

SENATE—Thursday, December 16, 1971

The Senate met at 10 a.m. and was called to order by the President pro tempore (Mr. ELLENDER).

PRAYER

The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward L. R. Elson, D.D., offered the following prayer:

We thank Thee, O Lord, for the good news that is sung out to us at this festival of the Divine Gift. We thank Thee for the birth of Him who changed history into His story. May His light continue to guide us so that knowledge may become wisdom, wisdom flower into action, action ripen into understanding, and understanding lead to peace. Then shall the world know that the advent of One so small is the advent of much for all. May His peace be in our hearts and a song of praise and thanksgiving on our lips.

We pray in His holy name. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Wednesday, December 15, 1971, be dispensed with.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT TO 9 A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 9 a.m. tomorrow.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR CONSIDERATION OF CLOTURE MOTION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 1 hour under the rule pertaining to cloture begin at 10 a.m. tomorrow.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. In other words, the vote will occur on the cloture motion shortly after 11 o'clock.

THE \$149 BILLION QUESTION—WAS IT WORTH IT?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a special report, a reprint from the Los Angeles Times of November 24, 1971, entitled "The \$149 Billion Question—Was It Worth It?" written by Robert C. Toth.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[Reprinted from the Los Angeles Times, Nov. 24, 1971]

THE \$149 BILLION QUESTION—WAS IT WORTH IT?

(By Robert C. Toth)

WASHINGTON.—A nation has "no permanent friends or permanent enemies," a

British statesman once remarked, "only permanent interests."

When the Senate Oct. 29 killed temporarily a foreign aid bill, it was basically demanding a similarly hard-nosed attitude by the Nixon Administration toward a very costly program which has been "a basic instrument of U.S. foreign policy" for a generation.

What permanent interest of the United States has been served by spreading \$149 billion worth of guns and economic help around the world over 25 years?

What reason is there for the United States to keep it up, either at the present requested rate—\$5.1 billion a year in the formal aid "package" (including \$3.5 billion in the bill killed by the Senate) or at \$9.5 billion all told when every spigot is counted—or at any other level?

CRITICIZED AS "HANDOUT"

Implacable foes of the program say "none." Conservatives like Rep. H. R. Gross (R-Iowa) call it the "foreign handout program." In Congress almost since aid began, Gross recently challenged anyone to prove he even once voted for "this giveaway." All justifications are, to him, one big "snow job."

Even liberals like Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) and economist-author-diplomat John Kenneth Galbraith, however, now blast foreign aid as dollar-diplomacy, a grab bag, a tool of the cold war and a form of imperialism. The aid program, said Galbraith, is "the disaster area" of American foreign policy.

Aid is certainly a grab bag. It is guns and money, and money to use the guns as well as money to improve the economies of poorer nations. It also includes humanitarian aid to refugees and the like.

Giveaway it is not, at least not exactly. Two-thirds of the \$149 billion was given away as "grants," but the rest was lent. About \$21 billion has been repaid on the principal or as interest on the loans.

Even the grants were not simply dollar handouts. Most were spent in the United States. The taxpayer footed the bill, but the money employed Americans.

EXAMPLES

Arms, worth \$41.7 billion. All were U.S. made. Whatever the morality of being the world's leading "merchant of death," the 10% of the total that was sold (on easy credit) did help the U.S. balance of payments and did partially subsidize the domestic arms makers.

Food for Peace, worth \$19.7 billion. All was grown here and most was surplus which, if sold cheaply abroad, would have created chaos on world markets.

Economic aid (excluding food, but including funds that support military efforts, as in Vietnam), worth \$88 billion. It was very largely spent in the United States for goods and services. This year the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) spent \$1.66 billion, over 90% at home. American business gets almost a \$1 billion a year; American labor gets jobs from the program.

Reasons for spending it in the first place are as numerous as the many parts of the program. But several grand rationales have been offered in the past; peace and stability in the world, and a better life for poor people in that world.

These generalizations are somewhat better focused now. Earlier this year President Nixon said his foreign aid bill had three aims:

"To strengthen the defense capabilities and economies of our friends and allies . . . ; to assist the lower income countries in their efforts to achieve economic and social development . . . ; and to provide humanitarian

assistance to countries struck by natural disasters and political upheaval."

But conservatives who had voted primarily for arms aid, and liberals who had preferred economic aid, combined in October to vote against all of it. The old reasons, despite the new cosmetics, have lost much of their force over the years.

Communism is seen as a less contagious disease than when aid began. Forward military bases are less valuable in a world of nuclear-tipped intercontinental missiles. Military pacts with small countries seem more trouble than they are worth. Hunger and discontent at home cry for priority over hunger and distress abroad.

GOALS ARE CONTRADICTORY

Furthermore, contradictions are recognized in the goals of foreign aid. Military assistance tends to perpetuate the status quo, economic aid to change it. Arms to Greece kept out communism but facilitated the military coup against a democratic government. Economic assistance raises living standards but also stimulates the appetite for more, and faster, * * * which is destabilizing.

Industrializing a poor country does create a greater market for U.S. goods. It also creates greater competition against U.S. goods, both in world and in American markets.

South Korea, which a U.S. senator in the early 1960s wrote off as "a hopeless, bottomless pit for aid," received \$5 billion before graduating last year out of the program. It exported virtually nothing to the United States in 1963; now it sends \$473 million a year, including textiles that apparently threaten U.S. jobs.

Western Europe was rebuilt with U.S. aid with similar results. But there, U.S. private money took up after government aid stopped. Now, over \$20 billion is invested by Americans in Europe, earning over \$2 billion annually. More than half the profits are brought back.

EUROPEANS CRITICIZE IT

Europeans do not like it. Some now see Marshall plan aid as malignant, rather than pure altruism by the United States because it promoted American hegemony in European industry. Liberals here like Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) see parallel developments in poor nations.

"Our foreign aid program," Church charged, "has become a spreading money tree under which the biggest American businesses find shelter when they invest abroad." This is done by U.S. aid that props up conservative, even totalitarian regimes receptive to private U.S. investment, and more recently, through U.S. government guarantees against takeover of U.S. businesses in poorer nations.

Running through all the criticisms of foreign aid is a strong thread of frustration. Expectations for the program have always been too great, however, and usually too simple. Not only was unalloyed good anticipated, but also everlasting gratitude.

Washington warned in his farewell address that "There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favor from nation to nation." Yet senators, in defeating the aid bill, noted that 46 aid-receiving nations were among the 74 that voted against the United States on the China issue in the United Nations a few days earlier.

Aid is also saddled with the image of an error-prone, bumbling operation. "Horror stories," as AID officials call them, have accumulated and stick better than success stories. Examples:

The beautifully equipped operating room in a rural hospital in Thailand with no surgeons to use it.

The softwood mill in Iran supplied with hardwood cutting equipment.

The bags of U.S. grain and tractors in

India stenciled with the hammer and sickle.

The aid mission in Laos that was a cover for Central Intelligence Agency "rural development specialists." Communist propagandists used the fact widely to make AID missions elsewhere suspect.

The widespread profiteering in Vietnam acknowledged and even accepted as just a sordid fact of war.

"UGLY AMERICAN" INCIDENTS

Nor are the inept "ugly American" incidents past. Some recent ones are recounted below. But just as "hard cases make bad law," generalizing from failures would lead to stopping aid immediately.

That would be a popular decision, for beyond the gunmakers and the missionaries, foreign aid has only a small hard-core constituency in the United States.

"We should never have built that dam. Over \$325 million for it. And now we're sucked in militarily and politically. It was our worst blunder."

Conventional sentiments, perhaps, but the speaker was a Russian, not an American, complaining about the Aswan Dam project in Egypt. How typical the sentiment is among Russians is not known, however, for as Times correspondent Harry Trimbom cabled from Moscow:

"The average Soviet citizen probably thinks and cares little about the Kremlin's foreign aid program. There are no raging public debates to stimulate his interest. None are permitted. When the Kremlin decides on a program there is nothing a citizen can say or do that will alter the decision."

If he knew, as the Russian who criticized the aid to Egypt did, about Soviet aid programs, he would probably be as unhappy about how his rubles are spent as his American counterpart. He might even be more unhappy.

Since 1954 when the program began, Soviet aid to third-world nations tops \$15 billion (excluding Communist Cuba). Roughly half went in arms, the other half in economic assistance. During the period, the Kremlin has suffered major setbacks in some recipient countries.

Billions of rubles were poured into Red China (not included as third-world country), but they certainly did not buy the allegiance of Peking for long. U.S. disquietment at the China vote in the United Nations, as a matter of fact, has its Soviet reflection. Said a Soviet diplomat wryly: "We have suffered a massive victory."

SOVIET PROGRAM SETBACKS

Soviet aid to Indonesia—about \$750 million—failed to keep Sukarno in power. Almost \$100 million to Ghana, sometimes paying for massive statutes to Kwame Nkrumah, failed to prevent the overthrow of that flamboyant African. The \$1.2 billion in economic aid, another \$2.7 billion military aid, to Egypt has not prevented Cairo's rulers from tossing a local Communist in jail, or worse. Moscow clearly gives aid more for imperialistic than ideological reasons.

Cuba has received a whopping \$3 billion from Moscow since 1960. This year it will benefit from between \$600 million and \$750 million in economic help. That sum, in perspective, rivals the total U.S. economic aid to all Latin American recipients. Eighteen nations got \$770 million from Washington in 1971.

On a population basis, the Russians provided \$70 for every Cuban, the United States \$4.50 for each citizen of the 18 nations.

Soviet assistance has dropped off somewhat in recent years but China has begun to enter the picture in a significant way. The largest single aid project ever is a Chinese-fund railroad being built through Tanzania and Zambia in Africa. It is costing \$400 million.

Fifteen wealthy non-Communist nations—

those in Western Europe plus Japan and Australia—are increasingly aiding poor countries. They spent \$3.8 billion for development/assistance compared to the United States \$3.1 billion. These donor states got \$20.8 billion from the United States since World War II; in the past decade they have provided \$24.7 billion to developing nations.

None of the contributions, however, approaches the aid target set by the United Nations: 1% of each rich nation's gross national product per year. France does the most (.65%). The United States provides .31%, making it 12th on the donor list. In 1949, at the peak of the Marshall plan, the United States provided almost 3% of its GNP. (A qualification is that current U.S. spending if all kinds of military and economic aid are counted, is about 1%.)

The point, however, is that other nations are following in the ground broken by the United States. Apparently they see aid as a way to promote their influence, exports and investment even as the United States wrestles with doubts.

HISTORY

American aid had its genesis in the Truman Administration. Some claim it dates further back—to the prewar "arsenal of democracy" when U.S. destroyers sailed under British flags and in Lend-Lease to Europe, or to American contributions through the U.N. Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to a Europe physically devastated by World War II.

But the Truman Doctrine of 1947 was an activist and even an interventionist policy of containment that was laid down when Britain admitted it was unable to stop Communist subversion that threatened Greece and Turkey.

In providing \$837 million in two years to those countries, the United States picked up the role of world policeman which, arguably, led finally and fatefully to Vietnam.

In 1949 came the Marshall Plan for Europe. Almost \$13.5 billion in economic aid and another \$1.5 billion in arms were provided between 1949 and 1952.

The neat bookkeeping separation between economic and military aid did not exist even then, however, and the blurring of the two bedevils "foreign aid" to this day.

"Economic aid" under the Marshall Plan supported France's fight against insurgents in Indochina, with U.S. approval, officials now admit. The last year of Marshall aid, in fact, was formally justified to Congress as "defense support of the Korean war effort." With it, nations like Britain rebuilt its defenses at home and contributed military forces to Korea.

Eisenhower era treaties

In the Eisenhower administration, aid passed into a new phase—the mutual security act period—as the U.S. defense umbrella was spread, through treaties, to 42 nations on the periphery of China and the Soviet Union.

The 1960s saw a greater sophistication in defining what were the security interests of the United States. Less emphasis was put on formal alliances, more on counterinsurgency efforts. More money went to economic aid. Where \$2 of every \$4 of foreign aid went for economic help in the 1950s, \$3 of every \$4 did in the 1960s.

The practice of labeling "economic" much of the aid that was militarily oriented, if not clearly security money, makes specific figures questionable.

"Economic supporting assistance," for example, backs military efforts approved by the United States. It is the economic underpinning of a foreign nation, like Vietnam or Korea. At least \$5.8 billion, or 13%, of what was officially called economic aid in the 1960s was such assistance.

Furthermore, not all foreign aid is counted in the "foreign aid package" sent to Congress.

Officials privately admit that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee calculation is essentially correct—that the Administration really asked \$9.5 billion for next year.

Many items go to boost the official figure. The biggest is "military assistance, service funded"—\$2.23 billion this year—in the Pentagon's budget. It pays for things like the ammunition and food that Vietnamese soldiers may get from U.S. depots, for U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Laos, for the Korean soldiers who fought in Vietnam.

The \$9.5 billion figure may be too high, nonetheless, but the "hidden funds" and "sleight-of-hand" charges are essentially supported by the latest task force on foreign aid, appointed by President Nixon and chaired by Rudolph Peterson, president of the Bank of America.

Its analysis of 1969 spending found that \$6.47 billion went for foreign aid in various ways, not the official \$5.08 billion figure. Where the official statistics show \$4 of every \$5 that year for economic assistance, the Peterson group reported that more than \$1 of every \$2 (52%) went for "security programs."

"Security" aid separated

The Administration accepted the Peterson recommendation that "security" aid clearly be separated from economic and humanitarian aid in money bills, and that all security-related items be contained in one measure rather than spread widely. The House complained there was too little time to consider this and lesser reform proposals and decided to continue the old pattern for another year. But the Senate rejected the House measure.

A final deceptive item in foreign aid is that grants and loans are not precisely what the words connote. Grants mean gifts. The trend now is to phase out grants in favor of loans—"Make them pay for it," as officials say.

But loans also cost the United States money. Only loans for military sales are at interest rates that the U.S. treasury pays for borrowing cash (currently 6.125%). And there are exceptions. Israel, for example, this year got \$500 million at 3%. Such "concessional" rates will be used more often, not less, in the future, if the Administration gets its way. It argues that "soft loans" are the only way to wean nations away from grants.

And concessional rates are always offered with economic loans—usually 2% for 19 years, 3% for another 30 years.

ECONOMIC AID

The 95 poor nations of the world—of 131 in the United Nations—are presently overwhelmed by \$60 billion in foreign aid debts.

An early attempt to ease this problem was to allow loans to be repaid in local currency for U.S. food shipments. The United States has had more than \$2 billion in "soft money" repaid, another \$6 billion owed to it, according to a House government operations subcommittee. An estimated \$2 billion has been lost through inflation of such currencies since 1954.

About 90% of it is slated for use by the country, with American approval, for economic programs. The rest can be spent only in the country. But there is still so much available that U.S. embassies and AID missions may never use it all up. Its presence is a source of embarrassment and tempts its ostentatious use. A \$3 million AID staff house for single person and childless couples has been built in the New Delhi suburb of Greater Kesh, for example, with these funds. It has three six-story buildings with fountains, a swimming pool and other luxuries as plush as the finest hotel in India.

BOWLING ALLEY PLANNED

A bowling alley is now to be added to its features. Times correspondent William Drummond asked one AID administrator about the plan:

"How much will it be? \$25,000?" responded the American. "What's \$25,000? If you dis-

tributed it to all the residents of Delhi, maybe each person would get 5 cents."

India has received the most U.S. economic aid of any country—almost \$10 billion—but U.S. arms to Pakistan have partially canceled out the friendship it earned. Moreover, AID regulations force India, and others, to buy American. This may be applauded in the United States but it has required recipients to pay as much as 30% more in AID funds for the same equipment if bought on a free market.

Nonetheless, India is viewed as an American aid success story. It has finally become self-sufficient in food production, thanks to the "green revolution." Private U.S. scientists made the research breakthrough in wheat germ plasm but U.S. aid programs pushed it intensively to fruition.

The "hardest nut" to crack in helping poor nations has been to modernize its infrastructure to create the organizational, administrative and technical capacities to use the assistance being offered.

Tunisia college problem

In Tunisia, which has received the most U.S. economic aid of any African state, a dam was constructed to enable poor farms to produce more food than its owner consumed and provide him with hard cash for the first time. But the farmers were never taught about rotating crops, which is necessary in irrigation farming. So while the dam is long finished, its potential has still not been realized.

The United States put up an agricultural college in Tunisia but it has not worked well either. The French-oriented culture in the country frowns on any educated person, even a university graduate trained in soil and crops, from getting his hands dirty.

"You can say this has been a worldwide problem for us," an AID official in Washington said.

"We made mistakes," he added in a broader vein, "but recognize that we were breaking new ground. No nation tried it before in history. Some failures were inevitable. In fact, if we'd had none, you could have accused us of being too conservative."

Some ways to stimulate social and economic progress have been successfully exported. In Latin America, the concept of a saving and loan association to pool resources was unknown. A man had to save all the money in advance before starting to build a new house. Now such institutions are fast rising as part of the Alliance for Progress effort.

Rivals Marshall plan

The alliance, initiated by President Kennedy, was to rival the Marshall Plan in size and impact during the "decade of development" just passed. Between 1962 and 1970, the United States pumped an average of \$1.1 billion a year into 18 Latin nations. Some progress has been achieved but how much because of U.S. aid is impossible to determine statistically. The consensus, however, is that it failed.

"Almost from the outset," Times correspondent Fran Kent cabled, "the Latins resented the 'father knows best' attitude adopted by many of the Americans staffing the sprawling AID missions. They built roads, schools, houses and factories but they often baffled the Latins.

"AID built the 'Villa Kennedy,' a housing project outside Rio de Janeiro that is virtually abandoned and in neglect. It is much too far from the jobs of those it was intended to house. They can't afford the bus fare.

"Nor has the alliance achieved its basic goal of bringing representative government to the Latin masses. On the contrary. Since it was formed, the military has taken over in five countries: Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Bolivia and Panama. But this is not to say that the military is necessarily worse than the olig-

archies and fumbling constitutional governments that ruled before them.

Soaring birthrates was another fundamental problem. Most Latin nations must grow at 3% a year just to keep pace with new mouths. This was always recognized as a major hurdle to economic improvement, but under the Eisenhower administration, the United States refused to support birth control programs. Even now U.S. support is done quietly and usually through private foundations.

Colombia is cited by AID officials as their best success story on that continent. Its GNP is rising and so is its income per head. Often the GNP rise only trickles down slowly to the peasants, however. But through its program in agriculture, education, urban and rural development, food-for-peace and population control, more than 25% of all Colombians are directly and immediately affected by U.S. aid.

Concentrating on economic sectors like agriculture and education is a new trend in AID programs, replacing the earlier emphasis on individual projects like dams. Another trend is funneling more U.S. aid through multilateral, international agencies like the World Bank. A third is to look at the totality of a nation's economic situation—its potential to use the help as intended without harming other sectors with high priority—before providing the help.

Indonesia inflation cut

In Indonesia, a 10-nation Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia, is the vehicle for U.S. aid. It provided the country with \$640 million this year, one-third from the United States, one-third from Japan, and the rest from the other eight nations. The visibility of U.S. AID personnel has dropped considerably. The United States does not risk blame for national failures, as it once did there. But credit is also spread when there is success, as in the cut in Indonesia's inflation rate from 635% five years ago to under 2% currently.

The mistakes, then, over the last generation for aid may have been relatively few and understandable, but they were eye-catching and emotive while the successes have been few, long-term and diffuse. Should the United States have waited for more thorough analyses of the problems before moving in?

Perhaps. On the other hand, Robert E. Asher of the Brookings Institution contends that "learning by doing . . . is consistent with the pragmatic, action-oriented temperament of this nation and with the exigencies of the situation abroad." Learning-by-doing means learning-by-error.

MILITARY AID

Mistakes are not unknown in the military aid program either, but they tend to be better hidden. Military assistance statistics remain classified for some countries (like Pakistan from 1953-66), which is another reason to suspect official totals of arms aid.

But where British imperialists once believed that "trade follows the flag," the U.S. Congress fears "men follow the money" when the money is military aid. It happened in Vietnam, it could happen in Cambodia.

The Administration insists it will not. "Cambodia is the Nixon Doctrine in its purest form," President Nixon said recently. Under it, friendly nations will be provided the means for defense, but not U.S. men to fight. Vietnam, Mr. Nixon said, was the antithesis of his doctrine.

However, his policy will cost more foreign aid money, not less, in the immediate future. Cambodia got \$8 million in 1970; \$341 million is asked for next year. South Korea's aid doubled in one year, to \$300 million in 1971, as U.S. forces were being cut back there.

Asia remains the focus of concern and criticism of military aid because three-

fourths of the current U.S. program—\$1.5 billion—goes to four nations there: Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and South Korea. But 38 other nations also share in the pie.

Sixty-eight nations got guns

At one time, 68 nations were getting U.S. guns. The Pentagon handed them out pell mell in the immediate postwar and mutual security act periods. More than 90% of the official arms aid total, \$41.6 billion, went as gifts.

An arbitrary value is put on arms given away, however: one-third the purchase price if the equipment has been used, although it may still have had useful life and been worth stockpiling.

Over \$1.5 billion of the total arms aid was declared "excess stocks" by the Pentagon, meaning surplus beyond stockpile needs. It, too, was valued at one-third original cost. Scrapping it might have brought in 5% of original cost. However, usually the arms needed rehabilitation to make them usable. Foreign aid paid for that and for transporting the arms to the recipient country.

Given these factors, the real total worth of American military aid spread around the world will probably never be known. Elmer Staats, the comptroller general, told Congress this year that nowhere in government is there one complete tabulation. One estimate, cited by Sen. Church, is \$135 billion worth since 1945.

It was unprecedented munificence, whatever the figure, and responsibility rests with many agencies of the government, according to officials intimate with the programs. For at least 15 years after the war, Congress was denying no Pentagon requests to fight communism through such gifts. The State Department, legislatively responsible for overseeing all assistance efforts including the military one, did not try very hard to put brakes on the Pentagon.

As for the Pentagon, its officers typically sat down with their opposite numbers in countries to be aided and determined the worst possible threat. This led to huge shipments of arms.

Moreover, if generals are always preparing to fight the last war, the corollary is that the military always tries to create its mirror-image in a country getting its help. Inadequate attention was given to what could be realistically used against the real threat, if any, to the quality of soldiers, the terrain, and certainly to the political ramifications of the arms supplies.

One result of this approach is the abundance of F-86 jet fighters around the world. The F-86 was built to combat Mig-15s. Some 2,000 of them have been supplied in all to nations like Thailand which never faced a credible Mig-15 threat.

Realistic role

Similarly, the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan have received hundreds of tanks for two armored divisions. But their realistic role was defense, not attack. Antitank weapons, not tanks, would have been more logical, officials acknowledge.

Certainly the mirror-image syndrome was manifested in Vietnam, and it seems to be cropping up again in Cambodia. Times correspondent Jack Foisie cabled:

"American planners prefer a neat logistical supply system for Cambodia, one that can eventually be computerized. Cambodians have been using the masses of Czech-Chinese AK-40 rifles, which are highly regarded, that were captured by U.S. and Vietnamese forces last year. They also have huge supplies of captured ammo for the weapons, and U.S. arsenals have also been turning out AK-40 ammo for them. But now American M-16 rifles are being provided the Cambodians."

Reforms are being instituted by the Nixon Administration. The State Department has

moved to regain control over military assistance levels. Program levels will be determined primarily by dollar ceilings rather than by the Pentagon's threat estimate. Political and economic considerations in the recipient nation will be examined thoroughly before the arms are shipped out.

While these will help bring down the size of military aid eventually, there remains the qualitative problem of what to do about the "Paraguays" of the world, one planner admitted.

Weaponry for Latins

Latin American countries have gotten over \$1 billion in U.S. arms since 1945, \$57 million last year. The present level is small in dollar terms but significant in a region where costly weaponry is unnecessary and often too sophisticated. Half the arms were given freely.

There is now considerable sentiment in Washington to cut off the arms gifts to most of the 46 nations on aid. Good arguments can be made for exempting Korea, the three Southeast Asian states and Turkey from the cutoff, an official said, "but as for the rest, let them buy the stuff if they want it."

Counterarguments can be made, however. Armament industries in Britain and France, to say nothing of Russia, are already offering easier credit for arms sales than the United States. The military in small nations like Latin America will have key roles there for a long time to come; assuring their friendship with arms is cheaper than buying politicians.

On the other hand, these considerations must be weighed against the discredit earned by the United States among reformers in those countries for whom the tide of change is running strong.

Finally, the United States will have a great deal of arms on its hands as the Vietnam war ends. The projected development of new weapons will add to the bulging surpluses. Political pressure to sell them will be considerable. The only limitation is that many weapons obsolete to the U.S. military will be still too sophisticated and expensive for developing nations to buy.

A SUMMING UP

But in the end, the hard questions remain unanswered: Did the arms slow the advance of communism that was so clearly a threat during the Berlin blockade and Korean war? Did economic aid advance the pace of development in poor nations?

Sen. Church, in his speech titled "Farewell to Foreign Aid: A Liberal Takes Leave," has answered no—emphatically and comprehensively.

"The failure of aid is not technical and administrative but conceptual and political. It can only be understood as an aspect of the large failure of American foreign policy over the last decade. . . . It is futile to continue reevaluating and reorganizing the aid program . . . if that program itself is rooted in obsolete conceptions of the national interest and if the objectives meant to be achieved are unsound, or unattainable, or both."

Church quoted the words of Captain Cook when looking back on his voyages that had introduced guns, alcohol, disease and concepts of morality to Tahitian and Australian natives. "It would have been better for these people never to have known us," he said.

Church hoped the United States would get out of the aid business before poor nations say that about it.

The senator has been accused of being disillusioned with his own old illusions about aid, of being like a missionary who, in losing faith, also loses hope. He would stop aid outright. But if more sober and limited objectives can be set, there are good reasons for continuing aid.

Asher, in "Development Assistance in the Seventies" which was reportedly influential in the reforms recommended by the Peterson

task force, contends that there remain "sizeable kernels of truth" in the old arguments for economic aid, despite the past mistakes:

Widespread poverty and frustration does represent a threat to peace; development does produce jobs, markets, trade, investment opportunities and material benefits for virtually all concerned; a broadly shared expansion of the world economy will contribute to a better-integrated political community with a greater stake in the peaceful resolution of conflict;

"And above all, in the humanitarian argument—that aid is right and decent and that responsibility for the mitigation of poverty does not end at national shorelines."

Issues: How? How much?

Even the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, long skeptical of the manner and methods of the aid program, has said: "The issue is not 'Should we provide aid?' It is 'How?' and 'How Much?'"

To these might be added: To whom? And for how long?

The arguments for continued military aid are less persuasive, in principle at least, than for economic aid. The 1969 "football war" between Honduras and El Salvador, with each side killing the other with U.S. guns, is qualitatively worse than any waste of misdirected dollars.

For the future, both types of aid are likely to have rougher passage in Congress, particularly if the Administration's proposal to separate "security" aid from "economic and humanitarian" aid cleanly and comprehensively is accepted.

But at the same time, short of utopia, both will continue to flow out from the United States in significant quantities. The "Doves" will paraphrase Oliver Wendell Holmes to argue that economic aid is an investment in civilization. The "Hawks" will argue the same for military aid.

[Reprinted from the Los Angeles Times, Nov. 24, 1971]

TOO MANY ADMINISTRATORS—INEFFICIENCY IMPEDES AFRICA AID (By Stanley Meisler)

NAIROBI, KENYA.—Africa is the poorest part of the world and gets the least American aid. But a good case can be made that the U.S. aid program here is far too large, incredibly overstuffed and tends to give too much to a few countries that use it poorly.

The Agency for International Development spends about \$140 million a year on overhead grants and loans in Africa. Adding Food for Peace, the Peace Corps, and U.S. Export-Import Bank programs, total direct U.S. assistance is \$300 million, or a fifth of all foreign aid to this continent.

The United States also spends about \$200 million annually through various U.N. and World Bank programs here.

American aid has changed in emphasis since 1966 when it operated under what Edward M. Korry, then U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia, called "the Pago-Pago theory of aid"—every postage stamp country, no matter how small, needed a big aid mission with a big budget.

Now AID concentrates on Nigeria, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Morocco, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire, formerly Congo (Kinshasa). It has cut the number of its establishments and brought better rationale to its former scatter-gun system.

But it left untouched some basic weaknesses. These are:

1—AID establishments remain too big.

In Kenya, AID spent \$5.6 million in 1970. It has 68 Americans working here. But at least 32 are administrators, rather than technicians. Even deducting nine administrators who monitor programs throughout eight African countries, AID has two administrators for every three men in the field. Sweden,

with a comparable-size program (\$4.6 million), has one administrator for nine men in the field.

2—AID personnel are poor quality. They tend to be older, inflexible technicians who find difficulty relating to Africans and adapting American techniques to African problems.

In Ethiopia a few years ago, an AID adviser ordered electric barbecue pits for the home economic departments of secondary schools. Most schools had no electricity. Even in those that did, the school principals had no use for the pits which their girls would never see after graduation.

3—AID officials fail to understand the true need of African development. The main problem is not lack of capital but lack of skilled manpower and of a resourceful, risk-taking population. It needs technicians and small projects. AID officials tend to think big.

In Cameroun, AID gave the Ministry of Community Development six pieces of road-building equipment. It overwhelmed the ministry. Politicians clamored for its use in their home districts. Villages laid down their picks and waited for the great American machines to come and do their work.

4—Politics sometimes governs AID programs. In economic terms the money is usually wasted; even politically it may not make sense.

In Zaire, the United States backs President Joseph Mobutu and is even willing to encourage his grandiosity and waste through AID funds, albeit indirectly.

Zaire's first economic priority is roads. But instead of spending his enormous copper revenues on them, Mobutu has built prestige projects like the world's second largest swimming pool, monuments and a giant football stadium. AID maintains his roads. As long as it continues to do so, he can keep building swimming pools.

In perspective, AID is far from the best foreign agency operating here but it is not the worst either. Many rate it better than the U.N. development program, which is ironic since many critics suggest the United States channel its foreign assistance through international agencies like the United Nations.

THE AIKEN-MANSFIELD RESOLUTION—ONE 6-YEAR TERM FOR PRESIDENT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in the December 15 issue of the New York Times is an article written by Jack Valenti, an old friend, a good friend, and former presidential assistant to the President of the United States, Mr. Johnson.

This article is entitled "A Term-and-a-Half for President," and refers to the Aiken-Mansfield suggestion that Presidents be limited to one term of 6 years for the purpose of taking away from them some of the political pressures which are a natural concomitant of any President and allowing him, on the basis of one term for 6 years with no reelection, to devote himself entirely to the welfare of the country as a whole.

I ask unanimous consent that this excellent article, by Mr. Jack Valenti, who certainly can speak from experience, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Dec. 15, 1971]

A TERM-AND-A-HALF FOR PRESIDENT

(By Jack Valenti)

A six-year term for the American President, with ineligibility for reelection, has be-

come an active public issue. Senators Mansfield and Aiken, two of that parliamentary chamber's most respected members, are now urging this on Congress. This kind of sponsorship persuades us that serious thought be given, particularly by those who believe the torment and risk that resides in today's problems force new ideas upon a reluctant Congress and its constituency.

The argument for the six-year term is overwhelmingly simple, which may be one reason why it has not caught on. The one six-year term would allow the President to concentrate on lifting the quality of life in this country, and not on the election calendar and a reelection campaign. This is the advantage of the six-year term, and it is considerable.

Every working politician knows that the quickest passage of the calendar is calculated by the span between victory day at the polls and the visitation of re-election day. There is no known piece of earth time that passes so swiftly. Political professionals understand that the President, any President of either party, begins his first four years in office by trying to insure he will have four more.

A good many of us argue incessantly about what needs to be done for the good of the country, and the necessity for leaders to be candid and energetic in doing that which ought to be done regardless of the political consequences. Yet we continue to tempt our leader by engaging his attention in re-election realisms rather than the difficult duties to which his oath commands him. (How many times have we heard a Senator or a Congressman say that he would want to do this or that because he believes it is right, but in order to get re-elected, he must choose another course?)

What are the arguments against the six-year term?

The noisy one, the one most often put forth, is this: The President becomes a lame duck the day he takes office and thus he reduces his effective powers for political persuasion. No one, goes the argument, chooses to follow a leader whose tenure is so marked in its limits.

But the counter-argument is that the re-elected President becomes a lame duck the day he begins his second term, since the 22d Amendment prohibits more than two terms.

A strong President can bring to bear enormous influence on his successor and thereby reclaim whatever eroded reach the six-year term imposes. President Johnson was able to pass through Congress a controversial tax bill as well as the hotly debated equal housing legislation after he renounced nomination for a second full term. One does not easily flout political clout from the White House, lame duck or not.

But the prime asset of the six-year term is the spacious arena it provides the President, the opportunity to make the hard choices in the public interest without nagging doubts about his reelectability.

Yes, say the critics, but if the President attempts to coerce the country with unhappy decisions (as the critics define unhappiness), six years is a mighty long time to live with him. Not really so. If that untoward event should occur (as it can occur now), the people can, by their election of Congressmen, stand in the Presidential doorway and demand he stop whatever the hell it is he is doing.

Six years is neither too short nor too long. Indeed, one of the blessed attributes of what we call our "system" is brief Presidential tenure. Arrogance which does not have time to harden has a softer bite and it is an accepted political fact that power which is transient seldom is fatal to the people.

There is no unerasable sanctity in the four-year term with eligibility to re-election for a second term. Our Constitutional Convention in 1787 did not receive the four-year term from some divine inspiration. It was the re-

sult of some gristly debate in which the Presidential term went through several sculpturings before it was finally cast. You will recall that in these debates a seven-year term without re-election eligibility was first decided on, and then changed, not because of any sturdy logic but mainly because the four-year term was the least opposed of all suggestions, and because Benjamin Franklin wanted re-election eligibility.

Change is always hard. Tradition, doing it the way we have always done it, is always offended by the insertion of new values.

But if we accept the fact that the stakes today are so high and the game so invaded by peril, and if we agree that we simply must free the President from every diversion of his energy (and his purpose), then the six-year term begins to make clear, plain sense.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I should like to add that what is going on in Washington now between the executive and legislative branches, and among the various political groups, speaks louder in support of a single 6-year term for President than any words that could be spoken or written.

I believe that we are witnessing a graphic demonstration, and have for the past few weeks, of why we should have a President limited to one 6-year term only. I think the situation is worse this year than it has been for many years. It certainly is striking evidence, since the introduction of the Mansfield-Aiken resolution.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I agree with the principal sponsor and initiator of the Aiken-Mansfield resolution.

Mr. AIKEN. When the President is harassed, the entire country is harassed. That is all it amounts to.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Are there any petitions and memorials?

ORDER FOR TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be a period for the transaction of routine morning business, not to exceed 30 minutes, with statements therein limited to 3 minutes.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Is there any morning business?

THE WAR POWERS BILL

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the leading editorial in the New York Times on Tuesday, December 14, 1971, reflects the importance attached to the legislation reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations last week, designated as the War Powers Act, in which I was joined by Senators STENNIS, EAGLETON, and SPONG.

The editorial emphasizes that this may very well be the basic issue upon which the relationship between Congress and the Executive, which has been so deeply troubled in recent years, will be resolved. Our endeavor as sponsors of the bill has been to fill in a lacuna in the Constitution which has led to an ambiguous constitutional position which has been interpreted differently by different Pres-

idents, and in which Congress has not asserted itself respecting its extensive war powers authority and the authority of the President as Commander in Chief to wage so-called undeclared wars without congressional authorization. The Javits-Stennis-Eagleton bill is a considered effort to regularize practice and to ensure the sharing of the responsibility for going to war between the President and the Congress, as intended by the framers of the Constitution.

One of the great things which this legislation will accomplish, in my judgment, will be to strengthen and fortify the American foreign policy of a President who now faces a divided country, with the tremendous agitation and dissension related to Indochina still going on, as evidenced by what is keeping us here. We will have a practice under the legislation by which Congress will be able to join the President to give assurance to our people—and to nations abroad—that it is not just the President who is committed to a course of action involving hostilities.

Our people will be protected against improvident wars or against improvident decisions taken unilaterally by a President under pressure. Under this legislation, Congress will have coequal authority with the President. If it is adopted every Senator and every Member of the House who votes when questions of military hostilities arise will have the responsibility on his hands and he will have to account to his constituents for what he did and why. The President, in this sense, could acquire strong insurance against second-guessing or backbiting from Members of Congress who had no share of responsibility in a national decision about war.

So, Mr. President, I hope that, in the intervening period until this matter comes up on the floor in a month or so, Members will study this measure carefully and diligently, and that the country will continue to discuss it. We must in all inescapably bear in mind that this is the fulfillment of a promise we made to ourselves as a result of Vietnam, that we would never be caught in that position again of being such a divided country because the Constitution did not speak to so critical a question as an undeclared war.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have the editorial I have referred to, entitled "Toward Bipartisanship Abroad," printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Dec. 14, 1971]

TOWARD BIPARTISANSHIP ABROAD

Under the Constitution, only the Congress can declare war and pay American troops. But the President, as Commander in Chief, can commit the armed forces to combat on his own. In an era of undeclared wars, this ambiguity has led inevitably to executive encroachment on Congressional prerogatives.

Efforts by the Congress to resist the trend now encounter the argument that Congressional debate is a luxury that cannot always be enjoyed in the nuclear age, when split-second reactions may be vital to avoid the nation's destruction. But it is not the nuclear contingency that is in fact at issue. It is the relatively limited military engagement—such

as the Dominican intervention or the Indochina conflict—that has most eroded Congressional control over the war-making powers. And it is essentially the no-more-Vietnam syndrome that is spurring current efforts in the Senate to increase the Senate role in future military decisions.

The legislative formula recently approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to restrict the war-making powers of the Presidency is not and cannot be watertight. It is recognized that the Congress cannot and probably should not attempt to prevent the Commander in Chief from engaging the nation in hostilities in certain emergency situations. The intention is to prevent military action from continuing more than thirty days without Congressional approval.

The thirty-day clause is the heart of the proposed legislation, rather than the attempt to define the circumstances under which the President would be authorized to use the nation's military power. The bill would indeed authorize armed force to repel or to forestall an attack on the United States or on American forces stationed abroad. While the President's constitutional powers could not be limited to such contingencies by legislation the Congress can insist on its participation in decisions to extend or enlarge a conflict beyond the measures taken in the initial emergency period.

This approach undoubtedly involves some disadvantages. The need to sway the Congress could conceivably impel a future Administration to escalate low-key military moves and to attempt to arouse popular emotion. The Congress itself is not impervious to an exigent President and can be misled, as the Tonkin Gulf resolution demonstrated in 1964.

But such risks are smaller than those revealed by unrestricted exercise of the Presidential war-making powers. What would chiefly be restricted would be the President's power to take the nation into a large-scale war without its consent, explicitly expressed by its elected representatives.

Instead of resisting the proposed legislation, the Nixon Administration would be well advised to embrace it and to go beyond it to create a new atmosphere of cooperation with the Congress in foreign policy generally. With a necessarily divisive Presidential campaign approaching, it is imperative to restore some semblance of the old tradition that politics stops at the water's edge.

As a first move to restore a bipartisan foreign policy, Mr. Nixon could well invite the Senate majority and minority leaders to accompany him to Peking and Moscow—and to the summit meetings with allied leaders that will precede these historic voyages. Although it is too late for the talks under way with President Pompidou of France in the Azores, Senators Mansfield and Scott would be valuable additions to the American delegation for the projected meetings with the leaders of Britain, West Germany and Japan. Now that he has wisely if belatedly moved to take the allies into his confidence, Mr. Nixon can afford to make the same gesture toward the Congress.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STEVENSON). Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, is there further morning business?

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President—

Mr. MANSFIELD. If the Senator will yield to me briefly, I wish to state that I intend to ask the Senate to adjourn as expeditiously as possible unless there is business in the way of speeches and the like to be undertaken.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the distinguished majority leader yield to me?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. I would like to have the majority leader answer a question. I have just come in, as the Senator knows, and I am trying to get briefed. The Senator from Michigan (Mr. GRIFFIN) left the matter with me on the theory that he did not wish action taken on the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), which is the pending business.

Am I to understand it is the majority leader's intention to adjourn the Senate rather than to seek a vote on the Fulbright amendment?

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is my intention. If the distinguished Senator from Arkansas desires to seek a vote on his amendment, that, of course, is up to him.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, I again suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for a quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMUNICATIONS FROM EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, ETC.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

PROPOSED MINORITY ENTERPRISE SMALL BUSINESS INVESTMENT ACT OF 1971

A letter from the Administrator, Small Business Administration, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, and for other purposes (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.

PETITIONS

Petitions were laid before the Senate and referred as indicated:

By the PRESIDENT pro tempore:

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of California; to the Committee on Public Works:

"Assembly Joint Resolution No. 56—"Relative to the federal-aid TOPICS program

"Whereas, The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968 authorized the expenditure of federal funds for an urban traffic operations program to increase capacity and safety, known as TOPICS, and this program was continued by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970; and

"Whereas, Local agencies have encountered difficulty in the administration of this program due to burdensome administrative procedures required by the federal government; and

"Whereas, The new urban system created by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 and the TOPICS program could be combined to provide a more efficient program which would be easier to administer; and

"Whereas, It is essential that steps be taken to simplify procedures so that federal funds can be more easily utilized by the cities and counties of California; now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the Assembly and the Senate of the State of California, jointly, That the Legislature of the State of California respectfully memorializes the President and the Congress of the United States to take the necessary steps to remove burdensome administrative procedures from the TOPICS program and to consider the integration of programs designed for the improvement of streets and highways in urban areas; and be it further

"Resolved, That the Chief Clerk of the Assembly transmit copies of this resolution to the President and Vice President of the United States, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and to each Senator and Representative from California in the Congress of the United States."

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of California; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs:

"SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION No. 49

"Relative to the proposed move of the National Park Service's Western Service Center from San Francisco

"Whereas, The National Park Service reportedly intends to close its Western Service Center in San Francisco and to move it to Denver where its services will be consolidated with those of the Eastern Service Center within the month, eliminating 90 positions and requiring a move of more than 200 employees to another location; and

"Whereas, California is the most populous state in the nation and its parks have more visitors than other national parks in other states, therefore the most prudent move would be to consolidate the national park service centers in San Francisco; and

"Whereas, The Department of Industrial Relations of the State of California reports a seasonally adjusted unemployment rate of 6.5 percent in the bay area at the present time, a rate which will be aggravated by such actions by federal agencies; and

"Whereas, The move will mean a loss in payroll in San Francisco of more than one million dollars a year; and

"Whereas, It may be expected that many good planners will leave the park service; and

"Whereas, The cost of consolidating the service centers in Denver is over two million dollars, at a time when dollars should be conserved, and there is an additional loss that cannot be estimated, the consequences of lower morale among National Park Service and Bureau of Outdoor Recreation personnel who do many joint feasibility studies for California in order to plan for new park areas, and the impaired operation of these two agencies would be characterized by inefficiency and a lack of cooperation to the detriment of California's environment; and

"Whereas, It may be expected that lowered morale and disruptions created by moving will result in greatly reduced services for at least a year and will impair conservation efforts by slowing down (1) the identification of new park areas; (2) the classification of wilderness areas which must be completed by 1974, and therefore especially affecting Joshua Tree and Death Valley National Monuments; and (3) the master planning and development for California parks, especially Yosemite, Redwoods, Point Reyes National Seashore, Sequoia, and Kings Canyon; and

"Whereas, The planning operations for the proposed Golden Gate National Recreation

Area would be impaired by the removal of planners and architects to a distant locale; now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and Assembly of the State of California, jointly. That the Legislature of the State of California respectfully memorializes the Director of the National Park Service to rescind the proposed move of the National Park Service's Western Service Center from San Francisco for combination with the Eastern Service Center in another location, or, if the two centers are to be combined, then to locate the combined center in San Francisco; and be it further

Resolved. That the Secretary of the Senate transmit copies of this resolution to the President and Vice President of the United States, the Secretary of the Interior, the Director of the National Park Service, and to each Senator and Representative from California in the Congress of the United States."

A resolution of the Senate of the State of California; to the Committee on Public Works:

"SENATE RESOLUTION 230

"Relative to the National Transportation Planning Study

"Whereas, The State Business and Transportation Agency has completed California's portion of the National Transportation Planning Study; and

"Whereas, The California study has been transmitted to the Secretary of Transportation in Washington, D.C.; and

"Whereas, The State Transportation Board has called attention to its finding that "... only the highway mode has adequate resources and planning facilities ..."; and

"Whereas, The State Transportation Board has urged that "... the study results should be used with considerable caution by the Federal Government in its funding programs ..."; and

"Whereas, Various assumptions in the study, relative to possible future state or local funding, have the effect of being prejudicial in determining the relative needs and programmed expenditures among the various modes of transportation; and

"Whereas, The need for interurban rapid transit was omitted from this study entirely; and

"Whereas, The final summary of needs and funding alternatives may lead federal authorities to conclude that California places a greater relative emphasis on meeting highway needs than on meeting transit needs; now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate of the State of California. That the Members respectfully memorialize the President and the Congress of the United States and the United States Department of Transportation to review the National Transportation Planning Study, and California's portion thereof, with the understanding that the need for new and improved transit facilities is considerably greater than the proportion programmed for funding under Federal Alternatives I, II, and III of the study; and be it further

Resolved. That the Secretary of the Senate transmit copies of this resolution to the President and Vice President of the United States, to the Secretary of Transportation, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and to each Senator and Representative from California in the Congress of the United States."

The petition of the Borough of Englewood Cliffs, Bergen County, New Jersey, praying for the removal of all United States troops from Southeast Asia; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

A resolution adopted by the Arizona Southern Baptist Convention, Phoenix, Arizona, reaffirming their belief in the separation of church and state; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

A resolution adopted by the California Veterans Board, Sacramento, California, praying for the enactment of legislation to provide for the necessary medical treatment and education of Vietnam veterans who are afflicted with drug dependency; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following reports of committees were submitted:

By Mr. JORDAN of North Carolina, from the Committee on Rules and Administration, without amendment:

S. Con. Res. 54. A concurrent resolution to print additional copies of hearings on "War Powers Legislation" (Rept. No. 92-586);

H. Con. Res. 439. A concurrent resolution to provide for the printing of fifty thousand additional copies of the Subcommittee print of the Subcommittee on Domestic Finance of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, entitled "A Primer on Money" (Rept. No. 92-587);

H. Con. Res. 441. A concurrent resolution authorizing the printing of "The Joint Committee on Congressional Operations: Purpose, Legislative History, Jurisdiction, and Rules" as a House document, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 92-588); and

H. Con. Res. 469. A concurrent resolution to provide for the printing as a House document a compilation of the eulogies on the late Justice Hugo L. Black (Rept. No. 92-589).

ENROLLED BILL AND JOINT RESOLUTION PRESENTED

The Secretary of the Senate reported that on today, December 16, 1971, he presented to the President of the United States the following enrolled bill and joint resolution:

S. 2891. An act to extend and amend the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, as amended, and for other purposes; and

S.J. Res. 184. Joint resolution extending the dates for transmission of the Economic Report and the report of the Joint Economic Committee.

INTRODUCTION OF BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

The following bills and joint resolutions were introduced, read the first time and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as indicated:

By Mr. JAVITS (for himself, Mr. BEALL, and Mr. SCHWEIKER):

S. 3028. A bill to protect the public health by amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to assure the safety and effectiveness of medical devices. Referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

By Mr. CRANSTON:

S. 3029. A bill for the relief of Mr. and Mrs. Jose Zuniga-Jaramillo. Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MILLER:

S.J. Res. 185. A joint resolution expressing a proposal by the Congress of the United States for securing the safe return of American and allied prisoners of war and the accelerated withdrawal of all American military personnel from South Vietnam. Referred, by unanimous consent, to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

By Mr. JAVITS:

S. 3028. A bill to protect the public health by amending the Federal Food,

Drug, and Cosmetic Act to assure the safety and effectiveness of medical devices. Referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

MEDICAL DEVICE SAFETY ACT

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I am introducing today on behalf of myself and Senators BEALL and SCHWEIKER a bill, on behalf of the administration, to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to assure the safety and effectiveness of medical devices, entitled the "Medical Device Safety Act."

The bill would authorize the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to establish safety standards for medical devices, and would require unreasonably hazardous medical devices used in life-threatening situations to undergo a scientific review by the Department for safety and efficacy prior to their introduction into commerce.

The scientific review section of the bill is more commonly referred to as the premarket clearance provision. It is the most dramatic portion of the bill and is intended to assure the safety and efficacy of devices used in life-threatening situations. Classes of devices that may be expected to require scientific review are cardiovascular implants, other implants composed of new materials, applications of new forms of energy to the body—for example, lasers—and new designs for machines which substitute for major bodily functions—for example, heart-lung machines. When the design and construction of any device or class of devices subject to scientific review reach the point where the safety and efficacy of the device or class may be assured under appropriate standards, such standards will be promulgated under the bill's standard-setting authority, and the scientific review requirement will be ended.

Two examples of devices which would be subject to appropriate standards are certain types of pacemakers and catheters.

I ask unanimous consent to have the bill, a letter of transmittal from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and a summary of the key provisions of the bill printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1.)

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, since this legislation affects medical device safety and effectiveness, pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, it is appropriately subject to jurisdiction of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee, of which I am ranking Republican member. However, I understand the Commerce Committee is presently considering generic product safety legislation and the question whether the authority for evaluating product safety should be vested in an independent agency or in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, which is how it is done under this bill. I assure my colleagues that when this legislation is considered by our committee, we shall consult with the Commerce Committee in view of their interest in the subject.

Although the purpose of this legislation is to provide a comprehensive reg-

ulatory program for medical devices in order to protect consumers from their potential hazards, I am concerned that the legislation as presently written is too limited in regard to its standard-setting authority for medical devices. The bill contains a limitation that there be unreasonable risk of illness or injury. I am not convinced that when we deal with the protection of consumers' health we should not provide authority to deal with all risks, not merely unreasonable risks caused by medical devices.

Also, I am concerned that in the establishment of the various scientific advisory committees there is no explicit provision for consumer representation on such committees, nor is there any provision which would assure the public that the scientific advocates for a particular medical device would not be among the scientific members of the advisory committee passing upon its safety and effectiveness.

On another point I believe all of us in Congress have a deep concern that there be adequate protection and humane treatment of animals. Accordingly, I wish to assure all animal lovers that the exemption provision covering animals in this legislation will be carefully reviewed by the committee as the legislation receives further consideration.

There is also a provision in the legislation exempting "reports on the investigational use of devices." Although I share the concern that there be adequate protection of trade secrets, I am equally concerned that all information which involves the public interest be available for public scrutiny. This section of the legislation shall also be subject to careful review by the committee.

Finally, the legislation does not provide funding authorizations for the activities to be conducted pursuant to the legislation and would, therefore, rely upon the general Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's funding authorities. I am concerned that if we are to adequately protect the public, we should require specific funding authorizations in this bill. This will also be subject to careful review by the committee.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXHIBIT I
S. 3028

A bill to protect the public health by amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to assure the safety and effectiveness of medical devices

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Medical Device Safety Act".

TITLE I—AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH STANDARDS

SEC. 101. Chapter V of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C., ch. 9, subch. VI) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"STANDARDS FOR MEDICAL DEVICES

"Authority To Set Standards

"SEC. 513. (a) (1) Whenever in the judgment of the Secretary such action is necessary to reduce or eliminate unreasonable risk of illness or injury associated with exposure to or use of a device (including the need for

uniformity and compatibility with systems or environments in which it is intended to be used) and there are no other more practicable means to protect the public from such risk, he may by order issued in accordance with subsection (g) of this section promulgate for any device, or type or class of device, a standard relating to any one or more of the following: the composition, the construction, the properties, the uniform identification, or the performance of such device. Such standard may include provisions for the testing of the device and the measurement of its characteristics, and may require the use and prescribe the form and content of instructions or warnings necessary for the proper installation, maintenance, operation, and use of the device.

"(2) A standard shall, where feasible, pertain to the safety performance characteristics of a device, except that it may apply to the composition, design, construction, finish, or packaging of the device or any component thereof if the Secretary determines such application to be in the public interest. Without regard to the limitations of the preceding sentence, a standard may require that the device or any component thereof be marked, tagged, or accompanied by clear and adequate warnings or instructions reasonably necessary for the protection of health or safety.

"(3) The Secretary shall provide for a periodic evaluation of the adequacy of all standards promulgated under this section in order to reflect changes in the state of the art of the development of devices and in applicable medical, scientific, and other technological data.

"Consultation with other Federal agencies and interested groups; use of other Federal agencies

"(b) (1) Prior to (A) initiating a proceeding under subsection (c) to promulgate a standard under this section, (B) initiating the development of a proposed standard under subsection (f) of this section, or (C) the taking of any action under subsection (g) of this section, the Secretary shall to the maximum practicable extent consult with, and give appropriate weight to relevant standards published by, other Federal agencies concerned with standard setting and other nationally or internationally recognized standard-setting agencies or organizations. In considering proposals for the development of standards, the Secretary may also invite appropriate participation, through joint or other conferences, workshops, or other means, by informed persons representative of scientific, professional, industry, or consumer organizations which in his judgment can make a significant contribution to such development.

"(2) In carrying out his duties under this section, the Secretary shall utilize to the maximum practicable extent the personnel, facilities, and other technical support available in other Federal agencies.

"Initiation of proceeding for standards—
development by interested parties

"(c) A proceeding to promulgate a standard under this section shall be initiated by the Secretary by publication of notice in the Federal Register. Such notice shall advise of the opportunity for comment on the need to initiate such proceeding and shall include—

"(1) a description or other designation of the device (or type or class of device) to which the proceeding relates;

"(2) the nature of the risk or risks intended to be controlled;

"(3) a summary of the data on which the Secretary has found a need for initiation of the proceeding;

"(4) identification of any existing standard (if known to the Secretary) which may be relevant to the proceeding; and

"(5) an invitation to any person, including any Federal agency, which has developed or is willing to develop a proposed standard to submit to the Secretary, within thirty days after the date of such notice, (A) such a standard; or (B) an offer to develop a proposed standard in accordance with procedures prescribed by regulations of the Secretary.

"USE OF EXISTING STANDARDS

"(d) If the Secretary (1) finds that there exists a standard which has been published by any Federal agency or other qualified agency, organization, or institution, (2) has made reference to such standard (unless it is a standard submitted under subsection (c) (5)) in his notice pursuant to subsection (c) (4), and (3) determines that such standard may be substantially acceptable to him as a device standard, then he may, in lieu of accepting an offer under this section, publish such standard as a proposed device standard in accordance with subsection (g).

"ACCEPTANCE OF OFFERS TO DEVELOP STANDARDS

"(e) (1) Except as otherwise provided by subsection (d), the Secretary shall accept one or more offers to develop a proposed standard pursuant to the invitation prescribed by subsection (c) (5) if he determines that (A) the offeror is technically competent to undertake and complete the development of an appropriate standard within a reasonable period of time, and (B) the offeror has the capacity to comply with procedures prescribed by regulations of the Secretary under paragraph (4).

"(2) The Secretary shall publish in the Federal Register the name and address of each person whose offer is accepted, and a summary of the terms of such offer as accepted.

"(3) Upon an offeror's application therefor prior to the acceptance of his offer under this subsection, the Secretary may agree to contribute to the offeror's cost in developing a proposed standard, if the Secretary determines that such contribution is likely to result in a more satisfactory standard than would be developed without such contribution, and that the offeror is financially responsible. Regulations of the Secretary shall set forth the items of cost in which he may participate, except that such items may not include construction (except minor remodeling), or the acquisition of land or buildings.

"(4) The Secretary shall prescribe regulations governing the development of proposed standards under this subsection and subsection (f), which regulations shall not be considered rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice for purposes of section 553 of title 5 of the United States Code. Such regulations shall include requirements—

"(A) that standards recommended for promulgation be supported by test data or such other documents or materials as the Secretary may reasonably require to be developed, and be suitable for promulgation under subsection (g);

"(B) that standards recommended for promulgation contain such test methods as may be appropriate for measurement of compliance with such standards;

"(C) for opportunity by interested persons to participate in the development of such standards;

"(D) for the maintenance of such records as the Secretary prescribes in such regulations to disclose the course of the development of standards recommended for promulgation, the comments and other information submitted by any person in connection with such development, including comments and information with respect to the need for such recommended standards, and such other matters as may be relevant to the evaluation of such recommended standards; and

"(E) that the Secretary and the Comptrol-

ler General of the United States, or any of their duly authorized representatives, have access for the purpose of audit and examination to any books, documents, papers, and records, relevant to the expenditure of any contribution of the Secretary, under paragraph (3).

"Development of Standards by the Secretary"

"(f) If the Secretary has published a notice as provided by subsection (c), and—

"(1) no person accepts the invitation prescribed by subsection (c) (5);

"(2) the Secretary has accepted neither an existing standard pursuant to subsection (d) nor an offer to develop a proposed standard pursuant to subsection (e); or

"(3) the Secretary has accepted an offer pursuant to subsection (e), but determines that the offeror is unwilling or unable to continue the development of the standard which was the subject of the offer or the standard which has been developed is not satisfactory;

then the Secretary may proceed to develop a proposed standard pursuant to procedures prescribed by subsection (g).

"Procedure for Promulgation, Amendment, or Revocation of Standards"

"(g) (1) (A) As soon as practicable after the initiation of a proceeding to promulgate a standard, and after review of any proposal submitted under subsection (e), the Secretary shall publish in the Federal Register either a proposal to promulgate a standard applicable to the device (or type or class of device) subject to the proceeding, or a notice that the proceeding is terminated. The proposal to promulgate a standard shall set forth the standard, the manner in which interested persons may examine data and other information on which the standard is based, and the period within which interested persons may present their comments on the standard (including the need therefor) orally or in writing.

"(B) As soon as practicable after the publication of a proposal to promulgate a standard, the Secretary shall, by order published in the Federal Register, act upon the proposed standard or terminate the proceeding. The order shall set forth the standard, if any, the reasons for the Secretary's action (including reasons for the promulgation of a standard materially different than that set forth in the proposal or for his failure to promulgate any standard), and the date or dates upon which the standard, or portions thereof, will become effective. Such date or dates shall be established so as to minimize, consistent with the public health and safety, economic loss to, and disruption or dislocation of, domestic and international trade.

"(C) (1) Prior to his issuance of an order to promulgate a standard, the Secretary shall consider—

"(I) the degree of risk of illness or injury associated with those aspects of the devices subject to the order;

"(II) the approximate number of devices, or types or classes thereof, subject to the order;

"(III) the need of the public for the devices subject to the order, and the probable effect of the order upon the utility, cost, or availability of the devices to meet that need;

"(IV) means of achieving the objective of the order with a minimal disruption or dislocation of competition and of reasonable manufacturing and other commercial practices; and

"(V) data and comments submitted in the course of any proceeding initiated under subsection (c) relevant to such order.

Such order shall include appropriate findings with respect to the matters set forth in clauses (I) through (V) and such standard shall be based on such findings.

"(ii) The Secretary shall include in the order promulgating a standard such addi-

tional findings as he may determine to be necessary to support the judgment required by subsection (a) (1).

"(2) The Secretary may revoke any standard, in whole or in part, upon the ground that there no longer exists a need therefor or that such standard (or part thereof) is no longer in the public interest. Such revocation shall be published as a proposal in the Federal Register and shall set forth such standard or portion thereof to be revoked, a summary of the reasons for his determination that there no longer be a need therefor or that such standard (or any part thereof) may no longer be in the public interest, the manner in which interested persons may examine data and other information relevant to the Secretary's determination, and the period within which any interested person may present his views, orally or in writing, with respect to such revocation. As soon as practicable thereafter, the Secretary shall by order act upon such proposal and shall publish such order in the Federal Register. The order shall include the reasons for the Secretary's action and the date or dates upon which such revocation shall become effective.

"(3) The Secretary may propose an amendment of a standard by publishing such proposal in the Federal Register. Such proposal shall be subject to paragraph (4) of this subsection and to subsection (h).

"(4) To the extent not inconsistent with this section, the provisions of section 553 of title 5 of the United States Code, shall govern proceedings under this section to promulgate, amend, or revoke a standard. An order promulgating, amending, or revoking a standard shall, upon its publication and without regard to its effective date, be a final order for purposes of chapter 7 of title 5 of the United States Code. Judicial review of such final order shall not be denied upon the ground that the petitioner has failed to seek the referral of any proposal to an advisory committee under subsection (h).

"Referral to Independent Advisory Committee"

"(h) (1) A proposal under subsection (g) may be referred to an advisory committee of experts for a report and recommendations with respect to any matter involved in such proposal which requires the exercise of scientific judgment. The Secretary may so refer such proposal prior to or after its publication under such subsection, and shall so refer it after its publication upon a request, within the time specified in the proposal, of any interested person (unless the Secretary finds the request to be without good cause).

For the purpose of any such referral, the Secretary shall appoint such an advisory committee (which may be a standing advisory scientific review panel established under section 514(b)) and shall refer to it, together with all the data before him, the matter so involved for study, and for a report and recommendations.

The provisions of the first and second sentences of section 706(b) (5) (C) (ii) shall apply to such report and recommendations. A person who has requested the referral of a matter to an advisory committee pursuant to this subsection, as well as representatives of the Department, shall have the right to consult with such advisory committee, and such advisory committee is authorized to consult with any person, in connection with the matter referred to it.

"(2) The Secretary shall appoint as members of any such committee persons qualified in the subject matter to be referred to the committee and of appropriately diversified professional background. Members of an advisory committee who are not in the regular full-time employ of the United States, while attending conferences or meetings of their committee or otherwise serving at the request of the Secretary, shall be entitled to receive compensation at rates to be fixed by

the Secretary but not at rates exceeding the daily equivalent for grade GS-18 of the General Schedule for each day so engaged, including travel time; and while so serving away from their homes or regular places of business they may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by section 5703 of title 5 of the United States Code for persons in the Government service employed intermittently. The Secretary shall furnish the committee with clerical and other assistance, and shall by regulation prescribe the procedure to be followed by the committee.

"(3) If such a matter is referred to an expert advisory committee upon request of an interested person, the Secretary may, pursuant to regulations designed so as not to discourage any such referrals which are in the public interest, require such person to pay all or part of the cost to the Department arising by reason of such referral. Such payments, including advance deposits to cover such payments, shall be available until expended for paying (directly or by way of reimbursement of the applicable currently available appropriations) such costs and for refunds in accordance with such regulations.

"Testing or Manufacture of Devices to Assure Compliance With Standards"

"(1) (1) Every manufacturer of a device subject to a standard under this section shall assure the Secretary, at such times and in such form and manner as the Secretary shall by regulation prescribe, that testing methods prescribed by the standard show the device to comply therewith, or that the device has been manufactured under a program of quality control which is in accord with current good manufacturing practice (as may be determined by regulations of the Secretary) designed to assure such compliance.

"(2) To assure that devices conform to standards under this section, the Secretary shall review and evaluate on a continuing basis testing and other quality control programs carried out by manufacturers of devices subject to such standards.

"Exemption"

"(j) This section shall not apply to any device intended solely (1) for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in animals other than man or (2) to affect the structure or any function of the body of such animals."

CONFORMING AMENDMENTS

Sec. 102. (a) Section 501 of such Act (21 U.S.C. 351) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:

"(e) If it is, or purports to be or is represented as, a device with respect to which, or with respect to any component, part, or accessory of which, there has been promulgated a standard under section 513, unless such device, or such component, part, or accessory, is in all respects in conformity with such standard."

(b) Section 502 of such Act (21 U.S.C. 352) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:

"(q) If it is a device subject to a standard promulgated under section 513, unless (1) its labeling bears such instructions and warnings as may be prescribed in such standard; and (2) it complies with the requirements of section 513(i) (1)."

TITLE II—SCIENTIFIC REVIEW OF CERTAIN MEDICAL DEVICES

Sec. 201. (a) Section 501 of such Act, as amended by section 102(a) of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:

"(f) If (1) it is a device, and (2) such device, or any component, part, or accessory thereof, is deemed unsafe or ineffective within the meaning of section 514 with respect to its use or intended use."

(b) Chapter V of such Act, as amended by this Act, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"SCIENTIFIC REVIEW OF CERTAIN MEDICAL DEVICES

"When Scientific Review Is Required

"SEC. 514. (a) The Secretary may declare that a device (or type or class of device) shall be subject to scientific review under this section with respect to any particular use or intended use therefore it, after consultation with the appropriate panel or panels specified in subsection (b), he finds that the device (or type or class of device) is used or intended to be used in life-threatening situations, that the composition, construction, or properties of the device (or type or class of device) is such that, in relation to that use or intended use, the device (or type or class of device) may present an unreasonable hazard, that scientific review may materially reduce this hazard, and that no more practicable means to reduce this hazard are available to the Secretary. The declaration shall be by regulation (which may be rescinded by the Secretary) which shall set forth and be based upon the findings prescribed by the preceding sentence and findings as described in clauses (I), (II), (III), and (IV) of section 513(g)(1)(C)(i). A device (or type or class of device) declared to be subject to scientific review shall be deemed unsafe or ineffective for the purpose of the application of section 501(f) unless either—

"(1) there is in effect an approval of an application with respect to such device under this section,

"(2) such device is exempted by or pursuant to subsection (k) of this section, or

"(3) such device is intended solely (A) for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in animals other than man or (B) to affect the structure or any function of the body of such animals.

"Standing Advisory Scientific Review Panels

"(b) (1) For the purpose of reviewing applications filed under subsection (c), and of reviewing plans and protocols submitted under subsection (k) (4), the Secretary shall establish one or more standing advisory scientific panels composed of members appointed by the Secretary. Such members shall consist of experts qualified by training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of devices in the category or class of devices to be referred to such a panel, including appropriate experts from one or more of the physical or biological sciences and of the professions of medicine, dentistry, and engineering. The Secretary shall from time to time designate one of the members of each panel to serve as chairman thereof.

"(2) Members of any standing advisory scientific panel established under this subsection, while attending conferences or meetings of their panels or otherwise serving at the request of the Secretary, shall be entitled to receive compensation at rates to be fixed by the Secretary but not at rates exceeding the daily equivalent of the rate specified at the time of such service for grade GS-18 of the General Schedule, including travel time; and while away from their homes or regular places of business they may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by section 5703(b) of title 5 of the United States Code for persons in the Government service employed intermittently. The Secretary shall furnish the committee with clerical and other assistance. The members shall not be subject to any other provisions of law regarding the appointment and compensation of employees of the United States.

"Application for Scientific Review

"(c) (1) Scientific review of a device (or type or class of device) which has been de-

clared subject to such review in accordance with subsection (a) may be obtained by filing with the Secretary an application for his determination of the safety and effectiveness of the device. The application shall contain (A) full reports of all information, published or otherwise available to the applicant, concerning investigations which have been made to show whether or not such device is safe and effective for use; (B) a full statement of the composition, properties, and construction, and of the principle or principles of operation, of such device; (C) a full description of the methods used in, and the facilities and controls used for, the manufacture, processing, and, when relevant, packing and installation of such device; (D) an identifying reference to any standard, applicable to such device, which is in effect pursuant to section 513, and adequate information to show that such device fully meets such standard; (E) such samples of such device and of the articles used as components thereof as the Secretary may require; (F) specimens of the labeling proposed to be used for such device; and (G) such other information, relevant to the subject matter of the application, as the Secretary, upon advice of the appropriate panel or panels established pursuant to subsection (b), may require.

"(2) Upon receipt of an application meeting the requirements set forth in paragraph (1), the Secretary shall refer such application to the appropriate panel or panels (established pursuant to subsection (b)) for study and for submission (within such period, if any, he may establish) of a report and recommendations, together with all underlying data and the reasons or basis for the recommendations. The provisions of section 706(d)(2) shall apply with respect to the material so submitted.

"Consideration of and Initial Action on Application

"(d) As promptly as possible, but in no event later than one hundred and twenty days after the receipt of an application under subsection (c), unless an additional period is agreed upon by the Secretary and the applicant, the Secretary, after considering the report and recommendations referred to in paragraph (2) of such subsection, shall—

"(1) approve the application if he finds that none of the grounds for denying approval specified in subsection (e) applies,

"(2) advise the applicant that the application is not in approvable form; and inform the applicant, insofar as the Secretary determines to be practicable, of the measures required to place such application in approvable form (which measures may include further research by the applicant in accordance with one or more protocols prescribed by the Secretary); or

"(3) deny approval of the application if he finds (and sets forth the basis of such finding as part of or accompanying such denial) that one or more grounds for denial specified in subsection (e) applies.

"Bases for Approval or Disapproval; Opportunity for Review

"(e) (1) If, upon the basis of the information submitted to the Secretary as part of the application and any other information before him with respect to such device, the Secretary finds, after opportunity to the applicant for the review prescribed by paragraph (4), that—

"(A) such device is not shown to be safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof;

"(B) the methods used in, and the facilities and controls used for, the manufacture, processing, and packing and installation of such device do not conform to the requirements of section 501(g);

"(C) there is a lack of adequate scientific evidence that the device will have the

effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof;

"(D) based on a fair evaluation of all material facts, such labeling is false or misleading in any particular; or

"(E) such device is not shown to conform in all respects to an applicable standard promulgated under section 513 and in effect;

he shall issue an order denying approval of the application and stating the findings upon which the order is based. In determining if a device is shown to be safe for purposes of this paragraph, the Secretary shall weigh any benefit to the public health probably resulting from the use of the device against any hazard to the public health probably resulting from such use.

"(2) As used in this subsection and subsection (f), the term 'adequate scientific evidence' means evidence consisting of sufficient well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations where appropriate, by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the device involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and responsibly be concluded by such experts that the device will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling or proposed labeling thereof.

"(3) For the purposes of this section, when a device is intended for use by a physician, surgeon, or other person licensed or otherwise specially qualified therefor, its safety and effectiveness shall be determined in the light of such intended use.

"(4) (A) An applicant whose application has been denied approval (either pursuant to paragraph (3), or in consequence of the Secretary's finding pursuant to paragraph (2), of subsection (d)) may, by petition filed on or before the thirtieth day after the date upon which he receives notice of such denial, obtain review thereof in accordance with subsection (1). The Secretary shall consider and give appropriate weight to the report and recommendations received from the advisory committee conducting such review under such subsection.

"(B) In lieu of the review provided by subparagraph (A), such applicant may, for good cause shown by such petition, obtain a hearing in accordance with section 554 of title 5 of the United States Code.

"Withdrawal of Approval

"(f) (1) The Secretary may, upon obtaining, where appropriate, advice on scientific matters from a panel or panels established pursuant to subsection (b), and after due notice and opportunity for hearing to the applicant, issue an order withdrawing approval of an application with respect to a device under this section if the Secretary finds—

"(A) (i) that clinical or other experience, tests, or other scientific data show that such device is unsafe for use under the conditions of use upon the basis of which the application was approved; or (ii) on the basis of evidence of clinical experience, not included in or accompanying such application and not available to the Secretary until after the application was approved, or of tests by new methods or by methods not reasonably applicable when the application was approved, evaluated together with the evidence available to the Secretary when the application was approved, that such device is not shown to be safe for use under the conditions of use on the basis of which the application was approved;

"(B) on the basis of new information before him with respect to such device, evaluated together with the evidence available to him when the application was approved, that there is a lack of adequate

scientific evidence that the device will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof;

"(C) that the application filed pursuant to subsection (c) contains or was accompanied by an untrue statement of a material fact;

"(D) that the applicant has failed to establish a system for maintaining records, or has repeatedly or deliberately failed to maintain records or to make reports, required by an applicable regulation or order under subsection (a) of section 516, or that the applicant has refused to permit access to, or copying or verification of, such records as required by paragraph (2) of such subsection;

"(E) on the basis of new information before him, evaluated together with the evidence before him when the application was approved, that the methods used in, or the facilities and controls used for, the manufacture, processing, packing, or installation of such device do not conform to the requirements of section 501(g) and were not brought into conformity with such requirements within a reasonable time after receipt of written notice from the Secretary; or

"(F) on the basis of new information before him, evaluated together with the evidence before him when the application was approved, that the labeling of such device, based on a fair evaluation of all material facts, is false or misleading in any particular and was not corrected within a reasonable time after receipt of written notice from the Secretary; or

"(G) on the basis of new information before him, evaluated together with the evidence before him when the application was approved, that such device is not shown to conform in all respects to an applicable standard promulgated pursuant to section 513.

"(2) If the Secretary (or in his absence the officer acting as Secretary) finds that an imminent health or safety hazard is involved, he may by order suspend the approval of such application immediately and give the applicant prompt notice of his action and afford the applicant an opportunity for an expedited hearing under this subsection. Such authority to suspend the approval of an application may not be delegated.

"(3) Any order under this subsection shall state the findings upon which it is based.

"Authority to Revoke Adverse Orders

"(g) Whenever the Secretary finds that the facts so require, he shall revoke an order under subsection (e) or (f) denying, withdrawing, or suspending approval of an application or reinstate such approval, as may be appropriate.

"Service of Secretary's Orders

"(h) Orders of the Secretary under this section shall be served (1) in person by any officer or employee of the Department designated by the Secretary or (2) by mailing the order by registered mail or certified mail addressed to the applicant at his last known address in the records of the Secretary.

"Referral to Independent Advisory Committee

"(i) (1) A person who has filed an application under subsection (c) may petition the Secretary, in accordance with subparagraph (A) of subsection (e) (4), to refer such application, or the Secretary's action thereon, to an advisory committee of experts for a report and recommendations with respect to any question therein involved which requires the exercise of scientific judgment. Upon such petition, or if the Secretary on his own initiative deems such a referral necessary, the Secretary shall appoint an advisory committee and shall refer to it, together

with all the data before him, the question so involved for study thereof and a report and recommendations thereon. The provisions of the first and second sentences of section 706(b) (5) (C) (ii) shall apply to such report and recommendations. The applicant, as well as representatives of the Department, shall have the right to consult with such advisory committee, and such advisory committee is authorized to consult with any person, in connection with the question referred to it.

"(2) Section 513(h) (2) shall apply to the appointment, compensation, staffing, and procedure of any such advisory committee.

"(3) Paragraph (3) of section 513(h) shall also apply in the case of a referral to an advisory committee under this subsection.

"JUDICIAL REVIEW

"(j) The applicant may, by appeal taken in accordance with section 505(h), obtain judicial review of a final order of the Secretary denying or withdrawing approval of an application filed under subsection (c) of this section. Judicial review of such final order shall not be denied upon the ground that the petitioner has failed to avail himself of the review or hearing provided by subsection (e) (4).

"EXEMPTION FOR INVESTIGATIONAL USE

"(k) (1) It is the purpose of this subsection to encourage, to the maximum extent with the protection of the public health and safety and with professional ethics, the discovery and development of useful devices and to that end to maintain optimum freedom for individual scientific investigators in their pursuit of that objective.

"(2) Subject to the succeeding paragraphs of this subsection, there shall be exempt from the requirement of approval of an application under the foregoing provisions of this section any device which is intended solely for investigational use (in a hospital, laboratory, clinic, or other appropriate scientific environment) by an expert or experts qualified by scientific training and experience to investigate the safety and effectiveness of such device.

"(3) The Secretary shall promulgate regulations relating to the application of the exemption referred to in paragraph (2) to any device which is intended for use in the clinical testing thereof upon humans, in developing data required to support an application under subsection (c).

"(4) Such regulations may provide for conditioning the exemption in the case of a device intended for such use, upon—

"(A) the submission, by the manufacturer of the device or the sponsor of the investigation, of an outline of the plan of initial clinical testing—

"(i) to a local institutional review committee which has been established to supervise clinical testing in the facility where the initial clinical testing is to be conducted, the composition and procedures of which comply with regulations of the Secretary, for review and approval as being adequate to justify the commencement of such testing, or

"(ii) if no such committee exists or if the Secretary finds that the process of review by such committee is inadequate or that protection of health and safety so requires (whether or not the plan has been approved by such committee), to the Secretary for review by the appropriate panel or panels established pursuant to subsection (b) and approval by the Secretary as being adequate to justify the commencement of such testing;

"(B) prompt notification to the Secretary by such manufacturer or sponsor (in such manner as the Secretary prescribes) of approval of any plan pursuant to clause (A) (i);

"(C) the submission, by the manufacturer of the device or the sponsor of the investi-

gation, of an adequate protocol for clinical testing to be conducted by separate groups of investigators under essentially the same protocol, together with a report of prior investigations of the device (including, where appropriate, tests on animals) adequate to justify the proposed testing, either (1) to a local institutional review committee for review and approval in accordance with the provisions of clauses (A) (i) and (B), or (ii) to the Secretary for review and approval in accordance with the provisions of clause (A) (ii) if such testing involves facilities in which no such committee exists, or facilities served by more than one local institutional review committee if such committees are unable to agree on the adequacy of the submission;

"(D) the obtaining, by the manufacturer, of the device or the sponsor of the investigation, if the device is to be distributed to investigators for testing, of a signed agreement from each of such investigators that humans upon whom the device is to be used will be under such investigator's personal supervision or under the supervision of investigators responsible to him;

"(E) the establishment and maintenance of such records, and the making of such reports to the Secretary, by the manufacturer of the device or the sponsor of the investigation, of data (including but not limited to analytical reports by investigators) obtained as a result of such investigational use of the device, as the Secretary finds will enable him to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of the device in the event of the filing of an application pursuant to subsection (c); and

"(F) such other conditions relating to the protection of the public health and safety as the Secretary may determine to be necessary. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require any clinical investigator to submit directly to the Secretary reports on the investigational use of devices.

"(5) Such regulations shall condition such exemption upon the manufacturer of the device, or the sponsor of the investigation, requiring that investigators using the device certify to such manufacturer or sponsor that they—

"(A) will inform individuals upon whom such device or any controls in connection therewith are used, or the representatives of such individuals, that the device is being used for investigational purposes, and

"(B) will obtain the consent of such individuals or representatives, except where such investigators deem it not feasible or, in their professional judgment, contrary to the best interest of such individuals.

"(6) Whenever the Secretary determines that a device is being or has been shipped or delivered for shipment in interstate commerce for investigational testing upon humans, and that such device is subject to the preceding subsections of this section and fails to meet the conditions for exemption therefrom for investigational use, he shall notify the sponsor of his determination and the reasons therefor, and the exemption will not thereafter apply with respect to such investigational use until such failure is corrected.

"(7) In determining whether this subsection is applicable to any device and, if so, whether there has been compliance with the conditions of exemption, or upon application for reconsideration of any such determination, the Secretary shall, if so requested by the sponsor of the investigation, or may on his own initiative, obtain the advice of an appropriate expert or experts who are not otherwise, except as consultants, engaged in the carrying out of this Act.

"(1) (1) If, on the day immediately prior to the date upon which a device is declared to be subject to scientific review under this section, the device was in use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man, or for the purpose of

affecting the structure or any function of the body of man, section 501(f) shall become effective with respect to such preexisting use or uses of such device on the closing date (as defined in paragraph (2) of this subsection) or, if sooner, on the effective date of an order of the Secretary approving or denying approval of an application with respect to such use of the device under this section.

"(2) For the purposes of this subsection, the term 'closing date' means, with respect to a device, the first day of the thirty-first calendar month which begins after the month in which the device is declared to be subject to scientific review under this section, except that, if in the opinion of the Secretary it would not involve any undue risk to the public health, he may on application or on his own initiative postpone such closing date with respect to any particular use or uses of a device until such later date (but not beyond the close of the sixtieth month after the month of such declaration) as he determines is necessary to permit completion, in good faith and as soon as reasonably practicable, of the scientific investigations necessary to establish the safety and effectiveness of such use or uses. The Secretary may terminate any such postponement at any time if he finds that such postponement should not have been granted or that, by reason of a change in circumstances, the basis for such postponement no longer exists or that there has been a failure to comply with a requirement of the Secretary for submission of progress reports or with other conditions attached by him to such postponement."

PROHIBITED ACTS

SEC. 202. (a) Paragraph (e) of section 301 of such Act is amended (1) by striking out "or" before "512(j), (l), or (m)", and (2) by inserting ", 514(k), or 516(a)" after "512(j), (l), or (m)".

(b) Paragraph (j) of section 301 of such Act is amended by inserting "514, 516," immediately after "512,".

(c) Paragraph (l) of such section 301 is amended (1) by inserting "or device" after the word "drug" each time it appears therein, and (2) by striking out "505," and inserting in lieu thereof "505 or 514, as the case may be,".

TITLE III—NOTIFICATION OF DEFECTIVE DEVICES; REPAIR OR REPLACEMENT

SEC. 301. Chapter V of such Act, as amended by sections 101 and 201(b) of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"NOTIFICATION OF DEFECTS IN, AND REPAIR OR REPLACEMENT OF, DEVICES

"Sec. 515. (a) (1) Every person who acquires information which may reasonably be understood to show that a device produced, assembled, or imported by him (A) contains a defect which is likely to create a substantial risk to the health or safety of any person, or (B) on or after the effective date of an applicable standard promulgated pursuant to section 513 fails to comply with such standard, shall immediately notify the Secretary of such defect or failure to comply if such device has left the place of manufacture and shall, except as otherwise provided by paragraph (3) of this subsection, with reasonable promptness furnish notification of such defect or failure (C) by mail to any purchaser not for sale of such device (where known to such person), and (D) by mail or other more expeditious means to the dealers or distributors to whom such device was delivered.

"(2) The notifications required by paragraph (1) of this subsection shall contain a clear description of such defect or failure to comply, an evaluation of the hazard related thereto, and a statement of the meas-

ures to be taken to correct such defect or failure.

"(3) The Secretary shall by regulation prescribe a procedure for the exemption or partial exemption of any person from the requirements of paragraph (1) of this subsection (other than notification to the Secretary) if the Secretary finds, upon application of such person, that the defect or failure to comply is not such as to create a significant risk to the health or safety of any person.

"(4) A dealer or distributor who is notified under paragraph (1) of a defect or failure of a device shall furnish to the manufacturer or importer from whom he obtained the device such information (at such times and in such manner and form as the Secretary may by regulation prescribe) as may be necessary to identify and locate each purchaser not for sale of the device.

"(b) Every person required to furnish the notification (other than to the Secretary) specified in paragraph (2) of subsection (a) shall submit to the Secretary upon his request a copy of all notices, bulletins, and other communications to the dealers or distributors of such person or to purchasers not for sale of devices of such person regarding any such defect in such device or any such failure to comply with a standard applicable to such device. The Secretary shall disclose to the public so much of the information contained in such communications or other relevant information in his possession as he deems will assist in carrying out this Act, but he shall not disclose any information which contains or relates to a trade secret.

"(c) If any device contains a defect which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or fails to comply with an applicable standard promulgated pursuant to section 513, and the notification specified in paragraph (2) of subsection (a) is required to be furnished on account of such defect or failure, the producer, assembler, or importer of such device may be required by the Secretary, without charge, to—

"(1) bring such device into conformity with such standard or remedy such defect and provide reimbursement for any reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in connection with having such device brought into conformity or having such defect remedied; or

"(2) replace such device with a like or equivalent device which complies with each applicable standard promulgated under section 513 and which has no defect relating to its safety or effectiveness; or

"(3) refund the purchase price of such device upon tender of the device by the owner, less a reasonable allowance for depreciation, and provide reimbursement for any reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in its return.

The producer, assembler, or importer shall take the action required under this subsection in such manner, and with respect to such persons, as the Secretary may by regulation prescribe.

"(d) The remedies provided for in this section shall be in addition to and not in substitution for any other remedies provided by law.

"(e) This section shall not apply to any individual device that was manufactured before the date of the enactment of the Medical Device Safety Act."

PROHIBITED ACTS

SEC. 302. Section 301 of such Act, as amended by section 202 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:

"(q) (1) The failure or refusal to furnish any notification or other material or information as required by section 515 or 516(c); or (2) the failure or refusal to com-

ply with any requirement prescribed under authority of section 515(c)."

CONFORMING AMENDMENT

SEC. 303. Section 502(j) of such Act is amended by inserting "or manner" after "dosage".

TITLE IV—REQUIREMENT OF GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE

SEC. 401. Section 501 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 351), as amended by sections 102 and 201 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:

"(g) If it is a device and the methods used in, or the facilities or controls used for, its manufacture, processing, packing, holding, or installation do not conform to, or are not operated or administered in conformity with, current good manufacturing practice as determined by regulations of the Secretary under section 701(a) to assure that such device is safe."

TITLE V—RECORDS AND REPORTS; INSPECTION AND REGISTRATION OF ESTABLISHMENTS; OFFICIAL NAMES

SEC. 501. Chapter V of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C., ch. 9, subch. V) is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"RECORDS AND REPORTS ON DEVICES

"Sec. 516. (a) (1) Every person engaged in manufacturing, processing, or distributing, a device that is subject to a standard promulgated under section 513, or with respect to which there is in effect an approval under section 514 of an application filed under subsection (c) thereof, shall establish and maintain such records, and make such reports to the Secretary, of data relating to clinical experience and other data or information, received or otherwise obtained by such person with respect to such device, and bearing on the safety or effectiveness of such device, or on whether such device may be adulterated or misbranded, as the Secretary may by general regulation, or by special regulation or order applicable to such device, require. In prescribing such regulations or issuing such orders the Secretary shall have due regard for the professional ethics of the medical profession and the interests of patients and shall provide, wherever he deems it appropriate, for the examination, upon request, by the persons to whom such regulations or orders are applicable, of similar information received or otherwise obtained by the Secretary.

"(2) Every person required under this subsection to maintain records, and every person in charge or custody thereof, shall, upon request of an officer or employee designated by the Secretary, permit such officer or employee at all reasonable times to have access to and copy and verify such records.

"(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply to—

"(1) practitioners licensed by law to prescribe or administer drugs and devices and who manufacture or process devices solely for use in the course of their professional practice;

"(2) persons who manufacture or process devices solely for use in research or teaching and not for sale;

"(3) such other classes of persons as the Secretary may by or pursuant to regulation exempt from the application of this subsection upon a finding that such application is not necessary to accomplish the purposes of this subsection.

"(c) Every person engaged in manufacturing a device subject to this Act shall provide to the Secretary upon his request such technical data and other data or information with respect to such device as may be reasonably required to carry out this Act."

INSPECTION RELATING TO DEVICES

SEC. 502. (a) The second sentence of subsection (a) of section 704 of such Act (21

U.S.C. 374) is amended by inserting "or prescription devices" after "prescription drugs" both times it appears.

(b) The third sentence of such subsection is amended (1) by striking out "for prescription drugs", (2) by striking out "and antibiotic drugs" and inserting in lieu thereof, "antibiotic drugs, and devices", (3) by striking out "or section 507(d) or (g)" and inserting in lieu thereof, "section 507(d), or (g), section 514(k), or section 516", and (4) by inserting "or devices" after "other drugs", inserting "or of a device subject to section 514" after "new drug", and inserting "or section 516" after "section 505(j)".

(c) (1) Paragraph (1) of the sixth sentence of such subsection is amended by inserting "or devices" after "drugs" each time such term occurs.

(2) Paragraph (2) of that section is amended by inserting ", or prescribe or use devices, as the case may be," after "administer drugs"; and by inserting ", or manufacture or process devices," after "process drugs."

(3) Paragraph (3) of that section is amended by inserting ", or manufacture or process devices," after "process drugs".

REGISTRATION OF DEVICE MANUFACTURERS;
OFFICIALS NAMES OF DEVICES

Sec. 503. (a) Section 510 of such Act (21 U.S.C. 360) is amended as follows:

(1) The section heading is amended by inserting "AND DEVICES" after "DRUGS".

(2) Subsection (a)(1) is amended by inserting "or device package" after "drug package"; by inserting "or device" after "the drug"; and by inserting "or user" after "consumer".

(3) Subsection (b) is amended (A) by inserting ", or of a device or devices," after "drug or drugs", and (B) by adding at the end thereof the following: "If any such establishment is engaged in the manufacture, preparation, propagation, compounding, or processing of any device, such person shall also comply with the requirements of subsection (j) of this section."

(4) Subsection (c) is amended (A) by inserting ", or of a device or devices," after "drug or drugs", and (B) by adding at the end thereof the following: "If such establishment is engaged in the manufacture, preparation, propagation, compounding, or processing of any device, such person shall also comply with the requirements of subsection (j) of this section."

(5) Subsection (d) is amended to read as follows:

"(d)(1) Every person duly registered in accordance with the foregoing subsections of this section shall immediately register with the Secretary any additional establishment which he owns or operates in any State and in which he begins the manufacture, preparation, propagation, compounding, or processing of a drug or drugs, or of a device or devices. If any device is manufactured, prepared, propagated, compounded, or processed in such additional establishment, such person shall also comply with the requirements of subsection (j) of this section.

"(2) Every person who is registered with the Secretary pursuant to the first sentence of subsection (b) or (c) or paragraph (1) of this subsection, but to whom the second sentence of subsection (b) or (c) or of paragraph (1) of this subsection did not apply at the time of such registration, shall, if any device is thereafter manufactured, prepared, propagated, compounded, or processed in any establishment with respect to which he is so registered, immediately file a supplement to such registration with the Secretary indicating such fact and shall also comply with the requirements of subsection (j) of this section."

(6) Subsection (g) is amended by inserting "or devices" after "drugs" each time such term occurs in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of such subsection.

(7) The first sentence of subsection (i) is amended by inserting ", or a device or devices," after "drug or drugs"; and the second sentence of such subsection is amended by inserting "shall require such establishment to provide the information required by subsection (j) in the case of a device or devices and" immediately before "shall include", and by inserting "or devices" after "drugs".

(8) A new subsection (j) is added at the end of such section 510 to read as follows:

"(j)(1) Every person who registers with the Secretary under subsection (b), (c), or (d) shall, at the time of registration under any such subsection, file with the Secretary a list of all devices (by established name as defined in section 502(e)(4) and by any proprietary name) which are being (or, in the case of a person who registers under subsection (c) or (d), proposed to be) manufactured, prepared, propagated, compounded, or processed in each establishment included in such registration. Such list shall be prepared in such form and manner as the Secretary may by regulation prescribe.

"(2) Every person registered under this section shall—

"(A) upon first engaging in the manufacture, preparation, propagation, compounding, or processing of a device not contained in any list filed by such person under paragraph (1) of this subsection:

"(B) upon ceasing or discontinuing the production or availability of any device being manufactured, prepared, propagated, compounded, or processed by him in any establishment, or

"(C) upon resumption of the manufacture, preparation, propagation, compounding, or processing of such device after such cessation or discontinuance,

notify the Secretary of such fact at such time and in such manner as the Secretary may by regulation prescribe and shall include with such notice the information required by paragraph (1) of this subsection (and, in the case of a person to which subparagraph (C) of this paragraph (2) applies, the reasons for such cessation or discontinuance)."

(b) Subsection (p) of section 301 of such Act (21 U.S.C. 331) is amended to read as follows:

"(p) The failure to register in accordance with section 510; the failure to provide any information required by section 510(j); or the failure to provide a notice required by section 510(j)(2)."

(c) Subsection (o) of section 502 of such Act (21 U.S.C. 352) is amended by striking out "is a drug and".

(d) The second sentence of section 801(a) of such Act (21 U.S.C. 381(a)) is amended by inserting "or devices" after "drugs" both times such words appear.

(e) (1) Subparagraph (1) of section 502(e) of such Act (21 U.S.C. 352(e)) is amended by striking out "subparagraph (2)" and inserting in lieu thereof "subparagraph (3)".

(2) Subparagraph (2) of section 502(e) of such Act (21 U.S.C. 352(e)) is redesignated as subparagraph (3) and is amended by striking out "this paragraph (e)" and inserting in lieu thereof "subparagraph (1)".

(3) There is added to such paragraph (e) a new subparagraph (2) as follows:

"(2) If it is a device, unless its label bears, to the exclusion of any other nonproprietary name, the established name (as defined in subparagraph (4)) of the device, if such there be, prominently printed in type at least half as large as that used thereon for any proprietary name or designation for such device: *Provided*, That to the extent compliance with the requirements of this subparagraph is impracticable, exemptions shall be established by regulations promulgated by the Secretary."

(4) There is further added to such paragraph a new subparagraph (4) as follows:

"(4) As used in subparagraph (2), the

term 'established name', with respect to a device, means (A) the applicable official name designated pursuant to section 508, or (B) if there is no such name and such device is an article recognized in an official compendium then the official title thereof in such compendium, or (C) if neither clause (A) nor clause (B) of this subparagraph applies, then the common or usual name of such device, if any."

(f) Section 508 of such Act (21 U.S.C. 358) is amended (1) in subsections (a) and (e) by adding "or device" after "drug" each time it appears; (2) in subsection (b) by adding after "all supplements thereto," the following: "and at such times as he may deem necessary shall cause a review to be made of the official names by which devices are identified in any official compendium, and all supplements thereto"; (3) in subsection (c)(2) by adding "or device" after "single drug", and by adding "or to two or more devices which are substantially similar in design and purpose" after "purity"; (4) in subsection (c)(3) by adding "or device" after "useful drug", and after "drug or drugs" each time it appears; and (5) in subsection (d) by adding "or devices" after "drugs".

(g) Section 301 of the Drug Amendments of 1962 (76 Stat. 793) is amended by inserting "and devices" after "drugs" each time such word appears, except that "or devices" is inserted after "which drugs" and after "intrastate commerce in such drugs".

TITLE VI—GENERAL PROVISIONS

ADVISORY COUNCIL ON DEVICES, ETC.

SEC. 601. Chapter VII of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"ADVISORY COUNCIL ON DEVICES, AND OTHER
ADVISORY COMMITTEES

"SEC. 708. (a) For the purpose of advising the Secretary with respect to matters of policy in carrying out the provisions of this Act relating to devices, there is established in the Department an Advisory Council on Devices appointed by the Secretary without regard to the civil service and classification laws. The persons so appointed shall be manufacturers and other persons with special knowledge of the problems involved in the regulation of various kinds of devices under this Act, members of the professions using such devices, scientists expert in the investigational use of devices, engineers expert in the development of devices, and members of the general public representing consumers of devices.

"(b) The Secretary may also from time to time appoint, without regard to the civil service or classification laws, in addition to the advisory councils and committees otherwise authorized under this Act, such other advisory committees or councils as he deems desirable.

"(c) Members of an advisory council or committee appointed pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) who are not in the regular full-time employ of the United States shall, while attending meetings or conferences of the council or committee or otherwise engaged on its business, be compensated at per diem rates fixed by the Secretary but not in excess of the rate for grade GS-18 of the General Schedule at the time of such service, including traveltime, and while so serving away from their homes or regular places of business they may be allowed travel expenses (including per diem in lieu of subsistence) as authorized by title 5, United States Code, section 5703, for persons in the Government service employed intermittently."

RESEARCH AND STUDIES

SEC. 602. Chapter VII of such Act, as amended by section 601 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"RESEARCH AND STUDIES RELATING TO DEVICES"

"SEC. 709. (a) The Secretary is authorized directly or through contracts with public or private agencies, institutions, and organizations and with individuals, to plan, conduct, coordinate, and support—

"(1) research and investigation into the safety and effectiveness of devices, and into the causes and prevention of injuries or other health impairments associated with exposure to or use of devices;

"(2) Studies relating to the development and improvement of device standards, and device testing methods and procedures; and

"(3) education and training with respect to the proper installation, maintenance, operation, and use of devices.

"(b) In carrying out the purposes of subsection (a), the Secretary, in addition to or in aid of the foregoing—

"(1) shall to the maximum practicable extent, cooperate with and invite the participation of other Federal or State departments and agencies having related interests, and interested professional or industrial organizations;

"(2) shall collect and make available, through publications and by other appropriate means, the results of, and other information concerning, research and other activities undertaken pursuant to subsection (a); and

"(3) may procure (by negotiation or otherwise) devices for research and testing purposes, and sell or otherwise dispose of such products."

PUBLICITY

SEC. 603. Section 705 of such Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"(c) To assist in carrying out the provisions of this Act relating to devices, the Secretary may cause to be disseminated information regarding standards, testing facilities, and testing methods promulgated, established, or approved under this Act. Subject to the provisions of section 301(j), the Secretary may also cause to be published reports summarizing clinical data relevant to marketed devices approved under this Act."

EFFECTIVE DATES AND TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 604. (a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, the foregoing provisions of this Act shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.

(b) Paragraph (f) of section 501 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as added to such section by section 201(a) of this Act, shall, with respect to any particular use of a device, take effect (1) on the first day of the thirteenth calendar month following the month in which this Act is enacted, or (2) if sooner, on the effective date of an order of the Secretary approving or denying approval of an application with respect to such use of the device under section 514 of such Act as added by section 201(b) of this Act.

(c) Any person who, on the day immediately preceding the date of enactment of this Act, owned or operated any establishment in any State (as defined in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act) engaged in the manufacture or processing of a device or devices, shall, if he first registers with respect to devices, or supplements his registration with respect thereto, in accordance with subsection (b) of section 510 of that Act (as amended by section 503 of this Act) prior to the first day of the seventh calendar month following the month in which this Act is enacted, be deemed to have complied with that subsection for the calendar year 1971. Such registration, if made within such period and effected in 1972, shall also be deemed to be in compliance with such subsection for that calendar year.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
December 14, 1971.

HON. SPIRO T. AGNEW,
President of the Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Enclosed for the consideration of the Congress is a draft bill "To protect the public health by amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to assure the safety and effectiveness of medical devices." The bill has the short title of the "Medical Device Safety Act".

The draft bill would authorize the Secretary to establish safety standards for medical devices, and to require such devices used in life-threatening situations which may present an unreasonable hazard to undergo a scientific review by the Department for safety and efficacy prior to their introduction into commerce. A summary of the key provisions of the bill is enclosed.

Our proposal is the product of a thorough study of medical device regulation undertaken by the Department at the request of the President in his October 31, 1969, consumer message. In the course of this study, we obtained the views of medical practitioners, research scientists, engineers, consumer groups, manufacturers, and Government agencies on the nature and extent of the medical device safety problem, and the type of legislation needed.

On the basis of these views we have prepared a comprehensive regulatory program to protect consumers from the potential hazards of these devices. A cornerstone of this program is its procedure for drawing upon the expert knowledge of consumer groups, manufacturers, and trade associations, in the development of safety standards; and upon the expert knowledge of the medical and scientific community in reviewing proposed standards, in advising upon the need for subjecting medical devices to scientific review for safety and effectiveness, and in conducting that review.

We ask that the draft bill receive favorable consideration.

We are advised by the Office of Management and Budget that enactment of this draft bill would be in accord with the program of the President.

Sincerely,

/s/ ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON,
Secretary.

SUMMARY OF KEY PROVISIONS OF PROPOSED
MEDICAL DEVICE SAFETY ACT

PURPOSE OF THE BILL

The draft bill, which has been prepared as an amendment to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, would authorize the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to establish safety standards for medical devices, and to require unreasonably hazardous devices used in life-threatening situations to undergo a scientific review by the Department for safety and efficacy prior to their introduction into commerce or, if already in commerce, to determine whether they may continue to be marketed.

The term "device", as now defined by section 201(h) of the present Act (which to a limited degree already regulates devices), means "instruments, apparatus, and contrivances, including their components, parts, and accessories, intended (1) for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; or (2) to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals." (The bill would exempt from its standard-setting and scientific review provisions devices for

use on animals, however. §§ 513(j) and 514 (a) (3) *.)

PROMULGATION OF STANDARDS

The bill would authorize the Secretary to promulgate a standard governing the performance or other characteristics of a medical device whenever, in his judgment, a standard is necessary to reduce or eliminate unreasonable risk of illness or injury associated with exposure to or use of the device and there are no other more practicable means to protect the public. § 513(a).

Prior to the initiation of a proceeding to promulgate a standard, and prior to publishing a proposed standard in the course of such proceeding, the Secretary would be required, to the maximum practicable extent, to consult with other Federal agencies concerned with standard setting and other nationally or internationally recognized standard-setting agencies or organizations, and to use the technical support of other Federal agencies. Under this provision the Department would contemplate extensive consultation with, and the use of the resources of, the National Bureau of Standards. § 513(b).

The Secretary would initiate a proceeding to promulgate a device standard by publishing a notice which would invite interested persons to submit to the Secretary an existing standard or an offer to develop a standard. The Secretary could accept one or more of such offers, or adopt an applicable existing standard, or in appropriate cases—for example, where no offeror is technically competent to prepare a standard within a reasonable period—develop a standard using the resources of the Department and other agencies, or by contracting with qualified non-governmental entities. A proposed standard would then be published by regulation, with opportunity for public comment before it became effective. § 513(c), (d), (e), and (f).

After publication of a proposed standard, interested persons may for good cause require the Secretary to refer the standard to an *ad hoc* independent advisory committee for recommendations with respect to any matter involved in the proposal which requires the exercise of scientific judgment. § 513(h).

The standard, when promulgated, would be subject to the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act governing informal rule making. § 513(g).

Every manufacturer of a device subject to a standard would be required to assure the Secretary that appropriate tests or its manufacture under a quality control program in accord with good manufacturing practice show the device to conform to the standard.

Nonconforming devices would be deemed to be adulterated (or, as may be applicable, misbranded), and would therefore fall under the same proscriptions now applicable to adulterated or misbranded drugs. §§ 501(e) and 502(q).

SCIENTIFIC REVIEW

The Secretary would be authorized to subject a device, or a type or class of device, to scientific review for safety and efficacy if, after consultation with an appropriate scientific panel, he found the device to be unreasonably hazardous when used, as intended, in life-threatening situations, and determined that there was no more practical means than such review to reduce the hazard. § 514 (a) and (b). Classes of devices that may be expected to meet these criteria would include cardio-vascular implants, other implants composed of new materials, applications of new forms of energy to the body (e.g., lasers), and new designs for machines which substitute for major bodily functions

* Unless otherwise indicated, section references in this summary are to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as it would be amended by the bill.

(e.g., heart-lung machines). When the principles of design and construction of any device or class of devices subject to scientific review evolve to the point at which the safety and efficacy of the device or class may be assured under appropriate standards, such standards would be promulgated under the bill's standard-setting authority, and the scientific review requirement rescinded.

The bill would provide for the exemption from scientific review of devices intended solely for investigational uses by qualified experts. § 514(k). Devices on the market which are made subject to scientific review could continue to be marketed during the pendency of the review unless presenting a hazard requiring otherwise. § 604 of the bill.

An application for scientific review would be referred by the Secretary to a standing advisory scientific review panel for its recommendations. § 514(c)(2). The application would be denied if the device is not shown to be safe and efficacious. § 514(e)(1), (2), and (3). An applicant may seek administrative review of the Secretary's denial of his application either through petitioning the Secretary to refer the application to an advisory committee of experts for its independent recommendations on the scientific issues involved, or in the alternative by obtaining a formal adjudicatory hearing. § 514(e)(4). Judicial review would be provided in the same manner as is now available for denial of new drug applications. § 514(j). Approval of applications may be withdrawn on grounds similar to those for which the Secretary may now withdraw approval of new drug applications. § 514(f).

NOTIFICATION OF DEFECTIVE DEVICES; REPAIR OR REPLACEMENT

A manufacturer or importer would be required to notify the Secretary of any defects in devices produced, assembled, or imported by him if the defect is likely to create a substantial risk to the health or safety of any person, or of the failure of a device to comply with an applicable standard. Unless exempted by the Secretary, the manufacturer or importer would also be required to notify his dealers or distributors, and purchasers not for sale who are known to him. (Dealers or distributors who are notified of a defect by the manufacturer would be required to provide to the manufacturer or importer the names and addresses of each purchaser not for sale.) The Secretary may require the manufacturer or importer to remedy the defect, replace the device, or refund the purchase price. § 515.

REQUIREMENT OF GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE

The bill would require devices to be manufactured in accordance with current good manufacturing practice (as determined by the Secretary) to assure their safety and efficiency. § 501(g).

REGISTRATION OF MANUFACTURERS; OFFICIAL NAMES OF DEVICES

The bill would require the registration of device manufacturers, and their continuing notification of the Secretary of the devices that they are producing and marketing. § 510. The Secretary would be authorized to establish official names for devices (as he now does for drugs). § 508.

RECORDS AND REPORTS

The bill also contains provisions (similar to those now in effect with respect to drugs) requiring manufacturers and distributors of devices subject to a standard or marketed under an approval of a scientific review application to maintain certain records relating to the safety and efficacy of the devices. § 516.

FACTORY INSPECTION

The factory inspection authority (now applicable to devices) would be amended to make clear the Secretary's authority to inspect research data on devices, and to extend to devices certain exemptions from inspection which are now applicable to drugs. § 704.

ADVISORY COUNCIL

The bill would establish an Advisory Council on Devices to advise the Secretary with respect to matters of policy in carrying out the bill's provisions. § 708.

By Mr. MILLER:

S.J. Res. 185. A joint resolution expressing a proposal by the Congress of the United States for securing the safe return of American and allied prisoners of war and the accelerated withdrawal of all American military personnel from South Vietnam. Referred, by unanimous consent, to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I send to the desk a joint resolution for appropriate reference. I ask unanimous consent that the joint resolution be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HART). Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, for the benefit of my colleagues I wish to say that this joint resolution is in almost identical form to the joint resolution I introduced last April which provided that upon the completion of the exchange of all prisoners of war and the accounting for men missing in action, there would be a total withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from South Vietnam within 12 months. I pointed out at that time that allowing for approximately 30 days for the exchange of prisoners this would approximate the target of July 1, 1972, by which all American military personnel would be withdrawn from South Vietnam.

I regret very much that the Committee on Foreign Relations did not see fit to act favorably on my resolution which provided that Congress would fully support any efforts made by the President and his administration to implement this proposal.

I am reintroducing it today with the proviso that within 4 months after the exchange of prisoners of war and the accounting for men missing in action there would be complete and total withdrawal of all U.S. military personnel from South Vietnam.

Mr. President, I doubt the Senate or Congress would be able to act on this measure before the end of next January, and allowing approximately 30 days for completion of the exchange of prisoners, that would bring us to July 1, 1972, by which all American military personnel would be withdrawn from South Vietnam. I am satisfied this could be done without undue jeopardy to the military position of South Vietnam, and I believe it is about time for the Senate especially, and for the Congress to get moving on a meaningful resolution which will safeguard the return of American prisoners of war while the total withdrawal of American military personnel is completed.

I hope the Committee on Foreign Relations will give prompt attention to this matter upon the return of Congress in January.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the joint resolution be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the joint resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S.J. RES. 185

Joint resolution expressing a proposal by the Congress of the United States for securing the safe return of American and allied prisoners of war and the accelerated withdrawal of all American military personnel from South Vietnam

Whereas the President of the United States in his address on peace in Indochina on October 7, 1970, publicly announced a series of proposals for consideration by the Government of North Vietnam at the talks being held in Paris; and

Whereas one of the President's proposals was the humanitarian offer to immediately and unconditionally exchange all prisoners of war held by both sides; and

Whereas no precondition was indicated by the President for negotiation and action on this proposal; and

Whereas the purpose of the President's program of Vietnamization is to give the people of South Vietnam a reasonable opportunity to achieve the capability of defending themselves and their country against armed aggression from North Vietnam and against subversion and terror directed, controlled, and supplied from North Vietnam in order that the principle of national self-determination under the Charter of the United Nations may be maintained without further involvement of American military personnel in South Vietnam; and

Whereas the program of Vietnamization has been rapidly moving toward successful completion, permitting a continued reduction of large numbers of American military personnel in South Vietnam; and

Whereas it is the intention of the Congress of the United States that all American military personnel be withdrawn from South Vietnam consistent with the time reasonably necessary for completion of the program of Vietnamization and in conformity with the so-called "Nixon Doctrine" announced by the President at Guam on July 25, 1969; and

Whereas the credibility of suggestions that American prisoners of war would be returned promptly upon complete withdrawal of all American military personnel from South Vietnam has been destroyed by the flagrant violation by North Vietnam of the Geneva Agreement covering treatment of prisoners of war to which North Vietnam is a signatory; and further by press conference statements of North Vietnamese representatives in Paris that if only a fixed date were set for the withdrawal of all American troops, the prisoner of war problem would be "settled", when such a position was not taken by the said representatives during the official negotiating sessions in Paris and when the official report of said press conference statements sent to Hanoi reportedly stated that the proposition was that the prisoner of war problem would be merely "discussed" rather than "settled": Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress of the United States proposes that the United States agree to the complete withdrawal of all American military personnel from South Vietnam within four months following completion, under appropriate international supervision, of the exchange of prisoners of war as proposed by the President in his public announcement of October 7, 1970, and the accounting for men missing in action; and

Resolved further, That the Congress of the United States will fully support any efforts made by the President and his administration to implement this proposal.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

S. 1428

At the request of Mr. PERCY, the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOK) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1428, to amend

title 18 of the United States Code by adding a new chapter 404 to establish an Institute for Continuing Studies of Juvenile Justice.

S. 2738

At the request of Mr. HUGHES, the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) was added as a cosponsor of S. 2738, to amend titles 10 and 37, United States Code, to provide for equality of treatment for military personnel in the application of dependency criteria.

S. 2813

At the request of Mr. GRIFFIN (for Mr. TOWER) the Senator from Indiana (Mr. BAYH), the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. BURDICK), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. DOLE), the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY), and the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCHWEIKER) were added as cosponsors of S. 2813, to amend the Vocational Rehabilitation Act to provide improved vocational rehabilitation services to individuals.

S. 2938

At the request of Mr. GRIFFIN (for Mr. DOLE) the Senator from Iowa (Mr. MILLER) was added as a cosponsor of S. 2938, a bill to amend the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 to require the National Railroad Passenger Corporation to provide free or reduced-rate transportation for certain railroad employees and their eligible dependents to the same extent such transportation was available to such employees and their dependents on the date of enactment of that act.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 119

At the request of Mr. ROTH, the Senator from Michigan (Mr. GRIFFIN) was added as a cosponsor of Senate Joint Resolution 119, to establish the National Commission on Executive Secrecy.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 180

At the request of Mr. ROTH, the Senator from Florida (Mr. GURNEY) was added as a cosponsor of Senate Joint Resolution 180, to authorize the President to issue annually a proclamation designating the month of May in each year as "National Arthritis Month."

SENATE RESOLUTION 214—SUBMISSION OF A RESOLUTION RELATIVE TO THE SUBMISSION OF ANY PORTUGUESE BASE AGREEMENT AS A TREATY

(Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.)

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, with the co-sponsorship of Senators FULBRIGHT, CHURCH, SYMINGTON, and JAVITS, I am today submitting a resolution which calls on the Executive to submit to the Senate as a treaty any new agreement with Portugal for American bases in the Azores. The resolution also states that no economic assistance should be furnished to Portugal without affirmative action by both Houses of Congress.

The framers of the Constitution were explicit in their inclusion of the requirement for advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate in the making of a treaty. Nowhere in the Constitution did they mention that the Executive could skirt senatorial approval by simply call-

ing a pact with a foreign government an executive agreement.

I cannot believe that the Founding Fathers would not consider to be a treaty an agreement, such as the reported one with Portugal, which calls for the stationing of American troops overseas and which furnishes a foreign government with a reported \$435 million in assistance.

This is simply too important a question to be decided on and then ratified in an exchange of diplomatic notes.

In 1971 the Senate has been called on only once to give its advice and consent on a treaty of major importance. This was, of course, the Okinawa Reversion pact. Even here, I would remind my colleagues, there was long standing controversy within the executive branch on whether the Okinawa issue should be submitted to the Senate, for, reportedly, possible rejection was feared. Moreover, in this particular case, Senator BYRD of Virginia had earlier introduced a resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that Okinawa reversion be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent, and the Byrd resolution was overwhelmingly approved by the Senate.

I would hope that the resolution I am submitting today would have a similar result.

I do not believe that a majority of my colleagues feel that the treaty role of the Senate should be confined to our giving unanimous approval to such pacts as the Locarno Agreement Establishing an International Classification for Industrial Designs, the Nice Agreement, as revised, concerning the international classification of goods and services to which trademarks are applied, or the protocol relating to an amendment to the International Civil Aviation Convention.

The Senate met in special session last Saturday for the sole legislative purpose of voting on these three treaties I have just mentioned.

Surely, the time has come—indeed, I think it came some time ago—when the Senate must decide whether we are going to play a part in important foreign policy decisions now being decided by executive agreement or whether we will confine our role to giving advice and consent to measures so technical and routine, as those passed Saturday, that not one Senator joined the debate and three treaties were passed by identical unanimous votes because of the lack of controversy.

I believe the Senate should reassert itself in this treaty-making area. But to do so, we must take strong affirmative action.

We have the precedent of the Byrd resolution to work from, and I would hope that my colleagues would support the current effort in respect to Portugal.

If we do nothing, we shall have only ourselves to blame for our importance.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the resolution and my letter to Secretary of State Rogers be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the resolution and letter were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. RES. 214

Whereas the Constitution states that the President of the United States must have

the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate in order to make treaties;

Whereas an agreement with Portugal, which would provide for the stationing of American troops overseas and which would furnish Portugal with large amounts of foreign aid, is clearly a matter of sufficient importance to necessitate its submission to the Senate as a treaty;

Whereas the Congress has the sole Constitutional right to appropriate funds for foreign assistance programs.

Be it resolved by the Senate that:

Any new agreement with Portugal for military bases or foreign assistance should be submitted as a treaty to the Senate for advice and consent.

No economic assistance should be furnished to Portugal without affirmative action by both Houses of Congress.

DECEMBER 9, 1971.

HON. WILLIAM P. ROGERS,
Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In this morning's New York Times, it was reported that the United States and Portugal had negotiated an agreement regarding the future use by the United States of air and naval bases in the Portuguese Azores. It was further reported that the United States would furnish Portugal with economic aid in return for the use of the bases.

While not questioning the right of the Executive to negotiate agreements of this sort, I would like to receive your assurances that any final agreement will be submitted as a treaty for the Senate's advice and consent, and that no economic assistance will be furnished to Portugal without affirmative action of both Houses of Congress.

There is no question in my mind that in and of itself, the stationing of American troops overseas is an issue of sufficient importance to necessitate the use of the treaty process. It is unfortunate that American forces have been in the Azores since World War II only on the basis of executive agreements, but this past oversight in no way justifies the enactment of a new agreement without conforming to our Constitutional processes.

Similarly, the Executive has the right to discuss with any foreign government the furnishing of foreign assistance, but the Constitution clearly establishes that the Congress must appropriate (and hence authorize) the funds to institute such a program. Congress has provided the President with certain discretionary authority to make changes in the allocation of foreign aid funds, but the clear intent of Congress has been for this discretionary authority to be used in emergency situations. The new agreement with Portugal is not a matter on which the Executive must act immediately and thus would not have time to come to Congress for authorization.

Finally, I would point out that the furnishing of economic aid to Portugal is complicated by the fact that Portugal is involved in colonial wars in Africa. You stated on March 26, 1970: "As for the Portuguese territories, we shall continue to believe that their peoples have the right of self-determination. . . . Believing that resort to violence is no one's interest, we imposed an embargo in 1961 against the shipment of arms for use in the Portuguese territories."

Yet there would seem to be a clear tie between the furnishing of economic aid to Portugal and the wars in the Portuguese colonies. The New York Times said this morning: "The loans could reduce pressure on Portugal's foreign currency reserves, which are under considerable strain because of the need to import foodstuffs in part because of the war against the guerrillas in Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea."

This additional complication is an added

reason for the Executive Branch to seek the advice and consent of the Senate before final action is taken on the reported agreement with Portugal. I am confident you will agree and I await your affirmative response.

Sincerely,

CLIFFORD P. CASE,
U.S. Senator.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

DOLLAR DEVALUATION AND MONETARY REALIGNMENT

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, on December 10, I circulated a letter to all Senators stressing the importance of the United States making a concession on the dollar price of gold if an interim settlement of the world's monetary crises is to be reached. The President has now indicated that the United States is willing to make such a concession. The wording of the joint communique issued by President Nixon and President Pompidou on this point read:

In co-operation with other nations concerned, they agreed to work towards a prompt re-alignment of exchange rates through a devaluation of the dollar and revaluation of other currencies.

It is my view that this concession lays the groundwork for good progress at the Group of Ten meeting of Finance Ministers which convene in Washington today and for an early interim settlement of the crises.

I would like to call the attention of my colleagues to the fact that I have amended the bill I introduced on November 18 to better reflect the current situation. Representative REUSS has similarly amended the companion bill in the House. This amendment recognizes the progress that has already been made on the fronts of defense burden sharing and trade in addition to the currency realignment question. Again the concessions won to date in these two areas are impressive and it can be anticipated that additional concessions, particularly in the trade area, are likely to be forthcoming in the near future.

The wording of my bill as amended new reads:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States, or his representative, in order to secure appropriate adjustment by other countries, is authorized on behalf of the United States to propose or agree to a change not to exceed 10 per centum in the par value of the United States dollar pursuant to section 5 of the Act of July 31, 1945 (59 Stat. 514).

I also invite the attention to the fact that both the original bill and the amendment were referred to the Committee on Housing, Banking and Urban Affairs.

I ask unanimous consent that my letter to Senators be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

UNITED STATES SENATE,
Washington, D.C., December 10, 1971.

DEAR —: On November 18, I introduced a bill to authorize the President of the United States to agree to change the par value of the dollar. The wording of my bill and the companion bill introduced in the

House of Representatives by Congressman Henry Reuss reads as follows:

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States, or his representative, in order to secure the appropriate revaluation of other major currencies, is authorized on behalf of the United States to propose or agree to a change not to exceed 10 per centum in the par value of the United States dollar pursuant to section 5 of the Act of July 31, 1945 (59 Stat. 514).

At the recently concluded Group of Ten meeting of Financial Ministers in Rome, Secretary of the Treasury John Connally asked the hypothetical question of what effect a ten percent devaluation of the dollar in terms of gold would have on the realignment of other currencies against the dollar. Subsequent statements of ranking Treasury officials seem to confirm that the United States indeed may be considering a "formal devaluation" of the dollar if necessary to secure an appropriate realignment of other major currencies and to construct a trade component for a world monetary agreement.

It is my view that no interim settlement of the world monetary crisis is possible unless the United States makes this mainly symbolic concession on gold; and that without such a prompt interim settlement, the chances of a full recovery of our domestic economy would be seriously jeopardized and our relations with our allies in the free world seriously compromised. In terms of its effect on the domestic economy, a satisfactory currency realignment—including a devaluation of the dollar—would strengthen our competitive position at home while enhancing our export position overseas. Both these results would lead to additional job creation within the United States. There would be no negative effect on our economy, there is no convertibility involved now, and, in fact, this step would automatically increase the value of our gold reserves.

The Bretton Woods Act of July 31, 1945 makes it perfectly clear that prior congressional authorization is needed for the President to change the dollar price of gold. Section V of this Act reads:

"Unless Congress by law authorizes such action, neither the President nor any person or agency shall on behalf of the United States (a) request or consent to any change in the quota of the United States under Article III, section 2 of the Articles of Agreement of the Fund; (b) propose or agree to any change in the par value of the U.S. dollar under Article IV, section 5, or Article XX, section 4 of the Articles of Agreement of the Fund, or approve any general change in par values under Article IV, section 7 . . ."

I would be very pleased if you would consider cosponsorship of S. 2879. If you have any questions on this matter, please call Ken Guenther on x56542 or George Krumbhaar on x55171.

Sincerely,

JACOB K. JAVITS,
United States Senate.

THE IDENTIFICATION OF HENRY KISSINGER

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, an article written by Don Oberdorfer and published in the Washington Post of this morning, Thursday, December 16, 1971, is headlined "Post Criticized for Identifying Kissinger."

I want the RECORD to show that as far as I am concerned, I have no criticism whatsoever of those in the Washington Post who are willing to oppose the perversion of the democratic process by the use of backgrounders.

The Committee on Foreign Relations recently went through the experience of

trying to obtain copies of White House backgrounders. We were told that the verbatim transcript of those backgrounders could not be given to us. After much correspondence and discussion, during which various members of the committee pointed out that they were obtaining copies of backgrounder transcripts from foreign embassies and foreign newspaper correspondents, arrangements were made for the backgrounders to be given to the committee.

I might note, however, that this is a "sometime thing."

There is much evidence that these backgrounders are used for political purposes in Washington as well as for political purposes in dealing with the press and apparently with foreign governments.

I personally find backgrounders of this kind inconsistent with our system and believe the Washington Post is to be highly commended for the position the executive editor of that newspaper has taken.

I ask unanimous consent that the article by Mr. Stanley Karnow of December 15 and the article by Don Oberdorfer be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Dec. 15, 1971]

MOSCOW WARNED ON INDIA—1972 NIXON VISIT
MAY HINGE ON WAR RESTRAINT

(By Stanley Karnow)

The Nixon administration warned the Soviet Union yesterday that the President may reconsider his forthcoming trip to Moscow unless the Russians exercise a restraining influence in the war between India and Pakistan.

The warning was contained in a background briefing given by presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger to a pool of reporters that accompanied Mr. Nixon on his return from two days of talks with French President Georges Pompidou in the Azores.

Kissinger indicated that the President will observe Soviet behavior in the South Asian crisis over the next few days in order to determine whether the Russians intend to use their influence to curb the Indians.

In the event that the Soviet Union fails to urge restraint on India and continues to encourage Indian military action, Kissinger suggested, plans for the President's trip to Moscow might be changed.

Such a development, Kissinger went on, could lead to a reassessment of the entire relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

White House spokesman Ronald L. Ziegler, apparently seeking to reverse the thrust of reports stemming from the Kissinger briefing, said last night that the President had not considered cancelling his Moscow trip. Ziegler was not aboard the aircraft carrying the President and Kissinger.

Summoning reporters on their return from the Azores, Ziegler said that "no U.S. official was suggesting or intending to suggest that the United States was considering cancelling the United States-Soviet summit."

The substance of the administration's warning to the Russians was reportedly conveyed to the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels before it was made known here.

Although administration officials declined to disclose details, it is known that the U.S. ambassador to Moscow, Jacob Beam, explained the President's views to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on Monday in what was described as "unmistakable terms."

The President is scheduled to visit Moscow

in late May, following his seven-day trip to Peking beginning on February 21.

The doubt being cast over the President's Moscow trip is believed to have been inspired by his view that the Soviet Union has been deliberately uncooperative until now in helping to bring about peace in South Asia.

Kissinger reportedly referred with sarcasm to the Soviet effort to restrain India, saying the Russians had repeatedly vetoed United Nations Security Council resolutions calling for a ceasefire and mutual withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani troops.

The White House aide estimated in his briefing that the Soviet attitude toward the South Asian conflict is apparently aimed at humiliating the Chinese by demonstrating to the world that they cannot protect their Pakistani allies.

Meanwhile, in another move evidently calculated to discourage the Russians, the administration is deploying a naval task force in the Bay of Bengal. The task force includes the aircraft carrier Enterprise.

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird declined on Monday to discuss the deployment of the task force. But informed sources intimated yesterday that the deployment is related to the buildup of the Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean. "It's a question of showing the flag," the sources said.

Speaking to reporters yesterday, Indian Ambassador Lakshmi Kant Jha said that any effort by the U.S. task force to evacuate American or other personnel from East Pakistan would be viewed with the "deepest concern" by the government of India.

Jha convoked the news conference after meeting with Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco, head of the State Department's Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

The Indian ambassador insisted that he was not issuing a warning but "only spelling out the dangerous potential" in the situation.

Jha said he had been prompted to make his statement after his government had received a report that the objective of the U.S. naval task force was to evacuate not only U.S. personnel but also Pakistani officers and men as well as "civilians who might feel insecure."

Kissinger's warning to the Soviet Union apparently reflected President Nixon's growing irritation with what he regarded as Russian efforts to gain advantages from the South Asian war rather than support peace initiatives.

In a background briefing on Dec. 7, Kissinger voiced the hope that the Soviet Union would "subordinate short-term advantages to the long-term interests of peace."

Kissinger's briefing was made public last week when it was read into the Congressional Record by Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.).

[From the Washington Post, Dec. 16, 1971]

POST CRITICIZED FOR IDENTIFYING KISSINGER
(By Don Oberdorfer)

Presidential press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler and a Los Angeles Times correspondent criticized The Washington Post yesterday for revealing the source of official "background" statements regarding relations with the Soviet Union.

The article in question, in Wednesday's Post, identified presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger as the source of a statement that the President may reconsider his forthcoming trip to Moscow unless the Russians exercise a restraining influence in the India-Pakistan conflict.

The Kissinger statement was made to five reporters in a "press pool" aboard the presidential plane returning from the Nixon-Pompidou talks in the Azores. Kissinger made his comments with the understanding that they could only be used by reporters without attribution to him or any administration official.

Ziegler said the Post story citing Kissinger as the source broke the ground rules of the encounter and "is unacceptable to the White House." He said he would begin consultations with the White House Correspondents Association, wire services and broadcast networks to establish clear "ground rules" for future situations, including interviews aboard the presidential plane.

David J. Kraslow, Washington bureau chief of the Los Angeles Times and a member of the Tuesday press pool, charged The Post with "unprofessional, unethical, cheap journalism" in citing Kissinger as the source. Kraslow said Kissinger's remarks were not "dumped in our lap" but were elicited by the reporters on the aircraft "under the most intensive kind of questioning" and only after they gave assurance to Kissinger that he would not be identified as the source.

Benjamin C. Bradlee, executive editor of The Washington Post, defended the newspaper's handling of the story and said The Post is drawing up a set of guidelines concerning "background briefings." Bradlee said it was common knowledge that Kissinger was the source of the statements—which were reported in various ways by major newspapers, wire services and networks yesterday—but that the "ground rules" kept this information from the reader.

Referring to unattributed information from officials at background briefings, Bradlee said, "We are convinced that we have engaged in this deception and done this disservice to the reader long enough." He said the policy of The Post shall be "to make every reasonable effort to attribute information to its source" and to view unattributed information with "skepticism and suspicion."

In presidential travel and in some other situations, a small group of journalists known as the press "pool" customarily accompanies the Chief Executive. Their job is to make sure that some reporters are with the President in all public situations, and to pass along anything they learn to the entire press corps.

The five-member press pool for Tuesday—chosen by the White House—left the Azores on Mr. Nixon's jet. The 88 other members of the traveling White House press corps—including British, Canadian, Danish, French, German, Italian, Japanese, Swedish and Swiss journalists—remained behind for three hours to file their stories on Mr. Nixon's meetings with Pompidou.

In flight over the Atlantic in the presidential plane, Kissinger came back to the aft compartment occupied by the press pool. There under questioning he made the statements about the United States' attitude regarding the Soviet position in the South Asia conflict. A summary of his remarks was then composed by members of the press pool and sent forward to Kissinger's compartment for his approval. The President travels in another compartment of the plane, but Ziegler said yesterday Mr. Nixon was aware of Kissinger's meeting with the press pool.

The portion of Kissinger's remarks concerning U.S.-Soviet relations was marked on the pool report to "be written on our own without attribution to any administration official." Shortly after the presidential jet landed, major wire services distributed "urgent" stories on the matter.

The Associated Press reported that "President Nixon may reassess his plans for a historic journey to Moscow, it is understood, unless the Soviet Union begins to exercise a restraining influence in the India-Pakistan war." United Press International said "President Nixon will re-examine the Washington-Moscow thaw and his planned spring trip to Moscow if Russia continues to encourage India's military drive against Pakistan." The AP and UPI reporters were members of the pool.

The CBS Evening News reported that Mr. Nixon "let it be known tonight" that he might re-examine Soviet-American relations if Russia does not restrain India. The NBC

Nightly News attributed the warning to "the Nixon administration." The ABC News said "it's reported" that the President may take a new look at his plan to visit Moscow.

By the time press secretary Ziegler and the bulk of the press corps landed here in two charter jets about 7:30 p.m., the stories mentioned above had been widely disseminated. The pool report had not been given to the traveling press corps in flight, as is often the case, because of communications difficulties.

Shortly after landing, Ziegler began issuing statements on-the-record denying that any U.S. official was suggesting that Mr. Nixon was considering cancellation of his trip to Russia. (Kissinger had said the President might consider a change in summit plans; he did not say the President was already considering it.)

The Washington Post established that Kissinger was the source of the stories which were being reported on all news wires and networks, and identified him as such. Executive Editor Bradlee said he made the decision at 8 p.m. Tuesday.

The New York Times informed the White House in early evening that it would attribute the Kissinger statements to "a high White House official." The Times did so in its early editions and in later editions quoted Kissinger by name on the basis of public attribution by The Post.

Seymour Topping, assistant managing editor of The Times, said that paper's policy is to seek the greatest possible attribution but make its judgment on every story on an "ad hoc" basis. Topping said the non-attribution rule in the case of Tuesday's Kissinger story was "unacceptable" in view of the importance and nature of the material.

The question of "background briefings"—in which information is given the press on the condition that the source not be identified—has been controversial among Washington journalists for many years. Bradlee said yesterday that Post reporters and editors had become increasingly concerned about use and abuse of unattributed information over the last five years.

When Kissinger began his "background" talk aboard Air Force One on Tuesday afternoon, he was reminded that another of his recent backgrounders had become public when it was inserted into the Congressional Record by Sen. Barry Goldwater. Kissinger appeared to be irritated about that incident, and remarked—ironically as it turned out—that the purpose of doing the briefing "on background" was to prevent inflaming of the issue.

THE U.S. BICENTENNIAL

Mr. BEALL. Mr. President, our country is fast approaching its 200th birthday. But as the bicentennial grows closer, we seem to be lacking the very key to a significant and memorable celebration—an appropriate theme. Many vague generalities have been mentioned, but few have proposed a concrete and constructive plan that will adequately achieve the twin goals of celebration and rededication that the occasion warrants.

Yesterday, however, a proposal was put forth that I think deserves much consideration. In remarks before the National Association of Accountants, Helen Delich Bentley, Chairman of the Federal Maritime Commission and, I am proud to say, a fellow Marylander, urged that every waterfront in America become a special bicentennial fair that would recall this country's glorious maritime past, complete with floating displays of American history and our contribution to world science and economy. The plan would insure a celebration national in scope, while at the same time requiring

minimal preparation and negative impact on communities.

But more important are the symbolic features of this proposal. America's history is a history built around the sea. The oceans brought our forefathers to this primitive land and enabled communities to develop and prosper. The inland waters of America carried the commerce that moved this country economically forward. Today, our ships are our keys to continued prosperity.

Mr. President, the sea is a part of our Nation's lifeblood and should have a significant part in the celebration of our country's 200th birthday. I ask unanimous consent that the address by Mrs. Bentley be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

OUR 200TH BIRTHDAY AND OUR MARITIME HERITAGE

It is a great pleasure to say a few words to you today about the coming 200th Birthday of the United States of America.

We are today standing on the threshold of one of the most significant periods in our history—the Bicentennial Era which will be formally marked in the United States and throughout the world on July 4, 1976, in commemoration of the American Revolution and the 200th Anniversary of the Signing of the Declaration of Independence.

As citizens of the United States of America we are a proud and mighty Nation, deep in the concerns and challenges of the present and involved and relevantly participating in the construction of a future that will respect freedom and liberty and dedicate itself to the achievement of greater justice.

But we are also the sum of all our yesterdays, possessors of a precious heritage which has been forged in the blood and courage of men of many nations and races, in their tears and triumphs, their toil and dreams.

We are a Nation that cherishes our heritage and yet we recognize that this is another day, and that today times are different.

In George Washington's day the world was bounded on the east by an ocean that took 30 days to cross, on the west by an uncharted wilderness; by the sky above and the virgin earth beneath.

Benjamin Franklin knew this Nation as thirteen colonies, some 3,000,000 people, half of whom were under 16, and 90 percent of whom lived off the land, their life an unrelenting struggle to maintain and expand a beachhead on the edge of unknown wilderness.

Two hundred years of high drama have been recorded since then.

Wars have been fought and won. Sweeping social, technological and economic changes have taken place.

Today, we are an industrial Nation of 50 States and 205 million people.

The ideals of human freedom which made us an independent Nation in 1776 still live.

The question before us as we face our 200th year is—Can this society indeed achieve equal opportunity and full citizenship for all its members, and will it commit itself to that task?

I want to express the hope today that our coming Bicentennial celebration will be formative and flexible, as it should be if it is to accommodate the changes that will occur during the Bicentennial Era.

Early in its work, the Special Commission which is setting up the program, concluded that some aspects of the Bicentennial should be solemn and some festive, because the 200th birthday of the Country should be at once a solemn rededication and a joyous celebration.

With this in mind, three guidelines for the Festival of Freedom have been adopted.

First, the Bicentennial should be national in scope. It should have an appeal which would make every American and all friends of America eager to participate.

Second, the Commission sees the Bicentennial Era as a period for commemorating events which led to and through the Revolution and to the formal founding of the Nation in 1787 with the creation of the Constitution.

Third, the Bicentennial will be a time for Americans to review and reaffirm the basic principles on which the Nation was founded. The principles of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" and the concept of man's equality are as valid today, and will be for tomorrow, as they were when the Nation was founded.

The goal for the Festival of Freedom is: To forge a new national commitment, a new spirit for '76, a spirit which vitalizes the ideals for which the Revolution was fought; a spirit which will unite the Nation in purpose and in dedication to the advancement of human prosperity and human welfare as it moves into its third century.

That, ladies and gentlemen, is what I call an open invitation to the Bicentennial Commission to make the maritime history of our Country the theme for the 1976 celebration.

Furthermore, the future of our Country is very dependent upon the sciences of the oceans.

Not only could the Bicentennial Commission use the maritime story as the Bicentennial theme, but our Bicentennial could be displayed in true maritime fashion—a floating exhibit upon ships which could move from one seaport to another, making the exposition available to all Americans, including those in mid-America along the Mississippi and other inland rivers. Actually you could have three or four floating exhibits underway at the same time, along the various coasts.

The SS *United States*, which now is scheduled to be placed into the mothball fleet of the Nation, could serve as an ideal floating display of the colonnade of the 50 States, with each State being allotted space on this magnificent passenger ship.

There are at least seven aircraft carriers, along with numerous other ships, in the inactive fleets of the United States Navy and Maritime Administration, which could be used in the floating flotillas calling at the various ports.

So that every American could see this floating pageant of history, the suggested floating ship exhibits could be scheduled over a period of several years, if necessary.

Those who are programming the celebration of the 200th year of our American Revolution view it as a Festival of Freedom in which they hope all of the people of the United States and those who cherish self-determination everywhere, will participate. That certainly calls for a waterfront, seapower-oriented Bicentennial!

All of us can be proud of the American Merchant Marine . . . of ships and sailors who pioneered new trade routes, discovered new lands and flew the Stars and Stripes on many foreign shores.

We can be proud of cargo ships that fought this Nation's battles when there was hardly a Navy worthy of the name—of hardy whalers who supplied oil for the Nation's lights and of intrepid traders who coursed over seas for which there were no charts and founded the fortunes that helped to build America.

Our merchant ships have supplied this Nation in time of war; have carried troops overseas and ferried guns and ammunition that enabled American armies to win victory on foreign shores.

Our ships of commerce comprise a vital industry in times of peace and are a fourth arm of the fighting forces in time of war.

Our Merchant Marine is today striving to be kept as adequate for national defense as

the Army, Navy, and Air Force, of which it is an indispensable, even if too-little appreciated, ally.

Although the United States is thought of as a "new" nation, . . . just 200 years old, its maritime traditions go back more than 300 years.

Almost as soon as the Pilgrims and Puritans landed in the New World, they built vessels for coastwise commerce and for distant voyages to Europe. The tiny ship *Desire of Salem* crossed the Atlantic in 1640 on a trading voyage to England with tobacco and other goods, making the trip in only _____ days!

In the 18th Century, American mariners ventured to the Caribbean, South America, Europe, and the Mediterranean in ships that most people today would not consider safe beyond the sight of land.

Armed merchant ships called privateers took the place of an almost non-existent American Navy during the Revolutionary War.

These fighting merchantmen captured 600 enemy vessels and quickened British desire for an end to the war.

Captain Jonathan Hariden, of the 14-gun privateer *General Pickering*, on one occasion overpowered three British vessels with a total armament of 40 guns!

Our privateers raided enemy commerce within sight of the British Isles.

The merchant ship *America* was converted into a privateer and in only three cruises captured 26 prizes valued at more than one million dollars. These intrepid privateers, more than anything else, convinced the British that it was wise to make peace with the new United States of America.

Yankee privateers also played a leading role in winning the War of 1812.

The annals of the American Merchant Marine in World War II are replete with thrilling tales of heroism and daring. One of these brave cargo ships of war was the Liberty freighter *Henry Bacon*. Steaming off the Nazi-held coast of Norway, this ship was attacked by 25 German torpedo bombers. Her crew fought off the attack with blazing guns that account for several of the bombers before torpedoes finally found their mark and the *Bacon* began to sink.

First place in the lifeboats was given to Norwegian refugees on board the ship so that many of her heroic crew went down with the freighter as she sank beneath the sea.

Countless other tales of heroism could be told of American merchant ships that comprised our fourth arm in World War II.

In commerce, as in war, Yankee mariners knew no barriers to trade and adventure in the days when the sea offered fame and fortune for many an adventurous man.

In 1797, Captain Edmund Fanning sailed from New York around Cape Horn in the 93-ton vessel *Betsy* with trinkets which he traded to West Coast Indians for a load of sealskins.

He then crossed the Pacific Ocean to Canton, China, where he traded the skins for silks and tea.

Circumnavigating the world by way of the Cape of Good Hope, this bold skipper-trader sold the rich cargo of tea and silk in New York for more than \$120,000.00, a substantial fortune in those days. Expenses of this round-the-world trading trip were only \$7,867.00!

World commerce has changed since the days when traders sailed on long, indefinite voyages and cargoes were venture goods for sale or barter. Today, ships must keep train-like schedules to accommodate shippers whose business demands prompt pickup and delivery. The worldwide network of regularly-scheduled, American freight and passenger liners; of oil tankers, OBO's and tramp ships carrying bulk cargoes, assures American importers and exporters of reliable access to foreign markets for the products of the American worker and speedy transport to the United States of raw materials needed

by our industrial economy. Our network of American merchant shipping is today not only a fourth arm of defense in times of national emergency, but a vital adjunct in the business of civilian existence.

History was made at sea in 1819, when Captain Moses Rogers and the ship *Savannah* left Savannah, Georgia, for Liverpool, England, to make the first crossing of the Atlantic with the help of a steam engine. This epic ship signalled the eventual end of the sailing ship on the seas.

The *Savannah* used its steam engine on 14 out of 22 days during the trip across; it sailed and steamed to St. Petersburg, Russia, and was inspected by the Czar.

After returning to the United States, its engines were removed and the ship was later wrecked on the shore of Long Island. Together with Robert Fulton and other steamship pioneers, Capt. Rogers and the *Savannah* gave the United States the distinction of being a leader in the new field of steam ocean transportation.

The American Merchant Marine also made history in July of 1952, when the 990-foot superliner *United States* set a new speed record by crossing the Atlantic in 3½ days. It could make six crossings of the Atlantic while the pioneer *Savannah* was making one.

Compared with the *Savannah's* 90-horsepower steam engine, new American freighters have steam-turbine powerplants of 120,000 shaft horsepower and they are unexcelled for speed and safety.

A unique chapter in the history of American ships is that of the ice trade to the Southern States, the Caribbean and the Far East. An adventurous young merchant named Frederick Tudor conceived the idea of sending ice by ship to hot countries where cold drinks were an unknown luxury.

The ice was cut from New England lakes and rivers. After losing money on experimental trips, Tudor was finally successful and opened up a prosperous business which continued for almost 100 years.

Ice ships carried cargoes to cool the drinks of Indian Rajahs and West Indian planters as well as to preserve food and make life more enjoyable for millions of people in many lands.

Apples from our orchards were often shipped along with the ice, which was stowed in sawdust or shavings to slow its melting.

Refrigerated ships that rush fruit and other perishable foods to American tables are part of a modern United States Merchant Marine that includes many special types for carrying molasses, lumber, ores, coal, gas and even railroad cars for the convenience of American shippers. From Capetown to Karachi and from Hamburg to Hobart, American-flag cargo ships tap trade opportunities for scores of American cities like Racine, Wisconsin, which sells in excess of two-hundred million dollars worth of goods all over the world every year and gives jobs to untold thousands of men and women.

American ships which "go to market" for American farmers helped to carry billions of dollars worth of wheat, evaporated milk, rice, tobacco, lard and other farm products to overseas buyers.

These same vessels, when they were required to, carried tanks, guns, shells and troops in time of war.

Romantic is that chapter of American maritime history which tells of bluff-bowed whalers from New Bedford, Nantucket, New London, and other New England ports, that cruised distant seas in search of oil to light the Nation's lamps before the discovery of petroleum in the 1860's.

Most famous of these whalers was the Charles W. Morgan, now enshrined at the Mystic Marine Museum in Mystic, Connecticut. Built in 1841, this oak-hulled vessel sailed the seas for 80 years, making 37 voyages and grossing two million dollars.

Her first trip lasted three years and three months—not unusual for a whale hunter.

At the peak of the business in 1846, there were 735 whaling ships under the American flag.

Our tremendous and ever-increasing appetite for fuel oil and power has made the oil tanker and the gas tanker a vital part of the Merchant Marine that serves us! Tankships bring petroleum to American refineries—deliver oil and gasoline from refineries to coastal distribution points. New tankers flying the American flag are giants that can transport more than 250,000 barrels of oil or gasoline—250 times as much oil as the Charles W. Morgan could carry. In time of war, the Navy, Air Force and the motorized Army could not move without a huge fleet of tankships. Our peacetime industry depends on oil and a large tanker fleet is indispensable to our high standard of living and our national security.

Need some more romance?

Let us recall that the clipper ship era in the 1950's marked the high tide of American glory on the seas.

Long, slim and graceful, the tall-masted clippers spread a cloud of canvas and led the world in speed and daring. They carried the 46-ers to the California and Alaskan gold fields.

Hailed as the finest specimens of the shipwright's art ever to sail the trade routes, the acme of ship design and craftsmanship, these beautiful vessels had a brief era of supremacy, for the increased use of steam, plus the demand for greater carrying capacity and economy, forced them from the seas.

Such names as Dreadnought, Herald of the Morning, Flying Cloud, and Sovereign of the Sea became memories of a glorious past as the United States. After the Civil War, the United States turned from the sea to let other nations carry its foreign commerce.

Technical skills of the engineer and American shipbuilding craftsmanship combine to make present-day American container and LASH-ships modern "clippers" of the ocean trade routes.

As a leader in world affairs, the United States must maintain its rightful place upon the seas with our freighters and liners carrying at least a fair share of our exports and imports. American industry demands a growing quantity of vital raw materials that should be carried in substantial measure by American ships.

With our shipyards ready and able to keep our Merchant Marine modern and adequate for those objectives, there is no reason why the American flag should not be the finest ships on the seven seas.

There are gray pages, too, in the history of our Nation's shipping.

Preoccupied after the Civil War with the development of internal resources and westward expansion, the United States neglected its Merchant Marine to the point where the American flag almost disappeared from the seas.

The great clipper ships were sold to foreign flags.

American shipyards were deserted. The complete decay of our merchant shipping was climaxed in 1898 when there were not even enough ships to transport an expeditionary force of 25,000 men to Cuba in the War with Spain.

This sad state of our shipping was a national disgrace in 1907 when foreign ships had to be chartered to provide a train of supply for the "Great White Fleet" of U.S. warships when President Theodore Roosevelt sailed them around the world.

The year 1936 marked a turning point in the fortunes of American shipping. In that year Congress passed the Merchant Marine Act, "to further the development and maintenance of an adequate and well-balanced American Merchant Marine" capable of promoting the commerce of the United States and aiding in the national defense. The Act set up a far-sighted program of Government

support for American shipping and established a network of shiplines serving routes essential to the prosperous foreign trade.

Large, fast vessels were built which provided a small, but highly important nucleus of military transport at the outbreak of World War II.

In the 1970 Merchant Marine Act, President Nixon's Administration drafted a program to revitalize U.S. merchant shipping.

Our goals, though higher, were based upon the same time-tested premises of the 1936 Act . . .

To be ready for any future we must keep a stable maritime industry in active operation with modern facilities and well-trained personnel.

We must plan to replace our deep-sea fleet, much of which is now past of "middle age" of its useful life. Special vessel types such as ore and oil carriers must be built.

Ways should be found to allow shipowners to accumulate capital for ship building and replacement programs.

Now—I expect you to ask at this point—What is the point of all of this recitation? and—How does it fit in with the 200th Anniversary of the Revolution of 1776 and the big American Birthday Party?

Well, let me get back to that vital theme.

There's a song we all know that states that you've got to have a dream if you want your dream to come true.

Let us exercise a little mutual imagination together and simply explore in our mind's eye the kaleidoscope of ships mixed in with the marking of our 200th year.

All of us will agree that what we want in 1976 is an exposition with meaning, dignity, and excitement.

We want an exposition relating man's American past to its future, using the media of today.

It should be a convocation of peoples from America and the world to experience the varied lessons and lore of our history, the divesty of today in the United States, and our march toward a future with humane values.

It should, if possible, be not only a new exposition but an entirely different kind of exposition.

We should be planning a totally new kind of presentation which reflects the phenomenal changes in mobility and communication in today's society and joins the vaulting ideas and plans of future goals with realistic and economical means of getting there. The Bicentennial, in other words, must show restraint in the normal costs associated with expositions and spend heavily in the resources of ideas, innovations, and spontaneously-generated activity. The event should be an educational experience, maximizing the potential for interchange between all institutions, groups, and individuals.

There is one thing in common for all of us in the United States today. We are a four-ocean country. We have waterways that reach toward the Rockies and rivers that bind our farm communities with our great city ports.

The core of the plan I would like the Bicentennial planners to begin thinking about involves the use of ships refitted as pavilions. These would be suitable for use by nations, corporations, and other institutions and groups who wish to exhibit at the Bicentennial.

Traveling ship-pavilions would be created so that exhibits would be virtually self-contained with a minimum of installation difficulties and a maximum of mobility. This plan would be contingent upon deployment of the great "mothball fleets" now anchored in east and west coast ports anywhere and everywhere that our American waterfront, wherever it might be, could accommodate them.

The ships' networks could be linked into existing networks of mass transit and road-

ways to facilitate the rapid, comfortable, and convenient transportation of visitors.

Harbors have traditionally been focal points of human movement and are ideally located for exposition purposes.

Such sites would require minimal preparation and have a minimum negative impact on existing communities and activities.

A basic principle in the development of an economical Bicentennial is the comprehensive planning of the site for maximum reuse at minimum costs. This factor could be incorporated in all plans and there are few waterfronts in the Country that would not welcome and cooperate in improvement.

I firmly believe that the central concept of a ship-oriented Bicentennial has numerous advantages and would benefit many people.

We all know that there is presently a surplus of military ships in the United States and presumably in other countries as well.

Underdeveloped or impoverished nations could be given exhibit ships from those surpluses.

There are many ships in merchant fleets around the world which have become obsolete or even obsolete. Having fulfilled their original design purpose they may still be highly suitable if refurbished as pavilions for a floating U.S. Bicentennial show.

One aspect which should have considerable appeal to international participants, would be the unencumbered ability to build their own pavillion, in one of their own ships, in their own shipyards rather than a pavillion built in a foreign land. This could be an economic advantage and a stimulant to national pride in participation.

If some nations, perhaps landlocked, or with insufficient shipyard facilities, would choose to have their pavillions constructed in the United States, this could mean a significant number of desperately needed jobs created in our recessed shipbuilding industry.

Perhaps the most conspicuous advantage in the use of ships is their natural mobility. This would allow the entire exposition to be moved either in a bloc, in smaller groups or individually to suitable locations with adequate port or anchorage could be an exposition site. For the first time there could be central, plus widespread, participation by different cities and states. The Bicentennial could be truly national in a way that no one-city site could offer.

While any number of cities could participate directly by hosting pavillions at their waterfronts it seems reasonable that one city with extensive historical credentials could still be the headquarters for exhibits.

When the Bicentennial period is completed the ships' sponsors would have many choices as to the future use of their pavillions, rather than the single necessity of simply dismantling and junking the old-fashioned type of pavillion.

All of the ships could be moved in a group to any future expositions, virtually anywhere in the world.

Each could possibly be used as a permanent traveling exhibition for the host country or organization.

With reconversion they could be used as floating municipal buildings, recreation centers, colleges, hospitals, housing, factories, or centers of operation for groups such as the Peace Corps.

They could possibly be converted into casinos, resort hotels, restaurants, or trade marts.

Too many cities have severed themselves from the potential amenities along their waterfronts by walls of expressways, garbage and dumping centers, and over-concentrated industrial facilities.

With the inherent impetus of a real waterfront exposition site a city could be able to turn one of its saddest oversights into one of its greatest attractions.

Looking objectively at the pros and cons of a "ships exposition" I say that, at present

the benefits certainly seem to outweigh the problems.

Certain basic steps inherent in this new approach minimize the enormous land commitments, minimize the negative impact on the communities, reduce the added transportation costs by bringing the exposition to the people rather than the people to the exposition and certainly there would be stimulated a much-needed resurgence of maritime interest everywhere.

Ships which travel and locate independently could still allow for a network of as many sites over as broad an area as is desired. This "maritime network," coordinated with improved "overland networks," could interlock with communication networks for voice, visions, and data.

The spreading, strengthening, and fostering of communication networks is inherently necessary in a prosperous world future for America. It is natural and appropriate for the Bicentennial to express and stimulate such worldwide-scope thinking.

We have been ignoring for too long shipbuilding, shipbuilding, and related activities. Passive research and development, combined with negligence has allowed American maritime interests here to become moribund.

Much of the impact of the Bicentennial could be to rekindle interest and involvement in the world's oceans and rivers.

Specific exhibits could demonstrate new potentials offered by the oceans, and, the total effect of the exposition could be to recall and emphasize, both explicitly and implicitly, the virtually forgotten realms of the seas and even perhaps reform thinking toward the utilization of the ocean and ocean resources for our future.

Specifically, locating the site on water for our 200th Birthday would motivate, if not virtually obligate, comprehensive clean-ups of the rivers and harbors.

The presence of the exhibition ships themselves could instill remembrance of the importance, beauty, power, and grace of ships. In fact, we could recall an entire lore which has been, we hope, only temporarily forgotten.

In fact, with a little extra dream-dust, the future maritime possibilities are so great and so diverse that an excellent comprehensive demonstration of them might make the U.S. Bicentennial a keynote event for the next half century.

Sincerely, I feel we ought to take immediate steps to assure that every entity in this Country concerned with ocean transportation in its broadest sense, begin planning to make the 1976 Bicentennial the greatest American Merchant Marine "Teach-in" this nation has ever known.

America wants to take note of its 200th birthday, to celebrate its vigorous growth into the role of one of the world's most important and influential nations.

An appropriate exposition must show not only the achievements of America but also the interdependency and diversity of peoples and nations—where America gained its heritage, made much of its recent wealth, and shed most of its blood.

We must show our perception of new issues and problems, and our willingness to undertake new challenges.

We must show the new relationships between men, their products, and their use in the environment.

Such a Bicentennial will be worth whatever the cost and the effort.

The goal of the Bicentennial is to forge a new national commitment, a new spirit of '76, a spirit which vitalizes the ideals for which the Revolution was fought and won, a spirit which will unite the Nation in purpose and in dedication.

The question most often asked about the Bicentennial is "Where is the Bicentennial going to be?" Let's make the resounding response—On The Waterfront!

HEROIN PRODUCERS KNOWN TO UNITED STATES AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, virtually all Americans know that one of the greatest causes of crime and human misery in our country, these days, is heroin addiction. It is also well known that a great part of this deadly narcotic smuggled into the United States comes from opium produced in Turkey and refined into heroin in processing plants located in France.

Joseph W. Grant, Jr., the publisher of Penal Digest International, a prison reform journal produced by a group of ex-convicts in Iowa City, Iowa, claims that the justice departments of both France and the United States know the locations of these plants, yet nothing is being done about it. He recommends a boycott of French products to force the closing down of these heroin processing plants.

Whether or not one may agree that such severe action should be taken toward a country that has long been one of our country's allies, I believe that Mr. Grant's article is a provocative addition to the dialog about one of the Nation's most urgent problems. I therefore ask unanimous consent that the news release dated December 10, 1971, and the article published in the October issue of The Penal Digest International—PDI—be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the item was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PDI DEMANDS BOYCOTT OF FRENCH PRODUCTS TO HALT FLOW OF HEROIN

A nationwide boycott of all French products, to last until the French government closes down all of the heroin processing plants in that country, is being called for by the Penal Digest International, publisher Joseph W. Grant has announced.

It is well-known, Grant said, that most of the heroin which makes its way into the United States comes from Eastern poppy fields via processing plants near French ports. "The justice departments of both France and the United States know the locations of these plants," he said, "yet nothing has been done to rid us of this billion-dollar industry which deals in nothing but death and misery."

PDI's stance on the issue is that the prisons and ghettos of this country are filled with thousands of addicts and ex-addicts who made the crucial error of taking their first fix because it created an illusion which tended to erase their sense of failure and frustration. Most of these addicts are from minority groups and low-income groups. They had nothing more going for them than an empty American Dream, soon followed by the bitter realization that this land of plenty wasn't giving up very much in their neighborhoods.

"Heroin traffic is another terrifying tool of oppression," maintained Robert Copeland, PDI associate editor. "It is subtly and covertly condoned by many power elements in our society because it is conducted on an incredibly large scale, like a well-organized business rather than the reprehensible crime against humanity which it actually is. Its victims—the poor and the oppressed—are completely at the mercy of the heroin traffickers because they are unable to combat the tremendous economic, and frequently legal and political, power which the latter possess. The corruption spawned by the hard-drug industry is all-pervasive."

For years the federal government has given lip service to the need for halting the flow of heroin into this country, but their ef-

forts have never gone deep enough or far enough. While the feds concentrate on the independent drug dealer, the pusher in the street, the real villain goes right on peddling his opiates to the people with impunity—safe behind the awesome power of his organization.

Likewise, the French government, apparently bedazzled by the streams of dollars which flow through their country along with the heroin, allows the processing plants to flourish. Occasionally a token bust is made to demonstrate the government's "concern," but, again, the effort goes neither far enough nor deep enough.

"France does understand the economics of exported goods," said Richard Tanner, PDI circulation manager. "She certainly wouldn't miss the point if every American citizen started to look at the labels of goods, and refused to purchase anything made in France until the French government puts a stop to what can only be called a traffic in stark misery for thousands of Americans who end up in prison if they don't have from one to four hundred dollars each day to support their habit.

"These people are forced to go out early in the morning to steal by whatever means are available to support a habit they can't get rid of. They cannot be independent. They cannot hold a job. They cannot participate socially. They are slaves of a narcotic monster. They cannot always walk into a hospital and ask for help. If they do, they often are locked in a strip-cell to kick their habit cold-turkey, and then are sent to prison. Their minds become oblivious to the realities of responsibility and purpose. There is only one fact in life for them—the fact that another fix is due at a certain time of their life, and it must be gotten together."

Grant added, "As we approach this season of traditional celebration and thanksgiving, it is easy to slip comfortably into illusions and platitudes. Instead, we should take a good, hard look at the problems which are oppressing so many people in this country. Heroin is among the top, and since the government has not done much about it yet, it is time for the people to rise up and use what power they have to rid themselves of this monster and the anguish which it creates.

"We realize that to some it will appear paradoxical that a group of ex-cons and convicts is taking a strong stand against the crime of heroin traffic. But isn't it more paradoxical that society, the government and its law enforcement agencies, automatically regard as criminals the victims of heroin addiction, while the real criminals, the purveyors of this atrocity, are permitted to continue their big, dirty business at the expense of powerless people entrapped by economic and social conditions?

"The boycott is a drastic action, but it is far less drastic than the actions which heroin addiction forces upon thousands of Americans each year. If this problem can be alleviated, thousands of worthy men and women will not wind up in prisons—and I'm not speaking only of the kinds of prisons with bars."

THE FOLLOWING INCLUDES THE SUBJECT MATTER OF A SPEECH TO BE DELIVERED BY EX-CONVICT JOSEPH W. GRANT, FOUNDER AND PUBLISHER OF PENAL DIGEST INTERNATIONAL, AT LEWISBURG (PA.) FEDERAL PENITENTIARY ON THE EVENING OF FRIDAY, DECEMBER 10. THIS NEWS RELEASE IS NOT FOR PUBLICATION BEFORE SATURDAY, DECEMBER 11.

IOWA CITY, IOWA.—A nationwide boycott of all French products, to last until the French government closes down all of the heroin processing plants in that country, is being called for by the *Penal Digest International*, publisher Joseph W. Grant has announced.

Letter-writing and petition campaigns and picketing of businesses selling French goods

are being planned in cities across the country in conjunction with the boycott.

A monthly prison reform journal, the *Penal Digest International* (PDI) is published here by a group of ex-convicts.

According to Grant, it is well-known that most of the heroin which makes its way into the United States comes from Eastern poppy fields via processing plants near French ports. "The justice departments of both France and the United States know the locations of these plants," he said, "yet nothing has been done to rid us of this billion-dollar industry which deals in nothing but death and misery."

Grant explained that PDI's stance on the issue is that the prisons and ghettos of this country are filled with thousands of addicts and ex-addicts who made the crucial error of taking their first fix because it created an illusion which tended to erase their sense of failure and frustration.

"Most of these addicts," he continued, "are from minority groups and low-income groups. They had nothing more going for them than an empty American Dream, soon followed by an awakening to the bitter realization that this land of plenty wasn't giving up very much in their neighborhoods. Now that heroin addiction has begun to leave its scars upon the suburbs and among middle-class and upper-class groups, more people are finally becoming aware of the threat which this problem poses to our nation and especially to our young people."

In announcing the boycott of French products in its most recent issue, published this week, PDI commented:

"For years the federal government has given lip service to the need for halting the flow of heroin into this country, but their efforts have never gone deep enough or far enough. While the feds concentrate on the independent drug dealer, the pusher who's supporting his own habit, the real villain goes right on peddling his opiates to the people with impunity—safe behind the awesome power of his organization.

"Likewise, the French government, apparently bedazzled by the streams of dollars which flow through the country along with the heroin, allows the processing plants to flourish. Occasionally a token bust is made to demonstrate the government's "concern," but, again, the effort goes neither deep nor far enough."

PDI associate editor Robert Copeland noted, "Heroin traffic is another terrifying tool of oppression. It is subtly, implicitly and covertly condoned by many power elements in our society because it is conducted on an incredibly large scale, like a well-organized business rather than the reprehensible crime against humanity which it actually is."

He added, "Its victims—the poor and the oppressed—are completely at the mercy of the heroin traffickers because they are unable to combat the tremendous economic, and frequently legal and political, power which the latter possess. The corruption spawned by the hard-drug industry is all pervasive."

Asked about the chances of the boycott's success, Richard Tanner, PDI circulation manager, stated, "France does understand the economics of exported goods. She certainly wouldn't miss the point if every American citizen started to look at the labels of goods, and refused to purchase anything made in France until the French government puts a stop to what can only be called a traffic in stark misery for thousands of Americans who end up in prison if they don't have from one to four hundred dollars each day to support their habit."

Grant added, "As we approach this season of traditional celebration and thanksgiving, it is easy to slip comfortably into illusions and platitudes. Instead, we should take a good, hard look at the problems and conditions which are oppressing so many people in this country. Heroin is among the top,

and since the government has not done much about it yet, it is time for the people to rise up and use what power they have to rid themselves of this monster and the anguish which it creates.

"We realize that to some it will appear paradoxical that a group of ex-cons and convicts is taking a strong stand against the crime of heroin traffic. But isn't it more paradoxical that society, the government and its law enforcement agencies, tend automatically to regard as criminals the victims of heroin addiction, while the real criminals, the purveyors of this atrocity, are permitted to continue their big, dirty business at the expense of powerless people entrapped by economic and social conditions?

"The boycott is a drastic action, but it is far less drastic than the actions which heroin addiction forces upon thousands of Americans each year. If this problem can be alleviated, thousands of worthy men and women will not wind up in prisons—and I'm not speaking only of the kinds of prisons with bars."

REGULATIONS ON THE DRAFT

Mr. JAVITS, Mr. President, on November 22, 1971, the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) and I, joined by 18 of our colleagues, wrote Director Curtis Tarr of the Selective Service System to express our concern with the proposed regulations to implement the procedural rights of registrants guaranteed by the new draft law. In particular we noted several proposed changes governing personal appearances and appeals generally by registrants, which did not, in our opinion, comply with the letter and intent of the new statute.

By publication in the Federal Register of December 9, 1971, Director Tarr has implemented several new regulations. I am pleased to note that the majority of those regulations dealing with procedural rights of registrants, with which we were so deeply concerned, have not been made effective. Director Tarr has indicated that these will be reexamined and republished at a later date for public comment.

Mr. President, draft board decisions are frequently more important than court decisions in criminal cases. Underlying the draft should be the principles of administrative simplicity, efficiency and due process. For these reasons, I coauthored, along with Senator KENNEDY, amendments providing for procedural rights for registrants and prepublication requirements for regulations affecting registrants.

In enacting the new draft law the Congress sought to join with the President in seeking as fair and as equitable a draft system as possible, consistent with the normal guarantees of due process and the need for simplicity and efficiency. The decision by Director Tarr to revise many of the regulations comes as a welcome response to our letter of December 22, 1971, and demonstrates an awareness on the part of Selective Service that it is the responsibility of the Government to provide as fair and as equitable a draft system as possible.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the letter written to Director Tarr on November 22, 1971, and an article published in the New York Times, commenting on the decision to revise many of the regulations, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PROPOSED CHANGES IN DRAFT WITHDRAWN

WASHINGTON, December 10.—The Selective Service System withdrew today several proposed changes in regulations governing the draft following complaints from local draft boards and the public.

The proposed changes had involved new procedures for appearances before local and appeal boards and the reopening of classifications. The system had also proposed a revision of the conscientious objector form.

Under the proposed changes a person appearing before a draft or appeal board would have been entitled to a minimum of 15 minutes. A registrant could present three witnesses in his behalf before the local board and none before the appeal board.

Many local boards had complained that the 15-minute minimum would allow registrants to tie up proceedings by filibustering, while some persons complained that the 15-minute period would be used as a time limit, making it more difficult to get deferments.

The Selective Service director, Curtis W. Tarr, said that no personal appearances or appeals would be heard until new regulations could be formulated.

This will take a minimum of six weeks because the law dictates that any regulations first be reviewed by a group of 10 Government agencies and then published in the Federal Register after which a 30-day period for criticism is mandatory. The action halts the induction of all men eligible for appeal hearings.

Under the proposals withdrawn today, draft boards would have been given the option of declining to reopen a registrant's classification even after the presentation of new evidence that could make him eligible for reclassification.

Selective Service also decided against issuing a revised conscientious objector form that would have required applicants for such status to answer 30 questions rather than four.

In addition, the system withdrew a change that would have limited registrants to 15 days for making an appeal of their classification from the time classification notices were mailed. They are now given 30 days. Many members of Congress said the 15-day limit violated the spirit of the new draft law by making it more difficult to get deferments for all except those who had them last June 30.

Draft provisions put into effect today included the ending of undergraduate student deferments except for those eligible during the last quarter or semester of the 1970-71 academic year.

Also, nonimmigrant aliens are now not required to register and no immigrant alien is subject to induction until after one year of residence in the United States. In the past, nonimmigrants, with certain exceptions, were required to register and were eligible for induction after they had resided in United States for one year.

DRAFT CALL FILLED

WASHINGTON, December 10.—Drafting of men into the armed forces stopped today until at least late next month. The drafting of men was halted for the usual Christmas-New Year holiday, and Selective Service said the November-December draft call of 10,000 has been filled.

Meanwhile, the Army announced that thousands of first-term draftees and volunteers due for discharge next year would be released up to six months early to bring Army strength down to 892,000 by June 30 as ordered by Congress. It was believed that the reductions would affect about 60,000 G.I.'s.

The discharges will be mandatory except for those men and women who indicate in writing that they plan to re-enlist for a sec-

ond term, the Army said. The new policy is effective immediately and will remain in effect until June 30.

U.S. SENATE,

Washington, D.C., November 22, 1971.

DR. CURTIS W. TARR,
Director, Selective Service System,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR DR. TARR: As you know, we were active in seeking to assure the procedural rights of registrants in the recent legislation extending the draft. Therefore, we have examined with great interest the regulations which you have proposed to implement the new provisions. There are a number of provisions of the regulations about which we are particularly concerned, and which we would urge you to revise.

First, under section 1626.2, the time for filing an appeal from the decision of a local board begins to run on the date the local board mails Form SSS 110 to the registrant. While this date may be reasonable in the case of registrants who receive the Form only after a personal appearance (if one has been requested) pursuant to section 1624.1(b) and section 1624.6(b), it is clearly unreasonable as to registrants who receive Form SSS 110 first and who subsequently request a personal appearance before the local board but are unsuccessful.

In this latter case no new Form SSS 110 is mailed after the decision of the local board; rather, a letter is then sent to the registrant informing him of the decision under section 1624.5. In such case the time for requesting an appeal should not begin to run until the mailing of the letter notifying the registrant of the local board's decision not to reclassify him.

Otherwise the registrant is being asked to appeal from a decision prior to its taking place. Such a situation would appear to deprive the registrant of traditional due process guarantees for full administrative review of Selective Service decisions.

Second, the time limits for taking appeals and requesting personal appearances at various stages in classification proceedings have been reduced to 15 days from mailing of the classification notice. Formerly, the time allowed was 30 days. We believe that the proposed reduction in time from 30 days to 15 days within which a registrant must exercise his procedural rights may result in many registrants losing them because they will not be aware of the change. Registrants are not trained legal personnel and are not used to deadlines which can cut off substantial rights involving life and liberty. Also, practically speaking, 15 days does not leave enough time for mail communications to arrive and still leave a registrant an adequate time within which to prepare his response. We also note that no provision is allowed for overseas registrants or other registrants living great distances from their local boards. Formerly, an overseas registrant was allowed 60 days to exercise his appeal rights, yet under the proposed regulations he will have the same 15 days as the registrant living near his board. In view of the fact that 60 days was considered necessary under the old regulations, we do not believe that 15 days is enough time now.

Third, we are deeply concerned that the recent discontinuance of the practice of issuing to registrants classified I-A a copy of Selective Service Form 217 advising him of various procedural rights will result in a denial of substantial rights in that registrants will not have access to the information which they need to protect their rights. The proposed regulations do not provide for the issuance of such a form. We would urge you to consider reinstating this practice—and issuing the form both in English and in Spanish—in order that a registrant's rights will be explained to him in non-legal and readily understandable language at a time when he can still exercise those rights.

Fourth, section 1624.4(e) prohibits representation of registrants by anyone acting as an attorney or legal counsel before a local board. A similar provision is contained in section 1627.4(d) concerning appeals to the National Selective Service Appeal Board.

While it is true that the provision in the Senate bill which would have permitted a registrant to be accompanied by counsel before his local board was struck by the conferees, and is thus not included in the law, there is no evidence that Congress intended to prohibit local boards, in their discretion, from permitting a registrant to be accompanied by an attorney to advise him. Thus, we would hope that the regulations would be revised to at least permit local and appeal boards, in their discretion, to allow registrants to be accompanied by an attorney of their choice. Alternatively, the regulations might be clarified so as to make clear that it is "representation" rather than mere accompaniment, that is prohibited.

In this regard, we are particularly surprised at learning that you have abolished the government appeal agents. Much of the opposition to the enactment of a right to counsel was based on the availability of government appeal agents. Yet now that source of assistance has been removed without any provision made for the appeal agent function to be filled in another way. We would hope you would reconsider this decision, grant more opportunities for legal representation, or transfer the standing to request reopening and the appeal powers of the government appeal agent to the advisors to registrants.

Also, relatives and employers are denied their previous standing under the proposed new regulations to make any request for classification or appeal in behalf of a registrant. We would hope that this might be reconsidered.

Fifth, under section 1626.1, appeal is permitted only from classification into classes 1-A, 1-A-O, or 1-O, although the registrant is entitled to be placed in the "lowest" class for which he is qualified. For example, a registrant who qualifies both as a surviving son (eligible for 4-G) and divinity student (2-D) is harmed if placed in the latter category, since 2-D is a "deferment" extending draft liability from age 26 to 35 while 4-G, an "exemption" does not extend liability.

Sixth, the prepublication requirements of section 13(b) have not been followed, particularly with regard to the recent issuance of amendments to Local Board Memorandum 99. It was the intention of the Senate, and the legislative debate so demonstrates, that regulations requiring prepublication including LBM's, guidelines such as those present in Form 150, and all those directives that have significant impact on the registrants, including letters to the state directors (LASD). For instance, the LBM 99 amendment establishes multiple "extended priority groups." Also LASD(00-23) establishes a II-A deferment for doctors based on "community essentiality." It was our intention that all of these directives be considered as "regulations" requiring prepublication and an opportunity for comment.

Seventh, we are concerned that a traditional appeal route for reconsideration by the appeal board "when either the Director of Selective Services deems it to be in the National interest or necessary to avoid an injustice" has been removed by the deletion of section 1626.61.

Eighth, we are concerned that the proposed regulations fail to carry out the understanding of the Committee of Conference with regard to the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in *Ehlert v. United States*, 402 U.S. 99. The Conference Report on page 22 notes that local boards have discretionary authority in unusual circumstances to consider claims for conscientious objector status after the mailing of an induction order. However, the proposed regulations, in section 1621.11, specifically forbid a local board

from issuing Selective Service Form 150 after the mailing of an induction order, thereby implying that the board may not consider a claim for conscientious objector status arriving at the board after the mailing of the induction order.

Finally, sections 1622.22(b) and 1622.25(a) provide for continuing student deferments for students at junior colleges and for students in a regular four year college respectively. However, no provision is made for a junior college student eligible for a deferment under section 1622.22(b) to transfer to a four year program and thereby retain his deferment under section 1622.25(a). Thus, the registrant in a junior college for two years who transfers to a four year school to complete his bachelor's program is accorded different treatment than the registrant who began his study at the four year school, although both will finish their studies at the same time. Such different treatment was not, in our judgment, intended by Congress. Rather, the intent was to continue existing classification practices for all students enrolled in school during the 1970-1971 academic year.

We believe that the debate on the draft extension bill and the conference and committee reports accompanying the bill clearly indicate a Congressional intent to assure a fair and equitable draft system with protection of due process to registrants while assuring the efficient operation of the Selective Service System. We believe that reconsideration of these regulations would be in keeping with that intent.

Sincerely,

Edward M. Kennedy, Clifford P. Case, Quentin N. Burdick, Philip A. Hart, George McGovern, Frank E. Moss, Gaylord Nelson, Ted Stevens, John V. Tunney, Gale W. McGee.

Jacob K. Javits, Frank Church, Hubert H. Humphrey, Daniel K. Inouye, Walter F. Mondale, Edmund S. Muskie, Richard S. Schweiker, Adlai E. Stevenson III, Harrison A. Williams, Jr., Thomas J. McIntyre.

JOSEPH McCAFFREY

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, a familiar figure to all of us here at the Capitol is Joseph McCaffrey, one of Washington's most prominent newsmen. Joseph McCaffrey is known and respected by colleagues and news sources alike, and I am proud to count him as a personal friend of many years' standing.

This year, Joseph McCaffrey's colleagues in the Washington chapter of the Academy of Television Arts & Sciences have given him the singular honor of the Ted Yates Memorial Award, presented annually to the local broadcaster whose work best embodies the qualities of another distinguished newsman, the late Ted Yates of the National Broadcasting Co.

A picture in depth of this man, Joseph McCaffrey, was presented by the Sunday Star in a feature article by writer Ruth Dean. I insert Miss Dean's article in the RECORD:

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JOSEPH McCAFFREY
(By Ruth Dean)

In his teens, veteran news commentator Joseph McCaffrey wanted to study law so he could enter politics, "I guess because I always wanted to help people," he said.

Now the recent recipient of the Ted Yates Award seems to have reached that youthful goal by another route. For his "constituency"

are the thousands of area television viewers to whom his rugged countenance is a daily familiarity.

Off camera, McCaffrey is a tall, gentlemanly man who talks with the same sense of purpose that comes through when he delivers his nightly commentaries on WMAL-TV Channel 7's 6 and 11 o'clock news, and on his ten-minute radio "Today in Congress" spot.

This confidence-inspiring rapport brings him thousands of phone calls and letters from his "constituents" who ask his help on everything from social security to, in one case, where to find a television repairman.

M'LEAN HOME

"I feel as if I'm a kind of ombudsman," he said during a recent morning visit with the McCaffreys in the comfortable home in McLean they bought 12 years ago because they wanted to be in the country. They share it with their son Mike, 15, two dogs and a cat. They also have a daughter, Sally Shumaker, married a year ago and living in Fairfax County.

As he rubbed the ears of his pet St. Bernard, Rosebud Michelob, McCaffrey looked back on his career and said: "After being in this business so long, I get letters. Every day people call or write in, some with clippings saying 'what about this', or 'what can we do about that?'"

"I've tried to help a lot of people, a lot of causes . . . but I'm not a crusader. I can't get fanatical and stay with something."

His wife interrupted, "You've been with the aged longer than anything else."

"Yes," he agreed, "I've been with the aged problem for years and years and years. I have been very interested. And I have so many pitiful people who called me."

Added his wife: "The letters he has! They have no one to turn to."

"I think our problem is that we've become so big, and government has become so concentrated in a monolithic structure that these people don't know where to go," McCaffrey added.

INTERESTED IN POLITICS

"When I was a boy I knew my parents could go to an alderman in the city and he would be able to do something for them, he was able to advise them. And this is one of the reasons I always thought I'd like to get into politics . . . to help people."

"And I think now Congress has become kind of frustrated in what it's trying to do. So many members come in there thinking they're going to change the world and they're not. I think the only satisfaction they actually can get is helping people with veterans' plans and social security. I feel the same way—that so many people have no place to turn to."

McCaffrey's most notable case of helping people was his assistance to the Alexandria Police Dept. in solving the murder of Judge James N. Colasanto of the Alexandria Municipal Court on Nov. 23, 1970.

A PHONE CALL

It all began with a telephone call to McCaffrey from a man who identified himself as Colasanto's murderer. The newsman tried to persuade him to give himself up. He even went to the man's house after alerting police, but was dissuaded from going in because they were fearful for his safety. Minutes later the man took his life as police broke in, and the gun found beside him was established as the murder weapon.

"It was very sad," McCaffrey recalled. "I still feel he wouldn't have harmed me if I had gone in. But I think it points up so graphically the helplessness of so many people. Here was a man who in the final hours of his life turns to a complete stranger in whom to put some confidence merely because he's seen him and listened to him on the air and on television. It's a rather depressing thing."

The newsman said the phone call was like countless others he's received from people in trouble. Many come from widows and retired oldsters trying to make ends meet on social security and welfare—a problem that is a frequent topic on his commentaries.

In one case, a woman told him that after paying rent, phone and electricity, she had \$29 left every month for food and other emergencies. She wondered why welfare cut back its allotment when her social security was raised. McCaffrey found he had to tell her, "after checking with the authorities, that unfortunately it is the law. She gets a cost-of-living raise from social security but it isn't one at all, because welfare takes back with one hand what social security gives with the other."

ANTIWAR

The war in Vietnam which he says "I've been against for years," and its effect on the nation's youth ("I think it has catapulted them into the political arena before they're emotionally and intellectually ready for it") are also frequent commentary topics.

Judging from his mail, his commentaries voice the frustrations of a lot of people. "I think I'll get out of the business if I read the morning, or the evening paper and not see something that doesn't provoke me," he observed.

Sometimes the calls he's received have been amusing, like the one from the woman in a public housing development who wanted him to send someone to fix her broken TV set.

LONG DAYS

The newsman puts in a 10 a.m. to midnight day that begins with an hour's drive into town in an orange Ford Mustang he says his son Mike refers to as "the pumpkin."

His tall figure is a familiar sight as he walks into the House basement corridor and is greeted left and right by everyone from Congress members to page boys. "This is sort of my second home," he says proudly, as he boards an elevator to the House Radio-TV Gallery where he has a desk overlooking the west front pillars of the U.S. Capitol. He is chairman for the second time of the radio-TV galleries, having first served as chairman in 1956.

He usually spends a few hours at the Capitol interviewing Congress members, "getting grist for my radio and television commentaries" as he puts it. Then about 3 p.m., he's on his way to WMAL to begin his "working day." The long drive home after the 11 o'clock news usually gets him home by midnight.

THE FARMS

McCaffrey relaxes from his week's labors on a 100-acre farm in Culpeper that he considers "a different world. And I like the people there." His wife Toni has a vegetable garden that produces so abundantly the family can't keep up with its output. And son Mike does most of the ploughing and taking care of the four head of steer and ponies. "When Mike leaves home we'll have to give up the farm," Toni joked.

More seriously she said she felt "Joe wouldn't be alive with his schedule, if he didn't have this place to go to. I think he just makes it through Friday and I think we're fortunate to have it because it keeps him going."

Joe and Toni first met when he was a senior and she a freshman at the State University of Education at New Paltz, N.Y., but didn't marry until the year after he left the Army.

The Poughkeepsie, N.Y., native supported his way through normal school working part time on a Dutchess County Sunday weekly. Upon graduation when he had to make a choice, journalism won out over teaching even though it didn't pay as well.

THE START

A military plane crash cut short his World War II service as an infantry information officer, and he spent a year in Canadian and

United States Army hospitals. His final hospital stay was at Walter Reed. By happenstance, a visit from an old friend who had been a radio announcer in Poughkeepsie, set him on his career as a broadcaster.

The friend told him about an opening at WTOP, so he applied for the job and got it as soon as he got his Army discharge. "Otherwise I might have gone back home to my old newspaper job," he recalled.

ADMIRERS

Now after more than 25 years of covering the national scene and Congress, the five times Washington Emmy award winner and dean of Capitol Hill radio and television correspondents has received the most prestigious Emmy of all—the Ted Yates Award.

The award is given annually by the board of governors of the Washington chapter of the Academy of Television Arts and Sciences to the person whose work best embodies the professional and personal qualities of the late Ted Yates, the NBC producer-journalist who was killed covering fighting in the Middle East.

McCaffrey is the first single station man to receive it.

In presenting the award to McCaffrey, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield praised him for his "personal and professional integrity, his professional excellence," and cited the esteem with which the newscaster is held by members of Congress on both sides of the aisle.

RECOGNITION

Not only do members of Congress hold McCaffrey in high esteem but so do his co-workers at WMAL. One of his greatest admirers "from cub reporter days when we had adjoining desks" is Len Delbert, the station's manager of news and public affairs.

In submitting McCaffrey's name for the Ted Yates award, he concluded the narrative entry with: "Ted Yates never operated out of an ivory tower—aloof from the pressures and dangers of informing the public. Neither has Joseph McCaffrey—whether it be risking his life in the Colasanto case in Alexandria or fighting government intimidation of broadcast journalists. Courageous, personal journalism—putting one's self at the scene of the story—typified Ted Yates. McCaffrey is made of the same fiber."

THE REASON FOR OUR DEFENSE PROGRAM

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, I have been under the impression for the past several years and especially since joining this distinguished body that the reason for our multibillion-dollar defense program was to maintain a position of military superiority over potential U.S. enemies.

In all the debates over whether we should build an anti-ballistic-missile system, whether we should increase our nuclear strike capability, whether we should improve our undersea nuclear submarine strike force, build more aircraft carriers, support and maintain NATO forces in Europe, and do all of the other things that add up to a defense cost of something like \$80 billion a year—in all these debates the rationale for maintenance and improvement of our overall military capability is basically—and, in fact, only—to counter the continued Russian buildup in nuclear, naval, and air force capabilities. In all of these debates—and I have supported the administration in all of its military and defense requests—the Soviet menace to the United States and the free world is the premise for the U.S. military posture.

In testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird has repeatedly pointed out that the Moscow government is moving into various parts of the world either to stir up trouble or to arm potential allies.

The Soviet Union continues to employ military assistance as a basic instrument of political infiltration. Soviet arms deliveries have raised concern about the level of armaments in the horn of Africa, as well as in the Middle East and North Africa. The Soviet Union has been the principal supplier of arms to India. Recent reports indicate that it is shipping weapons to Pakistan as well.

There is little doubt in my mind that military assistance will continue to be used as a major instrument of Soviet policy over the foreseeable future.

Laird declared, moreover, that—

It would be foolhardy to expect early abatement of fear of aggression in Europe and that he sees in prospect a continued instability in Asia.

Certainly, Mr. President, if any documentation of Secretary Laird's views are needed, recent events have proved how right he is. The continuing crisis in the Middle East and now open warfare between India and Pakistan in which India places the blame, as usual, on the United States prove the fallacy of any letup in the U.S. defense posture and the folly of considering Russia anything but an adversary, and I would not say a friendly one.

This brings me to the point, Mr. President, of a question of just how far we should go in furtherance of trade with Russia or doing business with a country that still uses its veto power in the U.N. on almost every issue in opposition to the U.S. position, a country that still maintains not only a wall of secrecy but literally a walled-in society not only of Russia itself but also the formerly free countries that ended up behind that wall following World War II.

I cannot object, Mr. President, to U.S. sales of corn, feed grains, or wheat to the U.S.S.R. nor of reciprocal trade in non-strategic goods with Russia.

But I cannot understand, Mr. President, how the United States can afford to take the risk of dependency on Russia for the most strategic commodity I know of—oil and gas on which the U.S. economy depends for three-fourths of its energy.

Undue dependency on Middle East and North African sources have been a matter of concern to many of us who believe the United States has the resources to provide its own energy resources for both short-term as well as long-term requirements.

The legal basis for the mandatory oil import program is, in fact, the national security clause of the Trade Expansion Act and I can think of nothing more perilous to this Nation's security than a shortage of fuel—oil and/or gas.

Some may rationalize that we must depend more and more on imports but I still contend that we have the resources available if we care to pay for the necessary exploration and development.

When the price of imported gas at three and four times the present well-head price of domestic natural gas is considered and other alternatives such as synthetic gas from crude oil naphtha

or coal, the cost of developing our own resources may actually be a bargain—especially if any substantial portion of that supply could be cut off or even threatened by the Soviet Union.

I cannot recall when the Soviet Union has made any real gesture to the United States or other free world countries toward the achievement of true world brotherhood and trust among nations. Rather, as Secretary of Defense Laird has so often warned, the Soviets are still intent on stirring up trouble in all parts of the world, including Latin America. They already have a foothold and potential naval base just 90 miles off the Florida coast and are now making gestures to the new Marxist regime in Chile.

While we counter Soviet aggression with our massive support of NATO, our commitments in the Far East continue to expend billions of dollars in the Vietnam venture against massive Soviet support of our Communist enemies there, our trade emissaries make gestures to Moscow to make huge investments in developing oil and gas which, presumably, we would buy from the Russians as long as they were willing to sell it to us.

I suggest that with any substantial dependence on Soviet sources for oil and gas we may as well scrap any plans we may have for continued military superiority. A military machine that is practically 100 percent dependent on oil for its movement and an economy in support of the military that is dependent for three-fourths of its energy from oil and gas would be in a most precarious condition under the threat of Russian blackmail, a tool they have never failed to use when it fit their purpose.

I would like to think, Mr. President, that the Soviet Union had softened and that rather than burying us, as Khrushchev threatened, that they would join us and other free world countries in a real endeavor to achieve lasting peace but I cannot see how we can be that gullible or take that risk, especially as the only remaining safeguard of freedom in the world.

The president of the Independent Petroleum Association of America addressed a letter to the President a few days ago in which he expressed misgivings over the proposed deal with Russia and concern over an act that would be directly contradictory to our national policy of limiting imports for security purposes.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the letter to the President from Mr. Tom B. Medders, Jr., president of the Independent Petroleum Association of America be printed in the RECORD.

Also, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of "Petty's Oil Letter," published in the December 11 issue of the Oil Daily on the same subject, be printed in the RECORD following the letter from Mr. Medders. Both of these emphasize the risks inherent in such a move and, as Mr. Jim Collins concludes in "Petty's Oil Letter":

All it proves is that there is no coordinated energy policy for the U.S.—one that is desperately needed and soon.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA,

Washington, D.C., December 10, 1971.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We are deeply concerned about published announcements by Commerce Secretary Stans that the Administration has under consideration the importation of oil and liquefied natural gas from the Soviet Union.

Since 1959, as you know, the government, in the interest of national security, has limited oil imports so as to prevent dangerous dependence on supplies beyond our control and to encourage a healthy domestic petroleum producing industry. Despite these limitations, imports have increased steadily and now supply over 25 percent of U.S. oil consumption. It would seem to be conflicting and inconsistent on the part of our government to now encourage or permit dependence on petroleum fuels imported from the Soviet Union.

Programs to ease international tensions and improve foreign trade relations are commendable but such efforts can and must avoid impairment of our national security.

In light of our own deteriorating energy supply situation, it would be inconceivable that our government would extend our dependence for petroleum fuels to the Soviet Union. To permit or encourage even minimal dependency on Soviet energy supplies would be directly contradictory to our national policy of limiting imports for security purposes.

In the case of liquefied natural gas, the cost of imports from the Soviet Union would be much greater than the cost of domestic natural gas. It would be ironic indeed if U.S. gas consumers on the East Coast were to be dependent on Soviet gas supplies at greatly inflated prices.

We urge the Administration not to take any action that would extend our present dangerous over-dependence on remote and uncertain petroleum sources to the Soviet Union.

Your consideration of our views would be very much appreciated.

Respectfully yours,

TOM B. MEDDERS, JR.

PETTY'S OIL LETTER
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
December 11, 1971.

DEAR SIR: Now it's official—there are a number of U.S. companies actively considering prospective deals to import liquefied natural gas from Russia, which the Russians say they could supply from large quantities of surplus gas within the Soviet Union.

The fact that a number of companies are eyeing such deals with the Russians was confirmed by Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans at a news conference in the National Press Club Dec. 9.

Stans would give no details—the companies involved or their prospective plans—but these are contained in classified documents held at the White House, which are now under study.

The idea of relying on Russian energy for any part of U.S. supply is mind-reeling. Stans might say that even large quantities of Russian LNG shipped to the U.S. would represent only a tiny fraction of our total energy supply, and thus would represent no threat to our economic or military security.

That might be true—but it's a little bit like being a little pregnant. There is also the factor that Russian LNG would be on top of very large quantities of other LNG, and of crude oil (and possibly large quantities of finished products) which will be entering the United States from other foreign areas—particularly the Middle East and North Africa—within the next few years.

"There are an awful lot of problems still to be worked out," Stans said of the proposed barter deals on natural gas from Russia, but

he indicated government support for them, if the current more favorable political relations between the U.S. and Russia continue and improve.

Stans said that the Russians told him on his recent trip to Moscow that the USSR has \$1 billion worth of gas a year surplus to its own and Western European requirements, which could be made available for shipment. Just how that translates out in billions of cubic feet of gas, or the cost of that gas laid down in the U.S., are still highly problematical items.

What the Russians want, Stans said, is for the American firms to put up the capital through joint working interests for gas development, gas pipelines, liquefaction plants and tankers to haul the LNG. Those investments would be paid off in Russian gas. Of course the Russians would wind up controlling, if not owning outright, the facilities.

Undoubtedly, if any of the current prospective deals firms up, much of the capital required would be provided through U.S. Export-Import Bank loans for equipment from the U.S. The balance would be financed by the companies, on their own or with commercial bank loans. The share to be put up by the Russians would be worked out.

In effect, therefore, the U.S. taxpayers would be helping to finance natural gas facilities in Russia which would be used in part, inevitably, to supply gas—possibly at low prices—to eastern European markets, as well as those in Western Europe. Using American taxpayers' money to help finance—or subsidize—gas consumption in Eastern and Western Europe would be ironic, indeed.

But, more basic than that prospect is the relationship such Russian deals would have on the "security" basis of the U.S. oil import control program. President Nixon's Cabinet task force on oil imports, in its report nearly two years' ago, said Eastern Hemisphere oil supplies were not reliable—so a quantitative limit should be placed on imports from those areas, and strictly controlled. We wonder what the Cabinet's concept of the security of Russian energy might be. It is also ironic that U.S. companies should be considering imports of Russian gas when they know there are very large quantities still to be discovered in the U.S.—at prices which would be far, far lower than what the Russian gas would cost.

But, some companies appear close to pushing the panic button of energy supply within the U.S. Alaskan North Slope gas is still far off and lines cannot be built to the U.S. until the trans-Alaska oil line is built; Canadian gas reserves have leveled off; U.S. gas reserves continue to slip, in relation to production—and all the time gas demands keep rising, limited only by supply. No wonder gas companies are desperate for supplies—from anywhere, even Russia. All it proves is that there is no coordinated energy policy for the U.S.—one that is desperately needed, and soon.

Very truly yours,

JAMES M. COLLINS.

SWORDS VERSUS PLOWSHARES

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, the continuing resolution now before the Senate does more than provide funds for the foreign aid program. It also perpetuates a very mistaken policy which seems to prefer swords to plowshares and the growth of armies to the growth of GNP and the betterment of human conditions in the countries assisted.

In our international affairs, no less than in our domestic policies, the priorities question is crucial. Our Government is judged, here and abroad, by what it does rather than what it says. When a society spends more on recreation than it does on education, as ours does, that says something about our values. When

our Government spends five times as much on military matters as on health, that shows what our priorities really are.

We can make these choices, if we will. We can spend \$90 million to buy a new destroyer for the Navy or we can spend the same amount and have five or six high schools. We can build a nuclear aircraft carrier for \$1 billion, or we can build 67,000 low-cost housing units each with two bedrooms.

When we look abroad, we face similar choices. We can provide a nation with airplanes or with electric power, with police training or with paramedical education, with surplus rifles or with surplus foods.

Not all nations need the same things, of course, there are some definite security needs for which the United States can provide timely and useful assistance.

But when we look at our overall effort, we see that our Government has relied overwhelmingly on providing swords rather than plowshares. Since World War II, 40 percent of our foreign assistance has taken the form of military aid. Much of this, of course, has gone to build and maintain NATO. But even among less developed nations—for whom survival is more likely to be a question of stopping poverty rather than stopping aggression—\$1 in every four we have given has gone for military aid.

As a result of our preoccupation with military needs at the expense of human needs, we have helped to arm and finance eight of the 10 largest armed forces in the world. Only the Soviet Union and China have not received our aid. Of the others, only France, which received \$7 billion in prior years, no longer receives such aid directly.

The United States remains the largest supplier of military equipment in the world, according to a recent study by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. We account for nearly half the world's total trade in weapons, the study says.

The following news account of this is from the November 25 Washington Star:

UNITED STATES LISTED AS NO. 1 ARMS SUPPLIER
STOCKHOLM.—Four countries—the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France—have supplied more than 90 percent of the major arms to the "third world" countries "where all wars have been fought in the past 25 years," the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute says.

TRADE OF \$1.5 BILLION YEARLY

"The United States is the largest supplier of military equipment in the world, accounting for nearly half the world's total trade in weapons," said the 910-page report. "Since 1950 well over a third of the total major weapons acquired by Third World countries has come directly from the United States."

The Institute said the export of major weapons—aircraft, naval vessels, armored vehicles and missiles—to the 91 Third World countries escalated sevenfold between 1950 and 1970. It said that by 1970 this trade amounted to more than \$1.5 billion a year.

"This represents an average yearly rate increase of 9 percent, nearly twice the average increase of the gross national product of Third World countries," the report commented.

SOURCE OF PLANES

The Soviet entered the arms trade late, the study reported. By the end of the 1950s, six countries had entered into arms deals with Moscow. By the end of the 1960s there

were 20 more. Today the Soviet Union is the world's second largest arms supplier. In the last 20 years, the Soviet Union has supplied various developing countries, both socialist and nonaligned, with a little over 200 MIG 15s, about 400 MIG 17s, nearly 200 MIG 19s, and about 800 MIG 21s," the Institute said.

The report was prepared by an international team of five researchers working for nearly four years under British economist Frank Blackaby. The Institute was set up five years ago as an independent foundation by the Swedish government and is financed by the Swedish Parliament.

The report said that all wars in the last 25 years have been fought in the poorer parts of the world, but the "weapons used in these wars have come almost entirely from the industrialized nations of the northern hemisphere."

TWENTY PERCENT LAID TO BRITISH

Britain and France accounted for more than 20 percent of these arms deliveries: in 1969, \$200 million worth from Britain and \$100 million worth from the French.

Exports of major weapons from China to developing countries have been small, only 2.2 percent of the total. But Chinese small arms and training assistance have gone "to a large number of countries and revolutionary movements in Africa and Asia," the institute reported.

The legislation now before the Senate perpetuates this emphasis on military assistance by providing nearly three-fifths of its funds for such programs.

The recipients of our aid, no matter what priorities they themselves might choose, have tended to adopt our own emphases. Each of those nations which we have helped to build the largest armies spends more on the military than on public health and education. India spends 14 percent more; South Vietnam spends 10 times as much; South Korea spends nearly twice as much; Taiwan spends nearly four times as much; Pakistan spends nearly three times as much; and Turkey spends 25 percent more on the military than on public health and education.

There is a direct relationship between our assistance and our overseas military installations, which leads to the question of whether we are buying bases.

Under the Guam Doctrine, the United States is supposed to be reducing its overseas military commitments. Yet the fact remains that we still have hundreds of thousands of Americans stationed overseas. And in most of these countries, excluding Western Europe, we contribute military-related assistance which permits huge local armies.

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the United States has deployed troops in 14 other nations. Consider these deployments and the amount of our military-related assistance in those countries. These figures include the security-supporting assistance that is used to reduce the inflation caused by large local military expenditures.

In South Vietnam, where the United States now has about 180,000 troops, our military-related aid amounts to four times South Vietnam's own defense budget.

The United States has 36,000 troops in Thailand, one for every five Thai troops. Our aid is equivalent to 45 percent of the Thai defense budget and has been supplemented by about \$50 million per year

to finance Thai troops in Vietnam. Since 1965, the United States has given Thailand over \$800 million in military-related aid. In addition, we have spent over \$400 million to build bases which are technically under the sovereignty and control of the Thai Government. It should be no wonder, then, that the Thai generals were so quick to dismiss the cabinet and the parliament when legislators tried to reduce the defense budget. It would seem self-evident that foreign aid programs based on militarism tend to produce military dictatorships in the countries aided.

In South Korea, where we plan to reduce our troop levels from the current 53,000, we give military-related aid equal to one and a half times the size of the Korean defense budget. And we made scarcely a protest recently when the government of President Park declared a national emergency and assumed special powers—despite the apparent lack of any hard evidence that South Korea was immediately threatened.

In the Philippines, the United States has one soldier for every two local ones—a total of 18,400 troops. Our aid is equivalent to 16 percent of the Filipino defense budget.

In Taiwan, we have 9,000 troops. And we give aid equal to 19 percent of the local defense budget.

In Morocco, we have 1,700 troops and give military-related aid equal to 16 percent of the defense budget. In spite of our aid, the King barely survived a coup attempt last summer. And the Washington Post reported last Sunday that economic growth barely keeps ahead of the annual rise in population, although Morocco has received more U.S. aid than any other African nation.

In Ethiopia, where we also have 1,700 troops, our military aid amounts to 37 percent of the local defense budget.

In Spain, where we have about 10,000 troops, our aid equals 10 percent of the defense budget. Despite our involvement and our apparent commitment to the Franco regime, the relevant Executive agreements are not subject to consideration or approval by the Senate.

In order to maintain our 3,000 troops in Greece, we have worked hand-in-glove with the local dictators and have provided aid equal to 35 percent of the local defense budget. In this way, I believe, we have perpetuated the control of the colonels.

In Turkey, we have 8,000 troops. Our military aid contribution amounts to 38 percent of the Turkish defense budget.

Although we have no troops in Portugal itself, we do pay heavily for our rights to the bases in the Azores which President Nixon visited this week. Only a few days ago the State Department announced that the United States has promised Portugal up to \$435 million in economic and social development credits in return for the use of these bases until 1974. The New York Times noted that this "arrangement could amount to one of the largest economic assistance packages negotiated in many years in exchange for foreign base rights."

The Times also noted that this Executive agreement is not subject to congressional ratification or consent. Its reporter added:

Administration officials showed no concern over possible criticism in Congress or elsewhere over the unusually high credit commitment to Portugal, which has a highly authoritarian regime and has been engaged for a decade in wars against nationalist guerrillas in Africa.

Some of these base facilities may be vital for United States or NATO defense. I am willing to consider the arguments in each case. But I am deeply troubled by the trend toward such extensive commitments which are not subject to congressional approval or thorough review.

We would do well to remember the statement just 1 year ago from the Subcommittee on Security Agreements and Commitments Aboard of the Foreign Relations Committee, which has been so ably presided over by the distinguished senior Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON):

In the post-World War II period the United States started the construction of a worldwide system of military bases. These bases were to be the foundation of a policy designed to contain the advance of communism in Europe, Africa, the Near East and Asia.

In the late 1940's and early 1950's, as an addition to this base structure, the Administrations of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower undertook to formalize defense commitments by means of multilateral treaties—the Rio treaty in the Western Hemisphere, NATO in Europe, SEATO in Southeast Asia, ANZUS in the Southwest Pacific—as well as a network of bilateral treaties—South Korea, the Philippines, Nationalist China and Japan. In addition, through CENTO, the United States undertook defense commitments of less than treaty standing in the northern tier of the Middle East. These latter commitments were made through Executive agreements.

In the 1960's, the threat of possible Communist imperialism appeared to change from one of overt aggression to subversion and infiltration. In some areas it would appear that what was considered a Communist effort was actually a rise of Nationalism, expressing itself by any means possible.

In any case, so as to meet possible new challenges, the United States increased steadily its military involvements abroad. Some new facilities were added, but the main growth was in expanded military assistance and training along with joint planning, and, in some cases, joint military operations.

Such activities represented an increased assurance of our commitment to countries with whom we already had formal treaties.

In addition, primarily through Executive agreements, the Administrations of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson undertook still additional arrangements. Many of the latter were not publicly disclosed; some were kept from most if not all Members of Congress.

With an eagerness and a "can-do" philosophy, the United States expanded its military presence abroad, to the point where it assumed, almost inadvertently and without notice, a role that has been described as the policeman of the free world.

As a result of these policies, by the mid-60's the United States was firmly committed to more than 43 nations by treaty and agreement and had some 375 major foreign military bases and 3,000 minor military facilities spread all over the world, virtually surrounding both the Soviet Union and Communist China in support of the policy of containment.

The problem of a creeping commitment is still most evident in Southeast Asia. U.S. officials maintain that we have no commitment to defend the Royal Lao-tian Government, yet Premier Souvanna Phouma says that we do. Since our mili-

tary related aid to Laos is over nine times that country's own defense budget and is nearly equal to its total gross national product, it is clear that we are very deeply involved in that small country's affairs.

Our commitment to Cambodia may well soon face a crunch, notwithstanding our own legislation of last year which specifically denied that our aid could be construed as a defense commitment. But in Cambodia we have financed a fivefold increase in the army in the past year and a half, and our military-related aid amounts to 95 percent of Cambodia's own defense budget.

In my view, Mr. President, these facts point to serious problems in our foreign assistance programs. The old ways, the previous easy reliance on military aid, are no longer adequate. We need to change our thinking, our programs, and many of our purposes.

Instead of the stopgap negativism of the past, we must develop a positive, forward-looking approach to the basic issues of human betterment.

The President's Task Force on International Development put it well in its report:

This . . . is a time for change, a time for reappraising our programs and designing them for the decade ahead. It is also a time to stake out in the most positive terms America's involvement in the way mankind manages its common problems. In time, U.S. international development policies may well prove to be the most important—and the most rewarding determinant of America's role in the world.

The foreign aid legislation which passed the Senate started us in the right direction. If we are to continue, we need to give thorough attention and reconsideration to our past policies. Merely to continue the past programs with the current resolution is a step backward, particularly since it obviates the many useful amendments which the authorizing legislation would have made in the conduct of our programs.

BALTIMORE METROPOLITAN MEALS ON WHEELS

Mr. BEALL. Mr. President, I wish to commend and to invite the attention of Senators to the outstanding work done by the Baltimore Metropolitan Meals on Wheels.

The program has just completed its 11th year of service to the shut-ins and elderly. They are now serving two nutritious meals, 5 days a week to over 350 grateful senior citizens. Last year this program was able to serve over 1,300 individuals. A recent HEW survey revealed that the Baltimore program was the largest one in the country. In addition to providing senior Marylanders with nutritious meals, this program is giving senior citizens an opportunity to get together and become acquainted with each other and helping to make them aware of the various programs that are available for elderly citizens. The merits of the program are also evidenced by the number of volunteers it has attracted. 1,500 volunteers who are interested in extending a helping hand and a warm heart to our senior citizens have been

working to make this important service available.

This is such an outstanding program that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has frequently visited in making films and documentaries.

Mr. President, on November 30 the Senate passed S. 1163, which I cosponsored. The bill authorizes a \$250 million program over the next 2 fiscal years for grants to the State programs such as this. Maryland has 443,561 senior citizens over 60, and if this program is fully funded it would receive approximately \$1.5 million in fiscal 1973 and \$2.2 million in fiscal 1974. Based on the outstanding record of the Baltimore Meals on Wheels, I know the program will work. I hope it will be passed by the House and funded by Congress.

ARMY HELP MAKES PLAYGROUND

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, the generosity of American servicemen toward young children is legend around the world. It is a pleasure to note that in my own State of Maryland, a group of men from the Aberdeen Proving Ground have helped convert a vacant lot in Baltimore's inner city into a playground. It is particularly pleasing to note that the efforts of these servicemen have already received national attention in a news story distributed by the Associated Press.

Mr. President, in tribute to these men and to the residents of the community who also worked on this project, I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GI VOLUNTEERS HELP TO CONVERT BALTIMORE LOT INTO PLAYGROUND

BALTIMORE.—Aided by some old-time Army scrounging, 26 G.I.'s from Aberdeen Proving Ground have helped convert a vacant lot into a playground for inner city children.

The work of the Aberdeen soldiers—all of them from a special college course to reorient them for civilian life—culminated two years of grassroots efforts to get the playground by residents of the Homestead Montebello neighborhood in east Baltimore.

The building of the "tot lot" was a project of a Prep Program run jointly by the Army and Harford Community College in a 10-week concentrated course stressing both academics and social and personal awareness.

THEY TAKE CHOICE

William Moessinger, an instructor in the program, said the G.I.'s decided to build the playground instead of simply sitting in classroom discussing social problems. He had told the soldiers of the neighborhood's two-year effort to build the playground.

After the Baltimore Parks Department said it had no funds, area residents went to work raising money through bake sales.

The Baltimore Public Works Department agreed to surround the lot with wooden posts to prevent cars from parking on it, the parks people said they would donate wooden chips to cover the ground and the city real estate office legally transferred the land to the Parks Department.

Volunteer architects from local firms and VISTA drew plans for the playground.

ARMY TAKES A HAND

Then the Army moved in. A 2½-ton green truck rumbled into the neighborhood loaded with soldiers and metal pipes, lumber, rakes, shovels and three rolls of fencing material.

Mr. Moessinger said the supplies materialized in a rather mysterious way, but he recalled that soldiers are noted for the ability to scavenge materials.

"I don't know where all the stuff came from," he said, "and I'm not going to ask."

Work by the G.I.'s produced a set of swings, sand box, sliding board, several climbing structures and a fence on the formerly vacant lot.

Pfc. Dennis Northouse of Saginaw, Mich., surveyed the tot lot while taking a break to eat fried chicken prepared by some neighborhood housewives.

"I was raised in an area like this," he said. "We really would have appreciated something like this."

The playground was dedicated to Frederick K. Kontner, a Baltimore patrolman slain in 1967 while attempting to arrest a narcotics suspect.

FISHING INDUSTRY REPRESENTATION AT THE 1973 UNITED NATIONS LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, it is with pleasure that I announce a partial victory has been reached in the efforts to insure representation of the American fish industry at the 1973 United Nations Law of the Sea Conference.

Last month I introduced Senate Resolution 203, which would establish the sense of the Senate that such representation be granted.

I have just been advised that initial steps are being planned to insure that the fishing industry of the United States has a voice in the formulation of U.S. policy prior to the 1973 U.N. conference. While it may be that further efforts might be needed to broaden the scope of the official delegation at the actual conference, I do think that an important first step has been taken.

Mr. President, the theme of this 1973 conference is the preservation and utilization of our ocean resources. The global fish resource is unique in that it is a renewable resource, and therefore deserves the utmost attention of any global conference.

As I understand it, the State Department has agreed to establish an advisory committee to advise the Law of the Sea Task Force. Included on this advisory committee would be representatives of the fish industry, as well as other interested parties.

At the March-April preparatory conference in Geneva next year, the State Department announces they also "expect to have a limited number of industry and other nongovernment observers included as members of our official delegation."

Mr. President, what had disturbed me greatly was the lack of any opportunity for input by the fish industry prior to this conference. The action announced by the State Department is a needed step. I am confident our fish industry can make constructive use of this opportunity. I think that the official U.S. delegation will be much stronger, and have a broader basis from which to operate at the final conference.

As the Senator who has spearheaded the efforts to secure this representation, I believe that this is a worthwhile step. I believe this forum should provide an opportunity for our fish industry to par-

participate in policy formulation that will help guide the delegates at the final conference. I hope the State Department will utilize the resources of the fish industry delegates in an optimum manner, and that the thrust of the U.S. policy at the 1973 United Nations Law of the Sea Conference can develop within the framework that will protect our global fish resource, and preserve it on a worldwide basis.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that two letters from the State Department to me announcing their plans for inclusion of U.S. fish industry representatives be reprinted at the conclusion of my remarks. I know that the Senators who joined me in cosponsoring Senate Resolution 203 share my belief that this is a worthwhile beginning. This is a meaningful plan for inclusion in the policymaking operation of the Task Force, and will help the United States in the long run, while giving our domestic fish industry a much needed voice in this policy planning.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DECEMBER 14, 1971.

HON. MARK O. HATFIELD,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR HATFIELD: The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of November 5 regarding the fishery industry's interest in the Law of the Sea Conference. On November 18, 1971 I sent an interim reply. I am now in a position to be more responsive to your inquiry.

We recognize that in preparing for the 1973 UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, it is highly desirable and necessary to consult with representatives of industry and other private and public groups whose interests would be affected by the results of the Conference.

To develop the framework for such consultations, we are establishing an Advisory Committee of fishing and other industry representatives as well as spokesmen from other interested groups to advise the Law of the Sea Task Force chaired by the State Department Legal Adviser, John R. Stevenson, who is also the U.S. Representative to the UN Law of the Sea Conference preparatory committee (Seabed Committee).

Although there were no non-Governmental personnel included in the U.S. Delegation at the July/August session of the Seabed Committee, we expect to include as members of our delegations to its forthcoming sessions a limited number of industry and other non-Government representatives in the capacity of observers. These observers will of course have direct access to the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation and will be subject to his instructions. You know, I am sure, that U.S. delegations to international conferences are instructed delegations. The process of developing policy guidance takes place in Washington before the delegation departs, and each member is bound to the agreed policies.

The Advisory Committee in our opinion will greatly improve the system of consultations from which our policy and instructions to our delegation will flow. This Committee will hold regular meetings with the Law of the Sea Task Force beginning early in 1972 as our policies and guidance are developed for the U.S. delegation. The arrangements set forth above should enable industry representatives to participate effectively in the development of U.S. policy in preparation for the Law of the Sea Conference.

Sincerely,

DAVID M. ABSHIRE,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional
Relations.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., December 14, 1971.
HON. MARK O. HATFIELD,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR HATFIELD: Ambassador McKernan's letter of December 6 acknowledged the receipt of yours of October 19 regarding the fishery industry's interest in the Law of the Sea Conference.

We recognize that in preparing for the 1973 UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, it is highly desirable and necessary to consult with representatives of industry and other private and public groups whose interests would be affected by the results of the conference.

To formalize and develop the framework for such consultations, we are establishing an advisory committee of fishing and other industry representatives, as well as spokesmen from other interest groups, to advise the Law of the Sea Task Force chaired by the Department's Legal Adviser who is also the U.S. Representative to the Seabeds Committee.

Although there were no non-Government advisers included in the U.S. delegation at the last session of the Preparatory Committee (Seabeds Committee) of the Law of the Sea Conference held in Geneva in July-August 1971, we do expect to have a limited number of industry and other non-government observers included as members of our official delegation to the forthcoming Preparatory Committee Meeting during March/April at Geneva. These observers will, of course, have direct access to the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation and will be subject to the instructions of the Chairman during the course of the conference.

The new Advisory Committee in our opinion will greatly improve the system of consultations from which our policy and instructions to our Preparatory Committee delegation will flow. The committee will meet regularly with the Law of the Sea Task Force early in 1972 as our policies are developed and guidance is worked out for the U.S. delegations to further meetings of the Seabeds Committee. These arrangements will enable industry representatives to participate effectively in the development of United States policy for the Law of the Sea Conference. You know, I am sure, that U.S. delegations to international conferences are instructed delegations. The process of developing policy guidance takes place here in Washington before the delegation departs and each member is bound to the agreed policies by its instructions.

Sincerely,

BURDICK H. BRITTON,
Acting Coordinator of Ocean Affairs.

LEAD-BASED PAINT POISONING PREVENTION ACT

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, a most serious health problem is lead poisoning of children. Silently, almost unnoticed, it causes the death of many children and leaves many more with mental retardation, irreversible brain damage, cerebral palsy, blindness, kidney diseases, and other handicaps. Worst of all, it is a man-made disease and as such a disease which is preventable and which has no reason to exist.

I cosponsored legislation to eliminate this man-made health hazard, enacted into law as the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act (Public Law 91-695) and argued and fought for increased funding.

When I learned that the \$7,500,000 appropriated to fund the act—an amount, I believe, is regrettably insufficient—had not been released by the Of-

fice of Management and Budget to the Bureau of Community Environmental Management of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, I urged President Nixon to reconsider this decision. I ask unanimous consent that the complete text of my letter to President Nixon dated October 14, 1971, be inserted in the RECORD.

Mr. President, I am pleased that the White House has informed me that:

We have released the entire amount of funds appropriated by the Congress for the lead-based paint poisoning prevention program.

I ask unanimous consent that the full text of that letter be included in the RECORD.

The problem of childhood lead poisoning has reached epidemic proportions in many of our large cities. The high incidence of lead poisoning is of particular concern to young children in our inner cities, but also has been reported in children from economically and socially advantaged homes.

We have a profound humanitarian obligation to our children to eradicate the preventable disease of lead-based paint poisoning for which the tragic statistics in New York City are: The number of lead-poisoning cases reported to the health department has increased over the last 10 years from 171 in 1959 to 727 in 1969. In 1970, 2,649 cases were discovered. In the first 5 months of this year, there have been 669 cases.

I cosponsored the Senate-passed amendment—regrettably lost in conference with the House—to increase the \$7.5 million appropriation for the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act to \$15 million and will carefully review the next year's budget requests for these vital programs and be prepared again to contend for them.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

OCTOBER 14, 1971.

HON. RICHARD M. NIXON,
The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am deeply concerned that the \$7.5 million appropriated pursuant to P.L. 92-80 to fund the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act (P.L. 91-695) has not been released by the Office of Management and Budget to the Bureau of Community Environmental Management of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. It is my understanding that if and when these funds are released, they will not be available for grant-making until the last quarter of fiscal year 1972 (April-June 1972); and not available for expenditure until fiscal year 1973 (July 1, 1972-June 30, 1973) and that perhaps the full \$7.5 million may not be released.

The incidence of childhood lead poisoning which these funds are intended to combat, prevent, and treat rises in the summer months. Unless the local communities receive grants sufficiently in advance of next summer, they will be unable to deal at all with this increase, let alone the normal monthly toll of this devastating, yet preventable, disease.

Any rationale that funds are not being requested for fiscal 1973 because funds are out in the communities in that fiscal year, in view of the noted particular restriction that will be imposed limiting expenditures to post-June 30, 1972, will be, in my view, unacceptable.

As you may know, I argued and fought for increased funding for the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act and believe that the \$7.5 million appropriated is regrettably insufficient. To further reduce that minimal amount is, I believe, hard, indeed!

I urge the reconsideration of this decision and prompt release of the appropriated funds, and supplemental appropriations to fund this program at the level it requires.

There is a profound humanitarian obligation to our children to eradicate the preventable disease of lead-based paint poisoning.

With best wishes,
Sincerely,

JACOB K. JAVITS.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

Washington, D.C., December 3, 1971.

Hon. JACOB K. JAVITS,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR JACK: This is in further reply to your letter to the President expressing your concern for the problem of lead-based paint poisoning in children.

I am pleased to inform you that we have released the entire amount of funds appropriated by the Congress for the lead-based paint poisoning prevention program. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare will be making appropriate announcements on individual projects throughout the coming months in accordance with the usual procedures.

Thank you for your analysis of the funding needs for this program. Your views will be considered during the preparation of the 1973 Budget.

Sincerely,

EUGENE S. COWEN,
Deputy Assistant to the President.

GREECE AND THE UNITED STATES

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, Prof. Nicholas Destounis, M.D., is national chairman of the Justice for Greece Committee, 799 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. He has authored and provided me with a copy of an informative essay entitled "Greece and the U.S.A." I believe that Members of the Senate and the public in general will profit by reading Dr. Destounis' penetrating analysis of historical and political events which led up to the April 21, 1967 uprising in Greece which, it is generally conceded, forestalled a Communist takeover in that great nation.

Mr. President, those of us who admire the courageous people of Greece also understand the vital role that nation plays in maintaining the security of Western Europe. Too, we are appreciative of the contributions of her people to the advancement and preservation of the values of Western Civilization and believe that it is important that the people of the United States understand the reasons for and the objectives of the present regime in Greece. The essay to which I have referred serves this purpose, and for this reason I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection the essay was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GREECE AND THE U.S.A.

(By Nicholas Destounis, M.D., F.R.M.S.)

For the past four and a half years Greece and its National Government have been under malicious attacks by a so called "liberal" part of the media of communications of this country, the self-exiled Greek "Politicians" and several members of the Congress.

In this essay, I shall attempt to present, as briefly as possible, the historical and political acts which lead Greece into the inevitable Revolution of April 21st, 1967, and thus saved her from communism and another Vietnam on Greek soil.

Plutarch had written "it is indeed a good thing to be well descended but the glory belongs to the ancestors". This history of the Greek-speaking peoples began in the dawn of history some 3000 years ago. When Athens was reaching its glorious cultural apex the philosopher Isocrates said, "so far has our city distanced the rest of mankind in thought and in speech that her pupils have become the teachers of the rest of the world, and she has brought it about that the same name "Hellenes" suggests no longer a race but an intelligence, and that the title "Hellenes" is applied rather to those who share our culture than to those who share a common blood".

Greece was destined to defend itself and Europe from invasion and onslaught of Asiatic hordes on many occasions. First, it was the Persians, next the Arabs and then the Turks. After 1000 years of glory, Constantinople fell on May 29, 1453.

The Hellenes with their indestructible love of liberty and honor, revolted and on March 25, 1821, the revolution which was destined to free the Hellenes was begun.

Earlier the American people had experienced also a revolution which gave them freedom, liberty and dignity. To those proud American people the Senate of the city of Calamata of Greece three months following the revolution of 1821, directed a proclamation:

"To the citizens of the U.S.A., having formed the resolution to live or die for freedom, we are drawn to you by a just sympathy; since it is in your hand that liberty has fixed her above, and by you that is prized as by our fathers. Hence in invoking her name, we invoke yours at the same time, trusting that in imitating you we shall imitate our ancestors and be thought worthy of them if we succeed in resembling you.

Earlier, Thomas Jefferson had written to Adamantios Korais, a Greek patriot, "whatever service the Americans might render the cause of revolutionary Greece must be considered a tribute to the splendid constellation of sages and heroes whose blood is still flowing in your veins, and whose merits are still resting, as a heavy debt, on the shoulders of the living and future races of men".

But history repeats itself. Greece defended herself on many occasions following her independence (this year we will celebrate the 150th anniversary). To note only a few, in 1912-13, 1914-18, 1919-22, 1940-44, 1947-50 and always as an ally of the western free world.

The American people experienced Pearl Harbor in 1941, the Hellenes experienced the 28th of October 1940 and the 6th of April 1941 when Europe under the overwhelming power of Axis lay in tyranny. It was Greece which for nine months fought against Italy and Germany and thus delayed the German troops to enter Russia.

Later, side by side, the Hellenes soldiers and the Americans fought in Korea and their graves symbolize the spirit of real liberty and democracy.

Earlier in 1944 and in 1947 the communists tried to take over Greece by revolution and thousands of innocent people were killed because they believed in freedom. It was again America and its leader former President H. Truman whose doctrine saved Greece and the free world from communism and tyranny.

In 1964, the late Prime Minister, George Papandreou won the elections in Greece and within 15 months he had led the country into a political and economic chaos. In addition, he had begun, along with his son Andreas and the communists, an antimonarchistic campaign.

On July 15, 1965, Premier George Papan-

dreou whose son was already involved in conspiratory military organization called ASPIDA, consisting of leftist officers, planned to overthrow the monarchy and start a revolution, demanded from the King the ministry of defense portfolio. The King refused, but offered to accept as minister of defense another member of Papandreou's party until after the completion of the investigation. Premier Papandreou refused this compromise and resigned. Since that time (July 1965) Greece has had four different caretaker governments, strikes every day, and an ailing economy.

National elections were scheduled for May 28, 1967. In the middle of April, the King appealed to all politicians to form an *ecumenical* government under G. Papandreou. Papandreou refused. He was ready to begin his new anti-constitutional campaign supported by communists in Salonica on April 22nd, with the purpose of overthrowing the government of P. Kanellopoulos, thus leading the country into a new civil war with its catastrophic consequences. The revolution of April 21, 1967, saved Greece from communism and another Vietnam.

Among the critics of the present National Greek Government, is Mrs. Helen Vlachos who as a publisher of the newspaper "Kathimerini" wrote on April 14, 1967.

COMMENTARY: "PIOUS ASPIRATIONS"

Mr. A. G. Papandreou assures a Swedish newsman that during the next election's confrontation will occur between the material force which the Palace and the Right dispose, and the will of the people." And he forecast that the will of the people will be demonstrated with passive resistance which will gradually bring "down to its knees" Greek economy and the entire Greek society." The question is being asked: For the sake of whom will the popular will demonstrate itself catastrophically against the people? Doesn't this modern Cassandra think that she is somewhat exaggerating by identifying her pious aspirations with the dispositions of the Greek people? It is, of course, the aim of a few inhabitants of this country—the communists—to bring Greek economy "down to its knees." However, it is not the aim of Greek citizens too.

Greece during the past four and a half years has become the most invaluable member of NATO, and perhaps the only real friend of this country. It has been stated by the enemies of the National Greek Government that the Greek army can't fulfill its NATO obligations and yet it is only last month that during the regular military exercise code-named "Hellenic Express 71" held in Northern Greece, the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces Europe, General Goodpaster of the U.S., the chairman of the Military Council of NATO, General Steinhoff of Germany, etc. praised the combat readiness and efficient organization of the Greek Armed Forces.

The historic trip of Vice President Spiro T. Agnew to Greece and his discussions with the leaders of the National Greek Government on matters of security of the free world, have convinced him that the continuation of military aid is absolutely indispensable not only for the security of that part of the world, but as well as of that of this country.

The Hellenes love freedom and liberty as no other people. Democracy was conceived, born and spread all over by them.

Greece will return to parliamentary rule as soon as the objectives of the revolution are accomplished. The Prime Minister, Mr. George Papadopoulos is leading the country into a new democracy based upon the Hellenic tradition, and a new system of values.

WILLIAM BONNETT AND JACOB J. EDELMAN

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, the city council of Maryland's largest city, Baltimore, has lost two of its most senior and

most colorful members. Councilmen Jacob J. Edelman and William Bonnett retired this year after serving a total of 66 years.

Other members of the Baltimore City Council paid tribute to the two retirees at a special reception shortly before the end of their terms. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Baltimore Sun's report of this event, honoring Councilmen Edelman and Bonnett for their long years of public service, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Baltimore Sun, Nov. 17, 1971]

MELLOW OLD DAYS RECALLED AS TWO COUNCIL MAINSTAYS BOW OUT

(By G. Jefferson Price III)

Two city councilmen in their 70's, who entered politics when boys were really b'hoys, took parting bows last night at the Governor's Club.

In a smoky room that was permeated with nostalgia and talk of the good old days, four dozen men and women including most of the present Council, bade farewell to William Bonnett (D. 1st) and Jacob J. Edelman (D., 5th), each of whom has been in the Council for more than three decades.

Both men retired this year rather than seek re-election.

Mr. Bonnett, 78 and the dean of the City Council, was first elected to public office in 1925, when he won a seat in the House of Delegates from the First district. He was elected to the first of nine consecutive Council terms in 1935.

Mr. Edelman, 75, was first elected to the Council in 1939. He will have completed his eighth term on the Council December 9.

William Donald Schaefer, the mayor-elect, referred to Mr. Edelman as the "silver-tongued orator."

"He could cut you up in the nicest way, with the kindest words, and the broadest smile on his face," offered Councilman Frank X. Gallagher (D., 3d).

FORMER WARS

Other Councilmen recalled battles waged on the floor of the Council when they had fought one of the retiring members.

Councilman Robert C. Marshall (D., 4th) recalled the bitter fight about a public accommodations bill over which liberals and conservatives were sharply divided.

Mr. Marshall was a clerk in the Council at the time and Mr. Edelman had just delivered a particularly impassioned speech supporting the bill. The speech inspired the clerk so much that he went to shake Mr. Edelman's hand.

"And just then," Mr. Marshall remembered, "Mr. Bonnett came up behind me and said 'I'm sorry, Bob. It's not that I'm against your people. It's just that we can't go along with this bill.'"

But Councilman Dominic (Mimi) DiPietro's memory went further back in history than anyone else's.

Amid much laughter, Mr. DiPietro (D., 1st) recalled that about 45 years ago he was among three runners-up in a "waltz contest" at a dance hall in East Baltimore when he first met Mr. Bonnett.

He and a partner were dancing when Mr. Bonnett appeared with several ward heelers to make a campaign speech.

As Mr. DiPietro described the scene, the band stopped playing, the dancers stopped dancing, and a chair was placed in the center of the dance floor from which Mr. Bonnett held forth with a thumping speech.

"If you was a dancer, you didn't want to hear nothing about politics," Mr. DiPietro recalled.

"But those guys made you listen, and you not only listened, you voted."

ADDRESS BY SENATOR DOLE BEFORE NATIONAL FARMERS ORGANIZATION CONVENTION

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Kansas (Mr. DOLE) gave a speech to the National Farmers Organization at Kansas City today. It is a good speech, and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REMARKS OF SENATOR BOB DOLE, NATIONAL FARMERS ORGANIZATION ANNUAL CONVENTION, MUNICIPAL AUDITORIUM, KANSAS CITY, MO., DECEMBER 16, 1971

I am pleased to be here today to speak to farmers devoted to improving the future of the American farmer. The National Farmers' Organization is devoted to that purpose—and I commend you for it.

During my eleven years in Congress—eight in the House and three in the Senate—I have served on the Agriculture Committees. Agriculture is of vital importance to my state and is the largest and most important industry in the Nation. Without this industry's food-producing capacity, no other segment of our economy would survive.

SHARED CONCERN FOR FARMERS

While serving on these Agriculture Committees, I have had many occasions to talk with Oren Lee Staley and other officers and members of the N.F.O., and this association has been helpful to me and to the farmers. Many times, Mr. Staley and I have been in agreement on farm issues, and other times not. But it is important to say here and now that despite our disagreements, we both share the same overriding goal, and are both working for the best interests of American farmers.

In an effort to determine the feelings of this group, I had considered asking everyone to stand who voted for President Nixon in 1968. On reflection, however, I concluded this would serve no useful purpose, but believe me, I am under no illusions that this is a pro-Nixon meeting. I would only hope that in your concern for agriculture, that you study carefully promises made by Presidential candidates in the next eleven months.

MUSKIE'S NEW-BORN INTEREST

Tomorrow evening you will be honored with the presence of Edmund Muskie, the present Democrat frontrunner, and I predict that he will castigate the Nixon Administration, ridicule Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, and in other ways condemn nearly everything President Nixon has done since January 20, 1969. While you are listening to the remarks of Senator Muskie, you should know that he has been in the Senate for twelve years and has failed to establish a significant record of expressing great concern for American agriculture.

After some research, it appears that Senator Muskie's latent interest in agriculture is partly based on his desire for the Presidency, rather than concern for farmers. So, tomorrow night, when Senator Muskie talks about the family farmer, parity, corn prices, or agriculture generally, remember that before this year he has had little to say on behalf of farmers and farm programs. My staff checked the Congressional Record since he came to the Senate in 1959 and found that most of his agricultural statements deals with potatoes, and his concern about the price of feed grains was that the price support levels would not increase the cost of poultry feed for his state's broiler industry.

So I suggest that you greet his remarks with a clear recognition of their context and the speaker's record.

INFO COOPERATION WITH BUTZ

I know that the National Farmers' Organization opposed the confirmation of Earl Butz as Secretary of Agriculture. However, I was pleased to learn that Oren Lee Staley called Secretary Butz immediately following the vote on his confirmation, pledging his full cooperation in working for improvements in agriculture. I think this is a great thing about our American system—that a man can be an adversary but not lose his perspective, especially when it involves the future of American farmers.

A BUSY SCHEDULE

In the brief time since his confirmation, Secretary Butz has already demonstrated his determination to act on his pledge to seek improvements in farm income. Last week he announced that the commodity Credit Corporation would purchase corn from the open market. And Monday of this week he announced the detail of the first purchase of 1.425 million bushels at prices ranging from \$1.12½ to \$1.30 per bushel, depending on the location. Additional corn will be purchased in the coming weeks.

Secretary Butz said he intends to be an active and tireless worker for the American farmer, and if his early plans are any indication, he is sticking to his promise. He has undertaken a heavy schedule of activities, not only in Washington, but throughout the country. And he will be speaking out for and working hard for the American farmer. To the Kansans present, I am pleased to announce that Secretary Butz will address the State Board of Agriculture meeting in Topeka on January 13, and will speak at the Salina meeting later that evening. These are two major farm meetings in the State of Kansas and will provide the Secretary an excellent opportunity to renew old friendships and make new ones with Kansas farmers. Later on in March, Secretary Butz is planning a trip to Manhattan and Kansas State University to speak in the Landon Lecture Series. With this number of personal appearances in this one state of the farm belt, it is obvious that Secretary Butz is going to have a great deal of personal knowledge and first-hand information with which to represent the farmer in the President's Cabinet.

GAINS UNDER THIS ADMINISTRATION

This Administration is genuinely and actively concerned with the long-term future of the farmer and with immediately improving farm income. And I will add, it is responsible for some meaningful gains during the past three years.

From 1961-1968 American farmers posted a realized net farm income level that averaged 13.8 billion dollars. Between 1969 and 1971, however, during the Nixon-Hardin period, farm income averaged 16.1 billion dollars, a 16 percent increase and a total increase of 6.6 billion dollars.

Of course, we all agree that farmers should receive incomes that compare favorably with the incomes of workers in most other segments of the economy. In the past three years, per capita farm income was 75.2 percent that of non-farm workers. This is a serious discrepancy, but it is a significant improvement over the 67.6 percent average of the Kennedy-Johnson-Freeman years of 1961-1968.

This is real, substantial and significant progress. It leaves room for more improvement, but it is definitely heading in the right direction. And in the light of this progress, I'm tired of hearing that this Administration is causing a farm depression. If these three years are a depression, what were we in during those Freeman years?

During Fiscal 1971, more farmers participated in the new farm program than ever

before in the history of volunteer farm programs. As a result, payments are now being earned by more farmers than ever before. Farmers like the options available to them; they offer a new measure of flexibility and allow a farmer to use his own judgment and experience in his crop planning.

It is now estimated that farm payments in 1972 will be up by about 800 million dollars. In addition, farm prices are going to be higher. I believe—and this is something in the nature of a prediction—that realized farm income will be in the 17 billion dollar area and could well be the highest on record.

IMPROVED NET FARM INCOME

There is a lot of talk in Washington, D.C., recently about rural development. But you and I know that as important as rural development may be, what farmers really need is increased net income. There are two ways to improve farm income.

To start with, you have to increase the prices farmers receive for what they produce. Let's look at some figures:

Since January 1969, hog prices have averaged \$20.89 cwt, compared with \$18.04 cwt during the Kennedy-Johnson years. I realize it cost you between \$18.00 and \$19.00 cwt to feed out a hog, and \$20.89 is sure a long way from enough to return a fair profit. But the trend is in the right direction.

Since this Administration took office, corn prices have averaged \$1.20 per bushel, compared to \$1.11 during the Kennedy-Johnson years. Here again, prices are far from a level that will provide a farmer the income he deserves, but we are moving in the right direction.

Beef cattle have averaged \$24.87 cwt compared to \$20.88 cwt during the Kennedy-Johnson years.

Soybeans have averaged \$2.63 per bushel compared to \$2.54 during the Kennedy-Johnson years.

Wheat has averaged \$1.50 compared with \$1.62 during the Kennedy-Johnson years. However, as you know, there has been a change in the payment procedure since 1965.

We are proud that prices paid to farmers have shown some increase during the past three years. However, increased prices are just one approach to improving income, and all too frequently farmers have found increased prices are not sufficient to offset the inflationary spiral left over from the "guns and butter" policies of the previous Administration.

President Nixon recognized the crippling impact of inflation on farmers and many others who were not tied into the rising spiral of wages and prices but were caught in the vise of fixed or declining incomes and profits. And in a decisive and far-reaching action, he instituted the wage-price freeze and the new economic policy that is designed to bring an era of real prosperity without inflation and in a time of lasting peace.

SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY

The prospects for better farm income will be especially good if the President's anti-inflation program is successful. For if the farmer has the grip of inflation relaxed and his costs for equipment, supplies and labor stabilize, his income is going to rise. But the President needs your support in securing the success of this program. Citizen confidence and citizen support are vital ingredients of this economic policy. We all know that inflation has robbed the American farmer of more net income than any other factor, and the farmer has one of the biggest stakes in this success.

In the eight Kennedy-Johnson years, farm production expenses leaped by \$8 billion dollars, and the inflationary forces unleashed by the fiscal irresponsibility of those years has continued to undercut the farm income even through the past three years.

President Nixon's new economic policy has contained bold steps to stop inflation and end this drain on farm income. Control

measures on wages and prices have brought stability to the farmer's costs, and by leaving farm commodity prices unfrozen, natural market forces will work to raise the prices the farmer receives for his products.

PRESIDENT CONCERNED FOR FARMERS

The President is concerned about farmers. He is concerned with improving their income. He wants farmers to enjoy the same privileges as the non-farm workers. He wants their vote.

He selected a man from a western Kansas wheat-growing community to be Chairman of the Republican National Committee. He knows, and the members of the Republican Party know, that in 1972 he will have to run on our record. We believe that it will be a good record. We will have a successful story to tell about this Administration's work for American agriculture—much better than the low price, high inflation Kennedy-Johnson years.

A STRONG EXPORT RECORD

Let's take a look at our export activities recently.

We attained a "triple" record for U.S. agriculture exports in the last fiscal year.

1. The value of farm exports was 7.8 billion dollars—a new record by a wide range.
2. Sales for dollars were a record 6.8 billion dollars.

3. The volume of these exports were about 8% above the volume of the previous record export years.

We are proud of this record—but not complacent. We have set a new export objective of 10 billion dollars by the end of this decade.

Our programs look to overseas markets, and we intend to compete for maximum utilization for our products throughout the world.

If U.S. farm exports are to reach our \$10 billion goal by the next decade—a necessary objective—they must move competitively in the world market. It will be our job to do everything feasible in our discussions with foreign governments to stimulate export markets for U.S. farm families. We are not satisfied with the results of the Kennedy round of trade negotiations. In this round, agriculture was treated as a poor relative.

It is the intent of this Administration to obtain our fair share of the world markets. Producers deserve every consideration, and we intend to see that they get it and that exports improve prices paid to farmers.

NEW MARKETS OPENED

President Nixon has taken another bold step in encouraging making possible the resumption of East-West trade. This should not be taken as support of the spread of communism, but instead as a bit of realistic protection of our national interest. Our past experience shows that refusing to sell grains to Russia or Mainland China only leads to our cash markets being readily taken over by Canada and Australia, with our country and its farmers left out in the cold.

The President recognized these realities and moved decisively to remedy the situation. And now American farmers are again eligible to compete for markets all over the world. In addition, the President has removed the restriction that half of these commodities must be shipped on American ships, thus opening further channels for improved access to foreign markets for our farmer.

DAMAGE FROM DOCK STRIKES

A repeat of last year's record-breaking export volume, however, is no longer a probability for this fiscal year; the Longshoremen have seen to that. The dock strikes we have experienced this year and expect to see resume shortly after Christmas, have forced our good customers to look to other nations for their wheat, feed grains and soybeans. They have done so reluctantly, but the damage is no less severe. Strike-caused disruption in our flow of exports has been a recurrent fact of life for our foreign customers. And in the place of this disruption, they

have indicated they must seek more reliable arrangements with our competitors who can dependably assure their ability to deliver.

We need these markets. Export sales stimulate the prices paid to farmers. This influence has been clearly demonstrated by the stabilization and increase of wheat and corn prices since President Nixon invoked the Taft-Hartley Act putting the ports back into operation for 80 days. Now we can expect another drop as soon as the strike resumes on the West Coast. Railroad strikes cause the same disruptions.

THE TRANSPORTATION CRISIS

In recent weeks, I have had occasion to travel around the country and talk to many people.

I've talked to many farmers. They want more farm income, they want firm markets, and they are entitled to them. They recognize the effects of the dock strikes and they want them to end. So does the Administration. This is a common problem and a shared goal. We not only want to end the current strikes, but we want to avoid future ones. In pursuit of these goals, the Administration has endorsed legislation to protect the public interest during labor-management disputes which affect our national transportation system.

This legislation would provide a fair, realistic and effective framework for the resolution of labor-management disputes which threaten to paralyze various segments of the Nation's transportation network. It would put an end to these recurring dock—and rail—strikes that so severely penalize the American farmer and stunt the growth of our economy.

The national interest demands an end to this intolerable uncertainty in our transportation system and in our exporting ability. Bitter experience shows that current labor-management relations are not going to provide the solution, so the Congress must. But this legislation (S. 560) needs public support and backing. It needs a firm demonstration of the public's aroused concern.

FARMERS DIRECTLY AFFECTED

No sector of the public has more concern or greater interest in seeing stability brought to the transportation field than the American farmer. The farmer depends on it every year to move his harvest to market—whether that market is across the country or around the world. And just as often as not, when the farmer most needs this transportation, it is tied up in a strike; so the farmer's crops rot in the warehouse, and his markets are grabbed up by his competitors from other countries.

CALL FOR SUPPORT

The opportunity is at hand to do something to change this situation, but it is going to take cooperation and teamwork to do it. Therefore, I call on the National Farmers' Organization to join with us in the Congress and the Administration to work for passage of this legislation. There could be no clearer example of common interests, and there could be no more effective way for us all to achieve a significant benefit for the American people and our Nation's economy.

DOMESTIC INITIATIVES

In the transportation field, the economy and throughout the domestic arena, the President has moved with imagination and high resolve as he seeks to bring government closer to the people and make it more responsive to their needs.

He has proposed and fought for a welfare reform program that provides realistic means to help the helpless, to lift up the weak, and to replace giveaways and handouts with work and self-sufficiency.

He has presented proposals to restructure the Federal Government and re-route the flow of Federal tax dollars to state and local governments.

In the face of legislative delay, he instituted, by executive order, the Special Action

Office for Drug Abuse Prevention to combat a problem that threatens the very roots of our social structure.

He has proposed a comprehensive national strategy to provide health service delivery to all who need it, regardless of individual financial limitations. It would improve medical education and accelerate research efforts—and do all these things without nationalization or taking a good, but improvable, system out of the hands of those who should govern it, the doctor and the patient.

CHANGING THE COURT

He has also made good on his campaign pledge to re-orient the prevailing judicial philosophy of the Supreme Court.

Of course, no one could have foreseen in 1969 that the new President would have the opportunity to name four Justices within three years. With Chief Justice Warren Burger, his very first nominee, President Nixon signaled his full devotion to naming men of high competence and a restrained judicial outlook.

The new Chief Justice and Associate Justice Harry Blackmun have borne out the President's judgment of their high qualifications, as well as their abilities. And they have provided the court with a strong, new sense of direction—away from the so-called Warren Court's activist innovation and expression of personal inclinations—and toward a conservative construction of our laws and Constitution.

And with the retirement of Justices Black and Harlan from the Supreme Court, the President seized a further opportunity to continue the job of reordering the priorities of our highest court. Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist are both extremely capable and qualified individuals. They will be excellent Justices, and the country will be well-served by their terms on the Court.

ENDING A WAR

This is a President who took office with more than 540,000 American servicemen embroiled in an inherited war costing hundreds of lives per week.

In his campaign for the Presidency, he promised to end this war. And in less than three years, he has withdrawn more than 50,000 troops and cut the casualties by more than 90 percent. Last week, four American lives were lost in combat. Let there be no mistake, those deaths were too many. But, there is a vast difference between four and the 196 combat deaths recorded in the week before Richard Nixon took office.

A GENERATION OF PEACE

This is a President who took office declaring an end to an era of confrontation and calling for an era of negotiation among the world's nations. He has set the goal of forging something the world has seldom known—a full generation of peace. And he is bending every effort to see it realized.

In pursuit of that goal, he has undertaken steps which have electrified and inspired the world. Foremost among these have been dramatic announcements that he will go to Peking and seek more normal relations with the People's Republic of China, and that he will later travel to Moscow to pursue the extremely important negotiations which have been continuing between our two countries over the past three years.

For 25 years, peace in Europe rested on a knife-edge balance of terror. Today, little by little, that status is giving way to an equilibrium of less dangerous and more positive national interests. There is growing prosperity in Eastern Europe, and Western Europe is an economic miracle. There have been productive exchanges between this nation and some of the countries the President has visited in Eastern Europe.

At the same time, the Soviet Union has had useful exchanges with various western nations, and these contacts have contributed to a relaxation of the tensions which for

too long characterized relations between East and West.

PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

This year's Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to German Chancellor Willy Brandt for his efforts at lessening East-West tensions. So I think the feeling is very strong and very optimistic that peace may have a chance in the world.

It may seem to be coming slowly—but we must be patient. The distant dawn seems to come slowly, too, but it is quickly upon us with its blessings—and so will peace be, I believe.

The enormous budgets which nations have so long turned to weapons of destruction may now at last be turned to the engines of creations—to industry, to better housing, and better health, better education. These are the blessings of peace.

Nations, including our own, can turn more resources to the benefit of their own people, and the world's as well; not in more give-away programs, and not in the old blackmail and extortion rackets of foreign aid which some small nations have worked against the superpowers—but in real assistance—in training and education, in new agricultural and industrial technology and in loans on a businesslike basis.

No nation in this age can afford to be selfish or short-sighted. None of our boundaries really stop at the map's edge, and no nation—nor any man—is an island. The future of mankind depends on joint efforts and shared concerns.

NEW COMPETITION

For we see before us a world in which the competition in the arms of destruction can be replaced with competition in the stimulation of growth and development, a world in which we may take satisfaction in mutual security, common prosperity and shared progress.

MAN OF PEACE

This is the shape of the world on the horizon. The road is still long, hard and treacherous.

But we have now, finally, the confidence that at last we are on the road. And we are there because history has given us a man of peace for an era of peace. Not only will America remember and be grateful, but the world will also remember and be grateful for the wisdom and the courage and the leadership of Richard Nixon.

MARCELLUS G. HALL

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, one of the best known figures of Maryland's capital city, Marcellus Hall, has died at the age of 77. When I was a member of the General Assembly, I knew Mr. Hall as did several generations of State legislators, Naval Academy midshipmen, and other guests as chief bellman at the old Carvel Hall Hotel. On his retirement 6 years ago, the Governor of Maryland, Hon. J. Millard Tawes, conferred upon Marcellus Hall the title "Admiral of the Chesapeake"—an appropriate honor in light of the 10 stars Mr. Hall wore on his sleeve.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Associated Press report of Mr. Hall's life and death, published this week in newspapers throughout Maryland, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TEN-STAR "ADMIRAL" SUCCEUMS AT 77 IN ANNAPOLIS

ANNAPOLIS, Md.—Marcellus Gabriel Hall, whose familiar grin and 10 stars on an elaborate gold-braided jacket were familiar

sights to dignitaries at historic Carvel Hall Hotel for 52 years, is dead at 77.

The hotel had been the home-away-from-home for state legislators until it was demolished in 1966. Only the original Paca House, which had been a part of the hotel, now stands. It has been renovated and the Paca Gardens occupy the ground where Carvel Hall once stood. They are an exact duplicate of the original, designed by former Maryland Gov. William Paca in 1763 and called the most beautiful in the colonies.

For years, Carvel Hall had been the only major hotel in this home of the U.S. Naval Academy, and Marcellus was the first friend thousands of midshipmen found here.

When they brought their dates back to the hotel after a dance, Marcellus was there to enforce the no-man's land rule above the first floor.

And as the 1 a.m. curfew neared, he would sound off with a stern, "All ashore that's going ashore."

He recalled once that he began work at the hotel as a bellboy in 1912 only as a favor to the manager.

"I agreed to do it for just one day," he grinned as he reminisced during his retirement party six years ago.

"It's been a long day."

Over 230 Maryland dignitaries, including then-Gov. J. Millard Tawes and his wife, turned out on that occasion to honor Marcellus and present him with an official "Admiral of the Chesapeake" title to go with the gold braid and 10 stars.

"It took me a little time to get up to this head table," Marcellus said then, "but as the eagle in the lobby says, 'Don't give up the ship.'"

After his retirement, Marcellus acted as a guide for Annapolis walking tours.

He died Sunday at Anne Arundel General Hospital after a brief illness.

Survivors include his widow, Sarah, a daughter, Mrs. Jeanette Tittle, and four grandchildren.

In his testimonial at the dinner honoring Marcellus six years ago Tawes remarked that "Chesapeake Bay, you know, belongs to Maryland."

"So does Marcellus."

HAZARDS OF DRUG ABUSE

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, two articles in Seafarers Log, a publication of the Seafarers International Union, warning against the use of and experimentation with drugs, deserve the attention of the general public. These articles offer to the seaman, and others as well, meaningful warnings of the hazards of drug abuse.

Mr. President, in our troubled times when drug abuse seems to loom larger and larger as a danger to the public, I feel that it is useful to submit these articles to the Senate.

I ask unanimous consent that the articles be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE VEILED DANGERS!

Horse. Barbs. Mary Jane. Speed. Downers. Bennies. You've heard of all of them.

They are narcotics. And, they are deadly danger signals which every Seafarer must avoid just as his ship steers clear of shallow water and treacherous reefs.

Narcotics are illegal. Soft, hard, pill powder or leaf—all illegal. Hallucinations, dizziness, prolonged periods of depression or euphoria, and "flashbacks" of the drug experience are results of narcotic usage.

Using drugs once and being "busted," whether on land or at sea will immediately be the end of a Seafarers career. His right

to the sea—not just for a little while, but forever!

It will mean his mind and body are functioning at all times at full capacity. He is physically and mentally weakening.

And, it will hurt those who associate with the Seafarer—his family, friends and fellow shipmates. Even his ship. All will be affected by the drug user's "bust."

A ship needs each Seafarer to be alert and able to do his individual duties. If a Seafarer is popping pills or searching for veins, then he is unable to help the ship. Other crew members have to take on more responsibilities to make up for his inadequacy.

The respect of his fellow shipmates, friends and the dignity of his ship all go around when narcotics are involved. A ship with a record of a Seafarer's drug use will always be under surveillance by customs authorities and narcotics agents wherever it docks.

The crew, too, his fellow Seafarers will be under close watch. They may have been "clean," but at the expense of their drug using shipmate, they are punished.

Everyone loses in the narcotics game. There is no second chance.

All Seafarers must know the consequences of narcotics use—even once—to his job, his life, his ship and his shipmates.

The temporary "high" is not worth all the hassle and bad times that will follow the "busted" Seafarer.

DRUGS—THEY'RE A MATTER OF A FEW HOURS VERSUS A LIFETIME

Will it be a few hours or a lifetime?

That's the question facing a Seafarer who reaches for a reefer, or a needle to take him temporarily away from his world.

Nobody takes dope intent on making a lifetime out of it. They take it to get away from reality for a few hours, to "turn on." They argue it is just a diversion, just a harmless once-in-a-while thing.

But for a Seafarer it could be forever.

A Seafarer found with any kind of drug—an upper, a downer, horse, pot, speed or any of the others—is through. Through with the sea, through with his career. Beached and washed up forever.

That's a tough price to pay but there are reasons for it, good reasons. A ship needs a full crew with each man pulling his own weight at all times. A Seafarer on a "trip" can't pull his own weight. And, in an emergency that might mean death for someone else.

Aside from that, a Seafarer caught with drugs taints his ship and his shipmates in whatever port they land. That ship and those men are marked by customs officials and police all over the world. So one man's use of dope hurts a lot of others. It is not just "his own thing."

And finally, you don't have to have medical degrees to see the wreckage of lives that have come to depend on drugs. It's all around you in hollow-eyed men who have "shot" whatever chance they had to know the good life into their veins. Hopes for their recovery in this world are very slim.

So when it comes to dope, the real question is: Is it going to be for just a few hours or will it stick for a lifetime?

DEPLETED STATE OF OUR MILITARY STRENGTH

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, more and more Americans are beginning to learn of the depleted state of our military strength. A depletion which grew out of the mistakes of the 1960's. Mistakes which can place this country in such an untenable position that we will no longer be able to participate actively and with meaning in the world of nations.

I have long been concerned with this

decline, and I have addressed myself to the problem at every opportunity.

The Air Force Association through its excellent publication, the Air Force magazine, has published in its December issue, a lengthy but, however, complete paper on "The Military Balance." I realize that it is long, but it covers the entire world, not only the Soviets and America. Knowing that Senators will have time on their hands during the recess, I want to have the opportunity of reading the truth about the world power picture.

I ask unanimous consent that the entire article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

INTRODUCTION—THE MILITARY BALANCE, 1971-72

For the past several years, Aerospace International magazine—a publication inaugurated by the US Air Force Association in 1965 and edited specifically to fulfill the information requirements of aerospace leaders around the world—has presented as a year-end bonus "The Military Balance."

Now, for the first time, Air Force Magazine and Aerospace International are joining forces to bring "The Military Balance" to their respective readers both in the US and in the international aerospace community. "The Military Balance" is an authoritative estimate of the makeup and size of the world's most important military forces. It is prepared annually by the renowned International Institute for Strategic Studies, based in London, and appears exclusively in Air Force Magazine/Aerospace International through a special arrangement with the Institute. "The Military Balance" should provide an informative and handy guide for military and civilian readers alike.

ABBREVIATIONS

AA: Antiaircraft.
 AAM: Air-to-air missile(s).
 ABM: Antiballistic missile(s).
 AEW: Airborne early warning.
 AGM: Air-to-ground missile(s).
 APC: Armored personnel carrier(s).
 ASM: Air-to-surface missile(s).
 ASW: Antisubmarine warfare.
 ATGW: Antitank guided weapon(s).
 AWX: All-weather fighter(s).
 BMD: Ballistic missile defense.
 CENTO: Central Treaty Organization.
 COIN: Counterinsurgency.
 DDG: Destroyer, guided missile.
 DEG: Destroyer/escort, guided missile.
 FGA: Fighter, ground attack.
 FPB: Fast patrol boat(s).
 GA: Ground attack.
 GM: Guided missile.
 GNP: Gross national product.
 GW: Guided weapon(s).
 ICBM: Intercontinental ballistic missile(s).
 IRBM: Intermediate-range ballistic missile(s).
 LPH: Helicopter landing platform.
 LST: Landing ship, tank.
 MIRV: Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles(s).
 MR: Maritime reconnaissance.
 MRBM: Medium-range ballistic missile(s).
 MRV: Multiple reentry vehicles(s).
 MTB: Motor torpedo boat(s).
 NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
 RCT: Regimental combat team.
 RL: Rocket launcher(s).
 SACEUR: Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.
 SAM: Surface-to-air missile(s).
 SAR: Search and rescue.
 SEATO: Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.
 SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe.
 SLBM: Submarine-launched ballistic missile(s).
 SP: Self-propelled.

SRBM: Short-range ballistic missile(s).
 SSBN: Ballistic missile submarine, nuclear.
 SSM: Surface-to-surface missile(s).

S/VTOL: Short/vertical takeoff and landing.

All miles are statute miles (5,280 feet).
 The International Institute for Strategic Studies was founded in 1958 as a center for research and discussion regarding defense, arms control, disarmament, and related activities. Since then, it has grown in recognition and prestige to become the authority in its field.

John F. Loosbrock, Editor of both Air Force Magazine and Aerospace International, has been a member of the Institute since its inception.

"The Military Balance for 1971-1972" recognizes the reality of the military status quo as it exists in the world today. Therefore, in the document's compilation, it presents as a first section a breakdown of the armed forces of the world's two military superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union (Chapter I). These two nations constitute, as they have since the conclusion of World War II, the globe's central major strategic balance.

The second main section of "The Military Balance for 1971-1972" is comprised of the respective forces in Europe: the Warsaw Pact signatories (Chapter II), the NATO-aligned countries (Chapter III), and the other nations of Europe (Chapter IV).

The military forces of the countries of the Middle East and Mediterranean areas (Chapter V) and the powers in Sub-Saharan Africa (Chapter VI) form the third main section, while China (Chapter VII) and the rest of Asia and Australasia (Chapter VIII) make up the fourth main section.

Chapter IX contains relevant tables, and "The Military Balance" concludes with Chapter X, an essay on "The Military Balance Between NATO and the Warsaw Pact" nations, appearing as the Appendix.

In preparing "The Military Balance for 1971-1972" the Institute sought, and in most cases received, the cooperation of the governments involved. However, since not all countries have been equally cooperative in producing information, some figures represent informal estimates.

The Institute, in its Preface, when this document was originally published in September, also noted that the Latin American nations were omitted from this year's "Military Balance" tabulation, but that coverage of that part of the world would be reintroduced next year.

Manpower figures contained in these pages are those of regular forces, although an indication of the size of paramilitary, militia, and reserve forces has been given for the individual countries.

Except where otherwise stated, naval strengths are those of active fleets, and vessels of less than 100 tons have usually been excluded.

Figures for defense budgets are the latest available and are generally exclusive of military aid.

National currency figures have been converted into U.S. dollars at the prevailing rates, as reported to the International Monetary Fund, except in cases of some European countries that are not members of the IMF. In view of this, the conversion rates listed in each country's section may not always be applicable to commercial transactions.

THE EDITORS.

CHAPTER I—THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION

Whatever their other commitments or capabilities, the primary mission of American armed forces remains the deterrence of a strategic attack, necessarily with nuclear weapons, upon the United States. The principal object of that deterrence is the only other "superpower," the Soviet Union, with China as a subsidiary object of potentially increasing importance. Conversely, although less explicitly, Soviet strategic nuclear forces appear

to be designed primarily to deter an American strategic attack upon the Soviet Union. The strategic forces and weapons of both super-powers have capabilities that, at least in theory, go beyond reciprocal deterrence, to the point of offering some prospect of limiting the damage either would suffer should a strategic nuclear war occur. They also provide means of deterring lesser nuclear powers. In terms of intentions, however, it seems that deterrence of each other represents the first priority for both countries.

Soviet and American representatives have been engaged since November 1969 in an effort to agree upon the mutual limitation of strategic nuclear forces. These Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) have not yet produced any formal agreement, although the governments issued a statement on May 20, 1971, in which they spoke of working out an agreement during the remaining months of the year that would limit the deployment of antiballistic missile (ABM) systems and that would also include "certain measures" of limitation on offensive weapons. Meanwhile, the expansion or modernization of strategic nuclear forces has continued on both sides. The Soviet Union, having matched the American total of offensive strategic missiles, has continued to deploy additional intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) on land, to construct additional ballistic-missile submarines, and to develop more effective weapons for its offensive forces. At the same time, the United States has embarked upon an extensive modernization of its strategic offensive weapons which, over the next four years, will add considerably to the number and effectiveness of the nuclear warheads which its own land- and sea-based forces can deliver. Both countries have also pursued attempts to deploy an effective ABM system: the Soviet Union by improving the small system that it already has, the United States by starting deployment of the *Safeguard* system, which was announced in 1969.

With an estimated total of 1,510 ICBMs (about 100 of which are positioned in MR/IRBM fields, and may, therefore, be intended for possible use against targets other than the United States), the Soviet Union has now surpassed the United States ICBM force of 1,054. Soviet deployment has, however, slowed down considerably since the beginning of 1970 and may have reached, or be approaching, its planned level. A number of underground silos of a new type have been observed, but it is not clear whether these are intended to fire a new ICBM (of which no other evidence has been reported) or to provide added protection for missiles of existing types, and especially for the large SS-9 missile. If, as seems possible, the latter is the case, this improvement of the silo for the SS-9 system will match the testing of an SS-9 multiple-warhead cluster, containing three reentry vehicles, in which the Soviet Union has been actively engaged since 1968.

The United States has made no effort to increase its total of ICBM launchers, it has, however, continued the replacement of *Minuteman I* missiles with *Minuteman III* missiles, which began in 1970. Over 500 *Minuteman III* launchers, each of which carries three independently targeter warheads, are to be deployed, under present plans, by 1975. This will have the effect of doubling the number of targets at which the total *Minuteman* force can strike.

Although the Soviet Union has continued to launch Y-class ballistic-missile submarines now at a rate of seven or eight a year, it has not yet overtaken the United States in this field. It now has about 350 SLBMs in nuclear-powered submarines (of which some 320 are in modern Y-class boats), in contrast with the 656 launchers in the parallel American force. In terms of launcher totals, the Soviet Union's construction program continues to bring it closer to the United States at a rate that could produce numerical equality by 1974. Moreover, the Soviet Union has been

testing a new SLBM that, with its estimated range of some 3,000 miles, would be comparable to the American *Polaris* vehicle. Meanwhile, the United States has begun to deploy the more advanced *Poseidon* SLBM, with at least ten independently targeted reentry vehicles. The first submarine equipped with *Poseidon* became operational during early 1971; the completion of the planned program for converting thirty-one boats would raise the total number of nuclear warheads deliverable by the American SLBM force from about 1,500 (capable of attacking 656 separate targets) to over 5,400 (capable of attacking some 5,000 separate targets). For the longer term, development work continues on an Undersea Long-Range Missile System (ULMS), which might replace the *Poseidon* submarines themselves at the end of the 1970s.

In contrast with the quantitative reinforcement of their offensive missile forces, the Soviet Union and the United States have continued to allow their strategic bomber forces to dwindle. The number of American B-52 bombers in service has dropped to well below 500, while the Soviet force of MYA-4 Bison and TU-20 Bear bombers is now estimated at 140 aircraft (with an additional fifty Bison tankers). On the American side, however, the effectiveness of the B-52 force is likely to be greatly increased by the introduction of the new Short-Range Attack Missile (SRAM), which has been ordered into production and which is expected to have an operational range of sixty to seventy-five miles. Each B-52 could carry up to twenty-four SRAM, while the proposed B-1 bomber, prototype development of which is under way would, if produced, be able to carry some thirty-two SRAM when it became operational about 1978. The total number of nuclear weapons deliverable by the American strategic bomber force is thus likely to rise sharply during the next five years. The Soviet Union has shown no apparent interest in matching this particular effort. The prototype of a new variable-geometry ("swingwing") bomber has been observed, but it is not clear that, even if produced, it would have an effective intercontinental capability, and there have been no reports of any attempt to develop air-to-surface missiles for it (or for existing Soviet bombers) of a type comparable to SRAM.

The Soviet Union, with some 10,000 anti-aircraft missiles (SAM) and 3,000 interceptor aircraft, has devoted a great deal more effort to territorial air defense than the United States, although the latter has continued development of its Over-the-Horizon (OTH-B) radar system, designed to detect attacking aircraft at great range, and of an Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), designed to track aircraft flying below the coverage of other radar systems. Both countries have continued to devote efforts to developing means of defense against ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union, which completed deployment around Moscow of sixty-four ABM launchers for its Galosh missile in 1970, has been testing an improved ABM missile and may be ready to begin its deployment. It does not appear, however, to have modified the basic orientation of its ABM system, whose missiles and radars are deployed in a manner that suggests a strong bias toward defense against an attack by American ICBMs. The United States has begun work on three sites for its *Safeguard* ABM system, each containing long-range Spartan and short-range Sprint missiles for the protection of a part of the *Minuteman* force against ICBM or SLBM attack; the first could be operational at the end of 1974. Funds have also been requested for a fourth site, either at an additional *Minuteman* field or at Washington, D.C., as well as for the continuation of development work on an alternative system, known as Hard Site (this would replace the *Safeguard* Missile Site Radars (MSR) with a large number of smaller and cheaper radars), for the more economical and less vulnerable defense of *Minuteman*. On both sides, how-

ever, continued deployment of ABM launchers now depends heavily upon the outcome of the SALT negotiations.

The manpower strength of American conventional forces has declined from the 1968 peak of over 3.5 million to the "pre-Vietnam" level of 2.7 million and is well on the way toward the 1972 target of 2.5 million. At the same time, withdrawals from Vietnam and South Korea and the redeployment of units from Japan have marked the further contraction of American military deployment in Asia. No parallel manpower reductions or deployment changes have been apparent in the Soviet case. As far as navies are concerned, the American tendency to reduce the active ship strength, while improving its quality, has been generally followed by the Soviet Union. Both navies have reduced overall numbers while continuing with modernization.

THE UNITED STATES

General

Population: 208,100,000.

Military service: selective service for two years. (A reform of the selective service system is being worked on. July 1, 1973, has been set as the target date for reaching zero draft calls.)

Total armed forces: 2,699,000.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$977,000,000,000.

Defense budget 1971-72: \$78,743,000,000. (New obligation authority for FY 1971-72; expected outlay is \$76,000,000,000.)

Strategic Forces

(a) Offensive

ICBM: 1,054 (Strategic Air Command—SAC); 400 *Minuteman I*s; 500 *Minuteman II*s; 100 *Minuteman III*s; fifty-four *Titan II*s.

SLBM: (US Navy) 656 in forty-one SSBMs: four with *Poseidon* (four more are converting); twenty-seven with *Polaris A-3*s; ten with *Polaris A-2*s.

Aircraft (SAC): bombers: 520; seventy FB-111s in four squadrons; 150 B-52C/Fs in ten squadrons (two squadrons of B-52s and about 100 KC-135s are based in Southeast Asia); 210 B-52G/Hs in fourteen squadrons; ninety B-52s in active storage; tankers: 420 KC-135s; strategic reconnaissance: SR-71s; two squadrons.

(b) Defensive

North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), with its headquarters at Colorado Springs, Colo., is a joint Canadian-American organization. American forces under NORAD are Aerospace Defense Command (ADC) and Army Defense Command (ARADCOM); combined strength 80,000.

Aircraft (excluding Canadian). Interceptors: 522. Regular: eleven squadrons with F-106s. National Guard: five squadrons with F-101s; twelve squadrons with F-102s; one squadron with F-104s. AEW aircraft: three squadrons with EC-121s.

SAM. Regular: two battalions with *Hawks*; five squadrons with 170 *Bomarc* Bs. National Guard: twenty-seven batteries with *Nike-Hercules*.

Radar and tracking stations—a chain including: the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), with stations in Alaska, Greenland, and England; the "forward scatter" Over-the-Horizon radar system (this radar-system can detect ICBMs regardless of the direction or trajectory of their launch); the *Pine Tree* Line; the thirty-three-radar Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line. Surveillance and tracking of objects in North American airspace is coordinated by the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) system. Fourteen locations are combined with Backup Interceptor Control (BUIC) stations. A system (474N) of seven radar stations on the East, West, and Gulf Coasts of the United States is designed specifically for the detection of submarine-launched missiles.

Army: 1,107,000.

Three armored divisions; one cavalry divi-

sion; four infantry divisions (mechanized); two infantry divisions; two airborne divisions; one cavalry brigade; three independent infantry brigades; one airborne brigade; five armored cavalry regiments; five special forces groups; thirty SSM batteries. About 200 independent aviation units with 11,600 aircraft, including 9,000 helicopters, M-48 and M-60 medium tanks; M-60 A1E2 medium and M-551 *Sheridan* light tanks with *Sheil-lelagh*; M-107 175-mm self-propelled guns, M-109 155-mm and M-110 203-mm self-propelled howitzers; *Honest John*, *Sergeant*, and *Pershing* SSMs; *Hawk* and *Nike-Hercules* SAMs; the *Chaparral/Vulcan* air defense system; and the *TOW* antitank guided weapons system.

Reserves. Army National Guard: 400,000 men capable, in five weeks from mobilization, of providing eight full divisions and some smaller units to round out regular formations, and thirty-six SAM batteries with *Nike-Hercules*. Army Reserves: average paid training strength 260,000, organized in twenty-one brigades. In addition, 48,000 undergo short tours of active duty.

Marine Corps: 212,000.

Three divisions (19,000 men), each supported by one tank battalion and one SAM battalion with twenty-four *Hawks*; M-48 and M-103 tanks; 105-mm SP howitzers; 105-mm and 155-mm howitzers; 175-mm guns. Three air wings, 540 combat aircraft; fourteen fighter squadrons with F-4s (with *Sparrow* and *Sidewinder AAM*); twelve attack squadrons, with A-6s and A-4s; one close-support squadron with AV-8A *Harriers*; three recon squadrons with RF-4Bs and RF-8s; forty-five AH-1 *Cobra* gunship helicopters; six heavy helicopter squadrons with CH-53As; nine medium helicopter squadrons with CH-46As; three assault transport squadrons with C-130s.

Reserves. Average paid training strength 49,500, plus paid training tours for a further 560. They form a reserve division and an associated air wing, which includes four squadrons with F-8s, five squadrons with A-4s, two squadrons with CH-53s, and three squadrons with CH-46s.

Deployment. Ground forces, Army and Marines, were deployed as follows at the beginning of July 1971. Continental United States: (1) Strategic Reserve—one armored division; one cavalry division; one airborne division; one mechanized infantry division; two Marine divisions; one Marine brigade; one armored cavalry regiment; (2) To reinforce Seventh Army in Europe—one mechanized infantry division (less one brigade; this division is dual based and its heavy equipment is stored in West Germany); one armored cavalry regiment; one Special Forces group; (3) Other—one infantry brigade; one airborne brigade; one armored cavalry regiment; two Special Forces groups. Hawaii: one infantry brigade; one Marine division (less one brigade). Germany: (1) Seventh Army—two corps include two armored divisions, two armored cavalry regiments, two infantry divisions (mechanized); one infantry brigade (mechanized); (2) West Berlin—one infantry brigade. Italy: Task Force with headquarters elements and one SSM battalion. South Vietnam: one infantry division; one airborne division; one cavalry brigade; one mechanized brigade. South Korea: one infantry division. Okinawa: one Special Forces group.

Navy

Submarines, attack: fifty-three nuclear powered (forty with *Subroc*), and forty-six diesel powered.

Aircraft carriers. (1) Attack: fifteen. One nuclear powered (USS *Enterprise*, 76,000 tons), eight *Forrestal*, and *Kitty Hawk*-class (60,000 tons), three *Midway*-class (52,000 tons), and three *Hancock*-class (33,000 tons). Each normally carries an air wing of seventy to eight-five aircraft organized in two fighter squadrons with F-4s (F-8s in the *Hancock*-class); two light attack squadrons; one AWX squadron with A-6s; and AEW, tanker,

and reconnaissance aircraft. Light attack aircraft include A-4s and A-7s (the A-7s eventually due to replace the A-4s). RA-5Cs are used for reconnaissance (RF-8Gs in the *Hancock*-class). E-2As and E-1Bs are used for AEW, and a few KA-3Bs as tankers. (2) Antisubmarine: three *Essex*-class, each with fifty-two aircraft and helicopters, including A-4Cs for air defense, S-2Es for longrange search, and SH-3 helicopters.

Other surface ships. One nuclear-powered guided-missile cruiser; three guided-missile cruisers; four guided-missile light cruisers; one gun cruiser; two nuclear-powered guided missile frigates; twenty-eight guided-missile frigates; twenty-nine guided-missile destroyers; ninety-two gun/ASW destroyers; six guided-missile destroyer escorts; fifty-one destroyer escorts; four radar-picket escorts (guided missiles in service are *Tartar*, *Talos*, and *Terrier* SAMs, and *Asroc* and *Subroc* ASWs); eighty-one amphibious warfare ships, including seven helicopter landing platforms (LPH); fifty-two landing craft; forty-two ocean minesweepers; 178 logistics, operational support, and small patrol ships.

Shore-based aircraft. Twenty-four maritime patrol squadrons with 216 P-3s. Transports include C-47s, C-54s, C-118s, C-119s, C-130s, and C131s.

Deployment. Fleets: First (Eastern Pacific), Second (Atlantic), Sixth (Mediterranean), Seventh (Western Pacific).

Reserves. Average paid training strength 127,000 plus paid training tours for a further 3,500. Training Fleet: Sixteen submarines; thirty destroyers; six ocean minesweepers; thirteen coastal minesweepers; thirty-five squadrons of fixed-wing aircraft including A-4 and A-7 fighters, P-2 and P-3A maritime patrol aircraft, and four helicopter squadrons. Air Force: 757,000; 6,000 combat aircraft (figures for manpower include strategic air forces).

General purpose forces include: (1) Tactical Air Command: 110,000; about 1,000 aircraft normally based in the United States. Twenty-three F-4, four F-105, one A-7D, and four F-111 fighter squadrons; nine tactical reconnaissance squadrons with RF-4Cs; sixteen assault airlift squadrons with C-180Es; four STOL airlift squadrons; with C-7s and C-123s; two electronic warfare squadrons; seven special operations squadrons with A-37s, AC-119s, C-123Ks, and AC-130s. (2) US Air Forces Europe (USAFE): 50,000, controlling Third Air Force (Britain), Sixteenth Air Force (Spain), Seventeenth Air Force (West Germany), and a Logistics Group in Turkey. Twenty-one fighter squadrons (and four in USA on call to USAFE) with 475 F-100s, F-4C/D/Es, and F-111Es; five tactical reconnaissance squadrons with eighty-five RF-4Cs; two transport squadrons with C-130s. (3) Pacific Air Forces (PACAF): 120,000, controlling: Fifth Air Force: over 25,000 (bases in Japan, Korea, and Okinawa) with F-4s, RF-4Cs, and C-130s. Thirteenth Air Force: about 32,000 (responsible for the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand, and all joint planning under SEATO), with F-4s, F-105s, RF-4Cs, and C-130s (of which 160 F-4s, a few F-105s, and forty RF-4s fly from Thailand). Seventh Air Force: 33,500 (the air component of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam, coordinating the operations of the Vietnamese Air Force); 200 F-4C and A-37 fighter-bombers; forty RF-4 reconnaissance aircraft; 150 A-1E, A-37A, AC-119, AC-130, and C-123 counterinsurgency aircraft; seventy-five C-7A assault airlift aircraft; a large number of observation and liaison aircraft, and helicopters. (4) Military Airlift Command (MAC): 90,000. Eighteen heavy transport squadrons with thirty-five C-130s, 260 C-141s, and twenty-five C-5As; twenty-four medical transport, weather reconnaissance, and search and rescue (SAR) squadrons.

Reserves: Air National Guard: 89,000; 1,500 aircraft in sixteen fighter-interceptor, twenty-eight tactical fighter and attack,

eleven tactical reconnaissance, three tactical air support, four special operations, seven tanker, and twenty-two air transport squadrons.

Air Force Reserve: average paid training strength of 48,400 plus training tours for a further 2,600; 400 aircraft in thirty-six squadrons include two C-119, thirteen C-124, and eighteen C-130 transport squadrons (the others have tactical support, special operations, and SAR roles).

THE SOVIET UNION General

Population: 245,700,000.

Military service: Army and Air Force, two years; Navy and Border Guards, three years. Total armed forces: 3,375,000.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$490,000,000,000.

Defense budget 1971: 17,854,000,000 rubles or \$39,700,000,000 (0.40-0.50 rubles=\$1).

(The official exchange rate is 0.90 rubles=\$1. The ruble figure represents the declared budget of the Ministry of Defense and does not include certain expenditures such as the cost of nuclear warheads, research and development expenditures on advanced weapons systems, and the military elements of the space program, which are believed to be included in the budget of other ministries. Total military expenditure could be of the order of \$55,000,000,000.)

Strategic Forces

(a) Offensive (Strategic Rocket Forces [SRF]—350,000). The Strategic Rocket Forces are a separate service, with their own manpower.

ICBM: about 1,510. 220 SS-7s and SS-8s; 280 SS-9s; 950 SS-11s (about 100 have been sited in IRBM/MRBM fields and may have a variable range capability); sixty SS-13s (solid fueled).

IRBM and MRBM: about 700. 100 SS-5 IRBMs; 600 SS-4 MRBMs (IRBMs and MRBMs are sited near the southern, eastern, and western borders of the USSR; about seventy cover targets in China and Japan; and about 630 targets in Western Europe).

SLMB: 440 in sixty-one submarines (Navy). Twenty SSBN each with sixteen SS-N-6 missiles; ten SSBN and sixteen diesel each with three SS-N-5 missiles; twelve diesel each with three SS-N-4 missiles; three diesel each with two SS-N-4 missiles.

Aircraft (Long Range Air Force): About seventy-five percent is based on European USSR, with most of the remainder in the Far East; in addition, it has staging and dispersal points in the Arctic. Long-range bombers: 140, 100 TU-20 *Bears* and forty MYA-4 *Bisons*. Tankers: fifty *Bison*. Medium bombers, 700; 500 TUX16 *Badgers* and 200 *Blinders*. (b) Defensive.

Air Defense Command (PCO-*Strany*) is a separate command of anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missile units, using an early-warning system based on radar, and fighter-interceptor squadrons for identification and interception; total strength 500,000 (250,000 from Army and 250,000 from Air Force).

Aircraft: about 3,200. Interceptors: mostly MIG-19s, MIG-21s, and SU-9s with a few MIG-17s still in service. Newer aircraft include the YAK-28P and TU-28, and more recently, the SU-11 and MIG-23. Many of these aircraft carry air-to-air missiles (AAM). AEW aircraft: some modified TU-114s with the designation *Moss*.

Antiballistic Missiles (ABM). *Galosh*: sixty-four launchers for these multistage missiles are deployed around Moscow. They are believed to have a range of more than 200 miles and to carry a nuclear warhead is the megaton range.

SAM. SA-1: An early vintage AA missile. SA-2: about 8,000. A two-stage boosted AA missile, slant range (from launch to contact with target) about twenty-five miles, effective between 3,000 and 80,000 feet. SA-3: A two-stage missile, probably intended for short-range defense against low-flying air-

craft, to supplement SA-2. It has a slant range of about fifteen miles. SA-4: An air-transportable, mobile AA missile with solid-fuel boosters. They are twin mounted on tracked carriers and assigned to ground forces in the field. SA-5: A two-stage boosted missile developed in a long-range AA role. SA-6: A triple-mounted missile on a tracked vehicle. It is entering service as a defense against low-flying aircraft to supplement SA-4 in the field forces.

Antiaircraft Artillery. 14.5-mm, 23-mm, 57-mm guns and ZSU-57-2 twin-barrel and ZSU-23.4 four-barrel self-propelled guns on tank chassis.

Army: 2,000,000 (including elements in the Air Defense Command).

One hundred and two motorized rifle divisions; fifty-one tank divisions; seven airborne divisions. Tactical nuclear missile units are organic to formations. T-10 heavy tanks; T-62 and T-54/-55 medium tanks; PT-76 amphibious recon light tanks (most Soviet tanks are equipped for amphibious crossing by deep wading, and many carry infrared night-fighting equipment). At full strength, tank divisions have 325 medium tanks and motorized rifle divisions 175 SP assault guns (in airborne divisions only); 100-mm, 122-mm, 130-mm, 152-mm, and 203-mm guns; 57-mm, 85-mm, 100-mm, 120-mm, and 130-mm antitank guns; Scud Scaleboard FROG SSMs, mounted on modified tank chassis and wheeled launchers; Shaddock cruise SSM; Snapper, Swatter, and Sagger ATGW. The Soviet Army also has a considerable air defense capability, including SAMs.

Deployment. Central and Eastern Europe: Thirty-one divisions of which twenty divisions (ten tank) are in East Germany; two tank divisions in Poland; four divisions (two tank) in Hungary; and five divisions in Czechoslovakia. European USSR: sixty divisions. Central USSR (between the Ural Mountains and Lake Balkal): eight divisions. Southern USSR (Caucasus and West Turkistan): twenty-eight divisions.

Sino-Soviet border area: Thirty-three divisions (ten tank) include two divisions in Mongolia. The thirty-one divisions in Eastern Europe are maintained at or near combat strength, as are about fifteen of those in the Far East. The other divisions in the Far East are probably in the second category of readiness: below combat strength, but not requiring major reinforcement in the event of war. Most of the remaining combat-ready divisions are in European USSR, while the divisions in central USSR would mostly require major reinforcement, as would ten of the divisions in southern USSR. Outside the Warsaw Pact area (mostly as instructors and advisers), 1,000 in Cuba, 15,000 to 20,000 in Egypt, 1,000 in Sudan, 1,000 in Syria, 1,500 in Algeria, and 1,000 in North Vietnam.

Navy: 475,000 (including Naval Air Force of 75,000).

Submarines (excluding ballistic-missile vessels. Attack: Twenty-five nuclear powered; 210 diesel powered. Cruise-missile: Thirty-five nuclear powered and twenty-five diesel powered (with four to eight 300-mile-range missiles).

Surface ships. Two ASW helicopter cruisers with SAM, and up to twenty KA-25 helicopters; two *Kresta II*-class cruisers with (horizon range) surface-to-surface cruise missiles (SSCMs) and SAMs; four *Kresta-I* class cruisers with SSCMs and SAMs; four *Kynda*-class cruisers with SSCMs and SAMs; eight *Sverdlov*-class and two older cruisers (one with SAMs); one *Krivak*-class destroyer with SSCMs and SAMs; six *Kanin*-class destroyers with SAMs; three *Krupny*-class destroyers with SSCMs; four *Kildin*-class destroyers with SSCMs; fourteen *Kashin*-class destroyers with SAMs; nine modified *Kollin*-class destroyers with SAMs; twenty-three *Kotlin*-class destroyers; forty *Skory*- and modified *Skory*-class destroyers; 105 other ocean-going escorts; 250 coastal escorts and submarine chasers; 110 *Osa*- and thirty

Komar-class patrol boats with SSCMs; 250 fast patrol boats; 180 fleet minesweepers; 125 coastal minesweepers; 105 landing ships and numerous landing craft; some trawlers are used for electronic intelligence. All submarines and the larger surface vessels not fitted with SSCMs are equipped for minelaying. A proportion of the destroyers and smaller vessels may not be fully manned.

Shore-based aircraft. Bombers: 500, most based near the northwest and Black Sea coasts of the USSR. 300 TU-16s with *Kipper* or *Kelt* ASMs; 100 TU-16 reconnaissance and tanker aircraft (replacement of the reconnaissance version with the TU-22 *Blinder* has begun); fifty IL-28 torpedo-equipped light bombers; fifty TU-20 long-range naval reconnaissance.

Other aircraft and helicopters—500. Seventy-five BE-12 AASW amphibians; twenty-five IL-18 *May* ASW aircraft; 200 MI-4 and KA-25 ASW helicopters; 200 miscellaneous transports.

Naval Infantry—about 15,000.

Deployment: Arctic, Baltic, Black Sea, and Far East Fleets.

Air Force: 550,000; 10,000 combat aircraft.

(1) The Long Range Air Force. (2) Tactical Air Force: altogether about 5,000 aircraft, including light bombers, fighters, helicopters, transport, and reconnaissance aircraft. Some obsolescent MIG-17s, MIG-19s, and IL-28s are still in service. The most notable high-performance aircraft are the MIG-21J and YAK-28P *Firebar* fighters; the ground-attack SU-7; and the supersonic light-bomber YAK-28. Ground-attack aircraft are equipped with a variety of air-to-ground rockets. The variable-geometry *Flogger* may be about to enter service. (3) Air Defense Command and (4) Naval Air Force. (5) Air Transport Force: about 1,700 aircraft. IL-14, AN-24, some 800 AN-12 and IL-18 medium transports and ten AN-22 heavy transports.

There are, in addition, civil airliners of *Aeroflot*, some of which could be adapted to military use; these include about 275 long- and medium-range TU-104s, TU-114s, TU-124s, and TU-134s.

About 800 helicopters in use with the ground forces including troop-carrying MI-6s and MI-8s and the heavy load carrier MI-10. The MI-12, a very heavy load carrier, may soon enter service. The total helicopter inventory is probably around 1,750.

Paramilitary forces: 300,000.

125,000 security troops; 175,000 border troops. There are also about 1,500,000 members of the part-time military training organization (DOSAAF) who take part in such recreational activities as athletics, shooting, and parachuting, but reservist training and refresher courses seem to be haphazard and irregular. However, DOSAAF assists in pre-military training being given in schools, colleges, and workers' centers to those of sixteen years and over.

CHAPTER II—THE WARSAW PACT TREATIES

The Warsaw Pact is a multilateral military alliance formed by a "Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance, and Cooperation" signed in Warsaw on May 14, 1955, by the governments of the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania (Albania denounced the pact in September 1968). According to East European documentary sources, the pact is committed to the defense of only the European territories of the member states.

The Soviet Union is also linked by bilateral treaties of friendship and mutual assistance with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. All present members of the Warsaw Pact also have similar bilateral treaties with each other. The Soviet Union concluded status-of-forces agreements with Poland, East Germany, Ro-

mania, and Hungary between December 1956 and May 1957, and with Czechoslovakia in October 1968; all these remain in effect except the one with Romania, which lapsed in June 1958 when Soviet troops left Romania. The essence of East European defense arrangements is not, therefore, dependent on the Warsaw Treaty as such.

ORGANIZATION

The Organization of the Warsaw Pact has two main bodies. The first, the Political Consultative Committee, consists, in full session, of the First Secretaries of the Communist Party, heads of government, and the Foreign and Defense Ministers of the member countries. It met twice in the year up to July 1971, at which point there had been seventeen meetings in all. (Some of these meetings have been entitled Meetings of Ministers.) The Committee has a Joint Secretariat, headed by a Soviet officer, consisting of a specially appointed official from each country, and a Permanent Commission, whose task is to make recommendations on general questions of foreign policy for pact members. Both these bodies are located in Moscow.

The second body, the Joint High Command, is directed, according to the Treaty, "to strengthen the defensive capability of the Warsaw Pact, to prepare military plans in case of war, and to decide on the deployment of troops." The Command consists of a Commander in Chief (CinC), a Defense Committee, made up of the six Defense Ministers of the pact, which acts as an advisory body, and a Military Council. This body, which is modeled on a similar organization in the Soviet Armed Forces, meets under the chairmanship of the CinC, and includes the Chief of Staff (CS) and permanent military representatives from each of the allied armed forces. (It seems to be the main channel through which the pact's orders are transmitted to its forces in peacetime, and through which the East European forces are able to put their point of view to the CinC.) The pact also has a Military Staff, which has been enlarged by additional non-Soviet senior officers. The posts of CinC and CS of the Joint High Command have, however, always been held by Soviet officers, and most of the key positions are still in Soviet hands. In the event of war, the forces of the other Pact members would be operationally subordinate to the Soviet High Command. The Command of the air defense system covering the whole Warsaw Pact area is centralized in Moscow and directed by the CinC of the Soviet Air Defense Forces.

The Soviet forces in the Warsaw Pact area are organized as the Northern Group of Forces, with headquarters at Legnica in Poland; the Southern Group of Forces, with headquarters at Budapest; the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, with headquarters at Zossen-Wünsdorf, near Berlin; and the Central Group of Forces, consisting of five divisions in Czechoslovakia, with headquarters at Mladice, north of Prague. Soviet tactical air forces are stationed in Poland, East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet Union has deployed tactical nuclear missiles in Eastern Europe. Most East European countries have displayed short-range SSM launchers, but there is no evidence that nuclear warheads for these missiles have been supplied to these countries. Soviet MRBMs (and other strategic weapons) are based in the Soviet Union and remain under Soviet control.

BULGARIA

Population: 8,555,000.
Military service: Army and Air Force, two years; Navy, three years.
Total regular forces: 148,000.
Estimated GNP 1970: \$8,900,000,000.
Defense expenditure 1970: 324,000,000 leva or \$279,000,000 (1.16 leva=\$1).
Army: 117,000.
Eight motorized rifle divisions (three

cadre); five tank brigades; thirty JS-3 and T-10 heavy tanks; about 1,900 medium tanks, mainly T-54s, with some T-34s, T-55s, and T-62s; PT-76 light tanks, and BTR-40P scout cars; BTR-50, BTR-60, and BTR-152 armored personnel carriers; more than 500 85-mm, 122-mm, and 152-mm guns; SU-100 and JSU-122-mm self-propelled guns; FROG and SCUD SSMS; 57-mm, 85-mm, and 100-mm antitank guns; *Snapper*, *Swatter*, and *Sagger* antitank guided weapons; ZSU-57 self-propelled AA guns; SA-2 SAMs.

Navy: 9,000.

Two submarines; two escorts; eight coastal escorts; two minesweepers; two minehunters; four inshore minesweepers; twelve motor torpedo boats (eight less than 100 tons); fourteen landing craft; a small Danube flotilla.

Air Force: 22,000; 252 combat aircraft (twelve aircraft in a combat squadron).

Six fighter-bomber squadrons with MIG-17s; four interceptor squadrons with MIG-21s; three interceptor squadrons with MIG-19s; five interceptor squadrons with MIG-17s; one reconnaissance squadron with IL-28s; two reconnaissance squadrons with MIG-17Cs; four LI-2, six AN-2, and ten IL-14 transports; about forty MI-4 helicopters; one parachute regiment.

Paramilitary forces:

15,000, including border security troops; a volunteer People's Militia of 150,000.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Population: 14,700,000.

Military service: Army twenty-four months; Air Force twenty-seven months.

Total regular forces: 185,000.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$30,300,000,000.

Defense expenditure 1970: 15,000,000,000 crowns or \$1,765,000,000 (8.0 crowns = \$1).

Army: 145,000.

Four tank divisions; eight motorized rifle divisions; one airborne brigade (all about seventy percent of strength except two cadre motorized rifle divisions at thirty percent strength); about 100 JS-3 and T-10 heavy tanks; about 3,400 medium tanks, mostly T-55s and T-62s, with some T-54s and T34s; OT-65 and FUG-1966 scout cars; BTR-50P, BTR-152, OT-62, and OT-64 armored personnel carriers; SU-100, SU-122, JSU-152 self-propelled guns; 82-mm and 120-mm mortars; FROG and SCUD SSMS; 57-mm, 85-mm, and 100mm antitank guns; *Snapper*, *Swatter*, and *Sagger* antitank guided weapons; 47-mm twin self-propelled and 30-mm AA guns; SA-2 SAMs.

Air Force: 40,000; 504 combat aircraft (fourteen aircraft in a combat squadron).

Twelve ground-support squadrons with IL-28s, SU-7s, MIG-15s, and MIG-17s; eighteen interceptor squadrons with MIG-17s, MIG-19s, and MIG-21s; six reconnaissance squadrons with MIG-15s, and L-29s; about fifty LI-2, IL-14, and IL-18 transports; about ninety MI-1, MI-4, and MI-8 helicopters.

Paramilitary forces:

Border troops (*Pohranicki straz*): 35,000; a part-time People's Militia of about 120,000 is being increased to 250,000.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Population: 17,150,000.

Military service: eighteen months.

Total regular forces: 126,000.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$34,000,000,000.

Defense budget 1971: 7,200,000,000 Ostmarks or \$2,124,000,000 (3.39 ostmarks = \$1).

Army: 90,000.

Two tank divisions; four motorized rifle divisions; about 100 T-10 and JS-3 heavy tanks; about 2,200 medium tanks, mostly T-54s and T-55s, with some T-34s and T-62s; about 125 PT-76 light tanks; SK-1 armored cars; BTR-40P scout cars; about 650 BTR-50P, BTR-60P, and BTR-152 armored personnel carriers; SU-100 SP guns; 85-mm, 122-mm, 130-mm, and 152-mm guns; FROG and SCUD SSMS; 57-mm and 100-mm antitank guns; *Snapper*, *Swatter*, and *Sagger* antitank guided weapons; ZSU-57-2 self-propelled, 57-mm, and 100-mm AA guns.

Navy: 16,000.

Four destroyer escorts; twenty-five coastal escorts; forty-seven minesweepers; twelve Osa-class patrol boats with Styx SSMS; seventy motor torpedo boats (less than 100 tons); eighteen landing craft; sixteen MI-4 helicopters.

Air Force: 20,000; 290 combat aircraft (sixteen aircraft in a combat squadron).

Two interceptor squadrons with MIG-17s; sixteen interceptor squadrons with MIG-21s; thirty transports, including AN-2s, IL-14s, and LI-2s; plus twenty MI-1, MI-4, and MI-8 helicopters; an antiaircraft division of 9,000 (five regiments), with about 120 57-mm and 100-mm AA guns and with SA-2 SAMs.

Paramilitary forces:

46,000 border troops (*Grenzschutztruppe*), including a Border Command separate from the regular army; 20,000 security troops; 350,000 in armed workers' organizations (*Betriebskampfgruppen*).

HUNGARY

Population: 10,320,000.

Military service: two to three years.

Total regular forces: 103,000.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$14,400,000,000.

Defense expenditure 1970: 8,900,000,000 forints or \$511,000,000 (17.4 forints = \$1).

Army: 90,000.

Two tank divisions, five motorized rifle divisions; two SAM battalions with SA-2s; T-10 heavy tanks; about 1,600 medium tanks, mainly T-55s, with some T-34s, T-54s, and T-62s; fifty PT-76 light tanks; FUG-A armored cars; OT-65 scout cars; OT-64, OT-66, and BTR-152 armored personnel carriers; SU-100 and JSU-122 self-propelled guns; about 400 76-mm, 85-mm, and 122-mm guns, and 122-mm howitzers; FROG SSMS; 57-mm antitank guns; *Snapper*, *Swatter*, and *Sagger* antitank guided weapons; ZSU-57 self-propelled AA guns; SA-2 SAMs.

Navy: 500.

There is a Danube flotilla of forty minesweepers and twenty patrol craft.

Air Force: 12,500; 130 combat aircraft (twelve aircraft in a combat squadron).

One fighter-bomber/recece squadron with MIG-17s; ten interceptor squadrons with MIG-19s and MIG-21s; about twenty-five AN-2, IL-14, and LI-2 transport aircraft; about six MI-1 and MI-4 helicopters.

Paramilitary forces:

27,000 security and border guard troops; 250,000 workers' militia.

POLAND

Population: 33,200,000.

Military service: Army and Air Force, two years; Navy and special services, three years; internal security forces, twenty-seven months.

Total regular forces: 265,000.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$42,500,000,000.

Defense expenditure 1970: 35,300,000,000 zloty or \$2,220,000,000 (15.9 zloty = \$1).

Army: 190,000.

Five tank divisions; eight motorized rifle divisions; one airborne division; one amphibious assault division (divisions are at seventy percent of strength, except those in the Warsaw Military District, which are at thirty to fifty percent of strength); thirty JS-3 and T-10 heavy tanks; 3,400 medium tanks, mostly T-54s and T-55s, with some T-34s and T-62s; about 150 PT-76 light tanks; FUG-A armored cars; BTR-40P scout cars; OT-62, OT-64 (Skot-2), and BTR M-1967 armored personnel carriers; ASU-57, SU-100, JSU-122, and JSU-152 self-propelled guns; FROG and SCUD SSMS; 57-mm, 85-mm, and 100-mm antitank guns; *Snapper*, *Swatter*, and *Sagger* antitank guided weapons; SA-2 SAMs.

Navy: 20,000 (including 1,000 marines).

Five submarines; two destroyers; thirty coastal escorts/submarine chasers; twenty-four fleet minesweepers; twenty-seven inshore minesweepers; twelve Osa-class patrol boats with Styx SSMS; twenty torpedo boats (less than 100 tons); twenty-two landing

ships; forty-five naval aircraft, mostly MIG-17s, with a few IL-28 light bombers, and some helicopters; Samlet cruise missiles for coastal defense.

Air Force: 55,000; 730 combat aircraft (twelve aircraft in a combat squadron).

Six bomber/recece squadrons with IL-28s; twelve fighter-bomber squadrons with MIG-17s and SU-7s; forty interceptor squadrons with MIG-17s, MIG-19s, and MIG-21s; three reconnaissance squadrons with MIG-15s and MIG-17s; about forty-five AN-2, AN-12, IL-12, IL-14, IL-18, and LI-2 transports; forty helicopters, including MI-1s and MI-4s.

Paramilitary forces:

65,000 security and border troops, including armored brigades of the Frontier Defense Force, and operating twenty small patrol boats.

ROMANIA

Population: 20,400,000.

Military service: Army and Air Force, sixteen months; Navy, two years.

Total regular forces: 160,000.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$21,400,000,000.

Defense Budget 1971: 7,500,000,000 lei or \$798,000,000 (9.4 lei = \$1).

Army: 130,000.

Two tank divisions; seven motorized rifle divisions; one mountain brigade; one airborne regiment (all at about ninety percent of strength); a few JS-3 and T-10 heavy tanks; 1,700 T-34, T-54, T-55, and T-62 medium tanks; about 900 BTR-40, BTR-50P, and BTR-152 armored personnel carriers; SU-100 and JSU-122 self-propelled guns; 76-mm, 122-mm, and 152-mm guns; about seventy-five FROG SSMS; 57-mm, 85mm, and 100-mm antitank guns; *Snapper*, *Swatter*, and *Sagger* antitank guided weapons; 37-mm, 57-mm, and 100-mm AA guns; SA-2 SAMs.

Navy: 9,000.

Six coastal escorts; four minesweepers; twenty-two inshore minesweepers; five Osa-class patrol boats with Styx SSMS; twelve motor torpedo boats (less than 100 tons); eight landing crafts.

Air Force: 21,000; 230 combat aircraft (twelve aircraft in a combat squadron).

Eighteen interceptor squadrons with MIG-17s, MIG-19s, and MIG-21s; one reconnaissance squadron with IL-28s; one transport squadron with IL-14s and LI-2s; ten MI-4 helicopters.

Paramilitary forces:

40,000, including border troops; a militia of 500,000.

CHAPTER III—THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY TREATIES

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 by Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United States; Greece and Turkey joined in 1952 and West Germany in 1955. The treaty unites Western Europe and North America in a commitment to consult together if the security of any one member is threatened, and to consider an armed attack against one as an attack against all, to be met by such action as each of them deems necessary, "including the use of armed forces, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

The Paris Agreements of 1954 added a Protocol to the treaty, strengthening the structure of NATO, and revised the Brussels Treaty of 1948, which now includes Italy and West Germany in addition to its original members (Benelux countries, Britain, and France).

The Brussels Treaty signatories are committed to give one another "all the military and other aid and assistance in their power" if they are the subject of "armed aggression in Europe."

Since 1969, members of the Atlantic Alliance can withdraw on one year's notice; the Brussels Treaty was signed for fifty years.

ORGANIZATION

The Organization of the North Atlantic Treaty is known as NATO. The governing

body of the alliance, the North Atlantic Council, which has its headquarters in Brussels, consists of the Ministers of the fifteen member countries, who normally meet twice a year, and, in permanent session of ambassadors representing each government.

In 1966, France left the integrated military organization and the fourteen-nation Defense Planning Committee (DPC), on which France does not sit, was formed. It meets at the same levels as the Council and deals with questions related to NATO's integrated military planning and other matters in which France does not participate. The Secretary-General and an international staff advise on the politico-military, financial, economic, and scientific aspects of defense planning.

Two permanent bodies for nuclear planning were established in 1966. The first, the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee (NDAC) is open to all NATO members (France, Iceland, and Luxembourg do not take part); it normally meets at Defense Minister level once or twice a year, to associate nonnuclear members in the nuclear affairs of the alliance. The Secretary-General is Chairman of the NDAC.

The second, the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), derived from and subordinate to the NDAC, has eight members, and is intended to go further into the details of topics raised there. The members in June 1971 were Britain, Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, and the United States (Belgium, Denmark and Greece had participated earlier). The Secretary-General also chairs the NPG.

The Council's military advisers are the Military Committee, which gives policy direction to the NATO military commands. The Military Committee consists of the Chiefs of Staff of all member countries, except France, which maintains a liaison staff, and Iceland, which is not represented; in permanent session, the Chiefs of Staff are represented by Military Representatives who are located in Brussels together with the Council. The Military Committee has an independent Chairman and is served by an integrated, international military staff. The major NATO Commanders are responsible to the Military Committee, although they also have direct access to the Council and heads of governments.

The principal military commands of NATO are Allied Command Europe (ACE), Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), and Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN).

The NATO European and Atlantic Commands participate in the Joint Strategic Planning System at Omaha, Neb., but there is no Alliance Command specifically covering strategic nuclear forces. As for ballistic-missile submarines, the United States has committed a small number and Britain all hers to the planning control of SACEUR, and the United States a larger number to SACLANE.

The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) have always been American officers; and the Commander in Chief Channel (CINCHAN) and Deputy SACEUR and Deputy SACLANT British. SACEUR is also Commander in Chief of the United States forces in Europe.

ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE (ACE)

Allied Command Europe has its headquarters, known as SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe), at Casteau, near Mons, in Belgium. It is responsible for the defense of all NATO territory in Europe, excluding Britain, France, Iceland, Portugal, and all of Turkey. It also has general responsibility for the air defense of Britain.

The European Command has some 7,000 tactical nuclear warheads in its area. There is a very wide range in the kiloton spectrum. The number of delivery vehicles (aircraft, missiles, and howitzers) is about 2,250, spread among all countries, excluding Lux-

embourg. The nuclear explosives themselves, however, are maintained in American custody. Tactical nuclear bombs and missile warheads are all fission. The average yield of the bombs stockpiled in Europe for the use of NATO tactical aircraft is about 100 kilotons, and of the missile warheads, twenty kilotons.

About sixty division equivalents are available to SACEUR in peacetime. The Command has some 2,900 tactical aircraft, based on about 150 standard NATO airfields and backed up by a system of jointly financed storage depots, fuel pipelines, and signal communications. The majority of the land and air forces stationed in the Command are assigned to SACEUR while the naval forces are earmarked.

The Second French Corps of two divisions (which is not integrated in NATO forces) is stationed in Germany under a status agreement reached between the French and German governments. Cooperation with NATO forces and commands has been agreed between the commanders concerned.

The ACE Mobile Force (AMF) has been formed as a NATO force with particular reference to the northern or southeastern flanks. Formed by eight countries, it consists of eight infantry battalion groups, an armored reconnaissance squadron, and ground-support fighter squadrons, but has no air transport of its own.

The following commands are subordinate to Allied Command Europe:

(a) Allied Forces Central Europe (AF-CENT) has command of both the land forces and the air forces in the Central European sector. Its headquarters are at Brunssum, Netherlands, and its commander (CINCENT) is a German general.

The forces of the Central European Command include twenty-one divisions assigned by Belgium, Britain, Canada, West Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States, and about 1,700 tactical aircraft.

The Command is subdivided into Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) and Central Army Group (CENTAG). NORTHAG, responsible for the defense of the sector north of the Göttingen-Liège axis, includes the Belgian, British, and Dutch divisions, four German divisions, and is supported by Second Allied Tactical Air Force (ATAF), composed of Belgian, British, Dutch, and German units. The American forces, seven German divisions, and the Canadian battle group are under the Central Army Group, supported by the Fourth ATAF, which includes American, German, and Canadian units, and an American Army Air Defense Command.

(b) Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH) has its headquarters at Kolsås, Norway, and is responsible for the defense of Denmark, Norway, Schleswig-Holstein, and the Baltic approaches. The commander has always been a British General. Most of the Danish and Norwegian land, sea, and tactical air forces are earmarked for it, and most of their active reserves assigned to it. Germany has assigned one division, two combat air wings, and her Baltic fleet.

(c) Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) has its headquarters at Naples, and its commander (CINCSOUTH) has always been an American admiral. It is responsible for the defense of Italy, Greece, and Turkey, and for safeguarding communications in the Mediterranean and the Turkish territorial waters of the Black Sea. The formations available include fourteen divisions from Turkey, twelve from Greece, and seven from Italy, as well as the tactical air forces of these countries. Other formations from these three countries have been earmarked for AFSOUTH, as have the United States Sixth Fleet, and naval forces of Greece, Italy, Turkey, and Britain. The ground-defense system is based on two separate commands: Southern, comprising Italy and the approaches to it, under an Italian commander,

and Southeastern, comprising Greece and Turkey, under an American commander. There is, however, an overall air command and there is a single naval command (NAV-SOUTH), responsible to AFSOUTH, with its headquarters in Malta.

A special air surveillance unit—Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean (MARAIRMED)—is now operating Italian, British, and American patrol aircraft from bases in Greece, Turkey, Sicily, Malta, and Italy. French aircraft are participating in these operations. Its commander, an American rear admiral, is immediately responsible to CINCSOUTH.

The Allied On-Call Naval Force for the Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED) has consisted of at least three destroyers, contributed by Italy, Britain, and the United States, and three smaller ships provided by other Mediterranean countries, depending upon the area of operation.

ALLIED COMMAND ATLANTIC (ACLANT)

Allied Command Atlantic has its headquarters at Norfolk, Va., and is responsible for the North Atlantic area from the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer, including Portuguese coastal waters.

In the event of war, its duties are to participate in the strategic strike and to protect sea communications. There are no forces assigned to the command in peacetime except Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), which normally consists, at any one time, of four destroyer-type ships. However, for training purposes and in the event of war, forces which are predominantly naval are earmarked for assignment by Britain, Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Portugal, and the United States. There are arrangements for cooperation between French naval forces and those of SACLANE. There are five subordinate commands: Western Atlantic Command, Eastern Atlantic Command, Iberian Atlantic Command, Striking Fleet Atlantic, and Submarine Command. The nucleus of the Striking Fleet Atlantic has been provided by the American Second Fleet with up to six attack carriers; their nuclear role is shared with the missile-firing submarines.

ALLIED COMMAND CHANNEL (ACCHAN)

Allied Command Channel has its headquarters at Northwood near London. The wartime role of Channel Command is to exercise control of the English Channel and the southern North Sea. Many of the smaller warships of Belgium, Britain, and the Netherlands are earmarked for this Command, as are some maritime aircraft. There are arrangements for cooperation with French naval forces.

Policy

The political and strategic guidance laid down in 1967 includes the concept of political warning time in a crisis, and the possibility of distinguishing between an enemy's military capabilities and his political intentions. The strategic doctrine defined by the DPC in December 1967 envisaged that NATO would meet attacks on its territory with whatever force levels were appropriate. In June 1968, at the Ministerial Meeting at Reykjavik, the Council called on the countries of the Warsaw Pact to join in discussions of mutual force reductions, reciprocal and balanced in scope and timing, and repeated this invitation at their meeting in Rome in 1970.

Belgium

Population: 9,800,000.
Military service: twelve months.
Total armed forces: 96,500.
Estimated GNP 1970: \$24,900,000,000.
Defense budget 1971: 29,700,000,000 francs or \$594,000,000 (fifty francs=\$1).
Army: 71,500.
Two mechanized divisions of two brigades each; one paracommando regiment; two SSM battalions with Honest Johns; two SAM battalions with Hawks; four squadrons with

Alouette IIs and DO-27s; 330 Leopard and 175 M-47 medium tanks; 135 M-41 light tanks; M-75 and AMX-VTT armored personnel carriers; M-108 105-mm, M-44, and M-109 155-mm, and M-55 203-mm self-propelled howitzers; 203-mm howitzers.

Reserves: one mechanized brigade and one motorized brigade.

Navy: 5,000.

Five fleet minesweepers/minehunters; two fleet minesweepers; ten coastal minesweepers/minehunters; ten inshore minesweepers; two support ships; two S-58 and three Alouette III helicopters.

Reserves: 3,000 trained.

Air Force: 175 combat aircraft (a combat squadron has eighteen to twenty-five aircraft).

Two fighter-bomber squadrons with F-104Gs; two fighter-bomber squadrons with F-84Fs; two all-weather fighter squadrons with F-104Gs; one reconnaissance squadron with RF-84Fs (the F-84 and RF-84F are being replaced by Mirage-VBs); thirty-three C-119 and eighteen C-47, Pembroke, and DC-6 transports; eleven HSS-1 helicopters; eight SAM squadrons with Nike Hercules.

Paramilitary forces: 13,500 Gendarmerie.

Britain

Population: 56,000,000.

Voluntary military service.

Total armed forces: 380,900 (including 16,300 enlisted outside Britain).

Estimated GNP 1970: \$121,000,000,000.

Defense budget 1971-72: 2,545,000,000 pounds or \$6,108,000,000 (one pound = \$2.40).

Strategic Forces

Four SSBNs each with sixteen Polaris A-3 missiles. The Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) station at Fylingdales provides early warning of missile threats.

Army: 185,300 (including 14,200 enlisted outside Britain).

Twelve armored regiments; five armored car regiments; forty-three infantry battalions; three parachute battalions; six Gurkha battalions; one special air service (SASH) regiment; three regiments with Honest John SSMs and 203-mm howitzers; twenty-four other artillery regiments; one SAM regiment with Thunderbirds; fourteen engineer regiments; fifty-nine of the above units are organized in two armored, twelve infantry, one parachute, and one Gurkha brigades.

Equipment. 900 Chieftain and Centurion medium tanks; 105-mm Abbott and M-107 175-mm self-propelled guns; M-109 155-mm self-propelled howitzers; 203-mm howitzers; Honest John SSMs; Vigilant and Swingfire antitank guided weapons; light aircraft and thirty Scout helicopters.

Deployment. The Strategic Reserve—includes one division of three airtachable brigades and two parachute battalions of the United Kingdom Mobile Force (UKMF), and the SAS regiment.

Germany—British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), of 54,900, includes three division headquarters, one mechanized and five armored brigades, two armored car regiments, two artillery brigades, and the Thunderbird SAM regiment. In Berlin there is one 3,000-strong brigade.

Far East (excluding Hong Kong)—By the end of 1971 the force will be reduced to one battalion group in Singapore, and one Gurkha battalion in Brunei.

Hong Kong—five infantry battalions, one artillery regiment.

Persian Gulf—two infantry battalions and support units (until end of 1971).

Cyprus—UNFICYP: one infantry battalion and one air-portable recon squadron. Garrison: one infantry battalion and one armored car squadron.

Malta—one infantry battalion and one company group.

Gibraltar—one infantry battalion.

The Caribbean—one company group and engineering detachment.

Reserves: 118,200 regular reserves; 49,000 volunteer reserves.

Navy: 84,600 (including Fleet Air Arm and marines).

Submarines, attack: two nuclear powered (SSN) (two more are due to enter service in 1971-72); seventeen diesel powered. Surface ships: two aircraft carriers; two commando carriers; two assault ships; one guided missile (GM) cruiser with *Seacat* SAMS; one GM destroyer with *Seadart* SAMS; six GM destroyers with *Seaslug* and *Seacat* SAMS; two other destroyers; twenty-nine general purpose (GP) frigates; nineteen ASW frigates; four AA and three aircraft direction frigates; forty-seven mine countermeasures ships. Ships in reserve or undergoing refit or conversion include (in addition to the above): two SSNs, nine diesel submarines, one commando carrier, two GM cruisers, one GM destroyer, one other destroyer, six GP frigates, three ASW frigates, one aircraft direction frigate.

The Fleet Air Arm: ninety-six combat aircraft. Two strike squadrons with *Buccaneers*; two air defense squadrons with F-4Ks; four air defense squadrons with *Sea Vixens* (a combat squadron has twelve aircraft); eight squadrons with *Wessex* helicopters; three *Sea King* helicopter squadrons; three *Wasp* and *Whirlwind* helicopter squadrons.

The Royal Marines total about 8,000 men, and include four 800-man commandos.

Reserves (naval and marines): 24,200 regular and 7,800 volunteers.

Air Force: 111,000; about 500 combat aircraft (a combat squadron has six to twelve aircraft).

Eight medium bomber squadrons with *Vulcans*; two light bomber squadrons with *Canberras*; three strike squadrons with *Buccaneers*; six strike/attack/reconnaissance squadrons with F-4Ms; one ground-attack squadron with *Hunters*; four close-support squadrons with *Harriers*; nine air defense squadrons with *Lightnings*; one air defense squadron with F-4Ks; one reconnaissance squadron with *Victor IIs*; four reconnaissance squadrons with *Canberras*; two maritime patrol squadrons with *Nimrods*; six maritime patrol squadrons with *Shackletons*; three tanker squadrons with *Victors*; four strategic transport squadrons with VC-10s, *Belfasts*, and *Britannias*; eight tactical transport squadrons with *Hercules* and *Argosy* aircraft; two light communication squadrons with *Andovers*; seven *Wessex* and *Whirlwind* helicopter squadrons (SA-330 *Pumas* are entering service). There are eleven ground defense and air defense squadrons of the Royal Air Force Regiment, some with *Bloodhound* and *Tigercat* SAMs, and L-40/70 AA guns (*Rapier* SAMs are being introduced).

Deployment. The Royal Air Force includes two operational home commands—Strike Command and Air Support Command, and four smaller overseas commands—RAF Germany, Near East Air Force, Air Force Gulf, and Far East Air Force. Squadrons are deployed overseas as follows:

Germany: 8,600. Four F-4s; one *Buccaneer* (a second is due to form during 1971); two *Canberras*, two *Lightnings*; two *Harriers* (a third is due to form by the end of 1971); one *Wessex*.

Near East: (a) Cyprus—two *Vulcans*; one *Lightning*; one *Hercules*. (b) Malta—*Shackleton* (converting to *Nimrod*); one *Canberra*. Gulf: one *Hunter*; one *Shackleton*; one *Argosy*; one *Andover*; one *Wessex* (until the end of 1971).

Far East: (a) mid-1971—one *Lightning*; one *Shackleton*; one *Hercules*; one *Whirlwind*. (b) after 1971—some *Nimrod* aircraft and *Whirlwind* helicopters, based at Singapore.

Reserves: 32,800 regular; about 400 volunteer.

Canada

Population: 21,700,000.

Voluntary military service.

Total armed forces: 85,000.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$US78,200,000,000.

Defense budget 1971-72: \$Can. 1,822,500,000 or \$US1,687,500,000. (\$Can. 1.08 = \$US1). The exchange rate has been allowed to fluctuate since June 1, 1970.

The Canadian Armed Services have been unified since February 1968, but for purpose of comparison with other countries, are presented here in traditional form.

Army (Land): 33,000.

In Canada: Mobile Command. One airborne regiment; three combat groups each comprising three infantry battalions, one reconnaissance regiment, and one reduced light artillery regiment (of two batteries); support units. One group is intended for operations in Europe, while part of it, an air-transportable battalion group, is assigned to Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force. The other groups contribute to North American ground defense, and UN commitments.

In Europe: One mechanized battle group of about 2,800 men, with thirty-two *Centurion* tanks, 375 M-113 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and eighteen M-109 155-mm self-propelled howitzers.

In Cyprus (UNFICYP): 460 men.

Reserves: about 18,000.

Four submarines; nine helicopter destroyer escorts; eleven ASW destroyer escorts; six coastal minesweepers; one ASW hydrofoil; three support ships. The Maritime Air Element consists of: four maritime patrol squadrons with *Argus*; one maritime patrol squadron with *Tracker* aircraft; one ASW squadron with *Sea King* helicopters.

Reserves: about 2,900.

Air Force (Air): 37,000; 162 combat aircraft.

In Canada: Mobile Command: two CF-5 tactical fighter squadrons; six helicopter squadrons. Air Defense Command: three interceptor squadrons with CF-101s (due to be replaced in 1971 by F-101Cs); two SAM squadrons with *Bomarc* Bs; twenty-eight surveillance and control radar squadrons (the above are assigned to NORAD); one CF-100 electronic warfare training squadron. Air Transport Command: one squadron with Boeing 707-320C transport/tankers; two squadrons with C-130E *Hercules*; two squadrons with CC-115 *Buffaloes* and CC-138 *Twin Otters*; two squadrons with *Buffalo* and CH-113 *Labrador* helicopters; one squadron with CC-106 *Yukons*; one squadron with CC-109 *Cosmopolitans* and *Falcons*.

In Europe: two strike-attack and one reconnaissance squadrons, with CF-104s (a squadron has six to eighteen aircraft).

Reserves: 800.

Denmark

Population: 4,990,000.

Military service: twelve months.

Total armed forces: 40,500.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$16,000,000,000.

Defense budget 1971-72: 3,077,100,000 kroner or \$410,300,000 (7.5 kroner = \$1).

Army: 24,000.

Four armored infantry brigades; one battalion group; three artillery battalions; *Centurion* medium tanks; M-41 light tanks; M-113 armored personnel carriers (APCs); M-109 155-mm self-propelled howitzers; 203-mm howitzers; Honest John SSMs (there are no nuclear warheads on Danish soil); twelve *Hughes* 500M helicopters.

Reserves: 40,000—two armored infantry brigades and support units to be formed from reservists within seventy-two hours. Local defense units form fifteen infantry battalion groups and fifteen artillery batteries. Volunteer Home Guard of 52,000.

Navy: 6,500.

Six submarines; two fast frigates; four helicopter frigates (fishery protection); four coastal escorts; sixteen fast torpedo boats; sixteen patrol boats (seven less than 100 tons); four fleet minelayers; three coastal minelayers; eight coastal minesweepers; four inshore minesweepers; nine seaward defense craft; eight Alouette III helicopters.

Reserves: 3,000. Volunteer Home Guard of 4,000 with small patrol boats.

Air Force: 10,000; 112 combat aircraft (a combat squadron has sixteen aircraft).

One fighter-bomber squadron with F-35XD *Drakens*; two fighter-bomber squadrons with F-100D/Fs; two interceptor squadrons with F-104Gs; one interceptor squadron with *Hunters*; one reconnaissance squadron with RF-84Fs (converting to RF-35 *Drakens* during 1971); one transport squadron with C-47s and C-54s; one SAR squadron with S-61 helicopters; four SAM squadrons with *Nike-Hercules*; four SAM squadrons with *Hawks*.

Reserves: Volunteer Home Guard of 8,000.

France

Population: 51,225,000.

Military service: twelve months.

Total armed forces: 501,500.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$148,000,000,000.

Defense budget 1971: 28,873,000,000 francs or \$5,202,000,000 (5.55 francs=\$1).

Strategic Forces

IRBM: the first nine-missile squadron became operational on August 2, 1971.

SLBM: the first sixteen-missile SSBN is due to become operational during 1971. Five SSBNs are due to be built in all.

Aircraft: Bombers: thirty-six *Mirage IVAs* in nine squadrons. Tankers: nine KC-135Fs in three squadrons.

Army: 329,000.

Five mechanized divisions; one parachute division (two brigades); one air-portable motorized brigade; two Alpine brigades; four armored car regiments; two motorized infantry regiments; one parachute battalion; twenty-five infantry battalions; five SSM battalions with *Honest Johns*. (The nuclear warheads held under double-key arrangements with the USA were withdrawn in 1966. The tactical nuclear SSM *Pluton* is due to enter service in 1973.) Three SAM regiments with *Hawks*; M-47 and about 575 AMX-30 medium tanks; AMX-13 light tanks; EBR heavy and AML light armored cars; VTT-AMX armored personnel carriers; self-propelled AMX 105-mm guns and 155-mm howitzers; 30-mm twin self-propelled AA guns; SS-11/*Harpon* antitank guided weapons.

Deployment. Strategic Reserve: permanent element includes the parachute division and the air-portable brigade.

Germany: About 62,000, including two mechanized divisions; four SSM regiments with *Honest Johns*; about 1,700 in West Berlin.

French Territory of the Afars and Issas: two battalions.

Elsewhere in Africa: about 4,000.

Pacific Territories: two battalions.

Caribbean: one battalion.

The remaining troops are stationed in France for local defense (DOT). Their peacetime strength is about 61,500 men, including thirty-five battalions (infantry, light armor, artillery, and engineer).

Reserves: Mobilization would bring the DOT up to a total of eighty infantry battalions, five armored car regiments, and support units.

Navy: 68,500 (including Naval Air Force).

Nineteen attack submarines; two aircraft carriers; one helicopter/aircraft carrier; one helicopter carrier; two assault landing ships; one anti-aircraft/command cruiser; sixteen destroyers (four guided missiles with Tartar SAMs); three GM frigates with Malafon ASW missiles (two with Masurca SAMs); twenty-seven frigates; fourteen coastal escorts; fourteen fleet minesweepers; six coastal minesweepers; fifteen inshore minesweepers; five landing ships; twelve landing craft.

Naval Air Force: 12,000; 200 combat aircraft. Three fighter-bomber squadrons with Etendard IV-Ms; two interceptor squadrons with F-8Fs; three reconnaissance squadrons with Etendard IV-Ps; three ASW squadrons with Alizes (all the above can be flown from aircraft carriers); five maritime reconnaissance squadrons with Atlantics and P-2s; one ASW heli-

copter squadron with Super-Frelons; two helicopter squadrons with Alouette II/IIIs.

Air Force: 104,000; 500 combat aircraft.

Air Defense Command (CAFDA) has: three interceptor squadrons with *Mirage IIICs*; two all-weather fighter interceptor squadrons with Vautour IINs; three interceptor squadrons with Super-Mystere B2s (coordination is by the automatic STRIDA II air defense system).

Tactical Air Force (FATAC) has: two subordinate Tactical Air Commands—First CATAAC and Second CATAAC—and includes: eight fighter-bomber squadrons with *Mirage IIIEs*; one fighter-bomber squadron with *Mirage IIIBs*; two fighter-bomber squadrons with F-100Ds; two fighter-bomber squadrons with *Mystere IVAs*; three tactical reconnaissance squadrons with *Mirage IIIR/RDs*.

Air Transport Command (COTAM) has: three tactical transport squadrons with *Transalls*; four tactical transport squadrons with *Noratlas*; one heavy transport squadron with DC-6 and BR-765 *Saharas* and two mixed transport squadrons; four squadrons with H-34 and Alouette II helicopters.

Deployment: one squadron of A-1Ds and one mixed transport squadron are stationed in the French Territory of the Afars and Issas.

Paramilitary forces: 65,000 Gendarmerie and 85,000 reserves (subordinate to the Ministry of Defense); 15,000 CRS (Compagnies Republicaines de Securite), subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior.

Federal Republic of Germany

Population: 60,000,000 (excluding West Berlin).

Military service: eighteen months. (A government commission has proposed a reduction to 16 months.)

Total armed forces: 467,000.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$185,000,000,000.

Defense budget 1971: DM 21,816,000,000 or \$5,961,000,000 (DM 3.66=\$1. The exchange rate has been allowed to fluctuate since May 1971.)

Army: 327,000 (including the 35,000 Territorial Force).

Twelve armored brigades; one armored regiment; thirteen armored infantry brigades; three rifle brigades; two mountain brigades; three airborne brigades; eleven SSM battalions with *Honest Johns*; four SSM battalions with Sergeants; 1,050 M-48A2 *Pattons* and 2,250 *Leopards* medium tanks; 1,770 HS-30 and 3,140 M-113 armored personnel carriers; 1,100 tank destroyers with 90-mm guns or antitank missiles; 250 105-mm, 375 155-mm, 150 175-mm, and seventy-five 203-mm self-propelled guns; 500 self-propelled 40-mm AA guns; about 460 Bell-47, UH-1D *Iroquois*, and *Alouette II* helicopters, and eighty DO-27 light aircraft.

Reserves: 540,000 on immediate recall.

Navy: 36,000 (including Naval Air Arm).

Eleven coastal submarines; three guided missile destroyers with Tartar SAMs; nine destroyers; six fast frigates; two frigates; five fleet utility vessels; thirteen escort and support ships; twenty-four coastal minesweepers/minelayers; thirty fast minesweepers; eighteen inshore minesweepers; two minelayers; forty fast patrol boats; two landing ships; twenty-two landing craft.

Naval Air Arm: 6,000; 100 combat aircraft. Four fighter-bomber/recece squadrons with F-104Gs; two maritime reconnaissance squadrons with BR-1150 *Atlantics*; twenty-three S-58 SAR helicopters, being replaced by SH-3Ds.

Reserves: 36,000 on immediate recall.

Air Force: 104,000; 504 combat aircraft. (Fighter, fighter-bomber, reconnaissance, and light-strike squadrons have fifteen to twenty-one aircraft, and transport squadrons up to eighteen.)

Ten fighter-bomber squadrons with F-104Gs; four light ground-attack/strike squadrons with G-91s; four interceptor squadrons with F-104Gs; four heavy reconnaissance squadrons with RF-104Gs (re-

placement with RF-4E *Phantom IIs* has started); four reconnaissance squadrons with G-91s; six transport squadrons with C-160 *Transalls*; four helicopter squadrons with UH-1Ds; three SSM battalions with *Perishings*; twenty-four SAM batteries with *Nike-Hercules*; thirty-six SAM batteries with *Hawks*.

Reserves: 87,000 for immediate recall.

Paramilitary forces: 18,500 Border Police with *Caladin* armored cars and coastal patrol boats.

Greece

Population: 8,960,000.

Military service: twenty-four months.

Total armed forces: 159,000.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$9,200,000,000.

Estimated defense expenditure 1971: 10,-138,000,000 drachmas or \$337,900,000 (thirty drachmas=\$1).

Army: 118,000.

Eleven infantry divisions (three close to full strength); one armored division; one commando brigade; two SSM battalions with *Honest Johns*; one SAM battalion with *Hawks*; 200 M-47, 220 M-48, and 50 AMX-30 medium tanks; M-24, M-26, and M-41 light tanks; M-8 and M-20 armored cars; M-3 scout cars; M-2, M-59, and M-113 armored personnel carriers; 105-mm, 155-mm, and M-107 175-mm self-propelled guns; 105-mm, 155-mm, and 203-mm howitzers; 40-mm, 75-mm, and 90-mm AA guns.

Navy: 18,000.

Two submarines (four more to be delivered by West Germany); eight destroyers; four destroyer escorts; seven coastal patrol vessels; two minelayers; twenty coastal minesweepers; twelve fast torpedo boats (less than 100 tons; four fast patrol boats, with *Eroceet* SSMs, are on order from France, the first one due for delivery in 1971); eight tank landing ships; six medium landing ships; one dock landing ship; eight landing craft; eight HU-16 maritime patrol aircraft.

Air Force: 23,000; 216 combat aircraft (a combat squadron has up to eighteen aircraft).

Three fighter-bomber squadrons with F-84Fs; two fighter-bomber squadrons with F-104Gs; four interceptor squadrons with F-5As; one interceptor squadron with F-102As; one photo-reconnaissance squadron with RF-5s; one reconnaissance squadron with RF-84Fs; thirty C-47s and C-119Gs, and twenty-five *Noratlas* transports; one helicopter squadron with twelve H-19s and six AB-205s; one helicopter squadron with ten Bell 47Gs; one SAM battalion with *Nike-Hercules*.

Paramilitary forces and Reserves: 25,000 Gendarmerie; 200,000 reserves.

Italy

Population: 54,000,000.

Military service: Army and Air Force, fifteen months; Navy, twenty-four months.

Total armed forces: 414,000 (excluding Carabinieri).

Estimated GNP 1970: \$93,200,000,000.

Defense budget 1971: 1,657,000,000,000 lire or \$2,651,000,000 (625 lire=\$1).

Army: 295,000.

Two armored divisions; five infantry divisions; one independent cavalry brigade; four independent infantry brigades; five Alpine brigades (of 5,000 men each); one parachute brigade; one SSM brigade (including four battalions with *Honest Johns*); four SAM battalions with *Hawks*; 800 M-47 and 200 M-60 medium tanks (deliveries of 800 *Leopards* have started); M-24 light tanks; M-113 armored personnel carriers; M-44, M-56, M-107, and M-109 self-propelled guns; M-42 self-propelled AA guns.

Navy: 45,000 (including air arm and marines).

Nine submarines; three guided missile (GM) cruisers with *Terrier* SAM and ASW helicopters (one with *ASROC* ASW missiles); two GM destroyers with *Tartar* SAMs; two destroyer leaders; seven ASW destroyers; ten destroyer escorts; sixteen coastal escorts; four ocean minesweepers; thirty-seven coastal

minesweepers; twenty inshore minesweepers; seven fast patrol boats; seven motor torpedo boats (less than 100 tons); one command ship; three landing ships; two marine infantry battalions.

Naval Air Arm: Three maritime patrol squadrons with S-2 (due to be replaced by *Atlantics* by mid-1972), HU-16A SAR aircraft, and 50 Bell-47, SH-34, AB-204, and SH-3D SAR helicopters.

Air Force: 74,000; 300 combat aircraft. (A combat squadron—"gruppo"—has twelve to eighteen aircraft and a transport squadron has sixteen.) Three fighter-bomber squadrons with F-104Gs; one fighter-bomber squadron with G-91Ys; one fighter-bomber squadron with F-84Fs; four light attack squadrons with G-91Rs; four AWX squadrons with F-104Gs; two AWX squadrons with F-104Ss; one AWX squadron with F-86Ks; three recon squadrons with RF-84Fs and RF-104Gs; three transport squadrons with C-119s (delivery of fourteen) C-130E *Hercules* is due to begin in 1971; one transport squadron with C-47s, Convair 440s, and DC-6s; six SAM groups with *Nike-Hercules*.

Paramilitary forces and Reserves:

80,000 Carabinieri Corps; about 650,000 trained reservists.

Luxembourg

Population: 342,000.
Voluntary military service.
Total armed forces: 550.
Estimated GNP 1970: \$910,000,000.
Defense budget 1971: 429,600,000 francs or \$8,592,000 (fifty francs=\$1).
Army: 550.

A light infantry battalion (four companies); some antitank guns and mortars.

Paramilitary forces:

350 Gendarmierie.

Netherlands

Population: 13,175,000.
Military service: Army, sixteen to eighteen months; Navy and Air Force, eighteen to twenty-one months.

Total armed forces: 116,500.
Estimated GNP 1970: \$31,300,000,000.
Defense budget 1971: 4,203,000,000 guilders or \$1,161,000,000 (3.62 guilders=\$1). The exchange rate has been allowed to fluctuate since May 1971.)
Army: 76,000.

Two armored brigades; four armored infantry brigades; two SSM battalions with *Honest Johns*; 400 Centurion (with 105-mm guns) and 200 *Leopard* medium tanks (285 more *Leopards* are being delivered); 120 AMX-13 light tanks; M-106, M-113, and M-577 amphibious armored personnel carriers; AMX-VTT and YP-408 armored personnel carriers; AMX-105 M-109 155-mm, M-107, 175-mm, and M-110 203-mm self-propelled howitzers.

Reserves: one infantry division, and the remaining corps troops, including one independent infantry brigade, are to be completed by call-up of reservists.

Navy: 19,000, including 2,900 marines and 2,000 naval air force.

Five submarines (two more due to become operational in 1971/72); two cruisers (one guided missile with *Terrier* SAMs); six GM frigates with *Seacat* SAMs; twelve destroyers; six corvettes; six support escorts; five patrol vessels; thirty-six coastal minesweepers and minehunters; sixteen inshore minesweepers; one fast combat support ship.

Naval Air Arm: five *Atlantic*, and about thirty P-2 and S-2 maritime reconnaissance aircraft; fifteen *Wasp*, SH-34J, and AB-204B ASW helicopters.

Air Force: 21,500; 126 combat aircraft (a combat squadron has eighteen aircraft).

Two fighter-bomber squadrons with F-104Gs; two fighter-bomber squadrons with NF-5As; two interceptor squadrons with F-104Gs; one photo-reconnaissance squadron with RF-104Gs; one transport squadron with F-27s; three observation and communica-

tion squadrons (under Army command) and *Alouette III* helicopters, and *Super-Cub* and *Beaver* light aircraft; eight SAM squadrons with *Nike-Hercules*; nine SAM squadrons with *Hawks*.

Paramilitary forces: 3,200 Gendarmerie (Royal Marechaussée).

Norway

Population: 3,915,000.
Military service: Army, twelve months; Navy and Air Force, fifteen months.
Total armed forces: 35,900.
Estimated GNP 1970: \$12,460,000,000.
Defense budget 1971: 2,932,000,000 kroner or \$410,640,000 (7.4 kroner = \$1).
Army: 18,000.

The peacetime establishment includes one brigade group in northern Norway, independent battalions, and supporting elements and training units. *Leopard* and M-48 medium tanks; M-24 light tanks and M-8 armored cars; M-113 and BV-202 armored personnel carriers; M-109 155-mm self-propelled howitzers; L-18 and L-19 light aircraft.

Reserves: mobilization would produce eleven regimental combat teams (brigades), supporting units, and territorial forces totaling 157,000.

Navy: 8,500 (including 800 coastal artillery).

Fifteen coastal submarines; five frigates; two coastal escorts; ten coastal minesweepers; five minelayers; twenty-one gunboats (refitting with *Penguin* SSMs); six torpedo boats; twenty torpedo boats (less than 100 tons); two armed depot and training ships; a number of coastal artillery batteries.

Reserves: 12,000.
Air Force: 9,400; 121 combat aircraft.

Five light attack squadrons each with sixteen F-5As; one all-weather fighter squadron with twenty F-104Gs; one photo-reconnaissance squadron with sixteen RF-5As; one maritime patrol squadron with five P-3Bs; one transport squadron with six C-130s and four C-47s; two helicopter squadrons with UH-1s; four SAM batteries with *Nike-Hercules*.

Reserves: 10,600, providing twelve airfield defense light AA battalions; Home Guard (all services): 75,000.

Portugal

Population: 9,730,000.
Military service: Army, twenty-four months; Air Force, thirty-six months; Navy, forty-eight months.

Total armed forces: 218,000 (about 60,000, including those locally enlisted, are in Angola, 45,000 in Mozambique, and 25,000 in Portuguese Guinea).

Estimated GNP 1970: \$6,100,000,000.
Estimated defense expenditure 1970: 11,444,000,000 escudos or \$398,100,000 (28.75 escudos = \$1).
Army: 179,000.

Two tank regiments; eight cavalry regiments and battalions; thirty-five infantry regiments and battalions; seventeen coastal artillery regiments and battalions; M-47 and M-4 medium tanks; M-41 light tanks; Hummer Mark IV and EBR-75 armored cars; AML-60 scout cars; FV-1609 and M-16 half-track armored personnel carriers; 105-mm and 140-mm howitzers.

Deployment: Some of the above units form two infantry divisions, at or below half strength, in Portugal; about twenty-five infantry regiments and supporting units are in the provinces in Africa.

Navy: 18,000 (including 3,300 marines).

Four submarines; eleven frigates; six corvettes; fourteen coastal patrol vessels; four ocean minesweepers; twelve coastal minesweepers; forty-one patrol launches (less than 100 tons); five landing craft (LCT-type); fifty-eight small landing craft (less than 100 tons).

Air Force: 21,000; 150 combat aircraft (a combat squadron has ten to twenty-five aircraft).

Two light bomber squadrons with B-26 *Invaders* and PV-2s; one fighter-bomber squadron with F-84Gs; two light-strike squadrons with G-91s; one interceptor squadron with F-86Fs; six counterinsurgency flights with armed T-6s; one maritime patrol squadron with P-2 V5s; twenty-two *Noratlacs*, sixteen C-47, eleven DC-6, and fifteen C-45 transports; thirteen T-33, twenty-five T-37, and thirty-five T-6 reconnaissance/trainers. Other aircraft include eleven DO-27 and about eighty-five *Alouette II/III* and SA-330 *Puma* helicopters; one parachute regiment of 4,000.

Deployment: One parachute battalion in each of the African provinces; one G-91 squadron in Mozambique.

Paramilitary forces and Reserves: 9,700 National Republican Guard; 500,000 reserves.

Turkey

Population: 36,100,000.
Military service: twenty months.
Total armed forces: 508,500.
Estimated GNP 1970: \$13,700,000,000.
Defense budget 1971-72: 6,695,000,000 liras or \$446,000,000 (fifteen liras=\$1. Before August 9, 1970, nine liras=\$1).
Army: 420,000.

One armored division; twelve infantry divisions; four armored brigades; four armored cavalry brigades; one mechanized infantry division; three mechanized infantry brigades; two parachute battalions; M-47 and M-48 medium tanks; M-24, M-26, and M-41 light tanks; M-36 tank destroyers; M-8 armored cars; M-59 and M-113 armored personnel carriers; 105-mm and 155-mm self-propelled guns; 105-mm, 155-mm, and 203-mm howitzers; 40-mm, 75-mm, and 90-mm AA guns; *Honest John* SSMs.
Navy: 38,500.

Twelve submarines; ten destroyers; six coastal escorts; eleven motor torpedo boats (two less than 100 tons); ten motor launches; fifteen coastal minesweepers; four inshore minesweepers; one fleet minelayer; five coastal minelayers; a number of landing craft.

Air Force: 50,000; 360 combat aircraft (a combat squadron has ten to twenty-five aircraft).

Two fighter-bomber squadrons with F-104Gs; four fighter-bomber squadrons with F-100s; four fighter-bomber squadrons with F-5s; four interceptor squadrons with F-5s; two interceptor squadrons with F-86s (in store); two all-weather fighter squadrons with F-102As; two reconnaissance squadrons with RF-84Fs; four transport squadrons including fifty C-47s, three C-54s, and five C-130s; two SAM battalions (six batteries) with *Nike-Hercules*.

Paramilitary forces: 75,000 Gendarmierie (including three mobile brigades).

CHAPTER IV—OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

ALBANIA

Population: 2,190,000.
Military service: Army, two years; Air Force, Navy, and special units, three years.
Total regular forces: 42,000.
Estimated GNP 1970: \$900,000,000.
Estimated defense expenditure 1971: 580,000,000 leks or \$116,000,000 (five leks=\$1).
Army: 35,000.

One tank brigade; six infantry brigades; some light shore batteries; seventy T-34 and fifteen T-54 medium tanks; twenty BA-64, BTR-40, and BTR-152 armored personnel carriers; SU-76 self-propelled guns; 122-mm and 152-mm guns and howitzers; 45-mm, 57-mm, 76-mm, and 85-mm anti-tank guns; 37-mm, 57-mm, and 85-mm AA guns; a few SA-2 SAMs.

Navy: 3,000.
Four submarines; four ASW patrol vessels; thirty motor torpedo and patrol boats (less than 100 tons); eight inshore minesweepers; some SSMs deployed around the ports of Durazzo and Valona.

Air Force: 4,000; seventy-two combat air-

craft (a combat squadron has twelve aircraft).

Three fighter squadrons with MIG-17s; two fighter squadrons with MIG-15s; one interceptor squadron with MIG-19s; one transport squadron with AN-2s and IL-14s; about eight MI-1 and MI-4 helicopters.

Paramilitary forces: 37,500, consisting of an internal security force of 12,500, and a frontier force of 25,000.

AUSTRIA

Population: 7,445,000.

Military service; nine months (to be reduced to six months during 1971).

Total armed forces: 48,350.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$14,300,000,000.

Defense budget 1971: 4,283,000,000 schillings or \$170,138,000 (24.75 schillings=\$1. Before May 9, 1971, twenty-six schillings=\$1).

Army: 44,000.

Four reduced strength infantry brigades; three reduced strength mechanized brigades; three tank battalions; three independent air defense battalions; 150 M-47 and 120 M-60 medium tanks; forty M-41 and sixty AMX-13 light tanks; 400 G1-2K armored personnel carriers; 105-mm and 155-mm howitzers, and 155-mm guns; JPz-4K self-propelled antitank guns; 84-mm Carl Gustav antitank guided weapons; 130-mm rocket launchers; thirty-eight M-42 self-propelled AA guns; 20-mm and 35-mm Oerlikon and 40-mm Bofors AA guns.

Air Force: 4,350; twenty-three combat aircraft.

Austrian air units are an integral part of the Army but for purposes of comparison have been listed separately.

Seventeen SAAB 105 fighter-bombers; six J-29F Tunnan fighter-bombers; thirty-five Magister, Vampire, and Sufr trainers; nineteen Cessna L-19 light reconnaissance aircraft; one transport squadron with three Beavers and two Skyvans; twenty-two AB-204, twenty-three Alouette, and twelve AB-206 helicopters.

Paramilitary forces; 12,000 Gendarmerie.

FINLAND

Population: 4,600,000.

Military service: eight to eleven months.

Total armed forces: 39,500.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$10,300,000,000.

Defense budget 1971: 646,000,000 markkaa or \$153,800,000 (4.2 markkaa=\$1).

Army: 34,000.

Navy: 2,500.

One armored brigade (at about half strength); six infantry brigades (at about thirty-five percent strength); eight independent infantry battalions; two coastal artillery regiments; three coastal artillery battalions; one antiaircraft regiment; four antiaircraft battalions; T-54, T-55, and Charioteer medium tanks; PT-76 light tanks; BTR-50P armored personnel carriers; 105-mm, 129-mm, and 130-mm guns; 122-mm and 152-mm howitzers; 81-mm and 120-mm mortars; Vigilant and SS-11 antitank guided weapons; ZSU-57, 35-mm Oerlikon, and 40-mm Bofors AA guns.

Three frigates (one used as training ship); two corvettes; one patrol boat with Mk 66 SSM; fifteen fast patrol boats (less than 100 tons); two coastal minelayers; five patrol boats (ex-inshore minesweepers).

Air Force: 3,000; forty-eight combat aircraft.

Three fighter squadrons with MIG-21Fs and Gnat Mark 1s; twelve Magister armed trainers; about 100 other trainers, including seventy Magister, thirty Sufr, and a few MIG-15/MIG-21 UTIs; about ten C-47 and Beaver transports; Hound, Alouette II, and four AB-204B helicopters.

Paramilitary forces and Reserves: 3,000 frontier defense troops; 650,000 reserves.

SPAIN

Population: 33,600,000.

Military Service: eighteen months.

Total armed forces: 301,000.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$32,300,000,000.

Defense budget 1971: 47,724,000,000 pesetas or \$681,000,000 (seventy pesetas=\$1).

Army: 220,000.

One armored division; one mechanized infantry division; one motorized infantry division; two mountain divisions; twelve independent infantry brigades; one armored cavalry brigade (all above are about seventy percent strength); one high mountain brigade; one air-portable brigade; one parachute brigade; two artillery brigades; one SAM battalion with Hawks; M-47 and M-48 medium tanks; M-24 and M-41 light tanks; Greyhound armored cars, AML-60/90 and M-3 scout cars; M-113 armored personnel carriers; 105-mm and 155-mm self-propelled guns; 105-mm, 155-mm, and 203-mm howitzers; 90-mm self-propelled antitank guns.

Navy: 47,500 including 6,000 marines.

Three submarines; one helicopter carrier; one cruiser; sixteen ASW destroyers; three destroyers; eight frigates; six frigate-mine-layers; six corvettes; one ASW patrol vessel; three torpedo boats; thirteen fleet minesweepers; twelve coastal minesweepers; eight landing ships; three ASW helicopter squadrons; one light helicopter squadron.

Air Force: 33,500; 221 combat aircraft.

Twelve Mirage 111E fighter-bombers; fifty F-5 fighter-bombers; fifty-five HA-200 fighter-bombers (thirty-six F-4C fighter-bombers are being delivered); twenty-one F-104G interceptors; forty-eight F-86F interceptors; twenty-five T-6 armed trainers; one ASW squadron with eleven HU-16Bs; about 150 transport aircraft and helicopters including C-47s, C-54s, twelve Caribou, and twenty Azors.

Paramilitary forces: 65,000 Guardia Civil.

Deployment (outside mainland Spain): Strength: 41,000, including mechanized and commando formations of the Spanish Foreign Legion, and elements of other units.

Balearic Islands: 6,000.

Canary Islands: 8,000. Ceuta: 8,000, including one regiment of the Foreign Legion. Melilla: 9,000, including one regiment of the Foreign Legion. Spanish Sahara: 10,000, including two regiments of the Foreign Legion.

SWEDEN

Population: 8,125,000.

Military service: Army and Navy, nine to fifteen months; Air Force, nine to fourteen months.

Total armed forces: 23,000 regulars and 50,300 conscripts (total mobilizable strength 750,000).

Estimated GNP 1970: \$31,200,000,000.

Defense budget 1971-72: 6,165,000,000 Swedish kronor or \$1,192,000,000 (5.17 kronor=\$1).

Army: 12,500 regulars; 36,500 conscripts; 100,000 reservists called up each year for eighteen to forty days' training.

Seven armored regiments; fifteen infantry regiments; seven artillery regiments; six antiaircraft artillery regiments; one parachute training unit (all in cadre form); one SAM battalion with Hawks; Centurion and STRV-103 medium tanks; STRV-74 light tanks; IKV-91 amphibious tanks; Pbv-301/302 armored personnel carriers; 105-mm and 155-mm self-propelled howitzers; 155-mm self-propelled guns; 105-mm and 155-mm guns; 75-mm, 105-mm, and 155-mm howitzers; 90-mm antitank guns; SS-11, Bantam, Carl Gustav, and Miniman antitank guided weapons; 57-mm self-propelled, 20-mm, and 40-mm AA guns; Redeye SAMs.

Navy: 4,700 regulars; 7,400 conscripts.

Twenty-three submarines; two GM destroyers with Rb-08 SSMs; four GM destroyers with Seacat SAMs; two other destroyers; seven fast antisubmarine frigates; seventeen heavy torpedo boats; twenty-five torpedo boats (less than 100 tons); one minelayer/submarine depot ship; eighteen coastal minesweepers; seventeen inshore minesweepers (eight less than 100 tons); five coastal artillery regiments with 75-mm, 105-mm, 120-

mm, 152-mm, and 210-mm guns; Rb-08 and Rb-52 (SS-11) SSMs; ten Vertol and ten AB-206A helicopters.

Air Force: 5,800 regulars; 6,400 conscripts; 650 combat aircraft (a combat squadron has up to eighteen aircraft).

Ten attack squadrons of A-32A Lansens with Rb-04 ASMs (replacement by the AJ-37 Viggen is due to start in 1971); thirteen all-weather fighter squadrons with J-35 Draken Fs; eight all-weather fighter squadrons with J-35 Draken A/Ds; two reconnaissance fighter squadrons with S-32Cs; three reconnaissance fighter squadrons with S-35Es; one transport squadron with two C-130Es and seven C-47s; one heavy helicopter squadron with ten Vertol-107s; six SAM squadrons with Bloodhound IIs. There is a fully computerized, fully automatic, control and air surveillance system, Stril 60, coordinating all air defense components.

Paramilitary forces: Voluntary defense organizations of 325,000, including 90,000 women.

SWITZERLAND

Population: 6,375,000.

Military service: four months' initial training, followed by reservist training of three weeks a year for eight years, two weeks for three years; and one week for two years.

Total armed forces: 5,500 regulars and 24,000 conscripts (total mobilizable strength 600,000; reservists can be fully mobilized within forty-eight hours).

Estimated GNP 1970: \$20,500,000,000.

Defense budget 1971: 1,909,200,000 francs or \$459,000,000 (4.08 francs=\$1. Before May 9, 1971, 4.3 francs=\$1).

Army: 2,500 regular training cadre; 17,000 conscripts; 530,500 reservists.

The militia-style Army is organized into four corps. One corps, for the defense of the Alps, consists of three mountain divisions; the other three corps, for the defense of the plain, consist of an armored division and two infantry divisions each. There are also seventeen frontier, fortress, and "redoubt" brigades, and forty-eight artillery battalions; 300 Centurion and 150 Pz-61 medium tanks; 200 AMX-13 light tanks; 1,000 M-113 armored personnel carriers; 155-mm self-propelled howitzers; 105-mm guns and howitzers; 81-mm and 120-mm mortars.

Air Force (including air defense troops): Swiss Air Force and air defense troops are an integral part of the Army, but are listed here separately for purposes of comparison.

3,000 regular; 7,000 conscripts; 40,000 reservists (maintenance by civilians); 315 combat aircraft (combat squadron has fifteen aircraft); thirteen ground support squadrons with Venom FB 50s; two interceptor squadrons with Mirage IIIS. Five interceptor squadrons with Hunter F-58s (with Sidewinder AAMs); one reconnaissance squadron with Mirage IIIRs; twenty transports including three JU-52/3s and six DO-27s; eighty helicopters including sixty Alouette II/IIIs; forty AA batteries with Oerlikon twin 35-mm cannons; two SAM battalions with Bloodhound IIs.

YUGOSLAVIA

Population: 20,800,000.

Military service: eighteen months.

Total armed forces: 233,000.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$11,800,000,000.

Defense budget 1971: 8,838,000,000 dinars or \$596,000,000 (fifteen dinars=\$1. Before Jan. 23, 1971, 12.5 dinars=\$1).

Army: 195,000.

Nine infantry divisions; fourteen armored brigades; thirty-one independent infantry brigades; one airborne brigade; one marine infantry brigade; T-54/55, T-34, M-47, and 650 M-4 medium tanks; PT-76 and thirty-five AMX-13 light tanks; M-3, BTR-50, BTR-60P, and BTR-152 armored personnel carriers; SU-100 self-propelled guns; 105-mm and 155-mm howitzers; 50-mm, 57-mm, 75-mm, and 76-mm antitank guns; SU-57 self-propelled AA guns; SA-2 SAMs.

Navy: 18,000.

Five submarines; one destroyer; three patrol vessels; sixteen submarine chasers; four coastal minesweepers; twenty inshore minesweepers (twelve less than 100 tons); ten Osa-class patrol boats with Styx SSMs; sixty-seven motor torpedo boats (fifty-five less than 100 tons); thirty-five landing craft; twenty-five coastal artillery batteries.

Air Force: 20,000; 330 combat aircraft (a combat squadron has fifteen aircraft).

Ten GA squadrons with F-84s, *Kragujs* and *Jastrebs*; ten fighter/interceptor squadrons with F-86D/Es and MIG-21F/PFs; two reconnaissance squadrons with RT-33s; sixty *Galab* trainers; twenty-five LI-2, *Beaver*, C-47, and IL-14 transports; fifty *Whirlwind*, MI-14, and some *Alouette III* helicopters; eight SAM batteries with SA-2s.

Paramilitary forces: 19,000 frontier guards; 1,000,000 territorial defense force (planned to increase to 3,000,000).

CHAPTER V—THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS

The members of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) are Britain, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, with the United States as an associate. All sit on the Military, Economic, and Counter-Subversion Committees, and on the Permanent Military Deputies Group. The Treaty provides for mutual cooperation for security and defense, but has no international command structure, nor forces allocated to it. For the local powers, the economic organization of Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), which arose out of CENTO, may today be more important.

BILATERAL AGREEMENTS

A number of external powers have military arrangements with countries in the region. The United States has varying types of security assistance agreements and provides significant military aid on either a grant or credit basis to Greece, Turkey, Portugal, Spain, Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. It provides, in addition, a significant amount of military equipment on a cash sales basis to many countries, notably Israel, Spain, and Jordan. For grant military assistance purposes Greece and Turkey are considered forward defense areas and Spain is considered a base rights country. Communication bases are maintained in Morocco under informal arrangements.

The Soviet Union has a military assistance agreement, concluded in December 1970, and a fifteen-year treaty of friendship and cooperation, signed in May 1971, with the UAR. Important military assistance is also provided to Algeria, Iraq, Sudan, and Syria, which may be covered by more informal arrangements.

The People's Republic of China has supplied arms to Albania, and has a treaty of friendship with the Yemen.

Britain has defense commitments to Cyprus, Gibraltar, and Malta, and has proposed defense arrangements with the lower Gulf States after her withdrawal from the Persian Gulf at the end of 1971. Britain is also an important arms supplier for the Gulf Sheikdoms, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.

France has a pilot training agreement with Morocco but no other formal commitments in the region. The facilities provisions of the Evian agreements with Algeria lapsed at the end of 1970 with the return of the Bou-Sfer airbase to Algeria. France sells arms to a number of countries, notably to Libya.

ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN THE REGION (BETWEEN ARAB STATES)

Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the UAR, and Yemen are members of the League of Arab States. Among its subsidiary bodies are the Arab Defense Council set up in 1950 and the United Arab Command organized in 1964.

Defense agreements were concluded by the

UAR with Syria in November 1966 and Jordan in May 1967, to which Iraq later acceded. These agreements provided for the establishment of a Defense Council and a Joint Command. The loosely associated Eastern Front Command, comprising Iraq, Jordan, the Palestine Liberation Army, and Syria, was reorganized in December 1970 into separate Jordanian and Syrian commands. Iraq and Syria concluded defense pacts in May 1968 and July 1969. The proposed Union of Arab Republics, announced by Libya, Syria, and the UAR in April 1971, would provide for a common defense policy and a Federal Defense Council. Sudan has announced its intention to join.

ALGERIA

Population: 14,150,000.
Military service: limited conscription.
Total armed forces: 60,250.
Estimated GNP 1970: \$4,400,000,000.
Defense budget 1971: 490,000,000 dinars or \$99,200,000 (4.94 dinars=\$1).
Army: 53,000.

Four motorized infantry brigades; one parachute brigade; three independent tank battalions; fifty independent infantry battalions; twelve companies of desert troops; five independent artillery battalions; 200 T-34, 200 T-54, and fifty T-55 medium tanks; AMX-13 light tanks; 350 BTR-152 armored personnel carriers; twenty-five SU-100 and six JSU-152 self-propelled guns; 85-mm guns, 122-mm, and 152-mm howitzers; 140-mm and 240-mm rocket launchers.

Navy: 3,250.

Six coastal escorts; two fleet minesweepers; one coastal minesweeper; eight Komar- and one Osa-class patrol boats (Styx surface-to-surface missiles); eight P-5 torpedo boats.
Air Force: 4,000; 142 combat aircraft.

Twenty-four IL-28 light bombers; twenty MIG-15s, forty MIG-17 ground attack fighters; thirty MIG-21 interceptors; twenty-eight *Magister* armed trainers; eight AN-12 and three IL-18 transports; three MI-1, forty MI-4, seven Hughes-269A, and two SA-330 helicopters; one SAM battalion with SA-2s.
Paramilitary forces: 8,000. Gendarmerie with fifty AML armored cars.

IRAN

Population: 29,500,000.
Military service: two years.
Total armed forces: 181,000.
Estimated GNP 1970: \$10,900,000,000.
Defense budget 1971-72: 77,500,000,000 rials or \$1,023,000,000 (75.75 rials=\$1).
Army: 150,000.

Three armored divisions; three infantry divisions; four independent infantry brigades; one SAM battalion with *Hawks*; 400 M-47 and 460 M-60A1 medium tanks; 100 M-24 light tanks; 100 M-8 and 140 M-20 armored cars; 300 M-113, 270 BTR-50, and 300 BTR-60 armored personnel carriers; 75-mm, 105-mm, and 155-mm howitzers; 40-mm, 57-mm, and 85-mm AA guns; eight *Huskie* helicopters (further helicopters are being delivered).

Navy: 9,000.

One destroyer; one frigate (four with Sea-cat SAMs are being delivered); four corvettes; four patrol boats; four coastal minesweepers; two inshore minesweepers; eight SRN-6 and two *Wellington* hovercraft (less than 100 tons); four landing craft.

Air Force: 22,000; 140 combat aircraft.

Two fighter-bomber squadrons with F-4Ds, with *Sidewinder* and *Sparrow* air-to-air missiles (thirty-two F-4Es are on order); five fighter-bomber squadrons with F-5s; twenty F-86 all-weather fighters (being phased out); nine RT-33 reconnaissance aircraft; transports include ten C-47s, twenty-six C-130Es, and six *Beavers* (thirty C-130Hs are being delivered); helicopters include ten *Huskies*, forty-five AB-205s, and sixteen *Super-Frelons* (further helicopters are being delivered); *Tigercats* SAMs (*Rapier* SAMs are on order).

Paramilitary forces: 40,000. Gendarmerie with thirty AB-206 helicopters.

IRAQ

Population: 9,250,000.
Military service: two years.
Total armed forces: 95,250.
Estimated GNP 1970: \$3,120,000,000.
Estimated defense expenditure 1970-71: 84,700,000 dinars or \$237,160,000 (one dinar=\$2.80).
Army: 85,000.

Two armored divisions; four infantry divisions (each of four brigades); 800 T-54 and T-55, and sixty T-34/85 medium tanks; forty-five PT-76 light tanks; 115 AML armored cars; sixty *Ferret* scout cars; BTR-152 armored personnel carriers; artillery includes 300 Soviet 120-mm and 130-mm guns.

Navy: 2,000.

Three submarine chasers; twelve motor torpedo boats (less than 100 tons); ten patrol boats (less than 100 tons).

Air Force: 8,250; 220 combat aircraft.

Nine TU-16 medium bombers; twelve IL-28 light bombers; forty-eight SU-7 fighter-bombers; thirty-five *Hunter* ground attack fighters; sixteen T-52 *Jet Provost* light-strike aircraft; eighty-five MIG-21 interceptors; fifteen MI-17 fighters; thirty-five M-14, twelve MI-8, and nine *Wessex* helicopters; two AN-2, eight AN-12, ten AN-24, two TU-124, and two *Heron* transports.

Paramilitary forces: 20,000, including 10,000 national guard and 4,000 security troops, forming one mechanized brigade.

ISRAEL

Population: 3,040,000.
Military service (Jewish population only): men, thirty-six months; women, twenty months.

Total armed forces: 75,000 regular cadre and conscripts (can be raised to 300,000 by mobilizing reservists within forty-eight to seventy-two hours).

Estimated GNP 1970: \$5,400,000,000.
Defense budget 1971-72: 5,193,000,000 Israeli pounds or \$1,483,700,000 (3.5 Israeli pounds=\$1).

Army: 11,500 regular, 50,000 conscripts (275,000 when fully mobilized).

Four armored brigades; four infantry brigades; one parachute brigade; 300 M-48 (with 105-mm guns), 250 Ben Gurion (Centurion with French 105-mm gun), 200 Senturion, 200 Sherman (with 105-mm gun) and Super Sherman, 100 T1-67 (T54/55 with 105-mm gun), and twenty-five M-60 medium tanks; AML-60, fifteen AML-90 and some Staghound armored cars; about 1,000 M-2 and M-3 half-tracks; M-113 armored personnel carriers; twenty-four M-109 155-mm self-propelled howitzers; 155-mm howitzers on Sherman chassis; about 300 self-propelled 105-mm howitzers, 120-mm and 160-mm mortars on AMX-chassis; 90-mm self-propelled antitank guns and 106-mm jeep-mounted recoilless rifles; Corba and weapons carrier-mounted SS-10/11 antitank guided weapons; 20-mm, 30-mm, and 40-mm AA guns (the M-660 280-mile-range surface-to-surface missile may become operational during 1971).

Reserves: would increase above formations to ten armored, nine infantry, and four parachute brigades.

Navy: 3,500 regular, 1,000 conscripts (8,000 when fully mobilized).

Three submarines; one destroyer (used as a training ship); twelve fast patrol boats (with Gabriel surface-to-surface missiles); nine motor torpedo boats (less than 100 tons); eight patrol boats (less than 100 tons); ten landing craft (four less than 100 tons); 500 naval commandos.

Air Force: 8,000 regular, 1,000 conscripts (17,000 when fully mobilized); 374 combat aircraft.

Ten Vautour light bombers; seventy-five F-4E fighter-bomber/interceptors; sixty Mirage IIIC fighter-bomber interceptors (some with R-530 air-to-air missiles); seventy-two

A-4E/H fighter-bombers (eighteen more are due to be delivered during 1971); twenty-seven Mystère IV-A fighter-bombers; thirty Ouragan fighter-bombers; nine Super Mystère interceptors; six RF-4E reconnaissance aircraft; eighty-five Magister armed trainers; ten Stratocruiser transports/tankers; fifteen Noratlas, ten C-47, and four C-46 transports; twelve Super Frelon, eight CH-53, twenty-five AB-205, and twenty Alouette helicopters; eight SAM batteries with forty-eight Hawks.

Paramilitary forces: 10,000. Militia providing regional border defense units.

JORDAN

Population: 2,225,000.

Military service: two years.

Total armed forces: 60,250.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$640,000,000.

Defense budget 1971: 32,300,000 dinars or \$90,440,000 (one dinar = \$2.80).

Army: 58,000.

One armored division; one mechanized division; one infantry division; one Royal Guards battalion (armored); three artillery regiments; one SAM regiment with *Tiger-cats*; 150 M-47 and M-48, and 140 *Centurion* medium tanks 125 *Saladin* armored cars; 140 *Ferret* scout cars; 250 M-113 and 100 *Saracen* armored personnel carriers; twenty-five-pounder guns; thirty 105-mm and 155-mm howitzers; a few 15-mm and 203-mm guns; M-42 self-propelled AA guns.

Navy: 250.

Eight small patrol craft.

Air Force: 2,000; thirty-three combat aircraft.

Two ground-attack squadrons with eighteen *Hunters*; one interceptor squadron with fifteen F-104As; four C-47 and two *Dove* transports; helicopters include seven *Alouette IIIs*.

Paramilitary forces: 37,500, consisting of 7,500 Gendarmerie, and 30,000 National Guard.

LEBANON

Population: 2,775,000.

Voluntary military service (proposals have been made to introduce compulsory military training).

Total armed forces: 15,250.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$1,560,000,000.

Defense budget 1971: 166,200,000 Lebanese pounds or \$51,100,000 (3.25 Lebanese pounds = \$1).

Army 14,000.

Two tank battalions; one motorized battalion; nine infantry battalions; forty *Charioteer* medium tanks; forty AMX-13 and twenty M-41 light tanks; M-706, M-6, and AEC Mark-3 armored cars; M-113 and M-59 armored personnel carriers; 155-mm howitzers; fifteen M-42 self-propelled AA guns.

Navy: 250.

One patrol vessel; four small patrol boats (less than 100 tons); one landing craft.

Air Force: 1,000; twenty-one combat aircraft.

Twelve *Hunter* ground-attack fighters; one interceptor squadron with *Mirage IIICs* (negotiations have taken place for their resale to France, and they are not thought to be operational) with R-530 air-to-air missiles; five transports; one helicopter squadron with four *Alouette IIs* and six *Alouette IIIs*. Some radar of a *Crotale* SAM system have been delivered.

Paramilitary forces: 2,500 Gendarmerie. A National Guard of 5,000 is being formed.

LIBYA

Population: 2,000,000.

Military service: Eighteen months.

Total armed forces: 22,000.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$4,000,000,000.

Defense budget 1971-72: 30,000,000 Libyan pounds or \$84,000,000 (one Libyan pound = \$2.80).

Army: 20,000.

Four armored battalions; five infantry battalions; three artillery battalions; two AA

artillery battalions; six *Centurion V*, 100 T-54/55, and fifteen T-34/85 medium tanks; *Saladin* armored cars; *Shorland* and *Ferret* scout cars; *Saracen* armored personnel carriers; 122-mm guns, 105-mm and 155-mm howitzers; L40/70 Bofors AA guns (an order for 188 *Chieftain* tanks from Britain is in abeyance).

Navy: 1,000.

One corvette; three fast patrol boats with SS-12(M) surface-to-surface missiles; one fleet minesweeper; two inshore minesweepers; one logistic support ship; twelve small patrol craft; one fast frigate is due for delivery during 1971.

Air Force: 1,000; seven combat aircraft.

One interceptor squadron with seven F-5s; eighteen *Mirage III* and three T-33 trainers; eight C-130E and nine C-47 medium transports; two AB-206, three OH-13, four *Alouette III*, and six *Super Frelon* helicopters (thirty more of the total order of 110 *Mirages* and eight F-5s are due to be delivered during 1972).

MOROCCO

Population: 16,000,000.

Military service: eighteen months.

Total armed forces: 57,500.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$3,340,000,000.

Defense budget 1971: 491,000,000 dirham or \$97,000,000 (5.06 dirham = \$1).

Army: 52,000.

One armored brigade; three motorized infantry brigades; one light security brigade; one parachute brigade; twelve independent infantry battalions; two camel corps battalions; three desert cavalry battalions; four artillery groups; 120 T-54 medium tanks; 120 AMX-13 light tanks; some EBR-75, and fifty AML-245 and M-8 armored cars; forty M-3 half-track and ninety-five Czech armored personnel carriers; twenty-five SU-100 and AMX-105, and fifty M-56 90-mm self-propelled guns; 75-mm and 105-mm howitzers; six *Alouette II/III* helicopters.

Navy: 1,500.

One frigate; two coastal escorts; one patrol boat (less than 100 tons); two landing ships.

Air Force: 4,000; thirty-eight combat aircraft.

Ten F-5A and four F-5B interceptors; twenty-four *Magister* armed trainers; forty-five T-6 and twenty-five T-28 trainers; ten C-47 and eleven C-119 transports; OH-13, twenty-four AB-204, twelve AB-205, and six HH-43 helicopters (twelve MIG-17 fighter-bombers are in storage).

Paramilitary forces: 23,000. 2,250 Gendarmerie, including two mobile security battalions; 750 Royal Guards; 20,000 Auxiliaries.

SAUDI ARABIA

Population: 7,400,000.

Voluntary military service.

Total armed forces: 41,000.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$4,100,000,000.

Defense budget 1970-71: 1,723,000,000 riyals or \$383,000,000 (4.5 riyals = \$1).

Army: 35,000.

Four infantry brigades; ten SAM batteries with *Hawks*; twenty-five M-47 medium tanks; 60 M-41 light tanks; 200 AML-60s and AML-90s; some *Staghound* and *Greyhound* armored cars; *Ferret* scout cars.

Deployment: 1,000 in Jordan; 2,000 in UAR.

Navy: 1,000.

Three torpedo boats; one patrol vessel; two fast patrol boats; eight SRN-6 hovercraft; twenty smaller patrol boats are being delivered.

Air Force: 5,000; seventy-five combat aircraft.

One fighter-bomber squadron with fifteen F-86s; two ground-attack squadrons with twenty BAC-167s; two interceptor squadrons with twenty *Lightnings*; ten C-130E transport aircraft; four *Alouette III*, one AB-204, three AB-205, and fourteen AB-206 helicopters; about thirty-five *Hunter*, *Lightning*,

and T-33A trainers; two SAM regiments with thirty-six *Thunderbirds*.

Paramilitary forces: 30,000. National Guard (formerly known as the "White Army"); lightly armed tribal levies with *Vigilant* anti-tank guided weapons.

SUDAN

Population: 16,050,000.

Voluntary military service (proposals for compulsory service have been made).

Total armed forces: 37,100.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$1,830,000,000.

Defense budget 1970-71: 46,400,000 Sudanese pounds or \$133,200,000 (one Sudanese pound = \$2.87).

Army: 35,000.

One armored brigade; six infantry brigades; one independent infantry battalion; one parachute regiment; three artillery regiments; one engineer regiment; twenty T-34/85, fifty T-54, and fifty T-55 medium tanks; fifty *Saladin* and forty-five *Commando* armored cars; sixty *Ferret* scout cars; BTR-40, BIR-152, and *Saracen* armored personnel carriers; fifty-five twenty-five-pounders, forty 105-mm, and some 122-mm guns and howitzers; twenty 120-mm mortars; eighty Bofors 40-mm and some Soviet 85-mm AA guns.

Deployment: 2,000 in Egypt.

Navy: 600.

Six coastal patrol boats; two landing craft.

Air Force: 1,500; 32 combat aircraft.

Sixteen Mig-21 interceptors; five BAC-145 Mk 5, eight *Jet Provost* Mk 52, and three *Provost* Mk 51 light attack aircraft; three *Pembroke*, three F-27 *Troopship*, six AN-12, and five AN-24 transports; ten MI-8 helicopters.

Paramilitary forces: 3,000. 1,000 Gendarmerie; 2,000 Frontier Police.

SYRIA

Population: 6,200,000.

Military service: thirty months (Jewish population exempted).

Total armed forces: 111,750.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$1,460,000,000.

Estimated defense expenditure 1970: 670,000,000 Syrian pounds or \$176,000,000 (3.8 Syrian pounds = \$1).

Army: 100,000.

One armored division; two mechanized divisions; two infantry divisions; one parachute battalion; five commando battalions; seven artillery regiments; eight SAM batteries with SA-2s; about thirty JS-3 heavy tanks; 150 T-34, and 800 T-54/55 medium tanks; some PT-76 light tanks; 100 SU-100 self-propelled guns; 500 BTR-152 armored personnel carriers; 800 Soviet-made guns including 122-mm, 130-mm, and 152-mm.

Navy: 1,750.

Two minesweepers; two coastal patrol vessels; six *Komar*-class patrol boats, with *Styx* surface-to-surface missiles; twelve motor torpedo boats (less than 100 tons).

Air Force: 10,000 men; 210 combat aircraft.

Eighty MIG-15 and MIG-17 fighter-bombers; thirty SU-7 fighter-bombers; 100 MIG-21 interceptors; eight IL-14 and six C-47 transports; four MI-1, eight MI-4, and some MI-8 helicopters.

Paramilitary forces: 6,500. 5,000 Gendarmerie; 1,500 Internal Security Camel Corps.

TUNISIA

Population: 5,050,000.

Military service: one year (selective).

Total armed forces: 21,550.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$1,240,000,000.

Estimated defense expenditure 1971: 10,509,000 dinars or \$20,020,000 (one dinar = \$1.905).

Army: 20,000.

One armored battalion; six infantry battalions; one commando battalion; one artillery group; one Sahara patrol group; about fifteen AMX-13 and M-41 light tanks; twenty *Saladin* and some M-8 armored cars; 105-mm self-

propelled and 155-mm guns; 40-mm Bofors AA guns.

Navy: 800.

One corvette; one coastal escort; two patrol boats with SS-12 (M) surface-to-surface missiles; ten patrol boats (less than 100 tons); four fast patrol boats and six coastal patrol boats due to be delivered in 1971.

Air Force: 750; twelve combat aircraft.

Twelve F-86 fighters; eight MB-326, twelve T-6, and fourteen SAAB 91-D trainers; three *Flamant* light transports; eight *Alouette II* helicopters.

Paramilitary forces: 10,000. 5,000 Gendarmerie organized in six battalions; 5,000 National Guard.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (UAR)

Population: 34,150,000.

Military service: three years.

Total armed forces: 318,000.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$6,430,000,000.

Defense budget 1971-72: 650,000,000 Egyptian pounds or \$1,495,000,000 (one Egyptian pound = \$2.30).

Army: 275,000.

Three armored divisions; four mechanized infantry divisions; five infantry divisions; two parachute brigades; sixteen artillery brigades; twenty commando battalions; fifty JS-3 and T-10 heavy tanks; 1,200 T-54/55 and 250 T-34/85 medium tanks; 150 PT-76 light tanks; 850 BTR-40, BTR-50P, BTR-60P, OT-64, and 350 BTR-152 armored personnel carriers, about 150 SU-100 and JSU-152 self-propelled guns; about 1,500 122-mm, 130-mm, and 152-mm guns and howitzers, and forty 203-mm howitzers; 57-mm, 85-mm, and 100-mm antitank guns; Snapper anti-tank guided weapons; twenty-four FROG-3 and twenty-five Samlet short-range surface-to-surface missiles; ZSU-23-4 and ZSU-57 self-propelled AA guns.

Navy: 14,000 including coast guards.

Twelve submarines (including six ex-Soviet W-class and six ex-Soviet R-class); five destroyers (including four ex-Soviet Skory-class); two corvettes; ten submarine chasers; four fleet minesweepers; two inshore minesweepers; twelve Osa-class and eight Komar-class patrol boats with Styx surface-to-surface missiles; thirty motor torpedo boats (less than 100 tons); twenty landing craft.

Air Force: 25,000; 523 combat aircraft.

Eighteen TU-16 medium bombers; twenty-five light bombers; 200 MIG-21 interceptors; 110 SU-7 fighter-bombers; 200 MIG-17 fighter-bombers; 150 MIG, YAK, and L-29 trainers (some can be armed); about forty IL-14 and twenty AN-12 medium transports; 140 MI-1, MI-4, MI-6, and MI-8 helicopters. Air defense is provided by 37-mm, 57-mm, 85-mm, and 100-mm guns; up to seventy sites with six launchers each of SA-2 SAMs; a radar network and six squadrons of MIG-21 interceptors. Coordinated with this defense are up to 150 MIG-21J and possibly MIG-23 aircraft—all Soviet operated. There are also up to sixty-five Soviet-controlled sites with four launchers each of SA-3s (and possibly SA-4s).

Deployment: elements in Sudan.

Missile Command: 4,000.

This is separate from the Army and the Air Force and its numbers include civilian technicians. Fresh development work may have started on the 1,000-pound warhead, 235-mile-range *Al Zafir*, the 375-mile-range *Al Kahir*, and the 440-mile-range *Al Raid*, stated to be able to carry a one-ton scientific probe, but these ranges are probably over-optimistic. The first two missiles were designed to be mobile; none is thought to have achieved any operational capability.

Paramilitary forces: National Guard of about 120,000.

CHAPTER VI—THE NATIONS OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS

The Organization of African Unity (OAU), constituted in May 1963, includes all internationally recognized independent African states except South Africa. Its Defense Commission is responsible for defense and security cooperation, and the defense of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of its members.

There is a regional defense pact among France, Congo (Brazzaville), the Central African Republic, and Chad, and there is a five-party defense agreement among France, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Niger, and Upper Volta, which has set up the "Conseil de défense de l'Afrique équatoriale."

BILATERAL AGREEMENTS

A number of external powers have military arrangements with countries in the region. The United States has varying types of security assistance agreements and provides significant military aid on either a grant or credit basis to Ethiopia, Liberia, and Congo (Kinshasa). For grant military assistance purposes, Ethiopia, where the United States has a large communications center, is considered a base rights country.

The Soviet Union and China are not known to have defense agreements with countries in the region, but Soviet military assistance has been given to Guinea, Mali, and Mauritania.

Britain maintains defense agreements with Kenya and Mauritius, and an agreement with South Africa, made in June 1955 and revised in January 1967, covering the use of the Simonstown naval base. France has defense agreements with Cameroun, Gabon, Malagasy Republic, Mauritania, Senegal, and Togo; technical military assistance agreements with Cameroun, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo, and Upper Volta; and mutual facilities agreements with Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, and Niger.

Portugal directly assures the defense of Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea, and Spain of Spanish Sahara, Ceuta, and Melilla. All of these are administratively regarded as overseas provinces, except Ceuta and Melilla, which are treated as integral parts of Spain.

With a few important exceptions, only countries with armed forces over 5,000 strong are included. Though in some African states they have a considerable internal security role, civil police forces have not been included. Details of civil police forces of African States and of the armed forces of countries not included here may be found in The International Institute for Strategic Studies' Adelphi Paper No. 67—*The Armed Forces of African States, 1970*. The amount of military equipment shown may not necessarily be that which can be used. In some of the developing nations, maintenance facilities and skills may pose problems, and spare parts may not be readily available.

CONGO (INSHASA) (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO)

Population: 21,300,000.

Voluntary military service.

Total armed forces: 46,000.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$1,900,000,000.

Estimated defense expenditure 1970: 42,000,000 zaires or \$84,000,000 (one zair=\$2).

Army: 45,000.

Fourteen infantry battalions; seven parachute battalions; one heavy weapons battalion; four other battalions. The above, together with support units, form seven brigade groups and one parachute division. About eighty AML armored cars; M-3 and

Ferret scout cars (less than half operational).

Navy: 150.

Seven river gunboats; one patrol boat.

Air Force: 850; thirty-two combat aircraft. Seventeen MB-326GB, eight T-6G, and five T-28D armed trainers; ten C-47, four C-54, and three C-130 transports; eight SF-260M trainers; one *Alouette II*, four *Alouette III*, and seven SA-330 *Puma* helicopters.

Paramilitary forces: Six National Guard and seven Gendarmerie battalions.

ETHIOPIA

Population: 25,800,000.

Voluntary military service.

Total armed forces: 42,750.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$US 1,750,000,000.

Defense budget 1970-71: \$E 89,100,000 or \$US 35,640,000 (\$E 2.50=\$US 1).

Army: 39,000. Four infantry divisions; 8,000 men in each (including imperial Guard); one tank battalion; one airborne infantry battalion; one armored car squadron; four artillery battalions; five air defense batteries; two engineer battalions; fifty-five M-14 medium tanks; fifteen M-24 light tanks; about fifty armored personnel carriers.

Navy: 1,500. One training ship (ex-sea-plane tender); five patrol boats; two motor torpedo boats; four gunboats (less than 100 tons); four landing craft (less than 100 tons).

Air Force: 2,250; forty-eight combat aircraft. One bomber squadron with four *Camberra B-2s*; one fighter-bomber squadron with eleven F-86Fs; one ground-attack squadron with thirteen T-28s; one ground-attack squadron with eight SAAB-17s; one fighter squadron with ten F-5As; one reconnaissance squadron with two T-33s; one transport squadron with four C-47s, two C-54s, four C-119Gs, three *Doves*, and one IL-14; three training squadrons with twenty *Safirs*, fifteen T-28As, and eleven T-33s; four *Alouette II* and two MI-8 helicopters.

Paramilitary forces: 13,750. 6,000 Territorial Army—active strength; 6,800 mobile emergency police force; 1,500 frontier guards.

GHANA

Population: 9,050,000.

Voluntary military service.

Total armed forces: 18,600.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$2,570,000,000.

Defense budget 1970-71: 45,300,000 cedi or \$44,400,000 (1.02 cedi=\$1).

Army: 16,500. Two brigades comprising seven infantry battalions and support units; two reconnaissance squadrons; *Saladin* armored cars; *Ferret* scout cars; heavy mortars. Navy: 1,000. Two corvettes, one coastal minesweeper; two inshore minesweepers; two seaward defense vessels; three P-class patrol boats (less than 100 tons). (There is a substantial shortage of spares for all naval craft.)

Air Force: 1,100; no combat aircraft.

One transport squadron with seven Otters; one transport squadron with eight Caribous and three Herons; one communications and liaison squadron with eleven Beavers; three Whirlwind, two Wessex, and three Hughes 269 helicopters; six MB-326 and nine Chipmunk trainers.

Paramilitary forces: A workers brigade.

GUINEA

Population: 4,075,000.

Military service: two years.

Total armed forces: 5,350.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$700,000,000.

Defense budget 1966-67: 2,338,000,000 Guinea francs or \$9,470,000 (278 Guinea francs=\$1).

Army: 5,000. Five infantry battalions; one armored battalion; three engineer companies; T-34 tanks; BTR-152 armored personnel carriers; 105-mm and 85-mm guns.

Deployment: about 200 in Sierra Leone.

Navy: (Coast Guard) 150. Six ex-Soviet patrol boats (less than 100 tons).

Air Force: 200; five combat aircraft. Five MIG-17 fighters; two IL-18 and four IL-14 transports; YAK-18 and MIG-15 trainers.

Paramilitary forces: 7,500. 900 Gendarmerie; 1,600 Republican Guard; 5,000 militia.

IVORY COAST

Population: 4,375,000.

Military service: two years.

Total armed forces: 4,400.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$1,440,000,000.

Estimated defense expenditure 1970: 6,350,000,000 CFA francs or \$22,800,000 (278 CFA francs=\$1).

Army: 4,000. Three infantry battalions; one armored squadron; one parachute company; two artillery batteries; one engineer company; about five AMX-13 light tanks; some armored cars, scout cars, 105-mm guns, mortars, 40-mm AA guns.

Navy: 100. Three patrol vessels (one less than 100 tons); two landing craft (less than 100 tons).

Air Force: 300, no combat aircraft. Three C-47 medium, and one *Mystère 29*, one *Commander 500*, and five MH-1521 *Broussard* light transports; five *Alouette* helicopters and six light aircraft.

Paramilitary forces: 2,000 Gendarmerie.

KENYA

Population: 11,525,000.

Voluntary military service.

Total armed forces: 7,170.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$1,580,000,000.

Estimated defense expenditure 1970: 175,000,000 shillings or \$24,500,000 (7.143 shillings=\$1).

Army: 6,300. Four infantry battalions; one support battalion with a parachute company; *Saladin* armored cars; *Ferret* scout cars; 81-mm and 120-mm mortars; 120-mm recoilless rifles.

Navy: 250. One seaward defense boat; three patrol boats.

Air Force: 620; six combat aircraft. Six BAC-167 ground-support aircraft; one transport squadron, with four *Caribous*; one light transport squadron with seven *Beavers*; one training squadron with five *Chipmunks* and three *Beavers*; three *Alouette II* and two H-269 helicopters; five *Bulldog* armed trainers are due to be delivered by mid-1972.

Paramilitary forces: 1,800 in general service units (including Presidential escort).

MALAGASY REPUBLIC

Population: 7,200,000.

Military service: eighteen months.

Total armed forces: 4,100.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$82,000,000.

Defense budget 1969: 3,450,000,000 MG francs or \$13,450,000 (278 MG francs=\$1).

Army: 3,700. Two infantry regiments; one parachute company; one armored squadron; one artillery battery; one engineer regiment.

Navy: 200. One patrol vessel; one training ship; one tender; one marine company.

Air Force: 200; no combat aircraft. Five C-47 medium and three MH-1521 light transports; two MD-315 *Flamant* light aircraft.

Paramilitary forces: 4,100 Gendarmerie.

NIGERIA

Population: 62,000,000.

Voluntary military service.

Total armed forces: 252,000.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$9,100,000,000.

Defense budget 1971-72: 87,000,000 Nigerian pounds or \$243,600,000 (one Nigerian pound equal to \$2.80).

Army: 240,000. Three infantry divisions; three reconnaissance regiments; three artillery regiments; *Saladin* and twenty AML-60/90 armored cars; *Ferret* scout cars; *Saracen* armored personnel carriers; twenty-five-pounder, 76-mm, 105-mm, and 122-mm guns.

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Navy: 5,000. One frigate (refitting); three ex-Soviet fast patrol boats (less than 100 ton); six seaward defense boats; one landing craft; two corvettes are due to be delivered by mid-1972.

Air Force: 7,000; thirty-two combat aircraft. Six IL-28 medium bombers; eight MIG-17 fighter-bombers; eight L-29 *Delfin* and ten P-149D armed trainers. Other aircraft include six C-47 transports; twenty DO-27/28 communication/liaison aircraft; eight *Whirlwind* and *Alouette II* helicopters.

RHODESIA

Population: 5,425,000 (250,000 white population).

Military service: twelve months (white population).

Total armed forces: 4,600.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$1,440,000,000.

Estimated defense expenditure 1970-71: \$R 17,879,000 or \$US 25,031,000 (\$R 1 equal to \$US 1.40).

Army: 3,400. Two infantry battalions (one has *Ferret* scout cars); one Special Air Service squadron; one artillery battery.

There is an establishment for three brigades, two based on regular infantry battalions, which would be brought up to strength by calling out the Territorial battalions referred to below.

Air Force: 1,200; fifty-five combat aircraft. One light bomber squadron with eleven *Canberras*; one fighter/ground-attack squadron with twelve *Hunters*; one fighter/ground-attack squadron with twelve *Vampires*; one recon squadron with thirteen T-52 *Provosts*; one armed trainer squadron with seven AL-60s; one transport squadron including C-47s; one helicopter squadron with eight *Alouette II*s.

Reserves: 8,000. The white population completing military service is assigned for three years part-time training to Territorial units, which include active Territorial battalions based on the cities and reserve Territorial battalions based on country districts. The establishment of the Army Reserves is eight infantry battalions and one field artillery battery. The majority of ground personnel servicing regular Air Force units are Air Force reservists or nonwhite civilians employed by the Air Force.

Paramilitary forces: 6,400 active; 28,500 reservists. The British South African Police (BSAP) have some military equipment such as small arms and would be responsible for much of the internal security of Rhodesia in the event of civil disturbances or a military threat from outside. The white population forms only about a third of the active strength, but nearly three-quarters of the Police reserves.

SENEGAL

Population: 3,950,000.

Military service: two years.

Total armed forces: 5,900.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$72,000,000.

Defense budget 1969-70: 4,461,000,000 CFA francs or \$18,060,000 (278 CFA francs=\$1).

Army: 5,500. Three infantry battalions; two parachute companies; two commando companies; one reconnaissance squadron; one engineer battalion; support units include transport and signal company; *Greyhound* and AML-245 armored cars.

Navy: 200. One coastal escort; two submarine chasers; one patrol boat (less than 100 tons).

Air Force: 200; no combat aircraft. Four C-47 medium and four MH-1521 light transports; two Bell-47G helicopters.

Paramilitary forces: 1,600 Gendarmerie.

SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Population: 2,900,000.

Voluntary military service.

Total armed forces: 15,000.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$180,000,000.

Defense budget 1969: 64,320,000 Somali

shillings or \$9,005,000 (7.143 Somali shilling=\$1).

Army: 13,000. Four tank battalions; nine mechanized infantry battalions; one commando battalion; about 150 T-34 medium tanks (only about one quarter are serviceable); five *Ferret* scout cars; over 200 BTR-40, -50, and -152 armored personnel carriers; 100-mm guns.

Navy: 250. Six patrol boats (less than 100 tons).

Air Force: 1,750; twenty combat aircraft. Twenty MIG-15/MIG-17 fighters; two MIG-15/17 UTI and three P-18 trainers; transports include one C-45 and three C-47s; three AN-2s and one AN-24.

Paramilitary forces: 500 border guards.

SOUTH AFRICA

Population: 20,500,000 (3,900,000 white population).

Military service: nine to twelve months in Citizen Force.

Total armed forces: 44,250.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$17,600,000,000.

Defense budget 1971-72: 316,000,000 rands or \$442,400,000 (one rand=\$1.40).

Army: 32,000 (10,000 regular; 22,000 Citizen Force). 100 *Centurion Mark Vs*, 100 *Sherman*, and forty *Comet* medium tanks; 500 AML-60 and AML-90, and fifty M-3 armored cars; 200 *Ferret* scout cars; *Saracen* armored personnel carriers.

Reserves: 23,000 trained reserves in Citizen Force.

One submarine (two more due for delivery in mid-1972); two destroyers with *Wasp* ASW helicopters (reports suggest that both destroyers and one frigate are temporarily in reserve); six ASW frigates; one escort minesweeper; ten coastal minesweepers; five seaward defense boats; one fleet replenishment tanker.

Reserves: 4,750 trained reserves in Citizen Force.

Air Force: 8,000 (5,000 regular; 3,000 Citizen Force); 163 combat aircraft.

One bomber squadron with sixteen *Canberra B-12s*; one light bomber squadron with fifteen *Buccaneer Mark 50s*; one fighter-bomber squadron and twenty *Mirage IIIEZs* (with AS-20 and AS-30). (*Mirage* aircraft are to be built in South Africa under license); one interceptor squadron with sixteen *Mirage IIICZ* (with R-530 air-to-air missiles). Other aircraft include four *Mirage IIIEZs*, thirty F-86s, five *Vampire FB-5s*, and at least fifty MB-326 *Impalas*; one maritime recon squadron with seven *Shackletons*; nine *Transall*, thirty C-47, four C-54, seven C-130B/E, and one *Viscount* medium and nine P-166 light transports; 106 *Alouette II/III*, eight *Wasp*, and sixteen *Super Frelon* helicopters (deliveries of twenty SA-330 *Pumas* have begun); a *Cactus* air defense missile system is being installed, but the *Crotale* SAMs have not yet been delivered.

Reserves: The Citizen Air Force operates eight squadrons with fifty *Impalas*, about 120 *Harvard* armed trainers, and C-47 transports.

Paramilitary forces. 78,000. 75,000 Kommandos organized and trained on the same lines as the Citizen Force. 3,000 police with antiterrorist training whose equipment includes eighty *Saracen* armored personnel carriers on loan from the army.

TANZANIA

Population: 13,600,000.

Voluntary military service.

Total armed forces: 11,100.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$1,100,000,000.

Defense budget 1968-69: 190,300,000 shillings or \$26,640,000 (7.143 shillings=\$1).

Army: 10,000. Four infantry battalions; fourteen Chinese T-62 light tanks; some BTR-40 and -152 armored personnel carriers; Soviet field artillery and Chinese mortars.

Navy: 600. Five fast patrol boats; eight patrol boats (less than 100 tons).

Air Force: 500; no combat aircraft. One AN-2, six Beaver, and four Caribou transports; seven P-149 trainers.

UGANDA

Population: 10,025,000.
Voluntary military service.
Total armed forces: 9,000.
Estimated GNP 1970: \$1,060,000,000.
Defense budget 1968-69: 120,540,000 shillings or \$16,875,000 (7.143 shillings=\$1).
Army: 8,500. Two brigades each of two infantry battalions with supporting services; two border guard battalions; one mechanized battalion; one parachute/commando battalion; one artillery regiment; five M-4 medium tanks; sixteen Ferret scout cars; twenty BTR-40 and BTR-152, and twelve OT-64B armored personnel carriers (perhaps half are operational).

Air Force: 450; nineteen combat aircraft. One fighter squadron with seven MIG-15s and MIG-17s; twelve Magister armed trainers; one transport squadron with six C-47s and one Caribou; two AB-206 and two Scout helicopters; four Piaggio P-149 and twelve L-29 Delfin trainers, and seven Piper light aircraft.

ZAMBIA

Population: 4,250,000.
Voluntary military service.
Total armed forces: 5,500.
Estimated GNP 1970: \$1,580,000,000.
Defense budget 1966: 12,600,000 kwachas or \$17,640,000 (one kwacha=\$1.40).
Army: 4,500. One brigade of three infantry battalions and one reconnaissance squadron; one artillery battery; one engineer squadron; a signals squadron and supporting services; Ferret scout cars; 150-mm guns.

Air Force: 1,000; 12 combat aircraft. Four Jastreb light attack aircraft; eight SF-260MZ armed trainers; one transport squadron with two C-47s and four Caribous; one communications/liaison squadron with six Beavers and two Pembrokes; four AB-205 helicopters; two Galeb and six Chipmunk trainers; twelve MB-326 ground-attack aircraft are on order.
Paramilitary forces: Two police mobile battalions.

CHAPTER VII—CHINA

China's dominant strategic concept is a People's War, in which most of the population is allotted a military role. This entails a peacetime program of rudimentary military training for civilians. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is heavily involved in the political and military administration of the country.

China's large manpower pool allows great selectivity in manning the 2,900,000-strong regular forces. The vast bulk of the manpower lies in the land forces, specifically in the infantry and artillery. Out of a total of 140 divisions, only five are armored. The Navy and Air Force account for little more than ten percent of the personnel, compared with about thirty percent in the Soviet Union.

The PLA is not equipped on the scale of major industrial countries, including the Soviet Union, and its mobility is limited. However, China's military production is improving steadily in quantity and quality. She now produces the TU-16 medium bomber, the MIG-21, the T-59 medium tank, the (Chinese) T-62 light tank, and armored personnel carriers, which improve the mobility of the PLA; also a new Chinese twin-engine fighter is being developed. In the Navy, the buildup of fast guided-missile patrol boats is continuing, along with its own version of the R-class medium-range, diesel-powered submarine. At least one nuclear-powered submarine appears to be under construction; it is probably an attack vessel.

The PLA is organized in eleven Military Regions, and to some extent its equipment and logistics support reflect this regional character. Its deployment is uneven, with major concentrations along the littoral, the

Canton-Wuhan railway, and in the north-east. During 1969-70, there were some shifts of forces from the south of China to the northern half of the country, but little movement has been reported since. In July 1971, there were thought to be 15,000-20,000 railway engineers, construction engineers, and protecting troops in North Vietnam and Laos.

China has a thirty-year Treaty of Alliance and Friendship with the Soviet Union, signed in 1950, with mutual defense obligations, the validity of which must be in doubt. China has a mutual defense agreement with North Korea dating from 1961, and it is probable that she has well-defined defense commitments toward North Vietnam. China has in the past year continued to provide military assistance to Pakistan and Tanzania, and to Albania, with whom she has been cooperating on defense matters.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

China conducted only one nuclear test in the past year, the eleventh since 1964. As with at least three of the previous tests, the 1970 explosion involved a fusion (thermonuclear) device with a yield of some three megatons. China has significant resources of natural uranium and its own plant for uranium enrichment. It may now have sufficient fissionable material for a total of about 120 fission and fusion weapons, although the availability of deuterium and/or tritium may constrain production of fusion weapons.

For air delivery of nuclear weapons China had until recently only a few old TU-4 bombers. At least thirty TU-16s, a medium bomber with an operational range of about 1,500 miles, have now been produced, and estimated production capacity is some five a month.

China, which has been testing MRBMs since the mid-1960s, has apparently deployed, mainly in northwestern and northeastern China, about twenty operational missiles with a range of up to 1,000 miles (the 230-kilogram second earth satellite was launched, in March 1971, by a booster of IRBM capability). During 1970-71, a new missile-testing site was also brought into use in Manchuria, allowing ballistic flights of up to 2,000 miles into the Sinkiang desert. One test from this site in late 1970 may have been connected with the development of an IRBM, or components for an ICBM. Full-range testing of an ICBM would require the use of impact areas and tracking facilities in the Indian or Pacific Oceans.

There is no clear evidence to show what "mix" of missile forces China is seeking to develop. The design of any Chinese ICBM would have to take into account the fact that the urban areas on the northwestern coast of the United States are some 6,000 miles from Chinese territory.

The responsibility for operational Chinese missile forces is believed to have been assigned to the "Second Artillery Command." It is not clear whether this Command is autonomous (as are the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces) or is subordinate to the Army.

GENERAL

Population: 760,000,000. (No official population figures have been published since January 1, 1958, when the total was 646,530,000. The figure quoted here is based on the latest estimate published by the United Nations. Other estimates range from 720,000,000 to 850,000,000.)

Selective military service: Army, two years; Air Force, three years; Navy, four years.

Total regular forces: 2,880,000 (including railway engineer troops).

Estimated GNP 1970: \$80,000,000,000 to \$90,000,000,000. (The Chinese Prime Minister has mentioned, as the gross value of industrial, transport, and agricultural production, a figure of \$120,000,000,000. This suggests that the GNP is higher than a recent Japanese estimates of \$75,000,000,000.)

Estimated defense expenditure 1970: \$7,-600,000,000 to \$8,055,000,000. (This is based on an American estimate that China is spending about 9½ percent of her GNP on defense, since the Chinese government has not made public any budget figures since 1960.) (2.46 yuan=\$1.)

Army: 2,550,000 (including railway engineer troops).

Five armored divisions; 110 infantry divisions; three cavalry divisions; two airborne divisions; about twenty artillery divisions. These are supported by signals, engineer, railway engineer, and motor transport units.

Heavy equipment consists of Soviet items supplied up to 1960, including JS-2 tanks and 152-mm and 203-mm artillery. Soviet T-34 and T-54, and Chinese T-59 (version of T-54) medium tanks; Chinese T-62 light tanks, and armored personnel carriers; self-propelled includes SU-76s, SU-100s, and JSU-122s.

Heavy field-engineering equipment, heavy self-propelled artillery and motor transport are in short supply. The army is, however, adequately equipped with infantry weapons, mortars, rocket launchers, recoilless rifles, and light and medium artillery, all produced in China.

Deployment: China is now divided into eleven Military Region (MR), as Inner Mongolia has been incorporated in the Peking MR, and Tibet in the Chengtu MR. The military commander of each Region commands the regular air and naval forces assigned to it, and the civilian militia. The MRs are in turn divided into Military Districts (MD), with usually two or three Districts to a Region.

It is believed that basically one Army is assigned to each MD, giving a total of about thirty Armies. An Army generally consists of three infantry divisions, three artillery regiments, and, in some cases, three armored regiments. Of the five armored divisions in the PLA, two or three are probably kept in the Peking and Shenyang Regions. The geographical distribution of the divisions (excluding artillery) is believed to be:

North and northeast China (Shenyang and Peking MR): thirty-three divisions. (There are, in addition, two or three divisions of border troops in each of these MRs.)

East and southeast China (Tsinan, Nanking, and Foochow MR): twenty-five divisions.

South-central China (Canton [includes Hainan Island] and Wuhan MR): thirty-one divisions.

Midwest China (Lanchow MR): eleven divisions.

West and southwest China (Sinkiang, Chengtu [these two MRs also have several divisions of border troops each], and Kunming MR): twenty divisions.

North Vietnam and Laos: one railway engineer division and some construction engineer troops, in all 15,000-20,000 men.

Navy: 150,000 (including Naval Air Force and 28,000 marines).

One submarine, G-class, with ballistic missile tubes (China is not known to have any missiles for this boat); thirty-two fleet submarines (also about ten older training vessels); three coastal submarines; four destroyers; four destroyer escorts; eleven patrol escorts; twenty-four submarine chasers; fifteen missile patrol boats; thirty minesweepers; forty-five auxiliary minesweepers; 220 MTB and hydrofoils (less than 100 tons); 320 motor gunboats; and 530 landing ships/landing craft (many less than 100 tons).

Deployment: *North Sea Fleet*: 240 vessels. The main bases are at Tsingtao and Lushun. It is deployed along the coast from the mouth of the Yalu River in the north to Lianyungang in the south.

East Sea Fleet: 700 vessels. Bases are at Shanghai and Chou San. It is deployed along the coast from Lianyungang in the north to Chaoan Wan in the south.

South Sea Fleet: 300 vessels. Bases are at Huangpu and Chanchiang. It is deployed from Chaoan Wan in the north to the North Vietnamese frontier in the south.

Naval Air Force: 16,000; about 450 shore-based combat aircraft, including up to 100 IL-28 torpedo-carrying light bombers and substantial numbers of MIG-15 and MIG-17 fighters. Though under Navy command, the fighters are fully integrated into the air defense system.

Air Force: 180,000 (including 85,000 air-defense personnel); about 2,800 combat aircraft.

About thirty TU-16 and a few TU-4 medium bombers; 150 IL-28 light bombers; about 1,700 MIG-15s and MIG-17s; up to 800 MIG-19 and a growing number of MIG-21 fighters; some AN-2, IL-14, and IL-18 transports; and MI-4 helicopters (these could be supplemented by about 350 aircraft of the Civil Air Bureau). There is an air-defense system, initially developed to defend the eastern seaboard of China and now greatly expanded, based on early warning/control radar, interceptor aircraft, and some SA-2 SAMs.

Paramilitary forces: About 300,000 security and border troops, including nineteen infantry-type divisions and thirty independent regiments stationed in the frontier areas; the public security force and a civilian militia with an effective element of probably not more than 5,000,000; production and construction corps in a number of MRs, including those adjoining the northern frontier.

CHAPTER VIII—OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES AND AUSTRALASIA

MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS

In 1954, the United States, Australia, Britain, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, which came into force in 1955 and brought into being SEATO. They committed themselves to consult with a view to joint defense in the event of direct or indirect aggression against a member country or against the so-called "protocol states" of Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam. However, since 1955 and 1956 respectively, Cambodia and Laos have not accepted the protection of SEATO.

The treaty area is the general area of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, below latitude twenty-one degrees thirty minutes north.

SEATO has no central command structure and forces remain under national control.

In 1969, Britain ceased to declare ground forces to the contingency plans for the Organization, and France has no forces declared. Pakistan has announced her progressive disengagement from the Alliance. All remain members.

The United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Thailand have troops serving in South Vietnam. This intervention was not the result of a decision by the SEATO Council, but these countries have, for the most part, justified this action in terms of their SEATO obligations.

Australia, New Zealand, and the United States are the members of a tripartite treaty known as ANZUS, which was signed in 1951 and is of indefinite duration. Under this treaty each agrees to "act to meet the common danger" in the event of armed attack on either metropolitan or island territory of any one of them, or on armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the Pacific.

Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Britain have agreed to Five-Power defense arrangements relating to the external defense of Malaysia and Singapore, which became effective on November 1, 1971. Britain, Australia, and New Zealand maintain forces in Malaysia and Singapore, with the land and naval components based in Singapore and Australia's air contribution mainly at Butter-

worth in the Malayan Peninsula. Until November 1, 1971, the British commitment was governed by the Anglo-Malaysian Defense Agreement but this was replaced after that date by new Five-Power political arrangements. These arrangements envisage that in the event of any armed attack or threat of attack externally organized or supported against Malaysia or Singapore, the five governments would consult together for the purpose of deciding what measures should be taken, jointly or separately.

BILATERAL AGREEMENTS

The United States has bilateral defense treaties with Japan (either party may terminate the treaty by giving one year's notice to the other), the Republic of China (Taiwan), the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines. It has a number of military arrangements with other countries of the region. It provides significant military aid on either a grant or credit basis to the Republic of China, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, Thailand, and South Vietnam. It sells military equipment to many countries, notably Australia, the Republic of China, and Japan. For grant military assistance purposes, Cambodia, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of China are considered forward defense areas. Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and South Vietnam receive grant military assistance direct from the US Department of Defense budget, the only countries in the world to do so. There are military facilities agreements with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines. Major bases maintained in the region include Okinawa and Guam.

The Soviet Union has treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with Mongolia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The validity of a similar treaty with the People's Republic of China must be in doubt. Military assistance agreements with Ceylon and the People's Democratic Republic of Vietnam reportedly exist. Important Soviet military aid is also given to Afghanistan and India and, on a small scale, to Pakistan. On August 9, 1971, the Soviet Union and India signed a twenty-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation in which each undertook to come to the assistance of the other in the event of a conflict with a third country.

China has nonaggression treaties with Burma, Afghanistan, and Cambodia, a treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with North Korea; and a treaty of friendship with North Vietnam, which is thought to contain defense arrangements.

AFGHANISTAN

Population: 17,600,000.
Military service: two years.
Total armed forces: 83,000.
Estimated GNP 1970: \$1,400,000,000.
Estimated defense expenditure 1970: 1,400,000,000 afghanis or \$31,100,000 (forty-five afghanis=\$1).
Army: 80,000.

One armored division; two infantry divisions; one infantry brigade (Royal Bodyguard); ten independent motorized battalions; ten independent infantry battalions; T-34 and T-54 medium tanks and Snapper antitank guided weapons.

Air Force: 3,000; 100 combat aircraft.
Three light bomber squadrons with IL-28s; two interceptor squadrons with thirty MIG-21s; one interceptor squadron with twelve MIG-19s; four fighter-bomber squadrons with MIG-15/17s; one IL-18, twenty-five IL-14, ten AN-2, two Twin Otter, and five Anson transports; MI-1 and MI-4 helicopters.
Paramilitary forces: 13,000 GenCarmerie.

AUSTRALIA

Population: 12,775,000.
Two years' selective military service.
Total armed forces: 88,280.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$US 34,400,000,000.
Defense budget 1970-71: \$A 1,149,000,000 or \$US 1,261,120,000 (\$A 1 = \$US 1.12).
Army: 47,760.

One tank regiment; one cavalry regiment; nine infantry battalions; two battalions of the Pacific Islands Regiment (PIR); one Special Air Service (SAS) regiment; four field artillery regiments; one light anti-aircraft regiment; one aviation regiment; five signals regiments; one logistic support force; 140 Centurion medium tanks; 265 Ferret scout cars; 675 M-113 armored personnel carriers; 235 105-mm howitzers; about fifty Sioux and Alouette III helicopters; twenty-five light aircraft.

Deployment: A task force of 7,000 in South Vietnam (including two infantry battalions and supporting services), although announced withdrawals will reduce this figure to 6,000 by the end of 1971; one battalion group and one signal regiment in Singapore; two PIR battalions in Papua and New Guinea.

Reserves: The Citizen Military Force of 36,000 is intended to form twenty-four infantry battalions with supporting arms and services.

Navy: 17,820.
Four submarines; one aircraft carrier (ASW); three guided missile destroyers with Tartar SAMs; five destroyers; six destroyer escorts; two minehunters; four coastal minesweepers; twenty patrol boats; one fast troop transport; one destroyer tender; carrier-borne aircraft include: one fighter-bomber squadron with A-4G Skyhawks, one ASW squadron with S-2E Trackers, and one helicopter squadron with Wessex.

Reserves: Navy Citizen Military Force; 4,330.

Air Force: 22,700; 210 combat aircraft.
One bomber squadron with Canberra B-20s; two fighter squadrons with F-4Es; four interceptor/strike squadrons with Mirage IIIOs; one maritime reconnaissance squadron with ten P-3B Orions and one maritime reconnaissance squadron of twelve P-2H Neptunes; sixty-four MB-326 trainers; twenty-four C-130, ten HS-748, twenty-four Caribou, and twenty-two C-47 transports; two helicopter squadrons with Iroquois.

Deployment: two Mirage squadrons in Malaysia/Singapore; one helicopter squadron in Vietnam.

Reserves: 950 Citizen Air Force.

BURMA

Population: 28,175,000.
Military service: two years.
Total armed forces: 143,500.
Estimated GNP 1970: \$3,200,000,000.
Defense budget 1970-71: 480,000,000 kyat or \$100,600,000 (4.77 kyat=\$1).
Army: 130,000.

Five regional commands; three infantry divisions. The army is largely an infantry force, with some artillery, engineer, and signals regiments. It is organized chiefly for counterinsurgency and internal security duties. Comet medium tanks; Humber armored cars; Ferret scout cars; mainly American, British, and Yugoslav light arms.

Navy: 7,000.
One frigate; one escort minesweeper; two coastal escorts; five motor torpedo boats (less than 100 tons); thirty-four river and patrol gunboats; seven motor gunboats (less than 100 tons); forty landing craft (less than 100 tons).

Air Force: 6,500; eighteen combat aircraft. Twelve AT-33 and six Vampire armed trainers; four C-45, twelve C-47, eight Otter, and two Bristol 170 transports; six Sioux, ten Huskie, eight Alouette III, and ten Shawnee helicopters.

Paramilitary forces: 25,000.

CAMBODIA

Population: 7,000,000.
Voluntary military service (conscription is authorized but not yet in force).

Total armed forces: 179,000.
Estimated GNP 1970: \$910,000,000.
Defense budget 1971: 18,650,000,000 riels or \$336,000,000 (55.5 riels=\$1).
Army: 175,000.

200 infantry and commando battalions; one tank regiment; one armored car battalion; three parachute battalions; M-24 and AMX-13 light tanks; M-8 and M-20 armored cars; M-3 scout cars; BTR-152 armored personnel carriers; 105-mm howitzers and Soviet 76-mm and 122-mm guns; 40-mm, 57-mm, 85-mm, and 100-mm AA guns.

Navy: 1,600 (including 150 marines).

Two patrol vessels; two support gunboats; two motor torpedo boats (less than 100 tons); six patrol boats (less than 100 tons); four landing craft.

Air Force: 2,400; seven combat aircraft.

Seven T-28 Trojan ground-attack aircraft; five C-47, five AN-2, and one IL-14 transports; three MIG-15 UTI, eleven Horizon, and four YAK-18 trainers; four Alouette II, one MI-4, and two H-34 helicopters.

Paramilitary forces: 150,000.

REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN)

Population: 14,575,000.

Military service: Army two years; Navy and Air Force three years.

Total armed forces: 540,000.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$5,500,000,000.

Estimated defense expenditure 1971: 24,500,000,000 new Taiwan dollars or \$601,250,000 (40.7 new Taiwan dollars=\$1).

Army: 390,000.

Two armored divisions, fourteen infantry divisions; six light divisions; three armored cavalry regiments; one SAM battalion with *Hawks*; one SAM battalion and one SAM battery with *Nike-Hercules*; two airborne brigades; four Special Forces groups; M-47 and M-48 medium tanks; M-24 and M-41 light tanks; M-18 tank destroyers.

Deployment: 60,000 on Quemoy; 20,000 on Matsu.

Navy: 35,000.

Ten destroyers; six destroyer escorts; twelve frigates; twelve submarine chasers; twelve patrol vessels; three fleet minesweepers; fifteen coastal minesweepers; two inshore minesweepers; twenty-one landing ships; nine medium landing ships; thirty landing craft.

Marine Corps: 35,000.

Two divisions.

Air Force: 80,000; 385 combat aircraft.

Eighty F-100A/D fighter-bombers; seventy F-5A tactical fighters; forty-five F-104G interceptors; 150 F-86F interceptors; eight RF-104G and four RF-101 recon aircraft; about ninety-five C-46, C-47, and C-119 transports; ten UH-19 helicopters.

INDIA

Population: 557,000,000.

Voluntary military service.

Total armed forces: 980,000.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$49,000,000,000.

Defense budget 1971-72: 12,420,000,000 rupees or \$1,656,000,000 (7.5 rupees=\$1).

Army: 860,000.

One armored division; two independent armored brigades; thirteen infantry divisions; ten mountain divisions; six independent infantry brigades; two parachute brigades; about twenty AA artillery units; 200 *Centurion MK 5/7*, 250 *Sherman*, 450 *T-54* and *T-55*, and 300 *Vijayanta* medium tanks; 150 *PT-76* and 100 *AMX-13* light tanks; *OT-62* and *Mk 2/4A* armored personnel carriers; about 3,000 artillery pieces, mostly twenty-five-pounders, but including about 350 100-mm and 140 130-mm guns; and *SS-11* and *Entac* antitank guided weapons.

Navy: 40,000.

One 16,000-ton aircraft carrier; four submarines (ex-Soviet *F*-class); two cruisers; three destroyers; nine destroyer escorts (including five ex-Soviet *Petya*-class); one general-purpose frigate; five antisubmarine

frigates; three anti-aircraft frigates; ten patrol boats (four less than 100 tons); four coastal minesweepers; four inshore minesweepers; one landing ship; two landing craft; nine seaward defense boats (six less than 100 tons). The naval air force includes thirty-five *Sea Hawk* attack aircraft, twelve *Alizé* maritime patrolers, and two *Sea King* and ten *Alouette III* helicopters. Ten *Sea Hawks*, five *Alizés*, and two *Alouettes* can be carried on the aircraft carrier at any one time.

Air Force: 80,000; 625 combat aircraft (eight to twenty-five aircraft in a combat squadron).

Three light bomber squadrons with *Canberra B(1)*; five fighter-bomber squadrons with *SU-7s*; two fighter-bomber squadrons with *HF-24 Marut IAs*; six fighter-bomber squadrons with *Hunter F-56s*; two fighter-bomber squadrons with *Mystère IVs*; seven interceptor squadrons with *MIG-21s*; eight interceptor squadrons with *Gnats*; one reconnaissance squadron with *Canberra PR-57s*; one maritime recon squadron with *L-1049 Super Constellations*. Transports include about fifty-five *C-47s*, sixty *C-119s*; twenty *IL-14s*; thirty *AN-12s*; twenty-five *Otters*, twelve *HS-748s*, and fifteen *Caribous*. Helicopters include about eighty *MI-4s*, 150 *Alouette IIIs*, ten *Bell-47s*, and a few *MI-8s*; about fifty *SA-2* SAM complexes.

Paramilitary forces: About 100,000 in Border Security Force.

INDONESIA

Population: 114,500,000.

Selective military service.

Total armed forces: 319,000.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$11,600,000,000.

Estimated defense expenditure 1970: 103,000,000,000 rupiahs or \$272,000,000 (378 rupiahs=\$1).

Army: 250,000.

Fifteen infantry brigades, formed from about 100 infantry battalions; eight armored battalions; one paracommando regiment. The Strategic Reserve Command consists of about six brigades and includes paratroops and armor, artillery, and engineers. About one-third of the army is engaged in civil and administrative duties. Stuart, *AMX-13*, and *PT-76* light tanks; *Saladin* armored cars; *Ferret* scout cars; *Saracen* and *BTR-152* armored personnel carriers; artillery includes Soviet 57-mm AA guns and associated radar.

Navy: 34,000, including 14,000 marines (it is thought that only about one-third of the Navy is operational).

Twelve submarines (ex-Soviet *W*-class); one cruiser (ex-Soviet *Sverdlov*-class); four destroyers (ex-Soviet *Skory*-class); eleven frigates (including seven ex-Soviet *Riga*-class); eighteen coastal escorts (fourteen ex-Soviet, four ex-USA); twelve *Komar*-class patrol boats with *Styx* surface-to-surface missiles; eight patrol boats; thirty motor torpedo boats; six fleet minesweepers; fifteen coastal minesweepers; eighteen motor gunboats; twenty-five seaward defense boats (less than 100 tons); six landing ships; seven landing craft, the marines form two brigades.

Naval Air Arm: twenty *MIG-19* and *MIG-21* interceptors; five *HU-16* and *PBY-5A* ASW aircraft; about twelve *S-55*, *S-58*, and *MI-4* helicopters.

Air Force: 35,000; 122 combat aircraft (only about eighty aircraft are thought to be fully operational).

Twenty-two *TU-16* bombers, some with *Kennel* ASMs; ten *IL-28* light bombers; five *B-25* light bombers; ten *F-51D* light strike aircraft; about twenty *MIG-15*, forty *MIG-17*, and fifteen *MIG-21* interceptors (mostly in storage); about sixty transports, including *IL-14s*, *C-130Bs*, *C-47s*, *AN-12s*, and *Skyvans*; about thirty helicopters, including *MI-4s*, *MI-6s*, *Alouette IIIs*, and *Bell-204s*; at least three *SA-2* sites.

Paramilitary forces: A police Mobile Brigade of about 20,000; about 100,000 militia.

JAPAN

Population: 104,600,000.

Voluntary military service.

Total armed forces: 259,000.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$195,000,000,000.

Defense budget 1971-72: 670,900,000,000 yen or \$1,864,000,000 (360 yen=\$1).

Army: 179,000.

One mechanized division; twelve infantry divisions (7,000-9,000 men each); one airborne brigade; one artillery brigade; one signal and five engineer brigades; one helicopter brigade; three SAM groups with *Hawks*; 380 *Type 61* and 120 *M-4* medium tanks; M-24 and 140 *M-41* light tanks; *Type 60* armored personnel carriers; thirty *M-52* 105-mm and ten *M-44* 155-mm self-propelled howitzers; 203-mm howitzers; *Type 60* twin 106-mm self-propelled recoilless rifles; *Type 64* antitank guided weapons; 120 aircraft and 220 helicopters.

Reserves: 36,000.

Navy: 38,300.

Eleven submarines; one guided missile destroyer with *Tartar* SAMs; thirty-seven ASW destroyers; one frigate; twenty submarine chasers; five motor torpedo boats (two less than 100 tons); two minelayers; thirty-seven coastal minesweepers; three tank landing ships; one medium landing ship; six landing craft; forty-two small landing craft (less than 100 tons).

Naval air component: 140 combat aircraft. Four maritime recon squadrons with two *PS-1s*, sixty *P-2Js*, and *P-2V-7s*; three maritime recon squadrons with fifty-five *S-2F-1s*; three helicopter squadrons with *HSS-2s* and *HSS-1Ns*.

Air Force: 41,700; 375 combat aircraft (eighteen to twenty-five aircraft in a combat squadron).

Seven fighter-bombers with *F-86Fs*; seven interceptor squadrons with *F-104Js*; one reconnaissance squadron with *RF-86Fs* (deliveries of *F-4EJs* are due to begin during 1971); three transport squadrons with thirty *C-46s* and ten *YS-11s*; twenty helicopters, including *S-62s* and *V-107s*; 360 trainers, including *T-1s*, *T-33s*, *T-34s*, and *F-104-DJs*; four SAM battalions with *Nike-Hercules* (100 launchers); a Base Air Defense Ground Environment with twenty-four control and warning units.

KOREA—DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (NORTH)

Population: 13,975,000.

Military service: Army three years; Navy and Air Force four years.

Total armed forces: 401,000.

Defense budget 1971: 2,183,000,000 won or \$849,400,000 (2.57 won=\$1).

Army: 360,000.

Two armored divisions; twenty infantry divisions; five independent infantry brigades; 15,000 men in "special commando teams"; 750 *T-34* and *T-54* medium tanks; *PT-76* light tanks; 950 *BA-64*, *BTR-40*, and *BTR-152* armored personnel carriers; 200 *SU-76*, *SU-100*, and *ZSU-57* self-propelled guns; 2,000 AA guns; 6,000 other guns and mortars up to 152-mm caliber, about thirty *SA-2* SAM sites (about 180 launchers).

Navy: 11,000.

Three submarines (ex-Soviet *W*-class); six *Komar*- and nine *Osa*-class *FPB* with *Styx* surface-to-surface missiles; three torpedo boats; forty high-speed torpedo boats (less than 100 tons); ten fleet minesweepers; twenty-two patrol vessels (four less than 100 tons); eleven motor gunboats.

Air Force: 30,000; 555 combat aircraft.

Seventy *IL-28* light bombers; 380 *MIG-15* and *MIG-17* fighter-bombers; 100 *MIG-21* interceptors; five *MIG-19* interceptors; about forty *AN-2*, *LI-2*, *IL-12*, and *IL-14* transports; twenty *MI-4* helicopters; seventy *YAK-11*, *YAK-18*, *MIG-15*, and *IL-28* trainers.

Paramilitary forces: 25,000 security forces

and border guards; a civilian militia with a claimed strength of 1,250,000.

KOREA—REPUBLIC OF KOREA (SOUTH)

Population: 32,700,000.
Military service: Army/Marines, 2¾ years;
Navy/Air Force, three years.
Total armed forces: 634,250.
Estimated GNP 1970: \$8,300,000,000.
Estimated defense expenditures 1971: 129,-
000,000,000 won or \$411,000,000 (314 won=
\$1).

Army: 560,000.
Twenty-nine infantry divisions (ten in
cadre only); two armored brigades; eighty
artillery battalions; one surface-to-surface
missile battalion with *Honest Johns*; two
SAM battalions with *Hawks* and one with
Nike-Hercules; M-4 and M-48 medium tanks;
Stuart and M-24 light tanks; M-10 and M-36
tank destroyers; M-8 armored cars and M-
113 armored personnel carriers; guns up to
155-mm.

Deployment: two infantry divisions and
some engineer units are in South Vietnam.

Navy: 16,750.
Three destroyers; three destroyer escorts;
four frigates; six escort transports; eleven
coastal escorts; seventeen patrol boats; twelve
coastal minesweepers; twenty landing ships.
Marine Corps: 33,000.
Five Brigades.

Deployment: one brigade in South Viet-
nam.

Air Force: 24,500; 235 combat aircraft.
Eighteen F-4 fighter-bombers; 110 F-86F
fighter-bombers; seventy-seven F-5 tactical
fighters; twenty F-86D all-weather fighters
(with *Sidewinder* air-to-air missiles); ten
RF-86F reconnaissance aircraft; thirty-five
transports including C-46s; C-47s, and C-54s;
helicopters include six H-19s.

Paramilitary forces: A local defense militia
with a strength of one to two million is being
formed.

LAOS

Population: 3,030,000.
Estimated GNP 1970: \$200,000,000.

Royal Lao Forces

Military service: conscription.
Estimated strength: 55,000.
Estimated defense expenditure: 10,800,-
000,000 kip or \$21,600,000 (500 kip=\$1).
Army: 52,800.

Fifty-eight infantry battalions; one artil-
lery regiment of four battalions; M-24 and
PT-76 light tanks; M-8 armored cars; M-3
scout cars; BTR-40 and M-113 armored per-
sonnel carriers; 85-mm guns and 75-mm,
105-mm, and 150-mm howitzers.
Navy: About 400.

Four river squadrons consisting of thirty-
six patrol craft and lighters, ten landing
craft (all under 100 tons, most not opera-
tional).

Air Force: 2,000; seventy-five combat air-
craft.

About seventy-five T-28 light strike air-
craft; twenty C-47 and AC-47 transports
and gunships; about eight helicopters.

Paramilitary forces and irregulars: 36,000.

Pathet-Lao Forces

Total strength about 45,000 men (includ-
ing dissident neutralists). PT-76 light tanks;
BTR-40 armored cars; 105-mm howitzers.
The Pathet-Lao are believed to be integrated
with about 75,000 regular North Vietnamese
combat and logistics troops, and have re-
ceived arms and ammunition of Soviet and
Chinese origin. The Pathet-Lao and North
Vietnamese control all the eastern half of
Laos.

MALAYSIA

Population: 11,200,000.
Voluntary military service.
Total armed forces: 50,000.
Estimated GNP 1970: \$3,950,000,000.
Defense budget 1971: \$570,000,000 Malay-
sian dollars or \$US 186,000,000 (3.06 Malay-
sian dollars=\$US 1).

Army: 43,000.

Seven infantry brigades, consisting of
twenty-four battalions; three reconnaissance
regiments; three artillery regiments; one
Special Service unit; three signal regiments;
engineer and administrative units; *Ferret*
scout cars; 105-mm howitzers.

Reserves: about 50,000.
Navy: 3,000.

Two ASW frigates (one with *Seacat* SAMs);
four fast patrol boats (less than 100 tons);
twenty-four patrol boats (less than 100 tons);
six coastal minesweepers.

Reserves: 600.
Air Force: 4,000; thirty combat aircraft.
Ten CA-27 *Sabre* fighter-bombers; twenty
CL-41G *Tebuan* light training and strike
aircraft; eight *Herald* and twelve *Caribou*
transports; five Dove, two HS-125, and two
Heron liaison aircraft; twenty-four *Alouette*
III and ten S-61A helicopters (one squadron
of *Mirage III*s is on order).

Paramilitary forces: 50,000—fourteen bat-
talions of field police.

MONGOLIA

Population: 1,315,000.
Military service: two years.
Total armed forces: 29,000.
Estimated GNP 1970: \$630,000,000.
Estimated defense expenditure 1971: 90,-
000,000 tugriks or \$22,500,000 (four tugriks=
\$1).

Army: 28,000.
Two infantry divisions; forty T-34 and 100
T-54/55 medium tanks; ten SU-100 tank
destroyers; forty BTR-60 and fifty BTR-152
armored personnel carriers; 130-mm guns and
152-mm guns/howitzers.

Air Force: 1,000 men; no combat aircraft.
Operates in support of the Army, and em-
ploys some Soviet technical advisers.

Thirty AN-2, IL-14, and AN-24 transports;
YAK-11, YAK-18, and MIG-15 UTI trainers;
ten MI-1 and MI-4 helicopters; one SAM
battalion with SA-2s.

Paramilitary forces: About 18,000 security
police.

NEW ZEALAND

Population: 2,880,000.
Voluntary military service (supplemented
by selective national service of fourteen
weeks for the Army).

Total armed forces: 12,750.
Estimated GNP 1970: \$US 5,770,000,000.
Defense budget 1971-72: \$NZ 110,450,000 or
\$US 123,704,000 (\$NZ 1 = \$US 1.12).
Army: 5,600.

One infantry battalion; one artillery bat-
tery. Regular troops form the nucleus of a
Combat Brigade group, a Logistic group, and
a Reserve Brigade group. These units would
be completed by the mobilization of Terri-
torials. Ten M-41 light tanks; nine *Ferret*
scout cars; forty M-113 armored personnel
carriers; twenty-eight 105-mm howitzers.

Deployment: One infantry battalion (less
one company) in Singapore; one infantry
company in South Vietnam.

Reserves: 11,300 Territorials.
Navy: 2,900.

One general purpose frigate with *Seacat*
SAMs (a second is due to be delivered in
1971); two ASW frigates with *Seacat* SAMs;
two escort minesweepers; twelve patrol craft
(less than 100 tons); two Wasp helicopters
(one operates from the GP frigate).

Reserves: 600 men, five patrol craft (less
than 100 tons).

Air Force: 4,250; twenty-seven combat air-
craft.

One fighter-bomber squadron with ten
A-4K and four TA-4K *Skyhawks*; one fighter-
bomber squadron with eight *Vampire* FB-5s;
five P-3B *Orion* maritime reconnaissance air-
craft; five C-130 *Devon* and nine *Bristol Mark*
31 medium transports; fourteen *Iroquois* and
thirteen *Stoux* helicopters.

Deployment: One transport squadron in
Singapore.

PAKISTAN

Population: 126,300,000.
Two years selective military service.
Total armed forces: 392,000.
Estimated GNP 1970: \$16,000,000,000.
Defense budget 1971-72: 3,400,000,000 ru-
pees or \$714,000,000 (4.76 rupees=\$1).
Army: 365,000 (including 25,000 Azad
Kashmir troops).

Two armored divisions; twelve infantry
divisions (two more being raised); on inde-
pendent armored brigade; one air defense
brigade; 100 M-47, 100 M-48, 100 T-54, fifty
T-55, and 225 T-59 medium tanks; 200 M-24,
seventy-five M-41, and twenty PT-76 light
tanks; 300 M-113 armored personnel carriers;
about 900 twenty-five-pounder guns, 105-
mm and 155-mm howitzers; 200 130-mm
guns; *Cobra* antitank guided weapons;
twenty H-13 helicopters.

Navy: 10,000.
Four submarines; one light cruiser/train-
ing ship; two destroyers; three destroyer es-
corts; two fast frigates; four patrol boats;
eight coastal minesweepers; two small patrol
boats (less than 100 tons); two UH-19 air-
sea helicopters.

Air Force: 17,000; 285 combat aircraft.
One light bomber squadron with IL-28s;
two light bomber squadrons with B-57s; two
fighter-bomber squadrons with *Mirage IIIEs*;
eight fighter-bomber/interceptor squadrons
with F-86s; four interceptor squadrons with
MIG-19s; one interceptor squadron with
six F-104As; one recon squadron with four
RT-33As and two RB-57s (with the excep-
tions noted, combat squadrons have sixteen
aircraft); transports include eight C-130Bs
and one F-27; forty *Sioux*, *Huskie*, *Alouette*
III, and MI-8 helicopters.

Paramilitary forces:
280,000, including 30,000 frontier corps;
250,000 militia.

A new force is being raised—the East Paki-
stan Civil Armed Force.

PHILIPPINES

Population: 39,800,000.
Selective military service.
Total armed forces: 34,600.
Estimated GNP 1970: \$5,900,000,000.
Defense budget 1971-72: 871,000,000 pesos
or \$135,500,000 (6.43 pesos=\$1). Before Febru-
ary 21, 1970, 3.9 pesos=\$1).

Army: 17,600.
Two light infantry divisions (under-
strength); two infantry brigades; fifteen
engineer construction battalions; M-4 me-
dium tanks; M-24 and M-41 light tanks;
M-113 armored personnel carriers.

Navy: 8,000 (including naval engineers).
One destroyer escort; four coastal escorts;
seven patrol vessels; forty-seven patrol boats
(less than 100 tons); two coastal minesweep-
ers; eleven landing ships; one marine bat-
talion; five engineer construction battalions.
Air Force: 9,000; fifty-seven aircraft.

Twenty F-5 fighter/ground-support air-
craft; eight T-28 ground-support aircraft;
twenty-six F-86F day fighters; three T-33
armed trainers; transports include twenty-
eight C-47s and one F-27; about sixteen heli-
copters, including UH-1Hs and H-34s.

Paramilitary forces:
23,500 Philippine Constabulary and about
400 armed civilian self-defense units.

SINGAPORE

Population: 2,100,000.
Military service: twenty-four to thirty-six
months.

Total armed forces: 16,000.
Estimated GNP 1970: \$US 1,820,000,000.
Defense budget 1971-72: \$484,000,000 Singa-
pore dollars or \$US 158,170,000 (3.06 Singa-
pore dollars=\$1).

Army: 14,000.
Two brigades, which include one armored
regiment, six infantry battalions, one artillery
battalion, one engineer battalion, one signals
battalion (a third brigade is being formed);
fifty AMX-13 tanks; M-706 *Commando*

armed personnel carriers; twenty-five pounder guns; 120-mm mortars; thirty-two 106-mm recoilless rifles.

Reserves: a planned total of 9,000 by the end of 1971.

Navy: 500.

One seaward defense boat. Three fast patrol boats (three more on order).

Air Force: 1,500; thirty-six combat aircraft. One ground attack squadron with sixteen BAC-167s and four *Hunters*; one interceptor/recece squadron with sixteen *Hunters*; one transport/liason squadron with eight Cessna-172s and two *Airtourers*; one helicopter squadron with four *Alouette IIIs*; twenty-eight *Bloodhound* SAM launchers.

Paramilitary forces: Two police companies.

THAILAND

Population: 35,000,000.

Military service: two years.

Total armed forces: 175,000.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$6,100,000,000.

Defense budget 1970-71: 5,413,800,000 baht or \$260,300,000 (20.8 baht=\$1).

Army: 130,000.

Four infantry divisions (including three tank battalions); one regimental combat team; one SAM battery with *Hawks*; M-24 and M-41 light tanks; M-2 and M-16 armored half-tracks; M-8 armored cars; M3A1 scout cars; about 200 M-113 armored personnel carriers; 105-mm and 155-mm howitzers; sixteen FH-1100 and six OH-23F helicopters.

Deployment: 11,250 in South Vietnam (all due to be withdrawn by February 1972).

Navy: 21,500 (including 6,500 marines).

One destroyer escort; three frigates (and three on order); one escort minesweeper; seventeen submarine chasers; four coastal minesweepers; two coastal minelayers; eleven gunboats (one less than 100 tons); three patrol gunboats; eight landing ships; eight landing craft; one maritime recece squadron with HU-16s and S-2s.

Air Force: 23,500; 144 combat aircraft.

Eleven F-5A and F-5B fighter-bombers; twenty F-86F day fighters; two RT-33A reconnaissance aircraft; fifty-five T-28D, forty T-6, and sixteen OV-10 COIN aircraft; twenty-five C-47 and thirteen C-123B transports; about sixty helicopters, including thirty-five CH-34s and twenty-three UH-1Hs; four battalions of airfield defense troops.

Paramilitary forces: 10,000 Volunteer Defense Corps; 8,000 Border Police.

VIETNAM—DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (NORTH)

Population: 22,675,000.

Military service: three years minimum.

Total armed forces: 492,000.

Estimated defense expenditure 1970: 2,150,000,000 dong or \$584,000,000 (3.68 dong=\$1). Army: 480,000.

Fourteen infantry divisions (infantry divisions normally total about 12,000 men, including three infantry and one support regiment); one artillery division (of ten regiments); two armored regiments; about twenty independent infantry regiments; fifty T-34 and sixty T-54 medium tanks; 300 PT-76 light tanks; BTR-40 armored personnel carriers, SU-76 and JSU-122 self-propelled guns; 75-mm, 105-mm, 122-mm, 130-mm, and 152-mm artillery; 57-mm, 75-mm, 82-mm, and 107-mm recoilless rifles; 82-mm, 100-mm, 107-mm, 120-mm, and 160-mm mortars; 107-mm, 122-mm, and 140-mm rocket launchers; 6,000 37-mm, 57-mm, 85-mm, and 100-mm AA guns; thirty-five SAM battalions (each with six SA-2 launchers).

Deployment: about 90,000 in South Vietnam, 75,000 in Laos, and 40,000 in Cambodia.

Navy: 3,000.

Two coastal escorts (ex-Soviet); four motor gunboats, ex-Chinese; about twenty-four gunboats (less than 100 tons), ex-Chinese; about three motor torpedo boats (less than 100 tons), ex-Soviet; about twelve small patrol boats (less than 100 tons).

Air Force: 9,000; 165 combat aircraft.

Ten IL-28 light bombers, ex-Soviet; forty MIG-21F/PP interceptors with *Atoll* air-to-air missiles; twenty-five MIG-19 interceptors, ex-Chinese; sixty (ex-Chinese) and ten (ex-Soviet) MIG-17 interceptors; ten (ex-Chinese) and ten (ex-Soviet) MIG-15 interceptors; eight AN-2, three AN-24, ten IL-14, and twenty LI-2 transports; twenty MI-4 and two MI-6 helicopters.

Paramilitary forces: 20,000 Frontier, Coast Security, and People's Armed Security Forces; about 425,000 regional armed militia.

VIETNAM—REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SOUTH)

Population: 18,800,000.

Military service: two years minimum.

Total armed forces: 500,000.

Estimated GNP 1970: \$4,000,000,000.

Estimated defense expenditures 1971: 155,000,000,000 piastres or \$564,000,000 (275 piastres=\$1). Before October 4, 1970, 117.5 piastres=\$1).

Army: 414,000. (With normally three regiments, each of four battalions, to an infantry division, there are some 150 infantry battalions in the regular army, but most units are below establishment; the actual strength of a battalion averages 500, and a regiment 2,000.)

Ten infantry divisions; one airborne division (three brigades); six independent armored cavalry regiments; three independent infantry regiments; eighteen Ranger battalions; one Special Forces group; thirty-five battalions; M-24, 200 M-41, and forty AMX-13 light tanks; 250 Commando and Greyhound armored cars; M-3 scout cars; M-59 and M-113 armored personnel carriers; 105-mm and 155-mm self-propelled guns.

Deployment: about 23,000 in Cambodia. Navy: 31,000.

One destroyer; three destroyer escorts; six patrol escorts; two patrol vessels; three coastal minesweepers; seventy fast patrol boats; twenty motor gunboats; twenty-three landing ships; about 200 landing craft and about 600 river patrol boats (most less than 100 tons); about 350 motorized coastal defense junks.

Marine Corps: 15,000.

One division.

Air Force: 40,000; 275 combat aircraft (combat squadrons have from fifteen to twenty aircraft).

One tactical fighter squadron with F-5s; six fighter-bomber squadrons with A-37s; three fighter-bomber squadrons with Sky-raid; some RC-47 reconnaissance aircraft; eighty O-1 armed light aircraft; twenty AC-47 armed transport aircraft; twenty-five C-47 and twenty-five C-119 transports; thirty-five Choctaw, 230 UH-1, and ten CH-47 helicopters.

Paramilitary forces: 555,000.

Regional Forces—285,000, forming about 1,700 rifle companies, at the disposal of the provincial governors. Popular Forces—250,000, a home guard of about 7,500 platoons, with light arms. Police Field Force—20,000, including special internal security units with armored vehicles and helicopters. There is also a People's Self Defense Force of about 1,500,000.

I.—ESTIMATES OF COMPARATIVE STRATEGIC STRENGTHS¹

(A) NUCLEAR STRIKE FORCES

UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION

[Figures in parenthesis are approximate]

Category	United States		Soviet Union	
	Type	Number	Type	Number
Land-based missiles:				
ICBM	LGM-25C Titan 2	54	SS-7 Saddler	
	LGM-30B Minuteman 1	900	SS-8 Sasin	220
	LGM-30F Minuteman 2		SS-9 Scarp	280
	LGM-30G Minuteman 3	100	SS-11	950
			SS-13 Savage	60
IRBM			SS-5 Skean	100
MRBM			SS-4 Sandal	600
SRBM	MGM-31A Pershing	(250)	SS-1b-d Scud A-B	
	MGM-29A Sergeant	(500)	SS-12 Scaleboard	(300)
			SSC-1 Shaddock	(100)
Cruise missiles:				
Sea-based missiles:				
SLBM (nuclear subs)	UGM-27B Polaris A2	160	SS-N-5 Serb	30
	UGM-27C Polaris A3	432	SS-N-6	320
	UGM-73A Poseidon	64		
SLBM (diesel subs)			SS-N-4 Sark	42
			SS-N-5 Serb	48
Cruise missiles (subs)			—Shaddock	310
Cruise missiles (surface vessels)			—Shaddock	48
Aircraft:				
Long-range bombers ⁴	B-52 C-F	150	Mya-4 Bison	40
	B-52 G/H	210	Tu-20 Bear	100
Medium-range bombers ⁴	FB-111	70	Tu-16 Badger	500
Strike aircraft (land-based) ⁴	F-105D		Tu-22 Blinder	
	F-4	(1200)	Yak-28 Brewer	
	F-111A/E		Su-7 Fitter	(1,500)
	A-7D		Mig-21 Fishbed ²	
			Il-28 Beagle	
Strike aircraft (carrier-based) ⁴	A-4			
	A-6A	(900)		
	A-7A			
	RA-5C			

OTHER NATO AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES

Category	NATO Countries		Warsaw Pact countries	
	Type	Number	Type	Number
IRBM	S-02 SSBS (France)	9		
SRBM	MGM-31A Pershing (West Germany)	(75)	SSib-d Scud A-B ¹	
	MGM-29A Sergeant (West Germany)	(100)		
SLBM	Polaris A-3 (Britain)	64		
Medium-range bombers	Vulcan (Britain)	56		
	Canberra B(1)8 (Britain)	24		
Strike aircraft (incl. short-range bombers)	Mirage IVA (France)	36	Il-28 Beagle ²	(150)
	Buccaneer S2 (Britain)	80	Su-7 Fitter ³	(200)
	F-4 ⁴	(60)		
	F-104	(400)		

(B) GROWTH OF ICBM/SLBM STRENGTH, 1961-71 (MID YEARS)

		1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
USA	ICBM	63	294	424	834	854	904	1,054	1,054	1,054	1,054	1,054
	SLBM	96	144	224	416	496	592	656	656	656	656	656
USSR	ICBM	50	75	100	200	270	300	460	800	1,050	1,300	1,510
	SLBM	Some	Some	100	120	120	125	130	130	160	280	440

¹ China is not included in this table. Her ability to deliver nuclear weapons appears to be limited to some Tu-16 and Tu-4 medium-range bombers, Il-28 short-range bombers and a few MRBM.
² Including those in IRBM/MRBM fields.
³ In addition, there are about 300 Tu-16 Badgers in the Naval Air Force, configured for attacks on shipping, which could deliver nuclear weapons.
⁴ These aircraft are dual-capable and could have a non-nuclear role.
⁵ These became operational on Aug. 1, 1971.
⁶ These missiles and aircraft are operated by a number of countries but may have non-nuclear roles.

2. NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES 1971 (ISSUED BY COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN, SAM AND ASW MISSILES ARE NOT INCLUDED)

(A) LONG AND MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES (U.S.A.)

Category ¹	Type	Propellant ²	Maximum range ³ (statute miles)	Estimated warhead yield ⁴	Inservice
ICBM	LGM-25C Titan 2	SL	7,250	5-10 MT	1962
	LGM-30B Minuteman 1	S	7,500	1 MT	1962
	LGM-30F Minuteman 2	S	8,000	1-2 MT	1966
SLBM	LGM-30G Minuteman 3	S	8,000	3x200 KT	1970
	UGM-27B Polaris A2	S	1,750	800 KT	1962
	UGM-27C Polaris A3 ⁵	S	2,800	1 MT	1964
	UGM-73A Poseidon	S	2,880	10x50 KT	1971

MISSILES (U.S.S.R.)

Category ¹	Type ²	Propellant	Maximum range ³ (statute miles)	Estimated warhead yield ⁴	Inservice
ICBM	SS-7 Saddler	SL	6,900	5 MT	1961
	SS-8 Sasin	SL	6,900	5 MT	1963
	SS-9 Scarp	SL	7,500	20-25 MT ⁷	1965
	SS-11	SL	6,500	1-2 MT	1966
	SS-13 Savage	S	5,000	1 MT	1968
IRBM ⁸	SS-5 Skean	SL	2,300	1 MT	1961
MRBM ⁹	SS-4 Sandal	L	1,200	1 MT	1959
SLBM	SS-N-4 Sark ¹⁰	SL	350	MT range	1961
	SS-N-5 Serb	SL	750	MT range	1964
	SS-N-6	? ¹¹	1,750	MT range	1969

AIRCRAFT (U.S.A.)

Category ¹²	Type	Maximum range ¹³ (Statute miles)	Maximum speed (mach no.) ¹⁴	Maximum weapons load (lb.)	ASM ¹⁵ carried	Inservice
Long-range bomber	B-52 C-F	11,500	0.95	60,000	Hound Dog	1955
	B-52 G/H	12,500	.95	75,000	2x Hound Dog	
Medium-range bomber	FB-111	3,800	2.2	37,500		1970
Strike aircraft	A-4	2,300	.9	10,000	2x Bullpup	1956
	A-6A	3,200	.9	18,000	do	1963
	A-7A/D	3,400	.9	15,000	4x Bullpup	1966
	RA-5C	3,000	2.0	13,500	2x Bullpup	1964
	F-104C/G ¹⁴	1,300	2.2	4,000	do	1958
	F-105D	2,100	2.25	16,500	4x Bullpup	1960
	F-111A/E	3,800	2.2/2.5	25,000	do	1967
	F-4	1,600	2.4	16,000	do	1962

AIRCRAFT (U.S.S.R.)

Category ¹²	Type ¹⁷	Maximum range ¹³ (Statute miles)	Maximum speed (mach no.) ¹⁴	Maximum weapons load (lb.)	ASM ¹⁵ carried	Inservice
Long-range bomber	Tu-20 Bear	7,800	0.78	40,000	1x Kangaroo	1956
	Mya-4 Bison	6,050	.87	20,000		1956
Medium-range bomber	Tu-16 Badger	4,000	.8	20,000	2x Kelt ¹⁸	1955
Strike aircraft (including short-range bomber)	Tu-22 Blinder	3,000	1.5	12,000	1x Kitchen	1962
	H-28 Beagle	2,500	.81	6,000		1960
	Yak-28 Brewer	1,750	1.1	4,400		1952
	Su-7 Fitter	1,250	1.7	4,500		1959
	Mig-21 Fishbed	900	2.2	2,000		1970

MISSILES (OTHER COUNTRIES)

Country	Category	Type	Propellant	Maximum range (statute miles)	Estimated warhead yield	Inservice
France	IRBM	S-02 SSBS	S	1,875	150 KT	August 1971.

AIRCRAFT (OTHER COUNTRIES)

Country	Type	Maximum range ¹³ (statute miles)	Maximum speed (mach No.) ¹⁴	Maximum weapons load (lb.)	ASM ¹⁵ carried	Inservice
Britain	Vulcan B2	4,000	0.95	21,000	1x Blue Steel	1960
	Canberra B(1)8	3,800	.83	8,000		1955
	Buccaneer S2	2,000	.95	8,000		1965
France	Mirage IVA	2,000	2.2	8,000		1964

(B) SHORT RANGE MISSILES AND ARTILLERY

U.S.A.

Category ¹	Type	Propellant ²	Maximum range (statute miles)	Estimated warhead yield ³	Inservice
SRBM	MGM-31A Pershing	S	460	KT range	1962
	MGM-29A Sergeant	S	85	do	1962
Unguided rockets	MGR-1B Honest John	S	25	do	1953
Tube artillery	M-109 155 mm. SP how.	HE	10	2 KT	1964
	M-110 203 mm. (8 in.) SP how.	HE	10	KT range	1962
	M-115 203 mm. (8 in.) towed how.	HE	10	do	1950

U.S.S.R.

Category ⁴	Type ⁵	Propellant ²	Maximum range (statute miles)	Estimated warhead yield ⁶	In-service
SRBM	SS-1b Scud A	SL	50	KT range	1957
	SS-1c Scud B	SL	150	do	1965
	SS-12 Scaleboard	SL	500	MT range	1969
Cruise missiles	SSC-1 Shaddock	J	290	KT range	1962
Unguided rockets	W Frog 1-7	S	15-40	do	Frog 1 1957; Frog 7 1965
Tube artillery	M-55 203mm gun-howitzer.	n/a	18	KT range	late 1950's

NOTES

¹ ICBM=intercontinental ballistic missile (range 4,000+ miles); IRBM=intermediate-range ballistic missile (range 1,500-4,000 miles); MRBM=medium-range ballistic missile (range 500-1,500 miles) SRBM=short-range ballistic missile (range under 500 miles); SLBM=submarine-launched ballistic missile.
² L=liquid; SL=storable liquid; S=solid; J=ram- or torbojet; HE=high explosive.
³ Operational range depends upon the payload carried; use of maximum payload may reduce range by up to 25 percent below maximum.
⁴ MT=megaton=1,000,000 tons of TNT equivalent (MT range=1 MT or over); KT=kiloton=1,000 tons of TNT equivalent (KT range=less than 1 MT).
⁵ The majority of Polaris A3 missiles, if not all, have been modified to carry three warheads of about 200 KT each.
⁶ Numerical designations for Soviet missiles (e.g. SS-9) are of U.S. origin; names (e.g. Scarp) are of NATO origin.
⁷ SS-9 missiles have also been tested (i) with three warheads of 4-5 MT each, (ii) with a modified payload for use as a depressed trajectory ICBM (DICBM) or fractional orbit bombardment system (FOBS).

⁸ A mobile IRBM (SS-XZ Scrooge) has been displayed and tested but is not known to be deployed operationally.
⁹ A mobile solid-propellant missile (SS-14 Scapegoat), apparently with MRBM range, has been displayed and tested but is not known to be deployed operationally.
¹⁰ Launched only from the surface.
¹¹ Possibly small propellant.
¹² Long-range bomber=maximum range over 6,000 miles; medium-range bomber=maximum range 3,500-6,000 miles, primarily designed for bombing missions.
¹³ Theoretical maximum range, with internal fuel only, at optimum altitude and speed. Ranges for strike aircraft assume no weapon load. Especially in the case of strike aircraft, therefore, range falls sharply for flights at lower altitude, at higher speed or with full weapons load (e.g. combat radius of A-7, at operational height and speed, with typical weapons load, is approximately 620 miles).
¹⁴ Mach 1 (M=1.0)=speed of sound.
¹⁵ ASM=air-to-surface missile.
¹⁶ F-104 are no longer in active service as strike aircraft with the U.S. Air Force but remain in service with other NATO air forces.
¹⁷ Names of Soviet aircraft (e.g. Bear) are of NATO origin.
¹⁸ Naval Air Force versions of the Tu-16 carry 2x Kelt or 2x Kennel ASM for antishipping use

3. DEFENSE EXPENDITURE AND NATIONAL ECONOMIES

Country	Defense expenditure ¹ 1970-71 (\$ million U.S.)		Defense expenditure per capita (dollars) 1970	Defense expenditure as a percentage of GNP ²			
	1970	1971		1967	1968	1969	1970
	1	2		4	5	6	7
United States	76,507	78,743	373	9.5	9.3	8.7	7.8
U.S.S.R. ³	53,900	55,000	222	10.6	11.1	11.0	11.0
Warsaw Pact:							
Bulgaria	279	NA	33	3.0	2.9	2.8	3.1
Czechoslovakia	1,765	NA	122	5.7	5.7	5.6	5.8
Germany (East)	1,990	2,124	116	3.7	5.7	5.9	5.9
Hungary	511	NA	49	2.6	2.9	3.4	3.5
Poland	2,220	NA	68	5.4	4.8	5.0	5.2
Rumania	750	798	37	3.1	3.0	2.9	3.5
North Atlantic Treaty:							
Belgium	688	594	71	2.9	2.9	3.0	2.8
Britain	5,950	6,333	107	5.7	5.4	5.0	4.9
Canada	1,931	1,687	90	2.8	2.7	2.4	2.5
Denmark	368	410	74	2.7	2.8	2.6	2.3
France	5,982	5,202	118	5.0	4.8	4.4	4.0
Germany (West)	6,188	5,961	104	4.3	3.6	3.6	3.3
Excluding financial assistance to West Berlin which included would make the entry read	7,067	6,860	119	4.7	4.2	4.2	3.8
Greece	453	338	51	4.4	4.9	5.1	4.9
Italy	2,599	2,651	48	3.1	3.0	2.7	2.8
Luxembourg	8	9	24	1.2	1.0	9	9
Netherlands	1,106	1,161	85	3.8	3.6	3.6	3.5
Norway	376	411	97	3.5	3.7	3.6	2.9
Portugal	398	NA	41	7.2	7.4	6.7	6.5
Turkey	503	446	14	4.4	4.5	4.2	3.7
Other European Countries:							
Austria	169	170	23	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2
Finland	145	154	31	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.4
Spain	627	681	19	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.0
Sweden	1,146	1,192	143	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.7
Switzerland	436	459	69	2.4	2.4	2.2	2.1
Yugoslavia	638	596	31	5.2	6.0	5.6	5.4
The Middle East and the Mediterranean:							
Algeria	174	99	13	3.9	4.7	4.4	4.0
Iran	779	1,023	27	4.9	5.6	5.0	7.1

Country	Defense expenditure ¹ 1970-71 (\$ million U.S.)		Defense expenditure per capita (dollars) 1970	Defense expenditure as a percentage of GNP ²			
	1970	1971		1967	1968	1969	1970
	1	2		4	5	6	7
The Middle East etc.—Con.							
Iraq	294	237	30	9.1	9.1	9.6	9.4
Israel	1,429	1,484	483	11.5	15.4	24.1	26.5
Jordan	105	90	47	11.1	14.7	21.0	16.4
Libya	84	84	43	1.5	1.6	1.4	2.1
Morocco	84	97	5	2.7	2.8	2.5	2.5
Saudi Arabia	387	383	53	11.9	8.9	8.8	9.4
Sudan	109	133	7	3.4	5.0	5.7	6.0
Syria	176	n.a.	29	10.7	12.1	11.6	12.1
Tunisia	18	20	4	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.5
United Arab Republic (Egypt)	1,262	1,495	38	12.7	12.5	13.0	19.6
Africa:							
Ethiopia	37	36	1	2.5	2.2	2.2	2.1
Nigeria	308	244	5	n.a.	5.9	5.9	5.6
Rhodesia	24	25	5	1.8	1.9	2.0	1.7
South Africa	458	459	23	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.6
Asia and Australia:							
Australia	1,261	NA	100	4.9	4.6	4.0	3.6
Burma	104	101	4	4.0	3.7	3.8	3.3
China (Taiwan)	482	601	33	7.9	7.2	9.2	8.8
India	1,535	1,656	3	3.3	3.6	3.5	3.4
Indonesia	272	386	2	2.3	1.8	2.3	2.3
Japan	1,640	1,864	16	9	8	8	8
Korea, South	333	411	10	3.9	4.2	4.0	4.0
Malaysia	183	186	17	4.1	3.9	3.6	4.6
New Zealand	115	124	41	1.7	2.0	1.9	2.0
Pakistan	605	714	4	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.8
Philippines	110	135	3	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.9
Singapore	106	158	52	2.2	2.1	4.9	5.8
Thailand	240	260	7	2.5	2.5	3.7	3.9
Vietnam, South	1,028	564	56	8.8	NA	NA	NA
Latin America:							
Argentina	477	NA	20	2.6	2.0	2.2	2.3
Brazil	579	NA	6	2.9	2.6	NA	NA
Chile	NA	NA	NA	2.1	2.1	NA	NA
Colombia	NA	NA	NA	2.8	2.8	NA	NA
Mexico	210	NA	4	.6	.6	.6	.6
Peru	NA	NA	NA	3.3	3.3	NA	NA
Venezuela	200	NA	19	2.3	2.2	NA	NA

¹ Column 1 represents the estimated out-turn of defense expenditure in 1970. Column 2 represents planned defense expenditure for the current year, in most cases according to the budget statements of national governments.
² The GNP figures are estimated at current market prices and the percentages may differ from

those published by national governments and international organizations.
³ The valuation of the Soviet GNP and the rate of exchange used for the defense expenditure were explained in the Military Balance 1970-71, pp. 10-11.
 NA=not available.

4. COMPARATIVE DEFENSE EXPENDITURE, GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, AND MANPOWER FIGURES, 1951-70

DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

[In millions of dollars]¹

Year	United States ²	Japan	West Germany ²	France ²	Britain ²	U.S.S.R.	Year	United States ²	Japan	West Germany ²	France ²	Britain ²	U.S.S.R.
1951	33,059	86		1,785	3,217	27,800	1961	47,808	503	3,268	4,131	4,785	35,800
1952	47,598	164		2,538	4,371	31,400	1962	52,381	586	4,308	4,493	5,097	38,700
1953	49,377	170	1,475	2,808	4,707	31,800	1963	52,295	688	4,981	4,628	5,236	40,200
1954	42,786	206	1,497	2,372	4,399	29,000	1964	51,213	780	4,888	4,918	5,600	38,400
1955	40,371	241	1,758	2,232	4,388	32,400	1965	51,827	848	4,979	5,125	5,855	37,000
1956	41,513	278	1,717	2,975	4,522	29,600	1966	63,572	959	5,063	5,415	6,028	38,700
1957	44,159	281	2,134	3,160	4,407	27,900	1967	75,465	1,075	5,352	5,856	6,259	41,900
1958	45,096	335	1,632	3,356	4,455	27,000	1968	80,732	1,172	4,827	6,117	5,597	48,200
1959	45,833	377	2,640	3,631	4,449	27,800	1969	81,444	1,344	5,486	6,184	5,496	51,100
1960	45,380	421	2,885	3,881	4,640	27,000	1970	76,507	1,640	6,188	5,982	5,950	53,900

¹ Exchange rates used are the same as in the GNP table below except for the U.S.S.R., which are calculated on the basis used in the country section (pp. 5-7) and explained in "The Military Balance, 1970-71, pp. 10-12.

² NATO definition of defense expenditure has been used.

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT—AT CURRENT MARKET PRICES AND EXCHANGE RATES

[In billions of dollars]

Year	United States of America	Japan	West Germany	France	Britain	U.S.S.R. ¹	Year	United States of America	Japan	West Germany	France	Britain	U.S.S.R. ¹
1951	331	14	28	25	41	86	1961	520	51	81	65	77	170
1952	350	16	32	29	44	90	1962	560	59	89	74	81	183
1953	370	19	35	31	48	95	1963	590	68	94	83	86	188
1954	365	20	37	32	50	102	1964	632	80	103	93	93	201
1955	399	23	43	35	54	109	1965	685	88	115	99	100	215
1956	420	25	47	39	58	116	1966	748	102	123	108	107	230
1957	444	28	51	43	62	125	1967	794	120	124	116	110	251
1958	455	32	56	50	65	142	1968	865	142	135	127	103	271
1959	484	33	60	54	67	151	1969	931	166	151	142	110	291
1960	511	39	71	60	72	161	1970	977	195	185	148	121	312

¹ Net material product converted at a constant exchange rate of 0.9 roubles=\$1. The U.N. accounts definition has been used. This consists of: individual and collective consumption, net fixed capital formation, and net exports of goods and productive services.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES

[In thousands]

Year	United States	Japan	West Germany	France	Britain ¹	U.S.S.R.	Year	United States	Japan	West Germany	France	Britain ¹	U.S.S.R.
1951	3,250	² 74		610	841	4,600	1961	2,572	209	325	778	455	3,800
1952	3,550	² 114		645	890	4,600	1962	2,827	216	389	742	445	3,600
1953	3,480	² 119		695	902	4,750	1963	2,737	213	403	632	430	3,300
1954	3,350	² 146	15	600	840	4,750	1964	2,687	216	435	555	425	3,300
1955	3,049	178	20	568	800	5,000	1965	2,723	225	441	510	424	3,150
1956	2,857	188	66	785	760	4,500	1966	3,123	227	455	500	418	3,165
1957	2,800	202	122	836	700	4,200	1967	3,446	231	452	500	417	3,220
1958	2,637	214	175	797	615	4,000	1968	3,547	235	440	505	405	3,220
1959	2,552	215	249	770	565	3,900	1969	3,454	236	465	503	383	3,300
1960	2,514	206	270	781	520	3,623	1970	3,066	259	466	506	373	3,305

¹ Excluding forces enlisted outside Britain.
² National Police Reserve.

³ Security force.
⁴ Self defenses forces.

5. MAJOR IDENTIFIED ARMS AGREEMENTS, JULY 1970 TO JUNE 1971

Recipient and primary supplier	Approximate date of agreement	Name of system	Approximate numbers	Primary role	Approximate cost to recipient (m.)	Expected date of delivery
(A) WESTERN EUROPE						
Belgium:						
France	1970	Alouette III	3	Helicopters	(¹)	(¹)
United States	March 1971	C-130H	12	Transports	\$55	1972-73
Italy	1970	SF.260 MX	36	Trainers	(¹)	(¹)
Britain	May 1971	Swingfire	(¹)	ATGW system	(¹)	(¹)
Britain: France	June 1971	Exocet	300	Naval SSM	54	(¹)
Denmark: United States	1970	Hughes 500M (OH-6A)	12	Observation helicopters	(¹)	1971
Germany:						
France	1970	La Combattante II	20	Patrol boats	240	1973-75
United States	March 1971	Exocet	(¹)	Naval SSM	(¹)	(¹)
Britain	December 1970	F-4E(F)	175-220	Interceptor/fighter bombers	1,180	1974-75
Greece: France	August 1970	Westland SH-3D	22	ASW helicopters	(¹)	1971
Italy:		AMX-30	50	Medium tanks	33	1970-71
United States	do	C-130	14	Transports	60	1971
Do	October 1970	CH-47C Chinook	8	Medium helicopters	(¹)	1972
West Germany	1970	Leopard	² 200	Medium tanks	(¹)	(¹)
Netherlands:						
United States	November 1970	P-3C Orion	1	Maritime patrol	(¹)	(¹)
West Germany	September 1970	SP guns on Leopard chassis	100	Antiaircraft	180	1971-

Footnotes at end of table.

5. MAJOR IDENTIFIED ARMS AGREEMENTS, JULY 1970 TO JUNE 1971—Continued

Recipient and primary supplier	Approximate date of agreement	Name of system	Approximate numbers	Primary role	Approximate cost to recipient (m.)	Expected date of delivery
Norway: Britain	2.71	Westland SH-3D	10	Helicopters	16.8	1972
Portugal: United States	1971	Boeing 707	2	Troop transport	18	1971
Spain:						
France	1970	AMX-30	19	Medium tanks	(¹)	(¹)
United States	1970	F-4C	36	Fighter	104	1971-
		KC-130 Hercules	2	Tankers	(¹)	(¹)
		P-3 Orion	3	Maritime patrol	(¹)	(¹)
		Sikorsky SH-3D	4	ASW helicopters	(¹)	1971
		Bell 209 Huey Cobra	4	Attack helicopters	(¹)	1971
		M-107 175mm	2	SP guns	(¹)	(¹)
		C-130 Hercules	6	Transport	(¹)	(¹)
		M-48	58	Medium tanks	(¹)	(¹)
		M-108 105mm	48	SP howitzers	(¹)	(¹)
		M-109 155mm	18	do	(¹)	(¹)
		M-113	49	APC	(¹)	(¹)
		Guppy-class	2	Submarines	(¹)	1971
		Destroyers	5	Escorts	(¹)	1971-72
		Agile-class	4	MCM	(¹)	1971-72
		Landing ships	3	LST	(¹)	1971-72
Sweden:						
Britain	Dec 1970	Westland SH-3D	4	ASW helicopters	(¹)	(¹)
Japan	1971	KV-107	7	do	1.25	1973-74
Switzerland: Britain	1970	Hunter	30	Fighter-bombers	14.4	1972-74
(B) MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA						
Abu Dhabi: Britain	December 1970	Hunter	(¹)	Fighter	(¹)	(¹)
Egypt:						
Soviet Union	1970-71	MiG-21	100	Interceptors	(¹)	1970-71
do	1970-71	SU-7	25	Fighter-bomber	(¹)	1970-71
do	1970-71	MiG-15/17	55	Fighters	(¹)	1970-71
do	1970-71	Mi-8	70	Helicopters	(¹)	1970-71
do	1970	203mm		Artillery	(¹)	1970
do	March 1971	SA-2, SA-3		SAM	(¹)	(¹)
do	1970	ZSU-23/4		Antiaircraft guns	(¹)	1970
Iran:						
Britain	1971	Chieftain	700-800	Medium tanks	168-192	(¹)
United States	December 1970	C-130H	30	Trnsports	122	1970
Israel:						
United States	October 1970	M-60, M-48	180	Medium tanks	35	1970
do	September 1970	F-4E	16-18	Fighter-bomber	(¹)	1971
do	November 1970	A-4E	18	do	(¹)	1970
Libya: Soviet Union	July 1970	Field artillery	75	do	(¹)	1970
		T-54, T-55	200	Medium tanks	(¹)	1970
		Amphibious vehicles	36		(¹)	
Muscat and Oman:						
Britain	October 1970	Skyvan 3M	5	Transport	2.4	1970
Canada	1970	Caribou	3	do	(¹)	1970
Syria:						
Soviet Union	1970-71	MiG-17/21	(¹)	Fighters	(¹)	1971
do	1970-71	Su-7	5	Fighter-bombers	(¹)	1971
do	1970-71	Mi-8	22	Helicopters	(¹)	1971
(C) SOUTH ASIA						
Ceylon:						
Britain	April 1971	Bell Jetranger	6	Helicopters	(¹)	1971
Soviet Union	do	MiG-17	6	do	(¹)	1971
India:						
New Zealand	May 1971	Canberra	10	Bombers	(¹)	(¹)
Britain	December 1970	Westland SH-3D	2	ASW	(¹)	1970
Pakistan:						
France	March 1971	Mirage III-E/V	30	Fighter-bombers	(¹)	1973
Do	1970	Alouette III	24	Helicopters	(¹)	(¹)
United States	November 1970	B-57	7	Bombers	(¹)	(¹)
Do	January 1971	F-104	6	Fighters (value of total deal)	15	(¹)
Do	October 1970	M-113	300	APC	(¹)	(¹)
Do	November 1970	Patrol boats	4	Coastal patrol	(¹)	(¹)
Do	March 1971	T-37	4	do	(¹)	1971
Sweden	1971	Saab 105	4	Trainers	(¹)	(¹)
(D) SOUTH-EAST ASIA						
Australia:						
United States	February 1971	Huey Cobra	11	Helicopters	13.8	1974
France	November 1970	Mirage III-D	6	Trainers	12.4	1973
United States	1970	CH-47C Chinook	12	Helicopters	41	(¹)
Do	1970	F-4E	24	Fighter-bombers	160	(¹)
Brunei: Britain	November 1970	HS 748	1	Transport	(¹)	1970
Indonesia: Malaysia	February 1971	Pioneer	12	Utility transport	(¹)	(¹)
Malaysia:						
France	August 1970	patrol boats/Exocet	7	SSM patrol boats	22.5	(¹)
Do	June 1971	Mirage V	(¹)	Fighters	(¹)	(¹)
Britain	May 1971	Bulldog	15	Trainers	.8	(¹)
United States	March 1971	Sikorsky S-61	6	Helicopters	(¹)	1971
Nepal: Britain	December 1970	Skyvan 3M	1	Transport	(¹)	(¹)
New Zealand: Britain	1970	BAC-167	10	Fighters	8.4	1972
Singapore: New Zealand	December 1970	Air tourer	2	Trainers	(¹)	1970
Thailand:						
Britain	October 1970	Shorland MK3	32	Armoured cars	.48	1971
United States	September 1970	Helicopters	5	do	(¹)	1970
Do	do	HAWK	(¹)	SAM	(¹)	(¹)
(E) LATIN AMERICA						
Argentina:						
France	October 1970	Mirage III-D/E	12	Trainer/fighter	49	(¹)
Britain	December 1970	Short Skyvan 3M	5	Patrol, search/rescue	24	(¹)
United States	May 1971	Hughes 500	6	Helicopters	(¹)	(¹)
Do	September 1970	C-130E Hercules	3	Transport	(¹)	(¹)
Brazil:						
Britain	September 1970	Frigates	6	ASW	283	(¹)
Do	1970	Seacat	(¹)	SAM	(¹)	(¹)
Chile: United States	November 1970	Beech 99A	9	Trainers	(¹)	(¹)

Footnotes at end of table.

Recipient and primary supplier	Approximate date of agreement	Name of system	Approximate numbers	Primary role	Approximate cost to recipient (m.)	Expected date of delivery
(E) LATIN AMERICA—Continued						
Colombia:						
France	1970	Mirage III-B/R	4	Fighters	(¹)	(¹)
Do	1970	Mirage V	14	do	(¹)	(¹)
Ecuador:						
France	1970	Light armoured vehicles	27		(¹)	(¹)
Do	1970	AMX-13	41	Light tanks	(¹)	(¹)
Britain	January 1971	Skyvan 3M	1	Transport	(¹)	(¹)
United States	October 1970	T-41D	12	Trainers	(¹)	(¹)
Guyana: Britain	January 1971	Islander	2	Communication	(¹)	1971
Peru: Canada	do	Twin Otter	8	Transport	4.8	1971
Uruguay: United States	June 1971	Friendship FH-227B ¹	2	do	(¹)	1971
Venezuela:						
United States	February 1971	C-130H	4	do	(¹)	1971
Do	June 1971	Cessna 182 Skylane	12	Transport/trainer	(¹)	1971
(F) AFRICA—SOUTH OF THE SAHARA						
Congo (Kinshasa):						
France	1970-71	SA-330 Puma	30	Helicopters	(¹)	1971-70
Italy	1970	SF-260	12	Trainers	(¹)	1971-70
United States	January 1971	C-130	8	Transport	17	(¹)
Cabon: France	August 1970	Alouette II	1	Helicopter	(¹)	(¹)
Ivory Coast: France	September 1970	SA-330 Puma	1	do	(¹)	(¹)
Kenya:						
Britain	October 1970	BAC-167 Strikemaster	6	Fighters	(¹)	(¹)
Do	do	Bulldog	5	Trainers	24	1972
Nigeria: France	December 1970	Noratlac	4	Transport	(¹)	(¹)
South Africa: Britain	November 1970	Hawker Siddeley 748	3	do	(¹)	(¹)
Tanzania:						
China	June 1971	Medium tanks	16		(¹)	(¹)
Do	1970-71	Patrol boats	2		(¹)	1971
Togo: France	August 1970	Alouette II	1	Helicopters	(¹)	(¹)
Uganda:						
Israel	1970	Sherman	10	Tanks	(¹)	1970
Britain	1971	Saladin	30	Armoured cars	(¹)	1971
Zambia:						
Italy	January 1971	SF 260	8	Trainers	(¹)	(¹)
Do	March 1971	MB 326	12	Fighters	(¹)	(¹)
Britain	December 1970	Hawker Siddeley 748	1	Transport	(¹)	(¹)
Yugoslavia	1970	Galeb	2	Trainers	(¹)	1971
Do	1970	Jastreb	4	Light attack aircraft	(¹)	1971
(G) NORTH AMERICA						
Canada:						
United States	April 1971	Boeing 707	1	Transport	(¹)	1971
Do	May 1971	Bell COH-58A	74	Light observation helicopter	11	1971
Do	March 1971	Beech Musketeer	25	Trainers	.825	1972
Do	November 1970	P-3C Orion	30	Maritime patrol	(¹)	(¹)
Do	September 1970	F-101 Voodoo	58-8	Fighters	66	1971
Do	October 1970	CUH-1N	124	Helicopters	(¹)	1971
United States; Britain	1971	AV-8 Harrier	18	Ground support	64	1971

¹ Not available.
² Another 600 are to be built under licence in Italy.
³ Loan.
⁴ March 1971.
⁵ France has since banned deliveries and the United States is holding action on these deals in absence.
⁶ 1 squadron.
⁷ 1 battery.
⁸ Cost of leasing for 4 years.
⁹ November 1970.
¹⁰ September 1970.

NOTES

This table lists major agreements on a firm-to-government and on a government-to-government basis, and covers both credit and cash sales. Costs to recipients may include spares, support, etc., and reflect the value of goods taken in part-exchange where applicable. Payees may include subcontractors in the purchasing country, as well as prime contractors in the supplying country. No licensing agreements are included.
 American, Soviet and Chinese military aid to Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Korea, and Soviet deliveries to members of the Warsaw Pact are excluded.

CHAPTER X—APPENDIX
 THE MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT

Any assessment of the military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact involves comparison of the strengths of both men and equipment, consideration of qualitative characteristics such as geographical advantages, deployment, training and logistic support, and differences in doctrine and philosophy. These are the factors—and there are others as well, including notably the performance of weapons systems—that are at the heart of military security and will have to be taken into account by both sides when considering Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), so as not to be placed, as a result of changes, at a disadvantage. (MBFR has historical antecedents in the various arms control plans of the 1950s and 1960s, but more recently a precise proposal was made at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Reykjavik in June 1968. In Spring 1971 there were indications of willingness by the Soviet Union

to discuss the proposal.) Most of these factors are variables and may change over time, but the geographical asymmetry is not: This point is critical to any negotiations.

Military considerations are, however, only part of the problem; political questions are of first importance. These include the extent to which reductions should consist of stationed or indigenous forces and their equipment; the impact on confidence of the measures for verification and control of force reductions; and the effect on relationships within alliances of any agreements reached. While the appraisal which follows touches on many matters central to MBFR, drawing attention as it does to asymmetries which now exist, it is military only and thus one-dimensional. It should be regarded as primarily a quantitative guide since there are difficulties in giving values, in so short a space, to qualitative factors and deciding on their relevance. Furthermore, the situation is not a static one: any single presentation must have inadequacies. The comparisons necessar-

ily oversimplify what is by its nature a complex problem.

Land and Air Forces

The three NATO major subordinate commands—Northern, Central, and Southern Europe—at first seem to offer a convenient basis for making a direct comparison with the opposing forces of the Warsaw Pact, but there are problems. The Northern European Command covers not only Norway but also the Baltic area including Denmark, Schleswig-Holstein, and the Baltic approaches. It is not possible to make precise calculations as to the Soviet formations that would be committed to the Baltic area rather than toward the NATO Central European Command. In both land and air forces there is a considerable degree of flexibility to do either: for the Warsaw Pact this sector is a coherent front. For this reason, Northern and Central Europe are grouped together in the tables which follow and Southern Europe is shown separately. Such a grouping conceals, however, a marked imbalance in north Norway.

GROUND FORMATIONS

Category	Northern and Central Europe ¹			Southern Europe ²		
	NATO	Warsaw Pact	Of which U.S.S.R.	NATO	Warsaw Pact	Of which U.S.S.R.
Ground forces available to commanders in peacetime (in division equivalents):						
Armored.....	8	28	19	7	9	3
Infantry, mechanized and airborne.....	16	37	22	30	21	4

¹Includes, on the NATO side, the commands for which AFCENT and AFNORTH commanders have responsibility (see introduction to NATO section). France is not included nor are any allied ground forces in Portugal or Britain. On the Warsaw Pact side it includes the command for which the pact high commander has responsibility, but excludes the armed forces of Bulgaria and Rumania. Soviet units normally stationed in western U.S.S.R. and such troops as might be committed to the Baltic theater of operations have, however, been included on the Warsaw Pact side.

²Includes, on the NATO side, the Italian, Greek, and Turkish land forces (including those in Asian Turkey) and such American and British units as would be committed to the Mediterranean theater of operations, and on the Warsaw Pact side, the land forces of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, and such Soviet units normally stationed in Hungary and southern U.S.S.R. as might be committed to the Mediterranean theater.

If French formations (not part of NATO's integrated commands) are included they would add two mechanized divisions to the NATO totals (these are the two divisions stationed in Germany. There are four more in France.) The appropriate forces of all of the Warsaw Pact countries are included, though the military values of some of them may be suspect for political reasons.

In Norway, there are only Norwegian forces in peacetime, a brigade group being located in the north. The Soviet forces facing them could be brought against them from northwest Russia probably amount to at least four divisions. This wide disparity highlights the problem of the defense of north Norway against surprise attack. To meet this difficulty, a system of self-defense, based on a

powerful Home Guard and rapid mobilization, has been designed to take maximum advantage of the ruggedness of the country and the poor road and rail communications, but it is clear that defense against attack of any size depends on timely external assistance.

Two further imbalances are worth noting. The first, a legacy from the postwar occupation zones, is a certain maldistribution in the NATO Central European Command, where the well-equipped and strong American formations are stationed in the southern part of the front, an area which geographically lends itself to defense, while in the north German plain, across which the routes to allied capitals run, where there is little depth and few major obstacles, certain of the forces are less

powerful. The second is that the whole of the Italian land forces, which are included in the table under Southern Europe, are stationed in Italy and thus are at some distance from the areas of potential confrontation.

Manpower

A comparison of formations is not by itself sufficient, however, since NATO formations are much larger than those of the Warsaw Pact. It is necessary to take account of this difference in size and also of the combat troops in formations higher than divisions and those men who directly support them. Figures calculated on this basis—and the calculations can only be an approximate and arbitrary one—give the following comparison for forces in peacetime (figures are in thousands):

Category	Northern and central Europe			Southern Europe		
	NATO	Warsaw pact	Of which U.S.S.R.	NATO	Warsaw Pact	Of which U.S.S.R.
Combat and direct support troops available.....	580	960	588	525	385	90

If French forces are counted, including those stationed in France, the NATO figure for Northern and Central Europe might be increased by perhaps 120,000.

Reinforcements

The mobilization of first-line reserves and the movement of reinforcements to the theater would materially alter the above figures. The immediate mobilization capacity of the Warsaw Pact is greater than that of the West: It has been estimated that the force of thirty-one Soviet divisions in Central Europe might be increased to seventy in well under a month, if mobilization were unimpeded. The Soviet Union, a European power and operating on interior lines, can bring up reinforcements overland, with heavy equipment, far faster than can the United States across the Atlantic. American ability to bring back quickly by air the dual-based brigades whose equipment is in Germany has been demonstrated and the C-5 aircraft, the first of which are now in service, will greatly increase the airlift. But this lift depends on a secure air environment, safe airfields to fly into, and the willingness to reinforce in a

crisis situation at the risk of heightening tension by doing so. And reinforcing divisions would need seallift to move their heavy equipment.

Implicit in Western defense plans is the concept of political warning time, that there will be sufficient warning of a possible attack to enable NATO forces to be brought to a higher state of readiness and for reinforcement and mobilization to take place. Advantage here will always lie with an attacker, who can start mobilization first, hope to conceal his intentions and achieve some degree of tactical surprise. The point of attack can be chosen and a significant local superiority built up. The defender is likely to start more slowly and will have to remain on guard at all points.

A fair summary of the reinforcement position might be that the Warsaw Pact is intrinsically capable of a faster buildup in the early stages, particularly if local or general surprise is achieved; that NATO can only match such an initial buildup if it has, and takes advantage of, sufficient warning time; that the subsequent rate of buildup favors the Warsaw Pact unless the crisis develops

slowly enough to permit full reinforcement; in this last case, the West would be in a position much more resembling equality. Alliance countries maintain more men under arms than the Warsaw Pact. For Army/Marines the figures (in thousands) are: NATO, 3,409 (including France, 329); Warsaw Pact, 2,778. Of course, large numbers of these men are outside Europe, as for example American forces in Asia and Soviet forces in their Far Eastern frontier.

Equipment

In a comparison of equipment, one point stands out: The Warsaw Pact is armed almost completely with Soviet or Soviet-designed material and enjoys the flexibility, simplicity of training, and economy that standardization brings. NATO forces have a wide variety of everything from weapons systems to vehicles, with consequent duplication of supply systems and some difficulties of interoperability.

As to numbers of weapons, there are some notable differences, of which tanks are perhaps the most significant. The relative tank strengths are as follows:

Category	Northern and Central Europe			Southern Europe		
	NATO	Warsaw Pact	Of which U.S.S.R.	NATO	Warsaw Pact	Of which U.S.S.R.
Main battle tanks in operational service—in peacetime ¹	5,600	16,000	10,000	2,250	5,700	1,600

¹These are tanks with formations and exclude those in reserve or storage.

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¹ These are tanks with formations and exclude those in reserve or storage.

It will be seen that NATO has little more than a third as many operational tanks as the Warsaw Pact in Northern and Central Europe, though NATO tanks are generally more modern (except for the T-62, now in service in the Pact forces in some numbers). This relative weakness in tanks reflects NATO's essentially defensive role and is offset to some extent by a superiority in ground antitank weapons. NATO probably also has more effective airborne antitank weapons, such as the missiles carried by fighter aircraft and helicopters. In conventional artillery, both sides are about equal in

strength: NATO is, though, likely to have superior firepower because of the greater lethality of its ammunition and the logistic capability to sustain higher rates of fire. This capability stems from a significantly higher transport lift, about half as high again in a NATO division as compared with a Warsaw Pact one. NATO has, however, an inflexible logistic system, based almost entirely on national supply lines with little central coordination. It cannot now use French territory and has many lines of communication running north to south, near the area of forward deployment.

Aircraft

If NATO ground formations are to be able to exploit, by day as well as by night, the mobility they possess, they must have a greater degree of air cover over the battlefield than they now have. Such cover is provided by a combination of rapid warning and communications systems, surface-to-air weapons, and fighter aircraft. In much of this ground-air environment NATO is well prepared, but in numbers of aircraft it is markedly inferior:

Categories	Northern and Central Europe			Southern Europe		
	NATO	Warsaw Pact	Of which U.S.S.R.	NATO	Warsaw Pact	Of which U.S.S.R.
Tactical aircraft in operational service:						
Light bombers	150	280	200		30	30
Fighter/ground attack	1,150	1,400	1,100	450	150	50
Interceptors	300	2,100	1,100	275	900	450
Reconnaissance	400	400	300	125	100	40

The division into the categories shown is only approximate since some aircraft can be adapted to more than one kind of mission. In general, NATO has a higher proportion of multipurpose aircraft of good performance over their full mission profiles, especially in range and payload. Both sides are modernizing their inventories, but the Warsaw Pact has recently introduced new types, such as the MIG-23 possibly superior to any interceptor that NATO has in operational service. The two air forces have, however, different roles: long range and payload may have lower priority for the Warsaw Pact. NATO, for example has maintained a long-range, deep-strike tactical aircraft capability; the Soviet Union has chosen to build an MRBM force which could, under certain circumstances, perform analogous missions.

The Warsaw Pact also enjoys the advantage of interior lines of communications, which make for ease of command and control and logistics. They have a relatively high capability to operate from dispersed natural airfields serviced by mobile systems, have far more airfields with more shelters and the great advantage of standard ground support equipment which stems from having only Soviet-designed aircraft. These factors make for much greater flexibility than NATO, with its many national sources of aircraft and wide variety of support equipment. NATO probably has some superiority in sophistication of equipment, the capability of its aircrews, which have in general higher training standards and fly more hours, and the versatility

of its aircraft. The NATO countries also have a worldwide inventory of aircraft far greater than that of the Warsaw Pact and in a situation where total reinforcement can be taken into account would have the greater capability. With all these different factors, the relative capabilities are not measurable in precise terms, but the Warsaw Pact advantage in numbers remains a very real one.

Theater nuclear weapons

NATO has some 7,000 nuclear warheads, deliverable by a variety of vehicles, some 2,250 in all, aircraft, short-range missiles, and artillery. These nuclear weapons are, in general, designed for use within the battlefield area or directly connected with the maneuver of combatant forces, which could be described as a "tactical" use. The figure of 7,000 warheads includes, however, a substantial number carried by, for example, aircraft such as the F-4 or F-104, which could be delivered on targets outside the battlefield area or unconnected with the maneuver of combatant forces and thus be put to "strategic" use. There is inevitably some overlap when describing delivery vehicles, aircraft, and missiles, capable of delivering conventional or nuclear warheads, as "tactical" or "strategic." The total of 7,000 also includes nuclear warheads for certain air-defense missiles. Three are also nuclear mines. Yields are in the kiloton range. The ground-based missile launchers and guns are in formations down to divisions and are operated both by American and allied troops, but in the latter case

warheads are under double key. The figure for Soviet warheads is probably about 3,500, delivered by roughly comparable aircraft and missile systems. Some of the delivery vehicles, but not the warheads, are in the hands of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces.

This comparison of nuclear warheads must not be looked at in quite the same light as the conventional comparisons preceding it, since on the NATO side the strategic doctrine is not and cannot be based on the use of such weapons on this sort of scale. These numbers were accumulated to implement an earlier, predominantly nuclear, strategy and an inventory of this size now has the chief merit of affording a wide range of choice of weapons, yield, and delivery system if controlled escalation has to be contemplated. A point that does emerge from the comparison, however, is that the Soviet Union has the ability to launch a battlefield nuclear offensive on a massive scale if it should choose, or to match any NATO escalation with broadly similar options.

Changes over time

The comparisons above are not very different from those of a year ago, but over a longer time-span the effect of small and slow changes can be marked and the balance can alter. In 1962, the American land, sea, and air forces in Europe totaled 434,000; now the figure is 300,000. There were twenty-six Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe in 1967; now there are thirty-one. The numbers and quality of surface-to-air missiles in the Warsaw

Pact forces have steadily grown, presenting now a most formidable defense, and Soviet tactical aircraft numbers have grown with them. The general pattern over the years has been a gradual shift in favor of the East.

Naval forces

To compare the maritime strengths of the two sides, particularly on a regional basis, offers many difficulties. Naval power is highly flexible; ships move between fleets, fleets move over great distances; strategic and tactical functions are often speedily interchangeable. It is far from easy and often inappropriate to set ships off against each other numerically. The requirement for destroyers, for example, is not related to the numbers of enemy destroyers but to the need to escort surface vessels against submarine or air threat; in antisubmarine warfare, surface vessels, submarines, and maritime aircraft must all be seen together as combined teams.

Given these and many other reservations, some touched on later, the relative strengths of the more significant ships in the North Atlantic, Baltic, and Mediterranean/Black Sea areas are listed below. The figures must not be regarded as indicating any fixed or optimum fleet dispositions, but simply a typical strength; transfers to and from the Soviet or American Pacific fleets can and do take place (though the size of the Soviet Pacific Fleet will be dictated not only by the number of American ships in that area but also by the navies of China and Japan).

Category	NATO	Warsaw Pact	Remarks
Attack carriers.....	10		Attack carriers have 70-100 aircraft embarked.
ASW carriers.....	4	2	
Surface attack, cruisers/destroyers ¹	6	15	
Antisubmarine, destroyers/trigates/escorts ²	276	150	
Motor torpedo/gun boats.	136	161	Warsaw Pact boats generally have SSM.
Attack submarines:			
Nuclear.....	33	20	
Diesel, long/medium range.	90	160	
Short range.....	30	22	

¹ These ships have significant anti-ship weapons, in the Soviet case long-range SSM.

² The missiles carried by these ships are primarily or exclusively for air defence (SAM).

The figures do not include the French Navy, which is a substantial force and quantitatively stronger than the Soviet Mediterranean squadron normally is.

The comparisons show marked and well-known asymmetries. The United States Navy has powerful carrier strike forces, with aircraft and missiles for air defense and anti-submarine warfare, and with long-range aircraft for the strike role against surface vessels and land targets, nuclear armed if appropriate. The Soviet Navy, by contrast, has no attack carriers and relies on land-based aircraft for both air cover and strike, supplemented by shipborne SAM and, of course, by the long-range SSM, which a large number of Soviet vessels carry and for which there is no Western equivalent. This lack of carrier-borne aircraft would in war or in time of tension effectively limit the radius of action of Soviet surface fleets, despite the fact that they are in other ways becoming increasingly self-sufficient, and means that they do not have a true worldwide maritime capability.

The Soviet Union has had to develop a counter to the strategic threat posed by strike carriers and missile submarines in the Atlantic and Mediterranean and has built large numbers of submarines for this purpose. Because of this, the West has paid great attention to antisubmarine warfare and is probably ahead in this field, but this does not offset the sheer numbers of submarines that the Soviet Union deploys; to find and engage nuclear-powered boats is particularly difficult. This imbalance is the more important because the West depends on major naval surface ships on the carriage by sea of basic commodities: it is more vulnerable to submarine attack than is the Soviet Union.

The long-range SSMs on Soviet cruisers, destroyers, and submarines have some limitations, and the horizon-range systems now entering service present a more serious problem. The short-range SSM on the patrol boats are most effective and are backed up by missiles carried by more aircraft and in shore batteries. The SSM systems pose a particular threat to naval forces without carriers, dependent for their own long-range strike on land-based aircraft.

Any assessment of an overall balance is difficult to make. The differing roles in wartime must be taken into account: The Soviet fleets would be largely strategically defensive, meeting the threat posed by Western carrier strike forces and missile submarines (though

there would be large numbers of Soviet submarines left available for offensive purposes). The nature of the main deployment areas must also be considered. In the Mediterranean, for example, Soviet resupply and reinforcement to and from the naval squadron could be extremely difficult. Of great importance would be the degree of availability to the Soviet Union of airfields in the Mediterranean countries. In the North Atlantic, the United States can readily draw on reinforcements from the home base; the Soviet Union, by contrast, is much more limited in its strategic movement.

The biggest imponderable is that of the nature and duration of any future conflict. If extended, then Soviet submarine strength would be a menace to Western shipping, worldwide, whereas the Soviet Union is much more self-sufficient. If short, then, naval action is unlikely to be dominant; the outcome would be decided on land. There are too many variables to allow comprehensive judgments, but it seems fair to say that while the sea is still an area in which the West has superiority, the Soviet fleets are now able to offer a challenge at every level of military or politico/military action.

New construction

This challenge has emerged in recent years and is the result of a Soviet shift to a more forward deployment rather than more rapid naval building in the East than the West. The following table, which lists the deliveries of new ships over 1,000 tons, of major conversions, and of ocean-going submarines in the last ten years, to the Warsaw Pact (in fact the Soviet Union, since the other Warsaw Pact countries received no new ships in the period) and NATO navies, excluding France, helps to show this. It certainly brings out the Soviet emphasis on building submarines, particularly marked since 1968, but, as far as surface naval vessels are concerned, it also shows that the NATO countries have generally been outbuilding the Warsaw Pact, quantitatively and often qualitatively. Whether, under pressure from rising costs, each will continue to devote the same proportion of resources to their navies is another matter. Furthermore, the ships to be delivered in the next few years will be the result of decisions taken some years ago and shipbuilding in individual NATO countries tends, in any case, to be somewhat of a cyclical affair. The pattern revealed by this table may not necessarily be maintained.

NAVAL DELIVERIES 1961-70

Category	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	Totals	
											Last 10 yrs	Last 5 yrs.
A—Attack Carriers, NATO.....	3			1	1			1			6	11
B—Cruisers (SAM conversions):												
WP.....		1									1	
NATO.....	1	3	1								5	2
C—ASW cruisers, WP.....							1		1		2	2
SAM cruisers, NATO.....	1	2	1						1		5	1
D—SSM ships, WP.....		1	2	1			2	2	1	2	11	7
E—ASW destroyers, WP.....	1	2	2	3	4	2	3	6	5	6	34	22
DLG/DDG/DEG, NATO.....	10	11	14	8	3	7	11	3	3	3	73	47
F—Escorts, WP.....	4	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	12	80	44
Destroyers/escorts, NATO.....	9	8	13	11	10	15	20	9	12	16	123	72
G—Amphibious ships:												
WP.....						2	2	2	2	2	10	10
NATO.....	1	3	2	1	4	2	3	2	6	1	25	14
H—Submarines, attack, nuclear:												
WP.....	4	3	6	5	6	5	5	3	6	7	50	26
NATO.....	4	2	2	4		4	8	5	10	6	45	33
I—Diesel:												
WP.....	9	6	6	6	6	2		4			39	6
NATO.....	4	4	2	4	2	2					20	4
J—Submarines, ballistic missile nuclear:												
WP.....	2	2					1	4	5	7	21	17
NATO.....	3	3	7	13	4	5	3	2	1	1	42	12
K—Diesel, WP.....	6	4									10	

¹ The Soviet Navy has no attack carriers. The Moskva class (see below) is an ASW cruiser.

² Moskva class. One of the NATO SAM cruisers has a similar but smaller capability but the remainder are not really comparable.

³ Kynda, Kresta and Krupny classes. There is no comparable cruiser in NATO fleets.

⁴ This NATO category covers a wide range of destroyers, the largest of which, the DLG, is classified by some navies as a light cruiser.

⁵ The small size of these Soviet escorts limits their world-wide value. Of the NATO ships compared here the greater proportion qualify in many respects for the heavier category E.

⁶ Soviet ships are much smaller and hardly comparable.

⁷ The Soviet building rate is now about 7 a year; the U.S. figure is 6.

⁸ Over 700 tons only. NATO has built a further 35 between 450-600 tons. About 25 of the Soviet submarines carry cruise missiles, usable against ships or land targets.

⁹ The Soviet building rate is about 7-8 a year. The U.S. Polaris programme ended in 1967.

**AWARD TO C. SCOTT FLETCHER,
PRESIDENT OF FUND FOR EDUCATION**

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, for 10 years I had the privilege of serving on the board of the Fund for Adult Education sponsored by the Ford Foundation and spent 3 years as chairman of the board. The president of the fund was C. Scott Fletcher, an outstanding businessman from Illinois, former president of Encyclopedia Britannica Films and for many years a close colleague and business associate of Paul Hoffman at Studebaker Corp.

When the full story of educational television and public broadcasting is known, the Fund for Adult Education and the Ford Foundation will be recognized as having served the same relationship to educational television as Carnegie did to the public library. Without the tenacity, foresight, and skillful direction of C. Scott Fletcher, the fund's president, educational television as we know it today simply would not be a reality.

I ask unanimous consent that the commendation awarded to Mr. Fletcher by the National Association of Educational Broadcasters at its 46th annual convention on November 11, 1970, and also the brief remarks made by Mr. Fletcher accepting this distinguished award be printed in the RECORD.

I am proud to have been associated indirectly with Mr. Fletcher in business and directly for so many years in philanthropy and to count him as a friend. My respect for him as a citizen who has contributed greatly to the quality of life in America is very high, indeed.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATIONAL BROADCASTERS PROUDLY SALUTES C. SCOTT FLETCHER

Who, in the 1950's, after highly successful careers in business and education, became president of the Fund for Adult Education, and in this position, provided the impetus for the start of educational television in America:

By helping to finance the JCET which just 20 years ago this month, began to marshal the forces of education and government to secure the reservation of television channels;

By providing the matching grants which hastened the activation of the first 30 ETV stations;

By creating the first national program service in educational broadcasting—the Educational Television and Radio Center—and serving as its first president.

Who, in the 1960's as executive consultant and founder of ETS and as management consultant to the NAEB, dramatically demonstrated the vital role of this national organization:

By obtaining the grants necessary to establish the ETS Program Service;

By organizing the first conferences on long-range financing of educational television stations;

By encouraging the creation of the Carnegie Commission on Educational Television, and by laying the groundwork for implementing its recommendations, which led to passage of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967; and

By counseling those who subsequently brought into being the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.

Who, as a leading crusader in the cause of lifetime learning for all Americans, has consistently manifested outstanding executive skills, astounding personal dynamism, and a remarkable intuitive sense of history in the making;

Whose very human qualities have brought him the love, friendship, and deep respect of thousands of associates across his adopted land;

Who, while closely associated with television, has maintained his stout faith in educational radio and has confidently predicted the day now dawning, wherein both of these broadcast media are finally beginning to fulfill their true potential;

And who today, despite his official retirement, has consented to let us invade that hallowed state of freedom with our continuing requests for his wise counsel.

In recognition of these and countless other contributions to the advancement of education and understanding through radio and television, The National Association of Educational Broadcasters is proud to bestow upon him its highest honor, the Distinguished Service Award NAEB—46th annual convention, Washington, D.C., November 11, 1970.

ACCEPTANCE SPEECH OF DISTINGUISHED SERVICE AWARD BY C. SCOTT FLETCHER, 46TH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF NAEB, NOVEMBER 11, 1970, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Thank you, Chairman Kraetzer, President Harley, and my gratitude to the Awards and Citations Committee, Ladies and Gentlemen. I receive this award with supreme pleasure. It will be my most treasured award because it represents twenty years of concentrated effort to help the members of NAEB and others to succeed in their determination that the American people shall have the advantage of receiving and benefiting from educational radio and television programming.

In January 1951, I was given the assignment by the Fund for Adult Education to help make educational television become a reality. At that time the major subject of conversation and concern in broadcasting circles was the FCC's "freeze" on all TV licenses. The outlook for developing a nationwide system of broadcasting was bleak—very bleak indeed. But a handful of NAEB members with vision, imagination and great courage rose to the challenge and began to fight in order to achieve their dream.

Victor Hugo said "there is nothing as powerful as an idea whose time has come." I can add that nothing is more exhilarating than to work with those people who have an idea before its time has come and to help them bring the idea into a reality. I have had that exhilaration—of cooperating with the few who had the vision two decades ago, of seeing them joined by others with imagination and energy and zeal and also of sharing in the achievement of our common ideals and goals.

NAEB's crowning achievement was the establishment of the Carnegie Commission which led to the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 which in turn led to the formation of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. During its short life this great organization has created and performed magnificently in advancing public radio and television.

And so as one studies the fifty-year record of non-commercial radio and the two decades of non-commercial television, it becomes clear that at long last we have completed a full circle. All the essential parts of the public broadcast system are now in existence and we are operating together. But in another sense what has been completed is not a circle, but a full turn in an opening and ascending spiral. Today the issues are even more momentous and the opportunities much larger.

Ladies and gentlemen let me assure you

that it would have been utterly impossible for us to have reached our present position of prominence without NAEB, its divisions, its friends—especially some very wealthy ones—its members, member institutions and its staff.

NAEB is your organization. You finance it. You control it. It serves you in many ways and speaks for you so that your voice is not only heard but heeded. It is imperative that it be strengthened so that its leadership role can be intensified as we take the next major steps concerned with the permanent financing of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.

TIME TO REVAMP BANKRUPTCY LAWS

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, in today's economy I view with increasing alarm the accelerated number of bankruptcies suffered by all segments of our society—from our largest railroads to the ordinary consumer of goods and services.

During the past 20 years, consumer bankruptcies in the United States have increased by substantially over 600 percent to more than 182,000 annually. Business bankruptcies have more than doubled and were in excess of 19,000 in 1970.

At the same time, the terms of the Bankruptcy Act are exceedingly complicated. Lack of clarity—even to those expert in the field—labyrinthine and costly procedures, and inordinate delays, have led to inequities for so many citizens and businesses forced by circumstances to submit to the process. The situation is exacerbated by the economic dislocation this Nation has been enduring in recent years and by a too rapid expansion of credit that has reached proportions far beyond anything contemplated at the time the Bankruptcy Act was enacted.

In this background, the 91st Congress provided for the establishment of a Federal Commission to Study the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States. The Commission has been working long and hard hours with relatively scant funds in attempting a thoroughgoing evaluation and restructuring of bankruptcy procedures which are today too heavily weighted in favor of creditor. Chairman Harold Marsh, a recognized expert in the field, has benefited from the advice of two of the most able members of this Chamber, my distinguished colleagues MARLOW COOK of Kentucky and QUENTIN BURDICK of North Dakota. Representing the House on the Commission are DON EDWARDS and CHARLES WIGGINS, both from California. Other members include Charles Seligson, J. Wilson Newman, Judge Hubert Will, and Judge Edward Weinfeld. Three law school professors advising the Commission—Frank R. Kennedy, from the University of Michigan, serving as executive director, Philip Shuchman of the University of Connecticut, and Walter Phillips of Texas Tech—have, through their research and contributions, been of invaluable assistance in this effort.

With reference to the behind-the-scenes efforts of this Commission in providing an impetus for reform, there appeared in the New York Times of No-

ember 21, 1971, an insightful article by Robert J. Cole, documenting some of the flagrant abuses which have characterized procedures under the existing bankruptcy laws. I ask unanimous consent, that Mr. Cole's article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Sunday, Nov. 21, 1971]

REVAMPING BANKRUPTCY LAWS

(By Robert J. Cole)

Ernest Medders, a \$75-a-week mechanic's helper with a wife and 10 children, decided about 10 years ago to pull up stakes in Tennessee and move to Texas.

Convinced that one day he would inherit a vast Texas oil field worth \$500-million—not an impossible thing in the Lone Star State—he found it surprisingly easy to convince others to help him along.

By the time he filed for bankruptcy five years later, he had parlayed his oil field claim, which never materialized, into a dazzling lifestyle.

His name was legend throughout Texas. His parties were the talk of the town. He had acquired a \$40,000 house in Dallas, a \$425,000 homestead in Muenster, a valuable herd of cattle, a \$100,000 prize bull, a \$15,000 riding horse, three cars, a string of charge accounts and even a personally autographed photo of Lyndon B. Johnson.

By the time the dust had cleared, he had borrowed nearly \$2-million alone from the Poor Sisters of St. Francis, an order of nuns in Indiana.

To satisfy debts of more than \$1-million, almost everything the Medders owned went on the auction block—everything that is, except the homestead.

Under Texas law, a man's homestead—regardless of value—is untouchable. If, however, the Medders had lived almost anywhere else, they would have lost their home as well.

Discussing the landmark case in the Cornell Law Review a few years ago, Raymond C. Marier, then a Cornell law student and now a New York lawyer, pointed out that all states provide some exemptions for debtors but that some are more liberal than others.

In the East, Mr. Marier said, creditors are favored by giving only parsimonious exemptions to people in debt.

On the other hand, the West, which was originally settled in large measure by debtors on the run, is very generous to people in debt. California and Texas are outstanding examples.

But in today's world, is this enormous disparity in debtor treatment a valid one?

This question and dozens of equally important ones are now being studied by a think tank in Washington, officially known as the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States.

Working out of a dingy office at 1016 Sixteenth Street, N.W., three law professors—Frank R. Kennedy of the University of Michigan, Philip Shuchman of the University of Connecticut and Walter Phillips of Texas Tech—are researching a report to Congress that may one day revolutionize bankruptcy procedures now heavily weighted in favor of creditors.

Consider, for example, the complex issues in establishing a uniform exemption in bankruptcy.

If the exemption is set at, say, \$10,000 everywhere, thousands of debtors in the West might be forced into bankruptcy by creditors eager to seize homesteads now beyond their reach. In the East, where exemptions are small, debtors would resort to bankruptcy to get the exemption where they don't have

it now. Creditors, on the other hand, would go to state legislatures to strengthen garnishment laws as another way to "get at" a debtor.

One possibility under consideration is a floor on exemptions that might be more liberal to debtors in the East but at the same time not against the interests of debtors in the West.

In an interview the other day, Professor Kennedy, executive director of the Federal commission, said that one important reason for the bankruptcy study—expected to take at least another year—is the "dramatic" rise in consumer bankruptcies since 1946.

In that year, total bankruptcies—business as well as consumer—totaled only slightly more than 10,000 but were not considered a realistic measure of the economy because credit was just beginning to return to normal after a war when credit was tight.

By 1950, a more normal year, bankruptcies by consumers had climbed to 25,000, and they moved up steadily year by year to nearly 100,000 in 1960 and more than 178,000 in 1970.

By June 30 of this year consumer bankruptcies had zoomed by substantially over 600 per cent in the last 20 years, to more than 182,000. Business bankruptcies more than doubled, from 8,350 to a little over 19,000 in the same period.

"Some people feel we're in dire trouble if this continues," Mr. Kennedy said.

The issues are so complicated—and the impact so important to both debtors and creditors—that the commission is moving slowly.

Mr. Shuchman said the commission has already heard from a number of creditor groups but so far has not heard from many consumers.

One lawyer who hears regularly from consumers, however, is Landon L. Chapman of Chicago, a nationally known expert on consumer bankruptcies.

Mr. Chapman, who has filed more than 15,000 voluntary bankruptcy cases in the last 35 years, said in a telephone interview that small-loan companies are particularly severe with debtors.

His major complaint is the false financial statement.

In theory, small-loan companies must get full disclosure of other debts from a borrower so that they can determine whether to grant a loan.

In practice, however, knowing that debtors cannot discharge debts based on fraud, many lenders use forms that, Mr. Chapman argued, make it "very convenient" for a borrower to leave things out—thus making a false financial statement.

Moreover, he said, "they [the finance companies] often help the debtor make a false statement."

One way to do this, he said, was to ask the debtor to list a few of his debts and then add on the form, "I have no other debts."

The debtor usually doesn't know what he's signing, Mr. Chapman said, until he goes bankrupt. "The loan papers are filled with fine print that the company relies on to nail the debtor," he said.

Another practice of loan companies he dislikes is the chattel mortgage on such household goods as the bed, stove and refrigerator. "It should not be permitted," Mr. Chapman said.

He argued that household goods were of little value to the loan company and that the only purpose of a chattel mortgage was to "put the debtor in distress by taking it or threatening to take it."

It gives the loan company "a club over the head," he said. "It's unfair, unjust and unethical. It's a means of putting pressure on the borrower to frighten him into borrowing from a friend or relative."

There has been one good sign for the debtor, Mr. Chapman said.

Under a new Federal law passed late last year, a claim brought by a creditor must be brought before the bankruptcy court or run the risk of being ignored. Under prior law—and to some extent even now—creditors would let consumers get their discharge in bankruptcy and then file suit in state courts. In most cases debtors would ignore them—in the mistaken belief that they were now bankrupt and didn't have to pay—and, as a result, the debtor threatening suit for judgment requiring the debtor to pay.

Another favorite device of the creditor was to call a debtor threatening suit for fraud. The only way out was a promise to pay, despite discharge.

An even more enticing way to get reaffirmation of a small-loan debt was to put, say, 100 \$1 bills in a pile in front of a debtor. The sight of the money was often too much for a debtor to pass up. In exchange for the cash, he often would sign a new note to pay off an old debt, of course with the \$100 tacked on top of it.

The new law, Mr. Chapman said, has turned out to be an improvement for the consumer.

For one thing, he said, it's "very difficult" for a creditor to get a default judgment now. Notice has to be served on the bankrupt as well as his lawyer, so that a creditor is unable to obtain a judgment without the knowledge of the debtor.

Before, he said, default judgments were widespread in the state courts because of what he called "the ignorance of the debtor, the corruption of the creditors and the help of the bribed deputy bailiffs and deputy sheriff."

In California, Hugh Slate, of Slate & Leoni, the biggest bankruptcy law firm in the country, has similar views on the need for bankruptcy reform.

Mr. Slate believes, for example, that reaffirmation—where the debtor agrees to pay a debt after filing for bankruptcy or despite bankruptcy—should not be permitted.

In a telephone interview from Los Angeles, Mr. Slate said he was also opposed to the \$50 bankruptcy filing fee—charged on the husband and again on the wife—where the debtor was insolvent.

"I've seen people go into bankruptcy court and explain that they can't pay the fee," Mr. Slate said. "But," he added, "the referee says he has 'no discretion' to waive the fee and dismisses the case. It's a dirty deal. The court sends notice to the creditors and they start at him—the debtor—all over again."

Courts should have discretion to waive the fee, he argued.

James E. Moriarty, a bankruptcy referee in Los Angeles, tends to agree in part. He remarked not too long ago that a "nominal fee" might be justified because debtors "should pay something." But, he added, \$50 for a person who can't afford it was "too high."

Turning to small-loan companies, he asserted that for too many years they had relied on garnishment and the courts "to bail them out." But, he said, "if they wouldn't lend to these poor unfortunate people, they couldn't get money."

He said he had "no great love" for finance companies but felt that "if you make it too difficult for them, they may have to raise their prices."

Congress, meanwhile, is looking for guidance on bankruptcy reform to a major study just completed by the Brookings Institution in Washington under the supervision of David T. Stanley, a senior fellow at Brookings.

The study, "Bankruptcy: Problem, Process, Reform," which is by Mr. Stanley and Marjorie Girth, will be published early next year, largely under a \$314,000 Ford Foundation grant. It will propose—among other things—the formation of a Federal agency to admin-

ister all bankruptcies except the big business reorganizations.

It will propose that the new Federal agency meet its expenses out of general revenue. At present the bankruptcy court must pay its own way.

Such a proposal would entail hearing examiners to make decisions and eliminate the use of bankruptcy trustees and referees.

This is a major issue that the Kennedy think tank will have to resolve. There is a strong possibility that Congress will be asked to support it. If it does, creditors would benefit because less money would be diverted to administrative costs. Debtors would thus benefit because more of their assets would go to paying off debts.

TRANSFER OF FEDERAL PROPERTY AND EFFECT ON SCHOOLS

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, with a considerable sense of disappointment, I desire to speak on amendment No. 74 of the supplemental appropriations conference report.

We all know that this country's public school systems face a bleak year, bordering on disaster level retrenchments. Operating budgets nearly everywhere have been pared to the bone; teachers have been laid off; classrooms have become more crowded; student services have been cut. Chicago's 588 schools, for example, may have to close for 12 days at some point this school year because of a budget deficit of \$22.8 million.

So, when the Chicago Board of Education brought to my attention the acute financial pressures that the transfer of property from the General Services Administration—GSA—to the U.S. Postal Service will bring to approximately 700 school districts in about 200 congressional districts, I immediately promised to help.

The transfer of properties from GSA to the Postal Service would, in effect, render those properties non-Federal and, therefore, ineligible for Public Law 874 funds. This consequence would be disastrous for the affected school districts, many of whom are already suffering from inadequate financing. I, therefore, persuaded the full Senate Appropriations Committee to include in its supplemental appropriations conference report a general provision to provide a 1-year grace period under Public Law 874 to allow the affected school districts to receive Federal funds which many of them had already budgeted for the coming year.

It is unfortunate that the Senate-House conferees in agreeing to amendment No. 74 did not see fit to give school districts affected by the transfer a 1-year reprieve, arguing that H.R. 11809, a bill introduced by Representative PUCINSKI in the House and Senator EAGLETON in the Senate, would accomplish the same purpose. Although Representative PUCINSKI and Senator EAGLETON deserve commendation for their efforts, my approach through appropriations channels would have made available this impact aid money in time for school districts and school board members to plan their budgets and their personnel contracts for the coming year without the anxiety and uncertainty of waiting for the enactment of H.R. 11809.

I am sorry that no Member of the

House or Senate saw fit at the time to help sustain the more efficacious Senate conference report provision. However, let us all now work together to make H.R. 11809 a reality.

JUDGES FOR THE SUPERIOR COURT

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, yesterday morning, the conferees on the District of Columbia appropriation bill reached agreement, and their conference report was quickly approved.

I am deeply disturbed by several reductions in the final bill.

In particular, I am surprised and shocked at the elimination from the bill of all funding for seven new judgeships and supporting personnel for the new superior court—an item contained in our Senate bill.

These seven new judgeships were authorized by the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, to take effect on February 1, 1972. From the outset these new judgeships were envisioned as an essential ingredient in the sweeping court reorganization for the District of Columbia.

On February 1, 1972, significant felony and civil jurisdiction will be transferred from the U.S. district court to the superior court. The seven new judgeships authorized last year will be urgently needed at that time if the superior court is to cope successfully with the heavy new burdens imposed upon it.

So important are these new judgeships to the success of court reorganization that the District government long ago spent substantial money to renovate the Pension Building so that space would be available to house the expanded court at the first of the year. The Department of Justice has been at work for some time in screening potential court nominees so that the President could send timely nominations to the Senate for action.

It is imperative that money for these new judges and their supporting personnel, including badly needed probation officers, be appropriated in the near future. Money for this purpose deserves and must receive a very high priority in any supplemental appropriation.

I shall fight to fund these new judgeships at the earliest opportunity because they are absolutely essential to the success of the President's crime program in the District of Columbia. Failure to fund these judges would be a death blow to court reorganization.

CRITICAL NEED FOR INDEPENDENT CONSUMER PROTECTION AGENCY

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, consumers need a Federal presence vested with sufficient powers and resources to act exclusively as their advocate in connection with activities of the Federal Government. As a principal cosponsor of S. 1177 to create an independent Consumer Protection Agency, the question I face is not whether, but how best to shore up the organization and improve the operation of Federal consumer protection activities.

If the experience of the past is any guide, our task is a formidable one. I am concerned about creating just another

new agency to add to the ledger of Federal bureaucracies. The youth of a new agency no more guarantees its fitness or success than the age of an old one. And we already have far too many time-worn agencies which seem to surface only during the annual appropriations process to obtain their moneys, but which seemingly do next to nothing to protect consumer interests.

I am concerned also that we do not impose on the American consumer another false panacea—some sugar-coated sop which is devoid of real powers, and which will invariably fall prey to the same ills of stagnation that have affected too many agencies over the years.

I am concerned about bigness, fatness, bureaucracy, stagnation and perversion of purpose. I have seen too many agencies that have failed to live up to their lofty purposes—relatively new ones exhibiting indecision; middle-aged ones showing signs of institutional paunch; and the traditional, inveterate ones which suffer from tired blood.

We cannot be satisfied with predicting more of the same, and then retiring to the sidelines to bemoan its occurrence while smugly gloating over the accuracy of our prediction.

Clearly, the blunders of traditional agency structure are wholly inadequate to the problem of consumer unrepresentation. But to recognize this merely reminds us that it is time to revise our theories, not renounce our visions.

Recent newspaper articles confirm that the regulatory agencies we have set up to assure consumer protection—particularly in the most important area of product safety—require just such a shot in the arm. I am especially disturbed by lax enforcement within the Food and Drug Administration, notwithstanding the outstanding leadership of Commissioner Charles C. Edwards. Whether the problem be lack of basic authority, money, manpower or motivation, I believe it is time for FDA to present to the Congress a detailed and comprehensive accounting of its needs and difficulties with respect to the plethora of responsibilities it has in protecting consumers.

I am shocked by the fine investigative reporting of Frances Cerra of Newsday—reprinted in the Washington Post, November 14, 1971—which documents that "Dangerous Children's Furniture Is Still on the Market." The chairman of the board of one of the largest crib manufacturing firms in the country—upon being informed that the space between the bars of his wooden cradle exceeded safety limits concurred in by experts, including the National Commission on Product Safety—cavalierly responded, "So what?", adding that he did not "have to justify anything."

Under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, as amended by the Child Protection and Toy Safety Act of 1969, the Food and Drug Administration has undisputed authority to regulate toys and other articles intended for use by children which may present an unreasonable hazard. The legislative history of the 1969 act will show that the above language was meant to be construed broadly—"by children" meaning near or around children—so as to provide the

greatest possible protection to the most cherished resource that this or any country has.

The time for action by the FDA is now, not after another heartbreaking tragedy occurs from product maldesign or manufacturing negligence.

In the days ahead, I am hopeful that we can expand our understanding of agency organization, and be open to the need to rethink, revise, and revamp, where necessary, whatever inconsistent notions we may have earlier entertained. Then, coming forth with a bill for a strong and independent Consumer Protection Agency which reflects a sensitivity to the unrequited needs of the American consumer to have his interests fairly, effectively, and responsibly represented, we will have done a real service to the Nation.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the outstanding article by Frances Cerra, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 14, 1971]

DANGEROUS CHILDREN'S FURNITURE IS STILL ON THE MARKET
(By Frances Cerra)

NASSAU, N.Y.—Safety experts generally agree that the bars of a crib should be no more than 3½ inches apart. More space than that makes it possible for a small baby to strangle himself by squeezing his body, all except his head, between the bars.

Despite this fact, the juvenile furniture department of a Nassau department store recently had on display a handsome wooden cradle with more than 4 inches between bars. The cradle, which was selling for \$36 was trademarked "Nod-A-Way," a brand made by the Okla. Homer Smith Furniture Manufacturing Co., Inc., of Fort Smith, Ark.

A call to the company, one of the largest crib manufacturers in the country, brought Okla. Homer Smith, the chairman of the board and president of the company, to the phone. When he was told that the space between the bars of the cradle exceeded what are believed to be safe limits, he said, "So what?" Then, in an angry tone, he said his company knew far more than the caller about making cribs and that he didn't "have to justify anything."

It has been almost 1½ years since the National Commission on Product Safety made its recommendations for improving the safety of furniture for babies and young children. Yet unsafe furniture is still on the market. Accurate nationwide statistics on injuries related to such furniture are not available. However, in a pilot project involving 14 hospitals in Washington, D.C., and Memphis, Tenn., 675 injuries to children and babies from juvenile furniture were reported during the period from September 1969, to August 1971. These were injuries treated in emergency rooms; no count was made of those treated in doctors' offices or at home.

The lack of progress in improving the safety of the furniture is due, on the one hand, to the attitude of the manufacturers, and on the other, to the understaffing and underbudgeting of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the federal agency that has the authority to set safety standards for juvenile furniture.

The final report of the Product Safety Commission released in June 1970, said "in the absence of government oversight, the infant furniture industry has neglected to assess the needs and nature of children who use their products." The commission went out of existence with the release of that report,

and since then Congress has been wrestling with bills that would establish a permanent product safety commission. Meanwhile, the furniture manufacturers have been occupied with just getting organized, according to Elliot Mover, head of the safety committee of the Juvenile Furniture Manufacturers Association. They have not come up with any voluntary safety standards.

"It has been a constant problem to get some people in the industry to accept outside advice," Mover said, and commented that he was not surprised at the response of Smith about the cradle. "But now," he added, "we're getting away from that attitude." As evidence of improvement, Mover cited the existence of committees within the trade group that are studying the safety problems of items such as cribs, walker-strollers, back carriers, and walker-jumpers.

The FDA, meanwhile, has come up with one proposed standard. That is the walker-jumpers, the bouncy seats-on-wheels used by millions of babies before they learn to walk. The reason for the agency's slowness is that it is "shorthanded and underbudgeted," according to Ed Chapin, a press relations officer for the agency. "In addition," he said, "this division of FDA (Bureau of Product Safety) is constantly being buffeted by crises."

The Bureau of Product Safety, which is staffed by about 75 professionals, is responsible for monitoring the safety of toys, hazardous substances like detergent and liquid drain cleaners and radiation sources like color television and microwave ovens. A crisis such as the recent death of a Connecticut girl from inhaling a small amount of nonphosphate detergent, means that almost all of the resources of the division must be mobilized to handle that one problem, and work on other important matter must be delayed.

Walter Johnson, deputy director of the Injury Data and Control Center within the Bureau of Product Safety, said that the Bureau's new budget will provide "additional resources," although how much is not yet known. He said that this will make progress possible, and that the manufacturers "have been put on notice that they should develop meaningful standards for juvenile furniture or we are going to develop regulations on them."

For prospective parents now shopping for juvenile furniture, this promise of action is not much help. It remains the responsibility of parents to try to discover which cribs, which jumper-walkers and which of all the other items will be safe for their babies and toddlers. Here is a rundown of danger points to look for in various items of furniture:

Cribs: Don't be bashful—take a ruler along with you when you shop to measure the distances between the bars. Johnson said that safety experts are sure that the spaces should not be larger than 3½ inches, and that less may be desirable. An estimated 200 children a year die from crib strangulation. Also, look for cribs with very low adjustments for the mattress height. As your baby grows and gets more agile, you will need to be able to lower the mattress to keep him from climbing out and probably falling to the floor. Don't buy a crib that has crossbars that will make it easy for him to climb. Check the latching system on the drop-side of the crib. If it is a simply operated foot latch, another child could open it without warning. FDA is studying the problems of crib safety with the goal of proposing a standard.

Dressing Tables. In the final report of the Product Safety Commission, it was recommended that these tables be made with concave rather than flat tops to make it more difficult for babies to do a sudden rollover onto the floor. Nevertheless, most of those on the market are still made with flat tops. Some brands, however, such as the Changer, by Hedstrom (about \$40) and the Oak Hill wooden dressing tables (about \$43), are

made with guard rails that may be an improvement. Of course, even the flat-topped kind have safety straps (one recent study showed that probably one out of two infants take a fall in his first year of life.) But these straps may not help much if the dressing table is very lightweight and unstable. Stability, then, is an important feature to look for. No standards for dressing tables exist and, none is under active consideration.

Jumper-Walkers: These coil-spring activated devices are known to have caused 21 amputations or near-amputations of fingers and other severe finger injuries to babies in the 15 months before last April 16, the day on which the FDA announced a proposed safety standard for them. The proposal would require that the frames of the jumpers be made without points of scissoring or pinching. Such pinch points, then, plus any unprotected coil springs, should steer you away from some models of the jumpers. Johnson said he believes that some manufacturers are now producing safer jumpers, but he could not give specific brand names. Final regulations on the jumpers should be issued soon.

High Chairs: The main problem here is stability. Can the chair be tipped easily? Does it fold from the back forward, so that another child could shove the chair and cause it to fold closed on the baby? Does the chair have any sharp edges, particularly on the feeding tray? No standard is in the offing.

Car Beds: These of course are not furniture items, and their design can be regulated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, which recently issued a standard for car seats. (Seats produced after April, 1971, must meet the new federal standard. But some stores still have old models in stock and may be having sales on them to try to clear them out. To be sure of what you are getting, look for a label that says the seat meets Federal Safety Standard 213. If there is no label, don't buy the seat.) Guy Hunter, safety standards engineer with the administration, said that a standard is being developed for car beds because the present design is considered unsafe.

Most are made like shopping baskets with handles and simply rest on the back seat of the car. The bed is not strapped into the car, and the baby is not strapped into the bed, so that in a collision the baby would probably be thrown out. Hunter said that the General Motors infant carrier is different from these—it has a belt for the infant and can be belted into the car—and is "quite good." A check of three General Motors car dealers showed that one had the carrier in stock and the other two said they could get it within two weeks. The price is about \$12.

Infant Seats: These seats seem so safe and secure that many mothers leave their infants in the seats and put the seats on tables or kitchen counters. However, the seats are light and unstable—some even have rockers—and some mothers report that even tiny infants can tip them. The resulting fall is face-first. No standard is being worked on, and cautious parents have advised never to leave a baby in an infant seat in a high place.

Cautious parents, are, of course, more essential to a child's safety than furniture design. But a couple who testified at one of the Product Safety Commission hearings said that they had no idea when they purchased their crib that it would become the instrument of their baby's death. Yet, they said, "In theory we should had had a better than average chance to spot the danger." They had better than average education, and the man had done mechanical and repair work while in college. "Still we did not realize the danger," they told the commission.

In Congress, meanwhile, a battle is on over the Nixon administration's proposal for a product safety law and the proposal backed by the original Product Safety Commission

and sponsored by Sen. Warren Magnuson (D-Wash.) and Sen. Frank Moss (D-Utah). The Nixon version would put product safety responsibility in the FDA, and would rely heavily on industry to develop safety standards.

The Magnuson-Moss bill would create a new, independent regulatory agency, and would require premarket testing of products. Hearings were held on the two proposals in July, but the Senate Commerce Committee still has not reported out either version for action by the whole Senate.

INTERVIEW OF DR. CHARLES MALIK, OF LEBANON

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, during the past week Dr. Charles Malik visited our country from Lebanon. Dr. Malik's outstanding reputation as a scholar needs no explanation to those familiar with him. As a professor at the American University in Beirut he has particular insight into the activities of that U.S.-supported institution and a sense of its future.

The Beirut, Lebanon, Daily Star of Sunday, November 28, 1971, contains an interview with Dr. Malik, in which Dr. Malik answered various questions about the role played by the American University there. The interview is most informative and I commend it to the attention of the Senate.

I ask unanimous consent that the interview be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the interview was ordered to be printed in the RECORD as follows:

EIGHT QUESTIONS PUT TO DR. CHARLES MALIK, BY THE DAILY STAR AND HIS ANSWERS TO THEM

(This text appeared in full in the Daily Star, of Beirut, Lebanon, on Sunday, November 28, 1971, page 3.)

Question 1. In what way(s) do you think the world-wide "student movement" could be tackled so as to avert further student "uprisings"?

Answer: By patience and love; by long-suffering and foresight; by understanding and forgiveness; by maintaining a continuous dialogue with the students at every level and in diverse ways; by holding fast to fundamental positions of principle drawn from the essence of truth and freedom; by having a firm idea of what constitutes a university and sticking to that idea; by dedication to the highest interests of the university above every partial or personal or political interest; by maintaining the highest possible standards of excellence, and holding up everybody, students and professors, to them; by being most careful with respect to faculty appointments and promotions, because it is as much the faculty—their spirit, their attitude, the philosophies of life that they teach and stand for—that are behind what you call "the world-wide 'student movement'" as anything or anybody else, by refusing to admit any polarization within the university body, whether between students and faculty, or between students and administration, or between faculty and administration; by depoliticizing the university so far as the processes of teaching and learning, and the academic quest after knowledge and truth, are concerned; and by expecting further student unrest, by adequately preparing for it, and by taking it in your stride when it comes along, knowing that while great institutions of learning may be temporarily disrupted or hurt by such unrest, they will never be destroyed, and with wisdom and real concern they will come out chastened and stronger from the experience.

Question 2. To what extent does the Middle East political setup reflect itself in the student activities at the American University of Beirut?

Answer: To a considerable extent. The Middle East is a tension area, perhaps the most critical tension area in the world, and the Middle-Eastern students carry this tension with them and live and reflect it in the University. I expect nothing else.

Moreover, altogether apart from its own internal problems, and even if it had none, half a dozen or more world movements converge upon the Middle East, with its central location and strategic importance. These movements pour each its own quota of challenge. This is indeed what makes life here so exciting, and to the sober and levelheaded it is not only exciting, it is most instructive and enriching. Thus, the marvel is that, despite all the almost unbearable stimulation, distraction, disturbance and tension that well up within or crowd in upon the region, the students on the whole have managed to control themselves so admirably.

I wish to assure the students and everybody categorically that the University has nothing to do with official United States policy in the Middle East or elsewhere. I wish to assure them further that when its opinion or the opinion of some of its members was asked, or when, unasked, they nevertheless volunteered to express their opinion, they often disagreed with or criticized United States policy. If the students knew all this they might then separate in their mind an institution of higher learning supported, in part, by the American people (directly or through their Government, for America is a free democracy and its people's external relations in matters of financial aid are effected either on a people-to-people basis or through the Government) from the policies of the Government of that people. I am sure many people know these truths, including the overwhelming majority of those who are vigorously opposing and even fighting United States policy in the Middle East, and I doubt that there is a single student who does not appreciate the education he is receiving at the University.

The University has nothing to do with politics; it wants only to educate; concerning this its only mission it need not be apologetic at all; it has the highest academic standards of any institution in the Middle East; and the children of our lands flock into it because they and their parents know this fact very well. Of course the responsible political and intellectual leadership throughout the Middle East is perfectly aware of all this, and therefore it will see to it that the natural and wholesome reflection in the University of what you call "the Middle East political setup" will only profit the University and be profited from it.

Question 3. How do you understand the term "student participation"? Do you approve of its implementation as a policy on the campus?

Answer: The university is a sort of organism which is made up of five distinct organs: the Board of Trustees, the Administration, the Faculty, the students, and the non-academic personnel. The integrity of the university consists in the harmony that should obtain between the functionings of these organs. No organ can usurp or undermine the place or function of another.

The university does not exist for its Board of Trustees and its Administration, neither does it exist for its non-academic personnel; all these serve the university, each in its own distinctive and honorable way. *The university exists for its Faculty and students*—for its Faculty, so as to enable them to be free to think, teach, conduct research, produce and publish; and for its students, so as to provide them with the most perfect opportunity of learning and participating in the wonderful process of seeking and finding the truth.

What form should this "participation" take? You will find that no two universities develop the same form; each university evolves its own "form of participation" according to its own concrete situation, needs and possibilities. Student "participation" at Oxford is quite different from student "participation" at Harvard or Princeton or Heidelberg. What works in one university may not work in another.

But nowhere do students take the place of administrators or professors: the distinctive functioning of the three categories is kept intact. Participation without encroachment on each other's competence is excellent; in fact it is not only excellent, it is necessary; such participation only means that student, professor and administrator are each what he is authentically, and that all three form a creatively interacting community. Participation which involves the danger of the students ruling or tyrannizing over the university is of course bad and nowhere tolerated. And where the politicizing of the campus is a distinct possibility, participation cannot be lightly or abstractly attempted, if the university is to be safeguarded against the danger of paralysis or destruction.

The participations that have not worked have been precisely those which were entered into rashly, and which, as mere slavish imitations of forms of participation that might have worked elsewhere, simply did not take adequate account of the concrete forces at work.

It is one thing to "participate" when you come from a soil where the democratic habit of mind, which fully respects the rights of minorities and which keeps the over-all common good above every partisan interest, is originally and organically ingrained in the social, political, legal, literary, artistic, intellectual and spiritual background; it is another thing to "participate" when you come from a soil where this democratic habit of mind is hardly known or appreciated.

But where people know and keep their place, where there is real love for the university and what it means and stands for, where the intention is to enhance the quality of the academic process by creating real communities of fun and friendship and free intellectual communion on the campus, and where there is mutuality of trust and confidence, then a most felicitous mode of participation, in which everybody is happy and creative and at his best, can be readily devised.

While people everywhere are keeping their fingers crossed, many people in America among those who hold high responsibilities for great universities believe that the student revolt is now abating. The competition for jobs is so keen that the students, even the radicals among them, are gradually discovering that unless they apply themselves assiduously to their studies and stop fooling around, they may have no chance later on of being employed. The future belongs, even after the revolution if it should come, to the thoroughly trained and not to those who wasted away the most precious years of their life in activities that had nothing to do with the polishing of their mind and the perfection of their competence. And the more thoughtful among the students are coming to the conclusion that in the nature of the case—what they have been told notwithstanding—they cannot be converted into a "class" to brave and carry out the revolution.

Many high-level studies are being conducted, at least in the United States, about the general university upheaval of the present and the immediate past. It will be a few years before the conclusions of these studies are sifted, criticized, appraised and assimilated into the system of secondary and higher education. The Carnegie Foundation has set up a Commission on Higher Education and entrusted it with the task of drawing up over a 5-year period a series of reports on the education crisis. In one of its published

studies, while warning that "the tinder of discontent on the campus remains dry," the Commission discloses the finding that on "perhaps 100" only of America's 2500 campuses there were "excesses, violence and near paralysis of the institution," while on the other campuses either there was no appreciable unrest or "the response was peaceful, resourceful and but briefly disruptive." The Commission has also come out with the suggestion that student government be abolished and the campus conceived as a total community. This communal conception of the campus is exactly in line with my opposition to any polarization and any division of the campus into "classes."

It is clear therefore that the university situation in the world is in a state of fundamental ferment, and that it is by no means certain that future trends, so far as "student participation" is concerned, are going to confirm the claims and assumptions of the student movement in recent years.

Question 4. Do you think the President of the American University of Beirut should be an American or a Lebanese? We feel you are as qualified as any American to hold the post.

Answer: To "nationalize" the University by pitting American against Lebanese does not become this great institution. It is another mode of polarization, and any polarization is unhealthy, and indeed nowhere more so than at this University, and that for a variety of reasons.

Who should be the principal officer of the University should never be thought of in terms of nationality, but in terms of the best person for the job regardless of nationality. And indeed not just the best "available" person, but the best person must first be found regardless of his "availability," and then everything should be done to induce him to take the job. Thus you do not just select the best "available" person—you make the best person available.

Two years ago an immigrant from Central Europe who came to America at about the age of twenty was elected president of one of the finest American institutions of higher learning, just because those responsible for that institution concluded that he was the best man for the job.

The term "best" here covers at least a dozen criteria, so that a man could be "best" from one point of view but certainly not from another. Only when all dozen criteria have been weighed and balanced against each other by the Board of Trustees would this responsible body be in a position to make a grounded decision on the question of the presidency from among the names it would be considering.

A man could be ruled out forthwith on account of his failure to measure up to one criterion, even if he fulfilled all other criteria perfectly. And people certainly may make mistakes in their final decision. But once the decision is made, people work together to make it work. An institution cannot function if, after the president is selected, people keep on entertaining doubts about the decision.

To make the "nationality criterion" determinant is, in view of the peculiar character of this University and of the excessive sense of nationality and nationalism in the Middle East, to introduce a vitiating principle. What is important and decisive is the University and its best interests and not the nationality of its president.

All of this applies to the correct procedure of selecting a president when the moment comes. But the moment is not upon us yet, because the present incumbent, President Samuel Kirkwood, was unanimously given the right last June by the Board of Trustees to continue serving as president of the institution for another five years. It is obvious they must have considered and weighed all pertinent criteria before they came to their decision.

As for myself, I must first thank you for

thinking that I might qualify for this most responsible post, but I suppose I have something to say about myself. Putting the question of nationality completely aside—for, as I said, this is absolutely necessary for the very health of the University—, and passing over the respects in which I do not qualify, I wish to assure you that I know that administrative jobs do not fit my temperament, principally because I covet my freedom above everything else. Administrators and presidents are the salt of the earth and without them the world cannot run, and they are our honored and respect masters, but the price they pay for this great responsibility is the drastic curtailment of their freedom. I live on freedom and I cannot trade it for anything else. A president, because of his responsibility, must be most careful what steps to take, what ground to tread upon, what to think, and what to say, but I feel I must be absolutely free to walk and think and say as I please, subject only to the rigorous requirements of truth and authentic being. My freedom before the truth is my responsibility.

Besides, think of the immense amount of detail to which presidents and administrators must attend, and without attending to which they cannot administer to preside successfully; for myself, however, I crave the steady vision of the whole, to be sure, solidly grounded on but not lost in or dissipated by detail.

It follows that the utmost a person, such as I am, should hope for is a president who fulfills the dozen criteria to which I referred—a man of real honesty and integrity, whom one can fully respect, and with whom and under whom one can, in freedom, think and act and be.

Question 5. Do you think that Arab finances should replace American finances in the American University of Beirut so as to diminish United States influence on the University's policies?

Answer: Again it is not healthy, from the point of view of morale and therefore of the University's highest interests, to pit Arab against American. Nor do I know exactly what you mean by "United States influence on the University's policies." You are probably thinking politically, because all Middle-Eastern thinking is shot through and through with politics. As I said above, "the University's policies" have nothing to do with the United States Government or its policies, nor have these anything to do with them.

Everybody must firmly get it into his head once and for all that the Board of Trustees of the University, which finally determines the University's policies, is composed of honorable and honest men who would resist any political pressure from any direction. Their policy decisions, and the policy decisions of the Administration under them, have as their aim only the highest possible academic standards for the various departments of the institution. To think otherwise is either to indulge in intentional malice, or to be ignorant both of the character of these men and women and of the organization of the University—and ignorance is the mother of a multitude of illusions and errors.

If what you call "American finances" are solely directed, under the Board of Trustees, towards the improvement of the academic standards of the University, then, far from wishing that they be diminished, would that they were considerably increased! And if "Arab finances" should be tied to political, non-academic strings, then, far from wishing that they replace "American finances," would that they were not accepted at all! But any donations offered the University, whether by American or Arab or German or Japanese or other sources, would, I think, be welcomed by the University, provided no non-academic strings whatever be attached to them.

There are many Arab universities, and may they all develop one day to the intellectual stature of a Sorbonne or an Oxford or a

Freiburg or a Harvard, and may they receive masses of unconditional aid from Arab and non-Arab sources!

But the unique value of the American University of Beirut, which is the product of more than a century of patient, organic development, is that it is rooted intellectually and culturally in the Western, and principally the American, university tradition; that it serves as a remarkable window letting in light and life into Lebanon and the Middle East from that incomparable cumulative tradition, which goes back to the Academy of Plato and the Lyceum of Aristotle; that, as a result, it tries—and I believe successfully—to set up before its students and before its community the ideas of freedom of inquiry, thought and discussion as supreme values to be sought and treasured by civilized men, if they are to cope, with any measure of adequacy, with the strenuous conditions of modern existence; and that it provides—again I believe successfully—a forum for American, Western (and under Western I do not exclude Russian) and Middle-Eastern to live together and exchange ideas and interact and cooperate and create, intellectually and existentially—and I believe the Middle East, intellectually and culturally speaking, is more in need, and for a long time to come, of such a communal forum to be found and cherished somewhere in it, than of anything else.

Thus, any aid coming from anywhere, or any political-social development in Lebanon or the Middle East, or, indeed, any turn of policy in the mind of the Trustees, that would have as its effect the destruction or dimming of this uniqueness of the American University of Beirut, would, in my opinion, be calamitous both for Lebanon and the Middle East.

Question 6. Do you think the political activity of the students of the American University of Beirut is reflecting itself on campus life?

Answer: What I said above, particularly under Question 2, touches on this matter. You want me to explicate further, I suppose, whether student identification with political movements and parties in the Middle East at large is carried over into the Campus of the University. The answer is of course yes, nor can it be otherwise. Essentially, a student is a living human being; he is a student only accidentally. Nor can he possibly cease, after he enters the University, to interact with and to be influenced by political and social movements in the Middle East as they explode and as they develop.

There are a dozen such movements, some responsive to native Middle-Eastern situations, some wafted upon us from the four winds of the earth, some splinters from a main trunk. No living human being in the Middle East, whether or not a student, can be impervious to the Palestine Question, or to world-wide movements of liberation and development, or to the Arab urge at unity.

The only question is whether these doctrines and developments, as they pour into the Campus, could "tolerably" tolerate one another, or whether in their concrete content, they would produce a fatal explosion, of one form or another, within the University; whether their objective incompatibilities among themselves are of such an intensity as to make the existence of the University, as a genuine university, impossible; whether the objective, concrete conditions for the possibility of the University have ceased, or will cease, to obtain; whether some of these movements will seek to dominate or terrorize the rest, or whether they could keep house together in relative peace. I believe it is in the interest of all of them to interact and dialogue with one another under conditions of freedom, respect and peace, and that is why the continued existence of the University, as a genuine university, is vital for all of them.

But whether the concrete historical situ-

ation will so mature as to precipitate an explosion, or whether adequate measures can be taken to avert such a possibility, nobody can predict. This concrete historical situation is determined by factors altogether beyond the control of the University. So far as the University and what falls under its control and determination are concerned, I trust wisdom and foresight, on the part both of the University and the students, and on the part of these movements themselves outside the University, will prevail. But while man surely proposes and plans, it must never be forgotten that in the end only God and history dispose and decide.

Question 7. Was your recent United States tour official? If so, would you elaborate on its objectives?

Answer: My recent United States tour was not official: it was purely private. I had a dozen private engagements in Chicago, New York and Washington, which I had to pack into my brief sojourn in America.

However, because people in America are intensely interested in Middle-Eastern and world affairs, because of my past association with these affairs, principally at the United Nations, because of my continuing personal interest in them myself, and because I happen to have many friends in the United States, among the churches and the universities, and in the circles of Government and industry, I always find myself called upon to discuss "official" matters "unofficially." This I do with pleasure and gusto, committing of course nobody, but only myself.

But it would not be true to think that my interests are exhausted by political conditions and developments: I am primarily interested in man and mind, in character and truth, in the collapse of morals, in the state of mind of youth, in the philosophical crisis in universities, in the Christian ecumenical movement, in human rights and fundamental freedoms, in the ultimate things of the spirit. And the opportunities that usually come my way to range over these realms are legion.

One should be ashamed to discuss with people only one's own political problems and woes; people do not listen to you if that is all you discuss with them; but if you are interested—authentically and helpfully—in their own deepest concerns, then your problems become intelligible to them, and in thus listening sympathetically to your tales, they will inevitably try to be helpful themselves. Community of interest is the matrix for all creativity and helpfulness.

Nothing is more certain to cause people to be sick and tired with the Middle East and all its problems (of course they will express their sickness and tiredness very politely, sometimes merely by the recital of sickening ineffectual generalities) than for one to talk to them only about the Middle East. And nothing is more calculated to move people to understand the real issues involved and to take some steps about them than for one to forget completely all about the Middle East and to talk to them, with knowledge and depth and authenticity, about intellectual, spiritual, human and world problems that have nothing to do with the Middle East.

But in all my travels I learn and profit much more than I am able to impart.

Question 8. It is often charged that faculty members of the American University of Beirut are "passive": are disinterested in administrative problems and their solutions. Do you agree? If so, how would you suggest the situation might be improved?

Answer: It cannot be repeated too often that the Faculty is only one of a totality of five organs constituting the organism which is the University. It cannot usurp the functions of the other organs. It could not perform its own proper function if it did so. It is indeed the most important organ, because if the business of the University is to seek

and transmit truth, it is around the Faculty that this business transacts itself.

Ideally, the Faculty would be most happy and contented to be free of any administrative duties and worries, because, ideally again, it would be wholly and joyously absorbed in its proper creative function—to research, to produce, to teach—and nothing is more satisfying and joyous than this function. As thus absorbed it has no time or interest or indeed patience for administrative tangles. But when problems arise—and in an ideal situation they would not arise, which is of course far from being the case at the American University of Beirut—some Faculty members do bestir themselves.

"Passivity" is a good thing if its conscious motive is not to lord it over the Administration and not to incite the students; "passivity" is a bad thing if it is the expression of innate indifference or fear. Where a Faculty member, or the Faculty as a whole, can help the Administration or the students in a crisis, it is their duty to do so, knowing in the attempt that they are not the whole of the University nor are they in a position to speak in its name as a whole.

If the Faculty behaves in such a way as to give the students the impression that it can trespass upon the prerogatives of the Board of Trustees or the Administration, then it is misleading the students, and when the truth comes to the light of day, as come it will, the University as a whole will have been hurt and the students will not be grateful to the Faculty.

Far from being "passive," some Faculty members have been conspicuously "active." There are ways and ways of being "active": you can be active respecting, fully and humbly, the rights and prerogatives of others; you can be active thinking, first and foremost, of the highest interests of the University, which, clearly, you cannot rightly claim you alone know; you can be active aiming at arrogating to yourself prerogatives that are not yours; you can be active thinking only of your personal interests, and suspecting that the moment of trouble may be a good opportunity to promote these interests; you can be active by utilizing the University to further some non-university interest; you can be active by enlisting, wittingly or unwittingly, in the service of tendencies that might, on account of their tentativeness, destroy the University, or radically change its character, if the highest University authorities allow them, from a genuine university to some instrument in the service of some extraneous force or will; etc. All these modes of "activity" have manifested themselves at the University and are likely to manifest themselves again. Not all "activity" is a virtue and not all "passivity" is a vice.

Every Faculty member is a member of his own Faculty and his own department, and enjoys the opportunity of fully and freely voicing his opinion when his Faculty or department meets; many Faculty members, elected democratically, serve on all sorts of committees and bodies entrusted with important mandates; and every Faculty member can caucus with his colleagues, or can see his Dean or the President, and discuss with them any matter on his mind. Thus there are structured and orderly channels of activity for every Faculty member.

It is quite possible that a restructuring is called for. In matters of organization nothing is above reconsideration, for organization is not an end, but only a means, and the end is that the University be a university, namely, a community of minds seeking and finding the truth together under conditions of respect and freedom—and this end cannot be reduced or tampered with. The most perfect organization without the spirit of mutual respect and trust is vain and vacuous; and where this spirit reigns

even the sloppiest organization can be made to work.

So, we should all work together to create this spirit, or to allow it to supervene and flourish. We should all work together to promote confidence and cooperation at this priceless institution. And in the stillness of my heart and hearth I sometimes feel that this can be consummated in the twinkling of an eye, for I do not believe that anybody, whether Administration, Faculty or students, who has served and profited and is serving and profiting from the University, can possibly wish it ill.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS TO THE U.S. ECONOMY

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I invite the attention of Senators to an excellent speech by Mr. Lee L. Morgan, executive vice president of Caterpillar Tractor Co., explaining how its worldwide operations as a "multinational" business benefit both the U.S. and foreign economies. Called the "Win-Win Situation," the speech describes factually the effects of Caterpillar's manufacturing operations in foreign countries. It is a direct response to those who criticize companies that operate on a global scale as damaging the U.S. economy. Mr. Morgan asks the question:

Let's examine where we stand now, after two decades of foreign operations—and determine if this company, as one example, may fairly be accused of "exporting jobs and technology."

Mr. Morgan then demonstrates that in each case where Caterpillar has invested in manufacturing facilities abroad the dollar volumes of exports from its operations in the United States have actually increased above the levels prevailing when the investment was made. For example, British Caterpillar was established in 1950. Since then the value of Caterpillar's exports to the United Kingdom from the United States increased 15 times.

Moreover, since Caterpillar began to invest abroad in 1950, its exports have increased from \$93 million in 1950 to \$767 million in 1970. Well over two-thirds of Caterpillar's foreign sales in 1970 consisted of products manufactured in the United States.

Mr. President, these facts, and others presented in Mr. Morgan's speech, are directly relevant to one of the most important current controversies in the field of U.S. international economic policy.

The AFL-CIO and other groups have made known their antagonism to the foreign operations of U.S. corporations, and have proposed direct restraints on them. The Hartke-Burke bill, S. 2592, is a direct result and an expression of this viewpoint. Such businesses are commonly accused of exporting capital, jobs, and technology, as if there were no benefit to the U.S. economy from international business operations.

Mr. Morgan's speech explains why Caterpillar is an example of how such companies benefit the United States. Caterpillar's foreign operations have given it the base in foreign economies from which to build a greater volume of total business and have generated increased U.S. sales from U.S. facilities. Operating

in foreign markets has helped it to stay abreast of the latest foreign technology—which is in many cases very highly advanced. And substantial amounts of profits from foreign operations have been returned to enrich U.S. stockholders, to finance new ventures in this economy, and to fuel expansion in other markets.

Detractors of the multinational company have been remarkably weak in their ability to demonstrate factually their claims that foreign operations of U.S. businesses represent a net drain on the U.S. economy, particularly on jobs. My own business experience has shown me first hand how foreign operations can strengthen and expand business and jobs in the home base in the United States.

Caterpillar Tractor Co. is one of the finest, most aggressive, and progressive businesses in Illinois. It is the largest exporter in Illinois and employs thousands of people in its export business. I commend Mr. Morgan's excellent, factual presentation to my colleagues, and I commend Mr. Morgan and Caterpillar for a willingness to reveal with unusual candor statistical information on Caterpillar's foreign and domestic operations in order to enlighten the dialog on this issue with fact, rather than further confuse it with rhetoric.

I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Morgan's speech be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE WIN-WIN SITUATION: HOW U.S. INVESTMENT ABROAD BENEFITS THE UNITED STATES AS WELL AS THE PEOPLE OF HOST COUNTRIES
(By Lee L. Morgan)

You've probably heard it said that all human transactions can be divided into four categories: The "lose-lose" situation—where both parties are disadvantaged; the "win-lose" transaction—the first party gaining at the expense of the second; the "lose-win" relationship—the opposite being true; and the "win-win" situation—where both parties benefit.

U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD: NOW AT \$75 BILLION LEVEL

Let's express these four relationships in a context of U.S. private direct investment abroad—now estimated at approximately \$75 billion:

1. The "lose-lose." I know of no one who views U.S. foreign investment as a losing arrangement for both parties.

2. The "win-lose." As you know, there has been a substantial body of thought holding that, although U.S. foreign investment is a "win" arrangement for Americans, it is a "lose" situation for host countries. With some notable exceptions, this view appears to be subsiding. There seems to be a growing realization abroad that U.S. investment can be a highly creative factor in generating jobs, training people and otherwise improving their lot in life, introducing new technology and management skills, upgrading suppliers and improving the local trade balance—all with a decent regard for national interests and jurisdictions, and without interfering with the economic and political integrity of host countries.

In any event, the impact of U.S. foreign investment on other countries is the subject for other portions of this convention; so I won't dwell on it.

3. By contrast, I hope to give considerable attention to the claims of those who have taken the "lose-win" point of view on U.S. investment abroad—namely, that there are indeed great gains to other countries in terms

of production, jobs, technology and taxes—but that these gains are, therefore, equivalent losses to the U.S. economy.

4. Fourthly, we should examine some of the evidence in support of the "win-win" philosophy, and attempt to document our belief that U.S. citizens rank high among the beneficiaries.

Finally, I hope to offer a few suggestions as to what we and our companies can do to assure that the benefits of an enlightened U.S. investment policy flow in a widening stream to all of the world's peoples.

As a passing preamble, may I underline the *timeliness and urgency* of this whole topic?

In the field of U.S. international economic policy, the public spotlight has moved away from "trade" and into the area of "investment." Regrettably, the two are often viewed by the public as separate and distinct. It is being seen that members of Congress wholly sympathetic to freer trade are not necessarily sympathetic to freer investment policies. And those well informed on trade may not be equally informed on, or understanding of, the benefits of U.S. foreign investment to the U.S. economy.

The multinational corporation—by no means a U.S. creation—is increasingly said to be "too big" and above the controllable limits of present U.S. law. While those of us in the multinationals may believe we are benefiting people's living standards as few others down the long reach of civilization have done, these words are getting a different translation by some of our critics. It's said we are spurred on by "anything for a buck" morality . . . to "take advantage of cheap exploited labor" . . . the result being "private greed at public expense," and the "export of American technology and jobs."

Regrettably, a growing number of Americans accept these dismal views.

MOOD IN CONGRESS NOW MORE PROTECTIONIST THAN IN 1970

Should you doubt the serious implications of the present public mood, recall that the highly protectionist 1970 Trade Act would probably have passed, had it come to a vote in the waning days of the 91st Congress. Since then, our trade balance has fallen into a deficit position; and I believe Chairman Mills* would agree the Congress has become more protectionist, not less so. The climate in Washington appears to be more conducive to protectionist, "fortress America" legislation than at any time since passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930.

As a case in point, let's briefly examine legislation introduced in late September in support of a succession of AFL-CIO statements and position papers.

This bill frankly names as one of its purposes "to insure that the production of goods which have historically been produced in the United States is continued and maintained." Toward that end, four basic proposals are offered:

1. There would be established a powerful new agency with wide authority to fashion country-by-country quotas on imports. Quotas would be based on the level of U.S. production of comparable products in the 1965-69 period.

2. The bill would repeal the tax credit now extended to U.S. manufacturing operations abroad for payment of foreign income taxes. Thus, if a \$100 pretax profit in country "X" were subject to a \$45 income tax, the full U.S. tax would be assessed immediately on the remaining \$55—leaving an after-tax profit of under \$29!

The "right" of our government to tax income of a foreign manufacturing subsidiary of a U.S. company (presently, to the ex-

*The next speaker at the convention was Wilbur Mills, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee.

tent that it isn't taxed at the full U.S. rate by the foreign country involved) is already subject to legitimate question, since the U.S. offers nothing in the way of services or protection in return. But legislation to *apply the full U.S. rate* has no international precedent.

In a masterpiece of understatement, this legislation asserts: "Thus the repeal of the foreign tax credit discourages both foreign investment and the transfer of technology."

3. Depreciation on property outside the U.S. would be on a straight line basis, computed on the useful life of the property. Thus, even present U.S. procedures permitting accelerated depreciation of assets would not be allowed . . . despite the fact that capital cost recovery provisions in the U.S. are the least realistic and least generous of any industrialized nation.

4. Finally, the President would be authorized to prohibit direct or indirect "transfers of capital" when his judgment a decrease in U.S. employment would result. Further, he would be authorized to prohibit holders of U.S. patents from manufacturing the patented product or using the patented process (or licensing others to do either) outside the U.S.—when, in his judgment, such would contribute to increased unemployment in the U.S.

The bill is named "The Foreign Trade and Investment Act of 1972"—nomenclature comparable to introducing legislation to stop government aid to the elderly and labeling it a "Social Security Act." If this particular "Foreign Trade and Investment Act" passes, there will eventually be little trade and less investment. The end result would be to drop a wall around this country—and if history is any guide—help precipitate a depression and another world war.

HOW U.S. ECONOMY BENEFITS FROM U.S. FOREIGN INVESTMENT

Now let's turn from this "lose-win" view of U.S. investment abroad to the "win-win" hypothesis, which holds that the *domestic* economy is also a major beneficiary of the U.S. investment outside of it.

Of real relevance here is the Report of the Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy—or the Williams Report. A reading of this thorough, contemporary study turns up six conclusions that appear pertinent:

1. Return flows from foreign direct investment represent a "major element of strength in our international position," as well as a favorable impact on the U.S. balance of payments.

2. Activities of U.S. enterprises abroad "directly induce considerable U.S. exports of capital goods, component parts and associated products for sale through distribution channels established by foreign subsidiaries."

3. U.S. foreign investment indirectly stimulates further exports by "raising levels of living and contributing to economic development abroad."

4. In most cases, U.S. investment in manufacturing abroad is intended to serve foreign markets. When a U.S. investment is made in foreign manufacturing, "production in the U.S. usually is not an economically viable alternative. In most cases, if American firms had not invested abroad, foreign firms would have, and U.S. jobs and exports would have been lost in any event, albeit with a lag."

5. In the long run, "U.S. workers stand to gain both directly and indirectly from U.S. investment abroad."

6. International investment contributes greatly to the integration of national economies, and thus to the long-term interests of human living standards and harmonious international relations.

The Williams Report emphasizes the need for a greater volume of more current data. Some of these facts are now coming in.

FACTS IN NEW SURVEYS SUPPORT WILLIAMS
REPORT'S FINDINGS

Surveys conducted by the National Trade Council, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Emergency Committee for American Trade, and other organizations are bringing in a great deal of specific data which also substantiate the general findings of the Williams Report. The National Foreign Trade Council study is available at this convention; I recommend it to you.

As far as facts are concerned, I can probably serve you best by speaking in the framework most familiar to me—that of my employer, whose business volume outside the U.S. last year exceeded the \$1 billion mark for the first time.

Caterpillar and its predecessors have been serving and competing in foreign markets since the start of this century. Up through 1950, this was comprised wholly of exports from the U.S. In 1950, our export volume was \$93 million—a respectable 28% of total sales.

In 1950, we started to establish operations abroad—simply because it became absolutely necessary to do so in order to survive, compete and grow in the foreign market areas concerned.

We have since established wholly owned manufacturing subsidiaries in Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Great Britain and Mexico . . . and wholly owned subsidiaries with other purposes in Hong Kong, Singapore, South Africa and Switzerland. These operations had a net worth of \$310 million at the end of 1970. (In addition, we have invested \$28 million in a joint venture in Japan and \$600,000 in a joint venture in India.)

This investment has clearly not been a "fight" from admittedly high U.S. labor costs. Our investment has been in capital-intensive rather than labor-intensive facilities. Virtually all of it has gone to industrialized countries rather than to the low-wage developing countries.

Employment at wholly owned subsidiaries was 13,500 at the end of 1970—or 21% of a worldwide total of 64,000.

In all cases, products manufactured abroad carry the Caterpillar trademark. Their technology is at such a level that whole products and parts are fully interchangeable with U.S. counterparts.

On all counts, then, it would seem that Caterpillar lies squarely in the gunights of the AFL-CIO legislation. So let's examine where we stand now, after two decades of foreign operations—and determine if this company, as one example, may fairly be accused of "exporting jobs and technology."

CATERPILLAR'S EXPORTS: UP EIGHT TIMES SINCE
1950

Our 1970 sales were \$2.1 billion, of which \$1.1 billion was generated outside the U.S. With 52% of sales abroad—and 21% of employment—it may be seen that well over two-thirds of foreign sales consisted of product manufactured in the U.S. Thus, while we generated \$330 million in 1970 business from wholly owned foreign manufacturing operations, exports from U.S. bases rose from \$93 million in 1950 to \$767 million in 1970. This is a multiple of eight.

Now examine the impact on U.S. exports—and thus on U.S. jobs—in those specific countries in which we have established subsidiaries. Four examples may suffice:

1. British Caterpillar was formed in 1950. Our U.S. dollar volume of exports to Great Britain from then through 1970 increased by a multiple of 15.

2. Caterpillar Brazil was organized in 1954. From that date through 1970, our exports to Brazil rose over five times.

3. Caterpillar Australia was launched in 1955. Our U.S. 1970 exports to Australia were over six times their 1955 level.

4. A French subsidiary was incorporated in

1960. Exports to France more than quadrupled by the end of 1970.

In every case where we have established overseas production, exports from the U.S. have risen. To some extent, these have been parts and components to be incorporated into machines manufactured abroad. But the major portion has been made up of whole machines not produced by the related subsidiary. In other words, manufacture of a portion of the product line in a foreign marketing area has strengthened the market demand for other Caterpillar products manufactured in the U.S.

In support of its claims of "export" of U.S. jobs and technology, the AFL-CIO has cited a lengthy list of foreign subsidiaries and affiliates of U.S. companies. Caterpillar Mitsubishi of Japan has been given special mention on this list; so let me deal in more precise detail with the history of that undertaking.

A 50-50 joint venture agreement with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. was approved by the Japanese government in mid-1963. Our exports to Japan in that year were under \$2 million. In no year since World War II had they risen as high as \$3 million—our access to this growing market being severely limited by high tariffs, other import restraints, and the growing difficulty of competing—in certain exported product lines—with the output of increasingly efficient and determined Japanese companies.

The decision to affiliate with Mitsubishi thus represented not a substitute for U.S. production, but rather an attempt to get inside a growing market and secure business which we were not getting, and which we plainly couldn't get without a local operation. In other words, we saw some sharply rising sales opportunities which would have been wholly captured by able Japanese competition had we not elected to establish ourselves inside the Japanese market. (It is worth noting that our largest competitor, worldwide, is now the Komatsu Manufacturing Company of Japan.)

Launched in 1963, Caterpillar Mitsubishi manufactured its first product in 1965, and started to turn the corner into profitability in 1968. Its 1970 volume in new Caterpillar machines and parts was approximately \$175 million. About one-fifth of this went to third country markets. The other four-fifths stayed home; in the process, it has captured about one-fourth of the domestic Japanese market.

U.S. BENEFITS FOUR WAYS FROM JAPANESE
AFFILIATE

Employment in a large, new factory near Tokyo and in an excellent field distribution and product support organization now totals over 8,000 Japanese. Do these 8,000 jobs represent a loss of U.S. jobs? We can demonstrate the opposite is true. This figure represents jobs which our able competitors would have generated within Japan had we not done so. But the fact that we did act in time has produced benefits for the U.S. in four significant respects:

1. Caterpillar Mitsubishi produces tractors at the smaller end of our product line, together with related equipment. These machines are every bit the equal of their U.S. counterparts. Japanese contractors who buy and like them have increasingly become customers for products at the larger end of the line—manufactured at our U.S. bases—despite freight and artificial trade barriers which add substantially to factory prices. (As a result, our U.S. exports to Japan have climbed steadily and rapidly—from under \$2 million in 1963 to over \$48 million in 1970—a 24-fold increase.)

2. The parent company receives license fees from the Japanese affiliate. These fees are then subject to income taxes by the U.S. government, with credit being allowed for the amount of Japanese taxes.

3. As is the case with all foreign sales—whether manufactured abroad or exported—

sales of Caterpillar equipment in the Japanese market are broadening our base of experience and enabling us to offer products better engineered to meet all of the varied operating conditions encountered across the globe. These sales are part of a very substantial foreign volume that helps us finance a much larger research and development effort than would otherwise be possible. Virtually all such technical investigations now take place within the U.S.

Of course, to build Caterpillar equipment in Japan, Caterpillar blueprints must be sent across the Pacific. But the connection between U.S. firms and foreign affiliates is only one of several avenues for the spread of technology.

It is in this field of technology, in particular, that the AFL-CIO's argument seems thin. Caterpillar products clearly require Caterpillar technology. If the AFL-CIO wishes to stop the "export" of our technology, this also appears to argue that tractors that will be made in Japan in any event should be produced by competitors rather than us.

4. A fourth benefit relates to what we in the U.S. learn—the technology we "import"—from others. People in other countries can be just as innovative as we. The diesel engine—which originated in Germany—is a good example from our experience. If our Japanese product is Caterpillar in design, it is substantially Mitsubishi in manufacture. The Japanese know how to build a factory quickly, get into production rapidly, and manufacture efficiently and with exceptionally low waste ratios. We are learning from them.

CATERPILLAR MITSUBISHI—A "WIN-WIN" SITUATION

I submit, then, that Caterpillar Mitsubishi is a good example of a "win-win" situation. Japan wins—through establishment of a successful enterprise providing direct employment for over 8,000 people (jobs that could not have been provided in the U.S. in any case) . . . through a rising amount of exports to third country markets that aids the Japanese balance of trade . . . and through availability of a tried and tested product that a growing number of Japanese buyers appear to prefer.

The U.S. gains through a rising trend of job-creating supplementary exports . . . through license fees that produce tax revenues and benefit the balance of payments . . . and through the better technical base that an enlarged business operation provides.

The Japanese are satisfied with this arrangement. We are satisfied. The result is the kind of good human cooperation and understanding that springs from commercial harmony, and makes for peace in the decades ahead.

WHAT SHOULD BUSINESS DO IN FACE OF NEW
CHALLENGE?

There is plenty of evidence at hand—and more that should be brought to light from the experience of our companies—to prove that the net effect of U.S. investment abroad is highly beneficial to the American economy. So perhaps the most important question of the moment is—what shall we do—now—in the face of the most serious legislative challenge international corporations have ever confronted?

I have three suggestions:

1. Recognize that while American labor officials have developed the wrong solution, they have identified the right problem—that of unemployment. We share their concern, and agree with the need to deal more effectively with this troubling human problem.

For the past quarter century, U.S. international economic policies have encouraged expansion of both foreign trade and investment; and labor has supported these policies. Labor has generally maintained a global outlook—as long as employment remained rela-

tively high in the U.S. And if unemployment today were 3% rather than 6%, I believe labor would still be of this internationalist view. Thus the complaints of labor—and its present campaign to effect a radical change in U.S. policies—are more attributable, I believe, to increasing unemployment than to foreign direct investment by U.S. companies. What, therefore, should be done?

It is already national policy to pursue the goal of full employment—which means that it is our aim to help those displaced by imports or by the “transfer” of a production line abroad—whether such displacement is caused by the ineptness of their employer or by other factors beyond their control. This in turn means that where people may be disadvantaged by the impact of foreign trade and investment, more effective ways should be found to raise their level of skills; to increase their mobility to move where jobs are; and, importantly, to launch and maintain the proper economic policies to create jobs.

All of this is compatible with the agreed-upon public need to do a better job of planning for social problems and change, with the concomitant need for government to facilitate rather than impede change.

2. It goes almost without saying that the AFL-CIO's “Foreign Trade and Investment Act” should be vigorously opposed—as being among other things, destructive to the very ends it seeks to achieve. The best way for us to do this is to transmit the facts—especially those describing the operations of our own companies—to employees, governmental officials and the remainder of the public, in a clear, complete and persuasive fashion.

This need is so obvious that it scarcely requires emphasis. Should you disagree, I invite you to make a quick survey of the magazines and newspapers your company has printed and distributed to your employees within the past year . . . of your Annual Report, the films you have produced, speech manuscripts you have offered to the public . . . and, indeed, of all of your communications.

Ask yourself how much of this substantial space and time has been utilized to explain the rationale of U.S. investment abroad (not just trade). Ask yourself if you have been too secretive—remembering that, although secrecy may be useful in a competitive sense, it also breeds suspicion on the part of legislators and the public. I'm prepared to admit that most of us have played the game too close to our vests; some of the data I've offered today represent a change in our thinking on disclosure.

NEED TO GIVE PUBLIC FACTS IN TERMS OF ITS INTERESTS

Most significantly, have you presented this story to the U.S. public in terms of its interests: the U.S. economy, U.S. technology, U.S. production, U.S. jobs?

You already know the answers to these questions. If your employees and legislators and the public don't have the facts about your international operations and don't understand the rationale behind them, your first step in finding a culprit is to look in the mirror.

3. Thirdly, I am by no means first to call attention to the need for some new multinational instrument to resolve disputes and begin to harmonize pertinent portions of the world's varying business systems.

There are real differences that merit intelligent resolution in such areas as: anti-competitive practices, international mergers and “take-overs,” accounting procedures, tax systems, transfer pricing, product labeling, labor standards, repatriation of profits, securities transactions, and more.

Toward this goal, there is a need for a cooperative international approach which includes the multinational corporations themselves. And if there is to be an international approach, there must also be appropriate authority vested in an international organization with stature and permanence: in the

GATT, the OECD, perhaps a new body, or some private international counterpart of one or more of the large private business organizations in this country.

IN SUMMARY

I've claimed that U.S. investment abroad is a “win-win” situation—with real benefits for this nation, as well as those countries harboring the investment.

I've attempted to demonstrate the hypothesis in a framework of the experience of my own company, as just one of many American firms which could be so cited.

I've suggested that seldom have the legions of the uninformed been as populous as they are on this particular question; and among their number we would have to count those who are now proposing abrupt, unwise shifts in public policy that would, I believe, ultimately work against their intended aims.

Finally, I've urged that those of us in the U.S. business community have work to do; in the field of effective communications and support for more creative and generous adjustment assistance, and for an effective multinational means of resolving world business differences.

There ought to be few higher ranking claims on our energies in the coming year. The penalty of failure could be disastrous; and the result of success could be great—not just in terms of business prosperity on both sides of the oceans, but in terms of lasting benefits for humankind and peace among the nations.

EXTENSION OF PERIOD FOR TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the period for the transaction of routine morning business, with statements therein limited to 3 minutes, be extended an additional 15 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STEVENSON). Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The remarks of Mr. JAVITS when he introduced S. 3028 are printed in the RECORD under Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.)

QUORUM CALL

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed out of order.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SUPPORT FOR ELIMINATION OF FOREIGN AID

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, last evening, the Senate was entertained with a rather novel theory about the Senate's recent decisions on foreign aid. The entertainment was choreographed by the distinguished senior Senator from Wyoming (Mr. McGEE), who maintained throughout the evening that the Senate's revival of the foreign aid program, following the overwhelming defeat of the earlier aid legislation, was due to a popular uprising among the citizens of this country who, according to the McGee theory, demanded that the Senate reverse its earlier decision and vote to support foreign aid. In other words, the McGee theory, relative to the resurrection of foreign aid, draws the conclusion that foreign aid is back by popular demand.

Until last night, I had never heard this theory, but the Senator from Wyoming seemed so positive about it that I was tempted at times to believe him. This is something I rarely do, because experience has taught me that the distinguished Senator, with the best of intentions mind you, frequently confuses fact and opinion.

The facts, as best as I can determine them, do not support the Senator's thesis, a thesis which postulates that foreign aid is everyone's choice as the Government's most popular program. Rather, the facts suggest exactly the contrary: Foreign aid is the program the public would like most to see defeated.

As evidence of this I wish to offer for the RECORD some 50 letters which I received following the Senate's defeat of the foreign aid bill on October 29. These letters were selected at random from the more than 900 I received on this issue during the period October 28 to November 20. Of the total, only 43, or 4 percent, wrote to express their disapproval of the defeat of the foreign aid bill. I doubt that even the senior Senator from Wyoming would consider this a popular mandate—but he might.

In any event, I think we ought to withhold final judgment on the McGee theory relative to the resurrection of foreign aid until all the evidence is in. Perhaps the Senator would wish to submit 50 letters which he has received in support of foreign aid. Given the firmness with which he extols his theory, I assume this would be no problem for him.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the sample of letters to which I have referred, which were received by me on this subject.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TYLER, TEX.,
November 3, 1971.

Sen. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: As a former Arkansan and a long-time admirer, let me say to you:

Please, now that foreign aid is dead, let it stay dead.

Individuals cannot buy friends, neither can Nations.

Sincerely,

JOHN BUCKINGHAM.

FAYETTEVILLE, ARK.,
November 4, 1971.

HON. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I want you to know wholeheartedly I approve of your vote, and the vote of other Members of the Senate, to defeat the renewal of the Foreign Aid Bill. I just wish we would act in the same way to defeat the Military Aid so that all troops and military personnel would be called home.

Sincerely,

HELEN FIELDS.

PINE BLUFF, ARK.,
November 6, 1971.

Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I am happy that the Senate rejected the Foreign Aid Bill as it had been submitted by the Administration. You are quite right in your assertion that we need to study the whole problem of foreign aid anew, in terms of today's conditions which are very different from the immediate post-war (II) period.

As I had stated in one of my previous communications to you, I still believe it will be the wisest part of wisdom for the Congress of the United States to take an imaginative and bold step by passing appropriations for foreign aid for a given year with a specific notice to the world that for five years thereafter the U.S. Government would give no aid to any country, military or economic, excepting in cases of extreme emergency, such as man-made disaster (e.g. nine million East Pakistani refugees in India, or military imbalance as between Arabs and Israel thanks to continued Soviet supplies to Egypt) or nature-made (e.g. devastation wrought by cyclone and tidal waves in East Pakistan not so long ago and in Orissa, India, less than a week ago).

Please let me know when your Committee is planning to hold hearings on a revision of the Foreign Aid format; I would like to appear before it to share my views.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely yours,

HARIDAS T. MUZUMDAR.

E. C. BARTON & Co.

Jonesboro, Ark., November 2, 1971.

HON. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
U.S. Senate,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: So often we write to express our opposition and urge you to vote the way we believe. In this case, I want to thank you for voting against the foreign aid bill.

Not long ago I wrote you that it was my feeling that the excessive government spending by all branches of the government and the monopolistic powers granted to the labor unions were the causes of our economic plight. Wage and price increases are the results of poor management of the economy and are not really the causes.

Thanks and best regards.

Sincerely,

ALLEN NIXON.

FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA.,
November 4, 1971.

Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I am delighted the Senators voted to stop the foreign aid

program. I have spent four vacations in countries of Central America. I failed to see that the huge sums of money extracted from the U.S. citizens result in any other than mere tokens of aid. One school I saw in Guatemala (and the only public school) couldn't possibly accommodate more than a 1,000 children. This school is in an area where 9,000 children live.

The school is beautiful—the prettiest building in this large and poverty stricken area. I saw no U.S. supported, nor constructed, hospitals, clinics, orphanages nor farmer-training centers. All I saw were supported by religious affiliated groups from southern and western United States and Canada. I saw one large farm training center supported and manned by the St. Meinrad's Benedictine Abbey somewhere in Indiana.

Apparently, the foreign aid funds make a huge pork barrel for dishonest politicians and bureaucrats, foreign and domestic. Very little of the taxpayers' money is used to alleviate poverty in areas where human misery exists.

Again, I say, I am delighted the foreign aid program was voted down. Of course, the sticky fingers are trying desperately to revive it. That program provides money easily obtained. The U.S. taxpayer is helpless in the grip of the I.R.S. I haven't forgotten reading the Readers' Digest January 1968 or 1969. The Digest described the treatment Mr. Hafey in Maryland received from the IRS which resulted in his death from a stroke. Imagine, his death occurred while Vice President Agnew was governor of Maryland. At no time did Mr. Agnew intervene in behalf of Mr. Hafey. After Mr. Hafey's death, Congress exonerated him. Exonerated or not, Mr. Hafey was just as dead.

Dear Senator Fulbright, stick to your guns. Please don't let the political and bureaucratic enemies of the American taxpayers overpower you and your committee.

I am a firm believer in helping the helpless poor and helping the helpless poor to help themselves. But seeing the foreign aid program by traveling and hearing about it on TV makes two entirely different stories.

I hope you and your committee continue to represent your people at home and the American taxpayers. I enjoy your TV appearances.

Yours respectfully,

MISS EMILY H. BARRETT.

NOVEMBER 3, 1971.

Senator WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: I would like to congratulate you and the members of the Senate on your recent decision to end foreign aid.

There are few issues that take place these days that are worth writing to a Senator or Congressman about, however this is a fine exception. I hope the aid bill stays dead and the money America poured into other countries will now begin to filter back.

Again, congratulations on a job well done.

Sincerely,

ALTA GARDNER.

LUBBOCK, TEX., November 5, 1971.

HON. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: I just wanted to let you know how pleased we were to hear that "Foreign Aid" was voted down. I think the whole thing should be carefully studied and aid given only where really needed, and, that, given in such a way that it be used only where really needed.

There are so many things done by our Government that seem wrong to me. I wish we could have more 'Common Sense' in our Government.

Best regards,

Dr. L. E. TICHENOR.

P.S.—I'm 80 years old.

NOVEMBER 4, 1971.

DEAR MR. FULBRIGHT: With great joy I heard the announcement that the Senate had killed the foreign aid bill. What sanity! Maybe Uncle Sam won't be Uncle Sap any longer.

Foreign aid could also be achieved by not doing certain things. If the administration really cared about this planet it wouldn't be planning to add atomic radiation to it.

Even the term Foreign Aid is obsolete. Who's foreign? We are all on this over populated planet together. Every mammal larger than a dog is doomed; the ocean is dirty. While armies fight and politicians quibble over who has more power the ocean gets dirtier and the population gets greater.

Thank heaven we have some Senators who are thinking.

Sincerely,

CHARLOTTE E. BASSETT.

NOVEMBER 3, 1971.

Senator WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Democrat, Arkansas,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I was pleased with the bold action taken by the Senate recently in regard to foreign aid. I think the recent actions in the United Nations reflect the feeling of our "friends" for 25 years of giving them money that we do not have. Further, I am of the opinion that most of our problems in regard to the dollar stems from the billions of dollars we have given away and which have caused a flood of dollars all over the world for which we have received nothing, except nonsupport for our foreign policy.

I am convinced that we cannot win friends by giving them vast amounts of our wealth. As a matter of fact, just the opposite is true just as it is with individuals. The best way to lose a personal friend is to give or loan him money.

I fail to see how we can continue to give away large sums of money when we are in debt some 400 billion or more dollars. It just doesn't make sense.

Sincerely,

TRUETT K. GRANT.

OCTOBER 31, 1971.

HON. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: I have not seen any list showing how you voted on the Foreign Aid Bill, but I respectfully ask that you vote against it.

If it is not stopped it will go on for another 25 years.

Yours truly,

F. W. CREEDLE.

EL DORADO, ARK.,

November 1, 1971.

HON. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Senator from Arkansas,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: I am extremely pleased with the Senate's vote to curtail Foreign Aid.

My thanks to you for your vote against this program. I only regret it wasn't shut off years ago.

Sincerely,

KENNETH WIMER, Jr.

SILOAM SPRINGS, ARK.

Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT:

I wish to add my words of congratulations to you on your vote and subsequent defeat of the foreign aid bill.

I believe we have been trying to buy friends far too long now. The defeat at the U.N. was just one of many cases where our Leech Allies have turned on us.

Sir, I am sure when Pres. Nixon tries to

put this bill through again, you and others like you will again defeat it.

You may say "Charity Starts at Home." I feel strongly that you will do your best. "Maybe Nixon Will Stay in China" as our foreign aid.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

NORMAN McNEIL.

VENICE, CALIF.

November 5, 1971.

Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: Thank you for your stand on foreign aid, stand firm. Let those foreign parasites get off their hands and solve their own problems, we have carried them long enough.

Let's have some American aid, such as Housing, rapid transit, medicare for our old and sick, schools for our children and so much more that has been neglected.

We had better get with it before we slide down the drain. It can happen here.

The American people have lost faith in our leaders, too many lies, too much irresponsible rhetoric by Laird, Kissinger, not to mention Agnew. They had better come down from their ivory tower and talk to the man on the street.

I could go on and on as you well know.

I pray our leaders wake up before it's too late.

Sincerely,

J. C. PICANOS.

LINCOLN, NEBR.

November 3, 1971.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: We taxpayers would like to thank you and the Senate for defeating the Foreign Aid Bill.

We would hope that will be the end of foreign aid, after 25 years of aid.

Very truly yours,

EARL BOWSMAN.

NOVEMBER 4, 1971.

Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT.

DEAR FRIEND: In my judgment if the United States Senate had stopped all Foreign Aid long ago, that beastly, unjust, unlawful, war in Viet-Nam, would have come to an end long ago. Now do we want Vietnam to start all over again in Cambodia? Think about this, before you change the law, on Foreign Aid, as it now stands.

Best Wishes and Kindest Personal Regards.

Most sincerely,

JACK and ZULA REARDON.

IRVINE, CALIF.,

November 3, 1971.

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: Just a brief note to let you know that we support your stand on the Foreign Aid Bill.

We feel that we've been more than generous with our resources during the last 25 years.

We must work on our own problems—schools, welfare, taxes and unemployment, just to name a few.

We think that it's about time that the Legislative Branch re-coup some of its responsibilities that have been abrogated by the Executive Branch.

Sincerely,

PETER V. URONE.

CLIFFTENE K. URONE.

CONCORD, CALIF.,

November 3, 1971.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I was elated when Congress stopped the stupendous foreign aid program.

I've read quotes of some leading men in Europe and Asia, saying the U.S. has been too generous with money.

It amazes me—why everyone can't see that the countries aren't one bit better off than before in spite of the aid.

My opinion is that the billions end up

in Swiss bank accounts under personal names.

I've written to others about this and they've sent me stacks of booklets on the subject. What a waste.

Those civilizations date back 40,000 to 50,000 years before Christ. Wouldn't it be better to just let them live, as what we give doesn't improve the lot of the needy?

Now that it's ended—why not let it cool until after the 1st of the year. It may do a lot of good all around the world. Most think of us as suckers & maybe they aren't so far wrong.

With the big surplus in foreign aid, there is no hurry.

I do hope that Congress will hold on to the reins and not give more power to the President. The Alaska blast should never happen.

Sincerely,

MRS. MABEL PEARSON.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,

November 1, 1971.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I wish to add my voice to those legion who shout hallelujah! on the ending of Foreign Aid. Please keep this preposterous policy killed for all time—do not let the villains of Vietnam revive it as they will assuredly try to do.

Sincerely,

PATRICIA NOONAN.

P.S.—No aid to Israel either—this is another Vietnam.

BIRMINGHAM, ALA.,

November 3, 1971.

Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT.

MR. SENATOR: I am grateful to you for speaking against foreign aid. Remember Checkaluoocia. We are wasting billions on our enemies. When we are falling apart in America. If my neighbor tried to shoot me; I would not take him a pie the next day, that makes as much sense as giving billions to our proven enemies. Edward Kennedy playing on the sympathy of we tax payers. With his sob stories, makes me sick at stomach.

Please stop this foreign aid rocket. America must be the best and stronger, let America be first for a change; I begrudge ever dime of my tax dollar going to our enemies.

Very sincerely,

MRS. C. F. MATTHEWS.

PARKER, ARIZ.,

November 3, 1971.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I strongly favor withdrawal of the United States from the United Nations and strict curtailment of foreign aid.

Many thanks for your efforts.

With warm regards,

ROBERT F. CASEY, Ph. D.

NORWOOD, MASS.,

November 2, 1971.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: Please do all that you can to reduce our foreign aid.

We, the taxpayers have really reached the limit of our financial resources—our tax burden is frightful.

We cannot feed and police the universe and it's high time that we admit we made a grave mistake in trying to.

Thank you.

Your truly,

MYRSA PHILLIPS GERAGHTY,

Mrs. Edward Geraghty.

FRANKLIN, LA., November 4, 1971.

Senator J. Wm. FULBRIGHT,

Senate Office Building,

Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: Though I'm not one of your constituents I wish to commend you on your stand against foreign aid. I hope you will not weaken. I see no sense in adding debt to our children and grandchildren to give to other countries that do not respect us or to

communist countries that are trying to conquer us.

If you or I would borrow money from a finance co. to give to all the charities we are asked to contribute to we would be perpetually in debt. So is our country. Instead of cutting back on our defense, let's cut foreign aid and use it at home.

Do you think the United Nations should be investigated as a Trojan Horse in our Land? I believe it is.

Sincerely,

OPAL H. ADAMS.

SOUTHEAST AUBURN, WASH.,

November 3, 1971.

Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,

U.S. Senate,

Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: We are in complete agreement with the action taken by the U.S. Senate in canceling Foreign Aid.

Sincerely,

HOWARD and DOROTHY BOTHELL.

CANDLER, N.C., November 2, 1971.

Senator Wm. FULBRIGHT,

DEAR CHAIRMAN: It is time for foreign aid programs to come to an end. After spending \$143,000,000,000 the results have been most discouraging. There are ills in this country to be given assistance. The taxpayer is already paying a huge interest on an immense national debt.

Would you in your personal life give, and give and give; then borrow money to carry on your business or household?

Respectfully,

FLORENCE WEIDEL.

MILWAUKIE, OREG.,

November 2, 1971.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I wish to thank you for your vote last Friday against foreign aid. I am very tired of having my tax money sent to such countries as Turkey, which is the main supplier of heroin in the world and is presently causing us so much trouble.

Let's start spending our tax money here at home by educating our own citizens and providing jobs for them instead of protecting foreign investments made by all major oil companies and General Motors.

Thanks again for your stand on foreign aid and keep up the good work.

Sincerely,

MRS. ALENE CROFT.

BELL, CAL.,

November 4, 1971.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: If handing out aid to all the world is stopped—will be to your untiring work. I listen to you on T.V. Your sincere efforts—you must feel battered & bruised some times—would like to shake your hand.

Truly, sincerely,

MARY E. JOHNSON.

LOS GATOS, CALIF.,

November 4, 1971.

Senator WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,

U.S. Senate,

Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: Thank God for the Foreign relations committee. Please don't start Foreign Aid in any way any more. We Americans can not afford it any more. I have been a loyal follower of yours for years. God bless you and keep up the good work.

Sincerely,

C. R. WIMS, R.N.,

FORT EUSTIS, VA., November 4, 1971.

Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT,

U.S. Senate,

Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: I just wanted to write and say that I give full support to the Senate's action on defeating the Foreign Aid Bill. It is a beginning in questioning our national priorities.

I received your reply to my letter of Aug. 30 from Vietnam. I thank you for your interest.

Please be assured that our interest is genuine change but realistic change for the betterment of our nation.

Yours respectfully,

RONALD DAVID YOUNG.

LARGO, FLA., November 4, 1971.

Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT,
U.S. Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: I am writing to congratulate you on your stand on Foreign Aid. Please stick to your guns—it's time we stopped giving everything away and protecting people. If they are mad at us, let Russia support them all. We can grow strong and become independent. We don't need them, but oh! how they need us. It's time they assumed their own responsibilities. There is lots of wealth in those countries, so let them share it among their own.

Please don't forget the Prisoners of War. Do all you can, as I hear our government is playing politics with them, which is tragic and very shameful.

May God bless you and guide you in all decisions.

Sincerely,

MARIE F. THOMPSON.

TEXARKANA, ARK.

Hon. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Senate Office Building.

DEAR SIR: Please hold your present position on Foreign Aid. I have not always approved of your position in the past, but you are correct now in my opinion, so stand firm.

Yours truly,

WILLIAM E. TAYLOR

FORT SMITH, ARK., October 29, 1971.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
U.S. Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: Recently, I read your Newsletter in regard to Foreign Aid and agreed with you wholeheartedly. I had intended to write to you, complimenting you on your stand on cutting foreign aid.

Enclosed find two Editorials that came out this week in the Fort Smith Southwest Times Record. I think both of these Editorials voice the opinions of most of the people. I have never heard as many people complaining about an issue as there are complaints about the ouster of Nationalist China (Taiwan) from the United Nations Assembly.

I, too, have felt that we have carried too much of the financial load of the United Nations.

My first reaction, after hearing of the United Nations vote, was to write a letter asking that you use your influence to cut all financial support to the United Nations. After thinking this matter through, I realize that this can't be done. However, I feel that we should cut down on our aid programs to several countries, as well as cut our financial assistance to the United Nations.

Sincerely yours,

J. FRED PATTON.

FORT ARTHUR, TEX.

DEAR SIR: Hold fast to your position on foreign aid. You are in a commanding position at last!

MIKE FLORES.

Footnote: Please acknowledge this letter.

DR. L. E. PARMLEY (RETIRED),
1700 LAKE MIRROR DRIVE,
WINTER HAVEN, FLA., Nov. 3, 1971.

Hon. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: Please fight the Foreign Aid in your committee and on the floor of the

Senate, our Foreign Aid has cost us some \$200 billion and has not been worth a dime. Every country in the world except the communist countries were our friends before we started the aid. Now we do not have a single country that we can count on as a friend. Our prestige was at the top all over the world before aid started, now our prestige is at an all time low, and we are facing bankruptcy. Our dollar has lost its value and prestige all over the world as well as here at home.

We need aid, but not one of these countries will help us.

There is not a country in the world that is not in better financial condition than we are. Our bonded debt some \$400 billion twice as much as the rest of the world owes, cost \$20 billion per annum to pay interest on these bonds. Please, please stop all foreign aid.

Yours truly,

L. E. PARMLEY, M.D.

AURORA, W. VA., November 5, 1971.

Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I wish to register my protest against the President's foreign aid proposal. The time has come to stop this give-away program. There are plenty of worthy causes in this country that need some assistance. Some of this foreign aid gets into the hands of communists, and a few cents of it comes from my pocket. I am not interested in one cent of my money being given to foreigners. This country is little respected by those who receive our aid. Let's stop it.

Respectfully yours,

HARRY SLAWTER.

GAITHERSBURG, MD., November 3, 1971.

Senator FULBRIGHT,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: I wholeheartedly support your stand on foreign aid.

Let's stop exporting bad will, i.e., arms and ammunition. People who love freedom and democracy, whether American, African, European, or Asian, cannot and never will accept U.S. support of dictators. If we really want "grass roots" support of the world's peoples, then in no way should we support dictators in Spain, Greece, Cambodia, Viet Nam, etc.

We have lost our army, and we have lost our national pride. Ask Secretary Rogers what more we should give for our misguided foreign policy? Ask President Nixon what greater loss he would like to preside over?

Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

RICHARD A. PROCTOR, M.D.

NOVEMBER 4, 1971.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: The whole country is overjoyed that the Senate at last voted to cut foreign aid. We are in debt and sick with the tax load to help countries who are so sure we can do it or we wouldn't have started the aid.

Please do not back away from your stand.

Sincerely,

(Mrs. M.E.) VIRGINIA FRANKLIN.

[This advertisement appears in U.S. News, May 24, 1971; Forbes, June 1, 1971]

NO WONDER WE'RE BROKE!

Here is the tragic list of 138 billion dollars (one hundred and thirty-eight billion!) this country has been giving or "loaning" to foreign countries, 1946 through 1969 (even higher today). We have borrowed billions so we could give them away—the interest alone on our debt is now in the billions of dollars every year! And we are still borrowing more to give more away.

Yet every few days we hear that another one of these nations has insulted Americans,

stolen even more of our property, driven us out of its country, which we saved and rebuilt.

What—what—have all these American billions accomplished?

Afghanistan	\$407,000,000
Ceylon	165,600,000
Cyprus	22,200,000
Greece	3,886,500,000
India	8,246,700,000
Iran	2,336,000,000
Iraq	102,000,000
Israel	1,226,100,000
Jordan	643,000,000
Kuwait	50,000,000
Lebanon	93,000,000
Nepal	137,500,000
Pakistan	3,721,600,000
Saudi Arabia	93,200,000
Syrian Arab Republic	60,500,000
Turkey	5,600,400,000
United Arab Republic (Egypt)	912,200,000
Yemen	42,600,000
Central Treaty Organization	54,100,000
Near East and South Asia Regional	1,510,600,000
Argentina	888,000,000
Bahamas	35,100,000
Barbados	100,000
Bolivia	548,100,000
Brazil	3,779,300,000
British Honduras	5,300,000
Chile	1,704,300,000
Colombia	1,205,500,000
Costa Rica	191,500,000
Cuba	52,100,000
Dominican Republic	463,900,000
Ecuador	311,200,000
El Salvador	135,200,000
Guatemala	331,000,000
Guyana	61,000,000
Haiti	118,700,000
Honduras	119,000,000
Jamaica	74,800,000
Mexico	1,168,200,000
Nicaragua	176,000,000
Panama	246,300,000
Paraguay	135,700,000
Peru	759,400,000
Surinam	10,500,000
Trinidad and Tobago	62,900,000
Uruguay	162,200,000
Venezuela	490,600,000
Other West Indies	8,000,000
Central America Regional	144,200,000
Latin America Regional	1,891,300,000
Vietnam	5,895,400,000
Burma	110,500,000
Cambodia	341,300,000
China (Republic of)	5,141,800,000
Hong Kong	43,700,000
Indochina	
Undistributed	1,535,200,000
Indonesia	1,128,300,000
Korea	7,829,000,000
Laos	\$641,100,000
Malaysia	90,200,000
Philippines	2,078,800,000
Ryukyu Islands	387,400,000
Singapore	40,000,000
Thailand	1,192,400,000
Western Samoa	1,500,000
East Asia Regional	767,100,000
Algeria	185,300,000
Botswana	16,500,000
Burundi	6,800,000
Cameroon	32,900,000
Central African Republic	5,000,000
Chad	8,700,000
Congo (Brazzaville)	2,100,000
Congo (Kinshasa)	430,700,000
Dahomey	12,200,000
Ethiopia	375,700,000
Gabon	7,500,000
Gambia	2,200,000
Ghana	267,300,000
Guinea	107,800,000
Ivory Coast	73,400,000

Kenya	66,200,000
Lesotho	4,800,000
Liberia	272,100,000
Libya	229,700,000
Malagasy Republic	13,200,000
Malawi	25,000,000
Mali, Republic of	25,300,000
Mauritania	3,300,000
Mauritius	1,500,000
Morocco	758,900,000
Niger	16,600,000
Nigeria	289,100,000
Rwanda	6,900,000
Senegal	38,100,000
Sierra Leone	43,100,000
Somali Republic	76,800,000
Southern Rhodesia	7,000,000
Sudan	104,800,000
Swaziland	700,000
Tanzania	65,000,000
Togo	15,100,000
Tunisia	627,100,000
Uganda	36,000,000
Upper Volta	12,700,000
Zambia	40,800,000
Central and West Africa Regional	8,000,000
East Africa Regional	26,400,000
Africa Regional	165,300,000
Malta	8,200,000
Spain	2,228,100,000
Yugoslavia	2,890,700,000
Oceania-Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands	230,800,000
British Oceania	1,500,000
Non-Regional	6,610,400,000
Albania	20,400,000
Austria	1,166,600,000
Belgium-Luxembourg	2,005,200,000
Czechoslovakia	193,000,000
Denmark	919,600,000
East Germany	800,000
Finland	151,500,000
France	9,415,900,000
Germany (Federal Republic)	5,020,300,000
Berlin	131,900,000
Hungary	31,500,000
Iceland	89,300,000
Ireland	193,000,000
Italy	6,043,000,000
Netherlands	2,470,300,000
Norway	1,253,300,000
Poland	577,300,000
Portugal	534,400,000
Sweden	188,100,000
United Kingdom	9,697,500,000
U.S.S.R.	186,400,000
Europe Regional	2,763,900,000
Japan	4,137,900,000
Republic of South Africa*	150,600,000
Canada	51,600,000
Oceania-Australia	825,900,000
Oceania-New Zealand	88,100,000
Non-Regional	1,434,000,000
Grand total	138,028,500,000

Source: Agency for International Development, U.S. State Department.

*Repaid in full with interest. Some other countries have paid some interest and principal (\$18½ billion) on some of their borrowings from the United States.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF., November 3, 1971.

HON. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: We wish to express our sincere appreciation for your successful fight in the Senate against the tremendous burden the American people have had to carry these many years on foreign aid. I always maintained that priorities are first to the American people. We appreciate your consistency in adhering to this objective.

Sincerely,

A. LOZIER.

MILLVILLE, N.J., November 3, 1971.

DEAR SENATOR: Am with you 100% to cut out or down foreign aid. Our schools need

money; our real estate taxes too high. Let's put some foreign aid money back to the states.

What can I do as a citizen to arouse public sentiment against foreign aid?

Sincerely,

THOMAS P. BROWN.

NOVEMBER 3, 1971.

HON. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: It is about time foreign aid comes to a complete stop. We have made no friends and we need the money at home.

Two only Americans died today in Vietnam? It is two too many.

Sincerely,

LUCILLE HELDE.

JACKSON, WIS.

NOVEMBER 3, 1971.

Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR J. WILLIAM: You are on the ball concerning Foreign Aid! Please do not back down or weaken, hold fast! Let the Russians fill in the gap and take it on the chin for a change. Uncle Sam has done more than expected. Russia will deserve her fate when she tries to replace us. Give them one of your 'sour' and 'terrible' looks when the pressure is extended to re-establish the Foreign Aid.

Respectfully,

FREDERICK W. MANNING.

PLATTSBURGH, N.Y.

FALL RIVER, MASS.,

November 2, 1971.

U.S. SENATE,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I am very glad that the foreign aid program was turned down.

Thank you for fighting for what is right for our own country.

Sincerely,

LUELLA THIBAUT.

OCTOBER 31, 1971.

HON. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

SIR: The adults in my family and many of my friends are in practically unanimous agreement that the Senate was justified in abolishing foreign aid.

United States help in this area in the past has undoubtedly helped many countries, especially after the ravages of World War II. It also has helped many nations resist expansionist communism, perhaps, by keeping these nations strong and raising their standards of living. I think that no one can dispute that we have fulfilled our moral, and in many cases self-imposed obligations to these countries.

However, it is in my opinion foolish to suppose that we could keep on maintaining foreign aid indefinitely: an end had to come.

If the United States ever gets weak, unstable, or otherwise down and out, I wonder how many foreign governments are going to come to our aid?

Very truly yours,

JOHN SANFORD, DDS.

ROGERS, ARK.,

November 1, 1971.

Sen. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: Congratulations on your Foreign Aid fight.

Stand by your guns.

Very truly,

R.H. McAFEE.

NEWPORT BEACH, CALIF.,

November 2, 1971.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: Ending the insidious Foreign Aid program is the most con-

structive action taken by the United States Senate in recent years.

Please support your fellow Senators in standing firm on this noble resolve.

Yours truly,

ELLIS M. YARNELL.

FORT WORTH, TEX.,

November 4, 1971.

HON. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: Voters in the U.S. should offer to you a resounding vote of thanks for your work and vote eliminating Foreign Aid. This is as good as a reduction in taxes, and should help the U.S. get back on its financial feet.

The President and his gang saying that this would affect our relations abroad is as much of a joke as saying it would dampen the Paris Peace talks; and also keep our soldiers from getting back to the U.S. safely.

Why should the U.S. continue handing out money and supplies to other countries who usually laugh at us for being such gullible dopes as to believe that any of them would do anything for the U.S.? They just continue laughing up their sleeves; and some of the individuals in other governments are fattening their purses with fortunes we send over. Just why can't other countries with more money than the U.S. has, give of their means to help underprivileged nations? Why must the U.S. with all of its good (?) intentions be laughed off of the map?

Keep working to prevent any kind of Foreign aid bill to be passed. Citizens of this country will be right behind you in anything you undertake.

Just get our boys home from South Vietnam; keep foreign aid bills killed; and do not furnish any more money to fight anybody else's war.

Yours truly,

W.G. HOWETH.

FRANCE PLEDGES \$3.9 MILLION TO U.N.

UNITED NATIONS.—France has agreed to pay \$3.9 million of the \$21.1 million it owes the United Nations, reliable sources said Saturday. French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann announced on Sept. 29 that his government had agreed to pay "quite a substantial sum" to ease the U.N. deficit. U.N. sources said the Paris government had agreed to pay less than \$4 million, or scarcely enough to meet the U.N. payroll for one wage period. The Big Four powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France—have held at least one secret session on payments to stave off U.N. bankruptcy. Britain previously made a voluntary contribution of \$10 million. The United States, which pays almost a third of the U.N. budget, has refused to put up more until the French and Russians make a payment.

U.S. MAY REDUCE AID IF FREE CHINA BOOTED

WASHINGTON.—Secretary of State William P. Rogers has cautioned foreign ministers that the United States might be forced by Congress to reduce its financial contributions to the United Nations if Nationalist China is expelled, State Department officials acknowledged Saturday.

The officials emphasized that Rogers, in private conversations in the past week at New York, did not raise the possibility as a threat but rather as a congressional problem facing the administration.

General Assembly debate starts Oct. 18 on the China issue. Rogers is lobbying for votes for an American resolution proposing to seat Communist China and give it a seat on the Security Council, while retaining General Assembly membership for the Nationalist regime on Taiwan.

Rogers was reported to have called attention to a growing feeling in Congress that U.S. moral and financial support for the United Nations should be "re-examined" if

the Nationalists are expelled, as provided in a resolution sponsored by Communist Albania.

State Department officials said they expected the China vote to be "very, very, very close."

As many as 30 of the United Nations' 131 member nations have yet to decide how they will vote, officials said.

Rogers has met 69 foreign ministers attending the General Assembly and plans to confer with about 20 more this week.

Among other arguments Rogers is advancing in behalf of Nationalist China are these:

If the Nationalists are expelled, it would create "an uncomfortable precedent" for expulsion of other member states.

If Taiwan is expelled, such action might encourage Communist China to move against Taiwan by the use of force.

It is a "false argument" to vote against the U.S. resolution merely to please the Peking government. The United States, after all, also is seeking to improve its relations with mainland China.

NOVEMBER 3, 1971.

Senator FULBRIGHT,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: You have made a good start by killing the recent foreign aid bill.

Foreign aid has been a fraud on the U.S. taxpayer and a delusion.

Estimates run from \$130 billions to \$200 billions with \$51 billions planned for the near future.

Taxes are already confiscatory and these programs should be cancelled to save the U.S. public from bankruptcy.

The number of U.S. foreign aid personnel in Brazil is an indication of how rotten the system is. They number more than the greatest number that England had in India when she was a colony.

Collect back the debts owed to us by others if they can pay such as France, England, Germany, Russia, Poland, India, Egypt, et al.

Use blocked foreign currencies and stop listening to the frightened striped pants boys who are afraid of losing friends. Look at Egypt, India, France, Libya, et al., if you want to know the price of being chicken.

Let India feed the refugees with the funds she owes the U.S. She can do it if she is willing to make the adjustment of her customs which are starving her people.

Let Israel borrow the funds other than from the U.S. to buy munitions and planes. Her credit is good elsewhere.

Let Vietnam go to work and stop milking the U.S. taxpayer to try to feed the world and to support political corruption.

Sincerely,

ST. CLAIR SHORES, MICH.,
November 1, 1971.

HON. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: It is gratifying that the Senate has eliminated foreign aid. I would say, keep it that way, tho I understand it may be continued in some form. Tell the mendicants that the U.S. is broke, which would be the truth, can no longer afford to give, more truth, that it has already overburdened itself, and unless it devotes all its efforts and funds, to straightening out its own troubles, it might disintegrate (no connection with the black problem.) You could tell them, but it would not be news to any interested party. Nixon stated the other day 150 billion had been spent on foreign aid. That is not the half of it. In this Century, there have been four major wars, and except what fighting Japan cost, it has all been foreign aid, probably enough to approximate the present debt.

My memory may fail me, but I believe the U.S. has been living with an annual deficit, for all but one of the last forty years. Lately this deficit has increased by leaps and bounds, even when things were booming, which indicates there is something rancid in the process. Debt is legitimate, and can be good business, when conditions are such that it can be controlled, and discharged as necessary. But a debt that is added to yearly for forty years, even to paying the interest out of borrowed funds, and where there is no idea as to how and when the obligation can be met, is preposterous. Only a Government could do it, in business probably not more than three years, would bring a vast upheaval. The greater part of the population is now living on credit. The temples are full of money lenders, and even the inflated prices, are incidental, to what the final cost of things may be. This usually works out pretty well as long as there is a steady income. But if things should get tough, the depression of forty years ago, might look like a trial run. What we have had is an attempt at Utopia, on the unorthodox basis of buying power being continually injected, by frequent wage increases, and Government spending. This cannot be continued without probable chaos. There must be a slowing down, and adjustment of the economy. What Nixon is doing now should have happened ten or fifteen years ago. There should be no more bargained raises allowed and very few of any kind, and an economy built on the resulting condition. Taxes should not be reduced, it just means more debt. I expect there has been a conflict of interests in letting things go so far. Presidents like to brag about the G.N.P.s. But to have lots of those, there must be lots of money changing hands, so high wages and high prices are the thing—till it gets you. What I think is, that on this Earth, no Nation is going to live very high on the hog, for any length of time. It is hard to think of any place that is not scratching for money, unless some of these countries that have been shot in the back with oil wells, and the oil will some day give out.

Nixon talks about everybody having a job, as if jobs hung on trees, to be picked. If you create a job where it is not necessary it means the cost of something is inflated. Actually I would say the U.S. already has too many people. A few years ago, there were say around 75 million employed people, who took care of all the goods and services for everybody, including foreign trade. Production of goods is the basis of an economy. Seems as if I heard there were something like thirty million, actually producing something, and one way and another, what they produce, everybody lives on. With the line held on wages, the individual demand will no doubt lessen, so a corresponding working force will no doubt be able to take care of many more buyers. On top of that, many methods are being introduced, to shorten production time. The computer fellers say after a while nobody will have much to do, but play and create. That would be the day. There will be no room to play, and if children are ruled out, the creation, would probably be trouble. I asked an official in a bank how much time he saved with some new computers. He said before they had 200 people, and after, 210. Personally I think, with a growing population, welfare is going to be a big business.

Now there is lots of worry. Viet Nam cannot get along without more money from the U.S. Why not tell them to go into the scrap business. Collect all the bomb fragments, and wrecks of eight thousand flying machines, and sell it to Japan. Should bring in lots of money. And presto, it would all soon be back in the U.S. in the form of automobiles, and there would have been no loss of important metals.

The way money is wasted is terrible. This hole in Alaska I understand cost two hundred

million. If the bomb is fired, nobody knows what the damage may cost. If not fired I hear it will take some hundreds of millions more to disarm it, or whatever they do to such monsters. These blasters don't know what they are doing down in the Earth, or what the results may be. There have been tests in hundreds, and if they have not now found out what it is they want, they should be fired for inefficiency. The activity should be stopped anyway, before they really come up with something, like cracking the Earth's surface. It seems the force of one of the explosions is irresistible, and something has to give, where giving is maybe impossible and far reaching.

I think the arms race is overdue. We have 500 or 5000, Russia has 400 or 4000, or vice versa. O.K., how many would it take to destroy everything, a dozen? The ABM I would expect is problematical, a scientists theory. If the warheads ever start flying, you can kiss everything goodbye—if you have time.

Too much has been blown on space, mostly to beat Russia. The results are a ball for the scientists and technicians, but otherwise, what is going to the moon doing for us. Which of our problems does it solve? I think it was Agnew who talked about going to Mars. When they get to travel at the speed of light, 186,000 miles a second, maybe they can think of extending things, otherwise the Mars trip now takes around four months one way. I doubt even the most avid spenders would throw seventy million or so in the Ocean, but if it is a dud space ship, think nothing of it.

As for helping the rest of the world, is the U.S. the only one that does it? The humanitarian aspect is all right, if there should be money for it, but the only other reason I can see is an expectation of getting their trade. Our building up lately has created competition, that cannot be met by our own industry, in our own Country. Generally we are buying more than we are selling abroad. There was a small overage reported lately, which I expect was due to the fact that a lot of ships were tied up by a strike, and could not unload. Just as a spurt in business claimed by Nixon, is probably due to the fact that it is assumed the tax will come off automobiles, and it has been possible to buy '72 cars at the price of the 71. It will be interesting to see what happens in phase II.

The U.N. I see as a sort of international club for elocutionists. I cannot remember what I have heard that has been accomplished there. It has actually no authority. The Middle East is a case in point. Israel thumbs its nose at the U.N. On the other hand it is not universal, so Viet Nam is not concerned. As for the U.S. longer supporting the U.N. I suggest the same reasons be given, as proposed against foreign aid, for not doing so. If the organization gets on its uppers financially, it should bring to light a fact, as to how important they all think it is to them. The building looks as if it would make offices or a hotel.

Nixon talks about maintaining a balance of power, by furnishing arms to various Countries. That would cover planes for Israel. If that Country does not have its power balanced, maybe it would take the chip off its shoulder, and listen to reason. From an abstract point of view, what I see there, is a people moving into another people's Country, and setting up business, crowding out the natives, and taking more territory by military force. That looks like aggression, which we understand the U.S. is against, unless maybe if a President wants to bomb N.V.N.

Considering jobs again, there is of course one way to create more. That would be by shortening working hours. If the same take home went with shorter hours, overall buying power would increase, individual buying power stay the same, but prices would have

to rise sharply. If take home were adjusted to shorter hours, overall buying power would stay the same, individual buying power would be reduced, and prices could stay the same. There is the choice. If prices start rising, then we are again on the inflation treadmill.

Any way you cut it, this Country is in a mess. Not only the economy, but there is domestic disorder, crime, drugs, revolutionaries, the black problem, dissent, high taxes, poverty, new rich, debt. You name it and if it is bad, we probably have it. These things are so intermingled, that what may relieve one, may worsen another. The question seems to be if there can be survival, without hitting bottom, and if there should be that occasion, what would emerge. And while the attempt to catch up with the past and present, what of the future, which comes fast. One way or another I expect internal combustion power is on the way out. That would cover automobiles and planes. The automobile has supported the Country for years. Something would have to replace it. It no doubt started with a vehicle built by Benz in 1886. I was born in 1886, so I have seen it all. Providence willing I might see the finish. Sort of an indication of how long and how short time is.

I don't know if you get into the bussing controversy. This has evolved into a matter of importance with the people, and unless the present policies are moderated, could get strongly into the next election. Petitions for recall of Hart are well on their way around here, because of remarks he made favoring bussing. As these things go the movement will probably not succeed, but it all indicates the temper. This C.R. business, I think, has been badly done. I don't know whether an unbiased decision would declare the various laws as passed to be constitutional, but passing such laws for a small minority, in matters affecting the thinking, habits and living conditions of the majority, is a poor way of getting results. We had the experience with prohibition. Once started, it seems there has been no direction, or control of the results. Our Cities have been wrecked by an influx of blacks for whom there was nothing there. The responsible taxpayers have moved out. There has been uncontrolled violence, rioting and destruction of property. How many billions overall have been the cost, nobody could compute. If the same results had come from something besides acts of Congress, there would no doubt have been a cry of calamity. Some schools are claimed not as good as others, so bussing is demanded. The effect is to reduce all children to a common state of mental ability. Somehow this reminds me of pictures I saw of children lined up helling Hitler. I think the Supreme Court should take another look at this situation, in fact, I think it has gone out of its jurisdiction in this matter. On top of all, there is no money to pay for bussing, and that should be sufficient reason for not having it. I see the House refused to back up the Court, by supplying funds to pay for bussing.

How about withholding some of the easy money the oil people are getting, or is that taboo?

My best wishes,

L. M. FRANCIS.

Snake-Oil Politics Destroying Senate

(By William S. White)

WASHINGTON.—Lost elan, lost caste, and lost hope now characterize what has historically been the last, best home of responsible government in this country—the United States Senate.

A mighty institution is gravely ill, bereft of genuine leadership, torn by an almost adolescent savagery of personal political ambition among nearly all of the battalion of left-wing Democrats who seek the presidency with the manners of greedy schoolboys. Day by day they demonstrate their utter incapacity to serve effectively even in the infinitely less-demanding posts they already hold.

Here, now, is a place of 100 members in which, at the most generous estimate, two in five do real work. The others simply go along as easy riders or spend their time preparing headlines or metaphorically—or actually—greasing their faces to appear on television. A handful of dedicated, and mostly elderly, real men is carrying the whole load while the pseudo-boys of "The New Politics" and "The Young Politics" rush about carrying demagoguery beyond the permissible limits which senators, however eager, have traditionally set for themselves.

Do the people long for "peace?" Well, give it to them, no matter what catastrophic wars would be the end result of the peace of sameless surrender which the George McGovern, the Fred Harris and the like are peddling like Bible-thumping revivalists all about the land. Maybe it is "sincere." In all probability it really is. But it is snake oil all the same.

Do the people chafe under the cost of national defense? Very well. Let us into the White House and we will free you of nasty old weapons, and a blessed serenity will then envelop all mankind.

Does this pressure group "demand" this and that pressure group "demand" that? Yes, yes, yes, certainly you may have this, certainly you may have that. Indeed, you should have had it long ago.

Do people want higher social services and ever-larger welfareism and appropriations accompanied by ever-lower taxes? Well, why should they not have it all?

The men, the real men, of the Senate sit and watch this all—the copping out of "The New Politics" from work, from responsibility, from adulthood in public affairs amid the constant exploitations of sentimentalism in the never-never land of the "new" politicians. And the men, the real men, wonder how much longer they can stand a forum that used to be the pride of a nation.

Moreover, they are weary of bearing all the burdens and seeing the pseudoboys treated, especially on the ever-present tube, as actually qualified for the presidency of the United States. For they know that these aspirants ("our presidents," the real men call them) are using a once-great place—a place in which not one of the New Leftists could pass a bill more difficult than one endorsing motherhood—like mannerless children trampling with hobnailed boots over priceless ancient titles.

And so, again, the men, the real men, are one by one losing heart, hoping against hope that when this year of the most-squalid forms of presidential grabbing in all history has ended, another year may return the dignity that has gone. But for some of them it is too late. These are going to give it up next year, refusing to stand for re-election to a chamber they can no longer respect, a chamber in which slick "public relations" has so largely displaced a thing called public service.

So a Gresham's law of politics (that the bad drives out the good) is twice at work. Able and responsible men are leaving. And even some presidential candidates who are basically up to the job—the Edmund Muskies, the Hubert Humphreys—are themselves being driven by competition from the all-out left closer and closer toward the demagogic rubbish that hangs over the Senate of the United States.

Two Hundred U.S. Air Strikes Blast Sites in North Vietnam

SAIGON.—American fighter-bombers have launched 200 combat strikes against military targets inside North Vietnam today, the U.S. Command announced.

It was one of the biggest raids since the halt in the bombing of North Vietnam nearly three years ago.

A spokesman for the command, Lt. Col. Gerald D. Hill, said the strikes were confined to within 35 miles of the demilitar-

ized zone, and "these operations have been terminated."

Hill said the raids were made because of increased North Vietnamese anti-aircraft and surface-to-air missile (SAM) attacks on unarmed reconnaissance planes flying over the North and on bombers attacking the Ho Chi Minh supply trail in neighboring Laos. He said anti-aircraft and missile sites were among the targets.

In ground action, South Vietnamese infantrymen today reported killing at least 82 more Communist troops to bring to nearly 500 the number of enemy casualties in a week of fighting in the U Minh Forest at the southern tip of South Vietnam.

As the fighting went on, police in Saigon battled students demonstrating against President Nguyen Van Thieu. Thieu said the only way toward freedom was to "deal the Communists a positive defeat."

Thieu told South Vietnam's voters last night how they could vote against him in the presidential election by tearing the ballot in half, marking an X across it or putting an empty envelope in the ballot box.

But at the same time he appealed for a clear-cut vote of confidence.

Police fired tear gas to drive banner-waving students back into Saigon University's science department.

Nearly 300 students, including a few girls, and Buddhist monks in white robes had converged on national police headquarters.

They sat down in the middle of the boulevard holding anti-war signs, lighted a bonfire and burned Thieu in effigy. They splashed "Peace in Vietnam Now" in red paint across the roadbed.

In Phnom Penh in neighboring Cambodia, about 40,000 civilians marched into the center of the capital today in a silent protest against North Vietnamese presence in their country.

Behind the demonstrators, smoke billowed from two of the city's oil depots, partly destroyed by a Communist attack early yesterday. Fires set off by the attack were still burning.

ISRAEL REINFORCING TROOPS AT SUEZ, EGYPTIANS CLAIM

The semiofficial Cairo newspaper Al Ahram said today Israeli troops are moving artillery up to their front lines along the Suez Canal.

With the situation deteriorating in the Middle East, Al Ahram said officers of Egyptian forces along the canal were ordered "to take the necessary measures to prevent the enemy from accomplishing his objectives." They had been placed on maximum alert.

In addition to moving up artillery, Al Ahram said, Israel also has increased air and ground patrols in the Sinai Peninsula.

Israel disputed Egyptian press reports that Egypt's armed forces were on "maximum alert" at the Suez Canal following weekend fighting at the waterway.

Official military sources in Tel Aviv said Egyptian troops "appeared to move about as usual, without weapons or helmets" along the 103-mile-long canal. Some Egyptian soldiers were seen bathing in the canal, the sources added.

And the U.S. State Department said yesterday that it feels the Middle East cease-fire will hold and is not on the verge of collapse after 13 months.

A state department official, speaking privately, said that both the Israeli and Egyptian governments reassured the United States through diplomatic channels that they wished the cease-fire to continue.

Israel is celebrating the Jewish New Year 5732, which began yesterday. The 10-day holiday ends a week from tomorrow.

Observers said the holiday mood in the nation reflected public confidence that the cease-fire would hold despite the weekend flare ups along the Suez Canal that included the downing of an Israeli Air Force transport

plane and an Israeli attack against Egyptian missile forces.

Beaches, campgrounds and resorts in Israel were jammed both with Israelis and with tourists. Judaism's holiest shrine, the Walling Wall in the old city of Jerusalem, was a central attraction despite a grenade attack on Sunday.

In Cairo, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat yesterday installed a new government to prepare for the possibility of a new outbreak of fighting. Most of the key spots remained in the same hands.

It was Sadat's fourth cabinet reshuffle in the 11 months since he took over after the death of Abdel Gamal Nasser.

PHOENIX, ARIZ.,
November 6, 1971.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I strongly urge you to not revive the foreign aid program. It has been proven many times in the past that you can't buy friends—this was proven once again in the U.N. China vote.

Why must American tax payers continue to support foreign nations who hate our guts and expropriate U.S. property at their whim? Give us a break and spend the money here at home.

Sincerely,

DON W. EDWARDS, D.C.

Ps. Think of all the bureaucratic leeches who have attached themselves to foreign aid during the past twenty five years—this is your opportunity to rid the country of the responsibility of supporting them.

OCTOBER 31, 1971.

DEAR SIR: We ask you to work with all Senators who are opposed to foreign aid, because in my opinion that is exactly what all tax payers really want—stop the flow of U.S. money to foreign soil. We should use our money to build transit systems in this country and black-top all dusty roads.

Thank you,

ROY E. BROWNING.

NORTH LITTLE ROCK, ARK.

NOVEMBER 5, 1971.

DEAR MR. FULBRIGHT: Please help to get us out of this foreign aid business. We have never been able to buy friends!

Sir, do you still believe this Nation should remain free and sovereign?

Thank you,

JOHN W. DAVIDSON.

P.S. Hope you read the enclosed Washington Report.

CUBA: THE SOVIET ICEBERG STILL FLOATS IN THE CARIBBEAN

(EDITOR'S NOTE.—The first report of the Cuban Watch Committee appeared on January 25, 1971 (Washington Report 71-2). This report dealt especially with the developments in Cienfuegos harbor, which earlier had provoked a U.S. warning to the Soviet Union against the construction of a nuclear submarine base in that key port on the south coast of Cuba. The Soviets responded by denying that they intended to build a submarine base in Cuba and reaffirmed their adherence—in a meeting between Presidential adviser Henry Kissinger and Soviet Minister Andrei Gromyko—to their 1962 commitment not to reintroduce offensive weapon systems into Cuba. This second report is intended to bring the reader up to date on the general situation in Cuba as it affects the security of the United States and the Western Hemisphere. It takes into account Cuban underground sources especially available to the members of the Cuban Watch Committee. This report will also throw light on the problems associated with the current U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union a reduction both in the strength of military forces in the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances and in the size of the

strategic arsenals in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.)

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

The specific threat posed to the United States by Soviet submarines based at Cienfuegos, or elsewhere in Cuba, stems from the fact that these submarines would be able to remain on station for a much longer time than would be the case if they were entirely dependent on their home bases in the Murmansk area of arctic Russia. This is particularly true of the new "Y" class, Polaris-type Soviet submarines, which now constitute the principal strategic naval threat to the United States. This force now consists of 25 operational submarines, with more being built at the rate of 8-10 per year. So far, none of the "Y" class is known to have operated in Cuban waters or to have called in Cuban ports, but other types of submarines, including those armed with missiles, have made repeated visits to Cuba.

The "minicrisis" between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. in September 1970, was provoked by indications of rapid building of shore installations on Alcatraz Island in Cienfuegos bay, and by the entrance into Cienfuegos of a Soviet flotilla, including a submarine tender, an LST, a buoy tender, and a tug. The buoy tender and tug were each towing an 82 foot barge which had been transported from Russia by the LST. It is believed the two steel barges are designed to store radioactive waste discharged from the reactors of nuclear submarines. They are still present in Cienfuegos bay. The submarine tender could, of course, service nuclear submarines at sea or along any protected coast where there is reasonably calm water.

The United States asserts that this kind of submarine support activity would come under its interpretation of the "understanding" of 1962 covering offensive weapon systems in Cuba. But what the U.S. could or would do about such an activity, if it persists, is a very different matter.

At present, the U.S. attention seems primarily directed to the shore installations in Cienfuegos and the presence in port of Soviet submarines and submarine tenders. But this concentration on Cienfuegos partially misses the point that the Soviet Union is strengthening its overall military position in Cuba—under the umbrella of its massive strategic power, which now exceeds that of the U.S. and which the U.S.S.R. is counting on to inhibit any strong U.S. reaction.

Despite Kissinger's warning to Gromyko in their meeting in October 1970, construction has continued at Cuban military installations under the direction of Soviet engineers, and Soviet military activities have increased. Among the key events have been these:

1. A major highway has been completed leading inland from Cienfuegos to La Cubilla, where there is a large Soviet military complex. Cuban workers, directed by Soviet military personnel, have expanded the base at Cienfuegos, to the point that it now covers an area of some six square miles. The already elaborate security precautions around the perimeter of the base have been further strengthened. And four subchasers of the Empka class, equipped with missiles, have been put on patrol around the waters near Alcatraz Island inside Cienfuegos harbor. In addition, the Soviet espionage ship, *Kosmonaut Vladimir Numerov*, which has been operating in the Caribbean for some time, has made Cienfuegos its regular port of call. These activities are in addition to earlier dredging and pier construction, and the erection of derricks, machine shops, storage tanks, barracks, warehouses, and recreational facilities. (For details, see: "Soviet Naval Activities in Cuba." Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, September 26, 1971, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office.)

2. Intensive construction work has been

started at Saetia, a peninsula enclosing the huge Nipe Bay in Oriente province, while other construction has continued at Caibarien, Neuvas, Bajuraybo, Managua, and other military facilities. At Cayo Largo, 65 miles southwest of Cienfuegos, the Soviets have built a landing strip and docks, emplaced anti-aircraft batteries, built barracks, and camouflaged hangar-like buildings by the sea.

3. On December 7, 1970, three Soviet naval vessels, including an anti-submarine ship, a submarine, and a tanker arrived in Cuba and stayed until December 23rd. During the same period, the Soviet Navy also had a guided missile frigate and an oiler east of the Virgin Islands, the espionage ship *Kosmonaut Vladimir Numerov* off the south coast of Cuba, and a submarine tender south of Haiti. The submarine tender, of the 9,000 ton Urga class, had by then become well known in the West Indies, and had provoked a remark the week before from Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird about a Soviet naval vessel "harbor hopping down in Cuba." Its movements, the Secretary noted, had been under the watchful eye of U.S. aircraft and warships. The tender had visited the harbor at Casilda, 40 miles east of Cienfuegos, sailed around western Cuba, entered the Gulf of Mexico for a stop at La Fe, a very secluded port at Guadiana Bay on the westernmost point of Cuba, and then moved to Mariel, 25 miles west of Havana before returning to Cienfuegos.

4. In mid-February, the fifth Soviet naval squadron made a port call in Cuba. The squadron consisted of one nuclear submarine, one guided missile cruiser, one submarine tender, and an oiler. The cruiser, No. 533, entered the harbor at Havana, while the other warships visited other Cuban ports including Mariel. Cuban underground sources reported that the submarine and the tender went to the area of Cienfuegos. Later, when the other vessels returned to the Soviet Union, the submarine tender remained behind.

5. In May, still another pair of Soviet naval vessels visited Cuba. They were the submarine tender No. AS-905 and a nuclear submarine of the Echo class. They stopped at Cayo Largo.

THE GROWING CUBAN NAVY

These activities of Soviet naval vessels in Cuban waters and the related construction work at various Cuban port facilities must, in turn, be viewed in relation to the expanding Cuban Navy and Merchant Marine. The Washington "Evening Star" reported on November 4, 1970, that "the Cuban Navy is growing into a significant force" of some 100 ships. The "Star" attributed particular significance to the 18 Komar-type guided missile ships. They have a speed of 40 knots and carry two surface-to-surface missiles. The booklet, "Communist Threat to the United States Through the Caribbean," published by the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (1970), carries several pictures of these Komar-type vessels traveling near the U.S. coastline.

The Cuban Merchant Marine, a branch of the Cuban Navy, has 51 modern freighters, five new oil tankers, and some forty trawlers. In addition, there are about 100 smaller ships engaged primarily in fishing activities. Soviet sailors are in control aboard many of the Cuban merchant ships and fishing trawlers. A crew manifest of the Cuban fishing vessel *Mar del Plata* which was turned over to authorities at Vigo, Spain, in 1969 lists a Boris Kinienko as Co-Captain, along with eight other Russian crew members. The Cubans officially admit that there are 150 Soviet advisers on Cuban "fishing" vessels.

The Soviet control of the Cuban Navy is tightening. On September 9, 1971, the Soviet minister of the Maritime Fleet, T. B. Gu-

shenko, signed an agreement in Havana with Captain Joel Cheveco, Cuban minister of the Merchant Marine, which will increase Soviet domination of Cuban naval activities. (See, September 12, 1971, edition of "Granma," Havana.) Admiral Ivan Baikov, former director of the Soviet Navy Academy in Leningrad, already has overall command of the Cuban merchant fleet. His deputies are Captain Daniel Alvarez-Ramirez, a Spanish communist who was an officer of the Spanish cruiser *Canarias*, during the Spanish Civil War and then went to live in the Soviet Union, and Captain Jesus Jimenez-Escobar who in 1968 was a member of the Cuban delegation to the U.N. and was expelled by the U.S. Government for espionage.

THE SOVIET ARMY IN CUBA

The number of Soviet Army and civilian support personnel now in Cuba is difficult to determine precisely. But there is no doubt that it is growing. As pointed out in the "First Report" of the Cuban Watch Committee last January, the Cuban underground estimated in September 1970, that the Soviet Army strength in Cuba was just over 20,000 including technicians and advisers. *Allowing for replacements in the past year, the Committee now estimates that the number of Soviet Army personnel in Cuba has increased to some 30,000.* This estimate is based primarily on reports from the Cuban underground. For example, on March 27, 1971, the underground reported that 2,000 Soviet soldiers had just arrived all very young, and were traveling toward Cardenas in Matanzas Province, 100 miles east of Havana, aboard 50 large trucks. Later the underground identified another new contingent of 2000 soldiers which had recently been quartered at the farms called "San Carlos" and "San Manuel" between the towns of Recreo and Maximo Gomez, not far from the military base that had been built in 1962 at Sierra Morena. The Soviet flag flies above the barracks. There are also more Soviet soldiers at the former School of Sugar Chemistry in Limonar, Matanzas Province.

Other reports have come in from the Cuban underground concerning large convoys of Soviet soldiers moving from Havana Province into Pinar del Rio Province for maneuvers in the area of the San Antonio de los Banos air base and a quadrangle of key military installations.

There are also Soviet Army garrisons at Sierra del Rosario, in Pinal del Rio Province, and at Mariel, La Fe, and Cabanas in western Cuba. In addition to the garrison at Cienfuegos there are others at La Cubilla, La Campana, Casilda, Las Malezas, and Caibarien in Las Villas Province. Even the Isle of Pines has a garrison.

How do these Soviet forces enter Communist Cuba? Soviet planes flying from Murmansk to San Antonio de los Banos carry some Soviet military personnel, but mainly they use Soviet oil tankers, one of which arrives every ten days on the average. Soviet transatlantic liners, transporting hundreds of Cuban students, also carry Soviet soldiers mixed with the students. In addition, two new Cuban tankers built in Leningrad recently arrived in Cuban with Soviet military personnel aboard.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

The Soviet Union continues to add to its Cuban investment at an estimated rate of \$300-\$500 million per year. The Cuban economy has been severely hurt by U.S. economic sanctions, and Moscow is taking up the slack, to guarantee the economic viability of its political and military foothold in the Western Hemisphere.

In the first days of September 1971, a large Soviet delegation came to Havana for high level discussions with the Castro regime. It was headed by Vladimir N. Novikov, Vice President of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. He was the same Soviet official who

in 1969 signed the Soviet-Cuban agreement for the Nuclear Energy Institute in Managua near Havana. (See "Washington Report" 69-6.) He was accompanied by Timofey B. Guzenko, Minister of the Maritime Fleet, O. A. Chukanov of the Department of International Relations of the Soviet Communist Party, V. A. Rostovsky, deputy minister for Tractors, N. D. Matsev, deputy minister for Electrification, and N. P. Bykov, deputy minister for Aviation.

On September 9, an agreement was formally announced, stating that the Soviet Union will send to Cuba many more technicians and advisers to implement its program to build roads, improve harbors and modernize communications and industrial facilities. This agreement will further develop it as a base for Soviet operations.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA

President Nixon's decision to visit Communist China and seek an accommodation has resulted in increased pressures on the U.S. Government to abandon its policy of sanctions against Communist Cuba. Senator Fulbright, in particular, attacked the U.S. administration for alleged inconsistency between its Cuban policy and its attempt at rapprochement with the U.S.S.R. at the SALT talks and with Red China through the Presidential visit to Peking.

In answer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert A. Hurwitt replied that U.S. policy toward Cuba derived from: a) its national interest, b) its obligations as a member of the Organization of American States, c) its concern over Cuba's exports of revolution, and d) Cuba's military ties to the Soviet Union. *Mr. Hurwitt pointed out that Cuba has not changed its policy of supporting armed revolution in the Western Hemisphere and that in the case of Cienfuegos, "Cuba permitted the Soviet Union to take new steps which could have afforded the Soviets the ability to again operate offensive weapons from this hemisphere."*

In addition, said Mr. Hurwitt, "Cuba continues to interfere in the internal affairs of other hemispheric nations by providing training in Cuba for urban and rural terrorists—by providing monetary and other material support to subversive groups and through occasional direct participation by Cubans in insurgencies. On July 26 Prime Minister Castro openly took sides in the pending Uruguayan elections and drew a stiff rejoinder from the Uruguayan government. His publicly expressed disappointment over the turn of events in Bolivia drew a reminder from the Bolivian Government that Cubans in 1967 and again in 1970 had blatantly interfered in the internal affairs of Bolivia. On August 27, 1971, Prime Minister Castro vigorously reaffirmed that he would not abandon his support for violent change in other nations of the hemisphere and spoke of Cuba's intention to give material support to Bolivian guerrillas. Prime Minister Castro said in August 1970 that if Cuba had not given full support to revolutionary movements in Latin America, it was in part because 'we have not been able to.' To abandon now these policies which hinder the Cuban Government's capability to achieve its objectives would therefore be neither prudent nor justified."

The Cuban Watch Committee applauds Mr. Hurwitt's statement on the U.S. position, as far as it goes. But the Committee also states the following:

First: The Sovietization of Cuba is making gigantic strides.

Second: It does not agree with Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. when the latter tells *U.S. News and World Report* (September 13, 1971) that he is "quite sure" that the Soviet Union in fact does not have a submarine base in Cuba. Admiral Zumwalt seems to be using a fine distinction between a "base" and a "facility." Other Defense offi-

cers have admitted that the Soviets have established the latter at Cienfuegos.

Third: The Kissinger-Gromyko "understanding" of October 1970, casts aside the Monroe Doctrine. This is something which can be done and has been done in certain cases in the past. But the charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Assistance of Rio De Janeiro include the United States among their signatories. The United States is violating these agreements when it discusses with an extra-continental power the fate of an American state, in this case Cuba, now under Soviet domination.

Fourth: The Soviet Union is engaged in political and military activities in the Caribbean Sea aimed directly at the security of the United States.

THE WAR GOES ON, ON, AND ON

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I know that it is unpleasant and apparently boring to many to be reminded that in Southeast Asia the war, and our involvement, go on and on.

The Boston Globe, in a recent editorial, cites some of the war's appalling statistics—statistics which seem to have little meaning except for those directly affected.

As the Globe points out, American casualties in the war last week were reported as the second lowest in nearly 7 years of recordkeeping. Still, the total was 15 killed—four of them in combat—and 14 wounded. But, as the Globe editorial notes, the officially listed deaths do not include 34 who died in a helicopter crash. The reason for not listing them is, to say the least, perplexing.

The Globe editorial also makes these significant points:

Civilian casualties were not officially listed either, and never are. It was reported that more than 1,100 Vietnamese soldiers, North and South, were killed. Unofficial reports, not including deaths in Cambodia on which American bombs pour down without letup, list 5,000 South Vietnamese casualties per month. The air war in Laos and Cambodia has added 250,000 refugees to the tragic roll of about 8 million. Vietnam forests and fields are being destroyed at the unofficially reported rate of 1,000 acres a day in the US bulldozing program.

Total American deaths now near 56,000, of whom nearly 46,000 were killed in action. About half of the American deaths have occurred since the presidential campaign of 1968 in which Mr. Nixon declared he had a plan for ending the war. About 600 have died since the Hanoi-Viet Cong offer of a cease-fire last July 1.

The editorial concludes by asking some questions—about which I think we should all be concerned:

... why President Nixon persists in sticking to his own agonizingly slow schedule of withdrawal? Why does he still refuse to recognize the validity of a law, incorporated in the arms procurement bill which he has signed, requiring him to set a date (a date of his own choosing) for our withdrawal? Why did he fight the Mansfield proposal which, if his congressional aides had not lobbied it to death, would have given him until next June to wind up the whole misadventure?

Mr. President, as I stated in the Senate last week, the Mansfield proposal is not dead, and for the very reasons outlined in this article, I think the Senate and the Congress must do all that it can to see

that our tragic involvement in this war comes to a rapid conclusion.

Along this same line, Mr. President, was a column entitled "Some War Questions" by Tom Wicker in the New York Times of December 14. Mr. Wicker also poses some hard questions—particularly about the bombing in North Vietnam, the shadow war in Laos, and the South Vietnamese "incursion" into Cambodia. As Mr. Wicker points out, the war is not "winding down" and has indeed become a far "wider" war.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Boston Globe editorial of December 13 and the December 14 column by Tom Wicker be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial and column were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Boston Globe, Dec. 13, 1971]

THE WAR GOES ON, ON, AND ON

Put two or three current news items together, and some vital questions to which President Nixon alone has the answers ask themselves.

News Item: American casualties in the Vietnam war last week were reported as the second lowest since the US Command started keeping weekly totals nearly seven years ago. Four GIs were killed in action, 11 died from other causes, 14 were wounded.

The officially listed deaths do not include 34 who died in a helicopter crash Nov. 28. These were not included the previous week because, it was explained at the Pentagon, "their bodies have not been recovered." The reason for not listing them this week, though the bodies have been recovered, is not known. Certainly they are very dead indeed. Just as certainly, had they been listed, the total casualties would not have been "the second lowest since, etc."

Civilian casualties were not officially listed either, and never are. It was reported that more than 1100 Vietnamese soldiers, North and South, were killed. Unofficial reports, not including deaths in Cambodia on which American bombs pour down without letup, list 5000 South Vietnamese casualties per month. The air war, in Laos and Cambodia has added 250,000 refugees to the tragic roll of about 8 million. Vietnam forests and fields are being destroyed at the unofficially reported rate of 1000 acres a day in the US bulldozing program.

Total American deaths now near 56,000, of whom nearly 46,000 were killed in action. About half of the American deaths have occurred since the presidential campaign of 1968 in which Mr. Nixon declared he had a plan for ending the war. About 600 have died since the Hanoi-Viet Cong offer of a ceasefire last July 1.

News item: "Fifty US Army doctors in Vietnam urgently appeal for an immediate and total withdrawal from Vietnam. In a letter to the US Senate, they state that they "see little good coming from our endeavors to our servicemen, to our allies, or to the Vietnamese, who strongly feel the fighting and the dying they know so well will end when the American forces leave this country and that our presence tends only to prolong their suffering."

They report that most of the US casualties they treat result from self-inflicted wounds, fighting between GIs, accidents, jungle diseases and drugs. They further assert that some Americans (unnamed) are profiting from the war and such profits are a factor in prolonging the US engagement.

The questions which ask themselves, in all of these circumstances, are as to why President Nixon persists in sticking to his own agonizingly slow schedule of withdrawal?

Why does he still refuse to recognize the validity of a law, incorporated in the arms procurement bill which he has signed, requiring him to set a date (a date of his own choosing) for our withdrawal? Why did he fight the Mansfield proposal which, if his congressional aides had not lobbied it to death, would have given him until next June to wind up the whole misadventure?

The anticipated pre-election announcement of withdrawal will not or at least should not erase the memory of the President's current adamy and the nations' current agony.

[From the New York Times, Dec. 14, 1971]

SOME WAR QUESTIONS

(By Tom Wicker)

Salgon, reads the dateline, and part of the story goes as follows:

"The reported drive is . . . aimed at keeping North Vietnamese forces away from South Vietnam's Military Region III. That region includes Saigon and eleven surrounding provinces and shares 231 miles of border with Cambodia.

"Other objectives . . . are to disrupt North Vietnamese supply routes and to destroy enemy base camps and materiel in order to prevent the enemy assaults against South Vietnamese bases."

Sound familiar? It certainly does, but this is not May 1970 and those are not American but South Vietnamese troops staging an "incursion" into Cambodia. Otherwise, not much has changed; the sanctuaries still have to be cleaned out, North Vietnamese supplies still have to be destroyed, enemy build-ups still have to be countered, despite the glowing claims of other days.

Of course, the B-52's were out ahead of the 25,000 South Vietnamese who mounted this most recent assault into Cambodia. From above the clouds, the Americans piloting them spread the random destruction that is their hallmark, while nearer the earth American-supplied helicopters and fighter planes played close-support roles. As in earlier invasions, some of these, now or later, may even be flown by American personnel.

Farther to the west and north of Pnompenh, meanwhile, the American-supplied and trained Cambodian Army has suffered major setbacks at the hands of tough North Vietnamese forces. American officials believe Hanoi's operations in Cambodia are directed primarily at easier military access to South Vietnam, rather than at Cambodia itself; but any way you study the situation, it hardly augurs well for Cambodia.

Aside from the fact that it was precisely this kind of situation that the American invasion of 1970 was supposed to prevent, the continuing battle in Cambodia raises some pointed questions, the answers to which could have loud reverberation in American politics.

Is the war really "winding down"? Obviously, it is not. The Nixon Administration has resumed the bombing of North Vietnam any time it declares a military necessity to do so, and the shadowy fighting in Laos continues; now the new incursion into Cambodia comes as a graphic reminder that this is a far "wider" war than it was when Richard Nixon took it over from Lyndon Johnson.

It is true that Mr. Nixon has reduced the American ground combat role and its consequent casualties, and no doubt he intends to cut them even further; it may also be true that constant pounding has reduced North Vietnamese and Vietcong strength. But there is nothing to show a slackening of will on Hanoi's part, and the Cambodian operations are ominous portents for the future.

Will pulling out American ground troops end the war for Americans? It is by no means clear that Mr. Nixon plans to pull them all out, but even if he did the United States almost certainly will have to retain a major

role in the wider war now being fought and that remains in prospect for the future.

For one thing, the United States is the principal supplier of both the Cambodian and South Vietnamese armies and owns Laotian forces, stock and gunbarrel. For another, the only thing that comes close to equalizing these forces with those of North Vietnam and the Vietcong is American air power. And these factors, which suggest that the United States is nowhere close to extricating itself from Indochina, are reinforced by still another question.

Can South Vietnamese forces defend Cambodia as well as South Vietnam? The South Vietnamese have not even established their ability to defend themselves, once more American combat troops are out of the war zone and if a determined Communist offensive begins. Most certainly, the Cambodian Army, improved though it may be, has yet to show that it can seal off the Cambodian approaches to South Vietnam.

The plain truth is that Cambodia flanks South Vietnam to the west, and that no matter how well Saigon's army may defend its own territory, it can only do so if that flank is secure. Further setbacks to Cambodian forces may well spread the South Vietnamese too thin in both countries, a situation that could result in even greater commitment of American air power—or worse, the reintroduction of American ground forces to help hold the line.

So these questions are in order, too: Is Mr. Nixon's Vietnamization program building toward a final triumphant withdrawal of ground forces just before the election—or toward a new Communist onslaught and the possibility of a major military setback? And what are his intentions, if that possibility should become a probability in the year ahead? Can even he answer those questions with any certainty?

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Mr. FULBRIGHT, Mr. President, on December 13, at page 46715, I submitted a rather interesting article written by a Mr. William G. Florence, a retired Deputy Assistant for Security and Trade Affairs for the Air Force, which was published in the Washington Post on December 12.

This article entitled "A Madness for Secrecy" deals with an issue—security classification—which has been a major concern of mine and that of the Committee on Foreign Relations for a number of years.

In fact, I would like to call the Senate's attention to a rather detailed study on this same subject which was prepared at the request of the Committee on Foreign Relations by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress. This study entitled "Security Classification As A Problem In the Congressional Role In Foreign Policy" is scheduled to be released as a committee print on December 16.

This publication confirms a great deal of what Mr. Florence states in his article. Both the article and the committee print point out that security classification is conducted entirely on the initiative of the executive branch governed by its own Executive Order 10501. There is no law which specifically authorizes what the Government must keep secret.

This system is a self-serving one, enabling the executive to withhold information which is of potential use or interest to the general public. Through the use of secrecy, the Government main-

tains the power to manage the news and to use it to manipulate public opinion. The weakness of this system is clearly evident in the revelation of the "Pentagon Papers." Secrecy in Government perpetuates bureaucratic mistakes and undermines our democratic system. As Justice Black so aptly stated in the recent New York Times and the Washington Post case:

... The guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative government provides no real security for our Republic."

The classification system affects the work of Congress in two ways. First, it limits the kind and amount of information which Congress receives. Second, it circumscribes what Congress can do with information which it does receive, especially what it can pass on to the public to explain its position. This situation endangers our democratic institutions. When the people or their representatives do not know what their government is doing, those who govern are not accountable for their actions. This weakens our democracy by insulating those who govern from the effects of their actions. The classification system precludes the general public from obtaining the knowledge necessary to control the actions of the Government in a manner envisioned by the framers of the Constitution.

It is for this reason that I urge my fellow Senators to give serious consideration, in the next session, to those legislative proposals which will minimize the impediments which classified information places on the work of Congress.

For a Senate which is determined to play its full constitutional role in the making of foreign policy, this article and committee print are "must" readings.

I ask unanimous consent that an excerpt from the Committee on Foreign Relations print be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

II. THE ORIGIN AND LEGAL BASIS OF PRESENT CLASSIFICATION PROCEDURES

A. ORIGIN

Secrecy has been practiced to some degree in diplomatic and military affairs, throughout the nation's history. For example, in 1790 President Washington presented to the Senate for its approval a secret article to be inserted in a treaty with the Creek Indians.² A formal and extensive classification system to keep certain information secret for purposes of national security did not develop until much later, however. According to one authority,

"Measures and practices for the protection of official information in general long served to protect any defense information that needed protection without there having to be any clear distinction between defense information and other official information requiring protection."³

The use of markings such as "Confidential," "Secret," or "Private" on communications from military and naval or other public officials "can be traced back almost continuously into the War of 1812."⁴ However, the roots of the present classification system appear to be found around the time of the First World War. A General Order of the War

Department dated February 16, 1912, established a system for the protection of information relating to submarine mine projects, land defense plans, maps and charts showing locations of defense elements and the character of the armament, and data on numbers of guns and the supply of ammunition, although it prescribed no particular markings.⁵ A General Order from the General Headquarters of the American Expeditionary Force dated November 21, 1917, established the classification of "Confidential," "Secret," and "For Official Circulation Only."⁶

The classification system established during the First World War was continued after the war was over. Army Regulation 330-5 of 1921 stated:

"A document will be marked "Secret" only when the information it contains is of great importance and when the safeguarding of that information from actual or potential enemies is of prime necessity."

"A document will be marked "Confidential" when it is of less importance and of less secret a nature than one requiring the mark of "Secret" but which must, nevertheless, be guarded from hostile or indiscreet persons."

"A document will be marked "For official use only" when it contains information which is not to be communicated to the public or to the press but which may be communicated to any persons known to be in the service of the United States whose duty it concerns, or to persons of undoubted loyalty and discretion who are cooperating with Government work."

In a 1935 revision the term "Restricted" was introduced as a fourth category, to be used when a document contained information regarding research work on the design, test, production, or use of a unit of military equipment or a component thereof which was to be kept secret. It also emerged in 1935 that documents on projects with restricted status were to be marked:

"Restricted; Notice—This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act (U.S.C. 50:31, 32). The transmission of this document or the revelation of its contents in any manner to any unauthorized person is prohibited."

Executive Order No. 8381 issued March 22, 1940, by President Roosevelt, entitled "Defining Certain Vital Military and Naval Installations and Equipment" gave recognition to the military classification system. In this order he cited as authority the act of January 12, 1938 (Sec. 795(a) of Title 18, part of the Espionage laws) which stated:

"Whenever, in the interests of national defense, the President defines certain vital military and naval installations or equipment as requiring protection against the general dissemination of information there-to, it shall be unlawful to make any photograph, sketch, picture, drawing, map, or graphical representation of such vital military and naval installation or equipment without first obtaining permission of the commanding officer. . . ."

In defining the installations or equipment requiring protection against the dissemination of information concerning them, the President named as one criterion the classification as "secret," "confidential," or "restricted" under the direction of either the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy. In addition to military or naval installations, weapons, and equipment so classified or marked, included in the definition were:

"All official military or naval books, pamphlets, documents, reports, maps, charts, plans, designs, models, drawing, photographs, contracts, or specifications, which are now marked under the authority or at the direction of the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy as "secret" "confidential," or

"restricted," and all such articles or equipment which may hereafter be so marked with the approval or at the direction of the President."⁹

That Executive Order was superseded by Executive Order 10104 issued by President Truman February 1, 1950. In addition to the three designations previously mentioned, the new Executive Order referred for the first time to "top secret," although this designation had been in use some years earlier. In place of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, Executive Order 10104 described the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force as being authorized to classify or direct to be classified the designated information.¹¹

On September 24, 1951, President Truman issued an executive order which officially extended the classification system to non-military agencies and to "security information—" Executive Order 10290, "Prescribing Regulations Establishing Minimum Standards for the Classification, Transmission, and Handling, by Departments and Agencies of the Executive Branch, of Official Information Which Requires Safeguarding in the Interest of the Security of the United States." It permitted any department or agency of the Executive Branch to classify and define "classified security information" to mean "official information the safeguarding of which is necessary in the interest of national security, and which is classified for such purposes by appropriate classifying authority."¹²

President Eisenhower replaced Executive Order 10290 with Executive Order 10501, "Safeguarding Official Information," on November 9, 1953. It narrowed the number of agencies authorized to classify and redefined the usage of the various security labels. Executive Order 10501, which will be described later, and its revisions, form the basis for the present system of classification of information.

B. LEGAL BASIS

Executive Order 10501 does not claim to be authorized by a specific statute. Unlike Executive Order 10104, "Definitions of Vital Military and Naval Installations and Equipment," which is linked to a specific provision of the statutes, Executive Order 10501 contains in its preface as to authority only the general statement, "Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes, and as President of the United States, and deeming such action necessary in the best interests of the national security, it is hereby ordered as follows. . . ." The Executive Branch apparently relies primarily on implied constitutional powers of the President and statutes which it claims afford a basis on which to justify the issuance of Executive Order 10501, acknowledging that there is no specific statutory authority for it. In 1970 when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee inquired of the State Department about the legal basis for the President's issuance of Executive Order 10501, the Legal Adviser of the State Department, John R. Stevenson, with the approval of the Department of Justice, referred to the Report of the Commission on Government Security of 1957 for a statement of the legal basis.¹³ That Commission cited provisions of the Constitution and stated: "While there is no specific statutory authority for such an order or Executive Order 10501, various statutes do afford a basis upon which to justify the issuance of the order."¹⁴

1. Constitutional provisions

The three constitutional provisions cited by the Commission are in article II on the Executive Branch: Section 1, "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America"; section 2, "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States"; and section 3, ". . . he shall take care that

Footnotes at end of article.

the laws be faithfully executed." The Commission said:

"When these provisions are considered in light of the existing Presidential authority to appoint and remove executive officers directly responsible to him, there is demonstrated the broad Presidential supervisory and regulatory authority over the internal operations of the executive branch. By issuing the proper Executive or administrative order he exercises this power of direction and supervision over his subordinates in the discharge of their duties. He thus 'takes care' that the laws are being faithfully executed by those acting in his behalf; and in the instant case the pertinent laws would involve espionage, sabotage, and related statutes, should such Presidential authority not be predicated upon statutory authority or direction."¹⁵

The 1957 Commission report did not explicitly spell out the right of Congress to make laws affecting the classification system. However, recognition of this right was implicit in the Commission's conclusion that "In the absence of any law to the contrary, there is an adequate constitutional and statutory basis upon which to predicate the Presidential authority to issue Executive Order 10501,"¹⁶ and in the citation of various statutes as affording a basis upon which to justify the issuance of the order.

Among the provisions of Article I of the Constitution which might be cited as giving Congress powers to legislate in this field would be the following: Section 1, "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . ." Section 8, "The Congress shall have power to . . . provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; . . . to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; . . . and to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."

2. "Housekeeping" Act prior to 1958 amendment

Prior to 1958, 5 U.S.C. 22, now 5 U.S.C. 301, sometimes called the "Housekeeping" act, was frequently cited as justifying a system for withholding information on the basis of a security classification system. This was the first and earliest statute cited by the 1957 commission as at that time providing a basis for Executive Order 10501. This statute had been enacted in 1789 with the purpose of providing the authority for government officials to set up offices and file documents.¹⁷ As early as 1877 and numerous times since then Section 22 of Title 5 of the U.S. Code had been cited as authority to refuse information sought from the government.¹⁸ However, in 1958 the housekeeping statute was amended by P.L. 85-619 to specify that it did "not authorize withholding information from the public or limiting the availability of records to the public." The Department of State 1970 memorandum pointed out that since the 1958 amendment this statute was no longer relevant to the justification of classification. It is mentioned in this report as a matter of historical interest and to note the legislation of 1951 specifying that it should not be used as authority for withholding information.

3. Espionage laws

Perhaps the statutes now most frequently cited for justification of the security classification of information are the espionage laws generally. The 1957 Commission cited the espionage laws second only to the housekeeping statute discussed above. It said:

"The espionage laws have imposed upon the President a study to make determinations

respecting the dissemination of information having a relationship to the national defense. For example, 8 U.S.C. 795(a) provides that "Whenever in the interests of national defense, the President defines certain vital military and naval installations or equipment as requiring protection against the general dissemination of information relative thereto, it shall be unlawful to make any photograph, sketch, picture. . . etc." Proceeding under this statute the President issued Executive Order 10104 which covers information classified by the agencies of the military establishments.

"In 18 U.S.C. 793 there is specific reference to the unauthorized disclosure of 'classified information' pertaining to the cryptographic and communication systems and facilities. Furthermore, the term 'classified information' is defined as information which for reasons of national security has been specifically designated by the proper government agency for limited or restrictive dissemination or distribution."¹⁹

It might be questioned whether the first provision mentioned above is a basis on which to issue an executive order covering classification by non-defense agencies since it relates to information pertaining to vital military and naval installations and has already been used to justify Executive Order 10104 on military information classified by the military departments.

The second provision mentioned section 798, does refer to classified information, thus acknowledging its existence. However, it provides penalties only for actions relating to communications intelligence and cryptography, specifying four specific categories of classified information: (1) concerning the nature or preparation of codes; (2) concerning the apparatus used for cryptographic or communication intelligence purposes; (3) concerning the communication intelligence activities; or (4) obtained by the process of communication intelligence from the foreign government, with knowledge that it was so obtained. Moreover, this section which was added by Public Law 248 of October 31, 1951, makes it clear that its objective is to prevent the use of classified information relating to communication intelligence activities in a manner prejudicial to the safety of the United States, and not to prevent congressional access to it. Sec. 798(c) states:

"Nothing in this section shall prohibit the furnishing, upon lawful demand, of information to any regularly constituted committee of the Senate or House of Representatives of the United States of America, or joint committee thereof."²⁰

Executive Order 10501 itself does not refer to Section 795 or 798 but instead refers to Sections 793 and 794 of Title 18 U.S.C., Section 5(j) of Executive Order 10501 states that when classified material affecting defense is furnished to persons outside the executive branch, the material should carry the statement, whenever practicable, "The material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law."²¹

Section 793, "Gathering, transmitting or losing defense information," provides penalties of a fine or imprisonment for (a) going into defense installations or in other ways obtaining information "respecting the national defense with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation"; (b) copying or obtaining sketches, documents, or anything connected with the national defense; (c) receiving or obtaining from any source any document, writing, or anything connected with the national defense, knowing that it has been obtained contrary to the provisions of that chapter of law; (d) will-

fully transmitting to a person not entitled to receive it a document, etc., which a person either lawfully or without authorization possesses and has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or the advantage of a foreign nation; or (e) when entrusted with any document or information relating to the national defense "through gross negligence" permitting it to be removed from its proper place "or to be lost, stolen, abstracted, or destroyed" or failing to report such loss, theft, abstraction, or destruction.

Section 794 provides for imprisonment or the death penalty for (a) communicating or transmitting a document or information relating to the national defense to any foreign government, faction, citizen, etc. "with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation"; or (b) "in time of war, with intent that the same shall be communicated to the enemy," collecting, publishing, communicating, or attempting to elicit any information with respect to the movement, numbers, or disposition of armed forces, ships, aircraft, or war materials or military operation plans or defenses "or any other information relating to the public defense, which might be useful to the enemy." In 1953 the provisions of this section in addition to coming into effect in time of war were extended to remain "in full force and effect until six months after the termination of the national emergency proclaimed by the President on December 16, 1950 or such earlier date as may be prescribed by concurrent resolution of the Congress."²²

The espionage laws may make it sensible to have some kind of system for marking information which it would be a crime to transmit, but history does not indicate that the classification system developed directly from the Espionage Act of 1917 or that the Espionage Act was intended to authorize such a system. One student of the history of classification has observed:

"There is no indication at this time [in 1917] that difficulties could arise in enforcing the Espionage Act if official information relating to the national defense was not marked as such, insofar as it was intended to be protected from unauthorized dissemination. Violation of the first subsections of Section I, Title I, of the act depended upon intent, but violation of the other two subsections depended in the one case on material relating to the national defense having been turned over to someone "not entitled to receive it" and in the other case on such material having been lost or compromised through "gross negligence." Since the expression "relating to the national defense" was nowhere defined, the possibility of the public being permitted to have any knowledge whatever relating to the national defense, even the fact that Congress has passed certain legislation relating thereto, depended on application of the expressions "not entitled to receive it" and "gross negligence."

"In any prosecution for violation of either of the last two subsections the burden of proving that one or the other key expressions had application in the case would rest on the prosecution, and proof would be difficult unless clear evidence could be adduced that authority had communicated its intention that the specific material involved should be protected or unless that material was of such a nature that common sense would indicate that it should be protected. For purposes of administering these two subsections of the Espionage Act the marking of defense information that is to be protected is almost essential, and its marking can also be of great assistance for purposes of administering the preceding three subsections.

"It would be logical to suppose that the markings of defense information began out of the legal necessities for administering the Espionage Act, but the indications are that

such was not the case. The establishment of three grades of official information to be protected by markings was apparently something copied from the A.E.F., which had borrowed the use of such markings from the French and British."²³

It apparently was not until 1935 that the link between classification the espionage act was made. Then, under the army regulation of February 12, 1935, it was specified that material on projects with restricted status would be marked: "Restricted; Notice—this document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act (U.S.C. 50:31, 32). The transmission of this document or the revelation of its contents in any manner to any unauthorized person is prohibited."²⁴

4. National Security Act

The 1957 Commission on Government Security report, referred to by the State Department in 1970 as citing the legal basis for a classification system, described the National Security Act of 1947 as the "most significant legislation, which set into motion the current document classification programs." It said:

The most significant legislation, which set into motion the current document classification program, was enacted in 1947, when the Congress passed the National Security Act in order to provide an adequate and comprehensive program designed to protect the future security of our country. To accomplish this avowed purpose the act provided for the creation of a National Security Council within the executive branch subject to Presidential direction. Its job is to consider and to make appropriate recommendations to the President. Within the framework of this program, the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) came into being, and the activity of this committee was responsible for the issuance in 1951 of Executive Order 10290, which established the original document classification program. Thus it would appear that a document classification program is within the scope of the activities sought to be coordinated by the National Security Act of 1947, and that the issuance of an appropriate Executive order establishing such a program is consistent with the policy of the act."²⁵

As has been pointed out, the roots of classification systems within individual Departments go back many years before the National Security Act was passed. However, efforts made after the National Security Act appear to have led to the new government-wide directive on classification which was embodied in Executive Order 10290. Coordination of classification systems in the military department had already been provided to some degree in Executive Order 8381 which was superseded by Executive Order 10104.

The Commission on Government Security contended that the National Security Act "set into motion" the current classification program; that the classification program "is within the scope of the activities sought to be coordinated by the National Security Act of 1947"; and that "the issuance of an appropriate Executive order establishing such a program is consistent with the policy of the act."²⁶ It did not contend that the National Security Act actually authorized the system.

One authorization which was made by the National Security Act is pertinent, however. After establishing the Central Intelligence Agency and giving it the purpose of coordinating intelligence activities, the National Security Act provided that the Director of Central Intelligence "shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."²⁷ This would appear to provide adequate authoriza-

tion for a system of protection of certain types of information, namely intelligence sources and methods.

5. Internal Security Act

The final statute cited by the 1957 Commission on Government Security under the assertion that "various statutes do afford a basis upon which to justify the issuance" of Executive Order 10501 was the Internal Security Act of 1950. The Commission report stated:

"Prior to issuance of Executive Order 10290, Congress had apparently recognized the existing Presidential authority to classify information within the executive branch when it passed the Internal Security Act of 1950. Contained therein were provisions defining two new criminal offenses involving classified information.

"Section 4(b) of the act makes it a crime for any Federal officer or employee to give security information classified by the President, or by the head of any department, agency, or corporation with the approval of the President, to any foreign agent or member of a Communist organization, and section 4(c) makes it a crime for any foreign agent or member of a Communist organization to receive such classified security information from a Federal employee."²⁸

Section 4(b) of the Internal Security Act states:

"It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the United States or of any department or agency thereof, or of any corporation the stock of which is owned in whole or in major part by the United States or any department or agency thereof, to communicate in any manner or by any means, to any other person whom such officer or employee knows or has reason to believe to be an agent or representative of any foreign government or an officer or member of any Communist organization as defined in paragraph (5) of section 782 of this title, any information of a kind which shall have been classified by the President (or by the head of any such department, agency, or corporation with the approval of the President) as affecting the security of the United States, knowing or having reason to know that such information has been so classified, unless such officer or employee shall have been specifically authorized by the President, or by the head of the department, agency, or corporation by which this officer or employee is employed, to make such disclosure of such information."²⁹

This provision of the Internal Security Act appears to come the closest to sanctioning a system for the classification of information "as affecting the security of the United States" rather than the narrower concept of "relating to the national defense" or the still narrower categories of cryptographic or intelligence information.

There has been one case in which a foreign service officer convicted under this provision appealed his case and the Court of Appeals, in affirming the verdict, held that under the statute and Executive Order 10501 an Ambassador did have authority to classify foreign service dispatches and the dispatches as classified and certified by him were within the scope of the statute. Moreover, it held that in prosecution of the officer for communication of classified information to a foreign government, the government was not required to prove that the documents were properly classified "as affecting the security of the United States."³⁰

6. Atomic Energy Act

In addition to the above statutes listed by the 1957 Commission on Government Security, the Department of State memorandum of 1970 said "there are other statutory provisions that contemplate and assume a system of classification of information."³¹ The first example it cites is section 142 of the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. section 2162 (c)). The entire Chapter 12 of the act (Sections 141 through 146) is on the control of information with section 142 providing for the classification and declassification of "Restricted Data."

"Restricted Data" is defined in the Atomic Energy Act as follows:

"The term 'Restricted Data' means all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy, but shall not include data declassified or removed from the Restricted Data category pursuant to section 142."³²

Section 142 requires that the Atomic Energy Commission from time to time determine the data within the definition of Restricted Data which can be published "without undue risk to the common defense and security and shall thereupon cause such data to be declassified and removed from the category of Restricted Data."

With "Restricted Data" so defined as to include all data in certain categories, Sec. 142 proceeds on the assumption that all information in these categories is classified "Restricted Data" and is concerned mainly with setting up procedures or declassifying information in these categories. It requires that the Atomic Energy Commission from time to time determine the data within the definition of Restricted Data which can be published "without undue risk to the common defense and security and shall thereupon cause such data to be declassified and removed from the category of Restricted Data." It provides that in the case of Restricted Data which the Commission determines jointly with the Department of Defense to be related primarily to the military utilization of atomic weapons, the determination that it could be published is to be made jointly by the Commission and the Department of Defense, with the President deciding in case of disagreement.

In Section 142 the Atomic Energy Act also recognizes the existence of "defense information" and intelligence information. Giving recognition to "defense information" Section 142d states:

"The Commission shall remove from the Restricted Data category such data as the Commission and the Department of Defense jointly determine relates primarily to the military utilization of atomic weapons and which the Commission and the Department of Defense jointly determine can be adequately safeguarded as defense information: *Provided, however,* That no such data so removed from the Restricted Data category shall be transmitted or otherwise made available to any nation or regional defense organization, while such data remains defense information, except pursuant to an agreement for cooperation entered into in accordance with subsection 144b."³³

Giving recognition to intelligence information and its treatment as "defense information" Section 142e states:

"The Commission shall remove from the Restricted Data category such information concerning the atomic energy programs of other nations as the Commission and the Director of Central Intelligence jointly determine to be necessary to carry out the provisions of section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and can be adequately safeguarded as defense information."³⁴

The act provided a channel for transmitting information to Congress rather than a barrier, however. It established the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (sec. 201), required that the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense keep the Joint Committee fully and currently informed on matters relating to development and application of atomic energy and re-

quired that any government agency furnish any information requested by the Joint Committee relating to its responsibilities in the field of atomic energy (sec. 202), and authorized the Joint Committee to "classify information originating within the committee in accordance with standards generally by the executive branch for classifying Restricted Data or defense information" (sec. 206).

7. Freedom of Information Act amending the Administrative Procedure Act

The second example the 1970 State Department memorandum cited of a statutory provision which assumed a system of classification was the Freedom of Information Act (P.L. 89-487, approved July 4, 1966). The Freedom of Information Act was an amendment and rewriting of Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act which had been passed in 1946. Both the original act and the amendment dealt with disclosure of information by Federal agencies, requiring them to publish procedures in the Federal Register and make available to the public final opinions, staff manuals and instructions, and statements of policy.

However the 1946 provisions had permitted material "required for good cause to be held confidential" to be withheld from disclosure. This has provided a loophole which Congress attempted to close in the 1966 Freedom of Information Act by exempting from its provision only nine specific kinds of information. The first of these exceptions was for matters "specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy." Accordingly, although the Freedom of Information Act was designed to make more government information available, it did not apply to classified information and even could be used, as it was by the State Department in 1970, as an example of a statutory provision that contemplated and assumed a system of security classification.

While the exceptions in the Freedom of Information Act may permit withholding information from the public on grounds that it needs to be held secret in the interest of national defense and foreign policy, however, they clearly do not apply to Congress. Section 3 (f) states:

"No person shall be permitted to enter on duty as such as officer, employee, consultant, or member of advisory committee or board, or pursuant to any such detail, and no contractor or subcontractor, or officer or employee thereof shall be permitted to have access to any classified information, until he shall have been investigated in accordance with this subsection. . . ."

Section 45(b) states:

"... The Director may also grant access for information classified no higher than 'confidential' to contractors or subcontractors and their officers and employees, actual or prospective, on the basis of reports on less than full-field investigations: Provided, That such investigations shall each include a current national agency check."

Section 45(c) discusses access to Restricted Data under the Atomic Energy Commission.

Through legislation such as this Congress has on occasion given recognition to the classification system although it has made no overall attempt to regulate it. To this extent it has sanctioned keeping information secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. At the same time, however, on a number of occasions (particularly the "disclosure of classified information" legislation relating to cryptographic intelligence passed in 1951, and the Freedom of Information Act of 1966), Congress has made clear its intention that provisions to keep security information secret were not to constitute authority to withhold information from Congress.

(f) Limitation of Exemptions—

"Nothing in this section authorizes with-

holding of information or limiting the availability of records to the public except as specifically stated in this section, nor shall this section be authority to withhold information from Congress."²⁵

8. Legislation on Foreign Relations

The Department of State 1970 memorandum did not mention any other legislation on foreign relations. However, there are some provisions in legislation directly relating to foreign affairs which also might be said to assume a system of classification or in effect sanction the withholding of some information of the grounds of national security.

One example is the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. Section 634 (b) provides that in the annual report on operations required and in response to requests from Members of Congress or the public, the President shall "make public all information concerning operations under this Act not deemed by him to be incompatible with the security of the United States." This section would provide a basis for the President not to make public certain information concerning aid operations. The next section, 634 (c), in effect limits any material which might be withheld from Congress to that which the President certifies he has forbidden furnishing with his reasons for doing so. Otherwise, funds are to be cut off if information or documents are not furnished by thirty-five days after a written request has been made by the General Accounting Office or by a congressional committee considering legislation or appropriations for the program.

Section 414 on munitions control of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, authorized the President to control the export and import of arms and technical data relating thereto. It also authorized him "to designate those articles which shall be considered as arms, ammunition, and implements of war, including technical data relating thereto, for the purposes of this section."

The Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961, as amended, assumes a system of classification in Sec. 45 on Security Requirements. Section 45(a) provides for investigations of all employees and states:

FOOTNOTES

² U.S. Congress, Senate, Executive Journal, vol. I, p. 55 (Aug. 4, 1790).

³ National Archives, "Origin of Defense-Information Markings in the Army and Former War Department," prepared by Dallas Irvine, Dec. 23, 1964, p. 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 24. Change No. 3 in Army Regulation No. 850, Feb. 12, 1935.

⁹ Sec. 795 of title 18, United States Code.

¹⁰ Par. 3, Executive Order 8381, Federal Register, Mar. 26, 1940, vol. 5, p. 1147-1148.

¹¹ Executive Order No. 10104, "Basic Documents," op. cit. p. 14.

¹² Pt. II, par. 4, Executive Order 10290, Federal Register, Sept. 27, 1951, vol. 16, p. 9797.

¹³ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, 91st Cong., hearings, vol. II, pp. 2008-2010, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971. Hereinafter cited as "Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad Hearings."

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 2010.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 2011.

¹⁷ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, "Amending Sec. 161 of the Revised Statutes With Respect to the Authority of Federal Officers and Agencies To Withhold Information and Limit the Availability of Records," H. Rept. 1461, 85th Cong., 2d sess., p. 1.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Hearing on U.S. security agreements and commitments abroad, op. cit., p. 2010.

²⁰ Congressional Research Service, "Basic Documents on Security Classification of Information for National Security Purposes," Multith 71-172 F, hereinafter cited as "Basic Documents," p. 15.

²¹ "Basic Documents," op. cit. p. 4.

²² Title 18, United States Code, sec. 798, "Basic Documents," op. cit., p. 15.

²³ National Archives, op. cit., p. 20.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

²⁵ "Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad Hearings," op. cit., p. 2011.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Sec. 102(d) (3), Public Law 253, 80th Cong., July 26, 1947, as amended. U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Security Act of 1947 as amended through Dec. 31, 1969. Committee print, pp. 4-5.

²⁸ "Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad Hearings," op. cit., p. 2011.

²⁹ Title 50, United States Code, sec. 783.

³⁰ *Scarbeck v. U.S.*, 1962, 317 F. 2d 546.

³¹ "Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad Hearings," op. cit., p. 2008.

³² Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Public Law 83-703, as amended, sec. 11y.

³³ U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, "Atomic Energy Legislation Through 90th Cong., 2d sess.," December 1968, p. 42.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

³⁵ Public Law 89-487, sec. 3(f), "Basic Documents," op. cit., p. 23.

EXTENSION OF PERIOD FOR TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the period for routine morning business be continued, not to extend beyond 12 o'clock noon today and that remarks therein be limited to 10 minutes.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed out of order.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AID FOR THE SEYCHELLES ISLANDS

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, some of my colleagues have said that the foreign aid program, in effect, is already at rock bottom and that solemn agreements might be broken if my amendment is adopted. If there are any such agreements, they have not been submitted to this body for approval.

I find that hard to believe. There is \$4.7 billion still in the pipeline and the administration has suspended aid to both

Pakistan and India. They were slated to get \$350 million this fiscal year and much of that amount is now available for allocation to other countries.

Only a few weeks ago the administration found enough money to add another country to the list of foreign aid recipients. The Secretary of State sent a formal legal finding making the Seychelles Islands eligible for foreign aid. A few days afterward, Newsweek carried an interesting article about these islands. I will read a portion of it for the benefit of my colleagues.

THE PROMISCUOUS ISLES

The trouble with getting away from it all is that, in the jet age, true escape becomes more difficult every day. But there are still a few new frontiers for the adventurous and well-heeled tourist. The Seychelles Islands, one of Britain's last colonial outposts, provide a case in point. Stretching like a giant coral necklace across the turquoise waters of the Indian Ocean, the 89 remote islets were once known only to a handful of hardy travelers, most of whom waded ashore from infrequent steamers. Today, the islands are being jet-propelled into the tourist business. BOAC has inaugurated weekly flights to the islands' new airport. Modern hotels are being built, and a deep-water port is in the planning stage. Recently, Newsweek's Peter Webb, who used to reach the islands by light plane in pre-jetport days, filed this report on the tropical lotusland:

Every adventurer who has ever landed on the fine-grain sand beaches of Mahé, the chief island, would agree that the Seychelles are a far-out delight. Even Archbishop Makarios, the Cypriot President who once spent a year there in enforced exile, was heard to remark a few days after his arrival: "This is a paradise." And the late Ian Fleming used to tell his friends: "Get there before the American millionaires take it over." So far, however, there is only one American millionaire in the Seychelles, and he is selling his land to British developers who see the island chain for what it is—the greatest getaway spot east of Suez.

The Seychellois, who have inhabited the islands for less than 200 years, are a fascinating racial mélange. Each member of a given family may reflect a different component of the population's diverse racial origins; brothers and sisters range in color from the cobalt black of an African slave ancestor to the fair complexion of a "grand blanc," an eighteenth-century French settler. The islands' slow-paced economic life—traditionally based exports of copra and wild cinnamon—has always been marked by what outsiders call the "breadfruit syndrome." Explains one elderly grand blanc: "Here we have fish in the sea for everyone to catch, the breadfruit fall from the trees and the palms provide toddy for our drinks. So why should we exert ourselves?"

Girls: Mahé has another valuable commodity. "There's one crop," says a long-time foreign resident, "that comes up with unflinching regularity: women, thank God." The girls of the Seychelles often are stunningly beautiful, and on the idyllic islands, lovemaking is a favorite pastime—so much so that the Seychelles are also known as "The Promiscuous Isles." Illegitimacy does run to more than 43 per cent of all births, but the title is a bit unfair. Seychellois maidens really prefer the married state, but the customary marriage ceremonies are so expensive that many couples are driven by economics to living together *en ménage*, even though the local Roman Catholic clergy frowns on the practice. An essay written by a 17-year-old Seychellois girl explains the paradox. "Couples who live en ménage," she says, "are very often visited by their priest. He tells

them they are sinful, and they cry. When he has gone away, they go to bed and comfort each other."

The national pastime could turn out to be cold comfort for the visitor because of the islands' ferocious venereal-disease rate. Fortunately, there are other activities for the tourist with simple tastes. A golf course is being built, and above all there are those marvelous beaches and the luxuriously slow pace of Seychelles life. Getting there is a bit expensive: \$840 from London, round trip. But travel companies are working up package tours that will cut the all-inclusive cost of a fortnight's stay; from London, one package deal will cost \$645, including transportation and accommodations; another starting in New York will cost about \$1,050.

Not all of the 52,000 natives are happy with the tourist invasion, which already brings in some 400 visitors a month, half of them British. Earlier this year, the opposition newspaper, *The People*, complained that the "so-called developers are interested only in making money, and not to preserve the asset of a country—its natural beauty." But the island's British governor, Sir James Greatbatch, insists: "We are trying to avoid the mistakes that have been made in the rest of the world. What we want is controlled and gradual development, which will eventually make these islands self-sufficient." Whether the easygoing Seychellois like it or not, in short, tourism is the wave of the future—if only because, in these troubled days, man no longer lives by breadfruit alone.

It is very interesting to note that the AID memorandum to the Secretary of State dated November 5, 1971, carried the subject heading, "Determination under Section 620(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, ('the Act') that the Seychelles are not dominated or controlled by the international Communist movement.

The memorandum reads in part:

Section 620(b) of the Act prohibits the furnishing of assistance under that Act to the government of any country unless the President determines that the country is not dominated or controlled by the international Communist movement. The function of making this determination was among those delegated to the Secretary by the President on September 30, 1961.

Assistance is going to be furnished to the Seychelles in the form of Self-Help Development Activity funds.

We have been advised by the responsible officers of the Department of State that the conduct of the government of the Seychelles is consistent with a determination that this country is not dominated or controlled by the international Communist movement.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached Determination.

The second memorandum, signed by the Secretary of State, has the following heading:

Determination under Section 620(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, that the Seychelles are not dominated or controlled by the international Communist movement.

And the memorandum reads:

In accordance with the recommendation in your memorandum of November 5, 1971, and pursuant to Section 620(b) of the Act, I hereby determine that the Seychelles are not dominated or controlled by the international Communist movement.

I think it would be interesting to know how the Department determines whether these islands are controlled by the in-

ternational Communist movement and how the Department defines "international Communist movement."

In all of this I think we have a good example of the corruption of the foreign aid program. I can think of no possible justification under the circumstances for using the taxpayers' money to begin a program of assistance to the Seychelle Islands. It is one of the examples of how a great bureaucracy, once it gets going, can find nothing better to do with the money which is appropriated in the bill which we are considering than to go off and seek new programs in an out-of-the-way place—Paradise, as they say of the Seychelles. I think it is symbolic of what is wrong with this program.

If they start economic aid, they will end up, no doubt, with a MAAG mission military aid program as well, because such attractive islands will be irresistible to those who staff MAAG missions and similar missions all over the world. We already have MAAG missions in 46 countries of the world.

I ask unanimous consent that memorandums and letter of transmittal be printed in the RECORD as part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the memorandums and letter of transmittal were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT,

Washington, D.C., November 24, 1971.

HON. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Enclosed is a copy of Secretarial Determination 72-1 made pursuant to Section 620(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.

There is also enclosed a copy of the memorandum from the Administrator to the Secretary recommending that he make this determination.

Sincerely yours,

MATTHEW J. HARVEY,
Director,
Office of Legislative Affairs.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AGENCY
FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOP-
MENT,

Washington, D.C., November 5, 1971.

Memorandum for the Secretary.

Subject: Determination under Section 620(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, ('the Act') that the Seychelles are not dominated or controlled by the international Communist movement.

ACTION MEMORANDUM

The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that, pursuant to Section 620(b) of the Act, you determine that the Seychelles are not dominated or controlled by the international Communist movement.

Section 620(b) of the Act prohibits the furnishing of assistance under that Act to the government of any country unless the President determines that the country is not dominated or controlled by the international Communist movement. The function of making this determination was among those delegated to the Secretary by the President on September 30, 1961.

Assistance is going to be furnished to the Seychelles in the form of Self-Help Development Activity funds.

We have been advised by the responsible

officers of the Department of State that the conduct of the government of the Seychelles is consistent with a determination that this country is not dominated or controlled by the international Communist movement.

Recommendation: That you sign the attached Determination.

JOHN A. HANNAH.

WASHINGTON, D.C.,

November 10, 1971.

Memorandum for: The Honorable John A. Hannah, Administrator, Agency for International Development.

Subject: Determination under Section 620(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, ("the Act") that the Seychelles are not dominated or controlled by the international Communist movement.

In accordance with the recommendation in your memorandum of November 5, 1971, and pursuant to Section 620(b) of the Act, I hereby determine that the Seychelles are not dominated or controlled by the international Communist movement.

WILLIAM P. ROGERS,
Secretary of State.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, an article appeared in the Wall Street Journal recently, under the heading, "Japanese Foreign Aid Sent to 'Hurt, Hungry'—in Troubled Seattle." This article describes how the Japanese, out of the goodness of their hearts—

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time of the Senator from Arkansas has expired.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, if I may be recognized, I will yield my time to the Senator from Arkansas.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article describing the generous gift by the Japanese people of food to the hungry people of Seattle, Wash., be included in the RECORD, together with a letter from Mr. David I. Wallace, of Minneapolis, Minn.

There being no objection, the letter and article were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

To: Senator William Fulbright, Chairman,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Senator Warren G. Magnuson
Senator Henry M. Jackson
Senator Michael Mansfield, Senate Majority Leader

GENTLEMAN: It's a strange twist of fate when the city responsible for designing the airplane that carried the bomb that caused the defeat of the Japanese in World War II now receives foreign aid as a gesture of friendship from a sister city in Japan.

Think of it, gentlemen, the richest country in the world refuses to feed highly educated, highly motivated citizens thrown out of work through no fault of their own by a shift in government policy. Yet we spend billions on foreign aid to countries which publicly scorn our attempts to help promote world peace, and actively seek additional aid from our enemies.

As a former citizen of Seattle, as a former employee of Boeing, as a man who has many friends in Seattle who are feeling the bite of poverty, I urge you to vote against any future foreign aid appropriation until the administration is willing to come to grips with the very real problem of poverty and hunger in this country.

Sincerely,

DAVID I. WALLACE.

JAPANESE FOREIGN AID SENT TO "HURT, HUNGRY"—IN TROUBLED SEATTLE

Its "Sister City" of Kobe Ships a Planload of Help Unemployed in the Community

SEATTLE.—Stunned by the federal government's refusal to start a free-food program to ease Seattle's growing hunger problem, the city has found help elsewhere: foreign aid from Japan.

Last week, Seattle's Japanese "sister city" of Kobe shipped a planload of 1,000 pounds of canned food and rice noodles to Seattle. Collected by Kobe's Christian community, the food was sent through the Kobe YMCA as a gesture of friendship to the thousands of Seattle residents who face hunger as their unemployment benefits run out.

Seattle unemployment has been running at about 13%, the highest in the nation, largely as a result of Boeing Co. layoffs.

The food is being distributed by Neighbors in Need, a church-sponsored, privately operated food bank program that has been relying on community donations to help feed the unemployed who can't qualify, or who can no longer afford the federal food stamp program.

The Rev. Bryce Little, a spokesman for the Seattle group, called the Japanese aid a "very meaningful contribution" and a "symbolic expression of concern by the Japanese people for the people here who are hurting and hungry." He said Neighbors in Need is operating 36 free food banks in the Seattle area alone, where it currently dispenses about \$10,000 a week in food to some 15,000 needy individuals.

In addition to the food, Seattle's Japanese benefactors also chipped in 276,000 yen, or about \$860, to help Neighbors in Need buy more food locally. More food and money for Seattle is being collected in Japan during the Christmas season, the Rev. Little added.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a recent memorandum prepared for Members of the House by the chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, the distinguished Representative from Louisiana (Mr. PASSMAN). It describes in some detail what is in the foreign aid pipeline overall.

There being no objection, the memorandum was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., July 1, 1971.

To the American Taxpayer:

The attached fact sheets should have your close scrutiny. Our government is continuing to dissipate your resources and wealth in foreign nations all over the world. This unconscionable practice is destroying our world markets, destroying the value of the American dollar and placing an unbearable public debt upon the shoulders of unborn generations. This practice of giving away your wealth is creating inflation and reducing the purchasing power of your dollar which is the equivalent of confiscating your savings. I must speak out again and say forthrightly that the good claimed for this program is not supported by facts.

Our fiscal irresponsibility is so obvious that many foreign nations are again demanding our diminishing gold for the surplus dollars they hold, thus further depleting our limited gold stocks. In some countries, businesses will accept dollars only at a discount. This uncontrolled dissipation of our wealth is pricing us out of world markets. We may well finish this year with a true trade deficit of a billion dollars.

There are approximately Fifty Billion U.S. Dollars floating around in foreign countries.

We do not have the gold to redeem these dollars, so they are surplus to the needs of foreign nations for commerce. Do not blame the present Administration for this unbelievable situation because it has been building up for 25 years. The habit of giving away our wealth is so ingrained in the minds of the bureaucrats who give away this money that they cannot overcome the addiction. So, those of us who know the facts must now spread this news throughout the nation and plead for support so as to bring this outlandish, wasteful, ever-growing addiction under control, or else someday surely regret our neglect.

The attached sheets establish beyond any doubt that this program could be termed frustrating, fanatical, frightening and foolish. I am going to expose the wastefulness of this program to the Nation even if it requires substantial use of my personal resources. This is an obligation I owe to the American people.

May I explain the attached fact sheets briefly before you read them:

(1) New budget requests for additional authorizations and/or appropriations for foreign assistance, fiscal year 1972, covering loans, grants and credits—thirteen billion, five hundred twenty-eight million, six hundred twenty-eight thousand dollars.

(2) Unexpended balance in pipeline from prior years—twenty-four billion, five hundred sixty-seven million, fifty-five thousand dollars, including appropriated funds and borrowing authority.

(3) If all new requests are approved by the Congress, the grand total funds available, new and from prior years, will amount to thirty-eight billion, nine hundred fifty-six million, eight hundred and thirty thousand dollars.

(4) Net cost of the foreign assistance program (1946-71) including interest on what we have borrowed to give away, amounts to two hundred twelve billion, eight hundred eighty million dollars. Many billions of the dollars we pay out in interest on what we have borrowed to give away go to foreign nations and foreign nationals.

(5) During this world-wide spending spree, our gold holdings have been reduced from twenty-two billion, eight hundred seventy-nine million dollars to ten billion, seven hundred thirty-two million dollars.

(6) Since the inception of the world-wide spending spree, short-term dollar claims against the United States (due now) have increased from eight billion, six hundred forty-five million dollars to forty-one billion, six hundred sixty-six million dollars, plus other United States indebtedness abroad which amounts to twelve billion dollars. If we should be called upon to pay off these short-term IOU's, we could not meet the demand.

(7) Our balance-of-payments situation, since this world-wide spending spree started, has placed our fiscal affairs in a grave position. We have paid to foreign nations forty-eight billion, eight hundred nineteen million dollars more than they have paid to us. This situation will continue to worsen until we bring the Aid program under control. As you know, this is what has created such a tremendous dollar surplus in the hands of foreign nations and nationals.

(8) The freewheeling spending program covering the face of the earth has helped push the U.S. Public debt to a figure eighty-seven billion dollars above the combined public debt of all the other nations of the world.

(9) Can it be denied that our country has substituted dollars for a sound foreign policy, aid for trade, appeasement for firmness? We have become so addicted to this formula that it is no longer even suggested that it be stopped. Only the American taxpayers have the power to stop it.

(10) Until this Administration came into power, we had been borrowing money from the American people to pay for commodities and services which were given free to foreign nations, and then borrowing dollars from foreign nations in order to make our balance-of-payments situation look better than it was.

(11) In the main, the foreign aid program is administered by patriotic Americans, but they are almost completely without banking and business experience. It has been established that it is the fourth and fifth echelon bureaucrats who are involving us in these foreign entanglements. During 1972 alone, some portion of the aid program will be operating in 98 nations of the world, with 54,599 individuals on the payroll. This includes U.S. personnel, foreign personnel and participants. There are now 4,416 projects and subprojects scattered all over the world. While many similar projects in America cannot go forward because of lack of funds, not a single foreign aid project has ever been stopped or slowed down for lack of funds.

Please analyze the attached sheets. They convey a significant message. A careful scrutiny may prompt the overburdened American taxpayer to take the necessary steps to bring this world-wide free spending program under control. Bureaucratic estimates are so unrealistic and unconvincing that the Congress has been able to reduce the budget requests by twelve billion, three hundred forty-three million dollars in sixteen years. The total reduction was limited to this amount because of the selfish interests of thousands of lobbyists and the scares peddled by bureaucratic personnel. Yet even after the reductions, the foreign aid program was still greatly overfunded.

Aid should be limited to agencies such as the Export-Import Bank with the disguised credit and grant portion being curtailed and eliminated at the quickest possible date. We should make sure that any aid extended is on a loan basis with reasonable maturity dates and at the same rate of interest we have to pay on the money we borrow to lend.

With my knowledge of this program, if I did not furnish the facts as I have in this report, I would be derelict in my obligation to the American people. I shall do my part to awaken the American people to this sad state of affairs. I hope that I may have the support of the Congress in my efforts.

Sincerely yours,

OTTO E. PASSMAN,

Chairman, Foreign Operations Subcommittee on Appropriations.

Attachments.

JULY 1, 1971—NEW REQUESTS FOR AUTHORIZATION AND/OR APPROPRIATION FOR FOREIGN AID AND ASSISTANCE—FISCAL YEAR 1972

Foreign Assistance Act (including Military Assistance)	\$3,313,000,000
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)	25,000,000
Inter-American Development Bank	500,000,000
Inter-American Development Bank (Supplemental)	486,760,000
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Supplemental)	246,100,000
International Development Association	320,000,000
Asian Development Bank	40,000,000
Asian Development Bank (Supplemental)	60,000,000
Expanded Multilateral Assistance	35,000,000
Receipts and Recoveries from Previous Programs	370,310,000
Military Assistance (in Defense Budget)	2,250,800,000
International Military Headquarters	74,400,000

Economic Assistance (in Defense Budget)	\$90,900,000
MAAG's, Missions and Milgroups	262,600,000
Permanent Military Construction — Foreign Nations	106,000,000
Export-Import Bank, Long-term Credits	2,445,000,000
Export-Import Bank, Regular Operations	1,195,639,000
Peace Corps	82,200,000
Ryukyu Islands	4,450,000
Migrants and Refugees	8,650,000
Public Law 480 (Agricultural Commodities)	1,320,400,000
Contributions to International Organizations	160,680,000
Education (Foreign and Other Students)	51,000,000
Trust Territories of the Pacific	59,739,000
Latin America Highway (Darién Gap)	20,000,000

Total new requests—
Foreign Aid and Assistance—fiscal year 1972

13,528,628,000

OTTO E. PASSMAN,

Chairman, Foreign Operations Subcommittee on Appropriations.

JULY 1, 1971—UNEXPENDED BALANCE FOR FOREIGN AID AND ASSISTANCE IN PIPELINE FROM PRIOR YEARS FOR APPROPRIATION AND AUTHORIZATION

Foreign Assistance Act (including Military Assistance)	\$4,403,985,000
Export-Import Bank, Uncommitted Borrowing Authority	5,230,600,000
Export-Import Bank, Long-Term Credits	2,937,800,000
Export-Import Bank, Regular Operations	624,600,000
Export-Import Bank, Export Expansion Program	295,000,000
Inter-American Development Bank	2,304,051,000
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	5,715,000,000
International Development Association	460,000,000
Asian Development Bank	150,000,000
Foreign Military Credit Sales Program	290,000,000
MAAG's Missions and Milgroups	10,000,000
Military Assistance (in Defense Budget)	945,000,000
International Military Headquarters	18,000,000
Economic Assistance (in Defense Budget)	15,000,000
Permanent Military Construction Overseas	210,000,000
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)	203,538,000
Public Law 480 (Agricultural Commodities)	664,439,000
Peace Corps	24,077,000
Contributions to International Organizations	5,808,000
Education Exchange	28,397,000
Ryukyu Islands	1,740,000
Migrants and Refugees	2,264,000
Inter-American Highway	6,100,000
Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands	21,656,000
Total	24,567,055,000

OTTO E. PASSMAN,

Chairman, Foreign Operations Subcommittee on Appropriations.

JULY 1, 1971—TOTAL NET FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO 127 NATIONS OF THE WORLD, FISCAL YEARS 1946 THROUGH 1971

The Five F Formula: Frustrating—Fanatical—Frightening—Foolish—Factual	
Afghanistan	\$373,800,000
Albania	20,400,000
Algeria	176,100,000
Argentina	341,100,000
Australia	594,400,000
Austria	1,218,400,000
Barbados	700,000
Belgium-Luxembourg	1,742,200,000
Bolivia	532,000,000
Botswana	19,100,000
Brazil	2,738,200,000
Burundi	7,800,000
Burma	158,600,000
Cambodia	613,700,000
Cameroon	33,500,000
Canada	46,500,000
Central Africa Republic	5,600,000
Ceylon	176,600,000
Chad	9,800,000
Chile	1,281,800,000
China, Rep. of	5,096,500,000
Colombia	1,119,400,000
Congo (B)	4,000,000
Congo (K)	456,000,000
Costa Rica	188,200,000
Cuba	43,700,000
Cyprus	22,400,000
Czechoslovakia	189,500,000
Dahomey	12,900,000
Denmark	873,300,000
Dominican Republic	483,400,000
East Germany	800,000
Ecuador	296,700,000
El Salvador	145,400,000
Equatorial Guinea	300,000
Ethiopia	394,100,000
Finland	10,300,000
France	7,059,700,000
Gabon	7,600,000
Gambia	3,300,000
Ghana	264,800,000
Germany and Berlin	3,652,400,000
Greece	3,681,900,000
Guatemala	355,300,000
Guinea	113,000,000
Guyana	69,900,000
Haiti	117,200,000
Honduras	122,800,000
Hungary	13,300,000
Iceland	59,800,000
India	8,003,600,000
Indochina	1,535,200,000
Indonesia	1,343,800,000
Iran	1,945,700,000
Iraq	90,600,000
Ireland	105,700,000
Israel	992,000,000
Italy	5,528,500,000
Ivory Coast	80,000,000
Jamaica	92,400,000
Japan	3,419,900,000
Jordan	710,000,000
Kenya	77,100,000
Korea	10,059,500,000
Kuwait	29,500,000
Laos	1,449,500,000
Lebanon	98,000,000
Lesotho	12,100,000
Liberia	217,100,000
Libya	221,600,000
Malagasy Rep.	14,100,000
Malawi	26,400,000
Malaysia	72,600,000
Mali	30,000,000
Malta	3,300,000
Mauritania	5,000,000
Mauritius	6,100,000
Mexico	451,600,000
Morocco	731,800,000
Nepal	157,600,000
Netherlands	2,033,300,000
New Zealand	58,800,000
Nicaragua	165,600,000
Niger	18,900,000
Nigeria	383,600,000
Norway	1,127,100,000

Pakistan	4,484,100,000
Panama	242,300,000
Paraguay	131,100,000
Peru	465,200,000
Philippines	1,938,600,000
Poland	437,300,000
Portugal	432,900,000
Romania	10,000,000
Rwanda	8,000,000
Saudi Arabia	178,800,000
Senegal	40,100,000
Sierre Leone	44,100,000
Singapore	31,300,000
Somalia	79,300,000
South Africa, Rep.	33,300,000
Southern Yemen	200,000
Spain	2,028,400,000
Sudan	91,000,000
Swaziland	4,900,000
Sweden	135,300,000
Switzerland	45,300,000
Syrian Arab Rep.	56,700,000
Tanzania	73,400,000
Thailand	1,592,400,000
Togo	17,300,000
Trinidad and Tobago	49,700,000
Tunisia	699,400,000
Turkey	5,640,500,000
Uganda	42,500,000
United Arab Rep.	759,900,000
United Kingdom	7,209,100,000
USSR	186,400,000
Upper Volta	18,500,000
Uruguay	184,900,000
Venezuela	317,600,000
Vietnam	15,213,700,000
Western Samoa	2,500,000
Yemen	45,300,000
Yugoslavia	2,515,600,000
Zambia	6,100,000
Bahamas	31,800,000
British Honduras	5,900,000
Brunei	14,000,000
Southern Rhodesia	1,500,000
Surinam	9,200,000
West Indies	8,900,000
Hong Kong	44,700,000
Papua and New Guinea	23,700,000
Ryukyu Islands	403,300,000
Trust Ter. Pac.	284,200,000

JULY 1, 1971—TOTAL NET FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO 127 NATIONS OF THE WORLD, FISCAL YEARS 1946 THROUGH 1971—Continued

CENTO	\$54,700,000
W/W, Regional	15,907,600,000
Total Net Disbursements to Foreign Nations, 1946-71	138,446,200,000
Total Net Interest Paid on What We Have Borrowed to Give Away, 1946-71	74,434,597,000
Grand total—cost of Foreign Assistance, 1946 through 1971	212,880,797,000

Of the 3½ billion people of the world, all but 36 million have received aid from the United States.

OTTO E. PASSMAN,
Chairman, Foreign Operations Subcommittee on Appropriations.

GOLD HOLDINGS, JULY 1, 1971

To whom it may concern:	
Gold holdings, United States, Dec. 31, 1950	\$22,879,000,000
Gold holdings, United States, Dec. 31, 1970	10,732,000,000
Gold holdings, other countries of the world, Dec. 31, 1950	10,935,000,000
Gold holdings, other countries of the world, Dec. 31, 1970	26,108,000,000
Foreign short-term dollar claims against United States	
Short-term dollar claims against United States, Dec. 31, 1950	8,645,000,000
Short-term dollar claims against United States, Dec. 31, 1970	41,666,000,000

U.S. balance of payments

1950 net deficit	—1,912,000,000
1951 net deficit	—578,000,000

1952 net deficit	—\$1,100,000,000
1953 net deficit	—2,100,000,000
1954 net deficit	—1,500,000,000
1955 net deficit	—1,100,000,000
1956 net deficit	—1,000,000,000
1957 net surplus	+500,000,000
1958 net deficit	—3,400,000,000
1959 net deficit	—3,700,000,000
1960 net deficit	—3,800,000,000
1961 net deficit	—2,400,000,000
1962 net deficit	—2,200,000,000
1963 net deficit	—2,660,000,000
1964 net deficit	—3,006,000,000
1965 net deficit	—1,306,000,000
1966 net deficit	—2,077,000,000
1967 net deficit	—3,650,000,000
1968 net surplus	+93,000,000
1969 net deficit	—7,208,000,000
1970 net deficit	—4,715,000,000

Net U.S. balance-of-payments deficit (21 years), 1950 through 1970—
—48,819,000,000

GROSS PUBLIC DEBTS

Public debt, United States, Dec. 31, 1970	\$391,626,290,000
Public debt, all other nations of the world (est.), Dec. 31, 1970	304,160,241,000
Public debt, United States exceeds combined public debt of all other nations of the world by	87,466,049,000

The above statistics cover (1) gold holdings, (2) short-term dollar claims against United States, (3) United States balance-of-payments position, 21 years, (4) public debt of the United States, (5) public debt of all other nations of the world, and (6) amount by which our public debt exceeds combined public debt of all other nations of the world. These statistics should be of interest to every American, conservative or liberal.

OTTO E. PASSMAN,
Chairman, Foreign Operations Subcommittee on Appropriations.

MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM (FOREIGN AID) ANALYSIS ON CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, 16-YEAR PERIOD, 1956-71 INCLUSIVE

Fiscal year	Budget estimate	Appropriation	Reduction below estimate	Percentage below budget estimate	Fiscal year	Budget estimate	Appropriation	Reduction below estimate	Percentage below budget estimate
1956	\$3,266,641,750	\$2,703,341,750	—\$563,300,000	17.24	1965	\$3,516,700,000	\$3,250,000,000	—\$266,700,000	7.58
1957	4,859,975,000	3,766,570,000	—1,093,405,000	22.50	1966	3,459,470,000	3,218,000,000	—241,470,000	6.98
1958	3,386,860,000	2,768,760,000	—618,100,000	18.25	1967	3,385,962,000	2,936,490,500	—449,471,500	13.27
1959	3,950,092,500	3,298,092,500	—652,000,000	16.51	1968	3,250,520,000	2,295,635,000	—954,885,000	29.38
1960	4,429,995,000	3,225,813,000	—1,204,182,000	27.18	1969	2,920,000,000	1,755,600,000	—1,164,400,000	39.88
1961	4,275,000,000	3,716,350,000	—558,650,000	13.07	1970	2,710,020,000	1,812,380,000	—897,640,000	33.12
1962	4,775,500,000	3,914,600,000	—860,900,000	18.03	1971	2,200,500,000	1,940,185,000	—260,315,000	11.83
1963	4,961,300,000	3,928,900,000	—1,032,400,000	20.81	Total	59,873,861,250	47,530,717,750	—12,343,143,500	20.62
1964	4,525,325,000	3,000,000,000	—1,525,325,000	33.70					

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE—ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its

reading clerks, announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills:

H.R. 6065. An act to amend section 903(c) (2) of the Social Security Act, and for other purposes; and

H.R. 11731. An act making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972, and for other purposes.

The enrolled bills were subsequently signed by the President pro tempore.

FURTHER CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS, 1972

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time for the morning hour having expired, the Chair now lays before the Senate the unfinished business which the clerk will state.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

H.J. Res. 1005, making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1972, and for other purposes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to amend my amendment by striking out on line 7 the first three words "by more than".

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, may we hear what the Senator is doing?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the Senator have my amendment before him?

Mr. JAVITS. Yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am asking to strike out the first three words on line 7, "by more than" because of the possibility of ambiguity.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the amendment is so modified.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I note that yesterday Mr. Frank Getlein, one of the most thoughtful and perceptive commentators about our public affairs had published in the Washington Star an article entitled "Time for Sanity in Foreign Policy." I think it is one of the best and most succinct descriptions of one aspect of our present situation that I have ever seen. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TIME FOR SANITY IN FOREIGN POLICY
(By Frank Getlein)

The "you're another" school of political thought—and political leadership, for that matter—has seized upon the intervention of India in the internal matter of West Pakistan's slaughter of its citizens in East Pakistan to rejoice that the morality-preaching, peace-loving democracy of the subcontinent has been shown up to be just a bloody aggressor as everyone else.

It's one reaction, all right, even a mildly legitimate one. It is true that the Indians, like the Americans, the Chinese, the Russians, the De Gaulle French and the Fidelista Cubans, have regularly taken a high moral tone that seemed to place the speakers and their nations above the ordinary run of common humanity.

Since it is always a pleasure to have the preacher revealed as a sinner like the rest of us, this reaction may be excused, but it would be a lot more excusable in people who were not themselves vigorous preachers of international morality and of their own moral superiority.

But the real trouble with the reaction is that it blinds the observer to the realities of the war on the subcontinent and, even worse, ignores the significance of that war for the foreign policy of the United States. Enjoying a hearty chuckle at the presumed perfidy of India against the Pakistanis, such observers pass up a golden opportunity to see where we are ourselves as a result of the war in Bengal.

The realities of the war are simple enough and have very little to do with the "aggression" of India against its smaller neighbor. The realities begin with the forthright rejection of the election returns by the military dictatorship running Pakistan and that dictatorship's subsequent embarking upon the wholesale slaughter of those of its citizens who had voted as a majority against the dictatorship. That act of genocide was, perhaps, an "internal affair," but unfortunately the military dictatorship neglected to seal the borders before beginning the killing. Hence the victims began escaping in their thousands, eventually in their millions, into neighboring India, where they posed a serious problem.

Thus, Indian intervention in the domestic slaughter of the East Pakistanis by their government was eminently justified not only on grounds of pure humanitarianism, but on those of legitimate self-interest.

All of this leaves the United States in an interesting position. Despite our proclamation of "strict neutrality"—by which we apparently mean we do not propose to bomb New Delhi at this time—we have all along supported the Pakistani military dictatorship in its war of decimation against its own people. We have supported that dictatorship in its setting aside of the results of the election. We have supported it in its seizure and jailing of the opposition candidate.

We have done all these things because the military dictatorship of Pakistan has been supposed to be our staunch ally in the defense of the "free world."

Pakistan is hardly alone in its status as a military dictatorship shooting, imprisoning

and slaughtering its own people and yet being a bastion of the "free world." Our most reliable allies all seem to drift into that combination sooner or later. In Greece, in Spain, in Central America and the Caribbean, and overwhelmingly in Asia, we always come out on the side of military dictatorship against at least possibly democratic opposition. And we always do so in the name of the "free world."

Surely it is time we revised our language. And after the language, the policy which has placed us invariably upon the side of military dictatorship in the name of freedom.

If we could start out admitting that this is hardly the "free world" we are involved in, it would be a good beginning. We might then, with at least a semblance of reason, argue that if it is not the "free world," at least it is the anti-Communist world and, in the struggle against communism, we have unfortunately found that military dictatorships tend to be more reliable allies than democracies, which is certainly the case.

We would then explain to ourselves that, all this being so, it is why we are now, in the war on the subcontinent, siding with Communist China in support of military dictatorship and against democracy.

At that point, we ought to be able to ask whether the whole anti-Communist policy is as viable as it must have seemed in 1948. Once we do that, we are within grasping distance of sanity in foreign policy.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. METCALF). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RECESS SUBJECT TO THE CALL OF THE CHAIR

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I move that the Senate stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair, with the understanding that it not go beyond 1 p.m. today.

The motion was agreed to; and at 12:03 p.m. the Senate took a recess, subject to the call of the Chair.

The Senate reassembled at 12:59 p.m., when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. SPONG).

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SPONG). The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT) as modified.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RECESS SUBJECT TO THE CALL OF THE CHAIR

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I move that the Senate stand in re-

cess, subject to the call of the Chair, not to extend beyond 2 p.m. today.

The motion was agreed to; and at 1 p.m. the Senate took a recess, subject to the call of the Chair.

The Senate reassembled at 1:58 p.m. when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. SPONG).

RECESS SUBJECT TO THE CALL OF THE CHAIR

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I move that the Senate stand in recess, subject to the call of the Chair, not to extend beyond 3 p.m. today.

The motion was agreed to; and at 1:59 p.m. the Senate took a recess, subject to the call of the Chair.

The Senate reassembled at 2:58 p.m. when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. AIKEN).

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE— ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Berry, one of its reading clerks, announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills:

H.R. 3304. An act to amend the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967 to enhance the effectiveness of international fishery conservation programs; and

H.R. 5419. An act for the relief of Corbie F. Cochran.

RECESS SUBJECT TO THE CALL OF THE CHAIR

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I move that the Senate stand in recess, subject to the call of the Chair, not to extend beyond 4 p.m. today.

The motion was agreed to; and at 2:58 p.m. the Senate took a recess, subject to the call of the Chair.

The Senate reassembled at 3:58 p.m. when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. GOLDWATER).

RECESS SUBJECT TO THE CALL OF THE CHAIR

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I move that the Senate stand in recess, subject to the call of the Chair, not to extend beyond 6 p.m. today.

The motion was agreed to; and at 3:58 p.m. the Senate took a recess, subject to the call of the Chair.

The Senate reassembled at 5:46 p.m. when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. MANSFIELD).

QUORUM CALL

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MANSFIELD). The Senate will come to order, and the clerk will call the roll, on the suggestion of the Senator from Montana that a quorum is not present.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

FORMER SENATOR WILLIAMS' REBUTTAL

Mr. ROTH, Mr. President, a group of students working for Ralph Nader recently attacked the integrity of former Senator John J. Williams. This deeply distressed me, as it does all Delawareans.

Many of us have been impressed with the fight that Mr. Nader has waged on behalf of the consumer and with the groundwork he has laid before making these charges. Therefore, it was particularly shocking to find that he would permit a report to be published which was in many respects based on half-truths and innuendos.

The lack of foundation of Nader's charges against Senator Williams has been confirmed by everyone who has taken the trouble to examine fully the incident in question rather than form his judgment on the words of a self-aggrandizing Washington attorney, as did Nader's students.

It particularly disturbs me that the attack would be made on Senator Williams on the basis of an incomplete investigation, because Senator Williams himself never made a charge against anyone until he was absolutely certain of all the facts. He told me many times that you can never entirely undo the damage caused to a person's reputation if you attack him wrongly.

Mr. President, a lesser man than John Williams, one who was interested in getting headlines, would have made attacks that John Williams chose never to make because the proof of the charge was incomplete.

It is ironic that he should now be the victim of precisely the kind of action he always shunned—an attack based on innuendos and incomplete investigations.

Mr. President, Senator Williams needs no defense. I know he will continue to be looked upon by all who know him as "Mr. Integrity." But let my words here demonstrate my anguish that he should be forced to suffer the embarrassment of a completely unfounded attack.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the following newspaper articles, statements, and documents be published in the RECORD at this point: from the Wilmington, Del., Morning News of December 16, 1971, an article entitled "Senator Williams' Records Rebut Nader Charges"; from the Wilmington, Del., Evening Journal of December 15, 1971, an editorial entitled, "Setting Record Straight"; from the Delaware State News of December 15, 1971, an article entitled "John Williams Rebutts Raider's Allegations"; from the Georgetown, Del., Sussex Countian of December 16, 1971, an editorial entitled "From the Countian Seat"; from the Chicago Sun-Times of December 12, 1971, a column by Clark Mollenhoff entitled, "Williams Attack a Nader Error?"; and a statement prepared by former Senator John J. Williams, including several letters and documents.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SENATOR WILLIAMS' RECORDS REBUT NADER CHARGES

(By Ralph S. Moyed)

Government records "completely repudiate" the Nader report's version of how tax

legislation benefiting Du Pont heirs got through Congress, according to former Sen. John J. Williams.

Williams produced government documents and letters to support his position that the Nader study group was wrong in claiming the Delaware Republican slipped a bill through Congress in 1964 to permit a special tax deduction for the loss of Irene du Pont's Cuban estate, which was seized by the Castro government.

Williams said he introduced the legislation at the request of several individuals, and that it was not special legislation, it was drafted by the staff of Congress, it was not opposed by the Treasury Department, and it was not done surreptitiously.

All his claims contradict Nader's charges, and all, Williams said, are supported by the documents he made available to the News-Journal.

Among those documents was a letter from Williams to Crawford H. Greenewalt, a guardian-executor of the estate of Irene du Pont Sr. and a former Du Pont Co. board chairman. In the letter, written the year before legislation was introduced, Williams mentioned other inquiries.

The Irene du Pont guardians were seeking legislation to permit a tax deduction for the confiscation of Du Pont's "Xanadu" estate, which, according to the Nader report, was worth \$2 million.

Among the documents is a State Department report showing that the number of individuals in a similar position could have run into the thousands. In terms of dollars, the State Department statistics show that Du Pont claim may have amounted to as little as 1 per cent of the total.

The problem, Williams said, was that American citizens who owned non-income-producing property in Cuba could not claim tax deductions under then-existing laws, while those with business properties could.

Williams said he held off until American government officials had abandoned hope that the properties would be restored to their owners.

Then, he said, he introduced legislation to correct what he viewed as an inequity in the old law on Cuban seizures—the exclusion of non-business properties.

The Nader report relied in part on letters exchanged by the late Fleming Bomar, attorney for the guardians-executors of Irene du Pont's estate and Greenewalt.

Excerpts from Bomar's letters were interpreted in the Nader report as showing Williams was going to bat for the Du Pont heirs.

Williams dismissed those letters, saying in an interview: "Every Washington lawyer who had a client with a Cuban claim probably wrote letters like that. That's how they build their fees."

Irene du Pont Jr., another of the executors of his father's estate, last week offered to make public his files of correspondence on the matter if Williams would agree. Williams declined.

The senator did offer to make copies of the documents to which he referred yesterday available to the public, through the News-Journal papers.

Richard P. Sanger, president and editor-in-chief, said he was pleased to do this and that they would be open for inspection in the newspapers' library.

"We are convinced of their authenticity," Sanger said, and referred to an editorial in yesterday's Evening Journal which read in part: "Sen. Williams has rounded up documents which prove to our satisfaction that the charge against him is without foundation in fact."

Williams said that while he had received several inquiries on the matter, there is no way of determining how many taxpayers may have benefited from the legislation or if any were allowed as large a deduction as the Du Pont heirs. The Nader report said it was \$2

million, but that is impossible to determine because such tax records are private.

Williams offered a letter from Edwin S. Cohen, assistant secretary of the treasury, saying the statistics on such claims are not published.

Cohen wrote, on Dec. 10, 1971, that Williams' measure "was not a private bill limited to one person" and appended a technical information release issued on the measure in 1964 to support this conclusion.

The State Department receives claims for damages—not tax deductions—covering Cuban confiscation losses. A report from the State Department shows 4,500 individual claims have been approved. Williams says some or most of the individual claims could have been for business losses.

The report, he said, demonstrates that Du Pont was not the only American to have property confiscated by Cuba. State Department statistics, Williams notes, show that "Xanadu" represented less than 1 per cent of the individually owned (as opposed to business-owned) property confiscated by the Cuban government.

Williams said he spent a week in Washington reviewing the files and said "the official government records completely repudiate (Nader's) allegations."

The report suggested that Williams merely introduced a piece of legislation drafted by Bomar. Bomar died four years ago.

Jay W. Glasmann, a partner of Bomar, said in a letter to Williams dated last week that his law firm could find nothing in its files to "indicate that Bomar delivered a draft of proposed legislation on this matter to your office."

The files, Glasmann wrote, do indicate that Bomar had been working on a draft "but the language of his draft is substantially different from the floor amendment which you offered in February of 1964."

Williams said the Nader study is wrong when it contends the bill was slipped through the Senate without proper committee consideration.

A copy of the minutes of an executive meeting of the Senate Finance Committee shows that there were 12 other senators present when his measure was considered as a floor amendment to another tax bill.

The minutes show that Robert A. Klayman, associate tax legislative counsel of the Treasury Department, also was there.

The minutes and Congressional Record also show the measure was discussed and approved without a dissenting vote before being sent to the full Senate.

George Smathers, then a senator from Florida, was a cosponsor, Williams said, because he had "a large number of constituents" who would be affected.

The Nader report said it was "doubtful" that the Treasury Department has supported the bill. But a letter from Laurence N. Woodworth, staff chief of the Joint Committee on Taxation, to Williams says a Treasury memorandum states the department at that time could find "no valid reason" why the deductions shouldn't be allowed.

Williams claims the Nader report also was wrong in claiming there was no precedent for such legislation, again quoting a letter from Woodworth, which said:

"Before our entry into World War I, Congress made provision for war loss deductions which, in effect, achieved a result which was substantially similar to the confiscation loss deduction provided in the case of Cuba." Woodworth added:

"I might also say that it is my understanding that Treasury is working on the treatment of expropriation losses in Chile. I would expect them to achieve a similar result as in the case of the Cuban expropriation losses."

The Nader report, quoting a letter from Bomar to Greenewalt, said Williams agreed "that no mention would be made of the

Du Pont name in connection with the legislation." The report said the family and its attorneys feared a furor if the name were mentioned.

Williams said there was no effort to shield the Du Pont name. To mention any name in such cases was unprecedented, he said, and would have brought on opposition in Congress and from the Treasury Department.

"Singling out and identifying one individual by name would be interpreted as Congress' having passed upon the validity of that taxpayer's claim, thereby relieving that individual of having to prove his citizenship, his ownership or his cost figures to the revenue agent," Williams said in a statement.

In an interview, he said he offered the bill in response to several inquiries because it seemed proper and fair, whether eventually it would benefit many small homeowners or only one individual.

"It was on the merits," Williams said, "and it was not special legislation."

SETTING RECORD STRAIGHT

It has been said here before that the Nader Report on Delaware merits thoughtful consideration. Inspection and introspection are good for any social system, and what Mr. Nader's raiders call the "company state" of Delaware is no exception.

There are segments of the report, however, which are incorrect and unfair and which if Mr. Nader and his associates choose not to correct them could discredit the whole document. Some of these are matters of small consequence, but the incumulative effect is great. Others including a couple that relate to the way this newspaper operates, are substantive and damaging.

Most serious of all are statements that misrepresent the actions and impugn the motives of honorable men. Two cases in point are the report's allegations about former U.S. Senator John J. Williams and U.S. District Judge Collins J. Seitz, two of Delaware's most distinguished public servants.

The report accuses Senator Williams of slipping special-interest legislation through Congress for the benefit of certain members of the Du Pont family. It charges that Judge Seitz, as Delaware's chancellor, found "shaky" legal reasons for ruling in the interest of family members in a large inheritance-tax case.

Senator Williams has rounded up documents which prove to our satisfaction that the charge against him is without foundation in fact. (It had never occurred to us that it was factual, but Senator Williams is not the kind of man to ask anyone to take things at face value; he has adduced the evidence for skeptical readers.

Judge Seitz was in an even more difficult position. As a member of the federal judiciary, he could not comment on the charge, much less try to vindicate himself. To its credit, the Delaware Bar Association has done that for him, citing chapter and verse to demonstrate that the underpinnings of his decision were anything but shaky. The association goes on to reaffirm something which should never have needed reaffirming—its "unqualified confidence" in Judge Seitz's judicial integrity.

The Bar Association also makes a point worth pasting in any good citizen's hat: "Disagreement with a judge's decision is certainly no ground to impugn the personal integrity of a judge."

It ought to go without saying that the same admonition should apply to those who disagree with a U.S. senator and, for that matter, with the authors of the Nader Report.

The missing ingredient in the report is balance; as in some lawyers' briefs, the evidence is presented (or withheld) in order to sustain a line or argument. Mr. Nader's associates have indicated a willingness to address themselves to this problem in certain specific

instances. In fairness to themselves, not to mention the victims of their attacks, they ought to reexamine the evidence in each of these cases.

JOHN WILLIAMS REBUTS RAIDER'S ALLEGATION (By Charles Elliott)

MILLSBORO.—Former U.S. Sen. John J. Williams yesterday categorically denied all charges leveled against him two weeks ago by the Ralph Nader Report on Delaware.

Williams brought a sheaf of letters and other documents to the Delaware State News offices in Dover as evidence of his innocence.

While in the U.S. Senate he earned the title "conscience of the Senate" for his attacks, among other things, on former Senate aide Bobby Baker's wheeler-dealer activities.

Though clearly smarting under the aspersions cast by the Nader Report upon him, Williams is still intent on pointing to the record.

He says he spent most of last week in Washington poring through old files from the 1963-64 period to work up a point-by-point refutation of the Nader charges.

At times he speaks loudly about the charges, but he struggled to avoid a personal attack on Nader or Nader's team.

"It is obvious that he first wrote his conclusions and then stopped looking for any facts which did not coincide with his views," is about as far as Williams will go. "The official government records completely repudiate his allegations."

The Nader Report charged that Williams sponsored a bill while in the U.S. Senate which gave tax relief for a \$2 million estate in Cuba which was owned by Irene du Pont Sr. and confiscated by the Castro government.

When he first talked to a Nader researcher, Williams said, "I couldn't even tell him if I was the author or not."

Williams emphasized that the law which he introduced as a committee amendment with the approval of 13 members of the Senate Finance Committee was a general bill aimed at giving aid to all U.S. citizens whose property in Cuba was seized by Castro.

According to his figures drawn from State Department records, 38 individuals have filed claims of loss of personal property worth more than \$1 million each. The total value of these individual claims, according to Williams' figures, is more than \$208 million, \$150 million of which was seized real estate.

"Mr. du Pont's approximately \$2 million investment in Cuban real estate represented less than one per cent of the estimated value of (all confiscated) property owned by individuals," Williams said.

The Nader report charged that the law was introduced at the urging of Washington lawyer Fleming Bomar, acting for the du Pont family.

In a letter from Bomar to Crawford H. Greenwalt, an executor of Irene du Pont Sr.'s estate, Bomar recounted an alleged meeting with Sen. Williams and said the Senator had agreed to introduce the tax relief bill, and not mention the du Pont name.

"I'll bet every lawyer in Washington who's got a client with confiscated property in Cuba claimed this amendment," Williams said.

According to a letter to Williams from Jay W. Glasmann, another attorney in the firm which included Bomar until his death four years ago, Bomar did not draft the bill as the Nader report suggested.

"We can find nothing in Mr. Bomar's files that indicate that he delivered a draft of proposed legislation on this matter to your office," Glasmann wrote.

"The files do indicate that he was working on a draft bill during the summer of 1963, but the language of his draft is substantially different from the floor amendment which you offered in February of 1964," according to Glasmann.

Legislation offered as early as 1961 failed

to gain Congressional support, Williams said, because Congress feared the Castro government's piecemeal seizures of American property would become a general policy if general tax relief for owners was enacted.

After late 1963, the Castro government seized all American-owned property anyway, and the argument against such legislation was no longer relevant.

The U.S. has never enacted a general law covering all future confiscations of private property in foreign countries for fear it would encourage such seizures, Williams said.

The Cuban losses were treated much as the World War II war losses of American citizens in Europe. Similar legislation to reimburse Americans who have property confiscated in Chile may soon be introduced, according to a letter from Laurence N. Woodworth of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation staff.

Throughout Williams' lengthy typed presentation he consistently misspelled Ralph Nader's name as "Nadar."

"I'm not very good at names," he shrugged apologetically.

"This is my answer to Ralph Nadar (sic)," he concluded. "And all of this information and statistics were a matter of public record had the Nadar (sic) group done its homework."

FROM THE COUNTIAN SEAT

In the case of the Nader Report attacking former U.S. Sen. John J. Williams for inserting a special provision into a 1964 tax bill permitting deductions for property seized in Cuba owned by the Delaware duPonts, there should be given to the Nader Raiders the "Sound and the fury award signifying nothing" award of the year. The report implied that Williams was cowtowing to the duPonts by saving a member of the family \$1.6 million. The facts are that this one claim was one of 7,659 individual claims with a total value of almost \$500 million. The duPont claim came to less than one-half of one per cent. The U.S. Treasury Department in a Democratic administration supported the bill and the bill had the unanimous backing of the Senate Finance Committee.

These facts were brought out by Clark Mollenhoff in the Philadelphia Sunday Bulletin. He writes that nothing was mentioned in the Nader Report about Williams opposing the whole duPont empire on legislation that involved billions of dollars after the U.S. Supreme Court ordered the duPont Company to divest itself of its General Motors holdings.

He writes and we agree. "There is no justification for the irresponsible charge against Williams, who for more than 20 years in Congress, was a symbol of aggressive honesty."

We might note that yellow journalism isn't appearing in newspapers but can get into reports.

WILLIAMS ATTACK A NADER ERROR?

(By Clark Mollenhoff)

WASHINGTON.—Consumer advocate Ralph Nader has made a serious error in permitting one of his study groups to attack former Delaware Sen. John J. Williams, who was busy crusading for the taxpayers for nearly 20 years before Nader arrived on the Washington scene.

It's possible the Nader group was trying for "shock impact" with its charges that Williams had engaged in activities on behalf of some members of the Du Pont family that are "essentially what he has been castigating Bobby Baker for."

The attack on Williams was included in a lengthy report that accused the Du Pont family and its chemical company—the world's largest—with creating a "company state" in Delaware. One part of the report said Williams inserted into a 1964 tax bill a special provision permitting a deduction for property owned by a Du Pont that was seized in Cuba.

Williams was credited with pressing the investigation that led to the conviction of Bobby Baker, the former aide to then Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson. It is absurd to contend that Williams was engaged in the same things that put Baker in prison.

Baker is serving time in federal prison upon conviction of income tax fraud, larceny of political campaign money and conspiracy to defraud the government. It involved charges that Baker had stolen \$99,600 in campaign money he had obtained from California savings and loan firms.

LACK OF DOCUMENTATION

There is nothing in the Nader study group report that even remotely tries to document the charge that Williams misused any campaign money, conspired to defraud the government or was engaged in evasion of his federal taxes. But, by innuendo, Nader has managed to leave the impression that Williams was involved in some dishonest activity that amounted to doing special favors for the Du Pont interests of Delaware.

In actual fact, Williams was a symbol of independence from the Du Pont interests. If Nader is really interested in making the government operate in a more honest fashion, he should be seeking to point out the example of Williams.

That part of the over-all report that deals with Williams reached a new low in irresponsibility when it sought to discredit Williams by leaving the impression there was some secret deal with Du Pont lawyers that meant a \$1.6-million tax break to a member of the Du Pont family.

There were only these facts established. General legislation was introduced by Williams that resulted in a tax advantage for one member of the Du Pont family. What wasn't said was that Williams introduced the legislation with the support of the Treasury in a Democratic administration. The bill also had the unanimous backing of the Senate Finance Committee. It was the normal kind of legislation to provide for reasonable tax write-offs when property is confiscated by a foreign government.

In this instance, the Du Pont claim was only one of 7,659 individual claims, with a total value of \$490,413,000. The Du Pont claim amounted to less than one-half of 1 per cent of the total. Williams pointed out the same type of legislation is being handled today on the same basis on U.S. property seized by Chile.

SUPPORTED BY RECORDS

While that legislation gave one member of the Du Pont family a tax break of about \$1.6 million on Cuba property, Williams had opposed the whole Du Pont empire on legislation that involved billions of dollars after the U.S. Supreme Court ordered Du Pont to divest itself of its General Motors holdings.

The explanation by Williams of the 1964 tax bill is fully supported by the records of the Senate Finance Committee and the Congressional Record for that time. There is no justification for the irresponsible charge against Williams, who for more than 20 years in Congress, was a symbol of aggressive honesty.

Williams didn't view public office as an opportunity to become wealthier. He regarded public office as a public trust. Although he had farmland that made him eligible for farm subsidies, he rejected them.

If Nader is looking for a pattern for rules of conduct to boost his own credibility, he will have a difficult time of finding a better example than the cautious Delaware Republican. Williams might even suggest that Nader's "public citizens" campaign fund is getting off to a questionable start with the following printed statement:

"Here's my \$15, please don't waste any of it sending me a thank-you letter, a membership card or literature, I know what's wrong.

What I want is to see something done about it."

This statement on the Nader subscription blank is an open invitation to the sloppy political bookkeeping that leads even well-motivated men into financial troubles. Williams could tell Nader something about the kind of clever characters who so often attach themselves to the highest-flying kite and bring it crashing to earth.

STATEMENT OF JOHN J. WILLIAMS

Two weeks ago Ralph Nader released a report wherein he questioned the merits of a legislative proposal in 1964 which I cosponsored, and made several criticisms of the procedure followed in getting it enacted. This legislation allowed any American citizen whose property in Cuba had been confiscated by the Castro government to claim as a casualty loss the lower of (1) the value or (2) the actual cash investment in the same manner the Revenue Code allows for losses sustained by fire, wind, flood, earthquake, etc.

In rendering this report Ralph Nader has demonstrated a complete lack of understanding of our tax laws or the legislative process by which laws are passed.

It is obvious that he first wrote his conclusions and then stopped looking for any facts which did not coincide with his views. The official government records completely repudiate his allegations, and I shall prove this with documents and information which would have been readily available to his group had they been interested.

I spent a week in Washington reviewing the files, and I shall answer his allegations point by point.

First, Mr. Nader said that the amendment which I sponsored in 1964 had actually been written by Mr. Bomar, a du Pont lawyer, and been delivered to me for introduction and support.

Answer. That is his first mistake, and to prove this I quote a letter dated December 9, 1971, signed by Mr. Jay W. Glassman, a member of the Bomar law firm. (Mr. Bomar is deceased.)

"LAW OFFICES OF IVINS,
PHILLIPS & BARKER,

Washington, D.C., December 9, 1971.

"HON. JOHN J. WILLIAMS,
Millsboro, Del.

"DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS: At your request we have reviewed Mr. Bomar's files during the years 1963 and 1964 on the Cuban loss matter involving Irene du Pont.

"We can find nothing in Mr. Bomar's files that indicate that he delivered a draft of proposed legislation on this matter to your office. The files do indicate that he was working on a draft bill during the summer of 1963, but the language of his draft is substantially different from the floor amendment which you offered in February of 1964.

"Sincerely,

"JAY W. GLASSMAN."

Second. Mr. Nader said that the legislation was slipped through the Senate without proper committee consideration or Treasury support.

Answer. Again he is wrong. The amendment was considered and unanimously approved by the Senate Finance Committee on June 25, 1964, and I was authorized to offer it as a committee floor amendment to H.R. 11376. Present at that meeting were 13 Senators, including Senator Harry F. Byrd, Sr., Chairman; Senators Long, Smathers, Anderson, Douglas, McCarthy, Hartke, Ribicoff, Williams, Bennett, Curtis, Morton, and Dirksen. Also present were Colin Stam, Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation; his assistant, Laurence Woodworth; and Robert A. Klayman, Associate Tax Legislative Counsel of the Treasury Department.

I quote an excerpt from the record of that executive meeting:

"Senator Williams asked the Committee to approve an amendment which he intended to offer on the Senate Floor to the excise tax bill H.R. 11376, which was in the nature of a perfecting amendment to the Floor amendment he offered and the Senate adopted to the Revenue Act of 1964, H.R. 8363, permitting a loss deduction by individuals for expropriation or similar taking over of non-business property by a foreign government. In sending the amendment to the desk for Senate vote, an effective date was inadvertently omitted. The amendment which Senator Williams intended to offer to H.R. 11376 would establish an effective date to apply to losses sustained in taxable years ending after December 31, 1958, so as to make the previously approved amendment cover the expropriations by Cuba. By voice vote the effective date amendment was approved and Senator Williams was authorized to offer it as a Committee Floor amendment to H.R. 11376."

Senator Smathers cosponsored the amendment since he had a large number of Florida constituents who had owned property in Cuba which had been confiscated by Castro and they would be affected by the proposed legislation. Senator Allott, from Colorado, previously had asked to be a cosponsor of the amendment. Prior to that time several Congressmen had introduced similar legislation in the House.

In accepting the amendment when it was presented in the Senate, Senator Byrd, Chairman of the Committee, said:

"Mr. President, this amendment was fully considered this morning by the Finance Committee, and I was unanimously authorized by the committee to accept the amendment."

As evidence that this 1964 legislation also had the support of the Treasury Department I quote from a letter dated December 10, 1971, signed by Laurence N. Woodworth, Chief of Staff, Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation:

"I have discussed with the Treasury Department their position on the 1964 legislation, and from their files it appears clear that they did not oppose the provision. In fact, a Treasury memorandum states, 'There appears to be no valid reason why loss of personal property by reason of expropriation by a foreign country should not be allowed as a deduction to the same extent as casualties and thefts.'"

After a brief discussion in the Senate the amendment was passed unanimously and later was unanimously accepted by the House.

Congressman Mills, speaking in the House earlier, had already endorsed the need for the Cuban legislation (Feb. 25, 1964, Congr. Rec. pg. 3561).

Third. The Nader report charges that the amendment was not general legislation but rather that the benefits of the amendment were primarily intended for one individual, Irene du Pont, Sr., whose property, valued at around two million dollars, had been confiscated by the Castro government. Mr. Nader creates the impression that Mr. du Pont was the only American citizen who had a sizeable investment in Cuban real estate that was confiscated by Castro, and he brushed aside the argument that it was general legislation and that there were other potential claimants involved by referring to it as benefiting "one elephant and a few mice."

Answer. Again he is wrong, and to dispose of that allegation I first quote a letter dated December 10, 1971, signed by Edwin S. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. This letter definitely states that it was not a bill designed for the benefit of any one individual but that it was of such broad nature that a general regulation or Technical Information Release was issued on November 27, 1964. This bulletin refers both to the loss of property as well as to the loss of deposits by

American citizens in American branch banks that had been seized by Castro.

As the Treasury Department points out, it maintains no tabulation as to the extent to which taxpayers claim benefits under the 1964 legislation, and I was referred to the State Department to obtain statistics which would give an indication of the amount and value of property owned by American corporations and individuals which had been confiscated by the Cuban government.

It should be pointed out that the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission assembles these statistics, examines them as to the validity of the claim, the status of citizenship, proper ownership, etc., and agrees upon reasonable valuations merely to determine and have available a record of the amount of the losses sustained by American citizens as the result of seizure of property by Castro. This is customary in all cases where seizure of property by foreign governments is involved. The filing of the claim and the compiling of the statistics do not mean that it is ever contemplated that the claim will be paid by our government. The statistical information is merely kept on file in case that at some future date a more friendly government comes into power in that country, and then the State Department would be in a position to negotiate a potential restoration of property or some form of settlement, or they could find some Cuban assets in this country that could be liquidated and divided among the claimants. In the event that any individual citizen or corporation had already claimed a tax credit as a casualty loss and ultimately regained possession of the property or partial reimbursement, then to that extent the law provides that those amounts would become taxable as income.

It is interesting to note that the State Department statistics show that Mr. du Pont's approximately \$2-million investment in Cuban real estate represented less than 1% of the estimated value of property owned by individuals seized or confiscated by Castro.

Some individuals whose property was confiscated did not even bother or go to the expense to prove a claim with the State Department since they see little or no chance that Castro or any future Cuban government will ever consider restoration. They have merely written the property off as a "casualty loss."

The State Department records are most interesting. They show that 8805 Cuban claims have been filed by American citizens, totaling \$3,346,406,271.36 and broken down as follows:

Corporate claims filed, 1146	\$2,855,993,212.69
Individual claims filed, 7659	490,413,058.67
<hr/>	
Total claims filed, 8805	3,346,406,271.36

Upon examination 1721 claims were rejected or withdrawn and others were reduced, leaving validated claims as of October 31, 1971, totaling:

Awards to corporations, 895	\$1,549,530,330.56
Awards to individuals, 4985	208,774,139.08

A breakdown of these 4985 claims by individuals as to size is as follows:

\$1,000 or less	1,248
\$1,001 to \$5,000	1,700
\$5,001 to \$10,000	637
\$10,001 to \$25,000	589
\$25,001 to \$50,000	323
\$50,001 to \$100,000	205
\$100,001 to \$250,000	143
\$250,001 to \$500,000	71
\$500,001 to \$1,000,000	31
Over \$1,000,000	38
<hr/>	
Total	4,985

These statistics clearly demonstrate that Mr. du Pont was not the only American to have property confiscated by Cuba.

In presenting these statistics I am not suggesting to what extent these individuals would be eligible to claim a casualty loss under the 1964 legislation. That determination comes under the province of the Treasury Department. All that Congress does is to enact the legislation and establish the rules.

Undoubtedly some of these claims by individuals represent income producing property, investments, etc., in which event they would get consideration under our tax laws through other sections of the Code, but it can be said that—and the Treasury Department has confirmed this point—to the extent that any of these individuals qualify under the provisions of the 1964 legislation he would be entitled to claim the loss as a casualty loss.

I spent a full day examining the State Department records, and the value of real estate alone owned by individual citizens which was confiscated by the Cuban government exceeded \$150,000,000; personal property, investments, etc., represented the other \$50,000,000 assigned to individual claims. Mr. du Pont was but one of a number of individual Americans who had property valued in excess of one million dollars confiscated by the Castro government.

I cite these statistics to establish that as Congress in 1964 approached a solution to this problem of Cuban confiscation of American property we were confronted with a much broader problem than that realized by Mr. Nader's narrow vision.

One final comment on Mr. Nader's suggestion that Mr. du Pont should have been named in the bill. I point out that none of the legislation affecting World War II claims, the legislation of 1964 affecting Cuban claims, nor the future legislation that may affect Chilean claims mentioned or will mention the name of any individual taxpayer as a beneficiary. To do so would be wrong and would be opposed by both Congress and the Treasury Department because singling out and identifying one individual by name would be interpreted as Congress' having passed upon the validity of that taxpayer's claim, thereby relieving that individual of having to prove his citizenship, his ownership, or his cost figures to the revenue agent. Just why Mr. Nader thought Congress should certify Mr. du Pont's claim and thereby relieve him of having to prove his loss to a revenue agent is a point I fail to understand.

What must not be overlooked is that some of these claims by individuals, even though considered small by Ralph Nader, represent the value of homes and personal property owned by employees of American companies operating in Cuba. Perhaps they had savings on deposit in the branch of an American-owned bank which was confiscated by Castro. The corporations under existing law could claim their losses as a business deduction, but it took legislation to permit the private individual citizen to claim as a casualty loss the value of his home or personal property that was confiscated.

Certainly this employee, as an American citizen, was entitled to the same consideration under our tax laws as were extended to corporations. That is what the 1964 legislation sought to accomplish.

Fourth. The Nader report claims that there was no precedent for such legislation allowing individual American citizens (not incorporated) to claim as a casualty loss the value of their private property which was seized or confiscated by a foreign government.

Answer. Again he is wrong.

To disprove that allegation I asked Dr. Laurence N. Woodworth, Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, to review the precedents of past Congressional action under similar circum-

stances as compared to the 1964 legislation relating to Cuban confiscation of property. (Dr. Woodworth was present at the Finance Committee meeting in 1964 when the Cuban legislation was approved.)

The Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation is composed of the five ranking members of the House Ways and Means Committee and the five ranking members of the Senate Finance Committee, with Congressman Wilbur Mills Chairman. It was my privilege to serve on this committee for 15 years.

I quote in full Dr. Woodworth's letter:

"CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION

"Washington, D.C., December 10, 1971.

"HON. JOHN J. WILLIAMS,
"Millsboro, Del.

"DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS: You inquired of me as to the background under which an amendment was offered to the Internal Revenue Code in 1964 relative to personal property confiscated by Cuba.

"Slightly before our entry into World War II, Congress made provision for war loss deductions which, in effect, achieved a result which was substantially similar to the confiscation loss deduction provided in the case of Cuba. Under the war loss provision, it was provided that property was treated as deductible if it was located in a country with which the United States was at war. The difference in circumstances, of course, made it impossible to follow the same format in the case of the Cuban losses. However, the result achieved was much the same.

"The amendment was first offered by you as an amendment to the Revenue Act of 1964 and subsequently, in that same year, you offered a second amendment to provide for technical problems (including the question of an effective date) in the Excise Tax Rate Extension Act of 1964. I have discussed with the Treasury Department their position on the 1964 legislation, and from their files it appears clear that they did not oppose the provision. In fact, a Treasury memorandum states, "There appears to be no valid reason why loss of personal property by reason of expropriation by a foreign country should not be allowed as a deduction to the same extent as casualties and thefts."

"The Finance Committee records indicate that on June 25, 1964, in an executive session of the Finance Committee, you asked the committee to approve an amendment which you intended to offer on the Senate floor to the Excise Tax Bill. The committee approved the offering of the amendment by a voice vote. I think this makes it clear that this amendment was offered with prior committee approval.

"I believe there is general agreement that the tax treatment of confiscations made by Cuba should be treated the same for tax purposes as war losses. This general policy is indicated by the treatment allowed losses in enemy countries under the war loss provision in World War II. The effect of this policy has been to treat losses of business property and these losses of nonbusiness property in the same manner. I might also say that it is my understanding that the Treasury is currently working on the treatment of expropriation losses in Chile. I would expect them to achieve a similar result as in the case of the Cuban expropriation losses. This might well, of course, require legislation along the same lines as the Cuban expropriation loss provision.

"Sincerely yours,

"LAURENCE H. WOODWORTH."

This letter clearly establishes that the 1964 legislation only gave to those American citizens whose property had been confiscated by the Castro government the same consideration under our tax laws—no more and no less—that Congress had in 1940 approved for Americans whose property in the war zone

had been seized. Dr. Woodworth points out that Congress historically has taken such action when a foreign government confiscates American-owned property without compensation to its owner. He also calls our attention to the fact that today the Treasury is working on plans for the treatment of expropriation losses in Chile and that here again they may require legislation along the same lines as the Cuban expropriation losses.

One question that will be asked—since Congress has always acted to give individual citizens the right to write off as a casualty loss the value or the cost (whichever is the lower) of their confiscated property and since they may have to act again in the case of Chile, why not make it a general law by just adding the word "confiscation" to the present definition of casualty loss, which covers fire, flood, earthquake, etc.?

That same question was raised during the discussion in committee in 1964, and the argument was made that it would not be advisable to write the word "confiscation" in the permanent Revenue Code as an additional definition of casualty losses since such action might serve as an encouragement to these foreign countries to go ahead and confiscate American property. They could use the argument that the American Government must be expecting such action since our tax laws provide relief for our citizens in the event of such confiscation. The committee agreed with the validity of this argument. That is why the legislation in World War II had been confined to just that situation. That is why the 1964 legislation was confined to just property confiscated by the Cuban government, and I am sure that any action taken in 1972 to provide relief concerning property of American citizens confiscated in Chile will mention that country only.

This is my answer to Ralph Nader, and all of this information and statistics were a matter of public record had the Nader group done its homework.

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,

Washington, D.C., December 10, 1971.

HON. JOHN J. WILLIAMS,
Millsboro, Del.

DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS: You have inquired whether the provisions of section 165 (i) of the Internal Revenue Code could be classified as special legislation, limited to a particular individual.

This amendment to the Code was not a private bill limited to a particular individual. Section 165(i) of the Code is a provision of general application providing a deduction to any taxpayer who satisfies its requirements. In November of 1964, the Internal Revenue Service issued a Technical Information Release calling the Public's attention to the provision and explaining its operation. A copy of this Technical Information Release is enclosed for your information.

We have no means of determining how many taxpayers have actually been allowed deductions under section 165(i) since this information is not included in the Statistics of Income published by the Internal Revenue Service.

If we can provide any additional information, do not hesitate to call us.

Sincerely,

EDWIN S. COHEN.

TECHNICAL INFORMATION RELEASE

The Internal Revenue Service called attention to the provisions of section 165 (i) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as added by section 238 of the Revenue Act of 1964 and as amended by section 3 of the Excise-Tax Rate Extension Act of 1964. Internal Revenue pointed out that section 165 (i), as amended, provides that in the case of an individual who was a citizen of the United States or a resident alien on December 31, 1958, any loss of property (not used in a trade or business or for income-producing

purposes) resulting from expropriation, intervention, seizure, or similar taking by the Government of Cuba, any political subdivision thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of the foregoing, is treated as a loss from a casualty within the meaning of section 165 (c) (3) (relating to limitation on losses of individuals) of the Code. Except in the case of intangible property, the expropriated property must have been held by the taxpayer and located in Cuba on December 31, 1958. Internal Revenue pointed out, however, that in the case of a Cuban expropriation loss of property used in a trade or business or for income producing purposes, the deductibility of such loss is not affected by section 165 (i) but continues to be governed by the rules provided in sections 165 (a) and 166 of the Code. See Revenue Ruling 62-197, C.B. 1962-2, 66.

Internal Revenue noted that there are special rules relating to a loss described in section 165 (i). Such a loss is treated as having been sustained on October 14, 1960, unless it is established that the loss was sustained on some other day. In determining the amount of the loss described in section 165 (i) to be taken into account for purposes of section 165 (a), it is necessary to determine the fair market value of the property immediately before the time when the loss is sustained. For this purpose, section 165 (i) provides that if property was held by an individual taxpayer on December 31, 1958, the fair market value of the property on that date shall be used. However, in the case of intangible property acquired by an individual after December 31, 1958, the fair market value of such property immediately before the time when the loss is sustained is its fair market value at such time. Internal Revenue further noted that the fair market value of any expropriated property immediately after the time when the loss is sustained shall be considered to be zero. Of course, the amount of the loss subject to section 165 may not exceed the adjusted basis of the property.

Internal Revenue also noted that in a case where amounts on deposit with a bank were stated in currency other than United States currency, it is necessary, in order to determine the amount of the loss, to convert such deposits to United States currency. Any amount on deposit which is expropriated will, to the extent that such amount does not exceed the amount on deposit on December 31, 1958, be deemed to be on deposit and held on December 31, 1958, and the amount of the loss with respect to that amount will be determined by using the rate of exchange on such date. The amount of the loss in respect of the excess (the amount expropriated over the amount on deposit on December 31, 1958) is determined by using the exchange rate on the day that the loss is sustained which, unless otherwise established, is October 14, 1960.

Also, Internal Revenue Service pointed out that the 3-year carryback and 5-year carryover rules as provided for in section 172, which are applicable in the case of section 165(c)(3) casualty losses, apply to section 165(i) expropriation losses. However, the special 10-year carryover for a foreign expropriation loss as defined in section 172(k) of the Code is not applicable for a loss within the meaning of section 165(i).

In any case where the statutory period of limitation has expired, refund or credit of any overpayment of tax attributable to the application of section 165(i) may nevertheless be made or allowed if claim therefor is filed before January 1, 1965. No interest may be allowed to the taxpayer on any overpayment of tax for any period before February 26, 1964 (the date of the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1964).

Section 165(i) applies in respect of losses sustained as the result of Cuban expropriations occurring before January 1, 1964, in taxable years ending after December 31, 1958.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROTH. I yield.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, I am delighted that my distinguished colleague has made the statement he has. No man ever stood in this Chamber with a record greater than that of John Williams. He was the very essence of integrity and ethical dealings. The fact that he would be charged with doing a favor in tax laws for a wealthy citizen of his State or any other State is not only outrageous; it is cruel; it is criminal.

John Williams will be remembered long after these little people have been forgotten.

I happen to know something about John Williams' work on the Committee on Finance, the committee of the Senate to which tax bills are referred.

This incident that we have discussed occurred in 1964, but it was prior to that time this particular family, the Du Pont family, was interested in a matter of legislation that was before the Senate Finance Committee. It will be recalled that the Supreme Court of the United States ordered a divestiture on the part of the Du Ponts of their General Motors stock. It was not a voluntary sale. It was a Court-ordered sale. Legislation was introduced in behalf of that company and the individuals involved. Senator Williams not only refused to join in introducing the legislation but he actively opposed it. Time and again I was startled at the legal ability of John Williams. If he had practiced law he would have been one of the greatest lawyers in the country.

He took that legislation and he pointed out errors in it. He pointed out, for instance, although these were unintentional errors, that perhaps a stenographer who bought this stock in recent times at a rather high price would have paid a greater tax than someone who had bought it at a lower price earlier—and other flaws. But he was against the legislation in principle because it was not the right legislation. That legislation never became law. Senator Williams was against it. I was against it. My recollection is that the chairman of the Finance Committee at that time also was against it.

Later on, a bill calling for treatment much less generous was passed and it affected all the people similarly situated.

But I saw, in that instance, John Williams taking action against a citizen of his own State because he was convinced in his mind and heart that the legislation was not the right answer. It was quite evident there had to be some legislation because of the court order divestiture, but what was first proposed, John Williams did not like because it went too far in granting relief. If it had not been for Senator Williams that legislation would probably have become law.

Now, these charges are utterly ridiculous. When Senators and the general public read what the distinguished Senator from Delaware (Mr. ROTH) has just placed in the Record today, they will find the full story. It was general legislation. It was for the benefit of all taxpayers similarly situated. It was a just claim.

The citizen of Delaware referred to, as I understand it, had 1 percent of property involved in the nonbusiness property that was seized.

It is basic in our tax law that if someone has a loss in property, it affects his taxes. In the same way, if there is a gain, the taxes increase. If there is a loss, the taxes are reduced. Losses are recognized in many ways. If one's house burns down and he had a loss greater than the amount for which it was insured, he can write that off as a loss on his tax return; or if he has a wind storm loss or many other kinds of losses.

There is a basic reason why confer action losses are handled in the manner that was followed in this case. If that was written into the law in advance, it would be a handicap to this Government, because it might be offensive to a foreign government in that we were insinuating that a foreign country was going to seize property. It also might lead to trumped up situations where it would be alleged that property was confiscated. So, in several instances, when there have been such losses by American citizens, the Internal Revenue Code has been amended so that these people who lost their property could be treated like any other American citizen.

If a taxpayer has a loss, it reduces his taxes and, in the same way, if there is a gain, his taxes would be increased. That is the law. It is just. It is for everyone.

This was not special legislation. The charges against Senator Williams made it appear that he used his position on the Finance Committee to slip something in the law unnoticed.

The records of the Finance Committee show a full discussion of this matter. Twelve Senators were present. It was presented on the floor of the Senate. It had the support of the Treasury Department. It was in no sense special legislation.

Again I want to commend the distinguished Senator from Delaware (Mr. ROTH) for setting the record straight, for righting a wrong against a good man, one of the best men who ever took the oath of office to serve as a U.S. Senator.

In one sense, John Williams needs no defense—and he does not. Anyone who has followed his work here would disbelieve these charges. But, after all, it is just and right that the record be set straight so that the entire public may have the benefit of the facts.

As to John Williams personally, he needs no defense. There is no force of evil in this country that can scar the man, or mar his good reputation, because it is too good. No one can do it.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Delaware yield?

Mr. ROTH. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I know nothing about the case which the distinguished Senator has brought up tonight. I was educated by what the distinguished Senator from Nebraska (Mr. CURTIS) has just said. But I do know John Williams, and John Williams was one of the truly great Senators, in my opinion, during the period I have served in this body, covering 19 years. John Williams played no favorites. He was just

as hard on a Republican administration as he was on a Democratic administration.

While we have had our differences on matters of legislation, I always found him to be honorable and decent. I always have known that when John Williams presented something to his colleagues on the floor of the Senate, or in the Committee on Finance, before he went very far, he had all the facts at his disposal. If he was questioned—and he was on occasion—he always had the answers and he had them from the source material.

So that anything said against John Williams, his honesty, his integrity, and his dedication and patriotism, I would resent; because I have nothing but the highest admiration and the greatest respect for a man who served the State of Delaware so well, who served the Senate so well, who served the Government so well, and who served the people of the United States superbly.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I, too, appreciate what the distinguished Senator from Delaware has just said. I join the majority leader in expressing not only our confidence in the integrity of our former colleague, John Williams, I also have very great respect for his knowing what he was doing and for his wise guidance which the Senator from New Jersey always found reliable and relied on, in fact, many times.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from New Jersey.

I yield now to the Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Delaware for bringing to the attention of the Senate the facts that he has submitted this afternoon.

I need not try to defend John Williams. His record does that adequately, completely, and to the satisfaction of every honest, fairminded American.

Certain words in the English language need no embellishment. We need no adjectives to spell out clearly and precisely what sort of man John Williams was and is. The words that come to my mind are honesty, integrity, loyalty, and patriotism, to mention four, each of which he measured up to in full amount.

I think that what has been said by our distinguished friend, the junior Senator from Nebraska (Mr. CURTIS), outlines, for those who may not have known, some of the reasons that prompted John Williams to do what any reasonable, fairminded, honest, and dedicated American would do. He acted in the best interests of all Americans, as he always did for the 24 years that he served in the Senate. For anyone to have expected anything less than that from John Williams would have simply called attention to the fact that such a person knew him not so well as those of us know him, because we would expect him to do just that.

The Senator from Nebraska (Mr. CURTIS) has pointed out the details for all who may not know what they should know in order better to understand why former Senator Williams did what he did. It needs no explanation. It needs no defense other than its own record.

I appreciate the efforts of the junior Senator from Delaware in saying what he has said about our former colleague, John Williams.

I think that all Americans who have taken the time to become interested in what has transpired in the last several weeks cannot help concluding that John Williams is not indicted for anything.

Ralph Nader, on the other hand, stands condemned by his own unfair, unethical, and inaccurate accusations.

I am certain that none of us finds it pleasant to have to say such things about any man. I am certain that Ralph Nader at one time was held in high esteem by many Americans as a young, interested, and dedicated person who wanted to help plead the cause of those who were not always able to get the public ear.

It is with some regret that I now find him seeming to display a greater interest in headlines and in the sort of flamboyancy that characterize his attitude in this respect, his willingness to distort the facts, and his willingness to tell half truths and innuendos, and to seek to associate that sort of situation with a very greatly respected and deeply loved former Member of this body in order to add to his own image. Has it, indeed, added to Mr. Nader's image? I believe it has served only to disclose what kind of man Ralph Nader really is. It is the sort of image that I suspect he would just as soon not have, because tonight there can be no doubt at all in the mind of any fair-minded person that Ralph Nader, by his own act, has condemned himself. All Americans from now on will have to look behind the statements he makes to determine what the facts are, and they will have to probe more deeply than the headlines that he has succeeded in having bannered across the newspapers in order to be certain that they know what he is talking about and to be certain that they know the truth and not half truths about anyone that Ralph Nader may be trying to condemn. That is too bad. However, that was Ralph Nader's choice. Seeking to keep in the limelight makes some men do strange things.

John Williams will be revered, loved, and respected long after Ralph Nader is gone and forgotten.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Delaware yield?

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Alabama.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished Senator from Delaware for coming to the defense of a great, former U.S. Senator, John Williams.

The junior Senator from Alabama had the pleasure of serving with former Senator Williams for some 2 years. However, prior to that time, for some 20 years he had admired the great John Williams for his integrity, for his honor, for his ability, and for his fairness.

To know John Williams was to know that not only would he not be guilty of any improper action, but also that he simply could not be guilty of any improper action, because it was certainly not without cause that he was known as Mr. Integrity here in the Senate.

His leadership in matters of ethics, his leadership in matters of economy, and his leadership in the matter of honesty in Government is unexcelled.

Certainly the junior Senator from Alabama was as proud to follow the leadership of John Williams in these matters.

Former Senator Williams has long been one of the political heroes of the junior Senator from Alabama. He knows that that great Senator has not been guilty of any sort of impropriety, that he has not been guilty of any improper action. And the junior Senator from Alabama is delighted that his successor in the Senate has come to the defense of John Williams in the able fashion that he has.

I would like also to commend the distinguished junior Senator from Delaware on his following in the footsteps and following the leadership of former Senator Williams.

It was with pleasure that the junior Senator from Alabama noted that the distinguished junior Senator from Delaware submitted an amendment to the tax bill seeking to set a ceiling on the expenditures of the Government for the present fiscal year. That is an amendment that former Senator John Williams of Delaware would have been proud of. I commend the junior Senator from Delaware for the great record that he is making in the Senate in relation to following the leadership and following in the footsteps of John Williams.

I am delighted that the junior Senator from Delaware has made an explanation of these charges that have been made against former Senator Williams.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I thank the junior Senator from Alabama for his gracious remarks.

In closing, I would like to echo what the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. CURTIS) had to say about former Senator Williams, that he knows of no man with a finer mind or more brilliance than John Williams and that he would have indeed made a great lawyer if that was his chosen profession. He is known as a man of great integrity.

I think the one thing he will be better known for than anything else is the fact that he lived by the standard he chose for others. There was nothing John expected of others that he did not perform with excellence himself.

I can say, with due humility, that I would not be here if Senator Williams did not practice what he preached. He well could have been reelected in the last election without any effort on his part. He was most popular in our State. But the good Senator felt that a man should not serve beyond the age of 70, and because he was 65, he chose to step down even though he was at the peak of his mental powers and certainly he was important on the Washington scene.

Again, I thank the many Senators here who have joined in these remarks about a great man.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROTH. I yield.

Mr. ALLEN. Did not Senator Williams have a constitutional amendment that he had offered that provided that no person could be sworn in as Senator after having reached the age of 65, and having introduced such an amendment he felt he should be bound by that amendment even though it never did pass the Senate? Was that not a mark of his honesty and integrity?

Mr. ROTH. He lived by his words. The Senator is correct.

Mr. ALLEN. I thank the Senator.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I want to commend the distinguished Senator from Delaware (Mr. ROTH) for his excellent statement concerning the charges made against our former colleague, Senator John Williams.

Those of us who know John Williams realize how ridiculous such charges were, how baseless they are in fact, as the distinguished Senator from Delaware and the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. CURTIS) have demonstrated.

John Williams personally needs no defense from his friends and colleagues in the Senate. His record during his 24 years in the Senate speaks eloquently of his complete dedication to the best interests

of the United States, first, last, and always.

I am glad the Senator from Delaware has made his statement. And I wish to associate myself with him and the others who have spoken.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa is recognized.

(The remarks of Mr. MILLER when he introduced Senate Joint Resolution 185 are printed in the morning business section of the RECORD under Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.)

QUORUM CALL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS TO FILE A REPORT AND PERTINENT MATERIAL UNTIL MIDNIGHT TONIGHT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Foreign Relations may have until midnight tonight to file a report and any other pertinent material necessary.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 9 A.M.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if there be no further business to come before the Senate, I move, in accordance with the previous order, that the Senate stand in adjournment until 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 6:26 p.m.) the Senate adjourned until tomorrow, Friday, December 17, 1971, at 9 a.m.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—Thursday, December 16, 1971

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward G. Latch, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Unto you is born this day in the city of David a Saviour, who is Christ the Lord.—Luke 2: 11.

O God of light and life, whose greatness is love and whose glory is peace, we thank Thee for Christmas and for the good will this season spreads around the world. May this spirit permeate the heart of all mankind as we think of Him whose birthday we celebrate. Help us to welcome Him and to make room for Him on all our common days.

Open our ears that we may hear again the angelic chorus of old: open our eyes that we may see the star that shines forever in our sky: open our lips that we

may sing with uplifted voices "unto us is born a Saviour who is Christ the Lord."

In us and in all men may there be a new nativity of His spirit of peace and good will. May the Lord bless us and keep us through these demanding days. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER. The Chair has examined the Journal of the last day's proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof.

Without objection, the Journal stands approved.

There was no objection.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. Arrington, one of its clerks, announced

that the Senate agrees to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 6065) entitled "An act to amend section 903(c)(2) of the Social Security Act."

The message also announced that the Senate receded from its amendments Nos. 6 and 7 to the amendment of the House to the bill (S. 2878) entitled "An act to amend the District of Columbia Election Act, and for other purposes", and, that the Senate agreed to the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate numbered 12 to the amendment of the House to the above-entitled bill.