ratify a treaty calling for anything less.

Some Administration planners are hoping for a phased mutual reduction of offensive forces, with permission for each nation to

place more of its retaliatory missiles at sea. There they would be less vulnerable to surprise attack than would fixed land-based ICBM's and bombers.

Testifying on the arms accords today before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird complained that President Nixon's proposed $250-billion ceiling on Federal spending would be unfair if it was applied only to defense and foreign aid spending. He said he "was not consulted" on the ceiling.

But Representative Frank T. Bow, Republican of Ohio, who introduced the bill setting the ceiling, said that defense and foreign aid would not be discriminated against under the measure since the President, not Congress, would decide what to cut.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I wish to make two or three observations.

In the first place, the Committee on Foreign Relations had no notice of any reservations or understandings which the administration desires. The committee acted unanimously, including the minority leader (Mr. SCOTT) and all the Republican members unanimously, to report both the treaty and the interim agreement, without encumbering reservations or understandings of any kind.

It was my understanding at the time that this was in accord with the desires of the administration. I have been very pleased, up until this point, at least, with both the accords on the ABM in the form of the treaty, and the interim agreement. I favored them, and I was very pleased to support them.

This news article, if it is true, does raise some very serious questions in my mind as to the sincerity of the administration. I again say—if the article is true.

A member of the committee staff did call Mr. Abshire, the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, who stated that he did have a copy of the proposal—I believe that is how he referred to it—in this article which Mr. Jackson is considering submitting, together with others.

It raises a very serious question in my mind as to my own position, having publicly committed myself in support of the agreement. I approve of both agreements—the ABM Treaty and the interim agreement. If the administration is supporting a move to qualify either—this article says by reservations or by understandings; it does not really matter much to me—I feel very much embarrassed to take the lead and to resist these new proposals—if they have administration support.

I anticipated that the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) would complain about the agreements, as he already has, and perhaps offer reservations; but I certainly did not anticipate that the administration would back a move to attach understandings or reservations to an agreement which, it seems to me, is a very hopeful one.

The thrust of the article is that we will, in effect, threaten the Soviet Union if they take advantage of the period of negotiations to increase their weaponry. It says:

Take advantage of the period of negotiations for a comprehensive treaty covering missiles and bombers to deploy improved weapons that could threaten American land-based forces.

This body voted in the last week for an enormous increase of funds for such weapons as the Trident and the B–1 and a variety of other more modern and more effective weapons.

I joined some of my colleagues in opposing those proposals, because I think those actions cast some doubt upon the good faith of our own Government in wishing to control the arms race. However, that decision has been made. But for us now, in the face of having ourselves taken the steps of authorizing the appropriations of enormous sums of money, running into the billions, to criticize or threaten the Russians that if they do likewise, we shall take measures that possibly will call for the abrogation of the interim agreements, and so forth, is a most inconsistent and, it seems to me, irrational procedure.

A more appropriate reservation would be that we would resist any inclination to increase our weapons if they would. In other words, an understanding of mutual restraint carried out by our actually restraining our own proliferation of these modern weapons, in my view, would be very much in accord, but to threaten them that we would do as they have done would be most inappropriate.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. A few minutes ago, I read the article to which the Senator from Arkansas, the chairman of the committee, is referring; and I want to say now that I learned a long time ago not to believe everything I read in the newspapers or heard on the air or saw on television.

The story may be accurate. I do not know. But I do know that no one has said anything to me about reservations or anything else which would weaken the treaty we are to act upon soon.

I expect that the United States will give its own understanding to the meaning of the treaty, because that is always done. I do not say that no reservations are advisable, because I do not know what they may be. I only hope that, following the approval of the treaties which we soon will be considering, the officials of the two countries—Russia and the United States—will again get together and see what can be done toward extending the area of peace, if we should call it that, and to see what can be done toward establishing still further peaceful understandings between the two countries. But as of now, I have heard nothing whatsoever about this.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I appreciate what the Senator from Vermont has said. He is the ranking Republican member of the Committee on Foreign Relations and is the senior Republican member of this body. He says he knows nothing about this and he raises doubts about it, and I am reassured about that.

I hope the article is not correct. I would be even more startled if they were doing this and did not inform the Senator from Vermont, because I think he has had the same view I have had. Both of us support this agreement; and it would seem most peculiar if, behind our backs, they would undertake to attach understandings to this, without notifying either of us about this kind of procedure—particularly if the administration should do it. If Mr. JACKSON should do it as an individual Senator, without being a member of the committee, he is at liberty to do anything he wishes. There is no reason why he should consult either the Senator from Vermont or me.

But I must say that if the article is true, it raises, for me, rather embarrassing consequences. If it is not true—and I hope it is not—we, of course, will proceed in the regular way.

I agree with the Senator that there is some form of understanding and that each government, usually unilaterally, states it. Already, in some subsidiary statements in Moscow, each side has made unilateral statements as to what it understood, particularly about the interim agreement, and that is perfectly normal.

Mr. AIKEN. The highest officials in Government were not bashful about conveying to me their ideas relating to the various amendments we voted upon yesterday. I believe that I would have at least some inkling of any plans to carry out what is referred to in the article that the Senator from Arkansas has read. I do not think they are bashful.

I might say that there are different schools of thought, even in the Senate, where we are not always of one mind, and that the story the Senator is referring to apparently emanated from members of a different committee.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Of course, I agree with the Senator. I was not at all taken aback by the fact that Senator JACKSON anticipated offering or was going to offer criticisms or reservations or anything else. The only part of the article that bothers me and concerns me is that this is with the administration's support. I hope that part of this story is not true.

Mr. AIKEN. I would like to add that for the last 7 years at least, we have been conducting a face-saving war in Southeast Asia; and the same instinct which prompts nations to conduct face-saving wars also trickles down through to individuals, whether they be officials of government or individuals among the public. I tried to point out yesterday that the business of face saving is tremendously important. We all indulge in it from time to time.

I do not take this article as a serious threat to improving our relations with Russia.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am glad to have that statement of the Senator from Vermont. I sincerely hope that his guess about the authenticity of the article in that respect proves to be true.

In the course of today or tomorrow, the gentleman mentioned and the Members of this body mentioned in the article will say whatever they have in mind.

Well, Mr. President, with those preliminary comments, I wish to proceed to

discuss the treaty on the limitation of the ABM systems and interim agreement and associated protocol.

I bring before the Senate today, with the unanimous approval of the Foreign Relations Committee, the treaty and agreement signed by the President in Moscow on May 26, 1972, that unanimously recommends the Senate give its advice and consent to the treaty on the ABM systems and its approval to Senate Joint Resolution No. 241 authorizing the President to approve the interim agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic offensive arms.

The treaty and the agreement are hopeful first steps in bringing some measure of restraint and control to what has been called the mad momentum of the nuclear arms race.

I wish, of course, that we had taken this first step years ago. I wish, for example, that the administration had taken the advice of those Members of the Senate who recommended against the initial deployment of the ABM systems. In retrospect, that advice was sound and would have saved our constituents and taxpayers many billions of dollars.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Arkansas yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the chairman for his great leadership on important matters relating to our foreign policy and our national security.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BAYH). The 15 minutes of the Senator from Arkansas have expired.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas is recognized for 10 additional minutes.

Mr. CRANSTON. I was as baffled as was the Senator this morning by the New York Times story, which indicated a totally different approach by the administration. I have just now received a memorandum explaining the amendment to Senate Joint Resolution 241 which was discussed this morning in the New York Times. There is indeed a reservation to be offered to the pending measure with the principal cosponsors being Senator JACKSON and Senator SCOTT. I am informed by their staff representatives that it has the support of the administration, their spokesmen say that the New York Times story is substantially accurate. So the situation is exactly as the Senator described it to be after reading the New York Times this morning. I have here a copy of the amendment to be proposed together with the explanatory statement.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, may I add this is the first I knew that the New York Times is an official spokesman for the administration. I know that Russia has its Tass, and I believe that North Vietnam has its paper, but I did not know that the President has an official newspaper. It may be. I do not say it is not true. But, if it is true that the New York Times has become the official newspaper for the White House, then that certainly means that times are changing.

Mr. CRANSTON. I think the general attitude of the New York Times toward many erroneous policies pursued by the administration indicates plainly that the New York Times is not a mouthpiece for this administration. The New York Times has succeeded in learning more about what is happening both inside the administration and on the Senate floor than members of the committee handling this legislation know.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. More than the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, certainly.

Mr. CRANSTON. Right.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Perhaps this is one of their gambits to embarrass the Foreign Relations Committee, to show how powerful Mr. JACKSON and the Armed Services Committee are. They have shown it all week. I do not know what the motive is or why they concealed—or failed to alert the Senator from Vermont, at least, if no one else.

The Senator from Pennsylvania, after all, is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. He offered no such resolutions, as I recall, in committee. He voted for the one that came out. I had no idea he harbored any desire to change the thrust of either of these agreements.

I am quite at a loss to know why they should do this. I was taken aback when, immediately after the agreements were announced, the Secretary of Defense made a statement demanding these enormous increases in our own armaments. It struck me then that his demand for increased armaments raised a serious question about the intentions of the United States. Did we really mean what the agreements said? This is the same question of credibility that has plagued our Government for several years—and domestically for that matter, besides on foreign policy. I thought that was a very poorly timed statement.

Now, if I understand correctly what these reservations do, they raise a further question. Only last night we voted, against my approval and that of the Senator from California, that we would go ahead on a very large nuclear weapons system on an accelerated basis. And now these reservations say to the Russians, "If you do anything during this period, we are going to take serious measures." This kind of action would raise questions about either our sanity or our sincerity. Take it either way you like.

Mr. CRANSTON. Let me say that I have the gravest concern about the fact that we are locked in by a unanimous-consent agreement to vote tomorrow on final passage of these treaties. All at once we have this surprise, this bombshell, thrown into the midst of our deliberations.

We should at once consider whether it will be possible to change that unanimous-consent agreement, which I know will be very difficult to do. But to vote responsibly, we have to come to grips with this vitally important measure which is so important to the peace of the world. The Jackson amendment has so many ramifications that we should take adequate time to consider this new stance taken by the administration. The committee, which is responsible for the SALT agreements, should have time to consider the matter. To me, free and unlimited debate is a basic principle of the Senate. I came into the Senate favoring a restriction on permission to talk at great length. But as the Senator from Arkansas knows, I have come around to his view. I have witnessed what happens when a Senator does not have full time to consider matters coming before the Senate.

I urge that the distinguished chairman seek to get an agreement for more time, so that we can consider this matter intelligently, wisely, and carefully.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think the Senator has a good point because in agreeing to the very short period of time for discussion, I had not the slightest idea that the administration would support any change of this kind or any addition of a reservation of any kind to the treaty. I did anticipate that Senator JACKSON would, but I do not think that Senator JACKSON, without administration support, would get anywhere. It did not bother me any, because his posture of continuing the cold war and enhancing our military strength on all occasions is so well known that there is nothing new to be said about that. But for the administration to support a reservation to the treaty or similar language on the interim agreement is a different matter.

Mr. CRANSTON. The administration is doing this. There is no question about it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Why does the Senator say there is no question about it?

Mr. CRANSTON. Because I checked with the staff representatives about the proposed amendment and I was told it is substantially correct. I received a copy of the proposed reservation of which Senator SCOTT is the principal cosponsor. I specifically asked the question, "Is the administration supporting this?" And the answer was "Yes."

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It seems to me that the Senator has a good case, that we should consider it. I will certainly talk to the whip about the time element because I did not anticipate anything like this.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, we took testimony from the administration on this matter before, in the Foreign Relations Committee, and I do not recall any of them expressing any displeasure over the treaty whenever they appeared before the Committee on Foreign Relations. I think that is what we have to go on. The administration was solidly in back of these treaties.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was certainly under that impression. As I say, I am puzzled about the story. But when the Senator from California says he checked with the staff of the minority leader and he affirms that it is true, it raises, as I say, very great and difficult questions because I have been very glad to support this treaty. I think it is a step in the right

direction. I have no reservation about its being in our interest.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I would like to make one correction. It was not a member of the staff of the minority leader. It was a member of the staff of the subcommittee that has been working on this matter, Mr. Charles Horner.

I now hand to the Senator from Arkansas the document setting forth the text of the reservation. It indicates that it will be sponsored by the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) and the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCOTT).

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, and I ask unanimous consent that the time not be taken from either side, so that I might have a chance to read this document.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BAYH). Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from California.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, upon an examination of the unanimous-consent agreement and the documents that I have handed to the distinguished chairman of the committee, it is apparent that the reservation as presently planned is something to be attached to the interim agreement on offensive weapons and not the pending treaty which is the matter before the Senate. Therefore, we do have time to consider this matter. And we are not bound or locked in by an inability to obtain adequate time in which to consider this new matter.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am glad the Senator made that point. For the record, I had agreed privately with the majority whip, the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD), to an 8-hour limitation on both the treaty and the agreement. He had asked and obtained unanimous consent for the limitation on the treaty last night. I was under the impression until now that it had been made on the agreement as well, but that is not the case.

Therefore, I would like to give notice that I would like to reconsider and discuss further with the majority whip the question of a unanimous-consent agreement for time on the interim agreement in light of this new development with regard to the understandings or reservations to be proposed by the minority leader and the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON).

As I said, I do support the treaty.

Mr. President, the treaty and agreement now before us do not solve the problem of nuclear arms control. They are no more than a modest beginning. But to reject them would be tantamount to saying that we do not want to control the arms race but to permit it to control us. For an unrestrained, constantly accelerating arms race—with its increasingly large costs, its effect on our relations with the Soviet Union and its increasing relative importance in terms of our own military power—would surely have that effect.

The Committee on Foreign Relations is satisfied that the treaty and interim agreement enhance our Nation's security and do not endanger it. Some of us believe, in fact, that there is too much room for further weapons development and deployment.

The interim agreement does not prevent further qualitative increases in nuclear weapons systems. If we regard this as an invitation to take every action not specifically prohibited and build costly weapons we do not need, the Soviets will surely follow our example and we will be off on another cycle of challenge and response, spending billions in a mindless search for the security that will be ever further away.

The committee is also satisfied, on the basis of testimony by Mr. Helms, the Director of Central Intelligence, that the available means of verification are now good enough so that we can be certain that there can be no undetected Soviet violation of the treaty or interim agreement. As a final report, of course, if there is a violation both the treaty and agreement include provision for withdrawal 6 months after notice if either nation determines that "extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interest."

The Members of the Senate are undoubtedly aware of the provisions of the treaty and interim agreement.

The Members of the Senate are undoubtedly aware of the provisions of the treaty and interim agreement. I will review them only briefly in order to provide a point of reference for our discussion here today.

First. The treaty prohibits the United States or the Soviet Union from deploying a national ABM system or the base for such a system. It permits the Soviet Union to have two ABM complexes—an ABM complex east of the Urals and a second system around Moscow. The United States is also permitted to have two ABM complexes—one at Grand Forks, N. Dak., which is partially deployed, and another around Washington, which we may build if we wish, but we are not required to build it under the treaty.

I might interpolate that the treaty states that these two complexes may not be closer than 1,300 kilometers; in other words, they would have to be separated. But there is no requirement that we build one around Washington and I sincerely hope we do not. I thought there was considerable sentiment in the Congress against the waste of further money on such a questionable weapons system.

Second. Under the treaty neither party may deploy more than 100 ABM launchers or more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles at either of the two complexes. All of the components for any single complex must be within a radius of 150 kilometers. In addition, there are limits placed on the locations of the two large and 18 smaller ABM radars allowed within each complex.

Third. Each side is prohibited by the treaty from developing, testing, or deploying ABM systems based at sea, in the air, or in space, or mobile ABM launchers, ABM interceptor missiles with multiple warheads, or ABM launchers with a so-called reload capability.

Fourth. The treaty permits modernization and replacement within the present technology but does not permit the deployment of a system or component capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, or radars.

Fifth. The Interim Offensive Agreement and the associated protocol freeze construction of additional fixed land-based ICBM launchers and place specific limits upon the deployment of submarine launched ballistic missiles.

Sixth. Under the terms of the agreement, the total number of fixed, land-based ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers will be kept at about the present level. The Soviet Union is to have no more modern heavy ICBM's than the 313 currently considered operational or under construction. Ceilings are placed on the number of modern submarine launchers on each side. Submarine missile fleet expansion is possible only by trading in ICBM launchers of older types or launchers on older ballistic missile submarines. The agreement prohibits either party from converting launchers for light or older heavy ICBM's into land-based launchers for modern heavy ICBM's.

These provisions have been criticized or questioned in several respects.

If I may digress for just a moment while the majority leader is here, just before the Senator came into the Chamber I referred to the article in the New York Times of today about a proposal backed by the administration to attach reservations to the interim agreement. I wish to give notice, because the Senator from West Virginia is temporarily not in the Chamber, that I would like to reconsider my agreement about a limitation of time on the interim agreement in view of this new development which I did not anticipate because no such reservations or understandings were offered to the committee. Just a moment ago the Senator from Vermont said he had no notice of administration backing of any such reservation.

We thought that the Senator from Washington might have a reservation of his own, but I was quite taken by surprise that the administration has apparently joined in backing reservations to the agreement. I was under the impression that they supported what the commitee had done.

So at least I would like to have the opportunity to reconsider the limitation of time on the interim agreement before it is actually made. I thought it had been made but it has not been made.

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct. That is what I was going to say. We do have a time limitation on the Nixon-Brezhnev treaty, as in executive session.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is right.

Mr. MANSFIELD. We have no time limitation on the interim agreement. I want to assure the chairman of the committee, the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), and the distinguished Senator from Vermont (Mr. AIKEN), the ranking Republican member of the committee, that their wishes will be kept in mind and no agreement will be made without their approval.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thank the Senator. I would not want to be overlooked because I had told the majority whip I would agree, but I did not anticipate this development.

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is the interim agreement.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The interim agreement.

Mr. President, it has been charged that the Soviet lead in strategic missiles on both land and sea is too much for us to tolerate. I would point out, however, that the United States is ahead of the Soviet Union in multiple warheads and bombers by well over 2 to 1 and is expected to maintain that lead during the next 5 years, during which the agreement is to be in effect. The Soviet Union leads in gross megatonnage. We lead in the number of warheads. In the opinion of most experts, the arsenals of both sides are roughly equal.

I might add one other element was overlooked, and that is our forward bases for submarines we have in Rota, Spain, and in the Pacific give us also a great advantage in enabling our nuclear submarines to remain on station with much less effort and much less time. It is an advantage which cannot be measured by numbers but it is significant.

It has also been charged that our deterrent may be in danger—despite the generally accepted invulnerability of the United States submarine-based missile force—if the Soviet Union makes certain improvements in its forces. During the committee's hearings, several witnesses were asked whether the United States would have an effective second strike capability if its bomber and missile forces were destroyed. All witnesses agreed that we would.

Mr. President, the treaty and agreement now before the Senate represent a modest beginning in moving from an era of confrontation to one of negotiation with respect to the most powerful weapons mankind has ever devised.

I trust that we will give our advice and consent to this modest beginning and, in doing so, encourage even more significant measures to control strategic arms. I would hope that the executive branch would consider a strong vote in the Senate on the treaty and agreement before us today as a measure of encouragement to reach even more significant agreements in the next phase of the strategic arms limitation talks.

Mr. President, I have had the staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations prepare a comparison of the strategic forces of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of the strategic weapons under the agreement, and as they potentially would have been without the agreement. I ask unanimous consent that the chart be inserted in the RECORD as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the chart was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

COMPARISON OF STRATEGIC FORCES OF UNITED STATES AND UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS[1]

	1972, operational or under construction		1977		
				U.S.S.R.	
	United States	U.S.S.R.	United States, programed/ SALT limit	Potential without SALT	Under SALT
Forces limited by agreements:					
ICBM's	1,054	1,618	1,054/1,000	2,250	1,410
SLMB's	656	[2]650–740	656/710	1,050	950
Total offensive launchers	1,710	2,268–2,358	1,710	3,300	2,360
Strategic systems not limited by the agreement:					
Heavy bombers	457	140	448	130	130
Total offensive forces	2,167	2,408–2,498	2,158	3,430	2,490
Independent warheads (operational):					
Missile	3,428	1,970	5,890	[3]6,500	[3]3,700
Heavy bomber	2,460	250	3,800	250	250
Total warheads	5,888	2,220	9,690	6,750	3,950
ABM interceptors (operational)	0	64	302/200	1,000	200

[1] In compilations, it is useful to compare equivalent megatonnage—a measure of the destruction capacity of an arsenal in light of various components and weapons sizes. The committee has not yet succeeded in obtaining from the executive branch unclassified numerical comparisons. The Defense Department informs the committee, however, that, in terms of equivalent megatonnage, the Soviet Union has "about the same as" the United States now. The situation in 1977 is expected to be similar.

[2] The smaller number reflects the U.S. estimate of the minimum number of launchers on integral submarine hulls under construction on May 26, 1972. From the Soviet viewpoint, more submarine hulls for SLBM's could be considered as "under construction" because major subsystems are being built for hulls not yet being assembled on integral units. The number 740 was negotiated as a firm baseline which circumvents the difficulty in defining the construction process.

[3] Soviets do not yet have MIRV's. Soviet warhead totals for 1977 represent rough estimates of possible totals. Potential Soviet missile warhead total based on reasonable assumptions of intensive effort by Soviets. SALT Soviet missile warhead total represents our best judgment of what Soviets might do under SALT. Assumption of all-out MIRV conversion effort by Soviets could add 1,500 to 1,900 more warheads to Soviet SALT total by 1977 but only at expense of placing many heavy missile forces under conversion and hence out of operation during some of period of agreement. This is considered highly unlikely. Moreover, the United States could also increase force loadings on programed delivery systems in face of such maximum effort.

Note: All comparisons and projections in the chart were provided by the executive branch.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, there are a few other comments I would like to make in anticipation of the possible reservations that are mentioned in the article to which I have already referred. These are statements taken from the testimony of Rear Adm. Gene La Rocque, who retired a couple of months ago from the Navy. He is now executive director of the Center for Defense Information, and is doing a very fine job in supplying information to the Congress and to the public about our defense posture and about matters which take so much of the resources of our country. Here are some of his comparisons of the relative naval strengths of the United States and the Soviet Union:

1. U.S. Navy has 602,000 officers and men; Soviets have 475,000.

2. U.S. has 212,000 marines; Soviets have 15,000.

3. U.S. has 6,000 operational naval air craft; Soviets have 500.

4. U.S. has a SOSUS detection system; Soviets have none.

5. U.S. has 246 major surface combatants; the Soviets have 222.

6. U.S. has 4 nuclear powered surface ships, is building 7 more; Soviets have none.

7. U.S. has 14 attack carriers with 90–95 aircraft on each and nuclear weapons; the Soviets have none.

8. U.S. has 2 ASW carriers; the Soviets have none.

9. U.S. has 7 amphibious assault carriers and is building 5 more up to 35,000 tons; the Soviets have 2 helicopter carriers of 15,000 tons. (*Moskva* and *Leningrad*.)

10. U.S. has 9 cruisers; Soviets have 25. Eight U.S. cruisers are missile ships and one is nuclear powered. Four Soviet cruisers are pre-World War II and 14 Soviet cruisers have no missiles. New Soviet cruisers are smaller, about 6,000 tons, than many new U.S. destroyers. The Soviets are building 3 new cruisers and refitting 3 others.

DESTROYERS

U.S. has 65 missile equipped Destroyers; Soviets 40.

U.S. has 2 nuclear powered Destroyers and is building 5 more; Soviets have 0.

U.S. has 105 non-missile Destroyers; the Soviets 155.

U.S. is building 16 large (7,000 ton) Spruance Class Destroyers; Soviets are building a new class of Destroyers and 2 are operational.

SUBMARINES

U.S. has 138 submarines; Soviets have 343.

Soviets have 90 less subs today than 10 years ago and the number is declining yearly. Of the 343 Soviet subs 190 are old diesel attack subs, 65 are nuclear attack subs of which 40 have cruise missiles. Soviets also have 28 older diesel attack subs with cruise missiles.

U.S. has 56 nuclear attack subs, and 41 diesel attack subs. U.S. is currently building 21 nuclear attack subs. U.S. subs are faster, quieter, and better operated.

STRATEGIC SUBMARINES

U.S. has 41 Polaris/Poseidon subs with missile ranges up to 2,800 miles. The 31 Poseidon subs will carry 16 missiles each with in-

dependently targeted nuclear weapons. The 10 Polaris have 3 separate nuclear weapons in each of the 16 missiles aboard each sub. Total nuclear weapon in U.S. sub force alone by 1976 will be almost 5,000. U.S. has 3 advanced operating bases in Scotland, Spain, and Guam.

So far as I know, the Soviets have no comparable operating bases outside their own territory.

Soviets have 25 Yankee class subs and 17 under construction for a total of 42 subs.

These are strategic subs.

Maximum range of Soviet missile is 1,200 miles and they do not have multiple weapons. Older Soviet subs carry only 3 missiles and have much shorter missile range. Soviets operate from their own bases and hence have less subs deployed.

Strategic submarines are, and I think it is generally admitted today, the most significant of the strategic weapons, the most invulnerable. I believe there is fairly general agreement among the experts, and I am not sure but among Senators, that the submarines are the most potent of the nuclear weapon systems.

In light of the information I have just supplied how it can be argued that the agreement we have made puts the United States in an inferior position is beyond my comprehension.

Mr. President, how much time have I used?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has approximately 192 minutes remaining.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum. I ask unanimous consent that the time not be charged to either side.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Without objection, the treaty will be considered as having passed through its various parliamentary stages up to and including the presentation of the resolution of ratification, which the clerk will read for the information of the Senate.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic-Missile Systems (ABM Treaty), signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972 (Ex. L, 92-2).

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, asking unanimous consent that the time not be charged to either side.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me 5 minutes?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, we are considering one of the most important treaties, the Nixon-Brezhnev treaty, to come before this body in a good many years. There seems to be little or no interest, so far as I can see, on the part of the membership to discuss the pending business. I would hope that those who are interested in this treaty, regardless of whether they are for or against it, would come to the floor and make their views known.

The treaty has been on the Executive Calendar since July 21; and if my calculations are correct, that is almost 3 weeks. The Senate is aware that we have a very heavy schedule and that, as a result of a meeting yesterday between the leaders of both Houses and the chairmen and ranking Republican members of the Appropriation Committees of both Houses, it was agreed informally that, if at all possible, we would try to conclude our business by September 30.

It is most difficult to understand why a treaty of this significance, this importance, a treaty between the two so-called super powers which well could be the first step on a long journey toward a degree of disarmament, is arousing so little interest and is causing so little debate at this time. Frankly, Mr. President, it does not speak well for the Senate.

We have the distinguished Chairman of the Committee, the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), and the distinguished ranking Republican member of the committee, the dean of the Republicans in this body, the Senator from Vermont (Mr. AIKEN), on the floor, ready to go. I know of no reservations or understandings which will be offered, except what I read about in the newspaper. The leadership has no knowledge at its disposal of any which will be offered to this bill.

The leadership was misled yesterday into agreeing that the vote on the Nixon-Brezhnev treaty would go over until tomorrow because of certain factors which were brought to our attention—factors which I learned just lately have not come to pass.

I would point out to the Senate that this is one of the major items on the President's list of "must" legislation. I would point out that the President, pending approval by two-thirds of the Senate of the Nixon-Brezhnev agreement and approval by both Houses of the interim agreement, had stated on a number of occasions that he hoped to enter phase 2 of the disarmament negotiations which have been going on between the Soviet Union and the United States for the past 2 years, next month—September.

Frankly, the leadership finds itself in a box. But, so far as I am concerned and I speak not as a Democrat but as a Senator, any proposal made by any President of the United States is at least entitled to the courtesy of consideration by this body. The Senate should not find itself in the situation which confronts it at this time in the consideration of this most vital treaty.

I do not intend, in view of the fact that no one is ready to say anything, to call a recess. We will just have to stand here, twiddling our thumbs, and wait for the expiration of the time limitation, unless those who wish to offer amendments or understandings, or those who wished to speak on this most important treaty, will come to the floor and undertake the responsibilities which are theirs and which are the Senate's collectively.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. If I have the time.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield the Senator the time he needs.

Would it be out of order if we could consider at least that we yield back the unused time and have a vote? I have said all I wish to say, and unless there is someone who wishes to engage in debate, we could yield back. I do not wish to say this unilaterally, but the Senator from Vermont (Mr. AIKEN), I understood, a few minutes ago, had no desire to say anything further, and I wondered whether we could not shorten this up. I know of no opposition to it. I have heard of no one who intends to vote against it. Therefore, I see no reason to waste these 2 days unless there is some overriding reason. So I wondered whether we could not get the leadership out of its box by unanimous consent.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The commitment has been made. The commitment will have to be honored, unless those who indicated they were going to offer amendments, understandings, or reservations, if there are any, or those who have indicated they intend to speak on the Nixon-Brezhnev treaty, would be willing to accommodate themselves to a situation which I certainly did not anticipate; but, unless that can be done, we will have to go through the agony of wasting time until we are through.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I support the suggestion of the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT). I think that, in general, we all are for this treaty, particularly those of us on the Foreign Relations Committee. We had good hearings on it. We studied it. We support it. I am wondering whether it would be out of order, therefore, for the leadership on both sides of the aisle to make inquiry of those to whom commitments were given, if they would bear with a shortening of the time.

Many of us would like to vote on it right now, in a very few minutes, or hours. I would strongly hope that the Members to whom the commitments were given could be queried as to whether they would be willing to bear with a unanimous-consent request to shorten the time, or to yield back the balance of their time.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I will be prepared to speak at about 2 o'clock. I, like all other Senators, assumed that others would be speaking now. I will be prepared to speak at 2 o'clock, if that will help the majority leader.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Make it a quarter after 12. We have nothing to do now.

Mr. JACKSON. I assumed that members of the Foreign Relations Committee that handled the treaty would want to have someone carrying the load besides just the chairman and that they would want to speak on the treaty. That is normal procedure here. I am making my contribution by making my speech and my remarks. I think it is not out of line to say that I would be prepared by that time, 2 o'clock.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Would the Senator consider the possibility of making his remarks at about the hour of 1:30, rather than 2 o'clock?

Mr. JACKSON. I shall try to make every effort to make it by 1:30.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I agree with the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL). I am for the treaty and the agreement. I believe that they should be voted on promptly, but if some elucidation is desired by members of the committee, I would be prepared to speak at 1 o'clock. I had not expected that we would need any fill-ins of this kind.

Mr. MANSFIELD. We do not really need any fill-ins because this is a most serious business. As I have indicated, it is probably the most important treaty to come before this body in many decades. I know of no one on the Foreign Relations Committee who indicated he wanted to speak on this subject. Evidently, by their unanimous vote in committee, they had made their judgment.

So, could I inquire of the other side, of the distinguished ranking Republican member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, whether he knows of anyone who wants to offer any amendments, understandings, or reservations, or whatnots?

Mr. AIKEN. No one on this side of the aisle or the other side of the aisle, either, has so intimated to me. I note the announcement has been made that there would not be any votes until tomorrow. In view of that, I would suggest that we announce the final vote for 12:15 tomorrow—a.m. 12:15 a.m.—not p.m.

Mr. MANSFIELD. A.M.? And let Members of the Senate be so advised? Well, I will see what can be done about this commitment.

Mr. AIKEN. I have had no word from anyone on this side of the aisle that they had any desire to speak on the treaty, or to offer any reservations, or any understandings, or anything else.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Fine.

Mr. AIKEN. I might also add, as I have already stated this morning, that every word of testimony from the administration, the executive branch of the Government, has been in favor of the treaty.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I have some remarks prepared which I do not intend to give verbally but to have printed in the RECORD on the treaty and the interim agreement. If it would be of any assistance, I would be very happy to proceed at this time. If I give the entire matter, it would probably take as much as 2 hours.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I would not want Senators just to talk for the purpose of filling up space and taking up time.

Mr. ALLOTT. I assure the distinguished majority leader that the effort that has gone into this has taken weeks.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator has indicated, if I heard him correctly, that it was his intention——

Mr. ALLOTT. To insert the matter in the RECORD. I do not enjoy speaking to an empty Chamber, either.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I understand.

Mr. COOK. Mr. President, my understanding is that the Senator from New York (Mr. BUCKLEY) will be here at 1 p.m. I have no idea how much time he will take.

Mr. MANSFIELD. If he is here at 1 o'clock, that will preclude the possibility of the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) talking at that time, or coming in at 1:30. But he could follow Senator BUCKLEY and that would keep the cadence going.

If I understood the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) correctly, he will speak on the bill at the present time; is that correct?

Mr. JAVITS. At 1 p.m.

Mr. MANSFIELD. At 1 p.m.

Mr. ALLOTT. Would the Senator from Vermont be willing to yield me 1 hour at this time?

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I yield 1 hour to the Senator from Colorado.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I would like to have 20 minutes after the Senator from Colorado has finished.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I yield 20 minutes to the Senator from New York after the Senator from Colorado has finished.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I join with the vast majority of Americans in commending the President for his bold diplomatic initiatives in the last year. He has demonstrated resourcefulness in coping with the changing strategic conditions. This resourcefulness has produced the ABM Treaty and the interim agreement, which we are considering.

I intend to support both the treaty and the agreement. I am cosponsoring an amendment to Senate Joint Resolution 241, the resolution of congressional support for the Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons, along with the distinguished minority leader and the distinguished Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON).

This language addresses three matters.

First, it endorses the objective of equality in the limits to be negotiated in the second phase of SALT. It urges general application of the principle of equality that underlies the ABM Treaty.

Second, the amendment stipulates that any Soviet action or deployment endangering the strategic deterrent forces of the United States would be contrary to our supreme national interests.

Third, the amendment expresses the view of Congress that pending a more comprehensive and permanent agreement, and in order to facilitate achieving such an agreement, the United States should maintain a sound national program of research and development and modernization relevant to a prudent strategic posture. This language is not directed at any specific procurement item.

The language of this amendment constitutes a constructive exercise of congressional responsibility in helping set basic policy for this Nation. This is certainly an appropriate moment for Congress to express itself.

The world remains dangerous and we have just begun the complicated process of controlling strategic weapons. No one believes that the results of the first phase of SALT are perfect. Everyone looks upon these as first steps toward more comprehensive and more satisfactory agreements. Thus today I want to examine where we stand, and what concerns I have about our current situation. I am primarily concerned about two things: First, the strategic imbalance that determined our bargaining positions; and second, a seeming incoherence in the argument currently being advanced to explain the agreements and guide our defense policies in the future.

It is especially important that we be clear about what the agreements involve, how we got to the position that produced the agreements, and where we go from here. In the following remarks I shall use the term "strategic weapons" to mean offensive missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads at intercontinental distances, and defensive missiles capable of intercepting and destroying such offensive missiles in flight.

CRITERIA FOR JUDGING ARMS AGREEMENTS

Every American supports the principle of arms control. Everyone hopes that someday the world will achieve real arms reductions. Our minimal goal should be arms agreements that satisfy these three criteria.

They should not be destabilizing in the sense that they leave either side with political-strategic options that might encourage dangerous behavior in a crisis.

They should not be destabilizing in the sense that they fuel arms races in the areas not covered by agreements.

They should not increase the net cost of national defense, unless they contribute dramatically to the stability of the strategic balance.

With these criteria in mind, let us be very clear about what these agreements do and what they do not do.

These agreements do not "freeze" the arms race, at least not in any meaning of the word "freeze" that I find intelligible.

On the contrary, stated with regard to U.S. security, these agreements could seem to mandate an arms race. That is what some persons are saying. Granted, this would be a slightly "hedged in" arms race. But there is plenty of room between the hedges for a colossally expensive race.

ARE THESE DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS?

These agreements are not disarmament agreements. They do not require the dismantling of any operational weapons system, not even the small and obsolete Soviet SS–7's and SS–8's. The only dismantling they require is by us—the partially completed Montana ABM site—which leaves us with a useless remnant of an ABM system.

DO THESE AGREEMENTS GUARANTEE BUDGETARY SAVINGS?

These agreements do not promise budgetary savings. Indeed, some persons in the administration argue that the agreements are unacceptable unless accompanied by several accelerated—and expensive—defense programs. Granted, at other times other persons in the administration seem to argue another doctrine. But however that may be, the unadorned truth is that strategic forces—those affected by the agreements—involve only $8.8 billion, or about 9 percent of the fiscal year 1973 defense budget, so the agreements could not be expected to bring about great savings. It is not clear whether they will actually provoke great spending.

This is a crucial question because these agreements may have the effect of limiting competition in the least expensive weapons categories and focusing competition on the most expensive weapons categories.

THE INTERIM AGREEMENT

There are three crucial facts about the Interim Agreement.

First. In those areas in which the Soviet Union is superior, the agreement guarantees the existing superiority. They have more ICBM's. They have bigger ICBM's—SS–9's. They plan to replace some large ICBM's with their new extra-large ICBM, what I shall call the SS–9-plus. We have nothing comparable to either the SS–9 or SS–9-plus. The agreement commits us to accepting the Soviet Union's numerical superiority in these categories. And nothing in the agreement stands in the way of Soviet plans to upgrade from the large—SS–9—to the extra-large—SS–9-plus—missiles.

Second. As regards the most important area in which we enjoy superiority—multiple warheads—the agreement does nothing to prevent the Soviet Union from surpassing us. There is no reason to doubt that the Soviet Union can master MIRV technology soon. And there is no reason to doubt that the Soviet Union intends to master and implement that technology. Indeed, why else did the Soviet Union adamantly refuse to include in the agreement a limitation on multiple warheads or multiply independently targeted warheads, either one.

The crucial point is this. Because of our current temporary advantage in multiple warhead technology we have a superior number of deliverable warheads. But the agreement does nothing to prevent or discourage the Soviet Union from surpassing us.

Third. With regard to the other area in which we now are superior—the number of submarine-based missiles—the agreement includes a puzzling provision which permits the Soviet Union to not only surpass us in numbers of Yankee-class nuclear submarines, but to achieve a superiority of about a third. The fact that the Soviet Union insisted on this provision is convincing evidence that they intend to exercise the right it confers.

MIRV'S AND THE MATTER OF "MERE NUMBERS"

There are those who say that one should not have anxieties about "mere numbers." They say that "numbers do not matter." To me, this is irresponsible. Obviously if the Soviet Union had 1,618 ICBM's and we had, say 500, those numbers would matter very much. I must say that during the Cuban missile crisis numbers did matter very much. It is surpassingly odd for these agreements to be praised by persons who say that "numbers do not matter." These agreements are all about numbers. Thus either numbers matter, or these agreements do not.

The most that anyone can argue reasonably is that these numbers—the deficiencies we are stuck with—are not intolerable. What one hears most frequently is the suggestion that these numbers are not intolerable because they are more tolerable than the numbers that would have confronted us at any point in the foreseeable future. It is said that the agreements are good if only because they have brought the Soviet strategic weapons momentum to a screeching halt. There is no sense in which this is true. There is one sense in which it is certainly false, and another sense in which it is probably false.

It is certainly false in light of the certainty that the Soviet Union will deploy MIRV's and upgrade its land and sea-based missile capabilities. It is probably false in the sense that it implies—and, frankly, those who make this argument do not merely imply this—they assert it—that, in the absence of these agreements, the Soviet Union would have pushed ahead rapidly with the deployment of large numbers of new large ICBM's. This conclusion is not self-evidently true. There is a paucity of evidence to support it—unless one accepts as "evidence" a simple extrapolation into the indefinite future of Soviet behavior in the recent past, particularly during the 30 months of the SALT negotiations. Actually an extrapolation from the last 12 months would lead one to conclude that prior to these agreements, the Soviet Union had begun at least a "slowdown" of ICBM deployment. Of course, any extrapolation has the charm of simplicity—and a corresponding implausibility.

The truth is less comforting than the extrapolation. The truth has nothing to do with the suppositious halting of hypothetical Soviet deployments. The truth is that the Soviet Union has very little reason to add more large ICBM sites to their current lopsided advantage in ICBM sites. That would not make military sense. What would make sense would be for them now to concentrate their efforts on improving the capabilities of their greatest missiles. Now is the logical time for them to concentrate particularly on completing their perfection of a MIRV capability, and retrofitting that capability in their current sites.

The Interim Agreement does not impede this. On the contrary, the agreement and the treaty taken together are an incentive to do this. Now I personally do not think the Soviet Union needs any incentive to do this; the logic of their strategic situation dictates that they do this. That is why I am so skeptical of the argument that, lacking the agreements, they would have plunged ahead with rapid new ICBM site construction. Thus I do not think the agreements can be blamed for focusing the Soviet Union's energies on technological refinements.

The agreements cannot be praised for halting what was coming to a halt, nor blamed for encouraging what needs no encouragement; that is, the rapid Soviet development and deploying of MIRV's.

When will the Soviet Union be ready to MIRV? Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's estimate is MIRV flight tests in 6 to 9 months. Our chief negotiator in Moscow, Dr. Kissinger, also believes that the Soviet Union will have a MIRV capability very soon. Consider two statements from one of his Moscow press conferences:

Q. What is the prospect of their developing a MIRV?

Dr. KISSINGER. You would have to assume that anything we can do, they can do, with perhaps some time.

Q. How many years?

Dr. KISSINGER. I don't want to speculate on it, but I think it is reasonable to assume that they will develop a MIRV during the freeze period.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, on the MIRV, aren't we really, by deploying MIRV's ourselves so rapidly, kind of forcing them or encouraging them into the MIRV business?

Dr. KISSINGER. This is a debate that has been going on for the entire postwar period, namely, whether our technological change compels the Soviet technological change, or whether the two technological changes are not occurring somewhat in parallel, and on the whole, the Soviet Union will do what it is technologically capable of doing.

You remember the debate about the hydrogen bomb in the early 1950's in which one argument against the hydrogen bomb was that if we developed it, the Soviet Union would be forced into following suit. As matters developed, we exploded our bomb 6 months before the Soviet Union did, making it obvious that we did not lead them but that they were pursuing a parallel evolution.

I think it safe to say that the Soviet Union has been engaged in the first step toward MIRV at a time when we have not yet deployed MIRV, and I would not, therefore, accept the proposition.

Our original estimates were that the Soviet Union would be ready 3 years ago. Thus the Soviet Union is already late. How much later they will be, we do not know. It seems safe to assume that they will be MIRVed within the 5-year time frame of this agreement. The Soviet Union repeatedly has demonstrated an ability to develop the technology it needs for military purposes. In fact, it has repeatedly demonstrated the discomfiting capacity for developing these things sooner than we had expected. Clearly it would be folly to take comfort from the assumption that our monopoly of MIRV's will be long-lived. These agreements shape the arms competition in such a way as to virtually guarantee that our lead in MIRV's—our only remaining lead—will soon evaporate.

And remember this: when our monopoly ends, we will not be left with anything remotely approximating parity. The Soviet Union will have more and bigger missiles to MIRV. Then the picture will be complete: the Soviet Union will enjoy superiority in every category

of strategic weapons covered by these agreements—assuming the United States does not deploy an ABM system around Washington.

THE QUESTION OF DELIVERABLE WARHEADS

At the present time the United States enjoys an advantage in the number of warheads it has deployed, an advantage that derives from our mastery of MIRV technology. One hears much about the relative importance of warhead numbers versus megatonnage, a sterile debate that generally fails to relate either numbers or megatonnage to strategic objectives.

The fact is that both numbers and size of warheads, along with a third factor, accuracy, are important. Accuracy is perhaps most important of all. A small number of small warheads accurately delivered may confer a much greater military advantage than a great number of large but inaccurately delivered warheads.

What concerns American defense planners is that the total megatonnage of the Soviet missile forces is several times our own, and we must anticipate the time when the Soviet Union's "carrying capacity" will be MIRVed extensively. When this happens there will not only be a great increase in the number of Soviet warheads, but they will retain warheads sufficiently large so as to enable missiles lacking great precision to nevertheless have a considerable capacity to destroy hardened military targets such as Minuteman silos. At present the United States has approximately twice the number of warheads the Soviets have, roughly 5,000 to 2,500 for them. Our numbers are increasing rapidly as we deploy MIRVed missiles on our submarines and slowly as we MIRV part of the Minuteman force. We will eventually have something approaching 10,000 warheads on land- and sea-based missiles. Many of these 10,000 compare in yield with the earliest atomic weapons, in the low kiloton range.

By contrast, the Soviets could in their SS–9 silos alone—some 313 of them—deploy some 6,000 warheads, each of which would be many times larger than the U.S. equivalent. If they were to incorporate our present technology in their future submarine force their 62 Y-class boats could carry more than 10,000 warheads. This would still leave their 1,100 other missiles for MIRVing. While speculation on exact totals is idle, it seems reasonable to arrive at a Soviet figure on the order of 35,000 to 40,000 plus—many of them larger than ours, and therefore lethal even if delivered with less accuracy.

ABM AND THE U.S. TRIAD

For two decades the security of the United States has rested on our triad of long-range bombers, land-based ICBM's, and missile-firing submarines. How does this triad stand in light of the lapse in our defense effort over the last decade, and in light of the Moscow agreements that were—it is claimed—dictated by that lapse? In the event of a determined Soviet first strike today our triad probably would be able to provide an acceptable retaliatory capacity. Whether it will in 1977—the time frame of the agreement—is another matter.

Of course, if the Soviet Union launches missiles at the United States, an American President could give the order to retaliate immediately. That is, he can give the order to "empty the silos" as soon as our warning systems confirm the approach of offensive missiles. This is one way to cope with the guaranteed vulnerability of our virtually undefended land-based missiles. But, then, this is exactly the sort of dilemma no President should face, and I underscore these words very strongly. Indeed, President Nixon defended—wisely, in my judgment—the ABM system, and the principle of defending some offensive missiles, precisely on the ground that such defense would insure that no President would find himself in a position where his only option would be to "empty the silos" in response to accident-prone electronic warnings.

Now I, for one, do not expect this to happen. But the fact that such a scenario is plausible makes it important. This is so because in some future confrontation—over Cuba or Berlin or the Middle East—an American President will understand our vulnerability and the Soviet leaders will know that the American President understands it. So when the showdown occurs, the American President will be the man facing the most grim and restricting options. It is wise to remember that at the time of the Cuban missile crisis the United States enjoyed an approximately 6 to 1 strategic superiority. It is certain that that superiority was crucial in successful resolution of that crisis.

THE ABM TREATY

In terms of "throwweight"—and this is a word of art—the warhead tonnage that can be delivered intercontinental distances—the Soviet advantage today is between 4-to-1 and 5-to-1. This is not intolerable until the Soviet Union MIRV's its missiles. Until then the Soviet Union's monster missiles are not as ominous as the numbers might make them appear. This is so because it does not make much military sense to hurl a 25- or 50-megaton warhead. Such warheads are useful as "terror" weapons: they can devastate cities. But much smaller weapons also can do that. And a 25- to 50-megaton warhead, with the kind of accuracy the Soviet Union will soon have, would be an inefficient way to destroy a "hardened" ICBM site. And that is the rub and the point of this whole matter. The giant Soviet missiles make no military sense—unless and until they are MIRVed.

Thus, the fact that the Soviet Union has invested so heavily in these huge missiles is convincing proof that it looks forward to achieving a sophisticated MIRV capability. When it does, it will have an awesome strategic advantage. I am wary of citing figures of these sensitive matters. Of course the exact figures are, and must be, classified. But on the basis of authoritative published sources, one can arrive at a reasonably clear picture of the growing Soviet threat. The SS–9 possibly can throw 6 MIRV's in excess of 1 megaton apiece. It is estimated that the SS–9–plus can deliver upward of 20 MIRV's in excess of half a megaton apiece. In contrast, one of our Minutemen can deliver only three MIRV's with a combined total of about 1 megaton. Clearly the SS–9 and the SS–9–plus when MIRVed, and made as accurate as our missiles are now, will be devastatingly effective at killing "hardened" but undefended ICBM silos. Given that fact, it should be clear why I have doubts about the wisdom of abandoning the defense of our land-based offensive capability.

Does the treaty commit us to abandoning that defense? It does not do this explicitly and officially. But that will be the effect of the treaty. This is so for three reasons.

First, the treaty does not permit an effective defense of even a single ICBM field. The 100 interceptors will not suffice to protect the Grand Forks complex from even a relatively modest effort to knock it out. And defense of a single ICBM field would not constitute a useful missile defense plan.

Second, support for even ongoing research and development on defensive systems will be hard to get from Congress. Support in Congress for missile defense has been consistent, but it also has been consistently shallow and fragile. In my judgment, it is going to be very difficult to get support for research and development in weapons systems that are illegal. I assume this fact was considered before the Moscow summit. We will not be able to avoid facing this fact in the years ahead.

Third, the proposed treaty fairly radiates the principle that it is a positive good to have undefended missiles.

This administration has only recently been converted to that principle. Just 4 months ago, in his most recent posture statement, Secretary Laird said this:

> With significant qualitative improvements in Soviet ICBM's even without increases in the number of Soviet ICBM's, the postulated threat to Minuteman in the last half of the 1970s could grow to a level beyond the capabilities of the four-site Safeguard defense of Minuteman.

Clearly Secretary Laird, at the time of this statement, had not been convinced that missile defense is dispensible.

Until very recently the official doctrine of the administration was that missile defense is stabilizing and cost-effective. The doctrine recognized that missile defense enables either party to offset—with relative ease and relatively small expense—any increased offensive missile deployments by the other party, and because missile defense as distinct from population defense diminished the possibility of a first strike capability. I believe that doctrine was wise. But evidently the new official doctrine that the United States should rest its deterrent on the assumption that the survival of our land-based force is unnecessary to our security, and that the "guaranteed vulnerability" of that force is not destabilizing.

The goal is "strategic sufficiency." The question is, sufficient for what? Today's answer is: sufficient to guarantee our ability to receive a first strike from the Soviet Union and still be able to inflict hideous carnage on the Soviet civilian

population. In short, today's doctrine is a version of that which Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara enunciated, more than a decade ago—the doctrine of "mutual assured destruction"—MAD. This is, perhaps, perversely appropriate in light of the fact that the main thrust of the argument for the agreements is that because of policies initiated in the McNamara years, we had no choice but to accept these treaties and the MAD doctrine.

I do not think that MAD is a stabilizing strategy. I do not think this is a strategy which allows the President more than one option in a nuclear confrontation. This, in turn, would then involve acceptance of a doctrine that is morally deplorable and politically unconvincing—the doctrine that the United States should base its deterrent on its willingness to slaughter vast numbers of unprotected Soviet civilians.

Given the fact that we have clearly accepted the early 1960s MAD doctrine, I was startled to read the following exchange in one of Dr. Kissinger's Moscow press conferences:

Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador Smith raised the point of this being the first time where each side has acknowledged or deliberately allowed itself to remain vulnerable to attack by the other side and talked about psychological and political ramifications.

I wonder if you could address yourself to that?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, to the extent that neither side is a territorial defense, it is, of course, vulnerable, and to the extent that neither side can destroy the retaliatory force of its opponent enough to prevent a counterattack on its population, it remains vulnerable.

The implications of this are what they have always been over the last 5 years, because both sides are now vulnerable to each other and, therefore, the simplistic notion of the early 1960's which measured deterrent by the amount of civilian carnage that could be inflicted by one side on the other were always wrong; hence, to consider the mass use of nuclear weapons in terms of the destruction of civilian populations, one faces a political impossibility, not to speak of a moral impossibility.

I agree with this. I have agreed for several years. I have supported the policies designed to support another, more prudent and palatable doctrine. But I think the doctrine I supported—that involving the defense of missiles—has been scrapped. It has been replaced by a doctrine which has one merit: it is consistent with the capability that exists vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the bargains struck in Moscow.

WHERE WE STAND TODAY

The treaty will prevent us from giving meaningful protection to any of our land-based missiles. The Interim Agreement will prevent us from "going to sea" with significant numbers of additional missiles. We can improve the quality of our sea-based missile systems by purchasing Trident. In addition, we can upgrade the bomber component of our triad by purchasing the B–1 system. But Congress may be increasingly balky until the administration gets its signals straight concerning the usefulness of a "qualitative edge" over our rivals, and concerning what we have to fear from any "qualitative edge" our rivals might have over us.

ABOUT DISMANTLINGS

Some persons are pleased about the fact that, under the terms of the Interim Agreement, the Soviet Union is almost certainly going to dismantle its SS–7's and SS–8's. These persons say that this is an historic breakthrough because, for the first time, a weapons system is actually being reduced. But this pleasure is mistaken, for two reasons:

First. The agreement does not force the Soviet Union to dismantle anything. It allows them to ride bicycles for Rolls Royces. That is, it allows the Soviet Union to "trade in" its most obsolete and vulnerable missiles—the SS–7's and SS–8's—on a 1-for-1 basis—for its most modern—as yet unbuilt—submarine launchers.

Second. What our negotiators "won" for us is the right to deploy an ABM system around Washington. Yet Congress already has expressed its unwillingless to do this, and our negotiators were told—repeatedly—that it is very, very unlikely that Congress will ever approve such a system. What our negotiators gave in return for this nonachievement was, at the very least, the Malmstrom ABM site in Montana. That is, having won on paper an ABM system which cannot—and should not—be won in Congress, our negotiators gave up an ABM system which Congress had approved and into which millions of dollars have been invested and which makes good tactical sense.

I do not think that a system of 100 interceptors is a useful instrument for defending a "soft" target. For that reason I intend to vote against deployment of an ABM system around Washington. I see no point in going to the great expense of deploying such a system when the net effect will be—to oversimplify a little, but only a little—to allow the 101st enemy reentry vehicle to do what the first reentry vehicle would have done in the absence of the system.

In addition, I have doubts about the usefulness of further funding for the Grand Forks "hardsite" ABM system. I have doubts about the wisdom of trying to use 100 interceptors to defend an ICBM complex against a Soviet threat of many thousands of warheads. I know that the Grand Forks site is over 80 percent completed. I know it will have some military use until Soviet missiles are MIRVed. And I know that some persons think it might make some sense to complete this site because it would provide us with a research and development base, and operational experience. This might be useful if, in the future, we find that the Soviet buildup requires us to abrogate the treaty and expand our missile defense. Perhaps I will be persuaded that the Grand Forks site has something substantial to contribute to national security under the prevailing philosophy. But I will need to be persuaded.

There are those who argue that an ABM is an either/or issue. Either one favors defending an entire nation—population and missiles—or one favors defending nothing. Or, alternatively, one is for no defense of offensive missiles, or one is for the total defense of all such missiles. This is not accurate. I have never been a supporter of a "thick" ABM defense suitable for protecting our population. I think it is at least doubtful that "soft" targets like cities can be defended against ICBMs, and I am certain that the cost of trying to do so in this expansive country would be prohibitive. I have been a supporter of an ABM system for the protection of a suitable portion of our land-based deterrent. I have supported this for reasons of morality and strategy, as outlined in the scenarios, and for reasons of economy that I shall come to in a moment.

SPEAKING OF EXPENSES

All strategic weapons are expensive. These agreements do not eliminate the need for such weapons. What these agreements do is freeze competition in the least expensive kinds of arms and encourage—or mandate—according to some spokesmen—increased competition in much more expensive kinds of arms.

For example, ICBM sites are expensive. But they are also relatively cheap. In addition, they are frozen. What is unlimited, and much more expensive, is a weapon such as the B–1 bomber system. There are those who say that we cannot live with these agreements if we have to live without the B–1. I take that to mean that we need to increase our offensive capability. But it would be much cheaper to increase it with additional Minutemen. In addition, one can effectively increase one's offensive capability by guaranteeing the survivability of existing offensive missiles.

Thus, it is unfortunate that we cannot increase our offensive capability by using additional Minutemen or ABM's—or a mixture of both.

On June 20, Secretary Laird told the Senate Armed Services Committee that if Congress did not push ahead with new offensive programs, he would advocate deploying ABM's at 12 sites. I do not know whether 12 sites would be necessary. But I do know there is a strong case that more ABM sites might be preferable—politically and economically—to the kinds of arms programs which Secretary Laird says are dictated by the agreements.

I shall be very interested to see how pending defense programs fare among those who have been quickest and most vocal in giving enthusiastic—indeed, almost unreserved—support for these agreements. The agreements have been praised unstintingly—on television, on the Senate floor, wherever two or three are gathered together—by certain Senators who are not the most likely candidates for heroic duty in fighting for those additional defense programs which Secretary Laird, for one, says must be passed along with the agreements.

MATTERS ON WHICH SOME LIGHT SHOULD BE SHED

I do not want to rehearse the missile numbers here. They are well known. Or, to be precise, the number of American weapons is well known because we gave the Soviet Union that number. We gave the Soviet negotiators the number of Soviet missiles. They never confirmed those numbers.

Of course, neither I nor anyone else can say for sure how many "heavy" missiles the Soviet Union can have. Our negotiators did not manage to extract a definition of a "heavy" missile from the Soviet negotiators. This failure makes it hard to understand the meaning of article II of the Interim Agreement:

The Parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBM's, or for ICBM's of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBM's of types deployed after that time.

In addition, I share the "regret" that our negotiators expressed on May 26 concerning the unwillingness of the Soviet negotiators to define terms. I only hope that we all shall not come to regret our decision to give way at the last minute and sign the agreements without knowing quite what they mean. This decision might be considered evidence of an unseemly haste to get ink on parchment. Of course, the Soviet stubbornness might have resulted from a Soviet conviction that we were excessively anxious to sign the agreements at the Summit.

This is only a speculation. But the Soviet stubbornness, and the success it brought, is a fact. Now it is up to us to figure out why the Soviet Union was so adamant about not defining a "heavy" missile.

BERTHING SUBMARINES

So I will not tarry over definitions which our negotiators did not tarry over. Rather, I will note yet another area mentioned by the U.S. negotiators in another somewhat plaintive unilateral statement accompanying the interim agreement. I refer to item "C" from May 20:

I wish to emphasize the importance that the United States attaches to the provisions of article V, including in particular their application to fitting out or berthing submarines.

What our negotiators were unhappy about was the Soviet Union's refusal to commit itself to facilitating verification concerning construction or modification of submarines. This raises questions about three things: Why we thought this was important, why the Soviet Union refused to comply, and why we yielded.

I confess that this episode suggests something alarming. The Soviet Union has not told us how many land-based launchers it has. The Soviet Union insists that we be content with our estimates of Soviet numbers. To check for the construction or modification of silos we can use satellites to sweep the entire Eurasian land mass of the Soviet Union. Obviously there is room for error. There have been intelligence errors in the past. Cloud cover can cause information problems. There is less room for error regarding the construction or modification of submarines. These operations can only be performed in a few well-known facilities. Therefore it is unfortunate that the Soviet Union did not satisfy our negotiators with regard to covered submarine berths. I cannot but wonder why the Soviet Union is reluctant to guarantee easy satellite verification of actions regarding submarines.

LAND-MISSILE ICBM LAUNCHERS

I also wonder about another episode on the busy day of May 20. On that day we made another unilateral statement, this one concerning land-mobile ICBM launchers. I cannot but wonder about four matters: Why we thought it important to limit such launchers, why the Soviet Union refused, why we yielded, and why we expect to do better in this regard during SALT phase II.

G-CLASS SUBMARINES

Under the terms of the Interim Agreement the Soviets have been permitted to retain the 22 diesel powered submarines known as G-class in addition to the 62 Yankee-class boats provided under the protocol to the same agreement. Moreover, a careful reading of the text discloses—and Ambassador Smith recently confirmed before the Armed Services Committee—that the Soviets are free to deploy additional submarines of this type in any number they might wish. The G-class submarines, while diesel powered, carry nuclear missiles at ranges of several hundred miles. I confess that I am puzzled as to why the agreement permits the additional Soviet deployment of such new boats. Surely we could have held them to no more than their present number. I am not reassured by Ambassador Smith's implied view that these boats are not useful enough for the Soviet Union to want to produce more of them. The obvious question occurs: Why did the Soviets press for the freedom to deploy them if they do not intend to do so? And if we were not pressed on this point, why did we agree?

SILO IMPROVEMENT

The agreement provides that in the course of modernizing the missile forces the parties are free to improve their missile silos. There is a stipulation, however, that in so doing they must not "increase significantly" the internal size of the silos. This prohibition was included in order to prevent the Soviets from retaining the freedom to increase still further the throw-weight of their forces by deploying larger missiles as "modernized" replacement for smaller ones.

The term "significantly increased" remained undefined, so the negotiators got together and prepared an exchange of comments in which it was agreed that the term would mean that the "dimensions"—not the size, but the dimensions—of the silos would not be increased by more than 15 percent. These words are very important in this whole matter, the terms "significantly increased" and "dimensions."

Unfortunately, this leaves open the question of whether the Soviets, under this definition, could increase the depth and the diameter of their silos by 15 percent, making a total volume increase in the neighborhood of 50 percent. The issue is not a trivial one. A 50-percent increase would enable the Soviets to double their throw-weight, thus extending their current 4- or 5-to-1 advantage into a potentially much greater one. Thus such an increase unquestionably would be "significant." As would be, for that matter, the increase in SS–11 payloads with solid fuel boosters, an increase permitted within the terms of this agreement.

These matters illustrate the kind of things that suffer when negotiations are carried out under pressing deadlines. These matters illustrate the kind of things about which our negotiators can be especially attentive in the second phase of SALT.

KISSINGER, LAIRD, AND THE "QUALITATIVE EDGE"

I want to outline what appears to be a puzzling aspect of the defense doctrines which have their advocates in the Government.

I am puzzled by some of Dr. Kissinger's statements about the bargains struck in Moscow.

Item: Dr. Kissinger said in Kiev that:

We wanted to see whether, as major powers, we could take account of the fact that we are living in a period which has some of the characteristics of traditional diplomacy in the sense that you are getting more states that are being active but with one important difference; in traditional diplomacy the aim was to, through an accumulation of small advantages, to gain qualitative edge over other countries. In the nuclear age, the most dangerous thing to aim for is a qualitative edge over your major rivals.

Comment: This is puzzling in light of the fact that other officials are arguing, with increasing desperation, that the agreements, far from ending the arms race, actually commit us to a strenuous and expensive effort to make the most of our tenuous and dwindling qualitative edge in strategic technology.

Item: At Dr. Kissinger's Kiev news conference this exchange occurred:

Q. Dr. Kissinger, another one of the arguments that is made with regard to the strategic arms agreement is that it may have the effect of directing, or redirecting rather, the arms construction effort. What reason is there to think this can be controlled?

Dr. Kissinger. This agreement, if it is not followed on by other negotiations, will, over a period of time, permit a qualitative race or a race in the weapons systems which are not frozen by the agreement.

Comment: Again, what are we to make of those who are arguing that these agreements do not just permit a qualitative race, but they require it until SALT Phase I somehow improves our position? I cannot but wonder if those persons are satisfied that there is congressional support for such a race. I wonder if our negotiators carried a realistic assessment of congressional support into the negotiating room.

Item: Dr. Kissinger has said that—

We attempted to conclude the SALT negotiations because we do believe that to put the central armaments of both sides for the first time under agreed restraint is an event that transcends in importance the technical significance of the individual restrictions that were placed on various weapons systems.

Comment: If any form of restraint on strategic arms is so transcendently important, then obviously we need not trouble ourselves about the details. But is this correct? I think not. The logic of Dr. Kissinger's statement is puzzling because it seems to suggest that it is theoretically impossible for either side to lose from such agreements. But that is wrong in theory and, alas, obviously

wrong in fact. What Dr. Kissinger dismisses as "the technical significance of the individual restrictions" are the very stuff of which these agreements are made. If these technical matters do not matter, then neither do the agreements.

Dr. Kissinger's statement—about the transcendent importance of agreements as agreements; about the inadvisability of a qualitative arms race; about how dangerous it is to have a "qualitative edge" in strategic weapons—are puzzling in their own right. They are especially mystifying when placed next to the recent statements by the Secretary of Defense.

On June 6 Secretary Laird declared that he could not support these agreements if Congress refused to support the administration's new proposed funding levels for Trident and the B–1 bomber. He repeated this many times. But Dr. Kissinger, in the statements just cited, used an argument that removes the urgency from the Trident and B–1 programs. According to my deciphering of Dr. Kissinger's philosophy of the SALT agreements, Trident and the B–1 may be only marginally important, and may be "a most dangerous thing to aim for." That is, they will only promote what Dr. Kissinger says are irrelevant to, or inimical to the diplomacy of the new era that is adawning.

Perhaps I am misconstruing what Dr. Kissinger has said. Perhaps I am reading too much into what Secretary Laird has said. Perhaps there is a synthesizing principle that makes all their statements compatible. I hope so. But pending the revelation of that principle I remain suspicious that there is a trace of confusion in the air. This is not confusion about niggling details—that is some confusion about those. Rather, the confusion concerns basic thinking about what we should depend upon to guarantee our national security."

If, as Dr. Kissinger says, "marginal additions of power cannot be decisive," then we cannot blame people for being skeptical about the notion that we should spend vast sums for weapons improvements. If our programs are not necessary, then it is important that we not squander resources on them. If they are necessary, the people will support them. The people have a fine record of rejecting incoherent arguments for questionable programs. They also have a fine record of shouldering unpleasant but necessary burdens. It is up to the Government to convince the people that it has a coherent defense policy.

HOW DID WE GET HERE?

At his June 15 White House briefing Dr. Kissinger described the situation confronting the administration in 1969:

> Perhaps most important for the United States, our undisputed strategic predominance was declining just at a time when there was rising domestic resistance to military programs, and impatience for redistribution of resources from national defense to social demands.

This is a correct assessment of the situation in 1969. Perhaps it is meant to suggest that we negotiated from a position of weakness. But if that is so, it is not at all clear that it had to be so.

This administration has received all the major defense programs it has insisted upon. The American people do not enjoy buying military hardware. But they have never proved unwilling to do whatever is necesary to provide for their security—if the political leaders have explained the problems to the people. If our SALT negotiators had to bargain from a position of weakness, then it is possible that we chose the wrong time to negotiate, or chose to negotiate the wrong conditions. The American people have never chosen to be in a position of weakness.

The problem is not that the American people refused difficult requests. The problem is that the political leadership—primarily in the 1960's—failed to ask the American people to do the necessary things. Obviously a dictatorship like the Soviet Union can extract whatever efforts it wants from its subjects. Our democracy must rely on leadership and persuasion. One lesson of this is that we in the Senate must take a more active attentive interest in the formulation of national security planning. The time to begin is now, and the way to begin is with a judicious selection of language in the resolution we pass to approve the interim agreement.

CONCLUSION

Today I have concentrated on enumerating some of the concerns I have about the agreements. The immediate need is for clear thoughts forcefully expressed. Thomas Hobbes, who earned an unfortunate reputation because he thought clearly and spoke forcefully about unpleasant things, said something we should all bear in mind. "Covenants without the sword are but words." This is especially true regarding covenants that concern swords. Unless we are strong, the covenants we are debating will not be obeyed, and there will be no subsequent covenants. Unless we are strong these agreements will be what James Madison called "parchment barriers."

But there seems to be some confusion as to what shall constitute strength for America. We are assured that numbers are not the key. We are told that a qualitative edge is not the key. The cumulative logic of these assurances is that the Soviet Union could have a lead in all these categories, and we still would be sufficiently strong. This is a novel theory of sufficiency and one on which I am an agnostic.

I hope we in the Senate can help dispel the confusion that surrounds these issues, and can do so before our negotiators carry that confusion into the second phase of SALT.

For that reason, Mr. President, after working for several weeks on this matter, I have joined the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) in the introduction of a resolution by way of amendment to the committee resolution, to define certain of our aims and goals with respect to the interim agreement and what we expect of our negotiators. Perhaps it will tell the Russians, also, what Congress expects. It is an excellent example and an excellent opportunity for Congress to exercise that part of foreign policy about which many have been wailing for so long.

I sincerely hope and pray that it will pass. I believe that it will.

The resolution I am cosponsoring, to express congressional approval of the results of SALT phase I, will provide constructive guidance for the future.

Mr. President, there are many matters in this speech of mine which many people will find provocative. Many who are overwhelmed at the moment with a sense of euphoria will not like it. Yet these items which I have discussed have been brought about and studied and discussed and rediscussed over every bit of the period since May 20, 1972.

While I shall vote for both the treaty and the interim agreement, I thought it was necessary that someone speak out, loudly and clearly, and try to explain in a rather simple way some of the principles and some of the issues involved in this very serious business.

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Colorado be kind enough to yield me 1 minute on a privileged matter?

Mr. ALLOTT. I do have 1 minute left to me, which I will be very glad to yield to my good friend from Georgia.

Mr. TALMADGE. I thank the Senator from Colorado.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President——

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TUNNEY). The Chair, as in legislative session, lays before the Senate——

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I do not expect to object, what is this? Has it cleared this side?

Mr. TALMADGE. Yes. I would request a conference with the House of Representatives on the bill that passed the Senate unanimously relating to the planting of trees on public forest grounds.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator. I have no objection.

ACCELERATION OF PROGRAMS FOR THE PLANTING OF TREES

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, as in legislative session, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on H.R. 13089.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TUNNEY), as in legislative session, laid before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives announcing its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 13089) to provide for acceleration of programs for the planting of trees on national forest lands in need of reforestation and for other purposes, and requesting a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon.

Mr. TALMADGE. I move that the Senate insist upon its amendments and agree to the request of the House for a conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that the Chair be authorized to appoint the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The motion was agreed to; and the Presiding Officer appointed Mr. TALMADGE, Mr. EASTLAND, Mr. JORDAN of North Carolina, Mr. MILLER, and Mr. AIKEN conferees on the part of the Senate.

TREATY ON LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

Mr. JAVITS obtained the floor.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I have only 20 minutes. I yield 3 minutes to my colleague.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, I very much appreciate the courtesy of my senior colleague.

Mr. President, I send to the desk an understanding to be appended to the resolution of ratification now under consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the understanding.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

At the end of the resolution of ratification, add the following: "It is the understanding of the Senate, which understanding inheres in its advice and consent to the ratification of the treaty, that a failure of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States to reach an agreement prior to July 1, 1977, providing for a more complete strategic offensive arms limitation agreement assuring parity between the two countries in their respective strategic forces, will be considered by the United States to constitute an extraordinary event related to the subject matter of the treaty which jeopardizes the supreme interests of the United States within the meaning of Article XV of the treaty."

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, Secretary of State Rogers' letter to the President transmitting the treaty an interim agreement contains the following statement of the official U.S. position with reference to these accords:

In this connection, the United States has stressed the unique relationship between limitations on offensive and defensive strategic arms. This interrelationship lends extraordinary importance to the undertaking in Article XI "to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms."

The special importance we attach to this relationship was reflected in the following formal statement relating to Article XI, which was made by the Head of the United States Delegation on May 9, 1972:

The US Delegation has stressed the importance the US Government attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The US Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces. The USSR Delegation has also indicated that the objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without the achievement of an agreement providing for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. Both sides recognize that the initial agreements would be steps toward the achievement of more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, US supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The US does not wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we believe that the USSR does. It is because we wish to prevent such a situation that we emphasize the importance the US Government attaches to achievement of more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. The US Executive will inform the Congress, in connection with Congressional consideration of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, of this statement of the US position.

Mr. President, in brief, the purpose of my understanding is to incorporate in the resolution of ratification this statement of the U.S. position.

Mr. President, I will now yield the floor to my senior colleague. I express my appreciation for his courtesy in allowing me to proceed. And if I may, I will return to the argument in support of the understanding following his remarks.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, in view of the fact that the Senator has called up his understanding and he has 2 hours under the unanimous consent agreement, would the Senator mind charging the time to himself?

Mr. BUCKLEY. That is agreeable.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The senior Senator from New York is recognized for 20 minutes.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the SALT treaty and interim agreement with the Soviet Union properly are regarded as historic. The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the ranking minority member have already, I am sure, explained the individual provisions. However, Mr. President, what is happening now in the understanding and the amendment which are being introduced—one by the Senator from New York (Mr. BUCKLEY) and the other, of which we have already had notice, from the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) and the Senator from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT), impinge on very critical points by Dr. Kissinger, speaking for the President, in the congressional briefing at the White House on June 15, 1972.

Dr. Kissinger said at that time:

Thus the deepest question we ask is not whether we can trust the Soviets, but whether we can trust ourselves. Some have expressed concern about the agreements not because they object to their terms, but because they are afraid of the euphoria that these agreements might produce.

But surely we cannot be asked to maintain unavoidable tension just to carry out programs which our national survival should dictate in any event. We must not develop a national psychology by which we can act only on the basis of what we are against and not on what we are for.

Mr. President, it strikes me that is exactly what may be happening in respect of these highly desirable agreements which are pending before the Senate. In the amendment and the "understanding," we are immediately summoning up our fears and having no faith in our strengths. Already, before the agreements have been ratified, we would have begun to notify the Soviet Union that we do not trust them or ourselves.

This is hardly a framework in which to approve agreements which are so portentous for the future. I would be gravely concerned, if I felt that way myself, about voting for their approval. From what Dr. Kissinger has told us, and from what the Secretary of State and others have said before the Foreign Relations Committee, I am convinced these are excellent agreements very much in the interests of our national security.

I do not base my approval of the treaty and the agreements upon "trust" in the benign motives of the Soviet Union. No one is asked to do that. What I do base it on is Dr. Kissinger's assurance that there is every likelihood that the agreements will be complied with because it is in the interests of the U.S.S.R. to do so. And that is the only faith of which I speak. So, referring specifically to the interim agreement, we must take the agreement for what it is and as it is.

To that extent, it seems to me, we must assume—because this is in relation to a treaty which the Soviet Union made with us—that the agreement will be complied with. We cannot at one and the same time approve the agreement and plan to act on the theory that the agreement will be breached. We also ought not to approve the agreement in such a way which says that we really distrust the agreement, or do not think it is a good agreement which safeguards our national security. I have serious problems with Senator JACKSON's amendment in this very regard.

If the agreement in itself, in compliance with its terms, sucks us in so deeply that we are seriously disadvantaged, we should not approve it. I believe that it does no such thing. The President and Dr. Kissinger have assured us it does no such thing.

On the basis of what I see as the psychology that is now being introduced in these amendments and understandings, I hope that the Senate will be very wary. I think we should know whether there has been a change in the President's position as put forth by Dr. Kissinger because that position seems different from the one in the amendment being proposed.

The treaty and the agreement symbolize a new concept of the relationship respecting nuclear armaments between the Soviets and ourselves. And that concept is a succession to two others which preceded it.

One was the concept of superiority. That pertained for a very long time; indeed, into the early 1960's. Then came the concept of parity. Now we have the more sophisticated concept of sufficiency, of President Nixon himself. Mr. President, "second to none" which is what the administration believes in essentially means sufficiency, and that is essentially what we have before us.

It is essential for the treaty and the agreement to meet the test. This is not going to remain static, because both parties have the right to improve and to modernize the existing weaponry in the offensive and defensive fields at one and the same time that the agreements are in effect. Indeed, we have the possibility of greatly expanding the capability of our offensive weapons through the MIRV technology; that is, adding to the number of effective warheads in each individual missile, as the freeze is on the number of individual missile launchers.

This is a critically important point because rather than being considered a disadvantage this is considered one of the great advantages by the United States under the agreement because, as again Dr. Kissinger explains:

The current arms race compounds numbers by technology. The Soviet Union has

proved that it can best compete in sheer numbers. This is the area which is limited by the agreement.

Thus the agreement confines the competition with the Soviets to the area of technology. And, heretofore, we have had a significant advantage.

There is no reason whatever why we should approve the agreement if we fear we are deficient, and that is what these amendments suggest in the future outlook respecting technology. I do not think we are facing such a future. All evidence suggests we are not. It seems a very reasonable risk we are taking with the great likelihood that the advantage is very materially with us, in terms of competition under the term of the agreement.

This question of unilateral declaration which is now coming to the floor, proposed by the Senator from New York (Mr. BUCKLEY) and which is going to be proposed by the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) and the Senator from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT), is very important because the agreement contemplates, or at least the framework in which the agreement was made allows for unilateral declarations. Indeed, the agreement is accompanied by two things: One, agreed interpretations and common understandings with respect to certain technical matters. For example, what is the significant increase in the size of Silos, which is to mean not more than 10 to 15 percent. It is also accompanied by a unilateral declaration on the part of the United States, and that relates to the fact that we would consider the "introduction of land mobile ICBM's would be inconsistent with the agreement."

Therefore, unilateral declarations, which may be adopted by the Senate and which the administration would be compelled to adopt in the event Senate ratification of the treaty with those unilateral declarations were accepted are likely to be treated as part of the agreement's meaning and perhaps binding because there is precedent for it. Therefore, they become important not only in terms of the future, to wit, as Senator BUCKLEY's understanding seeks to do, to commit us to a situation 5 years hence, but in terms of the present it would represent a declaration by the United States which could conceivably induce the Soviet Union to say, "You did not mean it when you signed, you have now changed the agreement, so we are backing out of the agreement."

So the stakes are very large. I hope very much that in rejecting what is sought to be accomplished by the understanding the Senate will bear that in mind.

The agreements may, in fact, be invalidated by adopting one of these amendments, understandings, reservations, whatever the authors may choose to call them.

In that regard I think we need to go back to the basis on which these agreements were negotiated. I revert to what I consider to be the basic doctrine which led us to undertake these agreements. It is incorporated in an address which former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara delivered on September 18, 1967, before the United Press editors and publishers in San Francisco. This represented a highly expert analysis of our situation. The Secretary said at that time that both we and the Soviets had far exceeded the nuclear needs of a second strike capability; that is, the ability to survive a first strike, and yet have a completely credible and reliable assured destruction deterrent in terms of the second strike.

Secretary McNamara attributed this situation—having far in excess of what either side needed—to the fact we could read their intentions and they could not read our intentions. He went back to 1961 and pointed out that, although at that time the Soviets had a relatively small nuclear weapons arsenal, the Soviet Union had gained a theoretical capability, he called it, of building up that arsenal to a much larger size.

The United States undertook materially to expand its nuclear defensive capability in order to meet, not the reality of a Soviet position of offensive capability, but the worst possible hypothesis, what was the largest they could theoretically build.

He pointed out that the need for a treaty was very great and he said:

> We both have strategic nuclear arsenals greatly in excess of a credible assured destruction capability. These arsenals have reached that point of excess in each case for precisely the same reason: we each have reacted to the other's build-up with very conservative calculations. We have, that is, each built a greater arsenal than either of us needed for a second-strike capability, simply because we each wanted to be able to cope with the "worst plausible case."
>
> But since we now each possess a deterrent in excess of our individual needs, both of our nations would benefit from a properly safe-guarded agreement first to limit, and later to reduce, both our offensive and defensive strategic nuclear forces.

These observations and views, therefore, lead me to the following conclusion: I appreciate the fact that my colleagues who have concerns as to the agreement and the treaty, knowing or seeing that it is to be overwhelmingly approved, may have decided to vote for it, too. Certainly, this, to my mind, is one of the most magnificent and most historic achievements toward seeking peace instead of war in which this Nation has been engaged. But they have determined that, in order to subserve their viewpoint, amendments, understandings, or unilateral declarations need to be attached. Those, as I have seen them, would only serve notice on the Soviet Union that we do not believe the agreement will be complied with or that the agreement is not agreeable to us in its own terms. Nothing else is served by these amendments and understandings.

Therefore, I hope the administration will be scrupulously careful in examining the proposed amendment and understanding that so they do not negate what the administration is asking us to do.

I also, as the chairman of the committee is now here, would like to suggest to him that it might well be in order to convene our committee so that we may have a look at what is here proposed and may take a position on it as a committee. It seems to me that the greatest vigilance must now be exercised in view of the origin of where this agreement and this treaty came from, and the reasons for them, to see that they are not, at one and the same time, overridden in the mere act of ratification, as this could happen, and I see the beginnings of that in what is proposed.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Is the Senator referring to the proposal by the junior Senator from New York (Mr. BUCKLEY), or the proposal by the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON), or both?

Mr. JAVITS. The junior Senator from New York (Mr. BUCKLEY) has already made his proposal, so that is already the pending business. The proposal of the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) I have just received. I am looking it over very carefully. I have concern over it. So I made the suggestion which I did only to have my chairman give consideration to whether it might not be useful to consider what may be proposed as a committee, rather than just individual views of Senators.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think the Senator's point is well taken. I share his concern about adopting, as the Senator says, either a reservation, interpretation or understanding without the most thorough consideration, because it does raise doubts about our intentions with respect to the treaty. These treaties are not self-enforcing, as the Senator has well said. They depend upon the good faith of the parties to them. If we do anything to arouse suspicion on the part of the other party to the agreement that may raise the question of deceiving or of not wanting to live up to the terms, of course the distrust will be mutual and destroy respect for the agreement.

I have no objection to acceding to the Senator's suggestion if he and other Senators feel there is anything to be achieved by it. I am available to do it.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator. I believe the discussion this afternoon, in which we will have the full explanation of the Senator from Washington's position, might help us in that regard.

Mr. President, my time has expired. I notice the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) is here, and I am prepared to yield the floor.

For the information of my colleagues, in their absence, the junior Senator from New York (Mr. BUCKLEY) called up an understanding which was read at the desk. That creates a somewhat different time situation in that 2 hours are now available for the purpose of considering that understanding, and that is the pending question, as I understand.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is the pending question. Who yields time?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, a parliamentary question on the time situation. Are the 2 hours attributable to the understanding offered by the junior Senator from New York (Mr. BUCKLEY) now running?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The junior Senator from New York has used 4 minutes of his 2 hours, or the 1 hour

that was allocated to him. Four minutes of the 1 hour were used by the junior Senator from New York. The time that has been used by the senior Senator from New York was on the treaty itself.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Was that under the time of the Senator from Vermont?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Actually, the Senator from Vermont and I are both for the treaty, and the allocation of time is not a case of one Senator being for and the other against.

I suggest, in view of the fact that I used considerable time, that we yield 20 minutes to the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON). Ten minutes from each side would be the fair way to do that.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Washington.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, the Senate has before it two historic agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. The treaty and the interim agreement contain the most extensive measures to which we have ever subscribed limiting American freedom to determine the nature of our own strategic nuclear defenses. The real question before us is whether, and to what extent, these arrangements support and advance the basic objective of our strategic posture: to deter war and to minimize damage should deterrence fail.

The President has said that he does not desire automatic approval of these agreements by the Congress—that he expects us to give them thorough review and full consideration. On these agreements, Mr. President, it is my deep belief that the Senate must indeed give the advice without which our consent becomes mere acquiescence. It is my purpose, therefore, in the remarks I shall make today, to offer for the consideration of the Senate an amendment to the authorizing resolution on the interim agreement that would bring into full partnership with the administration a Senate determined to meet its constitutional responsibility and to play its rightful role in advising on the arrangements now before us.

Many Senators will recall that I have reserved my judgment on the wisdom of giving unqualified consent and approval to the ABM treaty and interim offensive agreement. Those of my colleagues who have followed the discussion of SALT these recent weeks doubtless know that I have been critical of these early agreements. This concern was perhaps best reflected in my efforts, in the Armed Services Committee, to probe into the terms, the explanations, and the implications both of the agreements themselves and the future strategic balance under them.

In the several days of hearings we have now completed in the Committee on Armed Services I was able to question our negotiators, the Secretary of Defense, representatives of the Department of Defense, the Chairman and individual members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and outside experts. These extensive hearings were the culmination of nearly 3 years of hearings within the Subcommittee on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks that I am privileged to chair. I was able, Mr. President, to ask literally hundreds of questions of the various witnesses to come before the committee.

Several things emerged from this effort, not least of all some important clarification by administration spokesmen of various provisions of the agreements. Some of these provisions had been interpreted in several different ways depending on the witness commenting upon them. I believe the hearings were helpful both in clarifying the obligations we have undertaken and in understanding the implications for our future security of the many limitations to which we and the Soviets have agreed. I am pleased that several officials within the administration have expressed satisfaction at the opportunity to put the issues in SALT before the American people and to sharpen our own official understanding of some of the more complicated provisions of the agreements.

Many Senators will recall the early confusion that surrounded the first announcements of the agreements. The New York Times was not alone in incorrectly reporting the terms of the agreements; it was joined, as late as several days after the signing, by Members of the Senate. I hope that as we begin our consideration of the agreements the terms of them are at last firmly in mind.

By way of summary, Mr. President, let me state again the conclusion to which my examination of the terms of the agreements led me:

> Simply put, the agreement gives the Soviets more of everything: more light ICBM's, more heavy ICBM's, more submarine launched missiles, more submarines, more payload, even more ABM radars. In no area covered by the agreement is the United States permitted to maintain parity with the Soviet Union.

I shall not rehearse the numbers here. Suffice it to say that the Soviet advantage in offensive weapons covered by the interim agreement is on the order of 50 percent.

THE OBJECTIVE OF EQUAL LIMITS IN SALT II

In the treaty covering anti-ballistic-missile defenses we and the Soviets have clearly established the principle of equal limits on both countries. Both we and they are permitted two ABM sites, one at our respective national capitals and one located so as to defend strategic offensive weapons. Both countries have accepted limits on the numbers of radars that they may deploy and the number of interceptor missiles. Even though our defense requirements differed from those of the Soviets and even though our ABM program had a momentum that the Soviet program lacked, we and they have undertaken to live by identical limitations. The one minor exception involves some additional early radars on the Soviet side.

It is my view, Mr. President, that the principle of equality reflected in the ABM treaty ought properly to be applied to a future treaty on offensive systems as well. I am confident that the Senate of the United States would not wish to see this country undertake, in an international treaty having the force and weight of the Constitution itself, ceilings on U.S. defenses that are greatly inferior to the levels permitted for the Soviet Union. We cannot, in approving the interim agreement, proclaim that the law of the land is to accept in an eventual treaty major areas of Soviet numerical superiority. The Soviet Union must understand that the numerical advantages conceded to them in the interim agreement are not permissible except as a transitory stage to equal balances.

During these last weeks I have listened to administration spokesmen justify the wide numerical advantage granted to the Soviets in the interim agreement on the grounds that it is offset by our superior technology. It is no doubt true that U.S. weapons technology is currently superior to that of the Soviet Union in a great many areas. It is particularly true with respect to MIRV technology. I am persuaded after careful review of this argument that we are moving into a period of rapidly changing technology in which the advantage we presently enjoy by virtue of our greater technical sophistication will be narrowed as the Soviets move to close this gap. There was virtual unanimity among the witnesses to come before the Armed Services Committee that the Soviets are close to developing a proper MIRV capability. The consensus, in fact, was that they might demonstrate such a capability "at any moment." No one in or out of Government, so far as I am aware, has seriously suggested that the Soviets will fail to develop such a capability within the 5-year duration of the interim agreement. It is, therefore, with a view to the future when the Soviets are able to exploit their vastly greater payload capability by dividing it into many more efficient MIRV warheads that we must concern ourselves with a restoration of parity. My resolution would simply express the view of the Congress in insisting upon equal limitations in any future treaty negotiated in a period when improving Soviet technology will invalidate the basis for interim Soviet numerical superiority.

There is, Mr. President, a further reason for insisting now upon equality in a future treaty covering offensive weapons. It will draw clear lines for Soviet negotiators, removing any incentive to prolong the forthcoming negotiations while they try to continue building offensive weapons in the hope that they will be rewarded by higher agreed limits—a reward, in effect, for having accelerated the arms race. If we leave this door open we may offer an irresistible temptation to international instability. We have no plans to press weapons developments for such purposes, and a clear congressional declaration in support of equal limitations could well serve to discourage others from doing so.

I would simply point out that, during the 3 years we were negotiating in Helsinki, Vienna, and Moscow, the total number of Soviet ICBM's went from well below our 1,054 to over 1,600, well above it. And I would further point out that the interim agreement reflects the number of Soviet weapons operational or under construction on May 26, 1972, the date

on which the agreement was signed in Moscow.

THE SURVIVABILITY OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC DETERRENT

A central purpose of the SALT accords is to slow the momentum of the vigorous Soviet deployment program that persisted throughout the talks and is permitted to continue even under the terms of the agreements. We hope that we shall have succeeded in at least slowing the rate at which Soviet strategic weapons are being deployed against us. Since the extent of the slowdown, if any, depends more on Soviet unilateral decisions than on any limits imposed by the agreements themselves, we shall not know for some time at what rate the Soviet offensive capability will continue to grow. Clearly, there are some rates of growth that would be of great concern to us, just as there are others that might serve to reassure us that the agreements are being adhered to in spirit as well as in letter. For if anything has emerged from my study of these agreements, it is the unmistakable conclusion that there is much the Soviets can do within them to bring about a shift in the strategic balance that could have far-reaching adverse consequences for the United States.

I referred earlier to the likelihood that the Soviets would develop a MIRV capability sometime in the near future. If they were to aggressively pursue a silo-killing MIRV program for their force of SS–9 type heavy missiles they could, within the lifetime of the interim agreement, develop the capability to destroy virtually all of our land-based missile force. If they were to press ahead at full steam with permitted increases to their submarine fleet, the Soviets could, within the 5 years, develop a capability to destroy a very high percentage of our bomber force. It is potential developments of this nature that concern us; and it is in response to this potential that I would hope to see a declaration of congressional sentiment.

All that my amendment proposes to say on this subject, Mr. President, is that Soviet deployment programs that have the effect of endangering the survival of our strategic deterrent—programs such as those referred to above which are permitted within the letter of the SALT accords—are contrary to our supreme national interests. This declaration must be understood in conjunction with the provision in the agreement that permits either side to withdraw in the event that its supreme national interests are threatened.

The objective, in all of this, is to develop a stable strategic relationship with the Soviet Union. It is not self-evident, as some maintain, that the clear ability to engage in a massive, highly destructive attack against cities by itself provides stability against all possible forms of conflict between the two superpowers. Nor is it correct—indeed, there is no evidence—that the Soviet Union has obviously embraced such a notion of strategic stability. It would therefore be greatly troubling if the Soviet Union maximized its capabilities to develop its offensive forces, within the terms of the interim agreement, since this would strongly suggest that its objectives went well beyond that required merely to deter attacks against its own cities. We would have to draw the conclusion that its purposes went beyond and in the direction of threatening the stability of the political and military environment which currently exists.

In addressing itself to the question of Soviet actions which might endanger the strategic deterrent forces of the United States, whether or not such actions were within the terms of the interim agreement, Congress is reinforcing the strongly held position of the executive branch. For example, Ambassador Smith informed the Soviet representative that it was essential for the follow-on negotiations to constrain and reduce the threats to the survivability of the strategic retaliatory forces of both sides. If an agreement accomplishing this objective were not reached within 5 years, the Soviet Union was informed that U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized and under such circumstances would constitute a basis of withdrawal from the ABM treaty. I am confident that Congress fully supports this position. I am disturbed by the report of the President which suggests that Mr. Brezhnev has indicated an intent to press forward with the maximum range of programs permitted by the ABM treaty and interim offensive arrangement. While we would expect both nations to take reasonable measures to provide for what they view as legitimate security needs, Congress should go on record that it would consider the endangering of the survivability of U.S. strategic forces totally unacceptable and would fully support the President in actions designed to preclude this from occurring.

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION

I know that my colleagues in both parties have supported and will continue to support those essential programs of research and development and force modernization necessary to enable the United States to maintain a prudent strategic posture. Our resolution merely articulates this commitment in the context of the continuing SALT deliberations. It is not our intention to bind anyone to any particular procurement item in advance. I have always believed that procurement decisions must be taken on their merit on a case by case basis. Clearly language of the sort proposed here does not, in itself, suggest any particular level of procurement either generally or with respect to specific programs. All that is suggested in the resolution is that we ought not to assume that the interim agreement obviates the need for what we have been doing and will continue to do as part of a necessary effort to provide for a sound strategic posture.

Mr. President, I look forward, as the debate continues, to the opportunity to bring to the Senate as full a discussion as possible of the agreements and their relation to our strategic posture. I shall have more to say in elaboration as the debate proceeds. For now, I urge my colleagues to join this effort to make the views of Congress an integral part of our national policy on arms control.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. President, will the Senator from Arkansas yield me 3 minutes to comment on the Senator from Washington's address?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator but I want to make a short comment, too.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. I will delay my comments until the Senator from Arkansas has completed his.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thank the Senator. Mr. President, I yield myself 3 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TUNNEY). The Senator from Arkansas is recognized for 3 minutes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I am glad that the Senator from Washington has made the initial statement of his position. I only want to make a few brief comments.

These matters were examined not only in the Armed Services Committee, to which the Senator refers, but also in the Committee on Foreign Relations. I think, as of the moment, the calculations of the staff, with the information obtained from the executive department, clearly show that there is reasonable parity today between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

I put these figures in the RECORD this morning. I shall not put them in the RECORD again except to say on that in the case of the offensive launchers, for example, the figures have been well publicized, we have a total of 1,710 against the Russians' 2,268 to 2,358, which takes into consideration what the Senator just mentioned.

Heavy bombers, we have 457 against 140. On missiles, independent warheads operational, we have a total of warheads including, of course, our MIRV's 5,888 to 2,220, not that that controverts altogether the Senator's point.

What he has not taken into consideration at the present time, which was taken into consideration in the negotiations but may not be covered specifically by the agreement, are our forward bases for our nuclear submarines, of which we have three and the Russians have none.

The United States has forward bases for our airplanes, which give the capability of delivery by airplanes from Europe to Soviet country—to the heartland of Russia itself. I think that in the negotiations, as of the present, all of these were taken into consideration, even though some of them were, at our request, of course, not covered by the agreement itself. For example, the agreement does not deal with heavy bombers because negotiations were restricted to the area on which the negotiators thought they could get agreement.

I do not agree that there is not reasonable parity in total capacity for mutual destruction. That, together with the agreement on the ABM's which, in effect, adopts the principle that we accept the principle we have no effective defense against intercontinental missiles, makes for a stable situation, as one would expect between two great countries.

So I must submit that what the Senator is assuming is that between now and 5 years hence, we will stand still and the Russians will do everything possible,

as he says, to maximize the opportunities permitted them under the agreement.

I think that assumption is a questionable assumption.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, first of all, I want to thank the Senator for yielding me this time. We are talking about what is permitted under the 5-year agreement. We agreed to parity on the ABM's, that each side is to have two sites under this agreement, and that is what I am talking about. In the interim agreement the Soviets are permitted to have 50 percent more in numbers of strategic weapons and this is corroborated by all witnesses we heard.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I understand that, but——

Mr. JACKSON. And under the interim agreement the Soviets are permitted to have four times the throw-weight. The Senator's position, as I understand it, is that we have to take into consideration the bombers and the forward bases. Well, let us mention one thing that is brought up constantly—Secretary McNamara brought it up several years ago—that we have a little over 7,000 warheads in Europe. That is a classic comment. But warheads without delivery systems are not truly strategic weapons.

We have a limited number of airbases in Europe capable of delivering atomic weapons. The Soviets have over 600 IRBM's and MRBM's that can hit every one of those bases—just with missiles—and with a lot of missiles left over. We do not have a single IRBM or MRBM in Europe.

So when we talk about what we have in the forward areas, I would point out that they are all covered by Soviet missiles plus the Soviet fighter bomber forces in central Europe. Of course, here again, we are talking about NATO and NATO defenses and we are talking about the Mediterranean.

So I want merely to observe that when one gets into the numbers racket with nuclear weapons, he can fall into the dangerous fallacy of assuming that all warheads in a stockpile are capable of being delivered.

What we are really addressing ourselves to here is the question of having a stable relationship with survivable forces on each side. That is what we are talking about. I do not follow the basic logic or reasoning on the part of those who say that we cannot have parity in strategic arms with the Soviets.

That is what I am suggesting, that we be in a position to stand for and argue for parity with the Soviets in SALT phase II.

We agreed on parity on the ABM. So all I am saying is that we should settle for parity in offensive arms, too. I remember Secretaries of Defense coming before Congress and before the Senate for confirmation both Republican and Democratic, all arguing for superiority.

Now under the interim agreement, we found ourselves not even settling for parity but for subparity. I am willing to go along on the interim agreement, even though it gives them an interim advantage in numbers and throw-weight, provided it is our declared purpose in SALT phase II talks, to get parity in the offensive strategic arms area. That is what my amendment is all about—to get the parity in offensive arms that we obtain in connection with the ABM treaty.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I can only reiterate that the information we obtained from the Defense Department was in terms of what they call equivalent megatonnage, the Soviet Union has about the same as the United States.

Much has been made—and the Senator has done this before in talking about the SS–9's—of the fact that this country deliberately made the decision not to put our nuclear capacity into these big weapons. We chose the smaller weapons. I think it was a wise decision.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I was involved in that decision.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. But the SS–9 has become a kind of scare weapon. It frightens everyone. I am glad that the Senator would agree. However, I cannot understand why the Senator makes so much of the SS–9's, because it is comparable to weapons that we could have made but we chose not to. We chose instead to make a sufficient number of smaller ones.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, for what possible purpose would a nation deploy a missile with a 25-megaton payload capability if it was not for some sort of counterforce?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It may be that they were not as wise as we were. We could have made that decision.

I have seen them make 25-ton trucks years ago which were not efficient at all, but it was just to show that they could do it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield myself 3 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas is recognized for 3 additional minutes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I would not undertake to analyze the psychology that causes people to do more vigorous things than do other people.

In the testimony we had—not only from the Defense Department, but also from some of the others—the Defense Department thinks that every year is about the right time to scare us in order to get their appropriations. However, the CIA, Mr. Helms, and others who testified do not agree that this is the more efficient way and that we should not be so concerned about their SS–9's when we have more than enough Minuteman's which are deliverable and, may I say, are more accurate.

Sometimes Americans, including the Senator from Washington, brag about our superior technology. At other times they have a different view and they talk about the Russians outdoing us all the time—that they were widening the gap.

Mr. JACKSON. I never said they had technological superiority.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator said they were widening the gap. I suppose he meant that they would take over in superior technology in the next 5 years. I do not know why the Senator would say that.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, let us be accurate. I made it very clear in my statement. What I said was that currently we have superior technology. What I mean is that in the period ahead, while we are now ahead technologically, suppose that in MIRVing they can move in and equal us in a short time. In fact, I said that they could test MIRV's at any moment. These are facts corroborated by testimony before the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. There is no testimony that they have tested it. I suppose that they could if they are foolish enough to go through all of these exotic weapons systems. I do not believe that they will if they have any confidence that we will live up to the agreement.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I think the whole thing concerns the question of whether we can induce in each other some degree of confidence that the other side means what it says when it signs agreements like this.

Mr. President, I do not wish to take time to play the numbers game.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield myself 3 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas is recognized for 3 additional minutes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I said the same thing. The Secretary of Defense came back immediately, almost within hours, and said that we have got to have the new and very sophisticated weapons such as Trident and the B–1 and all of the things that we have been voting on recently.

All I think it does is to create a suspicion in the minds of the military leaders of Russia and they doubt our sincerity. And now we doubt their sincerity when they say they are going to do what we have already been doing in this Congress. It is the old problem of tit for tat, and each time we raise the suspicions that the others will do the same.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, that is all I object to about it.

Mr. JACKSON. All I am asking is what is wrong with parity so that we have the same number of land-based ICBM's and sea-based missiles? As the Senator knows, under the interim agreement the Soviets are permitted 62 Y-class submarines to our 44——

Mr. FULBRIGHT. But with respect to the numbers, as I have already said, we do not disagree on them.

Mr. JACKSON. What about the Soviet throw-weight advantage confirmed in the interim agreement?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, on the throw-weights, when they are concentrated, I have not talked about big versus small ones. I would prefer more of the smaller ones.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I would say to the Senator, we do not have more of the smaller ones, because when we agree on the interim agreement—we have fewer delivery systems. All I am saying is what is wrong with an agreement which would give us parity?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is as-

suming the very question at issue. And that is what is parity. There is more to parity than numbers. There is more to parity than the big SS–9's. For example, one must consider our forward bases for submarines. We have had testimony to the effect that having those forward bases enables us to keep fewer submarines on base than otherwise.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes so that I might yield to the Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, when we were briefed in the White House on these two agreements we were told by Mr. Kissinger—and this is not classified—that in order to supplement the agreements we were making, we would have to continue with the Trident and the B–1—and there was a third one which I cannot remember just now, but it will come to me as I go along.

Mr. JACKSON. It was to improve research and development and certain communications.

Mr. PASTORE. The Senator is correct. The argument at that time was that unless we so continued we would be at a disadvantage at the end of 5 years. We gathered that if we did do it, we would not be at a disadvantage, that we would be at parity.

My question concerns this. We have already authorized and funded in the Senate the nuclear aircraft carrier. We have already funded the Trident. And we are talking very seriously about the money for research and development. In line with our action, how does this shape up with the reservation the Senator is talking about?

Mr. JACKSON. Let me try to answer as directly as I can.

Mr. PASTORE. In other words, we say that we want parity. The Russians say that they want parity. Who is going to decide what parity is? They keep going and we keep going, and where do we reach parity?

Mr. JACKSON. Simply stated, all witnesses before our committee—the Secretary of Defense, Ambassador Smith, and all of the administration witnesses—said that they do not want the interim agreement as the final agreement.

The Senator recalls the argument that Dr. Kissinger made. He talked about momentum. He said that the accords were to slow down the Soviet offensive momentum. Frankly, as far as that argument is concerned, I think the Soviets would have as many submarines and as many land-based missiles whether they signed the interim agreement or not. I will not get further into the point.

The main point I want to make now is that the administration witnesses all made it very clear that this is an interim agreement and that we are not going into SALT II with the idea that the terms of this interim arrangement will be the final treaty, such as we have with the ABM.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 additional minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas is recognized for 1 additional minute.

Mr. PASTORE. Is the Senator actually saying that we have allowed ourselves to engage in an agreement whereby the way is open for the Russians to proceed in such a fashion that even if we do improve Trident and even if we do develop the B–1 and even if we do appropriate money for the research and development, we will still be at a disadvantage at the end of 5 years?

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator is correct.

Mr. PASTORE. Why did we make the agreement?

Mr. JACKSON. I would not have made the agreement. I am pointing out that Mr. Brezhnev has made it very clear that he is going to exercise all of his rights under this interim agreement.

That means that the Soviets, of course, end up with a superior number of delivery systems, strategically speaking, and I do not need to run through the specific systems now. This is the key question that disturbs me as much as anything—the survivability of our strategic deterrent under this agreement. That is what we are talking about. I want to see a survivable deterrent on both sides.

Mr. PASTORE. So it all comes back to this: The Senator from Washington has serious doubts about this particular agreement.

Mr. JACKSON. I do not have serious doubts and I can support it if we proceed as we go into SALT II on the basis that we are going to ask for parity on strategic arms.

Mr. PASTORE. Would we not be fools if we did not?

Mr. JACKSON. Of course. That is what my amendment says. That is what my proposal involves—parity.

Mr. PASTORE. I do not object to that. It goes without saying we do not have to make an hour's speech to be sure we have to have parity.

Mr. JACKSON. That is what I am arguing about.

Mr. PASTORE. That is what I am arguing about.

Mr. JACKSON. Then, we are in agreement.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. President, the Senator from Washington has made a major contribution to the debate on the Moscow agreements. I am even more impressed with the thorough and penetrating questions which he put to the many witnesses who testified on the treaty and the interim agreement before the Committee on Armed Services.

The Senator from Washington today suggests a new point in connection with the Moscow agreements. I will read one part of his sentence. He said:

Congress should go on record that it would consider the endangering of the survivability of U.S. strategic forces totally unacceptable and would fully support the President in actions designed to preclude this from occurring.

That seems to me to be eminently sound. I agree with the Senator from Rhode Island, as well as the Senator from Washington, that in SALT II the negotiators at SALT II should seek parity. I would hope that would be the paramount part of their negotiations.

Mr. President, I plan to support the treaty when it comes to a vote in the Senate tomorrow. I can support the interim agreement as an interim agreement.

I am concerned with what happens at SALT II, and I think the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) has placed his finger precisely on the key point.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for 1 additional minute?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. President, I think the Senator placed his finger on the key point when he said we must insist upon parity in SALT II and also—

Congress should go on record that it would consider the endangering of the survivability of U.S. strategic forces totally unacceptable and would fully support the President in actions designed to preclude this from occurring.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for 15 minutes for a conference report?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield 15 minutes to the Senator from Rhode Island.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum for 2 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Berry, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed, without amendment, the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 254) to authorize the printing and binding of a revised edition of "Senate Procedure" and providing the same shall be subject to copyright by the author.

ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

The message further announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills:

S. 247. An act for the relief of Albert G. Feller and Flora Feller;

H.R. 489. An act to approve an order of the Secretary of the Interior canceling irrigation charges against non-Indian-owned lands under the Modoc Point unit of the Klamath Indian irrigation project, Oregon; and

H.R. 9936. An act to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to provide for a current listing of each drug manufactured, prepared, propagated, compounded, or processed by a registrant under that act, and for other purposes.

The message also announced that the House had agreed to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 15093) making appropriations for the Department of Housing and Urban Development; for space, science, veterans, and certain other independent executive agencies, boards, commissions, corporations, and offices for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973, and for other purposes; that the House receded from its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate Nos. 1, 9, 16, and 32 to the bill and concurred therein; and that the House receded from its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate Nos. 2, 4, 27, 34, and 41 to the bill and concurred therein, severally with an amendment, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

HUD, SPACE, SCIENCE, AND VETERANS' APPROPRIATIONS, 1973—CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, as in legislative session, I submit a report of the committee of conference on H.R. 15093, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BROCK). The report will be stated by title.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 15093) making appropriations for the Department of Housing and Urban Development; for space, science, veterans, and certain other independent executive agencies, boards, commission, corporations, and offices for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973, and for other purposes, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses this report, signed by all the conferees.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the consideration of the conference report?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the report.

(The conference report is printed in the House proceedings of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of July 27, 1972, at pages 25816–25817.)

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, the pending measure contains new obligational authority of $20,125,951,000. This amount is $132,232,000 below the budget estimate, $407,461,000 above the amount recommended by the House, and $457,419,000 below the sum contained in the Senate bill. While it may appear on the face that the Senate conferees lost more than they gained in the conference, I will give an explanation indicating that this is not the case.

For title I of the bill, containing the items for the Department of Housing and Urban Development, a total of $4,034,065,000 has been provided, which is $718,596,000 more than the sum appropriated last year and $133,742,000 under the budget estimate. The reduction below the budget estimate can be primarily attributed to two line items contained in the title; namely, the special risk insurance fund, which carried a budget estimate of $195,000,000, and the special assistance functions fund, which carried a budget estimate of $119,369,000. For these two items, the conferees recommended no appropriation of new obligational authority at this time. However, the conferees have invited the Department of Housing and Urban Development to submit estimates to cover the losses of these two funds when such losses have been actually determined.

In other words, we took it out because there was no actual determination of the exact amount required, and we are perfectly willing to provide that money when that determination is made.

Since the reduction from the budget estimates for these two items amount to $314,369,000, and the total reductions in budget estimates for the Department of Housing and Urban Development—as indicated earlier—amount to $133,742,000, it is evident that for all other items of the Department of Housing and Urban Development the pending measure provides a sum that is approximately $181,000,000 above the budget estimate. In this connection, the committee on conference agreed to a figure of $1,200,000,000 for urban renewal funds, which is $200,000,000 above the budget estimate and the amount recommended by the House.

I want to say, for the benefit of the Senator from New York, who was very much interested in this, we went over the budget estimate with reference to the section 235 program. In conference we came out with an amount $115,000,000 over the House figure, so we came out very well.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I may say that the absolute key to enhanced housing in the core cities is this provision. I am pleased. I congratulate the Senator, because this is as close to his heart, I know, as it is to mine.

Mr. PASTORE. I thought that was a fine accomplishment.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator.

Mr. PASTORE. For comprehensive planning grants, a total of $100,000,000 has been provided, as compared with the House allowance of $19,002,000.

For the homeownership program, more commonly known as the section 235 program, a total of $170,000,000 is recommended, as compared with the House allowance of only $55,000,000.

For the section 236 program, the rental housing assistance program, a total of $175,000,000 is recommended, compared with the House allowance of only $25,000,000.

Moving to the other titles of the bill, the committee of conference recommends a total of $3,407,650,000 for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. This is the precise amount of the budget estimate and $58,440,000 above the House bill. The committee of conference has also provided for the earmarking of $24,000,000 of the research and development funds appropriated to NASA for research in the fields of noise abatement and aviation safety.

For the National Science Foundation, a sum of $626,000,000 is recommended for fiscal year 1973, and a total of $30,500,000 which was specifically earmarked for particular programs in fiscal years 1971 and 1972 has been made available for general purposes in fiscal year 1973. Thus, the National Science Foundation will have in excess of $656,000,000 to fund its programs in the current fiscal year.

For the Veterans' Administration, the committee on conference recommends an appropriation of $11,903,322,000. This amount is $80,424,000 more than the sum made available in fiscal year 1972, $26,044,000 greater than the allowance of the House, and $3,298,000 under the Senate bill. The entire amount recommended by the Senate for construction of major projects has been accepted by the committee on conference. Minor reductions of the amounts in the Senate bill were agreed to by the conferees in the appropriation "Medical Administration and Miscellaneous Operating Expenses" in the amount of $500,000, and in the line item "Construction, Minor Projects" in the amount of $2,798,000.

In addition to the money amounts involved in the bill, there were some language provisions to be considered by the committee on conference. In particular, the House had incorporated a proviso which prohibited the move of the Fourth District Bank of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board System from Greensboro to Atlanta. The committee on conference reached a compromise and modified this proviso to make the move possible if a plebiscite of the member institutions in the fourth district approve such a move.

That is generally considered a good compromise and a solution of a thorny problem that has been with us for years.

Mr. President, I believe that this covers most of the matters in the pending measure, and I am now ready to answer any questions that Senators may have concerning any of the particular items. At the proper time I shall move the approval of the conference report.

I yield now to the Senator from Colorado.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I do not think there is much to add to the report which the distinguished chairman of the committee has given. Frankly, I thought that in the areas in which we had a special interest, particularly in the field of housing, we came out very well in the report this year, as well as in the field of the National Science Foundation. I am happy to see it come out this way, and I congratulate the chairman on his work.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I move the adoption of the conference report.

The report was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the amendments in disagreement.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 2, to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum named in said amendment, insert: "$175,000,000".

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 4, to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum named in said amendment, insert: "$5,000,000".

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Sen-

ate numbered 27, to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum named in said amendment, insert: "$28,900,000".

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 34, to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert: ", to remain available until June 30, 1974".

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 41, to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: Restore the matter stricken by said amendment, amended to read as follows: ": *Provided further,* That none of the funds made available for administrative or non-administrative expenses of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in this Act shall be used to finance the relocation of all or any part of the Federal Home Loan Bank from Greensboro, North Carolina, nor for the supervision, direction or operation of any district bank for the fourth district other than at such location, unless such relocation is approved by a plebiscite of the member associations of the fourth district".

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I move that the Senate concur in the amendments of the House to Senate amendments numbered 2, 4, 27, 34, and 41.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Rhode Island.

The motion was agreed to.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the conference table which was included by the House, when it acted today on the pending report on the Department of Housing and Urban Development, Space, Science, Veterans appropriations bill, be incorporated in the RECORD by reference. This table gives the complete results of the conference in tabular form, and shows a comparison of the conference action with new budget authority made available in fiscal year 1972, the budget estimates for fiscal year 1973, the House bill, and the Senate bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Arkansas had agreed to yield to me 2 minutes on a privileged matter, a conference report.

Mr. PASTORE. As in legislative session?

Mr. ALLOTT. As in legislative session.

FURTHER MISSOURI RIVER BASIN AUTHORIZATION — CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, as in legislative session, I submit a report of the committee of conference on S. 3284, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The report will be stated by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the House to the bill (S. 3284) to increase the authorization for appropriations for completing the work on the Missouri River Basin by the Secretary of the Interior, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses this report, signed by all the conferees.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the consideration of the conference report?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the report.

(The conference report is printed in the House proceedings of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of July 24, 1972, at p. 24864.)

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, in view of the fact that the House of Representatives, which acted first on the conference report, has previously printed the report, together with the joint statement of the conference committee, I ask unanimous consent that the printing of this report as a separate document by the Senate be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, there were two points of difference between the Senate version and the House amendment which were the subject of discussion and action by the committee of conference.

With respect to the first difference, the committee of conference accepted the Senate version which authorizes $114,000,000 to be appropriated for completing work in the Missouri River Basin, rather than the House language which would have authorized $94,000,000 with which to continue such work for a period of 5 years. The second difference between the House and Senate versions consisted of language appearing in the House version to emphasize that the Garrison Diversion Unit, which has separately authorized appropriations authority, shall not participate in the funds authorized to be appropriated by this legislation. The committee on conference accepted the House language.

The conferees have reached what I consider to be a reasonable compromise on the differences between the two versions and, therefore, Mr. President, I move the adoption of the conference report.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the conference report.

The report was agreed to.

Mr. ALLOTT. I thank the Senator from Arkansas for yielding, and also the distinguished Senator from New York for bearing with me.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had disagreed to the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 15495) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1973 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to authorize construction at certain installations in connection with the Safeguard antiballistic missile system, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes; agreed to the conference asked by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. HÉBERT, Mr. PRICE of Illinois, Mr. FISHER, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. BYRNE of Pennsylvania, Mr. STRATTON, Mr. ARENDS, Mr. O'KONSKI, Mr. BRAY, Mr. BOB WILSON, and Mr. GUBSER were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I am authorized by the distinguished majority leader, after consultation with the Republican leader and interested Senators on both sides of the aisle, to ask unanimous consent that the final vote on adoption of the resolution of ratification occur no later than 6 p.m. today.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I do not quite get what the Senator means by the ratification of the resolution.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. That is, in the common language around here, to vote on the treaty.

Mr. JAVITS. To vote on the treaty rather than on the agreement?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. The vote will be on adoption of the resolution of ratification.

Mr. JAVITS. That is the treaty and the agreement?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. It is the treaty—not the interim agreement.

Mr. JAVITS. What are we going to do about voting on Senator BUCKLEY's understanding? That relates to the treaty.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Ample time will remain under the agreement for a 2-hour limitation of debate on any reservation or understanding.

Mr. JAVITS. The trouble with that is that, having fixed a time for voting on the treaty and leaving the time for voting on Senator BUCKLEY's understanding indeterminate, leaves Senators at a little bit of a disadvantage, does not the Senator think?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Not at all. I think the Senator's inquiry is quite pertinent, but the leadership on both sides of the aisle has put out information on the hotlines that we may vote on this treaty today. Whip notices had earlier carried the information, in accordance with yesterday's understanding, that we would not vote on the treaty until tomorrow. By virtue of that fact, the leadership on both sides of the aisle thought that extra precautions should be taken to insure that Senators not be caught unaware. But such information has been put out on the hotline; no objection has been returned, and the announcement has met with favorable reaction on both sides of the aisle.

Mr. JAVITS. I am persuaded, Mr. President.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I thank the Senator.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BROCK). Without objection, it is so ordered.

TREATY ON LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, Secretary of State Rogers' letter to the President transmitting the ABM treaty and interim agreement contains the following statement of the official U.S. position with respect to these accords:

"(T)he United States has stressed the unique relationship between limitations on offensive and defensive strategic arms. This interrelationship lends extraordinary importance to the undertaking in article XI 'to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms.'

"The special importance we attach to this relationship was reflected in the following formal statement relating to article XI, which was made by the head of the United States delegation on May 9, 1972:

" 'The U.S. delegation has stressed the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, following agreement on the ABM treaty and on the interim agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms . . . If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM treaty . . . The U.S. executive will inform the Congress, in connection with congressional consideration of the ABM treaty and the interim agreement, of this statement of the U.S. position."

I believe that it is most important that the resolution of ratification of the ABM treaty incorporate and emphasize this position. It is with this end in mind that I have proposed that an "understanding" be appended to the resolution of ratification. It states the understanding of the Senate that failure of the United States and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics to negotiate a satisfactory SALT II agreement prior to the expiration of the interim agreement is grounds for withdrawal under the "extraordinary event" clause of the ABM treaty. As such it is in harmony with the statement of Ambassador Gerald Smith as quoted by Secretary of State Rogers in his letter of transmittal to the President.

The inclusion of such an understanding will have two very important effects:

First, it will emphasize to the American public that the ratification of the ABM treaty in and of itself provides no reason for general euphoria. Important first steps have been taken toward the achievement of limitations on strategic arms. Whether we will achieve more complete limitations on the nuclear armaments of the superpowers will depend entirely on whether a satisfactory SALT II agreement can be negotiated prior to the expiration of the interim agreement.

Second, the adoption of an explicit "understanding" will place the Senate firmly behind the administration's position and will strengthen the bargaining hand at SALT II—which begins in October. It will make known to the Russians our understanding of the urgent need for the timely negotiation of an effective successor to the interim agreement. We must also keep in mind that a new administration will be in power 5 years hence. Should the situation then warrant withdrawal, the new President will then be in a better position to explain the necessary action to the Senate if my proposed understanding is adopted at this time.

Mr. President, the addition of such an understanding would demonstrate the Senate's acceptance of not only the letter but the spirit of the treaty as it is understood by the President and his chief advisers. It will effectively and dramatically underscore the Senate's acceptance of the principle of ongoing negotiations in the interest of international peace and security. Finally, it will serve as a constant reminder to the rulers of the Soviet Union that the United States of America has undertaken the commitments of the ABM treaty not as ends in themselves but as first steps on a long and difficult road to a significant reduction of the risk that a nuclear war might break out. Nothing could jeopardize peace more than a miscalculation on the part of the Soviet Union that since we have agreed to an ABM treaty we consider the matter of arms limitation closed.

Mr. President, this is a matter, I think, of critical importance. We must understand that however hopeful we are, however urgently we wish that there be success in the negotiation of a satisfactory successor agreement or a SALT II agreement in which we will find essential parity established between the two countries, taking into consideration their overall strategic forces, there is a possibility that we will find ourselves coming to the end of the life of the interim agreement having failed to reach an agreement on a SALT II treaty. In such a case we will have a dangerous and desperate situation facing the United States of America.

I therefore feel that in the discharge of its responsibility to advise as well as consent, it is incumbent upon the Senate of the United States not just to rely on the Executive's statement of our policy with respect to our insistence on the negotiation of the successor agreement, but that we take this opportunity to restate our concurrence with the policy that is reported in that statement which I quoted from Ambassador Smith.

Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BUCKLEY. I yield to the Senator from Washington.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I want to compliment the able Senator from New York, first of all, for his keen interest in this whole subject relating to the treaty and to the interim agreement. He has taken it upon himself to attend the meetings and the hearings that we held. He has evidenced a keen interest in every aspect of the problem, and I especially want to commend him for his approach to the problem involved here, which is, as I understand it, that there is obviously a direct relationship between the terms of a defensive accord—in this instance, the antiballistic missile system—and the provisions of an agreement that we reach in relation to offensive systems. Is that correct?

Mr. BUCKLEY. That is entirely correct.

Mr. JACKSON. And that the kinds of limitations we accept in an ABM agreement must be related to the balancing limitations in the accord we agree to on offensive systems. In short, the ABM and offensive accords are tied together, and it is the Senator's concern that this be fully understood. His proposed language or reservation relates directly to that kind of requirement which he feels is essential.

Mr. BUCKLEY. I should like to correct the Senator from Washington. It is not a reservation, but merely an understanding. In other words, it does not impose any qualitative or other change or modification on the resolution itself.

Mr. JACKSON. In sum, it would not require any further consultation with the two countries involved.

Mr. BUCKLEY. That is correct. It merely reiterates the formal position delivered by our representative to the Russian representatives during the course of the negotiations in Moscow.

I thank the Senator for his kind remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator from New York yield 10 minutes to the Senator from South Carolina?

Mr. BUCKLEY. I yield.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the treaty on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems, which we now have before us, is part of a package. The parliamentary situation, of course, differs from that of the interim agreement on limitation of strategic offensive arms. The treaty is of indefinite duration, and the Senate participates by virtue of its constitutional duty to advise and consent in the ratification process. The interim agreement is of 5 years' duration and obtains its force and effectiveness from its status as an executive agreement. The resolution endorsing the interim agreement, which will be taken up in due course, merely provides the Congress with an opportunity of expressing its opinion on the matter, and does not attach itself formally to the instrument of the agreement.

I take note of this distinction because the two items are, nevertheless, strategically interrelated. The ABM treaty is meaningful only in the context of the interim agreement. The ABM treaty is not an achievement in itself. Its primary effects on our security are negative. The hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee established clearly that approval of the treaty can only be considered responsible if it is considered on balance with the interim agreement. To put it simply, the ABM treaty is what we had to give up to achieve the overall package.

Precisely what is it we are giving up under this treaty? Let us look at the technical side first.

Under the treaty we are not permit-

ted to deploy a nationwide ABM defense or a base for such a defense.

Instead of the 12-site system which the Secretary of Defense proposed as the minimum which would be adequate for our offensive missiles, we are permitted to deploy only one site for our missiles, and one site for our national command center. We will not be getting the kind of protection that we envisioned when Safeguard was proposed in 1969. At best, the one site will serve mainly to keep our ABM technology in a state of readiness.

Under the treaty, we are not permitted to give ABM capability to non-ABM systems, that is to say, for example, to present air defense systems.

Under the treaty, we also give up the right to deploy any land-based ABM systems of a new type, should they be developed. At the same time we undertake "not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based."

This simple recital of the main points of the treaty also overlooks the fact that present ABM deployment in the United States and the U.S.S.R. is not symmetrical. We have one site 90 percent complete, and it is 1,400 miles from Washington. The Soviets have deployed their system at Moscow, where it would protect the national heartland, the basic industrial system, the national command center, and possibly as many as 300 ICBM's, if covertly tied in with appropriate radars. They have the option to build another system only 800 miles from Moscow.

If we sum up what this treaty does in strategic terms, the problem is even more complex.

It effectively prevents us from ever having the means to protect our population from a Soviet first strike. While Safeguard was not intended to protect our population, the option of deploying a system to do so is given up.

It also prevents us from developing new kinds of systems to protect our population. The most promising type appears to be the laser type, based on entirely new principles. Yet we forgo forever the ability to protect our people.

Moreover, the rationale behind our strategy of realistic deterrence is that enough of our nuclear striking force will survive a first strike to enable us to retaliate with unacceptable levels of damage. The Safeguard ABM was intended to protect this retaliatory force. Without the ABM, the power to retaliate is reduced to those Polaris subs and B–1's which chance to escape a first strike. In short, giving up the ABM raises doubts about the viability of our basic strategy.

At the same time that the ABM treaty takes away our basic missile defense system, the interim agreement allows the Soviet Union, with qualitative improvements, to build a strategic striking force conceivably four times greater than ours, because of the Soviet advantage in "throw-weight" or payload capacity.

Nor can we overlook the fact that at the same time that the ABM treaty is taking away our ICBM silo defenses, the Secretary of Defense has indicated that the Soviets already have the potential for a counterforce strategy aimed at those very silos. We have no such counterforce weapons.

Mr. President, I intend to go into the ICBM problem in greater detail during the debate on the interim agreement. It is my judgment that, on balance, the ABM treaty should be approved despite the drawbacks. I cite the negative side so that we do not enter into this treaty in a state of euphoria.

Yet it seems to me that the amendment offered by the Senator from New York is very much to the point. If it turns out that the strategic balance is considerably different in 5 years than we presently envision, our supreme interests will be jeopardized. SALT I is but a first step. If we fail to negotiate a SALT II agreement that gives us parity, then our supreme interests are also jeopardized.

I think we should put the Soviets on notice that the Senate supports the use of the withdrawal clause in those circumstances. This is indeed the position of the administration. It is the position stated by Ambassador Smith, and reiterated by the Secretary of State. At the same time, it will be useful to have this position reiterated in the legislative history of the ratification.

This is simply an understanding of the Senate. It does not change the terms of the treaty as understood by the Soviets. I urge support of the understanding.

Mr. President, in closing, I want to congratulate the distinguished and able Senator from New York (Mr. BUCKLEY) for presenting this understanding. I feel that he had exercised vision and wisdom in doing so. I am pleased to join him as a cosponsor and to support strongly the understanding.

Mr. President, the Senator from New York has been a Senator here only for a reasonable time—a short while—but during his service here he has proved to be a man not only of character and integrity but also a man of sound judgment and wisdom. I commend him for his actions in this instance.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, I want to say how deeply grateful I am for the personal references made by the distinguished Senator from South Carolina (Mr. THURMOND), a man of enormous distinction. I certainly am happy that he has associated himself as a cosponsor with this understanding.

Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes to pose one or two questions to the distinguished chairman of the committee.

I should like to ask him whether he would agree that the principles reflected in the understanding in fact represent the stated U.S. position as defined by our official representatives at the Moscow negotiations.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think that the statement carried on page XIII of Senate Executive L, message of the President of the United States—the Senator will see it at the bottom of the statement—in many respects is identical in significance with what the Senator's understanding is.

The one thing I do not like about the Senator's understanding is the implication that the treaty we are considering does not have parity and that, together with the interim agreement, there is no parity nor is it its objective. I have disagreed with the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) on that about the question of parity.

This concept, of course, does not lend itself to any precise measurement, because we all agree, including the Senator from Washington, that numbers alone are not the only constituency for parity. There are other things, such as quality, and such things as we have already mentioned in preceding colloquy.

So I would say this to the Senator, that his understanding is similar to the understanding as expressed on page XIII by the head of the delegation, in the statement he made on May 9, that this is an interim agreement, and that we look forward to further and more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, and so forth.

I do not think, however, that that statement, nor the Government and the administration's position, is that this interim agreement is not based on parity. That is parity in the sense that each has a capacity for, we will say, mutual destruction. It does mean that is precisely the same number and exactly the same kind of weapon. But I think the broad idea of parity is the only reasonable one to be applied here.

Mr. BUCKLEY. It was not my intention in the understanding to obtain any implication as to the present state of affairs but rather to look at the state of affairs as they would stand beyond 1977. It seems to me that the administration has reported to Congress, and Secretary Laird has maintained that, as of this moment, we do have parity if one takes into consideration the weapons covered in the interim agreement as well as those existing outside its scope. I would not want to get into an argument about that now. But there would also be expressed concern that, over the course of the next 5 years, the Soviets could be developing their technology which, beyond 5 years from now, could create a serious disbalance as between our forces.

My understanding is that the objective of SALT phase II is to go beyond weapons which are covered specifically by the interim agreement——

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is right.

Mr. BUCKLEY. In order to take over the entire balance. So my reference is to the overall objective, that there be permanent parity, but obviously on a vastly scaled-down basis.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree. I think that is what is implicit in the statement of the delegation. That is my argument. I think there is parity, because of the varying conditions I mentioned in the overall capacity of each for mutual destruction. The greatest significance of the ABM treaty itself is to give further parity in this sense, that it acknowledges the incapacity to defend against the intercontinental weapon and, in effect, agrees with the President that they will not try to defend the country, because these two little sites are of minimal significance.

It is not a real defense that also contributes very substantially—even more than substantially—to the concept of

parity because, as many witnesses, specifically people like Mr. Panofsky and some of the other better informed experts in this field, have pointed out time and time again, one submarine with our Poseidon weapon, and so forth, has 150 weapons equivalent to the one which destroyed Nagasaki, a capacity for destruction so great that when one gets above the idea of complete destruction, we have parity, even though the other side may have 10 times that. We have enough to destroy.

In that broad sense of parity, I do not think anyone disagrees with the Senator from New York. My only objection to putting it into this kind of understanding is that it is subject to different interpretations. It does raise certain implications. First, that the present agreement does not have parity, or that the administratiton has, in some way, been negligent about parity, or that we have not recognized it. It raises questions and fuzzes up the agreement.

It is not the objective of the Senator from New York that I disagree with. I would hope that the Senator would not insist on this. He has made a case. I think we all understand that that is the objective, presently and in the future, of this or any other government, that we remain parity. I do not know whether that is the better word. The President once used the word "sufficiency." Is that good?

Mr. BUCKLEY. I prefer the word "parity" to "sufficiency."

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not really know what it should be. I think that both have been tested by the majority of our people and certainly by the administration.

Mr. BUCKLEY. May I pose another question to the distinguished chairman?

Would my understanding be correct that, given the chairman's recognition of the validity of the U.S. position made by Ambassador Smith as cited by Secretary of State Rogers, and given the fact of debate leading up to ratification of the treaty, taking into consideration all the statements of U.S. policy, the necessary effect of the ratification would be to incorporate that statement of Ambassador Smith?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. In other words, the legislative history of the agreement would be considered to be what we intend by this. That is true, yes, just as it would be of an act. I think it is much better that way, because while the Senator and I may understand the significance of this, many people in the world do not understand the intricacies and the complexities of our system. They do not know the difference between an understanding and a reservation. This is what I am always afraid of in this kind of treaty. It is much safer just to make the legislative history as clear as we can, but not to meddle with or to change—unless there is an overriding necessity—the language of the agreement itself as drafted.

For that reason, I would agree with the Senator, as far as the concept he is seeking to express here is concerned, that we intend to continue assuring parity. What I do not like about that is that there is an implication that we do not have it now. And there is some indication that the Government has been delinquent.

Mr. President, I really reject that as a fact. The fact is that we are going to maintain our strength in an adequate way, whether one calls it adequate or sufficiency. No one quarrels with that. However, I think it would be unwise to put it in a formal way in what one might call a reservation or an understanding. I hope that the Senator would give it consideration.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, I thank the chairman.

Mr. President, I want to clarify the RECORD and to state that it is not my intention, as the author of this language, to create any inferences as to the present situation, but merely to recognize that my understanding is the substance of what Ambassador Smith was saying. And that is our reason for proceeding with the negotiations.

The purpose was to establish a limitation in the agreement in which there is an essential equality in the overall strategic clout.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I do not think there is any doubt about that. I think that the action of the Senate in the last few days in voting for all the major weapons—although I thought it was beyond the necessity for parity—can assure the Senator as to whether we are going to keep up parity. I am a little apprehensive, because we go as far as we are and are accelerating such weapons as the Trident and going forward with further aircraft carriers in view of the fact that the Russians have none. I am afraid that we are creating an impression that we are creating excessive superiority and are not sincere in our desire to control the arms race.

This is a matter of degree. We have already voted for these weapons. How anyone could believe that we are not on the way to maintaining, if not increasing parity, I do not know. I do not know how one could avoid that.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, if I might formalize my own statement, I gather it is the position of the distinguished chairman that our objective is to achieve an agreement which will assure mutual survival and mutual destructive power with the weapons systems.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think we have.

Mr. BUCKLEY. I am talking about the long terms.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes. I believe that.

Mr. BUCKLEY. And that that is the U.S. position.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. BUCKLEY. I thank the chairman. Under the circumstances, I will be glad to withdraw my understanding.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from New York.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I am glad that the Senator has withdrawn his understanding. I congratulate the Senator on that. I think that the Senator has served a very honorable purpose in making clear his attention that he is looking toward performance, rather than numbers or even the technology of each number, but simply the overall performance and capability.

I am pleased that the Senator did what he did. What worries me about it is that it tends to make the treaty a 5-year treaty which would foreclose our option. We may desire at the end of that period or near the end of that period that we do not want to do it in that way. I think that we would in a sense be committing ourselves.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, what I have said, in effect, is that the Senate agrees with the policy expressed by Ambassador Smith as reported by Secretary Rogers to the President, that should we fail to negotiate a successor agreement which would establish this equality, whatever terms are used to express it, the President would then be authorized under article XV of the declaration to state that we had come to the extraordinary event which enables us to proceed.

Mr. JAVITS. I understand perfectly. And as I say, I am very pleased that the Senator made the points he has and has gotten the explanations he has and is allowing us to go forward with the treaty without this understanding.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I want to join in thanking the junior Senator from New York for his action in precipitating and provoking this discussion which I think is excellent.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, I thank the chairman and my distinguished senior colleague for participating in the discussion.

Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time and withdraw the understanding.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum for a moment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, I believe that the Chair perhaps did not hear what I said. I said that I was yielding back the remainder of my time and that I do not intend to move forward on the presentation of my understanding.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The understanding is withdrawn.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum temporarily.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Indiana.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I intend to vote for ratification of the SALT

agreements now before us, but not without serious reservations as to what they portend in the way of a go-ahead for a qualitatively escalated arms race.

Supporters and opponents alike of the agreements reached in Moscow concur on this one point—that they provide positive encouragement for both parties to proceed as intensively as possible on development of a wide range of offensive weapons. Far from sparing either side from the crushing financial burden of the arms race, the agreements only add to that burden. Far from reducing the terrors of a rampant weapons technology, they only place a higher premium on a more murderous technology.

This is not, Mr. President, a mere unproved inference on my part. Both Secretary of Defense Laird and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Moorer have made clear their intention of pressing for every kind of arms development not expressly prohibited by the agreements—and they will do so on the grounds that SALT makes such development even more desirable than before. More than that, Admiral Moorer is quoted as saying that unless the administration and Congress approve the Pentagon's modernization program, the Defense Department might have to withdraw its acceptance of the arms control program we are here considering.

That kind of statement, Mr. President, comes very close to the kind of genteel military blackmail to which we once thought our political system was immune. The fact that Admiral Moorer still occupies his high office—and, indeed, without even a reproach from the Commander in Chief of the Nation's Armed Forces—is chilling testimony to how far we have gone along the road to a drastic alteration in our internal balance of power.

My principal concern today, however, is to relate what I see as the basic shortcomings of the SALT agreements to the far more basic and destructive shortcomings of our entire foreign policy posture since 1945. For let us make no mistake about it—for more than a quarter of a century now we have imprisoned ourselves in a tiger cage of our own devising, the tiger cage of militant, imperial anticommunism. Korea, Vietnam, and an intolerably wasteful arms race are only the measurable consequences of that folly. Immeasurable—and immeasurably more important—are the consequences we now must live with in the way of a nation divided, its spirit sapped, its self-confidence eroded, its world image tarnished beyond recognition, its constitutional system endangered, its finances in disarray, its priorities disordered, its youth in revolt, its very purpose called into question.

We have pursued, I say, on a bipartisan basis, the course of militant, imperial anticommunism for 27 long years. We have done this on the self-deluding basis that first the Soviet Union, then the People's Republic of China were waiting for only the slightest sign of weakness on our part to set forth on the conquest of the world. But we now know—or should know—that the militancy we envisioned in our Communist adversaries was primarily reflexive—a quest for security against what they perceived as America's thrust toward world domination. As I had occasion to note several years ago in criticizing our Vietnam policy, "escalation breeds escalation." And that is exactly what has happened during the entire generation since World War II: Our own escalations of anti-Communist activity at home and throughout the world only produced counterescalation on the part of the Russians and Chinese.

That, surely, is the genesis and rationale of the arms race. Unless we understand that, we shall make only fitful progress toward the great goal of nuclear disarmament. So long as we continue to believe that the Russians and Chinese are only just now setting aside their plans for world conquest—and doing so as the result of our own implacable determination—measured by our willingness to commit additional billions to new weapons systems—will appear to be the only guarantee against a resurgence of Communist imperialism.

If, on the contrary, we recognize that responsible Soviet and Chinese leaders have never conceived of military conquest as a viable means for reaching their national goals, then we shall be able at last to reach a clear understanding of our own legitimate security needs, and act accordingly. And just as it is true that escalation breeds escalation, so also deescalation breeds deescalation. No one who has given any thoughtful attention to the domestic problems of the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China can possibly doubt that they are at least as eager as we are to escape from the treadmill of a ruinous, unproductive arms race.

What I am suggesting is that we put aside our preoccupation with bilateral arms control negotiations designed to keep ourselves in lockstep with the Soviets. Instead, let us embark on a program of unilateral arms reductions geared to our own legitimate security needs and invite our adversaries to follow suit on the same basis.

There are two great advantages to this approach.

First, it will permit us to achieve the greatest possible savings, in the quickest possible time, consistent with our security.

Second, it will provide the clearest possible proof to the Soviet and Chinese leaders that this Nation, while maintaining an invulnerable deterrent for our own security, has absolutely no designs against theirs.

The fact is, for all their lip-service to the idea of deterrence, leaders on both sides of the Iron Curtain have never reached a truly profound understanding of what it means. They still regard an invulnerable deterrent as a platform upon which to build rather than as a fully adequate shelter behind which to pursue legitimate national interests. Let me put the matter plainly: so long as we possess a second-strike capability powerful enough to destroy any nation that may threaten our vital interests, plus a conventional force strong enough and flexible enough to meet the nonnuclear needs of a great power which has no imperial ambitions—so long as our defense forces meet those two requirements, the size of any other nation's arsenal is irrelevant to us. And a corollary to that proposition is that any nation which accumulates armaments in excess of those requirements is weakening itself through misallocation of resources.

This is certainly true of the United States—as we now know from bitter experience. It is ever more true of the Soviet Union and China, nations far poorer than we. And their leaders, we may be sure, are not blind to that fact. What impels them—especially the Russians—to press ahead with the appalling waste of an arms race is what they conceive to be the need to keep up with us.

That being the case, why have the SALT talks not been more productive? Why are we faced here today with a proposed treaty which, for all its limited virtues, only encourages a larger weapons budget?

The answer goes back to the nature of bilateral arms reduction negotiations carried on in the still toxic atmosphere of the cold war. And nothing symbolizes more clearly the futility of the SALT approach than the so-called "bargaining chip" argument with which the Congress has been so often beguiled.

It is obvious, surely, that predominant effort on both sides is to put one over on the other party, to concede little while demanding much. No doubt this is standard operating procedure for any normal negotiation, whether for a labor contract or an international trade dispute. But I submit, Mr. President, that it is wholly inappropriate to a negotiation aimed at preserving the very existence of civilization.

The idea behind the bargaining chip approach—and no one in the administration disputes this—is that we must pour billions of dollars into weapons systems the only need for which is to give our negotiators something to bargain away at the SALT talks. The late C. Wright Mills had a phrase for this kind of thinking: He called it crackpot realism. I am afraid that phrase describes all too well the majority of our foreign policy and military initiatives during the past quarter century. But it takes on added meaning today at a time when American public opinion is so overwhelmingly in favor of reconciliation among the superpowers.

The alternative I propose today—the alternative of unilateral arms reduction on our part geared to our own carefully calculated security needs—would at last break us out of this prison of our making in which we have so long been incarcerated. Whether or not the Soviets and Chinese would choose to follow our lead—and I am fully confident they would—we at least would be able to get out from under the intolerable burden of an arms race that has held us in its grip, like a wasting disease, for more than a generation. The resources, both material and spiritual, which ending the arms race would release would offer us nothing less than a national rebirth, and restore us, at long last, to our ancient place as beacon of hope to mankind.

That is the sort of challenge we must set ourselves, Mr. President. It is the only challenge that is worthy of our heritage,

and the only challenge appropriate to our birthright.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from Arkansas yield me 2 minutes?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield to the Senator from West Virginia.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATIONS, 1973—TIME LIMITATION AGREEMENT

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, as in legislative session, I ask unanimous consent that at such time as H.R. 15641, the military construction authorization bill, is called up and made the pending business of the Senate, there be a time limitation thereon of 1 hour, with the time to be equally divided between, and controlled by, the distignuished manager of the bill, the Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) and the distinguished senior Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER); that time on any amendment thereto be limited to one-half hour, to be equally divided between the mover of such and the manager of the bill; that the time on any amendment to an amendment, debatable motion, or appeal be limited to 20 minutes, to be equally divided between the mover of such and the manager of the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE ROLLING STOCK UTILIZATION AND FINANCING ACT OF 1972 TOMORROW AND FOR THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS TO BE TEMPORARILY LAID ASIDE

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, as in legislative session, I ask unanimous consent that on tomorrow, at the conclusion of the orders for the recognition of various Senators, the Senate proceed to the consideration of the Rolling Stock Utilization and Financing Act of 1972, and that the unfinished business, Senate Joint Resolution 241, the interim agreement, be temporarily laid aside and remain in a temporarily laid-aside status until the conclusion of action on that bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATION BILL TOMORROW, AND FOR THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS TO BE TEMPORARILY LAID ASIDE

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, as in legislative session, I ask unanimous consent that upon the completion of the action on the Rolling Stock Utilization and Financing Act of 1972 on tomorrow, the Senate proceed to the consideration of H.R. 15641, the military construction authorization bill; that the unfinished business, Senate Joint Resolution 241, be temporarily laid aside and remain in a temporarily laid-aside status until the conclusion of action on the military construction authorization bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

TREATY ON LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me 15 minutes?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

THE ABM TREATY: IS IT WISE? IS IT MORAL?

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, the distinguished English statesman and man of letters, John Morley once wrote:

> Those who would treat politics and morality apart will never understand the one or the other.

Morley's aphorism has never been more relevant than in the matter now before the Senate.

The treaty on limitations of anti-ballistic missiles is, of course, primarily concerned with strategic policy in an age of nuclear weapons. But I am convinced that the political and moral problems surrounding the treaty will be seen by history as having been the fundamental issues in question. I pause here to state that I am not using politics in the sense of narrow, partisan interests, but in that broader, more profound sense of dealing with the conduct and affairs of the Government or State. The political question concerning the treaty is, therefore, not of party politics but of statecraft. Is the treaty indeed in the long-range political interest of the United States? This is a question that is at the heart of the matter. But no answer can be arrived at concerning the political realities unless we also consider the moral problems, for there are basic and fundamental questions of morality involved here.

I will say at the outset that I will vote against ratification of the ABM treaty for the reason that I have strong misgivings as to both the prudence and the ultimate morality of denying ourselves for all time—or denying the Russians, for that matter—the right to protect our civilian populations from nuclear devastation. I am not suggesting that we have fully effective technical means to do so at the present time, but I challenge the morality of precluding the possibility of developing at some future date new approaches to antiballistic missile defenses which could offer protection to substantial numbers of our people. I question, in short, the basic doctrine on which the SALT accords have been constructed; a doctrine which requires us to dismantle our defenses before agreement is reached on dismantling the weapons of mass destruction.

The immediate objectives of the treaty, of course, is to limit antiballistic missile systems to nominal levels, where each side agrees to defend its national capital and one strategic missile site with not more than 100 antiballistic missile interceptors per site, I would argue that this agreement is defective on its face.

The ABM treaty seeks to perpetuate the policy which has dominated American strategic thinking for too many years. It is a policy which has been preoccupied with theories such as "assured destruction" or a contemporary variant of assured destruction known as strategic sufficiency. It has been a cardinal objective of these theories that U.S. security is best maintained by establishing a system whereby active defense is severely constrained on the theory that strategic stability will be assured by the mutual vulnerability of the citizens of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

Thus the agreement goes so far as to prohibit the development, test or deployment of sea, air or space based ballistic missile defense systems. This clause, in article V of the ABM treaty, would have the effect, for example, of prohibiting the development and testing of a laser type system based in space which could at least in principle provide an extremely reliable and effective system of defenses against ballistic missiles. The technological possibility has been formally exluded by this agreement.

There is no law of nature that makes impossible the creation of defense systems that would make the prevailing theories obsolete. Why then should we by treaty deny ourselves the kind of development that could possibly create a reliable technique for the defense of tens of millions of civilians against ballistic missile attack? Why should we not at least be in a position to deploy such a system with the least possible delay in the event that we should find it necessary to terminate the agreement under the conditions allowed in article XV?

There are other defects inherent in the treaty. For example, it is technically possible for the Russians to "net" or tie in their Moscow ABM defense system into the system which they are allowed for the defense of a strategic missile site. For some unknown reason, the Soviet Union may deploy its site for the protection of an ICBM base as close as 800 miles from Moscow, while the United States may not deploy one closer than 1,400 miles from Washington. These relative proximities would enable the Soviet Union, with appropriate radar and data processing equipment, to have the more effective type of radar coverage for its two ABM systems which comes from the capability to tie them together electronically. This disparity in the effect of the ABM treaty on the United States and Russia becomes even more significant when it is considered that the disposition of the Moscow defense system would permit them to defend about 350 of their ICBM's of the equivalent of about two U.S. ICBM bases.

There are also two problems which have to do with the capability of our existing surveiliance system to detect violations of the treaty by the Soviet Union.

The treaty contains language which prohibits the deployment of a "rapid reload capability" for ABM missiles. But

the nature of the Soviet ABM missile launcher makes it relatively simple for the Soviet Union to covertly develop for later deployment, a rapid reload capability.

There must be a more realistic means of insuring compliance with the rapid reload prohibition of the treaty that is possible with satellite surveillance. Otherwise, it would be a rather simple matter to develop the necessary mechanical devices and to store them in warehouses from which they could be deployed at launch sites in a matter of days.

The other possibility relates to the upgrading of existing or new antiaircraft systems to an ABM role. There are those who believe, for example, that the existing SA–5 missiles, with their effective altitude of 100,000 feet, could be given an ABM capability and connected with the necessary radar installations without detection.

These are important problems. Yet, in the final analysis they are problems of technology. The basic problem, as I have stated, is not technological, but moral: Is it morally responsible for the United States of America to enter into an agreement whose theoretical foundation rests upon the acceptance of the assured destruction of tens of millions of human beings?

The answer is "No."

The American people have not established the Department of Defense to act as an instrument for assuring their vulnerability to nuclear attack. Nevertheless, it is a necessary consequence of the ABM treaty that the Senate is asked to ratify that the Department of Defense will continue to remain an instrumentality for insuring the exposure of American citizens.

An important objective—perhaps the most important—of arms control is to mitigate the consequences of war, should war occur. The ABM treaty seeks to institutionalize an expedient posture, the posture known as "mutual assured destruction" a phrase which yields an acronym which is quite descriptive of the policy, mad, quite literally mad. The ABM treaty institutionalizes the notion that the United States and the Soviet Union will share the reciprocal capability to destroy each other's civilian populations should deterrence fail.

Since the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles, the problem of devising an effective or partially effective defense against ballistic missiles has been exceedingly difficult. As a consequence, when there was not an alternative to providing for the active defense of civilian populations, it could be deemed an unpleasant necessity that each side maintain a "mad" posture. To consider this a desirable theory of national defense for all time is more than simply unwise, it is intrinsically wrong.

Suppose, in spite of our most heroic efforts to deter nuclear war, a major nuclear war should in fact occur.

Maintaining a mad posture is a means of insuring for the rest of history if, indeed, such a concept as history could survive, that the consequences of the failure of deterrence would almost certainly be unlimited catastrophe. While technology and politics may for a time, leave us with no alternative, we should seek ways out of the posture rather than to institutionalize it permanently. However, the ABM treaty does in fact serve to permanently institutionalize this posture.

I am reminded of a grim and, in these circumstances ironic line from Longfellow:

> Whom the gods would destroy they first make mad.

It would seem that we are in the process of guaranteeing the second part, at least, of that equation.

It seems to me fundamentally wrong that the United States should commit itself to a policy which deliberately creates a system in which millions of civilians would necessarily be exterminated should deterrence fail. No work of man is that reliable.

It would be the height of folly to deprive our people of the protection against intentional or accidental ballistic missile attack not merely from the Soviet Union but from any other country that might achieve the ability to lob a nuclear missile or two in our direction. The ABM treaty would confer on any such country the status of a superpower by giving it the power to blackmail the United States because of the absence of any significant level of ballistic missile defense for its population centers. To perpeutate by treaty, a system of defense that forever denies us the possibility to defend American citizens against nuclear attack is an abdication of a first duty of Government and is unecceptable.

Mr. President, our ultimate goal, always, should be the gradual reduction of offensive nuclear armament in a prudent and rational manner. But until the day comes when we can say with honesty that defense against attack is no longer needed, we must not, forever, by solemn treaty, turn our back on the means by which we could defend tens of millions of Americans.

I share with all Americans the desire for a peaceful and secure world in which nuclear blackmail and nuclear war are no longer international threats. But in all conscience I cannot support a treaty that enforces on the American people as a permanent policy a doctrine which precludes the defense of our people from the possibility of mass destruction.

Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, while I have serious misgivings about certain features of the pending strategic arms limitation agreements, I believe this is an essential though small step in a long journey for peace. Therefore, I shall vote for ratification.

Mr. President, my concern primarily is centered on the terms of the agreement which allows the emplacement of an antiballistic missile system around Moscow and Washington. This system is to be deployed for the avowed purpose of protecting the centers of government of the two nations. In my opinion such an arrangement removes one of the greatest deterrents to war which the world has ever known, namely the certain knowledge in the minds of governmental leaders that if they blunder or deliberately lead their nations into a nuclear war they can expect to immediately and personally suffer for their stupidity.

Throughout history, rulers of nations have generally been in the position of sending the young men of their nations into the battlefields while the leaders of government have remained a safe distance away from the fray and avoid personal suffering or danger to their immediate families and friends.

Mr. President, the coming of the nuclear age has changed all this. With the development of nuclear warheads and a dependable delivery system, the seats of governments and leaders of governments immediately became primary targets. This knowledge has not been lost on those who have the authority to start wars.

The development of an antiballistic missile system to protect the national capitals of the two superpowers can conceivably create the illusion that the leaders of one of the two governments can launch a nuclear first strike and survive the retaliatory counteraction.

Mr. President, I am unable to determine why our negotiators allowed this provision to remain in the agreement the Senate is considering today. It is my hope that subsequent negotiations will bring about its elimination. Further it is my intention as a Member of the Senate to work and vote against funding of an ABM system for our Nation's capital. I do not feel it is in the Nation's interest or in the interest of world peace for the Government of this country to enjoy protection against a nuclear holocaust when this protection cannot conceivably be provided for the bulk of our citizens. In my opinion it should not be provided for the select few whose responsibility it is to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war. Until and unless protection can be provided for the bulk of our population the politicians should take the same risk as others.

Mr. President, the treaties which we are today considering represent a small but significant beginning. Their evolvement is a singular achievement of our age. The success of the negotiations which made them possible is a great tribute to the informed and dedicated members of our negotiating team. Further, it is a singular tribute to the courage and skill of President Nixon, whose conduct of foreign affairs and whose personal dedication to peace has made this day and this event possible.

Mr. President, I am pleased to support this first significant step in what I consider to be a vitally and desperately needed journey toward international understandings which can ultimately lead to lasting peace on this planet.

Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, the Senate has before it the first formal agreements to limit the deployment of nuclear weapons between the world's two largest industrial nations.

The treaty on antiballistic-missile systems is accompanied by a 5-year interim agreement on offensive strategic weapons. Both were successfully negotiated at SALT and signed at Moscow, and both give expression to a desire shared by the people of many nations for a more stable world and eventual control of the nuclear arms race.

These two agreements come to the Senate under favorable circumstances.

Together with the SALT documents, the President returned from Moscow

having identified a spectrum of areas for cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. On several of these—health, environment, technical exchange, and joint space flight—agreements were signed and further agreements are anticipated.

Negotiations on a comprehensive trade pact of considerable economic interest to both parties continue through the vehicle of a joint trade commission. They are expected to reach a conclusion this fall.

Also, the Moscow summit was accompanied in time by the ratification of treaties between the Federal Republic of Germany, on the one hand, and Poland and the Soviet Union on the other. This action opened the way for full implementation of the Four Power agreement on Berlin and is a step toward more normal relationships between East and West in Europe.

In spite of continued armed conflict in Southeast Asia, an atmosphere of positive negotiation was achieved at Moscow. This is a tribute to the diplomatic skill of the President, and it signals a strong desire on the part of the Soviet Union to prevent the conflict in Indochina from undermining world stability.

Taken together, these conditions provide a mutual restraint favorable to sound negotiation. And in fact the intent of both sides to avoid conflict which could endanger world peace was spelled out in a joint statement of principles, which also provides a means of measuring the promise against the performance of future Soviet actions.

As we seek to weigh the pros and cons of these SALT agreements, we should be reminded that fundamental differences in philosophy remain strong between the United States and the Soviet Union.

We should remain aware that it is the capability of each side to destroy the other—and not any newly discovered trust—which impels the two nations toward mutual arms control arrangements. This SALT treaty is not a treaty of friendship, but a treaty of survival.

SALT itself was possible because both sides accepted the principle of mutal vulnerability. From there, deliberate steps to slow the nuclear arms race and protect against nuclear proliferation have been taken.

In 1963, the successful treaty banning atmospheric nuclear tests was signed and ratified by the Senate. In 1970, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty was also ratified by this body.

Each step has resulted from hard bargaining and a strong American negotiating posture. In the case of the present SALT agreements, I would hasten to emphasize that they, too, reflect the great industrial and technological capacity of our Nation, and not any weakness or exhaustion over our international responsibilities.

In all candor, I believe we must attribute this first fruit of SALT to the determination of the President to proceed with limited antimissile deployment in this country 2 years ago. And I am glad his judgment proved to be correct.

Now we are faced with two new questions: Should the United States accelerate weapons programs outside the scope of these SALT agreements? Or should we seek to exercise restraint as the best way to preserve favorable conditions for future arms negotiations?

It is my view that we should approach this question with an open mind and from a balanced perspective. We should recall, for instance, that the failure of the Baruch plan offered by the United States in 1946 can be attributed to the fact that we bargained from too much relative strength during that period. We should recall that, with the ABM treaty operative, one of the prime stimulants to new offensive weapons development is removed. We should recognize the interim nature of the 5-year agreement on offensive weapons, and remember that its compliance depends not only on maintaining allowed numbers of launch vehicles but also, in the words of our Ambassador at SALT, "the achievement of an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations within 5 years."

There would seem to be no compelling reason why the treaty and agreement should be linked with other weapons programs. Both sides would lose in a game of catch-up. Each side now has the capacity to destroy the other. With ABM's curbed, national means of verification recognized, and the principle of mutual vulnerability firmly established, how many more offensive weapons of mass destruction do we need?

It is my conviction that an overzealous response on either side in terms of new weapons programs could trigger an untimely and unwanted new cycle of arms deployment. Continuation of strategic weapons already underway should not alarm us into a new action or reaction cycle of the arms race. Nor should we risk the favorable conditions which have been achieved by indulging unnecessary "hedging." The SALT agreements should be weighed on their merits and for their contribution to our national security. Requests by the administration for authority to proceed with weapons such as the B–1 bomber and the Trident long range underwater launching platform, should be weighed on the same basis.

THE TREATY

The heart of the SALT agreements is the treaty on anti-ballistic-missile systems. I would mention two reasons for its importance. First, by effectively halting a new defensive missile arms race, this treaty contributes significantly to preserving the stability of the present nuclear balance. In this sense, it builds directly on the atmospheric test ban and the Non-Proliferation treaty.

Second, the ABM treaty requires under the Constitution the advice and consent of the Senate to its ratification. It was in the U.S. Senate where questions about the reliability and effectiveness of ABM's were first raised before the American people, and it is appropriate that the Senate should now become the forum for public analysis and debate on this successfully negotiated treaty.

The treaty limits ABM's on a basis of parity and in its detail also prohibits mobile and multiple warhead ABM's, as well as testing of new launchers in an ABM mode and the deployment of radars which could serve an ABM system. The treaty does not compel either party to build the two allowed ABM sites.

The terms of the treaty and their observance will be monitored by national forms of verification—satellite and other high altitude air surveillance—and both sides have agreed not to interfere with these operations. These sources of information are the same ones on which our present deterrence system rests. They have been adequate in the past and they should improve in the future.

THE OFFENSIVE AGREEMENT

The 5-year interim agreement limiting offensive strategic missile deployment proceeds from recognition on both sides that significant arms control measures in this area must begin with restrictions on the numbers of launchers. In evaluating these numbers as they apply to land-based and sea-based systems, we should recall that agreement came only after the Soviets dropped their insistence on including in the negotiations the large number of nuclear delivery vehicles stationed by the United States in Europe and allied countries.

It was this concession—together with agreement in principle to concentrate on defensive weapons systems—which gave the SALT talks a shot in the arm. It allowed both governments to concentrate on matters where agreement was possible. As a result we have a treaty and an agreement after 2½ years of regular and diligent negotiation undisturbed by major incident between the two parties.

Now, in weighing the value of this offensive missile agreement, it is important to remember what it does not include, as well as what it does. Our decisive lead in strategic bomber forces was not affected. Nor was the more than two-fold advantage which this country holds in the number of deliverable warheads, provided by our MIRV. In addition, the lead in research, development and testing of these MIRV weapons gives the United States and advantage in weapons technology which the Soviets have not achieved.

All these advantages, of course, are elements in a system of overkill. Hopefully, their weight is not so great as to upset the rough parity established by the Moscow agreements. But they are great enough to leave concepts alleging the strategic inferiority of the United States without foundation.

Opponents of SALT emphasize the Soviet advantage in land-based missiles, and in the number of missile submarines allowed. In response, the President and his Secretaries of State and Defense have all made the point that without this agreement, these forces of the Soviet Union would very likely have been greater. Supporters of the agreement also make the point that it places no limit whatsoever on any present U.S. offensive missile deployment program.

The question is also raised: Can we trust the Russians? The response here is that the agreements depend not on mutual trust but on mutual self-interest. We are not seeking to put our fate in the

hands of the Soviets, but to place a limit on the cyclic nuclear arms race which could destroy us both. There is no disarmament involved, only open and verifiable restrictions on weapons which may be deployed in the future.

Some opponents assert the United States must always remain superior to its adversaries. In response, those who support the treaty reply that the security of the United States is enhanced by the establishment of a nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As President Nixon said in his message submitting these two documents to the Senate:

> Together the two agreements provide for a more stable strategic balance in the next several years than would be possible if strategic arms competition continued unchecked. This benefits not only the United States and the Soviet Union, but all the nations of the world.

Superiority in an unstable world headed toward nuclear chaos is a false security. I think the compelling point in all this was stated in the interpretations done at Helsinki by Ambassador Girard Smith:

> Both sides recognize that the initial agreements would be steps toward the achievement of more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized.

This statement was reported to Congress without reference to a Soviet reply. It clearly states a policy on the part of the United States. It says to the Senate and to the American people—and to the Russians as well—that we are entering into these agreements without illusions about our ability to divine or trust Soviet intentions.

Nor do we have illusions that the development of strategic nuclear weapons systems by other industrial nations has been impeded by this bilateral agreement. However, we can take some encouragement in the fact that the delivery of antiballistic missile systems to third nations is prohibited by the treaty. And insofar as parity between the two superpowers will relax tensions and reduce anxiety, it will serve to retard the proliferation of danger in the nuclear age.

Mr. President, these agreements could hardly be more defendable from the American point of view. There may be debates over technical points that military planners themselves will be asked to resolve. The charge of the Senate, however, is to evaluate the bones and muscles of the documents, and then give our estimate of the policy decisions on which they rest.

I believe the Senate will accept a policy which seeks to avoid confrontation with the Soviet Union. I believe the Senate will accept a policy which involves regular consultation with our allies at every stage. I believe the Senate will accept a policy which applies our 20th century weapons technology to control of the costly nuclear arms race.

I would suggest the Senate has before it an extraordinary opportunity to lay the groundwork for a positive approach to this first agreed limit upon an ongoing phase of the arms race, and to subsequent negotiations. I would suggest the people of the United States are looking to the Senate for guidance. And I would urge strongly that the Senate respond favorably to the request of the President for advice and consent to the ratification of this treaty and approval of the agreement accompanying it.

We are again at a turning point. The myths and concepts of the past recede. There is a certain awakening to a new and more complex world abroad. There is a renewed desire for common decency among men and women at home. Let us not indulge euphorics. Rather, let us proceed with carefully measured steps to change our world, if we can, into a more peaceful one. As Thomas Jefferson, who set down principles we would fight to protect, admonished:

> We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy as civilized society to remain ever under a regimen of their barbarous ancestors.

I believe in approving these agreements the Senate will mature and strengthen the principles of our democracy. And it will mature and strengthen the prospect that a more stable and peaceful world can emerge from the cold ashes of war.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, the arms control agreements negotiated by President Nixon constitute a welcome step toward effective control over strategic nuclear weapons. While the arms race is far from being ended, the SALT accords are a clear recognition by the two great superpowers that it is in their mutual interest to place restraints on the arms race.

The ABM treaty is a joint admission that no physical defense is possible against any determined nuclear attack. Under its terms, both the nuclear superpowers accept the proposition that the only real security against nuclear holocaust depends on the certainty that any attacker would himself be destroyed by a retaliatory second strike.

The Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms is the first real measure of control over offensive nuclear systems and is the basis for moving toward a more comprehensive restriction on offensive nuclear weapons. Still, its immediate utility as a real arms control measure depends upon its full acceptance in spirit and in letter by both countries.

Support for these historic agreements should not be conditional upon the hasty adoption of crash programs in those offensive weapons areas which the agreements do not cover. Such programs carry with them the danger of increasing strategic nuclear instability.

Even if the ABM treaty were the only accomplishment of the President's historic Moscow visit, this in itself would still constitute a major accomplishment in controlling the nuclear arms race, with its inordinate expense and incalculable risks.

The Interim Offensive Arms Agreement, if it actually does lead to a real and lasting limitation of offensive weapons, will be a most desirable complement to the ABM treaty. However, if the agreement is used as an argument for accelerated construction and deployment of new offensive systems, it will only cancel the accomplishments of both treaties and thus do incalculable harm to the cause of genuine arms control. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducted extensive and searching hearings on both treaties but focused particular attention on the complex provisions of the interim agreement. As I weighed the evidence presented to the committee, I became convinced that the interim agreement does represent both a real step forward in arms limitation and provides for the maintenance of a strong national security posture by our own country. Let me elaborate for a moment as to why I reached this decision.

The ceilings put on ICBM's and SLBM's do give a mathematical edge to the Soviets in both land-based and sea-based missiles. While the Soviet Union is permitted more missile launchers, they have no practical military advantage, since the United States has a commanding lead in strategic bombers and deliverable warheads. I understand that we have 7,000 warheads of all kinds positioned in Europe alone. Since there is no real hope of an ABM defense of populations or weapons systems, the limits in the agreement only emphasize a mutual position of military redundancy.

The specter of a first-strike strategy of a potential opponent has long haunted nuclear arms control discussions and conditioned our own nuclear posture. Unless analyzed carefully, this specter could lead one to false and dangerous conclusions about the insignificant statistical edge the interim agreement gives the U.S.S.R. in missile launchers. As our committee hearings fully brought out, whether an adversary has a first-strike policy or not, the critical factor in nuclear strategy is the number of warheads that would survive an all-out first strike. In our case the number would be sufficient to totally devastate the attacker's society. For example, even if the Soviet Union, by striking first, could destroy all of our ICBM's and all our bombers, and even if the attack could catch and destroy most of our submarines in port, 10 surviving Poseidon submarines could fire 1,600 warheads at the Soviet Union. We would run out of targets before we ran out of warheads. In thus assuring an awesome and total retaliatory capability, the ABM treaty only makes continuation of the missile numbers game a mindless exercise, and the interim agreement is, when all is said and done, a welcome exercise in reality.

It must be emphasized that the interim agreement is also of real value in assuring the survival of our land-based missile deterrent for the indefinite future. It limits the Soviets to no more than 313 large missiles of SS–9 size or greater, missiles of the kind that we do not ourselves have deployed or even plan to deploy. Without the agreement this number would only be substantially increased in 5 years. However, since the Soviets have not even begun the testing of a true MIRV technology, any Soviet counterforce strike would still leave enough

Minutemen to obliterate the Soviet Union, even without resort to our vastly more efficient and advanced submarine-launched missiles and our nuclear bombers. Our immense technological advantage in MIRV, missile accuracy, and submarine performance only lengthens the leadtime during which, if we are really serious about nuclear arms control, we can safely afford to exercise restraint and seek reciprocal action from the Soviet Union.

The 3 years at the bargaining table which produced these first steps to lasting and comprehensive limitations on offensive weapons resulted from each side's recognition of the other's nuclear potential. The agreements, we must assume, were in part designed to avoid the costs of converting that potential into weapons which would then be countered and their advantage thus canceled.

As President Nixon has suggested, the SALT agreements should and will be considered by Congress on their considerable merits. Decisions on new nuclear weapons systems not now forbidden by the agreements must be made separately and important emphasis must be placed on examining their arms control implications.

We all hope that the major accomplishment of the agreements signed at Moscow is to assure time for bringing about a policy of sensible, mutual self-restraint that in turn can bring an end to the nuclear arms race.

I firmly believe that the agreements reached at Moscow advance the world toward nuclear sanity. I therefore support both agreements.

Mr. FONG. Mr. President, I rise to express my strong support for the recently negotiated Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement and to commend President Nixon for an unprecedented accomplishment—a breakthrough that could result in the greatest single step toward world peace since the end of World War II.

The arms control agreement is without doubt one of the most important diplomatic achievements of the 20th century—and it could end up as one of the most significant and meaningful accords of all time in man's quest for lasting peace. The world is now on a new path that can lead—if all follow through and keep their word—to a new structure for enduring peace with national security for all nations, not just for the two superpowers.

Mr. President, to fully comprehend and appreciate the magnitude of the Moscow accords, it is necessary for us to first view the context in which the strategic arms situation existed when President Nixon took office 3½ years ago. At that time, the Soviet Union:

Was deploying about 250 ICBM's each year, including large modern missiles—SS–9's—which were particularly threatening to our Minuteman ICBM's.

Was deploying eight additional modern nuclear submarines per year, each with 16 strategic ballistic missiles.

Was improving the expanding ABM defense of Moscow and pursuing R. & D. on new ABM systems.

On the other hand, the United States:

Had no ongoing programs for deploying additional numbers of missiles, either ICBM's or submarine-based.

Was undertaking the following critical qualitative improvements in its strategic weaponry, none of which is prohibited by the agreements:

MIRV, which gives each U.S. missile many times the target capabilities of a Soviet missile.

Trident, a long-range submarine missile system under development but not available until the end of the decade.

B–1, a new strategic bomber under development.

An improved ABM defense of Minuteman.

Mr. President, after careful and intensive review of the strategic balance between the United States and Russia, President Nixon and his advisors realized the great importance of breaking the momentum of Soviet offensive deployments. They concluded that unless the accelerated rate of deployment of strategic nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union was stopped, the growth of Soviet weapons deployment, and the inevitable qualitative improvement thereof, would force the United States to deploy additional offsetting weapons. Such an occurrence would either intensify the arms race at staggering costs or force the United States into a crippling strategic disadvantage. Since neither alternative is acceptable, I wholeheartedly endorse and support the Arms Control Agreement with the Soviet Union, which the President was able to obtain after 3½ years of careful preparation and intense negotiations.

TREATY ON LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC-MISSILE SYSTEMS

The principal provisions of the ABM treaty may be summarized as follows:

First. Limits each side to one ABM site for the defense of its respective capital and one site each for the defense of an ICBM field.

Second. Limits each side to a total of 200 ABM interceptors, 100 at each site.

Third. Limits the number and the size of ABM radars at each site.

Fourth. Allows research and development on ABM systems to continue, but not the deployment of exotic or so-called future systems.

AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

In addition to the ABM treaty, an Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons was negotiated between the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States. This interim agreement on offensive weapons provides for the following:

First. Limits the number of ICBM's to those under construction or deployment as of July 1, 1972. This will amount to about 1,618 ICBM's for the Soviet Union and 1,054 for the United States. In addition, although the Soviet Union will field about 300 large SS–9's, they will be prohibited from converting other ICBM silos to accommodate the large SS–9 types.

Second. Limits the construction of submarine launched ballistic missiles—SLBM's—on all nuclear submarines at the current levels. The further construction of SLBM's on either side can only be accomplished by the dismantling of an equal number of older land-based ICBM's or older submarine launchers.

Third. Provides that the interim agreement will run for 5 years and that both sides are committed to negotiating a more permanent and comprehensive agreement.

NATIONAL INTEREST

Mr. President, after carefully studying the individual provisions of the Moscow agreements, I have come to the conclusion that acceptance of them is clearly in our national interest since they will put the United States in a strong position to protect our security even if we do not achieve followup SALT agreements. The essence of the offensive agreement, in terms of our national interest, is that it keeps Soviet offensive missiles down to about the present level for the next 5 years. Without the SALT Agreement, the Soviet Union could have deployed up to 1,000 more strategic missiles.

Although some older ICBM's and SLBM's can be traded for newer SLBM's during the 5-year period, the agreement accomplishes a prime U.S. objective—to halt the production momentum of the Soviet offensive missile programs, especially their large SS–9 missiles. Besides stopping the Soviets from increasing the numerical missile gap, the agreement allows the United States more time to develop the quality of its new offensive weapons, that is, Trident submarine, B–1 bombers, and MIRV missiles, which are not limited by the agreement.

Mr. President, some critics have charged that the SALT treaty and agreements place the United States in a position of military inferiority and that they threaten the security of our country. Although there are many honest and divergent opinions and analyses about the end result of the recently concluded SALT negotiations, I firmly believe that the SALT agreements enhance the security of the United States and insure that the Soviets do not attain some military advantage over us. What they do is foreclose the dynamic Soviet deployment of huge numbers of additional weapons, without limiting developmental progress of our new strategic systems.

Without the agreement, the Soviets could have completed an extensive ABM defense which could challenge our retaliatory capacity.

Also, it is no secret that the United States had no plans to make additional ICBM deployments, while the Soviets had been digging new silos at the rate of about 250 per year for the past 5 years.

In the submarine-launched ballistic missile field, the United States is accelerating the development of the Trident submarine, but it will not be ready for deployment until 1978. In contrast, the Russians have been producing new missile submarines at a rate of eight per year and could have had 80 or more missile-launching subs by 1977. Thus, had there been no agreement to limit these offensive systems, the Soviets could have achieved a numerical lead in the very near future.

Finally, the agreement does not cover

such key areas as manned bombers—B-1's—multiple independently targetable warheads—MIRV's—and the qualitative and technical aspect of our forces—areas in which the United States has a clear advantage and many ongoing programs.

When reviewing and weighing the assets and liabilities of the SALT agreements, we must keep in mind that President Nixon makes no claim that the agreements end for all time our concern over the potential growth of Soviet strategic capabilities. He has succeeded in blocking off only one aspect—the growth in numbers of strategic systems. As a result of his tireless efforts in this endeavor, our country now has time to negotiate more complete agreements and to continue with our current strategic programs which will help insure that further negotiations bear fruit.

AGREEMENT FOR A MORE STABLE WORLD ORDER

Mr. President, most attention and commentaries have been focused, understandably, on the SALT agreements to limit stategic nuclear weapons. However, let us not forget that there were other agreements reached that are very significant as well—both in themselves and in their total addition to a wide dimension of tangible results from the historic Moscow summit.

All together, the series of agreements—covering mutual future efforts in space, trade, the environment, health, medicine, science, and techology—add up to a greater and deeper commitment by each side to work for a more stable and improved world order. There can be little doubt that with these valuable agreements, the Soviet Union—as well as the United States—has a greater vested interest in the continuation of peaceful and productive relations between the superpowers.

The package of associated agreements, which contains many potential benefits to both countries, broadens and enlarges the scope and depth of the new arrangement between two historical antagonists. The agreements place a lot of pressure on both sides to take a second look at any provocation that, in the absence of the new wide range of mutual ventures, might lead to a break-off of the new ties of cooperation. In other words, the whole span of agreements means that the two nations will be loath to break up or jeopardize their relationship because of some secondary disagreements.

It is much like the familiar position that President Nixon faces in his dealings with the Congress. Whenever Congress attaches something he opposes to a major piece of legislation that he has been pushing, he is very reluctant to veto the entire package despite the undesirability of one of its smaller sections.

In studying and analyzing the SALT agreements which represent the first real step away from the nuclear arms race, we would be remiss if we did not learn some general lessons from the successful negotiations.

In the first place, the agreements would not have been possible had not the United States, in the face of some domestic opposition, maintained a military position of strength over the recent years. I am firmly convinced that no weak military power could have persuaded the Soviet Union that it should voluntarily interrupt its quickening nuclear arms development program.

Equally important, we should know now that no further progress in major arms reduction can be achieved unless the United States continues to maintain its military strength. If we are going to negotiate, obviously, we must have something with which to negotiate.

A third vital lesson which should flow from these developments is that our true security demands that we get something in return when we reduce our basic military strength—that it would be foolish, reckless, and irresponsible to cut back our own forces unilaterally, without regard to what our adversaries are doing in terms of providing for their national defense.

ROAD TO PEACE

Mr. President, now that President Nixon's planning, vision, and hard work have put the two nuclear giants on the road to peace, a gathering momentum toward a worldwide truce and global reduction in tensions seems bound to develop.

In the years to come, historians will look back on the developments of 1972 as a historic starting point—the time when the superpowers turned from the mutual burdens and dangers of the nuclear arms race and headed toward the rewards which flow from nations working together on "projects of peace" in an "environment of peace."

I am reminded of the words of another American President whose greatest hope, like President Nixon's, was the establishment of a structure which would promote world peace. I am, of course, referring to Woodrow Wilson.

In 1917, President Wilson spoke to the Senate about the kind of peace he hoped to encourage and foster:

> It must be a peace without victory. . . . Victory would mean a peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last; only a peace, the very principle of which is equality, and a common participation in a common benefit.

Obviously, there is a real difference between the circumstances of 1917 and today. In 1917, America was involved in a world war. Today, we are engaged in a cold war—a confrontation between the superpowers—which, although indirect, has proven to be very costly.

In this generation of the cold war, President Nixon has made great progress in beginning an era of negotiations instead of confrontations. First, China. Then, the Soviet Union. While the talks with the People's Republic of China will make a significant contribution to peace in the more distant future, the productive results of the Moscow talks will be felt soon.

In Moscow, the Soviet Union and the United States reached an agreement on the things they share in common—realizing and acknowledging that people can believe different things and live differently with mutual progress and economic development. How true this seems today as compared to 1917.

Today, lurking not far behind the scourge of war is a holocaust not just for one nation, but for all of mankind. There can be no victors. There can be no vanquished. There can only be the dead.

Mr. President, clearly, the hope of Woodrow Wilson—the hope of peace—is a little closer today than it has ever been since the end of World War II. We are, without doubt, at a pivotal point in world history; we have a historic opportunity to promote our own interests while promoting the interest of all mankind.

I firmly believe that the American people and the Congress of the United States will stand solidly behind President Nixon and support his bold efforts to bring peace to a world that is starved for it. The President has worked long and hard to wind down the war in Vietnam, to build stable relationships with the world's leading powers, and to promote economic progress and stability at home and abroad.

President Nixon deserves not only our strong support, but our profound gratitude for creating the climate for a generation of peace.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, yesterday the Senate voted to end one war. Today we have the opportunity to vote to prevent a future and undoubtedly far more devastating war. By approving the pending treaty on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems, we can end our mad and elusive search for some new device that gives us only a false sense of security and settle instead on what has so rightly been called a delicate balance of terror.

Perhaps international understanding and harmony are still too limited to permit far-reaching disarmament agreements. But at least we can take these steps toward arms limitation and arms control, which are, in effect, preemptive disarmament.

I shall vote for this treaty, although I am troubled by some of its provisions. I deeply regret, Mr. President, that this treaty permits any ABM deployment at all. For 3 years, I have fought programs to build such a system in the United States, for I firmly believed that it was unnecessary, unworkable, and enormously costly.

The fact that we now face the uncertainties of MIRV development can be traced directly to our unfortunate decision to proceed with an ABM. MIRV would not have been necessary if both sides had not built ABM's.

Although both nuclear superpowers have built and tested ABM systems, many of us are convinced that those weapons will perform as promised in actual combat situations. Let us hope that we never have such a test.

Observers of our negotiating positions at SALT have said that we probably could have concluded an agreement forbidding all ABM's several billion dollars ago, if the United States had not been

so insistent on linking this treaty with additional limitations on offensive arms.

Instead, we have already spent $5 billion on our ABM, with another half billion approved for this year. If we proceed with construction of the authorized site here in Washington, the cost will be an additional $2 to $4 billion according to official estimates, and perhaps double those figures according to the distinguished senior Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON).

Regrettable as this waste has been, at least now we have a chance by this treaty to turn off the tap.

One of the arguments frequently raise against this treaty is that it condemns our people and our strategic forces to a position of vulnerability. If that is true, it is true for both the Soviet Union and the United States, for we both have renounced national and even regional area defense. Long ago, the Congress decided that it would be impossible to give adequate protection to our civilian population through an ABM system.

Even if we build an ABM site in Washington, and even if we had assurance that all 100 launchers would destroy an incoming missile, all an attacking enemy would have to do is to target one additional missile to overwhelm the system.

The whole logic of deterrence is that neither side would risk an attack when it knew that the enemy could retaliate with enough force to do unacceptable damage.

There should be no doubt, Mr. President, that we have—and shall continue to have for the foreseeable future—that capability to destroy any enemy many times over.

As the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee said several weeks ago, 50 Minuteman missiles could destroy nearly half of Soviet industry. Ten B–52 bombers—about 2 percent of our bomber force—could destroy about 40 percent of Soviet industry.

And just one of our Poseidon subs—whose invulnerability is not in question—could destroy about one-quarter of Soviet industry. The numbers of civilian casualties associated with each of these retaliations are terrirfying.

We have indeed a balance of terror, but it was a stable balance until man devised the ABM and the MIRV's to combat it.

Some Members of the Senate have raised doubts or questions about possible violations by the Soviet Union—that they might develop and conceal additional launchers which could be reloaded rapidly into ABM systems or that Soviet SAM's might be upgraded to work in an ABM mode.

If we fear this about the Russians, we know that they fear the same about us. Some of the justifications for our SAM–D, for instance, carry hints that it also might be upgraded if SALT fails.

The only way out of this spiral of mistrust is to establish a basic foundation of trust. That we have tried to do in this treaty and the interim agreement. If we deviate from this now, especially by encumbering these agreements with contradictory reservations or understandings, we shall pollute the spirit of SALT with dangerous clouds of suspicion.

We are not asking our people to take the Russians on faith, for we have adequate national technical means to verify compliance with these agreements. Even if these means are not 100-percent accurate, we have been assured that the margin of error is well within our margin of survival.

But if this trust is to be allowed to grow and to produce further understandings and limitations, both sides have to mean what they said and fully comply with the letter and the spirit of these agreements. The Soviet Union should be on notice that we will examine their actions closely to be sure that they are living up to these accords. Likewise, I trust that the Congress of the United States will study the proposed programs of our Government to be sure that we also remain in compliance with these agreements.

Surely it is time for us to move in this direction. When the world is spending more than six times as much on military research as on medical research and when 6.5 percent of the hungry world's gross national product goes for armaments, we must call a truce to this terror.

This treaty is another advance toward that day when we can turn our swords into plowshares.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I support both the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and the Executive agreement. I do so confident that the United States will be able to maintain a parity with the Soviets—that we have not bargained ourselves into a position of irrevocable inferiority.

I must admit that I had grave reservations about the treaty and agreement when I began to study them. I was concerned by the apparent inequity in the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles allowed the Soviets and the United States. I was puzzled that the agreement allowed the Soviets to surpass us in missile-carrying submarines. I was apprehensive that the lack of limitations on qualitative improvements would allow the Soviets to MIRV their SS–9 and thus pose a serious threat to the survivability of our Minuteman strike force.

Subsequently, the Armed Services Committee held extensive hearings on the military implications of SALT. We received testimony from expert witnesses and questioned them in detail. Mr. President, I am fully satisfied that the SALT treaty and agreement should be approved and I lend my support to that end.

In approving the treaty and agreement, however, we must not lose sight of one basic truth. We have not and must not accept less than parity with the Soviet Union. The current euphoria over the initial success of SALT must not deaden us to the realities of the strategic nuclear balance. This treaty and agreement are simply the first step on a path that, I hope, will eventually lead to a reduction in nuclear armament. This treaty and agreement are not the final solution. We dare not abandon that elementary principle that has enabled us to make this first step—the principle of negotiating from a position of strength. To do this just when we begin to see some possibility of real arms limitation, and possibly reduction, would have the effect of fueling a one-sided arms race, an effort by the Soviets to achieve the kind of overwhelming strategic posture that could result in nuclear intimidation to which America would be forced to acquiesce.

I cannot accept that, the American people will not accept that, and the Congress must not accept it. Two recent votes on the military procurement bill encourage me to believe that the majority of Senators agree that, in order to maintain parity against Soviet improvements that are allowed by the treaty and agreement, we must continue to improve our forces. The B–1 bomber will urgently be needed as a replacement for our aging B–52. Our MIRV program will insure survival of additional reentry vehicles without posing a destabilizing threat to Soviet forces. The Trident submarine will provide a follow-on to early Polaris submarines in the 1978 time frame.

If there is one lesson to be learned from the strategic arms limitation negotiations, it is that to negotiate successfully, we must do so from strength. Where we had an on-going successful program, Safeguard, we ended up with a numerically balanced agreement. But where the Soviets had greater strength, and ongoing programs, we were forced to accept less than numerical equality. While our qualitative advantage balances this out, and while future improvements, such as Trident and MIRV, promise to retain that balance, we should remember that to negotiate successfully with the Soviets on further limitations and reductions, we must do so from strength. Continued approval of qualitative improvements and modernization of forces will give us that strength.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, today we have the occasion to participate in the historic consideration of the treaty between the United States and the U.S.S.R. on limitation of ABM systems.

These agreements represent the product of a major effort of the administration to bring about an era of mutually agreed restraint and arm limitation between these two nuclear powers.

The President had consistently maintained that our defenses shall remain second to none. Our entering into this agreement shall in no way limit our present or future ability to defend ourselves.

The ABM treaty limits the deployment of antiballistic missile systems to two designated areas. The Interim Agreement limits the overall level of strategic offensive missile forces. Together the two agreements provide for a more stable strategic balance in the next several years than would be possible if strategic arms competition continued unchecked. The United States and the Soviet Union will both gain from this but the greatest benefit will be to the people of all nations.

I am confident that these agreements are but a first step in checking the arms race. I emphasize first and not final; they do not close off all avenues of strategic

competition. The success of these negotiations was the maintenance of strong strategic posture and it is now equally essential that we carry forward a sound strategic modernization program to maintain our security and to ensure that more permanent and comprehensive arms limitation agreements can be reached.

The President has assured us that the terms of the ABM treaty and interim agreement will permit the United States to take the steps we deem necessary to maintain a strategic posture which protects our vital interests and guarantees our continued security. We are not unilaterally sacrificing American strength.

Aside from our national security, these agreements present an opportunity for a new and more constructive relationship between our two countries, unlike the hostility and confrontation of decades past, but this time characterized by negotiated settlement of differences.

These accords provide us with tangible evidence that we need not live forever in the shadow of nuclear war. We have the assurance of renewed hope that we can work together to build a lasting peace.

I am pleased with these agreements. The President needs our support as he continues to do everything possible to see that we have a more secure and peaceful world in which our security is fully protected.

Mr. CHILES. Mr. President, I am voting to approve the SALT treaty. However, I believe it is important that I point out my deep reservations concerning this agreement.

I believe this treaty addresses questions vital to this Nation and demands a careful weighing of two desirable ends: First, to maintain U.S. security through continued ability of nuclear attack; and second, the reduction, through all possible means, of the present level of international tensions, tensions partly fed through the continuing buildup of nuclear weapons.

But I had hoped that this treaty would represent a realistic assessment by both parties that continued proliferation does not enhance either's security and am distressed to think that we have been outtraded. I understand we wanted badly to get an arms agreement, but I believe we have moved tremendously from what our first positions were. While this is only the first phase of the agreement, I think we have given up more than we should have.

It now appears that the SALT treaty is going to be ratified with little or no opposition, but I feel it puts us in a precarious position for future arms talks. My consideration of the agreements and my reservations concerning them lead me to joining with Senator JACKSON, Senator SCOTT and others in cosponsoring an amendment to Senate Joint Resolution 241 authorizing the President to sign the interim agreement on offensive weapons concluded in Moscow.

This amendment makes clear the feeling of the Congress that the people of the United States sincerely desire a stable limitation and balance of strategic arms to maintain peace and deter aggression. However, the Congress would consider any action by the Soviet Union which would have the effect of endangering our strategic deterrent forces to be contrary to the supreme national interests of the United States. The amendment is necessary, I feel, as an expression of the view of the Congress with respect to the present treaty and agreements and our position on further agreements in SALT II.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the pending business be very temporarily laid aside, and that the Senate resume the consideration of legislative business.

The motion was agreed to and the Senate resumed the consideration of legislative business.

VIETNAM ERA VETERANS' READJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1972

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 937, S. 2161.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BROCK). The bill will be stated by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

S. 2161, to amend chapters 31, 34, and 35 of title 38, United States Code, to increase the vocational rehabilitation subsistences allowances, the educational assistance allowances, and the special training allowances paid to eligible veterans and persons under such chapters.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which had been reported from the Committee on Veterans' Affairs with an amendment to strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

That this Act may be cited as the "Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1972".

TITLE I—VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION AND EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE RATE ADJUSTMENTS

SEC. 101. Chapter 31 of title 38, United States Code, is amended as follows:

(1) by adding at the end of subsection 1502 a new subsection as follows:

"(d) Veterans pursuing a program of vocational rehabilitation training under the provisions of this chapter shall also be eligible, where feasible, for participation in the work-study/outreach program provided by section 1687 of this title and for advance subsistence allowance payments as provided by section 1780 of this title."

(2) by amending section 1504(b) to read as follows:

"(b) The subsistence allowance of a veteran-trainee is to be determined in accordance with the following table, and shall be the monthly amount shown in column II, III, IV, or V (whichever is applicable as determined by the veteran's dependency status) opposite the appropriate type of training as specified in column I:

"Column I	Column II	Column III	Column IV	Column V
Type of training	No dependents.	One dependent	Two dependents	More than two dependents
				The amount in column IV, plus the following for each dependent in excess of two:
Institutional:				
Full-time	$200	$247	$289	$21
Three-quartertime	150	185	217	16
Half-time	100	124	145	11
Farm cooperative, apprentice, or other on-job training:				
Full-time	166	213	255	21";

and

(3) by deleting in section 1507 "$100" and inserting in lieu thereof "$200".

SEC. 102. Chapter 34 of title 38, United States Code, is amended as follows:

(1) by deleting in the last sentence of section 1677(b) "$175" and inserting in lieu thereof "$250",

(2) by amending the table contained in paragraph (1) of section 1682(a) to read as follows:

"Column I	Column II	Column III	Column IV	Column V
Type of program	No dependents	One dependent	Two dependents	More than two dependents
				The amount in column IV, plus the following for each dependent in excess of two:
Institutional:				
Full-time	$250	$297	$339	$21
Three-quarter-time	188	223	254	16
Half-time	125	149	170	11
Cooperative	201	236	268	16";

(3) by deleting in section 1682(b) "$175" and inserting in lieu thereof "$250"; and

(4) by deleting in section 1696(b) "$175" and inserting in lieu thereof "$250".

SEC. 103. Chapter 35 of title 38, United States Code, is amended as follows:

(1) by amending section 1732(a)(1) to read as follows:

"(a)(1) The educational assistance allowance on behalf of an eligible person who is pursuing a program of education consisting of institutional courses shall be computed at the rate of (A) $250 per month if pursued on a full-time basis, (B) $188 per month if pursued on a three-quarter-time basis, and (C) $125 per month if pursued on a half-time basis.";

(2) by deleting in section 1732(a)(2) "$175" and inserting in lieu thereof "250";

(3) by deleting in section 1732(b) "$141" and inserting in lieu thereof "$201"; and

(4) by amending section 1742(a) to read as follows:

"(a) While the eligible person is enrolled in and pursuing a full-time course of special restorative training, the parent or guardian shall be entitled to receive on his behalf a special training allowance computed at the basic rate of $250 per month. If the charges for tuition and fees applicable to any such

course are more than $79 per calendar month, the basic monthly allowance may be increased by the amount that such charges exceed $79 a month, upon election by the parent or guardian of the eligible person to have such person's period of entitlement reduced by one day for each $8.50 that the special training allowance paid exceeds the basic monthly allowance."

TITLE II—ADVANCE PAYMENT OF EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE OR SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES; WORK-STUDY/OUTREACH PROGRAM

SEC. 201. Subchapter II of chapter 36 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by inserting immediately before section 1781 the following new section:

"§ 1780. Payment of educational assistance or subsistence allowances

"Period for Which Payment May Be Made

"(a) Payment of educational assistance or subsistence allowances to eligible veterans or eligible persons pursuing a program of education or training, other than a program by correspondence or a program of flight training, in an educational institution under chapter 31, 34, or 35 of this title shall be paid as provided in this section and, as applicable, in section 1504, 1682, 1691 or 1732 of this title. Such payments shall be paid only for the period of such veterans' or persons' enrollment, but no amount shall be paid—

"(1) to any eligible veteran or eligible person enrolled in a course which leads to a standard college degree for any period when such veteran or person is not pursuing his course in accordance with the regularly established policies and regulations of the educational institution and the requirements of this chapter or of chapter 34 or 35 of this title; or

"(2) to any eligible veteran or eligible person enrolled in a course which does not lead to a standard college degree (excluding programs of apprenticeship and programs of other on-job training authorized by section 1787 of this title) for any day of absence in excess of thirty days in a twelve-month period, not counting as absences weekends or legal holidays established by Federal or State law (or in the case of the Republic of the Philippines, Philippine law) during which the institution is not regularly in session.

"Correspondence Training Certifications

"(b) No educational assistance allowance shall be paid to an eligible veteran or eligible person enrolled in and pursuing a program of education exclusively by correspondence until the Administrator shall have received—

"(1) from the eligible veteran or eligible person a certificate as to the number of lessons actually completed by the veteran or person and serviced by the educational institution, and

"(2) from the training establishment a certification or an endorsement on the veteran's or person's certificate, as to the number of lessons completed by the veteran or person and serviced by the institution.

"Apprenticeship and Other On-Job Training

"(c) No training assistance allowance shall be paid to an eligible veteran or eligible person enrolled in and pursuing a program of apprenticeship or other on-job training until the Administrator shall have received—

"(1) from such veteran or person a certification as to his actual attendance during such period; and

"(2) from the training establishment a certification, or an endorsement on the veteran's or person's certificate, that such veteran or person was enrolled in and pursuing a program of apprenticeship or other on-job training during such period.

"Advance Payment of Initial Educational Assistance or Subsistence Allowance

"(d)(1) The educational assistance or subsistence allowance advance payment provided for in this subsection is based upon a finding by the Congress that eligible veterans and eligible persons need additional funds at the beginning of a school term to meet the expenses of books, travel, deposits, and payment for living quarters, the initial installment of tuition, and the other special expenses which are concentrated at the beginning of a school term.

"(2) Subject to the provisions of this subsection, and under regulations which the Administrator shall prescribe, an eligible veteran or eligible person shall be paid an educational assistance allowance or subsistence allowance, as appropriate, advance payment. Such advance payment shall be made in an amount equivalent to the allowance for the month or fraction thereof in which pursuit of the program will commence, plus the allowance for the succeeding month. In the case of a serviceman on active duty, who is pursuing a program of education (other than under subchapter VI of chapter 34), the advance payment shall be in a lump sum based upon the amount payable for the entire quarter, semester, or term, as applicable. In no event shall an advance payment be made under this subsection to a veteran or person intending to pursue a program of education on less than a half-time basis. The application for advance payment, to be made on a form prescribed by the Administrator, shall—

"(A) in the case of an initial enrollment of a veteran or person in an educational institution, contain information showing that the veteran or person (i) is eligible for educational benefits, (ii) has been accepted by the institution, and (iii) has notified the institution of his intention to attend that institution; and

"(B) in the case of a reenrollment of a veteran or person, contain information showing that the veteran or person (i) is eligible to continue his program of education or training and (ii) intends to reenroll in the same institution,

and, in either case, shall also state the number of semester or clock-hours to be pursued by such veteran or person.

"(3) Subject to the provisions of this subsection, and under regulations which the Administrator shall prescribe, a person eligible for education or training under the provisions of subchapter VI of chapter 34 of this title shall be entitled to a lump-sum educational assistance allowance advance payment. Such advance payment shall in no event be made earlier than thirty days prior to the date on which pursuit of the person's program of education or training is to commence. The application for the advance payment, to be made on a form prescribed by the Administrator, shall, in addition to the information prescribed in paragraph (2)(A), specify—

"(A) that the program to be pursued has been approved;

"(B) the anticipated cost and the number of Carnegie, clock, or semester hours to be pursued; and

"(C) where the program to be pursued is other than a high school credit course, the need of the person to pursue the course or courses to be taken.

"(4) For purposes of the Administrator's determination whether any veteran or person is eligible for an advance payment under this section, the information submitted by the institution shall establish his eligibility unless there is evidence in his file in the processing office establishing that he is not eligible for such advarce payment.

"(5) The advance payment authorized by paragraph (2) and (3) of this subsection shall, in the case of an eligible veteran or eligible person, be (A) drawn in favor of the veteran or person; (B) mailed to the educational institution listed on the application form for temporary care and delivery to the veteran or person by such institution; and (C) delivered to the veteran or person upon his registration at such institution, but in no event shall such delivery be made earlier than thirty days before the program of education is to commence.

"(6) Upon delivery of the advance payment pursuant to paragraph (5) of this subsection, the institution shall submit to the Administrator a certification of such delivery. If such delivery is not effected within thirty days after commencement of the program of education in question, such institution shall return such payment to the Administrator forthwith.

"Prepayment of Subsequent Educational Assistance of Subsistence Allowance

"(c) Except as provided in subsection (g) of this section, subsequent payments of educational assistance or subsistence allowance to an eligible veteran or eligible person shall be prepaid each month, subject to such reports and proof of enrollment in and satisfactory pursuit of such programs as the Administrator may require. The Administrator may withhold the final payment for a period of enrollment until such proof is received and the amount of the final payment appropriately adjusted.

"Recovery of Erroneous Payments

"(f) If an eligible veteran or eligible person fails to enroll in or pursue a course for which an educational assistance or subsistence allowance advance payment is made, the amount of such payment and any amount of subsequent payments which, in whole or in part, are due to erroneous information required to be furnished under subsection (d)(2) and (3) of this section, shall become an overpayment and shall constitute a liability of such veteran or person to the United States and may be recovered, unless waived pursuant to section 3102 of this title, from any benefit otherwise due him under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration or may be recovered in the same manner as any other debt due the United States.

"Payments for Less Than Half-Time Training

"(g) Payment of educational assistance allowance in the case of any eligible veteran or eligible person pursuing a program of education on less than a half-time basis (except as provided by subsection (d)(3) of this section) shall be made in an amount computed for the entire quarter, semester, or term during the month immediately following the month in which certification is received from the educational institution that such veteran or person has enrolled in and is pursuing a program at such institution. Such lump sum payment shall be computed at the rate provided in section 1682(b) or 1732 (a)(2) of this title, as applicable.

"Determination of Enrollment, Pursuit, and Attendance

"(h) The Administrator may, pursuant to regulations which he shall prescribe, determine enrollment in, pursuit of, and attendance at, any program of education or training or course by an eligible veteran or eligible person for any period for which he receives an educational assistance or subsistence allowance under this chapter for pursuing such program or course."

SEC. 202. Section 1681 of title 38, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

"§ 1681. Educational assistance allowance

"General

"(a) The Administrator shall, in accordance with the applicable provisions of this

section and section 1780 of this title, pay to each eligible veteran who is pursuing a program of education under this chapter an educational assistance allowance to meet, in part, the expenses of his subsistence, tuition, fees, supplies, books, equipment, and other educational costs.

"Institutional Training

"(b) The educational assistance allowance of an eligible veteran pursuing a program of education, other than a program by correspondence or a program of flight training, at an educational institution shall be paid as provided in section 1780 of this title.

"Flight Training

"(c) No educational assistance allowance for any month shall be paid to an eligible veteran who is pursuing a program of education consisting exclusively of flight training until the Administrator shall have received a certification from the eligible veteran and the institution as to actual flight training received by, and the cost thereof to, the veteran during that month."

SEC. 203. Subchapter IV of chapter 34 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by deleting section 1687 in its entirety and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

"§ 1687. Work-study/outreach additional educational assistance allowance; advances to eligible veterans

"(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Administrator shall pay a work-study/outreach additional educational assistance allowance (hereafter referred to as 'work-study/outreach allowance') to any veteran pursuing on a full-time basis a program of education under this chapter or a course of vocational rehabilitation under chapter 31 of this title, and who enters into an agreement with the Administrator to perform services under the work-study/outreach program established by this section. Such allowance shall be paid in advance in the amount of $300 in return for such veteran's agreement to perform services, aggregating one hundred and twenty hours during a semester or other applicable enrollment period, required in connection with (1) the outreach services program under subchapter IV of chapter 3 of this title, (2) the preparation and processing of necessary papers and other documents at educational institutions or training establishments or regional offices or facilities of the Veterans' Administration, (3) the provision of hospital and domiciliary care and medical treatment under chapter 17 of this title, or (4) any other activity of the Veterans' Administration as the Administrator shall determine appropriate. Advances of lesser amounts may be made in return for agreements to perform services for periods of less than one hundred and twenty hours, the amount of such advance to bear the same ratio to the number of hours of work agreed to be performed as $300 bears to one hundred and twenty hours. The Administrator may enter into a work-study/outreach agreement with a veteran who has satisfactorily pursued his courses during at least one enrollment period for the performance of services during a period between enrollments if such veteran certifies his intention to continue the pursuit of the program during the next enrollment period.

"(b) If an eligible veteran, after having received in advance a work-study/outreach allowance under subsection (a) of this section, fails to fulfill his work obligation under the agreement for any reason, the amount due (based upon the pro rata portion of the work obligation which the veteran did not complete), as computed by the Administrator, shall be considered an overpayment and shall become due and payable at the end of the enrollment period or at such time prior thereto when the Administrator determines that such obligation will not be completed prior to the end of the enrollment period. Any such amount due may be recovered from any benefit otherwise due the veteran under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration or shall, unless waived pursuant to section 3102 of this title, constitute a liability of such veteran to the United States and be recovered in the same manner as any other debt due the United States.

"(c) In order to carry out the purposes of this section and to determine the number of veterans whose services the Veterans' Administration can effectively utilize and the types of services that such veterans may be required to perform, the Administrator shall, at least once each year, conduct a survey to determine the numbers of veteran-students whose services under the work-study/outreach program can effectively be utilized during an enrollment period in each geographic area where Veterans' Administration activities are conducted. Based upon the results of such survey, the Administrator shall allocate to each Veterans' Administration regional office the number of agreements under subsection (a) of this section which the head of that office shall attempt to make during such enrollment period or periods prior to the next such survey. Each regional office shall further allocate to each educational institution, at which eligible veterans are enrolled pursuant to this chapter, within its area the number of such potential agreements based upon the ratio of the number of veterans enrolled in such institution to the total number of veterans enrolled in all such institutions in the regional area, except that, to the maximum extent feasible, 20 per centum of the allocated number of agreements shall be reserved for special allocation to those institutions with a substantially higher proportion of needy veteran-students than generally prevails at other institutions within such area. If the total number of agreements allocated to any institution cannot be filled by such institution, the number of such unmade potential agreements shall be reallocated to such other institution or institutions in the regional office area as the Administrator shall determine in accordance with regulations he shall prescribe.

"(d)(1) The Administrator shall, to the maximum extent feasible, enter into agreements with educational institutions under which such institutions will recommend, within the number of allocated agreements, which particular veteran-students enrolled in such institutions should be offered work-study/outreach agreements under this section.

"(2) The determination of which eligible veteran-students shall be offered work-study/outreach agreements shall be made in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Administrator. Such regulations shall include, but not be limited to, the following criteria—

"(A) the need of the veteran to augment his educational assistance or subsistence allowance;

"(B) the availability to the veteran of transportation to the place where his services are to be performed;

"(C) the motivation of the veteran;

"(D) in the case of a veteran who is a member of a minority group, the disadvantages incurred by members of such group; and

"(E) in the case of a disabled veteran pursuing a course of vocational rehabilitation under chapter 31 of this title, the compatibility of the work assignment to the veteran's physical condition.

"(e) No work-study/outreach agreement shall be entered into under this section which would—

"(1) result in the displacement of any employed person or impair any existing contract for services, or

"(2) involve the construction, operation, or maintenance of so much of any facility as is used or is to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious worship.

"(f) While performing the services authorized by this section or section 1688 of this title, veteran-students shall be deemed employees of the United States for the purposes of the benefits of chapter 81 of title 5 but not for the purposes of laws administered by the Civil Service Commission."

"§ 1688. Veteran-student employment

"(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in order to supplement the program established by section 1687 of this title, the Administrator is authorized to utilize on an intermittent basis the services of veteran-students who are pursuing full-time programs of education or training under chapters 31 and 34 of this title. Such veteran-students may be utilized to perform such services for the Veterans' Administration at such times and places as the Administrator deems advisable.

"(b) Veteran-students utilized under the authority of subsection (a) of this section shall be paid an hourly rate equivalent to the minimum rate for a grade in the General Schedule contained in section 5332 of title 5, determined by the Administrator to be appropriate for the services rendered. Such grade determination may, at the Administrator's discretion, be based upon, but shall not be subject to, position classification standards issued by the Civil Service Commission pursuant to section 5105 of title 5."

TITLE III—EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM ADJUSTMENTS

SEC. 301. Subsection (b) of section 1502 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by striking out "34 or 35" and inserting in lieu thereof "34, 35, or 36".

SEC. 302. Section 1671 of title 38, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

"Any eligible veteran, or any person on active duty (after consultation with the appropriate service education officer), who desires to initiate a program of education under this chapter shall submit an application to the Administrator which shall be in such form, and contain such information, as the Administrator shall prescribe. The Administrator shall approve such application unless he finds that such veterans or person is not eligible for or entitled to the educational assistance applied for, or that his program of education fails to meet any of the requirements of this chapter, or that he is already qualified. The Administrator shall notify the veteran or person of the approval or disapproval of his application."

SEC. 303. Section 1682 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by striking out subsections (c) and (d) inserting in lieu thereof the following:

"(c)(1) An eligible veteran who is enrolled in a 'farm cooperative' training program which provides for institutional and on-farm training and which has been approved by the appropriate State approving agency in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of this subsection shall be eligible to receive an educational assistance allowance as follows: $201 per month, if he has no dependents; $236 per month if he has one dependent; $268 per month, if he has two dependents; and $16 per month, for each dependent in excess of two.

"(2) The State approving agency may approve a farm cooperative training course when it satisfies the following requirements:

"(A) The course combines organized group instruction in agricultural and related subjects of at least two hundred hours per year (and of at least eight hours each month) at an educational institution, with supervised work experience on a farm or other agricultural establishment; and the course provides for not less than one hundred hours of individual instruction per year, at least fifty hours of which shall be on a farm or other agricultural establishment (with at

least two visits by the instructor to such farm or establishment each month). Such individual instruction shall be given by the instructor responsible for the veteran's institutional instruction and shall include instruction and home-study assignments in the preparation of budgets, inventories, and statements showing the production, use on the farm, and sale of crops, livestock, and livestock products.

"(B) The course is developed with due consideration to the size and character of the farm or other agricultural establishment on which the eligible veteran will receive his supervised work experience and to the need of such eligible veteran, in the type of farming for which he is training, for proficiency in planning, producing, marketing, farm mechanics, conservation of resources, food conservation, farm financing, farming management, and the keeping of farm and home accounts.

"(C) The farm or other agricultural establishment on which the veteran is to receive his supervised work experience shall be of a size and character which will permit instruction in all aspects of the management of the farm or other agricultural establishment of the type for which the eligible veteran is being trained, and will provide the eligible veteran an opportunity to apply the major portion of the farm practices taught in the group instruction part of the course.

"(D) Provision shall be made for certification by the institution and the veteran that the training offered does not repeat or duplicate training previously received by the veteran.

"(E) The institutional on-farm training meets such other fair and reasonable standards as may be established by the State approving agency."

SEC. 304. Chapter 34 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by striking out section 1684 in its entirety and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

"§ 1684. Apprenticeship or other on-job training; correspondence courses

"Any eligible veteran may pursue a program of apprenticeship or other on-job training or a program of education exclusively by correspondence and be paid an educational assistance allowance or training assistance allowance, as applicable, under the provisions of section 1787 or 1786 of this title."

SEC. 305. Section 1691 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by—

(1) inserting in clause (2) of subsection (a) after "educational institution" the following: "or training establishment"; and

(2) amending subsection (b) to read as follows:

"(b) The Administrator shall pay to an eligible veteran pursuing a course or courses or program pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, an educational assistance allowance as provided in sections 1681 and 1682 (a) or (b) or 1732(a) of this title."

SEC. 306. Section 1692 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by—

(1) striking out "marked" wherever it appears; and

(2) inserting a comma in subsection (b) immediately after "month" and by inserting immediately after "nine months," in such subsection, the following: "or until a maximum of $450 is utilized,".

SEC. 307. Subsection (a) of section 1695 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by inserting "(including courses needed to obtain high school equivalency certificate)" after "education or training".

SEC. 308. Section 1696 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by—

(1) striking out "diploma, or" and inserting in lieu thereof "diploma or needed to obtain an equivalency certificate, or" in subsection (a); and

(2) inserting at the end of subsection (b) the following sentence: "Where it is determined that there is no same program, the Administrator shall establish appropriate rates for tuition and fees designed to allow reimbursement for reasonable costs for the education or training institution."

SEC. 309. Subchapter VI of chapter 34 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"§ 1697A. Coordination with and participation by Department of Defense

"(a) The Administrator shall designate an appropriate official of the Veterans' Administration who shall cooperate with and assist the Secretary of Defense and the official he designates as administratively responsible for such matters, in carrying out functions and duties of the Department of Defense under the PREP program authorized by this subchapter. It shall be the duty of such official to assist the Secretary of Defense in all matters entailing cooperation or coordination between the Department of Defense and the Veterans' Administration in providing training facilities and released time from duty necessary to carry out the purposes of the program.

"(b) Educational institutions and training establishments administered by or under contract to the Department of Defense providing education and training to persons serving on active duty with the Armed Forces shall, in accordance with regulations jointly prescribed by the Administrator and the Secretary of Defense, be approved for the enrollment of eligible persons only at such time as the Secretary submits to the Committees on Veterans' Affairs of the Senate and House of Representatives a report containing such Department's plan for implementation of the program established under this subchapter, and periodically thereafter submits progress reports with respect to the implementation of such plan, which plan shall include provision for—

"(1) each Secretary concerned to undertake an information and outreach program designed to advise, counsel, and encourage each eligible person within each branch of the Armed Forces with respect to enrollment in a program under this subchapter, with particular emphasis upon programs under section 1691(a)(2) and 1696(a)(2) of this title, and in all other programs for which such person, prior to or following discharge or release from active duty, may be eligible under chapters 31 and 34 of this title.

"(2) each Secretary concerned to undertake, in coordination with representatives of the Veterans' Administration, to arrange and carry out meetings with each approved educational institution located in the vicinity of an Armed Forces installation (or, in the case of installations overseas, which have the capacity to carry out such programs at such overseas installations) to encourage the establishment of a program by such institution under this subchapter and subchapter V of this chapter in connection with persons stationed at such installation, with particular emphasis upon programs under section 1691(a)(2) and 1696(a)(2) of this title;

"(3) The release from duty assignment of any such eligible person for at least one-half of the hours required for such person to enroll in a full-time program of education or training under this subchapter during his military service, unless the Secretary concerned shall determine that such release of time is inconsistent with the interests of the national defense; and

"(4) establishment of an Inter-Service and Agency Coordinating Committee, under the co-chairmanship of an Assistant Secretary of Defense and the Chief Benefits Director of the Veterans' Administration, to promote and coordinate the establishment and conduct of programs under this subchapter and other provisions of this title and the implementation of the plan submitted pursuant to this section."

SEC. 310. Subsection (a) of section 1701 of title 38, United States Code, is amended as follows:

(1) by amending paragraph (6) to read as follows:

"(6) The term 'educational institution' means any public or private secondary school, vocational school, correspondence school, business school, junior college, teachers' college, college, normal school, professional school, university, or scientific or technical institution, or any other institution if it furnishes education at the secondary school level or above."; and

(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:

"(9) For the purposes of this chapter and chapter 36 of this title, the term 'training establishment' means any establishment providing apprentice or other training on the job, including those under the supervision of a college or university or any State department of education, or any State apprenticeship agency, or any State board of vocational education, or any joint apprenticeship committee, or the Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training established pursuant to chapter 4C of title 29, or any agency of the Federal Government authorized to supervise such training."

SEC. 311. Section 1720 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the first sentence in subsection (a) thereof a new sentence as follows: "Such counseling shall not be required where the eligible person has been accepted for, or is pursuing, courses which lead to a standard college degree, at an approved institution."

SEC. 312. Section 1723 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by—

(1) amending subsection (c) to read as follows:

"(c) The Administrator shall not approve the enrollment of an eligible person in any course of institutional on-farm training, any course to be pursued by correspondence (except as provided in section 1786 of this title), open circuit television (except as herein provided), or a radio, or any course to be pursued at an educational institution not located in a State or in the Republic of the Philippines (except as herein provided). The Administrator may approve the enrollment of an eligible person in a course, to be pursued in residence, leading to a standard college degree which includes, as an integral part thereof, subjects offered through the medium of open circuit televised instruction, if the major portion of the course requires conventional classroom or laboratory attendance. The Administrator may approve the enrollment at an educational institution which is not located in a State or in the Republic of the Philippines if such program is pursued at an approved educational institution of higher learning. The Administrator in his discretion may deny or discontinue the educational assistance under this chapter or any eligible person in a foreign educational institution if he finds that such enrollment is not in the best interest of the eligible person or the Government"; and

(2) inserting "(except as provided in section 1733 of this title)" after "regular secondary school education" in subsection (d).

SEC. 313. Section 1731 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by—

(1) inserting in subsection (a) immediately after the word "shall" a comma and the following: "in accordance with the provisions of section 1780 of this title,";

(2) striking out subsections (b), (c), and (e) in their entirety; and

(3) redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (b).

SEC. 314. Sections 1733 and 1734 of title 38, United States Code, are amended to read as follows:

"§ 1733. Special assistance for the educationally disadvantaged

"(a) Any eligible wife or widow shall, without charge to any entitlement she may have under section 1711 of this title, be entitled to the benefits provided an eligible veteran under section 1691 (if pursued in a State) of this title.

"(b) Any eligible person shall, without charge to any entitlement he may have under section 1711 of this title, be entitled to the benefits provided an eligible veteran under section 1692 of this title.

"§ 1734. Apprenticeship or other on-job training; correspondence courses

"(a) Any eligible person shall be entitled to pursue, in a State, a program of apprenticeship or other on-job training and be paid a training assistance allowance as provided in section 1787 of this title.

"(b) Any eligible wife or widow shall be entitled to pursue a program of education exclusively by correspondence and be paid an educational assistance allowance as provided in section 1786 of this title."

SEC. 315. Section 1777 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by inserting "or person" after "veteran" each place it appears.

SEC. 316. Section 1784 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by—

(1) striking out "34 or 35" and inserting in lieu thereof "34, 35, or 36" and in the first sentence of subsection (b);

(2) inserting "or eligible persons" after "veterans" in the second sentence of subsection (b); and

(3) striking out "enrolled under chapter 34 of this title, plus the number of eligible persons enrolled under chapter 35 of this title" and inserting in lieu thereof "or eligible persons enrolled under chapters 34, 35, and 36 of this title, or $4 in the case of those eligible veterans and eligible persons whose educational assistance checks are directed in care of each institution for temporary custody and delivery and are delivered at the time of registration as provided under section 1780 (d)(5) of this title" in subsection (b).

SEC. 317. Subchapter II of chapter 36 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by—

(1) striking out sections 1786 and 1787 and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

"§ 1786. Correspondence courses

"(a)(1) Each eligible veteran (as defined in section 1652(a) (1) and (2) of this title) and each eligible wife or widow (as defined in section 1701(a)(1) (B), (C), or (D) of this title, who enters into an enrollment agreement to pursue a program of education exclusively by correspondence shall be paid an educational assistance allowance computed at the established charge which the institution requires nonveterans to pay for the course or courses pursued by the eligible veteran or person. The term 'established charge' as used herein means the charge for the course or courses determined on the basis of the lowest extended time payment plan offered by the institution and approved by the appropriate State approving agency or the actual cost to the veteran or person, whichever is the lesser. Such allowance shall be paid quarterly on a pro rata basis for the lessons completed by the veteran or wife or widow and serviced by the institution.

"(2) The period of entitlement of any veteran or wife or widow who is pursuing any program of education exclusively by correspondence shall be charged with one month for each $250 which is paid to the veteran or wife or widow as an educational assistance allowance for such course.

"(b) The enrollment agreement shall fully disclose the obligation of both the institution and the veteran or wife or widow and shall prominently display the provisions for affirmance, termination, refund, and the conditions under which payment of the allowance is made by the Administrator to the veteran or wife or widow. A copy of the enrollment agreement shall be furnished to each such veteran or wife or widow at the time such veteran or wife or widow signs such agreement. No such agreement shall be effective unless such veteran or wife or widow shall, after the expiration of ten days after the enrollment agreement is signed, have signed and submitted to the Administrator a written statement, with a signed copy to the institution, specifically affirming the enrollment agreement. In the event the veteran or wife or widow at any time notifies the institution of his intention not to affirm the agreement in accordance with the preceding sentence, the institution, without imposing any penalty or charging any fee shall promptly make a full refund of all amounts paid.

"(c) In the event a veteran or wife or widow elects to terminate his enrollment under an affirmed enrollment agreement, the institution (other than one subject to the provisions of section 1776 of this title) may charge the veteran or person a registration or similar fee not in excess of $75. Where the veteran or wife or widow elects to terminate the agreement after completion of one of or more but less than 10 per centum of the total number of lessons comprising the course, the institution may retain either such registration or similar fee, or 10 per centum of the tuition for the course. Where the veteran or wife or widow elects to terminate the agreement after completion of 10 per centum but less than 65 per centum of the lessons comprising the course, the institution may retain an additional 10 per centum of the course tuition for each additional one-tenth of the lessons completed, or such registration or similar fee. If 65 per centum or more of the lessons are completed, no refund of tuition is required.

"§ 1787. Apprenticeship or other on-job training

"(a) An eligible veteran (as defined in section 1651(a)(1) of this title) or an eligible person (as defined in section 1701(a) of this title) shall be paid a training assistance allowance as prescribed by subsection (b) of this section while pursuing a full-time—

"(1) program of apprenticeship approved by a State approving agency as meeting the standards of apprenticeship published by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to section 50a of title 29, or

"(2) program of other on-job training approved under provisions of section 1777 of this title, subject to the conditions and limitations of chapters 34 and 35 with respect to educational assistance.

"(b)(1) The monthly training assistance allowance of an eligible veteran pursuing a program described under subsection (a) shall be as follows:

"Column I	Column II	Column III	Column IV	Column V
Periods of training	No dependents	One dependent	Two dependents	More than two dependents
				The amount in column IV, plus the following for each dependent in excess of two:
First 6 months	$160	$179	$196	$8.
Second 6 months	120	139	156	8.
Third 6 months	80	99	116	8.
Fourth and any succeeding 6-month periods	40	61	78	8.

"(2) The monthly training assistance allowance of an eligible person pursuing a program described under subsection (a) shall be (A) $160 during the first six-month period, (B) $120 during the second six-month period, (C) $80 during the third six-month period, and (D) $40 during the fourth and any succeeding six-month period.

"(3) In any month in which an eligible veteran or person pursuing a program of apprenticeship or a program of other on-job training fails to complete one hundred and twenty hours of training in such month, the monthly training assistance allowance set forth in subsection (b) (1) or (2) of this section, as applicable, shall be reduced proportionately in the proportion that the number of hours worked bears to one hundred and twenty hours rounded off to the nearest eight hours.

"(c) For the purpose of this chapter, the terms 'program of apprenticeship' and 'program of other on-job training' shall have the same meaning as 'program of education'; and the term 'training assistance allowance' shall have the same meaning as 'educational assistance allowance' as set forth in chapters 34 and 35 of this title."; and

(2) redesignating sections 1788, 1789, 1790, and 1791 as sections 1792, 1793, 1794, and 1795, respectively, and inserting after section 1787 the following new sections:

"§ 1788. Measurement of courses

"(a) For the purposes of this chapter and chapters 34 and 35 of this title—

"(1) an institutional trade or technical course offered on a clock-hour basis below the college level involving shop practice as an integral part thereof, shall be considered a full-time course when a minimum of thirty hours per week of attendance is required with no more than two and one-half hours of rest periods per week allowed;

"(2) an institutional course offered on a clock-hour basis below the college level in which theoretical or classroom instruction predominates shall be considered a full-time course when a minimum of twenty-five hours per week net of instruction (which may include customary intervals not to exceed ten minutes between hours of instruction) is required. Notwithstanding the provisions of this clause, in the case of an institution offering undergraduate courses leading to a standard college degree which are measured on a quarter- or semester-hour basis and technical courses which are measured on a clock-hour basis, any of such technical courses as determined by the educational institution shall be measured on a quarter- or semester-hour basis, as appropriate, for the purpose of computing the educational assistance allowance payable under chapter 34, 35, or 36 of this title if the Administrator determines that the basic characteristics of such technical courses, including the extent to which out-of-class preparation is required, are substantially similar to the characteristics of quarter- or semester-hour courses offered by such institution;

"(3) an academic high school course requiring sixteen units for a full course shall be considered a full-time course when (A) a minimum of four units per year is required or (B) an individual is pursuing a program of education leading to an accredited high school diploma at a rate which, if continued, would result in receipt of such a diploma in four ordinary school years. For the purpose of subclause (A) of this clause, a unit is defined to be not less than one hundred and twenty sixty-minute hours or their equivalent of study in any subject in one academic year;

"(4) an institutional undergraduate course offered by a college or university on a quarter- or semester-hour basis shall be considered a full-time course when a minimum of fourteen semester hours or the equivalent thereof (including such hours for which no credit is granted but which are required to be taken to correct an educational deficiency and which the educational institution con-

siders to be quarter or semester hours for other administrative purposes), for which credit is granted toward a standard college degree, is required, except that where such college or university certifies, upon the request of the Administrator, that (A) full-time tuition is charged to all undergraduate students carrying a minimum of less than fourteen such semester hours or the equivalent thereof, or (B) all undergraduate students carrying a minimum of less than fourteen such semester hours or the equivalent thereof, are considered to be pursuing a full-time course for other administrative purposes, then such an institutional undergraduate course offered by such college or university with such minimum number of such semester hours shall be considered a full-time course, but in the event such minimum number of semester hours is less than twelve semester hours or the equivalent thereof, then twelve semester hours or the equivalent thereof shall be considered a full-time course;

"(5) a program of apprenticeship or a program of other on-job training shall be considered a full-time program when the eligible veteran or person is required to work the number of hours constituting the standard workweek of the training establishment, but a workweek of less than thirty hours shall not be considered to constitute full-time training unless a lesser number of hours has been established as the standard workweek for the particular establishment through bona fide collective bargaining; and

"(6) an institutional course offered as part of a program of education below the college level under section 1691(a)(2) or 1696(a)(2) of this title shall be considered a full-time course on the basis of measurement criteria provided in clause (2), (3), or (4) as determined by the educational institution.

"(b) The Administrator shall define part-time training in the case of the types of courses referred to in subsection (a), and shall define full-time and part-time training in the case of all other types of courses pursued under this chapter or chapter 34 or 35 of this title.

"§ 1789. Period of operation for approval

"(a) The Administrator shall not approve the enrollment of an eligible veteran or eligible person in any course offered by an educational institution when such course has been in operation for less than two years.

"(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply to—

"(1) any course to be pursued in a public or other tax-supported educational institution;

"(2) any course which is offered by an educational institution which has been in operation for more than two years, if such course is similar in character to the instruction previously given by such institution;

"(3) any course which has been offered by an institution for a period of more than two years, notwithstanding the institution has moved to another location within the same general locality, or has made a complete move with substantially the same faculty, curricula, and students, without a change in ownership;

"(4) any course which is offered by a nonprofit educational institution of college level and which is recognized for credit toward a standard college degree; or

"(5) any course offered by a proprietary nonprofit educational institution which qualifies to carry out an approved program of education under the provisions of subchapter V or VI of chapter 34 of this title (including those courses offered at other than the institution's principal location) if the institution offering such course has been in operation for more than two years.

"§ 1790. Overcharges by educational institutions; discontinuance of allowances; examination of records; false or misleading statements

"Overcharges by Educational Institutions

"(a) If the Administrator finds that an educational institution has—

"(1) charged or received from any eligible veteran or eligible person pursuing a program of education under this chapter or chapter 34 or 35 of this title any amount for any course in excess of the charges for tuition and fees which such institution requires similarly circumstanced nonveterans not receiving assistance under such chapters who are enrolled in the same course to pay, or

"(2) instituted, after the effective date of section 1780 of this title, a policy or practice with respect to the payment of tuition, fees, or other charges in the case of eligible veterans and the Administrator finds that the effect of such policy or practice substantially denies to veterans the benefits of the advance and prepayment allowances under such section,

he may disapprove such educational institution for the enrollment of any eligible veteran or eligible person not already enrolled therein under this chapter or chapter 31, 34, or 35, of this title.

"Discontinuance of Allowances

"(b) The Administrator may discontinue the educational assistance allowance of any eligible veteran or eligible person if he finds that the program of education or any course in which the veteran or person is enrolled fails to meet any of the requirements of this chapter or chapter 34 or 35 of this title, or if he finds that the educational institution offering such program or course has violated any provision of this chapter or chapter 34 or 35, or fails to meet any of the requirements of such chapters.

"Examination of Records

"(c) The records and accounts of educational institutions pertaining to eligible veterans or eligible persons who received educational assistance under this chapter or chapter 31, 34, or 35 of this title shall be available for examination by duly authorized representatives of the Government.

"False or Misleading Statements

"(d) Whenever the Administrator finds that an educational institution has willfully submitted a false or misleading claim, or that a veteran or person, with the complicity of an educational institution, has submitted such a claim, he shall make a complete report of the facts of the case to the appropriate State approving agency and, where deemed advisable, to the Attorney General of the United States for appropriate action.

"§ 1791. Change of program

"(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, each eligible veteran and child eligible person (with the concurrence of such eligible person's parents or guardian) may make not more than one change of program of education, but an eligible veteran or eligible person whose program has been interrupted or discontinued due to his own misconduct, his own neglect, or his own lack of application shall not be entitled to any such change.

"(b) The Administrator may approve one additional change (or an initial change in the case of a veteran or person not eligible to make a change under subsection (a)) in program if he finds that—

"(1) the program of education which the eligible veteran or eligible person proposes to pursue is suitable to his aptitudes, interests, and abilities; and

"(2) in any instance where the eligible veteran or eligible person has interrupted, or failed to progress in, his program due to his own misconduct, his own neglect, or his own lack of application, there exists a reasonable likelihood with respect to the program which the eligible veteran or eligible person proposes to pursue that there will not be a recurrence of such an interruption or failure to progress.

"(c) The Administrator may also approve additional changes in program if he finds such changes are necessitated by circumstances beyond the control of the eligible veteran or eligible person.

"(d) As used in this section the term 'change of program of education' shall not be deemed to include a change from the pursuit of one program to pursuit of another where the first program is prerequisite to, or generally required for, entrance into pursuit of the second."

TITLE IV—MISCELLANEOUS AND TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE VETERANS' AND WAR ORPHANS' AND WIDOWS' EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

SEC. 401. Chapter 34 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by—

(1) inserting after "this chapter" in subsection (a) of section 1661; "or chapter 36";

(2) deleting "31 or 35" and inserting "31, 34, or 36" in subsection (d) of section 1673;

(3) striking out all after "certification" down to the period and inserting in lieu thereof "as required by section 1681(c) of this title" in the second sentence of section 1677(b);

(4) striking out "1683" and inserting in lieu thereof "1787" in subsection 1682(a)(1);

(5) striking out the last sentence of section 1682(b);

(6) striking out sections 1672, 1675, 1683, and 1685 in their entirety; and

(7) redesignating section 1686 as section 1683.

SEC. 402. Chapter 35 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by—

(1) deleting "1737" and inserting "1736" in section 1712(a)(2);

(2) striking out sections 1722, 1725, and 1736 in their entirety;

(3) redesignating section 1737 as section 1736; and

(4) striking out "1737" and inserting "1736" in section 1735.

SEC. 403. Chapter 36 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by—

(1) striking out "1686" and inserting "1683" in section 1770(b);

(2) inserting "this chapter and" after "purposes of" in section 1771(a);

(3) inserting "this chapter and" before "chapters 34 and 35" each place it appears in section 1772;

(4) striking out "1737" and inserting in lieu thereof "1736" in section 1772(a);

(5) striking out "1683(a)(1)" and inserting in lieu thereof "1787(a)(1)" in section 1772(c);

(6) inserting "this chapter and" before "chapters 34 and 35" in subsection (a) of section 1773;

(7) inserting "this chapter and" before "chapters 34 and 35" the first time it appears in section 1774(a);

(8) striking out "or special training allowance granted under chapter 34 or 35" and inserting in lieu thereof "granted under chapter 34, 35, or 36" in section 1781;

"chapter 34 or 35" in section 1782;

(9) inserting "this chapter or" before "chapter 34 or 35" in section 1872;

(10) inserting "this chapter or" before "chapter 34 or 35" in section 1785;

(11) inserting "this chapter or" before "chapter 34 or 35" in section 1793 (as redesignated by section 317(2) of this Act); and

(12) striking out "Chapters 31, 34, and 35" and inserting in lieu thereof "chapters 31, 34, 35, and 36" in section 1795 (as redesignated by section 317(2) of this Act).

SEC. 404. (a) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 34 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by—

(1) striking out:

"1672. Change of program."

and

"1675. Period of operation for approval.";

(2) striking out:

"SUBCHAPTER IV—PAYMENTS TO ELIGIBLE VETERANS

"1681. Educational assistance allowance.
"1682. Computation of educational assistance allowances.
"1683. Apprenticeship or other on-job training.
"1684. Measurement of courses.
"1685. Overcharges by educational institutions.
"1686. Approval of courses.
"1687. Discontinuance of allowances."

and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

"SUBCHAPTER IV—PAYMENTS TO ELIGIBLE VETERANS: WORK-STUDY/OUTREACH PROGRAM

"1681. Educational assistance allowance.
"1682. Computation of educational assistance allowances.
"1683. Approval of courses.
"1684. Apprenticeship or other on-job training; correspondence courses.

"WORK-STUDY/OUTREACH PROGRAM

"1687. Work-study/outreach additional educational assistance allowance; advances to eligible veterans.
"1688. Veteran-student employment.";

and

(3) adding at the end thereof the following:

"1697A. Coordination with and participation of Department of Defense.".

(b) The subchapter heading above section 1681 of such title is amended to read as follows:

"Subchapter IV—Payments to Eligible Veterans; Work-study/Outreach Program"

SEC. 405. The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 35 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by—

(1) striking out:

"1722. Change of program."

and

"1725. Period of operation for approval.";

(2) striking out:

"1733. Measurement of courses.
"1734. Overcharges by educational institutions.
"1735. Approval of courses.
"1736. Discontinuance of allowances.
"1737. Specialized vocational training courses."

and inserting in lieu thereof:

"1733. Special assistance for the educationally disadvantaged.
"1734. Apprenticeship or other on-job training, correspondence courses.
"1735. Approval of courses.
"1736. Specialized vocational training courses."

SEC. 406. The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 36 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by—

(1) inserting:

"1780. Payment of educational and subsistence allowances."

immediately above

"1781. Limitations on educational assistance.";

and

(2) striking out:

"1786. Examination of records.
"1787. False or misleading statements.
"1788. Advisory committee.
"1789. Institutions listed by Attorney General.
"1790. Use of other Federal agencies.
"1791. Limitation on period of assistance under two or more programs."

and inserting in lieu thereof:

"1786. Correspondence courses.
"1787. Apprenticeship or other on-job training.
"1788. Measurement of courses.
"1789. Period of operation for approval.
"1790. Overcharges by educational institutions; discontinuance of allowances; examination of records; false or misleading statements.
"1791. Change of program.
"1792. Advisory committee.
"1793. Institutions listed by Attorney General.
"1794. Use of other Federal agencies.
"1795. Limitation on period of assistance under two or more programs.".

SEC. 407. Section 101 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by striking out the last sentence of paragraph (4) and inserting in lieu thereof the following sentences: "A person with respect to whom an interlocutory decree of adoption has been issued by an appropriate adoption authority shall be recognized thereafter as a legally adopted child, unless and until that decree is rescinded, if the child remains in the custody of the adopting parent or parents during the interlocutory period. A person who has been placed for adoption under an agreement entered into by the adopting parent or parents with any agency authorized under law to so act shall be recognized thereafter as a legally adopted child, unless and until such agreement is terminated, if the child remains in the custody of the adopting parent or parents during the period of placement for adoption under such agreement."

SEC. 408. Section 102 of title 38, United States Code, is amended as follows:

(1) Subsection (b) thereof is amended to read as follows:

"(b) For the purposes of this title, (1) the term 'wife' includes the husband of any female veteran; and (2) the term 'widow' includes the widower of any female veteran."; and

(2) The heading of such section is amended to read as follows:

"§ 102. Dependent parents; husbands".

SEC. 409. The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 1 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by striking out:

"102. Dependent parents and dependent husbands."

and inserting in lieu thereof:

"102. Dependent parents; husbands.".

SEC. 410. (a) The first sentence of section 240 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by inserting "and encourage" after "aid".

(b) Section 241 of such title is amended by striking out "give priority to so advising" and inserting in lieu thereof "insure that contact, in person or by telephone, is made with" in clause (1).

SEC. 411. Subsection (b) of section 1774 of title 38, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

"(b) The allowance for administrative expenses incurred pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be paid in accordance with the following formula:

Total salary cost reimbursable under this section	Allowable for administrative expense
$5,000 or less	$500.
Over $5,000 but not exceeding $10,000	$900.
Over $10,000 but not exceeding $35,000	$900 for the first $10,000 plus $800 for each additional $5,000 or fraction thereof.
Over $35,000 but not exceeding $40,000	$5,250.
Over $40,000 but not exceeding $75,000	$5,250 for the first $40,000 plus $700 for each additional $5,000 or fraction thereof.
Over $75,000 but not exceeding $80,000	$10,450.
Over $80,000	$10,450 for the first $80,000 plus $600 for each additional $5,000 or fraction thereof."

SEC. 412. The Administrator, in consultation with the advisory committee formed pursuant to section 1792 of this title (as redesignated by section 317(2) of this Act), shall provide for the conduct of an independent study of the operation of the post-Korean conflict program of educational assistance currently carried out under chapters 31, 34, 35, and 36 of this title in comparison with similar programs of educational assistance that were available to veterans of World War II and of the Korean conflict from the point of view of administration; veteran participation; safeguards against abuse; and adequacy of benefit level, scope of programs, and information and outreach efforts to meet the various education and training needs of eligible veterans. The results of such study, together with such recommendations as are warranted to improve the present program, shall be transmitted to the President and the Congress within nine months after the date of enactment of this Act.

TITLE V—VETERANS' EDUCATION LOAN PROGRAM

SEC. 501. Chapter 34 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subchapter:

"SUBCHAPTER VII—LOANS TO ELIGIBLE VETERANS

"§ 1698. Eligibility for loans; amount and conditions of loans; interest rate on loans

"(a) Each eligible veteran shall be entitled to a loan under this subchapter in an amount determined under, and subject to the conditions specified in, subsection (b)(1) of this section if the veteran satisfies the requirements set forth in subsection (c) of this section.

"(b)(1) Subject to paragraph (3) of this subsection, the amount of the loan to which an eligible veteran shall be entitled under this subchapter for any academic year shall be equal to the amount needed by such veteran to pursue a course of study at the institution at which he is enrolled, as determined under paragraph (2) of this subsection.

"(2)(A) The amount needed by a veteran to pursue a course of study at an institution for any academic year shall be determined by subtracting (i) the total amount of financial resources (as defined in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph) available to the veteran which may be reasonably expected to be expended by him for educational purposes in any year from (ii) the actual cost of attendance (as defined in subparagraph (C) of this paragraph) at the institution in which he is enrolled.

"(B) The term 'total amount of financial resources' with respect to any veteran for any year means the total of the following:

"(i) The annual adjusted effective income of the veteran less Federal income tax paid or payable by such veteran with respect to such income.

"(ii) The amount of cash assets of the veteran.

"(iii) The amount of financial assistance received by the veteran under the provisions of title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965.

"(iv) Educational assistance received by the veteran under this chapter other than under this subchapter.

"(v) Financial assistance received by the veteran under any scholarship or grant program other than those specified in clauses (iii) and (iv).

"(C) The term 'actual cost of attendance' means, subject to regulations prescribed by the Administrator, the actual per-student charges for tuition, fees, room and board (or expenses related to reasonable commuting), books, and an allowance for such other ex-

penses as the Administrator determines by regulation to be reasonably related to attendance at the institution at which the student is enrolled.

"(3) The aggregate of the amounts any veteran may borrow under this subchapter may not exceed $175 multiplied by the number of months such veteran is entitled to receive educational assistance under section 1661 of this title, but not in excess of $1,575 in any one regular academic year.

"(c) An eligible veteran shall be entitled to a loan under this subchapter if he—

"(1) is in attendance at an approved institution on at least a half-time basis;

"(2) has sought and is unable to obtain a loan, in the full amount needed by such veteran, as determined under subsection (b) of this section, under a student loan program insured pursuant to the provisions of part B of title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965; and

"(3) enters into an agreement with the Administrator meeting the requirements of subsection (d) of this section.

"(d) Any agreement between the Administrator and a veteran under this subchapter—

"(1) shall include a note or other written obligation which provides for repayment to the Administrator of the principal amount of, and payment of interest on, the loan in installments over a period beginning nine months after the date on which the borrower ceases to be at least a half-time student and ending ten years and nine months after such date;

"(2) shall include provision for acceleration of repayment of all or any part of the loan, without penalty, at the option of the borrower;

"(3) shall provide that the loan shall bear interest, on the unpaid balance of the loan, at a rate prescribed by the Administrator, with the concurrence of the Secretary of the Treasury, but at a rate not less than the rate paid by the Secretary on Treasury notes and obligations held by the Fund at the time the loan agreement is made, except that no interest shall accrue prior to the beginning date of repayment; and

"(4) shall provide that the loan shall be made without security and without endorsement.

"(e) If a veteran who has received a loan under this section dies or becomes permanently and totally disabled, then the Administrator shall discharge the veteran's liability on such loan by repaying the amount owed on such loan.

"§ 1699. Sources of funds; insurance

"(a) Loans made by the Administrator under this subchapter shall be made from funds available under subsection (b) of this section for such purpose, and repayment shall be guaranteed as provided in subsection (c) of this section.

"(b)(1) Any funds in the national service life insurance fund continued under section 720 (in this subchapter referred to as the 'Fund') shall be available to the Administrator for making loans under section 1698 of this title. The Administrator shall set aside out of such fund such amounts, not in excess of limitations in appropriations Acts, as may be necessary to enable him to make all the loans to which veterans are entitled under section 1698 of this title.

"(2) Any funds set aside under parargaph (1) of this subsection shall be considered as investments of the Fund and while so set aside shall bear interest at a rate determined by the Secretary of the Treasury but at a rate not less than the rate paid by the Secretary on other Treasury notes and obligations held by the Fund at the time such funds are set aside.

"(c) The Administrator shall guarantee repayment to the national service life insurance fund of any amounts set aside under subsection (b) of this section for loans under section 1698 of this title and of any interest accrued thereon. In order to discharge his responsibility under any such guarantee, he is authorized to issue to the Secretary of the Treasury notes or other obligations in such forms and denominations, bearing such maturities, and subject to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. Such notes or other obligations shall bear interest at a rate determined by the Secretary of the Treasury but at a rate not less than the rate paid by the Secretary of the Treasury on other Treasury notes and obligations held by the Fund at the time the loan agreement is made. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to purchase such notes and other obligations.

"(d) There are authorized to be appropriated to the Administrator such sums as may be necessary to enable him to repay to the Fund any amounts set aside under subsection (b) of this section together with any interest accrued thereon. Any funds paid to the Administrator pursuant to an agreement made under section 1698(d) of this title shall be deemed to have been appropriated pursuant to this subsection.

"(e) A fee shall be collected from each veteran obtaining a loan made under this section for the purpose of insuring against defaults on loans made under this subchapter, and no loan shall be made under this section until the fee payable with respect to such loan has been collected and remitted to the Administrator. The amount of the fee shall be established from time to time by the Administrator, but shall in no event exceed one-half of 1 per centum of the total loan amount. The amount of the fee may be included in the loan to the veteran and paid from the proceeds thereof. The Administrator shall deposit all fees collected hereunder in the Fund, and amounts so deposited shall be available to the Administrator to discharge his obligations under subsection (c) of this section."

SEC. 502. The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 34 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof:

"SUBCHAPTER VII—LOANS TO ELIGIBLE VETERANS

"Sec.
"1698. Eligibility for loans; amount and conditions; interest rate on loans.
"1699. Source of funds; insurance."

TITLE VI—VETERANS' EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE AND PREFERENCE

SEC. 601. This title may be cited as the "Veterans' Employment and Readjustment Act of 1972".

SEC. 602. (a) Chapter 41 of title 38, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

"Chapter 41.—JOB COUNSELING, TRAINING, AND PLACEMENT SERVICE FOR VETERANS

"Sec.
"2001. Definitions.
"2002. Purpose.
"2003. Assignment of veterans' employment representative.
"2004. Employees of local offices.
"2005. Cooperation of Federal agencies.
"2006. Estimate of funds for administration; authorization of appropriations.
"2007. Administrative controls; annual report.
"2008. Cooperation and coordination with the Veterans' Administration.

"§ 2001. Definitions

"For the purposes of this chapter—

"(1) The term 'eligible veteran' means a person who served in the active military, naval or air service and who was discharged or released therefrom with other than a dishonorable discharge.

"(2) The term 'State' means each of the several States of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and may include, to the extent determined necessary and feasible, Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

"§ 2002. Purpose.

"The Congress declares as its intent and purpose that there shall be an effective (1) job and job training counseling service program, (2) employment placement service program, and (3) job training placement service program for eligible veterans. To carry out effectively such intent and purpose, policies shall be promulgated and administered so as to provide such veterans the maximum of employment and training opportunities.

"§ 2003. Assignment of veterans' employment representative

"The Secretary of Labor shall assign to each State a veterans' employment representative, and such assistant veterans' employment representatives as he shall determine, based on the data collected pursuant to section 2007 of this title, to be necessary to assist the veterans' employment representative to carrry out effectively in that State the purposes of this chapter. Each veterans' employment representative and assistant veterans' employment representative shall be an eligible veteran who at the time of appointment shall have been a bona fide resident of the State for at least two years and who shall be appointed in accordance with the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title, relating to classification and general schedule pay rates. Each such veterans' employment representative and assistant veterans' employment representative shall be attached to the staff of the public employment service in the State to which they have been assigned. They shall be administratively responsible to the Secretary of Labor for the execution of the Secretary's veterans' counseling and placement policies through the public employment service and in cooperation with manpower and training programs administered by the Secretary in the State. In cooperation with the public employment service staff and the staffs of each such other program in the State, the veterans' employment representative and his assistants shall—

"(1) be functionally responsible for the supervision of the registration of eligible veterans in local employment offices for suitable types of employment and training and for counseling and placement of eligible veterans in employment and job training programs;

"(2) engage in job development and job advancement activities for eligible veterans, including maximum coordination with appropriate officials of the Veterans' Administration in that agency's carrying out of its responsibilities under subchapter IV of chapter 3 of this title and in the conduct of job fairs, job marts, and other special programs to match eligible veterans with appropriate job and job training opportunities;

"(3) assist in securing and maintaining current information as to the various types of available employment and training opportunities, including maximum use of electronic data processing and telecommunications systems and the matching of an eligible veteran's particular qualifications with an available job or on-job training or apprenticeship opportunity which is commensurate with those qualifications;

"(4) promote the interest of employers and labor unions in employing eligible veterans and in conducting on-job training and apprenticeship programs for such veterans;

"(5) maintain regular contact with employers, labor unions, training programs and veterans' organizations with a view to keep-

ing them advised of eligible veterans available for employment and training and to keeping eligible veterans advised of opportunities for employment and training; and

"(6) assist in every possible way in improving working conditions and the advancement of employment of eligible veterans.

"§ 2004. Employees of local offices

"Except as may be determined by the Secretary of Labor based on a demonstrated lack of need for such services, there shall be assigned by the administrative head of the employment service in each State one or more employees, preferably eligible veterans, on the staffs of local employment service offices, whose services shall be fully devoted to discharging the duties prescribed for the veterans' employment representative and his assistants.

"§ 2005. Cooperation of Federal agencies

"All Federal agencies shall furnish the Secretary of Labor such records, statistics, or information as he may deem necessary or appropriate in administering the provisions of this chapter, and shall otherwise cooperate with the Secretary in providing continuous employment and training opportunities for eligible veterans.

"§ 2006. Estimate of funds for administration; authorization of appropriations

"(a) The Secretary of Labor shall estimate the funds necessary for the proper and efficient administration of this chapter. Such estimated sums shall include the annual amounts necessary for salaries, rents, printing and binding, travel, and communications. Sums thus estimated shall be included as a special item in the annual budget for the Department of Labor.

"(b) There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for the proper and efficient administration of this chapter.

"(c) In the event that the regular appropriations Act making appropriations for administrative expenses for the Department of Labor with respect to any fiscal year does not specify an amount for the purposes specified in subsection (b) of this section for that fiscal year, then of the amounts appropriated in such Act there shall be available only for the purposes specified in subsection (b) of this section such amount as was set forth in the budget estimate submitted pursuant to subsection (a) of this section.

"(d) Any funds made available pursuant to subsections (b) and (c) of this section shall not be available for any purpose other than those specified in such subsections, except with the approval of the Secretary of Labor based on a demonstrated lack of need for such funds for such purposes.

"§ 2007. Administrative controls; annual report

"(a) The Secretary of Labor shall establish administrative controls for the following purposes:

"(1) To insure that each eligible veteran, especially those veterans who have been recently discharged or released from active duty, who requests assistance under this chapter shall promptly be placed in a satisfactory job or job training opportunity or receive some other specific form of assistance designed to enhance his employment prospects substantially, such as individual job development or employment counseling services.

"(2) To determine whether or not the employment service agencies in each State have committed the necessary staff to insure that the provisions of this chapter are carried out; and to arrange for necessary corrective action where staff resources have been determined by the Secretary of Labor to be inadequate.

"(b) The Secretary of Labor shall report annually to the Congress on the success of the Department of Labor and its affiliated State employment service agencies in carrying out the provisions of this chapter. The report shall include, by State, the number of recently discharged or released eligible veterans, veterans with service-connected disabilities, and other eligible veterans who requested assistance through the public employment service and, of these, the number placed in suitable employment or job training opportunities or who were otherwise assisted, with separate reference to occupational training under appropriate Federal law. The report shall also include any determination by the Secretary under section 2004 or 2006 of this title and a statement of the reasons for such determination.

"§ 2008. Cooperation and coordination with the Veterans' Administration

"In carrying out his responsibilities under this chapter, the Secretary of Labor shall from time to time consult with the Administrator and keep him fully advised of activities carried out and all data gathered pursuant to this chapter to insure maximum cooperation and coordination between the Department of Labor and the Veterans' Administration."

(b) The table of chapters at the beginning of title 38, United States Code, and the table of chapters at the beginning of part III of such title are each amended by striking out

"41. Job Counseling and Employment Placement Service for Veterans.. 2001"

and inserting

"41. Job Counseling, Training, and Placement Services for Veterans ..... 2001"

SEC. 603. (a) Part III of title 38, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof a new chapter as follows:

"Chapter 42.—EMPLOYMENT OF DISABLED AND VIETNAM ERA VETERANS

"Sec.
"2011. Definitions.
"2012. Action plan for employment of disabled and Vietnam era veterans.
"2013. Veterans' employment preference under Federal contracts.
"2014. Eligibility requirements for veterans under certain Federal manpower training programs.

"§ 2011. Definitions

"As used in this chapter—

"(1) The term 'disabled veterans' means a person entitled to disability compensation under laws administered by the Veterans' Administration for a disability rated at 30 per centum or more, or a person whose discharge or release from active duty was for a disability incurred or aggravated in line of duty.

"(2) The term 'veteran of the Vietnam era' means a person (A) who (i) served on active duty for a period of more than 180 days, any part of which occurred during the Vietnam era, and was discharged or released therefrom with other than a dishonorable discharge, or (ii) was discharged or released from active duty for a service-connected disability if any part of such active duty was performed during the Vietnam era, and (B) who was so discharged or released within the 48 months preceding his application for employment covered under this chapter.

"(3) The term 'department and agency' means any department or agency of the Federal Government or any federally owned corporation.

"§ 2012. Action plan for employment of disabled and Vietnam era veterans

"(a) The Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of Labor and the Civil Service Commission, shall establish an affirmative action plan providing for the preferential employment of disabled veterans and veterans of the Vietnam era by every department and agency. Such action plan shall be promulgated within 90 days after the date of enactment of this section and shall be published in the Federal Register.

"(b) Each department and agency shall be responsible for implementing the action plan promulgated under subsection (a) of this section and shall, within 60 days after the promulgation of such plan, issue such rules and regulations, adopt such procedures and policies, and make such exemptions and exceptions as may be consistent with law and necessary or appropriate to effectuate such action plan. Each department and agency shall consult with the Administrator in order to achieve such consistency and uniformity as may be feasible.

"(c) Each department and agency shall submit a report to the President each year on or before March 31 indicating the extent to which the action plan referred to in subsection (a) of this section has been implemented by such department or agency during the immediately preceding calendar year. The President shall submit a report to the Congress each year on or before May 1 indicating the extent to which such action plan has been successful during such calendar year and including statistics showing the extent to which each department and agency has complied with such action plan during the preceding calendar year.

"§ 2013. Veterans' employment preference under Federal contracts

"(a) Any contract entered into by any department or agency for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services (including construction) for the United States, shall contain a provision requiring that, in employing persons to carry out such contract, the party contracting with the United States shall give a preference to disabled veterans and to veterans of the Vietnam era. The provisions of this section shall apply to any subcontract entered into by a prime contractor in carrying out any contract for the procurement of personal property and non-personal services (including construction) for the United States. A contractor or subcontractor shall be required to give an employment preference to a veteran under this section for any job only if the veteran otherwise meets the qualifications for such job. The President shall implement the provisions of this section by promulgating regulations within 60 days after the date of enactment of this section.

"(b) If any disabled veteran or veteran of the Vietnam era believes any contractor has failed or refuses to comply with the provisions of his contract with the United States, relating to granting employment preferences to veterans, such veteran may file a complaint with the Veterans' Employment Service of the Department of Labor. Such complaint shall be promptly referred by such service to the Office of Federal Contract Compliance of that Department. That office shall promptly investigate such complaint and shall take such action thereon as the facts and circumstances warrant consistent with the terms of such contract and the laws and regulations applicable thereto.

"§ 2014. Eligibility requirements for veterans under certain Federal manpower training programs

"Any (1) amounts received as pay or allowances by any person while serving on active duty, (2) period of time during which such person served on such active duty, and (3) amounts received under chapters 11, 13, 31, 34, 35, and 36 of this title by a veteran (as defined in section 101(2) of this title) who served on active duty for a period of more than 180 days or was discharged or released from active duty for a service-connected disability, and any amounts received by an eligible person under chapters 13 and 35 of such title, shall be disregarded in determining the need or qualifications of participants in any public service employment

program, any emergency employment program, any job training program assisted under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, any manpower training program assisted under the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, or any other manpower training (or related) program financed in whole or in part with Federal funds."

(b) The table of chapters at the beginning of title 38, United States Code, and the table of chapters at the beginning of part III of such title are each amended by adding at the end thereof a new item as follows:

"42. Employment of Disabled and Vietnam Era Veterans ..... 2011".

TITLE VII—EFFECTIVE DATES

SEC. 701. (a) Titles II and V of this Act shall become effective on the first day of the second calendar month following the month in which enacted.

(b) The provisions of section 602 shall become effective 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act.

SEC. 702. The provisions of section 1786 of title 38, United States Code (as added by section 317 of this Act) which apply to correspondence course training shall, in the case of any eligible wife or widow, become effective upon the first enrollment of veteran or person which occurs on or after the first day of the second calendar month following the month in which this Act is enacted.

SEC. 703. The provisions of the second sentence of clause (2) of subsection (a) of section 1788 of title 38, United States Code (as added by section 317 of this Act) shall, in the case of any eligible veteran or eligible person, become effective upon the first enrollment or such re-enrollment of veteran or person which occurs after the date of the enactment of this Act.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair would inform the Senate there is a 10-minute limitation on this bill.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I rise to speak in support of the provisions of my bill, S. 2161, the proposed Vietnam-Era Readjustment Assistance Act of 1972, as I reported it from the Committee on Veterans' Affairs on Wednesday, July 26. I have asked the leadership that rather than take up S. 2161 we take up instead the House-passed companion measure—H.R. 12828—and that the provisions of S. 2161 as reported be inserted in lieu of the text of the House bill. I thank the leadership for their cooperation in clearing this bill for action so swiftly.

I am grateful that S. 2161 is cosponsored by the ranking minority member of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. THURMOND) together with the entire membership of the committee, including the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON), the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH), the Senator from Georgia (Mr. TALMADGE), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. HANSEN), the Senator from Vermont (Mr. STAFFORD), and the Senator from Ohio (Mr. SAXBE).

This unanimous cosponsorship together with the strong bipartisan action of the members of the committee in approving this bill indicates, I believe, the degree of conviction held by each of us as to what must be provided for our returning veterans. It is a conviction which I believe is shared by every Member of Congress with the country as a whole. Members of our committee often have diverse viewpoints concerning what our military or foreign policies should be, but there has been little disagreement concerning the necessity of our Nation discharging its obligations toward those who were called upon to serve their country.

The challenge to our Government was well stated by President Roosevelt in the midst of World War II when in a message to Congress he said:

Vocational and educational opportunities for veterans should be at the widest range . . . lack of money should not prevent any veteran of this war from equipping himself for useful employment for which his aptitudes and willingness qualify him. The money invested in this training and schooling program will reap rich dividends in the higher productivity, more intelligent leadership and greater productivity, more intelligent leadership and greater happiness. . . . We have taught our youth how to wage war; we must also teach them how to have useful and happy lives in freedom and justice and decency.

Those words were spoken almost 30 years ago, but they are just as true today as they were then. If there has been a difference it is in the response of our Government to the challenge posed by those words then and now. Following World War II, we embarked upon what is perhaps the most important social experiment in the American history of education with the GI bill of rights. Under this bill, 7,800,000 veterans received training which included college level schools, below college level on-the-job training and institutional on-the-farm training. Over 1,400,000 were given on-the-job training. Seventy thousand participated in on-farm training and over 2.2 million went to college. By the time the World War II GI bill ended, America had been given over 450,000 engineers, 180,000 doctors, dentists, and nurses, 360,000 teachers, 150,000 scientists, 107,000 lawyers, 243,000 accountants, 36,000 ministers, 280,000 metalworkers, 138,000 electricians, 83,000 policemen and firemen, 700,000 businessmen, and over 17,000 writers and journalists. Finally it should be mentioned that I received training under the GI bill as did 20 of my colleagues in the Senate and 65 Members of the House of Representatives.

The total cost of this program was expensive—over $14.5 billion. But it was a blue chip investment: Our Government has received back in additional tax dollars at least $3 and perhaps as many as $6 for each dollar spent on GI bill training.

But does today's program provide the same opportunity that was available to veterans following World War II? The committee is convinced that it does not. The present monthly allotment of $175 per month for a Vietnam-era veteran without dependents does not equal in inflation adjusted dollars the GI bill entitlement of his World War II counterpart. At that time the veterans were eligible for benefits of up to $1,175 an academic year. Adjusting for increases in the cost of living since 1948 this equals $2,250 in today's dollars. By contrast, the single veteran today receives only $1,575 a school year—$175 for 9 months.

Thus, to encourage greater participation in GI bill training; to provide a more adequate level of benefits to meet today's educational costs; and finally, to provide true parity of benefits with the World War II GI bill the basic rate for a single veteran in my bill S. 2161 has been increased almost 43 percent from $175 a month to $250. A married veteran's rate is increased from $205 to $297 a month. A married veteran with a child will now receive $339 up from the present $230, with an additional $21 authorized for each dependent in excess of two.

COST OF VA EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM

The cost of my bill, S. 2161, as with the cost of the World War II GI bill does not come cheap, but then the cost of the war which created these veterans is more expensive. We must also remember that the question that we face today is not: "Can we afford to do it," but rather "Can we afford not to do it."

The World War II and Korean conflict GI bills totaled $19 billion. The current VA educational program through April 1972 has already cost $5.3 billion. The first year additional direct benefits cost provided for in S. 2161 is $843.4 million; over the span of 5 years the total additional cost will be approximately $3.9 billion. When added to the sums presently authorized we can expect in the next 5 years to invest over $13 billion of VA educational payments in the future of our country. And it is a prudent investment for as Benjamin Franklin noted over 200 years ago:

Investment in knowledge always pays the best interest.

At this point in the RECORD, Mr. President, I would like to insert a table showing the direct benefit costs of the GI bill for each of the next 5 years.

There being no objection the table was printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DIRECT BENEFITS COST OF GI BILL[1]

[In millions]

	Without increase	S. 2161	With $250 base
Fiscal year—			
1973	$2,123.8	$843.4	$2,967.2
1974	2,097.1	847.4	2,944.5
1975	1,894.6	741.5	2,636.1
1976	1,668.0	724.3	2,392.3
1977	1,475.7	656.2	2,131.9
5-year total	9,259.2	3,812.8	13,072.0

[1] Includes chs. 31, 34, and 35.

GENERAL SUMMARY OF THE PROVISIONS OF S. 2161

Mr. President, there are seven titles to S. 2161, the product of intensive work and discussion by members of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. Briefly summarized they are as follows:

TITLE I

Title I of the committee substitute provides for major increases in the basic rates for educational assistance to achieve parity with the World War II GI Bill entitlement level. Adjusting for increases in cost-of-living since 1948—plus an allowance of 3.5 percent for anticipated continuing inflationary increases—the basic rate for a single veteran has been increased approximately 43 percent from $175 to $250 a month. The vocational rehabilitation subsistence allowance under chapter 31 and the educational assistance allowances under

chapters 34 and 35 have all been increased consistent with this approach. Additional allowances for dependents have also been increased.

TITLE II

Title II provides for an advance payment of the GI bill educational assistance allowance to eligible veterans and persons at the start of the school term and prepayment of the allowance on the first of each month thereafter. Under existing law there is an inevitable delay in the veteran's receipt of his allowance at the onset of the school year. This provision will give an initial advance payment for the first full or partial month plus the allowance for the next full month. The initial check payable to the veteran will be mailed directly to the school to be picked up by the veteran upon his registration.

This title also establishes a new student-veterans' workstudy/outreach program whereby participating needy GI bill trainees would receive a $300 advance workstudy allowance for performing various services in Veterans' Administration programs, particularly in outreach activities to encourage increased participation in the GI benefit programs. The program will enable a veteran to receive additional funds early in the semester when such funds are most urgently needed and at the same time contribute to the GI bill program through vital outreach efforts and increased efficiency and speed in certificate and claim processing.

TITLE III

Title III amends title 38 as follows:

First. Extend the option of different types of training programs available to veterans under chapter 34 to participants under chapter 35. The title would extend to wives and widows the right to pursue correspondence courses and to wives, widows, and children eligibility for apprenticeship and other on-job training programs, which are currently available to the veteran. In addition the title would also provide authority for eligible educationally disadvantaged wives and widows to pursue secondary level training and receive tutorial assistance without charge to their basic entitlement. This authority is presently available to educationally disadvantaged veterans and servicemen.

Second. Combines basic provisions relating to the payment of allowances and the general administration of the GI bill program now contained in chapter 34, "Veterans' Educational Assistance," and chapter 35, "War Orphans and Widows' Educational Assistance," and enacts them in chapter 36, "Administration of Educational Benefits," as applicable to both chapters 34 and 35. A section-by-section citation of changes made in title 38 by this bill is contained in the appendix to this report.

Third. Make several adjustments to the PREP—predischarge education program—for active duty servicemen in order to make the program more effective. Payment of educational allowances for courses needed to achieve a high school equivalency certificate—GED—as well as high school degrees would be authorized, and participation in PREP and college preparatory programs facilitated especially for private nonprofit schools. It also provides for coordination with and participation by the Department of Defense in PREP programs.

Fourth. Amends the farm cooperative training program to increase participation by increasing the rates payable, reducing the high number of classroom hours, and expanding on-farm instruction.

Fifth. Makes amendments in the program relating to veteran—persons also made eligible—participation in correspondence courses to provide for a mandatory 10-day "cooling-off" period with return of the veterans full payment if he does not affirm any contract. In addition, in order to qualify for VA payments, correspondence schools will now be required to maintain a refund policy, based upon the percentage of the course completed, for those veterans who terminate their courses. The benefits payable under the correspondence training program would be increased by providing that a veteran's or person's entitlement would be charged with 1 month for each $250 paid to him as an educational assistance allowance instead of the current $175 figure.

Sixth. The rates for on-job and apprenticeship trainees are also increased substantially by approximately 48 percent, as recommended by the VA, from $108 to $160.

Seventh. Provides for prior consultation with the appropriate service education officer by any active duty serviceman intending to pursue a program of education under title 38.

Eighth. Authorizes eligible persons training under chapter 35 to pursue programs of education at institutions of higher learning outside of the United States, as is presently authorized for veterans training under chapter 34.

Ninth. Makes certain clarifying and liberalizing amendments with respect to measurement of courses including high school, trade or technical, adult evening high school, noncredit deficiency, and prep and college preparatory courses.

Tenth. Increases the amount of reporting fee paid to educational institutions by the VA for each veteran whose initial advance payment allowance check is processed and delivered by that school.

Eleventh. Amends the so-called 2-year rule authorizing enrollment of veterans in courses where the school has made a complete move to a new location outside the general locality of its former site where it is determined the school has substantially retained the same faculty, curriculums, and students without a change in ownership.

Twelfth. Authorizes the Administrator to approve additional changes of program which he finds are necessitated by circumstances beyond the control of the veteran or eligible person.

TITLE IV

Title IV amends title 38 as follows:

First. Provides for equality of treatment for veterans and their spouses regardless of sex by deleting certain criteria which currently restrict the eligibility of a husband or widower of a female veteran for certain benefits under title 38.

Second. Expands the definition of the term "child" to permit the payment of dependency allowances in certain circumstances prior to the issuance of a final decree of adoption.

Third. Amends the Veterans' Administration outreach services program to provide for greater contact in person or by telephone with educationally disadvantaged veterans to encourage the use of GI educational benefits.

Fourth. Increases the allowance payable by the Administrator for administrative expenses incurred by State and local approving agencies in administering educational benefits under title 38.

Fifth. Provides for an independent study to be conducted of the educational assistance programs under title 38, comparing them with previous programs in effect following World War II and the Korean conflict. The report with findings and recommendations shall be made to the President and Congress within 9 months following enactment.

TITLE V

Title V provides for supplementary assistance to veterans in the form of entitlement to direct loan from the Veterans' Administration of up to $1,575 a year to cover educational costs not provided for in title 38 or other Federal loan or grant programs.

TITLE VI

Title VI amends title 38 as follows:

First. Adds a fully rewritten chapter 41 to title 38 which sets forth the basic veterans' employment and manpower responsibilities of the Department of Labor, as administered through the Veterans' Employment Service.

Second. Provides for affirmative action plans for the hiring by Federal departments and agencies of service-connected disabled and Vietnam-era veterans.

Third. Provides for employment preference to be given to service-connected disabled veterans and Vietnam-era veterans in all Government contracts and subcontracts if the veteran otherwise meets all of the qualifiactions for the job involved.

Fourth. Facilitates entry of disadvantaged veterans into existing Federal manpower training programs by disregarding the pay and allowance received by a veteran and the time spent while in the service or payment received under title 38.

TITLE VII

Title VII makes most of the provisions effective upon the first day of the second calendar month following the month in which it is enacted. Rate increases become effective upon enactment.

EXCERPTS FROM THE COMMITTEE REPORT

Mr. President, the provisions of S. 2161 which I have previously summarized are described more fully in the committee report, and I ask unanimous consent that appropriate excerpts from that report be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the material was ordered printed in the RECORD as follows:

BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION

Participation rates

The Committee hearings were directed at reviewing the existing GI Education Program and seeking ways to improve it. Currently, 1.1 million veterans are in training together with 82,000 servicemen, 5,400 wives and widows and 36,000 sons and daughters. Since June 1, 1966, some 3.2 million veterans of a total of 8.9 million eligible veterans have entered training and received benefits in the amount of $5.3 billion. Subsequent to the passage of increased benefits by Congress in 1970 participation rates have increased to 40.0 percent but are still not equal to the total World War II rate of 50 percent.

Even if one compares, as the Veterans' Administration urges, the first 71 months of the World War II program with the results of today's program so far (June 1966 to April 1972) the World War II participation rate is more than 20 percent higher than the current GI bill (44.9 percent vs. 35.9 percent).

Moreover, participation by the educationally disadvantaged, a major concern of the Committee and a principal objective of the Veterans' Administration Outreach Program is not encouraging. Of the 5.6 million Vietnam era veterans, 915,000 were discharged with less than a high school degree or its equivalency as shown in the following table:

TABLE 1.—ESTIMATED NUMBER OF POST-KOREAN CONFLICT VETERANS SEPARATED FROM THE ARMED FORCES WHO HAD COMPLETED LESS THAN A HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION

[Numbers in thousands]

Fiscal year of separation	Total separations	With honorable discharge and 6 months or more of active duty service: Did not complete high school: Total	Percent of total separations	Number
1955 (February–June 1955)	4			
1956	26	10	19.2	5
1957	186	161	32.8	61
1958	449	390	29.4	132
1959	446	387	26.7	119
1960	463	418	24.8	115
1961	419	362	26.0	109
1963	430	395	22.8	98
1963	513	474	24.4	125
1964	547	496	22.5	123
1965:				
July 1964	41	37	22.0	9
August 1964–June 1965	496	455	22.2	110
1966	550	505	16.9	93
1967	576	502	18.2	105
1968	788	698	16.0	126
1969	972	871	14.4	140
1970	1,043	929	13.9	145
1971	995	867	11.3	112
1972	870	761	9.7	84
Post-Korean conflict	9,814	8,727	18.5	1,811
Vietnam era	6,290	5,597	14.5	915

Source: Veterans' Administration.

Yet only 17.4 percent of these educationally disadvantaged veterans have used VA educational benefits; 10.7 percent, have used the free entitlement for special benefits for educationally disadvantaged under subchapters V and VI of chapter 34.

But even these figures fail to reflect the gravity of these distressingly low rates of participation by those who most need GI bill educational training. The President's Committee on the Vietnam Veteran reported that test results show that 30 percent of high school graduates in the Armed Forces score as poorly or worse than the average score of those who had not completed high school. Using this figure the Committee estimates an additional 1.4 million veterans are eligible for these special assistance benefits. When these figures are added in with non-high school graduates plus 1.4 million—the participation rate in these programs is 4.2 percent of the total eligible.

Preliminary data also indicates that the Administration has not reached its Fiscal Year 1972 Veterans' Program goal for increased veteran enrollment in the GI Bill program. In addition, in a letter this past May concerning his Veterans' Program which he regards as the "highest priority in Federal Manpower and Training programs," the President stated that "efforts should also be made to increase veteran participation in GI Bill training. . . ."

The Committee is convinced that substantial increases in the present rates are necessary as a prerequisite to achieving significantly greater participation. An important indicia of the inadequacy of current rates is revealed in a survey commissioned by the Veterans' Administration entitled "A Study of the Problems Facing Vietnam Era Veterans and Their Readjustment to Civilian Life." This comprehensive survey, which was conducted by Lou Harris & Associates in August 1971, disclosed that, while Vietnam Era veterans rated educational benefits as the most important service provided by the Veterans' Administration, over 59 percent of them have never even applied for these benefits. Of even greater importance was the finding that over 53 percent of these veterans would "certainly apply" if benefits were increased while an additional 30 percent indicated they "might apply."

Educational costs

Currently, a single veteran receives an educational assistance allowance of $1,575 an academic year ($175 per month for nine months) to cover all school and subsistence costs. The Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, in its publication, "Higher Education Basic Student Charges" figures an estimated average for tuition, room and board in 1973–74 school year at $1,428 for public schools and $3,107 for non-public schools. Public two-year schools charges average $1,168 while their private counterparts were at $2,636, according to the same study.

The following table shows estimated average charges in current dollars for full-time independent resident degree students in institutions of higher education by institutional type and control in the United States for the period 1960–61 to 1972–73:

TABLE 2.—ESTIMATED AVERAGE CHARGES (CURRENT DOLLARS) PER FULL-TIME UNDERGRADUATE RESIDENT DEGREE-CREDIT STUDENT IN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION, BY INSTITUTIONAL TYPE AND CONTROL: UNITED STATES, 1960–61 TO 1972–73

[Charges are for the academic year and in current unadjusted dollars]

Year and control	Total tuition, board, and room: All	Uni-versity	Other 4-year	2-year	Tuition and required fees: All	Uni-versity	Other 4-year	2-year
1960–61:								
Public	$850	$919	$765	$576	$211	$252	$171	$81
Nonpublic	1,602	1,806	1,503	1,124	857	1,001	785	490
1961–62:								
Public	869	947	788	599	218	265	182	88
Nonpublic	1,666	1,882	1,570	1,198	906	1,059	838	537
1962–63:								
Public	901	986	814	615	222	268	192	97
Nonpublic	1,724	2,022	1,608	1,271	944	1,149	869	600
1963–64:								
Public	926	1,026	846	630	234	281	215	97
Nonpublic	1,815	2,105	1,700	1,313	1,012	1,216	935	642
1964–65:								
Public	950	1,051	867	638	243	298	224	99
Nonpublic	1,907	2,202	1,810	1,455	1,088	1,297	1,023	702
1965–66:								
Public	983	1,106	903	671	258	327	240	109
Nonpublic	2,004	2,317	1,898	1,559	1,154	1,369	1,086	769
1966–67:								
Public	1,026	1,171	947	710	275	360	259	121
Nonpublic	2,124	2,456	2,007	1,679	1,233	1,456	1,162	845
1967–68:								
Public	1,063	1,199	997	790	283	366	268	144
Nonpublic	2,204	2,544	2,104	1,763	1,297	1,534	1,238	893
1968–69:								
Public	1,117	1,245	1,063	883	295	377	281	170
Nonpublic	2,321	2,673	2,237	1,876	1,383	1,638	1,335	956
1969–70:								
Public	1,197	1,342	1,145	956	320	413	309	187
Nonpublic	2,518	2,903	2,434	2,065	1,516	1,794	1,470	1,065

TABLE 2.—ESTIMATED AVERAGE CHARGES (CURRENT DOLLARS) PER FULL-TIME UNDERGRADUATE RESIDENT DEGREE-CREDIT STUDENT IN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION, BY INSTITUTIONAL TYPE AND CONTROL: UNITED STATES, 1960–61 TO 1972–73—Continued

[Charges are for the academic year and in current unadjusted dollars]

Year and control	Total tuition, board, and room				Tuition and required fees			
	All	University	Other 4-year	2-year	All	University	Other 4-year	2-year
1970–71:								
Public	1,273	1,435	1,224	1,028	344	448	337	206
Nonpublic	2,712	3,129	2,625	2,251	1,649	1,950	1,605	1,174
1971–72:[1]								
Public	1,349	1,527	1,305	1,098	367	483	365	224
Nonpublic	2,906	3,354	2,820	2,441	1,781	2,105	1,740	1,285
1972–73:[1]								
Public	1,428	1,621	1,390	1,168	392	520	394	242
Nonpublic	3,107	3,586	3,022	2,636	1,919	2,266	1,881	1,401

[1] Projected.

Note: Data are for 50 States and the District of Columbia for all years.

Sources: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of Education publications: (1) "Higher Education Basic Student Charges," 1961–62 through 1964–65, 1966–67, and 1968–69; and (2) "Opening (fall) Enrollment in Higher Education," 1961 through 1964, 1966, and 1968.

But these data are only for fixed charges to the veteran. A more meaningful figure may be found in the estimates supplied by the National Center for Educational Statistics of the Office of Education in their estimates for "total costs" of attending college which includes tuition, board, room, and all other charges incurred by the student in college. For the school year 1970–71, such total charges for a student attending public schools were estimated at $2,726 while a student enrolled in a private school had total charges of $4,573.

Educational costs continue to spiral at a rate significantly higher than the rise in the general cost-of-living. The National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges reports that median student charges for 1971–72 increased by 8.8 percent over the preceding year. The American Association of State Colleges and Universities reported increases of 8.3 percent for the same period.

Even without reference to soaring school costs, it is obvious that current GI rates do not meet even general consumption level budgets. While a full-time student-veteran with no dependents receives $175 a month, the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that a "lower" consumption budget for a single person under 35 years of age is $170 a month and $252 for a "moderate" budget. Over 40 percent of all veterans in training are married; almost 23 percent of all veterans are parents as well. Yet, a married full-time veteran without children currently receives $205 monthly compared with BLS lower and moderate consumption budget levels of $238 and $352, respectively. Finally, for a family of four, a lower consumption budget is $351 a month and $518 for a moderate budget. By contrast, a veteran with three dependents receives $243 under the current GI bill.

Comparison of the amount by which the basic educational assistance allowance rate is increased for each dependent (hereinafter called veteran dependency allowances) with amounts paid under Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Unemployment Compensation benefits is also useful. While a full-time married student-veteran currently receives $25 for the first and $13 for each additional child, the current U.S. average monthly payment per recipient under AFDC is $52. Moreover, the current average Unemployment Compensation payment for a child is $56. In short, the present GI bill is, as General Westmoreland recently noted, "inadequate to support a student-veteran and his family."

It was against this background that the Committee attempted to fashion a bill which would more fully accomplish Congressional intent set forth in section 1651 which states:

"The Congress of the United States hereby declares that the education program created by this chapter is for the purpose of (1) enhancing and making more attractive service in the Armed Forces of the United States, (2) extending the benefits of a higher education to qualified and deserving young persons *who might not otherwise be able to afford such an education*, (3) providing vocational readjustment and restoring lost educational opportunities to those servicemen and women whose careers have been interrupted or impeded by reason of active duty after January 31, 1955, and (4) *aiding such persons in attaining the vocational and educational status which they might normally have aspired to and obtained* had they not served their country. (Emphasis added.)"

Consideration of direct tuition payments

In its deliberations, the Committee gave consideration to the interest expressed by Members of Congress and witnesses who appeared before it to urge a return to an educational system similar to that in effect following World War II. A full-time student-veteran with no dependents entering school in 1948 was entitled to up to $500 a year for tuition, fees and books together with a monthly subsistence allowance of $75. Higher allowances were authorized for veterans with dependents.

The tuition allowance at that time was sufficient to cover charges by most public and private institutions of higher learning in the United States. Over 7,800,000 men trained under the bill at a cost of $14.5 billion.

At the same time, the Committee gave consideration to the deep convictions held by distinguished Members of the House-Committee on Veterans' Affairs. The Committee report (92–887) to the House passed bill, H.R. 12828, declares that the World War II GI Bill "encouraged major abuses and became an administrative nightmare." In 1952, a special Congressional investigating committee said:

"In view of the waste, abuse, and inefficiency which occurred during the World War II program, it would be grossly unfair to veterans of the Korean conflict, and to the Nation as a whole, to extend the present program without corrective action. Veterans of the Korean conflict are no less entitled to readjustment benefits than veterans of World War II; however, a new group of veterans should not be exposed to the exploitation which has plagued the World War II program. A sound educational readjustment program, unhampered by blind adherence to the past, taking full advantage of the experience gained during the last 7 years, should be devised, employing adequate safeguards against abuse to the end that veterans of the present conflict would be entitled to a period of education and training consistent with that period which they may have lost because of service during a period of hostilities. The scholarship allowance should be sufficient to maintain a veteran-student under reasonable and normal circumstances in a reliable educational institution with customary charges for nonveteran students used as a guide."

The result of the investigation was, of course, the abandonment of a separate tuition payment system in favor of a monthly allowance paid directly to the veteran which was to cover both education and subsistence costs.

The Veterans' Administration testifying before the Committee earlier this year in opposition to enactment of a tuition payment program stated that it: "would complete a cycle which would again give rise to the same abuses as falsification of a veteran's progress and attendance records, and collusion between school officials and veterans in falsely obtaining educational assistance allowances."

While the Senate Committee is not convinced that a workable tuition payment system which is equitable, free of substantial abuse, and administratively simple could not be developed, it believes that additional study to produce such a system is needed, particularly in view of the strong opinions held by senior Members of Congress and the extremely strong opposition of the administration.

PARITY WITH WORLD WAR II ENTITLEMENT LEVELS

Apart from the method of payment, the Committee does believe, however, that the level of entitlement for today's veteran should be no less than for his World War II counterpart. The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education has formally recommended that: "Federal legislation should be amended to provide for benefits fully comparable to those following World War II in relation to prevailing wage levels, tuition and fees and the cost-of-living." And a "very substantial increase in GI benefits" was called for by participants in the Veterans' Administration National Task Force on Education of the Vietnam Era veteran which was convened subsequent to the Administration's submission of legislative recommendations to Congress (but whose full report has never been published).

Taking the foregoing factors into consideration, the Committee decided to retain the current method of payment of an educational assistance check directly to the veteran or eligible person in training, but to increase the rates payable substantially to achieve parity with veteran entitlement under the World War II GI Bill (and to provide a method of advance payment discussed below, to place the first check in the veteran's hands when he registers at his institution). To achieve this parity the Committee converted the World War II GI Bill to a monthly rate and then increased that amount by 185 percent to reflect the increase in the cost-of-living from 1948 to April 1972. The Committee also added an additional 3.5 percent to provide a cushion for anticipated inflationary increases during the coming school year. The result for a full-time veteran without dependents is an increase of approximately 43 percent from the present rate of $175 to $250 a month, the rate proposed in the committee substitute. An additional $47 is provided for the first dependent; $42 for the second; and $21 for each additional dependent in excess of two.

Dependency allowance

These dependency allowances were basically those included in S. 2161 as introduced, with a correction of five percent for the in-

flation during the time since introduction, and were derived by averaging the level of dependency support under Unemployment Compensation, AFDC, and the adjusted World War II rate. The Committee substitute applies this basic dependency allowance rate to the other GI Bill programs—vocational rehabilitation, apprenticeship or OJT, and farm cooperative—with corrections for the nature of the subsistence to be provided under the particular program. Other improvements in calculating the rates in the Committee substitute are an adjustment to make the rate for half-and three-quarter-time training exactly that proportion of the basic full-time rate and to make each rate schedule consistent in form and method of increasing the allowance for each dependent in excess of two.

A comparison of the World War II program with existing rates, the Administration's recommendations, the House-passed bill, and the S. 2161, Committee substitute is shown in the following table:

TABLE 3.—*Comparison of World War II GI bill with present law and proposals*

[Veteran without dependents]

	School year
Tuition: up to $500	$500
Subsistence: $75×9	675
Total	1,175
2. World War II GI bill adjusted to 1972 dollars:	
(a) U.S. Department of Labor Consumer Price Index:	
1967=100	
1948=66.9	
April 1972=124.3	
124.3 / 66.9 = 1.85	
1,175×1.85=2,174	
(b) Allowance for future inflationary increase:	
3.5 percent×2,174=7676.00	2,174
	76
	2,250
3. Current law, $175 per month	1,575
4. Administration recommendation, $190 per month	1,710
5. H.R. 12828, $200 per month	1,800
6. S. 2161, $250 per month	2,250

Education loans

The Committee is also aware that while the cost-of-living has increased 185 percent since 1948, the cost of education in many schools, particularly non-public institutions has increased from 300 to 500 percent during the same period. For veterans wishing to attend those higher cost institutions, the Committee believes that they should have access to direct loans from the Veterans' Administration for the excess to supplement their own resources as needed to meet those costs not covered by VA benefits or other Federal grants or loans. Loans in the amount of up to $1,575 per academic year are thus authorized under the Committee substitute.

Advance payment

The present VA educational payment system, also presents problems which cause financial and emotional hardship for the student-veteran and his family. Under the present system a veteran must obtain a certificate of eligibility from the Veterans' Administration by submitting an application. After receipt of his certificate of eligibility the veteran must present it to his college which verifies his attendance at the institution. Upon receipt of this certification, the VA is then authorized to issue an educational assistance allowance to the veteran.

The system often breaks down, however, because of heavy work loads at schools at the beginning of the fall term and at the Veterans' Administration regional offices which must process large numbers of entitlement certifications in the space of a few weeks. As a result, a veteran entering school in September may expect payment not to arrive before mid or late October, or in some cases November or even later. The Committee intends the advance payment system provided for in Title II of the Committee substitute to correct this situation by providing for an advance payment which will be waiting for the veteran at the school upon his registration there.

Work-Study Outreach Program

Due to the lower participation rate under the current GI bill, particularly among educationally disadvantaged veterans, the Committee also believes it imperative that there be a more effective outreach program than presently exists. This can be accomplished in large part by student-veterans hired under the Work-Study Outreach program provided for by Title II of the Committee substitute. Testimony has indicated, and VA profiles of the Vietnam era veteran confirm, that the most effective outreach worker is one with whom the potential trainee can identify most immediately and fully. Veterans who are themselves pursuing an education offer such ready identification.

Furthermore, the Committee questions whether it is economically productive to use GS–12's and 13's as contact officers to "pound the pavement" when young student-veterans (at $2.50 per hour) may carry out these functions, probably with a higher incidence of success, and at far lower cost.

Employment Assistance

Finally, the Committee also recognizes that another significant factor in the readjustment problem faced by the returning veteran is the continuing high unemployment rate. For the past two years this rate has been significantly higher for veterans than for comparable nonveterans. In Fiscal Year 1972, the unemployment rate for veterans age 20–29 ranged from 7.2 to 9.8 percent while the rate for nonveterans in the same age group fluctuated from 6.5 to 8.0 percent. For younger veterans age 20–24 the unemployment rate is even higher, sometimes reaching 20 percent or greater if that young veteran happens to be of a minority group.

Despite some recent improvements, statistics for the second quarter of 1972 for veterans age 20–24 indicate an unemployment rate of 10.9 percent or over 11 percent higher than the nonveteran rate of 9.5 percent as shown in the following table:

TABLE 4.—EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF MALE VIETNAM-ERA VETERANS AND NONVETERANS 20 TO 29 YEARS OLD, QUARTERLY AVERAGES

Employment status	Seasonally adjusted				
	2d 1972	1st 1972	4th 1971	3d 1971	2d 1971
VETERANS[1]					
Total, 20 to 29 years old:					
Civilian noninstitutional population	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)
Civilian labor force	4,180	4,076	3,951	3,814	3,632
Employed	3,848	3,743	3,623	3,463	3,302
Unemployed	332	332	328	351	330
Unemployment rate	8.0	8.2	8.3	9.2	9.1
20 to 24 years:					
Civilian noninstitutional population	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)
Civilian labor force	1,792	1,801	1,783	1,768	1,719
Employed	1,596	1,596	1,579	1,551	1,490
Unemployed	196	206	204	217	229
Unemployment rate	10.9	11.4	11.4	12.3	13.3
25 to 29 years:					
Civilian noninstitutional population	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)
Civilian labor force	2,388	2,274	2,168	2,046	1,912
Employed	2,251	2,148	2,044	1,912	1,811
Unemployed	136	127	124	134	101
Unemployment rate	5.7	5.6	5.7	6.5	5.3

Employment status	Seasonally adjusted				
	2d 1972	1st 1972	4th 1971	3d 1971	2d 1971
NONVETERANS					
Total, 20 to 29 years old:					
Civilian noninstitutional population	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)
Civilian labor force	8,586	8,435	8,371	8,136	8,076
Employed	7,978	7,816	7,727	7,544	7,502
Unemployed	608	619	644	592	574
Unemployment rate	7.1	7.3	7.7	7.3	7.1
20 to 24 years:					
Civilian noninstitutional population	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)
Civilian labor force	4,842	4,753	4,610	4,448	4,421
Employed	4,404	4,293	4,162	4,028	4,004
Unemployed	437	460	448	420	417
Unemployment rate	9.0	9.7	9.7	9.4	9.4
25 to 29 years:					
Civilian noninstitutional population	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)
Civilian labor force	3,745	3,682	3,762	3,687	3,654
Employed	3,574	3,523	3,566	3,516	3,497
Unemployed	171	159	196	171	157
Unemployment rate	4.6	4.3	5.2	4.6	4.3

[1] Vietnam-era veterans are those who served after Aug. 4, 1964; they are also classified as war veterans. About 80 percent of the Vietnam-era veterans of all ages are 20 to 29 years old. Post-Korean peacetime veterans 20 to 29 years old are not included in this table.

[2] Not applicable.

Note: Data are subject to sampling variability which may be relatively large in cases where numbers are small. Therefore, differences between numbers or percents based on them may not be significant. Because of rounding, sums of individual items may not equal totals. Rates are based on unrounded numbers.

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor.

The unemployment rates may be even higher when all veterans out of work are included rather than those just "actively seeking employment" according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics definition which does not include those who desire work but are discouraged by current conditions for actively seeking it. The survey conducted by Lou Harris & Associates for the Veterans' Administration this past August, for example, found that 15 percent of all Vietnam era veterans interviewed were unemployed at the time of the interview. Unemployment for non-high school graduates ranged upward to 30 percent.

Of the currently unemployed who were interviewed by the Harris survey over 64 percent had never collected any unemployment compensation. For those employed, the Harris survey revealed that the Government seems to have been of little assistance. Less than 13 percent obtained their jobs through the State Public Employment Services, and less than 1 percent obtained their jobs

through Job Marts/Job Fairs. Seventy-four percent of all veterans were never even contacted by the local public employment office after discharge. Of those that were contacted, only about half were referred to a job. The Harris report concluded that only about 4 percent of the returning Vietnam era veterans were materially helped in terms of getting an employment offer by the local public employment office.

The Committee is aware of efforts made this past year to improve this situation but remains convinced that far more needs to be done. The provisions of Title V are aimed at improving the effectiveness of the Government's employment efforts to help Vietnam-era and service-connected disabled veterans. A 48-percent increase in on-job training rates is also intended to improve the veteran employment situation.

SECTION-BY SECTION ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION OF S. 2161 COMMITTEE SUBSTITUTE

TITLE I—VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION AND EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE RATE ADJUSTMENTS

Section 101

Clause (1). Amends section 1502 to provide that where feasible chapter 31 trainees shall be eligible for participation in the work-study/outreach program authorized in new section 1687 and for advance subsistence allowance payments provided for in new section 1780, discussed in subsequent section.

Clause (2). Amends section 1504(b) by increasing the monthly subsistence allowance rates for veterans trainees pursuing chapter 31 vocational rehabilitation training courses. Currently, about 21,000 veterans are enrolled in such training. The rate for a single veteran pursuing full-time institutional training would be increased from $135 to $200 per month. The full-time rate for a veteran with one dependent would be increased to $247 a month; two dependents to $289 a month; with $21 added for each dependent in excess of two. Three-quarter and half-time rates are adjusted to provide for the same proportion as the amount of training taken. Comparable increases are provided for those trainees pursuing from cooperative, apprentice or other on-job training.

Clause (3). Amends section 1507 to increase from $100 to $200 the amount of non-interest-bearing loan advance which may be made by the Administrator to trainees.

Approximately 33,000 veterans will be affected under this section the first fiscal year at an additional cost of $19.9 million.

Section 102

Clause (1). Amends section 1677 to increase the monthly entitlement charge for flight training courses from $175 to $250 per month.

Clause (2). Amends the table contained in paragraph (1) of section 1682(a) to increase the monthly educational assistance rate for some 1,256,000 veterans and servicemen currently pursuing programs under chapter 34. The full-time institutional rate would for a veteran with no dependents, be increased from $175 to $250 per month. The rate for a veteran with one dependent would increase to $297; with two dependents $339; and $21 would be added for each dependent in excess of two. Three-quarter time and half-time training rates are adjusted to provide for the same proportion as the amount of training taken, and the rates for cooperative training, which consists of institutional courses in alternate phases of training in a business or industrial establishment, are also increased.

Clause (3). Amends section 1682(b) to increase to $250 the base figure for calculating the rates for educational pursuits by servicemen on active duty and for those pursuing less than half-time courses.

Clause (4). Amends section 1696(b) to increase the maximum educational assistance allowance for persons pursuing PREP courses from $175 to $250 per month.

For the first full fiscal year 1,326,000 veterans and servicemen will be affected under this section at an additional cost of $731.2 million.

Section 103

Clause (1). Amends section 1732(a)(1) to increase the rate of educational assistance allowance payable to children, widows, and wives pursuing educational programs under chapter 35. Approximately 5,500 wives and widows and 36,000 sons and daughters are presently receiving benefits under this chapter. The educational assistance allowance for these eligible persons pursuing full-time institutional courses is increased from $175 to $250 per month. Three-quarter time rate is increased to $188 with the half-time rate now set at $125 per month.

Clause (2). Amends section 1732(a)(2) to increase monthly educational assistance allowance rates payable in the case of eligible persons pursuing programs of education on a less than half-time basis.

Clause (3). Amends section 1732(b) to increase the monthly educational assistance allowance rate payable in the case of eligible persons pursuing cooperative education courses.

Clause (4). Amends section 1742(a) to increase the special restorative training assistance allowance to those children who are in need of special restorative training consistent with other increases in this title.

Sixty-one thousand wives, widows and children would receive additional benefits under this section in the first year of $33.8 million.

TITLE II—ADVANCE PAYMENT OF EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE OR SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES AND WORK-STUDY/OUTREACH PROGRAM

Section 201

This section would create a new section 1780 in subchapter II of chapter 36 to provide, in part, first, for a consolidation of certain common provisions of law applicable to the payment of educational assistance or subsistence allowances currently in force (or made applicable by the Committee substitute in chapters 31, 34, and 35 and second, to authorize a new advance payment and pre-payment system for educational assistance or subsistence allowance as follows:

§ 1780. Payment of educational assistance or subsistence allowances

Subsections (a), (b), (c), (g), and (h). Are technical in nature and restate common provisions now found in chapters 34 and 35 (or made applicable by the Committee substitute) which provide for the period for which payment of educational assistance or subsistence allowances may be made and the certifications required for regular educational programs, correspondence training, apprenticeship, and other on-job training.

Subsection (d). Provides for an advance payment of initial educational assistance or subsistence allowance based upon the express finding by Congress that eligible veterans and persons need additional funds at the beginning of the school term to meet the necessary expenses of books, travel, deposits and payments for living quarters as well as the initial installment of tuition which are concentrated at the start of the school year. An eligible veteran or person would be entitled (if intending to pursue a program of education on a half-time or better basis) to an advance payment in an amount equivalent to the allowance for the first month or fraction thereof plus the educational assistance allowance (or subsistence allowance in the case of chapter 31) for the succeeding month. For example, if a veteran has a September 10 school registration date he would be entitled at the date he registers to a check for the remaining 20 days of September plus the full allowance for the month of October in advance.

Under the present system, he would be eligible for the partial month of September only after the end of that month and under optimum conditions would not receive his first check before mid or late October. Under the Committee substitute, in the event of an initial enrollment of a veteran or person in an educational institution, the application for advance payment to be made on a form prescribed by the Administrator shall contain information showing that the veteran or person is eligible for educational benefits, has been accepted and has notified the institution of his intentions to attend that school. An advance payment is also authorized in the case of re-enrollment if the applicant indicates his eligibility to continue his program of education and his intention to re-enroll. In each instance, the application form shall also state the number of semester or clock-hours to be pursued by the eligible veteran or person.

Under the Predischarge Education Program (PREP) authorized in subchapter VI of chapter 34, an advance lump-sum payment based on the amount payable for the entire quarter, semester or term would be made. Applications for advance PREP payments shall contain additional information that the PREP program to be pursued has been approved as well as specify the anticipated cost and number or Carnegie, clock, or semester hours to be pursued. In the event that such program is other than a high school credit course the application shall certify the need of the person to pursue the course or courses to be taken. Information submitted by an eligible institution shall for the purposes of the Administrator's determination establish a veteran's or person's eligibility unless the Veterans' Administration has evidence clearly establishing that such person is not eligible for advance payment.

Any advance payment approved by the Administrator shall be drawn in favor of the veteran or person and mailed to the educational institution listed on the application form for temporary care and delivery to the individual upon his registration. No delivery, however, may be made earlier than 30 days prior to the date when the recipient's program of education is to commence. The institution shall submit certification of delivery of any advance payment or promptly return any check to the Administrator if delivery is not effected within thirty days following the commencement of the program of education for which payment is to be made.

Subsection (e). Provides that following the initial educational assistance or subsistence allowance advance payment, the eligible veteran or person would be entitled to receive directly subsequent payments in advance for each month thereafter. Administrative controls over the program are provided by permitting the Administrator to withhold the final payment of an enrollment period until proof of satisfactory pursuit has been submitted or to adjust appropriately the final payment.

Subsection (f). Authorize the Administrator to recover advance payments in cases where the eligible veteran or person fails to pursue the course for which advance payment was made. Such advance may be recovered from any other benefit otherwise due such individual under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration. Otherwise, such overpayment shall constitute a liability of such individual and may be recovered in the same manner as any other debt due the United States.

This section is based upon the advance payment and prepayment provisions in S. 740 and those contained in S. 3657 as passed by the Senate in the 91st Congress (Report No. 91–1231).

Section 202

This section makes technical amendments to section 1681 to reflect the transfer of certain provisions under existing law to new section 1780 created by section 201 of the Committee substitute, *supra*.

Section 203

§ 1687. Work-study/Outreach additional educational assistance allowance; advances to eligible veterans

Subsection (*a*). This section requires an advance payment of up to $300 additional educational assistance allowance to veterans pursuing on a full-time basis any vocational rehabilitation or educational program under chapters 31 or 34 when such veterans enter into a work-study/outreach agreement with the Administrator. Under this agreement, the veteran during an enrollment period undertakes to perform 120 hours of needed services for the Veterans' Administration in connection with: (1) the Outreach Services program under section 241 of this title (particularly performing peer-group direct contact work with eligible veterans); (2) preparation and processing of necessary papers and other documents at schools or VA Regional offices; (3) provision of medical treatment in Veterans' Administration facilities; or (4) any other activity of the Veterans' Administration which the Administrator deems appropriate.

To the maximum extent feasible, the Committee intends that most students be employed in outreach activities. Advances of less than $300 are permissible for proportionately fewer hours to be worked. Agreements for services during vacations between periods of enrollments are also permitted if the veteran has completed one enrollment period and certifies his intention to continue during the next.

Subsection (*b*). Authorizes and directs the Administrator to collect (or deduct from subsequent VA benefits) pro rata amounts of the $300 work-study/outreach allowance if he determines that the veteran has not completed or will not complete his work obligation by the end of the applicable enrollment period.

Subsection (*c*). Directs the Administrator to conduct a survey (at least annually) in each geographical area of the country to determine the numbers of veteran-students whose services can be effectively utilized there, in the work-study/outreach program, during an enrollment period. Based on the survey results, he shall allocate to each Veterans' Administration Regional Office (VARO) the number of potential agreements which the VARO Director shall attempt to make during the applicable period.

Each VARO is then charged with further allocating to each school in its area, at which GI Bill trainees are enrolled, a pro rata number of potential agreements based on the total number of veterans enrolled in all such schools in that area. To the maximum extent feasible, however, 20 percent of an area's allotted numbers of agreements are to be reserved for special allocation to those schools with disproportionately high numbers of needy veteran students. If the number of allotted agreements cannot be filled by a particular school, the number of unmade potential agreements are to be reallocated to such other schools as the Administrator determines under program regulations.

Subsection (*d*). Provides for procedures and criteria for determining which veteran-students shall be offered a work-study agreement. To the maximum extent feasible, the Administrator shall contract with the schools who shall make recommendations as to which of their student-veterans should be offered the allotted number of agreements. While final determination would be made by the VARO Director in accordance with the regulations prescribed by the Administrator, the Committee intends that the recommendations by the school be given great weight.

The regulations to be prescribed by the Administrator in determining which eligible veteran-students shall be offered work-study/outreach agreements shall include the following criteria: (1) the veterans' needs to augment his allowance; (2) the availability of the veteran to transportation to the work site; (3) the veteran's motivation; (4) the particular disadvantages of the veterans who are minority group members; and (5) the physical condition of chapter 31 vocational rehabilitation trainees.

Subsection (*e*). Prohibits any work-study/outreach agreement which would result in displacement of employed workers, impair existing contracts for services, or involve the construction, operation or maintenance of so much of any facility that is used for sectarian instruction or is a place of religious worship.

Subsection (*f*). Provides that while performing services under the work-study/outreach program, and the veteran-student program is new section 1688, described below, such veteran-students shall be deemed to be employees of the United States for the purposes of benefits of chapter 81 of title 5 but not for purposes of laws administered by the Civil Service Commission. This subsection exempts work-study/outreach veterans from strictures of Federal employment laws and regulations; however, as persons performing services for Federal Government such veterans would be covered by the Federal Employee Compensation Act for injuries or death occurring while in the performance of such services.

The Committee estimates that 102,000 veterans would be hired under the work-study/outreach program at a first-year cost of $35.1 million.

§ 1688. Veteran-student employment

Subsection (*a*). In addition to the work-study/outreach program previously described, sets forth new language which would give the Administrator authority to employ, as intermittent employees, veteran-students enrolled in full-time programs of education or training under chapters 31 and 34. This would broaden current Veterans's Administration authority to hire and utilize the services of veteran-students at such times and places as the Administrator deems advisable.

Subsection (*b*). Authorizes the Administrator to pay the going rate for job classification for the work which would be performed. According to the Veterans' Administration, this would mean a minimum rate of $2.48 per hour and an estimated average payment of between $2.80 and $3.15 per hour. The Veterans' Administration testifying in support of its request for authority to hire student-veterans said that the student-veterans would be employed to do work in "contact" or veterans assistance program activities in which they would inform veterans of VA benefits and provide assistance in applying for them. They would also be hired to assist the Veterans' Administration during peak work periods in January, September, October, and December.

The General Operating Expense (GOE) account from which payments would be made contains funds for "overtime" in Fiscal Year 1973 of approximately $1 million. The VA budget for the current fiscal year indicates funds for approximately 300 man-years of such temporary veteran student employment predicated on the assumption that most veterans would not work more than 100 hours. According to VA estimates, this would support 5,000 to 6,000 veterans for the first fiscal year.

TITLE III—EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM ADJUSTMENTS

Section 301

This section amends section 1502(b) in chapter 31 to reflect the consolidation and shift of certain provisions to chapter 36.

Section 302

This section amends section 1671 to provide for consultation with the appropriate service education officer by any active duty serviceman who intends to initiate a program of education authorized under title 38. Presently 65,000 servicemen or approximately 80 percent of all active duty personnel under chapter 34 are enrolled in correspondence courses. Representatives of the U.S. General Accounting Office testified before the Committee concerning extremely low completion rates by veterans and servicemen who enroll in correspondence courses often with little attention given to their objectives, aptitude, or the suitability of the course to obtain express objectives. By requiring consultation, the Committee intends that the information and assistance that will be provided by the service education officer will offer the serviceman a better basis for selecting the education programs having the greatest potential for fulfillment of his educational and vocational objectives. Consistent with the recommendations of a recent GAO report to Congress (B–114859, March 22, 1972) the Committee intends that the Department of Defense should provide servicemen with information about correspondence programs, such as the percentage of course completion by veterans and servicemen by individual subjects.

The Veterans' Administration has agreed with suggestions by the Comptroller General to compile periodically and distribute to its personnel responsible for assisting veterans data on the number of veterans who enroll in each correspondence course subject and the number of veterans who do or do not complete each course subject. The Veterans' Administration should cooperate closely with the Department of Defense in furnishing this information to service education officers. Finally, consultation with service education officers will enable servicemen to become familiar with the full range of educational opportunities available under title 38. Where appropriate, the Committee desires maximum encouragement to servicemen to enroll in PREP programs. Particularly remedial, refresher, deficiency or college preparatory courses.

Section 303

Subsection (*a*). Makes technical changes by repealing present subsection (c) of 1682. The provisions of the subsection are now found in new section 1786 as provided for by section 317 of the Committee substitute.

Subsection (*b*). Redesignates section 1682 (d) as 1682(c) and further amends the farm cooperative program by lessening the total hour requirement for intensive classroom farm training and replacing it with a more individualized and practical on-farm assistance program similar to that in effect during the Korean conflict GI bill program. The present program contains a 528 clock-hour requirement which is divided into a 12-hour per week, 44-week pre-scheduled year of classroom instruction. This heavy classroom hour requirement has been criticized by the National Farmers Union, among others on the ground that it is difficult for young veteran farmers with long workdays to participate in a program that requires extensive travel time plus 12 hours of classroom instruction a week.

The participation rates under this program would appear to substantiate this objection. Currently, less than two-tenths of 1 percent of GI bill trainees under the post-Korean conflict program have enrolled in farm cooperative programs as compared with World War II and Korean conflict respective participation rates of 3.6 and 1.6 percent. During a 7-month period from September 1952 to July 1958 over 89,545 veterans enrolled in on the farm instruction under the Korean conflict bill. By contrast, only 8,624 veterans enrolled in agricultural training under the current GI bill during a comparable 66 month period from January 1966 to November 1971. The Committee substitute reduces the number of hours so that the course combines organized course instruction of at least 200 hours a year (and at least 8 hours each month) at an educational institution, with supervised work experience on a farm or other agricultural establishment. Such a course would provide for individual instruction of not less than 100 hours per year of which at least one-half shall be on a farm or other agricultural establishment.

Under this program heavy emphasis is placed on the practical aspects of farm management, recordkeeping and financing together with instruction in producing, marketing, and farm mechanics. This training must meet such other fair and reasonable standards as the state approving agency may set including the provision that the institution may not duplicate or repeat prior training which a veteran has received. The rate payable has also been increased consistent with general increases provided for by this bill.

The rate for a single veteran, for example, will be increased from $141 to $201 a month. No three-quarter or half-time rates are provided because under the reduced instructional hours required there should be no need for such part-time participation. That the shift in emphasis from classroom instruction to individualized on-farm instruction will be beneficial to the farmer has the support of a number of educators. It would also appear to be supported by a study conducted by the United States Office of Education entitled "An Economic Study of the Investment Effects of Education in Agriculture" (1968). Finally, a survey by the National Farmers Union of 12 agricultural states indicated the adoption of a farm cooperative program contemplated by this section would result in over 20,000 veteran enrollments in the program the first year. The value of the small family farm is well known. The Committee believes that adoption of this program would encourage young veterans to remain as small family farmers. Surveys taken of Korean Conflict Farm Program Trainees indicate that a vast majority of those who have received training continue to be actively engaged in farming.

The additional first year cost entailed by this section is estimated at $29.1 million.

Section 304

This section deletes present section 1684, the provisions of which are in new section 1788 with certain modifications and replaces it with a new section 1684 to provide that eligible veterans under chapter 34 may pursue programs of apprenticeship or other on-job training or programs of education exclusively by correspondence in accordance with new sections 1785 and 1786 in chapter 36 as added by the Committee substitute.

Section 305

Clause (1).—Amends section 1691, which authorizes elementary and secondary education and preparatory educational assistance for the educationally disadvantaged, by adding the term "training establishment" as an institution for admission to which an eligible veteran or person under chapter 35 may need to pursue a refresher course, deficiency course or other preparatory or special assistance to qualify for admission. This corrects an oversight at the time of enactment of this provision in 1970 in Pub. Law 91-219.

At the same time, the Committee does not wish to imply any disagreement with the original intention underlying this program as expressed at the time of enactment: that is, to assist veterans, whose performance—past or present—indicates a danger of failure, to bring their academic achievement up to the level of their class norm.

Section 306

Section 1692 authorizes individual tutorial assistance of up to $50 a month for a maximum of nine months for a veteran who has a "marked deficiency" in required subjects if such assistance is necessary for the veteran to successfully complete the program. The Committee has been extremely disappointed with the low usage of this program. During the two years of the program's existence, only 11,626 veterans have made use of tutorial benefits under section 1692, averaging less than three months of assistance per participant. The Committee believes that this is due in large part, first, to the lack of knowledge about the existence of this program; and second, to the mistaken impression that the veteran must be faced with the spectre of imminent failure before he may qualify for such assistance. The Committee substitute eliminates the adjective "marked" to emphasize that a student does not have to be actually failing in order to qualify for tutorial assistance. The Committee notes that a school may make certification of the need for tutorial assistance on the basis of placement or other tests or previous performance in certain types of courses. For example, the Committee is of the view that any veteran who previously received training under the Special Assistance For the Educationally Disadvantaged Program (section 1691) or PREP may need this type of additional assistance at the beginning of the course to help them successfully complete it and should automatically be considered eligible for section 1692 benefits.

The schools may also certify as to the need for tutorial assistance after the course has begun and the academic progress of the student shows that the additional assistance is required for him to successfully complete the course.

Clause (2).—Revises present subsection (b) of section 1691 so as to include reference to payment of an educational assistance allowance to wives and widows enrolled under chapter 35 in a State (made eligible in new section 1732(a)), as well as eligible veterans, and to eliminate the limitation, which the Committee believes is no longer justified in view of the impressive gains in the quality of adult evening high school courses, to half-time for the allowance rates payable for adult evening high school. The Committee wishes to express its strongest intention that the tutorial assistance program and the conditions upon which such help is authorized should be far more widely publicized on a systematic basis by the Veterans' Administration (and the Office of Education, where appropriate) to both veterans and educational institutions.

Section 1692 is also amended to clarify that a veteran may receive assistance for a period in excess of nine months provided he does not exceed a maximum of $450 (9x$50), so that a veteran will not lose a full month's eligibility of $50 merely by taking one hour of tutoring during such month, as under present VA regulation. Rather, the Committee intends that this provision be construed in a way to give the veteran every benefit of the doubt—both in terms of basic eligibility and in terms of the duration and amount of his allowance entitlement.

Section 307

This section amends section 1695(a) to make celar the purpose of the PREP Program to include courses needed by servicemen to obtain a high school equivalency certificate prior to their discharge or release from active duty from the Armed Forces. (See discussion in following section.)

Section 308

Clause (1).—Consistent with the amended purpose of the preceding section, amends section 1696(a) to make clear authority to pay an educational assistance allowance to servicemen where they pursue courses needed by them to successfully pass the GED examination and receive a high school equivalency certificate. Current law specifically mentions only high school diploma courses, the objective of the PREP program. Veterans pursuing a program for the educationally disadvantaged under subchapter V of chapter 34 of title 38 are specifically authorized to pursue courses needed to obtain an equivalency certificate. This section would remove the ambiguity and provide expressly full equalization of benefits available to disadvantaged veterans and servicemen.

Clause (2). Amends section 1696(b) to provide the Administrator the authority to set rates for tuition and fees where schools have similar, but not identical, remedial programs for the educationally disadvantaged. This confirms the interpretations of the VA on this score so that less intensive, less costly remedial programs offered by the school which are similar but less comprehensive than the PREP program will not serve to limit the amount of fees and tuition that the school is permitted to charge for the PREP course. As at present, such charge under PREP may not exceed $250 ($175 presently) per month for a full-time course.

Because of increased participation in PREP anticipated by the changes made by this section an additional first year cost of $24 million is estimated.

Section 309

This section adds a new section 1697A to provide for coordination with and participation by the Department of Defense in educational programs authorized under chapter 34.

Educators, directly involved with the establishment of PREP programs, testified before the Committee that there appeared to be little real effort by the Department of Defense to encourage local base commanders to adopt and promote PREP programs for eligible servicemen. At present, there are an estimated 350,000 servicemen who are non-high school graduates. According to information supplied by the Department of Defense, there are an additional 200,000 active duty personnel who could benefit from remedial education programs offered under PREP. According to available statistics, however, only about 37,000 or 6.7 percent of those men will participate in PREP programs this year. In November 1971, Dr. George C. S. Benson, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Education), in response to the question of why there was such a low utilization of PREP said: "Frequently it is because the base education officer will not give up his small patronage of GED staff". Acknowledging that there is "no real joint planning of education training efforts in the services", Deputy Assistant Secretary Benson continued by stating that "the real truth of the matter is that the Department of Defense and the Military departments have not yet thoroughly thought through the extent of their commitment to education. Our instructions are still too broad and perhaps too vague." Section 1697A of the Committee substitute is intended to serve as a catalyst for this commitment as well as to provide better focus and direction to PREP and other title 38 programs.

§ 1697A. Coordination with and participation by the Department of Defense

Subsection (a). Provides that the Administrator shall designate an appropriate official to coordinate with and assist a counterpart official who has been similarly designated by the Secretary of Defense as administratively responsible for carrying out DOD functions and duties under the PREP program.

Subsection (b). Provides that any educational institution or training establishment providing education and training to active duty personnel under chapter 34 shall be approved for enrollment of eligible persons (in accordance with appropriate regulations jointly prescribed by VA and DOD) only at such time as the Department of Defense submits to the Committees on Veterans' Affairs of the Senate and House of Representatives its plan for implementation of a program to more effectively utilize and encourage the use of title 38 benefits by active duty personnel together with periodic progress reports as to its actual implementation. This plan shall include provisions for:

"(1) an information and outreach program by each Secretary concerned to advise, counsel and encourage eligible servicemen to make full use of benefits available to them under chapters 31 and 34 of title 38, with particular emphasis on deficiency, remedial or refresher courses required for or training program in an approved educational institu-

tion or training establishment, as authorized under sections 1691(a)(2) and 1696(a)(2). Particular emphasis should be directed toward those about to be released from the service so that they are fully informed and encouraged to participate in the educational benefits authorized under title 38. The Department's plan should make provision for furnishing information to veterans concerning those educational institutions which have programs for veterans who have academic deficiencies;

"(2) joint VA–DOD meetings with appropriate educational institutions to encourage the establishment of programs for eligible servicemen with particular emphasis on the remedial programs previously mentioned;

"(3) release of time from duty assignment equivalent to at least one-half the required hours for an authorized program unless the Secretary concerned determines that such release would be inconsistent with the interests of national defense; and

"(4) the establishment of an Inter-Service and Agency Coordinating Committee, under the co-chairmanship of an Assistant Secretary of Defense and the Chief Benefits Director of the Veterans' Administration, to further promote and coordinate establishment and conduct of programs under subchapters V and VI of chapter 34 and other provisions of title 38."

Section 310

This section adds two amendments to section 1701(a).

Clause (1). Amends paragraph (6) to include correspondence schools within the definition of an educational institution to reflect amendments made to chapter 36 by the Committee substitute which permits wives and widows to pursue home-study courses.

Clause (2). Adds a new paragraph (9) to section 1701(a) to include the term "training establishment" in the definitions currently applicable to chapter 35. Under current law, wives, widows and children are entitled to other educational benefits but are not eligible to pursue apprenticeship or other on-job training programs. This new paragraph reflects amendments made by the Committee substitute which would extend such training opportunities to them. College education may not be suited for everyone. Offering chapter 35 eligible persons the opportunity to pursue on-job and apprenticeship programs would afford those desiring post-high school training another way of entering an occupation.

The Veterans' Administration estimates that in the first full fiscal year about 2,300 persons eligible under chapter 35 would enroll in correspondence courses and an additional 4,500 in on-job training programs.

Section 311

Section 1720 is amended to eliminate mandatory counseling for certain children training under the provisions of chapter 35. This section currently provides that the Administrator shall arrange for counseling of all children entering training under chapter 35 to assist the parent or guardian and the child in selecting an educational or vocational objective. Under the chapter 35 program, the government acts as a substitute parent standing in the place of the deceased or disabled parent in providing financial assistance to enable the child to pursue his education. The responsibility imposed by law calls for the furnishing of this counseling assistance to help the child in making a reasonable choice of educational objective. There are, however, many cases where the child is already enrolled at or is attending a college and it can be assumed that in those cases a reasonable choice has been made and a suitable objective chosen. In this event, mandatory counseling is an obvious duplication. It should be emphasized that while the mandatory requirement would be removed any further counseling or guidance the child might need would still be available through the school or the Veterans' Administration, if requested.

It is estimated that enactment of this section would result in savings in the program of approximately $1.0 million per year over the next five years.

Section 312

Clause (1).—Amends section 1723 to remove the current prohibition against eligible persons training under chapter 35 attending institutions of higher learning in foreign countries. No similar prohibition exists as to veterans' training under chapter 34, and the committee is unaware of any reason to maintain this distinction. This amendment provides, as does section 1676 in chapter 34, that the Administrator in his discretion (in accordance with published regulations) may deny or discontinue the educational assistance allowance for any person enrolled in a foreign educational institution if he finds that such enrollment is not in the best interest of the person or the government.

Clause (2).—Makes technical amendments in subsection (b) of section 1723 to reflect changes made by section 314 of the Committee substitute authorizing subchapter V benefits (Special Assistance for the Educationally Disadvantaged) eligible wives or widows under chapter 35 studying in a State.

The Veterans' Administration estimates an additional first year cost of $2.7 million.

Section 313

This section makes technical amendments to section 1731, which reflect other changes made by the Committee substitute to amend, consolidate, and shift certain provisions of this section to new section 1780 of chapter 36.

Section 314

This section deletes present section 1733, the provisions of which are included new section 1790(a), and replaces it with a new section 1733 authorizing eligible wives and widows to pursue secondary level training without charge to their basic entitlement under section 1691 of chapter 34. Eligible persons under chapter 35 would also be authorized for certain eligible veterans under section 1692. Authorization of special assistance for educationally disadvantaged wives and widows is a logical extension of benefits presently available to disadvantaged veterans and servicemen. Due to the disability or death of their veteran husbands, wives and widows are required to assume the responsibility for support of themselves and their families. By authorizing them to pursue secondary level training without loss or their regular entitlement, with access to tutoring where needed, they will be given an opportunity to obtain the necessary training required for entrance into higher education.

First year additional cost attributable to this new section are estimated at $3.3 million.

Section 315

This section deletes present section 1734, the provisions of which are included in new section 1790(a), and replaces it with a new section 1733 authorizing apprenticeship or other on-job training for all eligible persons under chapter 35 and, in the case of wives or widows training under this chapter, eligibility to pursue a program of education exclusively by correspondence. This new authority is discussed further under section 318 of this act.

This section makes technical amendments to section 1777 by adding the term "person" after "veteran" to reflect the new eligibility (as authorized by the Committee substitute) of wives, widows and children training under chapter 35 to pursue apprenticeship or other on-job training.

Section 316

Clause (1). Makes technical amendments in section 1784 to reflect the transfer and consolidation of certain provisions under existing law to chapter 36.

Clause (2). Amends section 1784(b) is amended to increase the amount of the reporting fee paid to educational institutions by the Veterans' Administration to $4 (from the present $3) for each veteran whose educational assistance allowance check is processed and delivered by an institution under the advanced payment provisions authorized by Title II of the Committee substitute.

The Veterans' Administration estimates an additional first year cost of $1.5 million.

Section 317

Clause (1). Deletes present 1786, the provisions of which are included in new section 1790(c) and adds a new section 1786, including provisions now contained in sections 1682(c), and adding a number of changes regarding correspondence training, which were occasioned by the recent rapid growth in enrollment in home study courses, together with considerable testimony before the Committee. During the current GI bill, over 675,000 veterans or about 21 percent of all trainees have enrolled in correspondence courses for which Veterans' Administration benefits totalling $237 million have been paid. During the past year, enrollment in these courses increased 37.8 percent as compared with a 13.7 percent increase in college enrollment. The Committee was thus extremely concerned when it was revealed in testimony by representatives of the General Accounting Office that a survey conducted by them indicated that 75 percent of all veterans did not complete their correspondence courses. The following table indicates the competition rates by course subject of the surveyed veterans:

TABLE 5.—CORRESPONDENCE COURSES: VETERAN COMPLETION RATES BY COURSE SUBJECT

Subject	Did complete		Did not complete	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Commercial art	200	4	4,800	96
Accounting	800	7	10,700	93
Drafting	500	7	6,800	93
Electronic technician training	2,500	9	25,400	91
Electronic operation	300	9	2,900	91
Secondary courses, high school completion and college preparation	700	10	6,000	90
Engineering technician training	2,200	12	15,500	88
Performing arts	600	15	3,400	85
Radio and television broadcasting	800	21	3,000	79
Computer technician training (below college level)	1,900	22	6,800	78
Electronic mechanic and repairman training	3,500	24	10,800	76
Auto mechanics and repair	1,000	26	2,800	74
Other business and commerce	2,300	27	6,300	73
Electrical trades	2,600	30	6,100	70
Air conditioning and refrigeration	1,500	31	3,400	69
Mechanical courses	1,400	37	2,400	63
Protective services	1,700	44	2,200	56
Salesmanship	2,300	56	1,800	44
Real estate and insurance	12,500	64	7,000	36
Hotel and motel training	2,990	64	1,600	36
Total	42,200	25	129,700	75

The Committee understands that the 75 percent discontinuance rate in the above table does not necessarily indicate for all such veterans or servicemen surveyed either their dissatisfaction with the course or that they did not achieve a vocational objective.

Testimony also revealed that many veterans were being persuaded to enroll in correspondence courses with little attention given to their objectives or aptitude or the suitability of the course to obtain their express objectives. The General Accounting Office study, for example, found that 22 percent of the veterans they surveyed had been unable to understand the course materials. Almost 75 percent indicated that prior to enrollment they had not been advised by the

schools of educational or experience pre-conditions for the course. When asked whether their course selection would have been different if they had known of the rates of completion for the courses, 57 percent said they would have considered a different form of education. The Veterans' Administration in response to committee inquiries supplied information to the Committee that they had received numerous complaints concerning "various questionable sales techniques or false claims" including: (1) the claim that a course would prepare the student for a vocational objective when it was not proven to do so; (2) the course was fully paid for by the Veterans' Administration; (3) the course was "approved" or "accredited" by the Veterans' Administration; (4) use of the Veterans' Administration seal as part of approved literature; (5) "aptitude" tests given and accepted by the school were insufficient because the veteran could not understand the lesson material; (6) the course will do more than it can deliver; (7) excessive claims as to attention given to grading of lessons by "name" personnel not actually part of the school operation; (8) blind ads which read like help wanted ads but are sales ads; and (9) the veteran was induced to sign an application for a loan when he was told by a salesman that he was signing an application to the school for Veterans' Administration benefits.

Similar information was disclosed in hearings conducted by the Federal Trade Commission during the past two years. Because of the foregoing, the Committee believes that the veteran should have a sufficient period of time to consider his aptitude and objectives and to consult with appropriate persons (including Veterans' Administration advisors) prior to financially obligating himself. Such a decision is an important one which is often difficult to make on short notice in the presence of an energetic and enthusiastic salesman.

Bell & Howell Schools, which presently have more than 60,000 active students stated in testimony submitted to the Committee that: "There should be a 10 to 15 day cooling off period after enrollment, during which the student can cancel his enrollment contract without penalty for any reason." Representatives from Advanced Schools Incorporated, which expects to enroll 70,000 veterans in its courses this year, testified: "We feel that the cooling off period should be 15 days and there should be no provision for retention of a service charge." Many consumer laws specify a three-day period for cancellation without obligation. A new cancellation policy recently adopted by the National Home Study Council also provides for a three-day cancellation period. After deliberation, the Committee has decided to require full disclosure of the provisions and a 10-day "cooling off period" in which the veteran may decide after adequate reflection and without penalty or fee, whether he in fact still desires to pursue that course of study.

A second major concern of the Committee occasioned by the low completion rate of veterans is the applicable refund policy for those who terminate or cancel their studies. With respect to *non*-accredited correspondence schools, title 38 provides that they shall not be approved for VA payments unless approved by a state approving agency. Section 1776(c)(13) in turn provides that the state agency shall not approve a non-accredited school unless it maintains a pro rata refund policy based on the amount of the course completed.

State approving agencies also approve courses offered by an educational institution when it has been accredited and approved by a nationally recognized accrediting agency or association. The National Home Study Council (NHSC) has been approved by the Office of Education, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, as the accrediting agency for correspondence schools. No Veterans' Administration pro rata refund policy is in effect for such accredited schools which are bound only by applicable state law or the minimum standards prescribed by the NHSC. That policy presently provides that if the student cancels his enrollment the school may charge the student either (1) the pro rata charge for the lessons completed or (2) a fixed percentage for the course—computed on the basis of an arbitrary number of days that elapsed from enrollment to notification of discontinuance—plus a fixed charge of $50. An example of the second method of "time expiration" for a course having a tuition of $625 is shown in the following table:

TABLE 6.—NATIONAL HOME STUDY COUNCIL REFUND POLICY (CURRENT)

Number of days elapsed since date of enrollment	Charge for course	Cost to student
0 to 3	10 percent, not to exceed $50	$50
4 to 30	15 percent plus $50	144
31 to 60	20 percent plus $50	175
61 to 90	25 percent plus $50	206
91 to 180	50 percent plus $50	363
Over 180	100 percent	625

This has often meant that a veteran has been obligated for the full amount even if he has completed only 1 percent of the course. Subsequent to hearings by the Subcommittee concerning these problems, the NHSC adopted a new policy effective October 1, 1972, which provides that following the expiration of a three-day cooling off period and prior to the time the school receives the first lesson from the student, it is entitled to a registration fee of not more than 10 percent of the tuition or $50, whichever is the lesser, upon cancellation by the veteran. After receipt of the first lesson, and upon cancellation by the veteran, the new NHSC policy provides that the school shall be entitled to a tuition charge that shall not exceed the following: (1) during the first quarter of the course, the registration fee plus 25 percent of the tuition; (2) during the second quarter of the course the registration fee plus 50 percent of the tuition; (3) if the student completes more than half of the total course, the full tuition. The application of this new refund policy is shown in the following table for a course costing $625:

TABLE 7.—*National Home Study Council refund policy (effective Oct. 1, 1972) for a course costing $625*

Percentage of course completed:	Cost to student
0	$50.00
1 to 10	206.28
10 to 24	206.28
25 to 35	367.50
36 to 49	367.50
50 to 100	625.00

The Veterans' Administration in proposals submitted to Congress recommended amendments which would have required any correspondence school in order to qualify as an eligible institution to maintain a pro rata refund policy premised upon the number of lessons completed plus a maximum registration or similar fee of $50. The Federal Trade Commission on May 2, 1972, issued a Proposed FTC statement of Enforcement Policy which also called for a pro rata refund policy.

The NHSC and several correspondence schools have argued vigorously that a strict pro rata refund policy is unfair to those schools which invest substantial money and effort in producing good "quality" courses. They claim they will not be able to adequately recover the cost of their investment if such a strict pro rata policy is adopted and that consequently the quality of the courses will be adversely affected.

The Committee has attempted to weigh the competing factors to arrive at a policy which is fair and would adequately protect both the interests of the veteran and those accredited schools providing quality home study instruction. The refund policy provided in subsection (c) of the new section 1786 is a compromise between a strict pro rata policy and the policy recently adopted by the NHSC (effective October 1, 1972). It provides for a refund based on lesson completion in increments of 10 percent of the total number of lessons with no refund due the veteran if 65 percent of the course or greater is completed.

An example of the proposed refund policy contemplated by the Committee substitute is shown in the following table:

TABLE 8.—*Correspondence school refund policy required by Sec. 1786(c) for a course costing $625*

Percentage of course completed	Cost to student
0 to 10	$75.00
10 to 20	125.00
20 to 30	187.00
30 to 40	250.00
40 to 50	312.50
50 to 60	375.00
60 to 65	437.50
65 to 100	625.00

In this connection, the General Accounting Office has supplied information to the Committee of a sample survey showing the percentage of lessons completed by veterans when they discontinued their enrollment in an accredited correspondence course:

TABLE 9.—*Percentage of lessons completed by veterans who discontinued accredited correspondence courses*

Percentage of lessons	Percent of total
0 to 10	30.8
11 to 20	18.8
21 to 30	17.7
31 to 40	12.3
41 to 50	8.5
51 to 60	3.1
61 to 65	3.1
Subtotal	94.3
66 to 70	1.2
71 to 80	1.5
81 to 90	1.5
91 to 100	1.5
Subtotal	5.7
Total	100.0

An analysis of new section 1786 as added by this section follows:

§ 1786. Correspondence courses

Subsection (a). Basically restates existing law concerning the educational assistance allowance permitted for a program of education pursued exclusively by correspondence. The law is amended first, to reflect the new eligibility of wives and widows as defined in section 1701 of chapter 35; and, second, to amend the entitlement charge to provide that the period of entitlement of any veteran or person pursuing education by correspondence shall be reduced by one month for each $250 (currently $175) paid to the veteran or person for such course.

Subsection (b). Provides that each eligible veteran person shall be furnished with a fully completed copy of the enrollment agreement at the time it is signed, containing a clear and conspicuous explanation, prominently displayed, of the provisions for affirmance, termination, and refund and the conditions under which payments of allowance are made by the Administrator to an eligible veteran or person. According to the General Accounting Office survey, about 31 percent of the veterans who did not complete their courses had not been aware that the Veterans' Administration's reimbursement would not cover all of the costs if they did not complete their courses. In the event an eligible veteran or person elects to terminate an affirmed agreement, the Committee be-

lieves there should be clear instructions as to the form and means of notice the buyer should use in order to terminate, together with the name and address of the seller to which the notice should be sent or delivered. Subsection (b) further provides that no enrollment agreement shall be effective unless the veteran or person shall after the expiration of 10 days following signing of the enrollment agreement have signed and submitted to the Administrator a written statement (with a signed copy to the institution) specifically affirming the agreement. The institution shall make a prompt refund of all amounts paid without imposing any penalty or fee in the event the buyer at any time notifies the institution of his intention not to affirm the agreement as provided above—which is tantamount to notification of a cancellation. In such event, the school would be entitled to return of any materials already provided the veteran or person.

Subsection (c). Provides that in the event an eligible person or veteran elects to terminate an affirmed enrollment agreement with an accredited correspondence school, the institution may charge a veteran or person a registration or similar fee not in excess of $75 where termination is made prior to the completion of 10 percent of the total number of lessons. The institution may retain either the registration fee or 10 percent of the tuition for the course. For each additional one-tenth of the lessons completed, the school may retain an additional 10 percent of the cost of the course or the registration fee. Once such veteran or person has completed 65 percent of the course the veteran is entitled to no refund.

New eligibility for wives and widows to pursue education by correspondence will result in additional first year costs of $0.6 million.

Clause (2). Deletes present section 1787, the provisions of which are contained in new section 1790(d), and adds a new section 1787, incorporating the present provisions of section 1683 with conforming changes to reflect new chapter 35 trainee eligibility.

§ 1787. Apprenticeship or other on-job training

Subsection (a). Restates existing law, now contained in section 1683, concerning entitlement to a training assistance allowance for those pursuing programs of apprenticeship or other on-job training programs. The law is amended to reflect new eligibility of chapter 35 individuals as defined in section 1701.

Subsection (b). The monthly training assistance allowance of an eligible veteran or person pursuing a program described under subsection (a) has been increased approximately 48 percent in line with recommendations made by the Veterans' Administration. The monthly rate for the first six months for a trainee with no dependents would be increased from $108 to $160. The rate is increased to $178 for a trainee with one dependent and to $197 for a trainee with two or more dependents. An additional $8 is allowed for each additional dependent. Testifying before the Subcommittee in support of their proposal for OJT rate increases representatives of the Veterans' Administration explained: "In order to obtain veterans to fill these new training positions which are opening an added inducement was felt necessary to bring veterans into OJT. The proposed rate of $160 is felt to be sufficient inducement to further increase the number of veterans entering this important growing program." The Veterans' Administration anticipates an additional 50,000 trainees under this program in the first full fiscal year if the increased rates were adopted. The additional first year cost is included in the amount shown for title I of this act.

Subsection (c). Restates existing law in section 1683(c) and reflects new eligibility for chapter 35 persons.

Clause (3). Deletes present section 1788, the provisions of which are contained in new section 1792, and replaces it with a new section 1788, consolidating the provisions of present sections 1684 and 1733, with substantive changes explained below:

§ 1788. Measurement of courses

This section is a consolidation of existing law in chapter 34 (section 1684) and chapter 35 (section 1733) which is further amended to incorporate Committee amendments and the recommendations (in part) by the Veterans' Administration concerning the measurement of trade or technical courses.

Subsection (a), Clause (1).—Restates existing law concerning the measurement of institutional, trade, or technical school courses below the college level in which shop practice is an integral part.

Clause (2).—Restates existing law concerning the measurement of institutional courses below the college level in which classroom instruction predominates but adds an additional provision. Under current law in sections 1684(a)(2) and 1733(a)(2) such courses are measured on a clock-hour basis with a minimum of 25 hours weekly to qualify for full-time attendance. Junior and community colleges currently offer both professional courses as part of the degree program as well as technical courses which generally may lead to certification for a trade or technical license. College courses are measured on a credit or semester hour basis under present sections 1684(a)(4) and 1733(a)(3). (Under a conversion formula, equivalent semester hours are determined where a course is offered on a quarterly, trimester of other time basis.) The technical courses are measured on a clock-hour basis. There has been considerable dissatisfaction among veterans attending courses at the same school but who are paid under these differing criteria. The Veterans' Administration notes that these two types of courses are given in a school meeting the same high educational standards established by the Accrediting Association for the area, and further that "the standards established for these courses at these college level institutions generally ensure quality training is being offered equivalent to college level courses which are measured on a credit hour basis."

Accordingly, the Committee has adopted language in 1788(a)(2) which would permit the school to have the technical courses which meet their high standards for college level work measured on a semester-hour basis if the Administrator determines that the basic characteristics of such course, including the extent to which out-of-class preparation is required, are substantially similar to the characteristics of semester-hour courses offered by that institution.

Clause (3).—Restates existing law regarding measurement of an academic high school course—16 Carnegie units shall be considered a full-time course when a minimum of four units per year is required—and adds an alternative measurement provision that an individual pursuing a program of education leading to an accredited high school diploma at a rate which if continued would result in the receipt of such diploma in four ordinary school years shall also be considered to be pursuing a full-time high school course. The present definition of a unit—not less than 120 sixty-minute hours or their equivalent of study in any subject in any one academic year—is restated. It is to be understood that where a high school program meets the requirements of the first sentence of clause (3) of this subsection—i.e., sixteen units being necessary for a high school diploma—such units do not have to meet the criteria for a unit of measurement under the second sentence of this clause. It should be further noted that where a high school program is offered which does not meet the requirements of either the first or second sentence of clause (3) of this subsection such course will be measured on a clock-hour basis with 25 clock-hours per week constituting full-time.

Clauses (4) and (5).—Restate existing law with regard to the measurement of institutional undergraduate courses offered by a college or university and programs of apprenticeship or on-job training, respectively. In addition, the parenthetical phrase regarding non-credit deficiency courses, in present sections 1684(a)(4) and 1733(a)(3) is rewritten to make clear that any such non-credit course shall be measured on a quarter- or semester-hour basis as determined by the institution in question (and not converted to clock hours, as is present VA practice, which often significantly reduces the allowance of the most needy and disadvantaged veterans.

New clause (6).—Provides that an institutional course offered as part of a program of education below the college level under section 1691(a)(2) or 1696(a)(2) of chapter 34 shall be considered a full-time course and be measured generally on the basis of measurement criteria provided in clauses (2), (3), or (4) of this subsection at the option of the educational institution concerned. The Committee intends this change from the present clock-hour measurement system now applied to prep and college preparatory programs to provide significant new incentives to institutions to initiate or expand such programs.

Subsection (b).—Restates existing law in present subsections (b) of sections 1684 and 1733.

Clause (3).—Also deletes present section 1789, the provisions of which are contained in new section 1793, and replaces it with a new section 1789, consolidating sections 1675 and 1725 with substantive changes explained below:

§ 1789. Period of operation for approval

This section consolidates in chapter 36 existing law in chapter 34 (section 1675) and chapter 35 (section 1725) and further amends it by adding to clause (3) of subsection (b) of this section new language in the so-called "two-year rule" authorizing enrollment of veterans in courses where the school has made a complete move to a new location outside the general locality of its former site, where it is determined that the school has substantially retained the same faculty, curricula, and students, without a change in ownership.

Under current law, the Administrator may not approve the enrollment of veterans in any course offered by an educational institution where such course has been in operation for less than two years. Clause (3) of subsection (b) of present sections 1675 and 1725 presently states that where a course has been offered for more than two years, veterans may be enrolled in such a course even though the school has moved to another location within the general locality. By regulation (VAR 14251(D)) the term "same general locality" has been defined to mean a move to a new location within normal commuting distance of the original location. This regulation also states that in such case the faculty, student body, and curricula must remain essentially the same.

Established schools may find it neecssary to relocate, as additional facilities are required to meet demands caused by increases in the number of students, such as the need for library space and the need for additional classroom space. The application of VAR 14251(D) with reference to a move within the "same general locality" may have a different application where the school is in the city rather than in a rural area.

Under the proposed change, the determination would be made based upon the individual factors found in each case. Primary importance would be placed on such factors as: (1) retention of faculty; (2) no change in ownership; (3) substantially the same student body; and (4) the same curriculum. This will protect loss of accreditation for schools which find it necessary to move while still protecting against so-called, "fly-by-night" schools.

A new clause (5) is also added to subsection (b) to provide that the two-year rule shall not apply to any course offered by a proprietary non-profit educational institution which qualifies to carry out an approved program of education under subchapter V (Special Assistance for the Educationally Disadvantaged) or VI (PREP) where the institution offering such courses has itself been in operation for more than two years. This clause would also be applicable to those offered at other than the institution's principal location to allow, for example, the offering of a PREP program by a community college on a military base.

The Committee intends by this new clause to permit the participation of qualified non-profit private colleges which are presently barred because they are not public institutions and thus cannot set up new subchapter V or VI courses.

It is estimated that enactment of this section would not result in any additional cost.

Clause (3). Also deletes present section 1790, the provisions of which are contained in new section 1794, and replaces it with a new section 1790, incorporating provisions of sections 1685, 1687, 1734, 1736, 1786 and 1787, and other provisions of chapters 34 and 35, with one change as follows:

§ 1790. Overcharges by educational institutions; discontinuance of allowances; examination of records; false or misleading statements

This section, which is administrative in nature, generally restates in new section 1790 existing law in chapters 34, 35, and 36 and adds one new provision in clause (2) of subsection (a) providing for the Administrator to discontinue approval of any educational institution which he finds has altered policy or practice regarding payment of tuition or fees so as to substantially deny to veterans the benefits of the advance payment program provided for in new section 1780 in title II of the Committee substitute.

Clause (3).—Also deletes present section 1791, the provisions of which are contained in new section 1795, and replaces it with a new section 1791, which consolidates the provisions of sections 1672 and 1722, with one substantive change explained below:

§ 1791. Change of program

This section consolidates in chapter 36 existing law in chapter 34 (section 1672) and chapter 35 (section 1722) and adds a new subsection (c) which provides that the Administrator may also approve additional changes of program which he finds are necessitated by circumstances beyond the control of the veteran or eligible person.

TITLE IV—MISCELLANEOUS AND TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE VETERANS AND WAR ORPHANS' AND WIDOWS' EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Section 401

This section is technical in nature and amends or strikes out several sections in chapter 34 or reflect other changes made by the Committee substitute, previously discussed, which amend, consolidate and transfer certain provisions to chapter 36.

Section 402

This section is technical in nature and amends or strikes out several sections in chapter 35 to reflect other changes made by the Committee substitute, previously discussed, which amend, consolidate and transfer certain provisions to chapter 36.

Section 403

This section is technical in nature and amends numerous sections in chapter 36 to reflect changes made by the Committee substitute, previously discussed, which amend, consolidate and transfer certain provisions to this chapter.

Section 404

This section amends the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 34 to include new sections added by the Committee substitute.

Section 405

This section amends the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 35 consistent with amendments made by the Committee substitute.

Section 406

This section amends the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 36 to reflect the addition of new sections and the renumbering of existing sections, as amended by the Committee substitute.

Section 407

This section amends for the purposes of title 38 the definition of the term "child". For purposes of all VA benefits under title 38, it is presently defined to mean either an unmarried person who is a legitimate child, a child legally adopted before the age of 18 years, a stepchild who is a member of the veteran's household or was a member of the veteran's household at the time of the veteran's death, or an illegitimate child. In Public Law 91-262, the term "legally adopted child" was liberalized to include not only a child adopted pursuant to a final decree of adoption but also a child adopted pursuant to an unrescinded interlocutory decree of adoption while remaining in the custody of the adopting parent or parents during the interlocutory period. The Committee has become aware of the laws in several states, however, which provide instead for an "adoptive placement agreement" in which the adopting parents agree with an appropriate state agency to assume the full financial responsibility for the support and maintenance of the child who has been placed in their care and custody by that agency. No temporary or interlocutory decree of adoption is made in such cases, and the only judicial document authorized under those state laws (in California and Minnesota, for example) is a final adoption decree issued by a court of competent jurisdiction at the time the adoption is made final. The Veterans' Administration has interpreted the 1970 amendments to the law to mean that such parents are not eligible for additional benefits for the child placed in their custody although in every other respect their situation is identical to those parents who have custody of children pursuant to interlocutory decrees. The amendment made by this section is intended to eliminate this artificial distinction. It would recognize that any child placed for adoption under an agreement entered into by the adopting parent or parents with any agency authorized under law to so act, shall be recognized thereafter as a legally adopted child unless and until the agreement is terminated and so long as the child remains in the custody of the adopting parent or parents during the period of placement for adoption under the agreement.

Section 408

This section amends subsection 102(b) to provide for equality of treatment for veterans and their spouse regardless of sex by deleting certain criteria which currently restrict the eligibility of a husband or widower of a female veteran for certain benefits administered under title 38. With respect to increased benefits payable to a veteran because of a dependent, section 102(b) currently requires that in order to qualify the husband of a female must be incapable of self-maintenance and permanently incapable of self-support due to mental or physical disability. There is no similar requirement for married male veterans, however, who are entitled to additional educational benefits while they are in school without regard to the earning capacity of their wives. This existing discrimination may account in part for the fact that the overall participation rate of female veterans is only 25 percent as compared to 40 percent for male veterans. Similarly, section 102(b) provides that in order for a widower to have the same status as a widow with respect to survivor benefits the widower must be incapable of self-maintenance and permanently incapable of self-support due to mental or physical disability at the time of the veteran's death. Finally, section 1801(a)(2) provides that the widow of a qualified veteran is eligible for loan guarantee or direct loan benefits which the Veterans' Administration administers if the veteran died of a service-connected disability. In contrast, a widower of a female veteran would be similarly eligible only if he was incapable of self-maintenance and permanently incapable of self-support as previously mentioned.

The American Civil Liberties Union testified before the Subcommittee as to its conclusion that the existing law was unconstitutional as an "arbitrary distinction based solely on sex." The Veterans' Administration while not concurring in this view does favor the change contemplated by this section on the "principle that Veterans' Administration benefits are designed to cushion family living standards for the loss of, or lessened income stemming from the veteran's disability, school attendance, or death. . . ." This is accomplished by including in the definition of the term "wife" the "husband of any female veteran" and in the term "widow" the "widower of any female veterans." While not included in the Committee amendment the Committee intends that in the next technical revision of title 38 the terms "spouse" or "surviving spouse" be substituted where appropriate, for the terms "wife" or widow.

An additional first year cost of $2 million is estimated if this section is enacted.

Section 409

This section amends the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 1 of title 38 to reflect the amendments made by the preceding section.

Section 410

This section makes two amendments to the Veterans' Outreach Service Program in subchapter IV of chapter 1.

Subsection (a). Clarifies in section 340 Congressional intention to provide that the purpose of the Outreach service program is to *encourage* the use of available Veterans' Administration benefits and services as well as provide assistance in aiding veteran application for such benefits.

Subsection (b). Amends section 241 to provide that contact in person or by telephone will be made by the Veterans' Administration with those veterans who do not have a high school education or its equivalent at the time of their discharge or release from active duty. At present, they receive a computer generated letter following release and, under a new program just announced, a six-month follow-up letter.

A prominent recurring theme throughout the hearings of the Subcommittee on Readjustment, Education, and Employment this year was stated by witness after witness testifying both as to the inadequacy of the present outreach program and the need to make direct personal contact with disadvantaged veterans to encourage the use of VA benefits. The computer letter sent by the Veterans' Administration is often ignored along with the raft of other mail directed to the recently discharged veteran urging him to buy insurance, a new car, or whatever (the names and addresses of all recently discharged veterans are currently available for purchase from commercial companies). Often, the young veteran is unable to recognize the value of Veterans' Administration benefits or to relate them meaningfully to his own life. He is frequently distrustful of authority and in many instances finds it difficult to relate to others not of his peer group.

The Veterans' Administration has also recognized there are a number of characteristics that make today's veteran different from his predecessor. A profile based on an extensive survey made in late 1970 of Veterans' Administration health care facilities by the

Department of Medicine and Surgery listed among these characteristics the following:

Expectation that authority will *not* be responsive to his intense need to be treated as an individual.

Uncertainty and lack of optimism about life, with the resultant absence of direction of goals.

An intense positive identification with his own age group.

The Committee thus intends that veterans, especially the educationally disadvantaged, be sought out where they live and that the maximum extent feasible, personal contact be made by those of his peer group to encourage use of GI benefits. The National Adjutant of the National Congress of Puerto Rican Veterans testified, for example, that there are approximately 500,000 Puerto Rican veterans but that in New York City he knows of only one Veterans' Administration counselor who is a Puerto Rican.

Substantial increases in outreach contacts should, of course, be accomplished by student veterans hired under the Workstudy/Outreach Program authorized by title II of this act. The Committee is also aware that the Emergency Employment Act (under which one-third of those hired are to be Vietnam-Era veterans) permits programs for veteran outreach activities. The OEO funded Veterans' Educational and Training Action Committee Program of the National League of Cities and the U.S. Conference of Mayors is also active in attempting to promote effective outreach efforts by local government and community action agencies in demonstration projects in 13 cities. Efforts are also carried out as well by various programs of the National Urban League and the joint American Legion/American Association of Junior Colleges outreach efforts.

The Committee believes that the Veterans' Administration should take positive steps to coordinate these activities with their own outreach efforts. To meet the objective of the outreach program, and the amendments made by the Committee substitute, the Veterans' Administration should also make use of its general authority under section 213 to contract for outreach services from outside agencies and groups. The Committee notes that the Federal Government has spent millions of dollars developing the capacity of local agencies to service their community, particularly community action and model cities agencies and believes these agencies can be far more effectively utilized.

In addition, private non-profit organizations as well as city, county, and state offices have major service abilities which have yet to be focused fully on the needs of Vietnam-era veterans. Contracting for these services would help achieve the objective of peer group community-based outreach efforts. In addition, to ensure that the veterans, employers and educational institutions are contacted in a systematic and nonduplicative fashion the Veterans' Administration should require those contractors engaged in outreach efforts to participate in coordinating councils. In this connection, the Committee notes that the President in calling for additional governmental efforts to achieve increased veteran participation in GI Bill training this past May stated that he was "particularly hopeful that participation in GI Bill programs can be increased through specific outreach into urban and rural areas, fully informing veterans of available education and other benefits." He noted that these efforts for increased partcipation "lend themselves well to both state and local participation, and to plans for coalition among VA, Labor, OEO, HEW, HUD, and other public and private agencies and institutions."

SECTION 411

This section would increase the allowance payable by the Administrator for administrative expenses incurred by state and local agencies in administering educational benefits under chapters 34 and 35 of title 38. For sometime, the Administrator has been authorized under section 1774(a) to pay state and local agencies for reasonable and necessary expenses of salary and travel incurred by employees of such agencies in rendering necessary services for evaluating and supervising educational institutions offering courses of education to veterans and other eligible persons under title 38. In 1968, Congress amended this section to provide for an allowance for a fair share of the administrative expenses of a state agency as well. The amount payable, which is found in a formula in subsection (b), is determined by the size of the contract between the Veterans' Administration and the state for the amount of salary authorized by section 1774(a).

Representatives of the National Association of State Approving Agencies testified that their experience under this section indicated that the formula was inadequate to meet the administrative costs attributable to section 1774. A survey by the Association of State Approving Agencies this year found that the administrative allowance currently paid by the Veterans' Administration covered only 48 percent of the actual cost of administering the program.

The Committee is quite concerned that the state agencies take a more active and aggressive role than they have in the past in protecting the ever growing number of veterans who are enrolling in schools which advertise themselves as "approved for VA benefits." Under the Committee substitute—doubling the amounts payable under subsection (b). Lack of sufficient funds should no longer be provided as an excuse for ineffective action. The Committee intends to closely monitor the performance of the state agencies in the coming year.

First year additional costs occasioned by this section are estimated at $600,000.

Section 412

This section directs the Administration to contract for an independent study of educational assistance programs under title 38 after consulting with the advisory committee as formed under chapter 36 (presently section 1788 redesignated as section 1972 by the Committee substitute). The Committee also intends that the Veterans' Administration invigorate the presently moribund advisory committee as well as carry forward the reexamination of education programs begun by the Veterans' Administration Task Force on Education which was convened subsequent to the most recent Administration education proposals to Congress.

The study required by this section should compare existing programs with those in effect following World War II and the Korean conflict. In view of the considerable interest in a World War II type direct tuition payment program expressed by many witnesses appearing before the Committee, as well as the concern evidenced by senior Members of Congress, the study should address itself to the question of whether a separate tuition payment is etiher feasible or desirable. The report (including findings and recommendations) of the study is to be made to the President and Congress within nine months of enactment of this act shall consider a number of factors including problems in administration, veteran participation, safeguards against abuse, adequacy of benefit levels, scope of programs, and information outreach efforts to meet the various educational and training needs of eligible veterans. It is estimated that the study would cost approximately $400,000.

TITLE V—VETERANS' EDUCATION LOAN PROGRAM

Section 501

For those veterans choosing to attend certain higher cost institutions additional sums even beyond the rate increases provided for in title I of the Committee substitute will be required. To the extent that the additional costs are beyond the financial resources available to the veteran (including existing Federal loan programs), direct loans from the Veterans' Administration up to $1,575 an academic year are provided for. These direct insured loans which are to be from funds made available from the National Service Life Insurance Trust Fund are to be repaid within 10 years following a starting date nine months following the period when the student ceases to be an active student. The Administrator shall pay the Fund any interest accruing on the loan prior to the veteran-student's repayment date. The Veterans' Administration estimates that about 20 percent of all eligible veterans in college-level institutions and 30 percent of those in resident schools below college level would receive loans under this title. These estimates take into consideration that veterans must first seek to obtain a loan under the Higher Education Act which was recently amended to create a Student Loan Marketing Association to provide a secondary loan market in student loans which, hopefully, will release additional private capital for such loans. During the first year, it is estimated that 203,000 veterans will receive loans in the amount of $212.9 million. First year interest and administrative costs chargeable to the Veterans' Administration are estimated at $15.8 million. Sections 1688 and 1699 authorizing the program are described below:

§ 1698. Eligibility for loans; amount and conditions of loans; interest rate on loans

Subsection (a). Provides for educational loans to eligible veterans (as defined in section 1652(a) (1) and (2) of chapter 34) in such amounts and under such conditions as are specified in subsections (b) and (c) of new section 1698.

Subsection (b). Establishes an entitlement to a loan in the amount of $175 multiplied by the total number of months during which the needy veteran is entitled to receive educational assistance under section 1661. A veteran would be entitled to educational loans of up to a maximum of $6,300 (based on a full 36 months entitlement), provided however, that no loan shall be made in excess of $1,575 in any one regular academic year. The precise amount of the educational loan would be determined by subtracting the total amount of financial resources available to the veteran in any one year from the actual cost of attendance at school. A veteran's "financial resources" is defined as the total amount of his: (1) annual adjustment effective income less federal income tax paid or payable; (2) cash assets; (3) financial assistance received under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended; (4) regular chapter 34 VA educational payments; and (5) any other financial assistance received under a scholarship or grant program. "Actual cost of attendance," is defined (subject to regulations prescribed by the Administrator) to include actual per-student charges for tuition, fees, room and board, plus expenses related to reasonable commuting, books and such other expenses as the Administrator determines are reasonably related to the attendance at the institution.

Subsection (c). Provides that an eligible veteran is entitled to a loan subject to the requirements of subsection (d) of the new section if he is attending school on a half-time or greater basis and has sought unsuccessfully to obtain a loan under the student loan program authorized by Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 in the full amount he needs, as measured under subsection (b). If he had received less than such full amount under Higher Education Act or other loans, he would be entitled to a loan under this section in the amount of the difference, up to $1,575 for academic year based on his remaining GI bill entitlement.

Subsection (d). Provides that the principal amount of the loan and interest thereon

shall be repaid in installments within ten years beginning at a period nine months after the veteran ceases to be a student on a half-time or greater basis. No interest shall accrue prior to the beginning date of repayment. The interest rate on the loan shall be prescribed jointly by the Administrator and the Secretary of Treasury. In this connection, the Committee notes that current interest rates on loans made under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (which any recipient under this subchapter must have first sought to obtain) is seven percent. That rate is an appropriate benchmark in the determination of the interest rate to be charged under this subchapter. In no event, however, shall the rate be less than that paid by the Secretary of Treasury on Treasury notes and other obligations held by the National Service Life Insurance (NSLI) Fund.

Subsection (*e*). Directs the Administrator to discharge the loan obligation of any veteran who dies or becomes permanently and totally disabled by repaying the amount of his loan together with interest to the NSLI Fund.

§ 1699. Sources of funds; insurance

Subsection (*a*). Provides that the loan made under this subchapter shall be made from funds available under subsection (b) of new section 1699 and that the Administrator shall guarantee repayment as provided for in subsection (c) of this new section.

Subsection (*b*). Authorizes the Administrator to set aside from the NSLI Fund (Fund) such sums (but not in excess of limitations in Appropriations acts) as are necessary to make loans under this subchapter. Any funds which are set aside shall be considered as investments of the Fund and shall bear interest at a rate not less than is paid by the Secretary of the Treasury on the Treasury notes and other obligations held by the Fund at each point in time in which the funds are set aside for loans. Currently, there is in excess of $7 billion in the Fund returning a current interest yield of 4.6 percent. In view of current interest rates prevailing on education loans, the Committee anticipates that funds made available under this subchapter will return a higher rate than is presently being earned by the Fund. Thus, the amount paid back to the Administrator and treated as appropriations by virtue of subsection (c) of this section will eventually replenish and indeed exceed the amounts the Administrator pays to the Fund on the amounts he sets aside.

Subsection (*c*). Provides that the Administrator shall guarantee repayment of principal and interest to the Fund of any amount set aside for loans. Pursuant to this section the Administrator may issue notes or other obligations to the Secretary of the Treasury subject to such terms and conditions as the latter may specify, to gear a rate of interest no less than other Treasury investments of the Fund, and the Secretary is directed to purchase such notes and obligations issued by the Administrator.

Subsection (*d*). Authorizes the appropriation of such unnecessary sums as are required by the Administrator to repay accrued interest or to discharge responsibilities occasioned by death or disability under section 1699(f) and treats any amounts paid back to the Administrator under loan agreements as such appropriations. Thus, after several years' operation no further appropriations at all will be necessary to continue the program at a sizable level.

Subsection (*e*). Provides for the collection of a fee for insurance against loan default by the Administrator (not to exceed one-half of 1 percent of the face amount of the loan) from each veteran obtaining a loan under this subchapter. This provision is similar in purpose to a provision in the Higher Education Act and is modeled on a provision, repealed in P.L. 91-506, former section 1818(d), formerly in the Veterans Guaranteed Loan Program in chapter 37.

Section 502

This section amends the table of sections at the beginning of Chapter 34 to reflect new subchapter VII, added by the previous section, authorizing loans to eligible veterans.

TITLE VI—VETERANS' EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE AND PREFERENCE

Section 601

This section provides that this title may be cited as the "Veterans Employment and Readjustment Act of 1972."

Section 602

This section rewrites chapter 41 of title 38, dealing with job counseling, training and placement service for veterans, in a way virtually identical to S. 3867, passed by the Congress and vetoed by the President in December, 1971, and reintroduced in S. 2091 in this Congress.

§ 2001. Definitions

This section defines the term "eligible veteran" to mean a person who served in the Active military, naval, or air service who was discharged or released therefrom with other than a dishonorable discharge. The term "state" is defined to include the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and such American territories as the Administrator may determine necessary and feasible.

§ 2002. Purpose

This section amends the statement of Congressional intention to state that in addition to effective job counseling and placement programs there shall be effective efforts in counseling and placement in job *training* programs as well.

§ 2003. Assignment of veterans' employment representative

This section essentially restates existing law concerning the functions and assignment by the Secretary of Labor of Veteran Employment Representatives (VER's) to each of the states to aid in veteran employment. Amendments to this section authorize and require the assignment of such additional assistant VER's as the Secretary determined necessary based on data collected pursuant to section 2007, *infra*. In addition to the present functions of VER's, they shall be responsible for appropriate counseling and placement of veterans in job training programs as well as employment opportunities. They shall engage in job development and advancement for eligible veterans with maximum coordination with the outreach activities of the Veterans' Administration carried on under subchapter IV of chapter 3 outreach services). The appropriate matching of veterans with the jobs or job training opportunities by maximum use of electronic data processing and telecommunication systems is mandated. Finally, amendments to this section provide for VER's to maintain appropriate contact and coordination with labor unions and veterans' organizations in addition to employers to advise them of eligible veterans available for employment and training.

§ 2004. Employees of local office

Under the present law, most local employment offices have one or more persons (preferably veterans) who are assigned by the administrative head of the State Employment Service to discharge primarily the duties prescribed for veterans under this chapter. This section would amend the law further to provide that except as may be determined by the Secretary of Labor (based upon a demonstrated lack of need for such services) such local office employees so designated shall direct their services on a full-time basis to discharging the duties prescribed for the VER and his assistants. Hearings by the Subcommittee last fall revealed that local employees so designed generally devoted only a minimum of time to veteran employment problems. In addition to the higher unemployment rate that exists for non-veterans, information from the Employment Service Automated Reporting System (ESARS) last fall revealed that veterans were receiving less job placement, orientation, counseling and testing than non-veterans at employment offices. While the situation has improved somewhat this year, enough remains to be done in the Committee's opinion to warrant this section. The most current data for Fiscal 1972 indicates that only 13 percent of all Vietnam era veteran applicants at local employment offices received counseling interviews. Just 27 percent of all those veteran applicants were placed in any sort of regular non-agricultural job (defined as one of three days duration), according to that same data.

§ 2005. Cooperation of Federal agencies

This section in effect restates existing section 2004, directing federal agencies to furnish to the Secretary of Labor such records, statistics, and information as he may find necessary or appropriate in administering chapter 41, adding "training" as well as employment opportunities and making minor continuing changes.

§ 2006. Estimate of funds for administration; authorization of appropriations

Subsection (*a*). Restates existing law in section 2005, which requires that the Secretary of Labor estimate the funds necessary for proper and efficient administration of chapter 41. Such sums shall be included as a special item in the annual budget of the Department of Labor.

Subsection (*b*). Authorizes the appropriation of such sums as may be necessary for the administration of this chapter.

Subsection (*c*). Provides in the event the regular appropriation act for the Department of Labor does not specify an amount for proper and efficient administration of chapter 41 as prescribed by the preceding subsection, then of the amounts appropriated a sum equal to the budget estimate submitted by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to section (a) shall be available for those purposes only.

Subsection (*d*). Provides that such appropriations as are made available by this section shall be used only for chapter 41 purposes unless approved otherwise by the Secretary of Labor based upon a demonstrated lack of need of these funds for such purposes.

§ 2007. Administrative controls; annual reports

Subsection (*a*). Mandates the Secretary of Labor to establish sufficient administrative controls to ensure, first, that each eligible veteran applicant (particularly those who have been recently discharged) receive prompt employment assistance in finding a job or training opportunity; and, second, that state agencies are committing necessary staff and resources to accomplish the purposes of this chapter. The Secretary is directed to take corrective action when he finds state agencies have committed inadequate resources. Committee hearings last fall indicated the need for this section because of insufficient monitoring by the Department of Labor of veteran employment efforts by state agencies and the reluctance of the Department to employ available provisions under the Wagner-Peyser Act to ensure compliance.

Subsection (*b*). Provides for an annual report to Congress by the Secretary of Labor of detailed information on the efforts and achievements of the Department and the affiliated state agencies in carrying out the

provisions of chapter 41 and on any determinations made under new section 2004 or 2006.

§ 2008. Cooperation and coordination with the Veterans' Administration

This section provides for consultation by the Secretary of Labor with the Administrator with respect to all activities carried out and data gathered pursuant to this chapter. The section also makes technical amendments in the table of sections to reflect the changes made in the revised chapter 41.

SECTION 604

This section adds a new chapter 42 at the end of part 3 of title 38 entitled, "Employment of Disabled and Vietnam Era Veterans", which (1) directs an action plan for each Federal agency for the employment of such veterans; (2) establishes employment preference under Federal contracts and subcontracts for them; and (3) liberalizes the eligibility requirements for participation by veterans in certain Federal manpower training programs. The new sections are as described below:

§ 2011. Definitions

The term "disabled veteran" is defined to mean any veteran with a disability rated at 30 percent or more who is entitled to receive VA disability compensation or who was discharged or released from the service for a line-of-duty disability. The term "Veteran of the Vietnam Era" means any veteran who served on active duty during the Vietnam era for more than 180 days and was released therefrom without a dishonorable discharge, or was released from active duty because of a service-connected disability and was discharged within the 48 months preceding his seeking such a job. The terms "department" and "agency" refers to any department or agency of the Federal Government or any Federally-owned corporation.

§ 2012. Action plan for employment of disabled and Vietnam era veterans

Subsection (a). Provides that the Administrator, in connection with the Secretary of Labor and the Civil Service Commission, shall within 90 days of enactment establish an affirmative action plan for every Federal department and agency for the preferential employment of disabled veterans and veterans of the Vietnam era.

Subsection (b). Provides that sixty days thereafter each Federal department or agency (after consultation with the Administrator) shall issue such necessary rules and regulations to effectuate the action plan.

Subsection (c). Provides that on or before March 31 of each year, each agency shall submit to the President a report indicating action taken under the plan. The President in turn shall submit a detailed statistical report to Congress on or before May 1 indicating the extent to which the action plan has been successful during the preceding calendar year, together with statistics showing the extent to which each department and agency has complied with the action plan.

§ 2013. Veterans' employment preference under Federal contracts

Subsection (a). Provides that any contract entered into by a Federal department or agency shall contain a provision that those contracting with the United States (including subcontractors to provide personal property or non-personal services) shall give employment preference to otherwise qualified eligible veterans. The President shall implement the provisions of this section within 60 days after enactment.

Subsection (b). Provides that veterans who believe any contractor has failed or refused to comply with the provisions of this section may file a complaint with the Veterans' Employment Service of the Department of Labor which shall promptly refer it to the Office of Federal Contract Compliance for appropriate action.

This section is a logical extension of the President's Executive Order No. 11598 issued or June 16, 1971, which established the national policy that federal agencies, prime contractors, and first tier subcontractors engaged in the performance of federal contracts shall list all job openings (with few exceptions) with the Public Employment Service.

Under this policy as developed, qualified veterans would then be referred first to fill such openings. Unfortunately, the experience under this Executive Order since its issuance has not been encouraging. The Department of Commerce estimates that 2.9 million jobs in private industry resulted from government purchases of goods and services in 1971. The President in a letter dated May 5, 1972, to James D. Hodgson, Secretary of Labor, said that "based on Executive Order 11598 there should be a sizeable increase in the number of jobs listed with the local public employment offices and available to returning veterans." Yet, the most current ESARS data indicates that the total number of nonagricultural jobs listed by all employers with the Employment Service in Fiscal Year 1972 have increased by only 283,000 or 6.6 percent over the previous year. This section, then, is intended to achieve more effectively the intent of the President's Executive Order.

§ 2014. Eligibility requirements for veterans under certain Federal manpower training programs

This section alters current eligibility requirements for veterans to provide for increased enrollment in any job training program assisted under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 or the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962. This section provides that any amount received as pay or allowances while serving in the Armed Forces or any sums received under title 38 or any period of active duty service shall be disregarded in determining the need or qualification of participants in these programs or any other manpower training (or related program) funded in whole or part with Federal funds. Preliminary data for Fiscal Year 1972 indicates that only about 74 percent of the Administration's goal of placing 186,000 veterans in manpower administration programs will be reached. Apparently an even smaller percentage of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's work-training program goal of 9,000 will be met. This section is consistent with recent Manpower Administration Order number 3–72, issued March 21, 1972, and a recent emergency employment act directive by the Department of Labor establishing absolute preference for enrollment of Vietnam era veterans in MDTA manpower training and EEA programs. It is also consistent with the President's May 5 letter to Secretary Hodgson in which he stated "priority modifications which are necessary to ensure adequate enrollment of returning veterans in MDTA and HEW education programs should be made without delay."

TITLE VII—EFFECTIVE DATES

SECTION 701

This section provides that the advance pay and workstudy/outreach provisions contained in Title II and the veterans' loan provisions contained in Title V shall become effective on the first day of the second calendar month following the month in which enacted. The provisions of section 602 shall become effective 90 days following enactment.

SECTION 702

This section provides that the provisions of section 1786 (as added by section 317 of the Committee substitute) relating to correspondence course training shall become effective in the case of each individual veteran or person upon the first enrollment of an eligible veteran or person which occurs on or after the first day of the second calendar month following the month in which enacted.

Section 703

This section provides that the revisions in the law concerning the counting of vocational training in certain institutions contained in section 1788(a)(2) (as added by section 317 of the Committee substitute) shall in the case of each individual veteran or person become effective when a person affected by such change either first enrolls or at the time of his subsequent re-enrollment occurring after enactment.

COST ESTIMATES PURSUANT TO SECTION 252 OF THE LEGISLATIVE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1970

In accordance with section 252(a) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (Public Law 91–510, 91st Congress), the Committee, based upon information supplied by the Veterans' Administration, estimates that the expenditures for the first full year to be $855.3 million, increasing slightly in the second year and thereafter decreasing to a fifth year cost of $670.8 million. The five year total cost is $3.813 billion.

An estimated 1,326,000 individuals would be benefited by rate increases in the first fiscal year, decreasing gradually to 910,000 in the fifth year. The following table shows the number affected in the additional costs for chapters 31, 34, and 35.

TABLE 10.—S. 2161, COMMITTEE SUBSTITUTE, ADDITIONAL COST OF DIRECT BENEFITS DUE TO INCREASED ALLOWANCES—BASIC INSTITUTIONAL RATE $250

[Dollars in millions

	All chapters		Ch. 31 (vocational rehabilitation)		Ch. 34 (veterans' educational assistance		Ch. 35 (wives, widows, and children)	
	Individuals	Direct benefits cost	Individuals	Direct benefits cost	Individuals	Direct benefits cost	Individuals	Direct benefits cost
Fiscal year—								
1973	1,326,000	$731.2	33,000	$19.9	1,232,000	$677.5	61,000	$33.8
1974	1,283,000	705.5	34,000	20.5	1,186,000	650.5	63,000	34.5
1975	1,077,000	592.8	35,000	21.0	979,000	536.9	63,000	34.9
1976	1,037,000	573.4	36,000	21.6	939,000	517.5	62,000	34.3
1977	910,000	505.5	37,000	22.0	812,000	449.9	61,000	33.6
5-year total		3,108.4		105.0		2,832.2		171.1

The number of veterans receiving loans together with the administrative and interest costs for the next five years is shown in the following table:

TABLE 11.—ESTIMATE OF COST FOR EDUCATIONAL LOANS AS PROPOSED BY S. 2161, COMMITTEE SUBSTITUTE, 92D CONGRESS

[Millions of dollars]

Fiscal year	Veterans receiving loans (in thousands)	Total value of loans outstanding	Interest costs	Administrative costs	Total costs
1973	203.2	212.9	12.8	3.0	15.8
1974	228.1	418.2	25.1	4.2	29.3
1975	187.4	544.3	32.7	5.4	38.1
1976	180.1	633.3	38.0	6.3	44.3
1977	152.5	686.2	41.2	6.8	48.0
Total			149.8	25.7	175.5

Estimates for each of the next five years of the total cost of the S. 2161, Committee substitute, by direct benefit and administrative costs are shown in the following table:

TABLE 12.—ESTIMATED COST, S. 2161, COMMITTEE SUBSTITUTE

[Dollar amounts in millions]

	Section No.	Fiscal year— 1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	5-year total
DIRECT BENEFITS							
Rate increase	101, 102, 103, 303, 317	$731.2	$705.5	$592.8	$573.4	$505.5	$3,108.4
Workstudy	203	30.6	30.6	30.6	30.6	30.6	153.0
Farm training	303	29.1	44.9	44.9	42.8	40.6	202.3
GED under PREP	307	24.0	24.0	24.0	24.0	24.0	120.0
Foreign training, Ch. 35	312	2.7	3.0	3.1	3.3	3.3	15.4
Free entitlement, Ch. 35	314	3.2	3.7	3.5	2.7	2.5	15.6
Tutorial assistant, Ch. 35	314	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.5
Correspondence, Ch. 35	314, 317	.6	.7	.9	.9	1.0	4.1
OJT, Ch. 35	314, 317	7.1	7.9	7.2	6.9	6.0	35.1
Female veterans	408	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.4	8.6
Educational loans	501	12.8	25.1	32.7	38.0	41.2	149.8
Total, direct benefits cost		843.4	847.4	741.5	724.3	656.2	3,812.8
ADMINISTRATIVE COST							
Work-study	203	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	22.5
Reduce counseling, Ch. 35	311	−1.0	−1.0	−1.0	−1.0	−1.0	−5.0
Check delivery fee	316	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.1	1.0	6.3
Personal contact, Outreach	410	3.0	2.8	2.7	2.5	2.4	13.4
State approving agencies	411	.6	.6	.6	.7	.8	3.3
Comparative study	412	.2	.2				.4
Educational loans	501	3.0	4.2	5.4	6.3	6.8	25.7
Miscellaneous	309, 603	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.5
Total, administrative cost		11.9	12.8	13.6	14.2	14.6	67.1
Total cost		855.3	860.2	755.1	738.5	670.8	3,879.9

TABULATION OF VOTES CAST IN COMMITTEE

Pursuant to section 133(b) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended, there were no tabulations of votes to report; the committee unanimously ordered the bill with an amendment in the nature of a substitute and a title amendment reported favorably.

PREP

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, a number of amendments are also made to the prediscbarge education program—PREP—authorized under subchapter VI of chapter 34 to strengthen the program and encourage greater participation. Under S. 2161 PREP would be authorized for courses needed to obtain an equivalency certificate as well as high school degrees as now authorized. Advance lump-sum payment would be authorized for PREP under title II of this act and the monthly allowance payable has also been increased from $175 a month to $250 a month. In addition, section 1696 (b) has been amended to provide the Administrator the authority to set rates for tuition and fees where schools have similar but not identical remedial programs for educationally disadvantaged. This confirms the interpretations of the VA that less intensive, less costly remedial programs offered by a school which are similar but less comprehensive than the PREP will not serve to limit the amount of fees and tuition that the school is permitted to charge for a PREP course.

Technical amendments are also made in the present clock hour measurement system now applied to PREP and college preparatory programs to provide significant new incentives to institutions to initiate or expand such programs. The law is also amended to permit participation of qualified nonprofit private colleges in subchapters V and VI courses. I ask unanimous consent to include in the RECORD at this point a status report on special programs authorized under subchapters V and VI received by the Committee from the Veterans' Administration on February 25, 1972.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF VETERANS' AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C. February 25, 1972.

Hon. VANCE HARTKE,
Chairman, Committee on Veterans' Affairs, U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: As promised I am replying to your inquiry requesting a status report on the special programs authorized by subchapters V and VI, chapter 34, title 38, U.S. Code.

The Department of Defense has advised us that they do not have a list of all the military bases participating in PREP. I am sure that they would be pleased to gather this information upon your direct request for it.

Even if a list of participating military bases were available, it would not present a complete picture of PREP participation by the individual servicemen. In addition to actually offering PREP on military bases, schools may also offer courses under PREP at their regular locations. Since many servicemen might pursue these courses during off-duty hours, their participation and the schools' participation might not be reflected in Department of Defense statistics when the military bases are not directly involved in the program.

We also do not have a list of all the educational institutions offering courses under the provisions of PREP. Any refresher, remedial, deficiency, or high school course pursued by a serviceman would be under PREP. Virtually all colleges and high schools offering approved courses may participate in PREP by simply enrolling a serviceman in such a course.

I have attached copies of our reports with the available statistics on participation rates under subchapters V and VI, chapter 34, title 38, U.S. Code. Attachment A reports the participation rates by State during fiscal year 1971 and reports cumulative participa-

tion rates by State through June 30, 1971. The cumulative portion of the report begins with October 1, 1967, the effective date of Public Law 90–77. This law amended chapter 34, title 38, U.S. Code to provide free entitlement for the same types of courses now covered by subchapters V and VI, chapter 34, title 38, U.S. Code. The participation rates for veterans would be under section 1691, title 38, U.S. Code while the participation rates for servicemen would be under PREP, section 1695, title 38, U.S. Code.

Attachment B reports the participation rates under the free entitlement programs by month from June, 1971. Reliable monthly figures are not available for the period prior to June, 1971. As on Attachment A, veterans' participation rates would be under section 1691, title 38, U.S. Code, and servicemen's participation rates would be under section 1695, title 38, U.S. Code. These monthly figures are not available by individual State because only a yearly report by State is produced and it is produced at the end of the fiscal year.

The cumulative report of participation through December, 1971, is not a total of the cumulative report through June, 1971, plus the monthly participation since then. Each monthly figure indicates participation during that month. This figure includes those who have had free entitlement in other months and who are currently enrolled during the report month. The cumulative report, therefore, indicates the total individuals who have received free entitlement not the total months of free entitlement granted.

Attachments C through N report the monthly participation rates in the tutorial assistance program from July, 1970, through June, 1971. Since there was only one participant between March 26 and June 30, 1970, there are no reports for this period. Attachments O and P report the quarterly participation rates for the quarters ending on September 30, 1971, and December 31, 1971, respectively. We no longer compile the tutorial assistance report on a monthly basis.

We will be pleased to provide you with copies of the reports on the participation rates under these programs on quarterly basis. We will also furnish the annual report on free entitlement participation rates when it is available.

The Veterans Administration's responsibilities for implementing the special programs in subchapters V and VI, chapter 34, title 38, U.S. Code have fallen into three main areas. These three areas are:

1. Preparation, publication, and dissemination of basic information and instructions pertaining to the programs.

2. Providing information and technical assistance directly to interested schools and organizations.

3. Course approvals for PREP programs offered overseas.

While three separate areas of responsibility can be identified, there is a certain amount of overlapping among them.

Shortly after Public Law 91–219 was enacted, our implementing instructions and regulations were published. These were distributed to all our offices, the State approving agencies, and the United States Armed Forces Institute. Our offices in turn distributed this material to all educational institutions offering any course approved for veterans' training while the United States Armed Forces Institute distributed the material to the base education officers throughout the world. These instructions and regulations advised the schools and the military's base education officers of the new programs made available by the law.

After these basic publications were completed, our information pamphlets were revised to include descriptions of the special programs. We also published individual pamphlets on the PREP and tutorial assistance programs. These pamphlets have been made available to the military, schools, and other organizations for distribution to interested veterans and servicemen.

Our publications are, of course, subject to constant review to keep them current. Additionally, new publications are prepared as the need arises. Last summer we published a guide concerning PREP and programs for the educationally disadvantaged veteran. Our experience since the enactment of Public Law 91–219 showed a need for a publication to answer many commonly asked questions. The guide is very comprehensive and has been widely distributed in the same way that the initial instructions and regulations were.

No matter how carefully phrased, however, the printed word is not a substitute for personal action. Our personnel both in Washington and in our regional offices have always been available to provide technical assistance and advice to schools and other organizations concerned with these programs. We have met individually with schools and have actively participated in group meetings and regional conferences. In addition to discussing the technical requirements of the law, we explain the programs and their operations as they will affect both the schools and the students.

Courses under PREP, as with all other courses, must be approved for training. Section 1771, title 38, U.S. Code has delegated the authority for approving courses for veterans' training, including courses under PREP, to the State approving agency appointed by the governor of the State where the school offering the program is located. As soon as a school shows any interest in PREP, we refer them to the State approving agency. Although any refresher, remedial, deficiency, or high school course approved for discharged veterans would be available to servicemen under PREP, a supplemental approval covering the cost of required books and supplies is required for the servicemen to realize their full benefits under PREP. A separate approval would also be required for any new course or program developed for offering under PREP.

We also refer schools to the State approving agencies for assistance in developing programs under PREP. The approving agencies are generally branches or divisions of the State departments of education. One of the functions of the approving agencies when they review a course for approval is the evaluation of its quality and content. Because of their relationships with both the VA and their own departments of education, the State approving agencies are ideally suited to assist in developing programs that have a quality content and are approvable for veterans' training. For this reason and because section 1782, title 38, U.S. Code prohibits the VA from interfering in the operations of a State approving agency, we do not involve ourselves in curriculum development.

In some situations, including PREP programs offered overseas, the VA is responsible for the approval of courses. PREP courses overseas must be offered by an Overseas Dependents School or by a school operating under contract with the Department of Defense. We have continually cooperated with the Department of Defense in developing these programs. This cooperation has included active participation in meetings and conferences to help familiarize Department of Defense personnel with PREP and the other VA education programs. We have also assisted with the preparation of Department of Defense directive materials on our programs. These materials have been distributed to all military bases to aid them in counseling servicemen and in developing PREP programs.

As a result of this cooperation, our regulations were changed shortly after the enactment of Public Law 91–219 to provide for the approval of PREP courses offered overseas. This was required because foreign training is generally restricted to institutions of higher learning. We also changed our regulation that required a course to be offered for a two year period at any new location before a serviceman could enroll under PREP. PREP courses offered overseas by schools under contract with the Department of Defense are deemed to have met the two year rule when the same or similar course has been offered for two years at the school's main campus.

Recently we adjusted our regulation on certifications of need for remedial, refresher, and deficiency courses to allow the service education officers to certify to the need for courses in basic English language skills and mathematics. The previous regulation was a carry-over from the changes required by Public Law 90–77 which authorized refresher, remedial, and deficiency courses for veterans without a charge to their entitlement. At that time, of course, there was no need to include certifications by service education officers. The change was made after consultation with the Department of Defense, and they have already issued their directive setting forth the guidelines to be followed by the service education officers in exercising their new authority. We provided technical assistance to the Department of Defense in their preparation of these guidelines.

Our contacts with the Department of Defense have mainly been with the education branches of the different service departments because the Department of Defense is controlling PREP, both in the United States and overseas, through these branches. The education branches have been charged with developing participation in PREP. With overseas PREP they actually control the program through the Overseas Dependents School System or through their contract with the school offering the program. Where there has been a need for PREP programs, they have been established.

The question of curriculum development has been left to the Department of Defense. Since PREP is being controlled by the education branches of the service departments, they are in the best position to evaluate the needs of the servicemen and to develop programs that will be both attractive and useful to them. In any case, section 1782, title 38, U.S. Code prohibits us from interfering in the operations of any school.

In addition to the Overseas Dependents Schools, there is one school currently operating a PREP program overseas. The school is Big Bend Community College of Moses Lake, Washington. It is operating at five locations in Germany with over 500 servicemen enrolled. The school is operating under contract with the Department of the Army and is expected to serve as a model for expansion of this part of the program. The Department of Defense has already referred other interested schools to us for the technical information they need in order to structure an approvable PREP program. We expect to receive additional inquiries about and approval requests for programs offered under contract with the Department of Defense in the near future.

When PREP was initially established, a serviceman was required to submit three separate forms in order to have payment released. With the Department of Defense directly involved in PREP, however, we realized that no purpose was being served by having the same signatures on a series of different forms. We have, therefore, combined these forms into one, incorporating the information from the previous three forms. This has allowed for a much more orderly administration of the program for everyone from the individual serviceman to our own personnel.

We provided a kind of package processing for overseas PREP enrollments that met with very good success in the limited area of overseas enrollments. We are, therefore, in the

process of advising all our offices that the benefit of this package processing should be offered to all schools providing PREP programs.

Although we are not in a position to require any school to offer training under PREP, we have provided any assistance within our area of responsibility that has been requested of us. We will continue to provide this assistance whenever it is needed. Our regulations and procedures have been adjusted to make PREP more attractive to both the servicemen and the schools. The regulations and procedures are subject to a continuing review, and we are prepared to make future changes as the need arises.

Similar information has been furnished to Senator Alan Cranston.

Sincerely,

DONALD E. JOHNSON,
Administrator.

ATTACHMENT A

FREE ENTITLEMENT DURING FISCAL YEAR 1971 AND CUMULATIVE THROUGH JUNE 30, 1971, BY LOCATION OF FACILITY

State	During fiscal year 1971			Cumulative through June 30, 1971		
	Total	Veterans	Servicemen	Total	Veterans	Servicemen
United States, total	39,216	35,107	4,109	64,917	60,619	4,298
Alabama	485	484	1	822	821	1
Alaska	19	19		49	49	
Arizona	102	102		226	226	
Arkansas	171	171		272	272	
California	8,976	6,370	2,606	12,612	9,843	2,769
Colorado	780	750	30	968	938	30
Connecticut	319	319		638	637	1
Delaware	54	54		91	91	
District of Columbia	506	505	1	867	866	1
Florida	2,143	2,142	1	3,614	3,613	1
Georgia	1,175	1,093	82	1,760	1,677	83
Hawaii	155	48	107	180	72	108
Idaho	134	126	8	273	265	8
Illinois	998	925	73	1,661	1,587	74
Indiana	450	449	1	839	838	1
Iowa	144	144		292	292	
Kansas	117	117		232	232	
Kentucky	238	238		408	408	
Louisiana	196	196		345	345	
Maine	230	229	1	304	303	1
Maryland	879	800	79	1,427	1,347	80
Massachusetts	787	783	4	1,677	1,671	6
Michigan	1,452	1,446	6	2,325	2,319	6
Minnesota	210	210		424	424	
Mississippi	68	68		139	138	1
Missouri	337	337		558	557	1
Montana	92	92		193	192	1
Nebraska	111	108	—3	195	192	3
Nevada	76	74	2	212	210	2
New Hampshire	53	53		116	115	1
New Jersey	794	794		1,761	1,758	2
New Mexico	188	172	16	343	327	16
New York	2,467	2,241	226	4,907	4,679	228
North Carolina	1,512	1,512		2,271	2,270	1
North Dakota	26	26		39	39	
Ohio	1,521	1,520	1	3,269	3,266	3
Oklahoma	188	182	6	344	338	6
Oregon	776	776		1,269	1,269	
Pennsylvania	1,648	1,646	2	3,224	3,219	5
Rhode Island	155	131	24	277	252	25
South Carolina	1,256	1,205	51	1,679	1,627	52
South Dakota	22	22		42	42	
Tennessee	471	470	1	894	893	1
Texas	1,459	1,455	4	2,726	2,721	5
Utah	306	306		535	534	1
Vermont	64	64		111	111	
Virginia	1,218	1,158	60	1,941	1,881	60
Washington	1,592	1,529	63	2,403	2,339	64
West Virginia	162	162		258	258	
Wisconsin	627	627		1,097	1,097	
Wyoming	17	15	2	41	39	2
U.S. possessions	642	642		1,119	1,119	
Foreign	648		648	648		648

ATTACHMENT B

FREE ENTITLEMENT

	Veterans			Servicemen		
	Total	IHL	BCL	Total	IHL	BCL
June 1971	8,468	833	7,635	294	87	207
July	9,861	1,838	8,023	277	79	198
August	7,548	386	7,162	381	124	257
September	10,445	2,799	7,646	165	32	133
October	20,403	8,866	11,537	666	117	549
November	25,710	11,737	13,973	711	152	559
December	25,697	11,075	14,622	499	92	407
Cumulative December 1971	71,096	23,242	47,854	8,562	1,238	7,324

EDUCATION IN THE MILITARY

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, the committee has been quite concerned that the Department of Defense can make greater efforts to effectively utilize and encourage the use of title 38 benefits by active duty personnel. Educators directly involved with the establishment of PREP programs testified before the committee that there appeared to be little real effort by the Department of Defense to encourage local base commanders to adopt and promote PREP programs for eligible servicemen. This view is apparently shared by those within the Department of Defense closely involved with education in the military. Last November in a speech to the Armed Forces education section at the AEA conference Dr. George C. S. Benson, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense—Education—expressed some of the problems that confront the Department of Defense. I ask unanimous consent that his speech reprinted in the June issue of Adult Leadership be inserted in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD as follows:

EDUCATION IN THE MILITARY—SOME CRITICAL COMMENTS

(By George C. S. Benson)

At first sight our military education program looks very good. I suppose it is one of the largest, if not the largest, adult education program in the United States. Forty thousand high school dropouts a year moved to high school equivalency is certainly a worthy accomplishment. The Army reports that 45% of its non-commissioned officers received high school equivalency in the service. Two hundred thirty thousand college courses a year is something to be proud of. We don't know how many degrees are awarded to service men each year, but it is probably in the five thousand range. USAFI's hundred thousand course registration is something to be proud of. And all this is done for less than fifty million dollars—not much over five percent of the budget of the university of the state in which we are conducting our discussions. Uncle Sam seems fortunate in his military education program.

I could also point to signs that our program is moving forward. There are real stirrings of interest in education in the Defense Department. The Air Force is using some of its Project Volunteer money to hire 500 additional educational counsellors. The Commandant of the Marines has announced a desire to use some duty time to help enlisted Marines attain a high school equivalency. Admiral Zumwalt has issued a "Zgram" on completion of high school programs. General Westmoreland has announced that the Army staff is currently exploring a more systematic approach to soldier education. The staff is thinking of several possibilities:

That each soldier who is not a high school graduate should receive high school instruction on duty time.

That soldiers who are high school graduates should have an opportunity to pursue vocational and liberal education on duty time.

That a centrally coordinated program will provide for a logical educational progression over the period of the soldier's service.

The new program, passed by the last Congress, called PREP, is developing slowly in the Armed Forces. But it is developing and the Veterans' Administration has been cooperative in changing rules and asking for legal changes to make PREP more workable.

The above remarks are an outline of what I might have told you last year had I been at the Atlanta conference. This year, however, I am going to add some very important limitations on our programs, limitations which I will state bluntly, and which we can discuss forthrightly.

LIMITATIONS ON OUR PROGRAM

Statistics are unusually inadequate in this business, but our record on high school equivalencies seems to me to be quite deficient. We probably had 40,000 men secure high school equivalencies at the most frequently accepted level of equivalency (35 and 45)

last year. A fine record, except that we probably discharged from the services several times as many men who needed that high school equivalency and had not secured it. Courses were not available, or time was not available, or, all too frequently, the young man's attention was not sufficiently called to the availability of high school equivalency programs, or their potential importance to him. The percentage of those needing high school equivalency who got it was highest in the Army, but only 25%.

Figures on last summer's non-draft volunteers indicate that the volunteer armed forces of the future will include a higher percentage of non-high school graduates. It may drop to fifty or sixty percent graduates in the Army and Marines, sixty or seventy percent in the Navy and Air Force. If these high school non-grads are to become proficient service men, they must receive high school equivalencies fairly early in their military service. If they are not to be added to the unemployed Vietnam veterans, they need high school equivalency. We need a vast improvement of our efforts in this field.

In this connection, the administration of PREP comes in. Congress has authorized VA to assume the actual teaching costs of most high school equivalency work in the armed forces. But the armed forces are making little use of this gift. There may be 10,000 men a year taking PREP programs. The figure is surely not more and may be less. Why this failure to use PREP? Frequently it is because the base education officer will not give up his small patronage of GED staff. It is true that there are complications in Veterans' Administration operations. But VA is doing more to lick these than the armed forces are doing to take advantage of the PREP program.

Another part of our program seems to me to be highly vulnerable. Our college education is mostly for officers. One service in an important theatre reported that five percent of its eligibles are taking undergraduate work, but thirty-five percent of the eligibles are taking graduate work. In this service, the proportion of high school graduates is very high. So the figures really mean that the enlisted men are not taking college courses, but the officers are. "To him that hath shall be given," is the important truth in this situation.

Other figures confirm this unhappy result. In fiscal 1971, course registrations in Army and Air Force were 16.5% of the total number of officers. The corresponding figure for enlisted men was 8%, although both services averaged over 4/5 high school graduates. Of the non-college graduates, in both services courses taken by officers were 75% of their strength and courses taken by enlisted men made up only 10% of their enrollment.

We do not have complete figures on Navy and Marine Corps, but if we add their tuition assistance and PACE enrollments to the Army and Air Force figures, we find that courses taken were 62.9% of non-college graduate officers and 8% of non-college graduate enlisted men. Quite a contrast.

It is true that officers without college degrees are under more pressure to study than are enlisted men. But it is also clear that we just are not tapping the interest of enlisted men with our present college programs. The liberal arts—University of Maryland type program—is just not enough. I share the feeling of gratitude to Maryland which all of us have. But I also share the feeling of Maryland's fine chancellor, who tells me that we should be supplementing his program with a big battery of junior college occupational programs.

Why have we let these college programs drag so badly for so long? Some of the fault lies with us staff people and with commanding officers who have failed to recognize that the education program was failing to reach the man who needed it most—the enlisted man. Some of the fault lies with the colleges which have not always adapted their programs to the needs of the enlisted men. But some of it also lies with the education officer who has not sized up his job adequately or effectively.

EFFORTS TO CURE PROBLEMS

Fortunately, some of the colleges are now showing us a way out of our problem. In many parts of the country, technical schools, community colleges and some state colleges have developed occupational courses which apparently mean more than liberal arts courses to certain kinds of students. You know the list better than I do. Such fields as law enforcement, computer technology, environmental sciences, health services, and business management come to mind. Unfortunately, many of these fields require special teaching equipment. Some of this we must acquire, or borrow from other offices on the base.

Another major criticism of our education programs is that they are not adequately related to military training. There is every reason why education and training should be interrelated. Commanders will give more support to an educational program if it helps secure the military proficiency which they must have in their troops. Education is aided by training, and training frequently requires education. There should be one education and training record to help counsellors advise a man on how to move himself ahead.

In fact, as we know, there are some relationships. Many base education officers do what they can to help a man fit himself for his military occupational specialty. Education courses are sometimes selected to help the service men in a particular area who have specialties which require or are helped by particular educational background.

Overall, however, so far as I know, there is no real joint planning of education and training efforts in any of the services. A good deal is lost by both education and training as a result of this lack of joint planning.

Once again, a variety of offices and people are responsible for this lack of coordination. In the Army, individual training is usually a responsibility of the branch of service which does not have the responsibility for education. In the Air Force, training is somewhat more coordinated by Extension Course Institute but, again, education comes under different staff agencies. I am not fully aware of the interrelationships in Navy and Marines but I know they are not always close.

It would take a brilliant organization analyst to propose a reorganization which would bring education and training closer together. Some day this may occur. It already has in the British Army. In the meantime, there is a clear responsibility on all of us in the military education field to be helpful to military training in any way we can.

As we review our record of inadequate achievement, we naturally ask ourselves the question—who is to blame. Many of you, quite reasonably, feel that you have not had command support. Many commanders, quite reasonably, feel that their mission in education has not been made clear and that they are supporting education to the extent they should.

The real truth of the matter is that the Department of Defense and the Military Departments have not yet thoroughly thought through the extent of their commitment to education. Our instructions are still too broad and perhaps too vague. Under these instructions, an occasional combination of a highly sympathetic C.O. and an aggressive base education officer do a wonderful job. A number of education officers do good jobs with reasonably friendly C.O.s. And in some cases, unfriendly C.O.s and ineffective education officers accomplish little. We on the education side must do our best to make these teams as effective as we can. We must be salesmen as well as educators. We must persuade our commanding officers to give us command support.

The development of education in our armed forces has been gradual. The real start came in World War II; we have largely solidified our gains. There never has been much outside pressure. No study commissions or Congressional committees, even no military study committees, have recommended comprehensive programs. Instead, forward-looking commanders have aided the program, more in some services than in others.

I remind you of the recent outburst of service interest mentioned earlier. It may well be that, urged on by the needs of volunteer armed forces, education will take a real step forward in the next biennium, and that we will regain the position of being among the best educating, as well as best educated armed forces in the world.

All of you are to be commended for your excellent performance in jobs which are sometimes quite difficult.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, for these reasons the committee has added a new section 1697(a) to provide for coordination with and participation by the Department of Defense. This section is intended to provide better focus and direction to PREP and other title 38 programs available for active duty service personnel. The section provides for the submission of a plan by the Department of Defense which shall include provisions for an information outreach program by each Secretary concerned to advise, counsel, and encourage eligible servicemen to make full use of benefits available to them and to provide for joint Veterans' Administration—Department of Defense meetings with appropriate educational institutions to encourage the establishment of programs for eligible servicemen with particular emphasis on remedial programs previously mentioned. One indicator of the need for this section for greater coordination and participation by the Department of Defense is the fact that as late as March of this year the Department of Defense did not have a list of all military bases participating in PREP. Subsequently, the Department of Defense did submit the following list:

ARMY, PREP LOCATIONS BY GEOGRAPHIC AREAS

GERMANY

1. Camp H. D. Smith, Baumholder.
2. Bad Kreuznach Post, Bad Kreuznach.
3. Coleman Barracks, Mannheim.
4. U.S. Army Stockade, Mannheim.
5. Sullivan Barracks, Mannheim.
6. Anderson Barracks, Dexheim.
7. Army Air Field, Finthen.
8. McCully Barracks, Waeckernheim.
9. Lee Barracks, Mainz.
10. Neubraecke Post, Neubruecke.
11. Flak Kaserne, Stuttgart.
12. Krabbenloch Kaserne, Stuttgart.
13. Ludendorff Kaserne, Stuttgart.
14. Kapaun Barracks, Vogelweh (Kaiserslautern).
15. Kleber Kaserne, Kaiserslautern.
16. Gerszewski Barracks, Karlsruhe.
17. Rheinland Kaserne, Karlsruhe.
18. Smiley Barracks, Karlsruhe.
19. Neureut Kaserne, Karlsruhe.
20. Army Depot, Germersheim.
21. Patten Barracks, Heidelberg.
22. Tompkins Barracks, Schwetzingen.
23. Bremerhaven Post, Bremerhaven.
24. Ayers Kaserne, Kirchgoens.
25. Camp Pieri, Wiesebaden.
26. Ernst Ludwig Kaserne, Darmstadt.
27. Cambrai-Fritsch Kaserne, Darmstadt.
28. Kelly Barracks, Darmstadt.
29. Fliegerhorst Kaserne, Hanau.

30. Hutier Kaserne, Hanau.
31. Pioneer Kaserne, Hanau.
32. Coleman Kaserne, Gelahausen.
33. Annex A, Frankfurt.
34. Drake-Edwards Kaserne, Frankfurt.
35. McNair Kaserne, Frankfurt.
36. Sheridan Kaserne, Augsburg.
37. Reese Kaserne, Augsburg.
38. Ray Barracks, Friedberg.
39. Rivers Barracks, Giessen.
40. US Army Depot, Giessen.

U.S. ARMY PACIFIC

1. Fort Schafter, Hawaii.
2. Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.
3. Seoul, Korea.
4. Taegu, Korea.
5. Pusan, Korea.
6. Camp Hovey, Korea.
7. Sukiran, Okinawa.

CONARC

1. Fort Meade.
2. Fort Holibird.
3. Fort Belvoir.
4. Fort Myer.
5. Fort Dix.
6. Fort Eustis
7. Fort Lee.
8. Fort Devans.
9. Fort Monmouth.
10. Aberdeen Proving Ground.
11. Valley Forge.
12. Walter Reed.
13. Fort Benjamin Harrison.
14. Fort Bragg.
15. Fort Benning.
16. Fort Campbell.
17. Fort Gordon.
18. Fort Stewart.
19. Fort Hood.
20. Fort Leonard Wood.
21. Fort Wolters.
22. Fort Jackson.
23. Fort McPherson.
24. Fort Sheridan.
25. Presidio of San Francisco.
26. Red Stone Arsenal.
27. Fort Lewis.
28. McCord Air Force Base.
29. Leatherman General Hospital.
30. Fitzsimons General Hospital.
31. Five missile sights in the Washington and Baltimore area.

U.S. ARMY SOUTHERN COMMAND

1. Fort Kobe.
2. Fort Davis.
3. Fort Clayton.

GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS NAVY PREP PARTICIPATION

CONUS

NAS, Lakehurst, New Jersey.
NAVDIST, Washington, D.C.
CBC, Davisville, Rhode Island.
NAVBASE, Newport, Rhode Island.
NAS, Quonset Point, Rhode Island.
NAVSHIPYARD, Portsmouth, New Hampshire.
NAS, Brunswick, Maine.
SUBBASE, New London, Connecticut.
NTC, Bainbridge, Maryland.
NAVSHIPYARD, Portsmouth, Virginia.
PHIBBASE, Little Creek, Virginia.
NAVBASE, Norfolk, Virginia.
NAS, Norfolk, Virginia.
NAS, Oceana, Virginia.
WPNSSTA, Yorktown, Virginia.
NAS, Jacksonville, Florida.
NAS, Saufley Field, Florida.
NAS, Whiting Field, Florida.
NAS, Pensacola, Florida.
NAS, Corpus Christi, Texas.
NAS, Chase Field, Texas.
NAS, Kingsville, Texas.
NAS, Lemoore, California.
NAS, Pt. Mugu, California.
NAVSTA, Long Beach, California.
NAVBASE, San Diego, California.
NAS, Miramar, California.
NAB, Coronado, California.
NAS, Imperial Beach, California.
CBC, Port Hueneme, California.
NAVSHIPYARD, San Francisco, California.
NAVSTA, San Francisco, California.
NAS, Moffett Field, California.
NAVWPNSTA, Concord, California.
NAS, Whidbey Island, Washington.
NAVTORPSTA, Keyport, Washington.
NAVSHIPYARD, Bremerton, Washington.
POMFPAC, Silverdale, Washington.
NSA, Seattle, Washington.

PACIFIC AREA

NAVBASE, Subic Bay, Philippines.
NAS, Cubi Point, Philippines.
NAF, Atsugi, Japan.
MCAS, Iwakuni, Japan.
COMFLEACTS, Sasebo, Japan.
COMFLEACTS, Yokosuka, Japan.
NAVSTA, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
NAVSTA, Midway Island.

ATLANTIC AREA

NAVSTA, Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico.

NAVY PREP AFLOAT

USS Norton Sound.
USS Sacramento.
USS Badger.
USS Alamo.
USS Long Beach.
USS Juneau.
USS Pt. Defiance.
USS Piedmont.
USS Cayuga.
USS Okinawa.
USS Manitowoc.
USS Manatee.
USS Kitty Hawk.
USS Kyes.
USS Ogden.
USS Brooke.
USS Hull.
USS Buckley.
USS Parks.
USS San Bernardino.
USS Hancock.
USS Lockwood.
USS Jouett.
USS Dixie.
USS Hamner.
USS Coral Sea.
USS Constellation.
USS Prairie.
USS Vancouver.
USS Shields.
USS Thomaston.
USS Providence.
USS Dubuque.
USS Fox.
USS King.
USS Eldorado.
USS Ajax.
USS Fresno.
USS Durham.
USS Bauer.
USS Jason.
USS Frederick.
USS Marvin Shields.
USS Orleck.
USS Rupertus.
USS Shelton.
USS Wilson.
USS Bryce Canyon.
USS Observation Island.
USS Bausell.
USS Entemedor.
USS Barry.
USS J. K. Taussig.
USS Puget Sound.
USS Dealey.
USS Wm. R. Rush.
USS Cecil.
USS Farragut.
USS Mississinewa.
USS Glover.
USS Grand Canyon.
USS Davis.
USS Dewey.
USS McCloy.
USS Severn.
USS Voge.
USS Talbot.
USS E. McConnell.
USS Stickell.
USS O'Hare.
USS L. Y. Spear.
USS Lawrence.
USS Forrestal.
USS Hawkins.
USS Leahy.
USS Charleston.
USS Ranger.
USS Trigger.
USS Enterprise.
USS Oriskany.
USS Pigeon.

PROGRAMS ACTIVE IN FEBRUARY AND ADDED IN MARCH 1972

Locations

Conus

Hanscom Field, MA, AF Systems Command, off-base.

Offutt AFB, NE, Strategic Air Command, off-base.

Vandenberg AFB, CA, Strategic Air Command, on-base.

K. I. Sawyer AFB, MI, Strategic Air Command, on and off-base.

Pease AFB, NH., Strategic Air Command, on-base.

Wurtsmith AFB, MI, Strategic Air Command, on-base.

Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ, Strategic Air Command, on-base.

Fairchild AFB, WA., Strategic Air Command, on-base.

Grand Forks AFB, ND., Strategic Air Command, on-base.

Malmstrom AFB, MT, Strategic Air Command, off-base.

Holloman AFB, NM, Tactical Air Command, on-base.

Langley AFB, VA, Tactical Air Command, on-base.

Mountain Home AFB, ID, Tactical Air Command, on-base.

Nellis AFB, NV, Tactical Air Command, on-base (March start).

Andrews AFB, MD, Hq Command, on-base.

Hamilton AFB, CA, Aerospace Defense Command, on-base.

Ent AFB, CO, Aerospace Defense Command, off-base.

McGuire AFB, NJ, Military Airlift Command, on and off-base.

McChord AFB, WA, Military Airlift Command, on and off-base.

Scott AFB, IL, Military Airlift Command, on-base.

Lowry AFB, CO, Air Training Command, on-base.

Sheppard AFB, TX, Air Training Command, off-base.

Robins AFB, GA, AF Logistics Command, on and off-base.

Hill AFB, UT, AF Logistics Command, off-base.

Pacific Area

Kadena AB, Okinawa, Pacific Air Force, off-base (Kubasaki HS).

European Area

Rhein Main AB, Germany, U.S. Air Forces, Europe, on-base (March start).

PROGRAMS PLANNED FOR START IN APRIL 1972

Conus

Kincheloe AFB, MI, Strategic Air Command, on-base.

Forbes AFB, KS, Tactical Air Command, on and off-base.

Bolling AFB, DC, Hq Command, on-base.

European Area

Ramstein AB, Germany, U.S. Air Forces, Europe, on-base.

Alconbury RAF, UK, U.S. Air Forces, Europe, on-base.

Wiesbaden AB, Germany, U.S. Air Forces, Europe, on-base.

Zweibrucken AB, Germany, U.S. Air Forces, Europe, on-base.

MARINE CORPS PREP PARTICIPITION

GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS

MCB Camp Pendleton, Calif.
MCB 29 Palms, Calif.
MCSC Barstow, Calif.
MCRD San Diego, Calif.
MCAS El Toro, Calif.
MCB Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.
MCAS Iwakuni, Japan.
MCB Camp S. D. Butler, Okinawa.
MB Philippines.

The committee intends that the amendments to the PREP program previously mentioned and section 1697(a) will enable the wider expansion of PREP programs at bases other than those listed above.

FARM TRAINING

Section 306 of the committee bill amends the farm cooperative program by lessening the total hour requirements for classroom farm training from 528 to 200 hours and replacing it with a more individualized and practical on farm assistance program. This change in the existing program which represents a reactivation of the on farm training as provided under World War II and the Korean conflict veterans education program was made by the committee to overcome a major impediment that has kept veterans who are farmers from availing themselves of agricultural training under the GI bill.

There is little question that the requirement that farmers spend 528 hours annually in the classroom and not satisfy any of their instructional requirements on their farm has prevented farmers from participating in the program. Only 8,624 veterans have enrolled in agricultural training under the current GI bill from January 1966 through April 1972 a period during which no on farm instruction was authorized for credit under the law. In contrast, a total of 690,000 veterans enrolled in on farm instruction under the World War II GI bill and another 95,000 enrolled in the Korean conflict GI bill.

The fact that the high classroom attendance requirement has placed farm training under the GI bill out of the reach of most otherwise eligible farm veterans is tragic, for this instruction is increasingly essential if young farmers are to remain in farming. Today's farmer cannot survive without modern management skills and technological know-how.

At the same time it is increasingly apparent that we must do whatever we can to maintain family farmers on the land with a viable farm enterprise rather than stand by indifferently and watch the drift of rural people into overcrowded urban centers. On-farm training can be conducted with no dilution of educational quality provided it is adequately supervised and monitored.

The State of Minnesota's general adult vocational agricultural farm business management program which includes on-farm training has been in operation for 10 years and is an example of the sort of program contemplated by the amendments proposed in this act. Investigative studies of the World War II and Korean conflict on-farm training programs have shown that such training has been notably successful in general, although it has been subject to some abuses.

A general study of the Korean conflict on-farm training program conducted by the Minnesota State Department of Education in 1959 surveyed some 2,286 Korean veterans enrolled for 2 years during 1954 to 1956. This study showed that "there are many veterans who would not have gone on to become established in farming if an institutional on-farm training program had not been available."

The report showed substantial gains in capital, assets, and net worth of farmer veterans who participated in this program. I am convinced that adequate monitoring of on-farm training programs can be accomplished to eliminate substantial abuse should this program be adopted.

I ask unanimous consent that communications received from the president of the National Farmers' Union, the Indiana Farmers Union and the National Farmers Organization, urging support for adoption of these provisions be inserted in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

NATIONAL FARMERS UNION,
Washington, D.C., June 26, 1972.

Hon. VANCE HARTKE,
Chairman, Committee on Veterans Affairs, Subcommittee on Readjustment, Education, and Employment, Old Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR VANCE: I was very pleased that your Veterans' Affairs Subcommittee last Friday approved 1972 amendments to the G.I. Bill, with provisions for reduction of the annual classroom hours under the Cooperative Farm Training Program from 528 to 200. This reduction in classroom hours, I am convinced, will, if enacted into final law, provide for greater participation for farmers who are veterans under the G.I. Bill without significantly decreasing the educational quality of the Cooperative Farm Training Program.

Allow me to commend you for your leadership on the Subcommittee in making this important change in the Bill. I hope that you will be able to report the bill out of your full Committee soon, so that it can move to the floor of the Senate.

You can be sure that National Farmers Union will continue fully to support your efforts in securing the reduction in classroom hours when the bill goes to the floor of the Senate, and subsequently, when it goes to conference with the House.

Best regards,

TONY T. DECHANT.

INDIANA FARMERS UNION,
July 28, 1972.

Hon. VANCE HARTKE,
Chairman, Committee on Veterans' Affairs, Subcommittee on Readjustment, Education, and Employment, Old Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR HARTKE: I want to commend you for your leadership on the Subcommittee and in amending the G.I. Bill with provisions for reduction of the annual classroom hours under the Cooperative Farm Training Program from 528 to 200. I am convinced this reduction in classroom hours will provide for greater participation of farmer-veterans under the G.I. Bill without decreasing the educational quality of this training program.

I want to assure you that I will do everything I can to support your efforts in securing the reduction in classroom hours when this goes to conference with the House.

Best regards,

HAROLD W. WRIGHT,
President.

NATIONAL FARMERS ORGANIZATION,
Corning, Iowa, June 22, 1972.

Hon. VANCE HARTKE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR HARTKE: The National Farmers Organization takes this opportunity to express briefly certain viewpoints relating to legislation now under consideration in the Veterans Affairs Subcommittee on Readjustment, Education and Employment.

Our concern centers on the requirement for 528 hours per year of prescheduled classroom instruction as it applies to farm veterans. Although the current classroom hours requirement may not be solely responsible for the decline in the use of this program by present-day veterans, as compared to the record following World War II, we are convinced that it is a major contributor to this decline.

As you know, the young veterans who are most apt to benefit from training of this type are also the ones with time-consuming responsibilities in their farming activities. The current high cost of inputs in the average farm operation makes it mandatory that an operator of a small or moderately large farm unit perform most of his own labor and run the farm with great care and diligence.

Various studies of the effectiveness of training under the G.I. bill have concluded that actual on-the-job instruction may be equal to or more effective than classroom work. Our observations in the farm communities and the opinions of many of our members confirm the viewpoint that training in methods of modern day farm management and related topics can be best carried out on a one-to-one basis, with the instructor working with the young farm operator in terms of his own problems.

Furthermore, this arrangement is solidly based on established principles of learning theory. Indeed, it is the current trend in most of the vocational and industrial arts to combine classroom instruction with on-the-job training at both the senior high and college levels.

We are aware of the fact that another farm organization has recommended reduction of the 528 hour classroom minimum to 200 hours, supplemented by 328 hours of individualized instruction to be carried out on the farm under actual working conditions. We support this proposal. We would also be amenable to a 50–50 division of the requirement time, following the precedent of early training programs, if your committee believes this to be the only way to gain ready acceptance of a change by the Senate and members of the House. This compromise would still be a substantial improvement over the provisions now in effect.

Sincerely,

CHARLES L. FRAZIER.
Director, Washington Staff.

TUTORIAL ASSISTANCE

Mr. HARTKE. In section 306 the committee has also made amendments in the current tutorial assistance program authorized under section 1692. This section authorizes individual tutorial assistance of up to $50 a month for a maximum of 9 months for a veteran who has a "marked deficiency" in required subjects if such assistance is necessary for the veteran to successfully complete the program.

The committee substitute eliminates the adjective "marked" to emphasize that a student does not need to be actually failing in order to qualify for tutorial assistance. This section is also amended to clarify that a veteran may receive assistance for a period in excess of 9 months provided he does not exceed a maximum of $450—9 times $50—so that a veteran will not lose a full

month's eligibility of $50 merely by taking 1 hour of tutoring during such month as under present VA regulation.

The committee has been quite disappointed as to the relatively few veterans who have made use of tutorial benefits under section 1692. Most have averaged under 3 months of assistance per participant. Breakdown by reporting station with the period ending March 31, 1972 from the program's inception is shown in the following table:

REPORT FOR QUARTER ENDING—MAR. 31, 1972, 2524-12

Tutorial assistance—Ch. 34

Station name	Station No.	Individuals paid: This quarter	Individuals paid: To date	Payment months: This quarter	Payment months: To date	Dollars paid: This quarter	Dollars paid: To date	Payment months for which a maximum rate of $50 per month was paid to date
Item		1A	1B	2A	2B	3A	3B	4A
Grand total		3,044	8,590	5,559	17,383	227,819	690,796	7,292
Area No. 1—total		363	846	829	1,851	33,758	76,410	943
Conn.: Hartford	308	20	47	42	134	1,646	5,701	70
Del.: Wilmington	360	6	11	11	35	340	1,398	17
District of Columbia: VBO	372	16	47	40	119	1,456	4,646	37
Maine: Togus	402	8	18	15	55	698	2,221	25
Maryland: Baltimore	313	7	20	30	47	915	1,494	6
Massachusetts: Boston	301	43	109	92	268	3,875	11,318	151
New Hampshire: Manchester	373	7	10	1	49	289	597	4
New Jersey: Newark	309	51	109	95	206	4,073	8,206	84
New York: Buffalo	307	94	126	256	311	10,598	12,712	159
New York	306	51	79	130	195	5,219	7,829	89
Pennsylvania: Pittsburgh	311	25	79	44	210	1,897	9,116	133
Rhode Island: Providence	304	8	21	20	31	618	879	7
Vermont: White River	405	1	4	3	6	85	195	7
West Virginia: Huntington	315	26	175	50	230	1,999	10,098	154
Area No. 2—Total		1,004	3,328	1,649	5,689	69,187	205,915	2,486
Alabama: Montgomery	322	44	163	96	291	4,036	10,889	60
Arkansas: Little Rock	350	154	672	199	882	9,194	40,420	615
Florida: St. Petersburg	317	82	315	264	754	11,622	32,553	410
Georgia: Atlanta	316	85	322	192	533	8,382	22,375	247
Kentucky: Louisville	327	22	66	26	142	914	5,217	49
Louisiana: New Orleans	321	161	470	161	570	7,160	24,584	331
Mississippi: Jackson	423	7	12	20	43	600	6,234	11
North Carolina: Winston-Salem	318	53	128	100	365	4,441	15,176	163
Puerto Rico: San Juan	455	NG						
South Carolina: Columbia	319	69	146	121	309	5,060	11,942	145
Tennessee: Nashville	320	87	368	136	612	5,021	19,414	168
Texas: Houston	362	35	130	52	284	1,863	10,400	90
Waco	349	180	487	231	784	9,030	27,304	149
Virginia: Roanoke	314	25	49	51	120	1,885	4,249	45
Area No. 3—Total		779	2,121	1,417	5,169	57,218	203,745	1,893
Illinois: Chicago	328	42	301	71	589	2,885	22,772	178
Indiana: Indianapolis	326	41	65	86	181	3,439	7,387	77
Iowa: Des Moines	433	19	68	38	197	1,548	7,418	81
Kansas: Wichita	452	54	117	81	261	2,830	9,016	85
Michigan: Detroit	329	73	161	176	389	3,015	14,309	151
Minnesota: St. Paul	335	18	57	42	159	1,975	1,009	61
Missouri: St. Louis RO	331	105	308	155	726	7,647	28,725	83
St. Louis RPC	376							
Nebraska: Lincoln	334	13	28	37	71	1,377	2,503	20
North Dakota: Fargo	437	35	73	66	187	2,931	7,564	72
Ohio: Cleveland	325	32	65	60	169	2,148	6,356	63
Oklahoma: Muskogee	351	188	518	295	1,507	12,249	63,842	805
Pennsylvania: Philadelphia	310	43	117	79	251	3,111	7,393	98
South Dakota: Sioux Falls	438	17	26	39	102	1,102	4,455	711
Wisconsin: Milwaukee	330	99	217	159	380	6,299	13,616	138
Area No. 4—Total		898	2,295	1,664	4,674	67,656	184,726	2,070
Alaska: Juneau	363	0	1	0	2	0	23	0
Arizona: Phoenix	345	35	56	80	142	3,048	5,535	21
California: Los Angeles	344	231	479	462	1,174	19,912	48,992	643
San Francisco	343	177	592	351	1,028	14,822	43,997	568
Colorado: Denver	339	75	187	134	468	5,544	18,365	318
Hawaii: Honolulu	359	5	13	19	43	870	1,764	20
Idaho: Boise	447	58	172	65	216	2,650	4,450	124
Montana: Fort Harrison	436	30	78	56	194	1,990	6,062	18
Nevada: Reno	454	11	29	17	43	677	1,648	13
New Mexico: Albuquerque	340	9	42	27	110	794	3,770	34
Oregon: Portland	348	110	254	188	551	6,498	18,169	120
Philippines: Manila	358							
Utah: Salt Lake City	341	26	76	41	107	1,406	3,305	35
Washington: Seattle	346	99	266	168	421	6,779	15,855	154
Wyoming: Cheyenne	442	32	54	56	178	263	781	119

Mr. HARTKE. The amendments previously discussed are intended to spur greater usage in the program. But more important than any changes made in the law by this bill is the need for a change in attitude on the part of the Government to more fully publicize the program's existence to colleges and veterans to provide administrative regulations which make it possible to obtain tutorial assistance with a minimum of redtape. A letter to the editor of the New York Times published on June 1, 1972 from Assistant Dean Joseph Mulholland of Fordham University speaks eloquently to this issue. I ask unanimous consent that the letter be inserted in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection the letter was ordered to be printed, as follows:

VIETNAM VETERANS' EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS

To the Editor:

I have thought for weeks about your April 13 editorial calling the community's attention to the shamefully low educational benefits given to Vietnam veterans. It is excellent so far as it goes, but it does not go far enough.

The Vietnamese war is a national disgrace. Its chief victims are the people of North and South Vietnam. Its secondary victims are the young men, especially the young enlisted men who have fought there as members of the United States armed services. The disproportionate majority of the deprived and disadvantaged, both black and white, who have fought in Indochina receive stingy handouts; they deserve, as you imply, generous benefits.

They also deserve the right kind of generosity. We have seen members of the poor and lower middle class to fight this war. These men, most of whom, by definition, attended inferior schools, need extra help if they are to do college level work. Before victimizing them by sending them to fight an evil war, we victimize them with an inferior education in basic skills. They need more help than the average student.

Yet the bureaucratic maze through which they, and college administrators like myself, must travel in order to obtain funds for tutoring is all but impenetrable. That is just one instance. There are many. At times, I have found myself muttering, to adapt Kurt Vonnegut's words, "And so it goes."

Let me assure you that I know whereof I speak. Fordham's Excel Program has set out to recruit veterans, precisely because we feel that a liberal education is one smal' way in which we can make up for the injury done to those who fought a war invented (as Jimmy Breslin has pointed out) in Harvard, not in the corridors of John Adams High School.

Men who come into Excel receive inadequate payment and the payment is often delayed for months. (Some of our students are still waiting for their first check after applying for benefits in February.)

Supplemental payments for tutoring are difficult to come by. There is no serious sense in which I can say that veterans are being encouraged by the Government to make use of the benefits they have earned at the risk of their lives in a bad cause.

Is this an accident? I would like to think so. But I don't. Instinctively, our bureaucracy (with the complicity, I must admit, of many academics) is saving the taxpayers' money by surrounding educational benefits with a fog of difficulties that only the more sophisticated (read, middle class) know how to penetrate.

JOSEPH MULHOLLAND.

New York, May 2, 1972.

OUTREACH

Mr. HARTKE. Throughout the course of our hearings we were struck by statements made by Vietnam-era veterans as to the need for personal contact if veterans are to use their GI bill opportunities. Letters from the veterans in magazines, news stories, and interviews are replete with examples of men who are not responding to traditional methods of approach. A recent article in the Washington Post illustrates the feelings

of those veterans in the use of Vietnam-era veterans as counselors to assist their fellow veterans. These men have been through the war.

Many of them were drafted or felt compelled to enlist because they were from lower income families which did not have the means to provide them with a college deferment or with special occupational deferments such as that of a teacher. These men feel that they have been taken advantage of by the system, a thought which might well occur to me if I were drafted under those circumstances. Because of their attitudes they do not and will not respond once they have returned home to that system when it approaches them once again in the traditional manner.

Vietnam veterans, according to Dennis Baker, Veterans' Outreach Coordinator from Montgomery County, throw away VA pamphlets and forms without reading them. What is needed from the Veterans' Administration is more personalized contact as described in the following article for which I ask unanimous consent to be inserted in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection the article appears as follows:

EX-OFFICER HELPS VETERANS SURVIVE IN CIVILIAN WORLD

(By Doug Brown)

"Where do I go?" "What do I do?"

These are usually the first questions asked by the typical Vietnam-era veteran when he returns to the civilian world, according to Dennis S. Baker.

Baker knows because he is Out-Reach Veterans Coordinator for Montgomery County, where since November of last year he has been answering veterans' questions about jobs and education.

He also knows because he served as an Army officer until June, 1971, and spent almost half a year looking for a job, until he was hired through the federally financed Montgomery County Public Employment Program.

Sitting in his small office on the Rockland campus of Montgomery College, Baker said "one of the first things he tries to do is establish his credibility with veterans, who are often distrustful of the "establishment oriented." He makes it clear he is not an employee of the Veterans Administration, because, he said, many veterans have a negative attitude toward it.

Veterans don't like to deal with Veterans Administration bureaucrats who have been doing the same thing for 10 to 15 years, said Baker. He said these VA counselors don't know how to deal with the particular problems of the Vietnam-era veteran, and the veteran is inundated with VA pamphlets and forms, which he simply throws away without reading, even though they might have some information that would be useful to him.

He said today's veterans are frustrated with the VA because the programs that worked for World War II and Korean veterans will not work today. Baker said the VA does not "speak the language" and "the VA can't do things the way they're doing it." He believes instead in the "outreach concept."

This, said Baker, means going out where the veteran is and talking with him, whether it is a bar or the Montgomery College cafeteria. He said that some veterans resist his first efforts because their military experience has turned them against all contacts with organizations. But he added that most who do this return to see him in about three or four months, after they have encountered a series of frustrations and found the transition back to civilian life more difficult than they had anticipated.

Those veterans that Baker doesn't seek out see him at his office—either through appointment or by just dropping by. Counseling is tailored for the particular needs of each veteran, and many sessions last for an hour or more. Baker's approach is strictly realistic. He makes no promises he can't fulfill.

Baker said some employees will no longer deal with agencies which have traditionally aided the veteran because these agencies are so slow in telling veterans of openings that the jobs are filled by the time veterans apply.

According to Baker, a sizable number of veterans leave the military with bitterness and frustration. Citing his own experience, he said his career was "like 3 years in a vacuum" because he had lost three years out of his life. Baker said he had worked for one year before entering the military and this was all the work experience credit employers had given him, despite his three years as an Army officer. "They give you a pat on the back and tell you it was great you served your country and that's it," said Baker.

Baker said that the military is a traumatic experience for most enlisted men. Then, he said, after leaving the service, they come back and see their friends have two years of college education or job experience. "There are some awful angry people around," Baker said.

Serving as a job, school, and drug counselor is all part of Baker's job, and he estimates he has contacted over 1,000 veterans by mail, phone, or personal interviews.

No one knows exactly how many Vietnam-era veterans there are in Montgomery County. Each month Baker receives a computer printout from the Veterans Administration with the names and addresses of veterans returning to Montgomery County. He estimates the number at between 100 and 150 a month, although the number for March was 243, the last month for which figures are available.

Job fairs, counseling, and seminars have been set up for veterans. Baker has spoken to civic groups, and sometimes, he said, these produced an immediate payoff. After he spoke at the Bethesda Rotary Club, five businessmen came up to him and said they had jobs for veterans. One businessman had 10 openings.

Baker said he is going to ask the Montgomery County Council to expand the Out-Reach program. He would like to see eight veterans hired on a part-time basis to counsel other veterans, about the same number working in Prince George's "Out-Reach" program.

Mr. HARTKE. The Veterans' Administration also must respond more quickly to new methods of outreach than it has in the past. After almost 2 years of discussion and suggestions by Members of Congress that it use mobile vans in outreach work, the VA now has two vans operating in southern Texas on a "pilot" basis. The committee also strongly recommends that the Veterans' Administration make use of its general authority under section 213 of title 38 to contract for outreach services from outside agencies and groups, and further, to coordinate these efforts.

The Seattle Veterans' Committee whose director, Joseph Garcia, testified before our committee offers an excellent example of the sort of coordinated community outreach effort which could serve as a model for other areas of the United States.

Finally, Mr. President, I believe the challenge posed by the Cietnam era veteran together with their tremendous potential that he represents for our country is revealed in a recent article by Tony Jones entitled "The Invisible Army." I ask unanimous consent that it be inserted in the RECORD at this point. There being no objection the article appears as follows:

[From Harper's magazine, August, 1972

THE INVISIBLE ARMY

(By Tony Jones)

I wonder how many Harper's readers have spent more than twenty-five hours, say, talking with a veteran about his experiences in Vietnam. The figure is arbitrary, simply an attempt to create a sense of scale for a curious and unsettling phenomenon: there comes a point, after many hours of talk with veterans, when you become aware that they carry with them two sets of pictures, two sets of perceptions about the war and their experiences in it. One set—for public consumption, as it were, like snapshots in a wallet—is relatively neat, coherent, emotionless; it is comprised of answers meant to turn away further questions, or at the very least confine them to a predictable course. Only gradually, and with trust, does the second set of views emerge; they are far less ordered, more contradictory, charged with more emotion. They invariably contain elements of pain, anger, and despair, and they arise from some deep inner space accompanied by a sense of great vulnerability.

The most comfortable—and most dangerous—myth about Vietnam veterans is that they have not been deeply affected by their service in the war. They have. But as a society, we've done practically nothing to discover the dimensions of their change or to survey its contours. Instead, we comfort ourselves with the thought that men have always gone off to war, that they've always had readjustment problems on their return, and that eventually they always manage successfully to rejoin the society.

Veterans thus become merely another aspect of business-as-usual. We seem to be saying to them, "This war is essentially an aberrational occurrence, a momentary warping of reality to those of you who served in it, no doubt, but something to be put behind you, forgotten at the first opportunity." We greet returning veterans with the expressionless mechanical face of normal bureaucratic procedure and busy ourselves, as we have throughout the war, with everyday affairs. The individual veteran is left to thread his way alone through crowds of strangers, as if the unconcern itself, like a spell, would work forgetfulness.

To the degree that we deal at all with the special situation of veterans, it's with the surgical gloves of statistical analysis. We know there will be eight million Vietnam-era veterans returning to the society; we know or can predict the percentages that will be unemployed, that will have drug problems, that will be in need of physical rehabilitation, that will visit state employment offices, that will go back to school, that will spend the rest of their lives in hospitals, that will apply for GI Bill benefits. But of the men themselves—what they think, hope, expect, need, fear—we know practically nothing.

Such a depersonalized view of the veteran depends in some degree on the persistence of class distinction. The war has hardly ever done more than lap at the edge of the middle class, and in that sense it has been an outsider's war, carried out primarily by the professionals, the blacks, the poor, the uneducated, the mavericks of all sorts. So there has never been any clear or general understanding of why a man might be in that distant place, living a time out of time. The easiest explanation was that the stupid got drafted and the patriotic enlisted. The implicit assumption was that in some way each individual had written his own contract with the war, was getting back a tangible reward—

as a black, to escape the ghetto; as a misfit, to break out of the strictures of education or production; as a romantic, to fulfill some personal heroic image; as a patriot, to act on beliefs deeply held.

Put in its broadest terms, class distinction has simply amounted to an unquestioned acceptance of difference, a dim sense that those who were engaged in the war were different in some manner from those who weren't engaged in it. Nor did the middle class ever quite abandon the conviction that a man had a *choice* about being there, even if that meant only that he had failed to exercise a choice not to be there.

There must also be an element of fear. Why else would we so single-mindedly concentrate on the pathologies of veterans—unemployment, drug addiction, crime, alienation—while persistently refusing to look toward the positive potential, individually and collectively, that they represent? We assert, with varying degrees of righteousness, that the veterans "problem" is a social or economic or political problem, forgetting that above all it is a human question. And somewhere in that missed connection lurks a Roman nightmare, a terror at the idea of a class of legionnaires who are owed more than they have been paid and who, if they speak in unison, will extract their price from the society in a painful reckoning.

As a result, we resist providing veterans with special dispensations of any sort. We require them to stand in the same lines, deal with the same forms, trudge the same paths as anyone else. They can go back to school, but no requirements will be waived and no credit will be given for the experience they have gained. They can apply for jobs, but they are told they have to take their chances with everyone else and that suggestions like job-splitting (one full-time job held by two veterans, each working part time) really aren't very practical since they cause extra paperwork. They can join the American Legion or Veterans of Foreign Wars, but they have to be prepared to wear their hair short and overlook the differences between their own war and Korea or World War II

Nowhere does the veteran see reflected his own view of himself: a person with special resources to offer, but also with special needs to be met. The society fixes him with a blind eye, and he retreats from that blank gaze, learning to say what is expected rather than what he really feels.

The society's message to the veteran is clear: "We require invisibility of you."

All told, we have done a remarkable job of keeping Vietnam at a comfortable psychic distance. The media war is not the real war—no matter how many miles of film we see or yards of print we read or journeys of conversation we take. We've performed the miraculous feat vouch-safed to modern man: we've abstracted the war to the point where, like a communion wafer, it has been squeezed almost dry of any connection to flesh-and-blood reality.

The veteran, practically between breaths, has to exchange the reality for the image. In the span of seventy-two hours, he is flown out of Vietnam, mustered out of the Army, and finds himself back on his doorstep, all the dissonances amplified by the enormous efficiency of the process. Bewilderment is hard to hold at bay, especially when he finds that the war that dominated his existence so recently has only a tiny purchase on the national consciousness.

Then, to one degree or another, each veteran must navigate a hall of mirrors where image chases reality chases image chases reality. It starts from the point that most veterans never believed that Vietnam was "real" life. For GIs in Vietnam, the United States was "the world," as if in acknowledgment of the fact that life really happened back here. Despite the interminable debates, the constant argument, the war was never invested with enough meaning, never occupied enough of our everyday thoughts, for the men engaged in it to think it meant anything important—good or bad—or would change the way the world ran. More than anything else, the war represented an exile for them. The important things were going on back home, and to the extent that they felt connected at all they tended to visualize themselves at the terminus of an isolated tentacle of purpose, separated from the organism as a whole.

But from the perspective of "the world," they quickly learn, the war resembles a puppet show. What they see on television and read in the newspapers bears little correspondence to what they saw, felt, heard when they were in Vietnam. Their political and moral views of the war, to the degree that they hold them, are infinitely more complicated than those that structure the national debate; while we have moved toward the blacks and whites of polarization, their views are drawn with all the subtle and ambiguous shades provided by personal experience. Because of their distrust of slogans and simplifications, only a tiny percentage of the veterans have enlisted in political or ideological campaigns (and what impact they will have as a group on Election Day no one can pretend to predict). The result, paradoxically, is that Vietnam frequently becomes a fuller reality for the veteran *after* he returns home.

The veteran's dilemma, then, is simply which reality to trust. And until he can resolve the conflict in his own way and to his own satisfaction, until he can sort out and order the images and realities, he floats in a vacant uncertainty. When a veteran says—as most do—"I need to get my head together," it is this relativity problem with which he is wrestling.

The continued inability of the society and the veteran to reach each other and to establish bridges for reintegration will be an incredibly costly failure. Already it has been estimated that the cost of normal veterans benefits will exceed the direct cost of the war. Even such a huge figure seems insignificant next to the loss in wasted potential; very simply, the veterans constitute a unique resource.

The conventional wisdom holds that because this has been a bad war, those involved in it could hardly have salvaged anything of value from the experience. On the contrary, the evidence seems to be that Vietnam was an intense and productive, if sometimes horrifying, educational experience for a great many veterans. Like all wars, it functioned as a crucible for maturity; but this war—different in circumstance, nature, and outcome from any other in American history—had special lessons.

For one thing, an indeterminate number of veterans learned forms of self-reliance that this society has few techniques for breeding. Not self-reliance in the physical sense so much as the intellectual: understanding the critical importance of, and having the capacity for, individual judgment. None of the truly hard questions was dealt with in Army manuals, or provided for by Army procedures. Yet despite the lack of a coherent institutional framework, or even an understandable set of explanations, many men succeeded in developing their own existential solutions.

Vietnam was a constant procession of contradictory images, and practically everyone's experience encompassed both the logical and absurd, the banal and heroic, the human and inhuman. Sanity depended either on being able to ignore the contradictions or on being able to fit them into some larger pattern, a larger frame of reference. How do you balance hours of terror against days of boredom? Danger against comfort? Destructive force against the reciprocal risk?

Such problems unquestionably immobilized some men, left them wanderers in a trackless forest where any action is indistinguishable from any other. But other men fashioned their own answers, but not necessarily elegant or sophisticated, but serviceable. And if their individual codes got in the way of discipline, and occasionally resulted in disobeyed orders or impromptu mutinies, they were also life jackets in a sea of strange situations.

For a society rushing pell-mell into an uncharted future, that form of resilience and self-sufficiency is of inestimable value.

A second distinctive resource of veterans is their fund of practical experience in how to make institutional structures serve individual needs. Many veterans would be ideal candidates for positions as "change agents," that newly developing breed whose stock in trade is the ability to restore vitality to fossilized bureaucratic structures or, failing that, to find ways to bypass them.

In Vietnam the soldier's primary image of America is that of a machine. The intricate military apparatus transports him, feeds him, clothes him, cares for him, orders him around. Power is measured by the number of machine parts under one's command. War is waged predominantly by machine.

The soldier's challenge is to attempt to bend or control the machine at whatever points it has the most direct influence over his life. Manipulating its hidden levers brings freedom of movement, choice assignments, luxuries, promotions, and in general makes life more amenable. To a greater degree than previous wars, Vietnam taught many men how to make the bureaucratic, hierarchical machine serve their own purposes. Lacking the conviction that their daily lives and activities were measured against high ideals being served, at the least these men learned techniques that would cross circuits in their favor; at most, they learned how to make the machinery grind to a full halt by throwing their bodies somewhere in the gears, at times so skillfully they could later escape uninjured.

If the veterans' mechanical image of America is granted, then a sense of individuality rests on the confidence that the machine can be influenced, possibly manipulated, to meet important and immediate individual needs. While the machine as a whole may be incomprehensible, an absurd level of order away, there is still hope so long as the local segment of it responds to logic and in effect can be "managed." If this knowledge is left to serve only selfish aims, it will fuel the growing phenomenon of individual guerrilla warfare against social institutions, otherwise known as ripping off the corporate society. Yet harnessed to a sense of social purpose, this capacity among veterans could be put to valuable use. In simple practical terms, among several million veterans there are a great number accustomed to working for change, skilled at finding their way through bureaucratic mazes, and unintimidated by officialdom. In a variety of milieus, they could help assure that our institutional structures remain flexible and responsive to changing needs.

A balanced human view of Vietnam veterans demands weighing their strengths along with their disabilities. One of the first documents to treat the veteran with this respect and seriousness is an informal 125-page report called "Wasted Men," prepared by the Veterans World Project at Southern Illinois University.

"Wasted Men" was put together by sixty-odd Illinois veterans as a summation of a self-study project that began in the summer of 1971. A large part of its significance stems from the evidence it offers that veterans are willing to work hard to understand the situation in which they find themselves. They are doing their homework, and the value of the report is not only in the objective data it provides but in the subjective process it illuminates. The actual report is based on the participating veterans' own experiences supplemented by information gleaned from interviews and questionnaire responses from

about 700 other veterans, 100 employers, and numerous local, state, and federal officials working with veterans. While the report is unpretentious, even self-critical of its limitations, it represents one of the first serious attempts to examine the encounter between the returning veteran and the society.

The idea for the project came from Peter Gillingham, a forty-one-year-old veteran of Korea and former foundation official who was concerned about the small percentage of Vietnam-era veterans using the GI Bill to continue their educations (roughly 20 per cent, compared to 50 per cent following World War II). After talking with veterans, he came to the conclusion that education was failing them by refusing to grant opportunities—and academic credit—for veterans to explore the questions and issues that most concerned them: the evidence was overwhelming that by and large the educational establishment found nothing special about veterans and was unprepared to bend any rules or procedures for their benefit. As a result, the veterans who equated their return to the United States with being locked in a closed room were simply unwilling to voluntarily confine themselves further in one of its closets. Of those who did return to school, a disproportionately high number dropped out within the first year.

Moved by the potential waste of human resources he saw in the situation, Gillingham set out to find ways that veterans could be encouraged, in an academic setting, to define their own needs and design their own programs. He then proposed, and persuaded SIU to accept, an internship program whereby a group of local veterans could study the difficulties that faced them and their peers. The concept was intentionally fluid, and the first ground rule was that the participating veterans would be free to take the project in whatever directions they felt would be most fruitful.

Once the project itself got under way, the energies released by the veterans dwarfed even the outsized energies Gillingham had exhibited in carrying the idea through its initial stages. By all reports, the project was an extraordinarily intense experience for those involved—by turns emotional and analytical, cathartic and exploratory, threatening and reassuring, and, overall, contradictory enough to inspire confidence that it was dealing with the real situations of real people.

"Wasted Men," as a consequence, speaks in many voices. Black veterans argue with white, passionate personal statements overlap collective analyses, statistical evidence is interleaved with intuitive judgments. Similarly, the report treats a huge range of concerns. One moment there is a nuts-and-bolts discussion of the way State Employment Service forms fail to provide ways for the job-seeking veteran to communicate the full range of his service-related experience and skills. The next moment veterans' wives are discussing the marital and sexual problems that flow out of the tensions of readjusting to American society. Later, the report wrestles with the philosophical issue of how the destructive force he is capable of delivering affects a combat soldier's self-perception. The intent of such an improvised orchestration, no doubt, is to increase the likelihood of striking a chord that will bring response. Ultimately. "Wasted Men" provides poignant testimony of the veterans uncertainty about how best to catch the ear of the society, how to make us hear what they have trouble even finding words to say.

In its jumble of insights and personal vignettes, the report contains strong evidence in support of the following conclusions:

The problems of transition and return result in a full-fledged "Vietnam-veteran syndrome" that appears to be of far greater magnitude than was true of previous wars.

The most difficult aspect of readjustment for the contemporary veteran is making the transition into a civilian economy. By the report's reckoning, the national Jobs for Veterans and Job Fair programs have been dismal failures, providing little more than unfulfilled promises.

Veterans seeking further education face severe hardship, not only because GI Bill stipends are so modest and restrictions have been added to the original legislation but because they have different attitudes toward higher education than did their counterparts of World War II.

There is an appalling lack of vigorous or imaginative national leadership dealing with the veterans' situation. Administrative tangles, overlapping responsibilities and jurisdictions, bureaucratic inertia, and lack of contact with Vietnam-era veterans have conspired to prohibit new programs or new ways of thinking about veterans.

The black veteran suffers from special difficulties in reintegrating with the society, frequently as a result of unjust "bad paper" (less than honorable) discharges.

The mistrust of the present methods for dealing with veterans is based on the report's conviction that the panoply of current programs is largely ineffective in acknowledging or responding to what Vietnam-era veterans feel are their primary needs. In the report's words:

"It is essential to make the people aware that the civilian federal-state agency system for veterans is now operating so badly, yet is so well-entrenched and self-sufficient without any reference to or concern for its constituency of Vietnam generation veterans, that it is at least as serious as the now well-recognized 'welfare mess,' and probably worse . . . The treatment most veterans are now getting from these agencies tends to strengthen and solidify the worst possible negative stereotypes about the whole system, about our government and indeed our whole society."

A reading of the report leaves little doubt that a thoroughgoing shake-up of the present bureaucracies, accompanied by a sudden infusion of Vietnam-era veterans in all levels of the Veterans Administration and of the State Employment Services, would noticeably improve the veterans' lot. But the challenge is larger: in the report's view, we need new structures that provide veterans with the freedom to exercise their own initiatives. The dim outlines of a blueprint for such change can be found in the report itself. But its primary value is as a window on the process by which such change should take place—in a symbiotic relationship with the veterans who will be affected by it—rather than as a polished set of recommendations.

Throughout "Wasted Men" there are hints of the anger that exists among veterans. While the tone of the report is civilized and even respectful, there are subtle warnings of a rage that could escape its bounds, of a storm being bred of innumerable individual frustrations. In its closing line, "Let us hope we do not reap the whirlwind," the report expresses an unstated theme: if the immense energies of several million veterans are denied productive outlet or engagement, then we must be prepared to accept the consequences. If that has an apocalyptic ring, its intent is simply to be honest about a very basic matter: the veterans have brought the war back home. It exists in their heads and in their lives, and we as a society cannot long avoid dealing with that fact.

SUPPORT FOR S. 2161

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I am most gratified for the support shown for my bill by veterans' organizations and others who urge quick action and ratification of its provisions. I ask unanimous consent the communications from the National Association of Collegiate Veterans, the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Disabled American Veterans and the AFL–CIO concerning S. 2161 be inserted in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGIATE VETERANS,
Washington, D.C. July 31, 1972.

Hon. VANCE HARTKE,
Chairman, Committee on Veterans' Affairs, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR HARTKE: We appreciate the efforts by your Committee in reporting out the Veterans' Readjustment Act of 1972 (S. 2161, as amended). The Bill is, by far, the most comprehensive legislation offered, and is a clear effort toward meeting today's veterans' needs.

We strongly emphasize that delay in the passage of S. 2161, as amended, and any delaying actions by the Conference Committee in revising any part of this Bill, will gravely affect millions of Vietnam era veterans.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES M. MAYER,
President.

VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, D.C., July 31, 1972.

Hon. VANCE HARTKE,
Chairman, Committee on Veterans' Affairs, Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in reference to S. 2161, the GI rate increase bill, scheduled for consideration and vote by the full Senate this week.

S. 2161 proposes to increase the GI Bill rates by 43%. For a single veteran in full-time training, this would be an increase from the present $175 to $250 a month. Comparable increases are provided for veterans in less than full-time training and other education and training programs administered by the Veterans Administration. The proposed 43% increase substantially carries out a long-held Veterans of Foreign Wars position that the levels of assistance provided Vietnam veterans should be comparable to the levels of assistance provided veterans of previous wars. For this reason, the Veterans of Foreign Wars supports the increases provided for in S. 2161.

There are many other provisions in S. 2161, which is a very comprehensive bill. The Veterans of Foreign Wars has indicated its strong support for proposals which will help the returning Vietnam veteran. This bill is tailored to meet many of the problems of the returning Vietnam veteran, with some of the provisions addressing themselves to the problems of a number of veterans who are having extreme difficulty making a successful transition because of handicaps and other problems derived from the Vietnam war.

The immediate passage of S. 2161 is most urgent. The fall term of most institutions of higher learning will begin this September. Millions of veterans are watching this legislation very closely because the increased rates will be so important in their decision to either commence a training or education course or to continue in one.

The Veterans of Foreign Wars, therefore, supports this legislation and recommends its favorable consideration and approval by the Senate.

With kind personal regards, I am

Sincerely,

FRANCIS W. STOVER,
Director, National Legislative Service.

NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION,
THE AMERICAN LEGION,
Washington, D.C., July 28, 1972.

Hon. VANCE HARTKE,
Chairman,
Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs,
Washington, D.C.:

The American Legion is grateful to you and your Committee on Veterans Affairs for recommendating a substantial rate increase in

veterans educational assistance as provided in S. 2161 which was reported this week.

Vietnam veterans need this rate increase now. Early enactment will make it possible for many of them to pursue their education this fall.

The American Legion hopes, therefore, that S. 2161 will be scheduled for early Senate action so that differences with the House can be resolved without further delay.

JOHN H. GEIGER,
National Commander.

DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS,
Washington, D.C., July 28, 1972.

Hon. VANCE HARTKE,
Chairman,
Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CHAIRMAN HARTKE: The DAV commends you and the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs for your dedicated efforts to improve and expand the existing programs of educational benefits for America's veterans and their survivors.

We strongly support the many innovative features and the substantial rate increases contained in S. 2161, as recently reported by your Committee. On behalf of the nearly 400,000 members of the Disabled American Veterans, I therefore, urge early and favorable consideration of this important legislation by the United States Senate.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES L. HUBER,
National Director of Legislation.

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS,
Washington, D.C., August 3, 1972.

Hon. VANCE HARTKE,
Chairman, Committee on Veterans' Affairs,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: As you are well aware the AFL–CIO has long been concerned with the problems of the American war veteran especially in the areas of employment opportunity and educational assistance. In May of this year the AFL–CIO Executive Council unanimously adopted a resolution calling for, among other things, an increase in G.I. bill educational benefits comparable with post-World War II benefit levels, a veterans' preference tuition loan program and strengthening of accrediting controls and refund procedures for certain types of correspondence and vocational training schools. More recently the AFL–CIO testified before the Senate Veterans Affairs committee as to our specific proposals and recommendations in these and other related areas.

In this context, Mr. Chairman, we feel that S. 2161, entitled "The Viet Nam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1972," introduced by yourself and other members of the committee and reported out by the Veterans Affairs committee on July 26th, will, through its many innovative provisions, solve a number of critical problems which currently plague the Viet Nam era veteran. The over 40% increase in educational benefits will not only encourage more veterans to seek a college education but in doing so partially alleviate the seriously high unemployment rate among returning veterans. Concurrently the monthly advance payment of educational benefits, work study, veterans outreach recruitment programs and low interest tuition loan provisions in the bill will attract even more veterans into degree programs as well as assist the prospective student veteran while he is in pursuit of his college degree. The increase in apprenticeship and on-the-job training benefits and equalization of widow and dependent benefits will allow for greater flexibility in program selection for those seeking educational or occupational improvement training in other than college degree programs. Additionally the strengthening of provisions in the current law as they relate to the advertising, refund and cancellation practices of correspondence and vocational training schools will eliminate a number of practices which have taken cruel advantage of many unwary veterans.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, we in organized labor feel that S. 2161 adds many new dimensions to a program too long overlooked, eroded by inflation and hamstrung by outdated practices. We owe a great debt of gratitude to the Viet Nam veteran and S. 2161 represents a partial fulfillment of that debt. For these and other reasons which I have detailed above, the AFL–CIO fully supports S 2161 and urges quick Senate approval of this important legislation.

Sincerely,

ANDREW J. BIEMILLER,
Director, Department of Legislation.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I particularly want to commend the efforts and contribution of the senior Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON). Senator CRANDON'S outstanding performance this year as chairman of the Subcommittee on Health and Hospitals is well known by all of those who have watched the legislation which has been reported from that subcommittee. But he has been equally helpful as a member of the Subcommittee on Readjustment, Education, and Employment. Drawing on his experience as chairman of the Veterans' Affairs Subcommittee of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare for 2 years prior to the formulation of the full Committee on Veterans' Affairs he has been in a unique position to offer constructive suggestions and amendments to the education legislation pending before this committee.

The provisions for advance payment, workstudy/outreach, and amendments to the PREP program, for example, carry forward and are developments of earlier legislation sponsored by Senator CRANSTON in the Labor and Public Welfare Committee. The efforts of Senator CRANSTON and members of his staff to help produce the best legislation possible for veterans are greatly appreciated by each member of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

Mr. President, I have a technical amendment to S. 2161 which the committee overlooked at the time the bill was ordered reported. I move the Senate adopt the following amendment which I send to the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to read the amendment.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered, and the amendment will be printed in the RECORD.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

On page 74, line 1, insert "AND SAVINGS PROVISIONS" immediately after "DATES".

On page 74, after line 20, add the following new section:

SEC. 704. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1712(b) of title 38, United States Code, a wife or widow (1) eligible to pursue a program of education exclusively by correspondence by virtue of the provisions of section 1786 of such title (as added by section 317 of the Act) or (2) entitled to receive the benefits of subsection (a) of section 1733 of this title (as added by section 314 of this Act), shall have eight years from the date of the enactment of this Act in which to complete such a program of education or receive such benefits.

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1712(a) or 1712(b) of title 38, United States Code, an eligible person, as defined in section 1701(a)(1) of such title, who is entitled to pursue a program of apprenticeship or other on-job training by virtue of the provisions of section 1787 of such title (as added by section 317 of this Act) shall have eight years from the date of the enactment of this Act in which to complete such a program of training, except that an eligible person defined in section 1701(a)(1)(A) of such title may not be afforded educational assistance beyond his thirty-first birthday.

Mr. HARTKE. This amendment provides for a "savings" provision for eligible persons training under chapter 35. Under this provision such persons would have a full period of eligibility for programs of education exclusively by correspondence, apprenticeship, and other on-job training which are made available to them for the first time by this act. This amendment is consistent with previous Veterans' Administration acts. The Veterans' Administration estimates that this will have a minimal cost impact.

I urge adoption of the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Indiana.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Indiana yield?

Mr. HARTKE. I am delighted to yield to the Senator from California.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I am delighted to join with the distinguished chairman of the Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee (Mr. HARTKE) in urging the adoption of S. 2161, the proposed Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1972. I am particularly pleased that so many of my distinguished colleagues have joined Senator HARTKE and myself in cosponsoring this vital legislation.

Senator HARTKE and I introduced S. 2161, as originally formulated, on June 28, 1971. After subsequent extensive hearings on the readjustment and employment needs of returning Vietnam era veterans and on the adequacy of the existing GI bill, the full committee unanimously approved S. 2161, with a committee substitute amendment which Senator HARTKE and I proposed on June 29, 1972.

SUMMARY OF COMMITTEE SUBSTITUTE

The purpose of S. 2161, when introduced, was to provide a more realistic educational assistance allowance to veterans and their dependents. However, since that time it has become clear that more comprehensive legislation, to include the expansion and improvement of many existing GI bill programs in addition to increases in the level of educational assistance, is urgently needed in order to give the Vietnam era veteran the readjustment assistance that he so eminently deserves. Hence, S. 2161, as reported, has incorporated a number of important features of other veterans' readjustment assistance legislation which I authored and which was pending before the committee—namely S. 740 and

S. 2091—and certain administration proposals.

The purpose of this bill as introduced therefore, has been substantially expanded. It includes increasing the vocational rehabilitation subsistence allowance, educational assistance alowance, and the training assistance allowance payable to veterans and eligible persons under chapter 34 and 35 of title 38. Other features include:

Providing for advance payment of the educational assistance or subsistence allowances;

Establishing a work study/outreach program;

Improving and expanding the special programs for educationally disadvantaged veterans and servicemen;

Extending eligibility to certain wives and widows and veterans' dependents—in some instances—for tutorial assistance and participation in correspondence, apprenticeship, and other on-job training, and high school and elementary education programs;

Improving the farm cooperative training program by reducing the number of in-class hours and expanding on-farm instruction;

Establishing a veterans education loan program;

Promoting the employment of veterans by improving and expanding the provisions governing the operation of the Veterans' Employment Service and by providing an employment preference for certain Vietnam era and service-connected disabled veterans in Federal contracts and subcontracts; and

Improving the measurement of high school courses in the case of night adult evening courses and programs for which the Carnegie measurement produces inequitable results and further clarifying the definition of a "child" during a preadoption decree period of custody by the adoptive parents.

GI BILL ALLOWANCE RATES

The increases in the educational assistance and subsistence allowances provided for GI bill trainees are the most important features of this bill. The basic rate for single veterans (and servicemen), without dependents, who are pursuing full time institutional training or flight training is increased from the present $175 to $250 per month. Corresponding increases are made for less than full-time trainees and for veterans with dependents.

The basic monthly subsistence allowance for disabled veteran trainees who are pursuing vocational rehabilitation full time is increased from the present $135 to $200 a month; the basic rate for full-time farm cooperative training is increased from the present $141 to $201.

Mr. President, the present GI bill is not providing adequate readjustment assistance to the approximately 5.6 million Vietnam era veterans in the Nation. In enacting the post-Korean conflict GI bill, the declared purpose of Congress—as set forth in section 1651 of title 38, United States Code was, in part: "extending the benefits of a higher education to qualified and deserving young persons who might not otherwise be able to afford such an education." And: "providing vocational readjustment and restoring lost educational opportunities to those servicemen and women whose careers have been interrupted or impeded by reason of active duty." At present, congressional intent is being frustrated because the present GI bill educational assistance allowances are grossly insufficient. Even with the improvements we made 2 years ago in Public Law 91–219, the existing programs still do not adequately respond to the educational needs of today's veteran.

The neglect of the Vietnam era veteran is particularly shocking, Mr. President, because, in contrast to World War II when all classes of Americans served equally in the Armed Forces, the Vietnam conflict has drawn heavily upon the educationally and socially disadvantaged young men who lacked either the funds or the preparation to continue their education.

This neglect is clearly reflected in the history of Vietnam era GI bill participation rates, which without question have borne a direct relationship to the rate of the allowance in effect at a given time. Under the World War II GI bill, which in virtually every case paid the full educational costs incurred by veterans, the ultimate participation rate among eligible veterans was 50 percent. The comprehensive nature of the World War II GI bill insured that no veteran who desired to further his education or training would be denied that opportunity because of a lack of funds.

Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for Vietnam era veterans. In 1966, the rate of the educational assistance allowance was only $100; in 1967, it was raised slightly to $130. At this meager level of assistance, only 20.7 percent of the eligible Vietnam era veterans took advantage of GI bill benefits between 1966 and 1969.

In 1970, in Public Law 92–219, for which I had the privilege to serve as Senate floor manager, the basic educational assistance allowance was increased, effective February 1, 1970, to $175, and the veteran participation rate immediately rose to 30 percent within a year. It has now increased to about 40 percent. But this encouraging increase is not good enough. Large numbers of Vietnam era veterans who want to go to school simply cannot afford to do so. Many who start school are eventually forced to drop out because of inadequate funds, and many more who are persistent enough to complete GI bill training are forced to endure unnecessary financial hardship in the process.

The fact is that further education is far more of a necessity in the job market today than it was after World War II or the Korean conflict. And, moreover, the Vietnam era veterans most in need of furthering their education or training are those taking the least advantage of their GI bill entitlements.

A recent survey, "A Study of the Problems Facing Vietnam Era Veterans and Their Readjustment to Civilian Life," which was commissioned by the VA and conducted by Louis Harris & Associates, provided concrete evidence that substantial increases in the present allowance rates are a prerequisite to achieving greater Vietnam era veteran participation in the GI bill, a participation at least comparable to that under the World War II GI bill—and I am not one who believes a 50-percent rate is an adequate goal, given the importance of higher education today. This comprehensive survey found that of the approximately 60 percent of all Vietnam era veterans who have never applied for educational benefits, more than half of these veterans certainly would apply if benefits were increased, and another third might apply.

In opposing a substantial increase in the allowance rate, the VA has argued that the allowance has been increased by 75 percent in the last 6 years. The logic of this argument escapes me. The inadequacy of the present $175 rate of assistance as well as the paltry $15 increase proposed by the administration is certainly not made any more acceptable or justifiable because the GI bill of several years earlier was even more inadequate.

The figure the administration supports—an 8-percent increase to $190 for the full-time student veteran with no dependents—is exactly the figure approved by the Senate almost 3 years ago as part of the bill which became Public Law 91–219. I do not believe our struggling returning veterans can wait 3 more years for the administration to come around to our way of thinking on the increase included in the committee substitute.

Mr. President, who would argue that the Vietnam era veteran should not, at long last, receive a rate of assistance under the present GI bill which is comparable to the level of assistance under the World War II GI bill? Certainly, the war he has participated in is no less real; his sacrifice—largely unappreciated at home—has been no less painful; his readjustment problems—as an unheralded and often unwanted veteran—are hardly less great.

I find the reluctance of the administration and the Office of Management and Budget to help the Vietnam era veteran particularly hard to understand in view of the unquestioned soundness of the GI bill as a Federal investment. It is estimated that the cost of the World War II GI bill would ultimately be repaid as much as eight times by the college-educated veteran in the form of additional income taxes paid over and above what the individual veteran would have paid if he had received only a high school education. Can we not expect a similar return on a comparable investment in the Vietnam veteran?

Senator HARTKE and I, and the full Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee, have given very careful consideration both to the amount of increased assistance necessary to make benefits available under the present GI bill comparable to the level of assistance provided by the World War II GI bill—a comparability which I believe constitutes a moral imperative for the Nation—and also to the type of system under which increased benefits could best be paid.

THE WORLD WAR II DIRECT TUITION PAYMENT SYSTEM

As is well-known, a comprehensive investigation of the direct tuition payment system of the World War II GI bill indicated that this program had resulted in a considerable waste, abuse, and inefficiency. The special congressional committee conducting the investigation determined that although veterans "of the Korean conflict are no less entitled to readjustment benefits than veterans of World War II," the interests of veterans and the Nation would be best served if readjustment benefits were paid in the form of a fixed assistance allowance to the individual veteran.

In favorably reporting the House-passed Veterans Education and Training Amendments of 1972, H.R. 12828, the House Veterans' Affairs Committee, led by its distinguished chairman and my good friend, Congressman OLIN E. TEAGUE, gave careful consideration to bills which would have reestablished a program of separate payment to schools for tuition, fees, and other education costs. The House committee concluded that such a change in the existing system of payment of GI bill benefits would renew the same very serious problems that plagued the World War II GI bill.

While I am not convinced at this time that a workable and equitable direct tuition payment system could not be worked out in the future—particularly in view of the greatly improved and highly sophisticated accounting, regulatory, and administrative techniques and practices which have been developed since World War II—I am certain that, without further study, there is no chance that both Houses of the Congress would pass and that the President would sign legislation providing for direct tuition payment in addition to a subsistence allowance. S. 2161 provides for the conduct of such a study which might well confirm the advisability of returning to the World War II system.

But, Mr. President, time is terribly short. We must act quickly in the Senate, and take into account the deeply held views of the House committee and its distinguished chairman, if we are to be successful in enacting a new GI bill for this school year. We owe such responsible action to the hundreds of thousands of veterans who will be attending schools and colleges this fall and who desperately need our help. The consideration of a direct tuition payment program clearly would not serve this purpose. What it would do is to postpone or even entirely frustrate achieving an increase—let alone one of adequate magnitude—for this coming school year. Of that, I am as certain as I can be. And it would be irresponsible, in my judgment, for us to let that happen.

Therefore, Senator HARTKE and I, as well as the full Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee and my other distinguished colleagues who have joined us as cosponsors of S. 2161, have concluded that the appropriate alternative to direct tuition payment is to increase the present GI bill educational assistance allowance rate to the reasonable and practical rate of $250 per month for a full-time student-veteran with no dependents. Such an increase is justified because: First, $250 provides comparability with the level of assistance provided to World War II veterans; second, the cost of both private and public education is sky-rocketing; and, third, the everyday cost of living continues an ever-increasing inflationary spiral.

Under the World War II GI bill, veterans received a tuition payment of up to $500 in addition to a $75 subsistence allowance each month of the school year for a total maximum educational benefit of $1,175 per school year. Between April 1948 and April of this year, there has been an 187-percent increase in the cost of living.

Therefore, the initial computation to provide comparability consists of multiplying $1,175—the maximum educational benefit received by single World War II veterans pursuing full-time training—by 1.87, to compensate for the increase in the cost of living to date. Thus, the World War II GI bill provided the veteran with $2,174 in 1972 dollars.

In addition, the committee believed it wise to make allowance for the continuing inflation which will decrease the dollar value of the increased benefit in the coming year. Therefore, $2,174 is multiplied by 3.5 percent; the resulting $76 is then added to $2,174, to arrive at the total educational allowance of $2,250—$250 per month—for 9 months for the school year, the rate which the S. 2161 committee substitute would establish for a veteran, without dependents, who is pursuing full-time training.

The crucial point is, Mr. President, that although the system of payment would be different, such an allowance would give the Vietnam era veteran the same "hard" amount of educational assistance as the World War II veteran could have received.

Even a cursory examination of the cost of a higher education today provides indisputable evidence that the present 9-month allowance of $1,575 is inadequate, and that, in fact, the proposed $2,250 figure is not only not excessive, but actually rather modest. As I have mentioned, the World War II program gave the veteran a subsistence allowance in addition to the direct tuition payment, which in most cases covered the complete cost of his education—including books—and living expenses.

Although the House committee report stresses that the post-World War II educational assistance allowance was meant to meet a veteran's educational costs "in part," unless the benefit covers a very substantial part not only of tuition costs but of a veteran's total educational expenses, the declared congressional purpose of "extending the benefits of a higher education to young persons who might not otherwise be able to afford such an education" will continue to be frustrated.

And it is noteworthy that the comprehensive congressional study of 1952 which concluded that the direct tuition payment system should be abandoned also emphasized the following basic tenet of the GI bill program which has remained unchanged to this day:

> The scholarship allowance should be sufficient to maintain a veteran student under reasonable and normal circumstances in a reliable educational institution with customary charges for nonveteran students used as a guide.

Since World War II, the cost of education in most schools has increased 300 to 500 percent, far faster than the increase in the average cost of living. The Office of Education estimates that in the coming school year the cost of tuition, room, and board at the average public institution of higher learning will be $1,428; at the average private institution, the figure will be $3,107.

But these figures do not accurately reflect the actual "customary charges" which are necessary "to maintain a veteran student under reasonable and normal circumstances in a reliable educational institution"—to quote the House 1952 study report. The Federal Office of Education estimates that the average total cost that a student must bear today for one school year is $2,726 at a public college and $4,573 at a private institution of higher learning. Clearly, then, an increase from $1,575 to $2,250 in the amount of yearly educational assistance allowance will continue to be only an assistance allowance, meeting "in part" the cost of a veteran's education. I believe that as the result of such an increase to $250 per month, the cost of an education will cease to be the insurmountable obstacle that it is to so many Vietnam era veterans today.

It is important also to note that besides being unacceptable to many in Congress, and strongly opposed by the administration, the proposal to establish a direct tuition payment system of 75 percent of tuition and fees, up to, for example, $1,000, in addition to the present $175 per month allowance rate would also actually provide a lesser benefit for many veterans than a monthly educational assistance allowance of $250. Whereas a fixed allowance permits each veteran to utilize the GI bill according to his individual circumstances and educational needs, a system of direct tuition payment discriminates against veterans attending low-cost or no-cost junior colleges—fully 40 percent of all GI bill trainees today—and many 4-year public colleges and universities. These veterans would receive less under such a program than the programs we propose in the S. 2161 committee substitute—far less when the work-study allowance and veterans education loan possibilities are figured in.

DEPENDENCY ALLOWANCE RATES

In addition to the rising cost of living and education, a very substantial increase is necessary not only in the rate of assistance provided to the single veteran, but also in the benefits provided to the approximately 40 percent of Vietnam era veterans who have at least one dependent. The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that a "lower" consumption budget for a married couple is $238 per month, while a moderate consumption level is $352. Under the present GI bill, a married veteran receives only $205, substantially below even a "lower" consumption level—just for subsistence. BLS figures indicate that lower and moderate consumption rates for a family of four are, respectively $351 and $518. Un-

der the present GI bill, a veteran full-time student with three dependents receives a total of $243.

I wish particularly, Mr. President, to call to the attention of Senators, the rate for the dependency allowance increases included in the committee substitute. All the GI bill program allowances are for the first time built on a single scale—derived by averaging the level of dependency support under unemployment compensation, AFDC, and the adjusted World War II rate—$47 for the first dependent; $42 for the second; and $21 for each additional dependent in excess of two.

The S. 2161 committee substitute would realistically augment the allowance increase on behalf of the dependents of a veteran receiving full-time educational assistance benefits as follows: one dependent, $297; two dependents, $339; plus $21 added to the $339 for each additional dependent. S. 2161 provides for similar increases in the allowances paid to veterans and dependents engaged in other types of GI bill training and also, as I proposed, makes all part-time rates directly proportional to the percentage of training time; for example, the half-time rate would be $125 per month for the veteran—with no dependents—studying on a half-time basis.

IMPROVEMENTS IN SPECIAL GI BILL PROGRAMS FOR THE EDUCATIONALLY DISADVANTAGED

Even more distressing than the low-participation rate for the general Vietnam era veteran population is the fact, pointed out earlier, that the utilization of benefits is in inverse proportion to the degree of individual need for readjustment assistance. Almost 80 percent of all Vietnam era veterans have a high school diploma or less upon discharge. Studies by the American Association of Junior Colleges, which has provided much important leadership in improving and providing readjustment programs and benefits to the returning Vietnam era veteran, indicate that as many as 50 percent of these veterans require further education or training to compete realistically in the employment market. And yet veterans who face the least readjustment problems, those who have had preservice college, are more than three times more likely to utilize GI bill benefits than those veterans who have only preservice high school.

Only 17.4 percent of the nearly 1 million veterans who do not have even a high school diploma have pursued further training under the present GI bill. The fact is that the Vietnam era veterans who most desperately need readjustment assistance—those who are educationally and economically disadvantaged—are the least likely to get it under the present GI bill.

NEW PROGRAMS IN 1970

Increases in financial benefits alone are not enough to reach out to many of these veterans. Educationally and economically disadvantaged veterans need remedial and refresher programs and other educational assistance and counseling which are specially tailored to their needs and educational deficiencies. It was to help meet this special need that in 1970, in cooperation with Chairman TEAGUE, I authored several new programs which were included in Public Law 91-219, to help these veterans. Following is a brief review of these programs:

One. PREP: A new subchapter V—sections 1695 through 1697—was added to chapter 34 of title 38 to help men still in the service, by enabling them to complete their high school education or to undertake deficiency, remedial, refresher, or preparatory work in order to continue their education. PREP, the "predischarge education program," was conceived as a way to help tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of young servicemen to continue their education while in service, and to begin planning for their futures, without charge to their GI bill entitlement.

Two. Tutorial assistance: Section 1692 was added to title 38 to help veteran GI bill trainees enrolled in college but having academic difficulties, by permitting them to receive up to $50 a month for up to 9 months for tutorial assistance in their courses.

Third. Remedial-refresher courses. A new chapter VI—section 1691—was added to chapter 34 of title 38—amending previous law—to permit veterans to complete high school—or grammar school—and necessary refresher, deficiency or preparatory courses needed to prepare for a postsecondary program. Under this provision, veterans receive their GI bill educational assistance allowances while enrolled in such programs, but these allowances, as with PREP, are not charged against their GI bill entitlement. Thus, after completing this secondary-level or remedial work, these veterans generally still have a full 36 months of GI bill benefits to draw upon.

Fourth. A much greater emphasis on veterans outreach. A new subchapter IV was added to chapter 1 of title 38 to assure that the Veterans' Administration would expand and improve its programs for veterans outreach, so that all returning servicemen, and especially the disadvantaged, would be fully informed of all benefits available to them. The last sentence of the new section 240(a) declared:

> The Congress further declares that the outreach services authorized by this subchapter is for the purpose of charging the Veterans' Administration with the *affirmative duty* of seeking out eligible veterans and eligible dependents and providing them with such services.

INADEQUATE IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW PROGRAM

Mr. President, I am deeply disappointed that only a handful of the hundreds of thousands of veterans who could have so greatly benefited from these new programs have actually participated in them. The establishment of these programs in colleges and universities, has been greatly handicapped by lethargy, delays, and inexcusable footdragging, and, in some cases, out-right resistance, by the VA and the Defense Department. For example, in the 2 years since enactment, only 3,954 veterans have utilized tutorial assistance benefits.

The Defense Department, the individual armed services, and the individual military base commanders have never taken steps to make PREP available to large numbers of servicemen. The complete failure of individual base commanders to publicize PREP, to establish and promote PREP programs, or to encourage their men to participate has been particularly frustrating. I wish to stress that PREP cannot succeed without the active cooperation of the individual base commander. That this cooperation has not been forthcoming in any uniform sense is not really surprising in view of the fact that no official in either the Department of Defense or the Veterans' Administration has ever been given the specific responsibility to implement and oversee PREP. The establishment of PREP programs has also been hindered by excessively restrictive and cumbersome VA and DOD regulations.

Where small PREP programs have been established often with great difficulty, many bases have refused to allow release time from duty. The VA requires that a PREP program be in session 25 clock hours a week to be considered full time. Most bases have apparently not been willing to release more than a handful of servicemen for 25 hours a week for education or even to permit them perhaps 12 hours—the remaining 13 hours to come from their own off-duty time. Where PREP has been successful, it has often been because servicemen, after a full day's work, have been willing to spend from 2 to 5 hours a night, 5 nights a week, in class. These men have shown their desire for further education by this commitment of time; unfortunately, many times their dedication has not been matched by that of the military base commanders.

Minority group servicemen—black, chicano, Puerto Rican, American Indian, and others—are often in special need of educational help. But there has been no concerted effort by DOD to help these men upgrade themselves through PREP, which is designed to serve them as well as the hundreds of thousands of educationally disadvantaged white GI's.

PREP has also represented a way to help very large numbers of men overseas, in Europe and parts of Asia, to continue their education. Many of these men have a considerable amount of spare time, and could use it profitably to upgrade themselves. Only recently, however, have the services begun to move to create meaningful PREP programs in Europe; there has apparently been little of this kind of special help for men stationed in Asia and the Pacific.

In the case of servicemen, a great opportunity has been permanently lost for the very large numbers who have left the service or will leave it in the next few months. These men needed PREP; they lost this chance—for counseling, guidance, and placement as well as course work. There is nothing which can be done now, through PREP, to help them.

DEPARTMENTS IN EXISTING PROGRAMS

In order that the potentially great benefit of the PREP program will not continue to be wasted, the S. 2161 committee substitute includes the following

clarifying changes and improvements in PREP:

First. Authorization is provided for proprietary nonprofit educational institutions to offer PREP programs for servicemen—and also remedial and refresher program for educationally disadvantaged veterans—as long as the school has been in existence for 2 years by eliminating the requirement as applied to PREP programs at nonpublic colleges that the course in question must have been in operation for 2 years or be offered at a nonprofit accredited college for credit. This requirement has the effect of eliminating the typical noncredit PREP programs at private nonprofit accredited colleges. Under the Committee substitution this requirement continues to apply to other GI bill programs.

Second. Existing law is also amended in the committee substitute to make clear that the PREP program can include courses needed to obtain an equivalency or GED certificate. At present, veterans may receive GI bill benefits while enrolled in equivalency or GED programs. But the VA has construed present section 1696 as not permitting servicemen to do so. The armed services are already helping very large numbers of men to obtain equivalency certificates each year; this legislative change will allow many more servicemen to use PREP to advance their education in a more appropriate way than formal secondary school courses.

Third. The committee substitute also provides for the lump-sum prepayment of the total anticipated PREP costs—either the established tuition and charges for nonservicemen in an identical program, or reasonable charges where there is no identical programs—a legislative gloss made explicit—or $250, whichever is the least. Particularly in the cases of institutions offering PREP programs overseas, very serious problems have resulted from the greatly delayed or even the nonpayment of tuition costs. For example, Big Bend Community College, from Moses Lake, Wash., which offers PREP in Europe, is threatened with the loss of $45,000 and perhaps much more. The committee expects that the new lump-sum advance payment will overcome the great difficulties being experienced by Big Bend in its servicemen enrollees not receiving PREP checks before they terminate in the program. In order to insure the effectiveness of the new system in the overseas context, maximum cooperation by and coordination between DOD and VA with the PREP institution will be necessary, and every effort must be made to expedite and advance the date of enrollment processing and the transmittal of appropriate papers to VA in the United States in order to lead to timely mailing and receipt of checks.

Toward this end, the committee believes the VA should give the most serious consideration to assignment of a DVB expert to the overseas area to assure the most expeditious and accurate processing and transmittal.

Fourth. Increased cooperation within the Department of Defense as well as closer coordination with the VA is also called for by the committee substitute. The Administrator of the VA is required to designate an appropriate official who shall cooperate with and assist officials designated by the Secretary of Defense as administratively responsible for carrying out DOD functions and duties with regard to PREP.

Fifth. Moreover, in order for Defense Department overseas schools to be eligible to participate in PREP or any other title 38 program, the committee substitute requires the Department of Defense to submit to both the House and Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs a detailed plan for greatly expanded implementation of PREP, including provisions for each Secretary concerned to advise, counsel, and encourage eligible servicemen regarding the educational benefits available to them, especially the special remedial programs designed for the educationally disadvantaged. The plan would also include provision for the release of participating servicemen for at least one-half of the hours required for PREP, unless such release would be inconsistent with the interests of national defense. The establishment of an interservice and interagency coordinating committee is another condition established, this committee to be under the cochairmanship of the Assistant Secretary of Defense and the Chief Benefits Director of the VA with the task of promoting and coordinating all VA educational assistance programs, as well as implementing the plan mentioned above. One element of cooperation which the committee deems particularly important is for base commanders to be urged to assist in and encourage the earliest possible registration of PREP enrollees both in the United States and abroad so that the new advance lump-sum payment can arrive in time for the PREP institution to receive its charges from the serviceman as early as possible and at least prior to his completion of the program.

Sixth. A significant boost for PREP and college preparatory programs should be provided by the provision in the committee substitute to permit reduction of the 25-clock hours that are presently required for fulltime PREP participation. Educational authorities concerned with educationally disadvantaged young adults believe that such students should not be kept in class 25 hours a week, but rather should be assisted in developing habits of self-directed study. The present rule has occasioned numerous complaints from servicemen as well as PREP institutions. Under the change a precollege PREP program—or remedial or refresher program for veterans—would be considered full time if the program included a minimum of four Carnegie units per year—or, under a general change in measurement of high school courses, if the program, pursued full time for 4 years, would lead to a high school diploma—or if the school measured the program itself on a semester-hour basis in which case generally only 12 hours of classes would be needed. In any case, the form of measurement used would be left up to the school.

Seventh. Consultation between active duty servicemen who desired VA educational assistance and the appropriate education service officer—ESO—would also be required under the committee substitute. Such consultation would be particularly useful in helping servicemen choose the course of training best suited to his aptitude, educational needs, and his vocational goals. I am convinced, as are the other members of the Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee, that maximum encouragement should be given to servicemen to enroll in PREP programs, where appropriate.

At this point, I believe it is important to point out that while education service officers have an extremely important role to play in the successful training of servicemen, unfortunately very little is known in the Congress about ESO's or their work. Thus, I intend to followup with the Defense Department, requesting information in the following areas: The total number of ESO's; their educational backgrounds; their previous experience; and whether they have backgrounds in teaching or educational administration? How many of them are minority group members; how many have had special training in working with minorities or the disadvantaged? It is difficult enough for professionally trained educators with years of school experience to work effectively with many minority group and disadvantaged students today. It may be far more difficult for a man to do so who has been away from his own college education for many years, and has not had the advantage of recent refresher or advanced work in a graduate school. Thus, we should determine how many education service officers are trained in counseling and guidance, and how many can meet the minimum requirements which a high school guidance counselor, for example, must meet in most States.

I hope the Defense Department will compile that information and make it available to the Congress and the public. Certainly, we need to know at least this much before we provide a statutory veto for the ESO over servicemen's GI bill participation during service, as the administration proposed.

A more professionalized and better supported off-duty education program is essential to help both the large number of men now being separated and the many who will remain in the service for shorter or longer tours of duty. The Nation and the military will be the better for it if most servicemen are advanced at least through the high school equivalency or GED—general educational development, comparable to a high school diploma—and if many are given the incentive and the ability to take advantage of the opportunity for further education, either in service or later.

Therefore, Mr. President, I believe there is a great need for an evaluation by outside experts of all DOD off-duty education programs. Such a study would be a valuable one to be undertaken by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, for example. In addition, I am hopeful that, in the near future, the Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee will be able to conduct such an indepth review in order to help the individual serv-

ices to upgrade their members' skills and to help a far greater number of servicemen advance themselves under the GI bill, both while in the service and following discharge. Such a study would be a valuable part of planning for an all-volunteer Armed Forces, a concept I strongly support and one to which a strong in-service education program, especially for the educationally disadvantaged, is vitally important.

Eighth. As in the case of the PREP program, I have been deeply concerned by the underutilization of tutorial benefits under the special program I authored in 1970. This has primarily been the result of the VA's failure to adequately inform both veterans and educational institutions about this program. Another adverse factor has been the restrictive regulations the VA has established which require a veteran to be actually failing a subject before he is eligible for tutorial assistance. The intent of Congress was that the veteran be eligible for assistance if his performance was below the norm of his class and certainly well before he was caught in actual course failure. Any veteran who participated in remedial PREP or college preparatory program should be able to utilize his section 1692 tutorial benefits as part of a planned college program, rather than awaiting the development of serious academic difficulties. Therefore, the S. 2161 committee substitute would permit a veteran to use tutorial benefits to remedy a "deficiency" rather than a "marked deficiency," as is presently the case. The negligible utilization of this program to date demands that the eligibility requirements be made more realistic in this way. At the same time, there is no intention for these benefits to be used to upgrade adequate academic performance: from a "C" to a "B," for example.

ADVANCE PAYMENT OF GI BILL ALLOWANCES

Mr. President, one of the most unnecessary sources of hardship for veterans in training under the GI bill has been the chronic delays in the payment of educational assistance benefits. Complaints from veterans who do not receive their first educational assistance allowance checks on time constitute a major share of the casework that my office handles. The delays of 3, 4, or 6 months or longer, in the payment of the educational assistance allowance place an impossible burden on veterans, particularly disadvantaged veterans who are struggling to stay in school. In early January of this year, for example, I received lists from schools in California with the names of 206 veterans who had not yet received their first check for the school year beginning in the fall of 1971. This is an absolutely intolerable situation.

To help ease this hardship, I first introduced in 1970 S. 3657, legislation which would have provided for advance payment of the educational assistance allowance, to put money in the hands of the veteran when he needs it most, at the start of the school year. Unfortunately, this vital legislation, which passed the Senate in September of 1970, died at the end of the 91st Congress when the House took no action.

I am particularly pleased that provisions for advance payment, similar to those which were in my original bill, have also been included in the S. 2161 committee substitute with modifications and improvements I proposed. An advance payment provision, endorsed by the administration, is also in House-passed bill, H.R. 12828, and I believe we can work out our differences with the House on this matter quite readily.

Under the advance payment provisions in the S. 2161 committee substitute, an eligible veteran would be entitled to the advance payment of assistance benefits for the first month, or fraction thereof, of attendance, and for the succeeding month as well. Thereafter payments would be made for the succeeding month rather than as at present, after each month. Application for advance payment made to the Administrator would include evidence of eligibility, as well as of acceptance and intention to enroll or return for further study at the institution involved. Upon receiving such application, the Administrator would be authorized to mail to the institution a check made payable to the veteran for delivery to the veteran-student upon registration. In this way, the veteran, rather than often having to wait months to receive a check from the VA, should have initial capital to cover the cost of books and supplies, and living expenses for himself and his family.

As with S. 3657, a provision is included providing for disapproval of a school for GI bill study if it alters its payment policies for veterans in anticipation of getting more tuition or fees paid at an earlier date under the advance payment system. The committee intends for the advance payment to be of principal benefit to the veteran student, not the institution, although it may benefit incidentally by getting tuition paid earlier as the allowance prepayment provisions in the bill take effect following the advance initial payment.

WORK-STUDY/OUTREACH PROGRAM

In addition to the advance payment provisions included in S. 3657 as passed by the Senate in 1970, the committee substitute includes another feature from that bill, a work-study program, which, with minor modification made to place primary emphasis on outreach activities, is designed to be of particular assstance to disadvantaged veterans. The Administrator is authorized to contract for the services of GI bill veteran-students on the basis of financial need to work in VA regional offices or medical facilities, or on campuses performing outreach/contact work or other duties for the VA for up to 120 hours per year. For these services, the veteran would receive, in advance, a work-study educational assistance allowance of $300. In utilizing the services of veterans employed under this program, particular emphasis would be placed on outreach efforts to recruit other veterans to make use of their GI bill entitlements.

Unfortunately, to date, the VA outreach effort has been considerably less than an overwhelming success. Many young veterans, particularly minority group and educationally disadvantaged young veterans, consistently tell me and my staff that they do not trust the VA or feel comfortable looking to this large governmental bureaucracy for help with their readjustment problems. This is largely because the VA outreach effort is primarily handled by older men and is largely confined to regional offices in major cities which are often geographically inaccessible to many veterans. Not nearly enough has been done to counsel individual veterans in a sympathetic and empathetic way to which they can relate personally.

The enactment of this provision would go a long way toward solving that problem. It would accomplish twin purposes of particular importance to educationally and economically disadvantaged veterans: First, the work-study/outreach program would provide an important additional source of funds to needy veterans; and second, the program would utilize their rapport with, and understanding of, similarly circumstanced veterans for carrying out effective outreach programs.

The need for this type of program is clear. A provision in the recent Education Amendments Act of 1972 (Public Law 92–318) provides for a new veterans work-study program in the Office of Education. I believe such a program should be run by the VA and should stress outreach as its primary work product. The need for such a major GI bill outreach/work-study program is being met in small part today by the use of split job under the Emergency Employment Act for GI bill trainees to engage in outreach activities. This effective program—promoted primarily by the U.S. Conference of Mayors/National League of Cities—is too small now and does not necessarily have the permanence that such a statutory program as is included in S. 2161 would provide. The EEA split jobs concept has performed valuable service nevertheless; and if we are unable to convince the House to adopt our work-study/outreach program, the EEA effort should certainly be substantially expanded. Indeed, my public service employment bill (S. 3311) which should be considered in mark-up soon by the Employment, Manpower, and Poverty Subcommittee of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee, would provide specific statutory recognition for and thereby stress this split job/veterans outreach purpose for public service employment.

The committee substitute would also amend the present provisions governing the outreach program to require the VA not only to seek out eligible veterans but also to encourage them to make use of the benefits available to them, and to attempt to contact educationally disadvantaged veterans in a personal manner rather than by letter, as is presently the case for most such veterans.

VETERANS EDUCATION LOAN PROGRAM

As the Office of Education estimated total costs of going to school today make clear, even the proposed increase in the educational assistance allowance to $250 will still not permit large numbers of economically disadvantaged veterans to participate in GI bill training. Therefore, in order to remove any reasonable possi-

bility that lack of funds will continue to be an insuperable obstacle to postservice training of poorer veterans or veterans wishing to attend more costly institutions, the committee substitute would create a veterans' education direct loan program. This program would entitle eligible veterans to borrow up to an additional $175 per month, or a maximum of $1,575 per school year, from the VA.

The exact amount which a veteran could be loaned would be based on the difference between the amount of financial resources available to him or his education, and the actual cost of attendance at the institution in which he is enrolled. Also, to be eligible, a veteran would have to be in attendance on a more than a half-time basis in college under the GI bill and to have unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a guaranteed loan under the Higher Education Act of 1965. The amount of his loan entitlement in any academic year would be $175—up to 9 months per academic year—for each remaining month of GI bill entitlement.

Funds for the loans would be available from funds set aside from the national service life insurance fund and bearing interest back to the fund at a rate no less than the interest rate equal to that paid at the given point in time by the Secretary of the Treasury upon NSLI investments in U.S. Treasury notes and bonds. In this way, the funds of NSLI would not in any way be depleted by the loan program.

The veteran borrower would be obliged to make no interest or principal payments until after he finishes school and then would be liable for no interest prior to beginning such repayments. His interest rate on repayments to the Administration would be set by the Administrator, with the concurrence of the Secretary of the Treasury, at prevailing education loan rates—currently 7 percent under Higher Education Act insured loans.

The fact that the VA estimates that almost 1 million veterans based on their need would take advantage of the new loan program in the next 5 years is telling testimony to the need for such a new program.

VETERANS EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE AND PREFERENCE IN HIRING

Unfortunately, Mr. President, the social and individual cost of the failure of the Vietnam era GI bill to date is reflected in the distressing unemployment statistics of today's young veteran. The Bureau of Labor Statistics—whose figures often seem to represent a minimum rather than a maximum—estimated the unemployment rate for all veterans aged 20 to 29 at 10.1 percent as of January 1972. Although later figures show some improvement since then, such figures generally always include a bit of sophistry on the part of the administration. We must try to comprehend fine distinctions between seasonally adjusted figures, and seasonally unadjusted figures, as well as try to understand why BLS figures do not reflect those veterans who have given up looking for a job because of months or even years of frustration and disappointment. Frequently, these veterans are caught up in a vicious cycle of not having enough education to get a decent job, but not being able to afford schooling under the GI bill to improve their employment prospects.

Clearly, the BLS figures I have cited do not give an accurate picture of the jobless rate for young veterans, aged 20 to 24, who have far greater difficulty finding jobs than do older veterans. The Louis Harris study of Vietnam era veterans' readjustment problems, which I cited earlier, found that the total unemployment rate of Vietnam era veterans, when we stop juggling figures, is at least 15 percent, and runs as high as 31 percent for veterans without a high school diploma. In cities such as New York, or Los Angeles, 40 percent might well be a more accurate figure.

Whatever the figures, the unemployment rate of the Vietnam era veteran is significantly greater than that of his nonveteran counterpart in the same age group. This is clearly illustrated by a table found on page 37 of the committee report (No. 92-988). Whatever the figures, every season is a difficult one for the veteran who is unemployed, who cannot support himself or his family adequately, and cannot afford to better himself through further training.

Clearly, the efforts to date of the VA and the Department of Labor to find jobs and create employment opportunities for the Vietnam era veteran have not done enough.

To help the returning veteran find employment, I introduced with Senator HARTKE S. 2091, the proposed "Veterans Employment and Readjustment Act of 1971," during the first session of this Congress. The basic features of S. 2091 have been incorporated into title VI of the legislation under consideration today in order to make this bill truly a comprehensive veterans readjustment assistance act.

The provisions included in the S. 2161 committee substitute would add a fully rewritten chapter 41 to title 38 of the United States Code, requiring that at least one employee in each local State employment service be assigned full time to discharge the duties prescribed by the bill for a veterans' employment representative; strengthening and expanding the present Veterans Employment Service within the Department of Labor; mandating the development of jobs and the responsibility for counseling veterans with respect to and referring them to appropriate training and manpower programs as well as directly to job openings; requiring the establishment of appropriate administrative controls to insure that each eligible veteran who requests assistance is promptly placed in a satisfactory job or job training opportunity; providing for closer cooperation and coordination between the Secretary of Labor and the VA; and requiring a line item in the budget for operation of the Veterans Employment Service and an allocation of Department of Labor appropriations in that amount.

The committee substitute also mandates an affirmative action plan for the employment of certain service-connected disabled and Vietnam era veterans by Federal department and agencies and establishes an employment preference under Federal contracts for such veterans.

This provision is a logical extension of the President's Executive Order No. 11598 issued on June 16, 1971, which established the national policy that Federal agencies, prime contractors, and first tier subcontractors engaged in the performance of Federal contracts shall list all job openings—with few exceptions—with the Public Employment Service.

Under the policy as developed, qualified veterans would then be referred first to fill such openings. Unfortunately, the experience under this Executive order since its issuance has not been encouraging. The Department of Commerce estimates that 2.9 million jobs in private industry resulted from government purchases of goods and services in 1971. The President in a letter dated May 5, 1972, to James D. Hodgson, Secretary of Labor, said that—

> Based on Executive Order 11598 there should be a sizeable increase in the number of jobs listed with the local public employment offices and available to returning veterans.

Yet, the most current ESARS data indicates that the total number of nonagricultural jobs listed by all employers with the employment service in fiscal year 1972 have increased by only 283,000 or 6.6 percent over the previous year. This provision, then, is intended to achieve more effectively the intent of the President's Executive order.

MISCELLANEOUS ADJUSTMENTS IN GI BILL PROVISIONS

Mr. President, in regard to adjustments in existing educational assistance programs, this legislation includes three provisions which would solve problems that have been particularly troublesome in California.

MEASUREMENT OF ADULT EVENING SECONDARY SCHOOL COURSES

At present, full-time educational assistance payments are authorized for veterans attending full-time secondary school during the day but not in the evening. The result is that veterans who, for example, work day shifts and attend adult evening secondary schools are discriminated against. The committee substitute would remove the arbitrary prohibition against paying night students, regardless of the amount of courses they take, in excess of the half-time rate for such study.

MEASUREMENT OF HIGH SCHOOL COURSES DEVIATING FROM THE CARNEGIE UNIT MEASUREMENT

In 1970, in Public Law 91-219, we enacted a new definition for measuring high school courses—the so-called Carnegie unit, of which 16 are generally considered, and so section 1684(a)(3) of title 38 provides, to constitute completion of an approved secondary education program. However, in California, in Los Angeles County, for example, I am informed, this method of measurement means that even though a veteran completing high school in 4 years and getting his degree, might not qualify for a full-time allow-

ance in any one of his years of study. I am delighted that the provision I proposed to remedy this has been added as an amendment in the new measurement section—1788(a)(3)(B)—included in the committee substitute.

DEFINITION OF "CHILD" EXPANDED TO INCLUDE ADOPTIVE CHILD IN CUSTODY BEFORE ADOPTION

Also raising a problem in California as well as Minnesota and other States has been a number of veterans with adopted children who have sougnt to have these children recognized by the VA for the purpose of increased educational assistance allowances. The procedure for adoption in California is frequently effected for all practical purposes through an administrative agreement between the agency involved and the adopting parents. This procedure conforms with the California administrative code which considers the child to be the responsibility of the parents following such an adoption agreement prior to an adoption decree.

In cases of adoption, the VA generally makes a determination of what constitutes final legal adoption according to the governing law of the State involved. Unfortunately, in California adoption of a child is not now considered "legal" for VA purposes until a court grants an interlocutory decree, which is not the procedure generally followed in California, or a final decree. Thus, in California, following the initial administrative agreement, the parents assumed full financial responsibility for the child, but the VA does not recognize the child as "adopted" for the purposes of VA benefits during this period of time. Therefore, the S. 2161 committee substitute liberalizes the existing definition to make parents in such cases, when proceeding in accordance with State adoption law, eligible to receive additional educational assistance allowances and other title 38 benefits, based upon dependency, beginning when they assume responsibility for the child.

CONCLUSION

Mr. President, in closing I can think of no better way to cite a case in support of the various programs provided for in this multifaceted S. 2161 committee substitute than to reference an administration document. On June 23, 1972, Mr. Joseph P. Cosand, Deputy Commissioner for Higher Education, Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, sent a letter to all university, college, and junior college presidents in the United States calling upon them to make a major effort to improve the GI bill participation in their colleges and universities, particularly the enrollment of educationally disadvantaged veterans.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of Mr. Cosand's letter be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the letter ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
OFFICE OF EDUCATION,
Washington, D.C., June 23, 1972.

DEAR PRESIDENT: As a result of the winding down of the Vietnam war, an increasing number of servicemen are being returned to civilian life in need of jobs and education. Servicemen are being released at the rate of 80,000 persons a month and as veterans a significant number of these men are finding that employment opportunities are unavailable. In addition to unemployment rates which have exceeded 10 percent for Vietnam era veterans, we find that less than half of the Vietnam era veterans are taking advantage of educational benefits. Only 13 percent of those veterans with only high school completion to their credit are going on to college.

The purpose of this letter is to encourage colleges, universities, and other postsecondary institutions to make every reasonable effort to accommodate the large numbers of veterans who will be in need of education or job training to enable them to begin or to continue useful careers. Many schools and colleges have set aside admission requirements in accepting veterans as well as establishing special services and remedial programs to enable them to participate in programs either in degree or non-degree status.

The Office of Education is cooperating with other Federal agencies in an effort to reach as many servicemen as possible in encouraging them to accept education as an option for preparation for a career. In addition, we are working actively with the American Association of Junior Colleges to improve the outreach capability of these schools to accommodate returning servicemen. It is evident that a significant counseling activity must be made available to enable veterans to determine the education program which is most suited to their needs. I wish to ask each of you to take an institutional responsibility for extending this counseling service in your community.

One example of an effective way to reach veterans is through the use of work-study slots of employing Vietnam era veterans as counselors with the special responsibility of recruiting additional veterans for the school or college. Evidently Vietnam era veterans respond more readily to other veterans performing as recruiters or counselors. Other recruiting techniques include the use of lists of recently discharged servicemen which are available locally from veterans organizations.

A number of schools and colleges have found ways to open their doors to veterans and to provide special programs of academic preparation to facilitate the adjustment of marginally qualified veterans to an education or training program. I urge you to accept this kind of accommodation as a kind of special responsibility to the serviceman/veteran.

One measure that is being adopted by the Office of Education during the current year as a result of special funds appropriated by Congress is to establish specially designed Upward Bound projects which will serve Vietnam era veterans as a special client group. We are hopeful that this model effort will enable many institutions to find ways to reach and serve the Vietnam era veteran. Congress has also relaxed the eligibility of veterans for the National Defense Student loans as well as discount their veterans educational benefits in determining the newly authorized basic opportunity grants. The Education Amendments of 1972 also authorize grants to institutions which enroll large numbers of veterans to encourage these institutions to increase the numbers of veterans enrolled.

Now pending before the Congress are amendments to the G.I. bill which will increase substantially the monthly amounts paid to veterans who are pursuing educational programs.

The purpose of this letter is to enlist your cooperation in what must be a national effort to reach and serve the significant number of young men and women who have served their country well and who are deserving of our best efforts to provide an education which is suited to their special needs. I ask for your cooperation and I encourage your response in such ways as may be appropriate.

Please feel free to call upon this Office for additional information or service, and we will welcome your suggestions for ways to initiate educational opportunities for all Vietnam era veterans.

Sincerely,

JOSEPH P. COSAND,
Deputy Commissioner for Higher Education.

Mr. CRANSTON. Finally, Mr. President, I wish to express my personal appreciation to Mr. John Kirby, Assistant General Counsel, Veterans' Administration, and Mr. Robert Dysland of the VA General Counsel's Office, as well as Mr. Hugh Evans of our legislative counsel's office, for their outstanding technical assistance in the preparation of the committee bill. In addition, I am indebted to the chief counsel of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, Mr. Guy McMichael, for his informed and sympathetic advice and assistance regarding the preparation of the committee substitute proposed by Senator HARTKE and myself. Mr. McMichael's cooperation with me and my staff counsel, Jon Steinberg, was indispensable to moving this bill and in every way facilitating our contribution to the committee bill.

Mr. President, I urge an overwhelming vote of support by the Senate for this absolutely vital measure to make this GI bill a truly fitting vehicle to assist our returning veterans in readjusting to and assuming a productive role in our society.

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Indiana yield?

Mr. HARTKE. I am happy to yield to the distinguished Senator from Georgia who is a member of the Veterans' Affairs Committee and who has had a long and very distinguished record in this field.

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I want to compliment my distinguished chairman for the leadership he has demonstrated in bringing forth this bill. It is a thoroughly bipartisan bill, cosponsored by every member of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs regardless of political party. It was unanimously reported by the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. It will bring many long-needed changes in trying to provide adequate educational opportunity for those who have served their country in the uniform of the United States.

I urge that the Senate pass the bill, and I hope that they will do so by a unanimous vote.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I pay special tribute not only to the Democratic members of the Veterans' Affairs Committee, but also to the Republican members of the committee as well. Ours has been a thoroughly bipartisan committee.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina has 5 minutes on the bill.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished leadership of the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE), the chairman of the Veterans' Affairs Committee, for his comprehension of the needs of the veterans along the lines on which this legislation was based. It is a pleasure for me as a ranking minority member of the Veterans' Affairs Committee of the Senate to join with him in sponsoring this legislation. And, as has been brought out, every member of the committee, Democrat and Republican, have joined in cosponsoring the measure.

Mr. President, today we are considering one of the more important pieces of legislation to come before Congress this year—S. 1261. This bill will increase the vocational rehabilitation subsistances, the educational assistance allowances, and the special training allowances which are paid to eligible veterans under the GI bill.

The concept of the present GI bill was formulated following World War II when the United States enacted the original GI bill which enabled millions of former servicemen to receive educational assistance upon their release from service. These men, who otherwise would never have received more than a high school education, found it possible to attend schools of higher learning. Thus, they were able to prepare themselves for transition from miiltary service to civilian employment.

Mr. President, this program has proven to be so successful that it has been continued since its inception. This success is found not only in the benefits which these men have received, but also in increased economic benefits to our nation as a whole.

The Vietnam GI bill which was passed in 1966, was designed to permit the disadvantaged, who usually suffer the most in war time, to achieve upward social mobility and a higher standard of living.

Vietnam era veterans are encountering a situation very different from the World War II and the Korean war veteran. These men are returning to society in such large numbers that they are finding jobs scarce. Further, they are educationally unprepared to compete favorably in the job market.

The cost of living has jumped a great deal since the last GI bill increase. The Vietnam era veteran is unable to achieve an adequate education under a system which has not compensated for neither the cost-of-living increase nor the soaring cost of education. We who provided so well for the World War II veteran cannot, in good conscience, do less for our present veterans.

The Veterans' Affairs Committee and its staff have worked long and hard to provide a bill which meets the needs of these veterans and is also realistic.

Mr. President, many of the inequities which these veterans face will be corrected by the adjustments contained in S. 2161. For these reasons, I am pleased to coauthor this bill and urge my colleagues to respond to the plight of the Vietnam era veteran by passing this essential piece of legislation.

Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Indiana.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Do the Senators yield back their time on the amendment?

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I would be pleased to yield back my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to further amendment.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, would the Senator yield to me briefly?

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I am pleased to yield to the distinguished Senator from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on final passage.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to further amendment.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I call up my amendment No. 1389.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to state the amendment.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered; and the amendment will be printed in the RECORD.

The amendment is as follows:

On page 26, line 8, strike out "section 1684 in its" and insert in lieu thereof "sections 1684 and 1685 in their".

On page 26, line 17, strike out the quotation marks.

On page 26, between lines 17 and 18, insert the following:

"§ 1685. Tuition assistance allowances for institutional training

"(a) In the case of an eligible veteran not on active duty who is pursuing a program of education at an approved educational institution on a half-time or more basis, the Administrator shall pay directly to the educational institution on behalf of such eligible veteran the customary cost of tuition, and such laboratory, library, health, infirmary, or other similar fees as are customarily charged, and shall pay for books, supplies, equipment, and other necessary expenses, excluding board, lodging, other living expenses, and travel, which similarly circumstanced nonveterans enrolled in the same courses are required to pay.

"(b) In no event shall the payment authorized by subsection (a) of this section exceed $1,000 for an ordinary school year. If the educational institution has no customary cost of tuition, a fair and reasonable rate of payment for tuition, fees, or other charges for such course or courses shall be determined by the Administrator.

"(c) In the event a veteran fails to complete his program of education after a tuition assistance allowance has been paid to the educational institution on his behalf, the Administrator shall, pursuant to such regulations as he may prescribe, require a pro rata refund of the tuition assistance allowance based upon the uncompleted portion of the school year for which the allowance was paid.

"(d) Any veteran who elects to receive a loan under subchapter VII of this chapter shall not be eligible for the tuition assistance allowance provided under this section."

On page 48, lines 10 and 11, strike out "1683, and 1685" and insert in lieu thereof "and 1683".

On page 50, line 8, immediately below "1684. Apprenticeship or other on-job training; correspondence courses." insert the following:

"1685. Tuition assistance allowances for institutional training.".

On page 58, after line 23, add the following:

"(f) Any veteran who elects to receive a loan under this subchapter shall not be eligible for the tuition assistance allowance provided under section 1685 of this title."

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, over a year ago I introduced the Vietnam Veterans Act of 1971 to provide up to $1,000 a year to eligible veterans for tuition, fees, books, and supplies as well as allot them a $175 per month subsistence allowance.

In March I testified before the Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee in support of my bill and have since that time inserted into the RECORD statements and articles related to the urgent need to improve educational benefits for our veterans. These have included the testimony of the Military Order of the Purple Heart, the American Association of Independent Colleges, an article by columnist David Lawrence, and an article from Time magazine in reference to the convention of the National Association of Collegiate Veterans advocating a $1,000 direct tuition payment.

I am pleased to see that the Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee has reported a veterans educational bill and with the 43 percent increase in the monthly allowance from the current $175 per month to a figure of $250 per month. I am also pleased with the provision in the bill providing up to $1,575 per academic year for veterans to finance their education. However, I am not at all pleased with the fact that the committee bill omits entirely the concept of a direct tuition payment directly to the educational insitution for tuition, books, and supplies. I do not feel that the loan provision will give our veterans, especially those who go to less expensive public and State schools, the financial help they need to pursue their education.

Much of the concern over the direct tuition program was based on the abuses of the original World War II program. My first amendment, which is similar to the provision in my original bill, S. 2163, for which there were 20 cosponsors, would insert the $1,000 tuition figure into this bill thereby allowing the veteran to have the tuition payment sent to his school by the Veterans' Administration. A veteran who chose to apply for the loan provision in the bill would not be eligible for the direct tuition payment. Perhaps it can be said that all veterans would select the direct tuition payment rather than the loan—perhaps so. If this is the case, then we should discuss eliminating the loan next year and strengthening the direct tuition grant program.

I do not wish at this time to give the tuition payment as the only alternative to the veteran. First, because of much discussion and question as to whether or not the House would accept the tuition payment. Second, our veterans should have such an option. They have given their time, energy, and often parts of their bodies and minds to the war effort in Vietnam. We should at least give them something in return which they do not have to repay. Therefore, I offer this amendment to give our veterans a greater chance in life to obtain the benefits which they so deserve.

Veterans need at least a $1,000 direct tuition payment. The increased cost of education shows that current tuition costs are rising at an ever increasing rate. In my state of Maryland alone, at Johns Hopkins University, the cost for tuition, fees, and books for the upcoming school year alone is $3,000. Three thousand dollars for an education in 1 academic year. In 4 years this will amount to over $12,000. At the University of Maryland, a public school, costs will be nearly $800 this year and for 4 years it will be over $2,400. I realize that the Veterans' Affairs Committee bill provides for a 43 percent increase in the monthly allotment. However, living costs are also rising.

Statistics from the U.S. Office of Education indicate that by 1975, costs for tuition and fees in private universities in the Nation will average $2,265 and $518 at public universities—and this is just an average. I have already indicated that figures for a public and private school in Maryland already exceed these figures this year. Therefore, the need for a direct tuition allowance to schools for veterans is clearly needed at this time. Any further delay just further pushes our veterans into a financial quagmire. It is for this reason that I offer my first amendment.

Mr. President, at this time I ask unanimous consent that certain supporting tabulations and statistics from the U.S. Office of Education regarding tuition costs and fees in public and private institutions of higher education be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TABLE 43.—ESTIMATED AVERAGE CHARGES (1970–71 DOLLARS) PER FULL TIME UNDERGRADUATE RESIDENT DEGREE-CREDIT STUDENT IN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION, BY INSTITUTIONAL TYPE AND CONTROL: UNITED STATES, 1960–61 TO 1980–81

[Charges are for the academic year and in constant 1970–71 dollars; U.S. Office of Education figures]

Year and control	Total tuition, board, and room				Tuition and required fees				Board (7-day basis)				Dormitory rooms			
	All	University	Other 4-year	2-year	All	University	Other 4-year	2-year	All	University	Other 4-year	2-year	All	University	Other 4-year	2-year
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)
1960–61:[1]																
Public	$1,134	$1,227	$1,020	$769	$281	$336	$228	$108	$562	$573	$544	$470	$291	$318	$248	$191
Nonpublic	2,137	2,410	2,006	1,500	1,143	1,336	1,048	654	627	662	617	558	367	412	341	288
1961–62:[2]																
Public	1,148	1,251	1,040	791	288	350	240	116	559	572	540	470	301	329	260	205
Nonpublic	2,200	2,486	2,074	1,582	1,197	1,399	1,107	709	623	660	613	564	380	427	354	309
1962–63:[2]																
Public	1,177	1,287	1,063	803	290	350	259	127	568	595	526	471	319	342	286	205
Nonpublic	2,250	2,640	2,099	1,659	1,232	1,500	1,134	783	620	662	603	557	398	478	362	319
1963–64:[2]																
Public	1,192	1,320	1,090	811	301	362	277	125	560	602	514	465	331	356	299	281
Nonpublic	2,336	2,709	2,187	1,690	1,302	1,565	1,208	826	627	664	611	550	407	480	373	314
1964–65:[2]																
Public	1,207	1,336	1,102	811	309	379	285	126	554	587	511	459	344	370	306	226
Nonpublic	2,424	2,798	2,300	1,849	1,383	1,648	1,300	892	620	654	609	590	421	496	391	367
1965–66:[2]																
Public	1,223	1,375	1,123	834	321	407	299	136	552	589	507	456	350	379	317	242
Nonpublic	2,493	2,882	2,361	1,938	1,435	1,703	1,351	956	615	658	600	589	443	521	410	393
1966–67:[2]																
Public	1,238	1,412	1,142	857	332	434	312	146	551	591	503	454	355	387	327	257
Nonpublic	2,561	2,963	2,421	2,026	1,487	1,757	1,402	1,019	610	661	591	588	464	545	428	419
1967–68:[2]																
Public	1,240	1,400	1,164	922	330	427	313	168	545	579	510	470	365	394	341	284
Nonpublic	2,573	2,970	2,456	2,058	1,514	1,791	1,445	1,042	602	649	585	589	457	530	426	427
1968–69:[2]																
Public	1,244	1,387	1,184	984	329	420	313	189	540	567	517	485	375	400	354	310
Nonpublic	2,585	2,977	2,491	2,089	1,540	1,824	1,487	1,065	595	637	579	589	450	516	425	435
1969–70:																
Public	1,258	1,411	1,204	1,006	336	434	325	197	537	566	513	485	385	411	366	324
Nonpublic	2,648	3,053	2,559	2,171	1,594	1,887	1,546	1,120	591	635	575	595	463	531	438	456
1970–71:[1]																
Public	1,273	1,435	1,224	1,038	344	448	337	206	534	566	508	484	395	421	379	338
Nonpublic	2,712	3,129	2,625	2,251	1,649	1,950	1,605	1,174	588	633	570	600	475	546	450	477
PROJECTED[4]																
1971–72:																
Public	1,290	1,460	1,248	1,050	351	462	349	214	534	566	508	484	405	432	391	352
Nonpublic	2,779	3,207	2,697	2,334	1,703	2,013	1,664	1,229	588	633	570	606	488	561	463	499
1972–73:																
Public	1,309	1,484	1,273	1,071	359	476	361	222	534	566	508	484	416	442	404	365
Nonpublic	2,846	3,285	2,768	2,414	1,758	2,076	1,723	1,283	588	633	570	611	500	576	475	520
1973–74:																
Public	1,326	1,509	1,297	1,094	366	490	373	231	534	566	508	484	426	453	416	379
Nonpublic	2,913	3,363	2,840	2,496	1,812	2,139	1,782	1,338	588	633	570	617	513	591	488	541
1974–75:																
Public	1,344	1,534	1,321	1,116	374	504	385	239	534	566	508	484	436	464	428	393
Nonpublic	2,981	3,441	2,911	2,576	1,867	2,202	1,841	1,392	588	633	570	622	526	606	500	562
1975–76:																
Public	1,361	1,558	1,346	1,138	381	518	397	247	534	566	508	484	446	474	441	407
Nonpublic	3,047	3,519	2,983	2,658	1,921	2,265	1,900	1,447	588	633	570	628	538	621	513	583
1976–77:																
Public	1,379	1,583	1,370	1,161	389	532	409	256	534	566	508	484	456	485	453	421
Nonpublic	3,114	3,597	3,054	2,740	1,975	2,328	1,959	1,501	588	633	570	634	551	636	525	605
1977–78:																
Public	1,396	1,607	1,394	1,183	396	546	421	264	534	566	508	484	466	495	465	435
Nonpublic	3,181	3,674	3,126	2,821	2,030	2,390	2,018	1,556	588	633	570	639	563	651	538	626
1978–79:																
Public	1,414	1,632	1,419	1,206	404	560	433	273	534	566	508	484	476	506	478	449
Nonpublic	3,248	3,752	3,198	2,902	2,084	2,453	2,077	1,610	588	633	570	645	576	666	551	647
1979–80:																
Public	1,431	1,657	1,443	1,228	411	574	445	281	534	566	508	484	486	517	490	463
Nonpublic	3,316	3,830	3,269	2,983	2,139	2,516	2,136	1,665	588	633	570	650	589	681	563	668
1980–81:																
Public	1,450	1,681	1,468	1,249	419	588	457	289	534	566	508	484	497	527	503	476
Nonpublic	3,382	3,908	3,341	3,065	2,193	2,579	2,195	1,720	588	633	570	656	601	696	576	689

[1] Estimated.

Represents charges weighted by numbers of full-time degree-credit students, 1961–62 through 1964–65; weighted by full-time resident students for 1966–67; and by full-time undergraduate degree-credit students for 1968–69. These charges, shown in table 44 in current dollars, were converted to 1970–71 constant dollars by application of the Consumer Price Index. See constant dollar index, appendix B, table 6.

[2] Interpolated.

[4] The projection of basic student charges is based on the assumption that these charges will continue to increase through 1980–81 as they did during the base years of 1961–62 through 1964–65, 1966–67, and 1968–69 in constant dollars. Decreases in charges for board during the base period are not projected and are frozen at the 1970–71 level. The base year data for board charges, in current unadjusted dollars, did now increase for all types of institutions, both publicly and privately controlled, but not enough to offset the application of the Consumer Price Index for the computation of constant 1970–71 dollars. For further methodological details, see appendix A table 5.

Note: Data are for 50 States and the District of Columbia for all years.

Sources: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of Education publications: (1) "Higher Education on Basic Student Charges," 1961–62 through 1964–65, 1966–67, and 1968–69; and (2) "Opening (Fall) Enrollment in Higher Education," 1961 through 1964, 1966, and 1968.

TABLE 44.—ESTIMATED AVERAGE CHARGES (CURRENT DOLLARS) PER FULL-TIME UNDERGRADUATE RESIDENT DEGREE-CREDIT STUDENT IN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION, BY INSTITUTIONAL TYPE AND CONTROL: UNITED STATES, 1960-61 TO 1972-73

[Charges are for the academic year and in current unadjusted dollars]

Year and control	Total tuition, board, and room				Tuition and required fees				Board (7-day basis)				Dormitory rooms			
	All	University	Other 4-year	2-year	All	University	Other 4-year	2-year	All	University	Other 4-year	2-year	All	University	Other 4-year	2-year)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17
1960-61: [1]																
Public	$850	$919	$765	$576	$211	$252	$171	$81	$421	$429	$408	$352	$218	$238	$186	$143
Nonpublic	1,602	1,806	1,503	1,124	857	1,001	785	490	470	496	462	418	275	309	256	216
1961-62:																
Public	869	947	788	599	218	265	182	88	423	433	409	356	228	249	197	155
Nonpublic	1,666	1,882	1,570	1,198	906	1,059	838	537	472	500	464	427	288	323	268	234
1962-63:																
Public	901	986	814	615	222	268	192	97	435	456	403	361	244	262	219	157
Nonpublic	1,724	2,022	1,608	1,271	944	1,149	869	600	475	507	462	427	305	366	277	244
1963-64:																
Public	926	1,026	846	630	234	281	215	97	435	468	399	361	257	277	232	172
Nonpublic	1,815	2,105	1,700	1,313	1,012	1,216	935	642	487	516	475	427	316	373	290	244
1964-65:																
Public	950	1,051	867	638	243	298	224	99	436	462	402	361	271	291	241	178
Nonpublic	1,907	2,202	1,810	1,455	1,088	1,297	1,023	702	488	515	479	464	331	390	308	289
1965-66: [1]																
Public	983	1,106	903	671	258	327	240	109	444	474	408	367	281	305	255	195
Nonpublic	2,004	2,317	1,898	1,559	1,154	1,369	1,086	769	494	529	482	474	356	419	330	316
1966-67:																
Public	1,026	1,171	947	710	275	360	259	121	457	490	417	376	294	321	271	213
Nonpublic	2,124	2,456	2,007	1,679	1,233	1,456	1,162	845	506	548	490	487	385	452	355	347
1967-68: [1]																
Public	1,063	1,199	997	790	283	366	268	144	467	496	437	403	313	337	292	243
Nonpublic	2,204	2,544	2,104	1,763	1,297	1,534	1,238	893	516	556	501	504	391	454	365	366
1968-69:																
Public	1,117	1,245	1,063	883	295	377	281	170	485	509	464	435	337	359	318	278
Nonpublic	2,321	2,673	2,237	1,876	1,383	1,638	1,335	956	534	572	520	529	405	463	382	391
1969-70: [1]																
Public	1,197	1,342	1,145	956	320	413	309	187	511	538	488	461	366	391	348	308
Nonpublic	2,518	2,903	2,434	2,065	1,516	1,794	1,470	1,065	562	604	547	566	440	505	417	434
1970-71: [1]																
Public	1,273	1,435	1,224	1,028	344	448	337	206	534	566	508	484	395	421	379	338
Nonpublic	2,712	3,129	2,625	2,251	1,649	1,950	1,605	1,174	588	633	570	600	475	546	450	477
PROJECTED																
1971-72: [1]																
Public	1,349	1,527	1,305	1,098	367	483	365	224	558	592	531	506	424	452	409	368
Nonpublic	2,906	3,354	2,820	2,441	1,781	2,105	1,740	1,285	615	662	596	634	510	587	484	522
1972-73: [1]																
Public	1,428	1,621	1,390	1,168	392	520	394	242	582	618	555	528	454	483	441	398
Nonpublic	3,107	3,586	3,022	2,636	1,919	2,266	1,881	1,401	642	691	622	667	546	629	519	568

[1] Data for 1960-61, 1965-66, 1967-68 and for 1969-70 through 1972-73 estimated by applying the Consumer Price Index to the data in table 43. See constant dollar index, appendix B, table 6. For further methodological details, see appendix A, table 5.

Source: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of Education publications: (1) "Higher Education Basic Student Charges," 1961-62 through 1964-65, 1966-67, and 1968-69; and (2) "Opening (fall) Enrollment in Higher Education," 1961 through 1964, 1966, and 1968.

Note: Data are for 50 States and the District of Columbia for all years.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I salute the distinguished Senator from Indiana and the distinguished Senator from South Carolina who have both provided great leadership in the area of making some realistic adjustment to veterans' benefits, one which is very long overdue.

By pure coincidence, I had spent part of today with two young men who are Navy veterans of the war in Vietnam. They have been fighting that tough, bitter, uncertain, riverine war which has gone on throughout the Mekong Delta. They are now back in this country safe and in good spirits and in sound body. That is the big thing. However, they are wondering what they are going to do with their lives. They have new visions and new ideas. Their old moorings have in some measure come adrift and they face many difficult personal questions.

This is not unique in world history. This happens whenever we have the tragedy of a generation at war. But in my generation things were easier. In my generation I think that we had less general confusion. And we had certainly a better deal for the veterans who fought in World War II.

I came back from World War II with about 3½ years of service credit. I was entitled to GI benefits under which I went to law school where my tuition was paid, books were provided, and a subsistence payment was available. It was a realistic way to get an education. It was a way to get an education on one's own without a further drain on the family or other resources. It was a way to readjust and catch up from the time that had been spent in the military service. Millions of American veterans took advantage of it. It was one of the best investments the American people ever made.

One of the features of that was the direct payment of tuition, and that is what is provided for in amendment No. 1389. It is a direct payment, as was provided in the World War II GI bill of rights.

I know there have been objections to this program and I know there were abuses of it after World War II, and I know that Congress in the exercise of its oversight responsibility has turned the spotlight of publicity on those abuses, and I am inclined to believe they would not happen again.

Great credit in this area is due to the chairman of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs in the other body, Representative TEAGUE of Texas, who has made it one of his areas of major concern over the years. I have consulted with him and I have been assisted by him in many, many instances. He has been a real stalwart friend of veterans. I believe with the experience we have had we can run a direct tuition program without the problems that existed in the confusion at the end of World War II, and I think the veterans deserve it.

I would like to ask the chairman of the committee just a few questions because they might highlight some of the differences between the program and the bill, which is vastly different than the existing program. I wonder if the chairman would explain to the Senate the loan provisions of the bill because while I believe they have a potential of help to veterans going to college, it is going to be tough for many veterans, because of bureaucracy and redtape and the various justifications, to get loans, and the loans would benefit students in expensive colleges more than those at inexpensive colleges.

Would the Senator explain what is meant by the loan provision?

Mr. HARTKE. The Senator from Maryland knows I am not completely unsympathetic to what he is trying to do. I wish to point out that there was a substantial increase here to bring the benefits under this bill back to the same basic financial level as those that existed in World War II. Title V of the bill would in addition authorize loans from the VA of up to $1,575 an academic year.

Mr. MATHIAS. If the veteran is able to enjoy the full potential of the bill, the loan provisions, and all the rest.

Mr. HARTKE. Let me say this. The benefits to the veteran under this bill at

the present time are equivalent to the benefits of World War II without the loan provision. This is an additional benefit in order to deal with the situation which the Senator from Maryland has pointed out.

As most of us know who attended State schools at the end of World War II, there was a limit on the amount of GI bill assistance at that time. But taking that amount which was up to $500, for tuition and textbooks together with a living allowance and translating those items into present inflation-adjusted dollars, you come up with $250 a month for a single veteran at the present time. What we have done here is to try to adjust the benefits to establish true parity with World War II entitlement levels.

I might point out that the House provisions only come up to $200 a month, while the administration only recommended $190 a month. In addition we have instructed the Veterans' Administration to conduct an independent study and report back to Congress in 9 months as to what is feasible and desirable without any prejudice to the existing or past programs. Unless we move in this fashion now we run into large difficulties in getting a GI bill effective before September in which veterans can make plans for the fall term.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MATHIAS. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Vermont. First, I wish to ask the Presiding Officer how much time is left under the unanimous-consent agreement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Approximately 1 minute.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I yield time from my side.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont is recognized.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. President, I commend the chairman for his work on the bill, and also the ranking Republican member, the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. THURMOND). It is a good bill. I want to indicate that I am sympathetic to what the distinguished Senator from Maryland has been saying and what he proposes in his amendment.

It was my request in the Committee on Veterans' Affairs to include in section 412, which is the section providing for a study of the whole question of the adequacy of the provisions, for the benefit of post-Vietnam veterans. I think that study will be very helpful to the committee and the Senate as a whole in working on this matter in the future.

Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Indiana for yielding time.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I hear what the distinguished Senator from Vermont is saying. I have discussed this section with the distinguished Senator from South Carolina (Mr. THURMOND), and the Senator from Indiana and I have had many discussions over a long period of time.

Mr. HARTKE. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. MATHIAS. If this amendment were not pushed to a decision today would the committee, in the Senator's judgment, be willing to consider this whole area when the new Congress meets?

Mr. HARTKE. I would be glad to do that. In fact, I would do it without the insistence of the distinguished Senator from Maryland. But since the Senator has raised the question at this time I can give full assurance we will go into this in the next Congress. We have talked about directing the Veterans' Administration to shorten the time for the study. They expressed some apprehension about completing it in 9 months, but I think they can do this as the Senator from Maryland suggested.

I can give the Senator from Maryland the assurance that we will push the Veterans' Administration to complete the study, and further that the staff and the committee will continue to go into this matter in depth and hold hearings on this matter.

Mr. MATHIAS. On that assurance, I withdraw amendment No. 1389 at this time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is withdrawn.

AMENDMENT NO. 1388

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 1388.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to read the amendment.

Mr. MATHIAS. I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered; and, without objection, the amendment will be printed in the RECORD.

The amendment, ordered to be printed in the RECORD, is as follows:

On page 39, line 15, strike out the word "and" following the semicolon.

On page 47, line 17, insert a semicolon and the word "and" immediately after the quotation marks.

On page 47, between 17 and 18, insert the following:

"(3) Section 1792 of title 38, United States Code (as redesignated by section 317(a) of this Act, is amended by inserting between the first and second sentences of such section the following: 'The Committee shall also include veterans representative of the World War II era, Korean conflict era, post-Korean conflict era, and the Vietnam era.'."

On page 55, line 3, strike out the word "nine" and insert in lieu thereof the word "six".

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, amendment No. 1388 is a very simple amendment. The amendment is in two parts. First, it would provide that the advisory committee under the newly designated section 1972 of the bill include veterans' representative of the World War II, Korean conflict, post Korean conflict and Vietnam eras. This advisory committee, which has the responsibility for advising the Administrator on various programs for veterans, must become more active. Our veterans must have a major role to play in its deliberations and recommendations. At present, the committee consists mainly of educators and representatives of labor and the Federal Government—no veterans are represented. My amendment would give our veterans the role on this committee that they should have.

By having veterans from each major era of educational assistance programs, the committee will have a good representation of all age groups of veterans. Therefore, the Vietnam era veteran will have the opportunity to discuss programs with the Korean conflict and World War II era veteran so that both will be able to reach conclusions on program benefits with the experience and knowledge of the other veterans to consider. I urge the Administrator to utilize this committee as much as possible in the planning and programing of benefits under this act.

The second part of my amendment would reduce from 9 to 6 months the time required for the completion of the independent study provided for in the bill of various educational assistance programs. Because of the allegations of abuses in the World War II program in the direct tuition payment program, I feel that it is important that the Congress receive the results of the study as soon as possible.

Much of the criticism of my bill to provide a $1,000 direct tuition payment for our veterans paid directly to the educational institution was based on the fact that there were many abuses in the former World War II program of direct tuition payment.

Therefore, I am hopeful that the study, with the input and consultation of the Advisory Committee and its veteran members, will fully explore the direct tuition payment-subsistence form of educational assistance program. I believe that with all of the discussion which has already occurred on this subject, that the study should be able to be completed within the 6-month period.

Furthermore, I am also hopeful that the study will be as objective as possible with no built-in biases against the direct tuition program such as does exist in some sectors of the Federal Government and the Congress. Our veterans need an objective unbiased study of the merits of the direct tuition payment program and I believe that this independent study will provide the means through which the merits of such a program can be realized.

I reluctantly withdrew my last amendment. We are at the beginning of August and these veterans have to go to college in 30 days. If we get into a parliamentary wrangle here they will not get there. On the same basis, if we get this passed in the form the committee reported it and it takes 9 months for the study, that is too long, but if they reduced it to 6 months we could have the benefit of that and perhaps make further improvements in the program before college begins next year.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, the committee is prepared to accept the amendment. With respect to the reduction from 9 months to 6 months, I agree that we want to confront the issue of direct tuition payments as soon as possible.

We will proceed immediately with the hearings at such time as the independent report is completed, so that we will be able to have the hearings and the report commissioned by the Veterans' Administration before us, hopefully by the first of March.

I am prepared to accept the amendment.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I move adoption of the amendment.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I yield back my time.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I yield back my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time on the amendment having been yielded back, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the name of the distinguished Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BROCK) be added as a cosponsor of this amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment, and ask unanimous consent that its reading be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MONDALE's amendment is as follows:

On page 10, delete all on line 3 through line 12 and substitute the following in lieu thereof:

"(2) to any eligible veteran or eligible person enrolled in a course which does not lead to a standard college degree (excluding programs of apprenticeship and programs of other on-job training authorized by section 1787 of this title) for any days of absence in excess of thirty days in a twelve-month period, exempting from being counted as absences—

"(A) weekends or legal holidays established by Federal or State law (or in the case of the Republic of the Philippines, Philippine law) during which the institution is regularly not in session;

"(B) days when instruction is unavailable to the veteran by reason of prescheduled vacations or teacher meetings; or

"(C) days when instruction is unavailable to the veteran by reason of emergencies caused by weather or other natural conditions; except that for purposes of computing such exemption pursuant to clause (B),

"(i) for any institution covered by this subsection which enrolled eligible veterans during the 1971–1972 school year, no number of days greater than the number of days during which instruction was unavailable to students enrolled in such institution during the 1971–1972 school year shall be allowed; and

"(ii) for any institution covered by this subsection which did not enroll eligible veterans during the 1971–1972 school year, no number of days greater than the average number of days during which instruction was unavailable to students enrolled in all institutions covered by this subsection which enrolled eligible veterans during the 1971–1972 school year in the State in which such institution is located shall be allowed; or".

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, this amendment, which I hope the distinguished floor manager might accept, is designed to deal with a very minor, but I think important, problem of treatment accorded veterans who are attending vocational schools rather than institutions of higher education.

There are thousands of such veterans attending vocational and other non-college degree programs, and they, of course, depend for their livelihood on educational assistance allowance payments from the Veterans' Administration. At the present time, however, many of these veterans are suffering from reductions in the size of their benefit checks because of circumstances beyond their control.

There is little doubt that veterans attending noncollege degree programs must meet standards stricter than those for college degree programs in order to receive their educational assistance checks. Limited to a set number of days allowable for absence, these vocational school vets find their payments diminished because of a snowstorm, a scheduled vacation, or other causes totally beyond their control. Veterans attending college courses, on the other hand, need meet no such attendance requirement.

The entire area of educational benefits for veterans attending vocational schools urgently needs reexamination. There have been in the past abuses in some segments of the private vocational school industry. These should not be forgotten, but they should also not allow us to fail to take remedial action where needed to free vocational school veterans from unduly burdensome requirements originally enacted many years ago.

A comprehensive reexamination of the vocational school problem will require time, however. In the interim, veterans attending vocational schools should not continue to lose vitally needed dollars because of unrealistic requirements.

The amendment which I have proposed would amend the present statute to broaden the categories of absence for which a veteran attending vocational school would not be penalized. Prescheduled vacations, teacher meetings, and weather emergencies will no longer be cause for reduction in benefits, which many of us believe are inadequate to begin with. At the same time, this amendment provides safeguards to insure that the veteran attending vocational school will receive the instructional year which is his due.

Our primary task must be to raise veterans' benefits to levels which allow those who have sacrificed for our Nation to live decently. We must also, however, insure that the benefits legislated are not arbitrarily reduced because of factors over which the veteran has no control. This amendment will greatly aid in pursuance of this latter, and important, goal.

I would hope the distinguished floor manager would accept the amendment. What it does is apply to veterans attending vocational schools equitable standards in determining eligibility for full payment, so that these veterans are not penalized for vacation time or for absences from classes over which they have no control.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, let me say to my distinguished friend from Minnesota, I would be more disposed to accept this amendment except that it is a very technical amendment, concerning a matter which we have had under consideration in our committee. It would affect for profit schools rather than nonprofit schools. I wish to point out that there is already a period of 30 days' "off" time available to these individuals without reduction in VA payments.

I can assure my good friend that we will be willing to take this complicated matter up early next year. We have not received reports from the Veterans Administration as to the overall effect of the amendment or their position on it. We do not have any information at the moment which would make it possible for us to be in a position to accept such an amendment with full knowledge of its effect.

Mr. MONDALE. We have received any number of complaints that vocational school students are being treated differently from student veterans attending colleges. I do not see any basis for that distinction.

I would be glad to modify my amendment to exclude private, for-profit vocational schools, so that it would apply only to public vocational schools and schools which were of a nonprofit character, if that is important. I do not particularly like to make that distinction, because there are many fine for-profit vocational schools, but I would be willing to do that if I thought it would make the amendment more acceptable to the distinguished floor manager.

Mr. HARTKE. Let me point out that this matter is not quite as easily determined as might be implied from the statement by the Senator from Minnesota. Very simply, we have had numerous people trying to come up with a satisfactory arrangement to deal with the variety of programs which are offered by vocational schools. By their very nature, they often do not follow the routines that colleges follow.

Mr. MONDALE. Well, I attended college. Which routine did the Senator from Indiana follow?

Mr. HARTKE. The routine of my school. For example, the term of school was definitely set, as was the number of classes one could omit attendance upon without being expelled and there was considerable amount of out-of-class homework or preparation.

Mr. MONDALE. This is what amounts to class legislation. A man cannot afford to go to college. He has to go to vocational school. Then he is checked closely on the time put in, and he gets benefits deducted accordingly. But if one goes to college, no one pays such close attention.

Mr. HARTKE. Let me point out that there is a distinction of a major nature. The structure is generally entirely different in a vocational school. I am heartily in favor of vocational schools. There are plenty of provisions in this bill which benefit the vocational schools.

I wish the Senator would withdraw his amendment and permit us to have hearings in the next Congress. Then he can have a separate bill, if what he says is true, and we can have it passed early next year.

Mr. MONDALE. What I say is true. It is such a modest proposal that I would hope, with the deleting of the for-profit vocational schools, the floor manager might accept the amendment, and that he might have time to consult with the Veterans' Administration by the time the bill gets to conference.

I shall not press it if the floor manager of the bill feels strongly about it, but I would dislike to let another school year go by.

Mr. HARTKE. Let me assure the Senator from Minnesota that if I felt that at this moment there was sufficient evidence on which we could make a valid judgment on which we could take this amendment to conference, I would do so. I honestly do not feel we can at this time.

Let me say that the whole complaint of the vocational schools is not without some complications. That is not true in general with academic colleges, because they have more standardized approaches and the methods of instruction and attendance requirements are entirely different.

I would hope the Senator from Minnesota could rest on my assurance that we will have early hearings on this subject in the first part of the next Congress, following which we would be willing to proceed on the matter if at that time the Senator from Minnesota feels that would be the wisest course to follow.

Mr. MONDALE. With that understanding, I withdraw my amendment. I regret doing so, because, as I say, the amendment has been before the committee for a number of weeks. In any event, I realize that the floor manager does feel strongly about it, and, Mr. President, I withdraw my amendment.

Mr. HARTKE. I thank my colleague for doing so.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to further amendment.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, do I have 5 minutes remaining? I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Michigan (Mr. GRIFFIN).

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I know the value of the GI bill. Following my service in World War II, I was able to complete my prelaw college training and then go through law school because of the GI bill.

I congratulate the chairman of the committee (Mr. HARTKE), the ranking minority member (Mr. THURMOND), and all the members of the committee for reporting this legislation. It addresses itself to some inequities that we have been hearing about from our constituents. Of course, the most important improvement is the adjustment in the level of benefits. But I want to focus also on another section of this bill which is of particular interest to me. I refer to title II, which includes a section providing for the advance payment of initial educational benefits.

I had introduced legislation and presented testimony to the committee urging that something be done about the delays and redtape experienced by too many veterans in receiving their first check after enrolling in a college or university. In many cases, a veteran is married and has children. But after being accepted in college he finds that he has to wait for 3 or 4 months or longer before he receives a check. In many instances, this represents a severe hardship.

The legislation I introduced, like the section included in this bill, would establish a procedure for advance payment to a veteran once he is admitted to college. I am glad the committee has incorporated this concept into the bill now before us so that a veteran who is accepted and admitted to college will find a check waiting for him when he arrives on campus to enroll.

I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD a portion of the committee's report relating to the advance payment procedure together with a statement which I presented to the committee on this subject and an editorial.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TITLE II—ADVANCE PAYMENT OF EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE OR SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES AND WORK-STUDY/OUTREACH PROGRAM

SECTION 201

This section would create a new section 1780 in subchapter II of chapter 36 to provide, in part, first, for a consolidation of certain common provisions of law applicable to the payment of educational assistance or subsistence allowances currently in force (or made applicable by the Committee substitute in chapters 31, 34, and 35 and second, to authorize a new advance payment and prepayment system for educational assistance or subsistence allowance as follows:

§ 1780. Payment of educational assistance or subsistence allowances

Subsection (a), (b), (c), (g), and (h). Are technical in nature and restate common provisions now found in chapters 34 and 35 (or made applicable by the Committee substitute) which provide for the period for which payment of educational assistance or subsistence allowances may be made and the certifications required for regular educational programs, correspondence training, apprenticeship, and other on-job training.

Subsection (d). Provides for an advance payment of initial educational assistance or subsistence allowance based upon the express finding by Congress that eligible veterans and persons need additional funds at the beginning of the school term to meet the necessary expenses of books, travel, deposits and payments for living quarters as well as the initial installment of tuition which are concentrated at the start of the school year. An eligible veteran or person would be entitled (if intending to pursue a program of education on a half-time or better basis) to an advance payment in an amount equivalent to the allowance for the first month or fraction thereof plus the educational assistance allowance (or subsistence allowance in the case of chapter 31) for the succeeding month. For example, if a veteran has a September 10 school registration date he would be entitled at the date he registers to a check for the remaining 20 days of September plus the full allowance for the month of October in advance.

Under the present system, he would be eligible for the partial month of September only after the end of that month and under optimum conditions would not receive his first check before mid or late October. Under the Committee substitute, in the event of an initial enrollment of a veteran or person in an educational institution, the application for advance payment to be made on a form prescribed by the Administrator shall contain information showing that the veteran or person is eligible for educational benefits, has been accepted and has notified the institution of his intentions to attend that school. An advance payment is also authorized in the case of re-enrollment if the applicant indicates his eligibility to continue his program of education and his intention to re-enroll. In each instance, the application form shall also state the number of semester or clock-hours to be pursued by the eligible veteran or person.

Under the Prediscbarge Education Program (PREP) authorized in subchapter VI of chapter 34, an advance lump-sum payment based on the amount payable for the entire quarter, semester or term would be made. Applications for advance PREP payments shall contain additional information that the PREP program to be pursued has been approved as well as specify the anticipated cost and number or Carnegie, clock, or semester hours to be pursued. In the event that such program is other than a high school credit course the application shall certify the need of the person to pursue the course or courses to be taken. Information submitted by an eligible institution shall for the purposes of the Administrator's determination establish a veteran's or person's eligibility unless the Veterans' Administration has evidence clearly establishing that such person is not eligible for advance payment.

Any advance payment approved by the Administrator shall be drawn in favor of the veteran or person and mailed to the educational institution listed on the application form for temporary care and delivery to the individual upon his registration. No delivery, however, may be made earlier than 30 days prior to the date when the recipient's program of education is to commence. The institution shall submit certification of delivery of any advance payment or promptly return any check to the Administrator if delivery is not effected within thirty days following the commencement of the program of education for which payment is to be made.

Subsection (e). Provides that following the initial educational assistance or subsistence allowance advance payment, the eligible veteran or person would be entitled to receive directly subsequent payments in advance for each month thereafter. Administrative controls over the program are provided by permitting the Administrator to withhold the final payment of an enrollment period until proof of satisfactory pursuit has been submitted or to adjust appropriately the final payment.

Subsection (f). Authorizes the Administrator to recover advance payments in cases where the eligible veteran or person fails to pursue the course for which advance payment was made. Such advance may be recovered from any other benefit otherwise due such individual under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration. Otherwise, such overpayment shall constitute a liability of such individual and may be recovered in the same manner as any other debt due the United States.

This section is based upon the advance payment and prepayment provisions in S. 740 and those contained in S. 3657 as passed by the Senate in the 91st Congress (Report No. 91-1231).

STATEMENT BY SENATOR ROBERT P. GRIFFIN

MARCH 24, 1972.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to submit this statement concerning S. 2063, which would authorize the Administrator of Veterans Affairs to make advance educational assistance payments to veterans accepted for enrollment at colleges and universities.

I am sure this committee is acutely aware of, and sensitive to, the manifest problems facing our returning veterans.

As these young people begin to put their lives back together they are entitled to the maximum guarantee that their government will actually provide the benefits to which they are entitled.

Mr. Chairman, nearly half of the mail we receive in our office from veterans concerns problems these young people encounter in securing their educational assistance benefits.

Under my bill veterans accepted for ad-

mission under the G.I. Bill would be guaranteed advance payments of their checks from the VA.

At present, a veteran usually faces delays of two or three months before his papers are processed and he finally receives his initial assistance check.

This situation works a particular hardship on the young veteran who has dependents, and knowledge about such delays operates to discourage some veterans who might otherwise seek a college education.

One young man who served with honor and distinction in Vietnam with the U.S. Marines wrote me, in part:

"Upon receiving an Honorable Discharge I immediately began attending school; first Detroit Institute of Technology and now Wayne State University. While attending WSU I have not received any G.I. Bill educational benefits which goes back to September. I have called, inquired, pleaded, but as yet no one has been able to give any concrete reason for the delay of benefits. All necessary forms and paperwork on my part have been completed. The VA had previously informed me that I would be wasting my time seeking outside help because nothing would or could hurry their processing. After waiting five months I decided it was time to take some action."

This young man has a wife and son. Fortunately my office was able to expedite matters and the situation is now corrected.

Another young man wrote:

". . . . I started attending Highland Park night school Sept. 20, 1971. I didn't receive the September payment until December 8, 1971. Now I've still not received my October, nor my November payment. If the check isn't here by tomorrow I won't receive my December payment until January or later. I've been behind on my bills since I've started school."

This letter was written in January of this year.

Another young man attending college had to lean on his parents for aid until the VA started coming through with his checks. He wrote:

". . . . had I not come from a financially able family, my schooling would have been terminated. My parents, besides financing my education since August, have lost all interest that would have accumulated on their savings.

. . . . I feel it would be very appropriate to consider an examination of present law concerning this very important transition from military service to school, and to propose and enact measures that would better serve those that make this transition."

A letter received at my office on September 29, 1971 read, in part:

"I have been attending Oakland Community College for several months now in hopes of rejoining society and making something of myself. But unless you or someone else does not shake some sense of responsibility into the VA I don't know how much I can continue my schooling. For over a month now, the VA has owed me almost $350 for educational benefits for the summer semester which ended 17 August. Having to wait until the end of any given fiscal period for reimbursement from the VA is bad enough, but I have since had to scrape together my own funds for the autumn semester tuition, which is a phenomenal feat with a $50 a week job and a wife to support."

This same young man concluded his letter with this note of frustration:

"I am sick and disgusted sir, and beseech your help. Do we, or do we not, take care of our own?"

Mr. Chairman, I am sure the members of this distinguished committee agree with me that we should take care of our own.

Passage of this piece of legislation would help to demonstrate that commitment.

Thank you.

[From the (Michigan) Times Herald, Mar. 29, 1972]

VETS HAVE EARNED A BREAK

Sen. Robert Griffin (R-Mich.) has taken up the cause of American veterans whose plans for additional education are being frustrated by bureaucratic delay. He appealed to the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs last week for support in his bill, S. 2063, which would guarantee cash for veteran-students when it is needed.

Somebody, certainly, should take up their cause. They have earned consideration the hard way.

The Senator cited examples of veterans who have appealed to him for help when months have gone by after their applications for assistance under the G.I. Bill had been accepted. Qualified veterans, who had complied with all the requirements, were enrolled in acceptable educational programs on the strength of promised assistance. Then they watched bills pile up as benefits failed to come.

Everyone is familiar with delay. It seems a built-in characteristic of our form of government. Most times it does no great harm. But returning veterans may have had little opportunity to compensate for the time lag in restructuring their lives. College sessions begin on fixed dates; living costs do not take a holiday while governmental agencies follow their slow procedures.

What Senator Griffin is proposing is not an additional cost to the Veterans Administration. It would simply make available sooner the money already promised. There would be time for the routine paperwork when students are already busy at classwork.

It seems little enough accommodation in response to the honorable service they have given.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I commend the Senator from Michigan for his leadership in this field, and thank him for his remarks today.

I point out that there is an old story I used to hear from one of my Bible teachers. Talking about money, he said:

You cannot take your money with you, but you can give it to the church and have it waiting for you when you get to heaven.

That is sort of like what this section provides: You cannot take it with you, but you can have it waiting for you at the door when you enroll. That is what we have, in effect provided.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I thank the Senator.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I am pleased to offer my support for S. 2161. This bill was expertly designed by the Veterans' Affairs Committee to respond to the educational demands of the 6 million Vietnam era veterans. Though we have received loud and vigorous lip service from the administration about the importance of meeting the needs of the men and women who served during this war—it is clear that the Veterans' Affairs Committee, has produced the only package of assistance that can realistically deliver the benefits these valiant people deserve. I am particularly gratified that the committee's considerable foresight has generated the initiative to provide the Senate with a legislative proposal that offers the members of our Armed Forces, this chance to gain the educational benefits they missed because of their military service.

Not only will this bill guarantee educational opportunities to those whose education was interrupted by military duty—but this measure, more importantly assures that educational opportunities are guaranteed to people from disadvantaged backgrounds whose horizons and aspirations have been broadened in the service. With the passage of this bill, the Senate will insure provisions of educational adequacy that were included in similar bills I introduced in 1969 and 1970. Approximately 1 million veterans returned home during each of those years. But the benefits available to them were shamefully low. At that time, just as we are trying to do now, legislative proposals sought to make education more attractive to veterans with academic deficiencies, and to encourage colleges and other educational institutions to admit veterans and to develop special programs for them.

Since World War II, the United States has attempted to recognize its obligation to those young men and women who have spent a portion of their lives in the military service. Perhaps, because World War II was widely supported by the American public, a broad range of benefits were readily and easily authorized for those who served. But the participants in the Vietnam war suffer the misfortune of serving in an unprecedentedly unpopular conflict.

Moreover, because of the way the military draft has operated, the manpower machinery has scandalized our national commitment to insure equity to all those who were drafted. Thus, the draft system has been structured and administered to exempt from fighting, and most, particularly from dying, those with the power and affluence to stay out of service. And so it is, that the ravages of this war have been borne principally by the poor, and the disadvantaged. If a civilian failed to have the money, the scheme or the desire to avoid military service, that person was bound off to war to face all its dangers. For those who survived, the system nominally offers certain rewards and benefits. But in fact, the benefits have been grossly unequal to those offered to the veterans of our other modern wars.

World War II veterans' educational allowances covered all tuition charges regardless of how much they might have been. In addition each veteran in school at that time was eligible for a $75 monthly living allowance—with subsidies for any dependents. Korean war veterans received $990 a year; and the 1966 version of the Korean GI bill provided only $900 a year for a veteran to buy whatever education that amount would purchase in a 4-year period. Current benefits provide $175 a month for full-time students. But, any veteran who has tried to buy an education, pay rent, and buy food with that allowance, can vividly describe how woefully inadequate are the benefits under our existing law.

Moreover, it is incomprehensible to the veterans themselves that the system which sent them to war in the first place should deny them the extensive benefits that have traditionally been insured for other veterans of our country's battles.

No matter what views one holds concerning this current war, it is undeniable that through their service on active duty these men and women deserve the ad-

miration and respect of a grateful country. They have earned also the right to our attention and assistance on their return. That is why I support the provisions of S. 2161. This bill begins to provide fundamental education assistance for Vietnam veterans.

This bill has been expertly engineered to address the realistic demands of purchasing an education in the face of continuing inflationary increases. By raising educational assistance benefits from $175 to $250 a month for a single veteran this bill approaches a level of parity with the benefits that World War II veterans received.

Ironically, today's pitifully low allowance discourages the veteran who is in the greatest need—the veteran who has a family to support. Yet, the experience of the benefit system after World War II shows that educational assistance is a boon to the establishment of an enlightened middle class that cherishes the comforts and joys of a wholesome family life.

Our veterans of the war in Vietnam deserve the attention of this Nation because they represent a resource which society can utilize to the best advantage of all concerned. America's veterans have acquired wisdom and judgment though because they were thrust into circumstances that demanded responsibility in critical situations. They are citizens who have demonstrated discipline and ability. Returning veterans, therefore, have more than earned their place as constructive and valuable citizens. We must properly respond to their service by giving them a chance to channel their talents in a productive way. Since life for a returning veteran is uniquely difficult under most circumstances—special attention should go toward providing assistance to the veteran who wants to return to school. I am pleased, therefore to see that S. 2161 authorizes advance payment of tuition costs at the start of the school year.

Members of the National Association of Collegiate Veterans know that the existing law creates an inevitable delay between the time a veteran receives his allowance and the start of the school year. Many veterans must borrow money to keep themselves eligible to receive their delayed payments. Other veterans simply avoid the effort of seeking schooling because of this needless barrier. I am hopeful that with the enactment of this bill, the Veterans' Administration will launch a vigorous campaign to inform eligible veterans that they need not worry about the first check. Under this bill, the veteran can mail the first check directly to the school in time for the veteran to complete his registration.

Additionally, under the provisions of this bill eligible veterans are authorized to receive loans up to $1,500 that will aid them in meeting the high costs of schooling, along with the demand of basic living requirements.

Mr. President, in summary, I believe it is important that the Senate approve this measure because it includes so many features that will guarantee substantial advances toward adequacy of education benefits for veterans of the Vietnam era. Some other major features this bill authorizes include increased benefits for vocational rehabilitation subsistence allowances; and a new student-veterans work-study outreach program. And I know that other details of the legislation address the many specific education requirements that must be guaranteed to achieve adequacy for those who have served their country so well. This bill was carefully constructed on the basis of testimony from 65 witnesses during 5 days of committee hearings. Educational assistance for veterans has broad ranging interest as evidenced by the 16 bills that were submitted for committee action. The distinguished chairman of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, along with the members of that committee worked skillfully to fashion a measure that admirably responds to the requirements of returning veterans. S. 2161 emerged therefore as a substitute measure, incorporating the most meaningful and fundamental provisions required for a serious response to the educational concerns of returning veterans.

Congress has established program for our veterans in many areas—training, employment, medical and hospital benefits, pension—and in education. All of these are important, and perhaps none of these is more important than education. Americans have long recognized the value of education for all citizens. Today we in the Senate have an opportunity to show the Nation that we are committed to the guarantee of quality education to our veterans as a continuing obligation.

I am happy to give my full support to this measure by voting for the passage of S. 2161.

Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. President, I welcome the fact that the Senate is finally moving in this very important area. The Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1972 is an extremely urgent legislative priority.

It is vitally important that this bill be enacted promptly. It will affect over a million persons—and it will vest them with important opportunities which should be available immediately.

As soon as this bill is enacted into law its benefits will become available. Accordingly, I believe that it is imperative for my colleagues in the Senate and in the House and for the President to expedite the prompt passage of this bill.

No technical detail should be allowed to delay the implementation of this legislation. The provisions of this law are more important than any possible technical modification could be.

It is apparent, Mr. President, that my distinguished senior colleague has been instrumental in the development and expedition of this legislation. I believe that the full measure of this participation and leadership should be recognized by this body. We all owe him an enormous debt of thanks for an important job well and thoroughly done.

In light of the effort which has been put into this bill as well as the significant positive impact that it will have on the lives of over a million persons, it is imperative that this body pass this bill today.

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, one of the most successful programs ever established by the Congress is the Vocational Rehabilitation and Educational Assistance Act; the so-called GI bill. All veterans are grateful for it. The Nation as a whole has profited by it.

Yet the benefits under this act have never kept pace with the costs of education in our Nation's schools.

Too, the returning veteran who seeks assistance today feels he is or has been a victim of circumstance; he performed faithfully in an unpopular war; he returned to civilian life and applied for benefits which were less than equal to those provided for the World War II or Korean veteran.

The Committee on Veterans' Affairs and staff have worked long and arduously to perfect a bill which will alleviate these inequities, and it is felt that the bill now before the Senate will do just that.

This bill would provide benefit increases in all rates in chapters 31, 34 and 35 of title 38, United States Code, to achieve parity with the total dollar entitlement available under the World War II GI bill.

Although there may be some differences in philosophy between this and other bills which have been submitted, it is felt that this one satisfies the greatest majority of needs for today's veterans, and I wish to congratulate the chairman and the staff for their endeavors.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I am pleased today to express my full support for S. 2161, the Veterans' Education and Training Assistance Act of 1972, of which I am a cosponsor.

The institution of a program of educational benefits for our Nation's veterans was a fine moment in our history. These benefits are more than a nation's expression of its gratitude for the sacrifices of the men who fought to defend our liberty and freedom, they are a declaration of our sense of moral obligation. In our increasingly complex and technical society, education has become an essential component of successful job placement and career mobility. It is only just that our veterans have the opportunity to obtain the necessary education, which they have forgone while serving their country, so that they can successfully enter the civilian work force. Furthermore, it is in our national interest that these men and women have every opportunity to continue contributing to the welfare of our country.

Since we initiated the program of educational benefits, we have constantly sought ways to make the program applicable to the needs of the veteran. The program has grown to include benefits to veterans who participate in farm cooperative, apprenticeship, and on-the-job training programs. Furthermore, we have instituted a program entitled PREP, which is designed to assist veterans in need of additional preparation in order to enter and successfully pursue a course of higher education.

In spite of these efforts, the percentage of veterans taking advantage of these benefits has substantially decreased. Following World War II, some 50 percent of those eligible used their benefits; following the Korean war, approximately 42 percent of those eligible used their benefits, and during the first years of the Vietnam conflict, only a disappointing

20.7 percent participated in the program. In view of the ever-increasing level of educational attainment in our Nation with the resultant competitive advantage of trained people in the labor market, in view of the shockingly high unemployment rates for the Vietnam era veteran, and in view of the increasing scope of education benefits which have been provided to the veteran, we must ask ourselves why so few Vietnam era veterans have taken advantage of their benefits.

I feel that part of the answer lies in the spiraling costs of higher education and the rapid rise in the cost of living. This prohibits many veterans from seeking further education. The financial assistance that we have offered the veteran has simply not kept pace with increasing costs. The average cost of a college education in 1952 was $968. The monthly allowance available to the Korean veteran was $110. Although the average yearly cost for college tuition, books and fees is now about $1,940, the assistance offered a veteran pursuing a full-time course of study at an institution of higher education is now only $175. The correlation between the level of support and the percent of participation has been aptly demonstrated. Public Law 91–219, which provided the most recent increase in benefits, became effective as of February 1, 1970. During the following 12 months, the number of individuals participating increased by 33 percent.

The program of education assistance was never designed to pay the entire cost of the veterans' education. However, I feel that we should bring the level of benefits in line with those we offered to the veterans of the Korean conflict. Because the benefits we presently offer are insufficient, many veterans cannot afford to obtain further education. Instead, they are attempting to enter an already saturated job market. Our Nation must renew its efforts to meet its obligation to assist the Vietnam veteran in successfully readjusting to civilian life after completing his service in our Armed Forces.

I believe that the Veterans' Education and Training Assistance Act of 1972 is an enlightened piece of legislation which will do much to fulfill obligations to our veterans as well as further the interests of our nation. I urge my colleagues to approve this important measure.

Mr. BEALL. Mr. President, I support S. 2161, designed to increase the vocational rehabilitation subsistence allowance, the educational assistance allowance, and the special training allowance paid to eligible veterans.

This is an action of urgent necessity to the thousands of former servicemen who have found that the benefits of veteran educational support could not measure up to the spiraling costs of today's schooling.

As a member of the Subcommittee on Education, I have long been concerned with the ability of Americans to obtain quality education at a reasonable cost. This objective is especially pressing when it concerns those who have sacrificed so much in the service of their country. But today's Vietnam era veterans have found that the benefits of legislation formulated after World War II have not kept pace with the rising expenses of modern training and education. They have found, too late, that Federal support falls far short of the actual costs, and often either must live at a subsistence level or seek extracurricular employment, thus taking valuable time away from their studies.

This bill is a great step in the rectification of this situation.

S. 2161 attacks the problem of veterans benefits on several fronts. First, it increases the basic rates in order to achieve a cost-of-living parity with the World War II program, bringing 1972 benefits in line with 1972 costs. Under S. 2161, for instance, rates for a single man would be increased from $175 to $250 a month—a 43 percent raise.

Second, the legislation would eliminate serious difficulties some veterans face as they begin the program, by authorizing an advance payment system whereby the veteran's check would be waiting for the student at the time of entrance. This would prevent the often tragic consequences of a veteran who must wait for significant periods of time after beginning school in order to receive his first payment. This is a hardship that must be alleviated.

Third, the bill also provides for a work-study/outreach program where a veteran can earn $300 for performing needed services for the Veterans' Administration. This is a forward-looking proposal, and I urge its inclusion in this legislation.

In addition, several provisions of title IV of S. 2161 improve the technical aspects of the present program in a number of ways. These sections provide that benefits between male and female veterans are to be equal; mandates increased outreach efforts by the Veterans' Administration; increases allowances to State approving agencies; and calls for an independent study to be conducted of present and past VA educational benefits payment systems, with a report to Congress due in 9 months after enactment.

The bill also provides for direct insured education loans to veterans of up to $1,575 a year, in order to make up the remaining difference between the money available to a veteran and the cost of any training or schooling.

Finally, title VI of the bill recognizes the extraordinary difficulties the Vietnam era veteran is facing in obtaining employment by seeking to make more effective the current laws dealing with veteran unemployment assistance. It requires an affirmative action plan by Federal agencies for the hiring of Vietnam era veterans and disabled veterans; provides for preference by Federal contractors to such veterans who are otherwise qualified for the job; and eases eligibility requirements for entrance into Federal manpower training programs by Vietnam era veterans.

Mr. President, this is a much needed piece of legislation. It affirms in no uncertain terms the commitment that this Nation must have to its veterans, particularly those of the last decade. It tells these men and women that they have not been forgotten, and that we in the Government recognize their problems and are dedicated to their solution. I, therefore, urge the overwhelming passage of this measure.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, I add my unqualified support to S. 2161, the Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Act of 1972. Early last summer, I joined Senators HARTKE, CRANSTON, and THURMOND as the original sponsors of this bill. At that time, we were vitally concerned with developing legislation which would resolve or at least greatly assist the resolution of the extensive problems facing our veterans who have served during the unprecedented difficulties of the Vietnam era. I am pleased that we are considering such a bill today.

Although many of us here in the Senate have served our country during a war, we experienced a much different public sentiment when we returned from those battles. Few of us can appreciate the horror of the war in Vietnam as do so many of our young veterans.

Furthermore, the various problems which a veteran confronts today when he leaves the military service often seem insurmountable to him. For example, in June, the unemployment rate for Vietnam era veterans was 7.2 percent as opposed to 4.0 percent for all men over 20 years old, and for a veteran in the 20–40 year age group, the unemployment rate was 9.9 percent.

These unemployment statistics reflect the tightness of the job market today and the need for improved training and educational experience for people seeking work. Far too often, I hear from concerned young veterans who factually state that their "combat infantry badge" or "purple heart" has not prepared them for any acceptable jobs.

Combined with the burden of being undertrained in a scarce job market which demands increasing specialization, the veteran must contend with the lingering suspicion that he is a drug addict or has revelled in committing atrocities.

Today we are talking about men who have given at least 2 years of their lives at a time when they could have initiated a career. Too frequently during those years, they were sloshing through rice paddies or jungles trying to survive on a day-to-day basis.

Now these men have returned home, to the world, and they are overwhelmed by the cold, detached reception they receive both on a personal and institutional level. Certainly there is no comparison between the return of veterans today and that of veterans following earlier wars.

A man who spent a year in mortal fear of his life returns to a country which regards the war he fought as a stupid blunder not worth tax dollars, let alone a life, and which treats him suspiciously without much consideration for the terror and anguish he experienced during his tour in Vietnam.

I am sure that veterans are eager to reinvolve themselves in the routine of civilian life as soon as possible. Many hope to return to school to improve their credentials for finding employment. However, they are confronted with the

serious problem of receiving too little government help to pay for their education—especially when they compare the benefits they are eligible for under current programs to those received by veterans of World War II.

A Harris poll conducted last summer indicated that nearly 60 percent of the young veterans believed that they could not live comfortably on the present GI bill benefits and 53 percent of the veterans who did not return to school said that they would do so if they received more adequate assistance from the Veterans' Administration.

In 1948, a veteran of World War II received $500 per year for 4 years to defray the costs of tuition, books, and other fees. In addition, a single veteran was paid $65 per month for living allowance. At that time, $1,085 per year for living and school was an adequate amount which encouraged veterans to return to school and continue or begin to pursue a better education.

Regrettably, this is not the case today. The Vietnam era veteran is entitled to a living allowance of $175 for a 9-month school year. This amount represents a $510 increase in benefits over a 24-year period during which the cost of living rose about 87 percent. In other words, to receive an amount comparable to what the World War II veteran received under the GI bill, today's veteran would need to receive about $2,030. However, this increase does not fully take into account the substantial increases in tuition and general education costs. A very pertinent example is the tuition increases taking effect at New Jersey State colleges and universities this fall.

I believe that S. 2161 as reported to the Senate confronts the deficiencies of the present GI education bill and provides adequate assistance to veterans who are seeking an education today.

The major provisions of this bill are:

First, an increase in the monthly education assistance allowance to $250 from $175;

Second, advance payment of the monthly assistance allowance at the start of the school term and on the first of each month thereafter;

Third, establishment of a work-study/outreach program in the Veterans' Administration;

Fourth, the payment of VA loans up to $1,575 per year for educational costs not provided by other Federal loan or grant programs; and

Fifth, substantial employment assistance directed at the Vietnam era veterans.

I think this bill indicates the Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee's great thoughtfulness and sensitivity to solving these problems. In addition, the extensive hearing record demonstrates the depth of commitment which the committee has given this matter.

I commend Senators HARTKE, CRANSTON, and THURMOND for their dedication and significant work on this bill. Furthermore, I think we should note that once again the committee has developed legislation which corrects serious oversights and inadequacies in veterans' programs and establishes more responsive programs which will vitally assist American veterans.

Again, I am compelled to express my pleasure in being associated with these distinguished Senators as one of the original cosponsors of S. 2161.

SENATOR RANDOLPH ACTIVELY SUPPORTS VIETNAM VETERANS' AID

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, it is a privilege to join my colleagues on the Committee on Veterans' Affairs in presenting to the Senate the Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1972. Our committee has approved a comprehensive veterans education and training measure, which includes substantial and needed increases in monthly payments. We have worked diligently and thoroughly in the development of this measure. As a member of the committee it was my responsibility to participate in this vital endeavor. I honestly believe it is landmark legislation, based on the concept of achieving a rate level of educational assistance to place current aid on a parity with the World War II GI bill. I commend our able chairman, the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE) for his constructive leadership in bringing this measure through committee to the Senate floor.

This important legislation will provide expanded financial assistance and new programs to aid eligible veterans in securing education and training and vocational rehabilitation. The improvements contained in this new measure are urgently needed by our Vietnam era veterans. I am confident that it will enable a larger number of veterans, particularly those with families, to participate under the GI bill.

Our chairman has detailed the provisions of S. 2161. However, I comment very briefly on some of the major improvements and new programs contained in the legislation.

First, Mr. President, there is the deserved and urgently needed increase in the monthly educational assistance rates for veterans pursuing full-time, three-quarter time, and half-time institutional educational courses. The rates for cooperative training would also be increased. The single veteran without dependents who is pursuing a full-time institutional course would be increased from the current $175 monthly rate to $250 a month.

Additionally, there is a raise in the monthly subsistence allowance rates for veteran trainees in vocational rehabilitation training courses. The rate for a single veteran without dependents who is pursuing full-time institutional training would be increased from $135 a month to $200 a month. Comparable increases are provided for those trainees pursuing part-time training, for those pursuing institutional, on-the-farm, apprentice, or other on-the-job training full time.

The bill provides for the following payment increases—

From $10 to $200 the amount of a loan which may be made to trainees.

Rate of educational assistance allowance payable to children, widows, and wives pursuing educational programs. The rate increases apply to full-time, three-quarter time, and half-time training. The full-time rate would be increased from $175 to $250 per month.

Further, Mr. President, S. 2161 creates a new work-study/outreach program which would enable GI bill postsecondary trainees with a financial need to perform 120 hours of services needed by the VA—on campuses or at VA regional offices or medical facilities—under which a veteran would become entitled to receive, in advance, a work-study educational assistance allowance of $300. Particular emphasis under this program would be placed on outreach recruitment of other veterans to make use of GI bill entitlement.

It authorizes individual tutorial assistance for a veteran who has a "marked deficiency" in required subjects if such assistance is necessary for the veteran to successfully complete the program and entitles an eligible veteran to an additional $175 a month in loan entitlement for each month of eligibility or up to $1,575 per school year, based on the veteran's financial resources and the actual cost of attendance at the institution.

Other provisions of S. 2161 include improved job counseling, training, and placement service for veterans; a requirement for affirmative action plan for hiring of veterans by Federal Government; a requirement for employment preference under Federal contracts; and changes in eligibility requirements for veterans to allow for increased participation in certain manpower training programs.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. THURMOND. I yield back my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time having been yielded back, the question is on agreeing to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute as amended.

The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill (S. 2161) was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, and was read the third time.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Veterans' Affairs be discharged from further consideration of H.R. 12828, and that the Senate proceed immediately to the consideration of that bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

An Act (H.R. 12828) to amend chapters 31, 34, and 35 of title 38, United States Code, to increase the rates of vocational rehabilitation, educational assistance, and special training allowances paid to eligible veterans and persons; to provide for advance educational assistance payments to certain veterans; to make improvements in the educational assistance programs; and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the requests of the Senator from Indiana? Without objection the committee is discharged from further

consideration of the bill and the Senate will proceed to its consideration.

Mr. HARTKE. I move that H.R. 12828 be amended by striking out all after the enacting clause and inserting in lieu thereof the text of S. 2161, as amended.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Indiana.

The motion was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment of the amendment and the third reading of the bill.

The amendment was ordered to be engrossed and the bill to be read a third time.

The bill was read the third time.

Mr. HARTKE. I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BROCK). The bill having been read the third time, the question is, Shall it pass? On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Florida (Mr. CHILES), the Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON), the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. EASTLAND), the Senator from Georgia (Mr. GAMBRELL), and the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. HARRIS) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. MONTOYA) is absent on official business.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. EASTLAND), the Senator from Georgia (Mr. GAMBRELL), and the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. MONTOYA) would each vote "yea."

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER), and the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) are necessarily absent.

The Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) is absent because of illness.

If present and voting, the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) and the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER) would each vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 89, nays 0, as follows:

[No. 342 Leg.]

YEAS—89

Aiken	Dole	Mathias
Allen	Dominick	McClellan
Allott	Ervin	McGee
Anderson	Fannin	McGovern
Bayh	Fong	McIntyre
Beall	Fulbright	Metcalf
Bellmon	Gravel	Miller
Bennett	Griffin	Mondale
Bentsen	Gurney	Moss
Bible	Hansen	Muskie
Boggs	Hart	Nelson
Brock	Hartke	Packwood
Brooke	Hatfield	Pastore
Buckley	Hollings	Pearson
Burdick	Hruska	Pell
Byrd, Harry F., Jr.	Hughes	Proxmire
	Humphrey	Randolph
Byrd, Robert C.	Inouye	Ribicoff
Cannon	Jackson	Roth
Case	Javits	Saxbe
Church	Jordan, N.C.	Schweiker
Cook	Jordan, Idaho	Scott
Cooper	Kennedy	Smith
Cotton	Long	Sparkman
Cranston	Magnuson	Spong
Curtis	Mansfield	Stafford
Stennis	Taft	Tunney
Stevens	Talmadge	Weicker
Stevenson	Thurmond	Williams
Symington	Tower	Young

NAYS—0

NOT VOTING—10

Baker	Gambrell	Mundt
Chiles	Goldwater	Percy
Eagleton	Harris	
Eastland	Montoya	

So the bill (H.R. 12828) was passed.

The title was amended, so as to read:

"A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to increase the vocational rehabilitation subsistence allowance, educational assistance allowances, and the special training allowances paid to eligible veterans and persons under chapters 31, 34, and 35 of such title; to provide for advance payment of educational assistance or subsistence allowances and establish a Work-Study/Outreach Program; to improve and expand the special programs for educationally disadvantaged veterans and servicemen under chapter 34 of such title; to extend eligibility to wives and widows of certain veterans for tutorial assistance and participation in correspondence, apprenticeship and other on-job training, and high school and elementary education programs to extend eligibility to the dependents of certain veterans for tutorial assistance and participation in apprenticeship and other on-job training programs; to improve the farm cooperative training program by reducing the number of in-class hours and expanding on-farm instruction; to establish a veterans education loan program for veterans eligible for benefits under chapter 34 of such title; to promote the employment of veterans by improving and expanding the provisions governing the operation of the Veterans Employment Service and by providing an employment preference for certain Vietnam era or disabled veterans under Federal contracts and subcontracts; to consolidate certain provisions in chapters 34 and 35 of such title into chapter 36 of such title; and for other purposes."

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the bill was passed.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that S. 2161 be indefinitely postponed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXECUTIVE SESSION—TREATY ON LIMITATION OF ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate return to executive session to consider Executive L (92d Congress, second session), the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I rise to speak in favor of the Senate acting to advise and consent to the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty now before us, and the executive agreement limiting offensive weapons for a 5-year interim period.

When this matter was before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I testified in their behalf and I emphasized three points, as I shall today. First, the U.S. strategy of deterrence and the support that these agreements lend to that strategy. Second, the incredible overkill power that is contained within our current strategic stockpile and the effect of SALT to protect the invulnerability of that nuclear stockpile. Third, I stressed the mixed potential of these agreements either for promoting further arms control or for being used by defense ministries in Washington and Moscow to obtain every gold-plated weapons system that is not clearly prohibited by the treaty.

Today, it would appear that the third point has largely been decided. This administration has successfully forced through the Congress a $20 billion military procurement bill that contained the B–1 bomber, the Trident, the SAM–D, another nuclear aircraft carrier and a series of lesser new systems. This policy apparently indicates its acceptance of the view that the agreements should be read as a businessman reads the tax laws, as a series of loopholes in which to ram through every new weapons system that weapons planners can develop.

The restraint called for by the President when he returned from Moscow apparently remains an empty and little-heeded piece of advice by the Department of Defense. For not only has the Defense Department been permitted to push forward on systems originally justified by the absence of an arms limitation agreement, but they have specifically proposed more than $100 million additional for SALT add-on systems as well as a Washington-based ABM system.

The SALT treaty—which clearly is the landmark achievement of this administration—has been badly tarnished by the use placed on it by the administration. Instead of setting the Nation firmly on the path toward deescalating the nuclear arms race, President Nixon, by permitting the Defense Department to call the shots, has thoughtlessly placed greater nuclear destructive capacity into the hands of man.

I would urge the President to recall the words of Dr. Kissinger who expressed the underlying potential of these treaties when he stated:

> . . . The stakes were larger than the simple technical issues; . . . What was at stake was a major step toward international stability, confidence among nations, and a turn in the pattern of post-war relationships.

By giving in to the Pentagon, the President is risking this potential for a changed relationship between the two most powerful nations in the world. It is a risk not worth taking.

Instead, I would urge the President to commit this Nation to firmly pursue treaty limitations on offensive weapons systems in SALT II including a halt to the qualitative arms race.

And as a first step in that direction, I would urge the President to do what he has refused to do thus far, and that is

to commit this Nation to negotiate a nuclear test ban treaty covering underground testing. A moratorium announced by the President to remain in effect so long as the Russians abstain from testing and immediate negotiations to make that ban permanent, would be a step applauded by leaders throughout the world. I have introduced and other Senators have also, resolutions urging the President to take this action.

I urge him now to show leadership in this matter by announcing a U.S. temporary suspension and his intention to offer a new negotiating initiative at Geneva to secure a permanent test ban treaty.

This would be a major step toward placing a ceiling on the qualitative arms race.

And it would be in keeping with our overall strategy of deterrence. For the basic policy that has guided this Nation in determining strategic force requirements has been deterrence, the ability of our offensive strategic forces to not only survive an effectively launched surprise attack but to do so in a manner that assures a response of such devastating power that an opponent could not rationally decide to launch a first strike.

The ABM treaty not only prohibits nationwide antiballistic missile system but outlaws as well the upgrading of air defense systems to an ABM role. In addition, the treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based ABM systems.

The only exceptions are made for a National Capital site and for the protection of a single ICBM site.

I would emphasize that this treaty does not require either nation to go forward and build those sites and I would argue that there is absolutely no justification for going forward with a Washington-based ABM.

It would be an expensive and unfortunate decision to convert the option contained in the treaty into an obligation. For any scenario one could put forward, the National Capital area ABM represents no answer.

In a massive attack, its 100 interceptors could be overwhelmed without difficulty. The statement by Admiral Moorer that "a very small part" of the U.S. force could overwhelm the Moscow ABM system, holds for the National Capital system equally well. A small part of the Soviet weaponry could overwhelm the proposed Washington ABM.

The NCA also would be of almost no value in a limited attack by a third country since the rest of the Nation would be vulnerable. Also, it is a matter of extreme improbability for an accidental launch to head for Washington.

I have cited these provisions of the treaty because they represent a commitment by both the United States and the Soviet Union not to defend their territories from nuclear attack, a commitment essential to the concept of deterrence and an assurance that our existing strategic forces would retain their overkill capacity against the Soviet Union even after a first strike.

Thus, the treaty not only affirms the intention of both nations to stem the arms race but also reaffirms the strategic doctrine of mutual deterrence as a guarantee against the use of the weapons of massive destruction which we both possess.

The current strategic position of the United States seen in light of SALT and the Executive Agreement limiting offensive weapons should not be forgotten.

Our nuclear stockpile includes: 1,054 ICBM's, 656 ballistic missiles on our Polaris-Poseidon fleet, and 457 long-range bombers. That triad has the capacity today to send 5,700 nuclear warheads against Soviet targets, warheads which range from three times to several hundred times the power of the atomic device which destroyed Hiroshima.

These figures do not include the 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons based in Europe, a substantial number of which could be delivered on targets in the Soviet Union.

And what it is critically important for us to note. These numbers do not reflect estimates or forces dependent on any future development or deployment. They are developed. They are deployed. They are available today.

And so any discussion of the strategic posture of this Nation must begin with our invulnerable deterrent today and its enhancement by the ABM ban contained in the treaty now before us.

The long accepted level of destruction—25 percent of population and 50 percent of industry—could be achieved by destroying 100 of the Soviet Union's largest cities. And this could be accomplished by two on-station Polaris-Poseidon submarines.

The missiles from a single Poseidon submarine could destroy one-quarter of the Soviet Union's industry, not to mention a substantial percentage of the Soviet Union's population.

Fifty Minuteman III missiles could destroy nearly half of the Soviet industry and 10 B–52 bombers, approximately 2 percent of our strategic bomber force, could destroy nearly 40 percent of Soviet industry.

With our nuclear deterrent made more vulnerable by this treaty, with the clear result of its approval being a reaffirmation of mutual deterrence and with the potential for this treaty to be used as the first step toward more comprehensive strategic limitations, I strongly urge the Senate to advise and consent to this treaty.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield 8 minutes to the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire is recognized for 8 minutes.

Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I rise to speak for ratification of the treaty limiting development of antiballistic missile systems.

I do so because I firmly believe this treaty is in the best interests of national security and world peace.

To underscore how strongly I feel about this, Mr. President, let me report that just last week I made a public appeal to the people of New Hampshire to give their united support to both of the agreements negotiated by President Nixon with the Soviet Union.

I did this for three reasons.

First, because I believe these agreements will lead to greater national security and enhance the prospects of lasting peace.

Second, because I believe the issue is far above party or personal political considerations.

Third, because strident voices in my State were impugning the President's dedication to our best interests while sowing irresponsible seeds of distrust about the arms limitation agreements themselves.

In that appeal, Mr. President, I said that the agreements must be viewed in the overall, that to weigh the ABM treaty separately from the Interim Agreement limiting offensive missiles would distort perspective and do a disservice to both.

So in appealing to the people of my State to support both, I said the compelling reasons were these:

They would slow down the arms race and move us toward a more peaceful world.

The key to curbing the arms race was the recognition by both sides of the inevitability and the necessity of mutual vulnerability, and thus the agreement to limit ABM deployment to no more than two sites with a maximum of 100 defensive missiles each.

This means that both sides finally recognize that no amount of money, no stroke of technological genius, no total application of national resources could ever assure either side of the capability to destroy the other without in turn being destroyed itself.

They are a shrewd bargain that enhances national security.

By freezing ballistic missile submarines at the present level, the Soviets will lose their submarine building momentum. And by freezing SS–9 missiles at the present level, the Soviets are locked into a low-level status with this blockbuster weapon.

And by excluding the bombers in our Strategic Air Command from the limits on strategic weapons, we retain our unique advantage in this weaponry.

Now some have objected to President Nixon's agreement to freeze the Soviet's lead in the number of missiles at 2,350 long-range missiles on land and sea for them and 1,710 for us. And some might complain that the President locked us into a Soviet 3-to-1 lead in "throw weight" or megatonnage in comparable missile capacity.

But the key to our security, as the President well knows, is our three to one lead in warheads, a staggering advantage in the practical give and take of strategic forces.

And because our technology is so advanced, we are also able to continue to retool our missiles with multiple war-

heads, so-called MIRV's, and we are, therefore, sure to maintain a remarkable advantage in deliverable warheads no matter what contingency might occur during the 5-year course of this agreement. The Soviets simply have not tested any comparable multiple warhead capacity.

Because these agreements do not depend on good faith but are as foolproof as our own ingenious technology can make them.

Our satellite intelligence gathering will tell us whether or not the Soviets are living up to the agreements. From what I have learned as a member of the Armed Services Committee, we can, independently and reliably, tell whether the Soviets are honoring the agreed limits on ABM's, their SS–9 supermissiles, and their nuclear missile submarines.

Finally, Mr. President, I told the people of my State that united support of these historic agreements can symbolize our capacity to join together once again in a cause of profound importance to each and every one of us—and to those who are yet unborn.

Mr. President, I have my political differences with Mr. Nixon, and everyone in my State knows it.

But I believe the President served his countrymen well in Moscow, and I believe the agreements he negotiated there deserve the united support of the American people and the united support of the U.S. Senate.

So I shall begin by voting today to ratify the ABM treaty.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Maryland.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I want to express my support for the arms control agreements signed by the President in Moscow and for the ABM treaty and the interim agreement on offensive weapons are certainly among the greatest steps toward world peace during the past 25 years, and are concrete evidence that President Nixon's effort to build a new framework for lasting peace is succeeding.

The strategic arms limitations talks were characterized by President Nixon prior to their commencement in 1969 as "one of the most momentous negotiations ever entrusted to any American delegation." The arms control agreements are the culmination of 3½ years of delicate and complex negotiations and are the result of intensive preparation and involvement of President Nixon, his Cabinet members, and key advisers.

The talks opened in Helsinki in November 1969. The initial round was exploratory in nature and was of value in developing the necessary mutual understanding of concepts and principles, which guided the substantive negotiations.

Mr. President, I think it is of importance for the Senate that we know a little about the mechanics by which this agreement was reached because it is reassuring to the Senate to appreciate the painstaking nature of the work that went into the negotiations.

Six subsequent rounds of the negotiations ensued. The seventh round of SALT, which I had the privilege to visit, was held in Helsinki, Finland and concluded on May 26, 1972, with the signature of the historic strategic arms limitation agreements in Moscow.

I left Helsinki greatly impressed with the calibre of our delegation to SALT most ably led by Ambassador Gerard Smith, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I was extremely impressed with the work that was being done. Ambassador Smith, I think, deserves special credit and special notice because throughout his entire career, he has been active in arms control and disarmament affairs.

From 1961 through February 1969, he was a member of the Board of Consultants, Policy Planning Council, Department of State. As Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning, 1957–61, Mr. Smith was credited by President Kennedy with having made the original proposal for the Washington-Moscow "hot line"—one of the first steps taken in the field of practical arms control measures. He also played a major role in the shaping of President Eisenhower's 1958 long-term peace proposals to the United Nations for a permanent United Nations Force and regional arms control, and he originated the concept of nuclear test restraint agreed upon at the Bermuda Heads of Governments Meeting in 1957.

Other members of the delegation at Helsinki included Ambassador Philip J. Farley, Alternate U.S. Representative for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Deputy Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and who, prior to his present assignment was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs; Ambassador J. Graham Parsons, Deputy Chairman of the SALT delegation recently retired after a long and distinguished career as U.S. Ambassador to Laos and Sweden and Deputy Commandant of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces; Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, currently chairman of the advisory council, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and former Secretary of the Navy; Harold Brown, president of Caltech and former Secretary of the Air Force; Lt. Gen. Royal B. Allison, currently assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Strategic Arms Negotiations; Raymond L. Garthoff, Executive Secretary of the SALT delegation and Deputy Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Deparment of State. These individuals unquestionably comprise one of the finest negotiating teams this country has ever put together, and they have done an outstanding job.

The ambitious and thorough groundwork laid at SALT culminated in the Moscow summit, an international conference which will, I believe, go down in history as one of the most important turning points of our foreign policy. The series of agreements reached at the summit, plus the new understanding the negotiating fostered among officials of both nations at all levels, together represent the first real and broadbased breakthrough in the dangerous policies of confrontation and competition that have existed between the United States and the Soviet Union since the end of World War II. The concrete agreements for mutual cooperation toward controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons contrast vividly with the quick-fading "atmospheric" results of previous summits, and could indicate that the world has taken the first step toward a new era of realistic peace in the interest of mutual national security.

One of the hallmarks of Ambassador Smith's modesty and humility with regard to this accomplishment is his constant underscoring of the fact that while this is an essential first step, it is only a first step. I think we all understand how much more needs to be done before the world can be assured of the realization of a lasting peace. Both sides still possess the nuclear capability to destroy each other and third nations several times over. Both are involved in dangerous world conflicts in Indochina, the Middle East and elsewhere.

No one can, nor should proclaim the end of war, or the coming of permanent peace as a result of SALT, rather we should view the SALT agreements as but a first step down that road. It is a bold step. Consequently, of course, the step involves some risks—of noncompliance by the other side, of unwarranted complacency by Americans, of misunderstanding by third parties of our strong and continuing commitment to world peace. These risks are real, but after careful study, I sincerely believe that the risks we take are outweighed by the benefits we obtain under the agreements.

The comprehensive agreement on antiballistic missile systems is a long term commitment in treaty form. Under this treaty, both parties make a commitment not to build a nationwide ABM defense. This is a general undertaking of the greatest significance; through it, both great nuclear powers have recognized, and in effect agreed to maintain, mutual deterrence. Article III of the ABM treaty limits each party to only two ABM sites. There is no doubt that the possibility of nuclear war has been dramatically reduced by this treaty, and through it and the associated interim agreement on strategic offensive arms, the action-reaction cycle driving the arms race has been broken.

The interim agreement freezes at approximately current levels the aggregate number of intercontinental ballistic missile launchers and submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers operational and under construction on each side for 5 years. It has been adopted in contemplation of the negotiation of more complete controls on strategic offensive arm-

aments in a second phase of the negotiations expected to begin soon. We all hope that this agreement will be replaced will before expiration by a comprehensive treaty limiting strategic offensive weapons.

It is also hoped that the United States can make real progress not only in curbing quantitative proliferation of nuclear weapons, but in limiting their qualitative development as well. Senator HART and I, along with 15 of our distinguished colleagues, have introduced a resolution to assure Senate support of Presidential initiatives toward reopening the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

An agreement banning nuclear tests has long been a goal of U.S. arms control policy, and a comprehensive test ban has been an item on the agenda at the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament since 1963 when the Senate ratified the limited test ban treaty. Such an agreement would certainly be a fitting follow-on to the arms control pacts we are considering here today.

The Moscow summit also produced some other very significant agreements, both in themselves, and in their total addition of a wide dimension of tangible results from this historic meeting. All together the series of agreements—covering mutual future efforts in space, trade, the environment, health, medicine, science, and technology—add up to a greater, deeper commitment by each side to a more stable world order. With these valuable pacts, the Soviet Union, as well as the United States, has a more vested interest in the continuation of peaceful relations. They assure that both sides will be forced to take a second look at any provocation that might lead to a breakoff of the new relationships.

In 1969, President Nixon ordered a comprehensive review of the posture of nuclear weapons strategy and strength throughout the world. His goal was to bring a halt to the arms race. The careful and thorough step-by-step planning of the President resulted in the first giant step toward that goal. His efforts indeed have moved us away from nuclear catastrophe, and one step closer to world peace.

In the years to come, the world is going to look back on developments in the year 1972 as a historic starting point—the time when the world turned from the mutual burdens and dangers of the arms race and turned to the bountiful rewards which flow from dynamic nations working together on the projects of peace.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I know the Senate is very familiar with the details of the treaty on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems. All of us have become acquainted with anti-ballistic-missile systems through the debates of the past several years. We have been educated by great scientists and have done our own study.

I believe that the treaty and the agreement limiting offensive nuclear systems represent one of the most important and significant accomplishments in history for the security of our Nation and the world. The greatest commendation should be given to President Nixon for his steady and constant purpose in reaching agreement with the Soviet Union. It is a work for the United States and the people of the world.

I think also that we should remember always the faithful and difficult work of Ambassador Gerard Smith, General Allison of the U.S. Air Force, the Honorable Paul Nitze, Dr. Harold Brown, and Ambassador Graham Parsons, who were the negotiating team of the United States.

I had the opportunity to be in Vienna on two occasions and in Helsinki while the negotiations with the Soviet Union were in progress. My visits and talks with Ambassador Smith and his colleagues enabled me to know something of the difficult problems which had to be resolved if agreement was to be reached. Steadily throughout 3 years, they settled many difficult technical points and points of greatest substance which led to the treaty and agreement.

Now we have come to a vote on the treaty.

I have studied but I have not been concerned with the arguments that have been made against this treaty and the agreement on offensive nuclear weapons. I am confident that our security is protected. I believe that we are voting for a treaty as a step which can lead on to further controls, limitations, and reductions of nuclear weapons and systems. It is a measure which offers hope for the people of our country, the Soviet Union, and the people of the world, that we will not bring upon ourselves a nuclear disaster—a disaster which would blot out millions of lives, and civilization as we now know it.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Alabama (Mr. ALLEN).

Mr. ALLEN. I thank the Senator from Vermont for yielding time to me for discussing this important issue.

Mr. President, I compliment President Nixon on his initiatives in pursuit of world peace and his efforts to effect agreements with the Soviet Union to limit the nuclear arms race. I am sympathetic with all efforts to end the scourge of warfare and killing people as a means of settling disputes between nations. I hopefully look forward to the day when all of mankind may face the future with complete confidence that all nations have forever renounced war as an instrument to effect international policies.

The search for world peace is ongoing, and the search must not cease. Yet, history records a dreary catalog of hopes and expectations expressed in treaties and international agreements which have been dashed upon the hard rocks of reality. We need review no more than the past half century to see the terrible consequences of idealistic efforts to achieve world peace which have ended in dismal and tragic failures reflected in four major wars.

I mention this background merely to indicate that sincere convictions and motives and the best imaginable plans for world peace as may be conceived by the best minds of our Nation are not guarantees of world peace. The best minds and most competent negotiators are susceptible to errors of human judgment—all human judgments are fallible. My point is that there is ample justification for doubts and there is reason to question the wisdom of the proposed treaty and interim agreement.

Mr. President, I do not want to belabor this point, but it is worth considering that over the past several years, competent leaders of our Nation have advocated a policy of nuclear superiority as an essential element of our security and that of Western Europe and the free world. National policies based on nuclear superiority have undergone a rapid change to policies, first, consistent with nuclear parity, next, nuclear sufficiency, and now nuclear inferiority. Surely, somewhere along the line some judgments have been in error. By and large, Congress has acquiesced in each shift in policy. So, while I am reasonably sure that a vast majority of Senators will vote for ratification of the treaty and for approval of the interim agreement this fact alone is not proof of infallibility of the judgment; and the junior Senator from Alabama may well be a minority of one in his judgment on this matter.

Mr. President, the proposed treaty and agreement are without parallel in history. I approach a decision on the merits with a profound sense of awareness that the judgment of the Senate on these issues may rank among the most important the Senate has ever undertaken. I do not want to overdramatize, but I am sincerely convinced that the decision reached here today, and the ensuing votes in the days ahead, will represent a turning point in history with consequences affecting future generations time on end, and I would be less than true to myself if I did not voice my convictions concerning the ultimate wisdom of ratification of the treaty and approval of the interim agreement.

Mr. President, I shall vote against ratification of the proposed treaty and against approval of the interim agreement. The reasons for my decision are simple and straightforward.

With respect to the treaty, I cannot review the past record of Russia's indifference to treaty obligations with any degree of confidence. A study by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, covering almost 1,000 treaties and agreements which the Russians have entered into with the United States and other countries in the past 50 years, shows that the Communist record is filled with deceit, treachery, and broken promises. A more recent tabulation of Russia's agreements with the United States reveals a failure

to adhere to 24 of the past 52 agreements. There is no convincing evidence to indicate that the Soviet Union will adhere to this proposed treaty beyond the time such treaty promotes the interest and security of the Soviet Union.

The treaty to limit future development and deployment of defensive systems against nuclear attack which is provided, of course, by the treaty, is premised on several propositions. The first is that each side has a sufficiency of offensive nuclear weapons to provide maximum assured destruction and thus a realistic deterrent against attack; further, that an adequate defense against a nuclear attack is neither possible nor desirable because an effective defense against nuclear attack would jeopardize the deterrent of the other side.

Mr. President, I question the premise and inferences and the assumptions drawn from it. First, to contend that a freeze on defensive weapons against nuclear attack is a necessary condition to ultimate nuclear disarmament contradicts the assumption that it is impossible to develop an adequate defense against nuclear attack.

Furthermore, a freeze on development and deployment of defensive weapons against nuclear attack serves to voluntarily submit civilian populations as hostages under the threat of nuclear annihilation as the essential element of deterrence. There is reason to believe that the United States has the scientific and technological capability of providing adequate defense against nuclear attack, and I consider it immoral and an invitation to nuclear blackmail not to develop defenses against nuclear attack.

Furthermore, I question the assumption that the United States has a sufficiency of nuclear arms to assure maximum destruction of the Soviet Union under all circumstances. If it is true that the United States possesses the sophisticated devices to detect nuclear deployment by the Soviet Union, it would seem reasonable to assume that both the United States and the Soviet Union have the technological capability of detecting the location of the submarine components of our deterrent forces. Our land-based deterrent sites are well-known—all one has to do is read the magazines and newspapers as to where they are—and the superior megatonnage of the Soviets warheads is such as to reasonably anticipate neutralization of most of our land-based deterrent weapons. It is inconceivable that existing modern land-to-air defensive missiles could not seriously impair our airborne deterrent.

In short, the treaty, freezing continued development and deployment of defensive systems against nuclear attacks, seems to me to vest in the Soviet Union the potential for a preemptive first strike. My judgment in this regard is reinforced by consideration of the vast land area of the Soviet Union which lends itself to population and industrial dispersal. There is room to question whether or not the United States does in fact possess the nuclear capacity to inflict the same degree of destruction on the Soviet Union as might be inflicted upon us, should it be determined that a preemptive strike against the United States offers a reasonable chance of success.

But, it will be said, a treaty limiting nuclear defense capabilities is the essential to an agreement to limit offensive nuclear weapons. Mr. President, I suggest that this contention puts the cart before the horse. Logic would seem to dictate that we should first negotiate a treaty designed to limite offensive weapons before undertaking a treaty to limit defensive weapons. For example, in banning the use of poison gas in warfare, we did not first ban research and development, and manufacture of gas masks and antidotes. In banning bacteriological warfare, we did not first preclude research and development into possible defenses against its use. Were we to consider naval disarmament, we would not first agree to strip our ships of defensive weapons. Were we to consider disarmament of our air forces, we would not first ban the use of antiaircraft weapons and radar detection devices.

In considering the possible approaches to nuclear disarmament, I cannot understand why, if the Soviet Union and the United States have a nuclear capability for offensive overkill, they would not first willingly undertake to limit further development and deployment of offensive weapons. Only then would it seem logical to seek agreement to limit defensive weapons and then only to the point that assured protection of civilian populations. For these reasons, I cannot vote to ratify the treaty limiting our nuclear defensive potential as is sought by the treaty under consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BURDICK). The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. ALLEN. I ask for 2 additional minutes.

Mr. AIKEN. I yield the Senator 2 more minutes.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, turning now to the interim agreement, I shall vote against it. As previously stated, there is no convincing evidence to cause me to believe that the Soviet Union will adhere to the agreement beyond the point where breaking the agreement would serve the strategic advantage of the Soviet Union. Second, I cannot accept the proposition that the strategic interest of the United States is served by voluntarily agreeing to freeze the United States for any period of time into a position of nuclear inferiority in relation to the Soviet Union.

I will leave for others the technical arguments with respect to the relative effectiveness of the separate weapons systems and the fine-spun arguments with respect to quantitative and qualitative superiority which supposedly balance out one advantage against another. I rely only on a conclusion freely expressed in the Soviet Union and largely conceded in the United States, that our Nation has accepted a status of nuclear inferiority to the Soviet Union during the period of the interim agreement. Such a status of inferiority is inconsistent with the first purpose of our Government, which is to provide for the defense of our Nation.

Mr. President, I cannot in good conscience vote for any treaty or vote approval of any agreement which I believe to be contrary to the best interest of the United States. It is my solemn judgment that the proposed treaty and the interim agreement will not serve the best interest of the United States nor the best interests of the nations of the free world who have so heavily relied upon our nuclear umbrella as an element of security of those nations.

Mr. President, in voting against the treaty and agreement, I do not reject the efforts of the President to reach agreements with the Soviet Union to promote cooperation in solving environmental problems and cooperation in the areas of health, science and technology, education and culture, and space exploration and related matters outlined in the Nixon-Brezhnev declaration which accompanied the proposed treaty and agreements.

Mr. President, I have given unfailing support to all efforts to promote the strength and to preserve the honor of our country in our dealings with foreign nations, but I cannot support efforts which I believe will result in the weakening of our country in comparison with the Soviet Union.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, in the midst of what we all know to be a political campaign year, it is often difficult to make a statement which may not be interpreted by some people as being highly partisan. At the risk of being misinterpreted, it is my purpose today to challenge the skeptics of the ABM treaty, the treaty limiting the antiballistic missile system, and the agreement known as the interim agreement on offensive weapons. It is my purpose today to challenge the skeptics by giving what I intend to be not only a bipartisan speech, but a speech which I hope is worthy of the U.S. Senate in the exercise of its responsibilities as a partner with the President of the United States in the ratification of treaties and agreements. Therefore, I rise in support of the arms control agreements, concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union on May 27 of this year.

If I had been asked what I would like for my birthday present—since my birthday is on May 27—nothing would have pleased me more than to be assured that the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could come to some basic agreement relating to the arms race, either to stabilize it or to reduce it.

Therefore, I commend the President and the leaders of the Soviet Union for entering into these agreements, recognizing full well their limitations, but also recognizing their potential contribution in slowing down the arms race. As in most instances, their true worth will depend

upon interpretation and strict application by the signatory powers.

Mr. President, arms control or disarmament is a long, tedious, and difficult process. I think it should be recognized that nations and leaders of nations do not enter into these negotiations without the most careful and prudent consideration. I believe we have to understand that the leaders of the Soviet Union would not sign any agreement that they thought would in any way affect adversely the defense of their country and its people. I would hope that we would also believe that the leaders of our country, the President and his advisers, those who were a part of the negotiating team for the so-called SALT talks, would not enter into an agreement nor sign any treaty which they believed would adversely affect the security and the safety of this Republic and the people of these United States.

Therefore, I wish to state again that the achievement of an arms control agreement represents the epitome of statesmanship, and really represents a tremendous accomplishment on the part of our Government and its leaders.

I have long been interested in the subject of arms control. It has been a part of my life's work, and I have studied it, not as a starry-eyed idealist, but as a pragmatic realist.

I believe I understand the meaning of power and its application. I have never deceived myself, nor have I tried to deceive anyone else, about the power of the Soviet Union and the willingness of its leaders to use that power; nor am I today going to say anything that will indicate that I am unaware of the record of the Soviet Union with respect to its foreign and military policies. Having said that, however, I would also suggest that the leaders of the Soviet Union recognize the power of the United States—and that power is immense and awesome.

I participated in the preparatory stages of what we now call the SALT talks. The early stages started in the mid-1960's. In fact, on the occasion of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, in August 1968, this Government was then about ready to enter into discussions with the Soviet Union on arms control.

The former President, Mr. Johnson, the former Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, and others had laid the groundwork for those discussions. As the Vice President of the United States, I served as a member of the Committee of Principles, as it was termed, to discuss the early stages and early preparations for these arms control talks.

So I am familiar with the background of this important work, and I know that Ambassador Smith, who was the head of our negotiating team in the SALT talks, has performed a most valuable and worthy service for our country. I would like to have my remarks interpreted as commendation to Ambassador Smith and those who worked with him.

From President Nixon's own statements, those of several Government spokesmen, and from the articles which have been appearing in the Soviet press, I am encouraged that the ABM treaty and the interim agreement will go a long way in securing the principle of arms control and reductions as an essential stabilizing factor in international relations and the rejection of the heretofore accepted rule that the continual building of national armaments is the only way to enhance national security.

I would remind Senators that everything is relative, that as we lift the level of our armaments, so does the Soviet Union, and vice versa. What we ultimately do is not increase the area of safety but raise the level of danger. What is more important is the balance. What is more important is the degree of equality or parity which you can have so that you can be assured of your own security.

Dr. Kissinger made this point very effectively when he said in his briefing to Members of Congress:

> Each of us (The United States and the Soviet Union) has thus come into possession of power singlehandedly capable of exterminating the human race. Paradoxically, this very fact, and the global interests of both sides, create a certain commonality of outlook, a sort of interdependence for survival between the two of us.
>
> With modern weapons, a potentially decisive advantage required a change of such magnitude that the mere effort to obtain it can produce disaster. The simple tit-for-tat reaction to each other's programs of a decade ago is in danger of being overtaken by a more or less simultaneous and continuous process of technological advance, which opens more and more temptations for seeking decisive advantage.

History is full of paradoxes, some more constructive than others. I can remember very well past crucial debates on landmark treaties and legislation in the field of arms control when it was difficult to convince Senators of the futility of the arms race and of the urgency for our Government to take an initiative with the Soviet Union, as well as other nuclear and nonnuclear countries. I can vividly recall the reluctance of the Soviet Union to enter into any substantive arms control agreements which might have locked it into a position of inferiority vis-a-vis the United States. And I have most vivid memories of the history of the arms race in general where actions on one side provoked reactions on the other, leading to an endless nuclear arms spiral.

The latest Moscow agreements give me cause for hope that this syndrome is on its way out, but I am not naive enough to assume that a positive trend has yet been fully established or that the gears will not be shifted back. These treaties stabilize the arms race, more than they actually reduce it. This fact has been noted over and over again by the President, Dr. Kissinger, and many others. It is incorporated in the preamble of the ABM treaty where it is stated that it is the declared intention of both the United States and the Soviet Union "to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament.

We have not yet achieved this kind of cessation, but the Senate's ratification of the treaty and the approval by both Houses of Congress of the interim agreement would now provide a stabilization of our mutual deterrent capability. It could enhance the possibilities of moving beyond the concept of armaments development as an expression of national defense or security. It could be conducive to reaching agreements, both in SALT II, and in other diplomatic forums which would actually halt the arms race once and for all and move on to real disarmament.

Because I see great potential for these agreements, I urge that the Congress act promptly to approve them.

Admittedly, the ABM treaty and the interim agreement do not resolve all the questions. In fact the interim agreement's ambiguities will only attain clarification in its implementation and in its final translation into a more complete longer term agreement. The fact remains, however, that both the agreement and the treaty are steps in the right direction and should be considered as such.

The ABM treaty is by far the most important in that it accepts the principle of the renunciation of first strike as a purposeful, rational strategy and solidifies the mutual deterrent capabilities which now exist for the United States and the Soviet Union.

Implicitly, it offers both countries an even better opportunity to negotiate offensive armaments limitations as the need for offensive weapons is reduced over time. That is why I consider the interim agreement an acceptable complement to the ABM treaty, if the emphasis is laid where it belongs—on future arms control.

Dr. Kissinger and the President have told us that one reason for the successful conclusion of these latest agreements was the rough military balance which has been attained between the United States and the Soviet Union. Admiral Moorer and Secretary Laird have noted our technological superiority in weaponry and the quantitative superiority in launchers and throw weight which the Soviet Union has now achieved. Experts outside government have discussed this question at great length and while they may differ on the specifics, the overall picture of a rough balance between the United States and the Soviet Union is generally accepted. An example comparative analysis of the strategic positions of the United States and the Soviet Union is offered in the latest issue of the Defense Monitor, a publication of the recently formed Center for Defense Information. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all the tables of the July 1972 issue be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the tables were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TABLE I.—UNITED STATES, 1972—ESTIMATED STRATEGIC FORCE LEVELS OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE TIME OF THE SALT AGREEMENT, MAY 1972

Type and launch vehicle	Number	Missiles/bombs per launch vehicle	Missile bomb total	Warheads per missile bomb	Deliverable warhead total
ICBM:					
Light:					
Minuteman I	[1] 320	1	320	1.0	320
Minuteman II	[1] 500	1	500	1.0	500
Minuteman III	[1] 180	1	180	[2] 2.5	450
Older, Heavy: Titan II	[1] 54	1	54	1.0	54
Modern, Heavy: None	0		0		0
Subtotal	[1] 1,054		[1] 1,054		1,324
SLBM:					
Polaris (A-3)	[1] 21	16	336	[3] 1.0	336
Poseidon	[1] 10	16	160	10.0	1,600
Polaris under conversion to Poseidon	[1] 10	16	160	10.0	
Subtotal	[1] 41		[1] 656		[4] 1,936
Strategic Bombers:					
B-52	[5] 400	[6] 6	2,400	1.0	2,400
FB-111	[7] 66	2	132	1.0	132
Subtotal	466		2,532		2,532
Total	1,561		4,242		[8] 5,792

[1] DOD figures.
[2] A total of 3 warheads per missile is possible. A multiple of 2.5 is used as an average to take into account substitution of penetration aids for some warheads.
[3] Though the Polaris A-3 has 3 warheads, they are not separately targetable.
[4] Not including those under conversion.
[5] 400 is the unit equipped (UE) figure. It does not include planes in training and testing programs. It does include about 150 planes now assigned to conventional bombing missions in Southeast Asia.
[6] This figure includes 2 Hound-Dog air-to-surface missiles (ASM's) and 4 nuclear gravity bombs.
[7] 66 is the UE figure. The total number of FB-111's is 72. The additional units are in training and testing programs.
[8] DOD lists 5,700 as the U.S. warhead total.

TABLE II.—U.S.S.R., 1972—ESTIMATED STRATEGIC FORCE LEVELS OF THE SOVIET UNION AT THE TIME OF THE SALT AGREEMENT, MAY 1972

Type and launch vehicle	Number	Missiles/bombs per launch vehicle	Missile and deliverable warhead total
ICBM:			
Light:			
SS-13	60	1	60
SS-11	970	1	970
New ICBM's (silos under construction)	66	(1)	(1)
Older-heavy: SS-7 and 8	[2] 210	1	210
Modern-heavy:			
SS-9	288	1	288
New ICBM's (silos under construction)	25	(1)	(1)
Subtotal	[2] 1,618		1,528
SLBM:			
Y class	[3] 25	16	400
Y's and Stretch Y class (under construction)	[3] 17	[4] 14	238
H class	[2] 10	3	30
Subtotal	[5] 52		[5] 668
Bombers:			
TU-95 Bear (Kangaroo ASM)	[6] 66	1	66
TU-95 Bear (bombs)	[6] 34	[7] 4	136
M-4 Bison	[8] 40	[7] 2	80
Subtotal	140		282
Total	1,810		[9] 2,478

[1] Unknown.
[2] Kissinger press conference in Moscow, May 26 and 27, 1972.
[3] Laird's fiscal year 1973 posture statement.
[4] Average. The new Stretch Y class has 12 missile launchers versus 16 for the Y class and may carry a longer-range (3,400 nautical miles) SS-N-8 SLBM. Since it is not known how many of each type submarine is under construction an average of 14 missiles per submarine is used in this chart. See Kissinger's Moscow press conference, May 26 and 27, 1972. Missiles on Y class submarines have 1,300 to 1,500 mile range.
[5] These figures do not include the 22 Soviet G-class diesel-powered submarines, each with 3 650-mile missiles. The SALT agreements only mention modern submarines. These 650-mile missiles are the same as those carried by the nuclear-powered H class, but were considered similar in nature to U.S. forward deployed forces in Europe and the Mediterranean Sea. The G class submarines were excluded from SALT negotions. See Kissinger's Moscow press conference, May 26 and 27, 1972.
[6] This number is based on estimates that about 3/5 of the 100 TU-95 Bears carry a single Kangaroo air-to-surface missile (ASM). The remaining 1/5 carry gravity bombs.
[7] This is an estimated bomb load and is based on the Bear and Bison lift capacity as related to the U.S. B-52.
[8] About 90 M-4 Bisons exist of which 50 serve as tankers.
[9] DOD figures give 2,500 as the Soviet warhead total.

TABLE III.—UNITED STATES, 1977—ESTIMATED COMPOSITION OF U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES BY THE EXPIRATION OF THE SALT AGREEMENT IN 1977. TABLE SHOWS ONLY THOSE PROGRAMS APPROVED BY CONGRESS AND DOES NOT INCLUDE THE TRIDENT SUBMARINE OR THE B-1 BOMBER PROGRAMS

Type and launch vehicle	Number	Missiles/bombs per launch vehicle	Missile/bomb total	Warheads per missile/bomb	Deliverable warhead total
ICBM:					
Minuteman II	[1] 450	1	450	1.0	450
Minuteman III	550	1	550	[2] 2.5	1,375
Titan II	[1] 54	1	54	1.0	54
Subtotal	1,054		1,054		1,879
SLBM:					
Polaris (A-3)	[3] 10	16	160	[4] 1.0	160
Poseidon	[3] 31	16	496	10.0	4,960
Subtotal	41		656		5,120
Bombers:					
B-52G and H (Hound-Dog missiles and bombs)	[5] 163	6	978	1.0	978
B-52G and H (SRAM)	[6] 92	20	1,840	1.0	1,840
FB-111	66	6	396	1.0	396
Subtotal	321		3,214		3,214
Total	1,416		4,924		[7] 10,213

[1] DOD figures from Laird's Annual Defense Department Report for fiscal year 1973, pp. 67-72.
[2] A total of 3 warheads per missile is possible. A multiple of 2.5 is used as an average to take nto account substitution of penetration aids for some warheads.
[3] DOD figures from Admiral Moorer's U.S. Military Posture for fiscal year 1973, p. 10.
[4] Though the Polaris A-3 has 3 warheads, they are not separately targetable.
[5] This figure represents those B-52 G's and H's not currently scheduled for conversion to carry the short range attack missile (SRAM). See Laird, op. cit., p. 71.
[6] Laird, op. cit., p. 71.
[7] A figure of 14,082 was used by the Center for Defense Information in an earlier issue of the Defense Monitor entitled "ULMS: Too Much Too Soon." The present figure of 10,213 is a revised Center estimate adjusting for decoys and assuming only 92 bombers equipped with SRAM instead of 255.

TABLE IV.—U.S.S.R., 1977—ESTIMATED COMPOSITION OF SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES BY THE EXPIRATION OF THE SALT AGREEMENT IN 1977. TABLE ASSUMES ONLY A LIMITED MIRV CAPABILITY BY THAT TIME

Type and launch vehicle	Number	Missiles/bombs per launch vehicle	Missile/bomb total	Warheads per missile/bomb	Deliverable warhead total
ICBM:					
SS-13	60	1	60	1	60
SS-11	970	1	970	1	970
New ICBM's	66	1	66	1	66
SS-9 and larger	[1] 313	1	313	[2] 3	939
Mobile ICBM's [3]	(4)		(4)		(4)
Subtotal	[5] 1,408		1,408		2,035
SLBM:					
Y-class	[6] 34	16	544	1	544
Stretch Y-class	[7] 28	2	336	[8] 3	1,008
Subtotal	62		[9] 880		1,552
Bombers:					
TU-95 Bear (Kangaroo ASM)	66	1	66	1	66
TU-95 Bear (bombs)	34	4	136	1	136
M-4 Bison	40	2	80	1	80
Backfire [10] (under development)	(4)		(4)		(4)
Subtotal	140		282		282
Total	1,610		2,570		[11] 3,869

[1] This figure includes the current 25 Modern-Heavy ICBM silos under construction.
[2] This assumes at least a 3-warhead (MRV/MIRV) capability deployed in all SS9 and larger missiles.
[3] Mobile ICBM's are not covered by the present SALT agreements.
[4] Unknown.
[5] This assumes that the Older-Heavy SS-7's and 8's will be replaced by additional SLBM's as provided for by the SALT agreements.
[6] This figure is obtained by assuming half (or 9) of the 17 missile submarines presently under construction are Y-class, and this is added to the 25 presently operational.
[7] This figure is obtained by assuming that all the remaining allowed submarines, including the replacement of the 10 H-class submarines, will be of the newer stretch Y-class presently under construction.
[8] It is not known if the new SS-N-8 SLBM has a multiple warhead capability. It is assumed here that it is a logical possibility that they will develop a MRV/MIRV capability on this weapon.
[9] This SLBM total could be increased by 66 more missiles if the Soviets convert those older missiles on the 22 diesel-powered G-class submarines to the newer and longer range SS-N-6 or SS-N-8 SLBM.
[10] This new bomber is under development but it is not known whether it is designed for use against the U.S. homeland or for use in Europe and Asia.
[11] Accurate longer-range projections of Soviet warhead development are very difficult to achieve. Assuming 20 warheads on each of Russia's 313 heavy ICBM's, 10 warheads on each missile of the new stretch Y-class for the SS-N-8 SLBM, and 3 warheads each for the other ICBM's and SLBM's, one could project a Soviet warhead total of over 14,000 at some date beyond 1977.

TABLE V.—UNITED STATES, 1980'S—THIS TABLE SHOWS A POSSIBLE HIGHER U.S. FORCE LEVEL IN THE 1980'S ASSUMING TRIDENT, THE B-1 AND CONVERSION OF ALL MINUTEMEN TO MIRV INSTEAD OF 550 NOW PLANNED

Type and launch vehicle	Number	Missiles/bombs per launch vehicle	Missile/bomb total	Warheads per missile/bomb	Deliverable warhead total
ICBM: Minuteman III	1,000	1	1,000	[1] 2.5	2,500
Subtotal	[2] 1,000		1,000		2,500
SLBM:					
Poseidon	[3] 29	16	464	10.0	4,640
Trident	10	24	240	12.0	2,880
New strategic cruise missile [4]	(5)		(5)		(5)
Subtotal	39		[6] 704		7,520
Bombers:					
FB-111 (SRAM)	66	6	396	1.0	396
B-1 (SRAM)	241	24	5,784	1.0	5,784
Subtotal	307		6,180		6,180
Total	1,346		7,884		16,200

[1] A total of 3 warheads per missile is possible. A multiple of 2.5 is used as an average to take into account substitution of penetration aids for some warheads.

[2] This figure assumes the replacement of 54 Titan II ICBM's by additional SLBM's, and converting the Minuteman II's to III's.

[3] Under the SALT accords, the United States is allowed 44 submarines. But it is also limited to 710 SLBM launch tubes. In order to build the number of Tridents shown, with 24 missiles each, the United States would have to deactivate 10 Polaris submarines, cancel conversion of 2 more Polaris submarines to Poseidon and deactivate them also. The SLBM total would then be 704 as shown.

[4] The number of new strategic cruise missiles planned and new submarines required to launch them is unknown.

[5] Unknown.

[6] A total of 710 is allowed by the SALT agreements.

Mr. HUMPHREY. If the projections in the Monitor are correct, the United States is still decidedly in an advantageous position. If Admiral Moorer's testimony is more accurate, there is a virtual identical balance in our two arsenals, projected over the 5-year period during which these agreements are intended to remain in force. Whichever evaluation one accepts, they both substantiate the proposition that the United States has a sufficient nuclear arsenal to meet the demands of nuclear warfare and diplomacy. Certainly we should strive to retain this position of sufficiency which is in fact what we are told the agreements are designed to do. But we must also be coldly realistic about Soviet capabilities and behavior. Now that we are in a position of approximate military equality, we must assume that the Soviet Union would find any attempt of the United States to regain its former position of nuclear superiority as completely unacceptable. Not only would the Russians find such an attempt unacceptable, but, based on their reactions in the past and their present capabilities, they would strive to catch up and, perhaps, even surpass the United States. Hence, the arms race.

Finally, in approving these agreements, both the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union should be reminded that the Congress views these agreements as a serious effort to create the proper climate for halting the arms race. It would, therefore, consider it incumbent upon the two countries to exercise comparable self-restraint in other areas of weapons development which are indirectly related to the agreements. In its approval, the Congress implicitly would also be expressing its support for the continuation of SALT talks to cover such questions as qualitative controls and further armaments reductions and its support for other arms control and disarmament agreements.

The commitment for further armaments limitations and reductions is written in both agreements. It should be written indelibly in all our minds and actions. Then the interim agreement on strategic offensive weapons will not be interpreted by either side as a carte blanche for a new kind of arms race. Instead, it will be an obligation to be solidified and expanded in treaty form.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Unanimous consent is required.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I ask unanimous consent.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I wish to speak on behalf of Senate ratification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty—or SALT, as it is more commonly known.

This agreement is a great breakthrough in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. We have been waiting since World War II for the tension to ease sufficiently for us to enter into negotiations with the Soviets. The SALT agreement, therefore, represents tangible evidence that both sides have moved into an era of negotiation and both sides now have an important investment in cooperation.

Although the SALT agreement is a significant step forward, it is only a small beginning. We should not delude ourselves into believing this agreement serves as a panacea to the numerous hurdles which remain to be overcome in the relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R.—the world's two superpowers. Far more important will be phase II of the SALT negotiations and that is ahead of us. Phase II will require even harder bargaining on the part of both sides than the phase I negotiations.

With this in mind, let us not forget that the history of our relations with the Soviet Union is replete with instances of respect for strength in bargaining and an unwillingness to negotiate when signs of weakness become apparent.

Therefore, while it is important that we ratify the SALT agreement, we must couple this step with an awareness that we got where we are today because we maintained a balance of capabilities with the Russians. The SALT agreement has put a limitation on the nuclear capabilities of the United States and the U.S.S.R. Basically, we are acknowledging a balance of terror in a world which remains bipolar in structure. The SALT agreement means that the key factor of this bipolar structure of the traditional balance of power—nuclear capability—has been frozen. Yet, the bipolar structure remains.

Therefore, if we are to even consider taking steps toward disarmament or de-escalation of capabilities, we must insure that we preserve our position of strength. It would be foolish of us to be carried away in euphoria by this agreement. We cannot permit an erosion of our bargaining position with the Soviets. The incentive to negotiate on the part of the Soviets would rapidly deteriorate if they approached bargaining with all the chips on their side of the table. Such an imbalance of strength could only result in preventing future negotiations to be carried on.

Mr. President, what I am saying is that we should not allow ourselves the delusion of overexpectation with the ratification of this agreement. We must be realistic regarding its limitations. This is a significant first step in a long chain of steps to come in the future which is within the realm of possibility only if we preserve our position of strength.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I will vote for the treaty on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems. This treaty which limits both ourselves and the Soviet Union to two ABM sites each with no more than 100 interceptors, is potentially the most important arms control measure in recent years. The significance of this treaty is that both sides have recognized that they will remain vulnerable to retaliation in a nuclear exchange, and this, in turn, greatly diminishes the prospect that either side might ever seriously consider launching nuclear war. The limit on ABM's provides the foundation for nuclear stability.

I said on the day the SALT agreements were signed that these first steps symbolize our ability to construct a world which will be safe for ourselves and future generations. But if the SALT agreements are to be more than symbolic, they must produce greater stability in the arms race and they must provide immediate benefits to the American taxpayer in reduced defense expenditures. In President

Nixon's own words, they must check "the wasteful and dangerous spiral of nuclear arms."

I had hoped that the ABM treaty would mean that both sides would suspend development of various offensive strategic systems. Many of these systems, such as MIRV, were originally designed to penetrate a large ABM defense. Now that ABM has been limited to low levels, the rationale for pushing ahead with new strategic initiatives has largely disappeared.

The SALT agreements are a sound beginning. But to make them work in the long run, both sides must implement them in a spirit of achieving mutual benefit through mutual restraint.

It is ironic and bitterly disappointing that the Senate should now take up the SALT agreements in the wake of a military procurement bill that continues the momentum of our offensive strategic weapons buildup. Too often in the past, arms control agreements have simply accelerated the arms race in areas not covered by the formal agreement. It appears that we may be following the same pattern today.

Nevertheless, I am supporting the ABM treaty in the hope that its potential benefits will eventually be realized. I will continue to oppose any efforts to accelerate strategic weapons programs that are not necessary for our security. It is the American taxpayer who must bear the burden of irresponsible defense spending.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. AIKEN. I yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has been yielded back.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is, Will the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of the treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the limitation of anti-ballistic-missile systems? On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD (after having voted in the affirmative). On this vote I have a pair with the distinguished Senators from Mississippi (Mr. EASTLAND) and New Mexico (Mr. MONTOYA). If they were present and voting, they would vote "yea"; if I were at liberty to vote, I would vote "nay." I withdraw my vote.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON), the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. EASTLAND), and the Senator from Georgia (Mr. GAMBRELL) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. MONTOYA) is absent on official business.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Georgia (Mr. GAMBRELL) would vote "yea."

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER), and the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) are necessarily absent.

The Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) is absent because of illness.

On this vote, the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER) and the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) are paired with the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER). If present and voting, the Senator from Tennessee and the Senator from Illinois would each vote "yea," and the Senator from Arizona would vote "nay."

The yeas and nays resulted—yeas 88, nays 2, as follows:

[No. 343 Ex.]

YEAS—88

Aiken	Fulbright	Muskie
Allott	Gravel	Nelson
Anderson	Griffin	Packwood
Bayh	Gurney	Pastore
Beall	Hansen	Pearson
Bellmon	Harris	Pell
Bennett	Hart	Proxmire
Bentsen	Hartke	Randolph
Bible	Hatfield	Ribicoff
Boggs	Hollings	Roth
Brock	Hruska	Saxbe
Brooke	Hughes	Schweiker
Burdick	Humphrey	Scott
Byrd, Harry F., Jr.	Inouye	Smith
	Jackson	Sparkman
Byrd, Robert C.	Javits	Spong
Cannon	Jordan, N.C.	Stafford
Case	Jordan, Idaho	Stennis
Chiles	Kennedy	Stevens
Church	Long	Stevenson
Cook	Magnuson	Symington
Cooper	Mathias	Taft
Cotton	McClellan	Talmadge
Cranston	McGee	Thurmond
Curtis	McGovern	Tower
Dole	McIntyre	Tunney
Dominick	Metcalf	Weicker
Ervin	Miller	Williams
Fannin	Mondale	Young
Fong	Moss	

NAYS—2

Allen	Buckley

PRESENT AND GIVING A LIVE PAIR, AS PREVIOUSLY RECORDED—1

Mansfield, against.

NOT VOTING—8

Baker	Gambrell	Mundt
Eagleton	Goldwater	Percy
Eastland	Montoya	

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BURDICK). On this vote the yeas are 88 and the nays 2. Two-thirds of Senators present and voting having voted in the affirmative, the resolution of ratification is agreed to.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I move that the President be immediately notified of the action of the Senate in agreeing to the resolution of ratification.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Arkansas.

The motion was agreed to.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HART). The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BURDICK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Mr. BURDICK. Mr. President, I move that the Senate return to legislative session.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from North Dakota.

The motion was agreed to.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE JUDICIAL CIRCUITS OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. BURDICK. Mr. President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on H.R. 7378.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HART) laid before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives announcing its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 7378) to establish a Commission on Revision of the Judicial Circuits of the United States, and requesting a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon.

Mr. BURDICK. I move that the Senate insist upon its amendments and agree to the request of the House for a conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that the Chair be authorized to appoint the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The motion was agreed to; and the Presiding Officer appointed Mr. EASTLAND, Mr. BURDICK, and Mr. HRUSKA conferees on the part of the Senate.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. BURDICK. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, may we have order and will the Chair please clear the well?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will please be in order.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE—ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

A message from the House of Representatives by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills:

S. 3284. An act to increase the authorization for appropriation for completing work in the Missouri River Basin by the Secretary of the Interior;

H.R. 15093. An act making appropriations for the Department of Housing and Urban Development; for space, science, veterans, and certain other independent executive agencies, boards, commissions, corporations, and offices for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973, and for other purposes; and

H.R. 15418. An act making appropriations for the Department of the Interior and related agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973, and for other purposes.

INTERIM AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, what is the pending business before the Senate?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HART). The Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business which the clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

Calendar Order No. 929 (S.J. Res. 241), a joint resolution authorizing the President to approve an interim agreement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the joint resolution.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT TO 8:45 A.M.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 8:45 a.m. tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATORS SCHWEIKER, TUNNEY, McGOVERN, HARRIS, KENNEDY, AND CHILES TOMORROW

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that after the two leaders have been recognized under the standing order tomorrow, the following Senators be recognized in the order stated and for not to exceed the time stated: Mr. SCHWEIKER, 10 minutes; Mr. TUNNEY, 15 minutes; Mr. McGOVERN, 15 minutes; Mr. HARRIS, 15 minutes; Mr. KENNEDY, 15 minutes; and Mr. CHILES, 15 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, at the conclusion of the orders for the recognition of Senators tomorrow the Senate will then proceed to the consideration of the freight car bill. That order already has been entered. Following that, the military construction authorization bill will come up.

Upon disposition of the military construction authorization bill, H.R. 15641——

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, has that already been agreed to?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Yes.

Mr. TOWER. That will follow the freight car bill?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Yes.

Mr. TOWER. What is the time on the freight car bill?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. The time on the freight car bill, as I remember, is 30 minutes on the bill and 20 minutes on any amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Thirty minutes on the bill and 20 minutes on amendments.

Mr. TOWER. I thank the distinguished acting majority leader.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. On the military construction bill, 1 hour on the bill and one half-hour on any amendment.

I ask the Chair if that is correct. The order was entered earlier today, and I am speaking from memory. Thirty minutes on amendments in the first degree, and 20 minutes on amendments in the second degree.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that upon disposition of the military construction authorization bill (H.R. 15641) tomorrow, the Senate proceed to the consideration of H.R. 15692, the disaster relief bill, and that the unfinished business, the interim agreement resolution, be temporarily laid aside and remain in a temporarily laid aside status until disposition of H.R. 15692, or until the close of business tomorrow, whichever is earlier.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that during the consideration of H.R. 15692, debate on the bill—in other words, the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute—be limited to 2 hours, the time to be equally divided between the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. McINTYRE) and the distinguished Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER); that time on any amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, be limited to 1 hour, the time to be equally divided between the mover of such amendment and the distinguished manager of the bill, Mr. McINTYRE; provided, that time on any amendment to an amendment—or amendment in second degree—debatable motion, or appeal be limited to 30 minutes, to be equally divided between the mover of such and the manager of the bill, except in any instance in which the manager of the bill may favor such, in which instance time in opposition thereto, in the case of an amendment to an amendment or amendment in the second degree thereto, be under the control of the author of the amendment in the first degree; provided further, that time on any amendment to an amendment proposed to be offered by the distinguished Senator from Georgia (Mr. TALMADGE) embodying the language of S. 3840, be limited to 1 hour, the time to be equally divided between and controlled by the mover of such amendment and the distinguished Senator from Georgia (Mr. TALMADGE).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROGRAM

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, the program for tomorrow is as follows:

The Senate will convene at 8:45 a.m.

After the two leaders have been recognized, the following Senators will be recognized, in the order stated, for not to exceed the times mentioned: Mr. SCHWEIKER, 10 minutes; Mr. TUNNEY, 15 minutes; Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD, 15 minutes; Mr. HARRIS, 15 minutes; Mr. KENNEDY, 15 minutes; and Mr. CHILES, 15 minutes.

The Senate then will proceed to the consideration of S. 1729, the freight car bill, on which there is a time agreement. There will be yea-and-nay votes thereon.

Upon the disposition of that bill, the Senate will proceed to the consideration of H.R. 15641, the military construction authorization bill, on which there is a time limitation. There may be yea-and-nay votes on that bill.

Upon the disposition of the military construction authorization bill, the Senate will proceed to the consideration of H.R. 15692, the disaster relief bill, on which there is a time limitation. There will be yea-and-nay votes on amendments thereto and on the passage of the bill.

The Senate is quite likely to be in session until a reasonably late hour tomorrow, because several amendments are anticipated to the disaster relief bill. But there will be no session on Saturday. The Senate has been holding lengthy daily sessions and has been able to accomplish a considerable amount of work and will be able to accomplish the work set out for it tomorrow, thus enabling the Senate, at the close of business tomorrow, to go over until Monday.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 8:45 A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, if there be no further business to come before the Senate, I move, in accordance with the previous order, that the Senate

stand in adjournment until 8:45 a.m. tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to; and at 6:53 p.m. the Senate adjourned until tomorrow, Friday, August 4, 1972, at 8:45 a.m.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate August 3, 1972:

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE

Sidney P. Marland, Jr., of New York, to be Assistant Secretary for Education in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (new position.)

NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION

Subject to qualifications provided by law, the following for permanent appointment to the grades indicated in the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration:

To be captains

Kelly E. Taggart — Lavon L. Posey

To be commanders

Leonard E. Pickens — Carl N. Davis
Leland L. Reinke — Joseph W. Dropp
Christian Andreasen — Walter F. Forster II

To be lieutenant commanders

John C. Albright — Richard T. LeRoy
Hugh B. Milburn — John C. Veselenak

To be lieutenants

John D. Busman — Lester B. Smith, Jr.
Dean R. Seidel — Dale M. Hodges
William G. Pichel — Ronald L. Crozier

To be lieutenants

Roger J. DeVivo — Thomas E. Brown
Stephen M. Dunn — Jerry S. Crowley
Carl F. Peters — Larry J. Oliver
Donald A. Drake — Gregory R. Bass
Gregory L. Miller — Peter S. Hudes
Lewis A. Lapine — Carl A. Pearson
Robert M. Dixon — Leslie R. Lemon
John L. Robbins — Russell C. Arnold
Nicholas A. Prahl — Richard A. Schiro
William T. Turnbull

To be lieutenants, junior grade

John M. Barnhill — Gerald W. Stanley

To be ensigns

Harold B. Arnold — Neil P. Gloier
Curtis M. Belden — Kurt R. Groepler
Willis C. Blasingame — Roger G. Hendershot
Gary J. Decker — Timothy A. Kessenich
Thomas E. DeFoor — Alan D. Kissam
Bruce M. Douglass — Dan E. Tracy
Richard P. Floyd — William A. Wert

U.S. ARMY

The following-named officer for temporary appointment in the Army of the United States to the grade indicated under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, sections 3442 and 3447:

MEDICAL CORPS

To be major general

Brig. Gen. George Joseph Hayes, xxx-xx-x... [redacted] Army of the United States (colonel, Medical Corps, U.S. Army).

U.S. NAVY

Adm. John S. McCain, Jr., U.S. Navy, for appointment to the grade of admiral, when retired, pursuant to the provisions of title 18 United States Code, section 5233.

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

REFORMS IN THE NATIONALIST CHINESE GOVERNMENT

HON. ROBERT L. LEGGETT

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 2, 1972

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Speaker, rarely do we have the occasion to see the words and promises of a governmental official quickly put into action. However, Chiang Ching-kuo, who was recently appointed Premier of the Nationalist Chinese Government, has afforded us just this opportunity. He has set out from the beginning to work against corruption and inefficiency in the Taiwan Government, at all levels, and to work toward establishing more native Taiwanese in governmental positions.

Governments, at all levels and in all parts of the world, have constantly been faced with corruption and inefficiency in their ranks. All too often these evils are disdained and denounced but, on the other hand, left to remain in existence.

Chiang Ching-kuo, shortly after his appointment, officially put forth 10 rules of conduct, for civil servants at every level, aimed at abolishing the practice of exploiting the fringe benefits of civil service. The Premier has shown that these rules are to be more than just a token attempt but are to be actively enforced. There have been 200 cases in which violations have been reported. The public has applauded the move, but public officials have been distressed by the fact that enforcement has become a reality, not just a mere promise.

Chiang Ching-kuo has also attempted to break another long-established practice of mainland Chinese holding the large majority of Government positions. For too long the Taiwanese have not had access to the controls necessary to directing their own country. With some of the recent appointments by the Premier, headway is being made in achieving this goal of a national government run by the people of the nation itself.

The results of Chiang Ching-kuo's reforms will undoubtedly aid Taiwan in its ever-continuing progress toward maturity. Many other countries should benefit from Taiwan's efforts to rid itself of its internal corruption and inefficiency and to establish a government run by its own people. These so far successful attempts of the Nationalist Chinese are a good indication that just because a practice is well entrenched does not mean that it must remain as a permanent fixture; change is always a possibility that should not be denied the opportunity to become reality.

At this point I submit an article from the July 31 issue of Newsweek entitled "Taiwan: "The Ten Commandments"":

[From Newsweek Magazine, July 31, 1972]

TAIWAN—"THE TEN COMMANDMENTS"

Once he was written off as "the generalissimo's No. 1 son." But in the more than two decades since Chiang Kai-shek led his defeated Nationalist army to the island of Taiwan, Chiang Ching-kuo has developed into a political force in his own right. In one high-level job after another, the chunky, chubby-faced off-spring of President Chiang's first marriage has won a reputation for being honest, innovative and, above all, tough. Two months ago, his father named the 62-year-old "C.C.K.," as he is commonly known, Premier of the Nationalist government and since then he has launched a vigorous drive against corruption and inefficiency. "C.C.K. has started a pocket-sized cultural revolution," said one Taiwanese last week, "and he really means business."

That the new Premier planned to shake things up became evident when, soon after taking office, he issued a list of ten rules of conduct for all civil servants. The rules, which were quickly dubbed the "Ten Commandments," prohibit a wide range of heretofore common activities such as foreign junkets, official banquets, gift-taking and padded expense accounts. But the commandment that drew most attention was one that barred government officials of all ranks from patronizing "nightclubs, dance halls, bars and girlie restaurants."

The commandments, though immensely popular with the public, caused dismay in Taiwan's officialdom—especially since C.C.K. made it plain that they would be rigorously enforced. Last week, one high-ranking official was sacked because he violated a commandment by giving an overly lavish party for his son's wedding. And since the rules went into effect, the Taiwan police have staged regular raids on nightspots, checking the identification of every customer. So far, some 200 government officials have been arrested or reported to their superiors for being in violation of the new code of ethics.

SUGGESTIONS

To the further consternation of many bureaucrats, C.C.K. has also made it plain that he means to go beyond the Ten Commandments. He has already broken the near-monopoly that mainland Chinese have had on important posts by naming native Taiwanese to high positions in the central and provincial governments. The Premier has also appointed Chang Feng-hsu, a Taiwanese, mayor of Taipei and last week he sent Chiang a letter containing nine suggestions for running the city. These included fighting the capital's notorious air pollution, wiping out illicit gambling dens and even improving policemen's manners. Interestingly, Chiang Ching-kuo's nine points for Taipei were grouped under the heading "To Render Service to the People," a motto surprisingly close to Communist China's slogan, "To Serve the People."

With his reform program, C.C.K. undoubtedly has enhanced his popularity and strengthened his role as *tai tzu*—crown prince and heir apparent—to his 84-year-old father. But diplomats in Taipei are convinced that the Premier is not merely courting personal gain. A fanatic Communist during his student days in the Soviet Union, C.C.K. is generally given credit for being a genuine if sometimes iron-fisted reformer. "He believes in it, all right," said one Western ambassador last week. "But he also knows that the world has been impressed with reports that mainland China appears to be entirely free of corruption. C.C.K. would like to emphasize that this is one area where Taiwan can be like the other China."