

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

PENSION PROTECTION NEEDED

HON. ROBERT P. GRIFFIN

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, recently the Detroit Free Press published an article by Ralph Orr, which illustrates and explains in very human terms the need for pension protection legislation such as the bills S. 2485 and S. 2486, which I have introduced.

I ask unanimous consent that the article published on April 24, and entitled "Pension Dreams of Clare Worker Vanish With Job," be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PENSION DREAMS OF CLARE WORKER VANISH WITH JOB

(By Ralph Orr)

CLARE, MICH.—Arlon Laughlin is 44, has put in 20 years with his employer and had banked on Social Security and a company-funded pension plan seeing him through his sunset years.

But Chandler-Evans Inc. is closing its plant here and has shut the door on his dream.

Laughlin now faces not only the prospect of trying to find a job in a labor market that puts a premium on youth, but finds that his 20 years of pension equity have gone down the drain.

"They tell me I'll get \$667 in severance money and that's all," he said. "I get no vested rights to a pension. I'm worried, man."

The plight of Laughlin and other Chandler-Evans workers is an example of the fate befalling thousands of American workers in the current business recession.

Pension plans that they had thought were as sound as a Federal Reserve bank are turning out to be pieces of paper with little future value.

Angry workers and their unions are pressuring Congress for an end to a decade of talk about reform, and for legislation to protect workers against underfunded, poorly written and poorly regulated pension plans.

Most complaints are coming from people in smaller plants like the Chandler-Evans works. The company makes fuel units for jet engines.

Chandler-Evans, a division of Colt Industries of Hartford, Conn., bought out the old Holley Carburetor Co. three years ago.

Employment at Holley peaked at 1,800, but the work force had dropped to 300 by late 1968 and with the cutbacks in the aerospace program is now down to 116.

The plant is to be shuttered June 1 for good, and the machinery moved to Hartford.

Along with the business, Chandler-Evans inherited a pension program that Holley had negotiated with an independent union, the Clare-Employees Association.

For workers like Laughlin and George Dost, also a 20-year worker at age 44, the plan has some fish-hooks.

Chandler-Evans workers at Clare were to get vested rights to a pension on reaching the age of 45 and having 10 years of service. Vesting establishes the right of a worker to a pension if the place at which he works remains in business.

Post and Laughlin both have 20 years of credited service, but are only 44. They will

get, instead of vested rights, severance pay in accordance with terms in the pension plan.

But it is possible for a man who went to work for Holley 10 years ago at age 36 to get deferred vested rights to a pension even though he now is only 46.

This means that even if he goes to work for another firm, he will be entitled to a pension check from Chandler-Evans, however small, when he retires.

Laughlin, who worked twice as long, will get a severance check for \$667, based on \$35 per year of service, less lost time resulting from layoffs. And he is bitter about it.

"It just doesn't seem right," he said. "That was my money that went into the pension fund. If it hadn't been put there, I would have had it in wages. This way, I'm getting less than \$700 for 20 years of sweat."

The vesting terms were ratified by his union. He acknowledges that. "It still isn't right," he contends.

Sen. Robert Griffin, R-Mich., agrees. He has introduced a bill to guarantee full vesting for workers with 10 years' service under plans in operation at least 10 years.

But similar bills have been introduced before and never have come out of committee.

A companion Griffin measure would create a pension reinsurance fund to guarantee a worker's equity and his pension rights if a pension fund went broke or the company folded. This safeguard would be similar to federal insurance covering bank depositors.

Both UAW President Leonard Woodcock and his predecessor, the late Walter Reuther, long advocated this protection. But Congress has not bought it.

The status of the Chandler-Evans pension fund came up for discussion at a union meeting in Clare last week.

Actuarial figures given the union attorney, Edward Paul of Grand Rapids, showed assets last Jan. 1 of \$909,500 or 82.8 percent of the funding needed to cover a possible liability of \$1,097,800.

The assets are divided equally between stocks and bonds held in trust by a Detroit bank.

The value of the assets has dipped to as low as 68 percent of potential liability due to actions in the stock market.

Paul admitted that the fund—now paying out \$41,600 annually to 53 workers already retired, an average of \$785 per retiree—might be in trouble if the stock market "went to hell."

Richard J. Fritz, Detroit attorney for the firm, said the fund is in excellent shape.

He said the company had proposed a liberalized severance plan that could make the fund even more sound.

While the pension agreement provides only for severance at the rate of \$33 for each year of service, Chandler-Evans has suggested a graduated scale of benefits ranging as high as \$160 a year for the 59-year-old worker.

Such a worker, with 20 years of service, thus could draw \$3,200 in severance pay, but would forfeit his pension rights.

If enough workers figure that a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush and opt for severance pay, the pension fund would be that much more sound.

"It could reach the point where it is funded 100 percent," Fritz said.

"We have told the union that if that is the case and if there is a surplus, we would bargain about the disposition of that surplus, pending federal approval."

This might make it possible to improve the fortunes of workers like Laughlin and Post, he said.

The ultimate salvation for Laughlin, Post

and others would be enactment of federal "portability" provisions enabling them to take their pension credits with them to their next job.

But most experts believe that such legislation will have to wait until Congress has done something about reinsurance and vested rights.

Right now, Arlon Laughlin would settle for his vested rights.

EXPANSION OF THE ALASKA WATER LABORATORY

HON. NICK BEGICH

OF ALASKA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. BEGICH. Mr. Speaker, operating as a research effort of the Federal Environmental Protection Agency for the study of cold region environmental management, the Alaska Water Laboratory represents a big step in the direction of improving and maintaining the environment. This research program is essential for the responsible development of the 49th State, and is the only one of its type operated by the Federal Government. As a result, there is a large dependence on the Federal Government to maintain this facility. It is strange that while the Alaskan people are demonstrating their awareness of environmental problems, by requesting an expansion of the Alaska Water Laboratory, the Federal Government moves very slowly.

I find this strange because it is the very same Government that is presently seeking to protect the Alaskan environment by halting development of north slope oil. There would be a greater congruency if somehow a steady philosophy could be maintained. Alaskans are asking for the chance to develop the natural resources of the State responsibly. In order to do so they need the co-operation of all Federal agencies and facilities. They also need the support and advice of this Congress.

I submit into the RECORD at this point a joint resolution of the Alaska State Legislature entitled Senate Joint Resolution No. 69—relating to increased cold stress research at the Alaska Water Laboratory:

ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE, 1972

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 69—RELATING TO INCREASED COLD STRESS RESEARCH AT THE ALASKA WATER LABORATORY

Whereas the Alaska Water Laboratory is the only research laboratory of its kind now operated by the federal government of the United States for study of cold region aspects of environmental management; and

Whereas cold climate influences on water, air, land and other resources and the criteria, methodology, equipment and planning, construction and maintenance operations associated with wise management of such resources in cold climates is mostly undefined; and

Whereas it is apparent from the limited information available that cold stress is a significant influence on the factors and systems necessary to maintenance of a quality

environment throughout a major part of North America including several of the states and is a vital influence especially in environmental management in Alaska; and

Whereas both the citizenry of Alaska and the nation have reached a depth of concern and effort in instituting and maintaining measures essential to sound management and protection of the environment never before achieved in our nation;

Be it resolved by the Alaska Legislature that research effort of the Federal Environmental Protection Agency at the Alaska Water Laboratory at Fairbanks, Alaska be greatly increased and expedited to bring the level of cold region research activity at the Alaska Water Laboratory into reasonable relationship with the goals and needs of Alaska and the nation.

Copies of this resolution shall be sent to the Honorable Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States; the Honorable William D. Ruckelshaus, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency; and to the Honorable Ted Stevens and the Honorable Mike Gravel, U.S. Senators, and the Honorable Nick Begich, U.S. Representative, members of the Alaska delegation in Congress.

Passed by the Senate April 10, 1972.

JAY S. HAMMOND,
President of the Senate.

WEST CHESTER BOYS CHOIR IN INTERNATIONAL FESTIVAL

HON. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. SCHWEIKER. Mr. President, recently the boys choir of the Church of the Holy Trinity, West Chester, Pa., was invited to participate in the Graz International Youth Music Festival, to be held in Graz, Austria, from July 11 through July 15, 1972.

I am delighted by the honor which has been bestowed upon West Chester, Delaware County, and the State of Pennsylvania, by this invitation. I am confident that the boys choir will be outstanding ambassadors of good will for America, and that their appearance at the International Youth Music Festival will be a success.

An article describing the boys choir invitation was published in the West Chester Daily Local News on April 14, 1972. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

BOYS CHOIR GETS INVITATION

If a group of West Chester choir boys can find a few angels, they will be spending at least a week this summer in Europe, singing at a music festival.

An invitation to take part in the Graz (Austria) International Youth Music Festival in July has already been sent to the Boys Choir of the Church of the Holy Trinity in the county seat.

If the young singers make the trip, they will be one of 30 musical groups to participate in the week-long festival. Included are choirs, choruses, orchestras and bands from North America, Western Europe and Scandinavia.

The Holy Trinity Choir is one of only three U.S. boys choirs invited.

Hosting the festival is the Youth Department of the Styrian Provincial Government, Republic of Austria. Graz, the host

city, is nestled in the Styrian Alps and dates back to the 12th Century.

The Holy Trinity invitation came in January to Mrs. Jane Adams Moore, the choir director.

At that time, the trip seemed out of the question, as costs would run about \$13,000 for air transportation, lodging and meals for the 28 boys and their chaperones.

However, the enthusiastic choir director and some of the boys' parents didn't give up on the possibility of making the trip. Parents meetings were scheduled, and after a final session with the church vestry this week, it was decided to make every effort to send the choir to Graz.

The parents, working through Ralph Zaayenga, church music committee chairman, have pledged a substantial portion of the money needed, but the total figure has not been reached. No church funds will be used to make the trip, but a number of activities have been planned by the choir and parents.

Included are a pancake breakfast from 8 a.m. to noon, May 13 at the parish house; a car wash at Knox's Car Wash, E. Market street, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. May 20; and a concert at the church at 7:30 p.m., June 17. A dinner dance is also in the planning stage for May 6.

Day of decision for the boys is June 10. If, on that date, the additional money needed is raised, the trip is on. A lack of funds then means the trip will be postponed for a year.

The Boys Choir of the church is part of a larger Men's and Boys' Choir which was founded at Holy Trinity in 1891. There are currently 37 boys, aged 7-15, singing. Another 15 men make up the entire choir.

Some of the younger boys will not make the proposed trip because of the probable hectic schedule such a festival entails.

Concerts are not new to the Holy Trinity boys. During the past 18 months they have performed at the White House Rose Garden, the capitol rotunda in Harrisburg, the New York Civic Opera House, the State Museum Building Auditorium and a number of churches and organizations in three states. During the holidays the boys also sing in area nursing homes.

All of their concerts include both sacred and secular music, and their recent presentations have featured Gilbert and Sullivan's operetta, "Trial by Jury."

Much of the concert work is done by a select group of about 20 of the "older" choir members who have formed the Trinity Choir Boys.

First and foremost, the choir is a church choir, and the boys normally rehearse about five hours a week for the Sunday service. However, that time is now being extended and some strange European folk songs are finding their way into the Holy Trinity repertoire.

If enthusiasm alone can make a dream come true, the boys choir will be winging its way to Austria come July 10 for the week-long musical event.

If the trip becomes a reality, the 28 boys will be ready to "make a joyful noise . . ." in the storied old city of Graz.

EXPORT-IMPORT PROBLEMS

HON. WILLIAM L. HUNGATE

OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Speaker, in these days of export-import problems, perhaps we would learn from these suggestions

given the British upon entering the Common Market.

[From Punch, Apr. 19, 1972]

AND HOW DO I SELL THIS TO THE COMMON MARKET?

Easy. You simply remember that, for sales convenience, Europe is now divided into six marketing zones of ascending size and importance. Start at the bottom and work up, as you acquire confidence and off-load your product. Go first to the smallest which is known as

LUXEMBOURG

Do not, whatever else you do, suggest that Luxembourg is small. Most reps try to fit Luxembourg in between a Belgian breakfast and Dutch tea. Fatal. Turn up for your appointment twenty-four hours late, disheveled, explaining that you have been wandering round the Duchy, lost, trying to find the place. Drop into your conversation phrases like "as tiny as Liechtenstein" or "of course, I've never been to France myself."

When asked for details about the product, stress that you intend to make Luxembourg the springboard for your continental operations. If, translation being what it is, they deduce that you make springboards, encourage them. Sooner or later they will reveal what they really want, at which point you reveal that that's what you make, in aerosol packs. Hint ever so gently that your spray-on product makes things that little bit bigger.

Send them a postcard saying that you have been disappointed by the smallness of

BELGIUM

In Brussels, you will be surprised to find that they have been told along the grapevine that you make spray-on springboards. Smile, shrug and say "Ah, ces Luxembourgais!"

Market research among the Belgian consumers at their favoured purchasing point (Folkestone) reveals that they will buy anything as long as it is cheaper than at home. Does this invalidate your mission? Not at all. Simply add stickers saying DIRECTEMENT DE FOLKESTONES and charge what you like.

When asked for details about your product, profess absolute secrecy in case the specifications should leak to their great rival.

HOLLAND

The Dutch, as the consumers of Holland are known, speak perfect English and resent it if you try to speak Dutch, which suggests they are not part of the international scene.

As the Dutch are unusually conscious of cleanliness, health and safety standards, stress that your product is non-toxic, lead-free, non-staining, colourless, safe for children and absolutely non-injurious to tulips. Demonstrate this by producing an aerosol, spraying it into the air and saying, "You see?"

When, despite respect for Britain, you are asked for details concerning your product, launch into broad Cockney. Say: "Well, bilmey, that's a right teaser and no fooling, search me, governor, you've got me over a barrel; pull the other one, it's got bells on". No self-respecting Dutchman will admit he doesn't know what you've said, so chalk up your order and move on to the most challenging area so far,

ITALY

Psychological analysis of the Italian consumer reveals that he divides his time between loving his mother, fearing his wife and pinching English girls, which casts no light at all on the potential of aerosol packs in the Italian market, though it certainly suggests new theories concerning the mysterious smile on the face of the Mona Lisa. In fact, rather than discuss your banal product, why not launch into a sophisticated discussion of Leonardo da Vinci? Not only will this distract Italian buyers from the details of your product, it will also draw attention to the most famous Italian of all time who was in addition undeniably queer, which will by implication call into question your buyer's virility.

If he should wish to change the subject, switch to Michelangelo, that enthusiast of young boys. If you cannot then play on his outraged manhood with a large order, you should not be a salesman.

If you are asked for details of your product, you have only to hint at the possibility of increased potency, and/or the preservation of Renaissance canvases. Get your order signed and move on to

FRANCE

Ah, the French! This race so indomitably urbane, this example of humanity which knows no bounds to the possibility of ultimate improvement, which admits no theoretical hindrance to the limitless soaring of the human spirit, this nation which actually talks this sort of meaningless rubbish given a fraction of the chance.

Luckily, they have one Achilles heel. They are a sucker for the idea of the English upper class in a way which the English lower classes have long since learned to resist. All you have to do is suggest that your product produces a spray-on Milord effect, and you are home and quick-drying. The scent of English lawns . . . the soft embrace of Scottish tweeds . . . the gentle touch of fox-hounds . . . the misty appeal of Wellington boots . . . the old-fashioned flavour of public school floggings . . . That's what the Froggies are after.

Plus, of course, a hint that during the war you suffered dreadfully from . . .

GERMANY

Where you can safely drop a hint that if only England and Germany had been on the same side, things would have been over by 1942. Because if there's one marketing zone in Europe which resembles England, it's Germany, with the same emphasis on pragmatic virtues, hard-headed experience and practical knowledge of the world. What makes it difficult to admit this, naturally, is that Germany has made much better use of such qualities in the last twenty-five years, and we have tended only to pay lip service to them.

Nevertheless, lip service can be a trump card. Thanks to the Americans, English is now the language of international commerce, and you can sway the Germans by explaining to them that your product is . . .

Ein Tip-Top Spray-On Produkt . . .
Das Super Long-Term Aerosol Effekt . . .
Der Wunder-Trendy Skin-Food . . .
Ein Anti-Sovietisches Kalorie-Frei Gentle-men's Overcoat . . .

LETTER FROM THE FRONT

HON. ROBERT McCLORY

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. McCLORY. Mr. Speaker, in connection with the invasion of South Vietnam by regular forces of the North Vietnamese military, it would seem well for us to reflect carefully on a letter received from an American serviceman in Vietnam. This letter from Sgt. John A. Kukowski and signed by 35 other men of the 1st Platoon, Charlie Company, 2/1 196th Infantry Brigade, appeared in the Saturday, May 6th issue of the Washington Post under the title "Letters to the Editor."

This letter from the field of battle is most informative regarding the significance of American bombing strikes in behalf of the safety of the American troops which remain in Vietnam. The letter follows:

The men of the 1st platoon, Charlie Company, 2/1 196th Infantry Brigade, have been reading about the situation on the home front. While sitting around on our defensive perimeters the night of April 21st, we grunts decided to let the people back in the world know how we feel about the college demonstrations in favor of halting the bombing in Vietnam.

We appreciate the American people's support in trying to bring us home, but we think they're going about it in the wrong way.

Here are a few reasons why we think they're wrong:

First, halting the bombing could mean unnecessary involvement of American troops.

Second, the bombing strikes are doing an outstanding job of halting the enemy and destroying their resupply;

The third, and most vital reason to us for not stopping the air raids and bombing strikes would be enlarging the chances of us not coming home alive.

By writing this letter, we hope the veterans will understand and back us in our beliefs.

Sgt. JOHN A. KUKOWSKI.

Vietnam.

THE MINES OF MAY

HON. JAMES W. SYMINGTON

OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. Speaker, in assessing the President's decision to mine the harbors of North Vietnam, one is compelled to review his objectives and make a guess as to whether and to what extent this initiative contributes to their attainment. His short-term goals would include return of our prisoners, reduction of the threat to our remaining forces, and a possible cease-fire permitting the South to regain its composure. But even his short-term hopes are not confined to our Indochina involvement. They include also the keeping of his date in Moscow for the SALT talks, the success of those talks, and no break in the spirit of his journey to Peking. His long-term objectives would include a general reduction of East-West tensions, particularly in such recurrent trouble spots as Berlin and the Mideast, a favorable climate for more positive and practical expressions of detente, such as coadventures in space, environmental technology, world food management, and great power cooperative aide to the third world—in short, a transition from the cold war psychology of confrontation to a new era of conversation ushering in a "generation of peace." The foregoing list is by no means exhaustive, but illustrative of the reasonable hopes of America which have been articulated by no President more frequently or fervently than the incumbent. One cannot second guess history or the blue pencil with which it marks our papers. But I cannot see why President Nixon should expect to score well on any of the suggested tests. Even bringing Hanoi back to the conference table in the brooding presence of a stymied Soviet Union, a stung China, and a wondering world, would seem a victory of doubtful proportions and duration. The "threat to our troops" argument has finally become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

For the longer they remain as hostages to a bankrupt policy, the closer they are brought to answering for it.

The credibility of our national resolve is certainly another objective of both long- and short-term significance. It must be treated separately due to the simple fact that we must not automatically equate the Nation's resolve with Mr. Nixon's resolve. To put it another way, his latest initiative may at best be a well-intentioned but misguided expression of the true national resolve—one which would have been better expressed by early recognition that the political future of Vietnam, North and South, was neither subject to permanent U.S. manipulation, nor vital to permanent U.S. interests. Such a recognition, let us say, in 1969, by a newly elected President, could have led to the formulation of a more modest goal than continuing forceable restraint of the north by escalated attrition culminating in fire and sulfur. I doubt the greater part of the American people can contemplate with pride or satisfaction bringing to heel a small and somewhat ascetic Asian country, much less decimating its infrastructure, and millions of acres of friendly territory to make the point; and even less, challenging our principal nuclear adversary in the process. A withdrawal date in return for American prisoners of war might have proved a useful basis for discussion 20,000 American lives and \$50 billion ago. The very magnitude of our sacrifice in this struggle tells something, too—and something ominous—about the "credibility" of our deterrent to aggression. Having spent so much blood and treasure in this little corner of the world and devalued both the dollar and the national self-respect in the process, what reserves can we be expected to summon up for the truly important contests that could lie ahead? Who would believe that we have such resources or the will to use them? So I conclude by hoping that Hanoi will submit to the President's terms and that neither the Soviet Union nor Red China will consider the matter of sufficient importance to take immediate offense. But I would also observe that if this was indeed one of the contingencies of the "secret plan," then it is a part of the secret I wish we could have kept to ourselves. Perhaps the plan dissolved into improvisation. And who among us has not, at some time, in a fit of frustration at the world's strange ways, wished to fling an egg into the fan of history? Judging from conversations overheard in Washington and across the country, many of us would yield to that impulse. But that should be the difference between us and the Presidents we elect.

APPRECIATION DAY FOR MRS. MARGARET DAVIDSON

HON. DON EDWARDS

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Speaker, May 21 has been set aside as Appreciation Day for Mrs. Margaret Da-

vidson of San Jose, Calif. As a native of San Jose and representative of that city here in Washington, I would like to add my voice to those of Mrs. Davidson's many friends back home in appreciation of her many fine efforts in behalf of the community.

Mrs. Davidson, a member of San Jose's black community for a number of years, has served the city well in many positions. As a member of the legislative and human relations committee of the PTA and second vice president of the Santa Clara PTA she has served the cause of human rights and combined this service with a concern for the young students of Santa Clara County. As a member of the board of the Family Service Association and a volunteer driver for the American Red Cross she has personally been a part of the effort to help families throughout the area. Mrs. Davidson has also been a volunteer for Agnew State Hospital, is a member of the Garden City Women's Club and has been State chairman for the California Association of Colored Women's Clubs.

Mrs. Davidson has not enjoyed good health for the past year and the community has sorely missed her prodigious energy. I commend the Appreciation Day Committee for their efforts to bring Margaret Davidson the recognition she deserves and I want to add my thanks to those of the entire community for the service she has rendered over these many years.

RUMANIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY

HON. WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, on this day 95 years ago the country of Rumania achieved independence. For Rumanians all over the world, May 10 is a day of special significance. It is a day which serves as inspiration and hope for Rumanians who now must live under the shadow of foreign domination.

Historians tell us, Mr. Speaker, that Rumania has traditionally been viewed as a crossroads in the power politics and wars between the East and the West. As such, throughout history the Rumanian people have always been at the mercy of more aggressive, expansionist nations which have used their homeland as a pivot from which to carry through on their schemes of expansion.

Squeezed between two overwhelmingly powerful forces, Rumania has long been a pawn in the power plays of its neighbors. Indeed, it was only when two powerful nations, Turkey and Russia, were occupied in war in the Balkans, that Rumania finally achieved true independence 95 years ago.

Freedom and liberty were welcomed in 19th century Rumania with general rejoicing. Her people had just reason to celebrate because although Rumania is one of the oldest countries, it had never before tasted true independence.

Unfortunately, time would prove that this freedom was to be but a brief respite

from oppression. At the end of World War II, Soviet troops occupied Rumania, installed a puppet government, forced the abdication of the country's leaders and snuffed out any semblance of independence.

Thus, once again, Rumania struggles against tyranny. Once more while others enjoy freedom and liberty, Rumania must persevere against foreign rule, must continue to suffer the degradation of her basic rights.

However, Mr. Speaker, let there be no thought that the Rumanian people have resigned themselves to their plight, that they are satisfied with anything less than complete independence. On the contrary, the urge for liberty still burns deep, ready to explode and light the way out from under the yoke of foreign control.

Mr. Speaker, I, for one, will never accept the proposition that any people or nation will settle for less than the basic rights that they as men rightfully deserve. Freedom, independence, liberty, and equality may only be symbols yet, they represent the fulfillment of the hopes and dreams of all mankind. They are not divisible. One can not have partial freedom or liberty. In short these values can never be bargained for or compromised.

Rumanians, like all people of the captive nations of Eastern Europe, realize that they are being forced to endure the oppression of foreign rule. They are a brave people. Centuries of foreign rule have not extinguished their desires for self determination.

Mr. Speaker, I, therefore, commend the brave people of Rumania who still strive for freedom and I sincerely hope that in the days ahead their patience will be rewarded by a return of those freedoms which they first won some 95 years ago.

BREA-OLINDA HIGH SCHOOL DEDICATION

HON. JOHN G. SCHMITZ

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. SCHMITZ. Mr. Speaker, recently, I received a letter from one of my constituents, Mrs. Carole Hanson, giving thanks for dedicating Brea-Olinda High School to her husband, Capt. Stephen Hanson, a U.S. Marine Corps aviator, missing in action since he was shot down over enemy territory on June 3, 1967. I am proud that Brea-Olinda has become the first high school in the Nation to dedicate itself and its student body to keeping alive the memory of a brave American whose fate is still unknown. Despite the fact that Mrs. Hanson is about to cross the threshold of not seeing or knowing the status of her husband for 5 long years, she still has the courage to give thanks to that minority in this Nation who have proved that they still care. I am proud that the people of the new congressional district which I hope to represent did this for Captain Hanson, yet I am sick at heart that so many in the rest of this Nation stand by and

watch, for the first time in America's history, so that the wives of these men, some 1,600 of them, have to fight for their husbands' freedom. This is a national disgrace, and I, for one, shall not settle for anything less, than a full accounting of all 1,600 of these men. Mrs. Stephen Hanson's letter follows:

EL TORO, CALIF.,
April 20, 1972.

Congressman JOHN G. SCHMITZ,
Longworth House Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR JOHN: Forgive me for being so late in thanking you for being at the Brea-Olinda High School Dedication to Steve, and for your outstanding remarks on that occasion. I appreciate your taking time from a busy schedule to participate in an event that was most personal to me. Also, by your presence, you clearly demonstrated your interest in the students and their activities.

The Vietnam conflict has brought about many "firsts" and while my paramount concern is with the plight of the POW/MIA's, I do feel that Brea-Olinda High School and the Student Body are deserving of the highest recognition possible for being the first school in our nation's history to make such a dedication to a man who we do not know is living or dead.

I would be very grateful if you could give them such credit and recognition. Also, much praise is due Mrs. Susan Gaede for her work in helping them to make their Dedication an overwhelming success, as well as the Brea school officials for their cooperation.

Again, many, many thanks for your interest and support; I will continue to count on it in the long days ahead.

Best regards,
CAROLE (Mrs. STEPHEN) HANSON.

RUMANIA'S INDEPENDENCE DAY

HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, although today is Independence Day for Rumania, most of the real celebrating will take place here in the United States. It will be carried on by Americans of Rumanian extraction. Many of them came here from Rumania, while others are the descendants of immigrants therefrom.

While they and their friends celebrate with music, speeches, picnics, merrymaking, and religious observances, their thoughts will inevitably turn to the people living in Rumania. The inhabitants of that nation will merely observe the occasion, as they can hardly be expected to rejoice when the independence for which their forefathers fought and died is now but a memory.

Rumania, which was for a long time a part of the Ottoman Empire, had been theoretically independent since 1859, when Alexander Cuza became Prince of both Moldavia and Wallachia, but a meaningful separate existence was not achieved until 1881. Czarist troops invaded Rumania, with that country's acquiescence, when war broke out between Russia and Turkey. Rumania entered the conflict on the side of Russia and proclaimed its independence from Turkey.

In 1881, Carol I, a member of the royal

house of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, who had ruled Rumania since Cuza's forced abdication in 1866, became its king. Independence lasted for six decades, but the country's freedom ended during World War II.

Rumania survived the hellishness of nazism, but the Communists moved in after World War II. The Communists have been firmly in control of the nation for a quarter of a century. Agriculture has been collectivized, industry nationalized, and religious organizations subjected to state control.

Mr. Speaker, as we pause in our deliberations this afternoon and rejoice with our fellow Americans of Rumanian stock, let us not forget their kinsmen in the land of their ancestors. Let us unite our prayers with theirs and ask the Supreme Ruler of the nations to speed the day of freedom for Rumania and its people.

PROPERTY TAX REBELLION

HON. JOHN M. ZWACH

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. ZWACH. Mr. Speaker, it is elementary that when we have government we must have taxes and the more government we have, the higher our taxes become. Government exists on taxes. The more the people ask of their government, the more taxes the government asks of the people.

However, we have reached a point where taxes are becoming an awesome burden on our people. This relates especially to property taxes.

I commend to my colleagues and the thousands of others who read the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, a discussion of property taxes which appeared in the editorial columns of the Morris Sun, in our Minnesota Sixth Congressional District, which, with your permission, I hereby insert into the RECORD:

PROPERTY TAX REBELLION

"Taxation without representation" was the spark that fired the tinder of the American Revolution. Now, nearly 200 years later, taxation threatens to once again ignite rebellion—a taxpayers' rebellion against the property tax. President Nixon has called the property tax "... one of the most oppressive and discriminatory of all taxes."

The magazine Business Week has presented a history of the property tax and an analysis of its growing inequities that have led to court actions such as that in New Jersey where the operation of the property tax as a way to finance education was held illegal under the New Jersey Constitution. The property tax has been the principal means of financing local government. In the beginning, it was a reasonably equitable tax. As Business Week states: "There was a time in U.S. history when the property tax did make a great deal of economic sense. In Colonial days, wealth meant farmland, buildings, livestock, jewelry—items that could be seen and touched. The property tax then was a levy on wealth, and people could accept it as such because real wealth was a good proxy of a person's ability to pay a just amount for services rendered by society."

Today, the story is far different. Tangible property is no longer necessarily a measure

of wealth. Today, people have stocks, bonds, savings accounts and other intangibles often worth far more than their real estate. In other words, the mere ownership of a home or property is no indication of wealth or the ability to pay a progressively higher property tax.

In another respect, the property tax of today is far from fair. Its benefits bear little relation to its burden. In his book, "The Politics and Economics of State-Local Finance," economist L. L. Ecker-Racz writes, "Since we now move about freely, the beneficiaries of today's education, health, or welfare expenditures financed by the property owners of one community are tomorrow likely to be residents of another community. For this reason, it is neither logical nor fair to continue to distribute the cost of education and welfare services in proportion to the assessed value of property to which people happen to hold title."

The sheer growth of the property tax, aside from its inequities, is a primary source of taxpayer resentment. Business Week reports that the property tax brings in some \$40 billion a year—double the total of a decade ago and rising by nearly 10 per cent a year. Sixty per cent of the property tax burden falls on the homeowner and 40 per cent on business. In some states, the tax has risen far more rapidly than the national average. In California, property taxes have climbed by 147 per cent in the last decade. Not only is the property tax inequitable in present-day society, but it is also regressive. It has accelerated the deterioration of inner-city neighborhoods by penalizing property improvements. Property tax levies have developed a vicious cycle. Cities desperate for funds boost property tax rates. Each increase drives more businesses and homeowners away. Thus, the tax base narrows, and remaining property taxpayers are left with an even heavier burden.

Property tax relief—and reform—are now recognized as essential. But with the outgo of government at all levels soaring, the prospects of any real tax relief, property or otherwise, looks anything but promising. Plans for a national sales tax and other schemes to make taxes less offensive and confiscatory will no doubt run into stonewall opposition from affected groups. In the long run, a relative slowdown in the expansion of government services, benefits and subsidies must accompany tax relief. Whatever happens, however, with regard to the general spending level of government, recent court decisions as well as the mood of property taxpayers makes changes in the tax system a virtual certainty.

For two centuries, U.S. citizens have demonstrated a willingness to pay taxes in support of government. They are now demonstrating once again the spirit of independence that rejects infringement upon fundamental rights—including that of property ownership.

RUMANIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY

HON. WILLIAM J. SCHERLE

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. SCHERLE. Mr. Speaker, over a 100 years ago today, the Rumanian people took the first step towards national independence and, within the same generation, Rumania's sovereignty was acknowledged by all Europe. For more than a century, Rumanians have revered the 10th of May as the symbol of their freedom as a nation.

Unfortunately, it is only a symbol to-

day, for Rumanians no longer enjoy the independence they traditionally celebrated on May 10. This proud and freedom-loving people has been reduced to satellite status by the might of Russian imperialism. Only in exile and in secret can they commemorate the anniversary of their national sovereignty.

But they have not forgotten the meaning of the 10th of May, nor should we, secure in the blessings of liberty, neglect to pay tribute to their courage and tenacity. However assiduously the Communist rulers of Rumania try to eradicate this holiday from the national consciousness, they will never succeed. And though the great majority of Rumanians cannot voice their sentiments, they will undoubtedly be grateful for our recognition of their sacred national tradition.

Let us then join the silent millions behind the Iron Curtain in honoring this day, the 10th of May, as the birthday of Rumanian independence and a reminder that freedom everywhere is threatened when freedom anywhere is denied.

RUMANIAN INDEPENDENCE

HON. JOHN D. DINGELL

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, the Rumanian National Committee and Rumanians everywhere in the free world observe the 10th of May as the national holiday of the Rumanian people since it is that day which marks three significant events leading up to the achievement of the nation's independence.

On May 10, 1866, Charles, Prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, was proclaimed Prince of Rumania and founded the Rumanian dynasty.

Eleven years later, on May 10, 1877, during the turmoil of the Russo-Turkish War, the principality of Rumania, until then nominally a vassal of the sultan, proclaimed her independence and severed her ties with the Ottoman Empire. The Rumanian Army, as an ally of Russia, fought for its independence on the battlefields south of the Danube and played a significant role in defeating the Turkish forces.

Another 4 years elapsed after Rumanian people proclaimed their independence and a further step was then taken when they raised their country to the rank of a kingdom. On May 10, 1881, Charles I was crowned, by the will of his people, King of Rumania, and a prosperous era, which lasted over six decades, opened for the nation.

During all of those years and up to the present time, Rumanians have cherished and revered the 10th of May as their national holiday. It remains the symbol of their permanency and perseverance through many hardships and trials in their efforts to reach the goal of freedom.

The freedom which Rumanians have sought for so long is still denied to them by the Communist regime. However, it is the hope of Rumanians throughout the world that freedom shall be restored to their homeland.

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

HON. AL ULLMAN

OF OREGON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. ULLMAN. Mr. Speaker, American business faces serious challenge in demonstrating responsiveness to the many problems facing American society. The Chamber of Commerce of the United States has always played a key role in the past, and must continue to do so in the future. The president of the Portland, Oreg., Chamber of Commerce, Carl M. Halvorson, has thoughtfully articulated goals for the chamber of commerce to meet the needs of American business in the seventies. I commend the editorial that follows to the attention of all Members:

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

The Chamber of Commerce of the United States was created in 1912 to serve as the voice of the American business community on national issues. It has had an illustrious career. Its voice has gone out loud and clear on many occasions. Dedicated, thoughtful and self sacrificing individuals have devoted countless hours of work, at great personal expense, in service as officers, directors and committee members of the organization.

Over the past 60 years the Chamber has been generally well received by the Congress and the Executive branch. A respected, talented staff has ably supported the activities of the officers and the board of directors.

However, with a constantly expanding federal government complex, quickly changing institutions of government, strongly entrenched lobbying forces representing organized labor, and newly emerging powerful lobby groups it is time to re-evaluate the position and structure of the National Chamber to ascertain whether or not we have the most effective organization possible to represent us in Washington.

Inherent in such evaluation must be an awareness that voice is not the only measure. Effective structural power in action is most important.

The National Chamber has about 40,000 individual firm memberships as well as some 3800 trade associations or similar organizations, including local Chambers of Commerce, of which our Chamber is one. A local chamber member is not a member of the National unless he holds a separate membership in that organization.

Over the past several years there has been no structural relationship between the national governing board of 50 men and the general membership. The power structure of the National Chamber is self perpetuating. The president and other officers are elected by the board. The president annually appoints a nominating committee consisting of board members, which duly gives its report to the board. Whereupon the board elects its own membership. The directors usually serve the maximum period allowed, three 2-year terms. Virtually all board members and officers are eminently successful business leaders representing the larger corporate interests of the nation, or in some cases, they are astute, prestigious men from the professions. The individual prestige of these men, or the corporate interests they represent, is such that they are accepted as peers in any group.

The inherent weakness in the present form of organization is that there is no reasonable route of input into the decision making process of the National Chamber for almost

100 percent of the membership. For that group National Chamber activities are a spectator event and not one of participatory involvement.

The Chamber purports to represent an underlying constituency of over 3 million individuals and firms but generates only about two thousand delegates at its annual meeting in Washington. Groups with a minute percentage of the Chamber's constituency generate far greater attendance because the organization in question has a personal vitality to the participant and he knows that he can contribute ideas and muscle. These organizations generate power totally out of proportion to membership numbers because they are interested in and do have direct participation of the membership.

There are a great number of actions that could be instituted by the National Chamber to make its membership part of the action.

Some such programs might be:

1. Expand the present board structure to a much greater size, preferably at least 750 individuals, with the principle representation coming from the 3800 associations in the membership, including representation of all sizes of business and inclusion of minorities and other pressure groups in the structure.

2. Retain an executive committee to handle affairs of the association between meetings of the board and propose policies to the board.

3. Create regional alliances of the business community so that we truly have local, regional and national representation.

4. Create a logical line of progression within the overall structure so that participants can feel that they are making a contribution in a viable atmosphere, and that singular achievement can be recognized on its merits.

5. Associate and relate the committee structure and activity of local chambers and those of the great trade organizations of America into the committee work of the National Chamber, always recognizing that the great issues that will really make a difference in our national postures are infinitely more uniting to the business community than they are divisive.

6. Carefully program, and then coordinate a workable action group in political and social affairs from the fabric of our constituency.

7. Provide for an infusion of democracy into all levels of National Chamber activity.

The great power potential of the American business community cannot be marshalled by an oligarchy in which the democratic process is not allowed to function. The present cabal of power effectively insulates the National Chamber from its constituency and consequently the real potential power of the organization is unrealized.

NEW ROSWELL CANCER CENTER
NAMED FOR DR. JAMES GRACE

HON. THADDEUS J. DULSKI

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. DULSKI. Mr. Speaker, the new cancer drug center now under construction at Roswell Park Memorial Institute in Buffalo, N.Y., was commemorated Monday in honor of the late Dr. James T. Grace, Jr., institute director when the project was being developed.

The purpose of the James T. Grace, Jr. Cancer Drug Center is to provide a major facility for basic research and training in the various areas of pharmacology that are related to chemotherapy in general, and cancer therapeutics in general.

New forms of treatment will be sought and developed toward human application.

Young investigators, graduate students, clinical fellows, and scientists from both the local community and elsewhere will have an opportunity for advanced training in the biochemical and pharmacological approaches to therapeutics.

Clearly, the new cancer drug center at Roswell Park is going to play a vitally important role in the national drive to find a cure for cancer, a drive given leadership and support as a result of the landmark legislation enacted with my strong support last winter.

Roswell Park, now in its 74th year of operation, has been a leader in cancer research over the years. It has an outstanding staff which is making the maximum use of the facilities which have been developed and expanded.

Dr. Grace came to Roswell Park in 1957 as chief cancer research surgeon, amassing an impressive record of achievements during his service with the institute of which he became assistant director in 1959 and director in 1967.

At the peak of his brilliant career, and at the age of only 48, the life of Dr. Grace ended last August after he had been in a coma for more than a year following an automobile accident which claimed the life of his wife.

The construction of the James T. Grace, Jr. Cancer Drug Center was made possible through the joint participation of Federal, State, and private resources, representing an outstanding example of cooperation among these three sectors of the economy.

Based upon the scientific productivity of the institute's Department of Experimental Therapeutics at Roswell Park, an application to the National Institutes of Health resulted in funding of \$1,815,000 in 1967 for construction of the six-story structure.

Matching funds were obtained from the State of New York in the amount of \$1,596,000, plus \$708,000 from private sources. Construction began in April 1971 and the building is expected to be ready for occupancy in the spring of 1973.

Dr. Gerald P. Murphy, director of the institute succeeding Dr. Grace, presided at the commemoration program and Dr. Hollis S. Ingraham, commissioner, New York State Department of Health, was principal speaker. Dr. Ingraham also represented Governor Rockefeller, whose plans to be present had to be canceled due to other State obligations.

I was honored to be present on the platform and Dr. Murphy also introduced County Executive Edward V. Regan, Charles R. Diebold, Alfred H. Kirchhofer, and Elmer Lux. The president of Niagara University, Very Rev. Kenneth F. Slattery, C.M., gave the invocation.

The commemoration of the cancer drug center to the honor of Dr. Grace is a deserved tribute to a dedicated physician, surgeon, cancer researcher, and administrator who contributed so much during his too-short span of life that others may survive the scourge of cancer.

Mr. Speaker, as part of my remarks, I include the text of the brief speech by Dr. Ingraham, also a synopsis of the career of Dr. Grace:

SPEECH BY DR. HOLLIS S. INGRAHAM

Three-quarters of a century ago, the State of New York planted a seed here, when it gave Dr. Roswell Park a grant of \$10,000 to seek the causes of cancer.

From that first seed has grown the impressive living, vital entity that is Roswell Park Memorial Institute.

It is an entity that is still growing, both in its physical dimensions and its scientific and humane accomplishments.

Today, we mark still another area of that growth as we name this new cancer drug center in honor of the late Dr. James T. Grace, Jr., former institute director.

That initial grant in 1897 was not only the forerunner of this vast cancer research and treatment center.

It was also the beginning of New York State's commitment to medical research in general, a commitment that has repeatedly demonstrated its worth as State health department scientists have opened new doors to knowledge.

No other State has compiled as long or as successful a record of achievement in laboratory, clinical and epidemiological investigations.

Scientists at our Division of Laboratories and Research developed cardioliplipin, discovered nystatin, identified the Coxsackie viruses, and have many other research breakthroughs to their credit.

Only last week, two staff members reported development of a quick laboratory procedure for the diagnosis of gonorrhea.

Here at Roswell Park, as we all know, researchers established the association between cigarette smoking and lung cancer, developed anti-leukemic drugs, made major contributions to tumor immunology, revealed that viruses induce cancer in animals—the roster of the Institute's research accomplishments is too long to recite here.

Dr. Grace himself, whom we honor today, made notable contributions to the search for evidence that would indicate a possible cause-and-effect relationship between viruses and human cancer, especially leukemia.

In 1964, he and associates grew human leukemia cells outside the human body for the first time, which allowed other laboratories throughout the world to quantitate and corroborate work in this area of research.

Four years later, he reported that his studies had suggested, though not proved, the possibility of a link between some viruses and some forms of human cancer.

It is a tribute to investigators like Doctor Grace and colleagues—and to the farsighted leadership and encouragement that Governor Rockefeller's administration has continued to provide to the State health department's research efforts—that the Institute will play a large part in the Federal Government's cancer research program.

Roswell Park has been named the program's national coordinator for prostate cancer studies, and its director, Dr. Murphy, has been appointed to the President's advisory committee for the national cancer program.

So, on many fronts, the search for knowledge of cancer continues.

Cancer poses a complexity of problems, and there are many avenues of approach to possible solutions that must be explored.

In this new James T. Grace, Jr., Cancer Drug Center, research investigators, graduate students, clinical fellows and other scientists will receive advanced training in the biochemical and pharmacological approaches to cancer treatment, and will seek to develop new forms of treatment.

Perhaps, some day, important answers to

some of the riddles of cancer will come from this very building.

That is our fervent hope of the day.

THE LIFE OF DR. JAMES T. GRACE, JR.

Born in Troy, Ala., Dr. James T. Grace, Jr., received his bachelor of science degree from Yale University in 1945 and his medical degree from Harvard Medical School in 1948.

After an internship and assistant residency in surgery in St. Luke's Hospital, Chicago, he did private practice for a year, then served as a flight surgeon with the Air Force. He later completed his residency in surgery at Vanderbilt Veterans Administration Hospital, Nashville, Tenn., from 1953-57, when he came to Roswell Park as chief cancer research surgeon. The next year he became chief of the gastrointestinal and soft tissue surgical services.

Dr. Grace distinguished himself as one of America's leading men of science searching for the possible role of viruses in causing human cancer, especially leukemia. In 1964 he and his associates grew for the first time in a laboratory, human leukemia cells outside the human body. This allowed other laboratories throughout the world to quantitate and corroborate work in this area of research.

Four years later Dr. Grace announced that studies have suggested, but not proved, the link of virus(es) to some forms of cancer. He maintained interest in this area of research, particularly until his accident. He was director of the Institute's viral oncology as well as chairman of Health Research, Inc., which receives and allocates non-state funds for cancer research. He was assistant Institute director of Roswell Park from 1959 until becoming director in 1967.

In 1959, the U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce named him one of the nation's 10 outstanding young men of the year, and the Buffalo Junior Chamber of Commerce awarded him its 27th Annual Gold Key Award. The Buffalo Evening News in 1960 named him one of the area's outstanding citizens. In 1961 he was presented the Billings Medal of the American Medical Association and in 1965, the WGR Radio Community Service Award for Outstanding Contributions in the Field of Science and Medicine. The University Club of Buffalo named him "Scientist of the Year" in 1969.

In 1969 and 1970, Dr. Grace was one of the outstanding spokesmen who pioneered for a national cancer program. On the wall of Roswell Park Memorial Institute hangs a bronze tablet with a quotation from Dr. Grace's last major address supporting a national cancer program at the 1970 National Crusade of the American Cancer Society in Chicago:

"If I had my choice between a moon walk and the life of a single child with leukemia—I would never glance upward!"

JAMES T. GRACE, JR., CANCER DRUG CENTER

HON. JACK F. KEMP

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. KEMP. Mr. Speaker, Dr. James T. Grace, Jr., of Buffalo, distinguished himself as one of America's leading men of science while working at the Roswell Park Memorial Institute of Cancer Research. On March 8, 1970, a tragic automobile accident claimed his life as well as his wife's.

On Monday, May 8, 1972, a new building at the Roswell Institute was commemorated to the memory of Dr. Grace and will be known as the Grace Cancer Drug Center.

My distinguished colleague, Hon. THADDEUS DULSKI, attended that dedication and in an extension of remarks for today, will also include in the RECORD the remarks of Dr. Gerald P. Murphy, director of the Institute and Dr. Hollis S. Ingraham, Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health. Congressman DULSKI has long had an active interest in the cancer program of Roswell Institute and is to be commended for his support of these critical programs.

Mr. Speaker, one of the important events of my first term in Congress was to submit testimony on cancer research before the House Subcommittee on Public Health and Environment of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. The hearings were held at Roswell Park in October of last year.

In my testimony I pointed out the following:

Mr. Chairman, it is especially appropriate that this hearing concerning the conquest of cancer be held here at Roswell Park Memorial Institute, the world's oldest and one of the largest cancer research centers.

Although the Institute is not in my District, many of my constituents owe a debt of everlasting gratitude to Roswell Park for its programs in cancer research, education, and service to cancer patients. Nobel Prize-winners, Doctors Carl and Gerty Cori did some of their early work on carbohydrate metabolism here. Staff members, specialists in their fields, combine research activities with teaching in the State University of New York at Buffalo Graduate School (of which Roswell Park Memorial Institute is a division) and with the direction of training programs, such as the Research Participation Program in Science. The 2,000-person Institute staff includes 150 M.D.'s, 150 Ph.D.'s and approximately 500 assisting scientific workers. Basic research is conducted in biology (genetics, microbiology, entobiotics, hematology, immunology, physiology, endocrinology), chemistry (immuno-chemistry, biochemistry, organic chemistry), physics (radiation physics, biophysics, crystallography), and biostatistics.

I would like to include for the record, a folder outlining the outstanding activities now underway at Roswell Park Memorial Institute.

We are all acutely aware of cancer's grim statistics. Last year cancer killed eight times as many Americans as have been killed in Vietnam during the past 6 years. Over 16 percent of all deaths in the United States are caused by cancer and this dread disease ranks second on the list of the Nation's five greatest killers:

Cause of Death:	Deaths in 1969
Cardiovascular Disease	1,008,990
Cancer	323,330
Cerebrovascular Disease (Stroke)	206,030
Accidents	113,150
Influenza and Pneumonia	70,120

Today, out of this nation's 204 million people, some 52 million are currently destined to be victimized by cancer. Out of those 52 million—34 million will eventually die of some form of cancer—half of them under age 65.

Deaths from cancer have risen as follows over the past twelve years:

Year:	Deaths
1960	267, 627
1961	273, 502
1962	278, 562
1963	285, 362
1964	289, 577
1965	296, 588
1966	303, 736
1967	310, 983
1968	317, 000
1969	323, 000
1970	329, 000
1971 est.	335, 000

The American Cancer Society reports that in 1971 alone, approximately 975,000 Americans will require medical care for this disease.

None of us can escape a closeness to tragedy of such magnitude.

Definite progress has been made in raising the overall cure rate for all types of cancer. Over 40 years ago, the rate of cure was one out of five. Today, it is somewhere around one out of three. I am told that imaginative programs in research, education, and service—such as those at Roswell Park Memorial Institute—could improve these fearsome odds if we mount a greater national effort. According to the American Cancer Society, the cure rate could be brought to 1 in 2 with earlier and better use of the diagnostic methods and treatments already available. Over 106,000 cancer patients will probably die in 1971 who might have been saved by earlier and better treatment. Further alleviation of the cancer patient's suffering and an increased cure rate are already available if our society is willing to accept the challenge—and to pay the cost.

Information on the economic impact of cancer is presently incomplete. The Panel of Consultants on the Conquest of Cancer reports that an estimated \$1.5 billion was spent on medical care for cancer in 1969 and that indirect costs of cancer—such as those derived from loss of earnings and the like—bring the figure to over \$15 billion for that year.

I am enclosing for the record a summary of man's progress against cancer over the past 35 years as presented in a table prepared by the American Cancer Society.

The annals of sports are full of examples of young men and women who were cut down in the prime of their careers.

I sadly recall the case of Ernie Davis, the great All-American running back from Syracuse. When the Cleveland Browns obtained Ernie in a trade for Bobbie Mitchell, sports-writers and football fans expected that the high-flying Browns would be as tough as any team in the National Football League. But Ernie succumbed to an unforgiving opponent before he had a chance to suit up.

Babe Zaharias was as tough and courageous on the clay courts as any woman who ever swung a tennis racket before cancer took her life.

More recently there was Freddy Steinmart of the champion Texas Longhorns. The curtain came down on his bright future when cancer forced the amputation of his leg.

The list of victims, young, and at the height of their careers, is all too familiar.

The President demonstrated the level of his concern last January 22nd—when, during his State of the Union Message—he requested the Congress for an appropriation of \$100 million dollars.

"The time has come in America," Mr. Nixon said, "when the same kind of concentrated effort that split the atom and took man to the moon should be turned toward conquering this dread disease."

"Let us," he declared, "make a total national commitment to achieve this goal."

Mr. Chairman, I agree wholeheartedly with this commitment and although I am not convinced—at this time—that we can set a timetable for a cancer cure, it should not be said that we in Congress do not care enough to

make the same effort to conquer this terrible disease as we did to reach the moon.

Let me remind you that cancer killed eight times as many Americans last year alone than have been killed in Vietnam during the past six years.

Last year, the Federal government spent an average of \$110 for each person for defense—but only 89 cents per person to cure or curb cancer.

I am not saying we do not need to provide for our national defense and other important needs. But I do share the opinion of many that the time has come for a reap-praisal of priorities.

I feel there is a real need for more Federal funding for the crusade against cancer so that Roswell Park Memorial Institute and others can carry on and expand their vital work.

The Chairman and members of the Subcommittee are to be commended for scheduling this hearing in Buffalo at Roswell Park Memorial Institute.

I feel that the efforts of this Subcommittee to achieve meaningful legislation in the conquest of cancer will bring us closer to the day when cancer will join polio as a disease no longer to be feared.

Thank you.

Mr. Speaker, I want to point out that the construction of the Grace Cancer Drug Center was made possible through the joint participation of Federal, State, and private resources. Furthermore, in the appropriations hearings that were released yesterday, I was pleased to note that one of the major increases in health services funding was for cancer research—\$92 million. It was also gratifying to read of the increases for sickle cell research.

These two major research areas are actively pursued by a dedicated and experienced staff at Roswell. I am sure that in the years ahead, the Grace Cancer Drug Center will contribute to the betterment of mankind—a fitting memorial indeed for the late Dr. Grace.

At this point I included portions of the testimony of the hearings before the Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health, Education, and Welfare.

PORTIONS OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE HEARINGS
BALANCING OF INCREASES AND REDUCTIONS IN HEALTH BUDGETS

Mr. FLOOD. Looking at the total figures, your budget looks even more conservative than the Office of Education budget. The total for Health Services and Mental Health Administration actually goes down from \$2.29 billion to \$2.22 billion. The total for the National Institutes of Health goes up very, very little, from \$2.17 billion to \$2.18 billion. If you think this is not a standstill budget, as these totals indicate—if the totals are misleading, we would like to hear your explanation.

Dr. DuVAL. Mr. Chairman, I would make two points and then after that, as many as you want me to make as further confirmation. The growth in the capacity of our three health agencies to spend money in 1973 over 1972 is actually \$600 million in terms of outlays.

Second, the growth in programs between 1973 and 1972 amounts to \$4846 million. The reason that you have correctly noted that the net or aggregate gain is only \$13 million is because we have offsetting decreases of \$472 million which have already been explained as nonrecurring items or reflect a change in philosophy in regard to construction. In program growth it is a growing budget.

Let me add, the program growth of which we are most proud in this budget include

FDA, \$77 million; drug abuse, \$15 million; comprehensive health planning, \$16 million; regional medical programs, \$31 million; HMO's, \$33 million; maternal and child health, \$13 million.

Mr. FLOOD. Put that whole list in the record.

Dr. DuVAL. All right.
(The information follows:)

Major increases	Millions
FDA	77
Drug abuse	15
Comprehensive health planning	16
RMP	31
HMO's	33
Maternal and child health	13
Lead-based paint	2
Occupational safety and health	3
Family planning services	49
Indian health	22
Comprehensive health services programs	21
Diseases control	5
Other HSMHA	30
Cancer research	92
Heart research	22
Child Health Institute	10
Health manpower (excluding construction)	20
Other institutes	15
Other NIH	10
Total	486

Dr. DuVAL. We would submit that is a growing budget and a vigorous and dynamic budget.

Mr. FLOOD. During the past year there has been a terrific amount of interest generated in three medical problems that most Members never heard of 3 years ago. Sickle cell anemia, lead-based paint poisoning, and sudden infant death syndrome or "crib death." Tell us what you were doing this year and what is planned for next year.

SICKLE CELL ANEMIA

Dr. DuVAL. With respect to sickle cell disease, in 1971 we had spent an identifiable \$1 million on sickle cell disease. Beginning to recognize the problem in 1972, we moved that up to \$10 million, and in 1973 we are moving that again up another \$5 million to \$15 million. This will make it possible for us to increase the amount of money that is in research so that every reasonably promising lead can be explored with regard to preventing the disease and treatment. We will also expand the portion of the population that can be reached by surveys, screening, and so forth, for sickle cell problems.

Mr. FLOOD. Is education part of your program?

Dr. DuVAL. Yes, sir; it is. I suspect that maybe you have seen some of the spot announcements on television.

Mr. FLOOD. That is right.

Dr. DuVAL. We are trying to reach the black community. We are making it possible through programs of this type to reach more and more individuals for genetic counseling and such treatment as may be necessary if they have had the overt disease.

With regard to sudden infant death syndrome—

Mr. MICHEL. Before you leave that, isn't it true that if both parents have the sickle cell trait it is practically a foregone conclusion that their offspring are going to have it?

Dr. DuVAL. I think that it would be a mathematical probability. The point is that, if both parents had it, it would seem to work out to about a 50-percent probability. I think it is 50 percent. If one parent has it, is about one chance in four.

Mr. FLOOD. Mendelian law applies. Generation after generation?

Dr. DuVAL. Yes, sir. It is recessive so the trait may not show, but it is always there.

Mr. SMITH. I think when one parent has

it there is one chance in four the child would have it.

Dr. DuVAL. Yes; this refers to the trait, not necessarily the disease.

Mr. SMITH. I thought you were talking about the anemia.

Dr. DuVAL. I wouldn't want that misunderstood.

EXPANSION OF CANCER EFFORT

Mr. FLOOD. Tell us about the operations of the National Cancer Institute now and prior to the enactment of the Cancer Act of 1971. How significant are these differences in your opinion?

Dr. DuVAL. The basic differences are twofold. There has been a massive increase in the authorized dollar level for the cancer effort. This expansion will take place for the most part during the next year or so through contract rather than through the grant and intramural programs. Certain administrative changes have been made, including the establishment of a White House panel, and an 18-man advisory board. Fort Detrick will be operated under contract as a cancer center. This operation will be—

Mr. FLOOD. But is it underway, it will be executed, and nobody is stalling.

Dr. DuVAL. That is correct. The expenditures are already occurring. The process for the Fort Detrick is under way and we will have closed that contract by May or June. We will be on site working by July. The three-member panel already has been named. The 18-member board will be announced today.

INCOME DISTRIBUTION STATISTICS: WHAT DO THEY PROVE?

HON. SHERMAN P. LLOYD

OF UTAH

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. LLOYD. Mr. Speaker, one of our more controversial economic conundrums is whether or not the distribution of income in this country has become more equitable over the last 20 years. The subject has such political and emotional connotations that it is quite difficult to come to any rational conclusion in public discussions. A recent study by Professors Lester Thurow and Robert E. B. Lucas and published by the Joint Economic Committee shows how hard it is to reach an informed judgment by economic analysis as well.

In releasing the study, Senator WILLIAM PROXMIRE, the committee chairman, said, "the spread between the poorest and richest categories has widened considerably as real income has grown" between 1949 and 1969. The Senator apparently feels the income distribution in this country has become more inequitable.

Noted economic columnist, Prof. J. A. Livingston reaches the opposite conclusion. In an article coauthored with William K. Marimow, Professor Livingston presents evidence that the poor have in fact gained relative to the rich over the last two decades. The disagreement arises because they are different ways of measuring changes in income distribution. While the available evidence does not prove that our income distribution has become more equitable over the last 20 years, neither does it prove it has grown worse.

As a restraint to unjustified conclusions on this issue, I insert the article by J. A. Livingston and William K. Marimow which appeared in the April 16 edition of the Philadelphia Sunday Bulletin at this point in the RECORD:

PROXMIRE REPORT EXAGGERATES RICH-POOR DISEQUALITY

(By J. A. Livingston and William K. Marimow)

Do the rich get richer and the poor get poorer? The headlines say emphatically "Yes":

Income Gap in U. S. Doubles in 20 Years—Philadelphia Evening Bulletin.

Everyone has more to spend, but the gap between the rich and the poor is widening—Business Week.

Rich-Poor Pay Gap Widens, Study Shows—Philadelphia Inquirer.

But are those headlines accurate or a distortion?

The headlines, and others like them, were derived from a study—"The American Distribution of Income: A Structural Problem." It was prepared primarily by Prof. Lester C. Thurow, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, for the Joint Economic Committee. Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis), chairman, released it March 19 with a statement to the press.

Thurow declares that in the postwar period "everyone's income—male, female, majority, minority, rich, and poor—has been rising at approximately the same rate, leaving their ratios [relative shares] unaffected."

"As average incomes have risen, however, real income gaps have expanded when measured in constant dollars. Where the real income gap was \$10,565 between the average income of the poorest and richest quintile [20 percent] of the population in 1949, it was \$19,071 in 1969."

A FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION

The Proxmire press release declared: "The spread between the poorest and richest categories has widened considerably as real income has grown."

That's true arithmetically. But relatively, the poorest fifth has gained on the upper fifth. Its share of aggregate income has increased slowly—very slowly. But it has increased (chart).

The following table shows the share of aggregate pre-tax income of (a) the lowest 20 percent of families (b) the highest 20 percent of families and (c) the very rich—the 5 percent of families with topmost income:

Year	[In percent]		
	Lowest 5th	Highest 5th	Very rich ¹
1947	5.0	43.0	17.2
1949	4.5	42.8	16.9
1950	4.5	42.3	17.3
1955	4.8	41.6	16.8
1960	4.9	42.0	16.8
1965	5.3	41.3	15.8
1969	5.6	41.0	14.0
1970	5.5	41.6	14.4

¹ Top 5 percent of families.

The table raises a fundamental question: How should disparity be measured?

It shows that the income shares of the very rich and the highest 20 percent of families diminished between 1949 and 1969, whereas the share of the poorest fifth of families increased from 4.5 percent of total income to 5.5 percent.

THUROW'S STATEMENT

Stated differently, the aggregate income of the poorest fifth in 1949 was 10.5 percent of that of upper-fifth families. By 1969, the aggregate income of the poorest fifth had climbed to 13.7 percent of the upper fifth.

By Telephone, Prof. Thurow justified his approach: "Oftentimes, you will hear commentators say that the distribution of family income has remained roughly constant in the postwar period. If you look at relative shares, that statement is basically true, and there may even have been some slight improvement among those in the lowest income bracket."

"If you look at absolute dollar differences, however, income gaps have widened rapidly. There's no one method for measuring inequality in income which is universally acceptable."

But is the dollar gap a valid approach? On the basis of our calculations, the average income of a family in the upper fifth increased from \$11,800 to \$22,000 between 1949 and 1969. That's a gain of 86 percent. The average income in the lower fifth went from \$1,250 to \$3,000—an increase of 140 percent.

Disequality exists. The upper-fifth average family could buy 9.4 times the economic satisfaction—goods and services—as the poor family in 1949. In 1969, it could buy 7.4 times. This implies a decline in disparity—not an increase. Yet, the rich live much, much better than the poor. But to use an Orwellianism, less better than 20 years ago.

IMPROBABLE RESULT

As Prof. Thurow points out, the dollar difference has bulged from \$10,550 to \$19,000. But that's the arithmetic of the initial disparity.

Suppose A had an income of \$2,000 and B an income of \$5,000. A's income increases 100 percent to \$4,000, and B's increases only 60 percent to \$8,000. The dollar gap has widened from \$3,000 to \$4,000, but there's no doubt that A has narrowed the equality gap.

This device produces a stacked and improbable result. The income of the lower fifth families would have had to increase by 800 percent from 1949 to 1969 to maintain dollar-gap equality with the upper fifth. That would have been almost six times the actual 140 percent increase.

The disequality between the rich and poor in the United States requires no statistical refinement. The bare figures on income—how much does the average rich family have per year, how much does the average poor family have—are sufficient.

The study published by the Joint Economic Committee is not appropriate to the facts or the temper of the times. It duped the press, and perhaps even Sen. Proxmire.

RUMANIA'S INDEPENDENCE DAY

HON. CHARLES W. WHALEN, JR.

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Speaker, today is the most revered national holiday for the people of Rumania. It marks the attainment of that country's independence and the founding of the Kingdom of Rumania.

Although now a satellite of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Rumania preserves the commemoration of this significant date because it celebrates three great events in her history. On May 10, 1866, Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, was proclaimed Prince of Rumania, in Bucharest. Eleven years later, on May 10, 1877, the Principality of Rumania severed her bonds with the Ottoman Empire, until then whose vas-

sal she nominally had been. On May 10, 1881, Charles I was crowned King of Rumania by the will of his people.

Despite the cynical attempt by the Soviets to divert the national focus to May 9, the anniversary of the Russian victory, the citizens of that once prosperous free nation continue to celebrate in their hearts the 10th of May as do Americans the Fourth of July.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise on this occasion to pay tribute to the spirit of free Rumania. Her travails reinforce our own awareness of how valuable the system of unfettered democracy is. The irons of oppression remain. Unlike the persistent yearning of man for true liberty, they can rust and turn to ashes.

RUMANIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY

HON. WILLIAM G. BRAY

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Speaker, this is the 106th anniversary of the Rumanian nation. In observance of the day, I insert the following, from my book "Russian Frontiers: From Moscow to Khrushchev," published in 1963:

RUMANIA

Russian conquests in Rumania are not new. Rumania has known Russian aggression thirteen different times, the earlier occupations often under the guise of protection of the Christian faith. In the Russian war with Turkey in 1877, Rumania, to assist Russia, signed a convention with her to allow Russian troops to pass through Rumania. Article II of the convention is as follows:

"In order that no inconvenience should result for Roumania from the fact of the passage of the Russian troops through her territory, the government of his Majesty, the Emperor of Russia, pledges himself to maintain and to make respected the political rights of the Roumanian state, such as derived from the internal laws and the existing treaties as well as to maintain and defend the present integrity of Roumania."

Russia entered Rumania pursuant to the above convention and, once in the country, she violated Rumanian confidence and demanded and received the Rumanian state of Bessarabia by the Treaty of Berlin, which terminated the Russo-Turkish War in 1878. It should be noted that this acquisition was not from an enemy, but from a friend and ally that had assisted Russia in the war. Russia again used secrecy and subterfuge sixty-eight years later in forcibly taking territory from Rumania. Russia and Germany, by a secret treaty of June 22, 1940, agreed that Russia would be allowed to take over two provinces from Rumania as soon as Russia desired to do so. After the fall of France in June, 1941, Russia took advantage of this secret agreement with Germany and gave Rumania only three days to yield these provinces. Russia did not even wait for these three days, but invaded Rumania one day before the three-day deadline and brutally mistreated the Rumanian people.

Russia was forced out of the Rumanian territory by the oncoming German army after Germany had invaded Russia. As the German tide began to recede, the Russians followed the Germans into Rumania and on April 3, 1944, in order to quiet the fears of the Rumanian people as to Russia's inten-

tions, Molotov pledged noninterference in Rumanian affairs as follows:

This statement makes clear to the Rumanian people that the Soviet government declares that it does not pursue the aim of acquiring any part of Rumanian territory, or of changing in whatever manner the existing social order of Rumania.

In order to lull the fears of the Rumanians, Molotov further said, on August 25, 1945:

The Soviet Union does not intend to appropriate any part of Rumania, or to change the established social regime in that country, or furthermore, in any way whatsoever the independence of Rumania.

This promise was, of course, violated in the usual Russian manner. The Red Army proceeded to loot, rob, murder, and rape in Rumania to a degree that threw the entire country into terror. The Rumanian-Communist Party at that time, according to Ana Pauker, Rumanian Communist leader, numbered less than a thousand. The Communist Party took over the press and radio. However, all Russian ruses to overthrow the government in Rumania failed; and Russia finally imposed Soviet control by an impressive display of military force. Russia would not allow the American members of the Rumanian Joint Control Commission to travel in Rumania or become informed of what Russia was doing there. Our members were merely figureheads. Over a quarter of a million Rumanians were sent to Russian concentration camps. Rumania is still held in the Russian orbit by Soviet armed might.

NATIONAL SOIL CONSERVATION WEEK

HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, may I point out to the Members that we are this week celebrating National Soil Conservation Week. Certainly, the interest that many Members have exhibited and the legislative material that entered into this show that the concern of Congress is quite significant.

I am especially pleased that the Home-wood-Flossmoor Star, one of the outstanding publications serving suburban Cook County, Ill., carried an editorial in the April 30 issue on the subject of conservation. I insert the editorial in the RECORD.

CONSERVATION WEEK

Environment and ecology, once seen only in dictionaries, are now household words. They are, of course, part of the new vocabulary that has evolved as part of stepped-up local, state and national efforts to prevent further despoliation of our national resources.

Although seemingly new concepts, actually the two words related to an activity that has been a national concern for many years—soil and water conservation.

In Illinois the main thrust of this concern is provided by the state's 98 soil and water conservation districts. In the south suburban area, activities in this field are the responsibility of the Will-South Cook county soil and water conservation district, which was organized in 1946.

The district belongs to and supports the National Association of Conservation Districts, which represents more than 3,000 county districts and their state associations.

It provides residents with help in conservation planning, with help in resource conservation and development, with technical services, soil information, consultative service and flood prevention assistance.

In his annual report to the membership, district chairman William H. Stelter notes that improving the environment is an "extremely important and complex problem."

"The costs are going to be high," he stated. "Much research needs to be done, and it cannot be done overnight."

As part of its program, the district is coordinating area activities planned in connection with National Soil Conservation week, May 7-14, the theme of which is "Creative Conservation."

So here we have two more words enlisted in the continuing battle to conserve the environment, and they provide an important message.

VIETNAM ARMAGEDDON

HON. BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Speaker, President Nixon's decision to mine Haiphong Harbor and bomb transportation links from China, is an act of recklessness without parallel in American history. This reescalation, this "brinksmanship," make violent acts of protest against the war—acts which I strongly disapprove—seem innocent by comparison. When one weighs the potential risk of this decision against the possible benefits, one can only conclude that it is an act of unmitigated desperation and vindictiveness.

The blockade and bombing are not a defense of this Nation's most vital interests—and Mr. Nixon knows it. They will not turn the tide of battle in the South—and Mr. Nixon knows it. They will not free our POW's—and Mr. Nixon knows it. They will not end the war—and Mr. Nixon knows it.

The President has broken his promise to end the war; he has demonstrated the shallowness of his Vietnamization policy; he has betrayed the trust of the American people and dashed the hopes of all people for peace in the world.

Let us all hope and pray that there are not Nixon-like leaders in Moscow and Peking who value the "honor" of Russia and China over the lives of men, women, and children.

Mr. Speaker, this week's issue of Newsweek contained an interesting analysis of "What Went Wrong in Vietnam: The Fallacies in U.S. Policy." I insert it at this point in the RECORD:

WHAT WENT WRONG IN VIETNAM: THE FALLACIES IN U.S. POLICY

INTELLIGENCE

In its efforts to outguess the North Vietnamese, the U.S. has employed an impressive array of intelligence-gathering equipment—computers, reconnaissance aircraft, even electronic sensors that can detect enemy soldiers moving through jungles and along darkened trails. Yet for all this modern wizardry, American intelligence repeatedly has misjudged Hanoi's capabilities and intentions. Even when the North Vietnamese were gearing up for their current offensive, the Nixon Administration clung to the belief that the Com-

munists were incapable of inflicting real damage on South Vietnam. Asked in November if the Communists could mount a major campaign in the near future, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, replied, "They would not have the capacity or the capability for an operation such as you describe." And that same month, Mr. Nixon said, "The enemy doesn't have the punch that it had."

The reason for this massive failure of U.S. intelligence is not hard to find. "After the allied invasions of Cambodia and Laos," reported Newsweek's Pentagon correspondent, Lloyd Norman, "the U.S. military kidded themselves into believing that the Communist supply caches and logistics system had been badly damaged if not wrecked." The penchant for self-delusion did not end there. Months ago, captured enemy documents clearly indicated that Hanoi was planning an offensive for February or March. Said one U.S. official: "Some people in the Pentagon laughed when the attacks didn't come when we predicted." Even after the North Vietnamese began their offensive on Easter Sunday—backing up their infantry with 130-mm. artillery pieces, missile and rocket launchers, anti-aircraft guns and no less than 500 tanks—Pentagon officials predicted that the Communists would run out of supplies by mid-May. Yet as the fighting raged into its sixth week, there was no sign that the Communists were short of materiel. They poured 6,000 rounds of artillery shells into Quang Tri city in one three-day period and blasted An Loc with up to 1,000 shells a day. Now, Administration officials ruefully concede that Hanoi might be able to sustain such attacks for months.

The American intelligence network was equally inept at assessing Communist tactics. While the U.S. command believed that some sort of Communist offensive was in the works, it clung to the view that the assault would come in the central highlands—not across the Demilitarized Zone. And even when that judgment proved dramatically wrong, official optimism still prevailed.

Perhaps the biggest surprise of all was the appearance of massive numbers of North Vietnamese tanks in South Vietnam. "The electronic sensors," said a top U.S. intelligence analyst, "did not always pick them up, and they showed up in South Vietnam in places where they were least expected. The enemy had widened the roads and built more roads to enable the movement of tracked vehicles. Some were seen on the trails, but no one estimated the numbers that finally showed up."

Whether the faulty analysis of North Vietnam's capabilities was the result of wishful thinking or honest mistakes will be debated for years. But the fact is that Hanoi's successes to date raise serious questions about the way American military intelligence is gathered—and the way U.S. political leaders interpret the data they receive. It is an ageless military maxim to "know your enemy." But the U.S. appears to be singularly unable to understand either the mind or the determination of the North Vietnamese despite the abundance of information American intelligence has gathered over the years. And even when the Administration's advisers have been on target with their assessments of Hanoi's abilities and goals, their advice often has been ignored. That combination of shortcomings could turn out to be a formula for disaster for American foreign policy.

BOMBING

The sobering spectacle of Communist tanks and heavy artillery operating deep inside South Vietnam raises serious questions about the ultimate effectiveness of U.S. air power in Indochina. But despite that, President Nixon has clung to his conviction that massive American bombing attacks can stem the Communist tide. In his nationally televised

report two weeks ago on the renewed fighting in Vietnam, Mr. Nixon warned that U.S. air strikes "will not stop until the invasion stops." Officially, the Administration offered the explanation that the bombing was designed to aid the South Vietnamese forces and protect remaining American troops. But privately, some American officials suggested that the bombings might take on another, more ominous, character—that of pure punishment. As one State Department officer declared last week, "The President feels he has been abused personally by North Vietnam's current offensive."

In a sense, wider bombing raids are the only realistic option available to the President as a means of blunting Communist military assaults. There are too few American combat troops remaining in South Vietnam to be effective against Hanoi's forces, even if Mr. Nixon wanted to order the available GI's back into the ground war. In addition, Mr. Nixon can point to the fact that U.S. tactical bombing has achieved some short-term results during the current Communist offensive. American air strikes on North Vietnamese troop positions in the south have inflicted severe casualties on Hanoi's forces and have reportedly destroyed scores of Communist tanks. Moreover, the air campaign in the north has no doubt diminished Hanoi's capability to launch subsequent attacks in the future and has taken a harsh toll in terms of military matériel held in reserve.

Yet the weight of evidence over the years suggest that much of America's bombing has been in vain. Shortly after he took office, Mr. Nixon received National Security Study Memorandum No. 1, a secret report that strongly indicated that bombing had not played a decisive role in Vietnam. Yet only a week before Hanoi initiated its current offensive, U.S. officials were still claiming that bombing had interdicted more than 98 per cent of the supplies North Vietnam had tried to move down the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the previous four months. When the attack began, however, the Communists swarmed into South Vietnam behind the very equipment—tanks, artillery and rockets—that the U.S. claimed to have destroyed. And since the offensive began it has become clear that, like strategic bombing, close air support of ground troops also has limited utility—at least when the ground forces involved lack the will to fight. Despite hundreds of U.S. air strikes against enemy troop concentrations north of Quang Tri, for example, the North Vietnamese seemed to have little trouble capturing that provincial capital.

Still, the U.S. continues to view air power as something close to the ultimate weapon. When a U.S. Air Force officer in Saigon was questioned recently about the effectiveness of the bombing campaign, he replied, "I wouldn't know about that, but we have 'smarter' bombs and new, improved sensors now." And as if to emphasize beyond any doubt its heavy reliance on bombing, the Administration last week sent yet another attack aircraft carrier into action off the Vietnamese coast.

In short, the President seems determined to meet the new challenge in Vietnam with an old policy—and one that has always been of questionable wisdom. That air power plays a significant role in modern warfare, no one can deny. But to imply that it can somehow serve as a substitute for adequately trained and motivated ground forces flies in the face of military history.

VIETNAMIZATION

Few of his foreign programs can be more important to Richard Nixon than Vietnamization. And none has received more Presidential pats on the back. A year ago, Mr. Nixon flatly stated, "I can report that Vietnamization has succeeded." In the months that followed the President repeatedly lauded the Army of the Republic of Vietnam

(ARVN) and insisted that Vietnamization was working—even though it had never really been put to the test. But inevitably the test came—and whether the ARVN will pass or fail remains a moot question. Though some ARVN units have fought gallantly, other South Vietnamese troops fled the battle of Quang Tri in panic, deserted in droves, abandoned their wounded and, in Hue, even turned on their own comrades.

Technically, the White House has been correct in saying that the ARVN has the capability to stand alone. The South Vietnamese armed forces both out number and outgun their Communist adversaries—and enjoy the luxury of almost unlimited air support. Perhaps it was with this in mind that Defense Secretary Melvin Laird confidently predicted last January that the South Vietnamese forces would win "75 percent or more" of the battles in the event of a Communist offensive. Yet since the current offensive began, Saigon's forces have failed to score a conclusive victory in any major battle. The best they have been able to do is to hold tenuously to the provincial capital of An Loc north of Saigon, which admittedly has been a considerable achievement in the face of intensive and continuous Communist artillery barrages. But even at An Loc, the ARVN has had to abandon its attempts to destroy the North Vietnamese troops that are still besieging the town.

Somewhat surprisingly, Pentagon officials now openly admit that the Vietnamization program "hangs by a few threads." Perhaps the fatal flaw in Vietnamization has been the inability of the United States to instill in the South Vietnamese soldier the esprit and determination necessary to take on Hanoi's highly motivated and tightly disciplined troops. It was relatively easy for the United States to hand out the rifles, the artillery, the attack planes and the tanks that the ARVN lacked—something the U.S. did in a \$10 billion crash program. But last week, when more U.S. tanks arrived in South Vietnam to replace those lost to the Communists, one U.S. official in Saigon snapped, "For Christ's sake, they don't need more damn equipment. They need some guts."

There is considerably more to the problem than that, however. What the ARVN primarily needs are honest and efficient commanders. And in South Vietnam's corrupt and nepotistic military establishment, such men have always been in short supply. "There are many people here in important jobs who are unequal to the task," said one South Vietnamese official last week. "The one thing the Americans could not bring in from their arsenal was leadership."

The Nixon Administration's misplaced confidence in the ability of the ARVN is hard to comprehend. In seven years of intimate and painful involvement in Vietnam, U.S. military leaders had every opportunity to perceive and correct the shortcomings in the South Vietnamese forces. But, as NEWSWEEK'S Saigon bureau chief Nicholas C. Proffitt reported last week: "The Administration could not see the flaws in Vietnamization because of self-imposed blinders. Since Vietnamization, as defined by President Nixon, is the last American option in Vietnam, it simply had to work. The only alternative would be to admit that the Administration has failed. When this attitude at the very top is so ill-concealed, it is inevitable that it will filter down, and subordinates will don a matching set of blinders. Nice things do not happen to the careers of men who fail to see the emperor's new clothes." In the case of Vietnamization, the Nixon Administration apparently saw what it wanted to see and believed what it hoped would prove true. The result has been that a policy designed by the President to extricate the United States from the war has become a policy that threatens to prolong the agonizing and costly American involvement in Indochina.

TRIBUTE TO COACH JIM WILSON

HON. WILLIAM L. HUNGATE

OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Speaker, I would direct to the attention of the House the following article paying tribute to a great coach and teacher upon his retirement after 36 years as an educator:

COTTON HELPS BOBCAT FANS HONOR COACH JIM WILSON

"By doggies, you shouldn't have done it, but you did, and I like it," long-time BGHS coach-teacher James A. Wilson said at the conclusion of his "night" during the annual BGHS athletic banquet Friday night.

"You make me wish I'd retired five years ago," continued Mr. Wilson, who will retire at the end of this school year after a teaching and coaching career at BGHS which started in 1936.

Coach Wilson was honored by the R-1 Bobcat Boosters at the banquet at which the high school's athletes in basketball, football, track and cross-country and members of the Pep Squad also were honored.

SOME 500 HEAR COTTON

Featured speaker for the dinner was Lowell "Cotton" Fitzsimmons, a former basketball star on Wilson-coached teams and graduate of BGHS who now coaches the Phoenix Suns in the National Basketball Association.

Some 500 persons attended the annual athletic banquet. Additional Bobcat fans and friends of Mr. Wilson attended the awards program after the dinner.

Bobcat Booster President Al Crowley was master of ceremonies for the program and Patricia Fitzgerald, president of the BGHS Pep Squad gave the welcome. The Boosters and Pep Squad jointly sponsored the banquet.

WILSON'S "DAY," TOO

Coach Wilson's night at the Bobcat banquet came on his "day". Friday was designated as "James A. Wilson Day" in Bowling Green by the City Council.

And the things they did that pleased the retiring coach—make that coach and math teacher, because, he said, "I love to teach math about as much as I loved teaching basketball—included telling stories about Mr. Wilson and his coaching principles by the men who played for him or coached with him and presentation of gifts to Mr. Wilson and his wife by the Boosters.

"NOT AMUSING" COTTON

Phoenix Sun coach Fitzsimmons has several "Coach Wilson stories" to tell, although he had denied in the beginning that he would do so.

"Nothing he did to me at that particular time was very damn amusing," said Cotton, who played on Mr. Wilson's 1948-49 team that the BGHS coach called his best.

Cotton had been introduced by Mr. Crowley, who wound up by saying that "the only thing he knows is how to win."

Fitzsimmons, who had a 258-78 record coaching at Moberly Junior College and Kansas State before running up a 97-87 mark in two years with Phoenix, put himself down immediately.

NOT THAT HOT?

"If I'd done as well as Al said," the pro coach noted wryly, "you'd have seen me on tv Wednesday night instead of the Lakers."

He was sorry that his team wasn't in the NBA play-offs, of course. But, he said his Suns had the distinction of having beat the play-off finalist New York Knicks four out of five meetings this season and were the

only team to beat the Los Angeles Lakers twice.

The BGHS grad turned coach talked to his audience of athletes, parents and fans about the thing he's gained from sports. He made it clear that a lot of this knowledge started when he played for Coach Wilson.

LESSONS IN ATHLETICS

The first lesson, Cotton said, was learning "to compete."

"This in all honesty, is what life is all about."

Another important lesson was learning that "you don't quit, you just can't quit, because you'll have your opportunities. There's always a chance."

He also spoke of the discipline that an athlete learns in athletics. A winner must have desire, determination and will power, he said seriously.

"Self-discipline is one of the great things you have to have in athletics and in life and this was taught to me at Bowling Green High School."

HAVE TO PAY

And, Coach Wilson's former player said, the most important thing he learned at BGHS was that "rules are made . . . they are made to be broken and bent. But you have to learn to pay for them when you break them.

"And I had a good teacher in that, believe me," he added quickly.

He told about escapades in which he and teammates had broken—or at least badly bruised—the Bobcat coach's rules. But every time Coach Wilson came out ahead of his boys.

"You could bend his rules a little bit," Cotton said, "and he'd live with you. But you couldn't break the principles or integrity he had."

"THANK YOU, COACH"

Cotton wound up by condensing the spirit of the recognition right into one sentence: "Thank you, Coach, for the great job you've done."

Reports by the current BGHS coaches on their programs, and recognition of the 1971-72 Bobcat athletes, came next on the program.

The Booster president called R-1 Supt. Murry Smith forward and presented him with a \$750 check from the club to help finance new, permanent bleachers for the BGHS football field.

Then Mr. Crowley got the program down to the final, not-all-serious business of paying tribute to Mr. Wilson.

OVATION FROM CROWD

"By doggies," he said, using Coach Wilson's favorite phrase, "Today is Coach Wilson's Day." The crowd agreed by giving Mr. Wilson a standing ovation, after which Mr. Crowley presented him with the City Council's resolution making it official.

Cotton Fitzsimmons was called back to present a plaque to Mr. Wilson "in recognition for outstanding loyalty to BGHS." He praised the retiring coach for his "fantastic, unbelievable record" of 458 wins against 206 losses in 22 years of coaching.

That brought another ovation for Mr. Wilson.

COACH'S PLAYERS

After having all the men in the audience who had played for Mr. Wilson stand up, Mr. Crowley called on one of them, Philip Bibb, to read a letter from another member of Coach's great 1948-49 squad, Tommy Russell.

Then Gene Hall, who also teamed with Fitzsimmons, Russell, Perry Watkins and W. H. Quisenberry on that team, was introduced to present a color portrait of Mr. and Mrs. Wilson to the couple.

Argil Ellison, current BGHS basketball coach and athletic director, came next. He noted that Coach Wilson considered him-

self quite a fisherman, "but has a lot of trouble catching them."

On behalf of the Bobcat Boosters, Mr. Ellison presented Mr. Wilson with an electric trolling motor and boat trailer for his fishing boat.

SERIOUS MOMENT

Speaking seriously for a moment, Mr. Ellison also praised the retiring teacher. "He puts forth an example as it should be."

Obed Hall Jr., in the audience, just happened to have a trailer hitch with him in the audience and brought that up to go with the motor and trailer.

The Boosters also presented Mrs. Wilson with a bouquet of red roses.

Then Mr. Wilson, himself, got to speak to his friends, starting out with that familiar "By Doggies. . ."

He called the night's program "gratifying but said the honors actually should be for the "fine athletes" who'd played for him. "I only held the rein. They were a great bunch to work with."

THREE PARTNERS

Paying tribute to Mrs. Wilson—"I have a lot of compassion for coaches' wives—he said: "I'd had three great partners in my life . . . my wife since 1928, my Lord and Bowling Green."

With them, he went on, "I've always felt everything would turn out alright. And it has."

Mr. Wilson spoke of the satisfaction he'd had in coaching, and in teaching math, saying the best part was "these young men" he'd worked with.

He spoke briefly about some of them. Coach got the best of Cotton Fitzsimmons and Gene Hall again. Referring to the tales they'd told about him that night, he said "I don't know how they've done so well when their imagination is so great and their memory is so poor."

Mr. Wilson wound up thanking the fans and BGHS students by saying "A coach couldn't have found a better town than Bowling Green."

The program closed with the Pep Squad leading the audience in singing the school song.

IT IS OUR DUTY TO SUPPORT THE SAFE WITHDRAWAL OF OUR MEN

HON. TIM LEE CARTER

OF KENTUCKY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Speaker, I opposed our entrance into the war in Vietnam, because it was not consistent with commonsense, with supply lines 11,000 miles long; with the contiguity of China and Russia to the North Vietnamese; and with 70 percent of the Vietnamese, according to Eisenhower's book, sympathizing with Ho Chi Minh.

As a member of the Speaker's Committee of Fourteen to visit Vietnam in 1966, I was the only man of the 14 who said, "No, Mr. President, you are not winning the war in Vietnam."

Many of you Members here today who were on that committee remember the very night on which this was said. However, I never castigated the President of the United States. I opposed the policies which sent our men to Vietnam, but I supported the men who were there.

Approximately 500,000 of those men have been withdrawn; 60,000 more remain. In addition, 40,000 Korean troops are there at our request.

The President has agreed to a complete withdrawal in 4 months, subject to release of our prisoners of war and to the effective supervision of an international commission.

It is our duty to support the safe withdrawal of those men according to the policies of our administration. Such means as are necessary must be taken.

If we do not make common cause to save the good old ship of the Union on this voyage; nobody will have a chance to pilot her on another voyage.

SECOND BALTIC INFORMATION CONFERENCE

HON. JOHN J. ROONEY

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. ROONEY of New York. Mr. Speaker, recently 200 leaders of Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian organizations met in Washington at the Second Baltic Information Conference of North America. These leaders, representing more than one million Americans of Baltic descent, told of the brutality and slavery that have been the way of life in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia for more than 30 years of Soviet Russian occupation. At the Washington meeting a resolution was adopted which should remind us all that there are still many millions of people enslaved and denied their birthright of freedom by Red Communist oppressors.

Mr. Speaker, I recommend to my colleagues the reading of the resolution passed at the Second Baltic Information Conference of North America and under unanimous permission heretofore granted me I include it in the RECORD at this point.

RESOLUTION

Two hundred leaders of Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian organizations, representing over one million Americans of Baltic descent, met at the Second Baltic Information Conference of North America, held in Greater Washington on April 15th and 16th, 1972. At this conference, sponsored by the Joint Baltic-American Committee, sixteen prominent speakers revealed many shocking facts about conditions in the Soviet-occupied Baltic States.

This resolution was accepted and urgently submitted to The President of the United States, The Secretary of State, The Advisor to the President on Foreign Affairs, Members of the Congress of the United States, and other prominent Americans.

Whereas, Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians are proud of their long history, their distinct languages, and their own customs, and for several thousand years they were free and independent people,

Whereas, in 1918, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became free democratic Republics, and exactly 50 years ago (on July 28, 1922) they were recognized as sovereign nations by the United States Government,

Whereas, before World War II, the Baltic States had non-aggression treaties with the Soviet Union, yet these treaties were violated in June 1940, when the Soviet Union attacked, forcefully occupied and illegally annexed Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania,

Whereas, this unjustified occupation and annexation of the Baltic States has not been

recognized by the United States and by a great number of other free countries,

Whereas, the Soviet Union has deported or killed nearly twenty-five percent of the population of the Baltic States, and recently has intensified the attempts at russification of these people, and also the Baltic people are denied their basic human rights to religious freedom, freedom to select employment, freedom of speech, freedom of press, and fair trials,

Whereas, the Baltic people, including Baltic Jews and other minorities, have been persecuted and imprisoned for their attempts to emigrate or to join their families in the Free World, and yet regardless of the humanist manifestations by the Soviets, there are still thousands of Baltic people in Soviet prisons and Siberian forced labor camps,

Whereas, colonialism is rapidly declining in the Free World with many new nations gaining independence, still at the same time, the Soviet Union continues to expand its boundaries and continues its colonialism in the formerly independent Baltic States,

Whereas, the United States Congress has recognized the sad situation in the Baltic States, and has unanimously passed *House Concurrent Resolution 416*, supporting the rights of the Baltic people for self-determination, now therefore be it

Resolved, that the President of the United States carry out the will of Congress as contained in the *House Con. Resolution 416* (1965) to bring the question of the Baltic States to international forums and demand the withdrawal of the USSR military and civilian from Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia,

Resolved, that the President of the United States demand that the Soviet Union stop Russian influx, persecution and genocide of the Baltic people, restore their right to religious freedom, emigration, and selection of employment, and release all political prisoners (such as Simas Kudirka family, and thousands of others) from hard labor camps in Siberia and elsewhere,

Resolved, that the President request that all maps published by the United States governmental agencies delineate the free Baltic States in their original boundaries, with a footnote explaining that their military occupation and forced incorporation into the Soviet Union has never been recognized by the United States,

Resolved, that the Secretary of State produce "Background Notes" on the Baltic States as a source of information for federal agencies, educators, schools, librarians and general public, and that all U.S. Government publications and lists of the nations of the world include the names of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania as separate entities,

Resolved, that the participants of this Conference support extension of information to the captive nations by the Voice of America, and demand that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty broadcast in the Baltic languages,

Resolved, that peace cannot be brought by ignoring the cries of suffering people, and the world needs reminding that "Those who deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves" (Abraham Lincoln).

WASHINGTON MONUMENT

HON. TIM LEE CARTER

OF KENTUCKY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Speaker, under leave accorded, I am including as a part of these remarks, the subjoined, descrip-

tive verse of the Washington Monument, written by Maurice H. Thatcher, now the oldest surviving exmember of this Chamber.

I regard the poem as being of the highest value. The subject, which is a difficult one, is in this instance aptly and poetically described.

This verse, I believe, just about concludes Mr. Thatcher's series in dealing with National Parks and Monuments which he has visited throughout a long life.

The author has written many poems of merit dealing with Isthmian subjects—including the Panama Canal—national parks units—the Mayflower Pilgrims—and other worthwhile themes. By these prosodic efforts, he may have well earned a laureateship in all these categories. To say the least, the fact that he yet is able to write verse of this character is worthy of our admiration and respect. His intellectual gifts and interests seem unabated. If he survives to the last of next October, he will be—as I understand the facts—the oldest man who has served in Congress.

Also, under leave accorded, I am including herewith two poems about Mr. Thatcher's beloved Commonwealth, and my own. The first, "Kentucky—A Tribute," is self-explanatory, and the other, entitled, "Home Coming Song," is explained by the footnote.

The poems follow:

WASHINGTON MONUMENT

(By Maurice H. Thatcher)

A giant shaft which crests within the skies;
Simple, massive, it rises from the earth—
A fitting tribute to one whose fame defies
Time's septic touch! It looms in lofty worth
In witness of the deeds of Washington—
Who, with wisdom, courage, and zeal
supreme,

Led tattered forces in the war he won—
Thus vitalizing Freedom's ancient dream.
The great memorial tops the busy scenes
of the Nation's Seat. Like a monitor
It speaks, in sum, by plain, effective means,
What is portrayed in walled exterior.
Long may it dure for all to understand
This mighty symbol in a favored land!

KENTUCKY: A TRIBUTE

(Read by him at the close of his speech at a banquet given him by Kentucky friends at the Galt House in Louisville, on May 2, 1910, following his appointment by President Taft as a member of the Isthmian Canal Commission).

Kentucky, O Kentucky,
Thy fame hath travelled far;
In all the mighty civic sky
There is no brighter star.
We love thee for thy Lincoln,
George Rogers Clark and Clay;
For Boone and all the master folk
Who made thine early day.

We love thee for thy holy past,
For all thou art to be;
Our prayers and tears, our true hearts' blood
Are consecrate to thee.

Thou has no pallid virtues
To sap thy mighty soul,
Thy faults are those of vigor
That needeth but control.

Thy strength, thou yet shall curb it,
And guide with easy rein;
Thenceforth thy history may be
Without a scar or stain.

O, thou has known the shame and cross,
And dark Gethsemane;
Thou, too, has known transfigured heights
Where God communed with thee.

The wars have wrought their ravage,
Red hast thou run with gore,
Yet, virtue springs from struggle,
And bleaseth evermore.

The golden urn of history
Is filled with sacred dust
Of men and women dying here
For causes great and just.

Kentucky, O Kentucky,
Thy children hold thee dear;
Pour out the ointment of thy love
On all who bideth here!

Almighty Spirit, Father, God,
We kneel and pray to Thee,
Bless this Thy State, and these, Thine own,
And keep us just and free!

KENTUCKY HOME-COMING SONG*
KENTUCKY'S CALL TO HER ABSENT SONS AND
DAUGHTERS

I am calling, calling, calling, O my children,
I am calling,

I am calling you in welcome, I am bidding
you to come;

As a hen her brood doth gather when evening
shades are falling,

I would gather you at June-tide in the Old
Kentucky Home.

From the Northland and the Southland, from
the Eastland and the West,

From the continents and islands, from all
the ends of earth,

I am calling you, my children, to the Mother-
land of Rest,

To the place which gave you nurture, to
the spot which gave you birth.

RESPONSE OF THE ABSENT ONES

We are coming, Mother, coming,—your call
we shall obey;

Whatever be the journey, your love shall light
the way;

We shall meet in glad reunion beneath your
summer skies,

And be again the children of an earthly
Paradise.

CALL

You have scattered, O my children, you have
scattered far and wide;

You have ventured, you have struggled in
the spirit which is mine;

You have wrought in faith and honor—I view
your works with pride,

And I call you hither, children, to the old,
familiar shrine.

O, come you back, my loved ones, and tarry
for a while;

Touch once more your native soil, and all
your strength renew;

My gates are inward swinging, home faces are
a-smile,

And hearts of home are throbbing wel-
come unto you.

RESPONSE

We are coming, Mother, coming—swift-
winged, from everywhere,

To greet old friends and kindred, and your
dear love to share;

In your mountains and your valleys we shall
mingle and commune,

In the green and bloom and fragrance of the
ever-blessed June.

* (EDITOR'S NOTE.—Once a Kentuckian, al-
ways a Kentuckian. The Blue Grass State has
a "Home-Coming" every twenty years or so,
attended by thousands of loyal "expatriates."
Another such event is scheduled for the fort-
night, June 16th to 29th, 1974, and elab-
orate plans are being made to entertain, in
thorough-going Kentucky hospitality, the
hosts of widely-scattered sons and daughters
who will then return, for a brief visit and
reunion in the Old Kentucky Home.)

HEALTH MAINTENANCE
ORGANIZATIONS

HON. MARTHA W. GRIFFITHS

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Mr. Speaker, in order to correct the inadequate, nonsystem of health care delivery in the United States, we must develop a truly comprehensive health care system in which our health care resources are properly allocated, and our Nation's citizens provided with the health care they so desperately need. On May 4, Dr. Martin Barr, dean of the College of Pharmacy of Wayne State University, testified before the Subcommittee on Health and Environment of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee on the subject of Health Maintenance Organizations. In his testimony, Dr. Barr stressed the importance and the necessity of the role of the pharmacist in comprehensive health care and health maintenance organizations—a view with which I fully concur.

I urge my colleagues to read Dr. Barr's testimony:

DR. MARTIN BARR'S STATEMENT

MAY 4, 1972.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, my name is Martin Barr. I am dean of the Wayne State University College of Pharmacy in Detroit. I also serve as chairman of the Task Force on Health Care Costs, Organization, and Delivery of Services of the Comprehensive State Health Planning Council of the State of Michigan and as chairman of the Mayor's Advisory Committee on the Rehabilitation of Narcotic Addicts in the City of Detroit.

This statement is submitted in behalf of the American Association of Colleges of Pharmacy, membership of which consists of all 74 accredited schools and colleges of pharmacy in the United States and Puerto Rico. More than 2,500 full-time and part-time teachers are engaged in the instruction of approximately 20,000 students working toward a professional pharmacy degree and 2,200 students in various graduate programs.

With me is Mr. William J. Skinner, the Assistant Executive Secretary of the American Association of Colleges of Pharmacy. Mr. Skinner is a pharmacist and an attorney.

Pharmaceutical educators are vitally interested in comprehensive health care and in health maintenance organizations. They are placing increased emphasis in their pharmaceutical education programs on the preparation of pharmacists who are capable of providing a humanistic, patient-centered (clinical) service as part of the total health service team contributing to optimum patient care. I will attempt to illustrate this important role of pharmaceutical practitioners in health maintenance organizations later in my presentation by describing some of our service and educational programs at Wayne State University which serve to sensitize and prepare our students for those new roles which society requires and demands of them. Many colleges of pharmacy have similar types of service and educational programs but I am discussing those of my college as I am naturally most familiar with them.

From my discussion, I believe that you will see clearly that most pharmaceutical educators would favor the comprehensive health services offered by H.R. 11728 introduced by Congressman Roy and other members of his subcommittee. I have studied H.R. 11728 as

well as H.R. 5615 and I find the latter provides little assurance that comprehensive health services will be established, although they are not prohibited by it.

A clearly stated purpose of both H.R. 5615 and H.R. 11728 is to correct the maldistribution of health services in rural and inner city areas. We submit that it will be a short sighted effort, if health programs arising from such legislation result in providing traditional medical services. We would suggest that both H.R. 5615 and H.R. 11728 should include one most important requirement—that of a total interdisciplinary health effort on behalf of our citizens, and this includes patient-centered pharmaceutical services. Unless this is accomplished and we do integrate the services of all health professions on behalf of our citizens, health care will, for the most part, remain fragmented and inefficient and not in the best interest of the public.

Secretary Richardson of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare indicated in his testimony before you on April 11 that "it is essential to protect the public interest in the cost and quality of HMO services." We agree fully with the Secretary's statement; we disagree about its meaning.

We agree that HMO's will provide alternative methods to finance and deliver health services. To a large extent, health care as practiced today is crisis oriented. We believe that there is much that can be done by pharmacists to prevent health problems from arising.

Pharmacists educated 10, 20, or 30 years ago were not specifically instructed to provide the kinds of preventive care I am speaking about, but many have done it for years with no remuneration and little recognition. Pharmaceutical education has tackled the missing ingredients in our service component and our graduates are being guided toward increasing services to the public and the health team.

Some of our experiences in Detroit will explain what is needed, if drug regimens are to be given with optimum results. For example, in a February 1970 study of 100 patients patronizing a combination community pharmacy-diagnostic laboratory, an incidence of 20.7 per cent possible drug-diagnostic test incompatibilities were detected as a result of patients taking medications known to be incompatible with the diagnostic test prescribed. In an April 1970 study, the charts of 100 nursing home patients were received and it was noted that each patient received an average of nine different medications during a six-month study period. A maximum of 20.7 per cent possible drug-drug interactions was detected through the chart review.

As a result of three drug utilization studies in a health maintenance organization program I will describe later in this statement, it was ascertained that many patients with chronic conditions are not taking their digitalis preparations, oral hypoglycemic agents or isoniazid therapy correctly. It appears that in the past the health professionals involved have apparently not sufficiently emphasized the importance of taking prescribed medication as ordered nor stressed the necessity of returning promptly for prescription refills.

A study of 36 patients on isoniazid for tuberculosis prophylaxis revealed that only 8 patients (22.8 per cent) had been taking their medication properly. A second study of 51 patients for whom digitalis was prescribed revealed that only 28 patients (54.9 per cent) had been taking their medication properly. A third study of 76 patients on oral hypoglycemic agents revealed that only 57 (75 per cent) had been taking their drugs correctly.

Systems were developed which improved prescribed prescription utilization most significantly; thus pharmacist involvement*

contributed to the health of patients and hopefully kept some of them out of hospitals.

One of our students functioning in an HMO program is about to publish a very interesting finding about the effectiveness of pharmacists counseling a group of 25 essential hypertensive patients over a six-months period. The patients obtained prescription renewals monthly at which time the pharmacist asked questions about the patients' drug use, reminded the patient of the dose schedule, and encouraged compliance. They were also reformed as to their physician's directions concerning diet, etc. This procedure contributed to a significant reduction in the average diastolic blood pressure to a normotensive level in the group. There was an approximately four-fold increase (from 5 to 19) in the number of normotensive patients in the counseled group as compared to an approximate two-fold decrease (from 11 to 5) in a non-counseled control group of 25 patients.

The above examples illustrate how pharmacists, clinically educated and trained can protect the public interest in the cost and quality of HMO services. Some people say this service is not necessary, others would lead you to believe that the drug prescribers handle it, but neither are true. Proper drug therapy, followed through to a conclusion, is the only way to rationally prescribe drugs. The Task Force on Prescription Drugs and studies in Detroit convince me that the pharmacist must play a major role in drug therapy if we desire optimum health care.

All of the HMO bills direct attention to persons in medically underserved areas. These areas exist for many reasons including lack of money to attract or to support health professions, unattractive surroundings and lack of health knowledge on the part of those who are underserved. Therefore the Federal, state, and local governments will develop and pay for health care programs with tax dollars. In some cases, these HMO programs may be the only opportunity for care. That is, it will be the HMO or no real health care as now.

If it is wise for government to provide health care, and I believe it is, then it is wise for government to recognize that effective treatment and prevention of disease requires the services of persons who are knowledgeable about drug use and misuse. I believe the pharmacist is prepared to assume a greater service role. The pharmacist's education, especially the emphasis on clinical pharmacy, brings him into contact with the future members of the health-care team. While in school, the pharmacy student shares experiences and knowledge with medical, nursing, dental, social work, and other health students. It is our hope that such educational experiences will lead to reliance on the pharmacist's skills and drug knowledge by the other members of the health team. Where they do not, it is incumbent upon the pharmacist to exert his influence to guide the other health team members in proper drug use for the patient's welfare.

We have heard much about a health team. The fact is that this is a generally nonexistent concept except in certain isolated instances. It is a goal more than an accomplishment. It is interesting to note, however, that when the health team is used properly, the result is a more efficient use of various talents and a marked improvement in health care.

The efficiency I speak about is the result of physicians delegating tasks to persons having adequate, sometimes superior, knowledge, and skills in certain health tasks, as well as more time. The physician remains primarily responsible by overseeing the entire health care process. In order to increase the utilization of pharmacists, nurses, social workers, and other health personnel, health professions schools should be educat-

ing their students to rely on the expertise of their fellow health professionals. This can be done best by including in their curricula, clinical education involving the full health care team on a truly interdisciplinary basis.

In the great majority of clinical experiences provided, students are placed in direct contact with other members of the patient-care team in a hospital setting in order to develop an insight into disease processes and their treatment and to learn modern concepts of a pharmacist's role in total patient care. The students participate in patient rounds at which time they become sensitized to the patient as a human being with all his social, emotional, and economic problems; observe and discuss the major disease entities; develop expertise in drug therapy regimens and the methodology of optimum drug choice; learn to take patient drug admission histories and how to take part in patient discharge consultations as they concern their drug regimens; learn to utilize medication profiles and adverse drug reaction systems for monitoring such things as drug-drug, drug-food, and drug-laboratory test incompatibilities; and develop expertise in in-service clinical education programs for other health professionals.

Clinical experience is received by students in most pharmacy schools. We believe this will markedly demonstrate to all health professions students that true team work benefits patient care.

Now I would like to discuss the service and education programs of the Wayne State University College of Pharmacy including its role in an HMO, hospitals, community pharmacies, and extended care facilities.

Our College of Pharmacy has been increasingly active in the last few years in participating in various ways in a significant number of varied types of health programs and institutions in the community. Not only does the College contribute to the quality of life in the community by such participation, but it is able by careful planning to utilize these health care programs and institutions as important educational sites for the clinical instruction of the students. This combination of service and education is of crucial importance to the College and its curriculum, and its students, and has an impact on present pharmacy practitioners and other health care providers, and most importantly, it has positive effects for the society as a whole.

It is by means of such clinical service and educational experiences that pharmacy students learn how to apply their basic knowledge to health care. They learn how to cooperate with other health practitioners as well as patients of different socio-economic types in the case of such patients. And most importantly, they learn about the services society needs or desires, problems found commonly in patients, the significance of problems or potential problems to patients' health, and how such problems or potential problems can best be solved or avoided by pharmacist involvement.

MODEL NEIGHBORHOOD COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH PROGRAM, INC. (AN HMO)

In 1969, a nonprofit community corporation known as the Health Council of the Model Neighborhood began planning a comprehensive health care program designed to take responsibility for a designated and enrolled population of residents of the Model Neighborhood in Detroit. What eventually developed with the consummation of a contractual agreement with a health care provider group known as Model Neighborhood Comprehensive Health Program, Inc. (MNCHP, Inc.) to provide designated services for a specific number of enrollees at a specified yearly cost on a prepayment basis. The provider group agreed to establish a facility and to provide ambulatory medical care and other health services or to arrange

with other providers and community resource groups to provide specialized or hospital care on a subcontractual basis to the enrolled population. For example, community hospitals within the Detroit Medical Center corridor were contracted with for inpatient care and emergency room care and specialized out-patient services. Pharmaceutical services were to be provided by and through community pharmacies in the Model Neighborhood as part of a systematized delivery and financial mechanism.

The MNCHP presently makes available comprehensive health care services to about 9,500 enrolled citizens. Modern and comprehensive health care services await the citizen at the clinic including services in the area of general and specialty medical, surgical, pediatric, obstetrical, and mental health services; rehabilitative services; diagnostic testing; social work services; hospitalization followed by convalescent and home care; nutritional; pharmaceutical; and emergency services, including ambulance service. Health care items such as immunizations, eye examinations and eye glasses as well as prosthetic appliances are also provided although dental services have not as yet been included.

Having been awarded the Health Council contract to provide comprehensive health services, MNCHP, Inc., a nonprofit health services corporation directed by Dr. Thomas M. Batchelor, approached the Wayne State University College of Pharmacy requesting it to provide a specific program assuring optimum pharmaceutical services to the Model Neighborhood enrolled population. It was the goal of the College in developing its proposal to develop a type of pharmaceutical service which would reach every age bracket and need of the population within the Model Neighborhood area. This goal was to be accomplished by developing a program to provide a broad spectrum of pharmaceutical and health related services, including the provision of prescription and nonprescription drugs by participating pharmacies, and by the development of a program for monitoring the provision of pharmaceutical services to the community.

At the present time, pharmaceutical services in the MNCHP program are being provided by seven participating community pharmacies; patients have the opportunity to select the pharmacy closest to their home. This is in contrast to most other health care programs throughout the country which utilize on-site pharmacies.

The College believes it has an obligation to assist and motivate participating community pharmacies to continuously upgrade services to a level where they are comprehensive, dignified, and accessible. Furthermore, the College believes that as a social institution its obligation to the profession and to the public that supports its existence is to assist participating community pharmacies not only through continuing education programs but also through involvement in the creation of innovative pharmaceutical service programs and providing on-site consultation to pharmacy practitioners.

The responsibility of the College of Pharmacy in overseeing the pharmaceutical services program was formalized through a contract between MNCHP and the College of Pharmacy. Specifically, there were three major provisions in the contract:

1. The appointment of a College of Pharmacy faculty member as a full-time director of pharmaceutical services for MNCHP.
 2. The utilization of community pharmacies for the provision of pharmaceutical services to the enrolled Model Neighborhood population.
 3. The development of a Model Cities Pharmaceutical Services Advisory Committee.
- The Director of Pharmaceutical Services for MNCHP is a full-time faculty member of the College of Pharmacy who has as her role to identify the pharmaceutical needs of

MNCHP enrollees and to develop, coordinate, and continuously update programs evolving from established needs. The services provided by the director include the function of identifying from among thirty community pharmacies located within the Model Neighborhood area those pharmacies which desire to cooperate in the program and which are willing to meet the requirements for participating community pharmacies by developing of patient profiles and providing drug incompatibility information so that potential drug incompatibilities may be detected and prevented.

Functions of the Director of Pharmaceutical Services in the Health Center include the following:

1. Serving as a member of the Comprehensive Health Care Group and participating in the planning and provision of health-care services with the medical, nursing, and social work staffs of this group.
2. Acting as a drug consultant to other members of the Comprehensive Health Care Group within the clinic and aiding in the identification of the pharmaceutical needs of the enrollees.
3. Updating programs based on the needs of both enrollees and Health Center staff.
4. Providing pharmaceutical consultation services both at the Health Center and in homes to enrollees in regard to personal drug-related problems.
5. Maintaining an inventory of biological and parenteral drugs used in the Health Center.
6. Developing a monthly pharmacy bulletin concerning recent pharmacological advancement in the field of pharmacology and the latest developments in the pharmaceutical program of the Center for distribution to the Health Center staff and other professionals.
7. Assisting in the planning and implementation of a resident agent educational and training program.
8. Preparing monthly statistical reports reflecting the nature and volume of pharmaceutical services provided by MNCHP.
9. Representing MNCHP at pharmaceutical meetings and other health related professional meetings.

Functions of the Director of Pharmaceutical Services in the participating pharmacies including the following:

1. Orienting and assisting the participating pharmacists in the use of the drug-interaction file.
2. Coordinating the provision of prescription and drug-related services to the enrolled population in the participating pharmacies.
3. Assisting participating community pharmacists to provide drug education programs to neighborhood residents within the community closest to each participating pharmacy.
4. Regularly visiting the participating pharmacies to determine the quality of pharmaceutical services provided and developing methods to assure high quality pharmaceutical services offered to Health Center enrollees.

In developing comprehensive pharmaceutical services, the emphasis of concern for each patient begins at the moment of his entry into the system. A patient drug history is taken by the clinic admission clerk for each new patient. One copy of the form goes with the patient to the community pharmacy selected by the patient to serve as his family pharmacy and the second drug history form is retained as a permanent part of the patient's record. Every effort is made to encourage patients to select a participating pharmacy close to his home so that the patient and pharmacists will establish a close relationship which will foster genuine consultation services.

The responsibility of the participating community pharmacies in providing pharmaceutical services is to provide the following services:

1. Consultation services to enrolled citizens on both prescription and nonprescription medications.
 2. Development of a patient medication profile for each patient assigned to a participating pharmacy.
 3. Utilization of the medication profile cards for use in drug surveillance provided by the College of Pharmacy for the detection and prevention of adverse drug reactions.
 4. Participation in drug use and abuse education programs for citizens living within the area assigned to the participating community pharmacy.
 5. Submission of monthly reports on patient services provided and a willingness to participate in professional audits conducted by the Director of Pharmaceutical Services.
- It is expected that eventually participating pharmacists will form a Model Cities Pharmaceutical Services Corporation which would consider cooperative methods which could further the efficacy of MNCHP. At the present time, participating pharmacists are reimbursed for the cost of all drugs dispensed and, in addition, a designated professional fee per prescription order filled.

We are most pleased with our relationship and service contributions to MNCHP. The educational advantages obtained by participating in this program are exceptional.

MNCHP is a health maintenance organization (HMO). As such, it has given our students and faculty the opportunity to function and learn as part of a pre-pay comprehensive health care program, working as part of a full interdisciplinary health care team.

Some other interesting educational experiences at MNCHP include the roles of the pharmacist in making home visits, the special medication problems of senior citizens, the role of the pharmacist in family planning programs, and the role of the pharmacist in insuring the optimum administration of prescribed drugs by patients.

Permit me to discuss some advantages of home visits. As a result of such visits, many poisonous products were found in homes in places that are easily within the reach of children. Soaps, detergents, and bleaches were found stored on kitchen floors. Shampoos, shaving lotions, aspirin, and various other drugs were frequently left in the bathroom within easy reach of children. The visiting pharmacist was able to make suggestions which probably reduced the likelihood of accidental poisonings in the homes visited.

Through home visits, pharmacists identified many problems unique to senior citizens. Frequently this age group is found to be confused about the importance of taking medications properly, medications are often found to be improperly stored in the home. In one instance an almost totally blind 81 year old woman had removed her prescription drugs from their containers and stored them in egg compartments of her refrigerator, labeling each compartment with nail polish. Because of the constant exposure to air and moisture, many of the drugs were found to be disintegrated. The patient had devised this technique of identifying her prescription drugs because of her inability to read the small print on her prescription containers. Patients have been found who continue to take previously prescribed medications even when they have new prescriptions of identical or similar medication.

HOSPITALS

The College of Pharmacy of Wayne State University is privileged to have working relationship for clinical instruction of its students with 12 hospitals at the present time. It is at these hospitals that pharmacy students at our College learn first hand about the whole person, disease processes, and drug therapy, and how to communicate with members of the health care team and the patient. The College of Pharmacy, in varying degrees, provides pharmaceutical services to some of these institutions. Permit me to

discuss our service contributions to one hospital, Detroit General Hospital.

Three years ago, at the request of the administration of Detroit General Hospital, an institution caring mostly for Detroit's inner city residents, the College carried out an in-depth study of the existing pharmaceutical program at that institution and submitted a proposal for the development of an optimum pharmaceutical service system. This proposal was accepted by the administration of the hospital and by the City Council of Detroit. The City Council approved the expenditure of over \$300,000 for the construction of the hospital pharmacy and the administration of our University approved the appointment of an outstanding hospital pharmacist to our staff to serve as the director of pharmaceutical services at the hospital. The director of pharmaceutical services has now been in charge of the pharmaceutical program of Detroit General Hospital for over a year and construction of the pharmacy has begun.

This pharmacy and the services emanating from it, once fully developed, will be a most important educational site for our students and faculty. In the meantime, because of the fine working relationship between our College and the hospital, Detroit General Hospital has become a most important clinical education site for our students. This hospital is the major teaching facility for our School of Medicine, indeed its faculty serves as the staff of the hospital, and this advantage has made it possible for us to develop clinical education programs at the hospital quite rapidly.

The College is also providing service at the hospital at the same time it utilizes its facilities for educational purposes. Indeed both go together. In one ward, for example, a team including a physician, nurse, social worker, and pharmacist (from our College) are developing an interdisciplinary care program which is proving most exciting. Such a team is also staffing an out-patient clinic at the hospital. The educational advantages of these programs are obvious. In addition, the College was successful in obtaining a Regional Medical Programs grant to study medication distribution systems at the hospital, and data from this study are already proving most useful. The College has also joined in instituting a Drug Information Center at the hospital for the benefit of its staff and the community.

EXTENDED CARE FACILITIES

Our College has had the opportunity of aiding in the service programs of several extended care facilities in the Metropolitan Detroit area. The special medication problems that exist in these chronic care institutions are obvious to those in health care.

Our students have the opportunity to consult with the administrators of these facilities, to make rounds on the nursing units where they review patient records, and to answer drug-related questions from physicians and nurses. Students prepare clinically oriented pharmacy bulletins for distribution to the personnel in the extended care facilities. Of special significance is the role played by our students and faculty in further enhancing the nursing staff's understanding of drugs and drug problems as well as drug-control systems. Several clinical research projects have been completed in these facilities which have contributed to the improvement of the patient-care programs.

COMMUNITY PHARMACY

Our College utilizes 12 community pharmacies in the Metropolitan Detroit area for clinical instruction, and it contributes in various ways at the same time to the improvement of services in these places. We consider this a very important part of our clinical program. While there is a great need for patient-oriented pharmacists in institutional practice, there is even greater need for such pharmacists in community practice.

As in hospitals, the intent is to provide experiences which not only will assist future practitioners to serve at their greatest potential but also to affect students in such a way that they more easily will acquire the intellectual and moral strengths to make correct value judgements in the provision of consultation services. To this end, students are assigned to community pharmacies wherein they will be provided with the opportunity to offer consultation services to individuals and families in regard to prescriptions, nonprescription medications, and surgical supplies and appliances, and where they can assist in the development and use of patient profiles.

All types of pharmacies are utilized for clinical instruction purposes. In independent general type pharmacies, students receive prescription orders from the patients and consult with them both before and after the prescription orders are dispensed. In a chain pharmacy, located in a disadvantaged area, students become acquainted with the health problems of the poor as well as in gaining insight into the economic, social and psychological problems of the disadvantaged.

Several community pharmacies servicing extended care facilities are also utilized for clinical experiences. The experiences students are exposed to are summarized in the previous section.

Several community pharmacies with diagnostic laboratories associated with them provide a unique opportunity for students to become familiar with the types and significance of tests used in diagnosing a variety of clinical conditions. Such facilities also give students the opportunity to correlate prescription orders with diagnostic test orders.

Students also have the opportunity of undertaking clinical experiences in community pharmacies specializing in surgical and health-related items. Such experiences provide the opportunity to become familiarized with a large number of health and surgical supplies and accessories, to consult with patients on these items, and to assist in the provision of home care services.

DRUG PREVENTION, TREATMENT, AND REHABILITATION PROGRAMS

The College has been most active in a variety of ways in contributing to drug prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation programs in the Metropolitan Detroit area.

In recent years, our pharmacy faculty and students have been most active in presenting preventive education programs to many segments of the community, and this service role has served as an important educational experience for those who contributed.

The College has also had involvement in drug treatment and rehabilitation programs. One pharmacy student is presently participating as a member of a methadone maintenance program and is analyzing what new roles pharmacists can play in such programs. In another methadone maintenance program, our students are about to begin a study of the utilization of nonprescription medication by patients in the program in an effort to determine what influence such utilization has on the effectiveness of the maintenance regimen and the patients' rehabilitation.

DRUG INFORMATION SERVICES

The College has assisted pharmacists in the development of patient profile systems and, for this purpose, has prepared and made available a set of medication profile cards on approximately 50 medications for use in drug surveillance. These deal with about 60 per cent of the most widely used prescribed medication agents. These medication profile cards are periodically being enlarged and updated. The first cards printed represent months of arduous research on the part of certain members of the College of Pharmacy faculty in developing a reliable set of drug surveillance guidelines from a horrendous compilation of often contradictory and unreliable adverse drug reaction literature

which has been published over the past several years. The College recognizes that there are many factors which must be considered before communicating a potential adverse drug reaction to a prescribing physician and for this reason has carefully designed the format of the medication profile cards to include a section on the apparent clinical significance of reported reactions.

This medication profile system has been used by many pharmacists in the Metropolitan Detroit area, as well as throughout the country, as an aid in the monitoring of prescribed medications. The College considers this a significant service contribution to the profession. Students utilize this system in our College and are able to obtain better clinical instructional experiences in the various participating community and hospital pharmacies because of their availability and use by pharmacy personnel in these facilities.

Mention has previously been made of the Drug Information Center instituted at Detroit General Hospital with the cooperation of the College.

OTHER PROGRAMS

In addition to the service education experiences previously described, brief mention will be made of several other similar activities with which our College has been or is becoming involved.

Project PRESCAD (Preschool, School, and Adolescent Children) financed by Federal, state, and local governments, serving approximately 75,000 registered disadvantaged children in Detroit. It is a comprehensive health program. Our College has been asked to participate in the program concerning pharmaceutical services, and we are making final arrangements to do so.

Metropolitan Hospital in Detroit operates a hospital and four out-patient clinics as health facilities caring for approximately 70,000 individuals enrolled in a prepay comprehensive health program. Our College is beginning to become active in this program and this will offer to our students another site for learning of the potential for the delivery of patient-centered pharmaceutical services in an HMO.

Our University is presently completing plans for an ambulatory University Clinic Building which will be a service and education center in the Detroit Medical Center. Part of the structure will service families as an HMO; another part will be devoted to specialty care. Our College will have responsibility for the pharmaceutical services in this structure. Such services will be delivered as part of an interdisciplinary care program. It will provide an excellent educational site for the clinical instruction of our students.

Finally, I would like to mention briefly our experimental clinical internship program which is presently being undertaken by 13 volunteer fifth-year students. This program consists of 400 hours experience for which academic credit is given and which is creditable toward the internship experience requirement for licensure in Michigan. Students in this program divide their time between clinical experiences in various institutions and community pharmacies on a rotating basis. Each student undertakes about 12 such experiences in an academic year, each experience ranging from a minimum of 12 hours to a maximum of 60 hours. Institution practice experience includes such services as: intravenous additive services, out-patient services, unit-dose dispensing, educational in-service programs, discharge consultations, monitoring for drug incompatibilities, drug information services, adverse drug reaction reporting, and admission drug histories. Community practice experience includes consultation services (both prescription and non-prescription medications), extended care services, health maintenance organizations, health care accessories and appliances, and

diagnostic laboratory services. All experiences are on a one student-one preceptor basis. Students who complete this total 400-hour program are eligible to take the Michigan Board of Pharmacy examinations 3 months earlier than is presently the case. Our experience with this program has been exceptional; we could not have predicted that it would be as successful as it has been. We intend to increase the number of students in the program next year.

SUMMARY

I have attempted to discuss the importance of clinical education to present and future pharmaceutical education and practice and the mutual advantages of colleges of pharmacy cooperating with health care programs, especially HMO's, on a service and education basis. Our College has indeed been fortunate in developing a significant number of such relationships. I would suggest that all colleges of pharmacy do likewise. It is absolutely essential if colleges of pharmacy are to make their curricula relevant and in keeping with the needs of society. Faculties and students must become involved in the planning and implementation of modern pharmaceutical services in hospitals, extended care facilities, community pharmacies, and in health maintenance organizations, and, above all, in innovative urban area programs, where the need is so great. Only through involvement in such programs can we prepare pharmacists to serve as well-acclimated members of the patient-care team. To say that we understand the pharmaceutical needs of our citizens and yet never to have observed or helped organize the supply of those needs, limits our effectiveness in developing educational programs and pharmaceutical services which are relevant and in keeping with the needs of the public.

In conclusion, I wish to reemphasize the support of pharmaceutical educators for health maintenance organizations as proposed by H.R. 11728. We would plead that the importance of an interdisciplinary health team effort in its program, including patient-centered pharmaceutical services, be recognized and required as part of any health maintenance organization. If we are going to provide health care service programs to our citizens, we must make available true comprehensive health care service programs. This means that patient-centered (clinical) pharmaceutical services must be provided by HMO's. Only in this way can we assure proper drug use and true health maintenance.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee, and I invite you to visit us in Detroit at your earliest convenience for an on-site explanation of my testimony.

A LAWYER'S DILEMMA

HON. WILLIAM L. HUNGATE

OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Speaker, following the study of press, congressional, and other ethical problems, the following article seems relevant:

A LAWYER'S DILEMMA

(By William Raspberry)

What should be a defense attorney's chief concern: justice, or the best possible break for his client?

There are two answers to the question, one easy, the other agonizingly difficult. If the question is whether a defense attorney should try to win acquittal for a guilty client, the answer is easy and affirmative. It

hardly amounts to a serious question, in fact.

But ask another question: What does a lawyer do when the surest way to win freedom for his innocent client is to plead him guilty?

That's the question more and more lawyers in Washington and elsewhere are having to answer in these days of crowded court dockets and plea bargaining.

Thomas Fay, a lawyer who has done a good deal of defense work, largely on behalf of indigent clients, gives an example of the dilemma.

"Take the case of a man arrested on a narcotics charge after a clearly illegal search. Well, one of the things you learn through experience is that some local judges are not going to suppress the illegal evidence, even though it may get thrown out on appeal.

"So you go to trial, the judge convicts your man and he gets one to three, or maybe two to six. A year and a half later, the appeal is heard, the lower court is overturned and your man goes free. But he's already served a year and a half.

"Now you take the same case and you plead him (guilty) and—particularly if it's a first offense—your man will very likely get zero time. Probation."

The same sort of thing can happen even if there is good reason to believe the client will be acquitted by a lower-court jury. The time an innocent defendant spends in jail awaiting scheduling of his jury trial may be far greater than the time he would get in exchange for a guilty plea. Not that one can ever be truly certain of acquittal by a jury.

So what's the ethical thing for a lawyer to do? According to Fay, the ethical problem is further complicated by money.

"The private (court-appointed) attorney who pleads all his clients can make much more money than the guy who goes to trial most of the time," Fay says.

The reason is simple. The rates paid under the Criminal Justice Act are \$20 an hour for out-of-court time and \$30 an hour for in-court time, with an effective maximum of \$1,000 per case. (Vouchers for more than \$1,000 may be approved by the chief judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals, but almost never are.)

So, after a time, a lawyer's diligence starts to cost him money. And when it also holds the possibility of costing his client time in jail, you've got a nice little ethical dilemma.

There's one further complication: Guilty pleas do not automatically result in short-time or no-time sentences.

"Some lawyers have pleaded large numbers of people to armed robbery," says Fay. "I've pleaded relatively few. The reason is that if the prosecutor feels certain that you won't go to trial in any case, he'll offer less in exchange for a plea.

"Why should he offer anything for what you were going to give him anyway?"

So, Fay spends a lot of time preparing cases for trial. And although he wins about half these cases, he does so at a heavy price.

Last year, he earned \$7,331.38 under the Criminal Justice Act for his defense of indigents, although he spent about two-thirds of his time on those cases.

Maybe he should have been a doctor.

PRESERVE CONGRESSIONAL CEMETERY

HON. LAWRENCE J. HOGAN
OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. HOGAN. Mr. Speaker, the interment of the late J. Edgar Hoover in the

historic Washington Parish Burial Ground, better known as the Congressional Cemetery, some 30 acres of ground on the north banks of the Anacostia River, just northeast of Pennsylvania Avenue at the circle dedicated to Commodore Joshua Barney, serves dramatically to remind all America of the value of this site to the Nation at large.

Washington Parish was founded in 1794: Its first and only formal house of worship—Christ Church on Capitol Hill—was built in 1807. Extraordinarily rich in history and beauty alike, Christ Church can boast of association in its earliest days with many great Americans.

The cemetery itself, at 18th and E Streets SE., has been in use almost since Christ Church was built. It is operated by the vestry of Washington Parish. Originally established by a group of private citizens in 1807, it was officially turned over to the church in 1812.

From its beginning, it became known as the resting place of Senators, Representatives, and executive officers. In 1816 Congress recognized this semiofficial status by selecting 100 burial sites for Members of Congress and providing Christ Church with financial assistance for the reservation of a section of the cemetery for interment of Government officials. Henceforth, the ground became popularly known as the Congressional Cemetery.

For many years, the cemetery was the site of interment for some of the most distinguished Americans in our history.

At one time 16 Senators and 68 Members of the House were buried there. Twelve bodies of Congressmen have since been removed to burial grounds in their home States.

H.R. 14339, introduced by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. SAYLOR) would provide for Congressional Cemetery to be administered by the Secretary of the Interior as part of the park system of the National Capital. The problem of preservation of this historic site ought to be the concern of the Nation and of the Congress, acting in behalf of the people. Congressional Cemetery is a precious part of our heritage in this city and in the Nation, and I urge that we assume our rightful responsibility for its protection and preservation.

I can think of no more fitting tribute to J. Edgar Hoover, the great American most recently laid to rest in this hallowed ground.

TAX REFORM A PRIORITY

HON. J. EDWARD ROUSH

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. ROUSH. Mr. Speaker, all of the major revolutions in the history of western civilization for the past 400 years, including the American Revolution, have been caused in part, and most often in large part, by burdensome, unequal taxation policies.

Yet here we are in 1972, as Representatives of the American taxpayers, still expecting people to accept a system of taxation based on milking the middle class

and the poor while largely exempting the wealthy, under the aegis of providing incentives to investment and production.

Despite the improvements in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, there were still 394 persons with 1970 adjusted gross incomes in excess of \$100,000 who paid no tax. And figures indicate that 2 percent of the people in the United States receive 22 percent of the income and pay less than 10 percent of the taxes.

How can this be? Simply by the way our tax laws are constructed.

The fact is that dollars earned from wages and dollars resulting from the sale of stocks or from investment in local bond issues or oil business ventures, are not taxed the same. In a society that emphasizes the value and importance of work, earned dollars are taxed at a higher rate, effectively, than investment dollars because the tax law provides for special exemptions and incentives for those with money. These are "loopholes" or a form of welfare for the wealthy in the form of special capital gains treatment, oil depletion allowances, tax exemptions for State and local government bonds, to name but a few.

The result is not only unequal, unfair taxation, but a considerable drain on the Treasury to the point where there has been discussion of some additional kind of national tax to supplement the income tax.

Because I think our present tax law unfair to many of our citizens and because we already face a staggering deficit, I am today introducing a bill which would reduce in some cases, eliminate in others, special "loopholes" that make tax evasion legal.

The bill I am introducing would tax capital gains on property transferred at death or by gift; tax interest on State and local bonds—with a compensating Federal subsidy to States and localities—tax income of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations when earned rather than when remitted to the United States; and tighten up the minimum tax provision—which was supposed to eliminate the situation whereby some wealthy individuals pay zero in taxes—reduce the oil depletion allowance to 15 percent and make drilling costs for oil a capital investment deduction only. In future years this will represent a saving of approximately \$6 billion per year.

If these and other changes in the tax law could be passed, I believe the American taxpayer would finally be on the way to real equity; that the American taxpayer would receive the break he deserves. That would be a real revolution.

PERSECUTION OF SOVIET JEWS

HON. LESTER L. WOLFF

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Speaker, the persecution of Soviet Jews continues. A story in today's Washington Post documents one more aspect of that persecution. It concerns 11 young men wanted

by the Soviet police for induction into the army.

What crimes have these 11 young men committed? None really; they simply want to live in Israel. The Soviet Government refuses to grant them the right of leaving Russia. They are hounded by the police and threatened with imprisonment. These 11 young Jews, now in hiding from the police, face prison terms up to 7 years if found. It is not likely that they can escape the agents of the KGB.

I raise this issue today in the hopes that our Government can do something to help these young men. To save them from an uncertain fate at the hands of the Soviet secret police. These young men are scientists, they want out of Russia. They wish to practice their profession in Israel, in a free land with free people. Thousands of other Soviet Jews have been permitted to leave, why not these 11 men?

The Soviet officials do not want them to leave because they are scientists. They want their skills in Russia, rather than Israel. But of what good are 11 men whose commitment lies not to the Soviet Union, but to the State of Israel? Eleven men who no longer wish to be citizens of the Soviet Union, but who wish—in the best sense of the term—to go home. It may be difficult for the Soviet Government to part with these 11 men, but in the name of decency, they must.

The father of one of the young men, Mr. Jacob Shapiro, has written a letter that I think the Congress and the people should read. In his letter, Mr. Shapiro says:

MAY 8, 1972.

GENTLEMEN: Agents of the KGB are undertaking a treacherous campaign to terrorize all the young Jewish men with higher education who have presented documents to go to Israel. They will be inducted into the Soviet Army.

The Police brought Military Induction Notices to my son, Gavriel, as well as to 13 others. These notices stated that these young men must report immediately to their Regional Military Committees. The Police are presently looking for these young men all over Moscow, and have been coming to our apartment at all hours of the night looking for my son, who was already gone.

The situation is very dangerous for these young men. They are threatened with imprisonment for up to seven years. These 14 young men are struggling for emigration. . . . Today's. . . and the future's.

It is necessary to take the most effective action in their defense. Trials must be prevented.

World! Do not be silent!

JACOB SHAPIRO.

P.S.—Please convey my message to President Nixon, and to Mr. Kurt Waldheim.

INTERNATIONAL HIGH SCHOOL BAND FESTIVAL

HON. EDWARD HUTCHINSON

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. Speaker, during the week of July 11 to 16, high school bands from 51 nations of the world will be in Vienna, Austria competing in the

First International Band Festival. Participation in the festival is by invitation only.

I am very pleased to inform my colleagues that the St. Joseph High School Band of St. Joseph, Mich., is one of the 30 U.S. bands invited to take part in this international music festival.

The people of St. Joseph, Mich., which is within the Fourth Congressional District, are rightfully proud of this group of 116 bandmen and their director, Robert Brown. We know that the St. Joseph High School Band will be outstanding representatives of American youth and we are extremely pleased that they have received this recognition.

The trip to Europe climaxes many months of preparation on the part of the students and their parents. For when it was announced that the band had been invited, it was determined that the school system could not provide the funds necessary for financing the trip.

In true American spirit, the band members and their parents determined that they would set to the task of raising the money needed to participate in the festival this summer.

It was estimated that the venture will cost some \$70,000. In order to raise this large amount, the band conducted a variety of projects. The St. Joseph City Commission granted permission for the bandmen to conduct a door to door broom sale. There were dances, spaghetti dinners, the sale of Christmas ribbons, band concerts, and other projects—all with the same goal—finance the trip to Europe.

The drive to raise the money gained the support of the community as government officials, business firms, and industry joined in backing the projects of the band.

On July 5 the band and their sponsors will depart from Detroit for Amsterdam and the beginning of a 3-week experience that will provide them with an opportunity to foster good relationships and international understanding among youth of many nations.

Mr. Speaker, I include a series of articles on the St. Joseph High School band from the St. Joseph Herald Press:

[From the St. Joseph (Mich.) Herald Press, May 8, 1971]

ST. JOSEPH BAND INVITED TO VIENNA FESTIVAL

St. Joseph High school students, and especially its marching band and symphonic orchestra members, today are celebrating an invitation to the International School Band festival set for Vienna, Austria in July of 1972.

Whether the band goes to Europe is another matter, said Robert Brown, director, the important thing is the recognition of the band as a fine musical organization.

Senior High school Principal James Heathcote, who announced the news in a school wide broadcast yesterday afternoon, said: "even to be considered shows the efforts they put out is a reward for the excellence and discipline they have gone through."

Brown said the invitation came from Dr. Warren Freeman of Winnetka, Ill., chairman of the International School band festival in the midwest. The recommendation to invite the St. Joseph band came from Dr. William D. Revelli, director of the University of Michigan bands, according to Brown.

"I was just bowled over," said Brown over the invitation. He has two weeks to indicate

to the festival committee if the band will attempt to raise the travel funds and go to Austria.

"It could turn into a very valuable community project," he said. "I was elated because I feel this recognition is long overdue the band. Going back to the days of John Howard, (Brown's predecessor) I feel we have one of the finest instrumental programs, certainly the most balanced, in the state," Brown said.

The St. Joseph band has a string of 24 straight Division I ratings in district music festivals—longest string of any band in the area, Brown said.

Brown said he had no idea how much it would cost to transport the band to Vienna and spend a week there. But he felt confident the funds could be raised. He estimated he would take 75 of the best musicians of his band of 120.

"The reputation of our instrumental program has traveled to the point where Dr. Revelli felt he was making a good recommendation. This was a complete surprise to me and I'm so happy the kids are getting recognition," Brown said.

[From the St. Joseph (Mich.) Herald Press, May 11, 1971]

ST. JOE BOARD SAYS BAND CAN GO TO VIENNA

St. Joseph High School band can accept an invitation to compete in the International Band festival at Vienna, Austria in July, 1972 but members will have to raise their own travel funds.

St. Joseph school board last night at Upton Junior high congratulated the bandmen on the honor of receiving the invitation, said it was sorry it didn't have funds to help send the band but gave its blessing for the bandmen themselves to try to raise funds.

Figuring \$300 per student and about 100 in the party the bandmen need to raise \$30,000, Supt. Richard Ziehlmer said.

[From the St. Joseph (Mich.) Herald Press, Oct. 9, 1971]

ST. JOSEPH BAND ADVENTURE IS ON

"Operation Vienna Bear," the St. Joseph high school marching band trip to Vienna, Austria, is underway after 97 per cent of the band parents voted to support the project.

The band is seeking \$70,000 to fly the 108 members of the band to Vienna for the International School Band festival next July.

A steering committee headed by Edward Schalon and including Howard Brink, Herb N. Milnikel and Theodore E. Troff, is studying various fund raising plans.

MUST PAY WAY

The St. Joseph school board last May said the band could accept the invitation to attend the International Band Festival but would have to raise its own travel funds.

Band Director Robert W. Brown and the Band and Orchestra Parents studied the project for months. At a series of meetings it was decided to attempt to raise the funds necessary for the trip if parents of band members would pledge to pay up to \$400 of the \$675 per student.

This would cover a three-week trip and three countries.

All band members would go abroad, including those who parents could not afford to pledge the full amount per student.

It was this program that parents voted 97 per cent to support.

Sixty-five bands have been invited from the United States. Bands from 50 countries will be competing in the ancient city of Vienna.

Five Michigan high school bands have been invited. In addition to St. Joseph they are Roseville high school band, Waterford-Kettering high school band of Drayton Plains; Redford high school band of Detroit and Mona Shores high school band of Muskegon.

Dr. William D. Revelli, retired director of bands at the University of Michigan will serve

as musical director of the festival. It was Dr. Revelli who recommended the St. Joseph band be invited.

The International Music festival brings together the youth of 50 countries with varying socio-economic backgrounds, different languages, religions and is designed to foster international understanding, Revelli told Brown.

The prospect of a trip to Europe has already caught the imagination of the community, Brown said. The St. Joseph high school class of 1971 donated \$239.45 to the drive.

LIONS GIVE \$100

Director Brown recently spoke to members of the St. Joseph Lions club on the music program, mentioning only briefly the trip to Vienna because it had not been approved by parents, and a member of the Lions Club gave him \$100 for the fund.

The band will literally "work like slaves" to raise funds for the trip. As soon as the leaves begin to fall, bandsmen will schedule a work day similar to the one they usually hold in the spring. Another project will be a broom sale on the idea that everyone could use a new broom.

[From the St. Joseph (Mich.) Herald Press, Oct. 12, 1971]

TALE OF THE VIENNA BROOMS

(By Bill Ruch)

A request for St. Joseph high school band members to conduct a door to door broom sale starting Oct. 20 to raise funds for a trip to Vienna, Austria, was approved last night by the St. Joseph city commissioners.

Mayor W. H. "Duke" Ehrenberg proclaimed Oct. 17 to 23 as "Operation Vienna Bear" week in recognition of the band project.

Commissioners also adopted an amendment to the city's traffic ordinances and approved a special use permit for Memorial hospital to build a professional medical building on Niles avenue.

The Vienna trip was approved by the St. Joseph school board last May with the band members to attend the International Band Festival in Vienna next July.

Ray Goodman, president of the band parents, told the commissioners the fund raising project will kick-off Oct. 20 at 5:30 p.m. in downtown St. Joseph. About 50 adults and students will divide into three groups and canvass homes on State street, Lake boulevard and Main street. A pep band will accompany each group.

Goodman said the groups would sell brooms in other areas of the city on succeeding days and are planning other projects of a similar nature.

[From the St. Joseph (Mich.) Herald Press, Dec. 21, 1971]

HELP THE BAND

Fred Milnikel is convinced members of the St. Joseph High School band will find the trip to Europe next summer an enriching experience and he's backing his idea with bows.

Milnikel of 911 Jones street, St. Joseph, is a retired Laboratory Equipment Corp. employe and has traveled to Europe several times.

He said he can't give a lot of money but he gives the band a lot of his time making gift wrapping bows.

The band was given four bow making machines through the courtesy of Jack Hadley of Dixon Beverage, St. Joseph, and a committee immediately set up a system of placing boxes in various places.

Milnikel has taken over the task of making enough bows to keep the boxes filled.

Using the machine and a pair of scissors he can turn out about 400 bows an hour. Band members take the boxes of bows and fill one bag with 10 four-inch bows and another with four 5½-inch bows with two hanks of ribbon. A bag of bows costs \$1. "Buy

Ribbon and Bow, Help the Band Go" proclaims the displays in a dozen places.

In addition to the displays bandsmen have been canvassing the district offering the bags for sale. They report reception to the bow offering as excellent.

Herb Milnikel, a nephew of Fred Milnikel, and chairman of the project, has a machine at his house. Harold Berk and Ed Schalon, who is general chairman of Operation Vienna Bear, also turn out bows.

Bows can be purchased at the Hilltop branch of the F&M bank; Lambrecht's Party store; Gersonde's Recreation; One-Hour Martinizing; Froehlich's Little Super; Continental Beauty Salon; Don Shoes; and Milady's all in St. Joseph.

New locations for the bow boxes are Flagship restaurant at Holiday Inn, St. Joseph; Doubleday Bros. in Benton Harbor and the Clark Equipment Co. in Buchanan.

[From the St. Joseph (Mich.) Herald Press, Oct. 22, 1971]

BANK AIDS ST. JOSEPH BAND TRIP

Farmers & Merchants National bank made its formal debut in St. Joseph today and became an instantaneous Good Neighbor.

The bank presented a surprise \$1,000 check to help launch the St. Joseph high school marching band on its trip to Vienna next July for the International Band Festival.

F&M President Richard Willard bestowed the gift to mark the opening of F&M's seventh bank in Berrien county. The branch is at the southwest corner of Hilltop road and Washington avenue in St. Joseph township on the edge of the St. Joseph city limits.

The permanent building replaces a temporary mobile unit which served F&M customers during construction.

Willard said in presenting the check to Atty. Theodore Troff, representing Band and Orchestra Parents, and Director Robert Brown:

"We're nearby and neighborly. We want people to know we're part of the St. Joseph community and want to participate in worthwhile civic projects.

"We think the band trip to Vienna is a remarkably fine project—good for the bandsmen, a tribute to the school and a chance to increase St. Joe's image as a progressive city."

The band has launched a campaign to raise \$70,000 to pay for the trip to Vienna.

[From the St. Joseph (Mich.) Herald Press, Jan. 26, 1972]

ST. JOSEPH BAND WILL GO TO EUROPE

St. Joseph High school band expects to be playing about half the free time it has in Europe, Director Robert W. Brown told parents, chaperones and bandsmen yesterday.

But he could not be more specific because Dr. Warren S. Freeman, executive director of the International School Band Festival, couldn't make it through a midwinter storm to St. Joseph yesterday. Dr. William D. Revelli, the retired University of Michigan band director, who is the festival musical director, also had to reschedule his trip to St. Joseph.

The two festival leaders will come to St. Joseph sometime after Feb. 19, Brown said in the latest word from the two men, and spend the whole day here.

Brown offset the bad news that Dr. Freeman would miss the meeting by announcing that "our Vienna fund drive is now around \$16,000." The goal for the trip is \$70,000.

The \$16,000 total includes donations received this week including a \$50 gift from the Berrien County Sheriff's deputies and \$500 from Peoples State Bank. The bank's gift was scheduled to be presented at the formal opening of the Scottdale branch, but five degree below zero cold prevented the band from playing and appearing in person.

Brown is awaiting the concert schedule. He said yesterday that it will fit into the general

itinerary laid out for the St. Joseph band that calls for the following schedule:

July 5—Leave Detroit.

July 6—Arrive Amsterdam, clear customs, drive into city.

July 7—Sightseeing in Amsterdam and The Hague.

July 8—Drive to Rhineland in Germany. (Part of trip will be by boat.)

July 9—Drive to Munich.

July 10—Arrive in Vienna.

July 11—Preparation for festival.

July 12—Orientation day (some sightseeing and bandsmen will visit giant amusement park.)

July 13—Marching band parade, individual concerts in the evening.

July 14—Bands perform for rating.

July 15—Marching band competition in Vienna stadium, concert competition in Vienna State Opera house.

July 16—"Great Day of the Bands Program," with parade and massed band concerts and awarding of certificates and trophies.

July 17—Drive to Salzburg.

July 18—Sightseeing in Salzburg.

July 19—Drive to village of St. Anton via Innsbruck.

July 20—Sightseeing Austrian Alps.

July 21—Drive to Lucerne area in Switzerland.

July 22—Sightseeing in Lucerne area.

July 23—Drive to Heidelberg, Germany.

July 24—Sightseeing in Heidelberg.

July 25—Drive to Brussels, Belgium.

July 26—Drive to Amsterdam and board planes for Detroit.

Brown said he hoped the schedule would permit sightseeing one day and a concert appearance on another. He said the primary reason for taking the band to the festival was to show Europeans the quality of public school musical instruction as conducted in America.

Brown also said the band so far has operated on the theory that if one goes everybody goes and all are expected to volunteer for work that must be done. He said he recognized conflicts can arise. So far the co-operation has been 100 percent, he noted.

The St. Joseph band will have 140 in its Vienna party—116 bandsmen and 24 adults.

EDITOR WRITES POETRY

HON. JOSHUA EILBERG

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Speaker, many of us have talents, either natural or developed, which we waste on frivolous activities or do not use at all.

Mrs. Marilyn Krantz, the editor of the Northeast Weekly and Bulletin, which serves part of my district in Philadelphia, has a great ability to use the English language effectively.

In addition to editing an excellent newspaper, she uses this talent to write poetry which clearly indicates her feelings on important issues which confront us. Mrs. Krantz' poems also help to give the rest of us insight into these problems so our own decisions can be made more easily.

Three of these poems deserve special recognition. The first, "Without A Law," was written in honor of Law Day, U.S.A., which was celebrated on May 1.

The second, "Not My Boy," gives an excellent picture of why our battle against drug addiction is failing so terri-

bly, and the third, "A Voice From America," describes the hopes and prayers of Jewish people around the world for the 2.5 million Jews who are imprisoned in Russia.

At this time, with the unanimous consent of my colleagues, I enter these three poems into the RECORD:

WITHOUT A LAW

(By Marilyn Krantz)

Should you be prone to knock the laws
And consider them a pain,
Here's a thought: Without a law
What would folks have to gain?

Suppose you awoke one morning
To find the world devoid of law!
You might rejoice, then soon recoll
At what you heard and saw . . .

You'd be rid of those lawmakers
With their "wiles and ways," it's true;
You'd be rid of democracy
And our justice system, too.

Thieves, murderers and rapists
Would have a free hand, city-wide;
Without the threat of punishment
There'd be no cause for them to hide!

The home you bought and paid for:
You could never really own it.
A signed contract would be worthless
If one party should disown it.

And if someone had cheated you,
To whom would you complain?
Without a law, there'd be no courts.
Your loss would be a culprit's gain.

Your neighbors could spill leaves or trash
On your lawn, from sun to sun;
Without a law for it to be
Against, what could be done?

And if a bully threatens you
Because you're "different" than he,
Has he the right? Without a law,
Who's to say it cannot be?

Ah, true, our laws do sometimes seem
Too complex and too many;
Yet wouldn't it be worse, my friend,
If there weren't any!

"Not My Boy!"

(By Marilyn Krantz)

Oh, hello, Sally, come on in—
I've been meaning to give you a call,
But I haven't had a minute . . .
Been busy with my club work, and all . . .
Am I going to the meeting
On Drug Abuse, tonight?
What meeting? . . . Oh, I remember . . .
It was in the paper, that's right.
Isn't it an awful problem!
I hear it's getting worse each day!
Something should be done about it—
Something drastic, and right away!

Did you hear about the youngster
Down the street, whats-her-name's son?
Barely in his teens, and an addict!
You'd think his parents could have done
Something to prevent the problem . . .
I wonder if it was neglect . . .
Some people don't know how to handle
Their kids properly, I suspect.

Of course, I don't need to worry . . .
My boy would never touch the stuff,
We give him love and understanding
And we've guided him well enough.
Oh, we've looked for signs, of course,
As any parent would, these days.
Yet we're sure he won't fall victim
To such foolish, perilous ways.

Am I going to the meeting
On Drug Abuse? I'd love to go,
But I have my card-game tonight,
And I can't miss that, you know.
I do hope something's accomplished

To help the youth in our neighborhood!
Someone ought to find a solution,
And quickly . . . they really should!

Excuse me a moment, Sally,
There goes my phone . . .
I'll be right there . . .

Hello . . . yes, this is his mother . . .
It's the police? My son is where?
What's that you say? Oh, heavens!
No, not my boy . . . it couldn't be! . . .
And you found stuff in his possession?
Impossible! You're sure? Dear me! . . .
Yes, officer, I'll be right down,
I don't know what to do or say,
It must be all a big mistake . . .
Yes . . . I'll be there
Rightaway.

A VOICE FROM AMERICA: TO THE SOVIET JEWS
(By Marilyn Krantz)

To our Jewish brothers and sisters
In the Soviet, who are denied
Equality, goes our assurance
That we walk ever by your side.

Know this: your chains of oppression
Weigh heavy on us, too—
In the spirit of Brotherhood
Our hearts protest for you.

May the courage of the Maccabees
Be with you every day,
And the voices of Free People
Bring you hope along the way.

May you gain strength in knowing
That from a distant land
Folks are lifting up their voices
And reaching out their hand.

That people of all faiths cry out,
To let the Kremlin leaders know
They must let the Jewish people
Live as Jews, or let them go . . .

To a land where men are free
To live and worship as they choose,
Whether they be Protestants
Or Catholics or Jews.

COMPUTATION OF MILITARY
RETIRED PENSION

HON. BOB WILSON

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. BOB WILSON. Mr. Speaker, I am today introducing legislation embodying the President's compromise recomputation proposal.

This bill would permit those retired prior to January 1, 1971, to recompute their retired pay at age 60 if they have had less than 25 years of service and at age 55 with more than 25 years of service.

For more than 100 years military retired pay was computed as a percentage of the current pay of active-duty personnel. Men were recruited and continued their military service with the clear understanding that their retired pay would be tied directly to active-duty pay. In 1958 and 1963, however, Congress broke faith with our retired military when the time-honored retirement formula was changed. Since 1963, increases in retired pay have been based upon a rise in the consumer price index, regardless of the substantial number of raises received by active-duty personnel during the past decade.

Each retired member's pay is based at present upon the pay scale at the time of his retirement. Thus, we now have many situations with retirees of the same grade and years of service—and the same hardships endured—drawing considerably different rates of pay, dependent upon the date of retirement. Men enlisted and reenlisted in the military service over the years on the assurance of the pre-1958 retirement system. They were promised that, although active-duty pay was low, meaningful retired pay would help offset the economic difference between civilian and military compensation. Although the military retired pay system is not contributory, military men do in fact contribute to their retirement by accepting lower active-duty pay.

The President's compromise proposal has resulted from extended study by a special interagency committee. Although it may not go as far as many of us had hoped, the President's compromise is the most practical solution at the present time in view of the fiscal realities of retired pay expenses. A great deal of publicity has been given to the staggering cost of retired pay in the coming decades and, because of this, it appears that we have reached a stalemate in terms of congressional action. I, too, am concerned about Government spending, but feel in this instance that the Government and the Congress have a moral obligation which we cannot shirk. Military retirees have been waiting many long years for action to correct the present retired pay inequity. Now that we have a concrete proposal, endorsed by President Nixon, before us, I hope that meaningful consideration can begin this year.

SENATOR MCGOVERN ON GREECE

HON. DON EDWARDS

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. EDWARDS of California, Mr. Speaker, on April 22, 1972, a paper was read at a Harvard teach-in on Greece. The paper was a statement by Senator GEORGE MCGOVERN on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the dictatorship in Greece.

I am pleased to insert in the RECORD this statement of position on an important issue by the generally acknowledged leading candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination.

It has Senator MCGOVERN's unmistakable mark of honesty, clarity and good sense. The position paper follows:

SENATOR MCGOVERN ON GREECE

The foreign policy of the Nixon Administration is bankrupt. We are losing friends all over the world. The romantic pageantry of Presidential diplomacy cannot obscure the fact that the majority of mankind looks upon us with suspicion and fear.

The way we are handling the Greek dictatorship is symptomatic of this state of affairs. For the sake of dubious short term security interests we have permitted the consolidation of a neofascist regime, which has been poisoning our relations with the

democratic nations of the Atlantic Alliance for the last five years. To the freedom-loving peoples of Europe the imposition of totalitarianism on a member of the Alliance is a profound anomaly. Unfortunately it is no longer an anomaly for the foreign policy of the United States.

It would have been a simple matter, particularly for a President who believes in personal diplomacy, to explain to the little dictator in Athens that he is making continued close relations between the two countries impossible. This would not constitute interference in the internal affairs of Greece. It is what is happening in Greece now, that by impeding the smooth operation of the Alliance interferes with the internal affairs of the other allies.

Besides, we should put to rest the canard that whatever happens inside Greece is the exclusive business of the Greek people. In this day and age of technological police states it is absurd to expect the Greek people, or any people in a similar predicament, to assert their rights successfully.

The recent crisis fomented by the Papadopoulos regime in Cyprus is a good example of the irresponsible manipulations indulged in by Governments which are not answerable to the will of the people. It would have been impossible for a parliamentary government in Greece to embark upon such an adventure.

There are also alarming reports that the Greek junta has been implicated in a plot to bring about a right-wing dictatorship in Italy, by helping to finance and train a neo-fascist terrorist underground.

The Nixon Administration in the spirit of its simplistic Real-Politik, has chosen to ignore the ideological nature of the Greek dictatorship. It has, in consequence overlooked the connection between the ideas and actions of this regime, and has accepted it as a viable ally instead of realizing that it represents a major threat to the interests of the United States in the Mediterranean.

GLOOM AND DOOM

HON. LESTER L. WOLFF

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Speaker, the President's decision of Monday night means that we have taken a grave and ominous risk, not for peace, but for war. What he was saying, without saying it, was there is no hope for peace, there is only the threat of a wider, infinitely more difficult conflict. What Mr. Nixon proved, without attempting to prove it, was no light at the end of the tunnel, only an unending darkness.

What the President announced, although one will find no reference to it in his speech, is the end of Vietnamization. What he revealed, although that was surely not his intent, is the complete failure of a program that at its best was nothing more than the coining of a new phrase to mask an old policy. Vietnamization was destined to fail because it depended ultimately, not upon American military might, but rather the will of the Army of South Vietnam to make war, and they have no will for war.

I understand very well the President's reluctance to talk about the failure of Vietnamization. It was offered to the American people with the promise, if not the pledge, of great success. Like Mr.

Nixon's secret plan, which did do much to make him President, Vietnamization bore the hope of bringing peace to Southeast Asia. But Monday night, in one of this century's most precarious moments, the illusion of Vietnamization was destroyed forever and Americanization becomes now the order of the day.

In the new Nixon war plan, Vietnamization must now be set aside as a failure. Never mind that Vietnamization cost this Nation over \$75,000,000,000. Forget that we lost an additional 20,000 American lives. Put out of your minds the added division it brought to the people of this country.

Now, reeling as we and the world are from the complete collapse of Vietnamization, we must now demand a change in the President's policy that will bring American men home, all of them, from the POW's to the soldiers on the front lines.

The war we now wage threatens more than just the people of Vietnam, it threatens the peace of the world. It cannot continue. It must be stopped. Our involvement must end.

RED CHINA: SOURCE OF KILLER DRUGS—II

HON. JOHN G. SCHMITZ

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. SCHMITZ. Mr. Speaker, A. H. Stanton Candin, in "Red China's Narcotics Warfare" soon to be published, said:

From the guerrilla warfare base in Yunnan province in Communist China, their heroin becomes a long range intercontinental ballistic missile aimed at the addict target in Los Angeles, California, who will inflict the deadly wound of heroin on himself with a needle in the arm. That missile is part of the psycho-chemical warfare being conducted today against the United States.

In his book, "The Murderers," former U.S. Narcotics Bureau Chief Harry Anslinger declared:

A prime "target area" in the United States was California. The Los Angeles area alone probably received 40 per cent of the smuggled contraband from China's heroin and morphine plants.

And of the heroin transmission belt in the United States, Anslinger said:

The syndicate crowd does not object to dealing with the Reds, as long as the profits are big in terms of dollars.

In 1971 our soldiers in Vietnam were being introduced to 95 percent pure heroin at \$10 for a shot, which, according to Dr. George F. Solomon—Modern Medicine, September 20, 1971—"roughly translates into a \$200-per-day habit at home." And the heroin in the United States is only 40-percent pure. This means that, to satisfy his habit, the GI hooked on Chinese Communist—CHICOM—heroin has to inject the diluted heroin directly into his veins, which makes him a "mainliner." As all specialists in drug addiction know, cure of a "mainliner" is almost impossible. According to Col. Donald B. Peterson, former

consultant in neuropsychiatry, Army Forces Far East, a GI can acquire the habit by consistently taking the drug for just 30 days.

Commanders Digest, the official guideline for military officers, reported in its June 24, 1971, issue that 164 drug-induced deaths occurred in the military in 1970, as the CHICOM drug offensive got underway. Almost 20,000 drug abuse offenders were disposed of under the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1969 and 1970, while 18,744 more received administrative discharges for drug abuse during these same 2 years. An official study conducted in the Americal 23d Division found that in October and November 1970 heroin use in the division ran from 9 to 14 percent, with 27.2 percent of the division on some type of illicit drug. The study concluded that "the heroin problem is increasing."

The effect of the CHICOM drug traffic emanating from Asia was summarized as follows from official Government sources in a recent issue of Justice magazine:

The United States has the largest heroin addict population in the world;

At least five Americans die every day as a result of narcotics abuse—significantly more than the number now being killed by the Communist enemy in Vietnam;

Up to 50 per cent of all metropolitan area property crimes stem from the addict's need to support his habit;

The United States consumes about five to six tons of heroin illegally each year. That amount of heroin is distilled from 50 to 60 tons of opium.

But the only reaction here in Washington so far is to spend upwards of \$300 million on the transmission belt running through Thailand, Burma, Laos, Hong Kong, Macao, Saigon, and other points in Asia and through U.S. pushers to the drug user, rather than cutting off the traffic at its source or even acknowledging that source. It is claimed that an expenditure of \$1 million in Washington, D.C., alone, together with treatments such as the new opiate drug methadone, will bring about a \$5 million reduction in criminal activity. So the plan is to counter one opium derivative—heroin—with another—methadone. But for years researchers and doctors sought the cure for a disease by getting at the source. What is the matter with cutting off the source of CHICOM drug traffic and saving not only billions in money, but far more important, the lives and the souls of an estimated more than half a million drug addicts, thereby helping to make sure that fewer instead of more of our sons and daughters will be "hooked"? No American parent can now afford to assume that it cannot happen to his family. As Anslinger says in the chapter from his book, "The Murderers," entitled "A Girl Who Died":

The most sickening—and terrifying—form of addiction in my experience, is that of the teen-agers, both girls and boys . . . the primary targets of the pushers, the most easily seduced. Young, unsure, unhappy, maladjusted in many cases, terrified of being called "chicken" by their side alley friends, growing up in homes that are not homes, with parents that are not parents, and with discipline that is not discipline, they seek escape. Girl or boy, this is a familiar pattern—the dream-flooded highway to extinction.

The girl who gave Anslinger the title for this chapter followed that highway to extinction. She died at 18 years of age, after having made herself a prostitute to satisfy the habit of the heroin made from the poppy grown predominantly in the fields of Red China.

MEMO ORDERS DECEPTION

HON. LES ASPIN

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Speaker, American officials have been ordered to distort the truth about the success of the Vietnamization program according to a confidential memo that I made public yesterday.

The memorandum written by Brig. Gen. James A. Herbert last September, passes on to American officials in the field of Vietnam orders from the deputy commander of American forces in Vietnam requiring officials in the pacification program to develop 10 or 12 indicators that reveal the success of Vietnamization.

It would be one thing to request a summary of reports, but it is clearly dishonest to demand that U.S. officials fabricate evidence to prove the success of Vietnamization.

General Herbert's memorandum and the orders from MACV constitutes direct order to deceive top U.S. officials.

The memorandum directs U.S. officers to demonstrate that we have established conditions that give Vietnam a chance to choose its own future course and create a military establishment that will "be difficult to destroy by military actions."

General Herbert's memo and orders from Saigon demand officials to paint a rosey picture of Vietnam's military capabilities. This is in stark contrast to the battlefield reports which reveal that the South Vietnamese are being routed.

In face of the present situation, these orders for optimistic reports and predictions dramatically illustrate the deceptive nature of our present policy.

It is dishonest reports that first got us involved in Vietnam and its the same deception that has kept us there too long.

The memo follows:

REVISION OF MACV COMMAND BRIEFING
(Sept. 18, 1971)

1. *Purpose.* To task CORDS Directorates for input to revision of MACV Command Briefing.

2. *Discussion.* DEPCOMUSMACV has directed a revision of the MACV Command Briefing.

a. An outline of the proposed revision is at Inclosure 1.

b. The thrust of the briefing is progress made in the Republic of Vietnam.

c. The briefing is intended to stand alone, separating from the CORDS 1971 Community Defense and Local Development Briefing.

d. The period covered will be from Tet 1968 to the present, but can cover earlier dates, where necessary or required.

e. Overall security classification will be SECRET.

3. *Requirements.*

a. CORDS is primarily tasked for input on items listed in Inclosure 2. The CORDS directorate(s) responsible for compiling the script

for that item is designated in parenthesis following the item.

b. Other MACV staff elements have been tasked for input on subjects which are of CORDS interest. These staff elements can be expected to closely coordinate with CORDS directorates. However, to preclude possible omission of vital CORDS data in the briefing, CORDS directorates will submit information on the items in Inclosure 3 which are assigned to other staff elements.

c. Topics within the purview of War Victims Directorates and Chieu Hoi Directorate are not addressed in the enclosed outline. The significance of these programs is such that this office will recommend inclusion. Therefore, it is desired that both directorates submit material which reflects progress in their respective programs.

d. Submit material in narrative form (briefing script), with accompanying graphics requirements or photographs to Director, RAD, NLT COB 10 September 1971. All graphics requirements must be submitted in finalized format for production to avoid necessity for changes.

e. Since the entire briefing will be one hour, all inputs should be as succinct as possible and make maximum use of well designed graphics aids.

f. Address any questions to MAJ Miller, Reports Branch, RAD, telephone: 4720.

JAMES A. HERBERT,

Brigadier General, USA, Deputy ACOFS,
CORDS.OUTLINE OF NEW COMMAND BRIEFING—
SEPT. 5, 1971

Staff Assignments

I. Introduction:

- a. Purpose.
- b. Content.

II. The Changed Nature of the War:

- a. Allied military successes—Tet 68 to Present.
- b. Declining US involvement.
- c. Changing role of RVNAF.

III. The Enemy's Strategy:

- a. Direction from Hanoi.
- b. Organization (COSVN, Fronts, etc.)
- c. Broad objectives in SEA (will include discussion of objectives in Cambodia and Laos).

d. Elements of the enemy system:

- (1) Main Force Units—NVA.
- (2) Local Force Units—VC.
- (3) VC Infrastructure.
- (4) Rear Service Units.
- (5) Supply and Infiltration Systems.
- (6) Shadow Supply System.

e. Will return to the elements of the enemy system later and discuss Allied countermeasures to each item.

IV. Allied Objectives and Organization to Counter Enemy Strategy:

- a. Allied Objective.
- b. Drawdown of US Forces Since 1969 (Show this graphically by showing US and ARVN AOs in 1969 at start of drawdown and lift off colored flips to show graphically the decline of US responsibility and a concurrent increase of ARVN responsibility. Then show statistically the reduction in maneuver battalions and other combat forces.)

c. Current Role and Major Unit Composition of US Forces:

- (1) Current role (Combat support and advisory).
- (2) Strength in terms of major combat elements.

d. Vietnamese Political/Military Organization: (Province, District, Military Region).

e. Vietnamese Military Forces: ("Before and After" comparisons where feasible).

- (1) ARVN Divisions: Growth, training, experience (have weathered some big battles), problems.
- (2) RF: Growth, training, experience, problems.
- (3) PF: Growth, training, experience, problems.

(4) PSDF: Growth, training, experience, problems.

(5) National Police: Growth, training, experience, problems.

(6) VNAF: Growth, training, experience, problems.

(7) VN Navy: Growth, training, experience, problems.

V. Now return to discussion of Enemy Strategy and Allied Countermeasures (display slide showing elements of enemy system and highlight each as the countermeasures are discussed):

a. Main Force Units, ARVN/VNAF Counter, Operations.

b. Local Force Units, RF/PF/PSDF Counter, Operations.

c. VC Infrastructure, RF/PF/National Police.

d. Rear Service Units, ARVN/RF Counter, Operations.

e. Supply and Infiltration Systems, Ground-Air-Navy Integrated Interdiction System, Impact of Cross-Border Operations.

f. Shadow Supply System, Involvement of VN People plus continuous search for caches.

VI. Other Elements of Allied Strategy in Addition to Pure Countermeasures:

- a. Promoting Political Stability:
 - (1) VN Government withstood Tet 68.
 - (2) Withstood full mobilization.
 - (3) Hamlet Evaluation Statistics (A through V, Before and After.)
 - (4) Now have leaders in hamlets, villages and provinces.

(5) No prognosis for future. Will have to wait and see.

b. Economic Development:

(1) Agricultural Development—land reform—miracle rice—pig and poultry production.

(2) Industrial Development.

c. Education—military and civil.

d. Road Construction.

e. Communications Network.

f. Security—"Before and After" data on terrorist acts, attacks by fire, ground contacts, casualties.

VII. US Forces—Trends and Problems:

a. Drawdown continues:

- (1) Orderly withdrawal.
- (2) Continued combat, logistical, advisory support for RVNAF.
- (3) Maintain balanced force appropriate to changing mission at each stage of withdrawal.
- (4) Primary combat support now by air and naval firepower.

b. Problems:

- (1) Security of US installations.
- (2) Retrograde of large tonnages.
- (3) Drugs.
- (4) Animosity of some VN factions.

VIII. Develop ten or twelve high impact indicators "that say persuasively that much progress has been made; that our effort has not been a fruitless venture; that we have helped to establish conditions and build systems that at least give the Republic of Vietnam an opportunity to choose its future course of events. Final thought should be that a strong, broadly-based military establishment has been created in RVN that will be difficult to destroy by military action. Whether RVN can withstand subversion and political dissent remains to be seen and is a matter that only the Vietnamese people and their leaders can resolve.

PRIMARY CORDS, TASKS

1. Vietnamese Political/Military Organization at Province, District, Military Region, Village and Hamlet; see para IV d of outline. (PP & P on political and TSP on military)

2. Allied countermeasures; see para V b. J2 will input strategy of local force units. TSD will input RF/PF-PSDF counter operations. (TSD)

3. Allied countermeasures; see para V c. J2 will input VC infrastructure strategy. TSD will submit PF/PF counter operations; PHD

will submit National Police counter/operations. (TSD and PHD)

4. Promoting Political Stability; see para VI (1 thru 5) of outline.

a. How did VN government withstand Tet 1968? (PP&P)

b. How did VN withstand full mobilization? (PP&P)

c. Hamlet Evaluation Statistics (Tet and after). (RAD)

d. Narrative on leadership in hamlets, villages, and provinces. Statements reflecting on quality of leadership and how many hamlets, villages have held free elections. (RAD)

e. Statement on the future. Would a prognosis be valid? Should we comment that we will have to wait and see? (RAD)

5. Civilian education; see para VI c. (PP&P)

6. Security, Tet and after data on terrorist acts, attacks by fire, ground contacts, casualties; see para VI f. J3-05 will cover attacks by fire, ground attacks, and casualties. CORDS will provide supplemental input on terrorist incidents. (RAD)

7. Develop high impact indicators that show progress; see para VIII. (All addresses)

OTHER ITEMS OF CORDS, INTEREST

1. VC Infrastructure; see para III d (3). (PHD)

2. Allied objectives; see para IV a (PP&P)

3. Vietnamese Military Forces growth, training, experience and problems; see para IV e (TSD (2), (3), (4); PSD (5))

4. Economic development; see para VI b (1 and 2) of outline. The DCofS, EA, has primary action. PP&P should provide USAID input. (PP&P)

5. Animosity of some VN factions; see para VII b (4). (PSG)

LAW DAY U.S.A.

HON. WILLIAM L. HUNGATE

OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Speaker, I would call attention to an article in the Monroe City, Mo., News concerning Law Day, U.S.A. 1972. The author is a distinguished member of the Missouri Bar from Hannibal, Mo.

The article follows:

[From the Monroe City (Mo.) News, May 4, 1972]

LAW DAY U.S.A.

Dictatorship is the most discredited and outmoded form of government in man's history. It denies the sanctity of the individual, employs brute force, and a secret police system to maintain the power of the ruler or ruling clique. Since the beginning of organized society and the development of States and Nations, man's struggle has been to escape the tyranny of Ceasars, Czars and Kings who claimed Divine Rights and recently an assortment of Hitlers, Stalins and Castros. The quest for freedom has found its greatest measure of success in this social experiment we call the United States of America. Under the terms of our written Constitution we govern ourselves by a "Rule of Law". This is the touch stone which lifts us from anarchy and protects us from tyranny. Our elected leaders govern within the limits of office circumscribed by law, their jurisdiction is defined. We have woven into the fabric of our law the tradition and lessons of the Decalogue, Magna Charta, the Anglo-Saxon Common Law and similar milestones in the history of the law. We now accept, as self evident truth, that sovereignty lies in the individual. Government is not the source

of power. It is a creature of limited powers which it receives from the governed. We organize our society on the foundation of the written constitution, it is the supreme law of the land and under its protection we evolve and prosper. Thus, it is a "Rule of Law" and not the whim of man or dictator that guides and protects us. Under this system we attain the exquisite balance of the individuals needs for self expression and societies needs to control unbridled lust of the selfish and arrogant. With the "Rule of Law" as our protector, we need no "Berlin Walls" nor "bamboo or iron curtains". However, the naked aggression of the North Vietnamese in 1972 demonstrate the need for vigilance and determination to protect for ourselves and freedom loving people everywhere, the right to self determination. The captive people of the world, flee from East Berlin, Cuba and wherever they can find the means to escape to the free world and to nations which subscribe to the "Rule of Law". It is distressing that some figures in government would be willing to retire into isolationism and resort to puerile apologies for the ruthless aggression of dictatorship.

To foster a clearer understanding and universal acceptance of the "Rule of Law" a most cherished possession and worth defending for all people. "Law Day U.S.A." was established by presidential proclamation and is now observed under joint resolution of the congress.

The 1st day of May is set aside to encourage Americans everywhere to celebrate "Law Day U.S.A." The purposes of this special day are: (1) To Foster respect for law and understanding of its essential place in American life; (2) To encourage citizen support of law observance and law enforcement; (3) To advance equality and justice under law (4) To point up the contrast between freedom under law in the U.S. and governmental tyranny under communism."

We of the Missouri Bar Association and the American Bar Association hope that the great purposes of Law can serve as a mighty impetus to the goal of respect and obedience to the "Rule of Law".

ALBERT L. RENDLEN,
Attorney At Law.

RUMANIAN HOLIDAY

HON. SILVIO O. CONTE

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Speaker, following World War II the Rumanians, whose country borders the U.S.S.R., submitted to a Communist regime. On May 9 they were forced to observe the anniversary of Russian defeat of nazism in the country.

Instead of observing this holiday, the Rumanian people should be allowed to commemorate a more meaningful occasion. Today, May 10, is the 90th anniversary of the establishment of Rumania as a free kingdom.

The Rumanians have a history and heritage to be proud of. Despite the presence of Communist rule, the Rumanian Government has maintained independent ties with several Western nations. We have seen them vote in the United Nations—often times differently than the Soviet Union. Cultural exhibitions from Rumania are seen regularly in countries in the Western World.

Ninety years ago the Rumanians de-

clared their independence from the Ottoman Empire. Since then, these brave people have been subjected to differing militaristic forces and today they still are not free.

On this memorable holiday, let us hope that the courageous Rumanians will soon regain their complete freedom and one day be able properly to celebrate their day of independence.

POWER POLITICS REALISTIC

HON. ROBERT H. MICHEL

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, while any President expects to be criticized from time to time, it occurs to me that a good deal of the criticism presently being leveled at President Nixon as to his policy in Vietnam borders on the irresponsible. An editorial appearing in the May 7, 1972, edition of the Peoria Journal Star discusses the concept of power politics, President Nixon's application of it, and some of the criticism leveled at it. I include the text of the editorial in the RECORD at this point:

POWER POLITICS REALISTIC

Nixon's sober recitation of his Vietnam policy and what is happening there, how he interprets it, and what he is determined to do about it present the classic presidential attitude toward power politics.

It is based on recognition that power politics exists on the world scene, that it is being zealously practiced in powerful Red world capitals, and that the most disastrous way to deal with such a reality is to surrender to its pressures.

Like it or not, power politics is the "only game in town."

This is not a new view of the crux of the problem of peace.

Winston Churchill tried to persuade the western world to such a view when many of us were college students—and failed, until Hitler proved it for him. (Then, he was elevated to power too late to avert the world wide conflagration that consumed 40,000,000 human beings.)

It was the keystone of the policies of President Harry S. Truman, of President Dwight Eisenhower, of President John F. Kennedy, and of President Lyndon Johnson in regard to foreign policy and the quest for peace—as has often been pointed out in specific regard to Vietnam.

Now, it is quite possible that President Nixon is wrong, is in error, in his view.

It is quite possible that Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon have ALL been wrong in their approach to resist power politics with power politics, and their conviction that a "contract" must be kept and both ends of the bargain maintained or there is not even a structure for peace.

It is also possible that the avid critics scrambling for the White House and the college protesters are in error in THEIR view that renouncing power politics and throwing ourselves on the mercy of the erstwhile enemy would melt his heart . . . and we'll all live happily ever after.

It is even possible that McGovern's Carthaginian foreign policy would be a helluva mistake.

We are all mortal and all imperfect, and the record of quite a few thousand years

demonstrates that none of our theories is PERFECT.

But that is not the point.

It is patently an unjustified slander, to characterize Nixon's presentation, a reasoned outline of the classic presidential attitude toward aggression, as "political trickery designed to save Nixon's face and their (GOP) jobs." . . . as that noble knight, Sen. George McGovern promptly did.

Whatever else McGovern may be "elevating," it is not the level of the political rhetoric of a campaign that already had George Wallace going pretty good.

If Nixon had said anything new there might be a basis, at least, for suspecting it as "political trickery."

But it is hardly an excusable piece of campaign oratory, hardly a moral practice of moralizing about others, when it is NOT new. If it is "trickery," Churchill was a trickster, Truman a trickster, Ike a trickster, Kennedy a trickster, and Johnson a trickster.

One always recognizes the possibility of error in human affairs, but it is downright indecent to pretend that these men did not BELIEVE in facing the facts of the "natural laws" of power. To dismiss that view as "trickery" is intellectually bankrupt, morally reprehensible, and political muck-rakery of the worst sort.

It is not "discussing the issues." It is cheer-leading for the left-wing and Hanoi party line! It is rank demagoguery. It makes Agnew sound like a statesman, by comparison!

WHERE THERE'S A WHEEL THERE'S
A WHEEL!

HON. SEYMOUR HALPERN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Speaker, few issues in recent years have disturbed the conscience of America more than the urgent need to revitalize our environment. Urban congestion and pollution have been recognized as enemies so dangerous to the quality of American life that their elimination is truly a great national cause.

Last week was "Bikeology Week," and each of us was given a welcome opportunity to make an individual effort to save our country's environment. This morning I led a contingent of my colleagues on a bike tour around the Capitol. This, I am certain, will demonstrate that bicycling is a more healthful alternative to the endless streams of automobiles which strangle our highways and contaminate the air we breathe.

Michael Pousner recently wrote an article in the New York Daily News which captures the enthusiasm of the many New Yorkers who have willingly switched to the bicycle as their mode of travel. Mr. Speaker, this is a most persuasive representation of citizens who have made the decision to fight for their country's ecological health, while they cycle for a more invigorating life. The article follows:

WHERE THERE'S A WHEEL, THERE'S A WHEEL!
(By Michael Pousner)

It's hotpants and hot-pink tulips, baseball (however belated) and barbecues. It's spring.

In New York City, spring also heralds the annual outbreak of bikeomania, characterized by a penchant for lightweight foreign bikes.

But if bikeomania is a disease, it's also a cure—a quick-working antidote for the urban blahs.

Let Lindsay and the Rock kvetch over budget cuts, and let the cost of living take off like a moonbound Apollo. What do you care as you navigate your flashy blue Italia past the daffodils and joggers and into the E. 72d Street turn in the Central Park roadway? It all seems so far away as you shift your Chlorda into low to scale one of Staten Island's massive hills.

And the 1972 outbreak of bikeomania is pretty much summed up by the timeless rhyme: "Something old, something new, something borrowed, something blue."

What's old is the bike boom itself. At some local stores sales have doubled each year since 1969, and there's every indication that again will be the case.

But there's something new, too. Events in ensuing weeks will wheel in the pedal-pushing season in fine style:

On Sunday, a guided bike hike through Central Park's upper reaches will commemorate Frederick Olmstead's birthday, Olmstead being the designer of Central Park.

Also on Sunday, American Youth Hostels Assn. will dust the soot from urbanites' eyes with a daylong bike hike to the Hamptons. Sorry, but this one's long sold out.

On May 17, a number of city-sponsored activities will usher in annual night bike riding in Central Park, and on May 20, the Parks Council is sponsoring a tour of Prospect Park.

Ongoing bike activities now include Bike to Work each Thursday (leave 59th and Fifth at 8 a.m.) sponsored by Bike For a Better City, and day and weekend bike trips conducted by the youth hostels group.

Also, on some of the city's "safer" arteries, 200 green signs have been placed indicating designated bikeways recommended for street cycling.

Then there's a permanent transfiguration of the Central Park roadway, which has been made two ways for cyclists.

Whereas once you had to slink off the bike path, or worse, be seen WALKING your bike up the hill starting at E. 72d street, now all you have to do is turn around and go DOWN-hill, a grin splitting your face as you gulp up block after block in an effortless coast.

Fortunately, the complement of bike patrollers, those selfless guardians of parks rights-of-way, has been increased this year, and many were in evidence Sunday, forestalling what I feared would be the inevitable bumper-car-type collisions under the new setup.

And in the Bronx, bicyclists will reign supreme on spring and summer Sundays all along the four-mile length of the Grand Concourse meridian—except when the Yanks are playing.

Also new are the many more racks and garages accommodating bikes around town—a 50% increase in capacity. New sites vary from Gimbels East to several Broadway liquor stores which belie the adage about "drinking and driving." A full list of the new sites will be available in a new city cycling guide to be issued next week by the Parks Council, a private, pro-bike group.

What are the new trends in biking?

Bike trend-spotters, a burgeoning breed, notice an increasing preference for 10-speed cycles. Sal Corso, owner of Stuyvesant Bicycles, the city's largest bike store, is selling as many 10-speeds as three-speeds, whereas a couple of years ago the former were only a luxury.

The boom has lowered the prices, however. The serviceable three-speed Hercules that Gene's Discount Bikes sold last year for \$65 was knocked down to \$55 this spring and sold out immediately.

Meanwhile, bike and department stores are getting on the clothing-for-bicycling bandwagon. The compleat biker can wheel out of Stuyvesant Bikes this year in a hand-woven, form-fitting, red-white-and-blue jersey with

pockets (for sunglasses), special biking shorts (seat reinforced), biking shoes, helmets, gloves, caps and shoulder bag—all for around \$100—the price, strangely enough, of a workmanlike 10-speeder.

Also "in" is the two-bike person. A fellow who never could dream of owning two cars can satisfy his acquisitiveness with a couple of bikes—a collapsible one "for the road" and a conventional one for the city.

There is even some evidence that the tandem, the classic "bicycle built for two," is making a comeback, along with the bike Lotharios, who never really retired. These dashing young men on their flying Schwinn prove there's more to biking than shifting gears.

What's "borrowed"? Your brand new \$600 red-spangled Lejeune with its super-cool Compagniollo gears is borrowed (permanently) if you leave it unwatched for a fraction of a second. Bike Shops estimate that 20% of sales represent replacement of stolen cycles.

To prevent this, there now seem as many bike security devices as there are bikes, including the case-hardened steel "super-lock" sold at many stores for around \$20, and a bike alarm which can mummify a would-be thief.

For the first time, bike insurance is being offered at about \$9 for the first \$100 of purchase price and proportionally less expensive from there up.

Finally, what's "blue"? You are. According to Bike for a Better City, the vocal pedal power group, the city's new bikeways plan encourages cycling on Manhattan arteries without providing a smither of protection other than bland assertions that the more bikers there are, the safer they'll be. Tell that to those cables and truck drivers who look upon bikers as interlopers.

At one time officials let it leak out that the city was going to set off exclusive bike lanes. Since then, though, the city has continually back-pedaled.

Harriet Green of Bike for a Better City contends that thousands more people would bike to work if they had well-marked lanes flanked by wooden horses to ride along.

Even falling that, it's obvious that the jingling bike bell has become, like the voice of the turtle and the cry of the ump, a sure harbinger of spring.

LOS ANGELES LAKERS GREATEST
PRO TEAM IN HISTORY

HON. CHARLES H. WILSON

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON. Mr. Speaker, I would like to extend my heartiest congratulations to the Los Angeles Lakers, the new National Basketball Association world champions. With their 114 to 100 win over the New York Knicks on Sunday, the Lakers capped an incredible season. It was a season that saw the Lakers dominate basketball as few other teams have ever dominated any sport.

During the regular season the Lakers posted 69 victories, an NBA record. This included a fantastic 33-game winning streak, which is a record for any major league professional team. In the playoffs, the Lakers continued to show their strength by beating the strong Chicago Bulls and the two previous world champions, the Milwaukee Bucks and the New York Knicks. During the playoffs, the

Lakers lost only three out of the 15 games with these powerful teams.

Jack Kent Cooke, the owner of the Lakers, has managed to assemble a group of athletes that were a rare and extremely rich blend of talent, courage, and a desire for excellence. They displayed a degree of discipline and poise that made them a devastating champion. Certainly one of the real catalysts to the Lakers success was the acquisition of Coach Bill Sharman. Coach Sharman and his able assistant, K. C. Jones, took a team that had finished second seven times, and helped them to develop that extra bit that made them a champion. They were greatly responsible for the amazing team play that the Lakers became so well known for. Certainly the Lakers have a wealth of talented individuals, but it was not one or two individuals who were responsible for their victories. Rather, each player, both starter and reserve, played a major role in assuring each Laker victory.

Certainly Wilt Chamberlain, the Laker captain, deserves a special bit of praise. Playing with a bone chip in his hand, this gifted giant scored 24 points grabbed 29 rebounds, and blocked 10 shots in leading the Lakers to their final victory. For this exhibition and his play throughout the playoffs, he was named the most valuable player of the series. "Mr. Clutch," Jerry West, made his usual brilliant contribution to the team despite a short shooting slump, and Gail Goodrich, the other half of the NBA's most potent backcourt combination, turned in a great performance that has become commonplace for him. Jim McMillan, who replaced Elgin Baylor as the Laker starting forward, and Happy Hairston, one of the league's leading rebounders, made major contributions to the victory as they had done all year long. And, of course, the reserves, who play such an important role in any championship team, played consistently whenever called upon. Keith Erickson, Pat Riley, Leroy Ellis, John Q. Trapp, Fynn Robinson, and Jim Clemons all gave the needed spark when the regulars faltered. And some special mention should be made about the trainer, Frank O'Neil, who did a tremendous job of keeping the Lakers unusually healthy through the long and tiring NBA season.

I hope that my colleagues here in the House of Representatives will join with me in congratulating the Los Angeles Lakers, a team that Owner Jack Kent Cooke and all the people of the Los Angeles area, can truly be proud of.

LOUIS PERINI, A GREAT MAN

HON. MARGARET M. HECKLER

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mrs. HECKLER of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, Louis R. Perini was a gentleman who inspired the admiration of all who knew him—and of all who knew his work. Both the monuments he raised in

steel and stone and the monuments of civic and charitable progress serve as a lasting testimonial to his works in this world. I should like to share with my colleagues the words of the Boston Globe at the passing of this notable citizen of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, who contributed so much to innovation in the field of housing and public building throughout the course of his distinguished career.

As one who not only knew Louis Perini and respected him, I want to extend my deep sympathy to his family.

The article from the April 17, 1972 issue of the Boston Globe follows:

BRAVES EX-OWNER, CONTRACTOR, LOUIS PERINI, IN FLORIDA

Louis R. Perini, who took over his father's small construction firm in Framington at age 21 and helped make it a major international builder, died yesterday at Good Samaritan Hospital in West Palm Beach, Fla. He was 68.

The chairman and president of Perini Corp., whose interest in baseball led to his company's acquisition in 1943 of the old Boston Braves in the National League, had been ill since just before last Christmas, according to a family spokesman.

Born in Framington, Mr. Perini began carrying water for the men in his father's construction crews when he was six years old. When his father, Bonfiglio Perini, died in 1924, Mr. Perini became president of the firm.

Under his leadership, what had been a smaller highway and dam building enterprise grew into one of the largest firms in the nation performing heavy, highway, marine and pipeline construction. The company was active on four continents.

Two brothers joined Mr. Perini in the family business—Charles B. Perini, vice president, and Joseph R. Pirini, treasurer.

Besides its home office in Framingham, the company has offices in San Francisco, Seattle, New York City and West Palm Beach. There are five affiliated companies in Canada and a separate company, Perini International AG, which handles overseas operations.

His father and mother both emigrated from Italy. Louis was the ninth of 14 children, 10 of whom lived. In 1926 he married Florence Gardetto, daughter of another contractor from Milford.

Besides his wife, he is survived by three sons, David B. Perini of Dover, Albert J. Perini of Cohasset, and Louis R. Perini Jr. of West Palm Beach, Fla.; four daughters, Mrs. Charles Field of Scituate, Mrs. Francisco Iglesias of Framingham, Mrs. Francis Murphy Jr. of Wellesley, and Mrs. Julio Vega of Puerto Rico; four sisters, Mrs. M. Nicoll, Mrs. Lawrence Piotti, Mrs. Edward Kavanaugh and Mrs. Samuel Guarino, all of Ashland, and 38 grandchildren.

Visiting hours for relatives and friends at the Doherty Funeral Home, 477 Washington st., Wellesley, will be from 1 to 5 p.m. and 7 to 10 p.m. tomorrow and Wednesday. A private funeral Mass for family and relatives will be celebrated at 11 a.m. Thursday at St. Paul's Church, 500 Washington st., Wellesley.

Mr. Perini lived for many years in Boston. Last year he bought a home in Scituate.

He became President of the Boston Braves baseball club in 1946 and was cited by the Sporting News in 1953 as the "number one major league executive." His "courage and foresightedness" in transferring the club's franchise to Milwaukee "not only resulted in the club establishing a new National League attendance record, but paved the way for future franchise changes . . . by breaking a precedent of more than half a century," the baseball paper said.

The Braves moved from Milwaukee to Atlanta in 1962. Mr. Perini was a director of

the club at the time of his death. The Perini Corp. retains a 10 percent interest in the team.

The construction trade publication Engineering News-Record twice nominated Mr. Perini as the man of the year, in 1966 and 1967.

Mr. Perini also had wide charitable and civic interests. He helped develop the "Jimmy Fund" for the Children's Cancer Research Foundation in Boston, which he served as a trustee.

William Koster, executive director and vice president of the foundation, yesterday said he was "deeply saddened . . . As president of the Boston Braves baseball club (Mr. Perini) was one of the prime movers in the founding of the Jimmy Fund."

He was also chairman of the board of DASA Corp., an electronics firm in Andover, a director of ISI Mutual Funds in San Francisco, and a member of the Engineers Club and the Algonquin Club of Boston and the Twenty-Nine Club of New York City.

He received honorary degrees from Boston College and St. Anselm's College, Manchester, N.H., and served both schools as a trustee. He also received honorary degrees from Holy Cross College, Worcester, and Lesley College, Boston, and was a fellow of Brandeis University.

In 1961, he was one of three Greater Boston men honored by the northeastern region, National Conference of Christians and Jews, for "building brotherhood among the one family of man under God."

In a message to his construction executives, he once wrote: "With reference to time, and what we can all get from time, every human being starts each day from scratch and with an equal share. . . . What you do with yours, and what I do with mine, will have more bearing than any single thing I know in deciding the measure of satisfaction we can get out of life."

REDS INVADE AMERICAN POLITICS

HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, as the debate over the situation in Southeast Asia predictably escalates, we should keep in mind the very obvious efforts of the North Vietnamese to exploit the political atmosphere in the United States.

This point is well made in the Thursday, April 27, editorial of the San Diego Union which is as appropriate this week in the light of congressional discussions as it was at the time it was written.

The editorial follows:

EXTRAORDINARY LETTER: REDS INVADE AMERICAN POLITICS

The extraordinary letter sent by the Viet Cong foreign minister to members of the U.S. Congress should remove any doubt that the Communists have picked 1972 for a direct invasion of the American political process just as surely as they have picked this year for a do-or-die military sweep into South Vietnam.

Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh deserves precisely the sharp rebuke which her flagrant breach of international propriety has received from the White House. It is members of Congress themselves, however, who should rise in a body to express their indignation at this patent attempt by a foreign official to use them as tools for attaining Communist objectives in Southeast Asia.

Mme. Binh attacks President Nixon's determination to stand by South Vietnam in the face of the invasion as "an adventurous path fraught with unpredictable consequences." This might better be applied to her own venture into our politics. The consequences could well be a final awakening by leaders of both our political parties to the fact that the people most eager to keep the "Vietnam issue" alive in this American election are the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong themselves.

The Binh letter is the most bold and arrogant example so far of how the Communists are trying to influence political thinking in the United States to smooth their way for conquest in Asia. They have stepped up or scaled down the level of fighting at propitious moments to correspond with our national mood as they read it through anti-war demonstrations and the rise and fall of debate on Vietnam.

They used the offer of negotiations to gain a bombing halt in 1968, and since then have played cat-and-mouse with our delegation drawn to Paris by the lure of peace and the hint of release of our prisoners of war. Now, when they needed only to stand quietly by and await the total withdrawal of our troops, they elected to launch a full-scale invasion of South Vietnam in the hope of humiliating the Americans on the eve of our national elections.

It may be a sign of desperation that has prompted Mme. Binh to insinuate herself directly into our Congress. The North Vietnamese have poured virtually everything they have into South Vietnam, and the South Vietnamese have made them pay in blood for every inch of land that they have gained. Communists have failed in three weeks of intensive fighting even to capture the major cities that would give them an opportunity to symbolize a "victory."

North Vietnam and the Viet Cong know their only real victory would come with the total desertion of South Vietnam by the United States. They can achieve this only if controversy over our Vietnam policy is stirred and kept at a boil. Members of Congress, especially those who are candidates this year, should open their eyes to deliberate attempts from outside our country to weaken the resolve of the American people at this crucial moment in the Vietnam struggle.

ASSISTANT HEW SECRETARY
SPEAKS TO WASHINGTON WORK-
SHOPS CONGRESSIONAL SEMINAR

HON. MARVIN L. ESCH

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. ESCH. Mr. Speaker, at a recent session of the Washington Workshops Congressional Seminar here on Capitol Hill, Assistant Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Mrs. Patricia Reilly Hitt, delivered an important statement on the duties and responsibilities which we, as legislators and executive departmental personnel, have to the people of this Nation. I am pleased to bring Mrs. Hitt's speech to the attention of my colleagues:

HOW GOVERNMENT WORKS—AND
DOES NOT WORK

(By Mrs. Patricia Reilly Hitt)

INTRODUCTION

This year of 1972 will mark a major new milestone in American politics, with 18-year-old voters for the first time casting their ballots for a President and the Congress.

So, the importance of such seminars as this one is greater than ever before. I want you to know that I greatly appreciate the opportunity to be with you today as you concentrate on learning how our Government works.

In looking at the comprehensive program outlined for you and at the list of distinguished people who will be speaking to you, I feel that this subject will be more than adequately covered.

Therefore, I want to speak to you today about what many consider to be the most serious problem facing Government at all levels today—the crisis of confidence the American people are feeling in Government.

PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IS LACKING

There are many recent indications that public confidence in Government is lacking:

First, only about one-third of American citizens indicate satisfaction with the way this Nation is being governed, according to a February 1972 Gallup poll.

Second, in early 1971, another Gallup poll showed urgent public concern about national unrest and leadership. Many of those polled felt that governmental leaders were not trying hard enough to solve the problems the country faces.

Third, a survey last fall by the *Washington Post* showed that our political system faces a crisis of confidence, with voters complaining that public officials are unresponsive, unpredictable, and untrustworthy.

Fourth, a recent Harris poll indicated that the public believes—by a 65 to 25 percent margin—that "only a few men in politics are dedicated public servants." They also believe—by an 81 to 11 percent margin—that most elected officials promise one thing and do something different once in office. Almost 60 percent believe that most politicians take graft. Harris poll results over a period of more than 4 years reveal a diminishing trust in politics and politicians.

Americans have never been overly trusting of government, but still, something is very much amiss when surveys show a continuing decline in the percentage of those expressing a degree of trust in their government.

"Let's face it," President Nixon said in his State of the Union address in 1971, "most Americans today are simply fed up with government at all levels. They will not—and should not—continue to tolerate the gap between promise and performance in government."

WHY IS CONFIDENCE LACKING?

Now no single political party—and neither the executive branch nor Congress—is exclusively responsible for this crisis in confidence which has been growing for a number of years. Over the years, both branches and both parties have at times let their rhetoric outrace reality.

Actually, there are several reasons for the people's lack of confidence in government, and I would like to examine at least five of them in detail.

NOT PART OF SYSTEM

First, few people really feel a part of the political system. They feel that the system has passed them by—and that they no longer have an impact on decisions. People no longer see a clear relationship between what they think, support, and work for—and what actually happens. They doubt the responsiveness of the system—and, as a result, the number of nonvoters increases.

The United States, the leader of the free world and the world's greatest democracy, lags far behind many other free countries in voter participation.

Any public official is familiar with the remark, "What difference does it make whether I vote or not it doesn't seem to do any good." A favorite story of many politicians is about the lady who responded to the question about why she did not vote by say-

ing that she did not want to encourage any of the candidates.

In the 1968 presidential election, 31.8 million people voted for Richard Nixon, 31.3 million for Hubert Humphrey—but 47 million—or 40 percent of the electorate—*did not vote at all*.

And, the number of nonvoters has been increasing sharply—from 39 million in 1960 to 43 million in 1964 to 47 million in 1968. If this trend continues, in 20 years we will have from 70 to 90 million nonvoters in an election for President.

NOT THE WHOLE TRUTH

Second, people believe that government officials—elected and appointed—do not tell them the whole truth. This apparent inability of political leaders as a whole to "come clean" with the public is another reason for their distrust of government. Anxious to espouse popular rather than effective solutions, politicians are strong on rhetoric, weak on candor, and skillful at half truths.

As an example, the Pentagon papers of last June jolted public confidence in the utterances of the leaders of the previous administration. Those papers demonstrated that Government did not act in a manner to earn the confidence of the people. While policy-makers were involved in raging debates over the Vietnam conflict, very little of it surfaced. The American people, who had the most at stake, were given little or no opportunity to understand the stakes, the difficulties, and the options.

When elected leaders hesitate to deal with the difficult issues of the day with candor and honesty, the opportunity for the dialogue upon which a democracy depends is denied.

Soaring rhetoric by public officials often contributes to the lack of candor. In their enthusiasm for a proposal—and in an effort to sell it—their words ensnare them into exaggerations. All of us in public life should know by now that poverty, discrimination, and polluted water will not yield to fancy words.

And we should focus on the really pertinent question of whether we are willing—or able—to provide the resources—both human and material—over a long period of time to achieve our exalted goals.

GOVERNMENT TOO BIG

Third, Government has become too big for understanding or efficiency. Government is no longer plain, simple, and intelligible. Its vastness defies comprehension—it baffles and confuses people. Not understanding it, they do not have confidence in it.

And no wonder!

The Federal Government spends a quarter trillion dollars a year—employs one out of every 16 working Americans—administers one-third of the Nation's land—occupies over 42,000 buildings—consumes over 1 trillion pieces of paper a year—and operates according to 12,000 pages of laws.

No one expects it to run as smoothly as the neighborhood grocery, but—even making allowances—the public sees too much bureaucratic confusion, delay, and general mismanagement.

SECRECY

Fourth Government operates too secretly. Any reasonable person recognizes the necessity of secrecy in Government in a number of situations—including intelligence information, diplomatic negotiations, military plans, and secret weapons. But secrecy has been a way of doing business in Washington for many years. The people do not like secrecy—or a government that practices it. Part of this secrecy often is the inaccessibility of public officials.

Government is responsible only if the decisionmakers are accessible to the people and accountable for their decisions. Many top policymakers simply are not accessible or accountable to the people in any direct way.

Also, in their conduct of the public's business, congressional leaders as well are often inaccessible to the public.

Distinctive marks of democracy are its commitment to an open society, and the assumptions that policy can be improved by steady public examination and debate.

Few things should be immune from public scrutiny and criticism, because only by such examination and criticism can mistakes be corrected.

GREATER EXPECTATIONS

Fifth, and finally, people expect more of Government. Their standards of performance for integrity, efficiency, accountability, responsiveness, and results have soared. People expect Government to solve most problems and—when action does not come or is ineffective—they become critical because their expectations are not met.

As the gap between the people's expectation and the Government's performance widens, distrust of Government escalates.

Many people have lost confidence in Government because they feel that their Government does not give them a fair shake. Often they are right. Our laws are full of provisions that result in special treatment for special interests. All of these special provisions are not detrimental. But there are enough of them to arouse growing feelings among more and more Americans that their Government is not as "fair" as it ought to be.

MOST INFLUENTIAL

This last point—the "expectations gap"—I feel is the most profound and far-reaching source of our frustrations and disappointments. Compare for the moment the ever-widening distance between authorizations of the Congress for HEW and the actual appropriations. In 1964, the difference was \$200 million. In the current year, authorizations for HEW exceed appropriations by \$6 billion. Pending legislation is likely to add another \$9 billion to our spending authority—and this at a time when our budget deficit may total \$38 billion in the current year.

Authorizations to spend are rightfully viewed by the public as promissory notes, signed by Congress and made payable to the people. Failure to make good these promissory notes cannot help but breed disillusionment and discontent.

But the wide divergence between authorizations and appropriations is only a part of what could be called "untruth in legislation."

Another type is characterized by the kind of legislation that purports to find solutions to problems by simply creating a new agency of government—with the end result often being a further confusion of lines of responsibility and authority, a further fragmentation of services. Into this category fall current proposals that would create separate departments of health and education—or create a national institute of gerontology—or establish a separate product safety agency to replace the Food and Drug Administration.

Still another type of legislative overpromise is that which appears to grant government broad new authority to attach problems—but which, in fact, confers no additional authority whatsoever. An example was the Environmental Education Act of 1970, through which Congress authorized the commissioner of education to sponsor seminars, institutes and internships at colleges and universities to teach about environmental problems.

Legislation for a worthy cause? Certainly.

But worthwhile legislation? Hardly. For the fact was—and is—that the Commissioner of Education already possessed the authority newly invested—or in this case, re-invested—in him.

Those of us in the executive branch cannot control what is done by the legislative—the Congress. But there is a great deal which

we, as civil servants, can do—and are doing—to restore confidence in government.

Having diagnosed the illness, I maintain that a cure is possible. And this cure—in my opinion—is comprised of three, co-equal parts.

LIMITED PROMISES

First, government must carefully limit its promises to its capacity to perform. Government must give the people the information they need to make reasoned choices. We must, in short, "Come clean" with the people. And we must trust their ability to deal with the hard choices that a shortage of resources imposes.

As a chief executive whose election was in part a result of citizen distrust of government generated by the "credibility gap" of the 1960's, President Nixon was determined that his administration would carefully refrain from promising more than it could reasonably expect to produce.

He pledged his utmost effort to bridging the credibility gap, and I believe he has delivered on that pledge.

Under this administration, there have been no grandiose promises that poverty would or could be eliminated in short order—or that 100 percent employment was just around the corner—or that, by tomorrow at the latest, problems that have beset this society and other nations for centuries would be finally laid to rest with a stroke of the Presidential pen on new legislation, or approval of massive new expenditures from public coffers described as bottomless.

He has even vetoed legislation which—while politically very popular—promised much more than it could ever deliver. A case in point is the child-care bill.

The whole debate on this issue began when the administration offered what it felt was sorely needed legislation designed to provide high-quality child care for those mothers on welfare who could hold jobs—who could break the dependency cycle if only they could be assured their children were in good hands while they worked.

But the child-care bill acted upon by the Congress provided a network of child care centers covering most of the population—and did it in a way that made it an administrative monstrosity that could conceivably cost \$20 billion a year.

The American public—treated to a panoply of promises about child care—was one more misled. Congress, having made the promises, then imposed conditions that made the promises impossible to fulfill.

TRUE COSTS

A second necessary component of the cure also involves truth. It involves leveling with the people about the true cost of worthwhile programs that various groups promote. It means putting to rest the simplistic shibboleth that all we need to do to create utopia here and now is to "reorder our priorities."

To a degree you might find surprising, our priorities have shifted during the past three years. During this period, outlays for human resources programs have increased by 63 percent while total budget outlays grew by only 28 percent.

And in the budget for fiscal year 1973 beginning on July 1, human resources spending will be 45 percent of all expenditures, while defense spending will total only 32 percent. This exactly reverses the spending priorities of only three years ago—when the defense share was 45 percent and the human resources share was only 32 percent of the 1968 budget. The 1973 budget marks the first time in history that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's share exceeds that of the Department of Defense.

But despite this rather dramatic, even drastic reordering of military-domestic priorities, domestic problems remain unsolved—for the most part because major issues remain unresolved.

We have not—as a nation—focused sharply enough on the need to choose among the literally thousands of competing claims on our national tax resources. Moreover, in far too many instances, we refrain from closely examining the actual cost of satisfying these claims.

Let's look at a list of widely accepted goals:

Day care services for children who need them but whose families cannot afford them;

Fulfillment of the objectives of the right to read effort;

Homemaker services, mental retardation services, and vocational services for all who need them;

Good compensatory education for every disadvantaged child.

These programs—however worthy—represent just a partial listing of what many people would regard as "top" priorities.

They don't touch on cleaning up the environment—or improving mass transportation—or revitalizing our cities—or on the scores of other priorities that appear high on each individual's—or each organization's—agenda for government.

Yet to meet even those limited goals, we would have to increase our tax revenues by nearly \$28 billion—a sum equivalent to about one-eighth of the current Federal budget—and even then we have no assurance that these vast outlays would prove sufficient.

Also, we must make sure the public understands that solutions to all problems are not possible immediately. They must be made to realize that choosing to move strongly forward on one front necessarily means holding the line on another front—or even at times, retrenching a bit.

BETTER UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES

Third, and finally, we must better utilize the resources at our command. We must eliminate the waste, the duplication, and the inefficiencies that dilute and diminish our efforts, often destroy our incentives, and dreadfully damage our institutional credibility.

Without considering at this moment the duplication in programs between State and local governments and the Federal Government, there are many examples of the fragmentation of responsibility that exists on the Federal level alone.

Nine different Federal departments and twenty independent agencies are now involved in some aspect of education.

Three departments work to help develop water resources.

Four agencies in two departments are involved in managing public lands.

Six agencies in three departments administer Federal recreation areas.

President Nixon has set about to reorganize the internal structure of government to make it more receptive to the needs of the American citizen. In the early days of his administration, many reforms were accomplished by direction of the President or by Executive order.

But under the tripartite system of government assured under the Constitution, the President himself can only accomplish so much in the way of reorganization or reform.

After a time, the President laid before the Congress his plans for further, more extensive reforms in which he would have to have the cooperation and consent of the Congress.

Everyone is now familiar—at least in name—with some of the President's proposals for reform;

Reform of our welfare system;

Reform of our taxing and expenditure structure through revenue sharing; and, in fact,

Reform of the overall framework of the executive branch of the Federal Government.

This last is perhaps the most far-reaching proposal for reform in this century. How-

ever, at this point the Congress has not completed action on any of these reforms.

EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION

This executive branch plan recommends that the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, and Agriculture continue as basic units of the Cabinet, but that all other departments be consolidated and rearranged into four.

Under this plan, the executive branch would be modernized to deal comprehensively with modern-day national needs.

It would give us a department of human resources to deal with the concerns and needs of the people; a department of community development to bring assistance to the people's urban and rural community needs; a department of economic development to promote the Nation's prosperity and develop jobs and businesses; and a department of natural resources to look after our physical environment and the preservation and balanced use of our natural resources.

Executive reorganization *should* be the most popular domestic proposal of the administration—since it would make the Federal Government more responsive to the needs of the people. It has been given little publicity, however, after its initial proposal by the President.

As President Nixon said recently:

"Good men and good money can be wasted on bad mechanisms. By giving those mechanisms a thorough overhaul, we can help restore the confidence of the people in the capacities of their government."

CONCLUSION

Confidence in our government can be restored. As I have tried to point out, the prime responsibility for such restoration rests with the branches of the government themselves.

But there is room—indeed, there is grave need—for all of us in this great effort. It has been true of democracies through the ages that the effectiveness of government is directly proportionate to the degree of citizen interest and citizen participation.

Government can be relevant.

It can be an effective device for meeting critical citizen needs.

It can function as it should—as an extension of the people's will.

Whether it does or not is dependent on our willingness to demand relevancy—to demand efficiency—and to demand truthfulness—and to back up our demands with a commitment to make representative democracy function as it should.

IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS INSTITUTED AGAINST THE PRESIDENT

HON. JOHN CONYERS, JR.

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, today, a resolution of impeachment of the President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, was introduced for myself and Representatives BELLA ABZUG, SHIRLEY CHISHOLM, RONALD DELLUMS, and WILLIAM RYAN.

The waging of an undeclared war in Southeast Asia has reached its most dangerous height with President Nixon's announced decision to mine all entrances to North Vietnamese ports, and to otherwise interdict by use of naval force shipments to these ports, as well as engage in massive aerial bombardment.

This tactic has been considered in detail and expressly rejected on several earlier occasions by a previous administration.

Yesterday a number of our colleagues joined with us to say:

This act of war is a clear violation of President Nixon's oath of office. It usurps the constitutional authority of Congress, and also violates section 602 of the Military Procurement Act enacted last year, which declares the termination of the Indochina war to be a matter of national policy. * * * It is clear that the President will not end the war and that therefore, we must end his Presidency. We call on the people of America who so desperately want peace to exercise their right and their duty to petition their Government for redress.

Today we feel impelled to action. The resolution of impeachment has been carefully drafted and soberly considered. It appears below with a thoroughly documented memorandum of law prepared by the Lawyers Committee on American Policy Toward Vietnam:

H. RES. 976

Whereas Article II, section 4 of the Constitution of the United States provides: "The President, the Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for and conviction of treason, bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors"; and

Whereas Article I, section 2, paragraph 5 of the Constitution of the United States provides: "The House of Representatives * * * shall have the sole power of impeachment"; and

Whereas, Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States from January 20, 1969 to the present time has known that this House and the Senate of the United States have at no time declared war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the National Liberation Front, the sovereign state of Cambodia, or the sovereign state of Laos, pursuant to Article I, section 8, clause 11, of the Constitution of the United States which provides: "The Congress shall have power * * * to Declare War"; and

Whereas Richard M. Nixon has committed the acts hereinafter set forth, which constitute high crimes and misdemeanors within the meaning of the Article II, section 4 of the Constitution of the United States:

ARTICLE I

1. On January 20, 1969, Richard M. Nixon executed the oath of office of President of the United States, solemnly swearing that "I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."

2. From January 20, 1969 to the present time, Richard M. Nixon has known that this House and the Senate of the United States have at no time declared war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the sovereign state of Cambodia, or the sovereign state of Laos, pursuant to Article I, section 8, clause 11, of the Constitution of the United States, which provides: "The Congress shall have power * * * to Declare War," and has nevertheless committed the acts, including acts of war, hereinafter specified.

3. On January 12, 1971, after enactment by the Congress, Richard M. Nixon approved Public Law 91-672, section 12 of which repealed the Southeast Asia (Tonkin Gulf) Resolution, Public Law 88-408, approved August 10, 1964, withdrawing and terminating any power which may have been granted under such Tonkin Gulf Resolution to the President respecting the use of the Armed Forces of the United States in Southeast Asia.

4. On November 17, 1971, after enactment by the Congress, Richard M. Nixon approved the Military Procurement Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1972, Public Law 92-156.

5. Section 601 of the said Act, known as the Mansfield amendment, in pertinent part declares it to be "the policy of the United States to terminate at the earliest practicable date all military operations of the United States in Indochina, and to provide for the prompt and orderly withdrawal of all United States military forces at a date certain, subject to the release of all American prisoners of war held by the Government of North Vietnam and forces allied with such Government and an accounting for all Americans missing in action who have been held by or known to such Government or such forces."

6. Section 601 called upon the President "to implement the above-expressed policy by initiating immediately the following actions:

"(1) Establishing a final date for the withdrawal from Indochina of all military forces of the United States contingent upon the release of all American prisoners of war held by the Government of North Vietnam and forces allied with such Government and an accounting for all Americans missing in action who have been held by or known to such Government or such forces.

"(2) Negotiate with the Government of North Vietnam for an immediate cease-fire by all parties to the hostilities in Indochina.

"(3) Negotiate with the Government of North Vietnam for an agreement which would provide for a series of phased and rapid withdrawals of United States military forces from Indochina in exchange for a corresponding series of phased releases of American prisoners of war, and for the release of any remaining American prisoners of war concurrently with the withdrawal of all remaining military forces of the United States by not later than the date established by the President pursuant to paragraph (1) hereof or by such earlier date as may be agreed upon by the negotiating parties."

7. On November 11, 1971, Senator John Stennis, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, in commenting on section 601 prior to its enactment, stated to the Senate: " * * * for the first time we now have as a proposed law, language which makes our withdrawal from Indochina 'the policy of the United States,' rather than the sense of the Congress as contained in the previous version. For those who supported the Mansfield amendment, I would urge that they closely consider the meaning of this change in language. As a policy matter it binds the Congress and the President of the United States." CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 117, pt. 31, P. 40792.)

8. On November 17, 1971, upon approving Public Law 92-156 by affixing his signature thereto, and despite the will of the Congress in enacting section 601, Richard M. Nixon stated: "Section 601 expresses a judgment about the manner in which the American involvement in the war should be ended. However, it is without binding force or effect, and it does not reflect my judgment about the way in which the war should be brought to a conclusion. My signing of the bill that contains this section, therefore, will not change the policies I have pursued and that I shall continue to pursue toward this end."

9. On February 16, 1972 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York ruled in *DaCosta v. Nixon*, 72 Civil Action 207 (John F. Dooling, D.J.), that: "When the bill embodying Section 601 was passed by the Congress and approved by the President's signature it established 'the policy of the United States' to the exclusion of any different executive or administration policy,

and had binding force and effect on every officer of the Government, no matter what their private judgments of that policy, and illegalized the pursuit of an inconsistent executive or administration policy. No executive statement denying efficacy to the legislation could have either validity or effect."

10. Despite the foresaid enactment into law of the said section 601, Richard M. Nixon ordered the following actions:

(1) On March 23, 1972, broke off the negotiations in Paris with representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front;

(2) From March 24, 1972, to April 26, 1972, refused to return to said negotiations;

(3) On May 4, 1972, broke off again said negotiations, suspending them indefinitely;

(4) Since April 1972, escalated the air war in Indochina to levels unprecedented in the history of warfare, and on May 8, 1972, without prior consultation with or consent of the Congress, announced that he had ordered the mining of all North Vietnamese ports and the interdiction by United States forces of rail lines and other communications entering the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

11. By refusing to declare a final date for the complete withdrawal of all United States forces in Indochina, as called for by section 601 of Public Law 92-156, by insisting upon his Vietnamization policy, and by intimating that a residual military force would be left in South Vietnam until such time as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and forces allied with that Government acceded to his demands for the release of American prisoners of war, a cease-fire, and new elections under a caretaker government controlled and administered by Nguyen Van Thieu, Richard M. Nixon jeopardized the security of the United States.

12. By reason of the aforesaid acts, Richard M. Nixon has arrogated to himself the power to declare war and the power "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces," which are committed by Article I, section 8, clauses 11 and 14 of the Constitution solely to the Congress, and has, in violation of his oath as President of the United States, of section 601 of Public Law 92-156, of the Charter of the United Nations, and of principles of the Law of Nations, to the detriment of the national interest, at the cost of prolonging the retention of American prisoners of war, and at the risk of confrontation with the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Peoples Republic of China, caused untold killing and maiming of American military personnel and the people of Indochina and inflicting death and destruction upon the innocent civilian populations of said region, and he has committed and is guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors within the meaning of Article II, section 4 of the Constitution of the United States.

ARTICLE II

13. From January 20, 1969 to the present time, Richard M. Nixon, in violation of

(a) his oath of office to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States,

(b) Article I, section 8, clauses 11 and 14 of the Constitution of the United States, which assign solely to Congress the powers to declare war and to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces of the United States,

(c) Section 601 of the "Military Procurement Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1972, Public Law 92-156, declaring it to be "the policy of the United States to terminate at the earliest practicable date all military operations of the United States in Indochina",

(d) Section 12 of Public Law 91-672, the Congressional repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which withdrew and terminated

any power which may have been granted by such Gulf of Tonkin Resolution to the President, and

(e) The Charter of the United Nations, to which the United States is a signatory, and which is therefore part of the supreme law of the land, which obligates the United States to refrain from the unilateral use or threat of force in its international relations, and which obligates the United States to settle international disputes by peaceful means,

did willfully and intentionally cause and direct the Armed Forces of the United States to continue to engage in military hostilities and to continue to carry on a war against the territory and people of South Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the sovereign state of Cambodia, and the sovereign state of Laos, all without a declaration of war by the Congress of the United States pursuant to Article I, section 8, clause 11 of the Constitution.

14. By reason of the aforesaid acts, Richard M. Nixon has arrogated to himself the power to declare war and the power "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces," which are committed by Article I, section 8, clauses 11 and 14 of the Constitution solely to the Congress, and has, in violation of his oath as President of the United States, of section 601 of Public Law 92-156, of the Charter of the United Nations, and of principles of the Law of Nations, to the detriment of the national interest, at the cost of prolonging the retention of American prisoners of war, and at the risk of confrontation with the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Peoples Republic of China, caused untold killing and maiming of American military personnel and the people of Indochina and inflicting death and destruction upon the innocent civilian populations of said region, and he has committed and is guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors within the meaning of Article II, section 4 of the Constitution of the United States.

ARTICLE III

15. From January 20, 1969, to the present time, Richard M. Nixon has caused and directed the Armed Forces of the United States to engage in acts of terror against the civilian population and of devastation of the territory of Indochina, to kill and wound hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians by means of aerial, land, and naval bombardments directed against non-combatants, the designation of "free fire zones," "harassment," and "interdiction" fire, indiscriminate use of anti-personnel bombs, napalm, and defoliants, to drive innocent civilians from their homes into squalid refugee camps, and to commit other similar acts, all in violation of

(i) "the supreme law of the land," pursuant to Article VI, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States, as embodied in the Hague Convention No. IV of 18 October 1907, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War Land (36 Stat. 2277, Treaty Series 539); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 (T. I. A. S. 3365); Hague Convention No. IX of 18 October 1907, Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War (36 Stat. 2351; Treaty Series 542); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field of 27 July 1929 (47 Stat. 2074; Treaty Series 847), to which the United States is a signatory.

(ii) the Law of Land Warfare embodied in United States Field Manual 27-10, and

(iii) the laws of civilized society, including crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, agreed upon in "The Principles of International Law Recognized in the charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal" adopted unanimously by the first General

Assembly of the United Nations at the initiative of the United States.

16. By reason of said acts in violation of the said laws and principles, Richard M. Nixon is guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors within the meaning of Article II, section 4 of the Constitution of the United States,

Resolved, that Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States ought to be, and he hereby is impeached by this House, and further

Resolved, that the Speaker appoint a Committee of Managers on the part of the House, and further

Resolved, that a message be sent to the Senate to inform them that this House has appointed managers to conduct the impeachment of the President of the United States, and have directed the said managers to carry to the Senate the articles agreed upon by this House, as contained in this resolution, to be exhibited in maintenance of their impeachment against Richard M. Nixon, and that the Clerk of the House do go with said message, and further

Resolved, that the articles agreed to by this House, as contained in this resolution, be exhibited in the name of the House and of all the people of the United States, against Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, in maintenance of the impeachment against him of high crimes and misdemeanors in office, and be carried to the Senate by the managers appointed to conduct the said impeachment on the part of this House.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW ON IMPEACHMENT (By Lawyers Committee on American Policy Towards Vietnam)

The conduct of President Richard M. Nixon, since the enactment of the Mansfield Amendment (Title VI) to the Military Procurement Authorization Act of 1971, and the adoption of the "National Commitment Resolution" of June 25, 1969, and since the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on December 31, 1970 as well as the continued prosecution of the Southeast Asian war in utter disregard of the governing Nuremberg Principles affecting the conduct of war, made President Nixon culpably guilty of "high crimes and misdemeanors" warranting the presentation of a bill of impeachment by the members of the 92nd Congress.

The members of the 92nd Congress, and particularly the new generation of Congressmen who harbor such a close kinship for the families of the 50,000 casualties, the more than 300,000 wounded and, yes, the 35,000 drug addicts, have an opportunity to render their country a service which only members of the House of Representatives can render.

In consistent disregard of the popular will, the decisions of the Congress to end the war in Vietnam and all his protestations of peace to the contrary, the President of the United States has ordered a massive escalation of the war against the Vietnamese people. An estimated additional force of 150,000 Americans are manning the heavily augmented air and naval forces to rain death and destruction on North and South Vietnam. The resultant casualties to Americans in fatalities, wounded and maimed, missing and prisoners of war may be expected to mount. Hints of use of atomic weapons have been heard. A new war of vast proportions is under way without authority or approval of the Congress of the United States.

It is a clear fabrication to argue that this vast military operation is required to protect American withdrawal when more Americans are being exposed to danger by being moved into combat. The best protection for withdrawal of American forces is immediate withdrawal from all zones of danger. Nor has the President the authority to pursue a new war in support of the corrupt and tyrannical

Thieu regime. In fact his actions are in gross violation of two Congressional enactments:

1. The Mansfield Amendment—Title VI of the Military Procurement Authorization for 1972, (P.L. 92-156) Section 601.

2. Repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of December 31, 1970; and his conduct is also contemptuous of the intent and purpose of National Commitments Resolution of June 25, 1969. He outrages both national and international opinion as set forth in the Nuremberg judgments and the principles of the United Nations.

Under the Constitution, the Congress has the power to check excesses of Executive power. Judge John F. Dooling, Jr., in his decision in the *Orlando v. Laird* case in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, recited many instances in the past that Congress had passed "repeated amendments to the Selective Service Act", and laws affecting Veterans' Benefits for the "period of the war" and finally concluded: "But it is idle to suggest that the Congress is so little ingenious or so inappreciative of its powers including the power of impeachment, that it cannot seize policy and action initiatives at will and halt courses of action from which it wishes the national power to be withdrawn . . ."

"That, however, is simply a charge of Congressional pusillanimity . . ."

"The Constitution presents the Congress with the opportunity for it, but it cannot compel the making of unpopular decisions by the members of Congress." (Emphasis supplied.)

Some members of Congress have already begun to despair. Some have, among themselves, reflected on the issue of impeachment. Still others have given expression to the extant power vested in the House of Representatives to discipline officials guilty of political crimes.

Under our Constitution history the House of Representatives—the popularly elected branch of government—is the last rampart in the defense of the rights of the people.

Persons subject to impeachment are set forth in Article II Section 4 of the Constitution. It provides that "The President, Vice President and all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, or Conviction of Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."

Between 1797 and 1936 eleven impeachment trials were conducted to final decisions. The two most important ones were that of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Samuel Chase (1805), and that of President Andrew Johnson (1868), the remaining nine were United States Federal Judges, one senator and a Secretary of War. In the case of the senator no action was taken because he was not subject to impeachment. The final decisions in the remaining ten impeachment trials were six acquittals and four convictions.²

"High Crimes and Misdemeanors"

(As considered at the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention of 1787—The source material for this section is "Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution at Philadelphia in 1787; as reported by James Madison and revised by Janathan Elliot Vol. V, Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1861.)

The fifty-five members who wrote the Constitution, met in Philadelphia in secret sessions between May and September 1789. The records of their deliberations that did come down are sparse and the discussions by them of the section dealing with the "removal of officials" is quite limited. It was a fact, however, that the delegates met after a long war which ended the abuses of a tyrannical king and the need of avoiding the return of a "king" was prominent in their minds and hearts.

What follows is a day by day discussion of the section dealing with the conditions for impeaching a government official.

On May 29, 1787, a draft for a "Plan for a Federal Constitution" was presented by Charles Pickney. Article VIII of this plan provided that the President "shall be removed from his office on impeachment by the House of Delegates, and conviction in the Supreme Court, of treason, bribery or corruption." (p. 131)

On June 2, during the debate on that section, Mr. Dickinson moved "that the executive be made removable by the national legislature, on the request of a majority of the legislatures of the individual states." "The happiness of this country, in his opinion, required that considerable powers be left in the hands of the states." Mr. Sherman contended, "that the national legislature should have the power to remove the executive at pleasure." (p. 147)

On June 13, 1787, this summary power of removal was rejected and a motion was made to substitute the following language "and to be removable on impeachment and conviction of mal-practice or neglect of duty." (p. 190)

On July 20, 1787, during the debate, it was observed by Col. Mason that "No point is of more importance than that the right of impeachment should be continued." (p. 340) Dr. Franklin was for retaining the clause . . . it would be the best way, therefore, to provide in the constitution for the regular punishment of the executive, where his misconduct should deserve it, and for his honorable acquittal, where he should be unjustly accused." (pp. 340-41)

James Madison immediately added to Dr. Franklin's conclusion that he "thought it indispensable that some provision should be made for defending the community against the 'incapacity, negligence, or perfidy of the Chief Magistrate'" (p. 341).

"Mr. Gerry (at the same session), urged the necessity of impeachments. A good magistrate will not fear them. A bad one ought to be kept in fear of them. He hoped that the maxim would never be adopted here, that the chief magistrate could do no wrong." (p. 341)

"Mr. Randolph" observed, "the propriety of impeachment was a favorite principle with him. Guilt, wherever found, ought to be punished. The executive will have great opportunities of abusing his power, particularly in time of war, when the military force, and in some respects the public money, will be in his hands. Should no regular punishment be provided, it will be irregularly inflicted by tumults and insurrections." (p. 342)

On August 6, 1787, the report of the Committee of detail was submitted and a printed copy being at the same time furnished to each member. Article 9, Section II concerned itself with the duties, powers and responsibilities of the President of the United States of America and provided in part that "He shall be removed from his office on impeachment by the House of Representatives, and conviction, in the Supreme Court, of treason, bribery, or corruption." (p. 380)

On September 4, 1787, as the Convention was drawing to a close, a Committee of Eleven was created to whom sundry resolutions were referred for additions and alterations. This Committee inserted in the section dealing with impeachment the following change. "The Senate of the United States shall have power to try all impeachments, but no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the members present." But this Committee of Eleven made a further alteration to wit "He shall be removed from office on impeachment by the House of Representatives and conviction by the Senate for treason or bribery." (p. 507)

On September 8, 1787, the Committee of Eleven resumed its work. The clause referring to the Senate, the trial of impeachment against the President, was taken up. Col.

Mason Observed "Why is the provision restrained to treason and bribery only? Treason, as defined by the Constitution, will not reach many great and dangerous offenses. . . Attempts to subvert the Constitution may not be treason as above defined . . . it is more necessary to extend the power of impeachment." Col. Mason moved to add after "bribery" "or maladministration." This was seconded by Mr. Gerry. Mr. Madison then observed, "So vague a term will be equivalent to tenure during the pleasure of the Senate." Col. Mason thereupon withdrew "maladministration" and submitted "other high crimes and misdemeanors against the State." On the question thus altered the vote was Ay 8 No 3 (p. 528) The delegates to the Convention signed the Constitution on September 17, 1787.

What constitutes "high crimes" has eluded most authorities on constitutional law and the English Common Law. Pollack and Maitland, in their definitive "History of English Law" (Vols. I and II) devote a chapter (Crime and Torts), of more than one hundred pages, to an inquiry into crimes. There is much consideration of "petty treason" and "high treason". High treason covers forgeries, the making of counterfeit money and clipping of coin (Vol. II p. 511). But what constitutes "high crimes" has eluded these writers.³

During the trial of Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase for impeachment, a reference was made to Blackstone's commentaries: at one point in the argument it was urged, "Let us try judge Chase by this test, 'A crime or misdemeanor' (says Judge Blackstone) 'is an act committed or omitted, in violation of a public law either forbidding or commanding it.' This general definition comprehends both crimes and misdemeanors, which properly speaking, are mere synonymous terms."⁴

The writers of commentaries, historians and text writers on the constitution, have, each in his own way, attempted to answer the inquiry "what are impeachable offenses".

Kent in his *Commentaries* concluded that "The president, as well as all other officers of the United States, may be impeached by the house of representatives for treason, bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors. . . ." If then "the president will use the authority of his station to violate the constitution or law of the land, the house of representatives can arrest him in his career by resorting to the power of impeachment."⁵

Story, in his treatise *On the Constitution*, answered the inquiry of what are impeachable offenses as follows: "The only practical question is, what are to be deemed high crimes and misdemeanors? Now, neither the Constitution nor any statute of the United States has in any manner defined any crimes, except treason and bribery, to be high crimes and misdemeanors, and as such impeachable."⁶

"Congress have unhesitatingly adopted the conclusion that no previous statute is necessary to authorize an impeachment for any official misconduct . . . It seems, then, to be the settled doctrine of the high court of impeachment that, though the common law cannot be a foundation of a jurisdiction not given by the Constitution or laws, that jurisdiction, when given, attaches, and is to be exercised according to the rules of the common law; and that what are and what are not high crimes and misdemeanors is to be ascertained by a recurrence to that great basis of American jurisprudence (see Jefferson's Manual, Sec. 53, title, *Impeachment*, pp. 29 to 31).⁷

Cooley, in his *Principles of Constitutional Law*, defines impeachable offenses as follows: "The offences for which the President or any other officer may be impeached are any such as in the opinion of the House are deserving of punishment under that process. They are not necessarily offences against the general laws . . . It is often found that offences of a very serious nature by

Footnotes at end of article.

high officers are not offences against the criminal code, but consist in abuses or betrayals of trust, or inexcusable neglects of duty . . .⁸

Pomeroy, in his treatise "Constitutional Law," discusses the grounds of an impeachment at some length. In essence his estimate is that the President or Vice President who has "knowingly and intentionally violated the express terms of the Constitution, or of a statute which charged him with an official duty . . ." is impeachable. He then lists specific instances which make the President culpable. The following two instances have direct bearing on President Nixon's culpability:

(1) The "President has the sole power to carry on negotiations with foreign governments. Congress may not dictate to him, or restrain him, much less make any kind of diplomatic intercourse on his part an indictable offence. But by a rash, headstrong, wilful course of negotiation carried on against the best and plainest interests of the country, although without any traitorous design, he might plunge the nation into a most unnecessary and disastrous war. For such an act he would be impeachable."

(2) The "President as Commander-in-Chief has the sole power to wage war. Congress may not dictate to him the campaigns, marches, sieges, battles, retreats, much less make any method of conducting the actual hostilities an indictable offence. But if his conduct was something more than a mere mistake in the exercise of his discretion, although not an adhering to the enemies of the United States giving them aid and comfort, he might, by a stubborn and wilful persistence in his plans after their failure had demonstrated their futility, bring defeat, disgrace, and ruin upon his country. For such an act he would be impeachable. Many more instances might be given, but these are sufficient for illustration."⁹

Pomeroy in discussing the grounds of an impeachment makes the pointed observation that "Narrow the scope of impeachment, and the restraint over the acts of rules is lessened." He concludes his observations in the following significant language: "The phrase 'high crimes and misdemeanors' seems to have been left purposely vague; the words point out the general character of the acts as unlawful; the context and the whole design of the impeachment clauses show that these acts were to be official, and the unlawfulness was to consist in a violation of public duty which might or might not have been made an ordinary indictable offence." In Pomeroy's estimate the grounds for impeachment is that "The importance of the impeaching power consists, not in its effects upon subordinate ministerial officers, but in the check which it places upon the President and the judges."¹⁰ (emphasis supplied)

The impeachment of President Andrew Johnson

President Abraham Lincoln, even before his death, had approached "Reconstruction" in a constitutional and charitable manner. President Lincoln was prepared to recognize a seceded state when 10% of the population had taken an oath to uphold the Constitution. The radicals in Congress were opposed to this procedure and when President Johnson attempted to enforce Lincoln's policy of reconciliation, they organized their opposition.

Pursuing the Lincoln policy, President Johnson granted general amnesty to all participants in the rebellion who took an oath of allegiance to the United States. Soon after the reorganization of the Southern States, under Lincoln and Johnson, they enacted the "Black Codes." Under these codes, Negroes could be held as vagrants and in assigning them to the highest bidder to work off the fines, a new form of slavery was being reestablished. The reaction in the North to the "Black Codes" was crystallized by Horace

Greeley who said that the South would not "stop short of the extermination of the black race" and the "Chicago Tribune" wrote, "that men of the North will convert the State of Mississippi into a frog-pond before they will allow any such laws to disgrace one foot of soil in which the bones of our soldiers sleep and over which the flag of freedom waves."¹¹

After the 1866 midterm election, the struggle between the Radical Republicans in Congress and President Johnson became acute. A series of Reconstruction Acts were passed; and all were passed over President Johnson's veto. Finally, in March 1867, Congress passed the Tenure of Office Act which prohibited the President from removing officeholders except with the consent of the Senate.

President Johnson thereupon removed Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton. Secretary Stanton refused to resign, the radicals claiming that Stanton's removal was without the consent of the Senate. On March 2, 1868, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution impeaching President Johnson, charging him, in eleven articles, of "high crimes and misdemeanors." The first nine charges were concerned with President Johnson's violation of the Tenure of Office Act. The tenth charge accused him of attacking Congress with "inflammatory and scandalous harangues" and with intent "to bring into disgrace, ridicule, hatred, and contempt the Congress of the United States."

President Johnson escaped impeachment by a single vote. But by the filing of the bill of impeachment, the crisis that confronted the country at that time was overcome. The Radicals regained control of the legislative and the executive branches. The Reconstruction program in the South was reconstituted. The "Black Codes" were eliminated. The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted and the civil rights of Negroes, for at least a decade, were assured (1868-1877).

Of the eleven impeachments that went to trial and which are referred to above, the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson is the principal trial—because of the very nature of the office held by Andrew Johnson—that has a critical bearing upon the contemplated impeachment of President Richard M. Nixon.

GROUNDS FOR THE IMPEACHMENT OF PRESIDENT RICHARD M. NIXON

The publication of the Pentagon Papers by the New York Times and the Washington Post have already demonstrated the conditions under which the United States became involved in the Southeast Asia war and we will not burden this memorandum with more than reference to it.

The "Nixon Edition" of the Pentagon Papers, we must assume, will expose the present Administration's shortcomings and irregularities but in this section we will address ourselves to the specific grounds for the impeachment of President Richard M. Nixon.

The 91st Congress, soon after President Nixon's inauguration (on Feb. 4, 1969) began consideration of the "National Commitments" Resolution" introduced on that day by Senator William J. Fulbright. This resolution was agreed to on June 25, 1969. It reads in part: "Resolved, That (1) a national commitment for the purpose of this resolution means the use of the Armed Forces of the United States on foreign territory, or a promise to assist a foreign country, government, or people by the use of the Armed Forces or financial resources of the United States, either immediately or upon the happening of certain events, and (2) it is the sense of the Senate that a national commitment by the United States results only from affirmative action taken by the Executive and Legislative branches of the United States government by means of a treaty, statute or concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress specifically providing for such commitment."¹²

In the face of this clear expression of the sense of the United States Congress Presi-

dent Nixon, on April 30, 1970 informed the American people that "in order to avoid" a wider war and keep down the "casualties of our brave men in Vietnam" he had ordered American troops to invade Cambodia. In the same address he declared that the invasion of Cambodia was indispensable to the withdrawal of our troops and that if we escalate our efforts in Cambodia it would aid our program of Vietnamization.

One week before the Cambodian invasion, Secretary of State, William P. Rogers testifying before a Senate Committee stated: "We have no inclination to escalate. Our whole inclination is to de-escalate. We recognize that if we escalate and get involved in Cambodia with our ground troops, that our whole program (Vietnamization) is defeated."¹³ Either President Nixon elected to disregard his own secretary's conclusion that we do not intend to escalate or there was deliberate deception. In the words of Professor Richard B. Morris of Columbia University, "Instead of candid communication between the executive and Congress we have had unparalleled doubletalk, evasion and concealment." (New York Times April 13, 1972)

The Cambodian invasion, constituted a "high crime" warranting impeachment. His action was personal in character since his own Secretary of State appeared to be unaware of his plans for the invasion of Cambodia and the act was a high crime because it constituted a commitment of the Armed Forces of the United States on foreign territory without the approval of Congress.

The second "high crime" of which President Nixon is guilty, is the invasion of Laos. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution Repeal was passed on December 31, 1970, and signed by President Nixon on January 12, 1971. This act of Congress terminated any war-making authority vested in the President. Laos was invaded in February, 1971. President Nixon, in signing the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, was aware that his powers to wage war without the approval of Congress would constitute a high crime. And the commitment of air power in support of the South Vietnamese forces without the approval of Congress was in contravention of the "National Commitments" Resolution which forbids the commitment of "Armed Forces", without Congressional action. As a result of the illegal invasion of Laos the admitted losses by the Department of Defense in that undertaking included 174 Americans killed in action, 1,027 wounded, 42 missing in action and in addition 107 helicopters and planes were lost and hundreds more were damaged by enemy gunfire.

At no time prior to February 8, 1971 or thereafter has the Congress of the United States declared war against Laos pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause II of the Constitution of the United States. The U. S. participation with unlimited air support constituted a "high crime" justifying impeachment.

The third "high crime" of which President Nixon was guilty was that his renewal of massive bombardment of North Vietnam was in flagrant violation of Title VI (Section 601) of the Military Procurement Authorization Act for 1972 (P.L. 92-156).¹⁴ This law stated in essence that it is "the policy of the United States" to terminate at the earliest practicable date all military operations of the United States in Indochina and provide for the prompt withdrawal of all American forces subject to only one condition, the release of all American prisoners of war. To implement this policy the statutes called upon the President to "initiate immediately" certain actions: to set a final date for withdrawal of all American forces, to negotiate with the Government of North Vietnam for an agreement providing for "a series of phased and rapid withdrawals" of United States forces in exchange for a corresponding series of releases of American prisoners of war.

Commenting on Section 601 (known as the Mansfield Amendment), prior to the en-

Footnotes at end of article.

actment of P.L. 92-156 (Cong. Rec., Nov. 11, 1971, p. 18288) Senator Stennis said: "Mr. President, the Mansfield amendment in this bill in my opinion is far stronger than the one finally adopted as part of the Selective Service Law. It is true that the House did not agree to a specific date. However, for the first time we now have as a proposed law, language which makes our withdrawal from Indochina 'the policy of the United States', rather than the sense of the Congress as contained in the previous version. For those who supported the Mansfield amendment, I would urge that they closely consider the meaning of this change in language. As a policy matter it binds the Congress and the President of the United States."¹⁵

Nevertheless, the President, upon signing the Act made the following statement: "Section 601 expresses a judgment about the manner in which the American involvement in the war should be ended. However, it is without binding force or effect and it does not reflect my judgment about the way in which the war should be brought to a conclusion. My signing of the bill that contains this section, therefore, will not change the policies I have pursued and that I shall continue to pursue toward this end."¹⁶

On February 16, 1972, Judge John F. Dooling of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York in *DaCosta v. Nixon*, 72 Civil Action 207 ruled on these two conflicting interpretations of the legal effect of Section 601. Judge Dooling agreed with Senator Stennis; holding that: "When the bill embodying Sec. 601 was passed by the Congress and approved by the President's signature it established the policy of the United States to the exclusion of any different executive or administration policy and had binding force and effect on every officer of the government no matter what their private judgments of that policy, and illegalized the pursuit of an inconsistent executive or administration policy. No executive statement denying efficacy to the legislation could have either validity or effect."¹⁷

Judge Dooling's decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit without opinion, on February 23rd, 1972. This decision unless reversed by the Supreme Court is indisputable that the administration's current policy is illegal.

Finally, in light of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, "there are reasonable grounds for regarding Mr. Nixon as responsible for criminal conduct under each of the three categories of offenses charged to the defendants in those trials" to wit, *Crimes against peace, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity*. Professor Richard A. Falk, Milbank Professor of International Law at Princeton University, has arrived at these conclusions in his article entitled, "Why Impeachment."¹⁸

Professor Falk states: "Mr. Nixon has been, in my judgment and in the judgment of other international law experts, guilty of continuing wars of aggression in Vietnam and Laos and of initiating an aggressive war against Cambodia (1970) . . . The periodic resumption of bombardment against North Vietnam since Nixon took office in situations other than self-defense is a direct violation of the UN Charter. . . ." In urging President Nixon's guilt, Professor Falk declares "It is worth recalling that the Nuremberg Judgment emphasized Crimes against Peace as the fundamental offense: 'To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.'"

In considering President Nixon's guilt of "War Crimes", Professor Falk resolved that "Specifically Mr. Nixon has relied upon saturation bombing by B-52 bombers against undefended villages and inhabited areas, has

employed antipersonnel weapons, toxic chemicals and napalm. . . ."

Professor Falk concludes his "Why Impeachment" theses with the affirmation that, "Some might argue that 'international crimes' are not the sort of 'high crimes' that the Constitution contemplated as forming the basis of impeachment proceedings. But surely the Constitution is flexible enough to embrace a range of activities that endanger national, even human, survival and have long been reduced to legal form. International law has been developing on this subject over the life of the Constitution, largely, as I have indicated, at American initiative. Our domestic courts since the last century have applied international law to domestic controversies." Professors Kent, Story, Cooley and Pomeroy have been quoted above on the question of High Crimes and Misdemeanors, and it seems clear that in their opinion the Constitution envisaged the acts of President Nixon as high crimes under Article II, Sec. 4.

A PROJECTED BILL OF IMPEACHMENT OF PRESIDENT NIXON

The mere filing of the Petition for the Impeachment of President Richard M. Nixon will in itself establish the power and responsibility of the members of the House of Representatives to act in behalf of the people when the Judiciary and the Executive have been found derelict and delinquent in the fulfillment of their responsibilities. The American people are now confronted by the continuance of an illegal war in Indochina by an Executive no longer empowered by Congress to do so (repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution) on the pretext that our security compels such participation.

The members of the 92nd Congress constitute a free and unfettered body of spokesmen for the people at this moment in history. Whatever self-imposed limitation fettered the 91st and 90th Congresses, the members of the 92nd Congress are, to be sure, free of it. The election of freshman Congressmen displacing old and entrenched members of the House of Representatives is particularly conspicuous in the 92nd Congress. Thirteen women were elected and the young Congressmen who replaced House members of long standing, points directly to the changes that have taken place during the 5-year Vietnam war period. Congressman Paul N. McCloskey Jr. has adverted, in an address on the floor of the House, to "Impeachment as a check on the Presidential abuse of power."

Judge John F. Dooling Jr., in his decision quoted above in the *Orlando vs. Laird* case, refers to "Congressional pusillanimity" and that Congress is not "inappreciative of its powers, including the power of impeachment."

It is also important to note that the grass roots do not shy away from the use of impeachment as a means to terminate President Richard M. Nixon's abuse of power. The *Harvard Law Record* for May, 1971, reports that a "petition was signed by 400 students and three faculty members, Vern Countryman, Charles R. Nelson and Derrick A. Bell Jr. asking for the impeachment of President Nixon."¹⁹

Our examination of the original records of the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention records procedure ament the removal for "high crimes and misdemeanors" as well as the original records of the President Johnson impeachment proceedings disclose that offenses with which President Johnson was charged were essentially of a minor character. President Johnson was charged with violation of the Tenure of Office Act, in removing Secretary of War Stanton; an act, whose constitutionality President Johnson intended to test. The Bill of Impeachment charged that President Andrew Johnson had made speeches "with intent to bring into disgrace, ridicule, hatred, contempt and reproach the Congress of the United States."

It is submitted that if Congress was justifi-

fied in filing a bill of impeachment against President Johnson in 1869, then the members of the 92nd Congress are not only justified in filing a Bill of Impeachment against President Nixon, but would actually be obliged to do so. Whereas and President Johnson was essentially chargeable with misdemeanors, President Richard M. Nixon is chargeable with "high crimes" in a more positive way. The invasion of Cambodia in violation of the National Commitments Resolution and the spending of American lives in that venture constituted a "high crime" of a most serious kind warranting removal. President Nixon also "wasted" the lives of scores of members of the Air Force when he committed air-military support in the invasion of Laos without the consent of Congress.

More recently, on April 14, 1972, he renewed the bombardment of North Vietnam and included Hanoi, Haiphong, and the second biggest port, Than Hoa. In the current invasion, the United States used an armada of 200 planes, including 17 B-52 bombers. These rained explosives on petroleum depots and warehouses and returning pilots reported major damages with many fires and secondary explosions. The massive raids by B-52s are undertaken at altitudes greater than 30,000 feet and it is inconceivable that they can direct their bombs at such heights to military targets with any degree of accuracy. Thousands upon thousands of civilian casualties have resulted and bombs have hit hospitals, orphanages and schools. In the first three weeks of the current bombings 16 U.S. planes, 20 helicopters have been lost and nine crewmen have been killed, eleven wounded and 42 missing. (*Newsweek*, May 1, 1972), pp. 49-52.

Not only are these renewed raids in violation of our own laws but in blatant violation of the:

(A) Hague Convention No. IV, Annex, Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 18 October 1907, Article 25, which reads as follows: "The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited." and

(B) Hague Convention No. IX Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War 18 October 1907, Article 1, "The bombardment by naval forces of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings is forbidden. A place cannot be bombarded solely because automatic submarine contact mines are anchored off the harbor." (emphasis supplied)

In addition to the Hague Convention, we of course have comparable provisions in the Geneva Convention of July, 1929 (47 Stat. 2074 Treaty Series 847) and Geneva Convention August, 1949 (T.I.A.S. 3365) to which the United States is a signatory, and the U.S. Field Manual which embodies the Law of Land Warfare (36 Stat. 2277, Treaty Series 539).

President Nixon was inaugurated in January 1969. His earliest commitment was a proclamation that he would — to terminate Vietnam hostilities and bring peace to that part of the world. On June 25, 1969, less than six months later, the U.S. Senate adopted a resolution, quoted above, the essence of which was "that it is the sense of the Senate that a national commitment by the United States results only from affirmative action taken by the executive and legislative branches of the United States Government by means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both houses of Congress specifically providing for such commitment".

President Nixon committed American military forces on three specific occasions: (1) In ordering the Cambodian invasion, he did not consult or secure the consent of Congress, thus violating the Constitution; (2) In February 1971 his commitment of armed forces in support of the Laos invasion with-

out Congressional action violated the Constitution and lacked Congressional affirmative in view of the earlier repeal of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution; (3) In April 1972 he committed unrestrained naval and air forces for the bombardment of North Vietnam, singling out particularly as targets Hanoi and Haiphong, in violation of the Constitution and the express terms of the Mansfield Amendment to the Military Procurement Authorization Act (Title VI; Sec. 601).

President Nixon's commitment of armed forces vis-a-vis the invasion of Cambodia in 1970, the aerial invasion of Laos in 1971, and the re-escalation of the air and naval war over North Vietnam—all done without the affirmative action or even the knowledge of the Congress—constituted "high crimes and misdemeanors" within the purview of Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution, warranting the presentation of a Bill of Impeachment. Respectfully submitted.

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American Policy Towards Vietnam.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ *Orlando vs. Laird*, 317 Supp. 1013, p. 1019.
- ² Committee of the Judiciary, "Legal Materials on Impeachment"—Special Subcommittee on H. Res. 920, August 11, 1970, pp. 4-5.
- ³ *The History of English Law* by Frederick Pollack and Fredric William Maitland. Cambridge U. Press, England, 1911 at Vol. II, p. 511.
- ⁴ Trial of Samuel Chase, Impeached for High Crimes and Misdemeanors—Taken in short-hand by Samuel H. Smith and Thomas Lloyd, Washington City, 1805, printed by Samuel H. Smith.
- ⁵ Kent, *Commentaries*, Vol. I, 1826 edition, pp. 270-271.
- ⁶ Story, *On the Constitution* (5th edition 1891), Sec. 796, p. 580.
- ⁷ Idem. Sec. 799, p. 583.
- ⁸ Cooley, *Principles of Constitutional Law*, 4th Edition (1931) Sec. 9, p. 205.
- ⁹ Pomeroy, *Constitutional Law*, Third edition, Sec. 719, pp. 484-485.
- ¹⁰ Idem. Sections 725, 726 pp. 498-491.
- ¹¹ Carmen and Syrett, *A History of the American People*, Alfred A. Knoph, New York, Vol II, p. 22.
- ¹² S. Res. 85, 91st Congress, 1st Session.
- ¹³ Life Magazine, 5/22/70, p. 36, Clark Clifford, "Set a Date in Vietnam. Stick to It. Get Out."
- ¹⁴ See Hon. James Aboruzek, Congressional Record and Extension of Remarks, April 19, 1972, E4012.
- ¹⁵ Cong. Red., Nov. 11, 1971, p. S18288.
- ¹⁶ Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Nov. 22, 1971, p. 1531.
- ¹⁷ Idem.
- ¹⁸ Richard A. Falk, "Why Impeachment" The New Republic, May 1, 1971 p. 13.
- ¹⁹ *Harvard Law Record*, May 6, 1971 p. 4.

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ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE
NEW NAZIS

HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, in the Chicago Tribune's Perspective Page of Sunday, May 7, the distinguished academician, S. I. Hayakawa, commented on the attitude which threatens academic freedom as exhibited by present day campus radicals.

I believe this to be an especially thought-provoking and timely commentary and I insert it into the RECORD: [From the Chicago Tribune, May 7, 1972]

ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE NEW NAZIS

(By S. I. Hayakawa)

Not too long ago threats to academic freedom were all from outside the university—from reactionary business interests, anti-Communist witch-hunters, and patriotic societies suspicious of intellectuals.

Today the situation is reversed. Ever since the fall of 1964 when the University of California at Berkeley capitulated to the gangster tactics of dogmatic zealots of the Left, the greatest threats to academic freedom have come from within—from students, from faculty activists who egg them on, and administrators who knuckle under to their demands.

The latest sad story comes from Sacramento State College. Last November Dr. William Shockley, Nobel physicist who believes that Negroes may be genetically inferior to whites and continues to ask support for research into the genetic determinants

of intelligence, was invited by Dr. Carole W. Barnes, associate professor of sociology, to speak to her class. The meeting was so disrupted by black students that the talk was canceled.

PROFESSOR IS CRITICIZED

You might think that the faculty, to whom academic freedom is well-nigh sacred, might call for the punishment of the students who by violent means forced the cancellation of Dr. Shockley's talk. What happened instead is that the college's Racial Discrimination Commission, consisting of faculty, students, and staff, criticized Prof. Barnes for having invited Shockley to speak and recommended that she not be permitted in the future to teach her course in intercultural relations.

Under pressures such as these, President Bernard L. Hyink reprimanded Dr. Barnes for having invited Dr. Shockley and urged her, according to William Trombley in the Los Angeles Times, to consider withdrawing from the class. [She refused, bless her heart!]

What a sell-out! Imagine a war in which the captain of a unit puts up a fight for his country, suffers a setback, and is reprimanded by his commander in chief for having fought at all!

An especially spineless response to the black student disruption was that of John Livingston, acting dean of arts and sciences. "The completely free reign of ideas is not such an absolute value that it overrides all others," he is quoted as saying. "[It] has itself become a kind of disguised institutional racism. . . . An invitation to Shockley to speak is simply an assault on black dignity."

What rubbish! The free play of ideas may not be an absolute value that overrides all others in business, the military, or the church—or even in family life. But it is fundamental to a democratic society—that's what the First Amendment is all about—and it is essential to the intellectual life of a university.

Furthermore, there is profound racism in Livingston's remark that an invitation to Shockley to speak is "an assault on black dignity." How fragile does he think black dignity is?

Every nonneurotic Negro I know, whether professional man, businessman, or domestic servant, is unperturbed by Dr. Shockley. "Let him test his theories," they say. "We'll do all right." It is only the insecure blacks—and the condescending liberal whites who believe in black inferiority but won't admit it—who do not want Dr. Shockley's theories discussed or tested. If they are sure that there are no genetic differences in intellectual potential, why don't they welcome a test of the theory so that that particular ghost may be laid to rest once and for all?

CLASSES ARE DISRUPTED

Shockley's classes in electrical engineering at Stanford have been disrupted by white radicals. Prof. Arthur Jensen's classes at Berkeley and Prof. Richard Herrnstein's at Harvard have been under consistent attack because they have raised the same questions as Shockley. The students come not to dispute or refute them, but to shoot them down.

Academic freedom is sharply under attack from young Nazis, both white and black. They are given support by middle-aged knuckleheads who above all are afraid of being called reactionary or racist.

So it's rising Nazism all over again. We cannot afford to forget that the Hitler Youth Movement was full of starry-eyed idealists, like the Students for a Democratic Society, tired of the slow, difficult process of democracy, like the SDS, impatient for a regenerated and purified world.

President Hyink—Bernie, my friend—please don't let them do this to you. Fight back. Not for Shockley, but for all the geniuses and nuts who constitute our beloved academia.

WYDLER FIGHTS JET NOISE

HON. JAMES R. GROVER, JR.

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. GROVER. Mr. Speaker, a recent story in the Long Island Press of March 26 by the outstanding Washington correspondent, Dick Seelmeyer, praised my colleague from Long Island, JACK WYDLER. Congressman WYDLER has long been a leader in the fight against jet noise and that is a subject about which many people talk and only a few produce results. The article speaks for itself, and it follows in its entirety:

CONGRESSIONAL ACCOMPLISHMENT:
MYTH AND REALITY
(By Dick Seelmeyer)

WASHINGTON.—The shrill months quickly descending upon us undoubtedly will be filled with all sorts of political bunk on behalf of candidates of both parties, whose voter appeals will be based greatly on the plea that "our party needs me in Washington."

The real fact of congressional accomplishment has almost nothing to do with political party divisions. Like it or not, the seniority system—in both parties—is the real key to having any power in Washington. Persuasion and personality may compensate somewhat when it comes to the larger national goals, but in the basic "gut" issues so important in any congressional district, the real motivating factor is common regional needs and goals, not political philosophy.

As a brief example, consider the accomplishment last week by Rep. John Wydler, Garden City Republican, in convincing the House Science and Astronautics Committee to include in its bill his amendment to provide the National Aeronautics and Space Administration with \$41 million to conduct a crash jet aircraft retrofitting (anti-noise) program.

To anyone living in the metropolitan area who has watched the jet aircraft noise problem becoming worse each year, and has watched federal programs set up to deal with it wither away months of precious time, there is little need to be told of the importance of the program to the northeastern section of the United States.

But Wydler is a member of the minority party and could not have muscled the measure through committee, had not a majority of its Democratic members cooperated.

And since Wydler is experienced enough to know that authorization is meaningless without the money to implement a program, his first move was to seek help from two influential members of the appropriations committee, both Democrats.

Reps. Joseph Addabbo of Ozone Park and Edward Boland of Massachusetts listened and nodded approval. Both of them, like Wydler, have for years sought every available means of fighting aircraft noise. They considered Wydler's proposal innovative and workable.

Without their help, Wydler's plan would have simply been words on paper. Now, when it is finally passed the program will be armed with monetary "teeth" and should advance the fight against jet noise by several years.

It is doubtful that Wydler or Addabbo or Boland ever gave a moment's thought to the fact the measure was a bi-partisan effort: it became a good way of resolving an irritating problem, and each did what he could.

That spirit of working for the common regional good is far more widespread than public statements and press releases would have people think. Obvious restrictions are always present, of course, as in instances where re-

districting throws two incumbents together. At that point each man is on his own, and congressional colleagues of both parties are studiously careful not to interfere.

But in day-to-day operations, members of Congress are much more concerned with helping their home areas than in scoring points for the party.

SIGHTS AND SOUNDS OF WAR IN HANOI

HON. PAUL N. McCLOSKEY, JR.

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Speaker, yesterday's San Francisco Chronicle contained an on-the-scene report of the results of our bombing in North Vietnam the previous day. The story describes a situation which should cause grave concern to all of us in light of the almost universal view that no more American lives should be risked in Vietnam. To kill others, particularly Vietnamese civilians, in a war in which we ourselves are no longer willing to die is a tragic distortion of our once-respected goals of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

The article follows:

SIGHTS AND SOUNDS OF WAR IN HANOI
(By Joel Henri)

HANOI.—Houses in central Hanoi shook under the impact of bombs dropped by American aircraft yesterday in what appeared to be a violent attack on areas around the capital.

The rumble of a long series of explosions could be heard even by people who had sought refuge in underground shelters.

From outdoor observation posts, the explosions—wave after wave at five-minute intervals for 35 minutes—could be heard very clearly.

TARGETS

Still unconfirmed reports said the targets included the small commune of Phe Xuyen some 20 miles from Hanoi.

I spent the previous night at Phu Xuyen. Nothing in the locality except perhaps a small rail and road bridge could constitute a military target.

Phu Xuyen was a target of the United States Air Force several times during the Johnson administration.

Other unconfirmed reports said the Hao Binh region 25 miles west of Hanoi also was attacked.

Some explosions seemed to have occurred much closer. Rumors which could not immediately be checked said U.S. aircraft dropped leaflets over Hadong commune less than six miles from Hanoi urging the population to evacuate their homes before coming "raids of destruction."

Hadong is devoid of any strategic significance, in the view of observers here. It is a small town with a teacher's training college, a secondary school and agricultural cooperatives for the surrounding area.

In Hanoi, a special plane was expected late yesterday to evacuate staff members of the diplomatic missions of Eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union, who were not considered as "indispensable" for the working of their missions.

FOREIGNERS

Many foreigners, including diplomats and correspondents, who have to remain in North Vietnam, might be evacuated to less dangerous areas in the coming hours.

Prior to yesterday's raids, I visited the bomb-scarred provinces of Thanh Hoa and Nam Ha to the south of Hanoi, where American warplanes have hit schools and hospitals over the past fortnight.

If the raiding F-5 Phantoms were aiming for military targets such as convoys I saw no evidence of it—but together with about a dozen foreign newsmen I saw evidence of what the civilian population has suffered from American bombing.

NIGHT

We left in the middle of the night to avoid and unpleasant experiences with American planes, and set out along deserted Highway No. 1 which leads south to Saigon.

As we pushed south the villages came to life, and the first farm workers set out with their buffaloes for the rice fields. Soon we met our first road traffic: Military trucks loaded with children being taken to safety from the coastal areas.

Frequently we had to wait for the ferries to cross rivers, and beneath the trees, never far from slit-trenches, others were also waiting, some grouped around the small stalls selling coconut milk, bananas and ricecakes.

DISTURBANCE

Watching the groups of peasants standing in the early morning, chatting, it was hard to believe that the threat of war had disturbed the calm flow of their lives—but war has changed this life, and the almost medieval "technology" of rural Asia now co-exists with a modern more mechanical world.

While the ferries are often pulled across the river by hand-made cables, bulldozers are hidden in camouflaged shelters to repair roads damaged by bombs and rockets. Traditional wooden bullock carts pull off the road to let five-ton Chinese trucks and Soviet-built missile trailers pass.

Another indication of this modern world is the frequency with which the word "may-bay"—the Vietnamese for plane—crops up, and the new habit—quickly adopted by all travelers—of glancing up anxiously at the sky whenever one is in the open.

HOSPITAL

At the end of our journey was the Thanh Hoa provincial hospital 75 miles south of Hanoi. The destruction stunned our party.

It was hard to believe that this could have been the result of a mistake. The buildings are surrounded by rice fields. And the hospital has already been attacked before, last December, when the damage was shown worldwide on television.

The latest raid—on April 27—brought a shower of 36 bombs onto the hospital: 12 were giant 2000-pounders, and the rest were anti-tank bombs which penetrated the concrete roofs of the hospital as well as the air-raid shelters, the hospital's chief doctor told us.

In the enormous 45-foot craters and the rubble, the wreckage of operating tables and X-ray equipment could be seen. The death toll was 12—and now the 600-bed hospital has been evacuated to the mountains.

Our next stop was six miles south, in the village of Dong Yen, where five aircraft dived out of the sky to hit the primary school during morning classes. Five bombs fell, leaving 20 dead and 25 wounded. The village is still shocked and silent. In the ruins of the school scattered books, burned and torn, lie among shattered desks. A childish drawing showing the circulation of the heart floats on the water which now fills one of the giant craters.

We looked for the military targets which might have justified the raid—for artillery, radar aerials or machine guns. There was nothing. Just mud and straw huts.

The only "radar" here which gives only a few seconds warning of an approaching raid is supplied by children perched in the branches of trees, who bang on drums and blow whistles to sound the alert.

THE ORGANIZED RESERVE AND
NATIONAL SECURITY

HON. JOHN P. HAMMERSCHMIDT
OF ARKANSAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT. Mr. Speaker, the Chief of the Office of Reserve Components recently visited Little Rock to address a meeting of the Arkansas Reserve Officers Association.

Lt. Gen. Harris W. Hollis presented a timely and thoughtful appraisal of the reserve mission and its importance. I respectfully commend it to the attention of my colleagues. The remarks follow:

IF WE WANT TO

(By Lt. Gen. Harris W. Hollis)

Shortly before leaving Washington, I was reminded that Arkansas is unique in having our nation's only diamond mine. A replica of the "Star of Arkansas" was included in a display of reproductions of world-famous gems in the Pentagon concourse. Your state is blessed with a wealth of minerals and other natural resources; yet its true richness remains its people. Our nation has called on this human resource in times of need and has always "mined" a treasure. At the close of World War I almost 64,000 Arkansans were members of our armed forces. As World War II ended, about 200,000 Arkansans sons and daughters were in the military uniform. Many of you were among that number, following paths blazed by your forefathers. We see in those who served and do now serve "Stars of Arkansas" of a different character but nonetheless of a shining hue.

As we flew over the Arkansas River on our way, I saw that miracle of modern engineering that made Little Rock one of the nation's newest inland port cities, a project in which Army Engineers proudly played a role.

My remarks today are concerned with stewardship. That seems to be appropriate on the day when our income tax forms are filed. Now that you and I and millions of other taxpayers have relieved our wallets of sizable amounts to support the processes of government, including the Reserve Components, this seems to be a good time to talk about it; not partisanly, but as pragmatically as I can.

We all know that greater reliance is being placed on the Reserve forces these days. The citizen-soldiers in the Selected Reserve are already on notice to the American people that their units will be the primary augmentation of the active forces in future emergencies.

The Secretary of Defense has underscored this in no uncertain terms.

But yet the point is questioned. How many times have you heard these questions: "What are Reserve forces for?" "Why do we need them?" "Why must I serve?"

I was reading the other day Will Durant's marvelous history of the Reformation, and I was struck by one recurrent tendency in that period between the Fourteenth and Seventeenth Centuries; namely, a propensity of nations and peoples to resort to armed conflict, conflict arising from competing wills between groups of humans, each intent on a particular purpose. And, while Durant chronicled the violence of that age, he did it against the backdrop of a larger historical frame: a span of man's history between the Fifteenth Century, B.C., and the Nineteenth Century, A.D., during which for every one year of peace that transpired there were approximately thirteen years in which war of some sort occurred.

The record of the Twentieth Century is no less sanguinary: two major conflagrations almost engulfing the civilized world, and limited wars and minor wars by the score in this modern age of man.

And America as a foremost world power has been involved in a number of these.

As we seek disengagement from the war in Vietnam, man hopefully looks anew to a utopian peace.

Well-meaning individuals today, placing their trust in a belief that nonviolent arbitration alone can now solve all our ills, are demanding that war "be outlawed" and that arms be dismantled. The thought of armed force is painful to them. They do not see a need for significant American military power. Rather, they perceive that man can at last have his "Walden Pond" and keep it safe from the wolves, without the use of this power, if one but listen to them. I do not agree with the reasoning, as attractive as it may sound. It is a new and tenuous search for the golden fleece; it is a dream of things that never were. It would be a boon if such could be, but, alas, it is in the nature of man, himself, that war has its origin.

General George C. Marshall, in the aftermath of World War II counselled us about our dreams and our misunderstandings. He finally brought us victory in a war we had to fight, but which might have been prevented had we perceived the realities. He saw the tragic misunderstandings that came from our tendency to think in an absolutist and simplistic way. Recall how we sought refuge in weakness in the Thirties; how we undertook to legislate the outlawing of war, witness the Neutrality Acts; how we made moral preachments in the face of hostile power—all to no avail. We miscalculated and the war came. And one might look at the moral effects on man that these public tendencies wrought; almost 300,000 American dead, and millions of others; more than 340 billion dollars in national treasure expended.

Listen to General Marshall:

"We finish each bloody war with a feeling of acute revulsion . . . and yet on each occasion we confuse military preparedness with the causes of war and then drift almost deliberately into another catastrophe . . . Until it is proved that . . . a solution has been found to . . . (eliminate) war, a rich nation which lays down its arms as we have done . . . (before) will court disaster."

For a while General Marshall was heeded but a retreat into weakness in the late Forties soon tempted North Asian communist powers to assault Korea—and once more we were involved in a war we might have deterred with our power, had we had it.

Between Korea and now our policies have been oriented more to the realities of conflict than before. We have seen, some of us, that instances of non-intervention can be just as immoral, perhaps even more so, than intervention. After all, the Good Samaritan intervened. Would he have been more moral had he not? The problem is not so simple.

But in our frustrations with the latest phase of the struggle, some would draw strained conclusions about America's need to use responsibly its power in this day and age in maintaining justice, political community and order within the world.

Paul Ramsay, that eminent Professor of Religion at Princeton University, in his book, *The Just War*, reasons eloquently that "Peace and justice are not linked by an invisible hand, nor can political life endure without the use of force"—possibly armed force.

We Americans should know this too and try to avoid the fetters of wishful thinking.

Ours is a world pregnant with the potentiality of conflict; a globe of exploding populations and unsatisfied aims and hopes; an estate of frustrated dreamers and "get-rich-quick" international gamblers. The tensions, the stresses and strains are all around us—

in the Far East, in that bridge across three continents, the Near East; in the aspirations of those within the Western Hemisphere—Cuba is a case in point—who would export revolution throughout; in Europe where an uneasy equilibrium of power is juxtaposed between a growing and ambitious complex of Soviet armed force and that of the nations of the free world—where a balance of power favorable to our interests is the keystone of our security in the decades ahead; indeed a must. The potentiality for mischief in these times looms large.

In all of this, George Washington's ancient counsel seems today to be abundantly wise:

"There is a rank due the United States among nations that will be withheld if not absolutely lost by the reputation of weakness. If we desire to avoid insult . . . we must be ready to repel it. If we desire peace, one of the institutions of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war."

It is in this context of political reality that the mission of our Reserve Component forces takes on new meaning and new criticality. They are vital to our long term well-being; and the new policies take this into account.

Policies of the past, that bypassed the Reserves, have been discarded. A new challenge has been issued to us. The Reserve Components must be more ready than they ever were before in peacetime.

To get them that way we are moving forward on a broad front.

We are issuing new, modern equipment, including aircraft, reversing the mid-Sixty trend when much of the Reserve equipment, but not the Reserves themselves in meaningful numbers, were mobilized for the Vietnam conflict. Now direct, hands-on training can be accomplished at home station. We are looking anew at our training methods.

More dynamic training is in the mill. We are conducting a series of tests to determine the best ways to increase Reserve Component combat capabilities and to make them available as early as practicable.

Lest you think we have solved our problems, new ones are replacing those the Army has or is trying to solve.

The flood of incoming equipment presents maintenance and security problems.

Increased readiness for these combat units requires close-in training areas.

Not unexpectedly we are having trouble with maintaining our personnel strength. Six years ago the number of enlistees under the six-year Reserve program were large—some motivated by the draft—others filling to 100% the Selected Reserve Force units of that time. These enlistments are being terminated this year—just as we entered a no-draft environment.

An intensified recruiting and retention system has been organized and in the Army National Guard the strength is on the upswing. The U.S. Army Reserve, however, is encountering more trouble.

We are asking Congress for enlistment and reenlistment bonuses—and are planning other benefits. But even this will not fully satisfy the issue.

Admittedly, we have been late getting started in these matters, but let's not kid ourselves—the problem is more profound than that.

Given the way many are thinking, will we be able to man the force? Will we be able, in a no-draft environment, to attract quality youth to our ranks?

There is a lot of criticism of the military these days, some of it justified, much of it not. The armed forces, including the Reserves, have become the symbol of dissatisfaction with aspects of government policy on the part of those who do not like the draft, the war, and who are frustrated with problems in the cities, overpopulation, the environment and the high taxes needed to

carry out the affairs of the government. As antimilitary sentiments have grown, opposition in some segments of our society has come to impugn the very legitimacy of the armed forces. And thus our basic relationships are strained. This does not make for good recruiting.

It bears saying at this point that if we are really to achieve the full promise of our democracy today, we will have to pay more careful attention to our civilian-military relationships—and in an informed and sustained way. The ad hoc and kaleidoscopic analysis that dominates so much of our public discussions of this matter in these frustrating times does not greatly encourage balance, perspective, and reasoned outlooks; nor informed opinions.

In the world in which we live this day, an antimilitary emotion is as bad a guide to public policy as is a militarist emotion. The outlooks of all of our citizens ought to be reasonably free of both. When passion runs tyrant to the mind, it is hard for reason to flourish.

While we all want the development of a volunteer, professional army—active, National Guard, Army Reserve—I think we must be careful that we do not permit such an army to be politically alienated from the mainstream by contributing to things that tend to polarize the military from the people at large.

The Reservist must be convinced that the time and efforts he devotes to the Reserve Component units is important, is worthwhile to him and essential to his nation. We in the military must demonstrate these truths to him by our leadership and excellence. Others, too, must help.

I think we all need to take a stalwart view of the matter. I know that many people do. I know that some do not.

As I go about the country, I am from time to time asked the question, "Do you really think the Reserves can perform the mission which the Secretary of Defense has set out for them?"

That is a pertinent question. It is made all the more pertinent when one considers that by 1974 about 45% of the strength of the Army will reside in the Reserve Components. It is pertinent when one considers that about one and a half billion dollars were appropriated for the Army Reserve forces in 1972, and something under two billion is asked for 1973. The question is not only pertinent, the business at hand is serious, very serious.

My answer to that question is "Yes, if we want to. If the American people want to." It is more a question of national will than national capability. We have the means. Perhaps a better question to ask is, "Do we want to?" Are we willing each to contribute sincerely to these enterprises in appropriate ways? We should stand up before our mirrors and ask ourselves this. Those of us who have children should ask it of ourselves in recognition that these very children are hostages to the fortunes of tomorrow. They are influenced by our attitudes, our leadership, our goals, our capacity for hard work and sacrifice, our state of energy in pursuit of these goals.

I do not accept the view that the sturdy people of this land cannot do this job. We can do it if we all put our shoulders to the wheel and keep a gleam in our eyes.

We can do it, if the opinion makers and the state, city and county fathers—at large—stress the importance and honorable nature of the task of the citizen-soldier.

We can do it, if the employers throughout the land recognize that their larger interests are served by a program which encourages their employees to participate in the Reserve Component program; if they recognize that moves to discourage the Reservist are short-sighted and dangerous in the longer term.

We can do it if those romantic, 20th Century, Jacobin bent students and their young, affluent instructors in the universities throughout the land, who protest so loudly against the U.S. military, will strive to gain a better understanding of the historical processes and show more open-mindedness about military matters.

War is the foremost social problem of mankind and where else should it receive objective study but on the campuses? For we ought to look to the colleges for reasoned analysis in these matters, not inflamed rhetoric. We need their powers of sound analysis unfettered from the distortions of passion.

We can do the job, if there is a widespread understanding that with our modern equipment, now being delivered, we need places to train—and that our installations and training areas are important to that end. It is paradoxical that some would have these taken away for other uses, at the very time when the government is emphasizing more than ever the role of Reserve forces.

We can do this job, if all of us get our sights lined up on what is really important to us. We hear a lot about priorities these days, and this is appropriate. As for me, I can hardly think of a higher national priority than a program which keeps us free and reasonably safe in a competitive world.

We can get our Reserves ready and strong if we all understand how important it is for each of us first to decide that we are going to do it; to decide that the matter is indeed important and must be done.

"The commands of democracy", as Woodrow Wilson said, "are as imperative as its privileges."

I have unbounded faith in the American people, young and old.

When the issues are clear, I believe that they will overwhelmingly want to insure that our powder is dry and our defenses sure. Keeping the Reserve Components strong is part of that sure way.

As they see ahead their freedom worth enjoying, they will surely see it worth defending, and worth perfecting; so that justice, liberty, order, and the pursuit of happiness may be more fully realized—at home and for men of good will everywhere.

THE GREAT FRUSTRATION

HON. BILL ALEXANDER

OF ARKANSAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Speaker, we in Congress daily hear requests from Federal Government agencies and officials, from municipal officials, from county officials, and from State officials. They all want the same thing—more money to carry out their projects and run their government. And, in almost all cases, while we will agree that they do need the money, we also know there is very little in the pocketbook to pass out. It is a frustrating process. In today's RECORD, I am including an article expressing the frustrations of another person who is continually asked for money—the source of our revenue—the taxpayer. He also feels there is very little left in his pocketbook to pass out. And, to this one beleaguered man, it seems that taxes are becoming slowly but surely even more certain than death.

The article follows:

PUT-UPON CITIZEN

(Reprinted From the Pittsburgh Press)

My present financial condition is due to the effects of Federal laws, state laws, county laws, corporation laws, by-laws, brothers-in-law, mothers-in-law, and outlaws that have been foisted upon an unsuspecting public.

"These laws compel me to pay a merchants tax, capital stock tax, excess tax, income tax, real estate tax, property tax, auto tax, gas tax, water tax, light tax, cigar tax, street tax, school tax, syntax, and carpet tax.

"In addition to these taxes, I am requested and required to contribute to every society and organization that the inventive mind of man can organize.

"The government has so governed my business that I do not know who owns it.

"I am suspected, expected, inspected, disrespected, examined, reexamined, required, commanded and compelled until all I know is that I am supposed to provide an inexhaustible supply of money for every known need, desire or hope of the human race. . . .

"The only reason I am clinging to life is to see what is coming next."

TIME TO SOUND TAPS FOR TAPS

HON. LES ASPIN

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to include in the RECORD today an excellent analysis by the Sierra Club of the final environmental impact statement on the trans-Alaska pipeline recently released by the Interior Department. Those of my colleagues interested in this important issue will find the Sierra Club analysis informative and interesting. It follows:

TIME TO SOUND TAPS FOR TAPS

The environmental impact statement on the trans-Alaska pipeline system (TAPS) has been released by the Department of the Interior. It lists in great detail the magnitude of the certain and threatened harm to Alaska that would result from the construction and operation of the pipeline and road, the further development of the Prudhoe Bay oil field, necessary marine transport systems from Valdez to other west coast ports, and a probable gas pipeline from Prudhoe Bay through Canada.

These are the problems environmentalists have been hammering away at for three years. Finally, the Interior Department and the Alaska Pipeline Service Company agree they exist. In contrast to an earlier draft environmental impact statement, the final version is much more comprehensive. However, basic information on many problems is still lacking. While attempts are made to quantify the impact the pipeline would have on the environment, this process has not been carried to completion. Potential future uses of threatened resources are not adequately evaluated. Endangered resources are not weighed with reference to what is happening to similar assets elsewhere.

The adverse impacts of this project are many and complex. The most significant admitted by the impact statement itself are:

1. The largest remaining wilderness in the United States would be cut in half and its character forever changed.

2. Public access to northern Alaska would be considerably accelerated, both as a direct and indirect result of pipeline construction and operation. This would threaten the wil-

derness qualities of this area and render difficult the orderly and sensitive growth of potentially valuable developments that could benefit the state for a long time to come.

3. The construction and operation of the pipeline and its associated road, construction pad, and oil field in this permafrost-laden area will be difficult and expensive, and would result in considerable erosion, sliding, drainage pattern change and siltation.

4. Pipeline construction will have a detrimental effect on the vegetation, destroying over 61 square miles of surface cover. Re-vegetation proves to be exceedingly difficult in the Arctic.

5. Pipeline construction will have a negative effect on freshwater life and on fisheries because of unavoidable siltation.

6. The extensive requirements for construction materials (83 million cubic yards) will place a heavy burden on gravel deposits near the construction right-of-way.

7. Despite all precautions, heat loss from the pipeline would cause significant changes over a wide area, particularly in drainage patterns.

8. The noise and activity of construction would reduce the size of the habitat for several species of large mammals and would indirectly and significantly increase the hunting pressure upon them. Aerial transportation for pipeline operation, maintenance and surveillance would cause continuing disruption.

9. The pipeline itself, elevated for over 50% of its length to avoid problems with permafrost, would create a virtually uncrossable barrier to the migrations of several species of large mammals.

10. Oil terminal operations at Valdez and recipient ports on the west coast would contribute to the degradation of the marine environment, for a series of large and small oil spills are inevitable, as well as water contamination by ballast containing oil. This would be particularly hard on the relatively unspoiled marine environment and valuable fisheries of Prince William Sound.

11. The pipeline and associated systems would directly commit a total of 602,000 acres of Alaskan land to development.

12. There would always remain the threat of inevitable oil spills from the pipeline rupture due to earthquakes, landslides, differential land settlement in unstable soils, various permafrost effects and stream erosion.

13. The siting of several of the pump stations remains in question because of soil instability. Pump station operations would cause industrial-level noise, with unknown effects on wildlife, and they would also emit from 15 to 150 pounds of hydrocarbons per hour into the air to the detriment of delicate Arctic lichens.

14. The pipeline and oil development would be no panacea to the Alaskan economy. The result would be further inflation and continuing unemployment, in spite of the new jobs available in construction, and it would result in a surge in unemployment when pipeline construction is completed. The increased demand for goods and services would place heavy burdens on the Alaskan economy and on the state government in advance of any revenues from oil production.

THE CANADIAN ROUTE

It is clear from the environmental impact statement that one route through Canada would be better than the trans-Alaskan route, particularly when a gas route through Canada is part of the plan. However, the Sierra Club believes that neither route would be as desirable as halting North Slope development. A Canadian route would bring North Slope oil closer to where it is most needed, the areas of the country most dependent on outside petroleum sources. It would also be safer from both environmental and physical security points of view, avoiding risky marine transport and the earthquake belt of southern Alaska.

A Canadian route is already under serious consideration by oil consortia and by the Canadian government in connection with oil and gas transport from the Canadian arctic and gas transport from the North Slope. (In reality, a Canadian route is an alternative to two routes—one through Alaska plus one through Canada.)

OIL AND ENERGY

It is a mistake to maintain that an increase in energy consumption is equivalent to improving our well-being. The principles of ecology tell us that unlimited growth in anything is impossible—be it population or energy. We are already straining our energy resources, and we have begun to borrow against an uncertain future. We are depleting our non-renewable energy resources at an alarming rate. We also easily forget that all energy pollutes, and that the more energy we use, the more pollution we create. We are already paying a heavy price in lost land, and dirty air and water.

We need new public policies immediately that call for:

1. using less energy in the future, and using it less wastefully now;

2. developing new, better sources of energy;

3. halting the destruction taking place for the sake of energy—strip mining, loss of wilderness, oil contamination of the marine environment, thermal and air pollution from refineries and power generating plants; and

4. conservation of our dwindling non-renewable energy resources.

The environmental impact statement assumes unlimited growth in energy consumption. However, now is an appropriate time to begin educating the public toward changing their attitudes. At maximum capacity in the 1980s, the pipeline system would be able to deliver only two million barrels of oil per day to the "lower 48" states, yielding only about 4% of our total energy requirement and about 9% of our oil requirement. In the decade until then, we can make up for this amount by developing alternate energy sources and by curtailing growth rates in energy use. Reducing the demand for energy is not going to be easy. A major public commitment to find ways to be less wasteful of energy will be required.

The impact statement also claims that no other energy source can fill our needs as cheaply and as well as oil. This reasoning does not take into account the fact that oil is both a polluting and a non-renewable resource. In the past, the cost of oil did not include the cost of pollution caused by the oil from the time it is pumped from the ground to the time it is used. And because oil is a non-renewable resource, we must include the social cost of having less oil available for the future and the resulting cost of developing substitutes. These environmental costs—pollution and depletion—when added to the price of oil, make us realize that we pay more than we may think. And if we do not take these costs into account, we undersell other energy sources as well.

We are already running short of natural gas. In spite of the fact that peak production is now occurring, natural gas is not available to everyone who would like to use it, and prices are rising. When the peak in oil production is reached, probably within 50 years, it will be accompanied by similar restrictions. Now is an appropriate time to change public policies on oil.

Moreover, the choice is not to find a single, simple substitute for North Slope oil, as the environmental impact statement implies. Rather, the choice is to find a combination of policies and substitutes that will get us beyond our present impasse. There is no single substitute, but we can find the correct combination of policy changes and alternatives. The four billion dollars that would be spent on the pipeline would be better spent

in research with more far-reaching and long-term results.

Coal gasification and liquefaction, and nuclear and geothermal power offer short-term alternatives. Nuclear breeder reactors, nuclear fusion, and solar energy offer the prospect of significant amounts of power farther in the future. Processes such as topping cycles and magnetohydrodynamics will allow us to make more efficient use of fossil fuels. Technological advances will allow us to extract more oil from existing fields.

We cannot afford to wait until we run out of oil to develop new, less polluting alternatives. We must make a major commitment now instead of trying to postpone the inevitable by taking needless risks with our environment in an effort to drain what remains of the earth's oil supply.

We take this opportunity to call upon the President to establish a Commission on Energy and the American Future to examine the energy growth of our country and to recommend policies that will carry us not only for decades, but for centuries. Large-scale energy development, like that on Alaska's North Slope, should await the outcome of opportunities to achieve a broader consensus of our society.

IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Our national security, according to the environmental impact statement, calls for the immediate development of North Slope oil. This argument assumes that it is in the best interest of our country to be as self-dependent as possible, as quickly as possible, in case of the sudden unavailability of oil from the eastern hemisphere. For this reason, the United States has a restrictive oil import policy designed to promote domestic oil development.

We believe this argument is questionable. First, it does not take into account the long-term cost to our national security of a depleted and no longer available domestic oil resource. Second, even at maximum capacity of two million barrels per day, North Slope oil would not make much difference in our dependence upon insecure eastern hemisphere oil which would still amount to about one-third of all oil consumed. Finally, the parts of our country most dependent upon eastern hemisphere oil—the east and the midwest—would benefit only indirectly from Alaskan oil, unless a pipeline through Canada were selected.

Moreover, there are better solutions to the problem of "insure" foreign sources of oil as well. These include: (1) a federal program of oil exploration, placing new discoveries in reserve until needed; (2) federal purchase of domestic oil fields; and (3) storage of oil in salt domes and previously depleted oil fields until needed. Storage could be accomplished with less expensive foreign oil, allowing us to remove restrictive oil import quotas. Such reserves could also "buy time" to develop North Slope and offshore fields if we really got into trouble.

WHAT CAN BE DONE

The plan has changed. We know much more. Our view of what constitutes relevant environmental considerations has changed. The basic research carried out by the Department of the Interior and the Alyeska Company will ultimately be of great benefit to business, government, and all citizens. We must compliment them for the amount of time and effort that has gone into these studies. It is true that some environmental problems have been overcome. It is true that everyone has now agreed to take care of the Alaskan environment and to do their best to minimize the harm that would take place. But care and minimization are not enough.

"A country that runs on oil can't afford to run short" says an American Petroleum Institute advertisement. We agree: oil does run America. That worries us. We cannot afford to run short. That also worries us. We

have come to depend on oil, but we can lessen that dependence before it is too late. We will run out of oil sooner or later—and the Sierra Club believes it should be later. The use of a non-renewable resource should be difficult. The less that remains, the more difficult it should be to use it. The time has come to end our self-delusion about oil.

The Sierra Club reiterates its demand for a five-year moratorium on pipeline construction. This time should be used for fuller consideration of the alternatives presented in the environmental impact statement.

In the meantime, it is urgently important that concerned citizens write to President Nixon and Secretary of Interior Rogers Morton asking that they delay issuance of the permit until adequate solutions to the environmental problems are found, and to schedule hearings to permit citizen comment on the impact statement. Write or wire:

President Richard M. Nixon, The White House, Washington, D.C. 20500.

Secretary of Interior Rogers C. B. Morton, Interior Building, Washington, D.C. 20240.

REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, MAY 1972

HON. JOHN D. DINGELL

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, so that the information therein contained may be available to my colleagues, I include the text of the May 1972 issue of the Council on Environmental Quality's "102 Monitor" at this point in the RECORD:

MORE STATES ENACT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT REQUIREMENTS

Last July the 102 Monitor reported that California, Washington, Delaware, Montana, and Puerto Rico¹ had enacted statutes requiring environmental impact statements on State actions analogous to the statements required on Federal actions by Section 102 (2) (C) of the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). Similar provisions have now been enacted by three additional States: Wisconsin, North Carolina, and Indiana.² In addition, at least one State, Hawaii, has implemented impact statement requirements through Executive Order.³ Legislative proposals for comparable provisions are pending in over a dozen States.⁴

Although State requirements continue to be modeled for the most part on Section 102 (2) (c) of the National Environmental Policy Act, a number of differences in approach are evident, particularly with respect to the scope of the impact requirement. The scope of the requirement has been adjusted in at least two ways: first, with respect to the range of actions that will require an impact statement; second, with respect to the entities required to file such statements.

The latter question is resolved in NEPA by making the § 102 requirement applicable to "all agencies of the Federal Government." On the State level the question is whether the requirement should similarly be made applicable to all governmental agencies functioning within the State, or whether distinctions should be drawn, for example, between local and State agencies. Most of the State provisions appear to limit applicability to "agencies of the State" without indicating whether this description is intended to encompass governmental units below the highest level. The California Act, however, contains specific provisions dealing with the responsibilities of local agencies,⁵ the Puerto Rican Act applies to "all agencies of the Government," and the Washington Act specifically includes "all branches of govern-

ment of this State, including State agencies, municipal and public corporations, and counties."

One interesting development on the State level in terms of the entities required to file impact statements is the extension of the requirement to certain essentially private activities. The North Carolina Act, for example, provides in a separate section that:

"[t]he governing bodies of all cities, counties, and towns acting individually, or collectively, are hereby authorized to require any special-purpose unit of government and private developer of a major development project to submit detailed statements . . . of the impact of such projects."⁶

A similar provision is contained in a separate Wisconsin enactment.⁷

With respect to the range of actions requiring impact statements, most State provisions parallel the Federal requirements in covering "major," environmentally "significant" actions. One frequently recurring issue is whether such actions include only projects carried out by the State agency itself, or extend as well to such State "actions" as granting of a license or permit to carry on private activity. The California Act, for example, applies to any State-proposed "project" which could have a significant effect on the environment, and the question of whether the term "project" extends to licensing actions is currently being tested in the California courts.⁸ Other State Acts exclude licensing activities either explicitly, as in the case of Indiana,⁹ or indirectly, as in the case of North Carolina, which limits application of the impact statement requirement to "actions involving expenditure of public moneys for projects and programs significantly affecting the quality of the environment . . ."

In light of the increased interest in State legislation in this area, this issue of the 102 Monitor reprints the discussion paper developed at a recent State-Federal Workshop on State Environmental Policy Acts, indicating some of the issues that a State might consider in adopting legislation requiring environmental impact statements. The variety of approaches being explored by States in responding to the same environmental concerns which led to enactment of NEPA promises to provide a valuable opportunity for experimentation and exchange of experience in making the governmental decision process more responsive to environmental concerns.

FOOTNOTES

¹ See 102 Monitor, Vol. 1, No. 5 (July, 1971). For relevant portions of the texts see Appendix A.

² See Wisconsin: *Laws of 1971*, chap. 274 published April 29, 1972; North Carolina Environmental Policy Act of 1971, *General Statutes of North Carolina*, chap. 113A; Indiana: Pub. Law 98, 1972 *General Assembly Laws* (awaiting publication). The North Carolina Act provides for expiration on September 1, 1973, unless extended. A recently enacted "Virginia Environmental Quality Act" has no provisions for impact statements, the requirement having been deleted in legislative session. See *Va. Code tit. 10*, chap. 16, arts. 1-2, §§ 10-176 to 10-185.

³ Executive Order, August 23, 1971.

⁴ Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Ohio, Oklahoma and New Mexico are all reported to be considering variations on similar legislation.

⁵ See Appendix B.

⁶ North Carolina Environmental Policy Act, § 113A-8 (emphasis added). The Act further defines "major development project" to include "shopping centers, subdivisions and other housing developments, and industrial and commercial projects" *Ibid.*, § 113A-9(1).

⁷ See Assembly Bill 873 "An Act to Amend 30.19(4), 31.06(3) and to create 23.11(5) of the *General Laws*."

⁸ Friends of Mammoth v. Mono County Board of Supervisors (Calif. 3D Civil No. 13255).

⁹ Public Law 98, section 6.

WORKSHOP DISCUSSION PAPER: STATE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACTS, MARCH 15-18

The discussion in the workshop focused on problems of drafting and implementing a State Environmental Policy Act. Using the National Environmental Policy Act as an example, and drawing on the experience of States which had passed similar Acts,^{*} a number of issues were raised for consideration by any State proposing to adopt an Environmental Policy Act. These issues were presented in terms of ways in which a State Act might profitably differ from the Federal Act in order to reflect either differences between State and Federal Governments or the results of experience to date under the National Act.

Listed below are the major points raised for consideration, together with a brief report of the workshop discussion on each point. In many cases, the considerations on both sides of an issue were explored without reaching a definite conclusion. In other cases, some form of consensus emerged from the discussion. The following summarizes these results.

ISSUES TO CONSIDER IN DRAFTING A STATE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT

(1) What differences should be made between State Act and NEPA to reflect State-Federal differences:

(a) Section 101
(i) Should there be the same broad declaration of policy?

It was generally agreed that a broad declaration of environmental policy was desirable. The real problem however, was thought to be one of relating this broad declaration to other specific provisions of law for implementing the policy. An Act which had only a policy declaration, without an "action-forcing" mechanism would probably be ineffective. At the same time in adopting an "action-forcing" mechanism, one should be aware that the policy declaration will affect the obligations which such a mechanism places on governmental units.

(ii) Should there be a definition of environment?

No views were expressed concerning the desirability of the need to define "environment" in the Act itself. Some members of the workshop indicated, however, that a definition of this term was important at some point in implementing an Environmental Policy Act. One State has developed a list of environmental indices to help define the term. The general problem posed by attempts at definition is the problem of the relationship between "environmental" concerns on the one hand, and more traditional social, economic, and technical concerns on the other. An excessively broad definition of the "environment" would tend to obliterate the distinction among these different concerns, while an overly narrow definition would eliminate legitimate factors from an environmental assessment of a project.

(iii) Is the range of State concerns likely to be broader or narrower than the range of concerns expressed in Section 101(b) (1)-(6).

It was not suggested that the range of environmental concerns would differ for States. It was pointed out that the factors listed in § 101(b) (1)-(6) would be viewed as partially defining the term "environment," thus leading to the problems discussed above. The effect of an action on population patterns was discussed as an example of the range of considerations which probably should be included in an "environmental" analysis.

(iv) Should express provisions be made with respect to public availability of information or public hearings?

*See Appendix A.

It was agreed that some provision should be made for public availability of information and public comment.

(b) Section 102

(1) Is the requirement that agencies use a "systematic, interdisciplinary approach" a realistic one when applied to State agencies?

In theory, this requirement is unobjectionable as an expression of the thoroughness with which agency actions should be evaluated. In practice, however, there may be a real problem in securing an adequate budget and staff to make the requirement realistic in every governmental agency. A number of possible solutions to this problem were discussed, including the possibility of using outside contractors, the possibility of drawing on existing expertise in other agencies and the possibility of centralizing the environmental analysis in a single agency. It was suggested that States might wish to supplement the range of expert agencies contacted for comment by including relevant Federal agencies.

(ii) Are there State agency actions which do not have Federal counterparts and which might present unanticipated problems in complying with the impact statement requirements?

Zoning actions and similar land-use decisions do not seem to have a Federal counterpart. Applying an impact statement requirement to all local zoning board decisions, for example, might prove excessively burdensome. Some States may also face problems in applying an impact statement requirement to both State and local agencies (although no such problems have apparently been encountered in the case of California).*

States adopting an Environmental Policy Act should be aware of peculiar local-State relationships under existing constitutions or State laws which may need to be taken into account.

(ii) Is there any reason why the same NEPA section 102(2)(C) procedures should not be used on both the Federal and State levels?

Although this question was not explicitly answered, a number of alternatives to the impact statement process were discussed, including the possibility of replacing the impact statement process requirement with a central agency having environmental veto power (discussed further below), and the possibility of requiring impact statements only when requested by specified agencies. If the decision to follow the impact statement procedure is made, the balance of considerations would favor a State practice similar to the Federal practice.

(2) What differences should be made in a State Act to reflect experience to date under NEPA?

(a) Environmental Impact Statements.

(1) What provisions should a State Act include in order to avoid duplication on a project which represents both Federal and State "action"?

It was generally agreed that duplication should be avoided where both Federal and State agencies are involved in the same project. It is proposed under the California Act, for example, that a guideline be issued to avoid the requirement of two impact statements.

In the course of discussion, other problems were raised in connection with State-Federal involvement in the same projects. It was suggested that thought should be given to which agency—State or Federal—was the most suitable one to prepare an impact statement in cases where Federal involvement was perhaps less than that of the State. It was also urged that thought be given to the problem of projects financed through several Federal agencies (or financed as a result of revenue sharing) in which case, in the absence of specifically defined State

responsibility, there may be no environmental assessment at all. Both of these possibilities seemed to indicate a possible need for increased State responsibility in preparing environmental analyses. As State environmental impact statements procedures are evolved, further consideration can be given to the relationship of the State analysis to the analysis required of Federal agencies under NEPA.

Are there major State agency actions which should not be subject to the impact statement requirement (e.g., environmental, protective regulatory actions taken by an agency similar to the EPA).

Two types of actions were suggested as possible candidates for exemption from an impact statement requirement: (1) Environmental protective regulatory activities; and (2) Actions which have only "beneficial" environmental effects.

In opposition to these suggestions, it was pointed out: (1) that both types of activities may have secondary detrimental effects which should be explored in an impact statement; (2) that actions which protect the environment may nevertheless not protect enough; and (3) that decisions as to what is or is not "beneficial" may themselves be suspect.

In favor of the suggested exemptions, it was pointed out that a State which faces difficulties in enacting a completely comprehensive Act, may want to attack the major problems first. These are the problems of "developmental" as opposed to "environmental" agencies, and of "adverse" as opposed to "beneficial" environmental effects.

(ii) Should a new State Act contain provisions explaining how the Act should be applied to actions commenced prior to passage of the Act?

It was generally agreed that a State Act should explicitly address the "retroactivity" problem in order to avoid later confusion. In favor of applying an Act to ongoing programs and uncompleted projects already under way, the Federal experience was cited which requires impact statements for remaining commitments to be taken into account in balancing the environmental costs against the economic and technical gains. In favor of applying an Act only to new projects, the possibility of avoiding confusion and delay of projects already under way was stressed. In choosing among these positions it was suggested that a State should consider the amount of "backlog" projects which will be affected by retroactive application. If the State limits the availability of funds to a given fiscal year, this should also be considered in approaching a "backlog" problem.

(iv) Should a State Act describe the standard of judicial review to be applied under the Act? What standard should courts apply?

A variety of citizen suit provisions were discussed as were various standards of judicial review of agency compliance with State Environmental Policy Act. It was noted that States which had adopted broad citizen suit provisions have not experienced the flood of suits which had been forecast. No consensus emerged, however, concerning the desirability of such provisions. With respect to standards of judicial review, most members seemed to agree that agency decisions should not be subject to *de novo* judicial review, but instead more traditional, limited standards of review should apply. States proposing an Environmental Policy Act should consider whether existing standards of judicial review of administrative action would be applied or whether explicit standards of review need to be spelled out in the Act.

(v) Should an impact statement requirement be extended beyond State agency actions to environmentally significant private actions?

No consensus emerged for extending an im-

act statement requirement beyond actions taken by governmental units. The general problem was raised of the extent to which a governmental "handle" (i.e. permit, license, etc.) on an otherwise private action should justify or permit complete environmental regulation of the activity. A number of instances were cited in which such authority had been exercised.

(b) Administration of the Act.

(1) Should a State Act create a central agency to prepare and/or evaluate impact statements?

The advantage of a central agency to prepare or evaluate impact statements lies in the possibility of avoiding duplication of effort and of possibly insuring more objective environmental appraisals. The advantage of requiring each agency to prepare the statement lies in the possibility that this will increase the environmental consciousness of the agency. Which choice is preferable is probably best left to the decision of individual States.

(ii) Where should the responsibility for implementation of the Act and issuance of guidelines be located?

It was generally agreed that some check in the form of guidelines or the ability to require impact statements should be located outside the action-agency. The Governor's Office appeared to be a suitable place for locating the responsibility for issuing guidelines. The possibility of creating a central agency with "veto" power was discussed, without reaching a conclusion.

APPENDIX A

1. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332:

"(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall—

"(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on—

"(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,

"(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,

"(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,

"(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and

"(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.

"Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public as provided by section 552 of title 5, United States Code, and shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes;"

2. Cal. Public Resources Code, §§ 21100, 21104 (West 1970):

"§ 21100. All state agencies, boards and commissions shall include in any report on any project they propose to carry out which could have a significant effect on the environment of the state, a detailed statement by the responsible state official setting forth the following:

"(a) The environmental impact of the proposed action.

* See Appendix B.

"(b) Any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided if the proposal is implemented.

"(c) Mitigation measures proposed to minimize the impact.

"(d) Alternatives to the proposed action.

"(e) The relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity.

"(f) Any irreversible environmental changes which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented."

"§ 21104. Prior to the making of a detailed statement, the responsible state official shall consult with, and obtain comments from, any governmental agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved."

3. Montana Environmental Policy Act, Montana Session Laws of 1971, Ch. 238 § 4(b) (March 9, 1971):

"(b) all agencies of the state shall

"(3) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for projects, programs, legislation and other major actions of state government significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement on—

"(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,

"(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,

"(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,

"(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and

"(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.

"Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible state officials shall consult with and obtain the comments of any state agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the appropriate state, federal, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the governor, the environmental quality council and to the public, and shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes."

4. Public Environmental Policy Act, Puerto Rico Session Laws of 1971, Law No. 9 § 4(2) (June 18, 1970):

"All agencies of the Government shall:

"(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other governmental actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on:

"(i) the environmental impact of the proposed actions,

"(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,

"(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,

"(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and

"(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.

"Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the appro-

appropriate agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the Governor, the legislative bodies, the Environmental Quality Board, and to the public, and shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes."

5. State Environmental Policy Act of 1971, Washington Session Laws of 1971, Ch. 109 § 3(2) (May 10, 1971):

"... all branches of government of this state, including state agencies, municipal and public corporations, and counties shall:

"(c) Include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major actions significantly affecting the quality of the environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on:

"(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action;

"(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented;

"(iii) alternatives to the proposed action;

"(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity; and

"(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented;

"(d) Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any public agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the appropriate federal, province, state, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the governor, the department of ecology, the ecological commission, and the public, and shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes."

6. Coastal Zone Act, Delaware House Bill No. 300 as amended. (passed June 28, 1971): § 7002. *Definitions.*

(c) 'Environmental Impact Statement' means a detailed description as prescribed by the State Planning Office of the effect of the proposed use on the immediate and surrounding environment and natural resources such as water quality, fisheries, wildlife and the aesthetics of the region.

§ 7004: *Uses allowed by permit only.* Non-conforming uses.

(a) ... manufacturing uses ... are allowed in the Coastal Zone by permit only ...

§ 7005. *Administration of this chapter.*

(a) The State Planning Office shall administer this chapter. All requests for permits for manufacturing land uses and for the expansion or extension of non-conforming uses as herein defined in the Coastal Zone shall be directed to the State Planner. Such requests must be in writing and must include ... (3) an Environmental Impact Statement. "The State Planner shall hold a public hearing and may request further information of the applicant."

7. Wisconsin, Laws of 1971, Ch. 274 (Apr. 29, 1972):

§ 2. *Governmental Consideration of Environmental Impact.*

(2) All agencies of the state shall:

(c) Include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a de-

tailed statement, substantially following the guidelines issued by the United States Council on Environmental Quality under P.L. 91-190, 42 U.S.C. § 4331, by the responsible official on:

1. The environmental impact of the proposed action;

2. Any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented;

3. Alternatives to the proposed action;

4. The relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity;

5. Any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented;

6. Such statement shall also contain details of the beneficial aspects of the proposed project, both short term and long term, and economic advantages of the proposal.

7. Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any agency which has jurisdiction or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the appropriate agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards shall be made available to the governor, the department of natural resources and the public. Every proposal other than for legislation shall receive a public hearing before a final decision is made. Holding a public hearing as required by another statute fulfills this section.

If no public hearing is otherwise required, the responsible agency shall hold the hearing in the area affected. Notice of the hearing shall be given by publishing a class 1 notice, under ch. 985, at least 15 days prior to the hearing in a newspaper covering the affected area. If the proposal has state-wide significance, notice shall be published in the official state newspaper;

8. North Carolina Environmental Policy Act of 1971, *General Statutes of 1971*, ch. 113A:

§ 113A-4. Cooperation of agencies; reports; availability of information.—The General Assembly authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible:

(2) Any State agency shall include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and actions involving expenditure of public moneys for projects and programs significantly affecting the quality of the environment of this State, a detailed statement by the responsible official setting forth the following:

a. The environmental impact of the proposed action;

b. Any significant adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented;

c. Mitigation measures proposed to minimize the impact;

d. Alternatives to the proposed action;

e. The relationship between the short-term uses of the environment involved in the proposed action and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity; and

f. Any irreversible and irretrievable environmental changes which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.

Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any agency which has either jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such detailed statement and comments shall be made available to the Governor, to such agency or agencies as he may designate, and to the appropriate multi-county regional agency as certified by the Director of the Department of Administration, shall be placed in the public file of the agency and shall accom-

pany the proposal through the existing agency review processes. A copy of such detailed statement shall be made available to the public and to the counties municipalities, institutions and individuals upon request.

9. Indiana Public Law 98, 1972 General Assembly Laws:

"All agencies of the State shall . . .

Include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on—

- (1) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
- (2) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,
- (3) alternatives to the proposed action,
- (4) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
- (5) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.

10. Executive Order, Office of the Governor of Hawaii, April 23, 1971:

The heads of all affected States agencies shall:

- (b) Include, in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation, and any other major State actions or projects utilizing State funds and/or State lands, that significantly affect the quality of the human and natural environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on (1) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (2) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (3) alternatives to the proposed action, (4) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (5) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented;

APPENDIX B

The relative portions of the California Act dealing with local agencies are as follows:

Chapter 4. Local agencies

21150. State agencies, boards, and commissions, responsible for allocating state or federal funds on a project-by-project basis to local governmental agencies for land acquisition or construction projects which may have a significant effect on the environment, shall, unless exempted by formal procedures developed under the provisions of Section 21103 require from the responsible local governmental agency a detailed statement setting forth the matters specified in Section 21100 prior to the allocation of any funds other than funds solely for planning purposes.

21151. The legislative bodies of all cities and counties which have an officially adopted conservation element of a general plan shall make a finding that any project they intend to carry out, which may have a significant effect on the environment is in accord with the conservation element of the general plan. All other local governmental agencies shall make an environmental impact report on any project they intend to carry out which may have a significant effect on the environment and shall submit it to the appropriate local planning agency as part of the report required by Section 65402 of the Government Code.

SOURCES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS

In order to receive more efficient and prompt service, requestors are urged to order

draft and final impact statements from the Department of Commerce's National Technical Information Service (NTIS) rather than the preparing agency. Each statement will be assigned an order number that will appear in the 102 Monitor (at the end of the summary of each statement) and also in the NTIS semi-monthly Announcement Series No. 68, "Environmental Pollution and Control." (An annual subscription costs \$5.00 and can be ordered from the NTIS, U.S. Department of Commerce, Springfield, Virginia 22151.)

Final statements will be available in microfiche as well as paper copy. A paper copy of any statement can be obtained by writing NTIS at the above address and enclosing \$3.00 and the order number. A microfiche costs \$0.95. (Paper copies of documents that are over 300 pages are \$6.00.)

NTIS is also offering a special "package" in which the subscriber receives all statements in microfiche for \$0.35 per statement. Statements will still be available for public scrutiny in the document rooms of the various agencies. However, only limited copies will be available for distribution.

Yet another possible source of statements is from the Environmental Law Institute, 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. To order a document, please indicate the Department, date, and ELR Order # (given at the end of each summary). The Institute charges \$0.10 per page, and as you will note the number of pages is also given at the end of the summaries. Please enclose the correct amount of money with your order and mark the envelope to the attention of the "Document Service."

SOURCE FOR BACK ISSUES OF THE 102 MONITOR

Because the supply of past issues of the 102 Monitor is not sufficient to meet all requests, a list is provided below indicating where the various issues of the 102 Monitor appeared in the *Congressional Record*. You may wish to order these *Congressional Records* from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (\$25 per copy).

- Vol. 1, Nos. 1, 2, & 3: *Congressional Record* (page E 3607) April 23, 1971.
- Vol. 1, No. 4: *Congressional Record* (page E 5151) May 27, 1971.
- Vol. 1, No. 5: *Congressional Record* (page E 6023) June 16, 1971.
- Vol. 1, No. 6: *Congressional Record* (page E 8458) July 28, 1971.
- Vol. 1, No. 7: *Congressional Record* (page E 9483) September 13, 1971.
- Vol. 1, No. 8: *Congressional Record* (page E 10002) September 24, 1971.
- Vol. 1, No. 9: *Congressional Record* (page E 11596) November 1, 1971.
- Vol. 1, No. 10: *Congressional Record* (page E 12213) November 15, 1971.
- Vol. 1, No. 11: *Congressional Record* (page E 13322) December 11, 1971.
- Vol. 1, No. 12: *Congressional Record* (page E 76) January 18, 1972.
- Vol. 2, No. 1: *Congressional Record* (page E 1886) March 2, 1972.
- Vol. 2, No. 2: *Congressional Record* (page E 2409) March 13, 1972.
- Vol. 2, No. 3: *Congressional Record* (page E 3778) April 13, 1972.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS

(On the following pages are environmental impact statements received by the Council from April 1 through April 30, 1972.)

NOTE.—At the head of the listing of statements received from each agency is the name of an individual who can answer questions regarding those statements.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Contact: Dr. T. C. Byerly, Office of the Secretary, Washington, D.C. 20250 (202) 388-7803.

Title, Description, and Date
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service

Final

Cameron, Willacy, Hidalgo, and Stan Counties, Texas. The proposed action would allow a new Continental Cane Sugar Producing Area, of 25,700 acres, in the Lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas. It is intended that the acreage be committed to sugar early in 1972. Sugar production involves considerable burning of the cane to remove trash. A sugar processing plant would be part of the action. Its effluent would be discharged to an existing floodway. Total capital investment of the action is estimated at \$28,800,000, including the factory, farms, and farm and transportation equipment. Comments made by EPA. (ELR Order 4117, 73 pages) (NTIS Order PB-206 263-F) 4/4.

Animal and Plant Health Service

Final

1972 Gypsy Moth Suppression and Regulatory Program. Proposed USDA cooperation with state agencies in Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin to suppress and/or regulate the gypsy moth. Approximately 200,000 acres would be sprayed with carbaryl. Certain beneficial non-target insects and arthropods will be reduced in number; the possibility exists for run-off into area water supplies. Comments made by DOC, HEW, DOI, state agencies, and concerned citizens. (ELR Order 4079, 255 pages) (NTIS Order PB-205 589-F) 3/31.

Farmers Home Administration

Final

O'Brien and Sioux Counties, Iowa. Proposed issuance of a \$1,900,000 loan to Rural Water System No. 1 in order to develop water resources to serve over 500 rural families in a 170 sq. mile area. Comments made by USDA, EPA, HEW, DOI, and concerned citizens. (ELR Order 4081, 60 pages) (NTIS Order PB-202 790-F) 3/31.

Forest Service

Draft

Multipurpose Brushland Modification on Seven Plant Associations on National Forest Lands, California. Proposed reduction of brushland sites, through the use of mechanized equipment, prescribed burning, and herbicides; and replanting with grasses and forbs. The purpose of the action is to mitigate the potential for brush wildfires and subsequent flooding. (ELR Order 4242, 62 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 373-D) 4/20.

Lolo National Forest, Missoula County, Montana. Proposed aerial spray demonstration (in cooperation with the Department of Defense), on approximately 3,000 acres of western spruce budworm infested timber on the Ninemile Range District. Zectran is the agent to be used. One of the project objectives is to test the suitability of using large cargo aircraft as spray planes in forest environment. Some non-target terrestrial and aquatic insects are susceptible to Zectran. (ELR Order 4232, 51 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208, 381-D) 4/19.

Road Construction Program, Kootenai National Forest, Montana. Proposed 3-year road construction program, primarily in order to support timber cutting. Approximately 5,000 acres will be stripped of vegetative cover; 40% of this acreage will be permanently removed from vegetative production. Some big game range will be lost. (ELR Order 4238, 28 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 372-D) 4/20.

Aerial Tramway, Port of Cascade Locks, Oregon. Proposed construction of a tramway to a point of land above the Columbia River with a view of the "Great Gorge of the Columbia." Topping and removal of trees will be necessary; the introduction of visitors by a mechanical means to a point of land now

seldom visited will affect the ecosystem of the area. (ELR Order 4140, 53 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 914-D) 4/6.

Rogue River National Forest, Oregon and California. Proposed implementation of the 10-year Timber Management Plan, which includes construction of access roads, and clearcutting and shelterwood cutting of trees. Siltation of streams because of surface erosion is expected. (ELR Order 4261, 26 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 577-D) 4/25.

Snyder Hill Planning Unit, Colville National Forest, Washington. Proposed implementation of a revised Multiple Use Plan. Approximately 6,500 acres of roadless area would be provided with road and managed for timber, wildlife, aesthetic, and research values. Soil disturbance, erosion, and stream sedimentation will occur due to road construction and logging. (ELR Order 4234, 42 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 380-D) 4/19.

Final

Cooperative Spruce Budworm Suppression Project, Aroostock and Penobscot Counties, Maine. Proposed treatment of 500,000 acres of state and private woodlands with Zectran, in order to suppress the spruce budworm. Non-target areas and insects will also be affected. Comments made by USDA, DOC, EPA, HEW, state and local agencies, and concerned citizens. (ELR Order 4241, 88 pages) (NTIS Order PB-206 057-F) 4/20.

Siskiyou National Forest, Oregon and California. Proposed application of the herbicides 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T or atrazine on 11,358 acres in 204 separate tracts. The intent of the action is to reduce vegetative competition to conifer crop trees. The visual impact of the treated tract will be undesirable for several years; temporary harmful effects to aquatic life may result; changes in wildlife habitat will occur, with big game browse area being reduced. Comments made by USDA (ARS), EPA, DOC (NOAA), state and local agencies, and concerned citizens. (ELR Order 4267, 56 pages) (NTIS Order PB-206 404-F) 4/25.

Rural Electrification Administration

Draft

New Madrid Station Unit 2, New Madrid County, Missouri. Proposed loan of \$72,180,000 to Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. in order to help finance a 600,000 kw coal-fired steam-electric generating unit. Thermal discharge to the Mississippi River will be 2620 x 10⁶ Btu/hr. at full load. (ELR Order 4166, 273 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 179-D) 4/11.

Soil Conservation Service

Draft

Oliver Bottoms Resource Conservation and Development Project, Sebastian County, Arkansas. Proposed installation of 1.4 miles of channel improvement and appurtenant pipe overfall structures for grade stabilization and erosion control on a 521 acre watershed. (ELR Order 4154, 8 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 044-D) 4/7.

Eagle-Tumbleweed Draw Watershed Project, Chaves and Eddy Counties, New Mexico. Proposed watershed and flood control structures, including a floodwater retarding structure, 2 diversions and an outlet channel. Approximately 1229 acres of rangeland would be committed to the project. (ELR Order 4177, 17 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 176-D) 4/19.

Chicod Creek Watershed, Pitt and Beaufort Counties, North Carolina. Proposed construction of 66 miles of stream channel works, 11 rock dams, 30 water control structures, 10 sediment traps, 1 warm-water impoundment, 2 wildlife wetland preservation areas, and land treatment measures. The purposes of the action are watershed protection and flood control. Approximately 576 acres would be lost to the project; five miles of stream fishery habitat would be lost. (ELR Order 4188, 46 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 299-D) 4/19.

Pickett Creek Watershed, Marion County, West Virginia. Proposed conservation land treatment measures construction of one floodwater retarding structure, and 7,030' of channel work, including levees, floodwalls, and stream channel improvements. Twenty-two residences will be displaced, and 3,500' of free-flowing stream eliminated, as a result of the action. (ELR Order 4126, 17 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 385-D) 4/19.

Final

Eden Watershed, Yazoo County, Mississippi. The watershed consists of 11,528 acres of delta land and 1,992 acres of bluff hill land. The project consists of conservation land treatment supplemented by one floodwater retarding structure, three grade stabilization and sediment control structures, 25 miles of stream channel enlargement, and 4 miles of new channel. Sixty-six acres will be committed to the project; water quality levels will be decreased because of turbidity. Comments made by Army COE, EPA, HEW, DOI, and state agencies. (ELR Order 4289, 32 pages) (NTIS Order PB-202 301-F) 4/26.

Winters Creek Watershed, Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska. Proposed conservation land treatment, and construction of one floodwater retarding structure and 7.2 miles of channel enlargement. Construction of the project will necessitate periodic inundation of 400 acres of grassland which is in the flood pool area; this land is presently considered to be wildlife habitat. Comments made by Army COE, EPA, HEW, DOI, and the Governor of Nebraska. (ELR Order 4266, 20 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 584-F) 4/25.

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Contact:

For Non-Regulator Matters: Mr. Joseph J. DiNunno, Director, Office of Environmental Affairs, Washington, D.C. 20545 (202) 973-5391.

For Regulatory Matters: Mr. Christopher L. Henderson, Assistant Director of Regulation for Administration, Washington, D.C. 200545 (202) 973-7531.

Title, Description, and Draft

Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station, Weld County, Colorado. Proposed issuance of an operating license to the Public Service Co. of Colorado for the Fort St. Vrain Station. The station will utilize a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor and a conventional steam-turbine generator which will generate 842 MWt and 330 MWe. Approximately 1000 curies of gaseous radioactive wastes and 0.04 curie of liquid radioactive waste will be released per year to the environment. (ELR Order 4236, 154 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 371-D) 4/19.

Marine Yankee Atomic Power Station, Montsweag Bay, Maine. Proposed issuance of an operating license to the Marine Yankee Atomic Power Co. for the station. The plant uses a pressurized water reactor with net electrical output of 855 MW. (Salt) cooling water will be withdrawn from the Back River on Montsweag Bay, and discharged to Bailey Cove. These waters are part of the Sheepscot River estuary. Cooling water will be heated to 25° F above ambient, and will enter Bailey Cove (to Montsweag Bay) at 950 cfs; sea worms and soft shell clams in the Cove will be killed. Approximately 350 additional hours of fog per year may result from the operation of the plant. (ELR Order 4301, 121 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 647-D) 4/27.

Indian Point Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 2, Westchester County, New York. The plant will have three units, each with a pressurized water reactor. This statement refers to the issuance of an operating license to the Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., for Unit 2, but considers the environmental impact of simultaneous operation of Units 1 and 2. Another statement will be prepared for Unit 3. The electric output of Unit 2 is 873 MWe. A total of 2600 cu. ft./

sec. of water for once-through cooling and service water systems will be drawn from the Hudson River and heated by 15° F prior to discharge through a canal to the River; it has not been adequately demonstrated by the applicant that thermal discharge standards meet New York State criteria; dissolved oxygen levels in discharge water may be reduced to 3 ppm or less—oxygenation may be required; the operation of Units 1 and 2 with the present cooling system has the potential, because of mechanical, thermal, and chemical (chlorine) conditions, for long term environmental impact on the aquatic biota inhabiting the Hudson River which could result in permanent damage to the fish population in the river, Long Island Sound, the adjacent New Jersey coast, and the New York Bight. (ELR Order 4210, 405 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 314-D) 4/14.

Vermont Yankee Power Station, Windham County, Vermont. Proposed issuance of an operating license to the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. for the operation of the Station. The project consists of a single unit boiling reactor with a power rating of 1593 MW(t), which will have a power output of 540 MW(e). The reactor will be cooled by a once-through flow of water pumped from, and returned to, Vernon Pond, an existing impoundment of the Connecticut River. Mechanical cooling draft towers will also be used. Pond water will be heated from 50 to 10° F by cooling water effluent; residue chemicals will be introduced to the pond; radioactive effluents may be released; local air may be contaminated with fog formed by condensed water vapor from the cooling towers. (ELR Order 4192, 209 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 311-D) 4/14.

Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2, Surry County, Virginia. Proposed issuance of an operating permit to the Virginia Electric and Power Co. for the operation of Surry Units 1 and 2. Each unit has a pressurized-water reactor with a power output of 2,441 MWt which will produce 822.5 MWe. Gross capacities, however, are expected to be 2,546 MWt and 855 MWe each. Waste heat of 12 billion Btu/hr. will be dissipated by pumping cooling water from the James River through the station's steam condensers and back into the river. Water from the James will be heated 14° F/gal.; the discharge will be made 5.7 miles upstream from intake in order to minimize thermal effects upon nearby oyster seed beds; fish and plankton will be lost at intake; minor quantities of chemical waste will be discharged to the James; negligible quantities of radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents will be released (ELR Order 4141, 209 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 049-D) 4/7.

Highland Uranium Mill, Converse County, Wyoming. Proposed issuance of an operating license to the Humble Oil and Refining Co. for the Highland Uranium Mill. The mill is a conventional acid-leach, solvent extraction uranium ore processing plant with a capacity of 2000 tons of ore per day. The statement considers the impact of both mining and milling. Approximately 3200 acres will be temporarily (12-14 years) used; 120 million cu. yds. will be removed as overburden from 600 acres in open-pit mining operations; 500-1500 gpm of local ground water will be used in the processing and released back to the environment; stabilized tailings pile will cover 250 acres and consist of 11 million tons of tailings containing solid waste chemicals and low concentrations of radioactive uranium, with by-products; small quantities of chemicals and radioactive materials will be discharged to the environs. (ELR Order 4278, 41 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 574-D) 4/25.

Final

Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) Demonstration Plant. The statement is in support of AEC's action to effect the design, development, construction, and operation of the LMFBR Demonstration Plant as part of the overall LMFBR research and de-

velopment effort. The Demonstration Plant will be a 300 to 500 MW electrical sodium-cooled, fast neutron reactor, designed to produce more fuel than it consumes. It will be constructed and operated under a cooperative arrangement with the nuclear and utility industries. Specific design and location have not yet been chosen; general criteria and LMFBR technology have been used in the preparation of the statement. Comments made by USDA, DOC, EPA, FPC, HEW, DOI, DOT, the state of New York, and concerned citizens. (ELR Order 4189, 411 pages) (NTIS Order PB-200 778-F) 4/14.

Rocky Flats Plant, Jefferson County, Colorado. Proposed acquisition of 4,620 acres of additional land surrounding the 2,520 acres presently owned by the AEC. This would provide a 1 to 1.5 mile buffer zone around the 400 acre industrialized area of the plant. The plant is a key facility for the fabrication of plutonium components for nuclear weapons. The land in question is presently utilized for grazing animals; it is on the verge, however, of being developed for residential and industrial uses. The purpose of the action is to minimize the types of problems which often arise from the proximity of industrial facilities to residential communities. The land would become a greenbelt area. Comments made by USDA, DOC, DOD, EPA, DOT, the state of Colorado, and concerned citizens. (ELR Order 4285, 46 pages) (NTIS Order PB-206 081-F) 4/26.

Rio Blanco Gas Stimulation Project, Rio Blanco County, Colorado. Proposed simultaneous detonation of three 30 kiloton nuclear explosives, 5000' to 7000' below the surface in a natural-gas-bearing geologic formation underlying a site 27 miles from Meeker, in Rio Blanco County. The purpose of the project is the gathering of data on the feasibility of using nuclear explosions to stimulate natural gas production from low-permeability reservoirs. The action will result in ground motion from the detonations, with architectural damage to nearby structures; release of radioactivity to the atmosphere during production testing of the gas and the possible resultant low-level exposures to some local residents; and entrapment in the gas formations of radioactive materials, at or near the points of detonation. Comments made by USDA, DOC, DOD, EPA, HEW, and the state of Colorado. (ELR Order 4318, 262 pages) (NTIS Order PB-205 782-F) 4/28.

Rover Fuels Processing Facility, National Reactor Testing Station, Idaho. Proposed modification of a portion of the existing Idaho Chemical Processing Plant to store and subsequently reclaim usable Rover fuels. Rover fuel, from the joint AEC-NASA nuclear rocket project, contains approximately 2600 kg of highly enriched uranium. The facility would take one acre of land; small quantities of radio active fission products would be released; nonradioactive chemicals would also be released. Comments made by USDA, DOC, DOD, EPA, FPC HEW, DOI, and DOT. (ELR Order 4284, 185 pages) (NTIS Order PB-205 780-F) 4/26.

Power Burst Facility (PBF), National Reactor Testing Station, Idaho. Proposed use of an existing reactor in the AEC nuclear safety program. The PBF would be operated with a sudden increase in power level for a short period of time (burst of power) in order to subject test fuel elements to severe operating conditions. Radioactive waste systems have been modified to provide more control over effluent releases. Operation will commence this year. Comments made by USDA, DOC, EPA, HEW, DOI, and the state of Idaho. (ELR Order 4294, 121 pages) (NTIS Order PB-204 915-F) 4/27.

Radioactive Solid Waste Volume Reduction Facility, Los Alamos County, New Mexico. Proposed construction of a demonstration facility for reduction of solid radioactive waste volumes. Sorting, compaction, and

incineration procedures would be developed for low-level plutonium-contaminated wastes which are presently stored in enclosed trenches. A maximum of 10 grams of plutonium and one millicurie of mixed fission products would be allowed at the facility at one time. Combustibles will be handled; protective measures will therefore be taken to minimize the consequences of fire. Comments made by USDA, DOC, DOD, EPA, HEW, DOI, DOT. (ELR Order 4292, 85 pages) (NTIS Order PB-204 915-F) 4/26.

Plutonium-238 Fuel Fabrication Facility, Savannah River Plant (SRP), Aiken and Barnwell Counties, South Carolina. Proposed construction of facilities for converting plutonium-238 oxide into compacted shapes for use as fuel in Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTG's). RTG's have been used to provide electrical power aboard communication and weather satellites, and on the surface of the moon. Small (less than .01 of one per cent of the Federal guidelines) releases of ²³⁸Pu are unavoidable. Comments made by USDA, DOC, DOD, EPA, HEW, DOI, DOT, and the state of South Carolina. (ELR Order 4298, 78 pages) (NTIS Order PB-205 779-F) 4/27.

Radioactive Waste Evaporator and Auxiliaries, Hanford Plant, Benton County, Washington. Proposed construction of new facilities at Hanford to process liquid radioactive wastes into solid, retrievable, salt cake form. The three evaporators presently in use are considered to be of inadequate capacity. Approximately one billion gallons of cooling water per year will be released to a surface pond in the nearby desert. There a portion will evaporate and the remainder will percolate to ground water level. This water will contain no radioactivity. Radioactive effluents will be treated before being discharged to an enclosed trench. Comments made by USDA, DOC, DOD, EPA, HEW, and DOT. (ELR Order 4283, 96 pages) (NTIS Order PB-206 083-F) 4/26.

Contaminated Soil Removal Facility, Hanford Plant, Benton County, Washington. Proposed construction of a facility which would remove plutonium from an existing closed trench (Z-9). The trench was used between 1955 and 1962 as a subsurface disposal facility for contaminated liquids from the Plutonium Finishing Plant at Hanford. It is estimated that 100 kilograms of plutonium are contained in 1800 cu. ft. of soil. High efficiency filters will allow only an insignificant amount of plutonium to be released to the air. Comments made by USDA, DOC, DOD, EPA, HEW, DOT, and the state of Washington. (ELR Order 4286, 85 pages) (NTIS Order PB-206 084-F) 4/26.

Wagon Wheel Gas Stimulation Project, Sublette County, Wyoming. Proposed sequential detonation of five, 100-kiloton nuclear explosives, 9000' to 12,750' below the surface in a natural-gas-bearing geologic formation underlying a site in the Green River Basin 19 miles south of Pinedale and 18 miles east of Big Piney in Sublette County. The purpose of the project is the gathering of data on the feasibility of using nuclear explosions to stimulate natural gas production from low-permeability reservoirs. The action will result in ground motion from the detonations, with architectural damage to nearby structures; release of radioactivity to the atmosphere during production testing of the gas and the possible resultant low-level exposures to some local residents; and entrapment in the gas formations of radioactive materials, at or near the points of detonation. Comments made by USDA, DOC, DOD, DOT, the state of Wyoming, and concerned citizens. (ELR Order 4325, 287 pages) (NTIS Order PB-206 082-F) 4/28.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Contact: Dr. Sidney R. Galler, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environmental Af-

fairs, Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. 20230 (202) 967-4335.

Title, Description, and Date
Draft

Expo '74, Spokane County, Washington. The project is a proposed international exposition, the theme of which is "How Man Can Live, Work and Play in Harmony With His Environment." The effects of the Expo's structures on noise, air and water quality and waste disposal are discussed. (ELR Order 4131, 126 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 048-D) 4/5.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—DEPARTMENT OF AIR FORCE

Contact: Colonel Cliff M. Whitehead, Room 5E 425, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20330 (202 OX 5-2889).

Title, Description, and Date
Draft

Air Force Academy Airmanship Program, Colorado Springs, Colorado. Proposed relocation of T-41 training facilities from Peterson Field to the Academy Airstrip. (ELR Order 4090, 115 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 908-D) 4/3.

Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. Proposed outleasing of land to the Gulf Power Company in order to install new 230,000 volt power transmission lines which would back up the existing power net. Approximately 812 acres of land would be required; certain weather conditions would introduce ozone into the atmosphere; some vegetation will be lost. (ELR Order 4111, 20 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 922-D) 4/4.

Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi. Proposed extension of the runway from 5000' to 6000', in order to accommodate flights by C-9 aircraft. (ELR Order 4184, 15 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 193-D) 4/13.

Pacific Cratering Experiments (PACE), Eniwetok Atoll, Marshall Islands. Proposed detonation of a series of high-explosive charges at the air-ground interface of selected islands, in order to approximate the effects of nuclear bursts upon hard strategic systems. Craters will be caused by the blasts; chemical and/or radio-chemical contaminants may enter the water. (ELR Order 4229, 63 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 369-D) 4/19.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—DEPARTMENT OF ARMY

Contact: Mr. George A. Cunney, Jr., Acting Chief, Environmental Office, Directorate of Installations, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Washington, D.C. 20310 (202) OX 4-4269.

Title, Description, and Date
Final

Western Medical Institute of Research, Presidio of San Francisco, California. Proposed construction of research facilities for Phase II of the Institute's three phase construction project. Comments made by EPA, HUD, DOI, and local agencies. (ELR Order 4054, 30 pages) (NTIS Order PB-199 312-F) 3/29.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—DEPARTMENT OF ARMY

Corps of Engineers

Contact: Colonel William L. Barnes, Executive Director of Civil Works, Attn: DAEN-CWZ-C, Office of the Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1000 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, D.C. 20314 (202) 693-7168.

Title, Description, and Date
Draft

Small Boat Harbor, King Cove, Alaska. Proposed construction of a 1250' long earthfilled dike and a 210' rock groin, and dredging of a 400' long channel and 11 acre anchorage basin. The project would provide protected mooring for resident and transient fishing

vessels. Approximately 23.8 acres of marine and waterfowl habitat will be lost to the project. (ELR Order 4287, 26 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 572-D) 4/26.

Lytle and Warm Creeks, San Bernardino County, California. Proposed construction of concrete channel structures, levees, a bypass weir, etc. on Lytle and Warm Creeks in the Santa Ana River. Loss of natural stream-bed areas would result. (ELR Order 4181, 57 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 194-D) 4/12.

Russian River Basin, Sonoma and Mendocino Counties, California. Proposed construction of rip rap, flexible fence, and jacklines at seven sites on the Russian River. The purposes of the action are channel improvement and bank stabilization. Riparian habitat, and Indian and Russian fur trader archeological sites will be lost; the river's potential inclusion in the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System will be affected. (ELR Order 4183, 35 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 177-D) 4/11.

Santa Paula and Mud Creeks, Ventura County, California. Proposed construction of a debris basin and reinforced concrete channels on the two creeks. The purpose of the project is flood control. Some riparian vegetation would be eliminated. (ELR Order 4262, 13 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 578-D) 4/25.

Norwalk Harbor, Fairfield County, Connecticut. Proposed periodic maintenance dredging of the inner 10' entrance channel and basin to authorized dimensions. An estimated 75,000 cu. yds. of sediment would be removed and dumped in an approved spoil area. Temporary turbidity will damage marine ecosystems. (ELR Order 4305, 12 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 650-D) 4/28.

Beach Erosion Project, Brevard County, Florida. Proposed partial restoration and periodic nourishment of 4.8 miles of shoreline, at 2 sites. A total of 1,591,000 cu. yds. of material would be dredged from offshore for use at the sites. Dredging will temporarily degrade water quality, cause the beach to be closed for public use, and destroy benthic animals at dredging and deposit sites. (ELR Order 4280, 49 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 552-D) 4/26.

Bal Harbour, Dade County, Florida. Proposed restoration of an 0.85 mile stretch of beach. Fill would be obtained from an ocean borrow pit 1.5 miles off shore. Approximately 1.8 million cu. yds. would be dredged and filled. Marine life at both dredging and dumping sites will be disturbed and/or destroyed. (ELR Order 4296, 15 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 575-D) 4/27.

Ana Marie Key, Manatee County, Florida. Proposed construction of a beach erosion control project along the Gulf Shore of the Key. Revetment and groins will be constructed, and fill will be dredged and dumped, to provide 75' of additional beach at mean high water along 3.2 miles of shoreline. Temporary turbidity will disturb marine ecosystems. (ELR Order 4297, 40 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 553-D) 4/27.

Bayou Plaquemine, Iberville Parish, Louisiana. Proposed filling of Bayou Plaquemine to an elevation 26' above m.s.l. from west end of closed lock structure to a point approximately 200' west of the Texas and Pacific Railway bridge, preparatory to the construction of Highway 1 relocation fill will be obtained by dredging the Mississippi River Waterway. Several businesses will be lost to the action; a 4(f) statement will be required as public land will be taken. (ELR Order 4080, 127 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 772-D) 3/31.

Oil and gas exploration, Louisiana. Determination of permissibility for a permit to explore for oil or gas or develop production of such resources or other mineral resources in navigable waterways of the Gulf of Mexico. State-owned water bottoms on the Gulf and directly connected thereto are included; inland waterways and those not directly connected to the Gulf are not included; land areas, non-navigable waterways, and private-

ly owned waterways are not included. Granting of such permits would create obstructions to navigation and fishing; temporary turbidity; altered salinity and circulation of marsh areas; possible significant damage to ecosystems as a result of exploration, dredging and disposal, spillage and leakage of petroleum and gas, and burning of wastes and gases. (ELR Order 4175, 81 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 188-D) 4/11.

Plaquemine Lock Closure, Iberville Parish, Louisiana. Proposed construction of an earthen levee, which would permanently close Plaquemine Lock. The purpose of the action is flood control. (ELR Order 4195, 18 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 298-D) 4/14.

Monroe Floodwall, Monroe, Louisiana. Proposed construction of a 1,750' folding floodwall structure on the Ouachita River. (ELR Order 4223, 8 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 374-D) 4/17.

Wicomico River, Salisbury, Maryland. Proposed filling of South Prong of the river with dredge spoil from the North Prong. Hydraulic ecosystems would be disturbed by the dredge and fill operation. (ELR Order 4133, 8 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 905-D) 4/6.

Yazoo Basin, Delta Area, Mississippi. Proposed construction of a pilot study program of bank stabilization works. Types of stabilization works to be considered include vegetation, Gobi-block matting, transverse stone dikes, stone dike tool protection, articulated concrete mats, and other appropriate works. The estimated cost of the project is \$9,500,000. Temporary disturbance and damage to streambanks and vegetation will occur. (ELR Order 4174, 59 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 189-D) 4/11.

Bowie Dam and Lake, Pascagoula River Basin, Mississippi and Alabama. The statement is a legislative action involving proposed construction, if authorized by Congress, of a multipurpose reservoir, for flood control, water supply, recreation, and fish and wildlife enhancement. An unspecified number of residences will be displaced. Approximately 5,500 acres will be inundated by the project; rare or endangered species for which this serves as habitat include the Bald Eagle, the Peregrine Falcon, the Ivory-billed Woodpecker, Bachman's Warbler, and the American Alligator. (ELR Order 4247, 126 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 468-D) 4/24.

Cold Spring Inlet, Cape May County, New Jersey. Proposed dredging of channel and maintenance of jetties, with spoil being dumped in the Atlantic Ocean. Temporary turbidity will disturb marine ecosystems. (ELR Order No. 4249, 12 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 466-D) 4/24.

Absecon Inlet, Atlantic County, New Jersey. Proposed maintenance dredging of the inlet channel for navigational purposes. Temporary turbidity during dredging will disturb marine ecosystems. (ELR Order 4240, 11 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 377-D) 4/20.

Manasquan River, Monmouth County, New Jersey. Maintenance dredging of inlet channel, and maintenance of jetties and bulkheads. Dredged material will be deposited in the Atlantic Ocean. Temporary turbidity will disturb marine ecosystems. (ELR Order 4246, 12 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 469-D) 4/21.

Monongahela River, Fayette and Greene Counties, Pennsylvania. Proposed replacement of existing navigation facilities at Lock and Dam 7, and Lock 8. Increases in turbidity and sedimentation will degrade aquatic environmental quality. (ELR Order 4194, 15 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 297-D) 4/14.

Cordell Hull Dam and Reservoir, Cumberland River, Tennessee. Proposed construction of a dam including a 100 Mw power facility; a spillway; and a 13,900 acre reservoir. The purposes of the project are navigation, hydroelectric power, and recreation. Construction is more than 80% complete; conversion of a 72 mile stretch of stream to a lake will result in the displacement of residents, utilities, roads, and cemeteries. (ELR Order 4110, 20 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 921-D) 3/31.

Ediz Hook Beach Erosion Control, Clallam County, Washington. Proposed rock revetment and beach nourishment of 10,000' of the seaward shore of Ediz Hook. Material from the revetment would come from existing quarries; beach material from a source near Port Angeles. The purpose of the project is to provide protection for Port Angeles Harbor. (ELR Order 4155, 56 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 046-D) 4/10.

Milwaukee Diked Disposal Area, Milwaukee Harbor, Wisconsin. Proposed establishment of a contained disposal area for spoil dredged from Lake Michigan. Forty-four acres of aquatic habitat within the existing harbor would be committed to the plan. (ELR Order 4322, 25 pages) 4/28.

Final

Small Boat Harbor Project, Bethel, Alaska. Proposed dredging of a 5100' long access channel and a 1700' long harbor area. The purpose of the project is to provide all-tide access to the harbor. Turbidity from dredging will disturb marine ecosystems; water quality levels will decrease as a result of dredging, concomitant erosion, and the use of outboard motors. Comments made by DOC, EPA, DOI, DOT, and state agencies. (ELR Order 4196, 34 pages) (NTIS Order PB-199 620-F) 4/14.

Blaine Creek, Lawrence County, Kentucky. Proposed construction of a dam and other facilities, for purposes of flood control, water quality control, recreation, fish and wildlife enhancement. Approximately 20,800 acres will be committed to the project; 213 residences, 6 churches, 4 commercial buildings, and 93 cemeteries will be displaced. Comments made by EPA, DOI, and one state agency. (ELR Order 4203, 49 pages) (NTIS Order PB-200 941-F) 4/14.

Scituate Harbor, Plymouth County, Massachusetts. Proposed dredging of 32 acres in order to provide mooring space for commercial and recreational boats. Temporary turbidity will disturb marine ecosystems. Comments made by USDA, USCG, DOI, state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4198, 22 pages) (NTIS Order PB-202 804-F) 4/14.

Whitman River, Worcester County, Massachusetts. Proposed construction of a dam, lake, recreation facilities, and appurtenant structures. The purposes of the projects are flood control, water quality improvement, recreation, and industrial water supply. Twenty-seven residences, one business, and 638 acres will be lost to the project. Comments made by EPA, DOI, state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4202, 140 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 312-F) 4/14.

Roseau River, Roseau County, Minnesota. Proposed channel enlargement and straightening along 43.7 miles of the river; construction of 2 reaches of levee; and a possible 10-mile reach of channel work in Canada to be funded by the United States. Approximately 2400 acres will be lost to the project; the river will be rendered a less desirable habitat for both fish and waterfowl. Comments made by USDA, EPA, DOI, and one state agency. (ELR Order 4199, 41 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 295-F) 4/14.

Minnesota River, Blue Earth and Nicollet Counties, Minnesota. Proposed construction of levees, floodwalls, road relocations, interior drainage systems and intermittent ponds. The purpose of the action is flood control. Several residences will be displaced and existing ecosystems eliminated. This is a revised final. Comments made by USDA, EPA, HEW, and state agencies. (ELR Order 4204, 39 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 294-F) 4/14.

Western Unit Flood Protection Project, Billings, Montana. Proposed construction of a diversion project along the western edge of Billings in order to intercept flood flows from irrigation and drainage ditches and to direct these flows around developed areas. Sixty-six acres would be committed to the project. Comments made by USDA, EPA, DOI,

and state agencies. (ELR Order 4205, 24 pages) (NTIS Order PB-204 575-F) 4/14.

Jefferson River Gallatin County, *Montana*. Proposed construction of an earth filled levee and a drainage collector ditch approximately 14,700' long. The purpose of the project is flood control. Twenty-eight acres would be lost to the action. Comments made by USDA, EPA, DOI, state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4197, 33 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 296-F) 4/14.

Gallinas River, Las Vegas, *New Mexico*. Proposed clearing of 5,200' of river channel of obstructing vegetation and sediment deposits. The purpose of the action is flood control. Comments made by EPA, DOI, DOT, state and local agencies, and concerned citizens. (ELR Order 4200, 56 pages) (NTIS Order PB-205 199-F) 4/14.

Portsmouth State Park, Ohio River, *Ohio*. Proposed construction of a small boat harbor to accommodate recreational boats. Changes in fish and wildlife habitat, removal of vegetation, increase in stream sediment load, and potential pollution from fuels and lubricants will result. Comments made by USCG, EPA, USDI, and state agencies. (ELR Order 4253, 32 pages) (NTIS Order PB-198 883-F) 4/24.

Flat Rock and Valley View Creeks, Tulsa County, *Oklahoma*. Proposed channelization of 7400' of Flat Rock Creek and 4500' of Valley View Creek. Rip-rap will be used along with concrete and stone lined banks; Valley View Creek will be concrete lined. One residence will be displaced and 38 acres lost to the project; several utilities will be replaced. Comments made by USDA, EPA, HUD, DOI, DOT, and concerned citizens. (ELR Order 4254, 27 pages) (NTIS Order PB-198 847-F) 4/24.

Scappoose Drainage District, Columbia River, *Oregon*. Proposed construction of 2 pumping stations, an interior sublevee, and other modifications to the existing levee system. Twelve acres will be lost to the project; a lowered water table will encourage urban land uses, which are not recommended for floodplain land. Comments made by USDA, EPA, DOI, NOAA, and one state agency. (ELR Order 4258, 89 pages) (NTIS Order PB-198 847-F) 4/24.

Kingtree Branch Flood Control Project, Black River Basin, *South Carolina*. Proposed widening and deepening of an existing canal. Adjacent landowners will lose a portion of their properties to construction and right-of-way. Comments made by USDA, EPA, HUD, DOI, and state agencies. (ELR Order 4255, 35 pages) (NTIS Order PB-206 101-F) 4/24.

Brazos River Basin, Knox County, *Texas*. Proposed construction of a flood control project consisting of a channel, concrete chute, stilling basin, transition section, and bridge replacements. Approximately 60 acres will be lost to the project. Comments made by USDA, EPA, HEW, HUD, and DOI. (ELR Order 4237, 27 pages) (NTIS Order PB-206 460-F) 4/20.

Bonneville Lock and Dam, Columbia River, Skamania County, *Washington*. Proposed construction of an 8 unit second powerhouse at the Bonneville project. The second powerhouse will have the capacity of using 160,000 cu. ft./sec. of water. Total dependable capacity (minus a 22 MW loss at the Dalles) will be 562 MW. It will be necessary, however, to remove the existing town of North Bonneville. Approximately 18 million cu. yds. of material will be excavated and disposed of; 25 acres of wetlands will be lost; the mortality rate of downstream migrant fish will increase. Comments made by USDA, USCG, EPA, FPC, Bur. of Indian Affairs, DOI, NOAA, state, local, and regional agencies. (ELR Order 4190, 204 pages) (NTIS Order PB-202 133-F) 4/14.

Mud Mountain Dam, White River, King and Pierce Counties, *Washington*. The dam is an existing 700' long 425' high earth-core rockfill structure. The project would involve

a program of lateral bracing and installation of abrasion-resistant steel liner, in order to reduce the frequency of repairs to a 9' outlet. Comments made by USDA, Bureau of Indian Affairs, EPA, NOAA, state and regional agencies and concerned citizens. (ELR Order 4251, 39 pages) (NTIS Order PB-200 931-F) 4/24.

Kickapoo River, Vernon County, *Wisconsin*. Proposed construction of a 3,960' long, 103' high earth-fill dam which would create a multi-purpose (flood control, fish and wildlife production, and recreation) lake. The lake would have a surface area of 1,780 acres, and extend 12 miles upstream. A total of 9,780 acres of land would be committed to the project; 22.5 miles of road and 33 bridges would need to be replaced; 73 families would be displaced. The statement is a revised final. Comments made by USDA, EPA, DOI, state, local, and regional agencies, and concerned citizens. (ELR Order 4130, 540 pages) (NTIS Order PB-204-918-F) 4/19.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Contact: Mr. Joseph A. Grimes, Jr., Special Civilian Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D.C. 20350 (202) 697-0892.

Title, Description, and Date Draft

Naval Submarine Base, New London, *Connecticut*. Proposed dredging in order to deepen and widen 7.5 miles of existing navigation channel on the Thames River and Long Island Sound. Temporary turbidity will affect marine ecosystems at the site of dredging and that of disposal. (ELR Order 4176, 13 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 175-D) April 10.

Naval Ammunition Depot, Oahu, *Hawaii*. Proposed acquisition of fee title to approximately 1177 acres of land adjacent to the West Lock Branch of the Naval Ammunition Depot. The purpose of the action is to prevent development of land now within the explosive safety zone. (ELR Order 4138, 53 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 911-D) April 6.

Final

Sanguine System. Sanguine is an Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) communications system. (This statement primarily covers the next four years of development; another environmental impact statement would be provided prior to any requests for authorization to construct an operational system.) The Sanguine System, when constructed and deployed, would provide a survivable (after nuclear attack) and reliable military communication system for U. S. Strategic Forces, particularly submarines. The survivability of a Sanguine System would not only ensure an ability to execute and control strategic forces, but also clearly demonstrate to a potential enemy the requisite credibility of our National Policy which states that the United States will not initiate a nuclear war. Approximately 300 to 500 acres of land, probably in Wisconsin, would be permanently committed to a constructed system. Comments made by USDA, Army COE, EPA, FPC, HEW, Navy, and concerned citizens. (ELR Order 4219, 1021 pages) (NTIS Order PB-199 732-F) 4/17.

FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION

Contact: Mr. Frederick H. Warren Advisor on Environmental Quality, 441 G Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20426 (202) 386-6084.

Title Description, and Date Draft

Mitchell Project No 82, Chilton and Coosa Counties, *Alabama*. Proposed approval of an application by the Alabama Power Co. for a renewal permit on its Mitchell Project. The project has a present capacity of 72,500 kw; the applicant proposes to install an additional 80,000 kw. Also included in the present project are a 106' high x 1,264' long dam, and a reservoir of 5,850 acres. (ELR Order 4191, 97 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 301-D) 4/14.

Rocky River Project No. 2632, Fairfield and Litchfield Counties, *Connecticut*. Proposed approval of an application by the Connecticut Light and Power Co. for its Rocky River Project. The project consists of a 952' long earth dam, 4 dikes, a 5,600 acre reservoir, a steel penstock, and a 3 unit, 32,000 kw powerhouse. (ELR Order 4233, 40 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 365-D) 4/19.

Project No. 2354, Tallulah and Tugalo Rivers, *Georgia* and *South Carolina*. Proposed approval of the Georgia Power Company's plans to develop recreation facilities at its Project No. 2354, a hydroelectric power plant. Primary development would be at a 300 acre site near Tallulah Falls. (ELR Order 4257, 27 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 576-D) 4/24.

Lacassine Project, Cameron Parish, *Louisiana*. Proposed construction of 22.1 miles of 30" pipeline by Michigan Wisconsin Pipeline Co., from Block 71 to its compressor station near Lake Arthur. (ELR Order 4130, 24 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 926-D) 4/5.

Brainerd Hydroelectric Project, Crow Wing County, *Minnesota*. Proposed approval of an application for a permit by the Northwest Paper Co. to continue operation of the hydroelectric plant and dam. (ELR Order 4126, 26 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 897-D) 4/5.

Project No. 2692, Macon and Clay Counties, *North Carolina*. Proposed approval of a renewal operating license for the Nantahala Power and Light Company's Project No. 2692. The project consists of 1,042' long, 250' high dam, a 1,605 acre reservoir, a 5.6 mile conduit, two diversion dams, and a powerhouse with installed capacity of 43,200 kw. (ELR Order 4087, 63 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 901-D) 4/3.

Schoolfield Project No. 2411, Danville, *Virginia*. Proposed approval of an application by the Dan River Co. for Project No. 2411. This is a run-of-river development with a 5,300 kw powerhouse. (ELR Order 4088, 29 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 907-D) 4/3.

Project No. 2545, Spokane, Stevens, and Lincoln Counties, *Washington*. Proposed approval of a relicensing application by the Washington Water Power Co. for its Spokane River Project No. 2545. The project consists of four developments with a combined generating capacity of 99,200 kw. It is also proposed that one of the developments, the Monroe Street Plant, be reconstructed. (ELR Order 4118, 13 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 913-D) 4/4.

Final

Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), Everett, *Massachusetts*, and Staten Island, *New York*. Proposed construction by Distrigas Corp. of docking areas and terminal facilities for imported LNG. Dredging operations at the two sites will affect marine ecosystems. Comments made by USDA, Army COE, EPA, DOI, state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4180, 62 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 178-F) 3/28.

Project No. 2030, Portland, *Oregon*. Proposed approval of an amendment to the license held by the Portland General Electric Company for Project No. 2030, to enable the Company to construct, maintain, and operate a fish hatchery at its Round Butte Powerhouse. The hatchery would return 1,800 steelhead trout and 1,200 chinook salmon to the area annually. (ELR Order 4164, 19 pages) (NTIS Order PB-199 877-6) 4/11.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

Contact: Mr. Rod Kreger, Acting Administrator, GSA-AD, Washington, D.C. 20405 (202) 343-6077.

Alternate: Mr. Aaron Woloshin, Director, Office of Environmental Affairs, GSA-AD, Washington, D.C. 20405 (202) 343-4161.

Title, Description, and Date Draft

Parcel A-2, Sewage Disposal Area, Pleasanton, *California*. Proposed use of the area by the Valley Community Services District for holding treated effluent from its sewage treatment plant. Vehicular traffic will in-

crease at the site; breeding of mosquitoes may result. (ELR Order 4168, 12 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 184-D) 4/11.

Final

Fort Des Moines, Iowa. Proposed disposal by GSA of 198 acres of unimproved land. Approximately 95 acres would be assigned to HEW for conveyance to the city of Des Moines for police and fire department training programs; 103 acres would be assigned to the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation for conveyance to Polk County for park and recreation use. Comments made by Senator Miller, Congressman Smith, USDA, EPA, HEW, and local agencies. (ELR Order 4245, 22 pages) (NTIS Order PB-205 446-F) 4/21.

Army Tank Automotive Plant, Cleveland, Ohio. Proposed disposal of the 60.17 acre plant for use by the City of Cleveland as a buffer zone adjacent to the Hopkins International Airport. Comments made by DOD, EPA, DOT. (ELR Order 4170, 14 pages) (NTIS Order PB-204 562-F) 4/10.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE

Contact: Mr. Robert Lanza, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs, Room 4026 HEWN, Washington, D.C. 20202 (202) 962-2241.

Title, Description, and Date
Draft

Tri-Service Incinerator, Forest Glenn Station, Montgomery County, Maryland. Proposed construction of an 87.5 tons per day capacity incinerator to dispose of trash, animal, and infectious research wastes from Walter Reed Army Medical Center, the National Institute of Health, and the National Navy Medical Center. Twelve acres of land will be committed to the two-furnace project; traffic will increase in the area; emissions will result; sediment from construction will be discharged to a Rock Creek tributary. (ELR Order 4108, 124 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 893-D) 4/3.

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Contact: Mr. Richard Broun, Director, Environmental and Land Use Planning Division, Office of Community Goals and Standards, Office of Assistant Secretary for Community Planning and Management, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C. 20410 (202) 755-6193.

Title, Description, and Date
Final

Water Treatment Facilities, Custer County, Oklahoma. Proposed construction of 5.0 mgd pretreatment and 3.0 mgd demineralization water treatment facilities at Foss Reservoir, near Clinton. Cost of the facilities is estimated at \$2,200,000. Waste water and dissolved solids from the plant would be discharged to the Washita River. Comments made by USDA, Army, DOC, EPA, FPC, DOI, state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4139, 76 pages) (NTIS Order PB-204 460-F) 4/6.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Contact: Mr. Bruce Blanchard, Director, Environmental Project Review, Room 7260, Department of the Interior, Washington, D.C. 20240 (202) 343-3891.

Title, Description, and Date
Bonneville Power Administration
Final

Bonneville Power Administration, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Wyoming and Montana. Proposed additions to BPA's electric transmission system, including transmission lines, substations, and related structures; and maintenance of existing facilities. Comments made by USDA, Army COE, AEC, EPA, FPC, DOI, and numerous state, regional, and local agencies. (ELR Order 4201, 726 pages) (NTIS Order PB-202 413-F) 4/14.

Bureau of Land Management

Draft

Proposed 1972 Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas General Lease Sale Offshore Eastern Louisiana. Proposed sale of 78 tracts (866, 440 acres) of OSC lands in late summer, 1972. All tracts offered pose some degree of pollution risk to the marine environment and/or adjacent shoreline. (ELR Order 4078, 266 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 792-D) 3/31.

Bureau of Mines

Draft

Strip Mined Area Reclamation and Recreation Center Development, Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania. Proposed reclamation of 125 acres of strip mined area by filling with spoils, grading and planting. The project is to be coordinated with one being conducted by the county to provide a recreation area/mining museum. (ELR Order 4077, 52 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 777-D) 3/31.

Bureau of Reclamation

Draft

Nueces River, Nueces and San Patricio Counties, Texas. Proposed construction of an earthfill dam and reservoir on the Nueces, 22 miles upstream from its mouth. The purposes of the project are water supply, recreation, and fish and wildlife enhancement. Approximately 150 families would be displaced; 31,340 acres of wildlife habitat and 21 miles of fish habitat would be inundated; the salinity of the Corpus Christi estuary would be increased; productive capacity and sport fishing potential of the estuary would be decreased; degradation of the estuarine environment and impairment of its values would occur. (ELR Order 4291, 47 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 581-D) 4/26.

Final

Tualatin River, Washington County, Oregon. Proposed construction of an earthfill dam on Scoggins Creek, with an irrigation system, and 2 pumping plants, and a fish ladder at an existing dam on the Tualatin River. The purpose of the project is flood control. Twelve miles of trout spawning area will be inundated along with 1,100 acres of private land which serves both for dairy farming and winter range for 150 deer; 12 miles of road and 8 miles of power line will have to be relocated. Comments made by USDA, Army COE, DOC, EPA, EPC, HEW, DOI, DOT, state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4321, 74 pages) (NTIS Order PB-199 327-F) 4/28.

National Park Service

Draft

Cumberland Island National Seashore, Camden County, Georgia. The statement refers to a legislative proposal which would establish Cumberland Island as a National Seashore. This action would preserve the Atlantic barrier island and the related estuarine ecosystem complex for public recreation, improvement of environmental quality of life and education and research. (ELR Order 4231, 38 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 379-D) 4/19.

Springfield National Armory, Springfield, Massachusetts. A legislative proposal that the armory be established as a National Historic Site. It is also proposed that adjacent lands owned by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts be subject to development limitations and design control. (ELR Order 4326, 15 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 651-D) 4/28.

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Contact: Mr. Ralph E. Cushman, Special Assistant, Office of Administration, NASA, Washington, D.C. 20546 (202) 962-8107.

Title, Description, and Date

Draft

The Space Shuttle Program. The space shuttle is a piloted, recoverable, reusable space transportation system to provide rapid, easy, economical access to space. The shuttle can carry payloads of up to 65,000 lbs. into orbit and return them to earth; it will replace most present launch vehicles and expand flexibility. (ELR Order 4243, 91 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 535-D) 4/21.

Final

Apollo Program. The statement considers the environmental impact of the Apollo Program. Comments made by EPA. (ELR Order 4224, 21 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 366-F) 4/17.

NATIONAL CAPITAL PLANNING COMMISSION

Contact: Donald F. Bozarth, Director of Current Planning and Programming, Washington, D.C. 20576 (202) 382-1471.

Title, Description, and Date Draft
Comprehensive plan for the National Capital, Washington, D.C. Proposed modification to the Comprehensive Plan in order to make it conform to the Urban Renewal Area. The proposal involves relocation of the "Uptown Center," realignment of Fort Lincoln Park, etc. (ELR Order 2080, 56 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 439-D) 3/10.

PACIFIC NORTHWEST RIVER BASINS COMMISSION

Contact: Mr. Robert Vining, Post Office Box 908, Vancouver, Washington 98660 (206) 695-3606.

Titles, Description, and Date
Draft

Willamette River Basin Comprehensive Water and Related Land Resource Study, Oregon. Proposed comprehensive development plan based upon estimated basin needs for a future 50 year period. Structural developments would include 52 reservoirs, several major and minor channel works for flood control and irrigation works, etc. (ELR Order 4084, 27 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 920-D) 4/3.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Contact: Dr. Francis Gartrell, Director of Environmental Research and Development, 720 Edney Building, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 (615) 755-2002.

Title, Description, and Date
Final

Thomas H. Allen Steam Plant, Shelby County, Tennessee. Proposed addition of gas peaking units 17-20 to the Steam Plant, in order to provide additional power SO₂ and NO_x will be emitted; the possibility of oil spillage or leakage will result. Comments made by USDA, DOC, DOD, EPA, FPC, HEW, HUD, DOI, DOT, state and regional agencies. (ELR Order 4114, 40 pages) (NTIS Order PB-199 231-F) 4/4.

Colbert Steam Plant, Colbert County, Alabama. Proposed addition of gas turbine peaking units 1-8 at Colbert Steam Plant. SO₂ and NO_x will be emitted; the possibility of oil spillage or leakage will result. Comments made by USDA, DOC, DOD, EPA, FPC, HEW, HUD, DOI, DOT, state and regional agencies. (ELR Order 4109, 41 pages) (NTIS Order PB-200 365-F) 4/4.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Contact: Mr. Martin Convisser, Director, Office of Program Coordination, 400 7th Street S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590. (202) 462-4357.

Title, description, and date
Federal Aviation Agency
Draft

Litchfield Municipal Airport, Montgomery County, Illinois. Proposed extension of runway, taxiway and apron, installation of lighting, etc. (ELR Order 4127, 24 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 916-D) 4/5.

Town of Paris, Edgar County, *Illinois*. Proposed acquisition of land and construction of an E/W runway (75' x 3900'), taxiway, apron, access road, terminal, etc. An unspecified amount of land would be taken by the project; local air, noise and water pollution would increase accordingly. (ELR Order 4160, 44 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 042-D) 4/10.

Polk County, *Minnesota*. Request for Federal financial assistance to construct a new runway (75' x 3500'), taxiway, install lighting etc. (ELR Order 4116, 25 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 909-D) 4/4.

Aitkin Airport, Aitkin County, *Minnesota*. Proposed surfacing of runway (3500' x 75'), construction of a taxiway and terminal, and installation of lighting and navigational aids. The crossing of Sissabagamah Creek would be necessary; 16 acres of public land would be taken by the project. (ELR Order 4157, 41 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 054-D) 4/10.

Warroad Municipal Airport, Roseau County, *Minnesota*. Proposed surfacing of a 75' x 3500' NW/SE runway, construction of a taxiway, apron, etc. (ELR Order 4167, 11 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 185-D) 4/11.

Jackson Municipal Airport, Jackson, *Mississippi*. Proposed extension of a runway from 6,600' to 8,500'. (ELR Order 4173, 19 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 192-D) 4/11.

Cleveland Airport, Cuyahoga County, *Ohio*. Proposed acquisition of 44.532 acres at the northeast corner of the airport; construction of a Crash/Fire/Rescue and Maintenance Building, taxiway, and electrical vault and clearance of 40.2 wooded acres. Nineteen families would be displaced by the action. (ELR Order 4171, 12 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 191-D) 4/11.

Winnsboro Airport, Fairfield County, *South Carolina*. Proposed construction of a basic utility airport adequate for propeller driven aircraft of less than 12,500 lbs. Nineteen acres would be lost to the action. (ELR Order 4169, 33 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 190-D) 4/10.

Final

Stapleton International Airport, Denver, *Colorado*. Proposed construction of a new N/S runway (200' x 12,000') with connecting taxiways. The relocation of 64th Avenue and the Rocky Mountain Arsenal railroad spur would be necessary; air and noise pollution would increase. Comments made by USDA, Army COE, EPA, HUD, DOI, state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4137, 96 pages) (NTIS Order PB-204 557-F) 4/6.

Baxley Municipal Airport, Baxley, *Georgia*. Proposed extending and widening of an existing runway, to enable the airport to accommodate all propeller aircraft of less than 12,500 lbs. Approximately 10 acres of land will be lost to the clear zone area. Comments made by USDA, EPA, DOT, state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4127, 31 pages) (NTIS Order PB-206 167-F) 4/19.

Pocatello Airport, Power County, *Idaho*. Proposed extension of runway from 8,248' x 150' to 9,037' x 150', construction of taxiways, installation of lighting, etc. Comments made by USDA, EPA, HUD, DOI, and state agencies. (ELR Order 4136, 38 pages) (NTIS Order PB-204 958-F) 4/6.

Miller Field, Cherry County, *Nebraska*. Proposed extension of one runway and overlay of two others; construction of a hanger, taxiway and a segmented circle; runway marking, etc. Comments made by USDA, Army COE, EPA, HUD, and DOI. (ELR Order 4244, 29 pages) (NTIS Order PB-204 903-F) 4/21.

Albany County Airport, Albany County, *New York*. Proposed extension (from 4500' to 6000') of an existing runway. Six residences would be displaced by the action, which would also necessitate the acquisition of 29.5 acres of land. Comments made by USDA, Army COE, HUD, DOI, DOT, state, local, and regional agencies, and concerned citizens. (ELR Order 4290, 172 pages) (NTIS Order PB-204 026-F) 4/26.

Ashe County Airport, Ashe County, *North Carolina*. Proposed construction of a general utility airport which would accommodate all propeller driven aircraft of less than 12,500 lbs. Twenty-seven acres would be committed to the project. Comments made by USDA, EPA, DOT, state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4295, 26 pages) (NTIS Order PB-206 552-F) 4/27.

Neillsville Municipal Airport, Clark County, *Wisconsin*. Proposed construction of a new airport, including a 60' x 3000' EW runway, a taxiway, an apron, and an access road, etc. Approximately 170 acres would be committed to the project. Comments made by USDA, Army COE, AEC, EPA, FPC, HEW, HUD, DOI, state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4128, 51 pages) (NTIS Order PB-204 576-F) 4/19.

Park Falls Municipal Airport, Price County, *Wisconsin*. Proposed land acquisition and construction of a 75' x 3200' N/S runway, a connecting taxiway, an apron; low intensity lighting, marking, etc. Air and water quality standards whl be affected. Comments made by USDA, Army COE, EPA, HEW, DOI, DOT, state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4187, 38 pages) (NTIS Order PB-204 025-F) 4/13.

Federal Highway Administration Draft

Proposed General Guidelines for Consideration of Economic, Social, and Environmental Effects of Highway Projects. The statement is the response of the Department of Transportation to Section 109(h) of Title 23, U.S.C. (ELR Order 4163, 27 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 182-D) 4/11.

S-1078(10), Tehama County, *California*. Proposed construction of a replacement bridge over the Sacramento River, on F.A.S. 1078. Total project length is 0.45 mile, including approaches. A 4(f) statement would be required as land from adjacent county and state parks would be taken. (ELR Order 4086, 23 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 918-D) 4/3.

U.S. 50, Montrose County, *Colorado*. Proposed construction of 4.25 miles of U.S. 50. Three residences would be lost to the action. (ELR Order 4193, 29 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 300-D) 4/14.

I-291, Hartford County, *Connecticut*. Proposed construction of I-291, which will serve as a beltway around the city of Hartford, connecting I-91 and I-86. The length of the project varies from 11 to 17 miles (approximately) depending upon the route chosen. The amount of land and number of residences to be committed is not yet known. A 4(f) statement will be filed as city-owned lands would be taken. (ELR Order 4185, 132 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 180-D) 4/13.

U.S. 98, Polk County, *Florida*. Proposed construction of a new bridge over Peace River and 1.5 miles of approaches on a realigned segment of U.S. 98. An unspecified amount of land will be committed to the project. A 4(f) statement will be prepared as some land involved is city-owned. (ELR Order 4293, 33 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 582-D) 4/27.

F.A.S. Route 1362, Palm Beach County, *Florida*. Proposed reconstruction of 2 miles of multi-lane divided highway. (ELR Order 4300, 8 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 535-D) 4/27.

State Route 16, Spalding and Butts Counties, *Georgia*. Proposed reconstruction, possibly on a new location, of approximately 10 miles of S.R. 16 between U.S. 41 and I-75. Several alternate routes are under consideration; each of them would displace some residences and have a detrimental impact upon the Cabin Creek Watershed. (ELR Order 4327, 102 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 643-D) 4/28.

I-80 Elmore County, *Idaho*. Proposed construction of 7.7 miles of I-80. One residence, one business, and approximately 163 acres of land would be lost to the project, large

hillside cuts would necessitate the construction of retaining walls. (ELR Order 4185, 25 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 186-D) 4/11.

Project EBU-183, U.S. 45, Cook County, *Illinois*. Reconstruction of 4.5 miles of U.S. 45. Three residences and 6 businesses would be displaced by the action. (ELR Order 4115, 51 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 910-D) 4/4.

Project I-55-6 (80), Will County, *Illinois*. Proposed construction of a combined Safety Rest Area—District State Police Headquarters on I-55. A 4(f) statement is required as land would be taken from Des Plaines Conservation Area. (ELR Order 4120, 51 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 931-D) 4/5.

F.A.S. Route 28, Ogle County, *Illinois*. Proposed reconstruction of 0.705 mile of F.A.S. Route 28. Eleven acres would be lost to the project. (ELR Order 4235, 87 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 375-D) 4/19.

Lincoln Highway (U.S. 30), Cook County, *Illinois*. Proposed reconstruction (widening) of 4.6 miles of U.S. 30. Eighteen families and 11 businesses would be displaced by the action. A 4(f) statement will be prepared, as land would be taken from a school yard and playground. (ELR Order 4299, 84 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 644-D) 4/27.

U.S. 50, Clay, Richland, and Lawrence Counties, *Illinois*. Proposed reconstruction of 40 miles of U.S. 50. The number of residences and businesses displaced depends upon the route decided upon. Some 4(f) land may be committed. Construction is not scheduled until 1977. (ELR Order 4323, 26 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 646-D) 4/28.

U.S. 50, Marion and Clay Counties, *Illinois*. Proposed reconstruction of 30 miles of U.S. 50. Approximately 25 farm units, 13 to 25 residences, and 1800 acres of land will be committed to the project. (ELR Order 4324, 25 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 658-D) 4/28.

Freeport Bypass, F.A.S. Route 401, Stephenson County, *Illinois*. Proposed construction of 18 miles of 4-lane highway. Twenty-six families, one business, and three farm units will be displaced. (ELR Order 4328, 81 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 652-D) 4/28.

F.A.S. Route S-1095, St. Joseph County, *Indiana*. Proposed reconstruction of a portion of S-1095 at its intersections with 6 railroad lines; 68 residences and 9 businesses would be displaced by the action. (ELR Order 4250, 24 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 467-D) 4/24.

State Route 331, St. Joseph County, *Indiana*. Proposed reconstruction of a segment of S.R. 331 at its intersection with a rail line. Twenty-nine residences, 5 businesses and one church would be displaced by the action. (ELR Order 4281, 35 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 573-D) 4/26.

U.S. 151, Linn County, *Iowa*. Proposed construction of 13 miles of U.S. 151 through the cities of Cedar Rapids and Marion. Depending upon which of several alternate routes is taken, between 1,530 and 3,770 persons would be displaced. (ELR Order 4161, 33 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 045-D) 4/10.

Project S-120, Washington County, *Iowa*. Proposed reconstruction of F.A.S. Routes 595 and 2967 for a total length of 6 miles. A 4(f) statement would be required as some of the land needed is owned by the Iowa State Conservation Commission. (ELR Order 4144, 7 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 047-D) 4/7.

U.S. 54, Kingman County, *Kansas*. Proposed construction of 9 miles of 4-line U.S. 54, much of it on new location. An unspecified amount of land will be committed to the project. (ELR Order 4239, 10 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 376-D) 4/20.

U.S. 33 and U.S. 119, Pike and Letcher Counties, *Kentucky*. Proposed reconstruction of 10.49 miles of highway. Approximately 250 acres of land would be lost to the project and approximately 100 residences displaced. A 4(f) statement would be required as school land would be taken. (ELR Order 4265, 44 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 579-D) 4/25.

Plaquemines, Orleans, and St. Bernard Parishes, Louisiana. Proposed construction of 14.8 miles of I-410, a controlled access six-lane highway. Approximately 540 acres of land will be lost to the project; three families will be displaced; four major streams will be crossed. (ELR Order 4096, 50 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 912-D) 4/3.

I-410, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana. Proposed construction of 24.1 miles of six-lane I-410. Thirty-seven families will be displaced, 876.36 acres of land will be lost to the project. (ELR Order 4097, 30 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 924-D) 4/3.

I-83, Baltimore City, Maryland. Proposed construction of 0.7 mile of 6-lane I-83, in the City of Baltimore. Ten residences and 58 businesses would be displaced; there would be acoustic and visual impacts upon adjoining areas. The City Fish Market would probably be displaced. Several historic sites and recreational areas along the route would be displaced, necessitating the filing of 4(f) statements. (ELR Order 4186, 109 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 181-D) 4/13.

I-95, Baltimore County, Maryland. Proposed construction of 5.2 miles of 8-lane I-95, including a tunnel; and 1.0 mile of 6-lane I-395, 0.6 mile of 6-lane City Boulevard and 2.5 miles of 6-lane I-83. An alternate route is also discussed. An unspecified number of buildings would be displaced. Several 4(f) statements would be prepared as recreational areas and historic sites would be affected, including the Fort McHenry National Monument. (ELR Order 4218, 166 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 382-D) 4/17.

Project F-10-7(), Washtenaw and Wayne Counties, Michigan. Proposed construction of 12.3 miles of new Interstate quality highway along routes M-14 and I-96. Approximately 195 parcels of land, including wetlands and agricultural areas, would be lost to the action; an unspecified number of homes would be lost; a portion of the Middle Rouge River would be channelled; a 4(f) statement will be required as parkland would be taken. (ELR Order 4121, 52 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 930-D) 4/5.

Project I-275-7(1)21, Wayne County, Michigan. Proposed construction of 6.5 miles of I-275, a 6-lane controlled access highway. An unspecified number of residences and amount of land would be lost to the action; a 4(f) statement is required as parkland would be taken. A high local water table makes the disruption of groundwater systems probable. (ELR Order 4122, 37 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 929-D) 4/5.

M-24, Tuscola and Huron Counties, Michigan. Proposed construction of approximately 15 miles of 2-lane M-24 north of Caro. An unspecified number of residences and amount of land would be lost to the project, depending upon which of several alternate routes is taken. (ELR Order 4158, 40 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 041-D) 4/10.

Project U-34-1(), M-53, Macomb County, Michigan. Proposed construction of 8 miles of M-53, a 10-lane depressed-freeway urban facility, with a center, (11th) mass-transit lane. An unspecified number of structures and amount of land would be committed to the project. (ELR Order 4159, 37 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 043-D) 4/10.

N-25, Hitchcock County, Nebraska. Proposed construction of a new highway, N-25, to connect U.S. 35 and U.S. 6. Total length of the project is approximately 24 miles, depending upon which of several routes is chosen. Several bridges will be constructed; an unspecified number of residences and amount of land will be taken, depending upon the route. (ELR Order 4178, 20 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 195-D) 4/12.

Projects F-221(15) and USG-717(2), Lincoln County, Nebraska. Proposed reconstruction of U.S. 83, built to expressway standards, as a bypass of North Platte, with a proposed railroad viaduct to the city. An unspecified

amount of land would be taken by the action. (ELR Order 4179, 28 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 196-D) 4/12.

Nebraska L-56C, Lincoln County, Nebraska. Proposed reconstruction of a 1.6 mile segment of L-56C, between U.S. 30 and U.S. 80; and the construction of a new bridge over the South Platte River. An unspecified amount of land will be taken by the project; the South Platte River Valley flood plain, with several streams, will be crossed. (ELR Order 4308, 17 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 654-D) 4/28.

Project 9-8122812, Catawba County, North Carolina. Proposed construction of 2.1 miles of new highway between the N.C. 10-16-S.R. 1880 intersection and S.R. 1739. Fourteen residences and 35 acres would be taken by the right-of-way. The possibility of siltation in nearby streams will occur. (ELR Order 4089, 20 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 906-D) 4/3.

U.S. 221, Ashe County, North Carolina. Proposed reconstruction of 7.7 miles of U.S. 221, and addition of a curb and gutter. Thirty-three families and one business would be displaced; the possibility of siltation of the New River will exist. (ELR Order 4123, 36 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 928-D) 4/5.

I-94, Morton County, North Dakota. Proposed construction of an interchange on I-94 at the site of the Collins Avenue Separation in the city of Mandan. Three residences and one business would be displaced by the action. (ELR Order 4113, 19 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 923-D) 4/4.

Project US-1169(3), Cuyahoga County, Ohio. Proposed reconstruction of 2.86 miles of S.R. 252. Six residences would be displaced by the action. (ELR Order 4085, 13 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 899-D) 4/3.

Projects F-673() and F-297(), Hardin County, Ohio. Proposed construction of a 4-lane, 8.16 mile-long bypass which would remove routes U.S. 30S, U.S. 68, and S.R. 31 from the city of Kenton. Loss of an unspecified amount of farm land will result. (ELR Order 4128, 24 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 917-D) 4/5.

Project S-1262(6), Miami County, Ohio. Proposed widening of County Road 25A from 2 to 4 lanes, and construction of several bridges. An unspecified amount of land would be lost to the project. (ELR Order 4129, 20 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 927-D) 4/5.

Project ER-1642(1), Cuyahoga County, Ohio. Proposed replacement of a major bridge over the Cuyahoga River. Total project length, including approaches is .8 mile. An unspecified amount of industrial land would be taken by the project. (ELR Order 4134, 11 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 904-D) 4/6.

Project I-280-2(2), Wood County, Ohio. Proposed reconstruction of 6.6 miles of 4 lane I-280 to the latest Interstate standards. Four families, four businesses, and an unspecified amount of land will be lost to the project. (ELR Order 4143, 17 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 050-D) 4/7.

Project SU-7240(100)C, Tulsa County, Oklahoma. Proposed reconstruction of 3.5 miles of Avery Drive from 2 to 4 lanes. A 4(f) statement will be required as right-of-way would be taken from Chandler Park. (ELR Order 4082, 30 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 773-D) 3/31.

Eighth Street, West Wyoming, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. Proposed reconstruction of 3.2 miles of Eighth Street partially on a new location. Fifty-four families and 14 businesses would be displaced by the action. (ELR Order 4256, 40 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 470-D) 4/24.

S-21, Greenville County, South Carolina. Proposed widening of S-21 (Rutherford Road) from the intersection of U.S. Routes 25 and 276 north for a total distance of 3.81 miles. Seventeen residences and 6 businesses

would be displaced by the action. (ELR Order 4248, 13 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 465-D) 4/24.

Project F-024-3(), Putnam County, Tennessee. Proposed construction of 5.0 miles of S.R. 42. Two streams will be crossed by the project; from 10 to 41 residences will be displaced depending upon which of several alternate routes is chosen. (ELR Order 4142, 17 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 051-D) 5/7.

State Route 32, Granger County, Tennessee. Proposed construction of 8.09 miles of 4-lane S.R. 32. Ten residences and an unspecified amount of land will be lost to the project. (ELR Order 4221, 15 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 384-D) 4/17.

State Route 24, Davidson County, Tennessee. Proposed widening of 0.8 mile of highway from 2 to 4 lanes. Eight residences and six businesses would be displaced by the action. (ELR Order 4319, 17 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 656-D) 4/28.

Project F-003-4(), Dyer and Obin Counties, Tennessee. Proposed construction of 17 miles of new 4-lane highway. Wetland of the Obin River Bottom area will be lost, along with 450 to 500 acres of productive agricultural land. The number of residences displaced will depend upon the route chosen. (ELR Order 4320, 13 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 637-D) 4/28.

Project F-1128, S.H. 360, Tarrant and Ellis Counties, Texas. Proposed construction of 28 miles of S.H. 360, a 4-lane freeway. Approximately 2000 acres and an unspecified number of residences would be lost to the project, depending upon which of several alternate routes is taken. (ELR Order 4153, 35 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 038-D) 4/7.

Loop 499, Cameron County, Texas. Proposed construction of highway Loop 499, which would total 6.8 miles in length. Thirteen families and four businesses would be displaced by the action. (ELR Order 4182, 21 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 187-D) 4/13.

State Highway 71, Fayette County, Texas. Proposed reconstruction of 10 miles of S.H. 71 from 2 to 4 lanes. Two families and one business will be displaced; 210 acres of land will be lost to the project. (ELR Order 4222, 30 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 367-D) 4/17.

I-5, King County, Washington. Proposed construction of an interchange on I-5 at South 272 St., 10 miles south of the Seattle Corporate Limits. An unspecified number of residences and amount of land would be taken by the project, depending upon the route chosen. (ELR Order 4307 17 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 653-D) 4/28.

Project S-0145(4), Washington County, Wisconsin. Proposed reconstruction of 3 miles of FAS Route 145. Approximately 16.2 acres of land would be lost to the project. Cedar Creek would be exposed to contamination. A 4(f) statement would be required as land would be taken from a wildlife refuge. (ELR Order 4091, 9 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 925-D) 4/3.

U.S. 41, Winnebago County, Wisconsin. Proposed construction of an interchange at the intersection of U.S. 41 and Breezewood Lane. Three residences and an electric power substation will be displaced by the action. (ELR Order 4220, 24 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 370-D) 4/17.

Final

Project S-1117 (102), Chilton County, Alabama. Proposed reconstruction of 5.2 miles of FAS Route 1117. Comments made by USDA, DOC, DOD, DOI, state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4102, 28 pages) (NTIS Order PB-201 249-F) 4/3.

Project I-65-3(54), Limestone County, Alabama. Proposed construction of a rest area on I-65. The project would include parking, water, picnic, sanitary, and tourist information facilities. Comments made by USDA, AEC, Army COE, HUD, DOI, TVA, DOT, state

and local agencies. (ELR Order 4124, 43 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 900-F) 4/5.

I-59, Dekalb County, *Alabama*. Proposed construction of a rest area and welcome station on I-59, 0.5 mile south of the Georgia state line. An unspecified amount of land would be lost to the project. Comments made by USDA, Army COE, AEC, EPA, HEW, DOI, and state agencies. (ELR Order 4207, 43 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 313-F) 4/14.

Project F-208(33), U.S. 431, Etowah County, *Alabama*. Proposed construction of 1.2 miles of new 4-lane highway, beginning at the end of existing U.S. 431. Sixteen acres of land would be committed to the project; 37 families would be displaced. Comments made by USDA, Army COE, EPA, HUD, DOI, DOT, state, local and regional agencies. (ELR Order 4271, 48 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 583-F) 4/25.

Project I-759-7(1), Etowah County, *Alabama*. Proposed construction of I-759, the Gadsden Spur, beginning at I-59 and extending 4.57 miles to U.S. 411. The project is intended to serve as a bypass around the Gadsden business district. Forty-six residences and 2 businesses would be displaced by the action. Comments made by USDA, Army COE, EPA, DOI, Navy, DOT, and State agencies. (ELR Order 4274, 44 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 580-F) 4/30.

F.A.S. Route 414, Kenai Peninsula Borough, *Alaska*. Proposed construction of 9.8 miles of F.A.S. Route 414. An unspecified number of residences and amount of land will be lost to the project. Comments made by USDA, HUD, DOI, DOT, state and local agencies, and concerned citizens. (ELDR Order 4145, 44 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 040-F) 4/7.

Project S-0525(5), Wasilla, *Alaska*. Proposed reconstruction of 10.2 miles of existing roadway, providing it with a gravel surface and separate bicycle path. Comments made by USDA, EPA, DOI, and state agencies. (ELR Order 4270, 46 pages) (NTIS Order PB-202 795-F) 4/25.

I-40, Navajo County, *Arizona*. Proposed construction of a section of I-40, beginning on U.S. 66 and extending 8.43 miles east. One residence and an unspecified amount of land will be lost to the action. Comments made by USDA, Army COE, EPA, state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4209, 41 pages) (NTIS Order PB-204 465-F) 4/14.

Project U-048-1(5), Highway 9, Conway County, *Arkansas*. Proposed construction of 3.6 miles of 2-lane Highway 9. Three residences would be displaced by the project. Comments made by USDA, DOC, EPA, DOI, Dept. of State, state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4206, 27 pages) (NTIS Order PB-202 424-F) 4/14.

State Highway 138, San Bernardino County, *California*. Proposed construction of 3.9 miles of new 4-lane S.H. 138, much of it parallel to an existing route. Several sites of potential archeological importance would be damaged by the project. Comments made by USDA, EPA, HEW, DUO, DOI, DOT, and state agencies. (ELR Order 4317, 85 pages) (NTIS Order PB-200 022-F) 4/28.

Project S-0016(34), El Paso County, *Colorado*. Proposed construction of 3 miles of new 4-lane highway, built to expressway standards. Four residences would be displaced by the action. Comments made by USDA, DOT, and state agencies. (ELR Order 4316, 82 pages) (NTIS Order PB-203 617-F) 4/28.

Project I-86, Towns of Ashford and Union, *Connecticut*. Proposed reconstruction of I-86 for a length of approximately 7.16 miles. Comments made by USDA, EPA, HUD, DOI, State Dept., state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4101, 101 pages) (NTIS Order PB-201 299-F) 4/3.

Project F-024-2(), S.R. 80, Palm Beach County, *Florida*. Proposed construction of S.R. 80 along a corridor between S.R. 15 and S.R. 700. An unspecified amount of land would be lost to the project. Comments made

by USDA, Army COE, USCG, DOC, EPA, DOI, DOT, state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4147, 44 pages) (NTIS Order PB-202 644-F) 4/7.

Alt. U.S. 19, Pinellas County, *Florida*. Proposed construction of 1.2 miles of multi-lane highway. An unspecified amount of land would be committed to the project. Comments made by USDA, Army COE, EPA, and state agencies. (ELR Order 4264, 47 pages) (NTIS Order PB-202 170-F) 4/15.

Project-F-413(), Morgan Cass, and Schuyler Counties, *Illinois*. Proposed construction of 51 miles of Supplemental Freeway F.A.P. 413, a four-lane, fully access controlled facility. An unspecified number of residences and amount of land will be lost to the project. Comments made by USDA, Army COE, DOC, EPA, FPC, DOT, USCG, and state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4095, 91 pages) (NTIS Order PB-202 073-F) 4/3.

F.A.S. Route 257, La Salle County, *Illinois*. Proposed reconstruction of 10 miles of F.A.S. Route 257. An unspecified amount of land will be required for additional right-of-way; approximately 130, 100 year old sugar maple trees, which line the road south of Harding, will be lost to the project. Comments made by USDA, AEC, EPA, and DOI. (ELR Order 4309, 18 pages) (NTIS Order PB-203 479-F) 4/28.

Project S-296(5), Shelby County, *Indiana*. Proposed construction of 1 mile of highway to connect with I-74. Comments made by USDA, EPA, HUD, DOI, (ELR Order 4099, 23 pages) (NTIS Order PB-202 176-F) 4/3.

F.A.S. Route 459, Tippecanoe County, *Indiana*. Proposed construction of a bridge and approaches over the Wabash River, north of Lafayette. The present bridge is considered too narrow to be adequate. Comments made by ARMY COE, EPA, DOI, and state agencies. (ELR Order 4215, 42 pages) (NTIS Order PB-203 476-F) 4/14.

U.S. 65, Polk County, *Iowa*. Proposed reconstruction of 3.0 miles of U.S. 65. Approximately 1200' of creek channel change will be required. Comments made by USDA, EPA, DOI, state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4150, 19 pages) (NTIS Order PB-203 611-F) 4/7.

U.S. 50, Harvey County, *Kansas*. Proposed construction of 2.47 miles of 4-lane U.S. 50, with 4 bridges. An unspecified amount of land would be lost to the project. Comments made by USDA, ARMY COE, EPA, HEW, DOI, state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4214, 33 pages) (NTIS Order PB-199 240-F) 4/14.

I-70, Shawnee County, *Kansas*. Proposed reconstruction of 0.6 mile of I-70 in Topeka. A (small) unspecified amount of land would be lost to the project. Comments made by USDA, ARMY COE, USCG, EPA, HEW, DOI, state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4216, 31 pages) (NTIS Order PB-201 379-F) 4/14.

I-35, Lyon County, *Kansas*. Proposed construction of 10.6 miles of I-35, a 4-lane divided highway with a depressed median and full access control. Approximately 550 acres of land would be committed to the project and 14 farm ponds filled. Comments made by USDA, Army COE, EPA, HEW, DOI, and state agencies. (ELR Order 4313, 41 pages) (NTIS Order PB-200 772-F) 4/28.

Projects S-661 and 612, Floyd County, *Kentucky*. Proposed replacement of Bailey Bridge and reconstruction of 1.10 miles of highway, on KY 1426 and KY 979. Fifteen families would be displaced and 12 acres lost to the project. Comments made by DOC, EPA, DOI, DOT, and one state agency. (ELR Order 4106, 21 pages) (NTIS Order PB-202 011-F) 4/3.

KY 16, (F.A.S. 277) Boone County, *Kentucky*. Proposed construction of 1.04 miles of KY-16, a 4 lane highway, to connect I-75 and U.S. 25. Nineteen acres would be committed to the project; 4 residences would be displaced. Comments made by DOT and State

agencies. (ELR Order 4275, 22 pages) (NTIS Order PB-199 629-F) 4/25.

Project S-49(), KY-70, Hopkins County, *Kentucky*. Proposed reconstruction of 0.7 mile of Arch St. in the city of Madisonville. KY-70 traffic through the city would then be routed to Arch St. Seven residences and one business would be displaced by the action. Comments made by USDA EPA, state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4311, 22 pages) (NTIS Order PB-202 595-F) 4/28.

Project F-918-1(13), Worcester County, *Maryland*. Proposed construction of 1.6 miles of new highway and 0.8 mile of existing highway on U.S. 113. Five residences would be displaced by the action. Comments made by USDA, EPA, HUD, state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4152, 41 pages) (NTIS Order PB-201 502-F) 4/7.

U.S. 41, Marquette County, *Michigan*. Proposed reconstruction (widening) of 4.3 miles of U.S. 41. Two residences would be displaced by the action. Comments made by USDA, Army COE, USCG, EPA, HUD, DOI, DOT, and state agencies. (ELR Order 4272, 46 pages) (NTIS Order PB-204 840-F) 4/25.

I-69 and I-96, Clinton and Eaton Counties, *Michigan*. Proposed construction of approximately 21 miles of I-69, a 6-lane highway, to connect with I-96. An unspecified number of residences and amount of land will be committed to the project, depending upon the route taken. Comments made by USDA, Army, COE, EPA, HUD, DOI, state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4310, 76 pages) (NTIS Order PB-203 107-F) 4/28.

Trunk Highways 12, 23, and 71, Kandiyohi County, *Minnesota*. Proposed rerouting of the three highways to a southwesterly bypass of the City of Willman. The total project length is 10 miles. One farmstead, one residence, one church, and an unspecified amount of land will be lost to the project. Comments made by EPA, Army, COE, HEW, HUD, DOI, OEO, and DOT. (ELR Order 4125, 38 pages) (NTIS Order PB-204 029-F) 4/5.

Project S-6690(1), St. Louis County, *Minnesota*. Proposed reconstruction of 2-lane County-State Aid Highway 13, for a total length of 4.2 miles. One residence, several garages, and 20 acres will be lost to the project. Comments made by USDA, EPA, HUD, and DOI. (ELR Order 4149, 26 pages) (NTIS Order PB-204 966-F) 4/7.

Project SP-0056-1(4) Winston County, *Mississippi*. Proposed construction of 5.5 miles of Miss. Hy. 25, a 2-lane highway with right-of-way for ultimate construction of a 4-lane facility. An unspecified amount of land will be lost to the project. Comments made by USDA, Army COE, DOC, and state agencies. (ELR Order 4146, 13 pages) (NTIS Order PB-199 627-F) 4/7.

I-435, Clay and Platte Counties, *Missouri*. Proposed construction of 15.6 miles of I-435, a freeway standard facility of from 4 to 6 lanes. Seventeen families and an unspecified amount of land will be lost to the project. Comments made by USDA, EPA, DOI, DOT, state and local agencies, and concerned citizens. (ELR Order 4213, 57 pages) (NTIS Order PB-200 329-F) 4/14.

State Route 36, Marion County, *Missouri*. Proposed relocation and reconstruction of 4.8 miles of S.R. 36. Approximately 170 acres would be committed to the project. Comments made by USDA, EPA, HEW, and DOI. (ELR Order 4268, 19 pages) (NTIS Order PB-203 754-F) 4/25.

State Route AC, Buchanan County, *Missouri*. Proposed construction of 1.9 miles of new, 2-lane highway east of St. Joseph. Twenty-four people would be displaced and 50 acres, some of which is wildlife habitat, would be taken by the project. Comments made by USDA, EPA, HEW, HUD, DOI, DOT, and state agencies. (ELR Order 4315, 26 pages) (NTIS Order PB-205 350-F) 4/28.

Project I-80-2(41), Cheyenne County, *Nebraska*. Proposed construction of 3.0 miles

of I-80 and 5.4 miles of N-19. One business and an unspecified amount of land would be lost to the action. Comments made by USDA, Army COE, EPA, HUD, and DOI. (ELR Order 4132, 29 pages) (NTIS Order PB-201 237-F) 4/5.

Project S-1135(2), S.R. 292, Dona Ana County, *New Mexico*. Proposed reconstruction of 1.1 miles of S.R. 292, part of which is located in the city of Las Cruces. Two residences would be displaced by the project. Comments made by USDA, Army COE, EPA, HUD, DOI, DOT, state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4314, 31 pages) (NTIS Order PB-204 843-F), 4/28.

State Route 9, Dutchess County, *New York*. Proposed construction of 1.7 miles of S.R. 9, from 2 and 4 lanes to 6 lanes. Fishkill Creek would be relocated and channelized. A 4(f) statement is required as a historical site (Van Wyck Wharton House) would be affected by the project. Comments made by USDA, FPC, and DOI. (ELR Order 4263, 35 pages) (NTIS Order PB-200 035-F), 4/25.

U.S. 9W, Albany County, *New York*. Proposed reconstruction of the Dibbs Bridge and its approaches, on U.S. 9W. Comments made by USDA, AEC, EPA, FPC, DOT, state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4269, 25 pages) (NTIS Order PB-199 246-F), 4/25.

Project S-453, Cumberland County, *North Carolina*. Proposed reconstruction of 9.1 miles of NC 53-210. Six families and one business would be displaced by the project. Comments made by USDA, EPA, GSA, DOI, state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4107, 36 pages) (NTIS Order PB-201 848-F), 4/3.

Project U.S. 1604, Cumberland County, *North Carolina*. Proposed construction of 8.3 miles of new 4-lane highway. Approximately 25 families and 8 businesses will be displaced by the project; an unspecified amount of land will be taken. Siltation is expected, and the local ground water level will be lowered. Comments made by USDA, DOC, EPA, GSA, DOI, OEO, state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4208, 56 pages) (NTIS Order PB-199 625-F), 4/11.

U.S. 64, Edgecombe County, *North Carolina*. Proposed construction of 13.0 miles of new 2-lane highway. Fourteen families would be displaced and 580 acres committed to the project. Comments made by USDA, Army COE, GSA, HUD, DOI, state and regional agencies. (ELR Order 4277, 43 pages) (NTIS Order PB-201 845-F), 4/25.

Project F-82, LeFlore County, *Oklahoma*. Proposed relocation and reconstruction of 5.4 miles of U.S. 270. Nine families would be displaced and 85 acres taken by the project. Comments made by state agencies. (ELR Order 4092, 18 pages) (NTIS Order PB-199 574-F), 4/3.

Project F-236, Coal County, *Oklahoma*. Proposed reconstruction of 6 miles of S.H. 3. One family would be displaced and 220 acres would be lost to the project. Comments made by DOI and state agencies. (ELR Order 4093, 20 pages) (NTIS Order PB-199 593-F) 4/3.

Project F-180, Garfield and Major Counties, *Oklahoma*. Proposed construction of 20.15 miles of U.S. 60. Twenty-two families, four businesses, and two non-profit organizations will be displaced by the project; 315 acres of grass and farm lands will be lost. Comments made by DOI, and state agencies. (ELR Order 4098, 23 pages) NTIS Order PB-200 759-F) 4/3.

Project S-6012, Payne County, *Oklahoma*. Proposed construction of 2 miles of FAS Route 6012. Thirteen acres of grasslands will be lost to the project. Comments made by USDA, EPA, and state agencies. (ELR Order 4103, 18 pages) (NTIS Order PB-201 849-F) 4/3.

Projects F-152 and F-252, Osage County, *Oklahoma*. Proposed construction of 20.4 miles of U.S. 60, a four-lane highway. Approximately 430 acres would be lost to the project. Comments made by DOI, state and

local agencies. (ELR Order 4104, 30 pages) (NTIS Order PB-200 206-F) 4/3.

I-95, Philadelphia County, *Pennsylvania*. Proposed construction of 5 sections of I-95, totaling 2.15 miles in length. It is a fully controlled limited access highway, varying in width from 6 to 10 lanes. An unspecified number of individuals and buildings would be displaced by the action. Comments made by USDA, EPA, HUD, and state agencies. (ELR Order 4151, 76 pages) NTIS Order PB-208 052-F) 4/7.

Traffic Route 219, Somerset County, *Pennsylvania*. Proposed construction of an 8 mile length of 4-lane, limited access Traffic Route 219. The highway will serve as a connector from Maryland, north through Pennsylvania, to New York. Approximately 220 acres and 1 from 30 to 45 residences would be lost in the action. Comments made by DOC, EPA, FPC, HUD, DOI, state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4211, 76 pages) NTIS Order PB-199 623-F) 4/14.

Meeting Street Expressway, Richland and Lexington Counties *South Carolina*. Proposed construction of 3.3 miles of urban highway. Approximately 20 businesses and 125 residences would be displaced by the project. Comments made by Army COE, HUD, DOI, DOT, state, local, and regional agencies. (ELR Order 4105, 31 pages) (NTIS Order PB-200 526-F) 4/3.

Project F-039-1 (), McNinn County, *Tennessee*. Proposed construction of 7 miles of S.R. 30. Six residences would be displaced by the project; several small streams would be crossed. Comments made by USDA, FAA, TVA, state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4148, 44 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 053-F) 4/7.

Project F-405 (), Houston County, *Texas*. Proposed reconstruction of 6.1 miles of U.S. 287, from two to four lanes. Approximately 147 acres of land will be required by the project; 11 residences, three businesses and one church will be displaced, two lakes, totaling 2.8 acres, will be drained. Comments made by USDA, EPA, HEW, DOT, state agencies, and concerned citizens. (ELR Order 4094, 46 pages) (NTIS Order PB-200 012-F) 4/3.

Park Road 100, Cameron County, *Texas*. Proposed construction of 11.7 miles of 2-lane highway on a 200' right-of-way. The highway would introduce people and vehicles to a totally undeveloped seashore area, and to Padre Island. Damage to existing protective sand dunes would occur; rapid development of the area is expected to result from the project. Comments made by Army COE, EPA, and state agencies. (ELR Order 4119, 19 pages) (NTIS Order PB-203 480-F) 4/5.

I-27, Randall County, *Texas*. Proposed construction of 20.5 miles of I-27, a 4-lane divided controlled access highway. Four residences and approximately 955 acres of land will be lost to the project. Comments made by USDA, DOC, EPA, HEW, DOT, one regional agency, and concerned citizens. (ELR Order 4212, 61 pages) (NTIS Order PB-199 584-F) 4/14.

State Highway 154, Harrison County, *Texas*. Proposed reconstruction of 11.7 miles of S.H. 154; 5.6 miles would be on new location. Forty residences and 2 businesses would be displaced by the action. Comments made by USDA, Army COE, EPA, HEW, DOT, state, local and regional agencies. (ELR Order 4260, 41 pages) (NTIS Order PB-202 598-F) 4/25.

U.S. 259, Morris County, *Texas*. Proposed reconstruction, from 2 to 4 lanes, of 2.15 miles of U.S. 259. One business would be displaced by the action. Comments made by USDA, Army COE, HEW, and DOT. (ELR Order 4312, 26 pages) (NTIS Order PB-202 315-F) 4/28.

Project F-037-1 (), Whitman County, *Washington*. Proposed construction of 5 miles of new two and four lane limited access high-

way. An unspecified amount of land will be lost to the project. Comments made by USDA, Army COE, EPA, HUD, DOT, state and local agencies. (ELR Order 4100, 45 pages) (NTIS Order PB-207 915-F) 4/3.

S.R. 97, Chelan County, *Washington*. Proposed construction of 2000' of 2-lane roadway and the relocation of the Swakane Canyon approach. The purpose of the action is to provide a viewing point for Lincoln Rock, a natural formation which resembles the profile of Abraham Lincoln. One half acre of apple orchard will be lost to the project. Comments made by EPA, HUD, DOT, state and local agencies, and numerous concerned citizens. (ELR Order 4217, 75 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 302-F) 4/14.

State Route 101, Thurston County, *Washington*. Proposed construction of an interchange on S.R. 101. Comments made by USDA, DOC, EPA, DOI, state, local, and regional agencies. (ELR Order 4276, 43 pages) NTIS Order PB-204 258-F) 4/25.

State Route 90, King County, *Washington*. Proposed reconstruction of 5 miles of S.R. 90, from 3 to 7 lanes of interstate standards. Approximately 153 acres would be committed to the project; an unspecified number of residences would be displaced; 1.3 million board ft. of timber would be removed from the hillside site; scarring and potential erosion problems along the north side of the upper Snoqualmie River Valley would result. A 4(f) statement is required as the project would affect campgrounds. Comments made by USDA, EPA, HUD, DOI, DOT, and state agencies. (ELR Order 4279, 123 pages) (NTIS Order PB-206 869-F) 4/25.

F.A.S. Route 1462, Waukesha County, *Wisconsin*. Proposed construction of 4 new miles of 2-lane F.A.S. Route 1462. The facility will ultimately be rebuilt to 4-lanes. The Fox River will be crossed by the project; an unspecified amount of land will be committed to the action. Comments made by USDA, EPA, HUD, DOI, and state agencies. (ELR Order 4273, 34 pages) (NTIS Order PB-200 394-F) 4/25.

U.S. COAST GUARD

Contact: D. B. Charter, Jr., Commander, U.S. Coast Guard, Chief, Environmental Coordination Branch, 400 7th Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20591 (202) 426-9573.

Title, Description, and Date

Draft

Baltimore Harbor Outer Crossing, Baltimore County, *Maryland*. Proposed approval of plans for a high level fixed bridge across the Patapsco River from Hawkins Point, Baltimore City to Sollers Point, Baltimore County. Approximately 80,000 cu. yds. of material would be dredged from the river and disposed in upland containment area. Land would be taken from two public parks—Fort Armistead and Baltimore County Park. (ELR Order 4116, 67 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 039-4) 4/10.

Edisto River, Colleton County, *South Carolina*. Proposed approval of location and plans for a pipeline bridge across the river. The purpose of the bridge is to carry fossil fuel ash from a steam electrical generating plant to settling basins on the opposite side of the river. Both are properties of the South Carolina Electric and Gas Co. Approximately 400 acres of the Company's land would be committed to the action; some of this is wildlife habitat. (ELR Order 4288, 15 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 551-D) 4/26.

Ohio River Toll Bridge, Cabell County, West Virginia and Lawrence County, *Ohio*. Proposed approval of plans for a high level toll bridge across the Ohio River, from West Virginia State Route 108. Twenty-five residences and six businesses will be displaced by the project. A 4(f) statement will be filed as public land would be taken by the project. (ELR Order 4252, 51 pages) (NTIS Order PB-208 472-D) 4/24.

REGIONAL FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATORS

Region 1* (Conn., Me., Mass., N.H., R.I., Vt., N.J., N.Y., Puerto Rico) Administrator: G. D. Love, 4 Normanskill Blvd., Delmar, N.Y. 12054.

Region 3 (Del., D.C., Md., Pa., Va., W. Va.) Administrator: August Schofer, 31 Hopkins Plaza, Baltimore, Md., 21201.

Region 4 (Ala., Fla., Ga., Ky., Miss., N.C., S.C., Tenn.) Administrator: H. E. Stark, 1720 Peachtree Rd., N.W., Atlanta, Ga., 30309.

Region 5 (Ill., Ind., Mich., Minn., Ohio, Wisc.) Administrator: F. B. Farrell, 18209 Dixie Hwy., Homewood, Ill. 60430.

Region 6 (Ark., La., N.M., Okla., Texas) Administrator: J. W. White, 819 Taylor St., Fort Worth, Texas 76102.

Region 7 (Iowa, Kansas, Mo., Neb.) Administrator: J. B. Kemp, P.O. Box 7186, Country Club Station, Kansas City, Mo. 64113.

Region 8 (Col., Montana, N.D., S.D., Utah, Wyoming) Administrator: W. H. Baugh (Acting), Rm. 242, Bldg. 40, Denver Federal Center, Denver, Colo. 80225.

Region 9 (Arizona, Calif., Hawaii, Nev.) Administrator: S. E. Farin, 450 Golden Gate Ave., San Francisco, Calif. 94102.

Region 10 (Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, Wash.) Administrator: R. M. Phillips, 222 Southwest Morrison St., Portland, Oreg. 97204.

AVAILABILITY OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY COMMENTS ON ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS

Appendix I contains a listing of draft environmental impact statements which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has reviewed and commented upon in writing during the period from April 1, 1972, to April 30, 1972, as required by section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and section 309 of the Clean Air Act, as amended. The listing includes the Federal agency responsible for the statement, the number assigned by EPA to the statement, the title of the statement, the classification of EPA's comments, and the source for copies of the comments.

Appendix II contains a listing of proposed

regulations reviewed by EPA during the period from April 1, 1972, to April 30, 1972, under section 309 of the Clean Air Act. The listing includes the Federal agency responsible for the proposed regulation, the title of the regulation, the classification of EPA's comments, and the source for copies of the comment.

Appendix III contains definitions of the four classifications of the general nature of EPA's comments. Copies of EPA's comments on these draft environmental impact statements are available to the public from the EPA offices noted.

Appendix IV contains a listing of the addresses of the sources for copies of EPA comments listed in the appendixes.

Copies of the draft environmental impact statements are available from the Federal department or agency which prepared the draft statement or from the National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, Springfield, Virginia 22151.

SHELDON MEYERS,
Director,
Office of Federal Activities.

Date: May 3, 1972.

APPENDIX I

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS FOR WHICH COMMENTS WERE ISSUED BETWEEN APR. 1, 1972, AND APR. 30, 1972

Identifying No.	Title	General nature of comments	Source for copies of comments
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION			
D-AEC-C0041-25	Palisades nuclear generation plant	2	A
D-AEC-C0033-43	Wagon Wheel gas stimulation project, Wyoming	2	A
D-AEC-C0044-14	Surry power station, units 1 and 2	5	A
D-AEC-C0043-25	Enrico Fermi atomic powerplant	1	A
D-AEC-C0042-27	Quad Cities nuclear generating station	2	A
CORPS OF ENGINEERS			
D-COE-35016-02	Maintenance dredging and jetty repair, Hampton Harbor, Hampton, N.H.	2	B
D-COE-35015-05	Maintenance dredging, Guilford Harbor, Conn.	2	B
D-COE-50086-08	No. 174 bridge construction, Ass. scunk Creek, N.J.	1	C
D-COE-50085-08	No. 173 bridge construction, Crafts Creek, N.J.	1	C
D-COE-32329-08	No. 172 Absecon Inlet, N.J., navigation project	1	C
D-COE-32328-08	No. 171 Cold Spring Inlet, N.J., navigation project	1	C
D-COE-32327-08	No. 170 Manasquan River, N.J., navigation project	1	C
D-COE-32320-07	Gowanus Canal navigation improvements, New York	1	C
D-COE-35014-12	Proposed filling of the south prong of Wicomico River, Salisbury, Wicomico County, Md.	3	D
D-COE-35013-12	Proposed maintenance dredging of the Federal navigation project, St. Catherine Sound, Md.	1	D
D-COE-05179-15	Walker Dam project, New Kent County, Va.	3	D
D-COE-32041-23	West Tennessee tributaries-Mississippi River and tributaries, Obion and Forked Deer Rivers, Tenn., No. 210	3	E
D-COE-32325-24	Greenville Harbor expansion, Mississippi	2	E
D-COE-32185-18	Litt e River Inlet, N.C. and S.C.	2	E
D-COE-30030-21	Beach erosion control, Brevard County, Fla.	1	E
D-COE-30029-21	Partial beach restoration, Bal Harbour, Dade County, Fla.	2	E
D-COE-32331-23	Obion and Forked Deer Rivers and tributaries, Harris Fork Creek, Tenn. and Ky.	2	E
D-COE-32306-27	Kent Creek, Winnebago County, Ill.	2	F
D-COE-32312-35	Atchafalaya River and Bayous Chene, Boeuf and Black, La.	2	G
D-COE-36116-35	Monroe floodwall, Louisiana	2	G
D-COE-32319-35	Plaquemine lock closure, Mississippi River and tributaries project, Iberville Parish, La.	2	G
D-COE-32320-00	Treasure Island, Mississippi River, Mo.	2	H
D-COE-32325-46	Port Heuneme Harbor, Ventura County, Calif.	2	J
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE			
D-DOA-82031-00	Herbicide control of Big Sage	1	A
D-DOA-89056-00	Water bank program	1	A
D-DOA-82018-01	Cooperative spruce budworm suppression project	2	A
D-DOA-89057-00	Wheat, feed grain and cotton set-aside program	2	A
D-DOA-89062-27	Palzo restoration project, Williamson, Saline and Gallatin Counties, Ill.	2	F
D-DOA-36115-35	Town of Coushatta-flood prevention project measure, Twin Valley R.C. & D. project, Louisiana	1	G
D-DOA-41147-48	Clarkdale-Williams Highway, State Route 279, Coconino, Prescott, and Kaibab National Forests, Arizona	1	J
D-DOA-82026-55	Siskiyou N.F. herbicide programs, Oregon	3	K
D-DOA-41189-55	Eis on Coulter Creek Rd., Wenatchee N.F.	4	K
D-DOA-60036-54	Mount Bailey winter sports site (Umpqua)	3	K
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE			
D-DOD-52026-C0	Sonic booms	1	A
D-DOD-10018-18	Exotic Dancer V, N.C.	2	E
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR			
D-DOI-61040-01	Green Lake National Fish Hatchery, MA	2	B
D-DOI-02019-11	Synthane coal gasification pilot plant, Snowden Township, Allegheny County, PA	2	D
D-DOI-01010-11	Demonstration, hydraulic backfilling of mine voids, Scranton, Pa.	2	D
D-DOI-89080-14	Federal Mine Health Safety Academy, Beckley, W. Va.	1	D
D-DOI-61042-20	Blackbeard Island Wilderness Area, Ga.	1	E
D-DOI-62011-21	Chassahowitzka Wilderness Area, St. Petersburg, Fla.	1	E
D-DOI-07047-43	Lyman Tarrington 115-Kkv. transmission line, Wyoming	2	I
D-DOI-07012-44	Huntington Canyon generating station, Utah	3	A
D-DOI-89066-48	Proposed Havasu intake channel	2	J
D-DOI-31027-54	Proposed rehabilitation and betterment program, Cascade Irrigation District, Yakima project, Washington	1	K

APPENDIX—Continued

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS FOR WHICH COMMENTS WERE ISSUED BETWEEN APR. 1, 1972, AND APR. 30, 1972—Continued

Identifying No.	Title	General nature of comments	Source for copies of comments
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION			
D-DOT-41135-07	Riverdale Ave. Arterial, Yonkers, Westchester County, N.Y.	2	C
D-DOT-41134-07	Genesee Expressway, Livingston and Monroe Counties, N.Y.	1	C
D-DOT-50087-C7	South First Street Bridge, Allegany, Cattaraugus Counties, N.Y.	1	C
D-DOT-41171-12	Route 50 relocated bridge approaches across Nanticoke River, Wicomico, Md.	1	D
D-DOT-41201-11	L.R. 1021, section 3 O. R. X14-2, Allegheny County, Pa.	2	D
D-DOT-41202-22	Project S-1755-A Clay-Herron St., Montgomery County, Ala.	1	E
D-DOT-41183-20	Lakewood Freeway extension, Fulton County, Ga.	2	E
D-DOT-41173-17	U.S. 119, Pikeville-South Williamson Rd., Pike County, Ky.	2	E
D-DOT-41157-17	AP 98-543-5L Pike County, APD 127(29), Kentucky.	1	E
D-DOT-41156-21	State Road 435, Orange County, Fla.	1	E
D-DOT-41155-18	U.S. 64, Rosman to Brevard, Transylvania County, N.C.	1	E
D-DOT-51132-24	Holly Springs-Marshall County Airport, Miss.	1	E
D-DOT-51131-20	Thomas-McDuffie County Airport, Thomson, Ga.	1	E
D-DOT-51128-20	Fitzgerald Municipal Airport, extend and widen, Georgia.	1	E
D-DOT-51127-21	Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport, Florida.	1	E
D-DOT-51122-19	Williamsburg County Airport, Kingstree, S.C.	1	E
D-DOT-51121-20	Perry-Fort Valley Airport, Peach and Houston Counties, Ga.	1	E
D-DOT-41183-17	Laurel County, Somerset-London Road., Ky.	1	E
D-DOT-41180-21	State Road 865, Lee County, Fla.	1	E
D-DOT-41179-19	James Island Expressway and South Carolina connector, Charleston.	3	E
D-DOT-41178-21	State Road 45 (U.S. 41) Collier and Lee Counties, Fla.	1	E
D-DOT-41174-21	State Road 540, Polk County, Fla.	1	E
D-DOT-41107-27	FAP 408, Morgan, Scott, and Pike Counties, Ill.	2	F
D-DOT-40819-25	I-696 Freeway, Oakland County, Mich.	3	F
D-DOT-51162-25	Kirsch Municipal Airport, St. Joseph County, Mich.	1	F
D-DOT-51156-27	Mount Vernon-Cutland Airport, Jefferson County, Ill.	1	F
D-DOT-51129-27	St. Louis Airport, St. Clair and Monroe Counties, Ill.	1	F
D-DOT-41158-29	State Road 146 (improvement), Muskingum County, Ill.	2	F
D-DOT-41145-29	Upgrading Interstate 280, Lucas County, Ohio.	1	F
D-DOT-41144-29	State Route 35, Jackson County, Ohio.	2	F
D-DOT-41143-26	U.S. Highways 41 and 45, Washington, Wisconsin.	1	F
D-DOT-41126-27	FA Routes 12 and 174, Effingham County, Ill.	1	F
D-DOT-41110-29	Marion County Road 104-A, Ohio.	1	F
D-DOT-41109-27	Elgin-O'Hare Freeway, Cook and Du Page Counties, Ill.	1	F
D-DOT-51136-25	Kent County Airport, Michigan.	2	F
D-DOT-51166-33	Springdale Municipal Airport, Springdale, Ark.	2	G
D-DOT-41184-35	Bayou Plaquemine Waterway, Highway Route 1	2	G
D-DOT-41160-34	Spur 239 from intersection of U.S. Highways 90 and 277, Del Rio, Tex.	1	G
D-DOT-41167-38	18-81 F 082-1(14) and (13) Riley and Geary Counties, Kans.	1	H
D-DOT-41161-38	U.S. 75 from Kansas R. to U.S. 24, Topeka, Kans.	2	H
D-DOT-41196-39	Project U.S. 25, Dunklin County, Mo.	1	H
D-DOT-51135-42	Hoven Municipal Airport, Hoven, S. Dak.	2	I
D-DOT-51123-00	Golden Valley County Airport	2	I
D-DOT-41164-40	Highway project F-20(1), Montana.	1	J
D-DOT-51133-46	Napa County Airport, Napa County, Calif.	2	J
D-DOT-41186-48	Interstate Route I-17, Copper Canyon, section AR	2	J
D-DOT-41132-55	FHP 46-4(6), 3(1), Cascade Lakes Highway, Davis Lake bypass, Oregon.	2	K
D-DOT-41188-54	EIS on Swamp Creek interchange, Washington.	2	K
D-DOT-41236-54	EIS on Olson Pl., S.W., widening, Seattle, Wash.	1	K
FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION			
D-FPC-05052-22	Crooked Creek Project, Clay and Randolph Counties, Ala.	3	E
D-FPC-07046-54	EIS on project 2705, city of Seattle, Wash.	1	K
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE			
D-HEW-81077-16	Model Secondary School for the Deaf, Gallaudet College, Washington, D.C.	1	D
D-HEW-81078-39	St. Francis Medical Center, Cape Girardeau, Mo.	1	H
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT			
D-HUD-89064-54	EIS, Seahurst Park, Wash.	2	K
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY			
D-VA-82025-00	Control of Eurasian Watermillfoil	2	A

APPENDIX II

PROPOSED REGULATIONS FOR WHICH COMMENTS WERE ISSUED BETWEEN APR. 1, 1972, AND APR. 30, 1972

Title and number of statement	General nature of comments	Source for copies of comments
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE		
Trepass—Use of pesticides and chemical toxicants		1 A

APPENDIX III. DEFINITION OF CODES FOR THE GENERAL NATURE OF EPA COMMENTS

(1) *General Agreement/Lack of Objections:* The Agency generally:

(a) Has no objections to the proposed action as described in the draft impact statement;

(b) suggest only minor changes in the proposed action or the draft impact statement; or

(c) has no comments on the draft impact statement or the proposed action.

(2) *Inadequate Information:*

The Agency feels that the draft impact statement does not contain adequate information to assess fully the environmental impact of the proposed action. The Agency's comments call for more information about the potential environmental hazards ad-

ressed in the statement, or ask that a potential environmental hazard be addressed since it was not addressed in the draft statement.

(3) *Major Changes Necessary:*

The Agency believes that the proposed action, as described in the draft impact statement, needs major revisions or major additional safeguards to adequately protect the environment.

(4) *Unsatisfactory:*

The Agency believes that the proposed action is unsatisfactory because of its potentially harmful effect on the environment. Furthermore, the Agency believes that the safeguards which might be utilized may not adequately protect the environment from the hazards arising from this action. The Agency therefore recommends that alterna-

tives to the action be analyzed further (including the possibility of no action at all).

APPENDIX IV. SOURCES FOR COPIES OF EPA COMMENTS

A. Director, Office of Public Affairs, Environmental Protection Agency, 401 M Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20460.

B. Director of Public Affairs, Region I, Environmental Protection Agency, Room 2303, John F. Kennedy Federal Building, Boston, Massachusetts 02203.

C. Director of Public Affairs, Region II, Environmental Protection Agency, Room 847, 26 Federal Plaza, New York, New York 10007.

D. Director of Public Affairs, Region III, Environmental Protection Agency, Curtis Bldg., 6th and Walnut Streets, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106.

E. Director of Public Affairs, Region IV, Environmental Protection Agency, Suite 300, 1421 Peachtree Street, N.E., Atlanta, Georgia 30309.

F. Director of Public Affairs, Region V, Environmental Protection Agency, 1 N. Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois 60606.

G. Director of Public Affairs, Region VI, Environmental Protection Agency, 1600 Patterson Street, Dallas, Texas 75201.

H. Director of Public Affairs, Region VII, Environmental Protection Agency, 1735 Baltimore Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64108.

I. Director of Public Affairs, Region VIII, Environmental Protection Agency, Lincoln Tower, Room 916, 1860 Lincoln Street, Denver, Colorado 80203.

J. Director of Public Affairs, Region IX, Environmental Protection Agency, 100 California Street, San Francisco, California 94102.

K. Director of Public Affairs, Region X, Environmental Protection Agency, 1200 6th Avenue, Seattle, Washington 98101.

SUMMARY OF 102 STATEMENTS FILED WITH THE CEQ THROUGH 4/30/72

	Draft ¹	Final ²	Total ³
BY AGENCY			
Agriculture, Department of	66	116	182
Appalachian Regional Commission	1	0	1
Atomic Energy Commission	39	40	79
Commerce, Department of	2	7	9
Defense, Department of	5	2	7
Air Force	10	3	13
Army	5	9	14
Army Corps of Engineers	193	328	421
Navy	4	9	13
Delaware River Basin Commission	3	0	3
Environmental Protection Agency	8	14	22
Federal Power Commission	41	7	48
General Services Administration	13	28	41
HEW, Department of	4	1	5
HUD, Department of	9	22	31
Interior, Department of	85	44	129
International Boundary and Water Commission—United States and Mexico	1	4	5
Interstate Commerce Commission	2	0	2
National Aeronautics and Space Administration	13	10	23
National Capital Planning Commission	1	0	1
National Science Foundation	0	2	2
New England River Basins Commission	1	0	1
Office of Science and Technology	0	1	1
Pacific North West River Basins Commission	2	0	2
Tennessee Valley Authority	7	8	15
Transportation, Department of	874	774	1,648
Treasury, Department of	4	3	7
U.S. Postal Service	1	0	1
U.S. Water Resources Council	7	0	7
Veterans' Administration	1	0	1
Total	1,402	1,432	2,834

¹ Draft 102's for actions on which no final 102's have yet been received.
² Final 102's on legislation and actions.
³ Total actions on which final or draft 102 statements for Federal actions have been received.

	Draft ¹	Final ²	Total
BY PROJECT TYPE			
AEC nuclear development	2	20	22
Aircraft, ships, and vehicles	1	5	6
Airports	56	160	216
Buildings	5	8	13
Bridge permits	12	9	21
Defense systems	3	3	6
Forestry	6	4	10
Housing, urban problems new communities	8	13	21
International boundary	4	2	6
Land acquisition, disposal	10	34	44
Mass transit	3	2	5
Mining	6	2	8
Military installations	12	12	24
Natural gas and oil:			
Drilling and exploration	5	5	10
Transportation, pipeline	9	5	14
Parks, Wildlife refuges, recreation facilities	39	17	56
Pesticides, herbicides	16	15	31
Power:			
Hydroelectric	38	8	46
Nuclear	36	18	54

	Draft ¹	Final ²	Total ³
Other	12	8	20
Transmission	9	9	18
Railroads	2	1	3
Roads	639	563	1,202
Plus roads through parks	159	34	193
Space programs	3	6	9
Waste disposal:			
Detoxification of toxic substances	7	2	9
Munition disposal	2	3	5
Radioactive waste disposal	5	1	6
Sewage facilities	7	10	17
Solid wastes	3	0	3
Water:			
Beach erosion, hurricane protection	7	22	29
Irrigation	18	9	27
Navigation	65	111	176
Municipal and industrial supply	8	4	12
Permit (Refuse Act, dredge and fill)	12	1	13
Watershed protection and flood control	122	276	398
Weather modification	6	5	11
Research and development	15	9	24
Miscellaneous	30	16	46
Total	1,402	1,432	2,834

¹ Draft statements for actions on which no final statements have yet been filed.
² Final statements on legislation and actions.
³ Total actions on which final or draft statements have been taken.

HIGHWAY SAFETY

HON. RICHARD G. SHOUP

OF MONTANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. SHOUP. Mr. Speaker, in recent years many of our citizens—and particularly our young people—have begun to question our national priorities and methods of solving great problems. In this time, we have declared national wars on a number of ills, ranging from drug abuse, crime and poverty, to inflation, and environmental degradation.

But there is one nationwide problem which does not command a great deal of national attention, despite the great toll it takes on national resources in losses of life, injuries, and economic losses. I am referring to the national highway death rate, and the need for greater highway safety.

Last year, the National Safety Council estimates 55,000 people were killed on our Nation's highways, over 2 million people suffered disabling injuries, and economic losses totalled \$14.3 billion.

We must declare war on this needless loss of life and limb, and make highway safety the national priority it should be.

I do not mean to say that important steps are not being taken now in highway safety improvement. Under the 1966 Highway Safety and Motor Vehicle and Traffic Safety Acts, the U.S. Department of Transportation is implementing an extensive safety program for vehicles, drivers, and highways. Many private sector organizations are also doing fine work.

But the funding and public support for these programs is inadequate compared with the enormity of the problem.

President Nixon's Task Force on Highway Safety recognized the need for national support in its 1969 report, "Mobility Without Mayhem," by recommending that the President declare highway safety as a major national goal; that he

issue a special challenge to the Congress for support and the American people for commitment; that he allocate adequate resources to Federal programs; and that Congress appropriate funds for support of the Federal safety program.

Our distinguished colleague from Ohio (Mr. HARSHA) the ranking minority member of the Public Works Committee, recently called on the President to convene a White House Conference on Highway Safety to help mobilize public support for the safety program.

I support the intent of these recommendations, and urge that they be carried out as soon as possible.

My concern for highway safety is based on the unenviable fact that my home State of Montana is one of the unsafest States in the Nation for highway travel.

While the national highway death rate—measured by deaths per 100 million miles of vehicle travel—dropped to an all-time low of 4.7 in 1971, Montana's death rate—the third highest in the country—increased from 6.5 to 6.7.

Looking at another indicator, the population death rate, Montana ranks second in the country with a rate of 46.3 deaths per 100,000 population.

Part of the reason for my State's relative lack of highway safety is the fact that nearly all of our travel is on rural roads, and most safety figures indicate that chances of being involved in fatal accidents are more than twice as great on rural area roads.

However, Montana's death rate is still much higher than most of our neighboring States even with similar travel patterns.

In this regard, I am pleased that the Department of Transportation's National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has identified programs to keep the drinking driver off our highways as a top priority.

At present, there are 35 alcohol safety action projects in various phases of implementation throughout the country, with plans to eventually have a program operational in each State.

I am particularly interested in this program because figures supplied to me by the Highway Users Federation point out that drinking and driving contribute to a high percentage of fatal highway accidents in Montana.

For example, 102 of the 199 driving fatalities registered in Montana in 1969—more than 50 percent—involved drinking to some degree. The total alcohol involvement for all highway fatalities that year was 132 out of 339 fatalities, nearly 40 percent.

I hope that these Federal demonstration programs will help to develop public awareness of the drinking driver problem and develop effective programs for dealing with it.

Another important aspect of the safety problem is improvement of unsafe roadway characteristics.

The 42,500 mile Interstate Highway System, the most modern road network in the world, has been designed to the highest safety standards. As a result, travel on the Interstate is nearly twice as safe as other roads and streets in the Nation. In 1970, for instance, 2.69 million persons were killed per 100 million miles

of travel on the Interstate compared to 5.16 on other roads.

These figures indicate that for the safety benefit alone, we must continue to improve and upgrade our highway systems—particularly primary and secondary roads which have become outdated in the last 16 years while emphasis has been on Interstate construction.

In the area of roadway safety, Mr. Harsha' proposed Omnibus Highway Safety Act of 1972, which has the unanimous support of the Public Works Committee, would provide for expanded programs to improve high-hazard highway accident locations, eliminate roadside obstacles which often cause needless death and injury, and provide for a special pavement marking program to increase visibility on rural county and secondary roads and facilitate night time driving.

This legislation (H.R. 13539) would also establish new programs in the areas of public education and support for highway safety, and set higher funding levels for state and community safety grants and safety research and development efforts. It represents an important step forward.

I mentioned earlier the concern of our young people for many national problems—environment, poverty, the war in Southeast Asia. But there is relatively little concern about the fact that motor vehicle accidents are the leading killer of Americans between the ages of 2 and 24.

Nationally, 23 percent of youths 5 to 14 years old and over 40 percent of those 15 to 24 years old who die each year are highway fatalities.

Other figures emphasize the extent of this problem among young people. In 1970, 16,500 persons between 15 and 24 years of age were killed in motor vehicle accidents, a startling percentage of the national total of more than 55,000.

Between 1961 and 1970, while 53,316 Americans were killed in Vietnam, traffic deaths in the 15 to 24 age group totaled 137,900—2.6 times higher than the war's toll.

Obviously, strong steps must be taken at all levels of government and in the private sector to increase support among our youth for traffic safety and improve driver education and licensing programs.

In this area, I am pleased that Secretary of Transportation John Volpe has created a Youths Task Force in the DOT to advise him on methods of involving youth in the traffic safety movement. Through the Highway Users Federation's Auto Dealers Traffic Safety Council, new car and truck dealers try to bring safety into the minds of the very young through various programs, including a safety bug campaign.

These efforts are to be applauded, but both government and industry must do more.

I have touched today on only some aspects of the Nation's highway traffic safety problems, but these are areas which I feel are most important.

Worthwhile steps are being taken, as evidenced by the recent declines in national death figures. I ask that we make highway safety a national commitment, and bring more of our resources into the effort to get the job done—better.

GALLAGHER INTRODUCES LEGISLATION TO CHANGE FBI STRUCTURE AND PURGE FBI FILES

HON. CORNELIUS E. GALLAGHER

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to introduce a comprehensive bill which will alter the structure of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and which will establish a formal means to purge FBI files of irrelevant and harmful data. Let me briefly list what the original legislation I am introducing today will do:

First. Create two coequal Directors of the FBI. One will have sole control over criminal investigations and the other will concern himself exclusively with national security matters.

Second. Each of the Directors shall be limited to only one term of 5 years.

Third. Establish a National Records Review Board with, in the language of my bill:

The authority to examine all records and documents contained in the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to require the removal and destruction of any information found in such records and documents which in the judgment of the Board is unconnected with legitimate investigative purposes leading to the discovery and prosecution of violators of the laws of the United States.

The limitation on the term of the Director is a necessary first step and I understand that some of my colleagues propose a similar measure. I believe that 5 years is an adequate time for a director to serve. It will be recalled that John Edgar Hoover served as Director for 48 years and that is one-quarter of our National history. No man must ever again be permitted to amass so much personal power in such a sensitive position.

Recent disclosures have made it essential to split the criminal investigation work at the FBI from the national security, counter-espionage function. By having two coequal Directors with distinctly separate responsibilities we not only lessen the power of the "keeper of the files" but we also make it more difficult for the same rationale to be employed in conducting electronic surveillance on a local candy store or a local alderman as is employed in justifying tapping the phone of a foreign embassy. Today, campus activists or political protesters are put in the same category as a spy working for an enemy. This is not only unjust, but it also deliberately sets a torch to the Bill of Rights for, in my judgment, current practice allows an American citizen to be considered exactly the same as a foreign enemy.

All are viewed as a threat to national security, while the Bill of Rights is supposed to differentiate between American citizens and citizens of other countries.

THE NATIONAL RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

Mr. Speaker, by far the most important of the proposals I am offering today

is to establish a National Records Review Board. Two members of the Board will be appointed by the Speaker of the House, two by the President of the Senate, and three by the President. In order to emphasize the difference between the Board and what are called study commissions, it might be well if the members appointed by the legislative branch were not Members of the Congress. I recognize that there is some possibility of a constitutional question being raised about the Board, for some might argue that the power the Board would have to order removal of records in the executive branch may violate the traditional separation of powers. However, it is my opinion that the need for the Board is so urgent and so extraordinarily important to our Nation's future, that I offer this proposal in order to begin debate over the issue. Of course, I would hope that the standing committee to which my legislation is referred would begin hearings immediately, for the constitutional complexities posed deserve serious consideration.

I noted with great pleasure that the Democratic Party study group's report to the platform committee addresses the necessity of reforming the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Their proposal for a congressional watchdog committee is a very welcome suggestion, but I do not believe that, in the current situation, the chairman of a standing committee, an existing subcommittee, or even a specially created oversight committee could risk assuming the burden of taming the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

I know personally, Mr. Speaker, that when I told the facts of my blackmail by the FBI to responsible Members of the House when it was happening in 1966 and 1967, each responded as if I were a leper asking to hold his hand. They knew that the same thing could and probably would happen to them if they intervened. Everyone knows the Congress has failed in its oversight responsibilities in the past and that Mr. Hoover did not have to answer a serious question from the Congress in at least the 10 years with which I am familiar. As inviting as the concept of a congressional watchdog is, I believe that it could not be effective in the current climate.

However, after the National Records Review Board has done its work within 18 months, my legislation requires it to "submit a report, with recommendations for legislation concerning future congressional oversight of information gathering by the Federal Bureau of Investigation."

I would hope, of course, that congressional oversight could be mounted immediately but we must all admit that the chances do not look promising.

SEARCH AND DESTROY MISSION THROUGH FBI FILES

I do not propose that the National Records Review Board rent ITT's document shredder and destroy all Federal Bureau of Investigation files. What I do propose is a board composed of renowned civil libertarians who are attuned to modern concepts of civil rights—particularly privacy—and who would have the sound judgment to deter-

mine which items of information are irrelevant to legitimate law enforcement aims. The Board should be headed by someone of the stature and integrity of former Chief Justice Earl Warren.

It used to be that very few people dared mention what was in the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Now, men like Jack Anderson and Tom Wicker of the New York Times have been publishing extensive articles attacking the contents of those files. On April 19 of this year, I gave a long speech in which I proved conclusively that FBI files were leaked to Life magazine to form the basis for the ridiculous "body in the basement" story. I demonstrated how the sole author of that lie, Harold "Kayo" Konigsberg, was a captive of the FBI who emulated Scheherazade by spinning out a new falsehood every day and how those stories went directly to the top people in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is exactly this kind of thing—believed by Life writers solely because it had come from our chief law enforcement agency—which the Board would expunge. When I proved that this incredible tale was a total lie I was declared expendable because my continued presence in the Congress caused a credibility gap to those who passed out the story, particularly Mr. DeLoach, of the FBI. So I had to be eliminated.

MAYOR ALIOTO'S TESTIMONY BEFORE
THE SENATE

Mr. Speaker, in February and March of 1971, the distinguished Senator SAM ERVIN held a crucial series of hearings with his Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. Those hearings are replete with brilliant and revealing testimony and the penetrating questioning which has made Senator ERVIN the most respected constitutional authority in the Congress. But the most relevant example of what I am talking about today is found during the testimony of San Francisco Mayor Joseph L. Alioto. On pages 502 and 503 of volume I of those hearings, Mayor Alioto refers to a deposition by William Hundley, former Chief of the Organized Crime Section at the Department of Justice. Mr. Hundley was also an attorney for both Look magazine and Life magazine and he describes what he saw in the offices of Life. Mr. Hundley's sworn deposition states:

I went into his office and he had about a cabinet full of Government documents. I took them out and looked at them. They were FBI reports and I looked at them long enough to satisfy myself that they were authentic FBI reports.

How much more proof could we possibly ask for as to the necessity for a National Records Review Board?

WHAT GOES IN AS GARBAGE COMES OUT AS GOSPEL

Mr. Speaker, there is the accumulated garbage of 50 years in the files of the FBI and as I and many others have demonstrated, what goes in as garbage comes out as gospel. I would envision the National Records Review Board making a search and destroy mission through those files and purging them of meaningless items of hearsay, vindictive attacks by

political enemies, sexual innuendo and the outright lies like those of Mr. Konigsberg.

Some might claim that the National Commission on Individual Rights, created by the Organized Crime Act of 1970, obviates the necessity for the Board. During debate on that act, I called the Commission "a pale placebo" and "a puny palliative," and the fact that, as of this very moment, the administration has yet to appoint its own seven members suggests strongly that I was correct. Even if that Commission is not still born, it would still not have the power to order the destruction of records at the FBI.

The National Records Review Board, unlike so many study commissions, would do its job and then disband. It would not spin on endlessly, perpetuating itself and blindly pursuing its own existence and nothing else. Yesterday, on the floor we passed a bill which would cause those commissions to self-destruct in 2 years; the language of my bill self destructs the Board in 18 months. And its report required to be submitted to the Congress could provide a front-line dispatch on what really should be the responsibility of the Congress and the responsibility of the executive in bringing the FBI into line with democratic principles.

There are many examples of the necessity to study the operations of the FBI; for example, a lack of communication between the FBI and the CIA produces, in my judgment, a far more real threat to the national security than the Harrisburg seven ever could. I would hope that the hearings over my bill could explore the many serious questions which have arisen over the Federal Bureau of Investigation's role in democratic society.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Speaker, every single citizen in the United States is threatened by material in FBI files. There is no reason to tell our children to go to school to try to improve themselves and our society if a single act committed in youthful indiscretion or enthusiasm can be an immovable rock in their path. If education is really a passport to a better life, we must not allow the idle trivia at the FBI to be used by an all-knowing, but sieve-like Government to seal the borders to personal happiness and individual self-fulfillment.

A student who protests the war, a black detained for any reason, a woman who forcefully protests sexual discrimination: everyone can be damaged. A Federal job can be snatched away and because of the easy exchange of all this data, they can even affect credit ratings, insurance coverage, or private employment opportunities. We must avoid the clear and present danger of America turning away from its historical role as the home of the second chance. If we do not act now, America may move into a postconstitutional era where it will be a prison of no real chance at all.

Mr. Speaker, I insert a copy of my bill, Tom Wicker's fine article from the New York Times of May 7, an outstanding editorial from the Jersey Journal of May 1, 1972, and a description of the

democratic study panel's report from the New York Daily News of May 7, 1972.

H.R. 14890

A bill to amend titles 5 and 28 of the United States Code, and the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, with respect to the position and duties of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and for other purposes

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 532 of title 28 of the United States Code is amended to read as follows:

"§ 532. Directors of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

"The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, two co-equal Directors of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, one such Director to be the head of such Bureau with respect to all criminal investigatory matters, and one such Director to be the head of such Bureau with respect to the national security responsibilities of such Bureau. Each such Director shall serve no more than one five-year term in such office."

Sec. 2. (a) Section 5313 of title 5 of the United States Code is amended by inserting at the conclusion thereof the following new paragraph:

"(22) Directors of the Federal Bureau of Investigation."

(b) Section 5314 of title 5 of the United States Code is amended by striking out paragraph (44) thereof.

(c) The table of sections of chapter 33 of title 28 of the United States Code is amended by striking out "Director" in the item relating to section 532 and inserting in lieu thereof "Directors".

(d) Title VI of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 is repealed.

Sec. 3. (a) There is established the National Records Review Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board"), which shall consist of seven members knowledgeable with respect to civil liberties, at least some of whom shall be learned in the law. Two such members shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, two by the President pro tempore of the Senate, and three by the President.

(b) The Board shall have the authority to examine all records and documents contained in the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and to require the removal and destruction of any information found in such records and documents which in the judgment of the Board is unconnected with legitimate investigative purposes leading to the discovery and prosecution of violators of the laws of the United States.

(c) The Board may make such rules and regulations, including provision for the election of a chairman, as it deems necessary to the proper performance of its duties. The Board may hire such staff at such salaries, within the limitation of its appropriations, as it finds necessary to the proper performance of its duties. Each member of the Board shall receive no compensation with respect to his services on the Board, except as provided in section 5703 of title 5 of the United States Code for an individual employed intermittently in the Government service.

(d) The Board shall terminate no later than eighteen months after its first formal meeting, which meeting shall in no case take place later than 3 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and submit a report, with recommendations for legislation concerning future congressional oversight of information gathering by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Congress no later than the date of the termination of the Board.

A MAN WHOSE LIKE WILL NOT BE SEEN AGAIN

(By Tom Wicker)

WASHINGTON.—The death of J. Edgar Hoover brought an end to an era. That has been said of many men but in the case of Mr. Hoover—who, at 77, had been director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for 48 years—it was really true. The Hoover Era almost exactly spanned the years since the United States emerged from World War I to find itself a world power; and in the half-century that followed, he became one of the few constants in a rapidly changing nation, an endlessly evolving society.

The director's views and values never ceased to reflect the vanished America that had shaped him; but his remarkable combination of bureaucratic and political skills, public relations genius, dictatorial methods and law-enforcement professionalism enabled him to retain unmatched power and status in Washington through Prohibition, Depression, the gangster days of the thirties, World War II, the Cold War, Korea, Vietnam and the radical political activism of the sixties.

Eight Presidents depended on or tolerated him; Congress feared and favored him, from the "red scares" of the early twenties to the trial of Philip Berrigan; and he became the only high public official for whom the Federal retirement rules were specifically set aside so that he could serve on, as it seemed, forever. When his housekeeper found him, one morning last week, slumped by his bed, dead of natural causes, even J. Edgar Hoover's enemies—by whom the truculent old man liked to say he had been "distinguished"—conceded that his like would not be seen again.

For many Americans, that was a relief; but for others, Mr. Hoover's death symbolized the passing of much that they had valued—old-fashioned patriotism; rigid "moral" values; a stern code of authority; a political and social attitude uncomfortable with the strident demands of minorities, young people, liberated women, gays; and a view of "law and order" as the first priority of government. Both for them, and for those others who believed Mr. Hoover had outlasted his time, the question of his successor was a matter of vital importance.

The director, after all, had presided over one of the major agencies of the Federal Government; he had almost unlimited powers over its thousands of agents and its substantial budget; he had custody of its massive accumulation of reports, files, fingerprints, dossiers; he had, by custom and necessity, direct links to any man who might sit in the White House; and thus he had the potential for extending a vast and effective secret police system into the life of virtually every American. J. Edgar Hoover had personally had that potential; the question whether his successor also should have it could hardly be answered without searching study of the way Mr. Hoover had handled it.

The historical record is likely to accord him both good and bad marks. Up to the end of World War II, few officials had earned such esteem, in making an honest, efficient and feared Federal force of what had been a corrupt and sleazy agency; in developing scientific investigative techniques; in the F.B.I.'s effective wars on bank robbery and kidnapping and the gangsterism of Depression days; in its successful counterespionage activities during World War II—in these achievements and more—J. Edgar Hoover compiled a remarkable personal record.

With his flair for publicity—he invented the "Ten Most Wanted" list and shrewdly cooperated in "G-Man" movies and radio programs—he made himself a legend in the nation; and with his masterly bureaucracy, he made himself a fixture in Washington.

But the post-war era brought new problems. Hot war became cold war, in its late

Stalinist phase, Communism became the new international threat. Seen as a revolutionary and aggressive ideology, its intrusion from abroad into American life seemed a more formidable "fifth column" than the spies and saboteurs of World War II ever had; and since it was J. Edgar Hoover's F.E.I. that had taken care of the latter, it became the new mission of the G-Men to take on the Communists. But the task was subtly, perhaps fatally different; the Communist threat, if it had any substance at all, was far more a matter of domestic subversion than of foreign agents. Thus it was that the F.B.I. moved into what a group of academic and other specialists on the agency, meeting last year at Princeton, concluded was now its principal concern—domestic political surveillance.

Moreover, Mr. Hoover's public relations techniques, glorifying his agency's mortal combat with the "masters of deceit" in the Communist "movement," probably contributed as much as any other single factor to the virulent anti-Communism of the public and its politicians in the fifties and early sixties; and that public attitude had its effect on government policies, from the non-recognition of Communist China to the fiasco at the Bay of Pigs. Concurrently to those Americans less fearful of the Reds than for their own political institutions, the F.B.I.'s political surveillance came to seem an alarming secret-police threat; in some ways, that fear may have been little more justified than the fear of Communists, but it nevertheless began to undermine confidence in the F.B.I. and in J. Edgar Hoover personally.

Despite its front-page warfare on Communism, it also began to be apparent in the late fifties and early sixties that the bureau had been considerably less than alert, eager and effective in protecting the civil right of blacks, and of whites who tried to help them, in the years of upheaval that followed the Supreme Court's order for the desegregation of schools.

President Kennedy had made the reapointment of Mr. Hoover the first order of business after his election in 1960, but Robert Kennedy, arriving at the Justice Department intent on wiping out organized crime, found that the F.B.I. scarcely admitted the existence of organized crime. Students of the agency contend that these deficiencies, too, were to some extent the result of F.B.I. concentration on Communism—which the director considered more of a threat than segregation, and more rewarding in publicity and bigger budgets than organized crime.

During the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, these defects were to some extent rectified; but as black and antiwar militance became powerful in the sixties, the domestic surveillance of the F.B.I. became more and more extensive.

In recent years, therefore, the director and the F.B.I. he created had become engulfed in controversy, primarily as to the agency's surveillance and Mr. Hoover's personal activities—such as the feud with the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King and his powerful political opposition to a consular treaty with the Soviet Union.

The director was charged also with letting his agency's general effectiveness slip. Critics thought both were outdated—that the F.B.I. National Academy, for instance, reflecting Mr. Hoover's views, taught little that was relevant to the modern problems of police in central cities. They said F.B.I. agents were overwhelmed by Mr. Hoover's bureaucratic demands and intimidated by his dictatorial discipline.

But J. Edgar Hoover was never charged with being too weak to resist improper political demands; over the long pull, his stewardship of the F.B.I. files was reasonably good—but just flawed enough to suggest the damage that could be done by a weaker or less

scrupulous successor. His long career suggests, first, therefore, a replacement with a reassuring public reputation for strength and integrity, as well as one more in tune with the last third of the twentieth century than the first third. Law enforcement experience seems equally necessary, as well as freedom from entangling political commitments.

Whether structural changes in the F.B.I.—for instance, the separation of its counterespionage mission from its crime-fighting function—are also necessary is certain to be a matter of public and political debate. President Nixon implicitly recognized the complexity of these questions and the importance of finding a new director in whom the nation can have confidence, when he named Assistant Attorney General L. Patrick Gray as an interim choice, and promised a permanent selection to whoever takes the Presidential oath next January.

IS THIS YOUR FBI?

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is getting some serious criticism lately and some people are beginning to wonder why the liberals in Congress, usually ever so alert to pick on J. Edgar Hoover, have been letting opportunities go by.

Rep. Cornelius Gallagher delivered an hour-long speech in Congress recently, the gist of which was that the FBI had hounded him for years because he had refused to go along with a smear campaign against Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. He charged the FBI leaked raw, unsupported files to a magazine to force him out of Congress as punishment for his defiance of its plan against Dr. King.

Proof or disproof of those charges, made on the floor of Congress and off it too, would not affect the outcome of Gallagher's coming trial on income tax charges. But they would seriously affect the FBI.

The principal daily newspaper in neighboring Bergen County, never noted for its softness toward Hudson County politicians, only last week raised the question and wondered why nobody in Congress has bothered to see if what Gallagher said is true. Since Gallagher cited names and times and places, a congressional committee should be able to run down the facts rather quickly—empowered as it would be with the subpoena, prosecution for perjury, and punishment for contempt.

Now another charge against the FBI has arisen during the trial of several former members of Union City's board of education. Two defendants have accused the FBI of setting up State Sen. William V. Musto (who has not been accused of anything) as a target and then trying to make them help "get" him.

Again, this accusation cannot determine in one way or the other the guilt or innocence of any of the accused.

But it is unnerving if the nation's proudest police force is used in a sideline business of bagging political pigeons. Somebody ought to answer the charges and set them at rest. Otherwise, somebody ought to be looking into them.

DEMS PANEL ASKS TIGHTER GRIP ON FBI

(By Jeffrey Antevil)

WASHINGTON, May 6 (News Bureau)—A Democratic Party study group, charging that the FBI "has gone 50 years without full public accounting, particularly of unjustified political surveillance," called today for tighter control over the bureau by Congress and the White House.

In a report to the party's Platform Committee, the intelligence and security planning group of the Democratic Policy Council said the successor to J. Edgar Hoover, who died Tuesday after nearly 50 years as director of the FBI, should be selected on the basis of his administrative skills, policy-making

ability and "sensitivity to human values." He should be chosen, the group added, with the same thoroughness that is required for a Supreme Court appointee.

President Nixon announced Wednesday that he will not name a permanent successor to Hoover until after the November election. Assistant Attorney General L. Patrick Gray 3d was named acting director in the interim.

HEADED BY STEVENSON

The Democratic panel, under Sen. Adlai E. Stevenson 3d (D-Ill.), was sharply critical of the quality of domestic intelligence under the Nixon administration. It also accused the administration of excessive government secrecy, improper political surveillance and attempts to restrain the press.

The Democrats blasted what is called "the untouchable status of the FBI leadership with its painful implications for the unresponsiveness of the FBI either to modern management practices or to a proper concern for the protection of individual rights."

They said attention must be paid at the FBI to "refining selection of surveillance targets and diverting effort from surveillance or intimidation of the innocent."

OTHER REQUESTS

Other major recommendations included: Remedying the "now abysmal" coordination between the FBI and other intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA, by appointing the attorney general to the National Security Council and requiring joint supervision of intelligence by the executive branch and the council.

Creation of a congressional watchdog committee for the FBI—similar to that now existing for the CIA—including members from the Judiciary, Appropriations and Foreign Affairs committees and other panels concerned with citizen privacy, crime control and government efficiency.

Supervision by the President, acting through the attorney general, over policy and major administrative matters involving the FBI.

PUBLIC BROADCASTING

HON. SAMUEL L. DEVINE

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. DEVINE. Mr. Speaker, recently there has been a lot of discussion and debate about the future of public broadcasting in this country. The Federal Government first became substantially involved in funding public broadcasting when the Congress passed the Public Television Act of 1967. That act was written primarily from suggestions made by the Carnegie Commission on Educational Television in its 1967 report. Five years later in 1972 this Congress will soon be asked to fund the Corporation for Public Broadcasting for the amount of \$65 million in fiscal year 1972 and \$90 million in fiscal year 1974. I think it is important for us to go back and take a look at that Carnegie report to see if public broadcasters today are meeting its requirements. In that vein it might be helpful to see what the original architects of the Carnegie Commission think about the direction in which public television is headed today. Mr. Speaker, I now place in the RECORD a 1971 speech given by Arthur L. Singer, Jr., who was instrumental in the establishment of the Carnegie Commission:

THE CARNEGIE REPORT REVISITED

(By Arthur L. Singer, Jr.)

IS THE CPB FOLLOWING THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS?

(This address, adopted for publication in the interests of clarity, was delivered June 28, 1971, before the annual Public Broadcasting Development Conference in Boyne Highlands, Michigan. Arthur L. Singer, Jr., was instrumental in the initiation of the Carnegie Commission and now serves as president of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. Stephen White, whom Mr. Singer mentions in the first paragraph, drafted the *Carnegie Commission Report on Public Television* and is vice president of the Sloan Foundation.)

These comments are the product of a collaboration between Stephen White and me. Those of you who know both Steve and me will know what the division of labor was. Those of you who don't know us can assign credit for anything you like to me, and blame for anything you don't like to him.

When we were asked to prepare this talk it was suggested that we try to appraise the progress of Public Television in relation to the report of the Carnegie Commission on Educational Television. We were asked to address the question: What kind of match or mismatch is there between the recommendations of the Commission in 1967 and the state of Public Television four years later? Mind you, we were not asked to reevaluate the Commission's recommendations with the benefit of hindsight nor to appraise the progress of Public Television in any general sense. We were simply asked to compare the present course of Public Television with the course charted for it by the Carnegie Commission and to assess the extent of convergence.

It can be argued that mid-1971, only four years after the enabling act, is somewhat too early for the task you have set us. The Corporation for Public Broadcasting, which is the centerpiece of the whole undertaking, is still a young organization. It has not been funded, so far, at anything like the level that the Carnegie Commission recommended, and the insulation from annual Congressional financing, so strongly urged by the Commission, has not yet been provided. But since we have been asked, we can do no less than comply.

I want to be clear that I am not speaking here in any way for the Carnegie Commission nor for its chairman, Dr. James R. Killian, Jr. They spoke for themselves, in their report, and thereupon dissolved. Their report, and only their report, can be attributed to the Commission. So if you will keep in mind that I am speaking here only for ourselves, I will review what we had in mind early in 1965 when we took the first steps that led to the formation of the Commission, summarize where the Commission came out, and compare their recommendations with the state of Public Television four years later.

In 1965 we had in this country a commercial television system that had assumed pretty much a fixed form. It looked then as if nothing much was likely to affect its general shape, short of some kind of social revolution—which didn't look either likely or desirable—or technical revolution—which now begins to look at least possible but is still a little way down the road.

There were two characteristics of commercial television that determined the shape it had assumed. First, by decisions taken back in the 'twenties, long before there was any television, the system was firmly wedded to the advertising industry. Second, because of spectrum scarcity it was wedded to a certain kind of advertising—mass advertising. I am not going to belabor these points—they are familiar to all of you and so are the consequences. These two characteristics meant that the television industry was under re-

morseless economic pressure to maximize audience, minute by minute, over the entire broadcasting day. That meant an almost completely networked system. And it meant, finally, that the appeal had to be to the lowest common denominator of interests and tastes.

It's absurd to try to make a whippingboy out of commercial television. Given the terms under which it was expected to operate, it has done remarkably well. Technically, it is as good as the set-manufacturers allow it to be. It has managed to maintain to a high degree the integrity of its news services, at least at the network level. It has produced on occasion a documentary program like "The Selling of the Pentagon", which in the context of commercial television was a remarkable achievement. And even in its entertainment programming, it manages to squeeze the Bernstein concerts and the Hallmark dramas in between the cracks of its normal structure.

But still, in 1965 there was an inclination to wonder whether television—not commercial television, but television—couldn't do better than that.

There was also educational television. The reservation of allocations for education had been sold to the Congress primarily on the basis of television's assumed instructional value. Many stations, and particularly those in the larger cities, had moved toward prime-time programming largely because it seemed absurd, with so valuable an instrument at their command, to leave the evening hours open. The Ford Foundation, then as now the most stalwart supporter of the system, had by 1965 largely abandoned its own earlier pre-occupations with instruction and was supplying some funds for general programming. But even Ford funds are limited, and for the most part the prime-time programming was made up to bad lectures, scratched films intended to make the viewer expert in the art of Japanese paperfolding, and explorations of art museums in black-and-white.

The Ford Foundation had poured more than a hundred million dollars into educational television, over some fifteen years, but in television a few millions a year is simply not all that much, and the system was desperately poverty-stricken. While the Carnegie Commission was deliberating, the New York station very nearly went off the air. But New York was only slightly worse off than most—every station lived from hand to mouth, happy if it could get a signal on the air every day, and never much mind what the signal said.

The system also remained wedded to its instructional heritage. Most stations, numerically if not in audience reach, were attached to state or municipal educational systems. The leadership of the stations, even the community stations, were largely drawn from the ranks of educators. There is nothing wrong with educators, but they are not the source from which innovative prime-time programming is likely to come. It was not in their training, or in their blood, and if they were not entirely happy with the art of paperfolding, they were certainly not as unhappy as they should have been, and not particularly well-trained or well-disposed to do much about it.

Finally, and this is by no means least important, the system was demoralized. The hard fact was that television instruction—for which the system was created and around which it had organized itself—hadn't turned out to be the rousing success nearly everyone had expected. Far from revolutionizing education, it had barely made a mark on it, and it was by no means certain that even that dim mark was anything to be proud of.

Adding it all together, the system was out at the elbows and without a clear sense of mission. But at the same time it had assets. Perhaps its greatest asset was its ownership of spectrum-space, which in the larger cities

tended to be space in the VHF portion of the spectrum. The system had a physical plant—not much of a plant, to be sure, but at least something to be built on. And it enjoyed, in it and around it, the devoted support of a great many dedicated men and women, who in some intuitive fashion perceived its potential.

Irresistibly one could see, in prime-time television, a vacuum that commercial television was not designed to fill, and had moreover no desire to fill, and in educational television an instrument that could be shaped to fill that vacuum. By the time the Commission convened for its first meeting, the Carnegie Corporation was convinced that the Commission should be urged to section off prime-time for instructional television, and devote its energies to this area. (In fact, we toyed with the idea of christening it the Carnegie Commission on Non-Commercial Community Broadcasting.) That concept of the Commission's terms of reference was subsequently adopted. The beast was named Public Television, and the Commission set about trying to determine just what kind of beast it should be.

As usual, the first model that was put forth was that of the British Broadcasting Corporation, an enterprise intended to serve the whole public, independent of advertising and largely independent of Parliament, nationally networked, and under no overwhelming obligation to maximize audience for each and every program it presents. It is, in many respects, an admirable model. It served the British well, in the days when it was all the British had, although apparently it did not give them all the television they wanted, and it continues to serve them well now that it is supplemented by a commercial service.

But as a model for American imitation, it seemed inappropriate. To begin with, it was bluntly elitist, in the sense that in its most glorious days it was directed by people who decided, in the privacy of their own deliberations, just what it was the British public should see on television, and proceeded to provide it. In a country with a long tradition of elitist direction—a tradition of Eton and Harrow Oxbridge—this can work. But to make such a national network palatable either to the American public, or to the American Congress, seemed unlikely.

What is perhaps worse, an American BBC, newly created, would be unlike the original BBC in a most significant sense: it would not be the only game in town. It would have to come into being in competition with commercial television. And where that competition would hurt would be in the search for people of judgment and talent and skills to organize and operate the system. In Great Britain, when BBC-TV came into being, all such men and women who were drawn to television as an exciting new field of endeavor went to BBC or nowhere. In the United States, they have been drawn primarily to commercial television, where the resources and the rewards are so much greater. They have put their judgment and talent and skills to work selling Miller Beer—and sold a great deal of it.

Finally, there was a real question whether a system designed to serve the needs of 50,000,000 people, more or less homogenous, will also meet the needs of 200,000,000 people who make up the most diverse nation-state the world has ever seen. The man who makes program decisions at BBC knows pretty intimately the people he is programming for. His counterpart at an American BBC would have to deal with the demands of many who are total strangers. This fact, too, does much to explain the necessity to seek out, on commercial television, the lowest common denominator.

At the other end of the pole from the American BBC model is what might be called the forthright democratic solution: a system which aimed for maximization of audience.

In a Public system, the constraints of the advertiser would be removed. But in all likelihood, they would be replaced by the constraints—probably far worse—of Congress. In the end, such a solution would end up in a television system not substantially different from the commercial system that now exists, for there are really only a limited number of ways to maximize audience on a national network basis, and commercial television had no doubt already found them.

Just for the sake of being complete, there is still another possible solution—the whole system could be turned over to a government agency, which is essentially what has been done in France and what is generally done in a great many other countries. It is an interesting way of doing things, since the system changes every time the government changes. But I think I can safely say that it was never seriously considered. The Commission was unanimously of the view that non-commercial television should be a private system with maximum insulation from the political process and minimum interference from governmental authority.

What the Commission was led to, in the end, was the concept of a pluralistic system, in which decision-making was widely dispersed. I think this was set forth clearly in the report of the Commission, and yet I have a feeling it has never been fully comprehended. You will forgive me if I take this opportunity to go over it again.

First, the Commission wanted to see many points of program generation. By providing many such points, each closely associated with an operating station, it was hoped that program producers would remain close to their own publics. Each such station might define his public in his own manner: the station in New York might well choose as its primary public the depressed minorities who live in New York; the station in Boston might choose the communities of Harvard and MIT. That would be their business.

Now this would still represent an elitism of a sort: individuals would still be deciding what their publics should see and hear. But the publics themselves would be close at hand, monitoring the process on a day-to-day basis, making their views felt by the closeness of their contact with the station and the people who staff it. Elitism, to be sure, but elitism with some hope of general popular influence, and under some pressure to operate wisely and responsibly.

Next, the Commission wanted each program producer to have access to interconnection. If a station produced a program that it considered might be of general interest or utility outside its own community, it should have the absolute right to offer that program across the board. "Offer" I said, and "offer" is what I mean. I am speaking of interconnection and not of networking.

The other side of this, obviously, is that each station would select its own programs, from its own production and that of other major stations. From national programming as well, but I shall get to that later. I am still at the station level. Hour by hour, what the station would be putting on the air would be what those who ran the station were convinced, in their best judgments, was what their own public should see, or would see, or wanted to see—which are not the same things at all.

Since none of this would be possible unless there were many stations enjoying access to substantial funds, the Commission made the case for substantial funds. It urged that they be as free as possible from Congressional constraints, and believed that local stations explicitly serving local publics might begin to accrue substantial funds from local support.

It envisaged national programming, particularly in the areas of journalism—programming created on the national level for the national audience. It is in journalism that the strongest case can be made for net-

working—not networking as an economic method of distributing programming, or networking as a convenience, but as a substantive good.

Certainly, the Commission envisaged some networking. But over the whole system, they thought of it as primarily a set of local or regional subsystems, with program generation locally rooted, and program presentation locally determined.

There are serious risks in such an approach. For one thing, it has never really been tried, so there is no one to say it is even workable. For another, it requires strong local leadership, and Public Television, in 1965 at least, was not noteworthy for the strength of its local leadership. Furthermore, it represents the hard way. It is a lot easier to let someone in New York or Washington or Los Angeles decide what it is your public wishes to see, and to just patch in to the network. That kind of system enables the station manager to save his energies for begging money from his public—and he needs all the energy he has, because his public doesn't give a damn about the station anyway. It may care about the Forsythe Saga, but that clearly has nothing to do with the station—it comes from BBC via unseen hands in Boston and Washington.

There are, I repeat, risks to the kind of system proposed by the Carnegie Commission. But they thought they were risks worth taking, and risks that had a fair chance of leading in the end to a successful venture.

The Commission also had ideas about programming, and it turned out, as anyone will recall who read the report, that E. B. White was able to state them succinctly. "It should be," he wrote of Public Television "our Lyceum, our Chateaufort, our Minsky's, and our Camelot." To be more pedestrian in stating what he states so well, programming for Public Television can be thought of as parallel to programming for commercial television, but with the freedom that comes once the constraints of the advertising sponsor and the mass audience are removed. Soap opera and situation comedy and variety shows, and even westerns, can be done on a different plane than the plane of which commercial television has its existence. I don't say a higher plane, because I don't want to get into a discussion of what is meant by higher. Just different.

Let me say what I mean by giving an example. In Hollywood, a few years ago, some people had the notion that the comedic genius of James Thurber was made to order for television. They managed, I don't know how, to sell the idea to a network, and a program called "My World and Welcome To It" got on the air, for one season. I watched it, every so often, because sometimes for a minute or two at a time I could recognize traces of Thurber. But the pressures under which it had to be produced, to meet the very special needs of commercial television, converted it into a slapstick situation comedy, and not a very good one.

There should be a place in television for the comedy of James Thurber. There should be a place where an imaginative producer and writer and director can get it on the air in the form in which they originally conceived it, and not in the form it had to take after going through the pressure cooker of commercial television. There should be a place for "All in the Family" as it was originally conceived—as an exercise in making bigotry look as ridiculous as it is—and not as it has come out, as thirty minutes intended to shock.

This is the hard way to program. It is a lot easier to do journalism, which is a distinguished kind of enterprise but reflective rather than creative. Creative programming calls for artistic talent, and even with that kind of talent it fails more often than it succeeds. It requires creative direction, and creative acting. But without that kind of

thing television is doing only half the job that should be demanded of it, and I am not at all sure that the half it is doing—the journalistic half—is the more important half.

Whenever this kind of thing is suggested, people object that it simply won't work—that there isn't enough talent around to allow local production of ambitious programming, and that the quality of the programming would inevitably be so low that no one could possibly be persuaded to watch it. This appears at first glance to be the counsel of wisdom.

To begin with, all talent begins by being local. Only their own fair share of talented people are born and develop in New York and Los Angeles. The rest of the talent you find in those two cities comes from Des Moines and Houston and Seattle. They may in time be attracted to the two great centers of the entertainment industry precisely because they are the great centers of the entertainment industry, but everybody is likely to be better off if they mature in their own home towns first. Public Television can provide for them a means.

Second, the requirement that quality be high is connected somehow with the pretensions and the intentions of the source. This sounds peculiar, but every one of us knows that it is true. A man who will enjoy himself dizzy watching the local high school football game can be heard complaining a few days later that the Super bowl on national TV put on a second-rate performance. The local symphony orchestra sounds great in the town auditorium, but let a few false notes be sounded in Carnegie Hall and the audience begins to walk out.

And of course these two phenomena are not at all disconnected. Unless there is some kind of support for developing talent, or untested performers, the possibility of developing high quality is seriously jeopardized. Providing the opportunity for talent to develop, free from the extreme demands of commercial television, in its own environment and with the initial applause of its own community, insures that the medium will be constantly revitalized. If television at its best is to flourish, there must be a place on television for talent to take hold. No more honorable role for Public Television could be conceived.

The analogy is by no means perfect, but there is something of this in the relationship between Broadway and Off-Broadway. Off-Broadway serves a very special public in New York, mostly young, mostly newly-arrived in the city, largely resident in the immediate neighborhood. It provides what must be considered, in terms of Broadway, entertainment that does not begin to meet the technical standards or in fact many of the other standards of Broadway. But it is essential to the life of Broadway, for from Off-Broadway comes the flow of talent, the flow of ideas, the flow of new techniques, that keep Broadway alive. And Off-Broadway in turn is fed from the high school drama societies and the university drama courses, where quality, whatever that abstract word may mean, is lower still—but the audiences quite as enthusiastic.

So far as television is concerned, the products of local program generation should not be transferred automatically to the complete system, any more than every Off-Broadway play gets to Broadway. Most of them will be locally produced, and locally or regionally enjoyed. But those that are of more than local interest, just because they possess some unique quality, some individual display of virtuosity, some nugget of a notion that merits circulation, can be offered to the system at large and shown wherever a local station manager sees merit in them. Over time the mere existence of this ladder to eminence might be PTV's strength.

As I have said, they were all radical proposals. Then or now, there is no hard evidence that they can be made to work. Although I must say there is some soft evidence. Julia Child, the French Chef, was the creation of WGBH in Boston, aimed directly at the Cambridge community which at that time the station concentrated on. But once she had made her reputation in Boston, and perfected her odd assortment of skills, the program was offered to other stations which snapped it up, and provided ETV with its first starring attraction. Mr. Roger's Neighborhood, created in and for Pittsburgh; Max Morath, playing ragtime for a Denver audience—these were what we remember.

There is even evidence that the same principle applies on a larger scale. The British make two kinds of television program. One is intended for use in Great Britain. The other, called Mid-Atlantic Programming, is deliberately conceived to be merchandisable in both Great Britain and the United States. We see some of both in this country. But it is only the British programming that has made any mark, as everyone in Public Television very well knows. The Mid-Atlantic Programming, almost without exception, comes out insufferable trash.

I have given you a long description of what was embedded in the Carnegie Report. It was a plea for pluralism, a plea for localism, a plea for breadth of attack, a plea for an escape from the ponderousness and the pedagogy that had afflicted most of ETV. That was what they were asking for. How have we come out?

The present system is not pluralistic. It is dominated structurally by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the Public Broadcasting Service and the Ford Foundation. What goes on the air on the system, as distinct from purely local production, is what they approve.

When I say "domination," I must make it clear that I do not refer to any kind of editorial domination by any of the three institutions. To my knowledge, editorial control remains vested in the program producer, to the full extent that the centralized structure permits. The Ford Foundation, like any major private philanthropy, is likely to be extremely scrupulous in that respect.

Program production, it is true, is dispersed: there is production in New York and Los Angeles and Boston and Pittsburgh and San Francisco. But that production is financed upon petition to the three major institutions. It is essayed, by them, for its national significance, and put on the entire system, by network, on the basis of their judgment. The local manager is a petitioner, and not an originator. Making his plea for support, he must think not in terms of his own public but in terms of that faceless mass known as the national audience. It is dispersal in name only.

Let me make the distinction clear. What the Carnegie Commission had in mind was a system in which the station in, let us say, Boston, was awarded on the basis of its past performance a substantial sum and advised to produce the best it could for the audience in Boston and New England that it knew it had, or that it wanted to have. There was faith that some proportion of that production would turn out, as Julia Child turned out, to be of such great and wide interest that the entire system, voluntarily and of its own choice, would see that it got on the air. That is not what is happening. Boston is awarded funds on the basis of what Washington and New York think it should be doing. It is not truly a point of program generation; it is a branch office.

Because of that mode of operation—and for other reasons as well—the total system is primarily journalistic. If you are going to make a case for national exposure, on a local basis, you almost have to do it on the

basis of journalism, which doesn't really take much creative talent. I can make a case for a journalistic program out of San Francisco simply by listing the people I intend to interview. That case can be judged, more or less, where decisions are made, and support tendered or refused.

The Corporation for Public Broadcasting makes a case for its support of local production—it points with legitimate pride to the local sporting events, and the local town meetings, and the local news that are now being transmitted. For this it is to be only congratulated—it is doing a job that is well worth doing. But this is a circumscribed localism. It is, without meaning any pejorative sense, parochialism—a very worthy and indeed necessary attention to the affairs of the parish. The parish needs attention, which commercial television does not give it. To some degree, and in some places, Public Television, with the help of the Corporation, has begun to do it. It is also, I might add, good and cheap.

But it is also unambitious, and Public Television as a whole should not be entirely an unambitious system. I repeat, it should be our Lyceum, our Chautauqua, our Minsky's, our Camelot, not entirely our weekly meeting of the school board. (Although some day in this country there may be some local meeting of some school board that merits national attention—and the system should be so conceived that it will get it.) I am not for one minute knocking the parochial service that some of the stations now provide. But as Peggy Lee sings, is that all there is?

Let me put all this another way. Public Television has cast itself in the mold of commercial television. It is divided into networked and non-networked programming. The networked programming is every bit as centralized and in its own way as dehumanized as the network programming of CBS or NBC. The non-networked programming is local and parochial. There is virtually nothing in between. And this is exactly what the Carnegie Commission, as I understand it, did not have in mind.

I hope it is clear to you that in making these remarks about Public Television, I am not talking about people. These comments are directed to the structure that Public Television assumed after the Carnegie Report was issued—a structure that has made subsequent events as inevitable as the rise and fall of the tides. The Carnegie Report considered the advisability of a fourth network, and rejected it as a solution. The Public Television system has assumed the posture of a fourth network, with what are really insignificant variations, and is now operating exactly the way it was assumed, a few years back, a fourth network would. Since this is a public address and not a learned disquisition, it may sound too black-and-white, with not enough grey in it to make it sound real. Let me enter a few qualifications. Public Television has, after all, a great deal to its credit. "Civilisation," and the "Forsythe Saga," and the "First Churchills," and "Sesame Street," to begin with. However, none of these series is really the product of Public Television. The first three came from BBC and were in fact produced for British audiences. The last came from the Children's Television Workshop and was generated from outside the Public Television system. Public Television did not make these programs; it bought them. Well, I can add the drama being produced on a regular schedule by Lew Freedman, and perhaps the "Great American Dream Machine." As it happens, I am not happy crazy about the "Great American Dream Machine" but a great many people are, and you can put my own discontent down to my own deficiencies.

Add to all this the fact that the Carnegie Commission recommended an excise tax on

television sets to provide stable financing, and you can see that little of what the Carnegie Commission proposed has indeed come into being. All I can say is that we are not really surprised. Shortly after the report was published, my collaborator in this address wrote an account of the whole matter in the magazine "The Public Interest." I shall quote most of the last paragraph: "The likely outcome," he wrote, "is that the Corporation for Public Broadcasting will be formed, that Ford's Public Broadcasting Laboratory will dominate its program production, and that it will fall into a simple fourth-network operation. Let it at least be clear that if this happens, or if anything much like it happens, the intentions of the Carnegie Commission will have been largely ignored."

I think that quotation sums up our own views today, both in what it says and what it doesn't say. As I said at the beginning, when we were asked to prepare this talk it was suggested that we devote ourselves to matching the performance of Public Television against the intentions of the Carnegie Commission. That we have done, and our conclusion is that there is very little match.

Of course, the Corporation has never had the funds that Carnegie Commission sought for it. It can certainly be argued that the course of action laid out by the Carnegie Commission was contingent on the delivery of real money to the Corporation—money that it has never yet received.

Lacking funds, the Corporation has been forced to select its targets rather than range over the field. It may well be that the Corporation has in mind future developments, when the system approaches maturity, that will bring it closer to the model proposed by the Carnegie Commission. What appears today as a change of purpose may in time be revealed as a matter of phasing.

But the Carnegie Commission recommended against a fourth-network operation, and Public Television is now pretty much a fourth network.

But the more important fact, we truly believe, is that you now have, in the Corporation, a dedicated institution led by able and dedicated people. You have throughout the country a system in being, and men and women who are devoting their careers to making of it everything it might be. You have, in the last year or so, made the entire country sit up and take notice. Let us hope that, whatever the course you may adopt, E. B. White will in the end have made his point after all.

HENRY REGNERY: A CONSERVATIVE PUBLISHER IN A LIBERAL WORLD

HON. PHILIP M. CRANE

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, when Henry Regnery began to publish books in 1947 the American intellectual atmosphere was one-sided. It was predominantly liberal, predominantly of the view that government could solve the Nation's problems at home, and that communism represented no threat abroad. Those who challenged this thesis found themselves unable to publish their works and unable to gain a hearing in the Nation's academic and popular journals of opinion.

Seeing a great vacuum to be filled, and sensing the danger to America and to Western civilization if the vacuum remained and the traditional values of a

free and democratic society were not articulated, Henry Regnery decided to publish the books which others refused to publish.

Many of the volumes which have borne the imprint of "Henry Regnery and Company," are well known to all Americans who have studied the literature of the past 25 years. William F. Buckley, Jr.'s, first book, "God and Man at Yale," Russell Kirk's first book, "The Conservative Mind," Richard Weaver's, "The Ethics of Rhetoric," Freda Utley's, "The China Story," James Burnham's, "Congress and the American Tradition," all were published by Henry Regnery.

Some of these important volumes made money, and other did not. But Henry Regnery did not go into the book publishing business in order to achieve only commercial success, to pander to popular tastes and popular fads. His goal was the defense of the values which were under attack both at home and abroad, and in the books he has published over the years he became one of the great champions of freedom.

Because of Henry Regnery's courage and vision, conservatism has become an intellectual force to be reckoned with. At the time his publishing company began there were few conservative periodicals in existence. Today such publications as "National Review," "Modern Age," "The Alternative," "The Intercollegiate Review," and a host of others provide eloquent testimony to the force and vigor of the movement of ideas he helped to set in motion.

Last month nearly 200 prominent Americans gathered in Chicago to celebrate the 25th anniversary of Henry Regnery's decision to become a publisher of books.

Discussing this dinner, columnist James J. Kilpatrick noted that—

Henry Regnery . . . challenged the orchestrated liberalism of the whole book publishing world—not merely the houses themselves, but also the book reviewers, the periodicals, the critics who can make or break a title in the market. Then, as now, the media were dominated by intellectuals hostile to conservative thought. Henry took on the whole crew.

Mr. Kilpatrick wrote that—

Every faith must have its Henry . . . Someone has to keep the tablets, if only to preserve the possibility of enduring truth against the casual destruction of the passing hour.

I wish to share Mr. Kilpatrick's column, which appeared in the Washington Evening Star of April 20, 1972, with my colleagues. It follows:

HENRY REGNERY, KEEPER OF CONSERVATIVE STORE

(By James J. Kilpatrick)

CHICAGO.—Nearly 200 American writers and teachers, all of them identified with the conservative cause, gathered here in Chicago the other night to honor a benefactor and to renew old bonds. Liberals, of course, have such occasions also; they are indispensable to the keeping of any faith; and they remind us anew of the importance of ritual in the survival of civilized man.

Our own modest consistory was summoned to pay homage to Henry Regnery, founder and chairman of the board of the publishing house that bears his name. Henry is a diminutive fellow, maybe 5-foot-6, slender as a

snap bean, but he stands pencil straight and his placid face belies a stubbornness within. His is 60 years old, but in the past 25 years he has not gained a pound or added a wrinkle.

These were the 25 years we recognized last week—the quarter century since Henry, at 35, plunged into the perilous waters of the book publishing business. He set out in Chicago, of all places, to publish books by conservatives, of all people; and for nearly two decades, until Arlington House and the Conservative Book Club came along, Henry and Devin Adair Garrity in New York were the only two such lunatics in the land. Bless them, O Lord!

You have to be a professional writer, perhaps, to understand that invocation fully. The act of writing, in itself, is among the most agonizing occupations ever contrived by man; but to write futilely—to write and not get published—is to know the tortures of the damned. It is like the tree that falls in the desert: Does anyone hear? Without a publisher, a writer is an unstrung fiddle; other instruments are playing. He is mute.

Henry Regnery made it his mission to string us up. He challenged the orchestrated liberalism of the whole book publishing world—not merely the houses themselves, but also the book reviewers, the periodicals, the critics who can make or break a title in the market. Then, as now, the media were dominated by intellectuals hostile to conservative thought. Henry took on the whole crew.

Thus, when it was highly fashionable to praise the Chinese Communists, those agrarian reformers, he published Freda Utley's "The China Story," one of the most powerful anti-Communist works of our time. When progressive education was all the rage, he sought out Mortimer Smith, and thereby introduced in the groves of academe a cool voice of common sense. He breached the very citadels of the Eastern Establishment with Bill Buckley's "God and Man at Yale." In 1967, when liberals ruled the Southern roost, he sought a conservative in Richmond and let the young cock crow.

Most significantly, he discovered in Mecca, Mich., up in the burnt-woods country, a ruddy little Scot whose pedantic image concealed a quick and lively passion. This was Russell Kirk, teacher and philosopher. His seminal work, "The Conservative Mind," remains after nearly 20 years the one best starting point for an understanding of contemporary conservative thought.

What did Henry glean from his labors? Personal satisfaction, little more. Relatively speaking, he rarely made a dime. In the whole of the 25 years, only a handful of his titles, by the most generous accounting, ever ranked as best-sellers. But he had a wonderful time.

So the clan gathered to pay him honor, and as such ritual proceedings go, this one went very nicely. The preliminary speakers rambled on too long, but Bill Buckley, as principal orator of the evening, was exactly right. He recalled Whittaker Chambers' vivid description of the typical tiny shop on a side street of a great city. Here no customer is ever seen. A curious visitor, wondering what the shop conceals, finds at a dimly lit desk in the rear an old man who lovingly offers a few bolts of handcrafted cloth—fabric not meant to sell, but merely to endure. So, too, Henry, keeper of the conservative store.

Every faith must have its Henry. The liberals have theirs, and I would pay them homage also. Someone has to keep the tablets, if only to preserve the possibility of enduring truth against the casual destruction of the passing hour.

Recently, Henry Regnery told a small part of his own story, of how he first entered the publishing world, of the books he has published, the authors he has known, and, after 25 years, what it has meant to him.

He concluded his article by stating that:

The threat of extinction is now much greater than it was then: those bent on destroying civilization are better organized, and the defenses are weaker. To do what is needed to halt the disintegration of our society requires purpose and intelligence. There won't be any money or glory in it, but we have inherited a great and noble tradition, and it is worth fighting for.

Mr. Regnery's article, which appeared in the October 1971 issue of the *Alter-native* and was reprinted for the occasion of the April 12, 1972, dinner, follows:

HENRY REGNERY: A CONSERVATIVE PUBLISHER
IN A LIBERAL WORLD

When I first became interested in publishing, we didn't describe ourselves as conservative. What we now think of as the "conservative movement" received its name and identity with the publication in 1954 of Russell Kirk's *The Conservative Mind*. There had, of course, long been opposition to the dominant liberal ideology, in some cases on a high intellectual level—Weaver's *Ideas Have Consequences*, for example, and Hayek's *Road to Serfdom* had both preceded Kirk's book, but it was *The Conservative Mind* that brought the opposition together, gave it a name, and began the development of a coherent alternative.

When the Henry Regnery Company was organized in 1947, therefore, it was not with the idea of publishing conservative books, but books which didn't necessarily fit the liberal ideology which so dominated publishing as to constitute a particularly effective form of censorship. I came into book publishing, however, by degrees, and as a result of my association with Felix Morley and Frank Hanighen in the publication of a Washington newsletter, *Human Events*, which then consisted primarily of a four-page essay on some aspect of foreign policy. Morley and Hanighen had founded *Human Events* in 1944, as World War II was approaching its end; those who could "see things as they were," to which small but distinguished group Morley and Hanighen belonged, were not at all convinced that the victorious conclusion of the war and the policy enunciated by the administration would introduce the era of peace and good will among the nations proclaimed by the official propaganda line. The second issue of *Human Events*, for example, dated 9 February 1944, consisted of an article by Felix Morley called "The Trend Since Tehran," the Tehran Declaration having been signed some three months before by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. While the *New York Times* had greeted the *Tehran Declaration* with the assertion that it "laid the foundations for a new and better order in the world," Morley pointed out that in the eleven weeks that had followed the plous declarations of the big three about "working together in peace," and welcoming all "freedom loving peoples" into "World Family of Democratic Nations," Communist Russia had, without consulting its Western Allies done the following: signed an exclusive "mutual assistance pact" with the Czechoslovak government in exile; by its actions had made it clear that it considered Poland an exclusive Russian preserve; had blasted Pius XII as a profascist; and, finally, had incorporated the formerly independent states of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia into the Soviet Union.

Human Events, as the war ended, was one of the few publications to point out the dangers of the policy of unconditional surrender, and to remind its readers that a settlement based on hatred and revenge could neither bring peace nor would be in accordance with the traditions and ideals professed

by this country. When, therefore, Professor Karl Brandt of Stanford University sought a publisher to bring out an answer to Henry Morgenthau's *Germany Is Our Problem*, which had just appeared and proposed to convert Germany into a "goat pasture," it was quite natural that he should go to the publishers of *Human Events*—no one else, at that time, being even willing to discuss the publication of such a book. Brandt's answer was published by *Human Events* as a pamphlet, bearing the same title as the Morgenthau book, and became the first of a series of monthly pamphlets. The series continued for some three years, and included among its authors Felix Morley, John U. Nef, Joseph M. Lallely, Arthur E. Morgan, Clare Booth Luce, William A. Orton, Robert M. Hutchins, Douglas Steere and Frank Chodorov. One book was published during this period under the *Human Events* imprint, a collection of official Communist documents with an introduction by William Henry Chamberlin called "Blueprint for World Conquest." At that time, 1946, when Stalin was referred to as "Good Old Uncle Joe," and any realistic appraisal of Soviet Russia regarded as a particularly obnoxious form of heresy, the publication of the aims and methods of the Communist International created something of a sensation, and, I must say, whetted my appetite to publish more books.

It was becoming increasingly difficult in any case to conduct a publishing operation divided between Washington and Chicago, so in 1947 I decided to go it alone. The Henry Regnery Company began operations that year, but was not incorporated until 1948, taking over the pamphlet series and the remaining stock of "Blueprint for World Conquest." Our first list consisted of three books a study of the phenomenon of Hitlerism by the Swiss philosopher, Max Picard, and two books on allied occupation policy in Germany by the English publisher, Victor Gollancz.

Victor Gollancz was an extremely successful and astute publisher of Jewish background, a member of the Fabian society, and the founder, in the thirties, of the Left Book Club. All of this, however, didn't prevent him from taking an extremely critical view of post-war allied policy in Germany, which he felt was leading to mass starvation, was based on the Nazi doctrine of collective guilt, and was diametrically opposed to every principle the West stood for. His book on this subject, *Our Threatened Values*, was declined by his former New York publisher, who, by the way, had published the Morgenthau book, and somehow he came to me. I published it, along with another book by Gollancz which consisted of his account, with photographs, of several visits to Germany during the first terrible winter following the war. The other book on that list, Max Picard's *Hitler in Ourselves*, was a study of Hitlerism, not as an exclusively German phenomenon, but as an expression of the sickness of the West, which had taken a particularly virulent form in Germany.

To understand what has happened since, one should have some understanding of the general atmosphere of the immediate post-war period. It is probably difficult even for those who experienced it to believe that it could have happened; for those too young to remember, it must seem entirely incredible. What Albert J. Nock said of World War I, that it was a "Liberal's war and a Liberal's peace," was even more true of World War II, at least insofar as this country is concerned. Liberalism reigned supreme and without question; the liberal could believe, in fact, that no other position was conceivable. The war, which represented the triumph of good over evil, had been won. Fascism, militarism and colonialism had been banished from the earth; the Peace-Loving Nations, joined together in San Francisco in a perpetual bond, would preserve peace, protect the weak, and guarantee the rule of democracy—the future

seemed assured. It was a beautiful picture and questions about its conformity to the facts of life were not welcome. This, I think, is the explanation of the violent, irrational hatred by the liberals of McCarthy—he has become for them the symbol of the influence that brought their illusions down to earth.

But to get back to book publishing. Another early author of ours was Freda Utley. The daughter of one of the early Fabians, she became a Communist in the early twenties, while a student at the London School of Economics, but some six years in Russia as the wife of a Russian made her about as anti-Communist as one can be. In 1948 she went to Germany as a correspondent. Her strong sense of justice and her scorn of hypocrisy were outraged by what she saw, and the resulting book, *The High Cost of Vengeance*, appeared on our list in 1949. The liberal press, which meant nearly the entire press, still fighting for its illusions, ignored it, but such an influential publication as the *Christian Century* gave it a long and serious review, and it doubtless had some influence on American policy. Miss Utley was the first established author to appear on our list, and a following book of hers, *The China Story*, which we published in 1952, was our first book to make the best-seller lists. This came out just at the time MacArthur was dismissed from his command and when, as a conqueror, the whole subject of Asia, and particularly the loss of China to Communism, was at the center of discussion. Miss Utley was an authority not only on Communism, Communists and fellow travelers, but on Asia as well, and made it her business to put things down as she understood and saw them. Her account of the loss of China couldn't be ignored; it is to the credit of the *New York Times* that it reviewed the book favorably and at length, although Miss Utley blamed the *Times* for helping to create the illusions concerning the Chinese Communists which had disastrously influenced American policy. It was our first real success.

The following year we had another—William F. Buckley's *God and Man at Yale*. Frank Hanighen, who had published a piece on Yale by Buckley in *Human Events*, told me that Bill, who had just graduated, was writing a book along the same general lines. I wrote to him immediately to ask if we might see the manuscript. He replied at once, and a few months later *God and Man at Yale* gave Yale and the entire liberal establishment a shock from which they never recovered. If Bill had been a nobody or the book without basis it could have been ignored, but that wasn't the case—he had been Chairman of the Yale *Daily News*, a member of the debating team, an outstanding student, and, for a time, one of the president's prize exhibits at alumni gatherings, and worst of all, his book was effectively written and based on fact. For nearly a week after the book appeared, one prominent member of the faculty after another in the most ponderous, professorial manner, inveighed against "the book" as it soon came to be called in the *Yale News*; an entire issue of the alumni magazine was devoted to it; a commission was appointed to report to the trustees on its allegations. It was carefully denied, of course, that the commission had anything to do with "the book," which made it all the more apparent that "the book" was the sole reason for its existence. As was to be expected, Yale was completely exonerated in its report. There were reviews everywhere, columns, letters to the editor, interviews, with the author, all any publisher could ask for. Whether the book had any positive influence on Yale is doubtful, Yale's self-esteem at that time being pretty solidly entrenched, but it helped to launch the career of William F. Buckley, Jr., and it gave enormous pleasure and satisfaction to its publisher.

There were, of course, other books—a witty

little book on progressive education, *And Madly Teach* by Mortimer Smith which received much attention and was widely read, William Henry Chamberlin's *America's Second Crusade*, *The German Opposition to Hitler* by the distinguished historian, then at the University of Chicago, Hans Rothfels, several important books in philosophy, including James Collins' *The Existentialists*, which is still in print, to mention only a few. We were having some impact, it seemed, and some of our book: had done well, but it wasn't enough to put the operation on a sound financial basis. We needed a "back list," some books which would be steady, reliable sellers—a cook book, for instance, or text books. Our first step in this direction was an arrangement with the Great Books Foundation to publish paperback editions of the books required in their program, paperback editions of the classics being not then available. This seemed highly promising for a time, but the publication of *God and Man at Yale* put a stop to that. Then we decided to try to build up a college text book list, and brought in a retired textbook traveler, Sidney Gair, to put together a list. We did a few books of outstanding quality, but didn't have sufficient capital to put it over. Gair, however, made a great contribution to the firm—he put me in touch with Russell Kirk.

Returning from one of his searches for desirable textbook projects, Sidney told me that a young instructor in English at Michigan State had completed a manuscript he thought I should look at. "He doesn't say much," Sidney said, "is about as communicative, in fact, as a turtle [how Russell has changed], but he has a formidable intelligence, and when he gets behind a typewriter, the results are most impressive." I wrote for the manuscript which, as it happened, had just been rejected by Knopf, and a few days later the very neatly typed manuscript of *The Conservative Rout*, as it was then called, arrived in the mail. I read it during my vacation, and what an inspiring experience that was. We published it the following spring, and after much deliberation called it *The Conservative Mind*. Its impact was immediate, and beyond all expectations. It received leading reviews in the *Times*, *Herald-Tribune*, *New Yorker*, *Saturday Review*, etc. Then *Time* magazine—as a result, I learned later, of a suggestion of Whittaker Chambers—devoted the entire book review section of its 4 July issue to this one book, and mentioned it again in a news story. The young English instructor at Michigan State had become a national figure, and the amorphous, scattered opposition to the overwhelming power of liberalism had received its identity.

The Conservative Mind had an impact which, in the bored and blase atmosphere of the present, is hard to imagine. It was widely read and discussed, for example, in the colleges and universities, and after the reviews came articles—not all, of course, in agreement, but Kirk had launched a concept and established a position which the liberals recognized as a real challenge, and took seriously. There was opposition to Kirk, and from what became the conservative side, opposition particularly to the designation, "conservative." If I am not mistaken, no less a figure than Frank Meyer strongly opposed the adoption of the name "conservative" for the position he felt he represented, but when *National Review* began publication a few months later it described itself as a conservative journal of opinion. Kirk had won; we are all conservatives now.

Two authors whom it gave me special pleasure, but no profit, to publish were the South African poet, Roy Campbell, and the English writer, Wyndham Lewis; with them a *Festschrift* for the sixtieth birthday of T. S. Eliot and a book of essays by Ezra Pound, we could feel that we had some connection with the most important group of men writing in

English in this century, and writers who had devoted their talent and energy to opposing the disintegration of the values of our civilization. To have known Roy Campbell, a free spirit if ever there was one, was a great privilege. He had been a bareback rider in the circus, fought bulls in Spain and Portugal, served in the Nationalist Army in the Spanish Civil War and the King's Africa Rifles in World War II, baited left-wing poets in London, and with all that, had written some of the most beautiful lyric poetry of this century. But the critics would have none of him—he was violently anti-liberal and therefore for them a fascist, and his books, for all their great quality, have never sold. Lewis was also a difficult author to put over, but his intelligence and the quality of his work are gradually being recognized in spite of the critics. No matter what the critics may say, he is one of the towering figures of this century. As for the book of essays by Ezra Pound, the reviewer in *Commonweal*—a liberal Catholic, for me, is as much an anathema as a liberal Southerner—was outraged. "Who but Regnery would publish such a book?" was his scandalized reaction to this shameful act. I couldn't help but feel, who indeed?

We published many good books after *The Conservative Mind*—Felix Morley's *Freedom and Federalism*, Richard Weaver's *The Ethics of Rhetoric*, James Jackson Kilpatrick's *The Sovereign States*, James Burnham's *Congress and the American Tradition*, two books by William M. McGovern, Willmoore Kendall's *The Conservative Affirmation*, Wilhelm Roepke's *The Humane Economy*—but for me, *The Conservative Mind*, coming as it did after *The China Story* and *God and Man at Yale* was the high point of my publishing career. The unexpected appearance in the fifties of what promised to be a rational, viable alternative to liberalism was followed by the dismal sixties. A society seemingly characterized by Camelot, the "Playboy philosophy" of Hugh Hefner, Bobby Baker, the drug culture, and the contemptible collapse of our once proud universities in face of demands by "the kids" was hardly a favorable atmosphere in which to publish serious books. The drug culture, the kids, and the state of the universities no doubt symbolize the utter collapse of liberalism as a philosophy and a body of ideas, but we must face the fact that the liberals still hold nearly all the positions of influence in our society, and show no sign of being willing to relinquish them.

Perhaps there have been, for the time, enough books about conservatism itself, and there is certainly no need for more books pointing out the mess the liberals have made of things—that should be evident enough. What we do need, I think, is to develop a body of literature of high quality by people of conservative instincts—what, for example, T. S. Eliot undertook to do in his own writing and in his encouragement of others. For this, we need to encourage new talent, and one means, almost the only means, in fact, of doing this, is good periodicals. *Modern Age*, *National Review*, *The Intercollegiate Review* and the conservative student publications all perform an important function in this respect, but we also need a monthly of national circulation and of high quality—something on the level of the *Atlantic* or *Harper's* in their better days. I don't mean a conservative magazine; it should be edited by a man of conservative instincts—a man, that is, who takes a positive attitude toward the traditions of Western civilization—but the first consideration should not be conservatism, but quality.

Writing in 1947, in the disillusionment of post-war London Wyndham Lewis wondered if his long fight had been worthwhile. "Today," he said, "I should not write such books at all. People should be allowed to drop to pieces in any way they choose." But

then the old fighter went on to say, "... Darwin, Voltaire, Newton, Raphael, Dante, Epictetus, Aristotle, Sophocles, Plato, Pythagoras: all shedding their light upon the same wide, well-lit graeco-roman highway, with the same kind of sane and steady rate—one need only mention these to recognize that it was at least excusable to be concerned about the threat of extinction to that tradition." The threat of extinction is now much greater than it was then: those bent on destroying civilization are better organized, and the defenses are weaker. To do what is needed to halt the disintegration of our society requires purpose and intelligence. There won't be any money or glory in it, but we have inherited a great and noble tradition, and it is worth fighting for.

Henry Regnery has helped to keep the fires of civilization still burning. He deserves the thanks and admiration of all Americans and it is to be hoped that he will continue in his important work for many years to come.

AFRICAN-AMERICAN INSTITUTE

HON. JOHN R. RARICK

OF LOUISIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, capitalist collaboration with the Soviets in Russia and the Communists in Red China may seem contradictory. However, in Africa capitalists have been collaborating with the forces of revolution, violence, and international exploitation for some time. The actions of collaboration by capitalists in Africa are hidden from many Americans by the insinuations that progress is somehow impeded by white minority controlled governments which justifies the use of violence against them.

The violence promoters on the African scene such as the recent spear rattling revolutionary council at Lusaka, Zambia, are all easily traceable to the African-American Institute with offices at the United Nations Plaza, New York City and Washington, D.C. Principal foundations contributing to the African-American Institute according to their publication are the Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and Carnegie Corp. According to their material espousing peace, progress, and humanitarian endeavors, all contributions are tax deductible.

I include related articles from the Africa Report, organ of the AAI, and a list of programs and staff assignments follow my remarks:

[From the Africa Report]

THREE MAJOR FOUNDATIONS CONTRIBUTE TO AAI

(By Julien Engel)

The president of the African American Institute, Waldemar A. Nielsen, announced in January receipt of three major foundation as well as private grants totalling more than \$1,000,000. The Institute's main offices are at 345 East 46th Street, New York City.

The foundations contributing to the Institute's capital fund are: the Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and Carnegie Corporation. In announcing the grants, Mr. Nielsen declared, "These contributions will permit the Institute, as it enters its tenth year, to strengthen its staff and or-

ganization, improve its program planning and evaluation, extend its facilities, and develop its long-term fund-raising capacity." The object of these measures, he said, is to equip the Institute as the central private American agency in African-American relations, for the changing and growing tasks that it anticipates in the years ahead.

In its beginning years, the African-American Institute devoted itself to an active information program about Africa in this country and the provision of hospitality and assistance to African students and visitors here. With the onrush of African independence and the relative inactivity of private and official agencies with regard to the education of Africans, the opportunity subsequently arose for the Institute to pioneer in the creation of new programs of student exchange and teacher placement. The rapidly growing volume of its programs is reflected in its budget, which has doubled in each of the last three years, for a current total of \$4,500,000.

At this stage of its development, the Institute's main activities lie in the educational field. These include 14 different scholarship programs ranging from the large-scale ASPAU (African Scholarship Program of American Universities—nearly 500 students from 24-sub-Saharan countries and 214 participating colleges and universities) to the African Wild Life Leadership Foundation program (conservation training for five African students).

Either from its own resources or in association with other American organizations, the Institute now provides full or partial support to about 1,000 African students in the United States. In addition, it has undertaken in recent months to provide scholarship assistance on a trial basis to 150 needy secondary students in East African schools to permit them to complete their schooling. Another program administered by the Institute in this area assists a limited number of refugee students from non-independent territories to further their education, mainly in African institutions. A special school is currently being set up under Institute auspices in Dar-es-Salaam to prepare refugee students for various qualifying examinations.

The aid to secondary school students in Africa reflects a new approach developed by the Institute to mobilize American goodwill on behalf of the continent's youth. American schools and other organizations will raise the funds for the subsidy of needy African students. An average grant of \$150 will sustain a student for an academic year. It is anticipated that the formula of educational partnerships will eventually aid many hundreds of promising students and enlist the participation of American schools and groups across the nation.

In association with the Cambridge-based "Books for Africa" program, which it sponsors, the Institute is now actively seeking contributions from American, Canadian, and European publishers and book distributors to help build up the libraries of schools and institutions in both English and French-speaking Africa. Encouraging response has already been received from several quarters. The most recent is a donation of \$300,000 worth of carefully selected technical and other relevant titles by Prentice-Hall, Inc.

The development of Africa's mass media is another new area of rising interest to the Institute. Within the past year, it has awarded fellowships and grants-in-aid to 10 African journalism students and practicing journalists for further studies or on-the-job training in the United States and Europe, and to permit some of them to attend the International Press Institute conference in Paris. An American broadcasting specialist was assigned as program advisor to the

Ethiopian radio system, with the additional function of mass media advisor to the Institute for East and Central Africa. For African press attaches in Washington, D.C., the Institute developed a four-month weekly public relations seminar.

Plans for the current year include a series of journalism workshops in various parts of Africa to be conducted in cooperation with American newspaper editors and journalism professors, as well as representatives from other media. The Institute hopes in time to become involved in a number of major experiments in applying mass media to educational problems in Africa.

With the new organizational development funds at its disposal, the Institute will aim to become a bridge facilitating an increasing volume of two-way educational, intellectual, and cultural traffic between Africa and the United States. It foresees its role as a general purpose instrument helping to weave a pattern of close and effective relations between educational, civic, and philanthropic bodies in this country and institutions and leaders in Africa. Its concern will be not only to stimulate the flow of assistance and cooperation, but to attempt to bring about a somewhat more rational allocation of efforts and resources in the interest of balanced African development. To this end, the Institute hopes to launch a continuing, comprehensive inventory of all private non-profit activities in the Atlantic Community area relating to Africa.

Mr. Nielsen also announced that the Institute's Board of Trustees has recently added Dr. Robert Goheen, President of Princeton University; John H. Johnson, publisher of *Ebony* and other magazines; and Arthur Krim, President of United Artists' Corporation, to its ranks.

The Institute has been publisher of *Africa Report* (Washington, DC) since the magazine's inception in 1956.

The growth and diversification of the Institute's educational programs have occurred at a time when other educational efforts undertaken by the United States are registering a similar marked expansion. To assure itself of the best advice possible for the guidance of its educational programs and their proper integration with other efforts for Africa, the Institute is now proceeding with the establishment of an Educational Advisory Council to be composed of high-ranking American educators and specialists in Africa education. Among the persons who will serve on this body are Professor Karl Bigelow, Executive Officer of the Institute for Education in Africa and Professor of Education at Columbia University Teachers College; Dr. Gwendolen Carter, Professor of Government at Smith College; Dr. Cornelis de Kiewiet, President Emeritus of the University of Rochester and chairman of the American Council on Education's African Liaison Committee; Dr. James Nabritt, President of Howard University; Dr. Calvin Plimpton, President of Amherst College; and Dr. Judson Shaplin, Associate Dean of the Graduate School of Education, Harvard University.)

[From the Sunday Mail, Jan. 23, 1972]

OFFICIAL SHOCKED BY STATEMENT

Shocked African officials in Washington are trying to clarify a remark by — in Lusaka about the possible fire-bombing of the General Motors Plant in Port Elizabeth which they fear has doomed any chance he might have of again going to South Africa.

The remarks, as originally reported by the Times of Zambia, was interpreted by some officials in Washington as verging on incitement to violence against American property in South Africa. One official called it "disgraceful".

Some doubt has since been cast on whether

the controversial — actually advocated violence, but so far there is no text available in Washington.

[From the African-American Institute]

AAI TODAY

The African-American Institute is the major U.S. private agency working to further African development and to strengthen understanding between the United States and Africa.

There are many ways of serving the needs of African development. AAI believes it can be most effective by helping train Africans in needed fields. Projects providing academic education and technical and practical training for key Africans—including, increasingly, projects located in Africa—make up most of AAI's program.

As part of its efforts to strengthen understanding between the United States and Africa, AAI offers educators and African experts a first-class journal of current information and analysis, *Africa Report*. AAI also helps Americans with a general interest in Africa to keep in touch through meetings and community activities, and it promotes contacts between African and American leaders through visits by prominent Africans throughout the United States.

Since its founding in 1954, AAI has brought over 2,000 African students to U.S. colleges and universities—of whom a significant number have already returned to Africa to participate in the work of African development. AAI also has provided technical and practical training for some 1,500, in Africa and the United States. It has educated 580 young African refugees from southern Africa at its secondary schools in Tanzania and Zambia. More than 700 African leaders have visited America under programs administered by AAI, and 285 African women have participated in training activities organized by AAI's affiliate, the Women's Africa Committee.

The AAI program is flexible and growing. To meet growing needs, it has risen in volume from \$40,000 annually in 1954 to more than \$10 million in 1966.

It has changed to meet changing needs, with some activities dropped as the need for them lessened and others added as the need for them arose.

Most projects carried out by AAI are sponsored and financed by U.S. colleges and universities, private foundations, African governments, the Agency for International Development, or the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs of the Department of State—either solely or, in many cases, jointly.

Other AAI activities, like *Africa Report*, are financed almost entirely by general contributions to AAI, including contributions from private individuals and foundations.

AAI's work is directed by a Board of Trustees of distinguished Americans active in private philanthropy, civil rights, higher education, and business and finance.

AAI maintains its international headquarters in New York; an office in Washington, D.C.; regional offices in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Lagos, Nigeria; and sub-offices in Accra, Ghana, and Lusaka, Zambia. Its U.S.-based staff totals 117. Full-time staff, teachers at AAI's schools, and part-time representatives, located in 34 African countries, number 118.

In the past several years, AAI has tripled its staff and programs, consolidated its structure, and revised its operating procedures for maximum efficiency.

Although it has increased greatly in size and has become more professional in its operations AAI remains committed to the view that an organization's greatest asset is its capacity for sympathetic personal attention to human problems in an increasingly dehumanized world.

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RUMANIA'S INDEPENDENCE DAY

HON. THADDEUS J. DULSKI

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. DULSKI. Mr. Speaker, today is the national holiday of the Rumanian people, marking three great events of its history.

On May 10, 1866, Charles, Prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a scion of the southern and Catholic branch of the Prussian royal family, was proclaimed in Bucharest Prince of Rumania, and thus founded the Rumanian dynasty.

It was the successful outcome of the nation's long struggle to acquire the right of electing as its sovereign a member of one of the western non-neighboring reigning families in order to put an end to the strifes and rivalries among native candidates to the throne.

Although suggested as far back as 1857 by the Moldavian and Wallachian Assemblies, it nevertheless was opposed by the Russian and Austrian empires.

On May 10, 1877, during the turmoil of the Russo-Turkish War, the Principality of Rumania, until then nominally a vassal of the Sultan, proclaimed her independence by severing the old and outdated bonds that linked her with Ottoman Empire.

This independence had to be fought out on the battlefields south of the Danube, where the young Rumanian Army, as an ally of Russia, played a noteworthy part in the defeat of the Turkish forces.

The Congress of Berlin of 1878 confirmed Rumania's independence and conferred Europe's official recognition, a bright page in the country's dreary history though marred unfortunately by the loss of Bessarabia.

Another 4 years elapsed after the Rumanian people had proclaimed their independence and a further step was taken as they decided to raise their country to the rank of a kingdom.

On May 10, 1881, Charles I was crowned, by the will of his people, King of Rumania. A prosperous era opened on that day for the nation and continued for over six decades.

During all those years and up to the present time, Rumanians have cherished the 10th of May as their national holiday, the anniversary of happy and glorious events in their history. It remains the symbol of their permanency and perseverance through woes and hardships to reach the ultimate end of freedom and well-being.

The ruthless foreign rule which now oppresses the Rumanian nation has not been able to uproot the people's attachment to the traditional celebration of the 10th of May. In order to try and alter at least its significance, official celebrations were shifted from the 10th to the 9th of May, anniversary of the Soviet victory.

But, though flags are now hoisted on May 9, Rumanians in their captive homeland celebrate in their hearts the following day, awaiting with faith and courage the dawn of new times, when freedom shall be restored to them.

MR. HARRY F. TYLER OF JACKSONVILLE, FLA.

HON. LOUIS FREY, JR.

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. FREY. Mr. Speaker, on March 16 a most courageous and patriotic Floridian died.

Mr. Harry F. Tyler, a veteran U.S. Navy officer, served his country valiantly during World War II. He was credited with the sinking of an attacking enemy submarine in South Atlantic waters while operating from an oil tanker. His ship was sunk by another sub accompanying the enemy sub, and he and his crew of 52 men survived in a raft for 4½ days before being rescued by a British ship in 1942 near Trinidad.

He also took part in the invasion of North Africa and numerous other assignments before being transferred to aviation ordnance. There he logged 5,200 flying hours in seaplanes and bombers before his selection to the Naval Photo Intelligence Lab, NAS, Jacksonville, in 1962.

After his discharge from the Navy, he was employed by the Veterans' Administration Loan Guaranty Division of the Jacksonville offices until his recent death.

Having sustained various injuries during the war which resulted in the loss of both legs, Mr. Tyler's drive to succeed was not impaired. He was outstanding in the performance of his job and many other civic duties for the good of his community. This tremendous desire prompted his supervisors at the VA to recommend him for Outstanding Handicapped Federal Employee of the Year in November of 1969. Aside from this he was active in work with returning young veterans, former patron of Orange Park Chapter No. 226, former secretary of the Orange Park Masonic Lodge No. 267, Order of the Eastern Stars and Fleet Reserve No. 126.

Although Mr. Tyler was a double amputee, he possessed a desire to succeed and a personal fortitude to conquer any task at any time, having undergone several operations for circulatory conditions and eventually the amputation of both limbs, his attitude never faltered. He was continually outstanding in the performance of his duties which gave him the VA recommendation award. Living with tremendous pain his determination continued and from 1955 he attended Florida Junior College at various times until his enrollment. He also attended a class with the Society of Real Estate Appraisers.

Regardless of his handicap, Mr. Tyler's achievements are certainly an example for all Floridians and all Americans to follow. To be able to give unselfishly of one's self to accomplish such duties and community activities and living with such a handicap as Mr. Tyler has done should make all of us reevaluate ourselves and want to put more effort forward in achieving such goals. Mr. Tyler never stood behind the scenes or complained about his handicap, but through sheer determination and the use of his remaining faculties rose to achieve many arduous tasks. Florida has truly lost a great American.

NEED FOR MORE HEALTH RESEARCH FUNDS

HON. PIERRE S. (PETE) DU PONT

OF DELAWARE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. DU PONT. Mr. Speaker, I am today to speak for increased funding for health care in the United States. As my colleagues pointed out today, this year's proposed funding levels for health research are wholly insufficient given the magnitude of the tasks that lie ahead.

I am specifically concerned with the need for increased funds for the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development. This Institute faces the formidable job of seeking answers to problems in human reproduction, including the consequences of rapid population growth and distribution, and to

problems in child development, including the sudden infant death syndrome and prematurity.

With regard to child development, the budget proposes a small increase with which to fund research on primary causes of infant deaths, such as prematurity which afflicts twice as many of the poor and the black as of the more affluent. It is a minimal amount with which to fund a program dealing with the sudden infant death syndrome which causes approximately 10,000 infant deaths a year.

The same insufficient increase holds true for population research and reproductive biology, also housed within the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development. The budget includes only a \$4.7 million increase in this field.

During the hearing I chaired recently as head of the Subcommittee on Population Growth of the Republican Research Committee, it was brought out that last year, less than 38 percent of the new approved applications in this field were funded. Furthermore, less than 26 percent of the new approved training grant applications were funded. Yet in our continued striving for knowledge to improve human health and well being, I believe population research to be vital.

The population sciences offer the opportunity to fill great gaps which exist in our basic scientific knowledge concerning human reproduction; they offer us the means by which to provide American women with desperately needed improved methods of fertility control. Also important, this NICHD program carries the grave responsibility of evaluating existing contraceptives and thereby protecting the lives of the 8½ million women currently estimated to be using the oral contraceptives and the other approximately 20 million American women using other methods of fertility control. Since, admittedly, there is at present no contraceptive method which is safe, effective, inexpensive, and acceptable to all people, I submit that the small amount slated for an increase in population research is dangerously low given the importance of research in protecting the lives of American women, and indeed, ultimately for research which will affect all mankind.

The consequences of such a small investment are disproportionately large. The National Institute of Child Health and Human Development has a history of very small increases in budget. This tradition of smallness is reflected in the fact that it funds almost the lowest percentage of approved applications of any of the research institutes of NIH. This is true of both all research grant applications and of all training grant applications.

These small amounts have discouraged researchers from entering the field of population research, child health, and reproductive biology. The lack of training and fellowship funds, the lack of funds for starting new projects this year—all such factors serve to diminish these research programs, to retard them rather than to cause them to hold the line or merely stabilize. Child health wit-

nesses have urged an additional investment of \$10 million alone in the sudden infant death syndrome. Population research advocates have insisted that an investment of no less than \$60 million is necessary this year for growth in this field. For this reason I support the efforts of the Coalition for Health Funding in seeking to increase the funds available for the Center for Population Research and the National Institute for Child Health and Human Development.

MR. NIXON'S BRINKMANSHIP

HON. WILLIAM F. RYAN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, President Nixon has not only dangerously escalated the war in Vietnam, but has placed the United States in the perilous position of facing a possible direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union and/or China. He has further endangered the lives of the 69,000 American troops still remaining in South Vietnam, as well as the lives of American prisoners of war being held by the North Vietnamese.

The President's action in mining the harbors of North Vietnam and interdicting sea and rail communications contravenes the national policy adopted by Congress in section 601 of the Military Procurement Act of 1971, which called for a termination at the earliest practicable date of all military operations in Indochina.

His continued refusal to consult with the Congress on matters of war led me yesterday to introduce a resolution in the House to impeach the President—House Resolution 975. I made the decision to introduce this resolution only after I became convinced that President Nixon would continue to refuse to observe the limitations that the Constitution places on the warmaking powers of the President. He has subverted the Constitution, and Congress must find a mean to curb him.

The course of action he is pursuing is fraught with dangers far more serious than a deterioration in relations between Moscow, for world peace has been jeopardized with unpredictable consequences.

An editorial that appeared in today's New York Times provides a sharp analysis of the President's rash, misguided, and unconstitutional action. It follows:

MR. NIXON'S BRINKMANSHIP

In ordering the closing of land and sea supply routes to North Vietnam by American military action, President Nixon is taking a desperate gamble that alters the entire nature of the war, that risks the fundamental security and deepest interests of the United States for dubious and tenuous gains, and that runs counter both to Congressional mandate and to the will and conscience of a large segment of the American people.

The mining of the harbors of North Vietnam poses a direct challenge to the Soviet Union and other arms suppliers to Hanoi that could quite possibly escalate into a confrontation between the world's two great

superpowers. Only the gravest threat to the security of the United States could justify such a challenge, as was indeed the case in the Cuban missile crisis. But Vietnam is not Cuba; and there is no conceivable American interest at stake in Indochina today as there was in Cuba to warrant the risk—and the escalation—the President has so clearly undertaken.

Let us grant that the North Vietnam Communists are infuriatingly—even insultingly—intransigent in the negotiations at Paris and are stubbornly aggressive in the field, as indeed they are. Let us grant that the United States still has a commitment to support to the death the present Saigon Government as representative of South Vietnamese democracy—a commitment which, if it ever existed, has surely been long ago fulfilled. Let us even grant—contrary to fact—that President Nixon's Vietnamization program has been a success and that all that is needed is a little more time and a few more arms to bring Hanoi's belligerence to a halt. Granting all these hypotheses, what possible good could President Nixon's present escalation-cum-confrontation accomplish?

Even if the closing of the ports by mining and the interdiction of land routes by renewed extensive bombing should succeed in their goals without retaliation by the Soviet Union and China, the resultant cutoff in supplies could not materially affect the outcome of the present North Vietnam offensives in the South.

In any case, the bulk of North Vietnam's military supplies enter not from the sea but from China via road and rail. The entire history of deep interdiction of supply routes, from World War II to the present, demonstrates its ineffectuality. At most, therefore, Mr. Nixon's orders would simply tend to move Soviet supplies back to the trans-China route and shift the balance of influence in Hanoi a little more toward Peking.

This semi-blockade policy is both spurious and impractical; and it is difficult to understand how the President and his advisers, given the history of the war, can genuinely believe in it either. But to explain it, as the President did in his television address Monday night, as a means of protecting the American troops still remaining in Vietnam strains credulity to the breaking point. In fact, it is painfully obvious that Mr. Nixon's escalation of the conflict, including the stepped-up bombing of the North in reprisal for the Northern successes in the South, only increases the peril of American ground troops in Vietnam while obviously raising with every air raid the potential number of American prisoners held by Hanoi.

The President's risky action Monday evidently signals a decision to intensify and enlarge American military involvement in the war from sea and air, with all the attendant risks accompanying such escalation. The President is in fact leading the country down precisely the road—though by different means—that President Johnson did in 1965. The difference is that President Nixon has the benefit of these last seven years' experience. Yet, like the Bourbons, he seems to have forgotten nothing and learned nothing.

Even the peace offer included in Mr. Nixon's speech has a specious ring to it. He tells Hanoi that if it agrees to an internationally supervised cease-fire and returns the American prisoners, the United States "will stop all acts of force throughout Indochina" and will be out of Vietnam "within four months." On the face of it, this sounds as though Mr. Nixon were at last cutting all ties with the Saigon Government, for there is no mention of any political condition whatsoever. But given Hanoi's present military successes there is little incentive to North Vietnam to accept a cease-fire now; and while

Mr. Nixon specifically promises American withdrawal from Vietnam within a short period, he does not promise withdrawal from the neighboring states, leaving the implied threat of American force and American power still hanging over the peninsula.

By his rash and precipitate action, President Nixon is not only risking military confrontation with the Soviet Union over an issue that is not and never has been vital to the security interests of the United States; he is also risking the almost equally dangerous collapse of the painfully built progress toward a genuine diplomatic détente, as it is already taking form in the SALT agreements and would surely be further advanced by the now-threatened Moscow summit conference.

By his action, President Nixon is also inviting Soviet retaliation, if not in East Asia, then in other sensitive parts of the globe. By his action, he is unwittingly encouraging the Soviet hawks. By his action, he is incurring the possible speedy dissolution of the thin and delicate relationship just painfully constructed with Peking. By his action as well as his rhetoric, he has dug the United States deeper into the hole from which it had for four years been trying to extricate itself in Indochina.

And by his action he has clearly defied the Congress if not the Constitution. This may turn out to be the most dangerous of all the ominous aspects of Mr. Nixon's present course. The Congress of the United States last year resolved that it was "the policy of the United States to terminate at the earliest possible date all military operations of the United States in Indochina. . . ." Mr. Nixon said at the time that the resolution was "without binding force or effect and it does not reflect my judgment about the way in which the war should be brought to a conclusion."

But now Mr. Nixon has in effect defied the expressed will of the Congress by replying to North Vietnamese escalation with more escalation—an old, familiar and demonstrably useless course of action. His dangerous and unnecessary resort to semi-blockade and massive bombing in a futile search for military victory in an undeclared war repudiated by a large section of the American people can only weaken the country internally and discredit it abroad.

The only recourse now is in the hands of Congress. It still has the Constitutional power to curb and control the Executive. While it is an extremely distasteful action, under the circumstances Congress still can regain it along the general lines of the Church-Case amendment in the Senate. It can shut off funds for all further military operations after return of the prisoners and after a certain date, either in Indochina as a whole or, as a more limited restraint, above the North Vietnam panhandle.

Mr. Nixon is pushing the country very near to a Constitutional crisis; Congress can yet save the President from himself and the nation from disaster.

MAN'S INHUMANITY TO MAN— HOW LONG?

HON. WILLIAM J. SCHERLE

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. SCHERLE. Mr. Speaker, a child asks: "Where is daddy?" A mother asks: "How is my son?" A wife asks: "Is my husband alive or dead?"

Communist North Vietnam is sadistically practicing spiritual and mental genocide on over 1,600 American prisoners of war and their families.

How long?

ROBERT G. LINDSAY—1896—1972

HON. JOHN M. MURPHY

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. MURPHY of New York. Mr. Speaker, early on Sunday morning, May 7, 1972, Councilman Robert G. Lindsay of Staten Island, N.Y., passed away at St. Vincent's Medical Center. He is mourned by thousands of Staten Islanders and New Yorkers, and his extraordinary career spans more than 52 years in local government—52 years in which Bob Lindsay set an example of responsible political involvement and leadership.

In a front-page story on Monday morning, written by S. S. McSheehy, the Staten Island Advance related the story of Bob Lindsay, and I include it for the RECORD. It describes his early career and his first entry into politics, and it is evident throughout that Bob was first and foremost a champion of the people he served and represented.

Of the many tributes that may be rendered to a man on his passing, it seems to me that none is greater than the expression that "he will be missed."

Bob Lindsay will be missed. The article follows:

COUNCILMAN ROBERT LINDSAY DIES AT 76

(By S. S. McSheehy)

Councilman Robert G. Lindsay, whose service to Staten Island spanned more than half of a century, died early yesterday in St. Vincent's Medical Center, where he had been a patient for the past two months. He was 76 and lived at 1346 Victory Blvd., Sunnyside, although he was a longtime South Shore resident.

Mr. Lindsay had been ill with cancer for the past year, but death was attributed to a heart ailment.

Mr. Lindsay's 52 years of participation in politics taught him one thing: Once you are in office, keep active, be accessible to the public and keep alert.

While this pattern may have led to his illness, it showed Staten Island that the man who was publicly and privately behind the Democratic machine was not just in City Hall to satisfy his own ambitions and fill a gap.

No sooner did Mr. Lindsay walk into City Hall in 1964 than he sized up the situation, met his fellow Council members and formed alliances and established roots with the "in-group." He found a place for himself with the powerful Majority Leader Eric J. Treulich of Queens.

Before the new 37-man Council was a week old, Councilman Lindsay, with the robes of party boss in the closet at home in Eltingville, pushed resolutions to sell Staten Island as a site for an electronics research center, to clean up the waterfront, and to solve the school problems.

For Manhattan-born Robert G. Lindsay, Staten Island was everything. On the Island he was known to all as "Bob" Lindsay, political boss, boxing enthusiast, campaigner, charity worker and astute businessman.

During the 1920s and 1930s, a number of organizations that he belonged to—the Elks, the Knights of Columbus and Democratic clubs—honored him with dinners. "Bob Lindsay Nights" and dances. Hundreds paid him tribute.

Mr. Lindsay came to Staten Island when he was 14 years old. He worked in the old Terra Marine Inn in Huguenot and learned the hotel management business.

In later years he bought the old Collins

Hotel at the foot of Nelson Ave. near the Great Kills waterfront. It became Lindsay's Hotel, a meeting place, a popular place. It was torn down in 1937.

But during those years, Mr. Lindsay was active in the Richmond Boxing Club, an organization he founded; the South Shore Protective Association; Richmond Memorial Hospital, and, of course, the management of the Democratic Party.

In 1920 he founded the South Shore Democratic Club, which passed out of activity during the war years. It was revived in 1963 with Lindsay as honorary president. It was a sign that the Lindsay of the '20s was still active, vibrant and respected.

Mr. Lindsay was always considered somewhat of a maverick. In 1930, while secretary to Park Commissioner John J. O'Rourke, he was forced to resign. A champion of the South Shore, he publicly criticized the park boss for leasing two public facilities.

But his independence did not harm him. A year later he was named secretary to Borough President John A. Lynch and two years after that led Lynch's campaign. But after a falling out with the Lynch organization, Mr. Lindsay joined the faction led by former Judge William T. Fetherston.

It was Judge Fetherston, who, in 1934, recommended him for chief deputy U.S. marshal in the Eastern District. The next year Marshal Lindsay led the Fetherston campaign in a colorful, but bitter party primary.

His days as a marshal found him chasing bootleggers, smugglers, counterfeiters and others who violated federal laws.

In 1937 he was interim marshal for the district and when his interim post ended he was cited for "conducting the office in the best manner in history."

In the late 1930s his attempt at getting the party's nomination for sheriff failed. And for the next 15 years or so, Mr. Lindsay devoted most of his time to his shellfish and seafood business.

NEVER LEFT PARTY

Mr. Lindsay never "left the party." He could not be found in the foreground, but was deeply and firmly entrenched in the foundation.

It was 1955 before he made steps to get up front again. That year he led the Boro-Wide Democratic Committee of Staten Island to unseat County Chairman Jeremiah A. Sullivan.

He then took to campaigning for others. President Kennedy, Mayor Wagner, Borough President Maniscalco, Surrogate Frank D. Paulo were boosted by Mr. Lindsay. And in 1961 it was his turn.

Gathering Island-wide support to his South Shore stronghold, Mr. Lindsay swung the party to his side and by mid-1961 he was assured victory. That September, without a sign of dissent, he took over the reins from former Judge Joseph A. McKinney.

In 1963 hardened campaigner turned to a campaign for Robert G. Lindsay. With opposition within the party growing, Mr. Lindsay remained calm and confident. He won the nomination for councilman-at-large, edging out Thomas J. Russo, a West Brighton lawyer, in the primary.

LEADS CANDIDATES

And that November, at the age of 69, Robert G. Lindsay, with no intra-party opposition, led four candidates in votes to become the first Democratic councilman-at-large under the new City Charter.

The next few years continued to be stormy for the veteran Democrat as intraparty warfare again emerged. In 1966, an insurgent group, formed largely of people previously associated with the regular organization, challenged his leadership by running a candidate against him for the post of state committeeman from the old 58th Assembly District.

In the primary election, Mr. Lindsay was defeated by Thomas R. Sullivan, former chief

assistant district attorney and son of a former county chairman. It was a close contest, Sullivan taking it by 170 votes.

The move was viewed at the time as the prelude to a big push to unseat Mr. Lindsay as leader the next year. But in 1967, Sullivan dropped out of the picture, seriously weakening the insurgent forces.

TWO OPPONENTS

James Regan, a South Shore zone leader who had defected from the organization ranks on the basis of his opposition to the endorsement in 1966 of two Republican judges, tried to pick up the pieces.

The opposition to the leader was splintered when Russo, who had been defeated by Mr. Lindsay in the councilmanic primary two years earlier, also entered the race for chairman.

However, the party's public officials rallied behind Mr. Lindsay and at the county convention, Regan, realizing that he didn't have the votes, withdrew from the race. Russo remained in it and was soundly defeated by the incumbent.

Turning his attention to duties in the Council once more, Mr. Lindsay adopted two goals. One was the location of a botanical garden on Staten Island, and for this he obtained the support of Island garden clubs. He eventually succeeded in getting the Park Department to go along with the idea and a committee was formed to select a site.

The other pet project, having less chance of success, was to have the five-cent ferry fare dropped. He contended that the ferry should be free of charge.

In 1969, Mr. Lindsay again was faced with a primary for renomination as councilman at large. This time he was challenged by Assistant District Attorney Jerome M. Neuberger, now vice chairman of the County Committee, and John L. Soldini, a teacher and one of the leaders of the Staten Island Democratic Association.

This time he won easily, drawing 10,755 votes, about 2,500 more than the combined total of his two opponents.

In November, he was reelected in the general election, finishing second to the Republican candidate, Dr. Frank J. Biondolillo. The two top vote-getters from each borough are elected councilmen at large.

In July of 1971, Mr. Lindsay, then a veteran of 50 years of the County Committee, announced that he would not seek another term as leader. He would call it quits after 10 years at the helm of the Democratic County Committee, about eight years longer than most political observers thought he would hold power back in 1961.

He retained his post as councilman, however, until his death.

Mr. Lindsay's wife, Mrs. Katherine L. Lindsay, died in 1965. His son, Robert A. Lindsay, died last October.

Mr. Lindsay is survived by a sister, Mrs. Margaret Allen of Victory Blvd., Sunnyside, and a grandson.

The funeral will be Wednesday from the Oberg-Bedell Funeral Home, Great Kills, with a mass at 10 a.m. in Our Lady Star of the Sea R.C. Church, Huguenot. Burial will be in Ocean View Cemetery.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON POPULATION GROWTH

HON. LAWRENCE J. HOGAN

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. HOGAN. Mr. Speaker, across the Nation defenders of the rights of the unborn were shocked and dismayed by the

recommendations of the report of the President's Commission on Population Growth. After President Nixon had firmly stated that he opposed abortion as a form of population control, the Commission proceeded to advocate abortion on demand.

As an example of how liberalized abortion might proceed in the United States, the Commission proposed abortion laws similar to those in New York. In a logical and sensitive article in the National Review Bulletin, M. Stanton Evans presents the shocking facts of New York's experience since abortion statutes have been eased. Mr. Speaker, I now insert that article into the RECORD:

ABORTION ON DEMAND

The report of the President's Commission on Population Growth is a high-water mark in the current campaign for a national policy of abortion-on-demand.

With remarkable glibness, the majority findings on abortion raise and dismiss the rights of the unborn child, subordinating these to standard abortionist arguments about "the freedom of women to control their own fertility, and . . . freedom from the burdens of unwanted child-bearing." There is no discussion of any freedom of the child in embryo whose life is destroyed, and no reference to the considerable medical evidence that genetically separate life in fact begins with conception. The majority attitude is strictly that of extinguishing life for purposes of social convenience.

The Commission report is a *compote* of liberal demographic attitudes—the exceptions being minority opinions from Vice Chairman Grave Olivarez, Dr. Paul B. Cornely of Howard University, and Rep. John N. Erlenborn (R., Ill.). It is noteworthy that this attack on life should proceed from the liberal-left sector of the political community, the same sector that in other matters has much to say about the value of life and the horrors of taking life through capital punishment and war. This discrepancy is pointed out, to his credit, by Sen. Alan Cranston (D., Calif.), a member of the Commission.

Where abortion is concerned, the life-lovers of the Left turn stonily indifferent. They oppose extinguishing a guilty life in an effort to combat crime, but are more than willing to extinguish innocent lives in an effort at massive social engineering. Asserted concern for the victims of rape, for example, is one of the major emotional ploys of the abortionists. Yet they oppose the use of the death penalty to punish or deter the guilty rapist. They are more than ready to impose a sentence of death on the innocent child who is a product of the act.

The model proposed by the Commission for national edification is the abortion statute adopted two years ago by New York—the alleged showcase of good results under liberalized abortion. It is therefore instructive to see what has happened there under the newly enacted rule of abortion-on-demand. In the first place, we may observe the massive scale on which these abortions have occurred. Between July 1, 1970 and December 31, 1971, no less than 278,122 legal abortions were performed in New York City hospitals and clinics. This is a death toll approximately six times the number of all American lives lost in battle in Vietnam (45,679, as of April 1).

The abortionists, of course, contend that what they are extinguishing is not life, but merely potential life, and that up to some indeterminate point the fetus is not a human person but a thing, and therefore expendable. The standard chosen in New York is the 24th week of pregnancy, and according to the *Wall Street Journal* the thing-hood of the fetus is underscored by

using technical terms to describe it—such as "product of conception" rather than "baby." This language is intended to convey "maximum meaning with minimum emotional overtones." Unfortunately for this antiseptic approach, some of the aborted babies are born alive.

Dr. Jean Pakter of New York City's Bureau of Maternity Services said that under the new law more than sixty aborted fetuses have been born showing signs of life. Of these almost all subsequently died; one is living with its parents, and another is hospitalized. Again, for purposes of comparison, this number of live abortions followed by death in New York City alone exceeds the total number of deaths inflicted nationally by capital punishment in any year of the last twelve—the high such number being 56 in 1960. Since 1967, of course, there have been no executions at all in the United States. Under the new dispensation, it is wrong to kill convicted murderers but right to kill innocent babies.

Other aspects of New York's abortion experience, ignored by the Commission, are worthy of comment. The majority faithfully repeats the conventional abortionist doctrine—that the poor, black, etc. will be the principal beneficiaries of abortion-on-demand, since the well-to-do can already obtain abortions when they want them. By liberalizing the statutes, we can insure that everyone has equal access to this supposed benefit. The New York record deflates such arguments. The massive death rate, for one thing, indicates that permissive abortion is not being used to deal with statistically insignificant pregnancies involving rape and deformity, but is being employed instead to snuff out lives which are merely inconvenient to their parents.

Moreover, as pointed out last year by *Triumph* Magazine, some 55.5% of the New York abortions have been performed on women from out of state—indicating that people of means have simply traveled to New York to obtain a legal abortion. In the matter of allegedly "helping" blacks, we may add the fact that 74% of the women who had the abortions were white. Also worth citing is the fact that some New York doctors and clinics are making fortunes from the abortion trade. Dr. Byron Gordon of New York Medical College says a "large number" of doctors are making an extra \$100,000 to \$130,000 a year from abortions, and one doctor made \$148,975 for abortions referred to him during a six-week period.

Dr. Gordon is quoted: "You wake up in a cold sweat and say, 'What are you doing? Drop everything and do abortions for two years—and then play around for the rest of your life.'" Somehow, it doesn't sound as if the poor and downtrodden are the real beneficiaries.

SICKNESS IN THE FOURTH ESTATE

HON. LOUIS C. WYMAN

OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. WYMAN. Mr. Speaker, occasionally the media complains that the Vice President is too tough in his complaint that there is unfairness in reporting or commenting on the doings of the Nixon-Agnew administration. Yet yesterday's Washington Star contains a column by a member of the fourth estate that illustrates better than anything recently available how hysterically paranoid has become some of the writing of the anti-Nixon columnists.

Tom Wicker has likened President Nixon to an "American Emperor" crazed with power, undependable, unreachable, and inferentially unfathomable to such as Wicker. Wicker wrote:

Richard Nixon need not be psychoanalyzed or even mistrusted in order to perceive that mistrust was well founded, etc.

The implication is that somehow the President might throw some "nukes" and incinerate the world.

Mr. Speaker, we have never been more fortunate than to have such a man as Richard Nixon as our American President in these critical days and hours. President Nixon has waited beyond the limitations of reasonable patience to take the long overdue step of acting to cut off supplies to a Communist enemy engaged in an outright invasion by force of arms and endangering thousands of Americans sent there, not by Nixon but by his Democratic predecessor.

Let us be thankful that we have the best trained, best informed, most experienced professionally qualified man in the Presidency that the United States has ever had in all its history. And I for one resent deeply the rantings of a vindictive and myopic columnist suggesting to the minds of thousands that somehow our President is a Caesar or a Nero for doing what it takes to get the Vietnam war over with at long last with honor and with the return of our prisoners.

Wicker's column should be read with care to see in print just how vicious and distorted a columnist can designedly become:

AN AMERICAN EMPEROR DECIDES
(By Tom Wicker)

NEW YORK.—"No one knows," said the headline in the New York Times, "what he might do." And indeed, no one, including Secretary of State William Rogers, summoned home from Europe for a National Security Council meeting, could know what President Nixon might decide upon as antidote in the current crisis in Vietnam.

The press had described admiringly the range of explosive options open to him; members of his administration had been hinting darkly of the terrible vengeance this unchecked Caesar might choose to wreak upon something abstract known only as "Hanoi" or "the enemy;" but the decision to mine North Vietnamese harbors was Richard Nixon's and Richard Nixon's alone.

And when Nixon in his majesty chose to speak to the American people last night about his intentions in Southeast Asia, it was an act of noblesse oblige as well as an exercise in self-justification. Nothing in the law required him to confide in a single citizen; and although it was true that he spoke only after three hours of consultation with his primary national security associates, it is well-known that these officials more nearly ratify than form presidential judgments.

Has it come to this, then, that it lies within the sole province of one man, unlimited by law or opinion, whether elected by landslide or hair's breadth, to decide without let or hindrance how the military power of the United States shall be used even in a situation his own policies have done much to create? Is that what the Constitution means, when it says that the president shall be commander in chief of the armed forces?

As to the first question, there seems little doubt that the answer is yes. Just last year, for instance, Congress passed an amendment to the military procurement authorization which declared it to be the policy of the United States to bring to an end "at the earliest practicable date" all military opera-

tions in Indochina, subject only to the release of all American prisoners of war.

What was President Nixon's reply to that? Upon signing the measure on Nov. 17, he declared flatly that the amendment was "without binding force or effect and it does not reflect my judgment about the way in which the war should be brought to an end." It would not change his policies, he said, and in fact "legislative actions such as this hinder rather than assist in the search for a negotiated settlement."

Such high-handedness is not unique to Richard Nixon. The greatest of presidents, Abraham Lincoln, interpreted the presidential "war powers" so broadly that he repeatedly overrode both congressional wishes and military advice; and since his actions saved the union, history generally accounts him strong and wise for having done so. But Lincoln was literally waging war for national survival, in a situation in which there was no precedent and which does not provide a precedent for anything that has followed—least of all a deliberate act of presidential policy such as Vietnam.

Nixon, in contrast, now relies almost exclusively upon the commander in chief's power to protect the lives of American soldiers as constitutional justification for whatever he might choose to do in Southeast Asia; yet, it is arguable that American soldiers are in jeopardy primarily because Nixon's own policies have kept them in Vietnam. So the mere act of putting troops into a place, or keeping them there, which is in itself a presidential decision, becomes the presidential justification for any other presidential action he may choose to take.

Nixon has not, for example, resorted to the use of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia; fortunately, there is no sensible military rationale for doing so. Nevertheless, mining the North Vietnamese harbors risks nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union. This was not inevitable, but the President's choice. Sensible or not, he could order nuclear warfare tomorrow and no man could stop him, unless the military chose to revolt—hardly a desirable alternative.

Richard Nixon need not be psychoanalyzed or even mistrusted in order to perceive that that mistrust was well founded for as he went on the air last night, it was terrifying true that no one knew what the President would do, that no immediate means of influencing his judgment was at hand, that no real way existed to stop him from following some apocalyptic course.

He was in that moment as true an emperor as ever existed and scarcely more accountable; a people who wanted peace could still be given war at his dictate; and what good would it do to vote him out of office six months from now if the world were an ash, or "the enemy" had been obliterated in his honor?

REVOLUTIONARIES TO RENAME
WASHINGTON MONUMENT "LUMUMBA SQUARE"

HON. JOHN R. RARICK

OF LOUISIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, few Americans are ready to suffer further national indignity by having George Washington's Monument in our Nation's Capital renamed "Lumumba Square," even if only for 1 day, and especially under the auspices of revolutionaries. A major force behind this latest affront to the American people is said to be the Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization—IFCO—which is apparently in dire

financial straits and feels that by exploiting the American people it can obtain publicity, fame, and wealth.

The IFCO is interrelated to IFCO—Action, one of the plaintiffs in Civil Action 773-72 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, in support of the Soviet chrome monopoly by seeking to stop importation of Rhodesian chrome, alleging that the law authorizing such importation is in violation of the United Nations Charter, which it seems to feel has replaced the U.S. Constitution.

This is the same Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization reported on pages 17-21 in the 1970 printed hearings of a subcommittee of the Internal Security Committee of the Senate, and entitled "Extent of Subversion in the 'New Left,'" testimony of Robert J. Thoms.

I insert in the RECORD the newsclippings and related documents, including the Senate internal security report and a partial description of the plaintiffs in the lawsuit:

[From the Washington Post, May 10, 1972]
AFRICAN LIBERATION DAY PLANS SET
(By Francis Giles)

The embassies of South Africa and Portugal and the Rhodesian Information Office will be focal points for the May 25 African Liberation Day marches here.

Owusu Sadaukai, chairman of the steering committee for the day's events is expecting about 10,000 demonstrators to show support for the small black guerrilla armies fighting for independence in colonialist southern Africa.

After speeches at the embassies, the marchers will rally at the Washington Monument, which have renamed Lumumba Square for the day after the Congolise President assassinated in 1961.

Imamu Baraka (Leroi Jones), poet and leader of Committee for a United NewArk Amlcar Cabral, leader of the liberation army in Guinea-Bissau; _____, and Amy Jacques Garvey, widow of the Pan-Africanist Marcus Garvey, will be among the speakers that afternoon.

Demonstrations in observance of African Liberation Day are being held throughout the Western world as well as in Africa.

_____, Bobby Seale, chairman of the Black Panther Party and Angela Davis, will be among the speakers at the rally to be held in San Francisco.

Georgia state legislator Julian Bond and _____ will speak at the rally being held that day in Toronto.

Rallies set in Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, and Jamaica will feature local speakers and entertainers.

Members of the Congressional Black Caucus have announced plans for a strategy-oriented conference on May 25-26 at Howard University.

The two-day conference is being called to deal with the question of Africa. According to conference chairman _____ it will be a working session, setting priorities on critical African questions and devising legislative, judicial political, community and extra-legal techniques for achieving those priorities.

[From the sixth edition, Encyclopedia of Associations, Volume I, National Organizations of the United States]

INTERRELIGIOUS FOUNDATION FOR
COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION
(475 Riverside Dr., Rm. 560, New York, N.Y. 10027, Reverend Lucius Walker, Jr., Exec. Dir. (IFCO), Phone: (212) 870-3151.)

Founded 1967—Members 23—Staff 10. Two representatives from each of 14 religious agencies and denominations in the field of community organization. Provides coordination for members, carries out research, offers information, and provides financial and technical assistance to community organization efforts. Member agencies work in more than 40 cities in the fields of political organization, housing, education, job training, legal aid, and advising in economic development.

Foundation will coordinate their efforts, particularly to help mobilize poor communities to play a greater role in solving their problems.

Committees: Communications; Financial Development; Planning and Strategy; Proposals Advisory; Training. Convention/Meeting: Annual, usually June.

EXTENT OF SUBVERSION IN THE "NEW LEFT"— TESTIMONY OF ROBERT J. THOMS

(Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 91st Congress, second session, Part 1, January 20, 1970.)

INTER-RELIGIOUS FOUNDATION FOR COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION—IFCO

IFCO is a tax-exempt, non-profit organization located at 211 East 43rd Street, New York, New York. A newsletter, published by IFCO, lists its address at 475 Riverside Drive, New York. This is the same address maintained by the NCC. IFCO is alleged to be an interdenominational organization, but available data indicates it is not restricted to religious organizations.

A membership requirement is a \$1,000 minimum donation per year by each member organization. When IFCO was first incorporated, the membership included ten denominations, six of which were NCC member organizations:

American Baptist Home Mission Society—NCC member organization.

American Jewish Committee.

Board of Homeland Ministries, United Church of Christ—NCC member organization.

Board of Missions, Methodist Church—NCC member organization.

Board of National Missions, United Presbyterian Church U.S.A.—NCC member organization.

Catholic Committee for Urban Ministries. Executive Council of the Episcopal Church—NCC member organization.

Foundation for Voluntary Service.

General Board of Christian Social Concerns, Methodist Church—NCC member organization.

National Catholic Conference for Interracial Justice.

Additional organizations have joined IFCO since the group incorporated. This includes organizations that, in the past, as non-members, received funds from IFCO. Membership entitles each organization to have two representatives on IFCO's Board of Directors to dictate future policy. The additional members are:

	<i>Donation</i>
Black Affairs Council of the Universalist Association	\$1,000
California Center for Community Development	1,000
Catholic Committee for Urban Ministries	1,000
Disciples of Christ reconciliation program	1,000
Hope Development Inc., Houston, Texas	1,000
City Wide Citizens Action Committee, Detroit	1,000
Washington, D.C. Capital East Foundation	1,000

National Welfare Rights Organization	\$1,000
Milwaukee Northcott Neighborhood House	1,000
Foundation for Community Development, Durham, N.C.	1,000

The following organizations received money from IFCO prior to becoming a member of the organization:

	<i>Donation</i>
National Welfare Rights Organizations	\$1,000
City Wide Citizens Action Committee	1,000
Foundation for Community Development, Durham, N.C.	1,000
Capital East Foundation, Washington, D.C.	1,000

In 1966, when IFCO was incorporated, some of the directors and signers on the incorporation papers were identified as having previous NCC affiliation and others were presently affiliated. In 1966, IFCO's Board of Directors included twelve individuals of which eleven had NCC affiliation, either directly, or through their denominations.

Directors:

Harvey Everett—American Baptist Home Mission Society, NCC member organization.

Rev. Ray Schroder—American Baptist Home Mission Society, NCC member organization.

Henry B. Clark—Employed by NCC.

James A. McDaniel—United Presbyterian Church USA, NCC member organization.

D. Barry Menuez—Episcopal Church, NCC member organization.

Rev. Joseph Merchant—United Church of Christ, NCC member organization; and was the Director of the Division of Home Missions for NCC in 1954.

Leon E. Modeste—Episcopal Church, NCC member organization.

Rev. Gary Oalki—United Church of Christ, NCC member organization.

Rev. Paul A. Stauffer—Methodist Church, NCC member organization.

Rev. George E. Todd—Presbyterian Church USA, NCC member organization.

Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum—American Jewish Committee.

Rev. George H. Woodward—Episcopal Church, NCC member organization.

Incorporation signers were:

Ray L. Schroeder—See above.

James A. McDaniel—See above.

Joseph W. Merchant—See above.

James Brewer.

Harold K. Schultz—NCC employee.

Key individuals in IFCO:

Louis Gothard—Presently, IFCO Assistant Director; was Los Angeles Community Alert Patrol Director.

Lorenzo Freeman—Presently, IFCO Assistant Director, in charge of project evaluation; was Assistant Director of the West Central Organization, Detroit, Mich. The West Central Organization employed Saul Alinsky in a consultant capacity, allegedly paying him \$200 a day.

Joseph Merchant—Presently, IFCO Board of Directors; was incorporation signee.

Ray L. Schroeder—Presently, Board of Directors.

Chestyn Everett—Presently, IFCO Field Representative. He was listed in the space provided for husband, wife or guardian, on Ron Karenga's application for U.C.L.A., in December 1961.

Albert B. Cleage, Jr.—Presently, IFCO Board of Directors; was the director for the City Wide Citizens' Action Committee, in Detroit.

Organizations funded by IFCO—Donation

Operation Exodus, Boston, Mass.----- \$5,000

Operation Exodus initiated a program to bus ghetto students to outlying schools. When initial funds were expended, the orga-

nization filed a suit against the school board. They are demanding the school board to continue the bussing program and assume the responsibility for its funding.

Camden, N.J. Christian Center----- \$2,000

Rev. Amos Johnson, Jr., the Center's director, is employed through the American Baptist Home Mission Society, IFCO member organization. Another organization, the Black People's Unity Movement, holds meetings at the Center. The Black People's Unity Movement has been involved in high school sit-ins, walk-outs, boycotts and general disruptive activities throughout the community. A confidential source states the Black People's Unity Movement is supposed to receive \$57,000 from IFCO; however, no funds have been received as yet. Rev. Johnson is an officer of the Black People's Unity Movement.

Chester, Pa. Home Improvement Project ----- \$15,004

This organization was subsidized by the United Fund, until the money was withdrawn, due to the political involvement of the project.

Garfield Organization, Chicago, Ill.--- \$20,000

This organization is a militant, civil rights group. They were active in staging demonstrations against businesses, protesting the businesses selling over-priced and inferior products in the Negro community. Two officers of the organization, Frederick Andrews, the Executive Director, and Edward Crawford, the organizer, were arrested during the disturbance in Chicago, following the death of Martin Luther King, Jr. They are charged with arson, conspiracy to commit arson and burglary.

United Black Community Organizations, Cincinnati, Ohio.----- \$44,000

This is a coalition of Negro organizations similar to the Los Angeles Black Congress. The director, Harold Hunt, is described as "the militant of all militants." This organization applies pressure to the establishment demanding additional benefits in welfare and better housing.

East Central Area Council, Columbus, Ohio.----- \$21,065

This is an all-Negro organization. They have been involved in staging demonstrations, against the establishment. They have demanded changes in school policy and have protested alleged police brutality.

Force, Dayton, Ohio.----- \$26,000

This organization has participated in demonstrations demanding increased benefits for welfare recipients.

California Migrant Ministry----- \$54,000

This organization has involved themselves in the labor dispute between the migrant farm workers and the established farm owners in California. They exert pressure on the farmers in the grape industry, through boycotts, picketing and strikes. The NCC, IFCO, and the Council of Churches in Southern California have all endorsed the activities of the California Migrant Ministry.

City Wide Citizens Action Committee, Detroit, Mich.----- \$85,000

This is a militant organization led by the Rev. Albert Cleage, Jr. The Rev. Cleage embraces the philosophy that "Negro communities should band together for mutual defense and store food stuffs to prepare themselves for the coming invasion of Negro communities by the Whites." The Rev. Cleage sponsored a Black Power Convention at his church. Black Nationalists from throughout the United States, attended the convention, where initial plans for the Republic of New Africa were discussed. Also discussed, was the question of opening discussions with the

United States Government, for settlement of key questions and status under the Geneva Convention for black guerrillas that would swear allegiance to the new government.

West Central Organization, Detroit, Mich ----- \$7,000

The West Central Organization is a coalition similar to the Los Angeles Black Congress. It is described as very militant and has applied pressure against the establishment, demanding better welfare rights and housing. The past director, Lorenzo Freeman, presently an IFCO employee, received his training from Saul Alinsky.

Hope Development Inc., Houston, Tex ----- \$90,000

A militant organization, originally funded by a Federal Grant. They were involved in fund-raising activities which bordered on extortion. The method used was to mail letters to approximately five hundred local business owners. The letters solicited donations, explaining "the firms take funds from the black community work." The letter stated that HOPE represented the black community; therefore, the funds should be returned to them. The businesses were assessed specific amounts from \$25 to \$500. In some instances, where donations were refused, the businesses were picketed. The matter was investigated by the McClellan Committee; however, no criminal charges were filed.

Community Improvement Alliance, Jersey City, N.J. ----- \$64,341

This organization was sponsored and originally financed by the Jersey City Council of Churches, the Community Improvement Alliance and the Black Panther Party share the same headquarters. The Board of Trustees for the Community Improvement Alliance are:

David Bell who is also the finance officer for the Jersey City Black Panther Party.

Beatrice Walss is also one of the most outspoken members of the Jersey City Congress of Racial Equality.

Robert Castle, Jr. has been directly, or indirectly, involved in every major demonstration involving militants and the police in Jersey City, since 1963. A confidential source states that Black Panther Party members are trained in guerrilla warfare at Castle's farm. This farm is in his wife's name.

Joseph Cypress is active in the Black Panther Party and teaches the members Karate.

National Campaign for Political Education, Newark, N.J. ----- \$10,000

No record of this organization could be located as being an incorporated organization.

Newark, N.J., Area Planning Association ----- \$2,000

This organization protested the erection of a medical and dental center, stating it was unfair to relocate approximately seven hundred families. Demands were also made on construction companies and labor unions to have one-half of the apprentice and one-third of the journeymen jobs on the medical center filled by non-whites. The director, Junius W. Williams, shared his residence in Newark with Phillip Hutchings, who is a successor to H. Rap Brown, as the director of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee.

Liberty City Community Council, Miami, Fla. ----- \$5,000

This is described as a quasi militant organization. The organization attempts to promote trouble or make an issue of police action in their area and they were active in the 1968 racial disturbances.

Farm Labor Organizing Committee, Ottawa, Ohio ----- \$1,000

This is the Ohio counterpart of the California Migrant Ministry. They work through the AFL-CIO and are attempting to organize migrant farm laborers.

Suburban Action Centers, Philadelphia, Pa. ----- \$19,000

This organization states its purpose was to "unratchet the society." The organization opposed anti-riot legislation, calling it racist and repressive. This position appears to have caused dissension in the community, and according to the director, the organization has lost its effectiveness. He stated, "We learned that confrontation doesn't work without power."

Combat, Steubenville, Ohio ----- \$16,000

This is a Saul Alinsky oriented organization. They participate in demonstrations and civil rights marches, demanding additional welfare benefits. They are aligned with two left-wing organizations, the Communist Action Training Center and the Young Socialist Alliance.

National Welfare Rights Organization, Washington, D.C. ----- \$106,212

This is a nation-wide militant welfare organization. Their goals are additional welfare benefits and a guaranteed annual income. They participate in mass marches and civil rights demonstrations.

LOS ANGELES BLACK CONGRESS

IFCO and other participating groups allotted \$35,000 to train community organizers. The program would entail four new concepts of community organization:

Teaching basic elements of community organization through an intensive, controlled process within a short period of time.

Forming a network of neighborhood community groups within a political unit, in this case, the state of Ohio.

Wedding community organization skills and techniques to the black movement for identity and self determination.

Training allied groups of white people in the basics of massive community organizations and the methods by which they can support the black community.

Walter Bremond and Ron Karenga will be responsible for training the community organizers.

The following organizations have received grants from IFCO; however, information concerning their activities is not available at this time.

Southwest Georgia Project, Albany, Ga ----- \$5,000

Foundation for Community Development, Durham, N.C. ----- 189,742

Poor People's Corporation, Jackson, Miss ----- 1,000

Deep South Education and Research Project, New Orleans ----- 10,000

Afro-American Black People's Federation, Peoria, Ill. ----- 3,000

National Communications Network, New York ----- 8,117

Virginia Community Development Organization, Richmond ----- 2,000

Organization of Organizations, Syracuse, N.Y. ----- 5,000

Capital East Foundation, Washington, D.C. ----- 67,250

The total funds dispersed by IFCO, as covered in this report, amount to \$885,831. Of this total, \$774,000 was granted to organizations involved in militant, political or labor activities. The remaining may have been used for the same purposes; however, no information is available concerning the activities of these organizations.

The National Black Economic Development Conference ----- \$50,000

IFCO supplied funds and personnel for the conference. It was at this conference that the Black Manifesto was drafted and approved.

This manifesto is the document presented to the churches throughout the United States by James Forman and other members of S.N.C.C. demanding \$500,000,000 from what he terms "Christian Churches, Synagogues and all other racist institutions" in the U.S.A. A steering committee to implement the demands was proposed and included members of S.N.C.C., Black Panther Party and various other militant organizations.

U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA—CIVIL ACTION

American Committee on Africa, 164 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10002, (212) 532-3700; Council for Christian Social Action of the United Church of Christ, 815 Second Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017, (212) 682-3950; Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa, 14 West 11th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011, (212) 477-0066; IFCO-ACTION, 907 Maryland Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20003; Southern Africa Committee, 637 West 125th Street, New York, N.Y. 10027, (212) 866-9003; Southern Christian Leadership Conference, 334 Auburn Avenue, Atlanta, Ga. 30303, (404) 522-1420; Zimbabwe African National Union, 310 Parnassus, San Francisco, Calif. 94117, (415) 566-3460; Thomas M. Franck, Edward Weisband, Bert Lockwood, Shirley Fenchel, Joel Carlson, Robert Goldschmidt, Robert Janosik, Nigel Rodley, Diane Flaherty, Antione Van Dongen, as concerned individuals, 6 Washington Square North, New York, N.Y. 10003, (212) 598-2164, Plaintiffs, Versus John B. Connally, as Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, Department of the Treasury, 15th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20220, (202) 393-6400; Stanley L. Sommerfield, as Acting Director of the Office of Foreign Assets, Department of the Treasury, 15th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20220, (202) 393-6400; Myles J. Ambrose, as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, Department of the Treasury, 2100 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20226, (202) 964-8195; Foote Mineral Company, Route 100, Exton, Pa., Enterprise-6482; and Union Carbide Corporation, 777 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. (202) 393-7755, Defendants.

COMPLAINT

1. This is an action in which plaintiffs seek:

(a) preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to prevent the importation from Southern Rhodesia of metallurgical chromite and other materials, the importation of which is barred by Resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council (232 of December 16, 1966; 253 of May 29, 1968; 314 of February 28, 1972) and further implemented by Executive Orders issued by the President of the United States pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 278c, No. 11322 of January 5, 1967, and No. 11419 of July 29, 1968;

(b) a preliminary and permanent mandatory order directing government officials having authority to seize and impound goods imported into the United States in violation of law, to proceed forthwith to impound metallurgical chromite and other materials which may have been imported into the United States in violation of the foregoing Security Council Resolutions and Executive Orders; and

(c) a declaratory judgment that the General License issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the United States Treasury Department on January 25, 1972 (37 Fed. Reg. 1108) authorizing imports of metallurgical chromite and other materials from Southern Rhodesia is null and void, and is not authorized by the so-called Byrd Amendment (Section 503 Military Procurement Act of 1971, P.L. 92-156); and/or that the Byrd Amendment if construed to authorize the General License is itself null and void.

PARTIES
Plaintiffs

2. (a) *****

Their interests in this litigation are as follows:

(i) The importation of metallurgical chromite and other materials from Southern Rhodesia in violation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions and Executive Orders issued by the President of the United States contradicts the solemn commitment of the United States to the United Nations as a system for maintaining world peace; and violates the treaties and laws of the United States embodying such commitment;

(ii) ———, these plaintiffs are aggrieved in that the importation of embargoed materials from Southern Rhodesia constitutes a violation of international and domestic law and order, and undermines this nation's commitment to support the United Nations in its fostering the self-determination of colonized peoples;

(iii) In particular, ———, plaintiffs are further aggrieved by the violation of an embargo which was designed to benefit the subjugated Black majority of Southern Rhodesia. These plaintiffs have organized for the purpose of expressing their serious concern and the concerns of the Black people generally in respect to the policies of this nation both domestically and in foreign affairs as affects the efforts of Black people throughout the world to achieve freedom from subjugation. They have from the beginning of their organization exhibited a special interest in this nation joining in actions of the United Nations to support the efforts of Black people in Africa to free themselves from domination by minority colonial rulers.

(b) Plaintiff American Committee on Africa, (ACOA), is a non-profit organization incorporated in the State of New York. The National Committee of ACOA includes many persons of prominence in the United States, including past and present members of Congress. Its interests in this litigation are as follows:

(i) During the nineteen years of its existence, the ACOA has been the principal organization concerned with unearthing and resisting American participation in the perpetuation of colonialism and racism in Africa, as well as a major coordinator of other groups of like interest.

(ii) It has continuously professed a dedication to upholding international law and justice as they apply to Africa, particularly Southern Africa, and it represents the interest of those Americans who share this goal. It has a special interest in the actions of this nation in respect to the Rhodesian sanction resolution of the United Nations since that is the major issue upon which there is being tested the commitment of the United Nations and of this nation to the efforts of the Black people of Africa to free themselves from subjugation.

(c) Plaintiff Council For Christian Social Action, (CCSA), of the United Church of Christ is the instrumentality established by the United Church of Christ "To study the content of the Gospel in its bearing on man and society, provide and publish information and literature on social issues, cooperate with instrumentalities of the United Church of Christ and with other appropriate bodies in making the implications of one Gospel effective in society, and formulate and promote a program of social education and action for the United Church of Christ" (Paragraph 78, The Constitution of the United Church of Christ.) The membership of the United Church of Christ amounts to approximately 2.2 million people. Its interests in this litigation are as follows:

(i) One of the specific concerns of the CCSA has been the continuation of the immoral and illegal racist minority rule in Southern Africa.

(ii) CCSA has been particularly concerned with any aspects of United States governmental or corporate policy which strengthens such activity violative of international and natural law and the teachings of the Gospel. CCSA is committed to oppose such acts, and considers itself required to do so. CCSA considers that any violation by the United States of sanctions imposed by the Security Council in respect to Southern Rhodesia is directly supportive of illegal racist minority rule in Southern Africa.

(d) Plaintiff Episcopal Churchmen For South Africa, (ECSA), is a non-profit organization incorporated under the laws of the State of New York. Its membership consists of Episcopal laity who serve, by their words and acts, to maintain communication between Southern African and American churches, and to gain support for the Church of South Africa in its fight against apartheid. Its interest in this litigation is as follows:

ECSA, in supporting the struggle against racism in Southern Africa, has consistently declared its opposition to enforced separation of the races as being contrary to the will of God and the nature of His Church. ECSA is equally determined to oppose action taken by the United States which would serve to support racism in Southern Africa. The seizure of power by the white minority in Southern Rhodesia and their subjugation of the Black majority is in the view of ECSA one of the most important manifestations of racism in Southern Africa, and the action of the Security Council in imposing mandatory sanctions was an important world-wide commitment to oppose racism in Southern Africa. ECSA is especially concerned with any action of the United States to undermine that commitment.

(e) Plaintiff IFCO-Action is an unincorporated association related to, but independent of, the Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization, Inc., (IFCO), an ecumenical agency established to support minority communities. IFCO-Action, when established in March 1972, stated its purpose to oppose all legislation and public and private policies which were discriminatory. IFCO-Action, as related to IFCO, is supported by approximately thirteen national church agencies. Its interests in this litigation are as follows:

(i) IFCO-Action has declared its outrage at the Government's continued support of apartheid and white colonialism in Southern Africa, which support constitutes racial discrimination.

(ii) IFCO-Action regards the importation of materials from South Rhodesia by the United States as support by the United States of a racist minority stranglehold on Southern Africa, and a denial of liberation to Black Africans.

(f) Plaintiff Southern Africa Committee, (SAC), is an organization originally established in 1964 for the purpose of addressing itself to the problems of apartheid in the Republic of South Africa. Its membership includes expatriate Southern Africans and Americans who have worked in Southern Africa. Leaders of the SAC have appeared before the United Nations Special Committee on Apartheid, with which they maintain close contact, and the House Subcommittee on African Affairs of the United States House of Representatives. Its interests in this litigation are as follows:

(i) SAC has expanded its activities to include action aimed at changing all United States involvement in Southern Africa which encourages racism and colonialism and seeks to defeat self-determination.

(ii) SAC has also directed campaigns against American firms which do business in Southern Africa and thereby give support to the racist regimes therein to the detriment of its people.

(g) Plaintiff Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) is an organization of Black ministers and others, originally under the leadership of the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and presently under that of the Rev. Ralph Abernethy, which has expressed a commitment to justice, social change, and a moral obligation to act in opposition to injustice. The SCLC has actively pursued these commitments in an effort to achieve freedom and equality for Blacks and other minorities in the United States. The SCLC's interest in this case is embodied in its unwavering conviction that the policies and acts of the United States Government toward the Black exploited majorities in Southern Africa is directly related to the struggle of Blacks in America to achieve full equality before the law.

(h) Plaintiff Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) is an organization which maintains offices in a number of countries including the United States, and which represents the oppressed Black majority in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). Its membership consists of Black Rhodesians, some of whom reside in the United States. They are refugees who would be subject to arrest upon their return to their homeland simply because ZANU has been summarily outlawed in Southern Rhodesia. Many of ZANU's leaders are in jail or under detention in Southern Rhodesia. ZANU is recognized and supported by the Organization of African Unity, an intergovernmental organization of African States. ZANU is interested in the instant case in that it contends that a circumventing by the United States of the international economic sanctions against the illegal Rhodesian regime supports an indefinite prolongation of the state of servitude imposed upon its people by the ruling white minority.

(i) Plaintiffs Thomas M. Franck, Director; Edward Weisband, Associate Director; Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., Assistant Director; Shelley Fenchel, Assistant Director; Joel Carlson, Senior Fellow; Robert Goldschmidt, Junior Fellow; Robert Janosik, Junior Fellow; Nigel Rodley, Research Fellow; Diane Flaherty, Junior Fellow; and Antoine van Dongen, Junior Fellow, are administrators and scholars of the Center for International Studies at New York University, 6 Washington Square North, New York, New York 10003. They sue in their individual and not their institutional capacities. They are concerned educators and scholars deeply committed to the promotion of human rights through a system of international law and order. Plaintiffs' interest in this case is as follows:

The importation of chrome and other materials from Southern Rhodesia in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions and Executive Orders issued by the President of the United States contravenes the solemn commitment of the United States to the United Nations as a system for maintaining world peace, and also contravenes treaty and domestic legal obligations of the United States. These violations are directly counter to the policies plaintiffs are attempting to promote.

[From the New York Times, Mar. 19, 1972]

BLACK ACTION UNIT TAKES AIM AT BIAS

(By George Dugan)

The Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization, a black-controlled funding group supported by 13 national church agencies, yesterday announced the establishment of IFCO-Action, an independent association pledged to opposing all legislation and public and private policies it deems discriminatory.

IFCO-Action will not be tax exempt. It will attempt to influence government, "politicize" the American people and take "other direct actions."

Because of its status, IFCO-Action will

not be eligible for foundation support, but will seek small, non-tax-exempt donations.

The parent organization has allocated more than \$4-million to aid about 150 minority organizations in the United States.

The formation of the new group was announced by IFCO's director, the Rev. Lucius Walker, Jr., at a news conference at the Interchurch Center, Riverside Drive and 120th Street.

APARTHEID "SUPPORT" SCORED

Mr. Walker said IFCO had become "outraged at our Government's continued blatant and deliberate support of apartheid, mass murder and white colonialism in southern Africa."

The IFCO director introduced to the news conference Owusu Sadaukai, the head of the Malcolm X Liberation University, who will be responsible for IFCO-Action's programs and projects. The new group's headquarters will be at 907 Maryland Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C.

Mr. Sadaukai said IFCO-Action's first task would be to protest shipments of chrome ore from Rhodesia to the United States.

The purpose of the protest is to stop renewed trade with Rhodesia.

Last fall, Congress passed and President Nixon signed a measure that bypassed a portion of the United Nations' 1968 trade sanctions against that nation.

Mr. Sadaukai said the new association would also call upon black and white church leadership to use stockholdings, "moral suasion and power of the ballot to end United States corporate and Government complicity in further genocide."

He also charged that more than 350 American corporations were involved in efforts to strengthen the white economy in South Africa.

"These companies must be made aware that their continued complicity will not be ignored by black people and they will face increasing pressure and action to force a change in their exploitative policies," he said.

[From the Washington Post, Dec. 19, 1970]

INTERRELIGIOUS GROUP FORCED TO SLASH 1971 PROJECT GRANTS

NEW YORK.—After presenting more than \$3 million in grants in three years, the Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization (IFCO) has very little money for grants in 1971.

Directors of IFCO voted this week to suspend grant-making during the first quarter of 1971.

The foundation, founded three years ago as a channel for church funds to self-development projects controlled by the poor, says its own poverty in 1971 is the result of substantially decreased pledges from the churches, largely the major Protestant denominations, that formed the foundation.

The only money available for 1971 grants, according to IFCO officials, is a small amount left from funds given to IFCO two and three years ago and designated for specific projects.

To date, the foundation has made 100 grants totalling \$3,174,906 to black, American Indian, Mexican-American and white organizing programs.

During the past year, a substantial part of IFCO's budget came from the National Division of the United Methodist Board of Missions, which gave \$483,333 in undesignated money and \$183,333 for empowerment of black congregations.

Dr. Paul Stauffer, a representative of the United Methodist board, said his agency would give \$25,000 for 1971 administration of the foundation but was unsure that a request for \$100,000 could be met.

A United Presbyterian official said he had been unable to get "one cent" for 1970 and doubted that his denomination would meet a \$100,000 request for the coming year.

The Rev. Lucius Walker Jr., IFCO director, said that "the very denominations which created IFCO have grown cool in their support." The American Baptist clergyman listed several reasons why he thinks IFCO has financial troubles:

Denominations are thinking "we can do better for ourselves (than) IFCO has done for us." Such drives as the United Presbyterian Fund for the Self-development of People (authorized but not yet operating) were mentioned as potential competitors to interreligious efforts.

The rise of power blocs, such as black caucuses, have drained away funds that otherwise may have gone to IFCO.

IFCO's relations with militant minority groups have resulted in some white backlash, speculated the director.

[From the Washington Post, July 11, 1970]

INTERRELIGIOUS AGENCY AWARDS TOTAL \$2,596,936—GROUP MAKES 106 DEVELOPMENT GRANTS

NEW YORK.—The Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization made 106 grants totaling \$2,596,936 from September, 1967, through March, 1970.

IFCO was formed in 1967 by Protestant, Roman Catholic and Jewish organizations as an agency to channel funds to community and economic development projects created by deprived groups across the nation.

Twenty grants were made in 1967-68, 45 in 1968-69, and 41 in the first quarter of 1970, an IFCO report said. In addition, the ecumenical agency made 13 training grants and 10 special grants.

Among the latter was one the report said subjected the organization to "the most severe stresses and strains of its young life"—\$50,000 for the Black Economic Development Conference held in Detroit during April, 1969.

At that conference James Forman presented the Black Manifesto with its demands for \$500 million in reparations from white churches and synagogues.

The ensuing controversy "almost ended the dream-made-reality of IFCO," according to the Rev. Lucius Walker, Jr., executive director of the organization dedicated to supporting self-help projects in minority communities.

Two members of IFCO withdrew—the American Jewish Committee, whose interreligious director, Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum, had served as president of IFCO, and the Presbyterian Church in the U.S. (Southern).

But new members joined—the Board of Missions of the Lutheran Church in America, the American Indian Task Force, the National Committee of Black Churchmen, and others. Begun with nine member organizations, IFCO now has 27, including 12 religious organizations. Its board of directors is formed by two representatives from each member organization.

IFCO refused to disavow the BEDC, but stipulated that its staff members would not serve on the BEDC board and that it would give the BEDC only funds that came in specifically designated for it.

The first significant reduction of denominational pressure, the report stated, came in October, 1969, when the United Methodist Board of Missions—National Division made an undesignated grant of \$300,000 for 1970.

Total gifts received by IFCO from all sources since its founding amount to \$2,629,457. The largest single contributor was the United Presbyterian Church, which gave \$481,787.

Other major contributors included the Episcopal Church (\$475,504), United Methodist Church (\$340,133), American Baptist Home Mission Societies (\$193,756), United Church of Christ (\$182,382), and Lutheran Church in America (\$118,842).

Non-church groups contributed \$668,348.

To counteract white attempts at "co-optation and polarization of black groups,"

the report states, IFCO initiated moves leading to the formation last year of the National Black Coalition, which formulates strategies and defines roles. The coalition comprises IFCO, BEDC, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and the National Welfare Rights Organization.

In the report Mr. Walker described some of the games played on both sides of the struggle over empowerment of minorities. One tactic of church bureaucracies, he said, is "to create a proliferation of mission structures" so that when one becomes too threatening, they can shift to another and still claim to be involved.

"Another denominational ploy," he added, "is to make big promises in the face of confrontation, then renege on those promises when the threat to them lessens. The promises, of course, are widely publicized; the do-nothing result is not."

He quoted a paper published in Kentucky, The Black Rag, which criticized some games played by "the brothers." Those include the "Black Intellectual Game," the "Black Militant Game," and the "Swinger Game."

"Whites do not know when they are being taken or how to apply the principle of self-determination or how to evaluate the trick bags they are put into," Mr. Walker said. "Some whites look for militancy and are, therefore, impressed by the most 'militant-looking' brother, although they are incapable of seeing beyond the dashiki, the Afro, or other external symbols."

He added that the larger problem, however, is the "civil rights establishment game," in which "the older, more established organizations (NAACP, Urban League) claim that only they should receive funds for programs."

[From the New York Times, Dec. 12, 1970]

CHURCH AGENCY FOR MINORITY AID SUSPENDS GRANTS AS GIFTS LAG

(By George Dugan)

The Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization called a three-month moratorium this week on new grants to minority groups.

The Foundation gave as its reason the failure of its supporting denominations to supply sufficient funds for distribution.

The organization was founded four years ago by Protestant, Roman Catholic and Jewish agencies to finance economic-development efforts among minorities. Since then, it has channeled nearly \$3 million to black, American Indian, Mexican-American and white community organizations.

The suspension of new grants was approved at a meeting of the foundation's board of directors at the Interchurch Center, Riverside Drive and 120th Street.

ABOUT \$40,000 PLEDGED FOR 1971

According to its director, the Rev. Lucius Walker Jr., the interfaith agency has enough money for administration plus "firm commitments" of only \$40,000 for the coming year.

Hoped-for grants of \$100,000 each from the United Methodist Church and the United Presbyterian Church are nothing more than hopes, Mr. Walker told the 40-member board.

He emphasized that the foundation would continue to handle designated grants as they were received and would administer funds in reserve for purposes already earmarked.

The firm pledges for next year are \$20,000 from the Lutheran Church in America and a similar amount from the United Church of Christ.

DENOMINATIONAL WOES

Mr. Walker attributed the foundation's loss of income to tight money within the denominational structures, a feeling among the churches that they can "go it alone" without outside help, and the rise of black caucuses that demand and get financial support.

Dr. George Wiley, head of the National

Welfare Rights Organization, argued against the moratorium.

He told the board that the foundation should continue to make grants during early 1971 so that groups that had hoped for assistance would have time to seek funds elsewhere.

In 1968, the foundation called a black economic conference in Detroit. Out of that meeting arose the controversial Black Manifesto that demanded "reparations" from white churches and synagogues. Shortly thereafter, the American Jewish Committee withdrew its sponsorship of the foundation.

One of the board members called the financial crisis a "cop-out" by the churches. She said she could not believe that America's religious forces were so short of money that they could not find "a couple of bucks" for the poor and disadvantaged.

AN AMERICAN EMPEROR

HON. MICHAEL HARRINGTON

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Speaker, the President's recent decision to blockade the ports of North Vietnam offers striking evidence of just how deeply the constitutional form of government has eroded. Unilaterally, the President has undertaken an action, which by any definition of international law, constitutes an act of war.

The blockade of North Vietnam is clearly an act of desperation on the part of a man who is obsessed with the idea of protecting American honor. There is nothing honorable about the death and destruction we are wreaking upon the land and people of Indochina. The concept of a blockade was offered to and rejected by Lyndon Johnson, a man who could hardly be regarded as a man of great restraint, because of the probable ineffectiveness of the military policy and the tremendous dangers that attacking foreign ships, Soviet and Chinese, not to mention British, could entail.

The new Nixon policy could lead us to a direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union. He is playing the dangerous game of nuclear brinkmanship in order to save a corrupt government whose ineptitude and indifference on the battlefield have precipitated this crisis.

Last year the U.S. Congress went on record declaring it to be the policy of the United States to bring to an end "at the earliest practicable date" all military operations in Indochina, subject only to the release of all American prisoners of war.

The President has treated the Congress with arrogance and contempt, rejecting its advice, and informing the leadership of his actions only after they have been implemented. The Congress must reassert its constitutional mandate to declare war, by taking every action possible to prevent the President from waging a war that the Congress is on record as supporting an end to.

Two recent articles, one, an editorial in the Washington Post of May 10, and the other, a column by Tom Wicker of the New York Times, on May 9, place the President's action in historical and con-

stitutional perspective. I recommend them to all Members interested in restoring constitutional government to the United States:

[From the Washington Post, May 10, 1972]

NIXON'S WAR

(Once again the public is not being asked, it is being told; in the great tradition of the Vietnam War, a President has confronted us with a *fait accompli*, carefully concealed in advance by the most artful dissembling, supported by suspect evidence, specious argument and excessive rhetoric. And so, once again, one is left with the sensation of helplessness in the face of a self-renewing war, and in the hands of an administration as incapable as the last of distinguishing between hard decisions and what Mr. Nixon is pleased to call "the easy political path."—From an editorial in *The Washington Post*, May 2, 1970.)

That was our view the day after President Nixon sent American forces on their famous "incursion" into Cambodia and we cite it today out of the same sense of helplessness—a sense that it has all been said before. The same things have been said by the President, and by his critics, after Cambodia and after Laos and after the more recent renewal of the bombing of North Vietnam which has now been followed by Mr. Nixon's latest exercise in withdrawal from Vietnam, the mining of Haiphong and five other North Vietnamese ports, so that you wonder what more there is to say.

Remember at the time of Cambodia, how we would be a "pitiful, helpless giant" if we did not hang in there in Vietnam? "This action is a decisive move," the President said, and we bought it, we must admit, as the action of a barroom fighter in the best tradition of the old West, backing out the door with one last shot at the mirror on the saloon wall to keep everybody's head down. And we bought the Laotian "incursion" on similar terms, assured that this was the end of the line, that the President and the Secretary of State meant it when they said we were "getting out" and that it was "irreversible." We bought it, and a lot of people bought it, when the President quoted General Abrams that "the South Vietnamese by themselves can hack it, and they can give a better account of themselves than the North Vietnamese units." And when the President said that Laos proved the South Vietnamese "without American advisers . . . could fight effectively against the very best troops North Vietnam could put in the field."

That was a year ago, and we went along because Vietnamization had "succeeded" and "the end was in sight," although we did observe at the time that these initiatives are almost never decisive, that "every new initiative of ours has been met by some countermove or another on the part of the enemy; that the North Vietnamese have proved themselves almost infinitely resilient and resourceful; that the enemy is in a position to damage our interests in a rich variety of ways for which B-52s are not necessarily an effective remedy—by stepped-up terrorism, for example, or by merely lying low and buying time, or by a quick grab for all of Laos, or of Cambodia, or by a drive down through the DMZ . . ." We add that emphasis, not because we think we were particularly prescient, but because it was so obvious to anyone who had followed the history of this war.

And yet, a year later, here is President Nixon crying about "naked aggression," as if it were something nobody could have foretold and insisting that Hanoi has broken the rules, as if there ever were any. Here he is again renouncing what "from a political standpoint . . . would be an easy choice," and instead lashing back with an action that had been first proposed to President

Johnson six years ago, and rejected, and was then warmed over by the Pentagon and served up to Mr. Nixon again in 1969—and again rejected.

This is the first question raised by the President's decision to mine the ports: why is it worth doing in 1972, for the sake of the safety of 69,000 American troops, when our casualties are next to nil, if it wasn't worth doing in 1969, when we had more than a half million men in South Vietnam and our casualties were running at the rate of 300 a week. As we all know, from the recently-published Kissinger papers, the President had the advice of a solid and respectable segment of the government, including CIA and much of the State Department, and the Secretary of Defense, that mining Haiphong and bombing the north and piling still greater stakes on the potential combat capability of the South Vietnamese would lead us nowhere in the end; that our intelligence was unreliable and our military estimates almost always too optimistic; that you couldn't get where the President wanted to go from where we were—and still less could you do it while you were withdrawing American troops. And yet the President went along then with the military and the die-hards in the Saigon embassy, and made Vietnam his war. And now he has once again reached into the Pentagon's kit-bag for still another "decisive military action to end the war."

Why? The answer almost inevitably has to be, not that the idea of mining North Vietnamese ports has gotten any better with age, but that the situation in Vietnam, on the ground where it counts, has gotten a great deal worse, at Hue and Anloc and Kontum, and within the military power structure that passes for a government in South Vietnam. Somehow the President must have concluded, as President Johnson concluded in March of 1965, that everything would collapse if he didn't do something, and so, in his own way, he too has gone North. It is hard to imagine a more damning indictment of the vaunted Vietnamization program, but that, at this moment, is not the point. For the mines are in the water, and what matters now is whether the results can by any conceivable measure justify the risks, discussed in a separate editorial below, of rupturing relations with the Soviet Union, and alienating large parts of the rest of the world.

Even assuming the best, it is hard for us to see how the answer could be Yes. The North Vietnamese are no less resilient, no less resourceful and no less resolved than they were two or five or twenty years ago; supplies from somewhere—China if not Russia or a combination of the two—will get through. The offer of a stand-still cease fire is an open invitation for the North Vietnamese to grab quickly, with what men and material they have on hand, for further territorial gains before negotiating—if indeed they negotiate at all. In short, a situation desperate enough to argue for mining the ports cannot be retrieved so easily. Either Hanoi will win a settlement on exceedingly favorable terms or it will fight on. Either way, the outcome is going to be very largely decided by the armies of North and South Vietnam.

And that is really what is so reckless about the President's latest Vietnam initiative. It is not just our degree of reliance on a thoroughly unreliable South Vietnamese army. It is also the over-heated insistence that the fate of the world and the security of this country are riding on that army and on what marginal help it may get from the mining of the harbors of North Vietnam. Whatever may be said about that act itself, there is nothing whatever to be said for Mr. Nixon's compulsion to justify it by piling ever bigger stakes on so marginal an effort to influence the course of a war whose outcome this country has long since lost the capacity to control.

[From the New York Times, May 9, 1972]
AN AMERICAN EMPEROR

(By Tom Wicker)

"No One Knows," said the headline in the New York Times, "What He Might Do." And indeed, no one, including Secretary of State William Rogers, summoned home from Europe for a National Security Council meeting, could know what President Nixon might decide upon as antidote in the current crisis in South Vietnam. The press has described admiringly the range of explosive options open to him; members of his Administration had been hinting darkly of the terrible vengeance this unchecked Caesar might choose to wreak upon something abstract known only as "Hanoi" or "the enemy"; but the decision was Richard Nixon's.

And when Mr. Nixon in his majesty chose to speak to the American people last night about his intentions in Southeast Asia, it was an act of *noblesse oblige* as well as an exercise in self-justification. Nothing in the law required him to confide in a single citizen; and although it was true that he spoke only after three hours of consultation with his primary national security associates, it is well-known that these officials more nearly ratify than form Presidential judgments.

Has it come to this, then, that it lies within the sole province of one man, unlimited by law or opinion, whether elected by landslide or hair's breadth, to decide without let or hindrance how the military power of the United States shall be used even in a situation his own policies have done much to create? Is that what the Constitution means, when it says that the President shall be Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces?

As to the first question, there seems little doubt that the answer is yes. Just last year, for instance, Congress passed an amendment to the Military Procurement Authorization bill which declared it to be the policy of the United States to bring to an end "at the earliest practicable date" all military operations in Indochina, subject only to the release of all American prisoners of war.

What was President Nixon's reply to that? Upon signing the measure on Nov. 17, he declared flatly that the amendment was "without binding force or effect and it does not reflect my judgment about the way in which the war should be brought to an end." It would not change his policies, he said, and in fact "legislative actions such as this hinder rather than assist in the search for a negotiated settlement."

Such high-handedness is not unique to Richard Nixon. The greatest of Presidents, Abraham Lincoln, interpreted the Presidential "war powers" so broadly that he repeatedly overrode both Congressional wishes and military advice; and since his actions saved the union, history generally accounts him strong and wise for having done so. But Lincoln was literally waging war for national survival, in a situation in which there was no precedent and which does not provide a precedent for anything that has followed—least of all a deliberate act of Presidential policy such as Vietnam.

Mr. Nixon, in contrast, now relies almost exclusively upon the Commander in Chief's power to protect the lives of American soldiers as constitutional justification for whatever he might choose to do in Southeast Asia; yet, it is arguable that American soldiers are in jeopardy primarily because Mr. Nixon's own policies have kept them in Vietnam. So the mere act of putting troops into a place, or keeping them there, which is in itself a Presidential decision, becomes the Presidential justification for any other Presidential action he may choose to take.

Mr. Nixon has not, for example, resorted to the use of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia; fortunately, there is no sensible military rationale for doing so. Nevertheless, the fact that the President has not so chosen

does not alter the fact that it was his choice; sensible or not, he could order nuclear warfare tomorrow and no man could stop him, unless the military chose to revolt—hardly a desirable alternative.

Since the authors of the Constitution could not foresee the nuclear era, they could have had no intent to lavish upon the President that degree of power; indeed, almost every other line of the document they produced suggests the extent to which they mistrusted unchecked power, whether vested in an executive or in a people's assembly.

Richard Nixon need not be psychoanalyzed or even mistrusted in order to perceive that that mistrust was well founded; for as he went on the air last night, it was terrifyingly true that no one knew what the President would do, that no immediate means of influencing his judgment was at hand, that no real way existed to stop him from following some apocalyptic course. He was in that moment as true an emperor as ever existed and scarcely more accountable; a people who wanted peace could still be given war at his dictate; and what good would it do to vote him out of office six months from now if the world were an ash, or "the enemy" had been obliterated in his honor?

RUMANIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY

HON. EARL F. LANDGREBE

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. LANDGREBE. Mr. Speaker, I want to call the attention of my colleagues to the celebration of the national holiday of the Rumanian people. Unfortunately, this anniversary of the founding of the kingdom of Rumania is not a happy one. The holiday has been suppressed by the Communist regime which now has control of that country and which is repressing the Rumanian people.

I join the Rumanian people and others in commemorating this day and I pray that someday the Communist yoke will be removed from the people of that nation.

I am happy to include a brief statement on the Independence Day of Rumania supplied me by Mr. Constantin Visoianu, president of the Rumanian National Committee and former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Rumania:

THE 10TH OF MAY: RUMANIA'S INDEPENDENCE DAY

The Tenth of May is the national holiday of the Rumanian people, celebrating three great events of its history.

On May 10, 1866, Charles, Prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a scion of the Southern and Catholic branch of the Prussian royal family, was proclaimed in Bucharest Prince of Rumania, and thus founded the Rumanian dynasty. It was the successful outcome of the nation's long struggle to acquire the right of electing as its sovereign a member of one of the Western non-neighbouring reigning families in order to put an end to the strifes and rivalries among native candidates to the throne. This ardent wish, though officially expressed as far back as 1857 by the Moldavian and Wallachian Assemblies—the "Ad-hoc Divans"—convened as a result of the Paris Treaty of 1856, was nevertheless opposed by the Russian and Austrian empires, equally disquieted by the growth in power and prestige of the young bordering nation they both secretly hoped to absorb some day. It was due to unrelenting efforts made and wise

steps taken by Rumanian patriots, and also to the constant diplomatic assistance of Napoleon III, Emperor of the French (to whom Prince Charles was related through the Beauharnais and Murat families) that all political obstacles were gradually removed and what was to be the prosperous and glorious reign of Charles I could be inaugurated on May 10, 1866.

Eleven years later, on May 10, 1877, during the turmoil of the Russo-Turkish War, the Principality of Rumania, until then nominally a vassal of the Sultan, proclaimed her independence by severing the old and outdated bonds that linked her with the Ottoman Empire. This independence had to be fought out on the battlefields south of the Danube, where the young Rumanian Army, as an ally of Russia, played a noteworthy part in the defeat of the Turkish forces. The Congress of Berlin of 1878 confirmed Rumania's independence and conferred Europe's official recognition, a bright page in the country's dreary history though marred unfortunately by the loss of Bessarabia, cynically wrenched by Czar Alexander II and his government from the ally who helped them obtain victory over the Turks.

Another four years elapsed after the Rumanian people had proclaimed their independence and a further step was taken as they decided to raise their country to the rank of a kingdom. On May 10, 1881, Charles I was crowned, by the will of his people, King of Rumania. A prosperous era, which lasted over six decades, opened on that day for the nation. Its apex was attained when national unity within the historic boundaries was reached after World War I. The socially progressive country had now become a factor of peace and equilibrium in the South-East of Europe.

During all those years and up to the present time, Rumanians have cherished and revered the Tenth of May as their national holiday, the anniversary of happy and glorious events in their history, in which achievements of Monarchy and people were interwoven. It remains the symbol of their permanency and perseverance through woes and hardships to reach the ultimate end of freedom and well being.

The ruthless foreign rule which now oppresses the Rumanian nation has not been able to uproot the people's attachment to the traditional celebration of the 10th of May. In order to try and alter at least its significance, official celebrations were shifted from the 10th to the 9th of May, anniversary of the Soviet victory. But, though flags are now hoisted on May 9th, Rumanians in their captive homeland celebrate in their hearts the following day, awaiting with faith and courage the dawn of new times, when freedom shall be restored to them.

CRIPPLED CHILDREN'S SERVICES— MENTAL RETARDATION EMPHASIS

HON. JAMES C. CORMAN

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. CORMAN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to bring to the attention of my colleagues a budget consideration that is critical to the future health and productivity of many of this Nation's young children. I am referring to the portion of maternal and child health budget which provides funds to States through formula grants for crippled children's services. Since the original authorization under title V of the Social Security Act

in 1935, crippled children's services have provided care to hundreds of thousands of handicapped children. More recently many States have been forced to eliminate services, delay needed services to crippled children, lose program personnel, and freeze vacant positions.

In 1935, when the program was first established, crippled children's services were provided to those youngsters with orthopedic handicaps that were surgically correctable, and very few other types of handicapped children were accepted into State programs. With advances in medical science and preventive medicine, the reduction of cases of poliomyelitis and bone tuberculosis allowed the States to expand their definitions of handicapped to include epileptic children and those with congenital heart defects. Programs now meet the medical needs of children with cystic fibrosis, hemophilia, leukemia, cerebral palsy, hearing defects, and many congenital defects.

Prior to 1963 few retarded children were included in crippled children's programs. The 1963 amendment earmarked funds especially for retarded children and States were able to remove limitations on providing care to such children. Many children who are mentally retarded as well as physically handicapped are now able to qualify for services. In 1969, over 45,000 children with some form of mental retardation received care under crippled children's funds.

Many crippled children's agencies are providing followup care for the large number of children who are handicapped as a result of the worst German measles—rubella—epidemic in U.S. history—1963-65. The children affected in the early months of the epidemic are now of school age and, therefore, the full impact of their defects is now apparent. Some children, thought to be mildly affected at first, exhibit signs of brain damage and have learning problems. The number of severely handicapped children with hearing defects on crippled children's rosters has been increasing.

The original authorizing legislation for crippled children's services decreed that services should be made available to children in all States by 1975. If this commitment is to be fulfilled, there must be a considerable increase in appropriations to allow for program expansion. I would like to encourage my colleagues to join me in asking that funds for Maternal and Child Health Services be increased. Medical care provided to crippled children is only one portion of a very worthwhile overall program designed to improve the quality of life among our Nation's most valuable resource, our young children.

RUMANIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY

HON. MARIO BIAGGI

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Speaker, Americans of Rumanian origin, through the sponsorship of the Rumanian National Com-

mittee, commemorate today, May 10, as a triple anniversary of important events in the history of their native land.

On May 10, 1866, the people of Rumania ended internal strife among native candidates to the throne by proclaiming Charles, Prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen of the Prussian royal family as the Bucharest Prince of Rumania.

On May 10, 1878, the Rumanians proclaimed their independence after severing political ties with the Ottoman Empire.

On May 10, 1881, Charles I was crowned King of Rumania, and a kingdom was established by the will of the people. The country prospered for more than six decades.

These three events will forever be observed by devoted Rumanians and families of Rumanian ancestry throughout the world as their cherished national holiday. Austere Communist rule, currently tyrannizing Rumania, has characteristically attempted to change this national commemoration to May 9, the date of the Soviet victory in that country.

But no arbitrary resetting of an anniversary observance, imposed from without on a fiercely proud people, can change the heartfelt sentiments of these people. The 10th of May is an inherent and integral part of all Rumanian history, a holiday as beloved to these people as our own Independence Day of July 4, 1776.

I send my warm wishes to all freedom-loving Rumanians and those of Rumanian ancestry on this traditional national holiday, with the hope that the bonds of servitude currently engulfing their country will soon be broken and liberty restored to their cherished nation.

KENSTON HIGH SCHOOL CHAMPIONS

HON. CHARLES A. VANIK

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. VANIK. Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to recognize the Kenston High School wrestling team of Chagrin Falls, Ohio, for winning the Ohio State class "A" high school wrestling crown. The championship is the school's first in wrestling, and represents 4 months of determined effort by the school's coaches and athletes.

Coaches of the team were Don Havenner, Zinn Gorby, and Bob Mowry. Among the 13 men on the team, were five who qualified and scored points in the State tournament. Ralph Graham won the State championship in his weight class; Albert DiGiovanni and Mike Law were third-place winners in their class while John Althans was a fourth-place winner and Kevin O'Brien a runnerup.

Other members of the team were Jim Pekarek, Dick Cardaman, Tom Lucey, Ed Richards, Kent Walsh, Dave Russell, Ed McCune, and John Strickland.

Coach Havenner commented that—
It was a great pleasure to work with this dedicated group of boys.

I might only add that it is an honor to represent them.

COMMONSENSE LANGUAGE

HON. ROBERT H. MICHEL

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, a letter sent to me by a good friend and constituent, Mr. Al Fuller, owner of the Peoria Heights Lumber Co., expresses more eloquently than any speech I might make on the subject, the scope of the problems and difficulties confronting small businessmen as they try to cope with the rules and regulations under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.

If enough of our colleagues were to receive similar letters it would help immensely in getting the law amended to bring some commonsense language into the law that these businessmen could live with.

I insert the text of the letter to be placed in the RECORD at this point:

PEORIA HEIGHTS LUMBER CO.,
Peoria Heights, Ill., May 4, 1972.

HON. ROBERT MICHEL,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR BOB: I am writing to you a few facts that concern me. I hope you will study HR 12068 and act with good judgment as you have in the past.

Approximately 20 years ago there were 26 lumberyards in the Greater Peoria Area, now only 4 remain of that 26. Two changed hands and three new cash and carries have started. In Peoria, Carver's and Siegel-Hunt's; Bartonville, Claus Lauterbach—H. E. changed hands. In Peoria Heights, We are left. (How long I don't know). In Aurora, Illinois there were 10 now only 3, possibly going to 2. Its like this all over the state according to the Director of Illinois Lumber and Building Material Dealers Association, Ed Sembell. Ask Sonny Mackemer why he went out.

I know there are many reasons why these yards went out of business, but government regulations, union pressures forced many to retire early and live on their investments, rather than fight the pressures of government costs and controls and union pressures.

I pride myself in being unselfish that profit is not the only motivating factor why I have stayed in business this long. I am a servant to the public. I try to make it easy for the home owner to pick up supplies for repairs and still come out even or a little ahead.

After a severe windstorm in the Peoria Area, we get many calls to fix the roof shingles. Many of these calls come from people who we have done work for or been referred by customers because they know we are honest and will not overcharge. Many times we have sent a carpenter out repairing a few shingles and the charge would be \$10.00 to \$15.00. We did this because the \$50.00 deductible insurance left the owner with the expense. We made a little or no profit and the customer was happy. A large percentage of my customers are retirees or people on fixed income and they appreciated the economy.

Now comes OHS.A.

First, I must have specified ladders so I bought one 28'. (Used to be the owner would

have one or a neighbor). Now on a roof call with a couple of shingles blown off, out goes the 28' ladder. This requires a big truck or the pick-up with suitable racks. A union driver must drive the truck (rate \$4.62 hr.) a helper, yardman or laborer must go along (rate \$4.52 hr.). The carpenter in the meantime drives his car to the job (\$8.00 hr.) which includes 5 1/2 hr. to pension fund. Because I directed the carpenter to the job, I am now liable if he has an accident and his insurance coverage is not enough—additional expense to me. OSHA says the ladder must be secured to the building, cannot be placed in a driveway unless there is a barricade around the ladder. So the helper goes along to hold the ladder. Union driver or teamster can't do this because of the union rules. Now the carpenter takes the 3 or 4 shingles, cost 45¢, up the ladder and completes the work in 15-20 minutes. He must have a life line or build a scaffold. All three men must wear safety shoes and helmets, more cost.

So that a 15 minute job now becomes 30-45 minutes, be silly to have the truck come back and go out again. So 2 men wait. When the job is finished they bring back the ladder or if we are lucky they may have another job and could proceed on to it and reduce costs. Meantime a truck has been tied up. So that \$10-\$15 job has now gone up to \$40-\$50. Who pays, the home owner. The only increase in cost except OSHA standards has been maybe 5¢ for the shingles and a 75¢ hr. raise for the carpenter in the last year. I know some contractors say they won't go out for less than \$80.00.

That is bad to comply with such regulations, but the worst is the fear of an inspector. Do you realize a violation on a job I just described could run between \$50.00 and \$500.00. The record keeping of OSHA requirements and a possible \$10,000.00 fine. I know these things were intended to larger employers and I know there are hazards that should be corrected. I'm not saying OSHA is not good but latitude in correcting a situation should be considered. The seminars I have attended indicate the whims of these safety directors can fine you whatever they feel like and go according to the book.

In 26 years of operation, I have carried workmen's compensation with just two accidents, over 270,000 man hours in that time. One fellow jumped off the truck and a ring on his little finger caught the top stake—had to be amputated. Another, a ladder slipped and the employee said he hurt his back. After his settlement, which he agreed years later was in his favor, he continued to work and has for 10 years for other people.

The fear of penalties and my inability in my case (6-8 employees) to send someone to school to learn all of these rules, to have a safety director, first aid director. Why should I have worked and done without to build what I have got today be subject to someone who knows only the book and is out to show his power?

I say again all small business men I have talked to fear the penalties and fines, I don't think Hitler SS Troops were anymore feared. I like others say to hell with it, its not fun being in business anymore. You can't take pride in your work when you know costs are prohibitive due to government regulations. We are intelligent men and my employees are intelligent, they don't work on something unsafe and good judgment has always prevailed on our jobs. Our record attests to that.

I'm sure OSHA is needed in many, many areas but it seems to me it should be helping businessmen with their problems not penalizing them without a chance to correct errors. I know some employees would take advantage of things, but these are a minority. 98% don't want any unsafe conditions for their employees.

Sorry this got so long, hope you can find time to read it.

A very appreciative friend,
AL FULLER,
Owner.

ACCURACY IN MEDIA

HON. F. EDWARD HÉBERT

OF LOUISIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 4, 1972

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Speaker, Members of Congress are well aware of how a quotation, taken out of context, can be utilized to express a view entirely different from that which was intended.

Since we all have a parochial interest in this technique, I am inserting in the RECORD a copy of a letter from the executive secretary of Accuracy in Media, Inc. which pertains to our former President, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. The letter speaks for itself.

I am also inserting a column which appeared in the May 9 issue of the Washington Post. Written by Russell B. Nye, a professor of English at Michigan State University, it is an excellent commentary on how facts can be distorted:

ACCURACY IN MEDIA, INC.,
Washington, D.C., April 29, 1972.

Mr. ARTHUR H. MOTLEY,
President, Parade
New York, N. Y.

DEAR Mr. MOTLEY: *Parade* of April 9, 1972, carried an article by Lloyd Shearer entitled, "Ike Warned the World But We Wouldn't Listen." Mr. Shearer began his article with a quotation from an address that President Eisenhower delivered to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in April 1953.

The passage which he chose to quote from this speech described and deplored the high cost of military armament. Mr. Shearer created the impression that this passage was the principal message in Eisenhower's speech. He suggested that it was prompted by the President's frustration with rising defense costs, and he described it as a memorable address. Following the quote from the speech, Mr. Shearer went on to discuss the amounts of money being spent on arms today. He concluded with this statement: "... the defense budget of \$84 billion for the year is larger than when we had 540,000 ground troops stationed in Vietnam. Good old 'Ike' Eisenhower. He spoke well, but no one listened."

There are at least two serious errors in Mr. Shearer's article. We have not checked all of his figures on world spending on arms, but we have checked his figures for the United States. Defense outlays for the current fiscal year were budgeted at \$78 billion, not \$84 billion. This is lower than the defense budget in the years 1968 through 1970, when our troop strength in Vietnam was at its peak.

The second error is far more serious. It relates to the implication that Eisenhower's ASNE address was essentially a warning about the folly of spending vast sums on defense, stimulated by the President's frustration with rising defense costs.

We have gone over this speech carefully, and we find that the main message that President Eisenhower conveyed to the newspaper editors was quite different from the theme Mr. Shearer attributed to him. Stalin had recently died and new leaders had assumed power in the USSR. President Eisenhower used this speech to challenge the new leadership to alter the policies that Stalin had

pursued that had made it necessary for the West to re-arm and build up military alliances for protection against the aggressive policies of the Soviet Union. He indeed did point out that the burden of arms was a costly one and that the world would be a far better place if we could devote those resources to satisfying other wants. However, far from appearing as a pacifist who was wringing his hands in public about the folly of spending money on arms, Eisenhower pointed out in ringing words that this was a cost we had to bear as long as freedom was threatened.

Speaking of this need and of the behavior of the Soviet Union, Eisenhower said:

"It instilled in the free nations—and let none doubt this—the unshakable conviction that, as long as there persists a threat to freedom, they must, at any cost, remain armed, strong, and ready for the risk of war. It inspired them—and let none doubt this—to attain a unity of purpose and will beyond the power of propaganda or pressure to break, now or ever."

It is ironic indeed that 19 years after these words were uttered Mr. Shearer should extract a passage from this same speech out of context and use President Eisenhower's words in what appears to be an open effort to persuade the American people that the cost of remaining armed, strong and ready for the risk of war is too great for them to bear. This is a magnificent illustration of the lengths to which propagandists are willing to go to achieve their goals, but it is not the kind of journalism that should be practiced by *Parade*.

Mr. Shearer's article is inaccurate in both fact and spirit as a report of what President Eisenhower "warned the world" about in April 1953. He warned the world that it would have to remain armed, at great cost, if the Soviet leaders failed to show by deeds as well as words that they were willing to alter course. He said the test would come in the answers to these three questions:

Is the new leadership of the Soviet Union prepared to use its decisive influence in the Communist world, including control of the flow of arms, to bring not merely an expedient truce in Korea but peace in Asia?

Is it prepared to allow other nations, including those of Eastern Europe, the free choice of their own forms of government?

Is it prepared to act in concert with others upon serious disarmament proposals to be made firmly effective by stringent U.N. control and inspection?

President Eisenhower made it clear that the United States was prepared to call a halt to the arms race if the Soviet Union made it clear by its actions that it would cooperate in creating conditions in which men could live in peace and freedom. But he added: "If we strive but fail and the world remains armed against itself, it at least need be divided no longer in its clear knowledge of who has condemned mankind to this fate."

Mr. Shearer is wrong when he says "we wouldn't listen" to General Eisenhower. Americans listened very well. They watched to see if the Soviet leadership responded to "Ike's" challenge. They saw freedom in Hungary crushed in 1956. They saw Soviet arms and advice promoting war in Southeast Asia. They saw East Germany sealed off by the Berlin wall. They saw no evidence of willingness to agree to arms limitation with stringent inspection. They saw that as we halted the increase in ICBM's the Soviets went on installing these weapons at a furious pace. They concluded that Eisenhower had given good advice. We could not afford to disarm under these conditions. That has been the clear conclusion of Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon. Mr. Shearer badly misleads his readers when he suggests that the defense policies followed by these presidents, including Eisenhower

himself, ignored the advice that Eisenhower gave in his ASNE speech in April 1953.

We believe that this is a matter of such great importance that you will want to correct the false impression that Mr. Shearer created about President Eisenhower's warning. We urge that you do so. If you wish to do so, you may publish this letter. It would be an excellent corrective to Mr. Shearer's article.

Accuracy in Media, Inc. is a nonprofit, nonpartisan educational organization devoted to improvement of accuracy in news reporting. This is an example of the type of careful, responsible work we do in our effort to keep the public from being misinformed by inaccurate news reporting. We would welcome your support, which could be most appropriately given by responding to the request that Mr. Shearer's error be corrected.

Sincerely yours,

ABRAHAM H. KALISH,
Executive Secretary.

A CASE OF SLOPPY JOURNALISM

(By Russel B. Nye)

When it comes to facts, I have never really trusted newspapers very much. A youth spent in what Colonel Robert R. McCormick used to call 'Chicagoland,' reading the *Tribune*, and 25 years of historical research have convinced me that newspapermen are highly fallible sources of information. When I heard Martin Nolan on television (October 24, 1971) that there were "over 50,000 war resisters in Canada," I thought he might really know. The figure seemed to me important, so I wrote to Nolan, asking his source.

Nolan's reply was not helpful. He cited James Reston Jr. who had used the 50,000 figure in *The New Republic* without attribution. Newspapermen quoting other newspapermen arouse my suspicion, so I thought I'd look it up, especially when that 50,000 began turning up all over the media.

I began in 1968. That year a writer in *The Progressive* thought there were "at least 10,000 draft evaders in Canada. *U.S. News and World Report* gave estimates varying from 300-400 to 25,000. Edmund Taylor, in a well-researched article in the soon-to-be-defunct *Reporter*, cited a *New York Times* estimate of 4,000; another by a Toronto antidraft group of 10,000; and Canadian press estimates of 14,000 up. *The Atlantic*, using the Toronto group's figure, came up with 3,000-10,000.

In 1969 amazing things happened. The *New York Times* in April settled for "several thousand" draft evaders in Canada. In December, however, it raised that to 60,000 on the basis of estimates from the Toronto draft-resisters' group—a number soon to be enshrined in the American press. That the figure represented a spectacular increase of 56,000 over the 1968 news report bothered nobody at the *Times*, while CBC's "Public Eye" program, perhaps carried away by the *Times*, also estimated 60,000.

In 1970 things settled down a bit, but not for long. The *Times* shifted its estimate to 6,000-60,000 (a delightfully flexible figure, I thought) as well as quoting an "independent estimate of 20,000." The Toronto group (which used 10,000 in 1968) now placed the number at 60,000 (the *Times* again?) which other papers dutifully printed. Stewart Alsop, in *Newsweek*, fixed for no discernible reason on 25,000-30,000. Roger Williams, of the Toronto group, used the *Times'* 60,000 but insisted that "qualified observers" calculated "many more than that." (This seemed to me an interesting situation, in which draft evaders in Canada quoted the *Times* which quoted draft evaders in Canada.) Vance Garner, of the Montreal Resisters' Council, entered the field with a statement that there were 14,000 draft-age

landed immigrants "here now," a figure I found impossible to derive from any known Canadian immigration reports. He escalated things further by claiming that there were actually "three to four times that many" illegally in Canada, i.e., 42,000-56,000. A staff worker for the Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam told the press that there were 60,000 draft evaders in Canada (once more the *Times*), a figure which included 30,000 in Toronto alone.

The year 1971 was wilder. *Newsweek* cited 50,000-70,000, doubling what their man Alsop said a year before. *Parade*, apparently quoting the Clergy and Laymen group, said there were 30,000 in Toronto. The *Toronto Globe and Mail*, for its part, chose 30,000-100,000. Mike Wallace on "Sixty Minutes" used a new Montreal Resisters' estimate of 10,000, noting that it was perhaps inflated, but offering no alternative. Nolan, citing Reston, and Reston, citing nobody, said "over 50,000."

The most curious statistics of 1971, however, appeared in Rogers Williams' book, *The New Exiles*, which had few footnotes and no bibliography. Williams on different pages cited both 40,000 and 60,000 (the *Times* again!) for 1970. On another page he put the number in mid-1967 at 5,000-6,000, representing an increase of 34,000-55,000 in less than three years, certainly one of the least-noticed mass migrations in modern history. On two other pages he reported 25,000 evaders and deserters legally in Canada, and on yet another page, by adding wives and children, he got the number (legal or illegal?) to 50,000-60,000. Finally, at the close of his study, he increased this to 50,000-100,000.

1972 may be a banner year for inflation. *Newsweek* led off in January with "75,000, mostly in Canada," while David Brinkley, with oracular finality, made it 75,000-100,000. Senator Robert Taft, in an interview given to *The Los Angeles Times* news service, estimated there are "about 20,000 of these men in Canada." Since Senator Taft, who has initiated legislation, and Brinkley, who was commenting on it, differ by 55,000-80,000, the variance seems significant. They can't both be right.

In January, Gannett News Service used the figure "60,000-100,000," which strikes me as having a generous margin of built-in error. In February, UPI settled on 70,000. The last four references I have seen in January and February, 1972, choose 70,000.

What emerges from all this, and I have not by any means exhausted examples, is clear evidence of extremely sloppy journalism. Newspaper and television reports on draft evaders and deserters in Canada have, over those two years, varied from 10,000 to 100,000, a margin of error that ought to have stirred a twinge of doubt in some newspaperman's breast somewhere. Most striking in the stories was the almost complete lack of plain legwork. I found no journalist who had consulted easily obtainable Canadian immigration figures, and with one or two exceptions, none who had researched the realities of Canadian immigration laws. One cannot, as Alsop wrote, simply walk across the Canadian border and "fade into the economy," or, as *Newsweek* misleadingly implied, gain landed immigrant status simply by asking at the border. Canadian embassy and consular sources that have an ax to grind will, if asked, estimate about 10,000 American draft evaders in Canada (about the same number of Canadians have volunteered for the U.S. Army), but nobody asks them.

As for me, I trust the press no more than before, nor do I have any more information than before. I don't know how many draft evaders there are in Canada or elsewhere, but in the light of the growing debate over amnesty, I'd like to know as accurately and honestly as possible.

PRO-FAMILY GROUPS ORGANIZE TO BLOCK CHILD DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

HON. JOHN R. RARICK

OF LOUISIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, the more American citizens learn about the details of the insidious child development programs, the more voices of protest that are raised.

Much credit for alerting an increasing number of citizens of this menace to the traditional family unit and child-parent relationship is due to thousands of grassroots organizations all over America such as concerned parents associations, save our children groups, committees for moral education, civic clubs, women's clubs, taxpayers' educational associations, legislative and research councils, and many others.

Faced with no podium to participate in "the great American debate" to change child rearing traditions, these organizations are now shifting the thrust of their activities on the national level from the education of grassroots Americans to viable, nonpartisan political action.

Many of the concerned Americans will be coming to Washington for the National Convention on the Crisis in Education, phase II: The Crisis Invades the Home. The 4-day convention, being coordinated by the National Coalition on the Crisis in Education headed by Mr. and Mrs. Albert Westerfield, of Garden City, Idaho, will be held at the Mayflower Hotel, May 18-22, 1972.

The coordinating organization is a coalition of independent parent groups within the United States whose members believe that the ultimate authority and responsibility for the child must remain with the family. They have joined their efforts in order to preserve the family as the primary unit of our society to preserve and foster the right of parents to obtain the best possible education for their children and to determine their moral and religious training.

Being held simultaneously and jointly with the Phase II Convention on the Crisis Invades the Home called by the National Coalition on the Crisis in Education—NCOCE—is the first annual convention of the Scientific Information and Educational Council of Physicians—SIECOP. SIECOP with national offices in San Francisco, Calif., and Melbourne, Fla., has been the foremost organization of medical doctors and other professionals opposing the Sex Information and Educational Council of the United States—SIECUS—and its programs of introducing sex education into public and private schools. Dr. James M. Parsons, psychiatrist and president of SIECOP, announced in a recent press release that the theme of the SIECOP convention will be "Medical and Psychologic Aspects of Current Social and Educational Trends Affecting the Quality of Family Life."

The main thrust of the phase II con-

vention according to a recent press release of the National Coalition on the Crisis in Education will be to block child-development legislation pending in the U.S. Congress, along with federally funded pseudo-educational programs being introduced into the Nation's schools, is considered as constituting a massive assault on the American family unit.

The parent's viewpoint in the great national debate on this issue called for by President Nixon will take place here in our Nation's Capital May 18-22. These solid citizens are so concerned over the moral and social pollution—pornography, obscenity, permissiveness, abortion, sensitivity training, drug addiction, homosexuality, corruption—which permeates the cities and towns of America; and so alarmed at the regressive, immoral, and communistic proposals emanating from Washington, D.C., that they are coming to their Nation's Capital at considerable expense and inconvenience to themselves and their families so that their voices may be heard loud and clear. The thrust of the message they want us to hear is simply this: Leave us alone.

I am convinced that they represent the viewpoint of the overwhelming majority of parents of this land.

I include several pertinent news releases and a policy statement of the National Coalition on the Crisis in Education and an article by the eminent columnist Paul Scott:

THE NATIONAL COALITION ON THE CRISIS IN
EDUCATION
PRESS RELEASE

"Coalition is the name of the game," said Mr. and Mrs. Al Westerfield of Garden City, Idaho, national coordinators of the National Coalition on the Crisis in Education, a network of parent committees across the nation who will be holding their "Phase II" convention May 18-22, 1972 at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C.

"Once the purpose of our convention—to block child-development legislation—became clear", the Westerfields continued, "support began pouring in from other national groups with which we have not worked before and which, although their specialized interests are directed to other Crises in our nation, have all agreed that legislation pending in the United States Congress, together with federally-funded pseudo-educational programs being introduced into the nation's schools, constitute a massive assault on the American family unit."

Following the lead set by educational, "social service," and "behaviorally-oriented" organizations lobbying for "such radical programs as Child Advocacy bills which emphasize a child's rights instead of his needs, and propose to put a government mediator between parent and child", the Equal Rights Amendment "which encourages mothers to leave the home and turn their young over to federally-controlled and directed day-care centers" and "permissive abortion laws which arrogantly attempt to preserve the world exclusively for those already born and thus exempted from its death-dealing power", the NCOCE has extended its convention plans to include—and coordinate with—the leadership of other national organizations which recognize and oppose "the Orwellian tendencies now confronting American parents and children," according to the Westerfields.

"Since our inception as a national organization three years ago", they continued, "we have worked to educate the grass-roots Americans. The time for education on the

national level is past, however, and the future activities of the NCOCE must be directed toward viable, non-partisan, political action. Local and state committees will now bear the responsibility for continued education of the rest of the public, which is so tragically misinformed by the sloganeers, while national leadership, together with that of other organizations, will direct its efforts to lobbying and to influencing legislation on the federal level."

NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS UNITE TO BLOCK
CHILD-DEVELOPMENT LEGISLATION

Since the announcement two weeks ago of the *National Convention on the Crisis in Education, Phase II: The Crisis Invades the Home*, to be held May 19-22, 1972, at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C., mushrooming interest from other national organizations has already required a change in convention planning, according to Mr. & Mrs. Al Westerfield, Coordinators of the cosponsoring National Coalition on the Crisis in Education, headquartered in Garden City, Idaho.

In order to schedule the large number of speakers, and to allow for both joint sessions in areas of mutual concern and separate sessions devoted to the specialized interests of each group, Dr. James Parsons of Melbourne, Florida, President of the Scientific Information & Educational Council of Physicians (SIECOP), the original sponsoring organization, has found it necessary to convene delegates from the medical, psychological & psychiatric professions into simultaneous convention on *The Medical & Psychological Aspects of Current Social & Educational Trends Affecting the Quality of Family Life*. Other national organizations are being urged to follow a similar format.

Addressing the Coalition's opening *Parade of Issues* on Friday night, May 19, intended to present an overview of the problems confronting American family life, traditions, and freedoms, and their culmination in pending child-development legislation which the organizations believe is the opening wedge for state control of the child and family, will be the presidents of the Coalition, SIECOP, Unified Concerned Citizens of America, the National Parents' League, Happiness of Womanhood's new League of Housewives division, and the Detroit Education Association, together with the editor and publisher of the Barbara M. Morris Reports, a delegate to the 1970 White House Conference on Children, a former Head-Start Teacher's Aide, and the Headmaster of a traditionally-oriented British Jr. School, who will also participate in an International Forum at a joint session the following morning.

The National Coalition on the Crisis in Education, Coordinator Al Westerfield, SIECOP, Pres. Dr. James Parsons, Lock Drawer No. 249, Melbourne, Fla.

Unified Concerned Citizens of America, Pres. Dr. Mitchell Young, P.O. Box 2510, Texarkana, Tex.

The National Parents' League, Pres. Mrs. Mary Royer, P.O. Box 3987, Portland, Ore.

League of Housewives, Pres. Mrs. Jaqueline Davison, 1902 Pacific Ave., Kingman, Ariz.

Detroit Education Association, Pres. Robert Johnson, 8401 Woodward Ave., Suite 209, Detroit, Mich.

Barbara M. Morris Reports, Box 412, Elliott City, Md.

THE NATIONAL COALITION ON THE CRISIS IN
EDUCATION
PRESS RELEASE

Dr. James M. Parsons, Psychiatrist & President of the *Scientific Information & Educational Council of Physicians* (SIECOP) has released the list of speakers for its first annual convention, May 19-22, at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C. The Convention is being held simultaneously with the *Phase II*

Convention on the Crisis Invades the Home called by the *National Coalition on the Crisis in Education* (NCOCE) and will include many joint sessions.

SIECOP, with national offices in San Francisco, Cal.; and Melbourne, Fla., has been the foremost organization of medical doctors and other professionals opposing the Sex Information & Education Council of the U.S. (SIECUS) and its program of introducing sex education into public & private schools. Dr. Parson's council is composed exclusively of medical authorities, although he states "While all ethical specialties are represented, there is some weighting toward psychiatric & pediatric specialists who naturally are most concerned with the training & formal education of children."

Theme of the four day convention will be the *"Medical and Psychological Aspects of Current Social and Educational Trends Affecting the Quality of Family Life,"* according to Dr. Parsons, and speakers will include Dr. Rhoda Lorand of N.Y.C., internationally acclaimed child analyst and author of *Love, Sex and the Teenager*; Victor B. Cline, Ph. D., Psychologist and Assistant Prof. at the University of Utah; Dr. Richard Seymour, Psychologist and Internist, California; Louise F. W. Eickhoff, M.D., D.P.M. Royal College of Psychiatrists, England; Thomas P. Millar, M.D., Child Psychiatrist, Conn.; Dr. Florence M. Lewis, Psychiatrist, Calif.; Dr. Herbert Ratner, Public Health Director, Oak Park, Ill. and Assoc. Clinical Prof. of Family and Community Medicine, Stritch School of Medicine; Mary Royer, M.S., President of the *National Parents' League*, Research Psychologist who developed and perfected the psycho-diagnostic test of child-adjustment, the *Royer Identification Scale*; Dr. Collin Cooper, Asst. Clinical Prof. of Medicine, USC Medical School, California; Stuart F. Froome, Headmaster, St. Jude's Jr. School, England, and author of *Why Tommy Isn't Learning*; Robert Johnson, Educator and President of the *Detroit Education Association*, Michigan; Reul Shinner, Ph. D., Prof. of Chemical Engineering, City University, New York; Martha Rountree, creator and producer of *"Meet the Press,"* and others. Subjects will include sex education, sensitivity training, violence, pornography, drug abuse, abortion, delinquency, and innovative education.

Convention delegates will observe "a certain tinderbox quality when the child advocacy and day care schemes come up," Dr. Parsons predicted. Most good people simply have not been told that these schemes include sensitivity training, which causes mental illness requiring psychiatric treatment in over 10% of participants. *Why legislator-people should want to burden psychiatrists with an overload of innocent little-people who are fine before so-called child care hit them is one matter all ethical professionals will want to look at closely.*

Listening closely to the professional overviews will be the representative leaders of parent-committees across the nation who comprise the NCOCE, together with presidents of some half-dozen other national organizations with varying specialized concerns but all concerned with the assault on the American Family unit.

THE NATIONAL COALITION ON THE CRISIS IN
EDUCATION
PRESS RELEASE

Pointing to the Child Advocacy, Child Day Care/Development; & Child Mental Health programs proposed by federal, state & local governments, Barbara M. Morris, Maryland editor & publisher, wrote in her 10/70 Report, *"Anatomy of a Hoax,"* "Your children & grandchildren can't speak for themselves. You have an obligation to act for them. If you don't the government will."

Mrs. Morris, graduate of Rutgers University, & a practicing pharmacist, publisher of

the *Barbara M. Morris Reports*, blasted the coercive power of government over the family by quoting from the *Report to the President of the White House Conference on Children*: "A day care program that ministers to a child from six months to six years of age has over 8,000 hours to teach him values, fears, beliefs, and behaviors," & reminded her readers that, "The government is serious about raising your children. Are you?"

Described by the *Baltimore Chamber of Commerce* magazine as a pamphleteer in the Benjamin Franklin tradition, Mrs. Morris is nationally acclaimed for her success in exposing otherwise unpublished information from governmental and social-planning agencies. On Friday night, March 19, 1972, she will present the introductory "Child-Development—an Overview" in the initial *Parade of Issues* opening the *Phase II convention of the National Coalition on the Crisis in Education* at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C.

The convention, with the theme *The Crisis Invades the Home*, is being held simultaneously and jointly with that of a national professional organization, the Scientific Information & Education Council of Physicians (SIECOP), whose membership leans heavily toward child analysts, psychologists and psychiatrists. Dr. James Parsons of Melbourne, Florida, SIECOP President, predicts "a certain tinderbox quality when the child advocacy and day care schemes come up" before its delegates.

THE NATIONAL COALITION ON THE CRISIS
IN EDUCATION
PRESS RELEASE

Claiming that her organization actually represents the 97% of American women opposing the so-called 'women's liberation' movement, Mrs. Jaqui Davison, President of *Happiness of Womanhood* and its new division *Housewives League of America*, says that her organization intends to counter the degradation of femininity and the conversion of 'housewife' into a dirty word, pledging to the men of America, "You make the living, and we'll make life worth living."

According to the HOW newsletter, some 3% of the women in this country have pressured the Congress of the United States into withdrawing the rights, responsibilities, and privileges so treasured by the vast majority of American womanhood, by passing the "Equal Rights" Amendment and the first Child Advocacy bill later vetoed by President Nixon.

Housewives League of America is one of many national organizations with specialized interests who are joining together in Washington, D.C. May 18-22, 1972, to unite their efforts in blocking any and all forms of federal child-development legislation which they agree are destructive to the American family unit and the sanctity of the American home.

Stating that "A true woman is serene until her den is threatened; then she rises like a lioness to defend it," and pledging that "we are 'little old ladies' who are taking off our tennis shoes and putting on combat boots," Mrs. Davison's organization is hosting a May 18 banquet at the Mayflower Hotel, convention headquarters, to honor members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives who voted against the "Equal Rights" Amendment.

Other organizations which will be represented at the *National Convention on the Crisis in Education*,—*Phase II: The Crisis Invades the Home*, include state and local groups of the National Coalition on the Crisis in Education, the National Parents' League, Unified Concerned Citizens of America, the Private Day Nursery Association of Ohio, the Detroit Education Association, and the Scientific Information Council of Physi-

cians (SIECOP) which is holding a simultaneous convention, with joint sessions, on the *Medical and Psychological Aspects of Current Social & Educational Trends Affecting the Quality of Family Life*.

THE NATIONAL COALITION ON THE CRISIS IN
EDUCATION
PRESS RELEASE

"How to Reverse that Imperative Psychotic Childhood Regression, Primary Disidentification", will be the subject of a banquet speech to be delivered Saturday night, May 20, 1972, at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C., under the sponsorship of the *National Parents' League*, headquartered in Portland, Oregon.

Speaker Mary Royer, M.S., Research Psychologist and President of the NPL, is the developer and perfecter of the psycho-diagnostic test of child-adjustment, the *Royer Identification Scale*. She will be addressing delegates to simultaneous and joint sessions of the conventions of the *National Coalition on the Crisis in Education* (NCOCE) and the *Scientific Information & Education Council of Physicians* (SIECOP). Also in attendance will be presidents of other national organizations sharing concern over proposed federal child-development legislation which Mrs. Royer describes as "unequivocally destructive of children."

In July of 1970 in an article for the *Hillsboro Argus*, Mrs. Royer wrote, "The saddest commentary of all is that many parents are moaning a dirge instead of coming together as a group for the purpose of raising (their) voices in a thundering crescendo of rightful protest against these indignities being perpetrated upon the Innocents. Decisive, militant action is needed." Her comments were both prophetic and catalytic, for on Friday night, May 19, representative leaders of NCOCE parent-committees across the nation will convene for "Phase II: The Crisis Invades the Home" and for an initial "Parade of Issues" during which Mrs. Royer will speak on "The Psychological Implications of Contemporary Education and Alternatives Available to Parents."

Through her organization, Mrs. Royer has chartered and given assistance to those interested in establishing inexpensive parent-controlled private schools dedicated to basic academic education; under the auspices of Circuit Court Judges and school administrators in different states, she has conducted extensive testing of adjudicated delinquents, and in 1963 she served as a consultant to *President Kennedy's Comm. on Delinquency & Crime*, a pilot program in St. Louis.

"Sufficient probing has revealed," she writes, "that within a broad, amorphous, humanistic framework, your sons and daughters are being manipulated as experimental animals are manipulated . . . in giant, pilot school research projects designed by educators or behavioral scientists who are promoting various modular scheduling and differentiated staffing research projects, none of which have, according to educators, any definite proven value as educational techniques. Educators are also promoting the use of various psychological techniques, whose stated purpose is to 'alter attitudes' or to bring about various forms of 'behavioral modification' or change."

"Behavior modification techniques," she continues: "are being unethically, and unprofessionally, applied in the schools, against normal well-adjusted morally oriented children, without the knowledge of, or consent of, parents and/or guardians . . . The use of such psychological techniques is wholly inappropriate in a normal school setting, upon normal students, for, as stated, they are being utilized for the purpose of bringing about behavioral change."

"Specifically," Mrs. Royer concludes, "It is parental attitudes and values, that you

have taught to your children, that are the target for change."

THE NATIONAL COALITION ON THE CRISIS
IN EDUCATION
PRESS RELEASE

World-renowned child analyst and international lecturer on the emotional development of children, Dr. Rhoda Lorand of New York City, has challenged the self-assumed expertise in personal matters of the educational innovators, and emphasized the validity of the extreme credibility gap developed between parents and educators. "While school officials deny they have definite plans for programs, and use that denial to avoid showing parents the materials to be used, parents discover warehouses filled with the materials, which have been ordered paid for, and delivered", she wrote in her Fall, 1970 article for the N.Y. State School Nurse Teachers Association magazine, "A Psychoanalytic View of the Sex Education Controversy."

Because of her conviction that "the new [sex-education] programs would render parents obsolete", Dr. Lorand, whose book *Love, Sex, and the Teenager* was selected for inclusion in the VISTA Volunteers Portable Book Kit, will deliver the keynote address on "The Widening Assault on the Family" at the joint conventions of the Scientific Information & Education Council of Physicians (SIECOP) and the National Coalition on the Crisis in Education (NCOCE) to be held May 18-22 at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C. an effort bringing together representatives of grassroots parent-committees, and responsible medical, psychological and psychiatric professionals, from across the nation.

Speaking in her area of expertise, Dr. Lorand has said that "protesting parents are terated with unbelievable rudeness and hostility when evasiveness no longer works. These facts point to the probable presence of unresolved childhood hostility towards their own parents [on the part of educators] which is being vented on the protesting parents. The behavior of those who are so determinedly pushing these programs has been most interesting clinically."

"Everyone became an instant authority on mental health," she continued, "diagnosing those who disagreed with them as 'very sick' and 'sexually hung-up'. Teachers and principals with impunity told and continue to tell protesting mothers that they must be mentally ill and surely there is something wrong with their sex life."

Dr. Lorand, a Fellow of the International Council of Psychologists, concludes, "The over-enthusiasm for the courses arouses the conjecture that these people are reacting to an excess of unconscious anxiety and guilt about sexuality, produced by a too repressive upbringing. Thus their ready diagnosis of the opposition as being sexually troubled is pure projection (attributing to someone else what one cannot bear to know is true of one's self). The no-holds-barred approach appears to be giving them a feeling of liberation from childhood guilt feelings and anxiety about sexual matters and they are experiencing a great sense of release in having this material openly available and under authoritative auspices."

ENGLISH EDUCATOR BLASTS INNOVATIVE
EDUCATION

Headmaster S. H. Froome of the traditionally-oriented St. Jude's Jr. School in Surrey, England; author of the best-selling *Why Tommy Isn't Learning* (Tom Stacey Books, Ltd., London, 1970), and contributor to the *London Express*, *Teacher's World Magazine*, and the 1969 *Black Paper* on education, has blasted contemporary educational innovations as "trying to pretend that learning can be a pleasure; it can't. It's hard work, but it's got to be done."

Because of the parallel problems confront-

ing education both here and abroad, ranging from permissiveness through sex-education and school-bussing, Mr. Froome has been invited to address the assembled delegates of the simultaneous conventions of the National Coalition on the Crisis in Education, a network of grass-roots parents' organizations, and SIECOP (Scientific Information & Educational Council of Physicians), to be held in Washington, D.C. on May 18-22, 1972 at the Mayflower Hotel, in both joint and separate sessions.

In commenting on American educational problems, Froome points out, "We have the same problem in Britain with 'faceless' bureaucrats being able to shape educational organization without reference to an electorate. It is done slowly and insidiously, but gradually schools and other institutions are remodeled to agree with the wishes of the paid officials, not with the desires of the parents of the children who attend them. It is my experience in this country that parents generally want their children to be taught in the traditional way and to be masters of reading, writing and arithmetic, but the officials have decided otherwise, and that is why our schools are centres of discovery-learning and are addicted to life-adjustment courses." Meanwhile, he adds, "Discriminating parents are always looking for an old-fashioned school—somewhere with strict discipline and with traditional teachers who like their pupils to know their multiplication tables and to write English in a tidy grammatical form."

The fact that Mr. Froome's school is avidly sought by parents is obvious in England's "The Teacher" of July 31, 1970, where reporter Shirley Toulson, comparing St. Jude's to a progressive British school points out that "Parents of these children have all deliberately chosen this sort of structured primary education for their children. Many of them travel considerable distances to bring the children to the school and all of them think themselves fortunate to have got a place at St. Jude's. There is an enormous waiting list, and many children are turned away." The London Evening Mail in reviewing Froome's book and school on May 19, 1971, put it this way: "Any of the modern educationists with whom he is now engaged in virtually single-handed combat had better not look to Stuart Froome's school, the proof of his particular pudding, to provide their ammunition."

Mr. Froome's summary, written in his column for England's "Teacher's World", August 21, 1970, applies equally in the United States: "Much modern educational theory, like thalidomide, has not been tried and tested in the crucible of practical experience. Centre of interest and integrated day procedures are strenuously advocated by purveyors of modern methods, but there is no demonstrable proof of their efficiency as teaching aids. Nor can there ever be such proofs, because coincident with the introduction of these free methods of teaching have come demands for the abolition of examinations and tests in schools."

POLICY STATEMENT

This organization is a coalition of independent parent-groups within the United States whose members believe that the ultimate authority and responsibility for the child must remain with the family. We have joined our efforts in order to preserve the family as the primary unit of our society; to preserve and foster the right of the parent to obtain the best possible education for his child and determine that child's moral and religious training, and to preserve these rights for our posterity.

In accordance with said purpose, this Coalition takes a united stand against in-school sex-education or sensitivity-training; the abolition of the neighborhood school; mandatory bussing of schoolchildren beyond their

home communities for any purpose whatsoever; and against any form of education, or any other program—administrative or governmental, local, state, national or international—which serves to weaken the child-parent relationship, to undermine national patriotism or our traditional Judeo-Christian ethic, or to abrogate the rights guaranteed to the people under the Constitution of the United States of America.

It is our specific intent to further the exchange of information and assistance between cooperating groups, each of which retains at all times its individual autonomy.

[From the Enquirer-Gazette, April 20, 1972]

THE SCOTT REPORT

(By Paul Scott)

A backlash similar to that running against forced school bussing is spreading across the nation in opposition to legislation that would change the traditional role of the American family and parent-child relationship.

This potential, powerful political force is being generated by hundreds of small pro-family groups now springing up around the U.S. In sharp contrast to the child development groups organized and directed from New York and Washington, the new pro-family movement appears to be made up of hard-core grass roots organizations.

The pro-family groups are now organizing a national coalition to vigorously oppose massive government child development programs, sensitivity training in schools, in-school sex education, and the abolition of the neighborhood school.

Known as the National Coalition on the Crisis in Education, this loosely knitted movement plans to bring their campaign to strengthen the family to the nation's Capitol in May by holding a national convention here. The organizing groups include:

Crisis in Education Committee, Garden City, Idaho; Unified Concerned Citizens of America, Texarkana, Texas; the National Parents' League, Portland, Oregon; League of Housewives, Kingman, Arizona; Detroit Education Association, Detroit, Michigan; SIECOP, Melbourne, Florida; and a number of pro-family groups in California, Ohio, Missouri, and Maryland.

Immediate objective of the mushrooming coalition will be to spark a drive in Congress to block the latest version of the controversial Child Development legislation that President Nixon vetoed last year.

The new legislation package, which includes money for the Head Start program, was quietly approved last week by a Senate Labor and Education Subcommittee headed by liberal Democratic Senator —, the chief advocate of programs that would give the government more control over the early years of the nation's children.

The full Senate Labor and Education Committee is expected to act on the legislation later in the week. Supporters hope to win committee approval so Senate action can be taken early in May. Timetable for the legislation in the House now depends on action in the Senate.

The new strategy—The "Comprehensive Head Start, Child Development and Family Services Act", as the new legislation package is known, would provide for a network of preschool educational services for most children and controversial "development day care programs for youngsters whose parents are working."

In a major effort to win White House approval for the legislation, Senator — worked with GOP Senators —, and —, to slash the authorization for the first operation year from \$2 billion in the vetoed bill to \$1.2 billion.

Strategy of the — group is to try to get a frame-work child development program through Congress this year that President Nixon will not veto. Then after the 1972

election, the Senators would work to expand and radicalize the legislation to include many of the social engineering schemes that were in the vetoed measure.

The new pro-family coalition hopes to counter this move by convincing members of Congress and President Nixon that a majority of Americans are opposed to such social tampering with their children.

As one member of the coalition puts it: "Once the American people know what these Senators really have in mind when they propose child development, they will not only work to defeat the legislation but they will politically oppose those that support such programs."

White House aides report that President Nixon vetoed the original child development bill last year after receiving more than 100,000 letters from parents of children throughout the country who are fed up with efforts to weaken the family. More than three-fourths of the letters came from the Far West states including politically strategic California.

The strategy of the new coalition will be to use their national meeting here to spotlight their campaign against the Child Development legislation and to have their members talk with members of Congress. Their policy statement, now being circulated among members of Congress, states:

"This organization is a coalition of independent parent-groups within the U.S. whose members believe that the ultimate authority and responsibility for the child must remain with the family.

"We have joined our efforts in order to preserve the family as the primary unit of our society; to preserve and foster the right of the parent to obtain the best possible education for his child and determine that child's moral and religious training, and to preserve these rights for our posterity. . . .

"We are against any form of education, or any other program—administrative or governmental, local, state, national or international—which serves to weaken the child-parent relationship, to undermine national patriotism or our traditional Judeo-Christian ethic. . . ."

In a Presidential and Congressional election year, the new national coalition could be a very powerful political force—especially since it comes from the grass roots where they cast and count the votes.

TRANSLATOR STATIONS

HON. RICHARD G. SHOUP

OF MONTANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. SHOUP. Mr. Speaker, I have today introduced a bill to amend section 318 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended. Its purpose is to enable the Federal Communications Commission to authorize translator broadcast stations to originate limited amounts of local programming and to authorize FM radio broadcast translator stations to operate unattended in the same manner as is now permitted for television broadcast translator stations.

Translator stations are low-power broadcasting stations which receive the incoming signals of a television station on an FM radio station, amplify the incoming signals, convert—or "translate"—them to a different output frequency, and retransmit the signals to the community or area which it is desired to serve.

Translators are needed where, because of terrain or extreme distances, it is not possible to receive the signals of the originating television or FM radio station—the primary station. Consequently, translators are found in abundance in rural areas, mountainous areas, or areas far from any television or FM radio station and frequently they provide the only source of television or FM radio to the residents of such areas. Most translator stations are found in the western part of the United States, but many are on the east coast in mountainous States. Translators, in increasing numbers, carry the programing of noncommercial educational television stations and serve an important function by providing in-school programing. They are limited, however, to rebroadcast, or petition, of the signals of their primary stations without any significant alteration of the characteristics of the incoming signals.

Translation stations were conceived as simple, inexpensive devices which could be made available to small communities where demand for television service—and later, FM radio service—was great and financial resources were meager. As so conceived, the rules governing their operation were modest, as were the financial requirements and other qualifications. Television translator stations have proliferated, there being now nearly 3,000 authorized in the country. The demand has not diminished nor has the need, but there is an increasing demand for greater utility for these stations, specifically, the ability to originate programing of local interest as well as to find financial support by carrying commercial advertising. Because translators are not now permitted to originate programing nor, with an exception to be discussed subsequently, to carry commercial advertising of their own, they are not self-supporting and must depend upon the public generosity for their support. This has always been difficult. Profit is not a characteristic of translator stations.

Prior to 1960, section 318 of the Communications Act required all broadcast stations to be operated only by persons having license issued by the Federal Communications Commission. The Commission is, under the law, permitted to waive the requirement for certain types of stations, but not for broadcast stations. Congress, by Public Law 86-609, approved July 7, 1960, amended this section of the law to make a specific exception for those broadcasting stations "engaged solely in the function of rebroadcasting the signals of television broadcast stations." The purpose of this amendment was to enable the Commission to permit translator stations to operate without a licensed operator. At that time, there were only television translator stations. FM radio translator stations were not authorized by the Commission until September 1970. Under section 318 of the act, as amended in 1960, any broadcasting station which was engaged solely in the function of rebroadcasting the signals of a television station could operate unattended, thus fulfilling the promise of a simple and inexpensive device available to all. A

translator station, however, which originates programing would no longer be engaged solely in the function of rebroadcasting and would, therefore, be removed from the category of broadcasting stations which could operate without a licensed operator in attendance.

Television translator stations are of two basic types: Those that rebroadcast on a VHF output frequency—channels 2 through 13—known as VHF translators, irrespective of whether the primary station is VHF or UHF, and those that operate on UHF output channels—channels 14 through 83—known as UHF translators. UHF translators are necessarily more complex, require greater power, and are, consequently, many times more expensive to construct and operate than VHF translators. Because of the limited frequency space available in the VHF band, it is often not possible for communities to construct VHF translators and, if they are to have television, they must use UHF translators. This has generally resulted in a great financial burden. The Commission, recognizing this problem and desiring to encourage the use of UHF television, issued a Report and Order in Docket No. 15971 in 1968, in which it provided that UHF translators could originate local slide announcements for the purpose of soliciting or acknowledging voluntary local public financial support. This was later construed by the Commission to include carriage of pure commercial advertising. The duration and frequency of such announcements, however, was limited by the Commission to no more than 20 seconds every hour. The Commission held that this limitation was required by the proscriptions of section 318 of the Communications Act but believed that 20 seconds per hour was so insignificant as to constitute no change in the character of a translator as a station engaged solely in rebroadcasting. Any more than that, however, would remove such stations from that category and they would be required to employ licensed operators. The Commission said that, with this restriction, translator stations would still be considered to be engaged "solely" in rebroadcasting in the same manner as they are considered to be engaged solely in rebroadcasting when they originate and broadcast their call signs. The originations were restricted to slide announcements and no program origination was possible. Thus, translators are not permitted, and cannot be permitted under the statute as now worded, to originate programing of local interest.

People living in rural communities and areas, principally in the West, are increasingly demanding that their translator stations give them news, weather, and other programing of local interest. In many cases, such communities are able to receive, via translator stations, only television stations from a neighboring State. They are deprived of news of local political interest or events which vitally affect them. Frequently, isolated communities have no access to free television and are required to subscribe to a cable television system for which they must pay fees. Translators offer great promise for rural America if their func-

tions can be expanded even to a limited extent. This can only be achieved through amendment of the statute, as proposed.

The Federal Communications Commission has indicated that the amount of local origination which could be done by translators would still be limited, both because of the statute as it is to be amended, and for technical reasons. The extent of the origination permitted would need to be determined by the FCC but it must be limited so that translator stations retain their character as rebroadcast stations. To enable the Commission to proceed with consideration of revision of its rules to allow local origination by translators in harmony with the statute, I propose to amend section 318 of the act to change the word "solely" in the phrase that reads "... engaged solely in the function of rebroadcasting" to "primarily" so that the phrase will read "engaged primarily in the function of rebroadcasting."

Since the statute now specifies "television" stations in the phrase "engaged solely in the function of rebroadcasting the signals of television broadcast stations, the Commission is not permitted to allow FM radio translator stations to operate unattended. At the present time, a person with a restricted radiotelephone operator permit is required to monitor an FM translator. Therefore, I propose to amend the statute to eliminate the word "television", thereby allowing FM radio translator stations also to operate unattended and to originate programing and commercial matter.

I recognize, of course, that there will be many problems to be resolved if origination is allowed, including the question of political broadcasts, the fairness doctrine, false and misleading advertising, logging, and similar problems. These can be dealt with in the rulemaking proceeding which the Federal Communications Commission would institute to amend the rules.

Section 318 of the Communications Act, as it is proposed to amend it, will read as follows:

"Sec. 318. The actual operation of all transmitting apparatus in any radio station for which a station license is required by this Act shall be carried on only by a person holding an operator's license issued hereunder, and no person shall operate any such apparatus in such station except under and in accordance with an operator's license issued to him by the Commission: *Provided, however*, That the Commission if it shall find that the public interest, convenience, or necessity will be served thereby may waive or modify the foregoing provisions of this section for the operation of any station except (1) stations for which licensed operators are required by international agreement, (2) stations for which licensed operators are required for safety purposes, (3) stations engaged in broadcasting (other than those engaged primarily in the function of rebroadcasting the signals of broadcast stations), and (4) stations operated as common carriers on frequencies below thirty thousand kilocycles: *Provided further*, That the Commission shall have power to make special regulations governing the granting of licenses for the use of automatic radio devices and for the operation of such devices."

LIFE ABOARD A POLARIS SUB

HON. CRAIG HOSMER

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, the May 1972 issue of the VFW magazine carries an insightful article by Frank Carey about life aboard one of America's Polaris submarines.

Few of us can fail to be awed by the power of these magnificent machines and their crews. Mr. Carey's article gives us all a valuable insight into the atmosphere aboard the U.S.S. *Carver* during a cruise with Vice Adm. H. G. Rickover.

For the benefit of my colleagues, the article follows:

ON THE PROWL UNDERNEATH

(By Frank Carey)

"You're dead!" cried the old admiral, tapping a startled young officer on the shoulder—even as the full-speed-ahead power of the Polaris submarine *Carver* began to fade.

"Take over!" Vice Adm. Hyman G. Rickover, 71, ordered an equally-surprised enlisted man who had been tensely peering at the panels of a maneuvering-control console—the one controlling the submarine's atomic power plant.

The 8,000-ton *Carver*—equipped to launch more destructive power than all the explosives detonated in all the wars of history—was operating at 400 feet beneath an angry sea.

And Electronics Technician 1/C J. John Lennon, 26, of Joliet, Ill., did "take over" and ran the show, as he or someone else might have to do in wartime.

He delicately maneuvered instruments and barked orders that brought the nuclear power plant to a complete stop—even as other crewmen switched the ship to old-time, emergency battery power, thus allowing the *Carver* to still move ahead, although at a fraction of her former speed. Finally, Lennon virtually nursed the atomic power plant back into action.

The switch-of-command incident occurred shortly after peppy, controversial Adm. Rickover—often called "the father of America's nuclear Navy"—had given the sharp command to "Scram the reactor!"

This triggered one of the most tense emergency-drill operations aboard a nuclear submarine.

Hands flew to instrument panels, voices elsewhere cried "Reactor scram!" and a siren screeched like a police cruiser chasing a bandit car.

This "scramming" maneuver involved an intentional, temporary stoppage of the ship's ingenious nuclear power plant by reducing its steam-generating nuclear fission "fires" and shutting off the trillion-atoms-per-second "splitting" of its uranium fuel.

It's the thing that would have to be done on a truly emergency basis if something went awry with the power plant and the crew and the plant were endangered.

True, the whole thing was a test—and there were indications that at least some of the crew had a tip-off that Rickover might stage such a drill this night.

But, it was a grim game, and as Rickover himself said:

"There's no such thing as a fake drill aboard a submarine!" In effect, he indicated, every kind of drill aboard a submerged sub amounts to an emergency.

The test maneuver—including the switch of command from the watch officer "killed"

in action—was a dramatic finale to a rarely-given demonstration to a few newsmen of the deep-diving and other operations of a Polaris submarine.

The *Carver*—named for Dr. George Washington Carver, the famed black educator and chemist—is one of 41 nuclear-powered submarines equipped to launch 16 nuclear-warheaded Polaris missiles in a 2,500-nautical mile range.

And the *Carver* and 30 of her sister subs are being readied for conversion to carry even more powerful Poseidon missiles that may have multiple hydrogen warheads.

The Polaris subs, on secret submerged patrols lasting two months at a time—and ever on the alert to launch missiles capable of reaching virtually any target on earth—constitute one of America's chief deterrents against nuclear warfare.

As the 425-foot, cigar-shaped *Carver* operated at a Polaris diving area some 100 miles off the Virginia coast, newsmen—invited by Rickover for an overnight patrol—also experienced such maneuvers as:

—Diving to a classified-secret depth which they were only allowed to report as "greater than 400 feet."

—An "emergency stop" at full, but secret, speed—with the great hull of the *Carver* trembling and shuddering as the plummeting craft was suddenly thrown into reverse throttle by tall, alert Electrician's Mate 1/C Eugene Gihring, 24, of Seattle, Wash.

The amazing extent of the undersea, watchful prowling of the mighty Polaris fleet was disclosed aboard ship by Vice Adm. Eugene P. (Dennis) Wilkinson, now commander of all nuclear and non-nuclear submarines of the Atlantic fleet. About 16 years ago, then a commander, Wilkinson was the original skipper of the *Nautilus*, the world's first nuclear-powered submarine. He thrilled America when he signalled the terse, historic message—"Underway on nuclear power"—as the *Nautilus* put to sea on Jan. 17, 1955.

The *Carver* often rolled badly during a 7-hour surface voyage out of Norfolk, Va.—plowing into the teeth of a 25-knot wind beneath misty, threatening skies.

Such surface-rolling would be true of any nuclear-powered "true submersible," because they're not designed to run on the sea's surface like conventional, non-nuclear-powered subs must do.

Below deck, coffee cups slid off the ward-room table into the laps of officers and civilian "ship-riders." And shoulders and shins bumped against metal in the narrow passageways as the *Carver* struggled through 15-foot swells on the outward voyage.

Topside, a few "nukes" (nuclear sailors) having deck duties, lashed themselves with safety ropes to the nearest ladder, or to a kind of monorail which snakes along the deck.

In charge topside was the ship's "exec"—Lt. Cmdr. John L. Sullivan, of Minneapolis, who grinned, in replying to a reporter's question, that he was no "kin to the 'Boston Strong Boy' prizefighter" of yesteryear.

But now, the ship's clocks showed 10:05 p.m. and—

"Diving officer, submerge the ship!" ordered Cmdr. Donald Briggs, 41, of Gentry, Ark., the *Carver's* skipper, momentarily taking a fat cigar from his mouth.

"Dive! Dive!" came a cry from somewhere as two blasts from the ship's klaxon horn violently attacked our eardrums.

About 10 youths, sitting alert in front of a large console, peer sharply at their panel boards through the diving-control room's garish red light. That dim illumination was required by periscope viewers nearby to "night-adapt" their eyes for a final peak around before and early in submergence.

"Make (initial) depth 150 feet!" ordered Briggs, as the great ship, almost imperceptibly, began to go down at a 4-degree

angle—and a depth meter above this reporter's head graphically recorded our foot-by-foot descent . . . " . . . 37, 38, 39, 40 . . ."

Even at that shallow depth, the sub's surface-rolling had magically disappeared.

"It will take us about a minute or so to get down to around 150," said Briggs. "These ships are so large, and create such a suction as they submerge, you practically have to pop 'em under the surface."

These tests are needed periodically to provide information to guide the aiming and firing of the *Carver's* nuclear missiles if the ominous, secret order ever came from the White House. That's because density, motion and other water conditions can vary sharply from place to place in the open ocean from which the missiles would surge.

But we were to go much deeper than that into the strange, silent world which is the hiding place of the *Carver* and her sisters on their lonely, dangerous patrols.

Adm. Rickover walks three miles daily when ashore—and is a Spartan eater. Thus, the Navy's oldest officer in active service set a fast pace as he led hard-breathing newsmen along the labyrinthian passageways of the great ship.

He ducked through tight hatches, maneuvered close corners, descended and climbed the toughest ladders with a finesse matching that of crewmen young enough to be his grandsons.

Talking almost continuously as he cruised onward the onetime Western Union messenger boy from Chicago maneuvered from the torpedo room in one part of the ship through a maze of other compartments, including one nicknamed "Sherwood Forest."

The latter is a passageway flanked on each side by eight fat cylinders stacked like giant trees and extending some 30 feet from the bottom of the sub to now-buttoned-down "windows" on its deck.

These held the *Carver's* ever-ready missiles during the 5½ years she's been on patrol. And, modifications of them will hold the even more fearsome Poseidons.

Rickover, quickly doffing his civilian clothes for khaki Navy "fatigues" when he came aboard, warmed up for his Pied Piper role by telling us that he is greatly worried about the future of the Navy he loves.

He said that despite the *Carver's* potential destructive force—a symbol of overall U.S. naval power—the United States may soon become "the No. 2 naval power in the world."

That possibility could become a reality, he said, unless action is taken to at least match what he calls an ever-increasing build-up of Soviet naval strength—ranging from missile-equipped nuclear submarines to conventional warships and the Russian merchant fleet.

Then the admiral—who for years has been battling Pentagon bureaucracy and urging increased U.S. might at sea—gave the newsmen a cram course in atomic energy and nuclear propulsion in the still-surfaced *Carver's* badly-rolling wardroom.

The white-haired scrapper illustrated the longevity of undisturbed atoms of the universe by declaring:

"Some of the atoms from the last dying gasps of Julius Caesar still remain in the world's atmosphere some 2,000 years later, whereas, every second, one trillion atoms of uranium undergo fission in this ship's propulsion reactor!"

Paradoxically, the ship's real payoff department—the "Missile Control Center,"—is known as the "push-the-button-department." Here, among other gear, a soft-spoken youth unemotionally worked a handle containing THE button. Ironically, the handle that would loose the nuclear whirlwind resembles the handle of a child's toy water gun.

Contact with the men's families during the patrols is provided by radio messages from wives and girl friends. Such 20-word "fam-

ily-grams" are allowed only four times during each 60-day patrol, and there can be no replies from the radio-silent, prowling ship. The night's realistic training exercise completed, the Carver surfaced shortly after midnight.

Clumps of tiny, phosphorescent sea-creatures glowed like fireflies, and even Roman candles, in the surf, racing across the bow as the Carver headed homeward to Norfolk.

And a lone, leaping dolphin gleamed in the ship's light off the port side as the lookout, Seaman Robert Abreu, 21, of Westford, Mass., confided he was homesick for his family and his girl.

"My birthday was Oct. 12," he said, "and for the last three years, I've spent it on patrol."

"Tough luck!" the newsman agreed. "But at least you have much in common with Columbus."

PRESIDENT NIXON'S ACTIONS IN VIETNAM APPROVED BY TWO ARIZONA NEWSPAPERS

HON. JOHN J. RHODES

OF ARIZONA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. RHODES. Mr. Speaker, both of the major Phoenix newspapers, the Arizona Republic and the Phoenix Gazette, printed excellent editorials today regarding President Nixon's most recent actions in Southeast Asia.

I would like to share the wisdom of these editorials with my colleagues, and suggest we all listen to this reasoned approach to the present situation. I therefore, insert both editorials in the RECORD at this point.

[From the Arizona Republic, May 10, 1972]

NIXON'S DUAL ESCALATION

President Nixon's speech Monday night undoubtedly escalated American participation in the Vietnam war. What many of the President's listeners didn't realize, however, is that the speech also escalated the drive for peace. It probably was the bravest speech ever made by an American president, and it showed the only course that promises an honorable end to the war.

Mining of North Vietnamese harbors involves a calculated risk. But it also promises to shut off supplies for North Vietnam, and 85 per cent of the tanks, artillery and guns used so effectively by North Vietnam are delivered by ship.

At the time he announced his blockade of North Vietnam, the President also went further than he has ever gone to meet the peace demands of the Hanoi government.

With the complete support of liberal opinion in this country, Hanoi has repeatedly said it would return the American prisoners if the United States (a) stopped fighting and (b) announced a fixed date by which all American military forces would be withdrawn from Vietnam.

Monday night President Nixon said he would agree to withdraw all American military forces within four months of (a) the return of American prisoners and (b) the establishment of an internationally supervised cease-fire.

So it is obvious that President Nixon has now come very close to accepting the Hanoi demands for an end to the war. He threw in the blockade for two reasons, it seems to us. First, he will have something to bargain with if Hanoi agrees to meaningful talks. Second,

the South Vietnamese will be in a much stronger position to continue the war if enemy supplies of oil, tanks, guns, planes and ammunition are cut off.

There is, of course, a risk involved in ordering the interdiction of enemy supplies within the territorial waters of North Vietnam. What happens when the first non-combatant freighter, say a Russian ship, starts up the river for Haiphong? U.S. planes may bomb it, or U.S. ships may warn the Russian captain that he is entering a minefield. In either case, the supplies will not be delivered and the provisions of international law will have been complied with.

The President's hand was, of course, forced by the new missile and artillery attacks on American military bases in South Vietnam. Had he made no response the 80,000 American troops still in South Vietnam (most of them supply troops) might well have been faced with a Dunkerque of appalling proportions.

Cutting the Russian arms supply to North Vietnam assures the American command that it can continue its orderly withdrawal without running the risk of a slaughter on the beaches. To have done less would have made President Nixon guilty of neglecting his duty (1) to the American soldiers still in Vietnam, (2) to the prisoners still being used as pawns by the North Vietnamese, and (3) to the 17 million South Vietnamese whose capture is the goal of the Communist regime of North Vietnam.

[From the Phoenix Gazette, May 9, 1972]

TO WIN THE PEACE

When predator nations are on the prowl, most often peace can be achieved only by fighting for it.

Or by showing beyond even a fool's doubt the williness to fight.

America's Quaker President, whose very religion binds him to the cause of peace, who has gone the last mile with an arrogant enemy in seeking it, who has offered compromises so deeply cutting that they have lost him the good will of the far right in his own party—this President last night told his people, and the people of the whole world, that he intends to fight for peace.

Not for a false and transient peace born of surrender, that could have no other ultimate end but greater war.

A peace of honor, born of respect, sustained by strength.

In President Nixon's address to the nation last night was the implicit knowledge that there are two ways in which a great nation can fight. One is to win a victory. The other is to win a peace. The first seeks to humble and destroy the enemy. The second seeks only to bring the enemy to end the fighting.

By ordering the blockade and mining of North Vietnam's ports and the rail lines which bring in war supplies, Mr. Nixon entered into a great gamble that the Soviet Union would not react aggressively. But by going no farther at this time, he signaled to anyone who might listen that it is peace he seeks—not conquest and not a victory of conquest.

It should not be lost on anyone, and surely by now must not be lost upon the Communist world, that Mr. Nixon has meant what he has said from the beginning of his administration: He does not intend to surrender in this war; he does not intend to stand aside so that our ally can be first humiliated, then destroyed.

In our opinion Mr. Nixon has now done what President Kennedy and Johnson should have done, each in his turn.

Left undone in the proper time, it made the doing now vastly more difficult.

But no less necessary.

ESCALATION, AMERICAN OPTIONS, AND PRESIDENT NIXON'S WAR MOVES

HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, today I am joining with several of my colleagues in sponsoring a resolution of impeachment of President Richard M. Nixon.

Given the President's actions in recent days—indeed, over the entire term of his office—and given the type of information now available about the options he faced, I have concluded that he is guilty of both unconstitutional procedure and of crimes against humanity.

President Nixon thinks he can get away with anything. I do not. The real question is whether the Congress will justify his contemptuous opinion of it, or whether Congress will start doing its job. The President fools only himself in believing his grandstanding can solve problems. Those of us in Congress must have a greater sense of reality—and a great sense of responsibility both to the Americans who are pawns in Mr. Nixon's games, and to the Vietnamese whose society we are turning into a smoking ruin.

I am amazed by the cynical irresponsibility with which the President presumes to blackmail the American people. Is he so obsessed with his personal prestige and power, is he so removed from the human realities of his decisions, that he no longer cares how many lives he endangers through his cruel and reckless actions? After wantonly exposing American troops and installations and the lives of American POW's, he then tries to use their endangered position—for which he alone is responsible—as a weapon to silence criticism. After flouting international law and daring the Russians to forget about their national honor, their ability to help their allies, their fears of appearing a pitiful, helpless giant. I, for one, do not think the Russians are more saintly than the Americans—I think they will respond as we have, with aggressive belligerence. And their victims will be the same innocent people trapped in Indochina.

In the last year of the Second World War, after the Germans knew they were defeated, they went on an orgy of killing that exceeded the horrors of the earlier part of the war, haunting the conscience of mankind ever since. This is the choice that faces us now. No longer able to impose our will in Southeast Asia, will our removal be in the same frenzied manner? Or will the American people get down to the job of preventing the needless sacrifice of lives and of preserving the sense of honor that is sickened by senseless and cruel destruction?

In the 48 hours since Mr. Nixon made his speech to the American public, my offices here in Washington and in California have been deluged with calls and telegrams responding to the President's

moves. Of those calls and telegrams, my constituents and the Americans from all over the Nation who have contacted me have opposed the President by a margin of over 200 to 1.

This morning I accepted the following petition from students at Eastern High School here in Washington. I wish to insert their petition into the RECORD at this point—and, other than saying that I fully agree with them, I cannot add anything at all to this beautiful and eloquent statement by young black Americans:

EASTERN HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS' STATEMENT TO CONGRESS CONCERNING THE WAR IN VIETNAM

We, the black students of Eastern High School in Washington, D.C., wish to express our outrage at President Nixon's escalation of the war, in total disregard of the needs of our community. While billions of dollars are poured into a genocidal slaughter of our brown brothers and sisters in Vietnam, we are starved of a decent education seventeen blocks from the floors of Congress. While so-called "Representatives" express their humanitarian concerns for peoples thousands of miles away, they expose their true hypocrisy by closing their eyes to the ghettos of Washington, D.C., through which they drive to work.

Now President Nixon asks the same black people that he has shown such contempt, to support an escalation so dangerous that it can only be seen as an escalation of contempt for all the world's poor and powerless people. In the past we have said that this is not our war. But make no mistake, we will not stand by while President Nixon threatens to destroy everything which black brothers and sisters have built with sweat and blood here and around the world.

Not only do we refuse to give President Nixon the support he requested, it is our duty to assure the world that we will not abide his trickery and deceit. The President asks for decorum while he gives us drugs. He asks for support and gives us the syndicate. Instead of home rule, we have the rule of the night stick and the National Guard. The fruits of our education are inflation and unemployment.

We will not fight the President's war. Our fight is the survival and improvement of our homes, schools, and community. We will not allow Nixon's military-industrial complex welfare program to continue. Our answer to the President's appeal is this, "better to bring the troops home than to bring the war home."

For the sake of those young students, and for the sake of all humanity in this time of ultimate madness, I believe it is imperative that the Congress and the public be fully informed as to the nature of the decisions made by the President in taking the type of actions that he has.

I have made a careful analysis of the studies used in providing the President with information to make his decisions, and, after doing so, it is clear to me that in each and every instance the President has been swayed only by the powerful influences of the narrow-minded military establishment. Time after time, when views of the military differed with those of other experts, the President would completely disregard those conflicting opinions and go with what the militarists wanted.

To give my colleagues an idea of the background to decisions—and why I believe it is imperative that the impeach-

ment proceedings be taken against Mr. Nixon, I am now inserting into the RECORD those studies:

VIETNAM QUESTIONS

ENVIRONMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS

1. Why is the DRV in Paris? What is the evidence?

(Among the hypotheses:

a. Out of weakness, to accept a face-saving formula for defeat.

b. To negotiate the withdrawal of U.S. (and NVA) force, and/or a compromise political settlement, giving a chance for NLF victory in the South.

c. To give the U.S. a face-saving way to withdraw.

d. To undermine the GVN and U.S./GVN relations, and to relieve U.S. military pressure in both North and South Vietnam.

e. Out of desire to end the losses and costs of war on the best terms attainable.)

2. What is the nature of evidence, and how adequate is it, underlying competing views (as in the most recent NIE on this subject, with its dissenting footnotes) of the impact of various outcomes in Vietnam within Southeast Asia?

3. How soundly-based is the common belief that Hanoi is under active pressure with respect to the Paris negotiations from Moscow (for) and Peking (against)? Is it clear that either Moscow or Peking believe they have, or are willing to use, significant leverage on Hanoi's policies? What is the nature of evidence, other than public or private official statements?

4. How sound is our knowledge of the existence and significance of stable "Moscow" and "Peking" factions within the Hanoi leadership, as distinct, for example, from shifting factions, all of whom recognize the need to balance off both allies? How much do we know, in general, of intraparty disputes and personalities within Hanoi?

NVA/VC

5. What is the evidence supporting various hypotheses, and the overall adequacy of evidence, relating to the following questions:

a. Why did NVA units leave South Vietnam last summer and fall?

b. Did the predicted "third-wave offensive" by the NVA/VC actually take place? If so, why did it not achieve greater success?

c. Why are VC guerrillas and local forces now relatively dormant?

(Among the hypotheses: 1) response to VC/NVA battle losses, forcing withdrawal or passivity; 2) to put diplomatic pressure on U.S. to move to substantive talks in Paris; 3) to prepare for future operations; and/or 4) pressure of U.S. and allied operations.)

6. What rate of NVA/VC attrition would outrun their ability to replenish by infiltration and recruitment, as currently calculated? Do present operations achieve this? If not, what force levels and other conditions would be necessary? Is there any evidence they are concerned about continuing heavy losses?

7. To what relative extent do the U.S./RVNAF and the NVA/VC share in the control and the rate of VC/NVA attrition; i.e., to what extent, in terms of our tactical experience, can heavy losses persistently be imposed on VC/NVA forces, despite their possible intention to limit casualties by avoiding contact?

(Among the hypotheses:

a. Contact is predominantly at VC tactical initiative, and we cannot reverse this; VC need suffer high casualties only so long as they are willing to accept them, in seeking contact; or

b. Current VC/NVA loss rates can be maintained by present forces—as increased X% by Y additional forces—whatever the DRV/VC choose to do, short of further major withdrawal.)

8. What controversies persist on the estimate of VC Order of Battle; in particular, on the various categories of guerrilla forces and infrastructure? On VC recruiting, and manpower pool? What is the evidence for different estimates, and what is the overall adequacy of evidence?

9. What are NVA/VC capabilities for launching a large-scale offensive, with "dramatic" results (even if taking high casualties and without holding objectives long), in the next six months? (e.g., an offensive against one or more cities, or against most newly "pacified" hamlets.) How adequate is the evidence?

10. What are the main channels for military supplies for the NVA/VC forces in SVN. (e.g., Cambodia and/or the Laotian panhandle)? What portion of these supplies come in through Sihanoukville?

A. What differences of opinion exist concerning extent of RVNAF improvement and what is evidence underlying different views? (e.g., compare recent CIA memo with MACV views.) For example:

a. Which is the level of effective, mobile, offensive operations? What results are they achieving?

b. What is the actual level of "genuine" small-unit action in ARVN, RF and PF: i.e., actions that would typically be classed as such within the U.S. Army, and in particular, offensive ambushes and patrols? How much has this changed?

c. How much has the officer selection and promotion system, and the quality of leadership, actually changed over the years (as distinct from changes in paper "programs")? How many junior officers hold commissions (in particular, battlefield commissions from NCO rank) despite lack of a high school diploma?

d. What known disciplinary action has resulted from ARVN looting of civilians in the past year (for example, the widespread looting that took place last spring)?

e. To what extent have past "anti-desertion" decrees and efforts lessened rate of desertion; why has the rate recently been increasing to new highs?

f. What success are the RF and PF having in providing local security and reducing VC control and influence in rural populations?

11. To what extent could RVNAF—as it is now—handle the VC (Main Force, local forces, guerrillas), with or without U.S. combat support to fill RVNAF deficiencies, if all NVA units were withdrawn:

a. If VC still had Northern fillers.

b. If all Northerners (but not regroupees) were withdrawn.

12. To what extent could RVNAF—as it is now—also handle a sizeable level of NVA forces:

a. With U.S. air and artillery support.

b. With above and also U.S. ground forces in reserve.

c. Without U.S. direct support, but with increased RVNAF artillery and air capacity?

13. What, in various views, are the required changes—in RVNAF command, organization, equipment, training and incentives, in political environment, in logistical support, in U.S. modes of influence—for making RVNAF adequate to the tasks cited in questions 9 and 10 above? How long would this take? What are the practical obstacles to these changes, and what new U.S. moves would be needed to overcome these?

PACIFICATION

14. How much, and where, has the security situation and the balance of influence between the VC and NLF actually changed in the countryside over time, contrasting the present to such benchmarks as end-61, end-63, end-65, end-67? What are the best indicators of such change, or lack of it? What factors have been mainly responsible for such

change as has occurred? Why has there not been more?

15. What are the reasons for expecting more change in the countryside in the next two years than in past intervals? What are the reasons for not expecting more? What changes in RVNAF, GVN, U.S., and VC practices and adaptiveness would be needed to increase favorable change in security and control? How likely are such changes, individually and together; what are the obstacles?

16. What proportion of the rural population must be regarded as "subject to significant VC presence and influence"? (How should hamlets rated as "C" in the Hamlet Evaluation System—the largest category—be regarded in this respect?) In particular, what proportion in the provinces surrounding Saigon? How much has this changed?

17. What number or verified numbers of the Communist political apparatus (i.e. People's Revolutionary Party members, the hard-core "infrastructure") have been arrested or killed in the past year? How many of these were cadre or higher than village level? What proportion do these represent of total PRP membership, and how much—and how long—had the apparatus been disrupted?

18. What are the reasons for believing that current and future efforts at "rooting out" hard-core infrastructure will be—or will not be—more successful than past efforts? For example, for believing that collaboration among the numerous Vietnamese intelligence agencies will be markedly more thorough than in the past? What are the side-effects, e.g., on Vietnamese opinion, of anti-infrastructure campaigns such as the current "accelerated effort," along with their lasting effect on hard-core apparatus?

19. How adequate is our information on the overall scale and incidence of damage to civilians by air and artillery, and looting and misbehavior by RVNAF?

20. To what extent do recent changes in command and administration affecting the country-side represent moves to improve competence, as distance from replacement of one clique by another? What is the basis of judgment? What is the impact of the recent removal of minority-group province and district officials (Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Montagnard) in their respective areas.

POLITICS

21. How adequate is our information, and what is it based upon, concerning:

a. Attitudes of Vietnamese elites not now closely aligned with the GVN (e.g., religious leaders, professors, youth leaders, professionals, union leaders, village notables) towards: Participation—if offered—in the GVN; the current legitimacy and acceptability of the GVN; like-wise (given "peace") for the NLF or various "neutralist" coalitions; towards U.S. intent, as they interpret it (e.g., U.S. plans for ending the war, perceived U.S. alignments with particular individuals and forces within Vietnam, U.S. concern for various Vietnamese interests).

b. Patterns of existent political alignments within GVN/RVNAF and outside it—reflecting family ties, corruption, officers' class, secret organizations and parties, religious and regional background—as these bear upon behavior with respect to the war, the NLF, reform and broadening of the GVN, and responses to U.S. influence and intervention.

22. What is the evidence on the prospects—and on what changes in conditions and U.S. policies would increase or decrease them—for changes in the GVN toward: (a) broadening of the government to include participation of all significant non-Communist regional and religious groupings (at province and district levels, as well as cabinet); (b) stronger emphasis, in selections and promotion of officers and officials, on competence and performance (as in the Communist Vietnamese system) as distinct

from considerations of family, corruption, and social (e.g., educational) background, and support of the GVN, as evidenced, e.g., by reduced desertion, by willing alignment of religious, provincial and other leaders with the GVN, by the wide cooperation with anti-corruption and pro-efficiency drives.

23. How critical, in various views, is each of the changes in question 22 above to prospects of attaining—at current, reduced or increased levels of U.S. military effort—either "victory," or a strong non-Communist political role after a compromise settlement of hostilities? What are views of the risks attendant to making these changes, or attempting them; and, to the extent that U.S. influence is required, on U.S. practical ability to move prudently and effectively in this direction? What is the evidence?

U.S. OPERATIONS

24. How do military deployment and tactics today differ from those of 6-12 months ago? What are reasons for changes, and what has this impact been?

25. In what different ways (including innovations in organization) might U.S. force-levels be reduced to various levels, while minimizing impact on combat capability?

26. What is the evidence on the scale of effect of B-52 attacks in producing VC/N VA casualties? In disrupting VC/N VA operations? How valid are estimates of overall effect?

27. What effect is the Laotian interdiction bombing having:

a. In reducing the capacity of the enemy logistic system?

b. In destroying material in transit?

28. With regard to the bombing of North Vietnam:

a. What evidence was there on the significance of the principal strains imposed on the DRV (e.g., in economic disruption, extra manpower demands, transportation blockages, population morale)?

b. What was the level of logistical throughput through the Southern province of NVN just prior to the November bombing halt? To what extent did this level reflect the results of the U.S. bombing campaign?

c. To what extent did Chinese and Soviet aid relieve pressure on Hanoi?

d. What are current views on the proportion of war-essential imports that could come into NVN over the rail or road lines from China, even if all imports by sea were denied and a strong effort even made to interdict ground transport? What is the evidence?

e. What action has the DRV taken to reduce the vulnerability and importance of Hanoi as a population and economic center (e.g., through population evacuation and economic dispersal)?

SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO NSSM 1.—THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

The responses to the questions posed regarding Vietnam show agreement on some matters as well as very substantial differences of opinion within the U.S. Government on many aspects of the Vietnam situation. While there are some divergencies on the facts, the sharpest differences arise in the interpretation of those facts, the relative weight to be given them, and the implications to be drawn. In addition, there remain certain areas where our information remains inadequate.

There is general agreement, assuming we follow our current strategy, on the following:

(1) The GVN and allied position in Vietnam has been strengthened recently in many respects.

(2) The GVN has improved its political position, but it is not certain that the GVN and other non-communist groups will be able to survive a peaceful competition with the NLF for political power in South Vietnam.

(3) The RVNAF alone cannot now, or in the foreseeable future, stand up to the current North Vietnamese-Viet Cong forces.

(4) The enemy have suffered some reverses but they have not changed their essential objectives and they have sufficient strength to pursue these objectives. We are not attriting his forces faster than he can recruit or infiltrate.

(5) The enemy is not in Paris primarily out of weakness.

The disagreements within these parameters are reflected in two schools in the government with generally consistent membership. The first school, which we will call Group A, usually includes MACV, CINCPAC, JCS and Embassy Saigon, and takes a hopeful view of current and future prospects in Vietnam within the parameters mentioned. The second school, Group B, usually includes OSD, CIA and (to a lesser extent) State, and is decidedly more skeptical about the present and pessimistic about the future. There are, of course, disagreements within agencies across the board or on specific issues.

As illustration, these schools line up as follows on some of the broader questions:

In explaining reduced enemy military presence and activities, Group A gives greater relative weight to allied military pressure than does Group B.

The improvements in RVNAF are considered much more significant by Group A than Group B.

Group A underlines advancements in the pacification program, while Group B is skeptical both of the evaluation system used to measure progress and of the solidity of recent advances.

In looking at the political scene, Group A accents recent improvements while Group B highlights remaining obstacles and the relative strength of the NLF.

Group A assigns much greater effectiveness to bombing in Vietnam and Laos than Group B.

Following is a summary of the major conclusions and disagreements about each of six broad areas with regard to Vietnam: the negotiating environment, enemy capabilities, RVNAF capabilities, pacification, South Vietnamese politics, and U.S. military operations. Attached (at Tabs A-F) are summaries of the individual questions asked of the various agencies.

1. NEGOTIATING ENVIRONMENT

(Questions 1-4)

There is general U.S. government agreement that Hanoi is in Paris for a variety of motives but not primarily out of weakness; that Hanoi is charting a course independent of Moscow, which favors negotiations, and of Peking, which opposes them; and that our knowledge of possible political factions among North Vietnamese leaders is extremely imprecise. There continues wide disagreement about the impact on Southeast Asia of various outcomes in Vietnam.

Why is the DRV in Paris?

Various possible North Vietnamese motives for negotiating are discussed, and there is agreement that the DRV is in Paris for mixed reasons. No U.S. agency responding to the questions believes that the primary reason the DRV is in Paris is weakness. All consider it unlikely that Hanoi came to Paris either to accept a face-saving formula for defeat or to give the U.S. a face-saving way to withdraw. There is agreement that Hanoi has been subject to heavy military pressure and that a desire to end the losses and costs of war was an element in Hanoi's decision. The consensus is that Hanoi believes that it can persist long enough to obtain a relatively favorable negotiated compromise. The respondents agree that the DRV is in Paris to negotiate withdrawal of U.S. forces, to undermine GVN and USG relations and to provide a better chance for FV victory in the

South. State believes that increased doubt about winning the war through continued military and international political pressure also played a major role. Hanoi's ultimate goal of a unified Vietnam under its control has not changed.

Vietnam Impact on Southeast Asia

There continues to be a sharp debate between and within agencies about the effect of the outcome in Vietnam on other nations. The most recent NIE on this subject (NIE 50-68) tended to downgrade the so-called "domino theory." It states that a settlement which would permit the Communists to take control of the Government in South Vietnam, not immediately but within a year or two, would be likely to bring Cambodia and Laos into Hanoi's orbit at a fairly early state, but that these developments would not necessarily unhinge the rest of Asia.

The NIE dissenters believe that an unfavorable settlement would stimulate the Communists to become more active elsewhere and that it will be difficult to resist making some accommodation to the pressure than generated. They believe, in contrast to the Estimate, these adjustments would be relatively small and insensitive to subsequent U.S. policy.

Factors entering into the judgments are estimates of (1) Hanoi's and Peking's behavior after the settlement; (2) U.S. posture in the regions; (3) Asian leaders' estimates of future U.S. policy; (4) the reactions of the area's non-Communist leaders to the outcome in Viet-Nam; (5) vulnerabilities of the various governments to insurgency or subversion; and (6) the strengths of opposition groups within each state.

The assessments rest more on judgments and assumptions than on tangible and convincing evidence, and there are major disagreements within the same Department. Within the Defense Department, OSD and DIA support the conclusions of the NIE, while Army, Navy and Air Force Intelligence dissent. Within State, the Bureau of Intelligence supports the NIE while the East Asian Bureau dissents.

Both the majority and the dissenters reject the view that an unfavorable settlement in Viet-Nam will inevitably be followed by Communist takeovers outside Indo China.

Indeed, even the dissenters, by phrasing the adverse results in terms such as "pragmatic adjustments" by the Thais and "some means of accommodation" leave it unclear how injurious the adverse effects would be to U.S. security.

Moscow and Peking Influence

There is general governmental agreement on this question. Peking opposes negotiations while Moscow prefers an early negotiated settlement on terms as favorable as possible to Hanoi. Neither Peking nor Moscow have exerted heavy pressure on Hanoi and for various reasons they are unlikely to do so, although their military and economic assistance give them important leverage. CIA notes that "in competing for influence Peking and Moscow tend to cancel out each other." For its own reasons, Hanoi's tendency in the last year has been in the Soviet direction. However, the Hanoi leadership is charting its own independent course.

Hanoi Leadership Factions

There is agreement that knowledge of the existence and significance of possible factions within the Hanoi leadership is imprecise. There are differences of opinion within the leadership on tactics as opposed to ultimate objectives but there are not stable "Moscow" and "Peking" factions. The Hanoi leadership will form different alignments on different issues. The attempts by the agencies to ascertain the position of various North Vietnamese leaders on specific issues shows the imprecision of our information and analysis. For example, different agencies set forth

sharply conflicting identifications of the position of individual leaders such as Giap on particular questions.

2. THE ENEMY (Questions 5-10)

Analyses of various enemy tactics and capabilities reveal both significant agreements and sharp controversies within the Government. Among the major points of consensus:

A combination of military pressures and political tactics explains recent enemy withdrawals and lower levels of activity.

Under current rules of engagement, the enemy's manpower pool and infiltration capabilities can outlast allied attrition efforts indefinitely.

The enemy basically controls both side's casualty rates.

The enemy can still launch major offensives, although not at Tet levels, or, probably, with equally dramatic effect.

Major controversies include:

CIA and State assign much higher figures to the VC Order of Battle than MACV, and they include additional categories of VC/NLF organization.

MACV/JCS and Saigon consider Cambodia (and specifically Sihanoukville) an important enemy supply channel while CIA disagrees strongly.

Recent Enemy Activities

Military pressures and political considerations are viewed as responsible for the withdrawal of some North Vietnamese units into Cambodian and Laotian sanctuaries during the summer and fall of 1968. Military factors included heavy enemy losses, effective allied tactics, material shortages, and bad weather. Political factors centered on enemy efforts to make a political virtue out of a military necessity in a talk-fight strategy to influence the Paris negotiations, and the enemy's emphasis on the establishment of "Liberation Committees" throughout the South Vietnamese countryside.

The enemy undertook a third-wave offensive during the week of August 17. At a cost of 5,500 enemy KIA, the enemy tripled the number of his attacks to 300 per week and his assaults during the second half of August nearly equalled the level of his "second-wave" offensive in May. Prisoners and captured documents reported the goal of achieving a general uprising and overthrow of the GVN. The lack of greater success was attributed to: the enemy's economy-of-forces tactics; his desire to demonstrate initiative but at reduced risk; effective U.S. spoiling actions and increased intelligence; and the continuing deterioration of enemy Post-Tet capabilities in terms of quality of men and officers and lack of training.

All evaluators except the Department of State and Embassy Saigon state that VC guerrillas and local forces are not relatively dormant and that levels of harassment and terror remain high. However, the Embassy notes "the current low level of guerrilla and local forces activity," and State agrees there has been a "relative decline." Both agree that among the reasons are the heavy casualty rates, manpower problems and loss of cadres. But according to Embassy evaluators the main factor is that "The VC are husbanding their resources to give themselves the option of a 'climaxing' offensive." State notes that to support the VC counter-pacification campaign and their "Liberation Committees," "the Communists may feel that a demonstrably strong blow against the pacification program would have wide repercussions particularly at a time of optimistic Allied claims about pacification successes."

NVN/VC Manpower

It is generally agreed that the NVN/VC manpower pool is sufficiently large to meet the enemy's replenishment needs over an extended period of time within the frame-

work of current rules of engagement. According to the JCS, "The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong have access to sufficient manpower to meet their replenishment needs—even at the high 1968 loss rate of some 291,000—for at least the next several years . . . Present operations are not outrunning the enemy's ability to replenish by recruitment or infiltration." Enemy losses of 291,000 in 1968 were roughly balanced by infiltration and recruitment of 298,000. North Vietnamese manpower assets include 1.8 million physically fit males aged 14-34 of whom 45% are in the regular forces (475,000) and paramilitary (400,000) forces. 120,000 physically fit males reach draft age each year and 200,000 military and labor personnel have been freed by the bombing half from defensive work. The potential manpower pool in SVN is estimated at half a million men and recruitment, while down, is running at approximately 3,500 per month. Enemy maintenance of the current commitment of 300,000 new men per year requires that the Allies inflict losses of 25,000 KIA per month, or 7,000 more than the current rate. MACV considers current Allied force levels adequate to inflict such casualties if the enemy chooses to engage.

The enemy's employment of economy of forces tactics since the fall of 1968 and intelligence evidence reflect the enemy's concern about his 1968 level of losses, which if continued another year would mean nearly 100% yearly attrition of his full-time fighters and nearly total North Vietnamization of local fighting forces in South Vietnam. He is judged unlikely to undertake the heavy losses of a major offensive unless he believes he could thereby achieve a breakthrough in Allied will-power in Vietnam or Paris. Yet, without a VC/NVA offensive on the scale of Tet 1968, the JCS believe "It will be exceedingly difficult in 1969 for allied forces to attrite the enemy at 1968 levels."

Control of NVA/VC Attrition

There is general agreement with the JCS statement, "The enemy, by the type action he adopts, has the predominant share in determining enemy attrition rates." Three fourths of the battles are at the enemy's choice of time, place, type and duration. CIA notes that less than one percent of nearly two million Allied small unit operations conducted in the last two years resulted in contact with the enemy and, when ARVN is surveyed, the percentage drops to one tenth of one per cent. With his safe havens in Laos and Cambodia and with carefully chosen tactics, the enemy has been able during the last four years to double his combat forces, double the level of infiltration and increase the scale and intensity of the main force war even while bearing heavy casualties.

VC Order of Battle

Considerable disagreement is evidenced concerning the estimates of Viet Cong order of battle, the categories of guerrilla forces, recruiting manpower pool and quality of the data. MACV includes only enemy personnel engaged in offensive military actions and estimates enemy strength at 327,000. Moreover, CIA and State consider categories of paramilitary and administrative service to be indispensable to the enemy's military effort and population control and extrapolate a total range of 435,000-595,000 men. State, noting that the MACV estimate results from adding up so-called "hard" field intelligence figures for main force, local and guerrilla forces, believes CIA's extrapolation is developed more realistically from the totality of evidence. OSD presents both MACV and CIA estimates, pointing out that the differences in overall strength presented by the two are not sufficient to cause a change in overall strategy (though, as CIA notes, they could have a bearing on peace terms).

Recruiting figures vary for reasons similar

to the divergencies on strength. Monthly VC recruitment is estimated at 8,500 in 1966, 7,500 in 1967, double the 1967 rate during the first quarter of 1968 and dropping sharply after the Tet offensive to approximately 3,500 per month. CIA estimates a smaller drop than MACV. Saigon reports that the last six months reflect a reduced level of recruitment, citing as evidence GVN expansion, reduction in VC standards, VC attempts to improve existing cadre, increased use of NVA fillers in VC units, and GVN mobilization effectiveness.

NVA/VC Capabilities for a Large-Scale Offensive

All agree that (as recent events have borne out) the enemy has a capability for a large scale offensive against cities, bases and/or villages in the Accelerated Pacification Program if he wishes to bear the heavy casualties that would result. Allied countermeasures and preemptive capabilities make it highly unlikely that such an attack would have an impact on the scale of the Tet offensive of 1968. Further, the enemy would have to weigh the effect of such an offensive on the Paris talks and on the risk of touching off a resumption of bombing in North Vietnam.

NVA/VC Supply Channels

There is general agreement that the main channels for military supplies reaching enemy forces in the northern areas of South Vietnam (I, II, and a part of III Corps) are the Laos Panhandle and the DMZ. Considerable disagreement exists as to the channel of supplies for the southern part of South Vietnam (part of III and all of IV Corps). MACV, CINCPAC, JCS and Embassy point to Cambodia. MACV believes that no large shipments of ordnance are coming into IV Corps via Laos and that Cambodia has during the last two years become a major source of supplies for this region, with 10,000 tons of arms going through Sihanoukville to the border between October 1967 and September 1968. CIA disagrees strongly, especially with regard to the importance of Sihanoukville. It estimates that the external resupply requirement of IV Corps is three tons of combat-related material a day and that this comes across two Cambodian border points and the South China sea coast of South Vietnam. CIA notes numerous factors which it believes cast doubt on the importance of the Sihanoukville channel.

OSD summarizes without comment the national level CIA/DIA estimates for total enemy external daily supply requirements of 80 tons; 34 tons come from Laos, 14 tons across the DMZ, and 32 tons from Cambodia (of which 29 tons involve mainly food and other non-combatant goods).

3. THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES (Questions 10A-13)

The emphatic differences between U.S. agencies on the RVNAF outweigh the points of agreement. There is consensus that the RVNAF is getting larger, better equipped and somewhat more effective. And all agree that it could not now, or in the foreseeable future, handle both the VC and sizeable NVA forces without U.S. combat support. On other major points there is vivid controversy. The military community gives much greater weight to RVNAF statistical improvements while OSD and CIA highlight remaining obstacles, with OSD being the most pessimistic. Paradoxically, MACV/CINCPAC/JCS see RVNAF as being less capable against the VC alone than does CIA.

RVNAF Capabilities Against the Enemy

The Vietnamese Armed Forces (RVNAF) are being increased in size and re-equipped to improve their ground combat capability. The best measure of this improvement is the RVNAF's expected performance against a given enemy threat. However, there is

paradoxical divergence in agency views on the RVNAF ability to handle the internal VC threat without U.S. assistance. State (both EA and INR) and CIA—who generally rate RVNAF improvement and effectiveness lowest among the respondents, and who accept the highest estimates of overall VC strength—believe that, "Without any U.S. support . . . ARVN would at least be able to hold its own and make some progress against the VC unsupported by the NVA" (i.e. the VC without NVA fillers, though with regroupes).

In contrast is the view of MACV/CINCPAC/JCS, who rate RVNAF improvement and effectiveness highest, who accept the lowest estimates of VC armed strength and who (unlike CIA and State) do not consider VC irregular forces to be part of the VC military threat. But the military community believes that without U.S. combat support, in opposing VC main and local forces with any NVA units or fillers, RVNAF "would have to reduce the number of offensive operations and adopt more of a defensive posture," resulting in "loss of control by the Government of Vietnam over substantial rural areas." Thus, MACV/CINCPAC/JCS believe that RVNAF would not be able to cope with purely indigenous VC forces without U.S. combat support until the completion of the modernization program in 1972.

OSD, however, believes that a number of major reforms are required, in addition to the current modernization program, if this goal is to be met. "It is unlikely that the RVNAF, as presently organized and led, will ever constitute an effective political or military counter to the Viet Cong."

All agencies agree that RVNAF could not, either now or even when fully modernized, handle both the VC and a sizable level of NVA forces without U.S. combat support in the form of air, helicopters, artillery, logistics and some ground forces.

RVNAF Improvements

There is consensus that RVNAF forces are now much larger (826,000) than in December 1967 (743,000) and will be further increased to 876,000, with the greatest increases in manpower given to the Popular and Regional Forces needed for local security. The RVNAF is also better equipped. All regular combat units have M16 rifles and are beginning to receive increases in their own artillery and helicopter support. Militia (393,000 of the total RVNAF strength in December 1968) have 100,000 M16 rifles and are scheduled to receive 150,000 more in 1969. MACV has stepped up his training efforts by forming 353 mobile teams in 1968 to train and advise the militia.

Moreover, all agencies agree that overall RVNAF capabilities, number of operations and effectiveness increased during 1968. Data presents a mixed picture in some areas, but it is clear that the larger number of enemy killed by RVNAF resulted from better effectiveness (more kills per 1000 troops), along with higher kill ratios, as well as increased force size. In spite of these statistical improvements (which CIA in particular finds unreliable indicators), RVNAF is best thought of as a force which enlarged its contribution in 1968 within a total allied effort which also expanded. The modernization program, just beginning to have a high impact on the field, promises that results will continue to increase so long as RVNAF receives backbone in the form of a U.S. ground combat presence.

RVNAF Problems

RVNAF faces severe motivation, leadership and desertion problems. The officer problem is mixed in politics and little has been done to correct it. Poor leadership and motivation contributes to regular ground combat forces deserting (net) at an annual rate of 34% of their strength (gross rate 1/3 of the

divisions is more than 50%). Total RVNAF desertions (net) are equivalent to losing one ARVN division per month.

Thus, OSD does not believe that current expansion and reequipment programs are sufficient to make RVNAF into an effective fighting force because major political and military actions are required that are not now emphasized. OSD considers essential action to recognize and reward combat leadership and development of a favorable attitude by the military towards their own people which will result in acceptance and support of the government by its citizens.

JCS, CINCPAC, MACV and State feel that, without such changes, RVNAF is making reasonable progress toward development as a self-sufficient force able to hold its own against an internal VC threat. OSD and CIA feel that RVNAF is making limited progress and many of RVNAF's weaknesses are uncorrected.

OSD suggests the possibility of cutting costs and US losses by reducing US forces as RVNAF reaches milestones in the modernization program. This plan is contingent on the enemy force stabilizing at a reduced level of threat. A plan to withdraw one US division during mid-1969 has been discussed with President Thieu, who responded favorably. Allied troop reductions are dependent on progress in RVNAF improvement, changes in enemy forces and a manageable battlefield and pacification situation in South Vietnam.

4. PACIFICATION (Questions 14-20)

Two well-defined and divergent views emerged from the agencies on the pacification situation in South Vietnam. One view is held by MACV and Embassy Saigon and endorsed by CINCPAC and JCS. The other view is that of OSD, CIA and State. The two views are profoundly different in terms of factual interpretation and policy implications. Both views agree on the nature of the problem, that is, the obstacles to improvement and complete success. What distinguishes one view from the other is each's assessment of the magnitude of the problem, and the likelihood that obstacles will be overcome.

The Two Views

The first group, consisting of MACV JCS Saigon, maintains that "at the present time, the security situation is better than any time during period in question," i.e., 1961-1968. MACV cites a "dramatic change in the security situation," and finds that the GVN controls three-fourths of the population. JCS suggests that the GVN will control 90% of the population in 1969. The second group, OSD, CIA, State, on the other hand, is more cautious and pessimistic; their view is not inconsistent with another Tet-offensive-like shock in the countryside, for example, wiping out the much-touted gains of the 1968 Accelerated Pacification Program, or with more gradual erosion. Representing the latter view, OSD arrives at the following conclusions:

(1) "The portions of the SVN rural population aligned with the VC and aligned with the GVN are apparently the same today as in 1962 [a discouraging year]: 5,000,000 GVN aligned and nearly 3,000,000 VC aligned.

(2) "At the present, it appears that at least 50% of the total rural population is subject to significant VC presence and influence."

CIA agrees, and State (INR) goes even further, saying:

"Our best estimate is that the VC have a significant effect on at least two-thirds of the rural population."

The Major Issues

After removing population control changes attributable to urban migration (which has brought more people under GVN control than pacification), the two views differ by the magnitude of up to about one-sixth of the

South Vietnamese people, i.e., 2-3 million. The second group places these people in a contested category, yet to be secured by the GVN, while the first group maintains that these 2-3 million people are already under GVN control.

The substance of the argument is evident on the next page. Using HES data for 1967-1968, the chart shows that the optimistic interpretation leaves only 26.7% of SVN's population to be pacified as of November 1968. The conservatives think 41/3% of the population has yet to be pacified. More importantly, the second view shows little pacification progress over the period except for the gains of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) program, and they dispute these gains. State, OSD and CIA maintain that the October-December APC acquisition of 9.4% of the population is an exaggerated claim because these gains were achieved by cutting minimal force levels to one-third of previously accepted levels. These agencies, therefore, argue that the APC gains have stood only because the NLF has not challenged them, and they believe it is "quite likely" the gains will be contested in the coming months.

If the APC gains are removed, the substance of the long-term debate emerges clearly. The chart then shows that according to the second view, pacification programs have registered no progress over 1967-68, and before. The first view records only slight progress over the 1966-68 period. It is further seen that the second view places the chart's pacification line much lower. For example, in August 1968, the first group says 65.8% of the population was under GVN control; the second group places only 49.9% in the GVN category. The source of this difference is a dispute over the value of the HES composite indicator which is really an average of eight-eleven indicators, few of which have anything to do with security.¹ The second group arrives at their estimate by allocating the contested population on the basis of security criteria alone. According to their view, in the fall of 1968 at least one-half of South Vietnam's population was subject to a significant NLF presence; for the first group, this figure was one-third.

By neither view can pacification be said to have progressed much in the last three years (at least, prior to the last few months). Nor does either view promise anything close to complete success within several years. If the 1967-1968 pacification rate (including the debated APC gains) is sustained, the first interpretation implies that it will take 8.3 years to pacify the 4.15 million contested and VC population of December 1968; the second view implies pacification success in 13.4 years.

It is noteworthy that the gap in views that does exist is largely one between the policy makers, the analysts, and the intelligence community on the one hand, and the civilian and military operators on the other.

The policy implications of the disagreement could hardly be more divergent. One view sees a high probability of GVN success and generally applauds the GVN's performance. It finds that the GVN has been ineffective at times, but that it has not been negligent, and overall progress has been most satisfactory. The policy implications of this view are more of the same, gradual U.S. pressure and wholehearted U.S. support.

¹ There is a strong case for abolishing an overall composite indicator from HES and either utilizing the sub-indicators on a category basis, e.g., security, political, and economic development or using the category data within a newly devised system. Despite all its shortcomings, HES has provided useful data and the small amount of analysis available is very helpful, although large areas of analytical ground remain to be covered.

The other view leads to a radically different policy. The GVN has failed in the countryside. The rural population situation has not changed significantly and certainly not at a rate which will free us of noticeable burdens within 2-5 years. We may even be overextended in the rural areas and open to a damaging VC counter-attack. The implied policy recommendations would call for voicing considerable displeasure at the GVN's rural performance, establishing realistic rural goals for the GVN; penalizing the GVN if these goals are not achieved, and devoting a greater effort to promoting a GVN/VC rural political accommodation on, for example, a district or village basis.

Lesser Issues

In 1968, 15,776 members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) were neutralized, 87.1% of whom were low-level functionaries. Anti-VCI operations showed major improvements but did not seriously harm the VCI.

All agencies agreed that the Phoenix program was long over due and potentially very valuable. The respondents agreed that it is too early for a thorough assessment of the Phoenix program, and they predict it is unlikely to cause the NLF major problems in 1969. Embassy Saigon noted that Phoenix bears close watching with respect to the attitudes of rural population, attitudes toward the American sponsors, and a potentially deleterious effect on the possibilities for a rural accommodation.

Every agency except MACV/JCS agrees that the available data on war damage to the civilian population is inadequate. Using limited data which showed that 7% of the reporting hamlets were affected by friendly caused war damages, CIA concluded "the rural hamlets take a tremendous beating." The responses received suggest that this is a very serious problem in need of further U.S. government attention and analysis.

Recent GVN personnel changes were found by all agencies to have brought a significant upgrading in the average quality of GVN officials. Nonetheless, corruption, favoritism, and neglect of the populace's problems were still seen as major GVN shortcomings. There was no conclusive evidence that the 1968 personnel changes harmed the GVN's relations with minority groups.

5. THE POLITICAL SCENE

(Questions 21-23)

This section on the political situation can be boiled down to three fundamental questions: (1) How strong is the GVN today? (2) What is being done to strengthen it for the coming political struggle with the NLF? (3) What are the prospects for continued non-Communist government in South Vietnam?

The essence of the replies from U.S. agencies is as follows: (1) Stronger recently than for many years but still very weak in certain areas and among various elites. (2) Some steps are being taken but these are inadequate. (3) Impossible to predict but chancy at best.

Within these broad thrusts of the responses there are decided differences of emphasis among the agencies. Thus MACV/JCS and Saigon, while acknowledging the problems, accent more the increasing stability of the Thieu regime and the overall political system; the significance of the moves being made by the GVN to bolster its strength; and the possibility of continued non-Communist rule in South Vietnam given sufficient U.S. support. CIA and OSD on the other hand, while acknowledging certain progress, are decidedly more skeptical and pessimistic. They note recent political improvements and GVN measures but they tend to deflate their relative impact and highlight the remaining obstacles. State's position, while not so consistent or clear-cut, generally steers closer to the bearishness of OSD and CIA.

The Present Situation

We have a great quantity of information on Vietnamese politics but the quality is suspect. It varies greatly by elite and level and is usually sounder for broad groups than factions or individuals. In addition, we are dealing with a nascent constitutional system, and public opinion is often manipulated.

Non-communist elements rally in times of common danger from the communist threat, but otherwise generally engage in a perpetual struggle for power. Most elites may be willing to participate in the GVN but their motives are often more self-serving than nationalistic. In their view toward the military struggle, Northerners are most insistent on military victory, central Vietnamese the most war-weary, southerners the most ambiguous. Firm support for GVN comes from most military elements, Catholics and the bureaucratic and merchant classes. The major problem for the GVN remains in the rural villages where the VC are strongest. Opposition also comes from certain Buddhist, youth, union and Army elements. Various ethnic and religious minorities, while often anti-communist, are not strongly tied to the GVN.

In reading the Vietnamese political scene, one must keep in mind that pragmatism, expediency, war weariness, a desire to remain unaligned and end up on the winning side are all common features. So are family loyalty, corruption, social immobility and clandestine activities.

OSD points out (and a recent Saigon cable corroborates this view) that there has been a noticeable shift recently by many non-communists towards acceptance of the NLF in some capacity as part of an eventual political settlement. Most elites would want to minimize the communist influence in the government.

South Vietnamese attitudes toward the US are varied and ambivalent. Our presence is seen as a necessary evil to forestall a communist take-over. Our involvement is viewed with a mixture of gratitude, shame, and suspicion. In any event, recent events, especially the Paris talks, have made it clear to the Vietnamese that the U.S. commitment is not open-ended and that some withdrawals will probably come soon.

GVN Political Actions

All agencies agree that there has been substantial progress in broadening the government; all except OSD see significant movement against corruption; and all agree that political mobilization is both the (material missing) advancement based on merit, and there are many other political steps needed. In general, all these factors will be increasingly important as the US reduces its military effort. Such a reduction might stimulate political progress but it will also entail risks. As noted earlier, there is some ambiguity as well as differences of view about the proper US role in SVN politics. State and Saigon caution against undue US involvement and pressure, while MACV/JCS place greater emphasis on the use of our leverage in effecting needed reforms.

No agency clearly forecasts a "victory" over the communists, and all acknowledge the manifold problems facing the DVN as we withdraw. However, MACV/JCS stress the need for continued US support. OSD and State believe that only a compromise settlement is possible and emphasize GVN self-reliance. CIA states that progress in SVN has been sufficiently slow and fragile that substantial US disengagement in the next few years could jeopardize all recent gains.

JCS and OSD each list their essential conditions for cessation of hostilities. While they agree on certain elements, the JCS look toward continued US support to assure the sovereignty of the GVN while OSD requires only that the South Vietnamese be free to choose their political future without external influence.

6. U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS
(Questions 24-28)

The only major points of agreement with the U.S. Government on these subjects are:
The description of recent US deployment and tactics;

The difficulties of assessing the results of B-52 strikes, but their known effectiveness against known troop concentrations and in close support operations;

The fact that the Soviets and Chinese supply almost all war material to Hanoi and have enabled the North Vietnamese to carry on despite all our operations.

Otherwise there are fundamental disagreements running throughout this section, including the following:

OSD believes, and MACV/JCS deny, that there is a certain amount of "fat" in our current force levels that could be cut back without significant reduction in combat capability.

MACV/JCS and, somewhat more cautiously, CIA ascribe much higher casualty estimates to our B-52 strikes.

MACV/JCS assign very much greater effectiveness to our past and current Laos and North Vietnam bombing campaigns than do OSD and CIA.

MACV/JCS believe that a vigorous bombing campaign could choke off enough supplies to Hanoi to make her stop fighting, while OSD and CIA see North Vietnam continuing the struggle even against unlimited bombing.

U.S. Deployments and Tactics

In early 1968, MACV moved the equivalent of two divisions from II and III Corps to northern I Corps. This deployment was a defensive reaction to the threat of a major NVA siege of Khe Sanh and the coastal lowlands. With the further enemy offensives in February and May, U.S. forces throughout the country (except for I Corps) were pulled back into screening positions around SVN's major cities and used to push the VC forces out. Since then, the two U.S. divisions redeployed to I Corps have been returned to III and IV Corps. MACV now gives top priority to the control of Saigon, the approaches to it in III and northern IV Corps, and the heavily populated upper Delta.

Until late 1968, allied (particularly U.S.) efforts were directed largely against enemy main forces through large (1,000 men or more) unit operations. With the recent withdrawal of NVA main force units from SVN, U.S. units have been able to operate in smaller units and with more emphasis on the enemy's infrastructure and support apparatus. Though no U.S. units are currently in direct support of pacification, the deployment of U.S. units in SVN's populated areas and the change in tactics has, MACV asserts, helped improve pacification progress.

U.S. Force Reductions

MACV/JCS and OSD agree that there is no way of reducing U.S. force levels in Vietnam without some reduction in combat capability. However, OSD argues that withdrawing some U.S. logistics headquarters, construction or tactical air personnel may not have any significant effect on U.S. combat capability or effectiveness. For instance, OSD concludes that because of the halt in bombing North Vietnam, the U.S. needs neither as many interdiction aircraft as we now have, nor our full force of three Navy carriers off North Vietnam. OSD also believes certain tactical innovations might make some troop cut-backs possible. MACV/JCS feel that while some of the above elements would help to minimize loss of combat capability, in general, significant reductions in our force levels will proportionately reduce our combat capability.

OSD also thinks that U.S. forces could be reduced as the RVNAF improves and expands. By their estimates, the ongoing RVNAF improvement plan might free up to about 15

U.S. battalions and their support units by mid-1969 without a decrease in total allied force capability. This projection assumes that RVNAF combat effectiveness increases along with their combat capability. In their responses, MACV/JCS do not consider this question.

B-52 Effectiveness

All agencies acknowledge that sound analysis of the effectiveness of B-52 strikes is currently impossible for several reasons. The consensus is that some strikes are very effective, some clearly wasted, and a majority with indeterminate outcome.

There is agreement that B-52 strikes are very effective when directed against known enemy troop concentrations or in close support of tactical operations, and have served to disrupt VC/NVA operations.

There are sharp differences on casualty estimates. While the JCS estimate that about 41,000 enemy were killed in 1968 by the B-52's, OSD believes that perhaps as few as 9,000 were. The difference is that OSD, unlike MACV/JCS, find that B-52 strikes against suspected enemy infiltration routes or base camps (50% of 1968's sorties) are much less effective than close support strikes. CIA cites a variety of casualty estimates and considers it impossible to select one, but believes it is apparent that B-52 strikes have become a significant factor in the attrition of enemy forces.

The Laos and North Vietnam Interdiction Campaign

The MACV/JCS and State/CIA/OSD fundamentally disagree over whether our bombing campaign either prior to or after November has reduced the enemy's throughput of supplies so that the enemy in South Vietnam receives less than he needs there. The MACV/JCS feel the bombing has succeeded; State/CIA/OSD think it has failed.

Post-November Campaign

Since early November, MACV has attempted to reduce the logistic capacity of the enemy by blocking the two key roads near the passes from NVN into Laos. MACV finds it has effectively blocked these roads 80% of the time and therefore caused less traffic to get through. OSD/CIA/State agree that enemy traffic on the roads attacked has been disrupted. However, they point out that the enemy uses less than 15% of the available road capacity, is constantly expanding that capacity through new roads and bypasses, and our air strikes do not block but only delay traffic.

Besides blocking the roads, our bombing destroys material in transit on them. JCS/MACV and OSD/CIA agree that we destroy 12% to 14% of the trucks observed moving through Laos and 20% to 35% of the total flow of supplies in Laos. To MACV/JCS, the material destroyed cannot be replaced so that our air effort denies it to the VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam. In complete disagreement, OSD and CIA find that the enemy needs in SVN (10 to 15 trucks of supplies per day) are so small and his supply of war material so large that the enemy can replace his losses easily, increase his traffic flows slightly, and get through as much supplies to SVN as he wants to in spite of the bombing.

Pre-November Campaign

Prior to November 1968, we bombed in southern North Vietnam as well as Laos. The MACV/JCS find that this campaign reduced the flow of supplies into Laos greatly and that this flow increased greatly after the bombing halt. The OSD/CIA agree that traffic followed this pattern, but argue that it was caused by normal seasonal weather changes, not our bombing policy. Comparing 1967 traffic to 1968 traffic, they find that prior to the bombing halt, 1968's supply throughput was higher than 1967's and that, after the halt, it followed its normal seasonal patterns.

Alternative Campaign

All agencies agree that Chinese and Soviet aid has provided almost all the war material used by Hanoi. However, OSD/CIA and MACV/JCS disagree over whether the flow of aid could be reduced enough to make a difference in South Vietnam. If all imports by sea were denied and land routes through Laos and Cambodia attacked vigorously, the MACV/JCS find that NVN could not obtain enough war supplies to continue. In total disagreement, OSD and CIA believe that the overland routes from China alone could provide NVN enough material to carry on, even with an unlimited bombing campaign.

February 21, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: National Security Study Memorandum Number 1

With reference to my memorandum of February 13 transmitting the Department's answers to NSSM Number 1 as well as Ambassador Bunker's answers, I enclose an additional memorandum of comment responsive to the original request. The enclosed memorandum contains the Department's comments on our own submissions and those of Ambassador Bunker. These comments may be helpful in evaluating Ambassador Bunker's responses.

WILLIAM P. ROGERS.

Enclosure:

ENVIRONMENTAL OF NEGOTIATIONS

Question 1 (Why is the DRV in Paris?): The Embassy's response approaches the problem in a slightly different manner but reaches essentially similar conclusions to our own answers. Saigon places somewhat more emphasis on the difficulties facing the enemy in Viet-Nam than do we in assessing why the DRV came to Paris. In discussing likely future actions of the DRV in the negotiations, the Embassy stresses the importance of a firm policy by the new Administration to accept only a peace settlement that would meet the basic U.S. objective of assuring that the Vietnamese people are able to determine their future without outside interference. If such a policy is made clear to the other side, the Embassy is confident that events on the ground in Viet-Nam will eventually force the enemy to make significant concessions, in terms of their own withdrawal, to get our forces out. While our response does not specifically address this conclusion, we would accept Saigon's judgment while noting the critical factor of time.

Question 3 (Influence of Moscow and Peking on Hanoi): Our response is made from the viewpoint of Moscow and Peking while the Embassy has viewed the question from Hanoi. We do not see any major inconsistencies between us although Saigon quite rightly emphasizes the desire and the ability of the DRV to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet split. We concur with the Embassy's point that the Sino-Soviet rivalry has left Hanoi relatively free from pressure from these two powers. We attribute more significance than does the Embassy to Soviet efforts to be helpful in moving the negotiations ahead, and we think the evidence that they did so is quite clear. What is not clear is whether it was necessary for them to bring pressure on the North Vietnamese to bring about a compromise.

NVA/VC

Question 5a. (Why Did NVA Units Leave SVN?): While both the Embassy and we agree that military considerations led to the withdrawal of NVA units from South Viet-Nam last summer and fall, and that the DRV subsequently made a virtue of necessity by noting the political implications of the withdrawal, the Embassy lays greater stress on the military difficulties facing the NVA as against tactical military considerations. Specifically, as noted elsewhere, we would

not accord as much importance as does the Embassy to aerial interdiction of enemy supply lines in North Viet-Nam and Laos (para. 3). We also do not believe there is evidence to support the flat statement that the four NVA/VC divisions in III Corps are supplied via Sihanoukville and the Mekong River through Cambodia (para. 5).

Question 5b. (The Third Wave Offensive): Both responses agree that the Third Wave Offensive actually took place and achieved little success. Our assessment is that the enemy's intentions in this offensive were quite limited and that he achieved his purpose of demonstrating continuing initiative and the ability to inflict heavy casualties. The Embassy on the other hand notes the quite limited psychological impact of this offensive, and emphasizes the Allied military efforts and enemy weaknesses that prevented the enemy from achieving greater success.

Question 6 (NVA/VC Attrition): Although the Embassy and ourselves approach this problem from somewhat different directions, there is basic agreement on the conclusion that NVA/VC ability to recruit and infiltrate exceeds their attrition rate and will probably continue to do so for the foreseeable future. The Embassy lays heavier emphasis on the question of quality of manpower and believes that we already have sufficient forces to achieve a reduction of enemy personnel in terms of quality, if not quantity, and this seems to us a valid point. We do not know where Saigon obtained the figure of 289,000 VC/NVA losses in 1968; our cited estimate was 240,000 KIA.

Question 9 (Enemy Capabilities to Launch Large Scale Offensive): Both answers agree that the enemy has the capability to launch a large scale offensive with "dramatic" results in the next six months if he is willing to risk very heavy losses. We also both agree that the enemy is making preparations to do so, although he has probably not yet made a final decision to go ahead. The Embassy's response is more specific regarding possible targets. We do not agree with the inference in para. 2 of the Embassy's response that the enemy would need up to three months to reposition his units for a large scale attack in areas other than III Corps. We believe the enemy could do so in a much shorter time, particularly in the Highlands of II Corps.

Question 10 (NVA/VC Military Supply Channels Through Cambodia and Laos): It comes as no surprise that the Embassy places much more importance on Cambodia as a route for enemy military supplies in IV, III and southern II Corps, and that it believes that significant supplies come to the VC through Sihanoukville. As stated in our response to this question, we believe that there is clear evidence that military supplies to southern II Corps and III Corps move down the extension of the Ho Chi Minh trail in massive quantities. Saigon flatly disagrees and says there is little such evidence of the movement of goods on the North-South route south of I Corps. While we agree that Sihanoukville may be increasingly important as a channel of supply for the VC, we believe the evidence is not clear that it is the main source of supplies for III and IV Corps. The Embassy does agree that there is insufficient information on this aspect.

RVNAF

Question 10A (RVNAF Improvement): e. (Desertions)—The Embassy has explained that the Vietnamese definition of desertion is much broader than our own and that many deserters in fact leave regular military units to join one of the para-military forces, and vice-versa. In addition the Embassy notes the importance of improved welfare measures such as better housing, pay, and food allowances to cutting back the desertion rate. We concur with these observations, which were not included in our own paper.

f. (RF/PF Effectiveness)—We believe that our response is a good description of the causes of RF/PF ineffectiveness and the steps needed to improve their capabilities. The Embassy gives a good description of the role of the territorial forces in pacification. We both agree that the territorial forces are of critical importance to future efforts in the countryside.

PACIFICATION

Questions 14-20: We find Saigon's pacification assessment to be extremely well stated and are in basic agreement with it. Saigon believes that the rural security situation has recovered completely from the regression occasioned by the Tet Offensive and shows every sign of moving forward, particularly after the initial successes of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign. At the same time, their analysis of recurring GVN problems and the residual strength of the enemy leaves little doubt that pacification progress will be slow and arduous in the future and, possibly, even subject to some reverses. There are some differences in tone between Saigon's and our description of the situation. Most notably we tend to question more severely pacification statistics, particularly as to how much of the rural population is to be considered "relatively secure." We also give greater emphasis to the enemy's capability of disrupting the pacification program in coming months. In our opinion, the latter prospect is quite likely. It would cost the enemy less than larger scale campaigns; moreover, it could be effectively used to the advantage of the DRV/NLF position in Paris.

Question 15 (Pacification over Next Two Years): The Embassy has provided a more complete check list than did we of the changes on the part of RVNAF, the GVN and the U.S. necessary to improve security and control in the countryside. The Embassy also points out that continued GVN success could have a snowball effect, and that portents of what the Vietnamese would regard as a U.S. "sellout" would have rapid and disastrous consequences for the security situation; although not included in our paper, we concur with these assessments.

POLITICS

Question 22 A (Chances for Broadening the Government): In terms of broadening the GVN at the local level, the Embassy places more emphasis on the village/hamlet level than on the provincial level, whereas we tend to emphasize the latter. We think that the elections for provincial councils could be used as a significant means of broadening participation by the regional and religious groupings or even—possibly—by the NLF.

Province-level participation also has more international (i.e. propaganda) impact, whereas political activity at the village/hamlet level is too diffuse, disparate, and of low visibility outside the immediate locality for such impact.

Question 22 B (Chances for Improving Selection and Promotion of Officers and Civil Servants): We would agree with the Embassy that a trend exists toward establishing a GVN/RVNAF selection and promotion system based on merit. But we would be slightly less sanguine than the Embassy is about the pace of improvement and the time necessary to carry it out satisfactorily.

Question 28 a. (Bombing of North Viet-Nam—Significant Strains on DRV): There appears to be a difference in views between the Embassy and ourselves concerning the effects of the bombing on North Viet-Nam, most specifically regarding the severity of the manpower pinch on North Viet-Nam and the adverse effects on the morale of the people. We continue to believe that there is considerable evidence, some of it cited in our paper, to support our contention that both these problems were serious ones for the

DRV and were significant considerations in Hanoi's decision to come to Paris. The position taken by the Embassy on these points is not consistent with its responses to other questions (numbers 1, 5-A and 6).

To: The Secretary.

Through: S/S.

From: EA—John A. Calhoun.

Subject: National Security Study Memorandum Number 1—Action Memorandum.

Enclosed are our suggested answers to the questions on Viet-Nam posed in NSSM No. 1 as well as Embassy Saigon's responses to these same questions and our comments thereon.

These answers were drafted in the first instance by INR and the majority were concurred in by EA with relatively few qualifications and/or additions. However, on several significant questions we have made extensive revisions of the INR drafts or have substituted our own drafts reflecting major differences in our assessment of the issues under discussion.

Our chief differences with INR center on the efficacy of our pacification programs and on the degree of progress which has been achieved in providing security to the South Vietnamese rural population; on the question of whether the RVNAF without US combat troop support could cope with the Viet Cong in the event of a total NVA withdrawal; and on the impact on Southeast Asia of a settlement in Viet-Nam leading to a Communist takeover. INR is somewhat more pessimistic on pacification and the RVMAP than we, although, as our answers indicate, we too are mindful that performance has often fallen far short of our expectations. However, INR does not see a Communist takeover in Viet-Nam as having as unfavorable an impact on Southeast Asia as we do.

In the event of a situation unfavorable to the Communists, in the terms noted above, we see several major developments. There would certainly be a sense of relief throughout the region, US prestige would increase, Communist morale would sag, and the "people's war" concepts of Mao and Ho Chi Minh would be seriously questioned. On the other hand, few countries would conclude that the Communists had been permanently stopped in Vietnam or that the future of the Saigon regime had been assured. Nor would doubts be removed about the willingness of the US to engage on a substantial scale in any new military conflict in Southeast Asia.

The main thrust of the competing view, as exemplified by the dissents to NIE 50-68, is that, in the event of a favorable situation for the Communists in South Vietnam, the disintegration process in the rest of Southeast Asia would begin immediately. Most Southeast Asian leaders, including the Thai, would move quickly to alter significantly their relationships with the US, having little if any confidence in the future US role, regardless of stated US intentions in the immediate post-settlement period. In altering their commitments to the US, these Southeast Asian leaders would move quickly to take concrete steps looking toward some accommodation to Communist internal and external pressures.

The competing view also contends that there would not only be encouragement to Communist insurgent-subversive forces in various countries but also that these forces would move quickly to emulate "people's war." Substantial material assistance would be provided at least by Hanoi and Peking, particularly to Communist forces in Thailand. Finally, many, if not most, of the governments faced with insurgency problems probably would be unable or unwilling to move decisively against the insurgents.

Question 2: What is the nature of evidence, and how adequate is it, underlying competing views (as in the most recent NIE on this subject, with its dissenting footnotes) of the impact of various outcomes in Vietnam within Southeast Asia?

2. Prognoses on the outcome in Southeast Asia after Vietnam tend to rest more on highly subjective and interpretative judgments and assumptions than on tangible evidence, regardless of the stated views of a number of Southeast Asian leaders. For example, Thai leaders are among those most concerned about the Communist threat in Southeast Asia and among those unequivocally supporting US policy in Vietnam. Yet, Foreign Minister Thanat's views on the future roles of regional arrangements and the US in Southeast Asia suggest that the Thai are looking to developing alternatives for dealing with security problems in the area without the need for significant accommodation with Communist powers.

Our judgment on Southeast Asia after Vietnam is predicated on the following basic terms of reference, as noted, for example, in NIE 50-68: (1) we exclude the possibility of an outright military victory or a precipitous withdrawal by Allied forces or the Communists; (2) we assume a compromise settlement which, in the next year or two, leads either to Communist control (i.e., an unfavorable situation) or to the continuation of a pro-US regime in South Vietnam, or at least a regime not hostile to the US (i.e., a favorable situation); and (3) we do not prejudge future US policies or courses of action in Southeast Asia, regardless of the outcome in South Vietnam.

For several reasons, we believe that a settlement in Vietnam favorable to the Communists, in the terms stated above, in itself would not necessarily unhinge Southeast Asia. Very likely, Cambodia and particularly Laos might well become fairly early casualties although initially at least Hanoi would probably rely on political rather than military pressure to alter the situation further in its favor in both countries. However, Communist political and military assets elsewhere in the region, even in Thailand, probably would not be immediately strengthened, nor would the Communists during this early period be likely to rely more heavily on armed violence than at present. Hanoi would be preoccupied, for a time at least, with the formidable task of consolidating Communist rule in South Vietnam.

Neutralist sentiment would clearly increase in several countries, and throughout the region there would be damage to US prestige and serious doubts about the validity of US power and commitments. However, most Southeast Asian leaders would nevertheless continue to be influenced to an important extent by US actions elsewhere in the area, particularly Thailand, during and after the settlement. We do not believe that these leaders would be panicked into precipitate changes in policy and very likely would postpone any definitive policy decision until they had assessed US intentions. Indeed, for both the short-term and the longer-term, the role the US decides to play in the rest of Southeast Asia will be a critical factor.

20. Changes in command and administration affecting the countryside almost certainly are predicated to a considerable extent on personal loyalties. This is a complex and well-established Vietnamese tradition and is not likely to change radically in the near term. Perhaps the most notable example of personnel changes made principally on political grounds is the shift of Corps commanders. In virtually every instance, the out-going Corps commanders were supporters of Ky or had never been particularly committed to Thieu. While some of the new commanders may be somewhat more competent, they do not on balance appear to be less corrupt or less inclined toward intrigue.

However, there have been a number of significant steps taken during the past year to improve the command-administrative system. The political authority of the Corps commander has been reduced as has his role in the appointment of province and district chiefs. Of course, it must be assumed that new officials at these lower levels are regarded as being politically reliable and that they will remember under whose aegis they came to power. On the other hand, the ties to political patrons do not appear as evident as have existed in the past among local officials. For example, since Tet 1968, twenty-four province chiefs have been changed. Some of the changes were routine transfers while others occurred because of the corruption, inefficiency or ill health of the incumbent. The Embassy has reported that the majority of those province chiefs whom it considered corrupt and inefficient or both had been replaced by September 1968. The new province chiefs have in general been a politically faceless lot although it must be assumed that they are politically reliable, despite the absence as yet of any clear pattern or political loyalty. In general, they have been reported to be more competent and less corrupt than their predecessors; it is too early to tell whether these assessments simply derive from comparison with their predecessors, from the fact that the replacements are relatively new on the job and their flaws less visible, or from the lack of sufficient background information.

The general pattern of province chief appointments since Thieu took office has been the replacement of chiefs aligned with strong local interest groups by neutral outsiders. This pattern reverses the pattern of Ky's administration by which, for example, there was a VNQDD province chief in Quang Ngai, a Cao Dai chief in Tay Ninh, and Hoa Hao officers in several provinces of the western Delta. Such replacements as those of the Cao Dai province chief of Tay Ninh and of several Hoa Hao province chiefs in delta provinces have initially encountered resistance from the population in the areas affected although it does not appear to have resulted as yet in a major local problem.

The introduction of province chiefs not identified with local political/religious elements can have its benefits. The new chiefs may be better able to escape involvement in local squabbles among the extremely factionalized local groups. Theoretically, such appointments should tend to strengthen the authority of the GVN by separating religious influence from administrative authority and thus reducing the image of political/religious fiefdoms. Also, a province chief who has no local base of support must depend more heavily on the GVN and is presumably more responsive to Saigon directions. On the other hand, Thieu's actions also can have net losses. Whatever the support from and the degrees of responsiveness to Saigon, a province chief who does not have the support of the principal local group is not likely to get much meaningful response from the local level and upward to him. In the final analysis, this is perhaps where the issue is joined most realistically between the GVN and the Communists.

At the district level, the GVN appears to be attempting to improve the competence of its officials through better training and an improved assignment process. In March, the GVN conducted a training course for officers likely to serve as district and province chiefs; a second six-week course was held in September. Thieu addressed the first course and Premier Huong the second, an indication that the GVN appears to be placing considerable importance on the training of officials to work in the countryside. The graduates of the second course selected their district assignments on the basis of their class standing, thus removing the district chief assignment process from any apparent manipulation by province chiefs, division

commander, and Corps commanders. Furthermore, the GVN has shown itself somewhat more responsive than in the past to US advice in these matters. At the time of graduation of the second military administration course, the US Mission submitted a list of 29 incumbent district chiefs whom it wished to see replaced. The GVN agreed to replace all 29, and these slots were presumably among those from which the course graduates were allowed to choose. In addition, Thieu has urged recently that one of the priority tasks for the GVN in 1969 be to increase the number of GVN officials functioning at the hamlet level and to increase their competence.

21. a. Our information on the attitudes of Vietnamese elites such as those mentioned is generally adequate. Quite naturally, both the quantity and the quality of our information vary from one specific elite group to another. In almost every case, quantity and quality could be improved somewhat and the information further corroborated, though the necessary investment of effort might not always be worthwhile; in any event such information requires and does receive continual up-dating.

Generally speaking, our information on the attitudes of the various categories of "out-politicians", except on the extreme left-wing, is better than our information on any of the elites cited as examples. Our coverage of union leaders is probably next most adequate. Thereafter, in descending order of adequacy, the other elites would be roughly as follows: religious leaders; youth leaders; professors; professionals; and village notables. It is important to realize that "village notables" hardly constitute a homogeneous national grouping; communication among them is almost nil, and their individual attitudes are almost invariably determined by other and more specific affiliations such as those of race, religion, region, locality, education, occupation or party, or a combination of these factors. To varying degrees, of course, this is true of the other elites as well.

Information on attitudes toward participation in the GVN, the GVN's current legitimacy and acceptability, and US intentions is generally easy to acquire because these attitudes lie near the surface; they are frequently stated with little or no prompting. (It is worth remembering that members of the various Vietnamese elites are seldom reticent, even though sometimes guarded and on occasion deliberately misleading, in their conversations.) Attitudes toward the NLF and toward possible compromise political solutions are more difficult to determine, both because these attitudes in many individuals are tentative and uncertain and because the subjects themselves are still considered somewhat dangerous for public or even private discussion.

Our information on attitudes is based on US Mission, specifically, Embassy, CAS and JUSPAO, reporting from both overt and clandestine sources.

21. b. Usable and collective knowledge of political alignments of the types described is considerably less adequate than our information on current attitudes of the various elites noted earlier. To be sure, the behavior of numerous prominent individuals and some of the more readily-identifiable groupings within the GVN and the RVNAF are often predictable in general terms as a result of our knowledge of their past behavior, their personal alignments, or their regional, religious or other affiliations. For the most part, however, our knowledge of these matters is neither broad nor deep. Even our contacts at some important levels, e.g., second and third echelons of most government ministries, have tended to be inadequate in generating political or attitudinal information, even though advisory relationships exist in many cases.

There have been a handful of noteworthy efforts to study political alignments in the RVNAF. Two which come immediately to mind are Embassy airgrams of December

1965, on the career patterns of two dozen or more senior RVNAF officers then occupying important positions and commands, and of February 1967 on the appointments to province chief and high-level staff positions by Lieutenant General Vinh Loc during his tenure as commander of II Corps. We have fairly complete information on most cabinet ministers and how they got their jobs, but little or nothing on lower levels of the bureaucracy.

A basic cause of our ignorance in this area is the inadequacy of sophisticated biographic information; this deficiency would be less of a problem if all of the varied sources available to and within the US mission were systematically tapped and their information collated. For a number of years, we have had MACV advisors with RVNAF units down to battalion level and with province and district chiefs and principal members of their staffs, and USAID advisors in most ministries at sub-cabinet level and below. Yet, there has never been a program that would require (not merely encourage) candid biographic reporting on these hundreds or thousands of Vietnamese "counterparts," nor even any single, central agency for the collection and re-dissemination of the reporting that has been done. The Embassy and CAS both have biographic units, and MACV J-1 presumably has considerable holdings as well. However, biographic reporting by the US military, at least, as represented in the final products issued by DIA, has tended to be incomplete and highly superficial and roseate.

Increased attention to the collection, evaluation and utilization of biographic information would considerably enhance our knowledge of existent political alignments. Such information would be invaluable to succeeding generations of our advisors working with individual GVN officials and RVNAF officers. It would better equip us to block undesirable prospective appointments and to encourage valuable ones, though it will be necessary at the same time to find opportunities and channels for timely intervention in civil and military appointment processes. Such information would also buttress our efforts to obtain the removal of incompetent and corrupt officials, efforts which have been increasingly successful of late as CORDS has targeted a number of such officials and as the GVN has apparently become somewhat more receptive to our advice in such matters.

We have had a few valuable studies devoted to significant political groupings as well although several of the groups are not heavily represented in the GVN or RVNAF leadership. Notable here are Embassy airmgrams on the Viet-Nam Nationalist Party or VNQDD of April and May 1966, and on the Cao Dai in 1968, and a CAS report on the An Quang Buddhist faction also in 1968. Most of these efforts have entailed lengthy preparation by individual officers with language competence, relatively long service in-country, and extensive contacts in the groups under study. Officers with such expertise could and should be relieved of day-to-day reporting requirements when necessary to enable them to pursue such assignments on a more systematic basis. For example, we have a number of spot reports on individual Revolutionary Dai Viet and Tan Dai Viet officers and officials, and on aspects of Dai Viet organization and influence within the RVNAF and the upper levels of the civil service in some localities; however, we do not have comprehensive studies of these groups pulling together all of our knowledge and appraising total Dai Viet influence or delineating the attitude or likely behavior of covert party members. Similarly, there has to our knowledge been no comprehensive study of the alignments created by (or responsible for) the practice of corruption; we have often discussed, and less often, reported) the problem itself or its specific manifestations, but we have not analyzed its consequences in terms of the behavior and attitudes of those involved or its unfortu-

nate contribution to the popular image of the GVN.

In short, we conclude that our information in this general area is inadequate and unnecessarily so and that this inadequacy could be considerably diminished through better use of existing resources.

22. a. Events of the past year, particularly the Tet offensive, the establishment of a ceiling on the size and extent of the US military commitment, and the evolution of the Paris talks, have forced most responsible Vietnamese nationalists to look upon broadened, representative government in more realistic terms. The realization that they must prepare for an imminent political confrontation with the Communists has prompted a flurry of moves to create blocs, fronts, and various political arrangements which thus far have had only limited success. Perhaps more importantly, this same realization has stimulated greater receptivity to the idea of broadening within the GVN leadership, even though there has been little concrete action. At the same time, these events have sharpened opposition to the GVN by some groupings, notably the militant Buddhists, which have never reconciled themselves to the present government. Such opposition, however, is only one of several serious constraints that limit the prospects for a successful broadening of the government.

President Thieu and Prime Minister Huong are reportedly planning a cabinet shuffle for sometime after the Tet holiday, while they apparently are motivated by concern over the performance of some present ministers, there is some evidence that they see the present cabinet as mainly "technical" and that some additional political elements can be brought into the government without significantly altering their own concept of the existing political balance. They may also feel that the changes will defuse current criticism, whether justified or not, of the cabinet by the National Assembly, the press, and other sources. Some questions immediately arising, therefore, are whether the US should attempt more forcefully than on previous occasions to insert ourselves into Thieu's and Huong's deliberation on this matter and just how much weight could we really swing if we made the attempt. While broadening is clearly needed, cabinet changes with relatively minor additions of political strength could create an unfortunate picture of continuing division within the GVN and within the nationalist body politic at a particularly inopportune moment.

Even though there is general agreement on the desirability of broadening at the national level, the mechanics of such broadening are something else again, as Huong discovered when putting together the present cabinet last May. As has always been the case in Vietnam, political groups advocating "broadening" really want enhanced position for themselves, often at the expense of their rivals. The appointment to the cabinet of one man with a personal or organizational following or with any pronounced affiliations can easily alienate other individuals or factions. For example, the current upsurge in North-South regional frictions, both within the executive and between Huong and some elements in the National Assembly, suggests that any new cabinet appointments will be measured in regional terms and that Huong will have to be more careful about this aspect now than he was in forming the present cabinet. The continuing problem of Vice President Ky's relations with Thieu and the more recent one of Ky's relations with Huong have similar ramifications. Furthermore, representative men are not always competent ones; it is difficult, for example, to think of more than a handful of respectable Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, or Montagnard leaders who have the technical qualifications to hold down ministerial assignments. Therefore, the symbolic value of a cabinet appointment from any of

these groups could well be vitiated if the appointee turned out to be incompetent or corrupt or both, as appears to be the case with Paul Nur, the Montagnard who is presently Minister of Ethnic Minorities Development.

There are other means of effecting a broadening of the GVN at the national level, but none of them as visible in their results as changes in the cabinet. The Constitution provides for outside advisory council on culture and education, on economic and social matters and on ethnic minority affairs. (The National Security Council is intended to comprise leaders from the executive and legislative branches and the armed forces.) Implementing legislation is still to be passed for the establishment of all of these councils, but at least in theory these bodies have representative value and could, if the executive and legislature prove willing to utilize them, exercise some influence over government policy. Somewhat similar results could be obtained through less formal means such as presidential appointment of other consultative groups. An advisory body on negotiations was created in the summer of 1968 and has had at least a few meetings with Foreign Minister Thanh. Its members were chosen for their expertise, however, and not for their group affiliations, and the council has received relatively little publicity.

Broadening at province and district levels presents problems of a somewhat different and more complex nature. The only "representative" bodies, elective or appointive, which now exist at that echelon and in which broader participation might be encouraged are the virtually powerless provincial and municipal councils, elected in May of 1966 and now overdue for reelection or replacement. (It should be noted here that the district, unlike the province or the village, has no legal status or electoral tradition; it is merely an administrative subdivision of the province.) Aside from their lack of power, the provincial and municipal councils are not ideally representative. In several instances, they are dominated by single interest groups which managed to turn out a bloc vote, e.g., Buddhists in Quang Tri, Northern Catholics in Long Khanh, Cao Dai in Tay Ninh, Hoa Hao in several provinces of the western Delta, all to the exclusion of other elements of the local populations. While these results reflected accurately the local political muscle in most cases, they left the less-disciplined minorities, or unorganized majorities, virtually unrepresented.

However, the province echelon does offer certain opportunities. The provincial and municipal councils, with certain adaptations, could become fairly worthwhile institutions. Foremost among the changes would be a grant of considerably wider authority to the councils or their successor bodies and the creation of an electoral system (e.g., proportional representation or allocation of seats for recognizable minorities) that would guarantee more representative results in every locality and at the same time permit adequate reflection of local political strength. It is also at this level, perhaps, that some form of participation by the National Liberation Front could be provided for, or at least invited, at an early date with the fewest and least severe problems of constitutional change, recognition of territorial control, or derogation of over-all GVN authority.

The Constitution also provides that there are to be elected mayors and province chiefs not later than the second presidential term, which begins late in 1971. There is no legal obstacle to earlier implementation of this provision, and implementation could probably be undertaken now in most or all of the six autonomous cities (Saigon, Da Nang, Hue, Da Lat, Vung Tau and Cam Ranh) and in several provinces. The principal problem would be the reorientation of GVN thinking away from the concept of military control of

civil administration at the province level. Military officers would undoubtedly remain as sector commanders in almost all cases, and there would certainly be civil-military jurisdictional struggles at the outset. Nevertheless, there have been a handful of appointive civilian province chiefs during much of the post-Diem era, and their military deputies for security have functioned as sector commanders. The resulting mix has usually been no worse than the usual case where both civil and military authority have been vested in a single RVNAF officer.

Another change susceptible to early implementation would be in the status of the more populous provincial capitals. Large centers such as Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa, My Tho, and Can Tho have a stronger claim to autonomous status than do the special-purpose "cities" of Vung Tau and Cam Ranh, both of which contain large expanses of rural territory. The large provincial capitals are, rather anomalously, still governed as individual villages or, more typically, as several villages now covered by urban sprawls. There is no compelling reason why these truly urban areas could not, at any time, elect mayors and municipal councils with a degree of authority.

The institutional opportunities for broadening at the district level are few and of slight potential value. One possibility would be the creation of councils of elected village chiefs and/or village council chairmen to advise the chiefs of their respective districts on local matters. However, given the secondary importance of the district both traditionally and constitutionally, and the subordination of district to province in the administrative system, it is likely that continued effort at the village level and increased attention to the province level would have greater effect.

Many of the conditions necessary for broadening are already present. Most political elements are ready and even eager to participate, at least on their own terms. From a constitutional or legal standpoint, several opportunities for broadening at national and provincial levels already exist or can be created without much difficulty. Changes in conditions that might improve the prospects for broadening are numerous, of course. One would be movement at Paris toward serious discussion of the details of a political settlement; this would sharpen the stimulus that already exists from that quarter. Another would be greater success in the building of new nationalist organizations or the merger and strengthening of existing political groups; this may come about as various fronts, and parties and even the traditional but less formal political elements try to meet the requirements of the political parties law when it is finally adopted. Still another would be demonstrable, lasting improvement of security conditions in the countryside, which would encourage participation by individual candidates and officeholders and in turn might encourage the GVN to accelerate the process of civilianization and decentralization of real authority to popularly-elected bodies at province level and below.

No basic change in U.S. policy appears necessary in this sphere: our commitment to constitutionalism and our support for broadening are well known. What does need increased attention, however, is the extent and manner of our effort to encourage Thieu, Huong, and the Assembly to proceed with the job of broadening and to influence them and the numerous interest-groups which would logically be involved in the process. Some greater U.S. stimulation and involvement is probably advisable, but any U.S. efforts that were too forceful or too obvious could produce results opposite to those we intended. Finally, unless broadening at the central level is translated down-

ward and in some legal or practical way involves the variety of political forces operating locally, the impact in terms meaningful to the Vietnamese frame of reference will probably not be substantial.

23. The three types of possible change in GVN character, structure, and operations (discussed in response to Question 22) are closely inter-related. This is particularly true of broadening and political mobilization since the main purpose of broadening, if it is to be more than a facade, is to produce a significant increase in political mobilization. Stronger emphasis on competence and performance within the GVN is almost a precondition to political mobilization. Any separation of these three types of change is therefore somewhat artificial, but some effort at distinguishing among them is clearly necessary.

To many, "victory" has meant the outright defeat of Communist forces (both Viet Cong and NVA) or at least such heavy attrition of them that no alternative remained but their total and permanent withdrawal. It has also meant the destruction or dissolution of the entire Communist political apparatus. There now appears to be wide and growing realization that victory in these terms is unattainable and that the inexorable trend is toward some compromise settlement of hostilities and some kind of political competition thereafter. In this situation, a strong non-Communist political role becomes a practical necessity for any satisfactory outcome.

In this context, political mobilization is by all odds the most critical of the three types of governmental "change" (It is possible in terms of internal war to argue that the achievement of political mobilization itself is tantamount to "victory," but present NVA and VC military capabilities make such a view not wholly realistic.) Broadening of the government, which we consider basically a contributory factor to political mobilization, may be somewhat less critical in theory, but in practice broadening *per se* is deserving of priority attention in part because some steps in this direction can be taken relatively quickly and easily and can produce results that are visible, even though somewhat superficial at the outset. Stronger emphasis on competence and performance in the selection and promotion of officers and officials is in our view least critical, not because it is unimportant but because genuine and thoroughgoing change will probably take longest to effect (even though some early change is probably indispensable to successful political mobilization).

This basic ranking probably applies whatever the level of our military commitment. Clearly, however, any reduction in the level of our own military effort without a corresponding reduction in presence and activity of North Vietnamese forces reduces the likelihood that the GVN would work toward political mobilization. The same is true of any reduction of U.S. military effort in relation to Viet Cong military capabilities, except to the extent that the RVNAF can demonstrate its ability to take up the slack. On the other hand, experience seems to indicate that any conceivable increase in the level of US military effort would not alter the military balance to the extent that the prospects for political mobilization would be materially enhanced. Indeed, any such increase might lessen whatever sense of urgency the GVN and most nationalist political groupings now feel and therefore could conceivably retard current and prospective efforts toward political mobilization. On balance, we conclude that a policy of maintaining the current level of military effort while preparing for possible reciprocal reduction of that level affords the best prospects for increased political mobilization. Essentially, the same argumentation applies to the matter of broadening the government which, as noted above, is contribu-

tory to the process of political mobilization. The relation between the level of our military effort and the GVN's emphasis on the competence and performance of its personnel is of a different character; obviously, any reduction of our effort makes an improvement in GVN and RVNAF performance all the more necessary, but there is little evidence that changes in the level of our effort in and of themselves have had any significant effect on GVN and RVNAF policies in this regard.

In general, the GVN would run very little risk in making or attempting any of these changes; the problem, rather, is whether the GVN has the will and the ability to make them and whether they can be made in time to do much good. Some risks have already been noted possibly attending any spectacular effort at broadening the GVN even at the national level. Areas where US influence may be required have also been indicated (in Question 22). In general terms, US influence in the political sphere has often been misunderstood and its impact at times overrated; our support for governments and programs has been interpreted as support for their leaders of the moment or for their initiators (e.g., Nguyen Khanh, Nguyen Cao Ky, Nguyen Duc Thang) whether or not this was the case. And there are many politicians outside the GVN who profess to believe that the Embassy and CAS are behind every shift in policy, change in personnel, or other political development, even when this is patently not the case. These circumstances argue for caution and circumspection as we seek to wield political influence, but they also suggest that we should not hesitate to make the effort since we will frequently be damned whether we have made the effort or not.

Question 1: Why is the DRV in Paris? What is the evidence?

Hanoi decided to negotiate for a number of reasons related to its estimate of the course of the war and of its chances for success. Mainly, it came more and more to realize that it could not win the conflict by continued military and international political pressure, and that it would have to negotiate in order to make the American forces leave. It also sensed that the constitutional structure in South Viet-Nam, supported by the South Vietnamese Army, was developing in a manner which might preclude NLF participation unless the NLF could be negotiated into the picture.

Wanted to end bombing and reduce scale of war

Combined with these realizations was a desire to reduce the scale of the conflict, or at least to end the bombing. North Viet-Nam was beginning to feel greater pressure toward the middle and latter part of 1967, as the bombing became heavier. The Communist leadership also became worried that it was losing members of the important Southern cadre element in its Southern structure at a rate which, if continued over a long time, would leave the Viet Cong unable to compete effectively in the South. It wanted to open possibilities for greater emphasis on political warfare, and also to reduce the chance that the US might escalate further.

But not ready to surrender

But Hanoi's concern about its prospects for winning was not accompanied by any feeling that it had lost the war and that it needed to surrender. On the contrary, in fact, the Communist leaders felt distinct cause for pride because North Viet-Nam and the Viet Cong, even with large amounts of Soviet and Chinese aid, had resisted US military pressure for several years and had not been beaten. They also believed that US public opinion was beginning to tire of the war, and they believed that election year politics in the United States offered them an opportunity to profit from this attitude. Although the election is now over, the Hanoi leaders continue to believe that public pressure will

force the US Government to end the war. One reason Hanoi is negotiating is because it believes that we will have to look for compromise formulas in the talks, and that its own intransigence, coupled with continued military initiative, will add to public pressures on the Administration to make such compromises.

Hopes to reverse 1954

This means that Hanoi's desire for an end to the war is not yet combined with any readiness to yield on certain basic issues such as US withdrawal, an NLF political role, or the prospects for reunification. What Hanoi is hoping to do by negotiating is to reverse the 1954 result: at that time, Hanoi agreed to mutual regroupment of forces, a division of Viet-Nam, and the installation of a non-Communist government in the South. In exchange, Hanoi obtained the opportunity to socialize half the country, promises of heavy Communist aid, and a prospect of elections throughout Viet-Nam. Those elections were not held, and it is even uncertain whether the Communists ever expected them to be held. They were probably counting on a southern collapse more than on elections.

This time, the Communists would like to obtain a US withdrawal, the installation of a potentially Communist government in the South, and the opportunity to continue political struggle in the South. In exchange, they may be prepared to offer some prospects for an American non-military presence throughout Viet-Nam, and the prospect of elections in the South. They probably expect that the elections need not be held, if anti-Communist resistance collapses, and they may well believe that we will not count on the elections being held. Hanoi's decision to negotiate reflects some hope that it can obtain that kind of favorable settlement sooner or later. Frequent references by Hanoi spokesmen to helping the US find a face-saving formula for a withdrawal suggest that there may be some in Hanoi who believe this essentially is what the US really desires and would eventually settle for.

But settlement will not end Communist drive

We should not be under any illusions that the conclusion of some negotiated accord with the Communists will necessarily mean peace and quiet in Viet-Nam. Instead, it seems very likely that even if they withdraw their forces and turn to the reconstruction of North Viet-Nam, the Communists will want to use the post-war period to continue their political struggle against the GVN and to continue their drive to take over the South completely. One of their key purposes in negotiations will be to work out conditions which will optimize their chances for success in continued political warfare, in the long if not necessarily in the short term.

Will combine negotiations with pressure

However, the North Vietnamese leadership recognizes that such a settlement will not be easy to obtain, and that it may take some time before the US is prepared to grant terms which the Communists now consider acceptable. The leadership therefore hopes to continue to exert military and political pressure against us, and particularly against the South Vietnamese government, in order to force or persuade us to accept Communist terms. At the same time, the leadership recognizes that its own southern structure may suffer further under continued warfare.

Own positions also subject to change

Thus the Communists are negotiating under pressure, just as they think we are negotiating under pressure. Some of the same pressures which drove them to negotiate will also drive them to modify their own terms and conditions over time. The Communists will want to pick the best pos-

sible moment for compromise, when we have yielded on the things which they consider vital but before they themselves have had to give up anything of critical importance. This will require delicate and sensitive timing. It is thus not correct to say that the Communists are not negotiating "seriously." They are negotiating seriously, in the sense that negotiations are an important element in their strategy, and that they would like to see the war end by a negotiated settlement favorable to themselves. But the required evolution in their position will come slowly.

Also talking to gain tactical advantages

However, while Hanoi is basically interested in using talks to obtain a favorable settlement, it also has entered negotiations in order to gain a number of tactical advantages. It has used the talks to stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam, which was its principal tactical objective. It has now also obtained NLF representation at the negotiations, which was its second tactical objective. It will continue to use the talks to push for further restrictions on US military operations—in Laos as well as in South Viet-Nam—and it will also attempt to use the increase in the NLF's stature to undermine the GVN. It hopes that the very fact of negotiations and NLF participation will lead to unraveling of the South Vietnamese political and administrative structure and to a strong if not necessarily wide-spread South Vietnamese movement for political accommodation with the NLF. As in the past, it will also try to use the talks to explore the American negotiating position, and to push for changes in that position, without fully revealing its own.

Evidence scanty, but also shows evolution

There is no incontrovertible evidence of Hanoi's purpose or intentions with regard to negotiations, because there is no available record of Politburo meetings at which decisions on the subject were made. There is some treatment of the subject in the captured text of a speech made by General Nguyen Van Vinh in April 1966. In that speech, Vinh indicated that negotiations might occur in the future, but did not go into detail on their possible outcome. He placed his main emphasis on the point that those negotiations would be determined by the fighting. Politburo members Le Duan at about the same time referred to negotiations in a letter to the Viet Cong headquarters in the South. He did not go into detail either, but he wrote that the "diplomatic struggle" was "of prime importance." He also wrote that "our strategy on negotiations must serve in a practical manner our concrete political aims," indicating how negotiations strategy was designed to help obtain a favorable settlement. It should be kept in mind, however, that much has changed since 1966, and that Hanoi's ideas on the purpose of negotiations may have changed. For example, Vinh boasted that the Communists would not negotiate until the US had permanently stopped bombing, withdrawn our forces, and dismantled our bases. Those Hanoi conditions have obviously been either dropped or modified since.

Best evidence remains behavior

Thus the best evidence remains Hanoi's own behavior. It indicates that Hanoi does take negotiations seriously, and that its positions are considerably influenced by its judgments on the current situation in Viet-Nam and the United States. Hanoi began the Paris talks last May with a surprising readiness to survey the whole field of settlement issues, as if it were ready to discuss all of them. While its positions were hard and uncompromising, there were enough of them to reflect a readiness to use the talks for exploration of substantive issues.

In July, after it had become evident to

Hanoi that the United States was not yet prepared to negotiate its own withdrawal on Hanoi's terms, the Communist leadership decided that it had to settle for a bombing halt as an immediate first priority. And it began focusing on that. Now it has again begun covering the full range of settlement issues. While it is still speaking in harsh and demanding terms, its readiness to cover a wide range of topics suggests that it views the negotiations as a serious means for reaching a settlement.

Hanoi's desire to use the talks for tactical purposes is also evidenced by its behavior. It timed its own readiness to compromise on certain issues to accord with the periods of greatest American domestic sensitivity, in order to produce a bombing halt. It has also used the presence of the NLF as a means of influencing South Vietnamese political attitudes, and it has tried to use the talks as a means of pressure against the GVN (specifically, by arguing that there had to be a "peace cabinet" in Saigon before the talks could make progress). Such evidence, while admittedly imperfect, does suggest that Hanoi sees some tactical merit in the talks, and that it also believes they could be used to reach a settlement.

Question 2: What is the nature of the evidence, and how adequate is it, underlying competing views (as in the most recent NIE on this subject, with its dissenting footnotes) of the impact of various outcomes in Viet-Nam within Southeast Asia?

Assessments of how the outcome in Viet-Nam will affect the rest of Southeast Asia rest more on judgments and assumptions than on tangible evidence. The argument revolves around the impact of a settlement which for one reason or another would permit the Communists to take control of the government in South Viet-Nam, not immediately but within a year or two.

One view holds that such a settlement would be likely to bring Cambodia and Laos into Hanoi's orbit at a fairly early stage, but that these developments would not necessarily unhinge the rest of Southeast Asia. The judgment here is that Hanoi would be preoccupied, for a time at least, with the task of consolidating Communist rule in South Viet-Nam and even in Laos and Cambodia the Communists would rely in the first instance on political rather than military pressure to alter the situation in their favor. Elsewhere Communist political and military assets probably would not be immediately strengthened, nor would the Communists be likely to rely more heavily on armed violence than at present. Although neutralist sentiment would increase in several countries and U.S. prestige would suffer, these developments would not cause Southeast Asian leaders to be panicked into precipitate change in policy, although the degree of their steadfastness would depend on the role the U.S. decided to play in post-war Southeast Asia. An argument used in support of this assessment is that many of the current crop of leaders are in sympathy with and fully committed to current U.S. objectives relating to the security of Southeast Asia.

Another view of the probable effects of an unfavorable settlement and the one to which we adhere, holds that the prospect of a full takeover in South Viet-Nam will stimulate the Communists to capitalize on their success by becoming more active elsewhere and that it will be difficult for many Southeast Asian nations to resist making some sort of accommodation to the pressure thus generated. This judgment rests, *inter alia*, on a belief that Communist China as well as Hanoi will see opportunities to increase its influence in the area and that anything short of a major US commitment in mainland Southeast Asia is likely to be regarded as insufficient protection by many nations of

the area, e.g. Burma, Malaysia, and in particular, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand.

Both Hanoi and Peking have indicated in the past their interest in extending their influence over at least mainland Southeast Asia and there is no reason to believe that this interest would wane once Hanoi was on its way to consolidating its hold on all of Viet-Nam. The Lao Dong Party (Vietnamese Communist party) is basically oriented toward the concept of international Communism. The Vietnamese have historically had designs on much of the area and therefore Hanoi is doubly motivated. It probably suits Peking's plans (and perhaps Moscow's as well) to let the Vietnamese be the principal instrument for "revolution" in this area. An authoritative rendition of this view is a statement made by North Vietnamese Army General Hoang Minh Thao in the December 1966 issue of the Party Theoretical monthly "Hoc Tap":

"... the people's war in our country... is contributing a share to stimulating the revolution in Southeast Asia..."

Liturnaturnaya Gazeta of Moscow expressed a similar view of the scope of the Communist effort in an article which appeared in September 1967:

"Just as the frontiers of imperialism on one side of the continent have been thrust back to the extreme southwest corner, so too have they been moved to the southeast on the other side, South Viet-Nam. When imperialism loses this last beachhead in the southeast, the path toward freedom and socialism in continental Asia will basically be clear."

While we do not interpret these comments as indicating that the Communists would immediately move on all fronts to take over the remainder of Southeast Asia, we would expect them to take quick advantage of whatever opportunities arose to spread their influence once they saw success ahead in South Viet-Nam. The ongoing Communist insurgency efforts in Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Burma would probably get increased attention although their usefulness would vary and none by itself would be sufficiently powerful at the outset to serve as a vehicle to bring the Communists to power.

As to the likely reaction of non-Communist Southeast Asian leaders to a settlement favorable to Hanoi, the views of Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore and Tunku Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister of Malaysia are instructive. In a reply to a question in his Parliament on January 21, 1967 Rahman had the following to say:

"... if South Viet-Nam is handed over as a peace offer to the North, is there any guarantee that the people will be safe from the Communists? Will it stop the Communists from carrying out their plan to dominate Southeast Asia?"

"The intention of the Communists is not just to take over South Viet-Nam. They will not stop there... Once South Viet-Nam is taken over by the Communists, it will only be a matter of time before Malaysia goes under..."

In an interview on "Meet the Press" on October 22, 1967, Lee Kuan Yew made the following observation:

"... the Feld Marshal of Thailand says—Kittikachorn, and he is saying it to his own people, that they are going to fight in Viet-Nam, not in Thailand. But I take that to mean that if that is gone, he is going to anticipate history, and you know that Thais have this great sense of the future and are good anticipators of history. They made the kind of adjustments in their posture arising out of what they think is a failure in Viet-Nam. I don't think the Tunku in West Malaysia has very much years in spite of all his armed forces, and then they have got me by the throat."

Although there is little doubt that the staunchly pro-Western regime now in power in Thailand would make a stout effort to

shore up the country against Communist encroachment, it would probably be able to retain power only if bolstered by a major U.S. commitment. If such a commitment failed to materialize, other political elements more inclined to reach an accommodation with the Communists would be in a position to challenge the regime and move Thailand back to its more traditional position. To a greater or lesser degree the non-Communist regimes in many other Southeast Asian countries would face the same sort of challenge if U.S. strength in Southeast Asia following a Viet-Nam settlement appeared inadequate to the task.

In short we believe that in the situation postulated the Communists would not be inclined to exercise restraint and that the non-Communist countries, at least on mainland Southeast Asia, would find it difficult to resist the pressures they would come under without massive outside support.

Question 2: What is the nature of evidence, and how adequate is it, underlying competing views (as in the most recent NIE on this subject, with its dissenting footnotes) of the impact of various outcomes in Vietnam within Southeast Asia?

2. Prognoses on the outcome in Southeast Asia after Vietnam tend to rest more on highly subjective and interpretative judgments and assumptions than on tangible evidence, regardless of the stated views of a number of Southeast Asia leaders. For example, Thai leaders are among those most concerned about the Communist threat in Southeast Asia and among those unequivocally supporting US policy in Vietnam. Yet, Foreign Minister Thanat's views on the future roles of regional arrangements and the US in Southeast Asia suggest that the Thai are looking to developing alternatives for dealing with security problems in the area without the need for significant accommodation with Communist powers.

Our judgment on Southeast Asia after Vietnam is predicated on the following basic terms of reference, as noted, for example, in NIE 50-68: (1) we exclude the possibility of an outright military victory or a precipitous withdrawal by Allied forces or the Communists (2) we assume a compromise settlement which, in the next year or two, leads either to Communist control (i.e., an unfavorable situation) or to the continuation of a pro-US regime in South Vietnam, or at least a regime not hostile to the US (i.e., a favorable situation); and (3) we do not prejudice future US policies or courses of action in Southeast Asia, regardless of the outcome in South Vietnam.

For several reasons, we believe that a settlement in Vietnam favorable to the Communists, in the terms stated above, in itself would not necessarily unhinge Southeast Asia. Very likely, Cambodia and particularly Laos might well become fairly early casualties although initially at least Hanoi would probably rely on political rather than military pressure to alter the situation further in its favor in both countries. However Communist political and military assets elsewhere in the region, even in Thailand, probably would not be immediately strengthened, nor would the Communists during this early period be likely to rely more heavily on armed violence than at present. Hanoi would be preoccupied, for a time at least, with the formidable task of consolidating Communist rule in South Vietnam.

Neutralist sentiment would clearly increase in several countries, and throughout the region there would be damage to US prestige and serious doubts about the validity of US power and commitments. However, most Southeast Asian leaders would nevertheless continue to be influenced to an important extent by US actions elsewhere in the area, particularly Thailand, during and after the settlement. We do not believe that these leaders would be panicked into precipitate changes in policy and very likely

would postpone any definitive policy decision until they had assessed US intentions. Indeed, for both the short-term and the longer-term, the role the US decides to play in the rest of Southeast Asia will be a critical factor.

In the event of a situation unfavorable to the Communists, in the terms noted above, we see several major developments. There would certainly be a sense of relief throughout the region, US prestige would increase, Communist morale would sag, and the "people's war" concepts of Mao and Ho Chi Minh would be seriously questioned. On the other hand, few countries would conclude that the Communists had been permanently stopped in Vietnam or that the future of the Saigon regime had been assured. Nor would doubts be removed about the willingness of the US to engage on a substantial scale in any new military conflict in Southeast Asia.

The main thrust of the competing view, as exemplified by the dissents to NIE 50-68, is that, in the event of a favorable situation for the Communists in South Vietnam, the disintegration process in the rest of Southeast Asia would begin immediately. Most Southeast Asian leaders, including the Thai, would move quickly to alter significantly their relationships with the US, having little if any confidence in the future US role, regardless of stated US intentions in the immediate post-settlement period. In altering their commitments to the US, these Southeast Asian leaders would move quickly to take concrete steps looking toward some accommodation to Communist internal and external pressures.

The competing view also contends that there would not only be encouragement to Communist insurgent-subversive forces in various countries but also that these forces would move quickly to emulate "people's war." Substantial material assistance would be provided at least by Hanoi and Peking, particularly to Communist forces in Thailand. Finally, many, if not most, of the governments faced with insurgency problems probably would be unable or unwilling to move decisively against the insurgents.

Question 3: How soundly-based is the common belief that Hanoi is under active pressure with respect to the Paris negotiations from Moscow (for) and Peking (against)? Is it clear that either Moscow or Peking believe they have or are willing to use, significant leverage on Hanoi's policies? What is the nature of evidence, other than public or private official statements?

Communist China

We believe that Peking has brought pressures to bear upon Hanoi with respect to negotiations, but that the pressures have fallen short of major threats. These pressures weigh into Hanoi's calculations at each step of the negotiating way, but they have not prevented Hanoi from negotiating. Nor would they, in our judgment, prevent Hanoi from accepting a settlement which appeared desirable from other considerations.

Peking's Open Opposition to Talks. Peking has been against a negotiated settlement of the Viet-Nam war from the outset. Peking was not loath to make its opposition to the talks public, referring to the prospect of negotiations as "the peace talks hoax," and later when the talks actually opened, "the peace talks swindle." As early as mid-1965 Peking had taken the public position that there should be no negotiations prior to a complete US troop withdrawal, which should be brought about by "protracted struggle."

The Chinese used every opportunity to excoriate the Soviets for their role in facilitating the U.S.-D.R.V. conversations. According to the Chinese, the U.S. and the Soviets were in collusion to redive the world between them. The North Vietnamese leadership was concerned about Chinese objections to negotiations, as evidenced by periodic high-level visits by North Viet-

namese officials to Peking and by some deference to Chinese sensitivities in Hanoi's tactical handling of negotiations. But Hanoi's concern for Chinese attitudes did not prevent the North Vietnamese from moving toward negotiations.

Evidence of Chinese Pressure on North Viet-Nam. Intelligence reports indicate that China's opposition to the talks has shown itself in a variety of ways. British sources report that posters glorifying Hanoi's effort in the South no longer decorate the streets of Peking. In contrast to 1967, when at China's National Day Hanoi received much attention, in October 1968 Chinese mention of North Viet-Nam was merely perfunctory. There was no special reception for the North Vietnamese at the Chinese Communist National Day ceremonies in the fall of 1968 nor was Hanoi accorded a place on the speaker platform as in years past. Le Duc Tho's stop-overs in Peking enroute to and from Paris were not announced, and the talks themselves were ignored publicly until October 19. Another report tells of signboards erected at the Sino-North Vietnamese border promising that the Chinese "will not leave their Vietnamese brothers to suffer at the hands of the revisionists." There are also reports that Peking has withdrawn large numbers of construction troops from North Viet-Nam. If it actually occurred, however, this withdrawal appears at least as likely to be due to the completion of construction tasks and/or replacement by Vietnamese freed from bomb-damage reconstruction as to Chinese pique over the negotiations. There have also been reports of Chinese stoppages of Soviet air shipments, leading to complicated arrangements whereby the North Vietnamese assume responsibilities for those shipments at the Sino-Soviet border. During the 1968 phase of the Cultural Revolution rail service appears to have been stopped for a while. It is not certain whether this was caused by Peking's desire to show its muscle or by the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution. Vague reports of more substantial Chinese pressures have never been confirmed.

Chinese Influence Great. Peking obviously has a lot of influence in Hanoi. The Chinese Communist Party has long been a revolutionary partner of the *Lao Dong*. Communist Chinese aid played a major role in the Viet Minh victory over France, and in North Vietnamese economic development. Its assistance in both weapons and foodstuffs has been and continues to be essential to North Viet-Nam's war effort. Geography and history oblige Hanoi to be acutely sensitive to Chinese attitudes. Moreover, there are apparently North Vietnamese leaders who are sympathetic to Chinese attitudes and to Peking's on strategy and tactics. (This will be covered in greater detail in the answer to Question 4.)

But Limited. But Chinese leverage appears limited. Chinese advice has not always been good, and North Vietnamese limitations of Chinese campaigns (e.g., the land reform, the Hundred Flowers) have misfired. The Hanoi leadership therefore tends to act on its own. It has ignored and rejected Chinese tactical advice—even though that advice may in fact have been very sound—and it almost glories in its assertion that Vietnamese Communist strategy must be tailored to the particular situation in Viet-Nam.

As Is Its Freedom To Act. Peking cannot compel Hanoi to obey without hurting its own cause. Having long proclaimed its right to develop its own ideas against Moscow's, Peking cannot move militarily against a brother Socialist Party without severely besmirching its own image. If it chose to cut aid supplies, it would impede the North Vietnamese war effort—which it wishes to see succeed. Interference in North Vietnamese Politburo disputes by supporting one faction against another would be a tricky business, problematic both for ideological and practical reasons.

Basic Interests Being Served. Peking recognizes that its most important immediate interest is served by the existence of a friendly Communist state in North Viet-Nam; that state is a valuable buffer against the United States. It would be against Peking's interests to jeopardize its relationship with Hanoi or the existence of the DRV in a fit of pique or in a tactical dispute. Peking would certainly like to see the war concluded by the establishment of what is clearly a Communist South Viet-Nam (though it may have some reservations about the extent to which this might increase Hanoi's competitive position in Southeast Asia), but Peking recognizes Hanoi's primary interest and responsibility in Viet-Nam and is prepared to defer to it unless it believes that its own interests or the existence of the DRV are being placed in jeopardy. Thus, while we do not exclude Peking greater intervention if it believes there is some threat to its interests, we do not believe that Hanoi's current policies would produce such a situation.

Soviet Union

There are elements of both truth and error in the popular notion that Moscow has placed "active pressure" on Hanoi with respect to the Paris negotiations, and the proposition needs to be carefully weighed, first against basic factors restricting Soviet leverage, and second against recent evidence of a more assertive Soviet role.

Factors Limiting Soviet Leverage on Hanoi. Soviet ability to influence DRV policy decisions is limited by Hanoi's determination to have maximum freedom of maneuver within the schismatic Communist system, and Hanoi has been adept in playing the Soviets against the Chinese while giving neither of the powerful rivals a pretext for a decisive intervention in DRV affairs. Thus Hanoi's acceptance of major Soviet military assistance in the war has not been accompanied by any discernible derogation of the Hanoi leadership's firm control over its own war strategy. In dealing with the North Vietnamese the Soviets have experienced the full degree of Hanoi's ideological rigidity and distrust of the West, and on occasion they have privately deplored excessive North Vietnamese stubbornness.

Aware of these inhibiting factors, and sensitive to Chinese charges of "collusion" with the U.S., the Soviets long restricted themselves to unqualified support of Hanoi's terms for ending the conflict, even refusing to act as a "post office" for our message to Hanoi in May 1965 about the first bombing halt. However, Kosygin's visit to London in February 1967 suggested that the Soviets at least made serious effort to win Hanoi's agreement to an extension of the 4-day Tet truce.

Paris: More Assertive Soviet Role. With the beginning of the Paris talks last May, the Soviets began a new and decidedly more assertive phase of their diplomacy. Ambassador Zorin and Minister Oberenko were authorized by Moscow to act as primary Soviet representatives with respect to the talks. At several critical points during the ensuing months one or both of them intervened constructively, acting under both general guidelines and explicit instructions from Moscow.

Thus, it was Zorin who elaborated on the two-phase concept for stopping the bombing without any ostensible reciprocal action by Hanoi, and indicated Hanoi might be receptive to such an approach. When on October 11 the North Vietnamese for the first time gave a clear indication they would accept the GVN as a participant in the talks, the Soviets thought this move so important they confirmed this position to us on the following day. At several points during the culminating phase of these difficult negotiations the Soviets accepted our strong representations about North Vietnamese intransigence and appeared to have passed them along to Hanoi, to good effect. When the two sides were

deadlocked on the issue of what terminology to use in a secret minute—a demand later dropped by the DRV—the Soviets put forward a formulation which resolved the impasse. When the talks on procedural arrangements were deadlocked in January, the Soviets suggested the formula on seating arrangements which proved acceptable to all sides.

Conclusion and Prospect. Although there is strong evidence of constructive Soviet effort over this period, one must balance this appraisal with the observation that the North Vietnamese may at times have employed the Soviets as intermediaries to convey positions upon which they had already decided themselves, so that they would not have to "lose face" by making the concessions directly to us.

Even with this caveat, however, the record would appear to support the conclusion that since May 1968 the Soviets have employed their influence over Hanoi in a generally constructive direction both as to timing and substance. From all indications they will continue to stake out tough Hanoi bargaining positions, to explore U.S. thinking and, whenever they consider it warranted, to utilize their leverage upon Hanoi in measured, highly selective, and carefully timed fashion.

Question 4: How sound is our knowledge of the existence and significance of stable "Moscow" and "Peking" factions within the Hanoi leadership, as distinct, for example, from shifting factions, all of whom recognize the need to balance off both allies? How much do we know, in general, or intraparty disputes and personalities within Hanoi?

Knowledge Imprecise. Our knowledge of the existence and significance of any kind of factions within the Hanoi leadership is imprecise. The evidence, which takes the form of public statements and Hanoi diplomatic conversations, is both tangible and amorphous. We can be reasonably certain that differences exist, partly because statements by different leaders reflect different views on certain problems. Even without such evidence, we could assume the existence of disputes because it seems inconceivable that a group of strong-willed men engaged in ambitious tasks would not have divergent views on the best means of achieving them. Further buttressing these considerations are reports from former Viet Minh cadre and from Westerners who have had contact with the Hanoi leadership.

Not "Moscow" or "Peking" Factions. It is not accurate to state that these differences of opinion reflect the existence of "Moscow" or "Peking" factions. The Hanoi leadership is sufficiently xenophobic that its members must be considered "Vietnamese" first, with any other loyalties running a distant second. However, over the years patterns of attitudes have developed which suggest that some members of the *Lao Dong* Politburo are more attuned to the Chinese view of the world, and want to emulate policies which had been used by the Chinese, at least prior to the Cultural Revolution, for which we can see little sympathy in any quarter. Others tend more toward Russian ideas. It is generally believed that Truong Chinh, third-ranking man in the Politburo, is among those most sympathetic to China, whereas Phan Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap (numbers four and six respectively) are more pro-Soviet. Party First Secretary Le Duan, second-ranking in the Politburo, is reputed to be neutral.

At most, however, these leaders simply lean on some issues in one way or the other—and perhaps feel Vietnamese long-range interests are better served by closer cooperation with one or the other large ally. But they are not committed to full acceptance of either view. For example, the late General Nguyen Chi Thanh was considered to be one of the most "pro-Chinese" of the top Hanoi leadership. When he died two years ago, Peking called him a "great Marxist-Leninist" (which is

something the Chinese have not called Ho Chi Minh). Yet Thanh differed publicly from Chinese views on military strategy, and did not hesitate to express his attitude in characteristically fierce fashion.

Debate Is About Tactics, Not Goals. More over, not all subjects are open to debate. It would seem highly unlikely that any Politburo member would ever believe (much less say) that the Communist Party should give up its efforts to unite all of Viet-Nam under its control. Disputes would concern methods, timing, and priorities—not ultimate objectives.

Different Politburo members probably ally themselves temporarily with other members on specific issues, and policy decisions are obviously subject to review. The leadership has changed its war and negotiations tactics several times in the last few years, suggesting that members of the Politburo adjust their view to circumstances. Some members may remain always on one or another side of any given question, but others apparently shift their ground as they deem necessary.

Differences on Tactics. Disputes within the leadership cover a range of topics, including the tactics required to win the war. General Nguyen Chi Thanh was reputed to have favored a drive for military victory over the US forces; he believed such a victory was attainable by continuous attacks on many battlefronts. Le Duan, on the other hand, has apparently favored a combination of military and political tactics designed to frustrate US power and to compel us ultimately to withdraw. General Vo Nguyen Giap is also reputed to have favored a mix of military and political tactics, though it is not clear whether he has favored guerrilla war or large-scale attacks. He has on different occasions espoused each. Truong Chinh has favored protracted warfare, as have the Chinese Communists. He has also pointed more than others to the needs for constant contact with the population. There is evidently continuing controversy on this topic. When Truong Chinh in the summer of 1968 delivered a speech which implicitly attacked past military policy and called for "protracted war," North Vietnamese reports on the speech indicated that there was "heated debate."

Also on Negotiations. There also appear to have been disagreements on the advisability of negotiating, and on the extent to which negotiations could serve as a useful instrument of policy. Truong Chinh, again following a Chinese line, has generally spoken in ways which suggest that he does not favor negotiations. Pham Van Dong and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh appeared to have favored them. Dong in particular has said things which suggest that he has wanted to start negotiations for some time. He has spoken of "US strength" and has praised the Geneva Accords. Le Duan's position is unclear. He has not appeared either to favor or oppose negotiations consistently; he may once have opposed them, and later changed his views. However, the matter is not quite so simple. We do not see enough evidence to allow us to guess at more than broad inclinations and it is difficult to say who favors what tactic within a broad strategy at any given moment. For example, it is possible that Truong Chinh, despite his opposition to negotiations, might have favored some effort to procure a bombing halt in order to make "protracted war" possible.

Ho Appears to Balance. Similar patterns of disagreement probably prevail in other areas, including the Sino-Soviet dispute, internal political priorities, and Lao Dong Party organization and indoctrination. Key members of the Politburo are probably also jockeying for position to succeed Ho Chi Minh, who is about 78 years old. Ho has been careful not to designate his successor publicly, and has also been careful not to ally himself with

one or another particular view in the Politburo. He appears to act as a Chairman of the Board, casting the deciding vote in case of disputes but letting others air their views.

Question 5: What is the evidence supporting various hypotheses, and the overall adequacy of evidence, relating to the following questions:

a. Why did NVA units leave South Viet-Nam last summer and fall?

VC/NVA withdrawals to border areas and out-of-country sanctuaries during the summer and fall of 1968 were in part the result of serious Communist losses incurred during the Tet and May offensives. Indeed, regroupment of forces for resupply and reinforcement, followed by relative lulls in the fighting, have been characteristic of Communist tactics over the years, even during periods of activity less intense than occurred during the first half of 1968. In this instance, however, the Communists withdrew farther and in greater strength and stayed for a longer period than at any time in the past. We believe that Hanoi wanted to make a virtue of necessity, but it took care to make certain that its gesture was substantial enough to be clearly recognized. To underline the point further, Communist spokesmen in late June and July suggested that the reduced level of fighting, resulting from the withdrawal of Communist forces, was a "positive gesture" which should be reciprocated by a bombing halt.

Question 5: What is the evidence supporting various hypotheses, and the overall adequacy of evidence, relating to the following questions:

b. Did the predicted "third-wave offensive" by the NVA/VC actually take place? If so, why did it not achieve greater success?

The predicted "third-wave offensive" did take place from August 17 through the first week or so of September. This offensive was characterized by a mix of ground but primarily artillery attacks against targets of secondary importance and small-unit harassing-guerrilla actions in the countryside. This offensive, utilizing economy-of-force tactics, satisfied the Communists' need for military action to demonstrate their continuing initiative in Viet-Nam as well as their ability to inflict heavy casualties. It was, as General Abrams has described it, "a conservative campaign" which did not achieve "greater success" because it was not intended to do so.

Question 5: What is the evidence supporting various hypotheses, and the overall adequacy of evidence, relating to the following questions:

c. Why are VC guerrillas and local forces now relatively dominant?

There are probably several reasons for the relative decline in military activity by VC guerrilla and local forces. Among these obviously are the heavy casualty rate, manpower problems, and the decline in the quality of in-coming cadres. Also, there apparently is some diverting of guerrilla and local forces for logistical purposes, particularly in view of the on-going preparations for intensified military operations. Finally, it has been increasingly clear during the past several months that the Communists have placed high priority, and therefore time and effort, to improve political indoctrination and military training of the local and guerrilla forces. In this respect, some of the more important objectives relate to finding ways to strengthen the counter-pacification campaign and support of the "Liberation Committees". For example, the Communists may feel that a demonstrably strong blow against the pacification program would have wide repercussions, particularly at time of optimistic Allied claims about pacification successes.

Question 6: What rate of NVA/VC attrition would outrun their ability to replenish by infiltration and recruitment, as currently calculated? Do present operations achieve this?

If not, what force levels and other conditions would be necessary? Is there any evidence they are concerned about continuing heavy losses?

Captured documents, interrogation testimony, and other information indicate continuing Communist concern over the casualty rate. Indeed, the character and level of Communist military operations since August 1968 themselves reflect in part at least concerted enemy efforts to lower the casualty rate. On the other hand, we believe that, should they decide to accept the risks and launch major campaigns, the Communists can probably tolerate an attrition rate comparable to 1968, say 20,000 per month, without outrunning their ability to replenish their forces through infiltration and recruitment. In 1968, infiltration alone averaged 20,000 per month; reliable figures on recruitment are not available but may have averaged about 10,000 per month in 1968. Thus, the total Communist personnel input in 1968 may have been 360,000. In contrast, total Communist casualties (estimated KIA) from all sources was about 240,000, leaving therefore an appreciable residual. While manpower shortages in both North and South Viet-Nam may force the enemy to reduce his input somewhat in 1969, we believe that the Communists retain the capability to sustain an input averaging 20,000 per month on the basis of infiltration and recruitment. It should be noted, however, that the quality of enemy manpower has declined in recent months, as younger and less well trained personnel have been showing up more frequently on the battlefield.

Question 7: To what relative extent do the US/RVNAF and the NVA/VC share in the control and the rate of VC/NVA attrition; i.e., to what extent, in terms of our tactical experience, can heavy losses persistently be imposed on VC/NVA forces, despite their possible intention to limit casualties by avoiding contact?

While the Department of State does not have the data to permit a detailed analysis of this question, we believe that to a considerable extent, the Communists are able to control the rate of attrition of their forces. First, they have retained a surprising degree of tactical initiative, even during periods of intense fighting. A DOD study, for example, has concluded that perhaps as many as three-fourths of the engagements in South Viet-Nam occur at VC/NVA tactical initiative. In addition to choosing the timing of the engagements, the enemy is able to determine the type of attack, ranging from a costly assault on a major urban center to a relatively inexpensive harassment of a village or hamlet. Despite improvements in US/ARVN tactical planning, the NVA/VC have also proven that they can often break contact and escape into base areas or sanctuaries either within or outside South Viet-Nam when the fighting in specific engagements has become too intense. Indeed, Communist tactical planning, even since 1965 when the character of the fighting changed significantly, continues to place high priority on swift, surprise attacks, followed by quick withdrawals.

Finally, the Communists retain the option of avoiding contact, again, even during periods of intense offensive operations by our side. For example, DOD studies of combat statistics show little relationship between the number and scale of Allied operations and the rate of estimated enemy combat deaths. Instead, such studies have found a strong relationship between the rate of NVA/VC attacks and their estimated casualties; VC/NVA combat deaths have been high during the periods of their offensives and have dropped during the cyclical so-called "combat lulls," regardless of the level of Allied military operations.

Question 8: What controversies persist on the estimate of VC Order of Battle; in particular, on the various categories of guerrilla forces and infrastructure? On VC recruiting and manpower pool? What is the evidence for different estimates, and what is the overall adequacy of evidence?

Controversy still persists over the inclusion of various categories of forces in the Viet Cong Order of Battle and over the size of some of those categories that are, by general agreement, included in the OB. The principal controversies at present, as in the past concern: (1) the size of the VC Guerrilla Force and the Administrative Services elements; and (2) the inclusion in the OB of such categories as the Self-Defense or Militia forces, the Assault Youth, and the lower echelons of the Political Infrastructure. (There is, on the other hand, general but not total agreement on the size of the VC Main and Local Forces on the exclusion of the political Infrastructure from the military OB, though not from the estimate of overall VC strength.)

Both items of controversy derive from two basic disagreements: over definitions and methodology. MACV and DOD have consistently down-graded the importance of enemy units other than those regularly committed to offensive action and have argued for their exclusion from the OB because they do not constitute part of the enemy's "offensive threat" or because their shadowy nature makes it impossible for us to quantify their strength with any precision, or for both reasons. CIA and State, on the other hand, have argued that all categories of enemy strength and organization are indispensable to his military effort and to his control over portions of the population, that all armed categories properly belong in the military OB, and that some attempt must be made to quantify their strength.

With regard to methodology, MACV has in large part insisted on an empirical approach whereby MACV J-2 arrives at nation-wide strength totals by adding up the supposedly "hard" figures reported by U.S. military intelligence officers, including U.S. advisors to RVNAF intelligence officers, in the field who rely on "battlefield observation" of the actual enemy strength. MACV has traditionally applied this methodology in estimating Main and Local Force and Guerrilla strength, but in the past has been obliged to rely on a more theoretical method for estimating other categories such as Administrative Service and Political Infrastructure. However, we gather that MACV is increasingly using field figures as well for these "softer" categories. In any event, MACV has customarily argued that such evidence as that gleaned from captured documents and the interrogations of prisoners and ralliers was inevitably random, spotty, and often out-of-date and that extrapolations based on such evidence were therefore generally worthless. When MACV itself has had to extrapolate, it has usually taken the lowest "type" strength figure for any given echelon (e.g., infrastructure membership strength at hamlet level) as a base, even when the totality of evidence would have sustained or even favored base figures that were considerably higher.

The CIA methodology, on the other hand, assumes that field reporting is not necessarily complete on the "hard" components of the OB and is particularly inadequate on guerrillas and self-defense and on the non-combat elements, which are by nature either "behind-the-lines" or entirely clandestine. CIA methodology therefore relies heavily on the evidence of documents and interrogation reports, which provide firm figures for an admittedly small number of units in the "soft" categories, and employs those figures much less conservatively than would MACV to extrapolate strength estimates for the various categories nation-wide.

An out-of-date but clear-cut example of the differing results produced by the two methodologies is provided by these figures, tabled at an intelligence conference in April 1968, for "Regular Military Forces" (including North Vietnamese) as of March 31, 1968:

	MACV	CIA
NVA/VC main and local forces.....	123,000-133,000	135,000-145,000
Administrative services (in-country only).....	30,000-40,000	65,000-80,000
Guerrillas.....	50,000-70,000	90,000-110,000
Totals.....	203,000-243,000	290,000-335,000

(N.B.: These figures do not include the Political Infrastructure, which MACV then estimated at 75-85,000 and CIA at 90-120,000, or "Other, Irregular Forces," which CIA estimated at 90-140,000 and which MACV said could not be quantified.) The CIA approach would appear to provide a more realistic picture of the size and diversity of the enemy's entire apparatus and thus to reduce the risk of our underestimating his strength and staying-power. We believe that MACV, on the other hand, runs precisely this risk for reasons that have little to do with validity of the actual intelligence.

With regard to VC recruitment or the manpower pool, there has traditionally been greater uncertainty in this field because of the lack of adequate data even on the total population base and considerable controversy over the degree of VC access to manpower in contested and relatively-secure areas. Most of the data comes from captured documents, but these appear to be relatively few in number and insufficient for constructing estimates that would suffice for the country as a whole. Thus, the actual recruitment rate probably varies considerably from area to area.

Question 9: What are NVA/VC capabilities for launching a large-scale offensive, with "dramatic" results (even if taking high casualties and without holding objectives long), in the next six months? * * * How adequate is the evidence?

Should Communists decide to risk heavy losses, they have the capability to launch large-scale offensives in one or more parts of the country, particularly in III Corps. These offensives could include ground assaults or attacks by fire against any number of secondary, provincial centers and allied installations, a general heightening of minor actions and harassment throughout the country, and/or a strong counter-effort against the pacification campaign. There may also be some "dramatic" incidents, involving perhaps the infiltration of sapper units and some combat squads into Saigon or other major urban areas, the brief seizing of a section of a provincial capital, and a devastating attack against a model pacification area or refugee centers. Such military successes as might be achieved would be only temporary and would not approach the scale of Tet 1968. By a careful choice of targets and tactics, the enemy might be able to hold down his casualties; any major commitment of troops, however, would cost him dearly.

The evidence of NVA/VC attempts to improve their capabilities to launch such offensives during the next six months is extensive. Much of the NVA/VC main force has spent the recent months in base areas, re-equipping, retraining, and receiving replacements. And additional North Vietnamese replacements will continue to become available for some time and at a very significant rate. In the meantime, Viet Cong units have intensified recruitment and tax collection efforts in an attempt to rebuild their forces.

Truck traffic in North Viet-Nam and Laos has been heavy, suggesting that a consider-

able amount of material has been moving south to support Communists units. Captured documents, informants, POWs, and ralliers have all testified to the current buildup of NVA/VC forces and to the enemy's intention to launch some kind of offensive activity. In northwestern III Corps alone, the enemy has massed a force of over 40,000 troops.

Allied spilling operations have seriously disrupted Communist efforts to get an offensive underway, have caused a steady drain on forward supplies, have hampered LOC's, and have frustrated the attempts of NVA/VC units to move into attack positions.

Nevertheless, all evidence clearly points to continuing Communist preparations for offensive actions, suggesting the possibility that in spite of the difficulties, the enemy is determined to attempt some sort of military spectacular unless last-minute considerations, either in Paris or in Viet-Nam, dictate otherwise. Perhaps this is best illustrated by the continuing presence and deployment of substantial Communist forces in the provinces surrounding Saigon and toward northwestern III Corps, despite the continued commitment to this area of the bulk of the U.S. maneuver-battalion force.

Question 10: What are the main channels for military supplies for the NVA/VC forces in SVN, (e.g., Cambodia and/or the Laotian panhandle)? What portion of these supplies come in through Sihanoukville?

The Communists rely on the overland route from North Viet-Nam through Laos and Vietnamese/Cambodian border areas into South Viet-Nam as the primary channel for the movement of arms and ammunition to Communist forces in I, II, and III Corps. Several supplementary routes augment this flow and probably supply IV Corps. These supplementary routes include smuggling over Cambodian beaches and then across the Cambodian/South Vietnamese border into IV Corps, occasional penetrations of the Allied patrol system (Market Time) in the coastal waters of South Viet-Nam, and diversion to Communist forces of arms and ammunition entering Sihanoukville for the Cambodian Army. In specific local areas for limited periods of time, the amount of arms delivered through these channels may be significant. On the basis of available information, it is impossible to quantify the amount of military supplies moved by any single channel.

Trucks flowing over the overland routes from North Viet-Nam into Laos and down the "Ho Chi Minh" trails carry more than enough supplies for Communist units in Laos and in I Corps and northern II Corps. In addition, CIA, State, and DIA believe, but MACV does not, that the overland routes from the North also provide sufficient supplies to support the Communist forces in at least southern II Corps and III Corps; supplies into these two areas probably enter via the tri-border area of Laos, Cambodia, and South Viet-Nam. Positive information on the specific amount of arms and ammunition moved southward is limited, but the expansion of the truck routes in Laos and the truck traffic sighted on these routes, plus the north-south trail network in Laos and in the northern and central part of South Viet-Nam, clearly supports evidence that the movement southward is massive. Captured documents and prisoners report that Communist liaison stations and tactical and support units are present along the entire network to assist in the movement of men and supplies south. In short, the Communists moved enough supplies directly into I Corps and * * * Corps and into southern II Corps and III Corps. Moreover, they have a functioning logistics system south of the tri-border area which has the capacity to move these ton-nages to III Corps.

For some time, MACV has contended that the amount of arms and ammunition entering Cambodia through Sihanoukville and then transported to Communist forces in South Viet-Nam by elements of the Cambodian army has reached such proportions that Cambodia has become the main channel for Communist supply to forces in II, III, and IV Corps. There appears to be little doubt that elements of the Cambodian army are engaged in a relatively well-organized and profitable operation to supply arms and ammunition to the Communists. No firm basis exists, however, for estimating the quantities involved; evidence on the amount of arms arriving in Sihanoukville, on the requirements of the Cambodian army, and on the amount of arms delivered to the Communists is generally unreliable and inadequate. What reliable evidence is available does not suggest that the operation is of the magnitude MACV describes.

In our view, the Communists clearly have in the overland route a functioning logistics system in being which is capable of satisfying most of their needs and which is completely under their control, and it is therefore doubtful that they would place their main logistics channel under Cambodian control and make it vulnerable to Sihanouk's will and to the political pressures in Phnom Penh.

Question 10A: What differences of opinion exist concerning extent of RVNAF improvement, and what is evidence underlying different views? (e.g., compare recent CIA memo with MACV views.)

A recent CIA memorandum concluded that it would be at least two years, and perhaps longer, before ARVN would become an effective fighting force. The estimate of two years depended on the achievement of favorable military and psychological conditions during that time, an achievement considered unlikely.

We believe that the CIA estimate is not overly pessimistic. ARVN effectiveness has clearly improved as a result of better training, greater firepower, and inspiration by the presence of US forces. Indeed, a recent DOD study indicated that ARVN had been 58 percent as effective as US forces in 1968, as compared with 48 percent in 1967, and added that this progress could be expected to continue. However, since ARVN performance was measured in this study by comparing the number of enemy killed by US and Vietnamese forces, there was admittedly some question as to the validity of this improvement. The study noted that ARVN performance was generally best when the enemy was on the offensive and fell off during other periods, i.e., ARVN's own efforts to launch effective offensive operations were apparently not as large a factor in its improvement as during enemy operations. Finally, the DOD study pointed to a MACV assessment that the greatest improvement in ARVN performance was achieved by increasing ARVN firepower, and agreed with MACV that further improvement might be expected from the Phase I re-equipment program. While agreeing generally with these judgments, we believe that the more crucial problems—leadership, morale, discipline, and training—are long-term and highly complex and we are not confident that significant improvement in all these fields will be accomplished during the next year or so. Some of these problems are discussed in succeeding answers.

Question 10A: What differences of opinion exist concerning extent of RVNAF improvement, and what is evidence underlying different views? (e.g., compare recent CIA memo with MACV views.) For example:

(a) Which is the level of effective, mobile, offensive operations? What results are they achieving?

ARVN large-unit (battalion or larger) operations increased from about 3,200 in 1967

to over 6,000 in 1968. In 1967, ARVN achieved contact with the enemy in 1,974 of these operations; in 1968, 2,778 large-unit operations by ARVN achieved contact. In turn, the number of US large-unit operations declined slightly in 1968, but US forces were in contact with the enemy roughly twice as often as ARVN in both years. Thus it appears that, although the number of ARVN large-unit operations increased, they were less effective than large-unit US operations. On the other hand, it is probably true that the substantially greater mobility, particularly as provided by air, available to US forces has contributed to the latter's higher contact rate.

Question 10A: What differences of opinion exist concerning extent of RVNAF improvement, and what is evidence underlying different views? (e.g., compare recent CIA memo with MACV views.)

b. What is the actual level of "genuine" small-unit actions and night actions in ARVN, RF and PF: i.e., actions that would typically be classed as such within the U.S. Army, and in particular, offensive ambushes and patrols? How much has this changed?

Although ARVN small-unit actions increased slightly in 1968, daytime small-unit contacts dropped precipitously in 1968 to an estimated 813, from 3,089 contacts the previous year. Nighttime small-unit contacts also dropped, but not so steeply, from 8,233 in 1967 to 6,330 in 1968. Nighttime contacts by small US units actually increased, from 1,651 in 1967 to 1,888 in 1968. In 1967, for every 1,000 men in ARVN units, there were 4 enemy KIA in small-unit contacts; in 1968, this ratio dropped to an estimated 1 per 1,000. There is as yet no explanation for the overall drop in ARVN small-unit contacts, and MACV itself has noted this development with some concern. In any event, ARVN's effectiveness has long suffered from an overly defensive posture, particularly in terms of small-unit operations, night attacks, ambushes, and sustained patrolling. Available reports do not suggest any major breakthrough.

Question 10A: What differences of opinion exist concerning extent of RVNAF improvement, and what is evidence underlying different views? (e.g., compare recent CIA memo with MACV views.) For example:

c. How much has the officer selection and promotion system, and the quality of leadership, actually changed over the years (as distinct from the changes in paper "programs")? How many junior officers hold commissions (in particular, battlefield commissions (in particular, battlefield commissions from NCO rank) despite lack of a high school diploma?

Detailed information available to the Department of State is not sufficient to enable a comprehensive response to the matter of promotions within RVNAF. Nonetheless, it is clear from our general knowledge on the subject that the number of battlefield promotions within the officer corps has risen in each of the last two years but remains only a very small percentage of total promotions. For example, there were 2 battlefield promotions representing 0.05% of all promotions in 1966; the number rose to 56 or 4% in 1967, and to 195 or 3% in 1968. Moreover, while a fairly substantial program for the commissioning of RVNAF NCO's through officer candidate school, direct appointment, and battlefield promotion was initiated in 1966, only a small minority of these commissions are the result of battlefield promotion.

Apparently as part of the general mobilization program begun in 1968, all newly-mobilized personnel, regardless of educational background, are now reportedly being sent through the same basic training process, and holders of high school diplomas are no longer being sent automatically to officer-training schools. While this apparent reform sounds

promising, we have seen no information on its results, e.g., whether admission to officer training is now based on sounder principles. Finally, while we remain open to persuasion by contrary information which may be available in the field, we doubt that there has been much actual change in the officer selection and promotion system in recent years, and we doubt particularly that there is as yet much genuine commitment to the principle of battlefield promotions or commissions.

Question 10A: What differences of opinion exist concerning extent of RVNAF improvement, and what is evidence underlying different views? (e.g., compare recent CIA memo with MACV views.) For example:

d. What known disciplinary action has resulted from ARVN looting of civilians in the past year (for example, the widespread looting that took place last spring)?

Considerable looting by RVNAF troops occurred in portions of urban centers, especially in Hue, during the fighting of Tet 1968 and subsequent offensives. Low-level looting of miscellaneous items such as food has long appeared to be endemic among RVNAF units throughout the country. However, field reporting available to the Department has given no clear indication of the scope of disciplinary actions against looting.

It is possible that detailed information is available elsewhere. For example, the MACV Quarterly Evaluation Report for 1 July to 30 September 1968 lists under RVNAF "Investigations of Fraud, Theft and Misuse of Funds" a total of 104 RVNAF personnel of all ranks investigated during the first nine months of 1968; the third quarter saw 40 investigations and disciplinary actions against 13 officers. However, it is not clear from the report just how many of the investigations and disciplinary actions actually involved looting incidents. Moreover, we must also assume that there is considerable looting that goes unreported.

There are indications that the problems of looting are receiving increased GVN attention. At Vietnamese suggestion, in recent combined RVNAF-US cordon operations in Quang Nam, one family member from each dwelling was allowed to remain in his home to protect his property. Action is also reportedly being taken to provide increased amounts of food to RVNAF troops to reduce the need to forage for food.

Question 10A: What differences of opinion exist concerning extent of RVNAF improvement, and what is evidence underlying different views? (e.g., compare recent CIA memo with MACV views.)

e. To what extent have past "anti-desertion" decrees and efforts lessened the rate of desertion; why has the rate recently been increasing to new highs?

Available evidence does not point to any single cause for the marked increase in desertions during 1968. However, a variety of new factors, notably the changing political/military situation since Tet and the institution of general mobilization, have had much to do with the increase. The net desertion rate among the Regular, Regional, and Popular forces rose quite steadily during much of the year and peaked in October at a level more than twice as high as the pre-Tet level; increases were evident even during observable lulls in the fighting such as those that prevailed from mid-June through mid-August and from mid-September through late October. Average gross desertions from RVNAF combat units jumped immediately after Tet and thereafter remained at least 50% higher than during the same months in 1967. By November and December of 1968, measures taken to control the desertion rate, probably aided by the generally low level of combat, had succeeded in lowering the net desertion rate toward the pre-Tet level.

DOD studies indicate that in general those

combat units with the worst desertion rates in 1967 also had the worst rates in 1968, suggesting that chronically inferior leadership in those units is a significant factor. In December 1968, Lt General Dang Van Quang, special assistant to President Thieu, attributed the very high desertion rates among most III and IV Corps infantry divisions in part to poor leadership at division level, and said that plans were being made to replace the commanding officers of at least half the six divisions in those two Corps areas. The RVNAF Joint General Staff, when considering the desertion problem last September, noted that the increase in casualties in some combat units had been a key factor in the increase in desertion in those same units.

More generally, the rapid expansion of RVNAF during 1968 and the institution of general mobilization, which has included the return of numerous desertion-prone individuals to the armed services, has contributed significantly to the mounting desertion rate. An RVNAF JGS survey made in the latter half of 1968 showed that 80% of recent deserters had six months of service or less. The JGS in its September analysis also cited problems associated with the greatly increased numbers of volunteers and re-drafted army reserve personnel. The volunteers, the JGS said, become more desertion-prone than inductees, after their initial burst of enthusiasm. Presumably, the reservists are more ready to desert because they feel that they have already done enough for their country. Furthermore, many recruits are clearly aware that desertion control is slack, particularly in the countryside, and take advantage of this slackness. Traditionally, light penalties and periodic amnesties in the past undoubtedly contribute also to desertions by the newly-mobilized.

A final factor, clearly of significance to the problems of all units, but of special importance to combat units, is the natural reluctance to give one's life just before peace arrangements bring an end to the fighting. Lt. General Le Nguyen Khang, former III Corps Commander, has given great weight to this reluctance in analyzing the reasons for the increased desertions.

Past RVNAF efforts to bring down desertion rates have had varying degrees of effectiveness. Decree-Law 15, issued in April 1966, was the basis of a program which nearly halved the desertion rate that prevailed in the first half of 1966 and kept the rate down throughout 1967. Decree-Law 15 defined desertion more strictly than it had been defined in the past and provided harsher penalties, including service at front-line labor camps. Despite the promising initial results of this program, a number of weaknesses have become apparent. A tendency to minimize the penalties applied to deserters, through use of a "mitigating circumstances" clause in Decree-Law 15, developed within the RVNAF although this tendency has reportedly been dealt with by instructions from the Director of Military Justice issued late last year. There have also been reports that operational units found it too difficult to administer combat labor camps, as the number of such punishments increased, and in some cases refused to accept additional deserters. Though we have seen no verification of these reports and have no statistics on the size of the labor-camp program, we imagine that any such development could have reduced the effectiveness of general anti-desertion measures during 1968.

Question 10A: What differences of opinion exist concerning extent of RVNAF improvement, and what is evidence underlying different views? (e.g., compare recent CIA memo with MACV views.) For example:

1. What success are the RF and PF having in providing local security and reducing VC control and influence in rural populations? The causes of RF/PF ineffectiveness are

well known and generally agreed: inadequate leadership, training, and motivation; low pay, poor housing and dependent care; inferior weapons, particularly in the case of the PF, and insufficient logistic support; static deployments; and uncertain reinforcement by air, artillery, and ground units when under attack or in contact during offensive operations. On the other hand, despite these problems, the RF and PF have had reasonable success in providing local security. Many individual RF and PF units have been willing to take casualties and have sometimes accounted for a disproportionate number of the enemy KIA. We know too that the RF and PF have in general responded well to association with US units, as in the Marines' Combined Action Platoons, and to the technical and motivational training instituted more recently by the MACV Mobile Advisory Teams. Indeed, the insistent demands of US sector and sub-sector advisors in many areas for greater allocations of these forces are one indicator of their value.

US attention to the RF and PF has paid off and should continue, e.g., focussing on motivational training, provision of more and better weapons, general logistical support, improved living conditions, etc. At the same time, we should give further thought to the future missions of the RF and PF in support of pacification, to the place of the RF and PF in any reorganization of the RVNAF command system that may be undertaken, and to the role of these forces in and after a settlement.

Question 11: To what extent could RVNAF—as it is now—handle the VC (Main Force, local forces, guerrillas), with or without U.S. combat support to fill RVNAF deficiencies, if all NVA units were withdrawn:

a. If all Northerners (but not regroupes) were withdrawn.

b. If VC still had Northern fillers. Assuming that all US forces and all NVA forces—fillers as well as organized units but not regroupes—were withdrawn from South Viet-Nam, the RVNAF alone should be able to cope with the remaining Viet Cong. As the RVNAF modernization and improvement program advances, the ability of the government forces to make inroads into the VC military-political apparatus and to reduce the level of the insurgency will be enhanced. Even spokesmen for the other side (e.g. Tran Buu Kiem and Wilfred Burchett) have recently made reference to their concern for the fate of the Viet Cong if the North Vietnamese troops were pulled out.

If NVA regular units were withdrawn but NVA personnel remained in Viet Cong units as fillers, the relative balance would be more difficult to assess. Under these circumstances it would probably be necessary to provide the RVNAF with sufficient US combat support to make up for its deficiencies until the entire modernization and self-sufficiency program were completed.

Question 11: To what extent would RVNAF—as it is now—handle the VC (Main Force, local forces, guerrillas), with or without U.S. combat support to fill RVNAF deficiencies, if all NVA units were withdrawn:

a. If all Northerners (but not regroupes) were withdrawn.

b. If VC still had Northern fillers. 11. Assuming that all US forces and all NVA forces, fillers as well as organized units were withdrawn from South Vietnam, the RVNAF as it is presently constituted should be able to cope with the remaining Viet Cong, including the regroupes. Earlier American efforts to modernize and improve RVNAF presumably would have strengthened the ability of the government forces to erode the Viet Cong, and, over the short term, the GVN would be able to make appreciable progress in expanding its control over the countryside; this would be especially true if the terms of the settlement had a beneficial effect on RVNAF morale. However, we

do not believe that the RVNAF will be able to eradicate the VC political-military apparatus or to reduce significantly the level of the insurgency. Indeed, these objectives, as well as the resolution of complex and deeply-rooted RVNAF deficiencies, are realistically possible only in the long term context.

The presence of substantial numbers of NVA fillers in Viet Cong units, in the absence of any US combat troop involvement, would tend to negate even favorable short-term, not to mention long-term, prospects for the RVNAF.

Question 13: What, in various views, are the required changes—in RVNAF command, organization, equipment, training and incentives, in political environment, in logistical support, in U.S. modes of influence—for making RVNAF adequate to the tasks cited in questions 9 and 10 above? How long would this take? What are the practical obstacles to these changes, and what new U.S. moves would be needed to overcome these?

Under current and foreseeable circumstances, it will probably take a minimum of two years before structural and technical reforms can make any substantial contribution toward RVNAF fighting effectiveness. The more critical deficiencies—motivation, discipline, and leadership—and essentially deeper and longer-term problems, some arising out of complex socio-political traditions and others greatly dependent on the prevailing political and military environment. A clearly accelerating favorable military trend highlighted by ARVN battlefield successes could have considerable effect on RVNAF motivation and morale. A stable political situation, and particularly one in which the top military leadership is united and secure, would favorably affect discipline and lower-level leadership.

Question 14: How much, and where, has the security situation and the balance of influence between the VC and NLF actually changed in the countryside over time, contrasting the present to such benchmarks as end-61, end-63, end-65, end-67? What are the best indicators of such change, or lack of it? What factors have been mainly responsible for such change as has occurred? Why has there not been more?

It is extremely difficult to measure changes in the security situation within Viet-Nam over time with any degree of precision. In approximate terms, end-1961 saw a sizable increase in NLF activity and influence. The GVN possibly only controlled 1/2 of the population at that time. After the initial successes of the Strategic Hamlet program during 1962 and 1963, the situation at end-1963 rapidly reverted to the end-1961 level as a result of intensified VC attacks against the program and the political turmoil occasioned by the Buddhist/Diem conflict. The rural situation continued to deteriorate throughout 1964 and part of 1965, largely as a result of political instability and NVA infiltration. The initiation of bombing of the North and the introduction of US troops in 1965 served to stabilize but not reverse the rural security equilibrium by end-1965.

Security, though subject to occasional relapses such as occurred at Tet in February 1968, has generally improved since its nadir in 1965 required the introduction of American combat troops. However, detailed studies of some key provinces indicate that, though statistics may show increases in the secure population for a given area, these changes often result from simple population movement and government held hamlets or towns, the over-all geographic pattern of security in the countryside appears to have remained generally the same.

The official system for measuring of progress, the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), shows substantial progress. According to the December 1968 statistics of the HES, about three-fourths of the total population was

classified as "relatively secure", the remaining one-fourth being divided rather evenly between "contested" and "VC-controlled" categories. By comparison, GVN figures for September 1965 showed approximately half the population to be "relatively secure", approximately one-quarter to be "contested", and one quarter to be "VC-controlled".

However, there are a number of problems with these statistics. Critics of the current means of compilation of the statistics have pointed, among other things, to HES reliance upon GVN sources, the pressure to show progress exerted upon local advisors by upper echelons, the lack of ability to verify much information, and the limited training given evaluators. It also has been argued that the statistics constitute a snapshot of military presence and development which does not show the dynamics of important ingredients, such as political attitudes, and that the statistics are weighted in favor of progress. Problems of definition can also cloud the interpretations. For example, the interpretation of the current statistics can be changed dramatically by switching the population in hamlets currently classified as "C" (hamlets which are subject to VC harassment and where the infrastructure has been identified and curtailed but is still operative) from the "GVN-controlled" category to the "contested" category. Utilizing this method, it can be shown that less than half of the total population (46.7%) is "relatively secure" while 41% of the population is "contested". These figures portray a situation similar to that given by the GVN figures for 1965. Indeed, some studies have found that, if the indicators of the level of VC military and political operations were considered in isolation from the remaining HES statistics, one could in fact conclude that very little progress has been made in the past two years. In short, although progress has undoubtedly occurred, it is difficult to measure it accurately, and attempts to quantify it have generally ended up by overstating it.

The key element in what progress has occurred has been the U.S. military presence. Although few American troops have been directly committed to pacification, their presence has strengthened security and has both formed a protective shield behind which a pacification program could operate and freed ARVN forces to participate in pacification. The essential first step toward pacification is security; the preservation and extension of the pacified areas, however, depends on the ability of the GVN to establish an effective political structure at the local level capable of responding to and eliciting the support of the people. The GVN has made only limited progress in establishing permanent village and hamlet security against the VC and in committing the people against the VC in an active sense. Even during periods when the general military situation appeared to be improving and when statistics showed considerable pacification progress, such as in the second half of 1967, subsequent events and studies of specific areas showed much of this progress to be illusory. In 1967, for example, detailed studies showed that, despite favorable statistics, security actually deteriorated in the latter half of 1967 in several strategic South Vietnamese provinces and that pacification actually lost ground in some key categories. The regression in pacification statistics in February 1968 occasioned by the Communist Tet offensive revealed the fragility of the progress that had been previously portrayed.

At present, there is again statistical progress in South Viet-Nam: the Chieu Hoi rate is up again (though there has been a dip during the last two weeks), neutralizations of members of the Viet Cong infrastructure are high, the HES statistics are on the rise, the Self-Defense forces are expanding, and the Accelerated Pacification Campaign

(APC) is progressing well. Each measurement is subject to varying interpretations, and its significance can be questioned. However, one aspect of this current progress is clear: the current high rate of progress has resulted from an apparent Viet Cong unwillingness to challenge the APC. By the withdrawal of many units, which has resulted in a generally quiet main-force atmosphere, and by this somewhat surprising lack of sustained local activity against the pacification effort, the NVA/VC have given the GVN a chance to extend its control. The GVN has chosen to exploit this chance by spreading its military and pacification assets more thinly and by stressing security over development in order to achieve rapid statistical progress. A resumption of enemy activity against these fragile gains could reverse progress once again, although at the risk of considerable enemy manpower loss.

Question 15: What are the reasons for expecting more change in the countryside in the next two years than in past intervals? What are the reasons for not expecting more? What changes in RVNAF, GVN, U.S., and VC practices and *adaptiveness* would be needed to increase favorable change in security and control? How likely are such changes, individually and together; what are the obstacles?

We may expect more progress in the countryside during the next two years as a result of a variety of interrelated factors. These include: (1) better and more integrated organization and planning both in the GVN and US sides; (2) gradual improvement of the ARVN and RF/PF through more intensive training and better equipment; (3) having more RF/PF available, which form the backbone of local security; (4) greater GVN command emphasis to pacification and particularly the Phoenix program; (5) better province and district level leadership; and (6) perhaps most intangibly, greater GVN responsiveness to the governed as they realize that the US will not indefinitely remain in Viet-Nam, at least at present magnitudes.

Despite the above assertion, we should probably expect neither spectacular nor significant breakthroughs in the countryside over the next year or two. The basic reasons for this are threefold.

The rural population is generally apathetic and does not easily succumb to the blandishments of either the GVN or VC. This makes local political rejuvenation extremely difficult. Secondly, pacification is inherently a slow process because the assets used, whether police, ARVN, RF/PF or local officials, are low grade and thus difficult to control and improve. Finally, the VC still have considerable residual power to threaten and attack pacified areas, although they are unlikely to be able to regain the position of strength they held in 1964-1966.

If the GVN were to move vigorously in certain areas, more substantial results could be forthcoming. ARVN definitely needs better leaders. There is little question that the Vietnamese soldier will fight well if properly directed and led. The same is true for the RF/PF. Also in the area of leadership, the GVN should intensify its program of assigning competent and dedicated men to district and province chief positions. The importance of these positions cannot be overestimated in terms of progress or lack of it in pacification. Moreover, the GVN could make some political gains through the assignment of civilian district and province chiefs in certain pacified areas. Secondly, while retaining the pacification initiative and setting realistic goals, the GVN should avoid an overextension of its resources in the countryside which will inevitably lead to a VC response and some regression at a later date. There are indications that the Accelerated Pacification Campaign and 1969 pacification plan may have been too largely influenced by the desire to show

maximum GVN presence in the countryside for effect on the Paris negotiations, though Thieu's recent emphasis on consolidation during the first part of 1969 is encouraging and should restore perspective.

On the US side, continued effective support to the GVN in Saigon and the field is the most important requirement. At the same time, we must seek out every possible strategy whereby GVN dependence on ourselves will be selectively lessened, while avoiding the impression that we are pulling out.

The VC also have various options open and it is for this reason that our predictions are not more sanguine. As mentioned previously, they have the capability to disrupt the GVN pacification program if they are willing to pay the price. Even without large scale operations against pacified areas, they can reduce costs and effectively use terror and assassination to threaten, intimidate, and create fear among the population—if not control them. Finally, they still have approximately 20% of the rural population under their control. Most of these areas were controlled by the Viet Minh and therefore VC roots are very deep. We may expect a considerable slowdown when GVN emphasis shifts from "contested" to these red areas . . .

Future prognosis, therefore, is unclear. The most likely course of action is for the VC to launch selective campaigns of varying intensity against the pacification program. Some, though largely temporary, reversals to the pacification effort in given geographic areas would probably result. In this context, we consider it unlikely that the VC would be able to obtain the success which they enjoyed during the initial stages of the Tet offensive. If they did, the effect would be to deliver a major blow to the pacification effort and to halt progress for some time to come. Alternatively, if the VC refrain from conducting an active anti-pacification campaign, then we may expect continued momentum in the pacification effort, though not on the same scale as the APC program. Finally, if the enemy initiates a new military campaign and suffers significant military setbacks, the forward movement of pacification would be greatly facilitated.

Question 15: What are the reasons for expecting more change in the countryside in the next two years than in past intervals? What are the reasons for not expecting more? What changes in RVNAF, GVN, U.S., and VC practices and *adaptiveness* would be needed to increase favorable change in security and control? How likely are such changes, individually and together; what are the obstacles?

15. Since 1960, the strategic concept for countering the insurgency in Vietnam has remained basically the same, despite changes in terminology, organization, and the distribution of responsibilities. The doctrine adopted in 1960 accepted that the insurgent threat would be countered by a series of "pacification" stages in which the VC would be deprived of access to the people, their infrastructure would be destroyed, and the authority of the government would be re-established by its ability to provide security and to improve the physical lot of the peasant.

As program has succeeded program since 1960, the principal deficiencies in implementation have become increasingly clear. In 1967, further changes were made in the doctrinal and organizational aspects of pacification and an increased stress was placed on the interdependence between all aspects of the military and political struggle. Despite the deceptive progress of 1967, the statistical recovery since Tet, and the fragile progress of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, the basic deficiencies remain and give little reason to expect a significant change in the situation in the countryside in the next two years.

The Vietnamese Army has not escaped from its conventional warfare mold. Both in its military tactics and in its relations with the people it has all too often acted counter to the basic principles of counterinsurgency rather than in support of them. At the end of 1967, a year of sustained optimism, the U.S. Mission reported that "while ARVN support of pacification increased greatly, ARVN battalions in support of pacification were employed largely in static defense roles which limited their effectiveness." Studies of specific areas noted that RD teams were often "placed in hamlets where the security forces were understrength, inadequate, or simply non-existent." During the VC offensives of 1968, ARVN's tendency toward conventional warfare asserted itself: ARVN's search and destroy operations were less related to pacification considerations than before; ARVN units were more than ever committed to static defense; ARVN's lack of aggressiveness was exemplified by its withdrawal from the countryside; ARVN's looting and the use of artillery and air in populated areas both demonstrated and compounded its problems with the people. Another stage in the continuing effort to improve ARVN is now underway, but most analyses agree that it is unlikely that ARVN will achieve any significant degree of effectiveness any time soon.

Paramilitary units, locally recruited and locally based and theoretically the backbone of any counterinsurgency effort, have been repeatedly ignored or misused. Tet 1968 illustrated the resulting plight of these units. Outgunned by Communist units, they were left isolated in the countryside as ARVN units withdrew into the cities and then ignored in the post-Tet emphasis on urban security, relief and rehabilitation, and the creation of self-defense forces. Both the GVN and MACV have long recognized this problem. In discussing the 1969 Pacification plan, for example, the first "problem area" mentioned by Thieu was the quality and quantity of the territorial forces. MACV has several programs underway to improve the paramilitary services. As in the case of ARVN, recent studies have estimated that under the best of circumstances it would take eighteen months to two years to correct current deficiencies in equipment, resupply, training, firepower, relations with the civilian population, leadership, and motivation.

Despite elaborate planning and creation of machinery to execute and sustain a combined political-military pacification campaign, few Vietnamese leaders have clearly understood the goals of pacification or have committed themselves to supporting it through the GVN administrative apparatus. The majority of the South Vietnamese leaders, including President Thieu, have been chronically indifferent to the American ideas of pacification and skeptical of its claims of successes. Although acquiescing under American insistence and the promises of logistical support, in private they have consistently denigrated its principles and statistics. Under the pressure of the possibilities opened up by the Paris negotiations and the threat posed by the Communist campaign to establish "Liberation Committees," Thieu is now using the name and assets of pacification to pursue a goal of rapidly expanding the GVN's nominal presence in the countryside. To achieve this goal, it has required that the existing RD cadre teams be doubled by splitting existing teams in two, that teams be pulled out of locations prematurely, and that ARVN, RF, and PF forces be thinned out to provide the expanded territorial security required. These moves do not suggest that a solid base for pacification is being built; they may weaken the existing base. In any case, the background of the current Accelerated Pacification Campaign and the haste for rapid progress suggest that Thieu's motives are not linked to contingencies.

Pacification has thus far failed to give the peasant sufficient confidence in the GVN's ability to maintain security, or in the longer run, to redress basic economic, political, and social inequities. An apathetic and war-weary population has been subjected to a constant stream of alternating false and fresh starts of GVN programs; for example, 67% of the hamlets targeted in the 1968 program had been targeted in 1967 or earlier. The US Mission's report on pacification in 1967 commented: "The GVN has yet to invest itself with the image of social revolution and a dynamic alternative to the NLF." The Communists' success in February 1968 in penetrating the hitherto inviolate cities, the GVN's failure to react quickly in either the rural or urban areas, the destruction which accompanied the fighting, and the constantly renewed threats of enemy offensives have not appreciably enhanced the GVN's image nor the peasants' confidence in it.

In short, the problems hampering pacification over the years do not appear to have been significantly reduced. We believe that the pacification program is as vulnerable today as it was prior to the Communist 1968 Tet offensive.

Question 16: What proportion of the rural population must be regarded as "subject to significant VC presence and influence?" (How should hamlet rated as "C" in the Hamlet Evaluation System the largest category—be regarded in this respect?) In particular, what proportion in the provinces surrounding Saigon? How much has this changed?

The official interpretation of the December data from the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) showed that what is called the "relatively secure population" is now 7.1 million or 85.1% of the rural population, the "contested population" is 1.7 million or 16.0%, and the "VC-controlled population" is 2.0 million or 18.9%.

If one were to take the rural population currently classified as "C" in the HES and interpret it to be "contested" rather than "relatively secure," HES statistics would show 2.9 million or 26.8% of the rural population to be "relatively secure," 5.9 million or 54.5% to be "contested," and 2.0 million or 18.9% to be "VC-controlled." Under this type of breakdown, two-thirds to three-fourths of the rural population could be regarded as "subject to significant VC presence and influence."

Some recent DOD studies have provided reasons to believe that this range of two-thirds to three-fourths may not be inaccurate as a general gauge of the extent of VC presence among the rural population. One DOD analysis has shown that only 31% of the total population was rated continuously seen from June 1967 through March 1968, leaving 68% of the total population subject to VC influence during at least part of one month during this period; the percentage considering a rural population alone would be even higher. Another DOD study has found that HES statistics for November 1968 indicate that the VC can claim an active infrastructure in areas containing approximately 60% of the total population and around three-quarters of the rural population. This study has also found that over 85% of the hamlet population surrounding Saigon is subject to an active VC infrastructure, probably reflecting the strong VC attention to the area over many years.

The problem, however, is to define exactly what is "significant VC presence and influence." Both the VC and the GVN have some presence and influence in virtually every part of South Viet-Nam. The mere presence of VC organization within a hamlet

* Hamlets subject to VC harassment and where the infrastructure is identified and curtailed but still operative.

does not necessarily constitute "significant VC presence and influence." While it is true that most of the population of Viet-Nam is influenced in relative degrees by the VC through their infrastructure, for this to be significant the VC must be able to seriously affect the population's activities through such things as propaganda, hamlet infiltrations, tax collection, and disruption of local GVN administrative and security operations. Mere harassing or nuisance type activities should not be considered significant.

In this perspective, there is little question that a certain number of "C" hamlets are "subject to significant VC presence and influence." It becomes clear from a careful reading of the definitions in the HES for "C" and "D" hamlets that those "C" hamlets at the lower end of the scale (which must have some "D" responses to average out at low "C") would have significant VC influence, while those "C" hamlets at the upper end of the scale would not. Discussions with experienced field operators, have confirmed this assumption.

Thus we believe the line would have to be more finely drawn through the "C" hamlets to determine the rural population subject to significant VC presence and influence. There is no doubt that a large percentage is so subject; our best estimate is about half the rural population.

The Saigon area particularly demonstrates the importance of the "C" hamlets in assessing the proportion of the rural population subject to significant VC presence and influence. According to the December 1968 HES, 58% of the rural population in the five provinces surrounding Saigon live in "C" hamlets. If all the "C" hamlets were regarded as subject to significant VC influence and presence, 87% of the people of those provinces would be so subject. Without the "C" hamlets only 28% would be so subject. The Saigon area is a particular target of the VC and their efforts there are strong. A large proportion of the rural population in the provinces around Saigon is subject to significant VC influence and presence from time to time. We believe there has been improvement in this situation since the heavy VC activity at Tet and in May and June.

Question 16: What proportion of the rural population must be regarded as "subject to significant VC presence and influence?" (How should hamlets rated as "C" in the Hamlet Evaluation System—the largest category—be regarded in this respect?) In particular, what proportion in the provinces surrounding Saigon? How much has this changed?

16. The official interpretation of the December data from the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) showed that what is called the "relatively secure population" is now 7.1 million or 85.1% of the rural population, the "contested population" is 1.7 million or 16.0%, and the "VC-controlled population" is 2.0 million or 18.9%.

If one were to take the rural population currently classified as "C" in the HES and interpret it to be "contested" rather than "relatively secure," HES statistics would show 2.9 million or 36.3% of the rural population to be "relatively secure," 5.9 million or 54.5% to be "contested," and 2.0 million or 18.9% to be "VC-controlled." Under this type of breakdown, perhaps two-thirds to three-fourths of the rural population could be regarded as "subject to significant VC presence and influence."

Some recent DOD studies have provided reasons to believe that this range of two-thirds to three-fourths may not be inaccurate as a general gauge of the extent of VC presence among the rural population. One DOD analysis has shown that only 31% of the total population was rated continuously secure from June 1967 through March 1968, leaving 68% of the total population

subject to VC domination or influence during at least part of one month during this period; the percentage considering the rural population alone would be even higher. Another DOD study has found that HES statistics for November 1968 indicate that the VC can claim an active infrastructure in areas containing approximately 60% of the total population and around three-quarters of the rural population.

In addition to these statistical indicators, in evaluating the current situation among the rural population it should be noted that the Communists have traditionally focused their political effort at the village/hamlet level. Their campaign to create "Liberation Committees" throughout Vietnam is clearly built around the village and the hamlet, regardless of reports of organizational efforts at higher levels. Thieu has recently noted the need to increase the number of GVN officials functioning at the hamlet level; according to his figures at the present time there are only three GVN officials in each GVN-controlled hamlet, while the VC have nine officials administering each VC-controlled hamlet.

A DOD analysis has concluded that while the GVN infrastructure outnumbered the VC/NVA almost 30 to 1 at the national level, it has little less than a 2 to 1 edge at the hamlet/village/province level; at the level of the pacification effort in the villages and hamlets the Communists have a 2 to 1 manpower advantage over the GVN.

In short, there is little question that a certain number of "C" hamlets are "subject to significant VC presence and influence." It becomes clear from a careful reading of the definitions in the HES for "C" and "D" hamlets that "C" hamlets at the lower end of the scale (which must have some "D" responses to average out at low "C") would have significant VC influence, while those "C" hamlets at the upper end of the scale might not. The current stress under the Accelerated Pacification Campaign upon raising contested "D" and "E" hamlets to "C" by stressing military factors suggests that, especially in many of the hamlets recently raised to "C", the VC infrastructure remains a significant factor.

Thus, the line should be more finely drawn through the "C" hamlets in order to determine the percentage of the rural population subject to significant VC presence and influence. Our best estimate is that the VC have a significant effect on at least two-thirds of the rural population.

The Saigon area particularly demonstrates the importance of the "C" hamlets in assessing the proportion of the rural population subject to significant VC presence and influence. According to the December 1968 HES, 58% of the rural population in the five provinces surrounding Saigon live in "C" hamlets. If all the "C" hamlets were regarded as subject to significant VC influence and presence, 87% of the people of those provinces would be so subject. The Saigon area has been a special target of the VC for many years; an estimate of around 75% would probably be close to the percentage of the population in the provinces surrounding Saigon which is currently exposed to significant VC influence. While the VC have attempted to step up their political propagandizing and proselytizing efforts in the Saigon area, their relatively military inactivity since May and June probably means that this estimate of 75% represents a decline in their influence.

Question 17: What number or verified numbers of the Communist political apparatus (i.e., People's Revolutionary Party members, the hard-core "infrastructure") have been arrested or killed in the past year? How

many of these were cadre of higher than village level? What proportion do these represent of total PRP membership, and how much—and how long—had the apparatus been disrupted?

Statistics on Communist political cadre "neutralized," i.e., killed, captured, or defecting, are available through the Phoenix (Phung Hoang) program, the keystone of the current effort to attack the Communist infrastructure. According to these statistics, 15,700 political cadre were neutralized during 1968, or approximately 16%-20% of the Communist infrastructure currently estimated at 30,000-100,000. However, more than 13,000 of those neutralized last year were at the village and hamlet levels, suggesting that only a minimal number of middle- or senior-ranking officials were affected. Furthermore, while the infrastructure in several provinces may have been seriously impaired, any adverse impact throughout the vast majority of the provinces does not appear to be significant.

There is some problem with the statistics of the Phoenix program. Prior to August 1968, the reports of the number of Communists neutralized were not thoroughly screened to eliminate non-Communists. Correction of this data on the basis of the experience in the last part of the year, when tighter screening was introduced, reduces the official total of 15,700 to around 14,500, according to a recent DOD study. The same study notes that even the revised figures are believed to include non-Communists or part-time Communists, especially as report-padding may have increased recently under the pressure of attempting to reach the quota set for the Accelerated Pacification Campaign. In addition, it has been estimated that perhaps as many as two-thirds of the prisoners arrested in South Viet-Nam are released within a year as a result of the flaws in the GVN judicial system. If one applies this percentage to the figures on Communists neutralized, it appears that around 7,800 members of the infrastructure were eliminated during 1968, or approximately 8% of the total infrastructure. Such figures on the numbers and percent of Communists eliminated cannot be more than a general guide. Probably a working figure of around 10% would not seriously misrepresent the losses suffered by the Communist political apparatus during 1968. However, these calculations ignore the ability of the Communists to recoup such losses, at least in quantity if not in quality, by recruiting, upgrading of cadre, and introduction of North Vietnamese into the infrastructure. Nevertheless, the pressure on the infrastructure will continue to increase over time and should reduce its effectiveness.

Question 18: What are the reasons for believing that current and future efforts at "rooting out" hard-core infrastructure will be—or will not be—more successful than past efforts? For example, for believing that collaboration among the numerous Vietnamese intelligence agencies will be markedly more thorough than in the past? What are the side-effects, e.g., on Vietnamese opinion, of anti-infrastructure campaigns such as the current "accelerated effort," along with their lasting effect on hard-core apparatus?

The Phoenix program, however important to a successful anti-infrastructure effort, has certain inherent weaknesses. It does not collect intelligence but merely collates and analyzes information made available to the program from the intelligence community. However, it does provide the province and district chiefs with a slowly evolving management tool with which to systematically direct the anti-infrastructure effort and force the different collection and operational agencies to work together. It has also served notice to the Province Chiefs that their performance will in large part be measured by Phoenix results. Although the program was launched in December 1967, Saigon-level

Vietnamese cooperation was minimal until Thieu, after considerable American prodding, issued a presidential decree in July 1968 formally directing that the network be set up. Continuing expressions of interest in the program from the upper echelons of the GVN appear to be slowly breaking down some of the organizational jealousy, rivalries, and inertia shown by the different agencies involved and which hinder the development of the program.

In addition to the problems raised by the nature of the organization, certain problems have arisen from the nature of the effort. Members of the infrastructure, especially the high-ranking ones, are becoming increasingly wary and elusive; some are moving into VC-secure areas. Most easy targets have already been hit, and there are indications that some of the intelligence agencies involved are already beginning to exhaust their data bases. The Viet Cong are beginning to step up their passive and active counter-intelligence measures. As easy targets disappear reliance upon large-scale cordon and search operations and less on rifle-shot efforts based on detailed intelligence; cordon and search operations may get VC supporters and guerrillas, but rarely members of the infrastructure.

Phoenix, as a collator and coordinator, exists where almost nothing existed before. By forcing cadre to move back to VC-secure areas, by the psychologically inhibiting impact the effort is presumably having on members of the infrastructure, and by causing the Communists to divert resources to combat the effort, the current anti-infrastructure program is hindering and putting heavier pressure on the operations of the VC infrastructure, although not eliminating it to any major degree. If GVN higher echelons maintain their interest and if other problems high-lighted by Phoenix are faced, such as those in the judicial system, it can increase its contribution. Recent reports indicate that the field is aware of many of the problems and has commented that the infrastructure quota of the current Accelerated Pacification Campaign will probably not be met and that it may be difficult to meet the infrastructure quota laid out in the overall pacification guidelines for 1969.

Question 19: How adequate is our information on the overall scale and incidence of damage to civilians by air and artillery, and looting and misbehavior by RVNAF?

The information available in Washington on the overall scale and incidence of damage to civilians by air and artillery and by RVNAF looting and misbehavior is less than adequate. The same is true about other similar topics, such as the damage resulting from forced resettlement, and the general impact of the US presence. Specific incidents and chronically bad situations are reported in Embassy provincial reporters' airgrams, Corps situation reports, monthly CORDS province reports, the press, and other miscellaneous channels.

There are also regular monthly reports on civilian war victims admitted to GVN hospitals which give some indication of trends of civilian casualties from all causes. Order-of-magnitude estimates of total civilian casualties throughout Viet-Nam can be made from these statistics.

The section of the Hamlet Evaluation System concerning hamlet problems does require responses on "incidents of misconduct by friendly elements adversely affecting friendly relations with the hamlet populace" and on "actions by friendly elements during military operations adversely affecting relations with hamlet populace (including but not limited to fire from any type of weapon, destructive passage within hamlet area, defoliation)." Statistics from the HES are thus available and can be used to indicate trends, but they do not really provide a basis for

* Hamlets in which VC units and the VC infrastructure are fairly effective.

judgment as to how serious these problems are on an over-all basis.

US advisors at the battalion, district and province level in Viet-Nam are almost always aware of incidents involving civilian casualties and RVNAF misconduct which occur within areas controlled or contested by the GVN. They are also likely to learn of any serious incidents which occur in VC areas. Serious incidents which arouse local feelings would also be reported to Saigon in the Province Advisor's monthly report, which is available in Washington.

Despite this reporting, however, it is difficult to draw a clear picture of the over-all scale and incidence of these problems and how serious they are. Our assessment of these problems, based on the information available, including discussions with officials returning from Viet-Nam, is (1) that damage to civilians by air and artillery is still a serious problem in some populated contested areas and (2) that RVNAF behavior toward the civilian populace has improved considerably over the past year as a result of better discipline, increased indoctrination and training, and improved conditions of service for the troops and their families.

Question 20: To what extent do recent changes in command and administration affecting the country-side represent moves to improve competence, as distinct from replacement of one clique by another? What is the basis of judgment? What is the impact of the recent removal of minority-group province and district and district officials (Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Montagnard) in their respective areas?

Changes in command and administration affecting the countryside almost certainly are predicated to a considerable extent on personal loyalties. This is a complex and well-established Vietnamese tradition and is not likely to change radically in the near term. Perhaps the most notable example of personnel changes made principally on political grounds is the shift in Corps commanders. In virtually every instance, the out-going Corps commanders were supporters of Ky or had never been particularly committed to Thieu. While some of the new commanders are less than ideal, they are generally competent than their predecessors.

There have been a number of significant steps taken during the past year to improve the command-administrative system. The political authority of the Corps commander has been reduced as has his role in the appointment of province and district chiefs. Of course, it must be assumed that new officials at these lower levels are regarded as being politically reliable and that they will remember under whose aegis they came to power. On the other hand, the ties to political patrons do not appear as evident as have existed in the past among local officials. For example, since Tet 1968, twenty-four province chiefs have been changed. Some of the changes were routine transfers while others occurred because of the corruption, inefficiency or ill health of the incumbent. The majority of those province chiefs who were considered corrupt and inefficient or both had been replaced by September 1968. The new province chiefs have in general been a politically faceless lot although it must be assumed that they are politically reliable, despite the absence as yet of any clear pattern of political loyalty. In general, they have been reported to be more competent and less corrupt than their predecessors; it is too early to tell whether these assessments simply derive from comparison with their predecessors, from the fact that the replacements are relatively new on the job and their flaws less visible, or from the lack of sufficient information on which to judge them.

The general pattern of province chief appointments since Thieu took office has been

the replacement of chiefs aligned with strong local interest groups by neutral outsiders. This pattern reverses the pattern of Ky's administration, where for example, there was a VNQDD province chief in Quang Ngai, a Cao Dai chief in Tay Ninh, and Hoa Hao officers in several provinces of the western Delta. Such replacements as those of the Cao Dai province chief of Tay Ninh and of several Hoa Hao province chiefs in delta provinces have initially encountered resistance from the population in the areas affected although it does not appear to have resulted as yet in a major local problem.

The introduction of province chiefs not identified with local political/religious elements can have its benefits. The new chiefs may be better able to escape involvement in local squabbles among the extremely factionalized local groups. Theoretically, such appointments should tend to strengthen the authority of the GVN by separating religious influence from administrative authority and thus reducing the image of political/religious fiefdoms. Also, a province chief who has no local base of support must depend more heavily on the GVN and is presumably more responsive to Saigon direction.

At the district level, the GVN appears to be attempting to improve the competence of its officials through better training and an improved assignment process. In March, the GVN conducted a training course for officers likely to serve as district and province chiefs; a second six-week course was held in September. Thieu addressed the first course and Premier Huong the second, an indication that the GVN appears to be placing considerable importance on the training of officials to work in the countryside. The graduates of the second course selected their district assignments on the basis of their class standing, thus removing the district chief assignment process from any apparent manipulation by province chiefs, division commander, and Corps commanders.

Furthermore, the GVN has shown itself somewhat more responsive than in the past to US advice in these matters. At the time of graduation of the second military administration course, the US Mission submitted a list of 29 incumbent district chiefs whom it wished to see replaced. The GVN agreed to replace all 29, and these slots were presumably among those from which the course graduates were allowed to choose.

On balance, there have been modest gains in command and administrative competence over the past year, less so at the Corps than at the province and district levels. In addition, the removal of minority-group province and district officials has not proven to be disruptive to date.

Question 21: How adequate is our information, and what is it based upon, concerning:

a. Attitudes of Vietnamese elites not now closely aligned with the GVN (e.g., religious leaders, professors, youth leaders, professionals, union leaders, village notables) towards: Participation—if offered—in the GVN; the current legitimacy and acceptability of the GVN; likewise (given "peace") for the NLF or various "neutralist" coalitions; towards U.S. intent, as they interpret it (e.g., U.S. plans for ending the war, perceived U.S. alignments with particular individuals and forces within Viet-Nam, U.S. concern for various Vietnamese interests).

Our information on the attitudes of Vietnamese elites such as those mentioned is generally adequate. Quite naturally, both the quantity and the quality of our information vary from one specific elite group to another. In almost every case, quantity and quality could be improved somewhat and the information further corroborated, though the necessary investment of effort might not always be worthwhile; in any event such information requires and does receive continual updating.

Generally speaking, our information on the attitudes of the various categories of "out-politicians", except on the extreme left-wing, is better than our information on any of the elites cited as examples. Our coverage of union leaders is probably next most adequate. Thereafter, in descending order of adequacy, the other elites would be roughly as follows: religious leaders; youth leaders; professors; professionals; and village notables. It is important to realize that "village notables" hardly constitute a homogeneous national grouping; communication among them is almost nil, and their individual attitudes are almost invariably determined by other and more specific affiliations such as those of race, religion, region, locality, education, occupation or party, or a combination of these factors. To varying degrees, of course, this is true of the other elites as well.

Information on attitudes toward participation in the GVN, the GVN's current legitimacy and acceptability, and US intentions is generally easy to acquire because these attitudes lie near the surface; they are frequently stated with little or no prompting. (It is worth remembering that members of the various Vietnamese elites are seldom reticent, even though sometimes guarded and on occasion deliberately misleading, in their conversations.) Attitudes toward the NLF and toward possible compromise political solutions are more difficult to determine, both because these attitudes in many individuals are tentative and uncertain and because the subjects themselves are still considered somewhat dangerous for public or even private discussion.

Our information on attitudes is based on US Mission, specifically, Embassy, CAS and JUSPAO, reporting from both overt and clandestine sources. Embassy and CAS coverage of the Saigon political elite (of all persuasions) is both intensive and extensive. Embassy and JUSPAO coverage of the local Vietnamese-language press is fairly extensive, with concentrated attention devoted to the 8 or 10 publications representing distinct political shadings (e.g. militant Buddhist, radical Southern, Northern Catholic). JUSPAO, USAID, and Embassy contacts in youth and educational circles are extensive but could use further depth. In the provinces, Embassy provincial reporters spend full time contacting local elites, including local GVN administrators, religious and social figures, and political party leaders. Further information is developed from local CAS, CORDS, and JUSPAO sources. (Local elites seem to exhibit no greater or less inclination than their Saigon counterparts to discuss controversial subjects such as legitimacy of the GVN, recognition of the NLF, U.S. intentions, etc.).

Question 21: How adequate is our information, and what is it based upon, concerning:

b. Patterns of existent political alignments within GVN/RVNAF and outside it—reflecting family ties, corruption, officers' class, secret organizations and parties, religious and regional background—as these bear upon behavior with respect to the war, the NLF, reform and broadening of the GVN, and responses to U.S. influence and intervention.

Our usable knowledge of political alignments of the types described is less than our information on current attitudes of the various elites noted earlier. We can predict in general terms the behavior of numerous prominent individuals and groupings within the GVN and RVNAF, but our knowledge of individual attitudes at second and third echelons of the GVN/RVNAF machinery tends to be considerably more scattered and less comprehensive.

Increased attention to the collection, evaluation, and utilization of biographic information would probably enhance our useful knowledge of existent political alignments.

Such information would be valuable to our new advisors and officials arriving in Viet-Nam. It would also provide us a better basis on which to recommend to the GVN actions regarding various individuals, e.g., our efforts to obtain removal of incompetent and corrupt officials.

In general, we seem to have adequate information on significant political groupings, including several groups which are not heavily represented in the GVN or RVNAF leadership. We could use more information and analysis on some of the political party organizations—particularly the Dai Viet party and its influence within the GVN and RVNAF. We have seen no comprehensive study of the alignments created by (or responsible for) the practice of corruption; we have discussed and reported the problem itself or its specific manifestations, but we have not analyzed its consequences in terms of the behavior and attitudes of those involved.

In sum, we could probably use more information on a systematic basis in this particular field. At the same time, we must recognize that there is a definite limit to the quality and quantity of information we can effectively digest and act upon in this regard. Our ability to manipulate individuals and groups on the basis of such additional information will remain limited in any case, particularly in regard to those people below the top leadership positions in various fields.

Question 22. What is the evidence on the prospects—and on what changes in conditions and U.S. policies would increase or decrease them—for changes in the GVN toward:

a. broadening of the government to include participation of all significant non-Communist regional and religious groupings (at province and district levels, as well as cabinet).

Events of the past year have brought home clearly to most responsible Vietnamese nationalists the need for greater unity on the non-Communist side. Many if not most of these nationalists, particularly party and Assembly politicians, have called for a "broadening" of the government to help achieve this unity. The GVN leadership has also sounded more receptive to this idea, though it has taken no further action since the establishment of the Tran Van Huong government last May (which was a decided broadening, compared to the previous cabinet).

One difficulty is that most political groups advocating "broadening" really want an enhanced or preeminent position for themselves, often at the expense of their rivals. This can create further disunity rather than greater unity. Further more, "representative" men are not always competent ones; it is difficult, for example, to think of more than a handful of respectable and capable Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, or Montagnard leaders who could handle Cabinet or sub-Cabinet level responsibilities. The immediate symbolic, or "political", value of such appointments must therefore be weighed against the corruption or ineffectiveness which could result.

It must also be noted that certain groups, such as the "militant" Buddhists, are completely opposed to the present GVN leadership and are now actively seeking its overthrow. It is extremely unlikely they could be brought into a broad government on any reasonable terms at this time.

President Thieu and Prime Minister Huong are reported planning a cabinet shuffle for sometime after the Tet holidays. There is some evidence that they see the present cabinet as mainly "technical" and that some additional political elements can be brought into the government without significantly altering the existing political balance. They may also feel that the changes will defuse current criticism, whether justified or not, of the cabinet by the National Assembly, the press, and other sources.

While some broadening would clearly be desirable, we do not believe the present regional balance should be upset nor should Huong be replaced—which limits what changes can actually be made at this point. On the other hand, changes that are inconsequential politically could create an unfortunate picture of continuing division and weakness within the GVN.

On balance, we think the only "political" changes feasible at present would be the inclusion of relatively "safe" party leaders and former Presidential/Vice Presidential candidates such as RDV leader Ha Thuc Ky, or possibly former Vice Presidential candidate and still respected Phan Quang Dan, although he does not have a major political following now. Any attempt to include more militant "opposition" or "neutralist" elements would risk serious Northern/Catholic/RVNAF reaction. We would probably get nowhere if we attempted now to encourage such wider participation in any case and might merely confirm suspicions in certain Vietnamese leaders' minds that we are working for a "peace cabinet" or government of transition. This could unsettle the situation further.

There are other means of effecting a broadening of the GVN at the national level. The Constitution provides for outside advisory councils on culture and education, on economic and social matters and on ethnic minority affairs. Implementing legislation is still to be passed for the establishment of all of these councils, but at least in theory these bodies have representative value and could, if the executive and legislative prove willing to utilize them, exercise some influence over government policy. Similar results could be obtained through less formal means such as presidential appointment of other consultative groups.

Broadening at province and district levels presents problems of a different and more complex nature. The only "representative" bodies, elective or appointive, which now exist at that echelon and in which broader participation might be encouraged are the virtually powerless provincial and municipal councils, elected in May of 1965 and now overdue for reelection or replacement. Aside from their lack of power, the provincial and municipal councils are not ideally representative. In several instances, they are dominated by single interest-groups which managed to turn out a bloc vote, to the exclusion of other elements of the local populations. While these results reflected accurately the local political muscle in most cases, they left the less-disciplined minorities, or unorganized majorities, underrepresented.

However, the provincial and municipal councils, with certain adaptations, could become fairly worthwhile institutions. Foremost among the changes would be a grant of considerably wider authority to the councils or their successor bodies and the creation of an electoral system (e.g., proportional representation or allocation of seats for recognizable minorities) that would guarantee more representative results in every locality and at the same time permit adequate reflection of local political strength. It is also at this level, perhaps, that some form of participation by the NLF might be provided for, or at least invited, at an early date with the fewest and least severe problems of constitutional change, recognition of territorial control, or derogation of overall GVN authority.

The Constitution also provides for elected mayors and province chiefs not later than the beginning of the second presidential term in October 1971. There is no legal obstacle to earlier implementation of this provision, and it could probably be undertaken now in the six autonomous cities and perhaps in a few provinces. The principal problem is the GVN's reluctance to decentralize the Province Chief's considerable political

and military power to an elected civilian official at this crucial stage of the war.

Regarding district-level political changes, it should be noted that the district—unlike the province or village—has no legal status or electoral tradition; it is merely an administrative subdivision of the province. Any political "broadening" at the district level is therefore likely to depend on action at the province level rather than on separate initiatives at the district level.

Question 22: What is the evidence on the prospects—and on what changes in conditions and U.S. policies would increase or decrease them—for changes in the GVN toward:

b. stronger emphasis, in selection and promotion of officers and officials, on competence and performance (as in the communist Vietnamese system) as distinct from considerations of family, corruption, and social (e.g., educational) background.

Despite current efforts in this regard, there seems little prospect that in the near future the GVN will succeed in establishing a system fully emphasizing competence and quality of performance as the principal factors influencing appointments and promotions within the Vietnamese civil and military services. The concept of loyalty to the family unit and the nepotism that results from it are matters of long-standing tradition. The notion that only a *baccalaureate* holder is truly qualified to be an officer will persist for a long time, although there are signs that this prejudice is breaking down.

There are other limiting factors, ranging from the overall shortage of qualified manpower upon which the RVNAF and the civil service can draw to GVN fear of the possible inflationary consequences of salary increases designed to lessen the incentive for corruption. Some positive steps taken by the GVN even seem to have produced unintended results: when the RVNAF introduced fitness reports and promotion panels in 1967, the number of promotions to the critical ranks of captain and above declined and fell below the number authorized, thereby exacerbating rather than easing RVNAF's officer shortage.

There are signs that the GVN is coming to realize the importance of competence and performance as standards for selection and advancement; the recent initiation of administrative training courses for prospective province and district chiefs at our behest are among these indications. More basic reforms, such as the education of large numbers of junior officers and fledgling civil servants along Western lines, or systematic measures to reduce institutional opportunities for corruption, will probably have to await a scaling-down of the war and a greater degree of economic stability.

Intensification of present US policies, rather than any basic changes, seem to be indicated. We can and should continue to press the GVN for the removal of ineffective officers. We should systematize our biographic reporting and performance rating of officers and civil servants to whom US advisors are assigned, so as to reinforce our efforts to obtain influence in the GVN assignment process.

We should maintain our off-shore training programs for officers and civil servants at the maximum feasible levels, both to increase their technical competence and, if possible, to instill some basic concepts of leadership and public service. We should coordinate with the GVN on salary and allowance levels, so that theirs are at least roughly comparable with our own and those of our contractors and do not lag hopelessly behind those in the private sector. In addition, we should continue our advisory efforts in such fields as port operation and tax collection, in order to improve the capability to deal with such sources of corruption and financial loss.

We must be careful about applying too rigorous Western standards in measuring GVN performance, which has been a tendency in the past, especially in the U.S. press. In addition, in assessing the RVNAF/GVN's relative performance, two factors about the enemy should also be kept in mind; (1) We are not witness to his every action and error as we so often are to those of GVN/RVNAF; and (2) he has a cohesive political party organization which maintains stricter discipline and partially compensates for probably as much individual inefficiency and incompetence as on our side. In this regard, improved GVN political organization could also help to overcome some of the leadership deficiencies noted above.

Question 22: What is the evidence on the prospects—and on what changes in conditions and U.S. policies would increase or decrease them—for changes in the GVN toward:

c. political mobilization of non-communist sympathies and energies in support of the GVN, as evidenced, e.g., by reduced desertion, by willing alignment of religious, provincial and other leaders with the GVN, by wide cooperation with anti-corruption and pro-efficiency drives.

The prospects that certain government changes might promote greater political mobilization of non-communist forces in support of the GVN are mixed. The evidence of 1968 is instructive in this regard: GVN stability was decidedly greater than in any other year since the overthrow of Diem, in part the result of the legal and constitutional base developed during 1966 and 1967; the 1968 Tet offensive administered a powerful shock to the population and a major set-back to the pacification program, but at the same time it produced a widespread upsurge of national feeling and a greater willingness by many people to cooperate with the GVN. However, the intensity of these sentiments has clearly leveled off during the past several months. A number of nationalist fronts bloomed briefly, only to wither after a few weeks or months in the face of traditional factional in-fighting among their leaders and without their having established any significant mass support. During 1968, as GVN forces were expanded at our urging, RVNAF desertion rates rose.

1968 also saw some favorable signs of evolution in the attitudes and conduct of the GVN. Government response to the refugee and rehabilitation problems created by the Tet offensive was impressive. The reorganization of village and hamlet government and the election of local leadership at those levels have made administration on the local level somewhat more responsive and more acceptable to the populace. The recent agreement between the GVN and the Montagnard separatist movement may have resolved a somewhat secondary but festering problem of political mobilization. Even the People's Self-Defense program, inadequate though it is in military terms, is involving large numbers of people in an enterprise that emphasizes both their own responsibilities and the government's interest in their security and welfare.

Nevertheless, the issue remains: what constitutes political mobilization or commitment to the GVN cause? Our discussion of the prospects for broadening of the government implicitly carries the expectation that greater representativeness in political institutions and a larger share in the running of things for religious, ethnic, and political groupings will produce a reciprocal popular commitment. This is not necessarily true, however.

We believe that commitment to the GVN is determined for much of the population by the answers to a very few basic questions. By far one of the most important of these, now as always, is: Can the government pro-

vide security? It is in this context that the other questions become relevant: Will the government treat people decently, or at least leave them alone, educate their children, or make it possible for people to market their rice or obtain a fair price in return?

The answer to the basic problem, security, will rest increasingly with the RVNAF (as noted elsewhere). If adequate and sustained levels of security in the urban areas and in significant and increasing portions of the countryside can be assumed, the GVN will probably evolve slowly to the point where its performance can begin to generate significantly greater political mobilization. Similarly, a reversal or substantial reduction in security, either by dramatic developments or by attrition, might wipe out what political mobilization the GVN has managed to achieve during the past year.

In general terms, U.S. policy already supports a wide variety of programs designed to contribute to increased security and development, and thereby to increased political mobilization. This policy should obviously continue.

In regard to specific U.S. actions to encourage mobilization of political support for the GVN, it is clear that anti-GVN elements such as the An Quang Buddhists are hoping for U.S. help in replacing the GVN with one more to their liking. They obviously feel that their demand for a "peace government" will appeal to U.S. and other external opinion and may encourage action to unseat Thieu and Ky. This in turn has encouraged "fence-sitting" among the uncommitted political elements, many of whom would probably support the GVN if it were perfectly clear to them that the U.S. had no intention of pressuring Thieu and Ky into personally unacceptable political concessions or into stepping aside. Statements of reassurance by U.S. leaders and officials at all appropriate levels, which are in any case periodically needed by GVN leaders, would help discourage this "fence-sitting" tendency.

It must be recognized that short of actively moving for the replacement of Thieu and Ky, nothing the U.S. can say or do would satisfy such strongly anti-GVN groups as the An Quang Buddhists. Even if this were done, these extreme groups would then demand a wholesale purge which the U.S. would find totally unacceptable. The result would likely be a "right-wing" reaction involving far more repression of these groups than anything undertaken or contemplated by the present GVN.

Question 23: How critical, in various views, is each of the changes in question 22 above to prospects of attaining—at current, reduced or increased levels of U.S. military effort—either "victory", or a strong non-communist political role after a compromise settlement of hostilities? What are views of the risks attendant to making these changes, or attempting them; and, to the extent that U.S. influence is required, on U.S. practical ability to move prudently and effectively in this direction? What is the evidence?

The three types of possible change—broadening the GVN, a true merit system, and political mobilization—are closely interrelated. Any separation of these three types of change is therefore somewhat artificial, but some effort at distinguishing among them is clearly necessary.

To many, "victory" has meant the outright defeat of communist forces (both Viet Cong and NVA) or at least such heavy attrition of them that no alternative remained but their total and permanent withdrawal. It has also meant the destruction or dissolution of the entire communist political apparatus. There is now growing realization that victory in these terms is unattainable and that the inexorable trend is toward some compromise settlement of hostilities and some kind of political competition thereafter. In this situation, a strong non-commu-

nist political role becomes a necessity for any satisfactory outcome.

In this context, political mobilization is the most critical of the three types of government "change". Broadening of the government, which we consider basically a contributory factor to political mobilization, is deserving of priority attention, since some steps in this direction can be taken relatively quickly and can produce results that are visible, even though somewhat superficial at the outset. Stronger emphasis on competence and performance in the selection and promotion of officers and officials is least critical, not because it is unimportant but because genuine and thorough-going change will probably take longest to effect.

Any reduction in the level of our own military effort without a corresponding reduction in presence and activity of North Vietnamese forces may reduce the likelihood that the GVN would work toward political mobilization. On the other hand, any conceivable increase in the level of U.S. military effort would probably not materially affect the prospects for political mobilization. On balance, we conclude that a policy of maintaining the current level of military effort while preparing for possible reciprocal reduction of that level affords the best prospects for increased political mobilization. Essentially, the same argumentation applies to the matter of broadening the government.

The relation between the level of our own military effort and the GVN's emphasis on the competence and performance of its personnel is of a different character; obviously, any reduction of our effort makes an improvement in GVN and RVNAF performance all the more necessary, but so far there is little evidence on which to judge this.

In general, the GVN would not seem to run unacceptable risks in making or attempting any of these changes; the problem, rather, is whether the GVN has the will and the ability to make them and whether they can be made in time to do much good. Some risks have already been noted possibly attending any significant effort at broadening the GVN at the national level. Areas where U.S. influence may be required have also been indicated (in Question 22).

In general terms, U.S. influence in the political sphere has often been misunderstood and its impact at times overrated. Our support for governments and programs has been interpreted as support for their leaders of the moment or for their initiators (e.g., Nguyen Khanh, Nguyen Cao Ky, Nguyen Duc Thang), whether or not this was the case. And there are many politicians outside the GVN who profess to believe that the Embassy and CAS are behind every shift in policy, change in personnel, or other political development even when this is patently not the case. These circumstances argue for caution and circumspection as we seek to wield political influence, and for a sure understanding of what the exercise of such influence can entail—e.g., our responsibility for what follows after we intervene, as seen not only through the eyes of the Vietnamese themselves but of other allies and friends as well. This does not mean we should not make the effort (since we will frequently be damned whether we have made the effort or not), only that we should be clear about the risks and responsibilities entailed for us therein.

Question 26: What is the evidence of the VC/NVA casualties? In disrupting VC/NVA scale of effect of B-52 attacks in producing operations? How valid are estimates of overall effect?

Evidence on the scale of VC/NVA casualties resulting from B-52 attacks is available from a variety of sources, including agent reports, PW and rallier debriefings, captured documents, ground follow-ups and visual reconnaissance. However, the extent and usefulness of this evidence varies considerably.

In the case of harassment and interdiction missions and strategic missions (HIS) against suspected VC base areas, the evidence on enemy casualties is inadequate. Although PW and rallier statements and captured documents attest to significant casualties resulting from specific missions, the available evidence is insufficient for a confident estimate of the overall scale of these casualties. There is little evidence to suggest that these HIS missions have succeeded in inflicting a scale of losses on the VC/NVA sufficient to significantly disrupt tactical operations or to force the Communists to alter their basic strategy for South Viet-Nam. To some extent, moreover, the level of the effectiveness of the HIS missions does diminish as the enemy develops tactics to adjust to their destructive potential. Indeed, captured documents and PW and rallier statements often refer to early warning systems and experimentation with types of shelters and methods to avoid recurring patterns in B-52 strikes.

Evidence on the effect of tactical air support (TAS) missions permits more confident estimates of the scale of casualties. In addition to interrogations and captured documents, ground follow-ups and visual reconnaissance have provided additional measures of the scale of the casualties. Used together, these four sources have documented the large scale casualties resulting from tactical B-52 strike missions; for example, MACV's estimated enemy KBAs at Khe Sanh alone run from a minimum 4000 to over 10,000. Moreover, MACV operational reports have repeatedly noted that TAS airstrikes in South Viet-Nam have disrupted Communist combat plans and helped set back their immediate time-table.

Question 27: What effect is the Laotian interdiction bombing having:

a. In reducing the capacity of the enemy logistic system?

The bombing has clearly imposed serious strains on the enemy's infiltration and logistic capabilities. It has made the movement far more difficult and no doubt slower than would be the case if there were no bombing. Also, it has probably reduced the potential flow of supplies that Hanoi could have put into South Viet-Nam. However, despite our efforts to choke off the flow of supplies, the enemy has made effective use of by-passes, portages, water routes, night movement, additional trucks, and non-motorized transport, and has managed not only to keep the roads open and the supplies moving but also to expand and improve his logistics network. In short, our interdiction efforts in Laos do not appear to have weakened in any major way Communist capabilities to wage an aggressive and protracted campaign in South Viet-Nam as well as to support military operations against RLG forces in Laos itself.

Question 27: What effect is the Laotian interdiction bombing having:

b. In destroying materiel in transit?

Our information is inadequate to estimate accurately the amount of enemy supplies destroyed in transit to South Viet-Nam by the Allied interdiction effort in Laos. However, information provided by pilot sightings of trucks and other related reports permits an estimate that 10 percent to 15 percent of the trucks moving through the Laos panhandle are being destroyed.

Until mid-1968, the Laotian interdiction bombing campaign concentrated on destroying trucks carrying materiel from North Viet-Nam through the Laotian panhandle to South Viet-Nam. While this bombing placed heavy strains on North Vietnamese logistical capabilities, these obstacles did not prevent Hanoi from maintaining a flow of supplies sufficient to accommodate an expansion of Communist strength and an intensification of Communist military operations in the South, as demonstrated by the events of 1968. In mid-1968 the Allies changed the emphasis

of the interdiction effort from destruction of materiel and trucks to blocking so-called "non-bypassable choke points," hoping in this fashion to stop the flow of materiel south. While the present emphasis on choke points continues to hamper the enemy's ability to move supplies, truck movement in the Laotian panhandle is at the same high level this January as it was last January, suggesting that once again the Allied effort is only taxing the Communist flow of materiel. As long as the Communists wish to pay this price, they can continue to move materiel south.

Question 28: With regard to the bombing of North Viet-Nam:

a. What evidence was there on the significance of the principal strains imposed on the DRV (e.g., in economic disruption, extra manpower demands, transportation blockages, population morale)?

There was a good deal more evidence on the nature of the strain produced by the bombing than on their significance. U.S. intelligence indications, including *inter alia* the observations of travelers to North Viet-Nam, the opinions of the Hanoi diplomatic community (notably the Canadians and British), North Vietnamese public radio broadcasts, aerial photography, and the testimony of NVA POW's in South Viet-Nam, of fishermen captured off the coast of North Viet-Nam, and of the Spanish repatriates—all underscored the fact that the U.S. bombing was a matter of concern to the North. This evidence indicated that it was clearly having an impact and was generating strains throughout North Viet-Nam. As shown in the attached chart (at end of paper), the bombing is estimated to have caused North Viet-Nam economic and military losses totaling just under \$500 million. In addition, there were many additional losses that could not, in the intelligence community's opinion, be assigned any meaningful values.

Unfortunately, the available intelligence indicators were relatively silent about the significance of these strains, i.e., about their cumulative ability to deter Hanoi from political and military policies unacceptable to the U.S. In theory, there was an upper limit to North Viet-Nam's capacity simultaneously to continue the defense of the North and the big-unit war in the South. The bombing undoubtedly pushed Hanoi closer to that limit, but it was not possible to determine precisely (1) where the limit lay, and (2) how far from it Hanoi was at any given time. Hanoi's decisions to change from protracted war to the Tet offensive and then to negotiations may be seen as indications it was approaching that limit, but it obviously still had considerable reserve capacity at that time.

What did become clear during the course of the bombing was that the North Vietnamese had not been paralyzed. Hanoi found a variety of ways to minimize and adapt to the strains of the bombing. Foreign aid was perhaps the most important single element in this adaptation, but the striking tenacity of the North Vietnamese leadership and the disciplined if fatalistic response of the North Vietnamese people were of nearly equal importance. Despite increasingly heavy bombing, the North continued to function. A high level of imports continued to be received and distributed, permitting North Vietnam to serve as "the great rear" for "the great frontline" in the South. The infiltration of men and supplies continued to increase from 1965 to the present.

Nevertheless, *in retrospect* it appears that by late 1967 and early 1968, the strains caused by the bombing were having a cumulative effect. The Spanish repatriates (a group of 14 Spaniards and their dependents who were repatriated to Spain in late 1967 after living for 13 to 19 years in North Vietnam) reported that the bombing had made life in the countryside very difficult and had been extremely demoralizing to the population.

Some of the Spaniards believed that the North Vietnamese could not hold out longer than another year or two, because after that time the privations, misery, and bomb damage would be too great. One repatriate talked in Hanoi with an NVA lieutenant colonel from the DRV Ministry of Interior, who said in December 1967 that it would be very difficult to continue the fighting because of widespread demoralization and bomb damage.

Other evidence of growing difficulties in North Vietnam can be found in a decree on "the punishment of counterrevolutionary crimes," published by Hanoi in March 1968, which covered a wide range of activities harmful to state security and to the war effort and prescribed a variety of punishments ranging from several years' imprisonment to death. This decree was originally adopted by the DRV National Assembly in October 1967 and promulgated by President Ho the following month; the four-month delay between promulgation and publication has not been explained, but may have been related to Hanoi's expectations of intensified bombing. However, the very need for such a decree, as well as its timing, points to the leadership's concern with internal conditions and morale in the North in late 1967 and early 1968.

In addition, the bombing was having a cumulative impact on the North Vietnamese economy, resulting in the appearance of widespread black market activities which eventually came to involve many low-level DRV officials and cadre, as well as the man in the street. During 1967, the price of black market rice rose to ten times the price of rationed rice; some foods, like meat, could be procured virtually only on the black market. By the end of February 1968, economic damage caused by the bombing was estimated at \$295 million, more than twice the estimated \$135 million in military damage. A large number of reports from observers in Hanoi pointed to growing shortages in consumer goods and foodstuffs, persistent agricultural shortfalls, and increasingly strict rationing. The progressive dilution of the rice ration (by increasing the percentage of substitutes such as wheat, maize, and manioc at the expense of the percentage of rice) was one of the most striking indications of economic difficulties. By June 1968 the rice ration had been reduced to 50 percent rice substitutes, and subsequently it was reduced even further. (It is now about 60 percent rice substitutes.)

These facts, coupled with personal observations, led the Indonesian ambassador to Hanoi, Nugroho, to conclude in June 1968 that the main reason which impelled the DRV to agree to talk with the US was the need for a breather as a result of a deteriorating economic situation. In his opinion, peace negotiations were essential to Hanoi, at least for a "pause of calm," if not a permanent peace settlement.

Manpower shortages presented yet another intractable problem. Despite one school of thought, which held that Hanoi had more than enough manpower to keep the North intact and to fight a big unit war in the South, we came to believe by February 1968 that some of the key theoretical and statistical assumptions upon which these views were based had overlooked both Hanoi's own demographic data as well as the nearly unanimous opinions of on-the-spot observers, who pointed to severe and increasing labor and manpower shortages. Before the March 31 bombing limitation, an estimated 300,000 to 500,000 civilians were engaged in part-time bomb damage repair work, and an additional 100,000 military personnel were assigned full time to air defense. These manpower drains were intensified by high levels of infiltration into South Viet-Nam, and, in our judgment, by labor shortages which predated the bombing. The over-all result, therefore, was that

the manpower situation began to weigh more and more heavily on Hanoi, until eased considerably by the March 31 bombing limitation. It should be noted, however, that there is no evidence that manpower shortages in themselves were becoming acute enough to prevent Hanoi from continuing its policies.

Bottlenecks caused by intensive bombing of the bridges and roads near Haiphong were yet another problem for the Hanoi leadership. These strikes increased through the summer and fall of 1967, and while their impact cannot be quantified, it was clear from observers' reports that imports were piling up in the port due to interdiction of the lines of communication. Increasing use by the US of Mark 36 Destroyers in the latter part of 1967 undoubtedly contributed to transportation problems on inland waterways and some road areas. Throughout North Viet Nam as a whole, transportation routes were heavily interdicted; by the time of the March 31 bombing limitation, possibly 400 bridges had been damaged or destroyed throughout the country. The turn-around time for vessels calling at Haiphong increased from an average of 13 days in 1966 through 18 in 1967 and 25 in 1968, but there were variations within each year which could not be directly attributed to the bombing.

Question 28: With regard to the bombing of North Viet-Nam:

c. To what extent did Chinese and Soviet aid relieve pressure on Hanoi?

The degree of relief provided by Soviet and Chinese aid cannot be quantified, but its importance is suggested by the fact that, whereas the bombing destroyed capital stock, military facilities, and current production in North Viet-Nam worth nearly \$500 million, Soviet and Chinese aid during this period was nearly \$2.9 billion, nearly 6 times as much. This high rate of foreign aid, coupled with the relatively low requirements of North Viet-Nam itself and of NVA/VC forces in the South, goes a long way toward explaining Hanoi's ability to withstand the bombing.

Despite occasional Soviet complaints of Chinese interference with rail shipment, and despite such transportation difficulties as may have been caused in China by the Cultural Revolution or by deliberate Chinese Government policy, the Communist aid moved in sufficient quantities to take care of North Vietnamese needs and enable the regime to continue the war effort.

The trend of Soviet and Chinese aid has been as follows:

[In million U.S. dollars at Soviet foreign trade prices]

	1965	1966	1967	1968	Total
Economic:					
U.S.S.R.....	85	150	200	240	675
China.....	50	75	80	100	305
Total.....	135	225	280	340	980
Military:					
U.S.S.R.....	210	360	505	440	1,515
China.....	60	95	145	100	400
Total.....	270	455	650	540	1,915

All in all, the Soviets and the Chinese have supplied North Viet-Nam with a total of nearly \$2.9 billion in economic and military aid since the bombing began.

It would be difficult to overstate the importance of this aid to Hanoi. More than any other single factor, it has enabled the North Vietnamese to withstand the bombing and to continue the war in the South. In 1968, for example, the Soviets provided economic aid in the form of petroleum, industrial and agricultural equipment, trucks and other vehicles, and construction materials and equipment, as well as such consumer goods as cotton and silk textiles, and vitally needed

bulk foodstuffs. Much of the Soviet economic aid served military purposes, either by releasing North Vietnamese production and manpower capacity for war purposes, or because it was used in support of the military effort (e.g., trucks). In the pure military field the Soviets sent surface-to-air missile systems, aircraft, radar, armor, artillery, infantry weapons, and ammunition. The military aid, while higher in value than the economic aid, is much less in volume.

The Chinese, for their part, provided construction materials, trucks, spare parts, pharmaceuticals, and other machinery and equipment, as well as substantial deliveries of rice, grain, and other foodstuffs. Chinese military aid has consisted primarily of light artillery, rockets, and small arms and ammunition used by the Viet Cong., although most of the DRV's naval vessels and some token shipments of aircraft and armor have also been supplied by the Chinese in the past. In addition, the Chinese have had between 30,000 and 50,000 support troops (the number is declining) in North Viet-Nam. These troops have engaged in construction, repair, and air defense.

On a volume basis, about 85 percent of Communist aid to the DRV arrives by sea; rail deliveries from China account for the remaining 15 percent, including the military equipment provided by the Soviets and Chinese. During the first nine months of 1968, the composition of seaborne deliveries consisted of bulk foodstuffs, (chiefly rice and wheat, 38 percent of total volume), general cargo (33 percent), petroleum (20 percent), fertilizer (8 percent), and timber (1). This was similar to the first nine months of 1967, except that in 1968 shipments of bulk food replaced general cargo as the single largest category of imports. This point to Hanoi's growing dependence on foreign sources for supplies of rice and wheat, reflects continuing shortfalls in domestic agricultural production.

Question 28: With regard to the bombing of North Viet-Nam:

d. What are current views on the proportion of war-essential imports that could come into NVN over the rail or road lines from China, even if all imports by sea were denied and a strong effort even made to interdict ground transport? What is the evidence?

The crux of this question is the definition of "war-essential imports." There is room for considerable disagreement on this subject, but in our judgement, the category of war-essential imports should include most of the economic aid provided by the Soviets and Chinese, as well as nearly all of their purely military aid. The reason for this is that economic aid is equally if not more important than military aid in keeping North Viet-Nam a going concern. (During 1968, economic aid totaled some \$340 million and military aid about \$540 million). In fact, it can probably be assumed that all North Vietnamese imports in the past few years have been directly related to the war effort. The regime would not have used its sparse funds and credits, or burdened its strained transport system, with non-essential goods.

Food imports constitute a growing percentage of total imports, in 1968 replacing general cargo as the single largest category of imports. This reflects the steady decline in crop acreages and yields that began in 1965 and has continued through the present. The importance of food imports can hardly be overstated; even with them, North Viet-Nam has been forced to strictly ration foodstuffs on the official market and progressively to reduce the composition of the rice ration so that at present it consists 60 percent of rice substitutes such as domestic corn and imported wheat. In addition, a thriving black market has grown up, dealing in foodstuffs (and other items as well) and involving large numbers of DRV lower level officials and cadres, as well as average citizens.

Economic aid has been essential in keeping North Viet-Nam afloat; under present conditions it is extremely doubtful that Hanoi could dispense with any substantial portion of this aid.

The question becomes, therefore, "Could North Viet-Nam continue to receive and distribute most of the economic aid and nearly all of the military aid it is now obtaining from foreign suppliers if Haiphong and other key ports were closed and if the road and rail lines from China were heavily bombed?" A second question is: "What would happen if it could not?"

To begin with, it must be noted that in practical terms it would be impossible to deny all imports by sea. Even if the one principal port (Haiphong) and the two secondary ports (Cam Pha and Hon Gai) were closed, there would still be twelve minor ports as well as numerous coastal transshipment points suitable for over-the-beach off-loading. Lightering operations would permit an indeterminate amount of supplies to enter North Viet-Nam from the sea. It is nearly certain, however, that these minor ports and transshipment points could not handle anything like the present volume of imports going into Haiphong. (It is estimated that 85 percent of the total aid to Hanoi arrives by sea, i.e., through Haiphong. Almost all of this is economic aid, since military supplies are generally believed to come overland via China.)

We do not believe that the capacity of the DRV-CPR road and rail network is great enough to permit an adequate flow of supplies in the face of an intense day and night bombing campaign. In our view, earlier analyses which have claimed a virtually unlimited capacity for this network were based primarily on theoretical considerations of transport capacities and did not give adequate weight to the very real difficulties the North Vietnamese have experienced in handling imports even when Haiphong was relatively untouched. It is true that these difficulties were overcome, but to our knowledge there is no evidence that Hanoi would be able to deal as successfully with the closing of Haiphong and heavy attacks on lines of communication from China. We therefore believe that interdiction of Haiphong and heavy attacks on the rail lines from China would over time prevent North Viet-Nam from receiving sufficient economic and military aid to continue the war effort. But it would be difficult to quantify this, since it depends on the type and intensity of interdiction.

On the other hand, one important point should be kept in mind. The North Vietnamese surprised many observers, and confounded many predictions, by holding the North together and simultaneously sending ever-increasing amounts of supplies and personnel into the South during 3½ years of bombing. It is clear that the bombing campaign, as conducted, did not live up to the expectations of many of its proponents. With this experience in mind, there is little reason to believe that new bombing will accomplish what previous bombings failed to do, unless it is conducted with much greater intensity, and readiness to defy criticism and risk of escalation.

This brings us to the second part of the question, "What would happen if Hanoi could not obtain sufficient war-essential imports, as defined earlier?" Here again, there does not seem to be any quantifiable answer; we are reduced to educated estimates. If we arbitrarily assume that nearly all military aid reached North Vietnam (because it is relatively compact and could be transported by a small number of freight cars or a larger number of trucks, and because it has a high priority) but that only half of the economic aid did, we think that by strenuous exertions and considerable belt-tightening the North Vietnamese could continue on their present course for perhaps at most two

years more. Beyond that time, barring a cease-fire or protracted lull in the fighting in South Vietnam (either of which would greatly ease Hanoi's burdens), we would estimate that Hanoi would be forced (1) to make concessions to the US in order to get Haiphong reopened, or (2) at least to reduce the scale of the war in the South to manageable proportions, perhaps by reverting to political struggle backed by terrorism and selected guerrilla operations which did not require Northern aid and personnel. Of course, other factors such as manpower shortages would figure in the same time-frame.

It should be noted, in conclusion, that this paper does not address the advisability of closing Haiphong, nor the question of the Soviet and Chinese responses. These matters, clearly the most central problems, lie outside the terms of reference of Question 28 (d).

Question 28: With regard to the bombing of North Viet-Nam:

e. What action has the DRV taken to reduce the vulnerability and importance of Hanoi as a population and economic center (e.g., through population evacuation and economic dispersal)?

Three chief trends were evident during the bombing: (1) civil defense measures, (2) population evacuation, and (3) economic dispersal.

Civil Defense Measures. Even before the bombing began, the DRV leadership was warning the population of trying days ahead. In January 1965 the National Defense Council directed that citizens should "strengthen further defense and security work and get ready to fight," "actively push forward anti-aircraft work," "make all all-out efforts to build a powerful people's armed force," and "actively build and consolidate North Viet-Nam in all fields." After February 7, 1965 (the beginning of the bombing) intensified civil defense measures were undertaken. On February 9, AFP reported that trenches were being dug, air raid shelters constructed, and vehicles and important installations camouflaged in Hanoi.

Thus, beginning in early 1965, an extensive civil defense program was devised, which eventually provided some form of bomb shelter for virtually the entire North Vietnamese population. Shelter programs were begun earliest in Hanoi and other heavily populated urban areas, where large public semi-underground shelters were built in downtown sections. This was supplemented in less densely populated parts of the city by an extensive system of tunnels and by individual shelters—covered cement cylinders buried in the ground. Almost all industrial plants came to have a network of earthwork tunnels leading away from the buildings to provide protection for workers on the job, and even agricultural workers reportedly built trenches near their rice fields.

At the same time, other forms of air defense were improved or were introduced. The SA-2 surface-to-air missile system was introduced in 1965. The DRV air force, air fields, and early-warning radar system were rapidly improved, and anti-aircraft artillery weapons and units were dispersed throughout the country to protect major cities, industrial and defense areas, and lines of communication. Roughly half of the total AAA guns were located in the northeast quadrant of the country, which includes the Red River delta, and, of course, Hanoi.

Population Evacuation. This program got off to a slower start than the civil defense effort. In September 1965, however, a US traveler said that 50,000 persons had already been evacuated from Hanoi. It appears that, initially, the DRV Government gave little or no financial assistance to evacuees, but by early 1966, allowances for them were being made available. In June and July of the same year, the government conducted a ward census in Hanoi and cut off the ration cards of those deemed superfluous to the function-

ing of the city; these people were thus forced to evacuate. In July 1966 AFP reported that 10,000 people a day were leaving the city, and at the end of 1966 both Harrison Salisbury and a TASS reporter said that one-third of the capital's population had been evacuated.

People reportedly drifted back into Hanoi in early 1967, but evacuation increased sharply in April and May after US strikes on Hanoi. At that time a Swedish reporter was told that the DRV had plans to evacuate the whole city. In the summer of 1967, however, school children were reportedly entering Hanoi again, and this trend continued to the point where in early 1968 the Hanoi city council passed a decree instructing people not to return to the city. But after the March 31 bombing limitation, people began to return in considerable numbers, a trend which intensified after the November 1 bombing halt. It appears at this writing that the full population of Hanoi has not yet returned, but that a good portion of the inhabitants have indeed come back. The DRV Government, however, has not yet officially reversed its evacuation policy.

Economic Dispersal. Beginning in 1965, the expansion of centrally controlled, large-scale industry was deemphasized and local small-scale production received official encouragement with a goal of regional self-sufficiency. Long-term five-year economic planning was shelved in favor of a two-year planning period.

Economic activity in the Hanoi area consisted of electric power, machine building, chemicals, barge building, textiles, light industry, and phosphate processing. Some of these enterprises, such as textiles, were relocated and dispersed, but others, such as electric power plants, perforce had to remain in place. Accurate figures on the production of the relocated plants are not available, but we assume that even the limited pre-1965 output must have fallen considerably under the impact of the bombing and of dispersal.

Present Vulnerability and Importance of Hanoi. Hanoi's vulnerability and importance have probably both increased since the bombing halt. The population is returning to its pre-evacuation levels, and the defenses of Hanoi are reportedly being discreetly but substantially reduced. It appears that the DRV leadership has decided to continue indefinitely the policy of economic decentralization begun in 1965, probably to hedge against the bombing being resumed and to avoid the production losses which would occur if industry were recentralized. Some permanent rebuilding has begun, but full scale reconstruction throughout the country will probably await an end to the war in the South. In Hanoi itself, the Doumer bridge has been rebuilt, though it needs additional repairs, and the Hanoi thermal power plant is being rebuilt. Primary and secondary schools and universities in Hanoi have not been officially relocated back to the capital, but the kindergarten and nursery schools may reopen soon. However, hospitals and most government agencies remain evacuated. No large-scale construction of urban housing has been reported.

Question VII: To what relative extent do the US, RVNAF and the NVA/VC share in the control and the rate of VC/NVA attrition; i.e., to what extent, in terms of our tactical experience, can heavy losses persistently be imposed on VC/NVA forces, despite their possible intention to limit casualties by avoiding contact?

The Communists have a surprisingly large amount of flexibility in controlling their rate of casualties in South Vietnam. This flexibility is reflected in 1968 killed-in-action statistics—during February, at the height of the Tet offensive, VC/NVA KIA totaled nearly 40,000, but only five months later during July, the Communists were able to hold their monthly combat deaths to less than 7,000. During the last three months of

1968, average VC/NVA monthly killed-in-action was substantially below 10,000 per month.

The Communists have been able to control their attrition rate by varying both tactics and strategy. Given any current strategic deployment and short term goals, both offensive and defensive tactics may be more or less aggressive. In turn, strategic deployment and degree of offensive or defensive posture will greatly determine loss rates. These variations are obviously not mutually exclusive and tactical aggressiveness largely depends on short and intermediate term strategic goals.

Data on Allied military operations reflect the difficulty of making contact with VC/NVA forces. These data do not indicate which side is able to initiate the contact, only that Allied units were on offensive operations.

Question VIII: What controversies persist on the estimate of VC Order of Battle, in particular, on the various categories of guerrilla forces and infrastructure? On VC recruiting, and manpower pool? What is the evidence for different estimates, and what is the overall adequacy of evidence?

Strength estimates

Estimates of VC/NVA Order of Battle as well as estimates of various categories of guerrillas, irregular forces, and infrastructure have been under thorough review and discussion by members of the intelligence community and CINCPAC/MACV since the summer of 1967. An apparent agreement reached at a conference in Saigon in September 1967 proved to be short-lived. Therefore, the Director of Central Intelligence convened a second conference in Washington in April 1968. This conference included representation from all concerned USIB agencies, CINCPAC, and MACV, and observers from the military services. The Washington conference failed to reach agreement on any of the elements included in the estimates of enemy strength.

Since April 1968, at the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, a CIA/DIA Working Group has worked to reach agreement in Washington and with CINCPAC/MACV. This CIA/DIA group has reached Washington working-level agreement on the strength of those elements composing the military threat (Main and Local Forces, Administrative Services, and Guerrillas) as of the end of August 1968 and for 31 December 1968. In addition, the working group has reached agreement on end-of-the-year estimates for such irregular organizations as Self Defense Forces and Assault Youth, and for the Political Infrastructure.

The agreed CIA/DIA estimates for 31 December 1968 are as follows:

Military threat in thousands	
Combat forces:	
NVA	105-125
VC MF/LF	45-55
Subtotal	150-180
Administrative services:	
NVA	10-20
VC	45-55
Subtotal	55-75
Guerrillas	60-100
Total military threat	265-355

¹ An estimated 20,000-25,000 of these NVA troops are serving in VC units. This estimate excludes an estimated 28,000 NVA troops deployed north of the DMZ which include but are not limited to the 304th NVA Div., 320th NVA Div., 88th NVA Regt. of the 308th NVA Div., and 102nd NVA Regt. of the 308th NVA Div.

² We believe that the military threat represented by the Guerrilla forces is not on a parity with that of the Main and Local

Forces because probably only about one-third of the Guerrillas are well armed, trained, and organized.

Other irregular organizations

Self-defense forces.....	80-120
Assault youth.....	10- 20
Total.....	90-140

Political infrastructure..... 80-100

All of these agreed estimates have been communicated to CINCPAC and MACV. There has been some slight narrowing of the differences between the headquarters and field estimates, particularly in the estimates for combat forces, but neither CINCPAC nor MACV has been able to concur in these Washington figures.

Differences in estimates—military threat

The "military threat" component of the estimate includes NVA and VC Main and Local Forces, Administrative Services, and Guerrillas. The information available to CIA indicates that the current CINCPAC/MACV estimate of the military threat as of 31 December 1968 is as follows:

Combat forces and in thousands

NVA.....	106
VC MF/LF.....	36-40
Subtotal.....	142-146
Administrative services.....	42
Guerrillas.....	59
Total military threat.....	243-247

Although we do not have the detailed data underlying this estimate, it can, on the basis of our knowledge of previous estimates, be made reasonable comparable to the CIA/DIA estimate by making two adjustments:

(a) The latest information available to CIA indicated that CINCPAC/MACV judged that some 5,000 NVA troops serve in Administrative Service units.

(b) The CINCPAC/MACV estimate of 106,000 NVA troops apparently includes some elements which are excluded from the CIA/DIA estimate because they are north of the DMZ. If these units were excluded from the CINCPAC/MACV figure, then the CINCPAC/MACV figure comparable to the CIA/DIA figure for NVA troops would be 92,000.

With these changes the CIA/DIA and CINCPAC/MACV estimates of the military threat would compare as follows:

[In thousands]

	DIA/CIA	CINCPAC/MACV
Combat forces:		
NVA ¹	105-125	92
VC MF/LF.....	45- 55	36-40
Subtotal.....	150-180	128-132
Administrative services:		
NVA.....	10- 20	5
VC.....	45- 55	37
Subtotal.....	55- 75	42
Guerrillas.....	60-100	59
Total.....	265-355	229-233

¹ Both sets of NVA figures exclude an estimated 28,000 North Vietnamese Army troops deployed north of the DMZ. They include 20,000-25,000 NVA troops serving in VC MF/LF units.

The significance of these differences, particularly their military strategic implications, depends, of course, on whether the true military threat is closer to the lower or the higher end of the range estimated by CIA/DIA. The difference in estimates may become of major political importance if developments in Paris should lead to an agreement on the phased withdrawal of NVA troops which intelligence might be required to confirm or monitor. For example, the CIA/DIA estimate is that there were 115,000-145,000 NVA troops in South Vietnam at the end of 1968. This is about 20,000-50,000 troops greater than the

CINCPAC/MACV estimate of the NVA presence on 31 December 1968. Moreover, the differing estimates of guerrilla strength would have an important bearing on any estimate of the residual military capabilities of VC forces should the NVA in fact be withdrawn.

Other irregular forces

The agreed CIA/DIA estimates include estimates of other irregular forces—Self Defense Forces and Assault Youth. CINCPAC/MACV refuse to estimate these groups on the ground that they cannot be quantified and are not part of the military threat. We agree that these forces are not of the same military significance as combat and support troops, or guerrillas, and do not group them as part of the military threat, particularly since they are even less well armed or trained than the guerrillas. Nevertheless, they do perform important military support functions, inflict and receive casualties, and are meaningful elements of the enemy's organized resistance. Therefore, we believe that they can and should be quantified as part of the intelligence necessary for national level assessments of the war in the total context of its political, security, and military evolution.

Political infrastructure

The CIA/DIA estimate of a Political Infrastructure of 80,000-100,000 is not far out of line with the CINCPAC/MACV estimate of about 82,000. The main difference is that the Washington estimate includes staff and support types not counted by CINCPAC and MACV.

Reasons for the different estimates

The principal difference between CIA and MACV over the size of the several elements of Communist forces has been and continues to be the methods used to count them. In some areas, definitional problems also result in differences. For all echelons of the military threat, MACV compiles an OB, unit by unit, applying rigid acceptance criteria to evidence. Further, in compiling its OB, MACV uses only confidential-level documents and prisoner interrogations. As a result, the OB tends to understate enemy strengths and to lag significantly behind events. Utilizing all-source intelligence, we have developed varying methodologies that provide us with more current estimates of enemy strengths.

For example, at the Local Force level, we have added to the MACV OB 5,000-10,000 soldiers subordinate to districts and provinces. In doing this we have assumed the existence of units for which there is good indirect or inferential evidence. Most of these personnel are in small Local Force units commonly found at these levels. MACV does not carry such units unless it has direct documentary evidence for each one, even though they are standard in the enemy structure. Likewise, we estimate that some 10,000-20,000 soldiers, belonging to service and support units and staffs subordinate to divisions and regiments, need to be added to the MACV OB. This range is based on studies of the average structure and strength of these elements. The MACV OB criteria requires that each support element be individually confirmed.

The range of our estimate for Political Infrastructure reflects the fact that MACV's estimate excludes many thousands of low-level support personnel who are an integral part of the infrastructure. Our disagreement with MACV in this category arises not so much from differences over evidence but differences over criteria as to who should be counted. The basic problem in estimating the size of the infrastructure, therefore, is that the intelligence community has never come to a firm agreement on what constitutes an infrastructure member. Given the present definition, one could come up with a number ranging anywhere from a few

thousand to a figure far in excess of any of the current estimates.

Statement of methodology and confidence

Although we are unable to compute statistical measures of confidence for our estimates, we have varying degrees of confidence in them as reflected by the spreads in the ranges of our estimates.

We are most confident of our estimate of the over-all strength of the Main and Local Force structure. This estimate has been approached with three different methodologies, each of which provides answers within the estimative range. Each methodology involves the application of all-source intelligence to correct the deficiencies of the MACV Confidential-level order of battle. CIA has used a methodology which (1) to fill out the basic force structure, adds units not carried in the MACV OB and (2) adds manpower to the structure based on dynamic studies of average unit strengths. DIA has used a study based on manpower flows (gains and losses) and in addition has recently completed an independent construction of the entire OB from primary source materials.

The CIA estimate of Administrative Service troops is based on ratios developed from primary source materials that relate combat troop strength to support troop strength. Both the CIA study and a recently completed DIA reconstruction of the Administrative Services OB point to the high side of the estimative range presented here.

As the size of the range used for Guerrillas suggests, we are much less certain of the strength of these elements. The low side of the range is based on MACV estimates. The high side of the range is a result of conservative extrapolation from figures in VC documents that gave nationwide irregular strength figures for earlier periods; we have also used more recent VC documents that provided guerrilla strengths for certain provinces. As a rough check we have related these estimates to current HES population control data and inferred that the ability of the VC to organize guerrillas has diminished during 1968.

Our range for Self Defense forces is based on the same type of methodology used for the Guerrilla estimate. Our Assault Youth estimate is based on a small sample of unit strength reports. These estimates provide only a rough order of magnitude for these elements. Our estimate of the Political Infrastructure is based on the MACV estimate, adjusted to include staff and support personnel that we believe should be included.

Recruitment and the manpower pool

We have recently completed a preliminary study which concluded that the Viet Cong recruited an estimated average of 8,500 men per month for their combat units during 1966, and 7,500 men per month during 1967. These estimates are based on information in captured Viet Cong documents, interrogations of prisoners, and agent reports providing data on recruitment in areas including 30 to 40 percent of South Vietnam's hamlet population. This information—actually enemy reports of the numbers of people recruited in Viet Cong district or larger political subdivisions—was then related to population security data by geographic areas and the results projected for the remaining areas of South Vietnam.

Limited data in captured documents on recruitment activities during 1968 indicate that recruitment spurred to a level at least double the average 1967 rate during the first quarter of the year. This large increase is due largely to organizational improvements in preparation for the Tet offensive and easy access to an expanded recruitment base in rural areas after the offensive. During the second quarter, HES officials reported improvements in rural security, and captured documents indicate that Viet Cong recruitment began to fall off. On the basis of this

admittedly tenuous evidence, it would appear that second quarter recruitment probably dropped * * * even slightly lower. These trends have continued through the third and fourth quarters, probably with even sharper declines. Nevertheless, we judge recruitment still to be at a level higher than that estimated by MAC.

These estimates are substantially above those in use by MACV. Although there have been frequent changes, our understanding of MACV recruitment estimates is as follows:

Monthly recruitment

1966 -----	7,000
1967 -----	3,500
January-April 1968 -----	7,000
May-June -----	5,000
July-September -----	3,000
October-December -----	3,500

Determination of the size of the manpower pool available to the Viet Cong and the GVN is an especially vexing analytical problem. The "available pool" is a relatively small residual remaining after the deduction of estimates of the numbers of people not of prime military age, females, the physically unfit, and various estimates of population control and access. Consequently, estimates of the size of the pool are acutely sensitive to a number of necessary assumptions. For example, reasonable estimates of the share of draft age males in South Vietnam who are not physically fit for military duty range from 25 to 40 percent. With this uncertainty alone, estimates of the size of the manpower pool can vary by more than 400,000. Assumptions concerning the relationship between the contested portions of the population and accessibility for recruiting are even more important.

Despite these uncertainties about the "man-power pool" available to either side, it seems clear that the VC have begun to feel the effects of internal manpower shortages, perhaps even more seriously than in previous periods. The ability of the Viet Cong to maintain and particularly to again increase its flow of recruits will depend to a large extent on the military and political momentum they can sustain.

Question XV: What are the reasons for expecting more change in the countryside in the next two years than in past intervals? What are the reasons for not expecting more? What changes in RVNAF, GVN, U.S., and VC practices and adaptiveness would be needed to increase favorable change in security and control? How likely are such changes, individually, and together; what are the obstacles?

The principal source for expecting more change in the countryside in the next two years is the level of performance of pacification programs during the last quarter of 1968. While there is no doubt that this progress was achieved largely as the result of a permissive VC military environment, there have been improvements in GVN enthusiasm, in the use of improved intelligence, and in the application of resources which are encouraging in and of themselves. The test of this progress, and of the enthusiasm itself, however, is yet to come.

Prior to the last quarter of 1968, there was little cause for optimism regarding pacification progress in that the Communist forces were able to render the programs almost impotent by use of their military power. Much of our reported progress in "population control" stemmed not from the ability to release the countryside from the grip of the Communist forces, but from our ability to organize rural development programs and, more importantly, from the massive influx of population fleeing the countryside. When HES is used to measure the capabilities and activities of the VC in the countryside—as opposed to measuring population control—we find that in the twenty one months after January 1967, we actually lost ground in our

battle with the Communists. The Accelerated Pacification Campaign began on 1 November and rapid gains have been claimed for it. Reported progress indicates that we are now slightly better off than in January 1967, but our ability to hold on to these gains has not really been subjected to military test.

The rapid expansion into contested areas that produced the dramatic pacification progress also required that the pacification resources available to the GVN be spread quite thinly across the countryside. This could present a real problem at such time as the VC military challenge occurs—a challenge which may already be underway. Even if this challenge never fully materializes, it is doubtful that the accelerated rate of real progress can be sustained for an indefinite period. While there is an initial impact in obtaining military and political access to hamlets previously under substantial VC influence, genuine, lasting progress in pacification requires not only security but that these initial gains be consolidated through real, rather than paper, programs of land-reform, economic progress, and a host of governmental operations aimed at winning the support of the people. Should the GVN become enchanted with the statistical progress achievable by widely dispersing its resources rather than consolidating its gains, not only would the gap between "population control" and real progress widen, but also the credibility of the GVN could be easily punctured by VC actions.

Much the same commentary could be attached to the phenomenal flow of population to urban and semiurban areas. While this process was not a major factor in the gains made over the last quarter, it was a significant contributor to gains in "population control" made over the previous months. Although this process is widely hailed as being detrimental to the Viet Cong—which it is—it is also clear that pacification programs initiated by the GVN cannot take credit for it. More significantly, the influx of population presents a large mass of people who have no particular reason to develop an affinity for the GVN and unless rehabilitation programs are undertaken they could represent a factor that was neutral at best and disruptive at worst in the long-run prospect for pacification.

The success of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign strongly suggests that progress in pacification is heavily dependent on the military environment. Progress over the last three months was largely due to the fact that a significant number of VC military units withdrew to sanctuary areas and chose not to contest allied operations. This basic characteristic of pacification in South Vietnam converts the question of whether or not our recent gains can be held into a larger question of VC intentions and strategy—that is, their response to new GVN programs. The VC are currently intensifying their efforts to counter the pacification program; such intensified Communist counter-measures will provide an acid test of our real progress. If the VC can successfully implement their capability to mount offensives from time to time, then our recent gains in pacification could mean very little.

Question XVIII: What are the reasons for believing that current and future efforts at "rooting out" hard-core infrastructure will be—or will not be—more successful than past efforts? For example, for believing that collaboration among the numerous Vietnamese intelligence agencies will be markedly more thorough than in the past? What are the side-effects, e.g., on Vietnamese opinion, of anti-infrastructure campaigns such as the current "accelerated effort," along with their lasting effect on hard-core apparatus?

Despite encouraging trends in the attack against the overall VCI, it is not likely that any significant breakthrough will be made in

1969 at "rooting out" hard-core VCI, especially high ranking PRP members. As previously noted, leading hard-core VCI cadres have suffered the least of all categories from the Phoenix/Phung Hoang program. It is anticipated that in 1969 the anti-VCI effort will make some progress with a slight qualitative increase resulting from emphasis on specific targetting, particularly at the district level and above. Nevertheless, most gains will continue to be made against the more accessible lower level VCI members. It is hoped that sufficient stability and momentum will have been built into the program so that if and when the GVN begins to assume full responsibility, the anti-VCI effort will continue to make progress. Presently, it is believed that the effort would be certain to suffer, perhaps critically, without U.S. guidance and assistance. Similarly, a settlement at Paris that created a political climate in South Vietnam improving Communist prospects, could also derail the entire program.

Until 1967, probably the greatest weakness in the prosecution of the conflict in Vietnam was the lack of any real, organized, coordinated, efficient counterattack on the VCI. Although the Phoenix program had its beginning in 1967, it was not until the Presidential Decree of July 1968 that the program was officially sanctioned by the GVN and a countrywide effort (Phung Hoang) was authorized to collect information on the VCI and to plan and launch operations targetted specifically against it. To date, a great amount of effort has gone into the establishment of a system of 246 province, autonomous city and district Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers throughout the country. This has required a high degree of cooperation and coordination at all levels, often where little or none had previously existed, and is considered to be a significant accomplishment in itself, given the previous propensity of all concerned (U.S. and Vietnamese) toward parochialism. Although there are still instances of obstructionism and lack of cooperation by local officials and agencies responsible for conducting the attack on the VCI, there has been an overall and continuing trend toward improved coordination within the Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers. A good start has been made at accumulating the specific information needed to target against the VCI and an accompanying improvement in the quality of operations against the VCI should result as the effort gains momentum.

That the program is adding pressure on the VCI is probably best illustrated by the growing concern of the VC to its activities as reflected in their own propaganda and documents alerting subordinates to the program's operations. VCI targets are becoming more wary and elusive with a substantial fraction of the low level, easy targets probably already eliminated. Despite the enemy's extensive anti-Phung Hoang campaign and increased passive and active counter-intelligence measures, December results were the highest ever reported. This improvement can be directly related to the Accelerated Pacification and Phung Hoang Campaigns as security forces have moved into contested areas and military operations and have penetrated once sacrosanct base areas where VC cadres have long been able to stay with relative impunity. Recent reports reveal that higher ranking VCI are now moving to more secure areas where it will be more difficult for Phung Hoang operations to be successful. These factors, plus an increased VC emphasis on identifying and targetting the program's personnel for elimination or subversion, indicate the seriousness with which the VCI views the present and potential effects of the program on it.

Although important steps have been taken to establish an active program and there have been signs of improvement as it has developed, the numerous problems hamper-

ing effective anti-VCI operations will require considerable time, patience, and effort to correct. Among the most serious of these effecting the attack on the VCI is the limited professional capability of many of the GVN personnel due to a lack of adequate training especially apparent at the district level where a more experienced and efficient base is required, since this is the level at which the Phung Hoang program is geared. Additionally, the program continues to be hurt by the lack of full coordination at these lower levels where there still are overtones of separatism among the many agencies involved. Pressure from above has, however, forced increasing cooperation between some of these once totally insular, competing agencies.

Since many of the district centers are in the initial stages of organization and are still in the process of developing the data base required to operate effectively against the VCI, they have barely begun to direct operations. For this reason, operations targeted against specific VCI have not been too common and the attack on the VCI has continued to be plagued by the conventional approach of large operations. As agencies involved in anti-VCI operations have exhausted their limited intelligence base and pressure has increased for results, the tendency has been to rely on large scale cordon and search operations to the detriment of specific VCI operations based on detailed intelligence. Such sweeps, cordon and search operations, or ambushes on likely communications routes usually result in the apprehension of many guerrillas and VC supporters but few high quality VCI. The number of helicopter raids against specific VCI targets in VC "liberated areas" is steadily increasing, however, and these fast moving raid-and-run operations are producing effective results.

Other related areas of serious weakness in the anti-VCI program are in the fields of identification, classification, judicial processing, detention, and prisoner accountability. To assist in correcting these deficiencies, a classification list of VCI executive and significant cadre functions has been developed to reduce confusion in identification and to provide a uniform basis for assigning priority and selecting targets for neutralization. Perhaps of equal importance, the list will serve as a basis for proposed changes in civilian detainee processing and prescribes standard maximum and minimum sentences. Additional detention facilities are being prepared and more efficient utilization of those available as well as improved methods of prisoner accountability have been proposed to alleviate these problem areas.

An aggressive anti-VCI program has definite side-effects on the Vietnamese opinion given the preeminent position of the family in Vietnamese society. Since it is not unusual for a family to have members working for both the VC and the GVN, attacks by either side can directly affect the family unit. In addition to family contacts with the VC, there has always been a certain degree of accommodation between some local officials and VC cadres. Thus the intermix of family loyalty coupled with a lack of real commitment by some GVN officials to move against an organization with which they may wish to reach a further accommodation in the future continues to be a serious problem and undoubtedly has an effect on Vietnamese opinion. There is no doubt that the people in the countryside have mixed feelings toward the accelerated efforts to eliminate the VCI since these efforts often affect family members, cause disruption in their area, and throw off a local balance which may have led to a relatively peaceful situation. Involvement with the programs of either side is contrary to the peasant's basic desire to be left alone by both. If this is not possible, he then is willing to accept a degree of security from whomever is in control. Recently, hamlets

under the Accelerated Pacification Campaign appear to be attracting a significant number of refugees from VC areas, apparently confirming that the key to public approval and support is the ability to provide continuing security and to prevent reprisals by the opposition.

Recognition of the foregoing problem areas and the initiation of corrective measures where possible, along with the increased degree of coordination and cooperation required for the establishment of the Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers; all contribute to a belief that future anti-VCI efforts should be more successful than those of the past. There are no guarantees that the corrective actions taken will be successful, that the Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers will function as planned, or that the cooperation noted in their building will continue. However, the progress that has been made since July 1968 has been most impressive and encouraging. Probably the highest testimonial to the activities and potential of the Phung Hoang Program has been the concern exhibited by the VCI as it realizes that at long last, though in a neophyte stage, a counterattack has been launched directly against it.

Question XIX: How adequate is our information on the over-all scale and incidence of damage to civilians by air and artillery, and looting and misbehavior by RVNAF?

Information that would lead directly to an estimate of physical damage by bombing or the physical/psychological damage affected by looting and other types of military misconduct is not reported on anything resembling a systematic basis. Sporadic reports reach Washington concerning civilian complaints of such actions but currently there is no known way to establish a reliable data base for this information.

The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) does contain information on two aspects of the problem: (1) incidents of misconduct by friendly elements that adversely affect the hamlet, and (2) actions by friendly elements during military operations that adversely affect relations with the hamlet. It is not known how reliable this data base is, but based on a sample of 5,870 hamlets that were rated each month consistently since January 1967, it would appear that approximately one percent of the hamlets each month are victims of some sort of serious misconduct by ARVN; another one percent each month receive similar treatment at the hands of Regional or Popular Forces (RF/PF), and another three fourths of one percent fall victims of serious misconduct on the part of US forces. Additionally, about four percent of the hamlets are either bombed, strafed, defoliated, or otherwise harmed during the course of friendly military operations. A higher percentage of hamlets would appear to experience one or more of these phenomena in a minor form.

It is imperative that these measures be viewed with considerable discretion, both because the data base has not been validated and because no systematic weighting system is available to discriminate between lasting damage and accidental property destruction. Even under the most generous interpretation of the available data, however, it must be admitted that the rural hamlets take a tremendous beating by both friendly and enemy forces. This aspect of the war is borne out by the rapid flow of refugees and migrants to the urban areas of South Vietnam. While the long-run impact of this process would, at first examination, appear to be favorable to the GVN, it is probably true that a considerable proportion of the urban population which is normally classified as "GVN-controlled" is made up of a recently rural populace which has little reason to affiliate itself with the cause of its social disruption.

Question XXII: What is the evidence on the prospects—and on what changes in con-

ditions and US policies would increase or decrease them—for changes in the GVN toward:

(a) broadening of the government to include participation of all significant non-Communist regional and religious grouping (at province and district levels, as well as cabinet);

(b) stronger emphasis, in selection and promotion of officers and officials, on competence and performance (as in the Communist Vietnamese system) as distinct from considerations of family, corruption, and social (e.g., educational) background;

(c) political mobilization of non-Communist sympathies and energies in support of the GVN, as evidenced, e.g., by reduced desertion, by willing alignment of religious, provincial and other leaders with the GVN, by wide cooperation with anti-corruption and pro-efficiency drives?

(a) *Broadening the GVN.* The first question to be resolved is to define those regional and religious groups that warrant cabinet representation. For those who prefer a broad definition, the prospects of including all such groups are virtually non-existent. For those who would exclude such groups as the Hoa Hoa, Cao Dai, and the various Dai Viet and VNQDD factions from cabinet representation, the problem is far less formidable. With the addition of strong southern representation in the cabinet during the past year, it could even be argued that the essential balance of vital cabinet representation has already been struck. Others who prefer the narrow definition point out that representation from central Vietnam is thin, and that ultimately some kind of accommodation between the government and Tri Quang's Buddhists should be reached. In any event, current evidence indicates that while adjustments may be made in the cabinet during the next few months, no significant broadening is likely.

At the province and district levels, the problem is somewhat different. Virtually all province and district chiefs are military officers appointed by the central government. The issue of selecting province and district chiefs was raised at the time the constitution was written in early 1967; many civilians arguing for an electoral process. But the GVN—with U.S. concurrence—maintained that under wartime conditions these positions must be appointed, with the understanding that they would be filled by military officers. Thus the problem at this level has assumed the form of a civilian-military rivalry. Because the province and district chiefs have now become key figures with control over some ARVN units, the prospects for increasing civilians in these offices are very remote so long as the war continues.

Even so, there is some degree of local, as opposed to civilian, representation within the present system. There have been or are military province and district chiefs of montagnard backgrounds in the central highlands, and Cao Dai provincial officials in areas where that sect is strong. For all practical purposes, An Giang and Chau Doc provinces are run by Hoa Hao officials. Other officers occasionally have local ties to the areas in which they are assigned. We have no evidence, however, that the proportion of such officials is increasing.

(b) *Emphasis on competence in selection and promotion.* With the ascendancy of President Thieu during the past year or so, more than one half of all province and district chiefs have been replaced. We have evidence, in the form of reports from U.S. field advisers, that the replacements generally are more competent than their predecessors. Strictly on this basis, however, it is difficult to state that there has been a significant and deliberate increase in emphasis on competence at the expense of political loyalties and other considerations. Indeed, political loyalty almost certainly remains

paramount (i.e., there is no evidence that President Thieu has approved the appointments of many who are at political odds with him). Our feeling is that because President Thieu has wider associations than did his predecessors with the same appointive powers, the number of politically acceptable candidates has increased, thus allowing for more latitude in the search for competency.

There are, of course, a great many other positions in the government and armed forces and our evidence on increased competence in these positions is at best very sketchy. Civilian officials within the various ministries are almost certainly selected in accordance with the political coloration of their respective ministers. So long as the cabinet remains a delicate and highly charged political balance, this tendency will remain strong. For those whose appointments receive presidential consideration, however, it would not be unreasonable to assume that the same general factors described in the preceding paragraph are at work to some extent.

There remains the broader question of eligibility for government or military service at a meaningful level of those not already in the government (e.g., the degree of opportunity for the bright and vigorous peasant who might become an excellent company commander). The educational and social restrictions on eligibility for, let alone advancement in, government service have been long-standing weaknesses of the GVN. Though the war and the inordinate size of the RVNAF have probably created opportunity for peasants that otherwise would not have existed, there is no evidence of GVN encouragement or of any change in normal requirements. Even given vigorous US prodding and high level GVN concurrence, it would be prudent to envisage increased social mobility in South Vietnam in terms of decades.

In weighing GVN performance in this area, however, it is misleading and unrealistic to compare the actualities of GVN behavior with the tenets of Communist theory or propaganda. The statement of subsection (b) of Question XXII implies that, in contrast to the GVN, the Vietnamese Communists promote solely on merit and performance, without any reference to family or social background or other extraneous considerations. This is just not true. The Communists simply do not apply the same educational, social or other criteria in this sphere that the GVN applies. It is certainly the case that a poor peasant youth (other factors aside) has a better chance of becoming a company commander in the VC Forces than he would have in ARVN, but this does not mean that the Communists promote solely on merit. "Class origins," doctrinal orthodoxy, absence of "incorrect" or "impure" thoughts, and many other factors entirely unrelated to merit or performance weigh very heavily in Communist decisions on matters of advancement—or demotion. Even a brilliant performance record will not necessarily protect an officer of peasant stock from being cashiered—or worse—should the Party ever decide to classify his parents as "landlords." Furthermore, even the Vietnamese Communist Party, in practice, is not immune to the pull of regional or village ties or the influence of personal loyalties or jealousies and the Party is more than vulnerable to the ripple effect of doctrinal battles won or lost by contenders in the higher command echelons.

(c) *Political Mobilization.* We doubt that fluctuating ARVN desertion rates can be considered as a true indicator of the Vietnamese population's degree of political mobilization. There are simply too many other factors involved. For example, desertion rates went up sharply in the late spring of 1968, following a rapid expansion of the armed forces. We do not believe that this increased desertion reflected a lessening of

political mobilization, but rather that it was largely the natural result of the sudden expansion. (The same pattern was evident during the last large RVNAF expansion in 1966.) As the unreliaables are weeded out and as ARVN's command and control system gradually copes with the larger numbers of personnel, the desertion rates should go down. And this trend, when it begins to occur, should probably not be construed as an increase in political mobilization.

The willing alignment of religious and other leaders with the GVN has fluctuated in the past and will most likely continue to do so depending upon future events and the government's relation to them. Within the past year, there have been instances when broad and genuine endorsement of the government's position have been expressed by such leaders (i.e., in the wake of the Tet offensive and at the time of the U.S. bombing halt on 1 November). At other times, support has naturally been more muted, and disapproval has been expressed when some government act seemed to warrant it. We have no evidence suggesting that these rather normal fluctuations will not continue. Willing cooperation with anti-corruption and pro-efficiency drives, though they would be limited to persons within the government, would almost certainly reflect a virtual transformation of the government in terms of discipline and political unity. But evidence on the prospects for these occurrences is not good. Though corruption has perhaps been toned down and public attention has been diverted from it at least temporarily, the basic problem will remain so long as the large U.S. material presence remains in Vietnam and so long as the social ethos gives family or personal ties prior place to loyalties to abstractions such as "national interest." Pro-efficiency drives have not been a characteristic of the GVN to date, and there is no evidence of any plans for them. However, given U.S. prodding, GVN concurrence, and some skillful psychology, such drives might prove to be useful devices in harnessing in a useful way the incessant competition among the various political groupings in the government.

The foregoing simply illustrates some of the difficulties in attempting to detect an increase in political mobilization of the accidental or disorganized variety. It seems clear that the creation of an effective national political organization is the major change needed to provide the GVN with a dependable, enduring political base. The problems and shortcomings of the Lien Minh amply illustrate the fundamental problems involved in establishing such an organization. For in order to function effectively, such an organization must have real political power. The conflict that would ensue between it and the army, which currently is the real if not the constitutional power base, is only too obvious. Because of the difficulty inherent in the problem, political organizational efforts have been little more than marginal efforts during the past few years. In light of potential political competition with the NLF in peacetime, GVN leaders may soon begin to deal with the problem, though despite Thieu's verbal endorsement of Lien Minh, there is as yet no real sign of a serious address to this problem on the part of the GVN's top leadership.

Question XXIII: How critical, in various views, is each of the changes in question 22 above to prospects of attaining—at current, reduced or increased levels of US military effort—either "victory," or a strong non-Communist political role after a compromise settlement of hostilities? What are views of the risks attendant to making these changes, or attempting them; and to the extent that US influence is required, on US practical ability to move prudently and effectively in this direction? What is the evidence?

There is no question but that South Viet-

nam's political stability has a bearing on its military performance, and is in turn affected by the latter, and that both are affected by the levels and trends of the US effort. Intensified military efforts by themselves, however, neither compensate for nor cure basic political and administrative shortcomings which diminish the GVN's attractiveness to many who do not positively support it, including many whose opposition to the prospect of Communist rule is considerably greater than their dislike of the GVN. Furthermore, the attitudes of non-Communist groups which are currently aloof from the government, or are committed only passively, are not likely to be greatly altered by changes in US force or aid levels, unless these are so greatly changed as to result in early military "victory" or early GVN defeat. There have been in the past, and may be in the future, positive short-term public or military responses to emergencies, anti-corruption measures, pay raises or promotion policies, but we are not sanguine that such measures will be any more rapid or far reaching than in the past, or will have the needed short-term effect.

South Vietnam has shown progress whether measured against 1961 or 1964, but it has been slow, fragile and evolutionary. It is difficult to see how the US can largely disengage over the next few years without jeopardizing this. There are certain programs (Phoenix, etc.) which if effectively pursued in this period may well increase the GVN's margin for stumbling without falling. In general, however it appears that the RVNAF will for some time remain the only national political force capable of matching the Communists from the point of view of strength and organization. It must, therefore, be kept "cohesive and disciplined", and military corruption kept at tolerable limits; it will also be politically affected by US force levels and operations. While this does not mean that all feasible steps should not be taken to encourage the strengthening and participation of civilian groups, it does not appear realistic or prudent to expect that civilian groups alone can stand up to the Communists within the next few years or that they should be given the practical burden of this effort at the expense of the military.

Question XXVI: What is the evidence on the scale of effect of B-52 attacks in producing VC/NVA casualties? In disrupting VC/NVA operations? How valid are estimates of over-all effect?

The few existing studies and the available raw intelligence make it clear that B-52 strikes do account for a substantial number of casualties, have effectively disrupted VC/NVA operations, and have a strong adverse psychological impact on enemy troops. Unfortunately several factors—a poor evidence base, a lack of ground follow-up, and the inaccessibility of many targeted areas—make it impossible to arrive at any quantitative measurement of the effect of B-52 strokes that can be regarded with confidence.

Recent JCS, J-3, studies based on post-strike body counts obtained from aerial and ground observations between May 1968 and October 1968 accounted for 2,933 enemy dead as a result of 3,895 sorties. These J-3 findings would indicate a kill ratio of .74 per sortie, or an implied KIA rate of 1,300 per month during 1968. Thus, projections based on the J-3 studies would indicate that B-52 attacks in South Vietnam may have accounted for more than 16,000 enemy KIA and a like number of wounded during 1968. These estimates obviously understate enemy casualties, particularly when they are based principally on limited ground follow-ups. Normally, the enemy has had the opportunity to remove or conceal his dead before leaving the strike area.

A MACV post-strike assessment for earlier periods implies an even higher 1968 KIA rate. Between June 1966 and October 1967

245 B-52 strikes reportedly killed 2,489 enemy troops or approximately 10 per strike. If six aircraft are assumed to constitute one strike, this would be 1.7 killed per sortie, or an estimated 3,000 KIA per month if applied to the 1968 sortie rate.

An informal CIA study of captured documents and rallier-POW interrogations would suggest that as many as 6,300 troops per month could have been killed and a like number wounded by B-52 attacks during 1968, but these figures are substantially inflated. Our analysis was based on 233 documents and interrogations mentioning B-52 strikes that were selected randomly from intelligence reports available in 1968. These sources revealed 4,871 killed as the result of 229 strikes, or an average rate of 3.5 per sortie. However, the document and interrogation approach can be expected to yield an estimate higher than actual results because these sources fail to report missions where no one was killed, or where targets were missed completely.

Although we are unable to determine the extent of bias in any of these estimates it is apparent that B-52 strikes have become a significant factor in the attrition of enemy forces. To the best of our knowledge B-52 casualties confirmed by ground follow-up are included in the official KIA figures. Thus, to the extent that the remaining B-52 strikes are indeed casualty producing, the official KIA figures may understate somewhat the actual level of enemy attrition.

B-52 strikes undoubtedly disrupt VC/NVA operations, but because of the inaccessibility of most targeted areas, the extent of this disruption also cannot be quantified. We believe it reasonable to assume that materiel losses due to airstrikes of all kinds probably are at least equal to those resulting from Allied ground operations, some 20 tons a day during 1968. These losses may be critical in regard to specific military operations but do not represent a significant burden in terms of the enemy's over-all resupply capabilities. In addition to casualties and materiel losses, B-52 strikes induce numerous troops to desert or defect. Interrogation of captured enemy senior officers indicates that B-52 attacks are also a significant threat in rear areas where no other weapons system is really effective. In particular, B-52 strikes contributed greatly to the defense of Khe Sanh.

VC/NVA forces also apparently retain some capability to reduce the disruptive effects of B-52 strikes through the use of an elaborate warning system.

Question XXVII: What effect is the Laotian interdiction bombing having:

a. In reducing the capacity of the enemy logistic system?

The air campaign in Laos is not resulting in any sustained reduction of the capacity of the enemy logistic system, although it is causing the enemy intermittent, localized transport problems. Agreed CIA/DIA estimates of the road capacity and volume of truck traffic on the major access routes from North Vietnam into Laos indicate that these routes are being used at only 10 to 15 percent of their capacity. Such a low level of use, and the experience of four years of observing the effects of bombing, make it clear that the capacity of these routes cannot be reduced by bombing to a level that imposes a meaningful restraint to the enemy's ability to resupply his forces in South Vietnam. All available evidence indicates that traffic in the Laotian Panhandle is continuing at levels equal to, or slightly higher than, comparable periods in the past.

Aerial photography during December and early January revealed that the road network through and around the most heavily attacked logistics chokepoints in southern Laos was capable of supporting the amount of traffic entering from North Vietnam. Although these areas have been repeatedly interdicted, causing numerous delays and

disruptions, comparative photography indicated that trucks were able to move through the chokepoints or on nearby bypasses. This traffic apparently moved under cover of darkness and during periods of poor visibility.

Pilot sightings in southern Laos averaged 1,140 trucks per week during November and December 1968 and increased to 2,240 during the first three weeks of January, a slight increase over similar periods last year. Although part of the continued high level of truck sightings since 1 November may be explained by an increase in sorties, most of the additional sorties have been directed against fixed targets such as roads, truck parks, and enemy installations. Further, there has been an increase in truck sightings on main road bypasses, indicating the enemy's ability to circumvent interdicted roads and chokepoints.

The number of truck movements detected by sensors has increased substantially since the bombing halt in North Vietnam, from less than 400 per week in October 1968 to almost 6,000 in January 1969. Although this increase was due in part to the placement of additional and more effectively located sensors, sensor data indicated that the Communists have increased their use of Routes 128, 236A, 239, 917, and the alternate routes in the area between Mu Gia Pass and Sepone.

Reports from roadwatch teams along the two main entry routes into Laos also indicate that traffic within Laos has not been substantially disrupted by air attacks. Teams on Route 15 in the Mu Gia Pass area reported that traffic moving into Laos in October 1968—January 1969 was about the same as in the same periods in 1967 and 1968, as shown in the tabulation below:

AVERAGE NUMBER OF TRUCKS PER DAY SOUTHBOUND ON ROUTE 15

	1967	1968	1969
October.....	17	19
November.....	10	11
December.....	20	21
January.....	22	25	25

Although roadwatch teams along Route 912 have not been close enough to the road to estimate traffic flows, infrequent reporting from these teams have indicated that traffic on Route 912 has been the same or higher in the past few months compared to similar periods last year.

Other intelligence sources indicate that since 1 November there has been a relatively continuous flow of supplies and vehicular traffic along Routes 912, 911, 9 and 914.

b. In destroying materiel in transit?

It is extremely difficult to estimate how many tons of goods in transit the enemy is losing in Laos. Such estimates must depend upon pilot reports of trucks destroyed and damaged, and of secondary fires and explosions. Under the best of conditions bomb damage assessment based on pilot reporting is an extremely unscientific process. In Laos, where the target system is rudimentary, the tonnages being moved are small, the opportunities for dispersion great, and direct observation is obscured by rugged terrain and jungle canopy, any estimate of the volume of supplies being destroyed is especially tenuous.

The most reasonable way to estimate enemy supply losses in Laos is to multiply each truck loss to air strikes by 1.5 tons, on the assumption that half of the destroyed trucks were delivering supplies fully loaded, and the other half were returning empty. The average carrying capacity of the type of truck operating in Laos is 3.0 tons. Applications of this methodology to the 1968 campaign in Laos indicates that about 20 tons of supplies were destroyed daily, the equivalent of about 12 percent of the estimated 165 tons of sup-

plies that entered Laos daily during the same month.*

The above estimate makes no allowance for supplies destroyed in storage in Laos although such losses undoubtedly occur in addition to losses associated with truck destruction. The only available information that would permit an estimate of these supply losses are pilot reports of secondary explosions and fires. It is extremely difficult, however, to choose with any degree of confidence the factor that should be applied to each observed secondary explosion or fire. Under the jungle canopy, an explosion of a 55-gallon gasoline drum is difficult to distinguish from the explosion of three tons of ammunition. Furthermore, it is not known to what extent there is duplication in pilot reports of destroyed trucks that explode or catch fire, and other reports of secondary explosions and fires. Rather than use a methodology based on the evidence of secondary explosions CIA has customarily considered that the enemy's in transit losses amounted to 20 percent of total traffic, compared to our calculated 12 percent. This added margin, in our judgment, is sufficient to account for any supply losses that would not be included in our estimates.

Enemy supply losses at this level are not so great as to put a serious constraint upon enemy operations in South Vietnam. During 1968 an estimated 165 tons of supplies were delivered daily into the Panhandle of Laos. After allowing for the requirements of the forces in Laos and estimated losses, this volume of traffic was more than 2.5 times the enemy requirements for supplies that must enter South Vietnam. A similar level of truck losses and secondary explosions were reported by pilots in Laos during November 1967—January 1968 yet the enemy apparently moved a quantity of supplies through Laos that was adequate to conduct the Tet offensive.

Question XXVIII: With regard to the bombing of North Vietnam:

a. What evidence was there on the significance of the principal strains imposed on the DRV (e.g., in economic disruption, extra manpower demands, transportation blockages, population morale)?

The major effects of the bombing of North Vietnam were extensive damage to the transport network, widespread economic disruption, greatly increased manpower requirements, and the problems of maintaining the morale of the people in the face of personal hardships and deprivation. Hanoi was able to cope effectively with each of these strains, so that the air war did not seriously affect the flow of men and supplies to Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam. Nor did it significantly erode North Vietnam's military defense capability or Hanoi's determination to persist in the war. Material losses resulting from the bombing were, for the most part, offset by increased imports from Communist countries. Damage and destruction by the bombing of military and economic facilities and equipment, together with measurable losses of output, were valued at about \$500 million. Economic and military aid during 1965-68 is estimated at over \$3 billion.

* This estimate assumes that an average of about 100 trucks were destroyed weekly in 1968. Pilot reports of trucks destroyed and damaged were deflated on the basis of an agreed CIA/DIA formula that calculates losses as 75 percent of those trucks that pilots report as having been destroyed and 25 percent of those reported damaged. This deflation allows for some duplication and inaccuracies in pilot reports and recognizes the known ability of the North Vietnamese to repair damaged trucks. Despite this adjustment it is entirely possible that the truck loss estimates are still exaggerated and inflate the estimate of enemy supply losses.

Despite heavy damage to the transport network throughout the bombing, effective countermeasures kept the system operable. In the northern part of the country, transport into Hanoi and the port of Haiphong was disrupted by the destruction of a number of key bridges. The Hanoi Railroad/Highway (Doumer) Bridge over the Red River remained out of service between December 1967 and July 1968; the Haiphong Railroad/Highway Bridge was out much of the time between September 1967 and April 1968. Rail traffic on the Lao Cai line to China was restricted by the destruction of the bridge at Viet Tri that remained unserviceable from mid-1966 to December 1968. In each of these, as in countless other interdictions, pontoon bridges, ferries, or temporary bridges provided bypasses to the original structures and permitted continued logistic movements. Other measures to counter bomb damage included the prepositioning of materials and the training of local teams to effect repairs quickly; developing of transport schedules to make maximum use of the cover of darkness and of bomb free sanctuary areas; and pressing into service all types of equipment including bicycles and carts.

The bulk of the bombing throughout the air war was carried on in the Panhandle of North Vietnam. Even under the heavy bombing during the time that air attacks were restricted to the area below the 19th Parallel, however, logistic flows into Laos were maintained, as evidenced by the reports of roadwatch teams and by photography. (See question 28b.)

Throughout the bombing campaign, construction of new rail lines and new highways, along with the dual gauging of the Hanoi-Dong Dang line, was continued so that the transport network now has a greater capacity than at any previous time.

Economic disruption, besides that to the transport system, met with varying degrees of response by the Hanoi regime. Repair of damaged electric powerplants was carried out when major reconstruction was not required, and an estimated 20 percent of the country's prebombing capacity was kept operational at the height of the bombing in mid-1967. A large number of diesel electric generators were imported to provide independent power to essential users. Blast walls were constructed around the principal electric powerplants, beginning in early 1968. For the most part, damage to manufacturing facilities was left unrepaired and the reduced domestic output of such items as cement, chemicals, and clothing was replaced either in whole or in part by imported goods. Efforts to restore the output of important export products that were casualties of the bombing—pig iron, coal, apatite, and cement—were not observed until after the bombing north of the 19th Parallel had been halted. The machine building industry was relatively undamaged by the bombing and appears to have been expanded through substantial imports of machinery and equipment over the past three years.

Disruption of agricultural output by the indirect effects of the bombing on distribution and on the management and productivity of labor was offset by greatly increased imports of foodstuffs with little adverse effect on the availability of food. Rice rations, however, were increasingly honored with less palatable substitutes of imported wheat flour, corn, or domestic subsidiary crops.

Extra manpower demands induced by the bombing brought about some tightening of over-all manpower availabilities, but never reached proportions significant enough to limit Hanoi's support of the war. Additional demands for laborers to repair bomb damage, to move goods, and to help in civil defense were estimated to total between 475,000 and 600,000. Of these, less than 200,000 were occupied full time in war-related activities; the remainder were used as conditions warranted. The bombing required an additional 100,000

military personnel within North Vietnam to man the air defenses.

These extraordinary demands were satisfied primarily from the underemployed in agriculture and the services sectors, and by the increased use of women. The agricultural labor force could be reduced substantially without a proportionate decline in output because of the low marginal productivity of each farmer. Similarly, workers in handicraft industries could be diverted with only slight adverse effects on the economy. Military manpower requirements, that increased each year during the bombing, were satisfied by broadening the draft regulations. The draft age was increased, former servicemen were recalled to service, and physical standards were lowered. As a result, an estimated 600,000 males were added by 1967 to the 800,000 males eligible for military service in 1965.

The bombing imposed severe hardships on the people by the constant threat to life, by the disruption of personal routines, and by the dispersal of industry and evacuation from urban areas. There were some indications in late 1967 and in 1968 that morale was wavering, but not to a degree that influenced the regime's policies on the war. The regime was quite successful, however, in using the bombing threat as an instrument to mobilize people behind the Communist war effort. There is substantial evidence, for instance, that the general populace found the hardships of the war more tolerable when it faced daily dangers from the bombing than when this threat was removed and many of the same hardships persisted. Concern about maintaining popular morale, and, in particular, discipline and unwavering support for the needs of the war appears to have grown markedly in the past year when most of the country was no longer subjected to bombing. Since the 1 November bombing halt over the entire country, Hanoi has put great stress on countering the widespread tendency of the people to relax their efforts. Concern of this kind is reflected almost daily in North Vietnamese publications and broadcasts as the regime has used exhortation, criticism, and the threat of coercion to sustain support for the needs of the war in South Vietnam.

b. What was the level of logistical throughput through the southern provinces of NVN just to the November bombing halt? To what extent did this level reflect the results of the US bombing campaign?

An average of about 1,000 short tons per day moved south of Thanh Hoa into the southern provinces of North Vietnam during the period April through October 1968. About one third of the total flow was economic goods; the remainder, military and war-related goods such as petroleum. About 75 percent of the supplies moved into the Panhandle of North Vietnam were used locally (AAA ammunition comprised a major portion of the total), 15 percent were moved into the Panhandle of Laos for use there or in South Vietnam, 5 percent moved to the DMZ, and 5 percent moved into northern Laos.

The North Vietnamese have continually increased the volume of supplies moving into the southern provinces. The total daily volume moved south during the seven-month period before the bombing halt in October was 15 percent higher than that moved in 1967. The volume moved southward in 1967 was more than double that of 1965. The throughput tonnage to southern Laos increased substantially in 1968 compared with 1967 as shown below:

	[Average number per day]			
	April through October			
	1967	1968	1967	1968
Tons delivered to southern Laos....	95	165	70	145

The increase in the volume of supplies moved into the Panhandle of North Vietnam and Laos in 1968 consisted almost exclusively of military and war-related goods. It resulted from the step-up in personnel infiltration, the higher levels of combat in South Vietnam, and the increased supplies and equipment needed to maintain through logistic movements in the face of increased air interdiction against lines of communication (LOCs).

During April-October 1968 an average of about 95 tons per day were destroyed as a consequence of air attacks, or roughly 10 percent of the total flow into the southern provinces. In addition to direct losses the bombing complicated the flow of supplies to Laos and South Vietnam. We are convinced, however, that the bombing did not put a relevant ceiling on the volume of supplies that the enemy could move South. The enemy was able to take effective countermeasures that resulted in the maintenance and even an increase in the flow of traffic. During the final months of the air war, traffic movements in the Panhandle of North Vietnam were influenced as much by the weather and logistic needs as they were by the intensity of the air strikes.

One reason why the air interdiction campaign was not more successful is the fact that the capacity of the transportation routes remained well above the requirements for their use. Another reason is that even though large amounts of transportation equipment were destroyed and damaged by air attacks, the North Vietnamese were able to repair and replace motor trucks, watercraft and railroad rolling stock so that no shortages developed.

The estimates of traffic flows into the southern provinces of North Vietnam are based on both indirect and direct evidence, supported by a limited amount of documentary evidence. The estimate for 1965 was based, in part, on a sample of actual traffic and has been increased over time by such indicators of activity as changes in the military order of battle, pilot sightings, aerial photography, the level of imports, and roadwatch reporting. The data, therefore, are subject to a margin of error, but are of the proper order of magnitude and could have as great a downward bias as an upward one.

The estimate on supplies lost through air strikes contains an unknown amount of redundancy, and is probably too high. It is based on reports by pilots of the number of fires and secondary explosions, and of the amount of transport equipment destroyed and damaged.

The most authoritative part of the throughput estimate is the amount of supplies delivered to southern Laos which is based on reports from roadwatch teams, particularly those on Route 15/12 to the Mu Gia Pass. The tonnage moved to southern Laos via this route is an estimate based on these reports and is considered to be a minimum estimate. Roadwatch reports for Route 15 also serve as a basis for estimating traffic on the other principal access road (Route 137/912) which has not had good coverage by roadwatch teams. Other intelligence confirms that our estimates of the traffic moving on Route 137/912 were essentially accurate. We believe that the data compiled through careful research and analysis over many years are adequate to support our estimates and that objective alternative interpretations of the data would be difficult.

a. To what extent did Chinese and Soviet aid relieve pressure on Hanoi?

Communist military and economic aid to North Vietnam to a large extent offset the physical destruction and the disruptive effects of the US bombing and were instrumental in maintaining the morale of the people. Communist countries provided all of the weapons; enough food, consumer goods and materials to compensate for lost domestic output; and most of the equipment and materials to maintain the transport system.

Without Communist aid, most of it from the Soviet Union and China—particularly given the pressures generated by the bombing—the Vietnamese Communists would have been unable to sustain the war in both South and North Vietnam on anything like the levels actually engaged in during the past three years.

The amount of Communist economic aid delivered annually has grown from a yearly average of less than \$100 million through 1964, to \$150 million in 1965, \$275 million in 1966, \$370 million in 1967, and \$460 million in 1968. The value of Communist military aid increased from an average of less than \$15 million a year during 1954-64, to \$270 million in 1965, \$455 million in 1966, and \$650 million in 1967. With the restricted bombing of the heavily defended northern part of the country in 1968, military aid deliveries were reduced. At least 75 percent of total military aid since 1965 has been for air defense.

North Vietnam's air defenses significantly reduced the effectiveness of the US bombing, resulted directly or indirectly in the loss of almost 1,100 US aircraft, and provided a psychological boost to morale. Before 1965, the Soviet Union had provided North Vietnam with only ground forces equipment, transport and trainer aircraft, and small naval patrol craft, while China had provided MIG 15/17 jet fighters, motor gunboats, and ground forces equipment. Since early 1965, the USSR has provided North Vietnam with most of its air defense systems including surface-to-air missiles, jet fighters, a radar network, and antiaircraft artillery. Chinese military aid since 1965, much smaller than that from the USSR, has been important primarily in building up North Vietnam's ground forces, including reequipping Communist ground forces in South Vietnam with the AK-47 assault rifle, the 107-mm rocket, and other new weapons.

The bombing had been indirectly responsible for part of North Vietnam's reduced agricultural output since 1965 because of diversions of labor and disruptions to the distribution system. Greatly increased imports of foodstuffs in 1967 and 1968 have prevented any serious widespread food shortages. The food supplied by Communist countries during 1968 probably provided at least a sixth of the total calories consumed by the North Vietnamese. A comparison of estimated shortfalls in rice production and of imports of foodstuffs is shown below:

(Thousand metric tons)

	1965	1966	1967	1968
Shortfalls (in rice equivalents).....	0	200	350	500
Imports.....	120	80	460	790

Estimates of the shortfalls are tenuous and the extent of the increase in output of subsidiary foods cannot be measured. Moreover, the annual population increment adds almost 70,000 tons to the country's annual food requirements.

Without Communist assistance in maintaining the logistics network, North Vietnam's capacity to move supplies southward in support of the war in South Vietnam would have been seriously restricted. To offset the considerable damage to the transport system, the Soviet Union and China provided large quantities of construction machinery and materials, trucks, railroad rolling stock, and watercraft. At no time during the bombing was there close to a critical shortage of transport equipment in North Vietnam. In addition, China supplied North Vietnam with about 50,000 engineering and support troops to build, repair, and defend transport facilities in the northern part of the country.

North Vietnam's small modern industry was destroyed or rendered largely inoperative

as a result of bomb damage. All the major Communist countries, however, especially the Soviet Union, have supplied North Vietnam with a vast array of industrial machinery, metal products, vehicles, and chemicals that in total value are several times greater than the value of lost domestic industrial output.

d. What are current views on proportion of war-essential imports that could come to NVN over the rail or road lines from China, even if all imports by sea were denied and a strong effort even made to interdict ground transport? What is the evidence?

All of the war-essential imports could be brought into North Vietnam over rail lines or roads from China in the event that imports by sea were successfully denied. The disruption to imports, if seaborne imports were cut off, would be widespread but temporary. Within two or three months North Vietnam and its allies would be able to implement alternative procedures for maintaining the flow of essential economic and military imports. The uninterrupted capacities of the railroad, highway, and river connections with China are about 16,000 tons per day, more than two and a half times the 6,300 tons per day of total imports overland and by sea in 1968, when the volume reached an all-time high. Experience in North Vietnam has shown that an intensive effort to interdict ground transport routes by air attack alone can be successful for only brief periods because of the redundancy of transport routes, elaborate and effective countermeasures, and unfavorable flying weather.

Almost four years of air war in North Vietnam have shown—as did the Korean War—that, although air strikes will destroy transport facilities, equipment, and supplies, they cannot successfully interdict the flow of supplies because much of the damage can frequently be repaired within hours. Two principal rail lines connect Hanoi with Communist China, with a combined capacity of over 9,000 tons a day. Eight primary highway routes cross the China border, having a combined capacity of about 5,000 tons per day. In addition, the Red River flows out of China and has a capacity averaging 1,500 tons per day.

An intensive and sustained air interdiction program could have a good chance of reducing the northern rail capacity by at least half. However, roads are less vulnerable to interdiction, and waterways even less so. In the June-August 1967 air attacks—a previous high point of U.S. interdiction efforts against targets in the northern part of North Vietnam—the transport system was able to function effectively.* Strikes in August 1967 against the Hanoi-Dong Dang rail line were effective in stopping through service for a total of only ten days. Strikes during this period against the highways that parallel the Dong Dang line showed no significant or sustained reduction of capacity. The Hanoi-Lao Cai rail line capacity, after destruction of the Viet Tri bridge, was maintained at 700 tons per day by use of a rail ferry. If more capacity had been required, however, there is every reason to believe that additional facilities would have been installed at this lo-

* Interdiction of the lines of communication between Hanoi and the China border could not be sustained at the level that was achieved in the southern Panhandle of North Vietnam during August through October 1968 for a number of reasons. The multiplicity of modes and transport routes in the North would make it necessary to sustain interdiction at a larger number of points than in the Panhandle. Air defenses in the North—aircraft, missiles, and antiaircraft artillery—make air attacks less accurate and also more costly in terms of U.S. air losses. We believe it is unlikely that either B-52s or Sea Dragon forces could be brought to bear in an interdiction campaign in the north.

cation to restore the through capacity of the line.

In addition to the overland capacity, an airlift from Chinese airfields could potentially provide a means for importing a large volume of high-priority goods. Moreover, total interdiction of seaborne imports would be difficult because shallow-draft lighters could be used to unload cargo from ocean-going ships anchored in waters outside the mined major harbor areas. Large numbers of small coastal ships and junks could move cargoes from ships diverted to southern Chinese ports of Fort Bayard, Canton, or Feihai, and could unload imports over the beaches, or move into North Vietnam's network of inland waterways.

The volume of imports that would be essential to maintain the war cannot be closely estimated. Out of total imports in 1968, less than five percent were military material and ammunition. Other imports essential to the war would include petroleum, food, clothing, transport equipment, and construction materials to maintain the lines of communication. In 1968, the volume of all overland and seaborne imports included the following:

(In thousands of metric tons)

Total	2,300
Military materiel.....	100
Foodstuffs	790
Petroleum	400
Fertilizer	155
Miscellaneous	860

Within the miscellaneous category was an undetermined amount of goods to maintain the economy, to build factories, and to satisfy, at least in part, civilian needs. Moreover, the level of import of some goods was believed to be more than current consumption, permitting a buildup of reserves. It is possible, therefore, that war-essential imports might be as much as one fourth less than the total, or 4,700 tons per day. Whether war-essential imports are estimated to be 4,700 or 6,300 tons per day, however, the overland import capacity would be from two to three times the required import level, and it is unlikely that air interdiction could reduce transport capacities enough over an extended period to significantly constrict import levels.

e. What action has the DRV taken to reduce vulnerability and importance of Hanoi as a population and economic center (e.g. through population evacuation and dispersal)?

During 1965-68, Hanoi's vulnerability has been reduced somewhat by evacuation of the nonessential population and by dispersal of small industries. Despite these measures, however, Hanoi's economic importance has been largely preserved. The city's air defense is manned by experienced crews and probably has been enhanced during 1968 by the installation of new radar equipment. Construction of additional bomb shelters and maintenance of the older shelters apparently continues. Reports indicate a steady return of evacuees to Hanoi since mid-1968, but these probably could be evacuated again on short notice. On balance, the city's defensive posture appears to have improved gradually since the bombing limitation of 31 March 1968.

Evacuation of the population from Hanoi reportedly involved 300,000 people, more than one half the population of the city proper, of which 170,000 were students and children. Although few specific details are available, the second largest group evacuated probably was handicraft workers, followed by non-essential and old people, government workers, and the labor force of a few factories. Most of these people are believed to have been moved to the rural areas just a few miles outside the city, still largely within the boundaries of the Hanoi metropolitan area. Their proximity to the city is at-

tested to by frequent reports of a large influx of people on weekends. Even though the evacuation produced some hardships—crowded living conditions, separation of families, longer commuting distances—the welfare of the population generally was adequately served. Currently, a growing number of evacuated people are reported to be returning to Hanoi, but the regime has warned that conditions are still not safe. Although primary and secondary schools and universities have not been officially relocated to urban areas, some outdoor classes were observed in late 1968 in Hanoi. There were reports in December that some kindergarten and nursery schools would be reopening soon in the Hanoi area. Hospitals and most government agencies officially continue to operate from dispersed sites.

Industrial dispersal primarily involved small enterprises and short-distance relocation within the Hanoi metropolitan area. It apparently has been accomplished without long-term effects on Hanoi's economy. Dispersal of large industrial installations was limited to a few factories that could be broken up into small producing units. For example, parts of the 8th March Textile Plant and the Hanoi Machine Building Plant were dispersed, but certain shops at the original plants remained active throughout the bombing. On the other hand, in the handicraft sector, which supplied about half the total industrial output in Hanoi prior to the bombing, it appears that hundreds of handicraft shops were relocated, probably to the suburbs surrounding the city. Little disruption of output would result from dispersal of these small-scale, labor-intensive enterprises, compared to the inefficiency inherent in dispersing large installations. Furthermore, as handicrafts typically employ more than 65 percent of the industrial labor force in North Vietnam, the dispersal would be an effective means of evacuating a substantial segment of the population from the city with minimal disruption to the economy.

Hanoi is the land transportation hub to the southern part of the country. Rail connections with the port of Haiphong and with Communist China, as well as the most important highways, converge on Hanoi. Therefore, most of the imports destined for the south pass through Hanoi. When the main bridges into Hanoi were destroyed under the Rolling Thunder campaign, the North Vietnamese built rail and highway bypasses around the city. The original bridges now have been repaired but the ferry or pontoon bypasses are being kept in readiness for emergencies.

Hanoi continued to bolster its defense against air attacks even after the 31 March 1968 bombing limitation. Some 34 million individual shelters have been constructed throughout the country, and the Hanoi area claims an average availability of 3 shelters per person that can be reached in seconds after a warning is sounded. A number of bunker-type shelters were observed under construction in the spring of 1968, and limited construction of these was continuing as recently as December. The population is experienced in first-aid, techniques of designing home shelters, and regularly cleaning and repairing older shelters. The air defense capability probably has been upgraded by the installation of 10 modified Fan Song radars in the surface-to-air missile network around Hanoi in 1968. Revetments to protect a small number of critical installations have been observed, and massive blast walls were erected around the Hanoi Thermal Powerplant and the Hanoi Post, Telephone and Telegraph building to protect against all but direct hits.

ENVIRONMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS

Question 1: Why is the DRV in Paris? What is the evidence?

Among the hypotheses:

A. Out of weakness, to accept a face-saving formula for defeat.

B. To negotiate the withdrawal of US (and NVA) forces, and/or a compromise political settlement, giving a chance for NLF victory in the South.

C. To give the US a face-saving way to withdraw.

D. To undermine the GVN and US/GVN relations, and to relieve US military pressure in both North and South Viet-Nam.

E. Out of desire to end the losses and costs of war on the best terms attainable.

Answer:

1. We do not believe that any of the hypotheses listed in the question adequately explain why the DRV is in Paris, but we believe, as outlined below, that there are elements of several of these hypotheses, plus some that are not listed, in enemy motivation.

2. The fundamental reason that the DRV is in Paris is that the leaders in Hanoi feel that, given their present strengths and weaknesses, participation in the talks will further what remains their basic objective—to gain control of South Viet-Nam. Hanoi's tactics in Paris will be determined by their judgment as to how best to use the talks to attain this objective.

3. Hanoi's purposes in the talks must be viewed in the light of the fact that the long-term trend on the ground in Viet-Nam has for some time been unfavorable to them. Apparently the advocates of an all-out effort (according to the so-called Giap doctrine) won acceptance of such a strategy as against the alternative strategy of protracted warfare (usually attributed to Truong Chinh). As the failure of this strategy became more apparent in 1968, and as the enemy's hopes for a "popular uprising" were disappointed, he has come to pin his principal hope for early victory on a weakening of the U.S. will to carry on the struggle, and much of his military, political, and diplomatic activity is designed to encourage and accelerate that process. (There are elements of Hypotheses A, C, D and E here.)

4. Hanoi's basic purposes in the negotiations have thus been: first, to obtain relief from immediate allied military pressure (through partial and then complete cessation of the bombing, and now possibly through other de-escalatory measures)—part of Hypothesis D above; second, to obtain the withdrawal of American forces, the presence of which the enemy knows will prevent him from achieving military victory in South Viet-Nam; and, third, establishment, with U.S. help, of political arrangements for the South which will create favorable conditions for achievement of control over the nation by pro-communist political elements—Hypothesis B above. The most obvious evidence of this is in the enemy's propaganda—he first concentrated on cessation of the bombing; with the achievement of that aim, he has turned up the volume of his propaganda on withdrawals and on the need to replace the present GVN by a "peace cabinet" which will lead to a coalition government made up of the Communists and their friends but excluding the present GVN leadership. The captured documents and the private conversations of Hanoi's representatives in Paris and elsewhere echo the same themes.

5. The enemy is also pursuing several tactical ends in the Paris talks. These include: demonstrating his own "love of peace" to world public opinion, which is so important to him (this was probably one of the reasons he accepted President Johnson's offer to negotiate in March); casting the GVN, in the eyes of the world and the people of Viet-Nam, in the role of "the obstacle to peace" (the table shape debate is a good example); discrediting the GVN's character and accomplishments before the world press; exacerbating friction between the GVN and

the USG—Hypothesis D above; building up the NLF (the insistence on the "four-party" conference shows this); and advertising Hanoi's version of the origin and nature of the war.

6. These tactical aims are important to Hanoi, and pursuit of them has, and doubtless will on occasions in the future, delay or even risk prejudicing achievement on the more basic objectives outlined above. Yet these latter remain over-riding. Hanoi is under pressure on the ground. In the absence of a collapse of the U.S. will to fight, it is at the negotiating table that Hanoi must obtain relief and/or achieve its ends.

7. How much, or how little, Hanoi will settle for at the table depends on many factors. Hanoi's expectations from the negotiations appear to have changed considerably over the past months. There is fairly good evidence—in the way Hanoi responded to the March 31 speech, its statements about it at the time and afterward, and its conduct at the negotiations—that the leadership first thought they were probably going to get an American surrender, papered over with a few face-saving devices. As the weeks wore on, and it became apparent this was not in the cards, and as the situation on the ground continued to deteriorate, Hanoi decided it would have to make concessions to achieve its immediate strategic goal—cessation of the bombing. And Hanoi did make concessions.

8. Once Hanoi is convinced the new administration is not going to "quit" in Viet-Nam or give the game away for free in Paris, and after a period of propaganda exchanges, we would expect renewal of "serious" talks. The primary aim of these for Hanoi will be US withdrawal coupled with the best attainable political settlement. Hanoi will dangle issues such as prisoners before us to achieve these ends and in pursuit of their tactical objectives outlined above. Hanoi will try to obtain their ends at minimum cost to themselves in terms of their own withdrawal, effective supervision of a settlement, and the like. Yet we think the prospects on the ground are bleak enough for them so that they will, in the end, make significant concessions (in terms of their own withdrawal) to get us out. They may even relinquish their effort to obtain a favorable political settlement in the negotiations, provided they feel the play of forces in South Viet-Nam in the wake of the agreements reached holds out good promise for their military or political take-over of South Viet-Nam in the next few years.

ENVIRONMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS

Question 2: What is the nature of evidence, and how adequate is it, underlying competing views (as in the most recent NIE on this subject, with its dissenting footnotes) of the impact of various outcomes in Viet-Nam within Southeast Asia?

Answer:

1. There is evidence that the leaders of other Southeast Asian countries—Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines—are greatly concerned that a Communist victory in Viet-Nam will have gravely adverse repercussions on their own security. However, this does not in itself constitute adequate evidence that those repercussions would actually occur.

2. It might be held that a victorious North Viet-Nam might, at least for a time, conduct a policy of restraint and accommodation reassuring to the other countries of Southeast Asia, and/or that the non-communist neighbors of a victorious North Viet-Nam would unite together to create some kind of equilibrium in Southeast Asia that would deter further communist aggression.

3. Evaluation of such a prospect is a matter of judgment, not of evidence. It seems to us that a victorious North Viet-Nam would be overwhelmingly powerful in the area, would see no immediate reason for

restraint at least in Laos and Cambodia, would conduct itself with justifiable pride and assertiveness as a country that had defeated the most powerful nation on earth, and would accordingly strike terror into its opponents and convey encouragement and support to its potential allies and supporters in other Southeast Asian countries. We are not assuming an explicit "great design" for aggrandizement, which is difficult to substantiate, but rather a succession of moves in response to increasing opportunities to exercise Vietnamese influence and eventually control in Southeast Asia.

4. Some proof of this can be found in the behavior of the communists in Laos, Cambodia and Thailand. As North Viet-Nam scored successes during the current war, those elements were emboldened to act either at the direction of North Viet-Nam or independently. We think the case of Cambodia is particularly instructive. It is by no means certain that the "Red Khmers" were organized and sent into battle by the North Vietnamese. Neither, however, could they be disavowed or deprived of support. It stands to reason that initiatives of this kind, even if not directly instigated by a victorious North Viet-Nam, would furnish opportunities for support which it would find difficult to resist.

5. The foregoing reasoning, it seems to us, has merit regardless of whether or not one believes North Viet-Nam to be acting at the instigation of Communist China or other countries. In comparison to other Southeast Asian countries, a victorious North Viet-Nam would be a great power. Support for further aggressive policies in the name of "wars of liberation" could hardly be denied to it by at least some other communist countries. Restraints from others among the communist countries, in the heady atmosphere of victory, would probably be relatively ineffective; and various moves on the part of Southeast Asian countries to accommodate a victorious North Viet-Nam would create the general image of it as the "wave of the future."

6. We wish to underline that we are not able to answer the specific question, which is about the nature and adequacy of the evidence. Even if it were copious, we would not attribute much importance to evidence about the ideological commitment of North Viet-Nam to wars of national liberation. Ideology, while undoubtedly a factor, is probably less important in North Viet-Nam than national pride and assertiveness. We attach somewhat more importance to traditional Vietnamese national ambitions and expansionist behavior. But we attribute the greatest importance to evidence from other Southeast Asian countries that they feel they would have to accommodate themselves to a victorious North Viet-Nam.

7. It seems to us that an unusual amount of restraint would have to be postulated for a victorious North Viet-Nam if it is expected to resist the opportunities for further aggrandizement, at least over Laos and Cambodia. For specifics about those opportunities the other area posts should be queried. It seems to us that evidence should be readily available especially for Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. The degree of accommodation of such countries is apt to be a function, it seems to us, of (a) the degree of pressure from a victorious North Viet-Nam, (b) the internal strength and resilience of the non-communist societies, and (c) the degree and credibility of any countervailing pressure that could still be exercised by the U.S. and other major powers. We venture the guess that the first of these factors would be large and the others relatively small.

8. Should a relatively permanent stalemate be achieved between North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam, the prospects for a stable equilibrium in the area would seem much improved. There would be incentives for Laos and Cambodia to exercise a more truly neu-

tral role as buffers; and cooperative relationships among the non-communist countries of the area could gradually permit a reduction of the countervailing American power necessary for a wider equilibrium. The credibility of U.S. security assurances would have been strengthened by having been demonstrated. For these favorable trends to come into play it would not be necessary for North Viet-Nam to acknowledge defeat in any settlement; it would be sufficient for the demonstration to be made that its ambition to take over South Viet-Nam had been frustrated for the immediately foreseeable future.

January 30, 1969.

Question 3: How soundly-based is the common belief that Hanoi is under active pressure with respect to the Paris negotiations from Moscow (for) and Peking (against)? Is it clear that either Moscow or Peking believe they have, or are willing to use, significant leverage on Hanoi's policies? What is the nature of evidence, other than public or private official statements?

Answer:

1. We in Saigon have no evidence that Hanoi is under active and heavy pressure with respect to the Paris negotiations from either the USSR or Communist China. In fact, we believe that the North Vietnamese make their own decisions on the negotiations.

2. The Chinese of course have made it abundantly clear in their propaganda that they are opposed to the negotiations. They have also publicly indicated their displeasure with Hanoi's conduct by a variety of small slights and statements. How much they have told Hanoi privately we do not know, but we can assume they have made their views plain. There have been reports that delays in aid shipments, withdrawal of construction workers, and other actions by the Chinese were taken for the purpose of pressuring Hanoi to alter its stand on negotiations. While these things have occurred, we have not seen convincing evidence that the motive behind them was to pressure Hanoi, and they can all be explained by other factors (disorders within China, cessation of the bombing, etc.). Furthermore, it appears that the Chinese have now decided that the negotiations are a fact of life with which they must live.

3. The Soviets have been more circumspect in their public utterances than the Chinese, and they have in their propaganda applauded the negotiations and stressed their importance. They have on occasion been helpful in clarifying issues in the course of negotiations and in assisting ourselves and the North Vietnamese to reach specific agreements. We do not know how much pressure they have put on Hanoi to be "flexible", but we do think they have given some quiet encouragement in that direction.

4. It is of course the Sino-Soviet rivalry and the divergent views of the two nations on the Viet-Nam issue that have left Hanoi so relatively free from pressure from these two powers. Hanoi is very dependent on their help, and neither power is known for an innate reluctance to use its influence to pressure friend or foe. Given the rivalries between Moscow and Peking and their differing interests in the Viet-Nam war, Hanoi has ample room for maneuver between those Communist powers. Furthermore, the USSR and Communist China probably hesitate to put too much pressure on Hanoi for fear of lending substance to an accusation by the other of "betraying the front line of socialism." The Sino-Soviet rivalry also increases the interest of the Soviet Union in Viet-Nam, thus making it easier for Hanoi to obtain Soviet aid for its war and post-war needs.

5. Thus Hanoi, by playing its cards with skill and taking into account the sensibilities of the two powers in choosing the form, if not the substance, of its policies, has been able to maintain a remarkable degree of independence. With the decision to go into

negotiations, Hanoi has moved closer to the Soviet side of the argument, and it is perhaps natural that the role of Soviet advice and influence should loom larger now than before. The need for economic reconstruction and development of the North should also tend to heighten the Soviet role, for it is to the rich and distant USSR, not to Communist China, that the Hanoi leadership will be looking for massive economic aid. In spite of this present and prospective growth of Soviet influence, however, we believe the Hanoi leadership will try hard to maintain maximum freedom of action with respect to both the USSR and Communist China, and we think they have a good chance of success.

January 30, 1969.

Question 4: How sound is our knowledge of the existence and significance of stable "Moscow" and "Peking" factions within the Hanoi leadership, as distinct, for example, from shifting factions, all of whom recognize the need to balance off both allies? How much do we know, in general, of intraparty disputes and personalities within Hanoi?

Answer:

1. It is commonplace, but misleading, to single out certain North Vietnamese Lao Dong Party leaders as being in the camp of one or the other of the Communist superpowers. For example, Vo Nguyen Giap and Pham Van Dong often are listed as pro-Soviet, while Truong Chinh, the deceased Nguyen Chi Thanh, and occasionally Pham Hung have been placed in the pro-Chinese camp. Ho Chi Minh himself is usually characterized as being "in-between." Le Duan, Le Duc Tho and Nguyen Duy Trinh appear to have gone through various shifts and sometimes are referred to as a swing group.

2. Such characterizations are probably an impediment to a useful understanding of the political dynamics of the North Vietnamese leadership. For example, the "pro-Chinese" Nguyen Chi Thanh was at the same time an advocate of conventional style warfare in South Vietnam, despite China's call for protracted warfare. Other anomalies also are apparent. Even in the case of Truong Chinh, whose name means "Long March" and was chosen to honor Mao Tse-Tung, the most consistent of the pro-Chinese figures, there have been periods when his stance did not appear to jibe with what Peking was advocating.

3. Our knowledge of the internal personalities, workings and divisions within the Lao Dong Party is in fact very limited and speculative. We lack solid information concerning intraparty disputes and personalities within the Lao Dong hierarchy. We can be reasonably sure, in view of Hanoi's perplexing problems and the occasional surfacing of policy disputes, that there are differences within the top ruling group in Hanoi about the best course to be pursued at any given time. We cannot be nearly so sure that there are established ideological factions within the ruling group. It is possible that these do exist, but it is also just as likely, judging from the evidence we have, that the groupings shift according to the particular issue being discussed or the point in history that is being considered, and that personal rivalries, loyalties, and ambitions play a large role.

4. We have a great deal of evidence to indicate that the Hanoi leadership wants to be independent of both the USSR and China and, in fact, has acted independently of these two powers. We therefore think that the root and nature of differences in the leadership are unlikely to be found in "pro-Soviet" or "pro-Chinese" feelings on the part of individual Hanoi leaders.

Question 5-A: What is the evidence supporting various hypotheses, and the overall adequacy of evidence, relating to the following questions:

A. Why did NVA units leave South Viet-Nam last summer and fall?

SUMMARY

1. The withdrawals of NVA units last summer appear to have been motivated exclusively by military considerations though, as noted below, the enemy did reap certain political benefits from that withdrawal and the concurrent "lull" in fighting, which were interpreted by some Americans as a signal justifying a bombing cessation.

2. The withdrawal of NVA units from I and II Corps in October seems to have had a dual cause: (1) severe logistic difficulties due largely to allied interdiction efforts, and (2) the difficulty of supplying or protecting these troops if the DMZ was not to be "abused," one of the conditions of the total bombing cessation. These two factors seem sufficient to explain the enemy's action in those two Corps areas. He may have also hoped that his withdrawals would produce added pressures on the U.S. to cease bombing the north, but there is no positive evidence that he had this in mind, and he seems to have made no special effort to send us a "signal" on this point.

MILITARY MOTIVATION

3. NVN's inability to supply its troops in I and II Corps was attested by information contained in numerous captured documents, PW and rallier interrogations and source reports that indicated severe food shortages among enemy units—including near-starvation conditions for many troops—and serious material shortages. These shortages were a result of Allied military actions in SVN, unusually heavy rainfall, and—more importantly—improved interdiction of enemy supply lines in NVN and Laos following implementation of a different concept of aerial interdiction on July 20.

4. On July 20, aerial interdiction efforts in NVN and Laos were directed primarily at twelve essential but vulnerable road and water-crossing choke-points. By September, according to reliable intelligence estimates, the infiltration of supplies in SVN via Laos and the DMZ had been reduced to a rate about 10 percent of the pre-July level. This was the result of a combination of aerial interdiction and seasonal weather factors. Since most NVA as well as VC troops in I and II Corps were then dependent upon supplies entering SVN via Laos and the DMZ, supply shortages were undoubtedly a major factor in restricting enemy actions, reducing his ability to withstand the mounting Allied offensive operations, and forcing the withdrawal of his units to sanctuary in NVN or partial sanctuary in Laos. The position of enemy units south of the DMZ with regard to supplies and self-defense would have become tenuous after the bombing halt, with its obligation on the enemy not to "abuse" the DMZ and the enemy's consequent inability to send large amounts of supplies through the DMZ or move major forces across it.

5. Further evidence that the NVA withdrawal and reduction of military activity was due to the immediate military situation is found in the fact that the NVA First Division was dispatched at this time from II to III Corps where, along with the NVA Seventh and nominally VC Fifth and Ninth Divisions, it is supplied via Sihanoukville and the Mekong through Cambodia. Also, with the improvement of the enemy's supply situation in I and II Corps after the bombing halt and end of the southwestern monsoon, the movement of NVA units back into areas bordering Laos has been detected.

6. The withdrawal of NVA as well as VC units from III Corps into Cambodian sanctuaries has occurred in each instance following the severe losses the enemy has sustained in earlier offensives. The absences from SVN were in each case temporary, apparently for rest, refitting and training, while almost all intelligence indications—then as now—pointed to continuing enemy efforts to initiate further offensive action.

POLITICAL BENEFITS

7. The relative lulls in military activity which accompanied the withdrawals following the May offensive and again in late September and early October served to put pressure on the United States for a complete cessation of the bombing of North Viet-Nam. Many people believed that the lulls were the reciprocal gesture that we had demanded for a bombing halt, and that since Hanoi had taken this step we should cease the bombing. Hanoi somewhat belatedly took measures to exploit this attitude following the May offensive, presumably in the hope that the lulls in fighting brought on by their withdrawals due to military exigencies would bring about a complete halt to the bombing of North Viet-Nam without the necessity of their making any commitments to the United States.

8. By October the situation was different, for Hanoi was aware of the U.S. price for a bombing halt and was willing to pay it. They may have hoped, as noted above, that their withdrawals would bring reciprocal U.S. withdrawals, but they did not explicitly say so, and this does not seem to have been the reason for their action.

January 31, 1969.

Question 5-B: What is the evidence supporting various hypotheses, and the overall adequacy of evidence, relating to the following questions:

B. Did the predicted third offensive by the NVA/VC actually take place? If so, why did it not achieve greater success?

Answer: 1. There is no question but that the third-wave offensive did occur. That the enemy intended to launch such an offensive was perfectly clear from numerous captured documents, prisoner of war and allied interrogation reports, and agent sources. (In this respect, our information concerning the third offensive was identical to and as complete as that we received about the second offensive.) That he actually launched a third offensive is equally clear from the record of combat activities in August.

2. The third offensive varied markedly from the earlier two offensives of Tet and May-June. It did not begin with a large number of nationwide attacks by fire and assaults on a single day nor did it include a major attack on Saigon. It consisted rather of attacks by fire and assaults coordinated by corps area and staggered over a period of about two weeks. Thus, the third offensive failed to make the initial psychological impact of the earlier offensives, even though the total number of attacks by fire and assaults and of enemy casualties during the first two weeks of the third offensive approached those during the similar period of the May-June offensive.

3. Pre-emptive efforts were a major factor in preventing the enemy from achieving greater success. Additionally, improved intelligence, supply interdiction along infiltration corridors both in and out of country and aggressive Allied military operations all played important roles. Also limiting enemy achievements was the poorer quality of his men and officers, large numbers of whom were relatively untrained and considerably less experienced than those who had participated and been lost in the earlier offensives.

Question 5-C: What is the evidence supporting various hypotheses, and the overall adequacy of evidence, relating to the following questions:

C. Why are VC guerrillas and local forces now relatively dormant? Among the hypotheses:

(1) Response to VC/NVA battle losses, forcing withdrawal or passivity;

(2) To put diplomatic pressure on us to move to substantive talks in Paris;

(3) To prepare for future operations; and/or

(4) Pressure of US and Allied operations.

Answer: 1. The VC are husbanding their

resources to give themselves the option of a "climaxing" offensive. The evidence for this is substantial. VC guerrillas and local forces are now under instructions to harass Allied forces, LOC's and installations while concentrating primarily upon preparations for the offensive. The guerrillas and local forces, which suffered particularly heavy losses in earlier offensives, are essential for logistical preparations and as guides and vanguard elements for large-scale offensive operations. They cannot be expended prematurely. However, while preparation and conservation of resources for future operations are probably the main factor in the current low level of guerrilla and local forces activity, there are other factors that may be of about equal importance.

2. The enemy's personnel losses and failure to achieve his military objectives in earlier offensives have reduced VC morale and prevented recruitment of sufficient replacements within South Viet-Nam. There is also evidence that VC attempts to upgrade guerrilla and local force units into main force units for operations outside their native provinces have contributed to desertions and declining confidence in victory. This is particularly true in IV Corps where the bulk of VC forces are now concentrated. It must be assumed, therefore, that attrition of guerrilla and local forces, the loss of cadres, and declining morale are also important factors in the low level of enemy activity, as is the continued heavy pressure of US and Allied offensive operations.

3. There is no evidence that guerrilla and local force inactivity is designed to put diplomatic pressure on us to move to substantive talks in Paris.

Question 6: What rate of NVA/VC attrition would outrun their ability to replenish by infiltration and recruitment as presently calculated? Do present calculations achieve this? If not, what force levels and other conditions would be necessary? Is there any evidence they are concerned about continuing heavy losses?

Answer: 1. MACV-estimated VC/NVA losses from all causes were 145,000 in 1967 (an IDA study indicates they were 25 percent higher) and 289,000 in 1968. If intelligence estimates are correct that North Vietnam adds 120,000-130,000 physically fit men each year to a military manpower pool of nearly 2.5 million (500,000 of whom are in service), the enemy could not have maintained force levels as he has without either dipping into North Vietnam's manpower reserves or through extensive recruiting within South Vietnam. Since intelligence indications are that the VC has not been able to replace its losses by recruitment, the burden of replacing enemy personnel losses and maintaining the conflict in South Vietnam has fallen increasingly upon North Vietnam. The result has been a significant shift in the balance between VC and NVA personnel in the total enemy force structure as well as a significant downgrading of the quality of enemy personnel—particularly leadership personnel—in terms of training, experience, and knowledge of SVN. These factors are probably equally if not more important for future military developments in SVN than the ability of the enemy to maintain his force levels in terms of mere numbers.

2. It is difficult to judge the willingness of North Vietnam to sustain current losses. Certainly, North Vietnam cannot continue to do so without very serious consequences at least for its economic, if not political, future. Increasing evidence that the enemy is pursuing conservation of manpower tactics, which is supported by intelligence derived from captured documents, interrogations of PW's and ralliers, and clandestine sources, indicate that in fact North Vietnam is concerned about heavy NVA/VC losses. However, we believe that the enemy is willing to expend considerable manpower if he judges that the Allied

will to continue the war will erode faster than his will to continue the war.

3. Force levels and conditions are, therefore, already present to achieve the NVA/VC attrition necessary to outrun North Vietnam's ability to replenish personnel losses in terms of quality, if not quantity. Also, as Allied forces maintain or improve their quality, and the current pattern of enemy relative to friendly losses continues, conditions to achieve NVA/VC attrition in excess of their ability to replenish, even in quantitative terms, should improve.

Question 7: To what relative extent do the US/RVNAF and the NVA/VC share in the control and the rate of VC/NVA attrition; i.e., to what extent, in terms of our tactical experience, can heavy losses persistently be imposed on VC/NVA forces, despite their possible intention to limit casualties by avoiding contact? Among the hypotheses:

A. Contact is predominantly at VC tactical initiative, and we cannot reverse this; VC need suffer high casualties only so long as they are willing to accept them, in seeking contact; or

B. Current VC/NVA loss rates can be maintained by present forces—as increased X percent by Y additional forces—whatever the DRV/VC choose to do, short of further major withdrawal.

Answer: The Embassy has no evidence on this subject independent of that of MACV. Therefore we are not attempting to provide a separate answer.

Question 8: What controversies persist on the estimate of VC order of battle; in particular, on the various categories of guerrilla forces and infrastructure? On VC recruiting, and manpower pool? What is the evidence for different estimates, and what is the overall adequacy of evidence?

Answer: 1. Intelligence on the VC/NVA main and local force units is generally good and adequate. There are two sets of figures used—the first is based on "hard intelligence" derived from prisoners, reports, or captured documents, while a highly classified "estimate" of enemy strength would take account of units known or believed to be present or to have departed but which do not meet the "hard intelligence" criteria mentioned above. Since it may take several months before prisoners or documents are captured, the "hard intelligence" figure has a built-in lag, and in a period of enemy buildup would carry a lower enemy strength figure than the "estimate." It is believed that all agencies accept the MACV "hard intelligence" figure as a point of departure. The press in the past has sometimes tended to confuse these two sets of figures.

In preparing the classified "estimates" on the main and local forces, certain factors will cause the various agencies to come up with different estimates. These factors include: the speed with which units are accepted into the OB after their presence is known, the speed with which enemy losses are subtracted and replacements are added, and the degree to which normal divisional and regimental support units are assumed to be present despite lack of definite evidence. While these factors would cause differing estimates among the intelligence agencies, it is our understanding that the differences are not substantial in respect to the main and local forces.

2. Intelligence on the VC guerrilla forces is inadequate and unreliable. The degree of recruitment, upgrading and losses is dependent on local factors, thus precluding definitive countrywide estimates. Captured documents sometimes provide information, but it is usually not current and usually represents only a local situation. Limited Allied access to VC-controlled areas, where most guerrillas reside, is another limiting factor, and field reporting units acknowledge that their estimates are only educated guesses. Consequently, a great deal of assump-

tion goes into estimates of guerrilla strength, with Washington estimates running somewhat higher than those of MACV. The part-time hamlet (self-defense) guerrillas and the assault youth are also not quantified by MACV on grounds they do not represent a significant military threat. Some Washington agencies include those elements presumably because they are part of the insurgent base sometimes participating in battles and are included in the "body count."

3. Estimates of the infrastructure are also based on extrapolations of incomplete data. Earlier controversy over the size of the political infrastructure stemmed largely from the lack of precise definition of what constituted the membership, which has now been resolved in the field. We are not aware of any controversy over the number of professional cadre in the infrastructure, although there may still be differences between Washington and the field as to the inclusion of certain kinds of support personnel.

4. Differences in estimates of VC recruiting likewise exist for the same reasons as indicated for the guerrillas. Monthly recruitment and impressment estimates range between 3,500-7,000 with Washington estimates being generally higher. While documents and prisoners are able to provide the recruiting situation in specific areas, varying local conditions make countrywide extrapolations from this limited data of uncertain reliability. The expansion of GVN-controlled areas, a reduction in VC recruitment standards, increased resort to involuntary recruitment, an increased use of NVA fillers in VC units, and the GVN's mobilization program all point to the probability of a reduced VC recruitment level during the past six months.

Question 9: What are NVA/VC capabilities for launching a large-scale offensive, with "dramatic" results (even if taking high casualties and without holding objectives long), in the next six months: (e.g., an offensive against one or more cities, or against most newly "pacified" hamlets.) How adequate is the evidence?

Answer: 1. The enemy has positioned his forces in III Corps so that he has several offensive options which he can choose to exercise and at present it is III Corps where he presents the greatest threat for "dramatic" results. Elsewhere in SVN his present threat is limited; however, within weeks or months he could present significant threats in other areas such as the DMZ, Hue, the Danang area, Tam Ky, or Quang Ngai in I Corps. In II Corps, the most likely areas that could be seriously threatened are Kontum, Pleiku, or Ban Me Thuot. Can Tho and My Tho would likely remain high threat areas in IV Corps.

2. In order to build a serious threat in areas other than III Corps the enemy would be required to heavily infiltrate those areas and concentrate his forces, which he is capable of doing. He has greatly improved his logistical capabilities, and has been stockpiling large quantities of supplies in base areas and forward positions during the past 4 months. In addition, infiltration of personnel is on the rise and his organized units could be repositioned, probably within 3 months at the most. The Allies can, to a considerable extent, pre-empt the enemy and can certainly defeat him when he does attack, but he essentially controls the level of combat.

3. In III Corps, the enemy, if he is prepared to pay the high price, is presently capable of launching major attacks against Tay Ninh and Loc Ninh, and—to a lesser extent—Bien Hoa and Saigon, and of temporarily penetrating those cities, which would gain him headlines in the world press. He has the proven capability to get some forces through Allied defenses (particularly at night), he has temporarily penetrated cities in III Corps on three previous occasions, and he has today more forces available for the task with more on the way. However, these forces, which in-

clude 4 organized divisions and 3 additional division-equivalents presently in III Corps, are primarily NVA troops which are less capable of infiltrating target cities than were the predominantly VC units deployed at Tet and in May-June. The enemy would not necessarily need to commit most of these forces to a major attack on one city, making it possible to use others to hold down Allied forces in other areas or to launch a simultaneous attack.

4. If the enemy launched large-scale attacks against cities he would suffer heavy casualties because he would have to concentrate against the target in the face of reinforced Allied infantry and increased Allied artillery and air power, and he would have to surface his clandestine assets in the target city. To launch attacks against such odds would require the enemy to exert a great deal of effort, but he has previously demonstrated a willingness to accept heavy losses for political gains. Despite some signs of faltering morale, we believe that enemy discipline is sufficiently strong to enable him to carry out such plans.

5. With the forces available the enemy could also concentrate his activities against the pacification program using much smaller units over a larger area. Captured documents have revealed enemy concern about the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) and have indicated that they intend to smash it, and the enemy actions against pacification have increased during the last few months. They have the capability of striking at this program with guerrillas and Local Forces while holding down Allied forces with Main Force units who could also assist against the APC if needed. The security forces assigned to the APC would not be sufficient to withstand such an effort and the enemy could drive the friendly local forces out of a large number of hamlets, although the gains would only be temporary. Such an enemy success might be considered "dramatic" but would not have the impact of large-scale attacks against urban areas.

Question 10: What are the main channels for military supplies for the NVA/VC forces in SVN, (e.g., Cambodia and/or the Laotian panhandle)? What portion of these supplies come in through Sihanoukville?

Answer: 1. Military supplies for the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army (VC/NVA) forces are brought into South Vietnam (SVN) by various routes and methods, depending in large part on the region and the demands of the troops in the area. Enemy forces in I and at least part of II Corps receive supplies which have been moved across the DMZ or have been trucked through Laos and then into SVN. The possible routes for moving supplies into southern II Corps, III and IV Corps are: 1) via the Laotian panhandle and the tri-border area to roads along the Cambodian-SVN border (the North-South route); 2) by ship to Sihanoukville (or up the Mekong to Phnom Penh) and trucked from there to arms depots in Cambodia or moved along Cambodian lines of communication (LOC's) to SVN; 3) by sea infiltration either along the coast of SVN or across Cambodian beaches.

2. Some military material may be infiltrated into SVN by sea, but even for goods coming into IV Corps, this is not a principal channel. Although it would be difficult to intercept small coastal craft which could carry military supplies, the presence of enemy steel-hulled trawlers would almost certainly be detected.

3. Except for the movement of military supplies via the Laotian panhandle into I Corps, there is little evidence of the movement of goods on the North-South route. Still, this route possibly also is being used to transport goods to II and III Corps. For several years the VC/NVA have maintained a trail network from Laos and the tri-border area along the Cambodian-SVN border; how-

ever, in 1968 the road network was improved and expanded to such an extent that now there may be a road stretching from the tri-border area almost to Saigon. The paucity of evidence that arms and ammunition are moving southward to III and IV Corps from Laos and the tri-border area is significant. Coupled with copious evidence of substantial West-East movement inside Cambodia, it suggests that the latter route is most important to III and IV Corps, with some remaining doubt whether it is the most important supply route to the enemy in II Corps.

4. Sihanoukville and various Cambodian LOC's comprise another artery for moving military supplies to the VC/NVA in South Vietnam. Some of the military goods coming into Sihanoukville are destined for the Cambodian armed forces as part of the agreements with the USSR and Communist China, but the amounts agreed to, shipped or required, are unknown. On the other hand, some of the military materiel arriving at Sihanoukville probably is diverted to the VC/NVA by Cambodian military officers, possible as part of an agreement between Cambodia and the Communists. For the III Corps area, where the Communists have deployed a large number of main force units, no solid evidence is available which allows a precise judgment on whether Sihanoukville or the North-South route is the main channel for supplies. Based on the fragmentary evidence available, however, we tend to believe that Sihanoukville is increasing in importance to the Communists and may constitute the main source of supplies for III and IV Corps.

5. In sum, there is insufficient information available to judge whether the North-South route or the West-East route from Sihanoukville is the main channel for enemy supplies in III and IV Corps. All one can say with assurance is that the latter route has become significantly—indeed, vastly—more important in 1968 than previously. It cannot be proved that the West-East route is the principal supply route, but we believe that an informed estimate can be made in that sense.

RVNAF

Question 10A (A-D): What differences of opinion exist concerning extent of RVNAF improvement, and what is evidence underlying different views—(e.g., compare recent CIA memo with MACV views.) For example:

A. Which is the level of effective, mobile, offensive operations? What results are they achieving?

B. What is the actual level of "genuine" small-unit actions and night actions in ARVN, RF and PF: i.e., actions that would typically be classed as such within the US Army, and in particular, offensive ambushes and patrols? How much has this changed?

C. How much has the officer selection and promotion system, and the quality of leadership, actually changed over the years (as distinct from changes in paper "programs")? How many junior officers hold commissions (in particular, battlefield commissions from NCO rank) despite lack of a high school diploma?

D. What known disciplinary action has resulted from ARVN looting of civilians in the past year (for example, the widespread looting that took place last spring)?

Answer: The Embassy has no evidence on this subject independent of that of MACV. Therefore we are not attempting to provide a separate answer.

Question 10A (E): What differences of opinion exist concerning extent of RVNAF improvement, and what is evidence underlying different views—(e.g., compare recent CIA memo with MACV views.) For example:

E. To what extent have past "anti-desertion" decrees and efforts lessened the rate of desertion; why has the rate recently been increasing to new highs?

Answer:

1. Desertion is differently defined in the RVNAF than in our own armed forces. Those whom we would categorize as AWOL are considered deserters by the RVNAF. Additionally, many RVNAF "deserters" in fact leave the regular Army to enlist in the RF and PF because of a desire to be located close to home. At the same time, some RF and PF "desert" in order to enlist in the RVNAF to obtain better arms and uniforms. In the absence of accurate personal records, it has been impossible to ascertain the precise extent of these practices. We are satisfied, however, that they are a significant factor in the so-called "desertion rate." While we have not succeeded in our efforts to get the RVNAF to revise their criteria for declaring a serviceman a deserter, improved personnel controls through the GVN fingerprint program are now being established so that the true extent of "desertions" should become known in the near future.

2. The RVNAF desertion rate increased sharply from May through October 1968. This development followed closely on the heels of the rapid induction from April through August of large numbers of men into the RVNAF under the General Mobilization Law. Earlier, throughout 1967, the desertion rate had been relatively steady at about 10-11 per thousand per month; later, from a high of 18.3 in October 1968, the rate fell to 15.8 in November, and to 12.6 in December.

3. Since the desertion rate is substantially higher for military personnel in their first six months of service than for personnel who have served longer, it is believed that general mobilization and, especially, the induction of large numbers of youths between the ages of 17½ and 20 years of age, was responsible for the rapid increase in the RVNAF desertion rate. The decline in the desertion rate in November and December, the seventh and eighth months following the commencement of general mobilization, would tend to confirm this view. (Note: Monthly desertion rates in early 1968 were distorted by the effects of the Tet Offensive and the GVN's amnesty for deserters. Thus, those rates are not usefully compared with rates of other periods.)

3. The very recent decline in the desertion rate has also coincided with application of anti-desertion measures initiated in the late summer and early fall, 1968. Some of these were long-term welfare measures but many were a short-term, disciplinary nature. Given the recently increased interest of RVNAF and GVN authorities in the desertion problem and the better exercise of command leadership in such matters, the anti-desertion disciplinary measures may also have helped reduce the desertion rate in November and December. There is no hard evidence, however, that the anti-desertion decrees and efforts were the principal reasons, or even one of the principal reasons, for the drop in the desertion rate. They may, however, contribute to a further drop if one is noted in the future.

Question 10A (F): What differences of opinion exist concerning extent of RVNAF improvement, and what is evidence underlying different views—(e.g., compare recent CIA memo with MACV views.) For example:

F. What success (copy illegible) in providing local security (copy illegible) of and influence in rural populations?

Answer: 1. The increased percentage of population under GVN control since the Tet attacks in 1968 has been partly due to increased effectiveness of the territorial security shield provided by the RF and PF. The RF and PF began to be re-equipped during 1968 to offset increased VC unit firepower and to provide increased combat effectiveness. They were given a retraining program and improvements in the logistical support system were effected. Programs to improve leadership, the promotion system and the dispensing of awards were instituted. All the foregoing have resulted in increased confidence. All Corps

Commanders have insisted on and obtained, a higher level of operational activity. This higher level of activity has resulted in extension of the radii of operations and a steadily increasing number of contacts with the enemy. It should be noted also that improved performance by ARVN units has supplemented and supported RF and PF operations.

2. The appearance of improved RF and PF effectiveness may, however, be due in part to the lessened activity of the enemy (see Question 5). From end September to mid-January, during the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, there has been a lower rate of terrorism and a lower level of VC military activity. During this same period a rapidly rising Chieu Hoi rate and the increasing effectiveness of the Phoenix Program have reduced the VC popular support and recruiting bases still further.

3. Considering the factors noted above, together with the results of RF and PF operations over the past several months, we conclude nevertheless that RF and PF forces have significantly improved in effectiveness. January 31, 1969.

Question 11: To what extent could RVNAF—as it is now—handle the VC (main force, local forces, guerrillas), with or without US combat support to fill RVNAF deficiencies, if all GVN units were withdrawn:

A. If VC still had northern fillers.

B. If all northerners (but not regroupes) were withdrawn.

Answer: The Embassy has no evidence on this subject independent of that of MACV. Therefore we are not attempting to provide a separate answer.

RVNAF

Question 12: To what extent could RVNAF—as it is now—also handle a sizable level of NVA forces:

A. With U.S. air and artillery support.

B. With above and also U.S. ground forces in reserve.

C. Without U.S. direct support, but with increased RVNAF artillery and air capacity?

Answer: The Embassy has no evidence on this subject independent of that of MACV. Therefore we are not attempting to provide a separate answer.

RVNAF

Question 13: What, in various views, are the required changes—in RVNAF command, organization, equipment, training and incentives, in political environment, in logistical support, in U.S. modes of influence—for making RVNAF adequate to the tasks cited in questions 10-A and 11 above? How long would this take? What are the practical obstacles to these changes, and what new U.S. moves would be needed to overcome these?

Answer: The Embassy has no evidence on this subject independent of that of MACV. Therefore we are not attempting to provide a separate answer.

PACIFICATION

Question 14: How much, and where, has the security situation and the balance of influence between the VC and GVN actually changed in the countryside over time, contrasting the present to such benchmarks as end-61, end-63, end-65, end-67? What are the best indicators of such change, or lack of it? What factors have been mainly responsible for such change as has occurred? Why has there not been more?

Answer:

1. At end-1961, NLF activity had made such inroads in the countryside that the security environment in approximately 50% of the villages and hamlets would not be considered, in terms of Hamlet Evaluation Summary (HES) criteria, as "relatively secure" in the "C" category. The Strategic Hamlet concept had just been introduced, with its emphasis on population concentration and hamlet self-defense under local leadership. By comparison with January 1969, one would say

that the GVN controlled approximately one-third of the population that it controls today.

2. At end-1963, it was apparent that the Strategic Hamlet concept had achieved an initial success in establishing GVN control in the countryside, but that VC attacks against it, coupled with the decline and downfall of the Diem regime, had left the countryside in a position where perhaps 35% of the villages and hamlets would be considered as "relatively secure" in the "C" category. During this year increased US support in the helicopter transport, armored personnel carrier and close air support categories was offset by improved VC training, organization and tactics. NVA units were reported in the northern area of the country. The Buddhist confrontation with the Diem regime had a sharply divisive effect.

3. At end-1965, the country had passed through chaos following the downfall of Diem and the subsequent changes of government. The NVA presence grew steadily and the beginning of the present massive US presence was heralded by the decision to bomb North Viet-Nam in February and the introduction of an increasing number of US troops. NVA troop strength increased slowly throughout the 1963-65 period. By end-1965 programs were introduced with very much the same objectives as the Strategic Hamlet program although the refugee problem, created as a result of a much higher level of tactical operations, was an important and complex added factor. The GVN security situation vis-a-vis the NLF/VC at end-1965 was approximately the same as that at end-1963.

4. At end-1967, as a result of a combination of much greater US tactical, advisory and development support activity, as well as GVN involvement in the "Revolutionary Development" (RD) concept, the security situation and balance of influence between the NLF/VC and GVN had taken a favorable turn for the GVN with HES estimates of 67.2% of the population under GVN control, 16.4% in contested areas and 16.4% under VC control. The RD concept was to bring about concentration of population and introducing and/or improving technical and social services with emphasis on public health, education and agriculture. Eleven criteria were established under which the hamlet was improved physically, the VC infrastructure was to be rooted out and a self-defense capability in the hamlet was to be created. (This is the basis of the pacification campaign today with the exception of much greater emphasis on a village/hamlet self-defense capability). The momentum in the flow of materials and personnel in this program increased throughout 1967; however, the net increase in GVN strength and population control in the countryside increased only very slowly. Performance by appointive GVN officials was poor, and technical and social service representatives were generally reluctant to enter personally into the program. The self-defense capability was generally not realized and few weapons were made available for this purpose. A national Constitution was promulgated and village and hamlet elections were held in the spring of 1967. However, because of fear of assassination or other reprisal, many of the traditional candidates for village and hamlet office, such as family group leaders, did not run for office. The public administration training program for key elected officials was not particularly effective, having been geared to a higher educational level than that attained by many of the newly elected officials, and there was not much confidence in the ability of those officials to perform their duties adequately. On balance, there was no apparent transfer of authority and responsibility from the district to the village and hamlet level.

5. Enemy reaction to the spread of the Revolutionary Development hamlets throughout the countryside, which had in-

creased slowly during 1967, appeared to be leveling off at the end of that year. VC organization was more tightly knit and disciplined. Adherence to the VC by a significant segment of the population was more sharply defined, while confidence in the GVN and its ability to establish control over the countryside was still generally lacking. There was a notable war-weariness and desire for peace. Despite the move toward political organization by the GVN and the holding of elections, there was little enthusiasm for the Government. Further, it was apparent that there was little communication between the Government and the people.

6. In 1968 the security and control measures of the GVN were at first badly shaken by the Tet attacks. Parts of the countryside were lost to VC control for varying periods of time. It is the analysis of GVN efforts to strengthen and restore GVN security and control since 1 February 1968 which serves as the basis for the answer to this question.

7. At the end of February 1968 population in relatively secure areas was reported as only 59.4%, in contested areas as 22.4%, and in VC controlled areas as 18.2%. Considering that the VC infrastructure in what were considered relatively secure areas remained largely unidentified, these figures are perhaps misleading. Evaluation of the operations immediately following the Tet attacks indicates that the ARVN forces turned in a relatively good performance as did the RF to a lesser degree. Although the VC attacked or entered a large number of Revolutionary Development hamlets, many of these were subsequently re-entered with ease by GVN forces and Revolutionary Development cadre. "Project Recovery" was set in motion to restore GVN control, to continue the Revolutionary Development program, to care for the large number of refugees created by the attacks, and to restore essential services.

8. Throughout the remainder of 1968, ARVN performance continued to improve. ARVN and RF and PF units were re-equipped, retrained, and armed with improved weaponry to match enemy firepower. Under the mobilization decree Government forces began a rapid expansion program. The mobilization decree forced many people to the decision to adhere to one side or the other, and most adhered to the GVN side. Project Recovery was, by and large, successfully completed. Inefficient and/or corrupt officials at province or district level were replaced. The Revolutionary Development program was simplified and greater emphasis placed on adapting it to village development and to providing a self-defense capability at the village and hamlet levels. The President and leading Government officials began visiting various provinces and meeting the people informally. By the end of the year the Government's intent to institute a national land reform program had been announced and a small percentage of land titles had been distributed. The country had recovered almost completely from the Tet attacks and the percentage of population in relatively secure areas was reported at 76.3% with 11.4% in contested areas and 12.3% under VC control. A steadily increasing number of people came in under the Chieu Hoi program, there was a sharp increase in the number of VC infrastructures neutralized, and the Accelerated Pacification Campaign moved forward more smoothly and rapidly than anticipated. More than 1,000 hamlets have been entered to re-establish GVN control. Since 1 September 1968 approximately 100,000 refugees have been able to return to their original hamlets.

9. At the present time the security situation in this country is better than at any time during the period covered by this question. Principal factors in this improvement are: a) ARVN performance continues to improve; b) RF and PF forces have increased their operational activity and are providing

an expanding territorial security shield over the countryside; c) general mobilization is providing a broader recruitment base for an expansion of all the Viet-Nam Armed Forces; d) with the increasing success of the Phoenix and Chieu Hoi programs the popular support and recruiting bases for the VC are damaged; e) return to original hamlets and resettlement of refugees are proceeding at an accelerated pace; f) public services to the people have shown improvement and GVN officials are traveling more freely in the countryside; g) as GVN-controlled territory expands, inter-district and inter-province commerce and transport is resumed; h) local government is receiving impetus through the announcement that village and hamlet elections will be conducted during the month of March 1969 and the plan to place PF units and RD cadres in villages under village government control and to let village/hamlet governments have control of funds for local development; i) political leaders, aware of the coming political confrontation in the post-hostilities era, are engaged in talking with a view toward unified political action; j) there has been a relatively low level of VC activity during the last quarter of 1968 and the first half of January 1969; k) VC establishment of Liberation Committees at the village/hamlet level has proven to be largely a propaganda and political gesture without much convincing appeal to the aspirations of the people.

10. Reasons why there has not been more improvement follow: a) the VC retain the capability of attacking in force, and recent indications are that the pattern of VC tactics will be to avoid contact with ARVN units but to project main force attacks against the territorial security shield, thus undermining popular confidence in the GVN and seriously endangering the success of the Pacification Campaign; b) while activity toward unified political action continues, it has so far produced no concrete results; c) the GVN still demonstrates inability to communicate with the people; notably, GVN information initiatives fail to arouse popular enthusiasm or support; d) the psychological warfare program is generally considered pedestrian and lacking in imagination; e) the popular attitude continues to be one of apprehension that the GVN will not be able to meet successfully the politically confrontation with the Communists in the post-hostilities era; f) the people are not convinced that the Government can or wishes to root out corruption which, although traditional, is increasingly becoming a national issue; g) overshadowing all of this is the fact that the Vietnamese are basically unclear as to US intentions. They are plagued by the suspicion that the US will withdraw rapidly following negotiations and that the GVN will not be able to maintain security, law and order in the face of the Communist threat.

PACIFICATION

Question 15 (Part I): What are the reasons for expecting more change in the countryside in the next two years than in past intervals? What are the reasons for not expecting more?

Answer:

1. The reasons for expecting more change in the countryside during the next two years are as follows:

(a) The single most important reason is the urgent realization on the part of the GVN that control of the countryside will be critical in determining the final peace settlement. The GVN has not previously paid sufficient attention to pacification. Now, the GVN concern is very real, and is being pressed personally by President Thieu and the Cabinet as a whole.

(b) The initial success of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign.

(c) Assets for pacification (military and civilian) are becoming available in increasingly large amounts. This refers to weapons,

equipment for self-help projects, construction materials, manpower, etc.

(d) ARVN, RD, RF and PF as well as the entire pacification apparatus, are becoming more effective.

(e) More key GVN officials, especially province and district chiefs, are now being chosen on the basis of competence. This was not the case in past years. Motivation and performance have improved.

(f) The VC political infrastructure is being seriously challenged for the first time through the Phoenix program. This program has high level GVN priority and there is evidence from enemy sources that he is seriously worried by it.

(g) GVN planning and awareness of priorities is much improved over recent years. The enthusiastic acceptance of the Phoenix program is one example. The campaign to strengthen local government, with emphasis on the village rather than the hamlet, is another.

(h) The VC have lost much of their influence over and support from the populace. This has been a result of the sufferings at the hands of the communists at Tet, and subsequent onerous VC recruitment and taxation policies. There is now no great confidence (in or out of VC circles) that the VC can win a military victory. Evidences of the change in rural allegiance are plentiful, e.g., the increasing Chieu Hoi rate and Highland ethnic minority groups moving into GVN-held areas to escape VC demands. As the VC are losing the compliance and support of the people, their manpower base is becoming smaller and their effectiveness is correspondingly reduced.

(i) Approximately 100,000 refugees have returned to their old hamlet, demonstrating confidence in the GVN rural effort.

2. The reasons for not expecting more (or more rapid) change are often no more than insufficiencies and limitations in the above factors. They are as follows:

(a) The GVN effort sometimes appears directed more at Paris than to achieving real change in rural villages and hamlets. (The same, of course, can be said for the VC program of establishing Liberation Committees.) The effort is often superficial, and results are expected to come quickly. Pacification is a process requiring time and patience, and these qualities are not prominent in the current GVN pacification effort. The failure of the government to follow up on the 1967 elections, by providing adequately for local government development, is a case in point. President Thieu recognizes the importance of this, but it will not be easy or rapid.

(b) ARVN, RF and PF are not yet good enough. ARVN is still making insufficient contact with VC Main Force units. RF and PF are too concerned with static defense positions, and are ineffective or inoperative at night. While progress has been made, it is not nearly enough.

(c) Local GVN administration is often slow, corrupt and unconcerned.

(d) The GVN psychological warfare and VIS programs are inadequate. They lack imagination, and do not take advantage of existing opportunities.

(e) The rural population, while now less favorably inclined toward the VC, still does not support the GVN in any meaningful way. The desire to be left alone is still the predominant attitude in many rural areas along with an unwillingness to cooperate until it is clear which side will win.

(f) The Phoenix program is often concentrating on low-level village and hamlet cadre, rather than going after the more important and more elusive VC political personnel. Statistics, by failing to give weight to the importance or unimportance of cadres, encourages a "numbers game."

(g) Refugee programs and payments are not always administered with sufficient dispatch and compassion.

PACIFICATION

Question 15 (Part II): What changes in RVNAF, GVN, US and VC practices and adaptiveness would be needed to increase favorable changes in security and control? How likely are such changes, individually and together? What are the obstacles?

Answer:

1. Necessary changes for RVNAF are:

(a) The single most important change is in the area of leadership. The quality of officer and non-commissioned officer leadership is still low. More effective measures must be instituted to improve the quality of leadership, such as better promotion procedures and encouragement of initiative. Should leadership improve, then other necessary changes can be expected to follow. Among them are:

(b) Greater aggressiveness and willingness to seek out and pursue the enemy continuously.

(c) More emphasis on night operations.

(d) More mobile, small unit operations to take the place of cumbersome large unit ones.

(e) Greater concern and respect for GVN population and private property.

2. Necessary changes for the GVN are:

(a) Improve the quality of leadership.

(b) Consolidate GVN control over contested areas at an accelerated pace.

(c) Reduce corruption.

(d) Convince Vietnamese that the government is concerned about them.

(e) Decentralize administration and simplify procedures.

(f) To insure a faster-acting and more responsive civil administration, they must overcome the inheritance of the French civil service and give more training, encouragement, and support to administrative cadre so that they can contact the people they serve. At present, they are behind their desks far too much of the time.

(g) Continue to develop local government at the village/hamlet level.

(h) Improve psychological warfare and information programs.

3. Necessary changes for the US are:

(a) Improve US evaluation of the effectiveness of GVN programs and of US support for them, tempering the necessary statistical summaries by discriminating judgment.

(b) The US must bend every effort to encourage the GVN to develop Vietnamese leadership.

4. The likelihood of all this happening quickly seems dubious. Since Tet 1968 there has been very great progress for the GVN, primarily in troop combat performance and expansion of the area of the pacification effort, and a decline in VC power and influence.

This high rate of progress probably cannot be sustained. The likelihood in the future is for continued but somewhat slower progress by the GVN and a further gradual weakening of the VC.

5. There is, however, a possibility that the trends may be accelerated or reversed by the increasing expectation that the war is in its final stage. On the one hand, as the Government continues to make progress, the enemy could become increasingly dispirited and his resistance could lessen and in some cases collapse. On the other hand, a combination of "weariness and realism" on the GVN side could lead to an increasing tendency toward accommodation with the enemy. There already seems to be a growing tendency on the part of some Vietnamese on the GVN side to "think the unthinkable" about talking with the NLF, changing the Constitution to permit it some role, etc. To the extent that such thoughts stem from self-confidence in the ability of the non-communist majority to defeat the enemy also in open political battle, this is a constructive development; but if the idea gains ground that the US is pushing the GVN into a political accommodation with the enemy, the psychological reaction could be one of panic and pessimism,

resulting in a steep decline in government performance and a quick reversal of the presently relatively favorable trend in the security situation.

PACIFICATION

Question 16: What proportion of the rural population must be regarded as "subject to significant VC presence and influence"? (How should hamlets rated as "C" in the Hamlet Evaluation System—the largest category—be regarded in this respect?) In particular, what proportion in the provinces surrounding Saigon? How much has this changed?

Answer:

1. Most of the rural population, including that in the provinces surrounding Saigon, must be regarded as subject to some VC presence and influence, significant in the following respects. Even in relatively secure areas such as "A", "B" and "C" hamlets, there is usually still a VC presence, or at least people who have relatives in the VC or who are sympathetic to it. In such areas the Viet Cong can still make a credible threat of assassination or kidnapping of GVN officials, so it is a matter of interpretation to what extent one can say that the GVN presence is fully established.

2. The Viet Cong is continuing to collect taxes in most areas, including relatively secure areas, though apparently with decreasing effectiveness.

3. With regard to propaganda, the Viet Cong can still propagandize the people face-to-face in relatively secure areas. They do not always say they are Viet Cong, and sometimes the message is not openly pro-Viet Cong, but an attempt to play on fears and dissatisfaction; for example, by calling for peace, criticizing the shortcomings of the GVN, or predicting that the Americans will soon abandon Viet Nam.

4. A notable VC initiative in the last quarter of 1968 and in January 1969 was the establishment of Liberation Committees in many villages and hamlets in "relatively secure", "contested" and "VC controlled" areas. However, we do not regard such Committees as an indicator of the degree of VC control or influence. Moreover, verification of existence of these Committees indicates that many exist in name only and do not represent an accretion in VC-controlled population.

5. VC forced labor and recruiting is adversely affected by the extension of the GVN presence to villages and hamlets during the Accelerated Pacification Campaign.

6. The foregoing considerations apply also to the provinces surrounding Saigon. Nonetheless, these provinces are more secure than ever before. Some 85% of the people in the provinces around Saigon are regarded as "relatively secure", which represents a big jump from the period immediately following Tet 1968, and a significant increase over the pre-Tet period. The Accelerated Pacification Campaign, with its concentration on "D", "E", and VC hamlets, is largely responsible for this improvement.

7. It is of course a question of judgment whether the "pervasive" influence of the VC, which extends even to the pacified portions of the country, detracts from the validity of their definition as pacified. In the kind of war that exists in Viet Nam, security is always a relative matter. The test, perhaps should not be whether the VC still have a residual capability in pacified areas but whether the population considers the threat and the influence to be "acceptable." By that standard, most of the hamlets certified by the HES as "A", "B", and "C" (but not all of the latter) are actually pacified.

8. On an overall statistical basis the change during the last year is dramatic. According to the HES after Tet 1968, 59.4% of the population was "relatively secure"; at year-end, the figure was 76.3%. Even if these figures are discounted, they reflect a

'clear-cut and consistent trend since mid-1968 toward improvement in security throughout Viet Nam.

Question 17: What number of verified members of the Communist political apparatus (i.e., People's Revolutionary Party members, the hard-core "infrastructure") have been arrested or killed in the past year? How many of these were cadre of higher than village level? What proportion do these represent of total PRP membership, and how much—and how long—had the apparatus been disrupted?

Answer:

1. A precise estimate of the present strength of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) is not possible. A rough base of 82,500 personnel, however, has been agreed upon by Mission elements as a target to work against. In 1968, the PHOENIX office reported 15,776 VCI personnel neutralized. Of these, 2,255 were killed, 11,291 captured, and 2,230 rallied. The vast majority of those reported were low level functionaries, i.e., those more easily replaced or done without by the VCI. Only 12.9 percent (2,050) of those reported neutralized were from the district level or above.

2. VCI losses must be viewed in the light of inadequate reporting from the field. Great numbers of VC have been killed since Tet 1968 in large scale military operations. In most cases only a brief search for identifying documents was conducted on the battlefield before the bodies were buried. How many of these were VCI probably never will be known. In addition, the above figures also exclude reported losses that were rejected by the Saigon Phoenix office because of inadequate data identifying the suspect's position.

3. On the other hand, not all VCI members who are captured remain neutralized. Many captured suspects simply vanish into the system of interrogation and detention facilities with no record of their final disposition, and many subsequently slip back into the VCI. A major problem is the absence of effective laws covering Communist insurgent activities and personnel. GVN authorities often believe that they do not have sufficient evidence to prosecute in court many of the VCI suspects apprehended. Of those VCI actually brought to trial and sentenced, it is estimated that well over 50 percent are released within a year.

4. The number of "hard-core" infrastructure members, i.e., the Communist People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) members, neutralized is rather small. The total membership of the PRP is not known; nor is there any solid evidence of what proportion of the VCI is composed of PRP members, although 20 to 40 percent appears reasonable as a rough order of magnitude. In any event, of the total number of VCI neutralized in 1968, only 10.7 percent (1,697) were PRP members, and of these only 332 were at district level or higher. At the lower levels of the VCI, there are important cadres who are not Party members. Further, there are PRP members who have no function in the infrastructure, e.g., those who are guerrillas or who hold purely military position.

5. Although progress has been made in the attack against the VCI, particularly in the last quarter of 1968, the VCI does not appear to be faced with critical problems as yet. It continues to demonstrate the capability to exercise sufficient control over enough of the population to carry out combat and political operations. The Communists place a high priority on reconstituting their infrastructure losses and appear to have been able to keep ahead of critical personnel shortages. Nonetheless, the VCI has not gone completely unscathed. In some areas, it has been disrupted substantially, especially in the Capital Military District and in parts of I Corps. Attempts to rebuild the VCI organization in the major cities often has been countered by aggressive police work. But both intelligence on the VCI and operations against it

diminish significantly the further one moves from the secure urban areas. In general, the hard-core command cadres of the VCI largely remain intact and often unidentified.

Question 18: What are the reasons for believing that current and future efforts at "rooting out" hard-core infrastructure will be—or will not be—more successful than past efforts? For example, for believing that collaboration among the numerous Vietnamese intelligence agencies will be markedly more thorough than in the past? What are the side-effects, e.g., on Vietnamese opinion, of anti-infrastructure campaigns such as the current "accelerated effort," along with their lasting effect on hard-core apparatus?

Answer:

1. Serious efforts are being made by the Government of Viet-Nam (GVN) to achieve organizational and operational efficiency in attacking the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). This pressure from the top has paid off in forcing an increasing degree of cooperation between once totally insular, competing agencies. This has been demonstrably evident in a heightened awareness by tactical military units of the need to destroy the VCI, resulting in their greater participation in anti-VCI operations. With the formation of 246 District and City Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers, a good start at accumulating information needed to target the VCI has been made, while improved reporting from the field is producing a clearer picture of the losses inflicted.

2. VCI concern over the pressure exerted by the anti-VCI programs has been reflected in propaganda and documents alerting subordinate units to Phung Hoang operations. Indeed, over the past few months Communist propaganda attacking the Phung Hoang Program has bordered on the hysterical. This, plus the increased emphasis on targeting the program's personnel for elimination or subversion, indicates the seriousness with which the VC view the potential effect of the program. The increasing number of Hoi Chanh reflects growing morale problems, at least at the lower levels. In a few areas, the infrastructure has been totally disrupted. Military operations are beginning to penetrate once inviolate base areas where the higher level cadres have long been able to stay in relative security.

3. Despite these signs of improvement, the problems hampering effective anti-VCI operations will take considerable time and effort to redress. There is still the serious problem of a lack of adequate training and experience among the personnel involved in the program, and it is at the district level, the level to which Phung Hoang is geared, that such shortcomings are most apparent. The program continues to suffer from lack of coordination at the lower levels and there still are overtones of parochialism among the many agencies involved. Further, many of the District Intelligence Operational Coordination Centers are in the initial stages of organization and have barely begun to direct operations. The attack against the VCI continues to be plagued by the conventional military orientation of GVN agencies involved; with the exception of the Provincial Reconnaissance Units, there is little in the way of operations targeted against specific key VCI figures. One of the principal agencies tasked with running anti-VCI operations is the National Police Field Force (NPF), which still devotes very little emphasis to the VCI in its training program.

4. Other intelligence agencies such as the Police Special Branch and the Military Security Service are inadequate in the countryside, and the information they do possess often is withheld from or not sought by action elements. A more far-reaching problem is that there appears to be some accommodation between local officials and some of the more significant VCI cadres. Precise details of such accommodation are lacking, but the frequency of reports of it indicate that the

problem could become, or perhaps already is, serious. A related problem lies in the family-oriented nature of Vietnamese society. Family loyalties often supersede political loyalties.

5. The people in the countryside no doubt have mixed feelings about the accelerated effort to disrupt the VCI. Their basic desire is to be left alone by both sides, and barring that, to be given a certain degree of security by one or the other. Field police are not popular with the rural population. On the other hand, hamlets under the Accelerated Pacification Campaign appear to be attracting a significant number of refugees from VC areas. The key to public approval and support, however, continues to be the GVN's ability to provide continuing security and to prevent Communist reprisals.

PACIFICATION

Question 19: How adequate is our information on the overall scale and incidence of damage to civilians by air and artillery, and looting and misbehavior by RVNAF?

Answer:

1. In GVN-controlled and contested areas these matters are always brought to the attention of GVN authorities as soon as possible by the persons concerned. In fact, it has become a national pastime to see who can benefit most from inflated damage claims. Where these incidents occur in VC-controlled areas, distorted versions are broadcast widely as soon as possible. Sifting all these claims is difficult, but there is no lack for information. What we do lack is accurate data for an overall assessment and the ability to verify it.

2. Difficulties of language and occasional mechanical failures of communications, as well as occasional misunderstanding of instructions, have resulted in casualties and damage as the result of artillery firing and air strikes. Processing and payment of claims by MACV is fairly quick and direct. Processing and payment of claims by RVNAF is slow but is improving.

3. Looting and misbehavior by RVNAF since Tet has declined, but its continued existence is still taken by Vietnamese as an established fact.

Question 20: To what extent do recent changes in command and administration affecting the countryside represent moves to improve competence, as distinct from replacement of one clique by another? What is the basis of judgment? What is the impact of the recent removal of minority-group province and district officials (Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Montagnard) in their respective areas?

Answer:

1. Newly appointed province and district chiefs are younger, more intelligent, better trained and seem more highly motivated. Their performance has been better than that of their predecessors. They appear more honest. The choice of these men does not seem to have been based on considerations of position or status. They do not seem to be part of a new clique.

2. Administrative shifts have been less significant. There have been fewer changes of deputy province chiefs for administration. New service chiefs may possibly represent a slight improvement, but this is difficult to discern. These civil servants are still hampered by an excess of regulations and central control. Thus, some potentially good men are not performing the way they might.

3. The bases for these judgments are reports from province advisors, observations by various other US officials, and systematic analyses of performance.

4. There has been a tendency to remove officials previously closely identified with Vice President Ky. Their replacements have not all been pro-Thieu (there are few people with a pro-Thieu history) but at least they have not been identified with Ky.

5. Although it appears that the Interior Minister is more interested in installing

competent people loyal to him and the President rather than in selling positions, some exchange of money for some positions may still continue.

6. Province and district chiefs are now selected from officers assigned to an administrative training course. Before entering training the list of names is approved by the President, who assigns province chiefs after graduation upon recommendation by the Minister of Interior with concurrence by the Minister of Defense. Remaining officers of each class, by class standing, may select the district in which they wish to serve and are appointed district chiefs.

7. The GVN has adopted what appears to be a conscious policy of removing *Hoà Hao* officers from province and district chief positions to reduce favoritism and factionalism. While the reaction to this has been mixed, the effectiveness of GVN administration does not seem impaired.

8. There does not seem to be a conscious policy to remove existing *Cambodian* officers. Recently in Vinh Binh one *Cambodian* district chief was removed. When this kind of thing happens, it adds impetus to the growing *Cambodian* discontent with their lot.

9. The removal of the one *Cao Dai* province chief (in Tay Ninh) and replacement by a Catholic does not appear to have affected the administration or political complexion of that province. There seems to be no other evidence of a policy to remove government officials who are *Cao Dai*.

POLITICS

Question 21: How adequate is our information, and what it is based upon, concerning:

A. Attitudes of Vietnamese elites not closely aligned with the GVN (e.g., religious leaders, professors, youth leaders, professionals, union leaders, village notables) towards: Participation—if offered—in the GVN; The current legitimacy and acceptability of the GVN; Likewise (given "peace") for the NLF or various "neutralist" coalitions; towards US intent, as they interpret it (e.g., US plans for ending the war, perceived US alignments with particular individuals and forces within Viet-Nam, US concern for various Vietnamese interests).

B. Patterns of existent political alignments within GVN/RVNAF and outside it—reflecting family ties, corruption, officers' class, secret organizations and parties, religious and regional background—as these bear upon behavior with respect to the war, the NLF, reform and broadening of the GVN, and responses to US influence and intervention.

Answer:

1. The sources of our information on the subjects in both 21-A and 21-B are as follows:

a. Voluminous reports from American advisors, civilian and military, working throughout Viet-Nam. These reports are both formal and informal. Some are written, many are conveyed to the Embassy through personal conversations with Embassy officers.

b. Regular contacts by political officers and provincial reporters who operate out of the Embassy. These officers regularly seek opinions on all of the questions raised in 21-A and 21-B.

c. Some limited and relatively unscientific opinion sampling carried out by Vietnamese teams trained and directed by American political officers.

d. Contacts between Embassy officers and foreign journalists, visitors and scholars. Embassy officers seek to tape the knowledge gathered by journalists, scholars, and visitors in both written and oral forms.

e. Systematic screening of local publications, including such documents as political party organs as well as editorials in the regular vernacular press.

f. Voluminous reports on the opinions of

all these groups gathered through covert contacts by CIA officers and agents.

2. The adequacy of our information on the topics raised in Question 21-A is judged to be good with regard to national and provincial leaders. Our information on the attitudes of district and village level leaders is much less adequate.

3. Scientific opinion sampling is not feasible in Viet-Nam. This is true in the first instance because Vietnamese will not express their true opinions to strangers, i.e. pollsters. (The normal Vietnamese reaction to a request from a stranger for a political opinion is to ask himself what the questioner is trying to do to him.) Secondly, scientific opinion sampling is not feasible because our information on population, professions, and opinion groups is not adequate.

4. Our inability to sample Vietnamese opinion scientifically through US-style opinion polls is probably not as much of a liability as it may appear. To a large degree Vietnamese public opinion is synthetic and manipulated, and opinions tend to flow down from political, religious and other leaders. Sampling the opinions of the leaders therefore is a fairly reliable way to judge general opinion, much more so than in the US.

5. It may be added that opinion in Viet-Nam tends to be fragmented. It is not communicated very well from one group or area to another. Often it is based on poor information. An extreme range of opinion on any given problem is more the rule than the exception. In practice this means not only that it is very difficult to characterize public opinion on some subjects, but also that public opinion exercises far less political influence on events. When public opinion is badly divided, the opinions of leaders become more important politically.

6. As regards the adequacy of our information on the topics mentioned in 21-B, it is generally good as regards the GVN. Our information on the political alignments within the RVNAF is less satisfactory. In general, we have good information on secret organizations and parties, religious and regional backgrounds, and officers' class. Our information on family ties is spotty; family connections in Viet-Nam are labyrinthine, and the practical importance of family ties varies enormously from one family to another.

7. In the last year or so our information on corruption has greatly improved. Nevertheless, by its nature, information on this kind of connection is most difficult to dig out. Our information on how corruption affects political alignments within the GVN/RVNAF is therefore quite incomplete, though the overall outlines are clear enough.

Question 22-A: What is the evidence on the prospects—and on what changes in conditions and US policies would increase or decrease them—for changes in the GVN towards:

A. Broadening of the government to include participation of all significant non-Communist regional and religious groupings (at province and district levels, as well as cabinet).

Answer:

1. It is neither possible nor necessary to include all significant non-Communist regional and religious groupings at any given level of the government. However, it is desirable that more of the major groupings be involved in the government, particularly at the national level.

2. Elections for village councils and hamlet chiefs were held in 1967 and will be held again this year. This is probably the best way to insure representation of significant groups at the local level. Strengthening local government and stimulating wider local participation may be effected by according more authority to local officials. The GVN is interested in accomplishing this, and various measures are under study.

3. At the provincial level, elections for provincial councils were due last year but were postponed. Although security was a major reason for the postponement, another consideration was the fact that the provincial councils are something of an anachronism. Set up as advisory bodies before the Constitution was enacted, they served a useful role in the early stages of democratization. Now, however, they will require more power, such as provincial budget review, if they are to continue to serve a useful purpose.

4. Increasing the powers of the provincial councils will require legislation. While the Assembly and the executive branch probably favor such a measure, it is not high on their list of priorities and may not be accomplished soon for that reason.

5. Province chiefs and their subordinates are now all appointed officials. The Constitution makes election of province chiefs mandatory after the first term of the first President—a provision which it may or may not be wise to implement when the time comes.

6. With a more powerful elected provincial council, provincial government should certainly be representative of the major groupings within the province. (There is no plan for electing district chiefs, and this is probably quite unnecessary in any event.) While these measures are not likely to be taken in the immediate future, the prospects are encouraging.

7. At the national level, all of the major groups are already represented in the Assembly. Some, notably the Catholics, are over-represented and others, notably the An Quang Buddhists, are under-represented, but no important faction is missing entirely.

8. On the executive side, the cabinet is well distributed in terms of regional representation. There are nine southerners, 5 northerners and two central Vietnamese in the cabinet. President Thieu is a central Vietnamese and Vice President Ky is a northerner. (It is sometimes said that the military is dominated by northern officers. While the Minister of Defense is a northerner, none of the four corps commanders are from North Viet-Nam and the chief of the JGS was born of southern parents in Vientiane.)

9. On the religious side the cabinet is heavily Buddhist, with only two Catholic Ministers. There are no *Hoà Hao* or *Cao Dai* in the cabinet, which is a source of some dissatisfaction to those religious groupings. It is also important to note that, like most Vietnamese, the chief political loyalty of all the Ministers is not to a religious group but to some political leader or faction. Thus even Buddhist and Catholic political factions do not regard any of the present Ministers as their representatives in the government. Also not represented in the cabinet are some major political factions such as the VNDD, and the *Dai Viets*. Labor, however, is very well represented with an officer of the CVT serving as Labor Minister.

10. A cabinet shuffle is widely anticipated in the near future, and there is widespread discussion of the need for a more broadly representative cabinet to conduct negotiations. It is altogether possible that Thieu and Huong will seek to bring into a new cabinet some *Dai Viet*, *Hoà Hao*, *Cao Dai* and other faction leaders now excluded.

11. While most Vietnamese agree on the desirability of a more broadly representative cabinet, there are a number of practical difficulties. The *Hoà Hao* and the *Cao Dai* do not appear to have leaders with enough administrative and technical ability to run a Ministry. If cabinet posts are reserved for these groups, they will probably be largely honorary. This may or may not satisfy the *Hoà Hao* and the *Cao Dai*. *Dai Viet* leaders such as Ha Thuc Ky will demand real power as the price of their participation in the government. (Ha Thuc Ky's unwillingness to accept one of the lesser portfolios was the reason for his refusal to join the first Huong

cabinet.) The VNQDD is split into several major factions, and it would probably be impossible to find a single VNQDD leader whom all factions would regard as their representative in the government. The An Quang Buddhists would probably refuse to participate in any cabinet so long as Thieu is President.

12. If an effort is made to broaden the cabinet so as to include major political and religious groupings, there is also the risk that such a cabinet would not be an effective team. Whereas efficiency probably requires a small war cabinet, a broadened government would likely result in a large and somewhat unwieldy cabinet. Strong personalities such as Ha Thuc Ky might find it difficult to work under the very firm leadership of Prime Minister Huong. Some political leaders, given a place in the cabinet, would be likely to try to pack their Ministries with their supporters.

13. To sum up, prospects for broadened government at the local level are good, though not yet an accomplished fact. At the national level all important factions are already represented, though not proportionately, in the legislative branch. Prospects for broadening the cabinet are probably good, though such a process is not without some built-in hazards, and success is certainly not assured.

14. It may also be noted in this context that the present government is far more representative of major religious, regional, and political factions than any of its recent predecessors. At the beginning of 1966 the GVN was basically a northern, military junta. The present government is basically civilian, Constitutional, elected, and heavily southern. (While President Thieu is a general, his political connections and his role as President have to a considerable extent metamorphosed him into a civilian leader. With the exception of the Ministers of Defense and Interior, his cabinet is completely civilian, including the Prime Minister. The legislative branch, while it includes some former military personnel, is a civilian body. Although province chiefs are military personnel, the Ministries and the provincial administrations are manned almost exclusively by civilian personnel.)

Question 22-B: What is the evidence on the prospects—and on what changes in conditions and US policies would increase or decrease them—for changes in the GVN toward:

B. Stronger emphasis, in selection and promotion of officers and officials, on competence and performance (as in the Communist Vietnamese system) as distinct from considerations of family, corruption, and social (e.g., educational) background.

Answer:

1. Prospects are good for increased selection and promotion of officers and officials on the basis of competence and performance rather than family considerations, corruption and social background. In the past year and a half the trend has definitely been in that direction, though it must be admitted that there is still a long way to go.

2. The improved performance of the RVNAF was one of the most encouraging developments in 1968. This performance in part stems from better leadership, which in turn reflects more emphasis on merit appointments and promotions within the military.

3. On the civilian side it is worth noting that Thieu has pressed a program for appointing specially selected and trained personnel to the key jobs of province and district chiefs. His second training course for province and district chiefs was completed in October of last year, and 73 of the graduates were subsequently assigned as district chiefs. Of these district chiefs replaced, American advisors considered 30 to be notoriously corrupt or ineffective. Our field advisors are virtually unanimous in the opinion

that the new appointments are great improvements.

4. Since Tet 1968 a total of 25 province chiefs and 149 district chiefs have been removed. Most of the province chiefs whom our advisors considered corrupt or ineffective were included among the 25 removed. Three of the province chiefs were specifically charged with corruption and are expected to stand trial. Of the 149 district chiefs replaced since Tet 1968, 90 were regarded by our advisors as corrupt or ineffective.

5. A new National Director of Police was appointed last year, and in an effort to clean up the police force, over 800 police officials were disciplined or discharged. A marked reduction in corruption at the Port of Saigon was accomplished under the new Port Director. The Independent Inspectorate was established as required by the Constitution late last year, and it has begun to investigate charges of corruption. Both the Assembly and the press have maintained a considerable degree of public pressure for reduction of corruption. All of these developments are favorable to the effort to install a merit system in the government and the military establishment of South Viet-Nam.

6. The US role in this effort has been important. American counterparts regularly evaluate the performance of a very wide spectrum of government officials. We report those whom our advisors regard as corrupt or ineffective, and the GVN has in many instances acted to remove them.

7. Many obstacles remain in this area. Probably the most important is simply the ancient Vietnamese tradition of appointing officials on the basis of personal and family connections. Another important difficulty is the low level of salaries in the government. Exposed to American living standards and beset by continued inflation, most officials find it extremely difficult if not impossible to live on their salaries. This is one of the root causes of corruption in South Viet-Nam, and corruption in turn is one of the major obstacles to a true merit system.

Question 22-C: What is the evidence on the prospects—and on what changes in conditions and US policies would increase or decrease them—for changes in the GVN toward:

C. Political mobilization on non-Communist sympathies and energies in support of the GVN, as evidenced (e.g., by reduced desertion, by willing alignment of religious provincial and other leaders with the GVN, by wide cooperation with anti-corruption and pro-efficiency drives).

Answer:

1. As in the case of merit appointments and promotions, there is a favorable trend toward political mobilization. Some of the indicators of this trend are as follows:

a. More and better information about the enemy from the general population, often volunteered.

b. General willingness, in many cases popular demand, to participate in a civil defense program (the people in many areas are requesting training and weapons faster than the authorities are able and willing to provide).

c. Voluminous flow of complaints to the Inspectorate about corruption.

d. Assembly and press disclosure and complaints about corruption.

e. Despite the inevitable tugging and hauling between Legislative and Executive, realization of a broad degree of cooperation and joint effort between the Assembly and the Executive Branch.

f. Widespread recognition of the need for political unity, and—despite many failures and shortfalls—continued efforts to achieve it by virtually all major political groups.

2. While the trend is favorable, it must be said that progress has been painfully slow, particularly with regard to developing strong national political parties. The tradition per-

sists from French colonial days that a true nationalist is by definition anti-government. The government is still plagued by inefficiency and corruption. The government information program remains relatively ineffective. Furthermore, differences between the United States and the GVN over negotiations issues—which became public in November—have apparently led some nationalists to believe that the US wants to oust the Thieu government in favor of a peace regime. All of these factors impede political mobilization in support of the GVN.

3. A very important factor for continued progress toward political mobilization is the Vietnamese reading of American intentions. The realization that the American commitment is not open-ended had a salutary effect in that it pre-disposed nationalists to look for ways of carrying more of the war burden themselves. Yet they need to be reassured that the US does not plan a precipitate withdrawal regardless of the consequences for Viet-Nam; for they will not support a government which they believe has lost or is about to lose American support.

4. Continued improvement in the efficiency and effectiveness of the government and the RVNAF is vital in winning the active support of the people. Also, if President Thieu can be persuaded to give active support to a broad nationalist political organization designed for the coming political contest, the chances of effective political mobilization will be enhanced.

Question 23: How critical, in various views, is each of the changes in Question 22 above to prospects of attaining—at current, reduced or increased levels of US military effort—either "victory," or a strong non-Communist political role after a compromise settlement of hostilities? What are views of the risks attendant to making these changes, or attempting them; and, to the extent that US influence is required, on US practical ability to move prudently and effectively in this direction? What is the evidence?

Answer:

1. At current or increased levels of US military effort, broadening the government is probably not a critical factor in achieving American objectives here. While it would be very helpful to have wider representation in the cabinet in terms of presenting a united front during negotiations, broadening the cabinet or increasing the powers of provincial councils probably would not add all that much to political stability or to political effectiveness vis-a-vis the communists.

2. If the US military effort is reduced, the need for unity becomes much greater, and a broad government of national unity would be accordingly more valuable in achieving our objectives. This is because a reduced US military effort even if the reduction were carefully phased, would tend to increase pressures on various groups to seek an accommodation with the enemy. Unless this situation is carefully managed, there is the risk that disunity could breed more disunity, and rapid deterioration in nationalist morals might set in. A broad government of national unity could be an important brake on any such tendency.

3. As noted above, broadening the government at the national level is likely to make for a larger but less effective cabinet. Teamwork would probably be more difficult. But these negative effects should be more than counterbalanced by the positive value of including some additional major political factions in the government.

4. The practical ability of the United States to effect a broadening of the GVN is extremely limited. We can point out to all concerned the value of such a move and urge them to take the necessary measures. But we cannot force them to do it.

5. *Merit Appointments and Promotions.* Appointments and promotions of civil and military personnel on the basis of merit is an important ingredient in improved GVN

and RVNAF performance, and at any level of US military effort the current trend toward better GVN and RVNAF performance is probably critically important. Regardless of the level of US military effort, measures to assure promotions and appointments on the basis of merit and performance thus require high priority.

6. Our role in encouraging the merit system may have contributed somewhat to anti-American sentiments. Officials displaced on the recommendation of US advisors are often bitter against the United States. Nevertheless the results of our effort seem to have been far more important than any negative effects.

7. Although American advisors have played a very useful role in moving the Vietnamese civil service and military toward a merit system, our practical ability to make changes in this area is also limited. What is required ultimately is a revolution in attitudes toward public service. Social pressures must police Vietnamese officials and military personnel, rather than an external American watch-dog.

8. *Political Mobilization.* If the US military effort is reduced, progress toward political mobilization will be of critical importance. However, even if the US military effort is maintained at the present level or increased, political mobilization will also be very important for long term stability and success in the coming political contest with the communists.

9. As in the case of broadening the government, the United States' means for achieving Vietnamese political mobilization are distinctly limited. We can, as we have, press what we regard as enlightened policies on the government. We can make clear our support for elected constitutional government. We can provide both material assistance and advice for programs which appear to assist political mobilization. But only the Vietnamese can accomplish political mobilization and national unity, and they have to do it in their own way.

U.S. OBJECTIVES

Question 28-A: With regard to the bombing of North Viet-Nam:

A. What evidence was there on the significance of the principal strains imposed on the DRV (e.g., in economic disruption, extra manpower demands, transportation blockages, population morale)?

Answer:

1. The bombing of NVN created considerable strains in agriculture, but many of the effects were indirect, and because of imports NVN was never faced with starvation. The normal seasonal shortages of manpower were aggravated and many of the male managerial cadres were drafted and replaced by inexperienced females. As a result, the 1967 rice crop was at least 500,000 metric tons less than normal, and NVN imported about 450,000 metric tons of food during the year. This situation continued, perhaps worsened, during 1968, and NVN was forced to import around 700,000 metric tons of food. With the aid of imported food, primarily wheat flour, and the raising of rice-substitutes, NVN was able to meet its food demands.

2. North Vietnamese industry was damaged severely by the bombing. Up to 80 percent of its electric power capacity was knocked out, reducing not only the production of electricity but also production at plants dependent on the powerplants. The country's cement plant and iron and steel plant also were damaged heavily; this entirely eliminated domestically produced cement and pig iron, both traditional export items. Other plants extensively damaged included textile, paper, chemical, fertilizer, and coal processing.

3. NVN, however, took countermeasures to minimize the effects of the bombing. Indus-

trial plants were dispersed to more secure areas, diesel generators were imported to replace to some extent the reduced electric power production, and manufactured goods for both industrial and consumer use were imported, primarily from other Communist countries. Thus, the bombing postponed NVN's program for economic development. Nonetheless, the use of imported industrial goods provided an adequate standard of living for the people and allowed construction of a sizable number of small industrial shops to satisfy local needs.

4. The lines of communication (LOC's) were damaged continuously by the bombing; roads were interdicted, boat traffic disrupted, and bridges knocked out. The latter probably caused the greatest disruption. All of the major bridges were damaged; in particular, the bombing of the bridges along the LOC's from China to NVN was significant. The Viet Tri Bridge was damaged early, thus severing the Lao Cai-Hanoi rail line, and other bridges leading into Hanoi were struck, impeding the flow of goods on the Dong Dang rail line from China to Hanoi. Finally, the destruction of the bridges near Haiphong slowed the movement of goods from the port to other parts of NVN.

5. Several measures were taken to counteract the effects of the bombing on the LOC's. Thousands of full- and part-time workers were employed to repair roads and rail lines, often in a matter of days. Rail lines were made dual gauge to facilitate the flow of goods from China. Bridge substitutes were devised, including truck and rail ferries, and pontoon and cable bridges. By such expedients, goods continued to flow from China and to move from Haiphong to other parts of NVN. Of course, they moved more slowly and some were destroyed during the bombing raids, causing some temporary distribution problems and shortages, but there was never any evidence of serious disruption to the flow.

6. The bombing, viewed in Hanoi as an escalation of the war, increased NVN's manpower requirements for the armed forces and for repairing the LOC's. While the bombing diverted manpower from agriculture and industry into the military and war-related activities, NVN never appeared to be suffering from a shortage of manpower in general, only of manpower in particular skills. With an estimated 120,000 physically fit males coming of age each year, and by drafting older men and recalling officers, the necessary manpower for the armed forces was available. To satisfy the demand for managerial cadres, women were used. To insure the rapid repair of the LOC's, agriculture workers supplemented the full-time construction workers. As further testimony to the absence of critical manpower shortages, NVN continued to send thousands of students and technicians abroad for education and training throughout the period of the bombing.

7. There is little evidence that the bombing adversely affected the morale of the people of NVN. An indirect effect of the bombing was to create a lower standard of living, through a change in the composition of the rice ration, a general inability to fulfill the meat ration, and a reduction in the cloth ration. In addition, the programs to disperse industry and evacuate urban population were poorly organized, resulting in temporary unemployment, lack of housing and often inadequate rations. Moreover, both programs resulted in the separation of families, a possible morale-depressant. As the bombing continued, however, these programs were improved and the standard of living always was maintained, at least at subsistence-level.

Question 1: Why is the DRV in Paris? What is the evidence? (Among the hypotheses:

a. Out of weakness, to accept a face-saving formula for defeat.

b. To negotiate the withdrawal of U.S. (and NVA) forces, and/or a compromise political settlement, giving a chance for NLF victory in the South.

c. To give the U.S. a face-saving way to withdraw.

d. To undermine the GVN and U.S./GVN relations, and to relieve U.S. military pressure in both North and South Vietnam.

e. Out of desire to end the losses and costs of war on the best terms.)

There appears to have been differences of opinion in Hanoi concerning the situation in the south and appropriate strategies. These differences affect Hanoi's reasons for being in Paris. Thus, as far as our knowledge of how Hanoi thinks and feels, we see through the glass darkly if at all.

Notwithstanding, all echelons generally agree that the preponderance of evidence indicates that North Vietnam is in Paris because of a decision that it would be less costly to get the bombing stopped and to negotiate the U.S. out of South Vietnam (SVN) than to continue fighting for another five to ten years, and that they are pursuing objectives b and d above.

All five hypotheses apparently are contributory in some way to North Vietnam's (NVN) position in Paris. It appears there has been considerable debate in Hanoi over a correct strategic line and its proper tactical implementation. The essence of the discussion seems to be whether NVN should adopt an "offensive strategy" looking once again for dramatic military results or adopt a more flexible combination of political and military tactics. Evidence is that their intention are to adopt a more flexible combination of political and military tactics. There are several factors which may have influenced this direction:

First of all, and probably the most important is a conviction that Hanoi cannot win a war through large-scale, offensive military actions. Hanoi knows that continuing such a strategy would involve high losses without commensurate gains. The North Vietnamese further believe that the effort necessary to support large-scale fighting results in a serious weakening of the ideological struggle in both North and South Vietnam.

Closely allied to these propositions, is the probable conviction that the US will to persevere in South Vietnam is weakening and can eventually be undermined through a combination of the threat of indefinite military struggle coupled with pressures and gestures toward compromise and political settlement.

There is strong evidence that North Vietnam is in Paris to negotiate a withdrawal of US forces, to undermine the GVN and US Government relations, and to provide a better chance for Viet Cong victory in the South (hypotheses b and d).

It appears that a military victory in SVN is beyond Hanoi's capabilities as long as US forces remain and that Hanoi has become increasingly aware that the political dimensions of the struggle would have to assume greater significance in their overall strategy.

(1) By contrast with the Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese, the overall strength and effectiveness of allied forces has improved sharply. Alterations of US tactics have increased the combat effectiveness of US units, and Allied intelligence has been more successful in detecting enemy movements since Tet. More firepower has been added to Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) by modernization and expansion.

(2) In the last six months our military efforts against enemy main force units seem to be significantly improved. COMUSMACV has begun to concentrate much more on area

control than on kills. He has been aided in this approach by his defense in depth, particularly around the major cities. Moreover, since our "understanding" with Hanoi with respect to the DMZ, he has been able to redeploy one division from northern I Corps to III and IV Corps, and to free up for operations in the Danang area a division previously held in reserve for a DMZ contingency. The enemy has also been deterred from launching large scale attacks and attacks on cities, apparently because of the present disposition and tactics of our forces or because he is unwilling to violate our understanding concerning attacks on major population centers, or because he too may be in the process of changing his tactics.

(3) Despite allied successes, recent intelligence indicates that most enemy main force units have returned to SVN from border sanctuaries where they withdrew in September 1968. Further the number of infiltrators recently entering the pipeline to SVN recently increased significantly. These factors point to a continuing enemy capability to launch offensive operations.

(4) Although there has been considerable improvement in RVNAF capability, these forces are beset by a number of weaknesses and basic faults and remain highly dependent on US forces for support and continued improvement.

Politically, the enemy's prospects are brighter; despite some surface calm in the South Vietnamese political system, it is a changing and highly fragile device.

(1) Uncertainties about Communist military plans, the course of the Paris meeting, and the policies of US government have produced a widespread mood of apprehension in South Vietnam. There is acute concern that US domestic political considerations may lead the US to not consider GVN interests in the quest for a settlement in Vietnam.

(2) The GVN political system as it is now is probably inadequate for a political confrontation with the enemy. South Vietnam leadership remains divided and uninspiring. The Vietnamese nationalists have no national political organization to match the communists. Without an effective political organization, the lower level and local nationalist leadership is vulnerable to disintegration if the tide should appear to be moving in favor of the communists. Further, there is no large disciplined GVN structure in the rural areas to match the VC organization (See responses to questions 18, 22-24); and despite allied efforts to destroy the VC organization, it will probably remain a viable structure for some time.

With respect to pacification, while there has been some progress, the situation is not as favorable to the GVN as some believe. The recent Special National Intelligence Estimate on this subject concludes that:

a. The pacification program as a whole has made a significant contribution to the prosecution of the war and strengthened the political position of the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) vis-a-vis the Communists. Thus far the GVN's principal success has been in expanding its presence into the countryside. Providing permanent security for these gains has been more difficult. Security conditions continue to fluctuate with the intensity of combat. Low level terrorism, political agitation, and propaganda efforts by the Viet Cong (VC) continue to hamper progress, particularly since no more than a promising start has been made in reducing the effectiveness of the VC infrastructure. A large part of the countryside is still contested and subject to the continuing control of neither side.

b. As for gaining the allegiance of the people, this is almost impossible to measure. The turnout in the 1967 elections and the failure of the Communists to gain popular

support at Tet suggest progress. Apprehension over the settlement of the war and the firmness of the American commitment tends to reduce popular confidence. The most common attitude among the peasants, however, continues to be one of war-weariness and apathy.

c. Saigon now seems finally to have accepted the need for a vigorous pacification effort. However, progress may still be hampered by the political situation in Saigon, continuing inefficiency, corruption, and the parochial concerns of the GVN.

d. Another major uncertainty is how much time is left to make up past deficiencies and consolidate current gains. Over the next several months, further progress in pacification will almost certainly not make the GVN much more able to cope with the VC, given peacetime conditions, than it would be today; a significant advance in this respect would probably require at least a year.

e. Finally, there is the question of how the Communists will react to the growing pressures on them. Despite improvements in the overall security situation, gains in pacification are still vulnerable to adverse military developments. The chances are good that the Communists will attempt to make an intensified effort to counter the gains in pacification and they will probably have some success. Thus, consolidation of gains is likely to continue to be a very slow and uncertain process.

COMUSMACV considers that hypothesis b is probably the strongest motivation behind the enemy's presence in Paris and is certainly the best documented. There have been numerous enemy documents and reliable reports that set forth these objectives, and his propaganda, as well as public pronouncements, proclaim them. Typical in tone and thrust is a report on new Viet Cong policy from a highly reliable agent just four days prior to the bombing halt. In describing the new policy, he said that in the near future the VC may approve negotiations with the GVN and the Americans in order to bring about a cease fire and a coalition government. But it must be emphasized from the beginning that a coalition government is only temporary. The parallel was drawn with someone on a long journey. One must stop and rest before continuing. The ultimate goal is still a communist South Vietnam. There might be a cease fire, but after a period of time there would be another general uprising. US withdrawal is an equally important objective and receives equal attention. For example, a recent report from Paris indicates that key National Liberation Front leader, Tran Buu Khen, has told a confidant that the chief aim of the National Liberation Front was to get the United States out of South Vietnam at all costs. After that, the National Liberation Front could take care of Vietnamese problems including reunification. Similar attitudes have been expressed by other National Liberation Front leaders as well as stated in enemy documents.

COMUSMACV considers that hypothesis d also is well documented as an enemy intent which may now be a key element of his strategy. As early as March 1968, the sixth resolution of the Central Office, South Vietnam (COSVN) pointed out the mutual dependence of US presence in South Vietnam and the continued existence of the present Government of Vietnam structure. It set forth the specific objective of driving a wedge between the two. This obviously remains a prime enemy tactic. An undated document signed by the Undersecretary of the Central Office, South Vietnam Party Committee and promulgated subsequent to the bombing halt, contains the enemy's current view of his overall situation and opportunities. It sees the United States urgently "trying to find ways for withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam and to de-Americanize the war in

South Vietnam." It goes on to judge that these US attempts will be no different under a new Administration. The enemy believes that controversy exists within the GVN/US camp. He states that, "The US people and the people of the world want the US troops to depart Vietnam as soon as possible; whereas, the United States wants to prolong the period of withdrawal so that the puppet government can be consolidated."

Within this controversy he sees opportunity, the possibility to exploit situational developments which would result from the "swift solving of the Vietnam problem by either Johnson or Nixon, Diplomatically." Evidence continues to mount that the enemy sees these opportunities in a weakening of the Government of Vietnam that would result from allied controversy and tensions. For example, Directive No. 34, issued on 12 December 1968 by the VC Current Affairs Committee to Tay Ninh Province, goes into substantial detail in describing the various situations and conditions which could bring about an abrupt transformation of the GVN. The first would be a coup d'etat brought on as a result of US pressure to reshuffle the GVN Cabinet and, thus, ease the differences between the US and GVN negotiations. The second would be an open break between Thieu and Ky, leading to conflict between the Government of Vietnam and elements of the RVNAF. The third would result from a direct move by the US to replace the present leadership of the GVN. The fourth would be the complete replacement of the present GVN as a result of the popular uprising. In this document, the enemy goes on to say that the first condition would afford him the best opportunity and the second would be profitable to him locally and throughout the country. He makes no comment on the third. However, it is significant that he parenthetically states that there is little likelihood of the fourth contingency—the first evidence that he has lost face in the popular uprising concept. All evidence indicates that his military, political, and diplomatic efforts are devoted to aggravating these tensions, thus weakening the GVN to such a point that he can force a coalition government upon it.

CINCPAC considers that a combination of hypotheses b and d appear to be the key elements of the enemy's negotiating strategy. He notes that Hanoi has not acknowledge the presence of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces in South Vietnam. The communist position has not changed. This was reaffirmed by Ha Van Lau on 19 January 1969 when he asked the press to stress that the basis for the Paris talks remained the four points of the National Liberation Front (NLF) of South Vietnam. Having secured major concessions in 1968, i.e., total halt of aerial, naval and artillery bombardment in North Vietnam, and representation in Paris without being required to reciprocate, his next objectives would most likely be the withdrawal of US troops and continued exacerbation of US/GVN relations.

The JCS concur with COMUSMACV's and CINCPAC's views noted above—in particular that hypotheses b and d are the primary reasons for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's continued presence in Paris. The other hypotheses are also supported in some degree of available information. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur with the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, that, at the time of the failure of the third offensive, there was a significant reduction in the number of infiltrators in the pipeline, which reduced the enemy's capability for future offensives; infiltration did not cease and it subsequently was stepped up.

(1) In response to the question as stated, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the enemy first came to Paris in May in order to secure the complete halt of bombardment and other acts of war against North Vietnam. The ad-

vent of spring and the coming good-weather period over the industrial heartland of NVN was an additional factor which probably affected the decision by the DRV to come to Paris. From the first session on 13 May 1968 until the total bombing halt was announced on 1 November 1968, this platform was repeated in each meeting in various terms and was played repeatedly in press releases.

(2) Although we certainly do not believe the propaganda claims of the enemy, they have shown that their statement of objectives are true expressions of their desires. As stated again on 25 January 1969 and on 30 January 1969 by the North Vietnamese and VC representatives in Paris, they are continuing negotiations first to secure the withdrawal of US/Free World Forces, and second to establish a new government in South Vietnam in accordance with the program of the National Liberation Front. Third, they seek eventual reunification of north and south.

(3) In the course of the negotiations, the other side can be expected to use all measure of propaganda and negotiating ploy in an attempt to discredit the GVN and its Armed Forces, and to drive a wedge between the United States and the GVN.

There is some evidence to support the view that North Vietnam is in Paris out of a position of weakness. (hypotheses a and e).

While there is no evidence that North Vietnam seeks a face-saving formula for defeat, hypotheses a and e, above, are otherwise so closely related that they can be treated as one. The best evidence supporting both is the huge losses the enemy took during 1968 and the failure of his general offensive/general uprising strategy. The enemy losses of 291,000 men more than offset the massive infiltration effort he had mounted. With the failure of his third offensive, there were no more infiltrators in the pipeline moving south—a factor which severely reduced his capability for future large-scale offensives.

COMUSMACV reports that despite repeated attempts, the enemy had been unable to seize and hold a single military objective. His battlefield performance was declining rapidly as was demonstrated in the demilitarized zone, at Thuong Duc, Duc Lap, and fire-support base Dot. He had failed to achieve the popular uprising, and his campaign to proselytize the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) to his side had met with no success. The gain in population control he had achieved with Tet was only temporary; by the end of December, the accelerated pacification campaign of the Government of Vietnam had surpassed their pacification progress of 1967 and had surpassed the campaign goals for 1968 established before Tet. The air interdiction program, combined with severe weather, had nearly closed his supply routes from the north, and he could no longer logistically support his forces in the demilitarized zone or in the northern provinces of the I Corps Tactical Zone.

There is some minor and older evidence to support the view that North Vietnam is in Paris to give the U.S. a face-saving way to withdraw. (hypothesis c).

COMUSACV reports that some of the pre-Tet captured documents dealing with the possibility of negotiations allude to it. For example, notes taken by a Viet Cong cadre in late December 1967 state, "In case it is necessary to talk (peace) with the United States, the peace conference will be conducted in the line of 'creating an honorable defeat' for the United States." There have not been such references in recent evidence of enemy plans or intent.

And finally, some consider that the North Vietnamese are in Paris only because they were so forced by U.S. peace initiatives and pressures of world opinion. Proponents of this view argue that:

The enemy has been able, and can con-

tinue to control both his and our casualties. This has been an integral part of his overall strategy. His attacks are designed to have maximum psychological impact by inflicting heavy allied casualties and projecting an aura of country-wide strength. If the enemy does control casualty rates and, as indicated below, is not limited by manpower or logistical shortages, then the entire notion of winning the war by attriting the enemy force is untenable, at least at present force and activity levels.

The second principal factor working to defeat the allied strategy of attrition is the external manpower and materiel provided by North Vietnam and the Communist Bloc nations. Without this support, the military war would have slowed down or ended long ago; with it, the VC/NVA can continue to fight almost indefinitely. North Vietnam has relied primarily on external Communist aid and economic austerity at home to meet the steadily increasing military requirements of the war in the South and the bombing-induced difficulties in the North. The Soviet Union, Communist China, and Eastern European nations provide the bulk of the combat equipment and materiel used by enemy units in South Vietnam. The cost of this support to North Vietnam is negligible. Our interdiction campaign has failed to stop the movement of these supplies to SVN.

In summary, it appears that the prevailing evidence supports the view that North Vietnam is in Paris primarily to get U.S. forces out of South Vietnam and to provide a better chance of VC/NLF political victory in the South.

Question 2: What is the nature of evidence, and how adequate is it, underlying competing views (as in the most recent NIE on this subject, with its dissenting footnotes) of the impact of various outcomes in Vietnam within Southeast Asia?

The difference of opinion in NIE 50-68 between the Army and Air Force on the one hand and the remainder of the intelligence community on the other over the impact of a "good" vs a "bad" Vietnam settlement on the future of Southeast Asia reflects a differing evaluation of the same basic data. For the most part, these assessments derive from public and private statements by local officials and from diplomatic reports. Past national reactions to threats and crisis, and overall estimates of both the military and political weaknesses of each country are also weighted in these evaluations.

DIA has indicated that the Army/Air Force dissent resulted from their more heavily weighting the public declarations of Asian politicians and the weaknesses of the nations; whereas the other intelligence agencies emphasized the power of growing nationalism in focusing the opposition to externally inspired and oriented communist movements, especially insurgencies. CINCPAC tends to support the Army/Air Force emphasis on the public statement of Southeast Asian leaders, noting that Thailand's Foreign Minister Thanat has expressed his fear that US withdrawal will result in a Vietnamese version of the 1962 Laos accords which he considers a sellout. Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew warned, on 4 November 1968, that the most important outcome of the war would be to decide what is to happen to South Vietnam's neighbors. Chiang Kai-Shek, in a message to President Thieu, stated "if the US withdraws as a result of a split with the Government of Vietnam, South Vietnam, Thailand, and all Southeast Asia will crumble and fall prey to the communists and the Free World cause in Asia would be irreparably damaged."

Public statements by national leaders, however, must always be treated carefully since the opinions expressed may be: (1) more concerned with present problems than future situations; (2) intended to influence the US;

or (3) responsive to domestic political pressures. Moreover, in considering the post-Vietnam environment in Southeast Asia, it is important to remember that the outcome of the war in the South will be only one of the factors, and not necessarily the most important one, affecting developments. While the Vietnam settlement will have a significant psychological impact on Southeast Asian perceptions of US power and commitment, North Vietnamese strength, and the future of communism in the area, Vietnam will only set the political tone, not determine the eventual outcome for each country.

Other important factors will be: (1) the North Vietnamese and Chinese postures with respect to supporting insurgencies elsewhere in the area; (2) the degree of involvement in the area of extra-regional powers (Japan, USSR, India, Australia, UK, France); (3) the individual reactions of the countries to their specific internal situations. The compounding of uncertainties due to these multiple considerations makes it extremely difficult to judge the effect of a specific Vietnam outcome in isolation. Hence the generally cautious and qualified assessments in the NIE.

With respect to the impact of an unfavorable Vietnam outcome on Thailand, the Navy dissent is based upon judgments that: (a) Thailand is already engaged in a searching reappraisal of its geographical situation and future foreign policy orientation; (b) Thai leaders are deliberately signalling this fact to the United States; (c) their official and unofficial public statements to this effect are being confirmed by clandestine reporting of their private attitudes; and (d) the Thai appraisal of their strategic situation following the postulated communist takeover of the rest of Indochina would be a very realistic one in terms of what help they might expect from the United States in confrontations with Communist Chinese power short of general war. (Clandestine reporting indicates that the Thais may have undertaken to establish communications with Communist China via Pakistan over the question of the Chinese-sponsored insurgency in Thailand.) In this situation, the Navy concludes that Thailand would opt for a policy that maximizes her maneuverability in dealing with all powers in the area, and this would probably entail early movement toward a loosening of Thailand's security ties with the United States.

There is general agreement in the intelligence community that US performance in Vietnam is being closely watched by leaders in Southeast Asia. Nor are these leaders insensitive to the US public reaction to our involvement. Many of them genuinely fear that if the US retreats from its engagement in the region, the communists will move to take advantage of the individual weaknesses of the unprotected countries. Seeing themselves exposed to communist pressure without powerful US backing, some Asian leaders might feel compelled to accommodate the new realities. The dissents in the estimate reflect concern that the changes in this direction might be swift in the wake of an unfavorable settlement in Vietnam; whereas the majority believes that the record of the past would indicate that radical changes in policy would be some time in emerging.

Question 3: How soundly based is the common belief that Hanoi is under active pressure with respect to the Paris negotiations from Moscow (for) and Peking (against)? Is it clear that either Moscow or Peking believe they have, or are willing to use, significant leverage on Hanoi's policies? What is the evidence, other than public or private official statements?

On the basis of intelligence derived from analysis of Hanoi's known diplomatic relations with China and the Soviet Union; reports from third country diplomats; and continuing study of public and private state-

ments by officials of the three countries, there does not appear to be significant pressure by Moscow or Peking on North Vietnam. Moreover, it seems likely that leaders in both China and the Soviet Union recognize the limitations of their power over Hanoi's policies. Hanoi over the years has been extremely adroit at balancing between the two by avoiding involvement in the Sino-Soviet ideological split and leaving the subtle impression that attempted intimidation by one might force it into the arms of the other. Both can be expected, however, to continue their efforts, public and private, to influence North Vietnamese decisions in Paris and in the conduct of the war. At best, the Chinese probably hope to impress on Hanoi that any Paris settlement will not alter China's support for wars of national liberation throughout Southeast Asia, while the Soviets presumably are husbanding their influence in the hope of having decisive impact either to present a breakdown or achieve a breakthrough in the negotiations. Both sides continue to send aid to Hanoi adequate to support its war needs.

Relations between North Vietnam and China cooled after Hanoi's decision last April to enter into negotiations. Negotiations are not a part of the Maoist script for wars of national liberation. But Peking probably recognizes that it cannot block a compromise settlement if Hanoi desires it. Furthermore, North Vietnam appears to have ignored from time to time China's doctrine of "protracted war" because of Defense Minister Giap's known preference for "big victory" a la Dien Bien Phu. After having failed to dissuade the North Vietnamese from going to Paris, China sharply reduced its media coverage of the war, slighted the North Vietnamese at various communist celebrations, completely ignored coverage of the Paris talks, and may even have withdrawn some construction troops from North Vietnam. Manifesting its intent to continue supporting insurgency in the region, China has again begun road construction in northern Laos and announced that the insurgency in Thailand is a war of national liberation. Further, there are some indications that Peking may be bypassing Hanoi and seeking more direct contact with the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam. Hanoi has been careful not to exacerbate the situation and has sent Le Duc Tho to Peking on each return trip to Paris presumably to keep the Chinese informed. All evidence suggests, however, that while Hanoi may listen attentively to its northern ally, its leaders keep their own counsel.

Relations between the Soviet Union and North Vietnam have been good throughout the war and the Soviets have supplied vast amounts of aid and supplies reaching record levels in 1968 with further increases probable in 1969. Conversations with Soviet officials, diplomatic reports, and public statements indicate that the Soviets desire a negotiated settlement of the war, but are probably unwilling to use their aid as a direct lever. Although North Vietnam apparently recently accepted some Soviet proposals on procedural questions, Hanoi for its part will, no doubt, try to avoid giving Moscow the impression it has a voice or a veto in North Vietnam's negotiating position. In this connection, Hanoi's uncharacteristically vigorous support of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was somewhat of a surprise (and was not calculated to improve relations with China which condemned the Soviet action). Ambassador Thompson's year-end summary offers a succinct and accurate appraisal of the Soviet position:

"In Vietnam, the Soviets have openly and privately pressed for talks looking toward a political solution. We see no reason why they should not continue to use their leverage with Hanoi in this direction, but they are

likely to continue to employ it with caution, letting Hanoi call the signals. At the turn of the year, for example, support in Soviet media for the positions of the DRV and the NLF was vocal and unequivocal, and we think it unlikely that the Soviets will go far in pressing Hanoi toward concessions unless the talks are near breakdown."*

Questions 4: How sound is our knowledge of the existence and significance of stable "Moscow" and "Peking" factions within the Hanoi leadership, as distinct, for example from shifting factions, all of whom recognize the need to balance off both allies? How much do we know, in general, of intraparty disputes and personalities within Hanoi?

Our knowledge of DRV politics and key personalities remains fragmentary and largely second-hand. It derives primarily from second-hand diplomatic reports and a continuing close scrutiny of the public statements and actions of Hanoi officials. On the basis of this limited evidence it appears misleading to characterize any faction within the Politburo as either "Moscow" or "Peking" oriented. This is true mainly because most of the problem with which the Hanoi leadership must deal are issues of tactics and timing particular to the Vietnam situation. Chinese and Soviet ideologies can offer only the most general guidelines; often, no doubt, they are irrelevant. Moreover, even on issues where disagreements exist a strong element of nationalism and a shared view of the gravity of the situation work to produce unity and loyalty once decisions are made.

While the Hanoi leadership has exhibited remarkable external cohesion over time, there is evidence of considerable internal shading of opinion on both military and political-ideological issues, and there have been hints of intensive periodic debates on future courses of action. For instance, there is reason to believe a heated review of strategy for the "fight-talk" phase of the war took place late last summer.

On the question of military strategy there has been disagreement between the number three man in the official hierarchy, Truong Chinh, and Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap. Truong Chinh has consistently supported the Maoist doctrine of "protracted war" and violent revolution, most recently in a speech released last August. Because of this espousal of the Chinese line on wars of national liberation coupled with his doctrinaire ideological militancy, Chinh has been identified as the leader of the "pro-Chinese" faction. General Giap, whose brilliant victory over the French at Dien Bien Phu has conditioned his subsequent military outlook, has argued for a "big victory" in the current struggle with the U.S. Aside from several people closely identified with either Giap or Chinh, there is no clear evidence of the positions of most of the Politburo. Moreover, somewhat contradictory public statements suggest the issue raised last summer in the post-Tet policy debate may yet be unresolved.

On political and ideological issues there is evidence of a loose grouping of militants who favor an aggressive approach to both foreign and domestic policy. In addition to Truong Chinh, this group includes: the number two man, Le Duan; the senior member of the Paris delegation, Le Duc Tho; and Deputy Premier Hoang Quoc Viet. A more moderate and pragmatic approach is taken by another portion of the Politburo (often identified misleadingly as the "Moscow" faction). This group includes Premier Pham Van Dong; Defense Minister Giap; Pham Hung, Le Thanh Nghi; and Van Tien Dung. It is impossible to judge how cohesive or stable these groupings are or clearly which has most power. Ho Chi Minh has consistently remained aloof

from these groupings, presumably promoting consensus or playing one group off against another.

A somewhat different analysis of the groupings in the Hanoi leadership is offered by DIA and the JCS. Basing their conclusions largely on public statements and writings of the individuals, DIA and the JCS believe there are three broad groups generally active in the North Vietnamese Politburo. The distinctions among them, however, are by no means solid or suggestive of rigid factions. The groups reflect, at best, in this view, the general political philosophy to which these individuals adhere, and are regarded as useful only to a certain degree to identify the general approach of a man to political and national problems. Over the years, in the DIA/JCS view, the groupings in the Politburo have been as follows:

a. *Militant.* Favoring an extreme and aggressive approach to both foreign and domestic policy:

- (1) Le Duan.
- (2) Le Duc Tho.

b. *Moderate.* Inclined to greater caution in domestic and foreign policy:

- (1) Pham Van Dong.
- (2) Pham Hung.
- (3) Vo Nguyen Giap.
- (4) Le Thanh Nghi.
- (5) Van Tien Dung (alternate member).

c. *Neutral.* Open to persuasion:

- (1) Truong Chinh.
- (2) Nguyen Duy Trinh.

But whatever the internal alignments in the Politburo may be, the most important consideration favoring unity and discouraging open identification by a person or group with either China or the Soviet Union has been the widely shared fear of alienation either. This need to delicately balance and offset relations with the two Communist giants explains Hanoi's studied neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute and the muting of internal preferences by Politburo members.

Question 5a: Why did North Vietnamese Army units leave South Vietnam last summer and fall?

The three most likely reasons for the withdrawal of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units from South Vietnam (SVN) during the latter half of 1968 are: (1) military necessity as a result of losses inflicted by allied forces; (2) a gesture to persuade the United States (US) to order a complete bombing halt; and (3) a change in enemy strategy based on the opinion that he now may be able to gain more politically than he ever has been able to gain militarily.

The enemy traditionally has withdrawn his forces (particularly North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units) from South Vietnam (SVN) whenever he has felt the need to rest and refit them. He always has enjoyed relative safety from allied operations in North Vietnam (NVN) and Laos and complete immunity in Cambodia. In all three countries, the flow of supplies to the enemy base areas near the borders of SVN and his employment of these base areas are documented. He withdrew his units from SVN last summer and fall following his second and third offensives, respectively. In both instances, his decision to withdraw units was prompted by several factors, including the pressure of allied operations, heavy battle losses, and a need to prepare for future operations. The fact that most of the units returned to SVN for tactical operations is evidence of the last factor.

There were additional considerations regarding the enemy's withdrawal of units from the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and military region Tri Thien-Hue last fall.

Allied interdiction efforts south of the 19th parallel had reduced significantly the logistic support for these forces.

The DMZ area suffered logistically because

* Moscow Airgram 2351; 31 December 1968.

allied forces had uncovered enemy supply and munitions caches of unprecedented magnitude. For example, units of the 3d Marine Division uncovered 19 caches in the 320th Division area during the period 10-23 September 1968 which contained: over 11,000 rounds of rocket and mortar ammunition; 7,300 grenades, 850,000 rounds of small arms ammunition; 1,500 mines; and 4,600 pounds of TNT. In the months of August and September, friendly units in I Corps seized over 1,000,000 pounds of rice, further increasing the enemy's logistics problems.

There were numerous prisoner of war reports and captured documents describing food shortages in the military region Tri Thien-Hue. For example, an officer prisoner of war from the 5th Regiment stated that a lack of rice had created morale problems. Rice was gathered daily in the mountains, but deliveries were inadequate because of allied blockades of transportation routes. A rallier from the 803d Regiment declared that as a result of food shortages, the troops went without a noon meal. A late July 1968 notebook entry by a quartermaster cadre of the 812th Regiment spoke of men facing imminent starvation and disclosed that food shortages had hampered preparations for the third offensive. These reports are typical of many received during September.

While there is substantial evidence that military necessity may have forced the enemy to withdraw some of his forces from SVN in the summer and fall of 1968, within the enemy's broad strategy, political determinations well could have played an equally important role in his disengagement.

Although the evidence suggesting a political motive for the withdrawals is less obvious, there are indications that Hanoi was trying to influence a US decision to declare a complete bombing halt of NVN. The enemy's desire to obtain a complete bombing halt and guarded inference out of Hanoi support the hypothesis that there was a political motivation behind the withdrawals.

The speed with which the 320th NVA Division returned to NVN and the fact that the NVN delegation approached the US delegation in Paris shortly after the division's return to NVN, strongly suggests that the enemy seized upon the opportunity to turn fault to virtue, by withdrawing forces he could no longer support effectively as a seeming concession to attain the bombing halt.

Moreover, the withdrawals did not follow previous patterns. Some of the forces withdrawn from the DMZ area went further north in NVN than in previous years. In addition, in September and October, a greater number of units withdrew to border sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia than previously had been witnessed.

Other political considerations which may have influenced communist motives were their awareness of the rising unpopularity of the war in the US, the ramifications of the 1968 US Presidential campaign, and expressed US interest in negotiating an early reduction of its commitment in SVN.

All of these considerations, taken together with the military defeats inflicted on enemy forces, may have led the communists to the conclusion that they had much to gain in the short term by agreeing to negotiations as a part of a long-range strategy to continue fighting while negotiating.

There also are indications the enemy changed his strategy based on the opinion that he may be able to gain more by increased political activity than he ever has been able to gain through military efforts. He decided that the best time to accomplish these political initiatives is now, before the full effect of Government of Vietnam (GVN) programs to gain support of the people can be realized. At present the major threat to allied objectives in SVN is the enemy's effort

to extend his political control over the population and claim a facade of legitimacy for his authority. It is estimated that the enemy has established "liberation committees" in over half of the villages in SVN, and over 60% of the population could be said to live in areas subject to some VC political activity. In support of this effort, enemy military capabilities are significant and he still is capable of maintaining the military initiative. It is estimated that the total enemy military strength committed against or posing a threat against SVN is 265,000-355,000.

In summary, both military and political motives influenced the enemy's decision to withdraw forces from SVN in the summer and fall of 1968. On the surface, military necessity may appear to be the dominant factor, but in reality, political determinations may have been more important.

Question 5b: Did the predicted "third-wave offensive" by the North Vietnamese Army/Viet Cong actually take place? If so, why did it not achieve greater success?

An enemy "third-wave offensive" did take place and it began the night of 17-18 August 1968. It initially was evident in the sharp rise of enemy-initiated incidents and in enemy killed in action. Enemy large-scale attacks totaled 6 in June, 2 in July, and 3 in the first half of August, with 10 battalion-size and 1 regimental-size attacks. Enemy assaults and attacks by fire more than doubled in the week of 18-24 August over the previous week (38 assaults/attacks by fire to 91). The enemy killed in action also more than doubled, from 2,483 during the period 1-17 August to 5,534 during the period 18-24 August. The number of enemy incidents and killed in action remained at a relatively high level through the first week of September. Numerous captured documents and prisoners of war attested to the fact that a third offensive was both planned and launched by the enemy. In addition to the increase in enemy incidents and killed in action, there is hard evidence relating to enemy plans for a third offensive and his own admission that he had launched one. These include at least 183 captured documents, agent reports, and the statements from at least 16 prisoners of war.

In the III Corps, especially, numerous reports made specific reference to the "Third General Offensive," and indicated August as the time for the attacks. A notebook from the Central Office, South Vietnam (COSVN) Subregion 4 specified that preparations for the "climaxing phase" were to be completed before 30 July. Another notebook contained detailed plans for an attack against Saigon, and stated that from 15 June to 30 July 1968, the unit concerned was to prepare for the "third climax." All rear services preparations were to be completed by 5 August 1968. A prisoner of war, who was a battalion political officer, stated that a meeting scheduled for 7 to 9 July 1968 was to plan for a third offensive, which he estimated would begin sometime after mid-August. A political officer who rallied on 26 July 1968 described plans for major enemy units in the III Corps Tactical Zone during a "forthcoming third offensive."

The enemy's lack of success in his third offensive is predominantly a reflection of what has been a continual deterioration of his tactical capabilities since the 1968 Tet attacks.

In the Delta, his plans to attack Cai Lay and Can Tho had been compromised and preempted. Thus, he had been unable to launch any sizable offensive action there.

His attacks on III Corps' peripheral targets did not weaken Saigon defenses and his forces had been driven back to the Cambodian sanctuary, unable to reach the capital.

In II Corps his only major attack had been at Duc Lap. Four regiments were not able to take this outpost.

The three-plus division force he had been building all summer in northern military region 5 never was able to consolidate near Danang. They spread out along the coast attacking population centers and the outskirts of Danang itself. These attacks were repulsed with heavy losses to him and he was forced inland. His DMZ units were ineffective. Their mission was to tie down and attrite allied forces; instead, they suffered heavy casualties as well as loss of caches, and were forced out of the country.

To a lesser extent, the enemy's assessment of his potential for the future probably brought about an early decision to cut short his offensive plans.

Concurrent with the decided decline of the enemy's tactical capability has been a significant improvement in allied intelligence, which has allowed allied forces to anticipate enemy movements and locate his forces as well as his logistical activity. As a result, it has been possible to shift B-52 and tactical air assets, applying them to the most lucrative targets. In addition, improved intelligence has been instrumental in preempting enemy actions on the ground. Well in advance, his plans, targets, and timing for both the second and third offensives were well known to allied forces.

For example, it was learned from two highly reliable agents that B-52 strikes directed against a COSVN headquarters element and units of the 9th VC Division forced the enemy to cancel his plans for attacks on Tay Ninh City the end of July. The early detection of the 95 CNVA Regiment's move toward fire-support base Dot led to destruction of his artillery elements before they deployed to firing position. Consequently, his infantry was exposed to the heavy losses they subsequently sustained. The enemy himself has recognized the improvement of friendly intelligence and views it with considerable alarm.

For instance, a document captured last summer in I Corps contained notes indicating that allied intelligence was excellent, stating, "we frankly acknowledge that we are defeated in that field." More recent reports evidence that COSVN admits to great difficulty in carrying out large-scale operations because of improved allied intelligence.

In summary, the enemy's "third-wave offensive" began on the night of 17 August 1968 with a sharp increase in the number of attacks against military installations and population centers throughout SVN. By the time the offensive crested during the week of 18-24 August, comparative data showed there had been a three-fold increase in the level of his military activity—from a weekly total of about 30 attacks during each of the first two weeks of August to 100 for the initial week of the offensive. * * *

Question 5c: c. Why are the Viet Cong guerrillas and local forces now relatively dormant?

There is no evidence that Viet Cong (VC) guerrillas and local forces are now relatively dormant. On the contrary, enemy documents captured subsequent to the bombing halt called for renewed emphasis on guerrilla activity and a build-up in guerrilla strength.

Enemy activity since the bombing halt has been characterized by small-scale harassment, standoff attacks by fire, sapper and terrorist attacks. The predominant part of this activity has been carried out by guerrillas and local forces in support of attempts to consolidate and strengthen their position in the rural areas. Guerrillas and local forces also are trying to screen the deployment of enemy main force units into attack positions, especially in III Corps.

During the last six months, the only significant drop in categories of activity credited to guerrillas and local forces has been the decline in the number of acts of sabotage, as illustrated by the following table:

Type of incident	July 1968	August 1968	September 1968	October 1968	November 1968	December 1968	July to December 1968	Total 1968	1st half
Harassment	1,372	1,234	1,065	1,125	1,135	1,039	7,070	18,233	11,200
Terrorism	60	59	99	75	73	91	457	1,047	600
Sabotage	60	41	32	17	20	9	179	1,609	1,400
				Total 1967	Total 1968	1st quarter	2d quarter	3d quarter	4th quarter
Acks:				54	126	64	33	27	2
Bn size				2,422	3,795	1,473	1,234	567	521
Other									

Note: Big decline in 2d half compared to 1st half, or to 1967.

Question 6: What rate of NVA/VA attrition would outrun their ability to replenish by infiltration and recruitment, as currently calculated? Do present operations achieve this? If not, what force levels and other conditions would be necessary? Is there any evidence there are concerned about continuing heavy losses?

Current Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) estimates for 1968 place enemy gains from infiltration and recruitment at approximately 298,000, as opposed to enemy losses of about 291,000. Excluded from this loss count are the unknown casualties inflicted by B-52 strikes, tactical air, and ground artillery. MACV estimates that the enemy's gains and losses in South Vietnam (SVN) roughly balanced out for the year of 1968. If it is assumed that the enemy can infiltrate and recruit approximately 300,000 men a year, then allied forces would have to attrit the enemy at the rate of about 25,000 per month. Present operations (those since September to December 1968) have attrited an average of about 18,000 men per month. This difference of 7,000 men per month is not because the allied force level is inadequate, but because the enemy chooses not to engage.

The enemy has access to sufficient manpower to meet his replenishment needs for at least the next several years, even at the high 1968 loss rate of about 291,000. Approximately 120,000 physically fit males reach the draft age each year in North Vietnam (NVN). Prior to 1968 they have more than offset the requirements for infiltration into South Vietnam (SVN)—90,000 infiltrators in 1966 and 82,000 in 1967. About 250,000 men appear to have infiltrated in 1968, but even this level can be maintained by tapping the large pool of nonmilitary manpower available in NVN. For example, there are about 1.8 million physically-fit males in NVN aged 15 to 34; only about 45 percent (875,000) are in the NVN regular (475,000) or paramilitary (400,000) armed forces. The cessation of bombing probably has freed an additional 200,000 troops and labor force personnel of the approximately 600,000 total who were involved in anti-aircraft defense, repair activities and transport. Moreover, NVN has additional alternatives open with regard to the availability of manpower which include: reducing the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces committed to SVN; lowering physical standards for induction; requesting "volunteer" support from other Communist countries; and increasing the rate of food imports to free large numbers of marginally productive agricultural workers.

Even at the all time high enemy loss rates (340,000 annual rate) during the first six months of 1968, the Viet Cong (VC)/North Vietnamese Army (NVA) could replenish their forces for more than four years by depleting 33% of their joint pool of able-bodied manpower.

Estimated VC/NVA personnel gains

Infiltration ^a	128,000
Recruitment ^b	42,000
Total gains	170,000

Estimated VC/NVA personnel losses

Combat deaths ^c	109,584
Died of wounds ^d	38,354
Prisoners ^e	8,774
Military defectors ^e	14,677
Total losses	171,389

^a Estimated by taking all source infiltration estimate for 1st quarter 1969 and multiplying by 4.

^b Taking MACV's current recruitment estimate of 3,500 per month and multiplying by 12.

^c Taking 4th quarter 1968 rate and multiplying by 4.

^d Died of wounds=35 x KIA (MACV estimate).

^e Average of 1967 and 1968 statistics.

Assuming that VC/NVA losses could be boosted back up to the rates for the first half of 1968, the highest ever, the enemy still could replenish his losses for quite a while, depending on how far down he is willing to draw his manpower pool. At the first half 1968 rates, the enemy would lose about 340,000 personnel per year, assuming that MACV's combat death and died of wounds figures are correct. At this rate the total VC/NVA able-bodied manpower pool of 2.3 million would be depleted at a rate of about 175,000 per year. Assuming that the NVA replenish VC losses after the VC run out of manpower, it would take 13 years to exhaust the manpower pool, 6.5 years to cut it in half and 4.4 years to deplete it by a third.

Moreover, it is unlikely that the high enemy loss rates of January-June 1968 could be maintained by allied forces unless: (1) the enemy generates massive Tet offensive type attacks; (2) allied forces become much more efficient and effective; and/or (3) allied force levels are increased greatly.

Even if the enemy initiates massive attacks, the evidence is quite strong that he calculates the casualties he is willing to take before he goes into the battle and withdraws if casualties exceed acceptable levels. To support this, there is a very strong relationship between the level of attacks and the level of enemy casualties. Thus, the enemy is unlikely to launch sustained major attacks unless he figures he can stand the losses.

A higher tempo of allied operations is unlikely to raise enemy casualties the January-June 1968 levels, unless the allied kill rate can be doubled. Unfortunately, there is little or no relationship between the — of allied operations and fluctuations in enemy (or US) combat deaths. Thus, unless allied commanders can wrest the initiative from him, the enemy can be expected to control his losses within a broad range.

Another way enemy losses might be raised is to simply increase allied troops to the point where the desired level of losses is inflicted. It appears that the 4th quarter 1968 losses are at about the level the enemy must sustain in order to maintain his presence in the countryside. If so, more allied troops in the field ought to be able to raise the enemy loss rate. During the 4th quarter 1968, allied strength averaged 1,606,000 men, who inflicted

ed enemy losses at a yearly rate of 170,000 or 106 per 1000 allied troops. At this rate it would take more than 3 million allied troops to raise the yearly rate of 340,000 enemy losses, assuming the enemy continues to avoid contact and allied efficiency remains constant.

The foregoing troop estimates are unrealistic, because it is likely that the enemy combat death rate per 1000 allied troops would increase as more troops were added. Moreover, any large scale troop increase would have to come from outside SVN, since the Government of Vietnam is deep into its manpower pool and at current desertion rates will not be able to maintain present Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) force levels. Since US and other free world forces generally outperform RVNAF in killing the enemy, some gains would be expected from this substitution. However, if the difference in performance is due to difference in mission (i.e., pacification versus sweep), then the gains would be reduced. In any case, it appears that 500,000 to 1,000,000 US and other free world forces would have to be added to insure a level of attrition unacceptable to the enemy. Allied casualties, of course, would increase as the enemy casualties increased.

The prospects of continuing losses, even at a rate considerably less than 1968, would not be attractive to the enemy unless he thought that he was moving progressively toward his objectives. If he opts to continue the war, he would be required to consider carefully the relationship between his strategy and his losses. The high loss rate of 1968, for example, was a consequence of his offensive tactics, the forward deployment of his main forces during the first nine months of the year, and his effort to achieve a maximum impact, both politically and militarily, in a short period of time.

The JCS previously have recommended military actions under certain alternatives which they believe: (1) are feasible in terms of force, assets, time and risks; and (2) can be undertaken to either render the enemy incapable of continuing the war, or cause him to recognize the inevitable destruction of his capability to continue the war.

The JCS considers that, should a decision be made to resume full-scale hostilities with a view to achieving the objective postulated, authorities should be granted: (1) for closure of ports in NVN by mining; (2) for unrestricted air warfare against all targets of military and/or economic significance in NVN to within several miles of the Chinese border; (3) extension of normal naval surface operations to within 15 miles of the Chinese border; and (4) expanded current and covert operations, as required, in Laos, Cambodia and the demilitarized zone (DMZ), supported by air power.

There is evidence to indicate that the enemy is concerned about continuing heavy losses. Much of the evidence is contained in captured documents and prisoner interrogation reports in which concern is reflected about sickness, desertions, shortages of cadre personnel, poorly trained and tardy replacement personnel, and other problems. Ac-

ording to US commanders, however, the best evidence can be found in the pattern of enemy actions since the third offensive in August and September of last year.

General Abrams has characterized the enemy's third offensive as a conservative campaign marked by much greater tactical flexibility, in which the enemy began to pull his forces away once his casualties began to mount. Analysis of the enemy's daily combat deaths during the third offensive shows his apparent concern for a lessening of casualties. For example, there was a decided peak coinciding with his initial staggered attacks in mid-August; then there was a drop to below the average 280 combat deaths per day which he had sustained during the so-called June-July "lull." This was followed by an increase in his combat deaths as he turned to secondary targets such as Thuong Duc; then, when the third offensive finally was called off, his combat deaths returned to about the "lull" level.

The enemy's concern for losses also can be seen in the pattern of offensive actions which have occurred since the third offensive. These have emphasized economy of force tactics and stand off attacks by fire, with most of the contacts since September 1968 having been at allied initiative. In the past several months the enemy generally has been reluctant to engage in any large-scale combat operations and consistently has sought the security of his border sanctuaries.

Question 7: To what extent do the United States/Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and the North Vietnamese Army/Viet Cong share in the control and the state of Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army attrition, i.e., to what extent, in terms of our tactical experience, can heavy losses persistently be exposed on Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army Forces, despite their possible intention to limit casualties by avoiding contact? Among the hypotheses:

a. Contact is predominantly at Viet Cong tactical initiative, and we cannot reverse this; Viet Cong need suffer high casualties only so long as they are willing to accept them, in seeking contact; or

b. Current Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army loss rates can be maintained by present forces—as increased "X" percent by "Y" additional forces—whatever the Democratic Republic of Vietnam/Viet Cong choose to do, short of further major withdrawal.

The enemy, by the type action he adopts, has the predominant share in determining enemy attrition rates. The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) believes, however, that heavy losses can be and are being imposed upon the enemy regardless of the tactics he adopts in South Vietnam (SVN).

During 1968, the enemy's total monthly casualties (permanent losses) ran from a low of approximately 15,000 for July and October to a high of 40,000 to 41,000 in February and May. It is significant that the two high months (February and May) encompassed the peak of his Tet and second general offensives. As a broad rule, when the enemy attacks his casualties increase; when he evades, hides, or uses attacks by fire, his casualties decrease.

During 1968 the enemy's minimum monthly permanent losses from all sources totaled 15,000. During the last 4 months of 1968, when the enemy avoided large-scale offensive actions, his permanent losses averaged 18,000 per month.

Allied military strategy in SVN assumes that allied forces are superior to the enemy forces because of greater allied combat manpower, firepower, mobility and support. In terms of total armed men, the allies outnumbered the enemy about 6 to 1 at the end

of 1968, but the allies had only a slight advantage over the enemy in terms of combat troops on offensive operations. This is because about 25% of the allied maneuver battalions are tied down protecting base areas, lines of communication and pacification operations. Conversely, the enemy's small logistic and defensive requirements and reliance on local populace leave most enemy main force units free for offensive operations. As a result, allied forces committed to offensive operations only slightly outnumber the enemy troops in maneuver battalions; in terms of rifle platoon manpower the two sides are nearly equal.

Past experience indicates that the enemy tries to fight in a way nullifies the allied advantages in manpower, firepower, mobility support. One way the enemy does this is to mass his forces to exploit favorable tactical situations while tying down most of the allied forces through small attacks and harassments against allied forces and cities. The cost in enemy lives is high, but it prevents the allies from turning their resource superiority into a decisive military advantage.

Base areas in North Vietnam (NVN), Laos and Cambodia provide the enemy with a strategic advantage and a military sanctuary which permits them to choose the time and place of his offensive activity in SVN and provide a respite from allied operations. The enemy has the strategic initiative in SVN, and like a criminal in the city, he decides when and where he will strike, if the "climate gets too hot," he merely "lies low" for awhile. When the fighting becomes too intense, he can break or avoid contact by retreating to his base area sanctuaries.

Withdrawal of main-force units to base sanctuaries in NVN, Laos and Cambodia permits the enemy to regulate his casualty rate to a significant extent. In spite of the heavy casualties he sustained in 1968, he has been successful in maintaining and even increasing his force structure in SVN. In fact, during four years of intensive combat in SVN and unprecedented bombing of NVN and Laos, the enemy has more than doubled his combat forces, successfully sustained high casualty rates, doubled the level of infiltration, and increased the scale and intensity of the main-force war.

Allied operations do result in increased enemy casualties, but most often when the enemy is willing to engage in large-scale reaction and counter operations. From time to time, allied forces are able to cut off or trap enemy forces and impose unexpectedly high casualties on a particular unit. Such actions are too infrequent, however, to enable a continuing heavy casualty rate on the scale of early 1968 so long as border sanctuaries outside SVN are available.

Statistical analysis supports the hypothesis that the enemy exercises the greatest share in the control of the rate of enemy attrition. The allies never have persistently imposed significant losses on enemy forces when he has sought to avoid them.

Little or no relationship exists between the tempo of allied operations and fluctuations in either enemy or US combat deaths. A significant increase in allied operations is not accompanied by a significant increase in enemy or allied combat deaths, nor does a reduction in allied operations reduce deaths.

A very strong relationship exists between enemy-initiated attacks and enemy combat deaths, and there is an even stronger relationship between enemy-initiated attacks and US combat deaths.

Statistical analysis supports the hypothesis that the enemy holds the military initiative in SVN, as measured by his ability to influence casualty rates. Taken alone, the statistical findings must be considered tenta-

tive, but they accord well with past experience, which indicates the enemy can control his casualty rate, to a great extent, by choosing where, when, and how often he will fight. He tries to avoid contact with allied troops under unfavorable conditions by blending into the population or vanishing into jungle base areas during large allied operations.

Another way to show that allied forces cannot persistently impose heavy losses on enemy forces, except when the latter seek heavy combat, is to compare the tempo of operations and casualties during the 2nd and 4th quarters of 1968. The former was a period of high enemy activity while the latter was a period of significant lull. Despite increases in allied battalion days of operation, large and small operations, and force strength, the enemy reduced the monthly average of his combat deaths by 41% between the 2nd and 4th quarters of 1968. However, the changes in allied operations in SVN did produce a more favorable than usual kill ratio (8.0) in the 4th quarter of 1968. This improvement is only a marginal contribution to the effort since enemy yearly losses at this rate, while high, probably would not be considered unacceptably heavy by the enemy. A comparison of monthly averages during the 2nd and 4th quarters of 1968 is shown on the following table:

Indicators (monthly averages)	2d quarter 1968	4th quarter 1968	Percent change
Enemy combat deaths.....	15,540	9,132	-41
Enemy initiated attacks.....	422	174	-59
U.S. combat deaths.....	1,575	682	-57
Allied combat deaths.....	3,212	1,529	-52
Allied bn. days of opn.....	7,520	8,890	+18
Allied large opns.....	583	1,639	+10
Allied large opns.....	583	1,639	+10
Allied small unit opns. (thousand)...	182	1,205	+13
Allied Force strength (thousands)...	1,507	1,606	+7

¹ Estimated from October/November data.

The enemy combat death rate of 9,132 per month shown above probably represents a good indication of the combat death rate that the current allied forces can impose on the enemy when he is working hard to avoid contact. The following table shows that the rate would be 24% above the 1967 rate, but 40% below the 1968 rate:

	Annual rate at 4th quarter 1968 level	Total 1968	Total 1967	Total 1966
Enemy combat deaths...	109,584	181,146	88,104	55,524
U.S. combat deaths...	8,184	14,561	9,358	4,989

In summary, the ability to control casualties is an integral part of the overall enemy strategy in SVN. His attacks are designed to have the maximum psychological impact by inflicting heavy allied casualties and projecting an aura of country-wide strength. Severe enemy personnel losses, similar to those of early 1968, can be repeated only if the enemy chooses to remain in the field where he will be vulnerable to allied action. Experience has shown that enemy casualties increase in proportion to enemy offensive activity, or in reaction to allied operations. In either case, the choice to stand and fight or to avoid contact rests with the enemy.

What controversies persist on the estimate of Viet Cong order of battle; in particular, on the various categories of guerrilla forces and infrastructure? On Viet Cong recruiting,

and manpower pool? What is the overall adequacy of evidence?

The elements composing enemy strength in South Vietnam (SVN) are divided into two broad areas: (1) the military order of battle, or military threat; and (2) other organized portions of the insurgency base. The military threat, in turn, is composed of four elements: (1) North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces; (2) Viet Cong (VC) main and local forces; (3) administrative services (or support) forces; and (4) guerrillas. The total population under enemy control, including the agents and sympathizers in Government of Vietnam (GVN) controlled areas, is the insurgency base.

The Communists attempt to organize all elements * * * ; however, only those elements such as the infrastructure, self-defense militia and assault youth, which deal primarily with population/area control and provide some support to the combat forces, are considered appropriate for separate quantification. Although these organized blocks of the population are a problem for any long-range pacification effort, they are not considered as part of the military threat. On previous occasions, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), by including many of these organizations in its assessments, has estimated the enemy threat in SVN at a total strength in excess of one-half million. In the opinion of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), such inclusions appeared to increase the actual enemy military threat well beyond its realistic capability and attribute to the enemy an exaggerated military strength.

In the past, estimates of the enemy threat in SVN have proved to be closer to the actual military threat than the order of battle (OB) figures at the time, which were based only on collateral intelligence. The following table compares the unadjusted OB figures at the time with the retrospectively adjusted OB figures as of year-end 1968.

Strength in thousands	December—			
	June 1965	1965	1966	1967
Unadjusted military threat.	92.8-98.8	121.1-128.1	225.6-245.6	218.6-223.6
Adjusted military threat.	200.6	224.7	286.4	244.2

From the above table, it can be seen that in June 1965 the OB figures at the time were less than half of what retrospectively adjusted OB figures now reflect. Subsequent improvement in methods of collecting and evaluating information have provided more accurate OB figures in later years.

QUESTION 9

In terms of the total military threat, the present divergencies between the national-level (DIA/CIA) estimates and field (MACV) estimates are not significant enough to cause a change in strategy. The differences, in part, stem from the problem of balancing gains and losses, the different methodologies used to compensate for the lack of precise confidence, the strict acceptance criteria normally employed by MACV in developing order of battle data, and differences in analytical judgments.

The following comparison of DIA/CIA estimates and MACV estimates is of year-end 1968 is preliminary and may be subject to further change. The comparison is intended primarily to update and to bring together in some place the varying numbers, so as to facilitate understanding of this complex issue.

Military threat	DIA/CIA estimates	MACV estimates
Combat forces:		
NVA	105,000-125,000	106,000(116,000)
VC	45,000-55,000	37,000
Subtotal	150,000-180,000	
Admin. services:		
NVA	10,000-20,000	
VC	45,000-55,000	
Subtotal	55,000-75,000	42,000
Guerrillas	60,000-100,000	59,000
Total military threat	265,000-355,000	244,000

¹ An estimated 20,000 to 25,000 of these NVA troops are serving in VC units. This estimate excludes an estimated 28,000 NVA troops deployed north of the DMZ.

² The MACV estimate for total NVA troops in SVN, including administrative service troops, may be increased by approximately 10,000 (to 116,000) depending upon the results of a special study of enemy administrative service troops presently nearing completion. It is not clear whether MACV estimate includes those NVA troops currently out of country.

³ Although it is implied in text of MACV response that VC regular strength could be spread from 36,000 to 40,000 the latest known best estimate is 37,000.

⁴ The current MACV estimate for administrative service troops is 42,000; the special study mentioned above may raise this figure above 50,000.

⁵ DIA/CIA believe that the military threat represented by guerrilla forces is not a parity with that of main and local forces because probably only about 1/3 of the guerrillas are well-armed, trained, and organized.

QUESTION 9

Other elements	DIA/CIA estimates	MACV estimates
Infrastructure ¹	80,000-100,000	83,000
Other irregular organizations ²	90,000-140,000	
Total military/political	435,000-595,000	327,000

¹ Includes political cadre based on expansion of count down to hamlet level.

² Includes self-defense, secret self-defense and assault youth forces.

The following current MACV estimates of VC recruiting during 1968 may be subject to further change: January through April, 7,000 per month; May and June, 5,000 per month; July through September, 3,000 per month; October through December, 3,500 per month. MACV believes that the VC manpower pool throughout SVN is becoming not only smaller, but also poorer in quality, although statistical data is not available to support this belief. Such judgment is based on ever-increasing recruitment difficulties, expanding Government of Vietnam control of the populace in SVN, expansion of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, and the success of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign.

Evidence substantiating strength estimates by MACV is built on the methodology employed. This methodological approach rests on three fundamental principles: (1) the estimates are based on order of battle holdings—that hard intelligence data derived from such sources as captured documents, prisoner of war interrogation reports, and defector statements; (2) the estimates are complemented by all source intelligence, mathematically innovated into the estimates; and (3) the estimates incorporate extensive strength data as reported directly from major field commands under very specifically supervised collection programs.

Therefore, evidence regarding the NVA in SVN and the VC main and local forces is relatively good, since they are in frequent contact with allied forces and generally are organized along conventional lines. The evidence on the administrative services and guerrillas is substantially less firm and less

complete, permitting only a broad estimate quantification. The guerrillas, who are not organized conventionally, who are made up of large numbers of cell to platoon-size units at the village and hamlet level, and who operate in a far less open manner, also fluctuate in strength because they are used as a manpower base for the regular forces. Basic information on guerrilla strengths is derived from reports of intelligence officers at province and district levels; this evidence generally is accepted. The MACV estimate, derived from this data, has tended to be conservative, but usually has fallen within the uncertainty spread of the DIA/CIA estimate. MACV assessments of the VC infrastructure strength, VC recruiting level, and VC manpower pool generally are accepted at the national level.

Question 9

What are North Vietnamese Army/Viet Cong capabilities for launching large-scale offensive, with "dramatic" results (even if taking high casualties and without holding objectives long), in the next 6 months * * * an offensive against one or more cities, or or against most newly * * * fed" hamlets)? How adequate is the evidence?

The enemy retains a significant capability to launch offensive actions in South Vietnam (SVN) at times of his own choosing and on a broad scale * * * in the next six months. However, it is doubtful that he can successfully carry off a large-scale offensive and achieve "dramatic" results * * * par with the Tet offensive of last year.

From a quantitative standpoint, there is ample evidence that the * * * has the strength to launch a large-scale offensive during the next * * * months. In spite of heavy losses, his end-1968 military strength is approximately 6,500 troops greater than it was at the beginning of the year. Logistically, the combination of the bombing halt and the dry season has allowed him to replenish his stockpiles around SVN's northern borders, and he continues to resupply unhampered through Cambodia. Infiltration from North Vietnam (NVM), on the order of 40,000-50,000 troops since 1 December 1968, is adding to his capabilities.

Again, from a purely quantitative standpoint, the enemy could launch an attack through the demilitarized zone (DMZ) with an equivalent strength of two divisions, an attack against Danang by the equivalent of about one division, and an attack against Saigon with a strength of up to four or five divisions. If the 304th North Vietnamese Army Division moves to the northern I Corps area, as now destined, the enemy could launch an attack in Thua Thien with an equivalent strength of over one division.

However, from a qualitative standpoint, the enemy's chances of carrying off a large-scale offensive with "dramatic" results appear remote. During 1968, there was a marked deterioration in the combat effectiveness of enemy forces. A gross measurement of this deterioration can be found in the results of his three major offensives. Each was more poorly executed than its predecessor; each accomplished less in turn.

The enemy has growing problems influencing his quality. He has leadership problems, and in many units, morale problems. His troops appear less well trained than in the past. His in-country logistic problems have drastically increased over the last six months as allied military forces have uprooted the Viet Cong (VC) infrastructure and discovered his lines of communications and caches.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) believe that the allies in SVN have the forces and means to defeat an enemy offensive and that this is quite apparent to the Communists. * * *

In order to gain "dramatic" results in a large-scale offensive against any "pacified" hamlets, the enemy would need to carry out successful simultaneous attacks against a substantial number of hamlets in locations throughout SVN. If this involved the major redeployment and redistribution of his forces, such movement probably would be detected. He then would be faced with the problem that plagued him throughout his 1968 campaign—the inherent risk of exposure to allied mobile forces and overwhelming firepower. He would confront the bulk of allied forces, which increasingly are deployed in continuous direct support of pacification to prevent enemy success against pacified areas and to establish a Government of Vietnam (GVN) presence and administrative apparatus.

Over the next six months the enemy's main efforts, whether direct or indirect, probably will be aimed at crippling the pacification program. The enemy places high priority on efforts to keep the populace from supporting the Saigon regime. This is illustrated by a recent National Liberation Front (NLF) communique which emphasizes the necessity for the Communists to extend and strengthen their political influence over the South Vietnamese populace, through the continuing development of a "national administration" apparatus to rival the GVN.

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Question 10. What are the main channels for military supplies for the North Vietnamese Army/Viet Cong Forces in South Vietnam (e.g., Cambodia and/or the Laotian Panhandle)? What portion of these supplies come in through Sihanoukville?

There is general agreement that the main channels for military supplies reaching enemy forces in South Vietnam (SVN) are the Laotian overland route and Cambodian lines of communication, with some supplies coming in through the demilitarized zone (DMZ). There is some disagreement as to the specific type, amount and destination of the supplies that come by way of each channel.

The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) believes:

The Laotian overland route provides military supplies for enemy forces in I Corps and northern II Corps. The enemy uses Cambodian lines of communication to move most of the military supplies for his forces in III Corps and IV Corps and parts of II Corps.

The fact that the enemy supplies his forces in northern SVN by way of the Laotian overland route is concretely documented and accepted by the intelligence community.

The bulk of the evidence attests that enemy forces in southern SVN receive their military supplies from Cambodia. Of 236 reports documenting the flow of ordnance from Cambodia to SVN, only 15 allude to the use of the Laotian overland route as the point of origin or ordnance shipments. Significantly, throughout the year of 1968, vehicle movements equated to only 8 tons per day being trucked south of Base Area 610 in Laos, which is 350 kilometers north of the Cambodian/Laos border. Since the minimum ordnance requirements alone for II, III and IV Corps during 1968 were about 7 tons per day, this throughput of 8 tons is insufficient to support both the enemy combat forces in the southern III Corps and the troops also manning the long line of communication. Of the 236 reports documenting the flow of ordnance, only two reports describe the flow of munitions from the tri-border area south to Pleiku and Darlac provinces in II Corps. Additionally, a Controlled American Source (CAS) road-watch team south of the sensor string on Highway 92 reveals that little or no traffic is moving past their position. From the available evidence, it has been concluded that no significant amounts of ordnance are reaching southern SVN through the Laotian overland route.

The increasing use of Cambodia by the enemy for movement of his military sup-

plies has become more pronounced over the last two years. According to 70 reports, Sihanoukville is the primary point of entry for military supplies destined for the enemy. Based on 62 reports, over 14,000 tons of munitions have been shipped there in the last two years. Thirty-three reports state that civilian carriers and the Cambodian Army probably delivered over 10,000 tons of munitions to the Cambodian/SVN border regions from October 1967 through September 1968. The complicity of members of the Cambodian Army in the arms traffic to the enemy has been well established. The involvement of Prince Sihanouk has not yet been proved; however, it is believed that he is aware of the movement of arms to the enemy and has at least given his tacit approval to it.

The Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) concurs with MACV and estimates that enemy forces in SVN presently require approximately 240 short tons per day of all classes of supplies of which about 104 short tons per day must be brought in from out of country. About 30 short tons per day originate in North Vietnam (MVN) and pass through the Laotian panhandle prior to delivery, while almost 9 tons are moved directly from MVN across the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Some 65 tons, mostly food produced in Cambodia, transit that country before receipt by enemy in SVN. About 6 short tons per day are estimated to come in through Sihanoukville, with arms and ammunition comprising almost all of these deliveries.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) note that national-level intelligence estimates indicate that the Laotian panhandle provides the primary route for war related material for the war in SVN. The JCS also note that the extensive use of Cambodian territory by communist forces has grown alarmingly over the last two years for the storage of arms and ammunition and other supplies, for sanctuary, and as a source of supply. It is clear that Cambodian sources, including elements of the Cambodian Army as well as merchants and smugglers, provide enemy forces in SVN with the bulk of their foodstuffs, medicines, and other nonlethal supplies, and also with substantial amounts of arms and ammunition. Available evidence does not permit a confident quantification of the amounts of arms and ammunition which are moving through Cambodia as distinguished from on-ward movement from the Laotian panhandle. In any event, it is clear that Cambodia represents a significant source of supply for enemy forces in SVN.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) overview is:

The evidence pertaining to the movement of military supplies originating in NVN to enemy forces in I Corps and northern II Corps is considered good. It is based on truck sightings in the North Vietnamese panhandle and upper Laotian panhandle, captured documents, prisoner interrogation reports, aerial photography, and special intelligence. The evidence pertaining to the movement of supplies south through the Laotian panhandle to the Laotian-Cambodian-South Vietnamese border area for on-ward distribution to enemy forces in southern II Corps and III Corps is sparse. It is based mainly on truck sightings south of Sepone on major north-south routes, portaging observed around interdiction points, and limited special intelligence reinforced by a few prisoner/defector interrogation reports and clandestine source reports.

IV Corps arms and ammunition requirements as well as supplementary shipments to III Corps during the rainy season are believed to be supplied through Cambodia. The intelligence community long has agreed that a considerable volume of foodstuffs and nonlethal supplies from Cambodia reaches forces in Laos and SVN as a result of "legitimate" agreements and smuggling; the total may exceed 40 tons per day. Such movement, as

well as that of arms and ammunition to IV Corps, is undertaken with the complicity of some high-ranking Cambodian officials. The tonnages of arms and ammunition sent to Communist forces in SVN cannot be determined, however, because of the lack of reliable information on the amount delivered to Sihanoukville and the amount stockpiled or issued to Cambodian military forces. Moreover, it is not possible to distinguish between civilian and military shipments to the South Vietnamese border area nor can cargoes or consignees be categorized.

National-level estimates indicate that during 1968 enemy forces required a daily average of about 250 short tons of supplies per day. Of this total, approximately 80 short tons (32%) were provided by external sources. By commodity, 84% of the ammunition and 24% of their food is provided by external sources; 30% of the weapons and other supplies are also externally supplied, but most of this category are weapons, almost all of which are imported. The following table shows supply requirements for enemy forces in SVN in short tons per day (STPD).

[Short tons per day]¹

Category of supplies	Total supplied	Internally supplied	Externally supplied	Percent externally supplied
Food (class I).....	190.2	144.5	45.7	24
Weapons and supplies (classes II and IV).....	29.1	20.4	8.7	30
Ammunition (class V).....	30.3	4.9	25.4	84
Total supplies.....	249.6	169.8	79.8	32

¹ Based on 1968 figures through October.

The following table shows the flow of supplies from external channels based on national-level estimates.

External channel	Percent of total	Short tons per day
From Laos.....	43	34
From Cambodia.....	40	32
Across DMZ.....	17	14

—National-level estimates indicate that Cambodia primarily supplies food and non-combat materials. On the other hand, MACV estimates that Cambodia is a large scale source of weapons and ammunition which are imported through the port of Sihanoukville and then trucked to the Cambodian/SVN border. Intelligence reports have implicated the Hak Ly trucking firm and various Cambodian Army officers, but most of these reports are from low level sources and have not permitted reliable determination of the quantity of munitions shipped.

—MACV estimates that approximately 10,000 tons of military supplies were received at Sihanoukville from October 1967 through September 1968. National-level estimates list less than 2,000 confirmed tons of such material received during the same period. MACV also lists approximately 10,000 tons of military supplies delivered at the Cambodian/SVN border and connects it with the Sihanoukville deliveries. National-level estimates indicate that they may have been brought down through Laos. While evidence of Cambodian complicity is present, the methodology of the studies and the information upon which they are based are not reliable enough to make a meaningful estimate at this time.

Question 11. What differences of opinion exist concerning extent of Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) improvement, and what is evidence underlying different views? (e.g., compare recent Central Intelligence Agency memorandum with MACV views.) For example:

a. What is the level of effective, mobile offensive operations? What results are they achieving?

b. What is the actual level of "genuine" small-unit actions and night actions in the Army of Vietnam, Regional Forces, and Popular Forces, i.e., actions that would typically be classed as such within the US Army and, in particular, offensive ambushes and patrols? How much has changed?

c. How much has the officer selection and promotion system, and the quality of leadership, actually changed over the years (as distinct from changes in paper "programs")? How many junior officers hold commissions (in particular, battlefield commissions from noncommissioned officer rank) despite lack of a high school diploma?

What known disciplinary action has resulted from the Army of Vietnam looting of civilians in the past year (for example, the widespread looting that took place last spring)?

e. To what extent have past "antidesertion" decrees and efforts lessened the rate of desertion; why has the rate recently been increasing to new highs?

f. What success are the Regional Forces and Popular Forces having in providing local security and reducing Viet Cong control and influence in rural populations?

The answers to these questions are discussed in separate responses. This section responds to the question: what differences of opinion exist concerning extent of Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) improvement, and what is the evidence underlying different views?

Any analysis of improvement of the capability of Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) is directly linked to assessment of the direction of the war itself. Most observers and analysts agree that the battlefield situation has improved and that the allies are in a better position than 18 months ago.

Most also consider that the RVNAF has improved compared with several years ago. All recognize that RVNAF is faced with some major problems. The chief differences of opinion concern the (1) degree and speed of improvement and (2) the prognosis for the future. There are two views:

RVNAF is making fairly rapid strides in improvement and effectiveness and that the prognosis for a self-sufficient force designed to hold its own against an internal threat is good. RVNAF will continue to overcome its recognized endemic problems such as lack of leadership, difficulties with the population, etc. The VCS, CINCPAC and COMUSMACV are inclined towards this view.

RVNAF is making only limited progress due to primarily recent inputs of U.S. resources, to U.S. combat activity, and to a perception that U.S. forces may withdraw. Significant improvement of RVNAF is limited because of constraints of the present military and political system. RVNAF must take major political and military actions, some of which are not now underway, to become an effective force in the near future. OSD is inclined towards this view.

Both of these conclusions, however, are drawn from the same body of data from which the following trends emerge:

a. Overall, RVNAF capabilities and efforts have improved.

The total strength of RVNAF has increased by about 27% since 1967.

The number of regular battalions engaged in combat operations has increased by about 11% during 1968.

The firepower of RVNAF has improved. Since March 1968, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) battalions have been 56% as effective as U.S. battalions in killing the enemy vs 48% in 1967.

COMUSMACV reports that Regional and Popular Forces (RF and PF) are more aggressive and responsive, and that the combat

effectiveness of regular forces has improved, compared with 1967.

The number of large unit operations has about doubled compared with 1967. RF and PF are conducting almost twice the number of operations as they conducted earlier in 1968.

The number of returnees under the Chieu Hoi program has steadily increased during 1968. Monthly returnee rates are now almost double the rate during the first months in 1968. The highest rate is in IV Corps where there are few US forces.

The percentage of population living in relatively secure areas has reached an all time high at 76.3% in December 1968.

b. Despite these improvements, there has been no breakthrough in RVNAF performance. RVNAF performance is still directly related to US efforts.

While the number of military operations has increased overall, Regular Force effort has declined slightly since the 1st Quarter 1968.

The number of enemy killed per contact also has declined slightly since early 1968; although the number of operations with contact per unit has increased slightly during 1968.

The number of small unit operations with contact is below the 1967 rate.

Despite increases in relatively secure population, little of this is directly attributable to efforts of Regional and Popular Forces, those forces primarily responsible for territorial security.

Performance of RVNAF varies greatly between units. While there has been some general improvement, some units have declined in effectiveness ratings.

The RVNAF desertion rate is now the highest since early 1966. RVNAF lost almost 120,000 men due to desertion in 1968.

c. RVNAF, despite some minor inroads, continues to suffer from significant systemic and attitudinal problems.

The officer system is a closed system; it has changed little over the years. Entry to the system depends upon education, advancement depends upon political loyalty and opportunity for corruption, rather than aggressiveness on the battlefield. While there have been some changes at the low echelons resulting in improvements in quality, effectiveness of many of the senior officers has not improved. RVNAF leadership lacks the skills necessary for modernization.

RVNAF is conventionally organized and equipped, not necessarily well suited to an extensive pacification effort or to countering political action. Further the RVNAF organization maximizes divisive trends in the Vietnamese social and political system, and makes poor use of available manpower resources.

Despite the emphasis on pacification, most RVNAF leaders neither understand it nor support it. The pacification task has been given to RF and PF who have been inadequate. Plans call for continued shift of pacification to RF/PF; despite improvements in these forces, without regular force backup, they are likely to remain adequate by themselves.

RVNAF has been unable to relate to the population and is neither a politically unifying nor modernizing force. Both RVNAF and the civil populace regard each other as "outsiders"; there has been little change in RVNAF conduct towards the populace.

The capability of RVNAF to overcome these problems and the time available to do so is the chief question. OSD believes that RVNAF can become an effective force if certain major actions are taken. These are addressed in the answer to question 14. Evidence supporting this view, in addition to that cited previously is:

President Thieu has consolidated his position of power to a large degree and appears to be accepted, thus the central leadership in SVN with US advice and support could begin the necessary change.

It appears that the South Vietnamese leadership recognizes that certain changes are necessary if they are to survive.

There are a considerable number of effective and honest officers and enlisted men at lower levels who could be advanced.

The Vietnamese are a flexible and pragmatic people who have survived over the centuries; if the necessity for change is clearly understood, systematic changes could be made and would be accepted.

Question 11a. Which is the level of effective, mobile, offensive operation? What results are they achieving?

While the Republic of Vietnamese Armed Forces are killing more enemy, entering more base areas and conducting more operations that was the case in 1967, the effectiveness of mobile offensive operations is difficult to ascertain. The "hard" evidence of effectiveness of these operations often conflicts or is confusing since RVNAF and allied operations are closely associated. Despite an increase in the level of mobile, offensive operations during 1968, approximately 85% of all contacts in South Vietnam (SVN) are initiated by the enemy (while the enemy continues to be able to avoid contact, he does so only at the risk of uncovering more of his support structure). Furthermore, Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces can still freely strike most areas in SVN, though with the risk of incurring increased losses over 1967.

1968 marked a gradual improvement in the level of effective, mobile, offensive operations.

This improvement is exemplified by the employment of mobile reaction forces, ability to conduct sustained operations, the use of reconnaissance and intelligence resources and the ability to exploit the advantages gained by fire support. This improvement, however, varies according to the missions of friendly units, tactics employed, terrain and enemy dispositions within each Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ), and to a large degree according to the combat support received from us and limited RVNAF sources. Leadership and other qualitative factors such as experience and training also strongly affect the effectiveness of performance.

In I CTZ, regular ground forces have experienced a growing confidence in their own capabilities. Army of Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) battalions, once dependent upon division and regimental control, can now operate independently. The trend throughout the corps is toward extended operations to continuously apply pressure on the enemy. US support still plays a significant part in the success of I Corps forces, and while their precise share of overall success against the enemy is difficult to measure, it is the considered estimate of the Corps senior advisor that ARVN's share has been significant.

In II CTZ, a steady improvement in all elements of RVNAF has been noted. ARVN forces in particular have shown a disposition to engage more in offensive operations to seek out the enemy, to preempt him and keep him off balance. Previously weak and ineffective units have improved their performance and are now on a par with more effective units. Although still weak in combat support, RVNAF's capability to cope with enemy guerrilla forces continues to increase.

In III CTZ, one-third of the ARVN maneuver battalions conduct offensive operations effectively, another third is relatively ineffective, while another third is unsatisfactory.

Indications are that their effectiveness is declining in IV CTZ, IV the overall number of offensive operations has not appreciably increased, but with more helicopter assets available, the ability to conduct airmobile operations has been significant. Longer duration, large unit operations aimed at penetrating enemy base areas have been successfully conducted to destroy and capture the enemy and his material.

Country-wide, regular ground forces increased their percent of available battalion days on combat sweeps (offensive operations) from 35.1 for the first quarter CY68 to 44.7 during the last quarter. This equates to 2,219 more days per quarter during the fourth quarter compared with the first. The fourth quarter was particularly significant because regular ground forces for the first time during 1968 spent more time conducting offensive than security operations. NOTE: Tabulated data on operations for Vietnamese regular forces is derived primarily from the System for Evaluating the Effectiveness of RVNAF (SEER). Numbers are submitted by US advisors and refer to operations involving more than three companies of friendly troops. The number of operations and their results may be high.

Total RVNAF operations during 1968 through October involving all types of missions have increased 30%. Each South Vietnamese Army and Marine regular maneuver battalion spent 13 days per month on operations in early 1968 versus 20 days per month by October.

During January 1969, RVNAF had an average of 29 battalion sized operations in progress per day.

COMUSMACV reports that "the first two quarters of 1968 were characterized by many small-unit operations. These operations were generally of one or two days duration. During the last two quarters, CY68, the trend toward extended large unit offensive operations became evident. The average duration of these operations increased by one-third during the last two quarters of 1968. These operations have been the most productive in terms of enemy attrition."

While mobile offensive operations are generally effective at battalion level, such operations by both larger and smaller units are less effective; higher staffs lack experience and company operations lack the requisite force. Further, these operations have not yet reached the level of effectiveness of US units. An ARVN regular battalion is about 1/2 as effective as a US battalion. Specifically:

Operational days of contact are about 75% of that for US units. Further, analysis of data from the first three quarters of 1968, shows very little overall change in the number of operations conducted by RVNAF battalions.

In addition, RVNAF gets less artillery support than US forces. Overall RVNAF receives about 1/3 the average artillery rounds which US forces get in SVN. While the modernization program provides increased artillery to RVNAF approximating that organic to a US division, US corps artillery is so large that this addition changes only slightly the ratio of US to ARVN artillery support.

Finally, mobility is inherent in offensive operations against an elusive enemy. RVNAF has considerably less air mobility than US forces. RVNAF has about 5% of the organic helicopter lift capability of US forces; roughly 20-25% of the US lift is provided RVNAF. Even with modernization, RVNAF will have only about 25% of the helicopter lift that is now available to US forces. However, COMUSMACV reports that:

The effectiveness of these operations has increased with greater mobility of GVN forces. Mobile reaction forces have been organized in ARVN divisions and employed against the enemy. Where more assets become available, ARVN has developed a capability to conduct successful airmobile operations. Eagle flight operations have proven highly effective with small units deploying by helicopter to find the enemy and larger airborne reaction forces used to "pile" on and destroy him. With the increase of cavalry units in 1968, more operations with infantry and armored units have been conducted. The Vietnamese marines working with mobile riverine forces have conducted highly successful operations against enemy

base areas. In short, with some conspicuous exceptions, RVNAF are showing a willingness to conduct sustained operations, and are demonstrating an improved capability to conduct offensive mobile operations when given the means for performing them.

In terms of results, overall assessment of the RVNAF effort and the level of offensive operations is difficult to separate from the total allied effort.

The enemy lost about 290,000 men in 1968 from all causes; of this 181,000 were attributed to deaths from hostile action in SVN. In general, the number of enemy killed by RVNAF in 1968 has about doubled compared with 1967, and in IV Corps, where there are limited US forces, enemy casualties more than doubled.

The JCS and COMUSMACV report their RVNAF is proving more effective in combat. During the last five months of 1967, the RVNAF kill ratio averaged 2.9 enemy to 1 friendly. In 1968, through October, RVNAF kill ratios (Excluding Tet) were about 4.0:1. But despite increased enemy losses in 1968, RVNAF kill ratios increased proportionately. During 1968, RVNAF kill ratios declined from a first quarter high of 6.5:1 to 4.1:1 in the third quarter. For offensive actions only, kill ratios declined from 6.8:1 in the first quarter to 5.0:1 in the fourth quarter.

However, the decline is due to enemy avoidance of contact rather than reluctance of RVNAF to press contact. NOTE: enemy casualty data is derived from the SEER and other operational reports based on information submitted by the unit or its advisor. Reliability of this data is not high, but is considered adequate to reflect trends.

The enemy has lost about double the amount of weapons in 1968 as in 1967; the captured to lost ratio has increased continually during 1968 from a 1st quarter ratio of 5.6:1 to 11.5:1 in the fourth quarter.

The increased casualties and weapons losses may have forced the enemy to withdraw most of his major main force units to sanctuaries to retrain and refit beginning in September 1968.

Question 11b: What is the actual level of "genuine" small-unit actions and night actions in ARVN, RF and PF: i.e. actions that would typically be classed as such within the US Army, and in particular, offensive ambushes and patrols? How much has this changed?

As with large unit operations, the level of effective small unit actions is difficult to assess; the evidence is again conflicting. While there are more operations now being conducted than in 1967, results have not increased proportionately. Overall the level of small unit operations during 1968 was slightly above that for 1967, but the number with contact was less than the 1967 rate.

Generally, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) units conduct small unit operations at company and multibattalion level, the Regional Forces (RF) at platoon and company level, and the Popular Forces (PF) at squad and platoon level.

The number of small unit operations conducted by regular forces during 1968 declined slightly from 86,723 in the first quarter to 82,079 in the fourth quarter. Night actions were not tabulated during 1968. (NOTE: Data are derived primarily from advisor reports and reflect operations involving less than three companies but not less than a fire team).

COMUSMACV attributes this decline to (1) an increase in large unit offensive operations and (2) a decrease in the number of battalions assigned to pacification missions.

As a comparison, US forces conducted about one-third more small unit operations with almost three times the number of contacts.

COMUSMACV further reports that generally US advisors at division level and below believe that improvement has occurred, and

that command emphasis and advisory help is increasing the rate of these improvements. Some RVNAF units are showing increased confidence in themselves, their armament, and their support. However, other units, particularly in III Corps, are ineffective due to lack of leadership at all levels, a fear of conducting squad and platoon semi-independent operations and a widespread lack of offensive spirit.

Generally, the definition of RVNAF small-unit operations describes those that would be considered as genuine small-unit actions by a US unit. However, the degree to which the operations reported follow the guidance above is difficult to determine as the basic source of the data is the local Regional Forces and Popular Forces leader and is not entirely subject to verification by US advisory personnel. Additionally, in some areas senior South Vietnamese Army commanders have assigned quotas governing the number of operations that units must conduct. In some instances this may result in commanders reporting operations as offensive when, in fact, they do not meet the criteria stated in the definition.

RF and PF are now conducting slightly less than twice the number of operations than they conducted during the spring of 1968. About 75% of these are conducted at night; however only 45% of RF contacts and 60% of PF occurred at night. Note: These and data in the following paragraphs were extracted from the Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) which defines such operations as those which consist of a fire team or larger unit but one that is less than three companies and under control of a single headquarters. The minimum duration of the operation is 6 hours (unless significant contact occurs in less time). Movement must be planned and executed for purpose of contact with the enemy.

- (1) Relative strength of the enemy.
- (2) Degree of interest and support of nearby US Forces.
- (3) Caliber of the district chief.

The overall effectiveness of small-unit operations is difficult to determine. Data is conflicting and there appears to be considerable variance between units and areas.

Operations with contact per unit have increased slightly during 1968 but the number of enemy killed per contact has declined slightly. Results of operations per RF and PF unit, per operation, and per contact show only marginal improvement, despite some equipment modernization and increase in training.

Area security has improved, but this may be as much the result of VC/NVA inactivity as it is RVNAF activity. It appears that where the enemy makes the effort, he still can enter villages and hamlets that are defended by RF/PF.

RF and PF units are mainly still defensively oriented on the hamlet where their families live. However, there is an inherent danger of misinterpretation of the degree of effectiveness of Regional Forces and Popular Forces units if a straight-line comparison of number of operations and number of contacts by US and South Vietnamese Army units on one side is made against Regional Forces and Popular Forces units on the other side. US and South Vietnamese Army units in the main seek and destroy enemy main force units. The Regional Forces and Popular Forces mission of territorial security centers on keeping local forces and guerrillas from entering hamlets and villages and molesting the populace. The degree of which the Regional Forces and Popular Forces prevent attacks by active patrolling and ambushes is as much a part of the measure of their effectiveness as the number of operations or the results. The answer to Question 11f treats with this measure.

Territorial forces can do well, offensively, against enemy of their own size (i.e., fragmented local force units or guerrillas). Correspondingly, they are defensive-minded when strong enemy forces are operating in their general area.

The South Vietnamese Army Marine Corps averaged 25 enemy contacts per day during 1968 on operations of company size or less. Most recent monthly averages are:

November 1968: 31 per day.

December 1968: 36 per day.

January 1969: 38 per day through 22d.

Question 11c: How much has the officer selection and promotion system, and the quality of leadership, actually changed over the years (as distinct from change in paper "programs")? How many junior officers hold commissions (in particular, battlefield commissions from NCO rank) despite lack of a high school diploma?

There have been no major renovations of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) promotion system since 1965. There has, however, been some reform.

There has been a substantial increase in the number of promotions during 1967 and 1968. At the present time, approximately 60 percent of the Regular Forces officers in the grades of captain through colonel have dates of rank in 1967 and 1968.

In October 1968, the Joint General Staff promulgated a new promotion directive which revised and consolidated policies applicable to all RVNAF personnel. This directive reduced time in grade criteria for Regional Forces officers to bring them into line with those applicable to Regular Forces officers. It also reduced time in grade criteria to 18 months for automatic promotions for graduates of the Officer Training School at Thu Duc to second lieutenant and for graduates of the Vietnamese Military Academy at Dalat to first lieutenant. At the same time, the Minister of Defense approved a three-year phased officer promotion plan designed to correct the officer grade imbalance caused by the rapid expansion of RVNAF in 1968.

Significant is the action taken by the Joint General Staff in 1968 to increase the number of officer promotions, both special and annual, to meet the expanding needs of RVNAF. Although the Joint General Staff did not, in fact, meet its established promotion goals for 1968, it did promote more officers than in any previous year. The Chief Joint General Staff, has directed that the 1968 quota shortfall be added to the annual promotion quotas for 1969, and that 20 percent of the 1969 promotion quotas be allocated for special battlefield promotions. This policy will provide recognition for those personnel who have distinguished themselves through sustained combat operations.

An important improvement to the RVNAF promotion system in recent years has been the institution of an efficiency reporting system. Efficiency reports were used for the first time in the selection of officers for the 1967 annual promotion. Promotion boards allot 30 percent of the promotion score to efficiency reports, with the remaining 70 percent determined by such factors from the individual's record as time in grade, time in service, and decorations.

The JCS consider that the quality of officers within the RVNAF has shown significant improvement over the years. Today, a large percentage of the officers have extensive combat experience. In addition, an impressive officer schooling system now provides officer education at precommission, branch, command and staff, and national defense level. This is supplemented by schooling for selected officers in service schools in the United States.

While the Vietnamese have a "reformed" promotion system on paper, OSD considers it has changed little in method of operation. The promotion system responds to the politics of the senior generals rather than to the needs of the professional military service.

Decree Law 13, implemented in late 1965, stated the general bases upon which promotions were to be awarded, but the accompanying regulations only centralized the authority for promotions at the general officer level and did not specify the actual criteria upon which officer eligibility was to be evaluated. In practice, then, a tradition of rather long standing has been maintained; promotion are still made through negotiation and compromise at promotion boards between general officers trying to advance their protégés. This process is especially prominent in the promotion and placement of field grade officers where each general seeks to protect and position his supporters on the basis of politics rather than professional abilities.

OSD further considers that the price paid for the promotion system's responsiveness to the politics of the senior RVNAF generals is its autonomy. It has been unable to respond effectively to both requirements for professionalism and to the war itself.

First, the selection system has tended to reinforce and exacerbate the gap between the GVN and the population. In particular, the educational requirements for officer candidacy (i.e. the equivalent of a high school diploma) and the means employed to get adequate numbers of cadets to parallel the uneven growth of the RVNAF (i.e. occupational and educational drafts) produce officers more interested in the perquisites and privileges of rank than in effective military leadership. Education and the city life it required resulted in what many observers have now perceived as a gap between officers and soldiers.

The education requirement also tended to place the armed forces in a position where it had to compete only poorly with other forms of employment which offered higher pay and considerably better living conditions. As officers that during their initial period of service might have gained valuable operational experience were seduced to the better jobs, inexperienced cadets and junior officers replaced them and consistently deprived the RVMAF and the war if fought of the already small pool of experienced leaders.

Furthermore, the majority of subsequent promotions made in the RVNAF are not for military skills. Special, "other than battlefield" promotions in 1966-67 and 1967-68 accounted for 19% and 20%, respectively of all promotions, while less than 2% of all officers provided in those years owed their rank to combat victories.

RVNAF has not loosened significantly the educational requirements for commission.

COMUSMACV reports that the exact number of noncommissioned officers who have received commissions without having a high school diploma is not available. However, information provided by the Adjutant General/Joint General Staff shows that the number of noncommissioned officers commissioned as aspirants was approximately 520 in 1966, 490 in 1967, and approximately 1,900 in 1968. Indications are, that of the 1,900 commissioned in 1968, 99 percent did not have high school diplomas; however, because of their commander's recommendation, they were promoted to officer rank. It should be noted that those promoted without a high school diploma cannot be promoted beyond the rank of captain until they have completed high school level education.

Only 7% of all RVNAF officers have received commissions from the ranks and this proportion actually declines to only 4.8% in the 1967-68 class of Officer Candidates. There can be no concerted effort to raise the overall quality of officer leadership without RVNAF availing itself of the experienced leaders from the enlisted ranks.

The steady expansion in the size of the RVNAF has overtaken army politics in the sense that the need for more officers and, hence promotions has outstripped the capac-

ity of the RVNAF political system to sanction such promotions.

As a result of the early exhaustion of a limited reserve officer pool and the input of a great number of junior officers during 1968 (approximately 10,000 from Officers Candidate School), the overall quality of leadership in RVNAF has experienced some dilution. The quality of leadership varies from outstanding to weak at all levels, and MACV is directing efforts to influence RVNAF to identify and eliminate weak leaders.

While there is only about a 2,000 shortfall in regular and Regional Force (RF) officer strength compared with authorized, there is a considerable imbalance in the grade structure. These forces are short about 8,200 officers in the higher grades of Captain through Colonel and over about 6,100 in the aspirant and lieutenant grades.

Based on US standards, which may not be germane to South Vietnam but save as a comparison, RVNAF should have about 65% more officers than currently authorized.

In comparison to past two year periods the annual promotion rate actually declined despite the constant growth of the regular forces' size and leadership needs. COMUSMACV estimates that, at the current rate of promotion, and attrition, 90% of those authorized for all grades would be available by end CY 70. OSD estimates it should take the RVNAF a minimum of 2.5 years to fill the mid-1968 requirement for officers.

The relatively rapid expansion of the RVNAF filled the officer corps with men of approximately the same age (50% of all officers, for example, are between 25 and 31 years old). The relative chronological homogeneity of the officer corps has resulted in cleavages between those "political" officers who spend a rewarding and lucrative career in the national, provincial, or corps capitals and those "combat" officers who bear the brunt of the fighting with few rewards in the hinterlands. Morale, thereby, is low among these Vietnamese field officers who have held the same rank for 8 or 10 years while witnessing his colleagues at Saigon or Corps rapid advance due to favoritism. The "political" officers are divided between Thieu and Ky, while those officers bearing the brunt of the fighting may be beginning to coalesce into a 3rd faction opposed to both. Thus, the hope that Thieu's apparent victory over Ky in the struggle for control of the executive and the army will bring both stability and effectiveness to RVNAF command may well be frustrated. The Thieu consolidations represent the victory of one faction over another rather than the end to the causes of such factionalism. The Thieu consolidations represent but another act in the continuing drama of coup and countercoup within the Vietnamese military elite.

In summary, OSD considers that unless the promotion system is regularized and given the autonomy it clearly needs from the vagaries of general officer politicking, the increase in RVNAF effectiveness may well be limited.

Question 11d: What known disciplinary action has resulted from ARVN looting of civilians in the past year (for example, the widespread looting that took place last spring)?

Looting and other misconduct by Republic of Vietnam Armed troops toward the civilian populace have undermined the confidence of the people in RVNAF. Despite some efforts to correct the situation, efforts to undertake the required attitudinal changes of RVNAF towards the populace have not been productive.

COMUSMACV reports that his command has no firm evidence of widespread looting. However, as the Joint General Staff saw fit to publish a memorandum in March 1968 concerning theft, robbery, and rape, there apparently was concern in this area during the Spring.

The number of such RVNAF personnel

brought to trial during 1968 totaled eight. Of this eight, one enlisted man was acquitted, one officer received a sentence of five years detention, and six enlisted men received sentences of six months detention (suspended).

During 1967, several measures were taken to preclude RVNAF's stealing from the populace. A key program was the institution of a free issue of operational rations to troops. Prior to that time, the cost of operational rations was deducted from the soldier's pay. Consequently, he was prone to live off the land to save this expense.

During 1967, all South Vietnamese Army infantry battalions received training in Revolutionary Development, which stressed the importance of gaining the respect and cooperation of the people. This training was eventually extended to all other RVNAF battalions and to a high proportion of Regional Forces and Popular Forces units.

Many officers either have a disdain for dealing both with their men and with the peasants, or have come to expect and tolerate looting by believing that it "makes soldiers fierce" and unites them with a tradition of soldiering associated with the legendary and successful armies of Vietnam's past. During the third quarter of 1968, about 50% of MACV advisors with Vietnamese Army and

Marine units report that one-third of the populace has a feeling of hostility towards their unit. On the other hand, 68% reported that their units respected the right of the populace and property most of the time.

What may be a more serious problem, however, is not that looting will probably continue despite even the most concerted reform efforts but that it is part of the larger problem of the army's lack of compassion and respect for civilian life and property. Such lack of compassion, in turn, is likely to further alienate the civilian population from the government's cause.

Question 11e: To what extent have past "anti-desertion" decrees and efforts lessened the rate of desertion; why has the rate recently been increasing?

RVNAF personnel are deserting at a rate of almost 120,000 per year. In combat units, the rate is the highest; gross desertions account for about 65% of the losses in these units. MACV has estimated that desertion rate will be reduced by about 50% during 1969—in fact, achievement of the new force goals is contingent upon this.

The successes of past desertion reduction programs attest to the fact that a reduction in the current high desertion rate is possible.

The following table illustrates RVNAF desertion rates over time:

RVNAF NET DESERTIONS PER 1,000 STRENGTH

	1st quarter, 1966	4th quarter, 1966	4th quarter, 1967	1st quarter, 1968	2d quarter, 1968	3d quarter, 1968	4th quarter, 1968
Regular.....	23.0	11.0	9.7	4.8	12.8	15.8	18.6
Regional.....	10.0	6.3	9.0	8.7	9.8	16.3	16.3
Popular.....	27.7	14.8	12.7	13.3	16.6	11.9	8.6
Total RVNAF.....	21.1	10.8	10.2	7.7	12.9	15.2	14.8

Desertion rates during 1965 and early 1966 rose to high levels, reflecting the political instability of the Government of Vietnam and enemy battlefield successes at that time. As the US build-up took effect and the Government of Vietnam was able to reestablish itself, the implementation of Decree Law 15 of 1966 and of a series of administrative reforms within the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) began to result in steadily decreasing desertion rates. As enforcement of Decree Law 15 (which increased sentences for desertion to a minimum of five years at hard labor and provided punitive measures to be taken against inducers and accomplices) proceeded, the punishments for desertion became adequate deterrents. Prior to February 1968, about 16,000 people were tried and 11,000 sentenced. By 1967, the desertion rate showed a 34 percent drop from 1966, and by January 1968, the rate had decreased to the level of 1963.

The administrative reforms within RVNAF during 1966 and 1967 consisted of increased attempts at troop indoctrination; pay raises in June 1966, May 1967, October 1967, and a PF pay raise in July 1968; increases in fund allowances; some leadership improvements; and upgrading of Regional and Popular Forces (RF and PF). These programs also had some effect—the PF desertion rate, which was the highest in 1960, is now the lowest; interestingly enough, PF casualties during the same period declined from 31% of the RVNAF total to about 20% in 1968. However, we do not know the extent that these forces have made local accommodations with the Viet Cong—we suspect there has been some.

Yet despite these programs, the desertion rate rose in 1968. This rise is attributable to several factors.

In February, the GVN declared a general amnesty and all those deserters previously sentenced was sent to combat units; about 13,000 deserters returned. Following this, rates rose. COMUSMACV reports that such amnesties granted to deserters by the Government of Vietnam, despite advice to the

contrary by the Chief, RVNAF Joint General Staff, have not strengthened the desertion control program.

COMUSMACV reports that the present high desertion rate is due primarily to the large number of men entering the service as the result of the general mobilization.

"Prior to 1968, the RVNAF was a relatively stable force filled primarily with mature, trained individuals. As a result of the Partial and General Mobilization Decrees, the RVNAF expanded from a strength of 817,358. This accelerated mobilization required a general shift of the older officers, noncommissioned officers and enlisted men from their original units to one of the newly formed units. This shift resulted in a significant portion of RVNAF being manned by young, immature conscripts and volunteers supervised by a reduced quality of leadership by the young officers and noncommissioned officers."

"Statistics have shown that a soldier is more prone to desert during his first 6 months of service due to fear of the unknown, fear of combat, and because of strong family affiliations. This is the basic reason why desertions increased during the summer and fall of 1968 as over 200,000 new personnel were inducted or volunteered for service during this period."

In addition to new personnel, the increased rates may be due in part to the heightened intensity of combat and Viet Cong proselytizing.

The rising desertion rates turned slightly downward during the last quarter of 1968. Yet despite this further reduction may be difficult.

RVNAF initiated a program in July to encourage the populace to turn in deserters; the leave policy has been liberalized slightly as has been motivational training for new servicemen; and desertion "quotas" have been assigned to units. These programs appear to be having some effect.

The endemic poor environmental conditions of RVNAF, which contribute to deser-

tions, such as low pay, little dependent housing, limited leave policy, transportation problems to get home even if a man gets leave, remain to be corrected.

The Vietnamese people take a very pragmatic attitude toward desertions. They feel that desertion is not bad but a way to beat the central authority.

We do not know to what extent the rising desertion rate indicates disaffection with the GVN or how many deserters remain in GVN areas and how many go the VC. The answer to these questions become more important as the RVNAF and GVN supporters become increasingly aware that they probably will have to make some political accommodation with the Viet Cong. Fewer may be willing to die in combat. Thus continued innovative actions are required to reduce RVNAF desertions.

Question 11f: What success are the RF and PF having in providing local security and reducing VC control and influence in rural populations?

Information on the success of local security and the reduction of VC control is soft and recognized as such, but some conjecture can be made and trends discerned.

The JCS, COMUSMACV and CINCPAC report that the best overall measure of the success of Regional forces (RF) and Popular forces (PF) in providing local security and reducing Viet Cong (VC) control is the trend in relatively secure and VC controlled population.

Since the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) began breaking out rural population separately, the trends have been as follows:

PERCENT OF RURAL POPULATION

	Jan- uary 1968	March 1968	Octo- ber 1968	Decem- ber 1968
Relatively secure.....	53.0	42.9	55.0	64.9
Vietcong controlled.....	25.4	28.3	23.7	18.9

Thus, despite the Tet setback, relative security has been extended to about 1.3 million people in the rural areas during 1968, and the Viet Cong have lost approximately 0.7 million of the population they controlled at the outset of the year. NOTE: HES data does not necessarily depict an accurate reflection of the security conditions at any one time nor does it reflect internal variation with categories of security, yet trend information is considered adequate.

During the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, for example, significant numbers of Regional and Popular Forces units have been redeployed mostly from relatively secure areas into contested hamlets. Some 227 Regional Forces companies and 710 Popular Forces platoons (roughly 15 percent of the total territorial security forces) are now stationed in formerly contested or Viet Cong-controlled target hamlets. Although territorial security forces are spread somewhat more thinly, even taking into account the almost 100,000 strength increase over the past year, the enemy has not taken advantage, either through lack of capability or a conscious decision of this deployment of friendly security forces.

Viewed from a slightly different perspective, another good indicator of the status of local security is the status of the Viet Cong (VC) local government or infrastructure (VCI): the existence of a small disciplined organization in a village or hamlet is a significant threat to an individual.

As of the end of November 1968, only about 21.2% of the population lived in areas where the VCI were considered eliminated (this does not include non-hamlet secure population as rating of this group does not include specific VCI questions—and the extent of VCI may be considerable). According to HES

figures, about 61% of the total population and 80% of the rural population is subject to VCI influence; this has increased since 1967 as we find more about the VCI, despite anti-infrastructure efforts. Recent VCI political activity has also offset our efforts to destroy the VCI—as of the end of December 1968, about one-half of SVN's villages had "liberation committees"; about 10% of the relatively secure population lived in areas with such committees.

Actual Government of Vietnam (GVN) control is increasing very slowly. As of December 1968, only about 47% of the population of SVN was under primarily GVN influence with only 32% in rural areas.

Whereas the VC has a disciplined organization at village/hamlet level, the GVN does not: The GVN structure is smaller by almost one-half—the GVN has only about 15% of its structure at this level.

The existing rural GVN organization has little protection. During 1968, about 1300 GVN officials were killed and 300 abducted (it is likely that the large majority of these were from rural areas).

There is no significant programmed expansion of GVN and civil manpower resources at village and hamlet level. In fact, the GVN structure has declined in size due to general mobilization and input into RVNAF.

With respect to performance and effectiveness, while both RF and PF have improved, improvements are still not rapid enough. COMUSMACV reports that:

The presence of 353 Mobile Advisory Teams has added backbone to the Regional Forces/Popular Forces, improved their training, and increased the air and artillery support which they receive. Other similar programs such as Marine Combined Action Platoons, training courses conducted by US combat units, and numerous combined operations have enhanced the ability of the Regional Forces/Popular Forces to provide better protection to the people.

More than 100,000 M-16 rifles are already in the hands of Regional Forces/Popular Forces. Another 150,000 will be issued within the next year. The increased firepower and increased confidence these rifles give to the Regional Force/Popular Forces have enhanced their effectiveness and aggressiveness. As discussed in more detail under Question 11b, both Regional Forces and Popular Forces contacts in the last quarter of 1968 were up almost 100 percent over the 1st quarter of the year. Night contacts increased more than 100 percent during the same period.

The pace of Regional Forces/Popular Forces improvement is still not rapid enough. The first year's improvement program carried out in 1968 was moderately successful. With greater Government of Vietnam command interest being shown from the President on down, with the Territorial Forces Evaluation system (TFES) as a Government of Vietnam and US management tool, with more than 350 Mobile Advisory Teams available for full-time work, and with a vigorous improvement program for 1969, the Regional Forces/Popular Forces should be able to extend security to 90 percent of the population, which is the goal set by President Thieu for 1969.

OSD considers that despite increases in RF and PF operations and the increase in overall security ratings, improvement and extension of area security directly attributed to these remain marginal.

How much of the success of the accelerated pacification program is due to lack of VC opposition and how much is due to RF/PF efforts is not clear. An indicator is the fact that only about 20% of the RF/PF units in this program have moved from their original location.

Local units are mainly defensively oriented, related to villages or hamlets where their families are, rather than to conducting forays to close by VC hamlets.

The number of RF and PF units (currently about 32% and 65% of the total units respec-

tively) protecting villages and hamlets has changed only slightly throughout 1968.

According to analysis of TFES reports and HES security ratings, the population unprotected by RF or PF improved during 1968 almost as rapidly as those protected by RF or PF; further, security improvement existed only when PF were present.

The PF is programmed to be expanded over current levels by only about 6,000 men.

Thus it appears that influence of the GVN versus the VC is growing slowly and principally under the weight of allied effort. Yet influence extension still operates with minimal resources on the part of the RVNAF and GVN. For greater productivity in this regard, commitment of additional manpower and equipment resources is necessary.

Question 12: To what extent could RVNAF—as is now—handle the VC (Main Force, local forces, guerrillas), with or without US combat support to fill RVNAF deficiencies, if all NVA units were withdrawn:

a. If VC still had northern fillers
b. If all northerners (but not regroupes) were withdrawn?

RVNAF capabilities and possible NVA withdrawals are difficult to predict; judgments are highly conjectural at this time.

The JCS, CINCPAC and COMUSMACV estimate that it is highly probable that Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), as it exists today, adequately supported by US artillery, engineer, tactical air, helicopter, and naval assets, is capable of handling the Viet Cong. Without US combat support and when opposing Viet Cong main and local force units, the RVNAF would have to reduce the number of offensive operations and adopt more of a defensive posture. This would result in loss of control by the Government of Vietnam over substantial rural areas.

The above response is predicated upon two assumptions: first, there exists an internal environment characterized by a workable economy, a relatively secure civilian populace, and a functioning government. Secondly, the North Vietnamese Army forces have withdrawn to North Vietnam and terminated external support to Viet Cong Forces. Otherwise, if external support from the north were to continue, it is visualized that filler personnel would infiltrate in ever-increasing numbers to counter any substantial RVNAF success. This could result in a prolongation of the conflict unless substantial Free World Military Assistance Force presence were either continued or reestablished.

It is highly probable that the RVNAF, as it exists today, adequately supported by US artillery, engineer, tactical air, helicopter, and naval assets, is capable of:

(1) Making substantial progress in the elimination of Viet Cong main and local force units, including those with northern fillers.

(2) Making sustained progress in a reduction of the Viet Cong guerrilla threat although elimination would require a prolonged period of time.

(3) Achieving favorable results in a shorter time frame, if northern fillers are withdrawn.

It is estimated that without US combat support and opposing Viet Cong main and local force units, with or without northern fillers, the RVNAF would:

(1) Reduce numbers of offensive operations and adopt more of a defensive posture.

(2) Consolidate some forces and redevelop them within or in the proximity of major populated areas.

(3) Lose Government of Vietnam control over substantial rural areas.

(4) Retain Government of Vietnam control over major populated areas.

However, OSD considers that if all northerners withdraw the Viet Cong effort in the South may collapse, thus such a complete withdrawal may be unlikely.

North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces in the south now comprise about 70% of the enemy regular combat forces. If all northerners withdraw the internal threat would be

reduced from about 202 infantry type battalions to 73 with a regular force strength of about 37,000.

If fillers remained, the VC threat would be from 92 to 130 maneuver battalions. The larger figure is based on movement of NVA fillers into newly formed VC units.

RVNAF's capability against VC forces with NVA fillers is closely associated with time.

If most US forces were withdrawn now, RVNAF improvement may stop or regress. Most RVNAF gains are closely related to support provided directly and indirectly by US forces; if these forces are withdrawn rapidly, RVNAF's newly gained confidence may collapse.

While there has been considerable progress in increasing the force levels of RVNAF (now at about 826,000 to be expanded about 872,000 by end FY70), the initial expansion and modernization was designed to maximize combat power, rather than develop a balanced force. The impact of this expansion and modernization is just now being felt. The second phase of the modernization and improvement program is to develop a balanced force capable of coping with the internal VC threat, but despite acceleration, goals will not be met before end FY 72. Thus RVNAF capabilities should increase over time. Continued RVNAF modernization and more evidence of improvement over time will reinforce judgments on the question of RVNAF capabilities.

To what extent could the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces—as it is now—also handle a sizeable level of North Vietnamese Army forces?

a. With U.S. air and artillery support?
b. With above, and also U.S. ground forces reserve?

c. Without U.S. direct support, but with increased RVNAF artillery and air capacity?

(S) Today's Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), without full support of US combat forces, could not cope with a sizeable level of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces.

a. Should the present RVNAF be reinforced with US air and military support, their capability of defense would be improved, but not to the extent of being able to cope with the type and complexity of combat imposed by major North Vietnamese Army involvement.

b. The posture of the present RVNAF would be further strengthened if reinforced by major US air and military support, and backed up by major US ground force elements in a mobile reserve posture immediately available for commitment. The utility derived from placing major US Forces in standby reserve would depend on US willingness to use them as a threat and to commit all or part of the reserve as needed.

c. Finally, the question as to whether the present-day RVNAF, without US (or Free World Military Assistance Force) direct support but with an increase in organic artillery and air, could cope with sizeable North Vietnamese Army forces relates directly to the concept of the Phase II development.

Phase II is designed to restructure the present-day RVNAF to provide a more balanced combat support and combat-service support capability and includes a significant increase in air and artillery support. Air unit activations will commence in the 3d quarter, FY 1970 and be completed by end FY 1972. Artillery unit activations, currently underway, will be completed in the 2d quarter, FY 1970.

The RVNAF, with their present structure and degree of combat readiness, are inadequate to handle a sizeable level of North Vietnamese Army forces. The RVNAF simply are not capable of attaining the level of self-sufficiency and overwhelming force superiority that would be required to counter combined Viet Cong insurgency and North Vietnamese Army main force offensives. Some of the RVNAF would necessarily have to be

redployed to concentrate defenses in and around critical population centers and installations, thus abdicating a greater extent of rural areas to Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army control.

(TS) Although the question does not consider gradual US troop reduction, the most likely and feasible scenario would be RVNAF gradually improving its capabilities and effectiveness. Associated would be a phased reduction in US forces.

COMUSMACV considers that, with the momentum that has been built up in the pacification program, the expansion and modernization of RVNAF, and the steady attrition of the enemy, it would be possible to plan for removing one division from South Vietnam during mid-summer of 1969. He and Ambassador Bunker discussed this with President Thieu and were met with a favorable response.

In addition, reduction of other US forces should be possible in the near future. The numbers and timing depend upon progress of RVNAF modernization (some units will turn over their equipment to RVNAF units during 1969), improvements in effectiveness of RVNAF, and a drastic reduction in the RVNAF desertion rate.

Question 14: What, in various views, are the required changes—in Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) command, organization, equipment, training, and incentives, in political environment, in logistical support, in US modes of influence—for making the RVNAF adequate to the tasks cited in Questions 11 and 12, above? How long would this take? What are the practical obstacles to these changes, and what US moves would be needed to overcome these?

The JCS, CINCPAC and COMUSMACV consider that by 1972 the planned Phase II RVNAF will be adequate to handle the Viet Cong insurgency if the Viet Cong are not reinforced and supported by the North Vietnamese Army.

Command and Organization. From the initial decision to improve and modernize the RVNAF as a self-sufficient and effective military force until the present, planning has focused on developing the RVNAF command and organizational structure and providing the equipment, training, and logistical support adequate to the task cited in Question 12b, above. No major changes in command structure or organization are believed required at this time.

Force Level. The Phase II accelerated RVNAF force structure consists of a 10-division South Vietnam Army with a minimal logistic support force, expanded territorial forces which will total approximately 431,000 men and a 40-squadron South Vietnam Air Force. The approved SVN Navy plan calls for a balanced naval force of 24,734 men. Because of limitations on manpower availability, this total force is the maximum that can be achieved and sustained. It is the minimum force believed required to meet the likely threat from an internal insurgency without North Vietnamese Army support.

People's Self Defense. The Government of Vietnam is also pressing the People's Self Defense and similar programs. As these become more effective and involve a substantial portion of the total population, they can be expected to make at least part of the Popular Forces and Regional Forces available for more intensive efforts against local guerrillas and even local forces. This would correspondingly free elements of the Army of Vietnam now required to assist in this role, which could then be utilized not only against Viet Cong main force but also North Vietnamese Army main force units. While this would not be adequate to handle all of the North Vietnamese threat, it could contribute substantially to this mission.

Equipment. The RVNAF has yet to achieve the full quantities of equipment called for by the Phase II accelerated force structure nor has the planned modernization program

of equipment yet been completed. When the equipment called for by these programs is received, the equipment will be adequate to meet the requirements.

Training. Training within units needs to have continued emphasis. The product of the RVNAF training systems, to include their schools, is generally satisfactory. High skill, long lead-time training, such as helicopter pilots, must, for some time, continue to take place in the Continental United States.

Incentives. While increased pay for the RVNAF would amount to an increased incentive and could possibly assist in solving the desertion problem, there are no current plans for any raise. The RVNAF is currently paid at a level equal to, or greater than, the Government of Vietnam civil service. Other forms of incentive, such as increased promotion opportunities and greater use of decorations and awards, are being pressed by US advisors.

Logistical Support. While not yet approved, the recent recommendations of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, for an increase in logistical spaces of approximately 9,400 will produce a better balanced force more capable of self-sufficiency. It is a minimal logistical structure.

Modes of Influence. No significant changes in US modes of influence are called for or required. Certain reductions are being made within selected Army of Vietnam units in the level of US advisory effort as these units achieve maturity and effectiveness. In the territorial forces, on the other hand, consideration is being given to doubling the level of the Military Assistance Training program. This program, which provides small five-man advisory teams to work with the Regional Forces/Popular Forces, has been a significant contributing factor to the improvement of territorial forces.

Timing. Primarily because of long lead-time training requirements and secondarily because of stretch-out of delivery of required equipment, it will be FY 72 before the planned force can be fully effective.

Obstacles. Obstacles to the success of the program include the remaining high desertion rate and needed improvements in quantity and quality of leadership. These problems are receiving continuing command emphasis.

US Moves. In any case, until the goals of the Improvement and Modernization Program are achieved, US support units (approved at about 39,000 personnel) will be required to make up RVNAF shortfalls against the threat postulated in Question 12b, above. Continued US materiel support under a Military Assistance Program/Military Assistance Service Funded program will be required indefinitely to maintain an effective force. A continuing requirement for a US presence in the form of a Military Assistance Advisory Group is anticipated also (approved at about 19,000).

In addition to the above views of the JCS, CINCPAC and COMUSMACV, OSD considers that there are other required changes in RVNAF.

Without major reforms within the RVNAF command and selection system, however, it is unlikely that the RVNAF as presently organized and led will ever constitute an effective political or military counter to the Viet Cong. Moreover, as the Government of Vietnam's (GVN) major presence in the countryside, the RVNAF as presently constituted will only continue to widen the gap which exists between the government and the rural population. Thus, any program of priority changes must have as its primary purpose the provision of an interval during which maximum pressure can be exerted on the GVN to make the necessary organizational and political changes commensurate with the assumption of a larger role in the political struggle and the war. Actions enumerated in the following paragraphs should be undertaken. While some of these are

underway in varying degrees, they must receive more emphasis.

a. Concentrate on those organizational and command changes that can improve RVNAF strategic capability to assume a greater share of the overall military burden and increase their competence to better confront the enemy's military and political infrastructure.

Initiate top echelon political action to emphasize and reward professionalism in the RVNAF by making the basis of promotion and assignment professional competence rather than political loyalty. Immediate action on this priority is essential if the RVNAF is to emerge as a viable and an effective military establishment in South Vietnam. From the standpoint of GVN politics, the army is also at a major watershed in its development. President Thieu has succeeded in replacing those senior generals and other once-influential officers loyal to Vice President Ky. The Thieu victory, however, is not likely to bring either stability or effectiveness to future RVNAF operations unless Thieu can make the choice between basing RVNAF commands on professionalism rather than politics. First, while all major RVNAF commands have changed hands, the primacy of politics and political loyalties as the basis for advancement has not been changed. Second, if politicizing remains the basis of command assignment in RVNAF, then the Thieu victory is a temporary one at best. The tension between supporters of General Cao Van Vien vs Premier Tran van Hung, paralleling the basic antagonism between northerners and southerners in the policy at large is likely to further divide the RVNAF generals and threaten Thieu's hold over them. Similarly, at the battalion level and throughout the field generally, the tension between those officers who have fought hardest and advanced least versus those who have had little fighting experience but rapid advancement is likely to hamper the ability of the GVN to successfully carry out major transfer of fighting responsibilities. Unless the closed system of loyalties and regionalism is replaced in the promotion and assignment of officers the same problems of inept leadership and corruption will continue to paralyze the RVNAF regardless of the magnitude of future US/Allied assistance to the GVN.

What is now required, in essence, is to overlay the Vietnamese system with effectiveness criteria, institutionalize advancement and assignment on such criteria, and use US pressure to regularize the promotion system. There are some indications that the GVN both realizes that this must be done and is willing to do so. They have taken some steps to improve low level leadership. We should help the GVN make changes at the top. This can be done by first making it clear to the GVN at the highest levels that: (1) while we will continue support, we intend to reduce our effort, (2) that the GVN can no longer survive without making certain changes and we will assist them in making these changes—teach the leadership to survive in a changing system. In this regard, we should provide highly qualified and sensitive advisors for selected high level RVNAF leaders (at the Joint General Staff, Corps and division level) to work directly with these leaders.

In consultation with the Vietnamese, we should decrease the number of American advisors assigned to RVNAF units which have demonstrated the capability of operating effectively.

b. Increase the quality and quantity of territorial security and pacification operations aimed at expanding GVN influence and diminishing the VC support structure and its guerrilla and local force units.

Give priority attention to the territorial security forces by increasing support from regular forces, by providing more and better functioning communications as now planned under current RVNAF modernization and

improvement programs, by increasing the force levels of Popular Forces and by detailing more regular force officers and NCO's to fill leadership shortages in territorial security units.

Emphasize quality rather than quantity in the Phoenix program by providing greater incentives for the identification and capture of high ranking or key personnel in important positions within the VC infrastructure, as opposed to elimination or larger numbers of lower ranking personnel of lesser importance.

Be prepared to establish a national constabulary type territorial security force under the Ministry of the Interior as may become necessary in the event the activities of the RVNAF are severely circumscribed in the post hostilities environment due to a restriction of the use of the RVNAF to maintain security, law and order resulting from a ceasefire agreement or other agreement to terminate hostilities.

Augment territorial security forces as required with RVNAF regular force maneuver battalions, and US maneuver battalions if necessary, to improve level of security in selected high-priority districts. Develop more effective pacification tactics.

Reward unit and individual performance in providing local security and eliminating the VC infrastructure through promotions, awards and publicity.

Initiate motivational and educational actions to change the attitudes of RVNAF personnel towards the populace and toward pacification programs.

Revitalize the RF by redistribution of leaders from headquarters elements to combat units, cross assignment of ARVN officers, and improved training and motivation.

Bring about attitudinal changes in RVNAF leadership towards the worth of the populace and the necessity for local security. Here, the special advisors could be effective instruments in stimulating and guiding the Vietnamese, thereby bringing GVN leaders and RVNAF to the realization that effective protection of the local people is an essential priority if nation-building activities are to be carried out.

c. In addition to the foregoing groups of actions, there are a number of other less critical actions that should be taken to improve RVNAF. Among those, we should:

Modify the RVNAF force structure as the threat in SVN shifts in emphasis to an internal one. The current RVNAF is conventionally equipped and organized, not necessarily well suited to political action or countering guerrilla warfare. Its many varied and separate commands maximize divisiveness. Powers of military commanders continue to conflict with political development. The essential task is to build a structure that maximizes cohesiveness and national loyalty. Rather than separate commands, differences should be manifested in mission assignments.

Question 14: What, in various views, are the required changes—in Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) command, organization, equipment, training, and incentives, in political environment, in logistical support, in US modes of influence—for making the RVNAF adequate to the tasks cited in Questions 11 and 12, above? How long would this take? What are the practical obstacles to these changes, and what US moves would be needed to overcome these?

The JCS, CINCPAC and COMUSMACV consider that by 1972 the planned Phase II RVNAF will be adequate to handle the Viet Cong insurgency if the Viet Cong are not reinforced and supported by the North Vietnamese Army.

Command and Organization. From the initial decision to improve and modernize the RVNAF as a self-sufficient and effective military force until the present, planning has focused on developing the RVNAF command and organizational structure and providing

the equipment, training, and logistical support adequate to the task cited in Question 12b, above. No major changes in command structure or organization are believed required at this time.

Force Level. The Phase II accelerated RVNAF force structure consists of a 10-division South Vietnam Army with a minimal logistic support force, expanded territorial forces which will total approximately 431,000 men and a 40-squadron South Vietnam Air Force. The approved SVN Navy plan calls for a balanced naval force of 24,734 men. Because of limitations on manpower availability, this total force is the maximum that can be achieved and sustained. It is the minimum force believed required to meet the likely threat from an internal insurgency without North Vietnamese Army support.

People's Self Defense. The Government of Vietnam is also pressing the People's Self Defense and similar programs. As these become more effective and involve a substantial portion of the total population, they can be expected to make at least part of the Popular Forces and Regional Forces available for more intensive efforts against local guerrillas and even local forces. This would correspondingly free elements of the Army of Vietnam now required to assist in this role, which could then be utilized not only against Viet Cong main force but also North Vietnamese Army main force units. While this would not be adequate to handle all of the North Vietnamese threat, it could contribute substantially to this mission.

Equipment. The RVNAF has yet to achieve the full quantities of equipment called for by the Phase II accelerated force structure nor has the planned modernization program of equipment yet been completed. When the equipment called for by these programs is received, the equipment will be adequate to meet the requirements.

Training. Training within units needs to have continued emphasis. The product of the RVNAF training systems, to include their schools, is generally satisfactory. High skill, long lead-time training, such as helicopter pilots, must, for some time, continue to take place in the Continental United States.

Incentives. While increased pay for the RVNAF would amount to an increased incentive and could possibly assist in solving the desertion problem, there are no current plans for any raise. The RVNAF is currently paid at a level equal to, or greater than, the Government of Vietnam civil service. Other forms of incentive, such as increased promotion opportunities and greater use of decorations and awards, are being pressed by US advisors.

Logistical Support. While not yet approved, the recent recommendations of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, for an increase in logistical spaces of approximately 9,400 will produce a better balanced force more capable of self-sufficiency. It is a minimal logistical structure.

Modes of Influence. No significant changes in US modes of influence are called for or required. Certain reductions are being made within selected Army of Vietnam units in the level of U.S. advisory effort as these units achieve maturity and effectiveness. In the territorial forces, on the other hand, consideration is being given to doubling the level of the Military Assistance Training program. This program, which provide small five-man advisory teams to work with the Regional Forces/Popular Forces, has been a significant contributing factor to the improvement of territorial forces.

Timing. Primarily because of long lead-time training requirements and secondarily because of stretch-out of delivery of required equipment, it will be FY 72 before the planned force can be fully effective.

Obstacles. Obstacles to the success of the program include the remaining high desertion rate and needed improvements in quantity and quality of leadership. These prob-

lems are receiving continuing command emphasis.

US Moves. In any case, until the goals of the Improvement and Modernization Program are achieved, US support units (approved at about 39,000 personnel) will be required to make up RVNAF shortfalls against the threat postulated in Question 12b, above. Continued US material support under a Military Assistance Program/Military Assistance Service Funded program will be required indefinitely to maintain an effective force. A continuing requirement for a US presence in the form of a Military Assistance Advisory Group is anticipated also (approved at about 19,000).

In addition to the above views of the JCS, CINCPAC and COMUSMACV, OSD considers that there are other required changes in RVNAF.

Without major reforms within the RVNAF command and selection system, however, it is unlikely that the RVNAF as presently organized and led will ever constitute an effective political or military counter to the Viet Cong. Moreover, as the Government of Vietnam's (GVN) major presence in the countryside, the RVNAF as presently constituted will only continue to widen the gap which exists between the government and the rural population. Thus, any program of priority changes must have as its primary purpose the provision of an interval during which maximum pressure can be exerted on the GVN to make the necessary organizational and political changes commensurate with the assumption of a larger role in the political struggle and the war. Actions enumerated in the following paragraphs should be undertaken. While some of these are underway in varying degrees, they must receive more emphasis.

a. Concentrate on those organizational and command changes that can improve RVNAF strategic capability to assume a greater share of the overall military burden and increase their competence to better confront the enemy's military and political infrastructure.

Initiate top echelon political action to emphasize and reward professionalism in the RVNAF by making the basis of promotion and assignment professional competence rather than political loyalty. Immediate action on this priority is essential if the RVNAF is to emerge as a viable and an effective military establishment in South Vietnam. From the standpoint of GVN politics, the army is also a major watershed in its development. President Thieu has succeeded in replacing those senior generals and other once-influential officers loyal to Vice President Ky. The Thieu victory, however, is not likely to bring either stability or effectiveness to future RVNAF operations unless Thieu can make the choice between basing RVNAF commands on professionalism rather than politics. First, while all major RVNAF commands have changed hands, the primacy of politics and political loyalties as the basis for advancement has not been changed. Second, if politicizing remains the basis of command assignment in RVNAF, then the Thieu victory is a temporary one at best. The tension between supporters of General Cao Van Vien vs Premier Tran van Hung, paralleling the basic antagonism between northerners and southerners in the polity at large is likely to further divide the RVNAF generals and threaten Thieu's hold over them. Similarly, at the battalion level and throughout the field generally, the tension between those officers who have fought hardest and advanced least versus those who have had little fighting experience but rapid advancement is likely to hamper the ability of the GVN to successfully carry out major transfer of fighting responsibilities. Unless the closed system of loyalties and regionalism is replaced in the promotion and assignment of officers the same problems of inept leadership and corruption will con-

tinue to paralyze the RVNAF regardless of the magnitude of future US/Allied assistance to the GVN.

What is now required, in essence, is to overlay the Vietnamese system with effectiveness criteria, institutionalize advancement and assignment on such criteria, and use US pressure to regularize the promotion system. There are some indications that the GVN both realizes that this must be done and is willing to do so. They have taken some steps to improve low level leadership. We should help the GVN make changes at the top. This can be done by first making it clear to the GVN at the highest levels that: (1) while we will continue support, we intend to reduce our effort, (2) that the GVN can no longer survive without making certain changes and we will assist them in making these changes—teach the leadership to survive in a changing system. In this regard, we should provide highly qualified and sensitive advisors for selected high level RVNAF leaders (at the Joint General Staff, Corps and division level) to work directly with these leaders.

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Give priority attention to the territorial security forces by increasing support from regular forces, by providing more and better functioning communications as now planned under current RVNAF modernization and improvement programs, by increasing the force levels of Popular Forces and by detailing more regular force officers and NCO's to fill leadership shortages in territorial security units.

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Question 15: How much, and where, has the security situation and the balance of influence between the Viet Cong and Government of Vietnam actually changed in the countryside over time, contrasting the present to such benchmarks as end-61, end-63, end-65, and end-67? What are the best indicators of such change, or lack of it? What factors have been mainly responsible for such change as has occurred? Why has there not been more?

The number of relatively secure hamlets changed from 7,000 to 8,000 in early 1963 to about 4,000 in the fall of 1964 and mid-1965, 5,000 at the end of 1967, 4,559 after Tet, and 6,425 in December 1968. The main factors responsible for the changes for the better are the loss of local support when the North Vietnamese Army began to replace the Viet Cong programs, and the Accelerated Pacification Campaign. Obstacles to favorable change are failure of the Government of Vietnam to push reforms and a "wait and see" attitude on the part of the populace.

SECURITY CHANGES IN VIETNAM

The JCS, CINCPAC and MACV consider that the following historical evaluation reflects the change in the countryside since 1964 and the reasons for this change:

After failing to make political gains in South Vietnam between 1954 and 1959, the Viet Cong added a military thrust to their strategy. By 1959, security started to become a problem, and by end-1961, security had begun to deteriorate seriously as the Viet Cong guerrillas and small units attacked the practically defenseless hamlets and villages. The Army of Vietnam, organized for another type of war, was unable to cope with the terrorists, propagandists, and night guerrilla actions which marked the enemy campaign.

The Government of Vietnam developed the Strategic Hamlet Campaign as a counter strategy. It stemmed the loss of security in the countryside and in early 1963, was on an uptrend of success. Perhaps 7,000 to 8,000 hamlets would have been classed as relatively secure by today's more sophisticated standards. But by the summer of 1963, the house of cards had started to collapse as a result of strong pressure against the strategic hamlets by more powerful enemy units, political problems at the center which culminated in the 1 November 1963 coup, and the unwillingness of the Army of Vietnam to adapt itself to the enemy's kind of war. By the time of the coup, the number of relatively secure hamlets had decreased to about 5,500.

This deterioration presented an opportunity for rapid progress by the National Liberation Front in recruiting, arming, and influencing the South Vietnamese population. The series of governments following Diem was characterized by starting their tenure with the highest level of support they were ever to achieve and rapidly losing this support until they fell or were overthrown. By the fall of 1964, in the judgment of non-aligned Vietnamese, US and other foreign missionaries and numbers of the Viet Minh, the National Liberation Front enjoyed the active, willing cooperation of more than 50

percent of the population in South Vietnam and a belief among the majority of the population in the inevitability of a communist takeover. Scarcely 4,000 hamlets could be regarded as relatively secure. At this time, the National Liberation Front made a decision in late 1964 to depart from its own principle of protracted warfare and try for a knockout blow in 1965. The immediate results of this decision were:

a. The promotion of local effective and politically astute cadre from positions in the infrastructure to command or political positions in companies and battalions.

b. An increase in taxation to support main force units.

c. A reduction in the draft age to recruit the necessary filler personnel.

d. The replacement of local cadre leaders with more youthful, less politically knowledgeable individuals, many of whom tended to take financial advantage of their position.

e. A resultant shift from effective, discriminate terrorism wherein unpopular Government of Vietnam leaders were targeted, to indiscriminate terrorism wherein the noninvolved population began suffering casualties (mortaring and mining).

f. The increased vulnerability of main and local force units now concentrated in base areas to the Government of Vietnam, US air and artillery fire.

The enemy's overall strategy was to consolidate his units into regiments, or to coordinate several battalions, to threaten vital areas, including Saigon. The Army of Vietnam committed itself rather poorly in these battles and was forced to fall back toward the cities. Later at Tet 1964, the countryside was turned over to the Viet Cong so that by mid-1965 only the same hard core of some 4,000 hamlets that remained under Government of Vietnam control in mid-1964 could still be considered relatively secure.

A new factor was added to the security equation on 7 February 1965, when the United States bombed North Vietnam. At the same time, the National Liberation Front agreed to more overt support by North Vietnam rather than "lose face" by disbanding their recently formed main force and local force battalions and companies. They chose to escalate in a belief that the United States was a paper tiger. The United States and the Government of Vietnam continued to escalate. The once popular belief in the inevitable communist takeover began to evaporate.

Throughout 1966 and 1967, improved and strengthened pacification programs and the balancing off of enemy and friendly forces by external replacements, i.e., North Vietnamese Army and US troops, allowed the Government of Vietnam to slowly expand control by following the oil spot concept. Relatively secure hamlets increased by about 500 in 1966. Another 500 were added in 1967 bringing the end-1967 total, by this time measured by the Hamlet Evaluation System, to approximately 5,000 relatively secure hamlets.

Relatively secure population improved slowly and irregularly from about 40 percent in early 1965 to more than three-quarters of the total in South Vietnam by the end of 1968, in spite of the Viet Cong Tet and May attacks in that year.

INDICATORS OF CHANGE

All of the factors described above continued to exacerbate the relations of the National Liberation Front and North Vietnam with the population until Tet 1968. The Tet attack by the enemy, in retrospect, probably cost him even more dearly in the alienation of the population than the excessive casualties he took. A composite grouping of the relatively noninvolved observers on the scene in Vietnam, people who are able to converse across the political spectrum, now estimate that the enemy forces enjoy the willing cooperation and support of less than 15 per-

cent of the population, and possibly as low as 10 percent. Moreover, neither the population nor the majority of the enemy's forces any longer expect a military victory. The evidence to support the observations made above is as follows:

a. The fact that by all known measurements of Government of Vietnam versus communist control, the former enjoys the greatest degree of control exercised in this

decade, and the latter the least. With due respect to the limitations of the Hamlet Evaluation System report, such error or bias as is contained in the overall report is a constant and the Hamlet Evaluation System report is indeed a valid measure of trend, particularly over the past 18 months. The 31 December 1968 figures reflect the highest level attained since the start of the Hamlet Evaluation System in January 1967.

PERCENT OF TOTAL SOUTH VIETNAM POPULATION

	January 1967	June 1967	January 1968	March 1968	October 1968	December 1968
Relatively secure.....	62.1	65.6	67.2	61.0	69.8	76.3
Contested.....	18.5	16.4	16.4	20.7	14.9	11.4
Vietcong controlled.....	19.4	18.0	16.4	18.3	15.3	12.3
Number of relatively secure hamlets.....	4,700	5,189	5,331	4,559	5,509	6,425

b. The urban population which, although not widely supporting the enemy prior to Tet, was neither resisting the enemy nor inclined to seek an end to the war. This population now, by all measures of attitudes, has taken a distinctly hostile attitude toward the Viet Cong, particularly the North Vietnamese Army.

c. The Rural Technical Team Reports in the III Corps Tactical Zone, a series of over 300 in-depth interviews with the population by non-Government of Vietnamese personnel reflect an almost total reliance by the enemy on terrorism, coercion, and the abandonment of attempts to woo the population.

Prior to mid-1964, data did exist for the evaluation of population security. Beginning mid-1964, Government of Vietnam data showed that approximately 50 percent of the total population was considered relatively secure and about 20 percent of the population was under Viet Cong control. The remaining 30 percent was considered "contested" population. The nadir of relatively secure population was reached in February 1965, when only 40 percent of the population was considered relatively secure by the Government of Vietnam. Following this low point, there was a gradual improvement as evidenced primarily by changes from the contested to relatively secure categories. Government of Vietnam data for end-1965 showed that just over 50 percent of the population was considered relatively secure and about 20 percent was under Viet Cong control. Listed below are significant benchmarks in rural population control since January 1967, using Hamlet Evaluation System data.

[In percent]

Rural population	January 1967	January 1968 ¹	February 1968	December 1968
Relatively secure.....	47.5	53.4	44.5	65.1
Contested.....	27.3	21.6	28.3	16.0
Vietcong control.....	25.2	25.0	27.3	18.9

¹ As measured before the Vietcong Tet attacks.

With respect to geographic areas, population security has been the most favorable in the II and III Corps areas. Population security in III Corps has always been the best. Allied troop density and the Saigon population base account for the high relatively secure picture in III Corps. The III Corps rural population security situation is also high with just over 77 percent of the population being relatively secure at the end of December 1968.

Provinces which showed the most change during 1968 with respect to relatively secure population, are indicated below:

[In percent]

	Up	Down ¹
Quang Tri (I Corps).....	30.6	
Kien Phong (IV Corps).....	30.1	
Phuoc Long (III Corps).....	28.5	
Thua Thien (I Corps).....	28.4	
Binh Thuan (II Corps).....		6.8
Kien Giang (IV Corps).....		3.3

¹ Only 2 Provinces showed a net regression in relatively secure population during 1968.

FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR CHANGE

The greatest single factor determining popular support in any area is the presence of US/Government of Vietnam or North Vietnamese Army/Viet Cong Forces. The populace generally tends to support whichever side is in military control.

The shift in I, II, and III Corps went from a predominately Viet Cong force in 1967 to a predominately North Vietnamese Army force in 1968, has resulted in a withdrawal of support on the basis of family or village connections and its replacement by passive resistance and noncooperation. This should not be interpreted as a shift of support to the Government, but only as a shift of support from the enemy.

Although sometimes over-dramatized, the urbanization taking place in Vietnam is reducing the degree of Viet Cong control and increasing the degree of Government of South Vietnam control, regardless of security considerations. In a recent analysis of the increases in population during the 1960s in the III Corps Tactical Zone, to include the province and district towns and hamlets of 2,000, it was estimated that approximately one-third of the population of these towns and hamlets (1,000,000) has shifted location from the rural areas to one of the aforementioned population centers. In spite of problems of housing income, urban strife, the present benefits of urbanization outweigh the postwar costs and with the coming of peace, relocation to rural areas may again be accomplished.

The increase in quantity, the improvement in quality, and the increasing attention being focused on the territorial forces, are making substantial inroads to improve security in what were once considered inviolate enemy areas.

By all indications available to COMUS MACV, CINCPAC, and the JCS, there has been dramatic change in the security situation and balance of influence favorable for the GVN. Best estimates indicate that since January 1967, alone, more than 2,000,000 of the rural population have been brought into the relatively secure category. This represents a favorable change of more than 12% of the total population.

Some additional critical factors responsible for the change are:

a. A 28 percent increase and modernization of the RVNAF force structure over the period 1965-1968;

b. The large Free World Military Assistance Force troop buildup in South Vietnam over the period 1965-1968;

c. The U.S. civil and military advisory buildup over the past 3 years at all levels of the Government of Vietnam structure;

d. Intensified anti-Viet Cong infrastructure programs beginning in 1967; and

e. The Accelerated Pacification Campaign of 1968-1969.

Obstacles to Change

(OSD agrees with this assessment of the obstacles.) Obstacles to expected favorable changes in the countryside are:

Failure of the Government of Vietnam to push reforms and to crack down on corrupt practices.

Continuation of a "wait and see" attitude on the part of the population with regard to the outcome of the negotiations in Paris.

A too hasty withdrawal of US Forces, thus causing both a reduction in security and a loss of confidence by the people in the Government of Vietnam.

Early pacification programs had only limited success for the following reasons: (1) effective counteraction by the Viet Cong; (2) breakdowns in coordination by a shaky Government of Vietnam; (3) lack of communication and cooperation between the national Government and officials at corps through district levels; (4) lack of coordination machinery among US agencies Saigon and in the field adequate to the broad scope of the threat; (5) the slow development of conceptual agreement among Government of Vietnam and US officials; (6) overly optimistic reporting of results and data interpretation in response to public and political pressures; (7) over-emphasis on quantitative measurement rather than quality of effort and results; (8) programs more ambitious than initially achievable; (9) inadequacies in local leadership, cadre selection, and cadre training due, in part, to the losses to terrorism; and (10) inadequate provision of means for treatment of basic political, economic, social, and psychological problems. The underlying cause in most cases was the inability to achieve the essentially political objective of engaging the people in support of the Government of Vietnam.

OSD considers the following factors to be a partial explanation of the changes in the security situation and the balance of influence in the countryside of Vietnam since 1961 and the reasons for those changes:

(N.B. The answers to questions 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 are so closely interrelated that one answer should not be considered without considering the other answers at the same time.)

The following table represents population control data from the end of 1962 to the present. This data has been retroactively adjusted in order that data from the older reporting systems might be matched with the data presently produced in the HES. The two different systems used between 1962 and the beginning of the HES in early 1967 suffered from ambiguous and changing categories and definitions and from lack of detail and critical system checking. The HES, which we rely upon now, while far more systematic and detailed, remains quite subjective. (It is important to keep in mind that these statistics can only show gross relative trends and are constantly in need of caveats and refinements that can only be supplied by the subjective judgments and analysis of informed knowledgeable individuals.)

RETROACTIVE POPULATION CONTROL DATA

[Population in thousands]

	End—						
	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
GVN aligned ¹	7,674	9,011	6,716	8,884	6,065	7,235	8,165
Viet Cong.....	2,587	2,729	3,302	3,550	2,832	2,862	2,155
Total.....	15,210	15,590	15,980	16,379	16,402	17,209	17,477

¹ For end 1966 and following, A+B+nonhamlet secure population was considered GVN aligned; "C" hamlet population is not counted; therefore, the categories presented do not add up to total population.

This table illustrates well the roller coaster nature of the size and percentage of GVN aligned population with the average population in this category over the past six years being 7,679,000, but going as high as \$9,011,000 (1963) and as low as 6,065,000 (1966). At the same time, the relative constant nature of the population in the VC category is noticeable with the average VC population being 2,860,000 for the six years and the variation from this mean being not more than $\pm 700,000$. (The reported figures for VC population are probably quite soft. Few VC hamlets, if any, are subject to accurate census.) If retrospective urban population over the last six years is subtracted from the above secure population category, then the rural GVN aligned population has remained relatively constant at about 5,000,000 if the end-1963 and end-1965 data is not considered (they appear over-stated in any case.) This analysis suggests that the security situation and the balance of influence in the countryside have not appreciably altered over time: the GVN aligned population was about 5,000,000 in 1962 and remains about that in 1968, and the VC population was approximately 2,600,000 in 1962 and is approximately 2,200,000 today. In the remainder of the population (7-10 million) two phenomena seemed to have happened over time: (1) many individuals (perhaps up to 2-3 million) have abandoned the rural areas and moved either into or nearby the urban areas; (2) 5 to 7 million have wandered back and forth from GVN influence to VC influence dependent upon who was placing the greatest pressure upon them to conform at any given moment.

Examination of the past two years of HES reports indicates that the movement of individuals and census adjustments brought about nearly as much of the total net gains in "secure" population as did the population brought into this category by improvement in hamlet ratings (35-39% from adjustments to 41-52% from improvements). This tends to show: (1) that population goes up in secure areas not because the people are committing themselves to the GVN particularly but because they want to get out of the fighting in rural areas; (2) that there is a significant amount of "gain" which results from accounting adjustments not actual change. Additionally, analysis of the number of hamlets which regressed vs. the number of hamlets that improved shows that 40 to 44% of time the number of hamlets which improved their ratings was matched by the number of hamlets whose ratings regressed. This analysis somewhat supports the above thesis that

much of the rural population vacillates back and forth between the GVN and VC.¹

More detailed data to examine the balance of influence in the countryside did not become available until the HES went into operation in January 1967. However, the crucial issue of any analysis regarding the HES revolves around the degree to which "C" hamlets may be considered "relatively secure." Examination of some of the indicators reveals the following:

a. — was designed as a management tool to assist in allocating GVN and US resources in rural South Vietnam. As such the responses concentrate on those areas over which the GVN/US have the most direct influence, namely the activities of GVN ministries and political activities directed by the GVN. Accordingly, 12 of the 18 "indicators" measure GVN presence and activities with only 6 "indicators" measuring enemy activities. The values assigned to these "indicators" are given equal weight in determining the alphabetical standing of each hamlet and the system is thus based in favor of ratings favorable to the GVN. Moreover, HES ratings are made by Americans, few of whom speak Vietnamese, who are in the district generally from 6 months to a year, and who are able to visit the hamlets being rated on an average of less than once a month. Accordingly, the raters' ability to appraise those elements of GVN activity is far greater than for those of the VC. This is illustrated by the fact that when the requirement is laid on him to pay particular attention to certain VC activities such as that of the infrastructure (VCI), reported findings, as indicated in the tables below, indicate greater VC presence than was formerly perceived. It is for these reasons that OSD considers that C hamlets should not be considered as being "relatively secure" and that for "grading" purposes only 50% of the

¹ JCS notes that: According to the HES, the gain in percent of relatively secure population in 1967 was 3.8 percent for the first six months and 1.7 percent for the last six months, a total of plus 5.5 percent. Total gain in relatively secure population was 1,297,000. Total loss of contested and VC population reported was 378,000. Difference between gains and losses was due to population expansion, refinement of population data, and migration of people GVN controlled areas in which the population counts are often merely best estimates. Such "accounting" changes are necessary to achieve more data on increased population under GVN control, which is the true measure of pacification progress.

C hamlets should be considered as primarily under GVN influence.

The following tables illustrate the influence of the Viet Cong Infrastructure over the hamlet (rural) population as shown by indicators 2a and 2b of the Hamlet Evaluation System:

	December 1967	June 1968	November 1968
Indicator 2a, hamlet infrastructure:			
A and B.....	24.1	18.0	17.5
C.....	20.8	23.1	28.0
D and E and VC.....	36.8	40.3	32.7
Indicator 2b, village infrastructure:			
A and B.....	31.4	24.2	26.5
C.....	15.0	17.8	22.6
D and E and VC.....	35.4	39.7	32.7

In indicator 4a which "measures" the presence of GVN administration in hamlets, a rating of "C" is given when "Managerial groups are resident; mostly locally appointed or elected; and are usually present at night." Following table indicates the percentages under this category for 1968:

	December 1967	June 1968	November 1968
A and B.....	34.5	32.6	35.0
C.....	19.2	17.7	20.6
D and E and VC.....	29.3	31.6	29.3

If the "C" hamlet population is split evenly between primary GVN influence and primary NLF influence, the above tables would show the following:

	December 1967	June 1968	November 1968
Hamlet infrastructure:			
GVN influence.....	34.5	29.6	31.5
NLF influence.....	47.2	51.9	46.7
Village infrastructure:			
GVN influence.....	38.9	33.1	37.8
NLF influence.....	42.9	48.6	44.0
GVN administration:			
GVN influence.....	44.1	41.5	46.3
NLF influence.....	38.9	40.5	39.6

Thus, the range of possible percentages for the rural populace "subject to significant VC presence and influence" would be from 39.6 to 46.7 percent given the above interpretation of the "C" hamlets. Other assessments would tend to show that at least 65% of the rural population is subject to disciplined VC infrastructure activities. Probably as close as it can be estimated, 50% of the total rural population is subject to significant VC presence and influence and, at least 50% and probably more, of the rural population living in "C" hamlets is subject to such presence and influence.

The following table represents yet another way of looking at the HES statistics with regard to assessing GVN or VC influence. It summarizes data from indicators 3C (Internal Security), 2A (VC Hamlet Infrastructure), and problem areas 8 a and b (Tax Collection). In this analysis, "C" ratings were considered en toto for both GVN and VC categories, thus alleviating the necessity to split their population in half.

HES INDICATOR DATA

	December 1967			November 1968		
	Population claimed by—			Population claimed by—		
	GVN	VC	Both	GVN	VC	Both
Rural and urban GVN or VC/infrastructure functioning:						
Population (thousands).....	11,122	10,003	3,916	11,949	10,733	5,230
Percent of total.....	65	58	23	68	62	30
Tax collections:						
Population (thousands).....	12,220	8,300	3,311	13,102	9,229	4,879
Percent of total.....	71	48	19	75	53	28
Rural GVN or VC/infrastructure functioning:						
Population (thousands).....	5,464	8,114	2,807	6,081	8,552	3,828
Percent of total.....	51	75	26	56	79	35

The above tends to indicate that the GVN can claim to have built up a reasonable internal security apparatus with some degree of popular participation in areas which contain about 68% of the population. At the same time, the data tends to show that the VC can claim an active infrastructure operating in areas which have about 62% of the population. There is an overlap of about 30% and between 1967 and 1968 both sides increased their apparatus by 3-4%.

The tax collection data shows that the GVN collects taxes from about 75% of the population while the VC collect them from about 53%. At least 28% pay taxes to both sides.

The data represented by the above table tends to support the contention that the balance of influence in the countryside has not been tipped strongly in favor of either the GVN or the VC; further, the indication is that there has not been great change over the past two years.

A recent analysis of population regression and gains presented some evidence that there is a high correlation between VC attacks and population regression. Further, a high correlation was demonstrated between kill ratios and population regression. Since high kill ratios are associated with periods of high VC/NVA activity, this tends to support the correlation between VC attacks and regression. Additionally, examination of RF/PF casualties versus population regression shows a high degree of correlation and also supports the initial contention that VC attacks are the most significant factor in affecting regression in the rural population. At the same time, examination of VC attacks, kill ratios and RF/PF casualties versus population improvements shows little or no significant correlation. Further, checking population gains against friendly operations showed little or no correlation. Thus, population gains do not seem to relate directly to level of military activity while population regressions do, particularly enemy military activity.

OSD's analysis of the available data tends to lead to the following overall conclusions: (1) The portions of the SVN rural population which was aligned with the VC and aligned with the GVN is approximately the same today as it was in 1962: 5,000,000 GVN aligned and nearly 3,000,000 VC aligned; (2) At the present, it appears that at least 50% of the total rural population is subject to significant VC presence and influence; (3) The most significant factor negatively affecting the situation in the countryside is VC/NVA military activity.

In addition OSD supports the views of JCS, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACV that:

The main factors responsible for the changes for the better are the loss of local support when the North Vietnamese Army began to replace the Viet Cong; urbanization, improvement in RVNAR, Free World Military Assistance Forces buildup, anti-Viet Cong infrastructure programs, and the Accelerated Pacification Campaign. The greatest single factor determining popular support in any area is the presence of US/Government of Vietnam or North Vietnamese Army/Viet Cong Forces. The populace generally tends to support whichever side is in military control. (OSD considers it more accurate to state that the presence of US/GVN or NVA/VC forces is the greatest single factor in determining the level of security in any given area and that the level of security is the major factor in providing a climate in which popular support may be elicited. Popular support or commitment is probably more the function of political, social, economic and psychological measures than the function of military activities. Thus, the populace will acquiesce to whichever side is in military control but not necessarily support.)

Question 16: What are the reasons for expecting more change in the countryside in the next two years than in past intervals?

What are the reasons for not expecting more? What changes in RVNAF, GVN, U.S. and VC practices and adaptiveness would be needed to increase favorable change in security and control? How likely are such changes, individually and together; what are the obstacles?

CAUTIONARY NOTE

Much of the below analysis is predicated upon various statistics which are reported from Vietnam, with particular emphasis upon the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). Several weaknesses of the HES combine to make the overall picture it presents of the status of pacification in Vietnam tend to be overly optimistic: (1) It does not measure political development in any sophisticated or sensitive way; (2) It is reliant upon the subjective judgment of a foreigner; (3) It requires the adjudger to be the adjudger—thus requiring a somewhat inhuman capacity for honesty and objectivity; (4) It asks an impossible task of its reporters: In a countrywide average, each district adviser would have to visit 37 hamlets each month (not counting "E" and "VC" hamlets); or more than one a day in order to make his assessment of their ratings—given the magnitude of his other tasks, he cannot visit all the hamlets he rates; (5) Many of the ratings can only be supplied by the Vietnamese, thus the District Advisor is, in some cases, at the mercy of the District Chief who may have totally different perceptions of what is being asked and what the answer is or should be. Despite these shortcomings, the HES and our other statistical systems represent the best data that is available to us and therefore must be used in the decision making and evaluating process; however, it is important to keep in mind that these statistics can only show gross relative trends and are constantly in need of caveats which can only be supplied by the subjective judgments and analysis of informed knowledgeable individuals.

REASONS FOR EXPECTING MORE CHANGE

The favorable balance in opposing forces achieved by the GVN provides new possibilities for increased security of the countryside. Tables 1 and 2, below, show the change in friendly and enemy forces from 1967 to 1968:

TABLE 1.—FRIENDLY FORCES STRENGTH FIGURES

South Vietnamese Army (ARVN)	303,000	387,200	+28.0
Regional force/popular force (RF/PF)	300,000	393,000	+31.0
Total	603,000	780,200	+29.4

TABLE 2.—ENEMY FORCES STRENGTH FIGURES

	Dec. 31, 1967	Dec. 31, 1968	Percent change
North Vietnamese Army (NVA) (excludes 23,000 North Vietnamese Army fill in Vietcong units)	65,000	83,000	+27.7
VC main force/local force (includes 23,000 North Vietnamese fill)	63,000	60,000	-4.8
Guerrillas	73,000	59,000	-19.2
Total	201,000	202,000	+5

GVN territorial forces are starting 1969 with about a six to one advantage over VC main force/local force and guerrillas, compared with a five to one advantage at the start of 1968. Table 3 shows the ratio of friendly forces to enemy forces.

TABLE 3.—STRENGTH RATIO: FRIENDLY TO ENEMY

	Dec. 31, 1967	Dec. 31, 1968
RF/PF	4.8:1	6.6:1
ARVN to NVA	4.7:1	4.6:1

The increase in proportion of NVA indicates that the enemy is attempting to make good his VC losses with northern replacements. The significant drop in VC main force/local force and guerrillas in 1968, taken with the increase in NVA, indicates a substantial recruiting problem which should become still more serious as pacification progresses.

TABLE 4.—TOTAL UNITED STATES/FREE WORLD STRENGTHS AND FORCE RATIOS

	Dec. 31, 1967	Nov. 30, 1968	Percent change
United States/free world strength	556,605	616,929	+9
Force ratios for combined ARVN, RF/PF, United States, and free world versus the enemy	5.4:1	6.9:1	

The GVN is stronger and more stable than in the past several years. It has a freely elected, constitutional government which is slowly becoming more responsive to the aspirations of the people. President Thieu is the most knowledgeable GVN official concerning pacification and he is highly effective in that role. The President and Prime Minister are exerting strong personal leadership, holding provincial and district officials to high standards and encouraging dialogues with administrators and political groups.

Rapid completion of the current RVNAF improvement program and continued implementation of the Phase I and Phase II RVNAF expansion programs should appreciably improve territorial security with a concomitant improvement in pacification.

The integration and consolidation of US civilian and military pacification support activities under the Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) provides maximum assistance for the GVN. Additionally, COMUSMACV, has implemented and plans to make operational early in 1969 improved techniques for reporting, measuring, and analyzing the status of pacification, including a major revision of the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). These measures will permit better allocation of pacification effort and resources, and thus facilitate management.

The Vietnamese are considering their situation far more seriously than in the past. They are increasingly motivated to commit themselves more fully to winning their war. Significant events in 1968, particularly the Tet offensive, President Johnson's 31 March 1968 speech, and the Paris talks, have shocked the Vietnamese into a greater sense of urgency than in past periods. Removal of 21 province and 92 district chiefs for corruption or inefficiency in 1968 demonstrates the GVN willingness to exert pressure on its officials.

The 1969 pacification program focuses substantially more attention and resources on providing security to the rural population and strengthening the country's political foundations than in previous years. The GVN aims to control 90 percent of the population by December 1969 by concentrating on the destruction of VC local forces and the elimination of VC infrastructure.

a. Recent improvements in the GVN organization should result in more effective execution of pacification in 1969. The Central Pacification and Development Council (CPDC) now integrates and coordinates all GVN pacification elements for the first time. All assets have been concentrated on achieving a single set of clearly defined objectives. Ambitious goals have been set and pressure to achieve these goals is increasing steadily.

b. US units have assumed a larger role in pacification. Combined operations involving US units with all types of Vietnamese Forces are highly effective because they link

American initiative, drive and leadership to Vietnamese knowledge of the local situation, customs, language and prevalent VC modus operandi.

US field commanders estimate that nearly half of their operations are in support of the accelerated pacification campaign. Simultaneously, the Allies are destroying significant amounts of prepositioned supplies and equipment which are so vital to the enemy's main forces. These continuous and highly effective allied military spilling operations are perhaps the single most important new factor to be considered when assessing the complex pacification picture, especially future prospects. Under this allied umbrella the GVN's own security forces are operating with increased effectiveness. Similarly, other GVN pacification efforts benefits immeasurably from the allied military shield.

The December HES shows that 76.3% of the population (or 13,338,700 people) are now in the relatively secure category. This represents the highest percentage in this category since 1963. At the same time the percentage of the population in the contested category had dropped to 11.4% (or 1,983,100); while the VC category is estimated at 12.3 percent (or 2,155,100). These latter figures represent the lowest percentages ever in these categories.

The total resources available for pacification activity are greater than at any previous time. RVNAF stands at an actual strength of 826,500 as of end of December 1968—an increase of 179,000 since January 1968. Revolutionary Development (RD) cadre increased from 49,380 to 59,653 during the same period of time; while Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU) and National Police (NP) increased from 3,433 to 5,032 and from 70,291 to 78,431 respectively during the same period.

Total estimated VC/NVA personnel losses during 1968 were 290,000 which represents 92.1 percent of the average estimated VC/NVA strength.

It is estimated that 70% of the personnel in VC/NVA combat forces are NVA; thus diminishing their capability to relate to the South Vietnamese peasant.

Total number of operations, contacts, weapons captured and enemy killed in action (KIA) by RF and PF have increased significantly during 1968. (RF operations went from 38,487 in May to 66,958 in November; contacts increased from 1,378 to 3,061 during the same period. The PF show a similar increase in effort: operations; Apr 1968—62,661; November 1968—119,801; contacts; Apr 1968—1,449; November 1968—3,508.)

Another measure of reality concerning the RF/PF is found in the opinions of senior US military commanders in the combat theater. The current assessment of these individuals is that with few exceptions, RF/PF, and particularly RF, combat effectiveness has improved significantly in the past 10 to 12 months. This notable improvement is attributed to the current intensive weapons and equipment improvement programs, and, perhaps even more important, the outstanding performance of the Mobile Advisory Teams who work around the clock with the RF and PF.

The Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC), designed to increase the security level in more than 1000 contested hamlets, has thus far met with little opposition and with apparent success. As of 11 January 1969, 1,320 of the 1,332 hamlets targeted for the APC have been entered by GVN forces—of these, 842 are now considered to be in the "relatively secure" category. Further, functioning local governments were located in 84% of the targeted hamlets.

Although the overall Chieu Hoi figure for 1968 was considerably lower than that for 1967 (18,140 compared to 27,178), the monthly intake during the last quarter of 1968 (2,115, 2,408 and 3,117) was among the highest since the initiation of the program,

and January rates, reported to date, indicated a continuation of this trend.

During 1968, the People's Self Defense Forces (PSDF) program was initiated. By the end of December 1968 approximately 1,000,000 PSDF had been organized, 517,000 had been trained and 107,000 weapons had been distributed.

If categories A&B and the non-hamlet secure population are considered by themselves, the percentage of population under primary GVN influence has increased during 1968 from 37.3% in January to 46.7 in December.

REASONS FOR NOT EXPECTING MORE CHANGE

The main reason for not anticipating still further gains in 1969-1970 is the nature of the pacification itself. Pacification is inherently a slow process. Gains in any area can only be consolidated by continuous effort over a long period of time. It would be unrealistic to predict that much more than 90 percent of the population will come under the GVN control before the end of 1969.

As long as NVA units constitute a serious threat to the RVN security, significant change in enemy posture can effect pacification gains in either direction. Commitment of the NVA main force units will not only draw away present US and South Vietnamese support but could, if considered with increased guerrilla activity, result in an unfavorable reorientation of territorial security forces.

While total number of resources which could be devoted to pacification efforts in the countryside have increased significantly during 1968, the actual number of resources committed in support of pacification in the countryside have stayed approximately the same or decreased slightly. Less than one-third of all RF companies were committed to village/hamlet security during 1968 (31.9% in January; 31.1% in December). Slightly less than two-thirds of all PF platoons were committed to village/hamlet security during 1968 (64.1% in January; 65.8% in December). The percentage of ARVN maneuver battalions committed to direct support of pacification fell from 35 in 1967 to 16 in January 1969.

Further, while total RVNAF resources have increased 179,000 during 1968 the PF have only increased about 22,000 (from 151,000 to 173,000) and their planned increase by the end of Phase II RVNAF modernization program is only 6,000 more (to a force level of 179,000). A recent study shows a positive correlation between PF in a hamlet and the hamlet's ratings while, at the same time, showing a negative correlation between RF in a hamlet and the hamlet's HES rating. Further, PF are on the leading edge of pacification and bear the brunt of the program at the hamlet level. The minimal increase being made in the size of the PF tends to support the conjecture that "real" progress in pacification will not be significantly faster during 1969.

Since January 1967 the percentage of the South Vietnamese people subject to active influence by the VC/NLF has gone from 58 to 61 by the end of November 1968. Thus, VC/NLF political influence in South Vietnam, especially in the countryside, has probably not declined and may have increased.¹

At village and hamlet level, the GVN has about 38,000 members of its political infrastructure while the VC have approximately 70,000 or more of their political infrastruc-

¹ Using end-November 1968 HES data, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that 44.4 percent of the rural population was subject to significant VC presence and influence (20.6 percent VC control, 23.8 with active VCI). Obviously, the criteria selected by JCS explains the significant differences in the conclusions derived from identical data used by OSD.

ture. (The GVN figure does not include Revolutionary Development (RD) Cadre. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would include that portion of the RD Cadre engaged in political and development work in rural areas—approximately 25,000 of the RD Cadre. The VC figure does not include other VC irregular forces such as Secret Self-Defense, Armed Assault Youth which have some political roles to carry out.)

Despite significant increases in total number operations by RF and PF during 1968, the results per unit, per operation and per contact remained nearly constant or showed only marginal improvement, and, in some cases, such as enemy KIA and enemy weapons captured per contact, showed a decrease. (However, it is important to remember that our data for measuring combat effectiveness is not very sophisticated nor sensitive; thus analysis using this data can only show gross trends at best and may not be an accurate measurement of reality.) With regard to Regional Forces, the percentage of operations which made contact compared to total operations was 3.6% in April 1968 (the first month Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) reports are available,) varied from 1.1% to 4.6% during the year, and was 3.4% in December. The number of enemy KIA by RF per contact during 1968 varied considerably from (.63 to .58) but the number in April was .95 and in December it was .68. At the same time the number of enemy weapons captured by RF per contact was .47 in April and .25 in December. *These figures tend to indicate that RF efficiency and effectiveness has improved little if any during 1968. Another possible conclusion is that combat effectiveness of the RF is largely dependent upon VC initiative—* in other words, that enemy KIA, weapons captured and contacts are basically controlled by the enemy. One other indication available tends to contradict the above conclusions as the average number of operations with contact per RF company per month rose during 1968 from 1.3 in April to 2.2 in December with the last six months of 1968 showing an upward trend. As with the statistics concerning RF operations, those concerning Popular Force operations showed mixed results. The percentage that PF platoons operations made contact compared to total operations remained below 3% during the entire year, it was 2.3% in April and 2.2% in December. The enemy KIA per contact by PF dropped from .84 in April to .39 in December. Over the same time period, the enemy weapons captured per contact by AF dropped from .33 to .14. *Again, these figures seem to indicate that RF efficiency and effectiveness have not measurably improved during 1968. However, as with the RF statistics, the average number per month per unit of PF platoon operations arose during 1968 from .34 in April to .61 in December. Apparently, the "best" assessment that can be reached, given the inadequacies of the data available and the contradictions the present indications offer, is that RF/PF have increased their efforts in the gross sense but have not yet significantly increased their combat effectiveness or efficiency. (It should be noted that the main source for this data, TFES, is currently undergoing major revisions so that it will be more sophisticated, sensitive and accurate.)*

As of November 1968, it is estimated that about 1800 VC "Liberation Committees" had been formed. Close to 80% of these were at the village level, thus about one-half of the villages in South Vietnam could have these "committees" or a de facto sub rosa VC/NLF "government."

It is estimated that at least 1300 GVN employees and officials were assassinated during 1968 and another 330 abducted. It is likely that a large majority of these employees and officials were in the countryside, thus further diluting GVN capability to project itself in the rural areas.

Analysis of PF efforts during 1968 reveals that PF platoons received ground reinforcements in support of contacts only at 11% of the time. Additionally, 36 percent of the PF were considered by their advisors to have less firepower than the enemy they were confronting in December 1968. The seriousness of these figures is amplified by the fact that over the past five years approximately half of all VC activities have been against the PF. However, PF firepower, according to advisors' reports, has improved 65% in the period from May through December 1968.

As of 11 January 1969, less than one quarter of the RF and PF units which were scheduled to be deployed into the hamlets targeted for the APC had actually been deployed. This tends to support the view that progress in the APC is due more to lack of any enemy reaction than any other single cause.

Almost 67% of 1785 hamlets which were programmed for pacification during 1968 were hamlets which had been either "new life" or Revolutionary Development hamlets during 1967 or earlier. This would seem to corroborate some observer's statements that we have been pacifying the same hamlets year after year.¹

In 1968, pacification represented only 5% of total US expenditures in South Vietnam, indicating despite its relative high priority, the effort expended in support of pacification was relatively small in comparison with the total resources expended. (JCS notes that while the amount is small by US standards, the GVN is strained to the breaking point with its present pacification program. Pacification is, and must be, a 99% GVN effort, and most knowledgeable pacification authorities believe that it is practically impossible for the GVN to absorb any appreciable increases in expenditures for its pacification program.)

Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) Number 14-69; 16 January 1969, *The Pacification Effort in Vietnam* states, in part:

a. During 1968, however, new uncertainties have arisen which are bound to have impact on Revolutionary Development. With the beginning of negotiations and the end of the bombing of North Vietnam, there is a growing belief—at least among informed Vietnamese—that the war is coming to an end, sooner rather than later. Among these people, there is growing apprehension over the shape of a final settlement and the firmness of the American commitment. To the extent that this uncertainty may be reflected in the countryside, it would tend to undermine the gains of Revolutionary Development. Moreover, any weakening of the central government, whether real or imagined, would magnify the uncertainties of officials involved in Revolutionary Development programs and thus pose a growing threat to this aspect of pacification.

b. Even leaving aside such general uncertainties, progress in the field of "nation building" or Revolutionary Development is likely to be painfully slow for several basic reasons. As noted, security is an indispensable prerequisite. In areas where there is a decline in security conditions, even temporarily, the resulting damage to confidence and respect for the government more than offsets gains from developmental projects. Even if security conditions remain good, the administrative

capability of Vietnamese officials is weak; Revolutionary Development is heavily dependent on American advice, assistance, and inspiration. Pervasive corruption is a constant threat to the entire system.

c. Pacification is far too complex, covers too many individual programs, and is geographically too diverse to permit clear prognoses. All things considered, the program as a whole has made a significant contribution to the prosecution of the war and to the political struggle. It has been most successful in expanding the presence of the GVN in the countryside; it has been less successful in establishing permanent security or stimulating genuine loyalty and commitment to the Saigon government. And it has been laggard in coping with the political threat posed by a well-organized and disciplined Communist infrastructure. This has been a significant weakness, threatening and undermining other gains.

d. Much will depend on the attitude of the GVN. It cannot be said that the various Saigon governments have shared the American enthusiasm or dedication to pacification. Results obtained during 1966 and 1967 were largely because of constant American pressures. The skills, funds, and motivation have been overwhelmingly American; the GVN has provided manpower and occasional high level endorsements but has been far from committed to the programs. Too often GVN officials have participated or cooperated simply to please their American counterparts, or to share in the spoils of the inevitable corruption.

e. The GVN still does not have the skills and resources to assume a significantly greater role in the management and execution of an effective pacification effort in 1969. US assistance is still vital to success, but gaining popular acceptance will depend finally on a growing effectiveness of the GVN's performance in the program.

f. A major uncertainty is how much time is left to make up past deficiencies and consolidate current gains. Pacification has already strengthened the GVN position vis-à-vis the Communists. Over the next several months, further progress in pacification will almost certainly not make the GVN much more able to cope with the VC in peacetime than it would be today. A significant advance in this respect would probably require at least a year. And the terms of a settlement could undo virtually all that has been accomplished, especially since progress has been minimal in reducing the political threat.

PLANS FOR 1969

The OSD analysis of the GVN Pacification Plan for 1969 follows: The GVN Pacification Guidelines for 1969 have set the following objectives:

1. 90% of the population will come under the "relatively secure" (A + B + C) category.

2. 33,000 VC Infrastructure personnel will be eliminated.

3. Local government will be established in all villages; Village Administrative Committees and Hamlet Managing Boards will be elected in all secure hamlets and villages; village and hamlet officials will be trained in a large scale program.

4. 2,000,000 People's Self Defense forces to be recruited and 400,000 armed.

5. 20,000 Hoi Chanh (returnees).

6. The total number of refugees will be decreased to less than 1,000,000 and 300,000 will be resettled.

7. The information and propaganda effort will be increased.

8. Rural economy will be stimulated and rice production increased from five to six million tons.

In more specific terms, the 1969 pacification guidelines will require the following:

Total "relatively secure" population will number about 16,122,420 or an increase of

2,783,720 during 1969. This would mean an increase of over 231,977 per month into the A + B + C category. During the last quarter of 1968, the monthly increase in these categories was about 480,000 per month; thus, the 1969 goal seems attainable if: (1) *Hamlets and their populations are made relatively secure at the same rate as during the last six months of 1968;* (2) *The VC activities and opposition to pacification remain near the same level as during the last six months of 1968.* (Total incidents during the last six months of 1968 were at approximately the same level as during 1964.) The monthly rate that rural population moved into A + B + C category during all of 1968 was 146,000; thus the 1969 campaign would have to achieve nearly two times the monthly rate for the total 1968 program.

33,000 VCI to be eliminated in 1969 would represent 30% of the total estimated VCI in South Vietnam (CIA estimate). It would require monthly eliminations at triple the monthly rate for 1968 (3,000 vs 1,314) and a good bit higher than the rate achieved during the last two months of 1968 (2,355). Since the low level easier targets are the first to be eliminated, it can be expected that there will be difficulty in maintaining momentum in the anti-VCI campaign even if efficiency and effectiveness are considerably improved. *The 1969 goal does not seem possible to attain.*

Of the approximately 2,600 villages in SVN, about 1,290 had some form of fairly regular GVN presence by the end of 1968; this represented an increase of about 220 villages during the year or about 18 villages were provided some form of GVN aligned administration each month. Considering the last quarter of 1968, during the months of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign and the scale-down of VC activity, about 85 villages per month were provided some form of GVN administration. *To attain the 1969 goal will require a total of 1280 villages to be provided a GVN aligned administration or about 107 villages per month.* Considering the rate with which village administrations would have to be provided and considering that approximately 1100 villages may have VC/NLF "liberation committees" duly "elected," *it seems unlikely that this goal can be obtained.*

The present guidelines call for the training of nearly 42,000 village and hamlet officials during 1969. At present, it is planned to train these officials at Vung Tau where the RD Cadre are already being trained at the rate of approximately 5,000 a month. Shortage of facilities as well as instructors and lack of preparation makes it very unlikely that this ambitious program can be accomplished.

Latest reports indicate that 1,000,000 PSDF have been organized, 517,000 trained and 107,000 weapons distributed. *Attainment of 1969 goals will require the signing up of 1,000,000 individuals and the issuing of about 300,000 weapons and it should be relatively easy to accomplish* despite some misgivings as to the effectiveness and actual accomplishments of this program by US officials in Vietnam.

The weekly Chieu Hol rates for 1967 and 1968 were 522 and 348 respectively; however, the weekly rate for the past 16 weeks (as of 25 January 1969) has been 644. *To attain the 1969 goal would require a weekly intake of 385 which seems easily attainable unless an offensive equal in magnitude to the Tet offensive is mounted by the VC/NVA.*

During 1968 approximately 1,000,000 Tet and May offensives' evacuees were aided and returned to their homes or provided new homes. Total regular refugees in South Vietnam by the end of November 1968 were about 1,250,000. It is estimated that over 250,000 regular refugees were resettled during the year; *Barring unforeseen circumstances, the refugee goals for 1969 should be met.* However, this will mean that over 900,000 refugees

¹JCS Notes: Revolutionary Development hamlets planned but not worked in 1967 and those that did not achieve all of the pacification goals during 1967 were rescheduled in the 1968 RD program. This represents continuity of effort in the face of insufficient RD team resources and territorial security forces to meet the goals of the 1967 program. The expansion of the enemy main force effort in 1967 greatly hampered but did not stop pacification progress. Sixty percent of the hamlets that became relatively secure in 1967 were RD hamlets.

remain to be resettled indicating that the refugee problem will be with us for a considerable period of time.

The 1968 rice crop is estimated at 4.8 million metric tons. Given the increase from 40,000 hectares planted in IR-8 rice during 1968 to the planned 150,000 to 200,000 hectares to be planted during 1969 (IR-8 yields approximately 5 metric tons per hectare); the greater use of fertilizer (250,000 tons used in 1968; 400,000 tons planned for 1969); and the present improved security situation, the rice goal for 1969 should be met.

SUMMARY OF THE 1969 PLAN

Of the eight goals of the 1969 Pacification Campaign, three seems unlikely of attainment, or at least overly ambitious:

90% of the population relatively secure.
33,000 VCI eliminated.

Local government established in all villages; village hamlet officials trained.

Three seems relatively sure of attainment:
2,000,000 PDF recruited and 400,000 armed.
300,000 refugees resettled and less than 1,000,000 refugees remaining.

Rural economy stimulated and 60,000,000 metric tons of rice produced.

One seems to be understated and could be increased:

20,000 Hoi Chanh.

And one is not measurable in a meaningful way under the present indicators:

Increase information and propaganda effort.

From analysis of the above facts, several assessments can be made:

(1) Many, to include JAS, CINCPAC and MACV, consider that the VC/NVA are considerably weakened as indicated by the rapid increase in relatively secure population during the last quarter of 1968; thus, pacification progress should accelerate in 1969.

(2) Others, including OSD, think that pacification progress was made during 1968, but it is difficult to determine how much is due to the real weaknesses of the VC/NVA and the real strength of the GVN/RVNAF and how much is due to a deliberate plan by the VC/NVA not to oppose the pacification program but to concentrate on a political solution; thus, future pacification progress in the countryside is subject to too many variables beyond US/GVN control and is almost impossible to predict. In any case, progress probably will be made during 1969 but not at the rates of the last quarter of 1968 and it is unlikely that the 1969 goals will be met unless there is some sort of unpredictable dramatic breakthrough.

(3) Some, generally in the minority, assess that pacification has not made "real" progress during 1968; any "progress" indicated is because of faulty assessments, inadequacies of present indicators, lack of VC opposition because of VC/NLF concentration on organizing for the forth-coming political struggle and the withdrawal of NVA units (which is adjudged a tactical maneuver tied to negotiations). All of this "progress" could fade away without a trace if the VC choose to challenge, just as the 1967 "progress" faded away in the face of the Tet offensive. This view would hold that the VC influence over the countryside has not diminished but has increased during 1968 and that "great" progress or "real" progress is unlikely in 1969 unless the VC influence and presence is overcome and a GVN presence and influence installed; and the program as presently conceived is unlikely to accomplish such a task.

Depending upon which of the above assessments is accepted, the comments on what changes in RVNAF, GVN, US and VC practices and adaptiveness would be needed to increase favorable change in security and control vary considerably.

If the JCS, CINCPAC, MACV view is accepted, then the changes which would be needed are:

Several changes in practices could increase favorable developments or at least the rate

of development. A change of tactics by the South Vietnamese toward small company-size operations would provide an increase in territorial security and would permit extension or acceleration of pacification.

An extension of US unit involvement in pacification will have an increasing effect on the rate of progress. This involvement is contingent on the enemy's use of his main force units, and may have to cut back if the enemy attempts to use his main forces more aggressively than at present. The South Vietnamese adoption of US unit techniques for pacification would assist in accelerating the program. However, many South Vietnamese commanders are still reluctant to divide their commands or to conduct small unit operations.

Success in 1969 is largely dependent upon aggressive execution of the program at all levels of the GVN. This, in turn, is largely contingent upon US pressure on the GVN to put forth the maximum possible effort at all times. If US pressure is relaxed, the probability of successful pacification effort in 1969 will be reduced.

Continuing qualitative improvement in the GVN pacification personnel and administration, successful implementation of the APC, and realization of the goals established in the Guidelines for the 1969 Pacification Campaign would increase favorable trends.

Other requirements include: (a) continued development of national political unity and organization; (b) stimulation of active participation of the population; (c) continued development of a base of law and legal procedures; (d) adjustment of the inequitable salary structure of civil servants; (e) increased income for the workers; (f) increased impetus on land reform; (g) increased Government of Vietnam emphasis on supervision and direction of province pacification planning and execution; and (h) concerted US/GVN effort to establish a national psychology of success, while continuing to build Vietnamese self-confidence to assume greater responsibility for their own destiny.

The obstacles to accomplishment of any or all of the above changes are:

The many US/GVN actions designed for positively affecting changes in the countryside are all calculated to reduce relative enemy offensive activity. In the face of these measures, it does not appear that the enemy will be capable of a sustained increase in relative offensive activity, on the contrary, his more probable course will be the direction of reduced capability.

The growing energy and spirit with which the GVN is accelerating pacification efforts is encouraging. There have been many pacification programs in the past, but none on the scale and with the resources and the leadership being demonstrated today. Despite many continuing and serious problems, pacification has more than regained the momentum lost following the Tet and May offensives, and the outlook is most favorable. In 1969, the GVN should continue to achieve the same high level of progress in pacification as was evidenced during the last quarter of 1968.

However, if the less optimistic view of present and future progress in pacification is accepted, then the magnitude and seriousness of changes required expands considerably. The less drastic approach would call for not only the above changes but also the changes which can be made with minimum disruption of the present system and procedures. Among such changes would be:

a. Increase the quality and quantity of territorial security and pacification operations aimed at expanding GVN influence and diminishing the VC support structure and its guerrilla and local force units.

Give priority attention to the territorial security forces by increasing support from regular forces, by providing more and better functioning communications as now planned under current RVNAF modernization and im-

provement programs, by increasing the force levels of Popular Forces and by detailing more regular force officers and NCO's to fill leadership shortages in territorial security units.

Emphasize quality rather than quantity in the Phoenix program by providing greater incentives for the identification and capture of high ranking or key personnel in important positions within the VC infrastructure, as opposed to elimination of larger numbers of lower ranking personnel of lesser importance.

Be prepared to establish a national constabulary type territorial security force under the Ministry of the Interior as may become necessary in the event the activities of the RVNAF are severely circumscribed in the post hostilities environment due to a restriction of the use of the RVNAF to maintain security, law and order resulting from a ceasefire agreement or other agreement to terminate hostilities.

Augment territorial security forces as required with RVNAF regular force maneuver battalions, and US maneuver battalions if necessary, to improve level of security in selected high-priority districts. Develop more effective pacification tactics.

Reward unit and individual performance in providing local security and eliminating the VC infrastructure through promotions, awards and publicity.

Initiate motivational and educational actions to change the attitudes of RVNAF personnel towards the populace and toward pacification programs.

Revitalize the RF by redistribution of leaders from headquarters elements to combat units, cross assignment and ARVN officers, and improved training and motivation.

Bring about attitudinal changes in RVNAF leadership towards the worth of the populace and the necessity for local security.

Restructure RVNAF and increase PF to a force level of 250,000 during 1969 while decreasing ARVN and RF correspondingly.

Provide specific training to US and ARVN maneuver battalions commanders and their staffs in the tactics and techniques of providing offensive security operations in direct support of pacification.

b. Increase the Vietnamese perceptions that they must take the required actions to improve their own capabilities and effectiveness; that the US does not consider it has an "open-ended" commitment; and that they can "win" their own war if they really try.

Continue and accelerate the turn over of funding responsibility for most pacification programs to the GVN. It should be made clear to the Vietnamese that we will continue to provide overall budgetary support but that they must fund and manage their own pacification program and that we will retain the option to withdraw funding if the programs are mis-managed or subverted through inefficiency, disinterest or corruption.

Reduce a significant number (perhaps as high as 50%) of both tactical unit and the Civil operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) advisors over the next year. Withdrawal of advisors should be as a reward for good performance, not bad, with the growth in Vietnamese capability and efficiency being stressed.

Continue to stress the requirement to meet the felt needs of the people in all discussions with GVN leadership. Particularly, programs should be developed and initiated to reward officials, civil and military, for activities which assist the people and advance the GVN toward influencing the population.

The above changes could accelerate the pacification process during the forthcoming year. Further, because they would not require a major disruption of the system or present procedures, the obstacles which would prevent their accomplishment are not major and could be overcome.

The advocates of the more radical assessment, who feel that progress in pacification

has been chimerical during 1968 and is likely to remain that way in 1969, would call for, in addition to the above changes, other rather dramatic changes. The rationale for such changes results from a basic difference in perception of the nature of the pacification process. These individuals would argue that pacification is a state of mind—not a social condition. Pacification's real objective is attitudinal change, both by the South Vietnamese leadership and by the South Vietnamese people. On the one hand, the leadership needs to perceive the necessity for relating to the people and for providing them with clear evidence that the GVN represents the "JUST CAUSE" and for providing a reasonable degree of local security. On the other hand, the people need to perceive that security and commitment necessarily go together simultaneously and that the GVN represents the "JUST CAUSE" to which they should pledge their allegiance. (The Vietnamese are not nationalistic in the sense that they respect and support their "government." They are, however, extremely proud of their nation and of being Vietnamese. It therefore follows that the people who are willing to die in the service of the GVN are not doing so because of their respect for their government nor the image of that government. They are doing this because they think they are fighting for the "JUST CAUSE.")

Therefore, the basic and most important changes that could be made would be those that will have a positive effect toward creating the necessary attitudinal changes:

a. The institution of strong and energetic leadership in the top levels of GVN and RVNAF which is concerned with people and will emphasize the need for the GVN and RVNAF to relate to the people.

b. A promotion system based upon merit and not on personal loyalty.

c. Elimination of corrupt and ineffective officials, civil and military, at all levels, including some at the highest.

d. A system of punishment for officials and soldiers who mistreat the general public, individually or collectively.

e. Politicization of the pacification program so that it stimulates genuine loyalty and commitment to the central government. The RD cadre should be indoctrinated and trained to develop local grass roots political organization at the hamlet and village level and should be tied into the present program for development of village administration.

f. Increasing demonstrations of concern by all representatives of the GVN, executive, legislative and judicial of real concern for the average Vietnamese and his welfare.

These changes would require complete reorienting of the system of values and perceptions that the present Vietnamese leadership possesses. Since this is the most difficult task for any oligarchy to carry out, the US should be prepared to assist the Vietnamese leadership in carrying such changes out. This can, perhaps, be done by making it clear to the Vietnamese leadership at the highest level that: (1) While we will continue our support, we are determined to reduce our direct efforts; (2) We are convinced that they can no longer survive unless they make these rather drastic changes and we will assist them to make them, teaching them the skills necessary to survive in a changing system. In regard to the latter, we would provide the key Vietnamese leaders with mutually agreed upon special advisors who would act more as "special assistants" to the Vietnamese than as US agents assigned to advise them and to monitor their activities.

The obstacle to these types of changes would be enormous. The chances of their being carried out are minimal. Yet, because they do attack the central issue of pacification and because they carry the greatest potential pay off if instituted, they may be well worth attempting.

Question 17: What proportion of the rural population must be regarded as "subject to significant VC presence and influence?" (How should hamlets rated as "C" in the Hamlet Evaluation System—the largest category—be regarded in this respect?) In particular, what proportion in the provinces surrounding Saigon? How much has this changed?

Rural population regarded as "subject to significant Viet Cong presence and influence" is the rural population evaluated in the Hamlet Evaluation System as contested, and Viet Cong controlled by security ratings. The following table presents security evaluation data for contested and Viet Cong-controlled rural hamlet population.

PERCENT OF RURAL SOUTH VIETNAM POPULATION

	January 1968	March 1968	October 1968	December 1968
Contested	21.6	28.8	21.3	16.2
Vietcong controlled	25.4	28.3	23.7	18.9
Contested and Vietcong controlled	47.0	57.1	45.0	35.1

Total South Vietnam rural population in December 1968 was 10,836,500. The reduction in rural-contested and Viet Cong-controlled population in November and December 1968 coincided with the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, which is targeted on rural hamlets.

Another approach to measuring rural population, subject to significant Viet Cong presence and influence, is to add the Viet Cong-controlled population to that remaining rural population in any hamlet with active Viet Cong infrastructure.

An issue which impinges upon all assessments of the situation evolves around the interpretation of who has how much influence over the population of "C" hamlets. The JCS, CINCPAC and MACV view "C" hamlets as follows:

a. Hamlets rated as "C" in the Hamlet Evaluation System may be subject to some Viet Cong political/psychological activity and influence. For example, "C" hamlets may have village and hamlet Viet Cong infrastructure, although the infrastructure probably is unable to live or operate in "C" hamlets except covertly or at night. However, friendly capabilities are considerably more significant than Viet Cong capabilities. The willingness of the Viet Cong to resort to terror tactics permits them to "influence" the population to a far greater degree than their numbers or political power base would otherwise permit. Nevertheless, to rate "C", a hamlet must achieve a Hamlet Evaluation System score of between 2.50 and 3.49 out of a possible 5.00 for a "perfect" hamlet.

Since "C" is beyond the halfway point on the rating scale, a "C" hamlet is considered relatively secure.

b. Hamlets, which are rated "C" within the Hamlet Evaluation System, normally would not be regarded as being subject to significant Viet Cong presence and influence. However, it is possible that this would not be true, since the hamlet letter rating represents the average of 18 separate ratings. For example, a hamlet's Viet Cong infrastructure could receive a "D" or "E" rating—which would indicate "significant" Viet Cong present—while the overall rating could place the hamlet in a "C" category because of other indicators receiving higher ratings. However, proper ratings of guerrilla activity, Viet Cong extortion, and Viet Cong taxation—all controlled by the Viet Cong infrastructure—should give adequate weight and balance of the overall Hamlet Evaluation System rating. Considering solely the hamlet Viet Cong infrastructure, a "C" category indicates that most of the hamlet undercover party apparatus has been identified and accounted for,

with the possible exception of deep-cover agents working under the control of higher echelons within the Viet Cong infrastructure. The Viet Cong infrastructure remaining within a given hamlet rated "C" are quite limited as to overt and covert activity, allowing normal Government of Vietnam economic, political, and social activity to function. Thus, population falling within the "C" category is not generally considered to be affected by significant Viet Cong presence and influence.

On the other hand, OSD views "C" hamlets as follows:

The HES system was designed as a management tool to assist in allocating GVN and US resources in rural South Vietnam. As such, the responses concentrate on those areas over which the GVN/US have the most direct influence, namely the activities of GVN ministries and political activities directed by the GVN. Accordingly, 12 of the 18 "indicators" measure GVN presence and activities with only 6 "indicators" measuring enemy activities. The values assigned to these "indicators" are given equal weight in determining the alphabetical standing of each hamlet and the system is thus biased in favor of ratings favorable to the GVN. Moreover, HES ratings are made by Americans, few of whom speak Vietnamese, who are in the district generally from 6 months to a year, and who are able to visit the hamlets being rated on an average of less than once a month. Accordingly, the raters' appraisal of those elements of GVN activity is more complete than for those of the VC. This weakness regarding rating of the VC/NVA is illustrated by the fact that when the requirement is laid on him to pay particular attention to certain VC activities such as that of the infrastructure (VCI), reported findings, as indicated in the tables below, indicate greater VC presence than was formerly perceived. It is for these reasons that OSD considers that C hamlets should not be considered as being "relatively secure" and that for "grading" purposes only 50% of the C hamlets should be considered as primarily under GVN influences.

The following tables illustrate the influence of the Viet Cong infrastructure over the hamlet (rural) population as shown by indicators 2a and 2b of the Hamlet Evaluation System (In indicator 2a of the HES, a rating of "C" is given when "Intelligence indicates that most of the party apparatus is identified; but some agents under village or district control are still operative". In indicator 2b, a rating of "C" is given when "Most of the key members of village apparatus have been identified, effectiveness curtailed"):

	December 1967	June 1968	November 1968
Indicator 2a, hamlet infrastructure:			
A and B	24.1	18.0	17.5
C	20.8	23.1	28.0
D and E and VC	36.8	40.3	32.7
Indicator 2b, village infrastructure:			
A and B	31.4	24.2	26.5
C	15.0	17.8	22.6
D and E and VC	35.4	39.7	32.7

In indicator 4a which "measures" the presence of GVN administration in hamlets, a rating of "C" is given when "Managerial groups are resident; mostly locally appointed or elected; and are usually present at night". Following table indicates the percentages under this category for 1968:

	December 1967	June 1968	November 1968
A and B	34.5	32.6	36.0
C	19.2	17.7	20.6
D and E and VC	29.3	31.6	29.3

If the OSD assessment of "C" hamlets is accepted and the "C" hamlet population is split evenly between primary GVN influence and primary NLF influence, the above tables would show the following:

	December 1967	June 1968	November 1968
Hamlet infrastructure:			
GVN influence.....	34.5	29.6	31.5
NLF influence.....	47.2	51.9	45.7
Village infrastructure:			
GVN influence.....	38.9	33.1	37.8
NLF influence.....	42.9	48.6	44.0
GVN administration:			
GVN influence.....	44.1	41.5	46.3
NLF influence.....	38.9	40.5	39.6

Thus, the range of possible percentages for the rural populace "subject to significant VC presence and influence" would be from 39.6 to 46.7 percent given the above interpretation of the "C" hamlets. Other assessments would tend to show that at least 65% of the rural population is subject to disciplined VC infrastructure activities. *Probably as close as it can be estimated, 50% of the total rural population is subject to significant VC presence and influence and, at least 50% and probably more, of rural population living in "C" hamlets is subject to such presence and influence.*

The following table contains the proportion of rural population in provinces surrounding Saigon (Gia Dinh, Long An, Hau Nghia, Binh Duong, Bien Hoa) that are "subject to significant Viet Cong presence and influence," i.e., rural-contested and Viet-Cong-controlled hamlet population.

PERCENT OF RURAL HAMLET POPULATION IN 5 PROVINCES SURROUNDING SAIGON

	January 1968	March 1968	October 1968	December 1968
Contested.....	27.3	45.5	28.2	18.7
Vietcong controlled.....	19.8	21.4	17.5	11.4
Contested and Vietcong controlled.....	47.1	66.9	45.7	30.1

The marked change between January and March 1968 in the rural security conditions surrounding Saigon is indicative of the enemy's selection of Saigon as a primary target. The significant improvement since Tet is a measure of the improved security situation which is better around Saigon than the countryside average. The rural hamlet-contested and Viet Cong-controlled population has been reduced by over 15 percent since the beginning of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, despite continued enemy emphasis on Saigon as his primary target.

However, the enemy's political influence exerted through his infrastructure exceeds his overall influence. For example, although 30.1 percent of the rural population in the five provinces surrounding Saigon is either contested or Viet-Cong-controlled, the December 1968 Hamlet Evaluation System shows that 43.3 percent is affected by the presence of hamlet-level Viet Cong infrastructure and 45.4 percent is affected by village-level Viet Cong infrastructure.

One analysis of the VC infrastructure presence and influence in the five provinces surrounding Saigon indicates that 96% of the hamlet population in those provinces is subject to such presence and influence. At the same time, the latest HES statistics for December 1968 indicate that 90.1% of the population of III Corps was in relatively secure category.

a. Attempts to relate other data to either of these indicators have not been illuminating. For instance, the Chieu Hoi rate for III Corps has been relatively low in comparison to its percentage of population

(15.4% of the Chieu Hoi in 1968 are III Corps while III Corps has 31.2% of the population) and, further, has been lower this year than its average over the last four years (III Corps has averaged 22% of the Chieu Hoi over the last four years). Further, III Corps' percentage of total Chieu Hoi dropped during the last six months of 1968 (15.4% for the year and 15.0% for the last six months). Normally, Chieu Hoi rates correlate positively with numbers of military operations; however III Corps during 1968 had the highest number of battalion days of operations of any Corps area yet its percentage of total Chieu Hoi went down.

b. The Phoenix data shows that of the 95,708 Viet Cong infrastructure members in all South Vietnam, 29.9% were in I Corps; 33.3%, II Corps; 12.6%, III Corps; and 24.2%, IV Corps.¹ This low percentage for III means that the III Corps Phoenix program has been the most successful of all Corps as it eliminated 30% of its VCI during 1968. Given the fact that III Corps is the location (when in country) of COSVN plus has Saigon and contains over 30% of the population of the country, it seems unlikely that only 12.6% of the total VCI is located in III Corps. There is one report which indicates there are 7,500 VCI in Saigon alone (a figure which does not seem unreasonable in a city of 2 to 3 million inhabitants). Therefore it seems prudent to suspect that the VCI influence in the provinces around Saigon, while not all pervasive as the 96% figure above tends to indicate, neither is the GVN influence as widespread as the 90% "relatively secure" population figure tends to indicate.

A further factor to be considered is the opinion held by most Americans, past and present, who have knowledge of the situation in III Corps, that the three ARVN divisions in III Corps are the worst divisions in all of ARVN. A recent report by a very competent observer indicates that the RF/PF of III Corps have little confidence in the three ARVN divisions stationed there.

Thus, if the OSD assessment of "C" hamlets is accepted, an educated guess about VC influence in the provinces surrounding Saigon would be that the VC have significant influence over more than half of the rural populace in the five provinces immediately surrounding Saigon with particular strength in Long An and Hau Nghia.

Because of the VC/NVA threat to the Saigon metropolitan area during first half of 1968, the emphasis during much of this year in III Corps was to eliminate the commo-liaison VCI and not the higher level cadre. It may be added that the VCI structure in and around Saigon is still largely intact. Further, it is likely that the VCI in Saigon in particular are targeted against the GVN in what the NLF sees as the forthcoming political struggle to commence upon completion of the Paris Negotiations. Thus, it is unlikely that the higher level cadre will expose themselves prior to that.

Therefore, it would seem prudent to assume that "significant VC pressure and influence" will remain largely intact in III Corps during 1969, given present US and GVN and VC/NVA tactics and techniques.

Question 18: What number or verified numbers of the communist political apparatus (i.e., People's Revolutionary Party members, the hardcore "infrastructure") have been arrested or killed in the past year? How many of these were cadre or higher than village level? What proportion do these represent of total People's Revolutionary Party membership, and how much—and how long—had the apparatus been disrupted?

COMUSMACV reports that during 1968,

¹ Represents a count of specific VCI names and identified positions held in Phoenix files in Saigon and is not the presently accepted MACV figure.

15,776 members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) were killed, captured or surrendered. Of these, approximately 2,050 were cadre of higher than village level.

A breakout of the method of neutralization follows:

Killed	2,255
Captured	11,291
Rallied	2,230

Of the 15,776 Viet Cong infrastructure neutralization reported during 1968, 12.9 percent (2,050) were serving at district level or higher. The remaining 87.1 percent served at village and hamlet level—most being functionaries that the Viet Cong infrastructure probably can easily replace. However, considering the heavy casualties inflicted on the enemy, there is no doubt that an unknown but significant number of Viet Cong infrastructure of all ranks have been neutralized but not officially accounted for because of inadequate records and inability to identify the dead.

The number of VCI members neutralized during 1968 was about 16-20% of the total VCI estimated strength. However, our information on the VCI is soft and recognized as such. CIA and DIA estimate the VCI total strength to be between 80,000 and 100,000 now. Estimates have risen in the past several years. OSD analysis of Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) data over the past two years indicates that the more we concentrate on the VCI, the more we recognize the extent of VCI existence. In January 1967, excluding non-hamlet secure population, about 56% of the population was subject to some VCI influence. The figure had risen to 61% by November 1968. Further, we do not know about recruitment nor do we have an accurate accounting of the disposition of captured or rallied VCI members.

Approximately 10% of those neutralized in 1968 were People's Revolutionary Party Membership. COMUSMACV estimates the current personnel strength of the Viet Cong infrastructure at roughly 83,000. Of those, 20 to 40 percent (16,400 to 32,800) are believed to hold membership in the People's Revolutionary Party. The 2,050 cadre or higher than village-level Viet Cong infrastructure neutralized represent approximately 6.2 to 12 percent of the total People's Revolutionary Party membership. Examination of the monthly, provincial, by-name Viet Cong infrastructure neutralization reports for 1968, shows that 10.7 percent (1,967) of the total neutralized were People's Revolutionary Party members. Approximately 19 percent (332) of the People's Revolutionary Party members served at higher than village level.

Losses during 1968 have not unduly disrupted the communist political apparatus.

In terms of organizational goals, progress against the Viet Cong infrastructure has been satisfactory. However, it cannot be determined whether the number of Viet Cong infrastructure neutralized reflects an accurate picture of permanent or net losses to the Viet Cong infrastructure, especially in view of the lack of data on the final disposition of those who were apprehended. The attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure during 1968 did not significantly reduce the communists' ability to carry out essential activities, although Viet Cong infrastructure attempts to revitalize and strengthen their organizations in the major cities were often disrupted by fairly effective police work. Viet Cong infrastructure operations were disrupted in several geographic areas, and a noticeable attrition resulted from a combination of losses in combat and from anti-infrastructure activities. However, government intelligence on the Viet Cong infrastructure and operations against their activities diminish significantly as one gets further from the secure urban areas. What losses the Viet Cong infrastructure has suffered apparently have not unduly hampered its functioning.

Recent Viet Cong moves to streamline the infrastructure by reclassifying cadre according to their effectiveness and by transferring numbers of low-level or inefficient cadre into military units, suggests that Viet Cong infrastructure personnel losses have not yet approached the critical stage. It does not appear likely that they will in the near future.

The anti-infrastructure program suffers from some significant problems. These are:

Judicial Processing. This is one of the weakest links in the overall attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure. This is highlighted by the number of persons under detention who have been judicially processed: 16,638 as of 31 December 1968. Numbers of innocent persons, or at least persons who have been forced to perform tasks for the Viet Cong, have been arrested and held, sometimes for extended periods, without a hearing. Justifiably concerned, the Office of the Prime Minister established special screening committees throughout the country to review the cases of a large number of civil detainees, and many have since been released. On the other hand, real Viet Cong infrastructure and Viet Cong supporters are being released prior to judicial processing or receive very light sentences, usually on the ground of lack of sufficient evidence.

Detention Facilities. Interrogation and detention facilities are inadequate in many areas. At the end of November 1968, there was a total of 38,700 civilian confinement spaces in Vietnam, and the total incarcerated population was reported by Government of Vietnam officials to be 37,689. These figures, based on the best data available, are considered to be accurate only for the national prison system which holds 32,689 prisoners and detainees. The remaining 5,000, said to be held in National Police detention facilities throughout the country, is an unverifiable estimate. There are four national prisons, 37 provincial prisons, and 50 existing or planned detention centers. Although these figures indicate that there are sufficient confinement spaces on a nationwide basis, overcrowding still exists in some provinces, and poor prisoner accounting procedures are the rule rather than the exception. OSD estimates that roughly 60% of the prisoners arrested in 1968 were released.¹ Steps are underway to remedy these problems.

Government of Vietnam Intelligence Capability. The effectiveness of the attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure is hampered by the limited intelligence capability of the Government of Vietnam. Personnel in those agencies tasked with gathering intelligence on the Viet Cong infrastructure and running operations against it, such as the Police Special Branch and Military Security Service, simply have not had the training and background for sophisticated intelligence work. This is especially true at the district level and down, where the responsible Government of Vietnam personnel may barely be able to read and write. Many have difficulty understanding the requirements sent down to them, let alone fulfilling them. Although the Phung Hoang program is geared primarily to the district level, most of the talent, intelligence information, and reaction capability is presently found at province level. Information available at province level is often not fully disseminated down to the district; moreover, most of the District Intelligence Operations Coordination Centers are still in the process of developing the data base needed to operate effectively against the Viet Cong infrastructure. Further, many of the intelligence agencies are beginning to exhaust their intelligence data bases. For these reasons, to a great extent, operations targeted against specific individuals are not too common. Most Viet Cong infrastructure personnel are picked up in sweeps, cordon

and search operations, or in ambushes on communication routes; only 10-20% of those neutralized are specifically targeted through the Phung Hoang program.

In summary, at the current rates of attrition, the VCI can sustain its operations and replace its losses except in a few localities. We are, however, making inroads and should continue to disrupt VCI activities in an increasing number of hamlets. But it should be understood that the VCI is too large and well established to be permanently neutralized or rendered impotent, short of an extended and intensive campaign over the next several years, including much improved Government of Vietnam performance. (A more detailed prognosis for the VCI is contained in the response to Question 19).

Question 19: What are the reasons for believing the current and future efforts at "rooting out" hard-core infrastructure will be—or will not be—more successful than past efforts? For example, for believing that collaboration among the numerous Vietnamese intelligence agencies will be markedly more thorough than in the past? What are the side effects, e.g., on Vietnam opinion, of anti-infrastructure campaigns such as the current "accelerated effort" along with their lasting effect on hard-core apparatus?

The Government of Vietnam (GVN) did not fully commit itself to the attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI) until July 1968. Since that late date, the steady improvement in organizational efficiency has resulted in an increase in neutralizations. Given 12 to 24 more months of continuous US/GVN effort and command emphasis, present progress will pay off with much more significant damage to the VCI. Far more than in the past, the GVN has the will and the organization to achieve this goal.

GVN officials are increasingly aware of the need to pinpoint the attack on the VCI. Continued high-level GVN and US command emphasis should assure that this awareness continues to spread.

The program has generated coordination and cooperation at all levels, often where little or none previously existed. This includes disparate GVN officials, agencies, and military units, as well as US and allied agencies and military forces.

Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers, which have been established at province, district, and autonomous city levels, are becoming increasingly capable both of conducting anti-VCI operations and in supporting military and territorial security forces. Many of these centers have just reached the "take-off" point, and can be expected to assist greatly in intensifying operations against the VCI.

a. These centers are building data bases on VCI personalities and modus operandi. As they improve their capability to collate and analyze raw data, perfect source control, and agent handling techniques, operational effectiveness will improve proportionately. Inspection and training programs have been instituted and additional programs are being developed to upgrade capabilities, especially at district level and lower. The civil arms of the GVN, particularly the police, have been strengthened by heretofore unavailable military. Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU), and National Police Field Force support.

b. The centers have also increased the degree of province and district chief control over territory and resources by providing a more efficient staff mechanism through which they can plan and operate.

As part of the "Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC)", a special Phoenix-Phung Hoang (anti-infrastructure) campaign was launched on 20 October 1968 which concentrated military and paramilitary assets against the VCI. Results show that during the last quarter of 1968, VCI

neutralization accounted for just under 40 percent of the total for all of 1968. Of the VCI above village level who were "neutralized", slightly over 38 percent were "neutralized" during the last 3 months.

The VCI definitely is beset by problems. Most of these are related to the pressures of the war. However, an encouragingly increasing number of them can be attributed directly to the APC and to the anti-VCI effort. A notebook recently captured in Thua Thien Province in I Corps described the considerable losses among both guerrillas and infrastructure personnel caused by the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) and allied operations. A captured report from VC Subregion 4 complained about the shortage of personnel; stated that more than one-third of the hamlets in the subregion had no Party members, while the quality of existing Party chapters was below par. The chapters were described as weakened by factionalism and lack of determination. A source in Binh Chanh District in Gia Dinh Province reported in early October that a VC guerrilla platoon had been brought in, broken down, and assigned to four villages to help rebuild the infrastructure.

a. There has also been an increasing number of captured documents which labeled the Phoenix-Phung Hoang operation as a cunning, wicked plot and exhorted all VC/NVA Armed Forces to be wary of and strive to wipe out the "cruel de-hard agents of aggression." A captured document dated 10 December 1969, contained a detailed commentary on the mission, organization, and activities of Phoenix-Phung Hoang from national to district level, and a VC plan to counter Phoenix-Phung Hoang activities, stated that, "the most effective measure to combat this organization is to eliminate its members."

b. Perhaps more telling is the increasing amount of broadcast time Radio Hanoi and Liberation Radio devote to denouncing the APC, particularly Phoenix-Phung Hoang operations. A Liberation Radio commentary on 3 December 1968 called for the implementation of the Peoples Liberation Armed Forces Command's order to "crush the head of the venomous snake Phoenix." The communists have ordered all members of the Peoples Liberation Armed Forces "to resolutely smash the US-puppet rural pacification scheme, annihilate, and completely disintegrate enemy pacification teams, and to annihilate Phoenix teams which are composed of spies and intelligence agents."

c. One of the most explicit examples is that given by a VC proselyter in the Saigon/Cholon area. On 13 January 1969, he remarked to a personal friend who happens to be an allied GVN infrastructure. There is no data on local accommodations and accurate information on its existence and the extent of the area where it is practiced is very limited. However, it can be said that as the Vietnamese begin to perceive clearly that some form of negotiated settlement is to be reached with the National Liberation Front (NLF) then the pressure to reach some form of local accommodation will probably be increased, thus increasing the difficulties in carrying out the Phoenix-Phung Hoang program. The Joint Staff feels that the record of the Phoenix program since November when serious negotiations were in progress does not substantiate this view.

Additionally, it is important to remember the realities of the war in Vietnam—families have close relatives on both sides of the conflict. There are ways that are accepted to kill your brother and there are other ways such as "breaking his rice bowl" which are not. Further, an attitude of "if I don't bother his home, he won't bother mine" is sometimes prevalent, particularly at the hamlet level. One of the reasons why it took the GVN so long to initiate the

¹ OASD(SA) Southeast Asia Analysis Report, December 1968.

Phoenix-Phung Hoang program was just that reason. Until the VC/NLF/NVA "broke the faith" by attacking the cities during Tet 1968, the GVN was reluctant to carry out a systematic program of "neutralizations" in fear of reprisal and apparently because of this sort of unwritten agreement. Again as negotiations progress, or given the appearance of progressing toward a settlement, the pressures within families to reach accommodation will increase and, correspondingly, the effectiveness of the Phoenix-Phung Hoang program could decrease.

The 16 January 1969 National Intelligence Estimate on the Pacification Program, concurred in by DIA, CIA, INR and NSA, states in part:

"Over the next several months, further progress in pacification will almost certainly not make the GVN much more able to cope with the VC in peacetime than it would be today. A significant advance in this respect would probably require at least a year. And the terms of a settlement could undo virtually all that has been accomplished, especially since progress has been minimal in reducing the political threat."

This statement tends to support the conclusion that dramatic improvement in the Phoenix-Phung Hoang program in the near future is unlikely, and that "rooting out" the hard core VCI will continue to be slow and hard to do and that the whole program could be placed in jeopardy by the negotiations in Paris. Moreover, it indicates the judgment by the intelligence community that it will be at least a year before the GVN is in a significantly better position to deal with VC in the political struggle that may follow a cessation of hostilities.

The gathering of the representatives of all or most of the Vietnamese intelligence agencies together under the roofs of the District and Province Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers represents a giant step forward toward gaining active cooperation and collaboration among these Vietnamese agencies in the program of "neutralizing" the VCI. However, it is important also to remember that in the end cooperation and collaboration between Vietnamese agencies is a function of the relationship between the agency heads and the struggle for personal power within the Vietnamese political milieu; thus, the cooperation seemingly beginning with the development of the Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers could be reversed with the toss of one hand grenade.

In terms of organizational goals, progress against the VCI has been satisfactory. However, it cannot be determined whether the number of VCI neutralized reflects an accurate picture of permanent or net losses to the VCI, especially in view of the lack of data on the final disposition of those who were apprehended. The attack on the VCI during 1968 did not significantly reduce the communists' ability to carry out essential activities, although VCI attempts to revitalize and strengthen their organizations in the major cities were often disrupted by fairly effective police work. VCI operations were disrupted in several geographic areas, and a noticeable attrition resulted from a combination of losses in combat and from anti-infrastructure activities. However, government intelligence on the VCI and operations against their activities diminish significantly as one gets further from the secure urban areas. What losses the VCI has suffered apparently have not unduly hampered its functioning. Recent VC moves to streamline the infrastructure by reclassifying cadre according to their effectiveness and by transferring numbers of low level or inefficient cadre into military units, suggests that VCI personnel losses have not yet approached the critical stage. It does not appear likely that they will in the near future.

The effectiveness of the attack on the VCI

is hampered by the limited intelligence capability of the SVN. Personnel in those agencies tasked with gathering intelligence on the VCI and running operations against it, such as the Police Special Branch (PSB) and Military Security (MSS), simply have not had the training and background for sophisticated intelligence work. This is especially true at the district level and down, where the responsible GVN personnel may barely be able to read and write. Many have difficulty understanding the requirements sent down to them, let alone fulfilling them. Although the Phoenix-Phung Hoang program is geared primarily to the district level, most of the talent, intelligence information, and reaction capability is presently found at province level. Information available at province level is often not fully disseminated down to the district; moreover, most of the District Intelligence Operations Coordination Centers (DIOCC) are still in the process of developing the data base needed to operate effectively against the VCI. For this reason, to a great extent, operations targeted against specific individuals are not too common. Most VCI personnel are picked up in sweeps, cordons and search operations, or in ambushes on communication routes.

The above evidence seems to show that, while there has been improvement in our efforts to "root out" the infrastructure and further improvements are expected during 1969, there are inherent difficulties in the target, the organization and the methodology of the Phoenix-Phung Hoang program which make a dramatic improvement in the program unlikely. Further, the vast effect that seeming progress in reaching a settlement in Paris could have on the program's execution makes predictions of greater success during 1969 highly conjectural. Additionally, results to date and predicted over the next year do not support the contention that the program, within that time frame, can have a lasting effect on the hard-core apparatus.

The chief danger in a program such as the current anti-VCI drive is that it can cause the arrest of some innocent persons and result in inconvenience and injustice, giving the government a poor image. However, there are side effects on the positive side as well.

a. The increasing number of ralliers is indicative of the effect that various GVN programs, but particularly Phoenix-Phung Hoang, are having on the populace. These ralliers are providing valuable information on enemy activities, locations of enemy forces, arms and rice caches, and significantly, information on VCI. One of the largest anti-VCI operations so far conducted in I Corps—Meade River—was generated as a result of information obtained from a rallier and on the basis of Phoenix-Phung Hoang intelligence. In Binh Dinh Province, ralliers were used in a psychological operation which resulted in an entire hamlet rallying en masse on 24 December 1968.

b. Evidence indicates that the general population is cooperating more with GVN officials. For example, enemy activity in outlying portions of cities has often been reported by the people, demonstrating that they are putting more trust and confidence in Government of Vietnam agencies. The stepped-up VC terrorist-type activity in and around provincial capitals, and the VC's repeated attempts to lower the morale of the populace, has generally proven fruitless. These actions, and the GVN response to them, appear to have instilled a measure of confidence in the GVN leadership.

We have no systematic or continuing evidence on the "side effects" of the Phoenix program. There are those who feel that the Phoenix-Phung Hoang program, in particular the operation of the PRU's, may be counterproductive as it alienates the non-committed population more than it hurts the

VCI. There is not much evidence to support this conjecture.

Perhaps the most serious criticism of the PRU is that the whole concept and operation are copied after the Communists and that by copying their extra legal methods we lose any claim we have to the "just cause." (The majority of the infrastructure of the GVN are not nationalistic in the sense that they respect and support their "government" (Chinh Phu). They are, however, extremely proud of their nation and of being Vietnamese (Quoc Gia). It therefore follows that the people who are willing to die in the service of the GVN are not doing so because of their respect for their government nor the image of that government. They are doing this because they think they are fighting for "The Just Cause.")

An additional "side effect" for which we have no accurate measure is the fact that the Phoenix-Phung Hoang program is looked upon by many Vietnamese as having been forced upon the GVN by the Americans. Further, the PRU program is clearly identified as an American program—supervised, controlled and financed by Americans. Thus, the issue of national sovereignty is a "real" issue with regard to Vietnamese attitudes toward the Phoenix-Phung Hoang program and particularly the PRU program. How much anti-Americanism is caused by these perceptions is unknown, but the suspicion is that it is enough so that it should be taken into account when assessing the program.

Question 20: How adequate is our information on the overall scale and incidence of damage to civilians by air and artillery and looting and misbehavior by RVNAF.

The adequacy of information on the overall scale and incidence of damage to civilians by air and artillery is questionable.

On one hand, COMUSMACV considers that information of the overall scale and incidence of damage to civilians by air and artillery is direct and adequate. The JCS and CINCPAC concur. Further, COMUSMACV considers that adequate information is available on such damage caused by Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). Civilians killed or wounded and damages to property are reported, and the nationality of force and weaponry causing the casualties or damages are identified. Three sources of information are available.

On the other hand, there is little information available on damage in most Viet Cong controlled areas, and portions of contested areas. There is little systematic reporting to Washington on the overall level of combat damage.

The overall level of combat damage undoubtedly has been high. For example: the damage to Vietnamese cities at Tet was considerable; there have been over two million refugees in SVN since 1964—many of these were caused by combat activity; the U.S. Navy alone reports they have destroyed almost 35,000 structures and damaged about 43,000 since 1966. While much of the destruction has been unavoidable due to enemy provocations and tactics, undoubtedly some destruction could have and can be avoided.

Concerning RVNAF looting and misbehavior, there is no complete and comprehensive reporting system on this subject either in MACV or the Government of Vietnam. However, some conclusion can be drawn from available information.

COMUSMACV considers that information on this subject is of sufficient adequacy to indicate that the problem is still not fully controlled. MACV's Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) and System for Evaluation the Effectiveness of RVNAF (SEER) provide information from US advisors which permits evaluations of the incidence and seriousness of misconduct on the part of the RVNAF and also reflecting respect for the rights of the populace by Vietnamese Army and Marine units. For example, the HES shows that each month about 900 hamlets, or 7% of the hamlets reporting, are adversely affected

by either minor or serious incidents of troop misconduct, ranging from drunkenness and chicken stealing, to murder or rape. Based on quarterly response to the SEER questionnaire during 1968, 93% of US advisors to the South Vietnamese Army and Marine Corps units considered that their units respected the rights of the populace and property always or most of the time. The Vietnamese do not maintain a comprehensive reporting system for determining the overall scale and incidence of damage to civilians through looting or misbehavior by Government of Vietnam Forces.

HES data are available to indicate the adverse incidents committed by the RVNAF against hamlet population. (These data are reported monthly from the field by the

Hamlet Evaluation System and are maintained in an automated file with entries back to January 1967).

(1) A sampling of data indicating the incidence of misbehavior of the RVNAF and other allied troops shows that the RVNAF caused minor incidents affecting the population in approximately 43% of all hamlets reported for the months examined (Figure 1). The RVNAF also was reported as causing serious incidents affecting the population in 23% of all hamlets. (Figure 2).

(2) South Vietnamese Army troops caused serious incidents in more hamlets than the Regional and Popular Forces. However for minor incidents, the reverse was true. (Figure 3). This fact may be attributal to the Regional and Popular Forces normally being an

integral part of the community in which they are assigned. The South Vietnamese Army regulars, on the other hand, are most likely to be exposed to the hamlet population during military operations against the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army forces.

(3) The RVNAF was reported to have caused both major and minor incidents in 42% of all hamlets. It is interesting to compare South Vietnamese Army and US troops with respect to the hamlet reports. From the standpoint of behavior toward the population, US and South Vietnamese Army troops are on a par (Figure 4).

(4) It must be recognized that the Hamlet Evaluation System measurement is imprecise, and conclusions drawn from the data presented should be so qualified.

FIGURE 1.—HAMLETS IN WHICH MINOR INCIDENTS WERE REPORTED AS AFFECTING POPULATION

	September 1967	October 1967	November 1967	January 1968	April 1968	July 1968	August 1968	September 1968	November 1968
RVNAF.....	1,455	1,412	1,302	1,226	1,037	971	1,014	1,083	868
Revolutionary Development Cadre.....	100	93	85	83	62	62	71	86	91
United States.....	462	467	447	428	396	404	462	500	377
Other free world military assistance forces.....	187	172	155	145	129	128	107	176	107
Other friendly elements.....	887	868	896	848	773	725	779	845	94
Total reports.....	3,091	3,012	2,885	2,730	2,398	2,290	2,433	2,690	1,537
RVNAF percentage of total reports.....	47	47	45	45	43	42	42	40	39

FIGURE 2.—HAMLETS IN WHICH SERIOUS INCIDENTS WERE REPORTED AS AFFECTING POPULATION

	September 1967	October 1967	November 1967	January 1968	April 1968	July 1968	August 1968	September 1968	November 1968	Total report
RVNAF.....	44	43	50	52	131	122	122	147	56	75
Revolutionary development cadre.....	6	5	6	10	10	11	12	10	12	8
United States.....	46	44	58	66	76	72	78	77	58	57
Other free world military assistance forces.....	38	38	24	10	23	35	26	23	23	240
Other friendly elements.....	92	121	103	95	317	266	246	212	94	1,548
Total reports.....	226	251	241	223	557	506	486	469	243	3,202
RVNAF percentage of total reports.....	20	17	21	19	23	24	25	31	23	123

¹ Average.

FIGURE 3.—HAMLETS IN WHICH MINOR INCIDENTS WERE CAUSED BY ARMY OF VIETNAM AND REGIONAL FORCES/POPULAR FORCES

	September 1967	October 1967	November 1967	January 1968	April 1968	July 1968	August 1968	September 1968	November 1968	Total report
Army of Vietnam.....	610	603	544	499	394	385	435	444	330	4,244
Regional forces/popular forces.....	845	809	758	727	643	586	579	639	538	6,124

HAMLETS IN WHICH MAJOR INCIDENTS WERE CAUSED BY ARMY OF VIETNAM AND REGIONAL FORCES/POPULAR FORCES

	September 1967	October 1967	November 1967	January 1968	April 1968	July 1968	August 1968	September 1968	November 1968	Total report
Army of Vietnam.....	27	26	27	25	74	68	62	91	30	430
Regional forces/popular forces.....	17	17	23	17	57	54	60	56	26	327

FIGURE 4.—HAMLET REPORTS OF INCIDENTS AFFECTING POPULATION

Force	Hamlet reports	Percent	Percent total
RVNAF.....	11,125	42	
Army of Vietnam.....	4,674	18	
Regional forces/Popular forces.....	6,451	24	
Revolutionary Development Cadre.....	816		3
United States.....	4,518		17
Other free world military assistance forces.....	1,546		6
Other friendly elements.....	8,263		32
Total.....	26,268		100

Question 21: To what extent do recent changes in command and administration affecting the countryside represent moves to improve competence, as distinct from replacement of one clique by another? What is the basis of judgement? What is the impact of the recent removal of minority group province mid-district officials (Hoa, Hao,

Cao Dai, Montagnard) in their respective areas?

CHANGES IN COMMAND AND ADMINISTRATION

Considerations of political and personal allegiance remain and will, no doubt, always remain of paramount importance in the assignment of key personnel throughout the Vietnamese command and administrative structure. Since the national election of September 1967, for example, President Thieu has moved quite successfully from a "coalition" in which key jobs were divided between Thieu and Ky supporters to replacement of Ky men by those loyal to him. Nevertheless, it does appear that newly appointed province and district officials are being selected on the basis of competence from within the politically acceptable candidate group. This is a new and important development.

Recent changes in command and administration affecting the countryside represent a substantial effort to improve competence, in addition to President Thieu's moves toward consolidation of his personal political power base. In 1968, 25 province chiefs and 162 district chiefs were changed. The changes were made primarily to remove inefficient or

corrupt officials (21 province chiefs, 92 district chiefs). Field reports indicate that the new district and province officials are significantly more honest and competent than their predecessors. In addition, newly assigned officials are required to attend special training courses designed to prepare them for administrative and political duties. The stated intent of the Government of Vietnam is to prosecute those officers removed for corruption. To a greater degree than before, ousted officers have been transferred to positions where they could do less damage, rather than merely shifted to similar positions elsewhere as was the common practice in the past.

Collateral evidence of the intent and effort of the Government of Vietnam to give priority to administrative improvement are provided for in the 1969 Pacification Program:

- a. The mounting of large-scale training programs for village and hamlet officials.
- b. Studies to streamline administrative procedures at the local government level.
- c. The rendering of greater autonomy and authority to the village.

d. The availability of, and control over, more resources, particularly self-help funds to the village.

e. The very strong pressure from the central government and the President to increase the number of elected village and hamlet officials.

It may be useful in this context to bear in mind that (1) due to the nature of the political system in South Vietnam, competence and replacement of one clique by another are complementary terms not opposing. Given the state of political development, this is likely to remain true for some time to come. Thus, if the new district and province chiefs and division and regimental commanders were not basically aligned with Thieu as opposed to their predecessors who were aligned with Ky, they could not be effective in accomplishing their jobs given the political and military milieu that prevails in South Vietnam; and (2) our in depth knowledge of individual loyalties, family ties, clandestine networks, etc., in South Vietnam is sufficiently marginal to cast doubt on any answer provided to questions of this nature. In many cases we are dealing in supposition, assumption and intuition and not with facts or evidence.

REMOVAL OF MINORITY OFFICERS

On balance, the impact of the recent removals of minority group province and district officials does not appear to have generated any serious antigovernment feeling. In general, the Government has been discerning in handling this matter. In relation to the Hoa Hao, which has serious internal pressures toward dissension, non-Hoa Hao have been placed in important positions at province level.

In relation to the Montagnards, a more politically cohesive group (if only because of a relative lack of political sophistication) Montagnard officials have been replaced with other and more competent Montagnards. It is significant that the Government has agreed in negotiations to nominate more Montagnard officials to senior province and district positions. The benefits of such a policy are clear in areas like Pleiku where an excellent Montagnard province chief has been able to make significant gains in the Pacification Program.

Recent changes of the province chief in Tay Ninh and An Giang resulted in assignment of non-affiliated officials. The changes were made ostensibly to improve performance, but the change in Tay Ninh was probably to remove a controversial figure. In An Giang replacement of an inept Hoa Hao province chief by a non-affiliated officer has resulted in improved administration without serious disturbance among the people.

Other removals have had mixed results. In Chau Doc, for instance, the Province Senior Advisor has reported that the replacement of the old Hoa Hao politician by a non-Hoa Hao as Province Chief has been very successful with much of the factional rivalry and dissension that went on before now diminished and better cooperation with job effectiveness by the Provincial staff and the district Chiefs and staffs. On the other hand, the removal of a Cao Dai politician as Province Chief in Tay Ninh and his replacement by a Catholic had serious repercussions which forced the GVN to back down from trying the ex Chief for corruption and further to reappoint him to assist the new Province Chief. With regard to the Montagnards, the Vietnamese have by and large left Montagnards in those positions of authority which they have allowed them to have.

It should be brought out, however, that the GVN cannot "control" these minority groups by replacing Province or District officials in Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, or Montagnard territory. These groups effectively control their area through unofficial and sub rosa channels and organizations which have a unity and capability for action which exceeds that of the

official GVN structure. Thus, generally speaking, the GVN, by meddling with these minority organizations seldom can accomplish much in the way of "controlling" over them, but almost always runs the risk of alienating them. Therefore, the GVN's most fruitful course of action with regard to these minority groups generally lies in reaching some mutually advantageous accommodation with them.

Question 22a: How adequate is our information, and what is it based upon concerning:

Attitudes of Vietnamese elites not now closely aligned with the Government of Vietnam (e.g., religious leaders, professors, youth leaders, professionals, union leaders, village notables) towards: Participation—if offered—in the Government of Vietnam; the current legitimacy and acceptability of the Government of Vietnam; likewise (given "peace" for the National Liberation Front or various "neutralist" coalitions; towards US intent, as they interpret it (e.g., US plans for ending the war, perceived US alignments with particular individuals and forces within Vietnam, US concern for various interests).

The JCS, CINCPAC and MACV report:

ATTITUDES OF VIETNAMESE ELITE

Information on the attitudes of groups not now closely aligned with the Government is based in large part on: (a) their public utterances and actions; (b) public opinion polls; (c) the soundings of Embassy political officers, including the four regional political advisors; and (d) views of informed American officials with close contact and good understanding of various groups of Vietnamese. This information available to the US Mission has probably accurately identified and labeled the main groups insofar as they themselves developed a firm ideological posture.

ATTITUDES OF ELITES ON PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM

Participation may be defined as positions in cabinet, and subcabinet levels, positions of authority in various government departments (military forces, police, agriculture, refugee, provincial administration), and a role in special advisory groups on government programs and policy.

Religious Leaders. Relatively few religious leaders would be willing to serve directly in governmental positions. All are ready to support their lay candidates for office, and to play a role in advising the Government on its policies. Most religious groups tend of course to be interested primarily in programs of direct concern to them, such as education, refugee, and social welfare, although others, for example, the An Quang Buddhists, tend to actively oppose the GVN. In this regard, Catholics tend to be well organized and to participate effectively in such programs. The Buddhists are not well organized and their participation and involvement suffers by comparison.

Youth Leaders. Youth leaders, on balance, are rarely supporters of the GVN programs or policies or considered ready to serve as officials in the Government. Youth leaders are prepared to advise and consult with the Government on matters of concern to them (education, youth programs) but in general avoid direct participation in or identification with the Government of Vietnam.

ATTITUDES OF ELITES ON CURRENTLY LEGITIMACY AND ACCEPTABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT

Nonaligned elite groups have generally supported the process of establishing representational, constitutional government. They seem to accept the system laid down by the constitution. Many groups would undoubtedly like more representation in the Huong government and more of a voice in forming government policy. Many would like to see the National Assembly exercise more legislative control over the government. Some would like early province chief elec-

tions and more rapid civilianization of government (as is taking place in the national police). By and large, the constitutional system beginning with the province council elections in 1965, the constituent assembly in 1966, the local elections in early 1967, and the national assembly and presidential election in 1967, are considered by them as legitimate and acceptable.

ATTITUDES OF ELITE ON THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OR VARIOUS NEUTRALIST COALITION

Elite groups, not closely aligned with the government, reject the notion of coalition government as violently as the military and the government itself. They feel that this would be tantamount to giving the country to the Viet Cong (VC). The tremendously popular response to President Thieu's initial decision not to go to Paris reflects this strong prevailing view.

a. Some Buddhist groups, village leaders, village notables, union leaders, professors, and professionals (while not accepting the ideas of "coalition") are prepared to consider some sort of legitimization of the National Liberation Front as a political party provided they cast off, at least openly, their communist affiliations. However, most groups, particularly the Northern Catholics, prefer a harder line rejecting both "coalition" and legitimization of the National Liberation Front (NLF) as a political party.

b. The attitudes of village notables and villagers generally is of particular interest because of the importance of popular support for the government in the coming political contest. Generally speaking, the Vietnamese villager would prefer to be left alone in peace by both the VC and the government. Forced to choose, as a pragmatist, he usually will go along with the side which controls his area. He recognizes, nevertheless, that he will probably lead a less troubled existence under the GVN than the VC. Evidence of this is the fact that the average GVN hamlet has a much larger population than the average VC hamlet. When the GVN security and authority is reestablished in a hamlet, there is a clear tendency for its population to increase markedly. VC control brings high taxes, austerity, authoritarianism, and drafting of all youth for VC military service. GVN control brings some assistance for local development, at least a portion of local taxes are locally spent, and duty in Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF) or South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) is somewhat less onerous than service for the VC. Similarly, refugees flock not to the VC for succor, but to the GVN.

c. In certain areas, the peasant follows organized groups. The Hoa Hao reached an accommodation with the government some years ago and this group (1.5 million) provides strong resistance to any communist rule, as do the Catholics (1.25 million). Following Tet there has been clear indication that the Cao Daiists (750,000 minimum) are moving to a more pro-GVN stance. Although some small groups of isolated communities among the highlanders are strongly pro-VC, due to long exposure to the Viet Minh and later the VC, many of the 750,000 (or so) highlanders follow the United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races (FULRO) which has so far taken an anti-VC stance. Recently the GVN has concluded negotiations with the FULRO leading to the return of most of the group, which had been in Cambodia, and to support of the GVN by this segment of the population.

ATTITUDES OF ELITES CONCERNING US INTENTIONS AND PLANS

a. Most Vietnamese expect US military withdrawal, but hope and expect that it will be gradual. Most welcome the prospect, provided it is not abrupt. Few would expect the United States to return troops once withdrawn in the event of renewed attack from the north. Most Vietnamese expect extensive US economic assistance and political support

in any postwar period. The Paris talks have shaken the belief of many Vietnamese that the United States will remain committed here and has alarmed some over the prospect of an American sell-out.

b. There does not appear to be significant concern by the non-aligned elite groups over "perceived US alignments with particular individuals or forces within Vietnam" at this time. This represents a significant, if perhaps temporary, change from the past.

OSD views the information on the attitudes of Vietnamese elite as follows:

GENERAL—CONCERNING INFORMATION ABOUT ATTITUDES

There is a cornucopia of data flowing in from the various reporting agencies of the U.S. Government and news media but there is a paucity of *hard evaluated* documentation which alone can provide a basis for equally hard policy choices. Generally, the greater the distance between the GVN and its non-Communist opponents, the less is known about the basic attitudes of the Vietnamese elite. Moreover, each of the elite strata referred to (e.g. religious leaders, professors, youth leaders, professionals, union leaders, village notables) do not constitute homogenous entities with shared attitudes but are themselves split up in many ways. The reporting on each of these categories varies considerably in detail. Thus we have more information about religious leaders, union leaders and professionals than we do about professors, youth leaders and village notables.

The foregoing is further complicated, from an analytical approach, given the over-all evolution of the political situation in South Vietnam. We are not dealing with an *established* political system but rather an emerging constitutional order whose legitimacy is barely accepted even by the elite who emerged victorious in its *first* elections. Many of the GVN leaders tend to regard the election process itself not as a competitive means for providing alternative leaders but rather as a manipulatory process designed to confirm the existing minority group of power leaders in their leadership role.

Moreover, the fractionated character of Vietnamese political organizations, the lack of a mandate provided by an election process which because of plurality voting saw minority candidates for the most part succeed to office, and the instability within the armed forces leadership, all combine to place a premium on opposition to the GVN as a means of rapidly achieving a leadership role. Essential cohesiveness within the nationalist camp is provided by the common threat posed by communist takeover. Otherwise, energies are focussed upon a perpetual competitive struggle to gain status and dominance in Vietnamese political life without regard to the damage done to the nascent constitutional structure. In this regard, the consolidation of the Thieu presidency can be seen as a favorable offsetting stabilizing trend, as can the development of the legislature (Upper and Lower House) as a deliberative body with real powers to influence governmental action.

While we have some data about organizational activity and even strategies adopted by the oppositional elite groups, we do not have a clear picture of their attitudes toward many aspects of the GVN. Observations usually take the form of reports of clique or personality conflict without clear definition of the basic underlying attitudes toward maintenance of the existing governmental structures, nor the conceptual scheme for creating alternative organization for structuring Vietnamese political life. Some of the information seems designed to influence U.S. officials as to infighting in Vietnamese political circles.

ATTITUDES TOWARD PARTICIPATION IF OFFERED IN THE GVN

There is a general willingness of most of the non-communist non-aligned Vietnamese

elite to share in the perquisites and power provided by participation in the GVN. The weakness of political groupings and their perennial need for finances make access to the budgetary resources of the GVN a highly preferred objective. Even the militant Buddhist faction was pleased to have its most prominent lay leaders participate as ministers in the Nguyen Khanh government despite its general opposition to military rule. The very newness of the governmental structure makes it a tempting base for infiltration and Vietnamese of varying political persuasions are not averse to exploiting that structure either covertly or overtly for the particular needs of their political groupings of private well-being.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE LEGITIMACY AND ACCEPTABILITY OF THE GVN

As indicated earlier, the GVN is a transitional political system in its infancy whose legitimacy is barely acceptable. Principal opposition toward it is manifest most dangerously from members of the armed forces who are unhappy about its present organizational form i.e., the supremacy of President Thieu, and the sharing of power with civilian elements. It is these quarters that account for coup rumors that continue to plague political life in Saigon.

The An Quang Buddhists are also a principal source of disaffection. Having been roughly handled and defeated in their confrontation with the GVN, they continue to be a troublesome faction in opposition. They have ample reason to contest the legitimacy of the elections and existing government. They undoubtedly find support or can be expected to make common cause with oppositional elements such as the followers of Truong Dinh DZU, a defeated presidential candidate who languishes in jail. They may also be joined, as in the past, by oppositional youth leaders and youth groupings who remain most resistant to the GVN leadership. The "Peace Campaign" of these Buddhists can also be expected to strike a responsive chord among some of the organized union elements who perceive the GVN leadership as unfriendly to their economic as well as political demands. It is not surprising in this regard that all of the foregoing elements are clearly seen as high priority targets for communist infiltration and manipulation in anti-GVN struggle activities.

There is also a political gulf between the GVN and religious and ethnic groupings such as the Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Highlanders and Khmer minorities. In the case of the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai whose followers constitute organized peasant communities, the desire to constitute a religious state and monopoly of their leadership exists as a basic attitude. Even though both of these religions constitute hardened principled opposition to the VC, locally, these communities of co-religionists have, in the view of experienced observers, worked out some forms of accommodation with the VC. The GVN, for its part, has found it necessary to make equally considerable political adjustments in their areas of control.

In the case of the Highlanders and the Khmer minorities, the existence of the FULRO; its stormy relationship with the GVN and its links with the Cambodian government show the tenuousness of their acceptance and recognition of legitimacy of the GVN.

It is at the village level among the rural elite that the greatest problem exists for the GVN's acceptance. Ever since the Ngo Dinh Diem regime struck a blow at the autonomy of the village and extended the Saigon government administration's control of village life, there has been a marked gap between rural and urban elites. The success of the VC in the rural areas is in part traceable to this situation. There is considerable evidence that a good part of the GVN leadership still fears the outcome of village and hamlet elections (which have been partially

reinstated) unless they are manipulated by Saigon authorities because of the prospect of success therein for VC and/or oppositional elements. Indeed, this situation has led many observers to regard the rural situation in South Vietnam as one in which the villagers are being fought over and subject to pressure by two outside forces: the GVN and the Viet Cong as alternative governmental structures.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE NLF OR VARIOUS "NEUTRALIST" COALITIONS

Broadly speaking, we can say that there has been a noticeable shift in the non-communist camp to the acceptance of a political settlement that involves some form of co-existence with communist southern forces. In general, the non-GVN, non-Communist elites share with the GVN leadership a desire to reach a settlement which minimizes actual communist influence in the GVN government structure, whatever the form that is agreed upon. However, it is not clear how much "adaptation" to the communists many non-communists will make, as a means of achieving leadership, and in their belief that they can control the communists and thereby better manage the fortunes of a non-communist South Vietnam. In short, considerable opportunism will characterize many Vietnamese leaders and they will be highly vulnerable to manipulation by the NLF in terms of its organizational strength and political skills in a condition of political competition. Northern Catholics and other refugee elements will be less prone to this tendency toward adaptation because of their previous experiences with the communists in North Vietnam.

In this connection, the belated "discovery" by some of the non-communist Southern Vietnamese elite that a sizeable portion of the National Liberation Front now consists of "nationalists" is a sign of current adjustment to some form of coalitionism should this prove necessary as an outcome of negotiations. It should be remembered that the Viet Cong has always sought to promote the "broad coalition" character of the NLF as a cosmetic device despite the actual monolithic communist organizational structure and control that characterizes their "liberation struggle".

ATTITUDES TOWARD UNITED STATES INTENT

Elite groups not aligned with the GVN share with other Vietnamese generally a deep-seated ambivalence with respect to the United States. They recognize that insofar as their past, present, and to a degree their future existence in a viable non-communist South Vietnam is dependent upon the United States, our presence and/or support is required. Nonetheless, the United States intervention is perceived as a necessary evil. This perception arises from a deep seated feeling of shame that they cannot handle the problem posed by the Vietnamese communists without recourse to the presence of foreigners whose impact is considerable upon Vietnamese society and whose presence lends evidence to the charge of "puppetry" sedulously propagated by the Viet Cong.

Moreover, many Vietnamese (as do many Americans) do not understand why the United States has been willing to make so great an effort in Vietnam. As a consequence, because it is perceived that our interests and Vietnamese interests do not necessarily coincide, there is considerable doubt as to our intentions with respect to the struggle in Vietnam. Based on past experiences with the French, the non-communist nationalist elite is particularly sensitive to the prospect that at the outer limits the national interest of the United States may lead to U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam even if a communist victory were to be a likely outcome of such withdrawal. Willingness to negotiate in Paris was and is seen as partial confirmation of this view. Given this sensitivity, the non-communist Vietnamese, who wish to *survive* in South Vietnam, wish to minimize the nega-

tive consequences of U.S. troop withdrawal while maximizing their own ability to deal militarily and politically with the NLF. They also desire maximum United States support in the Paris negotiations to insure the most favorable military and political settlement for the non-communists.

Thus even the most critical opponents of the GVN (barring those who favor a victory for the NLF) do not wish to lose the benefit that continuing American pressures and presence confer for maintaining a viable non-communist South Vietnam. Even the disaffected militant Buddhist faction has always stressed the need for U.S. support. What they have objected to, and what they continue to oppose, is what they perceive as United States alignment with particular individuals and forces within Vietnam detrimental to their interests. With few exceptions of minor consequence, there is no political grouping, except the NLF, favorably or unfavorably disposed to the GVN, which has not sought United States support and intervention in their own behalf despite their basic desire for "the right of Vietnamese self-determination."

Question 22b: How adequate is our information, and what is it based upon, concerning:

Patterns of existent political alignments within GVN/RVNAF and outside it—reflecting family ties, corruption, officers' class, secret organization and parties, religious and regional background—as these bear upon behavior with respect to the war, the NLF, reform and broadening of the GVN, and responses to U.S. influence and intervention.

The JCS, CINCPAC and MACV report:

Information on these matters is based in great part upon counterpart contacts, supported by the informal local relationships of advisory teams and other officers. Part-time political reporting officers have been appointed in each province and full-time political officers are present at each corps, in addition to the Saigon level. Available information is adequate with respect to overall political positions of the standard political, religious, and regional groups, but is only partial with respect to the fractional and individual positions of the members thereof.

Since there is a strong conspiratorial tradition in Vietnamese politics, it is not surprising that much political activity is undertaken in conspiratorial ways, nor that simple Government or private activities are frequently misinterpreted as being the result of some dark conspiracy. However, the gradual development of political activity in Vietnam, at the national level through the Senate and National Assembly, and even at local levels, has tended towards more organized and more overt political activity. Similarly, the Tet offensive had a positive shock effect on many elite elements, leading them to adopt somewhat more constructive and loyal, rather than parochial and selfish, attitudes.

Factionalism within the Armed Forces similarly seems to be declining from its origins in the French-dominated Army as a factor of the growing maturity of RVNAF, the growing size and complexity of the RVNAF, and the increased professionalism of many of its officers. The conscious effort by the Government to reduce the power of corps warlords has had perceptible effects, although it must be recognized that the tendency toward direct transmission of the Presidential and national power, rather than through the Joint General Staff, is still prevalent.

OSD views the information concerning the patterns and attitudes of the existent political alignments in South Vietnam as follows:

Patterns of existent political alignments within GVN/RVNAF and outside it.

There is a considerable body of data available from reporting agencies of the U.S. Government and news media about the organiza-

tion and activities of the principal political fronts and parties on the Vietnamese political scene. This information varies in detail and utility depending upon the overt or covert character of the political grouping involved. The highly personalized and clique character of much of the "political elite" activity and the frequent shifts in political alignments as the power structure is altered complicates our ability to keep track of the situation and our understanding thereof.

It must be remembered that the Vietnamese political elites have been formed in an environment of colonialism, war and revolutionary upheaval in which survival itself was often dependent upon maintaining secret and conspiratorial organization. The Ngo Dinh Diem government's repressive policies also contributed to the development of clandestine political activity.

These long-time political habits are not easily dispensed with in the relatively short period of a freer environment since the overthrow of the Ngo Dinh Diem dictatorship. The tentative character of political arrangements since November, 1963, and the manifest instability of leadership circles in both the civilian and military spheres have further contributed to reinforce the behavioral need for covert organization.

The development of a parliamentary system coupled with elections has perforce brought out into the open a considerable number of the political actors. But the process of surfacing is necessarily incomplete and the oldest and most well-known political parties (e.g., the Dal Viet Quoc Dan Dang and Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang and the various factions thereof) still maintain what is essentially secret membership and networks of infiltration not subject to public scrutiny. The same approach is characteristic of lesser known political groups.

Proponents of political views prescribed by the GVN also have resorted to secrecy in their activities. Political exiles who have lost out in previous leadership struggles also maintain some clandestine links and organization in the hope that they can return and resume activity in South Vietnam. The real extent of the influence and power of such individuals is often difficult to gauge. It has not been uncommon for such exiles to return and receive ministerial posts which does testify to some residual base in Vietnamese political life.

In general, data relating to patterns of existent political alignments reflecting officers' class and religious and regional background is adequate. It is with regard to family ties, corruption and secret organizations and parties that our information becomes spotty or nonexistent.

Nonetheless, despite our lack of detailed information, we can estimate what the impact of such factors as family ties; corruption and secret organization are with respect to the climate of political opinion and to political loyalties in South Vietnam.

Family ties

The basic institutional tie of the Vietnamese is to his family and there are few other loyalties that transcend the family relationship for most Vietnamese. Wherever such extra-family loyalties are created, they are generally directed toward other individuals who are perceived in familial terms of respect, i.e., grandfather, elder brother, younger brother, etc., rather than to organization or ideology per se.

Political alignments and political participation of Vietnamese will often reflect family decisions and family needs. This accounts for a high degree of nepotism manifest throughout the society. Such family ties often transcend the ideological divisions that are part of the civil strife rending Vietnam today. Members of the same family can often be found on both sides of the nationalist-Communist split in Vietnam and there is considerable communication between families so

divided. This is less true for the Northerners who come South (communication with people in the Communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam is highly controlled), than is the case for Central and Southern Vietnamese who are separated by the fluid lines that are characteristic of the demarcation between GVN and NLF controlled territory.

Family decisions will often be a kind of indicator as to the course of the war and degree of commitment to either the GVN or the NLF or neither. Thus families living in GVN territory may affect the return of soldiers in the VC ranks if they develop strong views about the justness of the GVN struggle and its capacity to win the war. Family concerns may well account for some of the high desertion rates of young men drafted into ARVN, etc. Responses to political organization and political loyalties will also be affected by the fortunes of individuals within the particular family group as they react to opportunities and events in the churning of the war.

Corruption

Patterns of existent political alignments are greatly affected by corruption because of its endemic character in GVN and RVNAF functioning. Even though it is difficult to document and uproot through legal proceedings, its existence is widely known and does influence the whole context of the war situation in Vietnam.

The principal effect of corruption has to do with Vietnamese concept of the *Just Cause* wherein righteous behavior on the part of individuals either validates or discredits the government or political movement they serve. It is a prime objective of the NLF to depict the GVN and the RVNAF as corrupt and venal. Unfortunately, too many of the GVN's leadership—military and civilian—validate that image by their behavior and thereby undermine their own authority in a society where Confucian values of rectitude have considerable meaning for the people.

The perception the Prime Minister Tran van Huong is an honest man and that he is trying to uproot corruption is a factor offsetting some of the negative aspects of the GVN image. The administrative weakness and lack of adequate personnel for the inspectorate headed by Mai Tho Truyen, a respected Southern lay Buddhist political figure, limits his ability to deal more effectively with corruption.

The magnitude of the problem can be seen in part in the widespread acceptance of the view by Vietnamese that the Education Minister was killed recently because he was too vigorous in his effort to eliminate corruption within his ministry, one of the most sensitive because of the importance that education plays in Vietnamese life. This dampens the enthusiasm for other GVN officials to be too active in this regard.

Differential punishment for corrupt activities is also a negative factor in GVN reform and broadening of its appeal. Shooting a Chinese—with its negative political consequences in the Chinese community—or severely punishing low-ranking soldiers is a subject for much cynicism and discredit of the GVN in Vietnamese political circles when there are Corps Commanders or high ranking Generals who are notoriously corrupt and go unpunished. Indeed the endemic system of corruption that has not proved too amenable to correction to date in the RVNAF remains a serious political disability.

Corruption is an important source of revenue with which to build political organization in Vietnam. In the absence of wealthy patrons or businessmen who can provide donations from business income, political organizations and political leaders are hard put to finance their activities from lack of an adequate financial base provided by adherents. Engaging in corrupt and illicit dealings for the benefit of one's political orga-

nization and not personal gain has a certain legitimacy.

The high input of American aid and the disorganization inherent in a country at war provide many opportunities for corrupt practices. These activities do influence in turn the political arrangements in Vietnam. Moreover, it is natural that many Vietnamese will hold the United States responsible for not controlling its aid so that corruption will not flourish.

OFFICER'S CLASS

The most significant feature of the RVNAF is the relative homogeneity of its officer class drawn almost exclusively from those with at least a high school diploma. Without a high school diploma entrance to officer candidate status is limited to recommended non-coms. Only 7% of all RVNAF officers have received commissions from the ranks and this proportion actually declines to only 4.8% in the 1967-1968 class of officer candidates. Without a high school diploma, officers cannot be promoted beyond the rank of captain.

Since high school education is primarily available to the city-bred and wealthier classes, the officer class in Vietnam is hardly attuned to the life style of the rural conscripts and ordinary soldiers of the RVNAF. Indeed, this has led many observers to comment unfavorably on the "mandarin" character of RVNAF officers.

This acceptance of a "mandarin style" and inadequate other motivation produced many officers who were more interested in the prerequisites and privileges of rank than in effective military leadership. This gap between officers and soldiers has resulted to a degree in poor combat efficiency. Similarly, the lack of empathy shown by the officer ranks to the rural population has resulted to some extent in the perception by the peasantry that the RVNAF is not "our army" because of its poor discipline and behavior. Correspondingly, the armed forces of the NLF are often perceived more favorably since their leadership has more officers of peasant origin and its soldiers are made more conscious of and disciplined to the rural population's needs.

Although some improvement has been made in recruiting non-coms for officer ranks in recent years, it is clear that the numbers will have to be greatly augmented if RVNAF needs for officers are to be met.

This relative homogeneity of the officer class also has seen the RVNAF quite resistant to integrating into its ranks soldiers and officers of the Hoa Hao, Cao Dai and Highlanders. This clear discrimination inhibits the ability of the GVN to overcome the "autonomous" drive of these communities and develop a "national" outlook in its political leadership. The GVN has dealt with the problem in the past by attempted suppression of dissident armed forces and then integrating some into the RVNAF. In time even these officers were eliminated from the RVNAF. Cao Dai and Hoa Hao officers do not play any important role in the RVNAF today. The Highlanders have gone through the ritual of revolt and return several times. Most recently FULRO has again been "dissolved" with the promise of integration of its armed forces still to be realized.

There is considerable factionalism within the officer class that reflects and shapes the divisions inherent in all GVN political life. In fact, it is the emergence of the military as a powerful force in Vietnamese political life that has realigned existing political groups and created new patterns of political organization. The conflict between the military officers supporting President Nguyen van Thieu and the Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky still plagues the RVNAF and realigns political groups in the GVN.

In general, it seems clear that the position of President Thieu has been strengthened and that of Vice President Ky has been weakened considerably. A shift in power has

taken place that permeates the entire structure of the officer class and is reflected in the GVN political and administrative structure wherever the military plays a role. What sometimes goes under the rubric of replacement for efficiency and competency is a thinly disguised factional consolidation of political forces willing to accept President Thieu's leadership for the present. That politics still predominates over professionalism is still the guiding rule in RVNAF. Thus, political tensions between Northerners and Southerners for command will still affect the RVNAF as will the conflict between a large number of low ranking combat officers and the basically French-trained high ranking officers who have achieved their positions due to politics rather than performance in the field.

The recruitment of officers drawn from the same class strata represented by the GVN officials has also contributed greatly to the elite character of political parties and the failure of any of the pro-GVN parties to achieve a mass base in Vietnamese society.

The RVNAF officer class can be and is subject to a considerable degree of influence by the United States intervention in Vietnam. The process by which acceptance of professional standards becomes the mode of operation of the RVNAF has been greatly enhanced by the behavior and presence of our large military forces. The RVNAF is particularly dependent upon the United States presence and support. This influence accounts in part for discernible improvements in RVNAF performance and has had a corresponding impact of a basic character in shaping the long-term evolution of Vietnamese politics.

SECRET ORGANIZATIONS AND PARTIES

The full extent of war weariness and the desire for peace is not known in any exact manner for the people of South Vietnam. Indications are that such feelings are widespread and deeply desired by a significant number of the population. This was manifest in the Presidential election of 1967 when despite the desire of the ruling governmental elite, the peace issue surfaced as a principal point for discussion in the campaign. The relative success of Truong Dinh Dzu in garnering some 17% of the vote attested to considerable organizational activity in his behalf throughout GVN areas of control. The role of the Tan Dai Viet and some Cao Dai elements in this organizational effort has not been adequately analyzed.

The participation of the GVN in the Paris Peace Negotiations has opened the door for further discussion of alternatives to continuing the war. The GVN's difficulties, despite overall success in managing the transition to open consideration of what were forbidden topics of conversation, and its current irritation with the "peace campaign" of the An Quang Buddhists, student and youth groups, and some trade-unionists, indicates how explosive an issue is involved. The militant Buddhists decision to exploit this issue is apparently a consequence of their belief that they can achieve significant political mileage in this regard. It would not be surprising that considerable clandestine organizational activities around this issue and corresponding change takes place in patterns of existent political alignments.

It is at this level that the NLF can be expected to develop their own contacts and new organizations. The situation is roughly parallel to the condition that existed in the course of the "struggle movement" of the Buddhists in 1966 which lent itself to some Communist infiltration and exploitation.

Efforts to reform and broaden the GVN and develop the new constitutional structure are the only ways to get at the problem posed by secret organizations and parties. When leadership and acceptance of political views are made part of an open political process, the need for and efficacy of

classification of clandestine organization diminishes.

Because of the covert nature of such political activity, there is little that the United States knows or can do directly about this matter. Rooting out the NLF "infrastructure" is difficult enough without further complicating our intervention in Vietnamese political life by efforts in this area. Indirectly, we have influenced this area by our efforts to help create representative government in Vietnam and thereby contributed to an open political process.

RELIGIOUS AND REGIONAL BACKGROUND

The patterns of existent political alignments within GVN/RVNAF and outside it reflecting religious and regional background as these bear upon the situation in Vietnam are as follows:

CATHOLICS

The Catholics of South Vietnam remain one of the most intransigent groupings committed to victory in the war against the Viet Cong. For the Northern Catholics who fled to South Vietnam in the 1954 period, there is no disposition on religious and political grounds to come to terms with what they regard as their implacable enemies.

This view is shared for the most part by the Southern Catholic leadership except insofar as it is partially responsive to Papal enjoiners for peace in Vietnam and some greater willingness out of regional experience and shared feelings with other Southerners to seek some solution to the war short of total extermination of the Viet Cong cadres.

There are some miniscule Catholic groups of intellectuals and students who are advocates of a peace program but their influence is quite limited. The bulk of the Catholic population is quite resistant to any soft appeals in regard to the ending of the war and considerable numbers have been mobilized in the past by Catholic leaders against the GVN when it was deemed necessary to offset weakness in prosecuting the war because of the alleged soft nature of the then GVN leadership.

Catholics are the best organized of all political groups in Vietnam and are over-represented in the GVN and RVNAF at all levels. Not only did they benefit during the regime of President Diem but their adoption of Christianity has opened them up to "modernizing tendencies" and Western education to a far greater extent than most in the more traditional Vietnamese society.

In the recent period, increasingly conscious of their need to survive possible US withdrawal and some form of political accommodation with the NLF, Senate Catholics have sought to create a broader base for their political views by seeking to build legislative blocs in both the Upper and Lower Houses and extending such political activities beyond the legislature to the population generally by way of participating in the creation of nation-wide "Fronts."

Generally, the Catholic political leadership is most sensitive to and responsive to US influence and intervention. They have benefited, most from exchange programs in education, from working with Americans in Vietnam, and are most perceptive of the role that the United States has played in maintaining South Vietnam as a non-Communist state.

BUDDHISTS

As far as their behavior with respect to the war is concerned, the Buddhist political groups are quite split. Regional factors play an important role in influencing the divisions among the Buddhist leadership. There is a further split between the clergy and lay leadership. The lay politicians generally are more inclined to support military activity directed against the Viet Cong. The Northern Buddhists in the Thich Tam Chau tendency are likewise less inclined toward "peace activity." The Central and some Southern cler-

ics of the militant An Quang tendency have been principally concerned with exploiting a cease-fire and peace program. A large part of the Southern wing of the Buddhist clergy confines itself to religious activities and is not overtly political with respect to the war issue.

It is among the rural Buddhist masses that the Viet Cong has its principal strength. The NLF has also seen the Buddhist leaders as competitors who can affect their own base and has placed great stress on infiltrating Buddhist political organization.

Politically, the Buddhists have experienced great fluctuation in strength as far as the GVN/RVNAF is concerned. Their high points were their role in the events that resulted in the overthrow of the Diem government and the militant Buddhist alliance with General Nguyen Chanh Thi in the struggle movement of 1966 and its impact on constitutional development.

Buddhist leaders have always sought to influence the patterns of political alignments within the GVN/RVNAF and have moved from participation to opposition depending upon the benefits and interests to be served thereby. They share with the Catholics great sensitivity and responsiveness to United States influence and intervention which they regard as necessary to their survival and for some an obstacle to their political supremacy in Vietnam.

HOA HAO

The Hoa Hao religionists are quite split at the leadership level though recent efforts to provide a facade of unity and a unified religious organization have met with some degree of success. Apart from a small armed band believed to still function as an adjunct to the Viet Cong in the struggle against the GVN, the Hoa Hao are dedicated anti-Communists because of their past experiences and treatment at the hands of the Communists.

Whatever their degree of participation in the GVN structure at various levels, the Hoa Hao are fundamentally a state-within-a-state as yet in South Vietnam. Their accommodation to the GVN is considerable because of the desire to survive and continue to proselytize under the most favorable auspices, and it has proved profitable in terms of subsidies and political pay-offs. The GVN has equally made considerable adjustments to the Hoa Hao—as distinct from the relationship during the Diem period—but there is great sensitivity of the particularity of the Hoa Hao structured communities in South Vietnam and their autonomous character vis-a-vis a "national" concept. This often leads to contradictory GVN policies, i.e., the drive to accommodate vs. the drive to establish direct control.

There is some ambiguity about local accommodation by the Hoa Hao with the Viet Cong since some of the Hoa Hao areas are the most peaceful in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong forces avoid attacking these areas but some of the VC supply routes are known to go through these same areas.

The Hoa Hao leadership groups are aware that the United States plays a decisive role in Vietnamese affairs but some of them feel neglected in terms of their own efforts to build up their religion's influence and in benefits received for Hoa Hao areas from the American presence.

THE CAO-DAI

The Cao Dai religionists are—similar to all Vietnamese groupings—also split at the leadership level and have a range of response toward the war which includes some collaboration with the Viet Cong.

Basically, they are predominantly anti-Communist in orientation. Here again—like the Hoa Hao—the peasant Cao Dai communities collectively constitute what is more like a state-within-a-state than adherence to

the concept of citizenship within the GVN framework.

REGIONAL BACKGROUND

Regionalism is still an important political factor in Vietnamese political life. As far as the war is concerned, the Northerners remain the most intransigent in their desire for military victory. The Central Vietnamese who have borne the brunt of the war and experienced the greatest dislocation and suffering are probably the most "war-weary" and desirous of peaceful settlement. Nonetheless, political leadership groups that are most virulently anti-Communist have considerable support in Central Vietnam, and a desire for peace should not be confused with a willingness to compromise with the Communists.

The Southerners are the most ambiguous in their political responses to the war and the problem posed by the NLF. While most all leadership groups wish to maintain South Vietnam as a non-Communist state and limit NLF influence, the greatest "accommodation" has taken place with the NLF in many delta areas. In part, Southern dissatisfaction with Northern influence in the GVN/RVNAF has tempered their militancy against the NLF by focussing attention on the internal politics of the GVN. This regionalism is a great contributor to disruptive tension in the GVN, and expresses itself in the desire for greater Southern influence throughout the GVN political and administrative structure.

Awareness of the importance of the US role is high among Southern elite leadership, but it is tempered in part by some hostility engendered by what is perceived as US collaboration with and dependence upon Northern and Central dominated GVN leadership. This has been attenuated in part by the Prime Minister being a Southerner.

Question 23: What is the evidence on the prospects—and on what changes in conditions and US policies would increase or decrease them—for changes in the Government of Vietnam toward: (a) broadening of the government to include participation of all significant noncommunist regional and religious groupings (at province and district levels, and well as cabinet); (b) stronger emphasis, in selection and promotion of officers and officials, on competence and performance (as in the communist Vietnamese system) as distinct from considerations of family, corruption, and social (e.g., educational) background; and (c) political mobilization of noncommunist sympathies and energies in support of the GVN, as evidenced, e.g., by reduced desertion, by willing alignment of religious, provincial, and other leaders with the GVN, by wide cooperation with anticorruption and pro-efficiency drives.

The views of the JCS, CINCPAC and MACV are: There is a gradual expansion of the political arena to include additional elements and to give more power to legitimately elected representatives of the people. Further steps are contemplated and it can be anticipated that this gradual process will continue. The removal of incompetent officials in favor of specially trained and selected replacements occurred during 1968 in a substantial number of cases and testifies to a stronger emphasis on competence and performance. Experience in 1968 also highlighted the feasibility of combining legal pressure and political incentive to encourage political mobilization. However, in all areas, continued US assistance and pressure are required.

BROADENING OF THE GOVERNMENT

On occasion, President Thieu makes a verbal slip by referring to some government institution by its name during the Diem period. He has been quoted as to his belief that Diem ran an efficient administration. However, President Thieu has also given indications of his resolution to avoid the polit-

ical Achilles heel of the Diem regime, its refusal to share power, and develop a political base. Thus, he has been meticulous in giving the Prime Minister an important role, and the Prime Minister and the government have been substantially responsive to National Assembly interrogations and opinion. The National Assembly plays a substantial part in political review of the government's actions, even though it does not yet fully share in the decision stage. The government's authorization of processions and meetings by a variety of political and religious groupings fits into this gradual process of accepting the function of other centers of political power. This has not included, of course, elements about whose reliability with respect to communism or neutralism the government held any doubts, such as Truong Dinh Dzu.

In June 1968, the government postponed elections to province councils, with US concurrence at the time, but has lately directed holding of village council elections in all villages wherein appointed councils exist. It has also moved substantially to increase the authority of the village chief and council, and at least one senior minister is actively contemplating a move toward election of certain province chiefs. In summary, there is a gradual expansion of the political arena to include additional elements and to give more power to legitimately elected representatives of the people. Further steps are contemplated and it can be anticipated that this gradual process will continue as the government gains confidence in itself and in the dictates of its constitution. A primary factor in this is, of course, the delicate balance between enough US support to avoid collapse and a shortage to stimulate Vietnamese action to handle problems alone.

STRONGER EMPHASIS ON COMPETENCE AND PERFORMANCE

As with so many other questions, the pace at which this occurs is breathtaking in the eye of one beholder, snail-like in the eye of another. The facts are about 25 province chiefs and 182 district chiefs were changed during 1968, the majority because of malfeasance or inefficiency. Their replacements were the product of a special course of officers chosen for these jobs and given a choice of assignment according to their standing in the course. There is, at the same time, at least some live-and-let-live tendency among the members of the establishment. There are also political factors requiring something less than a vigorous application of objective standards of performance, as in the case of the three unsatisfactory Chieu Hoi Service Chiefs in three Hoa Hao-dominated provinces, who were each rotated to an adjacent province, so that the three individuals remained in equal jobs, the Hoa Hao balance was undisturbed, and yet a step was taken to demonstrate a refusal to accept their inefficiency of the job they had done. With respect to military officers, the failure to meet the quotas of promotion for 1968 reflects the severity of the promotion process, with its emphasis on review panels and all the paraphernalia of modern personnel management. Recent graduates of the National Institute of Administration have been assigned to rural areas to exploit their expertise and reports of their performance speak of satisfaction with their selection and training. While some of these actions are, in fact, substantial, the critical importance of leadership to a successful outcome of the struggle in Vietnam requires the closest US attention to this matter and vigorous projection of detailed American comments on Vietnamese officials to those levels capable of taking corrective action. This form of case-by-case removal of incompetents and trial of new candidates is most apt to accelerate the process of replacement of inadequate officials by those of greater capability.

Although the goal of objective promotion and retention of RVNAF personnel has not

been achieved fully, promotion procedures have been developed which apply to all RVNAF personnel and are designed to improve objectivity in the promotion system as well as enhance the quality of leadership through recognition of qualified and deserving persons. Specific features of the system are:

b. Establishment of selected criteria for annual promotions based on efficiency reports, time in grade, positions held, military schools attended, awards, time in combat, civilian education, and punishments (negative factor).

c. Provision for special promotions which can be awarded for battlefield performance and for individuals serving in positions for which higher grades are authorized.

MACV continues to emphasize to the Vietnamese Joint General Staff the necessity for achieving a professionally competent officer corps. Military effectiveness can be enhanced greatly by strenuously enforcing the improved promotion system now available.

POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

The experience of political mobilization during 1968 points out the feasibility and the technique of combining legal pressure and political incentive to secure such mobilization. The general mobilization law provided the spur to bring a substantial increase of recruitments into the Armed Forces and, combined with a vigorous expansion of the people's self-defense program, has engaged a substantial bloc of over 1,000,000 citizens in the national effort. There is, of course, no question but that the shock of the Tet offensive was contributory, as well as the clear indication that the Americans would not bear the burden of Vietnam indefinitely. During the coming year, all these pressures can and should be maintained. Legal pressure on all to participate in an effective desertion reduction program (including a central fingerprint file of all citizens), a clear indication of government desire for participation with the citizenry in the national effort rather than regimentation, and a continued pressure from the United States on public and official Vietnamese to assume a greater portion of the burden of effort, scheduling of village elections, granting power to village authorities over local forces, and the possible election of provincial councils and even some provincial chiefs should continue the spirit of mobilization launched during 1968.

OSD Views are as follows:

BROADENING OF THE GOVERNMENT

In considering the prospects for changes in the GVN and American leverage thereon it would be well to consider the proposition that the record of American experience in Viet Nam is one that indicates a signal failure to direct the evolution of Vietnamese political life into desired channels. It is only at the nether limits, i.e. getting rid of President Ngo Dinh Diem or, since 31 March 1968, raising serious doubts about American willingness to continue the war, that sufficient leverage has apparently been exerted to markedly influence but not direct the course of political events internally.

Baldly stated, it is more accurate to see the evolution of political life in South Viet Nam as reacting to Vietnamese imperatives, in response to which the United States has had to adjust its policy because its policymakers only saw dimly the internal political dynamics of Vietnam. The instability characteristic of Vietnamese life, from the fall of Diem through to the election process that installed General Nguyen van Thieu as President of the GVN, was not foreseen, planned or directed in any meaningful sense by the United States although we unwittingly contributed to it on numerous occasions. Our role has been to try and stabilize and support whomever emerged as the power holders

of the day which was a Vietnamese decision not our own.

Indeed, the record shows that the consolidation of the Nguyen van Thieu presidency is itself not primarily due to any American effort but rather his perception of the Vietnamese political process in terms of political strategy and timing of actions to be taken. To be sure we have influenced events considerably because the GVN has had to be mindful of some of our wishes but the number of frustrated American advisors who functioned at every level in Vietnam is legion and speaks eloquently to the weight of American opinion in shaping events in Vietnam.

The general rule that obtains with respect to US policies is that by withholding or allocating resources broad shifts can be caused in Vietnamese political alignments but that lesser Vietnamese policy changes can be effected only where the advice "fits" the requirements of the Vietnamese political process and strengthens the hand of the power-holders as they perceive their situation and can carry their constituencies.

The principal tendency in recent Vietnamese politics has been the emergence of and increasingly dominant position of President Nguyen van Thieu as the national leader of the GVN. The strong control position of the President in institutional terms as provided by the new constitutional structure and the legitimacy provided by an election process has afforded President Thieu, starting with his base in the military, the opportunity to consolidate his power and reduce the influence of his chief rival Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky and the generals who oppose him. President Thieu has found it expedient to fashion a political bloc of civilian support of Southerners and Catholics under the leadership of a Presidential rival Tran van Huong as Prime Minister. He has skillfully permitted the Legislative (Upper and Lower Houses) to play a significant role in the formulation of GVN policies and has created the broadest coalition of rule in South Vietnam's checkered existence as a sovereign state.

Thus the prospects for broadening of the government to include participation of all significant non-communist regional and religious groupings (at province and district levels, as well as cabinet) is thereby enhanced.

Offsetting this prospect for broadening change is the postponement of the provincial elections and some of the responses of cabinet members to the holding of village elections. The desire for administrative management of elections to assure their outcome and the unwillingness of GVN administration to share power with elected officials are stubborn realities that stand in the way of the broadening process. In this instance, sympathetic U.S. advice and pressure may induce President Thieu and Prime Minister Huong to intervene and push the election process along.

There may also be prospects for broadening change through providing participation for some of the political groups not currently represented at the cabinet level. It is still primarily a cabinet of technicians and could well be changed to incorporate some prominent political figures who might contribute to GVN's prestige.

United States pressure in this regard might be effective if President Thieu could be convinced that such action might not only improve the GVN image abroad in the course of the Paris negotiations but that American public opinion would be more willing to continue the sacrifices demanded by the war in Vietnam if such were the case.

At province or district levels it is more a matter of providing competent administrators (with the emphasis on appointing quali-

fied civilians and releasing RVNAF officers to military assignments) that will have the greatest impact. The shortage of officers in an expanded RVNAF responding to US withdrawal can serve as inducement for this change. In the absence of elections, some form of appointment to advisory councils that involve local and religious leaders at province or district level might prove useful. Perhaps some means of involving defeated local candidates for the Senate and Lower House in the governmental structure might prove advantageous to broadening GVN at Province and District levels. Some US funding of such arrangements might be a statutory step to bring this about.

SELECTION AND PROMOTION OF OFFICERS AND OFFICIALS

There is some slight indication that the GVN is prepared to rely on competence and performance as criteria for selection and promotion. Evidence usually cited is that about 25 province chiefs and 162 district chiefs were changed during 1968, the majority because of malfeasance or inefficiency, and their replacements came from among specially trained officers.

It is more likely that the initial choice of these officers to be trained was itself a product of the established system in Vietnam. Certainly these officers for the most part did have educational backgrounds that made them acceptable. Moreover, they were probably chosen within the requirement of a highly personalized system of providing personnel where considerations of family also played a role. What is more important is that political considerations emanating from the office of the Presidency undoubtedly had a good deal to do with the relief of many of the incumbents rather than the criteria of competence and performance.

The foregoing is not designed to argue that we are dealing with an intractable situation. Indeed, within the Vietnamese system one can bolster such efforts toward performance criteria by reference to Confucian standards of conduct and ability. President Thieu can agree to accept the principle of adequate training and competence as criteria for assignment of officers. It is more likely that this process will be resorted to when he can be sure that such officers are both competent and loyal to the GVN under his leadership.

Perhaps the best leverage exerted by the U.S. in this regard, apart from material aid extended in helping set up training facilities, is the quality of our own advisers at the provincial and district levels. A shake-down of our own staffs, the replacement of US officials who do not contribute positively to the American effort in Vietnam, and the maintenance of US performance standards through adequate selection and training would do much to ensure that our advice is taken.

POLITICAL MOBILIZATION DESERTIONS

It is admittedly difficult to assess the prospects for political mobilization of non-Communist sympathies in support of the GVN using desertion statistics as an indicator. Certainly the statistics for 1968 as compared with the previous year 1966 and 1967 are not promising since the desertion rate is quite high and shows an upward trend.

Data for 1966 shows a rise in gross desertion (net figures not available) commencing with February 1966, the beginning of the Buddhist struggle movement, and continues at high levels to May, when the struggle movement is crushed, declines during June, July and August and remains constant on the average from September 1966 (the first Constituent Assembly elections) through December 1967.

Net monthly figures for desertion were slightly down for the first three months of 1968 as compared with 1967. They then rose to a monthly average that is approximately

double the monthly average net figure for 1967. The dip in the first quarter of 1968 seems to be accounted for by the amnesty measures for desertion following the Tet holidays and the subsequent rise can perhaps be accounted for by higher force levels due to general mobilization efforts that brought in larger numbers of volunteers and conscripts commencing March 1968 who were not as easily integrated into the RVNAF.

There is a marked increase in volunteers commencing with general mobilization in March 1968 to approximately double the monthly rate for 1967 through August 1968. The volunteer rate drops back to the monthly rate of 1966-1967 for September and October and then is halved for November and December 1968. Conscription monthly figures remain fairly constant during the same period from March to December 1968 at the higher levels due to the general mobilization effort. These changes may well be accounted for by exhaustion of the eligibles in the manpower pool.

However, a more speculative *political evaluation* of the foregoing could result in the judgment that desertions rose in April coincident with the partial bombing halt and move toward peace negotiations in Paris to their present higher rate. In addition, the political impact of the mobilization drive after Tet accounts for the six month period of high volunteering and falls to the lowest level in three years in November and December 1968 coincident with the full bombing halt and the move toward expanded peace negotiations.

Thus, the prospects of an end to the fighting may have some political influence on the stability of the RVNAF. Certainly, the experience in 1954 of large scale desertion coincident with the Geneva peace negotiations is a factor that President Thieu is cognizant of from personal experience. Further study of this matter of desertions and volunteering would seem warranted to make possible better evaluation of the impact of political events.

It is not clear what specific US policies could reduce the desertion rate. Contribution to overall material improvement of the status of RVNAF personnel undoubtedly would have some effect. Politically, the prospects of continued fighting and increased combat for RVNAF units replacing US forces could increase the desertion rate since the rate is currently higher for combat units. Education of RVNAF troops politically as to the struggle commensurate with the better indoctrination of the NLF would seem to be indicated.

WILLING ALIGNMENT WITH THE GVN

The prospects for changes in the GVN for *political mobilization* by willing alignment of religious, provincial and other leaders would seem to be somewhat mixed.

Ever since the shock of the 1968 Viet Cong Tet offensive produced a political reaction favoring the creation of new nationalist political organization to rally the people of South Vietnam, there has been a marked and growing realization by all political leaders in Vietnam that they are dangerously divided and weak.

This realization of the need for unity has been sharply underscored by the prospect that open political competition with the NLF may well be an outcome of the Paris negotiations. While in the past a considerable section of the elite has envisaged a military solution that would eliminate the insurgent forces and had counted on the new GVN constitutional provisions as measures to outlaw the Viet Cong as a political force, more and more of the political leaders have come to believe that they will have to accept the legality of the NLF as an openly functioning political force in South Vietnam.

In the past when confronted with political conditions of such a crisis nature, the standard political response of the badly split nationalist leadership elite has been to at-

tempt consolidation within parties, create new parties, and also form some alliances between parties and fronts for unaffiliated individuals. On balance, the historical record would seem to indicate the Communists have been able to build and maintain such alliance organizations or Fronts because the steel structure of such organization was provided by the disciplined Communist Party organization. In contrast, the same process of factionalism which has marked all nationalist political parties has been extended to and led to the ineffectiveness and/or early demise of the non-Communist alliances.

Since Tet 1968, there has been a flurry of such organizational efforts by the nationalist political elite. The information available to date is hardly promising as to the success of these new efforts. Not only is there personal conflict which threatens the viability of the new formations but the dearth of financial resources is a serious limiting factor for organizational efforts. Moreover, these new groupings have difficulty defining themselves vis-a-vis the GVN and in particular the Presidency which as the center of power is vital to their prospects both financially and organizationally. Considerable instability has characterized legislative attempts to create blocs in the Upper and Lower House as a base for national coalition effort.

Nonetheless, the existence of the election system and the Legislature does have its consequences for these efforts at political organization. The new law dealing with political parties will undoubtedly require some coalition and unity of existing organizations if they are to meet its requirements. Changes in the present plurality voting system to reduce the number of candidates and splintering currently operative may well be devised to meet the future challenge passed by possible NLF participation in elections.

It would appear that the United States has little to gain by participating directly in actions aimed at building new grass-roots political organization or fronts in Vietnam. US muddling, covertly or overtly, in Vietnamese affairs at this level would embroil us in the very clique and personality struggles that are the bane of Vietnamese politics.

In Vietnam it is central to the process of political mobilization that the strengthening of the GVN's institutional structure in all its ramifications, the Presidency, cabinet, legislature, administration and recently organized judiciary be continued. Parallel to this effort is the continued improvement of the RVNAF as the military arm of the GVN. The more this governmental structure and its army appears to be the alternative to the NLF and its armed forces as the holders of the "just cause" mandate then the greater will be the willingness of the non-Communist elite to rally to it.

Alignment with the GVN of existing grass root religious organization such as the Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Catholics, Buddhists and Highlanders can best be facilitated by attention to their social and economic needs by the GVN while leaving them considerable leeway to develop politically.

A change in the policy of the GVN leadership toward the handling of militant Buddhists and others who favor peace programs and/or coalition with the NLF, by reinstatement of repressive practices, can contribute to the instability and narrowing of the base of support for the GVN. There is some evidence of desire for tightening up in this regard. Such divisive policies by the GVN leadership can only help to increase the numbers of those who will seek to change the GVN by accommodating to NLF demands for coalition policies and reduce their willingness to ally with the GVN leadership.

ANTI-CORRUPTION AND PRO-EFFICIENCY DRIVES

The prospects for cooperation by the people of South Vietnam with the GVN in anti-corruption and pro-efficiency drives would

seem to be good if the GVN sought their aid and created the necessary open climate. The major change required here is that the effort be undertaken by the top GVN leadership. The desire of the President and Prime Minister to be successful and survive has already seen them undertake a number of beneficial steps during the 1968 mobilization effort. The Vietnamese system, despite its grave shortcomings, is responsive to vigorous leadership.

United States advice and pressures to this end would be facilitated by a tightening of the standards of personal conduct by United States personnel in Vietnam, by streamlining and reducing American staffs in Vietnam and by continuing to take steps to get any U.S. civilians or military who contribute to wartime profiteering and corruption out of Vietnam.

US SUPPORT

Among the ways the United States might facilitate the movement toward broadening of the government, increasing competence and performance, and mobilizing non-Communist sympathies and energies in support of the GVN would be to:

a. Increase the Vietnamese sense of their own worth and capability by reducing the total numbers of American advisors, both civil and military.

b. Assist the Vietnamese in perceiving the necessity to relate to the people and meet their felt needs. Thus, special advisors, chosen in consultation with the highest levels of Vietnamese leadership as to their needs and desires, could be assigned to work closely with some Vietnamese leaders to develop programs of political organization and action. For example, advisors could be assigned to some key senators and representatives and they could assist then in touring their provinces and establishing and maintaining their constituencies.

c. Reassure the Vietnamese oligarchy of continued US support while at the same time providing clear evidence that the US commitment is not "open ended". For example, continued high levels of economic assistance and the provision of specially selected close-in political advisors to the President and the Prime Minister could do much to reassure the key leadership and assist them in developing the political skills for open democratic political processes at the same time the level of US troop commitments and total numbers of US advisors are reduced.

d. Continue to provide, in every case, clear advanced warning to the GVN leadership of major US moves vis-a-vis the scaling down of US forces or negotiations with the DRV/NLF and ask for their advice and assistance.

e. Scale down the numbers and types of demands that we make upon the Vietnamese; we should constantly reevaluate our requests of the Vietnamese in the light of feasibility and suitability to the Vietnamese milieu. For instance, asking the Vietnamese to "neutralize" a significant portion of the Viet Cong infrastructure in a one year period may be equivalent to asking ourselves to crack the Mafia in one year.

Question 24: How critical, in various views, is each of the changes in Question 23 to prospects of attaining—at current, reduced or increased levels of US military effort—either "victory" or a strong noncommunist political role after a compromise settlement of hostilities? What are views of the risks attendant to making these changes, or attempting them; and, to the extent that US influence is required, or US practical ability to move prudently and effectively in this direction? What is the evidence?

The views of the JCS, CINCPAC and MACV are:

The changes cited in Question 23 are important. However, they are only part of the total program needed to complete the constitutional structure, extend pacification throughout the national territory, and carry

out a process of reconciliation. The GVN should take the initiative. The United States can contribute by supporting efforts, prodding them into decreased reliance on the United States, and by suspending assistance to recalcitrant elements.

GENERAL

The three changes cited in Question 23 would, of course, be desirable, but it would be unfortunate to focus solely on them. To develop sufficient GVN strength to carry it to "victory," or to insure continued freedom for noncommunist Vietnamese after a settlement, a many pronged foundation, not a few glittering pillars is necessary. Thus, these three programs cannot be considered in isolation, but they should play their appropriate role in an overall strategy. Such an overall strategy for Vietnam could consist of a program of centripetal reconciliation and accommodation from the local level toward the national center. The GVN should take the initiative in the process, dealing from the position of strength it has achieved as a result of the military, pacification and political successes of the past year and those which can be reasonably anticipated from a steady projection of these programs into the next.

Such a program would be designed to expand the GVN's electoral base, at the local as well as national level. The Ministry of Interior has already decreed that village and hamlet elections will be held in all villages which now have appointed committees. These steps can be supplemented by holding the provincial council elections postponed from June 1968. Certain areas even offer the degree of security which would warrant the election of the province chief.

Real power over security, administration, and economic assistance is being given these elected officials and councils, and budgets and similar critical local decisions should be subjected to council vote as well as or in place of higher administrative approval. Thus, the process of decentralizing authority to the local level, and replacing the narrow elite as the power base by the broad mass of the rural and urban electorate can be initiated and even completed within a reasonable time span.

ATTENDANT RISK

An overall program such as this would obviously include steps toward broadening the Government and political mobilization by incorporation of all elements of the political spectrum. However, this would take place through the electoral process, not by appointment or coalition of self-appointed political forces. The electoral process would not necessarily develop greater competence and performance among elected officials, but it would name those giving greater satisfaction to the voters, a factor of perhaps greater importance. Upgrading could be expected through the process of political selection.

Such a program would include a number of other actions of equal importance to the three noted in question 23, such as providing forums for the growth of nongovernmental groupings, increasing the authority of elected representatives at the national level, providing an atmosphere of security against subversion or paramilitary violence to permit the electoral process to function, and invitation to Vietnamese currently engaged in violent attempts to seize power to participate in the electoral contest. The mere statement of the program outlines the difficulties and risks involved, and it is clear that elements of the establishment and even of the population might be reluctant to see such a trend. At the same time, the steps already undertaken and the provisions of the constitution itself point the direction of the program.

US ACTION

The United States can contribute substantially to such a development by encouraging and supporting the GVN as it moves in these directions, at the same time prodding the

GVN by both word and deed to get on with the job and not perpetually rely on the United States. US support could become a critical factor in the face of a flat recalcitrance by some elements of Vietnamese society to go along. In such a case the United States could suspend its assistance to that group and its supporters, e.g., a military element considering a coup d'etat.

Thus, the steps in Question 23 are important, and can be pressed by the United States, but they are only part of the total program needed to complete the constitutional structure, extend pacification throughout the national territory, and carry out the process of reconciling Vietnamese now pursuing the path of violence, to contend instead in peaceful political courts. The United States can assist such a program, and must, if it is to achieve the reduction of internal violence which can permit it honorably to consider its task accomplished in Vietnam.

Additionally, the JCS points out the following requirements:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the essential conditions for a cessation of hostilities include an effective cease fire, verified withdrawal to North Vietnam of all North Vietnamese personnel (including those in Laos and Cambodia), verified cessation of infiltration, substantial reduction in terrorism, repatriation of US prisoners, agreement to reestablish the demilitarized zone with adequate safeguards, no prohibition against US assistance to insure that; the RVNAF is capable of coping with the residual security threat, and preservation of the sovereignty of the GVN.

It may not be possible for negotiations to achieve agreement in full on all of the essential conditions. However, the degree to which the essential conditions can be achieved as a result of negotiations is crucial to the determination of whether "victory" has been achieved or a strong noncommunist political role assured. The degree of achievement of the above conditions will determine the post hostilities security threat in South Vietnam and the capability of the RVNAF to cope with the threat.

Achievement of the essential conditions for cessation of hostilities is contingent upon continuation of the US effort and improvement of the RVNAF. It is inconceivable that the essential conditions could be realized as a result of an early unilateral reduction of US military effort. Contemplation of such a possibility is not in consonance with our experience in dealing with the communists and ignores the basic causes of the conflict as well as the recognized communist objectives.

Two considerations loom large in any assessment of the leverage which the United States should exert on the GVN for changes in the political processes. First is the need to allay South Vietnamese fears that the United States might either desert the GVN or impose a settlement which could lead to a communist takeover. Secondly, the GVN must be allowed to establish its competence and independence as a sovereign government so that it can earn the support of the South Vietnamese people and provide confident, effective government. Untactful or excessive US leverage could produce instabilities contributing to political disintegration. The nature and level of pressure which the United States can effectively apply to encourage GVN political improvements can best be evaluated by the US mission in Saigon.

With regard to essential conditions for cessation of hostilities, OSD has the following views:

There is a need within the US Government for agreement on the essential conditions for a cessation of hostilities. Interagency efforts (in the context of preparing for the Paris talks) to achieve such agreement are in progress. Planning for the implementation of post hostilities programs at this time,

however, need not necessarily be identical to the US negotiating position in Paris. Implementation of post hostilities actions may begin independent of or in phase with the Paris talks rather than directly tied to these talks. Therefore, planning for these actions should be viewed as a step toward ascertaining general minimum conditions for post hostilities. The following is a suggestive list of criteria:

a. Restoration of the Demilitarized Zone defined in terms of the 1954 Geneva Accords, that is, a buffer zone observed and acknowledged by both sides which is free of all military forces. Further, the DMZ would separate the two zones of North and South Vietnam pending a peace settlement and would have the same exact area as the DMZ set up by the 1954 Geneva Conference. Additionally, all acts of force would be prescribed within the DMZ and an effective inspection system instituted.

b. Mutual withdrawal of forces in accordance with the Manila Communique and as security conditions permit. The required security conditions are: (1) Respect for the DMZ; (2) No attacks on the major cities; (3) No infiltration to replace troops withdrawn; (4) No attacks on units which have been designated by either side to the other for withdrawal and which are in the process of withdrawal.

c. Withdrawals include: (1) All North Vietnamese forces whether or not they are fighting in North Vietnam's units to include regroups; and (2) The withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops in Laos and Cambodia.

d. An agreement on inspection and verification machinery which might take the form of an international commission or a joint belligerents' commission or both. However, realizing inspection and verification in Southeast Asia has never been a workable proposition except with the full cooperation of all parties concerned, we would be prepared to rely upon our unilateral means of surveillance.

e. Release of all US/FW personnel held by the NVN/NLF.

Additionally, other conditions considered necessary but not subject to formal agreement are:

a. External security guarantees on a multilateral basis, or falling these, some declaration of future support for South Vietnam in the event of future breach, signed by ourselves and friendly nations (like the Korea 16-nation declaration).

b. Conditions in South Vietnam that will give an opportunity for free choice of political system and leadership under constitutional processes and without external interference.

Further OSD views re the issues raised are: Question 24 raises issues that go to the heart of the problem posed by the intertwining of the political and military that characterizes "wars of national liberation." "Victory" in such a war has a dual meaning.

"Victory" in the military sense would be the reduction of the military capabilities of the Viet Cong to the level where it could be dealt with throughout South Vietnam as normal police operations against criminal disturbers of the peace.

The question is fundamentally ambiguous in respect to the military aspect of "victory" insofar as it seeks evaluation of prospects for "victory" . . . at current, reduced or increased levels of U.S. military effort. . . or after a compromise settlement of hostilities. Presumably "a compromise settlement of hostilities" would preclude use of the word "victory" by definition and more over by its nature as a compromise would require appreciably reducing the level of the U.S. military effort since it is hard to envisage conditions requiring the maintenance of the current level or an increased level at that point in time.

A possible though unlikely "compromise

settlement of hostilities" might lead to mutual reduction in force levels of the United States and NVA troops in South Vietnam leaving the GVN to confront the NLF. In that case the prospects for military "victory" of the GVN leaves much to be desired since they would still have to successfully overcome an insurgent movement with armed forces of its own at a level of approximately 100,000 soldiers. Even the most optimistic would concede that will take some "doing" by the RVNAF and only after a considerable period in time, if at all, by a transformed RVNAF would the GVN be able to deal with the NLF at a police level. Thus military "victory" is not an issue under present circumstances.

In its political sense "victory" would require political submission of the NLF to the GVN to be dealt with as the GVN sees fit or at the least it would mean simply dissolving their infrastructure in the villages and leaving the political arena as an organized body. This outcome would appear unlikely at any level of U.S. military effort except one that would be increased to the point where military "victory" was possible and thus does not follow on a compromise settlement of hostilities. It would also seem unlikely that the U.S. would seek this outcome by abandoning the effort for a compromise settlement given the costs of further escalation.

Therefore, the changes envisaged in question 23 are primarily continuing efforts to improve the GVN's prospects as an alternative political system now to that of the National Liberation Front. Thus, when the political and not a military confrontation takes place after the compromise settlement of hostilities, the GVN would be able to play a strong or stronger non-Communist role depending on its progress in the course of the negotiating period.

From the vantage point of the political, the changes indicated above would seem to be necessary for the viability of the GVN in any case. If the GVN does not improve as an effective non-Communist political system even its military effort is bound to suffer as it has in the past. Americanization of the war in Vietnam was made necessary because of near-collapse of the GVN in February 1965. The U.S. military effort has provided the shield behind which the reconstruction of the GVN has taken place. De-Americanization of the war has to go hand-in-hand with the GVN takeover of its responsibilities if it is to survive in its own right and not be perpetually dependent on the United States military presence.

Question 25: How do military deployment and tactics today differ from those of 6-12 months ago? What are the reasons for the changes, and what has this impact been?

In early 1968, deployments were made in reaction to enemy actions. Later in the year, as a result of having nearly all Deployment Program 6 forces in South Vietnam (SVN) and of seizing the initiative, US forces were deployed in accordance with land area priorities and now are in a position to counter likely enemy threats with a minimum of changes. In addition, a number of developments in 1968 have had, and are continuing to have, a direct effect on tactical operations. They are: adoption of a "one war" concept with all assets brought together in a single effort; provision for major military support of pacification; increased waterway interdiction operations by the Navy; employment of B-52s as a strategic reserve; application of a "single manager" concept for tactical and reconnaissance air operations; and shift in allocation of air resources to interdiction campaign in Laos when the halt in the bombing of North Vietnam (NVN) freed air assets.

In early 1968, deployments were in reaction to the enemy invasion across the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and through Laos which placed Khe Sanh under siege and threatened the coastal lowlands. In January

and February, the 1st Cavalry Division from II Corps and two brigades of the 101st Airborne Division from III Corps were deployed to northern I Corps. These units were joined by the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, and Regimental Landing Team 27, 5th Marine Division, which were deployed from the Continental United States (CONUS). These additional units enabled allied forces to relieve the siege of Khe Sanh, force the enemy to withdraw from Hue, neutralize enemy strength in the A Sau Valley and Base Areas 101 and 114, and pursue the enemy into the western highlands.

SVN land area priorities, established in mid-year, have influenced subsequent deployments. These were: priority one, the western portion of III Corps (which includes Saigon) and the northern portion of IV Corps down to the mouth of the Mekong River (these areas were to be minimum risk, to be held as inviolate as possible); priority two, I Corps from the DMZ down to Quang Ngai; priority three, the highland areas of II Corps (this area was to be held by minimum forces backed by South Vietnamese Army and Republic of Korea divisions along the coast).

An additional factor influencing deployment was the availability of US forces. By mid-summer, practically all of the Deployment Program 6 forces were in SVN. With the arrival in-country of the complete asset for the Mobile Riverine Group (Task Force 117), two brigades of the 9th US Infantry Division were moved from III Corps and permanently stationed in the Delta. Operating on the rivers and canals, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) and US units have stepped up the pace of the war in IV Corps, especially against longheld enemy bastions.

By mid-October 1968, it became apparent that the enemy, reacting to allied pressure, had withdrawn virtually all of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units from northern I Corps into sanctuaries in Laos and NVN and that a reduced force could control the remaining enemy units and maintain offensive pressure south of the DMZ. At the same time, enemy forces were building up in III Corps astride the SVN-Cambodian border. Accordingly, on 28 October 1968, the 1st Cavalry Division began deployment to III Corps to screen the border provinces adjacent to Cambodia. The division was given the mission to interdict the movement of enemy personnel and supplies, locate the neutralize base areas and destroy caches, deny freedom of movement to reconnaissance elements, and preempt the enemy's offensive preparations.

On 1 December 1968, five US helicopter companies and two air cavalry troops were deployed to IV Corps to provide RVNAF and US forces in the Delta with the mobility and reconnaissance capabilities required for the operations that were planned for the dry season.

A major factor influencing deployments within the corps has been the degree of expansion and improved effectiveness of the Regional Forces (RF) and Popular Forces (PF). This has permitted some regular RVNAF and US units to be withdrawn from static security missions and resume offensive operations. The effectiveness of RF/PF has been enhanced by the deployment of US Mobile Advisory Teams to province and district level, providing better training and greater access to air and artillery support through US advisory channels.

US ground forces now are deployed throughout SVN to conduct offensive operations, to exploit enemy vulnerabilities, and to contain the enemy's offensive capabilities. US ground forces are not held in reserve because the superior tactical mobility of US forces permits any ground force out of contact to constitute the reserve. Two brigades in II Corps have been given a contingency mission and are prepared to move to either the I Corps or III Corps on a 36-hour notice.

Several factors have contributed to the change in the pattern of air operations during 1968. These include: additional deployments of aircraft; cessation of bombing north of 19 degrees; greater flexibility in the shifting of resources between in-and-out-country operations; greater availability of B-52 resources for interdiction; the introduction of centralized management of air support in key areas; new techniques of concentrated targeting; the effective application of sensor technology in tactical air operations; and the availability of sufficient air resources to operate effectively south of 19 degrees.

Deployment changes in air assets in 1968 include: the addition of five F-100 squadrons and one A-1 squadron to the 7th Air Force force structure; the movement to bases in eastern Thailand nearer the interdiction battlefield, enabling greater concentration of effort; employment in the interdiction campaign of four AC-130 gunships, and ten EC-47s; the introduction of F-100F and F-4 Misty and Stormy forward air controllers; and an increase of B-52 sorties allotted from 800 to 1,800 per month.

These changes in deployment have improved the round-the-clock interdiction of the route structure in Laos and the surveillance of the routes day and night, increased the night strike capability, and intensified close support operations in SVN.

A "one war" concept has been adopted which recognizes that there is no such thing as a war of big battalions, a war of pacification, or a war of territorial security. Under this concept, allied forces carry the battle to the enemy simultaneously in all areas of conflict by strengthening cooperation, between US commanders and US advisors to the RVNAF on the one hand, and between US commanders and US advisors to the Government of Vietnam (GVN) province and district officials on the other. In the employment of forces, all elements are brought together into a single effort. Ground forces, tactical air, B-52s, RF/PF, Province Reconnaissance Units (PRU), National Police Field Force (NPF), Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), and Revolutionary Development (RD) cadre attack the North Vietnamese Army (NVA)/Viet Cong (VC) units (main and local forces), guerrillas, and the VC infrastructure across the broad spectrum of the conflict to neutralize the enemy's capabilities and offensive options. The "one war" concept in-country achieved its biggest breakthrough with the combining of the civil/military support of pacification under a single agency in MACV.

Military support has been provided for the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) of the GVN for the period November 1968 through January 1969. The APC seeks to expand the GVN presence and control into contested areas by upgrading about 1,300 contested or VC-controlled hamlets containing some 1.4 million people to relatively secure status, based on Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) security score alone (the first nine factors). US forces have been used to keep large enemy forces away from the pacification areas, to destroy local forces and guerrillas in them, and to assist with an intensified attack on the VC infrastructure. Denied access to these formerly contested or VC-controlled hamlets, the enemy's main forces lose sources of food, recruitment, intelligence, and concealment. The GVN 1969 Pacification and Development Plan is an extension of the APC and is designed to maintain the momentum of the political/military attack on the enemy.

Interdiction operations on the navigable waterways of SVN have been intensified, utilizing the diverse capabilities of ground, air, and naval forces. These operations include actions to locate, block, and inflict personnel and materiel casualties on the enemy's supply, communication and evacuation routes. Multiple barriers are established across lines

of communication. Waterborne assets, US airborne troops, Special Forces, RF/PF, tactical air, and helicopters are used to form the barrier, augmented by sensors and other intelligence gathering assets, and defoliation of the river banks. Interdiction operations in III Corps are designed to make the enemy reorient his logistic structure and restrict the flow of supplies into the Saigon area.

B-52s have been employed as a strategic reserve. The B-52 force in Southeast Asia is a flexible reserve which gives the theater commander a means for influencing the battle without constant shift of major troop units. See Question 27 for additional comment.

A "single manager" concept has been adopted for control of tactical air assets. The COMUSMACV Deputy for Air was given the responsibility for management of III Marine Amphibious Force fighter-bomber and reconnaissance aircraft. At Khe Sanh, total centralization of reconnaissance and targeting functions, coupled with massive concentration of force, was a decisive factor in the outcome of the battle. The "single manager" concept for tactical and reconnaissance air operations, although providing overall more

effective air support, has resulted in some impairment of the air/ground organizational integrity of US Marine Corps forces.

The allocation of air resources has been shifted. On 1 April 1968, all bombing operations north of 19 degrees ceased, enabling the US Navy and Air Force to concentrate out-country tactical air in the NVN panhandle. As in-country ground operations diminished in intensity, additional tactical air sorties were applied out-country. This concentration of air power succeeded in disrupting the logistic flow into SVN along the coastal routes of the NVN panhandle, the DMZ, and the overland routes into Laos. The termination of all bombing operations in NVN on 1 November 1968 released more air resources which were shifted to the interdiction campaign in Laos. However, the same tactics used and lessons learned in bombing NVN are being applied in Laos, subject to political constraints. The object is to create impassable choke points on lines of communication. Waterways and crossing points are seeded with MK-36 mines and roads are closed with blast and delay fuzed munitions. The result is off-loaded supplies and backed-up logistics carriers which are located by all-source in-

telligence and attacked with area-coverage munitions. However, the geography of Laos is not as well suited to line of communication air interdiction as is NVN. This is offset partially by a higher rate of B-52 and tactical air strikes. With the aid of Igloo White sensor technology, road watch teams, and other intelligence collection assets to locate and monitor the flow of truck traffic, the enemy's truck parks have been systematically attacked. This has forced the enemy to change his convoy patterns and daytime truck parking habits. The major truck parks are no longer safe to use, and convoys cannot move freely. The air effort is reducing significantly the enemy's throughput capability.

Allied military forces in SVN almost have tripled in size during the last four years from about .5 million at the beginning of 1965 to approximately 1.4 million today. In the first three years of this period they increased about 650,000 and in the last 6-12 months they increased approximately 240,000. They currently are programmed to increase over 45,000 in the next six months to a strength of almost 1.5 million by mid-1969. The following table shows the increasing size of allied military forces in SVN since early 1965.

Strength (thousands)	December 1964	December 1967	June 1968	December 1968	June 1969
United States ¹	23.3	485.6	534.7	536.7	546.7
South Vietnam ²	514.3	643.1	765.3	826.5	872.4
3d nation ³	.5	59.4	62.4	65.6	69.9
Total strength	538.1	1,188.1	1,362.4	1,428.8	1,474.2

¹ Does not include forces offshore or in Thailand.

² Includes only national military forces (RVNAF); does not include paramilitary/security forces.

³ Includes only forces from Australia, Korea, New Zealand, Philippines, and Thailand.

In the past, the primary mission of US forces in SVN has been to destroy the enemy's main force units, to protect US bases and to provide air and artillery support for other allied forces. On the other hand, the primary mission of the RVNAF has been to provide territorial security and to support the pacification program. The third nation forces have operated autonomously in specific geographical areas and carry out offensive and security missions.

To accomplish these missions, the number of allied maneuver battalions has increased commensurate with the increasing size of allied military forces in SVN. During the last four years there has been one maneuver battalion for every 4000-5000 of total military strength. In the first three years of this period the number more than doubled, due to the expansion of the RVNAF and the deployment of US and third nation combat

forces to SVN. In the last 6-12 months the number increased at a slower rate, as the deployment of free world forces slowed down and the continued expansion of the RVNAF placed greater emphasis on more RF and PF for territorial security. The following table shows the increasing number of infantry-type allied maneuver battalions in SVN since early 1965:

Battalions (infantry type)	December 1964	December 1967	June 1968	December 1968	June 1969
United States	0	98	108	107	107
South Vietnam ¹	123	154	161	166	168
3d nation ²	0	26	26	28	31
Total battalions	123	278	295	301	306

¹ Includes only national military forces (RVNAF); does not include paramilitary/security forces.

² Includes only forces from Australia, Korea, New Zealand, and Thailand.

The total number of allied maneuver battalions in each corps has varied as US combat units and RVNAF general reserve units (airborne and marine) were shifted to meet the prevailing enemy threat. The maneuver battalions organic to RVNAF infantry divisions and third nation forces generally have remained within their assigned corps. In the last 6-12 months the number of maneuver battalions has fluctuated the most in I Corps (78-100), while II Corps (62-73), III Corps (94-102) and IV Corps (45-51) have been more stabilized. This fluctuation in I Corps has been dictated primarily by the changing enemy threat to Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces (XXIV Corps), particularly from enemy forces located in sanctuaries north of the DMZ and in Laos.

Until the last half of 1968, allied efforts were directed largely against enemy main forces through major unit operations. A significant portion of allied assets also was directed against enemy infiltration and committed to the defense of cities and towns. Because of these other operations, insufficient forces were available for continuous

direct support of pacification and local security. These efforts are essential to countering both the political and military threat in the rural areas.

The withdrawal of a large part of the enemy main forces recently has permitted allied forces to concentrate on offensive actions against the VC support apparatus, including the political structure, and on countering infiltration by improved intelligence and territorial security. This effort has accelerated progress in this area, but it still is unlikely that the conflict can be brought rapidly to a close. Conversely, deescalation of US military activities, not tied to a significant increase in RVNAF effectiveness or NVA deescalation, could lead to a deterioration of our position.

At present, the major threat to allied objectives in SVN is the enemy's effort to extend his political control over the population and claim a facade of legitimacy for his authority. Currently the enemy has two main alternatives for military action: either to conduct protracted guerrilla warfare, or to undertake widespread attacks similar to those mounted

earlier last year. It now appears that he has settled on a protracted war with the threat of major military activity, combining his military actions with intensified political activity.

Before the US can reduce its force levels in Southeast Asia the RVNAF will have to assume an even larger share of the fighting and pacification. Since 1965 the RVNAF has increased both the quality and quantity of its troops, but it still is far from being able to stand alone against the VC/NVA forces. The army presently is the best equipped and most effective fighting branch of the RVNAF and recently it has begun to assume a larger share of the main-force war throughout SVN, particularly in VI Corps which normally has only two US brigades. On the other hand, the RF and PF, who are supposed to provide security for the population in conjunction with other allied forces, generally have been less effective because of severe leadership, firepower, supply and motivational deficiencies.

In summary, the Vietnam war is both a political and a military one; the ultimate key

to victory for both sides in SVN is control of and support by the people. At present the major threat to allied objectives in SVN is the enemy's effort to extend his political control over the population and claim a facade of legitimacy for his authority. The withdrawal of a large part of the enemy main forces recently has permitted to allies to concentrate on offensive actions against the enemy support apparatus, including the political structure, and on countering infiltration by improved intelligence and territorial security. While elements of the overall situation may change and show signs of improvement, there is little likelihood that the allies can attain their objectives in the immediate future by military means alone. If the allies continue to shift towards the political aspects of the struggle, the present US effort appears to be the proper one to counter enemy actions and options and permit a gradual shifting of the war to the Vietnamese as they demonstrate the ability to handle their own political-military problems.

In what different ways (including innovations in organization) might US force levels be reduced to various levels, while minimizing impact on combat capability?

While there appears to be no acceptable way of reducing US force levels in Vietnam without at least an equal reduction of combat capability, there are a number of ways to reduce forces with minimal effect on combat capability. They are:

1. Reduction of logistic and headquarters forces limiting effect on combat capability by consolidation of units, locations and utilization of innovations in organization.
2. Reduced tactical air capability.
3. US troop reduction in phase with expansion and improvement of RVNAF.
4. Reductions of forces saved through revised tactical concepts for using US combat forces.
5. Increased use of contractual efforts and use of logistic facilities other than in South Vietnam.
6. Elimination or reduction in specific units of the force structure as they are no longer necessary.

The question of US force levels in South Vietnam and possible reduction of these levels is being reviewed by DoD continually.

—OSD controls tightly all US deployments and redeployments to and from South Vietnam. The existing force structure and possible ways to reduce US force levels in South Vietnam are continually under review.

—In addition to the reviews conducted by the Commander in Chief, Pacific, and the Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services continuously study the force structure in the Republic of Vietnam to identify lower priority forces, possible reorganizations, and other innovations to provide tradeoffs, within ceiling to accommodate outstanding high priority requirements.

—COMUSMACV reports this question has been raised and reviewed almost daily since the current force ceiling was established in mid-1968. Under present conditions in South Vietnam, any significant reduction in current force levels will result in a significant decrease in combat capability. An integrated Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, unit priority list is maintained under constant review to determine which spaces can be traded off at any moment to meet higher priority requirements. . . .

The principal criteria are perceived to be:

1. The tactical situation, in particular the residual threat. US/Free World Forces must, at all times, be adequate to ensure security.
2. The capability of the RVNAF to assume US missions.
3. The requirement to provide US combat support (e.g., helicopter, artillery, and combat service-support units) to the expanded RVNAF and, thus, assure a balanced combat capability in South Vietnam.

4. The requirements of the roll-up mission.
5. Impact on ongoing negotiations.

—An additional criterion that OSD will consider is the political situation in South Vietnam and the political stability of the Government of Vietnam (GVN). A large or precipitous withdrawal of US forces without prior preparation of the Vietnamese political structure may weaken seriously the GVN's progress in preparing itself for political confrontation with the Viet Cong.

The following paragraphs contain a brief review of some of the considerations involved in each of the ways to reduce forces.

Reduction of logistic support and headquarters forces. COMUSMACV reports that combat service-support units have been drawn down recently over 15,000 spaces to meet the civilianization program goal and to provide spaces for higher priority combat and combat-support units. Within the space ceiling established by Southeast Asia Program 6, the maximum number of combat-type units has been included with the result that only essential combat support and combat-service support are provided. The austerity of these type units is reflected in the Command's integrated unit priority list where the emphasis is on more combat-service support units as opposed to combat units.

On the other hand, OSD analysts consider that significant reduction in logistic and headquarters elements in SVN could be made. For example, as key engineer constructions are completed, engineer construction personnel could be reduced. Further, reduction could be made by reducing some of the over 12,000 personnel assigned to major units headquarters.

Reduced tactical air capability. OSD analysts consider that some reduction in tactical air capability devoted to SVN could be made with only limited reductions in combat efficiency. First, one of the three attack craft devoted to Laos interdiction might be feasible.

However, either or both of these actions depend on North Vietnamese observance of the tacit conditions of the US bombing halt. Reduction of tactical air capability at this time without an unacceptable reduction in combat capability is not supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCPAC, and COM USMACV. They considered that force requirements in Southeast Asia are not reduced as a result of cessation of bombardment operations against NVN and air assets should not be reduced at this time. Sorties currently being flown do not utilize the full tactical air capability. This is not the result of a reduced requirement but rather the consequence of adverse weather conditions and targeting problems associated with the interdiction program in Laos. The improvement in targeting procedures is now being pursued as a matter of urgency.

(TS) RVNAF improvement and expansion. US forces could be reduced as RVNAF improves and expands:

The ongoing RVNAF modernization and expansion program should increase RVNAF ground combat capability by the equivalent of more than 30 US Army combat battalions by the end of FY70, provided that RVNAF combat effectiveness increases along with combat capability, the security situation does not worsen, and the RVNAF desertion rate can be appreciably reduced. Depending upon increases in RVNAF effectiveness, some US combat capability could be withdrawn. Based on current levels of effectiveness, OSD analysts consider that about one-half the Vietnamese regular combat battalions are sufficiently effective so their combat capability should increase rapidly. Consequently, up to about 15 battalions might be reduced by mid-1969 without a decrease in total allied force capacity. Some associated support elements could also be reduced.

In regard to reduction of combat forces, COMUSMACV considers that, with the mo-

mentum that has been built up in the pacification program, the expansion and modernization of RVNAF, and the steady attrition of the enemy, it would be possible to plan for removing one division from South Vietnam during mid-summer of 1969. He and Ambassador Bunker recently discussed this with President Thieu and were met with a favorable response. OSD considers that at least some of the 43,000 men "division equivalent" could be reduced; however, those elements of this equivalent that could assist in quickly maximizing RVNAF's combat power (such as helicopter units, some logistic elements, etc.) should remain.

In addition to possible reduction of US forces through increased RVNAF capability, some US units will turn-over their equipment to RVNAF units during the accelerated modernization program. Most of these are combat support (helicopter and artillery units) and logistic units. . . .

Revised tactical concepts. It is OSD view that recent changes in tactical concepts and resulting innovations, may make some troop reductions possible. First, the increases in the number of integrated and combined relations with RVNAF should result in increases in RVNAF effectiveness above a level possible with a modernized RVNAF operating alone. A second, but less desirable approach would be encadrement, placing US forces in RVNAF units similar to the US Marine Combined Action Platoon program. A third way, would be to concentrate on extensive long range patrols in lieu of battalion fire operations. Proponents claim that these operations are more effective; however, small units are often more vulnerable to ambush and a highly mobile reserve is required. Regardless of the approach taken, ways of "stiffening" RVNAF with US combat and combat support are being studied and these may lead to possible reductions in US forces.

Increased use of contractual effort and use of logistic facilities other than in South Vietnam. In addition to continuing emphasis at all levels on combat capability in force structure development, two innovations have been undertaken: (1) the extensive use of civilian contractor effort in lieu of troop construction and service units; and (2) the use of direct-hire local nationals to fill selected positions within US military organizations. The potential saving in military manpower spaces was originally estimated to be 12,500, but it has not yet proven to be possible to realize the saving of this magnitude, a principal reason being the implications of combat on a country wide basis, e.g., at Tet 1968. In this regard, COMUSMACV, reports that civilian labor is unreliable during periods when proximity of combat is close, when there is labor unrest or security conditions are unfavorable.

Elimination or reduction in specific units of the force structure as military requirements for them decline in priority.

The JCS consider that US military ceilings in the Republic of Vietnam have always been substantially less than assessed military requirements, necessitating a continuing search for tradeoffs, within ceiling, to accommodate outstanding high priority requirements. During 1968, the ongoing search for space-saving actions or units of relatively lower priority, have produced over 12,000 spaces which, in turn, were used to accommodate, within the 549,500 ceiling, the most critical of the unfulfilled requirements. However, the directed method of accounting for spaces within this Program 6 ceiling includes personnel who are either not participants in combat effort, or for various reasons (temporarily assigned in-country hospitalized, R&R, temporarily assigned out-of-country, and in replacement or returnee status) are nonproductive personnel that must be included in accounting procedures. These procedures necessitate reductions in combat

personnel so as to remain within the Program 6 ceiling. Currently, consideration is being given to redeployment from Vietnam of certain Marine authorization, of the remaining elements of the division/wing . . . their full organizational strength. Elements being considered for redeployment include units such as a fighter-attack squadron and support two antitank battalions, one amphibian tractor battalion, an armored amphibian tractor company, and two medium tank companies (reinforced).

At present, COMUSMACV has certain unfulfilled high priority requirements for which compensating tradeoff spaces have not been identified. Some of these requirements such as the AC-119 gunships, have been specifically developed at great cost for use in Vietnam and will soon be available for deployment. Additional new requirements will develop as the situation in RVN changes or as other new or improved organizational equipments become available for units in RVN. Any such new requirements will require tradeoff spaces to remain within the ceiling. Thus not all actions mentioned herein can be applied to a reduction in the existing military ceiling but some must be utilized on an ongoing basis to offset organizational strength changes in-country or approved new deployments.

Question 27: What is the evidence on the scale of effect of B-52 attacks in producing VC/NVA casualties: In disrupting VC/NVA operations? How valid are estimates of overall effect?

ARC LIGHT is the code name given to high altitude tactical bombing raids flown in Southeast Asia by B-52 bombers. The missions are carried out by 105 B-52s based on Guam, Thailand (U-Tapao), and Okinawa (Kadena), supported by KC-135 tankers from Okinawa and Taiwan. At present, an average of 1600 ARC LIGHT sorties per month are authorized with the sortie rate scheduled to range between 1400 and 1800 depending on combat intensity.¹ Each B-52 delivers 28 to 30 tons of high explosives per sortie, depending on where the plane is based.

The B-52 ARC LIGHT force in Southeast Asia provides a flexible theater reserve with the firepower equivalent of a multidivision ground force. Retention of sorties under centralized control permits quick support of subordinate commanders. Reconstitution of this reserve is accomplished in a matter of hours by upcoming sorties. It also permits the weight of B-52 to be shifted between in-country and out-of-country targets as required.

About one-half of the strikes are against known or suspected enemy base camps, supply caches, and headquarters. The remainder are targeted against known enemy troop concentrations or in support of tactical operations, e.g., in support of the defense of an outpost such as Dak To and Khe Sanh.

During CY 1968, the B-52s flew 20,600 sorties, of which 16,450 were directed against in-country targets. Included in the in-country bombing are several noteworthy campaigns. At Khe-Sanh during January-March, 2,179 B-52 sorties delivered 61,012 tons of bombs. In mid-June, B-52s flew 5,378 sorties and delivered 150,584 tons of ordinance to disrupt Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army (VC/NVA) operations around Saigon. Recently, B-52 strikes have been shifted to the Laotian lines of communication to assist in blocking the flow of traffic entering Laos through the Mu Gia and the Ban Karai/Ban Labory Passes. Since November 1, 1968, 2,301 B-52 sorties have been flown over Laos.

¹The variable 1400/1800 rate replaced a level 1800 sortie rate on 1 Jan 1969. To date SAC has continued to fly at the 1800 sortie rate. The JCS are expected in the near future to recommend that the variable rate be dropped and 1800 be approved.

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EFFECTIVENESS

It is generally agreed that a feasible method for analyzing ARC LIGHT effectiveness has not yet been devised. It is not possible to make any definitive statements regarding the effectiveness of ARC LIGHT. Field commanders are lavish in their praise. COMUSMACV recently stated that ARC LIGHT was his strategic reserve and had the equivalent combat punch of two divisions. No one has been able to quantitatively support such claims (or disprove them). Hard evidence on the effectiveness of the ARC LIGHT program is difficult to find. Certainly some strikes are highly effective. Some are clearly wasted. The majority have an undetermined impact.

QUALITATIVE

Many qualitative statements of effectiveness can be cited. For example, at Khe Sanh ARC LIGHT has been credited with blunting the enemy's offensive plans. MACV states that prisoners of war reports indicated that some enemy battalions sustained from 50 percent to 75 percent casualties from B-52 attacks alone. Estimates of total enemy killed and wounded at Khe Sanh by B-52s ranged from 2,000 to 10,000 men.

During August and September an enemy force with an estimated strength of 6,000 to 8,000 attempted to overrun the Duc Lap Special Forces Camp in Quang Duc Province. ARC LIGHT strikes were ordered. Of the 800 enemy killed in action there, MACV states that about 300 were attributed to B-52 strikes.

In mid-June there was evidence of an imminent attack on Saigon. The enemy had placed three VC/NVA regiments in Binh Duong Province and the 9th Viet Cong Regiment in Hau Nghie Province. B-52s attacked their staging areas, base camps, and resupply points. The enemy did not launch the anticipated attack or make good his threat of 100 rockets a day for 100 days against Saigon. MACV states that there is evidence that, harassed by day and night bombing as well as by aggressive ground actions, the enemy was forced to split into small units and in many cases, withdraw to safe areas in Cambodia.

In the four northern provinces of South Vietnam (I Corps Tactical Zone) and the demilitarized zone, B-52 strikes have been used in supporting US and South Vietnamese ground forces with heavy firepower in preparation for and during operations. B-52s were effective in frustrating enemy efforts to overrun the Special Forces Camp at Thuong Duc and in support of friendly helicopter assaults into heretofore inaccessible areas such as the A Chau Valley.

In the delta region of South Vietnam (IV Corps Tactical Zone), B-52 strikes are scheduled in advance of US and South Vietnamese combat sweep operations, to permit the entry of friendly ground forces into former enemy strongholds with little or no resistance. In the delta, the constant threat of B-52 strikes has forced the enemy to disperse his forces and move almost every day, making it more difficult for him to mass for an operation. The necessity for frequent movement and dispersal has greatly increased the enemy's command and control problems.

Intelligence derived from documents, prisoners of war, and reliable agents, confirms that B-52 strikes have prevented high level infrastructure planning conferences from occurring, made local recruiting of laborers and village guerrillas difficult, exposed caches of supplies and munitions, and have forced the enemy to move in small groups. Frequent comments by prisoners of war and ralliers indicate that the B-52 strike is the one weapon most feared by enemy troops.

QUANTITATIVE

The only quantitative measures of effectiveness available deal with the damage inflicted by ARC LIGHT strikes. These measures (enemy killed, structures destroyed, days a pass is closed to traffic, trucks destroyed,

etc.) are indirect in the sense that their effect on the enemy's ability and desire to pursue the war is not known. Part of the difficulty in relating damage inflicted to real progress is due to the fact that the enemy can often delay his attack until he has built up the needed forces or repaired the damaged lines of communication.

The JCS estimate that 41,250 enemy were killed in 1968 by all in-country B-52 strikes. This is an average of 2.5 enemy killed per sortie.² (This is equivalent to the 13.75 killed per B-52 strike where each strike includes an average of 5.5 sorties.)

Office of the Secretary of Defense estimates of enemy killed by ARC LIGHT are much lower than those of the JCS. As shown below, they are derived from a different data base during a different time period. It is felt that Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) reports provide the most comprehensive source of data on ARC LIGHT casualty and destruction results. There are three sources of BDA. The first, ground follow-up, is the most thorough, even though there frequently is a time lapse between the B-52 strike and the follow-up, allowing the enemy to conceal his losses. The other two sources, aerial photographs and aerial visual reconnaissance, provide some information but are often limited by jungle cover and there is the unsolvable problem of multiple countings. BDA of some type is received on about 60% of ARC LIGHT missions, but only 18% of the total missions are followed up by ground teams. Missions in NVN and Laos receive no ground follow-up; missions in III and IV Corps have ground follow more than half of the time. The table below shows the extent and type of BDA during the period June 1966 through October 1967.

ARC LIGHT BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

[June 1966-October 1967]

	Mission	Missions with BDA	Type of BDA ¹		
			Photo	Visual recon	Ground
B-52 missions.....	1,351	801	308	299	247
Percent.....	100	59	23	22	18

¹ More than 1 type of BDA was available for some missions. Source: MACV-J-2 study 68-08, "Arc light effectiveness."

The following table summarizes Bomb Damage Assessment reports from June 1966 to October 1967. It indicates that the average ARC LIGHT mission kills 3.1 enemy and destroys 10.0 structures (huts, fortified positions, and buildings). An average mission consists of 7.2 aircraft; thus, an average of 0.43 enemy are estimated as being killed per sortie. (Note that the JCS estimate was 2.5 enemy killed per B-52 sortie.) If this average enemy casualty rate is extrapolated to include all B-52 strikes, ARC LIGHT apparently has killed approximately 17,000 enemy since 1965 (3.9% of total enemy losses) and will cause 8000 deaths in 1969. ARC LIGHT has also destroyed or damaged 41,000 enemy structures (5.7% to total structures reported destroyed by all air operations).

² This statistic is based on ground follow-ups of 103 B-52 strikes during the period 1 Jan-31 Jul 1968 which revealed 714 killed by air, or about 6 killed by air per strike. Also, in 50 prisoner of war interrogations, enemy soldiers who had undergone B-52 attacks indicated that their units had suffered 989 killed, 357 wounded, and 74 desertions attributable to ARC LIGHT strikes. Other prisoner and rallier reports concerning 22 specific ARC LIGHT strikes indicated a total of 435 killed, 235 wounded and 23 desertions.

ARC LIGHT BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT RESULTS (JUNE 1966-OCTOBER 1967)

Location	Missions with BDA	Missions with ground followups ¹	Structures ² destroyed/damaged		Enemy KIA	
			Total reported	Per miss	Total reported	Per miss
NVN	22	0	124	5.6	0	0
DMZ	92	2	1,415	15.4	8	0.1
I CTZ	250	57	882	3.5	493	2.0
II CTZ	182	29	2,565	14.1	637	3.5
III CTZ	239	144	2,907	12.2	1,089	4.6
IV CTZ	16	15	159	9.9	270	16.9
Total	801	247	8,052	10.0	2,497	3.1

¹ Included in BDA column.² Storage areas, fortifications, weapons positions, bases, camps.

Source: MACV-J-2 Study 68-08, "Arc Light Effectiveness."

UNCERTAINTIES

It is not possible to place any confidence limits on estimates of ARC LIGHT effectiveness. Even estimates of enemy deaths are difficult to obtain because:

1. VC/NVA practice of immediate removal of the wounded from the strike area and immediate burial of the dead.
2. Infrequency of immediate ground follow-up into accessible B-52 strike areas.
3. Significant numbers of B-52s are targeted against remote and inaccessible enemy base areas.
4. Aerial observation of the target area restricted by weather, terrain, and jungle canopy.
5. Blast effect of the individual B-52 weapon load (29 ton) tends to destroy some evidence.
6. Multiple countings.

Where total enemy deaths are estimated by projecting the available BDA data, a number of uncertainties can be identified. First, while the sample is reasonably large (the BDA reports cover 5,800 of the 34,000 B-52 sorties flown since 1965), it may be biased. The strikes with BDA tend to be those nearest friendly troop areas which may be the ones based on the best intelligence. The strikes against suspected enemy base camps, which may be the least productive, have few BDA reports. Second, the amount of damage reported is clearly related to the thoroughness of the BDA (more enemy deaths reported when ground follow-up is used). Thus, since we have ground follow-up on few missions, we may be understating the true impact. And third, B-52 strikes are not necessarily the cause of the reported destruction. This is especially true for those missions in support of ground operations, where artillery and tactical air were also employed.

Another source of information is reported by ralliers and prisoners of war. These reports provide substantial information about instances where ARC LIGHT strikes were highly effective. Unfortunately, this evidence is fragmentary and frequently vague regarding the place and time of the attack. Therefore, it has not been possible to utilize these reports to develop a comprehensive picture of ARC LIGHT effectiveness.

In conclusion, there is general agreement that ARC LIGHT strikes have been effective on numerous occasions in preempting enemy attacks, blocking lines of communication, and supporting troops in combat with sizeable enemy forces. However, OSD feels that there are no quantitative measures of effectiveness and the available data is of uncertain quality and limited quantity.

Question 28: What effect is the Laotian interdiction bombing having:
a. In reducing the capacity of the enemy logistic system?

b. In destroying materiel in transit?

The intensity of the US bombing campaign in Laos has more than doubled with the cessation of air strikes against North Vietnam on November 1, 1968 (15,178 attack sorties were flown in December 1968; 6,722 were flown in Laos in December 1967). Jet

sorties previously used to attack targets in NVN were shifted primarily to interdiction missions in the Laotian Panhandle. Also, in early November, the Air Force began a new interdiction campaign in Laos (COMMAND HUNT) designed to reduce or impede enemy truck traffic during the good weather months in Laos (November to May).

In addition to the destruction of trucks and supplies, the current campaign attempts to limit enemy traffic primarily by creating and sustaining a number of "non-bypassable" choke points in the key roads in Laos. About 45 percent of the attack sorties are devoted to this objective.

See answers at tabs A and B.

Question 28a: What effect is the Laotian interdiction bombing having: a. In reducing the capacity of the enemy logistic system?

With the bombing halt in North Vietnam on November 1, 1968, it was no longer possible to interdict the flow of supplies before they reached Laos. A large-scale program to interdict the flow was undertaken by B-52's and other tactical aircraft, with heavy weight concentrated on key choke points in Laos, just south of the Mu Gia and Ban Karai Passes. However, relatively large quantities of supplies still entered Laos. In fact, the normal seasonal traffic appeared to continue. Road watch teams stationed south of Mu Gia Pass reported truck traffic entering Laos that was identical to the seasonal buildup last year (an average of 10 trucks per day in November, 20 in December, and about 25 in January during both years). IGLOO WHITE sensors on roads south of the interdiction points strongly suggested that trucks were moving supplies south of our two key choke-points; special intelligence sources also indicated normal throughput traffic. The enemy was apparently using porters, or bypassing them altogether.

In the latter part of November 1968, most of the trucks entered through a newly constructed by-pass around the two Ban Pha Nop interdiction points south of the Mu Gia Pass. After its discovery, this by-pass was interdicted frequently; however, it was more difficult to keep interdicted than the two points chosen originally.

One measure of success in reducing the enemy's throughput capability is the better than 75 percent closure of the Ban La Boy/Ban Karai complex since October 1, 1968. However, the enemy was still able to complete a well-camouflaged road around the Ban La Boy Ford south of the Ban Karai Pass on 14 December 1968. This allowed another large influx of trucks prior to its interdiction by ARC LIGHT and tactical air strikes.

The current bombing campaign has forced the enemy to pay a high price to keep his supply lines open through Laos to South Vietnam.

Construction of camouflaged by-passes in mountainous terrain has required a sizeable expenditure of manpower and equipment. Road repair crews were harassed continually with cluster-type bombs and anti-personnel mines. Photographs show the enemy was forced to porter supplies around the interdicted points.

As the bombing progressed, destruction of the jungle canopy made the enemy more vulnerable to attack. As a result of the air strikes, enemy traffic was delayed and his resupply efforts from time to time were disrupted. Trucks moved in smaller convoys to lessen vulnerability and were more widely dispersed in revetted "stalls." Well-developed truck parks, with repair and support facilities, were denied the enemy by intensive bombing attacks. Improved intelligence collection methods and better integration of information made it easier to locate and attack the enemy. In addition to these factors, enemy logistic requirements have been increasing. The enemy antiaircraft reaction has doubled, probably causing expenditure on the order of 100 tons per week in ammunition and logistic support of antiaircraft artillery battalions. Additional engineer, construction, and antiaircraft artillery battalions have been employed to defend and maintain the road networks.

But in spite of evidence that aerial attacks reduced the flow of enemy supplies to very low levels; notably in the periods 1-11 November and 1-15 December at Mu Gia Pass, and 1 November-15 December and 7-24 January at Ban Karai Pass, intelligence reports indicate that the enemy has made a major effort to insure the continued forward movement of supplies for enemy forces in Laos and South Vietnam, and that the enemy has pushed through sufficient tonnages to provide the bulk of his external supply requirements. Although it is still too early to tell, experience during the first months of intensified operations in Laos indicates that the current campaign may not significantly limit enemy supply flows into South Vietnam. The external supply requirements of VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam are so small relative to enemy logistic capacity that it is unlikely any air interdiction campaign can reduce it below the required levels. Estimates of external enemy requirements from North Vietnam range from 30 to 50 short tons per day (10-15 truckloads).³

If truck sightings are any indication of supply flow, a comparison between 1967 and 1968 sightings, as shown below, indicates that activity on the Laotian roads has not been effectively reduced by the current campaign.

TRUCK SIGHTINGS IN LAOS PANHANDLE

Month	1967	1968
October	992	1,043
November	4,249	4,395
December	6,046	5,519

Question 28b: What effect is the Laotian interdiction bombing having: b. In destroying materiel in transit?

It is estimated that nearly 8,000 tons of enemy supplies have been destroyed in Laos

³ The exact magnitude for the supply flows and requirements is still not known with certainty.

in the period 1 November 1968-23 January 1969. Visual sightings report a total of 1,682 trucks destroyed, 706 trucks damaged, and a total of 13,130 secondary explosions and fires caused by aerial attacks. The following table shows the breakout by type of damage and time period.

MATERIEL DESTROYED IN LAOS

Time period	Type of damage	Number	Tons destroyed
Nov. 1-30	Trucks destroyed	344	567
Dec. 1-31	do	637	1,051
Jan. 1-23	do	701	1,157
Subtotals		1,682	2,775
Nov. 1-30	Trucks damaged	143	59
Dec. 1-31	do	220	90
Jan. 1-23	do	343	140
Subtotals		706	289
Nov. 1-30	Fires/explosions	3,219	1,207
Dec. 1-31	do	4,811	1,804
Jan. 1-23	do	3,659	1,372
Nov. 1	Arc Light	1,441	540
Jan. 23	Fires/explosions		
Subtotals		13,130	4,923
Total tons destroyed			7,587

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff (data for DIA is in substantial agreement).

It has not been possible to estimate accurately the materiel destroyed in truck parks. Most of these targets are well hidden under foliage and BDA is seldom available. More than 80 of these truck park areas have been heavily attacked. It is estimated that each contained from 20 to 50 trucks and may have contained between 50 to 500 tons of supplies, in addition to repair facilities. It is possible also that storage, housing, medical and petroleum, oil, and lubricant facilities and bunkers, as well as communications equipment and arms were destroyed.

These estimates indicate destruction of about 95 tons of supplies per day in Laos since November 1, 1968. While this is impressive, it is not what really counts. The critical factor is the amount that reaches South Vietnam. Another equally critical factor is the amount of supplies already stored in South Vietnam. Much of the materiel destroyed was probably not destined for South Vietnam but was for consumption or storage in Laos. Since we have no control over imports to North Vietnam or inputs to Laos, it appears that the enemy can continue to push sufficient supplies through Laos to South Vietnam in spite of relatively heavy losses inflicted by air attacks.

Question 29a: What evidence was there on the significance of the principal strains imposed on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (e.g., in economic disruption, extra manpower demands, transportation blockages, population morale)?

ECONOMY

By the time offensive air operations against NVN were stopped on 1 November 1968, most of the heavy industry and more than half of the electrical power generating capacity had been destroyed. Dispersion of industry and redistribution of labor resulted in serious inefficiencies, which were aggravated primarily by the constant disruption of lines of communication. As domestic economic requirements became more difficult to satisfy, NVN became more dependent on external assistance. What NVN was unable to produce itself (guns, missiles, ammunition, trucks, food, etc.) or was destroyed by US air raids (cement, POL, steel, etc.) was imported from abroad. Seaborne imports during 1968 totaled nearly 2 million metric tons, up from 1.4 million metric tons during 1967. Food im-

ports nearly doubled during 1968, and accounted for about one-third of all imports. Likewise, imports of fertilizer and petroleum products increased.

The economic (monetary) impact of the bombing is shown in the following table:

Costs and benefits to NVN (1965-68)
[In millions of dollars]

Costs:	
Destroyed capital stock	215
Lost current production	* 400
Destroyed facilities	153
Total cost	
	768
Benefits:	
Foreign economic aid	1,210
Foreign Military aid	1,845
Total benefit	
	3,055

* Estimate based on growth rates prior to 1965.

While air strikes destroyed about \$770 million worth of capital stock, military facilities, and current production, NVN received about \$3,000 million worth of foreign economic and military aid from Communist Bloc countries. Thus, in terms of total economic and military resources available to support the war, NVN is better off today than it was in 1965.

It is generally agreed that the bombing did not significantly raise the cost of the war to NVN. This was because production facilities outside of NVN were not targetable and ample external aid was available from the Communist Bloc nations. The Soviet Union, Communist China, and Eastern European nations provided the bulk of the combat equipment and materiel used by enemy units in South Vietnam. The cost of this support to North Vietnam was negligible.

Another major impact of the bombing of North Vietnam was a shift within the labor force. Workers moved from food production to the repair of bomb-damaged facilities. The resulting food shortage created further disruption at the ports by adding food imports to an already overburdened military goods traffic. The economy of the country was further upset by the relocation of industry and by the move of over 30,000 of their most highly trained workers from the Hanoi area. In addition, it was estimated that over 400,000 people fled from Hanoi and Hal-phong during the height of the bombing.

EXTRA MANPOWER DEMANDS

Manpower dislocations were apparent at the height of the air war. Women were assuming a greater proportion of the workload, and 40,000 Chinese Communist construction troops and anti-aircraft artillery units were moved into the country. Extra manpower was required for air defense, road and rail repair, logistical movement, industrial relocating, and rebuilding. A labor force of between 475,000 and 600,000 including women and children, was required in these areas to offset the effects of the airstrikes. About 110,000 military personnel were assigned to air defense duties. This drain, plus the increasing number of combat losses, necessitated a lowering of military induction standards with a like effect on the standards within their Armed Forces. Evidence from interrogation of North Vietnamese fishermen along the coast and from recent prisoners of war reflects the enormity of the manpower drain. Fifteen year-old villagers were conscripted for military duty in South Vietnam. Many received no more than a few days training. The apprentice, technical, high school, and college entry classes were reduced sharply.

In spite of these extra demands, it appears that NVN has enough manpower to continue the war at the high casualty rates

sustained in 1968. Most of the additional labor requirements have been met through normal population growth and through the use of their large pool of unemployed and underemployed citizens.

TRANSPORTATION

The interdiction of major lines of communication made the flow of material throughout the country more costly and time consuming. The degree to which interdiction was effective in reducing support of military forces in the south is difficult to measure. The difficulties brought on by the bombing were evident, however, in that the North Vietnamese were forced to build over 1,200 miles of alternate highways and by-passes, employ alternate and less efficient modes of transport, restrict movement to nighttime, and import large quantities of trucks and locomotives.

While the transportation blockage heavily taxed the capability of North Vietnam to support the troops in South Vietnam, the flow of supplies continued. The rail transit time from Hanoi to Vinh more than tripled, and rail traffic became almost non-existent from Vinh southward. As a result, truck travel from Hanoi to Laos and the demilitarized zone areas increased 100 percent. But these effects simply increased the time necessary to move supplies; they did not deny supplies to the VC/NVA in South Vietnam.

MORALE

The bombing undoubtedly had adverse effects on the people of NVN. Individual citizens suffered many hardships. While the total supply of goods in NVN increased, individual standards of living declined. Food was rationed and consumer goods were scarce; and air raid warnings disrupted the lives of the populace and forced many to leave their homes. Moreover, it has been estimated that approximately 52,000 civilians were killed in NVN by US air strikes.

Still, there is no evidence to suggest that these hardships reduced to a critical level NVN's willingness or resolve to continue the conflict. On the contrary, the bombing actually may have hardened the attitude of the people and rallied them behind the Government's programs. Firm population controls and a steady flow of propaganda from Hanoi have been credited with helping to maintain popular support for the regime. There is some evidence, however, indicating that morale and support for the war in NVN has declined significantly since the bombing halt. Whatever their feelings about the war, the people of NVN have lacked either the will or the means to make any dissatisfaction evident.

The bombing also impacted heavily on the morale of the North Vietnam soldiers moving to South Vietnam. Bombing made the journey difficult and hazardous, a fact reported by many prisoners after capture.

Question 29b: What was the level of logistical throughput through the southern province of North Vietnam just prior to the November bombing halt? To what extent did this level reflect the results of the US bombing campaign?

Estimates of the flow of supplies from the southern province of NVN to Laos vary widely. This is because we have no reliable

¹ The bombing may have killed up to 5% of the 285,000 infiltrating troops (about 14,200 men in 1968). Although there are considerable uncertainties about this estimate, these losses would represent less than 3% of the 700,000 regular and militia troops remaining in North Vietnam and are relatively small compared to the 180,000 VC/NVA reportedly killed in South Vietnam in 1968. Infiltration losses of this magnitude would not appreciably limit VC/NVA force levels or activity rates in SVN.

means of measuring this flow. The Joint Chiefs of Staff estimate that an average of 65 short tons per day flowed into Laos during the three months prior to the bombing halt. The Seventh Air Force estimated that the flow decreased from 340 tons per day in mid-July to 35 tons per day immediately prior to the bombing halt. The CIA and DIA estimate that an average of 165 short tons per day flowed into Laos during 1968. Some of this variation can be explained by the seasonal variation in truck traffic as indicated by the following table of truck sightings in Route Packages 1, 2, and 3 in NVN.

TRUCK SIGHTINGS IN NVN (ROUTE PACKAGES 1, 2, AND 3)

Month	1967	1968
January	383	2,866
February	654	1,037
March	770	2,142
April	1,731	3,346
May	2,919	5,140
June	3,388	3,723
July	4,254	4,868
August	5,717	3,337
September	2,510	1,958
October	1,037	1,488
November	1,090	
December	1,754	

Source: DIA.

In 1967, truck sightings dropped by a factor of 5.5 from the peak in August to the low in October as bad weather set in over NVN. The supply flow followed this trend. Thus, one cannot attribute the entire decrease in supply flow that occurred in the months before the bombing halt to bombing effectiveness.

Whether the "Summer-1968 Interdiction Campaign" had a special effect is difficult to assess. The following table compares truck attrition in Route Packages 1, 2, and 3 in NVN for June-October in 1967 and 1968.

TRUCK ATTRITION IN NVN

(EVALUATED DESTROYED IN ROUTE PACKAGES 1, 2, AND 3)

Month	1967	1968
June	402	565
July	577	775
August	784	622
September	239	295
October	77	242
Total	2,079	2,499

Source: DIA.

These results show a 20 percent increase in truck attrition in the period June-October 1968 over the same period in 1967.

Rather than look at monthly estimates of truck sightings and attrition and supply flows, a better perspective on the overall effect of the bombing in NVN on the supply flow into Laos is obtained by comparing estimates averaged over a whole year. The table below suggests that, despite our intensive 1968 bombing campaign, NVN was able to infiltrate supplies and equipment into Laos than it required to support military operations in SVN. The excess material was probably stockpiled in Laos and SVN to support future operations.

INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES INTO LAOS

[Short tons per day]

	Delivered to Laos	Consumed and destroyed	Available for SVN	Required in SVN
1967	93	57	36	15-20
1968	165	99	66	30-50

While the exact magnitude of these supplies flows and requirements are all subject

to uncertainty, the basic conclusion seems clear. The bombing failed to reduce support below required levels, even at the increased activity rates of 1968. The external needs of the VC/NVA forces were so small relative to enemy capacity that it is doubtful any interdiction campaign could have constrained their combat operations. Estimates of the NVA daily requirements for ammunition and weapons range from 30 to 50 short tons, the equivalent of about 10 to 15 trucks per day.

In addition to the destruction of supplies and lines of communication, the bombing campaign in NVN forced the enemy to provide additional materiel to compensate for the interdiction losses, this in order to maintain support for his forces in SVN at acceptable levels. Moreover, NVN was denied use of the more efficient means of transportation (i.e., rail and coastal shipping). Use of these modes since the halt has enabled the enemy to move large amounts of materiel into the southern Panhandle. Movement south to Vinh by rail is estimated at 400 short tons per day; by coastal watercraft, nearly 1,500 short tons per day. Truck activity now occurs throughout the day, whereas it was confined to the hours of darkness prior to the bombing halt. Further repairs and improvement to land lines of communication, coupled with continued southward extension of north-south petroleum, oils, and lubricants pipeline (1,100 metric tons daily capacity) will further increase the enemy's logistic capability.

Question 29c: To what extent did Chinese and Soviet aid relieve pressure on Hanoi?

Soviet and Chinese aid to NVN has provided nearly all of the materiel required to carry on the war against SVN; NVN's contribution has been chiefly the over-all direction of the war and the input of troops to do the fighting. The bulk of this military and economic aid comes from the Soviet Union. Its assistance generally has consisted of a sophisticated air defense system and training for associated personnel, artillery, petroleum products, transportation equipment, and food. Chinese aid has consisted primarily of small arms and ammunition. Without such aid, NVN long since would have been forced to reduce the scope of fighting in SVN to the guerrilla-warfare level.

One consequence of aid from outside countries was a lessening of economic pressures on Hanoi in the conduct of its war effort. On the other hand, dependence on outside countries for economic support may have resulted in an increase in the political leverage which could be exerted on Hanoi's war policies by other Communist states.

Another consequence of foreign aid directly affected the bombing campaign. The provision of a complete air defense system—including MIG aircraft, surface-to-air missile systems, and anti-aircraft guns—enabled NVN to mount a vigorous defense against US air attacks. This air defense environment had significant effects on our bombing performance and tactics.

Seaborne imports to North Vietnam during 1968 increased by almost 40 percent over 1967. The increase was caused mostly by a 40 percent rise in food and a 56 percent rise in petroleum shipments over the previous year from both the USSR and China. Large amounts of flour and rice were delivered last year to supplement the below-average harvests in North Vietnam. The delivery of such items permitted the movement of men and supplies to SVN and the maintenance of a subsistence-level diet in NVN.

Question 29d: What are current views on the proportion of war-essential imports that could come into North Vietnam over the rail or road lines from China, even if all imports by sea were denied and a strong effort even made to interdict ground transport? What is the evidence?

LAND IMPORT CAPACITY

In 1968, NVN imported an average of 6,800 STPD (short tons per day); 6,000 STPD by sea, and 800 STPD by land. Imports by land were higher in 1967, amounting to about 1,100 STPD. However, the land lines of communication from China were not used to capacity. It is estimated that the two rail lines from China have a theoretical uninterdicted capacity of about 8,000 STPD and the road network could provide an additional 7,000 STPD during the dry season (normally June-September) and about 2,000 STPD during the poor weather months. The combined capacity of the land routes (9,000-15,000 STPD) is more than enough to transport North Vietnam's total import requirements of about 7,000 STPD. If all seaborne imports were to come through China, considerable logistic problems would have to be solved by the Chinese regime.

INTERDICTION OF IMPORTS FROM CHINA

If seaborne imports can be denied to NVN, her ability to successfully pursue the war in SVN would be dependent on land imports from China.

A strong effort to interdict road and rail transport from Communist China through North Vietnam would require a concerted and coordinated air interdiction campaign against all transportation: military support; petroleum oil, and lubricants power; industrial; air defense; and communications target systems. The interrelationship of the effects of destruction of targets in one category to the effectiveness of others is such that a cumulative impact is achieved. The air campaign would be conducted in such a manner as to be free of the militarily confining constraints which have characterized the conduct of the war in the north in the past. The concept would preclude attacks on population as a target but would accept high risks of civilian casualties in order to achieve destruction of war-supporting targets.

An interdiction campaign as described above, when employed in conjunction with denial of sea imports, would, in large part, isolate Hanoi and Haiphong from each other and from the rest of the country. Isolation of Hanoi, the focal point of the road and rail system, would be highly effective in reducing North Vietnam's capability to reinforce aggression in South Vietnam. Importation of war-supporting material would be seriously reduced. Road capacities would be reduced by a factor well in excess of the estimated 50 percent believed to have been accomplished during the summer months of 1966 and 1967. Over time, North Vietnam's capability to cope with the cumulative effects of such an air campaign would be significantly curtailed.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that resumption of an interdiction campaign similar to that carried out in Route Package I between July and 1 November 1968 would assure almost total interdiction of truck and waterborne movement of supplies into the demilitarized zone and Laos. Naval blockade offshore and interdiction of Regional Package II to Thanh Hao would further enhance this effort.

Commitment of B-52 forces following heavy and unrestricted suppression of defenses by fighters, could reduce the amount of time to accomplish the above. Although the North Vietnamese have established a significant by-pass capability, the transportation nets remain vulnerable at many key points. The locomotive population could be attrited quickly if all buffer restrictions were removed near the Chinese border.

There is not sufficient data available at this time on either the cost or the effectiveness of an air campaign against these land lines to reach a firm conclusion as to the chances of isolating NVN from her neighbors. Past attempts to cut rail, road, and water networks in NVN have met with considerable difficulties. It has been estimated that a

minimum of 6,000 attack sorties per month would be required against the two rail lines from China. Even at this level of effort, the North Vietnamese could continue to use the rail lines to shuttle supplies if they were willing to devote sufficient manpower to repair and transshipment operations. Interdiction of the road system would be still more difficult. Since the bombing halt north of 19° in April 1968, North Vietnam has repaired all major road and railway bridges, constructed additional bypasses and alternative routes and expanded the railroad capacity by converting large segments from meter to dual gauge track. These improvements would make even more difficult prolonged interdiction of the overland lines of communication.

We currently fly approximately 7,000 sorties per month against two primary roads in Laos without preventing throughput truck traffic; the road network from China has 7-10 principal arteries and numerous bypasses. Finally, the monsoonal weather in NVN would make it difficult to sustain interdiction on the land lines of communication. Poor visibility would prevent air strikes during 25-30% of the time during good weather months and 50-65% of the time during poor weather months. Thus, it is not possible to give a definitive amount to the question of how much war-essential imports could come into NVN if sea imports are denied and a strong air campaign is initiated.

Attention would also have to be given to interdiction of supplies coming into SVN from Cambodia. Over the past 2 years, the enemy's use of Cambodia as a supply base and a place of refuge has become more pronounced. During the period October 1967 to September 1968, 10,000 tons of munitions transited Sihanoukville and are suspected of having been delivered to enemy forces in the Cambodia-Republic of Vietnam border regions. This amount represents more than enough ordnance to satisfy the arms and ammunition requirements for all enemy forces in South Vietnam during the same period. Thus, the act of sealing off the enemy's Cambodian supply lines must be considered as an integral part of any plan to prevent supplies from reaching enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam.

Question 29e: What action has the Democratic Republic of Vietnam taken to reduce the vulnerability and importance of Hanoi as a population and economic center (e.g., through population evacuation and economic dispersal)?

North Vietnam has attempted to reduce the vulnerability of Hanoi and Haiphong to US air strikes. A large segment of the civilian population (estimates range from 40-70% of the total) was evacuated from those two populated areas while US bombing operations were being conducted in the north. Some evacuees have drifted back into the city since the bombing halt, and a few schools reportedly have been reopened; however, the evacuated order has not been rescinded. In addition to personnel evacuation, the North Vietnamese dispersed most small industry, schools, hospitals, and government administration in Hanoi and Haiphong. There is no indication that these facilities have returned. Finally, North Vietnam has constructed an effective and extensive system of air raid shelters for Hanoi residents, and blast walls are under construction around important facilities such as the thermal power plant. Hanoi and its environs are also protected by a well-integrated air-defense system.

Although the North Vietnamese have attempted to reduce the importance and vulnerability of Hanoi and Haiphong, these two cities still remain essential to their war effort. Approximately 80% of the North Vietnamese imports enter through the port of Haiphong, and Hanoi is the logistic center for all rail, road, and water lines of communication from China. Both cities are im-

portant storage areas for war-supporting supplies and materiel. It has been reported that some fuel and industrial equipment are being sent directly to new regional sites and rural areas away from Hanoi where new factories will be set up.

The buildup of a major logistics support/trans-shipment complex in the Than Hoa and Vinh area since April 1968 has shifted this important war-support function from the Hanoi area. The buildup of Quang Khe and Dong Hoi since the bombing halt has further reduced dependence on Hanoi. However, the success of this dispersal is dependent in large measures upon unrestricted ship movements south from Haiphong. Hanoi continues to be a bottleneck for all land traffic from China.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

5. Prior to Tet 1968 any public discussion of negotiations was generally regarded as nothing short of direct assistance to the enemy. Even private discussion of the subject was very cautious and limited. Dealing with the NLF was hardly discussed in any form. The general assumption being that the NLF would be destroyed as an organization, and its members reintegrated into society as individuals (probably with a definite and lasting stigma as a result of their former Communist connection).

6. While there is now a broad consensus on the need to negotiate with Hanoi, dealing with the NLF remains a sensitive and sometimes hazardous subject. The November USG-GVN impasse over the role of the NLF at Paris reflected the fact that most SVN leaders remain profoundly reluctant to accord the NLF any status whatever. This does not mean that there has been no movement of opinion as regards the NLF, however. This movement is reflected in the series of controversial statements about the NLF—and reactions to them—which have agitated the SVN political scene since shortly after the partial bombing halt.

7. In mid-April 1968 presidential peace candidate Truong Dinh Dzu told foreign correspondents that he favored talks with the NLF. According to some reports, he also advocated coalition government. (Dzu and his family claim that he merely said non-Communist elements of the NLF should be included in the government). The GVN promptly re-arrested Dzu for these remarks (he had been in "protective custody" following Tet). As far as we could determine then, the vast majority of the Vietnamese body politic considered the arrest richly deserved and Dzu's remarks quite beyond the pale.

B. About the same time that Dzu made his comments about the NLF, then Foreign Minister Tran Van Do reportedly told the "Gazette De Lausanne" that after a settlement was reached with Hanoi the GVN could talk with the NLF "as well as other armed dissidents, just as Diem did in 1954". Do also reportedly said "we do not deny the existence of the NLF which is a powerful organization, but we do deny its existence as a government."

C. Do's remarks prompted a stormy protest from Hoa Hao and Cao Dai leaders who felt that he had compared them to the NLF (they were chief among the armed dissidents with whom Diem parleyed in 1954). Perhaps more significant, Do was questioned sharply by the assembly on whether his remarks represented any "shift toward the NLF". Do backed water and explained that he only meant to say that following negotiations with Hanoi, nationalist members of the NLF who put down their arms could return to the nationalist ranks. As for Communists in the NLF, they would be sent to North Viet Nam. Despite his disclaimers, Do's comments probably increased the pressures which resulted shortly in the removal of the LOC Government.

D. Early in his tenure as prime minister,

some of Huong's opponents charged that he was soft on the NLF. Perhaps in part as a response to this attack, the Huong Government adopted, at least by implication, a very hard line on the NLF. First indication of this posture was the response to Dr. Phan Quang Dan's June 3 Stanford University speech in which he commented on dealing with the NLF. Named Minister of State while in the US, Dan was summarily dismissed before ever taking up his portfolio. Another indication of Huong's position was the trial and sentencing of Truong Dinh Dzu for his April comments about the NLF. Tried July 26 by a military court, Dzu got five years of hard labor.

E. There was some confusion in Viet Nam about exactly what Dan said in the US. In part this was due to somewhat different American press versions of his statements. In his Stanford speech Dan reportedly observed that it is impossible to kill all the communists in SVN and so some kind of agreement must be reached with them. According to UPI, he also advocated immediate talks with the NLF. (He evidently made it clear to everyone that he was completely opposed to coalition government.) The general impression here was that Dan was proposing direct—and by implication, equal—negotiations with the NLF. On his return to Viet Nam, Dan "explained" that he had merely meant to advocate discussions with individual nationalists in the NLF in the framework of the Chieu Hoi program.

F. While there was a good bit of private sympathy for Dan, a number of our contacts observed that he was probably just ahead of the times. He was still treated as a political leper. His recantation on his return apparently did not cause any consideration of his reinstatement in the government, and political groups gave him a wide berth. Reaction to Dzu's July trial was even more harsh. Most Vietnamese believed that Dzu had advocated coalition government with the Communists, and we heard no expressions of sympathy or support for him.

G. While Dr. Dan's dismissal and Dzu's trial were probably related in part to Huong's political need to demonstrate his firm position vis-a-vis the NLF, they also reflected popular outrage over the prolonged enemy shelling of Saigon and other population centers which occurred in May and June. If opinion about dealings with the NLF had softened gradually though slightly after the partial bombing halt, it seemed to harden perceptibly in mid-year.

H. The announcement November 1 that the U.S. was preparing to sit down with the NLF, with the strong implication that we expected the GVN to do likewise, was a profound shock to Vietnamese leaders in both official and private circles. The March 31 partial bombing halt, the opening of U.S.-Hanoi talks, and Thieu's effective efforts had prepared public opinion for a negotiated settlement of the war, but Vietnamese in general had only very tentatively examined the problem of what to do with the NLF in such a negotiated settlement. November 1 they were suddenly confronted with the possibility of immediate, face to face talks with the NLF on an equal basis. The first reaction was an emotional rejection of the whole idea. During the prolonged GVN-USG impasse that followed, however, nationalists generally felt compelled to confront the dilemma of what to do about the NLF.

I. This renewed nationalist consideration of the NLF problem was reflected both in Prime Minister Huong's comments to the New York Times November 23 and in the relatively mild public reaction to those comments. According to that rather disjointed report, Huong said that the GVN could deal with the NLF as an armed opposition group, that the NLF could send a "delegation" to Saigon or another country such as Laos for discus-

sions with GVN authorities, that internal political questions could be discussed with the NLF. If they acknowledged that they are not a government, and that the NLF could form a political party if its members gave up communist ideology and disarmed. (In a later clarification in Viet Nam press, Huong said that the NLF must lay down its arms and give up communist doctrine before any talks with the GVN could take place.)

J. Huong's critics did not fail to point out that his remarks were not all that far removed from the statements which had caused him to dismiss Dr. Dan from the cabinet. But criticism in press and assembly was muted, and in private little exception was taken to Huong's statements by most SVN political figures. This mild reaction was partly due to the nearly total preoccupation with the USG-GVN split and the need to find a way to get the GVN to Paris. However, it also represented a significant movement of political opinion toward the idea of dealing with the NLF in some fashion.

K. Vice President Ky's December 21 comments on "Face the Nation", reiterated in part at the Saigon Airport on his return to Viet Nam December 23, also revealed the shift in Vietnamese opinion. Ky said in essence that while the GVN will not recognize the NLF as an "entity" or a government, it is prepared to talk with the NLF about internal SVN problems because the NLF is a "reality". Ky's views on the proper timing and context of such talks was not entirely clear, but he seemed to be saying that once negotiations were under way for the withdrawal of NVN forces from SVN, the GVN would consider a meeting with the NLF in South Viet Nam.

L. There appeared to be very little opposition to the substance of Ky's remarks. Official reaction was muted, in part perhaps because Ky's remarks were not agreed on beforehand by Thieu and other GVN leaders. None of the top GVN leaders made any comment on Ky's formula. Ky's remarks never appeared in Viet Nam press, and official spokesmen—after a delay of ten days—finally insisted that Ky's statements in no way constituted any departure from previous GVN policy.

M. Much more significant than official silence was the apparent lack of opposition in non-governmental circles. While many expressed amazement that "Superhawk" Ky should make such statements and some made fun of the fine semantic line between "reality" and "entity", virtually none opposed the basic idea that it would be necessary at some point for the GVN to discuss internal

SVN matters with NLF representatives. As noted above, the lack of adverse reaction to Huong's comments to the New York Times may have been due in part to popular preoccupation with the November GVN-USG impasse. This was no longer the case when Ky made his statements to "Face the Nation", and the mild reaction to Ky's comments must be taken as a reflection of a considerable shift in SVN opinion since early 1968.

N. Considering the foregoing sequence of official statements and reactions to them, it now seems safe to say that South Vietnamese Nationalists generally accept the proposition that the GVN will at some point and in some form be obligated to deal directly with the NLF. In large part this conclusion flows from the now general understanding that the US commitment is not endless and a negotiated settlement is inevitable. However, this change in Nationalist opinion also reflects increased confidence in GVN and RVNAF ability to handle the NLF and the Viet Cong if they are deprived of the heavy support they now get from Hanoi and the Communist bloc. (Probably this new confidence is reflected in part in the fact that there is increasing talk in political circles about there being some "Nationalists" in the NLF ranks who can be weaned away from the Communist cause). Having accepted the idea of some kind of negotiation with the NLF, a great many if not most Vietnamese political leaders are now thinking about the possible form of a GVN-NLF agreement. Most of their rather painful and muted debate on this question revolves around the possibility of somehow changing the NLF into a legal, law-abiding, and at least ostensibly non-Communist political party under the Constitution.

8. Nationalist conditions for integrating the NLF into the political life of the nation remain very hard, at least on the surface. In general nationalists totally reject any kind of parity with the NLF. Most if not all profess to see talks with the NLF taking place only after Hanoi has withdrawn its troops and logistics support; they generally insist on NLF acknowledgement of the legality of the GVN and the Constitution, including at least pro-forma acceptance of Article 4 (the basic anti-Communist provision of the constitution): the majority want the NLF to disavow Communist ideology as well as disarm.

9. These conditions are not immutable. In large part nationalist leaders are still groping for a position on the NLF which is at once realistic and not too risky. Most are

aware that the terms described in Para 8 above would amount to surrender in NLF eyes and for that reason are not realistic. While they seldom say it, most also undoubtedly go on to conclude that a considerably softer formula must ultimately be accepted. Their difficulty, however, is that they find it extremely hard to envisage any softer formula which does not entail risks which they now regard as quite unacceptable.

10. There are some minority opposition groups which seem to fear accommodation with the NLF much less than the majority. These probably include the An Quang Buddhists, some Song Dao Catholics, a few small leftist labor unions, and possibly some radical southern factions. Some of these groups are heavily infiltrated if not controlled outright by the enemy. Probably most of the remainder are motivated more by their intense opposition to the government than by a sober conviction that the nationalist side can or must take more risks in dealing with the NLF. At the moment these groups are small and wield little political influence.

11. The position of these opposition groups is rarely articulated, even in private, and probably varies considerably from group to group. Like other nationalists, they are groping for a solution which meets their needs and the requirements of the situation as they see it. However, it is safe to say that most of these factions would be quite willing to see the constitution scrapped and the present government replaced as part of a settlement with the NLF. (An Quang in particular would welcome such conditions as the fulfillment of their long-standing desire to humble their old antagonists, Thieu and Ky.) Yet probably very few—excepting of course those controlled by the enemy—would feel ready to accept a coalition government as the price of peace with the NLF.

12. In sum, it can be said that Nationalist attitudes toward the NLF have moved a long way from the general assumption of pre-Tet 1968 that the NLF could be destroyed and the problem thereby resolved. It is now widely accepted that at some point the GVN will have to deal directly with the NLF and find some means for reintegrating it into the political life of the nation. While opinion has thus moved a long way and is still moving, Nationalists are still confronted by a very painful dilemma. This is because Nationalists generally remain unable to envisage a GVN-NLF agreement which the NLF would accept and which would not at the same time pose a very grave threat of a Communist takeover of South Vietnam.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—Thursday, May 11, 1972

The House met at 10 a.m.

The Reverend Clarence L. Fossett, D.D., Wesley United Methodist Church Washington, D.C., offered the following prayer:

Eternal God, we thank Thee for the earth and the fullness thereof, the world and those who dwell therein. Grateful are we that we can join with Thee in Thy work of creation and redemption.

We praise Thee for the many ways Thou hast favored us as a nation. Remind us that we, who have received freely, have been commanded to give freely. Let us not forget that privilege carries responsibility. Bless our President and all other officials, especially these elected representatives of our people. Inspire all of us to be instruments of Thy peace. Hasten the day, O Lord, when nation shall not lift up sword against nation,

and when they shall not learn war any more.

In the spirit of Christ, we pray. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER. The Chair has examined the Journal of the last day's proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof.

Without objection, the Journal stands approved.

There was no objection.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. Sparrow, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed without amendment a bill and concurrent resolution of the House of the following titles:

H.R. 13334. An act to establish certain positions in the Department of the Treasury, to fix the compensation for those positions, and for other purposes; and

H. Con. Res. 557. Concurrent resolution authorizing the printing of additional copies of House Report No. 92-911.

The message also announced that the Senate agrees to the amendments of the House to a bill of the Senate of the following title:

S. 1379. An act to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to establish a volunteers in the national forests program, and for other purposes.

The message also announced that the Senate insists upon its amendments to the bill (H.R. 8140) entitled "An act to promote the safety of ports, harbors, waterfront areas, and navigable waters of the United States," disagreed to by the House; agrees to the conference asked by