The motion was agreed to; and (at 7 o'clock and 7 minutes p.m.) the Senate recessed until tomorrow, Thursday, August 5, 1971, at 8:45 a.m.

CONFIRMATIONS

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate August 4 (legislative day of August 3), 1971:

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Johnnie M. Walters, of South Carolina, to be Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD

Peter C. Benedict, of Virginia, to be a member of the National Mediation Board for the term expiring July 1, 1974.

OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

John Dickson Baldeschwieler, of California, to be Deputy Director of the Office of Science and Technology.

U.S. AIR FORCE

The following officer to be placed on the retired list, in the grade of lieutenant general, under the provisions of section 8962, title 10, of the United States Code:

Lt. Gen. Selmon W. Wells, [redacted] FR (major general, Regular Air Force), U.S. Air Force.

The following officer to be assigned to a position of importance and responsibility designated by the President, in the grade of lieutenant general, under the provisions of section 8066, title 10, of the United States Code:

Maj. Gen. Louis L. Wilson, Jr., [redacted] FR (major general, Regular Air Force), U.S. Air Force.

U.S. NAVY

Vice Adm. Thomas F. Connolly, U.S. Navy, for appointment to the grade of vice admiral, when retired, pursuant to the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 5233.

U.S. MARINE CORPS

The following-named officers of the Marine Corps for temporary appointment to the grade of major general:

Harry C. Olson
Ralph H. Spanjer
Fred E. Haynes, Jr.
Lawrence F. Snoddy, Jr.
Ross T. Dwyer, Jr.
Joseph C. Fegan, Jr.
Leslie E. Brown

The following-named officers of the Marine Corps for temporary appointment to the grade of brigadier general:

William L. McCulloch
Robert W. Taylor
Adolph G. Schwenk
William H. Lanagan, Jr.
Francis W. Vaught
Robert L. Nichols
Clyde R. Mann
Albert C. Pommerenk
Herbert L. Wilkerson
Manning T. Jannell
Ernest R. Reid, Jr.

IN THE ARMY

The nominations beginning Robert W. Sherwood, to be lieutenant colonel, and ending Strathmore K. McMurdo, Jr., to be second lieutenant, which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the Congressional Record on July 14, 1971.

IN THE NAVY

The nominations beginning Doyle E. Campbell, to be commander, and ending Ronald R. Yates, to be lieutenant (junior grade), which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the Congressional Record on July 14, 1971.

IN THE MARINE CORPS

The nominations beginning Paul R. Ahrens, to be second lieutenant, and ending Stephen L. Shivers, to be second lieutenant which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the Congressional Record on July 14, 1971.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—*Wednesday, August 4, 1971*

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

The Chaplain, Rev. Edward G. Latch, D.D., offered the following prayer:

If we confess our sins, He is faithful and just to forgive us our sins and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness.—I John 1: 9.

We thank Thee, our Father, that in the stress and strain of daily living we may pause a moment before the altar of prayer and lift our hearts unto Thee.

We confess that we have not lived up to our own high ideals. We have done many things we ought not to have done and left undone many things we ought to have done. Forgive us, we pray Thee, and help us to amend our ways. By Thy grace may we not waste time in vain regrets nor take ourselves too seriously but in humility and with courage and faith may we enter this new day to do the work Thou hast given us to do, in the spirit of Christ our Lord. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER. The Chair has examined the Journal of the last day's proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof.

Without objection, the Journal stands approved.

There was no objection.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate, by Mr. Arrington, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed without amendment a bill of the House of the following title:

H.R. 9798. An act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to establish the Lincoln Home National Historic Site in the State of Illinois, and for other purposes.

The message also announced that the Senate agrees to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 9272) entitled "An act making appropriations for the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and related agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972, and for other purposes."

The message also announced that the Senate agreed to the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate numbered 26, to the foregoing bill.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER

The SPEAKER. The Chair desires to make a statement. Until the conference report on the draft bill is disposed of the Chair is not going to receive unanimous-consent requests, but will thereafter, due to the fact that we are trying to adjourn the House as soon as possible.

CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 6531, EXTENSION AND REVISION OF THE DRAFT ACT AND RELATED LAWS

Mr. COLMER. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 578 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution as follows:

H. RES. 578

Resolved, That immediately upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to consider the conference report on the bill (H.R. 6531) to amend the Military Selective Service Act of 1967; to increase military pay; to authorize military active duty strengths for fiscal year 1972; and for other purposes, and all points of order against said conference report are hereby waived.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Mississippi is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. COLMER. Mr. Speaker, I yield the customary 30 minutes for the minority to the able and distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. SMITH); and, Mr. Speaker, pending that I yield myself such time as I may consume. I assure the Speaker and those Members present that the time consumed will be brief.

Mr. Speaker, the House some 7 or 8 weeks ago passed the so-called draft bill. It went over to the other body, and that body placed a substantial number of amendments upon that bill, and it went to conference.

Among the amendments which were placed on the bill was the so-called Mansfield amendment.

I think most of the Members are familiar with the Mansfield amendment and its purpose. When the bill got to conference the conferees had some difficulty in coming to an agreement on the issue and on the language involved. To be plain and specific and blunt about it, the Senate amendment, the so-called Mansfield amendment, specified a time for withdrawal of all of our troops in Vietnam.

The House conferees, under the able leadership—and I emphasize that—the able leadership of the chairman of that committee, the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. HÉBERT), and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ARENDS), upheld the House position in the matter, but finally, as in all matters of this nature, there was some necessity for compromise.

The compromise arrived at, in my judgment, upholds the position of the House. It also gives the President of the United States, the Commander in Chief,

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some elasticity in trying to wind up this unfortunate war rather than allowing 535 quarterbacks, in this body and the other one, attempting to call the signals along a particular line.

Mr. Speaker, I was attempting to observe to anyone interested in my own opinion on this matter, that the President of the United States is responsible more than anyone else for trying to wind up this war, and you cannot have 535 other people trying to tell him how to do it, particularly when he is doing his best to wind up, I repeat, an unfortunate and tragic war.

I could go on and talk for hours about that if time and your patience permitted it. However, that is the principal thing involved here.

Your Committee on Rules has had its own difficulty in coming to a conclusion about what type of rule we should have. Well, we finally came up with a rule waiving all points of order against the conference report.

Mr. Speaker, let me say for the benefit of those who are inclined to be critical of that position that the Committee on Rules last year adopted, not a rule, but a policy that we would not grant general waivers, but would require the legislative committees to point out the specific points of order which they desired to have waived.

This conference report presented so many parliamentary problems that it was recommended to the committee that a general waiver should be granted.

As one of the less—well, as one of the more humble members of that committee, I was constrained to go along with that recommendation, but other members of the committee—with justification, and I want to emphasize that—thought that we should follow our present policy.

But we ran into stumbling blocks. We were told that it was highly desirable, if not necessary, since the matter originated in the House of Representatives, that the House act upon the conference report first. Another argument was made that the other body would not act upon it before the recess, and therefore we should not act now.

But somewhere along the line our committee in our branch of the Congress had to take the initiative, and that is what we did. As I pointed out a moment ago, with considerable reluctance the committee came to the conclusion of granting a general waiver. And that is the rule you have before you.

Mr. Speaker, I want to briefly comment on the other side. I do not like it. Some of you do not like it, but what are you going to do? I understand some people are saying, "We are going to vote down the previous question."

Well, what does that get you? Of course, if you are against a continuation of the draft I can understand that position, but if you happen to subscribe to my theory that we have got to have the draft, at least for the foreseeable future, then what do you gain by voting down the previous question, and what would you have before you then?

I do not know what those who propose that program would gain by it. If that should happen then I hope that the House will sustain the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Rules, both of whom have labored earnestly and conscientiously on this subject. I urge you to vote up the previous question and adopt the rule and the conference report.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, this year the Committee on Rules has brought to the floor a number of really different type rules, maybe rather unique at times. This I think is a rather unique situation. I would like to take these few minutes to explain my opinion as to why we happen to be where we are today.

As you will recall the House passed this bill back I believe on April 1, several months ago. There was a delay as I understand it among the conferees before they came up with a report. Primarily their problems were in connection with the so-called Mansfield amendment. There are a number of points of order that can be raised so far as the conference report is concerned—at least seven were presented to the Committee on Rules. And as the distinguished chairman has stated we are attempting to get specifics on each point of order and include this in the resolution rather than a general waiver.

In view of the Reorganization Act passed last year those of us on the Committee on Rules felt that in this instance at least two of the seven should not have a waiver of points of order.

One of those has to do with the date which both the House and Senate bills set—the date for the enactment of the pay provisions of this legislation, as being the first day of the first month following its becoming law.

As the bill passed both bodies the date would be September 1, assuming congressional action is completed this week. The conferees changed that making the effective date October 1. Clearly that is a violation of the Reorganization Act which we passed last year.

The other has to do with the amendment offered here in the House by the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. BROYHILL) having to do with the induction of the remaining persons in a family and as to whether or not he would have to go if a father, brother, or sister previously had been killed. That was changed by the conferees to tie down as I understand it the particular conflict that we are now engaged in, and to limit it to relatives of the whole blood. In any event I think it clearly would be subject to a point of order; so we decided in the Committee on Rules that we would write a special rule. We waived points of order on all the other five but would not waive points of order on these two.

That is what we first did. It was brought to our attention that this cannot be done—that the conference report is a single amendment, with the result that if any part of it were stricken out then the entire conference report would fall.

The Rules Committee could write a rule and just say that if any part or parts of the conference report are stricken out it shall not affect the balance of the conference report, any precedents or rules to the contrary notwithstanding. I think that would work—up to a certain point. The Committee on Rules can report anything to the floor that we wish to propose to you so long as it is not unconstitutional—and it is up to the majority of the Members as to whether or not they adopt our proposal. We cannot do anything about changing the rules ourselves.

The majority of Members present and voting must agree with the proposal that is sent down. If our first decision would work we would get clear down to the end of the street, but we could not get home—it would be a deadend. Let us assume that the first amendment which I mentioned were stricken out because of the change in the date, as well as the other one concerning the family relationship. Then we get down to the question—assuming we pass the rest of the conference report—how are you going to get home from there? Very frankly I do not know how you are going to get home from there because you have the same conference report adopted without two parts—at least two parts—and there may be other points of order that could be made which were not brought to our attention. It would be an incomplete conference report.

In any event we are getting down the end of the street where we do not have a conference report and where we are either going to have to have new conferees or the present conferees are going to have to go back and start all over again.

I thus came to the conclusion that I was wrong and in order for this matter to be considered here today we would have to waive all points of order.

Now, I want the House to know I am going along with it because I think it is so important that this measure be voted upon this week. From that standpoint, I will go along and I intend to support the rule, and I intend to support the conference report. But I want the record clearly to show that I do not like the conferees coming in here in violation of the Rules of the House and the Reorganization Act which we passed last year. This is the first important measure that has come in where the conferees turn around and violate the rules we fought so hard to place into the Reorganization Act.

So I want to state that, so far as I am concerned, this is not a precedent which I intend to follow in future matters. If conferees bring in subjects or material which are outside the scope of authority of the conference as defined by clause 3 of rule 28, they should not expect the Rules Committee to protect them.

Mr. COLMER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMITH of California. I am glad to yield to the distinguished chairman.

Mr. COLMER. The gentleman has first stated what I wanted to emphasize. Since he has said, that so far as he is concerned, this is not setting a precedent, I would like to add to the statement of my able friend that we want to serve

notice now that this is not setting a precedent that we in the committee expect to follow. We treat these matters on their own individual basis, and it does not mean that we do not expect to follow our general policy of pointing out specifically the points rather than making general waivers.

Mr. SMITH of California. I thank the distinguished chairman.

There is one further point that I would like to talk about and that is with respect to the effective date of the pay provisions. Unless the other body acts on the conference report this week, the question would be moot, for if the conference report is not finally adopted until September, it would not become effective until October 1 in any event.

Some of the Members who are in support of changing these two parts of the conference report have indicated to me that they would possibly try to vote down the previous question on the rules. So far as I am concerned, I think that would be an unwise thing to do. We would simply be wasting our time, because if you vote down the previous question, you will never be able to proceed any further from that point. You would not have anything then. It would then be up to the conferees to determine whether or not they wish to bring the conference report back to the floor simply under what would be, in effect, regular procedure—with no waivers of points of order. They could call up the conference report at any time. At least seven things would be stricken out, and we would be worse off than we would have been a long time ago.

So rather than voting down the previous question, I think if Members are going to try to do so, they should merely vote against the rule, because technically if you vote down the previous question, then one of the Members who is opposed to the rule and has led the fight against it would be recognized by the Speaker for the purpose of offering an amendment. If the Speaker recognizes a Member for the purpose of offering an amendment, what could he offer? The only thing he could offer would be the same thing the Rules Committee has attempted to do in the first place—and we would be right back where we started in the beginning. We shall be at the end of the street and we will not get home.

So far as I am concerned, Mr. Speaker, there is justification to approve House Resolution 578, to waive all points of order. Let the distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee explain their conference report, and then all Members can subsequently vote in accordance with their desires.

Mr. Speaker, I urge adoption of the rule. I reserve the balance of my time, and in that regard I do have some requests for time.

Mr. COLMER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. SISK).

Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, as one of those who supported the Draft Act and supported a 2-year extension of that act, I well recognize the importance of the issue coming before us today.

I think it is essential that we do pass this act and permit the necessary activities in order to give us the security force that our country is entitled to. However, let me say I am going to vote against this rule. I am not here advocating anyone to follow my lead in that, and this may sound a little bit foolish, but I am simply going to assert my privilege as an individual, to express my displeasure with what occurred in connection with this conference.

I am not here condemning the distinguished gentleman from Louisiana, our able chairman of the Committee on Armed Services and his conferees, and I can well understand the very difficult situation they had in the conference. I am doing it rather to serve notice on the other body that our rules are somewhat sacred to us, and we passed these rules to be abided by, to give us orderly procedures, and that we are not going to continuously stand aside for nongermane material, for legislating within the confines of a conference, but that we, as individuals, are going to jealously guard the prerogatives of this House in having rules and abiding by the rules which we have.

I recognize that upon every occasion after the conferees have gone through a very serious and sometimes controversial conference, we are going to find a situation that, to some extent, seems to be a crisis. There is going to be an emergency. We are going to hear this time after time. It just simply seems to me that now is the time that we should have drawn the line.

It was for that reason that I moved the substitute rule to the one which is here before us today, the one which actually waived points of order on five items but did not waive points of order on two additional items, and to specify those items on which we were waiving points of order.

I still maintain that we could have written a rule that would have permitted this.

In this instance I find myself in some disagreement with the leadership. I think, as I say, we could have written a rule that would have permitted us to have knocked out those two points, which are in direct contradiction to actions taken almost unanimously by this House just last year, and provided for substitution of other language, and for sending it back to the other body, take it or leave it. Unfortunately we did not get the kind of cooperation we needed to carry that out, so we are here today with this rule.

I appreciate the position of our friend and colleague, the chairman of the committee, the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. COLMER) and my friend, the gentleman from California (Mr. SMITH) and their position. I well understand their position, and I sympathize with it. As I said, it just seems to me, though, that it is imperative that we take a position.

I understand the concern about the Draft Act. I want it extended. I recognize the need. I think we all recognize, though, the facts of life here today. Nothing is going to happen to this act in the other body this week, and we would be lucky if anything happened to it over there before the 1st of October.

Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SISK. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speaker, I commend the gentleman for his statement.

Did I understand the gentleman to say he was going to vote against the rule?

Mr. SISK. Yes; I want to join the gentleman in his statement that I think it would be a waste of time to vote down the previous question.

Mr. SMITH of California. That is what I understood.

Mr. SISK. There is nothing to be gained by voting down the previous question, because under the procedure we find ourselves in now, there is nothing to be gained.

I am not asking anyone to join me, but I am going to vote against the rule just to express my strong feeling and give notification to the other body, as well as my own colleagues and to all the Members, that we do not propose to join in this waiving of points of order.

Mr. SMITH of California. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. BROYHILL).

Mr. BROYHILL of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the rule. The House today faces its first test of a provision of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, under which conferees are prohibited or limited regarding the insertion of new or nongermane language into conference reports.

The conference report on the draft extension bill contains seven violations of these new rules, against which points of order could be made. Regrettably, the Rules Committee has recommended that this conference report be considered under a rule waiving all points of order.

I would like to discuss one of these provisions which has been changed by the conferees. During the floor debate on the draft bill, I offered an amendment which was accepted by the House by a large majority. My amendment expanded the present sole-surviving son law to provide that no young man who had lost a member of his immediate family for service-connected causes would be subject to the draft.

A similar amendment was offered during the Senate debate by Senator BOB PACKWOOD and accepted by the Senate. The intent of the amendments was the same, although Senator PACKWOOD added language providing that any young man already serving in the military who became eligible under this provision could be discharged. It is because of this additional language in the Senate version that this part of the draft bill was a conferable point.

The conference committee, in resolving the differences in the House and Senate language, took the language of the Senate bill for the conference version. However, the conferees took it upon themselves to add a date of effectiveness which appeared in neither the House or

the Senate version and which severely limits the impact of this change in the law. This added language provides that exemption shall apply in the case of family members lost subsequent to December 31, 1959.

This limitation severely restricts the effect of the provision and for all intents and purposes nullifies exemption from the draft for any young man whose father died as a result of World War II or the Korean war. The amendment as passed by the House implied a limit on its effectiveness by the family members listed—father, brother, or sister. The original language would limit the effectiveness to one generation and would vary with the circumstances in each family.

This unwarranted change from the House and Senate versions is a flagrant violation of the rules of the House—rule 28, clause 3. This is the first test of this important rule on a piece of legislation before the House.

Mr. Speaker, I cannot make a point of order against this new language in the conference report. I oppose the rule for this reason and I urge my colleagues to do likewise. By adopting this rule, the House would negate a key provision of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970.

It has been argued that the need for the passage of the draft extension is too urgent to take the additional time needed to return the bill to conference. I say to you that the test of this rule adopted by the House last year will not come on an easy bill but on a difficult one. It would not be difficult for the conferees to meet and resolve these points. If the House does not insist on this course, we will be setting a dangerous precedent for conference committees in the future.

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BROYHILL of North Carolina. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. LATTA. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I just want to say I am very much for the gentleman's amendment, and regret the fact that the conferees did not see fit to adopt it. Unfortunately, the parliamentary situation does not permit us to adopt the amendment on the floor today. I would hope the gentleman would pursue the matter in separate legislation.

Mr. BROYHILL of North Carolina. Certainly if we are defeated today in this attempt I am going to introduce legislation, and would hope the committee would give it proper attention.

Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished minority leader, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. GERALD R. FORD).

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, at the outset let me say I voted for the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970. I believe in the basic aims and objectives of that reform legislation. I believe in most, if not all, of its provisions.

I regret that on this occasion we are apparently to some extent violating some of the intent and some of the provisions of that legislation. I add, however, that I do not consider this action here today a precedent for any subsequent situations that might arise. In that I agree with the gentleman from California and the gentleman from Mississippi.

Let me say this about the substance of the conference report. I say this because we have received, all of us, a circular letter from several of our Members on both sides of the aisle raising some questions about the substance and particularly as it relates to several of the points of order that might have been made.

I should say categorically, as I have said before, that I believe in the concept of a volunteer military organization. It is my impression that the bill passed by the House in late March or early April was a big step in that regard primarily because it added substantially to the pay for those who initially volunteered for military service. The President had recommended a pay increase that involved $1,049 million in 1 year in order to induce young people to volunteer for the military. The House version increased that pay increase to $2.7 billion annually. The other body took a somewhat different approach, but the net effect of their action was to increase the pay in a 1-year span by $2,789 million. Now the conference report calls for an annual pay increase of $2,384 million, which is $1.3 billion over what the President asked for.

I concede it is less of a pay increase than either the House or the Senate version, but let me say that a pay increase of $2,384 million in 1 year is a substantial inducement for young people to join the military service on a volunteer basis.

Mr. Speaker, I defend what the conference committee did in taking this substantial step toward a volunteer military force.

I do not think you should vote against the resolution for the rule. I do not think you should vote against the conference report just because of the action in this regard taken by the conferees. They have been generous. They have taken a big step forward, and I think the conference report ought to be supported.

Secondly, the gentleman from North Carolina offered an amendment during the consideration of the bill in the House involving sole survivors of a family affected by the draft. I supported that amendment. The Senate made a change in regard to the so-called Broyhill amendment. The conferees came back with a slightly different version. The gentleman from North Carolina should take pride in the fact that his amendment is substantially in the conference report. It is not identical with what he proposed, but it is about 90 percent of what he recommended and what the House approved. All of us here on both sides of the aisle know that if you end up with a 90-percent version of what you recommend, that is not a bad batting average in this league.

I do not think you ought to oppose the rule. I do not think you ought to oppose the conference report on this ground. I think we ought to compliment the Congress and we ought to be grateful to the gentleman from North Carolina for initiating this legislation.

The SPEAKER. The time of the gentleman from Michigan has expired.

Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 additional seconds to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, let me conclude by saying that the conference report does incorporate a version of the Mansfield amendment. Personally, I did not believe we ought to have a Mansfield amendment, or a Nedzi-Whalen amendment in the legislation, but we have a constructive version in the conference report. I am willing to accept it.

I think it is probably a step forward in light of all the developments. I hope and trust that we vote for the resolution and we vote for the conference report. This is important legislation and it ought to be enacted now.

The SPEAKER. The time of the gentleman from Michigan has again expired.

The gentleman from California (Mr. SMITH) has 11½ minutes remaining.

Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3½ minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. STEIGER).

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, last year at this time the spirit of reform prevailed in the House as we fashioned the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970. In a burst of creative energy, this body fashioned the most sweeping revision of the legislative process in modern times. Now, less than a year later, we are faced with the first major test of its effectiveness.

There is much that is good, Mr. Speaker, in the conference report—particularly the manner in which the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. HÉBERT) upheld the views of the House on the Mansfield amendment. It is with the greatest reluctance that I have opposed his request for a waiver of points of order, because he has done such an outstanding job over the years in providing for the welfare of our soldiers. As one who supported the need for a year's extension of the draft in order to make a smooth transition to the volunteer force, and as one who voted for final passage of H.R. 6531, I have no desire to delay final action on the bill—in fact, I am hopeful that if a point of order is made and sustained, the conferees would meet and return quickly with a real compromise on military pay. But I cannot sit by while an attempt is made to force the House to accept a measure which blatantly violates the most important legislative reform of the modern era, and which severely discriminates against our men and women in uniform.

Clause 3 of rule 28 allows conferees to amend only the differences committed to them. Both the Senate and the House provided for enactment of the pay raises on the first day of the first month after enactment, in this case September 1. But the conferees decided to delay the pay increases until October 1 against the will of both the House and the Senate.

The Rules Committee, recognizing the validity and importance of this point, voted 9 to 6 on Monday to allow a point of order on this matter. Yet, now a rule has been granted waiving all points of order against this direct violation of the Legislative Reorganization Act.

I would point out to the House that under the pay rates in effect today—and

which the Defense Department has assured me will not be cut in spite of the expiration of the Dependents Assistance Act—a recruit with a wife and two children receives total compensation of only $3,500 a year, compared to the Federal poverty level of $3,900 for a family of the same size.

Mr. Speaker, today we have heard much about the possibility that first-term pay will be cut. But Defense has assured me that no such cut will be made. In whose interest, then, was the Legislative Reorganization Act violated?

Was the Legislative Reorganization Act violated in the interest of the 330,000 married first-termers who must depend on a military compensation system that is a national disgrace?

Was the Legislative Reorganization Act violated in the interest of the 142,-527 military families who would be eligible for food stamps if criteria were applied uniformly?

Was the Legislative Reorganization Act violated in the interest of the several thousand GI's receiving welfare payments? Or the service families of 21 States which refuse to give aid to military personnel which is available to civilians at the same income level?

Was it violated in the interest of the 134,000 first-termers who are forced to moonlight, often in two jobs, in order to support their families? Or the thousands more who cannot moonlight because their KP and guard duties leave them little free time?

Was it violated in the interest of 117,-000 wives of junior enlisted men—many with preschool children—who hold down full-time jobs in order to supplement their husband's poverty level wages?

Was the Legislative Reorganization Act violated in the interest of the 1,600 Fort Gordon families who must live in grossly substandard housing? Or the 5,-429 Fort Hood families who must live in equally inadequate housing? Or was it violated in the interest of the 2,918 married men at Fort Hood—many of them Vietnam veterans—who could not bring their families to Texas to join them because of inadequate financial means?

I submit, Mr. Speaker, that the violation of the Legislative Reorganization Act is not in the interest of our men and women in uniform. The impact of the delay has been compounded by the violations in terms of regular military compensation. The House bill provided the recruit with $5,036 a year, the Senate set his pay at $5,320 a year, yet the conferees reduced him to only $4,872. Thus, the annual increase for the recruit of $1,707 was less than the increase than the $1,898 raise they granted the four star general, the $1,788 slated for a lieutenant general, or the $1,709 for a major general.

Now I am not opposed for increases for our senior officers—I supported them in the House bill and I will support them in a compromise—but I am unalterably opposed to violating the Legislative Reorganization Act in order to provide increases for the generals at the expense of the recruits.

In closing, Mr. Speaker, I should like to quote from a letter I received from the Navy's senior enlisted man, Master Chief Petty Officer J. D. Whittet:

DEAR MR. STEIGER: I read your article in Sunday's WASHINGTON POST concerning the inequities in military pay for low ranking enlisted people with great interest.

The physical and mental suffering, that psychological deprivation and deterioration, and the social indignities you outlined are all true. They exist and will continue to exist until taxpayers and legislators realize that military service is not servitude and that people are more important than property. I sincerely hope your article in the POST will point out the horrible financial facts of life to those unaware of them and affect a rapid change in such conditions.

Mr. Speaker, we can legislate those changes today. I urge rejection of the rule.

Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3½ minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. GUBSER).

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Speaker, in the brief time allocated to me I would like to make one point—and respond to another point.

In the first place if we do not pass this very quickly the Department of Defense is going to be forced to dip into the pool of those who have been previously deferred and that includes fathers and students. If this happens I predict that you will hear from a great many citizens across the country.

Mr. Speaker, the second point is one which I make by way of response. The gentleman from Wisconsin in his remarks to the House yesterday made the point that the total compensation figure in the conference report is $2.4 billion—which is less than the $2.7 billion in the House bill, or the Senate bill and therefore violates House rules.

The gentleman from Wisconsin is confusing the concept of military compensation. This is not just salary. There is basic pay. There is quarters allowances. And there is dependents' assistance allowances.

If you take each of these considerations by themselves you will find that the conference report is within the limits of both the House and the Senate bills.

The basic pay recommendations of the two bodies range from a low of $1.8 billion up to $2.6 billion. In the case of basic pay, the conferees agreed to accept the House figure.

In the case of quarters allowances the House had recommended an increase of $842 million. The Senate had cut this to $79 million. The compromise agreement was on the figure of $515.7 million. It was this cut on this individual item which forced the entire conference report below the House-passed bill.

Now let us take an example. If you had two military construction projects—one project A for $1 million as it passed the House, and project B for $5 million as it passed the House. The Senate reverses the figure on project A so that project A gets $5 million and project B gets $1 million. Now the total overall figure is $6 million in both Houses. If you compromise that at $3 million for project A and $1 million for project B you would have a total of $4 million which would be $2 million below the total figure in each House.

But it is certainly not in violation of the rules. The business of the conference is to settle each individual item. And when you compromise between the limits set by both Houses on individual items, you can quite possibly come out below the overall figure of either House.

Mr. Speaker, I hope this clarifies the issue. Certainly it emphasizes the point that the House conferees did not go below or beyond the limits and that they acted responsibly. We must adopt this rule and this conference report.

Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3½ minutes of the 4 remaining minutes on this side to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON).

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, the discussion of the resolution this afternoon has already made it perhaps abundantly clear that the Committee on Rules was faced with the proverbial Hobson's choice in reporting this resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I rise to defend the rule under which this conference report has been brought to the floor. I do not do so because I necessarily condone everything the conferees have done; the fact is, I share some of the displeasure of my colleagues over the controversial changes made in this report. I do not defend this rule because I think the Congress can ignore with impunity the provisions of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970; the fact is I was a strong supporter of that act and think we should adhere to its provisions to the maximum extent feasible. Therefore, I do not intend by my vote in Rules Committee and my defense of this rule today to signal that the floodgates have been opened and a precedent established which future conferees can somehow count on. The fact is I would want to serve clear warning today that I would be extremely reluctant to grant such a rule in the future.

Why then do I defend this rule? I defend this rule because I think we are confronted with an extraordinary and emergency situation; namely, the expiration of the President's induction authority and the disruptive effects this will have on our military manpower program and the threat this consequently poses to our national security. The fact is, this bill could be bounced back and forth between the conference and the floor from now until Christmas and beyond if everyone who differs with one aspect or another of this report insisted upon having their way. And as I indicated earlier, I am not entirely pleased with everything contained in this report. But it seems to me there is a larger interest involved here than these individual points of difference, and that is the national security interest. The overriding issue before us today is whether we are willing to bite the bullet and provide the President with the necessary continuity in meeting our defense manpower needs. Whether the pay increase provided for under this bill takes effect on September 1 or October 1 will be a moot question if this matter is not resolved before the recess. And while I realize that there is some doubt that the other body will complete action on this by that time, I think our decisive action on this today may have a positive

impact on expediting this in the other body. But regardless of what the realistic chances of this might be, I think it would ill behoove us to engage in the delaying tactics for which the other body is noted and of which we have so often been critical.

Let us consider briefly the positive aspects of the report before us today. I think it is important to note that while the pay increase provided for here is slightly less than approved by either body, it is still considerably more than the administration request and will definitely enhance our goal of zero draft and an all-volunteer army by an early date. On the other hand, the more we delay on this, the more we will be impeding the early implementation of this goal.

A second major point to consider is the language of the modified Mansfield amendment. There are some who claim that the Mansfield amendment has been completely gutted and that as it now stands, it is meaningless. I fully disagree with that interpretation. The fact is that by this language the Congress will be going on record for the first time for withdrawing by a date certain contingent only upon the release of our prisoners of war. This constitutes a very substantive policy declaration by the Congress—one which I feel does fill the policy vacuum left by the repeal of the Tonkin Gulf resolution. The only substantial change made by the conferees was dropping the 9-month timeframe for our withdrawal. That does not mean the Congress thinks such a timeframe is unreasonable or unrealistic; it simply means that the Congress recognizes that setting a date certain should be a negotiable matter and that we do not wish to force our negotiators into a corner and tie their hands as they begin to seriously negotiate over the recent Vietcong peace proposal. I think it is of crucial importance that the Congress makes such a policy declaration now—at this critical stage in the negotiations; that we make it clear to the administration and our negotiating team where we stand as the people's representatives.

And so in conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I urge adoption of this rule and adoption of the conference report. Time is of the essence both in terms of our defense manpower program and in terms of any impact we might have on the Paris negotiations. Any further delay on our part would be contrary to the national interest on both of these points.

I cannot condone each and every thing that was done in this instance by the conferees. I would repeat that I do not consider that the action today should be interpreted as any precedent to open the flood gates and to condone future violations of that act.

I defend the rule this afternoon because I think we are confronted with an extraordinary and an emergency situation, namely, the expiration of the President's induction authority, and that that could have a disruptive effect on our military manpower program and thereby pose a threat to our national security. So I am willing, albeit reluctantly, to accept the work of the conference committee and to urge the adoption of the rule.

I believe also that the conference committee should be commended. They do deserve commendation for the language that they were able to agree on in substitution for the so-called Mansfield amendment. I do not agree with those who say that that amendment has been completely gutted and that it is meaningless. It seems to me by this language we do for the first time put the Congress clearly on record for withdrawing by a date certain, contingent only upon the release of our prisoners of war. I think that is a very signal accomplishment for which the conference committee should be commended. So for those reasons I urge adoption of the rule.

Mr. COLMER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HAYS).

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Speaker, I have one observation to make on the debate on the rule. The gentleman from California said that if the rule is not adopted, they are going to be dipping into the pool of the deferred people.

Well, you know, some guy over in the Defense Department, some lawyer said they could do this, but if I were a deferred fellow and they tried to "dip" me, I would go to court and that would be the end of it, because if there is no draft law, they are not going to dip into anything.

INCREASE IN PRICE OF HAIRCUTS

(Mr. HAYS asked and was given permission to speak out of order.)

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Speaker, I asked permission to speak out of order to make an announcement to the House, which I think the Members will approve of and understand, that the House Administration Committee today raised the price of haircuts in the barbershop to $2. That will apply to Members and also to the press, who have been writing all the stories about the 75-cent haircuts, but getting them just the same.

Further than that, since the barbers are on the payroll, there is going to be an accounting system, and half of the $2 they get they are going to get to keep as they have been given the 75 cents, which will raise them a little, and the other half is going to go into the Treasury and pay for the towels, the lights, the tools, and all the other appurtenances of the trade which the taxpayers have been furnishing to them.

I am sure that that is not going to be news. You know, anything that the House does that is good is not news. But at least I can say to the membership that there will not be any more semiannual stories in the media about free haircuts for House Members.

Mr. COLMER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. HÉBERT), the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Speaker, I have but one regret, that I did not get my hair cut yesterday, what little I have. It was impossible to get it cut because I was sweating it out waiting for the Rules Committee to give us a rule to bring this conference report before the House.

I merely want to make two very simple points. Unless we adopt the rule, there will be no conference report on the extension and revision of the Draft Act adopted.

I recognize what the gentlemen have said in opposition, as to the precedent. I accept what they have said, and I will say this to the Members: that it certainly was no easy matter for the conferees to have to give in on some of these points which we knew were in violation. The arguments were valid, the arguments were logical but in a conference expediency and compromise must have its moment, and an elastic conscience must prevail. We had to do it in order to get a conference report here. We had to get the conference report back to the Members as we had been instructed to do, and we had to come here to keep faith with the Members today.

So there are two items in contest. On the pay bill, we must remember that if this report is voted down, there will be no pay increase at all for anybody. In addition to that, the allowance for dependents goes out the window for more than 300,000 individuals, and nobody wants that on his conscience.

As related to the amendment offered by the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. BROYHILL) and the change in that date, we had to do that in order to bring some stability as to fixing a date, or it could have gone back to the Civil War. We had to put a date in.

I bring attention to these two matters also. The amendment of the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. BROYHILL), as offered in the House, was accepted by the chairman of the committee. We did not oppose it, but we did accept it on a voice vote, as I recall it. We were in complete accord with it. But because of the administrative difficulties we had to set a date.

As related to the pay bill, I ask the Members not to forget that it was the Committee on Armed Services that brought out the big pay bill, and it was not objected to on the floor of this House. A few remarks were made concerning it by the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE) but outside of that, the House bought that bill. We did the best we could.

In connection with the so-called Mansfield amendment, we accepted the Mansfield amendment as a vehicle on which to talk, but we brought back to the Members the very essence and the guts of what this House wanted and voted accordingly on six different occasions. The President's hands are not tied. There is no date for a cease-fire. The field is wide open for negotiation. This was the mandate of the House to us. This is what we were told to do.

I would also say to the gentleman that the members of this conference, standing there for 4 weeks and fighting for this conference report, stood solidly together shoulder to shoulder. Not one time did they break their lines. That is why we have a conference report today.

The October 1 date on the pay bill becomes a moot question if the Senate

does not act—and it appears that the Senate may not act. Let the blight be on their house. Let us do our duty and tell the world we are ready to accept our responsibility and respond by passing the rule and accepting the conference report.

Mr. COLMER. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the resolution.

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the resolution.

The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members, and the Clerk will call the roll.

The question was taken; and there were—yeas 250, nays 150, not voting 33, as follows:

[Roll No. 236]

YEAS—250

Abbitt	Dowdy	McFall
Abernethy	Downing	McKay
Anderson, Ill.	Duncan	McKevitt
Andrews, Ala.	Edmondson	McMillan
Andrews, N. Dak.	Edwards, Ala.	Macdonald, Mass.
Archer	Evans, Colo.	Mahon
Arends	Findley	Mailliard
Ashbrook	Fisher	Mann
Ashley	Flood	Martin
Aspinall	Flowers	Mathias, Calif.
Baker	Ford, Gerald R.	Mathis, Ga.
Baring	Fountain	Mayne
Belcher	Frelinghuysen	Michel
Bennett	Fuqua	Miller, Calif.
Betts	Galifianakis	Miller, Ohio
Bevill	Garmatz	Mills, Ark.
Blackburn	Gaydos	Mills, Md.
Blanton	Gettys	Minshall
Boggs	Gonzalez	Mizell
Bolling	Goodling	Monagan
Bow	Grasso	Montgomery
Brademas	Gray	Moorhead
Bray	Griffiths	Morgan
Brinkley	Grover	Murphy, Ill.
Brooks	Gubser	Murphy, N.Y.
Broomfield	Hagan	Myers
Brotzman	Haley	Natcher
Brown, Mich.	Hall	Nedzi
Brown, Ohio	Hammer-schmidt	Nelsen
Broyhill, Va.	Hansen, Idaho	Nichols
Burke, Fla.	Hansen, Wash.	Nix
Burke, Mass.	Hébert	O'Konski
Burleson, Tex.	Henderson	O'Neill
Burlison, Mo.	Hicks, Mass.	Passman
Byrne, Pa.	Hillis	Patten
Byrnes, Wis.	Hosmer	Pelly
Byron	Hull	Pepper
Cabell	Hunt	Perkins
Caffery	Hutchinson	Pickle
Camp	Ichord	Pike
Carter	Jarman	Pirnie
Casey, Tex.	Johnson, Calif.	Poage
Cederberg	Johnson, Pa.	Poff
Chamberlain	Jonas	Powell
Clancy	Jones, Ala.	Preyer, N.C.
Clawson, Del	Jones, N.C.	Price, Ill.
Cleveland	Kazen	Price, Tex.
Collier	Kee	Pucinski
Collins, Tex.	Keith	Purcell
Colmer	King	Quillen
Conable	Kluczynski	Randall
Crane	Kuykendall	Reid, Ill.
Daniel, Va.	Kyl	Reuss
Davis, Ga.	Landgrebe	Rhodes
Davis, S.C.	Latta	Roberts
Davis, Wis.	Lennon	Robinson, Va.
de la Garza	Lent	Rogers
Delaney	Lloyd	Rooney, N.Y.
Dennis	Long, Md.	Rooney, Pa.
Derwinski	Lujan	Rostenkowski
Devine	McClory	Runnels
Dickinson	McCloskey	Ruth
Dingell	McClure	Sandman
Dorn	McEwen	Satterfield
Scherle	Steed	Ware
Schneebeli	Steele	Watts
Scott	Steiger, Ariz.	Whalley
Sebelius	Stephens	White
Shipley	Stratton	Whitehurst
Shoup	Stubblefield	Whitten
Shriver	Stuckey	Widnall
Sikes	Sullivan	Williams
Slack	Talcott	Wilson, Bob
Smith, Calif.	Taylor	Winn
Smith, Iowa	Teague, Calif.	Wolff
Smith, N.Y.	Terry	Wright
Spence	Thompson, Ga.	Wydler
Springer	Thomson, Wis.	Wylie
Stafford	Thone	Wyman
Staggers	Vander Jagt	Young, Fla.
Stanton, J. William	Veysey	Young, Tex.
Stanton, James V.	Vigorito	Zablocki
	Waggonner	Zion
	Wampler	Zwach

NAYS—150

Abourezk	Ford, William D.	Melcher
Abzug	Forsythe	Metcalfe
Adams	Fraser	Mikva
Addabbo	Frenzel	Minish
Anderson, Calif.	Frey	Mink
Anderson, Tenn.	Fulton, Pa.	Morse
Annunzio	Fulton, Tenn.	Mosher
Aspin	Gibbons	Moss
Badillo	Goldwater	Obey
Barrett	Green, Oreg.	O'Hara
Begich	Green, Pa.	Pettis
Bell	Gross	Podell
Bergland	Gude	Pryor, Ark.
Biaggi	Halpern	Quie
Biester	Hamilton	Railsback
Bingham	Hanley	Rangel
Blatnik	Harrington	Rarick
Boland	Harsha	Rees
Brasco	Harvey	Reid, N.Y.
Broyhill, N.C.	Hastings	Riegle
Buchanan	Hathaway	Robison, N.Y.
Burton	Hawkins	Rodino
Carey, N.Y.	Hays	Roe
Carney	Hechler, W. Va.	Roncalio
Chisholm	Heckler, Mass.	Rosenthal
Clausen, Don H.	Helstoski	Roush
Collins, Ill.	Hicks, Wash.	Rousselot
Conte	Hogan	Roy
Cotter	Holifield	Roybal
Coughlin	Horton	Ruppe
Culver	Howard	Ryan
Daniels, N.J.	Hungate	St Germain
Danielson	Jacobs	Sarbanes
Dellenback	Karth	Scheuer
Dellums	Kastenmeier	Schmitz
Denholm	Keating	Schwengel
Diggs	Kemp	Seiberling
Dow	Koch	Sisk
Drinan	Kyros	Skubitz
Dulski	Landrum	Snyder
du Pont	Link	Steiger, Wis.
Dwyer	McCollister	Stokes
Eckhardt	McCormack	Symington
Edwards, Calif.	McDade	Thompson, N.J.
Eilberg	McDonald, Mich.	Udall
Erlenborn	McKinney	Ullman
Fascell	Madden	Vanik
Fish	Matsunaga	Whalen
Foley	Mazzoli	Wyatt
	Meeds	Yates
		Yatron

NOT VOTING—33

Alexander	Evins, Tenn.	Patman
Celler	Flynt	Peyser
Chappell	Gallagher	Saylor
Clark	Giaimo	Teague, Tex.
Clay	Griffin	Tiernan
Conyers	Hanna	Van Deerlin
Corman	Jones, Tenn.	Waldie
Dent	Leggett	Wiggins
Donohue	Long, La.	Wilson, Charles H.
Edwards, La.	McCulloch	
Esch	Mitchell	
Eshleman	Mollohan	

So the resolution was agreed to.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:

Mr. Teague of Texas for, with Mr. Tiernan against.

Mr. Evins of Tennessee for, with Mr. Clay against.

Mr. Charles H. Wilson for, with Mr. Conyers against.

Mr. Jones of Tennessee for, with Mr. Waldie against.

Mr. Alexander for, with Mr. Mitchell against.

Mr. Mollohan for, with Mr. Esch against.

Mr. Saylor for, with Mr. Celler against.

Until further notice:

Mr. Hanna with Mr. Wiggins.

Mr. Leggett with Mr. Peyser.

Mr. Clark with Mr. Long of Louisiana.

Mr. Chappell with Mr. Donohue.

Mr. Dent with Mr. Eshleman.

Mr. Corman with Mr. Patman.

Mr. Giaimo with Mr. Gallagher.

Mr. Flynt with Mr. Griffin.

Mr. Van Deerlin with Mr. Edwards of Louisiana.

Messrs. HOLIFIELD and DOW changed their votes from "yea" to "nay."

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Speaker, I call up the conference report on the bill (H.R. 6531) to amend the Military Selective Service Act of 1967; to increase military pay; to authorize military active duty strengths for fiscal year 1972; and for other purposes, and ask unanimous consent that the statement of the managers be read in lieu of the report.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Louisiana?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the statement.

(For conference report and statement, see proceedings of the House of July 30, 1971.)

Mr. HÉBERT (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the statement be considered as read.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Louisiana?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. HÉBERT) will be recognized for 30 minutes and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ARENDS) will be recognized for 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. HÉBERT).

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, while the debate and discussion on the adoption of the rule was in progress I could not help but recall to mind some lines which many of you, perhaps—those of my vintage, anway—have heard, from the famous play "The Student Prince." The old German professor said to the young Prince of Heidelberg:

A promise keep, all night you'll sleep;
A promise break, all night you'll wake.

I have to recall those lines because of the conferees who served with me in the conference with the Senate for 4 weeks, and at times with very vigorous debate and discussion. On my right were Mr. PRICE of Illinois, Mr. FISHER, and Mr. BENNETT, and on my left were Mr. ARENDS, Mr. O'KONSKI, and Mr. BRAY.

We seven people kept the promise which we had made to this body, and we had peaceful nights, I am sure, knowing that a promise had been kept.

I also must recall to you the fact that when the discussion and debate was held on instructing the conferees to ac-

cept the so-called Mansfield amendment I asked you not to shackle my hands or put handcuffs on the conferees but allow us to go into the conference free to negotiate. We promised you that we would come back with language, particularly on the Mansfield amendment, which would be acceptable to this body. We, too, have kept that promise and we have kept faith with you.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HÉBERT. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. FINDLEY. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

I want to add my congratulations to the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services and the conferees particularly on the language that is in the conference report regarding the termination of hostilities in Indochina.

The gentleman will recall, I am sure, that during the consideration of the bill on the floor of the House we had a colloquy about the possibility of instructing conferees. He gave me assurances, and he has certainly lived up to those assurances in every way.

I want to take note especially of the language which says "terminate at the earliest practicable date all military operations of the United States in Indochina." This is a very inclusive phrase. The use of the word "prompt" in regard to the withdrawal of all "U.S. military forces at a date certain" I think is a very significant legislative pronouncement. It is good for the President. It helps to protect his flanks in case difficulties arise in the future, and it is the sort of legislative pronouncement in support of total withdrawal at the earliest practicable date I have long felt we owe to the President and the people of the United States.

I congratulate the gentleman from Louisiana for seeing to it that it is now before us.

Mr. HÉBERT. I thank the gentleman for his observation.

Now, Mr. Speaker, chronologically and in order, let me review the circumstances that bring us to this particular moment in the House.

Mr. Speaker, on Friday, July 30, 1971, your conferees on H.R. 6531 reached a compromise agreement on the differing provisions of the bill as it passed the House and Senate.

The specific details concerning the conference agreement are reflected in the statement of managers and the conference report which have been printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of Friday, July 30, 1971, and which are also available as House Report No. 92–433.

No great purpose would be served in reviewing each and every one of the specific items in the conference agreement since they are, I believe, thoroughly explained and easily identified in the statement of managers. However, certain elements of these 28 major differences in the House and Senate versions of H.R. 6531 have caused some controversy, and therefore I will discuss these subjects in some detail.

The bill H.R. 6531, among other things, authorizes an extension of the induction authority of the draft law and provides a very substantial increase in military pay.

This House bill was completely rewritten by the Senate, both in committee and during floor action. The Senate committee struck all after the enacting clause and provided completely new language in the form of a substitute. When acted upon by the Senate, the bill was amended in many particulars, including the addition of a number of matters quite obviously, under the House rules, not germane to the bill as passed by the House.

Since it was apparent to the House conferees that as a practical matter it would be impossible to reject in total certain of these Senate amendments, such as the so-called Mansfield amendment on the war in Vietnam, the House conferees reluctantly agreed to accept some of these Senate changes, recognizing full well the ultimate necessity for obtaining a rule waiving points of order so as to permit consideration of the conference report by the House.

Some Members of Congress have questioned the action of the conferees in establishing an effective date for the military pay raise of October 1 rather than the first day of the first month following the month of enactment.

The effect of this action taken by the conferees is to delay the overall pay raise for a month, representing a savings of approximately $200 million. However, this saving was reduced substantially when the conferees made retroactive to July 1 of this year the increase in Dependence Assistance Act allowances. This action will provide approximately 330,000 military personnel in the lowest four pay grades with an immediate increase in their monthly pay ranging from $15 to $60 per month, at an additional cost for the period July 1 to October 1, 1971, of $26.5 million. This immediate increase, therefore, will go to military personnel who need it most—the lowest ranking enlisted member with dependents.

The action taken by the conferees is sound. It represents an effort to provide our men and women in uniform with a level of compensation which is truly competitive, in all grades, with the civilian economy, while at the same time recognizing the enormous fiscal ramifications of this action as it affects every U.S. taxpayer.

The most complex and controversial provision in the bill was that referred to as the Mansfield amendment.

Although this issue was only one of 28 major issues confronting the conferees, most of the time and attention of the conference was directed to this single issue. As a matter of fact, the entire month of July was devoted to this single issue.

I will not dwell on the many ramifications of the original Senate language. However, I can say with complete conviction that the language finally agreed to by the conferees does, in my view, achieve all of the objectives desired by Senator MANSFIELD, without imposing upon the President of the United States, limitations which would have seriously impaired our ability to negotiate an early and satisfactory withdrawal from Indochina.

The conference language emphasizes the sense of Congress that all U.S. military operations in Indochina cease at the earliest practicable date and that this objective be accomplished by, first, negotiating an immediate cease-fire; and, second, negotiating with the Government of North Vietnam for the establishment of a final date for the withdrawal from Indochina of all military forces of the United States contingent upon the release, at a date certain, of all American prisoners of war held by the Government of North Vietnam and forces allied with such Government.

I believe it significant that all conferees agreed that it was imperative that we enter into negotiations to immediately establish a cease-fire since such action could bring a termination to the killing in Southeast Asia.

Although I personally believe that the language of the Mansfield amendment should never have been included in the bill, the revised language does fairly and honestly reflect the views of the majority of Members of Congress of both bodies on this major issue of foreign policy.

This statement of the sense of Congress articulates the views of the legislative branch on the subject of the Vietnam war, but at the same time carefully avoids encroachment of the Congress upon the constitutional prerogatives of the President, and does not tie his hands in negotiating on these vital matters. We have, therefore, kept faith with the House in agreeing to this revised language.

I am therefore hopeful that both Houses of Congress will give this language and the conference report their unanimous support.

I again remind you that here today at this moment this body recognizes its responsibility and discharges its duty without regard to any delay or any tactics which would delay the immediate passage of this bill by the other body.

If the other body delays or filibusters or shirks its responsibility and fails to perform its duty to the American people and to the Nation this is a responsibility which it must bear—this is a blight upon its house, as I suggested before.

But certainly those of us in this House can leave here now on our recess and go home to our own districts and meet our own people with heads high and eyes straight forward looking into the eyes of our constituents and we will be able to tell them that we have done our job—that we have given our soldiers and our sailors and our airmen the support necessary to bring this horrible tragic war to an end and that we have done our job and we have no apologies to offer.

Mr. Speaker, this is a statement of fact. This is the explanation that we offer to you today. This is asking you, again, to express to your Committee on Armed Services and the conferees who have been appointed and who have come back to you, for that resounding vote of confidence which you just expressed in us by your vote in adopting the rule.

On behalf of the Committee on Armed Services let me thank you—both from the majority side and on the minority side

for the splendid support that has always been at hand under the very willing and able minority leader, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ARENDS). We could not function in our committee with the unanimity with which we have functioned, in that spirit if we did not function in a nonpartisan manner. We are all Americans whose only objective is to protect our country.

We thank you from a grateful heart for what you have given us today and ask you to repeat that vote of confidence. Please adopt this conference report.

Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HÉBERT. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN. I want publicly to express my appreciation to the chairman for his leadership, in addition to the other House conferees, on this very delicate matter. But more specifically I want to relate to him my personal appreciation for the consideration he gave to recommendations that not only I made to him personally and to the other conferees, but I know many other Members made in trying to come up with the kind of compromise language that would be acceptable, not only to the Congress, but also the executive branch.

I am pleased to vote the close similarity in the compromise language to the Mansfield amendment to that which I had submitted to you and the conferees for consideration and adoption.

Also, the incentive pay provisions should go a long way toward advancing the volunteer Army concept we have been supporting.

Again, I thank the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee for the time and attention you gave to my suggestions and requests.

Mr. HÉBERT. I thank the gentleman. I say to the gentleman, as my predecessor said so often, and I repeat now, we are all passengers together in the same boat, and we are heading for the same objective—peace in our time.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may desire.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Illinois is recognized.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the adoption of this conference report. Before I enter into some remarks that I prepared, part of which will be repetitious, but yet so basic that I think they should go into the RECORD so all might know and see exactly what we tried to do during our deliberations on this very important matter, I want to commend our chairman for his wonderful performance, shall I say, at the conferences which we had. They were long and drawn out, rather upsetting at times, and yet in the final analysis we all came out with a friendly feeling that we had accomplished a very good job.

One thing I would like to point out also is that since our committee was wholly nonpartisan, we were able to work together, and our conferees acted as a unit, Republicans and Democrats alike, with no difficulty whatsoever, undertaking the obligation we felt we had from this House to seek a good conference report as instructed by the rather overwhelming vote on rollcall No. 45 when we adopted the bill. That vote was 293 to 99, which was rather overwhelming.

Mr. Speaker, a great deal of comment has been made in respect to the action taken by the conferees on that portion of the bill concerned with military pay. Some of this commentary has been accurate. Unfortunately, a great deal has not been based on fact but merely on personal interpretation.

For purposes of the record let me review the action taken by the conferees on the military pay question.

As the Members of this body are aware, the House-passed bill included increases in both basic pay and quarters or Dependents Assistance Act allowances for all grades of service personnel. The Senate bill largely confined proposed increases in compensation to basic pay with modest increases in Dependents Assistance Act allowances.

The conference agreement resulted in acceptance of the basic pay increases recommended in the House bill. The conference agreement also accepted the proposed increases in basic allowances for quarters and Dependents Assistance Act allowances reduced to approximately 85 percent of the monthly amounts recommended by the House.

Thus, the reduction in the total compensation increase was confined to that portion of the House bill relating to quarters allowance increases since the Senate had virtually provided no increase in that area. The House had recommended increases in the amount of $842.2 million while the Senate had recommended an increase in the amount of only $79 million. The resolution of this difference by the conferees was an acceptance of an annual increase in these allowances amounting to $515.7 million.

The House conferees also accepted a Senate provision providing for an initial enlistment bonus into the combat elements. This provision will authorize certain new entrants into military service a bonus of $3,000. Included in the report agreed to by the conferees is language to the effect that this bonus authority could, at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense, be payable for enlistments occurring on or after February 1, 1971.

As a consequence of the foregoing action, along with a number of related minor changes, the conference agreement resulted in an annual compensation increase of $2.38 billion.

It is also important to note that the action of the conferees in providing a substantial increase in compensation in the form of allowances, actually provided $287 million in additional economic benefits to military personnel. This results since the compensation increases provided in the way of allowances are not taxable. Thus, although the annual cost of this military compensation increase is $2.38 billion, the military forces are receiving $2.67 billion in economic gain.

A related consideration stems from the fact that this action also precludes increased retired pay costs. By 1980, the Senate proposal would increase cumulative nondisability retired pay costs by $30 million and by 2001 costs would climb $472 million. Costs under the conference agreement would be $2 million and $67 million respectively.

In reaching this agreement on adjusting military compensation levels, the conferees were also mindful of the fact that in addition to this increase in military pay, there will also be another automatic increase in military pay on January 1, 1972. That increase is now calculated to approximate a 7.9-percent increase in basic pay at a cost approximating $1.3 billion.

These considerations, therefore, prompted the conferees to agree to establish an effective date of October 1, 1971, for the pay adjustment provided in H.R. 6531.

I must concede, as I am sure you will also, that establishing an equitable level of military compensation for the various grades is a judgmental matter and one upon which there can be honest disagreement. Some military personnel may consider these levels too low, while at the same time many taxpayers will consider them too generous. In any event, let me urge you to take a look at the final results of the conferees' action. I am inserting into the record at this point a brief table which compares average levels of regular military compensation for each of the pay grades below the rank of general or admiral. This table reflects present rates, as well as those proposed initially in the House and Senate bills, and finally the conference agreement.

As your review of this table will show, the compensation level of a new recruit, an E–1, is presently $3,165 annually. Under the conference agreement this will be increased to $4,872, an increase of $1,707. This includes a 100-percent increase in basic pay.

Within 4 months after a recruit enters military service he will become an E–2, and therefore receive regular military compensation of more than $5,300 a year, an increase of almost $2,000 over existing compensation levels. Military pay then becomes progressively higher thereafter with promotions and "years of service" increases. For example, virtually all personnel entering military service attain the grade of E–3 within 9 to 10 months.

These compensation figures do not include numerous other special pays, tax benefits for certain overseas service, and fringe benefits that servicemen receive. For example, dependents of military personnel, as a consequence of their status, were authorized medicare from civilian medical sources during calendar year 1970 at a cost to the Federal Government approximating $300 million. This cost does not include the cost incurred for medical care provided to these eligible dependents at uniformed services medical facilities.

My point, I believe, is obvious. Military personnel and related costs are very substantial and now represent much more than half of the total annual defense budget. Therefore, I personally feel that the conferees have arrived at a very equitable, effective and honorable solution to a most difficult and complex problem.

COMPARISON OF AVERAGE REGULAR MILITARY COMPENSATION [1]

Pay grade	House bill	Senate bill	Conferees' agreement	Present (Jan 1, 1971) rates
O-6	$27,197	$24,850	$26,389	$24,850
O-5	21,821	19,796	21,122	19,796
O-4	18,234	16,527	17,630	16,527
O-3	15,025	13,591	14,501	13,516
O-2	11,474	11,138	11,045	10,166
O-1	8,985	9,611	8,659	7,807
W-4	17,653	16,088	17,074	16,088
W-3	14,537	13,097	14,023	13,097
W-2	12,299	11,108	11,859	11,104
W-1	10,138	9,195	9,738	9,033
E-9	14,919	13,417	14,392	13,417
E-8	12,812	11,571	12,334	11,571
E-7	11,063	9,980	10,634	9,980
E-6	9,550	8,647	9,160	8,611
E-5	7,691	7,248	7,356	6,889
E-4	6,457	6,329	6,189	5,253
E-3	5,893	5,831	5,663	3,931
E-2	5,484	5,530	5,311	3,345
E-1	5,036	5,320	4,872	3,165

[1] Regular military compensation is defined as basic pay, basic allowances for quarters, basic allowances for subsistence and the tax advantage which accrues because the allowances are not subject ot Federal income tax.

CONFEREES AGREEMENT ON PAY IN H.R. 6531

[In millions of dollars]

	Administration	House	Senate	Conferees agreement
Basic pay	908.0	1,825.4	2,667.0	1,825.4
DAA	79.0	184.1	79.0	105.9
BAQ	0	640.1	0	409.8
BAS	0	37.8	0	0
Enlistment bonus	40.0	0	40.0	20.0
Recruiter expenses	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9
Optometrists	0	.5	.6	.6
DAA Reservists	20.0	20.0	0	20.0
Annual total	1,049.9	2,710.8	2,789.5	2,384.6

Let me repeat, if I might, the words, if only for emphasis, which the chairman of our committee said a moment ago. What we did in finally reaching agreement on the Mansfield amendment was that we said it should be the sense of Congress—rather than the words used by the Senate. Furthermore, we then said it would not be 9 months after the setting of a termination date, not 9 months, but rather we said the President should negotiate with the Government of North Vietnam for an immediate cease-fire in Indochina.

In line with this we urge the President to negotiate for the withdrawal from Indochina of all military forces of the United States, and to negotiate with the Government of North Vietnam for an agreement which would provide for a series of phased and rapid withdrawals of U.S. military forces from Indochina, subject to a phased release of American prisoners.

May I add one more thing. The language deletes setting of a date 9 months after enactment, as proposed in the original amendment. However, the conferees, as the joint statement says, agreed "that it was imperative to emphasize negotiations to establish a cease-fire since such could bring a termination of the killing in Southeast Asia at the earliest date." That is what all America longs for at this particular time.

We have put together the machinery so that this can happen, and most earnestly and sincerely hope it will happen.

Mr. Speaker, I trust that the conference report will have the overwhelming support of the Members of Congress, and that the Senate body will be called upon to act.

Mr. PIRNIE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ARENDS. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. PIRNIE. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I take this opportunity of expressing to the chairman of the committee, and the gentleman in the well my commendation for their leadership during this very difficult task which relates directly to the security of this country, equity for those in uniform, and also peace in the world.

I believe the result represented by this conference report is a tribute to the objectivity of the conferees, their patience and their skill. They have brought back to the House that which can be enthusiastically supported and it will enable every Member to go back to his constituency and give intelligent and encouraging answer to the questions of constituents and the families of our servicemen.

Mr. ARENDS. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ARENDS. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. FINDLEY. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I believe the gentleman has properly taken note of what the language in title IV does not say with reference to 9 months termination of our military presence in Indochina.

What remains does say a lot.

It is my belief, and I think the facts support it, that this is the first time the House will have stated legislatively its support for termination of all military operations of U.S. military forces in Indochina and for the prompt withdrawal of all such forces; so this is indeed a historic day.

Mr. ARENDS. I might say to the gentleman from Illinois. I know this is something he has been terribly interested in for a good long time. I am glad we are in agreement.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ARENDS. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. I want to compliment the gentleman on his presentation.

There is one thing which troubles me in this report, and that concerns the prisoners who are being held by the North Vietnamese and by their allies. It is my understanding that we propose to withdraw more or less concurrently with the release of prisoners.

The question I ask is, What will happen if they hold out on us? What will happen if they, let us say, release 350 prisoners when it is really true that they have 300 or 400 more, but deny they have them and, when we give them the names, say, "We do not have any idea of what happened to them"? What means do we have in this legislation to insure that some group, such as the Swiss or others, make all investigations it is possible to make to find out exactly how many prisoners they do have and to make sure they do not hold back on us? That is one question.

Mr. ARENDS. Of course that is a very difficult question to even attempt to answer. I believe we have opened the door by simply saying to negotiate. They can negotiate as hard and as long as they want, through any medium, ally, friend or other nation. They can negotiate. At least the pathway is there. We are starting down the road. We are trying to deal with people recognizing that we have to solve the problem of prisoners of war.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. The other question concerns those prisoners who do not want to come back, or say they do not. Certain American-held prisoners will be alleged to have been either won over to communism or otherwise who do not want to come back. Many Vietcong and North Vietnamese captured by our allies in South Vietnam may genuinely not want to go back to North Vietnam. In fact, a great number have already said they do not want to go back.

I would suppose the way to handle this would be to have some agreement whereby the so-called reluctant returnees would be turned over to some neutral authority—let us say the Swiss. Put them into their hands and then let them have complete control over them. They can make a genuine decision as to whether or not they want to go back. As you know, we will not trust the Communists when they tell us that they have men who do not want to return and they will not trust us when we tell them that we have men who do not want to return. And there will be many cases, I know, in which there will be men who genuinely do not want to go back. What provision is there in this legislation to cover that?

Mr. ARENDS. As far as I know, there is no provision. I have never heard it discussed in that kind of language. I would not know how to answer you. It comes under the broad umbrella of negotiation and how we will agree on it I do not know.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Will the gentleman agree that it is a difficult problem? Will not it make it difficult to carry out the term of the Vietnam withdrawal provision?

Mr. ARENDS. Yes; it is a difficult problem.

Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. ARENDS. I am glad to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. YOUNG of Florida. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I would like to add my compliments to those already heard for a very fine presentation on the part of the gentleman and also add my compliments to those received by the chairman of the committee and the ranking minority member and all of the conference managers on the part of the House.

Mr. Speaker, as anti-American elements throughout this country and the

world consider what we do here today in adopting this conference report, there will be those who will attempt to interpret it as a division of one group against another in our policies relating to Southeast Asia. I suggest that in their interest and in the interest of world peace, they should be very cautious in any misinterpretation of what we do. We are not dividing our great Nation. To the contrary, by our action today we are bringing together the Chief Executive of our Nation and bringing together the elected Congress of our Nation and bringing together the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives. For the first time in many months we will be presenting to the enemy and to the world a most united front as it relates to our involvement in Southeast Asia. I urge caution on those, especially the anti-American elements, who would try to misinterpret this as being anything other than a bringing together of the people of this Nation in a unified effort to bring a just and humane end to the hostilities in Southeast Asia.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from Florida for that very pertinent observation. It is very constructive.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio, a member of the committee (Mr. WHALEN).

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Speaker, I am disturbed by both the form and the substance of the draft conference report.

With respect to form, the report in at least two instances negates a very key provision of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970. Regrettably, the Committee on Rules, which supported this very key reform last year, chose to ignore it when it received its first test.

Substantively I am concerned by at least three provisions of the draft conference report.

First, the changes in the pay scales I think do damage to the concept of an all-volunteer military force. Second, the changes in the so-called Broyhill of North Carolina amendment certainly alter the original intent of this provision. Third, I think it goes without saying that the so-called Mansfield amendment has been emasculated by this report by the elimination of any definite withdrawal date.

For these reasons, Mr. Speaker, I plan to vote against the draft bill conference report.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. STEIGER).

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, it is not easy to come to a decision on this bill.

I am, of course, disappointed that the rule was granted waiving all points of order which precluded the opportunity for Members of the House to raise what have been recognized as valid points of order in areas in which this conference report exceeds the rules of the House. I had intended to offer, if I were recognized at the appropriate time, a motion to recommit with instructions to have the conferees insist on the House-passed pay package, and the so-called Broyhill amendment, but I must admit, Mr. Speaker, that were I to do that I would then be in a position of being forced to vote against the adoption of the conference report on final passage. I simply cannot do that.

The pay package, imperfect as it is, is significantly better than the pay scale that now exists. The fact that first-termers are going to be increased way above where they are now, even though it is below even that which the House passed earlier, is nevertheless a step in the right direction. Even though the conference report increases the pay of generals more than that which is given to those in the lower ranks, it nevertheless is a step toward attempting to alleviate the poverty wages from which the men in the armed services in the first terms now suffer.

Thus, Mr. Speaker, if a straight motion to recommit is offered, I shall vote "yea" on the basis of attempting to force the conferees to come to grips with the date, the Broyhill amendment, and the pay package.

But on final passage I shall vote "aye" because the pay package is so important. I have tried in every way I know to force change in the conference report but having failed I shall support adoption of the report as being an improvement for the men and women who serve our Nation.

This morning, Mr. Speaker, we received a letter from Chairman HÉBERT noting that the expiration of the Dependents Assistance Act on June 30 might result in a decrease in pay for first-term servicemen.

In view of the financial plight affecting our GI's, I wrote Assistant Secretary of Defense Roger T. Kelley on July 14 and noted:

> In view of the possibility that the draft bill may not be enacted for some time, I would be interested in what plans have been developed to deal with the loss of income associated with the expiration of the Dependents Assistance Act.

On July 23 the Defense Department responded:

> At this time, we are formulating plans to continue payment of Dependents Assistance Act allowances until final action on H.R. 6531 has been completed. We have advised the joint committee members, in conference on this bill, of technical corrections needed to continue current entitlement to DAA allowances . . .

I then confirmed by phone call that the Defense Department has no intention of stopping payments to our lower ranking GI's.

The major problem, of course, is that the conference committee decided to delay enactment of the pay bill until October 1, even though the House and Senate both stipulated implementation on the first day of the first month after enactment.

Further, Mr. Speaker, it is my belief that the draft bill conferees, in violation of clause 3 of rule 28, used the archaic distinction between basic pay and the quarters allowance to reduce the benefits in the military pay bill by over $300 million:

[In millions of dollars]

	House	Senate	Conference
Basic pay	1,825.4	2,667.0	1,825.4
Dependents Assistance Act[1]	184.1	79.0	105.9
Basic allowance for quarters	640.1	0.0	409.8
Subsistence allowance	37.8	0.0	0.0
Total	2,687.4	2,746.0	2,341.1

[1] This is the technical term for the quarters allowance provided men in pay grades E–4 (under 4 years service) and below.

The result of this compromise is to provide the first-termers—who were the target of the pay reform in the first place—with a lower rate of compensation than they would have received in either bill; only the careerists are given a compromise that splits the difference between the two bills. As can be seen from the table below, the increases for the careerists fall in between the two bills, while those for the privates, corporals, and lieutenants fall below the lowest House or Senate figure:

COMPARISON OF AVERAGE ANNUAL REGULAR MILITARY COMPENSATION

	House	Senate	Conferees agreement
Pay Grade:			
O–10	$43,872	$40,827	$42,725
O–9	39,169	36,319	39,107
O–8	35,772	33,042	34,751
O–7	31,654	29,065	30,689
O–6	27,197	24,850	26,389
O–5	21,821	19,796	21,122
O–4	18,234	16,527	17,630
O–3	15,025	13,591	14,501
O–2	11,474	11,138	11,045
O–1	8,985	9,611	8,659
W–4	17,653	16,088	17,074
W–3	14,537	13,097	14,032
W–2	12,299	11,108	11,859
W–1	10,138	9,195	9,738
E–9	14,919	13,417	14,392
E–8	12,812	11,571	12,334
E–7	11,063	9,980	10,634
E–6	9,550	8,647	9,160
E–5	7,691	7,248	7,356
E–4	6,457	6,329	6,189
E–3	5,893	5,831	5,663
E–2	5,484	5,530	5,311
E–1	5,036	5,320	4,872

The distinction between basic pay and allowances is a technical provision left over from the days when few soldiers were married, but it has little relevance to today's 1.5 million married servicemen. There is strong support, in the United States Code, for the principle that these elements should be considered together. As the Committee on Armed Services noted in the report to H.R. 6531:

> The Congress in Public Law 90–207 defined Regular Military Compensation (RMC) as consisting of the following elements that service members receive in cash or kind every payday: basic pay, basic quarters allowances, subsistence allowance, and tax advantage (received because the quarters and subsistence allowances are not subject to Federal income tax).
>
> It is the Regular Military Compensation that is used to establish competitive military pay levels which bear a reasonable relationship to civilian wages for equivalent levels of work . . .
>
> In developing the pay proposals on which the committee bill is based, the Department of Defense constructed a military pay standard to assure that military pay was properly equated with remuneration in other areas of national life . . .

The Committee's bill would provide total increases in Regular Military Compensation of $2,687.4 million per year. This includes $1,825.4 million in basic pay increases, $824.2 million for increases in basic allowances for quarters, and $37.8 million for increases in basic allowances for subsistence. (House Report 92–82, pp. 24 ff.)

The regular military compensation concept derives from enactment of the "Rivers amendment" in 1967, which was passed to insure that military personnel received pay increases which were equivalent to the increases granted civilian Federal employees. As the Committee on Armed Services noted in the report accompanying that measure:

Regular Military Compensation is defined as basic pay, quarters, and subsistence allowances, either in cash or in kind, and the tax advantage thereon. This regular compensation is considered to be the equivalent of the gross salaries payable to Federal employees under the Classification Act. (House Report 90–787, p. 3)

A dialog from the 1967 hearings on military pay illustrates why the total concept of regular military compensation, as defined by law, must be considered when looking at the pay of our servicemen. This dialog explains why the archaic concept of military "basic pay" must be increased by a greater percentage than civil service pay, in order to achieve the same end result in individual compensation:

The President has recommended that uniformed services personnel be provided a 4.5% increase in their compensation. . . . This increase which translates into a 5.6% increase in basic pay is therefore identical with the first stage salary increase provided classification employees.

The CHAIRMAN. Now does anybody not understand how we arrived at 5.6%?

* * * * *

Mr. HALLECK. Mr. Chairman, when you put that 5.6 up there, that is what is going to be written, and I, for one, voted for the motion to recommit, to strike that 6 down to 4.5 (for civil service employees), and to strike out the subsequent year raises.

The CHAIRMAN. That is already passed.

Mr. HALLECK. I have to be consistent about it.

The CHAIRMAN. You would be consistent.

Mr. HALLECK. . . . but when we make the blanket statement in this statement here, referring to 5.6, what I am afraid of is that that is going to be the figure in everybody's mind, and those of us—the President has been trying to hold it to 4.5. Where does that leave us?

The CHAIRMAN. That is what the President recommended, the 5.6.

Mr. SLATINSHEK. Mr. Halleck, this is precisely what the President recommended, a 4.5 increase in regular compensation, which translates into a 5.6% increase in basic pay. Basic pay is only one element of the monthly, or one element of the monthly compensation for military personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Halleck, are you for the 4.5?

Mr. HALLECK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you are therefore also for a 5.6% increase in basic pay.

It is our belief that the strong support the Armed Services Committee has shown for the regular military compensation standard, should be considered when viewing the action of the conferees on military pay. If the House had passed a Civil Service pay bill authorizing a GS–1 to be paid at the annual rate of $5,036, and the Senate had authorized $5,320, would the conferees have the authority to reduce him to $4,872? It is not our belief that this action would be permissible under the Legislative Reorganization Act. As Mr. SISK said during the debate on his amendment:

For example, the House passes a piece of legislation authorizing $1 million; the other body after having considered the legislation passes a bill authorizing $5 million; then the conference committee could not come back and report $10 million or, going the other way, report $500,000.

The point is that it should stay within the scope of what the two bodies have done initially.

Thus, it would seem that in the area of military pay, the conferees were in error in reporting a lower level of regular military compensation than that passed by either the House or the Senate. Otherwise it would seem to indicate that the Legislative Reorganization Act was designed to protect the compensation of civilian employee, but not the remuneration of our men and women in uniform.

At this point, Mr. Speaker, I want to include the text of my letter to Chairman Hébert outlining my comments on the actions of the conference committee:

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., July 21, 1971.

Hon. F. EDWARD HÉBERT,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your prompt and very detailed response to my letter regarding the actions of the conference on military pay. As it appears that the conferees may remain in session for some time, I should like to discuss the points raised in your letter in hopes of having the pay cuts restored.

1. The pay cut was justified because the conferees provided a combat arms enlistment bonus.

As you know, it is highly unlikely that this bonus will be paid to more than 60,000 men in the next fiscal year, as compared to over 440,000 required accessions. Moreover, the combat bonus will have no effect on the first-termers who entered service before February 1971. Thus, the overwhelming majority of our servicemen will receive no economic improvement from this item.

2. The tax advantage in the conference bill will create an additional $287 million in economic gain. "Thus, although the annual cost of this military compensation increase is $2.38 billion, the military forces are receiving $2.67 billion in economic gain."

The House bill, however, provided an even more substantial increase in tax advantage ($450.6 million). Therefore, even in terms of total economic gain, the conference bill is inferior to the versions passed by either House:

Economic Gain (cost plus tax advantage, $ Billions)
Senate 2.88
House 3.16
Conference 2.67

3. Retired pay costs would be higher in the Senate bill than in the conference bill.

It should also be noted that the retired pay costs in the conference bill are *identical* to the retired pay costs in the House bill. Moreover, as you will recall from the letter I sent you on 22 June, it is possible to devise a pay scale compromise which splits the difference between the House and Senate bills, yet maintains retired pay costs at a rate identical to that developed by the conferees. Therefore, it does not appear to be necessary to cut the pay bill below either the House or Senate versions in order to hold down retired pay costs.

4. Another automatic pay increase is scheduled for January 1, 1972.

Throughout the debate it was known that such an increase was scheduled for next year. Senator Stennis, in particular made numerous references to the cost of this pay hike during the debate, yet the other body chose to go for the full $2.7 billion increase by a 51–27 margin.

More importantly, the automatic increase simply continues the discrimination against the first-termer. If the increase is 7.4% as expected, under the conference bill the Major-General will get a $204.71 raise, the colonel will get a $133.42 hike, but the recruit would only receive an increase of $19.83 in his monthly pay. Since the comparative increase for the first-termer is so small, I am hopeful that the conferees will restore this pay bill to the range provided by the Senate and the House.

5. ". . . establishing an equitable level of military compensation for the various grades in a judgmental matter and one upon which there can be honest disagreement."

As the Committee pointed out in House Report 92–82 (pp. 24–25):

"The Congress in Public Law 90–207 defined Regular Military Compensation (RMC) as consisting of the following elements that service members receive in cash or in kind every payday: basic pay, quarters allowances, subsistence allowance and tax advantage. . . . In developing the pay proposals on which the Committee bill is based, the Department of Defense constructed a military pay standard to assure that military pay was properly equated with remuneration in other areas of national life."

The Senate, of course, chose to provide the entry grades with even a *higher* level of compensation than the House bill. Therefore, it is not clear why the conferees would settle for a standard which provides the recruit grades with less RMC than in either the House or Senate bills.

6. These compensation figures do not include the opportunity for the serviceman to receive fringe benefits, including special pays and dependant medical care.

Detailed studies have revealed that the serviceman has no advantage over his civilian counterpart in terms of fringe benefits. As Assistant Secretary Kelley recently noted before the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee (Part 3, pp. 47–49):

"I am conscious, of course, of the additional fringe or supplemental benefits which military people get, some of which are unique to the military and are not to be found commonly in civilian employment.

"We have therefore attempted to ascertain the total of these supplemental benefits as compared with the total of basic pay. The total supplemental benefits, expressed as a percentage of regular military compensation, runs somewhere in the range of 32 to 35 percent.

"The so-called fringe benefits received by his civilian counterpart—group insurance, retirement benefits, hospitalization insurance, the opportunity to purchase stock or to participate in savings plans with the employer matching the contribution—I am saying that these things for the industrial apprentice typically represent 35% of what he receives in regular pay, just as in the military these additional benefits outside regular military compensation amount to about 35 percent of the regular military compensation."

More importantly, in terms of the conferees' actions regarding pay at the entry level, is the fact that all servicemen are eligible for these benefits. However, as you know, there are a host of important fringe benefits denied to those in the recruit grades.

When making changes of station, careerists are given free travel of dependents, transportation of household goods, dislocation allowances, trailer allowances, transportation allowances for automobiles overseas, overseas allowance and evacuation allowance. If unaccompanied careerists receive $30 a month in family separation allowances. But the underpaid and oft moved first-termer is ineligible for all of these benefits.

I am still convinced, Mr. Chairman, that the type of bill originally reported by your committee represented a measure that was fair to both the first-termer and the careerist. I am hopeful, therefor, that the conferees will be able to agree upon a measure that retains the best of the House and Senate military pay bills.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM A. STEIGER, *Member of Congress.*

The SPEAKER. The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin has expired.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. BROYHILL).

Mr. BROYHILL of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I, too, agree with the gentleman who just preceded me, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. STEIGER) in wishing that it were possible to insist upon the changes in the amendment which I offered in the House.

I still feel that the intent of my amendment was clear, and that the conference committee far exceeded their authority under House rules in writing in new language. The amendment is now too severely limited by the inclusion of a date. The legislative language as originally proposed, implied a limit on its effectiveness only by the family members listed—father, brother or sister. This new language, added contrary to the rules, would not exempt from the draft the young man whose father had died as a result of service during the Korean war. The legislative intent of my original language was clear and would have limited its effectiveness to one generation.

However, I want to make it clear that I support this conference report and intend to vote for it on final passage. I think that on balance this conference report is good; that it is needed, and should be enacted. I hope that the House will enact it so that it can be considered by the other body at an early date.

However, in the future, conference committees should be most careful in considering differences in House-Senate passed bills.

The SPEAKER. The time of the gentleman from North Carolina has expired.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I have asked for these 2 minutes to make an observation on the statements of the last two gentlemen who have spoken, the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. BROYHILL) and the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. STEIGER).

I do so because I want to bring to the attention of the House that this is exactly the type of discussion that we welcome in the Committee on Armed Services. When we are in disagreement the gentlemen recognize we are in disagreement, and the gentlemen recognize we are entitled to our own thoughts in our disagreement.

As I suggested in my original presentation, we are in fact partners, and we are working together, and we are working under the Rules of the House and working for the rule of the majority.

So I want to thank the gentlemen for their contributions, and their discussion, and in their appearances before the Committee on Rules and the Committee on Armed Services. This is the way we should conduct ourselves. This is the manner in which I welcome opposition, and this is the way I welcome contributions, whether they may agree with me or not.

Mr. KING. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HÉBERT. I yield to the gentleman from New York (Mr. KING).

Mr. KING. Mr. Speaker, I simply want to join in this colloquy, and to compliment the chairman of our committee, the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. HÉBERT) and the ranking member of the committee, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ARENDS) and the conference committee for the very excellent job they have done in negotiating this conference report, a job that I believe they did under very, very trying circumstances.

The very able chairman and the other members of the conference on the part of the House have exhibited the utmost patience and good judgment in bringing to us today a draft bill which we can in all conscience support.

It would have been tragic had we postponed action on this measure until September because then the President might have been called upon to dip into the pool of deferments and interrupted the plans already made by many young men. We cannot possibly meet our military commitments without this draft bill, and our failure to pass one has been seized by those who would attack the military and by those who would destroy our country both from within and without as an indication of our weakness. The United States must present a strong, solid and unified front, especially at these trying times.

As a member of the Draft System Oversight Subcommittee and as a member of the full Committee on Armed Services, I am delighted to have played a very small part in the settlement of this difficult issue.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. RANDALL).

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Speaker, I rise to support the conference report on H.R. 6531 which is at one and the same time a draft bill, a military pay increase bill—and a sense of Congress resolution to end the Vietnam war. In my judgment the conference agreement justifies support because it contains a minimum change of the House position on all the major provisions of the bill as passed by the House by a vote of 293 to 99.

To support extension of the draft is unpleasant but nevertheless necessary. To say that any draft legislation is less than popular is almost a masterpiece of understatement.

There is another interim happening that galls us all. After the passage by the House of the extension of the draft, the Supreme Court rendered a decision on the appeal of Cassius Clay—alias Muhammad Ali. When I heard of this decision I became tempted to vote against any further extension of the draft. Now the passage of time has allowed our emotion to subside. Stated differently, our temptation to vote against extension of the draft because the nine Justices ruled as they did must now be submerged under the realities we face today.

Yes, extension of the draft is unpleasant and highly unpopular, but for a while longer is necessary. But this is not just a draft bill. We must remember we are not only voting for the draft but we are also voting for the greatest increase in pay ever accorded our military personnel. This bill may be called a draft bill but it is at the same time an honest and sincere effort toward recreation of an ultimate realization of a volunteer Army.

I regret to hear the frequently repeated comment that the only way we will ever get a volunteer Army is to draft one. This belief could prove to be correct. But I hope these prophets are wrong. I hope this bill will induce enough volunteers to come forward that the draft provisions of this enactment will have less meaning than anticipated.

This bill is more than even an effort to achieve a volunteer army. It is the vehicle that carries by incorporation the so-called Mansfield amendment on termination of the war in Vietnam. Without comparing word for word the version of the Senate's amendment on the Vietnam war with the wording adopted by the conferees, there is no doubt that the wording agreed upon by the conferees states that it is the sense of Congress that all U.S. military forces be withdrawn at a date certain subject only to the release of American prisoners of war and an accounting of all Americans missing in action. In other words this conference report provides that the Congress calls for a termination of the war at the earliest practicable date. For those who prefer to remain doubters as to the wording of the amendment set by the conferees, let us remind them that provisions of this conference report also urge upon the President the establishment by negotiation of an immediate cease-fire in Vietnam.

I do not know what more the Congress can do at this time than urge the President to negotiate such an immediate cease-fire. We have no power or authority to encroach upon his constitutional powers. Moreover, we should not tie his hands in the process or procedures of negotiation. But we have expressed in clear language consistent with our duties as Members of the Congress that this Nation shall commence immediately to negotiate for a cease-fire to stop the killing in Vietnam.

I would be less than candid or straightforward if I were to omit to say for the record that I have entertained some mixed emotions as to the level of pay

that has been set by this report, all as an inducement to enlistments to the point the draft will no longer be necessary.

Our House-passed bill called for an annual increase of $2.7 billion. The conference report calls for a total annual increase of $2.3 billion in pay. Some segments of the military will, of course, regard this as too low a figure. The taxpayers on the other hand will probably think the figure is too high. The concern which I cannot let go unexpressed is to wonder what will happen should our Nation be faced with another emergency such as World War II. In such a situation with the vast numbers that would have to be paid at the pay rates provided in this conference report, the question must be considered, with some concern—what will happen to the Federal budget under such circumstances.

I have not made a careful comparison of the pay provisions between the bill passed by the House and the conference report except to point out I believe a new recruit will now receive about $3,200 in annual pay. What a great difference from the pay many of us received when we started at the lowest level in World War II.

It has been argued that there is no urgency for the adoption of this conference report. Such an argument is just not in accordance with the facts. If we do not act before the August recess 330,000 military families of inductees and recruits may suffer actual reduction in their present monthly income ranging from $15 to $105. This is true because of the necessity of extending the terminal date of the Dependency Assistance Act beyond July 1, 1971.

Furthermore, to omit to extend the draft leaves us with the distinct possibility that those who have been previously deferred could now be called. This would include deferred fathers as well as deferred students. If this should happen I am sure we would hear from those who were called.

If we adopt this conference report, as the chairman of our committee so eloquently put it, we can go home to our districts with our heads held high. We can look our constituents in the eye and say to them we are not responsible for any inaction by the other body. We have done our job. We have done our best on our side of the Capitol. We will have to make no apologies.

Mr. Speaker, before concluding let me repeat again the conference report is not just a draft bill. It is also an honest sincere effort to create a volunteer Army. Equally important, this conference report is the document which for the first time contains language we have been able to agree upon to express the sense of Congress that the United States immediately terminate the Vietnam war and to withdraw now contingent only upon release of our American prisoners of war. This report for the first time contains agreed language that the President commence immediately to negotiate for a cease-fire. For all of these reasons the conference is worthy of the support of every Member.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from California (Mr. HOLIFIELD).

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I am in support of the conference report. I believe the committee has done a good job on the conference report. Notwithstanding the merits of the report, I am not in accord with the conference procedure which made necessary the obtaining of waivers from the Committee on Rules.

If conferees can violate the House rules by changing items which were identical in both House- and Senate-passed legislation—as in the case of the effective date for pay raises to servicemen—then the change goes beyond a compromise and becomes new legislation by the conferees. Such action makes a nullity of the function of the authorization and appropriation actions of the Members of both legislative bodies.

The same principle is present in lowering the annual pay raise figures, as passed by both Houses for the two lowest grades, below the lowest figure as passed by the House. Again this is not a compromise between House and Senate figures, but new legislation by the conferees.

I therefore voted "no" on the rule which permitted such practice.

Mr. McCLORY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the adoption of the conference report on H.R. 6531, extension and revision of the Selective Service Act. I am somewhat disturbed by the fact that the conferees appear to have acted contrary to certain provisions of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970. I am also bothered by the fact that this legislation would permit the President to abolish student deferments since I feel that it is essential that the 2–S deferment be retained. My opposition stems chiefly, however, from my belief that extension of the draft for the next 2 years is both unnecessary and unfair.

Mr. Speaker, I joined as a cosponsor of H.R. 4451, a bill to create an all-volunteer armed forces, because, in my opinion, we have burdened our Nation's youth with this antiquated manpower procurement device for too long a time already. The unanimous recommendations in the Gates Commission report establish that our defense needs can be met adequately and efficiently by a volunteer military force. There is simply no overriding necessity for maintaining a system which had its origin in medieval feudalism as a basis for our national defense.

Although it seems to have been in effect forever, in point of fact compulsory military service has never been the pattern of our Nation. The draft, first enacted during the Civil War, resulted in widespread dissension and even violence. The World War I draft was rescinded following the armistice. Thereafter, the selective service law enacted in 1940 was extended by a margin of only one vote just weeks before the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. Continuation of the draft since the end of World War II is quite out of harmony with the traditional policy in this country.

Mr. Speaker, I am committed to working for the elimination of the draft and establishment of a volunteer Armed Forces. Such action is necessary to bring our military service in harmony with the ideals and principles of other governmental institutions.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I intend to vote against the draft extension bill now before the House for two reasons.

While I have strong doubts about the establishment of a voluntary army, I have little doubt that the Congress is wrong in approving the extension of the draft for longer than 1 year. This bill provides for a 2-year extension and by doing so I believe the Congress loses what little power it has to influence the use of draftees by the administration in defining and coordinating foreign policy.

I am also persuaded that this legislation unjustly provides a large part of the pay increase voted by the House and Senate for the career officer while giving men in the lower four pay grades an increase smaller than that provided in either the House or Senate bills.

This action, by violating the provisions of the Legislative Reorganization Act passed by the Congress last year authorizing conference committees to consider only the differences between versions of a bill passed by both Houses, contributes to the further leakage of power away from the House and to the conference committees.

In the long run, Mr. Chairman, it is just as dangerous for the House to yield its independent judgment to conference committees as it is for the Congress as a whole to yield its powers to either the Executive or the bureaucracy.

In either case, the eventual result is congressional impotence.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to briefly explain my vote on this legislation.

Unfortunately, as the question is presented to the House, it is impossible to vote on the separate issues contained within this bill. Forced to vote up or down on the entire bill, after careful consideration, I am unable to reconcile my opposition to two particular provisions.

As an early supporter of a volunteer army, I opposed a 2-year extension of the draft. Along with a substantial minority of this body, I voted for prolonging the draft for only 1 more year, with the hope that it would then be replaced with a volunteer force. It is my position, that the mobilization of a volunteer army can and should be implemented, without any sacrifice to our national security, by fiscal year 1973. Thus the Selective Service System, with its present inequities, will not be needlessly prolonged for an extra year.

Again, as regards the Mansfield amendment which set a fixed date for American withdrawal from Vietnam, I was disappointed that the originally strong Senate language was not preserved. As reported out of the House-Senate conference, the concept of a fixed date of disengagement 9 months after the enactment of this bill and contingent upon the release of American prisoners of war, was eliminated. As presently constructed, the text states that it is the

"sense of Congress" to withdraw at the earliest possible date, thus dulling the thrust of the amendment as initially proposed. At a time, when increasing numbers of the American people support a deadline for military withdrawal, I feel that Congress should reflect this sentiment as strongly as possible.

Regretfully, in order to demonstrate my opposition to a 2-year extension of the draft and the watered-down Mansfield amendment, it is necessary to vote against the military pay increase. Since an adjustment in salaries for the Armed Forces is a necessary prerequisite for the realization of an all volunteer army, this action deeply disturbs me. Should the Draft Extension Act be defeated, I would sincerely hope that this provision will be reintroduced separately at the earliest convenience.

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, in our consideration of the conference report on H.R. 6531, the Military Selective Service Act, I want to discuss what I consider one of the most important provisions; namely, that proposing an immediate cease-fire in Vietnam.

As the sponsor of that provision, I want to reiterate my support for a cease-fire as a means of resolving the terrible Vietnam tragedy. As you may recall, last year I served as a member of the President's Factfinding Commission on our Cambodian operations. That experience caused me to again focus on the advisability of a cease-fire as means of ending the hostilities. In June 1970, in a speech before the Belleville Junior Chamber of Commerce I outlined my proposal. This past April I introduced House Concurrent Resolution 276 which incorporates the essentials of the proposal.

My proposal calls for the President of the United States to publicly announce that as of given date and time the United States would cease all offensive action by U.S. forces—air, land, sea—for a limited period of time, long enough for the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong to join in the cease-fire, either tacitly or officially.

If they responded favorably, a U.N. or other international truce force would be ordered into South Vietnam to oversee the cease-fire and the withdrawal of all foreign troops—a move that should in turn generate meaningful negotiations.

If the Communists refused to accept or observe or abide by the cease-fire, the United States would, of course, clearly reserve the right to defend itself against attack. Simultaneously, the President would declare that the United States would repeal the cease-fire initiative in 2 weeks' time. If that failed, it would be repeated a third and fourth time—until the Communists were convinced the United States was serious about ending the war.

A cease-fire would bring an immediate end to the killing and destruction; it provides for the protection and safety of American troops and provides for their early withdrawal; it guarantees the simultaneous withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops, thereby precluding any mistake about an American "surrender" or "sell out"; it offers a realistic opportunity for a political rather than a military settlement to the war through resumption of meaningful negotiations in Paris leading to the return of our prisoners of war, and it provides the Vietnamese people with full opportunity for self-determination.

For these reasons, Mr. Speaker, I advocated the inclusion of a cease-fire provision in the conference report on the draft and pay bill.

Mr. BELL. Mr. Speaker, I oppose the rule that has been adopted waiving points of order to the conference report on the military pay and draft bill.

If allowed to pass as currently worded, the conference report will endanger both the financial stability of our first term GI's and the intent of Congress in passing the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970.

Both the House of Representatives and the Senate passed military pay bills that would become effective on the first day of the first month after enactment. The conference committee rejected both versions; the effective date has been delayed to October 1.

Both the House of Representatives and the Senate passed pay bills that would provide sizable compensation increases to all servicemen. Using the technical distinction between basic pay and quarters allowance, the conference committee rejected both versions; total compensation has been reduced by over $300 million.

Furthermore, the pay increase reduction does not apply equally to all servicemen. The conferees only chose to split the difference between the two versions for the careerists, while providing the first-termer with less than under either bill.

Can Congress today condone these delays and reductions?

When the executive branch and a majority of both the House and the Senate tentatively praise the idea of a future volunteer armed services, can we fail to protest a report which may adversely affect the ability of the military to end the draft as soon as possible?

To quote the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs:

> Even if the goal of zero draft was not at stake, it is unfair to use the power of the draft to enforce inordinary low pay levels . . ." In passing the pay raises, it was the intention of Congress to assure that military compensation is "properly equated with remuneration in other areas of national life.

When the House and Senate can appropriate money to cover cost-overruns in defense procurement, is should certainly be able to pay living wages to its enlisted men.

Can Congress today condone an apparent violation of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970?

Clause 3 of rule 28 holds that the conference committee may only consider the differences between versions of a bill passed by both Houses. As a result of the Sisk amendment, clause 3 of rule 28 now holds that the report of conferees:

> **Shall not include matter not committed to the conference committee by either House, nor shall their report include a modification of any specific topic, question, issue, or proposition committed to the conference committee by either or both Houses if that modification is beyond the scope of that specific topic, question, issue or proposition as so committed to the conference committee.**

Some individuals contend that this legislation must be finally enacted before the August recess to avoid the possibility that military families may suffer an actual reduction in their present monthly income ranging in amounts from $15 to $105. This particular problem is said to arise because of the necessity of extending the terminal date of the Dependents Assistance Act beyond July 1, 1971.

In view of the financial plight affecting our GI's, my distinguished colleague from Wisconsin (Mr. STEIGER) wrote the Assistant Secretary of Defense Roger T. Kelley on July 14 regarding this specific matter.

A week later he received the following reply:

> **At this time we are formulating plans to continue payment of Dependents Assistance Act allowances until final action on H.R. 6531 has been completed. We have advised the joint committee members, in conference on this bill, of technical corrections needed to continue current entitlement to DAA allowances . . .**

Mr. STEIGER further confirmed by phone that the Department of Defense has absolutely no intention of stopping payments to our lower ranking servicemen.

The major problem is still the conference report; it is their compromises which threaten to reduce the GI's monthly income. It is their actions that we should be able to debate and vote on today.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose the rule waiving points of order against the conference report on the military pay and draft bill. If the decision of the Rules Committee stands, the House will have acquiesced in a clear evasion of a crucial provision of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 that seeks to restrict the authority of conference committees within the limits of the differences committed to them.

Chairman HÉBERT argued eloquently during the Armed Services Committee consideration of the military pay bill for the necessity to act quickly and generously to bring financial relief to the long suffering lower pay grades. The report of the committee in March 1971 stated, in support of a pay scale that exceeded the administration's request by $1.7 billion, that "budget constraints" were not a compelling reason for not adopting levels of pay that were required by the standard of equity. The committee emphasized:

> **If constraints were to be placed on the budget, they were not to be placed there at the expense of young men who make an inordinate commitment to their country by being inducted into the Armed Forces.**

But for reasons that I cannot comprehend the conference committee decided to provide the lower grades with levels of pay below those set by either the House or the Senate, while splitting the difference between the two Houses only for the already much higher paid careerists. The increases for the higher ranks in this illegitimate conference bill are

achieved by reducing the increases for the privates, corporals, and lieutenants.

Former Senator Albert Gore has written this year of "Congress House of Secret Deals" and of how secrecy and abuse of power pervade the House-Senate conference committees. All sessions are closed and no record is kept of what is said and how conferees vote. These secret meetings are detrimental to public confidence in the legislative process and one would have hoped that adoption of the Legislative Reorganization Act would have curbed at least some of the excesses. The example before us today, however, indicates that we are all too willing to betray our own hard-won reforms.

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, as we hear the pros and cons of extending the draft bill, I regard the several views and alternatives suggested as cliches and rationalizations which only becloud the hysteria and pressures of the hour.

Last night 198 Members voted against the Foreign Aid Assistance Act, having grown disillusioned at scattering taxpayers money to foreign countries around the world. Now today, less than 24 hours later, many of those same colleagues indicate their support of a measure to force American boys to be sent to foreign countries along with the money to supply arms, equipment, and housing in the foreign countries.

I do not oppose the draft per se. I feel that any country has the right to draft its men to come to the defense of that nation from attack or to prepare against its enemies. But who are America's enemies today and where are we fighting communism? With Cuba 90 miles off our shore and no precaution or military preparation, we are not being asked to ready an army for America. We are being asked to revitalize the draft laws to force American men to serve in an international army which is controlled by international policies and which will be used to achieve international goals. I could never, in good conscience, vote for any draft law which would force our men to supply bodies or numbers as policemen for secret and unidentified goals over indefinite periods of duration around the world.

Our young men are a natural resource and are just as vital to the survival and defense of our country as any other strategic resource. But forcing them to serve for purposes that they do not understand and without any hope of achieving victory so as to see an end to their military service is not only criminal, but immoral. The effect is displayed our country over. By forcing our young men to serve in other than American forces for over 26 years, many have turned against their country and are embittered at our form of government, not even understanding that their grievance has been the international politicians and not our Government.

By extending the draft, I fear that we are only wasting our manpower and gaining nothing for the freedom and interest of the American people. America is being bled white; her tax dollars drained into foreign aid, and now by a continuation of the draft, the drain of her sons into foreign aid to serve as policemen.

Those most wronged have been the patriotic Americans. The patriotic conservative Americans have never been responsible for wars or entangling international alliances. Rather, their aspirations have always been peace and individual liberty. Yet, after our country is manipulated into international commitments and foreign conflicts it is the patriotic American who rallies to the defense of his country, right or wrong, and who gets caught in trying to defend nearly indefensible actions. The real policymakers and manipulators who are responsible for America's tragic mistakes grow weary of their madness and failures, back off, and attack the extreme policies of their country—which in turn the patriotic dedicated American feels he is honor bound to defend.

Korea was clearly an international war where American men were drafted to fight under the U.N. flag. South Vietnam is but another U.N. war operated under SEATO, which is a regional defense pact under the U.N. charter, as is NATO. American men drafted to fight in any of these theaters will never be under American control nor permitted to end any conflict in the American tradition of victory.

I can never, in good conscience, support a draft to conscript American men unless they are to serve in an American army or military force for the protection of the people of the United States.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the conference report.

The previous question was ordered.

MOTION TO RECOMMIT OFFERED BY MR. WHALEN

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.

The SPEAKER. Is the gentleman opposed to the conference report?

Mr. WHALEN. I am, Mr. Speaker.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the motion to recommit.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. WHALEN moves to recommit the conference report to the committee of conference.

The SPEAKER. Without objection, the previous question is ordered on the motion to recommit.

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion to recommit.

The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the noes appeared to have it.

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members, and the Clerk will call the roll.

The question was taken; and there were—yeas 131, nays 273, not voting 29, as follows:

[Roll No. 237]

YEAS—131

Abourezk	Anderson, Tenn.	Bell
Abzug	Aspin	Bergland
Adams	Badillo	Biester
Addabbo	Barrett	Bingham
Anderson, Calif.	Begich	Blatnik
		Brademas
Brasco	Hathaway	Pryor, Ark.
Broomfield	Hawkins	Quie
Burton	Hays	Railsback
Carey, N.Y.	Hechler, W. Va.	Rangel
Carney	Heckler, Mass.	Rarick
Collins, Ill.	Helstoski	Rees
Conte	Hicks, Wash.	Reid, N.Y.
Cotter	Howard	Reuss
Coughlin	Hungate	Riegle
Culver	Jacobs	Robison, N.Y.
Delaney	Karth	Rodino
Dellenback	Kastenmeier	Roncalio
Dellums	Koch	Rosenthal
Denholm	Kyros	Roush
Diggs	Landrum	Rousselot
Dow	Link	Roy
Drinan	McClory	Roybal
Dulski	McCloskey	Ruppe
Eckhardt	McCormack	Ryan
Edwards, Calif.	McDade	St Germain
Eilberg	McDonald, Mich.	Sarbanes
Erlenborn	Macdonald, Mass.	Scheuer
Fascell	Madden	Schmitz
Foley	Matsunaga	Schwengel
Ford, William D.	Meeds	Seiberling
Forsythe	Melcher	Snyder
Fraser	Metcalfe	Steiger, Wis.
Fulton, Pa.	Mikva	Stokes
Fulton, Tenn.	Minish	Stuckey
Gaydos	Mink	Symington
Gibbons	Mitchell	Thompson, N.J.
Goldwater	Morse	Udall
Grasso	Mosher	Ullman
Green, Pa.	Moss	Vanik
Gude	Obey	Whalen
Halpern	O'Hara	Wolff
Harrington	Pettis	Yates
Harsha	Podell	Yatron
Harvey		

NAYS—273

Abbitt	Davis, Wis.	Johnson, Calif.
Abernethy	de la Garza	Johnson, Pa.
Alexander	Dennis	Jonas
Anderson, Ill.	Derwinski	Jones, Ala.
Andrews, Ala.	Devine	Jones, N.C.
Andrews, N. Dak.	Dickinson	Kazen
Annunzio	Dingell	Keating
Archer	Dorn	Kee
Arends	Dowdy	Keith
Ashbrook	Downing	Kemp
Ashley	Duncan	King
Aspinall	du Pont	Kluczynski
Baker	Dwyer	Kuykendall
Baring	Edmondson	Kyl
Belcher	Edwards, Ala.	Landgrebe
Bennett	Evans, Colo.	Latta
Betts	Findley	Lennon
Bevill	Fish	Lent
Biaggi	Fisher	Lloyd
Blackburn	Flood	Long, Md.
Blanton	Flowers	Lujan
Boggs	Ford, Gerald R.	McClure
Boland	Fountain	McCollister
Bolling	Frelinghuysen	McEwen
Bow	Frenzel	McFall
Bray	Frey	McKay
Brinkley	Fuqua	McKevitt
Brooks	Galifianakis	McKinney
Brotzman	Gallagher	McMillan
Brown, Mich.	Garmatz	Mahon
Brown, Ohio	Gettys	Mailliard
Broyhill, N.C.	Giaimo	Mann
Broyhill, Va.	Gonzalez	Martin
Buchanan	Goodling	Mathias, Calif.
Burke, Fla.	Gray	Mathis, Ga.
Burke, Mass.	Green, Oreg.	Mayne
Burleson, Tex.	Griffin	Mazzoli
Burlison, Mo.	Griffiths	Michel
Byrne, Pa.	Gross	Miller, Calif.
Byrnes, Wis.	Grover	Miller, Ohio
Byron	Gubser	Mills, Ark.
Cabell	Hagan	Mills, Md.
Caffery	Haley	Minshall
Camp	Hall	Mizell
Carter	Hamilton	Monagan
Casey, Tex.	Hammer-schmidt	Montgomery
Cederberg	Hanley	Moorhead
Chamberlain	Hanna	Morgan
Clancy	Hansen, Idaho	Murphy, Ill.
Clausen, Don H.	Hastings	Murphy, N.Y.
Clawson, Del	Hébert	Myers
Cleveland	Henderson	Natcher
Collier	Hicks, Mass.	Nedzi
Collins, Tex.	Hillis	Nelsen
Colmer	Hogan	Nichols
Conable	Holifield	Nix
Crane	Horton	O'Konski
Daniel, Va.	Hosmer	O'Neill
Daniels, N.J.	Hull	Passman
Danielson	Hunt	Patten
Davis, Ga.	Hutchinson	Pelly
Davis, S.C.	Ichord	Pepper
	Jarman	Perkins
		Pickle

Pike
Pirnie
Poage
Poff
Powell
Preyer, N.C.
Price, Ill.
Price, Tex.
Pucinski
Purcell
Quillen
Randall
Reid, Ill.
Rhodes
Roberts
Robinson, Va.
Roe
Rogers
Rooney, N.Y.
Rooney, Pa.
Rostenkowski
Runnels
Ruth
Sandman
Satterfield
Scherle
Schneebeli
Scott
Sebelius
Shipley
Shoup
Shriver
Sikes
Sisk
Skubitz
Slack
Smith, Calif.
Smith, Iowa
Smith, N.Y.
Spence
Springer
Stafford
Staggers
Stanton, J. William
Stanton, James V.
Steed
Steele
Steiger, Ariz.
Stephens
Stratton
Stubblefield
Sullivan
Talcott
Taylor
Teague, Calif.
Terry
Thompson, Ga.
Thomson, Wis.
Thone
Vander Jagt
Veysey
Vigorito
Waggonner
Wampler
Ware
Watts
Whalley
White
Whitehurst
Whitten
Widnall
Williams
Wilson, Bob
Winn
Wright
Wyatt
Wydler
Wylie
Wyman
Young, Fla.
Young, Tex.
Zablocki
Zion
Zwach

NOT VOTING—29

Celler
Chappell
Chisholm
Clark
Clay
Conyers
Corman
Dent
Donohue
Edwards, La.
Esch
Eshleman
Evins, Tenn.
Flynt
Hansen, Wash.
Jones, Tenn.
Leggett
Long, La.
McCulloch
Mollohan
Patman
Peyser
Saylor
Teague, Tex.
Tiernan
Van Deerlin
Waldie
Wiggins
Wilson, Charles H.

So the motion to recommit was rejected.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:

Mr. Tiernan for, with Mr. Teague of Texas against.

Mr. Clay for, with Mr. Evins of Tennessee against.

Mr. Conyers for, with Mr. Charles H. Wilson, against.

Mr. Celler for, with Mr. Jones of Tennessee against.

Mr. Dent for, with Mr. Mollohan against.

Mrs. Chisholm for, with Mr. Leggett against.

Mr. Waldie for, with Mr. Eshleman against.

Until further notice:

Mr. Chappell with Mr. Esch.

Mr. Patman with Mr. Peyser.

Mr. Clark with Mr. Saylor.

Mr. Corman with Mr. Wiggins.

Mr. Flynt with Mr. Long of Louisiana.

Mr. Donohue with Mr. Van Deerlin.

Mrs. Hansen of Washington with Mr. Edwards of Louisiana.

Mrs. SULLIVAN and Mr. FISH changed their votes from "yea" to "nay."

Mr. COLLINS of Illinois and Mr. METCALFE changed their votes from "nay" to "yea."

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the conference report.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The question was taken; and there were—yeas 298, nays 108, not voting 27, as follows:

[Roll No. 238]

YEAS—298

Abbitt
Abernethy
Addabbo
Alexander
Anderson, Ill.
Andrews, Ala.
Andrews, N. Dak.
Annunzio
Archer
Arends
Ashbrook
Ashley
Aspin
Aspinall
Baker
Baring
Belcher
Bell
Bennett
Bergland
Betts
Bevill
Biaggi
Biester
Blackburn
Blanton
Blatnik
Boggs
Boland
Bolling
Bow
Bray
Brinkley
Brooks
Brotzman
Brown, Mich.
Brown, Ohio
Broyhill, N.C.
Broyhill, Va.
Buchanan
Burke, Fla.
Burke, Mass.
Burleson, Tex.
Burlison, Mo.
Byrne, Pa.
Byrnes, Wis.
Byron
Cabell
Caffery
Camp
Carney
Carter
Casey, Tex.
Cederberg
Chamberlain
Clancy
Clausen, Don H.
Clawson, Del
Cleveland
Collier
Collins, Tex.
Colmer
Conable
Conte
Cotter
Coughlin
Crane
Daniel, Va.
Daniels, N.J.
Davis, Ga.
Davis, S.C.
Davis, Wis.
de la Garza
Delaney
Dellenback
Dennis
Derwinski
Devine
Dickinson
Dingell
Dorn
Dowdy
Downing
Dulski
Duncan
du Pont
Dwyer
Edmondson
Edwards, Ala.
Erlenborn
Evans, Colo.
Findley
Fish
Fisher
Flood
Flowers
Ford, Gerald R.
Fountain
Frelinghuysen
Frenzel
Frey
Fuqua
Galifianakis
Gallagher
Garmatz
Gettys
Giaimo
Goldwater
Gonzalez
Goodling
Grasso
Gray
Green, Oreg.
Griffin
Griffiths
Gross
Grover
Gubser
Gude
Hagan
Haley
Hall
Hamilton
Hammer-schmidt
Hanley
Hansen, Idaho
Hansen, Wash.
Harvey
Hastings
Hathaway
Hébert
Henderson
Hicks, Mass.
Hillis
Hogan
Holifield
Horton
Hosmer
Hull
Hunt
Hutchinson
Ichord
Jarman
Johnson, Calif.
Johnson, Pa.
Jonas
Jones, Ala.
Jones, N.C.
Kazen
Keating
Kee
Kemp
King
Kluczynski
Kuykendall
Kyl
Landgrebe
Latta
Lennon
Lent
Link
Lloyd
Long, Md.
Lujan
McCloskey
McClure
McCollister
McDade
McEwen
McFall
McKay
McKevitt
McKinney
McMillan
Mahon
Mailliard
Mann
Martin
Mathias, Calif.
Mathis, Ga.
Mayne
Mazzoli
Meeds
Michel
Miller, Calif.
Mills, Ark.
Mills, Md.
Minshall
Mizell
Monagan
Montgomery
Moorhead
Morgan
Murphy, Ill.
Murphy, N.Y.
Myers
Natcher
Nedzi
Nelsen
Nichols
O'Konski
O'Neill
Passman
Patten
Pelly
Pepper
Perkins
Pettis
Pickle
Pike
Pirnie
Poage
Poff
Powell
Preyer, N.C.
Price, Ill.
Price, Tex.
Pucinski
Purcell
Quie
Quillen
Railsback
Randall
Reid, Ill.
Rhodes
Roberts
Robinson, Va.
Robison, N.Y.
Rogers
Rooney, N.Y.
Rooney, Pa.
Rostenkowski
Rousselot
Runnels
Ruppe
Ruth
Sandman
Satterfield
Scherle
Schneebeli
Scott
Sebelius
Shipley
Shoup
Shriver
Sikes
Sisk
Skubitz
Slack
Smith, Calif.
Smith, Iowa
Smith, N.Y.
Spence
Springer
Stafford
Staggers
Stanton, J. William
Stanton, James V.
Steed
Steele
Steiger, Ariz.
Steiger, Wis.
Stephens
Stratton
Stubblefield
Sullivan
Talcott
Taylor
Teague, Calif.
Terry
Thompson, Ga.
Thomson, Wis.
Thone
Vander Jagt
Veysey
Vigorito
Waggonner
Wampler
Ware
Watts
Whalley
White
Whitehurst
Whitten
Widnall
Williams
Wilson, Bob
Winn
Wright
Wyatt
Wydler
Wylie
Wyman
Young, Fla.
Young, Tex.
Zablocki
Zion
Zwach

NAYS—108

Abourezk
Abzug
Adams
Anderson, Calif.
Anderson, Tenn.
Badillo
Barrett
Begich
Bingham
Brademas
Brasco
Broomfield
Burton
Carey, N.Y.
Chisholm
Collins, Ill.
Culver
Danielson
Dellums
Denholm
Diggs
Dow
Drinan
Eckhardt
Edwards, Calif.
Eilberg
Fascell
Foley
Ford, William D.
Forsythe
Fraser
Fulton, Pa.
Fulton, Tenn.
Gaydos
Gibbons
Green, Pa.
Halpern
Hanna
Harrington
Harsha
Hawkins
Hays
Hechler, W. Va.
Heckler, Mass.
Helstoski
Hicks, Wash.
Howard
Hungate
Jacobs
Karth
Kastenmeier
Koch
Kyros
Landrum
Leggett
McClory
McCormack
McDonald, Mich.
Macdonald, Mass.
Madden
Matsunaga
Melcher
Metcalfe
Mikva
Miller, Ohio
Minish
Mink
Mitchell
Morse
Mosher
Moss
Nix
Obey
O'Hara
Podell
Pryor, Ark.
Rangel
Rarick
Rees
Reid, N.Y.
Reuss
Riegle
Rodino
Roe
Roncalio
Rosenthal
Roush
Roy
Roybal
Ryan
St Germain
Sarbanes
Scheuer
Schmitz
Schwengel
Seiberling
Snyder
Stokes
Stuckey
Symington
Thompson, N.J.
Udall
Ullman
Vanik
Whalen
Wolff
Yates
Yatron

NOT VOTING—27

Celler
Chappell
Clark
Clay
Conyers
Corman
Dent
Donohue
Edwards, La.
Esch
Eshleman
Evins, Tenn.
Flynt
Jones, Tenn.
Keith
Long, La.
McCulloch
Mollohan
Patman
Peyser
Saylor
Teague, Tex.
Tiernan
Van Deerlin
Waldie
Wiggins
Wilson, Charles H.

So the conference report was agreed to.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:

Mr. Teague of Texas for, with Mr. Tiernan against.

Mr. Evins of Tennessee for, with Mr. Clay against.

Mr. Charles H. Wilson for, with Mr. Conyers against.

Mr. Jones of Tennessee for, with Mr. Celler against.

Mr. Mollohan for, with Mr. Waldie against.

Mr. Chappell for, with Mr. Dent against.

Until further notice:

Mr. Clark with Mr. Saylor.

Mr. Donohue with Mr. Peyser.

Mr. Patman with Mr. Esch.

Mr. Corman with Mr. Wiggins.

Mr. Flynt with Mr. Keith.

Mr. Van Deerlin with Mr. Eshleman.

Mr. DOW changed his vote from "yea" to "nay."

Mr. MAYNE. Mr. Speaker, when the name of Congressman CLAY of Missouri was called I advertently answered "yea." I have been advised by his office that he is out of the city. I ask unanimous consent that the RECORD be corrected so that he will not be shown as voting.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Iowa?

There was no objection.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the conference report just agreed to, and to include extraneous material.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Louisiana?

There was no objection.

APPOINTMENT OF CONFEREES ON H.R. 5208, COAST GUARD AUTHORIZATION

Mr. GARMATZ. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the Speaker's table the bill (H.R. 5208) to authorize appropriations for procurement of vessels and aircraft and construction of shore and offshore establishments for the Coast Guard, and to authorize the annual active duty personnel strength of the Coast Guard, with Senate amendments thereto, disagree to the Senate amendments, and request a conference with the Senate.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Maryland?

The Chair hears none, and appoints the following conferees: Mr. GARMATZ, Mrs. SULLIVAN, and Messrs. LENNON, PELLY, and KEITH.

AUTHORIZATION FOR CLERK TO RECEIVE MESSAGES FROM SENATE AND SPEAKER TO SIGN ENROLLED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS NOTWITHSTANDING ADJOURNMENT

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that notwithstanding any adjournment of the House until Wednesday, September 8, 1971, the Clerk be authorized to receive messages from the Senate and that the Speaker be authorized to sign any enrolled bills and joint resolutions duly passed by the two Houses and found truly enrolled.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Louisiana?

There was no objection.

AUTHORIZATION FOR SPEAKER TO ACCEPT RESIGNATIONS AND TO APPOINT COMMISSIONS, BOARDS, AND COMMITTEES NOTWITHSTANDING ADJOURNMENT

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that notwithstanding any adjournment of the House until September 8, 1971, the Speaker be authorized to accept resignations and to appoint commissions, boards, and committees authorized by law or by the House.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Louisiana?

There was no objection.

FURTHER MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A further message from the Senate, by Mr. Arrington, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate insists upon its amendments to the bill (H.R. 5208) entitled "An act to authorize appropriations for procurement of vessels and aircraft and construction of shore and offshore establishments for the Coast Guard, and to authorize the annual active duty personnel strength of the Coast Guard," disagreed to by the House; agrees to the conference asked by the House on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and appoints Mr. MAGNUSON, Mr. LONG, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. GRIFFIN, and Mr. HATFIELD to be the conferees on the part of the Senate.

COMMUNIST PRISONER REPATRIATION

(Mr. SIKES asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, the Communists are expert at sowing confusion in the ranks of their opponents. They used this tactic to very good advantage at the time of the recent proposal by the South Vietnamese to repatriate North Vietnamese war prisoners. It will be recalled that more than 600 Communist prisoners refused to go home. Most people in the United States saw this as an indication that the Communists would rather be prisoners in the South than return to the North. Whatever happened, the Communists succeeded in covering up the facts to the point that some now believe the Communists who remained prisoners in the South were acting on instructions from Hanoi. Undoubtedly Hanoi is willing to use its own people as pawns. Had the North Vietnamese prisoners been repatriated, there would have been additional world pressure for Hanoi to free Americans who are in Communist hands. Whatever the situation, we know that the Communists are completely callous to the problems of their own people as well as to those of other nations. I think it very likely the Communist prisoners know this and prefer to take their chances in South Vietnam.

NATIONAL TOBACCO SPITTING CONTEST

(Mr. MONTGOMERY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Speaker, I am happy to announce that the 17th annual national tobacco spitting contest was held this past Saturday in Smith County, Miss., which is located in my district. I had the pleasure of participating in the politicking part of the annual affair, but not the actual contests.

The two main events are for accuracy and distance. The distance title was won for the fourth straight year by Don Snyder, of Eupora, Miss. He managed a distance of 24 feet, 9½ inches. Don set the world's record last year with 25 feet, 10 inches. The accuracy event was won by Mike Thompson, of Raleigh, Miss., when he hit the bull's-eye three consecutive times.

I am told that you need a good pucker and a lot of wind to be proficient in tobacco spitting. I would suggest in good humor that some of my colleagues consider entering the contest next year.

OPPOSITION TO FORCED BUSING

(Mr. MIZELL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MIZELL. Mr. Speaker, I want to take this occasion to commend President Nixon for his announcement of yesterday, in which he stated once again his opposition to the policy of forced busing to achieve a racial balance in our public schools.

This announcement, Mr. Speaker, was more than a statement by the President. It was, in the truest sense, the voice of the American people. Every opinion poll ever taken on this subject has revealed that an overwhelming majority of the American people oppose forced busing.

President Nixon, as the elected representative of all the people, spoke forcefully in their behalf yesterday, when he made unmistakably clear that his administration will enforce only the minimum busing standards as required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the law.

As Chief Executive Officer of the Government, the President is charged with the responsibility of seeing that laws, as interpreted by the courts, are enforced. That is his constitutional duty, as we all must understand.

But the President also has a constitutional duty to "insure domestic tranquillity," and this he is attempting to do by minimizing the disruption and chaos that has come to characterize the implementation of forced busing in this country.

President Nixon is doing what he can do to try and "insure domestic tranquillity," as evidenced by his announcement yesterday that he will seek an amendment to his emergency school funding bill to prohibit the use of Federal funds for forced busing.

This action represents the limit of the President's authority in this matter. He can only enforce the law.

But we in this body have the power to make law, even to change the Constitution itself if such a change is required.

In view of the Supreme Court's recent decision in the Charlotte case, it appears that only such a constitutional amendment can bring about the change in policy the American people have persistently and rightly demanded.

I have introduced a joint resolution, House Joint Resolution 646, which calls for a constitutional amendment prohibiting the assignment of students to a particular school on the basis of race.

I urge my colleagues to join me in this effort to restore rightful authority to the people's will, and to restore sanity to public education in America.

OPPOSITION TO MASSIVE BUSING OF SCHOOLCHILDREN

(Mr. BAKER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BAKER. Mr. Speaker, it is heartening to see the President remains strongly opposed to massive busing of our children for the sole purpose of achieving numerical racial balance in our schools.

We who believe that such massive busing unfairly heaps burdens on the children and parents involved, and presents

school districts with staggering financial and logistic problems, will follow closely indeed the Justice Department's appeal to the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans.

OPPOSITION TO MASSIVE BUSING OF SCHOOLCHILDREN

(Mr. WHITEHURST asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. WHITEHURST. Mr. Speaker, in view of the President's statement yesterday with regard to his request that no funds be appropriated for the busing of schoolchildren to achieve racial balance, I think it is incumbent upon this body to take the additional step of passing a constitutional amendment which will restore the neighborhood school to our communities and end the madness of forced busing once and for all.

The people in my district, in the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth, are being forced to bus children in grades 1 through 12 this September. Hundreds of parents have written to me, bitterly protesting the inconvenience and expense, and the deprivation of the right of their children to go to the school closest to them. Many people who can ill afford it will have to pay for this out of their own pockets. They must truly believe that madness has seized us.

On the one hand, the President has declared that he is against massive busing and has instructed the Secretary of HEW to keep it to a minimum and not to request funds for that purpose. Yet on the other hand the courts are forcing our school boards to accept bizarre plans which are bringing about a mass shuttle of pupils from one portion of the city to another.

I say again, let us end this madness once and for all with a constitutional amendment which will say to everyone—to the courts, to HEW, and to the people of the United States: Every public school child shall have the right to go to the school that is in his neighborhood.

Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

HAILS PRESIDENT NIXON'S ANTI-BUSING STAND

(Mr. YOUNG of Florida asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks).

Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Speaker, during the 1968 Republican National Convention, I discussed with President Nixon the crisis facing America's school systems and the injustices of massive forced busing of our young people. As a candidate for President, Nixon spoke out strongly against forced busing.

Later, as our President, he spoke out again, against busing, and for the preservation of the neighborhood school system which has helped make this country great.

I am proud to note that yesterday, the President courageously repeated his stand against forced busing, and repudiated an extensive busing plan mapped out by some of the social experimenters in the Federal bureaucracy.

The biggest threat to our school and quality education in America today comes from meddling by the Federal courts. The President is opposed to busing; the Congress is opposed to forced busing yet the courts order it anyway.

The Congress must break the deadlock and amend the Constitution to protect the right of every student to attend his neighborhood school without regard to race, creed, color, sex, or national origin.

Such legislation is bottled up in committee. We must get it to the floor so the people of America, through their elected representatives, can be heard on this critical matter.

I respectfully urge my fellow Congressmen to join this cause by signing discharge petition No. 6 to bring a constitutional amendment to preserve the neighborhood school system, House Joint Resolution 600, to the floor for action.

COMMENDATION OF PRESIDENT FOR OPPOSITION TO MASSIVE BUSING OF STUDENTS

(Mr. THOMPSON of Georgia asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. THOMPSON of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I should like to commend the President for his statement of yesterday reiterating his opposition to massive busing of students for the purpose of achieving racial balance. The President's statement should help to dispell the fears of many parents.

I believe the time has come, Mr. Speaker, when we need to be more concerned about the quality of education in our schools throughout the entire Nation than achieving an artificial racial balance. We need to treat students not as black students or white students but as individuals. The test of whether a school meets the desegregation requirements of the Nixon administration should be that no discrimination is allowed not that children must be forced to attend a certain school in order to have a certain racial balance.

I hope, Mr. Speaker, that this test will apply in other areas of our social problems as well, including employment and housing and not that we require racial quotas in these areas. In fact, Mr. Speaker, I should like to see enacted an amendment to the Constitution which would state that we shall not have, in schools, housing, or jobs, classification of Americans based upon race but that each American be judged on himself as an individual.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO PRESERVE NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOLS

(Mr. BENNETT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Speaker, for some time I have had a proposed constitutional amendment to preserve neighborhood schools before the House Committee on the Judiciary. The chairman of that committee advised me in writing that no hearings would be held on this proposed legislation. Therefore, I introduced a discharge petition on the basis of that letter from the chairman of that committee.

Any Members who would like to join in trying to preserve the neighborhood schools will find that a good vehicle to do so, and may wish to sign the discharge petition.

Mr. Speaker, with regard to the President's position in respect to busing, there is one thing about it that I do not know, and which I have not heard clarified by the news media. What needs clarification is what is going to be done with regard to the many millions of dollars of expenditures required of the southern schools to accommodate themselves to the various decisions by the various courts? Is not Federal financial assistance required for this? In the district I represent there will be some 85,000 students required by Federal courts to be bused this fall for racial reasons, over 60 percent of the entire school population. There are not sufficient local funds to accomplish this busing and also provide minimal education. Both the Negroes and the whites are protesting. As a matter of fact, I understand that the NAACP is appealing the decision because Negroes do not wish to have their children bused all across the wide territory involved, much of it in congested city streets.

Please each of you sign the discharge petition.

THE PRESIDENT'S FORTHRIGHT STATEMENT ON THE BUSING ISSUE

(Mr. PUCINSKI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to see so many Members of the House on both sides of the aisle speak out in praise of the President's very forthright statement yesterday on the busing issue. It is my firm belief that the President's statement will now put the whole desegregation bill into a more positive perspective. I am particularly pleased to see this statement, because recently, when I said that the desegregation bill was nothing more than a massive busing bill, Secretary Richardson challenged my analysis.

It is quite apparent, now that the President has taken a look at this bill, he has taken his action yesterday to make sure it does not become a massive busing bill.

I have a special order at the end of our proceedings today to discuss at length legislation pending before my subcommittee, and I should like here to just add one footnote: I was impressed that this message came down the pike from the White House yesterday, 24 hours after the House took positive action, by a vote of 351 to 36, on a related issue.

Miss Maggie Hunter, of the New York

Times, was the only one who covered a story on the House vote and pointed out the one-sided vote of 351 to 36 in support of the Collins amendment shows the extent of growing concern among House Members about massive busing plans plaguing the Nation.

Obviously, Mr. Speaker, Miss Hunter's story proves once again that when the New York Times sneezes, the White House catches pneumonia.

HEW BREAKS OWN GUIDELINES TO APPROVE REPRESSIVE REAGAN WAIVER REQUEST

(Mr. DELLUMS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I am outraged to learn that the director of California's State health-care services program, Dr. Earl Brian, has just released information indicating that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare plans to approve Governor Reagan's waiver request entitled "The Medi-Cal Program Plan To Evaluate the Effects of Token Copayment, July 1, 1971–June 30, 1974."

When the waiver request first came before it, HEW guaranteed that no decision would be made until after August 20 in order to allow all interested parties to comment on the proposal.

Now it seems that the final decision has already been made.

The copayment plan requires welfare recipients to pay $1 for each outpatient visit, each prescription, each pair of eyeglasses. In conjunction, a statewide 3-year study would be conducted to determine effects of the scheme upon the demand for medical services by welfare recipients.

I totally oppose such a plan. Those people who manage to subsist in California on welfare payments can barely pay for rent, utilities, food, and clothing. To add new financial burdens to people who already receive the worst medical care is irresponsible.

One dollar may seem little to us, but to welfare recipients, it can be margin between seeking medical care and not seeking it. And we must remember, that in most poor neighborhoods, medical care is not readily available, and so there are always expensive transportation costs for those seeking health care.

I am sending the following letter to Secretary Richardson today seeking to know why the waiver has been approved, and why the August 20 dateline was abrogated.

The letter follows:

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, August 4, 1971.

Hon. ELLIOT T. RICHARDSON,
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have just learned that the Department is going to approve Governor Reagan's waiver request "The Medi-Cal Program Plan to Evaluate the Effects of Token Co-payment, July 1, 1971–June 30, 1974".

I understood that the Department set a date of August 20, 1971 for all interested parties to comment on the proposed waiver. Now I learn that the Director of the state Health Care Services program says the Department is going to approve the request.

Can you tell me, as soon as possible, why the August 20 dateline has been abrogated, and why the Department is giving its approval to this scheme.

Thank you very much.

Sincerely,

RONALD V. DELLUMS,
Member of Congress.

PERSONAL STATEMENT

Mrs. MINK. Mr. Speaker, the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. ABZUG), was unavoidably detained in New York on official business during rollcalls Nos. 147 and 148. Had she been present, she would have voted in the affirmative on both.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to state that the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. ABZUG) was unavoidably out of the Chamber during rollcall No. 199. Had she been present, she would have voted for the adoption of the resolution.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. KEITH. Mr. Speaker, I was unavoidably detained during the vote on the conference report on the draft bill. Had I been here I would have voted "yea," and I would like the RECORD to so show.

PLAYBOY PLAZA PLAYMATES

(Mr. GROSS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, the Southeastern Association of Community Action Agencies will stage an all-expenses-paid meeting in Miami Beach, Fla., August 11 through 14, 1971. These "poverty fighters" have been extended a special invitation by the Playboy Plaza Hotel in Miami Beach. Among other inducements to go to the Playboy Hotel is a beautiful pool and cabana area living room, playmate, VIP room, and penthouse.

Mr. Speaker, I hope that the "poverty fighters" have a very pleasant sojourn at the Playmate Playboy Hotel.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. I am happy to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. HALL. Did the gentleman say "playmates" were furnished as a part of this package deal?

Mr. GROSS. I cannot say they are furnished, but "playmate" is specified in the invitation.

Mr. ANDREWS of Alabama. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. Of course I yield.

Mr. ANDREWS of Alabama. Will the taxpayers pay for that era of entertainment and play?

Mr. GROSS. It is an all-expenses-paid meeting.

Mr. ANDREWS of Alabama. Well, the taxpayers will pay for it.

INTERSTATE AGREEMENT REGARDING CERTAIN MOTOR VEHICLE FEES

Mr. McMILLAN. Mr. Speaker, I call up the bill (H.R. 9580) to authorize the Commissioner of the District of Columbia to enter into agreements with the Commonwealth of Virginia and the State of Maryland concerning the fees for the operation of certain motor vehicles, and ask unanimous consent that the bill be considered in the House as in Committee of the Whole.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the bill as follows:

H.R. 9580

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Commissioner of the District of Columbia may enter into an interstate agreement with the Commonwealth of Virginia or with the State of Maryland, or with both, which shall stipulate that any person—

(1) who operates in the District of Columbia and in the State which is a party to the agreement a single unit motor vehicle which has three or more axles and which is designed to unload itself;

(2) who has registered that motor vehicle in the District of Columbia or in that State; and

(3) who but for the agreement is required to pay the fee for an annual hauling permit prescribed by the fifth paragraph under the heading "General Expenses" in the first section of the Act of July 11, 1919 (D.C. Code, sec. 5–316), and a similar fee imposed on the motor vehicle by that State;

shall not be required to pay a fee described in paragraph (3) which is imposed by a jurisdiction other than the jurisdiction in which the motor vehicle is registered.

The SPEAKER. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. McMILLAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. MIKVA).

Mr. MIKVA. Mr. Speaker, I thank my chairman for yielding.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. MIKVA

Mr. MIKVA. Mr. Speaker, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. MIKVA: Page 2, insert at the end of line 13 the following: "If the Commissioner enters into an interstate agreement under this Act, he may adjust the annual hauling permit fees of the District of Columbia referred to in paragraph (3) so that the total amount of fees (including registration and inspection fees) required for the operation in the District of Columbia and in each State which is a party to such agreement of the vehicles referred to in paragraph (1) shall be uniform."

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the amendment?

There was no objection.

Mr. McMILLAN. Mr. Speaker, I have had an opportunity to discuss this amendment with the Members on the minority side and the Members on the majority side, and we agreed to accept this amendment.

Mr. NELSEN. Mr. Speaker, I want to

comment that Mr. MIKVA had some well founded concern about this bill, and we discussed it with the majority and the minority, and we believe that this amendment will produce some of the adjustment that Mr. MIKVA was concerned about.

Mr. Speaker, I am in full agreement with the bill as passed with the amendment.

Mr. BROYHILL of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the bill, H.R. 9580, of which I am pleased to be a cosponsor.

The purpose of this bill is to authorize the Commissioner of the District of Columbia to enter into reciprocal agreements with the States of Maryland and Virginia, to the effect that the owners of single-unit, self-unloading trucks with three or more axles which operate both in the District of Columbia and in either of these neighboring States will be required to pay registration and hauling fees only in the jurisdiction in which the vehicle is registered.

We have recently been apprised of a very serious inequity which exists at the present time in regard to these fees, particularly with respect to the operation of these dump trucks between the District of Columbia and the nearby counties of Maryland, which is posing a very real threat to the ready operation of these vehicles on an interstate basis.

No problem existed in this area before last April. Prior to that time, out-of-State trucks weighing not more than 44,000 pounds could operate in the District of Columbia on an interstate basis without the payment of any fee to the District, though such a truck engaged in point-to-point operation in the District was required to be registered and licensed in the city. Such trucks with a gross weight in excess of 44,000 pounds but not more than 49,000 pounds—the maximum weight then permitted to operate on the District of Columbia streets—were issued a special hauling permit for an annual fee of $28.

A section of the 1970 District of Columbia Revenue Act, however, which became effective on April 5, 1971, changed this picture radically. This provision increased the maximum gross weight allowed for dump trucks operating in the city to 65,000 pounds, which was realistic in view of modern trends in the trucking industry. However, this new law also imposed a requirement that all single-unit dump trucks with three or more axles and with a gross weight of more than 44,000 pounds, obtain an annual hauling permit in the District of Columbia, the fee for which is set, first, for trucks placed in service prior to July 1, 1970, at rates ranging from $380 to $680, depending on the weight capacity of the vehicle; and, second, for trucks out into service subsequent to that date, $680 per year. All such vehicles operating in the District of Columbia, regardless of where they are registered, must obtain this hauling permit.

In addition, the requirement still exists that all trucks registered outside the District but operated from point to point within the city must be registered in the District. The annual fee for this registration presently ranges from $53 to $269.50, according to the weight of the vehicle. Since the typical modern dump truck is a vehicle with a wheel base of 16 feet and a gross weight capacity of 65,000 pounds, most such vehicles pay the maximum District of Columbia registration fee.

I wish to state at this point that inasmuch as the State of Virginia maintains a maximum gross weight limit of 50,000 pounds for single-unit dump trucks operating in that State, there is relatively little interstate operation of such vehicles between Virginia and the District of Columbia. Hence, no real problem exists in this regard, and the authority provided in H.R. 9580 for an agreement between the District and the State of Virginia has no real significance under present circumstances. The reason for this provision in the bill, however, is to arm the District of Columbia Commissioner with this authority in the event that this situation between these two jurisdictions may change in the future.

The situation with respect to the small trucking operators whose vehicles are registered in the District of Columbia or in Maryland, however, and who of necessity must operate in both these jurisdictions, is grim indeed by reason of this very substantial increase in the fee for annual hauling permit imposed in the District of Columbia.

The problem besetting the small truck operators whose vehicles are registered in Maryland is briefly the following. A Maryland dump truck may be operated into or out of the District of Columbia, on an interstate basis, but not point to point within the District, without payment of any additional fee, provided the gross weight of the vehicle does not exceed 44,000 pounds. This, however, applies to only a small number of such trucks, because few are within this weight limitation.

In order for the Maryland vehicle to operate in the District at a gross weight of 65,000 pounds, which is a typical weight capacity, the operator must purchase a District of Columbia annual hauling permit for $680 which allows the operation of his vehicle into or out of the District, on an interstate basis, but not point to point within the District.

For operation point to point within the city at 65,000 pounds gross weight, the Maryland registered vehicle would also be required to have a regular District registration plate in addition to the annual hauling permit, at a cost of $269.50.

Thus, for full and unlimited operation in the District of Columbia, such a Maryland vehicle would have to pay the District a total of $949.50, on top of his very substantial fees to the State of Maryland. To appreciate the full impact of this situation, it must be remembered that in many cases the Maryland truck is required to operate in the District for only a very short period of time, in connection with a particular contract, but the full annual fees to the District must still be paid, regardless of the time involved in the operation.

The small-scale truck operators in the District of Columbia, most of whom are minority contractors, face the same problem because the nature of the trucking business makes it virtually imperative that they operate to some extent in Maryland.

A dump truck not registered in Maryland, and with a gross weight not in excess of 48,500 pounds, may operate interstate in Maryland, though not from point to point within that State, without charge. Again, however, this offers little benefit to the District of Columbia operators because most such vehicles in present-day use will exceed that weight limitation.

As is the case in the District, point-to-point operation in Maryland requires Maryland registration, and the fee for a truck not more than 48,500 pounds in weight, for such registration, would be $280.

In the case of dump trucks in excess of 48,500 pounds, rather than levy the $280 registration fee plus a separate charge for the additional weight, Maryland simply requires a dump service registration at a fee of $13 per thousand pounds. Thus, a 65,000 pound such vehicle would pay Maryland an annual special registration fee of $845. In the case of the truck registered in the District of Columbia, this charge is in addition to the large fees he must pay to the District.

Again, it must be pointed out that this requirement of $845 to the State of Maryland is imposed on the District trucker regardless of the fact that his operation into Maryland may be of very short duration.

While the larger trucking firms in the area may be able to absorb these charges with little real difficulty, I am advised that for the small operators this very substantial increase in the District of Columbia annual hauling permit fee has created a real hardship. I am told that these 65,000-pound dump trucks cost some $30,000, and with the proliferation of fees and taxes with which these truck operators are faced, they must operate necessarily on a small margin of profit. Thus, they actually cannot afford this newly increased charge incident to their operation between Maryland and the District.

At the time we enacted the 1970 District of Columbia Revenue Act, we were requested by the District of Columbia government to include this section which increased the weight limitation on trucks operating in the city, and also to enact the new schedule of fees for the annual hauling permit. The rationale for setting this maximum fee at $680 was that the District of Columbia Department of Highways and Traffic estimated that this charge would bring in just sufficient revenues to pay for the additional damage to the streets in the city which these heavier trucks would cause. It is presently estimated that this fee will bring in some $347,250 annually to the District. Of this amount, 70 percent, or $243,000, will accrue from trucks registered in Maryland, and only 1 percent, or $3,450, will be attributable to trucks from Virginia.

As I have said, I am convinced that the

increase in maximum gross weight of these trucks to operate in the District of Columbia was a sound move, simply because the dump trucking industry has developed to the point where vehicles of 65,000 pounds gross weight capacity are in common use and now provide for the most economical operation. Also, I recognize the indisputable fact that such heavy vehicles do indeed cause additional damage to the streets and roadways on which they operate. What I did not realize at that time, however, and which has since been brought to my attention quite forcefully, is that it is basically unfair to the small truck operators to charge this expense solely to the industry itself, in the form of this exorbitant hauling permit fee.

In view of the tremendous volume of hauling which must be accomplished in the District of Columbia, and in the entire metropolitan area in the next few years, by reason of the construction of the Metro rapid rail transit system, and the many other large building projects now underway or scheduled for the near future, it is apparent that the demand for dump truck operations will tax the available facilities in the area for some years to come. For this reason, I feel strongly that it is in the public interest that steps be taken to assure the truckers in the Washington metropolitan area the opportunity to engage in business, on an interstate basis, under fair and reasonable conditions.

Under existing law, the Commissioner of the District of Columbia has the authority to enter into reciprocal interstate agreements with respect to the registration and licensing of trucks, and in fact, the District entered into just such an agreement with the State of Virginia in 1947, for which reason District registered trucks do not have to register in Virginia nor vice versa, even for point to point operation in the other jurisdiction. However, the District of Columbia Commissioner does not have authority at present to enter into such agreements with respect to the District of Columbia annual hauling permit fee; and as I have pointed out, this is the crux of the present problem existing between the District of Columbia and the State of Maryland. Maryland does have the authority, however, to negotiate such an agreement with the District of Columbia, and a spokesman for the Maryland Department of Motor Vehicles has indicated that they are ready and willing to do so. Thus, the bill H.R. 9580, which will afford the District of Columbia Commissioner the requisite authority, holds the key to the solution of this problem.

Any opposition to this proposed legislation on the grounds that it will cost the District of Columbia government some $245,000 per year in loss of revenue from the District of Columbia annual hauling permit fee is shortsighted indeed. In the first place, this estimate assumes that all trucks presently registered in Maryland but operated in the District will continue to be registered in Maryland, when actually there may be reason to believe that some of these vehicles may become registered in the District of Columbia instead, in which case there will be no loss of revenue to the city where these vehicles are concerned. Furthermore, in the event this agreement is not consummated between the District and the State of Maryland, the only recourse available to these small truckers, other than to go out of business in the Washington metropolitan area, will be to increase their charges for their services. Should this occur, the increased cost of construction of the Metro system alone will probably exceed any loss these agreements may cause to the District of Columbia highway fund. Thus, the taxpayers certainly cannot lose by the enactment of this proposed legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I urge the support of my colleagues for the speedy passage of this bill.

Mr. MIKVA. Mr. Speaker, I am grateful to the ranking minority member of the District Committee, the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. NELSEN), and to the members of the committee who supported H.R. 9580, for their willingness to reach an agreement on this amendment which removes some of the objections I had with the bill as it was reported.

As introduced and reported H.R. 9580 would have authorized the District of Columbia to enter into agreements with the suburban jurisdictions lowering the total fees required for operation of heavy dump trucks. At present, many trucks which haul dirt from excavation sites in the District to landfill sites in the suburbs are required to pay fees both to the District of Columbia and to the suburban State. H.R. 9580 is intended to lower the total fees required for interstate operation by providing that both suburban and District of Columbia truckers need pay the fees only to the one jurisdiction where the business is located. The justification urged on behalf of the bill is that without such relief, small truckers in the District of Columbia, as well as in the suburbs, will be driven out of business by the high cost of licensing and hauling fees.

My amendment would insure that some measure of relief is provided to truckers in the District of Columbia, many of whom are small operators and many of whom are minority entrepreneurs. The amendment would authorize the District of Columbia to adjust its trucking fees so that, after an interstate compact is concluded, the total amount of fees required is the same for suburban truckers as for District of Columbia truckers. At present, District of Columbia truckers pay about $100 more than Maryland truckers. Interstate agreements such as those contemplated under this bill as it was originally introduced would have provided reciprocality, but not uniformity. In other words, all truckers would have paid less, but District of Columbia truckers would still have been paying $100 more than Maryland truckers. This inequality would have made it more difficult for District of Columbia truckers to bid competitively for hauling contracts. My amendment will result in equalization of the total fee burden, and will enable District of Columbia truckers to compete on an equal basis. This is especially important in light of the substantial amount of hauling which is being generated by excavation for the new Metro.

The District of Columbia will be deprived of some revenue if such reciprocal agreements are put in force. But with the amendment which my colleagues have graciously agreed to support, the bill will at least maintain the competitive position of minority and other small truckers in the District of Columbia who wish to get their fair share of business from such massive construction projects as the Metro and the new Library of Congress addition.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. MIKVA).

The amendment was agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the passage of the bill.

The bill was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

House Resolution 574 was laid on the table.

TO AMEND TOBACCO MARKETING QUOTA PROVISIONS

Mr. ABBITT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of the bill (H.R. 6915) to amend the tobacco marketing quota provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Virginia?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the bill, as follows:

H.R. 6915

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 318(b) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended, is amended by inserting in clause (1) following the word "county" the following ": *Provided,* That in the case of Virginia fire-cured tobacco type 21 and Virginia sun-cured tobacco type 37, any such transfer may be made to a farm in another county in the same State".

(Mr. ABBITT asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ABBITT. Mr. Speaker, H.R. 6915 simply provides that as to Virginia dark-fired tobacco type 21 and Virginia sun-cured tobacco type 37, both of which are raised exclusively in Virginia, transfer and sale or lease may be made across county lines in said State. This bill is vitally important and will be of tremendous assistance to the producers of Virginia dark-fired and air-cured tobaccos. There is no opposition so far as I am able to ascertain by anyone to this bill. The Department of Agriculture has recommended its passage and other types of dark-fired and air-cured tobacco pro-

ducers have indicated that they have no objection to the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

APPROPRIATION FOR EMERGENCY EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 1972

Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 588 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. RES. 577

Resolved, That immediately upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 833) making an appropriation for the Department of Labor for the fiscal year 1972, and for other purposes. After general debate, which shall be confined to the joint resolution and shall continue not to exceed one hour, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Appropriations, the joint resolution shall be read for amendment under the five-minute rule. At the conclusion of the consideration of the joint resolution for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the joint resolution to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the joint resolution and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from California (Mr. SISK) is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. SMITH), pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 577 provides an open rule with 1 hour of debate on House Joint Resolution 833, which implements the emergency assistance Employment Act of 1971.

House Joint Resolution 833, being for a single purpose, is not regarded as a general appropriation bill. For this reason it was necessary to grant a rule providing for its consideration.

The purpose of House Joint Resolution is to appropriate funds to implement Public Law 92–54, the Emergency Employment Assistance Act of 1971. This act provides during times of high unemployment for programs of public service employment for unemployed persons and assistance to States and local communities in providing needed public services.

House Joint Resolution 833 provides appropriations in the amount of $1 billion designed to provide jobs in public service to approximately 150,000 people. This is the amount requested by the President for this purpose.

Under this legislation $600 million will be allocated on a two-part formula in which both the numbers of unemployed persons and the relative severity of unemployment will be given equal weight. The funds will be apportioned among the States, based on the number of unemployed nationwide, and on the number of the States' unemployed in excess of 4.5 percent. No State will be allocated less than $1,500,000 regardless of its unemployment status. The Secretary of Labor is given discretion in allocating $150 million which also includes the funds for administrative expenses and program direction.

The sum of $250 million is reserved for areas of substantial unemployment. An "area of substantial unemployment" is defined as "any area of sufficient size and scope to sustain a public service employment program and which has a rate of unemployment equal to or in excess of 6 percent for 3 consecutive months as determined by the Secretary."

House Joint Resolution 833, as reported by the Appropriations Committee, is in accord with the budget proposal of the President, with the exception of a limitation on the amount which may be used for program direction and support, administration of the program at the local level, and for agent assistance and statistics. Funds for this purpose are limited to $50 million.

Mr. Speaker, the presentation of this legislation before the Committee on Rules was quite interesting. I might say the hearings before the subcommittee conducted by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. FLOOD) were rather interesting. Many of us who supported this legislation at the time of the authorization, of course, were hopeful that this program would be beneficial and certainly we still have that hope.

However, upon reading the testimony that was offered in the hearings during the time that the Committee on Appropriations was considering this, it leaves something to be desired, in my opinion.

It seems to me there is a great possibility that there may be some considerable distortion by the administering agent in this case as against what the intent of the Congress was at the time that this act was passed.

I think a mere perusal of the hearings indicates some concern in connection with this and I would hope that during the debate on the matter there will be some further explanation as to the way in which we are going to see to it that this money is properly used.

I think there is no doubt—and in fact it was brought out pretty clearly in the testimony—that this is definitely revenue sharing and that there are some rather interesting things that can occur in connection with the administration of the program even though according to the testimony the Department retains a complete veto over any program that is proposed.

Mr. Speaker, I urge the adoption of the resolution in order to permit the Committee on Appropriations to explain the bill.

Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may use.

Mr. Speaker, I concur in the remarks made by the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. SISK).

I can simply add that this is another rather unique rule from the standpoint of the fact that it is a 1-hour open rule for the consideration of an appropriation bill. Usually we do not set time on those bills but as the gentleman from California stated this is not a general appropriation bill and in this case we had to have a rule because it did not come through the regular channels according to the Constitution and according to the rules. But on July 12 we did pass the Emergency Employment Act which authorized $1 billion and this is for the purpose of funding that $1 billion.

I certainly hope it works out in accordance with the intention of those supporting this particular resolution as well as the bill.

Mr. Speaker, I urge the adoption of the resolution.

Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Rules, the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. COLMER).

Mr. COLMER. Mr. Speaker, I am going to take about 3 minutes, not to explain the workings of this bill or how it is to be implemented, because I have not been able to find out, and no one else that I have appealed to seemed to understand just how this $1 billion is going to be spent. But the idea here is that we are going to spend $1 billion. We are going to hand it out, first, to the Secretary of Labor. Then he is going to dole it out to cities or counties under certain conditions. Under other conditions the Governor will be able to dole it out.

Incidentally, I just want to say that I never saw so much money appropriated in such a small bill. The joint resolution appropriating $1 billion contains only 2½ lines, without the trimmings.

I do not know how the money is going to be spent and, as I have said, I have not found anyone who knows how it is going to be spent. But I imagine that there is going to be a lot of politics involved, both on the local and the national level. I am not charging that there is any partisanship in this. Both sides feel that they are going to get some benefit out of it. Whenever money is spent, people expect to get something out of it.

I just want to call your attention to one thing. Where are you going to get this $1 billion? We just had a report from the President of the United States that instead of the expected surplus we have a $23 billion-plus deficit, and that is under one definition of a deficit. If you bring in the trust funds, it is more than a $30 billion deficit for 1971. Can anyone here say that it is going to be less than $30 billion for 1972? It is anticipated that we will have a $35 billion deficit for 1972 in addition to the trust funds which must be borrowed and paid back.

One of the able, learned, and knowledgeable members of the Appropriations Committee told me the other day that we were spending $40,000 a minute—get this—$40,000 a minute to pay the interest on the national debt. Incidentally, that interest is almost five times what it was costing us to run the whole Federal Government when President Franklin D. Roosevelt and I came to Washington. We owe over $400 billion at the present time.

We are told by those in authority that

they are going to have to come to you again to increase the public debt ceiling above $430 billion, the present debt limit.

How long can we go on with this kind of business? Can we continue to spend and spend and spend and elect and elect and elect indefinitely? Again, my purpose in arising here was just for the umpteenth time to raise the storm warnings, and I would suggest that we take heed of those warnings before the storm overtakes us and engulfs us.

Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the resolution.

The previous question was ordered.

The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee for the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 833) making an appropriation for the Department of Labor for the fiscal year 1972, and for other purposes.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Texas.

The motion was agreed to.

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 833), with Mr. BOLLING in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the joint resolution.

By unanimous consent, the first reading of the joint resolution was dispensed with.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. MAHON) will be recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Bow) will be recognized for 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

[Roll No. 239]

Abourezk	Eshleman	Powell
Alexander	Evins, Tenn.	Pryor, Ark.
Ashley	Flynt	Railsback
Baring	Foley	Rees
Blanton	Fraser	Reid, N.Y.
Buchanan	Frenzel	Rosenthal
Carey, N.Y.	Gray	Roy
Celler	Hébert	Saylor
Chamberlain	Horton	Scheuer
Chappell	Jacobs	Sullivan
Clark	Jones, Tenn.	Teague, Tex.
Clay	Landgrebe	Tiernan
Conyers	Long, La.	Van Deerlin
Dent	McCulloch	Waldie
Diggs	McEwen	Widnall
Donohue	Mikva	Wiggins
Edwards, Calif.	Mollohan	Wilson,
Edwards, La.	Moorhead	Charles H.
Erlenborn	Patman	
Esch	Peyser	

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. BOLLING, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the joint resolution, House Joint Resolution 833, and finding itself without a quorum, he had directed the roll to be called, when 376 Members responded to their names, a quorum, and he submitted herewith the names of the absentees to be spread upon the Journal.

The Committee resumed its sitting.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas is recognized.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, if Members will look closely at the measure pending before them they will find they are quite involved and no doubt interested in the pending legislation.

This joint resolution is being brought before you under some unusual circumstances. It is not a general appropriation bill; therefore, it came before you under a rule, and the rule provides for 1 hour of general debate before the 5-minute rule begins. The time is to be divided equally between each side of the aisle.

This is an appropriation to implement the Emergency Employment Act of 1971. When the basic authorizing legislation was originally before the House it was passed in a different form by a vote of 244 to 142. There were 142 of us who voted against it.

In conference it was sharply revised, and on July 1 the House adopted the conference report. There were 343 of us voting for the conference report and 14 voting against it.

The authorization is for $1 billion for public type employment, like working for cities, counties, States, political entities. It is for public type jobs. It is anticipated about 150,000 people would be employed in the first year of this 2-year program.

The highest amount of pay that could be given to any unemployed person employed under this program is $12,000. The legislation provides I believe that not more than one-third of the employees under the program can be of the professional type.

The money involved is $1 billion, but it is divided in this way: $750 million is to be utilized to relieve unemployment under one system of calculation and $250 million is to be used under another system.

It is proposed that the $750 million authorized by section 5 would be distributed as follows: A sum equal to 80 percent or $600 million will be allocated on a two-part formula in which both the absolute numbers of unemployed persons and the relative severity of unemployment will be given equal weight. The funds will be apportioned among States, based on the number of unemployed persons in the State as a percentage of the number of persons unemployed nationwide, and on the number of the State's unemployed in excess of 4.5 percent as a percentage of national unemployment in excess of 4.5 percent. No State will be allocated less than $1,500,000 regardless of its unemployment status, as the law prescribes. The Secretary is given discretion in allocating the remaining $150 million of the $750 million which also includes the funds for administrative expenses and program direction.

As to the $250 million authorized by section 6, this is set aside for areas of substantial unemployment. No State necessarily gets a certain percentage or a certain amount. This sum of $250 million is for these areas of substantial unemployment which are defined as an area of sufficient size and scope to sustain a public service employment program and which has had an unemployment rate of 6 percent or above for 3 straight months. This section of the bill is designed to take care of the most urgent unemployment problems in various areas of the Nation.

There are those who argue that the $600 million should be given to all of the States on the basis of each State's proportion of the total unemployment of the Nation. These people argue that relief for areas of high unemployment should come only from the $250 million authorized under section 6.

That is a factor about which you will want to inform yourself—and make a decision on, depending on your views.

There is a table made available by the Committee on Education and Labor which shows how each State would fare under each of these two methods of distribution.

The Committee on Appropriations, in considering this matter, adopted a provision which says that the Department of Labor cannot, as it had proposed, spend some $99 million for administration, but could spend only about half that amount—$50 million. It was thought that to spend approximately $100 million for administering this $1 billion program was excessive. The committee feels that administrative costs should be held down in order to make more money available for jobs. That was the purpose of that amendment.

The conference report on the bill authorizing $1 billion for this program for fiscal 1972 passed the House by a large vote, as I said a while ago, with only 14 Members voting against it. There is no question but that we do have very serious unemployment problems. The Congress has passed this act by an overwhelming margin and I propose that we proceed to provide the approriation.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chairman, would the distinguished gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I wholeheartedly endorse the comments and the observations made by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. MAHON), and I, too, intend to support the full amount, and support the action recommended by the Committee on Appropriations.

I should add, however, the footnote that I totally endorse the amendment that was made in the committee to reduce the burden of the administration of the program. As a matter of fact, I think with considerable legitimacy the limitation could have been made less because the function of the Federal Government in this regard is quite formal, and you can argue in reality it is primarily just a checkwriting responsibility, and certainly this did not justify $99 million as administrative overhead. I think we could even go a little lower.

Mr. MAHON. I thank the gentleman from Michigan for his comments.

I was concerned that such a large

amount was requested for the administration of the program. I think that the action of the committee limiting such expense to $50 million was very appropriate.

Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Connecticut.

Mr. MONAGAN. I would just like to ask a question about the $250 million that the gentleman said goes to areas of severe unemployment; that is, with 6 percent or above unemployment. Do they go directly to the localities, or do they go to the States?

Mr. MAHON. Assistance under this section as shown by the law itself may be provided by the Secretary of Labor to areas of high unemployment—equal to or in excess of 6 percent as the gentleman indicates.

An applicant might be a unit of local government or public agencies and institutions which are subdivisions of State or general local government, or Indian tribes on Federal or State reservations.

So applications would be made for the $250 million, as I view it, in much the same way as they would be made under the $600 million except that the 6-percent unemployment yardstick would apply.

Mr. MONAGAN. It could be a discretionary grant to divisions of local government directly, or Indian tribes, rather than to a State

Mr. MAHON. It is not required that grants be made to States or cities or subdivisions.

Mr. MONAGAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. DANIELS of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. DANIELS of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, in order to clarify the question raised by the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. MONAGAN) who just spoke, there are two funds in this bill. Under section 5 the bill provides for an authorization and appropriation of $750 million, and those funds are to be allocated to eligible applicants, and the eligible applicants are the ones the gentleman from Texas has just enumerated, and the eligible applicants are set forth in section 4 of the bill, which may be units of Federal, State, and general local government, or public agencies and institutions which are subdivisions of State or general local government, and institutions of the Federal Government, or Indian tribes on Federal or State reservations.

Now, those are the eligible applicants.

However, section 6 is an entirely different fund. That provides for an authorization—and now an appropriation of $250 million for areas of high substantial unemployment. Those areas would not necessarily be a Federal unit. It would not necessarily be a State. It would be an area—even a local community—and in the conference report it is clearly set forth. And also in the House report accompanying the bill, when it came here, we gave examples of what such areas may be. It could be the Watts area in the city of Los Angeles—and Los Angeles could itself be an eligible applicant. Or it could be Bedford-Stuyvesant.

Mr. MAHON. There is very, very wide latitude given here in the administration of this program.

There is some doubt as to what the legislative committee really meant in the authorizing legislation, as to how the 80-percent allotment should be made under section 5. I am not sure whether the committee handling the legislation, the Committee on Education and Labor, meant that all section 5 funds should be allocated under one system or whether they favored allocation under the two-part system as recommended by the Secretary of Labor in testimony before the Committee on Appropriations.

Section 9 of the bill says that the amount appropriated under section 5 of this act for any fiscal year shall be allocated by the Secretary in such a manner that of such amounts—

(1) not less than 80 per centum shall be apportioned among the States in an equitable manner, taking into consideration the proportion which the total number of unemployed persons in each such State bears to such total number of such persons, respectively, in the United States, * * *

There is the question of whether or not the Secretary has the authority under this very broad bill to do what the Secretary says that he proposes to do.

What does the gentleman think about whether or not the Secretary has that authority?

Mr. DANIELS of New Jersey. We gave the Secretary the authority to distribute money in an equitable manner.

Mr. MAHON. In an equitable manner—he could have two or three or four systems to distribute section 5 money.

Mr. DANIELS of New Jersey. No, no, because we say in this bill whenever national unemployment arrives at 4.5 percent or higher and continues for 3 months it triggers off the program. And should it go below that it triggers the program off.

Mr. MAHON. That is the national program?

Mr. DANIELS of New Jersey. That is the national program.

Mr. MAHON. Yes; but we are not interested in that for the moment.

Mr. DANIELS of New Jersey. That is to the other program, the local programs—that is triggered when the unemployment reaches a certain figure.

Mr. MAHON. Does the gentleman say that the allocation to each State is on the basis of its percentage of unemployed in relation to the total unemployed in the Nation?

Mr. DANIELS of New Jersey. Eighty percent of the $750 million, or $600 million shall be allocated to the States on the basis of the ratio of the unemployment in that State to the national unemployment.

Here is where the confusion arises. Recently, Secretary of Labor Hodgson stated——

Mr. MAHON. The Secretary of Labor has stated that he is going to allocate the funds otherwise, as I understand the situation.

Mr. DANIELS of New Jersey. I believe that the Secretary of Labor can allocate these funds in the same manner in which this legislation was written and not in the manner that he proposed to do it.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin. I cannot yield at length, because the time is so short, and I want to reserve some time for Members who have made requests for time.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. I appreciate the gentleman's yielding. I must say in all honesty that I think it is very clear the authorization bill does not require the Secretary of Labor to follow only the factors listed in the bill. We said in the authorization that they should take into consideration a factor. I would not want the record to stand as showing in some way that the Secretary of Labor has exceeded his authority. Clearly, he has not.

Mr. DE LA GARZA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. DE LA GARZA. I should like to ask the distinguished gentleman about an area of concern to me, and that is the small, rural areas. As I read the statement of Secretary Lovell, he seems to indicate that a 75,000 population level would be the amount that would qualify. I read the statement and it reads both ways apparently.

Mr. MAHON. In response to the gentleman's inquiry, the testimony before the committee indicated that in towns and counties of 75,000 or more one procedure would be followed in making the application, but in the smaller, less populous areas the Department of Labor, I believe, proposes that those applications be submitted by the State acting as agent. The State would be the agent for the less populous areas, whereas perhaps the mayor or some other local official would otherwise make the application.

Mr. DE LA GARZA. I understand that, Mr. Chairman, and this is where the problem comes and we see a lack of wisdom. For example, one county is with a group of counties for purposes of economic development. It is with another group of counties for OEO programs. It is economically and socially linked with a third group of counties. With such a multiplicity of effort, the small county gets nothing as an end result.

I am concerned that if you impose any amount of limitation as regards population, as has happened before, and I hope we might put a stop to it, that you do not neglect the smaller areas by imposing any population limit.

Mr. MAHON. I have no doubt myself but that in the administration of the program the Secretary of Labor will undertake to give equitable consideration to the rural areas and the less populous areas.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. BOW. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 3 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is recognized.

Mr. BOW. Mr. Chairman, I shall yield to others who have more details on this

bill than I have. I merely wish to say that I wholeheartedly support the proposed appropriation of $1 billion. There are many who raised their eyebrows when they heard I was supporting the measure because of some of the speeches I have made here on the floor opposing big spending. I remember one of the last ones that I delivered was when I was objecting to a vote on an agriculture bill.

May I remind you that this bill is not over the budget. It is the budget figure. When I objected to the Agriculture bill, that bill was $1.3 billion over the budget, and it contained in it some $3.6 billion to pay people for not growing crops and providing other benefits.

Now we bring an appropriation measure for $1 billion to take care of people who are out of work, whose welfare has stopped, men not on welfare now, but engineers, men who have been employed in good positions, and who, because of the winding down of the war and the closing down of defense plants, are now in need. This measure is to tide them over.

Let me point out that in the city of Cleveland, Ohio, 200 policemen had to be removed from duty in that great city because there were no funds to take care of them. If this joint resolution passes, some policemen will go back to work in Cleveland. This relates to law and order in a great city.

So I do not have any hesitancy at all, nor do I apologize to anyone for my position in respect to fiscal responsibility in saying that for a billion dollars, if we can help the unemployed and solve the problem of suffering of so many of our fellow citizens who through no fault of their own have no work but are willing to work and want to work, we shall accomplish something that will benefit our country.

This is not a welfare bill. This is a transitional bill to take care of those people over this period of time.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to remember that time and time again we go over the budget. We talk about inflation and a $30 billion deficit. How much of that has been brought about by the House by going way over the budget on many bills that do not help those who are desperately in need?

I am very happy to say, Mr. Chairman, that in my own city of Canton, Ohio, unemployment is 3.9 percent. I am proud of that. I am happy. I think those who complain that we are not giving them enough in these formulas should be pleased if their States and localities do not need the money, but I think places like Wichita and Seattle and other places have been severely hit because of changes from a wartime economy to a peacetime economy and are really severely affected. For that reason, Mr. Chairman, I wholeheartedly support this resolution.

I hope we can find some other area where we are way over the budget so we can try to do something to cut down a bit on the large deficit.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BOW. I said I would not yield, but I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. EDMONDSON. I just want to ask a question. Are the formulas under which this money is allocated to the States determined by statute, or have they been determined administratively?

Mr. BOW. It is my opinion they are determined by statute, but there are others here who are much more capable of answering the gentleman's question to whom I will yield time, and I will be glad to have them answer the question.

Mr. Chairman, at this time I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. MICHEL).

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this bill, but I do so with some real misgivings in supporting the full funding of the bill at $1 billion. It has the potential for being a billion dollar boondoggle. It is a badly written law, loose as a goose, and because it is so nebulously written, there is a tremendous burden thrust upon those responsible for administering the bill.

The chief witness before our subcommittee was the Assistant Secretary for Manpower, Malcolm Lovell, who has had a great deal of experience in this field with job training and work programs. He wants to do a good job. I think we all feel he is sincere and devoted to the cause of making this thing work.

It could be an administrative morass. There are certainly pitfalls in doling out a billion dollars in such a short span of time, but to do what the authorizing legislation seeks to do—put people to work who currently are unemployed—requires our moving expeditiously, and this measure is supposed to provide for transitional employment in public service fields. I am concerned that it may lead to a permanent Federal subsidy for public service employees. We were told that if the average salary paid to these people is in the neighborhood of $5,000, we can expect to employ 172,000 people. If it is at the level of $6,000, we can employ 144,000. If it is at the level of $7,000, we can put on 123,000 people.

Our good chairman mentioned that under the law we can pay as much as $12,000 per individual, but the law specifically states that it shall be limited to no more than one-third of the total number at that subprofessional or professional class. But bear in mind that in the city of New York the average salary for public service employees is close to a level of $7,000. So it cuts down the number of persons we would actually like to take off the unemployed rolls. I would hope that emphasis would be placed on providing the greatest number of jobs at the lower salaried figures.

The question has been raised here as to whether or not the enabling legislation prescribed formulas for doling out this $750 million to the States.

I say again the legislation was not very specific and is open to very flexible administration.

I believe in promulgating this second factor; the people downtown charged with this responsibility have taken the Congress at its word—that we wanted to give more emphasis where the problem was more severe. First we take into account the total number of unemployed in a State compared to the total in the country. Then giving equal weight to a similar comparison of only that number in excess of 4½ percent. That is good and sound.

The third step would be those areas of 6 percent or more qualifying under the special $250 million.

I must confess if we were to use only one factor my own State of Illinois would fare much better. Instead of getting $18 million or $19 million we would get $30 million. Several other States would be in the same kind of situation. But, as a State, we are relatively in pretty good shape in Illinois. We do not have as severe unemployment as some of the others do.

Frankly, from the standpoint of pure philosophy, I would much rather help those areas which are more destitute, with higher unemployment than we have in Illinois. So when that issue is enjoined, if it is later this afternoon, I will have to support the committee proposition here, because it puts the emphasis on the severity of unemployment, and that is the way it should be.

Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MICHEL. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. DENNIS. There were 142 of us here on the second day who voted against this bill in its original form. I realize there have been considerable changes. I wonder if the gentleman would mind refreshing this Member's memory, at any rate, as to what are those basic changes which might justify a change of position.

Mr. MICHEL. I must say that I was one of those voting against the legislation originally because it was of a permanent nature. The conference report came back with a bill that was considered to be transitional and I want it limited to simply helping us over this unemployment problem that confronts us currently. That is why I opposed the original bill and voted for the conference report.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Illinois has expired.

Mr. BOW. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. QUIE).

Mr. QUIE. Mr. Chairman, it seems as though the greatest concern today comes from the proposal of the administration to use two factors in devising the formula for distributing the money.

The law in section 9 reads that not less than 80 percent shall be apportioned among the States in an equitable manner, and then it reads "taking into consideration the proportion which the total number of unemployed persons in each such State bears to such total of such persons, respectively, in the United States," and then not less than $1.5 million in any one State.

When the administration looked at that, from all the legislative history they could see, it appeared they were supposed to do it as equitably as possible and they have to take that one factor into consideration, which they did, as to the amount of unemployment as it relates to total unemployment in the country. As indicated before, in the debate in both bodies, there is more severe

unemployment in some parts of the country than in others. The administration felt if they were going to distribute this as equitably as possible they had to take into consideration the extreme unemployment which exists in some States.

As Members know, we never went below 3 percent unemployment at a time when there was full employment, supposedly, in this country, so we are going to have some unemployed people in communities all over this Nation no matter how good the economy is.

Therefore, you cannot distribute this money so that a little bit of it dribbles to where there are just one or two people unemployed. We should really have an impact with this $1 billion. We will have to concentrate some of the money and put some of the money where severe unemployment is.

Title VI is written for the purpose of concentrating money with $250 million where the unemployment is above 6 percent. However, the administration decided that where the unemployment was above 4.5 percent in a community, which is a national triggering device, it appears that the Congress would want to have more of the money distributed there. For that reason, I guess, we have come into this conflict. Many Members look at the table and see which formula gives his State the most money. But there should be a concern for the Nation as a whole. That is really our major concern. Our major concern is helping to relieve unemployment in this country and not bring home as much bacon as possible to our own districts. It is true we want to bring home the bacon that is fairly ours, but we want to do it in an equitable manner.

I think we ought to permit the administration to take into consideration not only the amount of the unemployed in the State related to the total number of unemployed in the Nation but also the amount of severe unemployment which is existing in certain communities as it relates to severe unemployment around the Nation.

The Congress in the authorization bill it passed, put down 4.5 percent as the amount of unemployment nationally which appears to them to be severe and which therefore triggers this formula.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. QUIE. I am glad to yield to the distinguished minority leader.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. It is my recollection that consistently the Congress in many Federal aid programs cranks in an extra genorous amount of help for those States or areas where there is a special need. It just happens in many, many cases my State, for example, has not been able to qualify for those extra benefits under one program or another. We have been willing to be more generous in such cases because our needs in certain instances did not exist to the extent that others had it. In this case, because in our State we have relatively high unemployment and we have pockets in the State where unemployment is even higher, naturally we believe that the Secretary's decision is the right one. I hope and trust that some of those States that over the years have been the beneficiaries of the generosity of some States like Michigan will not now say, "Well, let us spread it across the board. That is the right way." We did not take that attitude a few years ago in many, many programs.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. QUIE. I will be glad to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. BOLAND. I want to congratulate the gentleman on his explanation of this particular point.

Is it the opinion of the gentleman and others who serve on this committee that the discretion of the Department of Labor, the Secretary of Labor, with reference to his formula is a correct one? Can he make this decision under the law itself?

Mr. QUIE. It is my belief that the Secretary of Labor can make that determination. He has the authority in the act. It is also understood some members of the committee do not like that, but the fact is that he has the authority.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. BOW. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman 1 additional minute.

Mr. QUIE. He does have the authority, as I read it. We require distribution in an equitable manner and specify one formula that have to be taken into consideration.

Mr. BOLAND. Will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. QUIE. I am happy to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. BOLAND. It seems to me that the Secretary is making the right decision here. He is putting the money where unemployment is most severe under his formula.

Mr. QUIE. That is correct. That is the reason why he did it.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. QUIE. I will yield to the gentleman.

Mr. PUCINSKI. I think the gentleman tried to explain this as much as he could, but he overlooked one point. I agree that section 6 does provide for concentrating this money in areas of the highest need. However—and our friend from Massachusetts ought to pay attention to this—applying the 4.5 percent factor at the State level before you can apply your State's unemployed against the national total is absolutely unauthorized. There is nothing in the authorization to permit this arbitrary rule and the Department is violating this act by requiring you deduct the first 4½ percent from your State's unemployed before you qualify for the national allotment.

Mr. BOW. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. STEIGER).

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I recognize full well that there is some controversy and some misunderstanding about this authorized program. I support the $1 billion and I commend the Committee on Appropriations for having moved promptly in this matter. I think all of us are going to have to recognize that we have imposed upon the Department of Labor an exceedingly difficult task. We just authorized this program and we have said here is $1,750 million under one section and $250 million under another section. And there are already literally scores of cities that are coming to the Department of Labor saying, "Tell us when we get our money. Here is our application. How soon can we find out how much money will we get?"

It is estimated that there are over 80,000 eligible applicants for money under this program, and there is only $1 billion available.

Now, with all due respect to those who think the formula is not right, and with all due respect to those who think there may be some other provision we ought to apply in place of the agency concept that the Department intends to use, I am going to be very honest and tell you if we start goofing around with the formula under this House joint resolution, or if we start goofing around with the Department's agent concept, then you are saying to those who are unemployed, and to those cities that are standing in line that they will have to wait an additional 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8 weeks before they get their money. It is just that simple.

I do not know how anybody can expect the Department of Labor to handle 30,000 applications for funds under this program if they do not set up some kind of check system. That is what the agent concept is all about. It says for cities and counties of 75,000 and over you can act as agent, and all applications by school districts, water districts, sewage disposal districts, Federal agencies, State agencies within that jurisdiction can come to them, and they can make a determination to all of those within that jurisdiction. That has to come forward to the Department of Labor for clearance, and they can get their money. For all of the others, cities and counties under 75,000—and the gentleman from Texas, I know, is concerned about this—they will go to the State as the agent. It does not require a county to go together, it does not require two counties to join to make 75,000. All it says is that the State will act as the agent for the distribution of funds within the State under their formula.

Let us also be very clear that the authorization is one of the problems in that within the authorizing legislation we said that it had to be distributed—I do not have the section in front of me in the act—to "areas" within a State. We did not say to cities within a State, and we did not say to counties within a State, and we did not say to school districts within a State, we said it had to go to areas within the State.

Mr. DANIELS of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. DANIELS of New Jersey. I would like the gentleman in the well to explain to this House where in the conference report do we authorize the Secretary of Labor to designate a State, a county, or a municipality as an agent?

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. Clearly, the act does not preclude the Secretary from making an administrative arrange-

ment of that kind. What you are asking me, I will say to the gentleman from New Jersey——

Mr. DANIELS of New Jersey. Is it authorized?

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. I am not yielding.

What you are asking me, I will say to the gentleman from New Jersey, is that you want the regional manpower administration to handle every single application for every single eligible applicant, and that is an intolerable burden. You are asking also that the money ought not to be distributed promptly and equitably.

Mr. DANIELS of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. I yield further to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. DANIELS of New Jersey. The gentleman from Wisconsin has been very active in the committee, and the gentleman has taken a prominent role in this legislation, and I want to commend the gentleman on his activities. The gentleman also served as a conferee. The gentleman understands this bill as well as I understand it, and as well as the Members on my side of the aisle understand it, and there is nothing in this act which authorizes the Secretary of Labor to designate a State or any municipality as an agent, nor is there anything in the act which authorizes the Secretary of Labor to direct that only a city or county having a population of 75,000 or more may be an eligible applicant who may go directly to the Secretary of Labor. The Secretary of Labor here is formulating his own rules.

Therefore, when he gave his release out to the press a week ago Friday, I summoned the Secretary of Labor before our committee and we had two informal conferences with him and you were present and members of the committee and the question of guidelines was heard, is that not true?

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. Yes, there were formal meetings. There was disagreement on the part of some on this committee who have apparently a different view on it. I think the Labor Department is acting within the law and appropriately.

Mr. BOW. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. GERALD R. FORD).

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chairman. I, too, strongly support the appropriation that is before us today. I likewise commend the administration for its rapid submission of the billion-dollar request to the Congress and for the very immediate action taken by the House Committee on Appropriations in bringing this bill to the floor for action.

Of necessity, this authorizing legislation had to be very broad if we were to utilize the funds in those areas where the greatest need existed. And, if the authorizing legislation had tied down the administration so tightly that they could not move with speed and with adequate funds, the justification for the legislation would have been considerably less. You have to have flexibility for this kind of program to work.

Therefore, I hope there will not be a great deal of controversial discussion with reference to the inclusion of some restrictive language in this case because if that is done we could undermine very substantially what I understood was the basic intent of the legislation when it was first authorized.

I suppose that one could argue as the gentleman from Wisconsin and the gentleman from New Jersey have argued. But in a time of emergency such as this I do not think it is productive to argue back and forth about some vague intent, when there are communities and when there are people who are unemployed.

Let me refer to my own State of Michigan. Our unemployment today is 9 percent or thereabouts. Some areas in the State have even a larger unemployment. The gentleman from Bay City (Mr. CEDERBERG) has an unemployment which is in the neighborhood of 12 percent or thereabouts.

I can assure you that there are communities in my State, and my own community of Grand Rapids is one such community, where unless we move quickly and make funds available they will be in the position of having to lay off a substantial number of policemen, firemen, and other essential employees. If we do not get this appropriation through before the Congress goes in recess that community and many other communities throughout my State of Michigan and other States will be deprived of essential services which provide for the protection of the health and welfare of our local citizens.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. The gentleman is raising a very interesting point.

How do we deal in this bill, however, with a community that has, let us say, plenty of unemployment but which simply takes this money and uses it to accomplish something that they would otherwise have to spend money for and either reduce its taxes or keep taxes from going up—so the community does not provide any extra employment but merely shifts the burden of its local cost of administration onto the Federal Government. Take the case of policemen, for example.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I would respond to the gentleman by suggesting that that question be asked of somebody on the authorizing committee as to what limitations or restrictions they included in the authorization.

But if there are no such limitations or restrictions in the authorizing legislation, it seems to me that those who have the job of administering the disbursement of the money ought to examine the facts in each application to make sure that the potential abuses the gentleman raises do not exist. I can only speak categorically about my own community, because the mayor and others were down here approximately a week ago. They pointed out to me that, I think as of August 1st, they will have to or had to lay off x number of firemen and policemen. Even though they had raised taxes, even though they had done other things to raise sufficient revenue, they had to lay off so many firemen and so many policemen.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. It is quite possible that this would occur as the gentleman has described it. But what do we do if the community merely were to claim that this would be true? In other words, these people are not reemployed people. There are merely people who claim that they might otherwise become unemployed if this money did not become available. Whether they would be unemployed in fact, if the Federal funds did not become available is speculative. For all we know, the community may decide, if they cannot get Federal money, to dig a little deeper into its pocket and keep the people on the payroll, notwithstanding.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. It is my understanding this is legislation and this is an appropriation to employ people in a public service capacity who are unemployed. If we find in the future that there have been abuses such as the gentleman indicates, the Committee on Appropriations, particularly the subcommittee, will find out in the hearings a year from now. I cannot imagine the gentleman from Pennsylvania and the gentleman from Illinois, if they find abuses, permitting such abuses to continue in the next fiscal year.

On July 12, President Nixon signed into law the Emergency Employment Act of 1971. In his statement at the time of signing, the President urged Congress to appropriate the full $1 billion authorized by the act for this fiscal year. As the President stated:

> America needs more jobs, and it needs them now.

The overwhelming vote in both Houses of Congress is testimony to our awareness of this need. The Emergency Employment Act of 1971 will provide more than 150,000 additional new jobs and it will provide them now, not months from now. It will provide payroll checks to unemployed persons, not unemployment checks or welfare checks. It will provide cities, counties, and States with the ability to meet the demands for increased public services. It will not saddle our Nation with the scandal of leaf-raking make-work activities that characterized the work-relief efforts of the 1930's.

The Emergency Employment Act of 1971 can do all of this, and more, if we take immediate action today to provide the requested $1 billion appropriation.

If today we act favorably upon the appropriations request and if our colleagues in the Senate give favorable consideration to our actions, the first public service employees funded under the Emergency Employment Act of 1971 should be on the job and have received their first pay check long before we in Congress have returned from our scheduled recess.

If we fail to act, if we delay action until after Labor Day, if we fail to approve the full amount authorized in the legislation, then we must be held accountable for depriving employment to

thousands of our deserving unemployed and, perhaps more significantly, we must be held accountable for depriving all of the citizens of the Nation of needed and essential public services.

The administration has fulfilled its pledge of immediate implementation of the Emergency Employment Act. On July 23, Secretary of Labor Hodgson announced the initial decisions implementing the act, including a listing of the allocated funds for each of the States. These data, together with broad information on the allocation formula and the proposed method of making the funds available to the eligible units of general purpose government, was made available to Congress and the public only 11 days following the President's signing of the act.

The Committee on Appropriations has responded to the President's call for fast action. Less than a month following the enactment into law of the Emergency Employment Act, the committee has laid before us the appropriations request which we now consider.

Congress must respond to its pledge to the Nation—its pledge to provide the means for alleviating the current levels of unemployment and for meeting the emerging public service needs of our general units of State and local government.

Our response must be evidenced by favorable action on the appropriations request now before us. I call for favorable consideration of this appropriations request. I call for Congress to fulfill its pledge to the Nation. I call for Members of this House to lay aside partisan and parochial considerations and to overwhelmingly endorse this request for appropriations to bring the benefits and services of the Emergency Employment Act to the citizens and units of government of our Nation. I call on you each, as individuals, as Representatives of areas which should share in the benefit from this act, to vote in favor of this appropriation request.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. PATTEN).

Mr. PATTEN. Mr. Chairman, we have waited 3 years for someone to help the unemployed. Last December we passed a manpower measure, which the President vetoed. We passed a program of accelerated public works, which the President vetoed. Now we have on the floor a joint resolution to help meet the problem with $1 billion. We went out of here one night wondering if the President would veto it.

This is our bill. It was given to us by the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. DANIELS) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. DULSKI) in the House committee. The measure provides only $1 billion. We cannot cure unemployment with $1 billion. It is too little and too late. We should not even be talking about it. We have the authorization. The President said that he will go along with this. Let us provide the $1 billion. I would not have the nerve to leave on a vacation without having done so.

I would like to make a prediction. I am an old WPA mayor. I know people jumped off the bridge and committed suicide. The kids who brought about the May Day confrontation will look like a Boy Scout picnic but a new unemployed march will make Hoover's Shanty Town look like a social if we do not solve this problem. Don't you dare pass by this problem. The only choice we have now is to vote this $1 billion. You will be back to consider the problems of the unemployed and you will have plenty of opportunity to debate and vote better plans.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time.

Mr. BOW. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. CEDERBERG).

Mr. CEDERBERG. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this legislation. The discussion here this afternoon reminds me of the discussion we had in the full committee. There was a great deal of confusion as to the formula under which this will be administered. I hope it will not be amended today to make even more confusion.

One of the things that concerns me is that I believe we are building up unreasonable expectations within our local counties and our cities as to what they are going to receive from this legislation. They will expect far more than can be granted when we take this amount of money and this number of people and spread it nationwide.

I believe this has been referred to as our first revenue-sharing bill. The only difference is it is a revenue-sharing bill with many administrative complications. If we wanted really to do something for our cities, we should have passed the general revenue-sharing bill requested over a year ago by the President in the amount of $5 billion. We would have had this money going now to our local counties and cities, and they could be using it to take care of the very problems we are discussing here.

As I said in the full committee, if it were germane to this legislation, I would offer an amendment to substitute the general revenue-sharing provisions proposed by the President.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CEDERBERG. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I understand what the gentleman is saying. Can the gentleman answer me this? How does the gentleman know, when we give a certain amount of money to an area that has unemployment, that the community will use the money to employ people? Maybe they will use it to reduce taxes or raise salaries.

Mr. CEDERBERG. I do not know about the gentleman's community near Baltimore, but I can tell the gentleman about some of my communities. They are having a difficult time holding their present employees. This is what they would use to employ people to provide services at the proper level.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. If the gentleman will yield further, some of them will be responsible communities, and some of them will not be. I go back to the WPA period and there is an interesting case about the University of Florida football team. Two hundred and sixty-five unemployed people were waiting assignment, and the members of the University of Florida football team squad were carried on the WPA rolls as certified relief clients. The coach and members of the university were involved, too. Would the gentleman deny this could happen?

Mr. CEDERBERG. I would not deny it could happen. I think under any legislation we can have irresponsible administration. There is always that possibility, but I do not know any other way to get at this situation when we are trying to help people who are unemployed.

I would prefer the general revenue sharing bill. I am supporting this, because people are unemployed. I think with the general revenue sharing bill we would all be better off, and the local cities and counties would know what they could expect, not only this year, but every year as this general revenue sharing progresses. Their problem is now they do not know what they can get, and they are expecting a great deal more than they will receive under this legislation.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. I agree with the gentleman that this raises a great many expectations that will not be met, but more strings should be attached to this, so we can make sure this does reemploy people. The gentleman is talking about unrestrained revenue sharing, and I wonder if that will accomplish the purpose.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, this bill is very reminiscent of the WPA—and I am not one of those who feel the WPA was a terrible thing. Whether it was good or bad depended on whether you looked at the tremendous number of things that were good that came out of it, or whether you looked at the tremendous number of things that were bad that came out of the WPA. There were 4,674 allegations of fraud, which were substantiated. These included administrative personnel carried on project payrolls; collusion in having projects approved; dual compensation; equipment, material and labor diverted to private use; equipment rented from employees; material diverted for projects and charged to other projects; padded payrolls; padded vouchers; property lost, stolen or diverted; sale of jobs and promotions; and shortages in accounts. It also included golf courses built for private use.

If we have to employ people and cannot possibly come up with any restrictions to prevent abuses. I say go ahead. But if we can prevent these kinds of abuses we should try to.

I wonder whether we have enough restrictions here. Does the Secretary of Labor, when he passes out the money to various communities, have any real control, to make sure that these tremendous numbers of abuses cannot take place? Can he do anything to stop it? Does he not merely hand over the money to the community on the basis of unemployment and beyond that have very little control over how it is spent?

Can any Members of the authorizing committee answer that question?

Mr. BOW. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LONG of Maryland. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. BOW. I am not on the authorizing committee and not as familiar with the measure as I wish I might be. In studying the hearings and the plans, it seems to me that when the agents, the people back at the local level, prepare these plans and make recommendations as to who shall be hired, that is subject to review again by the local level and must then be reported here, and there is a right of veto.

I wish a member of the Legislative Committee would correct me if I am wrong, but it seems to me there is a right of the Administration to veto a plan where they might indulge in the things the gentleman from Maryland is worried about.

Mr. QUIE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LONG of Maryland. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. QUIE. There are specific prohibitions, as I see it, in the law. It does give authority for the Secretary of Labor not to fund that. I would say section 12(a)(1) is the prohibition against using this money for the types of things the gentleman mentioned.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted that this bill calls for a full $1 billion appropriation for the Emergency Employment Act—the very maximum authorized by law. Throwing open more than 100,000 new community service jobs during its first year of operation alone, the Emergency Employment Act will attack the economy's knottiest problem: unemployment so severe and so widespread that it has taken on the dimensions of a crisis.

Unemployment rates are moving upward more and more, soaring to all but dizzying heights in some regions of the country—14 percent in Seattle, Wash., for example, to 12 percent in Lowell, Mass. Unemployment in my own congressional district's labor market, a market already designated an EDA redevelopment area, has crept up to 10 percent.

Jobs are vanishing overnight, throwing millions of people out of work. Major layoffs are no longer startling. Indeed, they are now drearily familiar everywhere in the United States. Yet the administration still stands aloof to the plight of the workingman, giving us comforting homilies instead of the decisive action that this problem demands.

It is high time we acted, Mr. Speaker.

The Emergency Employment Act calls for just the kind of action needed. It will ultimately create hundreds of thousands of new jobs—not merely temporary make-work jobs, but meaningful jobs leading to lasting employment.

Administered through two funds, a general fund distributed evenhandedly throughout the United States and a special fund for regions with the most alarmingly high unemployment rates, the act will help to solve economic problems that have defied solution for years now.

Now that the act itself has been signed into law, we must fund it as amply as possible.

Again, Mr. Speaker, I urge the passage of this appropriations bill.

Mr. JAMES V. STANTON. Mr. Chairman, the approval of $1 billion for the Emergency Employment Act of 1971 in the House today is good news for Cleveland.

These funds will help put more than 2,000 Clevelanders back to work in the coming months. This influx of Federal funds will put an end to diminishing city services and increased crime rates that have plagued the city during the past year.

Cleveland has already applied for $16.2 million to rehire 1,500 city employees laid off last fall. This includes doctors, nurses, dentists, 637 waste collectors, maintenance workers, laborers, housing inspectors, and clerks.

The Cuyahoga County commissioners this week submitted a proposal for $7 million to rehire another 900 employees. The county will use its funds for health care, public safety, street repair, parks, crime control, welfare, sewage disposal, the courts, and mental health programs.

These programs will directly help those persons who have been forced out of work by the present state of the economy, and create more jobs for Vietnam veterans and the unemployed in the inner city.

I understand these funds should be approved next month, and that city and county employees can plan to return to work this fall.

And this is only the beginning. More funds will soon be available for public works projects under the Economic Development Act of 1971. This public works program will directly help thousands of workers in the Greater Cleveland area.

These are the kinds of programs I have urged the Congress and the administration to begin since January. I am confident the job picture will improve in Cleveland as these programs get underway.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Chairman, it gives me great pleasure to rise today in support of the full appropriations for the Emergency Employment Act. This legislation is long overdue, and as personal experience and statistics demonstrates, it is desperately needed.

I congratulate the Congress for passing this bill, and I commend the Appropriations Committee for not only giving it the full funding it is due, but for doing it so quickly. I also commend the Education and Labor Committee for its perseverance in seeing that the authorization bill become law.

It would give me great pleasure to be totally positive about this legislation. It is one of the few times in my experience in the House that we have an opportunity to vote on adequate funding for a bill which clearly meets the demands of at least part of the domestic sector of our economy, and it is a pleasure to vote for legislation on whose merit I feel no reservation.

Nevertheless, I am deeply disturbed by an administrative action taken by the Labor Department which I fear will seriously undermine the effectiveness of the legislation and will run contrary to congressional intent. I have been told by the Department that it intends to restrict direct Federal contracts under the Emergency Employment Act to cities of 75,000 or over, and to require smaller communities to qualify for funds through procedures to be established by their State governments. This is a grave error.

To its credit, the Congress recognized the urgent need for this legislation last year. But the President, refusing to acknowledge this need, vetoed it. This year, however, the grave economic crisis confronting us has become clear even to the White House and the President signed the bill.

Unemployment statistics are rising. The crisis is worsening and the unemployed need immediate help. If there were ever a time to cut down on redtape and bureaucracy it is now.

Yet the Labor Department's tentative decision will slow down the flow of these funds to the affected communities, and the unemployed men and women within them will suffer longer because of bureaucratic insensitivity and myopia.

What the Labor Department is doing is simply to impose an unneeded layer of bureaucracy between the program initiated and enacted by the Congress and the intended recipients.

The Emergency Employment Act does not exclude States from participation. State governments are eligible recipients under the act. But, so are local governments, and their fiscal needs are even greater than those of the States. To require municipalities to await the formulation of statewide plans before they can receive funds we are voting on today is to defeat the efforts of Congress to make this money available immediately to meet the pressing needs of cities and towns.

The report on the Emergency Employment Act and the act itself make no mention or recommendation that funds should be funneled through the States. In fact, it is clear that the intent of the Congress is that the funds should be utilized to decrease unemployment as quickly as possible. Our cities and towns are in desperate need of workers to improve the level of services they provide to their citizens. They should not have to wait any longer. The money will be available by the end of this week. Why deliberately delay its expenditure?

It cannot be argued that the large number of local communities forced this requirement. In the first place, the Labor Department—and all other Departments—have experience in dealing with local communities. Moreover, many of the communities in my district have, on their own initiative, taken steps to form regional consortia of several cities and towns aggregating upward of 100,000 in population to apply for Federal funds. The Labor Department ought to encourage this sort of regional initiative. The proposed action of the Department in this bill does the exact opposite. By forcing local communities to apply through

their States, it perpetuates a policy of treating municipal governments as inferior, dependent units, unable to formulate their own programs and respond to their own needs.

I have written to the Secretary of Labor urging him to comply with the spirit of this act and to make funds directly and immediately available to those who need them. I hope that other Members will do the same.

Unless we object and object now, the unemployed men and women and the citizens of every community under 75,000 in population will be the losers; and the Emergency Employment Act will turn into the "Bureaucracy Proliferation Act."

Mr. SHRIVER. Mr. Chairman, this special appropriation bill we are considering today is one of the most important bills we will debate this year. It is designed to combat directly two of our Nation's most pressing problems, and to do it now. These problems are the tragic unemployment rate in certain areas of the country and the equally important demand for adequate public services in these areas.

Our Appropriations Committee has recommended full funding of the $1 billion authorized for fiscal 1972 under the Emergency Employment Act, which was signed by the President last month. Over 86 percent of these funds will go for actual wages and employment benefits for unemployed persons. They will be hired by local public agencies, which will provide at least 10 percent matching funds, to expand local services in the fields of environmental quality, health, education, public safety, crime prevention and control, transportation, park maintenance, recreation, rural development, and sanitation.

It has been mentioned, both here on the floor today and during our subcommittee's hearings on this bill, that administrative difficulties will arise in the implementation of this program. This is to be expected in any new Federal program.

I want to point out, however, that in passing the Emergency Employment Act, Congress purposely wrote the legislation broadly to allow for different local employment and services needs. What we have here is a bloc grant approach to a national problem, or, if you will, a revenue sharing program.

Under the broad guidelines which are now being completed by officials in the Manpower Administration, local officials will act as agents for the Federal Government. These local people will be responsible to their own constituents in using these funds in the most effective way. This is as it should be.

At the Federal level, we are fortunate to have two experienced administrators directing the initiation of this program. Malcolm Lovell, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Manpower, has overall responsibility. He is well respected by the committee and others who are familiar with his past efforts in manpower training and placement. Mr. Lovell has asked William Mirengoff to take actual responsibility for this act. Mr. Mirengoff is a veteran of 35 years of government, no small accomplishment in itself. More important, he worked for about 10 years in the old WPA program of the thirties and is well aware of the pitfalls of that program.

These gentlemen have a tremendous task ahead of them, but they are well qualified to do the job. I know they will have the support of our committee and the Congress as they proceed.

As described during our hearings, the administrators intend to conduct this program so that those areas with the most problems will get the most help. As denoted in the title of the act, this is an emergency measure and will be treated as such. With the appropriation of these funds, Mr. Lovell testified that people can be put to work by September 1.

Priority will be given to those who have exhausted their unemployment benefits and would otherwise have to go on welfare. This is important, as this program will allow an alternative to growing welfare rolls with all the accompanying costs, both monetary and personal.

Public service employment is not a new area of Federal Government involvement. The manpower administration has experience with the summer youth program, the Neighborhood Youth Corps and Operation Mainstream, which are all public service employment programs. The local employment service offices will be utilized, and these agencies will coordinate this program with ongoing manpower training programs.

Many of our cities have had to lay off needed public servants because of budgetary restrictions. This is especially true in areas of high unemployment where tax revenues have been reduced. This appropriation will provide for the rehiring of some of these policemen, firemen, teachers, nurses, and others. These people will be paid the same amount of money as other individuals performing comparable work for the same employer, and will be subject to the same employment regulations and requirements. In other words, these will be real jobs, not just make-work jobs.

Mr. Chairman, my home city of Wichita, Kans., has an unemployment rate of 11 percent, and it has been at that level for many months. This high rate is due largely to cutbacks in defense and areospace spending by the Federal Government. Congress has been responsible for many of these cutbacks in demanding reorientation of our national priorities. Now Congress must face the consequences of these cutbacks in terms of jobs.

This appropriation is not the whole answer. This is no substitute for needed reforms in our manpower programs, nor is it a permanent solution to the problems of our cities. More adequate revenue-sharing measures are needed.

What this bill will accomplish is a start in what I hope will be larger efforts on the part of the Government to control the rate of unemployment which seems to have stabilized at much too high a level. I urge prompt and positive action on this appropriation.

Mr. VANIK. Mr. Chairman, I support the amendment of the gentleman from Iowa, the Honorable NEAL SMITH.

The Labor and Education Committee, in setting the formula for distribution under this bill, apportioned these funds among the States based on the number of unemployed persons in the State as a percentage of the number of unemployed nationwide.

When Congress, by its action, establishes a formula for distribution of Federal funds, the administration has the authority to implement the formula, but certainly does not have the authority to distort the formula. In this situation, the administration added a second test to the one provided by the Congress in acting on the authorizing legislation, by adding as a factor "the number of a State's unemployed in excess of 4.5 percent as a percentage of national unemployment in excess of 4.5 percent."

It is not by mere coincidence that this provision added by the Secretary of Labor provides an increased distribution to 11 States, 10 of which are headed by Republican Governors. It is dreadful that the administration should make this effort to play politics with unemployment and the allocation of Federal funds.

An unemployed person is just as critically affected by unemployment whether or not his State has more unemployed persons in excess of 4.5 percent unemployed. It is impossible to meet the crisis which confronts him in his daily life by an explanation that he cannot be helped by this legislation because of this factor added by Executive indiscretion.

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, this bill appropriates $1 billion to be used as a downpayment on a modern-day WPA program. It is to be scattered over the Nation, hopefully to employ some unemployed people who seek work. It is called a public service employment program, and a rather substantial portion of it is to be used to pay the salaries of those who administer it.

I am constrained to vote against the measure. There is nothing urgent about this hasty action. Once begun, we all know it will be continued and will get larger each year. The guidelines under which the money is to be allocated and spent are somewhat hazy, and the waste will undoubtedly be enormous.

Mr. Chairman, people I represent are understandably concerned about inflation and the excessive spending that is taking place. If there is an urgent and really justified need for an expenditure, that is one thing; but unless that is true then we had better stop, look, and listen.

It is true—there is unemployment, approximating 6 percent of the labor force. That means that some 94 percent of Americans are gainfully employed. It is well known that a small percentage of employable people do not want to work. A good many of them are known to decline job opportunities for reasons best known to themselves. A number draw unemployment compensation, and are quite content with that income. Yet they are counted as unemployed. A good many others leave jobs because of pregnancy, temporary illness, movement from one locality to another, change in jobs, some young people who are still in school, and so forth. Then, there are those who live by their wits—gamblers, opportunists, those with some income who can get by

without working, and another group which prefers to live on welfare rather than exert themselves in a search for jobs.

A PALLIATIVE, NOT A CURE

So, while any unemployment is deplorable, the picture is not half as bad as some would have us believe. We know that by creating a public job program, the incentive to get out and hustle and hunt for work will be reduced. Some of those who will be favored with these jobs will prefer to become locked into such employment as a permanent way to make a living.

This WPA-type program is admittedly a palliative, not a cure for the cause of unemployment. It provides no permanent solution for anything. Indeed, over the long pull it can be expected to create and aggravate more problems than it will solve.

The real answer to unemployment is through the private sector, by the removal of shackles which cause business enterprises to slow down and lay people off. It is well known that the high minimum wage is causing thousands of people to be out of work because of their limited capacity to produce. Those are the fringe workers, the handicapped, the youngsters, and others who would be employed except for the minimum amount of wages that must be paid. Many of these would be quite willing to work for less, and still get along very well, particularly where there are two, three, or four potential wage earners in one family.

The minimum wage law should take these situations into account.

In addition, if necessary, tax laws could be amended to encourage business to expand and hire more people. Our public works programs and highway construction could be accelerated to permit more employment on sound projects which are needed and are justified.

But, instead, we are being asked to begin a massive public service program which admittedly will add little to the Nation's economy. This is the wrong approach when there are sound and desirable alternatives available.

CAN WE AFFORD IT?

Mr. Chairman, our country can ill afford this kind of unnecessary spending at a time when our public debt is approaching $400 billion. Every dime of the money appropriated here today will be added to the public debt. During the last fiscal year the deficit was in excess of $23.3 billion. It will be more this year. The combined 2-year deficit for last year and this year will exceed $44 billion—by far the largest in history except during World War II.

No wonder we have inflation. Because excessive Federal spending is a prime cause of inflation. Today we are being asked to pour more fuel on that fire. It has become stylish to spend and spend and spend. There are those who insist that by spending enough money we can cure anything. That concept is as fallacious for the Government as it is for the management of a household.

The simple fact is that Federal spending is running dangerously out of control, and unless there is a change in the direction we are going we must be prepared for a catastrophe.

Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. Chairman, I wish to express in strong terms my support for House Joint Resolution 833, which provides appropriations for the Emergency Employment Act of 1971.

The resolution, I am pleased to note, appropriates the full amount authorized under the legislation, $1 billion for the current fiscal year. Under the formula contained in the new law, my own home State of Hawaii will receive approximately $1,670,000 to be used for public service employment.

Mr. Chairman, the Appropriations Committee and its chairman, the distinguished gentleman from Texas (Mr. MAHON), are to be commended for the dispatch with which they acted in bringing this measure to the floor. It fulfills the promise of the Emergency Employment Act: to enable us to begin dealing with the twin problems of first, meeting a serious need for increasing public services at State and local levels and, second, providing employment for 5 million Americans willing and able to work but unable to find work.

No one suggests, Mr. Chairman, that the Emergency Employment Act will provide a complete solution to this Nation's economic problems. But when Congress passed the Employment Act of 1946, it committed the Federal Government to the goal of assuring every American the opportunity for useful, full-time employment at reasonable wages. Periodically we have reaffirmed that commitment. By providing full funding for the Emergency Employment Act, Congress can deliver, at least partially, on that commitment.

I, therefore, urge immediate and overwhelming approval of House Joint Resolution 833.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

H.J. RES. 833

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the following sum is appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972, namely:

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION

EMERGENCY EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE

For expenses necessary to carry into effect the Emergency Employment Act of 1971, $1,000,000,000, of which not to exceed $50,000,000 shall be available for program direction and support, administration of the program at the local level, and for agent assistance and statistics, to remain available until June 30, 1973.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. SMITH OF IOWA

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. SMITH of Iowa: On page 2, after the period on line 3, insert the following: *"Provided,* that the formula for distributing funds under section 5 of such Act shall be based solely and entirely upon the proportion total unemployment in each State bears to total unemployment in the United States."

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, I want first of all to say that I support the joint resolution and I support all of it, including the limitation of $50 million on administrative expenses.

My amendment, I believe, is a friendly amendment. I do not believe it is inconsistent with this measure at all.

We have been talking here about needing more money for areas where there is more unemployment. That is section 6 of the resolution and not affected by my amendment.

What we are really talking about is, should all the money be distributed in that manner? Section 5 is for general distribution. Section 6 is so those areas that have more than 6-percent unemployment can get extra money. I believe the areas of the greatest need should have some but not all of the money.

If we follow these arguments to their logical conclusion, why not give it all to one State or to two States? Why cut off at 4½ percent arbitrarily? They could have said it would all go to one or two States.

What they really propose to do is to make both sections of the resolution deal with only those areas of highest unemployment.

The law provides that:

Not less than 80 percentum shall be apportioned among the States in an equitable manner, taking into consideration the proportion which the total number of unemployed persons in each such State bears to such total number of such persons, respectively, in the United States.

Now that is, they say, subject to the interpretation that they can do use any formula they want to.

Mr. QUIE. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. Let me finish, and then I will yield.

In my opinion, it is not equitable to say that those persons who are in an area that happens to have less than 4.5 percent of the unemployment shall have less of a chance to secure one of these jobs than if they live in an area that has 5 percent. That is just not equitable under the law.

In addition to that, the report on the bill says this regarding the distribution under section 5:

The House amendment provides for an allocation of 80 percent of the funds according to a formula based on the proportion which the total number of unemployed persons in an area bears to the total in that State and the total in the State bears to the total nationally.

That is exactly what I am trying to do here in this amendment. This amendment provides exactly what was intended as shown by the report.

Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield on that point?

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. Yes; I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD. The gentleman explained very carefully what I believe to be our intent, since I was the author of the amendment in the committee. More importantly, it should be recognized that we are only dealing with 80 percent of the money in section 5. The other 20 percent can be spent anywhere

that the Secretary wants to with any formula that he devises. The section 6 money can be spent any place that the Secretary wants to according to any formula that he wants to devise. Out of the entire $1 billion, however, we wanted to say that you had to take at least $600 million of it and put it across the country so that every State ought to share according to its portion of the total unemployed in this country. In other ways in the bill we have taken care of the concentrated unemployment. Any other construction I believe strains the credibility of anyone who participated in the conference, and I am surprised at the memory of some of the people who participated in the negotiations in what we thought was an agreement to fit this into an overall report but who now have a lapse in their memory.

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. I want to point out that these people I am talking about are U.S. citizens. It does not matter whether he happens to be from an area that represents 4, 4.5, or 5 percent of those neighbors of his who are in areas close to him. They are American citizens and they pay taxes and they have the same rights. When we administer the food stamp program, we do not use a different kind of standard in certain areas where you have 4 or 5 percent of the unemployed or something in between. We have American citizens here who have a right to the equal protection of the law under the 14th amendment of the Constitution.

Mr. VANIK. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. When I finish.

There has been reference to some areas which happen to have less than 4½ percent unemployment. Do you know what the facts are on that? It has been shown over and over again in the last 10 years that most of those areas that have less than that percentage of unemployment have a situation where the people left there and went to areas with higher employment.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. SMITH of Iowa was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. In rural community after rural community in this country young men and young women, when they graduate from high school, do not see a job in the offing in the area, so they leave immediately and go to areas of the highest unemployment. It is about time that we try to help those areas provide jobs so that these young people will have an opportunity to stay there. Some of those counties do not even have enough money to pay the public officers that they are required to have under their State constitution. They cannot raise the taxes to do that let alone hire the additional people to help with the rural development and the development of the public facilities and to meet the various needs of their areas.

What I am trying to do here is restore what I believe was intended, and rightly so, which is to give a U.S. citizen equal protection of the law no matter where he happens to live—at least under one section of this act.

Under the Department's arbitrary ruling, in the guidelines which they set up. unemployed people will have only one-half the same chance to secure one of these jobs as they would have in another State. There is a list on the table if you want to see how it affects your State. I think at least one section of this act ought to provide for general distribution with equal rights for the unemployed people equal to all of the rest of the unemployed people in the United States.

Mr. VANIK. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. VANIK. Mr. Chairman, I support the amendment offered by the gentleman.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

That gentleman from Iowa is telling us that in effect what he objects to is an administrative change to a formula that had already been established by the Congress?

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. That is correct. Even if it is agreed that they have a right to a change, we have the right to write the guidelines. There seems to be a great deal of disagreement about what the guidelines should have been, and this gives us a chance to write the guidelines ourselves. We do not have to rely upon the administrators to write the guidelines.

Mr. DANIELS of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. DANIELS of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman from Iowa for offering his amendment because it reasserts and reaffirms the legislative intent. However, in the gentleman's discussion of his amendment, which he so ably discussed, I believe the gentleman neglected to state that no State may receive less than $1.5 million. Is it the gentleman's intention that his amendment was also to eliminate that minimum allowance?

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. No; it does not change that. It refers only to the 80-percent distributed by a formula. It does not affect the minimum.

Mr. DANIELS of New Jersey. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. Under section 6, the will have, on top of that, some more in those areas where they have more than 6-percent unemployment.

Mr. DANIELS of New Jersey. Again I thank the gentleman.

Mr. QUIE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. SMITH) says that the Secretary of Labor's interpretation is that he can write a formula in any way he want. Well, that is just not true. The law specifies that he shall take into consideration the proportion which the total number of unemployed persons in each such State bears to such total number of such persons in the Nation. And that is what he did. He did exactly that, but he also took another factor and added to it, which is permitted by the law, which says he shall do it in an equitable manner.

If the committee intends that he not take anything else into consideration here is the way they would have written that section; it would have said:

> Not less than 80 percent shall be apportioned among the States based on the ratio of the total number of unemployed persons in each State bears to the total number in the nation.

The section would not have read "in an equitable manner" if it was not intended.

We have written laws before which lay out specifically how the allocation formula shall be, and it does not carry this language, "in an equitable manner."

Evidently the committee assumed that there were other factors that could be taken into consideration to do it in an equitable manner, and that is what the Secretary chose to do. The gentleman from Iowa gets $1.8 million more under this new formula which he proposes. We could sit here all evening and devise new formulas, I imagine, to get our States up on the schedule some way.

However, let us now look at the manner in which we can do it the most equitable way for the Nation. If everybody was treated equitably we would then provide that they shall be provided this public service employment even if the unemployment went below 4.5 percent. But the Congress had something else in mind when it said that the triggering device is 4.5 percent. Therefore I think it is absolutely clear that we have a higher consideration for the State which has unemployment that is above 4.5 percent. Otherwise you could just consider that this was not important at all, because the Congress has already said that this is not important enough to have a public service employment bill if the unemployment nationally goes below 4.5 percent.

Although the gentleman from Iowa indicates that there is some outmigration, the formula is not concerned with outmigration, because this is not the area that is limited by either formula. To the extent that people leave and go outside the State, that is the same factor which shows up if you count the total number of unemployed as if you count those where there is greater impact of unemployment. I do not see how that should be considered at all, outmigration. Outmigration happens. We could take the unemployment figure in each area each day, but that isn't possible. And as far as that is concerned, it gets corrected the next time there is a determination of unemployment. The Secretary will make another determination next year.

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. QUIE. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I say to the gentleman that those areas are going to be given less jobs under the guidelines than they would have had under the original guidelines.

Mr. QUIE. It is the allocation for the States that we are talking about.

The Secretary indicates he does not use the excess of unemployment within the areas of that State. Because as you know he is going to distribute this amongst the areas within the State and to some extent through the State itself in less populous areas.

So my feeling is very strong that Congress did the right thing in leaving some flexibility to the Secretary. All down the line this Congress has shown concern for severe unemployment and for disadvantaged children and disadvantaged groups.

I think we ought to vote down the amendment and stick with the equitable formula devised by the administration.

Mr. CASEY of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word and rise in support of the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, you have heard the gentleman who preceded me stating that this is equitable. Just take any city in your district, if you have any such city, of 100,000 population. They would be qualified without this amendment.

They have to have 4.5 percent unemployment or more. They have to have 4,500 people out of work, if my arithmetic is correct.

Now, if that city of 100,000 population has only 4,000 people out of work they would not be qualified.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CASEY of Texas. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. I am sorry but the gentleman is not correct.

Mr. CASEY of Texas. Why am I not correct?

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. Because there is nothing in the legislation or in what the administration has proposed under this formula or in the law that you have to have a certain percentage of unemployment to be an eligible applicant.

Mr. CASEY of Texas. That is right but—that is what we have been led to believe.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. No.

Mr. CASEY of Texas. That is not going to be the requirement?

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. No; it is not. Every city and every county and every school district and every Indian reservation and every State regardless of the level of unemployment is eligible as an applicant under the act.

Mr. CASEY of Texas. Well, let us make sure and vote for the amendment offered by the gentleman from Iowa and then we will be sure.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. You are not sure?

Mr. CASEY of Texas. No; I am not sure.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. CASEY of Texas. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. That has nothing to do with the question of how the funds are distributed within a State. All that the amendment offered by the gentleman from Iowa does is to say that here is the formula you will use to distribute the funds.

Mr. CASEY of Texas. It is going to be what the gentleman from Ohio said a while ago. He said he had only 3.9 percent unemployment in his district and was glad he was not concerned but glad other communities could take advantage of this bill. I do not have any 4.5 percent of unemployed people in my district. And I think that those who are out of a job want a job just as badly as those where there is 4.5 percent or more. I do not think they should be ignored. I think if you want to be sure all are considered, then vote for the amendment offered by the gentleman from Iowa or you are going to find yourself in trouble when you get home.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CASEY of Texas. I yield.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. I would vote against the gentleman's amendment if for no other reason than that the amendment would take away from Wisconsin some $2 million under the allocation formula that the administration has developed.

Mr. CASEY of Texas. Maybe I could get some of that money from Wisconsin.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. You would.

Mr. CASEY of Texas. Texas needs it because it has some high unemployment areas.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. I will say to the gentleman from Texas you can vote for $14 million for Texas. From others you can be parochial, but that is not a reason to be for or against this amendment.

Mr. CASEY of Texas. I am going to be parochial on this bill, you can rest assured and I am going to vote for the amendment offered by the gentleman from Iowa. And the rest of you had better be parochial too, because that is where your votes come from.

Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word and rise in support of the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I want to offer my nonparochial support for this because if the gentleman's amendment is adopted it is very obvious from the sheet that is around on the floor Michigan would get less money out of this particular section of the bill than it otherwise would get. But I do not feel that this in any way is counter to the best interests of the people of Michigan because we have made provision for States like mine with a high concentration of unemployment in other parts of the bill.

In fact, you cannot qualify at all unless you have at least 6 percent unemployment for those funds; $250 million, or one-quarter of the entire package, was given to the Secretary and he was told, "You can spend it all in one State if that is where you find the heaviest concentration of unemployment. You can spend this money wherever unemployment is at its worst, as you identify it." We suggested no formula for the distribution of that money.

Section 5 is $750 million. We said that 80 percent of that $750 million must be spread so that it goes all across the country.

Then, if you will read section 9, you will see, Mr. Secretary, you take the remaining 20 percent and you spend it any way you want, wherever you want.

That is the money he should be using also to equalize the formula if he wants to do so to give an advantage to the high concentrations of unemployment. We have two sections of the bill in which we intended to let him do what he is trying to do here. But at the same time he is trying to subvert the intention of the Congress when we said we intend to give every community in this country and every school district and every township and village an opportunity to apply for some money. The only way we could guarantee that was through the language of section 9.

I should like to point out something else. Section 9 will not be amended merely with regard to the distribution of funds between States by the gentleman's amendment. His amendment goes to the formula of all section 5 money, and the second part of that formula says that when you distribute money within a State, you will distribute it according 'to the level of unemployment found within any given area measured against the total unemployment in that State. That is the guarantee that a little community is not going to be run over by the dominant communities that have the political power. We did not want to have somebody out in the State taking care of their friends to the exclusion of those people with whom they did not have a common interest. That is why we have a double guarantee in here to get this kind of distribution.

Once again, both sections I have mentioned are completely within the discretion of the Secretary to spend. It can be used in any community within a State without regard to the other communities in that State. There is all the latitude in the world for the Secretary without trying to cross the line to rewrite this formula, and even though it might appear to be rather foolish to be down here supporting an amendment that seems to take money away from my State of Michigan, to try to strain this language now, after we represented to Members of Congress whom we asked to support this legislation—and the support was over here with the gentlemen who are now concerned—to try now to strain the language and say, "Oh, no, we led you to believe that this was how it was going to be distributed, and, really, it was a clever device on our part. We left latitude so we could do it quite differently."

I would not want to come back as a member of our committee, to this floor, in the future and ask for the confidence and support of the people who have supported this legislation from the beginning if we allow this to happen. I feel very strongly that we have a moral obligation, every single one of us on this committee, in both political parties, and particularly my Republican colleagues. I would like to remind them that in the conference there was a long period of negotiation, and in order to accommodate them and in order to reach a final conference report that they would join in, we made a lot of concessions.

They are now saying to us that we wrote a loose bill. I think the gentleman from Illinois said, "as loose as a goose." I quite agree with him, but most of the looseness came out of the concessions we had to make to Republicans to get votes to vote this measure out of the conference. We had no support from that side of the aisle.

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. The gentleman from Michigan was a member of the authorizing committee with respect to that committee, as I understand it, one body had a bill that was for general distribution only and the other body had a section in their bill providing extra money for areas of higher unemployment.

Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD. That is correct.

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. The other body held to the section for more severe unemployment. You did not adopt just one formula but two separate propositions, one providing general distribution and one providing extra for areas with more than 6 percent unemployment. If neither section were supposed to provide a general distribution, why have two sections?

Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD. As a matter of fact, there was a continuous battle in the conference to knock out section 6. It was a part of an agreement that we had made. We made a lot of concessions to members of that committee to leave section 6 in with the complete understanding on the part of everyone that we had the protection of this formula in section 5. I negotiated with the Assistant Secretary of Labor in person, and he had no question in his mind about the meaning of this language before the bill was passed.

Mr. KAZEN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas is recognized.

Mr. KAZEN. I would like to ask a question of the gentleman from Michigan who just spoke in the well on the amendment. I am one of those who have supported this legislation from the very beginning. I did so because I have always figured that the word "community" meant every incorporated community in the United States. I did not know that a community under 75,000 was not, in effect, a community. What I would like for the gentleman to answer me is where in the authorization bill did we give the Secretary the authority to divide communities by population?

Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD. There is no authority any place in the legislative history of this. There was not even an amendment offered at any stage in the consideration of this bill to use population as a test of eligibility for application or as a distinction in any way at all. We have never talked about it at any stage in the handling of this bill in 2 successive years, that is, using a population cutoff. There is, however, pending over there a plan for a thing called manpower revenue sharing. It is a dream of the administration that has so far not kindled a spark in the eye of anybody in our committee, and we have not brought it to the floor.

But if the Secretary gets away with the 75,000 criteria, he will have set the stage for the infrastructure within each of the States that will fit, just by coincidence, the infrastructure of manpower revenue sharing.

Mr. KAZEN. Mr. Chairman, I would say, however, that along with many other Members in the House who represent communities of less than 75,000, and who have more than a 6 percent unemployment figure, have now concluded that those cities under this section 5 who could have become applicants, to the Department of Labor will find the Department of Labor, according to their formula, disqualifying them.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KAZEN. In a minute. I will be delighted to have an explanation of this statement that: "The proposed appropriation is composed of two principal parts, $750 million to carry out the provisions of section 5, and $250 million to carry out the provisions of section 6." And the special provision applies to communities with more than 6 percent unemployment. The guidelines for the second section have up until this time not been formulated. I am wondering if the Department is going to follow the precedent set for distribution of funds under section 5 for this section 6, because if they do, then many of the cities in my district will not be able to be agents and will not be able to receive the money due them even though they have consistently had over 6 percent unemployment.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KAZEN. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, let us be very clear about this. I am appalled at the confusion that exists on the situation of the agent versus the use of the words "eligible applicant". There is nothing promulgated by the Department of Labor that in any way denies to any city of any size the right to be an eligible applicant. So any city the gentleman has in his district is eligible. I have no city in my district that is over 75,000. All are under. They all are eligible applicants under the act. Let us have no confusion about this.

Mr. KAZEN. Is it not true that in any city over 75,000, the mayor, for instance, can apply to become the agent for that program?

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. There are two different concepts. Let me try to explain, if I may.

Mr. KAZEN. Please do, because I want in all sincerity to support this program, but I want my communities to be able to take full advantage of this act because many of them have over 6 percent unemployment and are under the 75,000 population figure.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. Let us take the city of Oshkosh, which is under 75,000. It is a city eligible under the act. It has a rate of unemployment over 4.5 percent, let us say. It applies to the State, which would be the agent under the rules and regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor. In no way is it denied its right to be an applicant and receive funds.

In the case of Green Bay, a city of over 75,000, in that case the mayor can go to the city or to the Brown County Board and say it is to act as their agent for all eligible applicants in this county. Then every community in the county or even the school districts can apply.

Mr. KAZEN. Let us stay with the cities.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. All right. Let us take the city. Every eligible applicant within the city—that is to say, a school district, a State agency, a county, a Federal agency—would be eligible.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas has expired.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

In the case of the city of Green Bay, you are talking about all of the eligible applicants within that jurisdiction being able to go to the city and to say, "Here are our applications for assistance under this act to put people to work." Then the determination is made by the agent on behalf of the Department of Labor as to what is distributed among the various applicants for the amount of money available.

I would hope it is very clear there is no denial of the opportunity to be an applicant.

May I say to the gentleman from Texas, what we are talking about is whether or not we want thousands and thousands of applications to go to the Regional Manpower Administration, wherever it is for the State of Texas—in Wisconsin it is the Chicago regional office—to make the determination.

Mr. KAZEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. KAZEN. Let me ask a question on the $250 million, in the other section.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAZEN. Will this money be available in addition to other moneys received by a city by virtue of having an unemployment rate above 6 percent?

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. Yes.

Mr. KAZEN. And those communities may apply directly to the Department of Labor?

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. Yes.

Mr. KAZEN. And the Department cannot then come back with their 75,000 population limitation?

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. It is my understanding, I say to the gentleman from Texas, based on section 6, that in this case we are talking about a special program separate from the section 5 money, and that it is designed by the Committee on Education and Labor for areas with extensive unemployment for a protracted period of time, and it can go to areas within a city such as Watts or Harlem.

Mr. KAZEN. In other words, there is no chance that the Department of Labor would limit those areas to areas over 75,000 people; is that correct?

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. That is my understanding.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. MAHON. On page 6 of the committee hearings, near the middle of the page, is set forth a colloquy I had with Assistant Secretary Lovell, who is the top man in the Department of Labor for the administration of the manpower programs. The colloquy is as follows:

Mr. MAHON. In other words, you write off smaller areas of the country right off the bat?

Mr. LOVELL. No, sir; quite the contrary. Really, I think we are saying there are three units that will receive an allocation on the basis of the same formula. The first unit is the cities and the counties that have less than 75,000. They will get their share according to this formula.

Take the unemployment in all the areas that do not have 75,000 and you will apply that proportion to the State allocation and that money must be used in those geographic areas.

Second, you take the cities and counties with a population of 75,000 or more and you apply the formula and you give them that share to be used in that area.

That is interpreted to mean that in areas of 75,000 or more they can get the allocation from the mayor of the city—as an example—but in areas of less than 75,000 they operate through the State. That is the clear intent of the language in the hearing, regardless of what the law says.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. That is correct. That does not apply, as I know the gentleman understands, to section 6 money.

Mr. MAHON. No. This has no reference to section 6 money.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I urge the defeat of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I would strongly wish and hope the House would seriously consider this amendment and adopt it. The distinguished minority leader made a very impassioned plea here about the need for this legislation to be very quickly adopted because of problems there are all over the country.

I would like to tell my colleagues, as a member of the Committee on Education and Labor who participated in writing this bill, that if we fail to adopt the Smith amendment, there will be litigation, prolonged litigation, because what they are doing here is handing down a formula in implementing this act without any basis in law.

When we wrote this law we agreed that the money would be distributed among the States on the basis of each States' rate of unemployment in relation to the national total unemployment in excess of 4.5 percent. What we in effect said, is that this law goes into effect whenever the national unemployment rate reaches 4.5 percent. Under a purely arbitrary rule, without an iota of authorization, the Department added another dimension to it, that is, that you can count in your State, in order to qualify for the formula for the 50 States, only those in your State who are unemployed above 4.5 percent.

There is no basis for this. They have shortchanged a whole series of States. What we had proposed under section 6 is that in areas of highest unemployment we could, if unemployment exceeds 6 percent within an area of high unemployment, apply for funds under the act for such an area. You can go to the area in back of the Chicago stockyards, which was just closed, and find 30 to 40 percent unemployment. These areas will be seriously shortchanged under the Department's arbitrary formula.

The amendment before us would cure this arbitrary administration policy. So I hope we can go along with the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. SMITH) and accept this amendment and get this bill to the President. Let him sign it, and fund it, and get this help to the people where it is needed as soon as we can, because it was very eloquently stated by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. FORD) that it is needed.

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in enthusiastic support of this measure. The jobless situation in this country is intolerable. Throughout every section of the Nation, people are experiencing the frustration, the humiliation, the heartbreak of being deprived of a means of earning a livelihood.

My own district in Massachusetts has not been spared from the devastating effects of high unemployment. The latest estimates from the Massachusetts Division of Employment Security indicate a jobless rate of 6.8 percent for the Pittsfield area, 9.5 percent for Greenfield, 11.9 percent for North Adams, and 9.9 percent for the Springfield area. The statewide rate stands at 8 percent—the highest since 1951.

So I know from firsthand experience that the time for debating and commiserating about the economy is over. The millions who are struggling to survive and maintain their human dignity have no use for cold discourses on the inflationary effects of the wage-price spiral. We must act. And we must act now.

The persons behind these grim statistics are our people—our friends and neighbors. Through no fault of their own, they have been cruelly thrown out of their jobs. With every ounce of determination they can muster, they want to go back to work. These people are not seeking a handout. They are seeking the dignity and satisfaction that comes from honest human labor.

The $1 billion lifeline provided under the Emergency Employment Assistance Act would help achieve their objective. Besides putting people back to work, the act would also provide for job training to move people from public service jobs to positions in the private sector. Thus the measure which we are considering will yield real and lasting benefits to the unemployed. This is not a public subsidy. It is a response to a public need. This is not another welfare or giveaway program. It is a means of helping those who sincerely desire to put in an honest day's work for an honest day's salary.

Nor would this legislation create a make-work type of program. Studies for the Urban Coalition and the National Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress have documented the existence of a huge job potential—as great as five million—in providing needed public services. These services are not now available, because State and local government agencies lack sufficient funds. As a result, our schools, parks, libraries, public safety organizations, and health care and recreational facilities are severely understaffed. The 150,000 to 200,000 jobs that this legislation would create will help to fill this gap.

There has been a lot of talk about revenue sharing in the last year or so. This resolution constitutes revenue sharing in the truest sense. By channeling money back to the States and the localities—$24 million alone to Massachusetts—it will create a viable partnership at all levels of government. And it will offer our citizens what, in all justice, they have a right to expect: the chance to hold their heads high and make a productive contribution to their own lives and the lives of their fellow men.

The administration has shown its good faith by submitting its budget request for this program in less than 3 weeks after the President signed the act into law. Many of the administrative procedures needed to distribute the funds have already been developed and a number of the basic decisions as to how the funds will be allocated have already been made.

Let us now show our good faith by promptly allocating the money that is needed to get this program off the ground. I exhort my colleagues to support this resolution.

Mr. PICKLE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. SMITH). I am sure every Member in this House wants to see these funds allocated on the basis of the legislation that we passed, and they would want to carry out the intent of this House specifically as we have tried to understand it. So if we are honest in that approach let me call, then, to your attention language which you will find in report No. 92–310, and I would like to read this language to the Members. There are several copies of this report on the desk, and I would invite you to get a copy of it if any of you have any doubt about it. This was the language that was written in an attempt to explain what we meant when we made such reference to "no less than 80 percent shall be apportioned among the States in an equitable manner that considers"—and so forth.

This is what we said in the report, and I quote:

The House amendment provides for the allocation of 80 percent of the funds according to a formula based on the proportion the total number of unemployed persons in an area bears to the total in that State, and the total in the State bears to the total nationally.

Now, there is no doubt about that. If

you want to follow the language that is in your conference report, then you are obviously going to follow the amendment that is offered by the gentleman from Iowa.

The report even goes further, and says that it requires this to be done on "an equitable basis among the States, and among the urban and rural areas, giving consideration to the relative incidence of unemployment in the area served by the applicant." And it adds, "The Senate recedes."

So this question was brought up in conference when this particular bill was reported that accompanies S. 31.

The reason the question was brought up was, what was the intent of the House? And clearly the intent of the House is to say that these funds ought to be allocated on the basis of unemployment in that State as it relates to the unemployment in the Nation.

If anybody questions that on either side I would be willing to yield to them.

I say it is absolutely stated here that the funds should be allocated on a basis stated on page 17 of this particular report.

When you go back and look at the language of the bill I must admit that there is confusion, because the bill does say "in an equitable manner, taking into consideration the proportion which the total number of employment," and so forth.

I do not know how that language crept in the bill, or how it stayed that way. But the question was raised by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. FORD) in which he wanted to know what did we mean—and he offered the amendment and we therefore put in the conference report exactly what was meant. It would seem to me that leaves little doubt what we meant, and therefore, if you do not adopt the amendment offered by the gentleman from Iowa, then you are simply allowing the Secretary of Labor to write a formula that is not intended and that was not clearly delineated when we considered this bill. It would seem to me we would really have no alternative, if we do not want to write the bill altogether different from what we try to outline in our conference report. The same language that is in the conference report was in the original bill when it was brought before the Committee on Education and Labor. So there is not any doubt that the language is the same in both instances when this question was raised and clearly it was based on the unemployment that the State has relative to the national figure. It seems to me that is obvious and therefore I rise in support of that particular amendment and I support the gentleman from Iowa, and I hope we do reach an accord on this amendment and pass this needed legislation.

Mr. RONCALIO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PICKLE. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. RONCALIO. Mr. Chairman, I would like to support this amendment but I see from the formula in Public Law 92–54 the document being distributed on the floor here that the State of Wyoming under its entitlement would receive only $600,000, and that is $900,000 less than we would receive under the other.

I ask, Is this a typographical error?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas has expired.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, we have sought to give ample time for debate and I think it is time to ask unanimous consent to conclude debate at a given time.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on the pending amendment and all amendments thereto close in 10 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair has noted the names of Members standing who wish to be recognized under the limitation of time.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Wyoming (Mr. RONCALIO).

Mr. RONCALIO. Mr. Chairman, I want it in the legislative history of the debate on this bill—I want it affirmed by the chairman of the committee that if we pass this bill every State will be guaranteed a minimum of $1.5 million.

Mr. MAHON. The amendment is not intended in any way to change the provision whereby at least $1.5 million goes to every State as stated in the public law which says "* * * but, not less than $1,500,000 shall be apportioned to any State, except that not less than $1,500,000 shall be apportioned among the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands," and so on.

So every State gets at least $1.5 million, regardless of the formula otherwise.

Mr. RONCALIO. I thank my colleague and I appreciate his consideration and I am grateful to the gentleman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. MICHEL).

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment. On very few occasions would I oppose the gentleman from Iowa, a valuable member of our committee. Too, perhaps it seems odd that I should oppose an amendment by which my own State would gain $11 million. But that does not make it a right move for me.

Frankly, the fact that the administration has developed this formula to help those who need the help most is a good thing. In my original remarks I said I did not want this to be a permanent piece of legislation but supported it as a transitional. I frankly feel, Mr. Chairman, that the 4½-percent figure for triggering this legislation is too low and should be at 5 or 5½ percent, because we have not had unemployment at a rate lower than 4½ percent in my lifetime without a war on our hands. I hate to see this thing become a permanent Federal subsidy. So in this time of special need for cities, counties, and areas with high unemployment we ought to zero in on the hardest hit areas with the most help.

The reason I opposed the measure when it passed the House was that it was legislation of a permanent nature. In conference it became something of a transitional piece of legislation. So I again address myself to the point. If we have an opportunity by this formula to help these people with a very severe problem, I think we should target in on those areas and give them assistance rather than simply having a bigger, broader, and grander revenue-sharing program of a permanent nature. I yield back the remainder of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. BOW).

Mr. BOW. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. MAHON).

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I think the matter has been fully debated, and I have no desire for further time.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. SMITH).

The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes appeared to have it.

TELLER VOTE WITH CLERKS

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, I demand tellers.

Tellers were ordered.

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, I demand tellers with clerks.

Tellers with clerks were ordered; and the Chairman appointed as tellers Messrs. SMITH of Iowa, BOW, MAHON, and CASEY of Texas.

The Committee divided, and the tellers reported that there were—ayes 172, noes 213, not voting 49, as follows:

[Roll No. 240]

[Recorded Teller Vote]

AYES—172

Abbitt	Culver	Jones, Ala.
Abernethy	Daniel, Va.	Jones, N.C.
Abourezk	Daniels, N.J.	Karth
Abzug	de la Garza	Kazen
Addabbo	Delaney	Kee
Albert	Denholm	Kemp
Anderson, Tenn.	Derwinski	King
Andrews, Ala.	Dorn	Koch
Annunzio	Dow	Landrum
Ashley	Downing	Latta
Aspinall	Dulski	Lennon
Badillo	Duncan	Lent
Baker	du Pont	Long, Md.
Baring	Edmondson	Lujan
Belcher	Evans, Colo.	McDade
Bennett	Fascell	McMillan
Bergland	Fisher	Mahon
Bevill	Flowers	Martin
Biaggi	Ford, William D.	Mathis, Ga.
Bingham	Fountain	Matsunaga
Blackburn	Fraser	Metcalfe
Blatnik	Frey	Mikva
Boggs	Fulton, Pa.	Miller, Ohio
Brasco	Fuqua	Mills, Ark.
Brinkley	Galifianakis	Mink
Brooks	Garmatz	Mitchell
Broyhill, N.C.	Gettys	Mizell
Buchanan	Gibbons	Montgomery
Burke, Fla.	Gonzalez	Moorhead
Burleson, Tex.	Gray	Mosher
Burlison, Mo.	Green, Oreg.	Murphy, Ill.
Byron	Green, Pa.	Murphy, N.Y.
Cabell	Griffin	Nichols
Caffery	Haley	Passman
Carney	Halpern	Pepper
Casey, Tex.	Hanley	Perkins
Chisholm	Harsha	Pickle
Collier	Hays	Poage
Collins, Ill.	Henderson	Podell
Collins, Tex.	Horton	Preyer, N.C.
Colmer	Jarman	Price, Ill.
Coughlin	Jonas	Pucinski
		Purcell

Quillen	Sarbanes	Stuckey
Railsback	Satterfield	Taylor
Rangel	Scheuer	Thompson, Ga.
Rarick	Schwengel	Thone
Reid, N.Y.	Scott	Udall
Rhodes	Seiberling	Vanik
Roberts	Slack	Vigorito
Robison, N.Y.	Smith, Iowa	Waggonner
Rogers	Smith, N.Y.	Wampler
Roncalio	Stanton,	Whalen
Rooney, N.Y.	J. William	White
Rosenthal	Stanton,	Whitten
Rostenkowski	James V.	Wright
Ruth	Steed	Yates
Ryan	Stephens	Young, Fla.
Sandman	Stokes	Young, Tex.

NOES—213

Adams	Grover	O'Hara
Alexander	Gude	O'Konski
Anderson,	Hall	O'Neill
Calif.	Hamilton	Patten
Anderson, Ill.	Hammer-	Pelly
Andrews,	schmidt	Pettis
N. Dak.	Hanna	Pike
Archer	Hansen, Idaho	Pirnie
Arends	Hansen, Wash.	Poff
Ashbrook	Harrington	Powell
Aspin	Harvey	Price, Tex.
Begich	Hastings	Pryor, Ark.
Bell	Hathaway	Quie
Betts	Hechler, W. Va.	Randall
Biester	Heckler, Mass.	Rees
Boland	Helstoski	Reid, Ill.
Bow	Hicks, Mass.	Reuss
Brademas	Hicks, Wash.	Riegle
Bray	Hillis	Robinson, Va.
Broomfield	Hogan	Rodino
Brotzman	Holifield	Roe
Brown, Mich.	Hosmer	Rooney, Pa.
Broyhill, Va.	Howard	Roush
Burke, Mass.	Hungate	Rousselot
Burton	Hunt	Roy
Byrne, Pa.	Hutchinson	Roybal
Byrnes, Wis.	Jacobs	Runnels
Camp	Johnson, Calif.	Ruppe
Carter	Johnson, Pa.	St Germain
Cederberg	Kastenmeier	Scherle
Chamberlain	Keating	Schmitz
Clancy	Keith	Schneebeli
Clausen,	Kyl	Sebelius
Don H.	Kyros	Shipley
Clawson, Del	Landgrebe	Shoup
Cleveland	Leggett	Shriver
Conable	Link	Sisk
Conte	McClory	Skubitz
Conyers	McCloskey	Smith, Calif.
Corman	McCollister	Snyder
Cotter	McCormack	Spence
Crane	McDonald,	Stafford
Danielson	Mich.	Staggers
Davis, Ga.	McEwen	Steele
Davis, S.C.	McFall	Steiger, Ariz.
Davis, Wis.	McKay	Steiger, Wis.
Dellenback	McKevitt	Stratton
Dellums	McKinney	Stubblefield
Dennis	Macdonald,	Sullivan
Devine	Mass.	Symington
Dickinson	Madden	Talcott
Diggs	Mailliard	Teague, Calif.
Dingell	Mann	Terry
Drinan	Mathias, Calif.	Thompson, N.J.
Dwyer	Mayne	Thomson, Wis.
Eckhardt	Mazzoli	Ullman
Edwards, Ala.	Meeds	Veysey
Edwards, Calif.	Melcher	Ware
Eilberg	Michel	Watts
Erlenborn	Miller, Calif.	Whalley
Flood	Mills, Md.	Whitehurst
Ford, Gerald R.	Minish	Williams
Forsythe	Minshall	Wilson, Bob
Frelinghuysen	Monagan	Winn
Frenzel	Morgan	Wolff
Fulton, Tenn.	Morse	Wyatt
Gallagher	Moss	Wydler
Gaydos	Myers	Wylie
Giaimo	Natcher	Wyman
Goldwater	Nedzi	Zablocki
Goodling	Nelsen	Zion
Grasso	Nix	Zwach
Griffiths	Obey	

NOT VOTING—49

Barrett	Donohue	Gross
Blanton	Dowdy	Gubser
Bolling	Edwards, La.	Hagan
Brown, Ohio	Esch	Hawkins
Carey, N.Y.	Eshleman	Hébert
Celler	Evins, Tenn.	Hull
Chappell	Findley	Ichord
Clark	Fish	Jones, Tenn.
Clay	Flynt	Kluczynski
Dent	Foley	Kuykendall
Lloyd	Saylor	Waldie
Long, La.	Sikes	Widnall
McClure	Springer	Wiggins
McCulloch	Teague, Tex.	Wilson,
Mollohan	Tiernan	Charles H.
Patman	Van Deerlin	Yatron
Peyser	Vander Jagt	

So the amendment was rejected.

(By unanimous consent, Messrs. COLLINS, MATHIS, KEMP, and LENT changed their votes from "no" to "aye.")

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. WILLIAM D. FORD

Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD: On line 3, page 2 after "June 30, 1973" add the following: "*Provided*, That, no funds appropriated herein may be used to pay, by way of reimbursement or otherwise, any state or local government which may be itself an eligible applicant under the Emergency Employment Act of 1971 (P.L. 92–54), or any officer or employee thereof, for the performance of any function required of the Secretary of Labor in administering such Act or in reviewing or performing any function with respect to the applications of other eligible applicants."

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order on the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas (Mr. MAHON), reserves a point of order on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD).

Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD. Mr. Chairman, this amendment would attempt to restrict the use of these funds so that the Secretary of Labor could not go forward with an announced program of appointing the Governors of the several States as his agents to perform the duties that we in the statute charged him with performing. At this stage the only way we can stop him from using this money to build little bureaucracies or another level of bureaucracy in each of the several States is to adopt this amendment.

It has been announced to us by the Secretary that he intends to create an artificial segregation of the communities in the country into two groups, those over 75,000 population and those under, notwithstanding the fact that our legislation clearly intended that each State, village, township, county, or unit of government that was an eligible applicant in this country should have the right to take its specific application directly to the Federal Government through the Labor Department for funds.

He proposes to say that only those communities having a population of more than 75,000 will be able to apply to Washington. Now, that is 5 percent of the total in number of all the communities in the country. What do the other 95 percent do? The other 95 percent will wait home until he makes an arrangement with each of the respective Governors. The Governor who is the principal officer of the State, which is itself an eligible agent to apply for funds, will then decide how to distribute the funds within the State, and put together a State plan for all the communities of 75,000 or less.

So the little communities are going to the State capitals for their funds, and the ones over 75,000 will come to Washington for their funds. And we have not found out what he suggests is going to be the solution of knowing who got what, or got nothing in the coordination between the several levels of bureaucracy that would be created.

There is a very serious conflict-of-interest problem involved here. We said that a State, a county, or any local unit of government could be an applicant, and for us to allow any one of the applicants to become the agent to process the applications of other eligible applicants is wrong.

Mr. Chairman, it just seems very foolish to me to say to a State that can itself be an applicant—we are going to make you an agent of the Secretary of Labor—who is supposed to decide who is going to get a grant under this program. So you can pass upon all of the competing applications in your State. Usually the State will have an application and the State is going to be competing with every other unit of government in that State for its share of that allocation.

How can you expect that Governor or his designee to fairly deal with the competing applications in instances of that kind? There has never been anything like this that I have been able to find in any local community, State or Federal Government. It will be an absolute monstrosity. I seek today to prevent the use of these funds for paying State employees to do the job that the Secretary of Labor should be doing. He has 2,700 employees now in the field service of the manpower department of the Department of Labor and he has 1,900 employees here in Washington. So he has 4,600 employees on hand who could very well handle this program. We did not pass this program through the Congress to start hiring a bunch of bureaucrats at either the Federal or the State level. We tried or at least we think we tried with this legislation to get some money out to every little community in this country and to put some people to work where they live.

Mr. Chairman, I urge the adoption of the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. For what purpose does the gentleman from Texas rise?

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, with respect to my reservation of a point of order I have examined the amendment and withdrew the reservation of the point of order.

Mr. QUIE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, if we adopt this amendment we shall severely delay the opportunity for public service employment jobs to become available in the communities of this country. The Department of Labor has already developed their delivery system. The delivery system that they have chosen I believe is necessary for speed because in each community of your State—and it will not just be the cities—that has jobs available to it—the school districts, the hospitals and the State hospitals and Federal hospitals and the Federal agencies and State agencies—all within each

community—it is not possible for the Secretary of Labor to determine which one of those units of government and agencies in each community should have how much money. Somebody has to do that. Now, you could hire a whole hierarchy of Federal agents to go out and make that determination. But it is not possible for them to have the intelligence or the sensitivity to make local decisions wisely. The Secretary of Labor needs to pick somebody as his agent who is there in the local community or State who can make that determination.

Mr. Chairman, you all have had experience with some quickly hired Federal employees coming out to your communities to administer or to tell you how to run some new Federal program. I think all of you would like to see some of your local people who understand your community make as many decisions as possible.

Section 12 says:

(e) The Secretary may make such grants, contracts, or agreements, establish such procedures, policies, rules, and regulations, and make such payments, in installments and in advance or by way of reimbursement, or otherwise allocate or expend funds made available under this Act, as he may deem necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.

So what the Department of Labor has chosen to do is clearly under the law. It is also specified in the law under section 8(3) that an opportunity must be given to the officials of the appropriate units of general local government to submit comments in regard to every application, and also in subsection (4) an opportunity must be provided the Governor of the State to submit comments in respect to applicant and to the Secretary.

He must go through the local units of government and the Governor for comments by them.

What is the quickest way in which this could be administered? The quickest way is to go through the people who have the right to make comments, who can act as the agents. The Secretary of Labor should be able to use them as his agents. Each will have to do what the Secretary of Labor tells him to do. They cannot go contrary to law.

If the Governor or the mayor chooses not to do that, does not distribute the money equitably to make certain the schools have an opportunity, the hospitals and the police department and other local, State, or Federal agencies in the community have an opportunity to hire public service employees, he will go through them and act himself without an agent.

Mr. Chairman, I believe we ought to vote down the amendment because we need to get this job done as quickly as possible and utilize the personnel who know their communities wherever possible.

Mr. MEEDS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment, and move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I submit that while there may have been some question about the language in section 9(a)(1), there is absolutely no question about the language employed for the distribution of funds within the States. I read 9(b):

The amount appropriated to each State under Clause 1 of subsection (a) shall be apportioned among areas in each State in an equitable manner, taking into consideration—

Et cetera. It said "to be distributed among areas of the State." It did not say to be distributed among artificially created municipal layers of government.

There was the clear intent—and I was a member of the conference committee as were some others on this floor—that we pass to the lowest level of local general government the ability to hire people now and not to have to go through another layer of bureaucracy to get at it. The gentleman from Minnesota says that this will delay the procedure. I submit to you it will enhance the procedure and speed it up, because every local unit of government knows the employees that it needs. They can submit an application direct to the Secretary, and that application can be approved or denied. But under the plan which is being submitted by the Secretary it will be necessary to go through yet another layer of government. So it has to go, first of all, through this artificially created agent, and then it has to go to the Secretary. I submit to you that that is the delaying tactic, the delaying tactic which puts the power of the dispersal of money in the hands of the Governors of the States against the intention of the members of the committee.

Let me point out what it does to you. They should have taken counties or standard metropolitan statistical areas and distributed the money to the local units of government. We could have immediate distribution and it would be effortless, but many of you are in the same position I am. I do not have one city in my district over 75,000, and yet every one of those cities will be lumped in with the State-at-large.

If unemployment, say, in one of my cities is 15 percent and the unemployment across the State is 10 percent, that city, instead of sharing as it should as an area, will be sharing as a governmental unit on the State basis and will be receiving approximately 5 percent less than it should. So this is clearly the kind of program which will not redound to the benefit of smaller units of government, and on the basis of where the unemployment is.

If the Secretary does follow the language of this bill and the clear intent of this bill, he would be putting money into the areas where the unemployment is instead of into the areas of some fictitiously created units of government.

I submit to you that the amendment of the gentleman from Michigan will help prevent this by refusing funds to those agents which would be eligible applicants themselves, and therefore, the tendency will be to give the money immediately and directly to the units of local general government where we intended it to go.

Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I want to point out that we would not have to guess what would happen if this amendment is not passed, because it has come to my attention that the Governor of Puerto Rico has already announced what he intends to do and what he will be forced to do under the regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor. Under the regulations as issued by the Secretary of Labor, the Governor of Puerto Rico has announced that only two cities, San Juan and Ponce, would qualify, would be eligible for assistance, because they are the only two cities with a population of 75,000 or more.

The mayor of Mayaguez, who is the president of the Puerto Rican Conference of Mayors, Benjamin Cole, has indicated his organization's very strong opposition. He has called me and told me that over 75 mayors who are involved protest the proposed regulations because most of the people who are in need of this program will not be able to benefit from it.

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BADILLO. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman, the point is that notification is absolutely in error, because that project or application would never be approved under those circumstances, because it does not take account of what the Secretary of Labor has in mind for those areas under 75,000.

Mr. BADILLO. The guidelines have been issued by the Secretary and they indicate that $600 million will be available to approximately 700 governmental units, and the 700 governmental units will be composed—and I am quoting: "of States and cities with a population of at least 75,000," and that the governmental units will be eligible to receive funds if they submit the projects as agents of the Governor. I am quoting directly from the press release, and this is the exact statement read by the Governor, and the exact statement that the president of the Puerto Rican Conference of Mayors is objecting to. It may be true there is another section under which the aid might be provided, but the vast majority of these funds will be limited to those 700 governmental units, and that applies to the 700 governmental units throughout the Nation.

I have spoken to the chairman of the committee, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. DANIELS) and not only is there nothing in the bill which sets up such a limitation, but the chairman indicates there was never any intention in committee or otherwise to have such a limitation imposed.

Mr. QUIE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BADILLO. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. QUIE. There is also nothing in the Constitution that prohibits aid to education, and we also go ahead and do it. We set up the Secretary of Labor to administer the act and we gave him a great deal of latitude in doing it.

But in talking about the 700 units of government, all government units will be eligible to be applicants. None of them will be cut out of the money under the $600 million. The Secretary of Labor

only needs to speed this up. He just could not handle the multitude of requests if he did not do it through the 700 agents.

Mr. BADILLO. Theoretically all units will apply through the Governor, but at least the Governor of Puerto Rico is being honest about it and saying, "Do not bother to apply, because these are the guidelines I must go by."

We were talking about being eligible not only to apply, but also being eligible to receive the benefits when we were writing this legislation; but we must, at least in this instance, be grateful to the Secretary of Agriculture for having tipped us off to what he is going to do, so we can support this amendment and make sure he does limit the legislation we have passed.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on this amendment close in 5 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

It is not clear to me what the effect of the amendment would be. I saw the amendment for the first time only a few moments ago. I am concerned about what might happen in the smaller counties and smaller communities, those under 75,000 population.

The areas under 75,000 do not come directly to the Secretary of Labor, as we understand the proposal of the Secretary, and therefore they have to go through the Governor. Many of the States are having financial difficulties. If this amendment would preclude them from having sufficient staff in order to commence the program it seems to me the communities might be in difficulty. As I say, I am not clear as to the exact import of the amendment.

In the circumstances, as a matter of precaution, we ought not do anything that might unwisely tie the hands of the Secretary with respect to the matters dealt with in this amendment. I therefore am constrained to urge that the amendment be defeated.

Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD. What the gentleman describes is precisely what we want to do. I am trying to discourage a network of State employees passing upon and administering this program and performing duties the Secretary of Labor and his employees ought to perform.

All I am saying is we should not permit the payment of wages for a State employee to administer some other unit of Government's program or to pass upon its application. I am trying to discourage the Secretary from doing this. He cannot force any Governor to accept the designation as agent. Some Governors will be willing to do it, and others will not be.

In some States every town is going to be able to come to Washington with an application because the Governor will say, "No, I am not interested." In other States it will be only those under 75,000. It is just another compounding of the layers of bureaucrats with whom people have to deal.

I have confidence that the Federal employees now in the Department of Labor could handle this adequately. If they apply the formula in this bill they can get all this money out to the communities within 60 days.

Mr. MAHON. The local communities in the smaller areas would have to originate these applications. If under the regulations they have to go through the Governors and they have no personnel with which to assist these communities, there might be difficulty.

I urge the defeat of the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD).

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD) there were—ayes 101, noes 114.

TELLER VOTE WITH CLERKS

Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I demand tellers.

Tellers were ordered.

Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I demand tellers with clerks.

Tellers with clerks were ordered; and the Chairman appointed as tellers Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD, Mr. BOW, Mr. MAHON, and Mr. MEEDS.

The Committee divided, and the tellers reported that there were—ayes 171, noes 219, not voting 44, as follows:

[Roll No. 241]

[Recorded Teller Vote]

AYES—171

Abourezk	Fascell	Macdonald, Mass.
Abzug	Foley	Madden
Adams	Ford, William D.	Matsunaga
Addabbo	Fraser	Mazzoli
Albert	Fulton, Tenn.	Meeds
Alexander	Fuqua	Metcalfe
Anderson, Calif.	Galifianakis	Mikva
Anderson, Tenn.	Gallagher	Miller, Calif.
Andrews, Ala.	Garmatz	Mills, Ark.
Annunzio	Gaydos	Minish
Ashley	Gibbons	Mink
Aspin	Gonzalez	Mitchell
Badillo	Gray	Morgan
Baring	Green, Oreg.	Moss
Barrett	Green, Pa.	Murphy, Ill.
Begich	Griffiths	Murphy, N.Y.
Bergland	Hall	Nedzi
Biaggi	Hamilton	Nix
Bingham	Hammer-schmidt	Obey
Blatnik	Hanley	O'Hara
Boggs	Hanna	O'Neill
Brademas	Hansen, Wash.	Passman
Brasco	Harrington	Pepper
Brooks	Hathaway	Perkins
Burke, Mass.	Hawkins	Pike
Burton	Hays	Podell
Byrne, Pa.	Hechler, W. Va.	Price, Ill.
Caffery	Helstoski	Pryor, Ark.
Carney	Henderson	Pucinski
Casey, Tex.	Hicks, Mass.	Purcell
Chisholm	Hicks, Wash.	Randall
Collins, Ill.	Holifield	Rangel
Conyers	Howard	Rarick
Corman	Hungate	Rees
Culver	Ichord	Reid, N.Y.
Daniels, N.J.	Jacobs	Reuss
Danielson	Johnson, Calif.	Roberts
Dellums	Karth	Rodino
Denholm	Kastenmeier	Roe
Diggs	Kazen	Roncalio
Dingell	Kluczynski	Rooney, Pa.
Dow	Koch	Rosenthal
Downing	Kyros	Rostenkowski
Drinan	Latta	Roush
Dulski	Leggett	Roy
Eckhardt	Long, Md.	Roybal
Edmondson	McCormack	Ryan
Edwards, Calif.	McFall	St Germain
Eilberg	McKay	Sandman
Scheuer	Stokes	Sarbanes
Selberling	Stratton	Vigorito
Sisk	Sullivan	Waggonner
Smith, Iowa	Symington	Watts
Staggers	Taylor	Wolff
Stanton, James V.	Thompson, N.J.	Wright
Steed	Udall	Yates
	Ullman	Yatron
		Zablocki

NOES—219

Abernethy	Frenzel	Pelly
Anderson, Ill.	Frey	Pettis
Andrews, N. Dak.	Fulton, Pa.	Pickle
Archer	Gettys	Pirnie
Arends	Giaimo	Poage
Ashbrook	Goldwater	Poff
Aspinall	Goodling	Powell
Baker	Grasso	Preyer, N.C.
Belcher	Griffin	Price, Tex.
Bell	Grover	Quie
Bennett	Gubser	Quillen
Betts	Gude	Railsback
Bevill	Hagan	Reid, Ill.
Biester	Haley	Rhodes
Blackburn	Halpern	Riegle
Boland	Hansen, Idaho	Robinson, Va.
Bow	Harsha	Robison, N.Y.
Bray	Harvey	Rogers
Brinkley	Hastings	Rooney, N.Y.
Broomfield	Heckler, Mass.	Rousselot
Brotzman	Hillis	Runnels
Brown, Mich.	Hogan	Ruppe
Broyhill, N.C.	Horton	Ruth
Broyhill, Va.	Hosmer	Satterfield
Buchanan	Hunt	Scherle
Burke, Fla.	Hutchinson	Schmitz
Burleson, Tex.	Jarman	Schneebeli
Burlison, Mo.	Johnson, Pa.	Schwengel
Byrnes, Wis.	Jonas	Scott
Byron	Jones, Ala.	Sebelius
Cabell	Keating	Shipley
Camp	Kee	Shoup
Carter	Keith	Shriver
Cederberg	Kemp	Skubitz
Chamberlain	King	Slack
Clancy	Kyl	Smith, Calif.
Clausen, Don H.	Landgrebe	Smith, N.Y.
Clawson, Del	Landrum	Snyder
Cleveland	Lent	Spence
Collier	Link	Stafford
Collins, Tex.	Lujan	Stanton, J. William
Colmer	McClory	Steele
Conable	McCloskey	Steiger, Ariz.
Conte	McCollister	Steiger, Wis.
Cotter	McDade	Stephens
Coughlin	McDonald, Mich.	Stubblefield
Crane	McEwen	Stuckey
Daniel, Va.	McKevitt	Talcott
Davis, Ga.	McKinney	Teague, Calif.
Davis, S.C.	McMillan	Terry
Davis, Wis.	Mahon	Thompson, Ga.
de la Garza	Mailliard	Thomson, Wis.
Delaney	Mann	Thone
Dellenback	Martin	Vanik
Dennis	Mathias, Calif.	Veysey
Derwinski	Mathis, Ga.	Wampler
Devine	Mayne	Ware
Dickinson	Melcher	Whalen
Dorn	Michel	Whalley
Duncan	Miller, Ohio	White
du Pont	Mills, Md.	Whitehurst
Dwyer	Minshall	Whitten
Edwards, Ala.	Mizell	Williams
Erlenborn	Monagan	Wilson, Bob
Evans, Colo.	Montgomery	Winn
Findley	Moorhead	Wyatt
Fisher	Morse	Wydler
Flood	Mosher	Wylie
Flowers	Myers	Wyman
Ford, Gerald R.	Natcher	Young, Fla.
Forsythe	Nelsen	Zion
Fountain	Nichols	Zwach
Frelinghuysen	O'Konski	
	Patten	

NOT VOTING—44

Abbitt	Evins, Tenn.	Patman
Blanton	Fish	Peyser
Bolling	Flynt	Saylor
Brown, Ohio	Gross	Sikes
Carey, N.Y.	Hébert	Springer
Celler	Hull	Teague, Tex.
Chappell	Jones, N.C.	Tiernan
Clark	Jones, Tenn.	Van Deerlin
Clay	Kuykendall	Vander Jagt
Dent	Lennon	Waldie
Donohue	Lloyd	Widnall
Dowdy	Long, La.	Wiggins
Edwards, La.	McClure	Wilson, Charles H.
Esch	McCulloch	Young, Tex.
Eshleman	Mollohan	

So the amendment was rejected.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. ABERNETHY and Mr. MELCHER changed their votes from "aye" to "no.")

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.

Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. BOLLING, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee having had under consideration the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 833) making an appropriation for the Department of Labor for the fiscal year 1972, and for other purposes, pursuant to House Resolution 577, he reported the bill back to the House.

The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.

The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the joint resolution.

The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

MOTION TO RECOMMIT OFFERED BY MR. SCHERLE

Mr. SCHERLE. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.

The SPEAKER. Is the gentleman opposed to the joint resolution?

Mr. SCHERLE. I am, in its present form, Mr. Speaker.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the motion to recommit.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. SCHERLE moves to recommit House Joint Resolution 833 to the Committee on Appropriations.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the motion to recommit.

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion to recommit.

The motion to recommit was rejected.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the passage of the joint resolution.

Mr. DELLENBACK. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The question was taken; and there were—yeas 321, nays 76, not voting 36, as follows:

[Roll No. 242]

YEAS—321

Abourezk	Bow	Cotter
Abzug	Brademas	Coughlin
Adams	Brasco	Culver
Addabbo	Bray	Daniels, N.J.
Alexander	Brinkley	Danielson
Anderson, Calif.	Brooks	Davis, Ga.
Anderson, Ill.	Broomfield	Davis, Wis.
Anderson, Tenn.	Brotzman	de la Garza
Andrews, N. Dak.	Brown, Mich.	Delaney
Annunzio	Broyhill, N.C.	Dellenback
Arends	Broyhill, Va.	Dellums
Ashley	Buchanan	Devine
Aspin	Burke, Mass.	Diggs
Aspinall	Burlison, Mo.	Dingell
Badillo	Burton	Dow
Barrett	Byrne, Pa.	Drinan
Begich	Byron	Dulski
Belcher	Caffery	Duncan
Bell	Carney	du Pont
Bennett	Carter	Dwyer
Bergland	Casey, Tex.	Eckhardt
Betts	Cederberg	Edmondson
Bevill	Chamberlain	Edwards, Ala.
Biaggi	Chisholm	Edwards, Calif.
Biester	Clancy	Eilberg
Bingham	Clausen, Don H.	Erlenborn
Blanton	Cleveland	Evans, Colo.
Blatnik	Collier	Fascell
Boggs	Collins, Ill.	Findley
Boland	Conable	Flood
Bolling	Conte	Foley
	Conyers	Ford, Gerald R.
	Corman	Ford, William D.
	Forsythe	McCloskey
	Fraser	McCormack
	Frelinghuysen	McDade
	Frenzel	McDonald, Mich.
	Frey	McEwen
	Fulton, Pa.	McFall
	Fulton, Tenn.	McKay
	Fuqua	McKevitt
	Galifianakis	McKinney
	Gallagher	Macdonald, Mass.
	Garmatz	Madden
	Gaydos	Mahon
	Giaimo	Mailliard
	Gibbons	Mathias, Calif.
	Goldwater	Matsunaga
	Gonzalez	Mayne
	Grasso	Mazzoli
	Gray	Meeds
	Green, Oreg.	Melcher
	Green, Pa.	Metcalfe
	Griffiths	Michel
	Grover	Mikva
	Gubser	Miller, Calif.
	Gude	Miller, Ohio
	Halpern	Mills, Md.
	Hamilton	Minish
	Hanley	Mink
	Hanna	Minshall
	Hansen, Idaho	Mitchell
	Hansen, Wash.	Mizell
	Harrington	Monagan
	Harsha	Moorhead
	Harvey	Morgan
	Hastings	Morse
	Hathaway	Mosher
	Hawkins	Moss
	Hays	Murphy, Ill.
	Hechler, W. Va.	Murphy, N.Y.
	Heckler, Mass.	Myers
	Helstoski	Natcher
	Hicks, Mass.	Nedzi
	Hicks, Wash.	Nelsen
	Hillis	Nix
	Hogan	Obey
	Holifield	O'Hara
	Horton	O'Konski
	Hosmer	O'Neill
	Howard	Patten
	Hungate	Pelly
	Hunt	Pepper
	Hutchinson	Perkins
	Ichord	Pettis
	Jacobs	Pickle
	Johnson, Calif.	Pike
	Johnson, Pa.	Pirnie
	Jonas	Podell
	Jones, Ala.	Powell
	Jones, N.C.	Preyer, N.C.
	Karth	Price, Ill.
	Kastenmeier	Pryor, Ark.
	Kazen	Pucinski
	Keating	Quie
	Kee	Quillen
	Keith	Railsback
	Kemp	Randall
	King	Rangel
	Kluczynski	Rees
	Koch	Reid, Ill.
	Kyl	Reid, N.Y.
	Kyros	Reuss
	Latta	Rhodes
	Leggett	Riegle
	Lent	Robison, N.Y.
	Link	Rodino
	Lloyd	Roe
	Lujan	Rogers

NAYS—76

Abernethy	Fountain	Price, Tex.
Andrews, Ala.	Gettys	Purcell
Archer	Goodling	Rarick
Ashbrook	Griffin	Roberts
Baker	Hagan	Robinson, Va.
Baring	Haley	Rousselot
Blackburn	Hall	Runnels
Burke, Fla.	Hammer-schmidt	Satterfield
Burleson, Tex.	Henderson	Scherle
Byrnes, Wis.	Jarman	Schmitz
Cabell	Landgrebe	Schneebeli
Camp	Landrum	Scott
Clawson, Del	Lennon	Sebelius
Collins, Tex.	Long, Md	Shipley
Colmer	McCollister	Sikes
Crane	McMillan	Smith, Calif.
Daniel, Va.	Mann	Snyder
Davis, S.C.	Martin	Spence
Denholm	Mathis, Ga.	Steed
Dennis	Mills, Ark.	Steiger, Ariz.
Derwinski	Montgomery	Stephens
Dickinson	Nichols	Thone
Dorn	Passman	Waggonner
Downing	Poage	Whitehurst
Fisher	Poff	Whitten
Flowers		

NOT VOTING—36

Abbitt	Evins, Tenn.	Peyser
Brown, Ohio	Fish	Saylor
Carey, N.Y.	Flynt	Springer
Celler	Gross	Teague, Tex.
Chappell	Hébert	Tiernan
Clark	Hull	Van Deerlin
Clay	Jones, Tenn.	Vander Jagt
Dent	Kuykendall	Waldie
Donohue	Long, La.	Wiggins
Dowdy	McClure	Wilson, Charles H.
Edwards, La.	McCulloch	
Esch	Mollohan	
Eshleman	Patman	

So the joint resolution was passed.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:

Mr. Tiernan for, with Mr. Teague of Texas against.

Mr. Celler for, with Mr. Evins of Tennessee against.

Mr. Charles H. Wilson for, with Mr. Chappell against.

Mr. Dent for, with Mr. Hébert against.

Mr. Carey of New York for, with Mr. Flynt against.

Mr. Clark for, with Mr. Dowdy against.

Mr. Mollohan for, with Mr. Abbitt against.

Until further notice:

Mr. Hull with Mr. Esch.

Mr. Jones of Tennessee with Mr. Kuykendall.

Mr. Waldie with Mr. Clay.

Mr. Van Deerlin with Mr. Wiggins.

Mr. Donohue with Mr. Gross.

Mr. Long of Louisiana with Mr. Peyser.

Mr. Edwards of Louisiana with Mr. Brown of Ohio.

Mr. Patman with Mr. Saylor.

Mr. McClure with Mr. Springer.

Mr. Eshleman with Mr. Fish.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks on the joint resolution just passed and to insert extraneous material, and I ask unanimous consent that all Members of the House may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the joint resolution.

The SPEAKER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There was no objection.

HASTE AND EMOTIONALISM IN THE ELIMINATION OF DETERGENT PHOSPHATES LEADS TO BURNED AND POISONED CHILDREN

(Mr. ANDERSON of Tennessee asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ANDERSON of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, the Department of Commerce has come under recent heavy criticism for its laxity in bringing into effect on a timely basis regulations designed to require a high degree of flame resistance in children's sleepwear. Too many children have died because of the slow pace of carrying out the intent of Congress.

The public is less aware, if not indeed unaware, that flameproof sleepwear which is considerably more expensive,

will lose its fire-retardant qualities after relatively few launderings in the leading nonphosphate detergents now on the market. Had the Department of Commerce moved more expeditiously, this problem probably would have been squarely faced some time ago.

As I understand it, the effect of nonphosphate detergents on flame retardants is dependent upon several factors—the hardness and temperature of the water, in some cases the alkalinity of the water, the presence of soap in the detergent, and particularly the relative alkalinity of the detergent. Nonphosphate detergents usually contain sodium carbonate and sodium metasylicate which affect the flame-retardant chemical—THPC. This is because of the high alkalinity of nonphosphate detergents, especially when coupled with hard water and high water temperatures. The calcium in hard water precipitates to create calcium oleate or calcium carbonate, both of which interfere with THPC. When THPC burns it turns to phosphoric acid which dehydrates and carbonizes the cotton to a form that will not burn. But calcium carbonate and calcium oleate neutralize the phosphoric acid and the clothing article burns.

If a flame-retardant fabric is washed in one of the new nonphosphate detergents, the product usually fails to meet the test for flame resistance after as few as 10 washings. Paradoxically, if the product is then washed in a phosphate detergent, such washing may reverse the effects of the nonphosphate detergents. The reversible effects of phosphate detergent depend upon how many times the product has been previously washed in nonphosphate detergents. Only limited data are available on this point.

Equally distressing, some if not all of the nonphosphate detergents now available are toxic and extremely harmful to children when ingested, so much so that warning labels are being required. Phosphate detergents are not harmful when ingested.

To top this off, a large number of scientists doubt that there is any relationship between detergent phosphates and the eutrophication process which is so damaging to water quality in our lakes and streams. Besides this, it is well established that through proper sewage treatment methods, phosphorus from detergents as well as from human waste and other sources, as well as related contaminants, can be removed at relatively low cost.

Other considerations regarding the use of nonphosphate detergents are reported:

A visible coating on dark colored clothes which resembles fading. A build-up in clothes which causes them to be harsh and stiff. Breakage of threads, fading of colors and yellowing of white clothes. Shorter washing machine life.

In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I am just as anxious as any Member of this body to clean up our environment, preserve and conserve our resources, and improve the quality of life. But we must be thoroughly enlightened in our approaches.

First. We urgently require clean water in our lakes, rivers and streams, nonflammable fabrics and non-toxic detergents. It is incumbent, therefore, upon the Nation to vastly enlarge the scope of research to achieve all three results on a timely basis.

Second, any precipitous action restricting phosphates in detergents is a prime example of trading a possible environmental hazard for two certain environmental hazards to young children. I strongly urge that governmental entities give due consideration to this paradox before precipitously adopting stringent bans against detergent phosphates.

I would hope also that industry will accelerate its efforts to develop fabrics which are inherently fire retardant.

THE SERIOUS MILITARY DRUG ABUSE PROBLEM

(Mr. HAGAN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HAGAN. Mr. Speaker, on April 27, 1971, I rose to address my colleagues in this Chamber on the Report of the Special Armed Services Subcommittee on Drug Abuse in the Military. I was chairman of that subcommittee and explained the basic results of our inquiry and the immensity of the problem which faced all of us in finding a solution to widespread illicit drug abuse in our civilian and military communities.

Without the fanfare of broad speculation, klieg lights and press conferences, we sought to issue a report reflecting as accurately as was humanly possible the sobering circumstances concerning the extent and significance of the drug problem in the military. For example, from the various reports, our consensus was that upward to 10 percent of our military personnel in Vietnam could be using hard narcotics. Notice carefully we did not speculate that maybe 15 percent or 25 percent were addicted to heroin. We did not speculate about this tragic business of addiction for the simple reason there was no way of knowing at the time how many among that 10 percent who could be using hard narcotics might be truly addicted. Today our hesitancy in that regard seems more than justified with the emerging results of scientific testing which have caused careful reexamination of earlier estimates of heroin addiction in Vietnam.

We presented to the Secretary of Defense 26 recommendations addressed to minimizing drug abuse in the military. Reported efforts implementing those recommendations are encouraging but there remains a long, hard road ahead. Thus, this subcommittee was reestablished on June 27 by Chairman HÉBERT of the House Armed Services Committee to hold hearings on legislation proposed by the President to improve and enhance the drug abuse treatment and rehabilitation programs in the military services. Again, I have been appointed chairman of that subcommittee along with a knowledgeable membership consisting of FLOYD V. HICKS of Washington, RICHARD C. WHITE of Texas, BILL NICHOLS of Alabama, Dr. DURWARD G. HALL of Missouri, JOHN E. HUNT of New Jersey and C. W. "BILL" YOUNG of Florida, and we have set our plans for open hearings on H.R. 9503 immediately after the recess. Our panel will receive testimony from the Executive Office of the White House, the Secretaries of Defense and the services, as well as the heads of other Federal agencies offering treatment and rehabilitation programs for members of the military. Also, time will be set aside for public witnesses who are competent to contribute to the subcommittee's deliberations on practical and effective legislation to further military efforts in attacking this serious drug abuse problem.

We plan to complete our work at the earliest possible date and again issue a report which we trust will represent accurately the situation as we find it, both during hearings and visits to military installations.

EFFORT TO BLOCK THE EFFECTS OF HEROIN ADDICTION

(Mr. ROGERS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Speaker, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Public Health and Environment, I am pleased to announce that today members of the Subcommittee on Public Health and Environment have asked the Nation's research-oriented pharmaceutical manufacturers to pool their scientific resources to develop a long-acting, nonaddicting drug to block the effects of heroin addiction.

I expect a response Thursday, tomorrow, when the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association testifies before the subcommittee at 10 o'clock.

The development of an effective antagonist would give us a major weapon to deal with the drug epidemic which we are now witnessing in this Nation. What we hope for is a safe and more effective successor to methadone which will not be addicting itself.

We do not minimize the challenge we have posed for the pharmaceutical industry.

There will be many scientific bridges to cross before a drug treatment or cure for addiction emerges from the laboratories and clinics. But I hope that major drug manufacturers will be willing to commit themselves to this task regardless of its difficulty.

If we do receive the desired response from industry, the committee will take all appropriate steps to obtain cooperation from Federal and State agencies with scientific and other expertise in the field, and from the medical and scientific community at large.

The job cannot be done by industry alone. Assistance will be needed from such organizations, for example, as the National Institute of Mental Health, the Food and Drug Administration, the Addiction Research Center at Lexington, and others with applicable medical and scientific knowledge.

I anticipate a summit conference of the scientific leaders of industry, Federal,

and State, the universities, and medical schools so that we can get this important project started.

TRIBUTE TO GIRLS NATION

(Mr. HECHLER of West Virginia asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HECHLER of West Virginia. Mr. Speaker, the finest citizenship training program in the Nation is Girls Nation. I am certain that many Members of both the House and Senate thoroughly enjoyed the visits from the outstanding young women of their States and in particular the sound viewpoints expressed by these young leaders.

Earlier today, I am sure that Members of the House greatly appreciated the chance to see and meet with their Girls Nation representatives. I was particularly impressed with the conversations I had with one of West Virginia's representatives to Girls Nation, Miss Martha Chadwick, of South Charleston, W. Va.

The practical training in citizenship which these young women obtain during their stay in the Nation's Capital will enable them to return to their home communities with new qualities of leadership and understanding. I commend and congratulate all of the 1971 participants in Girls Nation for their fine work and the influence I know they will have in their home communities in the future.

OLD CHINA TRUTHS DESERVE REWARD

(Mr. BURTON asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Speaker, on Friday, July 23, 1971, the Marquis Childs column entitled "Old China Truths Deserve Reward," appeared in the Washington Post. It was a provocative and thoughtful commentary on the renewal of national interest in the China question.

More pointedly, and of great interest and concern to me because of my friendship and high regard for John Paton Davies, it highlighted vividly the tragic loss to this Nation of the talent, knowledge, and integrity in public service that the witch hunting and the fear and hysteria of the McCarthy era caused.

John Paton Davis is a scholar and a man who towered above his detractors, even in those days some 20 years ago, when, under the influence of McCarthyism we temporarily lost some portion of our national sanity and decency. Mr. Davies does not now need words from me to add luster to his career or character, for neither was ever tarnished.

It is, however, good to see the pendulum start its return and to see men like John Paton Davies, who spoke out honestly and courageously, vindicated. Let us hope that Marquis Childs is correct and "that truth is rewarded no matter how long the reward is in coming."

I am placing the full text of the Childs' column in the RECORD at this time and in doing so, I cannot help but recall the words of George Santayanna:

Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.

The column follows:

[From the Washington Post, July 23, 1971]

OLD CHINA TRUTHS DESERVE REWARD

(By Marquis Childs)

In the general euphoria over the Nixon pilgrimage to Peking it is well to recall why the United States was for 20 years entirely cut off from the mainland of China. On the maps of American policy-makers China was a large blank space, and earth-shaking events, such as the Chinese nuclear and missiles successes and the People's revolution, were reported at secondhand.

The lesson of that fantastic illusion should not be lost now that with the reversal we Americans with characteristic enthusiasm, are lining up to 10 deep to rediscover the lost work. The 20 years of illusion brought the United States perilously close at least twice to a direct attack on China. This would almost certainly have meant world war III—a nuclear war in all probability.

The vicious McCarthyism of the late '40s and early '50s played on the theme of who "lost" China.

In the witch hunt that followed, a generation of distinguished Chinese specialists were driven out of public life, or, for a fortunate few, hidden away in innocuous posts having nothing to do with China.

One of the principal victims was John Paton Davies Jr. Born and brought up in China by Baptist missionaries, Davies had spent most of his 23 years in the Foreign Service in the country we knew so well. He served in Chungking, Chiang's wartime capital, when Chiang and his Kuomintang armies were disintegrating in a welter of corruption.

Davies' crime was that he was right. He reported the truth as he saw it. Such blind partisans of Chiang as Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer reported that Davies has had contacts with Communists. Of course he had in order to try to judge the sources of their strength and in the interval of the futile report to being Chiang's regime together with the Communists.

But the McCarthy bark grew into a roar. For a time Davies was hidden in the embassy in Lima. As the roar from the Asia-Firsters and the China Lobby grew louder he was summoned to Washington.

Although he had been cleared in nine separate investigations, still another security review board made up of officials from government departments with no knowledge of China found him guilty of a "lack of judgment, discretion and reliability." Secretary of State John Foster Dulles called him in and fired him on those grounds.

IN A STATEMENT he issued on that day in November, 1953, when he was fired Davies indulged in no recrimination. He repeated, as he had said in his dispatches, that he had seen Chiang's forces crumbling and the Communists steadily gaining. Then came this memorable passage:

"When a Foreign Service officer concludes that a policy is likely to betray our national interests, he can reason to himself that, as ultimate responsibility for policy rests with the top officials of the department, he need feel no responsibility for the course upon which we embarked; furthermore, his opinions might be in error or misunderstood or misrepresented—and so the safest thing for a bureaucrat to do in such a situation is to remain silent. Or a Foreign Service officer can speak out about his misgivings and suggest alternative policies. I spoke out."

Living as a private citizen, with continuing scholarly interest in his field, it would be simple justice if Davies were now brought back. His judgments are as cool, as reserved, as they were when he saw quite clearly what the end was for the armies of Chiang and American policy which had staked so much on the legend of his invincibility. Davies is not likely to be overwhelmed by the current euphoria. He knows too much about the character and temperament of the Chinese across the long span of the centuries.

One of the tragic consequences of the witch hunt that drove out the China specialists was the demoralization of the Foreign Service and, indeed, the State Department. The rule was: Keep your head down and don't speak out. Restoring Davies would be a healthy lesson, in that truth is rewarded no matter how long the reward is in coming.

CONSUMER POLLUTION CONTROL TAX CREDIT ACT

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LINK). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. KEMP) is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. KEMP. Mr. Speaker, I introduce today, along with 19 cosponsors, H.R. 10406 to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 in order to provide a tax incentive for homeowners, apartment owners, small businessmen and car owners to purchase and install pollution control devices. I think that this bill, the Consumer Pollution Control Tax Credit Act, will effectively complement the regulatory elements of legislation enacted in recent years and presently being considered by Congress to promote the control of pollution through positive incentives.

Environmental pollution of virtually every variety lately has become the subject of legislative interest as the serious effects of pollution have been detected in problems of health and personal comfort and in changes in climate, ocean ecology and in large terrestrial ecosystems.

The Clean Air Amendments of 1970 represent perhaps the most effective and thoroughgoing effort aimed at ending pollution. The clean air laws now set automobile emission standards and deadlines for their achievement. They provide for national air quality standards and deadlines for their achievement. They require effective pollution control equipment for new plants, give the Environmental Protection Agency Administrator power to set low hazardous substance emission levels and have stiff penalties for violation of State implementation plans and abatement orders. Further, the clean air laws now authorize citizen suits against industrial and governmental polluters.

Presently under consideration are bills that would more effectively deal with water pollution, solid waste disposal, noise control, land conservation, and other problems. These bills—enacted and being considered at this time—involve or will involve great changes in our life styles and changes in the ways our industrialized, technologically advanced society operates. These laws will affect everyone, both the large corporations and businesses and individual citizens. So much attention has been devoted to the large business and industrial and govern-

mental polluters in our society, however, that the individual taxpayer, the small businessman, the individual car owner feels helpless—the victim of industry, of technology, of society or circumstances. He may be impressed—even staggered—by the fact that the McGraw-Hill publications survey of pollution control expenditures estimated in May of this year that American business and industry will spend over $7 billion for air and water pollution control in 1971; or that $18.2 billion is the estimated total cost of bringing all of American business' existing facilities up to pollution control standards. He will not, however, be made to feel by these facts that his discrete, individual and personal choices and actions matter. In fact they do.

The bill I introduce today, the Consumer Pollution Control Tax Credit Act, recognizes that we are all polluters or potential polluters in our individual actions and everyday activities. We use water in bathrooms, on lawns, in washing machines. We use power in air conditioners and home appliances. We use chemicals in detergents and in other cleaning substances. We burn fuels in furnaces, fireplaces, and incinerators. We drive cars. Our individual actions are efficacious in reducing waste and pollution or they aggravate the problem. In every case, they matter.

This bill would amend the 1954 Internal Revenue Code to provide a tax credit for taxpayers to purchase and install pollution control devices. Allowed as a credit against taxes imposed under the Code would be an amount equal to 25 percent of all amounts paid or incurred by the taxpayer to buy or install any certified pollution control device.

The Environmental Protection Agency Administrator would, under this act, certify devices as being substantially useful in limiting pollution with respect to dwelling units, small business concerns or used automobiles. Initially, "certified pollution control devices" would include the following: First, a used vehicle device or system certified by the Administrator as meeting in all material respects the standards prescribed for remission control devices or systems designed to prevent or reduce air pollution from pre-1968 autos—those presently not possessing any devices to lower emissions; and second, any certified trash compressor, garbage diposal, septic tank or incinerator reburner.

At the present time, 90 million automobiles—almost one for every two Americans—release pollutants into the atmosphere. High concentrations of carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxide in our cities make life unpleasant and threaten health. While the clean air laws provide that 1975 model cars must achieve at least a 90 percent reduction from emissions of the 1970 models, older cars are not immediately affected. By permitting an individual tax credit, under this bill, the cost of having a cleaner car would be partially offset and more common ownership of these useful devices encouraged.

Proper solid waste disposal, another grave pollution concern, is encouraged under this bill. The Health, Education, and Welfare Department has documented this problem, reporting that each year Americans soon will be discarding over 30 million tons of paper, 4 million tons of plastic, 48 billions cans, and 26 billion bottles. Testimony taken on the Resource Recovery Act of 1970 during the last session of Congress revealed that paper consumption has risen about 100 percent since 1950 and plastic consumption has risen 759 percent in the same period. The current annual cost of collecting, transporting, and disposing of urban solid wastes of all kinds was set at $4.5 billion. Individual taxpayers, landlords and small businesses—not only the largest municipalities or business concerns—should be encouraged to buy and use devices that effectively reduce the bulk of solid waste while producing minimal amounts of undesirable byproducts. This bill provides that incentive.

The garbage disposals, septic tanks and like pollution control devices also aim at the amelioration of present and potential pollution problems of the water and land. The use of garbage disposals assures the proper disposition of unwanted and unneeded waste and the use of septic tanks promises to head off the poisoning of our precious and limited land resources.

The generous individual tax credit provided by this bill can serve as an important inducement to encourage taxpayers—small businessmen, householders, car owners—to do something about pollution and it can show our determination to enter into a new stage of national development, a stage characterized by concern over environmental quality. I urge, therefore, wide support of this new bill.

Mr. Speaker, much has been said about the role of the private sector with respect to pollution abatement. But unfortunately, most of the commentary is concerned with the investment in pollution control equipment by private business—particularly, big business. My preceding comments were designed to emphasize the role of the individual in the private sector's efforts in pollution abatement. A role that should no longer take a back seat to other programs.

In addition, Gov. Andrew Brimmer, member of the Federal Reserve Board, in his speech "Economic Impact of Pollution Abatement" points out that the cost of antipollution equipment for big business is passed along in higher prices to the consumer. He said:

> In a very important sense, when we add to the cost of electricity, for example, by insisting upon putting a cost on the use of natural resources such as water and air, we are adding to social costs.

He added:

> Instead, I see the need for all of us to exercise the critical judgment and make the hard choices which seek a reasonable balance between our hopes and possibilities.

Mr. Speaker, what would be more equitable or strike a better balance than a tax credit for those consumers who want to make an investment to control pollution. Dr. Brimmer, in fact, obtained an assessment of the implications of channeling a greater proportion of private investment to control pollution.

According to Federal Reserve estimates, real GNP might rise from $724 billion in 1970 to $893 billion in 1975. But the projections were based on business investment in plant and equipment for pollution abatement. I submit that the enactment of my bill, which is concerned with private individual investment, will add substantially to the increase in our gross national product.

Mr. Speaker, Dr. Brimmer made an excellent speech and I will include the entire text at the end of my remarks.

I also want to call attention to the speech of the distinguished chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. MILLS), at the appreciation dinner for the gentleman from Utah (Mr. MCKAY) on July 16. The chairman pointed out that if inflation comes under control, then two additional economic moves should be considered. He said:

> One relates to tax incentives to spur private investment and consumer spending.

I quote the chairman:

> For example, it is desirable that some form of the investment tax credit should be restored in connection with other appropriate actions. There is excess capacity in the economy, obviously made up of antiquated, marginal and obsolete equipment. All of this must be considered in connection with the present low rate of spending for new plant and equipment in 1971. With reduction in expenditures for the Vietnam war, there will tend to be more slack. Certainly an expansion in real investment in new plant and equipment would directly increase employment, reduce the number of labor surplus areas and reduce the unemployment rate.
>
> Moreover, an investment credit would tend to be anti-inflationary in the long run since it would increase cash flow, reduce external corporate borrowing needs, and make more goods available.

Mr. Speaker, I agree wholeheartedly with the chairman and I want to emphasize I feel that not only business but the consumer as well should get an investment tax credit—just what my bill is designed to do. Second, recently released economic indicators show the rate of inflation has slowed considerably from a year and a half ago. And third, as the chairman indicated, under these conditions consumer spending could be stimulated with tax incentives.

Moreover, this is a progressive piece of legislation. The tax credit can be used in addition to itemized or standard deductions, and will provide the same 25-percent credit at all income levels. Under the itemized and standard tax deduction approach, persons at higher income levels receive greater tax savings.

It will help stimulate industry which produces antipollution devices, provide more job opportunities and provide welcome tax relief and additional buying power to the people. In addition, Mr. Speaker, I think it would rekindle the early American spirit to help make our neighbor's life better and to conserve our precious land and air resources.

Mr. Speaker, at this point I include Dr. Brimmer's speech followed by a list of the cosponsors and the bill.

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF POLLUTION ABATEMENT

(By Andrew F. Brimmer)

One is not surprised to note that the problems of checking pollution and improving our environment are among the most popular topics for commencement speakers this year. In fact, if the issue were not such a vital one, I might be inclined to apologize for raising the subject again. However, we are confronted with a stark and unpleasant reality: many of our lakes and rivers (and even the oceans themselves) *are* polluted. Much of our air *is* contaminated—to the point of creating a serious threat to the health of some of our citizens in specific areas. In a variety of ways, our overall environment has suffered considerable deterioration.

On an occasion such as this, there is little to be gained by an attempt to assign blame for the circumstances in which we find ourselves. To a considerable extent, all of us—as citizens of a country with the most sophisticated technology in the world as well as possessing some of the earth's richest natural resources—are guilty of allowing our environment to be abused. On the other hand, we know a great deal about the main sources of pollution, and we have a fairly good idea of the requirements that must be met—if we are to cope successfully with the problem.

SOURCES OF POLLUTION

We know that certain industries, partly because of the inherent nature of the production processes which they employ and partly because of hesitancy in recognizing their responsibilities, have posed serious dangers to the environment:

A sizable share of the air pollution can be traced to electric power plants, to coke ovens in steel mills, and to smelters of nonferrous ores.

Paper mills pollute streams, and chemical plants produce waste that is discarded in lakes and oceans.

Faulty oil wells and accidents in petroleum transportation pollute ocean waterways and damage beaches.

In agriculture, drainage from feed lots spoil streams, and pesticides harm some beneficial plants, fish, birds, and people.

In transportation, airplanes, buses, trucks, trains, and other modes of transport also add to the pollution of the atmosphere.

But industry is not alone. Governments also contribute in significant ways to the deterioration of our environment:

Municipal incinerators rank high as a source of air pollution.

Garbage dumps scar the landscape, foul the air, and provide havens for rats and other vermin.

And above all, individual citizens collectively are probably the most important factor in air and water pollution in the United States:

The private automobile is obviously the chief source in the household sector.

Some furnaces and the burning of leaves and grass are also major contributors.

Drainage of septic tanks contaminate the subsoil and foul our lakes, streams and rivers.

Discarded solid waste disfigures our streets and highways and turns much of the countryside into a junk-heap.

So, we must accept the fact that the task of pollution abatement is both large and urgent. This conclusion seems self-evident—even after we discount (as we should) many of the overly dramatic claims of some of the more shrill environmentalists, some of whom do not distinguish between the wise and conservative development and use of our natural resources and the wanton squandering of our heritage. But we must also accept the fact that—left to themselves—some of the principal polluters (businesses, governments, and private individuals) would not correct the situation on their own responsibility.

Yet, the extent of the pollution problem varies greatly from industry to industry and even among firms within the same industry. Because of differing geographical and climatic conditions, one area with essentially the same industrial structure possessed by another may be relatively free of air or water pollution while the other staggers in smog or swirls of effluvium. So, what is needed is a national policy on pollution control—a policy with firm national standards, but one that also gives due weight to the diversity of experience and circumstances among industries and localities.

I realize, of course, that we do not need to begin from scratch in this effort. Laws and regulations on the books, at the Federal, State and local level, have already created much of the necessary framework for such a policy. And in a number of industries, business firms have gone a long way in adapting and upgrading their facilities in an effort to meet the more rigorous standards. Moreover, existing anti-pollution laws are being tightened, and new measures are being adopted.

ROLE OF PUBLIC SECTOR

In implementing these more stringent requirements for pollution abatement, the public sector (at all levels) does have a vtial role. In fact, the Federal Government has projected a sizable expansion in the volume of budget resources to be devoted to pollution con+rol in the next few years. Nevertheless, in the current fiscal year (ending on the last day of this month), outlays for these programs may amount to only $1.2 billion. And, despite a relatively large increase projected for next year's budget, outlays for pollution abatement in the year ahead still may not exceed $2 billion.

Moreover, as we look further into the decade, it is becoming increasingly clear that the resources of the Federal Government will be almost fully committed—despite the outlook for renewed economic expansion—through 1975. This prospect seems to be virtually assured because of the further maturing of programs already in force and because of the expected impact of new initiatives whose adoption appears to be well underway. State and local governments also will be hard-pressed to raise the revenue necessary to finance an expanding demand for public services.

Consequently, the major role in the campaign to control pollution must rest with the private sector. But, within the private sector, the efforts of households to expand consumption and the efforts of business firms to expand investment will make heavy claims on our limited resources. Under these circumstances, we must face squarely an inescapable fact: there is a fundamental conflict between our efforts to maximize the growth of our gross national product (GNP) as traditionally defined and our efforts to devote a substantial share of our real resources to pollution control.

While activities to check pollution and to improve our environment will undoubtedly take many forms, above all they will require a significant increase in the level of investment in pollution abatement equipment. This will mean a drastic change in the pattern of investment spending in both the private and public sectors. Historically, the vast proportion of the new investment in private industry has been made to increase production capacity, and only a modest share has been devoted to suppressing the pollutants generated as a by-product of industrial activity. To get a firm grip on the pollution problem will require a considerable reordering of investment priorities; a much larger share of new investment will have to be devoted to making production processes themselves far cleaner and to repairing the environmental damages suffered in the past.

RATE OF GROWTH

And here we encounter the toughest choice of all: the rate of growth of real output in the United States—as in any other advanced industrial society—depends heavily on the pace of investment in plant and equipment to expand productive capacity. With much more of our net investment being channeled into pollution abatement, the rate of expansion of the American economy as a whole will probably slow down perceptibly. So, with our population continuing to grow, we would be faced with the likelihood of a slower growth in real per capita income—and in our standard of living as traditionally defined. Some of us, of course, would accept such an outcome as a reasonable price to pay to halt the deterioration of our environment. Others would decry it as an unwarranted penalty to be paid primarily by those segments of society least able to bear it—under-developed regions of the country, the poor and disadvantaged, hard-pressed urban communities—all of which may benefit considerably from a high level of sustained economic growth. And, finally, still other observers would hope and search for a viable means of reconciling these conflicting goals.

That these goals are in conflict is shown clearly in the results of a systematic analysis of the effects of pollution abatement efforts which I undertook with the assistance of the Board's staff and the computer-based econometric model which we have had in operation for the last few years. These results are not altogether comforting; while pollution abatement activities would undoubtedly create many new jobs, the adverse impact of reduced or disrupted output in some sectors would partly off-set these gains. There would also be an adverse impact on residential construction and personal consumption. But perhaps one of the most disturbing adverse effects is the impetus to inflation that the pollution abatement efforts would produce. While some of the resulting increased costs and higher prices can be viewed as reflecting higher quality of output, there undoubtedly would be a further strengthening of inflationary pressures in the American economy.

Thus, the fundamental question that must be asked is this: are we prepared to pay these real costs? Only the American people as a whole can answer.

In the rest of these remarks, I will comment more fully on these major issues.

PUBLIC POLICY AND POLLUTION CONTROL

As I indicated above, the public sector is relying largely on the private sector for implementation of a large measure of environmental control. Essentially encouragement is given to the private sector with the stick of judicial procedures and the carrot of a modest amount of grant assistance. So far, the emphasis of the Federal programs is mainly on water pollution. About 80 per cent of Federal obligations are currently in this area, with the largest share of funds reflected in grants and loans for construction of municipal waste treatment facilities. Air pollution control, in second place, lags far behind with about 11 per cent of the obligated funds. Small sums are planned for activities relating to the pollution of land, for example, from mine drainage, nutrients, pesticides, and other substances. Most of these funds will be for research.

Altogether, outlays for these programs in fiscal 1971 are estimated at approximately $1.2 billion. In fiscal 1972, outlays for pollution control and abatement activities are expected to rise by a large percentage amount (71 per cent) but in absolute terms only by $838 million. Budget authority for these programs so far has been considerably greater than outlays. To some extent, these low expenditure figures reflect difficulties in starting up programs, and perhaps there have

been difficulties in the original drafting of some of the expenditure provisions. But, whatever the explanation, budget authority for pollution control in 1972 will increase rather significantly—from an estimated $1.8 billion in fiscal 1971 to $3.1 in fiscal 1972. On the other hand, these budget obligations are spread over a number of years in the future, and the amounts are relatively small.

WATER POLLUTION STANDARDS

As of this date, the Administration's program for fiscal 1972 has not been passed, and there are at least two major alternative programs being considered by Congress. However, there is a significant departure from previous policy in the Administration's new proposal for water treatment plants. From 40 to 60 per cent of the cost of waste disposal is apparently directly traceable to industrial users, and new proposals would require communities receiving waste treatment grants to recover from industrial users that portion of project costs that is allocable to the treatment of the specific company's waste. In other words, there would be a user charge associated with waste treatment, and industries would have a direct incentive to economize in their use of water. This clearly differs from past policies which relied on enforcement of water standards through judicial procedures, which could result in long delays and often were limited to a few conspicuous violators.

For the last 1½ decades, the central theme of Federal Government policy in this area has been that most pollution control must be effected by industry. In 1956, Congress amended the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and initiated Federal efforts to establish water quality standards and to enforce them. Federal involvement grew slowly, but the 1965 Water Quality Act provided Federal supervision in the establishment of water quality standards on all interstate water ways. As legislation now stands, Federal water pollution control is based on the required development by each State of water quality standards for each interstate lake, stream, or coastal area within its jurisdiction. Provision is made for Federal and State negotiations on the problem and judicial enforcement of the agreed upon standards against pollutors. To meet these standards, industry has already invested large sums of capital. The present structure of legislation and the apparent shortage of available government funds suggests, however, that the bulk of the effort will have to continue to be made without financial assistance from governments.

RECENT AND PROSPECTIVE PATTERNS OF BUSINESS INVESTMENT

These new investment requirements will follow a heavy volume of investment activity by American industry. In the 1960's, the growth in real private business investment outlays was particularly rapid, averaging about 6.5 per cent annually—well above the 2.7 per cent annual expansion during the 1950's. In 1970, real plant and equipment expenditures declined—partly because of the general economic slowdown and partly because of the lagged effects of monetary restraint in 1969. During the next few years, we expect outlays to expand again at a fairly rapid pace, if long-term capital markets remain favorable and if investment and depreciation allowances are made more liberal. In addition, if the investment tax credit were to be re-enacted, it too would provide inducement to expand durable equipment investment.

More generally, however, part of the unusually large volume of investment in recent years is undoubtedly attributable to inflationary psychology. The rapid rise in the prices of plant and equipment (especially in construction costs) caused business to push ahead with new programs even when the need for these facilities was not immediately urgent to meet current demand. As price increases moderate, this source of stimulus to investment should fade somewhat, but it will probably be quite some time before businessmen completely forget present inflationary conditions and the pressure of rapidly rising unit costs. Moreover, strong consumer demand (especially for durables with their greater capital investment requirements), the expected demand from the public sector (particularly from urban transportation systems), and requirements for changes in the production process to keep up with accelerating technological advances will undoubtedly generate large capital requirements.

Consequently, additional investment to curtail pollution of the environment will add importantly to already large capital outlays by private business. One recent survey estimates that investment in pollution-control activities by American companies this year will rise by 46 per cent over last year, to a total of $3.6 billion—or 4.4 per cent of total capital investment in the 26 industries surveyed compared to 3.1 per cent last year. To meet legal standards set up as of last January, it is estimated that, from the end of last year through the mid-1970's, it will take a cumulative total of more than $18 billion—and it is possible that standards will be stiffened further in the years ahead. Seven industries will probably have to spend more than $1 billion apiece, with electric utilities being hardest hit with an estimated cleanup bill of $3.2 billion. Electric utilities plan to spend $679 million this year, compared with only $127 million in 1966.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES IN ASSESSING POLLUTION ABATEMENT COSTS

The above outlays are obviously large, and they should make a significant impact on industry's capacity to cope with pollution. However, an economist would want to pose a number of specific questions in order to make a fairly good assessment of the probable costs of the investment necessary to meet the more stringent pollution standards. I addressed such a list of questions to representatives in two industries (steel and electric power generation), and they were hopeful of responding in time to permit an analysis of the replies in connection with these remarks. Unfortunately, the answers were not available.

In the absence of such data, I decided to try a different approach to obtain an assessment of the implications of channeling a greater proportion of private investment to conrol pollution. For this purpose, I relied on the Federal Reserve Board's staff and the modern, computer-based econometric model which the staff has had in operation during the last few years.[1] Essentially, I wanted to know what would be the general economic impact—both direct and indirect—of devoting a larger share of business investment in plant and equipment to pollution abatement. To answer this question, it was first necessary to have an indication of the contours of investment and the level and composition of GNP in the absence of special efforts to change the configuration of investment spending. Using the Board's econometric model, a "base projection" of real GNP—and its principal components in 1975—was prepared.[2] The results (in constant 1958 dollars) are shown in the attached table.

According to these estimates, real GNP might rise from $724 billion in 1970 to $893 billion in 1975. Producers' durables equipment (the most likely place where outlays for pollution abatement would be registered) might be in the neighborhood of $63.6 billion, representing about 7.1 percent of GNP, compared with $56.1 billion and 7.7 percent of GNP in 1970. Expenditures on producers' structures (mainly plant and other nonresidential structures) would approximate $25.7 billion, slightly more than in 1970, and equivalent to 2.9 percent of total output. Residential construction expenditures might amount to $24.7 billion compared with $20.6, claiming the same share of total output (2.8 percent) in both 1970 and 1971. This pattern of private investment and the overall structure of GNP associated with it should be kept in mind: without a conscious effort to modify the flow of investment, we might expect to see a slightly smaller proportion of our real resources devoted to capital accumulation in the private sector, and the increase in investment in plant and equipment would account for about 6 percent of the rise in real output between 1970 and 1975.

UNIT COSTS WOULD RISE

The next step was to determine the effects of raising the level of investment to cope with pollution. It was assumed initially that pollution control devices are added to new equipment purchases but that old equipment is not altered. Greater investment in pollution control equipment would increase the amount of capital required per unit of output[3]—because no increase in production capacity would be associated with a more expensive—but less polluting—production process. The result of this second exercise is labeled "new equipment projection" in the table.

In this projection, real GNP might rise to $918 billion in 1975 with investment in producers' durable equipment at $69.5 billion, accounting for 7.6 percent of total output.[4] Personal consumption expenditures would be held to proportionally less than in 1970, 64.9 percent of GNP compared to 65.9. Producers' structures and residental construction also would be held to proportionally smaller shares of total output than in 1970 as more investment is shifted to new pollution abatement equipment. The unemployment rate, however, would drop substantially below the 4 percent level, and the pressure on prices and interest rates would be increased significantly.

The final step in the exercise was to estimate the effect of raising the level of investment to cope with pollution in both new equipment and the cost of upgrading equipment already in place. It was assumed that rehabilitation of the old stock of producers' durable equipment would cost $3 billion a year from 1971 through 1975.[5]

The resulting projected GNP (labeled "upgrading" in the attached table) was $887 billion, nearly $5.5 billion less than the base projection (without special anti-pollution efforts) and $31 billion less than the projection for investment in new equipment provided with pollution control devices. As expected, producers' durable equipment, at $70.6 billion in 1975, claimed an even greater share of total GNP (8 per cent) than with either of the other projections, while plant held the same relative share. The increase in investment accounted for 10 per cent of the increase in GNP from 1970 to 1975. In addition, although they accounted for a slightly greater proportion of the total (66.3 per cent), personal consumption expenditures were lower than in the other projections, amounting to $588 billion in 1975. Outlays for residential construction and consumer durables were held to lower levels than in the base projection. The unemployment rate held at the same level as that of the base projection when no modifications were planned for pollution abatement, and interest rates rose only slightly.

The most disturbing aspect of this exercise is the projected effect on prices. Prices as measured by the GNP deflator began to rise more rapidly with the additional investment in pollution control. This, of course, raises

Footnote at end of article.

the whole question of national accounting vs. a fuller set of social accounts. In a very important sense, when we add to the cost of electricity, for example, by insisting upon putting a cost on the use of natural resources such as water and air, we are adding to social costs. Since our traditional measures of cost cannot easily be adjusted for environmental savings, the standard price indexes will continue to register increases.

In summary, the increase in producers' durable investment for pollution control was purchased at the cost of slight reductions in expenditures for plant and residential housing, and sizable drops in personal consumption and total GNP.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Before closing these remarks, I want to emphasize again that I personally share the concern being expressed increasingly (especially by young people) over the quality of our environment. Fortunately, the handful of critics (and it is good that there are so few) who try to minimize the seriousness of the pollution problem have not been able to divert attention from the genuine threat that confronts us. Hopefully, from now on, we will insist that consideration of environmental consequences be placed high on the agenda of any resource development projects—whether public or private. We can no longer defend a scheme simply because it will expand the supply of energy, increase the availability of building material, reduce transportation costs, or in other ways add to the material welfare of our citizens. The costs to the environment must also be added in the calculus of decision.

On the other hand, I certainly would not stand with that small band of intolerant men and women (and here also it is good that there are so few) who would so elevate environmental concerns that we would be virtually precluded from using our economic and natural resources to improve the lot of the poor and disadvantaged, to spur the growth of depressed regions, or to ease the plight of our cities. In all of these areas, too, we are still faced with a long agenda of unfinished tasks. They also have large and legitimate claims which must be honored through the allocation of a greater share of our real resources.

So, I am left in the middle. I see a basic conflict among competing goals, and a shortfall in the means to satisfy them all. And we cannot afford the illusion of believing that we can: despite our obvious affluence as a nation, we do not have the capacity to produce enough so that households can maximize their consumption (while minimizing taxes); so that an adequate volume of housing can be built; so that business can expand their production facilities at a maximum rate (and also make the investment needed to abate pollution); so that governments can meet the increasing demand for public services (while tax revenues lag behind spending). Instead, I see the need for all of us to exercise the critical judgment and make the hard choices which seek a reasonable balance between our hopes and possibilities.

In short, some things must be left undone; some goals must remain beyond our grasp—at least for the time being. And some common aims must be pursued—despite the cost and pain to some of us individually. Put another way—perhaps an old fashioned way—there are still many sacrifices ahead.

With respect to pollution abatement alone, the issue can be stated succinctly: in the next four or five years, it will take about 10 per cent of our net increase in the nation's real output (or roughly $16 billion in real terms, based on 1958 dollars) to finance the capital investment necessary to check pollution. At the same time, however, it might also place a substantial drag on the continued improvement in the material conditions of our lives.

How many of us are willing to pay this price?

FOOTNOTES

[1] The model was developed with the technical assistance of economists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the University of Pennsylvania.

[2] Key assumptions underlying the exercise were that tax rates were unchanged and that resources were fully utilized, with unemployment in the neighborhood of 4 per cent in 1975.

[3] Economists refer to the capital required per unit of output as the "capital-output ratio". It was assumed that the pollution control devices add 5 per cent to the cost of a unit of producers' durable equipment.

[4] A ten-year simulation indicates that real GNP in the "new equipment" projection will drop below the level for the "base projection" in about seven years, compared with 3½ years for the projection discussed below.

[5] This assumption appears consistent with results of the industry survey cited on page 11.

PRINCIPAL CLAIMS ON REAL GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1970, AND ALTERNATIVE PROJECTIONS TO 1975

[Amounts in billions of 1958 dollars]

Sector	1970 (actual)		1975 base projection [1]		1975 new equipment projection [2]			1975 upgrading projection [3]			
										Variance from—	
	Amount	Percent of total	Amount	Percent of total	Amount	Percent of total	Variance from base projection	Amount	Percent of total	Base projection	New equipment projection
Gross national product	724.1	100.0	892.6	100.0	918.0	100.0	25.4	887.2	100.0	−5.4	−30.8
Personal consumption	477.1	65.9	593.8	66.5	595.6	64.9	1.8	488.2	66.3	−5.6	−7.4
Producers' durable equipment	56.1	7.7	63.6	7.1	69.5	7.6	5.9	70.6	8.0	7.0	1.1
Producers' structures	23.1	3.2	25.7	2.9	26.2	2.9	.5	25.3	2.9	−.4	−.9
Residential construction	20.6	2.8	24.7	2.8	23.7	2.6	−1.0	24.3	2.7	−.3	.6
Consumer durables	82.0	11.3	106.6	11.9	110.2	12.0	3.6	105.3	11.9	−1.3	−4.9
Memorandum:											
Treasury bill rate (percent)	6.37	----	6.20	----	7.40	----	1.20	6.50	----	.30	−.90
Prices (GNP deflator)	134.9	----	159.9	----	162.9	----	3.0	163.0	----	3.1	−.1
Unemployment rate	4.8	----	3.8	----	2.7	----	−1.1	3.8	----	0	1.1

[1] The base projection" is derived from a simulation of the national economy by using the Federal Reserve Board's econometric model. A key assumption was that resources were fully utilized with unemployment in the neighborhood of 4 percent in 1975.

[2] In this projection, it is assumed that pollution control equipment is required on all new equipment, adding 5 percent to cost.

[3] This projection assumed that in addition to adding pollution control devices to new equipment, old equipment will be renovated for pollution abatement at a cost of $3,000,000,000 a year from 1971-75.

COSPONSORS OF CONSUMER POLLUTION CONTROL TAX CREDIT ACT

Mr. Bevill, Mr. Brasco, Mr. Byrne, Mr. Collins of Texas, Mr. Denholm.

Mr. Derwinski, Mr. Dulski, Mrs. Grasso, Mr. Halpern, Mr. Hogan.

Mr. Mazzoli, Mrs. Mink, Mr. Minshall, Mr. Morse, Mr. Runnels.

Mr. Sandman, Mr. Schwengel, Mr. Thone, Mr. Yatron.

H.R. 10406

A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide a tax credit for homeowners, apartment owners, small businessmen, and car owners who purchase and install certified pollution control devices

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Consumer Pollution Control Tax Credit Act".

SEC. 2. ALLOWANCE OF CREDIT

(a) GENERAL RULE.—Subpart A of part IV of subchapter A of chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to credits against tax) is amended by redesignating section 40 as section 41 and by inserting after section 39 the following new section:

"SEC. 40. TAX CREDIT FOR CERTAIN POLLUTION CONTROL DEVICES

"(a) GENERAL RULE.—There shall be allowed as a credit against the tax imposed by this chapter an amount equal to 25 percent of all amounts paid or incurred by the taxpayer during the taxable year to acquire or install any certified pollution control device.

"(b) ELIGIBLE TAXPAYERS AND USES.—The following taxpayers are eligible for the credit provided by this section:

"(1) any person with respect to a device for a home, apartment, housing project, or other dwelling unit (whether single family or multiple unit) which he owns, leases, or occupies,

"(2) any person with respect to a device for an automobile manufactured before 1968, and

"(3) any person opearting a small business concern with respect to any device used in the trade or business of such concern.

"(c) CERTIFIED POLLUTION CONTROL DEVICE.—

"(1) In general.—For purposes of this section, the term 'certified pollution control device' means—

"(A) a used vehicle device or system certified by the Administrator as meeting in all material respects the standards prescribed by the Administrator for emission control devices or systems designed to prevent or reduce air pollution emissions from used vehicles,

"(B) any trash compressor, garbage disposal, septic tank, or incinerator reburner certified by the Administrator, or

"(C) any other device or system which the Administrator may certify after the date of the enactment of this section as being substantially useful in limiting pollution with respect to dwelling units, small business concerns, or automobiles manufactured before 1968.

"(d) Definitions.—For purposes of this section—

"(1) Administrator.—The term 'Administrator' means the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.

"(2) Small business concern.—The term

'small business concern' means any concern which qualifies as such pursuant to the standards, criteria, and procedures set forth in regulations implementing the Small Business Act."

(b) Clerical Amendment.—The table of sections for such part IV is amended by striking out the item relating to section 40 and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

"SEC. 40. Tax credit for certain pollution control devices.
"SEC. 41. Overpayments of tax."

(c) Effective Date.—The amendments made by this Act shall apply to amounts paid or incurred after the date of the enactment of this Act in taxable years ending after such date.

NATIONAL DEFENSE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SPENCE) is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON) and I asked for this special order because of our concern for a problem which threatens the very survival of our Nation. We, along with many of our colleagues, have witnessed with alarm the steady growth of Soviet military power, while at the same time our own preparedness has been neglected.

This trend has developed to the extent that we are presently in serious danger of becoming a second-rate military power. For example, the balance of seapower in the world today is, at best, only precariously tipped in favor of the United States. In fact, there are indications that in a nonnuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union at sea, the U.S. Navy may come out second best.

We have been so preoccupied with "reordering our priorities" that many of us have let go unnoticed our relative position in the world from the standpoint of military preparedness. I agree wholeheartedly with Senator BUCKLEY, who concluded last week that it is time to "rereorder" our priorities.

Mr. Speaker, about a year ago, the late Honorable L. Mendel Rivers stood in the well of this great body and described in frightening terms the deterioration of our military capability vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Though his message has gone largely unheeded, the urgency it expresses is even more significant today. He said at that time:

Consideration of the defense budget, contrary to what some would have us believe, is not a question of assigning relative priorities between defense and domestic programs. Decisions on the defense budget should be based on the simple questions of national survival—nothing more.

The final measure of our ability to survive as a nation in a hostile world will not be how well we have managed our domestic resources and domestic programs, but whether or not we have avoided and frustrated the forces of evil which would draw us into the crucible of war with the Soviet Union. If we fail in this endeavor, we will have failed in everything.

After that speech, one editorial writer whom no one could describe as a hawk, wrote that the rhetoric was appalling but the logic indisputable. Yet, that message was, and still is, totally drowned out by the loud chorus calling for more and more reductions in defense expenditures. Mr. Speaker, this is suicide.

While it is true that some of us in Congress are privy to information not available to the general public, the material that is in the public domain should be enough to stand everybody's hair on end.

Item: Since 1962, the Soviets have undertaken a determined and ambitious surface ship building program. For every year of the last decade, new classes of rocket cruisers, missile destroyers, escorts, minesweepers, missile boats, and/or torpedo boats have appeared in the Soviet Navy. The past year was no exception. Not only has a new class of missile cruisers appeared, but also a new type of general purpose destroyer leader and two new classes of nuclear-powered submarines have been deployed. In 1962, the Soviet Navy numbered about 600 warships of ocean escort size or larger. By mid-1970, it had grown to over 720 such units.

Item: Jane's Fighting Ships is the authoritative source of the navies of the world. The latest edition of this highly respected British publication was issued last week, and the foreword contains the following statement:

By any standards, the Soviet Fleet now represents the super-navy of a super-power.

For the fourth consecutive year, the Soviet section of Jane's has been considerably enlarged, reflecting the growing size and power of the Soviet Navy.

Item: Again quoting from the foreword of Jane's Fighting Ships:

In the strategic/nuclear balance of forces the USSR has gained superiority over the United States in numbers of ICBM's and the megatonnage that can be delivered. . . .

Jane's goes on to say that the predicted Soviet strategic forces of the mid-1970's could destroy virtually all U.S. land-based ICBM's in a surprise first attack, and at the same time, their missile submarines could destroy most U.S. manned bombers before they could become airborne.

Item: The Russian submarine construction program has reached proportions which are indeed impressive—and frightening. They now have a fleet of attack submarines which is three times the size of ours. Furthermore, their subs are increasingly high performance, unlimited endurance, nuclear powered units. At this moment the Russians already have considerably more nuclear submarines than we do, and they possess three times the nuclear submarine construction capacity of the United States. They continue to build at a rapid rate, while our program through 1975 is essentially fixed by budget and procurement decisions already made.

Item: Beyond the threat the Soviet Navy poses by virtue of increased numbers of sophisticated weapons, is the vast expansion of operations into all oceans of the world. In the early 1960's, Soviet warships were a rare sight anywhere but near their own home ports. Today, the Soviet Navy averages 100 ships and submarines deployed daily. Again, according to Jane's the U.S.S.R. is now able to maintain a standing naval force in the Mediterranean five times stronger than they could 5 years ago to counter the U.S. 6th Fleet. Also, they now have bases in the eastern Mediterranean to support their navy, which they did not have a few years ago.

Item: A blue ribbon defense panel has recently reported to the President:

It is not too much to say that in the 1970's neither the vital interests of the U.S. nor the lives and freedom of its citizens will be secure. . . .

Item: While we are spending most of our resources on defensive weapons, the Soviets are going all out in the strategic offensive weapons area. In terms of percentage of GNP, Russia is devoting twice as much money as we are on offensive capabilities.

Mr. Speaker, I have only one question to ask of those who insist we have nothing to fear from Soviet Russia: While we have voluntarily cut back on defense spending and levied self-imposed restraints in any effort to relieve tension, why have the Soviets gone beyond parity with us and devoted more and more of their budget to an offensive military capability?

Mr. Speaker, as I noted earlier, many of our colleagues of both political parties and of widely divergent philosophies have come forward today to express concern. This is not a partisan issue. It is an issue which deals with our very survival as a free nation. We are not a people who like to fight wars. History will show that we fight only when forced to protect our freedom. History also records that the road to peace has never been through appeasement, unilateral disarmament, or negotiation from weakness. The current weakness of the United States—in areas of military capability and national resolve—is a grave threat to the peace of the world.

Our freedom was purchased for us by our ancestors with their life's blood. We were born clothed in the precious cloak of freedom, and we have never known what life is like without it. We are heavily in debt to those who made it possible for us to be free; and we can repay this debt only by guarding that legacy with all the resources at our command. We are not doing this.

If we fail—if our desire for the easy life is more important to us—we will have to answer to the spirits of those who have gone before, and to the generations yet to come.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks and include extraneous matter on the subject of my special order.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LINK). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SPENCE. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. Speaker, I have joined with my distinguished colleagues today in this special order to express my deep concern over the grow-

ing weakness in our national defense posture. Here in Congress we have a certain specialized access to inside information, and we have long known that things were not what they should be vis-a-vis our Nation's enemies.

Now the American public is finally awakening to the hard reality which has haunted us for months. Major articles in popular magazines are hammering home the theme that we have dreaded. The United States, once paramount in defensive and offensive technology, is being knocked from its position of world leadership in a variety of fields. Not since the age of sputnik have we fallen so drastically behind in aerospace-defense technology. It used to be that opponents of a large defense budget could accuse its proponents of scare tactics and juggling figures.

But this is no longer the case. The plain fact is, about the only defensive arena in which we are not either equalled by the Russians or behind them is that of submarines.

What is even more frightening, Mr. Speaker, is what is happening to the great manpower and technology pool which has been the source of our traditional preeminence. We are dismantling a great machine which has operated at maximum performance since World War II, perhaps the greatest machine for technological progress in the history of mankind. It has wrought both good and evil, and has done so with equal impartiality. The atom bomb ended a war, and its threat has prevented any further world conflict. At the same time, it has offered, in the form of a peacetime technology, the most economic form of universal power to drive a technological civilization ever encountered.

Yet the people of America have failed to understand the very impersonality of technological progress. They have equated this progress, which has, of course, dollar costs, with an increasing visibility of our social evils. But they have forgotten that it has been human decisions which have misused our technological bounty.

Thus, in the sudden shift toward totally humanistic priorities, the first victim has been technology—the technology of defense, the technology of aerospace, the same technology which could be solving social ills. We have, in the past few years, seen the most dramatic shift in this Nation's priorities ever undertaken. We have made a commitment to feed our hungry, house and clothe our poor, care for our aged, and clean up our environment. I applaud these commitments, these new priorities.

But do they mean that we should abandon our old commitments out of hand? Should we no longer care about the defense of this country, about our commitments to our allies, and about our future technological needs? This is the direction we are taking, and it frightens me more than any other single development in our history. I am gratified to note that it is finally beginning to frighten other people as well.

I do not think the American people really realize the erosion that has taken place in our national defense posture. I do not think they realize that the great defense machinery is being dismantled, and that it will take years to gear it up again—years which we will not have if there is a national or world emergency. Lines of defense technology are being broken off, new developments stifled for lack of Government support. We have stopped investing in our Nation's future, in order to apply palliatives to today.

There is a trite tendency to regard defense moneys as an investment in destruction only. This is a parochial view which fails to take into account both the world situation and our national situation.

The truth of the matter is, that no matter the kind words, the trade concessions, and the exchange of visitors and cultural events, the United States is faced with two gigantic opponents who have sworn to destroy the United States and every freedom for which it stands. The world situation has changed in certain superficial aspects, but what has not changed is the lesson we should know by heart—sheer strength and world leadership are the only things that the Communists really respect. The moment we let that strength lapse, the wolves are at our throat. Let me just point out an outstanding example of this Where the U.S. 6th Fleet once dominated the Mediterranean, it is now being jostled rudely by scores of Russian ships. And the belligerence of Soviet-supported nations toward our allies has grown correspondingly, until the peace of the entire Mediterranean lies in a delicate balance.

Another example of this: We all know the best way to negotiate is from a position of strength. It gives the other party a powerful motivation to cooperate in reaching a mutual goal. But what has happened to us at the SALT talks? We have not had much cooperation from the Soviets, who seem to feel that if we continue on our present course they will soon be bargaining from the position of strength.

A strong defense, then, is an investment in the freedom and growth of mankind. It is a statement to the American people, and to the oppressed of the world that individual freedoms will be maintained, that communism will not be allowed to spread unchecked.

A strong defense constitutes another sort of investment on the national level. Defensive growth and flexibility are an investment in the future of this Nation—in the maintenance of our manpower and technology pool, and of our economy as a whole. Defense technology, like aerospace technology, is not a thing in itself. It provides jobs, education, and skills in a variety of related areas which feed into the civilian economy and advance it in parallel fashion. The alloys developed for a top-secret plane may turn up in the shell of civilian aircraft, or in a high-speed rapid transit car. In a recent example brought to my attention, the specialized procedures used to assemble miniaturized components led to the creation of a dust-free environment for a specialized operation allowing thousands of persons freedom from a crippling disability.

It is absolutely imperative, then, that we reconsider our new goals, and insure that our defense posture remains of utmost importance. We should also listen to the voices of the true Americans—not the people constantly clamoring for a Government handout, for the Government to pay all the bills of society. I suggest we listen to people such as my constituents, who indicated in a recent poll that the national defense had the top priority over any other financial need. I suggest we listen to our President, who has constantly spoken out against those people in the Government who would dismantle the defense apparatus; a President who has fought for the B–1 bomber, the salvation of leading defense contractor Lockheed, the maintenance of an adequate ABM defensive network, and a foreign policy based on deterrent strength.

Humanistic priorities have long been the outstanding feature of this country. But I suggest that we will forfeit our ability to maintain these priorities and to spread them throughout the world if we abandon our capability to defend them.

Mr. DAVIS of South Carolina. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SPENCE. I am happy to yield to my colleague from South Carolina.

Mr. DAVIS of South Carolina. Mr. Speaker, it is with pleasure I join my colleague from South Carolina today in this great issue of informing the people of the great need which faces this country. We have for too long thought too little about our national defense. It is only through the efforts of gentlemen such as Mr. SPENCE and others here tonight who are really concerned that we can bring this important story to our Nation. It is with pleasure I join at this time with him and those others here tonight.

Traditionally a great Eurasian land power and currently a state that has attained strategic parity with the United States, the Soviet Union has now dynamically extended its military challenge to the world's oceans as well. While the Soviets were strengthening their armed forces during the past two decades, the West was generally able to take comfort in the advantage it continued to enjoy at sea. Today, due to the diligent development of the Soviet Navy, this advantage has been seriously jeopardized.

Progressing from a quantitative expansion during the 1950's to a qualitative concentration during the 1960's, the Soviets have methodically transformed their fleet from a coastal defense force to a formidable deep water navy which has demonstrated its capabilities to operate anywhere in the world. In the Mediterranean, where our Sixth Fleet has controlled the seas in the interest of peace for over 20 years, a Soviet squadron with considerable combat potential now limits our politico-military options. To foster Soviet state interests in the Indian Ocean, a group of naval ships has been regularly maintained on station since 1968. Closer to our shores, we have the bold example of four separate Soviet naval deployment to the Caribbean/Gulf of Mexico area since 1969. Last year, in what has been described as the largest,

most complex exercise conducted by any navy since World War II, the Soviets employed over 200 surface ships and submarines and a thousand aircraft sorties. the geographic scope of these integrated maneuvers ranged from the North Atlantic to the Philippine Sea and amply attested to Soviet accomplishments in the intricate categories of staff planning, communications and command and control of distant naval forces.

This expertise is also inherent in the continuous maintenance of Soviet Polaris-type ballistic missile submarines off our shores. By 1974, their present construction program promises to provide the Soviets with a Polaris force that is the numerical equivalent of our own.

Heavy emphasis on submarines has also furnished the Soviets with an undersea fleet to interdict our vital sea lines of communication. In such attack submarines, the Soviets have three times the number we do and, increasingly, they are high performance, unlimited endurance nuclear-powered units.

Nor has the surface fleet been ignored. Soviet shipyards have launched eight classes of major combatants in the last dozen years. Each successive design has displayed improvements that have enhanced antiair, antisurface and antisubmarine warfare capabilities. Especially ominous has been the arming of several of these modern units, as well as many submarines and naval aircraft, with unique breeds of antiship cruise missiles. These weapons, which do not exist in our fleet, have substantially complicated our defensive problems at sea.

It is also important to bear in mind the growth of overall Soviet maritime strength. Though the Navy's activities are often our major concern, the presence of manifold Soviet merchant, fishing, and research ships on the world's oceans and in the world's ports is even more pervasive. Each of these vessels underscores Soviet appreciation for the economic and political value of seapower to compliment its naval component.

Mr. Speaker, I say that it is incumbent in this Congress that we meet the needs of our Navy so that we shall not become the No. 2 naval power in the world. Our future is at stake.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SPENCE. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I wish to commend him for taking this time in order to present this very, very important issue to the American people.

If I were to ascribe a title to the few remarks that I would like to make I would call my statement. "The Realities of Lead Time."

I think you all remember the campaign for the Presidency in 1960. Remember what the big issue was? A missile gap. A missile gap which many of us knew did not exist, yet the American people were so afraid of that alleged missile gap that I suppose you might say that in a close election it determined the outcome of the Presidency.

Twelve years have gone by, or almost 12 years, and a strategic gap has in fact developed, so ably presented and documented by the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SPENCE).

There is a strategic gap today, and yet the emphasis is all in the other direction, reorient our priorities, take everything out of the military budget.

Unfortunately, America has never been enveloped in a war that it was prepared to fight, but usually our great industrial base, the genius that American industry possesses, made it possible to tool up and produce the implements of war so that after a reasonable period of delay we were able through industrial might and military genius to come out on top. But the next war is not going to be fought with 75 millimeter artillery pieces, it is not going to be fought with bayonets and rifles and machine guns, and relatively simple things to construct from an engineering point of view; the next war we imagine will be the most technical war ever fought. It will be push-button warfare, and we will not have time to tool up.

Those are the realities of leadtime.

It took 10 years to develop the Lance surface-to-surface tactical missile system. It took 8 years to develop the TOW antitank missile. It took 8 years to develop the Shillelagh missile system, and the Sheridan vehicle that goes with it.

The F–111 took 8 years in the development stage. The SSM688 submarine is going to take 10 years. The Polaris missile system took 5 years, and the Minuteman ICBM system took 5 years. And to each of these leadtimes you must, if you are realistic, add still another 2 years for preliminary studies and the formulation of ideas.

Let us face the reality of leadtime. You do not crank up an industrial production line overnight. It takes 8 to 10 and sometimes 12 to 15 years for a missile system or an item of defense to get out of the idea stage and into the hardware stage where it can be deployed.

Our present policies of weapons systems acquisition are designed to minimize risk, and to reduce cost and to insure extensive testing to see that it can work. When we look to the future, leadtimes are going to get even longer.

One of the principal ingredients necessary to produce a weapons system, and one of the first ingredients when you do go into it, is research and development.

And what are we as a people doing to keep input into the pipeline which will eventually produce the weapons which we need to defend ourselves? Let us take a look. Let us look at fiscal years 1969, 1970, and 1971. In fiscal year 1969 we cut back research and development by $303 million.

In fiscal 1970 we cut it back by almost another $300 million.

In 1971 we cut research and development for military purposes back by $275 million.

Now, when you consider that we have an inflationary factor of about 9 percent in research and development you not only have a sizable cut in dollars but you have a much greater cut in productive effort in research and development.

In our report which accompanied the procurement bill for this year we stated the cost index for research and development for the calendar year 1970 increased more than 7 percent and it has increased over 30 percent in 5 years.

The appropriations for defense research and development over the past 7 years were reduced more than $2 billion by the Congress from what is requested by the Department of Defense.

According to the testimony which our committee has received the Soviet level for research and development effort has shown a dramatic increase over the past several years to the point of threatening our previous advantage of technical superiority.

I have before me a graph which shows that shortly after 1960 the Russians passed us in research and development efforts for military purposes and today Russia through all sources of research and development spends about $11 billion against $8 billion for ourselves when reckoned in constant dollars.

So far as the civilian space effort is concerned the ratio is about $16 billion for Russia to about $10 billion for the United States.

The Russian people have need for social gains. They wish the comforts of life. Why is their Government insisting on this massive research and development effort? They must intend to use it for some purpose.

I would like to say in conclusion that this country can never again in this technological era in which we live count on what we did in World War I and World War II and the Korean conflict—there will not be that much time. Leadtimes are getting longer—and our time of safety is getting shorter.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague.

Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BURKE).

Mr. BURKE of Florida. Mr. Speaker I thank my colleague from South Carolina not only for taking this special order but for recognizing me and allowing me to be a part of it.

Mr. Speaker, those in our country who preach the unilateral disarmament of our country, as the road to peace, make as much sense as Nero who fiddled while Rome burned.

In fact, if we follow their suggestions we are not only going to pay the fiddler, but we as a free nation are going to get burned.

Mr. Speaker, the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, appointed by the President and the Secretary of Defense in July, 1969, submitted its report September 1, 1970. The members of the Panel reserved the right to submit supplemental statements on areas not addressed by the Panel's report. Seven members issued a statement entitled "The Shifting Balance of Military Power." This statement is essential reading for all Americans.

The authors of this statements are William Blackie, Peoria, Ill.; George Champion, New York; William P. Clements, Jr., Dallas, Tex.; John M. Fluke, Seattle, Wash.; Hobart D. Lewis, Pleasantville, N.Y.; Wilfred J. McNeil, New York, N.Y.; and Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Richmond, Va.

The material contains a shocking statement of growing Soviet strength and a corresponding decline in our own military posture.

The authors point out that—

In a dramatic shift in the balance of power, largely unnoticed by the public, the quarter century of our clear U.S. strategic superiority has ended. The Soviet Union has moved significantly ahead of the United States in ICBM's. . . . The U.S. retains, for the time being, a substantial edge in the smaller, short-range SLBM's launched from Polaris submarines. Yet, the Soviet Union has 700 intermediate range ballistic missiles (IBBM's) deployed within range of defenseless Western Europe cities and NATO forces including 300,000 American troops stationed in Europe.

In addition the Soviet Union has a major submarine construction program which by 1973–74 might well nullify our advantage of submarines. The U.S. subsonic B–52 bomber force still outnumbers the Soviet strategic bombers by a three to one margin, but both nations recognize the relatively obsolete character of this weapons system.

The report states that—

No informed person now denies that the period of U.S. superiority has ended. The Soviet SS–9 ICBM force alone is capable of delivering a megatonnage of nuclear warheads several times greater than that of the entire U.S. force of ICBM's and SLBM's.

In fact the Soviet force is capable of killing 100 million Americans on first strike.

While there are many in our country who speak of reordering priorities, and of conciliation with the aggressive forces of world communism, the authors of this report have correctly expressed the view that—

The road to peace has never been through appeasement, unilateral disarmament or negotiation from weakness. The entire recorded history of mankind is precisely to the contrary. Among the great nations, only the strong survive. Weakness of the U.S.—of its military and its will—could be the gravest threat to the United States and to the peace of the world.

I wish to share with my colleagues the summary of this Blue Ribbon Panel's report, and insert it into the RECORD at this time. I would like also to recall the statement of President Eisenhower who said:

Until war is eliminated from international relations, unpreparedness for war is well nigh as criminal as war itself.

SUMMARY

The principal points in the accompanying Statement may be summarized as follows: [1]

The Converging Trends. The convergence of a number of trends indicates a significant shifting of the strategic military balance against the United States and in favor of the Soviet Union.[2] These trends include: (i) the growing Soviet superiority in ICBM's; (ii) the Soviet commitment of greater resources than the U.S. to strategic offensive and defensive weapons, with the continued deployment thereof; (iii) the possibility that present U.S. technological superiority will be lost to the Soviet Union; (iv) the convincing evidence that the Soviet Union seeks a preemptive first-strike capability; (v) the rapidly expanding Soviet naval capability; and (vi) the mounting hostility of segments of the public towards the military, the defense establishment and "the military-industrial complex," without due recognition that sustained irresponsible criticism could undermine and weaken the only forces which provide security for the U.S.

A Second-Rate Power. If these observable trends continue the U.S. will become a second-rate power incapable of assuring the future security and freedom of its people. Neither the facts concerning these trends nor the ultimate danger is generally understood by the public, which for the most part remains uninformed and hence apathetic.

A Soviet World Order. Since World II a degree of world order has been maintained by the dominance of U.S. Strategic military strength. This American preserved world order is now disintegrating, as doubts arise as to our will and strength to preserve it. There is reason to believe that the Soviet Union envisions a new era which it will dominate, employing superior military power and the threat of its use to achieve long-cherished political, economic and even military objectives.

THE END OF U.S. SUPERIORITY

In a dramatic shift in the balance of power, largely unnoticed by the public, the quarter century of clear U.S. strategic superiority has ended. The Soviet Union has moved significantly ahead of the United States in ICBM's, the principal weapons system of the nuclear age. The U.S. retains, for the time being, a substantial edge in the smaller, short-range SLBM's launched from Polaris submarines. Yet, the Soviet Union has a major submarine construction program which by 1973–74 could nullify this advantage. The U.S. subsonic B–52 bomber force still outnumbers the Soviet strategic bombers by a three to one margin, but both nations recognize the relatively obsolete character of this weapons system.

There are, of course, other elements in the equation of strategic military power. In some of these—such as MIRV and Poseidon—the U.S. is ahead of the Soviet Union. In others—such as strategic defense against missiles (ABM's) and against bomber attack—the Soviets are significantly ahead.

But however one may view the balancing, no informed person now denies that the period of clear U.S. superiority has ended. The Soviet SS–9 ICBM force alone is capable of delivering a megatonnage of nuclear warheads several times greater than that of the entire U.S. force of ICBM's and SLBM's.

A SOVIET FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY

Our planners in the 60's assumed that if both superpowers had an adequate retaliatory capability neither would prepare for or risk a first strike. The evidence is now reasonably conclusive that the Soviet Union, rejecting this assumption, is deploying strategic weapons systems designed for a first-strike capability. This evidence includes: (i) the continued Soviet production and deployment of ICBM's *after* having attained a clear numerical and megatonnage advantage; (ii) the emphasis on SS–9's designed as counter-force weapons capable of destroying U.S. hardened missile silos; (iii) the development of MRV with warheads also designed as counter-force weapons, and of MIRV by 1971–72; (iv) the development of a fractional orbital missile which significantly minimizes warning time; (v) the construction of a Y-class atomic powered submarine SLBM launching fleet capable, with no effective warning, of destroying our national command centers and much of our B–52 bomber force; and (vi) the continued Soviet emphasis on strategic defense systems against both missiles and bombers—an emphasis without parallel in this country.

The characteristics of these offensive and defensive weapons systems, which the Soviets continue to expand, are consistent only with a preemptive strike capability. Such a weapons mix and volume are not required for effective retaliation.

A CHALLENGING SOVIET NAVY

The Soviet navy, modern and rapidly expanding, is now challenging U.S. naval superiority in every category except aircraft carriers. This Soviet naval buildup is a major element in the shifting balance of military power.

RETREAT FROM THE THREAT OF THE 70'S

The situation which our country faces is without precedent. As we enter the 70's, the strategy of American superiority has given way to the concept of deterrence by maintaining an assured retaliatory capability. But there is no longer any certainty that our nuclear deterrent will remain credible to a Soviet Union which apparently seeks a preemptive strike capability, and which is moving rapidly into the role of the world's dominant military power. Red China, bitterly hostile to the U.S., also is acquiring a significant ICBM capability. It is not too much to say that in the 70's neither the vital interests of the U.S. nor the lives and freedom of its citizens will be secure.

Yet, many of our most influential citizens respond to this unprecedented national peril, not by a renewed determination to assure an adequate national defense, but rather by demands for further curtailment of defense measures which can only increase the peril.

CUTBACK IN DEFENSE SPENDING

Although the President has submitted for FY 1971 a "bare bones" defense budget, reflecting the largest single cuback since the Korean War, public and political pressures are mounting for even more drastic reductions. As U.S. defense spending goes down, the trend of spending by the Soviet Union continues steadily upward. Its total military funding about equals that of the U.S., although its gross national product is barely half that of this country. The mix of Soviet spending is especially meaningful. Without the drain of a Vietnam War or public pressures to curtail defense funding, Soviet expenditures in dollar equivalents on strategic offensive and defensive weapons significantly exceed those of the U.S.

THREAT TO TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY

U.S. qualitative superiority in weapons, due to its advanced technology, has afforded a decisive advantage over the past years. This advantage is now being eroded away, as the U.S. falls behind the Soviet Union in the support of R&D and in the training of scientists and engineers. There is an ever present risk of disastrous technological surprise in major weaponry where an open society is in competition with a closed Communist society. We are neglecting, by inadequate support and planning, to minimize this risk.

NEGOTIATIONS—TRAP OR OPPORTUNITY?

Since the end of World War II repeated attempts have been made by the U.S. to negotiate limitations on the "arms race." Negotiations for sound enforceable limitations should be continued and hopes are now high for the success of the current SALT talks. But the total experience of negotiating with Communist nations suggests the utmost caution and the need for the most critical analysis of the possible consequences of any proposed terms. Not only is the security of this country at stake, but it is possible that a limitations agreement as to strategic weapons could have the effect of neutralizing the U.S. as a strategic power, leaving the

[1] This Summary is necessarily incomplete and reference should be made to the full Statement for the views of the authors.

[2] The principal threat to U.S. security for the 70's is the Soviet Union, and this paper is addressed primarily to that threat. By the late 70's and beyond, the most menacing country in the world may be Red China.

Soviet Union and Red China relatively free to employ their superior tactical capabilities wherever this seems advantageous.

HOSTILITY TOWARD THE MILITARY

At this critical time, when the balance of military power is shifting, it is uniquely unfortunate that public hostility toward national defense and the military is at an unprecedented level. This attitude reflects a broad spectrum of opinion from honest pacifists and dissenters over Southeast Asia to New Leftist revolutionaries. But the base is sufficiently broad, and the voices supporting various aspects of it sufficiently powerful, to have a profoundly adverse effect upon almost every aspect of national defense. In a democracy, national defense suffers when there is inadequate public understanding and support. It may be fatally undermined when a significant segment of public opinion is not merely negative but irresponsibly hostile.

A VIABLE NATIONAL STRATEGY

Unless the American people wish to accept irrevocably the status of a second-rate power—with all of the probable consequences—the only viable national strategy is to regain and retain a clearly superior strategic capability. This can be accomplished by reversing the trends identified above, and by eschewing agreements which freeze the U.S. into a second-rate status. The margin of our overall strategic strength must be sufficient to convince the most reckless aggressor that, even after a surprise first strike, the capability to retaliate will in fact survive and be adequate to impose unacceptable destruction on the aggressor nation. This course of action is not incompatible with continued negotiations for arms limitations. Indeed, it will significantly enhance the chances of negotiations being genuinely fruitful without constituting a trap.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF SECOND-RATE STATUS

Basic Communist dogma contemplates the employment—over such time spans as may be necessary—of the entire arsenal of pressures against the U.S. as the strongest democratic power. Despite discord among Communist states, there has been no amelioration of this doctrinal goal. Throughout the past quarter century, when the Soviet Union was relatively weak strategically, it precipitated or supported crisis upon crisis—directly or through puppets and satellites—designed to extend its influence and to create disarray within the U.S. and the Free World.

It is irrational to think, with the balance of military power shifting in its favor, that policies of the Soviet Union will be less hostile, disruptive and imperialistic.

The consequences of being second rate, even if national survival is not threatened, could be seriously detrimental to the most vital diplomatic and economic interests of this country.

WEAKNESS—THE GRAVEST THREAT TO PEACE

The road to peace has never been through appeasement, unilateral disarmament or negotiation from weakness. The entire recorded history of mankind is precisely to the contrary. Among the great nations, only the strong survive. Weakness of the U.S.—of its military capability and its will—could be the gravest threat to the peace of the world.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SPENCE. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. PUCINSKI. I would like to congratulate our colleague in the well, Mr. SPENCE of South Carolina, and all of those who are participating in this discussion here this evening. I think it is important as we prepare for the August recess to put the Nation's defense needs in a proper perspective so that the Members can indeed discuss these matters with their constituents when they get back home.

I am very much impressed with the statistics that our colleague has listed here on the deteriorating situation in American defense. And it is regrettable, really regrettable, that the system under which we operate here in Congress does not afford us a larger forum to call these facts to attention. While it is true that this material appears in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, and while it is true it has been a long, hard day here and it is late in the evening, it does seem to me somewhat lamentable that the excellent presentation being made here this evening on this extremely important subject does not have a greater participation, and I sincerely hope that our Members will take time to read the remarks of the gentleman in the RECORD, for the message he has delivered here today should be of deep concern to everybody.

The late Robert Kennedy made a rather interesting observation. He said the right thing for the wrong reason, but we cannot ignore what he did say. He made the statement that the enormous disappointment of well-meaning Americans in the long and bitter struggle in Vietnam has cast our Nation into a posture where even when our most vital national interest is involved, many Americans just do not want to react and respond. That is why the task the gentleman has taken on today is such a difficult one. He is trying to arouse the Nation into a realization that the Communists have not given up. They are going along with their plans. They are spending vast sums of money for an offensive military establishment. We in our country for the most part develop defensive equipment. We have tried to impress upon the Soviet Union over the years that we have this enormous defensive capability, and if they are foolish enough to disturb the peace they will, of course, have to suffer the consequences, but that we are, first of all, prepared to defend ourselves.

The gentleman quite properly points out that as our index of capability goes down, the prospects of a major war go up. If we had learned that lesson in the 1930's, even though we were in the throes of a terrible depression, then the horrible World War II might have been avoided, and communism would not be the menace that it is today.

So I respect, I admire, and I thank our colleague for taking this time. I know it seems a hopeless job and to some degree unrewarding. Sometimes one feels he is a lone voice in a big forest, but I think somewhere along the line the American people will have to realize the Communists have not given up. They have not altered their plans; and as tired as we may be of Vietnam and as tired as we may be of spending $50 or $60 or $80 billion a year on a Defense Establishment, this Defense Establishment of ours is the greatest guarantee for peace.

Once we Americans ignore and forget that, and once we give the Soviet Union the superiority which it is now trying to reach, the ball game is over, and this country could lose all its precious freedoms without a single shot being fired.

This is the message our colleague is trying to get through today. I sympathize with him. I wish there was some way I could assist in getting this very urgent and eloquent message to the American people. I hope his message will get wide distribution, because, indeed, the alarm he is sounding here today needs to be sounded. The American people must be reminded that this battle is nowhere near over, and that the end of hostilities in Vietnam is not going to change the order of things. The President's visit to China is not going to change the order of things. If anything, I would say it is going to polarize the great dangers that exist in this world for a major conflict.

As was stated by the gentleman from California (Mr. GUBSER), in the next major conflict we will never again have the security of the oceans that we had in World War II. The next conflict is going to be instantaneous, enormous, monumental—and unless we are fully prepared, we may never have a chance to retaliate.

So I would like to thank my colleague for his enormous contribution here this evening.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Illinois. He said it better than I could say it.

Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from California (Mr. ROUSSELOT).

NATIONAL SURVIVAL—NO. 1 PRIORITY NOW AS ALWAYS

Mr. ROUSSELOT. Mr. Speaker, the dangerous ebbing of our Nation's defenses must be brought to the attention of the American people.

There has been much talk in recent months about reordering our priorities, especially since the apparent winding down of the Vietnam war. I cannot agree with the peace-at-any-price group. The No. 1 priority of this country has always been, and always should be, national survival with freedom. Strength is our heritage—without it we would not have become the leader of the free world. Peace-at-any-price is not peace, but a delusion of peace. The price the enemy demands is relinquishment of our natural sovereignty and yielding to their dominate power. Let us, on this occasion, bring into clear focus the aims and peace objectives of our Nation and the responsibility of Congress to execute the authority clearly defined in the U.S. Constitution. Article I, section 8.

We Americans pride ourselves on being practical and realistic, and in many ways we are. In the face of the threat from the World Communist Movement, since 1917, we have become wishful thinkers in the matter of survival. In 1933, this country recognized as legitimate a regime in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which previous administrations, both Democrat and Republican had correctly identified as a gangster regime without honor since its inception in 1917.

Everyone loves the bearer of good tidings. No one likes bad news. It is only natural that we are not anxious to hear anything unpleasant. Yet, in our daily

lives, we individually know we have to be alert to bad news and take corrective action. At home, a child's carelessness may require corrective action—a plumber or repairman may need to be called, and that costs money. At work, any number of incidents arising purely out of competition may cause a businessman to hire more salesmen, purchase new equipment, or rent more space, and that costs money. In each of these cases the individual faces up to the problem and does what is necessary at the moment, despite the cost. We must face the immediate problem of our national survival in precisely the same manner. A loving parent cannot ignore his child's immediate need, nor the businessman his immediate competitive need, neither can we, this Congress, ignore our most pressing, immediate need. We cannot afford to make believe that the Communist problem just isn't there, or that someday it will go away because the Communists are changing—mellowing is the cliche—and, therefore, Communists no longer pose a real danger.

Now, if the Communists were to truly change, they would be giving up their goal of world conquest and their philosophy of dialectical and historical materialism which asserts and requires the inevitable establishment of a human society called communism. If, in fact, we found there was evidence that the dictatorial Communist leaders disbanded their worldwide agitation and propaganda apparatus called the Communist Party, and gave up their functions as agents or missionaries of that philosophy within that party to further the goal of world conquest by the power structure now identified as the Soviet or Socialist bloc, we would be wrong not to consider some change in our defense posture. The facts, however, show the opposite. In no way are the Communists giving up any of the three above-mentioned interlocking characteristics of the World Communist movement.

It is because too many of our leaders—in both political parties—have insisted, against all the facets of Communist doctrine, and against all the logic that decades of experience with Communist duplicity should have driven into our senses, that these diabolical criminals are still not what their words and deeds prove them to be, that we now find ourselves in a most perilous situation.

The United States of America can no longer claim to be the most powerful country in the world, capable of withstanding the assaults of any enemy on earth. The Soviet bloc has pulled even with us in almost every area of weapons systems. They are capable of delivering nuclear megatonnage far surpassing the power of U.S. warheads. This development has been the subject of a report of a blue ribbon defense panel appointed by President Nixon entitled, "The Shifting Balance of Military Power." The general press has failed to give this Presidential commission report the same attention it has given other commission reports.

Why has this shift in military power occurred? It has happened because the enemy—the Communists have been defined as our enemy in U.S. law—has cunningly played upon our natural desires to avoid bad news, or our unwillingness to face the total truth as to their actual intentions. How have they successfully put us to sleep and what are their intentions?

They have done much of this through their daily worldwide fact-distorting propaganda which lays the groundwork for coups and capitulations. Czechoslovakia, in 1948, was a major example. They rely all too successfully on the communications media of the free world to imply truth to their propaganda.

International agreements and treaties have been a particularly effective weapon, in the Communist arsenal of strategical and tactical maneuvers, to get and keep us off balance to exploit our weaknesses. Lenin, who masterminded the coup by which the Communists overthrew the Kerensky government in Russia in 1917, justified the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Germany:

As every sensible man will understand, by signing this peace treaty we do not put a stop to our workers' revolution; everyone will understand that by concluding peace with the Germans we do not stop rendering military aid; we are sending arms to the Finns, but not military units which proved to be unfit. Vladimir I. Lenin, "War and Peace" (1918), *Selected Works* (International Publishers, New York, 1943), Vol. VII, p. 303.

Lenin further instructed his followers on the value of treaties as weapons with which to implement wartime policy goals:

In war never tie your hands with considerations of formality. It is ridiculous not to know the history of war, not to know that a treaty is the means of gaining strength. Lenin, "Reply to Debate on War and Peace" (1919), Ibid., p. 309.

Lenin's pupil, Joesph V. Stalin, wreaked havoc against the free world's post-World War II solidarity in negotiations at Yalta, Teheran, and Potsdam. Yet, Stalin's own outlook had been expressed many years earlier:

A diplomat's words must have no relation to action—otherwise what kind of diplomacy is it? Words are one thing, actions another. Good words are a mask for the concealment of bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or iron wood. Joseph V. Stalin, "Elections in Petersburg" (Jan. 12, 1913), *Sochineniya* (Gospolitizdat. Moscow, 1946), Vol. II, p. 277.

Communists take no foolish gambles in their negotiations. They simply break them off—walk out—if things do not go their way. In the July 30, 1971, issue of Life magazine, long-time apologist for Red China, Edgar Snow, makes this statement about Chou En-lai:

Chou quickly cuts to the heart of matters, drops the impractical, dissimulates when necessary, and never gambles—without four aces.

What Snow says of Chou can be said in general of all Communists who enter negotiations on any level. They gamble only with four aces. The Communists are today moving toward their "four aces" in defense weapons and the strategic deployment of those weapon systems.

We, on the other hand, gamble with foolish hopes. We refuse to understand that Lenin's instructions and long-range intentions are being carried out today. We refuse to believe that the Communists today have the same scorn for truth in diplomacy which Stalin expressed. Our "want-to-believe-and-be-fair-to-the-other-guy" attitude played into the hands of Hitler even after he laid out his clear intentions in "Mein Kempf" for the whole world to see. The Communist leaders of today are no different in their plans and intentions.

Even since Brest-Litovak, the Communists have utilized negotiations to gain great advantages. Non-Communist countries in good faith have entered into what were expected to be long-term agreements with them benefiting both sides. The Communist signatories never considered the treaties to be anything more than temporarily necessary tools in the long and devious road to world conquest, to be discarded the moment they no longer were required, to be ignored, or repudiated with scorn. Their word has been meaningless, their signatures worthless. Yet, we go right on deluding ourselves that things are otherwise.

The U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, on August 1, 1955, published a staff study entitled, "Soviet Political Treaties and Violations." A third revision updated the study as of January 1, 1964. In the foreword of the first edition, Senator JAMES O. EASTLAND, chairman of the Subcommittee on Internal Security, emphasized the following important facts:

The staff studied nearly a thousand treaties and agreements of the kinds described above, both bilateral and multilateral, which the Soviets have entered into not only with the United States, but with countries all over the world. The staff found that in the 38 short years since the Soviet Union came into existence, its Government had broken its word to virtually every country to which it ever gave a signed promise. It signed treaties of nonaggression with neighboring states and then absorbed those states. It signed promises to refrain from revolutionary activity inside the countries with which it sought "friendship," and then cynically broke those promises. It was violating the first agreement it ever signed with the United States at the very moment the Soviet envoy, Litvinov, was putting his signature to that agreement, and it is still violating the same agreement in 1955. It broke the promises it made to the western nations during previous meetings "at the summit" in Teheran and Yalta. It broke lend-lease agreements offered to it by the United States in order to keep Stalin from surrendering to the Nazis. It violated the charter of the United Nations. It keeps no international promises at all unless doing so is clearly advantageous to the Soviet Union.

I seriously doubt that if during the whole history of civilization any great nation has ever made as perfidious a record as this in so short a time.

On the basis of the record, this question inevitably arises: Is the Soviet record merely a series of individual and unrelated misdeeds, or has treaty breaking been an instrument of national policy since the U.S.S.R. itself came into existence? Employed by the United Nations, the subcommittee showed that this had been answered as long ago as 1920 by Bainbridge Colby, who was Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of State. The existing regime in Russia is based upon the negation of every principle of honor and good faith, said Mr. Colby. The responsible leaders of the regime have frequently and openly boasted that they are willing to sign agreements and under-

takings with foreign powers while not having the slightest intention of observing such undertakings or carrying out such agreements.

At the time he uttered these historic words, Secretary of State Colby had available to him many examples of how Communist leaders "frequently and openly boasted" that their pledged word was worthless. Let me call attention to just one of those examples, given by Zinoviev, Lenin's lieutenant, as long ago as 1919.

We are willing to sign an unfavorable peace . . . Ainoviev said.

It would only mean we should put no trust whatever in the piece of paper we should sign. We should use the breathing space so obtained in order to gather our strength so that the mere continued existence of our Government would keep up the worldwide propaganda which Soviet Russia has been carrying on for more than a year.

Mr. Speaker, I am convinced that we are more brainwashed by our own "wishful thinking" than Soviet propaganda has ever accomplished. The Communist policy statements I quoted from Lenin and Stalin, and the last by Zinoviev, are on the record. Why do we continue to insist the Communist do not mean what they say?

In the updated 119 page study by the Senate committee, President Eisenhower is quoted in his note to Premier Bulganin of the U.S.S.R. protesting the Soviet's failure to keep promises made at Geneva:

I must confess that I am perplexed as to how we can work together constructively if agreements which are negotiated at the highest level after the most thorough explanations do not seem dependable.

Yet, today as I speak in this Chamber, a President who was Vice President when Mr. Eisenhower wrote those words is enmeshed in the toils of still another endeavor through which, I am afraid, the Communist world leaders will gain more advantage in their power play against the free world. The very designation of these negotiations reflects the supreme irony of our position. Instead of taking their propositions with more than the perverbial "grain of salt" because of decades of Communist treaty breaking, our American diplomats now are meeting in secret with the Communist masters of duplicity in what are called the SALT talks, for the ostensible purpose of reaching agreement on strategic arms limitation by the two major world powers. We can be certain, however, strategic arms limitation talks have been entered into by the U.S.S.R. only according to Lenin's dictum—to gain strength and to advance the goal of world domination.

Mr. Speaker, at this point in my statement, I am including a paper written by Dr. James B. Whisker of the political science department of West Virginia University which expressed his opinion on this country's participation in the SALT talks:

THE U.S. AND THE SALT TALKS

(Opinion by Dr. James B. Whisker, West Virginia University)

It has long been my considered opinion that we are wasting our time and losing valuable time in attempting to deal with the communists in regard to strategic arms limitation. Nothing I have read or seen in recent days has in any way altered that opinion.

After the Second World War we suggested that we limit the use of nuclear weapons, but the Soviet leaders said that it was not surprising that the U.S. wanted to do so since the U.S. had a monopoly there. Later, we suggested certain limitations on the use of nuclear devices, but the Soviet Union balked since its development lagged behind American research and development. The United States has in effect demonstrated its good will by unilaterally refraining from developing and manufacturing increasingly massive offensive weapons and from creating adequate defense of American cities via the installation of defensive weapons such as the ABM.

America now faces a growing Soviet threat of superiority on every front. Now that Soviet superiority is achieved they wish to speak of arms limitations. Their equipment is the most modern in the world, especially their naval equipment. Much of our obsolete and obsolescent equipment simply must be replaced in the very near future or we will face an even more dangerous lag than now exists.

Beyond arguing over what posture the Soviet Union has vis a vis the United States, the following must never be forgotten as general-philosophical principles:

1) The Soviet view, following marxism-leninism, of treaty-making accepts the principle of *autolimitation*. Treaties are "scraps of paper" whose use is entirely pragmatic. "Two steps forward, one step backward" as Lenin was quoted.

2) There is technologically no safe inspection practice under consideration. And we have absolutely no reason to take their word for it. We could limit our weapons and never know where they stand. Word of new American development would surely leak out; not necessarily so in the Soviet Union's closed state.

3) War is at the heart of marxist-leninist theory, past and present. Lenin wrote constantly of using "peace" and "disarmament" moves to throw the West off course. We failed to read Hitler, Marx or Lenin in the past and we found out in each case a little late that what they said they try. Basic theory has not changed.

4) The religious-like belief in dialectical and historical materialism, the inevitable fall of the West, etc., leads them to believe that their way of life will win inevitably.

5) It is a basic communist tactic to dupe the opponent until his weakness is discovered; and then to move in with force while he sleeps.

6) Accord with even a trustworthy Soviet Union presents no guarantees against Red Chinese aggression. Even if it were to be somehow proven that the Soviets are negotiating in good faith, still the Red Chinese must be considered. In face of Red Chinese nuclear potential—to say nothing of other potentials—we are deadly foolish to seek to curb our military response. The Red Chinese have long sought the war which would destroy the latest vestiges of the capitalist states.

7) In areas where communists around the world could lessen tension, tension which we have not created, they have not chosen to do so. Let them, if they be of good will, begin a tradition of peace: in Berlin, in Korea, in Vietnam, in the Middle East and so on. There is no reason to suspect that they would not exploit their potential, as they have done so often in the past, in the future when we are in a weakened posture.

The range of American policy in the future, especially as affects such policies as the "Nixon Doctrine", the Monroe Doctrine, and the "Containment of Communism"-Truman Doctrine, will be limited by SALT accords with the communist nations. Our range of policies in the Middle East, for example, is greatly limited now by Soviet superiority. We could not interfere as we chose to in 1956 in the Middle East.

In a time when communist aggression has never been more obvious it is certainly an unwise policy to limit our range of research and development and replacement alternatives. The United States, as a great power, seems to stand alone facing two communist leviathans, each of whom say that the other does not control its internal or external policies. If the one communist nation can give, by disarmament talks or arms limitations talks, an advantage to the other, what is the likely outcome? It bodes evil for the U.S.

The Vietnam conflict has had the very unfortunate side effect of limiting research, development and replacement of strategic weapons. During this time both the Chinese and the Soviets have been working to increase their respective stockpiles of important, new, strategic weapons. With that war now "unwinding" a new method has been devised by the communist world to keep America behind in weapons of strategic types—arms limitations.

I suggest we wait for the communists to show us some of their "good will" while we create parity with both communist giants, and, hopefully while we reconsider our alliance systems. Then let us talk as equals—if there then be anything to talk about.

Long ago the Communists learned our greatest weakness. They are mindful of our willingness to face up to the reality of their goals, to accept the fact that they really believe in the tenets of dialectical materialism, and that the Communist Party is functionally designed as a vehicle of world revolution. With the Soviet Union as the power base—that is, the armory for world conquest supplying most of the material needs of some 40 million Communists operating in every country—these foes have made tremendous strides by alternating their propaganda impulses calculated to raise our hopes for peace or deepen our fears of war, depending on the response needed to advance their goals. Hope or fear, hatred or love, in fact every emotion known to man has been exploited by these clever manipulators for their own devious purposes. The Russian people were misled by Lenin. Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai accomplished the same purpose in the same manner. The Communists have never departed from Leninist teaching and training, and we should not be deceived into believing otherwise. In too many cases, American officials have been deluded by Communist propaganda and have cooperated in the division of peoples—Germany, Korea, and Vietnam have been cut in two. Communist training is intensive. Communist operations follow a consistent pattern, Communist union leaders in the free world negotiate no differently than do Communist diplomats. They are sure-thing gamblers—playing only with four aces. They go into negotiations asking for the sun when their objective is only the moon, and they smile when we believe we have reached a compromise.

Mr. Speaker, we cannot be misled into thinking the Communists have changed. A July 28, 1971, broadcast from Moscow contained this declaration which demonstrates that Communist philosophy has in no way changed over the decades:

Communists struggle so that everyone should have work, a piece of land, bread,

a good dwelling, the right to education, medical care, and support in his retirement. The threat of war and imperialism must be done away with. Communists struggle for the security and peace for all peoples. Our people have followed the teachings of Lenin and our Communists have been in the vanguard in the task of building a new and happy society and a better life for the people.

Mr. Speaker, and my fellow colleagues, let us think carefully on these words vis-a-vis the key teachings of Lenin and the state of our national defense:

Socialists, without ceasing to be socialists, cannot oppose any kind of war . . . In the first place, socialists never have and never would oppose revolutionary wars . . . In the second place, civil wars are, also, wars. He who accepts the class struggle, cannot fail to recognize civil wars which under any class society represent the natural, and under certain conditions, inevitable continuation of the development and aggravation of class struggle . . . Socialism cannot win simultaneously in all countries. It will win initially in one or several countries, while the remainder will remain for some time, either bourgeois or prebourgeois. This should result not only in frictions, but also in the direct striving of the bourgeoisie of other countries to smash the victorious proletariat of the socialist state. In such cases, a war on our part would be lawful and just. This would be a war for socialism, for the liberation of other people from the bourgeoisie. Engels was completely right when in his letter to Kautsky of 12 September 1882 he directly recognized the possibility of "defensive wars" by already victorious socialism. He had in mind exactly the defense of the victorious proletariat against the bourgeoise of other countries . . . Only after we overthrow, completely defeat and expropriate the bourgeoisie in the entire world, and not only in one country, will wars become impossible. And from the scientific point of view, it would be completely incorrect and completely unrevolutionary to by-pass or tone down the most important, the suppression of the resistance of the bourgeoise—which is the most difficult, the most struggle-requiring of transition to socialism. "Social" priests and opportunists are always ready to dream of future peaceful socialism, but this is precisely the way they differ from revolutionary social-democrats, because they do not wish to think and ponder the embittered class struggle and class wars which are required in order to bring about this wonderful future. (Vladimir I. Lenin, "Military Program of Proletarian Revolution" (written 1916, published 1917) *Collected Works* (International Publishers, New York, 1942), Vol. XIX, pp. 362–366)

Lenin, the "revolutionary social-democrat," declared that:

Embittered class struggle and class wars are vital in bringing into being this wonderful future, world socialism.

He said—

Note well, wars will become impossible only after we overthrow, completely defeat and expropriate the bourgeoise in the entire world, and not only in one country.

So, the recent Moscow broadcast—which was in Arabic—identifying with Lenin's teachings, was clearly calling for still greater militancy in the class struggle and so-called class war in the Middle East. As we all know, an unending series of guerrilla outbreaks and civil wars of varying intensities have broken out in the Middle East in recent years. There are those leaders, however, whose dreams for a peaceful world have become confused with reality.

Lenin clearly stated the Communist position on war and imperialism. Communists, of course, define all free enterprise or capitalistic countries as imperialistic. In 1918 Lenin said:

Either the Soviet governments triumph in every advanced country in the world, or the most reactionary imperialism triumphs, the most savage imperialism, which is throttling the small and feeble nationalities and reinstating reaction all over the world—Anglo-American imperialism which has perfectly mastered the art of using the form of a democratic republic. One or the other, there is no middle course. (Lenin, "Valuable Admission of Pitirim Sorokin," 1918, *Selected Works*, International Publishers, New York 1943, Vol. VIII, pp. 148–149.)

In 1919 Lenin declared:

We are living not merely in a state, but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. And before that end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeoise states will be inevitable. That means that if the ruling class, the proletariat, wants to hold sway, it must prove its capacity to do so by its military organization. (Lenin, "Report of Central Committee at 8th Party Congress", 1919, Ibid., Vol. VIII, p. 33.)

Even more succinctly, Lenin summed it all up in 1920:

As long as capitalism and socialism exist, we cannot live in peace; in the end, one or the other will triumph—a funeral dirge will be sung over the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism (Lenin, "Speech to Moscow Party Nuclei Secretaries", November 26, 1920, Ibid., p. 297.)

Finally, we must realize the distinction Lenin made—and the distinction Moscow still makes today—between a war as waged by a capitalist country and one waged by a Leninist, Socialist country. On one occasion he clarified his distinction in this way:

If war is waged by the exploiting class with the object of strengthening its class rule, such a war is a criminal war, and 'defencism' in such a war is a base betrayal of socialism. If war is waged by the proletariat after it has conquered the bourgeois in its own country, and is waged with the object of strengthening and extending socialism, such a war is legitimate and 'holy.' (Lenin, "Left-Wing Childishness and Petty-Bourgeois Mentality", May 3–5, 1918, Ibid., Vol. VVI, p. 357.)

Mr. Speaker, Lenin remains the great all-time strategist of the World Communist Movement. Let us learn a lesson from Adolf Hitler's "Mein Kampf." Many have wisely remarked that had Hitler's principles and goals been read and studied, World War II might have been avoided. The Communists issue a "Mein Kampf" every day in every language, as they pour out billions of words in an unending propaganda barrage throughout the world.

Although Lenin is the major architect for world communism, his successors have never hesitated, when it suited their purposes, to seemingly contradict him. We let ourselves be brainwashed. We look for every shade of meaning, hopefully seeking some clue to a new outlook by the Communists. There is none, but we insist on finding one. They put before us what they think we want to believe—and they are usually right. For example, Joseph Stalin was Lenin's immediate successor, although he had to have Leon Trotsky murdered in exile in Mexico to insure his position, and an interview with Roy Howard, publisher of the New York World Telegram, March 1, 1936, Stalin said to the free world:

American democracy and the Soviet system can exist peacefully side by side and compete with each other. But one cannot evolve into American democracy or vice versa. We can exist peacefully side by side. If we do not find fault with each other over every trifling matter. (New York Times, March 5, 1936).

This was merely a shift of emphasis from a much clearer position given by Stalin to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1927 when he specified the purely temporary nature of peaceful coexistence:

We cannot forget the saying of Lenin to the effect that a great deal in the matter of our construction depends on whether we suceed in delaying the war with the capitalist countries, which is inevitable but which may be delayed either until proletarian revolution ripens in Europe or until colonial revolutions come fully to a head, or finally, until the capitalists fight among themselves over the division of the colonies. Therefore, the maintenance of peaceful relations with capitalist countries is an obligatory task for us. The basis of our relations with capitalists countries consists in admitting the co-existence of two opposed systems. (Speech to the 15th Congress of CPSU (b), Dec. 2, 1927, *Sochineniya* Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1949, Vol. X, pp. 288–289.)

Stalin enunciated the core of Lenin's teaching that war with the capitalist world was inevitable, but it is to the socialists' advantage to delay it until the situation becomes more advantageous to them. Are we fools to think they will not make the most complete preparations for that war while successfully delaying it? But how many Americans grasped at the straw that Stalin threw them in his words to Roy Howard, "We can exist peacefully side by side." He simply omitted the key word—"temporarily."

Stalin's successor, Georgi Malenkov, followed suit. In his speech at Stalin's funeral, March 9, 1953, he said:

The Soviet Union has pursued and is pursuing a consistent policy of maintenance and strengthening of peace, a policy of struggle against the preparation and unleashing of a new war, a policy of international cooperation and development of business relations with all countries, a policy preceeding from the Leninist-Stalinist thesis on the possibility of prolonged co-existence and peaceful competition of the two different systems—the capitalist and the socialist. (Pravda, March 10, 1953.)

What welcome news from the new face in the Kremlin. Hope abounded. The tyrant Stalin was dead. The new Communist leader sounded forth for peaceful competition and coexistence. The free world chose to continue to ignore the Leninist mold in which Malenkov had been cast. A peace-hungry world ignored his use of the world "prolonged" and his omission of the key strategy,

"until the time is advantageous for the socialist countries in the inevitable war with capitalism." Soviet psychology succeeds primarily because of freeman's wishful thinking.

Nikita Khrushchev followed next. Malenkov found little peaceful coexistence among his Communist compatriots who, unwilling to utilize the tried and true Stalinist pattern of personal liquidation, merely exiled him to run an electric complex well removed from Moscow. Khrushchev proved himself an able disciple of the Leninist creed and strategy. He denounced Stalin as a ruthless dictator. He parroted Stalin's and Malenkov's line on peaceful coexistence. But, he, too, relied on our wish for peace to stop us from facing the issue of the Communist threat. We wanted to be convinced that now, indeed, a new era had arrived in the relations of the Soviet Union with the rest of the world.

When Khrushchev denounced and downgraded the great Joseph Stalin, on February 25, 1956, in a "secret speech" that strangely got quick world notice and tremendous commentary, the entire world seemed to shout for joy. But the same world overlooked other words by Khrushchev to the same Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union earlier on February 14, in a report that was not secret. Pravda published it the next day.

Khrushchev would talk of peaceful competition between the capitalist and socialist systems in words like these:

We say to the representatives of the capitalist world: "You are for the development of capitalism. We are for socialism. We do not want to impose our institutions on you, but we will not allow you to interfere in our affairs. Therefore, there is only one way open to us—peaceful competition." (Speech at the All-Union Conference of Young Builders, April 11, 1956, Pravda, April 13, 1956).

But precisely just how Khrushchev intended "not to impose" socialist institutions on the capitalist world was made amply clear in the February 14 speech:

Our enemies like to depict us Leninists as advocates of violence always and everywhere. True, we recognize the need for the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society into socialist society. It is this that distinguishes the revolutionary Marxists from the reformists, the opportunists. There is no doubt that, in a number of capitalist countries, violent overthrow of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the sharp aggravation of class struggle connected with this are inevitable. But the forms of social revolution vary and it is not true that we regard violence and civil war as the only way to remake society . . .

Leninism teaches that the ruling classes do not surrender power voluntarily. However, the greater or lesser intensity which the struggle may assure, the use or non-use of violence in the transition to socialism depend on the resistance of the exploiters, on whether the exploiting class itself resorts to violence, rather than on the proletariat . . .

In the countries where capitalism is still strong and has a huge military and police apparatus at its disposal, the reactionary forces will; of course, inevitably offer serious resistance. There the transition to socialism will be attended by a sharp class, revolutionary struggle.

Revolutionary theory is not a collection of 'frozen' dogmas and formulas, but a fighting guide for practical activity for the transformation of the world, for the building of communism. Marxism-Leninism teaches that theory isolated from practice is dead, and practice not illuminated by revolutionary theory is blind.

Mr. Speaker, would that the President and every Member of this Congress read, reread, and memorize those words of Nikita Khrushchev. He was no grinning buffoon as some would have had us believe. He put in many years of apprenticeship in the ranks of the Communist Party. Labeled the Butcher of Budapest for his ruthless suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, he had long been well known as the tyrant of the Ukraine after January 1938. Over the he conducted a reign of terror. He served as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine after January, 1938. Over the span of those years he played a vital role in the man-made famine there, and purged the enemies of Stalin's regime. In 1943, 9,439 bodies were exhumed at Vinnitsa alone under the German occupation. Khrushchev was sent back in 1944 to purge those who had greeted the Germans too warmly. It is estimated some 400,000 were killed under Khrushchev. This was a positive public policy calculated to terrorize any who might wish to dissent from the Communist regime. When he got to the top position in the Party, he knew his job. The above exposition of gut Communist thinking and purpose was as definitive as anything Lenin ever wrote or uttered, and varied from the master in no single detail. Khrushchev successfully led the world Communist apparatus while simultaneously misleading the free world.

Nothing has changed. Under Khrushchev's successor, Leonid Brezhnev. We have the SALT talks at the moment to keep us concentrating in disarming and on limiting our scientific development of stronger defenses against Soviet intentions. But what do the Soviets keep right on doing? They continue to practice their theory. For example, Pravda reported on April 3, 1971, a speech given by U.S.S.R. Defense Minister, A. A. Grechko to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union:

The army and navy communists fully approve the political and practical activity of the Central Committee and support without reservation the domestic and foreign policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government!

Our army, which was created and nurtured by the Communist Party in order to defend the gains of the Great October Socialist Revolution, is obligated for all its successes and victories over the revolution's enemies to the firm leadership of the party and its Central Committee. It is precisely as the result of the party's concern and efforts that scientifically substantiated ideologic and theoretical as well as organizational principles of armed forces building have been created in our country . . .

The constant strengthening of the armed forces is an objective necessity for the successful building of socialism and communism, and one which results from the lawgoverned patterns of social development and from the particular features of the class struggle between capitalism and socialism. The experience of more than 50 years of socialist building in our country has fully confirmed the rightness of the military policy and practice of armed forces building being firmly pursued by the Communist Party.

Mr. Speaker, this is precisely why just a few days ago the highly respected Jane's Fighting Ships could report to the free world that the Soviets have developed a "supernavy" while the United States has allowed its naval strength to decline.

This is why the Soviet Union has developed and tested nuclear warheads of at least 58 megatons capacity.

This is why the Soviets have been producing the SS–9 missiles of far greater destructive power than in-place U.S. ICBM's.

On the other hand, Communist propaganda about peaceful coexistence and the need to negotiate differences has continued to mesmerize some of the free world's leaders.

Let us very briefly look at the history of nuclear arms negotiations and Soviet weapons development during that period.

In the fifties various proposals for nuclear testing cessation were presented to the United Nations, with India's Nehru playing a leading role. In 1955 at the Geneva summit meeting, Bulganin of the U.S.S.R. proposed a moratorium on nuclear testing in the atmosphere as a first step toward the end of testing and ultimate reduction of atomic weapons. Nehru proposed in the U.N. the establishment of a scientific committee on the effects of atomic radiation that would make yearly reports. It was set up and still exists. In 1958 a meeting of experts discussing the effects of radiation in Geneva concluded that physical inspection was not necessary to determine atomic testing activity. This removed a roadblock in President Eisenhower's desire to have inspection.

On October 31, 1958, the United States and the United Kingdom announced they would suspend for 1 year nuclear testing in the atmosphere provided the U.S.S.R. would observe the same moratorium. On November 3, 1958, the U.S.S.R. in a similar statement announced it would also stop atmospheric testing. The moratorium remained in effect until August 30, 1961.

On that day the Soviet Government announced the resumption of nuclear testing. In the months that followed, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission made periodic specific announcements of 69 atmospheric tests totaling 300 megatons of explosive power conducted by the U.S.S.R. from September 1, 1961, until December 25, 1962. Without announcing them specifically, the Commission declared the Soviets conducted additional tests in this period over and above the 69.

The largest of the announced tests was a nuclear device of 58 megatons.

Mr. Speaker, may I remind the Members of this body that the nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki only had a yield of some 15 kilotons, that is a blast effect of some 15,000 tons of TNT. A megaton is equal to 1 million tons of TNT.

The 15,000-ton explosion over Hiroshima killed 78,000 people. Why did the U.S.S.R. test a device of 58,000,000 tons?

For one thing, they want the world to know, fear, and be mesmerized by its power. They also wanted to know the precise effects of such power on the radar network that makes an ABM system operative. It has been conjectured in intelligence circles that the electromagnetic pulse following such a blast could also instanty knock out our country's communications over a vast area—including that required by the President personally to release the firing of our second-strike ICBM's that remain undamaged by the Soviet's first strike.

As Defense Minister Grechko put it, "ideological principles of armed forces building" require such qualitative and quantitative developments of Soviet weaponry.

The U.S.S.R.'s announcement of test resumption opened with this statement:

The peoples are witnessing the ever increasing aggressiveness of the policy of the NATO military bloc. The United States and its allies are spinning the flywheel of their military machine ever faster, fanning up the arms race to unprecedented scope, increasing the strength of armies, making the tension on the international situation red-hot. (Documents on Disarmament, 1961, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmanent Agency, p. 337ff)

Many pages followed along the same offensive line blaming the free world for the Soviets' need to resume testing. It also said:

And if the Soviet Government has nevertheless decided to carry out nuclear tests, it was with a heavy heart.

This self-serving balderdash was discounted by the explosion of the 58 megaton weapon just 60 days later. In the announcement's concluding paragraphs the following chest-beating declaration was for world consumption:

The Soviet Union has worked out designs for creating a series of superpowerful nuclear bombs of 20, 30, 50, and 100 million tons of TNT; and powerful rockets similar to those with the help of which Major Y. A. Gagarin and Major G. S. Titov made their unequalled cosmic flights around the earth, can lift and deliver such nuclear bombs to any point on the globe wherefrom an attack on the Soviet Union or other socialist countries could be launched.

But the Soviets backed it up in 60 days with a most horrendous weapon. They would have us think that as of August 30 when they broke the moratorium they only had designs for such a weapon. Obviously it had been not only designed, but developed and built, and testing facilities set up.

On the other hand, the President of the United States, John F. Kennedy, who said on the same day of the Soviet announcement that the Communists' action would force a resumption of U.S. testing, authorized underground testing, on September 5.

Finally, late the following April, the United States was ready for atmospheric testing. From April 25 until November 4, 1962, this country conducted atmospheric nuclear tests of megatonnage yields far below those of the Soviets. Our 39 atmospheric tests totaled only 37 megatons—compared to a single U.S.S.R. explosion of 58 megatons. In fact, the largest device we ever tested—February 28, 1954, yielded only 15 megatons.

Clearly, under cover of an agreement—though an unsigned one that we lived up to—the U.S.S.R. adhered to the Leninist principle of gaining strength through treaties and, according to the ideological principle of "armed forces building," did just that in a colossal way. Perhaps as a result of their testing, in 1963 Soviet military men spoke of the possibility of using "maneuverable warheads" against Western defenses. For some reason the United States did not learn from this incident. With the U.S.S.R. far ahead of us in tested destructive power, on August 5, 1963, the United States signed a partial test ban treaty in Moscow with the U.S.S.R. and United Kingdom. This banned all atmospheric and underwater nuclear testing but permitted it underground.

The Soviets continued to develop and build larger, more refined ICBM's and on July 1, 1968, we signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with the U.S.S.R. which was aimed at not allowing other states to become nuclear powers. Under this, we no longer have the option of utilizing our allies to help us catch up with any Soviet nuclear superiority.

Never giving up the hope that the Communists would live up to their word, this country proposed on January 21, 1964, to the ENDC—the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee—a limitation on both the number and characteristics of offensive and defensive weaponry. This in essence dealt with the systems aspects as well as quantitative aspects and would encompass submarines, bombers, ICBM's and the ABM's.

On January 28 the U.S.S.R. followed suit, obviously pleased with another opportunity to gain strength in the Leninist tradition of utilizing treaties.

By the summer of 1968 both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were in agreement to meet in what would come to be known as the SALT talks.

But a little affair which might be characterized as "internal" peaceful coexistence interfered. The Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968. So the atmosphere wasn't just right. On August 22, our Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, said of the invasion:

The action cannot help but damage East-West relations—get in the way of possible moves to more detente.

He meant detente with the lion who was in the midst of proving he devoured sheep—even his own brand of sheep. On October 6, 1968, Mr. Rusk on the TV program "Issues and Answers" said—

If these talks occur it would be very important that the general atmosphere be such that it would give them a chance to succeed or make important headway.

Clearly Soviet invasions—like those of Hungary and Czechoslovakia—do not help treaty negotiations with non-Communist states. But the atmospheric dust does settle, and such "disturbances" are conveniently forgotten. So on November 17, 1969, the SALT talks opened in Helsinki.

But we now are appraised by experts and a Presidential commission that the U.S.S.R. during all these years of ostensibly promoting such negotiations to limit all strategic armaments, has gone right on developing and producing such weapons systems until they no longer trail behind this country.

Our policymakers held back on more effective weaponry and ABM systems because of a fear it would be "provocative" to the U.S.S.R. since we already had superiority in strategic weapons. This suicidal policy was based on an ignorance of Communist intentions expressed by Lenin, Stalin, Malenkov, and Khrushchev as detailed herein. Yet those Communist declarations and the lessons of experience were no more hidden from those policymakers than they were from me. These men unfortunately feared—or told us that they did—that "provocation" on our part would cause the U.S.S.R. to proceed with building a stronger strategic missile and submarine capacity. Now the proof is in that they did just that in spite of our wishful thinking and "nonprovocation."

The greatest need if we are to survive is realism. The Communists may be dreamers by virtue of the philosophy they hold fast to, dialectical materialism. But they are supreme realists and ruthless criminals when it comes to applying it in practice against the non-Communist world. We cannot be any less realistic.

Yet one incident after another, unfortunately, proves that we abandon commonsense.

Our entry into SALT talks on the executive level despite the history of Communist doctrine, discipline, and duplicity is absolutely unreal.

But this same lack of realism pervades our citizenry on the individual level. We cannot blame only our leadership. The American people as a group are no more alert, I am afraid, to what has been and is transpiring around the world because of Communist machinations. But they have been affected by it. Both fear and wishful thinking are characteristic of individual citizens as well as leaders. Communist psychology of applying in alternating patterns the warm, cozy, and hopeful propaganda about arms reduction, peaceful coexistence, and the rest, with sabre rattling, thundering denunciations of American imperialism, and boasts of the inevitable victory of world communism over decadent capitalists, has had its effect on our people.

A case in point is that of the Lithuanian sailor who recently sought to gain asylum on an American Coast Guard cutter off New England. A number of individuals in various capacities in the Coast Guard betrayed an appalling lack of commonsense because of their apparent excessive concern over how the Russian personnel involved would react. The net result was that the seaman has been sentenced to 10 years in a Soviet concentration camp, and the United States received a black eye all over the world for its crassness in dealing with a man who sought freedom in the land of the free and the home of the brave.

Perhaps the individuals concerned had the North Korean seizure of the *Pueblo* on January 23, 1968, in mind, and feared some repeat of that incident. In any event, right off Martha's Vineyard in American territorial waters, a much more shameful incident took place on November 23, 1970.

Simas Kudirka, an English-speaking radio operator abroad a Soviet fishing vessel, the *Sovietskaja Litva*, which was moored together with the Coast Guard vessel ironically named *Vigilant*, jumped aboard the American ship several hours after he had passed a note to our sailors that he intended to defect and seek asylum aboard her. In the intervening and succeeding hours an incredible succession of acts took place, all entirely apart from our long tradition of affording a haven for the refugee from tyranny of any kind. The chief culprits were officers so perhaps the American crew which stood by unmovingly cannot be blamed in any way.

The rendezvous had previously been arranged to allow American and Soviet representatives to discuss fishing matters, mostly relating to the "overharvesting" of the yellow tail flounder, and three civilians from the New England fishing industry and two from the Department of Commerce Marine Fisheries Service were on the *Vigilant*.

The rear admiral who was the First Coast Guard District Commander in Boston advised that the defector be given back to the Communists if they wanted him, an unthinkable order—Hardly more unthinkable, however, than Operation Keelhaul, the official executive level project by which American servicemen under orders forcibly repatriated Russian defectors from the Soviet Red Army in Germany at Moscows' request right after World War II. Many committed suicide in their barracks to avoid it.

The Admiral told the cutter's skipper:

In view of the nature of present arrangements with them and in the interest of not fouling up any of our arrangements as far as the fishing situation is concerned, I think they should know this and if they choose to do nothing, keep him on board, otherwise put him back . . . If the man jumps into the water give the Russian ship the first opportunity to pick him up. Don't let him drown. Go get him if they are not going to retrieve him . . . make sure you don't preempt them in taking that action.

The admiral had been told by his chief of staff that the seaman feared for his life. The admiral's reply to this was:

I don't think we have any reason to believe this will happen. They are not barbarians.

The admiral evidently never heard of the Hungarian or Czechoslovakian invasions by these same Communists. I quote my colleague, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HAYS), concerning this admiral, in his report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs as chairman of the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations which held hearings on the Kudirka incident:

In his testimony before the subcommittee when he was reminded of the mass executions under Stalin, he defended his characterization (that they were not barbarians) because he thought "the situation has changed considerably." He was not familiar with more recent actions.

The press told of the barbaric beating the defector received at the hands of the Russians who were invited by the Coast Guard officers to come aboard our cutter to take back the man forcibly.

The New York Times reported May 22, 1971, that Kudirka was sentenced to 10 years on treason charges. On June 1, the Washington Post reported that the Soviet Lithuanian Supreme Court rejected his appeal against the sentence.

The Soviets would not have had a leg to stand on to try to get the seaman back. if, indeed, they would have known of his defection before the two ships parted. The point I wish to make it is that self-brainwashing played the major role in the admiral's thinking, and in that of those who went along with him. No Communist pressure whatsoever was applied until the admiral asked for it, literally. Of course they then insisted on Kudirka's return. There is no doubt, however, but that a subconscious awareness of the fact that the Communists can and do make trouble, helps induce self-brainwashing.

Let Americans put an end to our suicidal lack of realism. Let us all, whether public officials or private citizens, let neither fear of Communist strength, real or apparent, nor wishful thinking about it, cloud our ability to think clearly, assess our country's true position and that of the Soviet bloc, and then do what has to be done to insure our national survival as a free people.

Let us not be mesmerized and mentally paralyzed by the charming, cobralike "peace movements" of the Communist acts while we permit our superior defense system to be dismantled or to deteriorate.

Mr. Speaker, the theme of my presentation may be best summed up in the words of one of this Nation's greatest realists, Patrick Henry. Spoken in 1775, they are, I believe, even more meaningful in 1971 for our survival as a free people.

It is natural for man to indulge in the illusions of hope. We are apt to shut our eyes against a painful truth, and listen to the song of that siren till she transforms us into beasts. Is this the part of wise men, engaged in a great and arduous struggle for liberty? Are we disposed to be the number of those who, having eyes, see not, and having ears, hear not, the things which so nearly concern their temporal salvation? For my part, whatever anguish of spirit it may cost, I am willing to know the whole truth; to know the worst, and to provide for it.

Speech in Virginia Convention, Richmond, March 23, 1775.

From William Wirt, Patrick Henry, 1818.

Certainly none should be more heedful of Patrick Henry's timeless warning, his call for realistic vigilance, than we in the Congress who are charged by article I, section 8 of the Constitution to—

Provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.

Let not the "illusions of hope" not the siren song of today's enemies undermine our responsibility under the Constitution "to raise and support Armies" and "to provide and maintain a Navy" that will be second to none. Like Patrick Henry, let us not fear "to know the worst, and to provide for it."

Mr. SCHMITZ. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHMITZ).

Mr. SCHMITZ. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate this opportunity to join my colleagues in this special order devoted to alerting the Nation regarding this Nation's deteriorating defenses vis-a-vis its enemy's capabilities for war. I will focus my remarks on the status of SALT and MIRV.

Mr. Speaker, recently an administration spokesman has reaffirmed that no agreement will be made at the strategic arms limitation talks simply on the issue of anti-ballistic-missile systems. Testifying before the Senate Committee on Armed Services Dr. John S. Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, stated that:

Until we can obtain an arms control agreement that will constrain the threat to Minuteman solely through offensive force limitations, we must continue with the deployment of Safeguard and the development of Hardsite defense for the protection of Minuteman.

This makes good sense. In fact the basic asymmetry of the Soviet and United States strategic forces makes this type of approach mandatory. Those who advocate an agreement concerning ABM systems prior to any agreement concerning strategic offensive weapons have failed to grasp a very important point. The Soviet Union's land-based missile force has the capability to destroy a large percentage of land-based missile force while our land-based force does not possess this same capability. While our ABM system will protect our second-strike retaliatory force, the Soviet ABM system protects basically civilian-industrial areas since their land-based missile force does not need active defense from a U.S. force which cannot critically degrade it in any case. For us to discontinue work on our ABM system is to jeopardize our second-strike retaliatory capability, lower the credibility of our deterrent and thus create a destabilizing situation. The Soviet land-based forces already have a very good defense of their missile systems in the fact that the United States does not have an offensive capability against it.

The best approach to reaching an arms control agreement at SALT is to create a condition whereby the Soviet Union feels that it is to its advantage to reach an agreement. With the United States currently in a condition of self-imposed restraint the Soviets have very little reason to work seriously for an arms control agreement. Why should they when they are already controlling our deployment of strategic weapons before an agreement is reached?

Fortunately there is a relatively inexpensive method by which we can bring conditions conducive to arms control into being. The first step we can take is

to MIRV both our entire Minuteman force and our Polaris-Poseidon submarine force. This will increase the number of U.S. warheads surviving any Soviet strike, thus making it simpler to reach an agreement with the Soviets on limiting offensive weaponry. There is small chance that the Soviets will even think of limiting their strategic offensive forces when they see that if they simply continue building, these forces could be successfully used in a first strike on the United States in the not too distant future. By making plain to the Soviets the fact that no matter how hard they may try to acquire a first-strike capability we will not allow them to achieve the necessary force level, it will be easier to reach an agreement concerning the limitation of offensive weapons. If they see that their building is to no avail they will be influenced to stop.

The history of arms control agreements shows that once the technological potential of a weapon is fully exploited there is possibility for an agreement concerning the limitation of that weapon. The full deployment of MIRV by the United States is absolutely necessary as a step toward reaching an enforceable arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. This is even more the case when, as Senator BUCKLEY has pointed out:

> The Soviet Union now has a payload capability in her intercontinental and submarine launched ballistic missiles which is capable of delivering eight times as many nuclear warheads as the United States.

With this tremendous advantage in payload capacity which can be fully exploited by MIRVing their forces, the Soviets are hardly likely not to MIRV.

The second step which the United States should take at this time in order to create conditions conducive to an arms control agreement at SALT is to increase the accuracy of our missile forces to the point where they have a forward damage limiting capability. This is necessary because of the quantitative superiority in land-based missiles currently enjoyed by the Soviets. The Soviets currently have 50 percent more land-based missiles than we do. If the Soviets feel that they can successfully reduce our retaliatory capability below an unacceptable level of damage to themselves through the use of their counterforce weapons and ballistic missile defenses while holding back a sufficient number of invulnerable strategic rocket weapons to use as a blackjack to induce surrender, the temptation to strike will be very high. A successful first strike theoretically ends in victory and this is the reason for constructing a first-strike capability. By eliminating the possibility of holding back an invulnerable ICBM force through equipping our retaliatory systems with a damage limiting capability we dampen the hopes for victory and concurrently the incentive to build for a first strike.

Senator THURMOND pointed out in a speech last week that achieving this capability in our Minuteman force is relatively inexpensive. Senator THURMOND said:

> We have on the drawing boards an improved guidance system based on a new inertial measuring unit. Final development would cost $155 million over four years. Production cost to equip the Minuteman III would be $162.5 million.

This is a small price to pay for a system which can go a long way toward forestalling any possible Soviet attack on the United States.

Immediately upon suggesting any type of improvement in our strategic forces the cry goes up that fuel is being added to the arms race. This is despite the fact that United States Deployment of Strategic Weapons has been in what Defense Secretary Laird characterizes as "moratorium" since 1967 while the Soviets have been adding new strategic systems and expanding existing systems in what appears to be almost frantic haste. This historical fact is enough to overcome the arms race argument.

It is well to remember that even to the extent that the Soviets do react to our initiatives, they attempt to fit that reaction into the framework of their own strategic objectives. For example those who argue that a United States ABM system will force the Soviets to step up their deployment of ICBM's are tacitly admitting that the purpose of the Soviet ICBM's is to destroy our land based Minuteman force. Since an ABM is purely defensive, it is impossible to draw any other conclusion. We are building an ABM system precisely because the Soviet Union has increased its ICBM forces approximately seven fold since 1965. To allow the Soviets to feel that they can overcome our land based missile force if they will just continue building strategic offensive weapons is to encourage them to do just that.

The reason the Soviet Union is constructing forces far past any reasonable level needed for deterrence based on capability can only be that they have some strategic objective in mind other than deterrence. If mutual sufficiency consists of the second strike capability of each power exceeding the acceptable margin of damage of the other the Soviets have more than sufficient forces. In fact they have approximately 1,500 ICBM's which we cannot damage through application of our own strategic missile forces even if we wanted to. While we used to talk about deterrence resting upon a basis of our being able to deliver 300 warheads, what it is today the administration will not say but estimates range from 10 to 150 deliverable warheads, the Soviets have the capability to deliver approximately 1,500 warheads on the United States even if we were to strike first. Has anyone thought about this? Does this suggest anything to anybody? To me it suggests that they are not interested in deterrence as a desirable end policy.

How about MIRVing our forces? Is this destabilizing? Is this adding fuel to the arms race? While stability used to refer simply to the deployment of weapons systems which made credible a surprise attack, that is the deployment of a quantity and quality of weapons systems which gave one the capability for successful surprise attack was destabilizing, the meaning of the term was changed to include deployment of all weapons systems which might provide the Soviet Union with the incentive to increase its own forces. Now as everyone who has ever used an incentive system knows, what will stimulate one person will not necessarily stimulate another. It depends on what the individual values are, what he desires.

If the Soviets feel stimulated to higher efforts in strategic weapons construction because the United States is making efforts to assure the survival of its retaliatory force, does this mean that we should not attempt to assure the survival of our forces? I hardly think so. If the Soviets feel compelled to rapidly expand their forces until they can disarm the United States through a first strike, then it is necessary for us to take those measures which keep them building. For, if this is the case, and it looks very much as if it is, when the Soviets stop building, that is when the war begins. More to the point, that is when the war begins on the North American Continent.

So perhaps we can stop talking simply about what will or will not spur Soviet efforts in arms building and start talking about constructing strategic offensive and defensive forces which assure the survival of our Nation and preclude the possibility of the Soviet Union acquiring a first strike capability. If they wish to continue building weapons to the point where they can overwhelm our defenses that is their business. It is our business to see that they do not achieve this capability.

What about "MIRVing" our forces at this point? Recently a statement was made that a MIRV was a MIRV and to deploy multiple warhead missiles in any case whatsoever was destabilizing. This is nonsense. To discuss the deployment of any strategic weapons system without taking into consideration the environment in which it is to operate is ludicrous. In this case it is simply at attempt not to talk about the growing Soviet threat. If we do not discuss the deployment of weapons systems in light of present and projected enemy capabilities we are not taking into consideration the very factor which is in actually the determinant.

In present circumstances equipping our land- and sea-based missile forces with more than one warhead is simply a counter to the growing Soviet counterforce capability. As Soviet ability to degrade our land-based missile system increases, MIRVing is an attempt to simply maintain a more or less stable number of surviving warheads. Remember that it is the number of warheads surviving after a Soviet strike which determines one-half of our deterrent capability. The less Minutemen remaining after a Soviet strike the greater the need to increase the number of warheads on the smaller force.

After surviving an attack it is necessary that warheads penetrate enemy defenses. MIRVing increases the number of aim points which an enemy antiballistic system must take into account. Just as our Safeguard system is set up to work on the exhaust principle, that is the Soviets will have to expend one of-

fensive missile for each interceptor which we install to be sure of overwhelming the system, so we must have the capability to exhaust the Soviet Union's anti-ballistic-missile system. The Soviets already have a four-site system operational around Moscow and are working on four more sites which will possibly incorporate a new loiter type of antiballistic missile which they have been developing. There is also the matter of what is known as the Tallin Line. This consists of around 1,200 SA–5 surface-to-air missiles of which the head of our Strategic Air Command said in testimony this April:

I am about as convinced as I can be it is an ABM system or can reasonably be with simple changes.

We must have enough warheads to exhaust the totality of Soviet ABM systems. MIRV, therefore, is also an attempt to assure our ability to penetrate an increasingly sophisticated and dense Soviet anti-ballistic-missile defenses. It contributes to the requirements of the second half of deterrence penetration.

Putting these two aspects of MIRV together we find MIRV maintains, up to a point, a stable level of surviving warheads and therefore, markedly contributes to exhausting the Soviet ABM system, assuring penetration and destruction of targets in the enemy homeland. It is essential in order to maintain the credibility of a quantitatively decreasing deterrent. MIRV contributes to stability as far as any type of stability is possible with the Soviet Union in a position of strategic superiority. To say it is not is to completely overlook today's strategic imbalance.

In order to assure that all my colleagues are familiar with the threat which is the reason for this discussion we are having today I would like to insert the latest threat assessment prepared by the deputy chief of staff for intelligence for the Strategic Air Command, Gen. Harry N. Cordes. This is the environment in which the SALT talks are taking place and the environment in which the deployment of weapons systems by the United States must be considered. It is an environment which is becoming increasingly dangerous for the United States.

THE STRATEGIC THREAT

(By Brig. Gen. Harry N. Cordes, USAF)

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An inescapable fact of the 1970s is the Soviet Union's inventory of powerful and modern strategic weapons approaching—and in some cases, surpassing—ours in quantity and in quality. The importance of this change in relative power of the U.S. and USSR should be of real concern to all Americans, and countless officials and unofficial statements have addressed the relative strengths of the two superpowers.

Before analyzing this threat, one fact of traditional Soviet military policy must be considered: a reliance on mass—the concentration of arms at the critical place and time to the maximum extent possible. This is evident in their large land forces, their emphasis on firepower, and their propensity to retain older, proved systems. At the same time, they deploy barely operational new systems with the view of incorporating qualitative improvements in later modifications. These Soviet policies are apparent today in both strategic offensive and defensive forces.

THE SOVIET ICBM FORCE

The expanding Soviet strategic threat is reflected in the rapid growth of their ICBM inventory. Since initial deployment in the early 1960s, the Soviets have developed a number of ICBM systems, although growth of the force was quite moderate until 1965. Since then, an accelerated research, development, testing, production, and deployment program has resulted in a force today approaching 1,500 launchers—considerably larger than the 1,054 US ICBMs and almost seven times larger than the Soviets' 1965 inventory. Furthermore, deployment continues.

Currently, three ICBM systems—the SS–9, SS–11, and SS–13—are being deployed, through at reduced rates, and two of the earlier versions still are retained. These early systems, the liquid-fueled SS–7 and SS–8, were deployed in only limited numbers; however, their retention in the Soviet inventory illustrates the point made earlier about the propensity to retain older, proved systems. At this time, the largest segment of the ICBM force consists of SS–11s. Deployment of these launchers appears to have leveled off at the present time at somewhat in excess of 900. In addition, the Soviets have tested SS–11s with a new reentry vehicle that has shown improved performance. Last August, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird announced that two extended-range tests of the SS–11, into a Pacific Ocean impact area, may have carried as many as three reentry vehicles. Thus, multiple reentry vehicles are a distinct probability for this system.

Little is known about the only solid-fueled ICBM system in the Soviet inventory—the SS–13—except that deployment has been limited. Its testing continues, and deployment could be resumed at any time. It could also provide the technology for a mobile, land-based ICBM in a few years or for a completely new system.

Their most awesome and destructive weapon today is the SS–9. Liquid fueled, it is deployed in nearly 300 silos operational or under construction. The SS–9 has been tested in a variety of strategic roles. Its payload options include up to a single twenty-five megaton warhead or combinations of smaller multiple warheads. The multiple reentry vehicle version as already tested can carry three reentry vehicles, each capable of delivering a five-megaton weapon to a range of more than 5,000 miles. The SS–9 also has served as the booster for tests of a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS)). The large-payload SS–9 missile appears to have great versatility, with its flexibility offering the potential for a wide variety of employment or deployment options.

As mentioned previously, there has been an apparent slowdown in deployment of the three current systems—the SS–9, SS–11, and SS–13. One possible reason for this was revealed recently by Secretary Laird. The Soviets may be deploying a new ICBM with concurrent construction of new silos. While the missile associated with these new silos has not been identified as yet, it could be an improved version of already proved, flexible systems.

Based on the level of missile activity in recent years, the Soviet ICBM force could exceed 2,000 ICBMs by the mid-1970s. The total number of ICBMs is significant, but even more important are the qualitative improvements, total payload capacity, their emphasis on multiple reentry vehicle testing, and the wide variety of options thus provided by these systems.

Supplementing the ICBM force are many shorter range, medium- and intermediate-ranged ballistic missiles. Although not a direct threat to the United States, since the 650-plus launchers are deployed mainly along the western USSR border, they do present a threat to our overseas forces and bases as well as to our allies.

SUB-LAUNCHED MISSILES

The third category of ballistic missiles involves the submarine-launched force. Its growth has paralleled that of the land-launched systems. In less than five year, the threat has tripled, mainly due to the production of the new Yankee class submarine.

Currently, four ballistic-missile-carrying submarine types are in the inventory. Three are older classes but the fourth, the Yankee class nuclear-powered sub, is by far the most significant factor in the expanding SLBM threat. Like the United States Polaris/Poseidon subs, each Yankee carries sixteen missiles. At least seventeen of these subs are considered operational, while about fifteen more are being outfitted or are under construction.

Today, the United States still holds a lead in numbers of SLMBs, but the Soviets are continuing to close the gap. Present production rates for the Yankee submarines—about six to eight per year—could bring them to equality with the US in the next couple of years. By the mid-1970's, they could have about fifty Yankee submarines carrying 800 missiles.

The missile carried by the Yankee subs has a range of about 1,300 miles. However, testing is under way on a new, longer range, submarine-launched missile with the potential of doubling the present missile range and thus increasing the flexibility of their ballistic-missile submarine force.

SOVIET BOMBERS

Rounding out the Soviet offensive power is their bomber force, which has remained relatively static at a little over 900 aircraft since 1965. Although the United States stopped production of heavy bombers in 1962, the Soviet Union only recently discontinued a modest production. Currently, their heavy bomber force numbers 195 Bears and Bisons, about fifty of which are normally used as air refueling tankers. The Long-Range Aviation bomber force consists of about 700 Badgers and Blinders. While their range is less than the Bears and Bisons, when deployed at northern USSR staging bases, they could cover most of the United States on one-way missions. Therefore, in assessing the total threat to this country, the Badgers and Blinders must be considered as well as the Bears and Bisons. In addition to these bombers, the Soviet Navy has more than 500 Bear, Badger, and Blinder aircraft, configured in both reconnaissance and bomber versions.

In accord with their tradition, these older systems are regularly updated with modifications. At the same time, the Soviets continue to develop new and improved aircraft. The Soviet supersonic transport (SST) has been flying for more than two years, and although there is no known direct military application, it nevertheless would provide valuable engineering data for a follow-on strategic bomber.

In addition, there are indications that a new prototype strategic bomber is now flying in the Soviet Union. Available information points to a variable-sweep-wing, supersonic aircraft with range improvements over the

Badger and Blinder. Further indications are that it might be air-refuelable and could possibly carry a long-range air-to-surface missile, thus giving it an intercontinental capability. Since this prototype possibly is already flying, its deployment could, if it became operational, precede that of the USAF B–1 by several years.

Despite predictions to the contrary, the Soviets have made only minor reductions in their strategic bomber force during the past six years. We see a continued reliance on a mixed strategic force concept similar to our own Triad. In view of reductions in United States air defenses over the past several years, the relative threat becomes even more apparent.

SOVIET AIR DEFENSES

In order to gain a full appreciation of Soviet strategic strength, one must look at the defensive forces, as well as their offensive forces. By almost any yardstick, overall Soviet aerospace defenses are the strongest in the world. In all defensive categories, from antiaircraft artillery to antiballistic missiles, their forces are quantitatively superior. For example, with a land area not quite three times that of the US, they have from five to twenty times as many radars, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and interceptors. Furthermore, programs to improve air and missile defenses continue, and they have made significant progress in antisubmarine warfare.

Air defense radars number in the thousands and provide extensive warning and interceptor control throughout the Soviet Union. One feature—overlapping redundancy—characterizes the mass of warning and control radars. These radars span the full usable frequency spectrum and incorporate all the latest advancements to counter electronic jamming. In addition, the Soviet Union has under way an extensive program to improve their ability to detect and track low-flying bombers.

A key new development in air defense that may be deployed later in this decade is an airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, which could extend Soviet detection of penetrating bombers by a considerable distance. Even without ad-advanced technology, it could probably detect low-altitude aircraft against the background of a calm sea. In any event, the AWACS could further complicate our bomber penetration problems.

The fighter-interceptor inventory is at an impressive level of more than 3,000 aircraft. Some of them are older aircraft—1950 versions—but most, including the MIG–17, MIG–19, and MIG–21, are still effective aircraft and have good all-weather capability. Production continues on the MIG–21, which is employed throughout the Communist sphere of influence.

A dynamic modernization program has seen the introduction of a new fighter aircraft about every eighteen months, and in the past five years, three new fighters have become operational. One of these is the Fiddler, a large, long-range interceptor that could be a perfect complement to the AWACS. Another is the Flagon, a small, fast, point-defense interceptor that has been in service for more than two years. The Foxbat, a long-range, Mach 3 class fighter, has established several speed, payload, and altitude records and still holds two official world speed records over a closed-circuit course. This aircraft may be equipped in the future with radar and armament to attack low-altitude aircraft. We believe it was recently deployed as an air defense interceptor and may have a tactical role in the future.

SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES

The fighter-interceptor force is supplemented by an extensive deployment of surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems—on the order of 10,000 launchers—again illustrating the Soviet penchant for massive firepower. Besides numerous antiaircraft artillery weapons, the Soviet Union has literally thousands of surface-to-air missile launchers in both fixed and mobile configurations. In accordance with their policy of retaining older, proved systems, the SA–1, designed for defense against mass raids such as occurred in World War II, is still deployed around Moscow.

The backbone of the SAM defenses in the Communist world, however, is the SA–2. This medium- to high-altitude system has been spread throughout the Soviet Union and pro-Soviet nations, including Cuba, China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and the United Arab Republic. The SA–3 has better low-altitude characteristics and thus provides an excellent complement to the SA–2s.

In addition, the Soviets also have mobile SAM systems—the SA–4 and SA–6—which are ideally suited for defense of army field units. The one remaining system—the SA–5 Tallinn system—provides an excellent defense against high-speed, high-altitude aircraft. It also has the inherent potential to intercept ballistic missile reentry vehicles. The deployment pattern for the SA–5, as we know it, adds very little to the SA–2/SA–3 coverage against the sort of air attack we can mount. We in SAC believe this to be a strong 'argument that the SA–5 Tallinin system was deployed with a dual purpose in mind: air defense and ballistic missile defense. This thesis will be developed further in the discussion of Soviet ballistic missile defense.

ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE

The Soviet Union has declared its intentions on and beneath the high seas as illustrated by a well-documented naval production program. The naval exercise Okean in 1970, which was the widest in scope ever attempted by any navy, and displays of naval presence in the Mediterranean and Caribbean Seas are well known. Less well known, perhaps, are the two large helicopter carriers—*Moskva* and *Leningrad*. These ships carry sophisticated electronic gear for detection and tracking of submarines, and armed helicopters to attack undersea vessels.

In addition to the helicopter carriers, the Soviet Union has developed several long-range, land-based aircraft for the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) mission. These aircraft probably are equipped with a high-resolution radar and magnetic anomaly detection equipment, using torpedoes and depth charges as weapons. The long-range naval version of the Bear bomber could also be used for the ASW role. With such an aircraft recovering in Cuba, as has already been done with the reconnaissance version of the Bear, it would be possible to cover the entire North Atlantic in a routine fashion.

RALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

The third portion of the Soviet Union defensive system is ballistic missile defense, where there is considerable activity under way. The deployed Moscow system consists of sixty-four launchers in four complexes, supported by several radars. Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., the Department of Defense Director of Defense Research and Engineering, described this system as a "relatively complete ballistic missile defense" and also stated that there is "no reason to doubt the effectiveness of this system."

About five years ago, construction began on extremely large and powerful early-warning acquisition and tracking radars designated Hen House. This is a giant radar, approximately 900 feet long and ninety feet wide, providing early-warning acquisition and tracking functions. A new acquisition radar, known as Dog House, stands hundreds of feet tall and provides refined data for improved battle management. Final target tracking and missile guidance probably is provided by large, dome-covered tracking radars known as Try Adds at the four Moscow sites.

The interceptor weapon associated with the Moscow ABM system is a multistaged missile designated Galosh. It probably has a range of several hundred miles, can carry a nuclear warhead of one to two megatons, and appears suitable for a high-altitude area defense. As now deployed, it could give the Soviets some capability against Minuteman or Polaris missiles on northern trajectories. Completion of this entire system is still two or three years away, when the half dozen Hen House installations around the Soviet Union are operational.

However, some estimates do not limit the ABM missile inventory to just the Galosh, since the SA–5 Tallinin system has the potential of a second system. It has been pointed out that it could have considerable capability in making successful intercepts of incoming ballistic missiles if the system is given information from the aforementioned large ballistic missile acquisition and tracking radars.

In addition, extensive research, development, and testing of new and improved ABM components is under way. The sum total of these efforts indicates that by the mid-1970s the Soviets could have 2,000 or more ABM launchers defending all important industrial areas in the Soviet Union.

SOVIET R. & D.

Underlying this strategic buildup, which has been accomplished in an incredibly short time, is a dynamic research and development program efficiently managed and adequately funded. Again quoting Dr. Foster, "The Soviet Union is now about to seize world technological leadership from the United States." The basis for his conclusion is the comparative state of technology between the two nations and the current level of research and development efforts. The United States still retains an edge in overall technology, but unfortunately this edge may exist in nonessential or irrelevant areas.

Three features characterize research and development practices of the Soviet Union. (1) They are bold in the approach to program concepts. Construction on the large Hen House radar, for example, actually began several years before a working interceptor to complement it became available. (2) The Soviets organize their system development around a few prototypes, most often pitting two teams of designers against each other. The wide variety and variations of USSR fighter aircraft are examples of this methodology. (3) They seldom abandon a proved piece of equipment or system, but instead, rebuild or modify it to improve its usefulness or extend its life. Prime examples of this are the numerous modifications made to the Bear heavy bomber and the versatility of the SS–9 missile.

Allocation of funds and qualified personnel indicates heavy emphasis on research and development. Soviet efforts in defense-related R&D have exceeded those of the United States. The Soviets have expanded their research, development, test, and engineering (RDT&E) budget annually by ten to thirteen percent while the United States RDT&E budget has remained essentially constant. Looking at military, space, and atomic energy R&D, the US is already behind about $3 billion a year.

The production from this Soviet effort is phenomenal, and has had disquieting results in at least three major military areas. The Soviets have publicly flown twenty-five prototype bomber and fixed-wing, support-type aircraft in the past sixteen years. The regularity of their production output is amazing and apparently quite unaffected by the high-priority missile and space programs. In the last twenty years, fifteen fighter systems have been developed. All have flown at least in the prototype stage and have been seen in public.

Since 1957, the Soviets also have designed and tested a total of eight defensive ABM and SAM missile systems. The emphasis on development, initiation of programs, and competition between systems is evident.

COMMUNIST CHINA

By far the gravest military threat to the United States today is posed by the Soviets' massive strategic power. However, one must also keep an eye on the emerging threat from the Chinese Communists. The Chinese apparently are convinced that the possession of a strategic nuclear strike capability will greatly enhance Red China's bargaining position throughout the world.

As a step toward attaining this goal, the Chinese thus far have achieved a modest nuclear capability. They have conducted nuclear testing since 1964, totaling eleven detonations. Several have been thermonuclear devices, including both air- and, possibly, missile-delivered weapons, with yields in the megaton class.

They are working hard on all forms of delivery systems. The Chinese have successfully orbited two satellites, one in the spring of 1970, and one in March of this year. The technology displayed in launching these nearly 400-pound payloads provides an insight into their missile potential. Based on their demonstrated space technology, the start of ICBM testing could occur at any time. Following testing, an operational ICBM could become available as early as 1973 and could be deployed in limited numbers (ten to twenty-five) by late in the decade.

A parallel potential exists with mid-range ballistic missiles. Although the Soviet Union provided MRBMs in the early 1960s, the Chinese have been testing their own designs. It seems likely that they have developed an indigenous missile, and limited deployment could have begun already. A force of eighty to 100 MRBMs could be available by 1975. Emphasis in their missile research and development appears to have shifted last year to the development of an IRBM. This system could be operational within one or two years.

The present Chinese nuclear-capable delivery force consists of a limited number of medium-range bomber aircraft. These bombers include about ten B–29 type piston aircraft acquired from the Soviet Union in the late 1950s. They also have a small but growing jet-powered medium bomber force of Chinese-produced Badgers.

Communist China's air defense is a vintage version of the USSR's, with 3,000 fighter aircraft, mostly of Soviet design. Indications are that they may now be producing domestically designed fighter aircraft. A radar network supporting these fighters consists of nearly 1,500 air defense radar sets. In addition, key targets are protected by more than fifty surface-to-air missile sites and nearly 4,500 antiaircraft weapons.

While growth of the strategic forces of the Chinese Communists is hardly comparable to Soviet growth, the threat they pose does include improvements in all areas. The medium-range bomber force is expected to continue to grow at a modest rate. Missile deployment may have begun last year with MRBMs, followed by IRBMs, with an ICBM at the earliest by 1973. By the mid-1970s, total missiles on hand could reach as many as 125.

THE GROWING THREAT

In summary, there is no doubt that the threat is growing. The Soviets are testing improvements for three types of ICBMs and may be deploying a completely new system. Steady growth is also evident in the submarine-launched ballistic missile force, and testing is under way of a new sub-launched missile that could double the range of the current missile. They continue to maintain a large strategic bomber force, and a new bomber is undergoing extensive testing.

Although the Soviets already have superiority in all stages of air defense, they are deploying improved surface-to-air missiles, fighter-interceptors, and are working on antisubmarine and ballistic missile defenses. Finally, they are striving to build the world's finest technological base to support their expanding research and development program, which will provide them with options for the future.

The Chinese Communist efforts to attain an independent strategic force only complicate the problems facing the United States.

The impact on the United States and its overall strategic posture is at least threefold: First is the threat to the US Triad of strategic forces, in their daily posture, from the Soviet ICBMs, SLBMs, and antisubmarine warfare forces. Second, the penetration of defenses becomes increasingly difficult, for both US bombers and missiles. Finally, the enlarging and more complex strategic offensive and defensive system complicates the deterrence task of our strategic forces.

This article has focused on the strategic threat—offensive and defensive—but Soviet developments in tactical air, land, and sea forces are equally imposing. They have built an impressive force covering the full spectrum of warfare. Coupled with emerging Chinese military power, the threat to the United States is ominous and growing.

Mr. SPENCE. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Speaker, there has been considerable talk about the increasing threat and the declining confidence in the U.S. capability to keep the peace, honor commitments and deter aggression. At the same time, the American taxpayer cannot help but be aware of the billions we spend on defense. He may even have the feeling we are spending more for defense than last year. And in fact, he would be right, since the 1972 Defense budget request is about $2 billion more than last year, after allowing for the decline in Vietnam costs and pay and price increases.

In short, Mr. Speaker, we appear to be spending more and getting less for our money. Certainly, if there is one overriding problem in the U.S. defense posture, it is the matter of getting a dollar's worth for a dollar spent.

Everyone knows the sky is not the limit for defense spending year after year in peacetime. Other needs must be met as well within the means available. Of course there is give and take on how much we spend on defense and how much goes to domestic programs, but given present political realities there is little likelihood of large increases in military spending in the foreseeable future. Hence, unless we begin to get more for our money in defense, we will just continue to get less and less defense.

I

A major cause of the problem is continued and increased spending for programs which make little if any contribution to national security. Obviously, there is room for reasonable men to disagree on which programs are marginal. But the list is too long to believe that the old problems of waste, outdated force planning, goldplating, and cost overruns have disappeared. In fact, there is considerable evidence of this kind of fat in the defense budget that Congress is now considering.

For example, some of the assumptions used in developing the budget submitted in January have been overtaken by events. Whereas the budget allowed for a force of 150,000 in Vietnam by June 1972, the President's troop withdrawal schedule announced to date leaves only 50,000 troops in Vietnam by end of fiscal year 1972. This outdated force planning alone has caused the current defense budget to be $1.4 billion too high.

The support structure also can be sharply reduced. In fact, each of the services has proposed eliminating three to five bases in the current year. In hearings on the Defense appropriations bill, the Defense Department "noted that the requirement for civilians is a function of the relative mix of personnel—military and civilian—required to support approved force levels and mission requirements." Non-Vietnam force levels are 5 to 30 percent lower in fiscal year 1972 than the prewar levels. But civilian manpower—even allowing for the civilianization program—has dropped only 3.7 percent from the level in fiscal year 1964. A reduction in support activities, and hence civilian employment, in proportion to the reduction of forces in each service reduces civilian end-strength by 185,000 or about 17 percent.

A major contributor to increased spending in fiscal year 1972 is continued goldplating of obsolete or obsolescent systems. The B–1 and ABM are expensive yet nonetheless futile attempts to upgrade the manned bomber and land-based ICBM components of our strategic forces. Such attempts are unnecessary given the Polaris submarine force.

Continuation of the new sea-based ASW aircraft program—S–3A—is also unnecessary. The ASW carriers—CVS's—are approaching 30 years old. Hence, in the late seventies and beyond, a dual use of attack carriers is the only means of retaining the sea-based ASW capability. Moreover, the same mission can be accomplished using the land-based ASW aircraft—P–3's.

Procurement in fiscal year 1972 is higher in part because programs are funded which are not needed now and in fact may never be needed if a projected threat does not materialize. Continuation of the MIRV program for the land and sea-based ICBM forces—namely, the Minuteman III and Poseidon programs—can be deferred until such time as the Soviets in fact deploy a large ABM capability. We can install MIRV before the Soviets can deploy a large ABM system after such a deployment has been detected. Moreover, the likelihood that the Soviets might deploy such an ABM system is greater if we install MIRV's now.

Ship construction in 1972 is not consistent with the naval force levels needed or for that matter likely to obtain over the next 10 years. No more nuclear attack submarines—SSN–688—are needed for the next 5 to 10 years to maintain effective ASW barriers, yet the budget includes construction of five more such submarines. The fiscal year 1972 buy of seven more DD–963's is also not needed. By 1980, there will be no more than 12 carriers as opposed to 24 when the new ASW destroyer—DD–963—program was developed. Destroyers, frigates, and

cruisers currently in the force and authorized to date are all that is needed to provide escort protection for a 12-carrier force.

In addition, there is needless duplication of systems between the services to accomplish what is essentially the same mission. Buying the Air Force's A–X, the Army's Cheyenne, and the Marine Corps' AV–8A is needlessly expensive. One—or at most two—of these systems could accomplish the close air support mission for considerably less.

There should also be certain albeit limited productivity increases reflected in the fiscal year 1972 budget. During most of the 1960's, the military budgets incorporated an annual productivity increase of 1 to 1.5 percent. As new equipment and weapon systems entered the inventory, it was possible to buy the same capability for less. New generations of equipment were more operationally effective, reliable, and maintainable, and automation of particular functions reduced the need for personnel. In addition, management sought to eliminate marginal programs, policies and procedures, and implement cost reductions. The potential exists for similar productivity increases in fiscal year 1972. For example, many of the management procedures which can and should be implemented were outlined by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel.

Finally, the fiscal year 1972 budget continues to reflect two procurement problems confronting the Pentagon's managers. First is the problem of quantity and sophistication. Replacements invariably incorporate costly technology all too often for the mere reason that such technology is available. The following table shows what has happened in constant dollars of tanks, air-to-air munitions, and fighter aircraft. Similar charts could be made of other weapons. Even though the new systems are more effective than the systems they replace, we continue to replace older weapon systems on a one-for-one basis. Either we should continue to buy on a one-for-one replacement basis and eliminate the new technology and sophistication, or we should continue to upgrade the capability of new systems but buy fewer of them. Table I follows:

TABLE I.—INCREASED COST OF REPLACEMENT WEAPONS

[In constant fiscal year 1970 dollars]

(1) TANKS

Weapon	Date	Amount
M–3	Early 1940's	$125,000
M–48	Early 1950's	175,000
M–60	Early 1960's	200,000
M–60–A1–E2	Early 1970's	500,000
MBT–70	Middle 1970's	900,000

(2) AIR-TO-AIR MUNITIONS

AIM–9B	Late 1950's	$10,000
AIM–7D	Middle 1960's	50,000
AIM–7F	Early 1970's	120,000
AIM–54	Middle 1970's	400,000

(3) FIGHTER AIRCRAFT

P–51	Early 1940's	$200,000
P–86	Late 1940's	400,000
F–100C	Middle 1950's	1,100,000
F–104C	Late 1950's	1,600,000
F–4B	Early 1960's	3,500,000
F–15	Middle 1970's	9,000,000

In addition, the problem of cost growth continues. Decisions to precede with procurement of new systems are based too often on low-cost estimates which fail to reflect adequate inflation, design changes, cost of spare parts, buying in, and so forth, over the life of the program. In short, we should not have to decide on a new program, such as the Navy F–4, until firm cost estimates are available, which can be evaluated in the context of the importance of the mission and available options.

The following table summarizes the possible reductions which could be made in the fiscal year 1972 budget. Of course, these are illustrative, but they show there is considerable slack in the 1972 Defense budget. Table II follows:

TABLE II.—LIST OF POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS IN THE FISCAL YEAR 1972 BUDGET [1]

[Dollars in millions]

Strategic forces:	
Cut Minuteman III (MIRV)	$590
Cut Poseidon (MIRV) and associated Polaris conversion	800
Cut ABM	1,200
Eliminate B–1	370
Eliminate AWACS	150
Total	3,110
General purpose forces:	
Eliminate new destroyer (DD–963)	600
Cut 2 of 5 attack submarines (SSN–688)	325
Eliminate S–3A procurement	500
Eliminate F–14, more R. & D. on new plane	950
Cut 2 of 3 close air support systems (Cheyenne, A–X or AV–8A)	85
Total	2,460
Military and civilian manpower:	
Revise troop strength in Vietnam as of end fiscal year 1972 from 150,000 to 50,000	1,400
Reduce civilian employment by 185,000 in proportion to force reductions from prewar levels	1,900
Total	3,300
Management DOD-wide:	
Implement blue ribbon defense panel recommendations to realize 1 percent productivity increase	600
Total	9,470

[1] Gross savings estimated on annual basis. Excludes 1-time costs incurred in making the reductions in fiscal year 1972.

II

Continuation of such unnecessary spending jeopardizes programs needed to improve our defense capability and overcome current shortcomings. The point should not be missed, Mr. Speaker, that there is a need to increase defense spending, but only in certain problem areas. However, programs needed to overcome these problems are in jeopardy so long as we allow continued funding of programs which make, at best, a marginal contribution to our military capability.

Some of the programs which warrant increased funding include improved sonar capability for the ASW forces. Unless we have a better capability to detect enemy submarines, increases for construction of ASW submarines and destroyers is of little consequence.

Similarly, we need to find ways to overcome the problem of the maldeployment of forces in NATO Europe. Otherwise, increased spending to buy new generation hardware for our NATO-oriented forces has a limited effect on the overall capability of those forces.

A major problem confronting all the services is the increasing inability to maintain the complex and sophisticated weapons systems and equipment in the inventory. More spending for new weapons systems and equipment will not measurably improve our military capability until we can operate and maintain the weapons systems and equipment we have.

Yet another problem is in intelligence and communications critical to both our strategic and general purpose forces. Technology has given us the capability to acquire vast amounts of data and relay them to any point in the world. But the commanders on the receiving end lack the capability to discriminate between what is important and what may be merely interesting to know.

These are but a few examples. But throughout our military forces there are problems of survivability, maintainability, reliability, and so forth, which need to be addressed and overcome. Yet, many of the programs designed to resolve these problems are underfunded, while other programs which make a marginal contribution to military capability continue to be funded and even account for increases in defense spending.

We might call this aspect of the U.S. defense posture the shape of the defense budget. The issues concern what we spend the defense dollar on and how the money is spent.

III

Of course, Mr. Speaker, control of the shape of the Defense budget is not control of the size of military spending. We could simply buy the programs we need and at the same time continue to fund the unnecessary and wasteful programs. But that solution only works if there is an unlimited amount of money for defense.

On the other hand, the unlimited availability of funds is likely to be counterproductive. All of us know what can happen when people fail to budget their personal income. Decisions are made in a haphazard fashion and many times there is no money for what is needed. This is true in business and it is also true in government. Hence, unless there is control of the size of the Defense budget, the hard decisions on tradeoffs, alternatives, and priorities are not likely to be made.

How much we should spend on defense each year is a matter of judgment. Although we can illuminate issues and options, no amount of analysis leads conclusively to a given level of spending. The underlying foreign policy, strategy, and planning factors are themselves matters of judgment. Even for a given set of commitments, defense policy, and force structure, the level of defense spending can vary by a rather wide margin. This is largely because the capability and effectiveness of force components can vary. Hence, any attempt to control how much we spend on defense is no guarantee in itself of how we spend defense resources. On the other hand efforts to eliminate marginal programs alone do not guarantee that future or even current overall spending will be held down.

The Congress should control both: how much we spend on defense and what we spend it on. We must be concerned with both the size and shape of the Defense program. But efforts to control them should be separate.

A review of the administration's request for fiscal year 1972 clearly shows the need for a limit on overall defense spending in addition to whatever specific programs the Congress may take issue with. The following table shows that the program level for fiscal year 1972 is about $1.6 billion more than the fiscal year 1971 level, after allowing for, first, price and pay increases including the volunteer force; second, the incremental costs of the Vietnam war; and third, financing adjustments involving prior-year budget authority. Table III follows:

TABLE III.—REAL INCREASE IN MILITARY SPENDING

[Dollars in billions]

	Fiscal years 1971	1972
Military functions, total program level (TOA) [1]	$73.8	$78.0
Less: Vietnam incremental costs (TOA)	10.1	−7.6
Non-Vietnam program level (TOA) in current dollars	63.7	70.4
Plus: pay increases including volunteer force	+3.8	.....
Plus: price increases on goods and services (at 3½ percent)	+1.3	.....
Non-Vietnam program level (TOA) in constant fiscal year 1972) dollars	68.8	70.4
Net real increase (fiscal year 1972 dollars)	.....	+1.6

[1] Includes TOA for programs subject to appropriation bills other than the defense appropriation bill—military construction and family housing; civil defense; supplementals for comparability pay increases; and the pay increase for the volunteer force. Excludes TOA for the military assistance program (MAP).

Yet the $1.6 billion increase in spending on non-Vietnam forces, after allowing for the effects of inflation, understates the real increase in defense spending which the administration proposes for fiscal year 1972. First, there is no justification to increase defense spending for modernization to offset deferrals because of Southeast Asia requirements. No such backlog exists. The following table shows obligations for procurement for fiscal years 1965–72. If there was a backlog, as the administration has suggested, there should be a decrease in procurement for non-Vietnam forces during the war from the prewar level after allowing for pay and price increases. Strategic forces should be treated separately since they were subject to factors independent of the war. Table IV follows:

TABLE IV.—MODERNIZATION OF FORCES

[In billions of constant 1972 dollars]

Procurement use	1964	1965–71	1972
Total	$19.3	$23.7	$19.7
Strategic nuclear forces	6.1	3.3	3.3
Vietnam	.....	5.6	2.3
Non-Vietnam general purpose forces	13.2	14.8	14.1

Rather than a decrease, procurement for non-Vietnam forces increased on the average over the 7-year period 1965–71. Moreover, considerable modernization was financed by the war itself. As older equipment was attrited, replacements were procured. In many cases, replacements were of newer generations and models with more sophistication, reliability, maintainability, and firepower than the material and weapon systems they replaced. This is not to say that particular segments of the force structure are not without need of modernization. However, that is a separate matter of allocating the resources among the services and particular programs. What the administration has failed to justify is an increase in overall defense spending to make up a backlog in modernization.

Second, non-Vietnam force levels dropped considerably during the past few years. Instead of an increase in fiscal year 1972, there should be a reduction in overall defense spending. Most of the force reductions were in non-Vietnam general purpose force levels and took place last year. Reductions included 3⅔ divisions, four tactical air wings and three carrier task forces. The full annual cost of these forces alone is about $6 billion at fiscal year 1972 prices. Of course, not all of this amount can be saved in the first or even the second year following the reduction. During the first year savings average a half-year's pay at most and onetime costs associated with the spending reductions must be absorbed. This is true even when the Defense Department has planned ahead for reductions, such as those carried out in fiscal year 1971. In succeeding years, however, recurring savings should begin to approach the full annual cost as indirect support is identified and eliminated. Even assuming that a large amount of indirect support has yet to be cut, the force reductions in fiscal year 1970–71 should result in savings in fiscal year 1972 of at least $3 to $4 billion—of the $6 billion full annual cost of those forces.

In summary, the administration has requested an increase for non-Vietnam forces of $1.6 billion in fiscal year 1972. Spokesmen have sought to justify the increase on the grounds of a modernization backlog because of Vietnam when in fact no such backlog exists. Moreover, allowing for the reduction in non-Vietnam force levels, the administration request is actually about $5 to $6 billion more than is needed. In other words, we are being asked to pay $5 to $6 billion more than it cost last year to buy and maintain a comparable size military capability.

IV

Mr. Speaker, it is clear that, if we are to get a dollar's worth for a dollar spent, the Congress must control the size and the shape of the Defense budget. Control of one without the other provides no guarantee that the problems concerning the effectiveness and capability of our military forces are being faced.

To control the size of military spending, Congress should place a ceiling on the Defense budget. A reasonable objective of this ceiling would be to hold Defense spending to the amount paid in previous years for a comparable size military capability, after allowing for inflation. In other words, the Defense Department would be able to make improvements in the capability of our military posture but only after cutting those programs which are no longer needed or make a marginal contribution to capability.

A ceiling is not always an intelligent way to manage Defense budgets or to control defense spending. However, many of the problems encountered with ceilings in the past can be overcome.

For example, a ceiling placed on the appropriation rather than on outlays results in smaller cutbacks in the first year. Further provision can be made to prorate the savings on an annual basis and adjust the ceiling accordingly, since the cutback could not begin until after enactment of the appropriation and subsequent planning in Defense. Of course, the full amount of the savings on an annual basis would be realized the following year.

In any spending cutback, there are one-time costs in phasing out operations and activities. Rather than expecting the Defense Department to take these out of their hide, steps can be taken to apply a portion of the funds otherwise saved by the ceiling to cover these onetime costs.

Finally, any spending cut is going to affect certain individuals and communities. However, some of the funds otherwise saved can be set aside to assist those directly affected by reduction in Defense programs.

Mr. Speaker, given present political realities and alternatives, such a ceiling, together with congressional action on particular programs, is probably the best way of controlling defense spending that we have. Until the Congress begins to take the necessary steps to control the size as well as the shape of the Defense budget, Congress lacks the control of defense spending needed to assure the American taxpayer that we are getting a dollar's worth for a dollar spent.

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Speaker, we have been discussing the deterioration of our strategic situation vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and a great deal of emphasis has been placed upon the growth of Soviet hardware deployment and the development of new Soviet systems. I certainly do not want to take away anything from what has been said by my colleagues who have been pressing the point. However, I want to point out a more complicated problem which could have a devastating effect on the relative balance of power between the two major powers. I want to point out that our strategic situation would be affected adversely by unwise decisions in mutual arms limitation.

I am not one of those who fear negotiation, and fear the ability of American negotiators to drive a tough bargain. However, I am greatly concerned that the very fact of negotiations on this topic may lead to a state of euphoria among the general public, and may lead them to expect too much. There are, in fact, serious problems that stand in the way of reaching an agreement which will leave us more secure than before.

The experts in international relations are well aware of the dangers of an unbalanced or destabilizing agreement. I recently came across a fine paper on the topic written by Prof. Morton Kaplan of the Committee on International Relations of the University of Chicago. Dr. Kaplan is forthright in making this point. He writes as follows:

> Unless an agreement reduces the probability of war and the vulnerability of the United States to a first strike, and unless it improves the stability of the contending strategic systems against technological surprise, it is likely to be worthless or to do positive harm.

There are some people who assume that the Soviets will react to an international situation in the same way that we do. They assume that the Soviets will hold no objective that is likely to justify a first strike, and that the Soviets are fairminded and rational.

This may turn out to be a valid assumption. Yet when we are dealing in decisive strategic terms, there is no room for error or unfounded assumptions. Professor Kaplan says:

> The more appropriate analogy would be that of Russian roulette.

Why would such a tragedy be like Russian roulette? The simple reason is that we can't predict the future. We do not know what type of men will be ruling the Kremlin in a future crisis. Professor Kaplan says:

> As any intelligent and honest social scientist will admit, we are unable to predict the future and many surprises will occur. In a regime or bloc crisis, a first strike against the United States might prove tempting to the Soviet Union, provided that some reasonable calculations could be provided by the Soviet high command, whereas under normal circumstances, I agree, such a proposal would no doubt be instantly dismissed. Moreover, short of this, in a serious international politial crisis, if the American leadership made a calculation that the Soviet Union could contemplate a first strike against us, even though we did not believe they would actually engage in it, and we calculated that we could not even contemplate the possibility ourselves, our political will would likely erode.

Another problem which makes it difficult to stabilize the international strategic situation is the fact that technology brings sudden breakthroughs. The manned aircraft has certain vulnerabilities. We already know that by the mid-1970's the Minuteman system will have certain vulnerabilities, and we are taking steps to overcome them. Even the Polaris system, invulnerable as it presently appears, is undoubtedly the object of intensive study by the Soviets.

For this reason, we need all of the strategic system at our command. Says Professor Kaplan:

> Retaining a mix of strategic systems is the best procedure, for it complicates an enemy's attack and introduces uncertainties that reduce its probability.

Mr. Speaker, we should also remember that our strategic posture includes not only offensive weapons systems, but also defensive systems. We need to rely more on our defensive systems, such as the Safeguard antiballistic missile system, and expand it to protect not only our strategic forces but also our people.

It is disquieting, therefore, to see the misplaced emphasis which the SALT talks have been giving to offensive weapons, giving second place to a limitation on defense. As Professor Kaplan says:

> It is obvious that it would be sheer insanity for the United States to agree to dismantle ballistic missile defense without some limitation on offensive arms.

Indeed, Professor Kaplan considers it a distinct mistake to sacrifice ballistic missile defense. And the reasons are not only technological, but moral. As Dr. Kaplan points out:

> Defense enables us to avoid a strategy that in its absence may be necessary but that contains the seeds of deep immorality—namely, a strategy that depends upon the incineration of the other side, a revenge strategy. Ballistic missile defense is one of several steps that need to be taken to reduce the dangers of and to defuse the nuclear weapons race.

Mr. Speaker, I want to congratulate Dr. Kaplan for his clear and incisive statement, and I insert it in the RECORD:

STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR KAPLAN

All people of good-will, and in particular the government of the United States, desire a successful agreement or series of agreements to come out of the SALT talks. On the other hand, it would be extremely unfortunate if our desire for an agreement would outweigh our prudence concerning the terms of the agreement. Unless an agreement reduces the probability of war and the vulnerability of the United States to a first strike, and unless it improves the stability of the contending strategic systems against technological surprise, it is likely either to be worthless or to do positive harm. The emphasis therefore should be upon the attainment of an agreement with the Soviet Union that is of genuine strategic benefit to both sides. The Soviet Union is most unlikely to enter into an agreement that does not improve or stabilize its strategic situation. It does not have to contend with a democratic public opinion and has a hard-nosed attitude toward matters of diplomacy. On the other hand, it has no incentive to assure the United States of like results unless the United States is prepared to bargain in the same tough terms used by the Russians.

Although an agreement that improves international stability is obviously desirable, many people in the United States desire an agreement for reasons that will not withstand analysis. They believe that an agreement will improve the quality of the international system. However, a bad agreement may do just the opposite. It may lead either to a diplomatic defeat for the United States or to a renewed and intensive arms race when the unfortunate characteristics of the particular agreement become apparent to the American public. A failed agreement will be worse psychologically than no agreement. A second reason for reaching an agreement stems from the desire of people to reduce the cost of the arms race. However, the strategic arms race has already been reduced in scope from the approximately 11 billion dollars of 1961 to the approximately 8 billion of 1971, not taking inflation into account. The additional savings to be reached are likely to be quite small. A third reason for the desire for agreement lies in the lack of public awareness of the extent to which tacit rather than explicit agreements may already limit the arms race.

A fourth reason for the public desire for agreement may rest in a failure properly to understand the nature of the choices. People treat the arms race as if the proper analogy would be poker. They assume that finite deterrence will work under all circumstances, that no objective is likely to justify the Soviets' use of a first strike and that the world will develop in benign directions. Therefore they wish to place their bets on the probably winning hand. Yet the more appropriate analogy would be that of Russian roulette. It could be pointed out in defense of Russian roulette that there is only one chance in six that the chamber will have a bullet in it and the person be killed. Yet any sensible person would refuse to play the game in the first place. The truth is that we live in a world with one history, that we are seldom able to correct past mistakes, and that a catastrophe will be irrevocable. In this kind of world, a relatively small payment to insure that the game is not one of Russian roulette would be quite worthwhile, even if we could be assured that there are forty chambers to the gun and that only one chamber will have a bullet in it.

As any intelligent and honest social scientist will admit, we are unable to predict the future and many surprises will occur. In a regime or bloc crisis, a first strike against the United States might prove tempting to the Soviet Union, provided that some reasonable calculations could be provided by the Soviet high command, whereas under normal circumstances I agree such a proposal would no doubt be instantly dismissed. Moreover, short of this, in a serious international political crisis, if the American leadership made a calculation that the Soviet Union could contemplate a first strike against us, even though we did not believe they would actually engage in it, and we calculated that we could not even contemplate the possibility ourselves, our political will would likely erode.

Even in a game in which both contestants are terrified, it remains true that the one whose will collapses first is the one who loses. And, although political will surely consists of much more than calculation of nuclear interchanges, it woud require a state of sublime indifference to deny that such calculations are among the important considerations that go to make it up.

Many refer to the current strategic situation as one of parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. This is a very unsophisticated way of looking at the situation. Even if it were true, and it is not true, parity could be consistent with either stability or instability, depending upon the characteristics of the weapons systems. And, conversely, lack of parity need not be inconsistent with stability, again depending upon the degree to which parity does not exist and the specific characteristics of the weapons systems. In fact, stability, at least for crisis management, is not as easy to achieve as many believe. There are distinct vulnerabilities in the present strategic situation. The vulnerabilities of manned aircraft, although the system has its distinctive utility, are fairly obvious. The calculations leading to the vulnerability of Minuteman by the middle 1970's are well known. There are other calculations based upon more esoteric considerations that could speed that timetable up. The Navy and the New York *Times* have argued strongly against vulnerability of Polaris. It is good that we have the system and one hopes that it is not yet vulnerable, but the confidence placed in this is exaggerated. A New York *Times* story referring to the recent defection of a Soviet space expert also contained the interesting item that American intelligence wanted to interrogate him to learn about the extent to which Soviet space efforts could result in the tracking of our Polaris submarines. As a matter of fact there are also other potential vulnerabilities of the Polaris system that the Navy tries to ignore. Retaining a mix of strategic systems is the best procedure, for it complicates an enemy's attack and introduces uncertainties that reduce its probability.

Some of the reports coming out of the SALT talks with respect to potential agreement concerning ballistic missile defense are disquieting. It is obvious that it would be sheer insanity for the United States to agree to dismantle ballistic missile defense without some limitation on offensive arms. The proposal that ballistic missile defense be limited to national commands is almost equally bad. Washington is a relatively unimportant city in the United States, whereas Moscow is the hub of the economic activities of the Soviet Union. A ballistic missile defense system around Moscow would quickly be expansible into a thick population and area defense system that would be consistent with Russian achievement of a first strike capability against the United States, whereas

the dismantling of our point defense systems for Minuteman would simplify the Russian attack potential. The proposal is only superficially symmetrical, for the countries are structured quite differently.

However, even apart from all these considerations, it is a distinct mistake to sacrifice ballistic missile defense. A ballistic missile point defense system does a number of things to improve international stability, both for the Russians and for the United States. It further complicates enormously and thus reduces significantly the kinds of calculations that could support a first strike. And, it is for this very reason that the attempt to overcome it by increasing offensive capabilities is a losing game, for it is cheaper to expand defense than offense. Ballistic missile defense, therefore, defuses the arms race. It also permits the defending system to ride out an initial attack and therefore not to precipitate nuclear World War III by responding to warning—a warning that may either be mistaken or that may not imply a genuine attack against our retaliatory system. Since the numbers of attackers in the first wave could be considerably smaller than most people believe, this is an extremely important consideration. In addition, defense enables us to avoid a strategy that in its absence may be necessary but that contains the seeds of deep immorality—namely a strategy that depends upon the incineration of the other side, a revenge strategy. Ballistic missile defense is one of several steps that need to be taken to reduce the dangers of and to defuse the nuclear weapons race. A SALT agreement that strikes at ballistic missile defense is an agreement that eventually will accelerate, rather than decelerate, the arms race.

Mr. BROYHILL of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I join today with several of my colleagues in focusing attention on our current military commitments around the world and the defense posture we must maintain for the preservation of a free America.

The American people have, from the beginning, never been a militaristic people and in all the conflicts in which we have been engaged, we have turned to the citizen soldier to bear the burden of battle and protect this Nation from the onslaught of aggressors.

During the past generation, the realities of this uncertain world, in which we see the threat of continual advances from hostile nations have forced America to maintain a strong defense in view of the expansionist policies of not so friendly nations. The man in uniform has served us well and with the tremendous resources and emphasis that this Nation has put upon military preparedness in the past two decades, it is a significant fact that we have civilian control of the military.

Now the pressures are on us to give serious attention to reordering our military commitments. As the history of our involvement in Southeast Asia has tragically pointed out, we can no longer give carte blanche commitments to protecting the world.

I, for one, feel that in exercising civilian control of the military, there is a need to give close scrutiny to military decisions and expenditures, as well as our overall defense posture. There have been times in the past when expenditures in different areas appear to be inviolate to public discussion and examination.

The present administration has provided leadership and direction in reducing defense expenditures along responsible lines at the same time reevaluating our foreign policy commitments. The Congress must, however, take the role of partner in effecting substantial changes in this area.

A call for an examination of our defense priorities should not, however, be construed as a call which would jeopardize our national security or our vital defense systems. On the contrary, a critical review of what is vital to our national security and what constitutes necessary and adequate defense should result in policies and expenditures better suited to provide for our common defense without creating "white elephant" programs and outdated systems. It is my strong feeling that we can and must intelligently and safely reexamine our defense policies to this end; that we can and must aid other nations to help themselves and that we can and must put our own domestic house in order.

I would caution at this time, however, against a distressing trend that I have seen in the current wave of antimilitarism—a trend that goes directly against the American grain. We cannot allow this detailed look at the military to turn into a witch hunt to make the individual soldier bear the burden of errors of the past. There are too many today who would discredit the man who wears the uniform of his country and to demoralize the Vietnam veteran in this manner is to do him a great injustice. These are men who have shown ample courage and devotion under grave difficulties and hardships.

The Nation as a whole must move ahead in reexamination of our foreign military commitments, making the necessary adjustment in our defense posture to meet these commitments. Railing against the military as we make these changes will not bring us the security and peace that we all demand.

Mr. THONE. Mr. Speaker, I believe our Nation should be prepared. We must be strong enough not only to defend ourselves against attack but also strong enough to deter attacks. We must also be prepared to seek peace.

The most effective way to negotiate for peace, in my opinion, is from a position of strength.

We are already engaged in disarmament negotiations with Russia in the SALT talks at Helsinki. Now we know that our Nation and the People's Republic of China will be negotiating at the highest levels within the coming months.

The defense posture of the United States needs immediate bolstering in order that we may negotiate from strength at these meetings.

In particular, our Navy needs strengthening. The U.S.S.R. is building nuclear submarines at a far faster pace than is the United States.

Senator BARRY GOLDWATER has pointed that the average age of a U.S. Navy ship is 23 years, compared to an average age of 10 years for a Russian Navy ship.

Unless the U.S. Navy is strengthened swiftly, the Soviet Union will dominate the Indian Ocean, the Straits of Malacca, the Suez Canal, the Mediterranean Ocean and the Straits of Gibraltar.

The Russian Navy has gained on, and threatens to pass, the U.S. Navy in power because the U.S.S.R. has used modern technology to its advantage, while our Navy has clung to ways of the past.

We have sunk billions into the world's most expensive ships—aircraft carriers—which are also among the easiest targets for an enemy to hit. The Soviet Navy has concentrated on ships that are fast, small, and inexpensive.

The U.S. Navy has relied almost entirely on manned aircraft both for offensive and defensive purposes. The Soviet Navy has gone beyond manned aircraft and arms its ships with missiles—both surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles.

The U.S. Navy has yet to deploy a single surface-to-surface missile on any of its ships. This is despite the fact that compared to aircraft carriers, missile ships are cheaper to build, less vulnerable to attack because they are smaller targets, require less manpower, provide for greater maneuverability and can attack through more formidable defenses.

I believe our U.S. Navy must engage at once in building modern, fast ships armed with surface-to-surface missiles. These should be the size of patrol boats, of destroyers and of light cruisers. These could be built quickly, deployed quickly and would not require gigantic crews.

Such a modern Navy will add greatly to the strength of the United States and put us into position to negotiate for peace from a position of power.

Mr. DEL CLAWSON. Mr. Speaker, the great challenge for the U.S. Navy in the 1970's is supporting a strategy of realistic deterrents as envisaged in the foreign policy of the United States described in the Nixon doctrine. The sharing of security burdens with allies is the focal point of this doctrine; and while recognizing the importance of Western Europe and the Atlantic Alliance to the U.S. security interests, a strong U.S. force capable of application in a range of situations and types of response requiring a considerable mobility is demanded.

It must be a force capable of countering Soviet military power and initiatives. It is essential that the sea lines be maintained to our sources of raw materials and to our allies. The necessity to control the sea areas of the world is the foundation of our ability to protect U.S. interests. It is in this very area that the Soviet Union is now developing a capability second only in danger to their challenge in strategic nuclear arms. The logical military strategy consistent with our national interests, the threat posed by potential enemies, and the new approaches of this policy is sea-based mobility. Mobility to shift our forces to where they may be needed and to support them there as long as their presence is required.

The Navy must provide this mobility and the means to protect it. The military services and more particularly, the U.S. Navy must provide a foundation comprising five separate, but closely re-

lated concepts. First, credible strategic deterrent forces which will make strategic nuclear attack and unacceptable option for any national enemy. Second, deterrent theater nuclear and conventional holding forces in NATO and Korea and in Vietnam during withdrawal. Third, mobile conventional deterrent forces capable of: Maintaining an overseas presence; projecting allied power into subtheater conflict areas; and maintaining the security of vital sea lines of communication. Fourth, effective military assistance to our allies. Fifth, greater contribution to mutual defense by our allies as we disengage portions of the holding forces we now maintain overseas.

As we contemplate reductions in the sizes of forces stationed overseas, naval forces assume greater political and military significance. They are a constantly visible reminder to allies, and adversaries, that forces removed can be returned swiftly and that any adversary intending to usurp the use of the oceans, must first contend with our naval forces.

Whether our forces are constituted as holding forces or as mobility forces, their deployment from the United States will inevitably establish a dependence on sea lines of communication for sustained support. A basic assumption underlying any decision to deploy U.S. forces to any overseas area must be that we or our allies will control the sea lines of communication to the area in which friendly forces are to be deployed.

Having vital overseas interests we must give consideration to situations in which our interests are involved and our Allies vital interests or treaty commitments are not. In such cases as during the recent Mid-East crisis, our deterrent mobility forces must be capable of carrying out their missions without the support of Allies.

Secretary Laird has said:

Moreover U.S. involvement in world affairs is not based exclusively on our alliances, but rather our formal and informal obligations derived from and shaped by our own national interests. To protect our interests we must insure free use of international air space and free access to the world's oceans. Thus our future defense planning must also insure a U.S. capability to prevent an effective challenge to free use of international air space and the oceans of the world.

The ongoing development of the Soviet Navy and its large modern development in the 1960's has its own implications for us. Parity of strategic nuclear forces and reductions in U.S. Navy conventional forces make it more likely that Soviets will use military force to achieve their political objectives. Thus, there has been an increase in the importance of the portion of our conventional force that is capable of overseas presence.

The continuing withdrawal of the United States from foreign bases and in Asia, the change in the forms of armed support we plan to make available to our Allies place additional responsibilities on our sea control and projection forces.

The Nixon doctrine has effectively raised the threshold at which we would commit land forces overseas. We have moved closer to a situation in which Soviet or PRC involvement is the primary circumstance that might force us to intervene. We, therefore, face conventional war that will not include the sanctuary of full use of our sea lines of communication. The Soviets have conceded us this luxury in the past, in part because of our nuclear superiority, in part because of their belief that we could defeat them at sea in conventional war. We can expect these concessions to disappear.

It is for this reason that the Navy, in conjunction with our allies, must defend the sea lines of communication from and to the United States. Perceiving this as a weakness, the Soviets have optimized their new navy to be capable of pressuring us at what they perceive to be our Achilles heel. Thus their growing capability can deny us the seas as sanctuaries.

We must maintain and improve our forces committed to NATO and while we are doing what is necessary in this area we must also encourage our European allies to take up a greater share of the collective responsibiilty.

Other allies can provide the manpower for their defense and when necessary the United States will provide the necessary naval, air, and logistic support. A role that might be phrased "off-shore containment."

In the Middle East and in the Indian Ocean area the Navy is the most effective means of keeping our activities in balance with those of the other major powers concerned—principally the Soviet Union, which has maintained several combatants plus support ships in this area continuously since early 1969.

Thus, the Navy's role in our defense and in the Nixon doctrine ranges from a low profile peacetime presence and assisting allies to become more capable on through the provision of mobility and sea control forces necessary to project U.S. power worldwide in support of our interests and alliances.

The United States cannot permit the U.S. Navy to be anything but the best equipped, the best manned, and the most sophisticated of any military force in the world.

Mr. McKEVITT. Mr. Speaker, good intentions, wishful thinking and relaxation of vigilance have never defended freedom.

The lesson of history is loud and clear; a weak defense posture is an invitation to attack. There is no prudent alternative for this great Nation than to remain strong in weaponry and, of course, national will.

Most of the American people have learned the lesson of history. President Nixon restated those lessons not too long ago when he said:

We have accepted the necessity of war. But our purpose is peace. Peace with freedom . . . so that peace may be worth having. Peace with justice . . . so that peace may be worth keeping. And peace with strength . . . so that peace may be preserved.

The President continued:

We must have strength. If all the world were free, we might have no need of arms. If all the world were just, we would have no need for valor. But as we see that the values we cherish are not cherished universally, and that there are those who feel threatened by the prospects of freedom and justice, then we must keep the strength we need to the values we cherish.

And if we need to be reminded even more of the need for a strong defense posture, we need only look at the daily headlines. They tell of growing Soviet naval power, expanded missile forces, new aircraft and, of course, the growing nuclear threat from Red China.

Mr. Speaker, I believe the facts speak for themselves. I do not believe that now is the time for self-chastisement and pennypinching as we look at our Defense Establishment and defense posture.

The lesson of history is clear. I only hope it is loud enough for all to hear it clearly.

Mr. WHITEHURST. Mr. Speaker, in these days when a Babel of voices in our politics, books, and media urge us to turn our gaze inward and away from the harsh world outside, a great change has been in process which only the foolhardy or the negligent dare ignore. The perils attending this change are as great as any the United States has had to face in its close to two centuries of national existence. Gradually the massive scales of nuclear strategic strength have been tipping in the Kremlin's favor. The unmistakable and ever-growing signs of this great shift have not passed wholly unnoticed or unreported. Yet many figures in our public life have either minimized or ignored these signs. They are a bit like the improvident among the inhabitants of earthquake country who deceive themselves into believing that a series of tremors and minor shocks do not forewarn of a coming earthquake.

The latest tremor came about a week or so ago in the 1971–72 issue of Jane's Fighting Ships. As you may recall, the editors of this authoritative yearbook noted that the Soviet fleet in only a few years has grown into a supernavy of a superpower and that a serious corresponding decline in American naval strength has taken place. By the mid-seventies the yearbook sees the new Soviet supernavy possessing a potential for destroying in a single surprise blow all of our land-based missiles. It would be wrong to see in the new Soviet venture onto the sea as simply part of the normal and inevitable course of things in Soviet Russia's rise as a great power role. Rather, the rapid buildup of a powerful nuclear navy by a country which has traditionally relied largely on land-based forces in only one of the highly visible prongs of a conscious and concerted drive by the Soviet rulers to surpass the United States in overall nuclear, military, and naval power in the shortest possible span. That decision can be traced back at least to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. With our strategic advantage as an arguing point we were able then to persuade Khrushchev to take the nuclear missiles he had put in Cuba back home. Today's Soviet rulers, it is clear, intend not to be faced down in the same fashion in any future crises.

The current forced-draft buildup of Soviet military power has taken place in a period when many have unilaterally declared that the cold war was over. Yet anyone with eyes to see can observe

that hand-in-hand with the rapid rise of Soviet nuclear strategic power to a level with the American, has gone a steady and massive projection of the U.S.S.R.'s military presence into the world beyond its own borders. Quantum jumps in the Soviet military presence in the Middle East and in global naval operations from Cuba to the Indian Ocean came one upon another.

The new means of coercion now in Moscow's hands obviously is meant to be used, if not in direct warfare, then by proxy as in Vietnam and the Middle East and as levers in international power plays.

American strategic thinking, however, lulled itself with the assumption that Soviet attainment of nuclear parity with the United States meant stabilizing of the balance of power and a strengthening of mutual deterrence. That assumption was only shaken by such Soviet actions last year as the placement of Soviet missiles in the Arab-Israel cease-fire zone and the attempt to set up a nuclear submarine base in Cuba. Such events should have been a reminder that there is nothing very peaceful about the Soviet doctrine of "peaceful coexistence"—which is but a euphemism for the Leninist view that politics is war by other means. Moreover, Moscow has never made a secret of its view that from the Communist viewpoint there is no advantage in a balance of power or deterrence per se but ultimately, only in a preponderance of power for the Soviet side.

At the mass Soviet military maneuvers at Dvina in European Russia last year, Brezhnev indicated that each new increment of Soviet military power will be translated into power-political advantage not for stabilizing any United States-U.S.S.R. power balance, but rather for prosecuting, as he expressed it, an uneven but steady intensification of the global "class struggle."

Both in word and deed Moscow in the past few years has unmistakably revealed its earnest design for winning supremacy in the world arena. The Soviet rulers are now close to obtaining the means for realizing their desire. If the SALT talks have had any value, they have shown that the Soviet missile force is now on a level with ours and still rising, the Soviet Army is bigger than ours, and the Soviet Navy is starting to outdistance ours.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. Speaker, on September 28, 1970, the late and honored, Mr. Mendel Rivers, in a statement to the Members of the House of Representatives addressed the Soviet threat. His opening remarks were:

> Mr. Speaker, never before in the 30 years of my membership in this body have I stepped into the well of this House with greater concern for the future of this Nation.
>
> The fears that I have are those that must be shared by every American regardless of his political or social philosophy or his economic status.
>
> All Americans have been given the blessed and priceless heritage of freedom—a freedom which I am convinced is in terrible jeopardy.

Mr. Speaker, I echo the late Mr. Rivers' grave concern, for I too am of the opinion that the freedom of the people in the United States is in jeopardy. It is in jeopardy because of the Soviet Union—a Communist state, that in a quarter of a century has raised itself from a war-ravaged nation to a point where it is challenging the United States for world leadership.

I am deeply concerned about the future Soviet capability for warfare when we consider the money being invested by the Soviets in research, development, test, and evaluation of military weaponry. Their investment today will allow them to gain a decided strategic military superiority tomorrow.

As the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Mr. John S. Foster stated recently:

> It is today's research and development that provides tomorrow's weapons for 1975 and beyond.

Conversely, it can be stated that today's weapons were provided by yesterday's research and development, that is 1965 and before. In this vein, therefore, let me make a comparison of what the Soviet Union has accomplished with the technology of the early 1960's in comparison to the United States.

We have MIRV's while the Soviet Union has only tested multiple reentry vehicles. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has tested and possibly deployed a fractional orbit bombardment system; we have none. The Soviet Union has already developed a new strategic bomber; we are just now developing such an aircraft. The Soviet Union has an operational antiballistic missile and is developing an improved system; we are just now developing the Safeguard, 9 years after the Soviets began work.

Four years ago, the Soviet Union publicly demonstrated five short takeoff and landing fighters and one vertical takeoff and landing aircraft. The United States bought the Harrier VSTOL from the United Kingdom last year and has just approved development of the AX. And, finally, all of you are aware that the Soviet supersonic transport is nearing operational status, while development of an SST in the United States is doubtful, and may be foreclosed.

Mr. Speaker, these Soviet systems are tangible, they have been seen, they have been demonstrated. They are the product of the Soviet research and development base of the early 1960's and will constitute a significant portion of the threat to the United States throughout this decade.

What then of the Soviet weaponry of the more distant future, that weaponry which will emerge from the research and development activities of today? We may not know until those systems are deployed in the field or willingly displayed to us by the Soviets. However, there is no doubt that there will be new Soviet weaponry, and that it will be advanced weaponry, and that it will be produced to equip Soviet forces of the future.

The Soviets have already invested in the development of this new weaponry. In fact, they are—and have been—investing in the development of new military weaponry at a higher level in recent years than have we in the United States. For example, in 1955, defense-related research and development effort in the United States was $3 billion; in the Soviet Union it was the equivalent of $2 billion. In 1965, the United States spent $13 billion; the U.S.S.R. $10 billion. In 1968, the Soviet investment in defense-related research and development equaled that of the United States at $14 billion. In 1969, the Soviets surpassed the United States in this regard by investing $15 billion as compared to some $14 billion spent by the United States. In 1970, the United States spent about $14 billion, while the U.S.S.R. spent approximately $17 billion.

Certainly, this reflects a Soviet determination to match and surpass the United States in the development of advanced technology for military hardware. To understand the significance of the research and development gap, we must realize that a relatively small amount of research and development keeps many programs going on a yearly basis.

According to Dr. Eberhardt Rechtin, Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering:

> The $3 billion difference per year between the U.S. and Soviet R&D budgets is the equivalent of the development costs of the Minutemen, Poseidons, Polarises, Safeguards, B–1 bombers, F–14 and F–15 aircraft, main battle tanks, Cheyenne helicopters, C5–A, F–111s, and several dozen other major systems.

The real significance of the Soviet research and development effort now being made is that their research and technical advances will not be evidenced in weapon systems until the mid to late 1970's, at a time when there will be no possibility of catching up with these technical improvements. In other words, if we permit the Soviet Union to develop hardware that will cancel out our present technical capability in offensive and defensive weapons, the Soviets will so surpass us in military might as to preempt any possible influence we may desire to exert in future world affairs—and jeopardize the freedom of the people of the United States.

Mr. FREY. Mr. Speaker, one of the least discussed, but most important areas where technology can be applied for military purposes is in space. The Soviet Union takes the use of space for military operation very seriously. The Soviets have already demonstrated in their Cosmos series of experiments that they have a capability to destroy the communication and surveillance satellites in space at time and place of their own choosing. The Soviets can inspect and destroy space-based vehicles without nuclear weapons—something which the United States cannot do—thus avoiding violation of the Test Ban Treaty of 1963 which prohibits the detonation of nuclear weapons in space, and the Outer Space Treaty which merely prohibits the basing of weapons of mass destruction in space.

Perhaps the most important uses of space are in the field of surveillance of earth-based weapon systems, and potentially as a permanent space platform for truly effective defenses against ballistic missiles.

The Congress has recently authorized the start of work on the "space shuttle" program. This effort would permit low-cost launches of vehicles into earth orbit, and outer space including launches for military purposes. At the present time, the cost of placing large numbers of vehicles in space is prohibitive, but the space shuttle promises to reduce the launch cost per pound from nearly $1,000 to as low as $100.

Space is very much the "frontier" for the application of military technology to national security problems on earth. The vigorous effort being made by the Soviet Union in exploiting space for military purposes explains the significance of this area for future defense and security problems. Nevertheless, since 1970, research and development expenditures in this country for military astronautics have been reduced from $637 million to $499 million as proposed for fiscal year 1972. When one takes into account the impact of inflation, this amounts to nearly a 25-percent reduction in research and development effort in 2 years.

If the United States is to avoid the risk which could occur from the military parallel of a "sputnik-type" space vehicle placed in orbit by the Soviets during the 1970's, we must give vigorous support to programs which would exploit the military uses of space. Space-based systems are, for example, the most promising theater for the use of laser weapons against ballistic missiles. Scientific effort which has gone on to date indicates that lasers could be extremely effective against ballistic missiles, because basing a defense system in space would permit the defender to destroy the attacker's missiles midway in its flight rather than near the end of its trajectory. The race for the military exploitation of space is a race which has but one winner, because the first nation to dominate space would have the capacity to prevent the use of space by any other nation for military purposes.

We can no longer take a complacent attitude toward the manifest gains the Soviet Union has made in space. The time has come for us to assert our technological superiority into the space area before it is too late.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Speaker, the Soviet Union is embarked on a program which reveals a singular awareness of the importance of seapower and an unmistakable resolve to become the most powerful maritime force in the world. They demonstrate a thorough understanding of the basic elements of seapower: knowledge of the seas, a strong modern merchant marine, and a powerful new navy. They are surging forward with a naval and maritime program that is a technological marvel.

Since the end of World War II when the Soviet Union had a fleet of 200 diesel-powered submarines, they have pursued a massive building program, producing over 550 new submarines through 1968, at least 65 of which are nuclear powered. During the same period, the United States built 99 submarines, 82 of them nuclear powered. The Soviets have scrapped or given away all their World War II submarines as well as some built since. They now have a new submarine force of about 375; we have 143, which includes 61 diesel submarines most of which are of World War II vintage. Thus the Soviets have a net advantage of about 230 submarines. It is estimated that by the end of 1970, they will have a numerical lead in nuclear submarines.

To achieve this, the Soviets greatly expanded and modernized their submarine building facilities. Just one of their numerous submarine building yards has several times the area and facilities of all U.S. submarine yards. They use modern assembly line techniques under covered ways, permitting large-scale production regardless of weather conditions.

In the single year 1968, the Soviets put to sea a new type ballistic missile submarine as well as several new types of nuclear attack submarines—a feat far exceeding anything we have ever done. In looking to the future, it is estimated that by 1974 they will add about 70 nuclear powered submarines to their fleet, whereas we will add but 26—further increasing their numerical superiority. In the case of the ballistic missile submarine, the Soviets have undertaken a vigorous building program to surpass our Polaris fleet of 41. They have more than seven of the new Polaris-type submarines, and have the capability to turn out one a month. We have no Polaris submarines under construction or planned. We must assume that by the 1972–73 time period, they will be up to us.

The Soviets have frequently announced their intent to be the preeminent world power. Why do we not believe them? Hitler in "Mein Kampf" plainly announced his intent to dominate the world. We did not believe him either—until it was nearly too late. Admiral Gorshkov, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, said recently.

> The flag of the Soviet Navy now flies proudly over the oceans of the world. Sooner or later, the United States will have to understand that it no longer has mastery of the seas.

And just recently, the Russians announced a projected 50 percent increase in the size of their merchant fleet. These facts should be weighed when assessing the judgment of those who argue for a reduction of American military power while the Soviet military power, particularly their submarine force, is rapidly expanding.

Unless we take drastic action to improve the degree and quality of effort spent on submarines, we will lose our ability to use the oceans of the world in time of conflict—we may already be at that point.

Mr. KEMP. Mr. Speaker, despite the widely-published Pentagon papers and other Defense Department leaks confronting Americans in daily news reports, it seems that the best kept secret is that the era of U.S. military superiority has ended.

Although the public is not generally aware of it, a Presidential Panel consisting of distinguished citizens reported over a year ago that—

> The convergence of a number of trends indicates a significant shifting of the strategic military balance against the United States and in favor of the Soviet Union.

These trends, detailed in a supplemental report made by the Panel after an examination of our Defense Department and military contracting procedures and an assessment of Communist capabilities, point up ironical contrasts between the open society of the United States and the closed society of the Soviet Union.

Despite sophistication of our spy reconnaissance satellites and the vast intelligence these vehicles supply us about the kinds of weapons systems and their deployment the Soviets have arrayed against us, we are still largely in the dark about Soviet intentions even as we negotiate for weapons limitations at the SALT talks.

Our intentions are chronicled in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, the reports of congressional committees and other documents for all the world to see.

While we debated the ABM, the Soviets continued deployment of their system.

While we discuss defense authorizations and appropriations, the Soviets continue to build more missile launching submarines and otherwise continue their buildup of strategic weapons.

While the Soviet research and development budget has increased 10 to 13 percent a year since 1968, our budget has remained, essentially, constant.

Based on the equivalent of 1968 dollars, the Defense Department now estimates that Russia is spending some $3 billion more annually on military and space research and development than the United States.

As a result, we are faced with the prospect that, in the mid-to-late 1970's, we may find ourselves lagging behind the Soviets in some critical weapons areas but more critically in the area of technology.

These circumstances bring me to the subject of inspection at the SALT talks, inspection beyond that we are capable of achieving by electronic means.

The Communists, who even rigidly control the movement of their own citizens within their borders, let alone the movement of outsiders, have steadfastly rejected our requests for inspection. Their treatment of the "Soviet Jews" tragically illustrates this point.

If we could trust their announced intentions—and the Cuban missile crisis proved we cannot—our request for inspection could, one can speculate, not be necessary.

But we must squarely face the realization that we cannot depend upon announced intentions, made at the SALT talks or elsewhere.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia was not announced beforehand.

Only when U.S. tanks and other military muscle were arrayed against Soviet power across the Berlin wall were we able to halt Soviet expansion.

Only when we brought our nuclear forces to an alert were we able to convince the Soviets that they had to withdraw their missiles from Cuba.

Despite our mistakes and despite the criticisms of American foreign policy it was chiefly through our military assistance, our contributions to NATO and our

actions in Southeast Asia that we have helped prevent additional Communist expansion.

Recognizing that the Soviets and other Communist nations have closed societies, we cannot be optimistic about assessing their intentions with any degree of certainty under any circumstances.

But we can insist upon some degree of inspection at the SALT talks to more fully assess their research, industrial, and military capabilities.

And we can, through our individual efforts, more clearly apprise our citizens in an open society of our present and future capabilities vis-a-vis the Communist nations.

In this colloquy and that conducted July 29 in the Senate, our present strategic position with reference to that of the Soviet Union and other Communist nations has been eloquently placed upon the record.

From that record, it is clear that the security of the United States is already endangered to an extent unparalleled in contemporary history.

I strongly support ending, with honor, this Vietnam involvement as early as possible but it is clear that our current military capability and that in the near future is constricting U.S. support of its legitimate foreign policy objectives and, at the same time, enhancing the fulfillment of Communist objectives. It is not a question of trying to police the world, which we no doubt cannot do, it is a question of our assuming and retaining our responsibilities as the leaders of the free world.

It is clear we are not taking adequate advantage of our research and development and technological talents and facilities.

History is clear that our maintenance of peace depends on a realistic nuclear deterrent for a second strike in retaliation to a first-strike attack.

Each of us is here with the fervent hope that the United States will never be compelled to react to such an attack. Each of us must admit, I believe, there is no inherent value in maintaining extensive and costly weapons and forces which are unjustified.

Each of us, I believe, longs for lasting peace and substantive breakthroughs at the SALT talks which would add substantially to the maintenance of such peace.

I include the following:

[Washington Report, Washington, June 28, 1971]

ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE NATION'S SECURITY

The best kept secret in the United States seems to be the news that the period of U.S. superiority of military power has ended and that "in the 70's neither the vital interests of the U.S. nor the lives and freedom of its citizens will be secure . . ."

THE BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL

Shortly after his inauguration in 1969, President Nixon appointed a select group of distinguished citizens, to examine the organization setup and contracting procedures of the U.S. Department of Defense, and to make recommendations for improvements therein. On July 1, 1970, the Panel submitted to the President and the Secretary of Defense its report on those specific matters, including a number of recommended changes which the Defense Secretary has since announced have been or are in process of being introduced in that Department.

Subsequently, seven members of the Panel submitted a supplemental statement on related matters which they deemed to be of vital concern to the Nation at large, as well as to themselves as American citizens. It should be read by every American.

The principal points made may be clearly appreciated from the opening paragraphs and key phrases of the Summary of the Supplemental Statement:

"The Converging Trends. The convergence of a number of trends indicates a significant shifting of the strategic military balance against the United States and in favor of the Soviet Union. These trends include: (i) the growing Soviet superiority in ICBM's; (ii) the Soviet commitment of greater resources than the U.S. to strategic offensive and defensive weapons, with the continued deployment thereof; (iii) the possibility that present U.S. technological superiority will be lost to the Soviet Union; (iv) the convincing evidence that the Soviet Union seeks a preemptive first-strike capability; (v) the rapidly expanding Soviet naval capability; and (vi) the mounting hostility of segments of the public towards the military, the defense establishment and "the military-industrial complex," without due recognition that sustained irresponsible criticism could undermine and weaken the only forces which provide security for the U.S."

"Since World War II a degree of world order has been maintained by the dominance of U.S. strategic military strength. This American-preserved world order is now disintegrating, as doubts arise as to our will and strength to preserve it.

"U.S. strategic superiority has ended. The Soviet Union has moved significantly ahead of the United States in ICBM's, the principal weapons system of the nuclear age.

"The End of U.S. Superiority. . . . The Soviet SS-9 ICBM force alone is capable of delivering a megatonnage of nuclear warheads several times greater than that of the entire U.S. force of ICBM's and SLBM's. . . .

". . . The situation which our country faces is without precedent. . . .

". . . It is not too much to say that in the 70's neither the vital interests of the U.S. nor the lives and freedom of its citizens will be secure . . .

". . . Yet, many of our most influential citizens respond to this unprecedented national peril, not by a renewed determination to assure an adequate national defense, but rather by demands for further curtailment of defense measures which can only increase the peril.

"In short, the mood of the people and much of the Congress is almost one of precipitous retreat from the challenge. This paradox in response to possible national peril is without precedent in the history of this country."

A WELL KEPT SECRET

This solemn statement, throwing into question, for the first time, the survival of American life and liberty, had been in the hands of our governmental leaders since September 30, 1970. When it was released by the Pentagon on March 12, 1971, neither Government nor the media (with the single exception of *U.S. News & World Report* for April 5, 1971) deemed it a matter to be explicitly made known to the American people.

Whereas previous warnings of a dangerous shift in the balance of military power were often discounted on the grounds that those raising the alarm were "military-oriented", this cannot be said of the authors of the special "Blue Ribbon" report. Although several of them had wartime service in one or another of our Armed Services, they are all primarily noted for distinguished accomplishments in civilian pursuits. The seven signers of the Supplemental Statement are:

William Blackie—Peoria, Illinois; Chairman of the Board, Caterpillar Tractor Company.

George Champion—New York, New York; President, Economic Development Board of New York.

William P. Clements, Jr.—Dallas, Texas; President, Southeastern Drilling, Inc.

John M. Fluke—Seattle, Washington; President, John Fluke Manufacturing Company, Inc.

Hobart D. Lewis—Pleasantville, New York; President, Reader's Digest Association, Inc.

Wilfred J. McNeil—New York, New York; Director and Advisor, Fairchild-Hiller Corp.

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.—Richmond, Virginia; Lawyer, Past President, American Bar Association (1964–65).

1971 POSTURE STATEMENT

The statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird before the House Armed Services Committee on the FY 1972–1976 Defense Program and the 1972 Defense Budget, dated March 9, 1971, comprising 191 pages, devotes 39 pages in Section II *Toward Better Management of Human, Material and Economic Resources in the Department of Defense*, growing, in part, out of the work of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel.

It gets down to such subjects as "drug abuse in the armed forces" and to such details as following the Blue Ribbon Panel's recommendations in telecommunications. But, curiously, no mention is made of the Blue Ribbon Panel's Supplemental Statement on the Nation's peril and the chilling portent to the Free World, of our now overshadowed defense posture which no longer provides a realistic deterrence. Yet the term "Strategy of Realistic Deterrence" is used repeatedly as a statement of national policy, as if realistic deterrence could be achieved by mere use of the words!

How is it that recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Panel can be adopted as to "major changes in the organization of the Department [of Defense]" and other recommendations affecting the survival of our national life be swept under the carpet?

Further, the Laird Report states: "The threats to U.S. and Free World security obviously were a central factor in planning forces and programs to implement the new strategy." If this is true, how is the balance of strategic power being restored? The American people have a right and a "need" to know.

On page 12 of the Laird Report as a part of the Secretary's Summary it is said: "In the past two decades we achieved first place in nuclear capability, became pre-eminent in space, and substantially strengthened our conventional capabilities." In direct contrast, the Blue Ribbon statement said "Within a span of less than two decades we have moved from complete security to perilous insecurity."

On page 14—*The Changing Environment—Prelude to the 1970's*, one of the existing military realities listed as: "different from the situation just five years ago is: . . . A growing Soviet military capability and technological momentum." No mention is made of the existence of a massively overwhelming preponderance factor [about 8 times] of Soviet nuclear ICBM capability, expressed in megatonnage. The report continues: "Confronted with this changing environment, we conclude after careful analysis in the National Security Council that we must, whatever else, assume the following criteria in national security planning for the decades of the 1970's: 1. Preservation by the United States of a sufficient strategic nuclear capability as the cornerstone of the Free World's nuclear deterrent. . . ."

One has a right—and indeed a duty—to

ask what that means. How can we preserve what we do not have? Who decides what the subjective but key word "sufficient" means? And finally how decipher the meaning of the words "the cornerstone of the Free World's nuclear deterrent," when it is clear that our foreign policy as well as the "security of the lives and freedom of U.S. citizens" requires simply that we move to match if not exceed the present awesome balance of nuclear power now arrayed against the United States.

U.S. NEEDS "SUPERIOR STRATEGIC CAPABILITY"

The first duty of our responsible officials to "safeguard the security of the Republic", cannot be mixed up with other nations or the Free World's nuclear deterrent. The U.S. alone must look to its own security—as does the U.S.S.R.

The Blue Ribbon Panel's conclusion regarding the shifting balance was that ". . . the only viable national strategy is to regain and retain a clearly superior strategic capability."

As the Panel pointed out, "The road to peace has never been through appeasement, unilateral disarmament or negotiation from weakness. The entire recorded history of mankind is precisely to the contrary. Among the great nations, only the strong survive. Weakness of the U.S.—of its military capability and its will—could be the gravest threat to the peace of the world."

Thus this is no time for circumlocution or the obscuration of life and death box-scores with statements of purpose which admit of any and all interpretations under the sun. Our clear course, as expressed by the special Blue Ribbon statement is to move at once to offset "The Soviet Union's advantage in numbers and megatonnage of missiles . . . that could result in a force more than double that of the U.S. by the Mid-70's . . . (when) . . . the Soviet Union would have the capability of effectively destroying both U.S. ICBM and bomber forces as well as our cities." Otherwise we must accept the consequences of becoming a second-rate power, ". . . incapable of assuring the future security and freedom of its people."

WHY NOT LET THE AMERICAN PEOPLE KNOW?

The Special Blue Ribbon report states: "Neither the facts concerning these trends nor the ultimate danger is generally understood by the public, which for the most part remains uninformed and hence apathetic." Why?

In this day of electronic and communications pollution, every form of trivia can be and is elevated to the level of national interest. The media leave no electronic gap in the air and no tree standing that can be pressed into the service of engaging every ear and eye. Even the President of the United States must strain to fill two hours of chat over a nationwide network. Then how come the vital message of the Blue Ribbon Panel Statement, sufficient to alarm a group of distinguished citizens which had spent a year studying the Pentagon, was not deemed important enough to be expressly made known to the American people.

How come the President's 180 page *Foreign Policy Report for the 1970's* dated February 25, 1971 (five months after he received the Blue Ribbon Supplemental Statement) is silent on the consequences to our foreign policy while mentioning that we are outgunned as to numbers of ICBM's by some 40%. No megatonnage figures are given, but interestingly enough the meaning of the words "strategic sufficiency," as contrasted with "strategic superiority," is defined without clarifying very much the life and death aspects of the present shifting balance of power. However, the President's Foreign Policy Report does state: "The United States and the Soviet Union have now reached a point where small numerical advantages in strategic forces have little military relevance. The attempt to obtain large advantages would spark an arms race which would, in the end, prove pointless. For both sides would almost surely commit the necessary resources to maintain a balance."

If the 35 pages of the Blue Ribbon Panel's Supplemental Statement say anything, it is that the maintenance of that balance has long since gone by the boards. If that statement—in an official document—is untrue, it should be refuted—officially. If it is not untrue, then the President's Foreign Policy Report dated five months later needs re-evaluation.

THE PRIMARY STRATEGIC THREAT

Secretary Laird's Report, dated March 9, 1971, under Section III entitled, *The Threats to U.S. and Free World Security* states: "The threats to U.S. and Free World security obviously were a central factor in planning forces and programs to implement the new strategy. Before discussing specific force planning under the strategy, let me review briefly the current and projected security threats. Admiral Moorer, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will provide *a more detailed analysis of the threat* [emphasis added] in his statement to the Committee." (We shall turn to Admiral Moorer's report later.)

The Laird report stated: "The primary strategic threat to the U.S.—the capability of the Soviet Union to deliver long range, nuclear weapons against targets in the United States—has been a matter of grave concern to us. Shown on Table 9 are our estimates of Soviet strategic offensive and defensive weapon systems in the near term. U.S. strategic forces are shown for comparison on Table 3."

In the report, Table 9 applies to U.S. forces while Table 3 applies to the forces of the Soviet Union—a small matter, but a slip to which Freud would have attached great significance!

The "specific force planning"' of the Laird report still leaves the relative ICBM balance, U.S. versus U.S.S.R., unchanged: "at the end of FY 1972 (it) will consist of 1,000 Minuteman missiles, 54 Titan missiles" [ed. note: old and obsolescent] as against about 1,200 SS–11 and SS–13 missiles of around 1 megaton each and corresponding roughly to the U.S. Minuteman, and about 300 SS–9 missiles [ed. note: new] of 25 megatons each.

If all this is bewildering as a policy of "strategic sufficiency" for an announced "Strategy of Realistic Deterrence" the point has been made.

ADMIRAL MOORER'S REPORT

And now let us turn to the report entitled: *United States Military Posture for FY 1972* by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN, before the House Armed Services Committee, dated March 9, 1971. Here, surely, one seeking assurance against the spectre raised by the Blue Ribbon Supplemental Statement, must find it. Our problem, after all, is purely military and as promised in Secretary Laird's Report one may expect "a more detailed analysis of the threat". Perhaps this is where we should have looked in the first place to see the danger to the U.S. broadly delineated, and the few steps needed to parry this threat clearly stated.

Admiral Moorer starts out with a nicely balanced plea for objectivity, and that we neither underestimate nor overestimate the strength of an opponent. Neither, he says, should our enemies, our free world partners nor we ourselves, underestimate the military strength of the United States. But . . . "We dare not underestimate the military capability of those who seek to expand their influence and hegemony over peoples whose interests now coincide with ours." That about covers the subject.

Admiral Moorer reported that as of the end of 1970, the U.S. had "fallen distinctly behind the Soviets in total numbers of operational ICBM launchers" (1054 to 1440) and that "the Soviets are already far superior to us in total strategic offensive megatons." While the Soviet SS–9 ICBM is discussed at some length, no mention is made that the megatonnage of the 300 SS–9's alone, which the Soviets are expected to have by the end of 1971, ". . . each capable of delivering 25 megatons" (Blue Ribbon Panel assessment) exceeds by many times that of our total ICBM launchers and moreover are "designed as counter-force weapons capable of destroying U.S. hardened missile silos" (Blue Ribbon Panel Statement).

Admiral Moorer also said: "While I do not believe the United States today is in a position of inferior military strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, the balance is tenuous in certain areas and, therefore, we cannot help but be concerned. The United States no longer has clear, superiority in strategic nuclear weapons."

THE PROBLEM IS NOW!

But then the Admiral went on to make what must be the most incomprehensible statement in modern military history by saying: "Due to long lead time in acquisition of modern weapons systems, the problem we see is in the future."

A "long lead time", far from putting the problem in the future stresses the present imperative.

But in line with the concept of the problem being in the future, Admiral Moorer recommends the adoption of the Administration's proposed military budget for Fiscal Year 1972. This budget does not in any way call for a reversal of the shift in strategic military power balance. In fact, since the Nixon Administration took office deep cuts have been made in the defense budget. Most of the dollar cuts have been made by the Administration, itself; though some have been made by the Senate. An even larger reduction in the *effective* level of spending for defense has been caused by inflation and pay raises for military personnel without additional appropriations to cover the cost of those pay raises.

The combination of these several factors has reduced our *effective* defense spending by about 25% under the Nixon Administration—a sharper rate of decline than that under the preceding two administrations.

In all fairness, one must hasten to point out that the Laird and Moorer reports cited were prepared by dedicated, patriotic Americans striving to advance the interests of the U.S., to the best of their abilities, within the framework of Administration policy.

HOW TO REVERSE THE TREND

Also, reversing a trend such as this is a problem of great complexity; a multiplicity of facts and factors must be taken into consideration. To forewarn without frightening is a necessary prerequisite to action in a democracy. Yet *The Wall Street Journal* for April 28, 1971, says, in part: "Defense Secretary Melvin Laird's increasingly grim assessment of Soviet strength may be a prelude to another escalation of the arms race and a possible request for a boost in the Pentagon budget.

". . . Mr. Laird's new threat assessment is likely to produce some skepticism and anger on Capitol Hill. here, lawmakers critical of defense spending are likely to view the Secretary's remarks as part of the 'annual rites of spring'—when military men come forward with evidence of new and menacing Soviet developments to justify their budget submissions."

Other newspapers have made similar statements.

Small wonder that loyal Americans of good will, seeking to discharge their Constitutional responsibility "to provide for the common defense" may wonder in a political context how far to go in alerting a nation to its peril. On the other hand, because we are a democracy, the shifting balance of power

which imperils our Nation, our freedom, and the rest of the Free World, cannot be offset by our taking appropriate action, unless and until the people—all of the people—are informed by our governmental leaders who have the duty to assign the highest priority and sense of urgency to preparing Americans for a recital of some unpleasant realities and proposing a program for changing these facts.

The American people—we believe are capable of taking the harsh truth of our present danger—and capable of marshalling the spiritual, human, and material resources needed to assure the survival of our way of life.

It is this which must be done.

DR. A. G. B. METCALF,
Physicist and Military Analyst.

But at this time, hopes and longing are not enough. World conditions have given us responsibilities we did not seek, but which, in the interest of our survival, we cannot escape.

Mr. Speaker, with these thoughts in mind and my conviction that I am duty bound to help expose the best kept secret from the American public, I request that, at this point, I be allowed to submit for the RECORD a recent Washington Report of the American Security Council which contains the report detailing the decline of our comparative military leadership as well as excerpts from an article by Joseph Alsop which addresses itself to the alternatives we face as Americans in this less than perfect world. He illustrates that our role as a world power has a direct bearing on the lives and freedoms of the people of Israel as well as millions of other freedom loving people who look to us for support and friendship.

Mr. Speaker, the following is the article by Joseph Alsop, to which I referred above. I would like to quote in part from the article appearing in the Washington Post, Wednesday, August 4, 1971, and include the excerpt at this point:

[From the Washington Post, Aug. 4, 1971]

(By Joseph Alsop)

The alternatives, basically, are to submit to the Soviets, thereby creating "one world" rather rapidly; or to make the great efforts and sacrifices and investments that are needed to maintain a plural world, with room in it for free societies. The choice is uniquely American, for the reasons indicated in the last report in this space.

At bottom, there are two reasons. On the one hand, the Soviet Union can, and moreover quite surely will, create its own kind of "one world," if the Soviets ever manage to attain a nuclear monopoly. Given an effective nuclear monopoly, plus the will to make some hard examples, any nation today has world empire within reach.

On the other hand, the United States, as the only other serious nuclear power, is therefore all that stands today between the Kremlin and world empire. If you think about it at all, this clearly means that the unique American situation is also a most exposed situation.

Here, however, the main fact to note is rather different. It is the simple fact that Americans cannot possibly escape the responsibilities resulting from America's present unique situation. They are heavy and costly responsibilities. A great many people in this country now wish to ignore these responsibilities—to pretend that they are not really there—because of their unhappiness over Vietnam.

Yet this is an utterly untenable position, unless, for instance, you are cold-bloodedly prepared to see Israel crushed out of existence by the surrounding Arabs, with active military support from the Soviets. In 1970, the record is clear that the Kremlin gave serious consideration to just this enterprise of crushing Israel. And if the Kremlin has drawn back today, American power is the ultimate reason.

The plain truth is that until there are other serious nuclear powers among the nations, American power alone can prevent the Soviets from repeating, at will, other operations like the one that crushed the Czechs' new birth of freedom. Nor is that the end of the story. The new isolationism is not merely cruelly cold-blooded; it is also ludicrously impractical, at least for those neo-isolationists who sincerely desire what used to be called "Fortress America."

When the Soviets were seriously considering striking down Israel, for instance, their real aim was not Israel's destruction. Their aim was to get the whole Middle East in their grip, and thereby to turn the whole world balance of power almost upside down.

Yet we cannot maintain a true "Fortress America," while permitting the Soviets to do what they choose with the world power balance. It is simply not a feasible thing to attempt.

Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Speaker, in 1968 Congress first recognized the urgent need for a new class of high-speed attack submarines. As a result of this recognition, an additional submarine of the SSN 688 class was added by the Congress to the President's budget in each of the past 2 years bringing to seven the total number of these submarines we have previously authorized. Funding authorization in the amount of $1,310 million has also been provided. This year we are asked to authorize $881 million for the building of an additional five SSN 688 class submarines.

We cannot ignore the grave danger to our national security and freedom of the seas the Soviet submarine threat poses. This continuously expanding threat with its ballistic missile, cruise missile, and attack type submarines must be effectively countered. As the first all-new class of submarines in over 10 years, the SSN 688 with its tested and proven nuclear power plant, latest noise reduction features, improved sensors, advanced fire control and computer complex and improved countermeasures can provide the necessary counter. It will also be capable of performing many other missions including the traditional submarine role of attacking surface ships with torpedoes.

I call upon the Members to continue our support of the submarine construction program. We cannot afford to accentuate the erosion of our naval forces by cuts or deferments to this vital program. It is incumbent upon us to enable our Navy to prepare today to meet clearly foreseeable contingencies in time of need.

The Soviet ballistic missile submarine force has been significantly augmented in size and capability by the introduction of the *Yankee* class submarine with its capability for launching 16 nuclear ballistic missiles. The U.S.S.R. currently has a force of at least 17 *Yankee*'s, and an intensive construction program is underway. The threat posed by this rapidly growing force has a unique quality represented by its short time of flight capabilities against time-sensitive targets.

ASW command, control, and communications are essential to effective reaction to an attack, and the potential of the command and control system, as well as the alert system of our manned bomber force, raises questions about the continued ability of the United States to maintain a posture of strategic sufficiency, unless our ASW forces retain the capability to protect the credibility of our deterrent.

More serious than its obvious second-strike role is the possible employment of the Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine force as the spearhead of a coordinated first-strike disarming attack, in which the submarine-borne missiles would be launched from close range at the most time-sensitive U.S. strategic targets—the National Command Authority—NCA, the commanders in chief, the alert Strategic Air Command bombers, other fixed targets, and critical communication links. ASW forces have the potential to trail *Yankee* submarines and to provide warning at the launch of the first wave of submarine-launched ballistic missiles; however, improvements in underseas surveillance capabilities and communication systems are required in order to maintain an effective early warning system against these improved Soviet submarines. Although our ASW forces have a potential to destroy the missile-carrying submarines during a first-strike launch, major ASW weapon system improvements are required if this potential is to be maintained against a high missile firing rate.

The Navy is taking the following actions in recognition of the submarine-launched ballistic missile threat:

First, conducting at-sea exercises to measure and improve the coordinated strategic capabilities of our ASW air, surface, and subsurface forces working in conjuction with other surveillance systems.

Second, supporting research and development in acoustic surveillance and developing new and all-source information processing systems.

Third, exploring improvements in systems and procedures to provide reliable and timely warning of submarine-launched ballistic missile attack.

Fourth, initiating research and development programs for development of early intercept, and improved SSBN kill capabilities.

These efforts must be strongly supported in order to provide an adequate qualitative response to the Russian strategic submarine threat.

Mr. ARCHER. Mr. Speaker, we have already heard a great deal about the consequences of our involvement in the Vietnam war. But I am compelled to rise and point out a seldom discussed byproduct of that war which is, to me, extremely alarming and disturbing. I am talking about what that war has done to the American spirit and American self-confidence. There is really no way at present to measure with certainty what the long-range consequences of Vietnam may be. But it must be clear to every American that the war has seriously damaged the valiant American spirit.

Mr. Speaker, we are probably the most self-critical nation on earth. That qual-

ity has always been part of our national equipment and, in many ways, it has proven to be an asset. It has helped us to eliminate many of the flaws and injustices of our society, to correct most of the imbalances and inequities, and to repair the mistakes which all human institutions, because they are human institutions, make. Self-criticism, if it is constructive and properly directed, is a virtue and even a blessing.

We think of ourselves as an established country, mature in our judgment, responsible in our actions. Yet we continue to search for answers to problems that we could not conceive of just 20 years ago. At times our goals seem clouded, our aims unsure. Those ideals which we hold so dear have come under criticism both from home and abroad. But, to those who would have us believe that this country is suffering from some incurable disease because of the seemingly many mistakes we have committed, let me remind them of what Theodore Roosevelt said:

It is not the critic who counts, not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles—the credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena; whose face is marred by dust and sweat, who strives valiantly; who errs and comes short again and again; who knows the cause; who, at the best, knows in the end the triumph of high achievement; and who, at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly.

We should be proud of what our country stands for and what our country is. But we should not let our pride confuse us into thinking that we have no room for improvement. And it is our tradition of constructive self-criticism that will continue to guide us.

However, we seem to be on a binge of destructive self-criticism. I suggest that the long and costly war has helped to bring this about. Opposition to the war has spawned a whole class of individuals who have made it their purpose to disparage our country and our institutions. The result has been a concerted attack on the reputation of America.

But I believe these critics are ignoring our values and our greatness. The very fact that these critics are allowed to speak out so freely is a tribute to the freedoms we have always cherished and are striving to protect throughout the world. We must keep fully in mind that our ability to defend our freedoms depends upon our national defense posture. We must maintain a strong strategic position capable of meeting any foreign challenge.

I think we would all admit that there are things in this country that need to be corrected, that we have made mistakes, and that we are not perfect. But to ignore our progress and our ideals, our leadership in virtually every area of human involvement, is the greatest mistake of all. It is too easy to criticize and then say no more. Self-criticism carries with it the burden of finding a solution. The freedoms and privileges we enjoy are coupled with awesome responsibilities to protect those freedoms.

We can admit that we have made mistakes; fallability is the common burden of mankind. But we must resist the temptation to turn inward, to revive the isolationism of the past, to turn away from hard choices and difficult responsibilities. Responsibility is always difficult, whether on the personal level or on the level of international affairs. The temptation is always to go the easiest route, the path of least resistance. In the past, those who have sought the simplest solution often have found neither security nor peace. Weakness has only invited aggression, whether in the time of Caesar, Napoleon, Hitler, or Stalin.

Our country must not turn her back on her responsibilities now—the stakes are too great. We cannot allow a complete disavowal of our commitments. We cannot take the counsel of the prophets of doom, whether their motives are sincere or sinister. Although I wish it could be otherwise, we cannot accept the counsel that we have nothing to fear from the Russians; that we must scrap the military and rely on the good faith and beneficent intentions of the Communists; that an era of peace and understanding will be ours if only we will disarm unilaterally and then ask our enemies to renounce their warlike posture—these "simple solutions" can only compound the likelihood of international conflict.

As I said at the beginning, Mr. Speaker, we cannot as yet measure the long-term consequences of Vietnam. But it is clear at this point that disillusionment and frustration the war has caused has given birth to a new sort of isolationism and has given rise to many irresponsible demands for unilateral disarmament. abandonment of our allies, and rejection of our role as the defender of freedom.

I share President Nixon's confidence that our country will in the end shake off the "crisis of the spirit" that he correctly described as afflicting our people today.

Until our people regain their lost confidence in their government, in their will, and in their future, we will be passing through a difficult period. Hopefully, it will be a short period. However long it should last, we should resist the counsel of despair that America is "an outlaw state," the counsel that would have us turn inward, weaken our defenses, neglect our friends, and reject our international responsibilities. America, as President Eisenhower said 10 years ago, is the hope of free men everywhere. Let us keep it that way.

Mr. HILLIS. Mr. Speaker, the Preamble to the U.S. Constituiton says:

The first duty of the national Government is to provide for the common defense of our country.

Ralph Waldo Emerson—1803–82:

For what avail the plow or sail, or land or life, if freedom fail?

Theodore Roosevelt, speech at 1901 Minnesota State Fair:

Speak softly and carry a big stick.

Gen. George C. Marshall:

We have tried since the birth of our nation to promote our love of peace by a display of weakness. This course has failed us utterly.

L. Mendel Rivers, House speech October 7, 1970:

Decisions on the defense budget should be based on the simple question of national survival—and nothing else. The issue should be "what is required to survive?" and not "how should we allocate the national budget between defense and domestic programs?"

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, in defense posture statement to Congress March 9, 1971:

I reject the view that peace is well served if military power is unilaterally weakened.

Today, and in the near future, some serious and difficult decisions will have to be made concerning the future security of our great country. These decisions are far reaching. They affect the freedom of the entire free world.

The threat against our way of life is very real. In the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, President John F. Kennedy ordered the Strategic Air Command—SAC—to orbit B–52 bombers in and out of Russian radars at 50-second intervals. This overt show of force persuaded Nikita Khrushchev to withdraw Soviet missiles from Cuba. Following that humiliation, the Soviet Union has accelerated its military buildup at an unprecedented clip.

Referring to the Cuban confrontation, Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, told a group of American Legion students at the Pentagon July 27, 1971:

Just as the Soviets have been rational and back down in the face of our superiority, they will expect us to be rational and back down if they gain that superiority—and I think that we would have to.

Evidence is abundant that we will soon be No. 2 as a world power, if we are not already.

Janes Fighting Ships is a private British publication used the world over as a naval reference book. The 1971–72 edition, just published in July 1971, states that—

The Soviet fleet now represents the super navy of a superpower.

While—

The size and relative capabilities of the U.S. Navy continue to decline at what many authorities consider to be an alarming rate.

The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel—16 business and professional men appointed by President Nixon to study U.S. Defenses—concluded that the American-preserved world order is disintegrating and that no informed person denies that the quarter century of clear U.S. superiority has ended. The panel said evidence is reasonably conclusive that the Soviets have attained a numerical and megatonnage advantage in long-range missiles, an atomic submarine fleet capable of destroying our national command centers, and bombers that are more modern than ours.

George P. Hunt, a retired Marine Corps lieutenant colonel and former Life managing editor, said in a Life article published June 18, 1971:

It will take fast and skillful work to put our military back in shape.

The current U.S. defense strategy calls for a balanced mix of deterrent weapons to meet a variety of threats. In today's situation, no single deterrent weapon can be depended upon to do the job alone. To

counter Communist threats of military aggression and world domination, the United States must maintain sufficient military strength to make nuclear war not worth trying. We must also be able to suppress "brushfire" conflicts where nuclear destruction would be unthinkable. Our arsenal must be versatile enough to permit the President several options in the event of a flareup—not just the single option of overkill. That is like if you want to punish a youngster, and you have no choice other than capital punishment.

To nullify the awesome forces lined up against us, the Department of Defense employs a triad of deterrent strategic weapons: First, manned long-range bombers, second, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, and third, submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Of these three weapon systems, the bomber is the only one able to operate across the total spectrum desired. The manned bomber can deliver either nuclear or conventional payloads. It can be diverted, recalled and reused. It can survey the target area and assess damage. Nuclear missiles offer only total destruction—nuclear only response. In the current division of strategic targets, bombers have 60 percent of the job to do, with 25 percent assigned to ICBM's and 15 percent by SLBM's. Most of our strategic firepower—measured in numbers of weapons or megatonnage—is carried by the bomber fleet. ICBM's and SLBM's primarily are targeted against cities. There is no way to beef up our existing long-range nuclear missiles so they will carry enough megatonnage to destroy hard targets—missile silos and dug-in defense installations—now assigned to bombers.

It is imperative, therefore, that we modernize our bomber fleet. Weapon systems must be updated and improved continually to insure their credibility.

SAC has been using the B–52 as its principal strategic bomber for nearly two decades. This eight-engine, subsonic jet has done its job well—but it was not designed, nor can it be further modified, to perform today's heavy bomber role competently. Would you drive a 1952 car on a long, hard trip?

SAC's new B–1, now under development, is the answer. The B–1, though only two-thirds the size of the B–52, provides twice the payload, better prestrike survival—quick launch and dispersal or air loiter—50 percent greater low-level penetration speed, alternate supersonic defense skirting capability, shorter takeof and landing, better targets coverage requiring fewer missions, requires smaller crews, and consumes one-third less fuel than the B–52. The B–1's four new jet engines and swing-wing design provide supersonic dash speed, subsonic low-level penetration—cruise speed—and aerial refueling with existing KC–135 tankers.

The B–1 is a first priority "must" for maintaining the credibility of our defense triad.

Mr. LENT. Mr. Speaker, the potential threat to this Nation's national security interests is at a perilously dangerous level. If present trends continue to make the country's defense budget the whipping boy of Federal appropriations, the President's defense options in a confrontation situation will be seriously impaired.

Past Secretaries of Defense have perpetuated defense postures based on parity with the Soviet Union. While this posture may have seemed sufficient in the early 1960's, the Soviets have failed to reciprocate in this parity theory. Indeed, they have drastically increased their own nuclear forces, increasing intercontinental missiles eightfold in the last 5 years alone.

It should be clear to all of us that while the Soviets continue to speak gently of coexistence and disarmament, their ongoing expansion of sophisticated nuclear weaponry certainly detracts from their credence.

In the fact of this Soviet buildup, assured destruction has become an outmoded defense posture for this Nation to follow. We can no longer be assured that we are even at parity with the Soviets, and if the disregard for keeping this country militarily abreast continues in the Congress, I am troubled that we might soon find our own defense capabilities a sad second.

I firmly believe we must expediently devote attention to the modernization of our forces. We just cannot permit the country's "Vietnam hangover" to obscure the real and continuing need for a credible national armed force.

Temptation has abounded after every war to further slice the number of men in uniform and curb development of advancing weaponry. But technology has made it imperative that the United States maintain a credible deterrent in the 1970's and beyond.

I am especially troubled by the comparable backslide in our naval force and the reluctance to fund research and development projects commensurate with their importance.

While most Members of this body were all too eager to accept the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel's recommendations on an all-volunteer armed force, we seem anxious to ignore the supplemental findings that the United States is falling behind the Soviets in research and development.

I believe, Mr. Speaker, that a new defense strategy is required for dealing with the realities of the 1970's. Let us move forward to adopt that new strategy and back it firmly and adequately.

Mr. GETTYS. Mr. Speaker, we are discussing today one of the Congress' most fundamental rights, the power to raise armies and build navies. And I believe we must realize that with this right goes responsibility, a serious responsibility, to our security as a nation and to the men we call on to risk their lives preserving it.

We face today a formidable adversary who has brought the best products of modern technology into the service of an impressive military machine. If we fall behind him in this respect, if we fail to keep in the forefront of our defense forces the sharp cutting edge of our superior technological developments, we fail unforgiveably in our responsibilities to our Nation and its fighting men.

One area where the Soviets are putting great emphasis is in their submarine force, the largest in the world. They are launching a steady stream of nuclear submarines with all the benefits of sophisticated technology. We expect our Navy to keep the sealanes open. But we cannot expect our Navy to beat the challenge of the Soviet submarine with aging and deficient ships and obsolescent aircraft.

Antisubmarine warfare is particularly sensitive to technology. To find a submarine hidden in the ocean's depths calls for an impressive application of technology, and as the enemy submarines improve, so must our abilities to detect and kill them.

In this year's budget we see the Navy—very properly, I believe—increasing its emphasis on this uniquely naval mission.

We see an increase to 36 P–3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft, reflecting its outstanding performance in the fleet since its introduction last year.

We see the first production lot of 13 S–3A aircraft, designed to protect our carriers and to carry an advanced antisubmarine capability wherever needed.

We see the continuation of the latest classes of destroyers and submarines, with a program for seven 963 class detroyers and five 688 class nuclear submarines.

We see an increase of the MK–48 torpedoes so badly needed to insure our submarine superiority to the Soviet challenge.

We see two of the submarine tenders needed to support the advancing technology of our submarine forces.

And we see the R. & D. program necessary to put the latest achievements of our science in the service of our security at sea.

I support these items.

And I call on the Members of this House to defeat any measures which leave our Armed Forces dependent on outmoded technology and obsolete equipment.

Mr. RUNNELS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to join with my colleagues in expressing concern about the posture of this Nation in regard to our national defense. There is no greater problem facing this Nation—since our very survival depends upon our strength. In the past several years, it has become fashionable to attack our Defense Department, to ridicule those who are responsible for our security. And it seems to this Member of Congress that these sentiments are growing day by day. I would also like to say that I campaigned for Congress on a platform of concern about the rising cost of national defense. I felt, and I still feel, that much money has been wasted by bureaucrats on unnecessary items. I felt, and I feel, that much of our national treasure can be saved by closer scrutiny of the Defense Department now, and in the future.

But I also feel that we must spend whatever is necessary to protect our Nation, since our national survival is necessary for us to enjoy all of the other fruits of our freedom. Mr. Speaker, I ask, what good is a welfare program—if we have no nation? What good is a social se-

curity program—if we have no nation? What good is a medicare program—if we have no nation?

There was a time—not too many years ago—when this Nation could not have been defeated by the arms of all the nations in the world combined. But I have reservations today. I no longer feel as confident about the future of this Nation as I once did.

I am no longer positive that we could survive, as a nation, if we were subject to trial by fire. We have seen our enemies increase their expenditures for defense; we have seen the Soviet Union build up a "supernavy" in just the few short years since the Cuban missile crisis. We have seen the Soviet Union move ahead with their own intercontinental missile program; we have seen the Red Chinese test their nuclear weapons; and we have seen strong evidence that they are perfecting their delivery systems.

There simply can be no doubt—we are no longer the only supergiant. Others have moved into the arena, and our superiority has been effectively challegend. The question now seems to be what are we going to do about it? How are we going to meet that challenge?

I think that the first step we must take is to inform our fellow citizens. I believe that we must go to our people and tell them in no uncertain terms just exactly where we stand.

I still have faith in the people of this Nation and I believe that a vast majority of our citizens still have faith in this Nation. If our people are properly informed—without rhetoric or political hogwash—then I believe our people will respond with an outcry demanding that we move to close the security gap.

At one point in our national history the great rallying cry of the American people was "millions for defense, but not 1 cent for tribute." I believe today our people will say: "Do not spend one penny more than we must for national security, but in the name of the Almighty God, do not spend one penny less than we must."

Mr. MIZELL. Mr. Speaker, I first want to congratulate the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SPENCE) for reserving this time for us to discuss our national defense preparedness, a matter of the most extreme importance.

We are now seeing hopeful signs of progress in easing the tensions that have strained international relations, and posed serious threats to world peace, for a generation.

But in this period, as we attempt to move from an era of confrontation to one of negotiation, it is imperative that we keep our defenses strong, that we maintain our ability to negotiate from strength, rather than weakness.

This is no time for the United States to let its guard down, or to be lulled into dangerous complacency. For if this Nation loses its military preeminence in the world, the world will lose its greatest single hope for peace.

Again, I commend Mr. SPENCE for his efforts to forcefully remind the Congress, and the Nation, of the necessity for a strong defense, the very foundation of our freedom.

Mr. CAMP. Mr. Speaker, as my contribution to today's discussion on questions of military preparedness and strategic arms, I should like to make a few remarks on the subject of national sovereignty, which is what national defense is really all about in the final accounting. A nation which cannot defend its own borders is no longer sovereign; a nation which cannot defend its own interests abroad is well on the way to losing its sovereignty. We seem to be moving very much in that direction at the present, and this is a situation to which we need to draw attention now, since its stark reality may not become clear to everyone so long as there is no clear-cut confrontation between the Communist world and the free world at some point on the globe. That confrontation, by the way, need not necessarily occur at some faraway spot; it might very well take place in our own backyard.

Mr. Speaker, before the Soviet invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, a great many people—including many Czechs themselves—thought that the Soviet Union would never dare invade that country. Those who looked at the matter in this way were really analyzing things in their own terms: If they had been in the shoes of the Soviet leaders, they would not have contemplated doing such a thing. But the Soviet leadership has different ways of seeing things than we do, and they recognized very well that the Czech experiment, if allowed to succeed, would pose great dangers to communism in Eastern Europe and indeed all over the world: A reform movement from within is sometimes more difficult to cope with than foreign invasion. The only thing which might have deterred them from their move was the prospect of armed resistance from their victims, but the Czechs are well known for their reluctance to resort to arms, though for some reason they maintain a good army, and the Soviets knew there was very little chance that they would meet with any active opposition. They were right. And since the west hastened to forget what they had done as quickly as possible, the Soviets really paid a rather minimal price for averting a great danger to their system.

After the invasion was all over, the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev, enunciated a policy now known as the Brezhnev doctrine. Whereas before, at least consistent lipservice had been paid to the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations; now that was discarded, and the Soviet Union assumed not only the right but the duty to intervene in domestic affairs of countries of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe if it deemed that the Socialist system was endangered there. In a way the Czechs had even set themselves up for this. It is not usually noted that, whereas most of the East European countries still call themselves people's republic—for example, the Polish People's Republic and the Bulgarian People's Republic—the name of the Czech state was the Czechoslovak Soviet Socialist Republic, the same term as that used to designate the constituent republics which go to make up the Soviet Union, or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Thus the long-term prospect was that Czechoslovakia would be annexed to the Soviet Union as a republic, and thus would, of course, lose all its sovereignty. The other Eastern European countries would probably follow suit. So the liberalization in Czechoslovakia simply forced the Soviet leadership to speed up their timetable a bit and to declare that the Czechs were now deprived of their national sovereignty even if formally they remained an independent nation. In short, the interests of international socialism, as interpreted by the Soviet Union, override any principles of national sovereignty. This principle has been rigidly adhered to in the case of Czechoslovakia.

But, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Brezhnev has been willing to go a good deal further than this, especially when he began to extend his doctrine to such countries as West Germany. Eventually the Soviet Union will extend its claim to be the protector of international socialism in disregard of national sovereignty, not only to the countries of the Communist bloc, but also to those non-Communist countries in which the Socialists do not rule but where they have large constituencies, as in West Germany. In such instances it does not take much imagination to see the Soviet Union using all its military potential, up to and including invasion, if it decides that the interests of socialism are threatened in the free world. So long as the Western World has the power and the resolve to defend its interests, this power may be kept at bay, but we should not delude ourselves that it will not be used, as it was in Czechoslovakia, if it can be employed with impunity. So long as the West is strong, even if it seems irresolute, there is always the chance that it may find its resolution, and this may be enough to stay the Soviet leaders' hand; but if it has nothing with which to fight, it can discover all the resolution it wants, but it will get nowhere in the crisis. If our military power continues to decline at its present precipitous rate, we may someday find the Brezhnev doctrine applied to us. On that day there would probably be nothing we could do about it. And we would be no longer sovereign.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Speaker, I join in this colloquy today to restate a very simple fact—a fact so obvious, indeed, that it seems at first blush, both ludicrous and presumptuous to assume that it even bears repeating.

The fact is this. The Soviet Union is a nuclear power, and the United States is a nuclear power. They are the only serious nuclear powers in the world today. And they represent philosophies, political structures, economic forms, and social orders which are at virtually every significant point diametrically opposed. In this situation, the United States is all that stands between the Kremlin and world empire. It is all that stands between the Kremlin and totalitarian government for all people. It is all that stands between the Kremlin and an atheistic morality. It is all, in short, that stands between the Kremlin and the destruction of the values and the freedoms,

imperfect as they may appear to some, that this Nation guarantees to its people and has committed itself to help defend in behalf of the free world.

That is a rather obvious fact. But it is a fact that seems all too often forgotten today amid the disenchantment with our unhappy experience in Vietnam and the naive rhetoric which hammers away at the theme that we could solve all our domestic problems if only we could get out of Vietnam, cut the defense budget back to a nubbin and use the money to attack domestic blight. Without discussing the idea that society's problems can be solved by merely spending more money—a trite old saw that should have been laid to rest long ago—without refuting the erroneous idea that the end of the Vietnam war will mean bushels of dollars to spend on domestic ills—an idea already adequately repudiated by the facts which my colleagues have stated here today—let me simply say that I am indeed grateful for this discussion today and for the opportunity to participate in it. I deeply hope that it will go a long way toward dispelling the euphoric fog into which we have been drifting as regards the priority which defense should have in our planning and the importance of its being adequate to meet any of the threats to our continued existence which the international Communist conspiracy poses for us.

In this connection, I believe Mr. Joseph Alsop's column in today's Washington Post is both timely and pertinent, and I include it at the conclusion of my remarks:

ALTERNATIVES FOR UNITED STATES

(By Joseph Alsop)

On the day before they loosed the bomb on Hiroshima, this reporter came within an ace of deciding to join the Communist Party. Even today, the reminiscence is perhaps relevant.

In brief, the China theater commander, Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, had been warned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a nuclear bomb would be dropped on Japan. The indicated drop-time was still about 48 hours ahead when Gen. Wedemeyer gave a farewell dinner for my old chief of those days, Gen. Claire L. Chennault. And Gen. Wedemeyer told us at dinner what lay just ahead.

The news meant, of course, that the war would soon be over; but it meant, too, that the ultimate weapons had been perfected. In consequence, although I do not want to overdramatize, the sole emotion that I can now remember feeling was undiluted horror.

The next day, Gen. Chennault's plane took us on to New Delhi. On the long air journey, there was ample time to think and all too much, alas, that needed thinking about. With the ultimate weapons unleashed upon the world, it seemed to me that what was then called "one world" was the only rational solution. But I had enough sense to see that "one world" would never be produced by such an instrument as the United Nations.

I also had enough sense to share very few of the squashy-minded delusions about Josef Stalin's Soviet Union, that were so common at that time. Yet it appeared to me that the Communist Party was the only organization seeking to create "one world" in what may be called a practical manner.

So for hours in the air, I wondered whether I should become a Communist. Only as we reached New Delhi, I concluded that this particular alternative was basically unbearable.

The little anecdote of over a quarter century ago may seem ridiculous; yet it still has its point today. The point is, quite simply, that the rational alternatives still confronting every American are really hardly different from those I pondered over the Himalayas.

The alternatives, basically, are to submit to the Soviets, thereby creating "one world" rather rapidly; or to make the great efforts and sacrifices and investments that are needed to maintain a plural world, with room in it for free societies. The choice is uniquely American, for the reasons indicated in the last report in this space.

At the bottom, there are two reasons. On the one hand, the Soviet Union can, and moreover quite surely will, create its own kind of "one world," if the Soviets ever manage to attain a nuclear monopoly. Given an effective nuclear monopoly, plus the will to make some hard examples, any nation today has world empire within reach.

On the other hand, the United States, as the only other serious nuclear power, is therefore all that stands today between the Kremlin and world empire. If you think about it at all, this clearly means that the unique American situation is also a most exposed situation.

Here, however, the main fact to note is rather different. It is the simple fact that Americans cannot possibly escape the responsibilities resulting from America's present unique situation. They are heavy and costly responsibilities. A great many people in this country now wish to ignore these responsibilities—to pretend that they are not really there—because of their unhappiness over Vietnam.

Yet this is an utterly untenable position, unless, for instance, you are cold-bloodedly prepared to see Israel crushed out of existence by the surrounding Arabs, with active military support from the Soviets. In 1970, the record is clear that the Kremlin gave serious consideration to just this enterprise of crushing Israel. And if the Kremlin has drawn back today, American power is the ultimate reason.

The plain truth is that until there are other serious nuclear powers among the nations, American power alone can prevent the Soviets from repeating, at will, other operations like the one that crushed the Czechs' new birth of freedom. Nor is that the end of the story. The new isolationism is not merely cruelly cold-blooded; it is also ludicrously impractical, at least for those neo-isolationists who sincerely desire what used to be called "Fortress America."

When the Soviets were seriously considering striking down Israel, for instance, their real aim was not Israel's destruction. Their aim was to get the whole Middle East in their grip, and thereby turn the whole world balance of power almost upside down.

Yet we cannot maintain a true "Fortress America," while permitting the Soviets to do what they choose with the world power balance. It is simply not a feasible thing to attempt.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Speaker, I want to commend my distinguished colleagues, Congressmen SPENCE, STRATTON, and CRANE, for requesting this time in order that the Members might have an opportunity to express their strong opinions on America's defense posture or lack of it. I can remember distinctly on an early fall afternoon in September of last year, when the late Mendel Rivers stood in the well of this House and in his own words begged and pleaded with the Members to become aware and take note of America's deteriorating defense posture. As chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, he was in a position to know of what he spoke. Unfortunately, no one took Mr. Rivers' advice. I hope the discussion this afternoon will have some effect on my colleagues and make them realize the precarious situation into which our Nation has fallen.

Congressman Rivers ended his remarks by quoting from President Nixon who said:

If the present trend continues, the United States, a very few years hence, will find itself clearly in second position—with the Soviet Union the greatest military power on earth.

Congressman Rivers followed by saying "I am afraid that that day has already arrived."

Mr. Speaker, what we seem to forget is that, in the last analysis, it is the American people who stand to lose everything if we fail to discharge our awesome responsibilities in respect to our national defense.

Consideration of the defense budget, contrary to what some would have us believe, is not a question of assigning relative priorities between defense and domestic programs.

Decisions on the defense budget should be based on the simple question of national survival—and nothing more. The issue should be "What Is Required To Survive?" and not "How should we allocate the national budget between defense and domestic programs?"

Mr. Speaker, I would like to deal specifically with our naval preparedness. I wonder how many of my colleagues realize that approximately 80 percent of the major ships in the Atlantic fleet are over 10 years old, and over 50 percent are over 20 years. The average age of the ships in the 6th Fleet is almost 19 years.

Those who are more knowledgeable than I on our naval might believe that our ships are capable of handling a contingency situation, but are only marginally capable of maintaining a high level of sustained operations.

At the same time, we find the Soviet Union building more modern ships that are capable of traveling anywhere on the high seas. We find the Russians flouting their seapower in the Mediterranean and assigning their nuclear submarines to patrol the coastline of America at a discreet distance. Even with these direct threats to our national security, some of us appear to sit back and be content. Some feel that by closing their eyes, it will just all go away.

The best way I know to describe the situation is to compare it to a football game. A few years ago we were entering the fourth quarter with a 20-point lead over the Russians. By next year or the next, we will be entering the fourth quarter with the score tied.

Mr. Speaker, it is time we all waked up and became aware of the deteriorating condition of our national defense posture. We need to face facts and realize that we can no longer sit back on our laurels and live on a reputation of the 1940's. This is 1971. Times have changed and we may find them changing even more and in a way none of us care to think about.

We cannot as a nation afford to spend one penny less on national defense than

that amount which is required to insure that you and I and the generations that will follow us can continue to live as free citizens in a free and democratic America.

Mr. DANIEL of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, a once mighty nation is moving inexorably toward the status of a second-class power.

That once mighty nation is the United States of America.

Beset with domestic problems, real and imagined, torn by the war in Vietnam, harassed by seemingly uncontrollable inflation, slowly succumbing to a hedonistic indifference and complacency that is not only frightening but shocking, this Nation, as a representative democracy, may well be in its death throes.

There are many things right in America. There is still more freedom in the United States than in any nation in the world. The people of our country are still the best fed, best clothed, and best housed in the world. For the first time, we are spending more money for health, education, and welfare than we are spending on national defense. But somewhere, somehow, our sense of values has become distorted. We seem more determined to bring about shorter working hours and higher wages and profits than we are in preserving the system that has made America the wealthiest nation in the world.

If we are not already a second-class naval power compared to the Soviets, then certainly we shall soon become a second-class naval power.

We are spending more money on Navy shipbuilding this year than we have since unification of the armed services. But even the amount we are seeking this year leaves us far behind in our goal to at least maintain parity with the Soviet Union.

The Soviets are building submarines at a fantastic rate, not less than six to eight per year, a production rate far in excess of ours. Their shipyard capacity is even greater. These are nuclear and Polaris-type submarines. In 3 or 4 years they will have the equivalent of our Polaris fleet and then they will surpass us. They are far ahead of us in their guided missile capability on board their naval vessels. They have passed us in the production of new fighter aircraft. And while they are flying a new medium range bomber, and new supersonic fighters, we are still arguing about the B–1, the F–14, and F–15.

No one can question the fact that the Soviets today have a definite superiority in intercontinental ballistic missiles. I am not making this statement based upon my own conclusions. Let me quote from the supplemental statement to the report of the Blue Ribbon Panel which noted the following trends in our defense posture:

First. The growing Soviet superiority in ICBM's;

Second. The Soviet commitment of greater resources than the United States to strategic offensive and defensive weapons, with the continued deployment thereof;

Third. The possibility that present U.S. technological superiority will be lost to the Soviet Union;

Fourth. The convincing evidence that the Soviet Union seeks a preemptive first-strike capability;

Fifth. The rapidly expanding Soviet naval capability; and

Sixth. The mounting hostility of segments of the public toward the military, the Defense Establishment and "the military-industrial complex," without due recognition that sustained irresponsible criticism could undermine and weaken the only forces which provide security for the United States.

The panel concluded that if these trends continue the United States will become a second-rate power incapable of assuring the future security and freedom of its people.

In the forward to "Jane's Fighting Ships," which is certainly not a parochial publication, you will find these words:

> The size and relative capabilities of the United States Navy continue to decline at what many authorities consider to be an alarming rate. This situation, hitherto discussed in closed sessions of naval officials and in this annual, is now being addressed openly. The Chief of Naval Operations has told Congress that the Navy has "a lower than prudent level of current forces" and has "been falling well behind a responsible replacement rate."

The only naval superiority that remains exclusively in American hands is the aircraft carrier and it must be perfectly clear by now that the days of the big carriers are rapidly coming to a close. They are irreplaceable, but they are not being replaced. They are as invulnerable to attack as anything that floats, but they have been made vulnerable by attacks from all sides by those who argue that welfare programs must supersede defense programs. They are frightfully expensive—but they are also indispensable.

Mr. Speaker, America may be approaching the eventide of its short and glorious history. It may even now be too late to stop the clock. And unless this Nation tightens its belt, restores its initiative, rekindles its patriotism, and recognizes the awesome challenge to its way of life, then in not too many years from now we may simply be a short paragraph in Soviet history books.

I read recently in a book by James Michener that—

> In this country we get stuck with taxes, but in the old country we used to get stuck with bayonets.

I am not an alarmist, but I am a realist, and that day may be closer than we think.

Mr. PODELL. Mr. Speaker, there are 46 nations that are presently receiving American military assistance. Several of these nations make no pretense of allowing their own citizens political freedom. Several others are using our aid not for defensive, but for offensive purposes. Still others are employing American weapons not to protect themselves from foreign aggression, but to suppress lawful dissent at home.

Thus, much of the congressional debate over our military assistance program has necessarily centered around negatively oriented problems: Which nations currently receiving aid are underserving? Which nations are abusing our friendship? Which nations should be excluded from the next year's program?

My purpose, however, approaches the foreign assistance dilemma from a different, more positive direction. It is not to see support taken away from any of our friends. Rather, it is to insure that a highly deserving nation, the State of Israel, does become a recipient of U.S. military assistance.

Mr. Speaker, it is unanimously agreed among all rational statesmen that Israel is the only democratic ally we have position in the Middle East. The massive infusion of Soviet arms into the Arab States has made the situation clear. Israel is the only democartic ally we have in that area of the world. If the international security interests of the United States are to be preserved, Israeli political and military integrity must likewise be preserved. Even President Nixon has stated:

> We support Israel because we oppose aggression in every form. We support Israel because it is threatened by Soviet imperialism and we support Israel because it offers hope in the Middle East.

The Presidential words echo a fine statement. However, as has happened so often, the State Department has failed to match noble sentiment with equally noble action.

Allow me to document for you a procession of newspaper headlines which successfully highlights the absurdity of our present Mideastern policy:

September 4, 1970: "Arms Survey Shows Aid by Soviet Has Rebuilt Arabs to Prewar Power."

March 30, 1971: "Survey Discloses Massive Buildup of Soviet Military Force in Egypt."

April 19, 1971: "Soviet Spur Arms Flow to Egypt."

April 23, 1971: "Egypt Reportedly Gets New Air Defense Missiles." And finally, the crowning irrationality, on July 13, 1971: "U.S. Aides See No Shift in Mideast Arms Balance."

Mr. Speaker, in view of the overwhelming evidence of the Soviet arms buildup, I find it incredible that our Government can assert that it sees no threat to Israeli security.

During the last 10 months, Egypt alone has received over 100 new Mig–21 fighters. Under a Soviet-Syrian military pact signed last February, Syria has already received 21 Mig–21's, five Sukhoi–7 fighter-bombers, and 22 MI–8 helicopters, designed for troop transport. Another Arab belligerent, Lybia, has over 100 fighter jets currently on order from France.

Perhaps even more significant than the huge quantities of arms being shipped to the Arabs, is the extremely advanced quality of these weapons. For while the United States has dawdled over selling our older model planes to Israel, Russia has been giving her newest, most sophisticated weapons to the Arab aggressors.

Among these new armaments are a squadron of Mig–23 Foxbat fighters. Reputed to be the world's fastest warplane, the Foxbat has been judged by Israel and the West to demonstrate a clear superiority over the aircraft currently flown by the Israelis.

The Soviets have also supplied to Egypt the new SA–4 surface-to-air missiles, with an effective range of 80,000 feet.

Finally, Russia has installed "Swamp" and "Markham," two electronic military communications systems which effectively link fighter planes, radar, ground troops, and gun emplacements.

We are all familiar with the jokes regarding Egyptian military incompetence. However, these jets are no longer applicable, for the new weapons systems are being manned almost exclusively by Russians. There is no longer any doubt that the Soviets have undertaken a major military gambit in the Middle East.

The question before us is then, "Just what is the United States going to do about the Soviet-Arab militarization?" Recent developments seem to indicate that the administration intends to do nothing. It is my purpose to spotlight this do-nothingness.

So that the public can finally see how we have spent billions in aid for 46 different nations—yet for the firmest, most democratic of our allies, the State of Israel, we have not granted one penny of assistance.

I firmly hope that Congress may not only discover, but may correct the inconsistencies and irrationalities in our policy.

Why, for example, are we supplying aid to several nations which neither deserve nor require American military assistance as urgently as Israel, when at the same time, we are even balking at our promise to sell supersonic planes to the Israelis?

Due to the classified nature of the information, I cannot at this time reveal any specific facts or figures. However, I do wish to announce my intention to introduce, legislation that would include Israel in future U.S. military assistance programs.

Mr. WYMAN. Mr. Speaker, for the first time since the War of 1812 this Nation has genuine cause for concern as to its national security. The decade of the sixties witnessed the defense posture of the United States plummet from unquestioned superiority to the point where potential enemies have reason to seriously consider blackmailing the United States into submission to the will of another nation.

The Soviet Union today has deployed and operational more intercontinental ballistic missiles than does the United States targeted so as to wipe out most of our land-based ability to retaliate against attack. More ominous is the Soviet Union's research and development effort involving rapid and substantial increases in their already awesome first- and second-strike capability.

Russian research and development has also provided the Soviet tactical forces with a new fighter design almost every 18 months. The United States is not scheduled to have a new fighter until 1975—and this at a time when Soviet tactical aircraft are operationally superior to our most advanced.

Most alarming in the U.S. overall defense posture is the deplorable status of the U.S. Navy. The latest edition of the authoritative Jane's Fighting Ships credits the Soviet Union with superpower status in terms of its naval vessels in-being and rates the U.S. Navy as inferior at the present time, with the situation steadily worsening. Even after reducing the fleet to a 700-ship level, most of those remaining are at least 20 years old and many date back to World War II. Few modern replacements have been authorized and fewer are actually on the way. The Soviet Union, however, is presently expanding its new and efficient navy at three times the rate of the United States. At the same time, the Soviets are constructing additional shipyards to further accelerate their naval expansion. As with tactical aircraft and missiles, the Soviets have taken the lead in the oceans of the world and are making every effort to increase their lead.

The disquieting Soviet military advantage coincides with a rise in isolationism and antimilitary feeling in this country which is based on the naive belief that even defensive weapons, rather than the aggressive designs of men and nations, are the true causes of war. This is simply not so. In the rush to satisfy domestic priorities such as exist in no other nation, the damage to our defense capabilities is appalling. We cannot put the cart before the horse. It is impossible for this Nation to advance the principles upon which it is founded without first assuring freedom from outside aggression. Often forgotten is that in the last analysis, it is the American people who stand to lose a 200-year experiment in freedom—an experiment in which the well-being of the individual has risen to heights never before equaled. We, as representatives of the American people, cannot afford to fail in our responsibilities to provide an adequate national defense.

The following articles further illustrating the precarious state of our defense efforts merit serious consideration:

NIXON'S BIG TASK: DEFENSE FUNDING

(By William S. White)

Democratic defense leaders are privately pleading for more Republican help to beat off a gathering new-liberal, neo-isolationist assault upon the administration's military budget that is, in fact, by far the gravest challenge President Nixon has yet faced.

For while many have seen Senate rejection of two of the President's southern nominees to the Supreme Court as his most profound defeats ever, these would indeed be fairly relative to a loss by him of control of the defense posture of this nation.

The Senate's refusal to confirm Judges Clement Haynsworth and Harrold Carswell was no mere tap on the presidential wrist, to be sure. Still, he has already partly recaptured initiative there by bringing Associate Justice Harry A. Blackmun through to Senate confirmation, and there is no doubt that before too long Mr. Nixon will have put another conservative court appointee through the Senate.

So the President will ultimately win this war. To lose the war for the Pentagon's budget, however, would be an irreversible disaster, both in terms of our national safety and of Mr. Nixon's own authority as commander-in-chief.

For wild, deep cuts in military spending are now being demanded by a highly emotionalized and mixed bag of plain, old-fashioned budget-slashers, conscientious objectors to any and all wars or even defense appropriations, and howling evangels for limitless appropriations for domestic reforms. These people confront national security with its greatest crisis since the isolationists of the '30s very nearly destroyed our entire military establishment.

Such highly responsible men as the chairman of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, Sen. John Stennis of Mississippi and Rep. F. Edward Hébert of Louisiana, are thus poignantly aware of the magnitude of the job ahead of them.

It is not merely that so many of the headlined Democratic senatorial candidates for President are in headlong flight from the maintenance of adequate American military power before increasing Soviet military power. There is the immense complication that substantial ranks of liberal Republicans in Congress have joined the clamor against "militarism." Their rhetoric is almost word for word an echo of some three decades ago while Hitler was rising in Germany and the Japanese war lords were following suit in the Pacific.

Then, the leader of the isolationists, Sen. Gerald Nye of North Dakota, was running a high-decibel propaganda "investigation" against "the merchants of death." A rather less hysterical description of these fellows was that they were simply men who were trying to make such weapons of defense as were minimally vital against the onset of what everybody but the isolationist could see was the gathering storm of the second World War.

Interestingly, the leader of the new isolationists, the new adversaries of the despised Pentagon, is also from the upper Middle West, which more than any other section has for generations tended to believe that to see-no-evil and hear-no-evil was the best guarantee of "peace." The new Gerald Nye is Sen. William Proxmire of Wisconsin.

The great American war lover of old was a Democratic President named Franklin D. Roosevelt—who was, in fact, all but frantically trying to keep this country neutral. Now the great American war lover is a Republican President called Richard Nixon—who is, in fact, all but frantically trying to withdraw from Vietnam without intolerable loss of American honor and national interest.

We barely made it 30 years ago in the matter of an adequate defense establishment. And, with all our belated rearmament, we should possibly have been thrown off the Normandy beaches—and quite possibly have lost the war then and there—had fate given us three more days of the foul weather that hit us on D-Day. Those who were there know and remember this; it is a pity that those who were not do not and cannot.

[From the Manchester Union Leader, Feb. 1, 1971]

ADMIRAL RICKOVER EXPLAINS NAVY REQUIREMENTS: NUCLEAR WARSHIPS NEEDED FOR U.S. SECURITY

(By Adm. Hyman G. Rickover)

We are returning from the post-refueling sea trials of the USS Enterprise (CVAN65), our first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. The ship completed all tests, including full power operation, powered by her new design reactor cores which have enough fuel to last more than 10 years. The Enterprise was overhauled and refueled by her builder, the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. of Newport News, Va.

The Enterprise was commissioned Nov. 25, 1961. She operated three years before her first refueling, including a 30,000 mile cruise around the world without logistic support with the nuclear Long Beach and the nuclear frigate Bainbridge in 1964.

Following her first refueling, the Enterprise operated four years on her second set of reactor cores, including four deployments to Vietnam before entering the shipyard for her second refueling and overhaul. The En-

terprise has steamed more than 500,000 miles to date.

During the last year the Enterprise has been completely overhauled and reactor cores of an entirely new design have been installed in her eight reactor plants. These new cores contain energy equivalent to the amount of oil which could be carried on a train of tank cars stretching from Washington to Boston. This will provide her enough fuel to carry out all operations for the next 10–13 years, thus making her truly independent of fuel logistics support.

The new nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, Nimitz (CVAN68) and Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVAN69), now under construction at Newport News, will each have two reactors which will produce about as much power as the eight reactors in the Enterprise. The initial reactor cores to be installed in the Nimitz class carriers will provide for 13 years of ship operations without refueling.

We now have three nuclear-powered guided missile ships in operation, the cruiser Long Beach, the frigate Bainbridge and the frigate Truxtun. Two more are under construction: the frigates California and South Carolina. Funds have also been appropriated for the first two ships of a new class of nuclear frigates called the DLGN38 class and advance procurement funds have been appropriated for three more. The Navy plans to build more nuclear frigates in later years.

Nuclear power in surface warships gives them the ability to operate continuously at high speed which affords them protection not available to nonnuclear ships. This can mean the difference between winning and losing battles. As the number of our advance bases decreases and the size of the Fleet shrinks the need for ships independent of the logistic umbilical cord for propulsion fuel will continue to increase.

Next to providing the major deterrent to all-out nuclear war, the most important mission of our Navy is to insure that our first line naval striking forces can carry out their mission against the threats the Soviets are presently developing. A significant portion of our surface warships must be nuclear-powered or we may end up without a credible deterrent to Communist encroachments which do not warrant escalation to a nuclear war.

As the Soviets achieve parity in nuclear weapons strength, a credible deterrent against lower levels of aggression becomes vital. As recent developments have shown, we can no longer rely on the threat of nuclear war to stop Communist aggression unless the issue is so vital to us that we are willing to risk destroying ourselves to resolve it.

INVITES DISASTER

To structure our defenses on Vietnam-type wars and let our capability to hold our own in a larger nonnuclear war go by default is to invite disaster. It is widely understood that American nuclear superiority over the past 25 years has deterred nuclear war; it is not as widely understood that our naval superiority over this period has deterred lesser wars.

If we do not maintain the capability to operate our first line naval striking forces in all areas our national interests dictate, we will have given up the ability to carry out sustained military operations away from our shores, not only by the Navy but by the other services as well.

For the foreseeable future the aircraft carrier will be the principal offensive striking arm of the Navy in a nonnuclear war. No other weapon system under development can replace the long-range sustained, concentrated firepower of the carrier air wing.

Torpedo-firing nuclear submarines, cruise missile-firing nuclear submarines, nuclear frigates with antiair and antisubmarine capabilities, are all needed to supplement and augment the capabilities of the nuclear carrier.

Our carriers are vulnerable to attack by Soviet cruise missiles—as are all surface ships. However, the first line of defense our surface ships have against such missiles and their launchers is carrier based aircraft. Without carriers and their aircraft, other warships, replenishment ships and amphibious forces would all be much more vulnerable.

The nuclear carrier task force with its capability of unlimited operation at high speed is the most powerful, least vulnerable surface ship force in the history of naval warfare.

FUEL UNNECESSARY

Nuclear-powered carrier task forces can steam at high speeds without concern for fuel conservation or slowing to refuel. When necessary, nuclear ships can steam at high speeds to areas of low threat for replenishment of combat consumables such as weapons and aircraft fuel. These options are not available to conventionally powered ships.

Oil-fired warships must be refueled every few days, their operations will be restricted if the tankers they need are sunk or diverted by the presence of enemy ships. The United States lost more than 130 tankers in the World War II Atlantic Campaign, mostly due to German submarines an order of magnitude slower and less capable than the submarines the Soviets have today. The Germans started World War II with 57 submarines. The Soviets today have 350 submarines at least 85 being nuclear-powered.

Some have objected to nuclear warships on the basis of higher initial investment cost. These ships are often compared in cost with cheaper conventional ships of much lesser military capability, the argument being that we should build more of the cheaper conventional ships rather than fewer of the nuclear ships.

Yet study after study has shown that when all costs are considered nuclear warships cost little more than conventional warships having the same weapons systems—and the nuclear warships are far superior militarily.

Further, the cost of war itself far exceeds any cost needed to be prepared to prevent a war. The best warships we can build, hence the cheapest, are those which are never used in combat because they have served to prevent war.

With the heavy military and nonmilitary demands on the budget the United States must only spend where it is necessary and where the value received is clear. But the real value of having a Navy capable of countering the Soviet threat cannot be measured in dollars alone; our survival may depend on it.

The Soviets recognize the importance of becoming the world's strongest sea power.

We have now chosen not to challenge them with numbers of ships. It is, therefore, essential that the ships we do build are the most powerful and effective weapons we know how to build.

This means nuclear propulsion for major warships. The penalty for any other approach is the steady erosion of our conventional military forces; a consequent reduction in our influence and in our "options" in world affairs; and the reliance for our security on a nuclear weapons force which, if used, could mark the supreme failure of mankind.

[From the New York Times, July 29, 1971]

JANE'S SAYS U.S. FLEET DECLINES WHILE SOVIET HAS A "SUPERNAVY"

LONDON, July 29.—A British military expert said today that American naval strength in a serious decline while the Soviet fleet has expanded into a "supernavy" with a greatly increased sphere of influence.

"The situation for the U.S. Navy is serious," Raymond V. B Blackman, editor of the authoritative Jane's Fighting Ships, said in a foreword to the 1971–72 edition, published today.

"By any standards," Mr. Blackman added, "the Soviet fleet now represents the supernavy."

He wrote:

"So prolific has the Soviet naval shipbuilding effort been that the U.S.S.R. is now able to maintain a standing naval force in the Mediterranean five times stronger than five years ago to counter the American Sixth Fleet.

"Again, five years ago the U.S.S R. had no warships in the Indian Ocean, but today there are a score of surface ships alone, and there is no telling how many Soviet submarines are in the area."

ROLE OF MISSILE BOATS

Mr. Blackman underlined a relatively new development in "the recognition, not only by major powers but also by smaller countries, of the tactical power and strategic influence of the fast and diminutive warship armed with the optimum payload of guided missiles."

An alarming feature of the last decade, he said, was the rapidly increasing cost of building fighting ships. "Confronted with this escalation problem several of the smaller countries decided that the answer was smaller and cheaper vessels," he wrote.

"The diminutive missile boats with surface-to-surface systems will give smaller navies an offensive power out of all proportion to their modest over-all size."

Norman Polmar, editor of the American section of the 729-page annual, painted a gloomy picture of the United States naval development.

"The size and relative capabilities of the United States Navy," he said, "continue to decline at what many authorities consider to be an alarming rate. The force levels of the fiscal year 1972 budget reduce several categories of warship to their lowest strengths for a decade."

This has affected nearly all categories of vessels except aircraft carriers, in which the American Navy "now and for the near future maintains a decisive advantage," he said

The Soviet Union, however, "has already exceeded the United States in active surface ship and submarine numbers, including near parity in nuclear submarine strength and a larger nuclear submarine construction program," Mr. Polmar wrote. "In some respects the characteristics and capabilities of the Soviet ships obviously are superior to those of their U.S. Navy counterpart."

[From the Boston Herald Traveler, July 29, 1971]

U.S. NAVY DECLINE SEEN SERIOUS

(By Louis Nevin)

LONDON.—A British miltary expert said today that American naval strength is in a serious decline while the Soviet fleet has expanded into a "super navy" with a greatly increased sphere of influence.

"The situation for the U.S. Navy is serious," Raymond V. B. Blackman, editor of the authoritative Jane's Fighting Ships, said in foreward to the 1971–1972 edition, published today.

"By any standards," Blackman added, "the Soviet fleet now represents the supernavy of a superpower."

Increasing Soviet naval power, he said, has led to "a somewhat belated but now acute awareness evinced by hitherto quite autonomous navies of the need for international cooperation and mutual security."

This brought greater cooperation in both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, he said, but the British withdrawal from the Indian Ocean left a hole in Western global defenses.

"The prime necessity would appear to be a multinational Standing Naval Force East, comprising warships seconded from each of the countries with military or commercial

interests in that oceanic hemisphere from South Africa to Indonesia," Blackman said.

He wrote: "So prolific has the Soviet naval shipbuilding effort been that the U.S.S.R. is now able to maintain a standing naval force in the Mediterranean five times stronger than five years ago to counter the American 6th Fleet.

"Again, five years ago the U.S.S.R. had no warships in the Indian Ocean, but today there are a score of surface ships alone, and there is no telling how many Soviet submarines are in the area."

Blackman underlined a relatively new development in "the recognition, not only by major powers but also by smaller countries, of the tactical power and strategic influence of the fast and diminutive warship armed with the optimum payload of guided missiles."

He added: "Ironically it is the new world sea power of the Soviet Union which had engendered the yen for cooperation, and it is the Soviet navy which has pointed the way to the ascendency of the missile boat over much larger orthodox warships."

An alarming feature of the past decade, he said, was the rapidly increasing cost of building fighting ships. "Confronted with this escalation problem several of the smaller countries decided that the answer was smaller and cheaper vessels," he wrote.

"The diminutive missile boats with surface-to-surface systems will give smaller navies an offensive power out of all proportion to their modest over-all size . . ."

Norman polmar, editor of the American section of the 729-page annual, painted a gloomy picture of U.S. naval development.

"The size and relative capabilities of the United States Navy," he said, "continue to decline at what many authorities consider to be an alarming rate . . .

"The force levels of the fiscal year 1972 budget reduce several categories of warship to their lowest strengths for a decade." This affected nearly all categories of vessels except aircraft carriers, in which the American Navy "now and for the near future maintains a decisive advantage," he said.

The Soviet navy, however, "has already exceeded the United States in active surface ship and submarine numbers, including near parity in nuclear submarine strength and a larger nuclear submarine construction program," Polmar wrote.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Speaker, the 30 destroyers provided by the DD–963 program are urgently required as a vitally important segment of the Navy's future ASW force structure. Let me, for a few minutes, expand on why this need is so pressing at this time.

Although the U.S.S.R. is basically self-sufficient in that she can secure essentially all the raw materials she requires from the Eurasian Continent and does not have to rely on sea communication—the United States and its allies are not. Yet, the self-sufficient Soviets are continuing to expand their seapower while ours is being reduced. There is little doubt that the Soviets understand the geographic importance of seapower.

Our Navy's primary task is to insure that the sealines of communication are maintained—unbroken—in order to sustain our overseas forces and our allies. Today, the Soviet Navy is appearing in all the oceans of the world. Their large submarine force, in particular, constitutes a challenge to our primary task. Remember that in late 1942 the Germans, with only about 65 subs at sea in the Atlantic almost succeeded in severing our vital sealanes of communications. The Russians have almost six times that number, and to underestimate this threat could be fatal. We can only maintain our sealanes by a dedicated, modern Navy with adequtae resources in terms of modern ships and aircraft.

Because of this submarine threat, the U.S. Navy must have capable up-to-date ASW units. The backbone of any ASW force is the destroyer. It is the destroyer which has the speed and seakeeping qualities to keep up with our fast task forces and high speed, high value military convoys. These ships must be able to carry out protracted ASW missions at high speeds and in all sea conditions anywhere in the world. The destroyer has always been and will continue to be known as the workhorse of the Navy. A modern, capable destroyer force composed of adequate numbers of ships is more essential to our country's defense today than ever before.

Today, more than 25 years after World War II, the greatest portion of the fleet's destroyer force consists of ships whose basic design stems from the late 1930's and whose construction was completed in the early 1940's. These ships have been modernized to the limits permitted by their basic hull and machinery. The fact is that they are not capable of being further updated.

The DD–963 class destroyers, which have been optimized for ASW, are in part, the replacements for overage destroyers now in the fleet. The Navy has consistently reported to Congress the requirement for a minimum of 30 of these ships, which is far from a 1-for-1 replacement.

From the beginning, the objective of the DD–963 program has been to deliver highly capable, multipurpose destroyers to the fleet through series production of a standard design at a reasonable cost. All weapons and sensors for the DD–963 were selected from those available systems that have already been in production, or systems that will have completed extensive tests and proofing prior to being installed. I think it is important to stress that the program is no longer in the study phase but is now under development and production. We are not involved in guesswork or speculation—no research is involved.

There has been some talk that the DD–963 will be only comparable to its Soviet counterparts at sea today. This is not so. For its expressed purpose, the DD–963 has the best ASW weapons and electronic systems available. Its staying power, habitability, and growth features are the best yet developed by our Navy, and in those areas it will be far superior to any Soviet ship. In fact, Navy information shows that the DD–963 will be the best ASW ship in any navy.

There also has been some talk that the DD–963 program will be delayed by the LHA program. This is not so, either. To date, all contract milestones have been met and the program is on schedule.

Finally, the DD–963 program is the product of over 4 years of careful step-by-step planning which has resulted in a ship that will carry the most effective and modern weapons, sensors, and other equipments available. This program has already been subjected to unusually detailed and well-documented review by the Congress. It has gone beyond the initial funding stage. The contract was executed June 23, 1970, and funds have already been appropriated for nine ships: three in fiscal year 1970 and six in fiscal year 1971. The fiscal year 1972 Defense authorization bill now before Congress contains a requirement for the seven-ship third increment. Cost estimates have not changed since last year's program presentation, except for estimates of escalation. Any reduction in the 30-ship program would involve substantial cancellation costs and reduce any savings in cost that accrue from a multiyear contract. I urge Members of Congress to support full funding for the seven DD–963's now in the budget before Congress.

Mr. WHITE. Mr. Speaker, the weakness of our strategic defense doctrine is becoming more apparent every day. For example, rather than being able to quickly settle the dispute with the Soviet Union over the Middle East as we were able to do in 1956, we are now forced into an inconclusive and dangerous period of dealing with the Soviets when we are unable to influence their actions through diplomatic means. This is partly due to the vast growth in Soviet strategic forces.

While the United States has been clinging to the "assured destruction" doctrine of national defense for almost 10 years since it was forced upon the Department of Defense, the Soviet Union has been seeking strategic superiority. Rather than stopping at "parity" as Secretary McNamara assured us they would, the Soviet Union has been building strategic nuclear forces at a rate which far exceeds any plausible requirement of deterrence.

The result is that the task of the Department of Defense has become to assure the vulnerability of the citizens of the United States—in service of a doctrine that is without logical or empirical support for any of its premises.

The assured destruction doctrine has been concisely analyzed by Dr. Donald G. Brennan, a staff member of the Hudson Institute in an article published in the New York Times, entitled "Strategic Alternatives I and II" on May 24–25, 1971. While I may not necessarily endorse all its arguments, I think much of what is said should be considered, and therefore, I include the complete text of Dr. Brennan's essay in the RECORD:

STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES: I

(By Donald G. Brennan)

American strategic nuclear policy has been dominated in recent years by an idea called "assured destruction." This concept is that the dominant task of the U.S. strategic forces is to be able to mount a nuclear attack that would reliably destroy a substantial fraction of the Soviet society, even after a major Soviet strike on American forces. Recent public statements of the Nixon Administration have emphasized a doctrine called "strategic sufficiency." Although published formulations of this doctrine are ambiguous, it is clear that something like the concept of "assured destruction" still dominates American strategic policy, even if the terminology itself is no longer used in official statements.

This domination extends to strategic arms-control matters. It is widely argued that the

most peaceful, stable, secure, cheap, and generally desirable arrangement is one in which we and the Soviets maintain a "mutual assured destruction" posture, in which no serious effort is made by either side to limit the civilian damage that could be inflicted by other. Most of the opposition in the West to substantial systems of missile defense for cities and some of the opposition to the Safeguard ABM system derives from the alleged benefits of such a posture. This is pertinent to the forthcoming Soviet-American negotiations on offensive and defensive forces announced by President Nixon last Thursday.

I believe that the concept of mutual assured destruction provides one of the few instances in which the obvious acronym for something yields at once the appropriate description for it; that is, a Mutual Assured Destruction posture as a goal is, almost literally, mad, MAD.

If the forces of technology and international politics provided absolutely no alternative, one might reluctantly accept a MAD posture. But to think of it as desirable—for instance, as a clearly preferred goal of our arms-control negotiations, as many current proposals automatically assume—is bizarre. This can be made very clear by considering the simplest and most effective means of realizing it.

At present, we and the Soviets achieve a MAD posture by means of long-range missiles and bombers armed with thermonuclear weapons. There are, however, many problems associated with these forces; missiles and bombers may be attacked before they are launched, they may fail to perform properly, or they may fail to penetrate enemy defenses. Concern about such vulnerabilities in our posture helps drive the arms race. These forces are also expensive; the U.S. alone spends about $2 billion a year on them.

Now, if it were genuinely desirable to have a MAD posture, we could achieve it far more effectively, reliably and cheaply than at present. As Leo Szilard remarked ten years ago, we and the Soviets could have an arms-control agreement to mine each other's cities. We could install very large thermonuclear weapons with secure firing arrangements in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and so on, while the Soviets could install similar weapons and arrangements in New York City, Chicago, Los Angeles, and so on. It is technically feasible to make such a system very secure, and the vulnerabilities mentioned above could be eliminated, which would reduce arms race pressures. While such a system would have its own technical problems, analysis indicates they would be far simpler to solve than those of the present system. It would also be much cheaper than the current system; it could have billions.

Yet almost everyone will judge it starkly absurd, even after consideration. And, since a mined-city system is clearly the best way of realizing a MAD posture, it follows that a MAD posture as a goal is itself fundamentally absurd—it is, indeed, mad.

This reduction-to-absurdity argument is useful for sharply drawing attention to the fact that something must be wrong with MAD as a way of life. However, one can discuss the problems of MAD directly. There are at least three interrelated problems.

The first is that, in spite of our best efforts, a major nuclear war could happen. An institutionalized MAD posture is a way of insuring, now and forever, that the outcome of such a war would be a nearly unlimited disaster for everybody. While technology and politics may conspire for a time to leave us temporarily in such a posture, we should not welcome it—we should rather be looking for ways out of it. And they can be found.

The second fundamental difficulty is, in essence, political: The body politic of the United States did not create a Department of Defense for the purpose of deliberately making us all hostages to enemy weapons. The Government is supposed, according to the Constitution, to "provide for the common defense," and plainly most Americans would revolt at the idea that a mined-city system is a sensible way to do this. They would be quite right. The Defense Department should be more concerned with assuring live Americans than dead Russians.

The third fundamental difficulty is moral. We should not deliberately create a system in which millions of innocent civilians would, by intention, be exterminated in a failure of the system. The system is not that reliable. If we accept a MAD posture as an interim solution, we should be seeking ways out of it, not ways to enshrine it.

Tomorrow I shall discuss alternative directions for strategic policy and arms control.

STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES: II

(By Donald G. Brennan)

Yesterday I explained that many people regard a posture of Mutual Assured Destruction—MAD—as a desirable objective of our arms-control policy. I also explained that a mined-city system was obviously the most efficient way of achieving a MAD posture, and, since the mined-city system was clearly absurd, it followed that a MAD posture itself must be absurd.

Why, then, do some Americans advocate a MAD posture? The advocates involved are, in the main, technical or technically oriented people accustomed to theoretical models, and the arguments involve appeals to "stability" of various kinds and references to other sophisticated jargon—jargon that I understand very well, having helped to articulate it a decade and more ago. For instance, one argument sometimes heard is that this posture will best protect against nuclear war altogether, but this proposition is very dubious indeed.

While these advocates are undoubtedly sincere, and many of them are even intelligent, I believe have been bemused by theoretical models of strategic interactions, models which seem sophisticated and intellectually appealing but which are in fact much oversimplified descriptions of reality. Indeed, some few technical people, who have at least had the integrity to follow the logic of their analysis to its conclusion, have been so bemused by these models that they have seriously advocated the actual deployment of a mined city system.

Well, if an institutionalized MAD posture is not desirable as a permanent way of life, and it is not, what alternative is available? The answer is to provide increasing emphasis on defense, and corresponding reduction in the relative effort devoted to strategic offensive forces.

There is much controversy about just how effective defense (such as ABM) can be made against current offensive forces, or against further enlarged offensive forces. I cannot discuss this controversy here. However, there is very little controversy over the fact that defense can be made quite effective if the opposing offense is held down or actually reduced, while allowed defense is built up. This is precisely the direction that negotiations in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks should be taking, but, so far as I can see, have not yet been taking. The forthcoming negotiation on offensive and defensive forces will provide both Governments with a good opportunity to pursue this possibility.

Even if it were held that currently achievable defense is too ineffective to be useful against even a suitably reduced offensive threat (a position that few informed persons would believe), it makes little sense to preclude the possibility of a more effective defense being found in the future. Most of the current approaches to these matters would do so.

It might be possible to achieve similar effects simply by sharply reducing offensive forces, without any defense, if it were not for two factors: (a) there are other countries in the world besides the United States and the Soviet Union, and (b) perfect inspection of sharply reduced offensive forces probably cannot be achieved, and defense can provide protection against clandestine weapons.

The most desirable postures providing increased defensive emphasis would be those achievable through negotiations with the Soviets. If such negotiations should fail, other alternatives, though less desirable, are available. I believe a sensible unilateral American strategic program would be governed by the following three rules:

The Budget Rule. We should spend about as much money on strategic offensive and defensive forces combined as the Soviets do, neither greatly more, which might stimulate arms-race effects, nor greatly less, which would leave us in a position of increasing risk.

I shall, for obvious reasons, call this the Brass Rule. In terms of possible strategic nuclear wars, we should be able to do about as badly unto the Soviets as they can do unto us. This makes its unlikely that the Soviets could "dictate" terms to the United States in a crisis. Note that this formulation—in contrast to the McNamara formulation of "assured destruction"—leaves open the possibility of reducing our threat to the Soviets, if their threat to us can be reduced by whatever means.

The Defense Rule. Of the money provided by the Budget Rule, spend as much on defense as is compatible with the Brass Rule. For the foreseeable future, this would require major continued expenditures on offense.

We should not be busily engaged in forging a permanent Sword of Damocles, to hang forever over our heads, by our own design and efforts. It is too likely to fail. We should rather devote our best efforts to escaping from this MAD posture. The alternatives are available.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to bring to the attention of my colleagues an extremely interesting study written by Mr. Frank J. Johnson. This article, entitled "America In Danger," paints an alarming picture of the shifting balance in military power now underway. Mr. Johnson is a magna cum laude graduate in international affairs from Dartmouth University with a M.A. from Johns Hopkins University where he specialized in Soviet affairs.

As a member of the House Committee on Internal Security I am intimately familiar with the increasing domestic unrest which has characterized our Nation for at least the last 5 years. Internal subversion is a real and pressing problem with which members of the House Committee on Internal Security are trying to cope. However, as Mr. Johnson points out in this article, we must not let our internal problems distract us from maintenance of the defenses necessary to forestall an armed attack on the United States by the Soviet Union and, if such an attack should occur despite our best efforts, enable us to emerge from war the winner.

The Soviet Politboro has been concentrating its attacks against our Nation in various interrelated fields of unarmed revolutionary warfare up to this point. They have been conducting what one of the greatest military theoreticians of all

time, Karl von Clausewitz, referred to as "war in the wider sense." The fact that they have been using this approach up to now does not mean that they will not resort to the use of nuclear weapons to bring about the revolution should the opportunity to successfully utilize them arise. If the 250,000 demonstrators which assembled in our Nation's Capital last spring had been 250,000 members of the Red army, the situation today would be quite different.

Mr. Johnson points out that there is overwhelming evidence that the Soviet Union is constructing its strategic offensive and defense forces in such a manner as to acquire a first-strike capability against the United States. Although there are some who state that it is impossible to achieve such a capability we can very easily visualize situations where a disarming first strike on the United States is clearly possible within the not too distant future. A first-strike capability consists of being able to lower the U.S. retaliatory capability, through the use of counterforce offensive weapons and ballistic missile defense, both active such as ABM and passive civil defense procedures, below that level of damage which the Soviet Politboro would consider unacceptable. We know that the Soviet Union has immense missiles such as the SS–9 with a 25-megaton warhead capacity, and a strategic defensive system which the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Strategic Air Command has characterized in these words:

By almost any yardstick, overall Soviet aerospace defenses are the strongest in the world.

The Soviets long ago went beyond any reasonable force level which is designed simply for deterrence. A first-strike capability on the part of the Soviet Union is not only easily conceivable but it is apparent that they are moving toward the point where the reality of the relative strategic military balance will coincide with the conception. I would like to remind all my colleagues that the head of the Strategic Air Command, Gen. Bruce K. Holloway, stated before the Senate Committee on the Armed Services just last April that in his opinion:

This country is in greater danger today than it was at the time of Pearl Harbor or at any time, in my judgment, since the 18th century, but the danger isn't generally recognized.

I would have to agree wholeheartedly with General Holloway's evaluation of the situation. The question is, What can we do about it? One fact Mr. Johnson mentions several times is that the United States had denied itself a damage-limiting option for its missile force even though the state of the art allows us to give our ICBM's such a capability. General Holloway testified before the House Committee on Armed Services that nothing had a higher priority as far as he was concerned. He also testified that the Department of Defense did not request that our strategic forces be upgraded to include this essential damage-limiting capability.

The reason for this reluctance to make our strategic rocket weapons as accurate as they might be, seems to be that some of our policymakers are enmeshed in a vicious theory concerning the effect of counterforce weaponry on stability. They hold that a counterforce damage-limiting capability on the part of the United States, that is the ability to limit damage to ourselves through knocking out Soviet strategic offensive missiles prior to launch, may lead the Soviets to believe that we are contemplating a first strike and thus motivate them to strike first in a crisis situation. It is interesting to note in this context that some of these same people do not seem to regard the Soviet counterforce weapons as destabilizing or, if they do, would simply prefer not to mention the fact, since they are usually not only opposed to increasing the accuracy of our missile force, but also opposed to the construction of an ABM system which would help protect our land-based Minutemen from the Soviet counterforce weaponry.

In any case what would seem to be an obvious fact, that an adequate defensive posture must include the capability to eliminate enemy weapons prior to launch as well as after launch, seems to have become lost in the semantic shuffle. An example will serve to illustrate the extreme peril in which we are placing ourselves by refusing to perform a relatively inexpensive modification of our existing forces so that they will have a forward damage-limiting capability.

The time period when the Soviets were projected to have the capability to critically degrade our land-based Minuteman force was 1975 until, in February of this year, construction of new large Soviet silos was observed. This projection is now, according to testimony of Dr. John S. Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, obsolete. This construction of new missile fields is taking place during the SALT talks.

Although we are now satellite basing our strategic bomber force, dispersing them to a number of airfields away from our coast to increase the time available for takeoff in case the Soviets decide to attack them with their growing SLBM force, the B–1 bomber, with its much faster reaction time, will not be deployed until 1980. By the time the B–1 enters the force we will probably be down to a strategic bomber level numbering approximately 225 G and H model B–52's. To put this in perspective, our strategic bomber force numbered 1,500 in 1961. At the same time, Soviet deployment of Y-class ballistic nuclear submarines—similar to our Polaris—is proceeding at a much faster rate than originally projected, and they will probably equal us in numbers of Polaris-type subs by early 1974.

These two factors taken together lead me to believe that should present trends continue, Soviet momentum in deployment of new weapons systems, and lack of appropriate U.S. response will, in the not too distant future, result in the survivability of both our Minuteman force and our bomber force being in grave doubt. These two increments of our strategic triad contain 92 percent of our deliverable megatonnage. Should the Soviets be able to destroy our land-based Minutemen through the use of their SS–9's and new missile system, and our strategic bomber force through the use of SLBM's, this would leave us with 25 to 30 Polaris-Poseidon submarines, assuming that the Soviets do not make a breakthrough in ASW techniques, on station and ready to retaliate.

The Soviets on the other hand will still have unlaunched a force of 900 SS–11 ICBM's—similar to our Minuteman—in hardened silos, plus about 100 SS–3's—also similar to our Minuteman. Due to the influence of the "assured destruction doctrine" on our force structure neither our Polaris nor our new Poseidon have the ability to neutralize this Soviet countercity reserve force. Our SLBM's can only be used against civilian-industrial targets and are ineffective against hardened missiles such as the SS–11. We have only two options.

If stability has anything to do with preventing the Soviet Union from acquiring a first-strike capability and if stability implies anything, it implies this: failing to equip our Polaris-Poseidon force with warheads which can be delivered with enough accuracy to deny the Soviets an invulnerable missile force is highly destabilizing.

It is time we all came to grips with the reality of present-day conditions. By limiting our own strategic options, specifically by failing to equip our missile forces with a damage limiting option, we are increasing Soviet options and undermining the credibility of our deterrent.

The following study, written for distribution by the American Conservative Union by Mr. Johnson and released in July 1970, merits careful consideration and I include it at this point in the RECORD:

AMERICA IN DANGER—THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION; THE SHIFT IN THE BALANCE OF POWER

From the beginning of the so-called "cold war" the principal weakness in the American conduct of that struggle has been the factor of will. Except, perhaps, for the era of Louis Johnson (Secretary of Defense under President Truman), preceding the Korean War, the military power has been available to accomplish almost any objective to which the U.S. Government and the nation set its mind. Had it been the Soviet Union which enjoyed the atomic monopoly in 1945, rather than the U.S., the world today would quite probably be controlled by Moscow through means of nuclear blackmail against any nation that might not "cooperate." No such "solution" to the problem of peace was ever open to the United States because of our national character; we are not aggressors. Our great military advantage did offer us, however, the valid option of an uncompromising defense of national freedom—a defense which could have prevented—or at least undone—the subjugation of Eastern Europe, China, and Cuba, and which might have contributed to favorable political changes within the Soviet Union itself.

But we failed this historical test. Time and again we settled for half-hearted compromises in response to Communist moves and ignored opportunities to exploit the dissensions and weaknesses of our opponents. The Communists have always been encouraged to keep on trying in the knowledge that the price of failure would be limited. For twenty-

five years we have sought to deny Douglas MacArthur's great dictum that "in war there is no substitute for victory." It could not, it cannot be done. Not when the enemy's own objective is total victory over us.

Our failure to act decisively when the military advantage lay overwhelmingly with us may well prove to be ultimately suicidal. The United States is coming now into quite a new situation. In conjunction with the accelerating erosion of our political will to defend order and stability in the world (to be the world's policeman), there is occurring a pronounced adverse shift in the military balance of power. This means that before long, we may find ourselves without the effective capability to defend our friends and allies, and finally not even ourselves, when the chips are really down.

Granted, to some it is somewhat superfluous to worry about the roof blowing off when the walls are already leaking so badly that the water is up to the armpits inside the house. Why worry that the Soviets have passed us in numbers of ICBMs when the much more urgent problem is plainly one of internal revolution and domestic disintegration?

The answer is that the Soviet Union thinks it important, notwithstanding Weathermen, Black Panthers, the Workers' (Communist) Liberation League, Senator Fulbright *et al.*, to surpass us in ICBMs. There is no need for the Soviets to build such a large force for reasons of deterrence as we understand the concept. Russian imperial ambitions may not, after all, be entirely satisfied merely by the overthrow of capitalism in the United States. There is no "security" in the Kremlin so long as any state, regardless of ideology, still has the means to defy the Soviet will. The Radical Left, even if it wins all its points here at home, will still have those grim Soviet marshals to reckon with.

THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET POSTURES

One point must be grasped clearly or no mere comparison of Soviet and American military strength makes sense. The United States' strategic posture is, as President Nixon put it in his Foreign Policy statement to Congress, "political and defensive; to deny to other countries the ability to impose their will on the United States and its allies under the weight of strategic military superiority." The Soviet strategic posture, on the other hand, is the exact reverse of this. Its purpose may be said to be political and offensive; to impose the will of the Soviet Union on the United States and its allies under the weight of Soviet strategic military superiority.

The interesting thing about these divergent purposes in the nuclear age is that one is open-ended and the other in finite. The U.S. must maintain its deterrent power indefinitely. The Soviets achieve their objective at that point in time when ours is no longer tenable. And best of all, they can win the strategic struggle without the necessity of any nuclear exchange whatsoever. All that is required is a strategic situation in which all elements of the American retaliatory forces have ceased to become invulnerable to a Soviet first-strike. At that point the Soviet planners can be reasonably certain that the American will to resist them any further will collapse.

Secretary of Defense Laird has quite rightly pointed out that the question of whether the Soviets *intend* to strike first is less important than the factual question of whether or not they could acquire the *capability* to do so. The evidence here is overwhelming that they are building such a capability. Both their doctrine and their weapons systems are clearly oriented in a *counterforce* direction, i.e. toward neutralizing each and every American military threat to the Soviet Union. The U.S., on the other hand, has now shifted over essentially to a counter-value force, limited to being able to inflict unacceptable damage to Soviet cities and industrial installations after absorbing an initial Soviet attack. Warheads capable of attacking Soviet missile silos have been rejected by our planners. We no longer have the capability to strike first. Ours is a "deterrent" posture only.

SOVIET CAPABILITY

This is not the case with the Soviets. While some of the Soviet weapons systems, e.g. the SS–11 and SS–13 ICBMs and the Y class Polaris type submarines might reasonably be construed as targeted against cities rather than, or as well as, counterforce weapons, and therefore deterrence oriented, there can be no doubt at all about the giant SS–9 warheads or the fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS). It would make no sense at all to use them in any other way than as part of a first-strike at American retaliatory forces. With the unveiling of these weapons, the Soviets have tipped their hand in a manner which is unmistakable. They have gone beyond deterrence of "sufficiency". They are going to outright strategic superiority.

The rate of construction is such that the current estimate of Soviet operational ICBMs by mid-1970 is now 100 more than it was projected to be last year at this time. Between September 1968 and September 1969, 160 were added. By mid-1970 another 200 were projected, which will bring the Soviet ICBM force to 1260, including over 275 SS–9s. At this rate they could have over 2500 launchers by the mid-1970s. The Y class submarine construction rate is also ahead of our earlier estimates. The Soviets could have 35–50 of these ships, carrying 560–800 missile launchers, by 1974–75. Just as the SS–9s would be a major threat to our Minuteman silos, the submarine missiles would be a threat to our land-based bombers.

We ought to be quite clear about the circumstances surrounding this Soviet effort. The Soviet strategic arms program is conditioned by what the U.S. does only to the extent that the Soviets identify the general nature of the American threats to themselves and set out to counter them. This obviously requires very long-range planning and cannot be influenced by any transitory congressional debate or executive decision to build this or that specific weapon system. Generally speaking, the Soviets have four distinct threats to overcome. These are 1) land-based ICBMs, 2) land-based bombers, 3) submarine-launched missiles, and 4) carrier-launched bombers. The Soviets are, and have been since at least the mid-1950s, systematically building a force structure capable of knocking out all four of these elements of the U.S. strategic threat to the Soviet Union.

In pursuit of this goal the Soviets produce an average of eight new aerospace weapons systems (space, missiles, aircraft) each year. These include an average of one new model ICBM each year, a new spaceship each two-thirds of a year, and a new fighter bomber every year, as well as transport aircraft, naval missiles, etc. This constant rate permits the Soviets to plan and develop new weapons systems methodically. Almost all are counterforce oriented.

For example, the latest in the Soviet series of aircraft is the Mig-23 "Foxbat" Mach 3 all-weather fighter. Like all other Soviet aircraft in the Mig series, this plane is primarily a "point defense" weapon. The U.S. builds aircraft primarily to control the air. The Soviets build for air warfare, but for point defense as well. Soviet tactical fighters are characterized by short combat radii and small payloads. Their primary objective is to defend the Soviet Union against air attack. Along the same lines, the SA–5 surface-to-air missile system constructed along the U.S.S.R.'s western borders and elsewhere (sometimes known as the "Tallinn" system) is now generally thought to be a long range defense system against bombers, rather than an ABM system as earlier believed (though some analysts still think it could be upgraded to have an ABM capability). This is because the Soviets take the bomber threat to themselves very seriously and wish to be fully prepared against it.

ON THE SEAS

The naval situation further illustrates the Soviet concentration on the neutralizing role of their armed forces. The threats come from our carrier aircraft and our Polaris/Poseidon submarines. Soviet naval forces are particularly designed to counter these forces. For nearly fifteen years the Soviets have been equipping their own submarines with cruise-type missiles which could be used in an anti-shipping role. They now have more than 30 of their 60 general purpose nuclear submarines so equipped in addition to older diesel types. They could also be used against land targets, of course, which gives them a dual capability. The Soviets have also gone in extensively for surface-to-surface missiles on their cruisers and destroyers as well as on smaller patrol types. The newer ships of this type have been built with the specific purpose of attacking our aircraft carriers. It is extremely significant that Soviet missile-armed destroyers have now begun to shadow our carriers in the Mediterranean Sea more or less permanently and at very close range. What this is doing is to establish for the Soviets the capability to destroy our carriers as part of a first-strike. There is no present defense against such weapons fired from close range. The U.S. Navy not only has no cruise-missile firing submarines of its own, but we have no surface-to-surface missiles on our surface ships either. We are not equipped to fight surface actions with the Soviet Navy. Both navies are now well equipped with surface-to-air missiles. If used in conjunction with nuclear warheads, these would be extremely effective against attacking aircraft. But what about the surface threat? U.S. admirals, at least, are plenty worried.

Polaris/Poseidon is still a tough nut for the Soviets to crack; at present they have no real defense against it. But there, too, they are working on the problem. The new Moskva class of helicopter carriers, two of which have been deployed into the Mediterranean, is now credited with being almost entirely oriented toward an anti-submarine warfare capability. The presumption is that the targets are our Polaris submarines. More than that, the Soviets are turning out a new V class of ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare) submarines whose mission is probably to seek out Polaris. And both the Badger and Bear bombers have an ASW capability. The U.S. Navy still feels that there is not as yet a major threat to Polaris, but no one can bank on this for the indefinite future. The Soviets are making a particularly intensive effort to locate the launch areas of the Polaris boats.

On the defensive front, the Soviets have resumed work on their Galosh ABM complexes around Moscow. Some 60 sites have been brought to an operational status. Testing has been observed on an improved Galosh, and research and development related to a new long range ABM system has also been noted.

Still another ominous development is the Soviet anti-satellite capability. The Russians have set up a division of their defense system known as *protivo-kosmicheskaya oborona*, Russian for defense against space-orbiting combat missiles or intelligence satellites. One successful test of this system took place in October 1968 when Cosmos 248 homed in on two other members of the Cosmos class, 249 and 252, and destroyed them some 300 miles above the earth's surface. Destruction was by means of explosion. The Soviets could actually do the job by methods easier than the one used.

The U.S. has no comparable capability at present, but even if we had, the destruction or elimination of each other's reconnaissance satellites would benefit the Soviets proportionately more than ourselves. Assum-

ing that the Soviets might choose to neutralize our reconnaissance efforts at some point in the future as part of a gigantic campaign of nuclear intimidation and outright blackmail, the sudden loss of much of our early warning against missile attack would greatly increase the discomfort of our position. To reply in kind by knocking down Soviet satellites would not help much because the rules of the game and the actual balance of forces concede the Soviets the first-strike. The U.S. has no effective counterforce capability and thus no first-strike threat, even if we needed, for bargaining purposes, to be able to exercise it.

This is the dimension of the bind into which the across-the-board Soviet military build-up is rapidly putting the United States. Their military posture is assuming a balanced offensive-defensive position wherein their first-strike weapons can destroy an ever higher percentage of our retaliatory forces while their defensive capabilities just as steadily increase in their ability to destroy whatever U.S. weapon may escape the initial attacks. While this is going on, their "conventional" forces are by no means being neglected. Theater air defenses, particularly in Eastern Europe, have received increased attention in improved equipment and facilities. These include hardened shelters for their aircraft and extensive and sophisticated camouflage. The swift, superbly executed invasion of Czechoslovakia stunned NATO commanders with a new appreciation of the military machine facing them in the East.

DETERIORATION OF THE AMERICAN POSITION

Confronted with this situation, it is little wonder that the Nixon administration ordered a review of U.S. strategic doctrine immediately after taking office. As the President pointed out in his statement to Congress, the outlines of the Soviet threat were becoming apparent as early as 1965, but the Johnson-McNamara team *assumed* that the Soviets were only interested in a retaliatory capability (so pervasive was the spirit of "detente" nurtured by the Soviets and their American dupes after the signing of the nuclear test-ban treaty in 1963) and took heart in the comfortable belief that our own "assured destruction" capability could not be seriously affected by anything the Russians did anyway. Our own "restraint" in strategic weapons developments would supposedly provide a strong incentive for restraint by the U.S.S.R.

By 1969 these dream castles were in ruins to anyone with eyes to see what was going on. (More perceptive observers, in fact, had been warning of what was happening at least two years previously, only to be attacked as "alarmists" by Secretary of Defense McNamara and his spokesmen.) "The Soviets' present build-up," said Nixon, "raises serious questions about where they are headed and the potential threats we and our allies face." He went on to raise himself the spectre of blackmail: what if the Soviets should begin by knocking out a high percentage of our strike forces? Could a U.S. president reply by ordering an attack with the remaining forces against Soviet cities, knowing full well that this would result in a counter Russian devastation of U.S. population centers?

Thus the question is presumably no longer merely one of wishful thinking and false optimism at the top of the U.S. government. President Nixon and his Secretary of Defense have shown that they are aware of the problem.

THE INSUFFICIENCY OF "SUFFICIENCY"

What is not clear, unfortunately, is that the Nixon administration can or will do anything about that problem before it is too late. What is needed is a Churchillian "blood, toil, tears, and sweat" approach to a critical problem of national security. What is now being proposed, instead, is an "austere," "rockbottom" budget, a "minimum program essential for our security" for at least one more year during which we are to explore with the Soviets at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) the prospects for a mutual freeze on strategic weapons systems. Beyond this "year of transition", there is to be a five-year defense program based upon "four specific criteria for strategic sufficiency." The criteria are unspecified, but, according to the President, "there was general agreement that postures which significantly reduced or increased our strategic programs and deployments involved undesirable risks."

Risks, however, are being taken. The Administration appears to feel that it has no choice. "Changing national priorities," the battle against inflation, and strong congressional determination to reduce military spending persuaded the Administration to opt for a general politico-military policy of retrenchment. Since this policy is in no way being reciprocated by our foes, even Secretary Laird had to admit that there is "*some risk*" in the cutback. The actual result is a continuing relative shift in the balance of power to the side of the enemy.

For example, in the 1971 budget, funds are requested for a modest increase in the Safeguard ABM system, involving a third site. This will continue to be vital in counteracting the development of a Chinese threat when the Chinese develop an ICBM force—now expected to begin testing this year. But there is already some question about whether anything but a point defense of our Minuteman missile silos is feasible. This is because of the development of the Soviet FOBS. The characteristics of this orbital bombardment system are such that the warhead could be deorbited from a maneuverable trajectory to strike its target within a matter of a very few minutes, or before an area defense system could react.

Secretary Laird may have been alluding to this, in part, when he warned in his posture statement that "to be perfectly candid it must be recognized that the threat (to Minuteman) could actually turn out to be considerably larger than the Safeguard defense is designed to handle." Laird promised that should the threat go beyond levels which active defense can handle, he would not hesitate to recommend accelerated development of the Underwater Launched Missile System (ULMS), which would be a missile of intercontinental range fired from submarines stationed in U.S. home waters. But, so far, this is only in the planning stage.

A few general figures tell the overall story. The U.S. 1971 defense budget outlay is $71.8 billion, down from $77.0 billion in fiscal 1970. This represents 34.6% of the Federal budget of $200.8 billion and 7.0% of the Gross National Product, both the lowest percentages since before the Korean War. In the all-important area of research and development, the total expenditures will be about $13 to $14 billion for defense, space, and atomic energy research and development and for other space-related activities. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is expected to spend in 1970 some $16 to $17 billion in the same areas, except that *all* of their space programs appear to be directly oriented to military purposes. According to Secretary Laird, "during the last few years, Soviet expenditures on such research and development and space expenditures have been increasing at a rate of about 10–13 percent per year, while comparable U.S. expenditures have remained relatively constant, and our actual effort has declined when inflation is taken into account. As a result, the Soviet Union has probably forged ahead of us in terms of the total effort currently being devoted to defense-related research and development. Nevertheless. I believe we still have a technological lead over the Soviet Union because of our greater past expenditures."

But a bit further on in his posture statement, Laird says: "Nevertheless, we simply do not know enough about specific details of the Soviet Research and Development programs inside their laboratories and research institutes to assess fully the entire threat."

From what we do know of the Soviets, it is unlikely that what we don't know about their programs would be of any assurance to us if we did know.

Up-to-the-minute intelligence, of course, is absolutely vital in the kind of life and death struggle in which we are engaged. The overall ten percent cut in the Pentagon budget applies equally to the Defense Intelligence Agency and the service intelligence branches. Officials concerned report that the cutbacks have not yet interfered with their activities, but that by next year, some programs will have to be cut out. They also point out that as the United States withdraws from some of its overseas bases, intelligence collection operations will suffer accordingly. These include in particular reconnaissance flights by manned aircraft. The "Fortress America" concept, if that is what our politico-military policies ultimately reduce us to, will weaken us at home as well as abroad by crippling our ability to stay informed of what the enemy is up to.

In view of the pull-back from our overseas bases, and the increasing sophistication of enemy defenses, it would appear more obvious than ever that we need long range, flexible response weapon systems like the F–111 fighter and F–111B bomber, which has the high speed, low altitude, terrain-following penetration capability necessary to cope with Soviet countermeasures. Nevertheless, economy considerations and structural problems now threaten its existence.

Many more examples could be cited to show that the United States military capability—both nuclear and conventional—in relation to that of the U.S.S.R. is eroding. Severe cutbacks in funds for operation and maintenance are degrading the fighting edge of our armed forces, particularly of the Navy, which is having to put many of its ships in mothballs. At a time when the Soviet Fleet continue to expand quantitively and qualitatively, and to show the flag in such distant areas as the Gulf of Mexico and Carribean Sea, this hardly reassures those fence-sitting nations whose policies are determined mainly by the hard power reality of international politics.

HOGWASH AND AMERICAN SECURITY

The President and his Secretary of Defense continue to assure the country that the military risks now being run are not "unacceptable," but the assurances fall flat. A strong anti-military tide is running in the nation and, even though it knows the score, not nearly enough is being done by the Administration to counter it. Too many soothing soporifics still issue forth, like the following from Secretary Laird: "Vietnamization, SALT, and the development of a new national security strategy are concrete manifestations of major progress. The threats from abroad, while growing, continue to be contained for the present at less expense than in recent years, and a new vigorous attack on our domestic problems has been set in motion."

This is hogwash. The United States today presents to its friends and foes alike the appearance of a great nation which is over the hill of its power and on an accelerating slide down the reverse slope. General world disorder threatens as even the smallest nations come to realize that the stabilizing role of the United States is ending. The prospects for SALT have been grossly oversold. The Soviets told us at Helsinki that they would accept nothing less than "parity," and their definition of the world would entitle them to build enough ICBMs to match every weapon carried by the whole U.S. carrier and land-

based bomber force. This is obviously no good when the enemy is always conceded the privilege of striking first.

The open lobbying now carried on by Soviet ambassador Dobrynin and his aides against expansion of the Safeguard ABM system and the U.S. deployment of MIRV shows Moscow's current evaluation of the U.S. domestic scene. Last summer they failed to give much in the way of verbal assistance to the Safeguard critics, to the considerable chagrin of those gentlemen. The one-vote margin of approval must have convinced the Soviets to play their cards differently this time around.

The situation is grim. By rejecting the capability to destroy Soviet missiles on the ground, the U.S. appears to have adopted a strategic posture which is a loser. We cannot threaten the U.S.S.R. in the same way that she can threaten us. In the crises of the future—and they will make previous confrontations appear as nothing by comparison—this may be all-important. We put too much faith in the notion that the Soviets think like us; that like us, all they want is security against attack.

Untrue. We want to survive only. They want to win. The difference may cost us our lives, or our country, or both.

Mr. HOGAN. I thank the gentleman from South Carolina for yielding to me.

Mr. Speaker, I have on occasion voted to cut some military programs, feeling that we were probably spending too much money on military expenditures.

Ever since the early days in this country when a ragtag American Army of civilians beat a polished military aggregation, we have had an antimilitary, tradition in this country. We have always been jealous and suspicious of the military. As a consequence we have subjected the military to more intensive scrutiny than any other aspect of our Government.

Reflecting this attitude, the news media have been zealous in trying to expose scandals and waste of money by the military. Cost overruns on military contracts have been exposed by the news media. The American public has been shocked by these exposures and have brought pressure upon their elected public officials to reduce military expenditures.

One of the shortcomings in our form of government is that we sometimes overreact to situations. I fear we have done so in regard to military spending.

The military has not been the only part of our Government which has had shocking cost overruns. The Kennedy Cultural Center was supposed to have cost $31 million, so far it has cost $61 million. The news media has not given any attention to this, as far as I know. Nor am I aware of any campaigns to point out how much money has been squandered by the Office of Economic Opportunity. If we are concerned about cost effectiveness, there is no worse example than OEO.

The real news peg for today is not cost overruns in the military, but how the Soviets are outstripping us militarily.

A strong defense posture is the sine qua non in this country. If we cherish the things we have in this country—our freedoms, our culture, our benefits—we should remember that they are only as secure as our military defenses are strong. And the sobering point I want to make tonight is that we are becoming a second-rate military power.

The growth of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean is, of course, very noticeable to us because our own Sixth Fleet has been on station there practically since the end of World War II. Our fleet comes in almost daily contact with the Soviet fleet by aerial sightings, radar, sonar and so on; comparisons of the respective strength of the two forces are inevitable.

The U.S. Navy no longer controls the Mediterranean. As recently as 1965, the Soviet Union had five ships in the Mediterranean; today it has 50. In 1965, we had 40; we still have 40. Russia has more submarines in the Mediterranean than the United States.

I would also like to point out that the situation in the Indian Ocean is equally serious.

The British decisions to cut back, and ultimately to eliminate, its forces in the Indian Ocean during the 1960's was essentially an economic one: The British economy could no longer afford the burdens of having a fleet on station and army garrisons at key points "east of Suez," as they called the area in the days of British imperial glory.

British military presence in the Persian Gulf, at Aden, in Singapore, and elsewhere is now only a memory. Only Hong Kong remains, and there, too, the lease is running out. We have a tendency to take too many good things for granted, and we appreciate them only when they are lost. Certainly, we took the British presence in the Middle East and in the Indian Ocean for granted, failing to appreciate its stabilizing influence and the identity of British and American goals.

This is a good example of the "future shock" that Alvin Toffler talks about: the acceleration of history, the blinding speed with which change occurs. Within two generations—in a series of events witnessed from start to finish by people still alive, Britain has gone from almost universal political and military ascendancy to a minor, and still diminishing, role in world affairs. The decision to abandon its last pretensions east of Suez in 1967 was really the end of the line.

As the British retracted in the Indian Ocean, the Russians advanced. Let me quote from the 1971–72 Jane's Fighting Ships which came out last week:

Five years ago the USSR had no warships in the Indian Ocean, but today there are a score of surface ships alone, and there is no telling how many Soviet submarines are in the area.

This new Soviet presence has great implications for the United States and for the free world. Because we have neglected our own shipbuilding program for so long, because we have cutback on naval research and development, the balance is shifting against us in the Indian Ocean just as it is in the Mediterranean.

Mr. Speaker, I include in today's RECORD an article which appeared in the New York Times on November 13, 1970; it was written by Mr. T. B. Millar, who is the Director of the Australian Institute of International Affairs. It is entitled, "The Indian Ocean—A Soviet Sea?" Mr. Millar details what he sees as a menacing problem in the growth of Soviet power in the Indian Ocean. Let me quote him:

Over the past few years, the Soivet Union has become the principal supplier of arms to nine countries on the Indian Ocean periphery. Through aid to harbour development, it has obtained access to ports and dockyard facilities in places such as Mogadishu and Berbera (Somalia), Hodeida (Yemen), Aden, and Vishakapatnam (India), and to a lesser extent to other key ports such as Mauritius, Singapore, and Port Blair in the Andamans. It has forced its way into the shipping organizations trading between Europe and the Far East and Australia. It is engaged in extensive hydrographic, oceanographic and maritime intelligence activities. It is erecting some kind of military facilities on the island of Socotra at the entrance to the Gulf of Aden (the London Times reported them to be a naval radio station and an ammunition depot).

Mr. Millar is very concerned, but clearly not hopeful of a solution:

Do they matter? [Soviet intentions] They do if you live in the area, are a small state and see no evidence that any major power is interested in either verbal or practical restraint upon the Soviet Union's undeclared but increasing ambitions.

It seems to me, Mr. Speaker, that Soviet ambitions in the Indian Ocean should matter very much to the United States and it is time that we exercise that restraint that Mr. Millar hopes for.

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer reminds us that the Soviet deep water fleet, over the past decade, has been steadily expanding in size and capability. They are expected to have some 217 operational combat surface ships by the middle of this year, and this number will probably increase through the 1970's. In contrast to our fleet—which still has a sizable number of combat ships more than 20 years old—the Soviet fleet is much newer, with very few ships more than 20 years old.

President Nixon said this year:

We believe the number of Soviet strategic forces now exceeds the level needed for deterrence.

He went on to say:

The design and growth of these (Soviet) forces leads inescapably to profound questions concerning the threats we will face in the future, and the adequacy of our current strategic forces to meet the requirements of our security.

Dr. John Foster, Defense Department Director of Research and Engineering, testified in recent hearings before the Armed Services Committees of the House and Senate that since 1968 the Soviet Union has allocated most of its funding in research, development testing and engineering to the military.

Since 1968, there has been an annual growth rate of about 15 percent in Soviet military expenditures. As a result, the Soviets will be devoting the equivalent of about $11 billion to military research and development during fiscal 1972, 40 to 50 percent more than the United States.

Secretary of Defense Laird has said, that "reductions in technological areas already have seriously affected our ability to sustain essential technological leadership."

According to a study published by the American Enterprise Institute and the

Foreign Policy Research Institute, the capacity to retaliate after a first strike is affected crucially by the type of weapon available.

The study says current American ICBM and Polaris capabilities would be most effective against cities. In contrast, the Soviet nuclear force, with its SS–9 ICBM armed with a 25 megaton warhead, seems to be designed primarily for destroying ICBM silos and other strategic capabilities without employing the smaller warhead SS–11 ICBM's or missiles deployed on the submarine force. The United States could retaliate with its Polaris squadrons primarily against Soviet cities. But this would still leave the Soviet Union with a capability for destroying American cities, the study says.

In this context I think it is important, Mr. Speaker, that we look at Soviet attitudes toward international expansion.

At the 1971 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev said:

In recognition of its international duty, the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) will continue to pursue a line in international affairs toward promoting the further activation of the world anti-imperialist struggle and the strengthening of the combat unity of all its participants. *The total triumph of socialism the world over is inevitable,* and for this triumph, for the happiness of the working people, we will fight, unsparing of our strength.

We should also look closely at the attitude of Soviet military leaders regarding military force and use.

In 1961 a leading Soviet general said:

The growing superiority of the socialist forces over the forces of imperialism. . . . will make it actually possible to banish war from the life of society.

But this year, that same general talked of the threat of a new world conflict which he said is present in the policies of U.S. imperialism.

The general added:

If a third world war should become a fact, it will differ greatly from previous wars. It will take the form of a decisive class struggle between socialism and imperialism on a global scale with the most up-to-date weapons of armed conflict.

So, apparently Soviet military leaders who express in public only ideas that they have agreed upon, have made contingency plans for a third world war.

How do the top Soviet military leaders feel about the threat of war? Recently in their writings all four men emphasized not negotiations, not an effort to eliminate world tensions by reduction of military burdens, but in one man's words, "strengthening and keeping the Soviet defenses at top level."

And one general exulted, "Our modern armed forces are mighty as never before."

Throughout the statements by the four military leaders this year has run a shift from confidence in the irreversible strength of socialism to heavy emphasis on the increased imperialist danger.

How do analysts view the attitudes of these Soviet generals?

Milorad M. Drachkovitch, writing in the National Review, says that their statements show that—

Instead of showing any inclination to replace confrontation with negotiations, the Kremlin's military chiefs seem bent on sharpening the ideological struggle between socialist and capitalist systems.

He also says that—

These Soviet military leaders emphasize in the bluntest possible terms the strength and growth of a Soviet military might that goes far beyond the legitimate requirements of national defense.

Mr. Speaker, despite the ever dwindling difference between American and Soviet forces, the United States has sought to achieve security at "bargain rates." The proof of this can be seen in the continuous decline in the portion of our ever-expanding GNP that is committed to national defense—in contrast to the steady increase in comparable Soviet expenditures.

Although the wide margin of superiority we enjoyed over the Soviet Union a decade ago has, until recently, sustained the psychological appearance of U.S. advantage, we have failed to recognize that national security and international peace cannot be bought cheaply.

Leonid Brezhnev's declaration to the 24th Party Congress—"the total triumph of socialism over the world is inevitable"—should remind us that the Soviet Union has not changed its plans for world conquest.

As costly as it may be, we must be as strong, or stronger than our potential adversaries in the world. The question is not whether we can afford it or not. We cannot afford not to.

The above mentioned material follows:

THE INDIAN OCEAN—A SOVIET SEA?

(By T. B. Millar)

CANBERRA.—The Public Accounts Committee of the Australian Parliament has been examining witnesses over a budget allocation for the first stage of a naval base facility at Cockburn Sound near Perth on the West Coast of this three-million-square-mile continent. A pacifist geologist solemnly raised with the Committee the question of pollution, while a senior naval officer justified the allocation partly in terms of the growing Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean area.

A prominent East European visitor said here recently that there are two basic reasons why the Soviet Navy is in the Indian Ocean: (1) there is a Soviet Navy, and (2) there is an Indian Ocean. However sophisticated this may or may not be as a rationale, it does not go very far towards clarifying Soviet objectives.

Although it has occasioned a good deal of comment, some highly exaggerated, the Soviet Navy has not yet been out in strength in the Indian Ocean. According to reports, the number of surface ships has been as low as two or three in the whole ocean at any time, or as high as twenty-five or thirty. Submarines of course are less easily counted. The significance of the Soviet vessels lies less in their quantity than in their novelty, in the fact that they have so little competition, and in their being part of a collection or pattern of Soviet activities, strategic, political and economic.

Over the past few years, the Soviet Union has become the principal supplier of arms to nine countries on the Indian Ocean periphery. Through aid to harbour development, it has obtained access to ports and dockyard facilities in places such as Mogadishu and Berbera (Somalia), Hodeida (Yemen), Aden, and Vishakapatnam (India), and to a lesser extent to other key ports such as Mauritius, Singapore, and Port Blair in the Andamans. It has forced its way into the shipping organizations trading between Europe and the Far East and Australia. It is engaged in extensive hydrographic, oceanographic and maritime intelligence activities. It is erecting some kind of military facilities on the island of Socotra at the entrance to the Gulf of Aden (the London Times reported them to be a naval radio station and an ammunition depot).

No one has publicly objected to these developments. The impression one has in Australia is that the U.S. Navy would like to engage in some competitive appearances well beyond the Polaris program, but neither the State Department nor the White House sees that a major American interest would be so served.

The British Conservative Government is going to keep small naval and other forces in Malaysia and Singapore and perhaps the Gulf for a few years more. These will be local rather than oceanic. It would like South African co-operation in the southwest of the ocean but may be finding the stated price—arms supplies—a hotter potato than it had realized. Japan has a growing trade across the ocean, and almost all its oil comes from the Middle East through the Malacca Strait; but neither the public mood nor the defense vote is such as to provide protection so far from home. France has its Somaliland, Réunion, and other islands, but no major strategic interest in the area.

Of the peripheral countries, only India and Australia have navies of any size. India is too dependent on Soviet arms aid and Australia is too small to protest effectively against Soviet activities which are in any case quite legitimate and pose no apparent threat as yet to anyone. Only if Australia had some support from the U.S. or Britain could it demonstrate local superiority against Soviet incursions into its waters.

Some commentators believe the Russians are in the Indian Ocean to promote the containment of China. This seems too simple, and at best provides but part of the answer, most relevantly with respect to India and Pakistan. The Chinese have a foothold in Tanzania and are irritatingly active among Palestinian and other Arab guerrillas, but China is far from being an Indian Ocean power. To dominate the Suez passage; to have a major influence in the oil-producing states; to be able to exert political pressure, with modest military backing, at key points during times of decision; and to trade profitably—these are the Soviet Union's apparent intentions, or the likely effects of their endeavors.

Do they matter? They do, if you live in the area, are a small state, and see no evidence that any major power is interested in either verbal or practical restraint upon the Soviet Union's undeclared but increasing ambitions.

THE SOVIET NAVAL PROGRAM

(By Vice Adm. H. G. Rickover)

The Soviets are embarked on a program which reveals a singular awareness of the importance of seapower, and an unmistakable resolve to become the most powerful maritime force in the world. They demonstrate a thorough understanding of the basic elements of seapower: knowledge of the seas, a strong modern merchant marine, and a powerful new navy.

Starting with 200 diesel-powered submarines at the end of World War II, most of which were obsolete, the Soviet Union embarked on the largest peacetime submarine construction program in history, producing over 570 modern submarines in 25 years—most designed for long-range operations. During the same period the United States built 106 submarines. In two years alone, 1955 and 1956, the Soviets completed 150

submarines, one and one half times the total number of submarines this country has produced in the past 25 years.

They now have the largest and most modern submarine building yards in the world, giving them several times the nuclear submarine construction capacity possessed by the United States.

They are credited with a nuclear submarine production capability of 20 ships a year on a single shift basis. They have the facilities to increase this rate of production considerably. At present, while our Poseidon conversions are going on, the maximum U.S. capacity to build nuclear submarines is less than half that of the Soviets. Upon completion of these conversions—about 1977—the best we could do would still be well below their capacity.

According to the latest unclassified data the Soviets now have a total of 355 to 363 submarines, all built since World War II. Anywhere from 75 to 83 of these are nuclear-powered. The total U.S. force is 141 submarines, 88 nuclear-powered, the remainder diesel-powered. Most of our diesel units are of World War II vintage.

Today, as a result of the Soviets' large-scale construction program, our lead in nuclear-powered submarines is rapidly disappearing. Based on current force levels and estimated Soviet nuclear submarine building rates, they will be ahead of us numerically before the end of this year.

Of even greater concern than total numbers is the fact that since 1968 the Soviets have introduced several new designs besides converting older designs to improve their capabilities.

One of their current new designs is the Yankee Class nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine introduced in 1968. These submarines look very much like our Ethan Allen Class—our latest Polaris type—and are capable of submerged launching of 16 ballistic missiles within a range of over 1,000 miles.

They now have 13 of the Yankee Class in operation; additional units are under construction at a rate of about 12 a year. It is estimated that they will surpass our Polaris fleet of 41 by 1973 or 1974, possibly sooner. Further, it must not be forgotten that the Soviets also have over 30 conventional and nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines of the earlier design. Thus, we are faced with the imminent loss of our lead in numbers of sea-based strategic missiles.

The Soviet submarine force, like the entire Soviet Navy, has become capable of sustained open-ocean operations and is being used to support foreign policy in various areas of the world. In 1969 the tempo of worldwide Soviet submarine operations was at an all time high. This tempo has continued to increase in 1970. During recent naval maneuvers a large number of nuclear submarines were deployed in two oceans and nine seas.

The Russians are in the Mediterranean. They operate regularly and continually in the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea. Russian naval units now are being seen with regularity in the Indian Ocean and off both coasts of Africa. They are in the Pacific, the Arctic, and the Antarctic. The swimming Russian bear is not yet ten feet tall, but he is 5 feet, 8 inches, and growing rapidly. He has not yet wrested supremacy of the seas from the free world but he is making a determined effort to do so.

Throughout our history the waters that wash our shores have been friendly. They have given us geographical protection, making it practically impossible for anyone to attack us. They have also given us time to build up our strength when danger threatened.

But the tempo of modern technology has changed all this.

Yankee Class submarines off each coast can blanket practically the entire United States. When the Soviets have the 3,000-mile missile they are presently developing they will be able to do this from either ocean.

Let me first say that based on the best evidence available, I believe that today our Polaris submarines are safe from a massive, neutralizing blow. Further, I am not aware of any valid information indicating that the Soviets possess a means to track and destroy our Polaris submarines while they are on station. However, there is no assurance that this situation will prevail for long.

Given the recent Soviet progress in undersea warfare and the sheer magnitude of their nuclear submarine program, the conclusion is inevitable, that unless we are willing to match their effort, they will surpass us in this field during the 1970's.

MAO AND MOSCOW'S NAVY

Although Mao has recently called for the development of the Chinese Navy into a force at least able to defend the coastal lines of shipping communications and the coast itself against attack, the Chinese Navy is at present so weak as to be virtually helpless in face of an attack by the Soviet Pacific Fleet. Accordingly the coverage given to Soviet Navy Day this year in the Soviet Party newspaper *Pravda* can scarcely be interpreted otherwise than as a subtle reminder to Mao and Chou that they are virtually defenseless and open to Soviet assault and invasion by sea at any point . . .

The signs are twofold. In the first place, the issue of *Pravda* on Navy Day was not only sent from a special *Pravda* correspondent assigned to the Pacific Fleet, it also concerned the anti-submarine warfare capabilities of that fleet . . .

The second sign was simply that the *Pravda* of the day after Navy Day, in a front-page presentation of reports from each of the four Soviet fleets, carried the fleets out of any customary order to give the Pacific Fleet pride of place.—*From a Radio Liberty report.*

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Speaker, for almost 10 years, our strategic defense policy has been guided by a policy known as "assured destruction." This policy, the product of former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, is an academic theory which suggests that world stability in international relations will be achieved if both the United States and the Soviet Union have the mutual power to destroy each other's society should nuclear war break out.

The only problem with this theory—a theory which was so appealing to many on paper—is that the Soviet Union does not accept that notion. The Soviet Union has not stopped building strategic weapons at the point where some sort of "parity" exists with the United States. The Soviet Union has gone far beyond that—they already have 600 more ICBM's than we have, and are building *Yankee* class submarines—similar to our Polaris—at a rate of 10 to 12 per year.

The time has come for the United States to take seriously the problem of defense against attack by ballistic missiles, and seriously begin to develop plans and programs for an improvement in this Nation's capacity to protect our populations against attack. This means that we must change our strategy from "assured destruction" to a strategy which would reduce the vulnerability of ordinary American citizens to Soviet attack, while permitting the United States to become sufficiently strong to support U.S. foreign policy objectives abroad.

Senator JAMES L. BUCKLEY recently addressed himself to the subject of a new strategic defense policy—one that is appropriate to the realities of the 1970's. I include the text of Senator BUCKLEY's remarks in the RECORD:

A NEW STRATEGY FOR THE 1970'S

The security of the United States is endangered to a degree unparalled in its modern history. If present trends continue much longer, the ability of the President of the United States to support U.S. foreign policy objectives in Europe, the Middle East, in Asia and even in the Caribbean will be in jeopardy because of the precipitous erosion of U.S. strategic power in the late 1960's and early 1970's.

One need not look far to support the conclusion that there has already been a dramatic weakening of the ability of the strategic forces of the United States to deter Soviet diplomatic adventurism. The United States has permitted the Soviets to gain a striking advantage in the payload capacity of her intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine launched ballistic missiles. If the Soviet Union achieves the same level of technical competence which we now possess on a production line basis for the Minuteman III and the Poseidon missiles, this advantage could be translated into an eight-to-one superiority in deliverable warheads. Despite the formidable lead we now possess in intercontinental bombers, our 1955 vintage B–52's must face 12,000 reloadable Soviet surface-to-air missile launchers. Thus our numerical advantage in heavy bombers may have a questionable operational significance in the face of Soviet defenses.

The strategic forces we now possess, with the exception of the Minuteman III and Poseidon MIRV programs, are the same forces which we had in 1965. The doctrine which has dominated our strategic policy was developed during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations by former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. This doctrine is known as "assured destruction," and we see its legacy in the present Administration's doctrine of "realistic deterrence."

The policy of "assured destruction" established the notion that America's security was best safeguarded by the maintenance of sufficient forces-in-being to make sure that enough of these forces would survive a first strike launched by any aggressor or collection of aggressors to enable us to deliver a retaliatory strike which would inflict unacceptable losses upon the enemy.

As the Soviet strategic arsenal grew in recent years, it became increasingly evident that whatever validity the "assured destruction" doctrine might have had in the early and mid-1960's, it was a policy which could no longer be supported. The significance of the Soviet strategic buildup emphasized some of the critical weaknesses of the doctrine. Because a serious level of population defense was considered "destabilizing" under this doctrine, the Department of Defense became an instrument of a policy which would prefer the killing of enemy civilians to saving the lives of our own, should deterrence fail. The buildup of Soviet forces has now reached a point where it may soon become doubtful that the United States would have a sufficiently large retaliatory force available after a Soviet first strike to meet even the minimum requirements of "assured destruction" or of "realistic deterrence."

What is required is a new strategy—one which would accomplish the objectives of saving American lives in the event deterrence failed, while insuring that the United States would have sufficient strategic power to support its foreign policy objectives abroad.

In his annual State of the World message, the President stated that he should have some other option than simply retaliating

against Soviet cities in the event of a Soviet first strike. This he does not have, because the legacy of the mistaken policy of assured destruction has lead to steadfast opposition to a program which would improve the guidance systems on our Minuteman and Poseidon missiles which would give them the capability to destroy Soviet missiles in their silos following any Soviet attack on our strategic forces, and before they had an opportunity to threaten our cities.

In order to implement a new defense strategy appropriate to the conditions of the 1970's, we need to press for improvements in our strategic posture which must include the following: We must (a) proceed on an urgent basis to upgrade the guidance systems of the Minuteman and Poseidon programs as far as the state-of-art will permit; (b) replace all 1000 of our Minuteman II missiles with Minuteman III missiles rather than just the 500 or so now being replaced; (c) replace all of the Polaris missiles with Poseidon missiles, rather than three-quarters of them as is now planned; (d) proceed with all possible speed with programs currently in the advanced stage of research and development—especially the B–1 manned bomber and the Undersea Long Rance Missile System; and (e) conduct a stepped-up R&D program into means of reducing the vulnerability of U.S. citizens to strategic attack.

These incremental improvements in our strategic posture would make it possible for a new strategy to be pursued—one in which live Americans are valued more highly than dead Russians; one in which the Defense Department once again becomes the instrument for assuring the survival rather than the vulnerability of American citizens. It is new strategy which will assure an American President of the continuing ability to support American foreign policy objectives as well as to protect her citizens. It is a strategy which is necessary, desirable, and feasible, and it is the only strategy which will secure our essential defense and foreign policy.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, as a long-time member of your Committee on the Armed Services, a six-time elected Representative of the Seventh Congressional District of Missouri, and a citizen who wants to see his nation second to none, in any area; I wish to commend my colleagues here today for the expressions of concern they have voiced over the strategic posturing of this Republic, vis-a-vis that of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Speaker, last September 28, I stood where I am standing today, having gained the floor following an eloquent and memorable statement on this very same subject by the late L. Mendel Rivers, at that time, the chairman of the Committee on the Armed Services. We were eventually to be joined by 21 other Members of this body who desired to express, for the record, their own dismay at the state of our defensive posture.

Our colloquy was spirited and enlightening, yet, unfortunately, was almost totally ignored by the news media. Perhaps it was because they would prefer to gain such information by more clandestine methods.

During the course of his remarks, Mr. Rivers quoted from a 1969 report by the Comptroller General to the effect that:

Approximately 80 percent of the major ships in the Atlantic Fleet were over ten years old, and 50 percent were over 20 years of age. In April 1969, the average age of the ships of the Sixth Fleet was 18.3 years

It saddens me to report that those figures have not shown improvement to date. They have further deteriorated.

Chairman Rivers went on to say:

I can only warn the Members of this House that we are on the brink of disaster and I have never before been so concerned.

Just 3 months later, to the day, L. Mendel Rivers was to breathe his last, but the warning that he sounded cannot be permitted to be buried with him. That is why today's "special order" is of such high importance.

I put it to you, that the strategic position of this Nation is going through a critical stage. The rising crescendo of the antimilitarist, who desires to decimate the budget of the Department of Defense, under the guise of reordering priorities, are threatening to shove this Nation out on the limb of "opportunism" while the Soviets look on with a saw in their hands ready to cut it off.

Mr. Speaker, it is a fact that the operational level of the U.S. Navy's inventory of major combat ships is at its lowest level since 1950.

The strength of the U.S. Army in Europe is lower than at anytime since 1952.

U.S. aircraft in Europe have declined steadily since 1955.

The Soviets have surpassed us in land-based ICBM's.

Even the Communist Chinese now have a nuclear capability, and are hard at work developing a system to carry it.

You can go right down the line, ship after ship, weapon after weapon, plane after plane. The story is the same. We are falling behind, steadily and relentlessly, all the while failing to heed the warnings of such men as Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense Research, who revealed that the Soviets are putting the equivalent of more than $3 billion a year into defense-related technology than we are.

Mr. Speaker, today this Government is participating in strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union.

We are attempting to negotiate a settlement of the Vietnam war in Paris.

For years we have met at Panmunjom with the North Koreans.

Our envoys continually visit the Mideast seeking to settle that conflict.

We continue to talk with the Communist Chinese in Warsaw, to say naught of ping-pong games and Presidential visiting plans.

Our efforts in behalf of peace are monumental, but one thing is certain, a government that cannot negotiate from a position of strength and respect, is a government that is doomed to failure.

Some time ago, Dwight D. Eisenhower made a speech, where he coined the phrase, "military-industrial complex." While that part of his remarks have received the most attention there was another paragraph that deserved equal time. "Ike" also said:

A vital element in keeping the peace is our Military Establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction. We face a hostile ideology, global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in method. Unhappily the danger it poses promises to be of indefinite duration. To meet it successfully, there is called for, not so much the emotional and transitory sacrifices of crisis, but rather, those which enable us to carry forward, steadily, surely, and without complaint, the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle with liberty at stake.

Mr. Speaker, with these words, I rest my case, hoping that properly informed America will do her part.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Speaker, since coming to office, President Nixon has said on a number of occasions that the world is coming out of an era of confrontation and entering an era of negotiation. He has stated that American foreign policy is aimed at achieving that goal.

I think we can all applaud that resolve. "Jaw-jaw," as Winston Churchill said, "is better than War-War."

But negotiation is, by definition, a two-way street. There cannot be a one-sided negotiation; it requires two parties to negotiate, just as it requires two partners to tango. Merely labeling our times as the epoch of negotiation is not sufficient. Here, as elsewhere, wishing will not make it so.

I think this is one of the great problems we have as a nation in the SALT talks which are now underway: We want them to succeed desperately. We recognize—Members of all persuasion, both sides of the aisle, left, right, and center—we recognize the enormous burden that the arms race has put on our country. We can each offer a score or a hundred ways in which those staggering sums could be spent here at home or around the world for good things: Schools, or houses, or health, or improving the environment, or advancing the knowledge of mankind. We cannot help thinking that investing billions in weapons and weapons systems that will never be used is a waste.

And, that I suppose is the irony of our defense system: If it is good enough, sophisticated enough, powerful enough, it never will be used. The success of our deterrent is measured by its nonuse. If we ever have to use it, it will have failed in its central and essential purpose; to use it will be acknowlegment that it has failed to deter the enemy. To use it will be to admit that it was not sufficiently strong, sufficiently sophisticated, sufficiently powerful.

We all know—and I think our enemies know also—that our strength would never be used for a first strike. So our defense has been tied to the notion that we must be able to survive an enemy first strike with sufficient power to retaliate: With power sufficient to deliver a retaliatory blow which inflicts unacceptable damage or losses on the enemy. Nuclear stalemate, according to Robert McNamara when he was Secretary of Defense, was the ideal to be hoped for. That, of course, was at a time when the United States was unquestionably superior in nuclear strength.

But, times have changed: Since 1965, since the fall of Khrushchev, the Soviet Union has, at enormous cost, revamped and modernized every aspect of its strategic forces, its navy—which is now according to "Jane's Fighting Ships" a supernavy—and its air force—whose capability is very much in evidence on Israel's frontiers—and, of course, its missile and nuclear capability. If we assume that the Soviet MIRV is operational—

and that is not an unreasonable assumption—then the Russians can equip their more than 300 SS–9 missiles with independently targetable warheads, each with three to six warheads of its own. That means right now, the Soviet could dispatch a minimum of 900, or a maximum of 1,800 warheads, of 2 to 5 megatons each. Could the United States respond or retaliate after absorbing such a blow?

This is the setting for the SALT talks which resumed for their third stage at Vienna on July 8. Our new national position is that we are going to seek an agreement with the Russians on the question of defensive weapons—the ABM's. Heretofore, we had solemnly announced that separate agreements on defensive and offensive weapons would be unacceptable. Presumably, now it is acceptable. Why, I cannot say.

Mr. Speaker, I cannot understand the news story of July 23 which recites that the United States has asked for a land and sea missile moratorium. At Vienna, as elsewhere, I think we labor under enormous disadvantages when we seek to negotiate with the Russians. This does not mean that I am opposed to any negotiations; on the contrary, I am very much in favor of a settlement, by negotiation, of the substantial matters which separate our two nations. But, frankly, I am afraid that if we go into these talks with the naive ideas some of our officials apparently have, we will lose our shirts, as we have done on so many occasions in the past.

One Member of the other body, HENRY M. JACKSON, the distinguished Senator from Washington, has given us some good advice about how not to negotiate with the Russians. Mr. Speaker, I include in today's RECORD, at the conclusion of my remarks, an article from the Nation's Business for April 1971, by Senator JACKSON. I think we are all indebted to Senator JACKSON for the work which his subcommittee—the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Senate Government Operations Committee—has done over the years on the question of American methods of negotiation with the Russians. The research has been first rate. I commend it to the attention of the Members. I wish I had it in my power to make some of those committee prints required reading for our State Department, Foreign Service, and Disarmament Agency people.

The article follows:

HOW NOT TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE RUSSIANS

(By Senator HENRY M. JACKSON)

In Paris, Viet Nam talks drag on; SALT negotiations proceed at Helsinki and Vienna; the status of Berlin is under discussion; there is diplomatic jockeying over a European security conference; and talks about a Middle East settlement go forward.

Clearly, international negotiations are the order of the day.

If we handle such negotiations effectively, we are able from time to time to act together with the Soviets in ways consistent with our own interests and purposes. Certainly, Americans want to identify areas of common or parallel interest with the Soviets.

Yet negotiating with them is a most complicated process, and Moscow's objectives and tactics create enormous difficulties. Negotiations would be hard enough to bring to a successful outcome if those on our side handled themselves skillfully. That is very often not the case.

Watching America conduct its foreign affairs, I've seen blunders lead to missed opportunities and serious setbacks to the national interest, including unnecessary wars.

Here, for the benefit of those who want to avoid these pitfalls, is a "Bungler's Guide to International Negotiations"—or "How to Botch the Talks."

1. In approaching a negotiation, the born bungler will discard in advance any proposal he thinks the other side will object to.

As the American government formulates its position on an issue, it often happens that a possible proposal is scrapped as being "unacceptable" to Moscow—even though the idea has much to recommend it from the U.S. point of view. Since a proposal obviously can never be accepted if it is never submitted, the effect of ruling one out as "unacceptable" is to guarantee its unacceptability.

There is the possibility, however, that an adversary can be brought to change its evaluation of what is acceptable as a negotiation proceeds. It is, after all, one of the main purposes of negotiation to persuade the other side to change its mind about what is an acceptable outcome.

The Austrian State Treaty is a classic case in point. We and our allies remained firmly committed to a free Austria and we pressed the Soviets with proposals that were "unacceptable" from their point of view. Finally, in 1955, the Russians decided it would also be to their advantage to end the occupation and partition of Austria.

Another important postwar agreement with the Soviets—the partial nuclear test ban (i.e., it does not cover underground tests)—was realized after some five years of negotiations, although part of U.S. officialdom had classified the partial ban as "unacceptable" to Moscow.

2. The perfect patsy will banish from his mind any ugly suspicions about the intentions of the opposing side.

Ignorance of the other side's real intentions is obviously no help in negotiating. But understanding these intentions does not necessarily augment trust and make your task any easier. America's decision to enter the Atlantic Alliance did not result from failure to grasp what the Kremlin wanted. We needed that defensive alliance because the Kremlin's designs on Europe were crystal clear.

Averell Harriman tells how—at the Potsdam Conference in 1945—he said to Stalin that it must be very gratifying for him to be in Berlin, after all the struggle and tragedy. Stalin replied: "Czar Alexander got to Paris." As Mr. Harriman adds: "It didn't need much of a clairvoyant to guess what was in Stalin's mind."

Moscow may now share the common interest of avoiding a general nuclear war. But it does not follow that Moscow wants all-out peace. There is much room for maneuver between trying to avoid a nuclear holocaust and seeking a genuine peace.

The Russians know it.

Leonard Schapiro, dean of Soviet studies in Great Britain, stated the matter this way to our Senate subcommittee:

"Soviet policy is unremittingly dynamic. It is not directed towards achieving equilibrium, or balance of forces, or peace, or collective security. . . . Its ultimate aim is 'victory,' which means communist rule on a world scale. However, unrealistic this aim may seem, it is the case that it has been thoroughly inculcated into the minds of all Soviet leaders from Lenin onwards for over 50 years. . . .

"There is no time factor attached to this ultimate ideological aim—in contrast in this respect, say, to Hitler, or Genghis Khan. And so . . . the Soviet Union seeks to advance wherever this is possible, to gain one advantage here, and another there, and to move forward or halt as advantage dictates. . . ."

Understanding Soviet intentions today, far from diminishing concern, arouses it. What the Kremlin wants—if it can get it—is not in the interest of the Free World and the future of individual liberty.

3. The truly timid negotiator will not want to ambarrass the other side.

If it comes to light that an adversary is guilty of bad faith, you can make a lot of trouble for yourself by hiding the truth about it.

A classic example of how not to deal with the Russians was the U.S. response to the Soviet and Egyptian violations of the Mid-East cease-fire. We were taken to the cleaners in that August, 1970, fiasco.

No sooner had agreement on the military standstill been achieved than the first Soviet-Egyptian violations occurred. We saw the violations taking place. By failing to corroborate them, the State Department invited still further illicit movement of surface-to-air missiles into the prohibited zone.

The fact that we turned our backs on gross violations of an initiative proposed and arranged in Washington, and concurred in by Moscow, can have the effect of encouraging the Soviets to deliberate deception and greater boldness elsewhere.

U.S. officials should know by now that the consequences of telling the truth about Soviet bad faith will be easier to live with than the consequences of not telling it.

4. The brilliant bumbler will signal the opponent that he is desperate to get some kind of agreement, especially for domestic political reasons.

In adversary relations the appearance of overeagerness is bound to stimulate stubbornness and intransigence on the other side.

When top U.S. officials give the impression that some arms control treaty or agreement is indispensable to them they make it enormously more difficult for the American negotiating team to strike a favorable bargain in the talks.

We should not negotiate *any* agreement just for agreement's sake. We should vigorously pursue arms control agreements that can add to the stability of the strategic balance, while rejecting proposals that have a built-in incentive to instability. What we really want are agreements that will reduce the risk of nuclear war; and this means careful agreements which are extremely difficult to contravene and which confer no destabilizing advantage.

What security exists in the world today depends on the delicate balance of military, political and economic forces.

As the Soviet Union reaches parity (or more) with the United States in strategic arms, its leaders are likely to become more energetic in trying to spread Soviet influence and more willing to run dangerous risks in the interntional arena.

Those who live in freedom are able to do so only under the shelter and power of ourselves and our allies. This is a grave responsibility, and while we strive for sensible and salutary arms control agreements, we must not imperil a stable Free World deterrent.

5. The gregarious sap will put a premium on being popular with the other side.

A persistent danger of all diplomacy is what Harold Nicolson called "the human difficulty of remaining disagreeable to the same set of people for many days at a stretch."

If you have obstinately refused on Monday to agree in a matter pressed by the other side, you may be tempted to be less stubborn than you should be on Tuesday when a wholly different subject is under discussion. You may ask too little and offer too much.

Popularity-seekers seldom make good negotiators. They are likely to give the wrong signals.

If you are so concerned about being a "good fellow" that you shrink from speaking

bluntly when this is called for, you may lead your adversaries to misjudge your fortitude, thereby whetting their appetite. What might be appropriate to say on the Senate floor to one's colleagues is not necessarily appropriate to say in talks with top officials in Moscow.

Americans, often great conciliators in working with allies, sometimes lack perseverance in pursuing their cause against a hostile opponent.

6. The eager sucker will try for accord by giving something for nothing.

A sure way to worsen one's problems is to make unilateral concessions in hopes the opponent can be "conciliated" and will return the "favor."

When closely allied nations are engaged in a long-term common effort, there may be enough "community spirit," to use Jean Monnet's phrase, so that an act of generosity on one issue establishes credit on another issue. However, in negotiation with the Russians, a concession without any assurance of an equivalent countergain weakens one's bargaining position.

The policy of making gratuitous concessions to dynamic powers has been tried in the past from time to time, and the results have been disastrous.

There is the example of the obliteration of Carthage, which had allowed itself to be disarmed by Rome in the hope this would lead to peaceful coexistence. And there is the example of French and British appeasement of Nazi Germany, which led directly to World War II.

Moreover, things given as gifts cannot be traded.

A major and as yet unachieved purpose of the Atlantic Alliance is to reach a genuine, stable European settlement with the Kremlin. Among other things, such a settlement will involve the return of Soviet forces to the Soviet Union. How can the Soviet government be encouraged to move in this direction? Certainly not by our making a substantial, unilateral, and unrequited reduction of American forces in Europe, as some U.S. Senators are urging.

Clearly, NATO should sustain the bargaining position it has worked so long and hard to construct, and actively pursue acceptance of gradual, mutual and balanced revisions in forces on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

Mr. PRICE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I welcome the opportunity to participate in this much needed and overdue airing of the state of this Nation's military security. For as I have haid on previous occasions, if the United States is unable to guarantee the sanctity of its borders and the safety of its citizens then the prospects for the future of our country are grim indeed.

As we are well aware, the SALT talks have assumed historic importance in the present phase of the arms race. Out of these talks could come the framework for a new period of peace among the nuclear superpowers, or out of these talks could come the seeds of Armageddon. Given the import of these negotiations, I think it would be wise for this body and the American people to focus on what is their essential purpose; namely, achieving a bilateral limitation of both offensive and defensive stratgic weapons.

From the time the SALT talks commenced in Helsinki in 1969, President Nixon has repeatedly emphasized the policy of this Nation; that the talks were being held for the purpose of achieving a bilateral limitation of both Russian and American offensive and defensive strategic weapons. This purpose was underpinned in the minds of U.S. policymakers on the premise that such a comprehensive agreement would result in greater military security for the people of this Nation.

President Nixon has thought long and hard about the problems of maintaining U.S. national security in the nuclear age; his views on the balance of weapons power were clearly expressed in his report on U.S. Foreign Policy for 1970's, which was issued last February. The President stated the crux of the problem in the following terms:

> The strategic balance would be endangered if we limited defensive forces alone and left the offensive threat to our strategic forces unconstrained. It would also be dangerous, however, if only offensive forces were restrained while defenses were allowed to become so strong that one side might no longer be deterred from striking first.

As regards this view in relation to the SALT talks, the President declared, in the same report, that:

> The United States believes that to be stable and satisfactory, an agreement should include limitations on both offensive and defensive systems.

At the formal opening of the SALT talks in Helsinki on November 17, 1969, Gerard C. Smith, chief of the U.S. delegation, read a satement by President Nixon, who asserted that the United States would be guided by the principle of maintaining "sufficiency in the forces required to protect ourselves and our allies."

While recognizing that the Soviet Union had similar defense responsibilities, President Nixon affirmed:

> I believe it is possible, however, that we can carry out our respective responsibilities under a mutually acceptable limitation and eventual reduction of our strategic arsenals. . . . We are prepared to discuss limitations on all offensive and defensive systems, and to reach agreements in which both sides can have confidence. . . . We seek no unilateral advantage. Nor do we seek arrangements which could be prejudicial to the interests of third parties.

On February 18, 1970, in a foreign policy message stressing the new strategy for peace, President Nixon referred to the preliminary SALT talks which had taken place in Helsinki from November 17, 1969, to December 22, 1969, and termed them "serious and businesslike." He also said that the United States "would make a determined effort throughout these negotiations to reach agreements that will not only protect our national security but actually enhance it."

On March 21, 1970, at a news conference, President Nixon again stressed the U.S. intention to achieve a comprehensive and balanced limitation of strategic missiles:

> Our goal certainly is to limit offensive and defensive missiles and if the Soviet Union has the same goal, we will make a bargain. . . .

On April 16, 1970, the day the second series of SALT talks opened in Vienna, President Nixon briefed congressional leaders on the talks and according to the New York Times of that day, administration policy aimed at an agreement limiting each of the superpowers to a relatively small ABM system and imposing a numerical ceiling on ICBM's or SLBM's.

This balanced principle in limitations reflected the President's concern about the U.S. defense position, a concern he voiced a few days later, on April 23, when addressing GOP leaders of Congress. He warned then that Soviet military buildup was still going on and that the United States was in danger of becoming a second-rank military power, adding that:

> If we become the second power, world opinion will move toward the support of the strongest power.

President Nixon also reportedly told the congressional leaders that it would be "destructive" for the United States to agree to a unilateral limitation of strategic weapons. A "unilateral moratorium" he said, would "remove the incentive" for the Soviet Union to negotiate a strategic arms limitation.

President Nixon's awareness of the necessity for U.S. security to insure bilateral and balanced arms limitation was likewise manifested in his state of the world message delivered on February 25, 1971, in which he cited the continual development of Soviet arms buildup even while SALT talks were in progress.

While citing encouraging developments such as "a serious dialogue in the talks," he added that while the United States had not increased the number of its operational ICBM's, retaining a level at 1,054 during 1970 and the number of SLBM's at 656, the U.S.S.R. had increased its ICBM's from 1,109 to 1,440 and its SLBM's from 240 to 350.

Because of this continuing military buildup during SALT, the President stressed the need to clarify the relationship between negotiations and "actions taken during the talks and even after an initial agreement." It was clear, he said—

> That restraint is essential. If the Soviet leaders extend their strategic capability especially in ways that increase the threat to our forces, we would face new decisions in the strategic field.

The President said it was necessary to have the option to make a selective nuclear response to a provocation—

> We must insure that we have the forces and procedures that provide us with alternatives appropriate to the nature and level of the provocation. This means having the plans and command-and-control capabilities necessary to enable us to select and carry out the appropriate response without necessarily having to resort to mass destruction.

The President likewise said that the Soviet Union and the United States differed in their definition of strategic offensive weapons. The Soviet Union considered as strategic offensive weapons any system that could "reach the other side's territory," such as those on the U.S. aircraft carriers, but excluded its own theater nuclear forces with medium or intermediate range missiles. The United States on the other hand, included ICBM's, SLBM's and heavy strategic

bombers in its definition of strategic offensive weapons.

The President, therefore, said that—

We shall strive for an initial agreement which is as broad and comprehensive as possible but which "must deal with the interrelationships between offensive and defensive limitations."

In his report on U.S. foreign policy for the 1970's, President Nixon also clearly pointed out the necessity for a comprehensive, balanced limitations of strategic weapons, stating that—

The stable and satisfactory agreement should include limitations on both offensive and defensive systems.

In spite of the difficulties presented by the SALT talks, President Nixon still felt on March 15, 1971, when he commented on the opening of the fourth series of the SALT talks held in Vienna, that now "for the first time, a realistic dialogue is taking place between the Soviet Union and ourselves about the management of our strategic relations."

About 2 months later, on May 20, the United States and the U.S.S.R. announced that they had decided to discuss an agreement on defensive nuclear weapons alone at the SALT talks. Considering that some progress was better than none, President Nixon, speaking on a brief televised address on the matter, called it "a significant development" in the SALT talks which were "deadlocked for over a year." Both parties had "agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic-missile systems—ABM's." The President added that "together with the agreement on ABM limitation, the two states will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons." The President said that "intensive negotiations will be required to translate this understanding into a concrete agreement." Nevertheless, the next day, May 21, addressing a conference at the State Department, President Nixon said that he expected that an agreement on defensive strategic weapons could be implemented "some time this year." Let us hope that the parallel "certain measures" will also impose limitation on the offensive weapon systems.

In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I would in spite of all the difficulties facing this Nation in trying to reach an accord with the U.S.S.R. on the armaments, encourage my colleagues not to lose hope. At the same time, I would urge those who have unbridled enthusiasm about the SALT prospects to rethink their position in the light of reality. Russia wants to talk with us because Russia conceives it to be in its self interest to do so. Similar motives prevail on our side as well. There is though, as I see it, a crucial difference between the two nations. Nothing Russia has said or done since the talks started over 2 years ago has demonstrated that its conspiratorial plans for world domination and control have diminished one iota. Russia looks at the SALT talks as a vehicle for achieving its Marxist goals. The United States, in contrast, looks at the talks as a hope for world peace.

From my point of view, and I know I speak for millions of Americans when I say this, while world peace is a noble goal, to gain that goal at the expense of our Nation and our people would be to gain a prize worth nothing.

Mr. BRINKLEY. Mr. Speaker, as a former military pilot, I believe in the credibility of "air power." Thus, today, my topic is the F–14.

A little over 2 years have passed since the Navy signed a development contract for this aircraft. As you know, there have been many controversial issues with respect to a new Navy air superiority fighter. The Department of Defense, the Navy, and the aerospace industry have repeatedly been accused of designing an aircraft that would not meet the threat, proceeding too rapidly from R. & D. to production and would most certainly cost more than first estimated.

I think it is time to review the record. Clearly the threat has become more serious than it was 2 years ago. The continued deployment of tactical weapons including surface-to-air, surface-to-surface and new Soviet fighters in the Middle East highlights the growing threat to the free world. The Secretary of Defense, Mr. Laird, has testified to the alarming growth and deployment of intercontinental missiles such as the SS–9. The Soviet nuclear submarine fleet is growing and there is little doubt the missile launching capable nuclear submarines are deployed outside Soviet waters.

The Soviets have been busy developing new and advanced aircraft—particularly fighters and interceptors. They have introduced a new or an improved fighter into their operational inventory at the rate of one per year. In July 1967 the Soviets flew six new fighters plus major "block improvements" of three older ones in an air show. Two of these new fighters, the Foxbat and Flagon A, are estimated to have performance comparable to the F–4 at low and middle altitudes but higher top speeds and higher ceilings.

The Soviets have shown both ability and intention to create improved weapons and fire control systems. Their latest fighters appear to have all-weather, all-aspect, long range air-to-air capabilities. Fiddler, Foxbat, and Flagon A have large radomes to house new radar fire control systems. Badger and Blinder bombers can launch any of five guided air-to-surface missiles at ranges up to 150 miles. Most of these missiles have terminal homing. In addition, advanced surface-to-surface guided missiles have been developed and are in service in Soviet forces. These weapons are accurate and lethal—witness the Israel *Eilat* incident—and can be launched from submarines, ships, and shore installations.

The Navy must have a new fighter as soon as possible that is superior in air combat to the best Soviet fighters in close-in visual encounters and in stand-off all-weather conditions. This fighter must also be able to defeat enemy bombers, air-to-surface missiles, and surface-to-surface missiles. This threat is already in being and serious now. It has become more severe because Soviet investment in military technology has reached the pay-off stage across the board.

To ignore or doubt the severity of threat predictions and not adequately prepare for them is to invite future conflicts with an enemy who becomes stronger every day. Certainly defense of our country is expensive in dollars and the time our youth must give to it, but unpreparedness which could lead to losing future conflicts is immeasurable and infinitely more permanent.

The F–14, to be operational with the fleet in 1973, will replace the aging F–4 Phantom in the Navy/Marine Corps fighter inventory. The F–14 has been designed as an air superiority fighter. It is a weapon system capable of long-range fighter escort on internal fuel and can shoot down long-range multi-raid aircraft and cruise missiles as well as successfully engage enemy fighters in close-in combat. The F–14 employs any combination of Phoenix, Sparrow, and Sidewinder missiles as well as an internal 20-millimeter cannon. This flexibility provides fleet/area defense and escort capability two or three times more effective than the F–4 Phantom. The unique design of the F–14 also permits the incorporation of a significant air-to-surface capability without penalizing its air superiority performance.

In January 1969 the Navy described a very precise ambitious development program for the F–14. Included in this program were performance, cost estimates, major milestones, and assessment of the technical risks involved.

To date the F–14 program has met or exceeded all major milestones. First flight was successfully flown December 21, 1970, approximately 21 months from contract award. On second flight an untimely and unfortunate accident occurred to F–14A No. 1 on landing approach. The accident board reported fractures of hydraulic lines in both main hydraulic systems. A contingency plan reassigning flight test tasks has been in existence since early planning to cover the possible loss of any R.D.T. & E. aircraft. However, since the loss of the first F–14 a great deal of positive testing, evaluation and corrective action has ensued. The result has been not only to preclude the recurrence of the failures which caused the crash but also to incorporate many design refinements into aircraft No. 2 which would not have been possible until later in the program.

The flight test program, resuming in May 1971, has been restructured to permit the necessary test and contractor demonstrations required to commence board of inspection and survey—BIS—trials, now delayed approximately 6 months. In accordance with the original plan Navy preliminary evaluations—NPE—BIS, and fleet operational evaluation are being coordinated to avoid redundancy and reduce costs. In addition the loss of No. 1 F–14A does not indicate any major design deficiencies nor does it endanger meeting the F–14 initial operating capability in 1973.

I feel that there are no major risks that would prevent the program from proceeding as they have planned. Progress to date has been according to schedule. For instance, the performance characteristics with respect to speed, weight, radius of action, and carrier suitability

have remained essentially as initially specified. To date about 26,000 hours of wind tunnel testing have been completed. The fighter takeoff weight remains within 1 percent of that predicted. This is an unprecedented achievement in the design and development of military aircraft. The systems integration test station—SITS—is operating at NAS Point Mugu, Calif., and actual testing of avionics is already underway in the airframe environment. Static and fatigue tests of the wing pivot have been completed. All sections of the wing will be fully tested by this time next year. The static and fatigue tests for the entire aircraft will be complete well before fleet introduction. This too has never been done before.

About the Phoenix missile. It has a 60-plus nautical mile guidance range using semiactive, midcourse guidance and active terminal guidance to deliver a conventional warhead. It is an all-aspect all-weather weapon possessing outstanding capability in a heavy ECM jamming environment. The Phoenix is controlled by the long range airborne weapon control system—AWG–9—to be installed in the F–14. Near simultaneous launch of multiple missiles is possible against widely separated targets. Selection of target priority can be performed by the AWG–9 computer, flight crew, or naval tactical data system. The Phoenix missile is intended to destroy fighters, bombers, or cruise missiles—ASM's and SSM's—in fleet/area defense and other fighter roles. It also has the energy and ability to successfully destroy maneuvering targets.

The Phoenix/AWG–9 R. & D. program has been extremely successful. To date 27 of 42 missiles have guided to either direct hits or near misses. The AWG–9 has also successfully guided two Sparrows in two attempts. These shots have explored a substantial envelope and served to reinforce the Navy's confidence in this flexible weapons capability. The Phoenix missile will become operational concurrently with the F–14 in 1973.

I do not mean to convey that the F–14 will have no further problems in development. However, this program has been subject to many extensive technical reviews within the Navy, the Department of Defense, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. All have substantially agreed that the F–14 performance estimates are attainable. In addition extensive congressional reviews and investigations have been favorable to the F–14. With respect to cost, there is no doubt that a new fighter is expensive, but do not be deluded by inaccurate cost comparisons with yesterday's weapons systems for tomorrow's defense. There is no evidence that the cost estimates as presented in acquisition reports for the F–14 program are not sound and that the projections are not reasonable.

The F–14 must continue without delay so that we may be able to meet the threat at the earliest possible time consistent with a sound technical approach and an effective funding profile. We cannot afford to do otherwise.

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Speaker, let me quote a single sentence:

If these observable trends continue, the U.S. will become a second-rate power incapable of assuring the future security and freedom of its people. Neither the facts concerning these trends nor the ultimate danger is generally understood by the public which for the most part remains uninformed and hence apathetic.

Mr. Speaker, that stunning conclusion is contained in the summary of the conclusions of the report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel which President Nixon appointed shortly after he took office. The report, called "The Shifting Balance of Military Power" was delivered to the President and the Secretary of Defense in September of 1970, although its release to the public was delayed until late March of this year. The first published report of it I saw was in U.S. News & World Report in its April 5 edition. The report has been printed in full in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD but it has been neither discussed nor heeded since then. The lack of attention paid to its conclusions is, I suppose, proof of the apathy and indifference which it correctly diagnoses as the American disease of the 1970's.

Mr. Speaker, let me quote again from the summary:

The Converging Trends. The convergence of a number of trends indicates a significant shifting of the strategic military balance against the United States and in favor of the Soviet Union. These trends include: (i) the growing Soviet superiority in ICBM's; (ii) the Soviet commitment of greater resources than the U.S. to strategic offensive and defensive weapons, with the continued deployment thereof; (iii) the possibility that present U.S. technological superiority will be lost to the Soviet Union; (iv) the convincing evidence that the Soviet Union seeks a preemptive first-strike capability; (v) the rapidly expanding Soviet naval capability; and (vi) the mounting hostility of segments of the public towards the military, the defense establishment and "the military-industrial complex," without due recognition that sustained irresponsible criticism could undermine and weaken the only forces which provide security for the U.S. . . .

A Soviet World Order. Since World War II a degree has been maintained by the dominance of U.S. strategic military strength. This American preserved world order is now disintegrating as doubts arise as to our will and strength to preserve it. There is reason to believe that the Soviet Union envisions a new era which it will dominate, employing superior military power and the threat of its use to achieve long-cherished political, economic and even military objectives. . . .

A Soviet First-Strike Capability. Our planners in the 60's assumed that if both superpowers had an adequate retaliatory capability neither would prepare for or risk a first strike. The evidence is now reasonably conclusive that the Soviet Union, rejecting this assumption, is deploying strategic weapons systems designed for a first-strike capability. This evidence includes: (i) the continued Soviet production and deployment of ICBM's after having attained a clear numerical and megatonnage advantage; (ii) the emphasis on SS–9's designed as counter-force weapons capable of destroying U.S. hardened missile silos; (iii) the development of MRV with warheads also designed as counter-force weapons, and of MIRV by 1971–72; (iv) the development of a fractional orbital missile which significantly minimizes warning time; (v) the construction of a Y-class atomic powered submarine SLBM launching fleet capable, with no effective warning, of destroying our national command centers and much of our B–52 bomber force; and (vi) the continued Soviet emphasis on strategic defense systems against both missiles and bombers—a emphasis without parallel in this country.

The characteristics of these offensive and defensive weapons systems, which the Soviets continue to expand, are consistent only with a preemptive strike capability. Such a weapons mix and volume are not required for effective retaliation. . . .

Weakness—The Gravest Threat to Peace. The road to peace has never been through appeasement, unilateral disarmament or negotiation from weakness. The entire recorded history of mankind is precisely to the contrary. Among the great nations, only the strong survive. Weakness of the U.S.—of its military capability and its will—could be the gravest threat to peace of the world. . . .

Mr. Speaker, the Constitution in its preamble makes clear that the first duty of our national Government is "to provide for the common defense." We all have an oath, registered in Heaven as Lincoln said, to uphold the Constitution and to carry out its provisions.

That translates into a direct and unavoidable obligation on all Members to acquaint themselves with the problem of our national defense, and to equip themselves with the information necessary to force a valid judgment. It may be that a Member who reads this document will be inclined to agree with its conclusions; on the other hand, a Member may reject those conclusions in part, or out of hand. So be it. But, in my judgment, there is no excuse for a Member failing to read this seminal document and forming his own judgment about its contents. I implore the Members who have not done so to acquaint themselves with it.

Mr. TERRY. Mr. Speaker, the authoritative annual, Jane's Fighting Ships, just published, has taken somber note of the meteoric rise of the Soviet Navy and the concurrent decline of the American Navy. While still giving a slight edge to the American fleet, due to the striking power of aircraft carriers plus our still superior capability in amphibious warfare, the long-term outlook is not good in view of the declining number of ships in the U.S. Navy, with our global commitments remaining at a constant level.

The Soviet Union, for its part, has reaped the harvest of a carefully laid out plan. Since World War II, the Soviet Union has devoted nearly all its shipyard capacity to naval construction. At the same time she has not neglected her merchant fleet. She contracted with various satellites to construct certain types of merchant ships as well as many Western European nations.

What started out as a modest expansion of her merchant and naval fleets in the postwar years became a "military phenomenon of the 1960's which looks to be rising to a floodtide in the 1970's," according to this recent issue of Jane's. To mention just one example, that of submarine construction, the Soviet Union has the largest submarine-building yard in the world and now is constructing nuclear submarines at about three times the rate of the United States.

It is no wonder that Brezhnev recently spoke about having talks to limit naval forces. The Soviet Union now has nearly

three times as many submarines in commission as the United States. It has slightly over twice as many cruisers in operation. It falls slightly short of our number of destroyer and escort type ships, but more than makes up for this in possessing nearly three times the number of minor combatant and auxiliary ships as we do. It is no wonder that Brezhnev feels this is the time to talk. It is easy to recall that the Soviets did not feel the need of serious discussion of the test ban treaty proposal until they had achieved parity and some say superiority.

Skeptics, may argue, however, that all of the Soviet buildup has not hurt the United States directly, but most of the evidence is to the contrary. Our 6th Fleet is sharply circumscribed in its activities in the Mediterranean as a result of the large Soviet fleet maintained there. The Soviets maintain facilities for their fleet in Syria and Egypt, where our ships are not welcome. Sometimes numbering up to 60 ships, the Soviet Mediterranean fleet represents a force in being that could challenge us on an instant's notice. Beyond this, the Soviets maintain a presence in all critical areas of the world with one of their intelligence gathering ships monitoring every known operational area of the U.S. fleet as well as NATO exercises. In addition, the Soviet fleet is now a "deep water" navy. They have learned our methods of replenishment at sea and this coupled with their informal overseas base system would enable their fleet to react on a very flexible basis to any worldwide crisis.

The picture that all of this presents is the critical need to modernize our own Navy or face the prospect that we could not maintain control of the seas in some areas of the world if conflict with the Soviet Union developed.

It is therefore, necessary to maintain our strength as a nation through a strong, effective military force. But if this military force is to be strong; if we are to recruit the type of intelligent, dedicated men and women so vital to an effective military, the armed services will have to put their own house in order, as well.

Shortly after this Congress convened in January, I received word that Sp4c. Brian P. Russell of Port Byron in Cayuga County has been killed in action in Vietnam. I visited his family to express my condolences and learned from his mother that her son had been seriously wounded during a previous tour in Vietnam. She told me that her son was not physically capable of returning to Vietnam for a second tour.

After learning of the details of Specialist Russell's injuries, I began an investigation into the circumstances surrounding his reassignment to Vietnam. It was never possible to determine the physical status of Specialist Russell because of incomplete and incorrect information in his files.

However, we did discover a series of errors in the medical, personnel, and administrative procedures of the Army which resulted in Specialist Russell's being reassigned to Vietnam 3 months before he was eligible. This occurred because of the lack of proper procedures at one of the facilities at which he had been stationed.

Throughout the investigation, a variety of errors were discovered which reflected poorly on the cohesiveness of Army administrative practices. Voluminous regulations were vague in their content; policies were not understood at virtually every level from the company to which Specialist Russell was assigned while in the United States to the special actions branch of the Department of the Army; and confusion as to what a soldier could and should do in such circumstances was extremely common.

If we are to achieve an all-volunteer military force as is the declared goal of the President, then the military must be prepared to present itself to potential volunteers in a more positive light.

I am skeptical that a well-financed public relations campaign will attract the types of volunteers the Army needs. I am concerned that the security of this Nation will not be sustained if the military does not respond to the legitimate concerns of its career personnel.

Therefore, it seems appropriate that we commit ourselves to two goals. As we continue to disengage from Vietnam, we must be mindful of the needs for strengthening the capacity of a smaller military force to preserve our Nation's security. At the same time, we must insist that the military not become a force which is unresponsive to Congress and to the needs of its personnel of all ranks.

Mr. SANDMAN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to quote some remarks that Admiral Rickover, the father of our own nuclear submarine, made last winter:

The Soviets are embarked on a program which reveals a singular awareness of the importance of seapower, and an unmistakable resolve to become the most powerful maritime force in the world. They demonstrate a thorough understanding of the basic elements of seapower: knowledge of the seas, a strong modern merchant marine, and a powerful new navy.

It behooves us all to consider some of the specifics which Admiral Rickover and other experts have been trying to get across to the people and to the Congress for some time.

These are not generalities, but cold, hard specifics:

The Soviets in the last 25 years have produced 570 modern submarines;

During that same time period, the United States built 106 submarines;

According to the last unclassified data available, the Soviets now have between 355 and 363 submarines operational, all built since World War II;

Anywhere from 75 to 83 of these Soviet subs are nuclear-powered;

The U.S. Navy has 141 submarines operational of which 88 are nuclear-powered; the remainder are diesel-powered, most of them dating from World War II;

The Soviets now can build up to 20 nuclear submarines a year on a single shift basis;

Because we are now converting our Poseidon submarines, our present capacity is less than half that of the Soviet Union; even when the Poseidon conversions are completed—and that will not be until 1977—we will still be far below Soviet capabilities;

Since 1968, the Soviet Navy has been producing a new class of submarines—and converting their older ones, improving their capabilities;

The new Soviet class—the Yankee class—is a nuclear-powered, ballistic missile submarine, each capable of submerged launching of 16 ballistic missiles with a thousand-mile range;

The Soviets now have at least 15 of the Yankee class subs operational; they are producing new units at a rate of 12 per year and this means that they will surpass our own Polaris fleet by late 1973, possibly earlier.

What are the implications of the facts, the warnings we can draw from them? Let me quote Admiral Rickover:

Throughout our history, the waters that have washed our shores have been friendly. They have given us geographical protection, making it practically impossible for anyone to attack us. They have also given us time to build-up our strength when anger threatened.

But, the tempo of modern technology has changed all this.

Yankee class submarines off each coast can blanket practically the entire United States. When the Soviets have the three thousand mile missile they are presently developing, they will be able to do this from either ocean.

Admiral Rickover ties the facts, figures, and implications together thusly:

Given the recent Soviet progress in undersea warfare and the sheer magnitude of their nuclear submarine program, the conclusion is inevitable, that unless we are willing to match their effort, they will surpass us during the 1970's.

Mr. Speaker, I am not a Cassandra but I frankly am very alarmed; and, I think we all should be. Admiral Rickover is not a Dr. Strangelove but he is clearly alarmed and with good cause. Unless we decide to take corrective steps immediately, we are inviting Soviet blackmail. That cannot be, and we must not let it come to pass.

Mr. Speaker, I insert Admiral Rickover's article from the New York Times in the RECORD:

THE SOVIET NAVAL PROGRAM

The Soviets are embarked on a program which reveals a singular awareness of the importance of seapower, and an unmistakable resolve to become the most powerful maritime force in the world. They demonstrate a thorough understanding of the basic elements of seapower: knowledge of the seas, a strong modern merchant marine, and a powerful new navy.

Starting with 200 diesel-powered submarines at the end of World War II, most of which were obsolete, the Soviet Union embarked on the largest peacetime submarine construction program in history, producing over 570 modern submarines in 25 years—most designed for long-range operations. During the same period the United States built 106 submarines. In two years alone, 1955 and 1956, the Soviets completed 150 submarines, one and one half times the total number of submarines this country has produced in the past 25 years.

They now have the largest and most modern submarine building yards in the world, giving them several times the nuclear submarine construction capacity possessed by the United States.

They are credited with a nuclear submarine production capability of 20 ships a year on a single shift basis. They have the facilities to increase this rate of production considerably. At present, while our Poseidon conversions are going on, the maximum U.S. capacity to build nuclear submarines is less than half that of the Soviets. Upon completion of these conversions—about 1977—the best we could do would still be well below their capacity.

According to the latest unclassified data the Soviets now have a total of 355 to 363 submarines, all built since World War II. Anywhere from 75 to 83 of these are nuclear-powered. The total U.S. force is 141 submarines, 88 nuclear-powered, the remainder diesel-powered. Most of our diesel units are of World War II vintage.

Today, as a result of the Soviets' large-scale construction program, our lead in nuclear-powered submarines is rapidly disappearing. Based on current force levels and estimated Soviet nuclear submarine building rates, they will be ahead of us numerically before the end of this year.

Of even greater concern than total numbers is the fact that since 1968 the Soviets have introduced several new designs besides converting older designs to improve their capabilities.

One of their current new designs is the Yankee Class nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine introduced in 1968. These submarines look very much like our Ethan Allen Class—our latest Polaris type—and are capable of submerged launching of 16 ballistic missiles with a range of over 1,000 miles.

They now have 13 of the Yankee Class in operation; additional units are under construction at a rate of about 12 a year. It is estimated that they will surpass our Polaris fleet of 41 by 1973 or 1974, possibly sooner. Further, it must not be forgotten that the Soviets also have over 30 conventional and nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines of the earlier design. Thus, we are faced with the imminent loss of our lead in numbers of sea-based strategic missiles.

The Soviet submarine force, like the entire Soviet Navy, has become capable of sustained open-ocean operations and is being used to support foreign policy in various areas of the world. In 1969 the tempo of worldwide Soviet submarine operations was at an all time high. This tempo has continued to increase in 1970. During recent naval maneuvers a large number of nuclear submarines were deployed in two oceans and nine seas.

The Russians are in the Mediterranean. They operate regularly and continually in the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea. Russian naval units now are being seen with regularity in the Indian Ocean and off both coasts of Africa. They are in the Pacific, the Arctic, and the Antarctic. The swimming Russian bear is not yet ten feet tall, but he is 5 feet, 8 inches, and growing rapidly. He has not yet wrested supremacy of the seas from the free world but he is making a determined effort to do so.

Throughout our history the waters that wash our shores have been friendly. They have given us geographical protection, making it practically impossible for anyone to attack us. They have also given us time to build up our strength when danger threatened.

But the tempo of modern technology has changed all this.

Yankee Class submarines off each coast can blanket practically the entire United States. When the Soviets have the 3,000-mile missile they are presently developing they will be able to do this from either ocean.

Let me first say that based on the best evidence available, I believe that today our Polaris submarines are safe from a massive, neutralizing blow. Further, I am not aware of any valid information indicating that the Soviets possess a means to track and destroy our Polaris submarines while they are on station. However, there is no assurance that this situation will prevail for long.

Given the recent Soviet progress in undersea warfare and the sheer magnitude of their nuclear submarine program, the conclusion is inevitable, that unless we are willing to match their effort, they will surpass us in this field during the 1970's.

Mr. SCHERLE. Mr. Speaker, the question of the United States-Soviet naval balance has become one of increasing importance in recent years. The strategic arms limitation talks have highlighted the significance of all phases of the strategic nuclear balance, but the accelerated development of the Russian Navy over the past decade has focused particular attention on the maritime rivalry between the two nations.

In an apparent effort to overtake the United States which, until recently, unquestionably dominated the seas, the Soviet Union has built up a formidable fleet. The expansion of the Russian Navy has, however, charted a course quite different from ours. Comparison of relative strengths and weaknesses, therefore, is difficult to make, and must be qualified by an explanation of the disparities in measurement and the real differences in purpose and requirements.

Both the United States and the U.S.S.R. have commissioned roughly an equal number of nuclear attack submarines of approximately the same size and power over the past 10 years. Here the basic similarity between the two navies ends.

The Russian Navy has grown from a defensive, coastal-oriented operation, with large numbers of small ships designed for flexibility and maneuverability on the Baltic, Black and Caspian seas. Its new offensive capability is based largely on surface-to-surface antiship missiles. The American Navy, on the other hand, relies heavily for its offensive punch on large attack aircraft carriers. Thus while the Soviets have built more combat ships in the last decade than we have, American surface combatant tonnage tripled that of the Soviet force in the same time period. There is an approximate correlation between tonnage and cost, so it is fair to say that we are spending about three times as much, too.

The total Soviet submarine force numbers three times that of the United States. Many of the Soviet subs, however, are short range, conventionally powered vessels, suitable only for attack against shipping or European targets, but posing no threat to strategic targets in the United States. It should also be noted in this connection that our NATO allies have considerable navies of their own—the French fleet, for example, exceeds the Soviet force in the Mediterranean—while the members of the Warsaw Pact have essentially none.

Among the most significant of the Soviet developments is the modern, high-speed patrol boat, capable of launching surface-to-surface missiles. Russia now has 150 of these; the United States has none. We do not lack the technology—the Norwegians and even the Libyans have them, and it would be relatively easy to develop our own—but until recently, the American Navy saw no need for them. This year's budget, however, includes an interesting new request for "initial procurement for a force of high-speed patrol boats with surface-to-surface missile capability." The United States has apparently decided to diversify its fleet and build more and smaller ships, more flexible in function and design and cheaper to operate.

Clearly Russia has been imaginative and innovative in using limited resources to challenge American control of the seas based on our carrier task forces, and to threaten U.S. strategic targets with their imitation of American Polaris submarines. Equally clearly, the United States must meet this challenge as resourcefully as it first asserted its preeminence in seapower. With intelligent planning and adequate funding, there is no question but that we can do the job.

At this point, I would like to include an article from the Des Moines Register of July 29, 1971, entitled "Hails Soviet 'Super Navy' as U.S. Slips."

HAILS SOVIET "SUPER NAVY" AS U.S. SLIPS

LONDON, ENGLAND.—A British military expert said Thursday that American naval strength is in a serious decline while the Soviet fleet has expanded into a "super navy" with a greatly increased sphere of influence.

"The situation for the U.S. Navy is serious," said Raymond V. B. Blackman, editor of the authoritative Jane's Fighting Ships. In a foreword to the 1971–72 edition, published Thursday, he added:

"By any standards, the Soviet fleet now represents the super navy of a super power."

Increasing Soviet naval power, he said, has led to "a somewhat belated but now acute awareness by hitherto quite autonomous navies of the need for international cooperation and mutual security."

This brought greater cooperation in both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, he said, but the British withdrawal from the Indian Ocean left a hole in western global defenses.

"The prime necessity would appear to be a multinational Standing Naval Force East, comprising warships from each of the countries with military or commercial interests in that oceanic hemisphere from South Africa to Indonesia," Blackman said.

RUSSIAN STRENGTH

He added: "So prolific has the Soviet naval shipbuilding effort been that the U.S.S.R. is now able to maintain a standing naval force in the Mediterranean five times stronger than five years ago to counter the American 6th Fleet. . . .

"Again, five years ago the U.S.S.R. had no warships in the Indian Ocean, but today there are a score of surface ships alone, and there is no telling how many Soviet submarines are in the area."

Blackman underlined a relatively new development in "the recognition, not only by major powers but also by smaller countries, of the tactical power and strategic influence of the fast and diminutive warship armed with the optimum payload of guided missiles."

Blackman noted that several smaller countries have stressed "diminutive missile boats with surface-to-surface systems (that) will give smaller navies an offensive power out of all proportion to their modest over-all size."

Norman Polmar, editor of the American section of the 729-page annual, declared that "the size and relative capabilities of the U.S. Navy," continue to decline at what many authorities consider to be an alarming rate. . . .

"The force levels of the fiscal year 1972 budget reduce several categories of warships to their lowest strengths for a decade." This affected nearly all categories except aircraft carriers, in which the U.S. Navy "now and for the near future maintains a decisive advantage," he said.

NUCLEAR SUBS

The Soviet navy, however, "has already exceeded the United States in active surface ship and submarine numbers, including near parity in nuclear submarine strength and a larger nuclear submarine construction program," Polmar wrote. "In some respects, the characteristics and capabilities of the Soviet ships obviously are superior to those of their U.S. Navy counterpart."

He noted that "winding down the war in Indochina will make U.S. Navy sea duty and its family separation less attractive—in addition to the increasing hostility toward the military in the United States."

He added that, meanwhile, U.S. "commitments are continuing and, in some areas, increasing."

U.S. inflation and cost increases, he said, "are making ship and aircraft procurement difficult and new ships with relatively inferior capabilities are compounding the problems."

Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, I agree with my colleague that the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean continues to be an alarming situation, but I would like to call the attention of the House to some implications of that presence which my friend mentioned, but did not elaborate upon.

I am referring to the continuing Soviet campaign against Israel. The New York Times indicated on July 20 that since last September, the Soviets are alleged to have delivered more than 100 Mig–21 jets to Egypt. Abba Eban, the Foreign Minister of Israel, cited this step up in arm deliveries in request to the United States for additional Phantom jets.

Mr. Speaker, an analysis of the Middle East confrontation, in which I concur, was made by the distinguished Senator from Washington, HENRY M. JACKSON, in his report to the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this year. His thesis was simply this: Russian policy in the Middle East is aimed at achieving Russian hegemony in the area.

Inflaming the passions of the Arabs and playing on their age-old hatred of the Jews is a means consciously employed on a continuing basis by the Russians to achieve their basic goals. If Israel did not exist, the Senator said, the Russians would have invented it.

That analysis is essentially correct. But, even if we can stipulate as to the ultimate Soviet goal, there is a question of how the Soviets plan to proceed. One school of thought holds that the Soviets want neither peace nor war but a continuation, indefinitely, of the tension that now exists, because Russian purposes are best served in a state of continuous confrontation. The argument is that if Israel were to be destroyed or overwhelmed, Soviet influence with the Arabs would immediately be reduced and Arab dependence on Soviet armaments would diminish accordingly. The military stalemate and the seeming inability of the Arab leadership to do anything about Israel, encourages the Arab radirals in whom the Soviets are interested, especially in places like Jordan and Iraq.

The second school of thought is that the Russians intend first to build up Arab, especially Egyptian, defenses with the SAM–2 and SAM–3 missiles, to prevent another devastating Israel first-strike such as the one that won the Six Day War in 1967, and then to mount an offensive which would destroy Israel. Certainly the MIG's and the other Russian hardware flowing into Egypt and Syria right now are not exclusively defensive weapons.

Either way you look at it, it is hard to imagine that the Russians have much enthusiasm for a negotiated settlement. They really have nothing to lose—except the hardware—if the Arabs were to strike again and lose. The Israelis have no such luxury. If they lose once, they lose for all time.

Mr. Speaker, while we are discussing a negotiated settlement in the Middle East—whether such a possibility is real or illusory—it should be restated emphatically that no peace can be negotiated until the Russians are willing to endorse such negotiations. So far Russia has obviously been contrary minded. If there is any incentive for Russia that is controllable by Israel, that incentive must be the opening of the Suez Canal. Therefore, it seems to me to be both foolish and dangerous for us to suggest that the Israelis allow the canal to be reopened without a complete settlement including treaty, safeguards, normalized relations, open shipping, and monitored reduction of forces and armaments.

It would be sheer folly to give the Russians the thing they want most without asking in return for the things Israel needs to stay alive as a nation or that we think are necessary to prevent Russian Middle East hegemony.

Opening the Suez Canal would give the Russian shipping, commercial and military, direct access to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. If the Russians could command the mouth of the Red Sea, they would be in position to cut Israel's southern supply route through the Gulf of Aqaba. Furthermore, they could command the routes around the Arabian Peninsula to the oil fields of the Persian Gulf.

I believe that it is directly contrary to Israel's interest and to our own to give Russia this capability by the reopening of the canal without demanding in return a complete settlement which would insure normal relations with appropriate, monitored safeguards.

Mr. MATHIAS of California. Mr. Speaker, our discussions here today have centered not only upon our current strategic posture, but also upon the SALT negotiations, and the resulting effect upon our strategic posture.

I think it is wise to explore the Soviet position through negotiations, but that we have to be well aware of the pitfalls which may come to those who do not have a clear idea of what they want to obtain through negotiations. Some people are expecting too much.

I recently came across an interesting statement on the SALT talks by Prof. Anthony T. Bouscaren, of Le Moyne College, in Syracuse, N.Y. Professor Bouscaren is a distinguished writer and lecturer, as well as an eminent scholar in his field, and he outlines some of the difficulties.

Professor Bouscaren points out that we have reached limited agreements with the Soviets in the past in the realm of disarmament. Professor Bouscaren said:

Yet none of these agreements has slowed the pace of Soviet armaments or its manifest quest for superiority. Indeed we have magnified and perhaps even misconstrued the significance of such agreements.

The chief difference between the United States and the Soviet attitude toward negotiations is that each side enters for contrasting purposes. Professor Bouscaren points out:

It is prudent to remember that the Communist concept of negotiation differs from our own. They view it as a component of conflict, with the objective of gaining an advantage without conceding anything.

He goes on to point out the Soviets have no qualms about violating any treaties or agreements when it is in their immediate interest to do so.

Indeed, the Soviets have already been violating the spirit of the negotiations. The purpose of the talks is supposed to be to put an end to the arms race. Yet the Soviets have been going full blast ever since the talks began. As Professor Bouscaren points out:

The Soviet Union has been making a massive effort, out of all proportion to its own resources or any external threat, to acquire and extend strategic superiority over the United States.

Even when the Soviets make a concession, the resulting situation turns out to be to the detriment of the United States. Our Nation has made a determined effort for peace. We have done nothing to provoke the Soviets. Yet, as Professor Bouscaren has said:

While we stopped building ICBMs and nuclear submarines, and refused to go ahead with the development of an ABM system, the Soviets moved ahead on all fronts. Now that we have started an ABM complex, the Soviets appear interested in blocking it through a freeze which would lock them in a position of superiority.

Mr. Speaker, we should look at our overall military posture as we conduct our negotiations at SALT. Certainly, the Soviets have caught up to us in strategic systems. But, as Professor Bouscaren points out, their ground forces in Europe exceed those of NATO, and we have heard much about the spectacular growth of their Naval fleet. Let us be wise, then, at the SALT talks, and consider the over-all effect of our negotiations.

Mr. Speaker, I include the entire statement by Professor Bouscaren in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks:

STATEMENT ON SALT TALKS BY PROF. ANTHONY T. BOUSCAREN

One of the reasons assigned for the "transitional" budget for FY 1971 is the hope that the present Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) will be fruitful. Some political leaders have urged even greater restraint than that reflected in the reduced budget, arguing, despite all experience to the contrary, that the Soviets might be influenced favorably by our example.

There is nothing new about our seeking disarmament through negotiation. Few seem now to remember the U.S. offer to prevent

an atomic arms race by delivering its stockpile to the United Nations, an offer rejected by the USSR. Periodically since then various efforts to slow or halt the arms race by negotiation have been frustrated in every instance by the intransigency of the Soviet Union.

It is true that three negotiations have been successful in the sense that limited agreements were reached on important issues.[1] Yet none of thees agreements has slowed the pace of Soviet armaments or its manifest quest for superiority. Indeed we have magnified and perhaps even misconstrued the significance of such agreements.

It is prudent to remember that the Communist concept of negotiation differs from our own. They view it as a component of conflict, with the objective of gaining an advantage without conceding anything. As James Reston writes: "Their idea of give and take in a talk is simple: You give, then take." (*New York Times*, Dec. 8, 1960, p. 46.). The Soviet record of treaty violation extends right down to sabotage of the Middle East cease fire. The Kremlin broke its word, lied to the United States, and double-crossed the developing peace (see Joseph Alsop, *Washington Post*, Sept. 21, 1970; Evans and Novak, *Washington Post*, Sept. 21, 1970). The Soviets have acted with stealth, surprise and ruthlessness, when it attacked Poland in concert with Nazi Germany; when it subjugated its allies Hungary and Czechoslovakia; and when it moved to deploy missiles in Cuba.

The Soviet Union has been making a massive effort, out of all proportion to its own resources or any external threat, to acquire and extend strategic superiority over the United States. It is possible that the Soviet Union sees SALT as an opportunity to assure for itself by agreement, an indefinite position of military superiority. This would be accomplished if we were foolhardy enough to agree to an arms limitation which left the U.S. vulnerable to a Soviet first-strike capability.

President Nixon has announced a joint agreement with the Soviet Union to concentrate on negotiating an ABM limitation pact at the SALT talks. The Soviets have been demanding that an ABM limitation be negotiated first, before offensive weapons are discussed. The previous U.S. position was that offensive and defensive weapons systems are intimately connected, and that neither could be considered in isolation.

While we stopped building ICBMs and nuclear submarines, and refused to go ahead with the development of an ABM system, the Soviets moved ahead on all fronts. Now that we have started an ABM complex, the Soviets appear interested in blocking it through a freeze which would lock them in to a position of superiority. An ABM freeze would leave the Soviets with 67 launchers already protecting Moscow while the U.S. has only authorized work at four sites.

The Soviets have caught up to us in strategic weapons they have surpassed us in tactical weapons; their ground forces in Europe exceed those of NATO, and their energetic Naval building program threatens to reduce our Navy to second-rate status. If our nuclear weapons are neutralized by SALT, the Soviets would be left with an unmatched strength on land and sea.

Mr. THOMPSON of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, for my part in today's effort to bring into focus the defense needs of this Nation, and the dangerous degree to which they have been allowed to deteriorate in recent years by comparison with the offensive buildup in which the Soviet Union has been engaged, I should like to stress the importance of the B–1. I have chosen this particular aspect of our defense triad, because it seems to me that the B–1 has come in for special and totally unjustified abuse as a primary target of the antimilitary clique in Congress and the press.

The Air Force Association has recently prepared an excellent position paper on the B–1 entitled "The B–1: Vital to National Defense." It outlines the significance of this strategic manned bomber as a key and necessary element of our defense program for more succinctly and effectively than I could do from my own knowledge and I include it in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

In conclusion let me express my appreciation to the sponsors of this special order and my hope that it will go a long way toward creating a climate of realism and understanding regarding our present defense posture and the futility of laying magnificent plans for new and improved domestic social programs. If we do not protect our Nation's future against our foreign enemies, to what purpose do we plan for our Nation's future on the domestic front?

The material follows:

THE B–1: VITAL TO NATIONAL DEFENSE

Diverse political forces have launched a series of well-planned attacks on a number of weapon system development programs. This is a well-organized campaign which is lethal in intent and ingenious in its use of half-truths and no-truths at all.

The first target in this devious effort is the B–1 strategic bomber program of the United States Air Force.

The driving force behind these activities is a loosely constituted group of legislators who call themselves Members of Congress for Peace through Law. And they have tasted blood. They spearheaded the successful drive that killed our SST program earlier this spring.

At the latest count, there were 115 members in the so-called Peace through Law group—29 Senators and 86 Congressmen. Senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon is Chairman of the Steering Committee. Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin chairs the committee concerned with Military Spending, Arms Control and Disarmament. The task force which concentrated on the B–1 was headed jointly by Senator George McGovern of South Dakota and Congressman John Seiberling of Ohio. Not surprisingly, this group of Congressmen is broadly and eagerly supported by the liberal news media and the New Left.

Three points stand out in this anti-B–1 campaign. They are the claims that the country no longer needs a new strategic bomber . . . that if it did, the B–1 would be the wrong airplane . . . and finally, that the financial management of the program is a failure. Let's take these points one by one.

In order to do this, we must raise a few questions. The most obvious one is "Do we need a diversified force for our strategic nuclear deterrence?"

The primary objective of our strategic forces is to deter nuclear attack upon ourselves or our allies. We seek to achieve that objective, first by ensuring that our strategic forces always have the capability to retaliate decisively against an all-out surprise attack. This is our "Assured Destruction" capability.

Also, we incorporate into our strategic forces the capability to provide the President with a range of nuclear options for situations short of an all-out nuclear exchange.

A secondary objective of our strategic forces, in the event deterrence fails, is to limit damage to ourselves and our allies, and to exert pressure on the attacker to end hostilities promptly and on favorable terms.

Of these tasks, "Assured Destruction" is the most crucial, since it is the keystone of our entire strategic posture. It requires, obviously, that there never be any question about the ability of our forces to accomplish the "Assured Destruction" task—now or in the future. Uncertainties in any one element of the strategic forces, which are bound to arise from time to time as technology advances and the threat changes, must be offset by capabilities provided in other elements.

Moreover, we must not only guard against "foreseeable vulnerabilities" in our strategic forces, but also against those which may not as yet be clearly visible or understood.

For example, we know a great deal about the theoretical vulnerabilities of land-based missiles and bombers simply because we have studied them intensively and critically over a period of years. The potential vulnerabilities of the sea-based missiles, in contrast, have not been subjected to the same kind of critical and intensive analysis.

Yet, unless we believe that technological progress will come to a halt—which flies in the face of all our experience—we must assume that "potential" vulnerabilities of sea-based missiles will in time become much more visible. Dr. John Foster, the Pentagon's Director of Research and Engineering, has pointed out that the Soviets "could today with their technology make the sea transparent."

Given the long lead times involved in the development, production and deployment of major new weapons systems, we must plan ahead for at least 10 to 15 years. By that time, new and totally unanticipated vulnerabilities may appear in one element or another of our strategic forces, just as they have in the past. The only way in which we can ensure that these unanticipated vulnerabilities will not fatally weaken our deterrent is to maintain well diversified forces and to make sure that each element has distinctly different survival and penetration characteristics.

For this reason we have created a triad of forces, consisting of bombers—of which a large proportion are maintained on continuous ground alert . . . land-based missiles deployed in hardened underground silos that are dispersed in the central part of the U.S. . . . and sea-based missiles deployed in submarines.

Each element depends on a different mode for survival. Bombers depend upon tactical warning coupled with quick reaction. Minuteman depends upon dispersion and hardness. Polaris/Poseidon depends upon uncertainty as to location. If the Soviets could deploy SLMBs with depressed trajectories close to our shores, it would bring into question the survivability of some of our bombers. If the Soviets deploy many highly accurate ICBMs, then our Minuteman force in silos is threatened. If the Soviets can reduce the uncertainty of location of our submarines at sea, then our SLBMs are threatened. If the Soviets achieve a significant advance in ABM technology, the value of both our ICBMs *and* SLBMs is compromised. But a diversified force has the strong redeeming feature that a breakthrough in Soviet capability in any one area affects only that area and not our overall deterrent.

Further, and this is most important, by having a diversified force, temporary vulnerabilities in any one element are not fatal. We can counter the vulnerability with deliberate well thought-out actions because we have confidence that the other elements of our forces will still work. On the other hand, if we put all our eggs in one basket then we must be absolutely certain that there never is any gap in the survivability of that force, however temporary.

Further, a composite force of bombers and

[1] The test ban treaty of 1963, the UN ban on the use of outer space for military purposes, and the non-proliferation treaty.

land-based missiles greatly complicates Soviet "first strike" attack planning. That is, if the Soviets want to attack our land-based missiles and bombers at the same time with their ICBMs and SLBMs, they have two basic choices: (1) launch the ICBMs first, then the SLBMs, so that both arrive over target simultaneously, or (2) launch both forces simultaneously.

If the Soviets make the first choice, then our bombers would have ample time to clear their bases before the SLBM warheads arrive. Our early warning system, which is already operational, can detect Soviet ICBM launches while they are still in the boost phase. We have under development a new system which could provide increased warning.

If the Soviets make the second choice, then there would be an interval of about 15 to 20 minutes between the detonation of the first SLBM warheads over our bomber bases and the arrival of the first ICBM warheads over the Minuteman silos. This would give our National Command Authority time to make a final decision and launch our ICBMs before they could be attacked.

Obviously, the presence of bombers and land-based missiles in the force greatly feeds the retaliatory capability of both and thereby strengthens our over-all strategic deterrent posture. It confronts the Soviets with two mutually exclusive alternatives, each of which would be highly risky from their point of view.

Second, a mixed force of bombers and missiles complicates the Soviets' defensive problem. While an antiballistic missile defense would be equally effective against sea-based missiles and land-based missiles, it would be of little value against low-flying B–1 bombers. Conversely, a good defense against low-flying B–1s would be of little value against land or sea-based ballistic missiles. In addition, the B–1 bomber is the only weapon system that's capable of fighting its way through whatever defenses the enemy creates because it can detect and destroy the radar installations needed for any kind of defensive system. Missile defenses and bomber defenses require different sets of equipment and technologies. Moreover, it is not enough to defend some targets against bombers and others against missiles—*all* must be defended against both if the defenses are to be of value.

Now, what is it that the bomber allows us to do . . . or more importantly, causes the enemy to realize what we can do . . . that the other two elements of the triad can't do . . . or do as well?

First, we have the potential for limited and controlled actions, as expressed in the President's desire to ". . . insure that all potential aggressors see unacceptable risks in contemplating a nuclear attack, or nuclear blackmail, or acts which could escalate to strategic nuclear war . . ."

If we think in terms of limited nuclear responses, we must immediately recognize the utility of the strategic bomber. After launch, the bomber can be redirected or recalled over a period of hours, always remaining fairly noncommital with respect to the area it is threatening.

In the case of ballistic missiles, the only way we could "show the force" is to launch the missile. But the ballistic missile, once launched, cannot be recalled and will irrevocably detonate in a matter of minutes. In a situation which demands action with discretion, the strategic bomber offers a singular way to show our force and still provide the opponent with important time to evaluate our intent and reconsider his own.

Finally the presence of a strategic bomber in a diversified deterrent force helps our position in SALT-type negotiations. This hinges on the fact that the bomber—because of its relative slowness—is an unlikely first-strike weapon. As such, it is less destablizing than missiles and should be less subject to critical bargaining at the SALT table. If our objectives in SALT are to achieve stability while making deterrence work, we should decidedly benefit from possessing a strategic system that minimizes the possibility for first-strike and still assures that we retain a strong second-strike capability for retaliation.

I now come to the second major point that is being raised by the members of the Peace Through Law group and many of the news media. Simply stated, the accusation is made that if the country needed a bomber at all, then the B–1 is the wrong kind of airplane. The claim is made that a subsonic strategic bomber, serving exclusively as a standoff platform for a new air-to-ground missile, would be better than the B–1. For this reason, the Peace Through Law group has urged cancellation of the B–1 program and allocation of limited funds for basic research on such a standoff system.

I submit this reasoning is not only illogical but also leads to a weapon system that would provide less deterrence for higher costs than the B–1. There are two ways of achieving the standoff capability. One is by using a large aircraft as a launching platform for ballistic missiles. This is not only enormously difficult in terms of guidance system and very expensive but also gets us right back to my earlier argument against putting all of our eggs in one basket. Remember that a single major advance in Soviet ABM technology would be effective against *all* long range missiles whether launched from under the sea, from silos, or from aircraft. *All* have ballistic trajectories.

So, the only alternative that makes any sense at all is to have a standoff missile that penetrates at low altitudes and over great distances. Extensive studies by the Air Force, the Department of Defense, and outside experts over a number of years have addressed this question . . . and rejected it because of higher cost, lower performance and other ill effects. I don't want to belabor the highly technical aspects of such a system.

The gaggle of other accusations levelled against the B–1 is equally invalid. I am proud to say that the Air Force Association is dealing with these false claims in detail . . . refuting the range of errors from the B–1's alleged need for a special new tanker to insinuations about its inadequacy in terms of penetration speed. For reasons of time, I will single out only one other major point . . . that of costs.

Cutting the DOD budget in order to fund allegedly underfunded social programs is the name of the game in the Congress and it is being played with the greatest degree of ostentation. The most cynical charges against the B–1 program are in the financial field, and suggest cost overruns and financial mismanagement.

The most transparent hoax perpetrated by the Peace Through Law group is to charge the B–1 with such tangential elements as the cost of the Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM) which was developed for the B–52 and FB–111, and the eventual need of a new tanker . . . which would serve TAC as well as SAC.

With the help of this kind of financial fast shuffle, the committee arrives at the insinuation that the B–1 program will cost the tax payer between 47 and 75 billion dollars. Actual cost forecasts by DOD and the Air Force are around $11 billion . . . and during the past year alone, frugal management techniques have reduced the cost of the current R. & D. phase by about half a billion dollars. To me the devious juggling of figures by opponents of the B–1 is the height of irresponsibility.

At AFA's National Convention last fall Secretary Seamans made this statement: ". . . It might be possible to undermine the effectiveness of either missiles or bombers alone, but to counter both at the same time would be a vastly more difficult problem. We must retain this stabilizing capability for the indefinite future. The B–1 gives us an improved system to do the job and represents the most economically feasible means to achieve this end . . . we must expedite the development of this aircraft."

The Air Force Association believes ardently that attainment of this goal is one of the most vital tasks this nation faces in today's troubled world. And we hope and pray that like the venerable B–36 before it the B–1 will provide many years of service . . . providing free men with peace without having to fire a shot in anger.

Mr. DEVINE. Mr. Speaker, a report of the Members of Congress for Peace Through Law attacking the B–1 bomber has been widely circulated since its release in early May.

This report is full of errors and discrepancies which only serve to muddy the waters regarding our defense needs and, taken seriously, as they seem to be in some quarters, such inaccuracies could prove fatal to our future security.

Senator BARRY GOLDWATER, in a speech to the Senate on June 9, 1971—see CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, page 18887—performed an outstanding service in pointing out and correcting many of the errors and discrediting the report in general.

However, the June issue of Air Force magazine contained several excellent articles addressed to the erroneous information contained in the MCLP report, and I feel these observations are pertinent to matter under discussion in this special order today.

Therefore, I include in the RECORD at this point excerpted articles by George D. Hardy, president of the Air Force Association; John F. Loosbrock, editor; and Edgar Ulsamer and Claude Witze, both senior editors of Air Force magazine:

IN BEHALF OF THE B–1

The Air Force's most crucial need is for a new strategic bomber. Replacement of the aging B–52s is essential to the nation's deterrent power in the 1980s and beyond.

The Military Spending Committee of the "Members of Congress For Peace Through Law" has circulated widely a paper attacking the B–1 bomber. The paper, bylined by Senator George S. McGovern and Congressman John F. Seiberling, contains misinformation and half-truths that should be corrected in the interest of rational debate on this important issue. The June 1971 AIR FORCE magazine will include several articles that respond to charges made in the Committee's document.

The Air Force Association has long been on record in favor of rapid development and full operational deployment of the B–1. We believe that the B–1 is among the most vital needs of this nation in a period of increasing national insecurity. Our analysis of the B–1 program, therefore, is being distributed in advance of publication. The attached papers provide a factual basis on which the B–1 development program and its management by the Air Force may be judged. The papers may be quoted or reproduced in whole or in part without further permission, providing AIR FORCE magazine is properly credited.

GEORGE D. HARDY,
President, Air Force Association.

THE B–1 IS A MUST

(By John F. Loosbrock)

One hopes that the B–1 strategic bomber will never be tested against Soviet defenses. If it never is, then it will have done its job to perfection, just as did the B–36 and, up to now, the B–52. That is the nub of deterrence—not to have to fight, by virtue of being constantly prepared to do so.

Right now, the Soviet air defense system is not the problem. Long before the B–1 ever gets off the ground, indeed, almost three years before its first scheduled flight, it is running into flak. The flak is political, of course. Evasive action against it will not work and is not advised. Decoys or other diversionary penetration aids are not recommended. No, the best defense against the kind of opposition the B–1 currently faces is that peerless countermeasure known simply as the truth.

As noted elsewhere in this issue (*see "Airpower in the News," page 14*), an anti-B–1 paper has been circulated by a congressional group calling itself Members of Congress for Peace Through Law (MCPL). Among other assertions, the point is made at length that, if the country needs a new bomber at all, it does not need the B–1.

Instead of the B–1, the Committee for Peace Through Law wants to start basic research and development on a new and quite different aircraft. It would be subsonic and designed to stand off and launch a new air-to-ground missile that would not be ballistic. (Obviously, the latter requirement was stipulated so as to, in the words of the paper, "continue the mixed defenses problem confronting the adversary.")

So, right off the bat, the Members of Congress for Peace Through Law are seriously proposing that we terminate an on-going and thus far very successful program and start from scratch, not only on a new standoff bomber but on a new missile as well. This would be a dubious way to save money, an impossible way to meet the postulated threat timetable, and, worst of all, the deterrent job would not get done. The proposal would be bad fiscal policy, bad technological policy, and bad strategic policy.

In the jargon of the day, "No way!"

The members of the group obviously are forgetting, or choosing to ignore, the kind of laws that the Congress can neither make nor repeal, including the law of gravity, which obtains in any discussion of air-delivered weapons, whether ballistic missiles, cruise missiles or bombs dropped from an aircraft. The B–1, with its SRAM missiles, which can be launched accurately at high altitude as far as 100 miles from a target or from on the deck at thirty miles range, is designed to reduce to a minimum the adverse effects of gravity. The standoff-bomber system, with its sluggish, oversized cruise missile—inaccurate, easy to find, easy to shoot down with surface-to-air-missiles—would be fighting gravity every inch of the way to a target. And high-yield gravity bombs carried in the B–1, but unavailable in any standoff system, are still the only reliable way to sure-kill superhardened targets. This is an important plus for the B–1 that is simply not obtainable in any conceivable standoff system.

Suffice it to say at this juncture that the arguments in favor of the standoff bomber set forth in the paper of the Peace Through Law Committee are not persuasive. Indeed, they consist largely of a rehash of various proposals and concepts that were carefully considered in arriving at the B–1 concept and which were discarded long since by the Air Force and the Department of Defense. The B–1's attractive combination of characteristics—high prelaunch survivability, on-the-deck penetration capability, low radar cross section with efficient electronic countermeasures (the B–1's low radar cross section permits it to obtain the same ECM protection with 1,000 pounds of avionics gear that a B–52 could get with 100,000 pounds), its mixed load of SRAM missiles, penetration aids, and high-yield gravity bombs, its high-altitude supersonic capability—makes all other alternative proposals come off as shoddy Brand-X goods.

In fact, the Committee's proposed substitute system is so weak that one gets the uneasy feeling that the main thrust of the paper is against the triad concept itself—that a bomber is not needed at all. This ties in nicely with the known cordiality of many of the best-known and most vocal members of the group toward the concept of a single-mode, solely undersea-based deterrent force. Thus, we find the anomaly of such Senators as Proxmire and McGovern embracing this concept, whose vulnerabilities have never been subjected to the kind of critical and intensive analysis that has been applied to both bombers and land-based missiles, while loosely and irresponsibly criticizing the B–1, which has been through the analytical wringer. Apparently they choose to overlook the words of Dr. John S. Foster, Defense Director of Research and Engineering, that the Soviets "could today with their technology, make the sea transparent."

As transparent, that is, as the logic of the Committee for Peace Through Law.

THE B–1 STRATEGIC BOMBER

(By Edgar Ulsamer)

When the Air Force awarded engineering development contracts for the B–1 strategic bomber last June, three factors set the pace and direction of the program. (*See "The B–1: USAF's Most Versatile Bomber," April '70 issue of* AIR FORCE *Magazine.*) First was the obvious need to get the test aircraft into the air as soon as possible; second, this had to be done at a minimum of cost; and third, the test aircraft had to be sufficiently developed to be reproducible as a production aircraft.

These requirements, General Stewart told this reporter, led the B–1 Program Director, Maj. Gen. Douglas T. Nelson, to use management techniques "comparable to the Skunk Works approach," meaning a very close working relationship between the Air Force and the contractors (North American Rockwell Corp. and General Electric) with maximum flexibility and reduced reporting requirements. [The Skunk Works is the nickname for Lockheed's high-security facility in California, where the YF–12A and SR–71 were developed in secret.]

General Nelson explained that "between fifty and sixty military and civilian Air Force personnel under Deputy Program Director Col. M. M. Bretting are being assigned on a permanent basis to the contractor's facility in Los Angeles, where they work side by side with North American Rockwell. A smaller contingent is in residence at the GE engine facility in Evendale [Ohio]."

This arrangement provides two major benefits. The Deputy Program Director in residence is empowered to make routine decisions on the spot, which avoids delay. At the same time, the Air Force finds out about problems the minute they surface, without having to wait days for a written report.

General Nelson has introduced other innovative management techniques, after a sweeping review of management procedures in cooperation with the contractors last August. Partly because the SPO staff is in residence at the contractor facility, "the individual reporting requirements were reduced from several hundred to forty, which is saving many millions of dollars. Previously, many functions performed by the contractor were duplicated or reformatted to meet Air Force standards. Layers of personnel accumulated on both sides, and the contractors had to assign large numbers of people merely to satisfy USAF's reporting requirements. What we are doing on this program—with the exception of the DoD's Cost Schedule Control System, which is fully implemented—is to adapt our way of doing business to the methods of the contractor."

In a similar vein, the Air Force early this year decided to cut back the number of flight-test aircraft from five to three, and the number of complete ground-test airframes from two to one, and thereby save about $300 million. "This involves an element of risk since loss of one of the three test aircraft would have considerable impact on the program. But on balance, I believe it is a good trade off. With good supervision we can live with the increased risk, and I think we will wind up doing a much more efficient job during the flight-test phase. We plan a combined Air Force-contractor flight-test program. Both parties will participate in all activities and receive benefit from all test data. Previously, flight testing was done first by the contractor and then again by the Air Force, resulting in duplication of more than fifty percent of the effort," General Nelson said.

By changing the flight-test program to a "team effort," the Air Force not only assures "full engagement in all facets of the effort but is saving itself and the contractors a great deal of cost and effort," he explained. (Universally, ASD program managers view the "disengagement" policy, in effect in the late 1960s, which held contact between the government and the contractors to a minimum, as a prime factor in cost overruns and technical difficulties in recent weapon system procurement programs.)

FRUGAL MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES

Another innovative means for cutting cost during the B–1's RDT&E phase is the SPO's decision to use civilian airworthiness standards, in place of the more stringent military specifications, where reasonable.

"We are doing this to minimize the government's fiscal commitments prior to a production decision. By eliminating a high percentage of the formal military qualification testing of various system's components, we are running a small calculated risk. If and when a production decision is made, we will have had the advantage of actual flight-test experience instead of merely bench tests and analyses in the qualification testing on some key components. Still, I believe that about sixty percent of the components involved will not have to be requalified to military standards when we go into production," General Nelson said. However, because of their crucial importance, the Air Force is proceeding with standard military testing of the engines.

Another cost-cutting move, during the RDT&E phase is the "deferment" of all design and development work on the B–1's ground-support and training equipment until a production decision is reached. A similar tack is being taken with the B–1's avionics. "While we have designed into the airframe provisions for extremely sophisticated defensive and offensive avionics, we will use only off-the-shelf systems for the flight-test program. We will start the first production aircraft with perhaps no more than fifty percent of the full avionics potential. Over the years, we can add to our capabilities. While I don't want to commit myself categorically at this time, I think that the first SAC aircraft will have an offensive avionics system similar to that of the FB–111. On the other hand, it is quite probable that early model will require a new defensive avionics system, as well as a new computer installation to operate both the defensive and the offensive systems," the B–1 Program Director said.

PERFORMANCE CHANGES

In his no-holds-barred review of cost factors, General Nelson initiated a number of performance changes that have helped cut costs without impairing the aircraft's ability to perform its mission. Among them is a

reduction of the airframe's titanium content. Titanium is a high-priced difficult-to-machine metal which combines high strength with the ability to resist high temperature. While the B–1's supersonic cruise speed is classified, it is known to be between Mach 2 and Mach 2.5 and, therefore, not subjected to the high temperatures that would require extensive use of titanium. The airframe, therefore, contains no more than twenty percent titanium. Titanium is being used to provide extra strength for components exposed to high aerodynamic loading and in this limited application is considered quite cost-effective.

Following extensive trade-off studies, the initial performance criteria for takeoff performance were relaxed by about 500 feet. The refueling altitude requirement was relaxed slightly and the supersonic penetration range reduced a little. In addition, the size and weight of the aircraft were reduced slightly, compared to the original contract specifications. The aircraft's exact weight is classified, but is slightly above 350,000 pounds.

According to present plans, General Nelson said, the B–1's engineering mockup is to be completed by October of this year, the engine is to be qualified for flight testing late in 1973 and the aircraft is to fly for the first time in the spring of 1974. At about the time of first flight, the government will request production funding from the Congress and begin actual production in Fiscal Year 1975.

The production "buy" the Air Force is expected to propose will involve about 240 aircraft. While no Initial Operating Capability (IOC) has been established, it is likely that the aircraft will begin to enter the SAC inventory by mid-1977.

The program's technical progress so far "has been very good, regarding both airframe and engine. We are already running scaled-down engine components, such as half-scale fans, half-size turbines, and a full-size prototype compressor. The engine is an afterburning turbofan akin to the TF30 engine of the F–111, but using significantly higher temperatures and pressure ratios. By using new, sophisticated materials, such as the newly developed nickel alloy Rene 120, and advanced cooling techniques, we attain substantial increase in temperatures and, therefore, in efficiency, over the best engine currently in operation. GE was able to come up with a single high-pressure turbine design—in place of the several needed previously. This eases the task of maintaining the aircraft in the field. The engine can be disassembled and reassembled easily and quickly [vital for a bomber which is to be dispersed widely]," according to General Nelson.

General Nelson termed the B–1's mode-stabilizing Softride system a breakthrough of considerable importance. Without it, the high rate of turbulence encountered at altitudes below 400 feet during the B–1's high-speed penetration runs could severely impair both crew and systems performance. North American Rockwell's Softride represents the first application of a new technology, called COV (control configured vehicle), essentially an adaptation of missile control systems to aircraft. The B–1's Softride system suppresses up-and-down motion of the airframe with the help of a movable horizontal vane placed on each side of the aircraft's nose. These control surfaces are electronically activated by motion sensors in the fuselage.

GETTING OUT IN A HURRY

Within the framework of the U.S. deterrent triad, the strategic bomber's ability to take off rapidly from dispersed fields, before it can be destroyed by sea-launched missiles, is critical. The B–1's ability to "flush on warning" is outstanding. "We expect to be off the ground within no more than four minutes from the time of warning. Allowing for depressed-trajectory SLBMs, this is not good enough if the bomber is based in our coastal areas. It is, however, more than adequate if, as planned, we locate the aircraft and their supporting tankers about 300 miles or more inland. With the crews standing by in the cockpit or near the aircraft, and by starting all four engines simultaneously, we can gain additional, significant reductions in reaction time.

"Many detailed analyses and scenarios indicate that we can cope with the threat of depressed-trajectory sea-launched missiles by dispersing the fleet—say, two bombers and two tankers on alert per base—throughout the north-central part of the country. This can be done easily because the B–1 takes off from any runway that can accommodate medium- and long-range commercial aircraft," General Nelson explained.

The B–1 can carry three times the internal payload of the aging B–52, in either nuclear bombs or SRAM missiles. It is designed to fight its way through the heaviest air defense concentrations and to deliver high-yield nuclear bombs with extreme accuracy. At present it is the only weapon system capable of dealing with superhardened targets.

If an enemy has small chance of destroying a significant number of B–1s on the ground and "because there is no technology in sight that can prevent it from penetrating to target, the B–1 represents a pivotal element of our national deterrence in the years ahead," according to General Nelson.

The need for the B–1, reaffirmed by recent high-level defense studies, is not affected by a possible shift of part of the nation's ICBMs to a mobile-basing mode, be that either ground mobile or air mobile. "Whether you launch a ballistic missile from a silo, a submarine, a mobile ground launcher, or an aircraft on the ground or even in the air makes no significant difference to the enemy's ABM system. The basing does not change the penetration mode, and any Soviet breakthrough in ABM technology would jeopardize *all* ballistic missile systems. We tend to underestimate the ABM capabilities of the Soviet Union. For instance, does it make sense that the Tallinn system, involving thousands of interceptor missiles and ostensibly designed to defend against B–52s, would be made accurate to an altitude of 150,000 feet if there were no intent to use its missiles against our ICBMs and SLBMs?

"Our deterrence capability is only as good as the Soviets think it is. To maintain this credibility, we need an advanced strategic bomber that can provide us with various levels of deterrence. Also, only the bomber compensates for the fact that the Soviets don't expect this country to launch its missiles on warning but rather to absorb a first strike. They also know that we would launch our bomber force on warning, because it can be recalled," General Nelson said.

B–1 PAYLOAD AND TANKER COMPATIBILITY

Recent criticism of the B–1 program by the Military Spending Committee of the "Members of Congress for Peace Through Law" (see also "Airpower in the News," p. 14) raised questions as to the B–1's SRAM payload and the new bomber's compatibility with the KC–135 tanker fleet.

It was insinuated that the Air Force recently acquiesced to a twenty-five percent drop in the number of Short-Range Attack Missiles (SRAMs) to be carried internally aboard the B–1. The facts are that the Air Force, well in advance of the release of the request for proposals in 1969, devoted considerable effort to establish the optimum payload capability of the B–1. Cost-effectiveness studies showed that, within certain limits, the number of offensive weapons and decoys required was relatively constant. This optimum payload configuration has not been changed since the RFPs were released to industry, and no change is now anticipated.

The committee also claims that the B–1 is incompatible with the existing fleet of USAF KC–135 tankers and requires a new tanker fleet. This is not so either.

Adequate basing in the north-central part of the US is available for both the bombers and the tankers, which need not be located at the same fields. The KC–135s, which do not carry nuclear weapons, can be dispersed to civilian fields (a large number of which have adequate runway lengths) during periods of increased tension and alert. The B–1's relatively short-runway takeoffs, as presently specified, provide for a wider choice of dispersal bases, both military and civilian. And the B–1 can still reach a considerable portion of the Soviet target system unrefueled, should the tanker for a particular sortie not survive.

Another alternative would be to reduce the full offload available from the KC–135s, to permit them to take off from shorter runways. This would also limit somewhat the B–1's penetration capability, but much less so than complete loss of tanker support.

In addition, the KC–135 can be modified to shorten reaction time and takeoff distances. These modifications could include replacing the present engines with existing airline-type turbofans, as well as simultaneous engine start, using cartridge-starter techniques.

Air Force studies show conclusively that adequate basing facilities are available for both the B–1s and the KC–135s, which meet all criteria of safe escape from the most serious ICBM or SLBM threats.

THREATS: AT HOME AND ABROAD

(By Claude Witze)

WASHINGTON, D.C., May 7.—Senator George McGovern of South Dakota, who thinks he should be President of the United States, believes the Air Force wants a new supersonic bomber "to enhance the excitement for strategic bomber pilots and the glamor of Air Force recruiting programs." One of his conferees, Rep. John F. Seiberling of Ohio, says the USAF B–1 project is "utterly impractical." He describes the proposed new bomber as a "weapons system in search of a mission."

Against these learned viewpoints stands the opinion of Melvin R. Laird, the Secretary of Defense, himself a former member of Congress. He is worth quoting at greater length. A couple of weeks ago, Mr. Laird told a convention of the American Newspaper Publishers Association in New York that this country may be moving toward "a second-rate strategic position." He said, "Recent evidence confirms the sobering fact that the Soviet Union is involved in a new—and apparently extensive—ICBM construction program. This new ICBM construction effort, coupled with additional momentum in the strategic defensive area—all clearly planned months ago—must be of major concern. Moreover, while we have an advantage in submarine-based missiles today, the USSR is rapidly closing that gap with an energetic construction program that continues."

Mr. Laird has concluded that prudence dictates "accelerated development of a new strategic bomber, the B–1, and a new undersea-launched strategic missile system, the ULMS. We are proceeding at the optimum development rate consistent with sound management, but, of course, no procurement decisions have yet been made."

A few days later, at a press conference, the Defense Secretary expanded on this. He said he does not know whether the new Russian ICBM is a modified SS–9 or a new weapon. He added that Moscow is continuing development of its ABM system, with evidence of sophisticated tests and more construction. He reiterated that the B–1 and ULMS must be pushed as fast as the services can handle the programs, because of the Soviet momen-

tum. If necessary, he will ask for supplementary funds to keep up the pressure. If Congress makes a blanket cut in the proposed Fiscal 1972 budget, leaving it up to the Pentagon to decide where the money will be saved, there will be a tremendous reduction in manpower "because that is the only way you can get your money rapidly." It would not come out of the B–1 and ULMS programs, "because really when you're in the development stage you do not have large expenditures."

Probably the only important reaction to Mr. Laird's disclosures has been from the few concerned observers who are demanding that the increased threat be defined more precisely. And illustrated, if you will. If Russia is intent on nuclear superiority, the Baltimore *Sun* editorializes, the fact must be faced. A couple of columnists call on the Nixon Administration to be more frank. What they have in mind, obviously, is the fact that our information comes from satellite reconnaissance, that these satellites transmit pictures, and that the pictures are not shown to the American public.

When the Kennedy Administration faced a similar credibility problem in the early days of the Cuban missile crisis, it bridged the gap by distributing photos taken from U–2 reconnaissace planes. When the White House made a firm demand on Moscow, in that case, the American people, including all the Senators and Congressmen, had no doubts or reservations about the nature of the threat. Questioned, Pentagon spokesmen will say only that the idea is under consideration.

Mr. Laird's reasoning, tnat it is manpower he will cut if Congress makes an across-the-board slash in his budget, will be fully understood by most of Congress, but not by all of it. The ones who do not hear are the men who favor unilateral disarmament and refuse to recognize there is a growing threat. In the forefront are the Members of Congress for Peace Through Law (MCPL). At latest count, there are 116 of them, led by Sen. Mark O. Hatfield as chairman. He says MCPL, first organized in 1966, aims to "coordinate congressional concern for world peace into specific actions in the Congress. Our goals include the development of international cooperation, strengthening the United Nations, and the pursuit of a disarmed world under enforceable world law."

To take a monster step toward disarmament in Fiscal 1972, MCPL will do what it can to destroy the B–1 bomber project, new fighter planes for the Navy and Air Force, the ABM system, MIRV missile heads, antisubmarine warfare, nuclear weaponry and testing, and US troop deployment in Europe. In all, it has a list of fourteen areas where it will carry out an attack. Studies, made from the viewpoint of legislators who are in "pursuit of a disarmed world," will be released weekly between now and the first of July. The releases will be made at press conferences designed to get maximum publicity in the press and on the television tubes.

It was at the first of these sessions, early this week, that Presidential Candidate McGovern gave his evaluation of the new B–1 bomber project as a device designed not for deterrence, but for glamor. He and Mr. Seiberling claim joint authorship for a report on the new aircraft that, in effect, recommends the project be killed and new studies be undertaken, aimed at a flying platform for "a new air-to-ground missile with the range and flight characteristics required to penetrate from beyond enemy defenses in a fashion which achieves the greatest possible variation from the nature of SLBM and ICBM penetration."

This would be a cruise missile. It would have to be big, with a range of 1,500 miles or more, and a weight in the 2,000-pound class. It would have to be subsonic, nonballistic, and jet-powered. This means it would be slow and carry no penetration aids. Being unmanned, it would lack flexibility, one of the things that makes a manned bomber practical in combat. It would be vulnerable to surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) because of its slow speed and the larger radar image its jet engine inlet would create for the defending forces. In addition to the danger such a missile faces over a target heavily defended by SAMs, the cost would not be cheap.

On top of this, the airplane that launches the cruise missiles is itself vulnerable. Certainly, the enemy will try to intercept it, and the technology for doing this is on hand. Eventually, the carrier aircraft would have to be fitted with longer-range missiles and its own penetration aids to get within range.

The McGovern-Seiberling paper on the B–1 is too long for detailed analysis on these pages. It contains a great number of careless statements of fact, such as the assertion that fifty percent of the B–1's anticipated cost will be spent to give it supersonic capability at altitude.

Asked for his authority for this figure, Mr. McGovern said he obtained it from a study by Congressman William Moorhead of Pennsylvania. The contractor estimates the figure should be sixteen percent. There are other estimates; the highest of them is thirty percent. At another point, the report says nuclear warheads are delivered at far less cost by missiles than they are by airplanes. This is true, but only if you consider that each bomber flies only one sortie, the way a missile does. Bombers, of course, fly many sorties, a fact that Mr. McGovern should know. He piloted bombers in World War II.

The McGovern-Seiberling report says "enormous cost overruns" already have occurred in the B–1 project. This is not true. The latest B–1 program funding and expenditures chart, with figures up to April 1, 1971, show that the contractor, North American Rockwell, is achieving an *underrun* so far in the development. As of April 1, the actual cost of work performed was $44.6 million. The budgeted cost of that work was $48.52 million.

What the MCPL study intended to say is that costs have escalated since the first Air Force estimates. USAF acknowledges this. In a speech three days ago before the Aviation/Space Writers Association, Maj. Gen. Douglas T. Nelson, B–1 Systems Program Director, said the cost estimate went up $1.3 billion "between the . . . preliminary estimate of total program costs and the time that the Request for Proposals was received from the aircraft industry." The increase was not "uncovered" by anyone, and it is not a cost overrun. The $1.3 billion, General Nelson said, will pay for (1) inflation, (2) part of the AMSA program that preceded the B–1, and (3) testing support and SRAM interface not previously charged to the B–1.

Another item of easy dispute in the MCPL report is its apparent assumption that if the B–1 project is completed, a new tanker will be required as part of the system. The paper even includes one cost estimate that says $16.7 billion should be added to the B–1 bill to pay for 255 new tankers and their maintenance for ten years. Well, a tanker is not a B–1 requirement; it is a USAF requirement that is used in support of several weapon systems in both the Strategic and Tactical Air Commands, in addition to some other operations. The existing KC–135 still has many useful years ahead. When it is worn out, USAF will need a new tanker. Eliminating the B–1 will not eliminate the tanker requirement. Mr. McGovern also declares that the KC–135, requiring longer runways than the B–1, will be restricted in its dispersal to the airports it now uses. This also is incorrect. The tanker, unlike the bomber, be it B–52 or B–1, has its choice of many more bases because it has no nuclear weapons aboard and poses no security problem comparable to that of a bomber.

Throughout the MCPL study there is constant reference to the B–1's capability to penetrate Soviet defenses, with the suggestion that it will not differ materially from that of the existing B–52. It does not appear that the authors are familiar with the potential of modern electronic countermeasures (ECM), despite the advances made even in the years of the war in Vietnam. Men working in the area, and themselves pressing the state of the art, are convinced that the B–1 will penetrate.

The McGovern-Seiberling document tosses arithmetic around with some abandon. It says the current USAF estimate of B–1 program costs is $11.1 billion. Then it turns to Representative Moorhead for a figure and reports that he has two of them. They are $20.27 billion and $33.47 billion. From here, it goes to a professor at Princeton University, one Bruce W. McDonlad, who makes a guess at $75 billion.

From this, the conclusion is drawn that the cost, counting bombers and tankers, "is so staggering as to make the question of continuing any strategic bomber program one of great national concern."

The report then gets simplistic:

"The issue need not be decided, however, in order to deal with the Fiscal 1972 B–1 funding request. The B–52 useful life assures ample time to hold the project in abeyance while considering other alternatives." It suggests that the $370 million sought for continued research and development be cut to $20 million, and that money used to terminate the contracts and "preserve the advanced research and development option."

The Air Force, supported by Mr. Laird and his Defense Department staff, clearly is convinced that the time has passed for procrastination about the new bomber. The combination of land- and sea-based missiles and bombers—the triad—must be maintained in the face of the growing threat. The diversified force is considered essential, with or without a SALT agreement with Russia. Bombers are a critical portion of the mix. They also are convinced, in view of the state of the art, that the B–1 will have the required flexibility to meet the threats that are possible over the years ahead. The United States cannot save money by postponing this decision to develop a new bomber.

The MCPL, it is evident from this first report of fourteen scheduled, is a genuine threat to our security program. Mr. Hatfield, the MCPL chairman, scorns Administration claims that national priorities have been rearranged and says, "Federal spending consists largely of military spending," a statement that is not true and would not be meaningful if it were true, in view of the threat and the changes made in the past few years.

No one has argued that the nation's efforts at improving our society should not be pressed on every front. The picture of that problem is in every city and town. The pictures of the threat, taken from satellites, are classified. If they are given to the public, Mr. McGovern, an Air Force veteran, may remember it was not excitement and glamor he was seeking in the cockpit.

[From the Chicago Tribune, July 26, 1971]

CHIEF OF SOVIET NAVY BOASTS OF FLEET'S GLOBAL NUCLEAR MIGHT

Moscow, July 25.—The commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy today warned "imperialists" that his fleets can attack any point on the globe with nuclear missiles.

Adm. Serge Gorshkov used the occasion of Soviet Navy Day to proclaim: "Never before has our navy been so powerful and efficient.

Gorshkov said in an article in Pravda, "The navy's regular maneuvers and exercises are proof of the Soviet Union's ever-growing strength as a naval power.

CITE OCEAN PERIL

"This is not to the taste of the inspirers of aggression . . . who are trying to frighten the world public with the threat of Soviet fleets on the world's oceans."

No one has felt that newfound strength more than the United States 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean, which faces the possibility this year of being outnumbered and outgunned by an expanded Russian Black Sea fleet. Up to 60 Soviet warships now regularly patrol the Mediterranean, compared to about 40 U.S. vessels.

In the last eight years, the Soviet Union has transformed a small border fleet into the world's second largest naval force.

HAS NO CARRIERS

The Soviet Pacific, Baltic, Black Sea and Polar fleets today boast about 25 cruisers, 100 destroyers, 1,600 smaller craft and more than 400 submarines.

The Soviet Navy has no aircraft carriers but operates two new helicopter carriers each with 30 aircraft designed to hunt and destroy submarines.

Gorshkov said the United States has developed submarine missile systems with which it "hopes to divert from U.S. territory a considerable number of possible retaliatory nuclear strikes."

"Vain hopes," he declared. "No strategy, including this so-called 'ocean strategy' will save any aggressors, who risk waging war on the U.S.S.R. and other countries of the Socialist community, from a crushing retribution."

Gorshkov's top aide, Adm. Vladimir Kasatonov, backed up the warning by proclaiming in the Defense Ministry newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda [Red Star] that nuclear submarines are now the main striking force of the Soviet Navy.

EIGHTY-SEVEN ATOM SUBS

Latest figures reported by the U.S. Defense Department show the Russians have 87 nuclear submarines and have achieved parity with the United States.

Since 1968, the Soviet Union has been adding a nuclear submarine to its fleet at the approximate rate of one each month.

The Soviets still lag in the number of submarines capable of firing nuclear missiles—17 to 41—but U.S. naval experts feel this gap will close by 1973.

Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN. Mr. Speaker, I sincerely appreciate this time and this opportunity to speak today on the mounting Soviet threat in the Middle East.

I do so because of deep concern that our national preoccupation over the situation in Southeast Asia has had the effect, in my judgment, of literally blinding us to the realities of what is happening in the Middle East.

Ever since Israel's creation in 1948, the Arab world has remained in a self-imposed state of war—encouraged, supported and aided by Communist economic, military, and diplomatic assistance. As such, the Soviet Union has taken advantage of and used the Arab States as a pipeline for military assistance and propaganda in an open effort to undermine the West, gain control over the vast oil resources in the Near East and Africa, establish a foothold in the Middle East and the Mediterranean and, in the process, aid and abet the Arab defeat of Israel.

In 1967, Israel won a war in 6 days which she neither wanted nor provoked, against the combined efforts of the Soviet-backed United Arab Republic. Because Israel won, rather than accept military defeat or diplomatic surrender, she has repeatedly been condemned by the United Nations. Because Israel refuses to submit to diplomatic blackmail by giving up the territory she now occupies as a result of that victory, Arab enthusiasm and hostility is again being pumped up by the Soviets through increased military and technical assistance on an unprecedented scale.

The presence of a Soviet flotilla in the Mediterranean, now complete, means that, for the first time, our NATO allies and the uncommitted nations of the Middle East now have Russian guns pointed at them from both the north and the south. In addition, the Soviet Union has nearly completed replacement of all Russian-made weapons and military equipment destroyed during the 6-day war and subsequently.

Of equal importance is the report, just made public, that the Soviets are now supplying the Mig–23 jet fighter-bomber to Egypt and of particular significance is the fact that there are no Egyptian pilots or crews trained to fly the Mig–23. They must be flown by Russians.

While the United States cautiously considers Israel's latest request for military aircraft, the "Soviet bear is once again riding the Egyptian tiger." While President Nixon postponed Israel's request for Phantom fighter-bombers last year, he did so in the hope that the Soviet Union, by his example, would also limit its military aid to the Arab States and thus bring about stability in the Middle East.

Once, again, however, the leaders in the Kremlin have literally "thumbed their noses" at any and all efforts to stabilize the Middle East "tinderbox" and, instead, have deliberately reignited the fires of intimidation and aggression. There are now more Sam–3 missiles, more Mig–21 fighters, more Russian troops, and technicians and advisers, more Russian tanks and guns and ammunition, and more Russian "influence peddling" than ever before in the Middle East.

The presence of Soviet pilots flying Mig–23's in Arab skies poses a grave threat to the President's direct and ongoing efforts to achieve some kind of an agreement on the Middle East crisis. If, as believed, Russian pilots are now flying "operational missions" for the Egyptian Air Force, the delicate balance of power in the Arab-Israeli conflict, has been "tipped" dangerously to the point that there should be absolutely no question of honoring Israel's request for planes. I am sure President Nixon is aware of this, but I want to take this opportunity to place maximum emphasis on the urgency and importance of this request.

What is at stake? Historically, the Soviet Union has had a compelling interest in obtaining warm-water outlets in the Mediterranean and extending their influence over Turkic and Arabic territory. This, since 1955, has become a reality.

With a surplus of their own to export, the Soviets can hardly be seriously interested in Mideast oil, except perhaps to deny the United States and Western Europe of its source. Also, they are determined to advance their own ideological campaign to convert the Islamic world to Communism.

Most experts agree that, what is actually at stake, is Soviet control of the strategic Suez Canal—a waterway of vital importance to their growing Indian Ocean and Mediterranean fleets and the man-made gateway to Asia. Soviet control of the canal would, in effect, "turn the flank" of NATO in the Middle East.

The regional implications if the Soviets are permitted to continue to surpass us in naval superiority are many. Because of its strategic location linking Europe, Asia, and Africa, the Middle East has long been a target for the Soviets. The most immediate aim of the Russians appears to be the reopening of the Suez Canal and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from its Eastern bank. The canal could then be used as a channel for the extension of Soviet influence throughout the Middle East and into the oil-rich Persian Gulf. Our 6th Fleet now has the growing Soviet Navy to oppose it.

Mr. Speaker, I know I speak for many in this body when I say that I, for one, am gravely concerned over the possibility of surrendering the Middle East to the Soviet Union or allowing 2 million Israelis to be pushed into the sea by a Soviet-Arab onslaught. We simply can no longer afford to sit idly by and watch what is happening in the Middle East as if there were no tomorrow.

If current efforts fail to achieve a peaceful agreement in the Middle East, I can foresee three distinct possibilities:

First. Following their pattern of having others do their fighting for them, the Soviets could pressure the Arab countries to get involved in another war with Israel; this time with Russian pilots flying the planes and Russian technicians controlling the sophisticated weapons systems now in place.

Second. The Soviets are also capable of trying to achieve control of the Middle East through diplomatic attrition—wearing Israel down by means of threats, powerplays, and offers to come to terms.

Third. Also within the realm of possibility is a combined land, sea and air invasion of Israel by the Soviet Union in concert with their Arab client states. Recent reports indicate the presence of Soviet landing craft and waterborne invasion training underway in Egypt. This, of course, would raise the question of a direct confrontation between the superpowers. Some of our top naval leaders in this country now believe that the balance of power in the Middle East has swung so decisively in favor of the Soviet Union that, in another year, the United States could not counter a joint Russian-United Arab Republic thrust across the Suez Canal and the Sinai Desert.

At this moment, Israel is facing a struggle for existence and against attrition. She needs material help and she needs it now. The Reds are convinced Israel can be overcome by a "grinding-down process" and the awesome threat of overhelming military odds.

For those who believe that reports of Russian presence in Egypt are exaggerated, consider the fact that the three main Egyptian airfields at Cairo, Alexandria, and Aswan are now Russian con-

trolled so completely that Egyptians are barred.

As we all know, there is far more involved in the Middle East crisis than just Israel's security. The very location of Israel as the single "land bridge" linking three continents—Europe, Asia, and Africa—is so strategic that she remains the key to the Middle East, and the Soviet Union is well aware of this fact.

Today, only Israel stands between free institutions and complete Soviet domination in the Middle East and, although she has "bucked the odd" alone in the past—she cannot stand alone much longer.

Should present efforts to achieve an agreement in the Middle East fail, the United States may well be faced with a Middle Eastern "Cuban crisis" of such magnitude that to blink and look away could prove disasterous.

Israel is a living example of what the Nixon doctrine is all about. She seeks assistance but has never asked for and does not want a single foreign soldier, adviser, or technician. Certainly, she deserves our help.

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, from a variety of sources, we are simultaneously getting the disquieting news that our defense system, in which we have invested so much money for so long a time, is not in the condition that we thought—or hoped—it would be in.

We seem to be getting news of this fact from all sides, from liberals who are looking for the peace dividend; from radicals who want to see the Defense Department closed and put out of business; from the President's own Blue Ribbon Defense Panel; from our own committees; from our own military men who are pleading for reforms and modernization; from Jane's Fighting Ships; and from the media and press.

We have heard earlier today about the deterioration of America's nuclear strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, we can find little reassurance by inspecting our arsenal of conventional weapons.

Here as elsewhere, the balance seems to be shifting against us. We know from Jane's, and we heard earlier today here in the House about the deplorable diminution of our naval strength. I think we are going to have to face the hard reality that we will have to come up with a great deal of money now to begin a naval building program. We need new carrier-based airplanes; we will have to invest in nuclear-powered frigates to match Soviet hardware; we shall have to fund the Navy's hydrofoil; and we will have to increase the production of our nuclear submarines and step up the conversion of our existing subs.

I think, Mr. Speaker, it is a great mistake to underemphasize the importance of conventional weapons. It is perhaps an irony of our age that they are becoming more important as the nuclear weapons become most complex and most devastating. As a hypothetical example for instance, let us suppose that an enemy announced its intention to launch an attack against the United States using manned bombers carrying incendiary bombs: would, or could, our response be retaliatory nuclear strike against that enemy? That is perhaps a far-fetched example, but it is not unreal or unwise to consider the possibility of an enemy seeking to blackmail the United States by the use of conventional weapons. It can be done, especially if any kind of a substantive agreement comes out of the SALT talks.

What we need in the area of conventional weapons, just as in the nuclear field, is leadtime, a commodity that is today in short supply. Let me quote the President again. This is from the "U.S. Foreign Policy for the Seventies: A Strategy for Peace," February 18, 1970. Comprehensive planning is necessary, the President said:

> Because of the leadtime in building new strategic systems, the decisions we make today substantially determine our military posture—and thus our security—five years from now. This places a premium on foresight and planning.

In the months ahead, Mr. Speaker, we are going to have to make decisions on systems and research in the context of a number of very embarrassing Pentagon blunders: the TFX boondoggle, the C–5A cost overruns, the apparently missed estimates for the B–1 bomber, and the F–14 episode.

Let us be candid, Mr. Speaker, and admit that some of this current rash of criticism of the Pentagon is both legitimate and deserved.

Patriotism does not require that we endorse waste, mismanagement, or spendthrift habits. Far from it.

The days for congressional rubberstamping of Pentagon money requests are over, and happily so.

Part of the problem—one of the reasons things got out of hand—was that Congress failed to properly scrutinize DOD money requests and estimates. In the future, Congress must live up to this responsibility.

But, let us not throw out the baby with the bath water. If some of the criticism of the Pentagon is valid and constructive, much of the more lurid criticism is destructive and brainless. We should make it our task to separate the two. If you have a headache, you can cure it by aspirin or by cutting off your head; both methods cure the headache, but decapitation is not a sensible cure. Let us not decapitate the Pentagon for past crimes. real or imagined.

All things considered, our military has served us well. Its strength, our strength, is still the best hope for peace in the world. In his 1970 strategy for peace statement, President Nixon put it this way:

> Peace requires strength. So long as there are those who would threaten our vital interests and those of our allies with military force, we must be strong. American weakness could tempt would-be aggressors to make dangerous miscalculations.

I concur entirely, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. STEIGER of Arizona. Mr. Speaker, since World War II, there have been two major developments which have revolutionized strategic warfare, the intercontinental ballistic missile, and the nuclear-powered submarine. While the technology of guidance systems for ICBM's has improved to the point where such missiles can be attacked by an opponent, nuclear submarines are relatively invulnerable to attack, and thus form a major portion of our deterrent.

We cannot expect that technology will stand still—submarines will not remain invulnerable forever. There is grounds for belief some scientists close to antisubmarine warfare technology say, that if submarines are pursued long enough—say 30 to 60 days as might occur in an extended period of tension during a United States-Soviet political crisis—they can be located and attacked.

Since 1964, the number of vessels in the U.S. Navy available for antisubmarine warfare has fared about as badly as the rest of the Navy from the antimilitary hysteria which has been reduced by about one-third. This has occurred at the same time that the Soviet Union has increased its submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles at a rate of 9 to 12 per year. Moreover, since the mid-1960's, the Soviet Union has become extraordinarily active in the Mediterranean to the point that the United States may have great difficulty in supporting its foreign policy objectives in the region.

The large increase in the number of Soviet surface vessels has increased the Soviet antisubmarine warfare effort in the region to such an extent that to rely exclusively upon the invulnerability of our Polaris submarines would be a dangerous assumption. It is for this reason that the Defense Department is beginning to push ahead with the development of the undersea long-range missile system to minimize the exposure of our nuclear submarines to Soviet antisubmarine warfare efforts.

Nevertheless, we cannot simply refuse to develop forces capable of meeting the magnitude of the Soviet submarine capability. The Soviets currently possess about 350 submarines—both conventional and nuclear-powered, to about 150 U.S. submarines. We cannot afford to ignore the fact that Soviet nuclear-powered submarines now patrol within striking distance of our bomber and missile bases.

First, research and development activities for antisubmarine warfare programs should receive a far higher fiscal priority than they have received in the past. An energetic R. & D. program is necessary if we are to take advantage of such advances in the state-of-the-art as "super sonar" and other more exotic techniques for the detection and tracking of submarines. It should be recalled that Nazi Germany was able to cripple England for many months with 65 submarines. If we do not build up sufficient forces with the technological capability of coping with the Soviet submarine threat a U.S. President may become an easy target for Soviet blackmail in a political crisis in the future.

Second, we must maintain sufficient forces-in-being to cope with the present Soviet threat—rather than decommissioning vessels capable of antisubmarine warfare work. Where modern vessels are available for employment, their procurement should be accelerated. The time has passed for the long delays associated with such equipment as SSN–688 class nuclear-powered attack subma-

rine, and the Mark 48 torpedo. Effective antisubmarine warfare is perhaps the potentially most significant means of reducing the threat of nuclear annihilation from our midst, for the ability to destroy one nuclear submarine, can prevent the launching of as many as 16 ballistic missiles at American territory. It is time that antisubmarine warfare received the high priority it deserves.

Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Speaker, national defense is a fundamental national priority. It is, and has always been, a Federal responsibility, and no philosophical doubts or questions exist on this score. Moreover, without the protection of an adequate national defense we will not long remain in a position to do any of the other things we may wish to do.

It is essential that we maintain an adequate defense—and if peace is to be maintained this requires better than parity on our part—particularly in the nuclear and missile field, since our policy rightly rules out any preemptive first strike on our part, and we must be able to respond effectively even if we have first been attacked—and potential enemies must know that we can do this.

Today the only part of our nuclear armament in which we retain any clear superiority, as I understand it, is in respect to our Polaris submarines. This superiority, too, is being challenged and it must be maintained.

The other side of this grim coin is an adequate missile defense. Safeguard, by best advices and according to tests, will work and is worth having; but it can be successfully saturated by a sufficiently massive attack and it is probably not the best, or at least not the sole, means of defense for the future. Future adequate missile defense probably requires a defense in depth, by a variety of means now on the scientific drawing boards, and this will include a defense system based, to a substantial extent, in space itself—a spaceborn defense system.

It is noteworthy that the Russian space program tends to concentrate on the near-orbit problems of inner space. This area, in a military way, could become truly decisive in a manner heretofore unknown. It is imperative, I think, that this same area have our immediate attention. We need, indeed, to address this vital area with the same energy with which we have tackled travel to the moon.

Mr. Speaker, I am no warmonger. I favor international negotiation and an international rule of law. But we must negotiate from strength in today's world; and, as for me, I have no desire—as a Member of this great national assembly—to be, as I fear some of my colleagues are, a grasshopper legislator, voting for and enjoying all the good things of life, and never thinking of the winter, which always comes.

Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr. Speaker, I would like to add my voice to those of my colleagues who are becoming increasingly alarmed about the state of our national defenses. A recent series of articles by Joseph Alsop which appeared in the Washington Post outlined some of the reasons why we should all be concerned about what is going on in the Soviet Union as far as increasing their military forces goes, and what is not going on in our own Nation to cope with what is becoming a really massive threat.

Mr. Alsop wrote these columns while at Offutt Air Force Base, the headquarters of our Strategic Air Command. He wanted to see firsthand what the situation really was. I would like to make a few comments on these articles before inserting them into the RECORD for the benefit of any of my colleagues who may have missed them since the situation has, if anything, deteriorated since April when they were written.

In the first column entitled, "The Trouble Ahead," Mr. Alsop states that—

> Leaders of our Strategic Air Command are not merely convinced that the huge former American power has now been lost. They are further convinced that the Soviets today probably enjoy a favorable margin of nuclear strategic power that is now on the order of five to three.

Gen. Bruce K. Holloway, head of SAC, has stated in recently released testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services that in his opinion the United States is presently on the downside of parity in relationship to the Soviet Union. What are the implications of the current state of U.S. inferiority? To begin with it means that it is going to be much harder to deter the Soviet Union from expanding its influence to areas outside the continental United States. Mr. Alsop uses the Middle East as an example.

As our strategic power relative to that of the Soviet Union continues to decline we are losing what is known as an "extended deterrence capability." Extended deterrence is basically the ability to shape, limit, and hopefully preclude enemy actions beyond one's own borders by virtue of potential rather than actually performed actions. Although deterrence is basically a psychological phenomenon, it is ultimately based on capability.

Unquestioned nuclear superiority on the part of the United States, a Nation not bent on extending its influence through the use of military force, acted as a shield for many other nations who did not have, and do not have, the capability to successfully defend themselves should the Soviets decide to annex them. As our power relative to the Soviet Union continues to decline this nuclear umbrella is beginning to wear rather thin. It is really not too difficult to imagine the Soviets deciding to rapidly annex, for example, a portion of Norway, by using their tremendous general purpose force superiority in that area of the world, and presenting the United States with a fait accompli where our only alternative is either to cede the area to them or launch a nuclear strike which would mean our own total destruction.

Our extended deterrent capability is called into question not only by the quantitative force relationship now existing, but also by the type of forces to which we are limiting ourselves.

> We have purposely denied ourselves a capability to degrade the hardened Soviet missile forces by making our land and sea based missile forces less accurate than they might otherwise be. If the Soviets understand, as I am sure they do, that we do not have the capability to render inoperable those weapons systems with which they can decimate our Nation, the sense of security with which they undertake aggressive action against weak neighbors is obviously enhanced. To my way of thinking, this is a highly provocative and destabilizing situation. Stability would seem to be dependent first and foremost on the United States maintaining a strategic capability which precludes situations of the type mentioned above from arising.

In the second column, entitled "The Nondeterrent," Mr. Alsop draws out some implications of basing our defense posture on the "assured destruction" doctrine. If present trends continue as far as relative Soviet and United States military efforts go—and Secretary of Defense Laird has characterized these efforts as "momentum" on the part of the Soviet Union and "near moratorium" on our part—Mr. Alsop forsees a situation arising in which the Soviets have the capability to severely degrade our land based missile force through an SS–9 ICBM strike and our B–52 strategic bomber force through an SLBM—submarine launched ballistic missile—strike. Dr. John S. Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, testified recently before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, that former estimates of the time period when the Soviets would achieve the capability to cause attrition of our Minuteman force below what is considered a critical level, circa 1975, were now obsolete due to the appearance of a new type of large silo now under construction in the Soviet Union. It should also be kept in mind that the Soviets are deploying new Y-class ballistic nuclear submarines—similar to our Polaris—at a rate of 8 to 10 per year, which will equal our force of ballistic nuclear submarines in numbers sometime in 1974. This is a year earlier than previous estimates.

If the Soviets do achieve the capability to virtually eliminate two portions of our triad, the Minuteman force through the use of SS–9's and the B–52 force through use of SLBM's, we will then be in a situation where the Soviets will have 900 SS–11's—similar to our Minuteman—in hardened silos still unlaunched while the United States will have only the 50 to 60 percent of its Polaris-Poseidon force which was not destroyed in port still usable. Now, if our nuclear submarines had a counterforce capability—the capability to limit damage to the United States through knocking out hardened missile sites—we would probably be in a strong enough war fighting position to deter the Soviets from attempting an attack in the first place. Unfortunately, our submarine-launched missiles do not have the capability to destroy hardened Soviet silos. They do not have this capability because we have purposely limited their accuracy to the point where they are only good against civilian-industrial targets. Lacking a counterforce capability, the President would be in a position of either giving the order for our ballistic nuclear submarines to launch a retaliatory strike against Soviet cities, thus dooming our own population, or accepting a "Czechoslovakian solution."

This is by no means what is generally shunted off as a "worst case scenario." A "worst case" is one in which all our forces are inoperable and all the Soviet forces function perfectly. This is rather a case, given a certain strategic force relationship, in which both sides forces work adequately. It is a force relationship toward which we are currently headed.

The third Alsop column, entitled "What If They're Wrong?" deals with what is known as the Tallinn line. The Tallinn line is a system of surface-to-air missile launchers stretching from, I believe, Tallinn, Estonia, to somewhere around Archangel in the Soviet Union. It covers the northern approach to the Soviet heartland. The Tallinn line system having an ABM capability necessi- some elements of the intelligence community believing that it does not have antiballistic missile capability and others, including the Strategic Air Command which is responsible for overcoming it, believing that it does. General Holloway has testified on this subject that—

I am about as convinced as I can be it is an ABM system or can reasonably be with simple changes. With this tremendous radar system, those powerful radars, they are many times more than you need for early warning. I can't imagine what they are for if it is not to serve an ABM system, and a large ABM system.

While the technical arguments should be left to the experts, although personally I am quite willing to accept the SAC assessment since practically all the evidence I have seen points toward their evaluation of the Tallinn line's capability, one thing we must understand is that even the possibility of this SA–5 system having an ABM capability necessitates the continued MIRVing of both our ballistic nuclear submarine and Minuteman forces. In fact, as Soviet counterforce capabilities continue to grow at a staggering rate, they have multiplied their number of strategic offensive missiles almost sevenfold since 1965 and at current deployment rates will have a hardened missile force numbering almost 2,000 by 1975, it is absolutely necessary that the forces we may have remaining after any possible Soviet strike, have enough warheads to assure penetration of the Soviet ABM system. This is vital to maintaining a deterrent capability. The strategic offensive and defensive forces of the Soviets must be considered together when assessing our capability to retaliate since a first strike capability consists of being able to lower the opposite side's ability to do damage through a combination of counterforce weapons and ballistic missile defenses. Any combination of Soviet offensive and defensive weaponry which seems to them to be able to reduce our retaliatory capability to what they would consider an acceptable level of damage means that deterrence based on United States capability, which is what we must base it on unless we wish to rely on the benign intentions of the Soviet Politburo, has ended.

We cannot take a chance on the Soviets achieving this capability. In fact, it is our duty to our country and our people as elected Representatives to see that they do not. While MIRVing our land and sea based missiles is at best a reactive and defensive stopgap procedure for assuring that we maintain enough surviving warheads in the face of growing Soviet counterforce capability to penetrate Soviet defenses, it is essential that we proceed with all dispatch.

I highly recommend the following columns by Joseph Alsop to all my colleagues. Although the reality of the situation he paints is unpleasant the consequences of ignoring this reality are worse:

THE TROUBLE AHEAD

(By Joseph Alsop)

OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, OMAHA.—When you come out here to the rather unpretentious headquarters of American deterrent power, you find yourself endlessly reliving the Cuban missile crisis of the autumn of 1962.

At that time, the United States enjoyed a margin of nuclear-strategic power that was at least five-to-one; and it may have been as high as ten to one. Despite this huge margin of superiority, and despite the wisdom and courage of President Kennedy, it is not too much to say that the leaders of the U.S. government were breathless with fear until the Cuban missile crisis ended successfully.

You find yourself haunted by these facts, out here at Offutt nearly nine years later, for two very simple reasons. To begin with, the leaders of our Strategic Air Command are not merely convinced that the huge former American margin of power has now been lost.

They are further convinced that the Soviets today propably enjoy a favorable margin of nuclear-strategic power that is now on the order of five-to-three. This is not the view of those like Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, who say that there is now "parity" between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

But the Laird claim of "parity" is squarely based on optimistic rejection of important evidence. Notably, there is the evidence, firmly believed by the SAC analysis, that the Soviets already possess an extensive ABM defense system disguised as a system of anti-aircraft defense. The balance of power, and therefore the margin of either side, of course includes defensive strength as well as offensive strength.

As to the second reason, the power of the American deterrent has remained absolutely stable, or has even declined, for a period of years. Small advances have been, and are being made, here and there. But SAC's B–52 force, for example, has declined from 600 to 452 aircraft. Many items of SAC's equipment, including many of the strategic missiles, have reached the stage of obsolescence. Overall, in sum, the American deterrent has been complacently neglected for years on end.

In contrast, Soviet nuclear power has been built up, continuously, remorselessly and often with surprising advances, ever since the period just after the Cuban missile crisis. The technical components of this Soviet power do not matter as much as the over-all balance. That is probably five-to-three in the Soviets' favor at present, as stated above. By 1974, or thereabouts, the balance should be at least two-to-one in the Soviets' favor. And it just could be much worse than that!

To see the dreadful meaning of this dreadful forecast, it is only necessary to think of two things. First, think of the fear (and in some quarters, the plain weakness and uncertainty) that could be seen in the U.S. government in the 1962 Cuban crisis, when this country had a five-to-one margin over the Soviets.

Second, think of Israel. For Israel is confronted nowadays, not just by her surrounding Arab enemies, but by Soviet airmen and other soldiers ready to fight side by side with the Arabs. The Middle Eastern situation has again deteriorated gravely. The wisest men in Washington are again talking of "war breaking out again this summer."

That is no sure prediction. But one prediction is absolutely sure. If the Soviets finally push forward their Arab clients against Israel, they will never tolerate another great defeat in the Middle East. They will stop at nothing; they will do anything that is required, to avert such defeat—if they ever take the road of renewed war. And averting defeat for the Arabs necessarily means defeat, if not destruction, for Israel.

In these circumstances, empty-headed people in the U.S. government still prate about this country "never letting Israel be destroyed." But because of the factors above-described, they are lying. The "never" is what makes them liars. Suppose there is no way to prevent Israel's destruction except a nuclear confrontation, with all the advantages on the side of the Soviets. In that horrible event, the American attempt to save Israel will not go beyond hand-writing, empty gestures, and United Nations twaddle.

Such are the cruel realities of the changing nuclear-strategic balance. The Soviets are clearly aiming for what the Pentagon calls a first strike capability. For various technical reasons, however, there is little need to fear a Soviet first strike against the U.S., at any rate in the years just ahead.

But there is every reason to fear U.S. impotence in the face of the most terrible future developments, of which a Soviet-supported attack on Israel is only one example. And U.S. impotence is sure, if the nuclear-strategic balance goes on being neglected.

THE NONDETERRENT

(By Joseph Alsop)

OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, OMAHA, NEBR.—The strategy of "assured destruction" is still the official basis of U.S. nuclear-strategic planning. But "assured destruction" is also held to be illogical, erroneous and phony by the President of the United States, and also by all the leaders of the Strategic Air Command here at Offutt, who have the actual job of implementing this strategy of "assured destruction."

If these statements sound insanely remote from normal American affairs, the answer is, of course, that they are indeed remote. Everything is automatically remote, that has to do with the hideous new weapons that modern science has made available to the giant powers.

The question is, however, whether this remoteness can be permanently maintained. Here, the central fact to face is that the simple mechanics of the historical process have been radically changed by these new weapons.

The change is greater, in truth, than that which occurred when the Bronze Age followed the Stone Age, or the Iron Age followed the Bronze Age. It even exceeds the change when the industrial revolution once again made obsolete all former methods of making war.

The essence of the change wrought by the new weapons is really rather simple. For world empire in the last half of the Twentieth Century, you do not need Indian armies, or governors general in plumed hats, or any of the rest of the outmoded apparatus of old fashioned western imperialism. You need only one thing, an effective nuclear monopoly!

If the Soviet Union ever gains such a monopoly, the experience of the unhappy Czechoslovaks can be rather easily repeated, world-wide. It will not then be a question of imposing a docile Gustave Husak, to rule as the Kremlin commands in Prague. It will then be a question, rather, of men like Gustave Husak being imposed, to rule as the Kremlin chooses in Paris, London, Washing-

ton and any other capital the Kremlin fancies.

If you think about it, this enormous change in the basic historical situation places this country in an exceedingly exposed position. The U.S. and the U.S. essentially alone, now stands between the Soviet Union and world empire. This is because the U.S. alone is a serious obstacle to world-wide Soviet nuclear monopoly.

These are the reasons, in turn, for the extreme danger in basing everything on this strategy of "assured destruction", abovementioned. It is not just that the strategy is not credited by the President, or by the leaders of the Strategic Air Command here at Offutt. The real flaw is that the strategy cannot possibly seem credible to the Soviets.

Speaking of "assured destruction", Presi-Nixon told the Congress on 9 March, this year, "I must not be—and my successors must not be—limited to the indiscriminate mass destruction of enemy civilians as the sole possible response to challenges. This is especially so when that response involves the likelihood of triggering nuclear attacks on our own population."

The President could hardly have stated more cogently the reasons that this strategy of "assured destruction" can never seem credible to the Soviets. These are reasons, in fact, that mean we are rapidly moving towards having a deterrent that will not deter.

Consider the situation schematically, and you will soon see how this works. To begin with, the Soviets have been making enormous, highly impressive efforts to gain the capability of breaking the back of our main deterrent, the Minuteman missile system. They have also been making similar efforts to gain the capability of knocking out SAC's bomber force.

Suppose, then, that these efforts are permitted to succeed. Still speaking schematically, suppose that the back of the U.S. deterrent is broken, mainly by a first strike of the huge Soviet SS–9 missiles. In theory, our nuclear submarine fleet would still give the President the option of "assured destruction" our official strategy calls for.

But in practice, what would be the President's real option? Would he hurl against the Soviet population centers a few scores of Polaris and Poseidon missiles, with the certain knowledge that this would cause our population centers to be utterly destroyed by the huge numbers of SS–11 and other missiles the Soviets would still have in reserve? Would he wipe out the American people, in fact, for the sake of inadequate retaliation?

The answer is, of course, that no President in his senses would do anything of the sort. The time of Husak-government in Washington would thus have come. So the further answer is that we very badly need a brand new national strategy.

WHAT IF THEY'RE WRONG?

(By Joseph Alsop)

OMAHA, NEBR.—"And what if the estimates are wrong?" That is the question you find yourself asking, over and over again, if you come to the headquarters of the Strategic Air Command. Here the whole world balance of power is concentrated, as it were, in a single converted but still old-fashioned U.S. Army post.

The journey to Offutt Air Force Base was made to get the facts before the Senate's annual storm in a cave of winds over the next appropriations for American antiballistic missiles. And the journey raised the fairly worrying question above recorded for reasons of the utmost grimness.

In brief, the analysts of the Strategic Air Command are rather firmly convinced that the Soviet Union already has an extensive and efficient antiballistic missile system disguised as part of its antiaircraft defenses. In this matter, moreover, SAC analysts are supported by most Defense Department analysts, including the department's able chief scientist, Dr. John Foster.

It is a strange feature of our era that issues of potential life-and-death significance are quite often debated in private, in the most secret chambers of the government. In this instance, the issue of "SAM-upgrading," as the problem is called, is known to have been given nearly 30 hours of close, consecutive study by the director of Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms.

Any issue requiring that amount of desperately hard homework by a man in the position of the director of the CIA can only be an issue with potential life-and-death significance. And who on earth, outside the government's most secret chambers, has ever heard that such a problem as "SAM-upgrading" so much as exists?

But for the very reason that it has potential life-and-death significance, it is well for more people to understand the nature of the problem. The problem begins, then, with the Soviets' deployment of approximately 1,200 defense ballistic missiles of unusual size and power, which our people call "Tallinns" or "SA–5s."

As the designation "SA–5" should indicate, these Tallinns were originally classed as antiaircraft missiles, in the same series as the SA–2 and SA–3 that the Soviets have deployed in Egypt. The question whether the Tallinns really belong in this series was what engaged Director Helms' attention so many hours.

There are three facts of great importance that bear upon this question. In the first place, incoming ballistic missile warheads, greatly slowed by their descent and incapable of evasive manpower, are actually rather easier to knock down with missiles than are properly flown and equipped bombing planes.

Secondly, the Tallinn is an exo-atmospheric missile. In other words, with a range of 100 miles, it also reaches an altitude of 100,000 feet. This is somewhat above the atmosphere in which airplanes fly. Thirdly, in most parts of the Soviet Union where Tallinns are deployed, they are duplicated, as it were, by SA–2 missiles, whose antiaircraft character is beyond dispute.

Thus the Soviets have today 1,200 missiles which can be ABMs masquerading as antiaircraft missiles. This is of course in addition to the acknowledged ABMs of the type known as Galosh, deployed only around Moscow. That is by no means the end of the story, however.

The 1,200-plus-or-minus Tallinn missiles could not possibly be used as ABMs, without a complex system to give them the needed radar-targeting and radar-guidance. This is where the huge "henhouse" and "doghouse" radars come in, which the Soviets have also been deploying for some time.

These vast radars, over 100 feet high and as large in area as a couple of football fields, again appear to be superfluous, like the Tallinns' power to reach outside the atmosphere, except on one condition. That condition is that the radars are intended to be married to the Tallinns. This would make an ABM system protecting most of the other Soviet industrial centers, additional to Moscow which is protected by the Galosh system.

If this is true, as the SAC analysts believe, the upset in the balance of nuclear-strategic power is already far greater than the worst pessimists suppose outside the government's secret chambers. The untruth of the SAC analysts' conclusion is meanwhile stoutly maintained by most of the government's civilian analysts.

These are the same people who first maintained that the Soviets' giant SS–9 missiles were not aimed at our Minuteman system, and then repeatedly argued that SS–9 deployment would soon be stopped. They took five years to admit that other error, so the track record is not reassuring.

Mr. LANDGREBE. Mr. Speaker, while I have always believed that the best defense is a strong offense, I fully appreciate the importance of maintaining defensive mechanisms, capable of fielding any enemy nation.

In the first place, there is always the possibility of an accidental release of an enemy warhead. Second, if negotiations with unfriendly nations are going to be fruitful at all, our negotiators must be "backed up" by defense weaponry of the most modern design and superior effectiveness.

Therefore, it is most difficult for me to understand the reasoning of Senators MUSKIE and FULBRIGHT as reported by Holmes Alexander and printed as follows:

NATIONAL SCENE

(By Holmes Alexander)

WASHINGTON, D.C.—Ed Muskie is absolutely certain that we'd be safer if we were militarily weaker. Bill Fulbright is convinced that Mao Tse-tung and the late Ho Chi Minh wanted to be friendly with us in the past, and that from Harry Truman onward our Presidents have misread Communist intentions. Clifford Case believed there is no reason to be concerned just because Russia is ahead of us in nuclear striking power.

So help me. It's the solemn truth that these three U.S. Senators made those preposterous statements when they had Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard on the grill before the Foreign Relations Committee.

When Gail McGee (D., Wyo.) and Hugh Scott (R., Pa.) aren't there, this whole committee seems to walk around with hands in the air and gripping white flags to surrender. Some of its senior members, as those named, talk like men who've been scared out of their wits.

MAKES RUSSIANS NERVOUS

Muskie argues that it's dangerous for us to arm ourselves because that makes the Russians nervous, trigger-happy and causes them to speed up the arms race. This man most likely to be the next Democratic candidate reasons like a jealous woman: it's all our fault the Russians have all those SS–9s; they were just imitating us.

Fulbright is willing to discount all the anti-capitalist, anti-American literature by Chairman Mao, and to believe that Red China means us no harm.

He's dead set against moving our nuclear weapons from Okinawa to Taiwan in order to keep them pointed at the Mainland. Case is married to the simplistic theory of overkill, and he can't see any harm in Russian nuclear supremacy since the two nations are scorpions-in-a-bottle.

BEARS UP VERY WELL

Dave Packard, a tough hombre, bore up very well under the caustic and sarcastic treatment which is the fare now usually offered to any person who supports American security. The Deputy Secretary went through the A-B-Cs of international negotiating, showing that it's no good going to the SALT meetings with empty hands. Bargaining chips are the weapons there.

When the President announced two years ago his intention to go ahead with the ABM Safeguard system, the Russians showed a willingness to give up some of their own weapons if we would give up Safeguard. More recently, the American decision to press on with the MIRVs, the multiple-warhead missiles, has kept the bargaining sessions going.

DOUBTS SENATORS LISTENING

I don't think the Senators were listening, but Packard was saying that—contrary to ignorant opinion—the MIRV'ed weapons are more effective, but less destructive, than the pre-MIRV weapons.

The MIRVing of submarine borne missiles has raised their destructiveness to 106 per cent, but the MIRVing of the land-based Minutemen has made them only 63.9 per cent as destructive. It averages out to be a reduction of nuclear bang. This may indicate the direction of sophisticated weaponry. The more we improve and modernize, the better the accuracy, but the smaller the megatonnage.

Perversely enough, Muskie, Fulbright and Case don't want to hear this. They won't listen to anything good about weapons. They would rather believe that all arms are bad arms, and that any kind of a disarmament arrangement is a good arrangement.

WOULD LIKE LIBERATION

But a lot of people in Poland, Muskie's ancestral country, would like enough guns to liberate themselves. When Case said we'd all be better off without gunpowder, he must have forgotten that America won her independence on ammunition shipped in by France. The sword traditionally is not just a throat-cutting knife, but a symbol of freedom and gallantry. Fulbright's committee needs somebody to say a good word about weapons.

And that committee is one which should cause American knees to knock when you pause to consider that power is passing from the presidency to the Congress. Hardly a day passes but Mike Mansfield, Wilbur Mills or Harley Staggers don't do something that the Executive Branch used to do for itself.

It would be a case of Good Night, Nurse, if the Foreign Relations Committee ever got to running the U.S. foreign relations.

Mr. COLLIER. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague from Illinois for yielding.

I believe it is significant to bring the attention of the Members of this House to the recently issued handbook of Raymond Blackman, Britain's renowned expert on naval affairs. He pointed out that Russia now maintains 83 nuclear-powered submarines, 318 conventional submarines, two helicopter carriers, 26 cruisers, 100 destroyers, 130 frigates, 270 escorts, 320 minesweepers, 125 missile boats, and 325 torpedo boats. He compared the U.S. Navy today with its strength 3 years ago and concluded that we now have 13 attack aircraft carriers instead of 16; three antisubmarine carriers instead of six; 160 cruisers, frigates, and destroyers instead of 240; and 93 attack submarines instead of 103.

According to the Armed Services Committee we have 41 Polaris submarines which are nuclear-powered and have a tremendous striking capability.

These figures are significant and certainly must be the cause of concern. I feel sure that despite the strong anti-war sentiments which have spread across the country at varying levels, that most Americans do not wish to risk the ability of the United States to meet any attack in the future.

Recognizing that we must constantly review our defense requirements and update military weaponry with restraint and sensibility, we can ill afford to slip into the category of a second-class power nor weaken the basic strength of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

An adequate defense is a deterrent to war and can therefore well be the most effective means of maintaining peace—at least until a meaningful bilateral reduction of arms is achieved.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Speaker, the spectacular growth in the size and capability of the Soviet Navy has been a matter of increasing concern to me and many of my colleagues as well. Further evidence has recently come to light which can only serve to heighten that concern. I refer to the assessment of the world naval situation given by the authoritative publication "Jane's Fighting Ships," as contained in the forward to its 73d edition, which includes the following appraisal:

The expansion of Soviet maritime power was a military phenomenon of the 1960s which looks like rising to a flood tide in the 1970s. At the turn of the decade not only have more warships been added to the Fleet compared with last year, but another two million deadweight tons aggregate of new merchant ships have sailed on the world-chess board of military strategy to join the Soviet high-seas fleet of so-called "fishing" vessels, the flotillas of sophisticated "research" ships, and the squadrons of para-military support ships which contitute a long Fleet Train.

This sober report is something that cannot be ignored by anyone who wishes to be fully informed about this vital area affecting our national security. I am, therefore, taking this opportunity to place it in the RECORD for the benefit of my colleagues and for the wider circulation that it deserves.

I was particularly pleased to note that the release of this report has not gone unnoticed, and I also wish to insert at this point an editorial appearing in the State Journal of Lansing, Mich., on July 31 entitled, "America Can't Risk Second Rate Status," which offers some very timely and much needed comments about some of the hard realities concerning the Soviet Union's military buildup.

JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS, 1970–71—FOREWORD

In this edition, the 73rd year of issue of *Jane's Fighting Ships*, a great volume of new facts and figures have been added. Throughout the book the technical ship data, reference tables and specialised notes have been extensively revised and in many cases liberally amplified in the light of new information received and to keep abreast of the ever changing naval scene.

The amount of fresh material in this edition is well above the average. More new photographs have been added in the new issue than in previous years. And the volume is published some two months earlier in the year. Indeed, it is the earliest publication date in any year of the 22 years of the present editorship.

More than 1,250 new illustrations have been added in this issue, including over 300 new scale drawings. Altogether there are some 2,500 illustrations in the book comprising over 2,000 photographs and nearly 500 scale drawings. Particulars are given of about 15,000 ships and craft in the navies or sea defence forces of over 100 countries.

The numerical strengths of the 55 largest navies are summarised in a two-page spread table at the end of the ship reference section, thus affording quick comparison between the maritime nations of the world. And the preamble to each national chapter includes the additional summary of a table giving the number of ships in the main categories, affording sight assessment of the strength of the fleet without having to turn the pages and make a count.

There has been a good response this year from correspondents east and west, and with the goodwill and cooperation of all except one or two of the 100-odd naval and maritime authorities concerned there has been a steady flow of information and photographs to this annual, enabling the new edition to give the latest pictorial and descriptive portraits of newly built warships, reconstructed vessels and converted units, and to maintain the *Fighting Ships* tradition, established in 1897, of presenting a comprehensive panorama of all the world's fighting ships together with their support ships and auxiliaries.

Particularly thorough up-dating has come in for the navies of France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, United States and the USSR, either direct from defence headquarters or from other sources. For the first time in the history of this naval encyclopaedia the number of pages in the ship reference section alone exceeds six hundred. Commensurate with the greatly expanded and still growing navy of the USSR the size of the Soviet section in this volume has been increased by over 70 per cent.

USA

Those of responsible opinion in the United States are worried about the military posture and budget of the US Navy, which is considered to be inadequate to meet worldwide national and international commitments, or even to compensate for the natural wastage of an ageing fleet, an alarming proportion of which was built during the 1939–45 war emergency.

The force levels which the 1971 Fiscal Year Budget supports include 15 strike aircraft carriers, 4 anti-submarine aircraft carriers, 41 nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines, 52 nuclear powered fleet submarines, 53 conventionally powered fleet submarines, 10 guided missile cruisers, 234 frigate, destroyers and ocean escorts, sufficient amphibious forces for four Marine expeditionary brigades, and the necessary logistic support ships and miscellaneous craft.

But the US Navy will end the fiscal year with force levels reflecting a net reduction (i.e. total inactivations less new and converted ships) of 175 active fleet ships and 732 active aircraft below the levels operated at the end of the 1968 fiscal year which saw the height of activity in Southeast Asia.

The problem of the US Navy faces is still the encroaching obsolescence of much of the Fleet. The replacement of these worn out ships and aircraft is expensive under present market conditions, but cannot be further delayed if the Navy is to have the combat capabilities which the United States can rely on in the future.

The increased expenditure of recent years necessitated by the Vietnam war have had relatively little constructive effect on the long term modernisation of the US Navy. Some weapon sub-systems necessary to meet the demands of that unusual situation have been provided, but the bulk of the increased Navy expenditure was devoted primarily to sustaining combat operations, to catering for attrition, not modernisation. To rectify this situation it is necessary to provide, on a reduced time scale, several new ship and aircraft programmes repeatedly deferred during the mid-1960s.

In the Atlantic US Navy resources are stretched thinly in order to maintain the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean as well as a modest force in the Middle East. For several years the Atlantic Fleet has been called upon to provide a share of the naval requirements in Southeast Asia and the Navy has given first priority to Pacific Fleet forces in actual

combat. But as a result the Navy has been unable to maintain the modernity, readiness and capability of the Atlantic Fleet at the desired level.

There is, however, one bright feature of United States replacement and modernisation policy. As the older of the big front-line aircraft carriers (nearly half of which are still of World War II vintage) are reduced to support roles they are being replaced by new aircraft carriers (the large nuclear powered *Nimitz* and *Eisenhower* are under construction); and the US Navy very creditably has its sights firmly fixed on a permanent force of 15 "attack" aircraft carriers.

It appears that the offensive power of US carrier strike and amphibious assault forces is to be maintained at the levels required to fill the Navy's role in the national strategy, both for credible deterrence and wartime application. But what the US Navy would additionally like to ensure is the maintenance of the full array of forces required for control of the sea lines of communication to sustain Allies and forward deployed US Forces.

The planners of the US Navy of the future are perhaps understandably very preoccupied with what they see as the continuing growth and pervasive spread of Soviet maritime power in all its aspects, acutely conscious that while the USA has been severely reducing her Navy, the Soviet Union continues maritime expansion at a rapid rate. US Navy chiefs believe that careful consideration should be given to the changed situation in the Mediterranean where the recent increase in the number of Soviet warships is regarded as an "intrusion" with "significant military undertones for the North African littoral." During 1969 there was a 22 per cent extension of Soviet naval operations and the Soviet squadrons were increased to over 60 newer and more effective ships, with access to shore facilities in Egypt and Syria.

US experts point to certain discernible technological trends and observed new weapons systems of the Soviet Navy as being of particular significance to US naval planning. Among these are the continued construction and deployment of the new Polaris-type nuclear powered submarines, and it is now estimated by the US Navy that the USSR could have a ballistic missile submarine fleet equal to that of the United States by the mid-1970s.

In the USA the thrust and obviously sustained momentum of Soviet technological efforts and their impressive achievements recently are indicating the extent to which the US naval forces of the future must not only be redesigned and strengthened but prepared to match the same degree of sophisticated weaponry in many parts of the world where Soviet military equipment has been supplied to client states.

The missions which the US Navy aims to fulfil to provide for the future defence of the country and the free world are manifold. They include not only containing Soviet naval expansion, and the obvious duty of maintaining the sea lines of communication in hot war in Southeast Asia or cold war in the Middle East, or any other area of conflict, but protecting the flanks of NATO and preventing the isolation of Greece and Turkey by controlling the eastern Mediterranean, assisting Asian allies, and control of the airspace over the seas as well as of the seas.

To these ends, *inter alia*, the conversion of six more Polaris submarines to carry Poseidon is projected towards the ultimate target of 31 Poseidon submarines, constituting the most survivable components of the presently programmed national deterrent force to meet the increasing intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missile threat.

The proposed Undersea Long Range Missile System would support the Polaris and Poseidon forces. With its long range missile the ULMS increases the ocean areas available for operations and permits deployments around virtually the entire defence perimeter of the foreseen potential enemy.

A sea-based ballistic missile defence system, or SABMIS, is also being investigated. Deployment of this system in the adjacent sea buffer areas would permit interception of intercontinental ballistic missiles before they reach the US battle area and complement the SAFEGUARD system to provide a defence in depth.

A third nuclear powered aircraft carrier of the "Nimitz" class is projected to complete the three-ship programme. This is a ship for the 1980s and on into the 21st century, and it will be one of the cornerstones upon which the USA can build whatever maritime posture is then required. (Would that other nations had as much forethought instead of living from hand to mouth.)

Four nuclear powered guided missile frigates (fully as big as cruisers) are being provided in various funding instalments. There will also be a continuation of the nuclear powered fleet submarine construction programme, and the building and conversion of various categories of surface combatant warships and support ships, see reference pages.

But the US Secretary of Defence has indicated that the allies of the United States are expected to make an increasing effort for their own defence, and there will be a trend towards a somewhat reduced US forward defence posture with greater reliance being placed on a centralised strategic reserve to uphold US treaty obligations abroad.

Despite the severe reductions in the US active fleet the United States section of this edition is larger than in previous years due to the addition of considerable new material, especially data on shipboard electronics and advanced weapon systems, and several chapters having undergone major revision, especially the mine warfare, service craft, and Coast Guard pages. Six pages of new drawings appear in the US section.

USSR

It seems that once in her stride there is no stopping the Soviet Union in her naval progress. The pace of acceleration in naval strength has marched in parallel with the greatly increased and still rising strength of the Soviet mercantile marine. There is no hiding place from the Hammer and Sickle. It has long been said that trade follows the flag, but in this case it appears that the flag is following the trade routes all over the world. The Soviet merchant fleet has expanded from 1,000 ships aggregating 2,300,000 tons gross in 1955 to 7,000 ships aggregating 16,000,000 tons gross in 1970. The increase in the fighting fleet has been no less spectacular, particularly in the later 1960s.

The USSR is no longer copying and emulating. She is initiating and inventing. Regularly there appears a new class of warship peculiar to Soviet requirements. Each year for the last few years a new type of rocket cruiser or missile destroyer has appeared. Each year a new class of submarine has been observed, either nuclear or conventionally powered. And for years now improvements have progressively been made in a series of deadly little missile boats running into hundreds of units.

Recently *Leningrad*, the second of the large cruiser helicopter carriers emerged from her lengthy builders' and proving trials. She and her sister ship *Moskva* afford the most extensive vertical lift off and touch down flight facilities ever contrived in the limited compass of a guided missile cruiser's platform abaft the funnel. It would be no surprise if after the experience gained with these ships the Soviet Navy went the whole hog and produced a flat-top carrier for operating fixed wing aircraft.

In Soviet submarine construction the pendulum seems to have started to swing the other way. From an all out concentration on large nuclear powered and missile armed vessels in the last few years a return is being made to conventionally propelled and orthodox armed boats of quite modest dimensions. All the same the USSR is currently building at least three types of nuclear powered submarines and one class of diesel-electric propelled submarines.

The Soviet Union is not neglecting any aspect of naval warfare, and all classes of warships, from the largest to the smallest are being built. Even the supposedly outmoded cruisers are being employed. Although it was stated officially as long ago as 1960 that cruisers would be phased out and that submarines would be the main force of the Navy, one of the still extant 16 orthodox cruisers has been converted to a guided missile ship and new rocket cruisers continue to be built.

The USSR also continues to build or improve destroyers, and there is an extensive new construction programme providing for escorts of the small frigate type, coastal escorts of the submarine chaser or patrol vessel type, coastal minesweepers, missile boats, torpedo boats, amphibious vessels and support ships.

The expansion of Soviet maritime power was a military phenomenon of the 1960s which looks like rising to a flood tide in the 1970s. At the turn of the decade not only have many more warships been added to the Fleet compared with last year, but another two million deadweight tons aggregate of new merchant ships have sailed on to the world-chess board of military strategy to join the Soviet high-seas fleet of so-called "fishing" vessels, the flotillas of sophisticated "research" ships, and the squadrons of paramilitary support ships which constitute a long Fleet Train.

The Soviet roaming fleet of non-combatant ships, the largest in the world, continues to grow and expand its operations far distant from the USSR, while the Soviet fleet of fighting ships is extending its activities throughout the world, demonstrating growing confidence in the Navy's technical and operational competence and pursuing its missions with imagination, ingenuity and flexibility. At most all this adds up to a Soviet drive to attain supreme seapower. At least it means the not so new custom of the biggest boy "showing the flag" brought to a fine art.

The Soviet penetration of the Mediterranean is of special significance. By its concentration and continued presence the Soviet Fleet in this middle sea can deflect the influence of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, turn the political axis, upset the *status quo* for all the European, Minor Asian and African nations on the long Mediterranean seaboard.

"Mare Nostrum", the Italians called it, though it hardly ever was. For a century and a half from Trafalgar onwards it was *mare nostrum* for Great Britain imposing a Pax Britannica. Then for all too short a time the Mediterranean was indisputably American. Now the USA shares uneasily with the USSR in a situation which is neither peace nor war, both holding the flints and the sparks which could touch off the explosive ingredients in the hands of Egypt and Israel.

It is not only the Mediterranean in which the USSR is interested. Her outsurge extends to all the seven seas. So much so that the question might justifiably be posed: Who is policing the world now? Britain is withdrawing into isolation like any mid-west state, and the US has well defined and limited-compass fleets in several spheres somewhat reduced to provide reinforcements or replacements for the considerable fleet supporting the war off Vietnam; but the USSR has warships all over.

It is estimated that the Soviet Navy now includes 75 nuclear-powered submarines, 320 diesel-driven submarines, 2 helicopter carriers, 25 cruisers, 100 destroyers, 100 escorts,

275 patrol vessels, 300 minesweepers, 125 missile boats, 300 torpedo boats, 100 amphibious ships, 130 amphibious craft, and literally thousands of support ships, auxiliary vessels and service craft.

It is significant that the USSR, after concentrating on nuclear powered submarine construction over the last few years, has gone back to building conventional submarines as well. It is not unreasonable to assume that the Soviet Navy can see no merit in employing a nuclear powered submarine of 5,000 tons costing £30,000,000 on a task that could be performed equally well in the required circumstances by a diesel powered submarine of 1,000 tons costing only £3,000,000 but equipped with the same number of torpedo tubes.

Admiral Hyman Rickover, father of the nuclear powered warship, is reported to have predicted that by the end of 1970 the USSR will have more nuclear powered submarines than the United States (this is unlikely on the existing figures he gave—70 for the USSR and 87 for the USA). But there is no magic in nuclear power which automatically makes the vehicle it is driving better than a conventionally propelled vessel. A nuclear reactor is merely an alternative form of steam generator to the boiler, and the turbines and associated machinery are the same as in any other ship. A big diesel-electric powered submarine could carry ballistic missiles as easily as a nuclear powered submarine. Its limitation is that it has to be refueled periodically giving even a breathing tube submarine only temporary invisibility, whereas a nuclear powered submarine through its unlimited range has permanent anonymity. The USSR has a number of diesel driven submarines carrying ballistic missiles.

UNITED KINGDOM

The naval planners in Britain have multifold tasks, not made any easier by having to be done simultaneously: to reduce the fleet to its lowest ever peacetime level commensurate with the abdication of a worldwide role and superpower status; to conserve and maintain what remains and prepare it against emergencies in the areas from which it has nominally withdrawn but to which it might have to return; and in the meantime to build up the fleet of the future to a size and shape adequate for the envisaged requirements of the late 1970s and 1980s.

Good progress is being made with the three classes of surface ships to be brought into service in the Fleet in the 1970s. The design for the new cruisers which will succeed the converted helicopter cruisers of the "Tiger" class is being developed to provide three main capabilities: the deployment of anti-submarine helicopters, command and control of naval and maritime air forces, and a contribution to area sea defence. Their construction will also provide an optional capability of operating vertical or short take off and landing aircraft, but further work has to be carried out before any decision can be taken as to whether the advantages of taking up this alternative propensity would justify the substantial cost involved. The cruisers will be powered by gas turbines: they have been designed with a through deck unimpeded by superstructure for the operation of aircraft. The ships will be armed with "Sea Dart" surface-to-air missile launchers. Design assistance contracts are being placed with the shipbuilding industry in 1970.

Sheffield, the first of the new destroyers to carry "Sea Dart" missiles, and *Amazon*, the first of the new frigates of Yarrow-Vosper design, are under construction; and further destroyer contracts will follow during the year while three more frigates have been ordered.

HMS *Blake* has completed proving trials after her rebuilding aft to carry three "Wessex III" helicopters and is now on a world cruise. The similar conversion of her sister ship *Tiger* to carry "Sea King" helicopters will be completed by the end of 1971, and the reconstruction of *Lion*, the third ship of the class, is scheduled.

The aircraft carrier *Ark Royal*, is now operational after her three years' special refit and conversion costing about £32,500,000 to enable her to operate Phantom aircraft. She is now one of the most up-to-date aircraft carriers in the world, a vast and wonderful military machine constituting a potent instrument of sea power, and representing a massive contribution to Britain's deterrent against war.

Her sister ship *Eagle* is also in active service during the year and can operate Phantom aircraft. This great vessel was also redesigned and reconstructed a few years ago and is an equal partner with *Ark Royal* in Britain's front line striking power. Her rejuvenation, which cost £31,000,000, gave her an extension of life into the 1980s.

During their modernisation and rehabilitation they were not only converted and strengthened to carry the latest aircraft but the opportunity was taken while they were in dockyard hands to update them from stem to stern, from keel to truck, and from the starboard island to the port fully angled deck. Every compartment in each ship was brought to current and foreseeable future standards, with generously reappointed accommodation and furniture, air conditioning and insulation, every scientific aid to operating aircraft and fighting the ships, and every possible amenity for the efficiency, health and recreation of the ship's companies.

Each of these vessels is a mobile airstrip extending for one sixth of a mile, carrying its own hangar, control tower and the base facilities afforded by a flight deck area of four acres and a population of 2,800 sailors, airmen and engineers, from ocean to ocean at a speed of over 31 knots. They can project overseas the visible evidence and voice of a still first class naval power. Surely it would be at least inadvisable to phase out these magnificent concentrations of military power, the largest moving machines ever built, before they have expended their economical lives and before new types of ships capable of operating an improved type of longer endurance VTOL aircraft are built to replace them.

One cannot envy the awesome responsibility of a Defense Minister identified as the one who found it expedient to draw the nation's front teeth, nor measure the fearsome prospect awaiting a Government which would go down in history as the one which took away Britain's aircraft carriers and henceforth sent her naked to the conference tables of the world.

Actually the death knell has already sounded for one of Britain's only three remaining carriers, for it is officially stated that HMS *Hermes* will be phased out from her present fixed-wing flying role during the year. On a date of original completion basis *Hermes* is the Royal Navy's most modern aircraft carrier. She first joined the Fleet only ten years ago, so could normally be expected to serve until 1980 at least, especially as she was extensively refitted during 1964–66 at a cost of £10,000,000 and widened and rearmed with guided missile launchers. She seems destined to be converted into a commando ship, as it would indeed be folly to scrap a warship of her size, cost and complexity. She will doubtless replace the most worn of the two invaluable commando ships, *Albion* and *Bulwark* which with the ubiquitous assault ships *Fearless* and *Intrepid*, constitute Britain's amphibious forces.

It is a source of disappointment in naval circles that only one new fleet submarine, HMS *Churchill* has been completed after an interval of several years. The first nuclear powered fleet submarine, *Dreadnought*, was completed in 1963, the second, *Valiant*, in 1966, and the third, *Warspite*, in 1967 (in the interim the four deterrent submarines *Renown*, *Repulse*, *Resolution*, and *Revenge* have been completed).

Meanwhile the number of conventionally powered patrol submarines has been drastically reduced. There are now only 27 comprising 21 operational or preparing for service and six in reserve or under refit. This is the lowest number in the history of the Submarine Service since it first gained impetus over 60 years ago.

Attention was called to an impending reduction in the number of submarines in these columns two years ago. It was pointed out that the surviving war-built submarines had been gradually whittled down on account of age until only 16 remained and that these would have to go shortly. That warning was not very graciously received by the protagonists of the Submarine Service who pointed out that the boats in question had all been refitted; but since then no fewer than ten of them have been officially approved for scrap and the surviving six cannot last much longer. The only compensation from new construction in the same period is the one fleet submarine.

It is true that three more nuclear powered fleet submarines, *Conqueror*, *Courageous* (ex-*Superb*) and *Swiftsure* are under construction and that two more are in the pipeline, but before even one more fleet submarine is completed a total of 28 conventional submarines (15 "A" class and 13 "T" conversions and streamlines) will have been disposed of over a period of three years, leaving Britain with a bare handful of nuclear powered fleet submarines and the 21 post-war built diesel driven boats.

This is simply not good enough even in peacetime for a country with as many worldwide interests as Britain and investments abroad running into billions of £s sterling. Nor is it commensurate with her history, her still considerable influence and the voice that she presumes to have in the world's affairs. As a nucleus for war emergency it is entirely inadequate. If Britain is not to remain an aircraft carrier power she should at least continue to be a submarine power. Otherwise the Royal Navy will be reduced to merely a frigate navy, especially as it seems that the vagaries of the "Seaslug" missiles and the difficulties involved in refitting the sophisticated ships in which they are carried will limit the number of the "County" class destroyers that can be operational to only about half of the eight at sea at any one time.

What is wanted to redress the declining submarine strength situation is a crash new construction programme of a dozen utility patrol submarines of medium size, say 1,000 tons, powered by diesels, which would span the interim until a sufficient number of nuclear powered fleet submarines can be completed. These conventional submarines could be built in pairs or groups of three or four simultaneously by a number of specialist submarine builders in little more than a year if the necessary go ahead signal were given. They could have just as many torpedo tubes as is now customary in the largest nuclear powered submarines and therefore in that respect constitute just as deadly weapons, and they would do useful for both operations and training.

NATO

The Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's permanent, multi-nation squadron, the purpose of which is to demonstrate NATO solidarity and unity, has again had a successful year of operational exercises and manoeuvres. It has been and could be any number and any combination of vessels of any of the ship contributing nations in NATO, namely Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Nether-

lands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.

The Standing Naval Force Atlantic could be much more viable and effective as a deterrent against war if it were promoted from an international squadron to a supra-national fleet administered and controlled by a Greater Atlantic Treaty Organization (GATO) comprising not only the erstwhile North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) but a South Atlantic Treaty Organisation (SATO) and a Mediterranean Treaty Organisation (METO).

A GATO extending south from the present arbitrarily fixed tropical line of latitude limits could link up South Africa, never before in such a strategic position on the trade route round the Cape, and the Atlantic coast nations of South America. It could make sorties into the Indian Ocean to pierce the void caused by the withdrawal of British forces from their traditional spheres of influence. (Chinese naval activity in the Indian Ocean has already been observed).

In these days of financial stringency and political expediency a number of warships are being sacrificed to the shipbreakers before their economical lives have been expended. These could be turned over to GATO and operated for the benefit of the Atlantic Treaty countries as a whole or maintained in reserve on a short notice basis for use in emergency.

The Netherlands has dispensed with her only aircraft carrier and Canada is disposing of her one aircraft carrier. Britain is scheduled to phase out one of her three remaining aircraft carriers (only ten years old) shortly. This means that NATO as at present constituted will have lost the potential backing of three aircraft carriers, no mean diminution of Allied striking power.

The United States arrived at the figure of 15 as the absolute minimum number of front line aircraft carriers required in the overall scheme of national and allied security. But in assessing this figure she must have taken into consideration the number of aircraft carriers possessed by the other NATO countries who could hold the fort in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean or South East Asia while her own carriers were occupied elsewhere. So each aircraft carrier scrapped by other NATO countries means that the USA will have to build another carrier if the predetermined strategic pattern is to be maintained. But if redundant allied carriers were transferred to a supra-national GATO, financed by the constituent nations according to their means, the *status quo* could be preserved.

[From the State (Mich.) Journal, July 31, 1971]

AMERICA CAN'T RISK SECOND RATE STATUS

For many years U.S. defense strategists have expressed fears that the United States would become a second rate military power. Until fairly recently their message was effective in maintaining a high level of defense preparedness.

In large part this fear stemmed from the pre-World War II era when widespread isolationist sentiment helped reduce the armed forces to a dangerously low level. Americans paid a grim price for the reduction in the months immediately after the Pearl Harbor disaster.

Following the war the emphasis switched to a high state of military preparedness because of the emerging power of the Soviet Union. For nearly two decades U.S. military leaders had little difficulty in persuading Congress to pay for a big peacetime armed force and for new weapons development—but then came a new push for a turnaround.

Today, there is growing evidence that the U.S. is drifting back to the position of a second rate military power while the Soviet Union, whose leaders are unhampered by elections and public opinion, continue to accelerate a total military buildup.

Various civilian panels studying the situation have concluded that Russia, with vast geo-political goals, is not seeking military parity with the U.S. but is determined to become the unchallenged military power of the world. Some analysts contend the Soviets are already near that goal.

Latest to suggest this is Jane's Fighting Ships, a British based military research organization which for decades has studied the relative navy power of many nations.

Jane's recently reported that the Soviet navy is rapidly surpassing the United States in almost every area except aircraft carriers, and that the Soviets will have enough nuclear strength by the mid-1970's to knock out all American land based missiles and bombers in one blow.

The agency also contends Russia has gained superiority over the U.S. in numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles and that it could soon surpass the U.S. in Polaris-type submarines—one of the most vital weapons in the American defense system.

Many could brush this off as so much scare talk, and the frequent revelations of American military waste during recent years in cost overruns, development of non-workable weapons and the like have not done anything to encourage sympathy for the defense planners. Too, American military leaders have often cried wolf in the past when solid evidence was lacking. The missile gap uproar of ten years ago is one example.

So there is little surprise that numerous congressmen are chipping at the defense budget in response to public complaints about waste and the need of more money to meet the nation's domestic problems.

While it is certain that few want to engage in a continuing and unlimited arms race, there does come a time when realities must be considered. One major reality, we believe, is that the United States cannot engage in unilateral disarmament to the extent that this nation has no real deterrent power left.

The Soviet military buildup has been real enough to shake up the leaders of Red China, which faces Russia along a massive northern border.

The Soviet military presence is real enough in the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe as well as Africa.

Certainly, there must be a continuing campaign to wipe out military spending waste and for closer scrutiny of weapons development and costs.

And efforts to achieve safe arms control agreements must be pursued, for this is still the ultimate solution.

But at the same time, the lessons history has taught us should be remembered. Foremost of these is that the cost of being militarily unprepared is disastrous.

Mr. CLANCY. Mr. Speaker, I am sure that every Member of this body and rational men all over the world would agree that the greatest benefit mankind could do for itself would be to eliminate weapons and wars.

As man has progressed through the centuries he has also progressed in the art of destroying himself. His weapons have become much more sophisticated. When one thinks of the results of an all-out nuclear world war between today's super powers the mind boggles at the destruction that would be wrought.

Some say that if we lay down our arms others will do the same. The sentiment is admirable, but reality tempers the sentiment. We must ask, "Can we afford to make such a move?" Mankind's history answers with a resounding "no."

A quote by Gen. George Marshall sums up the problem. He said

We have tried since the birth of our nation to promote our love of peace by a display of weakness. This course has failed us utterly.

Since World War II, America has had an overwhelming advantage in strategic weapons. Not in manned armies, or numbers of tanks, or even in numbers of airplanes. The power has been in the ability to deliver enough destruction to make any direct move against this country absolute suicide for a nation contemplating any such move.

What have we done with this power? Have we attempted to conquer nations, acquire more land mass? No, and we are the first super power in world history not to follow a course of military expansion while holding the strategic balance of power.

When the Monguls had the greatest military power in the world Genghis Khan wreaked havoc in Asia Minor. When the Greeks had it, Alexander conquered in India. When the Romans had it, Caesar built forts in England. When Hitler had it, total world dominance was his goal.

Yet the United States of America—at the time when it owned 99 44/100 percent of all the world's atomic power—chose to use diplomacy against Russia over Iran. The United States—when the only nuclear strike force in the world was the Strategic Air Command—chose to use air transport to move the goods of life in order to break the Berlin Blockade rather than employ weapons to destroy the blockaders.

And since World War II another interesting fact surfaces. Between the World War I and World War II 22 years passed. It has now been 26 years since the end of World War II. In that more than a quarter of a century there have been several localized wars, the first two that come to mind are Korea and Vietnam, but there are dozens of others, including the Middle East crisis. Yet, no major military confrontation between super powers. We, by design, have avoided using what has been overwhelming superiority. The other side has avoided a direct military confrontation, undoubtedly because it was weaker from a strategic, or nuclear delivery standpoint.

This country has grown and prospered for the past 26 years, and at the same time helped a good portion of the world rebuild from the rubble of World War II. This has been accomplished behind the unused shield of our strategic forces. Unfortunately, we are faced with the grim prospect that we are no longer the dominant strategic power in the world.

The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, comprised of business and professional leaders, recently reported that—

. . . U.S. strategic superiority has ended.

The panel reported, and I quote—

The Soviet Union has moved significantly ahead of the United States in ICBM's, the principal weapons system of the nuclear age.

The panel also reported, and again I quote—

There is reason to believe that the Soviet Union envisions a new era which it will dominate, employing superior military power and the threat of its use to achieve long-cherished political, economic and even military objectives.

The words of the panel, which was appointed by the President and the Secretary of Defense in 1969, are sobering indeed.

We and the Soviets employ the same Triad concept of strategic forces, consisting of manned bombers, and land and sea-based missiles. The tremendous growth in the Soviet strategic forces can be shown by a comparison of numbers of strategic weapons in 1965 and 1970. In 1965 we had 854 ICBM's, they had 270. The numbers today are the U.S. 1,054 ICBM's and the Russians 1,500. In submarine-launched missiles we had 464 in 1965, they had 120. Today the totals read U.S. 656, U.S.S.R. 400. At the rate they are building missile-launching submarines the Soviets will have at least 900 missiles under water by 1975.

In the area of heavy strategic bombers this country still maintains a lead, but our force of B–52's is getting old. The first ones went into service in 1955, and the new Strategic Air Command bomber. the B–1, is 3 years away from its first flight. The Russians are reported to be flight testing a new swing-wing strategic bomber, which means it could go into service probably by the time the first B–1 is making its first test flight. Another point to remember about the Russian nuclear-delivering bomber force is that they kept their 1,000 or so B–47-type bombers in service while we chose to retire ours.

The blue ribbon panel pointed out what could be the result of this shift in strategic superiority. It said—

If these observable trends continue, the U.S. will become a second-rate power incapable of assuring the future security and freedom of its people.

Gentlemen, it is our job to see that this does not happen. We are the ones who control the purse strings of the country. It is a difficult job to balance the distribution of funds, but one thing is clear, if we cannot defend ourselves in a crisis, all other "priorities" become academic. There are military development programs now underway that are vital to our strategic forces and to the future of our country. Among these I would list in order of priority the B–1 bomber for SAC, the SRAM attack missile, and the updating of our Minuteman and Poseidon submarine forces when appropriate. All of these systems are vital to making our triad the credible deterrent it must be through the rest of this century. It is our responsibility and duty to the American people, as is so clearly pointed out in the preamble to the Constitution, which states:

The first duty of the national Government is to provide for the common defense of our country.

Mr. KUYKENDALL. Mr. Speaker, I think this body should remember from time to time the words of the philosopher Santayana, who said—

Those who do not learn from the past are condemned to repeat it.

We have, all of us in our lifetimes, seen nations and governments fall through neglect of their defenses, and we have seen other regimes shake and quake, barely recovering themselves in time to avoid collapse.

We have heard excellent summations today on our national defense posture, vis-a-vis the hardware that our Armed Forces must have. When you hire a workman, you want him to have the best tools possible, and we in Congress recognize that fact.

But what of the workman himself? Are we doing everything we can do to assure our Nation that its fighting men will be the best in the world, that they will be led by the best in the world?

Mr. Speaker, we are not doing everything we can do when we let a much-needed military pay raise languish in the halls of Congress while we fight about extension of the draft. Difference of opinion plays an honorable role in the deliberations of the Congress; but there is no honor in allowing the differences over one issue to hamstring a matter so vital, a totally unrelated matter that had the misfortune to be coupled with the thornier issue.

Fortunately, this matter is being resolved, but I wonder how many excellent officers and noncommissioned officers were lost to us during the waiting period. How many skilled technicians and able leaders must we now train and inspire to replace those we have lost? And when we delay, how much inspiration is that?

Mr. Speaker, I do not mean to carp at our Defense Establishment in its treatment of the men who serve in our Armed Forces when I say that these men must be told, and told in tangible ways, that their fellow citizens think of them as members of an honorable calling. I think, by and large, that what faults there are in our system, can be laid elsewhere—to the Congress, and to the people.

Kipling summed up the feelings of the soldier, Mr. Speaker, who saw himself scorned and shunned by polite society until that society needed him, and then it was different.

It's Tommy this, and Tommy that, and Tommy you're a brute; but it's "Thin red line of heroes," when the guns begin to shoot.

When was the last time, Mr. Speaker, that any of us drove 20 miles northeast of our city to look at the Naval Academy at Annapolis? How many of us have talked with the cadets and midshipmen that we appoint to our service academies, to learn what they think of their military futures, whether they are being inspired to become the type of men we want, to whom we will turn over the reins of our national defense one day?

I do not believe in a mercenary army, Mr. Speaker. But I want the best kind of leadership available in our Army, Navy, and Air Force, and I am prepared to cast whatever votes are necessary in this House, however long I may stay here, to accomplish that goal.

Mr. POWELL. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to participate in this special order of business on our deteriorating national defense posture, because I believe our Nation faces a period of grave peril not sufficiently recognized by this Congress or this country.

The two great oceans which have long protected us from foreign foes now can peril us instead, for they are full of undersea vessels bearing the Hammer and Sickle. The Soviet Navy can come closer to our cities and military installations than we can to theirs. They can come right up to our borders, so to speak, but they have a buffer of Iron Curtain countries protecting most of theirs. Russia may be land-locked, but we may find ourselves sea-locked after having enjoyed world maritime supremacy.

The newest edition of "Jane's Fighting Ships," the 1971–72 edition, was published last week, and the news it contained, news, that is, for the American people, but not for those of us who have been concerned about this for years, is very serious and troublesome. Jane's, which I think is universally regarded as an authoritative work, the definitive work on all the world's fighting ships, flatly states that American naval strength is in serious decline while the Soviet fleet "now represents the super-navy of a superpower."

Stated in its most extreme and perhaps oversensationalized form, but deducible from the Jane's findings, the peril to America could be posed in this question: Does the survival of the United States and the rest of the non-Communist world rest in the hands of a scant score or more of U.S. Polaris submarines and their crews at some given zero hour in world history?

For Jane's glumly predicts that the Soviet Union could well have the nuclear punch by the mid-70's to destroy virtually all American land-based Minuteman missiles and SAC bombers in one surprise attack.

Such a successful strike would leave America's 41 Polaris/Poseidon submarines as the most survivable U.S. strategic deterrent forces for the foreseeable future, Jane's says.

But Jane's—and an article last year in the prestigious Armed Forces Journal as well, based on testimony of then Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Thomas Moorer—also reminds us that of the 41 submarine ballistic-missile force, only 50 to 60 percent, about 24 or so—is on deterrent patrol at any given time. The remaining operational submarines are alongside tenders undergoing a 28-day replenishment and refit between deterrent patrols or are undergoing overhaul and conversion to the Poseidon capability.

These 24 Polaris crews could conceivably stand between us and the end of the whole free world as we know it. Do we want to allow such a narrow margin to determine the future fate of so many people?

But aside from this in extremis scenario, the struggle for control of the world's seas is an even more immediate and pressing concern. And on this score also Jane's gives us little to cheer about.

The editor of Jane's, Raymond V. B. Blackman, paints this gloomy picture of the Mediterranean situation:

So prolific has the Soviet Naval shipbuilding effort been that the U.S.S.R. is now able to maintain a standing naval force in the Mediterranean 5 times stronger than 5 years ago to counter the American 6th Fleet.

The picture in the Indian Ocean is hardly better:

The British withdrawal from the Indian Ocean has left a hole in Western global defenses—again, 5 years ago the U.S.S.R. had no warships in the Indian Ocean, but today there are a score of surface ships alone, and there is no telling how many Soviet submarines are in the area.

And we all know, Mr. Speaker, that today there is a real Soviet naval presence in the Atlantic and the Caribbean, and need we say, along the coastal corridors of these United States?

The new Jane's details, with all the available statistics, the declining American, and booming Soviet naval and ballistic missile strengths.

Consider the evidence, as presented in Jane's. As given by Navy officials to Congress. The Soviet Navy has already exceeded the United States in active surface ships and total number of submarines. It is now pulling even in the number of nuclear-powered submarines and is gaining in the race to have more ballistic nuclear submarines than the U.S. Navy. The lead we enjoy in this category is dangerously tenuous.

Not only this, the Soviets have a larger nuclear submarine building program. They build nuclear submarines at the rate of one a month and current Soviet construction of six Polaris-type ballistic-missile submarines a year could give them parity if not superiority in this crucial category by 1975.

In addition, the Soviet Navy is ahead of the American Navy in vessel categories which could prove important. They have, for example, 270 submarine chasers to our one. They have 450 missile and torpedo boats to our 37, and so on.

The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Zumwalt, told Congress this year in his annual statement:

We estimate the Soviet Navy will equal the U.S. Navy in total major combatants in 1972.

While the Soviet Union has been engaged in a crash program of naval building—conventional and nuclear submarines, fast, small and sophisticated missile boats, and very swift and up-to-date destroyers, there has been an American naval letdown so that our Navy is actually deteriorating while the Russian Navy is going full speed ahead in the opposite direction.

Between the fiscal year 1968 budget and the fiscal year 1972 budget, the Navy has been forced to reduce the number of total active commissioned fleet ships by 28 percent—or 269 ships, down to 658 from a high of 976—a severe reduction for the U.S. fleet. Most of the ships were mothballed because of old age. The encroaching problem of block obsolescence is now upon us.

Whereas no Soviet warship assigned a combat role is over 20 years old, about 37 percent of U.S. warships are 20 years old or older. Age is even becoming a factor among submarines. Eight of the 57 nuclear attack submarines are no longer considered first-line submarines, Jane's says, and 24 of the 36 conventionally powered attack submarines were constructed during World War II.

Meanwhile U.S. antisubmarine forces have been reduced as part of the overall cutback of the U.S. military establishment. Particularly hard hit have been the number of surface antisubmarine warfare ships and antisubmarine aircraft carriers and their squadrons.

Not only are old ships being dropped from the fleet without being replaced, not only are we starting to lag relatively in numbers, speeds, and certain weapons capabilities of our nuclear submarines, but important new naval capabilities—some possessed by the Russian Navy—have not been funded or developed for the U.S. Navy, or will not see the light of day until the eighties. The antiship missile capability. Guided cruise missile submarines. The undersea long-range missile system—ULMS.

The dangerous and disturbing thing about all these gaps is that we cannot mount a modernization and revitalization program for our Navy in 10 minutes. It takes leadtime and as the weaponry and ordnance become more sophisticated and complex, that leadtime grows even longer.

Jane's says that the alarming U.S. Naval situation "hitherto discussed in closed sessions of naval officials and in this annual, is now being addressed openly."

But you do not have to believe me, or even Jane's fighting ships. Listen to the carefully chosen words of Admiral Zumwalt to Congress this year. And note the undercurrent of urgency as he goes out to the very verbal end of his bureaucratically imposed tether as a service chief:

Unlike the high level of confidence I have in our nuclear deterrent forces, I have a much lower level of confidence in our sea control forces. In my estimation, our 1972 sea control forces must be regarded as high risk base line forces from which we must build in consonance with our national security strategy based upon the Nixon doctrine.

Admiral Zumwalt noted that since 1968, we have allocated an average of less than $2 billion of new obligational authority annually to ship construction and conversion programs, and less than $3 billion to aircraft and missile procurement and modernization programs. He said the replacement value of the active fleet is roughly $75 billion. Thus, assuming a 25-year replacement cycle, it would require a minimum of $3 billion annually for shipbuilding alone and "we have been falling well behind a reasonable replacement rate," he noted.

For keeping up in the nuclear submarine department, Admiral Zumwalt told Congress in May that he considers up to eight attack nuclear submarines a year should be built. Funds for five are being sought from Congress this year, the highest in several years.

The late chairman of our Armed Services Committee, L. Mendel Rivers, rightly dubbed by some as the "Paul Revere of the nuclear age," once estimated the cost of bringing the U.S. Navy up to a par with the Russian Navy at $5 billion a year minimum for 5 years, or $25 billion.

Our current chairman, the distinguished gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. HÉBERT, has suggested that the Navy's obsolescence is the achilles heel of American defense posture. This sentiment was seconded recently by the former managing editor of Life magazine in an article on deteriorating American defense posture:

Today the U.S. Navy as the service bearing the brunt of Soviet confrontation. It is challenged and vulnerable. The logical approach is not to cut the Navy back, which is what has been happening, but to put a fast, sure and serious rebuilding effort into it.

Do the American people want to have the world's No. 2 Navy? I say they do not. Not any more than they wanted to be the second nation to land a man on the moon.

I believe we should show them vividly and graphically the perils we face. As a first step toward restoring a meaningful balance between the Soviet and American Navies—and by that I mean modernizing our Navy—I would respectfully urge that our own Armed Services Committee—possibly through its seapower subcommittee—conduct nationally televised hearings into this crisis situation as soon as possible. Once the people see what we are up against, I feel sure Congress will get the necessary grassroots support to take the needed action.

America's special order of business must be to attempt to bridge what some say is already an unbridgeable gap. It must be to get the modern navy we must have for national survival.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the New York Times story entitled "Jane's Says U.S. Fleet Declines While Soviet Has a Supernavy," datelined July 29, 1971, be reprinted in today's RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

JANE'S SAYS U.S. FLEET DECLINES WHILE SOVIET HAS A "SUPERNAVY"

LONDON.—A British military expert said today that American naval strength is in a serious decline while the Soviet fleet has expanded into a "supernavy" with a greatly increased sphere of influence.

"The situation for the U.S. Navy is serious," Raymond V. B. Blackman, editor of the authoritative Jane's Fighting Ships, said in a foreword to the 1971–72 edition, published today.

"By any standards," Mr. Blackman added, "the Soviet fleet now represents the supernavy of a superpower."

Increasing Soviet naval power, he said, has led to "a somewhat belated but now acute awareness evinced by hitherto quite autonomous navies of the need for international cooperation and mutual security." This has brought greater cooperation in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, he said, but the British withdrawal from the Indian Ocean has left a hole in Western global defenses.

"The prime necessity would appear to be a multinational Standing Naval Force East, comprising warships seconded from each of the countries with military or commercial interests in that oceanic hemisphere from South Africa to Indonesia," Mr. Blackman said.

He wrote:

"So prolific has the Soviet naval shipbuilding effort been that the U.S.S.R. is now

able to maintain a standing naval force in the Mediterranean five times stronger than five years ago to counter the American Sixth Fleet.

"Again, five years ago the U.S.S.R. had no warships in the Indian Ocean, but today there are a score of surface ships alone, and there is no telling how many Soviet submarines are in the area."

ROLE OF MISSILE BOATS

Mr. Blackman underlined a relatively new development in "the recognition, not only by major powers but also by smaller countries of the tactical power and strategic influence of the fast and diminutive warship armed with the optimum payload of guided missiles."

He added: "Ironically it is the new world sea power of the Soviet Union which had engendered the yen for cooperation, and it is the Soviet Navy which has pointed the way to the ascendancy of the missile boat over much larger orthodox warships."

An alarming feature of the last decade, he said, was the rapidly increasing cost of building fighting ships. "Confronted with this escalation problem several of the smaller countries decided that the answer was smaller and cheaper vessels," he wrote.

"The diminutive missile boats with surface-to-surface systems will give smaller navies an offensive power out of all proportion to their modest over-all size."

Norman Polmar, editor of the American section of the 729-page annual, painted a gloomy picture of United States naval development.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Speaker, I am happy to participate in this colloquy on national defense.

The goal of this administration has been to rest our national security on the twin pillars of arms control and strategic arms sufficiency. Both these factors are important. President Nixon has stated that our Government is committed to achieving a stable strategic relationship with the Soviet Union through negotiations. In pursuit of lowering the current immense expenditures for strategic weapons systems, this administration has initiated a dialog with the Soviet Union on how to arrive at a mutually acceptable limitation on offensive and defensive weapons. On May 20 of this year President Nixon told the Nation that the strategic arms limitation talks would concentrate this year on reaching an agreement on antiballistic-missile systems. At the same time our two countries will try to agree on certain measures to limit offensive strategic weapons.

The basic aim of these talks is to achieve a mutually acceptable status of strategic sufficiency for both the United States and the Soviet Union. The President, in his annual review of foreign policy entitled "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace," defined the term sufficiency. He said that in the traditional military sense it meant the maintenance of strategic retaliatory force capable of inflicting a level of damage sufficient to deter an adversary from attacking. In the broader political sense sufficiency also requires the maintenance of forces adequate to prevent us and our allies from being coerced by an adversary. Interestingly enough, the President added a third definition of sufficiency, designed to lessen any fear the Soviets might have that we might launch a first strike. He said in his foreign policy report:

Sufficiency also means numbers, characteristics and deployment of our forces which the Soviet Union cannot reasonably interpret as being intended to threaten a disarming attack.

As the President explained:

Insofar as we can do so by unilateral decisions we seek to obviate the need for costly, wasteful and dangerous cycles of strategic arms deployments.

However, this policy should be interpreted as a sign of prudence and not weakness. The decision to pursue a policy of strategic sufficiency rather than strategic superiority does not represent any lessening of our resolve not to permit our interests to be infringed. Indeed the policy of this administration has been to pursue a balance development of our strategic forces.

As I said at the beginning of my remarks, the pursuit of limiting the arms race through negotiations is only one aspect of our national security policy. We must continually be on guard against possible unfavorable shifts in the balance between ourselves and the Soviet Union. In this regard, we have seen some disturbing signs of an accelerated Soviet buildup of both conventional and strategic weapons.

For example, just last week I saw an article on the latest edition of the authoritative "Jane's Fighting Ships." The 1971–72 edition details the buildup of Soviet naval forces, and says that the Soviet strategic forces are growing at a rate where by 1975 they would equal or surpass ours. This accelerated rate of building all their forces may or may not represent simply a Soviet effort to achieve parity with the United States.

Unfortunately we cannot be sure of Soviet intentions. We must guard against the possibility that the Soviets may try to achieve conventional and strategic superiority. This would clearly not be acceptable to us. We must make adequate preparations to assure that there is no further deterioration in our position as compared to the Soviet Union.

In this regard, we may find ourselves forced, after 2 consecutive years of reductions in appropriations, to increase defense spending again. Much of our Navy is over-age and needs replacement. Unless we see signs of a slowdown in the Soviet program, our nuclear submarine building program may need to be accelerated. If the Soviets continue to build land-based missiles, which already outnumber ours 1,400–1,000, we may be forced to improve radically our land-based strategic systems. We may also have to go ahead with development of a manned strategic bomber to give our forces a multipronged retaliatory capability.

Mr. Speaker, far preferable to such a serious acceleration of the arms race would be an agreement on arms limitations. It is to be hoped that ultimately China and other nuclear powers might also join any accord that SALT may produce. This would be far preferable to a situation where we constantly have to buy costly new weapon systems. However, as long as we live in a world of uncertainty we have to prepare for every contingency. This means maintaining a force structure adequate to defend our security interests around the world. It means also implementation of the Nixon doctrine by giving security assistance to allow our friends to defend themselves.

Mr. MYERS. Mr. Speaker, many of us remember that in the 1960 election one of the major issues between Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy was that of an alleged "missile gap." President Kennedy advanced the view that we were falling seriously behind the Russians. Fortunately, the case had been overstated and we maintained our superiority through the 1960's.

Now, however, a real missile gap crisis appears to have arisen. The Soviet Union is today far ahead of the United States in long-range missile, possessing at least 1,500 to our 1,054. Beyond this, it is believed that their SS–9 missiles, of which they have over 300, could destroy in a first strike our land-based Minuteman missile system, the backbone of U.S. nuclear power.

It is not only in the field of nuclear weapons, however, that we seem to be falling behind. According to the distinguished English publication, Jane's Fighting Ships:

The U.S. Navy will end the fiscal year with force levels reflecting a net reduction (i.e. total inactivations less new and converted ships) of 175 active fleet ships and 732 active aircraft below the levels operated at the end of the 1968 fiscal year which saw the height of activity in Southeast Asia.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, continues maritime expansion at a rapid rate. During 1969 there was a 22-percent extension of Soviet naval operations and the Soviet squadrons were increased to over 60 newer and more effective ships, with access to shore facilities in Egypt and Syria.

Why, at the very moment when we are falling behind the Soviet Union in all major weapons systems are we negotiating at the SALT talks with an intention to "freeze" our relative inferiority? In fact, President Nixon says that any decision made on such a "freeze" will not even be a treaty but will be only an "understanding."

Human Events recently pointed out that:

Back in 1958, we came to another "understanding" on nuclear matters with the Soviets. Instead of concluding a treaty, we, along with the Russians agreed to suspend all atomic tests. In September of 1961, the Soviets, to our everlasting sorrow, unilaterally broke the moratorium and conducted some 50 atmospheric tests, including the largest man-made explosions in history.

Human Events notes that:

From this series, our scientists and defense experts believe, the Soviets obtained enough knowledge to perfect a wide array of sophisticated nuclear weapons, including an ABM system. The stupendous strides in nuclear weaponry the Soviets have made in recent years can be directly attributed to this event.

Those who doubt that a new "missile gap" is now being created should carefully consider the material in the following Human Events article which I wish to share with my colleagues, and insert into the RECORD at this time:

NIXON CREATING MISSILE GAP ISSUE FOR DEMOCRATS

Who-Said-This Department: "I think that we are entering the critical era insofar as the confrontation between the United States and the Communist powers is concerned. . . .

"Within a year the Soviet Union will catch the United States and, if we don't get a change of leadership and policy in Washington, will pass us in deliverable nuclear capability. According to a British study, they already have equalled us and may have passed us in land-based nuclear deliverable capability.

"Now, that changes the balance of power in negotiation in the world, and it means that whoever is President for the next four years may be in the very difficult position of having to negotiate from weakness rather than from strength. . . ."

And who said this: "At this time I do not believe that the United States can afford to accept the concept of parity with the Soviet Union. I believe that we face a . . . potentially dangerous situation . . . to negotiate a de-escalation of trouble points around the world, whether in the Mideast or Viet Nam or Western Europe or what have you, if the next President of the United States goes into those conferences with the possibility that the Soviet Union rather than the United States is in a strong power position, I think that we would not be able to effectively reach the goals that we want to reach.

"I do not mean that the United States maintain superiority for the purpose of threatening anybody or waging war. I do mean that, as you look at today's world, the Soviet Union's goal in the world is somewhat different than ours, strikingly different. They are still in an expansionist stage. Our goal in the world is defensive, to keep the peace.

"And at any kind of negotiation when one side wants to expand and the other side to defend, make sure that the side which is in the defensive position has more strength than the other side."

These words, of course, were uttered by candidate Richard Nixon in 1968. These were the cogent arguments he used to gather support from Senators Strom Thurmond, John Tower, Barry Goldwater and other defense-oriented Republicans who were crucial in helping him win the GOP presidential nomination in Miami two and one-half years ago.

But Richard Nixon has not come close to fulfilling his pledge. He has obviously not provided the United States with a nuclear force that is superior to the Soviets. We do not even seem to be opting for "the concept of parity."

Indeed, it is not too much to say that the President appears willing to accept a posture of nuclear inferiority, one that may well be ratified in agreements resulting from the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks.

Sources in the White House say the President is well aware of the grave situation facing the country. He has reportedly come to the sad conclusion, however, that Congress will not approve the hefty sums necessary for our strategic strength because of the "climate of opinion" in the Senate and the incessant hostility of the news media towards the military.

But how does the President know that Congress will not grant his request? The truth is that he does not know, and the hard fact is that he has made no major effort to persuade Congress to approve such a request. Unlike his determined—and so far successful—efforts at selling the Vietnamization program, he has conspicuously avoided trying to galvanize Congress and the public behind a policy that would greatly improve our dangerously weakened military posture.

By lulling the populace to sleep with such dovish promises as an "era of negotiations," a "generation of peace," a "shifting of national priorities" and the like, the President has also helped to foster the psychological climate of euphoria and appeasement he now privately complains he cannot combat. He is somewhat like the general who tells his troops to take it easy on the enemy, and then complains they aren't fighting very well.

Disturbing as the President's failure to alert the country to the Soviet threat has been, even more ominous were his statements last week regarding possible agreements with the Soviets at SALT. The President reinforced the belief that he may very well come to an understanding with the Soviets that many disarmament experts predict will provide the Russians with an overwhelming advantage in both offensive and defensive weapons.

The U.S., said the President, would most likely submit any agreement on an ABM limitation in the form of a treaty to the Senate. Under a proposed antimissile limitation said to be in the works the U.S. would be permittted to erect a thin ABM system that could protect a small portion of its Minuteman retaliatory weapons.

As White House and Pentagon sources have suggested, however, the U.S. would not be permitted to deploy an ABM defense that could shield its major population centers from a swift, nuclear assault or could even provide protection from an accidental strike. Stripped forever by treaty of any nuclear defenses, our major cities would become permanent hostages not only to Soviet firepower but to any mini-nation with nuclear capabilities.

Yet such conditions, as explained on the cover last week, would apparently not hold true for the Soviets. According to top government sources, the USSR would be permitted to keep its "thick" ABM system around the capital city of Moscow, a system that is capable of—or will soon be capable of—protecting the Kremlin's leaders and some 50 million Soviet citizens from long-range missile attacks.

Equally startling, however, was the President's suggestion that any interim proposal to halt offensive missile development would not be in the form of a treaty but would be nothing more than a mere "understanding" between the two superpowers. The Soviets, of course, are far ahead of the United States in long-range missiles, possessing at least 1,500 to our 1,054.

Furthermore, it is believed that their monster SS–9 missiles—of which they have over 300—could destroy in a first strike our land-based Minuteman missile system, the backbone of U.S. nuclear power.

Thus any "freeze" on long-range missiles—and that appears to be the thinking in Washington and Moscow at this point—would be to the Soviet's advantage anyway. But surely it would be far more to their advantage if they were not even hampered in limiting their offensive missile production by a solemn treaty.

The Soviets, as most sane people have learned by now, are barely willing to keep treaties they have signed. And their word is even less trustworthy when not bound in ink.

The massive Soviet violation of the standstill cease-fire agreement along the Suez Canal last fall—when the Egyptians moved Russian-manned SAM missiles into neutral territory—is but the latest example of Soviet perfidy. Yet a more apt parallel exists.

Back in 1958, we came to another "understanding" on nuclear matters with the Soviets. Instead of concluding a treaty, we, along with the Russians, agreed to suspend all atomic tests. In September of 1961, the Soviets, to our everlasting sorrow, unilaterally broke the moratorium and conducted some 50 atmospheric tests, including the largest manmade explosions in history.

From this series, our scientists and defense experts believe, the Soviets obtained enough knowledge to perfect a wide array of sophisticated nuclear weapons, including an ABM system. The stupendous strides in nuclear weaponry the Soviets have made in recent years can be directly attributed to this event.

Equally important, America's most eminent scientists, including Dr. Edward Teller, were convinced that while we were honoring the moratorium the Soviets had been violating it in clandestine fashion. In referring to these huge Soviet tests, President Kennedy was prompted to say at the time: "We know now enough about broken negotiations, secret preparations and the advantage gained from a long test series never to offer again an uninspected moratorium."

Yet President Nixon's suggested "understanding" with the Soviets about long-range missiles has ominous parallels with our "moratorium" diplomacy back in 1958.

President Kennedy, it is interesting to recall, defeated Richard Nixon for the presidency in 1960, partially on the fallacious charge that the Eisenhower-Nixon Administration had created a missile gap. The Democrats might very well be able to wrap a real "missile gap" issue around the neck of President Nixon in 1972.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Speaker, I was recently honored to be appointed as a congressional adviser to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

As a congressional adviser to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament I am vitally interested in the SALT negotiations. I will be attending conference meetings in Geneva next week and I hope to go on to Helsinki where SALT negotiations are now in progress.

It is an excellent thing that a number of my colleagues have requested the time necessary to do some thinking out loud in advance about the hazards of the SALT talks currently being conducted between the United States and the Soviet Union in so much secrecy. Secrecy can be a very necessary thing in some negotiations, but in questions of such primary importance one may wonder whether secrecy is in the best interests of the United States in the long run. President Nixon succeeded in keeping his intentions to visit Communist China secret for a long time. When he made the announcement, everyone was caught off guard, and to many it seemed almost futile to raise any substantial objections to his decision, even though many people have grave misgivings about it. Many in the media and in the Congress lately have raised a hue and cry over the people's right to know in connection with the publication of the Pentagon papers. But the Pentagon papers are largely history now—though it is true they have their impact upon current policymaking—whereas the ingredients now going into the SALT negotiations are of the utmost importance for policy decisions to be made right now. Is it not possible that, just as has happened with the President's trip to Peking, we will be presented with a neatly packaged agreement on SALT which could have disastrous consequences for our survival as a free society in the very near future? Under these circumstances, is it not good to raise the question as to whether secrecy is necessary in these negotiations? And if secrecy is insisted upon, would we not be remiss in our duty if we did not raise many of the questions with which the negotiations are presumably dealing? That is the purpose of today's session, and I am glad to have the

opportunity to participate in it, Mr. Speaker.

The problem of the SALT talks, as everyone knows, is inextricably bound up with the question of our strategic doctrine and our military posture as against the Soviet Union. I should like to consider briefly a very important element in that strategic posture; namely, our anti-ballistic-missile system. I am sure that my colleagues remember the very heated debate over the installation of the Safeguard ABM system which occurred a couple of summers ago. Those who opposed the Safeguard system did so with much heat, and their arguments flowed from a whole strategic conception of deterrence based upon the McNamara doctrine of "assured destruction." If we made any effort to defend ourselves, the opponents of Safeguard said at the time, we will provoke the Soviets and "destabilize" the whole international strategic situation. So the first line of argument of the ABM opposition was that the best defense is a good offense. Now this may be true in sports oftentimes, but one has to be careful about accepting it uncritically in military matters at such a high level. You can see that this is especially so because, if you pushed the ABM opponents they would have to say that, yes, the best defense is a good offense, but you will never have to use that offense; but if it should turn out that we had to use the offense, they would be horrified, and oppose it with all their might, I am sure. So the upshot of the matter is that we would have no defense at all.

Mr. Speaker, this sort of policy is really based upon psychology, and not really upon weapons. Weapons for the sort of men who are now conducting the SALT negotiations, I am afraid, are really only psychological or bargaining counters. We might have to have them, they would say, but it is unthinkable that we should ever actually use them. They produce reactions only in the minds of our opponents.

Now, psychological warfare can be a very important thing, but it would be suicidal to rely only upon that. We cannot simply blank out the possibility that we may have to employ some of these weapons someday. We cannot put ourselves into the position of hiding behind a maginot line which can be outflanked, or in the situation of the Czechs, who in 1938 had a very well equipped army but who submitted to Hitler because they would not order their army into combat. If we are to spend money on weaponry, we must be ready to use it if necessary. Otherwise we might as well abolish the military and cease to exist as a sovereign state.

The Soviet leadership seems to have a much clearer view of the current situation than ours. They realize that they need a proper mix of offensive and defensive weaponry, and in particular, they see nothing at all harmful in anti-ballistic-missile systems, either for themselves or for us—let me repeat that once again, since it is important: For us either, and this despite what we have been told by our anti-ABM experts. Instead of listening to our American "specialists" tell us how they would react to the ABM if they were Russians, we should instead take a look and see what the Soviets themselves have to say about the matter. When we do, we discover that the Soviet leaders do not consider defensive missilery destabilizing at all: quite the contrary. In a chapter of the book "Why ABM?" published at the time of the ABM debates 2 years ago, Johan Holst did an investigation of the Soviet reaction to those debates. He concluded that:

> The Russians have adhered rather strenuously to the position that active defenses are, in fact, a peace-promoting value. It was only four days after the U.S. Senate voted favorably on construction funds for Sentinel in June, 1968, that the Soviet Union officially agreed to hold strategic arms talks with the U.S.

More than that, when Soviet Premier Kosygin was asked about the ABM decision after it was made, he took the whole situation quite calmly, and made it clear that in his opinion a country had not only the right, but the duty, to protect its civilian population against attack—and this applied not just to the Soviet Union, but to the United States as well. Consequently the Soviet Union has continued to construct ABM complexes to protect its major population centers, and apparently has programed many of its offensive missiles to kill our offensive missiles in their silos. Is this policy not the only one which makes much sense? Is it not insane to threaten to slaughter huge numbers of the unarmed Russian citizenry and refuse to try to stop Soviet missiles in order to protect our own people. Do we want Hiroshimas many times over, and Hiroshimas visited upon ourselves? Can the doctrine of "assured destruction" be considered a sensible one, especially now?

From what we know of the proceedings at the SALT negotiations, it appears that our negotiators are running entirely along the old lines. They want to reduce defensive weaponry while leaving offensive weaponry until later. It strikes me that, as Herman Kahn of the Hudson Institute has said, this is precisely the opposite of what we ought to be doing. We should first make it clear that we will continue our ABM deployment and construction efforts and discuss a methodical reduction in offensive missiles and a methodical reduction of defensive missiles but not on a freeze basis. In other words, we do not want to be in the position of agreeing not to further deploy Safeguard on the grounds that the Soviets not deploy any more of their ABMs, since we would then leave the Soviets with a very distinct advantage of having an operational ABM system and we would have nothing.

We need to recognize that the best defense is a good defense, only when it is combined with the proper offensive capabilities, and not a horrendous offense which we would never dare to use. The Soviets have a responsible view of defensive weaponry, and they are hardly likely to be so foolish as to accept the arguments of our disarmament "experts." We ought not to be that foolish either.

Mr. BETTS. Mr. Speaker, Russian adventurism in the Mediterranean is a new wrinkle in an old suit. We tend to forget that, since Czarist times, Russia has been a power in the Middle East: it has a common border with Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey, and a substantial Muslim population, absorbed in its imperialist wars of the 18th and 19th centuries. Russia's quest for territory and influence in the south dates back at least to the time of Peter the Great at the beginning of the 18th century. Britain and France joined forces to head off Russian expansion to the warm water posts of the Black and Mediterranean Seas in the 1850's during the Crimean War, successfully I might add.

And of course in our times, Stalin's attempt at takeovers in Greece, Turkey, and Iran in 1946–47 was thwarted by the Truman doctrine, massive American aid and the 6th Fleet.

I realize that it has become fashionable, Mr. Speaker, in this Chamber and elsewhere to downgrade the talent, intelligence, and, at times, even the loyalty of our military men. There is an unfortunate tendency to caricature our military men in the lurid fiction of our times.

At the risk of being accused of being a flag-waver, or a superpatriot, I would like to say something complimentary about the U.S. 6th Fleet and its presence in the Mediterranean: the U.S. 6th Fleet carried out its mission there for two decades with honor and with dedication. Furthermore, it has succeeded. If now it is ceasing to be an effective force, it is not the fault of the Navy. If the blame is ours, the ability to set things straight is also ours.

Unlike the Russians, the United States has no territorial designs in the Mediterranean. Our presence there has been to guarantee the territorial integrity of all the littoral States. Whether it was Lebanon in 1958, or Israel in 1967, or 1956 or 1948, the American presence has been directed toward stability and peace.

We have nothing to apologize for its presence in the Mediterranean.

But, Mr. Speaker, the times have changed and we have blindly allowed the balance to shift. Six years ago, the 6th Fleet had 40 ships on station in the Mediterranean; we still have 40. In 1965, the Russians had five ships there; today they have more than 40. Soviet influence extends as far west as Algeria where for more than a year, Soviet ships have been secretly calling at Mers El Kebir, which has, in effect, become a Soviet port.

The Russians have been wooing, formally and more importantly secretly, the government and the political leaders of Malta, hoping obviously to convert that island into a Russian base in the Western Mediterranean. As part of its quid pro quo for economic and military aid, the Russians got port concessions and service facilities for its Mediterranean fleet at Latakia and Tarsus in Syria, and at Alexandria and Port Said in Egypt. Its Arab client states are pleased; Russia is pleased. One tiny state is not; that tiny State is Israel, the friend of the West, which is further encircled.

The Russian influence in the Mediterranean is great and growing: this has enormous implications from our point of view, implications which we have not really begun to take the measure of.

The long-term Russian goal is to substitute its influence for that of the United States and the Western powers in the Middle East. And, they are well on the way to achieving that goal. While many Americans who should know better prattle about peace, an era of negotiation and a Lucarno-type treaty to eliminate all international problems with the stroke of a pen, the Soviets continue their build-up, their preparation for war.

We are told by some columnists almost daily that the cold war is over. The more radical chic is that the cold war never really existed, except in the minds of some trigger-happy American generals. I think those gentlemen would have a hard time convincing the Czechs, who saw their first feint steps toward freedom run over by Russian tanks, that this new breed of Kremlin leadership is "liberal." I imagine the Israelis must wonder about America's national sanity when they read of respected American leaders who are telling the people about "the peaceful intentions" of the Soviets. And, the captive peoples of Eastern Europe must be amazed to learn from Western sources how conciliatory, liberal and peace-loving their Russian masters have become: certainly they could never learn that from their own daily experiences.

And, the thousands of people who flee or try to flee every year from Communist oppression—all the way from Canton Province in China; to Jews trying to escape Russia; to Cuban fishing boats in Florida; to East Germans trying to go over, under, around the infamous Berlin Wall; to that unfortunate sailor in Martha's Vineyard last year—those unfortunate men and women give the lie to the whole preposterous notion that communism has become "liberal."

If communism is so incredibly liberal, why do Communists shoot people who want to go elsewhere? And, why are so many people willing to be shot at to get away?

Benjamin Franklin said in the 1750's:

The wolf sheds his coat once a year, but his disposition never.

Mr. SHRIVER. Mr. Speaker, I want to commend my distinguished colleagues for reserving this time to provide an opportunity to bring to the Nation's attention this vital matter of America's national defense posture.

We hear a great deal today about changing priorities. The Secretary of Defense earlier this year pointed out that the defense portion of the gross national product at 6.8 percent in the budget year is the lowest it has been since 1951 when it was 6.7 percent.

Our total expenditures for human resources this year, including health, education, and welfare and manpower programs, will be more than $83 billion, about $7 billion more than has been requested for national defense.

No one questions the need and the importance of expenditures for human resources. But are we keeping our guard up, so to speak, in this important matter of national defense?

The Appropriations Committee in reporting the defense appropriations bill last year pointed out that:

The Soviet Union continues to increase its inventory of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and sea-based submarine launched ballistic missiles. Soviet naval forces are being augmented steadily and modernized both in surface ships and in submarines . . . Competition with the Soviet Union is becoming keener every day and there is no room for American bungling in the field of defense.

The House Armed Services Committee has emphasized that at a time when defense expenditures are being reduced and the nuclear threat is being increased it is particularly important to assure that the weapons of our Armed Forces are the best that can be made available.

There is evidence that we have clearly fallen behind the Soviets in quantity of weapons. It is imperative that we improve the quality of our weapons.

At a time when we are winding down and phasing out American involvement in a most unpopular war, it is distressing to note what appears to be a deliberate effort to downgrade military service and our armed services.

Lt. Col. Donald B. Vought, a 17-year military veteran who holds two master's degrees and is an instructor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, writing in the August issue of the VFW magazine states:

American society today is virtually awash in a sea of change—in values, in technology and, it would seem, for the sake of change to avoid being accused of not changing.

Nowhere has the penchant for change seemed to be more dramatic than in the society's relations with its military.

The young man in service in 1960 was conceded generally to be performing an honorable duty he as a citizen owed his country. By 1970 he is frequently looked upon as an oddity, a "weirdo" or simple-minded while his professional commanders are vilified as being "Fascist Pigs."

We owe a great debt to the young men and women who today make up our American military forces throughout the world.

Congress must not remain silent in regard to our national defense posture; indeed we have a constitutional responsibility to make certain that America remains strong. The peace of the world rests upon our determination and our ability to resist aggression.

Mr. KING. Mr. Speaker, shortly after he came to office, President Nixon on April 10, 1969, spoke to the North Atlantic Council. He said:

I believe we must build an alliance strong enough to deter those who would threaten war; close enough to provide for continuous and far-reaching consultation; trusting enough to accept a diversity of views; realistic enough to deal with the world as it is; flexible enough to explore new channels of constructive cooperation.

Certainly, Mr. Speaker, those are lofty goals and noble sentiments. But somewhere along the line, the train seems to have strayed from the track; things have not been going well for NATO in the last few years.

My colleagues today have been concentrating their remarks on the growth in Russian military might—missiles, the new navy the Soviets built in the last decade, the Russian thrust into the Middle East, and the Mediterranean.

Certainly, those are topics we should pay more attention to, but, without detracting in any way from what my friends have said about hardware and military goals of the Soviet Union, I would point out that the Soviet Union has been recently engaged in a diplomatic offensive in Europe which we have either failed to admit, or if perceived, have chosen to ignore.

I think it is time for us to bite the bullet and talk about it. The Soviet goal, now and for the past 25 years, is and has been aimed at destroying America's presence and influence in Western Europe. Chancellor Brandt's policy of ostpolitik is a means, I suggest, which the Soviets are consciously employing to accomplish that end. Brandt is not responsible for ostpolitik—the Soviets are. I suggest also, and I know this is not a polite thing to say, that the Soviet-West German Treaty, signed by Brandt and Kosygin in Moscow on August 12, 1970, just about a year ago, is aimed at forcing West Germany out of NATO.

I suggest that the economic provisions of the treaty—the building of the Siberian pipeline and the sale of Siberian natural gas to West Germany—are of slender importance in the long haul. And, I think the Soviets are thinking in terms of the long haul. The abandonment of its "Eastern territories" by West Germany has litle lasting significance; it is at best a formal recognition of the realities of geography. The real meaning is more psychological than territorial; the wonder is that the West German Government sought it so eagerly. For, in the final analysis, the West Germans had nothing to gain by it and the Russians stood to lose nothing by it. One can also wonder at the reception of it by politicians in the West—an uncritical, almost childish reception.

If ever there was a period in international affairs when the United States required hardheaded, mature, and sober thinkers, it is now; and, this is precisely the time that the sophomoric thinkers are emerging from the State Department woodwork.

I think it is almost inevitable that, if this treaty is ever successfully submitted to the Bundestag for ratification, that the next Soviet ploy will be an offer of "preliminary talks" looking to the reunification of the two Germanys. The Government of West Germany—regardless of which party may be in power at that time—would have to accept such an offer. The offer, the bait, would of course, have several conditions attached: first and foremost would be the notion that reunification could not be discussed or accomplished while West Germany remained a member of NATO. Would West Germany abandon NATO for the sake of reunification and accept "Finlandization"—becoming a neutral, demilitarized state between East and West? Such a solution is unthinkable at this time, but times change.

And the Russians, give credit where it is due—the Russians adapt very well to changed conditions. Witness their policy in Western Europe—it began after the war with threats and intimidations. Those threats and the dangers we per-

ceived in Russian militarism gave birth to the NATO alliance and the mentality of collective defense. The Soviet theme has been basically one of harshness, intimidation and bullying since the war, interrupted by occasional sweet talk, as if for emphasis.

We are now in a full-fledged period of sweet talk, talk of detente and accommodation. It will be ironic, as well as disastrous, if the Russians accomplish by detente what their bullying and threats for 20 years could not. That is, the weakening of NATO to a point of ineffectiveness, and the removal of the American protective umbrella.

It seems to me, Mr. Speaker, that we owe it to ourselves and our allies to rethink and reexamine our NATO policy and to make the consultation and cooperation that President Nixon rightly called the hallmarks of the NATO union, flesh and blood realities and not abstractions to which lipservice is perfunctorily paid.

I wish to associate myself with the remarks of the other gentlemen speaking under this special order, and as I have in the past, would like to urge the Secretary of Defense and the other members of the Defense Department to bring home to the American people the dangers confronting us in the weakening of our defense posture at a time when the Soviets are rapidly increasing theirs. One of the gravest mistakes, in my opinion, that we are making is in discussing with the Soviets ABM's before ICBM's. In other words, in my opinion, we are putting the cart before the horse. We should be discussing offensive weapons rather than defensive weapons. Along these lines I would like to call to my colleagues attention, an interesting article written by Crosby Noyes for the Washington Star, and I would like to have the same be made a part of my remarks:

RUSSIA'S DRIVE FOR AGREEMENT ON ITS TERMS

(By Crosby S. Noyes)

With the reopening of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in Helsinki, it has become clear that the Russians are pressing for a quick decision on limiting defensive nuclear weapons—basically on their terms.

For many months now, the Soviet negotiators have been trying to separate the problem of antiballistic missiles (ABM) from the more complicated problem of limiting offensive nuclear weapons. It is beginning to appear that they may have succeeded.

The Americans have argued that the package of defensive and offensive weapons cannot be untied and that a limitation on nuclear defenses without a similar curb on the deployment of offensive weapons would be ineffective and dangerous.

Now it seems that the Russians have returned to Helsinki more determined than ever to separate the issues. An agreement on the ABMs, they are saying, can be reached relatively quickly and easily. The problem of offensive weapons, they say, is much more difficult.

There are some signs that the Nixon administration, in its anxiety to reach positive results in the SALT meetings, may go along with the Russian logic.

The Russians, of course, have a point. They are right in saying that limiting offensive weapons is more complicated than simply clamping a ceiling on the deployment of ABMs.

For one thing, there is no agreement on what "strategic weapons" are, since the Russians insist that any weapon which can reach the Soviet Union—including tactical aircraft stationed in Western Europe—should be classified as strategic. And apart from this, great differences in size between Russian and American warheads make it difficult to arrive at any common definition of equivalency between the two weapons systems.

So, say the Russians, let's forget about offensive weapons and concentrate on the ABMs. Their basic proposal is to limit ABM launchers to about 100 on each side, deployed in the vicinity of Moscow and Washington. The Russians already have set up sites for 64 launchers in the Moscow area and are working on additional ones.

In support of their proposition, the Soviet press has been quoting arguments of American experts who have opposed the development of an ABM system here, to the effect that the system is unreliable, very costly and would lead to an acceleration of the arms race. As Pravda put it:

"Action is met by counteraction. If one side strengthens its defense, then the other feverishly looks for new, more powerful means to pierce the defensive shield of the opponent. This process, if it is not stopped with the help of reasonable agreements on curbing the arms race, is endless."

Fair enough. The very obvious joker in this argument, however, is that the Russians already are feverishly expanding their arsenal of offensive nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union now has deployed close to 1,500 intercontinental ballistic missiles, as against 1,054 in the United States. These include nearly 300 of the giant SS–9 missiles which carry nuclear warheads 25 times as powerful as the largest American weapons. The American missile force has remained stable for several years. The Russian effort shows no sign of leveling off.

It is against this background that the Soviet offer at Helsinki must be judged. In effect, they are demanding that the United States stop the deployment of its Safeguard ABM system, which is designed to protect our Minuteman missile sites from a Soviet first-strike. Setting up 100 ABM launchers in the vicinity of Washington, as the Russians suggest we should do, would do nothing whatever to protect our second-strike capability.

The agreement that the Russians propose would leave their own missile defenses, deployed to protect major population centers, entirely intact. It would permit them to continue building their offensive capability to the point where they could destroy all of our land-based missiles in an opening nuclear attack.

The United States cannot accept such a deal in the vague hope that the Russians thereafter will go on and agree to limit their deployment of offensive weapons. For the Russian game-plan is ominously discernible. And this is one game that is played for keeps.

Mr. PIRNIE. Mr. Speaker, it would be difficult to overemphasize the importance of having adequate military forces—both conventional and strategic—to support our diplomatic efforts abroad.

To appreciate the importance of adequate military forces, one need only contemplate the impact of existing Soviet forces upon a contemporary version of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. In 1962, when the Soviet Union precipitated the major United States-Soviet political confrontation of the 1960's, the Soviet Union had less than 200 intercontinental ballistic missiles. Arrayed against these forces, the President of the United States had available a force of over 2,000 medium and heavy bombers capable of hitting nearly all Soviet targets. Further, the President had at his disposal about 200 ICBM's and medium-range ballistic missiles stationed abroad, as well as several nuclear-powered submarines capable of launching nuclear warheads against Soviet targets.

In the now famous "eyeball-to-eyeball" confrontation, the Soviet Union was forced to back down and remove its intermediate-range ballistic missiles from Cuba. It is inconceivable that the Soviet leadership—men who reached political maturity as the faithful servants of Stalin—would have backed down in the absence of this existing capability to use force.

In 1971, nearly 10 years after the Cuban missile crisis, the President of the United States faces a like threatening set of circumstances. The United States now possesses a force of land-based ICBM's of about 1,054, a submarine-launched ballistic missile force of about 656 missiles on 41 submarines, and about 450 B–52 bombers. Arrayed against the U.S. arsenal is a Soviet land-based ICBM force of over 1,500 missiles—about 20 submarines capable of launching 16 ballistic missiles each, 200 bombers, an operational ABM system, and 12,000 antiaircraft missiles. According to Gen. Bruce Holloway, the head of the U.S. Strategic Air Command, and Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., head of Defense Research and Engineering in the Department of Defense, the Soviet Union could convert some of the antiaircraft missiles to an ABM system without our knowledge.

It becomes less and less certain that the President of the United States—any President—will be able to sustain its position in a confrontation with a major power in a conflict over our vital national interests anywhere in the world. In short, it might become our turn to back down in the next crisis.

We should recognize that we will pay, and pay dearly in a political crisis with the Soviet Union or other powers if the will of the President cannot be effectively substantiated by an adequate military force. The Congress cannot afford any longer to ignore the ominous growth of Soviet strategic forces and its probable effect upon our diplomacy—we must arm adequately without delay. Our peace and the peace of the world is at stake. The power to prevent war is as important or more important than the power to win one.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. Mr. Speaker, one of the tragic consequences of our prolonged involvement in the war in Vietnam has been our neglect and failure to pay attention to our duties and responsibilities around the world. Whatever views we have on the Vietnam war, however we may differ on the conduct of that tragic war, however we may assess the causes that led us there; of the blunders we committed once we got there, I think that all the Members will agree that our preoccupation, during the last 6 years, with that tiny corner of the world has diverted our attention from other strategic and legitimate concerns.

While we have been bogged down in a land war in Asia—in exactly the sort of

war that General MacArthur counseled us to avoid 20 years ago—while we have concentrated our efforts and spilled our blood and our treasure in Vietnam, our enemies have been extremely busy. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the last 6 years have been profitably spent.

During that time, the Soviets have developed, almost from scratch, a very strong challenge to our Navy. It is no accident, I think, that the Soviet shipbuilding program began in earnest shortly after Khrushchev's fall from power in 1964. That is, of course, the same period in which our participation in the Vietnam war became significant. As many of us are aware, Jane's Fighting Ships, in its new edition, calls the Soviet navy a "supernavy of a superpower." We had to take the *New Jersey*, a pre-World War II battleship, out of mothballs to shell North Vietnamese coastal towns. While we were doing that, the Soviets were building missile frigates by the score and nuclear submarines by the dozen.

In 1965, the Soviets had five ships on station in the Mediterranean; today they have 50 there.

We have tragically neglected our responsibilities in Latin America. We have watched Cuba continue to export her revolution; in Guatemala, in Uruguay, in Brazil, in Argentina, in Peru, and in Bolivia, our diplomats and the representatives of other friendly states have been subjected to a reign of terror financed and directed by Cuban-style revolutionaries. The Alliance for Progress, which was launched with such high hopes and such lofty rhetoric in the early 1960's, has proved to be—let us be candid—a dismal failure.

While we were involved in Vietnam, the Russians were on the move in the Middle East, wooing the Arab countries. The campaign has been enormously successful. The Arabs look to Russia for leadership, for weapons, and "advisers." The Soviet-Arab relationship is becoming one of "master-servant." The hardware that the Arabs lost in the disastrous 6-day war with Israel has been replaced, and then some. Israel's aerial supremacy has been blunted by the introduction of Soviet ground-to-air missiles in Egypt.

I agree with President Nixon's assessment that, potentially at least, the Middle East is a more dangerous situation to the peace of the world than even Vietnam, involving as it does the confrontation and possible showdown between the nuclear superpowers.

Similarly, the Soviets have been on the move, diplomatically at least, in Europe. Our response to the Soviet diplomatic offensive has been, in my judgment, inadequate and ineffective. In the face of this offensive, we have allowed the NATO alliance to fall into disrepair. Some wag recently called NATO the "sleepwalker of Europe."

Soviet saber rattling and the threat of Soviet aggression in Europe caused the Western allies to form NATO in 1949. Continuing Soviet threats kept it alive and vigorous through the 1960's. It is ironic that Soviet sweettalk and talk of detente is on the road to accomplishing what Soviet threats and blackmail failed to accomplish: the destruction of NATO.

Mr. Speaker, at the risk of being labeled a "cold warrior" I will say that my conviction is that Soviet world goals have not changed in the past 25 years. The Soviet goal in Europe is to dominate Europe. To accomplish this, the Soviets know that American presence must be removed and American influence must be denied. That, I suggest, is why the Russians are wooing Chancellor Brandt and that is why the Russians are so receptive to Brandt's "ostpolitik." I think I can understand why the Russians would behave in this fashion; it is in their interest to do so. What I cannot understand is why the State Department views "ostpolitik" as such a desirable thing from our point of view.

If Soviet goals have remained constant, their tactics certainly have changed to accommodate changing circumstances. In my judgment, we are not responding adequately to these new Soviet initiatives, probes and pressures. I am thankful that American participation in the Vietnam war is ending. Perhaps it is not ending fast enough, for some, but it is ending.

My hope is that as we pull out, we will turn more attention to the American problems in other critical areas of the world, problems which we have too long neglected, neglected to our detriment.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Speaker, it is time to acknowledge the fact that for a quarter-century, since the beginning of the cold war at the end of World War II, our Republic's Defense Establishment has been unwittingly, but nonetheless effectively, sabotaged and crippled by a near autonomous, poorly regulated and almost unknown combine that is practically an extra branch of the Federal Government.

I refer directly and specifically to the so-called think tanks across the United States that have engaged in contract research work on many aspects of our national defense. Let me make it perfectly clear at the outset that I have no quarrel with, and I do not include in my remarks today, those institutions, or parts of institutions, that deal with the cold, hard scientific precision needed to research and plan weapons systems. There are very important areas of defense research where the best scientific minds in the country have been utilized, and should continue to be utilized. But there is a wide and unbridgeable gap between the physicist, the chemist or the engineer wrestling with the problems of ICBM construction, fueling and guidance, and the behavioral scientist attempting to resolve the vagaries of human nature into graphs, charts, and equations. The first must and do predicate their work upon immutable and proven laws of the physical world. The second deal to a great degree in mindless moon-spinning and theorizing; they do not, like the physical scientist, adopt conditions to facts. Instead, they seek to twist facts to fit conditions, and to merge with their own preconceptions of what should be, instead of the all-important factor of what is.

There is a sharp distinction between development and production and emplacement of strategic and tactical weapons, and the methods and manners in which they will be used. The research and development for the former has been highly productive; no one can fault it. I believe that on balance, we have as basically as good a Defense Establishment as any other nation, and far better than most. But the edges of superiority, so carefully whetted and honed, have been dulled by group-think methods which have rendered this superiority next to useless.

Let me give an example of what I mean. War may not be the world's oldest profession, but I am certain it is the most written about. The card files in the Library of Congress under that heading are probably one of the most extensive for any topic in that institution's records. Yet, we seem to have the idea that more study, and throwing good money after bad, will "prove" something, possibly turn up a hither-to-ignored theorem or proposition or formula, that will succeed in putting this most difficult, complex and subjective of all things onto paper in simple truths of eternal verity.

Earlier this year the National Science Foundation awarded $149,000 to a team of researchers at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor for a further 4-year study on a project called "Correlates of War." Little publicity has been given to this. The one most detailed account I have seen in the press—New York Times, May 6, 1971—tells me nothing that I would not expect any competent Ph. D. in history to know by second nature, and, indeed, something probably well-known by many college sophomores or well-read amateur military historians.

For instance—and these are some of the results of 7 years work to date—this team came to the conclusion that there has been war in all but 24 of the 150 years studied since 1816; 144 nations spent 4,500 "nation months"—1 month in combat by one nation—in combat; there were 29 million battle deaths, not counting civilians. There were 6.2 wars for each decade. Most wars begin in spring or autumn, generally April or October. Europe has been most war prone.

One would think that these statistical bases, drawn from data going back 150 years, would be of questionable value in the nuclear age. This point has been raised by some social scientists. Also, I must add, other social scientists say that war is too complex by far to even attempt to reduce its causes to equations. Here I would strongly agree.

The mentalities that find this occupation useful to the national defense of the American Republic are costing us more than money. They are costing us time, and they are getting our sights completely out of line.

Somewhere along the way we have totally lost our perspective. We have poured out millions to structurally unemployed academicians to theorize, conjecture, philosophize about war and how we should wage it—and walk out the door with classified material if things do not suit them; more about that later—all the while our adversaries have carefully,

coldly, and profitably studied and shaped their tactics by the works of just two men: the Chinese Sun Tzu, who wrote his classic: "The Art of War" in the fifth century, B.C., and a Prussian major general who died in 1831, Karl Maria von Clausewitz.

Clausewitz in particular has a few sentences which apply to my remarks today; they come from volume III, page 126, of "On War":

In one word, the Art of War in its highest point of view is policy, but, no doubt, a policy which fights battles instead of writing notes.

According to this view, to leave a great military enterprise . . . to *a purely military judgment and decision* is a distinction which cannot be allowed, and is even prejudicial; indeed, it is an irrational proceeding to consult professional soldiers on the plan of a War, that they may give a *purely military opinion* upon what the Cabinet ought to do; but still more absurd is the demand of Theorists that a statement of the available means of War should be laid before the General, that he may draw out a purely military plan for the War. (Italics in original)

"Defense intellectuals" is a common name for these people; one writer has called them "Pentagon Irregulars". Names aside, I would say that by and large they have been educated far beyond their capacity to absorb. They were allowed to become a more or less secret source of power, which has been wielded carelessly with poor service to the American Republic. If there are any doubts, the near-disaster of Vietnam should dispel them. If this is to be the product of 25 years of spin-the-bottle group thought, then I maintain the whole concept of much of this contract research is open to very grave doubt and question.

The recent notorious episode of the Pentagon papers must have mention. It was not enough that these were seized upon by the gullible as being the last and final word on our involvement in Vietnam, in spite of the fact that there were no State Department or White House records contained in them. The very circumstances surrounding their theft and publication indicate existence of a sievelike network of security leaks in these think tanks that is nothing less than intolerable.

Rand Corp., one of the oldest and largest think tanks, was warned 2 years ago that Dr. Daniel Ellsberg was a security risk. At that time, while he was still with Rand and on their payroll, he was making public speeches against the Vietnam war. Rand, obviously, took no heed of these warnings.

It is gratifying to note that Defense Secretary Laird has moved quickly to prevent such incidents in the future. Early in July Defense ordered a tough crackdown on all think tanks that had classified documents; Rand had its documents withdrawn from its custody and placed directly under control of the Air Force. "Special access" data—higher than top secret yet, and dealing with such matters as strategic war plans, codes, and nuclear weapon designs—have been totally removed and Rand's need to have these is being "redetermined."

Security procedures in think tanks have long been sources of concern to the military. Academic freedom on the campus is one thing; this ceases the instant an academician undertakes secret work for his Government, which gives him access to secret material. He is no longer his own man; that is harsh, and it may be regrettable, but that is the way it is and that is the way it must be. If he does not like it then he is free to look for employment elsewhere. He is no more free to do what he likes with this data than is a Member of Congress free to disclose secret testimony given him in a closed committee hearing. The rules apply equally to all.

I must say that Defense has not been entirely blameless in this matter. For instance, Defense could not tell the exact number of classified documents held by Rand. This in itself is inexcusable; surely somewhere in that mammoth complex there is room for some highly qualified persons to keep a close, constant, and accurate record of who has what, and how long they have had it, and who has access to it. This would require a lot of work; very well, but it must be done nonetheless. The Ellsberg incident will I am sure eliminate these shortcomings but they should not have appeared in the first place.

Subscribing to this footnote mentality has proven to be a dangerous luxury, and an expensive one as well. In 1969, there were contracts worth over $300 million held by 16 companies. How much has been spent over the last 25 years probably never can be accurately tabulated.

A great deal has been said lately about the right of Congress to be kept informed. Here is one instance where this should certainly apply, and to date it has been neglected. It can be neglected no longer.

I am recommending serious consideration be given to creating a joint House-Senate committee, composed of the chairmen and three ranking members of each party of the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services. This committee would periodically, on a schedule to be determined in consultation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, meet and receive and review, from the Department of Defense, full details on all Defense-sponsored research contracts.

Full justification for each contract, those granted and those planned, would be presented to the committee. In addition, the committee would be advised of the disposition of studies completed—what their nature was, to what use they had been put, and their effect on our national defense posture. Both military and civilian officials would appear as witnesses. The Armed Services Committees, when they act on military authorization requests, should have more knowledge of this facet of our defense planning than we have had in the past.

It is probably impossible to determine to what extent think tanks have influenced—and possibly corrupted—our defense policy to the point we have reached today. But it is not too late to try and learn—now. It may be too late—later.

Mr. PELLY. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate very much the opportunity to participate in this session and, along with some of my esteemed colleagues, raise certain questions about our military position in the world today and also about our attitudes in the SALT talks now being conducted in Vienna and Helsinki. These are very serious questions, and need to be given the most serious attention, but in recent years that is just the sort of attention which has not been given them. The first duty of a government, after all, is to provide for the security of its citizens. When it ceases to do that, it ceases to function as a real government: it will be subjected to anarchy within and intimidation from without, intimidation against which it can do nothing. It is vital to see to it that the SALT talks do not take us a giant step further down the road to unilateral disarmament.

Some people may wonder about my referring to unilateral disarmament, Mr. Speaker, but when we look at the trends in defense spending in the United States and the Soviet Union over the last decade we can see something which looks very much like unilateral disarmament. We can look at the relative strengths of the military forces of the Soviet Union and our country at any particular time and not be excessively alarmed. But the important thing to watch is the trend over time. And when we look at that trend, we discover we have everything to be alarmed about. In the course of a decade we have gone from superiority to parity to sufficiency, and now very soon, if the trend is not reversed, we shall end up at inferiority. McNamara and his experts assured us that the Soviet Union only wanted not to be inferior to us, that once they had acquired parity, the arms race would level off. In this, as in so many other things, history has proved them completely wrong, for the Soviet Union has kept right on driving for complete superiority in armaments. It has made no secret of this intention, and its actions demonstrate that its words are not empty ones. The McNamara reading of Soviet intentions was a very comforting one, but this world is not always a comforting one, and we have to deal often with very hard facts which we often wish were not facts. At present we are faced with just such a fact: the fact not only of Soviet military superiority, but also their intention to utilize that superiority very skillfully for their own ends in a way we never did when we possessed superiority.

Mr. Speaker, the Soviet Union realizes very clearly that control of the oceans gives the nation which exercises that control great advantages in world diplomacy. The Soviet fleet, modern and well designed, is gradually challenging our control over the seas in the entire world, especially in the Mediterranean where the military situation is now least stable, but also along our Atlantic and Caribbean shores. The Soviet Union, from all we know, is going right ahead with its plans for establishing naval bases in Cuba, which will give it the increased ability to harass our Atlantic coasts and our large population centers located along that coast. The Soviets even now are making probes to see how much they can get away with. They have damaged the equipment of our lobster fishermen

off the New England coast, deliberately, so far as we can tell, and it seems that our only reaction to this provocation is to be bland and conciliatory.

The entire Nation felt a sense of shame when the Coast Guard allowed a Soviet citizen who wished to defect on the seas to be brutally beaten on board an American vessel and then returned to his ship. Now it seems that he is paying a heavy price in a prison camp for being so foolish as to think that the United States would defend the interests of freedom within even a few miles of its own shores. The entire Cuban situation is another sad example of our lack of resolve. President Kennedy was able to win at least a partial victory in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis because we had unchallenged domination of the seas near our shores at that time. We can imagine the difficulties of instituting a similar blockade of Cuba in 1971, when we seem unable even to protect our commercial fishermen pursuing their legitimate business.

The Soviets would undoubtedly at least threaten to break any such blockade with military vessels, and the chances of a confrontation would be so great that one wonders whether we would ever risk it. But if we are unable or unwilling to stand up for our own interests when they are attacked virtually on our own territory, what will we do on the seas further away? And what will we do when a few more years have passed and our Navy is even more inferior to the Soviet fleet? Can we hope to conduct diplomacy then that will be anything other than continuous humiliation and defeat for the free world? With the best intentions in the world, we will find ourselves powerless then to accomplish our aims, to protect our allies or even ourselves, it seems. And then we shall no longer be a sovereign Nation.

Such, Mr. Speaker, is the grim prospect with which we are faced at the present moment if we do not take action now. The hour is late. Let us not repeat the mistakes which have gotten us into other wars. Let us learn something from history this time.

Mr. HARSHA. Mr. Speaker, for over a decade, a key element of America's deterrent power has been her arsenal of 41 nuclear powered submarines carrying ballistic missiles capable of underwater launch. These forces remain perhaps the most invulnerable portion of our deterrent since they can remain under water on station for days on end ready for instant retaliation, should such a fateful order have to be given.

There is growing evidence, however, that we cannot count upon our existing Polaris-class nuclear submarines remaining invulnerable under all circumstances during the 1970's. The Soviet Union now possesses a large surface fleet whose size now exceeds that of the United States in the aggregate. The Soviet surface fleet has grown so large that the authoritative British survey of naval power, Jane's Fighting Ships has concluded that the Soviets now possess a "super navy" comparable to, or more impressive than our own. This large surface fleet presents the U.S. Polaris submarine fleet with a formidable foe—a foe which could endanger its continued survival through the 1970s. Advances in antisubmarine warfare—a certainty since the Soviets are spending $3 billion more in defense research and development than the United States—coupled with a large surface fleet to conduct a search for American submarines could weaken our deterrent to a point where it might be impossible for a U.S. President to emerge from a 1975 version of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis with U.S. foreign policy objectives in tact. What is required in a nuclear powered submarine whose characteristics would substantially reduce the advantage the Soviets are building up through their investment in antisubmarine warfare and their large surface fleet.

This can be done by providing the U.S. Navy with a submarine with ballistic missiles with a range sufficiently long as to permit extended cruising far from Soviet territory. Such a vessel could complicate the submarine tracking task of the Soviet Union for many years to come, while providing the President of the United States with an appropriate element of military strength which could enhance his bargining power in a political crisis with the Soviet Union.

The basic characteristics of such a submarine, known as the undersea long range missile system or ULMS was presented to the Department of Defense as early as 1966. Congressional hostility toward improving our defense posture in recent years has prevented us from moving forward with this important effort. With the Soviet strategic nuclear force so large, that they possess a potential 8-to-1 advantage in the number of individual warheads if they apply the technology to warhead design that we already have on a production line basis, that we can delay no longer with ULMS.

For several years, the ULMS program has been carried along at a very low research and development priority. The Congress must act swiftly to accelerate the research and development work on ULMS so that an appropriate system can be available to our forces at the earliest possible date. We can no longer tolerate a situation where the Soviet Union is able to use the occasion of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks as a vehicle to slow down legitimate programs to insure our own security while the Soviet Union continues to build nuclear powered submarines at a rate of between nine and 12 per year.

The time has come to assign ULMS, and other important research programs designed to improve the ability of the President to protect America's security, a high priority without delay.

Mr. SHOUP. Mr. Speaker, I should like to contribute a few thoughts to the discussion being pursued on the floor of the House of Representatives today. These comments will be confined to the very idea of negotiation and bargaining, something at which Americans have historically not been very skillful. The results of our most recent bargaining sessions with the Communist world, especially those which are dragging out their weary existence in Paris at the moment, do not encourage anyone to believe that our grasp of the essence of bargaining has improved much of late.

It seems to me, Mr. Speaker, that one of the chief reasons why we do so badly in negotiations with the Communist world is that we enter them with the firm conviction that something must come out of them. I believe that if we were really to pause and consider the psychology of bargaining, we might come to realize that we are likely to get better results if we enter negotiations from the beginning with the thought that we do not necessarily have to emerge with an agreement at all, that no treaty may be preferable to one which is badly done from our point of view. This may seem like a paradox, but the world is full of paradoxes, and we should not reject them out of hand.

Americans are not temperamentally accustomed to bargaining. If we see something in the store we might want, we generally either pay the price on the tag or decline to buy at all. Most Americans do not haggle over the price in the attempt to beat the seller down to an acceptable level. Somehow this sort of competition does not suit us. But let us imagine a situation in which we do begin to bargain over the price. If the seller knows that we absolutely will not leave his shop without the item, although of course we would prefer to pay less rather than more and may even bluff a bit to make the seller think we just might, after all, walk out of his store—if the seller is almost certain that this is a bluff, he will have every reason to reduce his price not at all, or very little, since he is sure he will get what he asks for in the long run. If the buyer is in fact prepared to walk right out of the store and do without the item in question, though, the chances are much better that he can strike a truly advantageous bargain, can bring the price down to a level where the item he wants is really worth it. So the paradoxical fact is that the buyer can truly get something for a reasonable sum if he is truly ready to do without it. This is a fundamental axiom of bargaining which I am afraid our diplomatic negotiators do not comprehend.

Let us take another example of bargaining and negotiation at a higher level. We have a system of exchanges with the Soviet Union which have been in existence now for nearly 15 years. Many of them do not work very well from our point of view: our scholars are often denied access to materials they need, they are hampered in their travel, people who want to investigate the wrong sorts of subjects from the Soviet point of view are not allowed to participate, and so forth. We on our side make only feeble attempts to have these inequities corrected, and the reason is that we are convinced that the exchanges in and of themselves are so terribly important that it is unthinkable to interrupt, curtail or stop them. But in fact, if we want them to work to our advantage at all, we will have to be prepared to give them up. Only if we are ready to do without them will we derive much advantage from them.

The same sort of thing can be said about our treaty negotiations and peace

negotiations. I dare say the Paris peace talks would be much more productive if we were not eternally protesting about how eager we are to reach a negotiated settlement, and if we were genuinely prepared to recess or cancel them when they are not productive. And the same situation obtains with the SALT negotiations. It is very easy to imagine circumstances in which no strategic arm limitation agreement would be preferable, from our point of view, to the wrong sort of pact. If we conduct the negotiations on the basic premise that we do not necessarily have to come out with an agreement, then the chances are much improved that we will obtain a suitable treaty. But if we are totally convinced that we absolutely must conclude a pact, and even tell the other side this all the time, then there will be no reason at all for them to make any concessions: if they wait long enough, we will accept their terms almost intact. So this is the warning note I would like to sound today. If all the "breakthroughs" in the SALT negotiations turn out to be unilateral concessions on our part, then when any treaty is presented for ratification, we will probably be well advised to reject it and do without any agreement at all. The wrong sort of agreement can do much greater damage to our defenses and our national security than going on in the way we are now. In order to be successful at bargaining, we must grasp the basic principles of negotiating.

Mr. KYL. Mr. Speaker, the SALT or strategic arms limitation talks have now been going on for close to 2 years, and we are in the middle of the fifth series. So far, even the most sanguinely optimistic observer could hardly qualify them as successful insofar as bilateral strategic arms limitation are concerned.

For those who still believe that it is better to talk than to fight, the SALT talks offer clear evidence that talking does not preclude military buildup, at least not as the Soviet Union is concerned.

But talks go on in the hope of achieving some result favorable to world peace. We are ready to go to any lengths to prove our good faith. We have already gone so far as to deliberately slow down if not completely stop in some instances, our military construction program.

The divergence of our attitude from that of the Soviet Union is clearly illustrated by the statement on June 1, 1971, in Krasnaya Zvezda, the Soviet Defense Ministry daily:

> The desire for peace of the Socialist countries does not free their peoples from the necessary development of military weapons and of strengthening their defense.
>
> Our readiness to support practical steps towards disarmament must coincide and do coincide with our preparedness for any turn in the development of events.

The SALT talks should have begun already in 1968, but they were postponed owing to the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia.

The five series of SALT talks held to date have taken place alternatively in Helsinki, Finland and in Vienna, Austria, starting on November 17, 1969. The delegations have remained largely unchanged all through the series, and consist of five major delegates and close to 30 experts on both sides.

SALT–I—The first preliminary series of SALT talks took place in Helsinki from November 17 to December 22, 1969.

It was decided to have no daily press briefings but only brief communiques issued from time to time. A December 22 joint brief communique called the 5 weeks of "preliminary" talks "useful" to both sides.

Shortly before the SALT talks opened, the Institute for Strategic Studies in London published its annual report, the Military Balance for 1969–70, which stated that at that time the U.S.S.R. had reached parity with the United States in the number of land-based ballistic missiles—1,050 versus 1,054—and that the Soviet Union was expected to increase its ICBM strength to 1,150 by the end of 1969. The United States had still retained its superiority in SLBM's—656 to 160—but the U.S.S.R. was building ballistic missile submarines similar to the U.S. Polaris at a rate of at least four a year.

The above estimates were later proven to have been extremely conservative.

SALT–II—The second series of SALT talks was held in Vienna, Austria, from April 16, 1970 to August 14, 1970, and comprised some 32 meetings.

On June 25, Secretary of State Rogers told a Washington press conference that the SALT talks "have progressed very well" and that "there is reason to hope that we can reach an agreement," but a rather limited than a comprehensive agreement.

Meanwhile, the Department of Defense was receiving news of military buildup by the Soviets. On July 9, 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird told a Pentagon news conference that the Soviet Union had "gone forward with new starts" in deployment of ICBMs. "They have developed more SS–9 missile sites as well as SS–13 and SS–11s. They have proceeded with this program since the strategic arms limitation talks started in Helsinki," and "have gone forward with new starts since the talks opened in Vienna."

He said these new starts included SS–9s and were in addition to the 60 sites reported under construction earlier in 1970.

A few weeks later, on August 21, 1970, the U.S.S.R. conducted its first two tests of the MRV's on its SS–11.

SALT–III—The third series of SALT talks were held in Helsinki from November 2, 1970 until December 18. The U.S. side seems to feel that the talks had not progressed as much as had been hoped, and the Soviet said that they found the talks "useful."

Meanwhile, an annual report by the Institute of Strategic Studies in London revealed that as a result of a rapid increase in the past year, the Soviet Union now had 1,300 land-based ICBM's compared with a constant of 1,054 for the United States. The United States led in the number of SLBM's with 656—unchanged—but the Soviet Union although still lagging behind, now had 205 SLBM's—as compared to 160 in the fall of 1969.

On the naval side, the 1970–71 edition of Jane's Fighting Ships noted on August 27 that the Soviet naval strength was rising to "a flood tide in the 1970's."

On November 2, 1970, the day of opening the third series of SALT talks, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird was reported to have told a meeting of NATO defense ministers in Ottawa, that the Soviet Union now had 1,400 land-based ICBM's and 30 missile launching nuclear submarines of the Polaris type either operational or under construction.

SALT–IV—The fourth series of SALT talks opened on March 15, 1971 in Vienna and lasted until May 28.

It was reported that the delegates were working on the details of an ABM agreement, although the United States had officially expressed a preference for a more comprehensive agreement.

And then on May 20, President Nixon announced that:

> We have agreed to discuss an agreement on defensive nuclear weapons alone, with only "certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons," to be discussed simultaneously.

The next day, May 21, addressing a conference at the State Department, the President said that:

> He expected that an agreement on limitation of defensive strategic weapons (ABMs) could be implemented "some time this year."

The same day, however, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird remarked that "we should not anticipate any sudden successes."

The talks adjourned on May 28, the U.S. negotiating team voiding its opinion that they had ended "on a positive note" and that the United States was "quite satisfied with the developments at this session, particularly after the May 20 agreement was reached."

Meanwhile a comparative listing of U.S. and Soviet nuclear strength presented by the New York Times on May 20, 1971, showed that the figures for land-based ICBM's for the United States were still unchanged—1,954, while those for the U.S.S.R. had climbed to 1,500. The figures for U.S. SLBM's were likewise unchanged—656, while those for the U.S.S.R. had risen to 400.

The above report said the Soviet SS–9 ICBM's could be equipped to carry an estimated three warheads of 5 megatons each or six warheads of 2 megatons each, while the U.S. Minuteman-3 ICBM were said to be able to carry two or three warheads of 160 kilotons each only, and the Poseidon missile was said to carry 14 warheads of 40 kilotons each.

SALT–V—The fifth series of SALT talks opened in Helsinki on July 8, 1971. Its basic mission seems to be the working out of the agreement reached on May 20 of this year, on the limitation of ABM's and also the eventual freeze on construction of new land-based ICBM's and SLBM's.

It should be remembered that the U.S. ABM system is oriented exclusively to protect our second strike retaliatory power in the event of enemy attack and that the Soviet Union's ABM's are de-

signed also to protect the hinterland of the Soviet Union against a possible second strike.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union is feverishly building up its land-based ICBM strength while our own is still largely where it was several years ago.

The 1971–72 edition of Janes Fighting Ships just published in London said that by the mid-1970's, Russia will have enough nuclear muscle to knock out practically all U.S. land-based missiles and bombers, unless the United States will take fast, elaborate, and clostly measures to prevent it.

It is with such sobering considerations in mind that we should participate in the SALT talks now underway.

Mr. LUJAN. Mr. Speaker, I wish to associate with my fellow colleagues here today who are once again at this important time in history calling attention to the need of maintaining a strong national defense posture in order to adequately protect the citizens of our free society here in America. I would like to point out that one of the main reasons that the Original Thirteen Colonies banded together to form a constitution and establish a new concept of government was to provide for the common defense of its people. George Washington advised that:

> There is nothing so likely to produce peace as to be well prepared to meet an enemy . . . we must always keep ourselves in a respectable defensive posture . . . if we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it, if we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war . . . to be prepared for war is one of the most effective means of preserving peace.

That important tradition of a strong defense which was woven into our society at this early time cannot be neglected at this important moment in our history because once again we are potentially threatened.

Our Founding Fathers stated over again in the federalist papers, at the constitutional convention, in their many deliberations as they struggled to form a union, the absolute necessity and responsibility of the Federal Government maintaining an adequate and continuing strong defense.

Alexander Hamilton knew that "A Constitution of the kind proposed by the convention cannot operate without the aid of a military force." And Congress is clearly charged to "provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States—to raise and support armies—to provide and maintain a navy—to make rules for the Government and regulation of the land and naval forces."—Article I, section 8.

John Adams knew that "the jaws of power are always open to devour, and her arm is always stretched out, if possible, to destroy the freedom of thinking, speaking, and writing," the principles of a strong national defense that so adequately applied to the original colonies apply even more to our Nation today.

Thomas Jefferson told us that "the good sense of the people will always be found to be the best army." My colleagues, the American people have placed their trust in this great body to preserve the liberty and happiness of the country and I say this cannot be done unless the Congress exercises the good sense to undertake its obligation to secure this Nation with a power superior to those who would threaten our right to freedom.

Mr. WHALLEY. Mr. Speaker, on July 28, 1971, in a UPI dispatch datelined "London," it was reported that "The Soviet Union will have the nuclear punch by the mid-1970's to destroy virtually all American land-based missiles and bombers in one surprise attack." This is the opinion of the authoritative publication, Jane's Fighting Ships.

Jane's is not alone in its assessments of the vulnerability of the American deterrent force. Recent studies, from many sources, tend to confirm that the American strategic position is deteriorating to the point that the President's "Blue Ribbon Defense Panel" concluded that the United States faces an immediate future where it might not be able to maintain the Nation's independence and security.

It is now almost common knowledge that the Soviets have made fantastic strides in development of their nuclear and missile capabilities. What is less well known is the priority given to and the successes achieved in building the Soviet Navy into the world's most formidable nautical force. The Soviet Union already leads the United States in active surface ship and submarine numbers. Jane's reported that the only category of warships in which the United States maintains numerical superiority is aircraft carriers.

In the face of formidable advances by the Soviet Navy the United States has been carrying forward the systematic reduction of its nautical capabilities. We have reduced the number of aircraft carrier wings from 24 to 15; overall, our active ship numbers have gone from 932 to 658. While the Soviet Union is proceeding with a vigorous program of building Polaris-type subs, we have frozen our force at 41. Since the mid-sixties, no new nuclear subs have been authorized. By 1974–75, it can be expected that the Soviet Union will have at least four attack subs for every one the United States has operational.

Recent reports indicated the naval strength that the Soviets are adding to the Mediterranean Basin. Once a sea secured by the free world and the U.S. 6th Fleet, the Mediterranean is rapidly becoming a Soviet lake. The political implications for southern European, African, and Middle East nations will become increasingly clear as Soviet power makes its presence felt. Presently, the Soviet Union has twice as many subs as the United States patrolling that historical sea and a 25 percent larger surface force. These figures do not take into account the Soviets' Black Sea fleet, which is by itself larger than either of the Mediterranean fleets. Taken together, the Soviets outnumber American subs 6-to-1 and surface vessels 3-to-1 in the Mediterranean Basub.

With few exceptions the accounts are the same. In a recent report compiled by CBS, based on the NATO report, it was contended that the Soviet Union now presents a major threat to control of the vital North Atlantic shipping lanes.

Mr. Speaker, for almost two centuries American Naval Forces have patrolled the waters of the world to secure them for peaceful purposes. We are now coming face to face with the realization that within a relatively short period of time the United States will no longer be the superior naval power. At that time we will be faced with the situation that international waters will become an extension of the political expansionism of the Soviet Union.

The United States cannot afford to allow itself to continue to slip toward the status of a second-rate power. Our freedom, our security, our future depend upon the leadership of the United States' facing the facts and coming to the realization that the Soviet Union is seeking world military superiority. Editorial writers can debate the reasons why the Soviet Union is aiming at harnessing this quantity of military power; it is the responsibility of American military planners to meet this threat. In a world of aggressive powers leading revolution and seeking dominion, the United States must be prepared. To insure our continuation as a nation we must have a superior position in all fields of military preparedness. We must rereorder our priorities if there is to be an independent United States.

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, soon after his inauguration, President Nixon appointed a "Blue Ribbon Defense Panel" to study the workings of the Defense Department and recommend how to make it more efficient. In the course of their investigation, seven members of that blue ribbon panel became so alarmed about the inability of the United States to defend itself against the growing Soviet nuclear threat that they wrote a "Supplemental Statement" and submitted it to President Nixon on September 30, 1970.

That statement declared that the United States, as a "second rate" power will be "subordinate to manifest Soviet military superiority. The world order of the future will bear a Soviet trademark, with all peoples upon whom it is imprinted suffering Communist repressions." If our current defense policies continue, the panel reported:

> In the '70s neither the vital interests of the U.S. nor the lives and freedom of its citizens will be secure.

The blue ribbon statement warns in the strongest language against "the danger of fatal concessions or even of a deliberate trap" at the SALT talks now going on between the United States and the U.S.S.R. in Helsinki. The statement says that it would be "egregious folly" for the United States to agree to freeze strategic capabilities "at some level of specified parity" because this would actually enable the Soviet Union to "strengthen its overall military and political position."

Mrs. Phyllis Schlafly has devoted her newsletter for July 1971 to a discussion of this important question. She writes that:

> Americans are justly proud of having a system of government that guarantees more freedom than any nation in the world ever

enjoyed. Let us always remember that our American freedom includes the freedom to commit suicide. In the opinion of our best informed citizens, this is exactly what we are doing.

Mrs. Schlafly concludes by asking her readers:

Are you, my friends, doing the very best you can to save our beloved America from being 'hell-bent on national suicide?'

I wish to share Mrs. Schlafly's newsletter with my colleagues, and insert it into the RECORD at this time.

[From the Phyllis Schlafly Report, Alton, Ill., July, 1971]

"HELL-BENT ON NATIONAL SUICIDE"

Americans are justly proud of having a system of government that guarantees more freedom than any nation in the world ever enjoyed. Let us always remember that our American freedom includes the freedom to commit suicide. In the opinion of our best informed citizens, this is exactly what we are doing. Here are four warnings which have gone largely unreported by most of the press.

GENERAL LEMAY'S WARNING

General Curtis E. LeMay, the great commander who built up the Strategic Air Command as our first line of defense, on February 24 in Santa Ana, California predicted that within 18 months the Soviet Union will serve a "capitulation-or-else" ultimatum on the United States, and President Nixon will have no choice but to surrender and succumb to Soviet demands.

Asked what he meant by the words "or else," General LeMay replied that "or else" means an attack by "nuclear weapons." Continuing, he said:

"While the United States is wasting money on TNT for use in the jungles and rice paddies of Southeast Asia, Russia is spending money on what today is the finest strategic weapons system in the world. We have become a second-rate power, and our whole military establishment is rapidly going downhill because our weaponry—both offensive and defensive—is outmoded . . . . Like it or not, we are at war with the Communists—and we'd better do something about it, fast, before it's too late."

General LeMay said the American people are deceiving themselves if they "believe we have a strong national defense system. That's what we're told, but it's not so—really. And I know."

This sensational statement by one of America's greatest living military leaders was reported in newspapers in California and Indiana. It was apparently censored out of newspapers and television and radio reports in most of the rest of the country. Five months have passed since General LeMay gave his warning about "18 months," but nothing has been done in Washington to rebuild U.S. nuclear strength.

JOINT COMMITTEE WARNING

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, made up of nine Senators and nine Congressmen, some hawks, some doves, some conservatives, some liberals, ten Democrats, eight Republicans, is one of the best informed bodies in our Government. On May 24, 1971, this Committee issued an ominous warning: The United States, unless it moves quickly to counter a rapidly expanding Soviet naval threat, faces a future in which it will have to surrender to the Soviets on all issues or risk nuclear annihilation. Any delay may mean "no future."

The 278-page report contained hitherto unpublished official reports and statements by Admiral Hyman G. Rickover and other experts on the status of Soviet and U.S. naval forces. The bald facts are these.

The Soviet Union has a surface navy of 2,009 units compared with a U.S. surface navy of 563 units. The Soviet submarine strength is 355 compared with 142 for the United States. The advantage in nuclear submarines in which we long took comfort has disappeared. Soviet ballistic missile submarines armed with Polaris-type nuclear missiles now patrol off both coasts in range of most of our urban industrial areas.

This prestigious Congressional Committee concluded that unless prompt measures are taken to build up a nuclear navy, America will have "to give in on all issues. . . . There may be no future. . . . We will soon find ourselves unable to defend our national interests." The Committee urged recollection of the statement by President Eisenhower quoted on the keel of the nuclear aircraft carrier which bears his name: "Until war is eliminated from international relations, unpreparedness for it is well nigh as criminal as war itself."

BLUE RIBBON WARNING

Soon after President Nixon's inauguration, he appointed a "Blue Ribbon Defense Panel" to study the workings of the Defense Department and recommend how to make it more efficient. In the course of their investigation, seven members of that Blue Ribbon Panel became so alarmed about the inability of the United States to defend ourselves against the growing Soviet nuclear threat that they wrote a "Supplemental Statement" and submitted it to President Nixon on September 30, 1970.

Although this Statement expressly said that its purpose was to "contribute to public discussion" and result in "wider public understanding" because "the public remains uninformed and apathetic" in the face of the Soviet threat, the Pentagon suppressed it for nearly six months. When the Defense Department finally released it on March 2, 1971, no explanation was given for why it was kept secret so long.

On April 5, *U.S. News & World Report* printed a short summary of this Supplemental Statement. It was largely ignored by the press. On April 19, Congressman John G. Schmitz of California put the full text into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, page 10799. This Supplemental Statement was signed by William Blackie, board chairman of Caterpillar Tractor Company, Peoria; George Champion, president, Economic Development Council, New York; William P. Clements, Jr., president, Southeastern Drilling, Dallas; John M. Fluke, president, John Fluke Manufacturing Company, Seattle; Hobart D. Lewis, president, Reader's Digest Association, Pleasantville, N.Y.; Admiral Wilfred J. McNeil, director, Fairchild Hiller Corporation, New York; Lewis F. Powell, Jr., lawyer, Richmond.

The Blue Ribbon Statement publicly recognizes "the abandonment by the U.S. of its former policy of maintaining strategic superiority." It will be recalled that Richard Nixon, in campaigning for the Presidency, on October 24, 1968, specifically promised to restore our "clearcut military superiority." The Blue Ribbon Panel members, all of whom are Nixon appointees, tactfully refrained from mentioning this, but they make clear that the President's promise has not been kept.

A "SECOND RATE" POWER

The Blue Ribbon Statement bluntly states that the United States, as a "second rate" power, will be "subordinate to manifest Soviet military superiority. . . . The world order of the future will bear a Soviet trademark, with all peoples upon whom it is imprinted suffering Communist repressions." *That clearly means all Americans.* "In the 70's neither the vital interests of the U.S. nor the lives and freedom of its citizens will be secure."

The Blue Ribbon Statement says that our present danger "was predetermined by decisions made in the 1960's, which resulted in the reduction, postponement and abandonment of strategic defense measures and weapons systems." Of course, all readers of the Schlafly-Ward book, *Strike From Space,* knew this in 1965, *at the time it was going on.*

The Blue Ribbon Statement explodes the myth of relying on the "Sino-Soviet split," saying "the friendship between the Soviet Union and Red China has dissolved. . . . But this disunity among Communist powers does not necessarily enhance the chances of peace for the Free World. . . . Each has always proclaimed that the principal enemy is 'imperialistic America.' . . . The Marxist purpose of communizing the world remains the goal of every Communist party."

The Blue Ribbon Statement says flatly that "the reopening and control of the Suez Canal" is a Soviet objective; "this waterway [is] as important to the Soviet Union as the Panama Canal has been to the U.S." If Secretary of State William Rogers would read the Blue Ribbon Statement, he would see that he is directly serving the Soviet Union by his frantic efforts to pressure the Israelis into allowing the opening of the Suez Canal.

There has been much public debate in the last few months about the number of American troops which should be stationed in Western Europe. The truth is that whether we have 150,000 or 300,000 troops in Europe is an exercise in irrelevancy, as the Blue Ribbon Statement makes clear: "The Soviet Union has some 700 IRBM's deployed within convenient range of defenseless Western European cities and NATO forces." Note the word "defenseless." Western Europe has no strategic defense against the Soviet nuclear threat because former Secretary McNamara scrapped all our European-based IRBM's.

ICBM SUPERIORITY

The Blue Ribbon Statement warns flatly that "the Soviet Union has attained for the first time a superior strategic capability—where it counts the most—in ICBM's. . . . While we imposed a limitation on additional strategic weapons, the Soviets pressed forward to overtake and pass us. . . . More serious than the numerical superiority is the substantial megatonnage advantage enjoyed by the Soviet Union. The enormous payloads of the SS–9's have a destructive capacity incomparably greater than any U.S. missiles. . . . The Soviet SS–9 ICBM force alone is capable of delivering a megatonnage of nuclear warheads several times greater than that of the entire U.S. force of ICBM's and SLBM's. . . . It is well to remember that we have *no defense whatever* against Soviet ICBM's and SLBM's which *now* have the capability of killing perhaps *half of our population*—more than 100 million people—by a surprise first strike." (emphasis added)

The Blue Ribbon Statement calls attention to the heavy Soviet financial commitment to building a first-strike capability: "The trend of Soviet defense spending continues steadily upward. . . . The Soviet Union is spending significantly more than the U.S. in the buildup of its strategic offensive and defensive weapons" even though its gross national product is only half of ours.

The Blue Ribbon Statement concludes: "The only viable national strategy is to regain and retain a clearly superior strategic capability," which can be done (1) by building enough new strategic nuclear weapons, and (2) "by eschewing agreements [such as SALT] which freeze the U.S. into a second-rate status. . . . The road to peace has never been through appeasement, unilateral disarmament or negotiation from weakness. The entire recorded history of mankind is precisely to the contrary. Among the great nations, only the strong survive."

The Blue Ribbon Statement warns in the strongest language against "the danger of fatal concessions or even of a deliberate trap"

at the SALT talks now going on between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in Helsinki. The Blue Ribbon Statement says that it would be "egregious folly" for the U.S. to agree to freeze strategic capabilities" at some level of specified parity" because this would actually enable the Soviet Union to "strengthen its overall military and political position."

President Nixon's announcement that he has made "a major step in breaking the stalemate" in the SALT talks is the "egregious folly" of which the Blue Ribbon Panel members warned. What was hailed as a "major breakthrough" was really a U.S. surrender of our previous position that any agreement must cover all offensive weapons and not prevent our catching up with Soviet ABM systems.

Many people ask, "why do we need more nuclear weapons when we already have enough to kill every Russian?" The Blue Ribbon Statement clarifies the reason. We have no assurance whatsoever that our weapons can kill any substantial number of Russians because of the extensive Soviet anti-missile and anti-bomber defenses. More important, the U.S. has no missiles which can destroy Soviet weapons, while the Soviets are approaching the capability of wiping out our entire missile force with their giant SS–9's.

OUR "ONLY HOPE"

Although the Blue Ribbon Statement is "respectfully submitted to The President and The Secretary of Defense," it offers not the slightest trace of optimism that they will accept the recommendations. The impression given is that the Blue Ribbon Panel members have despaired that President Nixon will fulfill his promise to restore our "clearcut military superiority," and so are appealing over his head to the American people. The Statement repeatedly admonishes the American people to rise up and demand nuclear superiority, but never calls on President Nixon to do anything. At one point the Blue Ribbon Statement says our "only hope . . . is to assure a wider public knowledge of the facts and an understanding of the probable consequences of second-rate military status." If we fail, "there is little future for America as we know it or for our cherished freedoms."

What the Blue Ribbon Panel members are saying is: Voters, if you want America to survive in the face of the Soviet nuclear threat, it's up to you to do something about it, because the President, the Defense Department, and the Congress certainly are not doing what needs to be done.

CONGRESSMAN RIVERS' WARNING

The Congressional committee which is directly concerned with defense is the House Armed Services Committee. Its chairman for many years until his death this year was Congressman L. Mendel Rivers. Last September 28 he made a speech called "The Soviet Threat" which must rank as one of the most important ever given in Congress. He laid it on the line about the critical danger America faces today. Because this great speech was given the silent treatment by most of the press, we reprint here selected excerpts. The full text can be found in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, volume 116, part 35, page 33898.

"Mr. Speaker, never before in the 30 years of my membership in this body have I stepped into the well of this House with greater concern for the future of this Nation.

"The fears that I have are those that must be shared by every American regardless of his political or social philosophy or his economic status.

"All Americans have been given the blessed and priceless heritage of freedom—a freedom which I am convinced is in terrible jeopardy. . . .

"Consideration of the defense budget, contrary to what some would have us believe, is not a question of assigning relative priorities between defense and domestic programs.

"Decisions on the defense budget should be based on the simple question of national survival—and nothing more.

"The issue should be 'what is required to survive'? and not 'how should we allocate the national budget between defense and domestic programs?'

"The final measure of our ability to survive as a nation in a hostile world will not be how well we have managed our domestic resources and domestic programs, but whether or not we have avoided and frustrated the forces of evil which would draw us into the crucible of war with the Soviet Union.

"If we fail in that endeavor, we will have failed in everything.

"It is this circumstance which demands that we maintain a level of strategic and conventional military capability that will insure against any misunderstanding by the leaders in the Kremlin of our intentions to survive.

"Regrettably, the leaders in the Kremlin are now evidently unimpressed by both our military capability and our national determination to survive. . . .

"Since the deterioration of our military capability vis-a-vis the Soviet Union is no secret to the Kremlin, I believe it is high time that we tell the American people the facts of life. I plan on doing that today. . . ."

[Congressman Rivers then set forth in specific detail how the Soviet Navy has achieved superiority over the U.S. Navy, especially in submarines, modernization, speed, and surface-to-surface missiles. He spelled out the formidable Soviet naval threat in the Mediterranean, in the Caribbean, in the Atlantic, and off Cape Kennedy.]

"THE BRINK OF DISASTER"

"I cannot overemphasize the seriousness of this situation. Yet, I know that there are people in the Congress of the United States who will say 'so what?' I can only warn the Members of this House that we are on the brink of disaster and I have never before been so concerned in all the years I have served in the Congress of the United States.

"We must, therefore, acknowledge the fact that our naval vessels are today simply not capable of discharging their wartime mission requirements if called upon to do so. . . .

"The deliberate and calculated offensive plans of the Soviet Union are now becoming crystal clear with the release of information by the administration of evidence of new Soviet activity in Cuba. I have no doubt that the Soviets are now building a missile-launching nuclear-submarine naval base in Cuba. . . .

"We cannot live with this new Soviet threat at our very doorstep. We cannot permit the cities of the eastern seaboard to become hostages of the Soviet Union. . . .

"Do not be misled into believing we can make up for this frightening loss of naval superiority by relying upon a superior strategic nuclear capability vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Since 1965, the Soviet Union has engaged in a major effort to change the balance of power in this area of military capability. In that period it has more than tripled its inventory of strategic offensive nuclear weapon launchers. . . .

"In the same period, the United States has made no increase in its established level of 1,710 strategic nuclear missile launchers, and has reduced its heavy bomber strength from 780 to less than 600. . . .

"Although the 300 SS–9's will represent considerably less than half of the total inventory of the Soviet land-based ICBM's, this portion of the Soviet ICBM inventory will alone be capable of delivering a megatonnage in nuclear weaponry which exceeds the combined total nuclear weapon megatonnage delivery capability of all of our existing strategic delivery systems, including not only our ICBM force, but our Polaris force, as well as our heavy bomber force. Certainly this fact alone ought to raise serious questions concerning the alleged 'defensive' posture of the Soviet Union.

"We have no counterpart for this huge Soviet nuclear weapon delivery system. . . .

"In 1965 neither the Soviet Union nor the United States had a depressed trajectory ICBM or a fractional orbital bombardment system—FOBS. Today, the Soviet Union has tested both, and could very well have operational versions of these weapons systems already deployed. Both of these developments have far-reaching implications on our defense capability.

"Unfortunately, we have nothing like these, and to the best of my knowledge, none on our drawing boards.

"Today the Soviets can launch over 200 ballistic missiles from their nuclear-powered submarines. Two years from now 400 to 500 of these Polaris-type missile launchers are expected to be operational, and by early 1974, this Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile force will inevitably exceed the constant U.S. force we now have of 656 Polaris launchers. Further, most of our major cities are close to our coasts within short range of their submarine stations. . . .

"Our tactical air capability, when compared to the Soviet capability, also raises serious questions as to our ability to cope with the Soviet Union in a conventional confrontation. For example, since 1954 the Soviets have designed and produced 18 new types of fighter planes—13 of these models we have actually photographed in flight. In the same time frame, the United States has not produced a single new air superiority fighter, and actually we have not had one on order until this year. . . .

"HANGS BY A THREAD"

"I say to this House that the future of this Nation hangs by a thread.

"We are in a far more serious situation than many would have you believe. Our way of life is not only being challenged from within, it is being very definitely threatened from without. . . .

"Now let me summarize for a moment. I have outlined to you that our former 5-to-1 margin in nuclear strategic weapons has in a few short years vanished. The Soviet Union now has a nuclear strategic weapon capability in excess of ours, and this superiority will continue to increase if we do not take dramatic action to stem the tide. We can no longer look upon our threat of nuclear war as a satisfactory deterrent to aggression with conventional arms, as we could in the two decades past. From here on if we threaten nuclear war in response to aggression, we risk our own destruction.

"Moreover, I pointed out that the Soviet Union has within a few short years negated our naval superiority. This same accomplishment is evident in other areas of conventional warfare, including our ground and air capabilities.

"As a matter of fact, while Congress is still debating the necessity for building an advanced manned strategic bomber, the B–1, we now know that the Soviet Union has already built such an aircraft, and it should be coming into their operational inventory at least 3 to 4 years before we can hope to have our B–1 operational.

"HELL-BENT ON NATIONAL SUICIDE"

"The circumstances of the B–1 bomber debate in this country illustrate the reasons why we seem hell-bent on national suicide. While we debate the question of maintaining our military capability, the Soviet Union quietly but openly forges ahead.

"It may be that the gap which has now been created in our defense capability can never be bridged. The Soviets have the bit in their teeth, and make no mistake about it, are both capable and determined to maintain this newly developed superiority. . . .

"In calendar year 1969, the United States

spent a total of $7.5 billion on strategic offensive and defensive weaponry. During that same period, the Soviet Union expended approximately $13 billion for the same effort. Thus, it is evident that the Soviet Union in a single calendar year has spent approximately $5.5 billion more for increased strategic capability than did the United States.

"I recognize that a $5.5 billion added effort is somewhat difficult for laymen to comprehend. However, since the cost of a single Minuteman missile is approximately $4.8 million, the added Soviet effort is roughly equivalent to the procurement of a thousand Minuteman missiles.

"All of this in one calendar year. . . .

"As a matter of fact, this circumstance alone illustrates the cold and calculating master plan of the Soviet Union, who in entering the SALT negotiations hope to freeze the United States in an inferior position in strategic weaponry.

"I pray to God that the American people, and the Congress in particular, will soon awaken to these realities and recognize that the question confronting us is no longer one involving the relative allocation of priorities in spending between defense and domestic programs, but rather the fundamental question of national survival.

"We cannot as a Nation afford to spend one penny less on national defense than that amount which is required to insure that you and I, and our children, can convince the Soviets they dare not pull the trigger when a Soviet gun is placed against our heads.

"The issue, therefore, is very simply how much money must be spent to insure our survival—since if we fail to demonstrate to the Soviet Union our determination to survive—the amount of money we spend for domestic programs will become merely an academic exercise.

"I plead, and I beg you, my colleagues who collectively have the responsibility of the security of our Nation in your hands, to ponder these facts which I have brought to you today. They are proof positive that we are in serious trouble. Unpleasant as these facts may be, you cannot ignore them, for if you do, you are failing not only your constituency but also all the peoples of the world who, in the final analysis, look upon the United States as the fountainhead and guardian of the highest aspiration of genuine freedom in this chaotic world. . . .

"These are the facts which reflect the prophetic wisdom of an observation once made by a gentleman by the name of Mr. Richard M. Nixon, when he said:

" 'If present trends continue, the United States, a very few years hence, will find itself clearly in second position—with the Soviet Union undisputably the greatest military power on earth.'

"I am afraid that the day has already arrived."

"IF NOT US, WHO?"

When Congressman Rivers concluded his speech, he was warmly commended by Congressmen of both parties. Congressman Durward Hall said: "What you have said today can be construed as neither hawkish, nor dovish, but eaglish, that gallant and magnificent creature that symbolizes the strength and honor of this great Nation. . . . In the defense of freedom, if not us, who? If not now, when? If not here, where? I hear no answers. . . . If we do not first concern ourselves with the survival of this Nation, all the rest will go for naught."

Congressman Don H. Clausen said: "This historic and well-documented speech of Chairman Rivers could well record him as the 'jet, space, and nuclear age Paul Revere.' " Mr. Rivers responded: "I only hope that someone, somewhere in the smoldering ruins, will say, 'Old Rivers did the best he could.' "

Are you, my friends, doing the very best you can to save our beloved America from being "hell-bent on national suicide"?

Mr. ZION. Mr. Speaker, the best-kept secret in the United States seems to be the news that the period of U.S. superiority of military power has ended and that "in the 1970's neither the vital interests of the United States nor the lives and freedom of its citizens will be secure."

This is the warning given by seven members of a select group of distinguished citizens appointed shortly after his inauguration in 1968 by President Nixon to examine the Defense Department.

The principal points made by these seven men may be clearly appreciated from the opening paragraph and key phrases of the summary of the supplemental statement. They state that—

The convergence of a number of trends indicates a significant shifting of the strategic military balance against the United States and in favor of the Soviet Union. . . . Since World War II a degree of world order has been maintained by the dominance of U.S. strategic military strength. This American preserved world order is now disintegrating, as doubts arise as to our will and strength to preserve it. U.S. strategic superiority has ended. The Soviet Union has moved significantly ahead of the United States in ICBMs, the principal weapons system of the nuclear age.

Discussing the administration's response to this alarming situation, Dr. A. G. B. Metcalf, physicist and military analyst for the American Security Council, notes that—

This budget does not in any way call for a reversal of the shift in strategic military power balance. In fact, since the Nixon Administration took office deep cuts have been made in the defense budget. Most of the dollar cuts have been made by the Administration itself; though some have been made by the Senate. An even larger reduction in the effective level of spending for defense has been caused by inflation and pay raises for military personnel without additional appropriations to cover the cost of those pay raises.

"The combination of these several factors," writes Dr. Metcalf, "has reduced our effective defense spending by about 25 percent under the Nixon administration—a sharper rate of decline than that under the preceding two administrations."

This alarming situation must be reversed. But such a reversal will never come until the American people are made aware of the seriousness of the situation.

I wish to share with my colleagues the thoughtful analysis of Dr. Metcalf which was issued by the American Security Council on June 28, 1971. It is inserted into the RECORD at this point.

[From the Washington Report, Washington, June 28, 1971]

TOP SECRET

The best kept secret in the United States seems to be the news that the period of U.S. superiority of military power has ended and that "in the 70's neither the vital interests of the U.S. nor the lives and freedom of its citizens will be secure. . . ."

THE BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL

Shortly after his inauguration in 1969, President Nixon appointed a select group of distinguished citizens, to examine the organization setup and contracting procedures of the U.S. Department of Defense, and to make recommendations for improvements therein. On July 1, 1970, the Panel submitted to the President and the Secretary of Defense its report on those specific matters, including a number of recommended changes which the Defense Secretary has since announced have been or are in process of being introduced in that Department.

Subsequently, seven members of the Panel submitted a supplemental statement on related matters which they deemed to be of vital concern to the Nation at large, as well as to themselves as American citizens. It should be read by every American.

The principal points made may be clearly appreciated from the opening paragraphs and key phrases of the Summary of the Supplemental Statement:

"The Converging Trends. The convergence of a number of trends indicates a significant shifting of the strategic military balance against the United States and in favor of the Soviet Union. These trends include: (i) the growing Soviet superiority in ICBM's; (ii) the Soviet commitment of greater resources than the U.S. to strategic offensive and defensive weapons, with the continued deployment thereof; (iii) the possibility that present U.S. technological superiority will be lost to the Soviet Union; (iv) the convincing evidence that the Soviet Union seeks a preemptive first-strike capability; (v) the rapidly expanding Soviet naval capability; and (vi) the mounting hostility of segments of the public towards the military, the defense establishment and "the military-industrial complex," without due recognition that sustained irresponsible criticism could undermine and weaken the only forces which provide security for the U.S.

"Since World War II a degree of world order has been maintained by the dominance of U.S. strategic military strength. This American-preserved world order is now disintegrating, as doubts arise as to our will and strength to preserve it.

"U.S. strategic superiority has ended. The Soviet Union has moved significantly ahead of the United States in ICBM's, the principal weapons system of the nuclear age.

"The End of U.S. Superiority . . . The Soviet SS–9 ICBM force alone is capable of delivering a megatonnage of nuclear warheads several times greater than that of the entire U.S. force of ICBM's and SLBM's. . .

". . . The situation which our country faces is without precedent. . .

". . . It is not too much to say that in the 70's neither the vital interests of the U.S. nor the lives and freedom of its citizens will be secure. . .

". . . Yet, many of our most influential citizens respond to this unprecedented national peril, not by a renewed determination to assure an adequate national defense, but rather by demands for further curtailment of defense measures which can only increase the peril.

"In short, the mood of the people and much of the Congress is almost one of precipitous retreat from the challenge. This paradox in response to possible national peril is without precedent in the history of this country."

A WELL KEPT SECRET

This solemn statement, throwing into question, for the first time, the survival of American life and liberty, had been in the hands of our governmental leaders since September 30, 1970. When it was released by the Pentagon on March 12, 1971, neither Government nor the media (with the single exception of *U.S. News & World Report* for April 5, 1971) deemed it a matter to be explicitly made known to the American people.

Whereas previous warnings of a dangerous shift in the balance of military power were often discounted on the grounds that those raising the alarm were "military-oriented", this cannot be said of the authors of the special "Blue Ribbon" report. Although sev-

eral of them had wartime service in one or another of our Armed Services, they are all primarily noted for distinguished accomplishments in civilian pursuits. The seven signers of the Supplemental Statement are:

William Blackie—Peoria, Illinois; Chairman of the Board, Caterpillar Tractor Company.

George Champion—New York, New York; President, Economic Development Board of New York.

William P. Clements, Jr.—Dallas, Texas; President, Southeastern Drilling, Inc.

John M. Fluke—Seattle, Washington; President, John Fluke Manufacturing Company, Inc.

Hobart D. Lewis—Pleasantville, New York; President, Reader's Digest Association, Inc.

Wilfred J. McNeil—New York, New York; Director and Advisor, Fairchild-Hiller Corp.

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.—Richmond, Virginia; Lawyer, Past President, American Bar Association (1964–65).

1971 POSTURE STATEMENT

The *Statement of Secretary of Defense* Melvin R. Laird before the House Armed Services Committee on the FY 1972–1976 Defense Program and the 1972 Defense Budget, dated March 9, 1971, comprising 191 pages, devotes 39 pages in Section II *Toward Better Management of Human, Material and Economic Resources in the Department of Defense,* growing, in part, out of the work of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel.

It gets down to such subjects as "drug abuse in the armed forces" and to such details as following the Blue Ribbon Panel's recommendations on telecommunications. But, curiously, no mention is made of the Blue Ribbon Panel's Supplemental Statement on the Nation's peril and the chilling portent to the Free World, of our now overshadowed defense posture which no longer provides a realistic deterrence. Yet the term "Strategy of Realistic Deterrence" is used repeatedly as a statement of national policy, as if realistic deterrence could be achieved by mere use of the words!

How is it that recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Panel can be adopted as to "major changes in the organization of the Department [of Defense]" and other recommendation affecting the survival of our national life be swept under the carpet?

Further, the Laird Report states: "The threats to U.S. and Free World security obviously were a central factor in planning forces and programs to implement the new strategy." If this is true, how is the balance of strategic power being restored? The American people have a right and a "need" to know.

On page 12 of the Laird Report as a part of the Secretary's Summary it is said: "In the past two decades we achieved first place in nuclear capability, became pre-eminent in space, and substantially strengthened our conventional capabilities." In direct contrast, the Blue Ribbon statement said "Within a span of less than two decades we have moved from complete security to perilous insecurity."

On page 14—*The Changing Environment—Prelude to the 1970's,* one of the existing military realities listed as: "different from the situation just five years ago is: . . . A growing Soviet military capability and technological momentum." No mention is made of the existence of a massively overwhelming preponderance factor [about 8 times] of Soviet nuclear ICBM capability, expressed in megatonnage. The report continues: "Confronted with this changing environment, we conclude after careful analysis in the National Security Council that we must, whatever else, assume the following criteria in national security planning for the decades of the 1970's: 1. Preservation by the United States of a sufficient strategic nuclear capability as the cornerstone of the Free World's nuclear deterrent . . ."

One has a right—and indeed a duty—to ask what that means. How can we preserve what we do not have? Who decides what the subjective but key word "sufficient" means? And finally how decipher the meaning of the words "the cornerstone of the Free World's nuclear deterrent," when it is clear that our foreign policy as well as the "security of the lives and freedom of U.S. citizens" requires simply that *we* move to match if not exceed the present awesome balance of nuclear power now arrayed against the United States.

U.S. NEEDS "SUPERIOR STRATEGIC CAPABILITY"

The first duty of our responsible officials to "safeguard the security of the Republic", cannot be mixed up with other nations or the Free World's nuclear deterrent. The U.S. alone must look to its own security—as does the U.S.S.R.

The Blue Ribbon Panel's conclusion regarding the shifting balance was that ". . . the only viable national strategy is to regain and retain a clearly superior strategic capability."

As the Panel pointed out, "The road to peace has never been through appeasement, unilateral disarmament or negotiation from weakness. The entire recorded history of mankind is precisely to the contrary. Among the great nations, only the strong survive. Weakness of the U.S.—of its military capability and its will—could be the gravest threat to the peace of the world."

Thus this is no time for circumlocution or the obscuration of life and death box-scores with statements of purpose which admit of any and all interpretations under the sun. Our clear course, as expressed by the special Blue Ribbon statement is to move at once to offset "The Soviet Union's advantage in numbers and megatonnage of missiles . . . that could result in a force more than double that of the U.S. by the Mid-70's . . . (when) . . . the Soviet Union would have the capability of effectively destroying both U.S. ICBM and bomber forces as well as our cities." Otherwise we must accept the consequences of becoming a second-rate power, ". . . incapable of assuring the future security and freedom of its people."

WHY NOT LET THE AMERICAN PEOPLE KNOW?

The Special Blue Ribbon report states: "Neither the facts concerning these trends nor the ultimate danger is generally understood by the public, which for the most part remains uninformed and hence apathetic." Why?

In this day of electronic and communications pollution, every form of trivia can be and is elevated to the level of national interest. The media leave no electronic gap in the air and no tree standing that can be pressed into the service of engaging every ear and eye. Even the President of the United States must strain to fill two hours of chat over a nationwide network. But how come the vital message of the Blue Ribbon Panel Statement, sufficient to alarm a group of distinguished citizens which had spent a year studying the Pentagon, was not deemed important enough to be expressly made known to the American people.

How come the President's 180 page *Foreign Policy Report for the 1970's* dated February 25, 1971 (five months after he received the Blue Ribbon Supplemental Statement) is silent on the consequences to our foreign policy while mentioning that we are outgunned as to numbers of ICBM's by some 40%. No megatonnage figures are given, but interestingly enough the meaning of the words "strategic sufficiency," as contrasted with "strategic superiority," is defined without clarifying very much the life and death aspects of the present shifting balance of power. However, the President's Foreign Policy Report does state: "The United States and the Soviet Union have now reached a point where small numerical advantages in strategic forces have little military relevance. The attempt to obtain large advantages would spark an arms race which would, in the end, prove pointless. For, both sides would almost surely commit the necessary resources to maintain a balance."

If the 35 pages of the Blue Ribbon Panel's Supplemental Statement say anything, it is that the maintenance of that balance has long since gone by the boards. If that statement—in an official document—is untrue, it should be refuted—officially. If it is not untrue, then the President's Foreign Policy Report dated five months later needs re-evaluation.

THE PRIMARY STRATEGIC THREAT

Secretary Laird's Report, dated March 9, 1971, under Section III entitled, *The Threats to U.S. and Free World Security* states: "The threats to U.S. and Free World security obviously were a central factor in planning forces and programs to implement the new strategy. Before discussing specific force planning under the strategy, let me review briefly the current and projected security threats. Admiral Moorer, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will provide *a more detailed analysis of the threat* (emphasis added) in his statement to the Committee." (We shall turn to Admiral Moorer's report later.)

The Laird report states: "The primary strategic threat to the U.S.—the capability of the Soviet Union to deliver long range, nuclear weapons against targets in the United States—has been a matter of grave concern to us. Shown on Table 9 are our estimates of Soviet strategic offensive and defensive weapon systems in the near term. U.S. strategic forces are shown for comparison on Table 3."

In the report, Table 9 applies to U.S. forces while Table 3 applies to the forces of the Soviet Union—a small matter, but a slip to which Freud would have attached great significance!

The "specific force planning" of the Laird report still leaves the relative ICBM balance, U.S. versus U.S.S.R., unchanged: "at the end of FY 1972 (it) will consist of 1,000 Minuteman missiles, 54 Titan missiles" (ed. note: old and obsolescent) as against about 1,200 SS–11 and SS–13 missiles of around 1 megaton each and corresponding roughly to the U.S. Minuteman, and about 300 SS–9 missiles (ed. note: new) of 25 megatons each.

If all this is bewildering as a policy of "strategic sufficiency" for an announced "Strategy of Realistic Deterrence" the point has been made.

ADMIRAL MOORER'S REPORT

And now let us turn to the report entitled: *United States Military Posture for FY 1972* by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN, before the House Armed Services Committee, dated March 9, 1971. Here, surely, one seeking assurance against the spectre raised by the Blue Ribbon Supplemental Statement, must find it. Our problem, after all, is purely military and as promised in Secretary Laird's Report one may expect "a more detailed analysis of the threat". Perhaps this is where we should have looked in the first place to see the danger to the U.S. broadly delineated, and the few steps needed to parry this threat clearly stated.

Admiral Moorer starts out with a nicely balanced plea for objectivity, and that we neither underestimate nor overestimate the strength of an opponent. Neither, he says, should our enemies, our free world partners nor we ourselves, underestimate the military strength of the United States. But . . . "We dare not underestimate the military capability of those who seek to expand their influence and hegemony over peoples whose

interests now coincide with ours." That about covers the subject.

Admiral Moorer reported that as of the end of 1970, the U.S. had "fallen distinctly behind the Soviets in total numbers of operational ICBM launchers" (1054 to1440) and that "the Soviets are already far superior to us in total strategic offensive megatons." While the Soviet SS–9 ICBM is discussed at some length, no mention is made that the megatonnage of the 300 SS–9's alone, which the Soviets are expected to have by the end of 1971, ". . . each capable of delivering 25 megatons" (Blue Ribbon Panel assessment) exceeds by many times that of our total ICBM launchers and moreover are "designed as counter-force weapons capable of destroying U.S. hardened missile silos" (Blue Ribbon Panel Statement).

Admiral Moorer also said: "While I do not believe the United States today is in a position of inferior military strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, the balance is tenuous in certain areas and, therefore, we cannot help but be concerned. The United States no longer has clear, superiority in strategic nuclear weapons."

THE PROBLEM IS NOW!

But then the Admiral went on to make what must be the most incomprehensible statement in modern military history by saying: "Due to long lead time in acquisition of modern weapons systems, the problem we see is in the future."

A "long lead time", far from putting the problem in the future stresses the present imperative.

But in line with the concept of the problem being in the future, Admiral Moorer recommends the adoption of the Administration's proposed military budget for Fiscal Year 1972. This budget does not in any way call for a reversal of the shift in strategic military power balance. In fact, since the Nixon Administration took office deep cuts have been made in the defense budget. Most of the dollar cuts have been made by the Administration, itself; though some have been made by the Senate. An even larger reduction in the *effective* level of spending for defense has been caused by inflation and pay raises for military personnel without additional appropriations to cover the cost of those pay raises.

The combination of these several factors has reduced our *effective* defense spending by about 25% under the Nixon Administration—a sharper rate of decline than that under the preceding two administrations.

In all fairness, one must hasten to point out that the Laird and Moorer reports cited were prepared by dedicated, patriotic Americans striving to advance the interests of the U.S., to the best of their abilities, within the framework of Administration policy.

HOW TO REVERSE THE TREND

Also, reversing a trend such as this is a problem of great complexity; a multiplicity of facts and factors must be taken into consideration. To forewarn without frightening is a necessary pre-requisite to action in a democracy. Yet *The Wall Street Journal* for April 28, 1971, says, in part: "Defense Secretary Melvin Laird's increasingly grim assessment of Soviet strength may be a prelude to another escalation of the arms race and a possible request for a boost in the Pentagon budget.

". . . Mr. Laird's new threat assessment is likely to produce some skepticism and anger on Capitol Hill. There, lawmakers critical of defense spending are likely to view the Secretary's remarks as part of the 'annual rites of spring'—when military men come forward with evidence of new and menacing Soviet developments to justify their budget submissions."

Other newspapers have made similar statements.

Small wonder that loyal Americans of good will, seeking to discharge their Constitutional responsibility "to provide for the common defense" may wonder in a political context how far to go in alerting a nation to its peril. On the other hand, because we are a democracy, the shifting balance of power which imperils our Nation, our freedom, and the rest of the Free World, cannot be offset by our taking appropriate action, unless and until the people—all of the people—are informed by our governmental leaders who have the duty to assign the highest priority and sense of urgency to preparing Americans for a recital of some unpleasant realities and proposing a program for changing these facts.

The American people—we believe are capable of taking the harsh truth of our present danger—and capable of marshalling the spiritual, human, and material resources needed to assure the survival of our way of life.

It is this which must be done.

Dr. A. G. B. METCALF,
Physicist and Military Analyst.

Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, I am glad to join my distinguished colleagues who have taken this special order, in focusing attention on our Nation's deteriorating military position.

The facts of our increasing military inferiority have only recently become known to the American people. It has not been long since they learned that in the past 8 years the Soviet Union has caught up and is now moving ahead of us in many categories of missile strength. In an important article in Life magazine, George P. Hunt, managing editor of that magazine from 1961 to 1969, writes that—

Russia today could concentrate off Cuba a powerful surface fleet, newer, faster than ours and equipped with weapons we do not have and an underwater fleet outnumbering ours by many teams.

Mr. Hunt states that—

It will surprise most Americans that today, as opposed to 1962, we are the ones who could find ourselves at a military disadvantage.

He notes that—

In the intercontinental nuclear competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union the balance has shifted to Russian superiority in sheer weight of numbers: 1,900 Soviet ICBMs and submarine-launched missiles. Furthermore, while the U.S. is superior in long-range bomber strength (552 to 175 planes), the Russians also have about 1,200 intermediate range bombers. In the event of a nuclear exchange, it has been assumed, some of them could make one-way bombing runs, landing in Cuba.

How many Americans realize that we have not built a really new fighter plane since 1955? The Russians virtually produce one each year. They have only recently shown us a family of six new planes that have more maneuverability and acceleration than anything we have.

The same alarming facts are equally true with regard to naval strength. George Hunt writes that—

The Soviet navy began in World War II as a defensive coastal fleet with a strong emphasis on the submarine. In the late 1950's the Russians started their nuclear underwater development, pouring billions into it. They erected huge construction yards, which, on a one-shift basis, build at least one nuclear sub a month. The U.S. production rate is five a year. They have now matched the U.S. fleet in two categories; nuclear attack submarines (each about 50) and the even more critical strategic subs (with long-range ballistic missiles). In 1968 they revealed their new Yankee nuclear-powered sub, which is similar to the latest model of the Polaris and can fire a missile almost as far. At least 17 Yankee-class subs are now prowling the seas, some regularly patrolling both U.S. coasts, and more are being built at a rate of eight a year.

We must take immediate action to regain American superiority. Unless we do, we will be unable to defend our own country and unable to fulfill our commitments to our allies. We will, in effect, have surrendered our position of world leadership.

I wish to share Mr. Hunt's article with my colleagues. It appears in Life magazine and I insert it in the RECORD at this time:

OUR FOUR-STAR MILITARY MESS; THE BLUNT FACT IS THAT WE ARE ABOUT TO BECOME NO. 2

(By George P. Hunt)

In past weeks, several developments have freshened hopes for international disarmament. After months of deadlock, the U.S. and Russia agreed in Vienna on an agenda for future Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Then, quite unexpectedly, Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev opened up the possibility that mutual troop and weapons reductions might be negotiated between NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations. Against this background, we should take a hard look at the present state and future prospects of our armed forces.

The truth is that the U.S. military establishment is in ragged shape—lagging in technology, undermined by inflation, by worn-out strategies, by entrenched old ways of top direction and allocating budget money. The Vietnam war has ravaged it—gnawing at morale and discipline. The war has bred a disturbing dislike for the politician in the career officer, who believes the politician let him down over there and kept him from a victory. Into the civilian world has seeped the poison of suspicion—even scorn—for military men, who in turn resent the atti tude bitterly; and in the wake of public revulsion to PX scandals and atrocities, there has lately surged the turmoil over the Calley trial.

The world saw the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 as a victory for John F. Kennedy; and Nikita Khrushchev never forgot it. The Soviet leader was confronted by two-to-one superiority in nuclear missiles and by an overwhelming naval majority on the high seas. Indeed, the fantastic spurt in growth of both Russia's missilery and her fleet dates from that humiliating experience.

Khrushchev probably had no intention of using the missiles in Cuba but rather of waving the threat of them at us—90 miles from our coast; the missile beachhead would have given him a powerful new negotiating stance. But when his challenge was met, Khrushchev could hardly go to war about it, since no major Soviet national interest was at stake; indeed, in retrospect, the political situation was not so nightmarish that a genuine nuclear confrontation was plausible. More, the U.S. could—and did—mass from all directions a convincingly superior force at the strategic spot. Khrushchev had to back down.

Q: Could we still mass a convincingly superior force off Cuba today?

A: No. In some eight years Russia has caught up and is now going ahead of us in many categories of missile strength. She could today concentrate off Cuba a powerful surface fleet, newer, faster than ours and equipped with weapons we do not have and an underwater fleet outnumbering ours by many times. It will surprise most Americans

that today, as opposed to 1962, *we* are the ones who could find ourselves at a military disadvantage.

It will take fast and skillful work to put the military back in shape. The Pentagon's budget for the fiscal year beginning this month calls for $76 billion, of which roughly $10 billion is directly attributable to the Vietnam war. By this time next year, as the war diminishes, our commitment in Southeast Asia should cost one-half as much—$5 billion—for the next fiscal stretch. However, the non-Vietnam cost, $66 billion, will inexorably increase by about 10% because of climbing service-pay scales and the effect of inflation on the price of materiel and new technology. Thus, the price of maintaining our defenses as they now stand is bound to balloon, without even taking into account the cost of the sizable amount of modernization they need. Right there, if the Pentagon gets its way, we dash the hopes of Americans that all the money saved by ending the Vietnam war—the "peace dividend"—will be available for the troubles of the home front.

What kind of military establishment we have, how strong and how effective it should be and how much it should cost are major problems that concerns all of us. The military, of course, is primarily a supporting arm of our foreign policies which, as they shift in purpose or method, naturally affect the shape and posture of our defenses. Perhaps, in the years to come, changes will occur in international affairs—intelligent steps taken, new ground rules established, agreements signed—which will ease or even sharply cut military demands and stresses. But until such things happen, if they ever do, we are faced with some stern realities: a monstrously big, yet apparently inadequate, defense budget, and a military which, in large part, is in a mess.

Obviously, bold and fundamental changes must be made in the military—in its strategies, in its overall structure and in the way it spends its money. This in one reporter's investigative assessment of the condition of each of our military services, of what must be done, and how to do it in such a way as to achieve an efficient modern defense and at the same time save money desperately needed for domestic problems.

NUCLEAR POWER

A review of our military status must begin with a look at our nuclear arsenal—our most powerful and most dangerous weapons. In the intercontinental nuclear competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union the balance has shifted to Russian superiority in sheer weight of numbers: 1,900 Soviet ICBMs and submarine-launched missiles. Furthermore, while the U.S. is superior in long-range bomber strength (552 to 175 planes), the Russians also have about 1,200 intermediate-range bombers. In the event of a nuclear exchange, it has been assumed, some of them could make one-way bombing runs, landing in Cuba.

The U.S. defines its nuclear force as "second-strike" or "retaliatory," effective enough to deter through the threat of powerful response: 1,710 missiles now being improved. We calculate that if only 200 of our warheads of bombs can penetrate the Soviet defenses and hit the mark, the destruction of major cities and the deaths of so many Russians would make the Russians hesitate to attack us.

On both sides the competition is in the varieties of ICBM delivery sites—land, sea, air; in the accuracy of guidance; and in two sharply diverging technologies: the defense against missiles (ABM), and a new form of missile attack (MIRV)—the Multiply Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle). MIRV is a missile-launched package which, on approaching the enemy's defenses, aims and fires its many warheads at preselected targets. It not only multiplies firepower and the chances of penetration, but it carries the surprise of unpredictable numbers.

The overall U.S. nuclear force is called "the Triad" since it is composed of three delivery systems, each capable of large-scale thermonuclear destruction: the air force's land-based Minuteman (ICBM) and its manned bombers (Strategic Air Command or SAC), and the navy's underwater Polaris system. The Minuteman II force now in place throughout the U.S. is being augmented by Minuteman III, which fires the MIRV warhead. The Polaris submarines are also being converted to carry a MIRVed missile called the Poseidon.

The concept of the Triad is itself becoming controversial. As the navy perfects its missile systems, its advocates ask: why not move all U.S. ICBMs out to sea, on ships and in submarines, where sites are less vulnerable—mobile or hidden or both—and where survivability is more assured? The air force argues that technologies of surveillance, detection and guidance may develop to the point where missiles at sea would become as vulnerable to attack as on land, that concentrating on only one system is dangerous.

For the navy, Rear Adm. George H. Miller: "Instant retaliation is not credible unless weapons can survive relatively intact. If they can't do that, you don't have a deterrent. If most of our missiles are deployed at sea, then we're forcing the enemy to invest in countermeasures other than ICBMs aimed at the U.S.A. What you're doing is trying to preserve your country by keeping it out of the line of fire."

For the air force, Maj. Gen. Leslie W. Bray: "We need land-based as well as sea-based systems. The manned bomber, for instance, can be launched on warning, is subject to recall and can be reused. Our mix of weapons actually beef's up our deterrent threat because it compounds the enemy's defense task. It also complicates his offensive problems. With three systems to cope with, he may catch us with a technological surprise in one of them, but not in all three."

Of course, both countries also have thousands of small nuclear warheads, designed for tactical combat, which might be tempting to an embattled field commander. But the decision to use such weapons is the President's, and he would have to be ready for eye-for-an-eye retaliation; the succeeding exchanges could become hideous. It would take an insanely provocative act to compel a Soviet premier or an American President to pull any nuclear trigger—tactical or strategic—and cause mutual near annihilation.

A nuclear square-off deters both sides. It has created in effect a nuclear umbrella, sometimes described as a shield, under which daily life nonnuclear-style goes on as before. Peace can flourish, yet wars can too—nonnuclear or comparatively "safe" wars fought with conventional arms.

Since 1946 there have been 57 "conventional" armed conflicts on this earth. In the U.S. those charged with conventional fighting are called the "general purpose forces"—the elements of the military services not involved in the Triad.

THE ARMY

Condition: Because of Vietnam, the most criticized, even vilified, of the services; morale reeling but beginning to steady itself as withdrawal from Vietnam proceeds, seeking new definitions and fulfillment. Mission: All-out emphasis on support of NATO and on other troop commitments on foreign soil; military aid to treaty countries; counterinsurgency; defense of the Minuteman system and of selected U.S. targets through the "Safeguard" Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) program; continental defense against attack. Budget: $21.5 billion for fiscal 1972 as against $22 billion in 1971, $24 billion in 1970 and the decade high of $25 billion in 1968. Strength: 1.1 million men, but reducing to 900,000 by the end of 1972. Most Urgent Needs: Rebuilding purpose, morale and discipline; faster, heavier tanks, improved aircraft for front-line support of infantry, new battlefield technology, antitank inventions to counter massive numbers of Russian tanks.

Lt. Gen. William E. DePuy is assistant vice chief of staff of the army, a job which involves, among other far-reaching matters, the dilemma of the budget. Slim, articulate, he has the alert, impatient manner of an officer inundated with piles of paper and compelled to get to the point fast.

He swings around in his desk chair and says with brisk gloom: "1970 was a bad year for the army, one of the worst since before World War II. Aside from Vietnam we can't put a full-strength corps in the field. We're so short of money we have hundreds of trucks on blocks because we can't afford to keep them running. In NATO we are supposed to have four and one-third divisions, but some of the rifle squads and tank crews are at zero strength."

Lt. Gen. Richard G. Stilwell, deputy chief of staff for operations, tough, but punctiliously courteous, fixes blue eyes on his guest and says: "Yes sir, NATO is our first mission. The President and Mr. Laird have instructed us to bring those divisions up to strength and modernize them. This is a political decision as much as a military one, but vital either way. We have a lot of work to do."

It is current doctrine that the possibility of conventional war with Russia or its satellites or both on the plains of Europe must be assumed. To prepare for such a war, says the army, is to help prevent it. After the implausible confusions of Vietnam, the army is pointing with a sigh of relief toward the renascence of its NATO role, where its charge is clear. (There is blunt disagreement about this role in the other services. Snorts a marine, "The army is streaking out for that big NATO thing like a goosed cavalry horse with blinders on.")

The army envisions an "automated battlefield" which would use some of the equipment being employed in Vietnam: combat helicopters and, to detect approaching enemy, hidden radio reconnaissance sensors whose antennas can be disguised to look like hay, weeds or anything indigenous to the countryside. The sensors signal back to mortar, artillery or air headquarters, which quickly calculate the range to the sensors' known locations. Another device recently being used in Vietnam is a laser range finder for artillery; it is unerringly accurate at pinpointing distances to known enemy positions.

What the army imagines ultimately is almost here technologically: a battlefield reconnoitered by hundreds of disguised sensors chattering silently to mobile computers which—in seconds—would calculate ranges, then aim and fire automatically sighted artillery. Front-line troops would be protected by mobile air-defense units firing surface-to-air missiles. Wary of Soviet armor, the army intends to use swarms of little helicopters, unmanned and remote-controlled, firing a new antitank missile.

Close air support is as crucial for the infantry as mortars and artillery. Since 1946 the air force has had this supportive role, but elements within the army are increasingly dissatisfied. An impassioned exchange of memoranda has exploded in the Pentagon. The air force wants to build a new close-support plane (the A–X); but the army has already built the prototype of an armored 250-mph helicopter, the Cheyenne. Given the classic battlefield confrontation, the army wants to draw a line 300 yards beyond the front and say to the air force, "You interdict the battlefield from that point on, give us air cover. But *we'll* take care of the action inside that line." The air force flatly

refuses such a plan: "close air support" is its assigned job in the formal roles and missions of the services.

Traditionally, it is a "citizens' army," but the citizenry is fed up with the draft; so the President promised an all-volunteer army. But will 900,000 Americans eventually volunteer? General Stilwell says, "It's a long chance, but we're going to do our damnedest to make it work."

The air force and navy are perturbed by the whole idea. Their volunteers mostly sign up to escape being drafted into the army. Since the draft has recently been extended, their fears for the moment have been alleviated, but should it ever be dropped, the temptation to join their services is likely to disappear too.

Comment on the army—by a young lieutenant colonel in charge of a Pentagon group assigned to study army problems and suggest solutions to the top command. He is a tank officer, veteran of Vietnam, graduate of West Point and a former professor there. He is both loyal and irreverent, and here prefers to remain anonymous.

"As an institution the army is confused," he says. "It doesn't really know where it's going. Bright individuals in the army do, but it's hard to swing the whole thing around. Our basic problem is people. Things have happened outside this building which affect these people, and we have to figure out how to do what's right. The volunteer army is a big question mark and it's not the final answer anyway. Even if we were to have a volunteer force, we would still have many problems concerning how we organize, train and motivate people. It's up to us to seize on new standards of command that will give us the discipline to form up the new divisions. The talk about 'Mickey Mouse' regulations is on the surface. The trouble is deeper and we have to be deeper too."

THE AIR FORCE

Condition: Morale good to lively; firm direction in its missions; seriously weak in certain tactical missiles; key planes obsolescent; badgered by interservice rows with army and navy. Mission: Strategic nuclear deterrence—ICBMs and intercontinental bombers (SAC); continental defense in the air; in tactical combat, interdiction of battlefield, close air support, airlift for the army. Budget: $22.8 billion for fiscal 1972 as against $22.9 billion in 1971, $24 billion in 1970 and $25 billion in 1968. Strength: 757,000 right now, to be reduced to 747,000 by 1973; 54 Titan IIs (liquid-fueled ICBMs, the largest weapon in our nuclear arsenal); 1,000 Minuteman (solid-fueled); 552 strategic bombers; 2,600 fighter and attack planes; 17 cargo and troop-lift squadrons. Most Urgent Needs: New sophisticated tactical bombs and missiles to penetrate Russian antiaircraft defenses from points out of range of Soviet AA projectiles; more airlift capacity for troops (C5As); two new planes: a strategic bomber to replace the aging B–52, and a fighter to replace the old F4E. (The new B–1 bomber, supersonic, operational in 1978, will be smaller, faster than the B–52 with twice the arsenal; the new F–15 fighter, operational in 1973, will be an air-superiority plane, faster, more maneuverable than the F4E, with updated close-in guns and rockets.

The air force is young, uninstitutionalized, and it does not suffer from great brooding self-examinations. It has relatively few people problems. Its membership has always thought itself special. Rich in budget money over the years, it has provided comfortable living quarters which are the envy of the other services. Conditions are relaxed, discipline nonformat.

The man who presides over this service as chief of staff is a direct-talking, broad-shouldered, 55-year-old officer who grew up in SAC. In the tradition of his office, Gen. John D. Ryan offers his visitor a cigar. Then, committing a heresy that would make his cigar-smoking predecessors wince, he proceeds to light up a cigarette and puff on it as though it were, in fact, a cigar. He responds succinctly to the question: what does the air force need most?

"Modernization."

Down along Pentagon corridor "E" is the office of the director of defense research and engineering, Dr. John S. Foster, physicist, craftsman in nuclear configurations. He is wiry, 43 years old, and a shock of light brown hair is carefully smoothed back from the top of his forehead. In his shirt sleeves he sits down at the head of a conference table, leans back in a straight-back chair and talks, his face wrinkling and contorting as he makes his points.

"It seems to me that we'll have to have strategic bombers in our inventory for the foreseeable future. The B–52s are about 17 years old and they'll be more than 25 years old before we can replace them with the B–1."

The strategic missile picture?

Foster walks to the other end of the table where missile models stand like a forest. He starts pushing them around like chessmen. As he moves each Soviet missile, he places the U.S. equivalent beside it.

"Here is the SS–13. It's their first solid-propulsion ICBM and about the size of our Minuteman. These here are the Russian intermediate missiles—shorter ranges. And this big one (meticulously painted green with thin red stripe and hammer and sickle) is the SS–9, the largest ICBM in existence. It's like our Titan. They have less than 300 of them. If they were to deploy, say, another 125 of them, and the whole force were MIRVed with three warheads apiece, they'd have the capability of taking out almost every one of our Minutemen."

Prowling around the end of the table, Foster reaches to push a black-and-white ICBM model into place. "But now we're putting in Minuteman III, and that's a MIRVed missile."

The tactical picture?

"Do you know that we haven't built a really new fighter plane since 1955? The Russians turn one out every year. They've just shown a family of six new planes that have more maneuverability and acceleration than anything we have. But we're taking action to get two first-class fighters—the F–14 for the navy and the F–15 for the air force."

Foster doodles on a white scratch pad, drawing arrows from one side to the other. "We've got to arm our air force planes with 'smart' bombs and air-to-ground missiles. We have to be able to penetrate the Russians' air defenses. We certainly don't want to have to resort to throwing our aircraft and pilots against all that fire. I think a far better tactic is to stand off a a safe distance and fire missiles which will home in on their defenses and knock them out. We don't have any such missile in operation now."

A go-ahead for SAC's new B–1 bomber would be controversial: opponents argue that it is redundant with Minuteman. However, a human crew has the initiative and judgment a missile does not have. SAC is an elite command, and normally it keeps a 40% ground alert: within 15 minutes of warning, 200 nuclear-armed bombers and airborne tankers would be off the ground. When real trouble is imminent, SAC goes on a 40% air alert: 200 planes airborne, the remaining 300 ready on the runways.

One cannot be as sure as that about the Minutemen emplaced inland in the U.S. The missile cannot be tested in the silo from which it is meant to be fired, for fear that a down-range mishap would kill people and damage property.

"This is a serious matter," says Dr. Foster. "Let's face it, since we haven't done it yet, we can't be sure the Minuteman will fire from its operational silo. We test it every other way. It should fire. But we haven't proved it. The navy," he adds, "doesn't have the problem because it can test-fire Polaris and Poseidon at sea."

Several years ago the air force tried to test Minuteman publicly. It figured out a way to test-fire a Minuteman in North Dakota so that, only seven seconds after launch, it would drop harmlessly into a nearby field. VIPs were invited out to watch, as the event promised to be an occasion. The great silo cover rolled back; the switch was turned on. Flame and smoke spewed from the silo; there was a rumble of noise. The missile didn't budge. Two more times at other sites the air force tried again and, to its embarrassment, the same thing happened. Official explanation: unique conditions; the launching mechanism had to be disconnected from the established nationwide hookup and specially wired for the test. Says a colonel, pained by the memory, "Oh, those seven-second tests! We should never have done the damn things. The system isn't designed for them."

Since the air force cannot test-fire Minutemen from operational sites, it does so from two silos at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, where they are shot out to sea. The exercise works in lottery style. At any moment, without warning, a Minuteman crew at any silo anywhere in the country receives the order to take its missile to Vandenberg. By truck trailer and cargo plane they fly it to the coast where they themselves do the firing in the Vandenberg silo. There, the firing record has been good.

But the doubt continues that the unused inland silos are precisely the same as the proven ones at Vandenberg. Though it firmly believes they are precisely the same, the air force has a plan to stake out a firing range from the north midland states (where numerous Minutemen are emplaced) into the Rocky Mountains. Carrying it out would entail moving people, cattle and sheep away from the line of fire and would cost $30 million, an expense the air force says it cannot now afford.

The air force is dueling with the army on one flank and tilting with the navy on the other. There are several high-ranking officers in charge of repelling hostile boarders, and one of them is Maj. Gen. Leslie Bray, the enthusiastic and voluble 50-year-old spokesman for air force doctrine. Two of his current worries:

"The army wants its own helicopters for close air support. Okay in a benign environment like Vietnam, where the enemy has no air power, but even there they're losing a hell of a lot of choppers. Against a modern army with artillery and planes, the army's Cheyenne is a duck on the pond. An air force plane can loiter over the battleground and still have the speed and power to fight off air attack.

"As you know, the navy is pushing to take the ICBMs out of the silos and out to sea. I've even heard it suggested that our Minutemen be transferred to freighters roaming forever around the oceans. Certainly the navy, with its underwater missiles, should play a big role in our overall strategy. Submarines are hidden and mobile and, I agree, have good survivability. But a sizable share of our missile strength has to stay on terra firma."

Why?

Bray shrugs. "If we move all or most of our force to sea, we could face a protracted war at sea, a nonnuclear war of slow attrition. One of our subs is suddenly reported missing. How do we react? A week later another mysteriously disappears, and two weeks later a third fails to return home. Stop and dwell on this. It raises all sorts of possibilities, none of them good."

THE NAVY

Condition: Morale fair to very good; vulnerable; without more money and congressional-civilian support, potential disaster ahead; only military service confronting—day by day, ship against ship—the power of

the Soviet Union. Mission: Responsible for Polaris system; for attack by sea, for sea-lane control, for world "presence." Budget: $21.5 billion for fiscal 1972 as against $19.6 billion in 1971, $20 billion in 1970, and $18.3 billion in 1968; 1972 figure up from this year's, but not enough to regain strength and decisive superiority. Strength: Challenged by Soviet navy in numbers, technology and fleet profile; outnumbered three-to-one underwater, but in nuclear subs about even; superior in carriers (the Russians have none); seriously weak in missiles to attack enemy ships; many surface ships too old and too slow; 11 aging air wings, but Russians have no shipborne naval air. Most Urgent Needs: Crash development of sophisticated missiles and bombs to attack enemy ships; vastly improved techniques in antisubmarine warfare; electronic interception systems to protect surface ships against Soviet missiles; development of high-speed surface ships; new fighter to replace the Phantom (the F-14, faster with more range and firepower, will be operational in 1973).

Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, chief of naval operations, is forward-looking, dynamic, strikingly handsome. He has shaken up naval rigidity about beards and sideburns (his are long and flecked with gray); he is trying to make the navy an inviting place to work.

Sitting in his office, leaning forward with his elbows on his knees, chin slightly jutting, he deals with his implicit constant worry; that on some hideous day in the onrush of history his navy will not be able to concentrate the superiority it needs in a confrontation with Admiral Gorshkov's navy. In the last two years the U.S. fleet has been cut from 900 to 700 ships, and Zumwalt has personally presided over the liquidation of 108 of them—most of them, fortunately, obsolescent.

"Our ship construction has declined. The downward trend was accelerated by Vietnam. Go out and look at our ships, old tin cans and cruisers built in World War II. See for yourself how patched up they are. We should have been spending at least $3 billion a year on new construction just to replace our obsolete ships. Instead, because of Vietnam, we averaged less than two-thirds of that amount from '64 through '71."

He speaks of the navy's role as a four-part assignment: first, "Strategic Force"—putting our missile clout underwater, away from the homeland; second, "Sea Control"—keeping the shipping lanes open and getting the supplies through; third, "Projection"—attacking across the cleared oceans, carrying planes, marines, soldiers, cargo; and fourth, in peace or war, "Presence"—showing the flag.

Presence. Here is the suggestive arm of diplomacy—gesture of friendship, note of assurance, implication of threat, glimpse of power. The Soviet navy has learned about presence. Its fleet already is in the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, along the coasts of Africa and, in time, probably will be in Chile: stopping at ports, establishing bases, offering its support and friendship. It is moving out into the world in a kind of neocolonialism, with people and equipment following along behind to firm up the arrangements made—to build the bases from which they can operate ships, submarines, planes, and from which the expansion continues.

"The President and Secretary Laird believe in the navy. They're cooperative. But it's up to the Congress. Last year it cut us back $800 million and that was a serious blow. Now we've asked for $1 billion more. Will they give it to us?" Zumwalt shrugs his shoulders, arms spread out. "The Congress represents the people, and when the Congress says no—as happened last year—that must be what the people want. And the people seem to be against what we're trying to do."

The Soviet navy began in World War II as a defensive coastal fleet with a strong emphasis on the submarine. In the late '50s the Russians started their nuclear underwater development, pouring billions into it. They erected huge construction yards which, on a one-shift basis, build at least one nuclear sub a month. (The U.S. production rate is about five a year.) They have now matched the U.S. fleet in two categories: nuclear attack submarines (each about 50) and the even more critical strategic subs (with long-range ballistic missiles). In 1968 they revealed their new Yankee (NATO designation) nuclear-powered sub, which is similar to the latest model of the Polaris and can fire a missile almost as far. At least 17 Yankee-class subs are now prowling the seas, some regularly patrolling both U.S. coasts, and more are being built at the rate of eight a year. These figures do not include some 250 diesel-powered subs of modern design, which were built in the '50s and '60s. Besides converting Polaris to Poseidon, the U.S. Navy is beginning to build 17 nuclear attack submarines, at $170 million apiece, to start coming off the ways in 1974; final delivery in 1977.

Eyeing the U.S. surface fleet right after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the Russian admirals noted that its primary striking power lay in the capabilities of the carrier task force. Instead of building carriers and planes to fight carriers and planes, they decided to build the world's most modern system of tactical guided missiles. Their ships now bristle with them.

The Russians, on defense, can fling up around their ships a deep, broad antiaircraft missile screen designed to hit attacking U.S. planes at a distance before they can get close enough to strike. On offense, one dangerous weapon of the Soviet tactical missile system is a stand-off, air-to-ship guided missile fired from big-land-based intermediate-range attack planes. Another more ominous weapon is its ship-to-ship "cruise missile"; there are at least six types with accurate ranges of up to 200 miles. They are launched from surface vessels but, most important, they can also be fired from submerged submarines.

The U.S. carrier, always vulnerable to underwater attack, is now wide open from this new direction and its power thereby blunted. Worse, our navy has no cruise missile of its own. If it did, it could wield the same offensive threat the Russians now have, plus the thrust of an air arm the Russians do not have.

It will be two to three years before the navy gets its first true cruise missile, to be called the Harpoon. The navy is now testing an interim cruise weapon, the Standard, which is a short-range antiaircraft missile fired from an antisubmarine rocket-launcher. It will be operational by the end of this year.

Vice Adm. Gerald Miller, newly named commander of the Mediterranean's Sixth Fleet, sits in a deep sofa in the living room of his Norfolk home. He wears brown slacks and a tan jacket. At 51, he is one of the youngest and most junior of his rank. Ebullient, impulsive, words alternately flow and burst out of him.

What about the Soviet navy?

"They've become good seamen. They handle their ships well and seem to be pretty nice people, at least from signal distance. They're cooperative about our keeping track of them around Cuba. The other day a new Soviet destroyer appeared there for the first time, and the skipper of one of our destroyers flashed a blinker message in Russian asking him to report his position every day. The Soviet skipper answered back in amiable English, agreeing and congratulating my man on his Russian.

"Gorshkov! I don't know how he did it. He must be a genius. He started 14 years ago and now he's got a first-class fleet. And his ships make us drool—new, beautifully equipped, fast. He's a man I'd certainly like to meet."

Sixty days on patrol, 30 at home, then the cycle repeats—way of life of a Polaris crew. Eugene Parks Wilkinson, vice admiral and commander of the Atlantic submarine fleet, was the first naval officer to skipper a nuclear sub and take her to sea. In the tradition of his service, he tells little of what goes on under the sea. But he says enough to let one know that it is an evolving mutual search for the other side's subs, an eerie game of watch and be watched, of trail and be trailed, of hiding and listening in the valleys of the ocean floor. "Yes, we think we know where the Russian subs are, but can you ever be sure?" The accelerations of a smartly handled nuclear submarine are swift and elusive.

Our Polaris submarines navigate for 60 days without surfacing—by charts of the sea bottom, by inertial guidance, by loran C, by fathometer, by satellite. All calculations pour into computers which, in seconds, tabulate the positions. At any given moment a patrol must know where it is within 200 yards. Should it have to fire its missiles, accuracy of aim depends on knowing the precise position of the firing.

It is reliable scuttlebutt around the Atlantic fleet that on maneuvers Wilkinson's submarines regularly penetrate our own "antisubmarine warfare" defenses. The navy has sub-killer teams of destroyers and helicopters, antisub projectiles, sonar, and detection buoys dropped from planes or helicopters.

But the trouble is, the technology of the submarine has outdistanced the technology of defense. The nuclear submarine is faster than most surface ships, it is more silent, more maneuverable, more accurate with its sonar, more deadly in its armament. New antisubmarine destroyers are being built, but even these have stirred a controversy about whether they are already outdated. At the moment, and probably for some time to come, the best antisubmarine weapon is another submarine. The final answer may be a surface ship so fast that a sub cannot catch it. The hydrofoil is under increased study; so is the hovercraft.

Dr. John Foster gazes at the ceiling of his office overlooking the Potomac, and dreams. His new U.S. fleet would travel on foils and on a cushion of jet-produced air to lift above the sea, be propelled by equally powerful air jets in its stern. "It is," he says, "what technology is all about—getting ahead uniquely and surely. If we can make this work, it will keep us a jump ahead of the Russians. Imagine a 70-knot navy; 50 knots in heavy seas; big ships. Carriers. A fleet transformed!"

MARINES

Condition: Excellent; roles limited and sharply directed; traditional stress on professionalism; morale high and down-to-business. Mission: Readiness for anything that comes along, planned or unplanned, including full-scale amphibious assault; autonomous yet allied to the navy. Budget: $1.8 billion in fiscal 1972, down from $2.2 billion in 1971, $2.7 billion in 1970; most fighting efficiency for dollars spent. Strength: 220,000, but coming down to 206,000 by the end of 1971—or three divisions and three wings. Most Urgent Needs: A vertical-take-off close air-support jet fighter, a new landing vehicle, a new navy-provided ship to deliver a 2,000-man amphibious force, complete with helicopters and landing craft. All three are in the works.

"General Chaisson's quarters?"

"Please get out, sir, and wait for your escort."

From the darkness emerges a six-foot-six captain with white cap and belt, dress sword, dark-blue heavy coat, gold hilt, buckle and buttons gleaming even in the dim light. The

officer of the day, he marches along the concrete walk with such an erect and contagious military swing that anyone next to him, even with civilian coat flopping around below the knees, must fall into step.

Hup, two, three, four . . .

"Like this duty?"

"It's great."

Hup, two, three, four . . .

"Where were you stationed before?"

"Vietnam; been here six months."

Hup, two, three, four . . .

"Here's the general's quarters. Have a good evening, sir."

"Thank you."

Lt. Gen. John R. Chaisson is deputy chief of staff of the Marine Corps. Son of a New England boat builder, graduate of Harvard, he has fought in three wars and is the rising intellect in the corps, a brilliant and blunt man. He feels "good" about the corps. "We're amphibious shock troops, emissaries, police, whatever comes up. We are prepared to move the elements of a division from either coast in a matter of hours, with the whole force following within a few days."

Chaisson is wearing gray flannels and a tweed jacket. Highball next to him, feet up on a stool, he launches forth on today's kids.

"They'll listen if they get facts, not pap. I'm called on a lot to give speeches in colleges. There might be 700 kids in the hall wondering what this jerk from the military is going to say. I start out this way: 'If I were to tell you that the Russians have as many intercontinental missiles as we have, or maybe more, you wouldn't be surprised. If I were to tell you that the Russians have a bigger army than we have, you still wouldn't be surprised. But if I were to tell you that the Russians have a navy which is almost as powerful as our navy in some ways and more powerful in others, you would be damn well surprised. Well, that's what I'm telling you.'

"It grabs them."

Until recently Ray Davis, general USMC, wore three stars on his shoulders and was in command of Marine Corps Schools and the Development Center in Quantico, Va. He has been promoted to the second job in the corps, assistant commandant. A slim man with a gentle southern intonation in his voice, he does not at first reveal the tough fibers within him. The ribbons on his chest reveal some of it: two Silver Stars, the Navy Cross, the Congressional Medal of Honor won in Korea during the retreat from the Chosin Reservoir (Ray Davis, a general said, "brought the 7th Regiment out on his back").

Davis: "I gave a talk the other day to the class of second lieutenants. I told them, 'If you gentlemen are interested in the length of your hair, or your sideburns, beards or mustaches, you're in the wrong service.' "

The corps reflects the personality of its commandant. Gen. Leonard F. Chapman is a 57-year-old southerner, an erect, somewhat aloof officer who demands elegance of detail in performance. Since taking over as commandant in 1968, he has carried the corps through a potentially disruptive time and brought it out ahead. Ugly rivalries between the marines and the army, accusations about diverging tactical choices and different fighting styles in Vietnam boiled, but stopped short of erupting. Chapman publicly ignored them, privately muffled them and kept the corps about its business. While the army and the navy eased their disciplines, Chapman told his marines to toughen up. The military haircut is very much in evidence around his headquarters, and some of his officers are reviving the Sam Browne belt, though he himself is not yet wearing his.

Toughening up reflects Chapman's personal belief. But it is also aimed at recruiting. Chapman is counting on a backlash civilian sentiment against permissiveness in an elite fighting force. So far it is working. The marines need 35,000 enlisted volunteers and 2,000 officers a year, and they are meeting recruiting quotas in every U.S. city except New York.

The commandant: "I'm determined to preserve our manners and bearing. I've just gotten the okay from defense to make our blue uniform regular issue for enlisted men. I want to see a whole division parading in 'blues.' What a sight!"

PROPOSAL

The money we are spending for military defense—$66 billion a year exclusive of Vietnam—is not enough even to maintain parity with the Soviet Union, let alone regain the superiority we are losing or have already lost in critical military categories. That's a lot to spend—to the detriment of domestic problems which demand the same money and more—only to lose out. If we are serious about defense vis-à-vis Russia (and, in a decade or so, China), *we must either go on paying more and more, or figure something else out.*

The following proposal is an effort to figure something else out.

There is hope that the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) between U.S. and Soviet representatives will save the day and cut the costs for everyone. If that happens, everybody will gain. If it doesn't happen, what are we to do?

This proposal is based on new strategies, technologies and strengths, all to be completed and in operation (except for SAC requirements) by June 1974. It is based, too, on a change in the way the military has for years divided up the money. Each of the four services has its own money bin. As strategy is made and money allocated each year, these bins rise and fall proportionately. If an economy drive is on, all bins dwindle proportionately; if spending is in the air, they increase proportionately. Only occasionally does one bin swell above the proportionate allocations to the others. Bin-leveling has become practically institutionalized since its start in the late '40s. We should change the relative sizes of the bins and reshape the strategy whose demands fill them.

The Triad, for the most part, should be let alone. Its role as a deterrent, a retaliatory system, is essential. But there is danger in relying entirely on the technology of missilery, so it would be a mistake to let SAC and the manned bomber fade away into obsolescence with the B–52. The new B–1 bomber must be built and should begin, as already planned, to take over in 1978. With the completion of the MIRVed Minuteman III program, the U.S. will have enough sophisticated land-based ICBMs. After that, any new ICBM weaponry should go to sea. The navy's Undersea Long-Range Missile System (ULMS), future successor to Poseidon, promises to be such a weapon. The decision on whether or not to press ahead with it awaits results of the SALT talks. We should press ahead with research and development anyway. If SALT turns up with good news, we can cancel ULMS.

Safeguard is a limited ABM system to protect Minuteman and a few other prime targets. It should be canceled. The U.S. figures Minuteman can penetrate the Soviet ABM network with adequate megatonnage, and it is logical that the reverse would be just as true. The key to deterrence is the threat of annihilating offense—not a defense against it.

The Army is already reducing from 1.3 million men to 900,000 (13 divisions), but it should reduce further—to 500,000 skilled men, furnishing six superbly equipped reinforced divisions. They would constitute a highly mobile force organized for air or sea lift and have the accouterments of the automated battlefield. Instead of supporting treaty countries with garrisoned troops, this army would provide support, as needed, through swift movement from the U.S.—and thereby preserve its strategic options and eliminate the logistical costs, the human problems and the dangers of unnecessary involvement arising from being scattered permanently around the world. They would become elite divisions summoning up the spirit of the former army. Soon, we may hope, they would be genuine volunteer forces. Equipped with the Cheyenne helicopter, they would pilot and control their own close air support. They would be backed by a knuckled-down U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard.

Only one reinforced army division would continue to be deployed overseas—in NATO, whose countries exclusive of the U.S. can put into the field a force of more than a million men. The recent U.S. decision to maintain 4⅓ divisions in NATO is largely political and sets a base of troop strength from which to negotiate with the Russians. One division would be as much of a showpiece, underlining U.S. support, as the understrength, underequipped divisions now there.

The Air Force is spread over the world. It has a vast network of 50 bases, and it keeps many tactical squadrons watching for long periods of time where there may be nothing to watch. The air force should cut back its number of tactical wings from 21 to 14, a personnel cut of 40,000, an aircraft cut of 700. Excluding strategic air defense areas, it should shut down 43 bases in favor of the strategy of swift, long-range movement of its squadrons from U.S.-centered pools. The deserted airfields should, by arrangement with the countries involved, be kept ready for potential use.

The air force is already working on long-range tactical movement. Known as the "Bare Base" operation, studies and exercises are going on at Langley Field under the command of Gen. William Momyer. Momyer is preparing to move entire tactical wings by in-flight refueling to any threatened location or combat zone within 48 hours at most. They arrive complete with meshed runways (if needed), water, fuel, food, ammunition and spare parts for the first two days of fighting, after which more logistics are flown in.

Capacity for troop lift is a key to this proposal because the success of the reduced army will depend on efficient and ready mobility. The air force should be able to lift in 48 hours one light army division to any foreign area, and in theaters as close as Europe in a day or less. It is a crucial demand and, aside from the technology and organization needed, it succeeds or fails on the teamwork—or lack of it—between the two services.

In conjunction with the navy, the air force should develop the critical "smart" missile or bomb needed to cope with the screens the Soviets fling up around their land targets and ships. To provide close air support for treaty-country troops, something like the A–X—with firepower punch and loitering capability—should be built in limited numbers for "bare-base" operations.

So far, under this proposal, the money bins of the army and air force are reduced; but the navy's would be filled higher.

The Navy should proceed with what it is doing now, but faster:

Press a crash program to develop Harpoon and other cruise missiles to match the Soviet cruise weapons.

Press perfection of a compact missile defense system to protect carrier task forces against enemy cruise and air-to-air missiles.

Build a fleet of fast, cheap sub-killers.

Develop hydrofoil and surface-effect ships.

Continue modernization of the carrier force for use in antisubmarine warfare and as a way of deploying ready, ocean-roaming airstrips.

Keep building subs.

The Marines are on the right azimuth. But the corps will be too big, even when it has reduced its strength from 300,000 to 195,000—three divisions and three wings. That size is the legal floor for the Marine Corps, set by act of Congress in 1953—a level the Congress should be willing to lower. Two divisions and two wings of that remarkable corps—about 150,000 men—are sufficient: one division on each coast, providing three seaborne battalions in the Atlantic, three in the Pacific.

Strategically, a defense posture with naval emphasis is sensible for a country which, by geography and history, is a maritime nation, dependent on the seas for much of its protection, for most of its international trade, and in large part for the safety of its alliances and interests abroad. No one can control all the seas; but the power which is able to mass a convincing superiority at the point of confrontation can sway diplomatic decisions, the course of history—and do it without a fight.

Today the U.S. Navy is the service bearing the brunt of Soviet confrontation. It is challenged and vulnerable. The logical approach is not to cut the navy back, which is what has been happening, but to put a fast, sure and serious rebuilding effort into it.

The proposal for military redesign just described will save a total of $9.5 billion a year. However, $6 billion of this, through 1974, will have to be plowed back—mostly into the navy, some into the army and air force. Thus, we achieve a defense which gives us not only an effective strategy and a stronger defense in the critical areas but a net saving of $3.5 billion to start with. Once new costs have been funded and a start made in paying for them, the net savings, which are based on permanent manpower cuts, will begin to increase. And this does not include additional savings that are possible in another area where costs can and should be cut: the Pentagon itself, which is monstrously overstaffed and overorganized.

The treaty countries from whom we withdraw our forces would at first be distressed. But the withdrawals, to be completed by mid-1974, would take place gradually, giving the countries time to adjust to the fact that their own armed forces must bear the initial responsibility if trouble arises. The U.S. would have the strategic option to help: first, with its enlarged, faster navy, including carriers and marines, and second, with forces swiftly lifted and "bare-based" in from the U.S. To assure the treaty countries that U.S. support is as implicit in the new system as in the old garrison concept, we would be able to execute timely maneuvers in a given country or alliance, forcefully demonstrating the modern techniques.

For most of our history, our military stance has been inconsistent. Its size and shape have varied with the peaks and valleys of war and peace. As our involvement in Vietnam subsides, the temptation, as we look down into another welcoming valley, is to breathe another marvelous sigh of relief. That would be a mistake. Until the international realities change, we must keep ourselves militarily fit and progressive. But we should make a serious effort to do it with intelligence, imagination and efficiency. The old way is obsolete, wasteful and hopelessly expensive. Besides, it isn't working.

Mr. DORN. Mr. Speaker, since 1965, the Soviet Union has engaged in an unprecedented program of building up her naval forces on a worldwide basis. There has been a special emphasis upon a traditional area of Soviet concern—the Middle East. It is in the Middle East, that President Nixon has stated that there exists the greatest risk of nuclear war.

Perhaps the key impediment to Soviet expansionism in the Middle East, and by implication, the reduction in the possibility of nuclear war breaking out is the U.S. Sixth Fleet. The deterrent capacity of the Sixth Fleet lies primarily in the ability of the fleet to decisively defeat the Soviet Mediterranean fleet. That ability is waning every day.

The Soviet Union now has deployed IL–28 Maritime patrol craft at the former U.S. Air Force base in Libya, Wheelus Air Force base. These aircraft now can maintain constant surveillance of Sixth Fleet vessels. Moreover, it seems that every major capital ship in the Sixth Fleet is now shadowed by Soviet missile-launching surface vessels. It is, therefore, becoming less and less likely that the Sixth Fleet can continue to present a credible deterrent to Soviet expansionism in the Middle East.

It is imperative that the Congress take the initiative to seek to build up and modernize the military forces of the United States if they are to continue to guarantee the security of our country and of our allies.

Recent remarks by U.S. Senator JAMES L. BUCKLEY have crystalized the problem of the growing loss of ability of the Sixth Fleet to cope with the Soviet buildup. I include Senator BUCKLEY's remarks in the RECORD:

THREAT TO THE 6TH FLEET

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, as the distinguished Senator from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT) has pointed out in his remarks, in a period of just 5 years the Soviet Navy has grown from a coastal defense force of negligible importance into the world's most modern naval force. Her surface fleet now exceeds 2,000 ships; and over the past two decades, she has produced 585 modern conventional and nuclear submarines as compared with 110 for the United States. On the other hand, in the past few years, the U.S. Navy, which once sailed unchallenged in every ocean, has grown in creasingly obsolescent. Our submarine force has now more or less stabilized at 142 vessels; and since 1968, the number of ships in the U.S. fleet has declined by about 30 percent. We now have 270 fewer vessels in active service than we had in 1968, and half of this loss has been in surface combat ships.

Russia's transformation into a major naval power, perhaps the major naval power, has important implications around the globe. This morning, however, I will confine my remarks to the impact of these developments on the military situation in the Mediterranean because this is the area in which any United States-Soviet conflict would most likely take the form, in military terms, of a naval conflict.

The growing Russian presence in the Mediterranean and along North Africa poses obvious threats both to the southern flank of Europe and to the Middle East. It is the Middle East. It is hte Middle East, however, which is under the most immediate pressure. It is, in fact, the area which was singled out in the President's state of the world message last February as the one in which a United States-Soviet confrontation was most likely to occur, a confrontation which could spark a third world war.

The Middle East is a region of decisive strategic importance for the global balance of power. It is a crossroads of land and sea communications between the continents. Its oil deposits, by far the largest known on earth, are critically important for the economies, perhaps even the survival of Western Europe. Thus the critical interest of the West in preventing Russia from acquiring dominance of the Middle East is self-evident.

What is less well appreciated, however, is that the 6th Fleet has been the principal instrument on which we have relied in implementing American policy in this vital area. For over 20 years that fleet has assured the West of the unchallenged control of the Mediterranean Sea. And it has been the power represented by the 6th Fleet which American Presidents have relied upon to back our policy decisions. As of today, however, *it is* no longer certain that the 6th Fleet can long survive the kind of deterrence required to contain Soviet ambitions in the Middle East.

Since 1965, the Soviet Naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea has increased fourfold. Total Soviet ship-days have grown from about 4,000 in 1965 to 18,000 in 1970. On the other hand, total U.S. ship-days in the same region have declined from about 17,000 to 13,000 over the same period.

This development becomes especially significant when one takes into account the differences in missions of our respective navies. The mission of the U.S. Navy is to assure this country of the use or control of the seas at times and places of our own choosing. On the other hand, the Soviet Navy has an objective which places fewer demands upon their resources. Their objective is simply to deny the U.S. Navy the ability to carry out that mission. For this reason, the types of vessels in each fleet are different.

The United States still has a significant advantage in gross fleet tonnage in the ratio of about two to one; 4 million U.S. tons to about 2 million Soviet tons. However, when one examines the specific numbers and character of the major and minor surface combat vessels of the United States and the Soviet Union, the growing ability of the Soviets to deny the U.S. Navy the use of the seas becomes apparent. While the United States has 249 major surface combatants to the Soviets' 214, Russia has at her command 1,795 minor surface combatants to America's 309. This disparity is especially important because in the patrol craft category, all 160 Soviet patrol craft are equipped with surface-to-surface missiles of the variety which sank an Israeli destroyer in 1967, while none of the U.S. patrol craft are so equipped.

The Russians now routinely patrol the Mediterranean with naval units of a size and number which increasingly challenge the ability of our Navy to support a credible American presence in the area. According to an article published in the New York Times on March 14, 1971, the Soviet Black Sea fleet, which operates in the Mediterranean, is composed of 62 surface craft and 40 submarines while the U.S. 6th Fleet possesses only 45 surface vessels, and from six to eight submarines. Moreover, the Soviets have acquired basing rights for their surface vessels in Port Said and Alexandria in Egypt; their submarines are reprovisioned at the former French base of Mers-el-Kabir in Algeria; and the movements of 6th Fleet vessels are continuously monitored by Soviet maritime surveillance aircraft operating from the former U.S. Wheelus Air Force base in Libya.

Because of the continuing erosion of the 6th Fleet's ability to meet the Soviet challenge in the Middle East, one major objective of U.S. foreign policy; namely, the preservation of the State of Israel, will become increasingly difficult to carry out. The Russian-built air defenses in Egypt have already deprived the Israelis of their ability to duplicate the preemptive attack on Egyptian airfields which they carried out in 1967. Further, the growing Soviet naval strength in the Mediterranean will significantly weaken Israel's position in bargaining with the Egyptians because it is no longer clear that the United States has the power to deter Soviet intervention on the Arab side in the event of renewed Arab-Israel hostilities. If this inability of U.S. naval forces to support American foreign policy objectives is not reversed by modernization of our forces,

the ability of Israel to survive as a nation through the 1970's is called into serious doubt.

The 6th Fleet has also been a vital link in the defenses of Western Europe, a link which has become increasingly vital as one by one the Western Powers have abandoned military bases in Morocco, Algiers, and Libya. Thus any doubts as to the fleet's continuing ability to discharge its mission in the defense of the NATO alliance will have the most important impact politically and psychologically on future decisions made by the member countries. To the extent that their confidence in the security provided by the NATO alliance is eroded, to that extent will they become tempted to make accommodations with the East which would increasingly isolate the United States.

There are the implications of our deteriorating military position in the Mediterranean. We simply cannot afford, at this critical time, to lose sight of the fact that in the last analysis our ability to achieve our essential policy objectives in the Mediterranean basin and elsewhere depends on the plausibility of the military power which we can mobilize in their support. This is what makes it so vitally important that we reverse the damage done to the 6th Fleet in particular, and to our Navy in general, by the budgetary constraints under which it has had to operate in recent years. We simply cannot afford to fall further behind the Soviet Union.

I submit, Mr. President, that the hard realities leave us no choice but to rebuild our defenses to the level which are required for us to maintain the peace.

Mr. President, this morning after I had prepared my remarks I came across an article in this week's Newsweek magazine entitled "A Mediterranean Tide Runs For the Russians," written by Arnaud De Borchgrave, which supports the details of my position. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A MEDITERRANEAN TIDE RUNS FOR THE RUSSIANS

(By Arnaud de Borchgrave)

Aboard the U.S.S. Springfield last week, a young naval intelligence officer could hardly contain his admiration for the latest Soviet warships steaming in the Miditerranean Sea. "That's a beauty," he said, pointing to a photographic blowup of a Kresta-class guided-missile cruiser. "There's nothing like it on our side." Standing nearby, Vice Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, the commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, readily agreed. "A humdinger," he said of the Soviet ship. "Only 3,500 tons. But it's got the punch of a pocket battleship."

Nowadays, the Soviet Union packs quite a wallop in the Mediterranean. On a typical day last week, the wall-to-wall situation room (map) at NATO's surveillance headquarters in Naples bristled with symbols for Soviet men-o'-war: 55 versus the 44 in the Sixth Fleet (map). And Russian political influence in the strategically important inland sea has grown apace with its fleet. Last week, the Kremlin dispatched Ambassador Mikhail Smirnovsky to the Maltese capital of Valletta in hopes of securing an embassy in the one-time British possession. Both British and American spokesmen professed to see no threat to the NATO installation on Malta, doubting that its newly elected leftist Premier will turn over those naval facilities to the Russians. But there was no mistaking their fear—expressed also by Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan last week—that the successful Soviet penetration of the Mediterranean is bringing about a fundamental change in the balance of power in the area.

There is no question in my mind that the Russians see America's loss of taste for international leadership as the opportunity to become the dominant power in the Mediterranean and, ultimately, in the entire Eurasian land mass and adjacent oceans.

U.S. admirals in the Mediterranean claim to be confident that, in the event of a military showdown, the Sixth Fleet could still overwhelm the Soviet fleet and fulfill its "second strike" nuclear mission against assigned targets in East Europe and southern Russia. This claim to naval superiority is evidently based on the American fleet's two aircraft carriers, ships whose firepower the Soviet fleet cannot match on a ship-to-ship basis. But it is worth remembering that the newly installed Russian tactical air force in Egypt—which has recently been dug into 220 hardened sites—can fly cover for the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean and, if need be, attack the U.S. flat-tops. Moreover, some military experts are convinced that the two U.S. carriers have already been effectively neutralized by the latest Soviet guided-missile cruisers to arrive in the sea. Finally, the ships of the U.S. fleet are of much older vintage than the Russian vessels, and at the present rate of deployment, these experts believe, the Soviet Mediterranean fleet will clearly surpass the American armada in potency by mid-1972.

In the eyes of West Europeans, this expansion of Soviet power is directly related to critical changes in the American home front. The Europeans realize that the bitter taste of the Vietnam war has soured the U.S. on overseas commitments, and they are coming to believe that they may soon have to fend for themselves. But with the proliferation of Soviet power in the Mediterranean and along Europe's oil-supply routes, Moscow hopes to discourage a separate European defense effort as futile, thereby encouraging a trend toward West European neutralism. The combination of neo-isolatioism in the U.S. and neutralism in Europe could be the mix that removes the Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean without a shot being fired.

Raymond Cartier, one of Europe's most widely respected journalists, recently wrote: "America has given Europe a quarter of a century of invulnerabiilty but Europe has not had the foresight to transfer some of its opulence to the problem of its own security. The withdrawal of American forces in the relatively near future is a certainty. The Mediterranean is now blanketed by Soviet naval power lapping against Europe's southern coastline. The northern front has also been outflanked by the same Soviet naval power reaching into the Atlantic."

Disarray: If Europe existed as more than a geographic expression, there might be an alternative to U.S. power. But many countries that now might wish to reduce their dependence on one or the other of the two superpowers regretfully conclude that there will be no European alternative for a long time to come. The European monetary union project, a prerequisite for an integrated European defense community, was dealt yet another blow in the Franco-German summit meeting last week when Chancellor Willy Brandt and President Georges Pompidou failed to reach agreement on the status of the floating Deutsche mark (page 69). This kind of European disarray, coupled with the fact that the U.S. is already in retreat—at least psychologically—means that things will continue to go Russia's way in an area of vital concern to the entire Western world.

Many Western officials and commentators, convinced that gunboat diplomacy is dead in an age of multi-headed nuclear missiles, have dismissed the Soviet effort in the Mediterranean as wasteful and useless. But the Soviets know better. When Egyptian President Anwar Sadat purged pro-Soviet plotters from his entourage two months ago, Moscow managed to more than offset its losses; it swiftly extracted from Sadat a new fifteen-year treaty that tied Egypt even closer to the Soviet Union. Among the many reasons that led Sadat to sign the treaty, presumably one was his belief that the massive Soviet presence in the Mediterranean was visible proof of Moscow's commitment to the Arab cause.

Vacuum: The same kind of gunboat diplomacy, Europeans fear, might be used in countries all along the North African and European littorals of the Mediterranean in the years to come. Nonalignment is tantamount to a power vacuum in the Soviet book, and with the withdrawal of Western influence from North Africa, the Soviets are making a determined effort to move in. Morocco, the last remaining monarchy in North Africa, is ripe revolution—as last week's attempt to remove King Hassan showed—and the Soviets would be happy to help. Europe-oriented Tunisia, squeezed between revolutionary regimes in Algeria and Libya—and heavily dependent on ailing President Habib Bourguiba—would be another likely target.

The Soviet power in the Mediterranean basin will also make itself felt in the critically important Persian Gulf area once the Suez Canal is reopened. The gulf area supplies 60 per cent of West Europe's and 90 per cent of Japan's fuel needs. The British are phasing out of the gulf later this year and the U.S. has no intention—or desire—to fill the power gap. Moreover, London's plan for a gulf federation collapsed and the oil sheikdoms are about to opt for independence. "A few modern Soviet warships calling regularly at these ports and entertaining impressionable sheiks will work miracles," a longtime gulf resident told me. "Especially if there is no countervailing U.S. force."

It won't be long before the sheiks realize where the real power lies. The Soviets already have twenty new warships on station in the Indian Ocean (as against two U.S. ships). Anticipating the reopening of the Suez Canal, they have also just completed construction of a new naval base at Port Sudan on the Red Sea (in return for free MIG's and tanks for the Sudanese), halfway between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. Should the Soviets successfully expand their Mediterranean presence into this part of the world, they would be able to exercise additional political leverage on Western Europe by controlling its sources of oil.

Détente: No one suggests that the Soviets don't have a right to be in the Mediterranean in whatever force they wish, and in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf for that matter. But what is needed is a credible countervailing force. Instead, America is pulling out, and Europe is dithering. In the past five years, NATO forces in Central Europe have been allowed to run down by 25 per cent (including the loss of 500 aircraft). During the same time, Soviet forces alone, on the same front, have increased by six divisions. Despite U.S. pledges to maintain and improve its strength in Europe, it was revealed two weeks ago that two Air Force squadrons were pulled out of Europe in 1970 without a word being said to America's European allies. "The very prospects of détente," commented the outgoing NATO civilian chief, Manlio Brosio, last week, "have created a climate in Western opinion in favor of unilaterally reducing NATO force levels." Moscow, of course, remains unencumbered by the restraints of public opinion, and whenever anyone in the West tries to halt the drif toward a lax defense posture, the Russians fire off accusations that such talk impedes détente.

Even more important than Soviet intentions, however, is the American trend toward introspection and isolation. "The steady encroachment of Congress on the President's ability to conduct foreign policy," one of Europe's leading policymakers told me recently, "means that a formal pledge isn't what it used to be." Moreover, the release of

the Pentagon papers has, in a sense, vindicated those in the U.S. who regard power politics as evil and un-American. But that doesn't mean that the power realities will oblige us by simply disappearing.

Under these circumstances, Europeans are keeping their options open. Even Franco Spain and the colonels in Greece are doing what they can to improve relations with Moscow. For by conveying the impression that over the next few years domestic affairs will enjoy priority over foreign affairs, America is, in effect, telling Moscow: "This is your round in the Mediterranean. Make the most of it." It is an absolute certainty that the Russians will do just that.

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, pressures are growing toward a nuclear test ban and cancellation of Cannikin. Before acceding to any such pressures the President and Congress should weigh very, very carefully the probable long-term results by way of narrowing of U.S. national options which such an action would entail.

Cancellation of Cannikin would be tantamount to a bald public confession that Safeguard is dead and that the Spartan will never be deployed. We could not develop the warhead it requires. Aside from its direct adverse effects upon U.S. national security such action would certainly risk opening a wide credibility gap between our words and our actions. Note up to now our consistently strong insistence on the essentiality of Safeguard. That has been our national posture since March 1969, suddenly and unilaterially to abandon the possibility of any ABM at all, even for the national command center, would have deleterious effects on SALT and sacrifice our only leverage to obtain limitations on Soviet strategic forces.

Of even greater deterrent would be the effect of a nuclear test ban. Consider the following:

According to the policies and strategies announced by the President and Secretary of Defense—the Nixon doctrine and realistic deterrence—the United States commits itself to honor its overseas security commitments. The strategy for doing so has been specified essentially to be deterrence, which will be accomplished by means other than the large-scale commitment of U.S. ground forces anywhere overseas except for Europe during the next couple of years or so.

Irrespective of what may come out of SALT, even if nothing comes, a new strategic balance has been established, by which the United States has a 3 to 2 inferiority in numbers of strategic offensive missile launchers—ICBM's and SLBM's—and a much greater inferiority in throw weight, that is, payload capability. This, however, does not mean that the United States has become incapable of deterring a nuclear attack. Despite these numbers, it still retains a sufficiency for deterrence.

But, whether we regard this overall strategic situation as inferiority or parity or mutual sufficiency, the result is at best a stalemate at the strategic level. Hence, U.S. strategic forces are relevant to deterrence only for direct nuclear attacks on the United States. These forces are virtually irrelevant to deterrence of lower levels of violence and particularly as regards conventional aggression by means of limited theater attacks outside the United States, even in NATO.

Pressures for troop reductions in U.S. forces, first, overall and, second, specifically in Asia and Europe, will continue to bring reductions and withdrawals, further limiting the U.S. ability to honor its commitments by employing only conventional type weaponry. Many, particularly Europeans, believe that NATO cannot or will not match the U.S.S.R./Warsaw Pact forces in conventional, nonnuclear forces. This situation is bound to grow worse as U.S. manpower levels in Europe are reduced over the next several years.

Thus, with a stalemate at the strategic level and inadequate conventional defenses against large-scale but limited theater attacks, reliance for theater deterrence rests, if it rests any place at all, upon tactical nuclear capabilities as the only remaining military alternative.

Any review of the unclassified literature, however, reveals that these capabilities are, first, old and based on out-of-date technology largely of the 1950's, and, second, of higher yield, dirtier, more inflexible, and more handicapped by outmoded survival, safety, and dual capability characteristics than need be. Yet the very same literature hints that we have the technology to develop a credible "war-fighting" tactical nuclear capability which is survivable, accurate, flexible, discriminate, low-yield, and clean.

I well realize that many people regard the subject of tactical nuclear development and improvements as taboo. But it seems to me that we have boxed ourselves into a position where we are going to have to resort to a clean and discriminate new generation of such weapons or simply let the chips in the game being played under cover of the overall strategic nuclear umbrella be picked up by the other side.

This box can be got out of by means of a refurbished tactical nuclear arsenal which is credible to use because its destruction can be limited to the battlefields of land and sea. Such a posture can enhance deterrence without trying the impossible task of coupling all scales of hostilities to a now incredible threat of first use of U.S. strategic retaliatory forces. All we need is full appreciation of the need to modernize, and the will to do it.

Such a program should be given high priority by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Government as a whole.

A modernized and credible tactical nuclear capability—credible in that the threat of its use for deterrence, rational defense and war termination without great collateral damage to our allies can be recognized as obviously inherent in its characteristics—is essential to maintain theater deterrence and therefore essential to U.S. commitments and policy in accord with U.S. alliances, the Nixon doctrine, and realistic deterrence.

Any move toward a comprehensive test ban treaty, of course, would foreclose this option based upon stockpile changes and leave us with either, first, reliance upon eroded and inadequate tactical nuclear and conventional general purpose force capabilities, or second, a tacit retraction of our commitments to the security of allies, U.S. interests overseas, and world stability.

I would hope, Mr. Speaker, for at least some rational consideration of these suggestions, something at least a little better than the customary knee-jerk negativism that characteristically has greeted the mere mention of the tactical nuclear stockpile and its inevitable problem of obsolesence.

Mr. J. WILLIAM STANTON. Mr. Speaker, the fact the Soviet Union has suddenly bypassed the United States in strategic weapons is one which has not yet been understood by the American people.

From 1968 to 1970, the Russians have approximately tripled the number of their deployed ICBM's. No similarly rapid escalation of strategic forces has occurred since World War II. In the decade 1965–75, they are expected to have at least quintupled the number of deployed nuclear delivery systems.

This escalation of destructive power consists of three major components: counterforce-capable missiles—SS–9; missiles for urban-industrial targeting—SS–11's and SS–13's; and submarine-launched missiles, formerly of a cruise type and more recently of a ballistic type similar to our Polaris.

In an analysis of their developments Charles Benson points out that:

The SS–9 counterforce weapons (i.e. weapons designed for use against the U.S. nuclear strike capacity) are the startling new element. Each carries three five-megaton warheads, which are designed to attack the three silos in the triangle configuration in which our Minuteman missiles are deployed. . . . Over-all, the Russians appear to be headed for a 25 per cent to 50 per cent numerical superiority in offensive and retaliatory delivery systems; they already have a five to one superiority in megatonnage, and are headed toward as much as a twenty to one superiority if they choose to use a smaller number of high yield warheads rather than low-ield, high-accuracy warheads as employed by the U.S.

The serious implications of this situation are beyond the imagination of most Americans who continue naively to believe that their Nation is the most powerful in the world. Mr. Benson states that:

The potential rupture of the strategic detente could completely change America's relations with the rest of the world, including those with our closest allies, by weakening the credibility of the U.S. "nuclear umbrella." The policy of avoiding positive action while tacitly encouraging the achievement of "parity" by the Soviet Union has already proved itself a failure. If uncorrected, it will eventually lead to some form of strategic surrender by the United States.

Such strategic surrender can only be avoided if steps are swiftly taken to restore our position of superiority. This can only be done with the proper leadership making the American people aware of the grave risks of pursuing a policy of parity, or sufficiency while the Soviet Union is determined to achieve superiority for itself.

Mr. Benson states that:

The United States, having committed itself to a policy of abstention from aggressive war, is burdened by the need to deter any attack upon itself and presumably upon its allies. If the present basis of our strategic deter-

rence should fail, our policies must be drastically changed.

Unless something is done now, this failure will become a reality. To illustrate the nature of the threat before us, I would like to share with my colleagues the thoughtful article, "Deterrence Through Defense," by Charles Benson. It appeared in the March 9, 1971, issue of National Review, and I insert it into the RECORD at this time:

DETERRENCE THROUGH DEFENSE

(By Charles Benson)

The United States, having committed itself to a policy of abstention from aggressive war, is burdened by the need to deter any attack upon itself, and presumably upon its allies. If the present basis of our strategic deterrence should fail, our policies must be drastically changed.

In the popular consciousness, and to an alarming extent in the mental processes of our political leadership, deterrence is equated with fear; it is supposed that our strategy of deterrence works because the enemy is afraid of our weapons. Naturally he is afraid of them; they are frightful enough, and we are afraid of them ourselves. But military decision-makers do not operate in a context of fear. Their strategic and operational planning is done in conditions often far removed from direct combat. The commanders who effect these plans are inured to fear, and insofar as humanly possible they ignore it. The natural reaction to the effects of nuclear weapons—the reaction which the layman is likely to have—does not dominate the decision-making process which establishes the conditions under which these weapons are to be employed, to the extent that military and civilian professionals contribute to that process. In the normal organization of both superpowers, the influence of professional military expertise in these decision processes is formidable indeed, and it could hardly be otherwise.

The nature of deterrence is rational. To deter an act is to make the potential perpetrator of that act realize that it will avail him nothing. He must be made to realize this clearly and in advance. If he is not acting rationally he may go on and do it anyway; a strategy of deterrence will not be operative against him. Thus any strategy of deterrence must posses a certain psychological finality, an absence of doubt. A treat is not a deterrent; a questionable threat may act as an incentive to aggression. When doubt is introduced into a deterrent posture, deterrence vanishes.

MUTUAL DETERRENCE

Much of the confusion in recent discussions of nuclear strategy and weaponry in the Congress and elsewhere has resulted from a failure to understand clearly the nature of deterrence, and to keep it constantly in mind. Our nation has set upon itself the requirement, not of winning a nuclear war, but of deterring the initiation of such an event. It is by meeting this requirement during the past twenty years that we have continued to exist. The introduction of doubt into our deterrent posture is a war-generating process.

The stability of the nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Sixties was the result of an asymmetric detente involving both the level of strategic forces and the doctrine which directed the deployment and conditions of employment.

The Soviets almost certainly realized that no American President was likely to initiate a first strike under any plausible set of circumstances unless he was utterly convinced that a Russian strike was imminent (and even this was and will probably continue to be unlikely). According to our announced policy, our President would not even preempt under those circumstances, but would wait and order a second strike after the initial elements of any enemy first strike had been absorbed. Not only did we abjure launch-on-warning, but we did not press to acquire the necessary technology, and refrained from deploying weapons capable of targeting the Russian silos (or at least this was our publicly stated position).

The Soviets felt secure in maintaining a minimum deterrent posture that gave them a fairly high level of confidence that they could inflict a few tens of millions of casualties on the U.S. in a nuclear war—although by no means sufficient to destroy the U.S. as viable society. As the U.S. is now learning in the Middle East, and as the Soviets learned during the Cuban missile crisis, the power to deter is not necessarily the power to influence. The sobering character of this experience apparently encouraged the Soviets to build up a strategic nuclear force that could be plausibly employed in a first-strike role. Until the mid-1960s, they were unwilling to commit the research and development resources necessary to achieve such a capability.

America on the other hand possessed a substantial assured destruction capability during the entire decade. Even though we credited the Soviet government with enough malevolence to launch a first strike, we could not imagine a Soviet leader risking the loss of the Soviet Union merely for the satisfaction of having massacred the United States. As for a first strike of our own, this problem was considered by military professionals, but was not articulated in either crisis or non-crisis situations by a responsible political leader.

Russian deterrence was based on a first-strike philosophy, and American, on a second-strike philosophy. The Russians had no intention of striking second. They had almost no real suspicion that America might strike first. During the Fifties and Sixties, they were at least as much worried about an accidental war as about a calculated war resulting from a Presidential decision. Thus threat and counterthreat balanced for ten years even though the balance of forces was heavily in America's favor.

RUPTURED DÉTENTE

From 1968 to 1970, the Russians have approximately tripled the number of their deployed ICBMs. No similarly rapid escalation of strategic forces has occurred since World War II. In the decade 1965–1975, they are expected to have at least quintupled the number of deployed nuclear delivery systems.

This escalation of destructive power consists of three major components: counterforce-capable missiles (SS–9s); missiles for urban-industrial targeting (SS–11s and SS–13s); and submarine-launched missiles, formerly of a cruise type (i.e., air-breathing propulsion rather than rocket engines) and more recently of a ballistic type similar to our Polaris.

The SS–9 counterforce weapons (i.e., weapons designed for use against the U.S. nuclear strike capacity) are the startling new element. Each carries three five-megaton warheads, which are designed to attack the three silos in the triangle configuration in which our Minuteman missiles are deployed. The other weapons had been deployed earlier, but are suddenly being substantially increased in numbers. Their mission is destruction of "soft" targets, including cities, airfields, port facilities and the like. Over-all, the Russians appear to be headed for a 25 per cent to 50 per cent numerical superiority in offensive and retaliatory delivery systems; they already have a five-to-one superiority in megatonnage, and are headed toward as much as twenty-to-one superiority if they choose to use a smaller number of high-yield warheads rather than low-yield, high-accuracy warheads as employed by the U.S.

THEIR SCENARIO

The Russian first-strike scenario could be somewhat as follows: in a synchronized strike (some of their Polaris-type missiles, possibly together with FOBS (Fractional Orbiting Bombardment System), will wipe out our airbases, while most of the SS–9s will be used to destroy our Minutemen in their silos. At this point they will be in a position to destroy the United States no matter what we do, because our Polaris/Poseidon force is not expected to be accurate or powerful enough to strike their SS–11s and SS–13s, and even if it were, they would still have most of their Polaris-type missiles undischarged, holding our cities hostage in the event of a second and even a third exchange. An American retaliatory strike under these conditions would clearly mean suicide.

Thus they could rationally expect an American President to concede to a limited form of surrender after their first strike, even though our Polaris/Poseidon force and a few bombers and Minutemen remained intact. The perception that the Soviets have such a capability could cause an American President to back down in almost any important political crisis.

This is not a philosophy of an ideal or "splendid" first strike. The Russians are betting that an American President would prefer some form of limited surrender—for example, one allowing them to seize Northern China, the Middle East, and possibly even some part of South America—without nuclear retaliation. In these circumstances they could also rapidly complete the "Finlandization" of Europe. A major expansion of territory would give Russia much to consolidate so that she could afford to offer a long period of peaceful coexistence. American antiwar politicians and their allies would use the promise of such a period as a rationalization for nonviolence, even for unilateral disarmament.

This concept of a limited first strike makes "assured destruction"—heretofore the key to our nuclear strategy—an unwise posture, to say the least, in view of the magnitude of forces arrayed against us. Yet U.S. strategic doctrine remains committed to assured destruction, long after its usefulness has been obviated by events.

Within present weapons deployment, our only direct response (the U.S. MIRV program began earlier) to the developing first-strike threat has been to increase the blast resistance of our land-based ICBM silos. It remains very doubtful that we can absorb an SS–9 strike and retain our deterrant posture. Apparently, the situation has not yet deteriorated far enough for our government to admit this; although, if and when it does, it will probably try to suppress the fact.

If our side goes on a warning basis, the nuclear stalemate will be over. Russian fears of accidental or whimsical triggering will reemerge. Since they have from the beginning been committed to a first-strike philosophy, and will have developed a first-strike capability, they will be under pressure to preempt in order to prevent the U.S. from launching a disarming first strike.

DEFENSIVE DETERRENCE

The potential rupture of the strategic détente could completely change America's relations with the rest of the world, including those with our closest allies, by weakening the credibility of the U.S. "nuclear umbrella." The policy of avoiding positive action while tacitly encouraging the achievement of "parity" by the Soviet Union has already proved itself a failure. If uncorrected, it will eventually lead to some form of strategic surrender by the United States.

The influence of former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara has been perva-

sive in these matters. He emphasized in his testimony to Congress and elsewhere that he could buy assured destruction forces to overwhelm any Soviet ballistic missile defense more cheaply than the enemy could buy the defense, thus preserving deterrence through assured destruction for the foreseeable future. This position reveals a blind faith in the operability of deterrence and a blind eye to the inexorable historic dialectic between offense and defense, together with a remarkable indifference to the distinction between saving lives and killing people. Deterrence based on assured destruction is not always operable; if nonrational processes such as panic or anger take control of decision-making, no type of deterrence is operable; and we have a right to be interested in saving American lives, and also the lives of others.

The only fundamental addition to our strategic *offensive* capability which is available to us within the immediate future is a first-strike counterforce capability for our strategic attack forces, especially Minuteman and Polaris/Poseidon. We may be forced to make this change in order to preserve any effective threat against Soviet offensive power. But this change will not necessarily reestablish the stable strategic detente of the Sixties. On the contrary, many analysts before that such an advance would be destabilizing.

The re-establishment of the mutual deterrence typical of the Sixties requires a satisfactory ballistic missile defense.

America needs a means of suppressing ballistic missile attack:

1) regardless of point of origin;

2) without detonating nuclear warheads, defensive or offensive, within the atmosphere, or at least cutting such detonation to a minimum;

3) without otherwise causing heavy local fallout in the case of atmospheric detonations or nuclear blackout in the case of high altitude detonations;

4) capable of being applied against satellite-borne bombs as well as missiles;

5) nonsaturable by MIRV and decoy attack;

6) capable of defending itself, or being defended, as a system.

The technology is either available or on the verge of being available to accomplish these objectives if the resources are committed to them. Unless these defensive criteria are fulfilled concomitantly with the Russian achievement of a first-strike capability, the predictable truth is that the United States will be faced with a choice between strategic surrender and annihilation, and that this outcome will occur during the 1970s.

If a satisfactory defensive system is to be deployed before 1980, America today needs an explicitly stated program, comparable to that initiated by the late President Kennedy when he announced that we were going to put a man on the moon within the decade. This program would not be a waste; it would not be an international pr stunt; it would be a program concerned with the real task of preserving human life in the real world.

Research on defense against ballistic missiles began with the Nike-Zeus project back in 1956. The feasibility of such a defense was widely disbelieved, not only in popular thinking but in the scientific community. People talked about "hitting a bullet with a bullet." This very feat was accomplished over Kwajalein in 1962 by a Nike-Zeus intercept of an ICBM fired from Vandenberg AFB. Skepticism as to the basic feasibility of ballistic missile defense (BMD) has thus been anachronistic for nearly a decade.

Nike-Zeus suffered from various limitations, primarily arising from the slow sweep rate of mechanically rotated radar antennas and the limited information-handling capacity of the associated computers. With the advent of phased-array radars, which depend upon purely electronic means for their sweep rate, and with the rapid progress of computer technology, these limitations were overcome by 1967. The Nike–X system, the successor to the Nike-Zeus, incorporates these basic advances as well as others.

BALLISTIC MISSILES

Nike-X operates by acquiring and tracking an incoming warhead with a phased-array long-range radar, designating this warhead as a target to the fire-control system and the tracking and guidance radar, which then fires a long-range Spartan antimissile to intercept the incoming warhead in late mid-course, above the atmosphere and several hundred miles from the target. In case of a miss, or if for any reason a Spartan has not been launched, or a kill has not been verified for this incoming warhead, the fire-control system launches a short-range Sprint antimissile to intercept the incoming warhead in the upper atmosphere, on the order of 75,000 to 100,000 feet above the earth. In this back-up Sprint intercept, there is the advantage that the radar can discriminate between real warheads and decoys after they have entered the atmosphere and thus the Sprint intercept is not likely to be spent against decoys.

Nike–X works. Given an incoming warhead within its range and operating characteristics, it will destroy that warhead with a high degree of probability; given two simultaneous inputs, it will destroy both of them; given five, it will destroy several and possibly all of them; but given five followed within a short interval by five more, there is very little chance indeed that the system will stop them all. This is due both to operating limitations, which while high are not infinite, and to environmental effects of large numbers of nuclear explosions within the atmosphere—especially blackout, in which the nuclear explosion itself blocks the rays on which the radar depends for detection of further incoming warheads. It is therefore particularly important that all means be used to stop missiles outside the atmosphere, in order to avoid overloading the very last defense, the Sprint stage, in which blackout occurs.

ENTER SAFEGUARD

Nike-X was turned down for deployment in 1967. Certain of the radars in the then-called Nike-X have been modified or replaced. Still, the present system, Safeguard, is the product of the same development project and the changes have been in the nature of improvement evolved during the continuing development effort. Additional improvements will include increased range and other capabilities of the radars, a slightly longer-range Spartan, and possibe replacement of Sprint with Hibex, a hotter and more maneuverable antimissile interceptor.

Safeguard has been the subject of a debate worthy of a crowd of evangelists faced with a pretended Second Coming. It is in fact a practical system for shooting down hostile H-bombs, and little more need be said about it except to note certain limitations and disadvantages. These are that it is saturable, which is to say that it can be overwhelmed by a sufficiently large number of warheads and/or decoys arriving in a short enough time interval; and that one stage (Sprint) relies upon nuclear explosions within the atmosphere for its kill effect.

The saturability factor can be improved, but not eliminated, by improving the information-handling capabilities of the radar and associated computers, and by improving the accuracy and thus allowing a lower-yield nuclear charge to effect the kill. It is not likely that any missile defense system now under development can eliminate the necessity of having the final shot at some incoming warhead discharge a nuclear explosion in the upper atmosphere. This is undesirable because of well-known fallout effects, and because of blackout. This non-improvable feature of Sprint should motivate a search for means of minimizing the number of warheads in an all-out attack which are allowed to reach the Sprint stage.

Thus far Spartan, an integral part of the Safeguard system using the same radars, is the only stage in advance of Sprint. Spartan kills in the last two or three hundred miles of the incoming trajectory. By this time the independent warheads in a MIRV are widely separated, but the true warheads are not yet distinguishable by present means from decoys. Spartan is therefore more subject to saturation than Sprint, even though blackout is not yet a problem, at least on the first launch. In the present system, therefore, Sprint will take more of the load, and most of the kill explosions will occur within the atmosphere. No modification or deployment of Safeguard can avoid this weakness.

Two other missile defense systems are currently being advocated. One is SABMIS, a sea-launched antimissile capable of intercepting hostile missiles in early mid-course. It has all the advantages as well as the disadvantages of a seaborne system. It is mobile, and thus could be deployed against different threats, or even to protect different countries; it can be located close to the enemy's shores, exposing his missiles to attack shortly after launch. In this early mid-course part of the trajectory, the independent warheads and decoys in each MIRV have not separated, or are just beginning to separate; thus a kill brings down the entire vehicle, destroying all components of the MIRV at once. The explosion is outside the atmosphere. As of the present, the Department of Defense is against going ahead with a SABMIS system, primarily on cost-effectiveness grounds. Technological advances might, however, overcome the present objections.

The Air Force is studying a system that would use a modification through which the already available Minuteman would acquire antimissile capability. Early studies show the system to be entirely feasible, and probably cheaper than any other. Intercept would occur in mid-course. It could be used against orbital (FOBS) as well as high trajectories. The explosion would be far outside the atmosphere, and could be of high yield. Thus even though the MIRV components had partly separated, there would be a high probability of killing all of them in a single explosion. The Air Force also has under study a system called ABMIS, an airborne antimissile comparable in its effect to the Navy's SABMIS.

All of the above systems have multishot capability, in case of a misfire or a miss. All are within the present (1970) state of the art in electronics and missilery. They could be developed and deployed within a few years.

LASERS AND OTHERS

More exotic defenses have been studied. BAMBI was a projected spaceborne system which would have intercepted hostile missiles at launch, before their boosters had burned out. (This is a desirable objective, because any explosions, including secondary explosions, occur over enemy territory.) The system was determined to be non-feasible, not because it "wouldn't work," but because the task of maintenance in orbit would be prohibitively expensive. (This was the conclusion in terms of 1965 technology—at that time nobody had walked on the moon.)

The Defense Department is now conducting research into a giant laser, a concentrated beam of light in which the power density is so high that it will melt steel in milliseconds. Small laboratory- or shop-sized lasers have been in use for several years, but the idea of developing one of the huge magnitude required to kill a missile is still under study. The gas-dynamic laser seems

most promising. *Ordnance* Magazine has reported that a drone aircraft was destroyed in flight over an Air Force base in New Mexico by an experimental laser. The laser kills the warhead by generating such heat within it that circuits and other components melt, thus rendering the fusing and detonation systems inoperable and turning the bomb into a dud. It might tumble, and burn up within the atmosphere, or it might fall to the earth. The Russians are also known to be working on this idea.

The laser beam, if reliably operable, would undoubtedly be a superior kill mechanism, and it is conceivable that it could be mounted permanently in space without incurring prohibitive maintenance costs, because the mechanical systems within which it would operate are much simpler than BAMBI, and also because the reliability of electronic components and systems has been greatly improved over the past five years. Since the presently envisaged laser defense would be earth-mounted, its range and effect would be limited by atmospheric absorption and flicker. These limitations are serious and cannot be eliminated unless the system is mounted in space. For immediate (1971–74) purposes, the giant laser must be considered exotic technology.

ATTENUATION

We have available to us today at least three and possibly four defensive stages of demonstrated feasibility: a revised SABMIS (or substitute advanced stage), Minuteman (modified for antimissile defense), Spartan and Sprint. The last stage has by far the highest kill probability, but it suffers from major disadvantages. It is critically important that the proportion of the total missile defense problem handled by Sprint be minimized. Only by minimizing the load on Sprint can we minimize the probability of a successful hit by an enemy missile, because only in this way can we protect Sprint from being blinded by blackout or otherwise overwhelmed. Reducing the load on Sprint also minimizes fallout from our own nuclear explosions and fallout from possible detonations of hostile warheads by the kill process. If the number of incoming warheads dealt with by the Sprint stage at each Safeguard missile site can be kept small enough we have an excellent chance of avoiding any nuclear detonations at the altitude of maximum effect, and a fair chance of avoiding any nuclear detonations at all, except those from the relatively small charge of the Sprint missile itself. This achievement would make the protection of cities as well as missile silos feasible. Such a result cannot rationally be hoped for by means of Safeguard alone.

In order to attain satisfactory protection against a massive enemy strike, it is necessary to utilize not just one or two of the proposed stages, but as many as are feasible.

A four-stage Ballistic Missile Defense (Figure 1) would operate by placing SABMIS (or a substitute advanced stage) as close in to enemy shores as possible, from which vantage it would knock out some of the enemy strike before the payloads separated into MIRVs and decoys. This first stage would be backed up by the Minuteman modification, which would stop a portion of the strike, and by virtue of a high-yield detonation would also knock out entire payloads or perhaps multiple payloads, since the enemy's MIRVed components would not yet have reached full separation. When the remaining warheads, now fully separated into MIRVs and decoys, came within range of the Missile Site Radar (MSR), Spartans would be launched to effect a third attenuation of the attack outside the amosphere. As the remaining warheads and decoys entered the atmosphere, the decoys could be discriminated and Sprint would be launched against the true warheads only.

Thus, to protect the Sprint stage, the key and final defense element, from saturation by the MIRV technique we must put more stages of defense ahead of it, even though these stages may possess relatively low-kill probability. A kill probability on the order of one-half for the advanced stages is compatible with testimony of Defense officials before Senate committees. But whatever the actual probability, a multistage system, compared to the two-stage (Spartan, Sprint) Safeguard system, would reduce the proportion of warheads that got through to the final Sprint stage. This would mean a much smaller total megatonnage detonation in our atmosphere, and, in particular, fewer warheads detonating on target.

Because of the MIRV technique and decoying, Spartan is the least effective stage of the system. If an attack on the order of four hundred SS–9s were to come in against Safeguard alone, not only would the MSRs be overloaded in launching Spartans, but the entire stock of Spartans would be exhausted. Twenty-four hundred Spartans would have to be launched. Bearing in mind that roughly half of the incoming targets would be decoys and that roughly half of the remainder would be missed, eighteen hundred of the Spartans would be wasted. There is no similar waste in any other stage of the system.

WHY NOT MIMI?

There is an obvious answer to this weakness: MIRV the Spartan. The Spartan must be given multiple-kill capability in order to preserve a satisfactory attenuation coefficient in this stage of the system without excessive expenditure of missiles, as well perhaps as excessive reduplication of radars. (A similar effect could be improvised by resorting to a huge nuclear detonation, but this approach has obvious disadvantages.) MIRV, of course, is not the appropriate acronym, because the Spartan warhead is not a re-entry vehicle. Something like MIMI, for Multiple Independent Missile Interceptor, might be suggested.

To accomplish this by the guidance techniques presently utilized in the system might require extensive redesign of the MSR, which is already the most complex radar ever designed. If the MIMI components themselves had maneuverability and homing guidance, the maximum redesign required in the MSR would be the capability to designate and hand off control to the homing guidance. The question would be the cost and feasibility of a set of maneuverable MIMI interceptors with homing guidance mounted on a Spartan configuration, against the extent of redesign required for the MSR to take over guidance of a multiple set of interceptors as they separate from a Spartan.

Extension and refinement will tend to diminish somewhat the probable success of the system described, but not in sufficient degree to alter the major conclusions:

1) a 99 per cent or better ballistic missile defense is achievable against a massive missile attack within present technology;

2) any BMD within present technology, in order to cope with a massive enemy strike, must consist of successive stages of defense applied at different segments of the hostile missile's trajectory;

3) the portion of the defense which is loaded upon Sprint—or Hibex or whatever final stage—must be minimized in order to realize the full potentiality of the defense;

4) Spartan is the weakest stage in the proposed system, and must be given multiple-kill capability in order to apply the high-kill probability of Sprint to the best advantage.

THERE'S MORE

The four-stage defensive system can provide adequate defense against any attack reasonably to be expected in the early and middle Seventies, and can be deployed in time to forestall an SS–9 first strike. But the enemy will do his best to complicate the problems of this defense. Specifically, he will do everything possible to improve his FOBS, which theoretically can attack from any direction, thus multiplying defensive problems indefinitely, and he will endeavor to develop a spaceborne system.

The only type of defense that can literally stop anything is one that destroys the missile at launch, or at any rate during the launch and boost process, before it has entered its final trajectory. Such a defense would be applicable against cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, satellites and possibly even aircraft. It would destroy them at their point of origin, before they could be decoyed or disguised, or engage in evasive maneuvers. Such a defense would, essentially, put a fifth stage ahead of the four stages of attenuation already discussed. Depending upon the effectiveness of this fifth stage, the others might be reduced or even phased out completely. Depending upon the promptness of its development, it might be possible to substitute such a boost-stage defense for SABMIS and Minuteman from the beginning.

BAMBI is the only such system which has so far been envisaged. It was turned down for good reason. It seeems impossible to conceive of such a system without assuming that it will be spaceborne. Yet most of the arguments used against BAMBI would apply to any spaceborne system. The most conclusive of these arguments is the inordinate expense of maintaining a complex system in orbit. Either the units must be returned to earth for periodic maintenance, and then re-orbited, or men must be sent aloft to service them. There is no such thing as a system so reliable that it does not need to be serviced. Returning the units to earth would mean fitting them with re-entry vehicles, which would greatly complicate the design of the units, which in turn would greatly increase the servicing requirements. Sending men up to service them would mean developing our ability to carry out docking operations routinely, and to perform delicate technical operations in space which are far beyond the present state of the art in space technology, as well as dependent on an enormous number of space launches.

It is significant that the Russian space program has tended to concentrate on near-orbit problems. The Russians hold the record for time spent continuously in orbit, a fact that bears witness to their achievements in life-support systems and space medicine; and they have a number of firsts in humble processes such as welding pieces of metal together in space, which we have not yet duplicated.

One possible way of decreasing the maintenance costs of a spaceborne system is not to mount all of it in space. The less we have to put up there, the lower the maintenance requirement will be. For example, the detection and fire-control systems might be in orbit, perhaps a deep-space orbit, while the interceptors themselves, or some of them, might be located on submarines as close in as possible to enemy shores.

This configuration would replace boost-intercept with early mid-course intercept. Again, if a sufficiently rapid and reliable communications channel could be established, only part of the fire-control system need be mounted in space. The large computers and associated elements could be located in earth bases. Location of the sensors and other data-acquisition elements in slow orbits out in the stationary orbit region (roughly 20,000 miles up) would not only drastically reduce the number of sensors required, but would eliminate thousands of cross-designation operations which might be involved in nearer orbits (depending on how the system was designed). The range would be great, but the consequent simplification of the system could be the key to its feasibility.

In another configuration, the data acquisition, guidance and computing functions

might be located in deep space, and the interceptors in near orbits, with semipermanent space stations serving as maintenance shops at a slightly higher orbit (Figure 2).

Shuttle operations would then supply the space stations, and the individual interceptor satellites could be called to the space stations for regular maintenance.

These systems implicitly accept the nuclear bomb as the kill mechanism. As already stated, the giant laser has been put forward as a superior kill mechanism; masers and conventional explosive bombs have also been discussed.

A space-mounted laser is a marvelously efficient device. Without absorption and refraction in the atmosphere, a laser beam can produce its almost instantaneous destructive effects at virtually unlimited range. Thus a giant laser could be mounted in deep space, with relatively few devices being required to cope with an attack on the expected scale. Reliability also might be superior to the near-orbit nuclear bomb, because of the smaller number of components required. Hence maintenance costs could be lower.

Whatever its virtues as a kill mechanism in relation to ballistic warheads, it would probably be unwise to bet our entire stake on the giant laser. It is a device in the research stage; we cannot yet estimate the lead time required for its deployment. Unforeseen difficulties, unforeseen and perhaps very simple defenses, or limitations on its application may make it impractical, or make a mix of lasers and other weapons more desirable.

SPACEBORNE DEFENSE

The over-all prospect as the Seventies progress is for an increasing vulnerability of all earth-based strategic systems, whether land, sea or air, to a spaceborne system. Such a spaceborne system would have the very significant capability of prohibiting the establishment of a similar enemy system. For this reason it is imperative that the U.S. move forward into a space-borne defensive posture as rapidly as possible.

It is less necessary in this discussion to envisage the system than to state the scope and character of the effort required in system development. In order to render a space-mounted defense system practicable, at least eight major development efforts must be successfully carried through:

1) perfection of a suitable kill mechanism, whether orbited nuclear bomb, giant laser, or both, or something else;

2) development of a delivery system or systems capable of intercepting missiles or satellites in arbitrary trajectories at orbital or near-orbital velocities;

3) development of spaceborne detection, fire-control and information-processing systems, presumably including large arrays of infrared sensors and radars;

4) development of vehicles, including a reusable booster stage, a space shuttle, and space tugs and taxis;

5) development of semipermanent space stations with life-support systems for extended manned operations;

6) development of long-lasting high-output power sources in space;

7) development of technical shop operations in space;

8) improvement of reliability of all system components.

It is evident that most of these efforts are more appropriate to NASA than to the military services; NASA has, in fact, already begun preliminary work on 4), 5) and 7). It is therefore desirable to reconsider the mission of NASA. The entire complex of industries, government activities, quality-control procedures and standards, and other features of the NASA program has displayed to the world a technical competence unexampled anywhere. This competence is dying out for lack of funding, which of course results from the lack of a suitable mission. If the NASA mission were redefined to include the development of a spaceborne defense system, the chances of our achieving an adequate defensive posture by the end of this decade would unquestionably be improved. As in the Apollo program, when the initial goal is set there remains much uncertainty and a lot of work. It took us nine years to get a man on the moon, and it may very easily take nine years to achieve a spaceborne defensive system. It is urgent, therefore, that we become involved in the project as soon as possible.

STRATEGIC ASPECTS

The primary strategic function of ballistic missile defense is to forestall the achievement of a first-strike capability by the Soviet Union, and thus re-establish the stalemate in strategic power typical of the Sixties. If this can be accomplished, American political leaders will be able to rock along from crisis to crisis indefinitely without drifting into a nuclear war unless someone exercises more than usually poor judgment. If the Russian first-strike capability is not forestalled, the best America can hope for during the remainder of the Seventies is an acquiescence to Russian expansion wherever it occurs, and a slow drift toward outright strategic surrender.

The key concept in present strategic thinking on the subject of a "credible" first-strike capability is *acceptable damage*. No one knows what an acceptable level of damage would be to the Soviet leaders, under a given set of circumstances. It is possible that the Russian leaders would be willing to accept a very large loss of population and industry in exchange for a virtually complete knockout of the United States. If they managed to save 50 per cent or so, there is no doubt that they could then proceed to polish off China, France, Britain and any other powers they chose to eliminate. In this sense, the United States is the sole protector, not only of our allies, but of many nations that consider themselves our enemies. Thus the "credibility" of the Soviet first-strike capability is a subjective concept, probably no clearer to the Soviet leaders than to our own. Basically, if the Soviet Union possesses the means to destroy our land-based retaliatory missiles (Minutemen), and if their submarine-based missile force equals or exceeds our own, then they will have a first-strike capability, whether any officials of our government choose to find it credible or not. This state of affairs is imminent in the early or middle Seventies.

A spaceborne defense is achievable by means of present technology and presently foreseeable advances in technology. The first nation that seriously sets about the task of developing it and putting it up there is going to have most of the say in international affairs for at least a decade and probably for the rest of this century.

More basically, the establishment of an effective ballistic missile defense will revive the importance of the strategic defensive as a successful instrument of national policy. During the past two decades everyone on earth has been tyrannized, not so much by any one nation as by the imperious superiority of the offensive. Under this strategic condition, the only means of stability is terror. It is reasonable to hope that the re-establishment of a rough balance between offensive and defensive strategic capability will permit a saner and more civilized approach to international relations than has been typical in recent times.

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Speaker, there has unquestionably been an erosion of U.S. military strength in the past few years. The fact that Soviet strength is increasing should come as no surprise in that they have been making steady efforts, year in and year out to improve their military posture. What is surprising is that the United States has taken no serious effort to halt the erosion of U.S. military strength—especially strategic strength, and the strength of key elements of our conventional forces on a worldwide basis.

At the present time the Soviet Union now has an 8-to-1 potential advantage in individual warheads which can be delivered by ballistic missiles. In is long past the time when we can discuss the possibility that the Soviet Union merely seeks "parity" with the United States. The well-known dimensions of the Soviet strategic nuclear buildup have gone far beyond the requirements of simple deterrence. It is become evident to all but the most ideological observer that the Soviet Union is seeking to use its new military strength to support her diplomatic objectives.

Recently freshman Senator JAMES L. BUCKLEY addressed the National Press Club on the subject of, "The Erosion of U.S. Military Strength: Can There be Peace Without Power?" In my view, Senator BUCKLEY's remarks are a cogent statement of what has happened to our military strength—and what is likely to happen to our diplomatic posture in the future if an early and rapid rearming of the U.S. strategic and conventional forces does not take place. I include the text of Senator BUCKLEY's remarks in the RECORD:

[From the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, July 15, 1971]

THE EROSION OF U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH: CAN THERE BE PEACE WITHOUT POWER?

(By Senator JAMES L. BUCKLEY)

I would like to talk about the urgent need to *re-order* our priorities.

In simpler times, when it was somehow easier to maintain touch with reality than it is today, it was understood that the first priority of any society was to provide for its own survival. This fundamental principle ought to be as self-evident today as it ever has been in the past. Yet for some time now we have been on an anti-military binge which has forced drastic cutbacks in large categories of defense spending which are essential to our security. As a result we are not only falling critically behind in the necessary business of military research and development, but we have allowed our existing forces to deteriorate to a point where the ability of the President of the United States to assure the defense of vital national interests may be in jeopardy.

Because of the attrition caused by inflation, these cutbacks have been far more severe than would appear on the basis of dollar figures alone. We have not simply cut the fat out of military budgets, we have been hacking away at the sinews and muscles as well. By way of illustration, because of inflation and because payroll costs have risen from 40 per cent of the defense budget for fiscal 1964 to 60 per cent of the defense budget submitted for fiscal 1972, in the coming year we will be purchasing 40 per cent less in military research and hardware than we did eight years ago before we became actively involved in the Vietnam war. These same figures have forced us over the same eight-year period, to reduce the number of our Navy carrier wings from 24 to 15, the number of our tactical Air Force squadrons from 119 to 105, and to reduce by almost 30 per cent the number of our active naval vessels, from 932 vessels to 658.

I take no pleasure in reciting these figures.

I have never had a consuming interest in military affairs, but because of the responsibilities of my office and because of the growing evidence of America's rapidly deteriorating defenses, I have found it necessary to seek out the facts. And the facts that I have been able to determine and their implications are so very serious that I feel I must do what I can to contribute to a better public understanding of what is at stake. We simply cannot any longer afford the blind attacks on just about every program for military research or military procurement which continue to be made in the name of an overriding need to reorder our priorities. Because in the words of Hanson W. Baldwin, "For the United States . . . the eleventh hour is here."

Now admittedly, there is no inherent virtue in maintaining extensive and costly military forces or in developing increasingly sophisticated weapons. No nation with peaceful intentions requires or can justify a defense establishment which is larger than that which is necessary to meet the needs of her own security. But the adequacy or inadequacy of a nation's defenses is not determined by consideration of domestic priorities, but by the power relationships within which it must operate. And we must keep in mind that in the real world, no country can conduct an effective foreign policy without a military capability which is appropriate to its responsibilities.

In our case, our responsibilities since World War II have necessarily been international in scope as they have concerned themselves primarily with the need to contain the aggressive outward thrust of the Communst powers. These are responsibilities which we did not seek, but which we cannot escape as the only free world power capable of facing up to the Russian challenge. In the past we have succeeded time and again—witness, for example, the Berlin and Cuban crises—in causing the Soviets to back away from confrontations which might have ignited a Third World War precisely because we had the military power to back the positions we had to take. The Soviets simply could not risk a test of strength. Our military might, in other words, has been the critical factor in our ability to maintain the tenuous peace which by and large has existed since the end of the Second World War.

While the effectiveness of our foreign policy has ultimately rested on our power to unleash nuclear devastation on any enemy, it has long been an accepted fact at home and abroad that it is unthinkable that the United States should ever initiate an atomic strike. Therefore, the whole fabric of our defense policy has depended on our having sufficient strategic weapons survive any attack launched by an enemy to assure us the ability to deliver a retaliatory strike which would inflict unacceptable losses. This is what our policy of nuclear deterrence has been all about. This is what has been called the balance of terror.

It has therefore been with deep concern that I have found my investigation confirming those recently published stories which conclude that we will soon find ourselves in a position where our deterrent capacity will no longer be sufficiently plausible to cause the Soviet Union to back away from future confrontations involving interests vital to the West. What this means, quite simply, is that we are rapidly approaching a point where no American President will be able to emerge from a political confrontation with the Soviet Union with our foreign policy objectives intact, whether that confrontation takes place in the Middle East or Western Europe or even in the Caribbean.

Since 1965, the Soviet Union has launched and sustained a truly extraordinary drive to increase and modernize every sector of her strategic and conventional forces. As a result, the Soviet Union now has a payload capacity in her intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles which is capable of delivering eight times as many nuclear warheads as the United States. This buildup so far exceeds any plausible requirement for a policy of deterrence that we can only conclude that the Soviet Union has developed this extraordinary capacity for use in support of her own diplomacy, a diplomacy whose historic goals have always been aggressive.

The conventional wisdom states that any development of nuclear warheads beyond a certain point, whether by the United States or the Soviet Union, is simply superfluous—the disparity in warheads representing merely an "overkill" capacity. I suggest however, that there is no evidence whatever that the Russians buy this analysis.

For an insight into what may be the Russian view, let us consider what might plausibly be the result of a hypothetical "first strike" attack by the Soviets on our strategic forces. If we assume that Russia's production line technology is equal to our own—and we must—then the existing three hundred Soviet SS–9's could each be equipped with between three and six independently targeted warheads, having a yield of from two to five megatons each. This would give their SS–9's the present capacity to deliver between 900 and 1800 warheads, each capable of attacking and destroying one of our Minutemen ICBM's. If we assume further that the Russians employ guidance systems equivalent to those available to us for our Minutemen III and Poseidon missiles, then a "first strike" attack by their SS–9's could destroy on the ground or in port about 90 per cent of our land based ICBM's, 50 per cent of our aging B–52 bombers, and one-third of our Polaris submarines before we could even consider a retaliatory strike. And this destruction of our deterrent force could be significantly increased by advances in guidance technology which our own research has already shown to be feasible.

Assuming such an attack, the Soviets would have left over sufficient forces-in-being to pose a continuing threat to our remaining strategic forces and to our cities. This remaining capacity would include over 900 SS–11's, over 400 submarine launched ballistic missiles, and nearly 200 bombers. We would, as of the present, still have the suicidal capacity to inflict devastation on those Russian cities not protected by ABM systems, but this remaining deterrence could soon be taken from us by any expansion of Russia's ABM defenses.

There are many, of course, who are pinning their hopes on the strategic arms limitation treaty negotiations which are now taking place between the United States and the Soviet Union. In a sensible, rational, truly peace-seeking world, we could have high hopes for the success of these discussions, and the optimist in me believes that such success may in fact be possible, but only if the Soviets are satisfied that we will not deal away our strength in exchange for unenforceable promises. One thing which ought to be clear is that we cannot hope for success if we hide from the cold realities of life, if we let ourselves be carried away by euphoria at every small concession. Let us keep in mind that the SALT talks are now in their second year, and that we have experienced the scope of our research and development of new and more exotic weapons. We simply cannot afford any longer to ignore the fact that the Soviet Union is currently spending $3 billion per year more than we are on military and space R&D, and that she is expanding these expenditures at the rate of 13 per cent per annum while ours have been declining. For us to continue to fall behind in this critical area is to invite a technological Pearl Harbor.

And further, we must devote a significant portion of this research to developing ways of reducing United States vulnerability to strategic attack. Specifically, we must capitalize on the promising advances which have been made in the once maligned Safeguard program, advances which indicate that major gains in effectiveness can be achieved within the next several years.

This, of course, suggests the need for a major shift in the U.S. strategic philosophy whch dominated our planning during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, and which still limits the options available to the Nixon administration. I speak of the theory known as "assured destruction." This doctrine, in brief, holds that our security is best maintained if we make certain that sufficient Russian and American missiles will survive any first attack to guarantee mutual suicide. This requires that each side maintain the vulnerability of its respective populations to nuclear annihilation. Thus, as a result of this involuted reasoning, it became the official policy of McNamara's defense department to make certain that our citizens were exposed to maximum danger. Our failure to deploy defensive ballisic missiles around our major centers of population has resulted in the grotesque implication that U.S. policy prefers dead Russians to live Americans.

Now the trouble with this doctrine is that the Russians have evidently refused to play the game in accordance with the McNamara rules. Since 1964, they have been deploying ballistic missile defenses around their major population center, Moscow; and this system, which is constantly being improved, now offers some measure of protection for 15 per cent of the Soviet population. And as I mentioned earlier, the Russians have expanded their offensive capabilities far beyond the limits required by a philosophy of "assured destruction." Under the circumstances, I cannot see how we can afford to delay any longer those measures within our capabilities which will assure some measure of protection to our major population centers; and I cannot view with equanimity any agreements which might be arrived at in the SALT discussions which would have the effect of preventing us from developing such defenses while preserving for the Soviet Union her current offensive advantage.

Our strategic posture, of course, is only part of the story. Under any philosophy of strategic defense, the objective has been to assure a balance of forces which will preclude a resort to nuclear warfare. But while the maintenance of such a balance might avert the horror of an atomic holocaust, it does nothing to eliminate recourse to more conventional forms of warfare; and to the extent that nuclear warfare becomes unthinkable, to that extent must we make certain that we maintain the conventional strength essential to our needs. But here again, while we have allowed our position to deteriorate, the Soviets have been overtaking us with astonishing determination and speed, with consequences which are far from academic.

Let me illustrate the significance of these developments by focusing on one area in which it is generally conceded that the West has strategic interests of critical importance. I speak of the Middle East.

Because of the extreme danger to the interests and security of the West which is posed by Soviet expansionism in the Middle East, and because Israel sits athwart Soviet ambitions, we have had a special interest in Israel's continuing independence. American policy, therefore, has sought to assure Israel of the weapons required for her defense against her Arab neighbors, while at the same time we have sought to dissuade the Russians from the kind of adventurism which might escalate Arab-Israeli hostilities into

an American-Soviet confrontation. To the latter end, we have relied on the United States Sixth Fleet to provide the credible threat required to deter the Soviets from any temptation to intervene on the side of the Arabs in an all-out attempt at a military conquest of Israel.

In the past, the United States has been able to achieve these twin objectives, and as a result she has helped to keep the Middle East from blowing apart. She has been able to avert, in other words, a crisis of the kind which might have triggered a third world war. But as a result of the persistent cuts in research and procurement which have been imposed on our military in recent years, it is no longer at all certain that the United States will continue to have the capability of meeting these objectives in the future.

The Soviet Union, for example, has recently introduced the MIG–23 Foxbat into Egypt's already formidable arsenal. This is an aircraft which can outshoot and outmaneuver anything the Israelis have, and we can do nothing about it because we simply have nothing in our existing military inventory which can challenge the Foxbat. And this of course applies to the primary aircraft utilized by the Sixth Fleet for its own defense and for support of ground operations. I speak of the F–4 Phantom which until recently the Israelis had also counted upon to maintain their air superiority. Yet it is typical of the blinders worn by so many in and out of the Congress today that there are active attempts to scuttle the F–14 Tomcat which is the only aircraft competitive with the Foxbat which we are in a position to deliver to the Navy at a reasonably early date.

But this isn't the only problem now facing the Sixth Fleet. The growing obsolescence of its combat vessels, the abandonment of NATO bases along North Africa, the rapid expansion of modern Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean, and the deployment of Soviet fighter, bomber and reconnaissance squadrons at air bases in Egypt, Libya and Algeria are reducing to the vanishing point the effectiveness of the Sixth Fleet as an instrument of American policy.

Because the simple, quite inescapable fact is that unless action is taken to modernize and reinforce the Sixth Fleet; and unless we are able to develop and deliver to Israel weapons which can challenge those which the Soviets can provide to the Arab states, we will find our Mideast options foreclosed. If our compulsive antimilitarism is not soon brought to heel, we will find that American foreign policy objectives will have become irrelevant because we will be without the means of implementing them. It will be irrelevant that the United States is committed to the survival of the State of Israel, or that the United States opposes a Russian hegemony in the Middle East, because in a showdown the United States will have no choice but to back down.

And once we begin backing down under pressure here and there around the globe, we will court the disaster of a third world war. Because aggressive nations seem inevitably to overestimate the readiness of free men to retreat. This was the lesson of the first and second world wars. It is a lesson which we will forget at our mortal peril.

Military forces are not a luxury but a necessity. So long as we live in a world in which some nations feel a compulsion to dominate others, we have no choice but to maintain those levels of defense which are essential to our survival. Great nations are not allowed the luxury of retiring from the world. For such nations, there can be no peace unless they have the power and the will to defend it.

NATIONAL DEFENSE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON) is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, I want to express my congratulations to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SPENCE), my colleague on the Armed Services Committee, for taking the initiative in setting up this time today—these 2 hours of special orders he and I have taken—so that together Members of Congress on a bipartisan basis could take some time to point out some of the more disturbing aspects of the current military situation that is facing the United States.

I do not intend to take all of my time, but I believe it is important we should spend some time pointing up some of the problems we face, recognizing that there is a different story to be told from just the criticisms of the military we hear so frequently.

Mr. Speaker, for the past year or more we have been beset by a mounting antimilitary movement, not only in portions of the country and in the public press but here in Congress as well, with special emphasis in the Senate but to a growing extent also in the House. This has been marked by repeated efforts to cut back our military forces, to block the development of new weapons, to discontinue our system of military recruitment, and a general bias, usually expressed in highly emotional terms, against the so-called military-industrial complex.

Mr. Speaker, I am sure that virtually all of us here in this Chamber are interested in obtaining peace, and I would think that most of us were also interested in eliminating excessive spending, not only in the military but elsewhere. Until recent years our basic objective had been to achieve military superiority over our chief potential antagonists, the Russians. This was superiority both as regards our nuclear capability and our conventional capability. Now our goal has been switched to "sufficiency." I am not sure whether this is a genuine change or only a semantic one, but the real crux of the problem is what is sufficiency? What is enough?

The point I want to make briefly here this afternoon is that while we have focused so much of our energies and our attention on eliminating unnecessary military activity, we are in real danger of having gone too far. We are in real danger of having started a process that has already cut our forces below what is adequate to meet our defense needs, and may even have already tipped the balance of world military power against ourselves.

Military strength is not an absolute. It is not something that can be considered in a vacuum. It is always relative to something else, like the old chestnut about "How's your wife?" and the rejoinder comes back, "Compared to what?" The real question here is how does our military power stand compared to the Soviet military threat which faces us around the world?

Frankly, the picture is not reassuring, and it is well for Members who take their responsibilities in this body seriously to look the facts squarely in the face. While we have been rapidly decreasing our military power, the Soviets have been steadily increasing theirs, and doing so on a worldwide basis. As happens in the case of two airplanes approaching each other from opposite directions, the relationship between ourselves and the Soviet Union has been changing a good deal more rapidly than many of us are aware.

Let me cite just three examples which will point up what I have been speaking about. The foreword to the 1971 edition of Jane's Fighting Ships contains these quotations which should be of interest:

> The size and relative capabilities of the United States Navy continue to decline at what many authorities consider to be an alarming rate. . . . The Chief of Naval Operations has told Congress that the Navy has "a lower than prudent level of current forces" and has "been falling well behind a responsible replacement rate."
>
> U.S. strategy calls for maintaining a capability for countering the other super-power at sea. But the Soviet Navy has already exceeded the United States in active surface ship and submarine numbers, including near parity in nuclear submarine strength (and a larger nuclear submarine construction program). In some respects the characteristics and capabilities of the Soviet ships obviously are superior to those of their U.S. Navy counterparts.
>
> In the strategic nuclear balance of forces the USSR has gained superiority over the United States in numbers of ICBMs and the megatonnage that can be delivered; and the current Soviet ballistic missile submarine construction rate of at least 6 submarines per year would give the USSR parity if not superiority in 'Polaris' type submarines by 1975 . . . Soviet progress in the strategic weapons area is of utmost concern to U.S. defense leaders because improved guidance and multiple warhead technology (MIRV) could permit the predicted Soviet strategic forces of the mid 1970s to destroy virtually all land-based ICBMs in a surprise first-strike attack.
>
> The situation for the U.S. Navy is serious. By any standards the Soviet fleet now represents the super-navy of a super-power.

These excerpts from Jane's Fighting Ships are of particular interest since this publication is not generally regarded as being an unthinking spokesman of the so-called military-industrial complex.

Second, Mr. Speaker, consider an article that appeared in the June 18 issue of Life by George P. Hunt, formerly managing editor of Life, under the heading "Our Four Star Military Mess: The Blunt Fact Is That We Are About to Become No. 2." Here are some quotes from that article:

> The truth is that the U.S. military establishment is in ragged shape—lacking in technology, undermined by inflation, by worn-out strategies, by entrenched old ways of top direct and allocating budget money. The Viet Nam war has ravaged it—gnawing at morale and discipline.
>
> In some 8 years Russia has caught up and is now going ahead of us in many categories of missile strength . . . It will take fast and skillful work to put the military back in shape.

Here are some other details the Life article inventories. The Soviets have roughly 1,900 ICBM's and submarine-launched missiles, 1,200 intermediate-range bombers, and 175 long-range bombers. In contrast the United States has 1,710 land- and submarine-based missiles and 552 long-range bombers.

Today the U.S. Navy is the service bearing the brunt of Soviet confronta-

tion, the article concludes. It is challenged and vulnerable. The logical approach is not to cut the Navy back, which is what has been happening, but to put a fast, sure, and serious rebuilding effort into it. Until the international realities change, we must keep ourselves military fit and progressive. But we should make a serious effort to do it with intelligence, imagination and efficiency. The old way is obsolete, wasteful, and hopelessly expensive. Besides, it is not working.

It is interesting to observe, incidentally, that this recent Life article pointing out the seriousness of our comparative military position still takes the Congress to task for our failures. Yet Life and other publications have until recently been attacking the same Congress and its individual Members for wanting to spend too much money on military weapons, and too little on other "more urgent" priorities.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, as my third example, let me cite some recent political developments that have not caused too much attention in the press but which have very profound and unfavorable implications for our future. Needless to say, our protection against the massive Soviet submarine threat involves our ability to keep track of these submarines. And one of the areas from which we have been able to observe their movements into the north Atlantic has been Iceland, from our important base there at Keflavik. Yet only the other day there was a change in the Iceland Government which was followed in turn by an announcement by the new leadership that our American base in Iceland will now have to be closed within the next 4 or 5 years.

Similarly, our ability to confront the Soviet forces in the Middle East with a credible deterrent depends very substantially upon the 6th Fleet forces stationed there, and upon their ability to operate in the eastern Mediterranean in the face of a superior Soviet force and a superior number of Soviet submarines. This kind of activity could not take place without adequate antisubmarine aircraft patrol operations in the eastern Mediterranean. Until now these patrol flights have been flown out of the British base at Malta. But the British are phasing their operations completely out of Malta in another year or so, and a recent change of government in Malta has led to a firm statement by the new Prime Minister that Malta will not welcome NATO forces nor will she welcome American forces to that strategic island. So if Malta is closed to the operations of the NATO forces in the Mediterranean, the balance in the Mediterranean shifts dramatically against us, and our ability to deter Soviet aggression in the Middle East and to come quickly to the defense of Israel in case of renewed hostilities, will be gravely eroded. This is the situation many of us here in this House have ignored.

Mr. Speaker, these disturbing facts can be multiplied at great length. The Armed Services Committee report on the 1972 defense authorization bill contains the information that as of May 1971 the Soviets have a total of 356 operational submarines compared to our 142. They also have a total of more than 92 nuclear submarines compared to a total of 92 for ourselves. Moreover, by 1975, the report states, the Soviets will have at least 70 nuclear submarines, which will give them a total of between 145 to 153, or a nuclear superiority over us of 50 percent in nuclear submarines. We, incidentally, are producing these submarines at a rate of about two or three a year at best. They are producing at a rate from 6 to 10 a year. Moreover their submarines are faster than ours and have achieved significant improvements in other areas.

The American fleet, as Jane's Fighting Ships has indicated, is already seriously obsolete. It is disturbing enough that the Soviets have considerably more ships in the Mediterranean today than we have, sometimes as many as twice our number. But in addition to that virtually all of their Mediterranean fleet units are modern ships, while most of ours are close to 20 years of age. Even by the time all of our recently announced fleet retirements take place, our fleet will have an average age of 15 years, while the Soviet fleet average will be 8.8 years. During this period the U.S. Navy has been reduced from 894 ships to 642 ships, or 21 ships less than we had at the beginning of the Korean war. At the same time the Soviet Navy has increased from 1,575 ships to 1,604.

Another disturbing comparison is the amount of money spent in the field of research and development. At the present time Soviet expenditures for research and development are more than $3 billion greater than those in the United States.

These are serious and sober trends, indeed, Mr. Speaker, and I believe it is time for us to be aware of them and of the future dangers that our actions today or our omissions are encouraging.

In announcing his new strategy of realistic deterrence, Secretary Laird was particularly careful to emphasize why this new strategy is based on the concept of realism. As a prelude to his report he said to the Congress:

> It's based on a sober and clear view of the multiple threats to peace that exist in today's world. It neither exaggerates nor underestimates those threats.

Accordingly, the new strategy has as its cornerstone an extremely clear perspective as regards the threat today and into the future.

Our task today is to meet an increasingly formidable Soviet threat while reducing the resources allocated to defense.

Five years ago, the United States possessed a marked strategic nuclear superiority. Our policy, and that of our allies, was based on the fact of that advantage.

Today, however, we face a Soviet strategic force that is roughly comparable to our own.

Specifically, the Soviets now have 1,440 land-based ICBM's, while we have 1,054—and have been at this level for several years.

Among the Soviet's ICBM arsenal are the monster SS–9 missiles, which are capable of carrying a single large warhead, and have been tested with multiple reentry vehicles since late 1968.

It is estimated that the SS–9's accuracy could be greatly improved by fiscal year 1976. This improved accuracy could present a serious threat to the survivability of undefended Minuteman silos.

Another area in which the Soviets are eroding our lead is in submarine launched ballistic missiles—SLBM's. Our Polaris fleet has been constant at 656 missiles for several years.

The Soviets now have at least 17 similar submarines operational, with a capability of launching at least 272 missiles, each of which has a range of 1,300 nautical miles. We estimate that at least 15 additional Polaris-type submarines are under construction. At present construction rate, the Soviet fleet will match or exceed ours by 1974. And this does not include the older Soviet missile subfleet, with more than 75 missiles.

The Soviet also have a large intercontinential bomber force—about 200, including about 50 tankers. Although this force continues its slow decline in numbers, we must not dismiss it. In addition, the Soviets do have a new swing-wing bomber under development and it is estimated to have an intercontinental range.

In strategic defense, the Soviets have a long lead. They have over 3,000 interceptor aircraft. Four new interceptors have been added in the last 7 years.

Furthermore, the Soviets have four different surface-to-air missiles—SAM's—with about 10,000 launchers currently deployed. Some of these launchers could theoretically be upgraded to ballistic missile defense. The Moscow ABM system contains 64 operational launchers. The Soviets are working on research and development of new ABM system components, including a new missile.

The Soviet Union is building up its strategic forces. The most obvious example of this is the massive increase in Soviet naval capability.

The Soviet Navy is projecting Soviet power to every area of the world. In the Mediterranean alone, the number of ships steaming days increased from 750 in 1963 to over 16,000 last year.

Last spring, the Soviet Navy conducted a worldwide exercise involving over 200 ships that was closely coordinated from Moscow.

In short, the Soviet Union is embarked on an unprecedented military buildup. While attacks on the United States are unlikely, if we maintain a sufficient deterrent capability, incidents in the past decade—such as the Cuban missile crisis—have shown that military superiority can play a vital role in crises and greatly increase a nation's political options.

We must always remember that weakness is more provocative than strength. Should deterrence fail—at any level—we and our allies must be prepared to counter aggression forcefully and to whatever degress is required to protect our mutual interests.

Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks I include a chart setting forth in greater detail the imbalance in our relative nuclear deterrent situation. In addition I include two articles by Joseph Alsop which appeared in the Washington

Post which bears directly on this subject. The first appeared on August 2, 1971. The second appeared just this morning:

Operational	United States	U.S.S.R.
ICBM's	1,054	[1] 1,500
Polaris-type submarines (number of boats/number of SLBM tubes)	41/656	[2] 20/320
Intercontinental bombers	569	[3] 175–195
Total offensive force loadings weapons	4,600	2,000
Air Defenses:		
Fighter-interceptors	599	3,000–3,300
Surface-to-air missile launchers	1,136	10,000
ABM launchers	0	65

[1] Includes ICBM's associated with MR/IRBM fields.
[2] With 15/240 more under construction.
[3] Includes 50 Bison bombers configured as tankers.

PRAYING TO BE WRONG

(By Joseph Alsop)

At this season, sensible men in their sixties head for the mountains or the sea. In four decades of hard work, moreover, this reporter has almost never used the pronoun "I" in the print. And this has only happened when the first person seemed wholly unavoidable, in order to record a very personal experience.

These ancient, sensible rules—regarding the pronoun as well as the August vacation—are both going to be broken in this space for a while, however. A personal explanation is needed. The truth is that unless I am gravely mistaken, I am the only reporter in this city teeming with reporters, who goes to bed every night praying that he is dead wrong.

It is an odd predicament for any reporter, since reporters always prefer to be dead right. Yet it is easy to explain why I pray that I am dead wrong.

I see danger—fearful danger—hanging over this country that I love. I keep hoping it is a mirage, in which case I shall indeed be dead wrong. Yet history says that the danger can be all too real.

History, of course, is sadly outmoded in the United States today. "Our young people," they now say solemnly (as though that were final), "have rejected history." At least in reverse, it reminds me of the story of Margaret Fuller and Thomas Carlyle.

Margaret Fuller was a self-inflated female belonging to Emerson's circle. She made the somewhat pompous announcement: "I accept the universe!" On hearing of her announcement, Carlyle remarked bleakly, "By God, she'd better!" As to rejecting history, the suitable comment is: "By God, better not!"

The existence of laws of history is firmly denied by the sleazy anti-historians who now flourish in the alleged history departments of so many of our universities. Unfortunately, however, history has its laws, although they were few in number. All can be included in a single sentence:

"Nothing endures, because there is always change and there is always war."

As will be noted, there are three statements in the sentence, that "Nothing endures," that "There is always change," and that "There is always war." If these statements do not express historical laws, it must be noted that human history, at any rate to date, has produced no exception to them.

No human society, however successful, has ever lasted indefinitely, for just the reasons stated. I can see no reason, either, to suppose that God, or providence, or history, has made a special exception in favor of our country.

If that is true, moreover, our country is now in a situation that has no real precedent in the past. By no accident at all, the main historical ages have been traditionally named after the main raw materials of men's tools and weapons—the Stone Age, the Bronze Age and the Iron Age, to be exact.

Now, however, we live in the age of the H-bomb. That is the vast and dreadful change that has occurred in the lifetimes of many of us.

There are two reasons why this change has placed our country in a unique and unprecedented situation. The first is economic. Besides the Soviet Union, and perhaps Communist China in the fairly remote future, only the United States can afford the huge investments that must be made by any serious nuclear power.

As to the other reason, it has to do with historical process itself. Ancient societies have fallen by the wayside; Ancient ways of life have to be abandoned: Strong and ancient peoples have dwindled (or have been extirpated)—with each great change that has caused the historical process to mutate. From stone to bronze; from bronze to iron; from iron, indeed, to industrial steel, this has always been true.

The present mutation of the historical process is the most extreme on record, however. Power, alas, rules men. In the new situation, those who seek to rule all men—to have world empire, in short—ultimately need only two things. They need a worldwide nuclear monopoly, plus the toughness to use this monopoly in an exemplary manner.

Look at any photograph of Marshal Andrei Grechko or Leonid Brezhnev. Above all, read their records, in the Stalin time or concerning Czechoslovakia, for instance. You cannot rationally doubt their toughness or their liking for empire.

Yet this country, alone and foolishly guilt-ridden and confused by false councils is literally all that stands between these hard-faced men and the rule of the whole world. That is what now places us in such a lonely and unknown situation. And that situation cannot be escaped.

ALTERNATIVES FOR UNITED STATES

(By Joseph Alsop)

On the day before they loosed the bomb on Hiroshima, this reporter came within an ace of deciding to join the Communist Party. Even today, the reminiscence is perhaps relevant.

In brief, the China theater commander, Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, had been warned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a nuclear bomb would be dropped on Japan. The indicated drop-time was still about 48 hours ahead when Gen. Wedemeyer gave a farewell dinner for my old chief of those days, Gen. Claire L. Chennault. And Gen. Wedemeyer told us at dinner what lay just ahead.

The news meant, of course, that the war would soon be over; but it meant, too, that the ultimate weapons had been perfected. In consequence, although I do not want to over-dramatize, the sole emotion that I can now remember feeling was undiluted horror.

The next day, Gen. Chennault's plane took us on to New Delhi. On the long air journey, there was ample time to think and all too much, alas, that needed thinking about. With the ultimate weapons unleashed upon the world, it seemed to me that what was then called "one world" was the only rational solution. But I had enough sense to see that "one world" would never be produced by such an instrument as the United Nations.

I also had enough sense to share very few of the squashy-minded delusions about Josef Stalin's Soviet Union, that were so common at that time. Yet it appeared to me that the Communist Party was the only organization seeking to create "one world" in what may be called a practical manner.

So for hours in the air, I wondered whether I should become a Communist. Only as we reached New Delhi, I concluded that this particular alternative was basically unbearable.

The little anecdote of over a quarter century ago may seem ridiculous; yet it still has its point today. The point is, quite simply, that the rational alternatives still confronting every American are really hardly different from those I pondered over the Himalayas.

The alternatives, basically, are to submit to the Soviets, thereby creating "one world" rather rapidly; or to make the great efforts and sacrifices and investments that are needed to maintain a plural world, with room in it for free societies. The choice is uniquely American, for the reasons indicated in the last report in this space.

At bottom, there are two reasons. On the one hand, the Soviet Union can, and moreover quite surely will, create its own kind of "one world," if the Soviets ever manage to attain a nuclear monopoly. Given an effective nuclear monopoly, plus the will to make some hard examples, any nation today has world empire within reach.

On the other hand, the United States, as the only other serious nuclear power, is therefore all that stands today between the Kremlin and world empire. If you think about it at all, this clearly means that the unique American situation is also a most exposed situation.

Here, however, the main fact to note is rather different. It is the simple fact that Americans cannot possibly escape the responsibilities resulting from America's present unique situation They are heavy and costly responsibilities. A great many people in this country now wish to ignore these responsibilities—to pretend that they are not really there—because of their unhappiness over Vietnam.

Yet this is an utterly untenable position, unless, for instance, you are cold-bloodedly prepared to see Israel crushed out of existence by the surrounding Arabs, with active military support from the Soviets. In 1970, the record is clear that the Kremlin gave serious consideration to just this enterprise of crushing Israel. And if the Kremlin has drawn back today, American power is the ultimate reason.

The plain truth is that until there are other serious nuclear powers among the nations, American power alone can prevent the Soviets from repeating, at will, other operations like the one that crushed the Czechs' new birth of freedom. Nor is that the end of the story. The new isolationism is not merely cruelly cold-blooded; it is also ludicrously impractical, at least for those neo-isolationists who sincerely desire what used to be called "Fortress America."

When the Soviets were seriously considering striking down Israel, for instance, their real aim was not Israel's destruction. Their aim was to get the whole Middle East in their grip, and thereby to turn the whole world balance of power almost upside down.

Yet we cannot maintain a true "Fortress America," while permitting the Soviets to do what they choose with the world power balance. It is simply not a feasible thing to attempt.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, I take this opportunity to commend the gentleman from New York and the gentleman from South Carolina for the leadership they have exhibited in this discussion this evening, with participation by a very substantial number of Members, which has indicated, I believe, their wisdom and the objectivity with which they have approached this subject. I commend them both for the excellent presentations and leadership.

Mr. Speaker, I welcome the opportunity to take part in this special session to-

day, in which we give consideration to some of the great questions of war and peace as they relate to problems of national defense. This gives us an opportunity to raise some serious questions about the progress of the SALT talks, so shrouded in secrecy, and some of the "breakthroughs" we have been told about in them which may turn out on closer inspection to be simply concessions we have made without receiving anything in return.

It is in the interests of the United States, whose people we represent, to see to it that this sort of thing does not happen. After all, the results of the SALT negotiations will have tremendous implications for all of us, for the future of our own society and of the free world. It is only fitting that we should examine, long and carefully, the positions which both sides are taking in the negotiations and, at the same time, the whole problem of our defense capabilities, which—as we are beginning to recognize more and more widely—have declined by comparison with the arms buildup of the Soviet Union.

In my remarks, Mr. Speaker, I would like to say a few words about the psychology of the Soviet citizen as compared with our own. One naturally is inclined to interpret the reactions of foreigners to specific events in terms of how he himself would react to them. We tend to assume that all other people are pretty much like us, from the Vietnamese peasant to the Arab nomad. This misreading of the world gets us into some pretty serious difficulties on occasion. When you think of how frequently we are surprised by things our own people do and which we did not expect, we ought to be even more careful about assessing citizens of foreign nations.

In the case of the Russians, we are dealing with people who are not only of another nationality, but who also espouse a world view which we call Communist, and which is very different from ours. These two things superimposed—the difference in national character plus the difference in ideology—mean that in negotiating with the Soviets we face people who look at things very differently indeed from the way we do. Even if we made no attempt to define what these differences consist of, it would be very helpful to remember simply that these differences exist.

For one thing, the Russians are very definitely accustomed to overstatement. Whenever the ordinary Russian hears his leaders say something—that the production of television sets will be increased by 20 percent, say—he will automatically scale it down in his mind by a very large percentage, if he believes it at all, for he has become used to the notion that political leaders exaggerate. Anglo-Saxons, on the other hand, tend to understate things very often. Thus, when the Russian hears an American say something which is understated to begin with, and then scales it down by the usual fraction in his own mind, he arrives at an estimate which is very far from the truth. The lesson from this is that if an American wants to communicate effectively with a Russian, he has to exaggerate his own statements a bit, and at the same time discount a great deal of what the Russian tells him. Then the two sides to the exchange may be closer to the truth.

The greatest difference between Russians and Americans, however, is one of ideology. The sorts of Americans who conduct our negotiations with the Russions tend to be intellectually trained and are not ultra rigid in a philosophical sense. Most Russian negotiators, however, do believe in Marxism-Leninism as a philosophy of history; they give intellectual assent to a philosophical system which answers most of their questions rather neatly. The Americans, being pragmatic and practical, cannot understand the commitment of their Soviet counterparts: they dismiss Soviet doctrine as something in which they must appear to believe, but which they do not really take seriously. Since we Americans do not take it seriously, it follows that they cannot either. The Russians, though, look at things the other way: They cannot understand how Americans can operate without philsophical beliefs with a rigid structure. As a result, they attribute beliefs which are the mirror-image of their own to us, or else they seize upon Christianity as the only ideology available to us.

If negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union are to be realistic, we must keep the difference in our psychologies clearly in mind, and not assume that the Russians are just Americans who happen to speak another language. We are separated by more than language, and the recognition of this fact is the beginning of negotiating wisdom.

Mr. Speaker, I reemphasize the point that a number of Members have made this afternon that the foreign policy of the United States is to seek a world of peace, while the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and of Red China is to impose some form of communism throughout the world. Our Armed Forces face the responsibility of defending our freedoms, and maintaining our obligations to our free world allies. The offensive buildup of Soviet armed forces is consistent with the dreams of world control that the Communists maintain.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the very generous remarks of the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. BLACKBURN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. BLACKBURN. Mr. Speaker, I want to join my colleagues who are speaking this evening, as well as the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON) and the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SPENCE), whom I congratulate for taking the initiative in this great and vital area of our national security.

In all the discussions today about our strategic position, many have pointed to the lamentable decline and fading of our superiority in strategic weaponry. Others have pointed out that the current SALT talks may lead to dangerous technological and political imbalances which may leave us without the means to defend ourselves against Soviet attack.

However there is another danger, a danger of which many are seemingly unaware. Some people seem to think that it is of no practical difference whether we have nuclear superiority or not. They think that a treaty—a mere scrap of paper—can provide us with the necessary security against enemy attack.

Mr. Speaker, I wish to address myself to the real meaning of strategic superiority, and that meaning goes to the very essence of our nationhood. We forget that the ability to defend ourselves successfully is the very basis of our sovereignty.

Smaller nations can depend upon their stronger allies to remain free. But when you are the most powerful nation in the free world, there is no one to whom you can turn. If we become strategically inferior to the Soviet Union, we have lost our nationhood; we have lost our sovereignty. In short, we have lost the freedom to make our own decisions uncoerced by the rest of the world.

Moreover, there is a more subtle danger. We can also lose our sovereignty through negotiations. There is always the temptation that supranational arrangements may take the place of our Constitution as the supreme law of the land. When such negotiations could conceivably place us in a position of strategic inferiority, then it is plain that our sovereignty could be swallowed up in the trap of negotiations.

Mr. Speaker, I was greatly concerned about this question when I recently read a paper on the subject by Prof. Henry Paolucci, of St. John's University, Professor Paolucci is no ivory-tower academician. He is a distinguished scholar in his own right, and a recognized political thinker. But more important, he has been in the realm of practical politics.

Professor Paolucci warns against the atmosphere of secrecy which has surrounded the SALT talks, and points out that the Soviet Union and the United States do not enter the talks upon the same basis. Dr. Paolucci says:

> Although the Soviet Union is not constituted as a nation-state—although it legally and ideologically rejects the notion of occupying a 'separate and equal station' among the powers of the earth—it has consistently exercised the prerogatives of sovereignty in its relations with the United States.

In other words, the Soviet Union has as one of its goals the elimination of the concept of the nation-state. Dr. Paolucci says:

> From its inception, the Soviet Union has regarded itself as a powerful means for the realization of a stateless, classless world community, to be built upon the ruins of the traditional nation-state system. It has acted like a sovereign nation-state, but it has never accepted the nation-state system.

With such an unequal situation prevailing at the negotiation tables, Professor Paolucci believes that the Soviets will take advantage of the different goals to tempt the United States to purchase a "secure peace" by a sacrifice of the prerogatives of sovereign nationhood. Under such an agreement, the Soviets would sacrifice nothing, because they do not believe in the nation-state system anyway.

The danger comes when the architects of the American negotiating posture draw up their guidelines for the negotiating effort. Professor Paolucci points out that President Nixon's chief adviser, Henry Kissinger, is only one in a long line of Presidential advisers who have urged an end to our Constitution and the sovereignty it enshrines. Like Walt Whitman Rostow and McGeorge Bundy, says Professor Paolucci:

Henry Kissinger, too, expresed as recently as 1965 the conviction that the time was at hand for a surrender of nationhood because "institutions based on present concepts of national sovereignty are not enough." The ultimate goal of a supranationalist world community, he wrote, "will not come quickly; many intermediate stages must be traversed before it can be reached. It is not too early, however, to prepare ourselves for this step beyond the nation-state."

All of this brings us to the question then, of what is actually transpiring at the SALT talks. Are we gradually being sucked into a system that will supplant our national sovereignty with a supranational arrangement. Is this what Rostow meant by "an end of our nationhood as it has been historically defined?"

Mr. Speaker, Professor Paolucci's paper is well reasoned, and of immense benefit to all those studying this question, and would like to include it in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks:

THE "TOP SECRET" STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS TALKS AND OUR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

If Henry Kissinger and the President he advises were committed to guarding the sovereign independence of this nation at all costs, nothing could be more conducive to the stabilizing of international relations at this time than strategic arms limitations talks with the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, if Henry Kissinger and the President he advises are committed to eliminating the possibility of a general war *at all costs,* then nothing could be more dangerous, nothing could be more disloyal than to veil in absolute secrecy, as the SALT meetings are indeed veiled, the negotiations whereby our sovereign independence of almost 200 years' standing may be bargained away.

Although the Soviet Union is not constituted as a nation state—although it legally and ideologically rejects the notion of occupying a "separate and equal station" among the powers of the earth—it has consistently exercised the prerogatives of sovereignty in its relations with the United States. It was not in the least tempted to make a sacrifice of its sovereign independence to purchase peace even when the United States enjoyed an absolute monopoly of atomic weapons. Certainly it is not prepared to do so now. Our atomic monopoly was reduced to a preponderance before it faded into parity. And now parity has been reduced to sufficiency, which, by definition, cannot suffice to do what preponderance or parity could do. Sufficiency is a move downward.

Meanwhile the Soviets have passed from total deficiency through sufficiency (in our current sense) to parity; and they are now rapidly on the way, with only the vaguest propaganda-hint of any possible self-restraint, toward absolute preponderance. Thus, in this nuclear arms "race," the United States and the U.S.S.R. have been for a moment on the same level—but only in the sense that an elevator going down may be for a moment on a level with an elevator going up.

What are the Soviets disposed to sacrifice in the SALT negotiations to spare mankind the risks of a nuclear holocaust? We can be certain of this: they will not sacrifice their sovereign independence with all the prerogatives of their major power status.

Can the same be said of the government of the United States in this time of acute domestic turmoil and intellectual alienation? Is our political independence, our sovereign nationhood, on the bargaining table? Is it to be a sacrifice of last resort, if peace cannot be purchased otherwise?

From its inception, the Soviet Union has regarded itself as a powerful means for the realization of a stateless, classless world community, to be built upon the ruins of the traditional nation-state system. It has acted like a sovereign nation state; but it has never accepted the nation-state system; it has never defined its independence as the assumption of a "separate and equal station" among the powers of the earth. American independence is, and has been from the beginning, the independence of membership in a system of independent states, Soviet independence, on the contrary, presupposes the "fading away" of its sovereign political characteristics once the non-communist nation-state governments have been destroyed.

One way the government of the United States could purchase a "secure peace" with the Soviets would be by a sacrifice of the prerogatives of sovereign nationhood. Is it conceivable that Henry Kissinger and the President he advises might, for reasons best known to the great brain-trust of civilian war strategists who had advised our Presidents since 1961, contemplating such a sacrifice? Today, because of the shift of focus in our war-peace debate—a shift brought to unexplored frontiers by the Pentagon Papers affair—Walt Rostow can now be represented as some sort of hard-line traditionalist, whereas, when he came to Washington in 1961, he was clearly a revolutionary in his concept of "security" in the nuclear age. He had argued in *The United States in the World Arena* (New York, 1960, p. 549)):

"It is a legitimate American national objective to see removed from all nations—including the United States—the right to use substantial military force to pursue their own interests. Since this residual right is the root of national sovereignty and the basis for the existence of an international arena of power, it is therefore, an American interest to see an end to nationhood as it has been historically defined."

Despite its academic articulation, that is a highly revolutionary doctrine. The legitimacy claimed for it is certainly not an American constitutional legitimacy. It proposes to sacrifice the sovereign national union of which the Constitution is the organic law. If it indeed comes to pass, as many of our professed enemies hope, that there is an end of our nationhood, our Constitution will constitute nothing.

McGeorge Bundy shared Rostow's view of the matter. And Henry Kissinger, too, expressed as recently as 1965 the conviction that the time was at hand for a surrender of nationhood because "institutions based on present concepts of national sovereignty are not enough. "The ultimate goal of a supernationalist world community, he wrote, "will not come quickly; many intermediate stages must be traversed before it can be reached. It is not too early, however, to prepare ourselves now for his step beyond the nation-state."

Bundy, Rostow, and Kissinger have put their theory into practice in their increasingly powerful service as chief presidential advisors for national security affairs under Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon. The Ellsbergs have been impatient for results. But the Rostow-Kissinger counsel has been: Be patient in your hearts, however much you protest on the campuses and in the streets, and raise a hullabaloo with stolen "top secret" papers. Americans must learn how to lose while armed with nuclear weapons before they can be induced to give up (in Rostow's words) "the right to use substantial military force to pursue their own interests."

Is the time now ripe for negotiation to put an end to our nationhood, for taking the step beyond the nation-state? If it is done in secrecy, while the Times and its powerful allies are celebrating an end to secrecy, it will have to be registered in the annals of history as the greatest betrayal of public trust ever perpetrated in a civilized nation.

That is the great danger of the secret SALT negotiations. The "temptations" not to lose the Vietnam war experienced by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson have been extravagantly publicized. Now we ought to have comparable publicity on "temptations" of Henry Kissinger, and the "devoted pacifist" he advises, to put an end to our nationhood as it has been historically defined.

Just after leaving office in 1968, Robert S. McNamara wrote (*The Essence of Security,* p. 53):

"If the United States is to deter a nuclear attack on itself or its allies, it must possess an actual and credible assured-destruction capability . . . capable of damaging the aggressor to the point that his society would be simply no longer viable in twentieth century terms. That is what deterrence of nuclear aggression means. It means the certainty of suicide to the aggressor, not merely to his military forces, but to his society as a whole."

That was what deterrence of nuclear aggression meant in U.S. policy up until the end of President Johnson's term. But, with the entry of Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger into White House offices in January 1969, there was a basic change. In the "State of the World" message of 1970, Nixon referred explicitly to the inherited policy of assured destruction, remarking that, "once in office, I concluded that this strategic doctrine should be carefully reviewed." He went on to say that, as part of that review, Kissinger and his staff would explore the following question: "Should a President, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans?" That question was answered in the 1971 message, where we read:

"I must not be—and my successors must not be—limited to the indiscriminate mass destruction of enemy civilians as the sole possible response to challenges. This is especially so when the response involves the likelihood of triggering nuclear attacks on our own population."

Thus, the policy of McNamara, which was a drastic reduction of deterrence in the quantitative sense, as compared with the Eisenhower-Nixon-Dulles policy of Massive Retaliation, is here reduced to non-existence. What McNamara defined as the *essence* of nuclear deterrence—"the certainty of suicide to the aggressor, not merely to his military forces, but to his society as a whole"—has been abandoned by the Nixon-Kissinger administration.

If the Soviets are assured, through secret SALT negotiations, that our posture of nuclear deterrence is indeed what the Nixon-Kissinger messages say it is, then that "American interest," of which Rostow wrote, "to see an end to our nationhood as it has been historically defined" will have been realized.

If we have not the will to do what McNamara defined as the essence of deterrence then we have no deterrence. We invite the ultimate form of nuclear blackmail.

Needless to say, if the secret papers on this subject are published, and, by some act of military boldness, our armed forces prevent

an American surrender to blackmail, there are bound to be recriminations.

[From the Congressional Digest, December 1965]

"The Soviet Union and International Agreements", issued by the U.S. Department of State: "It is clear that the Soviet Union has violated a number of major international agreements and treaties. The record is well known, and there are various lists of the agreements which the Soviet Union has violated."

At least 55 major treaties and other agreements have been violated by the Soviet Union since the early 1920's—42 treaties entered into since U.S. diplomatic relations were established. More than 100 agreements have been concluded; 42 of these are formally termed treaties.

Mr. STRATTON. I thank the gentleman.

These are not comments by members of the Committee on Armed Services, these are not comments by the military-industrial complex, this is Jane's Fighting Ships, a document that has been recognized for years as being a sober, conservative estimate of the comparative military powers around the world.

Let me give a second example. The June 18 issue of Life magazine, which has not been particularly gentle on the Congress of the United States, contained an article by George Hunt, former managing editor of Life magazine, under the heading of "Four-Star Military Mess. The blunt fact is that we are about to become No. 2." And this article says that the truth is that the U.S. military is in ragged shape, lacking in technology, undermined by inflation, by wornout strategies, by wornout ways of top direction, and allocating of budget money. The Vietnam war has ravaged it, gnawing at morale and discipline. In some 8 years Russia has caught up, and is now going ahead of us in many categories of missile strength. It will take fast and skillful work to put the military back in shape.

That is Life magazine, not the military-industrial complex.

As a matter of fact, the irony is that this article criticizes Congress for allowing our military posture to deteriorate, and yet I am sure I remember that not too many weeks ago this same magazine was criticizing Congress for spending too much money on military expenditures.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. STRATTON. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. PUCINSKI. I know the gentleman in the well, the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON), as well as the gentleman from South Carolina, are very, very hard-working members of this committee, and I have always respected them for their sincerity and for their perseverance, but has anybody on your committee or anyone else that you know of developed a formula to give us some idea of how many minutes to zero we have before the Soviet Union does issue an ultimatum on this country once it has gained military superiority?

Mr. STRATTON. That of course, as the gentleman from Illinois knows, is the real problem that we face. Some people seem to think that this matter of nuclear balance is something that can be determined carefully by a scale. Some people seem to think that the question of sufficiency is something that can be accurately measured in comparison to superiority, and as long as the scale rises in this direction and does not begin to swing over this way, we are all right. But the fact of the matter is that these are not precise determinations. What really is important is what the enemy thinks. We could well find ourselves, as the gentleman suggests, confronted with the kind of superiority in nuclear weapons on the part of the Soviet Union that is very similar to the superiority that we had at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, and then we could find ourselves blackmailed into accepting some particular demand.

That is the kind of thing that we have got to avoid, because if we should be confronted, let us say, with a Soviet threat to hit our cities with nuclear missiles unless we allowed Egypt to drive the Israelis to the sea, I do not know what the answer of this country would be.

Many people who have been deploring our attempt to build up our defenses are strong in urging us to come to the aid of Israel in the Middle East. I have been one of those who supported our coming to the aid of Israel. But we cannot provide a deterrent to the Soviet Union's attempts to stimulate the Egyptians to drive the Israelis into the sea without having a strong military defense of our own. And the gentleman is absolutely correct in indicating that we could be blackmailed.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. STRATTON. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Does the gentleman see any parallel between the middle 1930's and the middle 1970's? As the gentleman recalls, because of the economic problems we had in the 1930's and because of the deficits, we just hopefully kept shortchanging the Defense Establishment to the point where we did not have anything.

Now, is there any possibility in the gentleman's judgment that we are perhaps approaching the same situation now where there is great pressure on the Congress to balance the budget even at the expense of our minimum defense needs to protect this country?

Mr. STRATTON. The gentleman from Illinois is much younger than I am and I had not realized that he could remember back that far. But I must say that I have been seriously disturbed by the parallels between our situation today and the situation in the early 1930's and the late thirties and the parallel I am afraid is frightening.

We have a temper in this House I am afraid and particularly in the other body that is very much like the temper in the House of Commons under Neville Chamberlain—and those who speak about the need for defense are regarded as crackpots just as Winston Churchill was regarded as a crackpot back in 1938.

I can remember, although I am not sure that the gentleman can remember as far back as that in 1938 reading an article in the New York Times magazine section about a rather sad member of the British Parliament who had had a rather promising career and who had been a brilliant writer and who had gone into politics at an early age and who had been Chancellor of the Exchequer and First Lord of the Admiralty. He seemed to have a great future but as he had grown older he had gotten hit on the subject of defense—and everybody knew he was a little bit off his rocker. And he was a back-bencher in the Conservative Party. And that of course was Winston Churchill.

We find, I am afraid, some of the same kind of consequences because of the initiative of the gentleman from South Carolina and those of us who are taking part in this. Maybe we can prevent that from happening here.

Mr. Speaker, there is one third point that I want to mention and then I will close and that is that there have been two developments in the last 2 weeks which I do not think many people have realized but which could also have a very serious impact on our future.

One concerns Iceland. We are concerned about the Soviet submarines there in the North Atlantic. Those submarines come down from the north through the narrow passage between Iceland and the Faeroe Islands. We have a base at Iceland on Keflavic. We can keep an eye on those submarines and we know what the threat is.

The other day they had a political change in Iceland and the new administration is threatening to throw us out of our base there, in the next 4 or 5 years. That could have a very disturbing and unsettling impact on the balance of our NATO forces.

The other development is as to what has taken place in Malta. The problem we face in the Mediterranean is the Soviet operation there and also our trying to protect Israel and prevent war in the Middle East.

First our 6th Fleet has to operate in the eastern Mediterranean. But with all of the Soviet submarines there we cannot do much without an adequate air cover and without adequate anti-submarine aircraft protection—and that protection has been flying from Malta. But the British are leaving Malta in the next year. They had an election the other day and the new Premier of Malta who is very chummy with the new Premier of Libya, who as you know ordered those jet aircraft to bring down the Soviet airliner the other day—the new Premier of Malta has told us he is going to kick out the British and he is not going to let the Americans into Malta. And if we do not have any air protection out of Malta I do not know whether we are going to be able to back up Israel and the eastern Mediterranean.

That is the third serious development.

So all of this points up the shifting balance of power and I think it is time

we in this House realize that we are faced with a problem and as the gentleman from Illinois has eloquently implied—let us not get in the position of the British House of Commons in the 1930's under Neville Chamberlain.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. CRANE. I would like to take this opportunity to offer my profound congratulations to the gentleman from New York as well as the gentleman from South Carolina, both distinguished members of the Armed Services Committee, both in a unique position to understand the nature of the peril to our national security that has been revealed through the remarks made by colleagues this evening.

I had the privilege of attending a press conference this morning where yet another colleague, the distinguished gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOGAN) made in my judgment, a most astute observation. He pointed out that the news media unfortunately have chosen to fix in a most critical manner on our Defense Establishment, particularly with respect to the so-called cost overruns that occasionally occur in defense bidding, and he then observed that these overruns occur in virtually every area where the Federal Government contracts to have services performed.

One example that he cited most specifically of the cost overrun was the Kennedy Art Center here in Washington, D.C., where the costs have come to approximately double what was initially anticipated. He did not intend to be critical of this overrun in that instance. He did observe the fact that it is difficult for one to be able to make a projection as to what his costs may be in a time of extreme inflation and the steadily rising prices we are confronted with as a result of rather dramatic wage increases. What he did attempt to fix on was the refusal on the part of many in the news media to devote equal attention to that kind of cost overrun as they do to cost overruns in military apropriations, and I think it was a most significant and important point, and one which we should keep in mind when we are inclined perhaps to be a little bit critical of this unfortunate procedure that does occur and not, I am sure, because of a malicious intent to do so, but because of the factors that the distinguished gentleman from Maryland referred to; namely, inflation and inability to make this kind of projection as to what our costs may be in any Federal enterprise.

But the final point he made in that press conference this morning was that we have to be aware that the foremost responsibility of the Federal Government is to guarantee our national security and, as a result, because of an imbalance in terms of news media attention to one aspect of our problem here in Washington, we are confronted increasingly with the prospect of a deteriorating defense posture that could conceivably lead to the demise of all those hopes, ideals, aspirations and values cherished by all Americans. It is in this context that I wish to address some remarks to the subject that we have touched upon tonight.

We have always prided ourselves on being the world's most powerful nation. We have said to ourselves and to others that we would use whatever force was necessary to preserve our freedom, and theirs, from any potential aggressor. We have used that power to defeat nazism and fascism during World War II, to defeat Communist aggression in Korea, and to prevent the Communist domination of Europe and Asia in recent years. This we have done through a series of alliances, such as NATO and SEATO, and through many bilateral treaties and agreements with nations who have depended upon us to support and defend them against possible aggression. Today, we say that our commitments are as firm as ever—to Israel, to Western Europe, to South Vietnam, to Taiwan, and elsewhere.

Yet, today our leaders no longer tell us that our country is the world's most powerful. In more technical terms we once spoke of "superiority," and later spoke of "parity." Now we hesitantly argue that our military forces and weapons arsenal will provide "sufficiency," a term which remains undefined.

It is as if Americans awakened one morning to find that all of their confident assumptions about their country were no longer true, as if they discovered that not only could their country not fulfill its commitments to others, but could not even defend itself.

For some months there have been bits and pieces of commentary, in the press and in scholarly journals, to the effect that something is drastically wrong with our national defense posture. Let us, briefly, review some examples of this growing concern.

Only last week a British military expert said that American naval strength is in a serious decline while the Soviet fleet has expanded into a "supernavy" with a greatly increased sphere of influence.

The situation for the United States is serious—

Raymond V. B. Blackman, editor of the authoritative Jane's Fighting Ships, said in the foreword to the 1971–72 edition. Mr. Blackman added:

By any standards the Soviet fleet now represents the supernavy of a superpower.

He wrote:

So prolific has the Soviet naval shipbuilding effort been that the U.S.S.R. is now able to maintain a standing naval force in the Mediterranean five times stronger than five years ago to counter the American Sixth Fleet . . . Again, five years ago the U.S.S.R. had no warships in the Indian Ocean, but today there are a score of surface ships alone, and there is no telling how many Soviet submarines are in the area.

Norman Polmar, editor of the American section of the 729-page annual, painted a gloomy picture of U.S. naval development:

The size and relative capabilities of the United States Navy, he said, continue to decline at what many authorities consider to be an alarming rate . . . The force levels of the fiscal year 1972 budget reduce several categories of warship to their lowest strength for a decade.

Mr. Polmar wrote:

The Soviet Navy, however, has already exceeded the U.S. in active surface-ship and submarine numbers, including near parity in nuclear-submarine strength and a larger submarine construction program. In some respects the characteristics and capabilities of the Soviet ships obviously are superior to those of their U.S. Navy counterpart.

That our position in the Mediterranean is in a serious state of decline is beyond question. In an important report in the July 19, 1971, issue of Newsweek magazine, senior editor Arnaud De Borchgrave states:

There is no question in my mind that the Russians see America's loss of taste for international leadership as the opportunity to become the dominant power in the Mediterranean and, ultimately, in the entire Eurasian land mass and adjacent oceans.

Looking forward to the possible "Finlandization" of all of Western Europe, Mr. De Borchgrave points out:

With the proliferation of Soviet power in the Mediterranean and along Europe's oil supply routes, Moscow hopes to discourage a separate European defense effort as futile, thereby encouraging a trend toward West European neutralism.

Looking to the future, and aware of the danger of the growing neo-isolationism in the United States, not only among the New Left but even among more allegedly responsible spokesmen, Mr. De Borchgrave notes that—

The combination of neo-isolationism in the U.S. and neutralism in Europe could be the mix that removes the Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean without a shot being fired.

Because of their fear of an imminent American withdrawal from the Mediterranean, the Newsweek editor reports:

Even Franco Spain and the colonels in Greece are doing what they can to improve relations with Moscow. For by conveying the impression that over the next few years domestic affairs will enjoy priority over foreign affairs, America is, in effect, telling Moscow: "This is your round in the Mediterranean. Make the most of it."

Our Government cannot be both sincere in its commitment to NATO, to Israel, and to our other allies in the Mediterranean and committed to the kind of "reordering" of priorities which places defense in a lesser position. At some point, a real choice must be made.

The Mediterranean, however, is only one of our problems. Shortly after his inauguration in 1969, President Nixon appointed a select group of distinguished citizens to examine the organization setup and contracting procedures of the U.S. Department of Defense, and to make recommendations for improvements. On July 1, 1970, the panel submitted to the President and the Secretary of Defense its report on those specific matters. Subsequently, seven members of the panel submitted a supplemental statement on related matters which they deemed to be of vital concern to the Nation.

This supplemental statement declares:

The convergence of a number of trends indicates a significant shifting of the strategic military balance against the United States and in favor of the Soviet Union.

The trends set forth include, first, the growing Soviet superiority in ICBM's; second, the Soviet commitment of greater resources than the United States to strategic offensive and defensive weapons, with the continued deployment thereof; third, the possibility that present U.S. technological superiority will be lost to the Soviet Union; fourth, the convincing evidence that the Soviet Union seeks a preemptive first-strike capability; fifth, the rapidly expanding Soviet naval capability; and, sixth, the mounting hostility of segments of the public toward the military, the Defense Establishment, and the "military-industrial complex," without due recognition that sustained irresponsible criticism could undermine and weaken the only forces which provide security for the United States.

Citing facts which are shocking to most Americans, the report states:

> The Soviet SS–9 ICBM force alone is capable of delivering a megatonnage of nuclear warheads several times greater than that of the entire U.S. force of ICBM's and SLBM's . . . The situation which our country faces is without precedent . . . It is not too much to say that in the 70's neither the vital interests of the U.S. nor the lives and freedom of its citizens will be secure.

This alarming statement, throwing into question for the first time the survival of our society, had been in the hands of our Government leaders since September 30, 1970. When it was released by the Pentagon on March 12, 1971, neither Government nor the media, with the single exception of U.S. News & World Report for April 5, 1971, deemed it a matter to be made known to the American people. Dr. A. G. B. Metcalf, physicist and military analyst for the American Security Council, points out that the statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird before the House Armed Services Committee on the fiscal years 1972–76 Defense program and the 1972 Defense budget, dated March 9, 1971, comprising 191 pages, devotes 39 pages in section II "Toward Better Management of Human, Material, and Economic Resources in the Department of Defense," growing, in part, out of the work of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel.

It gets down to such subjects as "drug abuse in the Armed Forces" but, curiously, no mention of the Blue Ribbon Panel's supplemental statement on what Dr. Metcalf calls the Nation's peril and the chilling portent to the free world, of our now overshadowed defense posture which no longer provides a realistic deterrence. How is it that recommendations of the blue ribbon panel can be adopted as to "major changes in the organization of the Department" and other recommendations affecting the survival of our national life be swept under the carpet?

While those who have the authority and responsibility to maintain our national strength seem surprisingly hesitant to discuss the facts and to propose programs which will once again place us in a superior position, military experts have been vocal in attempting to set these very facts before the public. In an important article in the spring 1971 issue of Modern Age, Anthony Harrigan, an expert on military matters, points out that—

> Today—less than a decade after the Cuban missile crisis—the United States no longer is the first military power in the world . . . in terms of overall military capability the Soviet Union is ahead of the United States. Where the Soviets are now on a basis of parity with the U.S., they are moving ahead rapidly.

Mr. Harrigan notes that at the present rate of Soviet missile deployment, the U.S.S.R. should have 2,500 ICBM launchers by 1975. He states that—

> Unless dramatic action is taken this year, the United States will still have only 1,054 missile launchers four years from now.

In addition, while the Soviets are expanding their missile submarine force at a rapid rate, no U.S. missile-firing submarines have been built in more than 2 years. None is definitely announced for the future.

Despite these facts, and others which Mr. Harrigan sets forth in this article, many in our own Government speak of SALT talk agreements as if we were superior to the Soviet Union, or at least on a parity with them. By June of this year, for example, the number of Soviet ICBM's will have increased sixfold over what it was in 1965. Adm. Thomas Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, projects a Soviet ICBM force numbering 1,500 at that time, a force 50 percent larger than that possessed by the United States.

Numbers alone, however, do not tell the whole story. The 300 Soviet SS–9 missiles now deployed, a weapon which far overshadows our Minuteman ICBM, by themselves possess several times the destructive capability of our entire land and sea based missile force. Since the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel report was issued, Secretary of Defense Laird has noted that the Soviets have started a "new—and apparently extensive ICBM construction program." These new ICBM's will be at least as large if not larger than the SS–9's. Weapons of this size are not designed to destroy cities but rather to be used as counterforce weapons, that is, used to knock out our Minuteman force and help preclude a U.S. response to a Soviet attack.

This confirms another significant trend identified by the Defense Panel:

> The evidence is now reasonably conclusive that the Soviet Union . . . is deploying strategic weapons systems designed for a first strike capability. The characteristics of their offensive and defensive weapons systems, which the Soviets continue to expand, are consistent only with a preemptive strike capacity.

Things have gotten so bad that experts say that our present inferior nuclear position would now make the United States rather than the Soviet Union back down in the event of a 1971 version of the Cuban missile crisis. Thus, our pledge to defend Western Europe with our "nuclear umbrella" becomes less and less credible, for if we canot really defend ourselves, which is becoming more and more evident, we will hardly risk nuclear war to protect anyone else. The moment Western Europeans feel this to be the case, our whole system of alliances will come to an end.

In his 1968 campaign Richard Nixon declared:

> Within a year the Soviet Union will catch the United States and, if we don't get a change in leadership and policy in Washington, will pass us in deliverable nuclear capacity.

Candidate Nixon also stated at that time that—

> I do not believe that the United States can afford to accept the concept of parity . . . the Soviet Union's goal in the world . . . is still in an expansionist stage. Our goal in the world is defensive . . . And at any kind of negotiation when one side wants to expand and the other side to defend, make sure that the side which is in he defensive position has more strength than the other side.

Yet, we are failing to provide the United States with a nuclear force which is superior to the Soviet Union. In fact, we no longer seem to be opting for parity. We have achieved only inferiority into the future. The President has stated with regard to the SALT talks that any interim proposal to halt offensive missile development would be nothing more than a mere "understanding." The Soviets, of course, are far ahead of us in long-range missiles, possessing at least 1,500 to our 1,054. As a result, any "freeze" on long range missiles would be to the Soviets' advantage.

The President also said that the United States would most likely submit any agreement on an ABM limitation in the form of a treaty to the Senate. The United States, under the proposed agreement, would not be permitted to deploy an ABM defense that could shield its major population centers from a swift, nuclear assault, but this would not hold true for the Russians. According to top Government sources, the U.S.S.R. would be permitted to keep its "thick" ABM system around Moscow.

Discussing the current policies of the administration, Dr. Stefan T. Possony, a highly regarded Soviet defense analyst now with the Hoover Institution of Stanford University, stated:

> The Republican Administration has resigned itself to accept decisive Soviet superiority . . . the longer the talks last, the stronger the USSR will get. Indeed, as the talks have stretched out, we are continuing to discover dramatic new deployment of Soviet missiles, both defensive and offensive. By the end of the current Nixon Administration, or at the latest by 1974, the USSR will possess a crushing long range missile superiority.

Experts at the Hudson Institute express a similar view. In the SALT talks, they argue that the current policy is the exact reverse of what it should be. The administration is trying to negotiate limits on defensive weapons such as ABM's which are designed to limit damage, while leaving open the question of offensive weapons. Donald G. Brennan, an expert on nuclear strategy, notes that this is a policy designed to maximize destruction. We should, he says, be more interested in saving American lives than in killing Russians.

The Soviet military advantage comes at a time when a new isolationism is

growing in our country together with an antimilitary feeling, based upon the naive idea that armaments are the cause of war rather than the aggressive designs of men and nations. This same view dominated our political life in the years between World Wars I and II. The Nye committee, it must be remembered, discussed the "merchants of death" much as political spokesmen today decry the "military-industrial complex."

One result of that flirtation with weakness, and a "reordering of priorities," was that our Nation was helpless just prior to Munich and exposed at Pearl Harbor. In 1945, Gen. George Marshall wrote:

> We finish each bloody war with a feeling of acute revulsion against the savage form of human behavior, and yet on each occasion we confuse military preparedness with the causes of war and then drift almost deliberately into another catastrophe.

We already find ourselves exposed and helpless in the Middle East. The Soviet Union, for example, has recently introduced the Mig–23 Foxbat into Egypt's already formidable arsenal. This is an aircraft which can outshoot and outmaneuver anything the Israelis or the United States have. The unfortunate fact is that we can do nothing about it because we have nothing in our existing military arsenal which can challenge the Foxbat. This also applies to the aircraft in use by the 6th Fleet for its own defense and for support of ground operations. Today, there are attempts to scuttle the F–14 Tomcat which is the only aircraft competitive with the Foxbat which we are in a position to deliver to the Navy at a reasonably early date.

There are Members of Congress who have spoken out on the growing threat of American military inferiority. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, made up of nine Senators and nine Congressmen, of varying political views, 10 Democrats and eight Republicans, issued a report on May 24, 1971, which states that the United States, unless it moves quickly to counter a rapidly expanding Soviet threat, faces a future in which it will have to surrender to the Soviets in all issues, or risk nuclear annihilation. Any delay may mean "no future."

The 278-page report contained hitherto unpublished official reports and statements by Adm. Hyman G. Rickover and other experts on the status of Soviet and United States naval forces. The facts are that the Soviet Union has a surface navy of 2,009 units compared with a U.S. surface navy of 563 units. The Soviet submarine strength is 355 compared with 142 for the United States. The advantage in nuclear submarines in which we long took comfort has disappeared. Soviet ballistic missile submarines armed with Polaris-type nuclear missiles now patrol both of our coasts, in range of many of our urban-industrial areas. Unless we act quickly, the committee stated:

> We will soon find ourselves unable to defend our national interests.

We must remember the statement by President Eisenhower which is engraved on the keel of the nuclear aircraft carrier which bears his name:

> Until war is eliminated from international relations, unpreparedness for it is well nigh as criminal as war itself.

Why responsible public officials seem unconcerned with these alarming facts is difficult to understand. Perhaps many of them are as concerned as we, but feel the political imperatives of the day preclude laying the facts before the American people.

This is not a time to permit politics to interfere with national safety. The American people will never support a government which presides over the deterioration of our means of self-defense. This makes a strong defense posture, in the long run, the best political posture as well as the only one consistent with the constitutional mandate to provide for the common defense.

The future of the entire free world, not only our own, rests in the balance. Either we will be strong enough to resist aggression or we may slowly see a world in which we stand alone, not only unable to fulfill our commitments to others, but unable to even maintain our own national integrity.

It is, indeed, that nightmare time, when a nation has awakened to find itself second best, to find that its military has been permitted to deteriorate, that critics have urged weakness and leaders have refused to speak for strength.

Unless we become both shocked and alarmed at our current condition, and quickly resolve to reverse current trends, all of the ominous warnings cited here will become a reality. When that occurs Western civilization itself will have died—not of attack from without, but from suicide. It would be an ignoble death indeed.

Abraham Lincoln summarized the problem for us more than a century ago:

> At what point is the approach of the nation's danger to be expected? If it ever reaches us, it cannot come from abroad. If destruction be our lot, we must ourselves be its author and finisher. As a nation of free men, we must live through all time or die by suicide.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I would like to call to the attention of my distinguished colleagues the various remarks I have made in the past concerning our deteriorating defense posture and also a news item which appeared in the Sunday, August 1, edition of the New York Daily News and which indicates that the need to speak out on this very serious issue is being recognized in the Senate as well. A list relating to my previous remarks follows:

March 30, 1971, Congressional Record, Page 8723, "The Path to Peace in the Middle East."

May 25, 1971, Congressional Record, Page 16960, "U.S. Strategy Beyond Vietnam."

May 26, 1971, Congressional Record, Page 17222, "Soviet Union Seeking Credit From the U.S."

June 8, 1971, Congressional Record, Page 18818, "Keep Locomotives."

July 1, 1971, Congressional Record, Page 23383, "The Selling of the Soviet Pentagon."

July 12, 1971, Congressional Record, Page 24646, "Soviet New Tactics in Germany."

July 13, 1971, Congressional Record, Page 24812, "America's Weakness Threatens Israel's Security."

July 21, 1971, Congressional Record, Page 26512, "The Plight of Totalitarian Captives."

July 28, 1971, Congressional Record, Page 27761, "America's Deteriorating Defense Posture."

July 31, 1971, Congressional Record, Page 28516, "Russians Gain in the Mediterranean."

[From the Sunday News, Aug. 1, 1971]

BUCKLEY BREAKS SENATE TRADITION AND SPEAKS OUT

(By Jerry Greene)

WASHINGTON, July 31.—New York's Sen. James Buckley (C.R.) alarmed by Russia's rapid arms development and disturbed over the growing power of the anti-Pentagon bloc in Congress, has broken the freshman senator's vow of silence in the interests of national security.

Moving quietly behind scenes, collaborating with another GOP freshman, Sen. William Brock (Tenn.), Buckley is speaking up strongly for adequate military strength to defend the country and meet vital commitments.

Buckley and Brock are developing a counterlobby within the Congress, a force to offset such outfits as the "Members of Congress for Peace Through Law," which has as one aim a drastic cut in military spending.

"If our compulsive antimilitarism is not soon brought to heel," Buckley said in a recent speech, "we will find that American foreign policy objectives will have become irrelevant because we will be without the means of implementing them, it will be irrelevant that the U.S. is committed to the survival of the state of Israel, or that the U.S. opposes a Russian hegemony in the Middle East. . . ."

When the Conservative Party's Jim Buckley came to Washington in January to take his Senate seat with the Republicans, he had determined he would not seek a leading national security role, despite a deep interest therein. He brought with him a campaign worker who became his legislative assistant, William Schneider, expert military analyst of the Hudson Institute think tank.

But Buckley, mindful of his junior status and the fact that there were veteran senators expert in the area of national defense, planned to sit in the back row and listen, at least for a respectable time.

Unfortunately, from his viewpoint, all he heard was criticism from liberal Democrats who used antiwar sentiment to assault the military from almost every angle. The Pentagon budget, the draft, the ABM, the size of the armed forces—these and more came under fire almost from the opening gavel.

Buckley and Brock and a handful of others listened with increasing concern.

The prime defenders of national security, indeed of the Nixon administration's military budget, were two Democrats—Sens. John Stennis (Miss.), chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and Henry (Scoop) Jackson (Wash.).

It was true enough that they had an occasional assist from Republicans Strom Thurmond (S.C.) and Barry Goldwater (Ariz.), but both these men were retired generals and bore a pro-military brand.

One item of note that Buckley and the rest heard, or rather, read, was a translation in April of a speech made before the 24th Communist Party Congress by Soviet Defense Minister A. A. Grechko. He wrote:

"The constant strengthening of the armed forces is an objective necessity for the successful building of socialism and communism, and one which results from the law-governed patterns of social development and from the particular features of the class struggle between capitalism and socialism. The experience of more than 50 years of socialist building in our country has fully confirmed the rightness of the military policy and the practice of armed forces building being firmly pursued by the Communist Party."

TO FILL THE VACUUM

A few weeks later, Buckley had made a decision: There was a vacuum in the Republican ranks in the Senate and he would seek to fill it.

About the same time, Brock, like Buckley a Navy veteran, reached a similar conclusion. The two senators had neighboring offices, and the collaboration was a natural.

Buckley made his first defense speech in late June. On July 14, without fanfare and definitely without any big public relations push, they arranged the first of what they called "colloquies" on the Senate floor—a series of pro-defense speeches.

The pair's aids got little cooperation from the Pentagon. Relatively new in town, they couldn't even find the right people to answer technical questions. This was a do-it-yourself sort of counterlobby; the mini-filibuster by four or five senators drew little notice. But they began a record, and they laid the facts on the line. They submitted hard evidence to show that, as Buckley put it, "we have allowed our existing forces to deteriorate to a point where the ability of the president of the U.S. to assure the defense of vital national interests may be in jeopardy."

MORE NAVY MUSCLE

The first colloquy was directed toward beefing up the Navy—the number of ships in the U.S. fleet has declined 30% since 1968, while Russia has been filling the seas. Brock acted as a sort of master of ceremonies for the fledging group.

Brock took the same role in the second production, two days ago, when eight senators voiced deep concern about strategic forces, with emphasis on the massive increases in Russian missile strength.

Buckley spoke at both these affairs. He had also been busy with other projects. At their invitation, he had addressed a group of 20 representatives on national security requirements. We are told that these 20 and 15 of their colleagues are scheduling their own defense colloquies after the congressional recess.

The New Yorker is planning an expansion of his national security activities in coming weeks. He doesn't figure there is time for him to keep playing freshman, in silence, any longer.

Mr. STRATTON. I appreciate what the gentleman from Illinois has said. I might say what he mentioned with respect to overruns is, of course, very true. The Kennedy Center, which will be opening in another month, is an example of an overrun certainly close to 100 percent, and I think it makes it perfectly clear the military is not the only area in which there are overruns.

We have a classic example in my own State, in my own district in New York, the so-called South Mall in Albany, which was the architectural dream of Governor Rockefeller. Estimated originally to cost something like $500 million, it is now well over $1 billion and it has not even been completed. In fact, I am holding my breath that they complete it, or otherwise we will have another Washington Monument in the center of Albany which will sit around for 40 or 50 years half completed, except that will be a much bigger hole than the Washington Monument was.

This is a very important point the gentleman makes, and certainly we must protect our defense in order to protect these other things.

Mr. RUTH. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I am very happy to yield to the gentleman from North Carolina.

Mr. RUTH. I thank the gentleman from New York for yielding. I would like to commend my colleague from South Carolina for taking this special order on an issue which is so vital to our Nation.

Mr. Speaker, since the end of World War II, America has loaned money, given money away, and has shouldered much of the burden to maintain freedom for more than half the people of the world. Our people have paid in money and in lives for those decisions, which I think most Americans have supported. But now there is developing a mood in this country that it is time to cross the river and rest for awhile under the trees.

While this is understandable in view of all our past burdens, there are consequences to be paid by lowering our guard. If we will all look closely, we can observe the Soviet Union building its military and political strength in strategic areas around the globe—in the Indian Ocean, the Middle East, and in Latin and South America, for example.

I submit for the RECORD today the conclusions of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research on "Soviet Military Trends: Implications for U.S. Security." This is an authoritative report that indicates our military capabilities may not be as good as the new military capabilities of the Soviet Union. We need to take a hard look at our position. The article follows:

CONCLUSIONS

In this study, we have attempted to assess the potential implications of Soviet military capabilities and to relate current Soviet policy emphases to the growth of those capabilities. We have found that the nuclear protection provided by U.S. strategic forces to our friends and allies is being reduced by the vast increase in Soviet military capabilities. In addition, the Soviet Union appears to be developing naval and air forces capable of projecting its political influence on a global scale.

Through its superior conventional strength and growing nuclear forces, the Soviet Union is enjoying the status quo in Eastern Europe, while maneuvering to keep Western Europe divided and to strengthen forces friendly to the Soviet Union. Soviet influence and presence are expanding in the Mediterranean, in the Middle East and in the Indian Ocean. Through skillful manipulation of local conflict and direct military intervention along the Suez Canal, the Soviet Union is bidding for control of the old British imperial route to the Indian Ocean and Far East. Whether the purpose of this policy is to obtain leverage against European and Japanese oil sources in the Persian Gulf, to assemble the forces and alliances necessary to contain Communist China, or simply to replace declining American or Western influence remains to be seen. Meanwhile, the Soviets are doing nothing to lesson tensions in the Middle East or Southeast Asia. Instead, they are extending their political and military influence by seeking naval and air bases in those regions.

This policy is paralleled in Latin America where an embryonic Soviet Caribbean fleet is based at Cienfuegos, Cuba. The political trends in the Southern hemisphere—anti-American and revolutionary—favor Soviet activities which have the effect, at the least, of restricting future U.S. flexibility in dealing with crises like Cuba (1962) and the Dominican Republic (1965). Recent Soviet nuclear submarine visits to Cuba have violated the spirit if not the letter of the 1962 agreement between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev not to station Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba.

What policy emphasis will the Soviet Union adopt? The Soviet leadership could take advantage of the military weakness and public divisions in the West by adopting an opportunity strategy. Alternatively, it may find itself compelled to decide between pressing an opportunity strategy against the West or seeking condominium with the West, in order to prepare against a threat from China. Finally, it may conclude that the caution strategy is least likely to frighten the West and will, at the same time, provide maximum advantage for Soviet political gains—whether these are at the expense of the United States or in preparation against the Chinese, or both.

It is most likely that the Soviet Union will continue its past performance of alternating and combining these approaches, as the situation warrants. This task is made easier by the existence of many more military options than it has ever possessed. The uncertainty associated with nuclear deterrence cannot check a calculated, incremental extension of Soviet foreign policy interests and commitments, buttressed by conventional military presence and an ever more powerful strategic nuclear force. Even the most cautious and least pretentious of the tendencies in Soviet foreign policy presumes the growth of Soviet power and influence in areas from which the Soviet Union has been historically excluded—from the Middle East to Southeast Asia to Latin America. The Soviet Union stands ready, as never before, to complement and consolidate the political gains of the indirect approach by militray might.

Those who wish the United States to avoid this prospect in the face of growing Soviet strategic power are concerned especially about the decline in national morale caused by the Indochina war. Both Presidents Truman (in 1953) and Johnson (in 1969) retired from political life because they took measures, respectively, in North and Southeast Asia to resist what they considered to be communist aggression. In neither of these cases, however, were Soviet military forces employed, although Soviet military and financial support was crucial to both.

These precedents dramatically illustrate the limitations inherent in the polarization of the American people on questions of foreign affairs: the ultimate limitation is the threat to a President's continuation in office if his concept of the national interest compels him to commit large numbers of American troops in areas where Soviet forces are not directly involved. Thus, the failure of the United States to counter the "indirect" application of Soviet military resources is complicated by the problem of a growing Soviet military presence deriving from the USSR's increased capabilities.

A leading Soviet student of American affairs, G. A. Arbatov (director, Institute for the Study of the USA, Moscow), analyzed the contemporary U.S. mood in a recent article on American foreign policy prospects for the 1970s:

"A situation has arisen in which continuation or, beyond that, further activation of a policy aimed at strengthening the military might and international influence of the United States is beginning, in the opinion of many sober Americans, to threaten serious domestic complications and the undermining of the foundations of the "national power of the USA." From this derive the deep differences in the ruling circles themselves, in the 'political elite' as such."

The reluctance of many Americans to cope with the world beyond U.S. borders could be read by Soviet policymakers as presenting

opportunities to alter the global balance of power, to fragment our alliances, and to threaten U.S. security itself.

Growing American incapacity and irresolution before Soviet advances is already making the United States a questionable partner for those who must risk our friendship as an alternative to accommodation with the Soviet Union. The United States can have no policy save retreat if it is unable or unwilling to maintain political commitments with a defense capability sufficient to deter the Soviet Union from *political* exploitation of the vast Soviet military establishment.

Yet in recent years, we have sought to achieve security at "bargain rates." The proof of this can be seen in the continuous decline in the portion of our ever-expanding GNP that is committed to national defense—in contrast to the steady increase in comparable Soviet expenditures. Although the wide margin of superiority we enjoyed over the Soviet Union a decade ago has, until recently, sustained the psychological appearance of U.S. advantage, we have failed to recognize that national security and international peace cannot be bought cheaply. The United States may have forgotten the maxim that there is room for only one at the top Leonid Brezhnev's declaration to the 24th party congress—"the total triumph of socialism the world over is inevitable"—reminds us that the Soviet Union wants to be that one.

Mr. MATHIS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. MATHIS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. MATHIS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I congratulate my colleagues for taking this special order today to call the attention of the American people to our country's deteriorating defense posture. It will not be possible for America to maintain a strong defense unless the people of this Nation are given the facts about the serious national security problems we face.

During the almost 200 years this Nation has been in existence, we have faced and overcome many dangers and adversities. But this is an especially critical time for America. At a time when our enemies are capable of destroying us, we are counseled by many who should know better to lay down our arms and depend on the good will of our enemies for survival.

There can be no question about the fact that the American public has an overwhelming desire for peace in our time. We all dislike wars and dissension, but we are a people who finally do what we must do.

A majority of our fellow citizens must realize that the most essential requirement in terms of national survival is to assure the adequacy of our strategic deterrent.

We face the very real possibility of finding ourselves in a second-rate strategic position by the time we celebrate America's 200th birthday—just 5 years from now. I, for one, have not seen enough positive action being taken to prevent America from finding herself in a position that would have been unthinkable just a few short years ago.

The Soviet Union continues to reach out with its navy into the far corners of the world's oceans. The Peoples Republic of China continues to develop a nuclear arsenal of its own. Our other enemies are not sitting still.

And despite the growing menace, it is far from clear that the Western response has been adequate. Instead, the familiar cry in Washington has been for less in defense expenditures, not more.

We simply cannot provide the capabilities necessary to prevent war by playing the role of an ostrich and by putting off until tomorrow what should be done today.

Hope springs eternal that true peace will return to this troubled world of ours so that our children and our children's children will never have to know—firsthand—the horror, the tragedy, and the finality of war.

But until we are absolutely sure that our enemies share our desire for world peace, we must face the challenge of survival with determination—determination to get the job done without regard for cost.

I want to face 1976 and the years following with the knowledge that America has the strength, the determination, and the capability to survive.

My fervent hope is that other Members of the Congress will feel as I do—and as the other Members who have participated in these special orders.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the remarks of the gentleman from Georgia. They are helpful.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, again I would like to express my appreciation to the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON) for joining with me in this effort, in an attempt to inform the American people and the Congress of the serious situation in which we find ourselves relative to our Defense Establishment.

I also want to thank all the other Members who have joined with us to make it a bipartisan effort.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, I want to express my appreciation to the gentleman. I feel sure although the hour is late and our colleagues have departed the Chamber largely, that perhaps what we have to say will provide some material in the RECORD that will be helpful to Members, particularly as they go through the RECORD and as they go back to their districts during the August recess, so they will realize there is a problem that perhaps has been overlooked in the mad rush to denigrate the military services instead of to recognize the need to maintain our strategic deterrent.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Speaker, I must commend the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON) and the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SPENCE) for their leadership in arranging for their special orders today and for leading the discussion on the status of our national defense.

The gentleman from New York has been a member of the committee since 1961, has served on a number of subcommittees and has chaired the Subcommittee on Antisubmarine Warfare and is presently the chairman of the Real Estate Subcommittee. He has done an outstanding job for the committee.

The gentleman from South Carolina has just joined the committee in this Congress and has already made significant contribution to the Armed Services Committee.

We in the Armed Services Committee have been trying to bring this situation to the attention of the Congress and of the public for a long time. Last year our late, great chairman, Mendel Rivers, stood in the well of this House on September 28, 1970, and delivered his impressive address on the Soviet threat.

That speech became so popular that it was distributed by the thousands.

Again on October 8, 1970, he stood in the well of this House begging for appropriations for the nuclear Navy and especially for nuclear submarines. On both occasions he was raising his voice in protest against the weakening of American military forces when he should have been in the hospital for an operation. Mendel Rivers literally gave his life trying to warn the American people that our military forces are being seriously depleted.

Mr. Speaker, what Mendel Rivers had been saying, what the Armed Services Committee has been saying would happen, has now come to pass. The foreword of the latest edition of Jane's Fighting Ships had this to say about the Soviet Navy:

By any standards the Soviet Fleet now represents the super-navy of a super-power. This tends to serve as the red rag to the bull to some countries whose spheres of influence, commensurate with their declining navies, are shrinking, while in step with her expanding navy Soviet spheres of influence are widening.

On June 26 of this year there was a keel laying ceremony at Newport News for a new nuclear-attack submarine named the U.S.S. *L. Mendel Rivers*. At that time, I dedicated myself to carry the torch that he had carried so well. I especially dedicated myself to the restoration of the U.S. Navy and to the development of an adequate nuclear naval capability. There is only one way we can meet this situation and that is boldly and forthrightly. It is a shame that we have allowed our forces, and particularly our Navy, to fall so low.

Mr. Speaker, I insert the complete foreword to Jane's Fighting Ships in the RECORD at this point:

FOREWORD

Since last year's edition of this annual was published two factors have projected from the maritime defence concept which could influence the composition and deploy-ment of many navies in the immediate future.

One is a somewhat belated but now acute awareness evinced by hitherto quite autonomous navies of the need for international co-operation and mutual security.

The other is the recognition, not only by major powers but also by smaller countries, of the tactical power and strategic influence of the fast and diminutive warship armed with the optimum payload of guided missiles.

Ironically it is the new world sea power of the Soviet Union which has engendered the yen for co-operation, and it is the Soviet Navy which has pointed the way to the ascendency of the missile boat over much larger orthodox warships.

As regards international naval co-operation, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is, of course, now well established, and there is a Standing Naval Force Atlantic, a permanent, multi-national squadron, albeit not nearly as powerful as it could and should be; but there is no comparable multi-national naval force in the Indian Ocean.

Recently, however, there has been a change in the climate of opinion. From last year, when it seemed that few countries officially showed the slightest interest in the void created by a combination of the prospective withdrawal of British warships from the Far East and the preoccupation of United States naval forces in Vietnam and the Mediterranean: to this year when, not only several navies, but almost every thinking-ahead authority, is suggesting or formulating ways of filling the Indian Ocean gap from Cape Town to Singapore.

If the arms for South Africa controversy has done nothing else it has shed light on the problems of sustaining the European ocean trade routes round the Cape to India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Hong Kong and Australasia, and has brought home to all countries on the Indian Ocean seaboard the extent to which they are laid open to foreign maritime infiltration and influence.

The prime necessity would appear to be a multi-national Standing Naval Force East comprising warships seconded from each of the countries with military or commercial interests in that oceanic hemisphere from South Africa to Indonesia. Ideally this Standing Naval Force would include ships from U.S.A., Britain, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Singapore, Portugal and South Africa.

As regards the new era of guided missile boats in spate it is quite remarkable how many of the smaller countries as well as the major powers have seen the light and have taken up the small fast boat with the long-reach big-punch.

An alarming feature of the past decade has been the progressively increasing cost of fighting ships of the categories to be found in most navies: destroyers, frigates and escorts. When confronted with this escalation problem several of the smaller countries decided that the answer was smaller and cheaper vessels.

This policy was given impetus after the sinking of the Israeli destroyer *Eilath* by an Egyptian missile boat, and several western navies became aware of the possibilities of equipping small and fast vessels with modern guided missile systems for the surface-to-ship role.

Of particular interest are the missile boat flotillas created by Norway, which represent a considerable increase in the effectiveness of her navy. Adopting the indigenously designed "Penguin" system, four missile launchers are being installed in six new fast torpedo boats and six missile launchers have been or will be installed in 20 existing fast gunboats in addition to their present armament.

Germany has also taken up guided missile boats in a very decided way. Abandoning what seemed to be a firm project to build four guided missile frigates of 3,500 tons, the German Navy is instead to build ten guided missile boats of 350 tons and 20 guided missile boats of 250 tons.

Among the other countries which have or are building missile boats are Denmark, Israel, Italy, Greece and Malaysia; and Algeria, China, Cuba, Egypt, Finland, East Germany, Indonesia, Poland, Romania, Syria and Yugoslavia, indeed most of the satellite countries who take their marine armaments from the Soviet Union.

Much the same as the submarine was in the past reckoned to be the weapon of the weaker power, so the diminutive missile boats with surface-to-surface systems will give smaller navies an offensive power out of all proportion to their modest overall size.

In fact, viz-a-viz a country with a much greater fleet of larger warships without missiles the smaller country with missile boats could hold the balance of deterrent power and exert a containing influence. And withall the missile boats are cheaper and quicker to build, easier to maintain and much more economical in manpower.

Yet there is seeming reluctance on the part of some of the larger maritime powers to build missile boats. The British Navy, for instance, has no missile boats and has not shown any inclination to operate such craft, although at the time of writing the Royal Navy is temporarily using the guided missile boat *Tenacity* built by Vosper Thornycroft. The two fast patrol boats of the "Brave" class have been laid up and Britain's representatives of the Coastal Forces are three new fast but unarmed training boats. However, these are eminently suitable for arming with missiles and doubtless would be if emergency required.

A great volume of new facts and figures and a large number of pictures have been added in this edition, the 74th year of issue of *Jane's Fighting Ships*. For the fourth successive year the Soviet section has been considerably enlarged and is now three times the size that it was in the late sixties, reflecting the growing size and power of the Soviet Navy. And the volume is again issued earlier in the year, the earliest publication date in the 23 years of the present editorship. More than 1,100 new illustrations have been added in this issue, including over 200 scale drawings. Altogether there are some 3,200 illustrations in the book comprising nearly 2,700 photographs and nearly 500 drawings. Particulars are given of over 15,000 ships and craft in 110 navies or sea-defence forces.

U.S.A.

Norman Polmar, editor and compiler of the American section, has given an outline of the American naval scene:

The size and relative capabilities of the United States Navy continue to decline at what many authorities consider to be an alarming rate. This situation, hitherto discussed in closed sessions of naval officials and in this annual, is now being addressed openly. The Chief of Naval Operations has told Congress that the Navy has "a lower than prudent level of current forces" and has "been falling well behind a responsible replacement rate".

The force levels of the Fiscal Year 1972 budget reduce several categories of warships to their lowest strengths for over a decade. The situation is evident in the planned force of 13 attack aircraft carriers (one with a mixed attack/anti-submarine air wing) compared to 16 attack carriers three years ago; three anti-submarine carriers instead of six in 1969; 160 cruisers, frigates (leaders) and destroyers decreased from 240; and 93 attack submarines, a drop of ten boats since 1969. The number of nuclear-powered attack (fleet) submarines has increased from 41 to 57 during the past three years, but this is limited compensation for the reduction in destroyer-type ships and ASW carriers with their air groups.

Despite the wind-down of the Vietnam War, the responsibilities of the US Navy remain. The Navy will long be engaged in supporting US and South Vietnamese forces on the Indochina peninsula; the "Nixon Doctrine" for foreign policy in the 1970s calls for meeting overseas military commitments and responsibilities, but with a "low profile" of US forces overseas, an obvious mandate for the astute employment of sea power. Simultaneously, US strategy calls for maintaining a capability for countering the other super-power at sea. But the Soviet Navy has already exceeded the United States in active surface ship and submarine numbers, including near parity in nuclear submarine strength (and a larger nuclear submarine construction programme). In some respects the characteristics and capabilities of the Soviet ships obviously are superior to those of their US Navy counterparts. Expanding Soviet naval operations during the past few years, notably the 200-ship-plus "Okean" exercise of April 1970, demonstrate that the Soviets have developed the ability to operate these ships on the high seas; regular deployments of warships to the Caribbean, Mediterranean, and Indian Ocean areas demonstrate that the Soviets are in fact using these ships as politico-economic-military forces.

The only category of warship in which the U.S. Navy now *and for the near future* maintains a decisive advantage is the aircraft carrier. No other ship or even combination of surface ships can match the versatility, striking power and range, or endurance of the modern attack carrier and her 80 to 90 aircraft. Yet even this margin over the Soviet Navy is narrowing as the number of attack carriers in commission is being reduced, the construction of a fourth nuclear-powered carrier (the CVAN 70) is in doubt, and the adequacy of the F–14 ship-borne fighter (successor to the F–4 Phantom) is being questioned.

In their stead, some naval authorities are advocating smaller and lower-cost air capable ships, hydrofoil missile boats and surface effect ships for a variety of missions. However, it seems questionable to consider even a squadron of air capable ships, each with perhaps six Harrier V/STOL attack aircraft and six SH–3 helicopters, as comparable to a single attack carrier.

But if the United States is seriously to address the question of countering the Soviet Union at sea, or indeed the Soviet allies equipped with advanced aircraft, missile boats, and submarines, the question of maintaining *and even increasing* attack carrier strength must be considered and difficult decisions have to be made. The aircraft carrier has been viable for so long, proved itself so often in hot and cold wars, and is so versatile that its place in modern warfare should be understood and properly evaluated.

The cost of modern air power—both land-based and sea-based is rising at an awesome rate. The costs of aircraft, ordnance, support equipment, manpower, and bases all are increasing. The CVAN 70 probably will cost more than $800 million if constructed under the Fiscal Year 1972 or 1973 programme; the cost will most likely be a *billion* dollars if delayed until 1975. However, this cost is comparable if not actually less than the cost of supporting an equivalent number of aircraft at land bases overseas in view of vulnerability, political considerations, support and logistics. Korea and Vietnam have amply demonstrated this comparison.

Solutions to the problem of maintaining a strong Navy with limited funds are difficult to devise. However, there are some alternatives that warrant consideration: To maintain carrier strength the Navy could consider a halt to the construction of destroyers and frigates—which are being criticised for poor design as well as increasing costs—to permit carrier construction and operation. This would result in fewer screening ships, but this partially could be compensated by increased use of ship-based early warning and anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters, operating nuclear submarines as ASW escorts for carriers, and expansion of passive defensive activities (e.g. operating the carriers under conditions of electronic silence). Imaginative concepts of operation can compensate for shortages of escorts as long as carriers are available to provide the increase reconnaissance and strike capabilities over opposing naval forces.

All of the above is predicated on the thesis that a naval confrontation with the Soviet Union is possible (or could be avoided by strong US naval forces); similarly, sea-based tactical air would be the key in supporting US and allied operations ashore, and in operations against other naval and air forces. The North Korean capture of the US intel-

ligence ship *Pueblo* and downing of a naval reconnaissance plane have called attention to the "other" military threats to US activities.

In the strategic/nuclear balance of forces the USSR has gained superiority over the United States in numbers of ICBMs and the megatonnage that can be delivered; and the current Soviet ballistic missile submarine construction rate of at least six submarines per year could give the USSR parity if not superiority in "Polaris" type submarines by 1975. (In addition to which the USSR has a number of nuclear powered and diesel-driven submarines with shorter-range missiles). Soviet progress in the strategic weapons area is of utmost concern to US defense leaders because improved guidance and multiple warhead technology (MIRV) could permit the predicted Soviet strategic forces of the mid-1970s to destroy virtually all US-based ICBMs in a surprise first-strike attack; simultaneously, Soviet missile submarines could destroy most US manned bombers before they could become airborne. Accordingly, the US Navy's 41 Polaris/Poseidon submarines are acknowledged as the *most survivable* US strategic deterrent forces for the foreseeable future.

Arguments for partially or entirely replacing the land-based missiles and bombers with additional missiles at sea are being countered by arguments for maintaining the "triad" of deterrence—the combination of land-based bombers, land-based missiles, and sea-based missiles that have been the premise of US strategic forces for more than a decade. Although modern technology argues against this "triad", political and separate service concepts survive. Increasing the seaborne portion of deterrence, either in submarines or surface ships, would increase weapon survivability, remove strategic targets from the heartland of the United States, and eliminate or reduce the need for the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system that will have the primary purpose of protecting land-based Minuteman ICBMs.

The US Navy is receiving the largest portion of the proposed Fiscal Year 1972 defense budget allocation to the services, 34.56 per cent compared to 33.77 percent for the Air Force and 31.66 per cent for the Army (about $500 million more than the Air Force and $2 billion more than the Army). This is the first budget since the "unification" of the armed services in 1947 that the Navy has received the largest share. However, the FY 1972 military budget represents the smallest portion of the Federal budget (32.1 per cent) and the smallest portion of the Gross National Product (6.8 per cent) since before the Korean War of 1950–1953. A comparison of FY 1972 defense spending in terms of constant dollars represents a decrease of $23.9 billion from FY 1968, the Vietnam War peak.

The situation for the US Navy is serious: winding down the war in Indochina will make sea duty and its family separation less attractive; there is increasing hostility toward the military in the United States; reductions in ship strength make deployments longer and more arduous; commitments are continuing and, in some areas, increasing; inflation and real cost increases are making ship and aircraft procurement difficult; and new ships with relatively inferior capabilities are compounding the problems. There are no simple answers. The US Secretary of Defense declares: "I pledge that I shall continue to urge actions which will assure the supremacy of the US naval power". The President of the United States avers: "What the Soviet Union needs in terms of military preparedness is different from what we need. They are a land power, primarily, with a great potential enemy on the East. We are primarily, of course, a sea power, and our needs, therefore, are different."

U.S.S.R.

By any standards the Soviet Fleet now represents the super-navy of a super-power. This tends to serve as the red rag to the bull to some countries whose spheres of influence, commensurate with their declining navies, are shrinking, while in step with her expanding navy Soviet spheres of influence are widening.

But it might well be the case that the Soviet Union is just as concerned about what she considers to be a threat to her overseas trade and ultimate security, namely the knitting together of NATO navies and the deployment of the fleets of western countries the breadth of the Atlantic and the breadth of the Pacific away from their own domains, as the USA is worried about the expansion and broad-scattering of the Soviet Navy.

After all, seen through Soviet eyes, the naval squadrons of the USSR are only just off their own Baltic doorstep in the North Sea, only just off their own Black Sea doorstep in the Eastern Mediterranean, and only just off their own Vladivostok doorstep in the China Seas. It is only in their recent forays into the Indian Ocean that Soviet warships are off limits and even then the excuse could justifiably be made that they are on passage from one part of the Soviet Union to another.

Whereas, also from the Soviet point of view, the USA maintains a powerful fleet in the Mediterranean 4,000 miles from New York and a huge fleet in South East Asia 5,000 miles from San Francisco.

So the USSR probably fears the overseas extension of the USA and the constant liaison of the British, French, Italian and German navies, through NATO, as much as the USA fears the ever widening ripples of Soviet sea power all round the world. And the USSR can always say that they are merely "showing the flag", much the same as the US Navy has done since the Second World War and the British Navy did when it had a comparable navy.

"The Soviet Navy on the seas and oceans reliably guarantees the USSR's security and its state interests", says the Soviet Minister of Defense. The men of the Soviet Navy were tirelessly improving their military and political knowledge, successfully mastering modern combat equipment and weapons, and enhancing vigilance and combat preparedness. They were ready at all times to defend the sea frontiers of the socialist motherland. The shipbuilding industry was reaching new achievements in equipping the Navy with combat ships and formidable armaments.

"Our strong ocean-going Navy is the basis of the might of our country" says the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy. "Soviet fighting ships are systematically present on the seas, including the areas where the shock navies of NATO are present. The presence of our ships in these areas binds the hands of the imperialists and deprives them of the possibility of unhindered interference in the internal affairs of peoples. This situation is undoubtedly not to the liking of the imperialist 'hawks' who are trying to distort the purpose of the voyages of Soviet ships and to diminish their importance for the cause of peace. Of decisive importance in present day conditions is not only the number of ships, but mainly the quality of their nuclear missile, weapons and technical capabilities and the high morale and fighting capabilities of their personnel.

"In this respect our Navy is up to the level of present day demands. Its equipment and the vigilance of the crews protect our country from all kinds of surprises. The pride of our Navy is our nuclear submarines, which are fitted out with a variety of missiles which can be launched from under water. Our submarines, together with the Navy's missile-carrying and anti-submarine high speed, long range aircraft, are the basis of the striking might of the Navy. Up-to-date surface ships, equipped with the most modern weapons are assigned a major role in carrying out the Navy's tasks. The Soviet Navy is an impressive deterrent in the way of imperialist reaction and adventures. At the same time the Soviet Navy is a symbol of our fraternal assistance to the friendly and freedom-loving peoples," declared the Commander-in-Chief.

Friend or foe will read what they will from this peroration, but it sounds very much like "show the flag and police the world", which is what Britain did until the Second World War and what the United States has been trying to do ever since.

Every year for the last decade or so a new class of rocket cruisers, missile destroyers, submarines, escorts, mine-sweepers, missile boats and/or torpedo boats has appeared in the Soviet Navy and most western observers have been impressed by their sophistication and novelty.

The past year has been no exception. Not only has a new class of missile cruisers appeared, the "Kresta II" class, bristling with their missile and radar control complex, but a new type of general purpose destroyer leader, the "Krivak" class, see photographs in the Late Addenda, and two new classes of nuclear-powered submarines have been operationally deployed, and a new class of guided missile corvettes is being built.

So prolific has the Soviet naval shipbuilding effort been that USSR is now able to maintain a standing naval force in the Mediterranean five times stronger than five years ago to counter the American Sixth Fleet. Recently a US admiral remarked to the Editor of this annual with some bitterness that he could count more guns in the Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean than he could in his own fleet there.

Again, five years ago the USSR had no warships in the Indian Ocean, but today there are a score of surface ships alone, and there is no telling how many Soviet submarines are in the area. The Soviet Navy is believed to be completing nuclear powered submarines at the rate of one every long month. (There was a gap of three years between the completion of Britain's third nuclear powered fleet submarine *Warspite* and the completion of the fourth, *Churchill*).

The United States is very worried about the growth of the Soviet Navy's mounting strength in the Mediterranean, along North Africa and in the Indian Ocean. But while the USA is shackled to an enervating war elsewhere she expects the countries of NATO in general and the countries bordering the Mediterranean in particular to increase their naval contribution to the common effort.

It is estimated that the strength of the Soviet Fleet now comprises 83 nuclear powered submarines, 318 conventionally powered submarines, 2 cruiser helicopter carriers, 26 cruisers including missile ships, 100 destroyers including missile armed vessels, 130 escorts of the small frigate and corvette type, 270 coastal escorts and patrol vessels, 320 minesweepers, 125 missile boats, 325 torpedo boats, 125 amphibious ships and 75 smaller landing craft excluding minor LCMs. Support ships, auxiliaries and service craft run into thousands.

This navy list constitutes a very formidable force indeed, both as a strategic deterrent and for conventional sea warfare. It indicates the transition of the USSR from a land power to a sea power, and suggests that the Soviet Union is just as concerned about the ganging up of smaller Western navies, which have little power individually but immense power collectively, as the United States Navy is about the growing spread of the Soviet Navy all over the world.

UNITED KINGDOM

The bald statement in the 1971 Defense Estimates that "Work continues on the design of a through-deck cruiser" was hardly calculated to inspire credibility in the fashioning of the Royal Navy of the 1970s, to encourage those in the Fleet Air Arm to perfect their skill in those incredibly efficient dual-element machines *Ark Royal* and *Eagle*, or to aid recruiting.

With a change of Government it seems likely that *Ark Royal* will continue in service until the end of the decade and that *Eagle* will not now disappear from the naval scene until her economical life is expended. In which case, providing the so-called "through-deck cruiser" is completed and in operational service by 1980, the viability of the Fleet Air Arm would be assured in continuity.

From the first picture impression, the new through-deck cruiser appears to be quite an aircraft carrier in its own right, capable of operating vertical and short take off fixed wing aircraft as well as helicopters. "What's in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name. . . ."

In this particular case there is quite a lot in a name. Had it been generally known at the time of the great Fleet Air Arm controversy, when the late Government was cutting down Britain's aircraft carriers right and left under the expedient euphemism of "phasing out", that the new through-deck cruisers, of which three are envisaged eventually, were going to be so viable for operating aircraft it would have been realised that it was in the nation's interests to maintain at parity, or even above par, the recruitment of pilots and aircrew into the Royal Navy, thus ensuring a continuity of training and expertise right through from the passing of the great angled-deck carriers to the advent of the smaller through-deck, aircraft-carrying cruisers.

Smaller or not, however, the new style cruiser-carrier does not appear to be any the less complex or cheaper, judging by the time it is taking to get it off the drawing board and the figures mentioned as being the likely eventual cost. £50,000,000 was the estimate for the projected fixed-wing aircraft CVA 01 which was cancelled a few years ago on the grounds of economy, but the first through-deck cruiser will probably give no change from that. The constant fear of the Royal Navy is that it will price itself out of existence.

Perhaps it could be forgiven if the question were posed as to why the "thing", as it has been both bitterly and affectionately called, has to be so costly. A few years ago, the Americans wanted a class of ships quickly "in the vertical envelopment concept" to support the Marine Corps. The US naval architects simply took a wall-sided mercantile hull of the C 2 type, virtually an oblong steel box sharpened at one end and faired-off at the other, and fitted in all the offices and shops required to operate and maintain helicopters around this platform which of its own nature provided the large hangar in its belly for the stowage and servicing of helicopters and the long flat top for a flight deck. The resulting first "amphibious assault ship", essentially a helicopter carrier, but a potential take-off-and-landing strip for vertical fixed-wing aircraft, was the *Iwo Jima*, built for only $40,000,000/£16,000,000, less than the cost of a modern British destroyer. Six more ships of the class have been built since in an average time of only two years. So it can indeed be said that the USA got its amphibious/helicopter carrier squadron cheaply and quickly. Yet it serves the purpose. That splendid acrobatic flying machine, the Harrier, capable of hovering, lifting and dropping vertically, and crabbing sideways, could be operated from simple ships of this type as well as helicopters. And the flight deck is ample for a short take-off to save fuel and boost the payload.

It is greatly to be trusted that the three through-deck cruisers will materialise and not only for strategic and tactical reasons. There is a lot in prestige. Prestige is power, and power is a deterrent, the last stop deterrent before the nuclear one. But there is little prestige in an entirely small ship navy, desirable though smaller and cheaper ships are in many ways. There must be the leaven of the capital ship whatever form it may take. When Britain ceases to have big ships she will have lost face forever and she will have no voice at the conference table.

Of the few big ships remaining in the Royal Navy; the former fixed wing aircraft carrier *Hermes* (Britain's youngest carrier, completed only eleven years ago) is being converted into a commando ship/helicopter carrier; and the conventional cruiser *Tiger's* conversion to a *commandement* helicopter ship is nearing completion, but the conversion of her sister ship *Lion* has been cancelled.

The fixed-wing aircraft carrier *Centaur*, only fifteen years old, and originally a sister ship of *Hermes*, is regrettably being scrapped: the question could logically be posed why she is not also being converted into a commando ship/helicopter carrier (for *Albion* and *Bulwark* have now been running almost continually for a decade or so and must eventually be retired) or at least into some form of amphibious ship combined with a vertical take-off interim role, until the new through-deck cruisers materialise.

The last two of the class of eight "County" class guided missile armed destroyers, *Antrim* and *Norfolk* have been completed, and *Bristol*, the only guided missile armed destroyer of her type, is nearing completion. The first of a new class of guided missile armed destroyers, *Sheffield*, has been launched.

Work continues on the design of a new class of general purpose frigates, the "Type 22". The last two of the 26 very successful general purpose frigates of the "Leander" class, *Apollo* and *Ariadne*, are being completed. The first of the new "Type 21" frigates, *Amazon* has been launched.

In the underwater field, the fifth and sixth nuclear-powered fleet submarines, *Conqueror* and *Courageous* are being accepted from the builders; the seventh, eighth and ninth, *Swiftsure*, *Sovereign* and *Superb*, are under construction; and the tenth is being ordered. But a matter of concern is that the number of submarines being produced is not nearly keeping pace with the number being scrapped. The "T" class diesel-powered submarines have gone, even though 13 were reconstructed and converted in recent years, and only a handful of the 16 "A" class conventional submarines remain in service.

So the backbone of the Royal Navy's submarine patrol service, apart from deterrent and strategic considerations, are the 21 diesel powered boats of the "Oberon" and "Porpoise" classes. The need is clearly pointed for the urgent building of more medium sized diesel-electric boats of about 1,000 tons for normal operational patrol, fleet exercises and routine training.—RAYMOND V. B. BLACKMAN.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman's yielding to me for a few remarks concerning our national security.

It is not my purpose to go into the numbers of men, missiles, ships, and aircraft involved in our military capability vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

For this comparison, and a clear statement of the threat to world peace, I recommend a careful reading of the report of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy issued on May 24, 1971.

The late distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Mendel Rivers, expressed the apprehension of many in a major speech in the well of the House on September 28, 1970.

These assessments of the Communist threat, made by the Joint Committee and Chairman Rivers, were made on the basis of the best information available to the Congress—not the pipe dreams of "counter budgets" or the false hope that unilateral disarmament will assure peace.

Hope is a wonderful and sustaining quality, however it is a poor basis for decisions on national security or foreign policy. In the past, hope about the intentions of others has led to isolationism, weakness and world wars.

If the lessons of the 20th century have taught us anything, it is that decisions on national security must be based upon reality. The world is as it is, not as we wish it to be.

We faced the real world when we entered into collective defense treaties with 43 other countries in the years following World War II. These treaties are the highest law of the land and commit the United States to war upon certain conditions.

The realities of the situation demand answers to some basic questions.

Will the United States honor all, some, or none of these treaties?

If the answer is yes, we must maintain standing forces and provide for their mobility.

If the answer is no, our national honor demands that these treaties be repealed. In this case, we must be prepared to see Western Europe, Africa, Japan, and Australia fall under the influence and control of the Soviets and a Communist China armed with nuclear weapons. We must be prepared for world wide economic and military blackmail.

Short of nuclear war, the only means we have to honor those treaties is through control of the seas. Yet, our surface Navy has been reduced to 536 units and will be further reduced by 322 units by the end of June 1972.

We are also being out produced and outnumbered in submarines capable of cutting off our Nation's lifeblood of raw materials, and capable of devastating our cities with nuclear weapons.

Our Air Force has also suffered through obsolescence. Our Army is currently suffering from its greatest morale problem in our history.

I believe that much of the uncertainty, division, and even expense connected with our defense posture is a part of the cost of maintaining a democratic society.

Partisan and personal politics too often influence the development or nondevelopment of weapons. Inflation, weapons modifications, and even increased procurements are referred to as "cost overruns." Good men are accused of cupidity and gross misconduct.

It has become politically popular to cast all military men in the role of Attilla the Hun, while, at the same time, there are calls for an all-volunteer Armed Force.

We are urged to support a policy of "peace at any price" in one geographic area, and to intervene in conflicts in other areas.

In the face of all the evidence, it is proposed that the defense budget be reduced below pre-1964 levels—thus assuring our decline to the status of a second-rate power.

Mr. Speaker, I have spoken in this House many times on this subject. I have never advocated the expenditure of more tax money than was necessary to assure an adequate national defense. I do not do so now.

We must not let frustration lead to isolationism.

We must not mistake hope for reality.

And in our desire to improve the quality of the lives of our citizens, we must not forget our first priority—national survival.

A flight from reality means relieving the past, and a flight from international responsibility.

Our unwillingness to properly attend to the priority of survival must inevitably result in our inability to set any other priorities. If we refuse to maintain a deterrent military power, there will be nations that will continue increasing their military power until they can defeat us first at the diplomatic table and then unless we surrender to their wishes they will be able to defeat us in a war at a time and place of their choosing.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks on the subject of my special order.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

RESEGREGATION

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PUCINSKI) is recognized for 60 minutes.

(Mr. PUCINSKI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks and to include a table and other extraneous matter.)

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, I know it is late and we have had a very long and difficult day, but I did want to call to the attention of my colleagues some things that are happening in the educational field which I believe are of importance and which I hope will give them some food for thought during the August recess.

It occurs to me, Mr. Speaker, that we may very well be on the threshold of a major turnaround in judicial thinking in this country on the whole question of busing schoolchildren for the purpose of overcoming racial imbalance or eliminating racial isolation.

I am aware of the historic Swann decision and some of its ramifications, but I am also aware of two very significant decisions handed down within the last few weeks, which I believe have a significant bearing on what is happening across the country and may very well indicate that district judges are taking a second look at the whole question of mass busing of children to overcome racial imbalance.

The most recent such decision comes from the District Court of Georgia, the Atlanta Division, where the court handed down a decision rejecting a proposal for massive busing in Atlanta, Ga.; and the court held that such busing would adversely affect that community and the city's school system.

In the decision, which I am going to include in its entirety at the conclusion of my remarks, the court quite properly stated that the problem is no longer how to achieve integration but how to prevent resegregation. I submit, Mr. Speaker, that the court has very succinctly stated the case.

With my remarks today I shall include a table of a study that I have just concluded showing the degree of resegregation which is occurring in some typical school districts that we have selected which are under court order.

There is no question in my mind that this is a matter of deep concern to educators, and of course to legislators. It appears to me that it is a subject which has even reached the highest councils of our Government, namely the White House, because last night the President issued a very strong statement challenging the validity and the desirability of mass busing in the desegregation bill which the President has proposed to this House and which my subcommittee has reported out of the subcommittee for action before the full committee.

Indeed, it does appear that what we are witnessing across this country is such a preoccupation with moving youngsters around that we have interfered to a great extent with the educational process. And we are finding that, similar to the finding of the court in Atlanta, many responsible parents in this country, both black and white, are now seriously asking the question whether massive busing is the answer to the problem.

Mr. Speaker, I was interested in the Atlanta decision because this is a decision handed down by the court that has been overly sympathetic to the plight of minority groups, and it has shown deep compassion in trying to put together a system which would assure every young American, black and white, an equal opportunity to develop intellectual resources to the best of his ability. So it is rather significant and historic and, in my judgment, of more than just passing notice when a court in Atlanta says, "halt, stop." We want to take another look at this whole concept of massive busing. The court quite properly says that the problem is no longer how to achieve integration but it is how to prevent resegregation, for indeed, Mr. Speaker, if resegregation does occur, where do you go for further relief? What court do you go to then?

I think all of us as Americans, black and white, can agree that if resegregation does occur in areas of large minority concentration, public interest in public education will wane and public education in itself will suffer enormously. We need each other. So I think that the time has come soberly and dispassionately and, above all, honestly to discuss this problem.

I think there has been too much demagoguery on both sides in discussing this issue of race relations in our educational institutions. So it occurs to me what we are now witnessing is a major turnaround in judicial thinking.

I am aware of the fact that two swallows do not make a spring, and I am aware of the fact that these two decisions are subject to review, and I am aware of the fact that the Justice Department has already announced that it will appeal the Austin, Tex., case where a judge similarly dismissed massive busing; but all of this being taken into consideration, I think it is of more than passing interest when two distinguished panels of Federal judges decide to take a second look at the whole concept of massive busing as a means of overcoming racial isolation.

In the Atlanta decision the court stated of paramount significance, however, is the obvious result, meaning the result of the proposal. Atlanta now stands on the brink of becoming an all-black city. A fruit basket turned over through busing to create 30 percent white and 70 percent black uniformity throughout the system would unquestionably cause such a restriction in a few months' time. Intelligent black and white leaders in the community realize and fear it. Responsible citizens are deeply concerned with preservation of biracial identity of the city. Without it the ultimate goal of equality in all its aspects is doomed. The court further stated its various objections to massive busing and then addressed itself to the Swan decision itself in which the court said that Swan holds that once de jure status is removed a district court is not required to integrate continually due to desegregation.

The Speaker, I bring these facts before the Congress today because as chairman of the House Subcommittee on General Education my committee is responsible for the educational needs of 55 million young Americans in this country.

So I bring this fact before the House, so that we may consider it, and point out that there is this possible turnabout. The courts are looking at the whole system because in my judgment we have lost a great deal of valuable time. This is not to say we ought to turn back the historic Brown decision of 1954 which struck down the doctrine of separate but equal education, this is not to suggest that we should turn our back on minority groups and ignore their needs, nor is it to suggest that anybody will tolerate an educational system which will deny young people equal educational opportunities because of the color of their skin. I think we Americans are past that. I think that we have reached an era of maturity when we accept the fact that we Americans are all equal, and that we must learn to live together regardless of what our race may be, or what church we worship in, or what our national origin is.

But it does seem to me that there is an important and necessary national dialog in this country taking place on what has happened to the American school system. You cannot discuss American education without addressing yourself to the most pressing problem, the turmoil that is being created in the American public school system because of the great struggle between the races and the effort to try and find some formula for assuring every young American an equal educational opportunity.

In the Atlanta decision the judges quoted the Swan decision, and said:

> In essence, Swann holds that the essentials of any unitary system are the elimination of invidious racial distinctions in regard to (1) transportation, and (2) faculty and

supporting personnel, and (3) extra-curricular activities, (4) construction and site selection, and the presence of an (5) optional majority-to-minority transfer provision. To the extent that they apply, Atlanta has had such essentials for some time.

And that is why it refused to alter the original order.

Mr. Speaker, I am going to ask unanimous consent to place in the RECORD the Atlanta decision in its entirety. I hope the Members will read this decision and then apply their own rationale accordingly.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, in the Austin decision the court had a similar question about a massive busing plan, and the court held:

The testimony at the earlier hearing of this case convinced this Court that extensive crosstown busing could only harm the local education system.

And the court quoted Dr. Cecil Hardesty, superintendent of schools in Jacksonville, Fla.

An unbiased educational expert who has had extensive experience with crosstown busing ordered in his school district, delineated the many adverse effects from this remedial technique.

The court said:

The added time requirements imposed on students by busing often reduce attendance and produce higher dropout rates, especially among minority students, and limit the opportunity of all transported students to participate before and after school in extra-curricular activities, which both parties agree are an important factor in the educational process.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to place the entire Austin, Tex., decision with my remarks today.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

Mr. PUCINSKI. I do so because I believe that these two decisions indicate perhaps a pattern of practice and a pattern of thinking by at least some judges have taken a hard look at the whole prospect of mass busing.

Mr. Speaker, I should like to now address myself briefly to the President's statement yesterday.

Mr. Speaker, yesterday, the President, reacting obviously to a growing concern across the country to this problem of massive busing stated he is opposed to it. And he even suggested some language for an amendment to the desegregation bill.

The language reads: "No funds appropriated pursuant to this Act may be used to acquire or pay for the use of equipment for the purpose of transporting children to or from any school, or otherwise to pay any part of the cost of any such transportation."

My judgment is that the President's proposed amendment to the desegregation bill will make it substantially easier to get the bill through the Rules Committee and through the House to final passage.

What the President is in effect saying is he wants his $1.5 billion desegregation bill to have as his main thrust a substantial contribution in improving the quality of education for children attending desegregated schools.

The President is of course right, because as we look at many of the programs in this country now, under court orders huge sums of money are being diverted to busing alone.

In Tampa, Fla., under a court decision there and a court order the Tampa School Board has to buy 187 buses and has to hire 187 drivers and train those drivers and set up maintenance facilities for those buses. This is money that really should be going to improve the quality of education among both the white children and the black children of that community.

In Los Angeles, Calif., the school system under a State court order there which calls for busing some 278,000 children every day at an estimated cost of some $40 million a year—money that in my judgment could be better used to improve the quality of education.

So the President yesterday quite properly reacted and wanted to assure the Congress that financial assistance that the Federal Government will give to the local school districts to overcome the problems of integration must be used for improving the quality of that education and not for busing youngsters around from one part of a city to another.

The President's amendment is going to create some problems because the amendment undoubtedly is going to be adopted by the House and Senate—at least I hope it will—and if that is done the local communities that are depending on the Federal Government to provide them financial assistance to purchase buses and operate those buses will find that they have to find this money from their own local resources. But in many instances the local resources are not available—and then there are those who think well, they can use the local resources for this purpose and then use the Federal funds for other needs and they will find the same disappointment because the desegregation bill requires a maintenance of effort by the local educational agency before it can qualify for Federal assistance.

So they are not going to be able to shift local funds into the busing operation and then use Federal funds to replace those local funds for maintaining the local school system.

So it seems to me we are now on somewhat of a collision course with the judiciary, because the judiciary order certain activities and actions and it occurs to me that many local communities are not just going to have the financial wherewithal to meet those obligations and carry out those court orders. And I am not sure what the action of the courts are going to be in that situation.

One court in Richmond City in Virginia has ordered a local school board to purchase the buses necessary to carry out a court order and then ordered the local board to impose a levy against the taxpayers to pay for this equipment. I should like to remind the distinguished court that the American Revolution was fought over the issue of taxation without representation.

I seriously doubt if a court can order the imposition of taxes to pay for this equipment and for these services. So while I applaud the President's proposal and I applaud the forthright stand he has taken on this whole question of using Federal funds for busing I think it is my responsibility to point out that that decision is going to create some very serious problems.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I should like to include in the RECORD today an analysis I have made of a number of typical school districts in this country which are under court order and which have been for some time, showing the flight of white students as the percentage of minority students increases in the school system.

Mr. Speaker, the matter referred to is as follows:

RESEGREGATION TABLE

These statistics give some indication of the degree of integration within the school districts and also indicate the degree to which blacks and whites are leaving particular school districts.

This chart has dealt with those school districts which are among the nation's largest 100, and of this group, the ones that are in the South. (For purposes of this chart the South includes Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Arkansas, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, and Tennessee).

Among this group those districts which had approximately 30% black enrollment or higher showed white exodus. There were only two exceptions, Richmond, Va., and Memphis, Tenn. However, the large increase in white enrollment in these districts is attributable to annexations which have changed the dimensions of the districts.

In considering whether resegregation is, in fact, occurring in those districts which have come under desegregation orders, many factors must be considered. Approximately 30% black enrollment, appears to be a crucial figure. As the percentage of blacks increases to around that figure and the degree of integration within the district increases, the percentage of whites exiting grows. Exodus of relatively small percentages might, however, be attributable to any variety of factors. Some of the school district officials who were contacted in the course of this study mentioned students being lost to private schools, but some also mentioned employment shifts, changing district boundaries, migratory families, etc., as effecting enrollment levels. Within districts, the direction is toward lower percentages of blacks attending predominantly minority schools. At the same time, however, this increased integration, in at least those districts in which black enrollment is 30% or higher, may be spurring the white exodus.

In estimating the results of white exodus, one must weigh against this, any positive effects of increased inter-racial contact within the school districts. From the figures on this chart, it is impossible to determine the quality of the integration and the interpersonal effects of increased integration within the districts.

Following is a table showing some typical school districts in the South which either are or have been under court order.

These figures reflect the situation in 1968 and in September 1970. We shall view with interest whatever changes occur in September 1971.

District	Year	Total number of students	White students		Black students		Spanish-surnamed students		White students		Black students		Spanish-surnamed students		Percent blacks attending minority schools							Total population	Black population	
			Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Increase or decrease in	Percent variation in population	Increase or decrease in	Percent variation in population	Increase or decrease in	Percent variation in population	0-49	50-100	80-100	90-100	95-100	99-100	100		Number	Percent
Atlanta, Ga.	1968	111,227	42,565	38.3	68,662	61.7	(1)		−9,490	−22	+3,861	+6			5.4	94.6	91.8	90.0	90.0	89.3	78.1	496,973	255,051	51
	1970	105,598	33,075	31.3	72,523	68.7	(1)								6.6	93.4	87.0	77.9	74.3	65.4	33.6			
Austin, Tex.	1968	51,760	34,021	65.8	7,783	15.0	9,956	19.2	+1,475	+4	+501	+6	+1,238	+12	13.1	86.9	86.0	84.6	65.1	57.6	22.2	(2)		
	1970	54,974	35,496	64.5	8,284	15.1	11,194	20.4							16.0	84.0	78.5	78.5	66.9	42.8	14.7			
Birmingham, Ala.	1968	66,434	32,278	48.6	34,156	51.4			−4,153	−13	−287	−1			7.2	92.8	92.7	91.6	90.2	90.2	84.6	300,910	126,388	42
	1970	61,994	28,125	45.4	33,869	54.6									15.8	84.2	73.5	69.7	64.5	55.0	33.5			
Brevard County, Fla. (Titusville).	1968	62,563	56,236	89.9	6,327	10.1			−946	−2	+291	+5			69.8	30.2	30.2	30.2	30.2	30.2	30.2	230,006	20,628	9
	1970	61,908	55,290	89.3	6,618	10.7									88.8	11.2	11.2	11.2	11.2	0	0			
Borward County, Fla. Ft. Lauderdale).	1968	103,003	77,664	75.4	24,516	23.8	823	0.8	+10,544	+14	+2,714	+11	+1,063	+129	14.5	85.5	79.7	79.7	79.7	77.8	68.9	620,100	77,382	12
	1970	117,324	88,208	75.2	27,230	23.2	1,886	1.6							52.1	47.9	41.1	39.2	33.8	22.3	15.8			
Caddo Parish, La. (Shreveport).	1968	60,483	34,054	56.3	26,429	43.7			−6,589	−19	−28				2.5	97.5	97.4	97.4	97.4	97.4	94.0	230,184	83,947	36
	1970	53,866	27,465	51.0	26,401	49.0									25.7	74.3	68.0	65.1	62.2	52.5	44.5			
Charleston County, S.C.	1968	58,164	31,655	54.4	26,509	45.6			−1,304	−4	+550	+2			30.8	69.2	59.9	53.7	47.2	33.5	13.6	247,650	77,884	31
	1970	57,410	30,351	52.9	27,059	47.1																		
Charlotte-Mecklenberg County, N.C.	1968	83,111	58,870	70.8	24,241	29.2			−1,767	−3	+1,163	+5			27.7	72.3	68.1	58.9	58.9	57.2	39.0	354,650	84,254	24
	1970	82,507	57,103	69.2	25,404	30.8									90.7	9.3	4.1	1.8	.3	0	0			
Chatham County, Ga. (Savannah).	1968	42,416	24,967	58.9	17,449	41.1			−2,033	−8	+514	+3			9.3	90.7	86.5	86.5	86.5	86.5	77.1	187,767	63,522	34
	1970	40,897	22,934	56.1	17,963	43.9									19.5	80.5	67.1	64.5	48.5	23.5	15.6			
Cobb County, Ga. (Marietta)	1968	40,918	39,582	96.7	1,336	3.3			+3,525	+9	+61	+5			93.3	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.7	196,793	8,180	4
	1970	44,504	43,107	96.9	1,397	3.1									100.0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
Corpus Christi, Tex.	1968	46,110	22,124	48.0	2,496	5.4	21,490	46.6	−1,151	−5	+94	+4	+1,239	+6	1.7	98.3	78.5	77.6	76.6	32.5	25.6			
	1970	46,292	20,973	45.3	2,590	5.6	22,729	49.1							2.7	97.3	84.0	54.0	38.5	12.2	.5			
Dade County, Fla. (Miami)	1968	232,465	136,460	58.7	56,518	24.3	39,487	17.0	−6,323	−5	+4,439	+8	+9,896	+25	12.4	87.6	82.0	80.7	77.3	72.7	48.6	1,267,792	189,763	15
	1970	240,447	130,137	54.1	60,927	25.4	49,383	20.5							21.7	78.3	53.1	41.9	33.3	20.6	12.3			
Dallas, Tex.	1968	159,924	98,493	61.6	49,235	30.8	12,196	7.6	−3,350	−3	+6,413	+13	+1,749	+14	2.1	97.9	93.0	87.6	82.1	53.1	32.1			
	1970	164,736	95,143	57.7	55,648	33.8	13,945	8.5							2.7	97.3	94.1	91.4	84.9	67.4	23.2			
DeKalb County, Ga. (Decatur)	1968	77,967	73,843	94.7	4,124	5.3			+6,637	+9	+1,255	+30			44.6	55.4	47.0	47.0	47.0	47.0	10.2	393,444	48,213	12
	1970	85,859	80,480	93.7	5,379	6.3									70.5	29.5	14.7	14.7	.9	.9	.9			
Duval County, Fla. (Jacksonville).	1968	122,637	87,999	71.8	34,638	28.2			−1,560	−2	+1,416	+4			12.6	87.4	87.4	87.4	87.4	85.0	76.9	528,864	118,140	22
	1970	122,493	86,439	70.6	36,054	29.4									25.6	74.4	57.5	54.9	54.9	54.9	37.0			
East Baton Rouge Parish, La.	1968	63,725	39,974	62.7	23,751	37.3			−561	−1	+1,034	+4			5.6	94.4	94.2	91.0	91.0	89.8	80.0	285,167	81,415	29
	1970	64,198	39,413	61.4	24,785	38.6									22.0	78.0	71.9	68.7	63.0	54.1	29.1			
El Paso, Tex.	1968	62,105	26,662	42.9	1,804	2.9	33,639	54.2	−896	−3	+83	+5	+1,253	+4	61.8	38.2	28.3	25.9	21.0	10.8	4.3			
	1970	62,545	25,766	41.2	1,887	3.0	34,892	55.8							57.8	42.2	20.3	18.5	15.1	10.2	3.2			
Escambia County Fla. (Pensacola).	1968	46,875	33,951	72.4	12,924	27.6			−407	−1	+519	+4			22.5	77.5	71.3	70.0	70.0	70.0	70.0	205,334	40,384	20
	1970	46,987	33,544	71.4	13,443	28.6									41.3	58.7	16.6	3.8	0	0	0			
Fairfax County Va. (D.C. area).	1968	122,107	118,785	97.3	3,322	2.7			+10,369	+9	+892	+27			100.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	455,021	15,856	3
	1970	133,368	129,154	96.8	4,214	3.2									100.0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
Fort Worth, Tex.	1968	86,528	58,193	67.3	21,398	24.7	6,937	8.0	−1,745	−3	+2,144	+10	+1,168	+17	9.7	90.3	85.4	85.4	85.4	76.6	60.7			
	1970	88,095	56,448	64.1	23,542	26.7	8,105	9.2							9.8	90.2	80.0	75.3	73.4	65.3	48.4			
Greenville County, S.C.	1968	56,306	43,853	77.9	12,453	22.1			+581	+1	+355	+3			14.8	85.2	83.3	83.3	83.3	83.3	74.3	240,546	39,829	17
	1970	57,222	44,434	77.7	12,788	22.3									98.5	1.5	.6	0	0	0	0			
Hillsborough County, Fla. (Tampa).	1968	100,985	74,994	74.3	19,225	19.0	6,766	6.7	+3,180	+4	+1,192	+6	−10		18.3	81.7	77.4	73.3	70.8	70.8	64.3	490,265	66,648	14
	1970	105,347	78,174	74.2	20,417	19.4	6,756	6.4							23.4	76.6	62.8	49.4	41.3	25.9	11.3			
Houston, Tex.	1968	246,098	132,352	53.8	81,966	33.3	31,780	12.9	−11,937	−9	+3,999	+5	+2,979	+9	5.3	94.7	90.9	88.0	86.4	79.2	64.5			
	1970	241,139	120,415	50.0	85,965	35.6	34,759	14.4							8.4	91.6	85.4	73.7	65.0	34.6	8.8			
Jefferson County, Ala. (Birmingham area).	1968	65,328	47,142	72.2	18,186	27.8			−4,201	−9	−1,410	−8			3.0	97.0	96.7	96.7	96.7	96.7	96.7	344,081	80,073	23
	1970	59,717	42,941	71.9	16,776	28.1									19.3	80.7	78.4	77.6	76.7	76.7	47.8			
Jefferson Parish, La. (Gretna).	1968	59,485	46,673	78.5	12,812	21.5			+3,698	+8	+389	+3			20.5	79.5	79.5	79.5	79.5	79.5	79.5	337,568	41,873	12
	1970	63,572	50,371	79.2	13,201	20.8									48.7	51.3	36.3	31.7	19.5	19.5	19.5			
Memphis, Tenn.	1968	125,813	58,418	46.4	67,395	53.6			+13,583	+23	+8,908	+13			2.6	97.4	95.4	92.7	92.2	83.4	73.3	623,530	242,513	39
	1970	148,304	72,001	48.5	76,303	51.5									6.5	93.5	90.1	89.5	83.5	73.8	49.8			
Mobile County, Ala.	1968	75,464	44,023	58.3	31,441	41.7			−5,266	−12	−407	−1			10.9	89.1	87.5	87.5	85.3	85.3	59.9	317,308	102,383	32
	1970	69,691	38,757	55.5	31,034	44.5									18.2	81.8	54.4	47.1	41.3	31.0	10.1			
Muscogee County, Ga. (Columbus).	1968	42,373	29,856	70.5	12,517	29.5			−920	−3	+557	+4			7.1	92.9	87.5	87.5	85.9	85.9	70.0	167,377	42,981	26
	1970	42,010	28,936	68.9	13,074	31.1									12.0	80.0	85.8	80.9	79.7	73.4	61.9			
Nashville-Davidson County, Tenn.	1968	93,720	71,159	75.9	22,561	24.1			+681	+1	+912	+4			16.8	83.2	69.4	61.3	56.5	54.3	51.8	448,003	87,876	20
	1970	95,313	71,840	75.4	22,473	24.6									25.0	75.0	67.0	62.4	49.7	39.5	21.1			
Norfolk, Va.	1968	56,029	32,530	58.1	23,499	41.9			−2,170	−7	+1,258	+5			11.5	88.5	82.3	79.6	78.0	73.3	49.6	307,951	87,275	28
	1970	55,117	30,360	55.1	24,757	44.9									32.9	67.1	55.9	46.3	40.2	37.6	26.1			
Organce County, Fla. (Orlando).	1968	76,089	63,034	82.8	13,055	17.2			+6,838	+11	+2,343	+18			20.1	79.9	77.1	77.1	77.1	77.1	77.1	344,311	48,462	14
	1970	85,270	69,872	81.9	15,398	18.1									40.7	59.3	52.0	33.3	26.6	16.6	16.6			
Orleans Parish, La. (New Orleans).	1968	110,783	36,405	32.9	74,378	67.1			−2,937	−8	+2,010	+3			8.8	91.2	83.3	81.2	81.2	80.3	62.3	593,471	267,244	45
	1970	109,856	33,468	30.5	76,388	69.5									7.8	92.2	81.9	78.6	74.6	71.1	48.5			
Palm Beach County, Fla.	1968	61,715	43,004	69.7	17,158	27.8	1,553	2.5	+3,219	+7	+1,180	+7	+646	+42	18.6	81.4	79.8	76.2	76.2	72.3	72.3	348,753	61,015	17
	1970	66,760	46,223	69.2	18,338	27.5	2,199	3.3							25.1	74.9	40.6	29.4	11.9	2.5	0			
Pinellas County, Fla. (Clearwater).	1968	78,446	65,751	83.8	12,715	16.2			+5,600	+9	+1,051	+8			21.7	78.3	73.2	72.1	72.1	64.5	25.9	522,329	42,774	8
	1970	85,117	71,351	83.8	13,766	16.2									45.5	54.5	20.9	20.0	20.0	16.5	4.8			

Polk County, Fla. (Barton)	1968	52,255	40,603	77.7	11,652	22.3			+1,878	+5	+247	+2			32.7	67.3	66.7	66.7	66.7	66.7	66.7	227,222	40,201	18
	1970	54,380	42,481	78.1	11,899	21.9									72.5	27.5	12.1	11.4	5.2	0	0			
Richmond, Va.	1968	43,115	13,674	31.7	29,441	68.3			+3,529	+26	+1,344	+5			6.4	93.6	88.6	84.6	84.6	82.8	78.0	249,621	104,766	42
	1970	47,988	17,203	35.8	30,785	64.2									11.7	88.3	56.8	44.7	28.2	28.2	9.6			
San Antonio, Tex.	1968	79,353	21,528	27.1	11,637	14.7	46,188	58.2	−3,615	−17	+216	+2	+1,299	+3	10.6	89.4	85.6	85.3	81.8	56.0	52.7			
	1970	77,253	17,913	23.2	11,853	15.3	47,487	61.5							9.3	90.7	67.1	60.1	51.4	28.6	11.1			
Spring Branch, Tex. (Houston area).	1968	35,704	35,689	100.0	15	0			+4,060	+11	+7	+47			100.0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
	1970	39,771	39,749	99.9	22	.1									100.0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
Virginia Beach, Va.	1968	41,272	36,900	89.4	4,372	10.6			+3,552	+10	+421	+10			62.2	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	29.2	29.2	172,106	15,688	9
	1970	45,245	40,452	89.4	4,793	10.6									87.4	12.6	12.6	12.6	0	0	0			
Winston-Salem-Forsyth County, N.C.	1968	49,831	36,033	72.3	13,798	27.7			−246	−1	−71	−1			15.3	84.7	84.7	84.4	84.4	79.4	70.9	214,348	47,825	22
	1970	49,514	35,787	72.3	13,727	27.7									37.0	63.0	57.4	57.0	57.0	53.4	43.8			

[1] In calculating the number of white students for Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas and Tennessee school districts, the number of black students were subtracted from the total number of students in the district. This remainder was taken to be the number of white students. The percentage of black students in those districts was subtracted from 100 to arrive at the percentage of white students. HEW table 2–B cites Texas and Florida as among the 10 States having a significant population of Spanish-surnamed Americans as judged by number and by percentage of the population. HEW table 3–B was used to obtain the statistics on Spanish-surnamed Americans used in this chart. In compiling HEW table 3–B, the 10 States having a significant Spanish-surnamed population were selected out. Only large school districts were considered, and, of these, school districts were included on table 3–B, which had an enrollment of at least 1,000 Spanish-surnamed Americans. By using table 3–B, it is likely that those school districts in which the Spanish-surnamed American enrollment would sifinificantly affect the tabulations, have been considered.

[2] Statistics for Texas on total population in the school districts, black population in the school districts, and percentage of black population in the school districts, are not available at this time.

We find a rather striking parallel here, as we look over these statistics, that when the minority population of a school reaches somewhere around 30 percent, then the flight of youngsters becomes very pronounced. In Atlanta, Ga., when the minority population of that school system reached 68 percent, 22 percent of the white children left that school system. We have these statistics showing other districts where the population has reached close to 30 percent in the minority ranks and the flight of white students becomes more apparent.

I cite these figures only to support to some degree the conclusion reached by the Atlanta court in which the court stated that the problem today, perhaps the most significant problem in areas of large minorities, minority concentration, is the problem of resegregation, and we are going to have to address ourselves to that problem before we can deal with the whole specter of education in America.

I should like to suggest this as an alternative, Mr. Speaker. We have talked about the desegregation bills to some extent. We have provided $1.5 billion in the next 24 months of special aid to schoo's undergoing desegregation. We have talked about the President's busing amendment. I submit that perhaps there is another alternative that we might look at, and that is the question of general aid. I think the time is long past due when the Federal Government ought to take a greater responsibility for producing quality education for every American child in this country, for as we look over the whole school system of America, we find that there is a great disenchantment among American parents in the quality of the education of their children. This disenchantment we find among minority people as well as those in the very rich and affluent suburbs of America.

So we will have an opportunity as we work on the desegregation bill to study the prospects of perhaps offering a general aid bill, an alternative to the President's revenue-sharing proposal for education—a general aid bill which by 1974 or thereabouts, hopefully, would make the Federal Government a partner in the financing of better education for the children of this country, so that every school administrator can then make a sincere, honest, bona fide effort to improve the quality of education in his community.

I submit that if the trend of these judicial decisions handed down in Austin and in Atlanta continues, and that the court does go back to the neighborhood school system, depending on neighborhood schools to provide a good education for the children of that community, and as North and South turn to that kind of system, and as we find educators struggling to improve the quality of education in that kind of a system, in my judgment the color line will then disappear. When every American youngster in this country gets a good education, whether he is attending an all-white school, an all-black school, or an integrated school, only then, when the American people are convinced that every school is a quality school in this country, will the fears and the prejudices and the apprehensions that have quite properly dominated so many of our citizens in this country will disappear, and maybe we will have made a significant contribution, a contribution where the next generation of young Americans will be able to face the complex world which they are inheriting.

I have said many times the one fear that we as free people have is an inability by our citizens to understand the complexity of freedom. For that reason, in my judgment, education is the keystone of our very existence. If we Americans do not understand, we do not have the comprehension, the ability to communicate and to understand the complex nature of the world in which our children are growing up and in which we live, then we become easy prey for the prophets of the false gods and the false ideologies.

I feel so strongly about an educational system which will give every single American in the country, boy or girl, white or black, younger or older, an opportunity to develop his resources to the best of his ability.

Mr. MATHIS of Georgia, Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PUCINSKI. I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. MATHIS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I would like to commend the distinguished gentleman from Illinois, the chairman of our Subcommittee on Education, for bringing this to the floor of the Congress today.

Mr. Speaker, we must face this issue honestly, and we must face it foursquare, and we must do it soon, because the public education system in this country is in danger of being destroyed.

Also I would like to commend the gentleman for bringing his subcommittee to my district a few weeks ago to discuss how education has been affected by this question. I understand the gentleman was to have several of the members of his subcommittee, and he came to my district alone. This made me wonder whether the other members shared our concern for the future of public education in this country. I thank the gentleman for coming to my district to find out about the problems we face in the South and the problems we will be facing in the country in general on education.

I concur with what the gentleman has said that the President is sincere, but I have serious doubts about what the President has said, as contrasted with what his administration has done. During his campaign for the Presidency, the President opposed busing to achieve racial balance, and yet I would point out to the gentleman we have experienced more busing during his administration than at any time previously.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Georgia for his contribution, and I thank him for the hospitality shown to me in his district.

Mr. Speaker, I wish we could get the Members of this body and the members of the Supreme Court to take that trip to the gentleman's county in Georgia and let them see the problems faced by the people there and see how the people there are trying to face the problem.

Yes, we are aware of the fact that some people do not want to face the problem. We will always find such people in a country as large as ours, but I believe the people generally have tried to adapt themselves to the orders of the Supreme Court in an orderly fashion. I

wish the Members could see the guerrilla warfare being waged by the Justice Department against these people. I was dismayed to hear that the Austin decision is going to be appealed simply because they did not cross all the t's and dot all the i's. The Judges are honestly and sincerely facing up to the problem.

I think my colleague is so right. We Americans are going to have to sit down and reason together, because this is a problem that can destroy the whole educational system. It could bring great disillusionment to the black children of our country as well as to the white children.

I remember so vividly being in the gentleman's district and having a lovely young girl, a junior in high school, a black girl, appear before our committee. She broke down three times and cried, because she said—

Mr. Congressman, I am not interested in whether I go to an integrated school or to a segregated school. What I want is to go to a good school, so I can go to college and get the things my mother never had.

I remember also a young man, a senior, who had just graduated from school in Baker County, a very bright young man, who said—

Mr. Congressman, I received actually no education during this last year, because of the turmoil there was in our school because of these court orders and all these plans.

He said—

We are being short-changed on education simply because they will not give us a chance to learn.

I think these things sometimes are missed as a point, as a mark in the cold vocabulary of the legal brief. It is easy enough for people in Washington to go into the hustings and insist on every i being dotted and every t being crossed, and they say, "You have not done enough," or "You have not purged yourself completely of a dual school system."

If indeed a community is making an honest effort, and the judge is supervising the school board, and there is a decent effort being made to break down a dual school system, to break down discrimination, to break down the denial of opportunity to all children, it seems to me that school board ought to have an opportunity to move forward and develop an educational system for those children.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PUCINSKI. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. SPENCE. I should like to thank the gentleman from Illinois for bringing to our attention the problem, which is not peculiar to any one section of our country. I will predict that in the next year this will be one of the biggest problems we will have throughout this whole Nation of ours. I just do not believe our parents, school administrators, teachers, and citizens throughout this country will stand for this kind of situation to exist which the courts are forcing on us right now.

Mr. PUCINSKI. I would make just one minor correction. The gentleman is absolutely correct, but this is already a national problem.

In San Francisco, where they have ordered massive busing, there is violent reaction from all the citizens there, minority groups and others. In one of our northern cities the black people have served notice on the school board if their children are going to be bused clear across town they will refuse to send the children to school.

We are finding that black people, the minority people, are just as outraged at these schemes as are their white neighbors.

We have looked at this as a problem affecting only the South, but, for instance, Mr. Pottinger, the head of the civil rights section in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, in his statement recently which appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, said that we have attorneys in some of these northern school districts that are going back 25 years scrutinizing board proceedings if they can find some seed, some basis which would indicate that the school system was segregated de jure. Going back 25 years? He said it takes countless hours, that it takes in some instances 2,000 hours to complete an investigation. This kind of harassment against a community that is trying to do a decent job in giving its children education?

I agree with the gentleman, the time has come when we Americans ought to take a hard look at this whole subject, black and white, reason together and find a common answer to this problem.

Right now black children are being short-changed in public education as well as white children. I hope that somewhere along the line we can rally enough support in the Congress to get some answers to these pressing problems. Otherwise I fear the mass exodus of white youngsters into private schools is going to leave the public school system a shell, a public school system totally segregated nonwhite, a public school system which has lost the support of the general public.

I can actually see, if we look far enough into the future, a public school system without any public support, and no system at all. I cannot think of any greater tragedy that could beset our country than to see the public school system of America strangled by its own foolishness.

Mr. RUTH. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PUCINSKI. I yield to the gentleman from North Carolina.

Mr. RUTH. Mr. Speaker, I would like to commend my colleague, the gentleman from Illinois, for addressing himself to this most important problem in our schools today.

Mr. Speaker, desegregation has come a long way since it was first introduced in the South. In lieu of this progress the Supreme Court would do well to recognize it and begin to base its decisions with a greater regard for quality education. The time has expired for punitive decisions and the time has come to bring the people together. It is indeed strange to have our court decisions not in accord with either the executive or legislative branch of Government. I refer to the recent statements of both the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and the President of the United States; and of course, from the beginning the civil rights law stated that Federal funds would not be used to achieve racial balance or for forced busing.

The material previously referred to is as follows:

[In the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division]

CIVIL ACTION No. 6298

Vivian Calhourn, et al., plaintiffs, v. *Ed S. Cook, et al., Defendants.*

This case is on remand from the Fifth Circuit with directions to require implementation of a pupil assignment plan in compliance with the principles of *Swann* v. *Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,* —— U.S. —— (39 L. W. 4437, April 20, 1971). Specifically, it directs only two changes: (1) The provision for majority-to-minority transfer with transportation and space being guaranteed under the option and (2) The filing of semi-annual reports. *United States* v. *Hinds County School Board,* 433 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1970). After hearing on remand the court finds the following:

HISTORY

This case is now in its thirteenth year before this court, having been filed in 1958. Atlanta in 1961–62 was one of the first major southern cities officially abandoning the dual school system. In its court experience, the original desegregation order was one of the few unappealed and assented to. Periodically as each new specific to *Brown* v. *Topeka*[1] was belatedly developed by the higher courts, the School Board has been returned to court and given new directions under such landmark cases as *Jefferson,*[2] *Green,*[3] *Singleton,*[4] *Montgomery County,*[5] and *Orange County.*[6] Each has been accepted and promptly implemented. In the interim, the system voluntarily accelerated from the early concept of grade-by-grade annual integration to system-wide integration; it voluntarily and studiously located new schools and rezoned so as to maximize integration; it voluntarily liberalized its pupil-transfer plan; and in various ways increased responsibility for its black teaching personnel, principals, and area superintendents. Through court order, it has advanced from the initial requirement of two teachers of opposite race to each school to a computerized mathematical distribution of its facility by race throughout the city; and from historical and traditional attendance zones to a court-supervised optimum *Orange County* plan. No one has successfully challenged the good faith of its elected Board of Education, the appointed Superintendent, Dr. John W. Letson, or of its administrative personnel throughout this uncertain decade. Its efforts were early described as "commendable" by the Supreme Court. *Calhoun* v. *Latimer,* 377 U.S. 263 (1964). Each change has produced convulsive implosions within the system and what has now become the annual agony of Atlanta has caused significant change in the character of the system, both physically and psychologically.

When this suit began, Atlanta had a pupil ratio of 70% white and 30% black and a predominantly white faculty; today, its racial complexion has reversed to 70% black and 30% white and its 4,800 teachers are 60% black and 40% white. From an enrollment of 115,000 students its has dropped to 100,000 in the school year 1970–71, during which it lost 7,000 whites and gained 1,000 blacks. The system itself covers an area approximately 16 miles long and 14 miles wide wide lying in Fulton and a portion of DeKalb counties. The Atlanta City School System is a so-called "independent system" in that it is separately organized and operated from the county systems, each receiving direct grants from the state, supplemented by local tax funds. It is one of the 31 remaining independent city systems within the state.

Footnotes at end of article.

As such, it receives no state funds for transportation. It has never transported students, owns no busses, and there is no school "bussing" available. Based on information furnished by each principal as to location and times, the private Atlanta Transit System arranges routes to accommodate students at reduced fares provided by each student individually. The system presently maintains 123 elementary/primary schools and 29 secondary schools, with two units to be opened this coming year.

The white students remaining are concentrated at the extreme northern and southern ends of the district, while the vast middle is a broad belt of industry and high-density solid black housing. The line between these areas is steadily creeping towards the ends, with increased black housing and diminished white housing. Since 1961, it has anually achieved substantial temporary integation by the establishment or construction of "line schools". However, 34 of those schools have gone from all-white to 90% or more black during the period. This "tipping process" is so rapid that it sometimes occurs by the time a facility deliberately located to increase integration can be completed and occupied. Seldom does it last longer than two years. Since official desegregation in 1961, 24 new schools have been constructed, several of which have been especially built to serve federal housing developments in the inner city. Others were appropriated for such purposes. In spite of official laws and directives to the contrary, the bulk of such developments have been operated as all-black since inception. As a natural consequence, 29 schools provided for such "controlled situations" are substantially black. Enforcement of fair housing legislation under *Jones* v. *Alfred H. Mayer Co.*, 392 U.S. 409 (1968), and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 will automatically integrate these zones. See *Hightower* v. *West*, 430 F.2d 552 at 556 (5th Cir. 1970).

The cause of such frustrating results lies in factors completely beyond the control of school authorities. Segregated housing, whether impelled by school changes or not, remains the unconquerable foe of the racial ideal of integrated public schools in the cities. The white flight to the suburbs and private schools continues. As far back as 1967, in an offshoot of this case involving the proposed construction of an all-black school in the heart of the black belt, the problem was accurately characterized by plaintiffs' witnesses and the court as *de facto* rather than *de jure*. *Griggs* v. *Cook*, 272 F. Supp. 163, *aff'd* 384 F. 2d 705 (5th Cir. 1967). Only last year, the parties and Judge Hooper for this court exhaustingly investigated possible remedies for over seven weeks of trial, culminating in the orders involved in this appeal and remand. Some of the fruits of those "best efforts" have already slightly soured in the face of evolutional *de facto* changes. Through it all, the Atlanta system has maintained a traditional position of leadership in the public schools. It remains at the top of the state in pay scale, curriculum development, and innovative efforts in quality education.

THE PRESENT SITUATION

In this litigation, the longtime standard of measurement has been the classification of schools in excess of 90%–10% enrollment by race as "integrated". Presently, 38 elementary schools and 13 secondary schools meet this test in that they have integration in excess of 10% (many at 50–50) of the minority race at such schools. Of the remainder of 101, all but 46 have either completely resegregated, serve special controlled housing situations, or have been built since official desegregation as previously discussed. Of some 46 schools in neither category, the information furnished the court reveals substantially the following:

24 have integration of less than 10% (ranging from 1%–7% black and 1%–5% white);

7 have only token integration (less than 10 students of the opposite race, ranging from 1–4 blacks and 3–9 whites);

15 are either all-black or all-white.

The closest schools with a majority of the opposite race are located as follows:[7]

Less than ¾ mile, 1.

¾ mile to 1½ miles, 5.

1½ miles to 2 miles, 11.

2 miles to 8½ miles, 29.

Last year, 1140 students took advantage of the unlimited transfer option in effect.[8] There is, in fact, no serious problem of overcrowding at any facility. Annual zone changes and excellent modern portable classrooms are used to take care of increasing enrollments in either white or black schools. There are, proportionately, as many vacant classrooms at black schools as at white. The court is convinced that no device of packing is being used to preserve segregation. To the contrary, crowding at one school has been used to increase integration at another school. The Board assures the court there will be no problem of overcrowding at any school during 1971–72.

When the remand issued, the Board promptly agreed to the specifics required therein by formulating plans with the Atlanta Transit System to afford transportation by direct grants to the students taking advantage of the majority-to-minority transfer option. Prior thereto and following the issuance of *Swann*, it formed administrative task forces to study the possibilities of increasing integration by pairing, rezoning again, etc. All of those efforts have been reviewed by the court and representatives of the plaintiffs. Pairing or additional zone changes along the line either produce substantial hardship increases in travel time for the children involved or seriously imperil existing integration at one of the schools involved. In either event, the end result at best would accomplish only a temporary change soon to be wiped out in the historical pattern already established.

With the exception of an innovation in the transfer system, no single measure appears hopeful under the circumstances. There is evidence in the prior record that Atlanta has encouraged maximum majority-to-minority transfers on an individual basis. The court reasons that if such transfers could be effected on a bus-load basis, the prospects can be enhanced. The Atlanta Transit System is in dire straits itself. However, it has agreed to allow the Board to utilize the same total number of busses previously employed on an individual pick-up route basis for "group transfers". Thus, if a bus-load group of students in one area opt for a transfer to a particular school of the opposite race in another area, they can be transported at the same time in the same bus rather than individually along with the general public. The attached order so provides.

Additionally, the Board has agreed to make special efforts in the black area to encourage such group transfers through its area superintendents and other personnel stationed there. Already, it has given wide-publicity to the new transfer option through local newspapers, television, and radio. Over 100,000 bulletins have been placed in the neighborhood schools and a teacher is on duty to explain the plan to all interested parties. A central information center with a publicized telephone number has been established to impart the details to anyone inquiring. Each pupil may readily apply for the new transfer at the school he last attended on a quarterly basis on or before two days before the quarter opening.

CONCLUSIONS

Other than the above, it is apparent that the only device which could effect any significant change is mass-busing in an endeavor to achieve a 30%–70% ratio throughout the system. As seen, distances alone would require 40 minutes or more for each child transported and all of this would have to be achieved by a system which has no busses, no drivers, and no funds with which to acquire and operate them. The pairing of non-contiguous attendance zones is, under urban circumstances where a half-mile for a school child is a long distance to walk, but another term for busing. The court has considered the possibility of requiring the transportation of black students from the center to the white ends. This move is opposed by a large group of blacks except on a voluntary basis as described. On the facts alone, the court concludes that wholesale busing is neither "reasonable, feasible, or workable."

Of paramount significance, however, is the obvious result. Atlanta now stands on the brink of becoming an all-black city. A fruit-basket turnover through busing to create a 30% white–70% black uniformity throughout the system would unquestionably cause such a result in a few months time. Intelligent black and white leadership in the community realizes and fears it. Responsible citizens both in and out of the school system are deeply concerned with preservation of the biracial identity of the city. Without it, the ultimate goal of equality in all its aspects is doomed and Atlanta's position of leadership is severely threatened.

The Atlanta School Board is made up of ten members, three of whom are black. Its chairman is Dr. Benjamin Mays, a respected black educator and civil rights leader. The Board deems it unrealistic to go further than stated and unwise to do so. The Biracial Committee appointed by this court is composed of ten outstanding civic and business leaders, five of each race. Its Chairman is Mr. Lyndon Wade, the black Executive Secretary of the Urban League. A majority of 9 [8A] of its members have furnished the court with a resolution praising the Board's efforts and recommending no further action. Short of mass busing, the plaintiffs whose counsel and advisors have vast experience in such matters can offer no other alternatives. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare has long ago approved the present plans.

The remedy of mass bussing under these circumstances is rejected. Nor is it deemed required under *Swann*. "An objection to transportation of students may have validity when the time or distance of travel is so great as to risk either the health of the children or significantly impinge on the educational process." [*Swann* at Part V(4)]

The time and distance which would be involved is impractical, particularly for children in the primary and elementary grades. If the premise of *Brown* is correct and education in an all-black system is injurious, then certainly the results here would impinge the educational process for the children remaining. At least now there is complete integration administratively and substantial integration in pupil assignment. In a similar situation (Memphis), the Sixth Circuit in its post-*Swann* remand, indicated that the "extensive transportation of pupils to schools all over the city, regardless of distances involved in order to establish a fixed ratio in each school" is not required; and seemingly recommends that the trial court review all of those other devices already considered in Atlanta. *Northcross v. Board of Education*, ——— F.2d ———) 6th Cir., June 7, 1971).

Swann holds that once *de jure* status is removed that a school district is not required to reintegrate continually due to *de facto* changes. "Neither school authorities nor district courts are constitutionally required to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimination through official action is eliminated from the sys-

Footnotes at end of article.

tem." [*Swann*, Part VI]. On this basis, there is considerable merit to the position that this case ought to be dismissed forthwith. Atlanta's *de jure* status has long since been removed by Board action and by successive court decrees. Its present problems are entirely *de facto*. There is absolutely no evidence of any affirmative action by the board to increase segregation. *Cf. Hobson v. Hansen*, 320 F. Supp. 720 (D.C.D. 1970). To the contrary, all official action for many years has been to promote integration. It appears to be a unitary system "within which no person is to be effectively excluded from any school because of race or color." *Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education*, 396 U.S. 19 (1969). On such basis, Atlanta is entitled to a dismissal.

However, should Swann be considered as a starting point for such a goal, the present qualify. In essence, Swann holds that the essentials of any unitary system are the elimination of invidious racial distinctions in regard to (1) transportation, (2) faculty and supporting personnel (3) extracurricular activities, (4) construction and site selection, and the presence of an (5) optional majority-to-minority transfer provision. To the extent that they apply, Atlanta has had such essentials for some time. With this order, the payment of public transportation and space guarantee has been added to the transfer provision. On pupil assignment, the Court, sitting in equity, may utilize any number of devices to achieve a "realistic and workable" plan for the district. All of the devices named, with the exception of mass bussing, have been considered by the Board and the Court and optimum results obtained. Insofar as one-race schools are concerned, the Board has satisfied its burden of showing that "their racial composition is not the result of present or past discriminatory action on their part." [*Swann*, Part V(2)].[9] Accordingly, upon implementation of the attached order, the system will be judicially declared unitary and a dismissal will be directed on January 1, 1972, the court retaining the inherent jurisdiction to deal with future problems.[10] "But in the absence of a showing that either the school authorities or some other agency of the State has deliberately attempted to fix or alter demographic patterns to affect the racial composition of the schools, further intervention by a district court should not be necessary." [*Swann*, Part VI].

COMMENT

Looking ahead, the court is compelled to note that the critical point for public education in the City of Atlanta and its environs has been reached. The situation calls for a sweeping examination of its relationship to housing, planning, finances, rapid transit and all the other external factors which vitally affect its role in the community. Apparently, no serious effort has been expended on the question of consolidation of the Atlanta system with the Fulton County system. In terms of efficiency, taxes, and quality education, such consolidations normally produce long-range improvements. In terms of the current problem, such consolidation might well produce partial, even though not perfect, solutions. Certainly for many reasons connected and unconnected with this case, this one aspect ought to be studied without delay. In any such investigation, the proper vehicle should be community-wide, crossing lines of industry, government, and transportation as well as education. While the School Board should certainly participate, it cannot function successfully alone. A special Mayor's Committee of both races might be appropriate. The existing Biracial Committee might well be expanded to 20–30 members to undertake such a task. If so, the court would gladly entertain a motion by any party or the committee itself to add sufficient members to represent the other community aspects involved Short of such critical reevaluation, the Atlanta system faces a difficult task in merely "hanging on" to its present position, awaiting the uncertain reversal of white flight from its limits.

It is so ordered.

This the 28th day of July, 1971.

SIDNEY O. SMITH, Jr.,
U.S. District Judge.
ALBERT J. HENDERSON, Jr.,
U.S. District Judge.

FOOTNOTES

[1] *Brown* v. *Board of Education*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

[2] *United States* v. *Jefferson County Board of Education*, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967).

[3] *Green* v. *County School Board*, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).

[4] *Singleton* v. *Jackson Municipal Separate School District*, 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1970).

[5] *United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education*, 395 U.S. 225 (1969).

[6] *Ellis v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, Florida*, 423 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1970).

[7] These distances are calculated in straight lines without regard to traffic patterns, transportation barriers, etc. In many instances, there is an intervening interstate highway, railroad, or similar artificial barrier.

[8] Under the old freedom-of-choice provisions, an unusually large number of blacks by-passed closer white and black schools to attend a "prestige" black school; and white students by-passed closer white and negro schools to attend a "prestige" white school.

[8A] The tenth member was out of the city for an extended absence.

[9] As seen, on a school-by-school basis there is existing integration of some kind or there is a purely *de facto* situation occurring since official desegregation in all but 15 all-black or all-white schools, or less than 10 percent of the total facilities in operation.

[10] In this respect, it should be made clear that for the present, the *Singleton*-type faculty assignment ordered by the court on March 20, 1970, calls for an annual adjustment. See *Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Board*, 432 F.2d 875 (5th Cir. 1970). Implicit in the attached order is the admonition that it be so administered until further direction is received.

[In the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division]

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6298

Vivian Calhoun, et al, Plaintiffs, v. *Ed S. Cook, et al, Defendants.*

Upon consideration of this case under the remand of the Fifth Circuit, the defendant is ordered and directed as follows:

1. To abide by the previous decrees of this court regarding faculty and pupil assignment in the Atlanta public schools and specifically the orders of February 9, 1970; March 20, 1970; and August 31, 1970;

2. To provide for majority-to-minority transfers by application at the school last attended or at the central office each quarter of the school year at any time on or before the second day prior to the beginning of each quarter with space to be guaranteed each applicant at the school of his choice.

3. To provide for transportation for majority-to-minority transfers on the following basis:

(a) Where a sufficient number of students from a given community, zone, or point of origin will be traveling to a single destination, transportation will be provided by direct-billing contract with the Atlanta Transit System or some other carrier.

(b) Where the number of children moving to a given destination school is smaller than a bus load, transportation will be provided in the form of special bus tokens, distributed directly to the pupil involved on a weekly basis, to be used on regular Atlanta Transit System routes.

4. To furnish to the court and to the Biracial Committee through its chairman, reports on at least a semi-annual basis by October 1st and February 1st of each year containing the data set out in Appendix "B" of the district court order approved in *United States* v. *Hinds County School Board*, 433 F. 2d 611 (5th Cir. 1970). If such data is presently available in the existing monthly/quarterly reports published, *such* reports may be furnished in lieu of a special report.

5. To consult with the Biracial Committee, in its advisory capacity, in the areas of the promulgation and maintenance of school zone lines, in the selection of sites for new schools, in student transfer and school transportation policies, together with such additional matters as may be assigned to the Biracial Committee by the School Board for consultation and advice. *United States* v. *Hinds County School Board*, 433 F. 2d 611 at 612 (5th Cir. 1970).

To the extent stated herein, relief is granted; otherwise, it is denied. The motion by plaintiffs to hire a prfessional consultant at the expense of defendant is rejected. Considering the experience of the parties and the court in these matters, and the obvious factual situation, such expense is deemed unnecessary. Moreover, such action would delay these proceedings several more weeks up to the projected opening of school.

It is so ordered.

This the 28th day of July, 1971.

SIDNEY O. SMITH, Jr.,
United States District Judge.
ALBERT J. HENDERSON, Jr.,
United States District Judge.

[In the U.S. District Court, Western District of Texas, Austin Division]

United States of America vs. Texas Education Agency, et al. (Austin Ind. School District).

CIVIL ACTION NO. A–70–CA–80

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On June 28, 1971, this Court entered an Order determining the absence of *de jure* segregation against Mexican Americans, but the continuation of the vestiges of a dual school system as regards Blacks. This Order incorporates that earlier Memorandum Opinion and Order and proceeds to outline a plan for eliminating the dual school system.

Despite this Court's repeated requests for a joint plan, the parties were able to agree only as to the high school integration plan submitted by the Austin Independent School District. *See* Report and Submission filed July 15, 1971. As regards junior highs, the Plaintiff continued to disregard this Court's guideline three as to the unsuitability of Anderson for a junior or senior high facility. The previously determined unsuitability of the Anderson facility, the greater costs, and longer transportation time involved in the Plaintiff's plan require this Court to reject it. *See* Defendant's Exhibits 37 and 82.

In reviewing the plans submitted for elementary school integration, this Court first reiterates its guideline calling for minimized busing. The testimony at the earlier hearing of this case convinced this Court that extensive crosstown busing could only harm the local education system. Dr. Cecil Hardesty, Superintendent of Schools in Jacksonville, Florida, an unbiased educational expert who has had extensive experience with crosstown busing ordered in his school district, delineated the many adverse effects from this remedial technique. The added time requirements imposed on students by busing often reduce attendance and produce higher dropout rates, especially among minority students, and limit the opportunity of all transported students to participate before and after school in extra-curricular activities, which both parties agree are an important factor in the educational process. Busing similarly reduces parental participa-

tion in school activities, particularly where it necessitates dividing a family's children among a number of schools. It also taxes the capability of health facilities in individual schools to deal with at-school injuries and illnesses. Of course, the objections to busing thus far enumerated might in many circumstances apply with equal validity to the traditional role bus transportation has played in overcoming the geographical separation between pupil and school. However, such objections take on a new and much larger dimension in the urban environment where massive transportation of students is involved.

Moreover, both Dr. Hardesty and Dr. Davidson further testified that busing students simply to achieve racial balance, as opposed to the traditional function of bus transportation, raises new educational problems not heretofore experienced. Transportation of students, particularly the very young, from their home neighborhoods into strange and often hostile environments causes raised anxiety levels in both students and their teachers that constitute psychological barriers to learning progress, and subjects students to traumatic experiences that they are not equipped by age or experience to handle. The Court is also aware of other barriers posed by community opposition to forced busing. Cf. United States v. Haynes,— F.2d. — No. 71-1165 (5th Cir. June 17, 1971). Because such large numbers of students must be transported within a reasonably short period of time, busing to achieve desegregation in Austin will necessitate assembly of students at their neighborhood schools prior to transporting them to another school. Thus inclement weather may pose problems in sheltering up to twice the school's student capacity during the busing period in the morning and afternoon. Moreover, in Austin, the bus routes would require transporting many students through a heavy traffic complex consisting of downtown Austin (Colorado River to 11th Street), the Capitol complex (12th Street to 19th Street) and the University of Texas campus (19th Street to approximately 27th Street). The traffic situation is further complicated by the fact that Interstate Highway 35, which is the main north-south traffic artery in Austin, is undergoing major construction work involving the closing of traffic lanes and various detours. This Court therefore finds that the traffic situation presents a serious and substantial obstacle to the safe transportation of school children. Finally, it should be noted that transportation costs in excess of those normally incurred in the traditional function of busing are essentially a non-productive expenditure, since such costs contribute little, if anything to academic achievement. Dollars spent on additional buses, driver's salaries, gasoline, tires and other maintenance yield little or no educational return to the community; dollars spent on productive programs, teacher's salaries, books, facilities and teaching equipment do.

Accordingly, this Court finds as a fact that busing to achieve desegregation in the Austin community will result in serious interference with the educational process. Because of this, the Court has examined both the HEW Recommendations and the AISD plan with a view toward minimizing busing and maximizing the use of neighborhood schools. Normally, in fashioning a remedy, the recommendations of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare are entitled to great weight, U.S. v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F. 2d 836, 847 (5th Cir. 1966), and "the school districts are to bear the burden of demonstrating beyond question, after a hearing, the unworkability of the [HEW] proposals . . ." Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Bd., 396 U.S. 290, 292 (1969) (concurring opinion of Justice Harlan.) In the instant case, however, the evidence adduced at trial, especially the uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Cunningham and Dr. Davidson, shows that despite AISD's repeated attempts to communicate with HEW, over a period of several months, nothing was forthcoming from HEW until approximately 30 days prior to trial. At this time, HEW filed with this Court its comments on the desegregation plan formulated by the AISD. These comments (Letter from Thomas Kendrick, Senior Program Officer to Dr. Jack Davidson, Superintendent, AISD, dated and filed May 14, 1971) [Hereinafter called HEW Recommendations] as they have been amended at trial through the introduction of Plaintiff's Exhibits 23, 25 and 26, and the Report and Submission filed with this Court on July 15, 1971, constitute the only documentary evidence of any desegregation plan developed by HEW. At trial, several further modifications to the HEW Recommendations were revealed for the first time through the oral testimony of Mr. A. T. Miller, the HEW Project Officer. The only explanation offered by HEW for this course of conduct was the testimony of Mr. Miller that he was not authorized to deviate from the HEW plan, which had been drawn in Washington, D.C., but that he had been "available" for consultation throughout the pendency of the suit. The fact remains, however, that the AISD was not given the benefit of HEW recommendations in drawing its plan, despite repeated efforts to obtain such recommendations, until approximately 30 days prior to trial. This inflexibility on the part of HEW is inconsistent with this Court's understanding of the role to be played by HEW in the complex, difficult task of urban school desegregation, and it is further inconsistent with the clear and obvious purpose of this Court's Order of September 4, 1970, directing the parties to attempt agreement on a common desegregation plan. This case thus appears to depart substantially from the usual run of school cases in that here the uncommunicative, uncooperative and recalcitrant party has been not the local school board, but the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

This Court has therefore weighed both plans according to their relative merits under the two-pronged test developed in the cases:

(1) Does the plan convert *now* the existing dual school system "to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch?" Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1969), and

(2) Is the plan "reasonable, realistic and workable?", Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, supra, at 575.

HIGH SCHOOLS

The parties have agreed that the plan submitted by AISD for implementation in the Fall of 1971 (see Defendants' Exhibits Nos. 35 and 37) would assign all black high school students to schools that are not identifiable as Negro schools, (Report and Submission of July 15, 1971, at I), and the Court so finds. The AISD plan for the high schools, (Alternate Plan No. 2, for the 1971-72 school year) together with the planned construction of three new high schools and proposed revision of attendance zones, (Alternate Plan No. I, for the 1973-74 school year) meets all constitutional requirements and is therefore approved.

JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOLS

The parties similarly agree that the AISD plan for junior high schools. (Defendants' Exhibit No. 36, Alternate Plan No. 2, as modified by the closing of Kealing Jr. High School for the 1971-72 school year) would assign all black junior high school students to schools that are not identifiable as Negro schools, although HEW expresses doubt that this would comply with the fourth guideline contained in this Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order of June 28, 1971, since it, together with AISD's high school plan "unnecessarily places on the black community the entire burden of desegregating on the secondary level." Report and Submission of July 15, 1971, at 2-3. The guideline in question was addressed to any attempt on the part of either party to achieve desegregation merely by integrating blacks with Mexican-Americans as opposed to integrating them throughout the entire community. Although some of the same considerations of fairness support HEW's position, this Court believes that they are outweighed by the continuity of zone lines and feeder patterns, decreased likelihood of "white flight," transportation efficiencies and coordination with the AISD elementary plan afforded by the AISD junior high plan. Moreover, the HEW proposals for secondary schools disregard an additional cost of some $246,200 for portable buildings made necessary by the crowding of some facilities and drastic underutilization of others under the HEW plan, and involves the use of Anderson High School as a junior high facility, which this Court finds unsatisfactory. The AISD junior high school plan (alternate Plan No. 2), as modified by the closing of Kealing Jr. High, also meets all constitutional requirements and is APPROVED.

ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS

Austin's 55 elementary schools, which are widely scattered across the city to meet neighborhood needs, pose the major problem in implementing an effective desegregation program. HEW suggests pairing for a few contiguous attendance zones, but in the main recommends the groups of contiguous zones be "clustered" with "satellite" or non-contiguous zones. *See* HEW Recommendations at 3-5 and Attachment 1, and Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. Each cluster, usually consisting of one predominately Black school, one predominately Mexican-American school, and four predominately Anglo schools, would be thoroughly integrated on a daily basis through extensive cross-town busing. Mr. Miller, the HEW Project Officer, indicated that in each cluster all students in one of the schools, or several grades could be divided among several of the schools in the cluster. In the Report and Submission of July 15, 1971, HEW further suggests "full time pairing of the five all-black elementary schools (counting Rosewood and Oak Springs as one school encompassing grades one through six) with ten or more non-contiguous Anglo schools."

While employing a form of clustering similar to that proposed by HEW at trial (*see* Defendant's Exhibit 78 at 16) AISD offers a unique new approach to elementary desegregation. Integrating not only people, but the entire educational process, the AISD plan creates learning resource centers, provides inter-school visitations, and sponsors joint field study trips. A "Companion School Team Planning Advisory Council", composed of representatives from each school in a given cluster as well as staff representatives, would develop integrated educational programs for the cluster. As explained more fully in Defendant's Exhibit 80, [t]he primary purpose of the multi-cultural learning activities at the Learning Resource Centers is to provide new dimensions of understanding by placing greater emphasis on the cultural influences and contributions of various ethnic groups of American society.

To accomplish this objective, one center each for fine arts, social sciences, avocations, and science, would be established in vacant or underutilized facilities designated by AISD. According to Defendant's Exhibit 78, "Major Program Thrusts" would be "1. Bolster academic programs in one race schools (cognitive learning) (and) 2. Develop wholesome attitudes and understandings (affective learning)." As "a major portion of the social studies curriculum," these centers will concentrate on "instructional groups" "composed of "four multi-ethnic student teams

consisting of 6, 7, or 8 students each, depending on the size of the companion school group." Defendant's Exhibit 80. These instructional groups would regularly be assembled for inter-school visits, field study trips, and planned programs at the learning resource centers. The bus transportation used both to assemble the groups and transport them to these activities would be integrated into the educational program through the use of supervised on-bus activities.

Under the AISD plan the Court finds that elementary students would be in a desegregated environment as much as twenty-five (25) percent of the school year. This Court further finds that the AISD elementary plan, particularly in its creation of learning resource centers, possesses great educational benefits. It is a program designed specifically to develop in elementary school children the capacity to understand, appreciate and respect cultural values other than their own by providing, in a structured, supervised program, a common bond of experience with members of other ethnic groups. The central thrust of the AISD plan is to eliminate the mutual fears that lie at the heart of racial prejudice, and the discriminatory attitudes that flow from such fears, through educational activities specifically tailored to reach this objective. Its underlying premise is that meaningful and effective desegregation depends primarily on the quality, and only secondarily on the quantity, of the multicultural experiences to which each elementary school child is exposed.

HEW attempts to stigmatize this innovative proposal with the label "part-time desegregation", relying on *Bivins v. Bibb County Board of Education*, 424 F.2d 97, 98 (5th Civ. 1970) where only 25% of the Negro students were attending formerly all-white schools and only "nine percent of the white students were participating or waiting to participate on a part-time basis in virtually all of the all-Negro schools in response to the incentive of special courses there . . . ." No such scheme is proposed by the AISD elementary plan, which is mandatory on all elementary students and which encompasses virtually all of the system's Anglo elementary students for a much larger portion of their academic time in a far wider and more meaningful range of multicultural experiences. This Court therefore considers *Bivins v. Bibb County*, supra, inapplicable to this case.

Nor can the HEW Recommendations be said to provide a more satisfactory distribution of ethnic groups. Plaintiff's Cluster No. 5, when examined in view of the more accurate enrollment figures provided in Defendant's Exhibit 79, includes only eighteen Blacks or about 1% of the cluster's student population; Cluster No. 6 includes only twenty-one Blacks or about 2%. *See* HEW Recommendations, Attach. E for composition of clusters. At the same time HEW would pair three schools—Becker, Mathews, and Pease—which, as indicated in Defendant's Exhibit 79, are already integrated on a tri-ethnic basis.

While the HEW Recommendations strictly avoid any discussion of implementation methods, which, of course, from the core of any determination as to reasonableness and workability, Mr. Miller's testimony indicates almost total reliance upon extended daily busing of 89% elementary students. *See* Plaintiff's Exhibit 26. This Court finds as a matter of fact that this proposal entails all the educational disadvantages of busing previously discussed. Moreover, the cost comparison of the HEW proposal with that of AISD is startling. Because the AISD can employ during the school day at the elementary level the same buses used to transport secondary students, no additional equipment is required. Consequently, expenditures would be held to $100,000 in operating costs. Defendant's Exhibit 82. In this same exhibit, the AISD estimates that the HEW elementary proposal would cost $1,708,000–$1,573,000 for transportation, and $135,000 for additional portable rooms. Even the Plaintiff's Exhibit 26, with its understatement of the number of buses required to implement the HEW Recommendations estimates total first year costs of $717,900. This Court finds as a matter of fact that, by either estimate, the cost of this proposal places an unreasonable burden upon the school district. This Court further finds that the minimum number of buses necessary to implement the HEW proposals cannot be obtained until late in the 1971–72 school year. See direct testimony of Dr. Leon R. Graham.

After a review of the evidence, particularly Defendant's Exhibit 82, Attach. A, this Court finds that the AISD plan is preferable also because it imposes lesser time burdens on students in going to and from school and lessens traffic hazards. Unlike the HEW Recommendations, the limited amount of busing required by the AISD will occur during hours of lessened traffic flow, as a part of the learning day with teacher participation. This Court finds that the AISD plan minimizes the disadvantage inherent in busing

The AISD elementary plan is a wholly new approach to the problems of desegregating elementary schools locked deeply in areas of urban minority concentration. Under difficult circumstances, the plan achieves maximum desegregation consistent with reasonable cost, student safety and educational soundness. It is the finding of this Court that Defendants have met their burden of showing the non-feasibility of the HEW proposals, and that the AISD elementary plan is the only physically possible desegregation plan for the 1971–72 school year because of the nonavailability of additional buses until late in the second semester.

With the closing of St. John's Elementary School, a predominantly black school, the students of which can easily be assigned to neighboring schools, and the addition of a majority-to-minority transfer provision, the AISD elementary plan will also meet all constitutional requirements.

CONCLUSION

Upon implementation of the AISD plans for the high schools, junior high schools and elementary schools, as modified herein, the defendant school district will be in full compliance with the previous Orders of this Court dated September 4, 1970, December 15, 1970, February 26, 1971, and April 14, 1971, all terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the constitutional principles announced in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968), and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, — U.S. —, 28 L.Ed. 2d 554 (1971), and will have achieved a unitary school system. This memorandum Opinion shall constitute this Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Order

Based upon the foregoing memorandum Opinion, it is Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that"

1. Alternate Plan No. 2, proposed by the Austin School Board, is to be put into immediate effect subject to the following modifications:

a. Kealing Junior High School is to be closed for school year of 1971–72.

b. St. Johns Elementary School is to be closed and its students reassigned to the neighboring white schools.

c. Paragraphs B, C, F and G of the Interim Desegregation Plan for the Austin Independent School District implemented by this Court's Order of September 4, 1970, shall remain in effect.

2. The site locations for the proposed high schools, junior high schools, and elementary schools are hereby approved; the School Board is further Ordered to report back to this Court on June 1, 1972, and every six (6) months thereafter, on the site acquisition, progress, planning and construction of new schools.

3. Since the AISD plan for elementary desegregation is unique in approach, the Board will report to this Court on October 1, 1971, and each February 1, and June 1, of succeeding years the progress made in desegregation at all levels with special emphasis on information pertinent to the elementary program, such reports to include, but not be limited to, student involvement, racial composition of staff and students, participation in extra curricular activities, and transportation utilized to accomplish both Board Alternate Plan No. 2 and the AISD plan for elementary schools.

4. Prior to the occupation of the new high schools and junior high schools at Northeast High School, Northwest High School, Austin High School, Rundberg Lane Junior High School, Northeast Junior High School, and the South First Street Junior High School, the Board will submit to this Court a projected ethnic composition for each school so that this Court can determine whether the features of Alternate Plan No. 2 should be continued or altered.

5. As authorized by the Supreme Court in *Swan* v. *Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, supra*, this Court will retain jurisdiction of this case to insure that the unitary system hereinabove provided and required is operated in accordance with these orders to achieve the objective specified. For this purpose, it is required that the Austin School Board shall, on or before the 1st day of the months of November, December, February, March, April and May, during the 1971–72 school year, submit to this court reports each of which shall cover the following topics:

a. Students, including (1) the number of students by race enrolled in the school district; (2) the number of students by race enrolled in each school in the district; (3) the number of students by race enrolled in each classroom in each of the schools in the district; and (4) the number of school days during each month that each child has participated in multi-cultural activities pursuant to the elementary school program, broken down by learning resource center visits, inter-site visits, and field-study trips.

b. Teachers, including (1) the number of full-time teachers by race in the district; (2) the number of full-time teachers by race in each school in the district; (3) the number of part-time teachers by race in the district, and (4) the number of part-time teachers by race in each school in the district.

c. Transfers, describing the requests and results which have accrued by race, under the majority-to-minority transfer provision which is a part of this Court's Order.

d. Specifying any change which may have been made in the boundaries of any zone or zones.

e. Transportation system, including the number of vehicles in use and the extent to which black and white students are transported daily on the same buses.

f. Utilization of equipment, including a statement that all gymnasia, auditoriums, cafeterias and like facilities are being operated on an integrated basis.

6. If it appears that the plan hereby adopted does not in actual fact and in operation provide the unitary system for which it was designed and adopted, the Order of this Court may be changed to whatever extent necessary to accomplish the objective.

Signed at Austin, Texas, this 19th day of July, 1971.

JACK ROBERTS,
U.S. District Judge.

[In the U.S. District Court, Western District of Texas, Austin Division]

CIVIL ACTION NO. A–70–CA–80

United State of America v. Texas Education Agency, et al.

ORDER

Pursuant to Rule 60(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order of July 19, 1971, is corrected on the last line of page eight to read 8900 elementary students rather than 89%.

It is so ordered.

Entered this 22nd day of July, 1971, in Austin, Texas.

JACK ROBERTS,
U.S. District Judge.

CIA SHOULD REPORT TO CONGRESS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, in 1947 Congress passed the National Security Act, which greatly restructured the executive branch of Government. In addition to combining the various armed services into the Department of Defense, the act also established the Central Intelligence Agency to coordinate the work of the individual intelligence-gathering branches of each armed service, and also to report directly to the National Security Council and the President of the United States.

Thus, the President was given the tools which would permit him to make the decisions which could lead to peace and to war in the coming decades.

Unfortunately, Congress did not give itself the same tools, although the legislative branch of Government is equally charged by the Constitution with making those same decisions. The National Security Act of 1947 did not specifically exclude Congress from receiving reports and periodic and regular briefings, nor did it specifically provide for them. It was silent. As might have been expected, regular reports have not been forthcoming. When specific requests for information on the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency have been made these questions have generally not been answered.

The problem with that approach has been that, with such a supersecret agency, it is difficult to know just what questions need to be asked. Since requests for the CIA are carefully hidden in the President's budget and in authorization and appropriation bills, it is impossible to know even how much money is spent by the intelligence community, let alone for what purposes it is spent.

Congress should have that information—even though most of it must necessarily be highly classified, because it does have the responsibility for major decisions of foreign policy. The power of the purse and the power of the sword are the two major power grants committed to the Congress by the Constitution. Each is intimately connected with operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, and so far, Congress has neglected to use either power.

The bill I am introducing today will help Congress to fulfill its responsibility. It is a companion measure to S. 2224, introduced in the Senate by the senior Senator from Kentucky, JOHN SHERMAN COOPER. Its sole purpose is to require the CIA to make regular and special reports to the House Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees and the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. Such reports would deal with the intelligence information collected by the Agency and analyze its significance in terms of our relations to foreign countries as well as national security.

Naturally, such reports would often deal with sensitive subjects, and the Members of the committees and their staffs would be subject to the same security clearance as members of the executive branch dealing with the same reports. The only purpose for receiving such reports would be to enable the Congress to fulfill adequately its decision-making role. The question of the public's right to know is not at issue.

In 1954, when Congress set up the Atomic Energy Commission, it specifically provided that the appropriate body of Congress constantly be kept apprised of the Commission's activities. The act states plainly:

The Commission shall keep the Joint [Atomic Energy] Committee fully and currently informed with respect to all of the Commission's activities. The Department of Defense shall keep the Joint Committee fully and currently informed with respect to all matters within the Department of Defense relating to the development, utilization, or application of atomic energy. Any Government agency shall furnish any information requested by the Joint Committee with respect to the activities or responsibilities of that agency in the field of atomic energy.

Those serving on the Joint Atomic Energy Committee describe it as a "refreshing experience" because "the committee does not have to go after the information; the information is volunteered."

The Congress should have similar access to information gathered by the intelligence community. Only in this way can we can be better equipped for the decisions which we have the responsibility for under the Constitution.

I hope that this bill will be thoughtfully considered in both Houses of Congress, and that it will be enacted into law at an early date.

Text of bill follows:

H.R. ——

A bill to amend the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, to keep the Congress better informed on matters relating to foreign policy and national security by providing it with intelligence information obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency and with analysis of such information by such agency

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 403), is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsections:

"(g) It shall also be the duty of the Agency to inform fully and currently, by means of regular and special reports to, and by means of special reports in response to requests made by, the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the Senate regarding intelligence information collected by the Agency concerning the relations of the United States to foreign countries and matters of national security, including full and current analysis by the Agency of such information.

"(h) Any intelligence information and any analysis thereof made available to any committee of the Congress pursuant to subsection (g) of this section shall be made available by such committee, in accordance with such rules as such committee may establish, to any Member of the Congress who requests such information and analysis. Such information and analysis shall also be made available by any such committee, in accordance with such rules as such committee may establish, to any officer or employee of the House of Representatives or the Senate who has been (1) designated by a Member of Congress to have access to such information and analysis, and (2) determined by the committee concerned to have the necessary security clearance for such access."

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California (Mr. BELL) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. BELL. Mr. Speaker, earlier this year, I and 20 other Congressmen introduced H.R. 4911 to provide that State and local laws and regulations on environmental matters shall not automatically be preempted or nullified by Federal law; the bill would correct a major error in the Environmental Quality Act of 1970. Today, I and 27 other Congressmen introduced H.R. 10353 to amend the Clean Air Act to clarify California's right to enforce its own stringent motor vehicle emission standards.

Recently, two matters have come to my attention which show the urgency of immediate passage of such legislation.

The city of Inglewood borders Los Angeles International Airport. Its residents are subjected to physically harmful noise levels 24 hours each day. Taking an important lead in local noise standards, the city of Inglewood, therefore, passed legislation fining any airline, first, in violation of FAA regulations, and second, emitting noise at a level greater than 90 dbA. A noise level of 90 dbA is equivalent to the sound of a subway car.

Here was no danger of an "impossible ordinance" destroying the aviation industry. Any airline that violated Inglewood's regulation would have violated FAA regulations. Inglewood could be accused of nothing worse than following through on FAA's responsibilities.

On March 9, according to Inglewood's surveillance devices, Continental Airlines Flight 25 flew over the city at a height below FAA standards. The citizens below were subjected to 102 dbA of noise. Inglewood filed suit.

Continental asked for and received a temporary restraining order. They relied on two points: First, a dispute over whether the aircraft had actually been lower than FAA standards; and second, but more important, the preemption of authority by the Federal Government. To make matters worse, the FAA has now joined in asking for a preliminary injunction.

To quote a constituent's recent letter:

I am distressed that the federal government is suing the City of Inglewood concerning jurisdiction over airplane noise. Inglewood's noise ordinance is one of the few rays of hope I have seen in the seemingly losing battle against noise.

Congress has built itself into a corner. It has not only preempted the mild and realtively valueless noise regulations of some communities, but also the progressive and necessary regulations of communities like Inglewood. If a community wishes peace and quiet, why must they be frustrated by the Federal Government.

Substantial improvement in the abatement of air pollution is also delayed by current Federal laws. On April 30, William D. Ruckelshaus, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, denied California's request for assembly line emission inspection for all 1973 model cars.

Mr. Ruckelshaus backed his denial with two rationales. First, "California introduced no evidence to indicate that such a requirement would significantly improve air quality in California." But the so-called Murphy amendment to the Air Quality Act of 1967 placed the burden on the Federal Government to present evidence showing the waiver to be inconsistent with Federal requirements.

Congress obviously needs to clarify the intent of the Murphy amendment; H.R. 10353 would do just that.

Second, Mr. Ruckelshaus contended that "the requirements would not have allowed sufficient time for manufacturers to obtain and install necessary testing equipment." However, Ford Motor Co. specfically stated that they could meet the deadline proposed by California.

Thankfully, Mr. Ruckelshaus is now reconsidering his stance.

State and local governments have finally taken the initiative in solving today's pollution problems. It would be unfortunate if the Federal Government now stops them.

FEDERAL GASOLINE TAX

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. SEBELIUS) is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. SEBELIUS. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing legislation that would reduce the Federal gasoline tax 2 cents per gallon for gasoline containing grain alcohol made from wheat as a substitute for lead.

This bill would help answer three great social needs. A true no-lead gasoline would mean a cleaner environment. The use of wheat to make grain alcohol would improve farm income. The use of high protein byproducts that stem from grain alcohol production would give us additional products to fight malnutrition and hunger in our Nation and throughout the world.

First let us consider the quality of our environment. In this regard, lead is the oldest recognized environmental poison in the history of man. The natural level of lead in human blood is believed to have been less than .01 parts-per-million in preindustrial times. Today, the average American has 0.2 to 0.3 lead parts-per-million in his blood. Classical lead poisoning occurs when the level reaches 0.5 to 0.8 parts-per-million.

Since one of the main identifiable sources of lead pollution to humans is leaded gasoline exhausts, we should consider positive programs with incentives to utilize no-lead gasoline. Data from Southwest Research, Inc., San Antonio, Tex., indicates that grain alcohol gasoline utilization improves combustion and results in an 80-percent reduction in chamber deposits and exhaust emissions compared with leaded gasoline.

Second, widespread utilization of no-lead grain alcohol gasoline offers many social and economic benefits. To make the complete transition to all-grain-alcohol gasoline would require more than 3.2 billion bushels of cereal grains annually. This potential market would certainly improve farm income which is imperative if the family farm operation is to be saved and if we are to improve conditions in rural and smalltown America.

The fermentation plants which would be required for manufacturing would logically be located in farming areas with a high concentration of grain production close to markets for the high protein byproducts. This employment potential coupled with improved farm income would provide the necessary ingredients for a successful rural development program.

Third, aside from environmental protection, it is apparent that this proposal has the potential of improving the quality of life for all Americans. New jobs and increased economic opportunity in rural and small town could achieve a better distribution of our population and economic balance between rural and urban America. The overcrowded conditions in urban America have created impossible demands on urban resources to meet the requirements of transportation, education, welfare, crime control, pollution control, health care, public services, and housing. We must find answers to these urban problems and I feel this legislation represents a direct and inexpensive solution.

Fourth, the byproduct of grain alcohol production is a protein concentrate containing about 25 to 30 percent protein. I have been most encouraged by the joint research efforts of the Kansas Wheat Commission, the Kansas Association of Wheat Growers, and FAR–MAR–CO, Inc., of Hutchinson, Kans., regarding the utilization of this high protein byproduct. This research coupled with the efforts of Midwest Solvents Co., Atchison, Kans., and the Southwest Research Institute underscores the byproduct market potential in our efforts to satisfy skyrocketing protein requirements and to fight hunger and malnutrition at home and abroad.

In the quest for world peace, for too long now we have overlooked the talents of the most successful producer in the American economy, the farmer. A hungry world is a troubled world. Our greatest weapon in our arsenal of peace should be our willingness to share our agricultural abundance and expertise with the developing nations. This legislation provides the vehicle to accomplish this most far-reaching and worthwhile goal.

Many comments have been made regarding the economic feasibility of this proposal and a profitable market for the high protein residue is the key. It has been reported that 100 percent conversion to lead-free gasoline by 1975 would cost the petroleum industry approximately 3 cents per gallon more than current production. If you consider present gasoline costs of approximately 20 cents per gallon, not including tax, and if you assume that a 10-percent ethyl alcohol blend would give satisfactory combustion characteristics, this increased cost to 23 cents per gallon would make the ethyl alcohol worth about 50 cents per gallon as an additive. An added 2-cent tax incentive for grain alcohol as proposed in this bill would make the grain alcohol worth approximately 70 cents per gallon as an additive.

However, a recent article, "Industrial Alcohol From Wheat" prepared by Dwight L. Miller, Assistant Director, Northern Utilization and Development Division, Agricultural Research Service, USDA, estimates the cost of grain alcohol to be 59.5 cents per gallon with wheat at $1 per bushel, 69 cents per gallon at $1.25 per bushel, and 78.7 cents per gallon at $1.50 per bushel. It becomes clear that the price and market demand for the high protein byproduct of grain alcohol production are the keys to the utilization of grain alcohol gasoline at a competitive price and at a price to assure the farmer a fair return for his grain above the cost of production.

This tax reduction would be handled by the retailer and would be passed on directly to the consumer. A sign on the retailer's gasoline pump would be required to serve notice to consumers that it contained lead-free grain alcohol gasoline and a 2-cent reduction in the Federal gasoline tax.

Any loss in tax revenue would be more than offset by cleaner air, income relief to the farmer and the development of high protein products to feed the hungry and malnourished. This kind of positive approach certainly merits serious consideration by Congress as opposed to punitive control measures. I am hopeful that it will be possible to schedule this legislation for a comprehensive hearing some time in the near future.

THE SHARPSTOWN FOLLIES—XXVII

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. GONZALEZ) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, in the Frank Sharp empire there were certain patterns of operation. These would have been familiar to anyone of any importance in the Sharp enterprises, including of course Will Wilson.

One of the curious things about the investigation of the Sharpstown scandal is that as far as I know, Will Wilson has never been asked about his role by official investigators. Surely he has much to say that would be of interest, in view of his key role in the construction and operation of the great scheme.

Surely Wilson would have recognized the patterns of Sharp's deals, and surely he would have known of their questionable legality. Were he to be asked to tell what he knows, under oath much might emerge. It is curious that he has not been asked.

Wilson might have been able to tell investigators of the three or four Sharp patterns of operation, such as the pattern of self-dealing loans, which I have described time and again. In these deals, Sharp would lend money to his interests from his banks, secured by stocks in his companies, or occasionally by letters of guarantee from one of his insurance companies.

Wilson might be able to tell investigators about Sharp's kiting of assets from one company to another. Though this reached its peak after Wilson left the Sharp empire, he must have known of the practice almost from its inception.

Or Wilson could tell about the many political figures in the Sharp operations. After all, he was one of them. He might be able to explain how all these men got involved, what they did, and why, for the benefit of Sharp, his pals, and themselves.

Wilson might also be able to tell something about Sharp's fourth general pattern of operations, the manipulation of company stocks. After all, he traded in those stocks, just like other insiders did, and he gave legal advice on which those deals were based. He knew the laws, and how to skate around their extreme edges.

Wilson might be able to tell something about how the great Sharp schemes started, and how they grew with his help, and what he did and did not do to prevent illegal acts from taking place. He might be able to tell many things. I can only wonder why he is not asked.

COSPONSORS OF HIGHER EDUCATION FUNDING ACT OF 1971

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. BURKE) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, today I am refiling my bill H.R. 5, the Higher Education Funding Act of 1971 with additional cosponsors Congressmen WILLIAM R. COTTER of Connecticut, GUY VANDER JAGT of Michigan, and JACK F. KEMP of New York. These Members add to the following list of sponsors of H.R. 5:

LIST OF H.R. 5 SPONSORS

Watkins M. Abbitt, Virginia.
Thomas G. Abernethy, Mississippi.
Joseph P. Addabbo, New York.
William R. Anderson, Tennessee.
Frank Annunzio, Illinois.
Edward G. Biester, Jr., Pennsylvania.
Edward P. Boland, Massachusetts.
Joel T. Broyhill, Virginia.
John Buchanan, Alabama.
James A. Byrne, Pennsylvania.
Bob Casey, Texas.
Frank M. Clark, Pennsylvania.
James C. Cleveland, New Hampshire.
George W. Collins, Illinois.
Edward J. Derwinski, Illinois.
Harold D. Donohue, Massachusetts.
Thaddeus J. Dulski, New York.
John J. Duncan, Tennessee.
Joshua Eilberg, Pennsylvania.
Walter Flowers, Alabama.
William D. Ford, Michigan.
James G. Fulton, Pennsylvania.
Richard H. Fulton, Tennessee.
William J. Green, Pennsylvania.
Charles H. Griffin, Mississippi.
Gilbert Gude, Maryland.
G. Elliott Hagan, Georgia.
Seymour Halpern, New York.
John Paul Hammerschmidt, Arkansas.
Julia Butler Hansen, Washington.
Ken Hechler, West Virginia.
Henry Helstoski, New Jersey.
Floyd V. Hicks, Washington.
Louise Day Hicks, Massachusetts.
John C. Kluczynski, Illinois.
Speedy O. Long, Louisiana.
Paul N. McCloskey, Jr., California.
John Y. McCollister, Nebraska.
John Melcher, Montana.
Robert H. Michel, Illinois.
Abner J. Mikva, Illinois.
Parren J. Mitchell.
John S. Monagan, Connecticut.
G. V. (Sonny) Montgomery, Mississippi.
F. Bradford Morse, Massachusetts.
John M. Murphy, New York.
Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Massachusetts.
John J. Rhodes, Arizona.
Benjamin S. Rosenthal, New York
William R. Roy, Kansas.
Edward R. Roybal, California.
Fernand J. St Germain, Rhode Island.
Robert H. Steele, Connecticut.
Frank A. Stubblefield, Kentucky.
Charles Thorne, Nebraska.
John C. Watts, Kentucky.
Charles H. Wilson, California.
Lester L. Wolff, New York.

H.R. 5 is an idea which has "caught-on" and is meeting with widespread support in all sections of the country. As you all know considerable attention is being focused on the need for financial assistance for families attempting to meet the high costs of college education. H.R. 5 provides an answer to this problem by encouraging families to set aside limited amounts of money annually to meet future college expenses.

I submit for the RECORD an excellent New York Times article appearing in the personal finance column written by Robert Cole. This news item I believe indicates that the merits of H.R. 5 speak for themselves:

CONGRESS IS CONSIDERING TAX BENEFITS ON TUITION COSTS AND AUTO INSURANCE

(By Robert J. Cole)

Congress is taking a close look at revolutionary consumer legislation designed to provide meaningful Federal income tax deductions in two major areas: college tuition expenses and automobile insurance premiums.

Both proposals have the backing of important segments of the financial community as well as that of key Congressional leaders.

Under present tax laws, if you happen to have $30,000 you don't need and a child under 8 years old, you can build up a tax-free college fund at the rate of at least $1,800 a year simply by buying stock or putting the money into savings and setting up a trust.

The income is reported, of course, but no tax is paid on the first $1,800. That's Federal law. Next year the amount goes up to $1,850.

But this, obviously, benefits only the rich. What about the millions of others who don't have the $30,000 to put away all at one time?

John P. Meehan, president-elect of the National Association of Life Underwriters, has devised a savings plan that has resulted in a bill introduced in the House by Representative James A. Burke, Democrat of Massachusetts. It is co-sponsored by more than 50 Congressmen, Republicans as well as Democrats. In the Senate, it is also expected to be supported by Senator Robert J. Dole, Republican of Kansas.

Known as the Higher Education Funding Act, or H.R. 5, the measure is similar to the Keogh Act, which today enables thousands of self-employed workers to set aside tax deductible funds for their retirement.

This is how H.R. 5 would work:

You would be able to set aside 10 per cent of your adjusted gross income or $500 per child, whichever is less, up to $2,500 a year.

If, for example, your adjusted annual income is $25,000 and you have five children, you could deduct $2,500 a year from your gross income. If you earn $20,000 a year and have four children, you could deduct $2,000. If you earn $15,000 and have three children, you could deduct $1,500.

You would be able to build up a college nest egg in any one of several investment vehicles—a trust fund, a mutual fund, an insurance policy, an annuity contract, a custodial account or even certificates and Government bonds.

Other proposals to relieve the burden of parents sending children to college are now before the Congress but have languished because of strong opposition from the Treasury which contends that they represent a strong drain on tax income. One popular device is a proposed tax credit—say of about $300 a year. Another proposal calls for itemized deductions similar to those now permitted on medical bills.

Mr. Burke maintains that his proposal will be much less of a burden on the Treasury.

Commenting on his proposal, Representative Burke said it was specifically intended to help what he called "the neglected middle income family, which just misses qualifying for Federal assistance and yet does not possess an income sufficient to take increasing college costs in stride." The measure is expected to receive strong support from banks, savings and loan associations, insurance companies and other financial institutions.

Meanwhile, in a move to help automobile owners, the National Association of Mutual Insurance Agents has been successful in getting a bill introduced in the House by Representative Thomas P. O'Neill Jr., Democrat of Massachusetts. It would give taxpayers a deduction of up to $150 a year on their auto insurance premiums.

Representative O'Neill, the House majority whip, in calling for such legislation, noted that Congress already had "adequate precedent" for such a tax deduction on car insurance.

He noted, for example, that taxpayers already get a deduction for hospitalization insurance premiums while employers get one for the health insurance premiums they pay for their workers.

He also noted that only about 60 million of the more than 75 million cars on the road today are insured.

"Perhaps," Mr. O'Neill said, "the owners of the 15 million uninsured vehicles will be more inclined to purchase adequate insurance if they can deduct the premiums on their Federal income tax."

He also pointed to legislation introduced by Senator Philip A. Hart, Democrat of Michigan, and Senator Warren G. Magnuson, Democrat of Washington. It would enable employers to take a tax deduction on any contributions they make on the premiums of workers who are able to buy auto insurance on the job.

Mr. O'Neill did not oppose the tax break for those who might get it on the job but maintained that such a deduction would discriminate against the estimated four out of five auto owners whose insurance probably never would be subsidized in this manner.

James S. Kemper Jr., president of the Kemper Insurance Group, recommended in testimony recently before the Senate Commerce Committee that the Hart-Magnuson bill be amended to include the millions of motorists who may never qualify for a tax break.

It is too early to forecast the outcome of either measure but strong forces are behind both. If action is not taken in this session of Congress, insiders maintain that something may happen very soon.

ALLOWANCE FOR RENTAL OF DISTRICT OFFICES

(Mr. HAYS asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 457, adopted by the House of Representatives on July 21, 1971, provided the Committee on House Administration the authority to fix and adjust from time to time various allowances by order of the committee. During House debate on House Resolution 457, the Members were assured that any order adopted by the committee under the authority of the resolution would be published in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD in the first issue following the committee action. Pursuant to that commitment, the following order of the Committee on House Administration is submitted for printing in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. After careful consideration, the order was approved unanimously by the Subcommittee on Accounts on July 29, 1971, and adopted unanimously by the Committee on House Administration August 4, 1971.

TO ADJUST THE ALLOWANCE FOR RENTAL OF DISTRICT OFFICES

Resolved, That effective August 1, 1971, until otherwise provided by order of the Committee on House Administration, each Member of the House of Representatives shall be entitled to office space suitable for his use in the district he represents at not more than three places designated by him in such district. The Sergeant at Arms shall secure office space satisfactory to the Member in post offices or Federal buildings at not more than two locations if such space is available. Office space to which a Member is entitled under this resolution which is not secured by the Sergeant at Arms may be secured by the Member, and the Clerk shall approve for payment from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives vouchers covering bona fide statements of amounts due for such office space not exceeding a total allowance to each Member of $200 per month; but if a Member certifies to the Committee on House Administration that he is unable to obtain suitable space in his district for $200 per month due to high rental rates or other factors, the Committee on House Administration may, as the Committee considers appropriate, direct the Clerk to approve for payment from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives vouchers covering bona fide statements of amounts due for suitable office space not exceeding a total allowance to each Member of $350 per month. No Member shall be entitled to have more than two district offices outfitted with office equipment, carpeting and draperies at the expense of the General Services Administration.

As used in this resolution the term "Member" means any Member of the House of Representatives, the Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico and the Delegate of the District of Columbia.

THE ONE-SIDED NATURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH RED CHINA

(Mr. SIKES asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, there must be many students of Government who are apprehensive about the direction of United States-Red China discussions. President Nixon already has yielded substantial concessions, presumably in an effort to provide a more favorable atmosphere for serious bargaining later. There are no indications that the Chinese have accepted these concessions in the spirit in which they were given. In fact, nothing has come from China except an invitation to an American ping-pong team and an agreement to talk with President Nixon if he travels to China for the privilege. They appear to have ignored their gains and now they bring out additional conditions which they expect to require before resuming normal diplomatic relations with the United States. These demands are accompanied by a continuing drumfire of criticism.

One of the new demands is that the United States remove all of its forces from Southeast Asia and that we abandon our commitments for the defense of Taiwan. Presumably Red China expects to gain membership in the United Nations and support for this already has been promised by President Nixon. They also want the seat on the Security Council now held by the Republic of China. That would mean swapping a friend for an enemy—and we do not need more enemies. They even want Taiwan handed over to Peking. The blood bath which would follow needs no description. The doubtful friendship of the Chinese Reds would not be worth this cost to U.S. policies and U.S. prestige.

We should remind ourselves that Red China is the principal supplier of conventional weapons to Communist forces in Indochina and, second only to Russia, provides other supplies and equipment which supports the North Vietnam and Vietcong war effort.

It will come as a surprise to some that the Chinese Reds also have forces in Indochina. They have maintained military service units in North Vietnam throughout much of the conflict and they have a 50,000-man work force, protected by Chinese troops, cutting a road across helpless Laos. The road will make it easy for Red China to disrupt conditions in Laos and provide quick access to Thailand and North Vietnam. Nothing has been said about the withdrawal of these forces. It is not sound policy to ignore the one-sided nature of the negotiations which are proposed.

There are reliable reports that numerous Asian leaders friendly to the United States have misgivings about our course of action. Some are fearful that U.S. policies will help to drive neutral and Western-leaning nations toward greater neutrality or toward the best deal they can make with Red China for their own preservation. When we embark on doubtful ventures without preconsultation with our friends, it is small wonder that they find it difficult to understand.

A PRAYER FOR GROWING OLD GRACEFULLY

(Mr. BARRETT asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Speaker, to live graciously, to stay young even though the years may take their toll motivates me to call attention to a beautiful prayer which is most appropriate.

A PRAYER FOR GROWING OLD GRACEFULLY

Lord, Thou knowest better than I myself that I am growing older and will someday be old. Keep me from the fatal habit of thinking I must say something on every subject and on every occasion.

Release me from craving to straighten out everybody's affairs. Make me thoughtful but not moody; helpful but not bossy. With my vast store of wisdom, it seems a pity not to use it all; but Thou knowest, Lord, that I want a few friends at the end. Keep my mind free from the recital of endless details; give me wings to get to the point. Seal my lips on my aches and pains; they are increasing, and love of rehearsing them is becoming sweeter as the years go by.

I dare not ask for improved memory, but for growing humility, and a lessening cocksureness when my memory seems to clash with the memories of others. Teach me the glorious lesson that occasionally I may be mistaken.

Keep me reasonably sweet, for a sour old person is one of the crowning works of the devil. Give me the ability to see good things in unexpected places and talents in unexpected people, and give me O Lord, the grace to tell them so. Amen.

SCHEDULE OF HEARINGS ON HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT LEGISLATION

(Mr. BARRETT asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Speaker, the subcommittee on Housing of the House Banking and Currency Committee began hearings this week on 1971 housing and urban development legislation. On August 3, Secretary of HUD George Romney testified before the subcommittee on two administration bills dealing with housing and urban development. On August 5, six witnesses will testify on the recommendations contained in H.R. 9688, the bill proposed by the three housing subcommittee panels.

I would like at this time to announce the schedule and witnesses for the balance of the hearings which will resume after the congressional summer recess. They are as follows:

SEPTEMBER 8

Morning: The National Governors Conference; and a panel consisting of representatives of State legislatures.

Afternoon: A panel consisting of chief elected officials of small cities in metropolitan areas; and William H. Wilcox, secretary, Department of Community Affairs, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

SEPTEMBER 9

Morning: The AFL–CIO; and the U.S. Conference of Mayors—League of Cities.

Afternoon: The National Association of Counties; and the Rural Housing Alliance.

SEPTEMBER 10

Morning: Allan K. Campbell, dean of the Maxwell School, Syracuse University, and Lyle C. Fitch, president, Institute of Public Administration; and James Pellish, New York Urban Development

Corp., and Robert Piper, architect, Chicago, Ill.

Afternoon: The American Institute of Architects; and the American Institute of Planners.

SEPTEMBER 13

Morning: The National Urban League; and a panel of mayors—to be announced.

Afternoon: The Investment Bankers Association; and the National Association of Building Manufacturers.

SEPTEMBER 14

Morning: Robert C. Wood, former Secretary of HUD; and the National Urban Coalition Action Council.

Afternoon: Members of Congress—to be announced.

SEPTEMBER 15

Morning: The National Association of Housing and Rehabilitation Officials; and the National Association of Real Estate Boards.

Afternoon: The Mortgage Bankers Association; and the National Association of Mutual Savings Banks.

SEPTEMBER 16

Morning: Rev. Theodore Hesburgh, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission; William Morris, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; and Nathaniel Keith, the National Housing Conference.

Afternoon: A panel on the implementation of the HUD "new community program," consisting of Edward Logue, the New York Urban Development Corp.; William R. Mason, the Irvine Co.; Raymond D. Nasher, Co-Sponsor Flower Mound, New Town, Tex.; and Keith Heller, chief executive office, Cedar Riverside, Minn.

SEPTEMBER 17

Morning: The National Association of Home Builders; Governor Sherman Maisel, the Federal Reserve Board; and Philip Brownstein, the Council of Housing Producers.

All morning hearings will begin at 10 a.m., afternoon hearings at 1:30 p.m. p.m.

PLIGHT OF RURAL AREAS IN LOWER RIO GRANDE VALLEY

(Mr. DE LA GARZA asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. DE LA GARZA. Mr. Speaker, for the past several months I have been bringing to the attention of my fellow Members the plight of rural areas, small cities, and counties in the United States regarding Federal aid, and I have here a resolution adopted by the Lower Rio Grande Valley City Officials' Association, Region 12 of the Texas Municipal League, which I wish to bring to your attention:

"Whereas, the Lower Rio Grande Valley City Officials Association, Region 12 of the Texas Municipal League, held their quarterly meeting at the Fort Brown Motor Hotel in Brownsville, Texas, on Thursday, July 22, 1971; and,

"Whereas, it was unanimously agreed that member cities of the Lower Rio Grande Valley City Officials Association should petition by an emergency Resolution all federal and state agencies for a two year moratorium on complying with those agencies of air pollution control; and,

"Whereas, member cities feel like during the two year moratorium legislation can be enacted by those governing bodies that will enable those small municipalities to conform to air pollution requirements imposed by federal and state government; and,

"Whereas, the Valley cities have a unique condition due to the low water table level of approximately three feet; and,

"Whereas, any land purchased for sanitary landfill will be filled very rapidly; and

"Whereas, this is creating an extensive economic crisis and burden on the small municipalities in the Lower Rio Grande Valley; and,

"Now, therefore, be it Resolved, that all federal and state governmental agencies be apprised of the desires and feelings of the cities of the Lower Rio Grande Valley in the State of Texas concerning their need for a two year extension to comply with pollution laws and their need for federal assistance.

"Unanimously passed and approved on the 22nd day of July, 1971."

We in Congress pass the laws concerning the matters which need to be done on the local level, but yet the responsibility is ours that many of the small towns and rural areas do not have the necessary wherewithal to match these Federal funds. Many times we say such small areas will receive a 50-percent grant or a 75-percent grant, which means nothing to a small city which has nothing except the means to run a day-to-day operation, and cannot go out and borrow the remaining funds needed.

Mr. Speaker, and my colleagues, we must not forget rural America when we consider legislation which must in the future reach out to these areas as well as to the large cities.

A BILL TO PROVIDE THAT A GOLD MEDAL BE PRESENTED TO THE WIDOW OF THE LATE LOUIS ARMSTRONG

(Mr. RANGEL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, Louis (Satchmo) Armstrong once pointedly stated—"Either you got it or you ain't."

And as the master showman, Satchmo, certainly had it. We all recall that deep guttural voice, that grin as wide as a keyboard, and that horn which blew sweet and clear.

On July 6, Satchmo suddenly left us. He died in his sleep of heart failure shortly after observing his 71st birthday. I was in the process of drafting legislation to honor his enormous contribution to music, when I learned of his death.

He will always remain in my mind as one of the main forces in the development of jazz that help shape it into the great musical form it is today.

I am proud to have introduced with the support of my 53 colleagues legislation to provide that a gold medal be presented to the widow of the late Louis Armstrong in recognition of Mr. Armstrong's contributions in the field of music and in recognition of his great achievement as a good-will ambassador abroad for the United States.

The legislation authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to strike a gold medal with suitable inscriptions.

At this point I wish to introduce into the RECORD a copy of the bill, a list of these Congressmen and an eloquent article which appeared in the New York Times the day after his death:

A BILL To provide that a gold medal be presented to the widow of the late Louis Armstrong

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That in recognition of the great achievement of the late Louis Armstrong as a goodwill ambassador abroad for the United States and in recognition of his contributions to the culture of this Nation in the field of music, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to cause to be struck, and the President is authorized and directed to present to Lucille Armstrong, the widow of the late Louis Armstrong, a gold medal with suitable emblems, devices, and inscriptions to be determined by the Secretary.

SEC. 2. The medal provided for in this Act shall be considered a national medal within the meaning of section 3551 of the Revised Statutes (31 U.S.C. 368).

SEC. 3. There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for the carrying out of this Act.

List of Congressmen who have indicated their support:

Congresswoman Bella Abzug, Cong. Joseph Addabbo, Cong. Glenn Anderson (Calif.), Cong. John Anderson (Ill.), Cong. Herman Badillo, Cong. John Brademas, Cong. John Buchanan, Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm, Cong. Harold Collier, Cong. W. C. Daniel, Cong. Mendel Davis.

Cong. Ronald Dellums, Cong. John Dent, Cong. Charles Diggs Jr., Cong. Don Edwards, Cong. William Ford, Cong. Bill Frenzel, Congresswoman Ella Grasso, Congresswoman Martha Griffiths, Cong. Seymour Halpern, Cong. James Hanley, Cong. Michael Harrington.

Cong. James Hastings, Cong. Augustus Hawkins, Cong. Henry Helstoski, Cong. William Hungate, Cong. Walter Jones, Cong. Clarence Long, Cong. John McFall, Cong. James Mann, Cong. Romano Mazzoli, Cong. Parren Mitchell, Cong. John Monagan, Cong. Bradford Morse.

Cong. John Moss, Cong. John Murphy, Cong. Thomas Pelly, Cong. Claude Pepper, Cong. Otis Pike, Cong. Thomas Rees, Cong. John Rhodes, Cong. Peter Rodino, Cong. Robert Roe, Cong. Benjamin Rosenthal.

Cong. Harold Runnels, Cong. Philip Ruppe, Cong. Paul Sarbanes, Cong. Keith Sebelius, Cong. John Seiberling, Cong. William Steiger, Cong. Charles Thone, Cong. Robert Tiernan, Cong. Larry Winn.

LOUIS ARMSTRONG, JAZZ TRUMPETER AND SINGER, DIES

(By Alben Krebs)

Louis Armstrong, the celebrated jazz trumpeter and singer, died in his sleep yesterday morning at his home, 34-56 107th Street, in the Corona section of Queens. He had observed his 71st birthday Sunday.

Death was attributed to a heart attack. Mr. Armstrong had been at home since mid-June, when he was discharged from Beth Israel Medical Center after 10 weeks of treatment for heart, liver and kidney disorders. He seemed in good health during an inter-

view June 23, in which he played his trumpet and announced his intention to return to public performances.

"I'm going back to work when my treaders get in as good shape as my chops," he said, noting that his legs were weak from his hospitalization.

President Nixon released this statement:

"Mrs. Nixon and I share the sorrow of millions of Americans at the death of Louis Armstrong. One of the architects of an American art form, a free and individual spirit, and an artist of worldwide fame, his great talents and magnificent spirit added richness and pleasure to all our lives."

Tributes to Mr. Armstrong also came from a number of leading musicians, including Duke Ellington, Gene Krupa, Benny Goodman, Al Hirt, Earl (Fatha) Hines, Tyree Glenn and Eddie Condon.

Mr. Ellington commented: "If anybody was Mr. Jazz it was Louis Armstrong. He was the epitome of jazz and always will be. He is what I call an American standard, an American original."

"He could play a trumpet like nobody else," Mr. Condon said, "then put it down and sing a song like no one else could."

Mr. Hines, who frequently said he had taken his piano style from Mr. Armstrong's trumpet style, remarked: "We were almost like brothers. I'm so heartbroken over this. The world has lost a champion."

In Washington, the State Department, noting that Mr. Armstrong had toured Africa, the Middle East and Latin America on its behalf, said:

"His memory will be enshrined in the archives of effective international communications. The Department of State, for which he traveled on tours to almost every corner of the globe, mourns the passing of this great American."

The entertainer's final appearance was last February, when he played a two-week engagement at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel.

A master showman known to millions as Satchmo, Mr. Armstrong lived by a simple credo. Putting it into words a couple of years ago, he said:

"I never tried to prove nothing, just always wanted to give a good show. My life has been my music, it's always come first, but the music ain't worth nothing if you can't lay it on the public. The main thing is to live for that audience, 'cause what you're there for is to please the people."

Mr. Armstrong was first and most importantly a jazz trumpet player without peer, a virtuoso soloist who was one of the most vivid and influential forces in the development of American music.

But he was also known to delighted millions around the world for his ebulliently sandpapery singing voice, his merry mangling of the English language and his great wide grand-piano keyboard of a smile.

Jazz music, probably the only art form ever wholly originated in America, and Louis Armstrong grew up together in New Orleans. It was in a seamy slum there that Mr. Armstrong learned to love and play jazz in the company of gamblers, pimps and prostitutes.

But in time he was to play his trumpet and sing in command performances before royalty and, through his numerous worldwide tours, to become known unofficially as "America's ambassador of good will."

RECOGNIZED FOR ROLE

Jazz experts, even the purists who criticized Mr. Armstrong for his mugging and showmanship, more often than not agreed that it was he, more than any other individual, who took the raw, gutsy Negro folk music of the New Orleans funeral parades and honky-tonks and built it into a unique art form.

Over the years, his life and his artistry changed radically. He left New Orleans for Chicago in the early nineteen-twenties, when he was still playing the cornet, and before 1930 made some of his most memorable recordings—with his Hot Five or Hot Seven groups.

Mr. Armstrong won his initial fame playing an endless grind of one-night stands. Under constant pressure to put on a show that made the customers tap their feet and cry for more, he did not hesitate to exploit a remarkable flair for showmanship. His mugging, his wisecracking and most of all his willingness to constantly repeat programs that had gone over well in the past won him the cheers of his audiences, along with the disapproving clucks of some of his fellow musicians and jazz specialists.

The criticism that he no longer improvised enough, innovated enough, mattered little to Mr. Armstrong. He dismissed the more "progressive" jazz approved of by some leading critics as "jujitsu music."

He did not mind being called "commercial" because he followed popular music trends, and he deliberately introduced into his repertory crowd-pleasers such as "Mack the Knife" and "Hello, Dolly!," which put his recordings on the best-seller charts when he was in his 60's.

LIKE "SANDPAPER CALLING"

As his ability to play his horn exceptionally well waned with the years, Mr. Armstrong supplanted his trumpet solos with his singing voice. An almost phenomenal instrument in its own right, it has been compared to iron filings and to "a piece of sandpaper calling to its mate."

Just watching an Armstrong performance could be an exhilarating experience. The man radiated a jollity that was infectious. Onstage he would bend back his stocky frame, point his trumpet to the heavens and joyfully blast out high C's. When he sang he fairly bubbled with pleasure. And as he swabbed away at the perspiration stirred up by his performing exertions, Satchmo grinned his famous toothy smile so incandescently that it seemed to light up the auditorium.

"I never did want to be no big star," Mr. Armstrong said in 1969, in an interview for this article. "It's been hard work, man. Feel like I spent 20,000 years on the planes and railroads, like I blowed my chops off. Sure, Pops, I like the ovation, but when I'm low, beat down, wonder if maybe I hadn't of been better off staying home in New Orleans."

Mr. Armstrong's early years, spent in New Orleans, were marked by extreme poverty and squalor, but he emerged able to recall them without self-pity and even with good humor.

"I was a Southern Doodle Dandy, born on the Fourth of July, 1900," said Daniel Louis Armstrong. "My mother Mary Ann—we called her Mayann—was living in a two-room shack in James Alley, in the Back O' Town colored section of New Orleans. It was in a tough block, all them hustlers and their pimps and gamblers with their knives between Gravier and Perdido Streets."

LEFT WITH GRANDMOTHER

Mr. Armstrong's father, Willie Armstrong, who stoked furnaces in a turpentine factory, left Mrs. Armstrong when the boy was an infant. Leaving the child with his paternal grandmother, Mrs. Armstrong went to live in the Perdido-Liberty Street area, which was lined with prostitutes' cribs.

"Whether my mother did any hustling I can't say," Mr. Armstrong said. "If she did, she kept it out of my sight."

However, Louis, who rejoined his mother when he was 6 years old, recalled that for many years afterward there was always a "stepfather" on the premises and that before his mother "got religion and gave up men" around 1915. "I couldn't keep track of the stepdaddies, there must have been a dozen or so, 'cause all I had to do was turn my back and a new pappy would appear." Some of them he added, "liked to beat on little Louis."

However, Mr. Armstrong was always intensely fond of his mother, and he cared for her until her death in the early nineteen-forties.

Dippermouth, as he was called as a child, and his friends often sang for pennies on the streets. To help support his mother and a sister, Barbara, Louis delivered coal to prostitutes' cribs and sold food plucked from hotel garbage cans.

The night of Dec. 31, 1913, Louis celebrated the New Year by running out on the street and firing a .38-caliber pistol that belonged to one of his "stepfathers." He was arrested and sent to the Colored Waifs Home for Boys.

"Pops, it sure was the greatest thing that ever happened to me," Mr. Armstrong said. "Me and music got married at the home."

PLAYED IN HOME'S BAND

Peter Davis, an instructor at the home, taught Louis to play the bugle and the cornet. Soon the boy became a member of the home's brass band, which played at socials, picnics and funerals for a small fee. Louis was in the fifth grade when he was released from the home after spending 18 months there. He had no other formal education.

The youth worked as a junkman and sold coal, while grabbing every chance he could to play cornet in honky-tonk bands. The great jazz cornetist Joe (King) Oliver befriended him, gave him a cornet and tutored him.

"I was foolin' around with some tough ones," Mr. Armstrong recalled in 1969. "Get paid a little money, and a beeline for one of them gambling houses. Two hours, man, and I was a broke cat, broker than the Ten Commandments. Needed money so bad I even tried pimping, but my first client got jealous of me and we got to fussing about it and she stabbed me in the shoulder. Them was wild times."

In 1918, Mr. Armstrong married a 21-year-old prostitute named Daisy Parker. Since Daisy "wouldn't give up her line of work," Mr. Armstrong said, the marriage was both stormy and short-lived.

The same year he was married, Mr. Armstrong joined the Kid Ory band, replacing King Oliver, who had moved to Chicago. In the next three years he marched with Papa Celestin's brass band and worked on the riverboat Sidney with Fate Marable's band. Dave Jones, a mellophone player with the Marable band, gave him his first lessons in reading music.

FAME WAS SPREADING

By then Mr. Armstrong's fame was spreading among New Orleans musicians, many of whom were moving to Chicago. In 1922 King Oliver sent for his protege. Mr. Armstrong became second cornetist in Mr. Oliver's by then famous Creole Jazz Band. The two-cornet team had one of the most formidably brilliant attacks ever heard in a jazz group. Mr. Armstrong's first recordings were made with the Oliver band in 1923.

The pianist in the band was Lillian Hardin, whom Mr. Armstrong married in 1924. Miss Hardin had had training as a classical musician, and she gave him some formal musical education.

Mrs. Armstrong, convinced that as long as her husband stayed in the Oliver band he would remain in the shadow of his popular mentor, persuaded him to leave the band in 1924 to play first cornet at the Dreamland Cafe. The same year he joined Fletcher Henderson's orchestra at the Roseland Ballroom in New York.

For the first time, Mr. Armstrong found himself in the company of musicians of an entirely different stripe from those he had known in New Orleans and Chicago who, like himself, had fought their way up out of the back alleys and were largely unschooled in music. From these men, many of whom had

conservatory educations, he learned considerable musical discipline.

Moving back to Chicago in 1925, Mr. Armstrong again played at the Dreamland Cafe, where his wife, Lil, had her own band, and with Erskine Tate's "symbonic jadd" orchestra at the Vendome Theater. It was at that point that he gave up the cornet for the trumpet.

"I was hired to play them hot choruses when the curtains went up," Mr. Armstrong recalled. "They put a spotlight on me. Used to hit 40 or 50 high C's—go wild, screaming on my horn. I was crazy, Pops, plain nuts."

BILLED AS 'WORLD'S GREATEST'

During his second Chicago period, Mr. Armstrong doubled in Carroll Dickerson's Sunset Cabaret orchestra, with billing as the "World's Greatest Trumpeter." The proprietor of the Sunset was Joe Glaser, who became Mr. Armstrong's personal manager and acted in that capacity for the rest of his life. Mr. Glaser died on June 6, 1969.

In that Chicago period, Mr. Armstrong began to make records under his own name, the first being "My Heart," recorded Nov. 12, 1925. Louis Armstrong's Hot Five (and later Hot Seven) recorded, over a three-year span, a series of jazz classics, with Earl (Fatha) Hines on the piano. These records earned Mr. Armstrong a worldwide reputation, and by 1929, when he returned to New York, he had become an idol in the jazz world.

While playing at Connie's Inn in Harlem, Mr. Armstrong also appeared on Broadway in the all-Negro review "Hot Chocolates," in which he introduced Fats Waller's "Ain't Misbehavin,'" his first popular-song hit. (He later appeared as Bottom in "Swingin' the Dream," a short-lived travesty on "A Midsummer Night's Dream." Over the years he appeared in many movies, including "Pennies From Heaven," "A Song Is Born," "The Glenn Miller Story" and "High Society.")

For several years, Mr. Armstrong "fronted" big bands assembled for him by others. By 1932, the year he was divorced from Lil Hardin Armstrong, he had become so popular in Europe, via recordings, that he finally agreed to tour the Continent.

It was while he was starring at the London Palladium that Mr. Armstrong acquired the nickname Satchmo. A London music magazine editor inadvertently invented the name by garbling an earlier nickname, Satchelmouth.

ONE FOR THE KING

While he was in London, Mr. Armstrong demonstrated memorably that he had little use for the niceties of diplomatic protocol.

During a command performance for King George V, Mr. Armstrong ignored the rule that performers are not supposed to refer to members of the Royal Family while playing before them and announced on the brink of a hot trumpet break, "This one's for you, Rex."

(Many years later, in 1956, Satchmo played before King George's granddaughter, Princess Margaret. "We're really gonna lay this one on for the Princess," he grinned, and launched into "Mahogany Hall Stomp," a sort of jazz elegy to a New Orleans bordello. The Princess loved it.)

One of Mr. Armstrong's pre-World War II European tours lasted 18 months. Over the years his tours took him to the Middle East and the Far East, to Africa and to South America. In Accra, Ghana, 100,000 natives went into a frenzied demonstration when he started to blow his horn, and in Leopoldville, tribesmen painted themselves ochre and violet and carried him into the city stadium on a canvas throne.

His 1960 African tour was denounced by the Moscow radio as a "capitalist distraction," which made Mr. Armstrong laugh.

"I feel at home in Africa," he said during the tour. "I'm African-descended down to the bone, and I dig the friendly ways these people go about things. I got quite a bit of African blood in me from my grandmammy on my mammy's side and from my grandpappy on my pappy's side."

PLAYED WITH BIG BANDS

Before the war, Mr. Armstrong worked with several big bands, including the Guy Lombardo orchestra, concentrating on New Orleans standards such as "Muskrat Ramble" and "When the Saints Go Marchin' In" and on novelties such as "I'll Be Glad When You're Dead, You Rascal You." He did duets with Ella Fitzgerald and he accompanied Bessie Smith.

After 1947 he usually performed as leader of a sextet, working with such musicians as Jack Teagarden, Earl Hines, Joe Bushkin and Cozy Cole. He was a favorite at all the jazz festivals, in this country and abroad.

Mr. Armstrong lost track of the number of recordings he made, but it has been estimated there were as many as 1,500. Dozens have become collectors' items.

The jolly Mr. Armstrong was quite inured to his fame as a jazz immortal. Not too many years ago, he was interviewed backstage by a disk jockey who began with the announcement, "And now we bring you a man who came all the way from New Orleans, the Crescent City, to become a Living American Legend." The Living American Legend, who was changing his clothes, dropped his trousers and began the interview with the observation, "Tee hee!'

"Tee hee" was part of a uniquely Armstrong vocabulary, which included Satchmo-coined words such as "commercified" and "humanitarily." In his speech he arbitrarily inserted hyphens in the middle of words ("ar-tis-try" and "en-ta-TAIN-uh") and, unable to remember names too well, peppered his conversations with friends and interviewers with salutations such as "Daddy" and "Pops."

Despite the hard life he led—traveling most of the time, sleeping too little, living out of suitcases, eating and drinking too much or not enough—Mr. Armstrong, even into his 60's, was still going strong. His chest was broad and powerful, and his 5-foot-8-inch frame carried a weight that varied between 170 and 230 pounds.

CONCERNED ABOUT HEALTH

He was, however, keenly aware of his health. "I'm one of them hy-po-CHON-dree-acs," he would say with a delighted laugh. He was afraid of germs and always carried his trumpet mouthpiece in a carefully folded handkerchief in his back pocket. He liked to talk at length about his physic, a herbal mixture called Swiss Kriss, while at the same time he recounted how unwisely he sometimes ate especially when his favorite food, New Orleans-style red beans and rice, was set before him.

Although in latter years he suffered from a kidney ailment, Mr. Armstrong's greatest worry was chronic leukoplakia of the lips, what amounted to a tough corn that resulted from blowing his horn. He used a special, imported salve to soothe his lips.

"If you don't look out for your chops and pipes," he said, "you can't blow the horn and sing. Anything that'll get in my way doin' that, out it goes. That trumpet comes first, before everything, even my wife. Got to be that way, I love Lucille, man, but she understands about me and my music."

He was referring to the former Lucille Watson, whom he married in 1942.

He loved all forms of music. When asked what he thought of the country-and-Western and folk music so favored by the young, he replied. "Pops, music is music. All music is folk music. I ain't never heard no horse sing a song".

Some Negro militants criticized Mr. Armstrong for his earthy speech and his habit of rolling his eyes and flashing his toothy grin while performing. They said he was using stereotyped characteristics of the happy-go-lucky Negro and playing the Uncle Tom. Mr. Armstrong ignored the charges.

COMMENT ON SELMA

Nevertheless, Mr. Armstrong, on learning in 1965 that the police in Selma, Ala., had taken violent action against freedom-marching Negroes in that city, told an interviewer:

"They would beat Jesus if he was black and marched. Maybe I'm not in the front line, but I support them with my donations. My life is my music. They would beat me on the mouth if I marched, and without my mouth, I wouldn't be able to blow my horn."

For many years Mr. Armstrong refused to perform in New Orleans, his hometown, because of segregation there. He did not return until 1965, after passage of the Civil Rights Act. On that occasion he triumphantly played with an integrated band in the city's Jazz Museum, a shrine built around the remains of the old shack in which he was born.

Reflecting on his more than 50 years as a musician, Mr. Armstrong said, "There ain't going to be no more cats in this music game that long."

There was no doubt that he was the most durable of the great jazzmen, nor that millions of people held him in great affection. His fellow musicians, many of whom were influenced by his artistry, looked upon him with awe.

Miles Davis, a contemporary jazz star, has asserted that "you can't play anything on a horn that Louis hasn't played." Teddy Wilson, who played piano with Mr. Armstrong in 1933, has called him "the greatest jazz musician that's ever been."

And Leonard Feather, the eminent jazz critic and author of "The Encyclopedia of Jazz," wrote of Mr. Armstrong:

"It is difficult . . . to see in correct perspective Armstrong's contribution as the first vital jazz soloist to attain worldwide influence as trumpeter, singer, entertainer, dynamic show business personality and strong force in stimulating interest in jazz.

"His style, melodically and harmonically simple by the standards of later jazz trends, achieved in his early records an unprecedented warmth and beauty. His singing, lacking most of the traditional vocal qualities accepted outside the jazz world, had a rhythmic intensity and guttural charm that induced literally thousands of other vocalists to imitate him, just as countless trumpeters through the years reflected the impact of his style.

"By 1960, Armstrong, set in his ways, improvised comparatively little; but he retained vocally and instrumentally many of the qualities that had established him, even though entertainment values, by his own admission, meant more to him than the reaction of a minority of musicians and specialists."

As for Mr. Armstrong, it was pleasing his listeners that really mattered.

"There's three generations Satchmo has witnessed," he said, "the old cats, their children and their children's children, and they still all walk up and say, 'Ol' Satch, how do you do!' I love my audience and they love me and we just have one good time whenever I get up on the stage. It's such a lovely pleasure."

Mr. Armstrong is survived by his widow, the former Lucille Wilson, and by an adopted son, Clarence Hatfield of New York. He also leaves a sister, Mrs. Beatrice Collins of New Orleans and two half-brothers, Henry and William Armstrong, both of New Orleans.

A funeral service will be held Friday at 1 p.m. at the Corona Congregational Church, 34th Avenue and 103d Street. Burial will be in the Flushing Cemetery.

The honorary pallbearers will include Governor Rockefeller, Mayor Lindsay, Bing Crosby, Ella Fitzgerald, Guy Lombardo, Duke Ellington, Dizzy Gillespie, Pearl Bailey,

Count Basie, Harry James, Frank Sinatra, Ed Sullivan, Earl Wilson, Alan King, Johnny Carson, David Frost, Merv Griffin, Dick Cavett and Bobby Hackett.

Mrs. Armstrong requested that flowers and cards be omitted and said those wishing to do so could send contributions in her husband's memory to the Kidney Research Foundation and to the Sickle Cell Anemia Foundation, which promotes research on a disease that mainly afflicts blacks.

TAKE PRIDE IN AMERICA

(Mr. MILLER of Ohio asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MILLER of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, today we should take note of America's great accomplishments and in so doing renew our faith and confidence in ourselves as individuals and as a nation. As stated in the World's Nations:

> The development of natural unity is one of the salient features in American life. In spite of diversity of ethnic origin, the United States possesses one of the most homogeneous cultures in the world. This unity results from the interaction of many factors. Historically the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States established concepts and a form of government that united the people into a great Federal Republic. The U.S. with its freedom of religion, speech and opportunity for every man to seek his future according to his abilities has been a haven for many of the oppressed peoples of the world. But more important these peoples wanted to turn away from their old form of life and adopt the American way.

QUALITY EDUCATION

(Mrs. GREEN of Oregon asked and was given permission to extend her remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mrs. GREEN of Oregon. Mr. Speaker, everywhere our priorities are muddled.

Education is no exception.

Today, no one would deny that our schools are plunged in a crisis of unprecedented severity. Funds are no longer available for adequate professional staffing, proper learning facilities, satisfactory compliance with court orders, or sufficiently long school sessions. Our public schools are rapidly decaying, their downfall hastened by a social unheaval threatening cities and suburbs alike.

School leaders—wide awake to the rugged world they are putting children into—have had to hack away at the fiber of school budgets—dismembering limb by limb the tree of learning.

More and more rank and file black Americans are speaking out for quality education rather than the mere mythical matching of numbers of children of a given color in a given room.

Annoyed by the disruption of neighborhood schools, many white parents are incensed by the dreams of those who think children are numbers.

The very strong need for general aid to schools has been overlooked. We need to phase out categorical programs as we bring in general aid. Apparently the message is believed that a veto awaits any measure that authorizes general aid as well as aid to schools under court or Federal directives to desegregate.

If that is to be the congressional consensus then we are face to face with the absurd.

We can be witness to the travesty of seeing a child hauled at the crack of dawn in a shiny new bus from his neighborhood to a school from which the heart and viscera have been cleavered by the budgetary ax.

The President is to be commended for the wisdom which has led him to repudiate the elaborate school busing plan originally proposed by his Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. I am greatly heartened by his pledge given August 3 "to hold busing to the minimum required by law."

Busing will not create good schools and the President speaks for millions of Americans when he wisely and carefully points this out. Indeed, busing might only hasten the already rapid demise of the good schools we have left. Busing has no educational value, and it has dubious social value as well. I am greatly encouraged that the President recognizes these facts, too, and I will welcome whatever efforts are forthcoming to deemphasize busing in any rational order of national priority.

Otherwise, a lost generation of American children will later understand that their elders smugly practiced easy virtue because it was fashionable—and cheap.

I do not think America is in a mood for tricks. Middle America will not be bamboozled and black America will not be fooled by a well-publicized emphasis on racial equality. I submit that if we can give a guarantee to Lockheed, if we can go to the moon, if we can go to Cambodia, if we can explore the ocean floor, and go to China, then we can guarantee to the children of this country some quality in their equality.

To help reestablish priorities in the pursuit of the central goal of quality education in all our schools, I have drafted a bill which I am introducing today. It will provide general aid instead of fragmented categorical programs to our hard-pressed schools. One component of that aid will help those under court order in desegregation, but most of the money will help to make possible quality education programs for those districts determined to strive for it. Local districts can begin to decide their problems, their priorities. Parents will be happy to enroll their children in schools offering quality as well as equality. Money spent on such an effort has a better chance of solving our racial problems than forced busing of children in an artificial attempt to obtain a magical racial balance.

We cannot legislate morality. We should have learned that from the failure of prohibition. It forced our citizens into personal decisions of evasion. Desegregation can and must be accomplished, but not as national moral legislation. It must be achieved through maintaining and raising the level of quality education available to all our children.

We must use our national resources to strengthen, not weaken, our local communities and their schools. My bill would foster local autonomy, not only by providing general aid to schools, but also in making some of the school facilities into community centers available for use by all children, for use in the evenings by adults in vocational and educational training, and for all members of the community in recreational as well as educational activities. We must revive and strengthen community ties if our society is to recover its old strength and vitality.

A major step in that direction is that provision in my bill which would allow a local school district to choose to use part of the Federal aid for local tax relief. In so many places, real property taxes are so high as to disorient the local economy. Help here will revitalize the local community.

I urge you to give the question of general aid special thought. And I urge on you the words of President George Washington:

> In a country like this, if there cannot be money found to answer the common purposes of education, there is something amiss in the ruling political power.

There follows the language of the bill being introduced today by myself, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PUCINSKI), the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. THOMPSON), the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. DANIELS), the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. FORD), the gentleman from New York (Mr. BIAGGI), the gentlewoman from Massachusetts (Mrs. HICKS), the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. MAZZOLI) and all members of the Education Committee in the House.

H.R. —

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "National Quality Education Act of 1971."

POLICY FINDINGS

SECTION 1. The Congress finds that there is a crisis in the Nation's school systems that directly and immediately affects the future of this generation of young people and therefore the future of the Republic. The crisis in education reflects a larger crisis arising from the social and economic tensions and distortions produced by a rapidly developing technology and the migration of rural populations into the cities. The crisis is beyond the unassisted social and financial capability of our hard pressed local school systems to restrain or control. The Federal Government must extend its responsibility for pre-school, elementary, and secondary education and must, while preserving local autonomy, assume a direct role in the financial support of local schools.

The Congress finds that effective desegregation and the avoidance of the resegregation resulting from erosion of quality in schools can be accomplished only through universal quality education.

The Congress finds that the national interest requires the strengthening of the autonomy of local educational agencies. Accordingly as general aid is funded, appropriate special legislative programs should be phased out. The present diversity among the Nation's schools should be preserved and fostered. Programs of mutual cooperation, including the sharing of facilities, should be encouraged.

The Congress finds that the burden of local school support must be shifted at least in part from the local real property tax. That

tax, local by its nature, produces intolerable inequities in resource availability that is reflected immediately in differences in quality of education available to our young people.

PURPOSE

SEC. 2. It is the purpose of this Act to furnish assistance to local educational agencies—

(a) so that their resources, with the Federal supplement to State and local funds, will help provide a quality education at the pre-school, elementary, and secondary levels for all children and

(b) to strengthen communities by (A) assisting in providing community facilities which students from private and public schools together with members of the community may use throughout the day and into the evening twelve months of the year, (B) permitting relief in local taxes, and (C) phasing out categorical programs as funding of general aid reaches commensurate levels.

(c) to meet the special needs incident to the elimination of racial segregation and discrimination among the students and faculty in elementary and secondary schools by plan required by court order or approved by the Secretary under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The provisions of this Act shall be applied uniformly in all regions of the United States.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 3(a) The Secretary shall carry out a program during the fiscal year 1972, and each of the four succeeding fiscal years, for making general assistance grants to States and to local educational agencies as provided in section 4, and shall carry out a program during the fiscal year 1972 and the fiscal year 1973 for making special desegregation grants to local educational agencies and other public and nonprofit organizations and agencies as provided in section 5.

(b) There is authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal year 1972 and the fiscal year 1973, such amount as may be necessary to make the grants provided for in this Act, and for the fiscal year 1974 and each of the two succeeding fiscal years, there may be appropriated such sums as may hereafter be authorized by law, but in no event may the amount so appropriated exceed an amount (determined by the Secretary) which, when added to the amount appropriated to carry out the provisions of all Federal education programs for elementary and secondary schools or schoolchildren exceed the percentages set forth in the next sentence of the aggregate current expenditures for elementary and secondary education made by all local educational agencies. The percentages referred to in the preceding sentences shall be 10 per centum for the fiscal year 1972, 18 per centum for the fiscal year 1973, 20 per centum for the fiscal year 1974, 22 per centum for the fiscal year 1975, and 25 per centum for the fiscal year 1976.

GENERAL ASSISTANCE

Entitlement Allotments to Local Educational Agencies

SEC. 4(a). From the amount appropriated under section 3(b) for the fiscal year 1972, the Secretary shall allot to each local educational agency in a State for making grants under this section an entitlement amount equal to the aggregate of—

(1) 10 per centum of the product obtained by multiplying the estimated number of children who will be in the membership of pre-school, elementary, and secondary schools in the school district of such agency at the beginning of the school year ending during the preceding fiscal year by the current expenditure per public school child for the State or for all of the States, whichever is the higher, and

(2) an amount which bears the same ratio to one-third of the amount determined for all local educational agencies in the States under clause (2) as the number of disadvantaged children to be counted for purposes of this clause as hereinafter determined bears to the number of children so counted for all local educational agencies in the States.

The number of such disadvantaged children shall be determined as follows: If the Secretary determines that satisfactory data for that purpose are available, such number shall be the number of children who are aged 3–17, inclusive, in the school district of such agency (based on the latest available date from the Department of Commerce) who are in families having an annual income of less than $3,000, or in families having an annual income in excess of $3,000 from payments under the program of aid to Families with Dependent Children under a State plan approved under title IV of the Social Security Act. In any other case, such number shall be the number of children of such ages in such county or counties in which the school district of the particular agency is located who are described in the preceding sentence, and shall be allocated among those agencies upon such equitable bases as may be determined by the Secretary. In the case of local educational agencies which serve in all or in part the same geographical area, and in the case of a local educational agency which provides free public education for a substantial number of children who reside in the school district of another local educational agency, the Secretary may allocate the number of children among such agencies in such manner as he determines will best carry out the purposes of this section.

An amount equal to not more than 1 per centum of the amount allotted under clauses (1) and (2) shall be allotted to Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands from the amount so appropriated according to their respective needs for assistance under this section, and the Secretary shall set the maximum amount which their local educational agencies shall be eligible to receive.

Annual Increase in Entitlement Allotments

(b) From the amount appropriated under section 3(b) for the remaining fiscal years ending prior to July 1, 1976, the Secretary shall make allotment to each local educational agency in the same manner as in subsection (a), except that for the purpose of making entitlement determinations under clause (1) of such subsection the per centum factor shall be 18 per centum for fiscal year 1973, 20 per centum for fiscal year 1974, 22 per centum for fiscal year 1975, and 25 per centum for fiscal year 1976.

Local Tax relief

(c) Any local educational agency may determine to use funds received under this section to replace funds which would otherwise have been raised by local taxes for preschool, elementary, and secondary education: *Provided, however,* that such relief shall be limited to a local education agency in which the effective tax rate for education support taxes is above the average of the State and then only to the extent that such relief would not reduce it below such average. In those states in which education support funds are obtained in whole or in part from other than a local tax, the State educational agency may determine to use funds received under this section to replace such funds. Determinations under this subsection shall be made in accordance with objective criteria prescribed by the Secretary.

Categorical Program Phase-Out Upon Full Funding of General Assistance

(d)(1) The aggregate of appropriations under section 3(b) and of appropriations under all federal education programs for elementary and secondary schools or school children for any fiscal year may not exceed an amount equal to the aggregate of the allotments under Section 4 and the amounts payable under section 5 for the preceding fiscal year. If such appropriations aggregate equals or exceeds such allotments aggregate, then effective with respect to appropriations for that fiscal year the following statutes are repealed or amended as indicated:

(A) repeal of Title II of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 821–827);

(B) repeal of Title III of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 841–848);

(C) repeal of Title III of the National Defense Education Act of 1958 (20 U.S.C. 441–455); and

(D) repeal of subpart 2 of Part B of title V of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1108–1110c);

(E) amended by striking out "reserved in section 304(a) for the purposes of this section" in section 309(a) of the Adult Education Act and inserting in lieu thereof "appropriated pursuant to section 312(a)"; and striking out sections 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, and 310, and subsection (b) of section 312 of the Adult Education Act.

(d)(2) The Secretary shall submit to the Congress within ninety days after the date of enactment of this Act recommendations for the repeal or amendment by July 1, 1976, of all unnecessary, duplicative, or obsolete programs, both State grants and discretionary grant programs, which are administered by the Federal Government. These recommendations for repeal and amendment must include proposals to assure that no local educational agency will receive less under this Act than it is presently receiving under Federal programs for preschool, elementary, and secondary education.

Application by Local Educational Agency

(e) Any local educational agency which desires to receive for any fiscal year a grant under this section shall submit to the appropriate State educational agency an application which contains—

(1) a proposal for the use of funds granted under this section;

(2) such information as the Secretary and the State educational agency may reasonably require to enable them to evaluate the effectiveness of the grant expenditure and to perform their duties under this section;

(3) an evaluation of the effectiveness, including objective measurements of educational achievement, of programs and projects funded in the preceding fiscal year from funds provided under this section; and

(4) assurances that—

(A)(i) to the extent consistent with the number of children in the school district of such agency who are enrolled in private nonprofit elementary and secondary schools, such agency, after consultation with the appropriate private school officials, will provide where feasible in such schools for the benefit of such children secular, neutral, or nonideological services, materials, and equipment including such facilities as necessary for their provision, consistent with subparagraph (B) of this section, or, if such are not feasible or necessary in one or more of such private schools as determined by the local educational agency after consultation with the appropriate private school officials, such other arrangements, including but not limited to dual enrollments and shared facilities, which will assure adequate participation of such children, and (ii) from the funds received by such agency, will expend for the purposes of fulfilling the requirements of this paragraph, an amount which bears the same ratio to the total amount received as the number of children enrolled in private nonprofit schools who are counted for the purposes of section (4)(a) bears to the total number of such children enrolled in elementary and secondary schools in the school district of such agency."

(B) (i) the control of funds provided under this section and title to property acquired therewith shall be in a public agency for the use and purposes provided in this section, and that a public agency will administer such funds and property; (ii) the funds provided under this section shall not be commingled with the State or local funds; and (iii) subject to the tax-offset provisions of section 4(c), Federal funds made available under this section will be so used as to supplement and, to the extent possible, increase the level of funds that would have, in the absence of such Federal funds, been made available from non-Federal sources for the education of pupils participating in programs and projects assisted under this section;

(C) it will keep such records and afford such access thereto as the State educational agency may find necessary to assure the correctness and verification of such applications; and

(D) no more than 25 per centum of the funds received under this section in any fiscal year will be used for capital outlay and debt service.

Responsibility of State Educational Agency

(f) The State educational agency shall not finally disapprove in whole or in part any application for funds under this section without first affording the local educational agency submitting the application reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing.

(g) Any State which desires to participate under this section shall submit through its State educational agency to the Secretary an application, in such detail as the Secretary deems necessary, which provides satisfactory assurances that the State educational agency will make to the Secretary (A) periodic reports (including the results of objective measurements required by subsection (e) evaluating the effectiveness of programs and projects assisted under this section in improving educational attainment, and (B) such other reports as may be reasonably necessary to enable the Secretary to perform his duties under this section (including such reports as he may require to determine the amounts which the local educational agencies of that State are eligible to receive for any fiscal year.

Responsibility of Secretary

(h) (1) The Secretary shall approve an application which meets the requirements specified in this subsection, and he shall not finally disapprove an application except after reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing to the State education agency.

(2) (A) The Secretary shall, subject to the provisions of subsection (i), from time to time pay to each State the amount which the local educational agencies of that State are eligible to receive under this section.

(B) From the funds paid to it pursuant to paragraph (A) each State educational agency shall distribute to each local educational agency of the State which has submitted an application approved pursuant to subsection (e) the amount for which such application has been approved, except that the amount shall not exceed the allotment to that agency pursuant to subsection (a).

(3) The Secretary is authorized to pay to each State amounts equal to the amounts expended by it for the proper and efficient performance of its duties under this section (including technical assistance for the measurements and evaluations required by subsection (e)), except that the total of such payments in any fiscal year shall not exceed—

(A) 1 per centum of the total grants made to local educational agencies of such State within that fiscal year, or $150,000 whichever is greater;

(B) $25,000 in the case of Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, or the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

By-Pass

(i) In the case of an application to be funded under this section which is submitted by a local educational agency which is located in a State in which no State agency is authorized by law to provide, or in the case in which there is a substantial failure by a local educational agency whose application was approved under this section to provide for secular, neutral or non-ideological services or for effective participation on an equitable basis in programs provided under subsection (e) by children enrolled in any one or more private nonprofit elementary or secondary school located in the school district of such agency, the Secretary shall arrange for the provision, on an equitable basis, of such services or programs and shall pay the costs thereof for any fiscal year out of that State's allotment. The Secretary may arrange for such services or programs through contracts with institutions of higher education, or other competent nonprofit institutions or organizations.

(2) In determining the amount to be withheld from any State's allotment for the provision of such services or programs, the Secretary shall take into account the number of children who are excluded from participation therein, and who except for such exclusion, might reasonably have been expected to participate.

Enforcement

(j) Whenever the Secretary, after reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing to any State educational agency, finds that there has been a failure to comply substantially with any assurance set forth in the application of that State approved under subsection (g), the Secretary shall notify the agency that further payments will not be made to the State under this section (or, in his discretion, that the State educational agency shall not make further payments under this section to specified local educational agencies affected by the failure) until he is satisfied that there is no longer any such failure to comply. Until he is so satisfied, no further payments shall be made to the State under this section, or payments by the State educational agency under this section shall be limited to local educational agencies not affected by the failure, as the case may be.

Appeal

(k) If any State is dissatisfied with the Secretary's final action with respect to the approval of its application submitted under subsection (f) or with his final action under subsection (h), such State may, within sixty days after notice of such action, file with the United States court of appeals for the circuit in which such State is located a petition for review of that action. A copy of the petition shall be forthwith transmitted by the clerk of the court to the Secretary. The Secretary thereupon shall file in the court the record of the proceedings on which he based his action, as provided in section 2112 of title 28, United States Code.

(2) The findings of fact by the Secretary, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive; but the court for good cause shown, may remand the case to the Secretary to take further evidence, and the Secretary may thereupon make new or modified findings of fact and may modify his previous action, and shall file in the court the record of the further proceedings. Such new or modified findings of fact shall likewise be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.

(3) Upon the filing of such petition, the court shall have jurisdiction to affirm the action of the Secretary to set it aside, in whole or in part. The judgment of the court shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States upon certiorari or certification as provided in section 1254 of title 28, United States Code.

Special Assistance to Combat Racial Segregation and Discrimination

SEC. 5. (a) From the amount appropriated pursuant to section 3(b) for a fiscal year, the Secretary shall make a grant to each local educational agency which is implementing a plan—

(A) which has been undertaken pursuant to a final order issued by a court of the United States or a court of any State, or any duly authorized judicial authority, and which requires the desegregation of racially segregated students or faculty in the elementary or secondary schools of such agency, or otherwise requires the elimination or reduction of racial isolation in such schools;

(B) which has been approved as adequate under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for desegregation or racially segregated students or faculty in such schools.

(b) The aggregate amount which may be granted under this section shall be an amount equal to 20 per centum of the amount granted under section 4 for that year. The amount granted each local educational agency shall be an amount equal to the additional costs which will be incurred by such agency in carrying out the plan referred to in subsection (a). In the event the funds available for carrying out this section for a fiscal year are insufficient to permit the Secretary to make the full grant to which such agencies are entitled under the preceding sentence, the grant to each shall be reduced pro rata.

(c) Grants under this section shall be made upon application to the Secretary, and upon such terms and conditions as he may prescribe, but such funds may only be used to meet the additional costs incurred by local educational agencies in carrying out plans referred to in subsection (a).

Attorney Fees

(d) Upon the entry of a final order by a court of the United States involving a local educational agency, a State (or any agency thereof), or the United States (or any agency thereof), for failure to comply with any provision of this section or for discrimination in violation of title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States as they pertain to elementary and secondary education, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, costs including a reasonable attorney's fee.

Resegregation

(e) If a local educational agency has successfully carried out a plan pursuant to a final order issued by a court of the United States requiring the desegregation of racially segregated students or faculty in its elementary and secondary schools, or has successfully carried out a plan which has been approved by the Secretary as adequate under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for such desegregation thereafter no officer or agency of the United States may require the submission or adoption of another such plan (or amendment of the original plan) to correct any condition of resegregation which may have occurred in such schools, but only if such resegregation has occurred without any action or encouragement of any public officer or agency.

Payments

SEC. 6. Upon his approval of an application for assistance under this Act, the Secretary shall pay to the applicant such amount, in advance or by way of reimbursement, and in such installments consistent with such implementation of the approved plan as he may determine.

Definitions

SEC. 7. As used in this Act, except when otherwise specified—

(1) The term "local educational agency" means a public board of education or other

public authority legally constituted within a State for either administrative control, or direction, of public elementary or secondary schools in a city, county, township, school district, or other political subdivision of a State, or such combination of school districts or counties as are recognized in a State as an administrative agency for its public elementary or secondary schools, or a combination of local educational agencies; and includes any other public institution or agency having administrative control and direction of a public elementary or secondary school; and where responsibility for the control and direction of the activities in such schools which are to be assisted under this Act is vested in an agency subordinated to such a board or other authority, the Secretary may consider such subordinate agency as a local educational agency for purpose of this Act.

(2) The term "nonprofit" as applied to an agency, organization, or institution means an agency, organization, or institution owned or operated by one or more nonprofit corporations or associations no part of the net earnings of which inures, or may lawfully inure, to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.

(3) The term "elementary and secondary school" and "school" mean a school which provides elementary or secondary education, as determined under State law, except that it does not include any education provided beyond grade 12.

(4) The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.

(5) The term "State educational agency" means the State board of education, or other public agency or office primarily responsible for the State supervision of public elementary and secondary schools, or, if there is no such officer or agency, an officer or agency designated by the Governor or by State law for this purpose.

(6) The term "State" means one of the fifty States or the District of Columbia or Puerto Rico.

Evaluation

SEC. 8. Such portion as the Secretary may determine but not more than 1 per centum, of any appropriation under this Act for any fiscal year shall be available to the State educational agency for evaluation (directly or by grants or contracts) of the uses to which the general assistance provided under Sec. 4 and the special assistance provided under Sec. 5 have been put. Such evaluation shall be reported to the Secretary. In the case of allotments or allocations for any such appropriation, the amount available for allotment or allocation shall be reduced accordingly.

Joint Funding

SEC. 9. Pursuant to regulations prescribed by the President, where funds are advanced by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and one or more other Federal agencies for any program, project, or activity funded in whole or in part under this Act, any one Federal agency may be designated to act for all in administering the funds advanced.

Reports

SEC. 10. The Secretary shall make annual detailed reports concerning the effectiveness of general assistance and special assistance under this Act in achieving the purposes of this Act. The report shall be submitted to the President and to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare of the Senate and the Committee on Education and Labor of the House of Representatives.

Reductions Necessitated by Insufficient Appropriations

SEC. 11. If for any fiscal year the amount appropriated under section 3(b) is insufficient to make to local educational agencies the full amount of the allotment provided for in section 4(a) or the grants provided for in section 5(a), then the amount of each such agency's allotment or grant under each such section shall be reduced by a percentage (which shall be uniform for each such agency and both of such sections) which will result in allotments and grants which do not exceed the appropriations available therefor.

General Provisions

SEC. 12. (a) The provisions of the General Education Provisions Act (title IV of Public Law 247 (Ninetieth Congress)) shall apply to the program of Federal assistance authorized under this Act as if such program were an applicable program under such General Education Provisions Act, and the Secretary shall have the authority vested in the Commissioner of Education by such Act with respect to such program.

(b) Section 422 of such General Education Provisions Act is amended by inserting "the Emergency School Aid Act of 1971;" after "the International Education Act of 1966;".

INTRODUCTION OF WATER POLLUTION BILL

(Mrs. ABZUG was granted permission to extend her remarks at this point in the RECORD.)

Mrs. ABZUG. Mr. Speaker, the pollution of our streams, rivers, and waterways has grown to disastrous levels. Human waste is dumped directly into our water. It is a health hazard just to be near some bodies of water. A river in the Midwest has become a fire hazard. Practically every body of water has become a dumping ground for industry to unload its waste. Drinking water has become contaminated and our natural waterways are ceasing to be the recreational and esthetic places they once were.

I have today introduced legislation providing for a comprehensive revision of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act which will dramatically change our approach toward the pollution of our waterways.

My bill increases the annual appropriation for administrative and enforcement grants to State and interstate water pollution control agencies from $10 million to $30 million, beginning July 1, 1971, through June 30, 1976.

It provides that the money used to develop and carry out plans to implement, maintain, and enforce water quality standards for all waterways; to carry out a program of State certification of Federal permitting and licensing agencies under the act that their proposed activities will comply with applicable water quality standards; to train water pollution control personnel and to assist local governments in pollution control.

It increases the Federal share of such grants from 66⅔ percent to 75 percent, and calls for State or interstate plants to be approved by EPA before these grants are made. It extends the waste treatment construction grant through June 30, 1976; authorizes $5 billion annually for these grants; and increases from 50 to 60 percent the amount of grant that can be made for treatment works and increases up to 80 percent if the State agrees to pay 15 percent of the cost. Ninety percent of the cost will be paid by the Federal Government beginning in 1973, if the project is in a river basin or if it is specifically designated to insure coordinated and effective waste treatment by EPA.

It provides for a system of "user charges" where industry will be charged for the use of such treatment facilities based upon the volume and strength of the user's waste. Such money shall revert to the Treasury of the United States.

The first $100 million will be allocated on the basis of population and per capita income. Of the sum remaining, 50 percent will be allocated on the basis of population and 50 percent to those projects in which preliminary planning is complete and sufficient local financing is assured.

It provides for reimbursement to those States which have begun projects after June 30, 1966, and which met the requirements but for which money was not available. Two billion dollars is authorized for these provisions.

It extends water quality standards programs to all navigable waterways. Each State must adopt and submit to EPA water quality standards and a plan for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement within 9 months after enactment. EPA must approve or disapprove them within 6 months after they are submitted to EPA. The plan must require that no toxic or other hazardous wastes be discharged from any stationary source, and include effluent requirements and schedules.

EPA's enforcement powers are strengthened with increased minimum and maximum penalties; civil and criminal charges against pollution violators are also increased.

Citizen class action suits are provided for against any violation of the standards or schedules or the Administrator for failure to perform any act or duty under this act. Employees who give information or testify about polluting discharges are protected.

Emergency pollution action can be taken through civil proceedings to control pollution that endangers the health and welfare of persons or presents substantial economic inquiry to persons.

It prohibits the exclusion of any person from participation in any program under this act on the basis of sex.

Mr. Speaker, at this point I include the text of the bill in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

H.R. —

A bill to amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to provide for its uniform application to all of the navigable waters of the United States and to provide financial assistance to States and municipalities for water quality enhancement and pollution control, and for other purposes

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) the Federal Water Pollution Control Act is amended as follows:

(1) Section 1(b) is amended by striking out the second and third sentences thereof.

(2) Section 2 is hereby repealed, and sections 3 and 4 are redesignated as sections 2 and 3, respectively.

(3) Redesignated section 2(a) is amended by striking out "interstate waters" and inserting in lieu thereof "the navigable waters of the United States".

(4) Before the heading above section 5 insert "TITLE I—RESEARCH, TRAINING, AND GRANTS FOR WATER POLLUTION CONTROL".

(5) Redesignate sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20 as sections 101 through 111, respectively.

(6) Before the heading above section 10 insert "TITLE II—WATER QUALITY STANDARDS AND ENFORCEMENT".

(7) Redesignate section 10 as section 201, and sections 11, 12, 13, and 21 as sections 206 through 209, respectively.

(8) Before the heading above section 9 insert "TITLE III—ADMINISTRATION".

(9) Redesignate sections 9, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27 as sections 301 through 307, respectively.

(b) All references to sections of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act redesignated by this section are amended to correspond with such redesignated sections.

SEC. 2. Redesignated section 103 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act is amended to read as follows:

"GRANTS FOR STATE AND INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCIES

"SEC. 103. (a) There is authorized to be appropriated annually to the Administrator for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972, the sum of $30,000,000, and for each succeeding fiscal year to, and including, the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976, for the purpose of making grants to State and interstate water pollution control agencies under this section. The portion of the sums appropriated for each fiscal year which shall be available for such interstate agencies shall be specified in the Act appropriating such sums, except that such portion shall not exceed 15 per centum of the total sum appropriated for that year.

"(b) Beginning in fiscal year 1972, the Administrator is authorized to make grants to State and interstate agencies having effective plans approved under this section for the enhancement of water quality through the prevention, control, and abatement of water pollution, to assist such Sate and interstate agencies—

"(1) in developing and carrying out plans for the implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of water quality standards for all waters;

"(2) in carrying out the certification requirements of section 209(b) of this Act;

"(3) for the effective enforcement of water pollution control laws and regulations;

"(4) in the training of water pollution control and enhancement personnel of public agencies; and

"(5) in assisting political subdivisions of a State in developing and carrying out effective water pollution control programs.

"(c) Beginning on and after July 1 of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, each State water pollution control agency or appropriate interstate agency shall adopt and the Administrator shall approve annually a plan for the enhancement of water quality through the prevention, control and abatement of water pollution which—

"(1) provides for the orderly development, implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of water quality standards and plans for each river basin or portions thereof within such State, including procedures to assure that all sources of waste within a basin or portion receive effective treatment to prevent the degradation of any waters and to enhance water quality;

"(2) provides for the administration of, or for the supervision of administration of, the plan by the State or interstate water pollution control agency;

"(3) provides that such agency will make such reports, in such form and containing such information, as the Administrator may from time to time reasonably require, but at least annually, to carry out his functions under this Act, and that such reports shall be available to the pubic;

"(4) sets forth the plans, policies, and methods to be followed in carrying out an approved State (or interstate) plan and in its administration;

"(5) provides for extension or improvement of the State or interstate program for water quality enhancement and for prevention and control of water pollution;

"(6) sets forth (A) effective criteria, consistent with an adopted plan for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of water quality standards, established by the State, in determining priorities for treatment works, and (B) the priorities so determined;

"(7) contains assurances that such agency has or will employ an adequate and competent staff of trained personnel to carry out effective water pollution control laws, standards, and regulations;

"(8) contains assurances that grants provided under this section will supplement, not supplant, existing State or interstate water quality enhancement and pollution control programs;

"(9) provides such accounting, budgeting, and other fiscal methods and procedures as are necessary for the proper and efficient administration of an approved plan;

"(10) sets forth applicable State or interstate water pollution control laws and regulations;

"(11) provides an effective waste treatment management program under which treatment works are planned, constructed, and maintained so as to achieve efficiency, water quality enhancement, and economy; and

"(12) meets such additional terms and conditions as the Administrator may prescribe from time to time in furtherance of, and consistent with, the purposes of this section.

"(d) The Administrator shall approve any plan which, in his judgment, effectively complies with the requirements of this section. He shall not finally disapprove any plan or modification thereof submitted under this section without first affording the appropriate State or interstate water pollution control agency reasonable notice and an opportunity for a public hearing. In disapproving any plan or modification thereof, he shall make findings of fact, and issue a decision incorporating such findings therein.

"(e) Whenever the Administrator, after reasonable notice and opportunity for a public hearing, finds that, in the administration of an approved plan, there is a failure to comply with one or more of the requirements of this section, the Administrator shall issue a decision, incorporating his findings and a notice to such agency therein, that no further payments will be made to the State or interstate agency, under this section (or, in his discretion, that further payments will not be made to the State or interstate agency for treatment works under that portion of the plan affected by such failure) until he is satisfied that there will no longer be any such failure. Until he is so satisfied, the Administrator shall make no further payments or shall limit such payments to such State or interstate agency under this section.

"(f) Any State or interstate water pollution control agency aggrieved by a decision of the Administrator under subsection (d) or (e) of this section may file within thirty days from the date of such decision with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia a petition praying that such action be modified or set aside in whole or in part. The court shall hear such appeal on the record made before the Administrator. The court may affirm, vacate, or remand the proceedings to the Administrator for such further action as it directs. The filing of a petition under this subsection shall not stay the application of the decision of the Administrator, unless the court so orders.

"(g)(1) From the sums available therefor for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972, and for each succeeding fiscal year thereafter, the Administrator shall from time to time make allotments to the States, in accordance with regulations promulgated by him, on the basis of (A) the population of each State, and (B) the extent of the water pollution control problem of each State. The population of each State shall be determined on the basis of the latest figures furnished by the Department of Commerce.

"(2) From the allotment of each State made under paragraph (1) of this subsection for any fiscal year, the Administrator shall make grants to such State in an amount equal to its Federal share (as determined under this section) of the cost of carrying out a State plan approved under this section.

"(3) The Federal share for any State shall be 100 per centum less that percentage which bears the same ratio to 50 per centum as the per capita income of such State bears to the per capita income of the United States, except that (A) the Federal share shall in no case be more than 75 per centum or less than 33⅓ per centum, and (B) the Federal share for Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Guam shall be 66⅔ per centum. The Federal share shall be determined and promulgated by the Administrator between July 1 and September 30 of each even-numbered year, on the basis of the average of the per capita incomes of the State and of the United States for the three most recent consecutive years for which satisfactory data are available from the Department of Commerce. As used in this subsection, the term 'United States' means the fifty States and the District of Columbia.

"(h) From the sums available therefor for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972, and for each succeeding fiscal year thereafter, the Administrator shall from time to time make allotments to interstate agencies, in accordance with regulations promulgated by him, on such basis as the Administrator finds reasonable and equitable. He shall from time to time pay to each such agency from its allotment, an amount equal to such portion of the cost of carrying out its plan approved under this section as may be determined in accordance with such regulations. The regulations relating to the portion of the cost of carrying out a plan of an interstate agency which shall be borne by the United States shall be designed to place such agency, so far as practicable, on a basis similar to that of the States.

"(i) Beginning in fiscal year 1972, the method of computing and paying grants pursuant to this section shall be as follows:

"(1) The Administrator shall, prior to the beginning of each calendar quarter or other period prescribed by him, estimate the amount to be paid to each State or interstate water pollution control agency for such period on the basis of such records of the State or interstate agency and information furnished by it, and on the basis of such investigation, as the Administrator may require.

"(2) The Administrator shall pay to such State or interstate agency, from the allotment available therefor, the amount so estimated by him for any period, reduced or increased, as the case may be, by any sum (not previously adjusted under this paragraph) by which he finds that his estimate of the amount to be paid such State or interstate agency for any prior period was greater or less than the amount which should have been paid to such agency for such prior period. Such payments shall be made through the disbursing facilities of the Treasury Department, in such installments as the Administrator may determine."

SEC. 3. Redesignated section 104 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act is amended to read as follows:

"GRANTS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF TREATMENT WORKS

"SEC. 104. (a) There are authorized to be annually appropriated for the purpose of making grants under this section for the fis-

cal year ending June 30, 1972, the sum of $5,000,000,000 and for each succeeding fiscal year to and including the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976. At least 50 per centum of the first $100,000,000 appropriated each fiscal year shall be used for grants for the construction of treatment works servicing municipalities of one hundred and twenty-five thousand population or under. Sums appropriated under this subsection shall remain available until expended.

"(b) The Administrator shall, in accordance with the provisions of this section, make grants (from the sums appropriated under subsection (a) of this section) to any State, municipality, or intermunicipal or interstate agency for the construction of necessary treatment works to provide for the effective treatment of sewage and other wastes of any kind or description prior to the discharge thereof into any waters, and for the purpose of reports, plans, and specifications made in connection therewith.

"(c) Except as provided in this subsection or subsection (d) of this section, the amount of any grant for approved treatment works under this section shall not exceed 60 per centum of the estimated reasonable cost thereof (as determined by the Administrator), except that such percentage limitation shall be increased—

"(1) to a maximum of 80 per centum, in the case of grants made from funds allocated for any fiscal year to a State under this section, if the State agrees to pay not less than 15 per centum of the estimated reasonable cost (as determined by the Administrator) of all treatment works in such State for which grants are to be made under this section from such allocation.

"(d) The Administrator shall designate any river basin or region as eligible for up to a maximum of 90 per centum grants under this subsection whenever he finds, and publishes such finding, that there exists therein a river basin or regional plan for a basin or region which provides an effective and economical system, consistent with applicable water quality standards, for the collection and treatment of sewage and all other municipal and industrial wastes of any kind or description throughout such river basin or region for which recycling is not technologically practicable. Such river basin or regional plan shall provide that (1) each user of treatment works in the basin or region participates equitably in the non-Federal construction costs of such works; (2) adequate reserves to offset the cost of future treatment works constructed therein are provided; (3) the costs of operating and maintaining treatment works assisted by grants under this section are equitably shared by the users; (4) the degree of treatment to be provided is compatible with the long-range needs of the basin or region which shall be identified in the plan and shall include, among other things, an inventory of approved sites for the location of new industrial facilities, residential communities or developments, and municipalities in the basin or region and the effluent requirements to be imposed on such facilities, communities or developments, and municipalities; (5) each user pay the cost of any new treatment works constructed after fiscal year 1976 where such works are required by new industries, increased population, or expanded usage of facilities in the river basin or region; and (6) such plan is in accordance with any approved water quality standards and implementation plan for that basin or region. The Administrator may designate one or more portions of a basin or region, if he finds, from a pollution control and water quality enhancement standpoint, that, because of the geographical size of the entire basin or region, an effective and economical basinwide or regionwide treatment system is not practicable for the entire basin or region. The Administrator shall make grants for up to 90 per centum of the costs of eligible treatment works within such designated basin or region or portion thereof from funds allotted or reallotted under this section.

"(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the Administrator may increase the amount of a grant made under subsection (b) of this section by an additional 10 per centum of the amount of such grant for any treatment works which has been certified by an official State, metropolitan, or regional planning agency empowered under State or local laws or interstate compact to perform metropolitan or regional planning for a metropolitan area within which the assistance is to be used, or other agency or instrumentality designated for such purposes by the Governor (or Governors in the case of interstate planning) as being in conformity with the comprehensive plan developed or in process of development for such metropolitan area. For the purposes of this subsection, the term 'metropolitan area' means either (1) a standard metropolitan statistical area as defined by the Office of Management and Budget, subject, however, to such modifications and extensions as the Administrator deems appropriate for the purposes of this Act, or (2) any urban area, including those surrounding areas that form an economic and socially related region, taking into consideration such factors as present and future population trends and patterns of urban growth, location of transportation facilities and systems, and distribution of industrial, commercial, residential, governmental, institutional, and other activities, which in the opinion of the President lends itself as being appropriate for the purposes hereof.

"(f) Before approving grants for any treatment works under this section, the Administrator shall determine—

"(1) that such works are included in any applicable comprehensive program developed under section 2(a) of this Act;

"(2) that such works are in conformity with the State water pollution control plan approved under section 103 of this Act;

"(3) that such works (A) have been certified by the appropriate State water pollution control agency as entitled to priority over such other works in the State in accordance with such approved State water pollution control plan, and (B) have been approved by such agency;

"(4) that the applicant proposing to construct such works agrees to pay the remaining non-Federal costs of such works and has made adequate provisions satisfactory to the Administrator for assuring after construction thereof (A) proper and efficient operation, including the employment of trained personnel, and (B) maintenance of such works in accordance with an effective plan of operation approved by the State water pollution control agency, or, as appropriate, such interstate agency, and the Administrator;

"(5) that such works will provide effective treatment for all sewage and other wastes prior to discharge thereof into any waters, including the use of new or improved treatment processes and procedures;

"(6) that the source and composition of all industrial wastes discharged into such works is identified and, where appropriate, provision is made for treatment of such wastes at the source (A) to insure that no toxic or other hazardous industrial wastes which threaten the public health, safety, or welfare shall be discharged from such works, (B) to prevent damage to such works, or (C) to prevent impeding the efficient operation of such works;

"(7) that such works meet such other requirements as the Administrator may from time to time prescribe by regulation, or by conditions in any grant agreement, or by both, which are consistent with the purposes of this section; and

"(8) that the applicant (A) has imposed, or will impose, a system of charges to insure that each user of any treatment works participates equitably in the operation, maintenance, and construction costs of such works; and (B) has legal, institutional, managerial, and financial capabilities to assure adequate operation, maintenance, expansion, and replacement of treatment works throughout the applicant's jurisdiction as determined by the Administrator. The amount of project costs recovered from each industrial user shall be based on the proportion which the volume and strength of such user's wastes treated by the project bears to the volume and strength of all wastes treated by the project and shall include charges which shall be adequate to encourage reduction in the quantity and character of such wastes. Revenues derived from such cost recovery, to the extent apportionable to the Federal share of eligible project costs allocable to the treatment of industrial wastes, shall revert to the Treasury of the United States.

"(g)(1) The first $100,000,000 appropriated pursuant to this section for each fiscal year shall be allotted by the Administrator from time to time, in accordance with regulations promulgated by him, as follows: (A) 50 per centum of such sums in the ratio that the population of each State bears to the population of all States, and (B) 50 per centum of such sums in the ratio that the quotient obtained by dividing the per capita income of the United States by the per capita income of each State bears to the sum of such quotients for all the States. Sums allotted to a State under this paragraph, which are not obligated at the end of the fiscal year for which they were allotted because of a lack of treatment works which have been approved by the State water pollution control agency and certified as entitled to priority, shall be reallotted by the Administrator on such basis, as he determines to be reasonable and equitable and in accordance with regulations promulgated by him, to States having treatment works approved under this section for which grants have not been made because of lack of funds.

"(2) All sums in excess of $100,000,000 appropriated pursuant to this section for each fiscal year shall be allotted by the Administrator from time to time, in accordance with regulations promulgated by him, as follows: (A) 50 per centum of such sums in the ratio that the population of each State bears to the population of all States, and (B) 50 per centum of such sums specifically for waste treatment facilities in any State for which preliminary planning has been completed, and sufficient local financing is available. Sums allotted to a State under this paragraph which are not obligated within six months following the date of such allotment, because of a lack of treatment works approved by the State water pollution control agency and certified as entitled to priority, shall be reallotted by the Administrator, in accordance with regulations promulgated by him. Priority in such reallotment shall be given to States which are eligible under this section for up to 80 per centum grants for such works and to States having designated basins or regions eligible for a maximum of 90 per centum grants under this section for the construction of such works in such basins or regions.

"(3) All reallotted sums shall remain available for obligation for one additional fiscal year following the end of the fiscal year for which they were appropriated. Any sum made available to a State by reallotment under this subsection shall be in addition to any funds otherwise allotted to such State for grants under this section during any fiscal year.

"(4) The allotments and reallotments under this subsection shall be available, in accordance with the provisions of this section, for payments with respect to treatment works in such State approved under this section.

"(5) (A) In the case of any treatment works on which construction was initiated after June 30, 1966, and which was approved by the State water pollution control agency and which the Administrator finds meets the requirements of this section but was constructed without a grant under this section because of a lack of available Federal appropriations, such allotments and reallotments for any fiscal year ending prior to July 1, 1976, shall also be available for payments in reimbursements of State or local funds expended for such works prior to July 1, 1976, to the extent that grants could have been provided under this section if such works had been approved pursuant to this Act and if Federal appropriations up to the level of those authorized under this Act since July 1, 1966 were available, and

"(B) in the case of any treatment works on which construction was initiated after June 30, 1966, and which was constructed with a grant under this Act but the amount of such grant was a lesser per centum of the cost of construction than is allowable under this section because of lack of available Federal appropriations, such allotments and reallotments shall also be available for payments in reimbursement of State or local funds expended for such works prior to July 1, 1976, to the extent that grants could have been provided under this section if Federal appropriations up to the level of those authorized under this Act since July 1, 1966 were available.

"(C) There is authorized to be appropriated $2,000,000,000 to carry out the provisions of paragraph (5) of this subsection.

"(6) Nothing in this section, including a finding by the Administrator that any treatment works meets the requirements of this section for approval for a grant under this section, shall be construed to constitute an actual or implied commitment or obligation of the United States to provide funds other than those appropriated under this section for purposes of reimbursement of State or local funds under paragraph (4) of this subsection.

"(h) For the purpose of this section, (1) population shall be determined on the basis of the latest available figures, as certified by the Secretary of Commerce, and (2) per capita income for each State and for the United States shall be determined on the basis of the average of the per capita incomes of the States of the continental United States for the three most recent consecutive years for which satisfactory data are available from the Department of Commerce.

"(i) The Administrator shall make payments under this section through the disbursing facilities of the Department of the Treasury. Funds so paid shall be used exclusively to meet the cost of construction of the treatment works for which the amount was paid. As used in this section the term "construction" includes (1) preliminary planning to determine the economic and engineering feasibility of treatment works, the engineering, architectural, legal, fiscal, and economic investigations and studies, surveys, designs, plans, working drawings, specifications, procedures, and other actions necessary to the construction of treatment works; (2) the erection, building, acquisition, alteration, remodeling, improvement or extension of treatment works; and (3) the inspection and supervision of the construction of treatment works.

"(j) The Administrator shall take such action as may be necessary to insure that all laborers and mechanics employed by contractors or subcontractors on treatment works for which grants are made under this section shall be paid wages at rates not less than those prevailing for the same type of work on construction in the immediate locality, as determined by the Secretary of Labor, in accordance with the Act of March 3, 1931, as amended, known as the Davis-Bacon Act (46 Stat. 1494; 40 U.S.C., secs. 276a through 276a–5), and the Secretary of Labor shall establish effective safety standards for the protection of such laborers and mechanics. The Secretary of Labor shall have, with respect to the labor standards specified in this subsection, the authority and functions set forth in Reorganization Plan Numbered 14 of 1950 (15 F.R. 3176) and section 2 of the Act of June 13, 1934, as amended (48 Stat. 948; 40 U.S.C. 276c).

"(k) The provisions of this section shall apply to all treatment works for which grants are made from funds appropriated under this section."

SEC. 4. Redesignated section 201 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act is amended to read as follows:

"WATER QUALITY STANDARDS AND IMPLEMENTATION PLANS

"SEC. 201. (a) Water quality standards and plans for the implementation, maintenance, and enforcement thereof, including compliance schedules and timetables and effluent requirements, and revisions thereof established pursuant to this Act shall have the purpose of protecting and improving the public health, safety, and welfare, protecting and enhancing the quality of the Nation's waters for the benefit and enjoyment of present and future generations of Americans, and otherwise serving the purposes of this Act. In developing and considering such standards and plans or revisions thereof, the Administrator and the appropriate State—

"(1) shall take into consideration (A) the present and future quality, use, and value of the applicable body of water for public water supply, propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife, and recreational purposes, and for agriculture, industrial, navigation, and other legitimate uses, and (B) the present and future sources of waste discharges into such waters and the composition, quantity, frequency, and extent of treatment of such discharges, and

"(2) shall strive to enhance the quality of such water body. Public participation in water use designations of all or part of any such waters and in the development, revision, and enforcement of such standards and plans at all levels of government shall be provided and encouraged.

"(b) (1) The Administrator shall develop and publish, within sixty days after the effective date of this paragraph, criteria of water quality which, in his judgment, is requisite for the protection of the public health, safety and welfare and for the protection and enhancement of water quality. Such criteria shall accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on health, safety, and welfare and on water quality which may be expected from the presence of a pollutant or combination of pollutants in any body of water in varying quantities and at varying times.

"(2) Simultaneously with the issuance of criteria under this subsection, the Administrator shall issue to State and interstate water pollution control agencies information on pollution control techniques. Such information shall include technical data relating to the technology and costs of effluent control and such data as are available on the latest available technology and on alternative methods of prevention and control of water pollution, including cost-effectiveness analyses.

"(3) In order to assist in the development of information on pollution control techniques, the Administrator may establish one or more standing consulting committees which shall be comprised of technically qualified individuals representative of State and local governments, the academic community, industry, and the public. A verbatim transcript shall be kept of all meetings of such committees which shall be available to the public.

"(4) The Administrator shall from time to time review, but at least every two years, and, as appropriate, modify and reissue any such criteria or information.

"(5) Such criteria and information shall be set forth in the Federal Register.

"(c) (1) Each State shall, after reasonable notice and public hearings, adopt and submit to the Administrator, within nine months after the enactment of this section—

"(A) water use designations and water quality standards for all navigable waters and tributaries affecting such waters within or bordering such State, including interstate and underground waters, which are consistent with subsection (a) of this section and the criteria published by the Administrator, and

"(B) a plan, including compliance schedules and effluent requirements, for the implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of such standards (hereinafter referred to in this title as the 'plan').

"(2) Water quality standards, including any implementation plan, approved under the Water Quality Act of 1965 and any enforcement action taken or pending prior to the date of enactment of this title shall continue in full force and effect until superseded or modified pursuant to this title, but all such standards and plans shall be reviewed and, where appropriate, revised to conform to the requirements of this section.

"(3) The Administrator shall, within six months after the date required for submission of water use designations, water quality standards, and a plan under paragraph (1) of this subsection, approve or disapprove such designations, standards, and plan or each portion thereof. The Administrator shall approve such designations and standards, or any portion thereof, if he determines that they were adopted after reasonable notice and hearing and are consistent with subsection (a) of this section and the criteria published by him under subsection (b) of this section. He shall approve such plan, or any portion thereof, if he determines that it was adopted after reasonable notice and hearing and that—

"(A) it provides that no toxic or other hazardous wastes which threaten the public health, safety, or welfare shall be discharged from any stationary source into any waters;

"(B) it provides for the attainment of such standards as expeditiously as practicable, but in no case later than three years from the date of approval of such plan or any revision thereof;

"(C) it includes effective effluent requirements for all stationary sources discharging wastes into such waters and schedules and timetables for compliance with such requirements, and such other measures as may be necessary to insure attainment and maintenance of such standards, including, but not limited to, land use controls;

"(D) it provides that, wherever technically feasible, effluent requirements shall, except in the case of municipal waste treatment works, provide for the recycling of wastes or for other means which eliminate or substantially reduce discharge of wastes into any waters;

"(E) it includes provision for (i) the establishment and operation of appropriate devices, methods, and procedures necessary to monitor, compile, and analyze data on water quality, and (ii) upon request, making such data available to the Administrator and the public;

"(F) it contains, where appropriate, adequate provisions for intergovernmental cooperation, including measures needed to insure that discharges of wastes from any stationary source located on or near navigable waters or tributaries thereof located in or bordering one State, including interstate waters, will not interfere with the attainment and maintenance of such standards in another State;

"(G) it provides—

"(i) necessary assurances that the State water pollution control agency has or will have (within one year from the date of approval of such plan) adequate funding, authority, and trained personnel to carry out and enforce such plan;

"(ii) for installation, where appropriate, of equipment by persons owning, leasing, or otherwise controlling stationary sources to monitor discharges therefrom;

"(iii) for periodic reports on the composition, frequency, and quantity of such discharges, which shall be available to the public; and

"(iv) for authority comparable to that in section 204 of this Act, including effective contingency plans to implement such authority; and

"(H) it provides (i) for periodic review, at least every three years, and, where appropriate, revision, after public hearings of such standards and designations, or plan, or both, to achieve the purposes of this section, (ii) for revision of such designations and standards or plan, or both, whenever the Administrator finds on the basis of information available to him that such designations and standards or plans are substantially inadequate to achieve the purposes of this section.

"(4) The Administrator shall, in accordance with the procedures and requirements of this subsection, approve any revision of such designations and standards or plan.

"(5) The Administrator may, whenever he finds it necessary and publishes his finding, extend the period for submission of any plan or portion thereof not to exceed six months.

"(d) The Administrator shall, after consideration of any State hearing record, promptly prepare and publish proposed regulations setting forth such designations and standards or plan or portion thereof, or both, if (1) a State fails to submit water use designations and water quality standards or a plan for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of such standards within the time prescribed, or (2) the designations and standards or plan, or portion thereof, or both, submitted is determined by the Administrator not to be in accordance with the requirements of this section, or (3) the State fails, within sixty days after notice by the Administrator or such longer period as he may prescribe, to revise such designations and standards or plan as required by this section. If such State held no public hearing associated with adoption of such designations and standards or plan, the Administrator shall provide an opportunity for such hearing within such State on any proposed regulation for such State. The Administrator shall, within six months after the date required for submission of such designations and standards or plan, promulgate any such regulation unless, prior to such promulgation, such State has adopted and submitted designations and standards or plan which he determines to be in accordance with the requirements of this section. Such designations and standards or plan promulgated by the Administrator for any State shall be the designations and standards or plan, or both, applicable to such State in the same manner as if such designations and standards or plan had been adopted by such State and approved pursuant to this section, and shall remain in effect until such State submits such designations and standards or plan and it is approved under this section.

"(e)(1) A petition for review of any action of the Administrator approving such designations and standards or plan, or both, may be filed in the United States court of appeals for the circuit which includes the applicable State. Such petition shall be filed, within thirty days from the date of such approval, by any person praying that it be modified or set aside in whole or in part. A copy of the petition shall forthwith be sent by registered or certified mail to the Administrator and thereupon the Administrator shall certify and file in such court the record upon which the approval complained of was issued, as provided in section 2112 of title 28, United States Code. Upon the filing of such petition the court shall have jurisdiction to affirm or set aside the determination complained of in whole or in part. The findings of the Administrator with respect to questions of fact shall be sustained if based upon a fair evaluation of the entire record at such hearing.

"(2) Proceedings before the court under this paragraph shall take precedence over all the other causes of action on the docket and shall be assigned for hearing and decision at the earliest practicable date and expedited in every way.

"(3) Such approved designations and standards or plans with respect to which review could have been obtained under this subsection shall not be subject to judicial review in any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding for enforcement thereof under this Act."

SEC. 5. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act is amended by inserting after redesignated section 201 the following new sections:

"FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF PLANS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION, MAINTENANCE, AND ENFORCEMENT OF WATER QUALITY STANDARDS

"SEC. 202. (a)(1) Whenever, on the basis of any information available to him, the Administrator or his authorized representative finds that any person violates any applicable water quality standard or applicable plan, or both, he shall notify such person and the appropriate State water pollution control agency of such violation. All such notices shall be made public when issued. Unless the Administrator finds, and publishes his finding, that such violation is being effectively abated by such agency within ten days after such notice, he shall immediately issue or cause to issue an order requiring such person to comply with such standards or plan, or both.

"(2) On or after the effective date of this title, whenever the Administrator or his authorized representative finds that any person is discharging into any navigable waters or tributaries thereof, including interstate or underground waters, a hazardous substance, he shall issue an order requiring the abatement of such discharge within ten days after the receipt of such order, or he shall bring a civil action in accordance with subsection (d) of this section. The Administrator shall notify the appropriate State water pollution control agency of such action.

"(b) A copy of any order issued under this section shall be sent to the State water pollution control agency of any State in which the violation occurs. Any order issued under this section shall state with reasonable specificity the nature of the violation, specify a time for compliance which the Administrator or his authorized representative determines is reasonable, taking into account the seriousness of the violation and any good faith efforts to comply. In any case in which an order under this section is issued to a corporation, a copy of such order shall be issued to appropriate corporate officers. All such orders shall be made public when issued.

"(c)(1) Any person issued an order pursuant to the provisions of this section, or any person affected by such order or by any modification or termination of such order, may apply to the Administrator for review of the order within thirty days of receipt thereof or within twenty days of its modification or termination. Any person issued a notice pursuant to this section may, if he believes that the period of time fixed in such notice for the abatement of the violation is unreasonable, apply to the Administrator for review of the notice within twenty days of the receipt thereof. Upon receipt of such application, the Administrator shall cause such investigation to be made as he deems appropriate. Such investigation shall provide an opportunity for a public hearing, at the request of any such person to present information relating to the issuance and continuance of such order or the modification or termination thereof or to the time fixed in such notice. The filing of an application for review under this subsection shall not operate as a stay of any order or notice.

"(2) Written notice of the time and place of the hearing shall be given at least five days prior to the hearing. Any such hearing shall be of record and shall be subject to section 554 of title 5 of the United States Code.

"(3) Upon receiving the report of such investigation, the Administrator shall make findings of fact, and he shall issue a written decision, incorporating therein an order vacating, affirming, modifying, or terminating the order, or the modification or termination of such order, or the notice, complained of and incorporate his findings therein.

"(4) In view of the urgent need for prompt decision of matters submitted to the Administrator under this section, all actions which the Administrator takes under this section shall be taken as promptly as practicable, consistent with adequate consideration of the issues involved.

"(d)(1) The Administrator shall commence a civil action for appropriate relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction, whenever any person—

"(A) violates or fails or refuses to comply with any order issued under this section; or

"(B) fails or refuses to comply with any requirement of subsection (f) of this section.

"(2) Any action under this subsection may be brought in the district court of the United States for the district in which the defendant is located or resides or is doing business, and such court shall have jurisdiction to restrain such violation and to require compliance. Notice of the commencement of such action shall be given to the appropriate State water pollution control agency.

"(e)(1) Any person, who violates any requirement of an applicable plan or fails or refuses to comply with any final order issued under this section, shall be assessed a civil penalty by the Administrator which penalty shall not be less than $1,500 or more than $50,000 for each such violation. If any violation is a continuing one, each day of such violation shall constitute a separate violation for the purpose of computing the applicable civil penalty. If any violation is a continuing one, every third day of such continuing violation the minimum civil penalty shall be increased by $1,000 until the maximum penalty is reached. The Administrator shall not have the power to compromise such penalties.

"(2) Whenever the Administrator believes that a person is subject to the imposition of a civil penalty under the provisions of this subsection, he shall notify such person in writing (A) setting forth the date, facts, and nature of each act or omission with which the person is charged, (B) specifically identifying the particular provision or provisions of the section, rule, regulation, order, standard, or plan involved in the violation, and (C) advising of each penalty which the Administrator proposes to impose and its amount. Such written notice shall be sent by registered or certified mail by the Administrator to the last known address of such person. The person so notified shall be granted an opportunity to show in writing, within such reasonable period as the Administrator shall be regulation prescribe, why such penalty should not be imposed or why the amount of such penalty is not warranted. The notice shall also advise such person that upon failure to pay the civil penalty subsequently determined by the Administrator the penalty shall be collected by civil action. All such notices and writings shall be available for public inspection.

"(3) The Administrator is authorized to institute a civil action to collect a penalty imposed pursuant to this section.

"(f) (1) Any person who knowingly—

"(A) violates any applicable water quality standard or requirement of an applicable plan, or

"(B) violates or fails or refuses to comply with any final order issued by the Administrator under this section, shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than $5,000 per day or more than $75,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both. If the conviction is for a violation committed after the first conviction of such person under this paragraph, punishment shall be by a fine of not more than $200,000 or less than $10,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or by both.

"(2) Any person who knowingly makes any false statement, representation, or certification in any application, record, report, plan, or other document filed or required to be maintained under this Act or who falsifies, tampers with, or knowingly renders inaccurate any monitoring device, system, or method required to be maintained under this Act, shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both.

"(3) One-third of any fine imposed upon conviction of a violation under this subsection shall be paid to the person or persons giving information leading to such conviction.

"INSPECTIONS, MONITORING, AND ENTRY

"SEC. 203. (a) For the purpose of (i) designating water uses for any water or developing or assisting in the development of any water quality standards and any plan for the implementation, maintenance, and enforcement thereof, including any effluent requirement and schedule or timetable for compliance, (ii) determining whether any person is in violation of any such standard, plan, requirement, timetable, or schedule, or of any prohibition of discharge of a hazardous material, or (iii) of carrying out section 204 of this Act—

"(1) the Administrator may require the person who owns, leases, or otherwise controls any effluent source to (A) establish and maintain such records, (B) make such reports, (C) install, use, and maintain monitoring equipment or devices, (D) sample such effluents (in accordance with such methods, at such locations, at such intervals, and in such manner as the Administrator shall prescribe), and (E) provide such other information as he may reasonably require; and

"(2) the Administrator or his authorized representative, upon presentation of his credentials—

"(A) shall have a right of entry to, upon, or through any premises in which an effluent source is located or in which any records required to be maintained under paragraph (1) of this subsection are located, and

"(B) may at reasonable times have access to and copy any records, inspect any monitoring equipment or method required under paragraph (1) of this subsection and sample any effluents which the owner or operator of such source is required to sample under paragraph (1) of this subsection.

"(b) Each State shall develop and submit to the Administrator a procedure for carrying out subsection (a) of this section in such State. Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit the Administrator from carrying out this subsection in a State.

"(c) In carrying out the provisions of this title, the Administrator may issue subpenas for the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of relevant papers, books, and other documents, he may administer oaths. Any records, reports, or information obtained under this title shall be available to the public, except that upon a showing satisfactory to the Administrator by any person that records, reports, or information, or particular part thereof (other than effluent data), to which the Administrator has access under this title if made public, would divulge methods or processes entitled to protection as trade secrets of such person, the Administrator shall consider such record, report, or information, or particular portion thereof confidential, except that such record, report, or information may be disclosed to other officers, employees, or authorized representatives of the United States concerned with carrying out this Act or when relevant in any proceeding under this Act. Witnesses summoned shall be paid the same fees and mileage that are paid witnesses in the courts of the United States. In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpena served upon any person under this subsection, the district court of the United States for any district in which such person is found or resides or transacts business, upon application by the United States and after notice to such person, shall have jurisdiction to issue an order requiring such person to appear and give testimony before the Administrator, to appear and produce papers, books, and documents before the Administrator, or both, and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by such court as a contempt thereof.

"(d) Subject to the direction and control of the Attorney General, as provided in section 507(b) of title 28 of the United States Code, Attorneys appointed by the Secretary may appear for and represent him in any proceeding instituted under this section.

"(e) There is authorized to be appropriated annually to the Administrator beginning July 1, 1971, and ending June 30, 1976, $75,000,000 to carry out his enforcement responsibilities under this title, and he shall submit to the Congress on March 1 of each year a detailed report concerning the enforcement activities of the Administrator, including a discussion of the violations discovered, during the preceding calendar year. Such sums shall be available until expended.

"(f) The Administrator shall periodically hold public hearings in various regions or States of the United States to determine the effectiveness of approved water quality standards and plans and the enforcement thereof and to investigate significant pollution problems.

"EMERGENCY POLLUTION CONTROL

"SEC. 204. Upon receipt of evidence that a pollution source or combination of sources, including moving sources, (A) is presenting an imminent or substantial endangerment to the health or welfare of persons or to treaty-protected fish or wildlife, or (B) may present a substantial economic injury to persons because of their inability to market any products in commerce because of such pollution, the Administrator shall institute a civil action for relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or any other appropriate order, in the district court of the United States for the district in which the persons owning, leasing, or otherwise controlling such source or sources, is located or resides or is doing business. The district court shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide such actions and to issue such orders as it deems appropriate.

"CITIZEN SUITS

"SEC. 205. (a) Any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf or on behalf of a class of persons—

"(1) against any person (including the United States, and any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) any water quality standard or plan or effluent requirement, schedule, or timetable of compliance, or prohibition of discharge under this Act, or (B) any order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to any violation under this title, or

"(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this Act, including the enforcement of any water quality standard, plan, effluent requirement, schedule, timetable of compliance, or prohibition of discharge.

"(b) The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to hear and decide such actions and to issue such orders as may be necessary.

"(c) In any such action, the Administrator, if not a party, may intervene as a matter of right.

"(d) Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any such standards or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a State agency).

"(e) No bond shall be required by the court of the plaintiff, except that the court may, upon clear and convincing evidence offered by the defendant other than the Administrator, that the relief required will result in irreparable damage to the defendant, impose a requirement for security to cover the costs and damages as may be incurred by defendant when relief is wrongfully granted. Such security shall not be required of the plaintiff if it would unreasonably hinder the plaintiff in the maintenance of his action or would tend unreasonably to prevent a full and fair hearing on the activities complained of. The court, in issuing any final order in any action brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, shall award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to citizens or citizens groups in any case in which such citizens or citizens groups successfully maintain an action under subsection (a) of this section.

SEC. 6. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act is amended by adding after redesignated section 209 the following new section:

"EMPLOYEE PROTECTION AGAINST DISCHARGE OR DISCRIMINATION BY EMPLOYER

"SEC. 210. (a) No person shall discharge or in any other way discriminate against or cause to be discharged or discriminated against any employee or any authorized representative of employees by reason of the fact that such employee or representative of employees has filed, instituted, or caused to be filed or instituted any proceeding under this Act, or has testified or is about to testify in any proceeding resulting from the administration or enforcement of the provisions of this Act.

"(b) Any employee or a representative of employees who believes that he has been discharged or otherwise discriminated against by any person in violation of subsection (a) of this section may within thirty days after such violation occurs, apply to the Secretary of Labor for a review of such alleged discharge or discrimination. A copy of the application shall be sent to such person who shall be the respondent. Upon receipt of such application, the Secretary of Labor shall cause such investigation to be made as he deems appropriate. Such investigation shall provide an opportunity for a public hearing at the request of any party to enable the parties to present information relating to such violation. The parties shall be given written notice of the time and place of the hearing at least five days prior to the hearing. Any such hearing shall be of record and shall be subject to section 554 of title 5 of the United States Code. Upon receiving the report of such investigation, the Secretary of Labor shall make findings of fact.

If he finds that such violation did occur, he shall issue a decision, incorporating an order therein and his findings, requiring the party committing such violation to take such affirmative action to abate the violation as the Secretary of Labor deems appropriate, including, but not limited to, the rehiring or reinstatement of the employee or representative of employees to his former position with compensation. If he finds that there was no such violation he shall issue an order denying the application. Such order issued by the Secretary of Labor under this subparagraph shall be subject to judicial review in the same manner as orders and decisions of the Administrator are subject to judicial review under this Act. Violations by any person of subsection (a) of this section shall be subject to the provisions of section 202 of this Act.

"(c) Whenever an order is issued under this section to abate such violation, at the request of the applicant, a sum equal to the aggregate amount of all costs and expenses (including the attorney's fees) as determined by the Secretary of Labor to have been reasonably incurred by the applicant for, or in connection with, the institution and prosecution of such proceedings, shall be assessed against the person committing such violation."

SEC. 7. Redesignated section 209 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act is amended by adding a new subsection at the end thereof as follows:

"(e)(1) Any person (A) required to comply with any order issued by a Federal court pursuant to this Act, who fails to comply within the time period specified in such order, or (B) convicted by a Federal court for a knowing violation of any applicable schedule or timetable of compliance, effluent requirement, discharge prohibition, or water quality standard shall be ineligible to enter into any contract with any Federal agency for the procurement of goods, materials, and services to perform such work at or with any facilities which are subject to such action by the court and which are owned, leased, or supervised by such person. Such ineligibility shall continue until the Administrator certifies compliance with such order, or that the condition giving rise to the violation has been corrected.

"(2) The Administrator shall establish procedures to provide all such Federal agencies with the notification necessary for the purposes of paragraph (1).

"(3) In order to further implement the purposes and policy of this Act to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's water, the President shall, not more than one hundred and eighty days after enactment of this paragraph cause to be issued an order (A) requiring each Federal agency authorized to enter into contracts and each Federal agency which is empowered to extend Federal assistance by way of grant, loan, or contract to effectuate the purpose and policy of this Act in such contracting or assistance activities, and (B) setting forth procedures, sanctions, penalties, and such other provisions, as the President determines necessary to carry out such requirement.

"(4) The President may exempt any lease, contract, loan, or grant from all or part of the provisions of this section where he determines such exemption is necessary in the paramount interest of the United States and he shall notify the Congress of such exemption.

"(5) The President shall annually report to the Congress on measures taken toward implementing the purpose and intent of this section, including but not limited to the progress and problems associated with implementation of this section."

SEC. 8. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act is amended by adding after the new section 210 a new section to read as follows:

"DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING

"SEC. 211. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person who manufactures any equipment, devices, or systems of any kind or description for commerce to make any false or deceptive claims, statements, or representations concerning their use and effectiveness for the control of pollution or the enhancement of the human environment. The Administrator shall promptly refer any complaints received by him concerning any violation of this subsection to the Federal Trade Commission for prompt investigation. All such complaints and the reports of each investigation thereon and supporting material shall be available to the public.

"(b) Any person who violates subsection (a) of this section shall be assessed a civil penalty by the Federal Trade Commission in accordance with the provisions of section 202 (e) of this Act.

"(c) Any person who knowingly violates subsection (a) of this section shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than $25,000, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both."

SEC. 9. Redesignated section 303(e) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act is amended by inserting the word "navigable" before the word "rivers."

SEC. 10. Redesignated section 102 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act is amended by adding the following new subsection:

"(f) No research, demonstrations, experiments, or other such work shall be carried out, contracted for, sponsored, or authorized under this Act after the effective date of this subsection, unless all information, uses, products, processes, patents, and other developments resulting from such work will (with such exception and limitation, if any, as the Secretary may find to be necessary in the public interest and he publishes his finding) be available to the general public."

SEC. 11. Redesignated section 302(a) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act is amended by adding the following new sentence: "All regulations, criteria, or guidelines issued under this Act, unless otherwise provided in this Act, shall be published as proposed rule making under section 553 of title 5, United States Code, and adequate opportunity shall be provided for public written comment thereon and copies of all such comments shall be available for public inspection."

SEC. 12. Nothing in this Act or the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended, shall be construed as limiting the authority of the Secretary of the Army and the United States attorneys under the River and Harbor Act of 1899 to vigorously enforce that Act against any person or corporation violating the provisions of that Act or any regulation issued thereunder.

SEC. 13. No person in the United States shall on the ground of sex be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal assistance under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. This provision shall be enforced through agency provisions and rules similar to those already established, with respect to racial and other discrimination, under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. However, this remedy is not exclusive and will not prejudice or cut off any other legal remedies available to a discriminatee.

ROGERS COMMENDS PRESIDENT NIXON ON FORCED BUSING STATEMENT

(Mr. ROGERS asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Speaker, I wish to commend the President for his statement yesterday on the issue of forced busing to achieve racial balance in our schools, and I regret that the Departments of Justice and HEW are intent on pursuing forced busing, even when it means the destruction of the neighborhood school concept and the disruption of education for all children.

I have supported and continue to support the "freedom of choice" approach to desegregation and I believe that the House of Representatives should have the opportunity to vote on a proposed constitutional amendment which would prohibit forced busing to achieve racial balance in our schools. I, therefore, am today again introducing such a proposed constitutional amendment.

In addition, because of the urgency of this matter, I am signing a discharge petition for House Joint Resolution 30 introduced by my good friend and colleague, CHARLES BENNETT, which would also prohibit forced busing, in order that the House may vote on this matter more quickly.

I also am pleased that the President has proposed an amendment to the school desegregation aid bill that would prohibit the use of funds from that measure for forced busing. I have previously supported efforts to prevent the use or withholding of Federal funds to achieve forced busing and I am hopeful that the Congress will agree.

BIG CYPRESS WATERSHED

(Mr. PEPPER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, I have introduced legislation which authorizes to the Secretary of the Interior funds not to exceed $200 million for the purchase of the Big Cypress watershed and the Ten Thousand Islands, an adjoining estuary, in southwestern Florida.

At a time when Americans are critically conscious of their dwindling and deteriorating natural resources, the importance of protecting a life-supporting watershed cannot be overemphasized. The Big Cypress watershed is part of a delicate ecosystem which must come under Federal scrutiny if it is to continue to survive and prosper. I believe that the future safety of Big Cypress can be best insured by Federal acquisition and regulation.

Big Cypress is a flat, slightly sloping watershed that provides a myriad of economic, ecological, and cultural benefits to southern Florida. As a source of fresh water, Big Cypress bountifully supplies many of the new gulf coast communities and provides more than half of the water that nourishes Everglades National Park. Furthermore, because of its unique topography, Big Cypress is able to extend the "wet months" well beyond the duration of actual rainfall. Thus, the ability of Everglades National Park to withstand drought is due, in large part, to Big Cypress' distinctive ability to act as a natural reservoir.

Yet, besides its obvious value as a vital link in south Florida's ecological chain and its value as an abundant source of

fresh water for Florida's evolving gulf coast, Big Cypress also has an intangible, inestimable value because of the part it plays in the Miccosukee and Seminole Indian cultures. To the Seminoles and Miccosukees residing on the fringes of Big Cypress, the watershed represents the center of their spiritual and economic existence. The watershed's destruction would be their ruin.

Clearly, therefore, the Congress must act with a sense of urgency to protect this vastly important resource. Oil probing and agricultural carelessness has already had its toll on Big Cypress. Water tested near Naples shows significant concentrations of iron, lead, and aluminum contaminants. In addition, unsupervised agricultural developments are already foreshadowing Big Cypress as another episode in the continuing saga of ecological destruction.

The legislation which I have introduced today, if enacted promptly, will prevent Big Cypress from following the senseless path of Lake Erie, the Potomac River, and thousands of other natural resources whose rampant exploitation now weigh heavily on the American conscience. I strongly encourage my colleagues to give this matter the urgent attention that it demands.

AMENDING THE BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1966

(Mr. PEPPER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, I am introducing a bill to amend the Bail Reform Act of 1966 so as to increase the penalties for violating bail provisions in felony cases. This bill would have the effect of raising the penalty for "bail jumping" to a term of years or fine equal in magnitude to the possible sentence of the underlying crime.

There is a two-fold basis for such legislation. First, enactment of this bill would bring the penalty for bail jumping in felony cases in accord with that covering misdemeanors (18 U.S.C. 3150 (2)). The misdemeanor section already provides for sentences consistent with the sentence for the underlying crime.

The second reason, and perhaps the most persuasive, is the fact that many criminals are using the bail jumping route as a method of avoiding retribution for their crimes. The select committee on crime has received evidence that in many instances—most involving major drug offenses—defendants are jumping bail, and avoiding trial, for substantial periods of time. In these situations, informants become reluctant to testify; evidence dries up; witnesses die or disappear; and in general a conviction is more difficult to obtain after a lapse of even a moderate period of time. Authorities are then forced to prosecute under the bail jumping statute which, at present, has a maximum penalty of 5 years. Thus, for example, an individual who would have otherwise received a sentence of 15 to 20 years, had he been convicted of the offenses for which he had been arrested, may instead be out on parole in 20 months or less. It can be seen then, that one arrested on a felony charge is, in practice, encouraged to jump bail in hopes of, at the worst, receiving a lesser sentence. Such encouragement is not consistent with the sound administration of justice.

While increasing the penalty for bail jumping may at first appear severe, upon reflection it is actually not. An involuntary absence or an absence with extenuating circumstances will, of course, not be punishable under this section. A trial will be held to determine whether the bail provisions were willfully violated since willfulness is an element of the crime. While it is true the maximum penalty is increased, no minimum is set and the judge will have discretion in finally setting the sentence.

An increased penalty does not necessarily represent a jaundiced view of the civil liberties of individuals. As noted, the bail system is being flagrantly misused by people who are arrested on charges carrying severe penalties. It is believed that the increasing of penalties under this section, either by the coercive effect of their presence in the statute, or by the use of the maximum in certain situations, will decrease the incidence of bail jumping in felony cases. No rules of procedures and no constitutional safeguards would be altered by this legislation.

Mr. Speaker, the bail system cannot be allowed to become a vehicle for avoiding a just punishment. The bill I have introduced today would rectify the inequities of the present system; and hopefully bring about a smoother more consistent operation of our criminal justice system. I urge its passage.

H.R. —

A bill to amend title 18 of the United States Code to provide that a person found guilty of willfully failing to appear as required while charged with a felony and free on bail be liable to receive the same penalty provided for the felony charge pending when he failed to appear

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. It is the purpose of this Act to amend section 3150 of Title 18 of the United States Code (penalties for failure to appear) to provide that the penalty for any person released on bail while charged with a felony who willfully fails to appear as required shall be liable to a penalty equal to the maximum sentence of imprisonment, the maximum fine, or both, provided for the offense that person was released in connection with.

SEC. 2. Section 3150 of Title 18 of the United States Code is amended to read as follows:

"§ 3150. PENALTIES FOR FAILURE TO APPEAR

"Whoever, having been released pursuant to this chapter, willfully fails to appear before any court of judicial officer as required, shall, subject to the provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, incur a forfeiture of any security which was given or pledged for his release, and, in addition, shall—

"(1) if he was released in connection with a charge of a felony, be fined not more than the maximum fine or imprisoned for not more than the maximum sentence of imprisonment provided for such felony, or both;

"(2) if he was released while awaiting sentence or pending appeal or certiorari after conviction of any offense, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both; or

"(3) if he was released in connection with a charge of misdemeanor, be fined not more than the maximum fine provided for such misdemeanor or imprisoned for not more than 1 year, or both; or

"(4) if he was released for appearance as a material witness, be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than 1 year, or both."

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE FREEZING OF POWER

(Mr. PEPPER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, Brazil is represented in our country by a very distinguished Ambassador, the Honorable J. A. de Araujo Castro, who took his post in Washington in May of this year. The Ambassador had 2 years of eminent service as Ambassador to the United Nations before coming to Washington, and behind that lay an illustrious career. I have had the privilege of seeing a very able address by Ambassador Castro, delivered before the National War College of Brazil on June 11, 1971, entitled "The United Nations and the Freezing of Power." This is the first statement of Ambassador Castro on the Brazilian position since his arrival in Washington. It represents an attempt out of his wide experience to set forth the way in which Brazil views not only its own interests but the broad problems of great power relationships as well. It is a thoughtful study by a concerned and knowledgeable spokesman for a great country. We will benefit by reading Ambassador Castro's learned address and will always be pleased to hear the representative of our long-time and great friend in Latin America and in the world, Brazil. Accordingly, Mr. Speaker, I insert Ambassador Castro's address, immediately following my remarks, in the body of the RECORD:

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE FREEZING OF POWER

(By Ambassador J. A. de Araujo Castro)

I. SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

If the international scene has been gloomier and more somber than it is today; if we have been closer to a Third World War and if certain situations have in the past been more explosive and fraught with peril, it is none the less true that we have never been faced with a more complex and fluid state of affairs. It would be impossible to define today's world in erstwhile terms such as black-and-white, all-or-nothing, infrared and ultraviolet. Observe how greatly the world has changed since October 1962, or in other words since the "thirteen days" of the crisis precipitated by the emplacement of Soviet missiles in Cuba. From that moment on there has seemed to prevail a certain tacit understanding between the Super-Powers in the sense of avoiding the exacerbation of crises and tensions in certain areas held to be of special interest to one or the other of them. It is really noteworthy that while many decried the invasion of Czechoslovakia, there were few—and not necessarily the most powerful ones—who condemned the uncouth doctrine of "limited sovereignty" on which it was allegedly based and by which it was obviously inspired. Now, the invasion, as an episode, was perhaps less dangerous than the doctrine, as a political norm, responsible for ideas and concepts of spheres of interests and areas of influence, capable of evolving into areas of domination.

We had an opportunity of witnessing facts and circumstances related to this matter, in August, 1968, when we were charged with the responsibility of presiding over the meetings of the United Nations Security Council. The reciprocal interest shown by the two Super-Powers in the preservation of the spirit of *détente* was so strong that it proved capable of withstanding everything—the Viet Nam conflict, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and even the confrontation in the political and strategical area of the Middle East.

II. PEACE, DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

The Super-Powers appear determined to avoid the outbreak of a world conflict charged with nuclear overtones, but they appear at the same time to have despaired of Universal Peace, in the same way as they appear to have despaired of General and Complete Disarmament. Today there is very little talk about Peace; the talk centers almost exclusively around *Détente*. Today there is very little talk about Disarmament; the talk is almost exclusively about "Arms Control" or "Limitation of Armaments". As we have reiteratedly stressed at the United Nations, a process of devaluation of the concepts and basic ideals of the San Francisco Charter is well under way. In tribute to considerations of "political realism", the concept of Peace is being transformed into a "tolerable state of war"; the concept of Disarmament is being transformed into a "tolerable arms race" and the concept of Development, of such great importance to three quarters of mankind, is reduced to the meager proportions of a "tolerable state of poverty".

III. THE FREEZING OF WORLD POWER

On various occasions, within the setting of the United Nations, before the General Assembly and before the Economic and Social Council, Brazil has sought to characterize what is now clearly looming as a firm and indisguised trend towards the *freezing of world power*. And when we speak of Power, we speak not only of Military Power, but also of Political Power, of Economic Power, of Scientific and Technological Power. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, the highest point of the detente between the USSR and the United States, is the main instrument of this policy of freezing of World Power. According to all extant indications, the Treaty was demanded by the Soviet Union as a *sine qua non* condition for the continuation of the process of detente. It aimed and still aims primarily at impeding the military nuclearization of West Germany and Japan, countries defeated in the Second World War, and is thus linked to the effort, already reflected in the San Francisco Charter towards the immobilization of the 1945 political and strategical framework. The Super-Powers are conducting a joint effort for the stabilization and freezing of world power, based upon two arbitrary historical dates: October 24, 1945, when the Charter of the United Nations came into force, and January 10, 1967, the deadline for countries to qualify as Nuclear Weapons Powers under the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Treaty, which is interpreted as a complement to the Charter in the process of freezing of World Power, is in direct violation, however, of several of its Purposes and Principles, insofar as it established distinctive categories of nations: one comprising strong and therefore adult and responsible countries, and another comprising weak and therefore non-adult and non-responsible countries. Contrary to all historical evidence, the Treaty starts from the premise that prudence and moderation are built-in features of Power. It institutionalizes inequality between nations and apparently accepts the premises that the strong countries will become ever stronger and the weak ones will grow ever weaker. On the other hand, the Non-Proliferation Treaty extends to the fields of Science and Technology privileges and prerogatives which the Charter of the United Nations had limited, within the specific field of peace and security to the five Permanent Members of the Security Council. It should be noted that because of the two-face China Syndrome, the five Permanent Members of the Security Council no longer perfectly coincide with the five Nuclear Weapon States.

IV. THE CO-CHAIRMANSHIP AND THE DWINDLING CIRCLES

Clear symptoms of this process of freezing of the World Power can be detected in recent development in the Disarmament field with special emphasis on the proceedings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the new label now attached to the former Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. The Committee, installed in 1962 under the terms of the Zorin-Stevenson Agreement, functions under the co-chairmanship of the United States of America and the Soviet Union. Its composition is tripartite, in line with the old cold-war blueprints: one group of NATO countries, one group of Warsaw Pact countries, one group of countries designated at times as neutralist, at times as non-aligned, at others as mediators (the latter designation proposed and always used by Brazil). Within nine years' work in the field of General and Complete Disarmament, it never went beyond two imprecise paragraphs of a would-be preamble to a would-be Treaty. In the beginning, the function of the mediator countries was that of seeking to reconcile the supposedly antagonistic positions of the Super-Powers and of their allies. Perhaps the mediators may have been a little too successful in their diplomatic efforts, since through the mechanism of the Co-Chairmanship, the two Super-Powers became reconciled and went on to act jointly to try to disarm—or prevent the arming of—the mediator countries. "Disarm the countries already disarmed"—this seems to be the slogan and the program of the Committee. This is what happened with the conclusion and signature of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which Brazil made and continues to make so many objections. The same phenomenon is applicable both in regard to conventional disarmament and to regional disarmament. An almost total impasse prevails over the negotiations on nuclear "disarmament" while the intermittent SALT talks do not aim in reality at the suppression of nuclear power, but rather at its regulations and disciplining. These conversations aim at best at the elimination of the *over-over-kill*, with the ostensive understanding that the over-kill will subsist. Meanwhile, there arise and spring up frequent attempts to discipline the flow of conventional arms to the underdeveloped countries, under the allegation that such flow constitutes a new obstacle to the tasks of economic development.

The danger now seems to lie in conventional armaments, for security purposes, of the Medium and Small Countries, not in the great arsenal of the Nuclear Super-Powers. The latter appear to be generally in favor of the emphasis on conventional disarmament and on regional disarmament; a recent proposal at San José de Costa Rica seems to be affiliated with this type of ideas and preoccupations. Brazil has opposed this manner of posing the problem of Disarmament, which should be General and Complete, with specific obligations for *all* nations. The regionalization and sectorialization of the problem of Disarmament or even of that of Arms Control—in keeping with the terminology now used by the Super-Powers—are mere aspects of a process of freezing of World Power, under the aegis of the "new, elusive but all-pervasive art of Co-Chairmanship" under the charges of the Super-Powers. The general philosophy appears to be that arms are extremely dangerous in the hands of the Small Ones, not in those of the strong, adult and responsible countries. No Delegation to the United Nations has been so active and assertive as the Brazilian Delegation has in pointing out and denouncing these attempts at the establishment of a Directorate or a Co-Chairmanship that would be in charge of a new world regimentation. Brazil has consistently decried the tendency to discuss world problems—and particularly the problem of Disarmament—within dwindling circles of great powers.

V. 1945 AND 1967

Due to all these reasons, in such a process of freezing of World Power, the superpowers tenaciously oppose all attempts at review or revision of the San Francisco Charter, which, as we have stated, would seek to immobilize the 1945 political and strategical set-up and render it static. With the support of an important group of Latin American countries, Brazil has taken up, with firmness and determination, the problem of revision of the Charter, with the argument that "we cannot live for ever in the year 1945" and that, anyway, any attempts to freeze and immobilize history are futile and pointless. Any revision of the Charter can only be approved with the concurring vote of five permanent Members of the Security Council, and it is evident that none of those Members would agree to divest itself of the privileges and prerogatives conferred upon them by the San Francisco Charter and extend to other Member States those self-same privileges and prerogatives. The San Francisco Charter and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1945 and 1967 have thus become the two basic documents on an entire process of Freezing of the World Power.

VI. COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD

The same purposes of stabilization and maintenance of Power have led the Great Powers to oppose tenaciously the efforts of the developing countries towards modifying the norms that still govern international trade. It is clear that some evolution has occurred in the attitude of the industralized countries since March 1964, the date of the installation of the UNCTAD I. It happens, however, that the specific problems of the developing countries have become aggravated at a much faster tempo than that of the changes in question, and in consequence the problem of underdevelopment has never presented more somber and discouraging aspects.

It suffices to consider the following: the entire development program of the United Nations (UNDP) has at its disposal yearly a maximum of two hundred and thirty million dollars, representing one tenth of one percent of merely the world's yearly military expenditures. At one of the General Assemblies of the UN, Brazil advocated that a quantitative fund corresponding to one percent of such expenditures be allocated for the tasks of development, which would permit a tenfold increase in the effort actually undertaken. "We are only asking for one percent of human folly"—was the explanation then given by the Brazilian Delegation.

It should be noted that the attitude adopted by the USSR and the other socialist countries has been extremely negative in the matter of multilateral programs for economic development. In this field, the socialists paradoxically cling to outdated principles of economic liberalism and show themselves to be ultra-faithful followers of Jean Baptiste Say's "laissez faire, laissez aller". It has been said that when the socialist Delegates are preparing to attend any meeting of the Economic and Social Council or of the Second Committee of the UN General Assembly, they take the elementary precaution of leaving in the cloakroom all their books by Karl Marx.

Actually, what the developing countries are seeking to do is to transpose into the international field certain principles of social justice and redistribution of wealth that have been gradually gaining ground within the internal systems of the more politically advanced countries. Ultimately, the objective is to obtain international recognition of the principle of "collective security in the economic field", similar to that which we are trying, gradually and slowly, to outline in the field of peace and international security. It must be admitted that the results to date have not been too promising. The First Decade of Development implemented by the United Nations was a failure and the prospects for the Decade which is now beginning are not very promising either. At bottom, it is a matter of determining whether the United Nations, or rather, the States compromising that Organization, are willing or not willing to accept a collective responsibility in the field of economic development.

This, on the multilateral plane. On the plane of of bilateral assistance, which should be held today more and more as signifying "fair and equitable conditions for the pursuance of international commerce", the positions of the Great Powers generally coincide in a stubborn resistance to the claims of the developing countries. On the other hand, as the "cold war" progressively fades away, the former motivation for bilateral assistance is gradually disappearing as one of the formative elements of the old policy of alliances or "alignments".

VII. THE DIVIDEND AND THE DIVISOR

There exist, however, other factors that are beginning to affirm themselves within this process of freezing of world power. We refer specifically to some tendencies which are emerging in the treatment of the problems of population and preservation of the environment. It is said that the "population bomb" can become more fatal and nefarious than the nuclear bomb itself and there is a growing tendency to handle the problem on uniformly universal bases, ignoring that the matter lies within the exclusive competence of each State, which, in the exercise of its full sovereignty, has to take into account facts and circumstances of an eminently national character. No one doubts that there are overpopulated States, just as no one should doubt that some States, such as Brazil for instance, with its ninety five million inhabitants—are requiring a demographic growth in line with their needs for full use of their natural resources and the effective occupation of their territories. To try to solve the problem in the abstract, on allegedly cold and statistical terms, without taking into account a series of factors of the greatest importance to the survey of the general problem of Development, strikes us as an attitude devoid of logic and surely fated to political failure. It is argued that demographic growth neutralizes the advantages of the growth of the Gross National Product, in the evaluation of per capita income, held nowadays in a rather simplistic manner as the sole and absolute index of economic development. In short, instead of insisting on an increase in *dividend*, or in other words the GNP, insistence is being made on the immobilization of the *divisor*, that is, the population contingent. Still in other words: It is attempted to convert the grave problem of underdevelopment into a mere problem of stabilization, thus ignoring the fact that any attempt to stabilize the economies of many countries at their present levels would be tantamount to accepting extremely low levels as a target for stabilization.

VIII. AGAIN, THE HAPPY SAVAGE

On the other hand, in tackling the problems related to the preservation of the human environment, the tendency is to place an unduly strong accent on the dangers of rapid industrialization. Emphasis is laid on the dangers of pollution, certainly serious for the highly industrialized countries, while the larger part of the planet is still in a stage of pre-contamination, or, in other words, it has not yet had a chance to become polluted. Two-thirds of mankind are far more threatened by hunger and poverty than by the evils of pollution. For this same reason, much concern was felt over the recent statement by Mr. McNamara—contradicted by Brazil in the Economic and Social Council—to the effect that the World Bank henceforth would not authorize any project for economic development without a minute prior evaluation of possible repercussions on the environment. It is clear that the developing countries will not want to fall into the same errors incurred by the highly industrialized countries, but it is evident that we could not passively accept the resurrection, in the twentieth century, of Rousseau's theory of the "happy savage" which lent flavor and color to French romanticism. "Do not let happen to your cities what has happened to New York". "Preserve your beautiful landscapes" such warnings are constantly hammered into the ears of the representatives of developing countries. Now, these developing countries start from the premise that the preservation of the human environment ought to take into account the basic factors of Development, since underdevelopment represents by itself one of the worst forms of pollution of the human environment.

IX. POLITICS AND TECHNOLOGY

At the moment, the great Powers appear to be interested in "depolitizing" the United Nations, which is becoming really irrelevant in the matter of international Peace and Security. Every effort is now being centered on the so-called "new task" (Non-Proliferation, Population Control, Narcotics, Environment, etc.), which should be requiring new norms of international cooperation on *supra-national* terms. The Brazilian Delegation has consistently and openly opposed this tendency to transform the United Nations into a sort of "International Institute of Technology", or into a mere ineffective chapter of the International Red Cross. For this very reason, Brazil proposed, in a memorandum dated April 3, 1970, addressed to Secretary General U Thant, an entire process of "diplomatic reactivation of the UN", through the establishment of Ad-hoc Negotiation Committees within the scope and under the authority of the Security Council. More specifically, it proposed that one of those Committees be immediately constituted to explore the modalities of a peaceful solution of the question of the Middle East. Arabs and Israelis have, in principle, welcomed the Brazilian suggestion, which, to date, has been received coldly by the Great Powers. An effort is being made at the moment to "rationalize" the working methods of the General Assembly, with the concentration of all *technical* subjects in one of the *Political* Committees of the Assembly. Technical consideration of political subjects is one of the elements of this policy of Freezing of the World Power, it being well known that the developing countries are much less prepared for discussion on this terrain. Another method utilized by the policy of freezing consists in the idea of the constitution of Committees with memberships of experts or "wise men" instead of official and direct representatives of the Member States. Now, experience has shown that such scholars and wise men are by the very reason of their wisdom, to defend the interests of the highly industrialized countries. The "depolitization" of the United States ,a tendency that grows daily, is thus one of the main features of the whole process of the "freezing of World Power."

X. "MARE NOSTRUM"

On subjects relating to the Law of the Sea, the same tendency toward freezing is prevalent. The great maritime Powers are tenaciously opposed to the fixing of limits to territorial seas beyond the perfectly arbitrary distance of twelve miles. Here, also, it is argued that national sovereignty must yield ground to norms of a supranational character that should govern the subject on the basis of the principle of freedom of the seas, "for the common benefit of mankind". It is pertinent, however, to note that in regard to the utilization and exploitation of the resources * * * of the thesis of the "common heritage of mankind". Through the initiative of the Brazilian Delegation, adoption by the XXIV General Assembly of the United Nations was obtained—actually by two-thirds of the membership—for a Resolution establishing a moratorium or freeze for the exploitation of the sea-bed pending an agreement on an international regime on the matter. The Great Powers not only opposed stubbornly the Resolution but declared expressly that they would not comply with the recommendations of a Resolution adopted against their will. They even held that Resolutions of this type could not be approved by a simple majority or even by a qualified majority of two-thirds; on subjects of such a general scope they said, unanimity or consensus would normally be required. This signifies that for all practical purposes, the Great Powers now wish to extend to the UN General Assembly the right of veto—already in force within the Security Council. On this particular subject, of the free and unlimited right to exploit the resources of the seabed the Great Powers, holders of the monopoly over adequate technology, cling to the traditional right of sovereignty, which they try to discredit in other areas.

XI. INDEPENDENCE AND INTERDEPENDENCE

In order to provide a better international regulation of these questions of nuclear non-proliferation, population control, preservation of the environment and restrictions to the free and unimpeded exploitation of natural resources, the Great Powers, who make not the slightest concession of a political character in regard to the major themes of International Peace and Security, now appear to favor a concept of interdependence, which would imply a sensible attenuation of the concept and practice of national sovereignty. No one doubts that the world tends to become ever more interdependent. No one doubts that any tangible progress in the international field will have to be stimulated by reciprocal concessions of sovereignty. All this is true. It is our standpoint, however, that interdependence presupposes the independence, economic emancipation and sovereign equality of nations as an indispensable prerequisite. We cannot declare that the Principles inscribed on Article 2 of the San Francisco Charter are superseded, before we apply them and transform them into reality. First let us be independent. Then let us become—and as rapidly as possible—interdependent.

XII. THE INTERNATIONAL POLICY OF BRAZIL

The International Policy of Brazil, such as it has been defined and expressed within the United Nations, has as its objective the removal of all obstacles whatsoever that may counter its full economic, technological and scientific development, the preservation of its cultural heritage and national identity as a sovereign country, and the affirmation and growth of its National Power. Pending the establishment of a system of distributive justice among Nations, each State has the right, and even the duty, of promoting the active defense of its national interests. And these Brazil has not renounced. In the development of its International Policy, Brazil

must continue to oppose tenaciously any attempt at *containment*, all the more so since it is sure that with the country at the threshold of a full economic development, Brazil would be, among the countries in the world, one of those that would suffer the most through the affirmation of a policy of Containment, or in other words, of a Policy of Freezing of World Power. Brazil cannot accept shackles and hindrances to its free takeoff towards a full economic development. Nor can it accept limitations to any aspect of its growth, whether economic or demographic, in defense to a doubtful principle of interdependence or of supranationality. On matters of sovereignty, concessions are possible when nations feel strong enough to make them. The moment has not yet come for us to yield. This International Policy is authentic in the measure in which Brazil preserves its national identity and in the measure in which it can fulfill its needs for social and economic development. This Policy was affirmed with perfect clarity at the General Assembly of the XXV Anniversary of the United Nations when presenting, on behalf of all the political and regional groupings of the United Nations, the Draft Declaration of International Security (approved by 124 votes in favor and only two abstentions), Brazil succeeded in obtaining recognition of the principle that International Security signifies security for all nations, as well as recognition of the intimate and close inter-relationship between the concepts of International Security, Disarmament and Economic Development. For an understanding of the guidelines of the International Policy of Brazil, we should ponder each word and each concept contained in the following passage of the Message from the President of the Republic to the Brazilian Congress on March 21, 1971:

"Conditioned by its position as an Atlantic, American and developing country, Brazil maintains the traditional guidelines of its foreign policy, the principal aims of which are the maintenance of the integrity of its geographical space, the preservation of its security and the pursuance of an accelerated economic, cultural and social development.

"These objectives are translated into continued action in behalf of the organization of peace and friendly relations between peoples, Inter-American solidarity, political security on the Hemisphere and the implantation of a system of cooperation leading to collective economic security.

"Persistently adhering to a line of historical coherence, Brazil is opposed to the division of the world into zones of influence, considering peace to be an essential condition to the achievement of progress and remaining faithful to the precept of a peaceful solution of disputes as a main line of action of its diplomacy. For this reason, while recognizing that the United Nations is in need of reforms for improvement, it maintains its faith in the destiny of the Organization, which has already proved able to reduce tensions and curtail conflicts throughout various parts of the world. Brazil is convinced that the political character of the UN must be revitalized, and for this reason it has played an active role in the preparation of a document on measures relating to the strengthening of international security, which as President of the Latin American Group, it presented on the occasion of the celebration of the 25th Anniversary of the United Nations.

"This document of signal importance, advocating the strengthening of the United Nations as a political institution and as a center for diplomatic activities and negotiations, was approved by unanimity and is now an essential part of the new philosophy for the World Organization as an element for peace, justice and progress and not only as an instrument for the maintenance of the International status quo.

"In the awareness that the distances are becoming greater between the developed countries and those in process of development, Brazil is working unceasingly for the elimination of the economic, scientific and technological inequality between the Nations, and undertaking activities of continued reasoning and agglutination, not only in its bilateral relations, but also within agencies engaged in multilateral action."

Brazil's repudiation of the tendency towards the Freezing of World Power could not have been more clearly forcefully and authoritatively stated than it was in the Presidential Message. Therein are contained the guidelines of the *International Policy of Brazil.*

ADDRESS OF AFL–CIO PRESIDENT GEORGE MEANY AT THE CONVENTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION

(Mr. ROONEY of New York asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD, and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ROONEY of New York. Mr. Speaker, I should like to insert at this point in the RECORD the transcript of an address by AFL–CIO President George Meany at the Convention of the International Longshoremen's Association held at the DeLido Hotel, Miami Beach, Fla., on Monday, July 19, 1971. This address is indeed a very forceful one, and I am sure that most of the membership of this body will subscribe to the expressions set forth therein.

The address is as follows:

ADDRESS BY AFL–CIO PRESIDENT GEORGE MEANY

Mr. Gleason, my good friend, Senator Jackson, officers of the ILA and delegates to this very important convention of a very important trade union, a trade union that is doing its job today, day in and day out, to uphold the interests of its membership and, at the same time, make its contribution to the society in which we are a part.

Now, I could talk to you this morning about a number of things.

Naturally, the first two items that come to mind are the economy and foreign affairs. These are also uppermost in the minds of the trade union movement because when you talk about the economy you are talking about our membership; you are talking about those who work for wages; you are talking about jobs; you are talking about lack of jobs; you are talking about all the things that are important to the ordinary citizen in taking care of his family, educating them and bringing them up.

And when you talk about foreign affairs, then you are also talking about our people because we find out that any mistakes made in that field, we pay. Labor is in the front line in all of these things, and we have this great relationship with workers all over the world. So, we are interested in all phases of foreign affairs.

Now, as far as the economy is concerned, I hear it's O.K. in 1971 or what's left of it, it is going to be a good year. 1972 is going to be a very, very good year.

So, if you think things are bad, better get up to date, because these statements are made by the President of the United States. He says, "Everything is fine. Everything is okay."

Then we have Mr. Connally, the big industrial and financial man from Texas who has very, very little familiarity with the problems of workers, but he says that everybody knows—he said this the other day—everybody knows that things are turning better every day.

Then George Schultz, oh, he says, "Why, look at the stock market. It's gone up about 30 percent since Mr. Nixon took office." He said that a few weeks ago. He hasn't said anything in the last few weeks because it dropped down a little bit.

Then we get to the Secretary of Labor. Essentially he makes his contribution to this little chorus. He says, "Everything is on the up." He said, "We dropped six-tenths of one percent in the unemployment rate between May and June."

Well, this sounds awfully good.

Then he says, "Of course, this percentage figure is a little misleading because it has got to be weighted and adjusted to what they call the seasonal adjustment and all this."

But the one important fact, and he has confirmed this, that there were 1.1 million more people out of work in June than there were in May.

So, you can take the six-tenths of one percent drop or you can take 1.1 million increase in unemployment. And I'm quite sure that those people who are unemployed, newly unemployed, are not very much impressed by the so-called "seasonally adjusted figure" of six-tenths of one percent.

And then we hear about inflation. That is going to be brought under control any minute now. Any minute the prices are going to start to come down.

Well, this is the kind of an Administration we have in Washington.

The public relations image is building every minute of every day, day in and day out. Madison Avenue gimmickry. And what Madison Avenue has as its stock in trade is, "Fool the public." They make a virtue of deceit.

Well, we don't buy this sort of thing. We are very practical people in the trade union movement and we are concerned with facts and we deal with people and their problems and that is what unions are all about.

And what are the facts and where are we now? And how did we get where we are?

Well, Fact No. 1: There are five million people unemployed in this country at this minute and hundreds of thousands of those have run out of unemployment insurance benefits.

In the last three years, 500,000 jobs have been shipped overseas due to an outmoded, discredited foreign trades policy, and we have a new record on the poverty question.

Twenty-five and a half million people in this country, one out of every eight, are now below the poverty level, the official government poverty level.

We have an unemployment rate for blacks of 10 percent; construction workers 10 percent; returning GI's 10 percent; teenagers 17 percent.

And where is the cost of living going?

Now, the annual rate of increase is six percent, the highest in many, many years. So, despite all the statements, despite all the looking for bluebirds, despite all the propaganda, we are faced with hard, cold disagreeable facts.

And how did we get where we are.

This was arranged by President Nixon and his experts, Dr. Burns and Dr. McCracken, because they were going to cool off the economy. They were going to bring down prices curb inflation, by cooling off the economy by tightening up on the money, all this sort of thing.

Well, in 1968, Mr. Nixon promised that he would halt inflation, he would do it without causing any additional unemployment.

And in 1969, in February, he put it in writing in a letter to the Executive Council of the AFL–CIO, that he was going to cool off the economy but he was going to do it without causing more unemployment.

Well, in 1968 before Mr. Nixon took office, the annual increase in the inflation rate was 4.2 percent.

In Nixon's first year, it went up to 5.4 percent.

In 1970, 5.9 percent.

This year it is going up at the rate of six percent.

So, what happened? He piled a recession on top of inflation.

In January, 1969, when Mr. Nixon took office, the unemployment rate was three percent. Two million, seven hundred thousand people out of work. The lowest figure in many, many years.

And despite the fact that we were told by Mr. Nixon that he was going to create five million new jobs in four years, if he was elected, we now find out we do not have the new jobs, but we have got 2½ million more people unemployed than when he came into office.

So, when we look at this picture, we have to look behind the cold statistics because behind the cold statistics are the five million human beings and their families, with responsibilities to take care of those families and responsibilities as members of the community.

So, due to this policy at the highest level, we have come to this state and what do we get? We get bunk, propaganda, a lot of baloney about everything going to be all right.

Well, we've heard enough about this and we feel that Mr. Nixon will be better served if he faced up to the truth and used the powers of his office, the powers granted him by Congress to do something about these situations.

Maybe he might even put a ceiling on interest rates which have been going up and seem to do good only for the bankers. They don't do any good for the small businessman. They don't do any good for the home buyer.

We have a situation in this country where now if you make $15,000 a year you can't afford to buy your own home.

We used to talk about six percent interest, five and a half percent interest.

Well, go out and buy a home today and see what you get. Nine and nine and a half and ten percent after they add on the so-called points.

This interest rate is determined by government policy at the highest level.

And then we have the search for jobs. We have had some action from Congress. We had the Accelerated Public Works Jobs, 200,000 jobs it would provide.

Mr. Nixon vetoed it. He said that they are not the right kind of jobs.

I'll tell you what kind of jobs these were: They were jobs doing the things that the cities and the counties and states are prepared to do. The plans are drawn for things that they need; roads, repairs here, repairs there, new libraries, community centers, parks, and all these sorts of things, useful things, and they are on the drawing boards and all we asked was that the government, the federal government, help them financially to get these things off the drawing boards and put them to work immediately.

Mr. Nixon said, "No."

He is for revenue sharing, but it has to be his kind of revenue sharing.

So, he passed up this opportunity to be helpful.

Then, we got this thing which I think you are interested in about five years ago, and President Kennedy, a little more than eight years ago—it happened really at the end of President Kennedy's term—was asked to sell wheat to Russia. This great, big collossus, this great, big workers' paradise where they have got all the answers, suddenly ran short of wheat, despite the fact that you find they have got the greatest wheat area in Europe.

So, President Kennedy decided he would sell them some wheat, but he laid down a provision that a least 50 percent of that wheat would be shipped in American ships.

Then, in came our big wheat dealers, Continental Grain, Cargill, people like that, and they had some way of getting into the Commerce Department through some door that we didn't know about, and they started to come down with waivers. They waived the 50 percent rule and within the period of three or four months, early in President Johnson's term, we found out that instead of 50 percent being shipped in American ships, it was down to 26 percent with 74 percent going in foreign ships.

Now, we were willing to share this work but we wanted our half, but they were taking it away from us, cheating us.

Well, the Maritime Trades and the Longshoremen did something about that and you all remember it, and I know Teddy remembers it and I know the other Maritime leaders remember it, and we didn't load any ships. Then I reached an agreement on behalf of the AFL–CIO with the President of the United States, and it was quite simple, that there would be no more wheat shipments in foreign vessels above the 50 percent; that we would stick to the 50 percent; that what we lost would be made up by Public Law 480 shipments, which is a Food For Peace thing, and we went back to work under this agreement, and Mr. Nixon publicly committed himself to this idea.

He said it was absolutely unfair to think of any other idea; we are at least entitled to the 50 percent.

Well, in his effort to see that we don't get too many jobs, evidently the desire to see that unemployment goes up—for what reason, I don't know—he decided last week or the week before that, "We are going to waive the 50 percent rule," that this was archaic, this was out of date.

Well, I don't know what the trades are going to do about it, but whatever they decide to do, they will have the AFL–CIO in back of them in this particular fight.

Well, what happened to Dr. Burns, who was the architect of this Nixon game plan that failed? He didn't get sent to Siberia which he would have if he was working for the Russians, but he got promoted.

He was made head of the Federal Reserve Bank.

And what does he say now? Well, he made a speech a few months ago on the economy and he didn't make any apology for the fact that he led us down the wrong road. He didn't even mention it. He didn't even say, "Sorry about that, boys." No, not as much as an apology.

But he has some new ideas about what to do with the economy and he is saying that the trouble with the economy is high wages and unions and we have to keep wages down; we have got to destroy collective bargaining; we have got to go to compulsory arbitration.

This comes from this egg-head who fell on his face two years ago.

He now comes up with some new ideas and labor is going to be the whipping boy—not a word about bank profits or anything like that.

Oh, he wants to suspend the Minimum Wage Law as it applies to teenagers. This is so the kids getting out of school can work for a $1.50 and their old man can go home and sit down and wash the dishes. He'll lose his job.

I think we are fed up with this, and let me say something about this idea: The people have an idea that America can be prosperous on the basis of low wages.

Well, that's absolute bunk. Just read the record. Just look at the history.

What has sustained this great dynamic economy that we like to boast about? We talk about the American standard of life. We talk about the good things that our people can buy. We point to the factories and their parking lots, and we say, "Those thousands of cars, they don't belong to the bosses; they belong to the workers." And when you go through the suburbs, you see radio and TV aerials, all the good things.

Where did they come from? They come from a high wage economy. And they come from no other kind of economy.

And if we want to turn this thing around, as Dr. Burns and some of his friends want to do, to a low wage economy, then you will have a low wage country and America will not be the first world power that she has been in the past.

And who is going to suffer? Not only the workers. These people who advocate low wages—do not understand that 95 percent of the things we manufacture we sell here.

If you destroy the wage structure, who is going to buy them? There are not enough people getting $10,000 or $20,000 a year to buy all the things we can make.

You've got to look to the little guy and here is where the unions come in. Here is where the union has played its part in raising the wages, raising the mass purchasing power of this country that made this country a great nation, and we are going to try to keep on doing just that in the future.

Now, let's take a look at the foreign situation.

On the winding down of the Vietnamese War, we give Nixon a plus, up to now.

It seems that he is ready to turn it over to the South Vietnamese, but we are all very much interested in a little maneuver that took place in the last couple of weeks, and that is Dr. Kissinger's secret trip to Peking, and this was a great stunt, this "Fool the newsmen."

This allowed the President to make an announcement which kept everybody in suspense. He made a three-minute announcement—couldn't tell anybody what it was about.

Well, as a stunt, it was a good stunt, I guess, to fool the newsmen; get away with something like this.

And there is no question that Mr. Nixon feels he has enhanced his stature as a foreign policy strategist.

Anyone who can pull a Houdini stunt like that must be good, and likewise, he has enhanced his chances of re-election, he believes, and I'm sure that many agree that this has built up his stature. There is no question that this little maneuver may raise the hopes of people everywhere that in some way the proposed visit of our President to Communist China will bring peace in Southeast Asia and perhaps help us get our prisoners of war back home.

That is a hope.

In addition, I'm sure it will cause some misgivings in the smaller nations in that part of the world that things are now going to be decided by the so-called big powers. They are going to make the decisions.

But, still, there are some questions that come to mind. What happened? What has happened to change Red China's attitude?

For 20 years, we have been the international aggressor, we have been the ruthless invader, the capitalist exploiter, and all this other bunk. What's happened?

Well, I note where Dr. Kissinger had 20 hours of discussion with Chou En-lai before he finally got the invitation for President Nixon to visit Communist China.

Well, the question comes up: "Who made what concessions on what in order that the visit would take place?"

You know, in September, we may get one of the answers. The United Nations will again be voting on the question of the admission of Red China to membership in the U.N., a membership which Red China has stated time and time again that they would not

accept unless it was accompanied by the simultaneous expulsion of America's long-time friend, the Republic of China, on Taiwan.

Well, of course, it is possible that in the 20 hours of discussion between Chou En-lai and Dr. Kissinger, maybe this question never came up. After all, 20 hours is just so much time. You can just say so much in 20 hours.

But everybody is watching to see how we handle the Red China question of admittance to the United Nations.

Some other old friends that we have had for many years will be watching, like Golda Meir and Willie Brandt, people who feel that we are good friends.

And the question comes up, "What is Red China's contribution to the cause of peace in our time? Are they going to put a little pressure on their junior partners in Hanoi to look at the prisoners of war issue in a humanitarian way?"

Well, while we can hope as a consequence of Kissinger's long conversations that the Americans still imprisoned in Red China, missionaries, men of peace, and the like of that, tortured over the past twenty years, can we hope for a better day for them? Is it possible that the Red Chinese will think of them in human terms?

Only time will give us the answer to these and many other questions. But, if we will, do not place our hopes too high on this coming visit.

Red China is still a slave state where human freedom is nonexistent. It still has its program in company with the Soviets for Communist world domination, and the only difference between them and the Soviet Union on this question is: "How do you accomplish your objective?"

So, let's hope and let's, at the same time, keep our fingers crossed on the coming meetings between President Nixon and the Red Chinese Communist voice.

Now, I want to say a few words to you about Teddy Gleason.

I don't have to tell the job he does for the ILA. You know his record.

But I'm sure you are not so familiar with his activities in behalf of the labor movement in the United States and, in addition, his activities for many years in behalf of workers all over the world.

Few people in the labor movement are aware of this participation in trade union affairs abroad by Teddy Gleason.

He is a strong voice in the International Transport Federation to which most dockworkers' unions, maritime unions in the free world are affiliated.

His organization promotes free trade unions and helps to build them in many newly merging areas of the world.

At the request of the United States government through the AFL–CIO a few years ago, Teddy made a major effort to modernize and make efficient the port facilities of Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay in South Vietnam.

At the time when off-loading was taking months in those harbors and cost millions in time and effort, your president, on several working visits to Vietnam, straightened that situation out and he straightened it out for the workers, the Vietnamese workers in those ports also.

He made visits to Laos, Nigeria and Kenya, Africa, to inspect their maritime facilities, and he made recommendations, brought them back to Washington, and they were conveyed to these governments and they are now acting on them. Their situation is improving because of his interest.

A year ago, he represented the AFL-CIO as a fraternal delegate to the British Trade Union Congress.

Well, the left-wing agitators tried to upset him over there. They interrupted him quite a bit. But he stood his ground. He gave them as good as they gave him, and he held to his point of view. And, at the conclusion, he was given a standing ovation by the British Trade Union Congress.

I can tell you, this is an unusual phenomena for the British Trade Union Congress. They booed hell out of me a few years ago.

Teddy effectively represented the AFL–CIO at the inauguration of Luis Echevarria in Mexico, took part in all those activities, saw the new President, talked to him, and got our American labor message across.

He has taken the lead to coordinate the activities of the trade unions all over the world in the maritime industry in meeting the problem posed by "containerization" and I'm delighted to see this group of delegates from the other parts of the world present here at this convention and who are also concerned with the many problems that Teddy Gleason is active in, not only for his own union but for unions all over the world.

I can tell you from my knowledge something that happened a few months ago, when millions of letters were mailed in this country and there was a question how they were going to be delivered to the representatives of the Hanoi government on the release of American prisoners of war. These were written by citizens all over this country, millions of them, tons of mail.

Well, the Commies had their own way of handling things and they decided that mail was not going to be delivered. But Teddy Gleason decided it was going to be delivered, and it was all dumped—all the tons of it, all the millions of letters—were dumped on the doorstep of Hanoi's Embassy in Paris.

I don't know how he brought it about but I can assure you if it wasn't for Teddy Gleason those letters would never have reached their destination.

Finally, as a member of the Executive Council of the AFL–CIO, he makes his contribution on every problem that affects the AFL–CIO and that affects all of our affiliates.

I don't know how much your people know about these things. I know that Teddy doesn't like to talk about them, but I felt it was my obligation to talk about them here today and express my appreciation to him on behalf of the entire American trade union movement for his activities.

Well, you can see that we have got a lot of problems here in the American trade union movement, problems at home and abroad, problems as trade unions, and problems as citizens, but we are practical people. We try in every way to solve our problems in a practical way.

When we feel we are not getting the type of cooperation governmentally that we feel we deserve, not getting the type of cooperation that we feel is best for the country, we have a very practical approach to that problem, too.

We have an organization known as COPE. In the year coming up, 1972, it is going to be an important year for COPE and COPE is going to do a good job. It is going to carry the message of American labor to the members of American labor, to their homes, in every single precinct in America, and we are going to try to see to it that come 1972 we get the kind of Administration in Washington that is responsive to the ideals and the principles espoused by the American trade union movement on behalf of the "little people" of America.

I'm sure that in that effort, in 1972, we are going to have the whole-hearted cooperation of Teddy Gleason and the ILA.

Thank you very much.

GREECE—A NEW VIETNAM?

(Mr. KOCH asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Speaker, Mr. Eliot Janeway, a highly respected economist, has sent me a copy of a speech delivered at MIT on April 27 of this year by Mr. Elias P. Demetracopoulos. Before the 1967 coup, Mr. Demetracopoulos was the political editor of three Greek newspapers, as well as the chief Mediterranean correspondent for the North American Newspaper Alliance. He escaped from Greece in September of 1967 with the aid of the United Nations, and is now a leader of the Greek resistance movement.

I feel that the speech is of particular significance after yesterday's welcome termination of economic and military aid to Greece, and I would like to take this opportunity to put it before our colleagues by inserting it in the RECORD:

GREECE—A NEW VIETNAM?

(By Elias P. Demetracopoulos)

I would like to discuss the situation in Greece; a situation which I believe not only denies the Greek people basic democratic rights but is also harmful to the national interests of the United States and contains the seeds of another "Vietnam." The element of time is terribly important in this connection, as the dangers posed by the current Greek situation leave little time for constructive action by the United States. In other words, I believe the clock is running out in Greece, and unless some major changes are forthcoming in American policy toward Greece, both the U.S. and NATO are apt to be faced with the reality rather than the potential of explosive political, military, and economic developments on NATO's Southern Flank.

U.S. foreign policy in Greece, inherited by the Nixon Administration, is based on the hypothesis that the present dictatorial regime provides sufficient military, political and economic stability to satisfy America's strategic interests in the area—the kind of stability, supposedly, which could not be guaranteed by any realistic alternative.

If that were true—if indeed the regime offered the only reasonable hope of stability in Greece—it would be possible for me to understand, even though both as a Greek and as a supporter of free democratic systems of government as a matter of moral and political principle, I am strongly opposed to dictatorship in any form. In my opinion, however, the premise that the Junta has or can bring stability to Greece is false. On the contrary, not only has the Junta failed to provide stability in spite of dictatorial and ruthlessly repressive tactics; it has actually created instability, uncertainty and the very real risk of civil war in Greece.

First, let us begin with the premise that the Junta has brought military stability. Both Pentagon and other senior U.S. officials claim that the Greek armed forces and terrain, as well as the U.S. and NATO bases in Greece, are necessary to maintain control of the Eastern Mediterranean, to deter direct communist aggression from the North, and to provide a vital link with Turkey which would otherwise not be a viable military ally. In addition they cite increased Soviet naval strength in the Mediterranean to strengthen their argument. I agree with their assessment as to the importance of a strong and stable Greece as far as NATO is concerned. The key question then is: have the Colonels indeed provided his stability?

The Greek armed forces today are far less effective than they were prior to the coup. They are mainly an internal security force in which the Junta-controlled elements watch not only potential civilian opponents but also the very real latent opposition in the armed forces themselves. To this effect the continuing purges of the Greek military establishment four whole years after the April 21, 1967 coup are a key indicator.

The Junta has systematically removed from the armed forces an alarming number of the officers they consider unreliable. These hundreds of officers were trained at enormous American expense in the U.S., other NATO countries and Greece, since the Truman Doctrine of 1947. The officers urged were not and could not possibly be communist, considering the nature of the recruiting process and the close ties between the Greek Armed Forces and the U.S. military and intelligence communities. Indeed many of these officers fought against the communists in the Greek guerrilla war. In fact, the officers purged by the Junta were generally considered by Washington, the NATO authorities and the Joint U.S. Military Aid Group to Greece to represent the elite of the Greek officer corps. Their only sin was to have opposed the illegal seizure of power by a relatively small group of officers. It is interesting to note that "the hatchet fell with particular alacrity," according to the May 1969 issue of *Le Monde Diplomatique*, "on those officers who, during the German occupation . . . chose the path of resistance, either inside Greece or outside, especially those who served in the 'Sacred Battalion' which distinguished itself in all Mediterranean campaigns alongside the British forces . . . For any man who was capable of choosing to fight against an oppression (the Nazis) is perfectly capable of fighting a new oppression. . . ."

The usurpers, the officers who seized power four years ago, are reliably reported to number no more than 300, with a good percentage of them having intelligence and security training and background.

The purging of the cream of the Greek officer corps and a preoccupation with the internal security duties make the combat effectiveness of the Greek armed forces in time of full mobilization of the reserves an agonizingly open question mark for NATO planners. Thus the illegal seizure of power by the Junta and its subsequent actions have not only seriously weakened the combat capabilities of the Greek armed forces; they have also undermined Greece's political and moral ability to fulfill its NATO commitments. For any crisis which required full mobilization would in all probability lead to the speedy overthrow of the Junta. This really explains why the Junta thought it wise to "defuse" the Cyprus crisis in November 1967. The armed forces have become mostly a police force which, under the new constitution, are also charged with preserving the "existing Social Order." The same reasoning applies to the U.S., NATO bases and other American listening posts and propaganda machinery operating on Greek territory. These bases are important. Yet in view of the climate in which they exist today it is a real question how much long-range strategy in the area can be built around them.

The Soviet naval build-up in the Mediterranean, the Middle East crisis, the events in Czechoslovakia and the outflanking of Greece and Turkey by the Soviet Union's rapid strategic deployment along North Africa's coastline and the Middle East, were used by the Johnson and Nixon Administration as reasons for supporting the Junta. This is indeed tragic, since the Junta's actions have weakened the military capabilities and stability of the Greek armed forces and consequently NATO's strength in the area.

Let us now turn to the key question of political stability which the supporters of the 1967 coup—including the Junta itself—cite as one of the prime benefits of the current Greek dictatorship. Measuring political stability is not easy when there is martial law and press censorship, when no opposition is permitted, and when violence, although on the increase, is still sporadic. The Junta alleges that they stepped in to save the country from the danger of communism—yet even Greek Conservative leaders emphasize the fact that the danger of communism was nonexistent in Greece. They overthrew a conservative government.

Those who place too great an emphasis on the confused political situation in Greece as a justification for the Colonels' coup must remember that Greece fought a hard and dirty war against a foreign dominated and supported communist aggression at the peak of the "Cold War" in Europe. The victory, although assisted greatly by U.S. material help and advice, was finally wrested with Greek, and only Greek, blood. If Greece were able to win this victory under a parliamentary government with basic democratic institutions functioning it is inconceivable that the current military dictatorship is necessary to correct alleged political instability.

There are some who argue that there was no political stability prior to the Junta and that the present arrangement is at least an improvement. This argument is superficial. Its evaluation needs a detailed recording of the events and the over-all background that preceded the coup.

The fact is that political stability was damaged in the 1965–67 period by the intervention of the Greek Monarchy and its military establishment in the political process, thus perverting the institution of parliament and the mechanism of achieving political stability which had worked well until then. This was done by repeatedly denying the use of the best safety valve available to real democracies—free elections.

In 1963 and early 1964, the eight years of conservative (ERE) rule under Prime Minister Constantine Caramanlis, ended at the polls with the largest majority in modern times for the Center Union Party led by the late George Papandreou. The peaceful transfer of power was accomplished in the middle of the Cyprus crisis involving the threat of a shooting war with Turkey, following years of impressive aggregate growth and financial stability.

The victors (the Center Union) promised a better distribution of income, a more rapid modernization of Greece to enable it to enter the Common Market, and a reform of Greece's institutions which included a reduced role of the Crown in controlling the Armed Forces and the political processes. In short, a return to the intent of the constitution which would have the King "reign, not rule." In foreign policy, Greece was to become a fully equal member of the NATO alliance, with a real voice in determining its own destiny. In pursuing these goals there is no question that the Papandreou Government committed a number of mistakes and lost many opportunities.

The Center Union party was soon faced with the violent and growing opposition of the Crown, the Armed Forces leadership, and the economic oligarchy—an opposition which was enjoying the support of a large part of the official American establishment in Athens. The result was the overthrow of the elected government and a series of almost comic-opera attempts to make parliamentary rump-governments from mid-1965 through Christmas 1966. The agreement of the Conservative and Center Union Parties to hold elections in 1967 in order to restore real parliamentary government, and thus political stability, led directly to the Colonels' coup, only a few weeks before the elections were to be held under the conservative government of Mr. P. Canellopoulos—who, by the way, has spent a good part of the last four years under strict house arrest.

The Athens Colonels have since persecuted the leaders of all of Greece's major political groupings, i.e., the conservatives, the royalists, the Center Union—among whom were several of America's best friends—as well as the left and the extreme left. They have resorted to systematic torture of opponents, as was shown at the Strasbourg hearings of the European Human Rights Commission and as has been publicly condemned by leaders of the British, Danish, Swedish, Norwegian, Dutch and Italian governments, among others.

Many senior U.S. government officials, at the time of the Colonels' coup, argued that there was little the U.S. could have done because the coup took the U.S. by surprise and once it was successfully carried out the U.S. was faced with a *fait accompli*. This is untrue as the threat of dictatorship in Greece was spotted early and this threat greatly disturbed politically prominent Americans well before the actual coup took place.

As early as September 4, 1962, and again on October 13, 1963, Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) in published interviews with this writer stated: "I am particularly concerned about the political developments in that country (Greece) and I do believe that careful investigation should be carried out on those accusations against our U.S. Embassy role in Athens in the last Greek elections." And in 1963 he said: "I am against the establishment of a dictator any place. That is why I strongly attacked the suggestion made that the establishment of a dictatorship in Greece would be an effective solution to Greece's problems. Oh, Lord, No. Greece is the most sophisticated, civilized country in the world. Our democratic way of government came from Greece. It would be tragic if Greece, where democracy itself was first founded, were to go back to a dictatorship. I can't even imagine the Greeks thinking about it."

And in the summer of 1966 a galaxy of highly placed and influential U.S. personalities, covering the spectrum of American political life, condemned publicly, very strongly and in no uncertain terms, the possibility of a military dictatorship of any kind in Greece, under whatever pretext. They also urged the Johnson Administration to take all necessary steps to ensure that such a catastrophic development for American interests will not occur.

Their names are: The Speaker of the House of Representatives J. McCormack, Senators V. Hartke, S. Thurmond, E. McCarthy, J. Javits, W. Morse and E. Kennedy; the Chairmen of the House Judiciary, Armed Services and Agriculture Committees, Congressmen E. Celler, M. Rivers and H. Cooley; the former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral A. Burke, the former Supreme NATO Commander in Europe, General L. Norstad; and the Governor of California E. Brown.

They spelled out their views to me in question-answer format, taped, typed and in officially signed press interviews, which received wide coverage both in Europe and America. In short, there were numerous, early and authoritative warnings given to Washington, but to no avail.

Since 1947, America has played a decisive role in Greece, and, beginning in 1959 with Ambassador Ellis Briggs—now a strong advocate of the Athens Colonels—America has pursued disastrous, contradictory and vacillating policies—policies largely influenced by inter-service and personality rivalries. Should these policies be continued the communists will have an opportunity to organize and lead a liberation movement in Greece, for the first time since the late 1940's, with wide support and backing from non-communist elements in both Greece and Western Europe. Such a movement, even if led by communists, would ironically be formed under the banner of returning democracy to Greece. Thus, the tragic makings of a new Vietnam in Greece are all present.

It is very important for Americans to understand that there is widespread belief in non-communist Europe that Washington was involved, either by commission or omission, in the April 21, 1967 coup and is responsible for keeping the Athens Colonels in power. While the substance of the more extreme forms of these theories has not been proven

yet, the U.S. should realize that these beliefs have done much more than the criticism of the Vietnam War or the de Gaulle policies to undermine basic U.S. positions and interests in this vital area. This point, in many ways the most telling, is supported by such a personality as Mrs. Helen Vlachou-Loundras, well-known publisher of the most influential conservative Greek newspapers, who was forced into exile in London when, after the Junta seized power, she bravely refused to publish under censorship. Mrs. Vlachou-Loundras spoke about the Greek regime in London on October 17, 1968:

"So the moment of truth is approaching, and the first brand new European dictatorship since the war is about to emerge, born of The Pentagon by the CIA, reared by NATO, surrounded by doting businessmen. It is no use criticizing the Americans, divided as they are between those who would like to chase the junta but can not do it, and those who can and will not." In this connection it is very significant that the Johnson Administration in December 1967 let down, in a shameful, unbelievable and humiliating way, even the untra-conservative greek monarchy which, since the Truman doctrine of 1947, has been a basic element of U.S. foreign policy towards Greece. This happened when King Constantine finally decided to overthrow the Junta in his armed but ill-fated attempt.

That is why I strongly believe that an over-all and thorough congressional investigation of the U.S. role vis-a-vis Greece would not only be completely justified but also urgently advisable if the blunders of the past are not to be repeated and a new "Vietnam" is to be avoided.

The European reaction to the Greek coup can be gleaned in the following statements: West German Deputy, Klaus Schultz, said, "It was 36 years ago that Hitler took power in my country. And he did it under conditions far more democratic than those imposed by the Greek colonels." British Deputy Robert Edwards, during the debate whether to expel Greece from the Council of Europe for violating the 18-nation organization's statutes on human rights, said: "I am amazed at some of these speeches. We heard them between the wars—Franco was going to hold elections. Hitler was no dictator and Mussolini made the trains run on time."

In a futile attempt to improve their international image, to buy desperately needed time and to overcome the stubborn refusal of Greeks of prestige and ability to work for the regime, the Junta announced a referendum on a new constitution in September 1968. This document, which received the private blessing of some American officials, in fact makes the Armed Forces the sole final source of power, the guardian of the status quo and the dispenser of civil liberties in Greece. Thus the constitution in effect gives the wolves the responsibility for guarding the lamb by giving the Athens Junta full power to "protect" the liberties they had already seized from the Greek people.

The subsequent referendum on the Colonels' constitution, carried out under conditions of martial law, resulted in a Soviet-style vote of 92.2%. The really free sentiments of the Greeks became manifest a few weeks later when over 300,000 people in Athens spontaneously demonstrated against the regime and for democracy on the occasion of the funeral for George Papandreou, the last elected Prime Minister.

Let us turn now to the economic stability that allegedly the junta brought to Greece.

Under democracy the Greek economy had achieved one of the highest rates of economic growth in the world together with monetary equilibrium. Greece was officially and repeatedly cited as one of the two or three countries, which made the best possible use of American economic aid and achieved a spectacular recovery from the ravages of war. Sustained sharp increases in domestic saving, coupled with massive inflow of foreign long-term development capital, allowed for an accelerated capital formation and expansion of the industrial basis of the economy. But instead of burdening you with details I may simply refer to assessment of the free Greek economy by the Nobel prize winner Professor Paul A. Samuelson on May 22, 1967 in Newsweek.

In short, the junta inherited a sound and rapidly growing economy the momentum of which somehow survived the Colonels although there are increasing signs of deceleration and strain. It, indeed, takes some time to undo a good thing! . . . Reaping the benefits from the successful development efforts under parliamentary governments the junta in vain strived to buy popular support through measures of utter financial irresponsibility.

For example, a massive giveaway took place when all farm debts amounting to some $280 million to the formerly U.S.-financed Agricultural Bank were written off. This not only penalized farmers who had paid their debts but probably convinced all farmers, who constitute some 45% of the total population, that there is no point in paying future loans. What is perhaps worse is that the immense resources distributed in this way have not been directed towards raising farm productivity and bringing about the long needed structural reform of Greek agriculture.

The Government made numerous appeals to attract foreign capital. Its most publicized achievement for political, propaganda and lobbying reasons, was the signing of a lucrative contract with Litton Industries (a few weeks after coming to power) which guaranteed the latter a handsome annual fee as well as a commission on all investments it induced to come to Crete and the Western Peloponnesus. It is of interest to note that Litton withdrew its proposals prior to the coup, due to overwhelming parliamentary opposition. Litton produced some studies and very small investments coming mainly from the Litton group companies. It would seem that even their corporate name has not been sufficient to overcome the doubts of those who might have put their money in Greece. That is why this contract was terminated.

Alhough most foreign investors found pre-Junta Greece a favorable spot for private enterprise, a difficulty did arise in the case of the Esso-Pappas refining, petrochemical and steel complex. This contract was strongly criticized by the Center Union before it came to power and was renegotiated to Greece's advantage while they were in power. Oddly enough, Thomas Pappas of Boston has since then managed to avoid, with Junta approval, most of the less profitable investments he was supposed to undertake and he has emerged as one of the most influential and vocal backers of the Junta in the U.S.

Much has been made of an agreement of the Junta with Onassis to establish a new refinery, aluminum plant and tourist investments, reportedly totaling some $600 million. It is significant that the Onassis effort to build the alumina-aluminum plant in partnership with the U.S. Reynolds Metals Company has fallen through. On April 15, 1971 the Junta publicly and strongly hinted that the agreement with Onassis is likely to be cancelled while Onassis has requested international arbitration.

By contrast to the massive net inflow of capital from abroad for investment purposes in pre-Junta Greece, today this type of capital inflow is equal to zero on a net basis. It is the first time since the end of World War II that Greece has such a heavy short-term debt burden.

The overindebtedness created for the economy by the large amounts of short-term borrowing abroa in order to conceal the impending balance of payments crisis may well lead to external insolvency in the next few years.

In summary, instead of bringing about stable economic growth the Junta has presided over a tragic misuse and waste of national resources, in an attempt to buy acceptance and some semblance of legitimacy. The resulting "gold rush" to extract favorable concessions from the Athens Colonels in return for supporting their dictatorship has resulted in the sacrifice of important Greek economic resources and interests which no parliamentary government could have undertaken and remain in office.

The political anomaly of a new post-war dictatorship in present day non-communist Europe has led to a suspension of some $55 million of European Investment Bank loans to Greece under the Treaty of Association with the Common Market. The long-run future of Greece's association with the Common Market, the first of its kind, is in fact in doubt. As Greece's chief Common Market negotiator John Pezmatzoglu, then Deputy Governor of the Central Bank, said in a 1966 Bank of Greece message, the economic union of Greece with the EEC was based on the mutually agreed, basic objective of an ultimate political union of Greece with its European partners.

Since then the Governor of the Central Bank, Professor X. Zolotas, an internationally respected central banker, and the equally prominent Professor J. Pezmatzoglu have resigned in protest over the Junta and its policies. In fact, the great bulk of Greece's trained professionals have refused to participate in the Government, a phenomenon which has seriously hindered efforts at rational economic policy formulation and implementation.

I believe that it is imperative for the Nixon Administration, which is in the advantageous position of having no responsibility for the events of April 21, 1967 and December 13, 1967 to conduct a basic and urgent review of U.S. policy towards Greece on the following grounds:

A. The assumption that the current military regime in Athens has or can bring stability is incorrect.

B. The Junta has greatly weakened Greece's military capability and political ability to fulfill its NATO commitments.

C. The situation in Greece is potentially dangerous. If present policies are continued, a new Vietnam could result.

D. The widespread belief in Europe that the U.S. is responsible for the coup and for keeping the Colonels in power is seriously damaging to America's position in Europe.

E. The existence of a military dictatorship in Greece is morally and politically repugnant especially to the extent that it appears that the United States is supporting this regime.

In considering U.S. policy towards Greece I would like here to make several points directed primarily to American conservatives. It has been a tragedy that many American opinions and actions concerning Greece have been viewed as a political issue between conservatives and liberals. As a result of the opposition to the Greek Junta by many prominent American liberals, all too many American conservatives have not realized the true nature and intent of the current Greek regime. While Greek political liberals have suffered as a result of the coup, as many Greek conservatives with well-known anti-communist credentials have been suppressed, imprisoned, and driven into exile by the Junta. In fact, many of the most severe critics of the coup and the current regime could be described as conservatives.

In the light of the Athens Colonels' past and continued repression of anti-communist Greek conservatives and the often-forgotten fact that the Colonels seized power from a conservative government, I would ask some

American conservatives who have either largely remained neutral or have supported the current Greek regime to reconsider their positions. For the situation in Greece cannot be described or understood along American political lines. In this case both American liberals and conservatives, perhaps for different but compatible reasons, should oppose the authoritarian dictatorship imposed on the people of Greece by a small group of colonels in Athens.

Thus, in reviewing U.S. policy towards Greece I would suggest that the following specific changes in the policies inherited by the Nixon Administration would be both in the interest of the United States and the Greek people:

1. A clear-cut public condemnation of the Greek Junta by the Nixon Administration and real efforts of disassociation from the Johnson Administration policies, attitudes and methods used in dealing with Greece.

2. Terminate immediately and completely all U.S. military aid to the Athens regime and reverse the disastrous decision taken on September 22, 1970 to resume delivery of major U.S. military equipment to the Athens Colonels. Such a decision gave in effect official public U.S. government approval to the Athens military dictatorship.

3. Take the initiative for joint NATO action against the Junta by exercising maximum diplomatic, economic and military aid pressure, on a well-coordinated basis, in behalf of the Atlantic Alliance. Such an American initiative will take options away from Moscow policy-makers and will build up U.S. influence in NATO and among the European liberals, intellectuals and youth. Such a U.S. initiative would have worldwide favorable repercussions and Washington will be in a better position to exploit existing turmoil among Moscow's Eastern European communist satellites, non-satellites and the communist parties in non-communist Europe.

4. Give full U.S. support to the efforts of the Common Market and the Council of Europe to isolate morally, politically and economically the Athens Colonels.

5. Find appropriate ways and means to support actively and effectively all anti-Junta, anti-communist elements who represent the vast majority of the Greek people.

6. Strong efforts should be made to dispel the belief of U.S. involvement and support of the Greek Junta in Greece and the rest of Europe, including the use of the Voice of America. Such efforts are essential to forestall violent anti-American backlash in Greece, which otherwise is a virtual certainty.

In evaluating the merits of the above basic recommendations it is important to understand the following points:

A. All the above peaceful measures are sufficient if used effectively, in my opinion, to overthrow the Greek dictatorship without bloodshed, and without risking American lives, as you do in Vietnam today, or you did in Korea, Lebanon and in the Dominican Republic. The Nixon Administration must have learned some very valuable lessons with the events in Pakistan, the crisis in Peru and the negotiations over the Spanish bases. These events proved the grave risks inherent in dealing with anti-communist military dictatorships and should help dispel the myth that such regimes serve effectively the U.S. interests.

B. If the Junta is overthrown by these peaceful measures proposed to the Nixon Administration, Washington will be in a much better position to deal also with the Middle East crisis, having the full support and cooperation of the liberated (with American support) Greek people, and the U.S. and NATO bases presently in Greece will not any longer be surrounded, as is the case today, by an increasingly hostile population, which makes their value presently, in the case of emergency, at least doubtful.

C. More than 100,000 hard-core Greek communists live in various parts of the Eastern European communist world, including the thousands of young children abducted by the retreating Greek communist guerrilla forces in 1949. These children are now completely trained militarily and indoctrinated. Greece has very extended and rugged mountain frontiers with her northern communist neighbors. These facts may represent, at a given moment, an ace in the hands of Moscow and Peking.

D. Greece's unique geographical position places her athwart the crossroads of Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The Middle East and Africa are two areas where the Greeks for centuries have maintained the closest ties and interests. On the northern borders of Greece is a kaleidoscope of three different kinds of communism: the Peking style in Albania (where hundreds of Chinese advisors are stationed in this first Chinese beachhead in Europe), the Moscow style in Bulgaria, and the Tito style in Yugoslavia. This fact itself makes Greece a very good western "window," an ideal listening and influence post for the Southeastern European area. But it also makes Greece far more exposed to external communist and Slavic-chauvinistic pressures now greatly complicated by the current Sino-Soviet confrontation.

E. The U.S. record over the last decade clearly shows a very benign attitude toward right-wing military coups while registering great alarm over left-wing ones. The so-called Schwartz doctrine (State Department senior official and former top Pentagon authority on international security affairs) makes clear the U.S. will not interfere with extra-constitutional, totalitarian rule by anti-communist governments. This double standard justified accusations all over the world and, naturally, Greece.

We were all dismayed at the ruthless crushing with Soviet military power of the modest liberal reforms which were taking place in Czechoslovakia. No satellite could be allowed to sway that far from orthodoxy and control in the minds of Warsaw Pact hard liners. Moscow paid a heavy price in terms of world condemnation and the discrediting of hard-core Czech communists. To many, the parallel of the U.S. position in Greece is disquieting. And Moscow's diplomats and propagandists are counter-attacking criticism aimed at their Czechoslovakian action by pointing to the U.S. role in Greece since April 1967. For the coup against the prospect of a liberal but pro-NATO government was carried out by people closely connected with the U.S. military, intelligence and financial complex, with U.S. weapons and using a top-secret emergency NATO plan. All in the name of anti-communism, the preservation of the orthodoxy of Greece in the Western Alliance and protecting the Monarchy—which the Junta forced into exile eight months later. Moscow intervened with Soviet troops to crush what she considered dangerous Czechoslovak liberalization tendencies.

While I do not believe that the use of U.S. troops to protect the freedom of the Greek people was, or is, necessary, it is a tragedy that the Johnson and Nixon Administrations played the role of Pontius Pilatus while U.S.-supplied tanks were used to crush Greek democracy even though ample warnings about the impending coup existed. That the Johnson and Nixon Administrations, on many occasions, has given the impression of supporting the dictatorship of the Athens Colonels, is doubly disquieting, considering that the freedom of the Greek people was guaranteed by NATO which Greece freely joined as a free nation in 1952.

In the process the U.S.'s best friends were systematically destroyed. In the end the Greeks will force their oppressors out of power. The process could be bloody and might well involve the U.S. in another Vietnam-type situation. It is, therefore, legitimate to ask why long-term U.S. interests are being sacrificed in Greece for the sake of an ephemeral appearance of security and stability and whether it is wise to continue along this road to disaster much longer.

MORE ON POLYGRAPH TESTS

(Mr. KOCH asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Speaker, last week I reported to our colleagues on the use of polygraph tests by a New York department store. I am pleased to report that today's New York Times indicates that this store has halted its use of such tests.

Although this decision appears to have been made on "practical" grounds rather than civil libertarian ones, I am glad to learn that the store's employees will be spared this invasion of privacy.

I want to call our colleagues' attention to my bill H.R. 9449, which would prohibit an employer requiring a polygraph test for an individual's employment or promotion. I urge the passage of this legislation to assure the protection of all persons' right of privacy.

[From the New York Times, Aug. 4, 1971]

BONWIT TELLER ENDS LIE-DETECTOR TESTS OF STORE EMPLOYEES

William Fine, president of Bonwit Teller, said yesterday that the Fifth Avenue specialty store would discontinue its "experiment" with polygraph interviews, or lie-detector tests.

The tests had been tried as a possible technique in reducing stock losses through pilferage by employes.

About 30 tests were administered by a professional tester to volunteers from management and some of the men's department sales staff.

"Our testing of the test proved it was ineffectual for our purposes," Mr. Fine said.

He said that he was disturbed by the reaction of many employees to reports that the tests might become general, but that the main reason for abandoning the experiment was that "the kind of thing we wanted doesn't show up—how much of our stock loss is from internal theft or external theft or simply disappears on paper."

All such losses last year at the four Bonwit stores in the New York area were reported of nearly $2-million. This was about 4 per cent of total sales, compared with 1.5 per cent a few years ago.

Mr. Fine said he would wait until "we have discussed it among ourselves" before making any further announcements about what steps the company might take to solve the pilferage problem.

Samuel Fass, president of the Employes Mutual Association, said the organization took no position on the polygraph experiment since it was concerned only with "personal contact and assistance" for ill or needy employes or retired employes. The association receives most of its funds from canteen vending machines in the store. Mr. Fass is head of the new-accounts department.

H.R. 10400: THE URBAN TRANSPORTATION EMERGENCY RELIEF ACT

(Mr. KOCH asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extranous matter.)

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Speaker, I am introducing today a bill, H.R. 10400, to provide a 5-year, $1 billion emergency relief program for rapid transit and commuter railroad systems in urban areas. There is no more pressing problem for many of our metropolitan areas than providing

efficient and economic mass transportation. H.R. 10400, entitled, "The Urban Transportation Emergency Relief Act" would establish a program of annual assistance to help offset transit deficits by paying for the maintenance and repair of their rights-of-way. This means that the Federal Government would pick up the full cost of the maintenance of their tracks, tunnels, signals, trestles, subways, bridges, elevated structures, and power substations.

Public transportation has suffered a cycle of deteriorating service and fall-off in ridership, and now is being hit by deficits and frequent fare hikes. In my own city of New York, the transit authority operating the city's subways and buses anticipates a cash deficit of $100 million by the end of this fiscal year, even without the added cost of whatever wage package is negotiated in the late fall. The fare is already 30 cents, with 18 percent of the riders having to pay a double fare for a single trip—according to estimates made by the Citizens Budget Commission, Inc. If some other sources of revenue for transit operations are not found, the fare will go up another 10 to 20 cents.

Other large cities are faced with a similar problem. Chicago's subway fare is 45 cents, Cleveland's is 50 cents up from 45 cents this year, Boston is 25 cents with an expected increase and Philadelphia is 30 cents with a pending change to 35 cents.

High fares work the greatest hardship on persons with low and moderate incomes—the very people who are most dependent on public transportation to get to work and back home again. The age of the farebox paying for the total operating costs of public transportation has passed. Costs simply have gone too high for a reasonable fare to support all expenses; and only if there is a reasonable fare can public transportation serve the number of people it must to insure mobility in our urban areas. Thus, some form of revenue must be found and the question becomes not whether there should be a subsidy but where it will come from.

New York City is already paying a total of $244 million annually to the MTA for debt service and certain operating expenses such as transit police and reduced fares for children and senior citizens. It is time that the States and Federal Government do their share in supporting public transportation facilities so vitally important to our country's major metropolitan areas. In the case of New York, H.R. 10400 would provide between $70 million and $85 million in the program's first year.

The availability and utilization of public transportation have a great impact on commerce, the cost of labor for employers, a person's opportunities for employment, auto congestion, and even air pollution. Our cities cannot hope to survive without public transportation that is reasonable in cost and used by a major portion of the public. And surely, the economic and social viability of our metropolitan areas affects the entire country.

The Federal Government spends approximately $1 billion annually on air traffic safety. And the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 provided for a new program of $100 million in Federal assistance this year for the repair and reconstruction of bridges on federally aided roads. Certainly, we should be able to allocate $200 million a year, as my bill prescribes, to defray mass transit operating expenses.

Mr. Speaker, I view H.R. 10400 as an interim, emergency measure designed to stem the increase in operating deficits and the continual fare hikes until the Congress can enact a comprehensive national transportation program. On February 18, I introduced H.R. 4571 providing for the creation of a national transportation trust fund, placing in a single trust fund all transportation programs and providing more resources for urban transportation on a long-range basis. I continue to believe this is the most desirable approach and will work toward achieving it.

In the meantime, we cannot stand by while existing facilities deteriorate. H.R. 10400 makes a modest contribution to urban transportation systems and provides and incentive to State and local bodies with existing facilities to maintain them until more adequate resources can be provided under a long-term approach.

I would emphasize that the approach taken in this bill avoids, I believe, the problems raised with approaches that involve grants to defray general operating expense deficits. The cost of the maintenance of rights-of-way is a fixed and determinable amount calling for a limited, defined, and ascertainable amount of Federal assistance. Such a Federal aid program represents a realistic extension of the present authority under the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 for capital improvements.

The Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1970 directed the Department of Transportation to conduct a study of the feasibility of the Federal Government's providing some form of mass transit operating subsidy. The report is due in October. I know that objections have been raised by administration officials to the Government's providing any operating subsidies for mass transit. I hope, however, that a realistic appraisal will be given of what the needs are and the simple fact that the farebox alone cannot support the operations of transit service; that public transportation is the lifeblood of an urban area; and that it is vital if the country is to survive that the cities be made more habitable—and this depends in part on better and reasonably priced public transportation.

The text of H.R. 10400 follows:

H.R. 10400

A bill to amend the Urban Transportation Act of 1964 to authorize certain emergency grants to assure adequate rapid transit and commuter railroad service in urban areas, and for other purposes

Be it enacted by the Senate, and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

Section 1. This Act may be cited as the "Urban Transportation Emergency Relief Act."

FINDINGS AND PURPOSE

SEC. 2. The Congress finds—

(1) that the continued operation of existing rapid transit and commuter railroad facilities in urban areas is threatened by the lack of resources;

(2) that the Federal Government has a responsibility to help support the operations of these facilities until more adequate long-term programs can be enacted; and

(3) that immediate Federal assistance is needed on an emergency basis to avoid the shutting down of some of these facilities and to prevent fares from escalating beyond the reach of rapid transit and commuter railroad users.

EMERGENCY GRANTS TO MAINTAIN RIGHT-OF-WAY

SEC. 3. The Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 is amended by redesignating Sections 6 through 16 as Sections 7 through 17 and inserting after Section 5 a new section as follows:

"Emergency Grants to Maintain Rights-of-Way:

"SEC. 6. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the Secretary shall make grants to states and local public bodies and agencies thereof in an amount equal to all or a part of the total cost incurred on and after January 1, 1972, of the regular maintenance and repair of the right-of-way of a rapid transit or commuter railroad facility serving a city or the metropolitan area surrounding a city.

"(b) Payment of such grants shall be made quarterly, in arrears, based upon such interim proof as shall be required by the Secretary of Transportation that the said costs have in fact been incurred, subject to subsequent verification and adjustment by the Secretary of Transportation upon the completion of detailed post audits.

"(c) Regular maintenance and repair of the right-of-way shall include maintenance and repair of (1) grade, tunnels, subways, bridges, trestles, culverts and elevated structures; (2) track, including replacement of ties, rail, other track material and ballast; (3) signal systems, inter-lockers (including operation thereof) and grade-crossing warning and protection systems (including operation thereof); and (4) power substations (including operation thereof) and power transmission and distribution systems, including replacment of third rail. Where the cost of maintenance and repair as aforesaid reflects the salary of an employee of such facility, such salary shall be augmented by a factor to approximate payroll taxes, fringe, pension and retirement benefits and general overhead and supervision expense attributable to such employee.

"(d) A state or local public body or agency shall be considered to have incurred costs of the regular maintenance and the repair of a right-of-way of a rapid transit or commuter railroad facility if such state or local public body or agency is charged by law or contract with the responsibility to operate or to provide at least eighty per centum of any annual deficit arising from the operation of the rapid transit or commuter railroad facility.

"(e) To finance grants under Subsection (a) of this Section, there is authorized to be appropriated $200,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, and 1976. Any amount appropriated pursuant to this subsection shall remain available until expended, and any amount so authorized but not appropriated for any fiscal year may be appropriated for any subsequent fiscal year."

THE REGIONAL AIRPORT OF THE FUTURE

(Mr. HECHLER of West Virginia asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HECHLER of West Virginia. Mr. Speaker, the following is the text of my remarks delivered at the Aviation Conference held in Huntington, W. Va., on August 2:

STATEMENT OF REP. KEN HECHLER DELIVERED AT AVIATION CONFERENCE

Unless specific and positive steps are taken now toward construction of a modern regional airport to serve the Huntington-Charleston metropolitan area, West Virginia is condemning itself to a second-rate economic future. Everyone agrees that basic improvements must be made at the existing airports to protect the safety of passengers while a regional airport is being planned and built. But to use such improvements as an argument for delay on what West Virginia needs to serve the future is both short-sighted and self-deluding.

I specifically urge that the voters of Cabell County have an opportunity for a separate vote on the issue of whether they continue to believe, as they expressed at the polls in 1967, that there must be early and positive action toward building a regional airport at the same time as the Tri-State Airport is improved. We must proceed immediately to purchase the land at the Midway site, and take all other planning steps necessary to start building at the earliest possible date. If this means teaming up with Putnam County and those communities of Kanawha County like St. Albans and Nitro wishing to proceed by any means possible, then let us begin.

There will be efforts at this aviation conference to try and persuade those who want to look to the future to look instead at the present, and forget the future. I predict there will be a strong attempt to "sell" this conference on a "study" of the future possibilities and feasibility of a regional airport to serve the great Huntington-Charleston area. Federal funds from the Federal Aviation Administration will be dangled in front of our noses to try and persuade us that FAA will do such a study at little local cost. There will be a great propaganda drive to try and persuade the advocates of a regional airport that they can have their money for a meaningless study of what everybody already knows, in exchange for silently approving a multi-million dollar expenditure on an airport which cannot serve West Virginia's indefinite future needs.

Now we face a stern test of West Virginia's mettle. Four years ago, the advocates of a regional airport predicted that unless action occurred, the major airlines would leave West Virginia. Now Eastern Airlines, after reducing its flights to the bare bones, is ready to pull out of West Virginia. There will be more reductions in service, and more outright abandonment of West Virginia unless our leaders wake up and display some vision for the future.

What disturbs me most is that the people of West Virginia see so clearly what is happening, yet those who aspire to positions of leadership or who hold positions of leadership on the statewide level refuse to acknowledge either the problem or what the people want as a solution. May I remind this conference that the total combined vote in the 1967 bond elections on the Midway Airport in Cabell, Putnam and Kanawha Counties was 34,329 FOR and 28,615 AGAINST. This is a time for courage, foresight and determination, not timidity, myopia and indecision. I trust that those represented at this conference will solemnly consider their obligations to the future, and act decisively to protect lives today, tomorrow and for the future. West Virginia has looked through the small end of the telescope for too long. If we really want to provide economic opportunities to persuade young people to remain in West Virginia, then we must move forward and build a first-class airport to serve an area which is destined to grow.

Finally, to those who repeatedly and resignedly say a regional airport is five, ten, or fifteen years away, I would relate one of President Kennedy's favorite stories. The French Marshal Lyautey consulted his gardener about planting a tree, but the gardener responded: "Why, that tree won't grow to its fullest height for a hundred years!" Whereupon Marshal Lyautey immediately answered: "In that case, there's not a minute to lose. Plant it this afternoon!"

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted as follows to:

Mr. FLYNT (at the request of Mr. BOGGS), for today, on account of official business.

Mr. TEAGUE of Texas (at the request of Mr. BRASCO), for Wednesday, August 4, and balance of week, on account of official business.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. KEATING) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. FINDLEY, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. BELL, for 10 minutes, today.

Mr. SEBELIUS, for 15 minutes, today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. MATHIS of Georgia) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. GONZALEZ, for 10 minutes, today.

Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts, for 10 minutes, today.

Mr. ASPIN, for 20 minutes, today.

Mr. PODELL, for 30 minutes, today.

Mr. HARRINGTON, for 10 minutes, today.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

Mr. HAYS (at the request of Mr. MCFALL) to extend his remarks in the body of the RECORD.

Mrs. ABZUG (at the request of Mrs. MINK) to extend her remarks in the body of the RECORD.

Mr. MAHON, to revise and extend his remarks today on the Emergency Employment Act appropriation bill, and to include extraneous material.

Mr. BROYHILL of Virginia, immediately prior to the passage of H.R. 9580 today.

Mr. MIKVA, immediately prior to the passage of H.R. 9580 today.

Mr. ABBITT, immediately prior to the passage of H.R. 6915 today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. KEATING) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. SCHERLE in five instances.

Mr. CRANE in five instances.

Mr. COUGHLIN.

Mr. CLEVELAND.

Mr. BOB WILSON.

Mr. HARVEY in two instances.

Mr. LENT.

Mr. WYMAN in two instances.

Mr. STEIGER of Arizona.

Mr. MILLER of Ohio.

Mr. MOSHER.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN in two instances.

Mr. WIDNALL in two instances.

Mr. SCHMITZ in three instances.

Mr. BRAY in two instances.

Mr. NELSEN in two instances.

Mr. PRICE of Texas in two instances.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN.

Mr. HOSMER.

Mr. LANDGREBE.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. MATHIS of Georgia) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. GARMATZ in two instances.

Mr. REES in two instances.

Mr. WOLFF in four instances.

Mr. FRASER in four instances.

Mr. EDWARDS of California in two instances.

Mr. HARRINGTON in three instances.

Mr. JAMES V. STANTON.

Mr. JACOBS in two instances.

Mr. MAZZOLI in three instances.

Mr. MURPHY of New York in three instances.

Mr. RANGEL in two instances.

Mr. FAUNTROY in three instances.

Mr. METCALFE.

Mr. FUQUA.

Mr. GONZALEZ in three instances.

Mr. VANIK in two instances.

Mr. DINGELL.

Mr. CASEY of Texas.

Mr. ROYBAL.

Mr. RARICK in three instances.

Mr. Dow in two instances.

Mr. GALLAGHER in two instances.

Mr. ANDERSON of California in three instances.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON in two instances.

Mr. PICKLE in 10 instances.

Mr. CORMAN.

Mr. KYROS in two instances.

Mr. EDMONDSON in two instances.

ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

Mr. HAYS, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that that committee had examined and found truly enrolled bills of the House of the following titles, which were thereupon signed by the Speaker:

H.R. 7586. An act to amend the act of December 30, 1969, establishing the Cabinet Committee on Opportunities for Spanish-Speaking People, to authorize appropriations for 2 additional years;

H.R. 7931. An act to amend the District of Columbia Code with respect to the administration of small estates, and for other purposes;

H.R. 9272. An act making appropriations for the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and related agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972, and for other purposes; and

H.R. 9798. An act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to establish the Lincoln Home National Historic Site in the State of Illinois, and for other purposes.

SENATE ENROLLED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

The SPEAKER announced his signature to enrolled bills and a joint resolution of the Senate of the following titles:

S. 485. An act to amend the Communications Act of 1934 to provide that certain aliens admitted to the United States for permanent residence shall be eligible to operate amateur radio stations in the United States and to hold licenses for their stations;

S. 751. An act to authorize the disposal of industrial diamond crushing bort from the national stockpile and the supplemental stockpile;

S. 752. An act to authorize the disposal of vegetable tannin extracts from the national stockpile;

S. 753. An act to authorize the disposal of thorium from the supplemental stockpile;

S. 755. An act to authorize the disposal of shellac from the national stockpile;

S. 756. An act to authorize the disposal of quartz crystals from the national stockpile and the supplemental stockpile;

S. 757. An act to authorize the disposal of iridium from the national stockpile;

S. 758. An act to authorize the disposal of mica from the national stockpile and the supplemental stockpile;

S. 759. An act to authorize the disposal of Metallurgical grade manganese from the national stockpile and the supplemental stockpile;

S. 760. An act to authorize the disposal of manganese, battery grade, synthetic dioxide from the national stockpile;

S. 761. An act to authorize the disposal of diamond tools from the national stockpile;

S. 762. An act to authorize the disposal of chromium from the national stockpile and the supplemental stockpile;

S. 763. An act to authorize the disposal of amosite asbestos from the national stockpile and the supplemental stockpile;

S. 765. An act to authorize the disposal of antimony from the national stockpile and the supplemental stockpile;

S. 767. An act to authorize the disposal of rare-earth materials from the national stockpile and the supplemental stockpile;

S. 768. An act to authorize the disposal of chemical grade chromite from the national stockpile and the supplemental stockpile;

S. 769. An act to authorize the disposal of industrial diamond stones from the national stockpile and the supplemental stockpile;

S. 770. An act to authorize the disposal of columbium from the national stockpile and the supplemental stockpile;

S. 771. An act to authorize the disposal of selenium from the national stockpile and the supplemental stockpile;

S. 772. An act to authorize the disposal of celestite from the national stockpile and the supplemental stockpile;

S. 774. An act to authorize the disposal of vanadium from the national stockpile;

S. 775. An act to authorize the disposal of magnesium from the national stockpile;

S. 776. An act to authorize the disposal of abaca from the national stockpile;

S. 777. An act to authorize the disposal of sisal from the national stockpile;

S. 778. An act to authorize the disposal of kyanite-mullite from the national stockpile;

S.J. Res. 105. Joint resolution authorizing the President to issue a proclamation designating 1971 as the "Year of World Minority Language Groups."

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. MATHIS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 9 o'clock and 35 minutes p.m.), the House adjourned until tomorrow, Thursday, August 5, 1971, at 12 o'clock.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

1030. A letter from the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, transmitting a report of actual procurement receipts for the medical stockpile of civil defense emergency supplies and equipment, covering the quarter ended June 30, 1971, pursuant to section 201(h) of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended; to the Committee on Armed Services.

1031. A letter from the Administrator, Small Business Administration, transmitting the 1970 Annual Report of the Small Business Administration; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

1032. A letter from the Secretary of Commerce, transmitting a report covering calendar year 1970 on the administration of the Flammable Fabrics Act, as amended, pursuant to section 14(b) of the act; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

1033. A letter from the Secretary of Transportation, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to make the basic pay of the master chief petty officer of the Coast Guard comparable to the basic pay of the senior enlisted advisers of the other Armed Forces, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

1034. A letter from the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend title 38, United States Code, to provide for the review of certain veterans' benefit cases forfeited for fraud on or before September 1, 1959, and for remission of forfeiture; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. SANDMAN: Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. 2118. A bill for the relief of Amos E. Norby (Rept. No. 92–443). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. SMITH of New York: Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. 4485. A bill for the relief of Estelle M. Fass (Rept. No. 92–444). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. DONOHUE: Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. 6503. A bill for the relief of Capt. Claire E. Brou (Rept. No. 92–445). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. WALDIE: Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. 7312. A bill for the relief of Catherine E. Spell (Rept. No. 92–446). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. DANIELSON: Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. 7829. A bill for the relief of Stephen H. Clarkson (Rept. No. 92–447). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. SANDMAN: Committee on the Judiciary. S. 47. An act for the relief of Flore Lekanof (Rept. No. 92–448). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. FLOWERS: Committee on the Judiciary. S. 415. An act for the relief of Mr. and Mrs. Arvel Glinz (Rept. No. 92–449). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. FLOWERS: Committee on the Judiciary. S. 708. An act for the relief of the village of Orleans, Vt. (Rept. No. 92–450). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. ANDERSON of California:

H.R. 10364. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to increase personal exemptions after 1973 by an amount based on annual variations in the Consumer Price Index; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. ADDABBO:

H.R. 10365. A bill to clarify the right of States and local subdivisions to provide for domestic preference in acquiring materials for public use; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mrs. ABZUG:

H.R. 10366. A bill to amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to provide for its uniform application to all of the navigable waters of the United States and to provide financial assistance to States and municipalities for water quality enhancement and pollution control, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. ASPINALL (for himself, Mr. HALEY, Mr. EDMONDSON, Mr. TAYLOR, Mr. MEEDS, Mr. BEGICH, Mrs. MINK, Mr. STEIGER of Arizona, Mr. KYL, Mr. CAMP, Mr. TERRY, Mr. ABOUREZK, Mr. SEBELIUS, and Mr. STEPHENS):

H.R. 10367. A bill to provide for the settlement of certain land claims of Alaska Natives, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. BIAGGI (for himself, Mr. HANLEY, and Mr. HULL):

H.R. 10368. A bill to amend the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to provide a system for the redress of law enforcement officers' grievances and to establish a law enforcement officers' bill of rights in each of the several States, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. BIAGGI (for himself and Mr. MIKVA):

H.R. 10369. A bill to amend title II of the Social Security Act to increase to $750 in all cases the amount of the lump-sum death payment thereunder; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

H.R. 10370. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide payment for chiropractors' services under the program of supplementary medical insurance benefits for the aged; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. BIAGGI (for himself, Mr. MIKVA, Mr. O'NEILL, and Mr. RYAN):

H.R. 10371. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to permit an exemption of the first $5,000 of retirement income received by a taxpayer under a public retirement system or any other system if the taxpayer is at least 65 years of age; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. BIAGGI (for himself, Mr. PERKINS, Mr. NIX, Mrs. GRASSO, Mr. ANDERSON of Tennessee, Mrs. CHISHOLM, Mr. BRASCO, Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON, Mr. BYRNE of Pennsylvania, Mr. ROSENTHAL, Mr. HARRINGTON, Mr. STOKES, Mr. RIEGLE, Mr. BEGICH, Mr. HORTON, Mr. RYAN, Mrs. HECKLER of Massachusetts, Mr. DRINAN, and Mr. MIKVA):

H.R. 10372. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide that the personal exemption allowed a taxpayer for a dependent shall be available without regard to the dependent's income in the case of a dependent who is over 65 (the same as in the case of a dependent who is a child under 19); to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. BIAGGI (for himself and Mr. MIKVA):

H.R. 10373. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide payment under the supplementary medical insurance program for optometrists' services and eyeglasses; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

H.R. 10374. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to permit the full deduction of medical expenses incurred for the care of individuals 65 years of age and over, without regard to the 3-percent and 1-percent floors; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. BIAGGI (for himself, Mr. MIKVA and Mr. O'NEILL):

H.R. 10375. A bill to amend titles II and XVIII of the Social Security Act to include qualified drugs, requiring a physician's prescription or certification and approved by a formulary committee, among the items and services covered under the hospital insurance program; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. BOLAND:

H.R. 10376. A bill to amend title 39, United States Code, as enacted by the Postal Reorganization Act, to facilitate direct communication between officers and employees of the U.S. Postal Service and Members of Congress, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts (for himself, Mr. COTTER, Mr. VANDER JAGT, and Mr. KEMP):

H.R. 10377. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to encourage higher education, and particularly the private funding thereof, by authorizing a deduction from gross income of reasonable amounts contributed to a qualified higher education fund established by the taxpayer for the purpose of funding the higher education of his dependents; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. CAREY of New York:

H.R. 10378. A bill to amend the Tariff Schedules of the United States to provide for a partial exemption from duty for articles previously exported from the United States composed in part of fabricated components the products of the United States, when returned after having been exported, without having been advanced in value or improved in condition while abroad; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. CONABLE:

H.R. 10379. A bill to amend the Tariff Schedules of the United States to provide for a partial exemption from duty for articles previously exported from the United States composed in part of fabricated components the products of the United States, when returned after having been exported, without having been advanced in value or improved in condition while abroad; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. CORMAN (for himself, Mr. ASPIN, Mr. BRASCO, Mr. COTTER, Mr. DANIELSON, Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania, Mrs. GRASSO, Mr. HARRINGTON, Mr. HAWKINS, and Mr. HICKS of Washington):

H.R. 10380. A bill to prohibit common carriers in interstate commerce from charging elderly people more than half fare for their transportation during nonpeak periods of travel, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. CORMAN (for himself, Mr. ANDERSON of California, Mr. BELL, Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN, Mr. DANIELSON, Mr. GOLDWATER, Mr. HAWKINS, Mr. MAILLIARD, Mr. MILLER of California, Mr. PETTIS, Mr. ROYBAL, and Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON):

H.R. 10381. A bill to amend the customs brokers licensing provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. FINDLEY:

H.R. 10382. A bill to amend the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, to keep the Congress better informed on matters relating to foreign policy and national security by providing it with intelligence information obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency and with analysis of such information by such Agency; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. FUQUA (for himself, Mr. HUNGATE, Mr. STUCKEY, Mr. BROYHILL of Virginia, and Mr. SMITH of New York):

H.R. 10383. A bill to enable professional individuals and firms in the District of Columbia to obtain the benefits of corporate organization, and to make corresponding changes in the District of Columbia Income and Franchise Tax Act; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. GARMATZ (for himself and Mr. DINGELL):

H.R. 10384. A bill to amend the act of September 28, 1962 (76 Stat. 653), as amended (16 U.S.C. 460k–460k–4) to release certain restrictions on acquisition of lands for recreational development at fish and wildlife areas administered by the Secretary of the Interior; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mrs. GRASSO:

H.R. 10385. A bill to make specific provisions for ball or roller bearing pillow block, flange takeup, cartridge and hanger units in the Tariff Schedules of the United States; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. GUDE:

H.R. 10386. A bill to provide home rule for the District of Columbia; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. HALL:

H.R. 10387. A bill to amend the Federal Meat Inspection Act to require that imported meat and meat food products made in whole or in part of imported meat be labeled "imported" at all stages of distribution until delivery to the ultimate consumer; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. HENDERSON:

H.R. 10388. A bill to provide for the acquisition of career status by certain temporary employees of the Federal Government serving under overseas limited appointments; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

H.R. 10389. A bill to provide a uniform administrative workweek for wage board employees of the Federal Government and employees of nonappropriated fund instrumentalities, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. HOSMER (for himself and Mr. CAMP):

H.R. 10390. A bill to extend the life of the Indian Claims Commission, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. McDADE:

H.R. 10391. A bill to amend chapter 34 of title 38 of the United States Code to restore entitlement to educational benefits to veterans of World War II and the Korean conflict; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. MELCHER:

H.R. 10392. A bill to amend the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

H.R. 10393. A bill to provide for the division and for the disposition of the funds appropriated to pay a judgment in favor of the Assiniboine Tribes of the Fort Peck and Fort Belknap Reservations, Mont.; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

H.R. 10394. A bill to provide for the division and for the disposition of the funds appropriated to pay a judgment in favor of the Assiniboine Tribes of the Fort Peck and Fort Belknap Reservations, Mont.; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

H.R. 10395. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to provide for the inspection of facilities used in the harvesting and processing of fish and fishery products for commercial purposes, for the inspection of fish and fishery products, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. MURPHY of New York (for himself, Mr. ADDABBO, Mr. MAZZOLI, Mr. EILBERG, Mr. KUYKENDALL, Mr. HARRINGTON, Mr. BLANTON, Mr. HALPERN, Mr. MORSE, Mr. SIKES, Mr. ANDERSON of Tennessee, Mr. ST GERMAIN, Mr. FORSYTHE, Mr. STEPHENS, Mr. CARTER, Mrs. ABZUG, Mr. REES, Mr. PODELL, Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI, Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN, Mr. KYROS, Mr. HATHAWAY, Mr. GONZALEZ, Mr. THOMPSON of New Jersey, and Mr. CAREY of New York):

H.R. 10396. A bill to provide for national educational campaign to improve safety on the highways by improving driver skill, driver attitudes, and driver knowledge of highway regulations; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. REUSS:

H.R. 10397. A bill to establish further means of economic stabilization; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. ROYBAL (for himself, Mrs. ABZUG, Mr. DANIELSON, Mr. EDWARDS of California, Mr. GUBSER, Mr. HAWKINS, Mrs. HICKS of Massachusetts, Mr. MIKVA, Mr. MOSS, Mr. REES, Mr. RIEGLE, Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON, and Mr. YATES):

H.R. 10398. A bill to establish a program to replace, through the cooperative efforts of Federal, State, and local governments, elementary and secondary schools which are in a dangerous location or unsafe condition or are otherwise deficient; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. RUNNELS (for himself, Mr. LINK, and Mr. BARING):

H.R. 10399. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to allow a deduction from gross income for certain social security taxes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. KOCH:

H.R. 10400. A bill to amend the Urban Transportation Act of 1964 to authorize certain emergency grants to assure adequate rapid transit and commuter railroad service in urban areas, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. SEBELIUS:

H.R. 10401. A bill to provide a 2-cent-a-gallon tax reduction on gasoline sold for use in highway vehicles where the gasoline contains cereal grain alcohol as a substitute for lead; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. SYMINGTON:

H.R. 10402. A bill to amend the joint resolution establishing the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission, as amended; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SYMINGTON (for himself and Mr. VIGORITO):

H.R. 10403. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 so as to permit certain tax-exempt organizations to engage in communications with legislative bodies, and committees and members thereof; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. ZWACH:

H.R. 10404. A bill to amend the Consolidated Farmers Home Administration Act of 1961, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mrs. GREEN of Oregon (for herself, Mr. PUCINSKI, Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD, Mr. DANIELS of New Jersey, Mr. BIAGGI, Mrs. HICKS of Massachusetts, Mr. MAZZOLI, and Mr. THOMPSON of New Jersey):

H.R. 10405. A bill to assure quality education for all children by establishing a partnership of cooperation in education between the Federal, State, and local governments; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. KEMP (for himself, Mr. BEVILL, Mr. BRASCO, Mr. BYRNE of Pennsylvania, Mr. COLLINS of Texas, Mr. DENHOLM, Mr. DERWINSKI, Mr. DULSKI, Mrs. GRASSO, Mr. HALPERN, Mr. HOGAN, Mr. MAZZOLI, Mrs. MINK, Mr. MINSHALL, Mr. MORSE, Mr. RUNNELS, Mr. SANDMAN, Mr. SCHWENGEL, Mr. THONE, and Mr. YATRON):

H.R. 10406. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide a tax credit for homeowners, apartment owners, small businessmen, and car owners who purchase and install certified pollution control devices; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. LENT:

H.R. 10407. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide that the first $5,000 of the income of an individual who is over 65 years of age shall be exempt from income tax; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. McKINNEY:

H.R. 10408. A bill to provide that cigarettes furnished to certain facilities for the treatment of addicts shall not be subject to the Federal excise tax; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. MARTIN:

H.R. 10409. A bill to amend the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970 to postpone for 1 year the effective date of the prohibition against the operation of certain airports without an airport operating certificate or in violation of the terms of any such certificate; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. PEPPER:

H.R. 10410. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to acquire certain lands within and adjacent to the Big Cypress watershed in the State of Florida; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. PEPPER (for himself, Mr. BRASCO, Mr. MANN, Mr. MURPHY of Illinois, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. WIGGINS, Mr. STEIGER of Arizona, Mr. WINN, Mr. SANDMAN, and Mr. KEATING):

H.R. 10411. A bill to amend title 18 of the United States Code to provide that a person found guilty of willfully failing to appear as required while charged with a felony and free on bail be liable to receive the same penalty provided for the felony charge pending when he failed to appear; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ULLMAN:

H.R. 10412. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide a carryback and carryover of certain foreign taxes on mineral income; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. WAGGONNER:

H.R. 10413. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to deny tax-exempt status to churches which carry on propaganda or otherwise attempt to influence legislation and to provide that no deduction may be taken for any charitable contribution to any such church; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. FORSYTHE:

H.J. Res. 839. Joint resolution creating a Joint Committee on Classified Information; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT:

H.J. Res. 840. Joint resolution: Stable Purchasing Power Resolution of 1971; to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mr. JONES of Tennessee:

H.J. Res. 841. Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MORSE (for himself and Mr. MIKVA):

H.J. Res. 842. Joint resolution limiting military assistance and military sales to Pakistan; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. RARICK:

H.J. Res. 843. Joint resolution to provide for the protection and political asylum for the people of the Republic of China; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ROGERS:

H.J. Res. 844. Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution to provide that no child shall be deprived of education or otherwise be forced to attend a school not chosen by such child when such child is not in the school nearest the area of residence of such child; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mrs. GRIFFITHS:

H. Res. 579. Resolution authorizing the Speaker, during the remainder of the 92d Congress, after agreement with the minority leader, to entertain motions to adjourn the House to a day and time certain; to the Committee on Rules.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. ABOUREZK:

H.R. 10414. A bill to declare that certain federally owned land is held by the United States in trust for the United Sioux Tribe of South Dakota Development Corp.; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. RAILSBACK:

H.R. 10415. A bill for the relief of Howard D. Harden; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ROYBAL:

H.R. 10416. A bill to provide that a gold medal be presented to the widow of the late Louis Armstrong; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. SPRINGER:

H.R. 10417. A bill for the relief of the J. L. Simmons Co., Inc.; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII,

121. The SPEAKER presented a petition of William J. Layton, Bloomfield, N.J., relative to the military draft, which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

FAITH AND HARD WORK STILL THE BEST WAY

HON. BOB WILSON

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, August 2, 1971

Mr. BOB WILSON. Mr. Speaker, it is heartening to be reminded from time to time of individuals who, despite obstacles, have achieved those goals they have set for themselves through faith and hard work. It is very easy when faced with hardship, particularly with the specter of discrimination, to retreat into cynicism. The two individuals I will talk about today have faced racial discrimination. They have faced it in a time when racial discrimination was so well rooted as to make any meaningful protest futile. There is much to be learned from the examples that they pose to us. Rather than becoming overburdened with bitterness, they have seen their way clear to outstanding achievements and contributions. The two articles that I am entering in the RECORD today discuss the careers of these two men, one who has distinguished himself in the Air Force as a brigadier general, and one, who dedicated himself to police work, entered the legal profession at the age of 53.

GENERAL ANSWERS CYNICISM—"YOU THINK IT'S TOUGH? YOU SHOULD'VE BEEN WITH ME"

(By Edward W. O'Brien)

WASHINGTON.—It is easy to feel depressed from overexposure to the crass cynicism and venality that can be found in this city.

Then you spend an hour in conversation with a rugged 6-foot-4 Air Force brigadier general named Daniel James Jr. and you walk out of the Pentagon mended in spirit and elevated in outlook.

"Chappie" James is the second Negro American to attain the rank of general in the Air Force and the fourth in the history of the military services.

He also is an outstanding fighter pilot. He is a veteran of 179 combat missions in the Korean and Vietnam wars, and he personally led the famous sweep in 1966 in which seven Communist MIG–21 fighters were destroyed.

YOUNGEST OF 17

He was the youngest child in a blue-collar family of 17 children. He was reared in Pensacola, Fla., in the 1920s and 1930s, before the bonds of racial discrimination began to fall.

"There were some angry young men in those days, but they were a small minority," he recalls.

"We grew up under a different code of ethics, discipline and everything else. There wasn't much democracy in child-rearing in the average home at that time. It was, 'You do what I say because I'm paying the bills and if you don't like what I say, get out of here.'

"Today—and I'm not criticizing—they don't go for the rod any more, and they are still raising some fine kids.

'REACHING OUT'

"But that former theory of life and living is what kept me from being an angry young man. I was too busy reaching out. I didn't want to drive a cab or work on the garbage truck and do the other menial chores that I saw most of the black community doing at that time.

"I wanted to accomplish something.

"Oh, I did get angry at times, sure. I felt the rebuff of the signs that said 'colored' and 'white' on the water fountains, and because of this I'd never drink water downtown.

"And there were the benches for whites and benches for colored in the park, so I wouldn't sit on any of them rather than sit on segregated benches.

"That was really the only way you had of fighting segregation at that time because the laws were not there to protect you if you attempted to mount any sort of violent protest.

"Now you find that a black man can speak up for his cause anywhere in this country."

Pensacola has a big Navy air training base, but in those days the Navy did not accept Negro pilots. Instead, young James received a bachelor's degree at Tuskegee Institute in Alabama and completed civilian pilot training under a government-sponsored program.

RECEIVED PROMOTION

He became a civilian instructor in the Army Air Corps and then entered the corps. He was commissioned in 1943 and over the years served at many bases around the world, rising to command and staff positions and winning many decorations and awards.

He was promoted to brigadier general last year and also was sworn in as deputy assistant secretary of defense, a civilian position that makes him the third-ranking official in the Pentagon's public affairs division.

Despite his competence, James had rough experiences in the service, but he also had the inner equipment to survive, grow and move up.

For this, he credits his parents—"strong patriots," he says, "who had less reason to keep the faith than now. My mother . . . used to say, 'Don't be part of the problem. Always contribute to the solution.'

"I am not nonviolent. No fighter pilot is, but I fight for my country, and I have never been discouraged or encountered any ob-